The Decline and Fall of Medieval Sicily: Politics, Religion, and Economy in the Reign of Frederick III, 1296-1337

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF MEDIEVAL SICILY Politics, religion, and economy in the reign of Frederick III, 1296-133J

CLIFFORD R. BACKMAN Boston University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1995 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1995 First paperback edition 2002 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Backman, Clifford R. The decline and fall of medieval Sicily: politics, religion, and economy in the reign of Frederick III, 1296-1337 / Clifford R. Backman p. cm. Based on the author's doctoral dissertation, UCLA. Cf. Preface. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0 52149664 0 1. Sicily (Italy) - History - 1282-1409. 2. Frederick II, king of Sicily, 1272-1337. I. Title. DG867.5.B33 1995 945'.804-dc20 94-48333 CIP ISBN 0 52149664 0 hardback ISBN 0 521 52181 5 paperback

To Nelina

Contents

Preface Note on currency and measures List of abbreviations Map: Sicily in the earlyfourteenth century 1 The kingdom at risk

page x xix xx xxii i

2 The international scene: war without and within

29

3 A divided society I: the urban-demesnal world

85

4

A divided society II: the rural-baronial world

156

5

The religious scene: piety and its problems

186

6

In the margins: slaves, pirates, and women

247

Conclusion

303

Table 1 Judices of Palermo Table 2 Juriste and xurterii ofPalermo Table 3 Judices ofAgrigento, Catania, Messina, Polizzi Table 4 Feudal dues

308 310 312 316

Bibliography Index

327 348

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Preface

Sicily inspires strong emotions, and few who travel there fail to come away with conflicting feelings about the island and its people. Plato thought it a place of great potential until the harshness of everyday life there became plain to him; in the end, he could endure no more than a stay of a few weeks. Goethe fell in love with its cloudless blue skies and scenic coastline - parts of which (such as at Taormina and Monte Pellegrino) he reckoned to be among the most beautiful spots on earth - and his insights into the culture and economy led him to conclude that the island was "the key" to understanding all of Italy. But, even so, he recoiled from the poverty and meanness he saw in each city and hurried back to the mainland as soon as he could. And Bertrand Russell, who always had a sharp eye for what pleased him and a sharper tongue for what did not, thought the island to be "unimaginably beautiful" but the people to be "a revelation of human degradation and bestiality." My own first impressions remain vivid: blazing heat, a ubiquitous scent of lemons, the flowers and songs of a saint's-day festival in a mountain village, a riotous fishing expedition off Pantelleria, the mosaics of the cathedral in Monreale. I also saw many of the sights that so horrified Russell and Goethe, although to my eyes it was the poverty in which the people were trapped, not the people themselves, that was degrading and bestial. The bulk of the historical literature dealing with Sicily parallels or mirrors the polarized nature of people's reactions to the island. Ranging from romanticized waitings of outraged innocence (Sicily as the victim of foreign tyranny) to irritable censures of outrageous incompetence (Sicily as the victim of its own lack of talent and superabundance of corruption), this literature has contributed powerfully to popular bias regarding the island and its people. These prejudices have a long genealogy and indeed, as I argue in

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this book, they began to emerge as early as the first half of the fourteenth century. But the problem of how to perceive Sicily has taken on particular importance ever since the unification of Italy in 1870 - and the role of Garibaldi and his southern supporters in that cause - highlighted anew the disparities between the economic and social developments of northern Italy and the Mezzogiorno. This "southern question" has troubled four generations of Italians and, with the approach of a unified European economy, the issue now lies before a larger audience: what to do with the poor, backward south? What was it that caused this seemingly ineradicable underdevelopment? Can such persistent problems of ingrained poverty, poor education, institutional corruption, and reflexive distrust of outsiders be explained, much less solved? Opinions have varied widely, but there has been a general consensus that, on the economic level at least, Sicily fell permanently behind the rest of Italy at some point in the later Middle Ages. 1 In the twelfth century the Norman kingdom of Sicily was one of the strongest and wealthiest states in Europe. Roger II, in his imposing new palace at Palermo, enjoyed revenues at least four times greater than those of the contemporary king of England, which he derived from a vibrant and variegated economy. By the end of the fourteenth century, however, Sicily was in ruins physically, economically, and morally. War, plague, and famine had killed hundreds of thousands of people; the diverse rural economy had taken a disastrous turn to grain monoculture; and a once strong central government had given way to a petty baronialism that eventually gave birth to a proto-Mafia. Yet, remarkably, Sicily's fortunes rebounded in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: the population and the economy grew rapidly, government became more stable, and cultural life (at the aristocratic level, at least) took on a new vibrancy under the impact of Spanish Gothic and continental humanism. What, then, caused the late medieval collapse? How permanent were its consequences? And why did the recovery of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries fail to effect more widespread and long-lasting social development? 1

Giuseppe Galasso, "Considerazioni intorno alia storia del Mezzogiorno in Italia," in his collection of essays, Mezzogiorno medievale e moderno (Turin, 1975), pp. 15—59, summarizes the debate.

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In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries two schools of thought offered competing answers to these questions. The first argued that, on account of fixed geographical and hereditary factors, Sicily had always been doomed to failure. The story of the late Middle Ages was not one of decline from an assumed earlier golden period, but rather one of the same plodding poverty and backwardness that had been there all along. Norman glories had indeed been glorious, but they were Norman, not Sicilian. This school, with its stress upon genetic factors and its implicit belief in immutable historical fates, clearly betrays its nineteenth-century origins. The second school, comprised chiefly of native Sicilian writers, emphasized instead Sicily's victimization. Some argued that the island's troubles actually began with the arrival of the Normans who, by imposing a foreign and artificial feudal structure on society, fundamentally crippled it at a time when urbancommercial energies were first being released in the northern communes. Others, most notably Benedetto Croce, identified the revolution known as the Sicilian Vespers, and the two decades of war it sparked, as the culprit. This struggle - which began when Sicilian mobs rose against their Angevin rulers in 1282, bloodily overthrew them, and ultimately offered the throne instead to the royal family of the then fast-growing Crown of Aragon confederation centered in Barcelona - not only depleted vast amounts of human and material resources during the twenty years of fighting that followed, but even more disastrously resulted in the permanent rupture of Sicily from its traditional political and cultural partner in southern Italy — Naples. All the foreign meddling that was involved in finding a solution to Sicily's dynastic problem, this school asserts, resulted in a permanently structurally handicapped Sicilian world. Croce's interpretation proved to be remarkably resilient, and it still lives on in the works of Steven Runciman and a few others. Behind this line of thought there lies a firm assumption of the primacy of political and institutional factors - an assumption no longer accorded much currency by most historians, who instead seek the answers to the Sicilian problem in economic factors. Through most of the decades since World War II, a model of "economic dualism" has steadily attracted support as the best explanation not only of Sicily's underdevelopment but of the backwardness of many decolonized lands all around the

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2

world. This model, in general, posits a traditional nexus of complementary, or mutually dependent, economic relations between two lands, or between discrete regions of the same state one being dominant or "advanced," the other acquiescent or "backward" - that alone gives the territories involved economic viability; but this linkage results actually in a "blocked" economy for the subservient partner that merely survives and never thrives. The "advanced" partner, being based on manufacturing and commerce, adopts a quasi-paternalistic or even an overtly colonial attitude towards the "backward" agricultural sector. As far as Sicily is concerned, the dualists assert, the predominance of the rural basis of the Sicilian economy, and its transition from varied agricultural production to grain monoculture, made the island inescapably dependent on the manufactures of the northern communes. The trend to monoculture began with the Norman conquest and the consequent shift of Sicily's foreign commerce away from north Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, where there was ample demand for a variety of Sicilian products, and towards continental Europe, where demand for wheat predominated to the virtual exclusion of everything else. As a consequence, the uncommercialized nature of the rural economy made it increasingly impossible to generate domestic industries, since greater outlays of capital were required to start up a new manufacture, or to resuscitate a moribund one, than were needed to maintain an on-going enterprise; moreover, the institutional and cultural constraints that hampered the movement of labor from the rural to the industrial sector made it more difficult for the populace to acquire the skills it would need, even if capital were available, to initiate a more advanced level of economic activity. Thus the more Sicily came to depend on its agricultural production, the more impossible it became for the overall economy, and the social structures that depended upon it, to develop. This resulted in a "blocked" economy and a structurally decreed state of underdevelopment. And this increasing dependence on agriculture was made permanent by the 2

See, for example, the essays gathered in // Mezzogiorno medievale nella storiogrqfta del secondo dopoguerra: risultati e prospettive, ed. Pietro De Leo (Cosenza, 1985), Atti del IV Convegno nazionale dell'Associazione dei medioevalisti italiani: Universita di Calabria, 12—16 giugno 1982; and in Sviluppo e sottosviluppo in Europa e fuori d'Europe dal secolo XIII alia Rivoluzione industriale, ed. A. Guarducci (Florence, 1983), Istituto internazionale di storia economica "Francesco Datini," Pubblicazioni, 2nd ser., vol. x.

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cataclysmic Vespers struggle, for by losing its connections with Naples, Sicily was left without the means of maintaining its own economic diversity and viability, leaving it increasingly at the mercy of the merchants from Catalonia, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, who were interested in only one thing - grain.3 This model, with certain adaptations provided by writers like Henri Bresc, Stephan Epstein, and David Abulafia, sheds much light on the Sicilian problem and provides a useful starting point for further study. Epstein's great contribution has been to indicate the extent to which the interior, domestic economy of the island had greater overall influence on society than did the foreign trade that is so central to the dualist theory- and must therefore be taken into account whenever analyzing the "Sicilian problem." Abulafia, by contrast, highlights foreign trade but points out that it was actually the northern communes, not the Sicilians, who were economically "blocked." Being unable to feed themselves, the Genoese, Pisans, and Florentines had no option but to industrialize and diversify; without industry Sicily certainly would not thrive, but without agriculture the north would not even survive. The jury is still out on dualism as an interpretive model. Its beauty lies in its simplicity, but like many such cases it is the very simplicity of the theory that makes it suspect to some writers, economists and historians alike.4 Apart from disagreement over some specifics (such as the argument that Sicily produced nothing else for which there was continental demand; in fact sugar, cotton, and alum were easily available in Sicily and were highly prized across Europe), my own objection is not with the theory itself but with the nearly exclusive explanatory role its adherents have assigned it. Among some of them, such as Henri Bresc, the dualist diagnosis of Sicily's ills is asserted with a calm certainty that resembles the self-confident belief in historical fate elucidated by the historians of the nineteenth century. In hopes of offering a subtler response to the Sicilian problem, I suggest in this book that there were many more things "wrong" 3

4

The first person to put forth a fully developed dualist explanation for the Mezzogiorno was Gino Luzzatto, Storia economica delVeta moderna e contemporaneay 4th edn. (Padua, 1955); and Luzzatto, Breve storia economica delVItalia medievale dalla caduta delVImpero romano al principio del Cinquecento, 2nd edn. (Turin, 1965). See the discussion in R. Hodson and R. L. Kaufman, "Economic Dualism: A Critical Review," American Sociological Review 47 (1982), 727—39.

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with medieval Sicily than simply its economy, and that in order to understand the enormity of the island's suffering in the fourteenth century we must take into account aspects of Sicilian life that certainly bore relation to, but were not entirely dependent on, economic concerns. Among these other factors are a knot of ethnic rivalries, persistent problems in spiritual life, faults and shortcomings in the physical infrastructure of the island, a set of technological hurdles that made improvements in daily life unnecessarily difficult, changes in demographic patterns (especially the dramatic proportionate increase in women among the populace), administrative failures at the royal and local levels, and the development of an overbred sense of personal and family "honor" and the violence it justified in the face of any perceived threat to it. Many of these problems were of long standing, but for a number of reasons, as this book argues, they came to a head during the reign of Frederick III (i296-1337). Frederick was the third of the Catalan kings of Sicily, successor to his elder brother James who had relinquished the crown in order to receive papal acknowledgment of his inheritance as ruler of the Crown of Aragon. Intensely pious and idealistic, Frederick presided over Sicily's post-war reconstruction, once the war with Angevin Naples finally came to an end in 1302 with a limited Sicilian victory. Though not a very gifted ruler, he nevertheless showed a fair degree of acumen by recognizing that the island had become atomized: petty baronies divided the interior between them, the coastal cities acted as independent agents, domestic trade was limited to the local level with virtually no trade at all between the larger zones (valli) of the realm, and a plethora of local customs and tariffs made efficient and fair administration virtually impossible. The central policy behind the reconstruction, therefore, was to promote Sicily's internal integration and to create a sense of the island as an organic whole - as a true "Kingdom of Sicily" and not as a mere congeries of loose-cannon towns and estates united only by the fact that they all hated the Angevins more than they hated each other. For a while, Frederick succeeded. Within a few years of the end of the war, Sicilian life had improved so greatly that the king began to believe the wild prophecies made about him by the apocalyptic prophet Arnau de Vilanova, who eventually assigned Frederick the role of the great reformer of Christendom who would lead the final successful crusade against Islam, would root out all the corruption

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in the church and in European society, and would prepare the world for battle with Antichrist. What's more, the Sicilian people began to believe it too; and soon an ecstatic wave of evangelical fervor rushed over the populace that inspired vast numbers of men and women to abandon their families and farmsteads in order to follow itinerant preachers and listen to their claims of how the world was soon to end in glory, and how the Sicilians themselves were going to overthrow Antichrist just as they had overthrown the Angevins in 1282. But then, mid-way through Frederick's reign, a host of forces came together to undo all that had been achieved: the recovery fell apart and Sicily began a dismal slide into poverty and violence. An integrated, reformed, and divinely favored "Kingdom of Sicily" gave way, after about 1317, to a fractured and fractious society upon which, they feared, God had turned His back, and where Armageddon was still expected - but no longer with joyful confidence. This book attempts to explain why. Frederick's reign began with high hopes and ended in misery. The real disasters were yet to come, when Frederick died: the Black Death and a shockingly savage series of civil wars among the petty lords who were tearing up the countryside. But the groundwork of ruin was firmly laid by 1337, and this book argues that it was precisely this groundwork that went on to undermine Sicilian development in later centuries. The most remarkable thing about Sicily's economic recovery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, after all, is that it didn't solve Sicily's problems. If the island was not "behind" the rest of Europe by that time (and I am so far unconvinced by arguments that it wasn't), it was certainly a place set apart, a pariah and a backwater, isolated and disdained. The surviving records for late medieval Sicily are relatively meager when compared to most western Mediterranean territories of the age - the result of damage done to the archives during World War II - and this makes it difficult to assert anything too boldly. But enough remains to offer compelling glimpses of this intriguing society at a point of unique challenge. In pursuing those glimpses, I have tracked down virtually every surviving document and manuscript from those forty-one years that I have heard of or seen reference to. This would have been impossible without the personal kindness and professional efficiency of many people and institutions. I am grateful to the staffs of all the following for their help.

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In Barcelona: the Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, the Biblioteca de Catalunya, and the Biblioteca de la Universitat de Barcelona. In Catania: the Archivio di Stato. In London: the British Library. In Messina: the Archivio di Stato and the Biblioteca universitaria. In Oxford: the Bodleian Library. In Palermo: the Archivio di Stato, the Biblioteca centrale della regione di Sicilia, and the Biblioteca comunale. In Trapani: the Archivio di Stato and the Biblioteca Fardelliana. And in Vatican City: the Biblioteca apostolica vaticana. Within the United States I have debts outstanding in three principal sites. In Boston: Boston University's Mugar Library, the Boston Public Library, and Harvard University's Widener Library. In Los Angeles: the University Research Library of UCLA and the Institute of Medieval Mediterranean Spain. And in Providence: the John Hay Special Collections Library at Brown University. Generous financial assistance was given by the Del Amo Foundation in Los Angeles (during this project's first incarnation as my doctoral dissertation at UCLA), by the National Endowment for the Humanities, and by both the Seed Grant Program and the Humanities Foundation of Boston University. My deepest thanks to all of them. I wish to thank the two men who co-directed the dissertation on which this book is based: Robert I. Burns, S J., and Bengt T. Lofstedt. Much of whatever is good in this book is owed to their knowledge and patience, and one of the best things about publishing these results is the opportunity it affords to thank them in public. Their recent retirements from active teaching leave a great institution much diminished. David Abulafia (Cambridge University) and Robert Lerner (Northwestern University) gave advice and encouragement at critical times. My colleague at Boston University, James McCann, split the rent with me and rallied my occasionally sagging spirits during a memorable summer in Rome. To William Davies, of Cambridge University Press, I owe thanks for the interest he showed in this project. It is rewarding to be able, at last, to thank all the members of my family for the good-natured support they have shown over the years to a wayward son who was determined to study "something practical" (?!) like medieval history instead of pointless ephemera like medicine or particle physics. My mother, Mary Betker, has waited a long time to see this book finally in print. She and my stepfather Al Betker encouraged my love of books and taught me the

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virtues of hard work and of seeing a project through to the end. My parents-in-law, Charles and Roelina Berst, unfailingly offered sound advice, good humor, excellent meals, tragic puns, and endless tales about George Bernard Shaw and the continuing parking difficulties on the UCLA campus. Apart from the exuberant generosity that marks everything they do, they gave me the best and most exuberantly generous gift of all - my wife Nelina. She has never been to Sicily, and yet she has patiently endured and even encouraged all of my passion for the place. We met just before I left for the Barcelona archives, in 1987, to start work on my "Sicilian thing," and so it is a special pleasure to share its end with her. She has loved me beyond all hope and sense. To her the book is, like its author, entirely dedicated. POSTSCRIPT

Portions of chapter 5 originated as articles: "The Papacy, the Sicilian Church, and King Frederick III, 1302-1321," Viator 22 (1991), 229-49; and "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily," Franciscan Studies 50 (1990), 3-29. I am grateful to the publishers of each journal, for permission to reprint.

Note on currency and measures

The basic unit of currency in medieval Sicily, even though it was never actually minted, was the gold ounce (Latin uncia, or Italian onza). Smaller coins, actually circulated, were the tarinus (Italian tari) and the granus (Italiangrano). A still smaller denomination, the denarius (one-sixth of a. grano), existed but will not be used here. One ounce represented thirty tari; and each tari was in turn worth twenty grani. Thus 1 ounce = 30 tari = 600 grani = 3,600 denari. Omitting denari, the following notation will be used in this book: 00.00.00. Thus, for example, 12.16.09 represents 12 ounces, 16 tari, and ggrani. Dry goods like grains and legumes were measured in a unit called a salma (pi. salme). Two standards were used in the fourteenth century: in western Sicily a single salma represented 0.128 bushels (275 liters) or, to figure in the reverse direction, one bushel of grain made up 7.8 salme. In eastern Sicily the salma was 20 percent larger (or 1 salma = 0.154 bushels = 330 liters). But the smaller salma, sometimes called the salma generate, is that most commonly used by scholars, and I follow their convention. The unit derived as an estimation of the minimum amount of grain needed to support a single individual for an entire year.

xix

Abbreviations

(For full bibliographical citations, see Bibliography.) ACA Acta curie ArchStperSic ArchStSic ArchStSicOr ASC ASM ASP BCP bk. Cane. Cartas ch. CSIC DSSS EEMCA FAA GAKS GG Lettres communes MM MRC Not. Perg.

Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Barcelona Ada curie felicis urbis Panormi, ed. Francesco Giunta et al., in 6 vols. Archivio storicoper la Sicilia Archivio storico siciliano Archivio storico per la Sicilia Orientate Archivio di Stato, Catania Archivio di Stato, Messina Archivio di Stato, Palermo Biblioteca comunale di Palermo book(s) chancery, cancelleria, cancilleria Cartas reales diplomaticas chapter(s) Consejo superior de investigaciones cientificas Documenti per servire alia storia di Sicilia Estudios de la Edad Media de la Corona de Aragon Ada aragonensia, ed. Heinrich Finke Gesammelte Aufsdtzefur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens Ada siculo-aragonensia, vol. n, ed. Francesco Giunta and Antonino Giuffrida Jean XXII (1316-1334): Lettres communes, ed. Guy Mollat Mediterraneo medievale: Scritti in onore di Francesco Giunta, 3 vols. Magna Regia Curia notary, notario, notario parchment, pergamena, pergamino

List of abbreviations QFIAB Reg. Reg. Benedict XI Reg. Boniface VIII Reg. Clement V RGBS RPSS SDS

Spez. Tab. Testa

XI Congresso

xxi

Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken

register, registro, registro

Le registre deBenedict XI, ed. Charles Grandjean Les registres de Boniface VIII, ed. Georges Digard et al. Regestum dementis papae V . . . cura et studio monachorum ordinis S. Benedicti Biblioteca scriptorum qui res in Sicilia gestas sub Aragonum imperio retulere, ed. Rosario Gregorio Sicilia sacra, ed. Rocco Pirri (3rd edn.) Storia della Sicilia, ed. Rosario Romeo

spezzone tabulario

Capitula regni Sicilie, ed. Francesco Testa XI Congresso di storia della Corona dAragona

c/3

CHAPTER I

The kingdom at risk

In the spring of 1314 King Robert of Naples consulted a soothsayer. He was planning a new assault on Sicily, the island-kingdom whose rebellious citizens had driven his grandfather from the throne in 1282 and placed themselves instead under the royal house of Catalonia-Aragon, and he wanted to know his chances for success. He had good reason to feel confident. The previous August, the German emperor Henry VII of Luxembourg - Dante's hero, Robert's nemesis, and the Sicilians' most powerful ally - had died unexpectedly while campaigning to unite all of Italy under his command. Moreover, the ever expanding Crown of Aragon confederation, of which Sicily was now a loose satellite, had for the moment committed the bulk of its military resources to the conquest of Sardinia. Sicily lay temptingly exposed, ripe for the taking. According to Nicola Speciale's racy Historia sicula, our only source for this story, the augur told Robert (as augurs will) that he would indeed gain "Sicily and all her possessions." These last words must have clinched the deal in Robert's mind, for among Sicily's possessions since 1311 was the duchy of Athens, a small but valuable principality also previously under Angevin control and still much coveted by the throne in Naples. Thus encouraged, Robert launched his attack. His fleet landed at the far western end of Sicily's long northern shore, near Castellamare. This was a rather desolate region, but a good place to land because of it. From there his soldiers, having avoided the harbor defenses of the major port cities, could easily move inland and burn the poorly defended fields, vineyards, and villages. Such tactics had served him well in the past: apart from the damage caused to the local economy wherever he struck, these rural raids had the additional benefit of aggravating the seldom dormant peasant and baronial frustration with the

2

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

Catalan regime in faraway Messina that so consistently failed to protect the villagers. This discontent was strongest in the western provinces, where Robert aimed the bulk of his attacks. After his soldiers had secured a beachhead and had advanced a short way inland, they came across a woman from nearby Alcamo who was trying desperately to escape into the mountains, and captured her. Although obviously a pauper and dressed "in the filthiest of torn rags" she was evidently a comely woman, for the soldiers, after questioning her about conditions on the island, sent her to Robert's tent. There the king passed his eye over her and asked her what her name was. She replied: "Sicilia." At these words Robert started and, with the ironic twist common to soothsaying stories, he suddenly understood the true meaning of the prophecy given to him back in Naples: he would gain nothing from his bold venture save this ruined woman and whatever tattered possessions she carried. He reboarded his ships in a fury and sailed further westward to Trapani, where he hoped to avenge his hurt pride and salvage something of value from his efforts by laying siege to the relatively well-to-do merchant center there. But the Sicilians were ready for him, because their soldiers, who earlier had rushed to join the emperor Henry at Pisa, only to learn upon arriving there of his death, had returned to Sicily by way of Sardinia and had themselves landed precisely there at Trapani only a short time before. Stationed in Monte S. Giuliano (modern Erice) on the high ground behind Trapani, they rushed to the city and held the Angevins at bay while an urgent command from their king, Frederick III (also present), soon brought a reinforcement contingent of sixty-five galleys racing from Messina. The Angevins were trapped. They controlled part of the city, but were unable to advance on land or to retreat by sea. Caught between an impenetrable defense line at their front and a pressing naval counterattack at their rear, they appeared to be on the verge of annihilation. By this stroke of rare good fortune the Sicilians' dream of a definitive and successful end to their drawn-out conflict with Naples seemed to be at hand. Battle was joined - a long and trying double-sided siege. But bad harvests in the three preceding years had resulted in a severe food shortage throughout the kingdom; hunger gnawed at both sides. The Angevin soldiers stalked through the city and found sufficient stores of food to keep them, for the moment, relatively

The kingdom at risk

3

well supplied. But those supplies would not last long. The problem for Frederick's forces, however, for those on land as well as for the sailors ringing the city, was even more severe. They could not risk sending any of their galleys off in search of supplies without giving the Angevins a chance at escape (for sixty-five galleys, although a large force, were barely enough to enclose the long, scimitar-shaped promontory that Trapani inhabits); and the land forces held positions largely outside the city, where salt-pans and alum mines outnumbered crop fields. Food would have to be brought in from a distance, provided that any could be found. But as month followed month and expenses continued to mount, Frederick soon ran out of money with which to buy new supplies or to pay his soldiers' wages. When rations grew smaller and less frequent rebellion broke out, and with it a total collapse of discipline. The soldiers saw little reason to continue risking their lives for a king who could not pay them or for a city that could not feed them. Frustrated, hungry, and impatient, they began to desert in large numbers in order to scavenge and pillage their own countryside, while the king looked on in horror. Since neither side was thus able to continue the fight, Robert and Frederick agreed to a truce that each felt was humiliating.1 This episode from Speciale's history resonates with meaning. His portrayal of "Sicily" as a ruined beauty is particularly apt, for by the early fourteenth century the kingdom was indeed in a frightful state of decline. It had been one of the wealthiest states in Europe in the twelfth century and its rulers had controlled the central Mediterranean, or had at least bullied people into thinking that they did. The royal palace had played host to an exceptionally lively troubadour and scientific court culture, while the realm's commercial life had been enviably varied and profitable: to the rich agricultural produce of the land (grains, citrus, olives, and wine, chiefly) were added cotton and silk manufactures, dyeworks, alum mining, and a prominent role in the lucrative slave trade. But hard times had fallen on the island since then. Hohenstaufen rule, a combination of rigid authoritarianism and careless neglect, gave 1

Nicola Speciale (Nicolaus Specialis), Historia sicula in VIII libros distributa ab anno MCCLXXXII usque ad annum MCCCXXXVII, in RGBS i, see bk. n, ch. 4-6. See also Salvatore Romano, "Sulla battaglia della Falconaria e sull'assedio di Trapani nel 1314/' ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 25 (1900-1), 380-95.

4

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

way in 1265, by papal fiat, to seventeen years of detested Angevin control. Under both of these dynasties local challenges to the increasingly centralized monarchy had been suppressed with a heavy hand. Charles I of Anjou, for example, had ordered the torture and execution of the entire population of Augusta after its inhabitants joined a rebellion against him. Landholdings had been confiscated from Sicilian barons and awarded instead to the foreign nobility. The underdeveloped but cherished communal institutions of the coastal cities had been suppressed everywhere. Manufacturing had slowed as a result of the chaos in the cities; and whatever profits did accrue had been largely siphoned off in order to fund first Hohenstaufen adventures in the Levant and later Angevin campaigns on the Italian mainland and in Greece. Life changed dramatically for the Sicilians, if briefly, with the arrival of the Catalans in 1282. Under kings Peter (1282-5) and James (1285-95) an impressive recovery began, aided by the sudden availability of Catalan arms, organizational skills, and cash. By the time the so-called War of the Vespers ended in 1302 -with James's younger brother Frederick on the throne, after six years of energetic campaigning - the future looked promising. The Treaty of Caltabellotta, signed in that year, confirmed Frederick as the legitimate "King of Trinacria" (an anachronistic title designed to keep alive Angevin claims) for the rest of his life; henceforth the popular war hero could turn his energies to rebuilding his realm. And, indeed, for a decade after Caltabellotta the Sicilians enjoyed a surprising improvement in their fortunes, both commercial and cultural, that would have seemed impossible twenty-five years earlier. Freed from hated French control, they were, if not independent, at least under the governance of a reasonably friendly foreign regime that had sworn to preserve all local privileges and customs and to institute a regular parliament that would possess a measure of real power. The Catalans also offered a network of commercial contacts that spanned the Mediterranean, and they were committed to religious revival and reform, both of which Sicily sorely needed. Moreover, a military alliance with Catalonia, furtively arranged after Caltabellotta, protected them from renewed Angevin attack and seemed to ensure the new government's ability to put an end to the unabated infighting of Sicily's belligerent inland barons. Within a few years of the war's end the government managed to

The kingdom at risk standardize and liberalize the kingdom's burdensome tariff code and to restore most of the lands and goods confiscated by opportunistic barons and grasping clerics during the war. Scores of new churches, schools, hospitals, and monasteries sprang from the ground or were rebuilt from ruins and generously reendowed. Frederick, true to his promise, convened an annual parliament and, remarkably, gave it final authority over foreign policy. For the first time in years, almost beyond the memory of anyone then alive, Sicilians believed that a measure of peace and prosperity had come, or would soon come, to their long-troubled land. But the reemergence of hostilities with Naples signalled the end of the brief ascendancy. At the midpoint of Frederick's reign a wide variety of factors - of which the struggle with Robert was merely one, and not necessarily the greatest - catalyzed to bring about a startling unraveling of Sicilian life. Speciale's narrative suggests, with the aid of hindsight, that this decline was in full swing as early as 1314; but a case may be made for pushing that date forward to 1317 or even 1321. Nevertheless, by Frederick's death in 1337, fully a decade before the arrival of the Black Death, Sicily was a ruin of poverty, violence, and bitter discontent. A severe demographic decline, one that would eventually reach staggering proportions, had begun, leaving villages, farms, monasteries, and some whole towns empty and lifeless and their buildings in decay. A crippling burden of illiteracy still weighed down the populace that remained. Angevin armies, having renewed their attacks in 1317 and 1321, by 1325 had penetrated the hinterland and laid waste vast stretches of farmland; scores of villages were razed, and at least a handful of larger towns raided, before the attackers were finally driven from the island by the king's few remaining loyal troops. In the wake of this campaign, a round of civil wars, between vendetta-driven baronial families on one hand and between ersatz native patriots and the dominant Catalan caste on the other, erupted; these conflicts would not be wholly resolved until well into the fifteenth century. The central government, as a result of its inability to control all of this fighting, was increasingly hated and powerless. And on the social level Sicilian life fared no better. Religious life suffered from the despoliation of churches and monasteries, a severe shortage of qualified clerics to guard their flocks, popular confusion over widespread heterodox and heretical teachings, and long periods of ecclesiastical interdict. A xenophobic cultural

5

6

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

isolation gripped all levels of society; foreigners of any sort were distrusted, resented, and increasingly subjected to vituperation and physical attack. The alliance with Catalonia had long since been broken and was replaced by two useless pacts with the northern Ghibellines that brought the islanders nothing and in fact only added to their misery by further entangling them in peninsular affairs. The economy, which had indeed rallied in the immediate post-war years, stagnated around 1317-18, and entered a sharp decline after 1321. Cities already groaning under severe financial difficulties and high levels of crime and disease were choked with peasant refugees from the fighting and poverty of the upland territories. And a proto-Mafia, with its distinctive mentality and violent methods well established, already controlled the interior of the island. It is challenging enough to summarize such chaos; but to explain it presents special difficulties. The greatest of these is the relative paucity of sources. Sicily's archival holdings are meager for the medieval period, compared to other Mediterranean regions. Centuries of invasion, rebellion, earthquakes, and fires have exacted a heavy toll on the extant documents and have consequently obscured our view of this complex society at the point of one of its worst crises.2 The narrative sources provide a vivid if unreliable chronological framework. These works focus inevitably on the political and military events of Frederick's reign and are decidedly partisan (either in favor of the Sicilians as opposed to the Catalans, in general, or in favor of one region or city over all others). As a rule, their unreliability is in direct proportion to their partisan zeal. In addition to Nicola Speciale's chronicle there is the Historia sicula of Bartolomeo di Neocastro (as patriotic a son as Messina ever produced), yet another work of the same name by Michele da Piazza, and an anonymous Chronicon Siciliae. Two short works in Sicilian dialect survive, the better known of which - a fifteenthcentury work known as Lu rebellamentu di Sichilia - provided the plot for Verdi's opera. Our knowledge of the rogue Catalan-Sicilian 2

On the Sicilian archives and chancery, see Adelaide Baviera Albanese, "Diritto pubblico e istituzioni amministrative in Sicilia," ArchStSic, 3rd ser., 19 (1969), 391-563; Baviera Albanese, "La sede delFArchivio di Stato di Palermo," in La presenza della Sicilia nella cultura degli ultimi cento anni (Palermo, 1977), pp. 721—36.

The kingdom at risk

7

seizure of the Athenian duchy comes chiefly from Ramon Muntaner's Crdnica, a fascinating work by one of the more colorful figures of the age. These narratives, with the exception of Muntaner's, are unique since they represent the first histories of Sicily to be written by native Sicilians rather than by scribes for a conquering foreigner; consequently what they have to say is important even when they are incorrect.3 More important is the documentary evidence. This book utilizes several thousand records that survive in a series of patchwork registers and portfolios (tabulari, in Italian) of scattered parchments. These, plus a handful of extant notarial registers and fragments (spezzoni), are housed in the state archives in Palermo. A large number of documents dealing chiefly with diplomatic matters are located in the Crown of Aragon archives in Barcelona. But apart from these two collections little remains. No less an obstacle is the problem of objectivity. Little enough has been written about Sicily in these years, but much of what has been published is no less blinkered than the fourteenth-century texts on which the modern works have been chiefly based. These biases are, to an extent, understandable. For many Sicilians the Vespers era, taken as the decades from 1282 to 1337, is the most romanticized period of their history after the gilded Norman kingdom of the twelfth century. It is, after all, the story of their great patriotic rebellion against foreign tyranny, a revolution initially triumphant but ultimately tragic in its outcome. Pathos and a kind of tired pride inform much of this sense of their past, 3

Bartolomeo di Neocastro (Bartholomeus Neocastrensis), Historia sicula ab anno 1250 ad i2gj deducta, in RGBS 1; Michele da Piazza (Michaelis de Platea), Historia sicula ab anno MCCCXXXVII ad annum MCCCLXI, ed. Antonino Giuflrida (Palermo, 1980), Fonti per la storia di Sicilia, vol. in; Anonymous, Chronicon Siciliae ab acquisition ipsius insulae per Graecos usque ad obitum Guillelmi duds Friderici II regis Siciliae filii, in Rerum italicarum scriptores, ed. Lodovico Muratori, 25 vols. (Milan, 1722—51), x; Anonymous, Historia conspirationis quam molitusfaitJohannes Prochyta, in RGBS 1; Ramon Muntaner, Cronica, ed. Ferran Soldevila, in Les quatre grans croniques: Jaume I, Bernat Desclot, Ramon Muntaner, Pere III, 2nd edn. (Barcelona, 1983), Biblioteca Perenne, vol. xxvi. Of the Sicilian works, Speciale's is much the most interesting and has received the most serious attention; see Giacomo Ferrau, Nicolb Speciale, storico del <(Regnum Siciliae" (Palermo, 1974), Bollettino del Gentro di studi filologici e linguistici siciliani, Supplementi, ser. mediolatina e umanistica, vol. 11. On Muntaner, see Roger Sablonier, Krieg und Kriegertum in der Cronaca des Ramon Muntaner: Eine Studie zum spatmittelalterlichen Kriegwesen aufgrund katalanischen Quellen (Bern, 1971), Geist und Werk der Zeiten, Arbeiten aus dem Historischen Seminar der Universitat Zurich, vol. xxxi; and R. G. Keightley, "Muntaner and the Gatalan Grand Company," Re vista canadiense de estudios hispdnicos 4 (1979), 37—58.

8

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

in a tradition that stretches from the fourteenth to the early twentieth century; and with some praiseworthy exceptions it still dominates much of Sicily's historical thought. In countless histories, novels, stage dramas, operas, even puppet plays, from Neocastro's chronicle to the fanfare that surrounds each new edition of Michele Amari's Laguerra del Vespro siciliano, the Sicilians' noble struggle against the horrors of oppression has been told over and over again.4 Modern research has added detail but has failed to alter the basic picture - indeed, it has all too often refused to alter it. And inevitably, from this viewpoint, the dramatic failure of Frederick's reign appears as tragedy, the ineluctable result of continued foreign enmity, oppression, and meddling, only this time by the once-friendly Catalans. The battlecry of 1282 "Morano li francesi!" ("Kill the French!") had become by 1337 "Morano li Catalani!" Except for the venerable king who had brought them victory at Caltabellotta and a few stalwarts like Simon de Vallguarnera, the Catalans were generally regarded at best as privileged outsiders who had unintentionally but decisively brought ruin upon the natives, and at worst as callous traitors to the trust Sicily had placed in them. This is a lachrymose and damaging tradition, one that portrays the Sicilian people as hapless victims of international greed, fated by geography to repeated plunder and colonization. And it has endured. Conversely and perversely, a second historical tradition, represented chiefly by non-Sicilian historians, recognizes in Sicily's decline evidence of the islanders' fundamental ungovernability and truculence. The supposed tyranny of Hohenstaufen and Angevin rule, this view maintains, was instead a much needed attempt -justifiably stern by the standards of the age - to impose order on an inveterately disordered society. By this reasoning the Vespers war was less a heroic and ill-fated struggle than it was an incident of rationalized pack violence, a mere riot that succeeded only because it provided a convenient vehicle for Catalan expansionism. And the collapse that occurred in the last half of Frederick's reign resulted as much from innate Sicilian weaknesses 4

Michele Amari, La guerra del Vespro siciliano, gth edn. (Milan, 1886) established the definitive text; it was initially published, and promptly banned by the Bourbon government, in 1842. Now see the new edition in 3 vols. (Palermo, 1969), ed. Francesco Giunta.

The kingdom at risk

9

as from the king's bungling attempts to manage an impossible situation.5 In any situation as polarized as this, there is something to be said for each side. The war that the Angevins forced on Sicily by refusing to relinquish their claim clearly left the Sicilians with no choice but to fight back and to devote to that struggle resources that were desperately needed elsewhere. By the time peace finally came, in 1437 under Alfonso the Magnanimous, both Sicily and southern Italy were devastated and cripplingly impoverished; the gulf that separated them economically and socially from the more prosperous north, and still separates them, here makes its first tentative appearance.6 Moreover, the Catalans, like their German and French predecessors, indeed conspired to control the most profitable trades passing through Sicilian ports, just as they came 5

6

Leonardo Sciascia, "II mito dei Vespri siciliani da Amari a Verdi," ArchStSicOr 69 (1973), 183-92, discusses various interpretations of the Vespers period during the Risorgimento. An interesting, idiosyncratic survey of responses to the Sicilian problem is Salvatore Tramontana, Gli anni del Vespro: I'immaginario, la cronaca, la storia (Bari, 1989), Storia e civilta, vol. xxv. Two examples of the contrasting scholarly traditions are Antonino de Stefano, Federico III d'Aragona, re di Sicilia: 1296-1337, 2nd edn. (Bologna, 1956), with its paeans to "la grande anima del popolo siciliano"; and Denis Mack Smith, Medieval Sicily, 800-1715 (London, 1968), a splenetic work that sees incompetence and corruption at every turn. The larger debate over the Mezzogiorno's economic underdevelopment in relation to the northern Italian regions (a phenomenon that is variously dated from the first century BCE to the advent of industrialism) has received considerably more and better attention from scholars than the forty-year period examined by the present book. The best overview is Giuseppe Galasso, "Considerazioni intorno alia storia del Mezzogiorno in Italia," in his collection Mezzogiorno medievale e moderno (Turin, 1975), pp. 15-59; s e e a ^ so t n e introductory chapter to the excellent new work by Stephan R. Epstein, An Island/or Itself: Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily (Cambridge, 1992), Past and Present Publications, pp. 1-24. This is not to say that Sicily's economic backwardness, in relation to northern Italy or the rest of Mediterranean Europe, was established permanently at this time. Recent studies have shown that the Sicilian economy recovered from the crises of the fourteenth century (which were experienced at any rate by all of western Europe) to enjoy a wide-ranging expansion of productivity and trade in the fifteenth. See Epstein, An Island for Itself ch. 8. Epstein's thesis, admittedly tentative, that Sicilian underdevelopment did not become permanently entrenched until the general European crisis of the seventeenth century, is intriguing but needs further study. Such research would need to examine not only the extent of Sicilian trade, whether foreign or domestic, and the productivity of manufacturing, but also the distribution of the wealth created by that trade — something that Epstein was not able to examine in his fascinating book. Certainly a Val Demone weaver or taverner of the sixteenth century would have disputed any claims that he was doing as well as his compeers on the continent. While agreeing with Epstein that Sicily staged an impressive economic recovery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, this book contends that there are more factors to consider than just the economic in assessing the overall Sicilian crisis. Indeed, it is significant that Sicily, in the early modern period, continued to lag behind the rest of Europe in so many aspects despite its economic recovery.

io

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

to hold more and more of the leading political and ecclesiastical positions in the realm, especially in the latter half of Frederick's reign. Nevertheless, the Sicilians magnified their own misery in important ways. Rather than capitalizing on their brief peacetime prosperity by investing in new manufactures or developing a carrying trade, for example, they sank their money into a vain consumerism that was perhaps understandable, given their wartime privations, but which in fact left effective control of nondomestic commerce in the hands of merchants from Genoa, Pisa, Venice, Marseilles, and Barcelona. Rather than using the proffered royal parliament to establish a sense of communality and shared interests, they remained intensely and unshakeably local in their concerns, willing to obey the central government or to serve it whenever doing so offered them a chance to wield power or earn money, but never willing - as at Trapani in 1314 - to sacrifice for it. Curiously, however, this stubborn localism never evolved into a positive spirit of independence. We see one aspect of this in the demesne cities, where the high degree of personal mobility that evolved out of the collapse of serfdom in the thirteenth century created large municipalities made up of nuclear families and isolated individuals; the sudden absence of extended family networks, or of corporate structures such as trade or artisan guilds, might have led, under different circumstances, to the creation of an atmosphere of independence. But as the economic and social problems of Frederick's reign deepened, the urban populace sought refuge instead in quasi-paternalistic customs and institutions such as joining the comitiva (an inchoate and ragtag group of followers or hangers-on) of a member of the urban elite.7 Divided into factions of "Catalanists" or "Latinists," of Ventimiglia supporters or Chiaromonte champions, the people of the fourteenth century increasingly sought to escape the misery of their lives by seeking security in their local consuetudines or, in more dangerous times, in the protection of the emerging grandees (Latin meliores, Italian migliori, in our sources).8 7 8

Acta curie i, docs. 21 (29 Dec. 1311), 69 (26 Aug. 1312). Henri Bresc, Un monde mediterraneen: economie et societe en Sidle, 1300-1450, 2 vols. (Palermo,

1986), p. 737 cites what seems to be the first appearance of the term migliori, in reference to the dominant figures in the cities (referring here to Calascibetta). In Messina these

The kingdom at risk

11

For both of these traditions, as for the compromise position this book will argue, Frederick's reign holds a crucial place in the larger debate. His forty-one years on the throne mark the most critical decades in medieval Sicily's agonizing transition from modest prosperity to deep-rooted poverty and social divisiveness. He came to the island with his father's armies in 1283 and spent his adolescence in the raucous capital of Palermo. Unlike his elder brothers, who viewed the place as little more than a useful addition to the growing Catalan hegemony, Frederick loved Sicily. The troubadour culture of the royal court was much faded by that time, compared to its heyday in the earlier part of the century, when poetry from the so-called "Sicilian School" inspired mainland poets like Guinizetti and Cavalcanti and eventually Dante himself; but even in its decayed state that culture exerted a powerful influence on the young Frederick. His father's campaign to wrest the kingdom from Angevin control struck young Frederick as an exciting and chivalrous quest. The heady atmosphere of a successful revolution in an exotic new realm of bustling, crowded cities, pleasure gardens, and majestic churches had a strong effect on him. He was a young man of emotion and impulse - a sensualist, not a man of thought.9 The conviction that his life was destined for some divinely sanctioned adventurous purpose never left him, and this accounts in part for the uncanny consistency of his life-long devotion to lost causes, and for his woodenheaded inability to compromise. There was, however, no doubt of his bravery or of his affection for his realm - and herein lies the secret of his continued popularity with his subjects, even after the Sicilians had begun to resent the Catalan presence in general.10 To Sicilian eyes,

9

10

figures were described as nobiles even though they were not in all cases members of the aristocracy; see Enrico Pispisa, Messina nel Trecento: politico, economia, societa (Messina, 1980), Gollana di testi e studi storici, vol. i, pp. 98-9. In his younger years, he had a well-deserved reputation for sexual indulgence and headstrong anger, even cruelty. Even allowing for a Neapolitan bias, Boccaccio knew his man when he provided a thumbnail sketch of Frederick in // Decamerone 5.6. In the last years of the fighting, from 1296 to 1302, Frederick delighted in his personal command of Sicily's forces, organizing sieges in Calabria, constructing war engines, leading small reconnaissance squadrons, and marshalling troops in open battle, all with great brio. For a summary of these exploits, see Amari, La guerra del Vespro siciliano, ch. 15—16; Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 119-124; and Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 11, ch. 18-19; bk. in, ch. 5-7, IO-II, 15, and 18. Shortly after the battle of Falconaria in late 1300 Frederick defeated Prince Philip of Taranto, the son of Charles II of Anjou, in single combat and held him prisoner for two years at Cefalu; see Muntaner, Cronica, ch. 192; and Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. v, ch. 10.

12

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

Frederick was the first king since the Norman era who was unquestionably loyal to the island, a ruler who - unlike Frederick II of Hohenstaufen or either Charles I or II of Anjou -viewed Sicily as an end in itself and not merely as a geographical base or financial resource for pursuing grander schemes elsewhere. He had a gift for languages, wrote a good deal of troubadour verse as a young man (although only one poem survives), and could speak to his subjects in their own tongue. His cocky, idealistic manner inspired strong emotions. His contemporaries outside of Sicily certainly found him a compelling figure, although not so compelling that anyone rushed to his aid when serious trouble with Naples began again. According to one tradition Dante, grateful for Frederick's devotion to Henry VII, considered dedicating part of the Commedia to him; Ramon Muntaner once endured torture at Angevin hands for his loyal service to him; and both the heretical leader Fra Dolcino and the heterodox mystic reformer Arnau de Vilanova believed him to be the "God-elected king" who would lead the final reform of Christendom before the advent of Antichrist. A more sober judgment came from Pope John XXII, to whom Frederick was simply "an evil man who would be even worse if he had the ability."11 The kingdom he ruled was a fractious and turbulent island where life had never been easy and where sharp contrasts existed between the economic and cultural development levels of the various population groups. Sicily's strategic location accounted for much of 11

Antonino de Stefano, Federico III d'Aragona, I2g6-i^y, 2nd edn. (Bologna, 1956); see also Rafael Olivar Bertrand, Un rei de llegenda: Frederic III de Sicilia (Barcelona, 1951); and the very old Francesco Testa, De vita et rebusgestisFriderici IlSiciliae regis (Palermo, 1775), which is still useful for some of the transcribed documents it contains. Frederick III (sometimes referred to as Frederick of Aragon) was actually only the second of his name to rule the island, and this has created a small though irritating degree of confusion among historians and bibliographers. The Hohenstaufen ruler Frederick II was the first Frederick to govern the island, but his numerature remained defined by his German imperial inheritance. Since the Catalan Frederick regarded himself as the ideological as well as the chronological heir of the Hohenstaufen Frederick, and since the majority of the records of his time describe him as the Third, this book uses the citation "Frederick III" throughout, although the reader should be aware that many of the archival sources and secondary materials utilized are inconsistent in their taxonomy. Marjorie Reeves, Joachim o/Fiore and the Prophetic Future (London, 1976), pp. 45-9 (Fra Dolcino); ACA Cartas James II, no. 9944 (Muntaner's torture), and no. 3286 (John XXII's comment): "Verum est, quod dominus Fredericus est malus homo, et esset peior, si haberet potestatem." General context can be found in Corrado Mirto, // regno delVisola di Sicilia e delle hole adiacenti dalla sua nascita alia peste del 1347-1348 (Messina, 1986).

The kingdom at

risk

13

what was best and worst in Sicilian life, for as Muntaner (who understood such matters) wrote, "Whoever wishes to control the Mediterranean must control Sicily." And throughout the centuries many peoples, desiring the larger goal, had achieved at least the lesser. What attracted these successive waves of invaders - Greeks, Romans, Vandals, Goths, Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, Germans, Angevins, Catalans -was an island of approximately 25,000 square kilometers (9,800 square miles), moderately rich in resources but desirable above all for its position at the nexus of the twin basins that make up the Mediterranean. To this extent, for Sicily at least, geography is history. Merchants or soldiers moving from east to west, or vice versa, had to pass by the island, making it a natural port of call. The preferred route passed through the narrow Strait of Messina, so that sailors could take advantage of the large, inviting harbors along Sicily's northern and eastern shores while avoiding the Tunisian pirates operating further to the south. It was the desire to control these harbors and the agricultural and mineral produce of their hinterland that spurred such endless conquest and colonization. These incursions seldom were successfully turned back since the Sicilians were never able to mount a unified resistance to invasion. In fact, nothing at all about the realm was unified, owing to a dizzying variety of geographical and cultural factors that combined to keep the people poor, uneducated, backward, and as often as not hostile toward one another. The landscape is dominated by mountains. Rising in some places right from the coast, these mountains are broken into four distinct chains that divide the island into discrete regions. From the Strait of Messina the Peloritani chain stretches to the south and west, reaching altitudes well above 1,200 meters (4,000 feet). In the Middle Ages only its lowest reaches were cultivated, and even then only on the southern and eastern sides of the chain; its long northern coastal plain had no arable land, except for a small region near Milazzo. Conifers covered the middle level, providing one of the most densely forested areas on the island. This region provided the timber for the busy shipbuilding industry in the Val Demone. The upper reaches, however, had little or no vegetation and were scarred by rapid currents that frequently produced flash floods during the heavy rains of late autumn and winter. Further to the west stand the Nebrodi and Madonie chains, climbing still higher to

14

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

over i,800 meters (6,000 feet). Stark and barren above and skirted with beech and chestnut trees below, these mountains flatten west of the watershed of the Belice river to form high limestone plateaus thick with scrub and dotted with sulfurous massifs. Upland grasses and olive trees grew well on these plateaus in the Middle Ages, but little else since their lower altitude resulted in considerably decreased rainfall. The mountains themselves produced considerable drainage, however, which ran (and still runs) to the north and west and provided water ultimately to the capital city of Palermo. The Iblei chain in the southeast promontory is considerably lower than the other three. Volcanic in origin, it provided both the greatest expanse of fertile land and the greatest variety of vegetation in Frederick's kingdom. This region was, not coincidentally, the site of many of the largest estates held by the nobility. Limestone of excellent quality for building was also abundant in this area, increasing in both quality and abundance as one moved further south and east; the availability of such material, and the superior quality of the soil, made this one of the longest inhabited regions on the island, with a developed urban life dating to ancient Greek times. Rising between the Iblei and Peloritani chains and dominating the eastern coastline is Mount Etna, the highest point in the realm, rising well above 3,000 meters (10,000 feet). It is one of the most active volcanoes in the world, and the residue of its many eruptions has made the surrounding hillsides and plains very fertile, if more than usually vulnerable. Vineyards and citrus crops grew well in this area, especially in the Catanian plain. This whole region - from Catania itself (perhaps the third or fourth largest city in the kingdom by the end of Frederick's reign) northward along the coast to Acrireale and inland as far as Paterno and S. Maria di Licodia - would be all but destroyed in a catastrophic eruption in 1329.12 Movement through these mountains was both difficult and dangerous. By controlling only a handful of mountain passes or roads a local baron could effectively seal off his territory from the rest of the realm and become a law unto himself. In times of foreign invasion, spreading disease, or social unrest, or simply in order to express dissatisfaction with the government, these upland lords did precisely that with considerable ease and usually with impunity. 12

See the dramatic eyewitness account by Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. VIII, ch. 2.

The kingdom at risk

15

As if to invite their efforts, the roads they had to block were surprisingly few and primitive. Indeed, considering that Sicily was one of the longest settled sites in western Europe, the absence of a network of usable roads linking the cities was a telling and debilitating characteristic. By the fourteenth century the situation had hardly improved from the seventh. The only thoroughfares that could be considered major roads ran from Trapani to Palermo, from Palermo to Agrigento, from Agrigento to Castrogiovanni, and from Castrogiovanni to Randazzo; but even these were as often as not in poor repair or, at some critical juncture, were under the control of peevish local knights. Most other roads were little more than tracks. Riverine systems offered no alternative. The kingdom had no rivers of any great size; but since it had likewise no useful network of bridges the minor waterways that did exist provided obstacles sufficiently large to frustrate trade or travel by land. Consequently, internal trade was either immediately local (the largest economic spheres that had meaning were the local valli) or else had to follow a burdensome coastal orbit. Wines from central Caltanissetta, for example, could reach the markets of northern Cefalu only by being carted southward to Agrigento, whence they sailed around the island to the northern coast (assuming they successfully avoided Tunisian pirates), where they would likely be unloaded at Palermo before being carted along the coast road eastward to Cefalu. But of course so long a journey would result in the price of the wines being raised to a level where they could not compete with local vintages. For these reasons, there was relatively little trade between the separate regions of Frederick's Sicily - although trade within the valli was considerably more active than most scholars have recognized - and hence relatively little sense of a shared fate or responsibility in the kingdom as a whole. Only the river Salso had any particular importance for the realm as a whole: stretching northward from Licata (roughly the midpoint of the long border facing Africa) to reach the Madonie mountains, it provided a natural border for administrative and ecclesiastical districts. Royal justiciars before 1282 and for a short time after Frederick's coronation were appointed to serve "on this side" (citra) or "on the far side" {ultra) of the Salso, in relation to the peninsula. But the river itself had no considerable value as a thoroughfare. The rivers, too narrow and shallow for navigation and too slow to

16

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

provide much hydraulic power for milling, were important chiefly for irrigation. Since rainfall patterns generally did not coincide with the growing season (almost all rains falling between November and February), agriculture depended on continuous irrigation; and as a result the great bulk of arable land lay adjacent to the scrawny rivers, with fragile networks of carefully plotted ditches and the occasional aqueduct spreading out from the stream. These farms tended to be smaller affairs than those found on the continent or peninsula, and a far-flung system of earthwork structures known as il terraggio separated individual farms and crop fields while also providing a primitive check on the erosion of the crumbling topsoil. In so difficult a terrain and climate as this, water rights were as highly prized and as stoutly defended as landownership itself, since any field or vineyard whose water had been cut off would quickly wither and die in the intense heat. Access to water was in fact one of the few things that could inspire a small landowner or tenant farmer to challenge the bullying tactics of the great lords - as when, for example, a Monreale widow named Fioremille Luvetto sued in 1303 to break up the wealthy D. Guglielmo Abbate's seizure of the "aqueducts and water channels" that issued from the river Garbele, and for her trouble won not only the free use of the irrigation network every Wednesday hence but also restitution of her legal costs in pursuing her suit.13 The majority of the kingdom's small towns and hamlets also lay along the rivers, with the result that most farms were worked by leaseholding tenants with the help of day laborers hired in the town or village rather than by a soil-bound peasantry. Indeed, by the early fourteenth century, manorialism survived only on a handful of ecclesiastical estates.14 The mobility thus available to the peasants, 13

14

ASP Tabulario S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 18 (i6Jan. 1303). For similar cases, see Pietro Burgarella, "Le pergemene del monastero della Martorana," ArchStSic, 4th ser., 4 (1978), 55—110, doc. 69 (17 May 1329); and Salvatore Giambruno, // tabulario del monastero di S. Margherita di Polizzi (Palermo, 1909), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xx, doc. 45 (4 Aug. 1331). See also Giacomo Mustaccio's suit against Giovanni Chiaromonte in 1322—3, after the great lord built a private aqueduct from the Oreto river to his vineyards that trespassed upon Mustaccio's land; ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 77 (Giacomo di Gitella), fol. i26v; Ada curie in, doc. 34 (Oct. 1325). Illuminato Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro: uomini, citta e campagne, 1282-1376 (Rome, 1981), pp. 57-9; Giuseppe Silvestri, Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala e S. Maria di Maniaci (Palermo, 1887), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xi, pp. 34—6, 57—8, 59-61; Epstein, An Islandfor Itself, pp. 318-19.

The kingdom at risk

17

as we shall see, was a crucial factor in the economic strategies of the time: the common people, at least in theory, were free to move from farm to farm, from farm to town, or from region to region, in response to the economic opportunities (or lack of them) available. Workers commonly plied a trade in the town and earned extra, though paltry, wages by tending the crops and vines. Similarly the village work-force was often comprised of day workers from the surrounding rural areas; but in either case no hard distinction existed between the town and rural economies. Peasant freeholds were not numerous, especially in the poorer Val di Mazara, but when they do appear in the extant sources they illustrate the interpenetration of the two micro-economies. Sales of farm plots were frequently accompanied by sales of their corresponding village residences, as when Guglielmo and Margherita Truxavella, for example, sold their paired domus and vineyard, located within and without Petralia Soprana, respectively, to another local farmer. And prosperous farmers often owned more than one field or farmstead. In these cases the family typically resided in the patrimonial village house and worked their various fields or vineyards with the help of family members or hired laborers.15 The large, and largely empty, expanses of land away from the rivers were either barren wastes or were given to cattle and sheep rearing. These territories especially were the domain of the powerful barons whose estates usually comprised a central manorhouse (casalis, in the sources; but castrum or fortilicium, if fortified) and the surrounding regions of grassland and pasturage, dotted with the occasional cattleman's station or shepherd's rest {rachalis or rahallusy from Arabic rahl) that itself often formed the nexus of a small settlement (such as Racalmuto or Rahalmingieri).16 As early as the middle of the thirteenth century, and certainly by Frederick's time, the various regions of Sicily had developed distinct cultural, social, and economic characteristics. This point would not have to be made, were it not for the general failure of non-Sicilian historians to appreciate the diversity that existed. Traditionally, scholars have spared no effort to emphasize the 15

16

Giambruno, S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 6 (24 May 1286); see also doc. 31 (26 March 1328), in which Pietro Dancia of Polizzi bestows a field and vineyard, plus corresponding town residence, upon his German-born wife Maria. Ibid., doc. 4; Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 135.

18

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

extent of social and cultural differences between the northern Italian provinces, and even between the individual towns and villages within each province; yet they have felt no compunction in treating Sicily as a whole, a vast, unvaried, if unusually chaotic, area of cereal production - the Mediterranean's breadbasket. The reality, of course, was considerably different. Features of geography, as described briefly above, divide the island into at least three distinct zones, apart from the more fundamental division between urban coast and rural hinterland. These zones, called valli, correspond roughly with the contours provided by the mountain ranges. The Val di Mazara, the largest of the provinces, comprised the western portion of the island, reaching as far eastward along the southern shore as the river Salso, and as far along the northern shore as the town of Termini; inland, it reached to the Madonie mountain range. Thus it was roughly equivalent with the ultra Salsum justiciarate. The Val di Noto, second in order of size, was the district east of the Salso and south of Mount Etna (or, approximately, the Iblei mountains and all the land within an 80-kilometer [50-mile] circumference of them). Smallest, and the most mountainous, was the Val Demone, in the sharp northeast promontory. Made up chiefly of the Peloritani and Nebrodi mountains and their coastal skirt, the Val Demone had the highest population density on the island.17 These valli, which later became formalized as administrative divisions, seem to have derived historically as well as geographically: they correspond to the three major phases of the Muslim conquest of Sicily, in the early, middle, and late ninth century, respectively. This correspondence is important, for it signals the major traditional ethnic distributions on the island. For example, the Val di Mazara, being longest under Muslim control, customarily held the largest Muslim population, whereas the Val Demone, with its Byzantine heritage, had the most pronounced Greek element in its ethnic and cultural makeup. The different agricultural and mineral products of each vallo, combined with their varying cultural characteristics, produced the distinctive life of each. As we shall see, the valli experienced separate fates in Frederick's reign, each succeeding or failing to the extent that it 17

Karl Julius Beloch, Bevolkerungsgeschichte Italiens, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1937-61), 1, pp. 153-4. For a fuller treatment, see Vincenzo Epifanio, / valli di Sicilia nel Medioevo e la low importanza nella vita dello stato (Naples, 1938).

The kingdom at risk

19

adapted itself to the ever straitened circumstances from mid-reign onwards. The cities that lay along the coastal perimeter were crowded, noisy, commercial centers where the produce of the interior was bought and sold, where local manufactures were produced, and where the most diverse populations were to be found. These municipalities, plus a handful of larger inland towns like Corleone and Castrogiovanni, belonged to the royal demesne but were ostensibly self-governing as long as they paid their taxes to the crown, especially the vital harbor duties, and preserved the peace. But, as the reign progressed, the cities - especially those in the west, which were most vulnerable to attack - found it increasingly difficult to perform either task. From 1317 onwards a frustrating downward spiral eroded urban life: foreign attack led to civic chaos, which contributed in turn to economic stagnation. But this, of course, only heightened the need to impose order, which necessitated an increase in tax revenues. The presence of numerous ethnic and religious groups only made matters worse once the decline set in, as people wasted their energies on a search for scapegoats. The Catalans were centered in these coastal cities - Trapani, Messina, Catania, Siracusa, and the megalopolis (population near 100,000) Palermo - and so were foreign merchants from the northern Italian communes and the southern French cities. 18 Most of Sicily's native Jewish and remaining Muslim populations also lived here, especially in Trapani and Palermo, while eastern Messina sported a sizable Greek population made up chiefly of Basilian clerics and domestic servants but with a smattering of Byzantine merchants still in evidence. All of these foreign groups were victims of popular resentment and mob violence after 1321.19 18

Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 62—3; Ferdinando Lionti, "Le societa dei Bardi, dei Peruzzi e degli Acciaiuoli in Sicilia," ArchStSicy 2nd ser., 14 (1889-90), 189-230; Carmelo Trasselli, "Nuovi documenti sui Peruzzi, Bardi e Acciaiuoli in Sicilia," Economia e storia 3 (1956), 188-9; Henri Bresc, "Marchands de Narbonne et du Midi en Sicile, 1300—1450," in Narbonne, archeologie et histoire: 45/e Congres de la federation historique du Languedoc mediterraneen

19

et du Roussillon, 3 vols. (Montpellier, 1973), m, pp. 93-9. See also ASP Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 96-96V (31 May 1313) and 114-15V (12 Sept. 1332) for the trade privileges granted to the merchants of Roussillon and Perpignan, and of Montpellier, respectively. Eliyahu Ashtor, "The Jews of Trapani in the Later Middle Ages," Studi medievally 3rd ser., 25 (1984), 1—30; David Abulafia, "The End of Muslim Sicily," in Muslims under Latin Rule, ed. James Powell (Princeton, 1991), pp. 103—33 anc^ Abulafia, "Una comunita ebraica della Sicilia occidentals Erice 1298^1304," ArchStSicOr 80 (1984), 157-90; Mario Scaduto, // monachesimo basiliano nella Sicilia medievale: rinascita e decadenza, secoli XI-XW

(Rome, 1982).

20

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

If life in the interior was a matter of land labor, small wages or even barter, and dependence upon the local lord for protection and justice, then life along the perimeter was altogether different. These quasi-communes (universitates) were sites of Roman law courts, municipal night-watch companies, armies of harbor officials, schools, tariff codes, almshouses and hospitals, more tax collectors, taverns, warehouses, and urban magistrates endlessly copying, invoking, exercising, and seeking to expand their cities' cherished and obsessively guarded consuetudines.20 Each community followed its own customs but all remained open to outside contact; and this frequently resulted in curious social tensions, since the cities were exposed to all the new developments in Mediterranean commercial and cultural life but lacked the ability or willingness to adapt themselves easily to those changes. For example, the wave of reformist apocalyptic fervor that swept over much of southern Europe around 1300 worked its way into the cities with great ease and resulted in, among other things, an urgent popular embrace of a radicalized "evangelical poverty" that would help to purify the people so that they would be able to withstand the destructive power of the approaching Antichrist.21 The identification of Frederick as the God-elected king who would lead the evangelical mission only intensified these convictions among the illiterate populace. Large segments of the urban crowd embraced the movement, which had a large component of anti-clericalism; and the papacy, as the force behind the original imposition of Angevin rule, was popularly discredited for its political meddling and, from Avignon, its perceived obsession with money. Thus when members of the papally appointed inquisition arrived to restore discipline, accompanied by a fresh corps of tithe collectors, they were met with grumbling disobedience, heckling in the streets, and more than once with outright assault. Yet adherence to the evangelical For a sampling of these texts, see Santi Luigi Agnello, "II Liber privilegiorum et diplomatum nobilis et fidelissimae Syracusarum urbis," Archivio storico siracusano 5-6 (1959-60), 32-81; D. Puzzolo Sigillo, "I privilegi di Messina in un Compendium spagnuolo del seicento ed un Summarium latino del trecento," Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser., 7 (1955—6), 25—107; 9-10 (1957-9), 207—50; Carmelo Trasselli, I privilegi di Messina e di Trapani (1160-1355) con un'appendice sui consolati trapanesi nel secolo XV (Palermo, 1949); Raffaele Starrabba and Luigi Tirrito, Assise e consuetudini della terra di Corleone (Palermo, 1880), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. 11. See my article, "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily," Franciscan Studies 50 (1990), 3—29; see also ch. 5, below.

The kingdom at

risk

21

movement was fitful and periodic, because many Sicilians, though critical of church secularism, were reluctant to accept the reformers' corollary that the church had vitiated its spiritual authority. Unable to resolve their conflicting sentiments, the crowds turned to a variety of prelates and popular preachers for guidance - and of course received the contradictory answers they might have expected, which only threw them into greater confusion. Still others, who had long known poverty and had found no particular benefit to result from it, found themselves embracing a movement they did not truly understand while struggling to remain loyal to a church whose policies they bitterly resented and whose clergy they distrusted. With tensions like these constantly arising, whether from religious developments or shifts in Mediterranean commerce, political realignments, or inter-ethnic relations, the coastal cities remained hubs of change, excitement, bewilderment, and social strain.22 Compounding all of these difficulties, a fundamental rift existed between the coastal societies and the inland world that prevented any political or social cohesion from developing and that in fact even kept economic relations between the two worlds to a minimum. The baronial-rural world was altogether landlocked, since the royal domain comprised not only the king's privately held estates and the port cities but also the entire periphery of the island to a distance "within a bowshot from the coast."23 Royal law also forbade "any nobleman or baron" from interfering with town government and punished anyone who sought to contravene the liberties granted to urban citizens or who blocked the cities' access 22

23

Reg. Benedict XI, no. 834 (28 M a y 1304); A C A Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 336-336V (11 Feb. 1314); Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 3871 (3 June 1314); Cartas James II, no. 4956 (1 Aug. 1314) and 5503 (5 Sept. 1316); ASP Tabulario S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 263 (11 July 1343, but containing text of record from 20 March 1318); Ada curie v, doc. 8 (13 Sept. 1328); BGP MS Qq H 3, fol. 243—243V (9 Oct. 1336). An example (actually a feudal grant of estates in Calabria, then under Frederick's control, to Blase d'Alago) is ACA Perg. James II, no. 641 (2 May 1296): "Si vero pertinentie baronie, castrorum, terrarum, locorum, et bonorum ipsorum vel alterius eorumdem currerent usque ad mare, jus dominium et proprietas totius litoris et maritime pertinentiarum ipsarum in quantum a mari infra terram per jactum baliste ipse pertinentie protenduntur tamquam ex antiquo ad Regiam Dignitatem spectantia in nostro demanio et dominio reserventur." The stipulation was normally added even to feudal contracts for fief estates far inland, to protect the king's rights in the event that the landholding, through marriage or any other means, ever came to expand until it confronted the sea; see also no. 856 (27 Aug. 1297), and 4051 (20 Feb. 1323).

22

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily 24

to fresh water. These stipulations aimed to safeguard the government's revenues and to prevent the possible control of the market places by those who already controlled cereal production, but they had the additional effect, whether intended or not, of cutting off the interior world from trade and the embryonic communal-republican style of government and social structure. As often as not, this division suited the nobles, who preferred their traditional ways and valued their virtual independence in the highlands. But in times of crisis in the agricultural economy, which were frequent from 1311 on, rural Sicily had no alternative means of supporting itself. Whenever disaster struck, those starving peasants and unskilled workers who could do so streamed into the cities, seeking work or alms and placing a terrible new burden on already overstretched resources there. Urban crowding, and its concomitant crime and disease, increased dramatically in the last two decades of Frederick's reign. Small wonder, then, that urban unrest did the same, and that this generally coincided with a decline in the upland economy. As for the barons caught in the downward spiral, improvement in their economic position was possible only by receiving additional land through service to the crown, or, more simply, through grabbing the land by force. Extortion and private war proliferated throughout inland Sicily and resulted in the complete annihilation of numerous aristocratic families. Shortly after Frederick's death, but still before the Black Death, the counts of Antiochia, Cisario, Maletta, Monteliano, Palizzi, Passaneto, Prefoglio, Sclafani, and Uberti had all disappeared in baronial wars.25 Another alternative was to move into the demesne cities, which they did in considerable numbers. These "urban knights" as a rule did not participate in trade, lacking both the expertise and the inclination; instead they acquired urban wealth by assuming the lucrative administrative roles that became available at mid-reign.26 In some cases they 24

25 26

Capitula regni Siciliae, quae adhodiernum diem lata sunt, ed. Francesco T e s t a , 2 vols. (Palermo, 1741-3): here see vol. 1, ch. 57 (Capitula alia); Luigi Genuardi,//comune nelMedioEvo in Sicilia (Palermo, 1921), pp. 121-5; Enrico Mazzarese Fardella, "L'aristocrazia siciliana nel secolo X I V e i suoi rapporti con le citta demaniali," in Aristocrazia cittadina e ceti popolari nel tardo Medioevo in Italia e Germania, ed. Reinhard Elze and Gina Fasoli (Bologna, 1984), pp. 177-94. Bresc, Un monde, p. 807. Mazzarese Fardella, "L'aristocrazia siciliana," p. 184 argues that the barons a i m e d chiefly not at capturing urban financial resources but at directly attacking the royal d e m e s n e as an institution. Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 319—20 contends that economic concerns predominated; gaining power in the cities was simply a consequence of the grab for cash.

The kingdom at risk

23

simply usurped authority, but in most cases for which there is explicit evidence they were established in office by the king, who contravened his own constitution of 1296 in order to regain control over municipalities that were degenerating into chaos; in some instances baronial officers were given command of the cities at the request of the universitas itself (although the urban officials thus displaced later chose to ignore this fact, when complaining of the knights' intrusions). The nobles' lack of alternatives, as matters worsened in the 1320s and 1330s, only increased their bellicosity and contributed to their reputation for rebellion and vendettas in the highlands and for swaggering, heavy-handed bullying in the cities. And as their reputations thus declined, the prejudice against them held by the urban populace only increased. To coastal Sicily the baronial world was a backward and brutal place where the rule of law was ignored and the word of God had scarcely penetrated. As early as 1285, for example, Kingjames referred to the upland world as a foreign territory that lay outside the civilized realm, when he complained about "the barons and other men outside the confines of the realm who neither serve nor offer aid" to the kingdom as a whole. And in 1328 thejudex of Catania, Simone Pucci, patronizingly inserted into a court record a notice that he had rephrased the legal details of the document (a simple property transaction) in the most simplistic terms possible for the benefit of one of the participants, a Val Demone miles, "because he is a knight, and is presumed to be ignorant of the law."27 These "urban knights" were opportunistic and frequently guilty of a certain hostile haughtiness toward the town-dwellers whom they had been sent (they felt) to protect from their own ineptitude. In some places they exercised near martial law authority. Few, however, were as bad as D. Federico d'Algerio, whose excesses rapidly led to mass protests in the streets of Palermo: "He is a person of depraved nature, who has committed numerous crimes in the city . . . And how many citizens, even mothers and wives, has he ruined and treated ignominiously! . . . This knight is so crammed with perversions, stains, and disgraceful qualities that the cry of the common people has made it plain to us

27

Testa, ch. 39: "barones et alii extra regni confinia nee servire personaliter nee adiumenta prestare cogantur"; and AGA Perg. Alfonso III, no. 184 (27 April 1328): "eo quod miles est, et presummitur juris ignarus."

24

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

all... that he is a criminal and an evil-doer, whose house is a den of thieves."28 The king tried to be the unifying force between these disparate worlds and to provide some sort of standard justice without either infringing on guaranteed privileges or appearing to favor any particular group. It was a difficult balance to maintain, and in the end Frederick failed on all counts. Blunt parochialism - the entrenched concern for oneself, next for one's family, and at most for one's city - was too powerful a force in Sicilian life to be overcome easily by a dynasty that was, however capable, still suspected by many rural and urban subjects to be merely the most recent figures in a long series of crown-wearing foreign opportunists. Even his much more capable brother had faced three murder attempts by disgruntled subjects. Frederick, for his failures, was confronted by at least two would-be regicides.29 More commonly, however, those who felt themselves to be victims of monarchical abuse or ineptitude satisfied themselves by simply ignoring the king's commands. One early rebel against Frederick, for example, who seized thefortalicium at Gangi and sought to live as an independent petty prince, not only escaped punishment but was even brought into the royal diplomatic service only two months after being forced to surrender his stronghold.30 To hold the realm together, Frederick had few tools at his disposal apart from his general popularity, a currency easily exhausted. Sounding the alarm of a new threat from Naples was usually one reliable way of rallying popular support, since hatred of the Angevins was one of the few sentiments his subjects held in common. Much more important, however, was the resource of the royal demesne itself, which Frederick was forced to parcel out in order to purchase peace. Loyalty to the king, and by implication to the kingdom as a whole, ran high only when the government had some largesse to share; royal favors, administrative posts, tax immunities, pensions, and 28

29 30

Ada curie v, doc. 32 (23 Nov. 1328): "ipsum Fridericum fuisse et esse persona prave condicionis, et commisse multiplices errores excessus in dicta urbe . . . et quamplures et alii cives dicte urbis matres et mulieres que sibi ipse miles injuriatus extitit et cum ignominia in eos processit... ipsum militem pravis, maculis, et ignominiosis irretitus et plenus, ut de hiis est vox et fama publica manifestat, quod . . . eundem militem talem fuisse sontem et maleficum, cum domus eius sit spelunca latronum." Maria-Merce Costa, "Un atemptat frustrat contra Frederic III de Sicilia," in XI Congresso 11, pp. 447-60. ACA Cartas James II, no. 10210 (3 Aug. 1299) anc * 10262 (24 May 1299).

The kingdom at risk

25

commercial privileges were eagerly sought amid florid declarations of fidelity to and affection for the king's desire to provide justice to a unified realm. 31 It is not altogether surprising to find an element 31

A good example of the obsequious rhetorical lengths to which petitioners resorted is the Palermo commune's plea for a royal pardon ofjudex Tommasso Benedetto, a prominent figure in the city who had been convicted by the MRC of corruption in public office; see Ada curie I, doc. 42 (4 May 1312) - here reedited by me, in order to clarify the text: "Sacre Regie Maiestati, universitas felicis urbis Panormi fidelis sua, oscula et debite fldelitatis obsequia. Justus es, Domine, et rectum judicium tuum fac cum servo tuo secundum misericordiam tuam,' comendatur Justitia, qua reges et principes regnant, quibus nichil dignoscitur adversari, dum ipsam exerceant juxta legum et canonum instituta. 'Hec a morte liberat, nee timet qui Justitiam operatur,' sicut Sapiens in suis proverbiis deno[t]avit. De hac Apostolus corde creditur ad Justitiam. Hanc desideravit Propheta, postulans 'Concupivit anima mea desiderare justificationes tuas omni tempore.' In qua Justitia Vestra Maiestas omni tempore conversatur et laudis preconio decoratur, ut beneficia dominatrix vix posset in mundi climate reperiri sic principem Justitiam assecutam esse, qui non solum se Justitie prestatorem exhibet incessantem. Verum appetit Justitiam, requirentes dum minimis adversus potentes earn exuberat fructuosam, qua exultant et Regem Regum exorant, ut in dierum longitudinem sempiternam vivere faciat desideria omnium consolantem. Sed Justitie miscenda est misericordia, consulens nam multum Justitia destituitur, si una sine altera teneatur. Debet itaque circa subjectos inesse regibus et justi consulens misericordia et pie serviens [discijplina. Hoc declaratur a Sammaritano, qui semivivi vixeribus et vinum in oleum immiscere curavit, ut per vinum morderentur vulnera, per oleum foverentur in vino morsum districtionis occurrit, in olio molliciem pietatis ostendit. Virga quis percutitur, baculo substentatur. Idem Propheta, petens a Domino, demonstravit, 'Virga tua et baculus tuus ipsa me consolata sunt.' Hoc cum Israelitico populo dum ipse ante Dei oculos pene inveniabilem traxisset offensam, Moyses, pie Domino supplicans, ait, 'Aut dimitte eis hanc offensam, aut, si non facis, dele me de libro, quern scripsisti.' Pensandum est quanto zelo rectitudinis fuit accensus dum inquit, 'Ponat vir gladium super femur suum et occidat unusquisque fratrem et amicum proximum suum,' et ceciderunt viginti tria milia hominum mox, ut culpe venia daretur, obtinuit Domino dicenti, 'Dimitte me, ut irascatur furor meus contra eos.' Intus Moyses arsit igne amoris, foris accensus virga Justitie — causam Dei apud populum gladiis, causam populi apud Deum precibus, allegavit. Nee mirum, si hoc mundi regibus illius exemplo committitur, ut post judicium viscera sue pietatis ostendant et dampnatis in integrum restitutionis beneficium impendant et ad omnia inhabilem, qui speciali dono gratie decorantur. Et propterea universi cives, considerantes Justitie veritatem (qua Vestra Maiestas prefulget, ut sidus irradians misericordie caritatem, qua obtinet pre cunctis regibus principatum) et clementiam (qua non desinit petentibus gratiam habundare recurrere non diffundunt [sic] clementie) Maiestatis Vestre humiliter et multipliciter supplicantes, ut judicem Thomasium de Benedicto concivem suum tune judicem urbis predicte per Vestram Magnam Curiam ex certa causa pecuniarum penam judiciali angulo spoliatum, ob quod ipsius fame integritas lesionem substinuisse dignoscitur ipsumque tarn advocationis quam aliorum bonorum civilium extorrem factum esse juris auctoritate perpenditur, in integrum restituere dignetur, si placet, fame ac honoribus in civilibus aliis actibus quibuscumque, ut sicut ceteri cives illese fame de nostre benignitatis gratia ipsis gaudeat et fruitur [sic], cum tanto tempore sit afflictus et Vestra Serenitas consuevit aliis peccantibus in integrum restitutionis beneficium impertiri. Et in Vestra urbe felice consilio et patrocinio necessarius reputetur, et alias guerrarum tempore juxta suum posse serviverit, ut Vester subditus etfidelis.Et cives Vestri hoc reputent ad gratiam specialem et ad obtinendum premissa Orlandum de PhisaulofidelemVestrum concivem suum universitas dicte urbis

26

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

of self-interest in career politicians; but few Sicilians were as forthright about the limits of their loyalties as was Leonardo d'Incisa who, upon being appointed "treasurer of their Kingdom of Sicily" in late 1311, announced in a letter: "I trust in the Lord . . . that [the king and his court] will enrich [me] with ever more generous gifts and benefices" in return for his faithful service.32 Frederick more than once expressed his amazement at this sort of attitude. In this case he did not have to wait long to witness it again. Only a month later he learned that the men of Palermo appointed to the municipal night-watch company had refused to serve, citing as their excuse an ancient consuetudo that exempted them, and so had left the streets unguarded - "on account of which a great number of crimes are being committed." Their strike was evidently a protest against the king's introduction of a Catalan nobleman, Pong Caslar, in the local justiciarate, since they had angrily proposed that Pong should hire his own family members to patrol the streets. Whether their complaint was justified or not, Frederick wrote, he was astonished that local officials would sacrifice public safety so thoughtlessly.33 Given such firmly rooted geographic and human obstacles to social cohesion, the failure of this long reign is hardly a surprising

32

33

Maiestati Vestre suum nuncium destinare curavit, cui super hiis Maiestas Vestra credere dignetur, si placet. Nichilominus tamen clementissime principum omnia supradicta et alia arbitrio et voluntati Vestre pie relinquimus Maiestatis. Scripta in urbe felici Panormi, ut supra." There is no record of whether or not the pardon was granted (the request for clemency was repeated on 23 June; see ibid., doc. 58). Tommasso, however, was elected judex in the city at least three times more, in 1321, 1324, and 1329. See table 1 on p. 309. ACA Cartas James II, no. 10124 (16 Oct. 1311): "meque noviter eorum regni Sicilie thesaurarium ordinavunt; et spero in Domino, quod in anima eorum liberalitatibus munificentie dextera, ut suis est solita facere, donis et gratiis largioribus ampliabunt." Ada curie 1, doc. 19 (18 Dec. 1311, citing text of royal letter sent from Messina on 27 Nov.). The local judices, for their part, denied Pong's claims and assured Frederick that the city was safe. Four months later, however, the issue was still unresolved, and they confessed that Palermo had been so overrun with "wretched vagabonds," especially near the harbor where the opportunities for theft were greatest, that they had taken to registering the vagrants. See ibid., doc. 35 (20 March 1312). In 1332 another Palermitan leader, Giacomo Cisario, murdered a rival, and having waived his right not to be tried by any court outside the city he was placed on trial and convicted by the MRC in Messina. The Palermo universitas nevertheless appealed for an overturning of the verdict or at least for leniency, given Cisario's standing in the community. The king responded, once again, with amazement: "There can be no exceptions for individuals; the law must be enforced with equal severity for all." See Arta curie v, doc. 155 (7 Oct. 1332): "in cultu et administratione justitie non est habenda personarum acceptio, sed procedendum est in singulos equa lance."

The kingdom at risk

27

occurrence. A more talented king and a less avaricious set of government officials (at all levels) might have mitigated, or even solved, many of the problems besetting the realm. Frederick's brash, petulant, and frankly woodenheaded nature brought a lot of harm. His energy was considerable, as was his constancy in pursuing what he thought to be the best path for Sicily, but his most prominent characteristic was less idealism - contrary to what his biographers to date have asserted - than it was simple credulity.34 As a young king, stirred by the romanticized chivalric deeds of his father and his own undeniably impressive wartime exploits, he displayed the cocksure certainty of a popular ruler who could apparently succeed in whatever he attempted; and after his conversion, ca. 1304, to the Spiritual reform program of Arnau de Vilanova this self-assuredness was given an evangelical veneer that never dulled. Whatever positive qualities may be ascribed to him, profound thought - or even ordinary reflection - cannot be numbered among them. In forty-one years on the throne he never changed his mind on any major issue or admitted of any doubt. Such constancy of purpose, while perhaps admirable in the abstract, represented a profound political liability and an intrinsic personal flaw which he was never able to overcome, and which the island he loved barely survived. Even so, when one considers the impact of the continued hostility between Sicily and Naples - an on-again, off-again war that ultimately lasted over one hundred years - it is very much to the Catalans' and Sicilians' credit that the unraveling of the kingdom was not more severe than it was. The Angevins had good reason to desire to regain control: apart from the traditional strategic benefits of possessing Sicily, the war in the south represented an attempt to halt the growing power of the Catalans in the Mediterranean world. "Nothing good ever comes from a Catalan," thought Boniface VIII, for the Catalans threatened not only to upset Guelf 34

See for example, Francesco Giunta, Aragonesi e catalani nel Mediterraneo, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1953-9) a t x» P- *9: "Con Federico III la Sicilia inizia il suo periodo di piena autonomia politica e rivendica quei ideali che la legavano all'ancora operante tradizione sveva. Questa nuova realta politica costitui il punto fondamentale da cui si sviluppo il programma politico del giovane re. Di fatti tutta la sua vita fu dedicata alia aflermazione dei diritti siciliani sul piano europeo ed alia ricostruzione dell'antico regno normannosvevo. Nello stesso tempo Pelezione di Federico scindeva nettamente gli interessi dell'isola da quelli delPAragona, mentre dava impulso ad un nuovo orientamento nei rapporti internazionale."

28

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

authority in Italy, but also ecclesiastical authority in Christendom generally, since their own land was a hotbed of some of the most worrisome religious heterodoxies of the age. Naples and Rome, then Naples and Avignon, had much to gain by wresting Sicily away from its new dynasts, and consequently they each consistently pledged their own strained resources and energies to the task. For the Sicilians, this meant either capitulation to a detested French regime and increased bitterness toward the church, or grudging support for a Catalan caste that at least seemed to be less overtly predatory than any of its predecessors. Still, despite the collapse of the economy, the paralysis of the government, the xenophobic ethnic hatred among the populace, the growth of an embryonic Mafia, the undermining of republicanism, and the crisis of ecclesiastical administration and of popular spirituality - all legacies, in some way, of Frederick's reign - it is possible to overstate the severity of Sicily's decline. The fabled brilliance of the Norman period was, after all, largely purchased or stolen abroad and imported into Sicily, rather than achieved natively; its noted wealth and religious or ethnic tolerance characterized the royal and aristocratic courts (and even there only briefly), but not the mass populace. The Hohenstaufen rule of Frederick II was more autocratic and self-interested than effective. And compared to the difficulties faced by other Mediterranean societies in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the problems besetting Sicily, for all their enormity, formed simply one part of an overall pattern of decline and challenge. Although we recognize that the period from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries represents one of the most crucial periods in Sicily's long history, a period in which the painful transition from one of Europe's wealthiest and most powerful states to an impoverished and strifetorn backwater occurred, and although it is clear that Frederick Ill's reign coincides with some of the most critical decades in that transition, we have the responsibility not to exaggerate the degree of the decline, nor to romanticize the attempt made by some to avoid or alleviate the general ruin.

CHAPTER 2

The international scene: war without and within

I ASSESSING THE DAMAGE

How great an impact did the international scene in general and the war with Naples in particular have on Sicilian developments? Is the decline so painfully evident in these years best explained as the result of Sicily's forced war with the Angevins; of her diplomatic and cultural isolation; or of the control of her international commerce by foreign monopolies? Certainly these explanations have found the greatest number of supporters, within Sicily and without; and the assumptions that lie behind this line of reasoning also have much to do with the current debate over the applicability of the "dualist" economic model. The most influential figure here is Benedetto Croce, whose classic History of the Kingdom of Naples argued that Sicily's radical separation from her traditional peninsular partner in 1282, and the acrimonious relations that followed, was nothing less than a catastrophe that spelled the ruin of both lands. This rupture, formalized at Caltabellotta in 1302, according to Croce "marked the beginning of much trouble and little greatness." Commercial and cultural contacts vital to both lands were permanently severed, and a lasting enmity took their place. The subsequent military conflict - a "Ninety Years War," as Santi Correnti called it — wasted precious energies and resources, and forced both the Sicilians and the Neapolitans, and their various allies and opponents, to abandon efforts to expand Latin influence into the Levant at a time when Acre was falling, or had fallen, and when the most promising opportunities existed for strengthening the western presence in Achaea, Constantinople, and parts of Asia Minor. By implication, therefore, the harm engendered by the Vespers afflicted all of Europe and indeed all of Christendom, both Latin and Greek. The ubiquity of these dangers, the full range of 29

30

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

their possible consequences, accounts for the extraordinarily wide diplomatic and economic entanglements we find in the eventual working out of the conflict. Thus Croce and his followers see the Sicilian problem as a Mediterranean-wide phenomenon, a conflict equally as central to fourteenth-century Europe as the Black Death, the Avignon Papacy, and the Hundred Years War between England and France.1 Just as harmful, locally, according to this view, were the wrenching economic adjustments made necessary by the loss of the peninsular market for Sicilian grain; having lost their major market, and crippled by the financial and social pressures of interminable war, the Sicilians had no great reserves of capital to invest in manufacturing, and hence became dependent on northern Italian manufactures and on the capital of omnipresent foreign merchants. The island's manufacturing potential was great, although it needed considerable capital investment; the loss of the Neapolitan market deprived Sicilian entrepreneurs of that capital and left them dependent on northern merchants who, unlike the Neapolitans, were interested almost solely in the island's grain. This resulted in Sicily's slow slide into agricultural monoculture, and began her chronic economic backwardness.2 There is some reason to credit this interpretation. While the mortality of the war was not great outside of a few horrific battles, the economic burden it created for both sides was indeed substantial. In the 1325-6 campaign alone, for example, the Angevin government spent nearly 1,250,000 florins (an amount roughly equal, for comparative purposes, to six times the regular annual income of the king of England - without his continental territories 1

2

Benedetto Croce, Storia del regno di Napoli (Bari, 1925), Scritti di storia letteraria e politica, vol. xix, pp. 10-11. Croce's most effective English disciple, in this regard, has been Sir Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History ofofthe Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1958). See also Santi Correnti, Laguerra dei novanti'anni e le ripercussioni europee della guerra del Vespro, 1282-1372 (Catania, 1973). Michel de Bouard, "Problemes de subsistances dans un etat medieval: le marche et les prix des cereales au royaume angevin de Sicile, 1262—1282," Annales d'histoire economique et sociale 10 (1938), 483—501; Gino Luzzatto, Storia

economica dell'eta moderna e contemporanea, 2

vols., 4th edn. (Padua, 1955), 1, pp. 103-15; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 16-18, 20-1, 576, 917. See also the important studies by David Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom ofSicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge, 1977); "Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370," Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 34 (1981), 377-88; "II commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento," in XI Congresso, pp. 5—22; "Catalan Merchants and the Western Mediterranean, 1236-1300: Studies in the Notarial Acts of Barcelona and Sicily," Viator 16 (1985), 209—42; and "The Merchants of Messina: Levant Trade and Domestic Economy," Papers of the British School at Rome 54 (1986), 196-212.

The international scene

31

- in the early fourteenth century) and still failed to unseat Frederick; and Robert repeated the folly in 1334 when he spent another 40,000 florins on shipping costs alone on another unsuccessful invasion, all but deserting his obligations to his few remaining Greek possessions in the process.3 Large as these sums were, they were more than matched by Robert's obligations to defend the Guelf cause in northern Italy - a struggle in which the Sicilian affair played a large role since the Sicilians were allied, from 1312 onwards, with the combined Ghibelline forces centered at Savona.4 The scale of this spending over so long a period shows that the dispute over the control of Sicily was a matter of the greatest importance, and was considered, without exaggeration, a matter of life or death by the participants. Confronted by so determined an enemy, the Sicilians struggled to find the resources needed to defend themselves. But the very nature of the threat facing them required that they get involved in the larger Mediterranean dispute. Thus they scrambled to meet their obligations to the Ghibelline league, even while offering continuous military and financial support for the newly founded Catalan duchy of Athens (wrested from a cadet branch of the Angevin house by veterans of the Vespers war who had refused to demobilize after Caltabellotta), plus extending repeated assistance to James's designs to conquer Sardinia. With burdens like these, it is no surprise to find the government bemoaning its "numerous and diverse debts . . . enormous and unimaginable sums of money."5 3

4

5

Roberto Caggese, Roberto d'Angid e i suoi tempi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1922—31), 11, pp. 224-37; Norman J. Housley, "Angevin Naples and the Defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise and the Naval League of 1334," Byzantion 51 (1981), 54^-56 at 555; Bernard Guenee, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe (Oxford, 1985), trans. Juliet Vale, p. 109 and Table 1. This alliance was made initially with emperor Henry VII on account of "the many injuries and offenses which [the Angevins] daily inflict" upon Sicily; the pact was later reestablished in 1318 - this time between Frederick, Cangrande della Scala of Verona, Matteo Visconti of Milan, Rainaldo Bonaccolsi of Mantua, and the exiled Doria and Spinola families of Genoa. See Giovanni Villani, Cronica, ed. Francesco Gherardi Dragomanni, 4 vols. (Florence, 1844-5), bk. ix, ch. 71-2, 86-92, 118; ACA Cartas James II no. 6217, 10183. ACA Cartas James II, no. 10222 (13 Jan. 1315): "pro variis multiplicibus et diversis expensis guerre negotii imperatore ipso mortuo nobis mote per dominum Robertum (quondam regis Karoli secundi filium) hostem nostrum, grandes et inextimabiles effundimus pecunie quantitates; unde variis et diversis sumus debitis obligati." On the duchy of Athens, see Kenneth M. Setton, "The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380," in A History of the Crusades, gen. ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Wisconsin, 1969-89), m, pp. 167—224, with bibliography; also his older study, Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311-1388 (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), Mediaeval Academy of America Publications, vol. L.

32

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

And if we can take Frederick at his word, the constant fight with Naples was all that stood in the way of his own desire to undertake a crusade to the east. The anonymous author of the Directorium ad passagiumfaciendum writes that Frederick "wanted nothing so much in the world as to spend the rest of his life on crusade, if only he was offered a secure and suitable peace." 6 By referring to the troubles in the Levant in this way, the Sicilians obviously hoped to increase public pressure on the papacy and the Angevins to give up the fight. It was a strategic ploy, but one which nevertheless had much truth in it. Nevertheless, the war with Naples can hardly suffice to explain the full extent of Sicilian difficulties. With the exception of the 1325-6 invasion, nearly all of the hostilities were waged at sea and involved far more blockading, siegework and quick raiding than face-to-face fighting between armies and militias. Even though more than half the Sicilian population lived in the coastal demesne cities, and thus lived under the daily burden of exposure to hostility, most sites were spared direct attack. Only a few settlements, such as that at Brucato (near Termini), were destroyed outright. As with the Hundred Years War, it is easy to exaggerate both the destruction caused by the war and the direct harm it inflicted upon the economy.7 The indirect impact of the war, however, while it is more difficult to measure, is no less important. The effects here are numerous, if somewhat opaque. An atmosphere of suspicion and hostility lingered after each aggression, particularly in cities like Palermo, Trapani, and Mazara, which suffered repeated, indeed almost annual, attacks either by the Angevins themselves or by Angevinsupported Genoese and Pisan pirates. 8 Brawling and violence against foreign merchants of every stripe - from individual assaults to popular riots - commonly occurred after each attack, with obviously harmful results for trade. These eruptions were not just reflexive, sudden lashings out against any available victim, but were 6

7 8

Anonymous, Directorium ad passagium faciendum, in Receuil des historiens des Croisades, 14 vols. (Paris, 1841—1906), 11, pp. 367—517 at 404—5; Georges Digard, Philippe le Bel et le Saint-Siege de 1285 a 1304, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886), 11, pp. 226-7; Norman Housley, The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford, 1982), p. 80. Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 85-6. AGA Cartas James II, no. 10238 (17Jan. 1316); Lettres communes, no. 7563 (20June 1318).

The international scene

33

rather the bubbling over of long-brewing resentments. In the minds of the rioters the trade privileges awarded to foreign merchants by a central government desperate for any sort of aid had become grossly excessive and in fact easily matched the physical harm represented by the predations of those merchants' bellicose compatriots.9 In fact, it was not uncommon for peaceful merchants from the very states attacking Sicily to appear in the harbors immediately after a raid had been repulsed or had turned away to sea laden with booty. The sense of resentment and distrust created by these occurrences clearly affected trade relations for the worse as when a Catalan trading ship leased by the Peruzzi firm in 1328 was seized by angry harbor officials in Trapani on the charge that the ship was Florentine, and therefore Guelf, and therefore an enemy of the Sicilian kingdom. The officials complained to the local royal justiciarius that even in times of war "many ships belonging to the Genoese Guelfs . . . arrive in the port . . . and they are there at the king's will," loading their hulls with Sicilian grain while parading their privileges. When the Peruzzi representative was turned away in Trapani, he sailed for Termini, where "many of the citizens rushed out to stop his ship, rousing themselves and crying out against [him], saying that he should not be allowed to load his ship in their port." On this occasion even the municipal court in Palermo, usually ever at the ready to flatter the royal government, protested to Frederick that privileged exports "have multiplied to no small degree in recent days . . . such that they are prohibited to nobody at all.™ 9

10

See, for example, ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 48, which tells of a riot in Palermo in 1328, after four galleys manned by Sicilian soldiers disappeared in a storm at sea. The riot, which apparently originated with a dispute between the resident Catalans and Genoese (who had made up most of the officers on board) who were being blamed for the disaster, left more than 300 dead in the streets: "Diebus etiam proximis de predicta Sicilie insula nova sunt habita, quod, dum dompnus Fredericus de Aragonia . . . aliquas galeas armari fecisset, quibus preerat Corradus de Auria, quatuor ex eis in loco qui nominatur 'Mortilla' maris insurgente turbine fracte sunt, et magna pars hominum navigantium in eis mortui sunt et capti, et res existentes in eis in parte sunt perdite et in parte ad manus fidelium pervenerunt. Predictus quoque Corradus de Auria qui vix evasit exinde Messanam nudus aufugit. In civitate vero Panormi inter Catalanos et Januenses magna briga est orta, in qua ultra trecentos de ipsis Januensibus sunt occisi." Ada curie v, doc. 14 (1 Oct. 1328): "lignum ipsum esse florentinorum vel guelforum, hostium regiorum . . . et eo maxime quod cocke ianuensium guelforum quamplures portum dicte urbis noviter advenerunt, et ibi sunt de voluntate regia"; and 26 (18 Nov. 1328): "in cuius portu fieri debet et iam hiis diebus multipliciter fuit acta exitura

34

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

Clearly the extension of trade privileges to foreign merchants, and the resentment of such by domestic merchants and workers, cannot be ascribed directly or solely to the wars in which the kingdom was embroiled; still less can the deleterious effects of such developments be quantified or understood in a systematic way. But such indirect effects of international hostilities were present throughout coastal Sicily in the latter half of Frederick's reign and contributed significantly to aggravate already severe social tensions. In Naples, Robert certainly understood the calamitous effects his constant attacks had on the island; as he boasted to a Catalan envoy, Pere Ferrandis d'Hixar, all he needed to bring about Sicily's ultimate collapse was "to keep striking, not hard but often like a chisel hollowing out a stone."11 How extensive was the damage his chisel wrought? What were the catastrophes that struck the island and turned it into the "ruined beauty" of Speciale's narrative? Few reliable statistics survive, unfortunately, and many of the repeated protestations of hardship and suffering offered up by the cities were obviously calculated to win royal subsidies - and hence were as likely to exaggerate local troubles as to describe them with scrupulous accuracy. But the bulk of the evidence indicates clearly that changes of a very dramatic - indeed almost an astonishing - nature occurred in Frederick's lifetime. Virtually every aspect of Sicilian life, from trade practices and market structures to marriage patterns, religious life, and social organization, differed significantly in 1337 from what it had been in 1282, and continued to change as the island's internal problems grew worse during the civil wars that followed Frederick's death. Certainly the most striking and influential development was a radical decline in the population. Precise estimates have varied, but the central fact seems clear enough: owing to war, the Black Death, famine, emigration, and a declining birth-rate, Sicily lost as many as two-thirds of its

11

non modica, que nemini prohibetur . . . multi ex ipsis civibus intendebant concurrere ad impendiendum cockam eandem insurgentes et clamantes contra dictum Benchium [the Peruzzi representative] onerare volentem cockam existentem in portu eiusdem." FAA 1, p. 179: "guta que cavat lapidem, non vi sed sepe cadendo." Cf. ACA Gartas James II, no. 5669, 10248, 10270,10272.

The international scene

35

12

population in the years from 1282 to 1376. From a pre-Vespers high of roughly 850,000 the demographic base collapsed to no more than 350,000. All considerations of what happened during Frederick's reign must be viewed in this essential, appalling context, and all judgments of the relative achievements and failures of late medieval Sicily must take into account the extraordinary challenge that this demographic hemorrhage represented for the island. Of course, Sicily was not alone in this. The fourteenth century was indeed, in the words of one historian, an "age of adversity" for all of Europe; but no other European state of the time confronted so disastrous and total a collapse of its demographic base as did Sicily, an island that had been rather lightly populated even in palmier days.13 The damage wrought by this decline was felt in every aspect of life from agriculture, which responded to the challenge by restructuring its farming and marketing techniques, to ecclesiastical administration, which hobbled along with an ever growing number of vacancies on the parish level. Tax assessments from 1277, 1283 (a partial record, for western Sicily only), and 1374-6 document the decline. Val di Mazara suffered the worst: Palermo's population (the city plus its surrounding district) fell from a pre-Vespers height of nearly 100,000 to somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 only a generation after Frederick's death; Corleone shrank from 30,000 to 6,000; Castronovo fell from 13,000 to 4,000; Sciacca from 8,000 to 5,000; and Calatafimi's population dropped from 5,500 to less than 1,700. The Val Demone records are inferior for 1376 (especially since figures for Messina are missing), but the surviving statistics are somber enough: Cefalu lost over 75 percent of its population, declining from 11,000 to 2,000; Randazzo shrank from 20,000 to 6,000; and Gangi survived with only 1,800, after a pre-Vespers high of 5,000. In the Val di Noto, which was the most dynamic region in terms of its demography since it received most of the emigrating population from the ravaged Val di Mazara, the least amount of change in absolute numbers is recorded: Terranova (modern Gela) collapsed ruinously from 22,000 to 2,000, and Castrogiovanni's populace ebbed from 12

13

Franco D'Angelo, "Terra e uomini della Sicilia medievale, secoli XI-XIII," Quaderni medievali 6 (1978), 51-94; Carmelo Trasselli, "Ricerche su la popolazione di Sicilia nel secolo XV," Atti delVAccademia di scienze, lettere, e arti di Palermo, 4th ser. 15 (1954—5), See also Bresc, Un monde, pp. 59-77; and Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 33-72. Robert E. Lerner, The Age of Adversity: The Fourteenth Century (Cornell, 1968).

2I

3~7 I -

36

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

10,000 to 5,000; but Noto, Caltanissetta, Siracusa, and Modica all increased in size, from 4,500 to 6,800, 750 to 3,300, 8,000 to 8,800, and 1,500 to 3,000, respectively.14 The hardest hit region, the Val di Mazara - always the poorest region in the kingdom, but the heart of cereal production - lost over 250,000 inhabitants in total, falling from 350,000 to 100,000, due to the fact that its population traditionally had been centered in a small number of large settlements with vast empty spaces between. When Angevin armies attacked, or when famine and disease struck (or when they were imposed upon them, as occurred in the civil wars of the 1340s and 1350s in the form of baronial sieges and deliberate starvings), these large centers became scenes of mass death. So severe was the decay that these cities, once thriving commercial and manufacturing centers, became characterized by "overflowing cesspools lying between houses, as in Trapani; mounds of filth heaped in the streets, as in Palermo, and sometimes, as in Noto, piled so high as to block the entrance to the church; chamber pots dumped on the heads of passers-by, as in Nicosia; the corpses of animals lying everywhere; streets cluttered with wild swine who knock to the ground priests trying to bestow last rites on the dying, or who rush to eat the dead bodies strewn in the cemetery, as in Corleone; and offal thrown from town walls, as in Malta, until the very moats are stuffed solid."15 In circumstances as calamitous as these one would expect to find a breakdown of social order, and not surprisingly mass riots, the spread of heresy, a sharp rise in crime, and other extreme acts became commonplace. But so did less dramatic, though ultimately just as important, phenomena such as migration and the gradual 14

15

All figures are approximate, of course. They are based on a simple calculation of the number of assessed hearths, in each tax roll, at a rate of 00.03.00, with an average of five persons per hearth. Thus Galatafimi, for example, was assessed a total tax of 110.00.00 in 1277, which represents 1,100 hearths, or approximately 5,500 people. In 1376 the assessor counted 335 hearths, roughly 1,675 people. Calculating five people per hearth is not excessive even in a period of much warfare, disease, and famine, when one takes into account the number of tax-exempt individuals (clergy, aristocracy, those to whom special privileges had been granted), who comprised perhaps 15 percent of the population. Another consideration is that as the population decreased, many people (especially widows and their children) lived together in multi-family (though not multigenerational) households, which contributed to keeping the number of people per hearth relatively constant. Nevertheless, using a lower multiplier merely decreases the absolute numbers; the degree of decline remains the same. See Beloch, Bevb'lkerungsgeschichte Italiens, pp. 92-9, 159—60; Epstein, An Islandfor Itself] pp. 40-50, with Table 2.1. Carmelo Trasselli, "Aspetti della vita materiale," in SDS m, pp. 601-21 at 609.

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37

alteration of market structures and trade techniques. These responses to the island's challenges helped the economy to recover significantly by the middle of the fifteenth century; but their more immediate consequences, for the fourteenth, were severe dislocation and poverty. Thousands of Sicilians streamed from the poorer Val di Mazara into the more stable (because more economically diversified) Val di Noto and Val Demone, deserting farms and towns at roughly equal rates. Indeed, evidence of neglect and desertion is everywhere.16 Giacoma Baldinoto's taverna in Sciacca was reduced to "a ruin, wasted with age and practically useless."17 Francesco Tuderto in 1305 bartered away lands he held near Agrigento "because of the condition of the place, which would require huge sums and expenses to maintain."18 The abbot of S. Filippo di Fragala gave away-without seeking any compensation whatsoever - the church building, lands, rights, and appurtenances of the church of S. Nicola di Pergario, because they had "no perceivable use or value; on account of the damage wrought by the on-going wars the said church has been destroyed and devastated . . . the vineyards have been cut down and demolished . . . and the lands, on account of the defection of the farmers living there, have been rendered barren and sterile."19 In 1321 the bishop of Cefalu traded away the castellum of Monte Pollina because he could no longer afford the upkeep of the site, mentioning particularly the cost of repairing the stone walls, even though the annual income from the castle was "perhaps thirty or forty gold ounces, or even more."20 And in 1328-30 the bishop of Agrigento, who as one of the largest landholders in the Val di Mazara saw his bishopric's economic base erode catastrophically, lacked for cash so badly that he was forced to sell "all the temporal rights, revenues, and profits" 16

Henri Bresc, "L'habitat medieval en Sicile (i 100-1450)," in Atti del colloquio di archeologia medievale, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1976), 1, pp. 186-97 at 190. 17 ACA Perg. James II, no. 465 (8 Feb. 1294): "ruynosa et vetustate corrupta et prorsus inutilis." is BCP, MS Qq H 6, fol. 216-25V (2 July 1305). 19 Silvestri, Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala, doc. 6 (4 March 1305): "nullam utilitatem seu comodum extitit consecutum; cum quia preteritarum guerrarum discrimina predicta ecclesia dirupta et devastata extitit; cum etiam quia quedam vinea spectans dicte ecclesie per tune inimicos et hostes incisa, destructa et devastata fuit, et terre etiam spectans dicte ecclesie defectu habitatorum non existentium in predictis partibus efTecte sunt gerbe et steriles et nullius redditus et proventus." 20 A S P Tabulario Cefalu, perg. 95 (5 Sept. 1321): "forte unciarum auri triginta vel quatraginta ad plus." See also pergs. 96-8.

38

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

of his own cathedral church to a local notary in return for 600 gold ounces.21 As peasant laborers in the western districts fled to the cities (where wages had doubled, and in some cases tripled, on account of the labor shortage), baronial incomes fell precipitously, causing many to resort to heavy-handed measures to shore up their finances.22 In the Val Demone, by contrast, where the greatest number of peasant freeholds existed, desperate smallholders who could no longer support themselves or a family bequeathed their lands to local churches in so great a number that the churches themselves could not administer them and had to resort to a record number of emphytheusis contracts, if any good was to be had of the land at all.23 Destruction of the land and the movement, whether forced or otherwise, of the populace undermined grain production and resulted in decreased royal revenues - since the gabelle figured among the most important sources of income - and in a recurring series of food shortages. Food crises, variously severe, occurred in 1311-13, 1316, 1322-4, 1326, 1329, and 1335.24 And since the major Angevin campaigns against Sicily - apart from the more commonplace smaller-scale pirate raids - occurred in 1314, 1316-17, 1321, 1323, 1325-6, 1327, 1333, and 1335, it is difficult not to posit their complicity in the economic and social chaos of the second half of Frederick's reign. 21

BCP, MS Qq H 6, fol. 480-3 (7 Sept. 1333): "omnia jura temporalia, redditus, et proventus sue majoris Agrigentine ecclesie," to Notar Gofiredo Curatore. Witness the fall in Francesco di Ventimiglia's finances; although he was one of the largest landholders in the realm, by 1322 his agricultural income was less than three-quarters his annual expenditures. See Enrico Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali di Sicilia dai normanni agli aragonesi (Milan, 1974), Pubblicazioni a cura della Facolta di giurisprudenza dell'Universita di Palermo, vol. xxxvi, pp. 109-16. On labor wages, see Epstein, An Island for Itself] p. 56 and notes. 23 Witness the bequests and subsequent sublets of Messina's abbey of S. Maria del Carmelo: ASM Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria del Carmelo, perg. 32, 36, 37, 41, 87, 88; or of Catania's church of S. Maria de Licodia: ASC Archivio dei Benedettini, Corda 56, fol. 5V—6 (listing eighteen such transactions). By 1329 the bishop of Siracusa had granted no less than thirty-three emphytheusis contracts for excess lands that his church could not work directly; see BCP MS Qq H 5, fol. 88-9V. 24 The best documentation exists for the shortages of 1311—12 and 1325-6, owing to the survival of curial records for Palermo in those years, see Ada curie 1 and v,passim. See also Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 136-50, with full notes. Food shortages of a temporary nature occurred whenever there was a protracted siege of any city. The siege of Messina ca. 1297-8, for example, reduced the populace to eating dogs and mice, until rescue provisions arrived under the command of Roger de Flor (later the leader of the Catalan Company in the east); see Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. vi, ch. 2. 22

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But was the war itself so much at fault? The demographic shift from western Sicily to eastern, and from unfortified settlements to forticilia, actually began sometime in the 1220s as a result of Frederick II Hohenstaufen's attacks on the numerous Muslim communities in the realm.25 Hence the fourteenth-century decline, for all its severity, was only an acceleration of a long-developing trend. And certainly the Black Death - which arrived in Messina in 1347, ravaged the island for two years, and then recurred in 1366 accounts for much, perhaps even most, of the population loss from 1282 to 1376. Still, conditions established in Frederick's lifetime undoubtedly prepared the way for the epidemic, since over 50 percent of the population lived in the coastal demesne cities from the start of the Vespers, and the percentage continued to rise throughout the rest of the reign; crowding, poverty, poor sanitation, and periodic though recurring undernourishment all ensured the plague's effectiveness once it arrived in port. In the larger cities fetid garbage heaps (sterquilinia) threatened public health from mid-reign.26 Filthy conditions in Palermo, for example, led to an outbreak of tertian fever in 1328 that nearly killed Frederick and his co-regent son Peter, and afterwards prompted municipal officials to hire a general physician-to-the-public.27 Moreover, dislocation of the populace contributed to an observable decline in birth-rates. As the economy grew unsteady more and more Sicilians delayed marriage until they felt secure of their ability to support a family; this inevitably resulted in a curtailment of the number of childbearing years for most women. Nor should the loss of life in the wars, whether foreign or civil, be too readily dismissed. Six thousand Sicilian men perished in the battle of Capo d'Orlando alone, on 4 July 1299, for example. Extant wills and commercial records denote a constantly increasing percentage of widows in society. Marriages thus delayed, then cut short by early death, 25 26 27

Bresc, Un monde, p. 791; Abulafia, "The E n d o f M u s l i m Sicily," in Muslims under Latin Rule, ed. James M. Powell (Princeton, 1991), pp. 108-9. Ada curie vi, p. xlvi. Ada curie v, doc. 42—5 (25—31 D e c . 1328), 4 6 (2 J a n . 1329). T h e physician hired, M. G i a c o m o Corneto, was awarded a salary of 40.00.00, making him the highest paid civil servant in the city. Since the universitas lacked the funds, however, his salary was guaranteed by a group of ten barons (D. Giovanni Calvello, D. Giovanni de Milite, D. Guido Filangieri, D. Giovanni di Caltagirone, D. Simone d'Esculo, D. Senatore di Maida, D. Giovanni di Maida, D. Matteo di Maida, D. Guglielmo Podioviridi, and another D. Giovanni di Caltagirone - a baron from S. Stefano); ibid., doc. 47.

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

brought about ever fewer births in relation to the ever rising mortality. Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact of Sicily's international relations and conflicts on her domestic economic and social developments it is necessary to look at more than simply the on-again, off-again violence along the Sicilian and Calabrian coastlines, and to see the kingdom's relations in their full complexity and interrelation. In one way or another, the Sicilian problem affected nearly all the diplomatic concerns of the age within the Mediterranean world. Without regaining the island, Angevin hopes to press eastward into Byzantium were impossible; James of Catalonia knew that he could not undertake his conquest of Sardinia without first securing some sort of lasting peace for his wayward brother in Messina;28 the northern Ghibellines recognized, cynically but accurately, that their chances for success depended heavily upon the Sicilians keeping Robert preoccupied with matters close to home;29 and the papacy, still keen to promote crusading, realized, in Boniface VTIFs words, that "the rescue of the Holy Land depends for the greatest part on the recovery of Sicily" — a fact that cost him "immense mental efforts, sleepless nights" and "innumerable expenses."30 Everyone, in short, had some sort of interest in the island. But the Sicilians had their interests too, and were themselves fully engaged — albeit in a lesser degree, owing to their more limited resources - in a tangled web of social and political issues beyond their shores. II EARLY SUCCESSES AND HEIGHTENED HOPES, I 2 9 6 - 1 3 1 3

A series of alliances, both formal and informal, provided the basic framework for most of Sicily's foreign entanglements. In addition to Catalonia, with whom an obviously close and necessary relationship had been established, the islanders forged ideological and practical ties with the duchy of Athens, Henry VII of Luxembourg, the Ghibellines of northern Italy, and finally and perhaps most desperately with Louis the Bavarian. With the exception of the Catalan connection, though, none of these allegiances brought Sicily any 28 29 30

A C A Cane. R e g . 338, fol. 49-49V (17 Apr. 1320). A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 6217 (27 J u n e 1319). Reg. Boniface VIII, no. 2663, 3871, 5348.

The international scene particular benefit and indeed most had profoundly harmful results; but reasons existed - sometimes compelling reasons - for the formation of each link. By tracing the development of each tie, the numerous pressures and constraints upon Sicily become apparent; and what emerges from this is the fact that the "international problem" of Sicily, while it did not create or directly cause the island's radical social and economic difficulties, certainly catalyzed, aggravated, and extended them. A Sicily left unmolested by Angevin belligerence, unhobbled by papal interdict, unencumbered by ruinous Ghibelline allegiances, and unhindered by Genoese, Pisan, and Venetian economic warfare, would have fared better against the various disasters of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, the intrigues and entanglements that ensnared the kingdom harmed it less by their directly damaging effects than by the limitations they increasingly placed on the Sicilians' options and thus their abilities to help themselves. The Caltabellotta treaty (1302) recognized Frederick as legitimate sovereign of "Trinacria" (an ancient Greek name for the island) for the remainder of his life, and awarded him control of the surrounding islands of Malta, Gozo, Pantelleria, Limosa, Lampedusa, and the Lipari. The odd title would later prove troublesome, but for the moment it seemed an acceptable, if awkward, compromise. Both sides agreed to exchange all prisoners of war, to relinquish occupied territories, and to grant amnesty to all subjects who had opposed them during the war. Of particular concern were some Calabrian castles and settlements that the Sicilians had captured - Reggio di Calabria, Motta S. Giovanni, Bagnara, and some others - since ensuring safe passage through the Strait of Messina was essential for the Sicilians until normal economic relations between the Val Demone and the southern peninsula recommenced. They were determined to hold firmly onto all these sites. Naples, of course, demanded their return, but agreed that the general peace could not be delayed on their account and so consented to leave them in Sicilian hands until a separate agreement regarding them could be reached. The treaty also arranged Frederick's marriage to Charles IPs daughter, Eleanor. This had significance beyond the symbolic, for the union drew the Catalan royal house still closer to that of the Angevins, coming as it did on the heels of James's own marriage to Charles's other daughter, Blanche. Eleanor was a suitable match for Frederick - young,

41

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

attractive, and susceptible to the same evangelical spirit that soon caught Frederick in its grip. Frederick in turn vowed to restore all ecclesiastical possessions in Sicily to the status they had held prior to 1282 - a major, though unavoidable, compromise on his part, considering the extraordinarily high number of lands stolen during the war by Sicily's aggressive barons. Finally, Caltabellotta stipulated that the throne, upon Frederick's death, was to revert to Charles II or his heir in Naples, who would in turn compensate Frederick's own heir with military assistance adequate to conquer a suitable substitute realm (possibly Cyprus), or with a single payment of 100,000 gold ounces.31 The treaty did not please Boniface VIII - few things did. Nonetheless, he dispatched two nuncios to lift the interdict under which the island had labored for two decades.32 Ecclesiastical reform took precedence over all other actions, once peace was established, probably at Boniface's insistence. Episcopal vacancies were filled, earlier appointments were reconfirmed, and efforts were made to recruit new clergy and to reestablish ecclesiastical discipline. Restored to communion with the church, Sicily was also restored to its tax rolls: henceforth an annual census of 3,000 gold ounces would be exacted, although, as we shall see, seldom paid. Relations with Catalonia after 1302 did not so much improve as simply become more overt. To explain this, a brief digression is necessary. Catalan intentions for Sicily had been suspect ever since Peter the Great died in 1285 - and indeed, for many Sicilians that suspicion had never wavered since the Catalans' arrival in 1282. But despite lurking fears, royal policy seemed clear enough while Peter lived; Sicily would remain as a permanent, constituent part of the Crown of Aragon, administered independently (as were Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca) yet sharing the same monarch as the Iberian realms. Far from being unique, this sort of confederation had typified Mediterranean empires since ancient times and, within limits, suited the needs of both ruler and ruled. It gave the 31

32

Manuel de Bofarull and RafTaele Starrabba, "Documento inedito riguardante la esecuzione di uno dei patti della pace di Caltabellotta (1302)," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 4 (1879-80), 189-92; Vicente Salavert y Roca, "Jaime II de Aragon: inspirador de la paz de Caltabellotta," in Studi in onore di Riccardo Filangieri, 3 vols. (Naples, 1959), 1, pp. 361-8; Vincenzo D'Alessandro, Politica e societa nella Sicilia aragonese (Palermo, 1963), p. 191. Reg. Boniface VIII, no. 5023-4; for J a m e s ' s reaction, see A C A Cane. R e g . 334, fol. 89-89V.

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Catalans access to a resource-rich and strategically placed foothold in the central Mediterranean, leaving them in an enviable position to dominate the trade of the western basin; and it offered the Sicilians protection from peninsular aggression while making available to them a host of new markets and a steady supply of commercial credit. It is true that the Catalans and Sicilians were foreign to each other, in terms of culture, language, and social organization, and that successful assimilation would be a challenge; but the difficulty of establishing a durable convivencia in Sicily in 1282 surely appeared less daunting a task than had the building of a stable, or even a barely functional, modus vivendi in overwhelmingly Muslim Valencia in 1254. Peter's sudden death in late 1285, however, threatened to bring all such hopes to ruin. Fearing reprisals from Rome, including even a crusade against the entire Crown, once his considerable presence left the scene, he stipulated in his will that his territories be divided between his two eldest sons: the eldest, Alfonso IV ("the Liberal"), inherited the Iberian titles, while second-born James ("the Just," or sometimes "the Wily") received the Sicilian throne. For the next six years the two kings worked to preserve the linkage between their realms. Alfonso, facing baronial rebellion in upland Aragon while trying to assert his claim over Majorca, needed the help that Sicily could offer by way of foodstuffs, trade revenues, and men. James's need to preserve the link even exceeded Alfonso's, since the island, left to itself, had no chance of repelling Angevin advances even in the best of circumstances; but the deep distrust with which Sicily's barons (especially those in the Val di Mazara and Val di Noto) viewed James seriously undermined his position, and hence that of all the Catalans living under his rule. It was all he could do to preserve a shaky status quo in the face of growing doubts of the viability of the Crown's continued control of the island. When Alfonso himself died, childless, in 1291, the total confederation fell into James's hands. Had he been able to build up a measure of good-will and trust with the Sicilians up to that point, James might have succeeded in uniting permanently the vast territories he now commanded, but Sicilian suspicions ran high on account of the news that Alfonso, just prior to dying, had agreed to withdraw all Crown support for Sicily in return for peace with the church in the Iberian lands. The Sicilians, in other words, would once again be abandoned and left exposed to the returning Angevins. James's efforts to

44

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

dispel rumors that he intended to sacrifice Sicily, but keep it permanently within the union, failed to satisfy the islanders, who gradually turned for protection, in no very organized way, to James's younger brother Frederick, who had been left in control of the kingdom as James's viceroy. Frederick was loyal to the Crown, but was also passionately devoted to the Sicilian cause, and his odd bravura, it was believed, would never allow him to surrender the island while he thought that the fight could be won on the battlefield. It is possible, and indeed likely, that James had counted on his brother's obstinacy all along, and thus could retain Catalan rule even while protesting that Frederick's refusal to relinquish the island was a rogue campaign beyond his control. Matters stood thus stalemated for four years after James's succession. But by 1295 Rome, Naples, and Capetian Paris had put together a unified front against the growing Catalan hegemony. The pope excommunicated James, placed an interdict on the Crown lands, and called for a French crusade against Catalonia. Faced by such resistance, James capitulated. In 1295 he agreed to the Treaty of Anagni, whereby, in order to secure his Iberian titles, he renounced forever his claim to Sicily and vowed to assist the Angevins in dislodging Frederick and his now discredited supporters.33 After this, relations between Catalonia and Sicily understandably became greatly strained. Reaction to the news on the island was characteristically swift and violent. Many urban and rural elites called for the removal of all Catalans from the island, and many indeed took up arms in open revolt. Those who supported Frederick, however, carried the day, seeing in the young prince and his retinue the only force capable of withstanding Angevin advances while still holding the island together. Consequently, they chose him to be their king, and he was crowned in Palermo. The new king defeated the rebels in a few months, confiscated their lands, and then renewed the campaign against Naples. After some initial resentment over James's apparent betrayal, Sicily's new regime recognized that James had managed to leave a loophole in the treaty, one that made room for Catalonia's continued link with its 33

FAA 1, docs. 43-9; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. n, ch. 20-5; Vicente Salavert y Roca, "El Tratado de Anagni y la expansion mediterranea de la Corona de Aragon," EEMCA 5 (1952), 209-360 and "La pretendida traicion de Jaime II de Aragon contra Sicilia y los Sicilianos," EEMCA 7 (1962), 599-622.

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newest satellite. James's gains by Anagni - recognition as king of Aragon, lifting of the papal interdict on Catalonia, and the cancellation of the French invasion - had been made conditional not upon the actual removal of Frederick and his supporters but only upon James's contribution, however slight, to achieving that goal. It was a hazardous stratagem, but in the end it proved successful. Catalan relations with Sicily, both economic and strategic, continued right through to the end of the war. The Catalans, indeed, managed to avoid direct involvement in the conflict for two years after 1295, sending only enough ancillary ships and recruits to Naples as needed to fulfill the minimum requirements set by the pact.34 "Frederick could be captured if James truly wanted it," wrote Roger de Lauria, the hot-headed Catalan admiral who had a personal dislike for Frederick.35 But James had no desire to capture his renegade brother, and instead had every intention of keeping Sicily within the Catalan orbit. And the scheme to wage a pseudo-war while secretly retaining relations with the island was no surprise to the Sicilians. In 1298, after one of James's minor contributions to the Angevin war-chest, Frederick wrote of his great pleasure at the cleverness of it all: once again James "has completely fulfilled his obligation to the Roman curia in regard to the promises he made to it . . . and if he has not fully rigged out [Charles's] armada . . . it's not his fault, and he cannot be blamed."36 Exchanges of ambassadors, diplomatic pacts, and commercial agreements continued unabated; and trade, though forbidden by the pact, may actually have increased, although it was conducted via third parties in a clandestine network.37 Sicilian grain, for 34 35

36

37

For the loophole, see Salavert y Roca, "El Tratado de Anagni," docs. 3 0 - 3 . FAA 1, docs. 47 and 71. A m o n g the Angevins* strongest desires at this time was to have de Lauria ( t h e most capable admiral t h e n alive) assigned to their c o m m a n d , but J a m e s steadfastly refused his permission. See A C A Perg. J a m e s II, extra inventario, no. 503; and Cane. Reg. 252, fol. 171. J a m e s , even after he had b e e n forced to mount a substantive attack on Sicily (under threat of another interdict and French invasion), immediately relinquished all the lands he had m a n a g e d t o take; see A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 1185. O n de Lauria's personal vendetta against Frederick, see Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. m, ch. 8-22; on his military career in general, see J o h n H. Pryor, "The Naval Battles of Roger ofLauria,"Journal of Medieval History 9 (1983), 179-216. FAA 1, doc. 35: "havia complidament feyt son deute envers la cort de R o m a de tot 50 que promes li havia . . . s'il senyor rey d'Arago n o complia la armada . . . no era en falta sua . . . no era culpa del senyor rey d'Arago." See also A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9775—6. A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 3335, 10179-80, 10205-6, 10210, 10233, I O 273~4-

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

example, was sold and shipped to Genoa, and the Genoese merchants then resold the grain to merchants in Barcelona. Money, clothing, and arms were shipped from Barcelona to Palermo via merchants in Tunis.38 And large numbers of Catalan adventurers joined in the fight against Naples, many acting no doubt out of mercenary motives, but many too fighting out of conviction. The county of Empuries in particular supported the Sicilians fervently.39 But support for Sicily, whether based on principle or (more likely) the practical concern for keeping the island in the Catalan orbit, ran high in all quarters. Blase d'Alago, Marti Talach, Bernat de Ripoll, Guillem Galcera, Pong Queralt, Bernat Queralt, Gerau Ponts and Pere de Puigvert all formed companies of knights and infantry — notably the almogavers - to join in the fight; and they were joined at times by Guillem d'Entenga, Sang d'Antillo, and count Ermengol X of Urgell.40 Worse yet for the Angevins, much of the money used to pay for the Catalan contributions to the war came from the Angevins themselves; the Catalans merely redirected a portion of the grants and subsidies they received from Naples and Rome, without which, they claimed, they could not hope to fulfill their military obligation.41 With the war over in 1302, Catalan dissembling, transparent though it had been, ended, and full diplomatic and commercial relations were openly established. All the years of secrecy and suspicion had left a mess, however, and a good deal of confusion had to be cleared away first. Economic affairs between the two lands had become considerably jumbled on account of the forced clandestine nature of the trade and because many of the individuals involved, had they been found out by the papacy and the Angevins, faced censure, arrest, and confiscation of their goods until their claims could be

38 39 40 41

Abulafia, "Catalan Merchants" (see n. 2, above), pp. 232-41. A C A Cane. R e g . 252, fol. 149; Speciale, Historia siculay bk. 11, ch. 25. A n o t h e r loyal recruiter for the Sicilian cause was R a m o n Oulomar; see A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 756. A C A Cane. R e g . 252, fol. 165V, 167, 219; Perg. J a m e s II, no. 629, 641, 855-6; Cartas James II, no. 10207-9. ACA Cartas James II, no. 334, 338; Perg. James II, no. 2019; Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 112, 120, 203, 601. See also Housley, The Italian Crusades (see n. 6, above), pp. 177, 201—2, with notes. For examples of the military restrictions placed upon those Catalans who did take the field against Sicily, see ACA Cane. Reg. 334, fol. 23V—24V.

The international scene settled in court or pardons could be granted. Pong Hug d'Empuries, for example, who had remained in Sicily after Caltabellotta to serve as marshal, had had his Catalan lands and titles stripped from him by a reluctant James, at papal insistence; Asnar Peris and his brother Montaner had to plead for restoration of their confiscated estates near Bolea, in Aragon; and a Barcelona woman, Saura de Torrelles, had to sue for the return of certain commercial properties in Sicily that had been in her family's hands since 1282. Resolving these cases monopolized much of the Sicilian government's attention in the first three years after Caltabellotta, but were vital to assuring the access to capital and credit needed to begin economic recovery.42 Unknown to the papacy and to Naples, however, a new clandestine alliance was forged between Sicily and Catalonia after Caltabellotta that included another dynastic union, so that henceforth each realm would come to the aid of the other in war; and should either king or their heirs die intestate, the two states would become one under the surviving monarch, thus in effect recreating the vast united kingdom of their father Peter. This arrangement aimed to guarantee the Catalans' dominance in the western Mediterranean and, from Sicily, to extend their influence further eastward; and although the pact was short-lived, it offers proof of Catalan intentions to hold onto Sicily permanently. The idea came from Sicily and presumably from the parliament itself since that body, by Frederick's grant in 1296, possessed full authority over foreign policy. James initially hesitated at the offer, fearing the possible repercussions from papal opposition; but ultimately he endorsed the idea, and indeed it appears to have been he who 42

AGA Cartas James II, no. 9760, 9778, 9781-3, 9787, 9831, 9853, 9858-61, 9911, 10032; Perg. James II, no. 1359, 1899. The two kingdoms ultimately expedited matters by integrating their administrative records; the idea originated with James, who wrote to Frederick on 9 June 1303 and proposed the consolidation of all records regarding land tenure, commercial holdings, and trade privileges. See Ganc. Reg. 334, fol. 163V: "Cum scripta receptarum aliarumque amministrationum contractarum et factarum per officiales Cathalanos Aragonensesve, quocumque nomine, premissa nominaretur officia, a tempore citra quo comunis pater illustrissimus dominus rex Petrus memorie recolende insulam Siciliam suo submisit dominio, usque ad tempus quo nos eiusdem terre regimen duximus . . . Fraternitatem Vestram ex corde precamur, quatenus omnia scripta premissarum receptarum aliarumque amministrationum premissarum diligenter proquiri mandetis et faciatis ac proquisita nobis per fidelem et familiarem nostrum Riccardum de Bona Morte [sicl], quern hac ratione ad Vestram presentiam transmittimus."

47

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

suggested the dynastic union aspect of the pact. The act was formalized in August 1304.43 Expansionist ambitions in both realms were fed almost immediately. James's 1295 P a c t with the church had awarded him title to the island of Sardinia, should he be able to muster the force needed to take it from its Pisan masters. Sardinia's importance to the Crown was comparable to that of Sicily itself: it offered both a strategic location from which to protect the eastern approach to the Balearics and to harass Genoese and Pisan trade routes, and a steady source of staple items like grain and salt (although the Catalans later profited most from the exploitation of newly discovered silver mines there). But just as important, for James, was the need to conquer something. For three generations the rulers of Catalonia-Aragon had aggressively expanded their borders in pursuit of new markets and in the name of Christ; and the expectation that James would continue in the good cause was high, especially after his appointment by Boniface VIII as "admiral and captain-general of the church." With his Sicilian connections assured by the new alliance, James began to prepare for the campaign. The plan to take Sardinia proved to be surprisingly popular in Sicily, where it was viewed as proof positive that James had not wavered after all from the goal of upsetting the GenoesePisan-Angevin balance of power that had so long dominated the western sea. The pact obliged the Sicilians to help, and they were eager to do so. Over the years they contributed exceptionally large amounts of money, men, and materiel. 44 Corrado Doria, the Sicilian admiral, was among the first to serve; he placed himself under James's command almost immediately after the parliament's confirmation of the new alliance. 45 But James, as during the last years of the Vespers, when the papacy forced his hand against Frederick, proved to be a reluctant warrior. From the moment of Corrado Doria's signing on, and many times later, the Sardinian campaign was initially delayed and soon thereafter cancelled 43

44 45

A C A C a n e . R e g . 334, fol. 162—162V, 162V—163,164,164V—165, i66v—167,169V-170, 170V; P e r g . James II, no. 2035, 2037, 2039, 2042, 2052, 2070; Cartas James II, no. 9771, 9777, 9832-3, 9876. The only stipulation James added was that Catalonia need not support Sicily if the Sicilians waged an offensive war on Naples. V i c e n t e Salavert y Roca, Cerdenay la expansion mediterrdnea de la Corona deAragon, 1297-1314, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1956), CSIC estudios medievales, vol. xxvi, is the best study to date. ACA Cartas James II, no. 9770 (6 Aug. 1304).

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because of sudden pressing concerns in Spain (notably James's Vail d'Aran dispute with France, and the campaign against Granada), and because of James's innate overcautiousness. Sardinia was always on his mind, but was always being deferred by other matters, and in the end the invasion did not occur until 1325. But plans to invade were prepared, money collected, arms purchased, ships rigged, and men recruited, many times over the years. And in each instance Sicilian subsidies were raised: in 1304, 1308,1311,1312,1317, 1320, 1322, and 1323. Many of these subsidies were quite large. In April 1320, for example, Sicily rigged out forty galleys (each of which usually represented between twenty-five and forty men, plus supplies) and twelve horse-transport ships, and furnished between 150 and 160 knights; by December, hoping that this time the campaign actually would come to pass, the kingdom had added an additional thirty galleys and 120 archers to the total. 46 Such high costs could not be supported for long. At stake were not only the immediate expenses (severe enough) of procuring the necessary equipment and paying the salaries of the fighting men, but also the cost in lost revenues, since most of the ships assigned to these fleets were simply trading ships commandeered for military service in the traditional practice of the medieval Mediterranean. Thus the 1320 subsidy represented no fewer than seventy trading ships taken out of commercial service for at least the period from April to December. If we calculate that each galley had a load-capacity of 500 salme of grain (a very conservative estimate - many galleys were capable of transporting over 800 or 1,000 salme), and that the price of grain at that time was around 00.07.00 per salma, then each ship represented a cost of 116.20.00 in terms of lost commerce, and the total fleet represented a loss of well over 8,000 gold ounces.47 In 46

47

ACA Cane. Reg. 338, fol. 49-49V (17 April 1320), 51 (27Jan. 1321); CartasJames II, no. 6535 (9 Dec. 1320), prompting the Catalan ambassador to Sicily to write back to James, regarding Sicily's contributions to the Sardinian war-chest: "Et en veritat, Senyor, que tots los de son consell, son de cor et d'enteniment de servir a Vos en totes coses. Axi propriament com al Senyor Rey Frederich, per 56 cor veen et entenen, que Vos et ell sots una cosa et entenen lo gran profit et el salvament que al regne de Sicilia ve, que Vos aiats Cerdenya. Senyor, yo Us dich en la mia fe, que si negun fill ne negun frare ha encor de esser obedient a pare, ne a frare, sia lo Senyor Rey Frederich de esser obedient a tot 56 que Vos volguestets ne manasets." ACA Cartas James II, no. 9802 (8 July 1304) details the shipment of 500 salme of grain, by royal grant, to the Cistercian monastery of Sant Creu, in the diocese of Barcelona. The load-capacity of trading ships varied widely, depending on the type of galley, and could reach amounts considerably greater than what is factored here. I have taken 500 salme as

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addition a direct loss of tax revenue (at 3 percent excise) of 250.00.00 was suffered for the entire fleet. Salaries had to be paid, too. Those who fought for the king (either as permanent, career sailors, or as temporary members of the coastal militia) earned 00.00.03 per day of service.48 Thus the seventy-ship fleet, comprising as many as 2,800 men serving for nine months, cost the king an additional 3,780.00.00 in salaries and wages. To this one must add as well the cost of supplies and food, which must have been substantial but which we have no adequate means to calculate. Omitting those expenses, the 1320 subsidy, in terms of actual cost plus lost revenue, can already be figured at more than 12,000 gold ounces - that is, well over half of the government's entire annual feudal income. This is admittedly a hypothetical calculation, one that assumes that each of the seventy ships was indeed a redirected merchant vessel, and that each of the ships carried a full contingent of men serving for the entire nine months; nevertheless, it is useful for suggesting the approximate expenses caused by Sicily's commitment to Catalonia. It is in the light of these continuing real costs to his purse, as well as his cocksure bravura, that we must view Frederick's brash offer, after he had grown impatient with his brother's excessive caution and constant delays, to undertake the entire conquest by himself and to deliver Sardinia to James as a gift.49 Anything would be better than these endless and fruitless expenses.

48

49

the most conservative estimate possible, on the unlikely assumption (since it was after all a military mission being organized) that all seventy of the ships involved in 1320 were of the smaller type used in 1304 by the Catalan monks. The Sant Francesc, a cargo ship belonging to Mateu Oliverdau, transported no fewer than 2,500 salme, plus a crew of sixty, out of Val di Mazara in 1298; see Le imbreviature del notaio Adamo di Citella a Palermo: 20 registro, I2g8-i2gg, ed. Pietro Gulotta (Rome, 1982), Fonti e studi del Corpus m e m b r a n a r u m italicarum, 3rd ser., 11, doc. 25. O n t h e price o f grain, I have used A S P Notai defunti, Reg. 1, fol. 12V-13 (9 Sept. 1323). S e e also Epstein, An Islandfor Itself ] p. 148 (Table 3.4). S e e Frederick's coronation laws, the Constitutiones regales, in T e s t a , ch. 33: "Compacientes marinariorum laboribus duris et mediis atque periculis edicimus et m a n d a m u s , quod postquam ipsi marinarii in armata generali receperint soldos et coeperint a locis, in quibus degunt, ad extolium proficisci, a die q u o abinde recesserint, et pervenerunt ad portum ubi fuerit usque quo galea rubea, c u m extolio coeperit feliciter navigare, habeat a curia quilibet pro sustenatione vite sue quo libet grana tria." Antonio Arribas Palau, La conquista de Cerdeha por Jaime II de Aragon (Barcelona, 1952), pp. 93-4. Assistance came from individuals within Sicily as well. Corrado Lancia di Castromainardo, for example, in 1314 led his own comitiva into Sardinia at his own expense, and while there acquired extensive information about Pisan defenses, supplies, and morale, which he in turn passed on to Barcelona; see ACA Cartas James II, no. 10198 (31 May 1314); cf. Matteo Sclafani's offer of aid, Cartas James II, no. 10136 (26 Nov. 1312).

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Besides, he had other things to spend his money on. Frederick's immediate priority post-Caltabellotta was to reward those individuals and municipalities whose service had helped to win the war and whose continued support was vital to keeping him on the throne. Lacking alternatives, he did this by opening his purse: he restored all municipal liberties and granted generous new privileges in recognition of unique wartime sacrifices, and in the uplands he turned a blind eye to many crimes and guaranteed all feudal land tenures to virtually any baron who had not opposed Catalan rule too openly, while awarding new tenures to members of the urban elite whose peninsular connections had proved valuable during the war.50 To spur investment in the economy, he standardized the tangled tariff code and stabilized excise taxes on most foreign trade at 3 percent; for domestic trade, he granted a great number of toll franchises, or exemptions from royal gabelle di dogana, both to reward wartime service and to attract capital to the demesne. The most favored cities were Messina, Palermo, Sciacca, and Siracusa, which together represented about one-fourth of the total population. Coupled with large-scale Catalan credit and investment, these incentives succeeded beyond expectation; and in the first decade after Caltabellotta Sicily's overall economy grew at a healthy rate, supplying the king with "an ample amount of money" that one historian has estimated as an annual income of between 120,000 and 168,000 gold ounces (or, according to his conversion figures, over 230,000 florins per year, which was roughly 50

For example, see ASP Cane. Reg. i, fol. 39 (30 Aug. 1302), granting tax exemption to "the burghers and inhabitants of Sciacca": "Considerantes integritatem devotionis et fidei, quam universi homines terre Sacce fideles nostri, necnon servitia nobis devote prestita, et que prestare possunt (dante Deo) gratiora, eis de liberalitate mera et speciali gratia et ex certa nostra scientia concedimus, quod burgenses et habitatores terre predicte Sacce pro mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et permissis per eos, tarn per mare quam per terram, sint liberi et immunes, et pro eisdem mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et permissis intrando, stando, et exeundo terra marique nullum jus dohane et alterius cuiuslibet dirittus propterea nostre Curie debitam eidem curie vel officialibus ipius curie, ad quorum hoc spectat et spectabit offlcium, exhibere et solvere teneantur. Quibus officialibus et personis privilegii tenore injungimus, quod eisdem burgensibus et habitatoribus Sacce penitam libertatem et immunitatem observent et faciant per aliquos observari." Cf. Reg. 2, fol. 66-9V, 70-2V, 73-73V, 84V-85, 85-85V, 86-8, 89-89V, 95-95V, 105V-106, IO6V-IO7, 107-107V. For some of the feudal grants and re-grants, see Enrico Mazzarese Fardella, // tabulario Belmonte (Palermo, 1983), DSSS 1st ser., xxx, doc. 13 (17 Oct. 1296); ACA Perg. James II, no. 856 (27 Aug. 1297); ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 41-4.1v (3 Apr. 1299); Sante Polica, "Carte adespote dell'Archivio Gargallo," Archivio storico siracusano, 2nd ser., 3 (1974), 15-47, doc. 2 (29 Jan. 1302); ASP Tab. Ospedale di S. Bartolomeo, perg. 1 (29 Dec. 1305).

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equal to the estimated annual income of the papacy at Avignon or of the Pisan commune at its height).51 They put this money to work advancing an ambitious campaign for the restoration of the church within Sicily, to which they were obliged by the Caltabellotta agreement.52 The government built scores of new churches and monasteries, restored all ecclesiastical privileges, confiscated from inland barons all the church lands and possessions they had stolen during the war, and returned these to the clergy. The government also helped to clarify the tangled jurisdictional affairs of the dioceses (the church of S. Lucia in Siracusa, for example, lay under the ecclesiastical authority of the bishop of Cefalii owing to a donation in 1140). Frederick also began to pay the annual census (3,000.00.00) to the Holy See, for which Sicily was in arrears. These things the government did out of obligation and expediency; but by 1305 matters had changed. In that year Frederick, who had already been exposed to reformminded mysticism by Catalan visionaries and preachers, fell under the spell of Arnau de Vilanova - the physician turned apocalyptic prophet who had fled to Messina after nearly losing his life to inquisitors at Perugia - and became convinced, as was Arnau himself, that he (Frederick) had been chosen by divine grace to be an instrument for the purification of Christendom. The end of the world was fast approaching, Arnau believed, with Antichrist's arrival expected as early as 1368, so there was little time to be lost. Moreover, the transfer of the Holy See to Avignon in 1305 not only validated but added potent urgency, in Frederick's eyes, to the call for apocalyptic reform. Since the pope at that time, Clement V, was a friend of Arnau's - although certainly one whose friendship became more distant with the advancing radicalization of the prophetic message — there was, for the moment, no need to interpret the move to Avignon as the fall from legitimacy of the papal office. Rather, it signified simply the dire need within Christendom for a new champion, a "God-elected king," in Arnau's words, who would save the church. Only later did the papacy's inability or refusal to return to Rome appear to the Sicilian radicals 51 52

Chronicon siculum, ch. 80: "amplia pecunia pervenit." See also Guenee, States and Rulers, p. 109 and table 1. M y article "The Papacy, the Sicilian Church, and K i n g Frederick III, 1302—1321," Viator 22 (1991), 229-49 discusses this campaign in detail. See also ch. 5, below.

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as a clear vitiation of spiritual authority; and the stubbornly antiSicilian policies of John XXII would eventually guarantee the shift in attitudes. But, in 1305, Clement's flight to France and Arnau's flight to Messina meant only one thing to the Sicilians who boarded the evangelical train: the Christian world was in the gravest danger, and Frederick, of all people, had been given unique responsibility for saving it. Being "inspired with the flame of the Holy Spirit and wanting with a most fervent desire to pass that Spirit on" to others, Frederick devoted himself with extraordinary energy to his new evangelical calling.53 He began to build "evangelical schools" throughout the kingdom, "for men and women alike, where both rich and poor are given instruction in that evangelical life which is the true Christianity... Some will be taught to preach while others will be trained in diverse languages, so that the truth of the Gospels may be made known to all, both pagans and schismatics." He appointed "evangelical teachers and writers in a number of tongues . . . and caused to be preached throughout the island that all who desire to live in evangelical poverty, from whatever land they may be, may come [to Sicily], for there they will receive protection and supply of all life's necessities."54 He welcomed to the kingdom groups of Franciscan Spirituals, the heterodox group most wedded to the idea of evangelical poverty, and encouraged the further study of their (and others') apocalyptic reckoning.55 And he began to think about a crusade. A victorious campaign to the Holy Land, combined with James's slow but steady successes 53 54

55

FAA 11, doc. 559; the words are James's. See also my article "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily" (see ch. i, n. 21, above); and ch. 5, below. A r n a u d e Vilanova, Obres catalanes, e d . M i q u e l Batllori, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1947), E l s nostres classics, obres completes dels escriptors Catalans medievals, at 1, pp. 220-1: "Lo rey Frederich, per si a comencat a bastir e a continuar escoles evangelicals, de mascles a una part e de fembres a altra, en les quals rics e pobres seran informats a vida evangelical, 50 es, de ver christia; e aquels qui seran abtes a preycar, oltra ago seran enformats en lengiies diverses, en tal manera que la veritat del Evangeli pusquen mostrar a tots, pagans o scismatics. E, a promocio d'ac.6, a procurat ja maestres e escriptures evangelicals en algunes lengiies, e procura en altres, e a feyt cridar per la ylla que tots aquells qui volran en paupertat evangelical viure, de qualque nacio sie, vagen la, car ell los dara proteccio e provisio en necessaris de vida." A number of manuscripts dating to these years still survive: works on astrological portents, alchemical treatises, copies of Abraham Abulafia's On the Light ofthe Intellect, etc. See, for example: Messina, Biblioteca universitaria MSS 29-30, 149; Trapani, Biblioteca Fardelliana MSS 9 (ex V.b.3), 12 (ex V.b.12); Palermo, Biblioteca comunale MSS Qq A 21, Qq F 31, 2 Qq E 4, 2 Qq E 5, 4 Qq A 10.

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against the Muslims in Granada, would surely prepare a purified Christendom for Antichrist's challenge, and would as well prove the House of Aragon's preordained role as the leader of the Christian world. It is important to see Frederick's evangelical calling for what it was - an extension, however radical, of his life-long belief in the destined greatness of the House of Aragon. His and James's father assumed near mythic proportions in his mind;56 and Peter's fight to free Sicily from Angevin hands did more than lead to Frederick's kingship: it defined his life's purpose. And this purpose was now given a new luster and urgency at the hands of the persuasive Arnau. How could he doubt it? Against long odds Sicily had won the Vespers war and was prospering; liberties were restored, the countryside was at peace, and churches, monasteries, and evangelical schools now dotted the landscape; James, with Frederick's help, seemed on the verge of taking Sardinia; and another group of Frederick's soldiers were well on their way to conquering Greece. Surely this was no accident. In these years, from 1305 to 1312, Frederick moved from strength to strength, and with utter conviction that he was fated to succeed. Failure was impossible. Thus, Sicily's eyes turned eastward. This was likely to have happened eventually even without the evangelical influence, given the island's traditional eastward orientation. The more prosperous east had always naturally drawn Sicilian economic interest, and was chiefly responsible for the more diverse, commerce-oriented economy of the Val Demone and Val di Noto; and after the Norman conquest in the eleventh century, Sicily's rulers had always had an eye on extending political power in Greece as a means of gaining a larger portion of eastern trade. A new opportunity appeared shortly after Caltabellotta when an embassy from the Byzantine emperor Andronicus II Palaeologos arrived in Messina, the center of the Sicilian-Greek population, urgently seeking aid in the fight against 56

In the minds of some Sicilians, Peter evidently had not even died; see ACA Perg. James II, no. 1495 (17 Dec. 1300), a property transaction in Catania dated "in the nineteenth year of Peter's happy reign." Others compared Peter's rescue of Sicily to Moses' liberation of the Israelites from the clutches of the Pharaoh; see De rebus regni Siciliae, ed. Giuseppe Silvestri (Palermo, 1882), doc. 367: "Multiphariis oppressionum et afflictionum generibus quibus tarn vos extra regnum Sicilie quam regnicole alii fideles nostri intus in regno ipso per huiusmodi hostem suosque sequaces diutina fuistis vexatione contriti, quarum fontis, si dici liceat, replevit ambitum orbis terre, pietatem humanitatis nostre subintrantibus et ad compassionis miserationem flectentibus divino sumpto auxilio a diris Pharaonis manibus Isreheliticum populum venimus liberare."

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the Turks. Relations with Constantinople had been good ever since Frederick's coronation, and indeed a marriage pact between Frederick's sister Jolanda and Andronicus' eldest son and heir Michael was briefly considered - which, had it been realized, would have resulted in a substantial strengthening of Sicily's eastern position vis-a-vis the Angevins and the northern Guelfs trading in that region.57 The Sicilians were also eager to displace the large number of Catalan mercenaries who, while they had proved to be indispensable during the war, posed a threat to the post-Caltabellotta world. These men, particularly the almogavers (specially armed Catalan light infantry) among them, knew no occupation other than war and did not adjust easily to the quieter life of farming and trade. And indeed they evinced no desire for such adjustment. Desclot's Crdnica describes these mercenaries as men who literally lived for war, preferring to sleep out of doors and to forage for their food; worse yet for a society trying to de-militarize, these men prided themselves on hardship and self-denial and positively disdained civilian life as a corrupt weakness. 58 In short, precisely the sort of ruffians to send hurriedly on their way. Consequently, the Sicilians signed a pact with the Byzantines, and a much relieved Frederick personally saw the fleet off - a force of over 6,000, together with their wives and children who followed in the hope of finding eastern lands to colonize.59 This "Catalan Company," as the group became known (although it contained a number of Sicilians), scored a quick string of victories against the Turks, but in so doing roused Andronicus' fears. He had grown chary that the Company's charismatic leader, Roger de Flor - the man who had broken the Angevin siege of Messina in 1298 - might aspire to more than what the Byzantines were prepared to reward him with for the Company's services. Consequently, Andronicus arranged Roger's murder in 1305, at which the outraged Company turned on their traitorous patron, allied themselves with the very Turks they had 57 58 59

A G A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10064. Desclot, Crdnica, ch. 49, 67, 79; Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 58. For background, s e e Ferran Soldevila, Els almogavers (Barcelona, 1952), Colleccio popular barcino, vol. CXLIX. Georgios Pachymeres, De Andronico Palaeologo (in Patrologia cursus completes, series graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857-87), vol. CXLIII), bk. 5, ch. 12, states that the force numbered 8,000; Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 199-201, 211 has an additional 300 cavalry and 1,000 almogavers following on the heels of the first contingent.

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been fighting, and ravaged the Greek countryside for six years with such ferocity that the curse "May the Catalan vengeance befall you!" entered folk usage and is still to be heard in rural areas. They attacked, in turn, Gallipoli, Thrace, and Macedonia, stopping even to besiege the monastery of Mount Athos, until finally in 1311, after some intrigues, they seized the duchy of Athens from the Angevin-linked Gautier V de Brienne and settled into a permanent occupation.60 By this point the soldiers, their wrath spent and their numbers depleted, had tired of war and wanted to establish a state that would be part of the same loose Catalan confederation that Sicily had joined. Fierce though they were, they recognized that they would need protection if they were to survive the inevitable attempts by Naples, the papacy, Constantinople, and the Venetians to drive them out; they would need some sort of administrative guidance as well, given their relative ignorance of everything but war-making. They preferred James's protection to that of Frederick, but James kept them at more than arm's length out of fear of upsetting his relations with Avignon and Paris, even though he recognized the value of a Catalan outpost in the area.61 And so they turned instead to Frederick who, after some initial hesitation, appointed his five-year-old son Manfred as "duke of Athens" and assigned Berenguer Estanyol d'Empuries to govern the duchy as vicar-general until Manfred came of age.62 For the next quartercentury Sicily held ultimate sovereignty over the province, which added a painful complication to Sicily's effort to win a secure place for itself among western states. Achaea, after all, had originated as a papally bestowed Angevinfief.Now, whether by prophetic design

60

For t h e c a m p a i g n , see M u n t a n e r , Cronica, ch. 228—39; A n t o n i R u b i o i Lluch, Documents per I'historia de la cultura catalana mig-eval, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1908-21), 1, doc. 36; R u b i o i Lluch, Diplomatari de VOrient catala, 1301-1409: Colleccio de documents per a la historia de Vexpedicio catalana a Orient i dels ducats d'Atenes i Neopatria (Barcelona, 1947),passim. See also Robert I.

61 62

Burns, S.J., "The Catalan Company and the European Powers, 1305-1311," Speculum 29 (1954), 75i-7iFAA 1, doc. 428. When Manfred died, at Trapani, on 9 November 1317, Frederick appointed another son, William, to the dukedom. William died in 1338, and was succeeded by yet another of Frederick's sons, John. Of the vicars-general: Berenguer died in 1316 and was succeeded by the king's bastard, and most talented son, Alfonso-Frederick. In 1330 AlfonsoFrederick was replaced as vicar by Nicola Lancia; Alfonso-Frederick became count of Gozo and Malta.

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or simple accident, Frederick was in command of two of the church's most important Mediterranean provinces. With every Sicilian advance, papal and Angevin hostility increased. Ties with the new duchy were somewhat tenuous, but constant. According to the surviving fragments of the constitution drawn up for the new state, Frederick had sole authority to appoint the duke who would serve as the "true, legitimate, and natural lord" exercising all pertinent (though unfortunately, unspecified) rights, powers, and jurisdictions over the Company and its territorial possessions. The Company in return vowed its allegiance in perpetuity to Frederick and his appointed duke, plus the vicargeneral who would govern in situ as the duke's representative; owing to the overwhelmingly Catalan makeup of the Company, the duchy would be governed according to "the laws of Aragon and the customs of Barcelona." 63 Thebes, not Athens, became the capital. The major cities - Thebes, Athens, Neopatras, Levadhia, Sidhirokastron, for example - belonged to the royal or ducal demesne, and like the demesnal cities of Catalonia and Sicily they were essentially self-governing corporations that handled their own daily operations. Territories outside the demesne were held in fief by members of the Company, who, similar to the barons of Sicily or of Aragon, stood largely beyond the reach of royal authority. Defense of the duchy was the responsibility of the marshal (a post created in 1319), who was appointed by the duke. Ducal revenues remitted to Sicily for reallocation to the vicar-general - consisted of the standard feudal aids and taxes, various rents and fees, and above all the income generated by the demesne. 64 Frederick's determination to hold onto his new duchy and to utilize it as a base for extending his reach still further east was clear from the start. At one point, in fact, he was so encouraged by his unlikely success (which had, after all, to be divinely ordained) that he even entertained the typically unrealistic thought of conquering all that remained of Byzantium. 65 Cautionary grumblings from Venice forced a quick abandonment of that hope, but the victory in Achaea nonetheless refueled his desire to lead a crusade to the Holy 63 64 65

Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, docs. 53, 133, 294, 391, 433. Court cases could also be appealed to the royal court in Sicily, although no record of any such case survives; see Setton, Catalan Domination (n. 5, above), pp. 17-20. Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 11; FAA 11, doc. 431.

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Land; after all, it was clear that the Turks could be beaten and that the Byzantines, in disarray after the Company's rampage, could not interfere with the would-be crusaders.66 Sicily's alliance with Catalonia, he felt sure, would suffice to defend against any Angevin attack while the Sicilian army was in the Holy Land. Thus the House of Aragon would fulfill its destiny by seizing control of the Mediterranean from west to east, becoming the indisputable leader of Christendom and bringing to fruition its glorious evangelical/apocalyptic purpose. Such schemes were obviously grandiose, and the crusade plans were easily checked by the announcement of Naples' pact with Guelf Genoa, which provided for as many as 100 galleys and 5,000 archers, in addition to the Neapolitan forces already mobilized, to invade Sicily as soon as the prospective crusaders put to sea.67 But the point to emphasize is that Sicily's sudden presence in Greece - whatever it brought to Sicily in terms of commerce, prestige, or strategic alignment placed an additional and constant burden on the kingdom's already strained resources. Moreover, it hardened Angevin and papal resolve to undermine Sicily's developing political and economic base by invading, or threatening to invade, either Sicily itself or the Athenian duchy, or both, whenever it was even hinted that the king was considering some new stratagem to capitalize upon his odd new satellite. Naples increased the diplomatic pressure by suddenly demanding the return of the Calabrian territories left over from Caltabellotta. Naples also suddenly laid claim to the sizable tribute paid annually by the Tunisian caliph to the Sicilian king, and began harassing Sicily's eastward trade with an intensified piracy campaign. All of these new offensives threatened to dislodge Frederick's increasingly secure hold on Sicilian society by raising the cost of popular support for his regime. But the sudden possession of the duchy also exposed Sicily to a new and equally 66 67

A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9922 (2 May 1308). GG doc. 51 (4 Jan. 1308). The citation given by the editors for this document - the capitula for a Sicilian embassy to Barcelona - is incorrect. They cite the document as ACA Perg. James II, no. 125. I have been unable to locate the document in either the series of James's parchments or in the series of his Cartas reales diplomdticas, or in the extra inventario appendices to those series. In any case, Sicily was forced to build and equip forty new galleys in order to prepare for the invasion. It is also possible that Clement V considered launching a crusade against Sicily at this time; see Reg. Clement F, no. 3611; and Housley, The Italian Crusades, p. 177.

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68

determined rival -Venice. Events in the south and east thus drew the kingdom ever closer to the conflicts in northern Italy. Sicily hardly profited from its accidental sovereignty in the east. Virtually no records survive that indicate any heightened eastern trade for Sicily at this time. Most of the prosperous manufacturing and commercial territories in Byzantium lay at some distance from Achaea by the fourteenth century, and whatever manufactures the duchy did produce (wine, olives, saltmeat, leather, and textiles, chiefly) were already available in Sicily. More likely, the duchy had some short-term value as a market for Sicilian exports, particularly grain; for whereas the region had been largely self-sufficient for food through most of the Middle Ages the well-documented destruction of the land by the conquering Company must have caused at least a temporary decline in agricultural production that would have been eagerly filled by merchants back in Messina.69 By the time the duchy was established, the demographic decline and compensatory shift in settlement patterns within Sicily had already begun to accelerate, bringing ever more farmers, laborers, and merchants to the eastern valli and hence within the trading orbit with Greece, and the pace quickened right until Frederick's death. A handful of Greeks - principally agricultural workers but with a few artisans mixed in - took advantage of the link with Sicily to emigrate: for example, Greeks comprised the third largest group of permanent immigrants to Palermo (after Catalans and northern Italians) between 1290 and 1339, and all of these arrived after 1311.70 And the flagging fortunes of the Basilian churches in the Val 68

69 70

T h e papacy was quick t o cultivate good relations with the V e n e t i a n s , in t h e hope that V e n i c e might at least provide intelligence regarding the duchy's doings. For example, the pope regularly appointed Venetians to the principal ecclesiastical positions within the duchy, and from 1314 onwards the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople established his regular residence in Venetian-controlled Negroponte, of which he eventually became bishop. On the Tunisian tribute, see ACA Cartas James II, no. 10001—2; and Perg. James II, no. 2570. The tribute amounted to 8,000 gold dirhams per year. The treatment of the church within the duchy also contributed to papal ire. The Company not only forbade the newly appointed Latin bishop of Thebes to enter his see, but further hindered the bishop of Corinth from collecting his tithes to be sent to Avignon. Moreover, the constitution written for the duchy forbade all testamentary gifts to the church, especially bequests of land. See Reg. Clement, no. 3138, 7890-1, 8597; Muntaner, Crdnicay ch. 242; Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 294, 391, 433. Barisa Krekic, Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au moyen age (Paris, 1961), D o c u m e n t s e t recherches, vol. v, doc. 106. Bresc, Un monde, pp. 599 (Table 153), 601-2 (Table 154).

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Demone likewise received a brief injection of popular support.71 Beyond this, however, the duchy was of direct value to Sicily for only two things: piracy and slavery. Neither trade came without risks, and in the end both may have been more costly than profitable.72 The absolute necessity of avoiding conflict with Venice was the chief reason for this. As early as 1315 Frederick had made overtures to the Venetians, hoping to calm their concerns about their new rivals by stressing his greater interest in the duchy's expansion in the Peloponnesus (site of the last Angevin strongholds in the region) rather than in challenging Venetian dominance at sea, and asking in fact for Venetian help in the land campaign.73 Venice demurred but was grateful for the assurances. Relations remained cordial until 1317, when the duchy's second vicar-general - one of Frederick's bastard sons, named Alfonso-Frederick - married the heiress to several Angevin settlements on the Venetian-controlled island of Negroponte (modern Ewoia) and insisted, against good counsel, on taking possession of them. 74 His insistence was based upon more than marriage custom-rights; Alfonso-Frederick was the most talented and energetic of Frederick's sons, but he had unfortunately inherited his father's showy bravura and stubbornness. Seeing a chance to prove his mettle, he had no doubt that he would be able to drive Venice from the scene and thereby become the undisputed ruler of Greece. 75 The Venetians were well aware of his talents as well as his boorishness, and immediately dispatched 2,000 soldiers to Negroponte. War seemed imminent. Frederick intervened directly at this point, however, only to be confronted by an unshakeable Venetian demand: if Sicily wanted peace, the duchy would have to exempt all Venetian trading ships from pirate attack in perpetuity and would have to disarm all its own ships in any territory it held

71 72 73 74

75

Ibid., pp. 516-17 (Table 126) notes an increase in the importation of Greek icons into Sicily. These trades will be discussed in detail in ch. 6, below. Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 75. Alfonso-Frederick married the daughter of Boniface of Verona, who had disinherited his son (for reasons we do not know), leaving his daughter Maria the heiress of the castles of Carystus and Larmena. According to Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 243, Maria's inheritance amounted to one-third of Negroponte. Setton, "The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380" (see n. 5, above), pp. 178—9; Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 96, 98, 100-2.

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anywhere in the vicinity of Negroponte. Sicily had no choice but to accept.76 This treaty, reconfirmed in 1321 and again in 1331, managed to keep the peace, but in the end had disastrous effects on the duchy, since it effectively granted full control of Aegean trade to Venice and permanently ruptured any commercial links that the Company might have developed with Sicily.77 After all, on account of the ubiquitous piracy in the Mediterranean, armed escorts for trading ships were standard procedure in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries - a necessity rather than a luxury. Ships without escorts, even if they carried a contingent of their own weaponry and fighting men, were vulnerable to easy plunder. Thus Venice's demand that Athenian ships passing Negroponte (which meant, in essence, every ship that sailed into or out of the duchy) had to be disarmed meant that every merchant vessel following the trunk routes between Sicily and Greece lay exposed to inevitable attack. Few ships could have avoided Angevin attack as they rounded the foot of the Italian peninsula, since prevailing currents and wind patterns brought them inevitably within easy range of Neapolitan galleys operating out of every southern port, and there is little evidence that any made the attempt. Consequently, as was increasingly the case with Sicily itself, the duchy's trade fell into the hands of foreign merchants, to whom the Venetian strictures did not apply. Revenues from piracy or corsairing also plummeted, since the Company now had to venture much further out to sea in order to find non-Venetian victims, which dramatically decreased the chances of success. After this, Sicilian pirates tended to operate out of domestic ports or out of Cyprus and perhaps Cilician Armenia. Stripped of its maritime ambitions, the duchy turned instead towards expanding its control of mainland Greece. By coincidence, just when the truce with Venice was being arranged, the ruler of northern Thessaly -John II Ducas Comnenus - died unexpectedly without an heir. Alfonso-Frederick, eager to make up for his blunder, immediately organized the army and seized control of the province. Attempts to conquer the Peloponnesus continued as 76

G e o r g e M a r t i n T h o m a s , Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum, sive acta et diplomata res venetas graecas atque levantis illustrantia a 1300-1350 ( V e n i c e , 1880), M o n u m e n t i storici dalla

77

Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 109,116, 153.

R. Deputazione veneta di storia patria, 1st ser., vol. v, doc. 64-5.

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well, though with less success. The results of this new wave of land-fighting were several. First, it brought, principally on Tuscan ships, a dramatically increased number of Greek slaves onto the Sicilian market, so that they quickly became the most common commodity available. Second, the cost to the crown of supporting the duchy likewise increased. With piracy revenues curtailed and with little regular trade revenue generated, the government could support its busy eastern army only by alienating the royal-ducal demesne. Extensive grants of land were made, which benefited the soldiers and probably inspired other Catalan-Sicilian adventurers to emigrate to Greece, as the only means of propping up the regime. This quickly became the dominant, if not the sole, means of keeping the duchy alive - and when no further lands could be alienated the throne had to resort, as it did in Sicily itself, to bestowing rights of civil and criminal jurisdiction to the fief holders, thus making them, in effect, virtually autonomous figures. By 1328 Frederick recognized that this alienation had gone as far as it could go, and henceforth denied the vicar-general's requests for permission to have any new lands awarded. This action was surely necessary, but it forced the duchy once again to seek new revenues by renewing its piratical campaigns which, while scrupulously avoiding Venetian ships, brought the Company into renewed conflict with the (Guelf) Genoese and Angevins still trading in the Aegean. And, consequently, in 1330 the papacy responded by excommunicating the duchy's rulers and calling for a crusade against them. On 14 June John XXII directed the Latin patriarch and the archbishops of Corinth, Patras, and Otranto to condemn the Company as "schismatics, sons of perdition, and children of iniquity"; and one week later Robert granted permission to all his Neapolitan vassals to seek the pope's offer of "full forgiveness for all sins" by joining the fight. Gautier II de Brienne assembled his army of 800 Angevin knights and 500 Tuscan infantry at Brindisi in August 1331, and set sail.78 This crusade failed after two years, however, since the Company - which could no longer defend itself against so large an invasion because no aid was available from Sicily - simply refused to meet the crusaders in open battle. Unable to besiege their foes or to destroy them on the field, the Angevins accomplished little apart from yet another ravaging of the Greek 78

Ibid., doc. 150-2.

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countryside, although they made another attempt in 1334-5. It too came to nothing.79 In the end the unplanned conquest of the Athenian duchy brought Sicily only loss by deepening the resolve of her enemies to oppose her on all fronts. The whole struggle to control Sicily, after all, was in large part the struggle for a base from which to gain a foothold in the east, and the Angevins and the papacy rightly feared that a prosperous, peaceful Sicily would make it impossible to dislodge the usurping duchy - just as a thriving, strong duchy would encumber efforts to regain Sicily. Foolish though many of the decisions made were - such as Alfonso-Frederick's insistence on provoking the Venetians in Negroponte, or the duchy's continued alliance with the Turks (which provoked the expected reaction in Avignon) - there was little to fault the Sicilians for in the overall adventure. Good sense had dictated getting rid of the troublesome veterans after Caltabellotta; and had the Company not been betrayed by the Byzantines the initial successes they scored against the Turks might well have led to a substantial revival of the crusading movement to the Levant and might have won for Frederick some credit with the papacy. The treatment of the Greek populace was relatively benevolent, once peace had been established, as evidenced not only by the Greek emigration to Sicily but also by the fact that virtually none of the local populace rose to aid the Angevin crusaders in 1331-2 or 1334-5 when doing so likely would have assured the Company's overthrow. The commercial gain inspired by the influx of Greek slaves into Sicilian markets was tempered, as we shall see later, by an evangelically inspired attempt to modify and meliorate slave practice, to provide for the more humane treatment of slaves and to make it easier for those sold into slavery to gain their freedom. But the impossibility of any substantial trade between the kingdom and the duchy (owing to the decline of both manufacturing and markets), and the Venetianimposed restraints on the duchy's piratical activities as the price of the Republic's political neutrality, in the end caused the duchy to be a greater burden than boon to Sicily - a weakened satellite that could be kept afloat only by the continuous depletion of the royal-ducal demesne. 79

Ibid., doc. 154, 158; Lettres communes, no. 63,752; Setton, "The Catalans in Greece," p. 190.

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At the moment the duchy was first established, however, none of these harmful effects was foreseen; and indeed, in the heady atmosphere of 1311-12, when the Sicilian economy was well recovered after ten years of peace, when the government of both kingdom and cities was stable, and when the Crown of Aragon seemed (once again) ready to launch its Sardinian campaign, the time seemed ripe for the final step in the loose confederation's march towards dominating Mediterranean life. On every front their principal rivals appeared to be in retreat or at least to be held in check. This was the point when Sicily formed its alliance with the German emperor Henry VII. Ill THINGS FALL APART!

This marks the turning point in Frederick's reign too, at least in terms of its political fortunes. From the moment when Sicily thrust herself into the larger Guelf-Ghibelline conflict she faced not only the active opposition of Avignon and Naples but of every Guelf commune in the north - states which, while they had long been energetic commercial rivals of the Sicilians and Neapolitans, had taken no direct interest in the political struggle that engulfed the Mezzogiorno. But by siding openly with the Ghibellines, Sicily altered the situation entirely. The Angevins henceforth had in their Guelf allies considerably larger resources of revenue, credit, and manpower on which to draw; and Sicilian traders henceforth lost much of what access they had had to the northern markets, which had a dramatic effect on the economy. Between 1298 and 1310, no less than 50 percent of Sicily's documented foreign trade was directed towards northern Italy (Genoa, Pisa, and Florence being the most important sites, and all being Guelf-controlled at the time of the pact with Henry VII). The next nine years are uncertain, given the paucity of records, but between 1319 and Frederick's death the amount of trade directed to those same sites had declined to only 18 percent of all exports (and, needless to say, the total volume of trade had likewise fallen sharply). 80 The burden of this collapse fell especially hard on the Val di Mazara, the chief grain-producing region, and must account for a large portion of the demographic

80

Bresc, Un monde, pp. 281 (Table 42), 286 (Table 46).

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flight from that hardscrabble territory. Trading ships from northern Italy had comprised 40 percent of all the vessels in the ports of the Val di Mazara between 1298 and 1310; but for the following period that figure fell to just over 25 percent - a diminished share of an already diminished production.81 For a kingdom essentially to declare war on its most important trading partners, which the Sicilians did in casting their lot with the emperor, is an act that needs some explaining, and the government went to considerable pains to explain itself to those most affected by the decision: the urban merchants, the baronial farmers, their Catalan creditors, and James. What makes the link with Henry so perplexing is the fact that it was a popular decision. No opposition was voiced in the parliament, and it was the parliament, after all, that had the sole authority to make such an alliance; neither is there evidence of resistance to the pact on the local level. Throughout 1311 and 1312, even as the full scope of the crop failure was becoming evident, Sicilians across the island believed that the pact with the German empire was a boon, a necessity, and a kind of fulfillment. Was their evangelically inspired sense of destiny so strong that they would willingly act against their own best interests? The answer is somewhat more complicated than that. In order to understand Sicilian motives, we must first consider the options that existed. What real alternatives did they have, given the specific conditions of the time? Many people in early fourteenth-century Italy, Dante among them, looked hopefully to Henry VII to restore order to the peninsula, seeing in him the first figure since Manfred - and perhaps the last figure one could hope for - who possessed the ability to unseat the Angevins.82 So long as the French were in the south, they felt, the northern Guelfs could rely on their aid and so continue to overthrow Ghibelline power; and so long as partisan strife raged in Italy, the papacy would remain exiled in Avignon, whence it necessarily devoted more and more of its energies to secular matters rather than to the spiritual needs of Europe. These feelings may or may not have been justified, but such was the view held by many. And such has been the traditional explanation for 81 82

Ibid., pp. 282 (Table 43), 284 (Tables 44-5), 286 (Table 46). W i l l i a m M . Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy: The Conflict of Empire and City-State, (Nebraska, i960) is the best study to date.

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Sicily's sudden allegiance to the imperial ideology.83 There is some justification for this, given Sicily's historical link to the Hohenstaufen dynasty, and especially when we have Frederick's own words proclaiming that "since all kings are obliged to aid the Roman emperor, for reasons both of charity and divine justice . . . I, being zealous in the cause of that justice, have proposed to help him achieve what is rightfully his . . . and have intended [thus] to give glory to God, honor to the Holy Roman Church, useful service to the Holy Roman Empire, and confusion to the enemies of the Cross."84 But more practical reasons existed. Caltabellotta had kept the peace for a decade, but several issues that had been left unresolved in 1302 continued to plague relations with Naples. The first of these was the problem of Frederick's title. The treaty had granted him the title of "king of Trinacria" and had reserved the exclusive use of the title "king of Sicily" for the Angevin monarch. The anachronism seemed at first an acceptable compromise; Paris may or may not be worth a Mass, but peace after twenty years of war is certainly worth a Greek toponym. For a while, the Sicilians used their odd new name while busying themselves with the more important matter of putting their house in order; but once the post-war recovery had begun in earnest around 1305, and after Arnau de Vilanova had made his fateful first visit to the kingdom, Frederick grew dissatisfied with his awkward title, arguing that it detracted from his personal dignity and failed to reflect political reality. Moreover, and more importantly, the sense of political and social communality that the government was attempting to foster in the island seemed unlikely to advance if the king had to call upon his subjects to rally their collective spirits in support of a diplomatic fiction.85 By 1308 the chancery began to vary its use, referring to the king sometimes as "king of Trinacria," 83

84

85

S e e especially D e Stefano, Federico IIId'Aragona re di Sicilia, i2gG-ijjyy 2nd edn. (Bologna, 1956), pp. 160—70, 249 on the "Hohenstaufen dream" attributed to Frederick; and Giunta, Aragonesi e catalani nel mediterraneo, vol. i, p. 19. ACA Cartas James II, no. 10183 (7 Aug. 1313), a letter from Frederick to James: "quemadmodum universi reges tenentur juvare imperatorem Romanorum ex debito caritatis et divine justitie . . . nos, zelo ipsius divine justitie, proponebamus eum juvare in suis juribus . . . [et] intendebamus dare ad laudem Dei, et honorem Sancte Romane Ecclesie, ac Sacri Romani Imperil rei puplice utilitatem, et confusionem hostium Crucis." It should be noted that Arnau de Vilanova had emphasized in one of his works written expressly for Frederick (the Allocutio christiani) that seeking justitia for all men, even those who are subjects of another ruler, is God's first requirement of all kings and princes. ACA Cartas James II, no. 9839 (8 March 1305).

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sometimes as "king of the island of Sicily," and sometimes simply as "king."86 When Avignon and Naples balked at this, the government rationalized its violation of Caltabellotta with the claim that Charles II had originally agreed to let Frederick choose either "king of Trinacria" or "king of the island of Sicily," and when the Sicilians chose the latter Charles changed his mind and insisted on the "Trinacria" formula.87 Thus Frederick - over the strong objections of James, who saw no reason to threaten the peace over a matter of nomenclature - declared void his obligation to abide by a fraudulent agreement, and began to style himself "king of Sicily" in all domestic records.88 It was a foolish issue to risk war over, and it reflects the petulant behavior of which Frederick (the God-elected savior of Christendom) was capable. Under the guise of idealism, he believed he was entitled to what he wanted. More important than the problem of titles were two issues related to it, one of which we have mentioned earlier. From the twelfth century on, the wealthy Almohad, and later the Hafsid, rulers in Tunis paid yearly tribute to the Sicilian throne in return for useful trade connections and a guarantee against unchecked piracy and slave gathering. Since this tribute was substantial (8,000 gold dirhams) the government had come to rely upon it to meet their annual costs.89 But the Angevins, as legitimate possessors of the "king of Sicily" title, claimed the tribute for themselves - and not surprisingly found papal support for their claim. For years they pressed Avignon to force Sicily to hand the money over to them, and when the pope turned to his newly appointed "admiral of the church" James to resolve the matter, extraordinary pressure was placed on the Sicilian-Catalan alliance. This problem was related to the larger issue of the Calabrian strongholds still under Sicilian control. There were several of these sites; in addition to Reggio di Calabria itself, Sicily maintained garrisons in Bagnara, Calama, Catona, Motta S. Giovanni, Motta di 86

87 88

89

AGA C a r t a s J a m e s II, no. 9990; Ganc. Reg. 335, fol. 2 2 8 - 9 (24 April 1308), 314V-315 (7 May 1304)A G A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9914 (24 Feb. 1308). Three years later, declaring himself tired of the dispute, he temporarily returned to the "Trinacria" usage, but soon abandoned it again. See A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10120 (3 Sept. 1311). Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 97 asserts, without citation, that the tribute stood at 200,000 "duplia miria," which is an outrageous figure; s e e instead A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 2570 (28 Aug. 1308).

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

Mori, Scilla, and S. Niceto. A glance at a map shows their strategic importance. For six years after Caltabellotta the Angevins voiced no complaint over Sicily's control of the sites, a fact that may imply recognition of Sicily's claim to them but more likely is evidence of a desire not to upset the peace. In 1308, however, Robert formed a pact with Genoa for a joint attack on Sicily, and cited as his justification Sicily's unlawful possession of the strongholds. 90 It is unlikely that Robert suddenly viewed the Calabrian sites as threats to his security; after all, they had been peacefully administered by the Sicilian chancellor Vinciguerra da Palizzi since 1302. What had changed since then, however, was Naples' strategic position vis-a-vis the north and the east. In 1308 Henry VII came to the throne in Germany with his eyes already cast towards Italy where Robert was hastily appointed leader of the Guelf faction; in that year also, the Catalan Company, which had just plundered Thrace and Macedonia, was clearly working its way towards the Greek heartland, where it threatened to turn out the cadet Angevins' only remaining beachhead in the east. And the Sicilians, newly evangelized and eager to capitalize on the Company's successes, were preparing to launch their self-proclaimed crusade to the Levant. Neither side wanted a renewal of the war, but with too little time available to work out a permanent settlement, a temporary new truce was patched together. The Angevins agreed to grant Sicily the Tunisian tribute and to cancel the invasion they had planned with Genoa, while Sicily in return cancelled its crusade and delivered the Calabrian castles to Bernat de Sarria (admiral of the Crown of Aragon), who would hold them until a permanent pact was reached. 91 This compromise kept a shaky peace for the next four years. But the creation of the Athenian duchy in 1311 and the installation of a Sicilian duke and vicar-general, at the very time when Henry VII had himself crowned emperor at Rome with the intention of taking control of the entire peninsula, provoked the Angevins to act. They felt literally besieged, and with good reason. Now, with Sicily apparently getting stronger (or at least more brazen), Greece newly fallen, and a hostile emperor already in Rome and gaining support every day, the Angevins were forced to 90 91

GG, doc. 50-1; ACA Cartas James II, no. 9914; Ganc. Reg. 335, fol. 228—9. ACA Cartas James II, no. 9930, 9992; Perg. James II, no. 2551.

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take the offensive. This explains Naples' move towards war, and it also explains the sudden Sicilian alliance with Henry. In 1312 it appeared quite possible to the Sicilians to rid themselves of the Angevin nuisance once and for all. Their confidence ran high; after all, in the years since Caltabellotta they had managed to restore stability to their realm, to reestablish their bruised ecclesiastical institutions and to foster a passionate spiritual revival, to enhance their foreign and domestic trade, and to conquer Greece. James, having just completed negotiations with the Florentines for subsidies, seemed about to launch his conquest of Sardinia (again). And the newly crowned emperor offered the Sicilians the destruction of Angevin power in return for their assistance; Frederick, in fact, was appointed "admiral of the Holy Roman Empire," although in the end the title did him no good. Sicily had only to ally itself with the bold, charismatic, capable Henry, and the result would be not only the reestablishment of the empire (a necessary precondition, it was thought, for the purification of Christendom in which Frederick presumably had a crucial role) but also the incontestable domination of the Mediterranean by the House of Aragon. 92 As it happened, this opportunistic alliance — whatever sensible arguments could be marshalled for it in 1312 - sealed Frederick's political fate. Because of Sicily's pledge to support the Ghibelline cause throughout Italy (a pledge it honored, sending many tens of thousands of gold ounces in ships, arms, equipment, food, and fighting men, over the next twenty-five years) Naples' opposition became not only more resolute, but more active. 93 Robert no longer saw any reason to wait for the island to devolve to Angevin control upon Frederick's death, and instead mounted an essentially continuous campaign against the realm as soon as his own resources permitted the attempt. Henry's unexpected death put an end to the imperial threat and left the Sicilians badly exposed. The campaign of 1313—14 (regarding which Robert had taken recourse to the soothsayer, in Speciale's tale) was the first step. Thereafter, with one exception, no period longer than three years ever passed without a new invasion of the island, which forced the Sicilians to 92

93

A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 2956, 2957; Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10183; D e Stefano, Federico III, pp. 160-5. For J a m e s ' s reactions, see A C A Cane. Reg. 336, fol. 122V—123V, 124.V, 153-153V, 157—158V; Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 2o6v—209V, 21 iv—214.V, 218—2i8v. Henry had been crafty enough, in the original pact, to draw a solemn vow from Frederick never to abandon the Ghibelline cause for any reason.

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devote an ever higher portion of their revenues to their immediate defenses even while fulfilling their pledged support of the northern Ghibellines, the Athenian duchy, and the on-again off-again Sardinian campaign. Folly and accident had entangled Sicily in expensive commitments that it could ill afford; a sense of chivalrous honor, and further folly, made the royal court nearly bankrupt itself in order to meet those commitments. Unfortunately, the German pact coincided with the three-year drought. This was one of the worst droughts the island had suffered in well over a hundred years, and its impact was considerable. Reserve grain stores alleviated some of the suffering at first, but when the crop failure extended into a second year, and then a third, much of the population was reduced to famine, particularly in the west. The search for food, combined with the difficulty of competing for capital to reinvest in the next season's planting, accelerated the abandonment of the land and the migration to the coastal towns. This influx of labor decreased urban wages in the short term; but the sudden presence of so many new mouths to feed stretched resources to the limit precisely at a time when, on account of the grain shortage, royal and municipal revenues were curtailed. This reversal of fortunes was as much the result of simple bad luck as it was of misguided evangelical idealism - but its consequences were permanent. The pact with Henry was a point of no return, strategically speaking. Having once entered the Guelf-Ghibelline tangle, the kingdom could not extricate itself - and the tenor of papal and Angevin opposition changed. But it seemed worth trying. Frederick and his councillors (and the parliament that controlled foreign policies) gambled everything on this tempting opportunity, and Henry's unexpected death left them permanently exposed and gravely overextended precisely at the moment when the bottom fell out of their economy. Nevertheless, they struggled to live up to their promises right up until Frederick's death, and it is important to note that at no point between 1313 and 1337 was there any expressed popular opposition to the German connection. If anything, as matters worsened through the second half of Frederick's reign, the imperial linkage gained a kind of pathetic popularity, as if it were the kingdom's last and most desperate hope; a contingent of "at least thirty galleys, well-armed, and at our expense" for no less than three years' service were delivered to the ragtag Ghibelline league organized in

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94

1318; Gerardo Spinola the royal marshal, and Raffaele Doria the admiral, ventured north again in 1323 at their own expense to aid the Ghibellines with money, food, and supplies, when the government was unable to send assistance because of "the great number of armed galleys Robert had on the seas" around Sicily;95 at times the ports were closed to grain exports in order to make sure that sufficient food was available to feed the populace, and any surpluses were immediately confiscated for shipment to the Ghibelline army based in Savona.96 But by this point the costs of these commitments were insupportable. Defending their own realm, propping up the Greek duchy, assisting the northern Ghibellines, and helping with the Sardinian campaign all at once placed an enormous burden on the fast weakening economy. The wages alone for the fleet committed to the northern Ghibellines in 1318 amounted to over 6,500.00.00. This is when we first begin to see the government complaining about its "numerous and diverse debts . . . enormous and unimaginable sums of money";97 it is also when we see the parliament, for the first time, beginning to refuse the king 94

95

96 97

A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 6217 (27 J u n e 1319), comprising the twin a g r e e m e n t s of the "Confederatio Lombardorum" and the "Confederatio Januensium." In the end, the "Confederation's" attack on Genoa lasted until 1323. A s Giovanni Villani described it: "Who could ever write or narrate the extraordinary siege of Genoa, or the remarkable deeds performed there by the [Ghibelline] expatriates and their allies [the Sicilians]? For it is reckoned, indeed, by those who know that not even the siege of Troy witnessed by comparison a greater series of battles on land and sea — with armed galleys on the waters constantly, such that the people there were struck time and again by shortage and want of food; while twice the fleet (by the sea's fortuna) struck the coast, breaking its galleys and losing a great number of the m e n on board (but still they did not quit the war, even despite the continuous piracy at sea throughout the world, and each side despoiling the other of more goods than a kingdom has need of); with the city assailed day and night by attacks on land, resulting in many deaths; and with those inside the city hurling ruin on those outside (and vice versa); with the city walls crumbling and falling; and with those inside the city hurriedly repairing and restoring t h e m at great travail and cost — all such that, if the whole of this book were written to tell this story alone, it would be full." Villani, Cronica (see n. 4, above), bk. ix, ch. 118. GG, doc. 133 (21 J u n e 1323). T h e Spinola and Doria families, of course, were o f Genoese origin, and hence their involvement in the fight w a s motivated by immediate family concerns. But even so, the fact that the government in Messina would allow both the admiral and marshal to leave for Genoa w h e n Angevin fleets were attacking the kingdom speaks of the depth of the realm's c o m m i t m e n t t o the northern allies, and of the desperation of Sicily's condition. O n c e it had joined with the Ghibellines, the kingdom had no choice but to continue to support the alliance and to pray for victory. But neutrality in peninsular affairs was no longer possible. A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10531 (31 Jan. 1323). ACA Cartas James II, no. 10222 (13 Jan. 1315): "multiplicis et diversis expensis guerre . . . grandes et inextimabiles pecunie quantitates."

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the revenues he needed.98 Worse than the expenses involved was the loss of life. Thousands of Sicilians perished in the fighting, both at home and abroad. Storms at sea claimed hundreds of others. Angevin offensives in 1313, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1320, 1325-6, and 1327 killed thousands more men and quite literally turned Sicily into a nation of widows. Crops were destroyed, vineyards cut down, cities burnt to ruins or starved into submission. In Palermo, during the 1325-6 campaign, Giovanni Chiaromonte ordered the very paving stones of the city's streets and squares to be dug up, for use as projectiles against the Angevin besiegers. In Greece, continued warfare in the Peloponnese and two Angevin invasions took more lives - primarily Catalan, but still Sicilian subjects - while the piracy to which more and more of the duchy's inhabitants took recourse became increasingly dangerous and violent. Strained to the limit by these losses and the increased demands for more tax revenues, the royal and municipal economies rapidly deteriorated. Catalonia tried to help. But it could not afford, either financially or diplomatically, to involve itself directly at least until Sardinia had been achieved, so it tried instead an indirect method; throughout the 1320s the Crown offered tax deferments (generally for a period of two years) to any of its citizens who wanted to enter military service in Sicily. Many took up the offer. These volunteers, though, were hardly motivated out of high ideals or love for the beleaguered island; they were mercenaries, eager only to fight and to be paid - or better yet, not to fight, and still be paid. They armed themselves, and came in retinues. Thus one Bartomeu Quineran, for example, applied for such a deferment in 1321 and hastened to Messina with a squadron of archers and infantry." Once the Catalans had finally secured Sardinia in 1325 they were again willing to offer direct military aid; by this time, however, Catalonia's chief aims had been achieved and Sicily's fortunes were fast fading. Consequently, those men who volunteered for service in 98 99

ACA Cartas James II, no. 9961 (27 Oct. 1322), rejecting the king's proposed new tariff on wheat and millet (in this case, to raise money for Sardinia). ACA Cartas James II, no. 6660 (27 April 1321). Applicants for deferments (litterae elongamenti) had to pay a deposit to the government in Barcelona — money which presumably would be used to ransom the soldier, should he be captured, but which was also available for the government's use during the two years of service. Bartomeu paid 3,000 Valencian solidi. Cf. no. 6946 (11 March 1323), 6950 (13 March 1323), 6956 (15 March 1323), where litterae were used to enlist soldiers for the (final) invasion of Sardinia.

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Sicily tended to be misfits and troublemakers. For example, a company of ruffians hired out of Valencia in 1326 was shipped to Trapani, where the men quickly terrorized the town. They refused to take orders from the Sicilian command, sold the weapons given to them by the Sicilians, used the cash to get drunk, and prowled the streets looking for adventure while brandishing the weapons they had brought themselves. By this point most of the local barons had turned their backs on the royal government and shut themselves up in their mountain fortresses, refusing to fight for a kingdom they did not recognize and whose days appeared to be numbered. When the government, in desperate need in 1325-6, offered even the most suspicious-looking of mercenaries two months' wages up front if they would only take action against the Angevins then marauding the countryside, the mercenaries took the cash and promptly fled the island.100 After this, Catalonia recognized that it had either to provide more useful, organized assistance or risk losing Sicily permanently; so after 1328 the Crown offered help directly, under the command of Ramon de Peralta. 101 Even this failed to improve matters, however. Rioting in the demesne cities forced the court to award more tax exemptions; and to keep the remaining barons loyal, it had to grant them the full civil and criminal jurisdiction (merum et mixtum imperium) that they demanded over their baronies - in essence, making them autonomous political entities in the highlands. 102 To offset these losses, the court began aggressively to confiscate vacant fiefs, whose numbers were fast increasing, especially in Val di Mazara, and to sell government offices to whomever could, or would, pay for them. 103 Still other offices were given away as hereditary fiefs. And when no other option was available, the government went so far as to begin confiscating ecclesiastical property. In May 1328, for example, the king ordered the transfer of the annual revenues from Ravennusa - until then the property of the archbishop of Monreale 100

ACA Cartas James II, no. 10076 (30 July 1326). In this letter to James, Frederick mentions that of all the cavalry now serving in Sicily "la maior part eren Catalans e Aragoneses." 101 ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3684 (26 April 1328), 3711 (27 Feb. 1331); Perg. Alfonso III, extra inventario, no. 815 (4 Oct. 1335), 819 (2 Oct. 1335), 860 (Mar. 1335); Cane. Reg. 544, fol. 89-89V (6 Sept. 1335), 90V-91 (22 Oct. 1335). See also Maria-Merce Costa, "Un episodi de la vida de Ramon de Peralta," in MM 1, pp. 313-27. '°2 ASP Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 95-95V, 96-96V. 103 ACA Cartas James II, no. 5935; Perg. Alfonso III, no. 351; ASP Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 92-92V.

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- to D. Filippo Curto in return for his continued military service.104 The clergy complained loudly, but there was little they could do since the papal interdict which had been reimposed in 1321 had severed links between the prelates and the court in Avignon. One last desperate opportunity presented itself. After many years of struggle Louis the Bavarian had emerged in Germany as emperor, and like Henry VII before him he seemed to some of his more hopeful contemporaries to be capable of reestablishing imperial authority throughout Germany and Italy. He was of course regarded as an enemy of the church, which had excommunicated and deposed him in 1324, but that mattered little to Louis, who simply proclaimed his own deposition of the pope and installed an anti-pope (a Franciscan Spiritual, Nicholas V) more to his liking. Thinking himself secure in Germany, he led his army into Italy where in January 1328 he received the imperial crown from Sciarra di Colonna in Rome. The Sicilians viewed his advance southward with great excitement and frankly deluded optimism. If Louis were able to subdue Guelf power, they hoped, Sicily might have a last chance. The Angevins, caught between imperial forces to the north and Sicilian arms to the south, might finally be overcome. Louis played on those hopes and sent an imperial embassy to Palermo as soon as he was crowned, offering to reactivate Sicily's original pact with Henry VII.105 The embassy attempted to drum up local support for Louis's anti-pope as well, thinking that the Sicilians' embrace of the evangelical movement would assure their embrace of the rival pontiff. At Frederick's command, however, the Germans were forbidden to propagandize for the anti-pope, and were allowed only to address the political and military issue.106 Sicily patched together a force of 500-600 knights, nearly a thousand infantry, and fifty galleys to join with the imperial forces stationed in Pisa. There they were to link up with Ghibelline forces sent from Savona, and then 104

105 106

ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 154: "usque ad beneplacitum nostrum seu quamdiu proventus et jura dicte Montis Regalis ecclesie, occasione presentis guerre, in manu Curie fuerint pro ipsis unciis viginti novem et tarinis quindecim per annum pro parte nostre Curie committatur." ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3684; Cane. Reg. 562, fol. 26-26V (7 May 1328). In Avignon, John XXII also assumed that the Sicilians would throw their support behind Nicholas; at least two months passed before the rumor was dispelled. See ACA Cane. Reg. 562, fol. 31—32V (28 June 1328) - a diplomatic capitula from Alfonso (James's son, and ruler of the Crown of Aragon since 1327), still warning Frederick of the grave dangers of accepting the false pope.

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proceed to drive the Guelf forces from the peninsula. 107 But both rulers had miscalculated. Louis had made the mistake of advancing into Italy before quelling all resistance to his rule in Germany, and had to retreat hastily when news arrived of an aristocratic rebellion in the north; this spelled disaster for the Sicilians once again, since the expected Ghibelline forces never arrived, leaving the Sicilians exposed to the quickly deployed Guelf armies. They avoided slaughter, but were nevertheless lost: they all disappeared in a storm at sea as they sailed back to Palermo. News of the tragedy prompted the worst rioting the city had seen since another shipwreck in 1321 - a loss of only four galleys under Genoese command - had led to violence that left 300 dead in the streets. 108 From this point on, urban unrest was commonplace throughout the realm. 109 Once again the kingdom, in seeking to capitalize upon what seemed at the time to be a sound opportunity, had only further alienated Naples, the papacy, and Catalonia itself (which had urgently exhorted Frederick not to form any pact with Louis), and had made any sort of negotiated settlement impossible. And indeed, for the last ten years of Frederick's reign there was scarcely any concerted effort even to speak of peace. After this, everything, even Nature herself, seemed to conspire against the Sicilians. In 1329, Catania - then perhaps the third or fourth largest of the kingdom's cities - suffered heavy damage from a disastrous eruption of Mount Etna. Nicola Speciale witnessed it first-hand. He described it as follows: In the year of the Lord 1329, on the 28th ofJune, as the sun was setting in the west . . . Mount Etna shook violently in horrific upheaval and roared with a tremendous thunder, which struck terror in the minds of all the farmers on the mountain and of all the people throughout a wide stretch of the kingdom. From the eastern face of the mountain (the cliff known as "Musarra"), where white clouds hitherto could always be seen, the earth suddenly ripped away and fire burst forth vehemently. Hideous fumes gathered in the air like a foul cloud. At that moment the fire shot forward rapidly, and a sound like the rumbling of monstrous wheels or of a thousand thunders could be heard, even a far distance away. Once the sun was gone and the evening shadows began to spread, fire fell from the sky . . . and globs of molten rock belched forth with a horrible din. Suddenly 107 108 109

Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 98-9. ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 48, 100. See, for example, ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 2083 (18 Dec. 1331), 3711 (27 Feb. 1331).

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the devouring fire grew stronger, running in a torrent over the slopes and all the settlements below, destroying everything. All along the eastern and southern sides (where the break in the mountain was greatest), where many ancient buildings had stood (for those seeking solitary worship of God), the powerful and ceaseless shaking of the earth either destroyed them outright or left them broken and shattered; and the earth itself opened so wide as to swallow whole streams that had [hitherto] flowed by peacefully. Along the nearer coastline, many boats and skiffs, which had just recently docked, sank on account of the countless quakings of the land beneath the sea. The volcano continued to erupt for more than two weeks. The burning stream of lava and the rumbling of the land destroyed building after building. The panic that had seized Catania worsened daily when suddenly, as if to confirm fears that the apocalypse had come at last, there was an eclipse of the sun, on 15 July. Speciale himself watched, he tells us, with a kind of dreadful admiration. After the eclipse passed, lava still spewed and fire raged. As I watched the fire, and beheld the thousands of flaming rocks that had been blown from the mountain, a terrific earthquake shook the whole land, and the ground ripped open on this side and that . . . [The lava] finally divided into three main streams, two of which ran eastward, bringing great slaughter throughout the district of Aci. . . while the third ran headlong to the limits of Catania. Queen Eleanor, who happened to be in Catania at the time, led a procession of the relics of St. Agatha, the city's patron, around the city walls. The eruption grew louder and more frightening, and clouds of sulfurous ash darkened the sky. So thick was the ash that fell, he continues, that all the fish in a number of nearby rivers died, and the whole plain beneath the city (its agricultural heartland) lay buried. The saint saved her city, however, for the lava flow halted just outside the city gates. Nevertheless, hundreds of people had died, including some who, according to Speciale, were "seized by demons, who, many people at that time had preached, would enter peoples' bodies," and much of the agricultural and manufacturing base of the region had disappeared. 110 Nor was this the end. Etna, 110

Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. VIII, ch. 2: "Anno Domini millesimo tricentesimo vicesimo nono, die vero XXVIII Junii, cum sol ad vesperum declinabat . . . Mons Ethna horrifico motu vehementer intremuit, magnisque videbatur mugire tonitribus, quod non solum incolas montis perterruit, quin etiam passim habitantium plurima loca Sicilie mentibus

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which had previous erupted only in 1323 (a blast that showered ash as far away as Malta), exploded yet again in 1333. This latter eruption fell far short of the violence of 1329 but did much to reconfirm fears of divine displeasure and to uproot many of the crop fields and vineyards that local farmers had replanted in the interim. The ruin of the Catanian plain, however dramatic it was, did not end the calamities of Frederick's last years. The last and most grim legacy of his reign was only then coming to the fore. "Now the point in the story has come," wrote Speciale shortly after bringing his description of the volcano to a close, "when it is necessary to describe the campaign of Giovanni Chiaromonte, the count of Mohac, against Sicily, and to tell of the ensuing war . . . which was the cause of the desolation [of the land] and the loss of so many people."111 The struggle he refers to was the vendetta that broke out between the Chiaromonte and Ventimiglia families, a shockingly bitter and bloody feud that quickly escalated into full-scale civil war among the barons. This war dominated the rest of the fourteenth century, and when it finally ended in 1395, with the coronation of Martin I, Sicily's countryside in many places was an ashen wasteland. Vendettas possess a peculiar ferocity all their own; and in this particular case, added to the dispute over family honor was an otiose element of self-serving patriotism, of class

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terrorem incussit. Et factu, quod subito ab ipsius montis latere sublimi [sic] ad partem, que respicit orientem, super earn rupem (que dicitur "de Musarra") ubi gelate nives hactenus perpetuo videbantur, subito visa est divulsa tellussubsidere, unde violenter ignis erupit, quod etiam tetri fumi quasi atre nubis se tollentis in aera vestigia demonstrabant. Egrediebatur quidem ignis cum impetu, et velut ingentium rotarum strepitus aut sonitus diversorum tonitruum spectantes a longe audiebantur. Postquam vero sol occidit, ceperuntque imminere crepuscula tenebrarum, in celum quasi flammarum globi tollebantur incendia et liquefacti saxorum orbes, quasi avulsa montis viscera, cum fragore terribili ructabantur. Tune protinus ignis edax invaluit, qui tamquam impetuosus torrens iter agens in loca declivia et subjecta, cunctaque prosternens, iter vastantis alluvionis agebat. Ab orientali vero, et meridionali parte, ubi montis concussio plusquam in locis aliis videbatur erumpere, plurima edificia, que in eremo veneranda vestustas ad Dei cultum fundaverat, ipse jugis et validus terre motus vel diruit vel in rimas et fisturas plurimas separavit; placidos etiam rivos aquarum fluentium dehiscens tellus absorpit. Insuper ad propinqua litora Mascalarum scaphas plurimas et faselos, quas paulo ante subduxerant, ex crebris et validis terre concussionibus in mare deductas . . . Cum spectarem, inquam, incendium et mirarer ignita saxorum millia, que ab ipsius terre visceribus ructabantur, circa locum eundem terremotus efTecti sunt validi, tellus ipsa vice alia et alia dissiluit . . . Cumque ipsius alluvionis igne vastans impetus per certum terre spatium continuo defluxisset, ultimo in tres decursus divisa est, quorum duo ad ortum in magna strage per districtum Jacii usque ad loca propinqua litoribus diebus plurimis processerunt; tertius vero contra fines Cathaniensium se direxit." Ibid., bk. VIII, ch. 6.

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against class and of native against foreigner, which resulted in the sort of capricious cruelty that Sicily had not witnessed since the very beginning of the Vespers, when furious crowds reportedly ripped people open simply on account of their accents. The new baronial war, according to Giovanni Villani, was fought "as though by savage beasts" who, at the height of the brutality, thought nothing of starving whole towns into submission or of bursting aqueducts and irrigation networks, which turned some valleys into dustbowls and others into malarial swamps.112 The frustration that lay behind the brutality resulted from the steady undermining of the barons' economic and social position after 1311; but the particular timing of the rebellion was related to the kingdom's international difficulties. Two marriages triggered everything. Early in 1316 the king's illegitimate daughter, Eleanora, was wedded to Giovanni Chiaromonte II, the ten-year-old son of Manfredi Chiaromonte, the count of Modica and Mohac as well as the royal seneschal. The previous year young Giovanni's sister Costanza had married Francesco Ventimiglia, the count of Gerace and along with Manfredi one of the wealthiest and most prominent figures in the realm. But Francesco also kept a mistress, and by her he had "a multitude of children" on whom he doted so excessively that he apparently professed no desire for any legitimate offspring who might displace those he already had. Costanza was "made a stranger to his bedroom"; and soon Francesco began proceedings to obtain an annulment of his loveless marriage (on what grounds it is not clear) and the legitimation of his bastards - both of which ends he achieved thanks to his contacts at the papal court, where he had led an embassy on behalf of the government in 1318. This repudiation of his sister bitterly angered Giovanni, who had become count of Modica after Manfredi's death in 1321. He turned to Frederick, his father-in-law, for justice; but when the king refused to take action against Ventimiglia, Giovanni, his mind "seething with great tempests of rage," left Sicily to join Louis the Bavarian in Germany, in whose service he remained for several years.113 112

113

The indispensable source for the baronial war is Michele da Piazza, Historic, sicula ab anno MCCCXXXVII ad annum MCCCLXI, in RGBS i, pp. 509-780 and 11, 1-106; there is a new edition by Antonino GiufTrida (Palermo, 1980), Fonti per la storia di Sicilia, vol. in. See also Salvatore Tramontana, Michele da Piazza e ilpotere baroniale in Sicilia (Messina, 1963). Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. vm, ch. 6: "Dum Franciscus de Vintimilio comes Ghiracii Constantiam sororem iamdicti Johannis de Claromonte comitis haberet in conjugem,

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In his German exile Giovanni nurtured his anger until it became an obsession. His sufferings were made worse by the fact that his enemy Ventimiglia, although he suffered in the decline in which all of Sicily was caught, never fell from grace with the king or from power in the government. Indeed, Ventimiglia seemed immune from all royal criticisms or attempts to undercut his commanding position in society. Finally unable to bear matters any longer, Giovanni returned with a band of German mercenaries, and searched the streets of Palermo until they found Francesco, whom they struck down but failed to kill. Giovanni and his men hastened to their highland strongholds and rallied supporters to their cause - now a movement against an ineffectual, corrupt, and unfair foreign government as well as against a rival noble family vilified as the privileged pet of the monarchy - with promises of assistance from, once again, the German imperial court. This support, of course, never materialized, since Louis had other priorities (besides which, Frederick was a useful source of ships and men for continental Ghibellinism). Giovanni and his supporters, in the face of a mounting campaign against them, decided to quit the island once more, and his estates were quickly confiscated by the government. Renouncing their links with the imperial court, Giovanni and his cohorts threw in their lot instead with the Angevins, thus triggering charges of treason, countercharges, a chain of rebellions and repressions; and by 1335 the stage was set for ruinous civil war, much to the glee of the Neapolitan court.114 So great was the

114

turba filiorum, quos idem Franciscus ex concubina susceperat, tanquam novelle olivarum, ante patris oculos, adolebant, ipsique genitori, sublato moderamine rationis, plus debito spectabiles videbantur . . . Unde actum est, quod in ea parte, pudoris gravitate deposita, Franciscus ipse jactaret se in hoc numeros prole felicem, abjectaque omni spe omnique desiderio suscipiende prolis ex conjuge, fecit illam de suo cubiculo alienam, illosque filios, quos legitimus thorus non edidit, successores et heredes relinquere meditatus est. Quocirca dato conjugi libello repudii, per diversas semitas et amfractus divortium obtinuit, matrem filiorum sibi nuptam adhibuit et tandem legitimationem eorum a Sede Apostolica impetravit. Tune Johannes, quern juvenilis etas et objectum sororis repudium instigabant, moliri cepit de Francisco vindictam. Sed quia Franciscus a Friderico rege tolerabatur in plurimis . . . Johannes experiri quod mente conceperat effectu operis non audebat. Itaque magnis irarum fluctibus estuans ad Ludovicum imperatorem, de quo iam fermo preteriit, tune parantem Italiam invadere, profectus est, ubi cum in agendis bellicis ei prospere successisset, usque adeo fama gloriosus excrevit, quod idem imperator eundem Johannem gloriosis titulis insignivit." Stefano Vittorio Bozzo, "Giovanni Chiaramonte II nella discesa di Ludovico il Bavaro," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 3 (1878-9), 155-85; Roberto Cessi, "Giovanni di Chiaramonte, conte di Modica, e Ludovico il Bavaro," ArchStperSic 10 (1913), 223-36. See also Laura Sciascia,

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danger, that Frederick suddenly added a codicil to his will, stating that, in the all too likely event that he and his entire family should perish in the war, the throne should pass to Alfonso in Barcelona.115 The baronial war began after Frederick's death, with innumerable atrocities committed by all sides. But it is important to recognize the extent to which this tragedy too owed its existence to Sicily's international difficulties. The constriction of the economy from mid-reign had caused tremendous hardship for the landholding class, whose land rents and agricultural profits fell precipitously; this paved the way both for their bitterness against the urban sector of society (where their peasant laborers had fled, and where other economic options held out at least the possibility of recovery under the protection of their extensive privileges) and against the prominent Catalan caste, but also for their opportunity to increase their power-base in the highlands. Frederick after all had made it possible, reluctantly perhaps but consistently, for them to grow into a stronger and more independent-minded group by removing the ban on subinfeudation, by granting them criminal and civil jurisdiction (merum et mixtum imperium) over their territories, and finally by appointing many of them to military positions within the cities they so disdained. The more that Sicilian life decayed, the more the barons were in a position to dominate society and to blame the prevalent ills on the government. And the king's links with Ghibellinism on the mainland provided a convenient justification for Giovanni Chiaromonte and his men to turn to the German emperor, as theoretical overlord of the recalcitrant monarch. When Louis failed to meet Giovanni's expectations, the latter's indignation and frustration were sufficiently great that he was willing, temporarily at least, to champion the Angevins as once again the legitimate sovereigns. That so many of the Sicilian elites would consider renewing Angevin claims to the kingdom - even if only as a tactical measure - speaks eloquently of the dreadful extent of Sicily's decline by the time of Frederick's death.

115

"Scene da un matrimonio: Eleonora d'Aragona e Giovanni Chiaramonte," Quaderni medievali 31-2 (1991), 121-9. ACA Cane. Reg. 544, fol. 89-89V (6 Sept. 1335), is a letter from Alfonso to Frederick, offering assistance in putting down the coming war. ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3718 (25 Feb. 1335). Text of codicil is included in this letter from Ramon de Peralta to Alfonso.

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It is easy to criticize Sicily's gross overextension of its power, resources, and loyalties. Despite the impressive economic and social recovery that followed Caltabellotta, entering into so many overseas obligations was sheer foolhardiness. What the land needed instead - and what, to be fair, the government tried to offer until the temptations of 1311-13 arose - was an organized effort to capitalize upon prosperity by developing new manufactures, a carrying trade, a more effective parliament, more equitable means of dealing with the social tensions caused by demographic shift, more schools, better roads. Once Greece had been taken, an offer to restore the duchy to Naples and to assist in further Angevin expansion in the east might have won an Angevin renunciation of claims upon "Trinacria" and brought peace. But the extraordinary opportunities that appeared, or seemed to appear, in 1311-13 proved irresistible both to the evangelically inspired royal court and society at large. Whatever we make of this grandiose vision of Mediterranean domination and spiritual purification, we must recognize that for Frederick's Sicily such a vision did temporarily exist, and that this vision tempted the kingdom into its web of foreign involvements which, once begun, only kept the realm entangled in difficulty after difficulty until Frederick's death. The web, once entered, proved impossible to escape. Thus, in order to evaluate the effect of the war with Naples upon the dreadful unraveling of Sicilian life one must broaden one's scope of vision and take into consideration more than the immediate struggle along the Sicilian and Calabrian coasts. That struggle was indeed an on-again off-again campaign of harassment and siege, costly enough in men and resources and interrupted trade, but hardly enough by itself to explain a kingdom's shattering. Nicola Speciale, we have seen, pinpointed the decline's start to the 1311-13 period; but that may have more symbolic than literal truth to it. There is clear evidence that serious social and economic decline had begun as early as 1317, especially in Val di Mazara; most papal negotiating offers from that time on were willing to give Frederick permanent control of western Sicily (plus some other overseas lands, like Albania or Cyprus), if he would relinquish the more stable eastern valli.116 It seems more likely, though, that 116

FAA 11, doc. 449; Rubio i Lluch, Diplomatari, doc. 99.

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serious decay did not set in until 1320 or 1321; once begun, however, it accelerated rapidly throughout the 1320s. Successes overseas may have taken attention away from the failures at home, for a while, and may even have been pursued with greater vigor for that very reason. But the collapse of any reasonable hope for international success as a compensation or possible remedy for domestic problems soon became apparent. After some brief initial benefit caused by the formation of a new forced market, the Athenian duchy represented a continual drain on the royal coffers and thus an impediment to economic health. The more demesne land the government had to alienate in order to prop up the regime, the more it had to recoup those losses in another sector of the economy. And the same held true of the ties with Catalonia and with the northern Ghibellines. It is impossible to estimate the overall cost to the kingdom of pursuing these wars. Surviving records simply do not exist. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some impressionistic conclusions. First, tens of thousands of people were killed, and tens of thousands more were pushed off the land, made homeless, sent into exile, or driven into poverty. (It is no coincidence that most of the Sicilian-based tales in Boccaccio's Decameron feature a young widow.) Usually the displaced populace trailed into the nearest demesne city where it was hoped the persistent labor shortages might provide a chance to make a new beginning, but many pushed eastward, or even emigrated abroad to Sardinia and Tunisia when they found life in Palermo, Trapani, Mazara, or Agrigento no easier than life in the desolate countryside. The economic effects of this shift were devastating, since the erosion of the agricultural base contributed to a dramatic loss of commerce within the cities and consequently to a decline in revenues to provide for the cities' defense. Labor shortages there might be, but without adequate capital or credit for the commercial sector there was little chance of finding permanent work. In the 1325-6 campaign, for example, the Angevins had stormed in succession Mazara, Salemi, Marsala, Sciacca, Caltabellotta, Corleone, Cattolica, Agrigento, Licata, Naro, Terranova, Caltagirone, Scicli, Modica, Siracusa, Noto, Buccheri, Ferla, Palazzolo, Avola, Ragusa, Augusta, Lentini, and Catania, destroying villages and farms, burning crops, tearing down aqueducts, and cutting down vineyards as they went. The damage cannot be calculated; commercial contracts for several years

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afterwards, however, are filled with clauses stipulating the extent of individuals' liability for failing to produce the promised goods or services "on account of the war."117 Palermo itself, at which that campaign had first aimed, had to spend great sums of money to repair the city walls and other fortifications destroyed by the Angevins, to buy emergency provisions, and to hire a number of the private armies (comitive) that had appeared on the scene by then, even though the commune was nearly insolvent. 118 But trouble was evident in Palermo even before the invasion. The first notarial register of Salerno di Pellegrino, for example, which covers foreign trade in that city for the indictional year from September 1323 to August 1324, records fifty-eight transactions (approximately 40 percent of the total register) in which commodities were purchased on credit, or loans were advanced, yet no repayment is noted. (Debts that were repaid are carefully documented as such.) These defaults, if such they were, represent a total value of over I,2OO.OO.OO.119

The cost in social tension and mob violence was equally great, as poverty and frustration pushed increasing numbers of people towards a xenophobic search for scapegoats on whom to vent their anger. The inland barons led the charge against the Catalans, who, they contended, were avaricious traitors to the trust Sicily had placed in them. "Morano li catalani!" was their cry, which could be heard from 1321 onwards.120 In the cities, though, the victims tended to be foreign merchants, especially those from Genoa (owing to their increasing presence rather than the particularity of their origin). The attacking mobs were ambivalent about the Guelf or Ghibelline leanings of their victims, it would seem; foreign merchants in general were viewed as privileged predators, and at times foreigner even attacked foreigner in the overheated atmosphere. 121 117 118

119 120 121

Muntaner, Cronica, ch. 282; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. vn, ch. 18-19; ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 76 (Ruggero di Citella), fol. 65, 66, 68-9, 86V-87, 87V-S8V, 90V-91, 97-97V; Spez. 89. Acta curie in,passim. The royal bailiff for the city in 1315 (D. Bertolo Cosmerio), the chief official responsible for preserving peace, could not be paid his salary until 1323 owing to the city's defectus pecunie, although urban intractability over the presence of a knight as bailiff cannot be discounted as a reason for failing to find funds to pay him; see ibid., doc. 16. ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 1 (Salerno di Pellegrino),passim. Michele da Piazza, Historia sicula, bk. 1, ch. 3; Giunta, Aragonesi e catalani 1, pp. 22-3. ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 48,100.

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In sum, the international scene may not have caused Sicily's depressing decline but it certainly aggravated that fall, and it provides the necessary background or context for analyzing domestic policies and developments. Sicily's possible responses to worsening circumstances became consistently narrower. Whatever the central and local governments wanted to do, in terms of domestic development, their real options were few and were constantly shrinking in the face of their international problems that demanded immediate and urgent attention. The barons had shown themselves, in the post-Caltabellotta settlement, to be willing to work with the new government, and in the process peaceably divested themselves of territories they had seized during the first phase of the Vespers even though the government had little power to force their compliance. But the erosion of their economic base spurred them to a rebellion which took a number of forms either moving into the demesne and disrupting life there, or sealing themselves off in the highlands and establishing themselves as independent petty princes, or openly breaking with the government and taking arms against it. Once the decline set in, the kingdom stumbled from alliance to alliance and from crisis to crisis; but nothing could free it from the constantly constricting web in which it was caught. At a certain point, it became clear, there could be no peace with Naples, so long as the Angevins wanted to prolong the war and the papacy was willing to support their efforts, except for an all-out victory; and opportunity for such a victory seemed to present itself twice, in the persons of Henry VII and Louis the Bavarian. The Sicilians' hopes were wholly unrealistic, but in the concatenation of events that led to each new tie we can see the full extent of the appalling difficulties they faced.

CHAPTER 3

A divided society I: the urban-demesnal world

Urban-demesnal Sicily comprised both the coastal communerepublics (universitates or urbes), several inland towns (like Polizzi, Castrogiovanni, Naro, and Piazza) that were likewise governed by elected judices and lesser municipal officials but which lacked the more varied economic activity and demographic makeup of the perimeter cities, and the personal estates of the crown. In addition - although it was not strictly part of the demesne - Frederick's queen Eleanor held an extensive independent apanage known as the camera reginale, which she administered with her own corps of officials; located in the Val di Noto, its most important component was the city of Siracusa, but it included Francavilla, Lentini, Mineo, and Vizzini as well. This camera grew rapidly in the 1320s and 1330s and became a favorite resettlement site for immigrants from the Val di Mazara, owing to certain tax advantages it enjoyed but above all due to the relative absence of baronial influence there. Whether as part of the king's demesne or as subjects to the queen's administration, well over 50 percent of the total population of Sicily lived within sixteen kilometers (ten miles) of the coastline at the start of Frederick's reign; and the urban segment of the population increased proportionally as the overall population declined. Thus if we consider the demesne in the broadest context — that is, as all the sites under royal control, whether that meant the king or the queen - it is likely that from 1325 onward as many as two-thirds of all Sicilians inhabited the crown's territories and paid taxes to the royal fisc. Administering so extensive a demesne obviously commanded most of the king's attention. From the day he took the throne, Frederick regulated municipal elections, guaranteed local privileges, organized networks for defense of the ports, heard judicial appeals, and manipulated the tariff system, all in order to 85

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ensure urban prosperity. Although he liked to claim otherwise, he owed his kingship to the support for him registered by the major municipalities. Without urban backing he would not have received the crown in 1296; and he knew that without the continuance of that support he would not be able to keep it. Hence there was always a certain contradiction or tension between what Frederick said, in regard to the cities, and what he did. The cities, as the crucial pillars of the economy, understood their importance to him very well and never hesitated to remind him of it and to seek new grants of privilege or assistance. After almost every Angevin or Genoese attack, outbreak of disease, or conflict with baronial ambitions, the beset town or towns turned to their lord for some form of compensation for their sufferings on his behalf. Their petitions frequently angered the king since they dealt inevitably with local needs and desires, to the frustration of Frederick's larger aim of promoting realm-wide unity. His transition from glorified war hero to administrative supply clerk proved painful for him and might well have driven him to despair if it had not been for his adoption of the evangelical-reformist platform that gave so strong a sense of divine purpose to his actions. Frederick matured in his role. In his early years, from his coronation to Caltabellotta, he displayed the brashness of a young warrior-king living out what he deemed to be chivalric adventures in the manner of his beloved father. After Caltabellotta, however, he adapted to peacetime and engineered an ambitious and mostly successful reform of the demesnal administration that resulted in the standardization of the tariff code, the provision of orderly elections within the cities, and a reasonably equitable administration of justice. In this period, until roughly mid-reign, the cities remained relatively peaceful and prosperous. The surviving evidence records remarkably few incidents of urban unrest despite the broad-ranging changes taking place in society, although some must have occurred. The second half of the reign, however, is another story. With the constant threat of war impinging on trade, with displaced and starving peasants crowding into the cities, with ethnic tensions on the rise, and with the gradual monopolization of local wealth and power by handfuls of organized rival elites, the cities became centers of considerable poverty, unrest, crime, and disease. Faced with these mounting difficulties, the king turned to members of the baronial world to restore order and began to

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appoint them as bailiffs or pretors possessing extensive authority to suppress unrest. He was also forced, in other instances, effectively to buy the continued support of a town by awarding further privileges and tax immunities that he could ill afford. Royal popularity declined steadily, while requests for favors just as steadily increased and in fact began to take on the character of demands. In Val di Mazara the king's standing with his subjects had sunk so low that after 1321 Frederick was hardly to be seen anywhere west of the river Salso and seldom ventured even as far west as Castrogiovanni. For the rest of the time he remained in or near Messina, making it the de facto capital, and journeyed when necessary to friendly sites like Lentini and Siracusa. 1 Frederick's sole surviving poem, asirvante written in an Italianate Provengal in 1298, illustrates his early brashness; in it the cocky new king views his monarchy as a stage upon which to play out his chivalric dreams: Ges per guerra non chal aver consir: Ne non es dreiz de mos amis mi plangna, Ch'a mon secors vei mos parens venire; E de m'onor chascuns s'esforza e s'langna Perch'el meu nom maior cors pel mon aia. E se neguns par che de mi s'estraia, No Ten blasmi che almen tal faiz apert Gh'onor e prez mos lignages en pert. Pero el reson dels Catalans auzir E d'Aragon puig far part Alamagna; E so ch'enpres mon paire gent fenir: Del regn'aver crei che per dreiz me tagna. E se per se de mal faire m'assaia Niguns parens, car li crescha onor gaia, Bern porra far dampnage a deschubert, Gh'en altre sol non dormi nim despert. Pobble, va dir a chui chausir so plaia Ghe dels Latins lor singnoria m'apaia; Per que aurai lor e il me per sert. Mas mei parens mi van un pauc cubert.2 1 2

His favorite residence was his palace (today in ruins) at Castroreale, a small upland town a few kilometers above Barcellona, roughly forty-five kilometers from Messina. This poem appears in Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, PL XLI, Cod. XLVII, fol. 63, and as document no. 54 in the appendix to Amari, La guerra del Vespro siciliano. "The events of

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It is a bad poem, but it reflects the conceit he was capable of and offers a hint of his political attitude, even as it illustrates the decayed troubadour atmosphere that still lingered in the aristocratic courts. He treats the Vespers as chivalric sport, an opportunity to gain knightly renown and extend the honor of the royal House of Aragon. He even lacks ill-will towards his enemies and asks only that they declare themselves openly. He rejoices in the support given to him by the Sicilians and their Catalan allies, and declares his determination to retain the throne despite the difficulties that loom ahead. This much of the sirvante is formulaic; but a few complex political realities are also suggested. When he penned this poem Frederick had been on the throne for two years, after his election and acclamation by the parliament; but he states that the crown sits atop his head rightfully as the son of King Peter, whose conquests he aims to complete. As though he were anticipating later struggles with the urban leaders, he asserts that his authority derives from inheritance. But Peter had held the twin rights of conquest and legitimate succession through marriage to the last Hohenstaufen, Constance; hence Frederick's inherited rights have vague implications "as far away as Germany." This is of course merely a reference to his Hohenstaufen lineage, but it ironically presages the links with Henry and Louis which brought so much harm to the kingdom. The poem's emphasis on hidden enemies, secret abandonment, and betrayal refers to the treason of Roger de Lauria (who defected in 1297) but it may also be an ironic, and somewhat anxious, lament for the position taken by James in the pseudo-war between Sicily and Catalonia. He sees the monarchical authority above all as a thing to be enjoyed - as though the ultimate purpose of the office were to please its holder rather than to serve its subjects. the war should not cause alarm, / nor is it right that I should despair of my friends, / for I see my relations coming to my aid / and everyone striving and exerting himself for my honor / so that my name may hold higher place in the world. / If anyone should abandon me / I do not blame him, provided he deprecates openly/ the honor and worthiness of my lineage. // But I can make the repute of the Catalans / and of Aragon resound as far away as Germany, / and so complete the deeds of my father / whose realm I believe I hold by right. / If any of my kin try to do injury to me on this account, / hoping to gain an increase of honor for himself, / then let him well try his harm in the open; / for on this soil I sleep not, and am ever watchful. // People, let it be said to whomever desires to hear: / that the rule over the Latin people pleases me, / that I will have them and that they indeed will have me. / But of my kindred I have some suspicion."

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His published laws provide clearer evidence of his approach to managing the demesne. Six main legislative efforts make up whatever constitutional legacy he may claim. His Constitutiones regales, issued upon his coronation, established the main framework; they were followed almost immediately by the supplementary Capitula alia. In late 1309 or early 1310, after his evangelical conversion, came the Ordinationes generates which are much the most interesting of his promulgations, dealing with matters of the slave trade and broader social reform. These bear all the fingerprints of Vilanova and indeed are sometimes cataloged among his religious writings. After this no new laws were issued until the Stratigoto civitatis Messane (1321), the Constitutiones fade in Castro Johannis (1325), and the Constitutiones facte in urbe Panormi (1332), all of which were weak,

reactive measures towards what were by then virtually intractable urban problems.3 The cities made their demands clear from the beginning: first, an unequivocal promise by the royal government to protect them from any malefactor, whether lay or ecclesiastical, noble or common, Sicilian or foreign, and to forgo any foreign involvements "without the expressed consent and full knowledge of the people." Their defensiveness and suspicion are plainly evident here. To their eyes every monarch since Frederick II Hohenstaufen had abandoned the island to pursue grander schemes elsewhere and had stripped the merchants' commercial resources in order to finance adventures overseas, only to leave the perimeter cities undefended against aggressive barons or exposed to retribution from the overly ambitious king's foreign rivals. And in order to ensure against any attempt to evade this primary obligation the cities demanded, and received, a parliament in regular sitting that held supreme authority over all foreign policy; they were particularly concerned, lest Frederick seek to escape from his oath, that the new king 3

Capitula regni Sicilie, quae ad hodiernum diem lata sunt, edita cura ejusdem regni deputatorum Herculis Michaelis Branciforti, Buteras principis . . . , ed. Francesco Testa, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1741-3). Henceforth they will be abbreviated as Const. reg., Cap. alia, Ord.gen.,Strat. Messina,

Const. Castrogiovanni, and Const. Palermo. In Testa's edition the laws are numbered sequentially from one work to another (e.g. the Ord. gen. closes with ch. 107 and the Const. Castrogiovanni begins with ch. 108). Testa's dating, organization, and editing of the laws is faulty. Yet, except for a new version of the Ord. gen. that has recently come to light, we have to rely on his work as the only available version of the texts. Because of the great rarity of his volumes, I will quote the laws in extenso in the notes that follow, with a few editorial changes, to correct obvious mistakes.

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"never seek, procure, or receive any absolution of this bond and obligation."4 Next, they obliged him to recognize and confirm "all grants, concessions, donations, gifts, privileges, liberties, immunities, customs, constitutions, ordinances, and laws" preexisting in the cities, which would allow them to reestablish their former commercial and manufacturing networks. Significantly, they further extracted his promise that in all reasonably contested cases the legal interpretation of the original privileges and grants, if challenged, would always favor the individual or city on whose behalf they had been initially awarded. This concession has too frequently been overlooked by scholars. In effect, it gave each municipality full autonomy over its own trade, or least over those aspects of it for which an earlier grant had been given. 5 If Sciacca, for example, failed to win for itself a new grant comparable to a new award given to its rival port of Mazara, all it had to do was to reinterpret an older grant in the desired manner and insist on the king's acquiescence: a crude move, to be sure, but not an uncommon one in the 1320s and 1330s. Recourse could also be had to the vetting of royal officials. The parliament demanded by the cities in 1296 - which within ten years had developed into a three4

5

Const, reg., bk. i, ch. i: "respondemus et dictis fidelibus nos et heredes nostros in perpetuum obligamus Regnum Sicilie, precipue insulam ipsam Sicilie, homines et habitatores ipsius, contra quascumque personas ecclesiasticas et seculares, publicas et privatas, universitates, et singulares personas cuiuscumque gradus, ordinis, et dignitatis extiterint, statui predicti Regni, et hominum eorumdem hostiliter adversantes protegere ac defensare fideliter et toto posse, et quod, pretextu Regni alterius, dignitatis aut prosperitatis cuiuslibet nobis undecumque et qualitercumque obvenientis nullo umquam tempore, nulla ratione vel causa, ab ipsisfidelibusnostris Sicilie divertimus ... Adjicimus etiam sponsioni et obligationi presenti, quod nullum tractatum concordie, guerre, vel pacis incipiemus, habebimus, vel faciemus seu ceptum vel habitum hactenus qualemcumque probabimus vel admittemus, cum Papa aut Ecclesie Romane prelato aut hostibus et impugnatoribus nostris, et status Sicilie suprascriptis, sive cum sequacibus et fautoribus eorumdem absque consensu expresso et aperta scientia Siculorum. Huic insuper nostre adnectimus sanctioni et dispositioni firmissime, absque predictorum fidelium nostrorum consensu, numquam a Romano pontifice seu quibuslibet ecclesiarum rectoribus vel eorum nunciis aut ministris absolutionem sacramenti et obligationis huiusmodi expetere, procurare, vel oblatam recipere, seu liberationi vel remissioni talium nullatenus consentire." Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 2: "omnes gratias, concessiones, donationes, provisiones, privilegia, libertates, immunitates, consuetudines, constitutiones, ordinationes, et leges . . . acceptamus, confirmamus, laudamus, et approbamus, et ex certa scientia robur illis et efficaciam impartimur . . . adjicientes ut, si quid circa interpretationem privilegiorum, gratiarum, et concessionum huiusmodi dubitationis emerserit, interpretatio fiat in favorem et commoditatem eorum, quorum intuitu privilegia et predicta omnia processerunt."

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chambered body, with a house each for the clergy, the nobility, and the representatives of the demesne cities - was mandated to meet annually on All Saints, Day to review the actions taken in the past year by all royal officials and "to reckon and renounce" their inadequacies or corruption.6 Anger with the church still ran high, and violence in the streets could result from an ill-advised accusation of Guelf partisanship. Even during the peaceful decade after Caltabellotta passions still ran feverishly enough to occasion mob riots whenever loyalties were questioned - as was the case in Corleone in 1309, when a violent struggle broke out between two factions "that seemed capable of destroying the whole region."7 In order to avoid such conflagrations, the Constitutiones included a prohibition against calling anyone a Guelf or traitor, as well as explicitly forbidding the king from forming any agreement with the papacy without the parliament's consent.8 Clergy within Sicily were obliged to pay the hated collecta tax whenever it was levied on the urban populace as well; and local churches had to sell "within one year, plus one month, one week, and one day" any and all demesnal property bequeathed to them by the faithful.9 The church, in other words, could be restored to the possessions and privileges it had held prior to the Vespers, but further acquisitions were to be checked in the 6

7

8 9

Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 3: "providimus, anno quolibet, in festo scilicet omnium sanctorum, in Sicilie partibus generalem curiam celebrari, in qua nobis adesse statuimus comites, barones, et universitatum quarumlibet syndicos idoneos et sufficientes, instructos, et alios ad hoc opportunos et utiles . . . ad examinandum etiam et puniendum justiciariorum, judicum, notariorum, et officialium quorumlibet defectus, negligentias, et excessus." Gf. ASP Tab. S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 11-12, 17, 51. ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 65 (6 Jan. 1309): "briga sive sarra concitabatur inter quosdam homines dicte terre projicientes immensos lapides . . . terra videbatur posse vastari propter dictam brigam." Const, reg., bk. 1, ch. 1 (papacy), 5 (Guelf). Ibid., bk. 11, ch. 22: "Levius quidem facit, quod portatur a multis, et quod in communi deducitur, lucidius elucescit. Itaque, cum fideles nostri Sicilie pro bonis eorum in premissis casibus nobis teneantur et debeant subvenire, volumus, ut in subventionibus necessariis . . . clerici et ecclesiastice persone pro bonis burgensaticis, patrimonialibus, et que aliunde, quam ab ecclesiis habuerunt et tenuerunt, cum aliis habitatoribus terrarum et locorum, ubi fuerint, pro modo facultatum bonorum ipsorum conferre et contribuere teneantur"; and ch. 24: "statuimus, ut si per aliquem burgensem nostri demanii aut vassallum dictorum feuda tenentium in ecclesias predium aliquod rusticum vel urbanum quoquo alienationis titulo seu per aliquas voluntates ultimas alienare et transferre contigerit, prelati ecclesiarum ipsarum . . . predia ipsa infra annum unum, hebdomadam, mensem, et diem a tempore alienationis iamdicte vendere seu concedere teneantur et debeant, si de demanio fuerint."

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hope of putting a cap on ecclesiastical influence in the realm. Fearful of other sorts of violence and abuses, the cities exacted further injunctions prohibiting the bearing of arms in the municipalities (except for the aristocracy, whether higher or lower, who were entitled to carry a knife and a sword), and guaranteeing that criminal trials appealed to the royal courts would be heard and decided within two months. The tenor of urban—royal relations was thus set. Each municipality governed itself according to its own traditions and consuetudines, and pursued its own commercial strategies, while the central government collected taxes and oversaw elections to the urban magistracies, but otherwise had little direct control over each town. But the cities had limits on them of a different nature. Unlike the urban communes of northern Italy, Sicily's cities did not own or control their surrounding districts, and without this control over the contado each municipality was exposed to the potential interruption of the surrounding resources on which its economy lived. As more and more immigrants flocked to the urban centers it became increasingly important for towns to acquire jurisdictional and commercial authority over their environs. Thus the cities determinedly sought either to gain direct control over their local districts, through one stratagem or another, or to protect themselves from any potential loss by securing additional grants or privileges based on their often asserted longsuffering on behalf of the central government. As the decades passed, the general effect of these strategies was to enhance the localist and isolationist tendencies that were already present in each community, even if at the expense of neighboring cities or the kingdom as a whole - and sometimes especially at their expense. I ECONOMIC STRATEGIES

Until mid-reign only Messina had any significant influence over its contado. Its uniquely valuable location on the Strait combined with the uniquely poor quality of its rural hinterland to create a manufacturing and commercial economy that required procurement of raw materials from a wide expanse of the Val Demone. In order for Messina to survive, much less thrive, it had to have unimpeded access to the resources of the whole district, and consequently, the Messinese merchants and urban elites had always been particularly

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persistent in seeking concessions from the government. In order to ensure the regular availability of galleys and other tradeships, for example, Messina was granted control of Randazzo, situated above the Alcantara valley and noted for its timber production, as early as 1199. The steady flow of good quality timber helped to make the Messina shipyards the largest and most productive in the kingdom, making it possible when necessary to build and rig ships for trade or war with enviable speed. Particular care went into making the city commercially and politically stable, and this did not preclude the forging of privileges whenever it was thought useful. Most of these forgeries were successful; owing to the decayed state of the royal archives once the Angevins had departed, taking their records with them, the government had no effective means of checking on the authenticity of claims presented to it. Acting on one of these false precedents, for example, Frederick confirmed Messina's right to select the magistri jurati throughout the whole of its territory which by 1302 was extended to include the plain of Milazzo, the only major grain production site in the Val Demone.10 This greatly expanded the jurisdictional clout of the universitas and made it much easier to consolidate control over the regional economy. It furthermore enjoyed a monopoly on wine production (imports being expressly forbidden) that provided considerable revenue for the leading merchants. And the city's highest official, the stratigoto, was awarded authority over several older jurisdictions reaching as far as Castrogiovanni. But even as Messina grew in strength, problems kept pace. Because of the strong demographic drift eastward and because Messina attracted a disproportionate percentage of the migration, grain supplies were always perilously low. Even in years of high yield Messina had to import grain; but since western Sicily directed its export grain to northern Italy, Tunis, or Catalonia, Messina had to look elsewhere for supplies. Consequently urban leaders sought to reestablish their traditional trade links with Angevin Calabria. Animal products such as cheese and salted meat, some timber, wine, possibly silk or even iron ore, 10

Neocastro, Historia sicula ab anno 1250 ad i2gj deduct a, in RGBS, ch. 33; Carlo Giardina, Capitoli eprivilegi di Messina (Palermo, 1937), Memorie e documenti di storia siciliana, 2nd ser., vol. 1, doc. 31, 33; Testa, De vita et rebus gestis Friderici II Siciliae regis (Palermo, 1775), p. 263; F. Martino, "Una ignota pagina del Vespro: la compilazione dei falsi privilegi messinesi," QFIAB, forthcoming. See also Abulafia, "The Merchants of Messina" (see ch. 2, n. 2, above).

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were available in sufficient quantity to trade for the grain produced by the Angevins' large latifundia.11 Despite the acrimony that existed between the realms, it is likely that the king was in favor of such commerce even during periods of open warfare, since trade with Calabria counted technically as foreign trade and was therefore subject to royal duties. So important was trade with the peninsula that the Messinese leaders even opened their own consulate in Naples after the final phase of the Angevin attack on Sicily began in the 1320s.12 Messina also traded extensively with the Levant, particularly with Egypt; Pegolotti's handbook, for example, offers conversion figures for the weights and measures used in Messina and those used in Alexandria and Damietta.13 Eastern spices and dyes were traded for local manufactures and for goods from northern countries. Trade relations with Egypt had long been a major concern of the Catalans, as a matter of course; but this connection was noticeably strengthened under King James, whose appointment as "admiral of the church" by Boniface VIII made him responsible for protecting Christian merchants and pilgrims in Egypt and the Holy Land.14 As with most of Sicily's foreign trade, though, Messina's commerce with the east was largely in the hands of the Catalans or other foreign merchants. Other Sicilian cities, especially those in the west, failed to copy Messina's success in gaining control over the contado for two reasons: they lacked the options available to the Messinese in terms 11

12 13 14

Pegolotti's handbook describes Messina as one of the principal wine-exporting cities in Sicily, having a clear eastern orientation; see Francesco Pegolotti, La pratica della mercatura, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), Medieval Academy of America Publications, vol. xxrv, pp. 39, 66. Indeed with the exception of Cefalu, virtually all of the wine exporters in Sicily by mid-reign were in the eastern valli: Messina, Patti, Acireale, Catania, Augusta, and Siracusa. There were known iron ore deposits south of Messina at Ali and Fiumedinisi; see Epstein,^4n Island for Itself p. 229. On animal products, etc. traded with the peninsula, see Bibliotheca historica regni Siciliae, sive Historica, qui de rebus siculis a Saracenorum invasione usque ad Aragonensium principatum illustriora monumenta reliquerunt amplissima collection ed. Giovanni Battista Caruso, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1723), doc. 489, 522-3, 591; Riniero Zeno, Documentiper la storia del diritto marittimo nei secoli XIIIe XIV (Turin, 1936; rpnt. 1970), Documenti e studi per la storia del commercio e del diritto commerciale, vol. vi, doc. 27, 33. Georges Yver, Le commerce et les marchands dans Vltalie meridionale au Xllle et au XlVe siecle (Paris, 1903), p. 197. Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983), pp. 31—2. Aziz Atiya, Egypt and Aragon: Embassies and Diplomatic Correspondence, IJOO-IJJO (Leipzig, 1938), Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des Morgenlands, vol. xxm, Nr. 7 is the only study to date of this relationship. A new study is sorely needed.

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of the economic diversity of their land - Messina's district, though extremely poor for grain production, had other resources that it could exploit - and they failed to present the united front that the Messinese merchants had done in pursuing that control. For example, at least a dozen cities - notably Caltabellotta, Castrogiovanni, Lentini, Licata, Marsala, Mineo, Nicosia, Petralia, Terranova, Trapani, and Vindicari - had nearby saltworks that offered one potential avenue for growth, yet none of them, with the possible exception of Trapani, had production levels much above what was needed for local consumption. Even more crucially, most of these saltworks were enfeoffed and thus out of the hands of the urban traders. Only Trapani was likely engaged in any significant amount of trade.15 Deposits of alum, a mineral salt used as an astringent in wool production, were likewise known in several sites throughout the kingdom, but little of it was mined in a systematic way: it lay in the volcanic soil surrounding Mount Etna, on the Lipari islands, and near both Caccamo and Sciacca in the Val di Mazara. But alum was not needed to produce the rough wool cloth worn, for reasons of poverty rather than preference, by most Sicilians and hence no significant local market existed for it. Foreign demand, however, was quite high. Alum was used extensively to refine higher quality cloths, and thus its production might have been a very profitable industry for local entrepreneurs, but what little evidence we have of an alum trade in Frederick's time suggests that foreign merchants like the Bardi had command of both distribution and consumption.16 Some sugar production occurred near Palermo and Siracusa, but the manufacturing of sugar was both capital- and labor-intensive (burdens that not many local merchants could bear) and was heavily taxed, resulting in a product that was too expensive for most Sicilians to use; what local demand there was for sugar remained centered in apothecary shops.17 15 16

17

Bresc, Un monde, p. 219, Table $i;Acta curie v, doc. 95; vi, doc. 61; Epstein,^4n Island for Itself p. 224 (Table 4.4). Bresc, Un monde, p. 285, n. 10, citing AGA Perg. Peter IV, no. 1 (which records Bardi merchants leasing a ship from a merchant "de Yspania" to transport Sicilian alum to Bruges in 1335). ASP Notai defunti, Spez. 20 (2 Aug. 1329), 127 (9 Jan. 1324), 9N (22 Oct. 1331). The best study is Carmelo Trasselli, Storia dello zucchero siciliano (Galtanissetta, 1982), Storia economica di sicilia, Testi e ricerche, vol. xxv. Later in the fourteenth century and

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With fewer options at their disposal, therefore, most cities turned instead to securing privileges and controlling, wherever possible, local prices and wages. They wasted no time in this, and felt no compunction in seeking redress for their sufferings, whether real or imagined. Demands for various grants reached the king even before he had left Caltabellotta in 1302. The merchants' representatives from nearby Sciacca were first in line: "considering the full extent of the devotion, faithfulness, and service which all the people of Sciacca have shown" to the crown in the justconcluded war, Frederick was compelled to extend to them immunity from all dohana duties, which was a concession of some considerable size, since Sciacca was perhaps the third most important grain-exporting city in the realm, after Palermo and Agrigento.18 There was no choice but to make the grant (and those that followed on its heels), and the effects of this royal weakness were two-fold: first, there was a significant reduction in royal income that, however modest it may have seemed at first, became ever larger as time passed. Such tax discounting was a common practice throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but those were centuries of increasing population, heightened industrial production, and increased demand. In a period of decline, by contrast, such actions had a deleterious effect that increased proportionally as the population declined. Second, and not to be dismissed lightly, such continuous acquiescence on the part of the central government only strengthened and encouraged the localist prejudices that guided each city's thought. Even on the assumption that the cities that received these exemptions had to pay for the privilege - thus, in effect, paying compounded taxes for at least several years in the future — the immediate cash gain to the royal purse hardly made up for the revenue lost in the long term. This

18

throughout the fifteenth sugar manufacture developed into one of Sicily's most important exports, owing in large part to technological advances that made production more cost-effective and less labor-intensive. ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 39 (30 Aug. 1302): "Considerantes integritatem devotionis et fidei, quam universi homines terre Saccefidelesnostri necnon servitia nobis devote prestita, et que prestare possunt (dante Deo) gratiora, eis de liberalitate mera et speciali gratia et ex certa nostra scientia concedimus, quod burgenses et habitatores terre predicte Sacce pro mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et permissis per eos, tarn per mare quam per terram, sint liberi et immunes, et pro eisdem mercibus et rebus eorum licitis et permissis intrando, stando, et exeundo terra marique nullum jus dohane et alterius cuiuslibet dirittus propterea nostre Curie debitam eidem Curie vel ofYicialibus ipsius Curie, ad quorum hoc spectat et spectabit officium, exhibere et solvere teneantur."

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sort of economic bunker-mentality had an obvious appeal at the local level, but it worked directly against the government's own policy of promoting greater cohesion in the realm. As with the case of the rebel Giovanni Chiaromonte in the 1330s, dissatisfaction with the royal court was easily translated into an opportunistic alliance with anyone - even with the Angevins - who promised to protect the individual community, even while harming others in the process. By mid-reign Frederick had given away an astonishing number of immunities, privileges, and special grants. Most urban demands came in the wake of foreign attack or crop failure; and at such times, a royal failure to deliver opened the door to rebellion. Consequently, within a short time full toll franchises, which exempted the cities themselves and the individual citizens (in case of their traveling to another location) from all dohana duties, were enjoyed by (in chronological order of their awards) Messina, Siracusa, Randazzo, Palermo, Sciacca, Monte S. Giuliano, Trapani, Marsala, Mazara. 19 In gross terms, these exemptions covered as many as 280,000 town-dwellers out of a total (pre-Vespers) population of perhaps 850,000; in other words as much as one-third of the total population that we know of- and well over one-half of the demesne population - possessed some sort of exemption from taxation. Many of these prizes were reconfirmed or extended several times, too. And since the government relied on duty revenues to provide administrative salaries and to fund the various building and resettlement programs in which it was engaged, budgetary problems ballooned and loomed over every meeting of the court. Compounding the problem were the numerous privileges awarded as well to particular individuals, often to foreigners but mostly to natives, whose service commanded special treatment, such as the Florentine merchant Guglielmo Rosso's 1312 exemption from royal collectae for exporting one hundred salme of grain out of Palermo (an award probably linked to the court's newly declared Ghibelline allegiance), or Bartolomeo Iardo's tax immunity for unlimited grain shipped out of "all the ports, gates, lands, and sites 19

ASP Cane. Reg. i, fol. 39; Reg. 2, fol. 73-73V, 73V—75, 84.V-85, 86v—88v, 95—95V, 104— 104.V, io8v—109V; ASP Cane. Reg. 840 (unnumbered folio); Giardina, Capitoli eprivilegi di Messina, no. 11, 32, 40, 60, 81, 93, 100; Testa, De vita et rebus, pp. 244—5, 255> 2^2» 272~3> 274> 2 76-8. Randazzo's franchise was limited to its trade with Messina, a fact that merely strengthened Messina's economic grip on the site.

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily 20

in Sicily." Granting immunities to individuals may have served a specific purpose, though they were hardly likely to promote social cohesion. Franchises to the cities, on the other hand, although they certainly strained the royal purse, probably had a temporary beneficial effect on overall trade since they created a network of enterprise zones that placed competitive pressure on unfranchised cities and non-demesnal lords to lower their own prices and taxes. And since the dohana duties in question applied not to foreign-traded luxury goods (upon which a standard 3 percent levy was imposed) but to the bulk commodities - like salt, cheese, cotton, and cured meat - traded and consumed locally, the end result, for a brief while, was to bring more affordable staple goods to the general populace. But clearly such concessions could not be extended ad infinitum; and so the government sought other ways to meet urban demands and to stimulate trade. One alternative was the institution of trade fairs, which did much to encourage a livelier regional commerce. 21 Here again the major demesne cities led the way. At Frederick's coronation Messina was awarded, or was reconfirmed in, a fair of fifteen days, at the Feast of the Holy Sepulchre (23 April-7 May); Trapani celebrated the Feast of St. George (23 April) with an annual fair from 1302 on; Piazza followed in 1306, Termini and Agrigento in 1312, and Trapani again in 1315 (a second fair, this time for fifteen days in August - a likely reward for enduring, and a mechanism to aid the recovery from, the Angevin siege of 1314); Mazara was granted a month-long fair (6 August: Translation of Corpus Christi) in 1318; Palermo petitioned in 1325 and received permission for a seventeen-day fair centered on the Nativity of the Virgin (8 September); and Corleone, from sometime before 1329, marked each Feast of St. John the Baptist (24 June) with a fair of its own of unknown duration. 22 These newly inaugurated fairs supplemented those established before Frederick's reign, like the 20 21

Ada curie i, doc. 33 (10 March 1312), 51 (10 J u n e 1312). T h e best study is Marina Scarlata, "Mercati e fiere nella Sicilia aragonese," in Mercati e consumi: Organizzazione e qualificazione del commercio in Italia dal XII al XX secolo, 2 vols.

22

(Bologna, 1986), 1, pp. 477—94, replacing Alberto Grohmann, "Prime indagini sull'organizzazione fieristica siciliana nel Medio Evo e nell'eta moderna, con particolare riferimento alia fiera di Sciacca," Atti dell'Accademia pontaniana, n.s. 18 (196&-9), 295-341. See also Bresc, Un monde, pp. 364-9, and Table 74; and Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 107-20. Bresc, Un monde, T a b l e 74; and Epstein, An Island for Itself T a b l e 3.2.

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fairs at Lentini (1287: Feast of the Ascension) and at Naso (1254: Feast of St. Marina), that presumably continued, even though direct notice of them is lacking, on the strength of Frederick's coronation guarantee of all preexisting municipal privileges. Like the toll franchises just described, these fairs clearly aimed to bolster the Val di Mazara communities, and so can be taken as indications of some of the economic challenges posed by rural decline and the flight of people and skills to the east. They also offer evidence of the nature of local trade: by attracting regional business to the enfranchised town square, each city's fair highlighted local manufactures and provided a market for the various products available in the town due to the influx of people and skills. Although foreign merchants, who frequented these fairs in an annual circuit, were interested chiefly in grain and wool, local merchants utilized the fairs to make products like pitch, leather, salt, iron, cotton, and sugar available for domestic consumption. In this way, cities unable to exert direct authority over their contadi were able gradually to extend some measure of economic control over them and thereby reduce the costs of trading in bulk commodities for which no significant foreign market existed. This contributed to an internal specialization of the local, or at most the regional, economies; but at the same time it catalyzed the self-reliance and self-interest that increasingly characterized the western municipalities. As the years passed, and particularly after the severe decline began in the 1320s, the cities clung dearly to their privileges and betrayed an ever increasing reluctance to sacrifice any aspect of their rights or resources to offset any particular, or even critical, need felt elsewhere in the kingdom. In places where the local economy seemed particularly vulnerable the municipal governments tried to stabilize matters by controlling wages and regulating the labor market. As described earlier, the initial consequence of the post-Caltabellotta flight to the demesne was the creation of a surplus labor force that sharply reduced manufacturing costs; and these reduced costs were an important catalyst to the recovery after 1302. But the decline of the population in absolute numbers after 1311-13 produced a shortage of labor, especially skilled labor, that became severe throughout the 1320s and 1330s. Skilled and unskilled wages in Palermo, for example, nearly doubled between 1321 and 1337, even after taking into account a currency devaluation in 1333. Many universitates

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resorted to the rather heavy-handed control of workers. This occurred at different times in different places, but few cities avoided the practice altogether and the implementation of such measures provides an impressionistic but useful key to the extent and pattern of the economic problem. Southern Agrigento, for example, forbade the emigration of laborers from the district shortly after Caltabellotta; northeastern Patti moved to set ceilings for labor wages in 1312; and western Trapani, like Agrigento, prohibited the flight of workers in 1331.23 Actions like these undermined the social mobility that characterized most of late medieval Sicily and thus were unlikely to succeed as long-term measures; but if they were necessary they had to be taken at the municipal level, since no trade guilds existed. As it happened, though, the gradual monopolization of municipal government by small circles of urban elites often amounted to much the same thing as a guild structure. Beyond these artificial strategies, urban society tried any number of other adaptive techniques. The post-war decade, like many such periods, saw a momentary rise in the number of marriages that reflected the rush to resettle the land and recommence full commercial life. But the downward turn starting in 1311-13, and the shrinkage of the credit market as the supply of available cash dwindled, inspired considerable changes. Marriages, for example, tended to be delayed until a measure of economic stability had been attained by an individual or his or her family; extant wills from Palermo indicate that as many as 60 percent of all adult sons and nearly one-half of all adult daughters remained unmarried at the death of the testators; and, moreover, one-third of all sons and daughters mentioned in these wills are described as minors, which suggests that the parents themselves had been rather late to the altar. 24 While this pattern of delay may have had the desired effect of temporarily stabilizing certain family finances it also contributed to a decrease in the birth-rate that aggravated the general popu23

24

BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 381 (Agrigento); Giovan Crisostomo Sciacca, Patti e Vamministrazione del Comune nel Medio Evo (Palermo, 1907), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. vi, p. 58 (Patti); Vito La Mantia, Antiche consuetudini delle citta di Sicilia (Palermo, 1900), p. 1 (Trapani). On Palermo's wages, and the currency devaluation (the denaro was devalued by roughly onethird), see Genevieve Bresc and Henri Bresc, "Maramma: i mestieri della costruzione nella Sicilia medievale," in / mestieri: organizzazione, tecniche, linguaggi (Palermo, 1983), pp. 145-84 at 148; and Epstein, An Island for Itself p. 89, n. 37. Bresc, Un monde, p. 77 and T a b l e 4.

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lation decline already set into motion. By the end of the fourteenth century, in fact, the birth-rate in Palermo - the only city for which reasonably reliable statistics survive - had sunk to such a low level that, on average, less than one surviving child is mentioned per family in extant wills.25 Under these impulses the cities gradually took on a strongly developed character of an inchoate, indeed chaotic, mass of more or less atomized self-reliant individuals without the traditional structures of extended families around which to organize their lives. The records indicate both an ever increasing number of urban citizens without significant local kinship ties, and a growing number of isolated new immigrants - either from abroad or, more commonly, from elsewhere in Sicily. In the first half of the fourteenth century no fewer than one-quarter of all extant wills by males are drawn up by immigrants to the cities (the percentage for females cannot be calculated, since so few wills survived that they cannot be a representative sampling); and surviving marriage contracts suggest that for these same decades one-third of all urban marriages involved a newcomer to the city.26 More successful were attempts to find new markets for local manufactures and to attract foreign investment. Over 1,000 foreign merchants are known to have resided in Sicily during Frederick's reign - most Genoese, Pisans, and Catalans, but with some Neapolitans, Venetians, Occitans, and Castilians in evidence as well - and they carried Sicilian goods (grain and wool, especially) throughout the Mediterranean. A few patterns or trends can be traced. First, the destination of grain exports, calculated by tonnage, altered dramatically with the realm's changing political fortunes. Trade with Tunisia, for example, represented a solid onefourth of all grain shipped abroad (out of Agrigento and Sciacca, principally) until the Caltabellotta treaty, after which north African trade declined to less than 10 percent of the foreign market. For the next ten years fully two-thirds of Sicily's exported grain was shipped to the Italian peninsula, most of it to the northern communes but with some going as well to the Angevin kingdom. In this decade exports to Catalonia (one-fourth of the trade prior to Caltabellotta) declined sharply, due mainly to uncommonly high Aragonese yields that reduced the demand for imports. After the re-ignition of the war in 1311, however, grain shipments to 25

Ibid., p. 80 and Table 5.

26

Ibid., p. 651 and Table 163.

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Catalonia all but monopolized foreign trade until 1329, since few other sites seemed willing to rely on rapidly declining Sicilian supplies or to risk papal or Angevin reprisals, and the Catalans, then bent on their long-delayed Sardinian campaign, were experiencing new shortages of their own. Then, from 1329 to 1337, something like the initial equilibrium prior to Caltabellotta was reestablished: sales to north Africa once again comprised one-third of market share; Catalan purchases declined to about 40 percent of total exports; and the remainder was taken up by Montpellier, Perpignan, and the Slavic lands. By this time, however, total grain exports had declined to less than one-fifth of their peacetime high after Caltabellotta.27 Second, the importance of Palermo as the hub of this trade increased dramatically in relation to every other city west of the river Salso. This was mainly a consequence of the city's sheer bulk; and no doubt our picture is skewed somewhat by the much greater survival of Palermitan records over those of any other site in Sicily. Still it seems clear that, as the western part of the kingdom weakened, only Palermo was in a position to take advantage of whatever resources, skills, and manufactures remained available to strengthen its economic role vis-a-vis the other universitates. Geography favored it, to a degree, since the urban basin has a natural and well-delineated hinterland in the Conca d'Oro. This sizable plain of citrus groves, vineyards, and carob trees, sweeping an arc of approximately fifteen miles inland from the capital, from Sferracavallo west of the city to Solunto east of it, was ringed by high limestone hills that formed a natural border separating it from the rest of the realm. Technically, this land lay outside Palermo's legal jurisdiction until well into the fifteenth century, but the capital was able to establish economic control over it in the fourteenth by the sheer weight of its population and the relative dominance of its market. Palermo's tactics varied from those of the Messinese. Rivalries 27

Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 108-9; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 525-34; Epstein, An Island for Itself] pp. 270-2. A relatively late entry in the grain trade network was Cilician Armenia, where Sicilian merchants were permitted to sell their produce, and export local manufactures, for a low 2 percent tariff, from 1331 on. The Armenian king made the offer presumably in the hope of seeking a partner in his struggle against the Mamluks; but since Sicily was then preoccupied with the newly called crusade against Athens, his hopes were frustrated. See Le tresor des chartes d'Armenie, or Cartulaire de la chancellerie royale des

Roupeniens, ed. Victor Langlois (Venice, 1863), doc. 38.

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between local merchants and the urban elites, and between individuals or families within each group, prevented them from presenting a united front, with the result that they were never able to secure anything approaching the extensive monopolies granted to Messina. But even if such a coordinated effort had been mounted, it is unlikely that the royal court would ever have been inclined to extend vast privileges. The plethora of tax breaks and full exemptions given to lesser sites made it all the more vital for the government to protect its ability to draw revenue from Palermo - and this became all the more important as Palermo's share in total overseas trade increased. Still, the Palermitans, whose own constant shortages resulted from their huge population rather than from any chronic lack of resources (in sharp contrast to Messina's situation), were able to protect themselves by purchasing larger shares of the Conca d'Oro lands and, when this still proved insufficient to meet demand, by market strategies such as offering a reduced excise tax on commodities, like wine, imported from the district for local consumption. 28 As cities like Agrigento and Sciacca declined, Palermo quickly emerged as the most important western port and as virtually the only viable option for traders, given the well-established inability of Trapani, Mazara, Marsala, and Sciacca to protect the sea routes leading into and out of them. Palermo relied principally on local suppliers like Termini and Castellamare for its domestic needs, but it gradually provided, after 1319, the principal trading place for foreign buyers of all Sicilian grain. 29 From 1298 to 1319, for example, most buyers (to judge from the number of merchant ships present) went directly to the regional centers in the grain-producing areas for their purchases: 39 percent of recorded foreign trade ships in these years weighed anchor in southern ports from Sciacca to Agrigento, while 13 percent appeared in the west from Mazara to Castellamare, 18 percent along the northern coast from Solanto to Cefalu, and 24 percent sailed directly into the harbor at Palermo (5 percent sailed directly to eastern shores). But between 1319 and 1339 the corresponding percentages are 16 percent, 5 percent, and 12 percent for the 28

29

Privilegia felicis et fidelissimae urbis Panormi selecta aliquot ad civitatis decus et commodum spectantia, ed. Michele de Vio (Palermo, 1706), pp. 10-11. Protectionist measures increased throughout the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, to restrict foreign merchants from competing with local city-controlled vintages; see ibid., pp. 247—52, 262. Ibid., pp. 6 8 - 9 , 9 0 - 2 ; Ada curie 1, doc. 3 - 5 .

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regional ports, while Palermo commanded 46 percent (with 20 percent going to the eastern valli).30 While these figures ought not to be taken at face value, given the much greater survival of Palermo's commercial records, it is nevertheless clear that Palermo acquired a much greater control of the Val di Mazara economy as that economy declined (a trend that coincided with the growing importance of Catalonia as the main shipping destination of goods traded out of Palermo). 31 It is clear too that the increased share of foreign trade held by the two eastern valli was a function of those regions' more successful adaptation to the straitened circumstances of the 1320s and 1330s. Could those straitened circumstances have been avoided or mitigated in any way? As we have seen, the island's various international entanglements came at a high cost. Direct military expenses continued to climb even as public revenues declined, creating a constant state of public debt and shortage of capital. But what of the private sector? Was capital lacking there, too? Why did no new manufactures arise in the prosperous post-Caltabellotta years? Why did Sicily's artisans and traders remain island-bound, and not invest in a carrying trade of their own? The island, or at least the eastern half of it, possessed ample natural resources that opened the way to new industry, even as the mobility of the population made it possible to draw on untapped skills and abundance of labor to manufacture new goods and bring them to foreign ports; yet neither the industry nor the trade developed. Why? The peace treaty itself was partially to blame. By guaranteeing the eventual return of Angevin authority after Frederick's death, Caltabellotta effectively discouraged large-scale investment in new industrial or commercial ventures, since it was assumed that the Angevins, upon their return, would inevitably displace Sicilian entrepreneurs in favor of their own supporters and clients, just as they had done in 1265. It was certainly a reasonable concern. Why risk capital that would only benefit the enemy? No one foresaw, in 1302, that Frederick would still be on the throne thirty-five years 30 31

Bresc, Un monde, p . 282 a n d T a b l e 43. Catalonia received 5-10 percent of Palermo's foreign trade from 1298 to 1319, but from 1319 to 1339 no less than 40 percent of Palermo's exports were aimed at Catalonia. See Epstein, An Island for Itself, p. 305 and Table 6.4.

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later. On the safer assumption that his reign would last perhaps fifteen years (after all, there had already been one assassination attempt on him, by 1302), it made far better sense to devote one's capital to ventures that promised an earlier return. That meant investing in industries and businesses that already existed rather than venturing into expensive new pursuits that might take years to win back one's initial investment. Moreover, the sheer amount of rebuilding that had to be done - of homes, warehouses, churches, shops, and ships - left precious little excess cash at either the public or private levels to devote to wholly new manufactures. Hence the bulk of whatever venture capital the Sicilians had went into the traditional bulk commodities that the island had always produced: grain and wool. By the time the economy had begun to recover and sufficient cash or credit was available for Sicilians to take a stronger role in these trades throughout the Mediterranean, it was too late to do so. By 1308, according to Giovanni Villani, Sicily's annual wool cloth production had equalled that of Florence itself, in terms of quantity. 32 Florentine cloth was of much higher quality than rough Sicilian orbace, of course; but with sufficient investment in new fulling mills and especially in the production of alum, which was plentiful in the region around Trapani, Sicily's textiles stood a chance of gaining a much larger share of the European market - something that the king recognized and tried to get others to recognize too. 33 But domestic investment lagged until, finally, foreign merchants stepped into the breach. Exchange rates at that time favored them: the florin, which had earlier been reckoned at 00.06.00, in 1308 had gained in value by a third, and stood at 00.08.00, making it considerably easier for northern entrepreneurs to seize control of the island's textile exports. This explains the dramatic increase in the number of foreign merchants doing business in the realm; dozens of new individuals and societatesflockedsouthward to buy consignments of raw wool and to speculate in commodity futures. This commercial invasion might easily have exacerbated ethnic tensions had not the northern investors hit upon the idea of hiring locals to act as their 32 33

Villani, Cronica, bk. x n , ch. n . Stephan R. Epstein, "The Textile Industry and the Foreign Cloth Trade in Late Medieval Sicily, 1300-1500: A 'Colonial Relationship?"Journal ofMedieval History 15 (1989), 141-83 at 160-1.

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procurators. The demographic drift then begun played directly to the interests of the northerners, as each demesne town had surpluses of recent immigrants - often individuals lacking local family ties or a sure way to support themselves - who could do their bidding for them. Thus, if we take the notarial register of Bartolomeo di Citella for 1307-8 as our guide, we find purchase agents from Agrigento, Bivona, Butera, Caccamo, Caltabellotta, Caltanissetta, Caltavuturo, Cammarata, Castelvetrano, Castrogiovanni, Castronovo, Cefalu, Ciminna, Corleone, Eraclea, Gangi, Geraci, Licata, Mistretta, Monreale, Monte S. Giuliano, Naro, Petralia Soprana, Petralia Sottana, Piazza, Polizzi, S. Mauro, Salemi, Sciacca, Sclafani, and Termini all at work in Palermo on behalf of merchants from abroad.34 Another conspicuous failing was the island's inability to develop a carrying trade. As natural ports of call for ships passing between the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean, cities like Palermo, Trapani, Sciacca, Siracusa, Catania, and Messina had long been accustomed to the sight of foreign trading ships sailing into harbor, but had not developed sizable merchant marines of their own. Messina's shipyards certainly were capable of producing vessels of all sizes, often with considerable speed. But the overwhelming majority of Sicily's seacraft were smaller vessels designed for local fishing or for navigating around the island, bringing goods from one port to the next, rather than for sailing on the open sea. Long centuries of colonial rule explain much of this phenomenon, since it was obviously in the interest of the island's rulers to monopolize international trade. By controlling both the ports and the available seacraft sailing through them, foreign dynasts could secure the greatest profits for themselves. This accounts for one of the earliest privileges demanded by the Messinese merchants from their new Catalan monarchs - namely, that the tax on foreign trade (dohana maris) in Messina's harbor be levied upon the shipowners rather than on the merchants who used the vessels to transport their cargoes.35 Here again the Sicilians reckoned that it better served their interests to make use of existing commercial structures than to invest their own funds in an undoubtedly expensive new venture of building up their own merchant marine. Outside of 34 35

Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 8 0 - 1 . Epstein, An Island for Itself p. 244 and n. 8.

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the large comitive of someone like the admiral Corrado Doria, who owned many of his own ships, only a handful of explicit records exist that attest to seagoing galleys and cogs with Sicilian ownership. Occasional references to Sicilian-owned and Sicilian-commanded ships can be found - usually in the eastern trade - but it is important to note that even most of these references denote shipowners who were "Sicilian" in name only. Messina, as we have seen, owed much of its growth in the pre-Vespers era to merchant immigrants from Arnalfi who brought their wares and capital, and often their ships as well, with them. And as we shall see later in this chapter, the influx of peninsular entrepreneurs continued long after the arrival of the Catalans. Thus many of the confirmed "Sicilian" carriers were Sicilian only in this minimal sense, a fact that was understood by local rioters against foreign privilege. Indigenous Sicilian shipbuilders and naval crews, in fact, seem to have left the island in considerable numbers towards the end of the war. They appear again mainly in the eastern seas, contracting their services in Cyprus, Acre, Armenia, and as far as the Black Sea.36 Such movement suggests that either they perceived the impossibility, or anticipated the unlikelihood, of making a living on the home front in the face of an inevitable Angevin return. Better to take their skills and ships elsewhere. Moreover, those Sicilian merchants who did invest heavily in foreign trade preferred to place the risk of transporting their goods on the shoulders of others. Grain and wine merchants operating out of Messina, Catania, and Siracusa, for example, relied upon Pisan fleets to deliver their cargoes to the Levant; this explains why Acre - where large amounts of Val Demone and Val di Noto produce were regularly sold to the Hospitallers - had no Sicilian consulate and the cargoes were unloaded under the observation of Pisan officials. Thus, while the demesne cities showed considerable adaptive skills, the problems besetting them after the post-Caltabellotta zenith proved in the end too great to overcome. Market structures, limited resources, downward demographic pressure, cultural differences, vulnerability to naval attack, and inter-urban rivalries all conspired to impede realm-wide economic growth and to foment 36

See Notai genovesi in Oltremare: Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto, 3 luglio 1300-3 agosto

1301, ed. Valeria Polonio (Genoa, 1982), Collana storica di fonti e studi, vol. xxxi, doc. 204, for example.

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urban particularism. The central government tried to stabilize matters by standardizing and codifying tariffs and collection techniques, both of which had gone through several complicated revisions since the Normans had first established a comprehensive fiscal administration in the twelfth century.37 This effort likely had as much to do with simplifying tax collection and record-keeping as it did with fostering supra-regional trade, since no such trade can be seen in any significant amount either before or after codification. Still, some benefit accrued to the cities, which we can see in Palermo's petition to the king in 1312 for admission into the new tariff mechanism: "The city beseeches Your Sacred Majesty that, on account of the great number and diversity of the royal dohana tariffs, the cities whose lives depend on the imports and export of goods, both by land and by sea . . . and the merchants coming into them with their merchandise are being constantly impeded and in countless ways hindered . . . And therefore might Your Royal Majesty deign to reduce all those taxes into a single code, as has been done in Messina."38 As the petition suggests, Messina was the first city to be restructured in this way, followed by Trapani, Agrigento, Terranova, and Siracusa.39 Because he was about to formalize his link with Henry VII and begin their supposed campaign to conquer the peninsula, and because he needed the city's support in that cause, Frederick responded with a lengthy new 37

For a good overview of these changes, see Ada curie n, pp. 31-50. For specialized studies, see Mario Caravale, "Uffici finanziari del Regno di Sicilia durante il periodo normanno," Annali di storia del diritto 8 (1964), 177—223; Enrico Mazzarese Fardella, Aspetti dell'organizzazione amministrative dello stato normanno esvevo (Milan, 1966); Hiroshi Takayama,

38

39

"The Financial and Administrative Organization of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily," Viator 16 (1985), 129—57. And for the later period, see the articles by William A. Percy, "The Earliest Revolution against the Modern State: Direct Taxation in Medieval Sicily and the Vespers," Italian Quarterly 22: 84 (1981), 69-83; "The Indirect Taxation of the Medieval Kingdom of Sicily," Italian Quarterly 22: 85 (1981), 73-85; and "A Reappraisal of the Sicilian Vespers and the Role of Sicily in European History," Italian Quarterly 22: 86 (1981), 77-96. Acta curie 1, doc. 5 8 (at pp. 94—5): "Item supplicavit dicta universitas e i d e m Sacre Maiestati, ut, quia propter multas et diversas cabellas dohanarum regiarum, urbes quarum jus consistit in mercibus immittendis et extrahendis, tarn per mare quam per terram, mercatores venientes cum mercimoniis suis ad urbem eamdem sepius impediuntur et diversimode molestantur, in eo maxime, quod per diversas solutiones eos proinde facere oportet in cabellis eisdem et ideo mercatores ipsi venire desinunt urbem ipsam et urbis ipsius condicio deterior est effecta, dignetur Maiestas Regia omnes cabellas predictas Curie in unam tantum reducere sicut Messane solvitur et per Maiestatem Regiam est permissum ibidem." A S P C a n e . R e g . 2, fol. 29V—36 (Trapani), 37V—41 (Agrigento), 42—45V (Terranova), 45V—52V (Messina).

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code that established a sliding scale of tariffs for foreign imports and exports, greater for some commodities and lesser for others, but with a base rate of 3 percent. 40 But, even at this point, he was administering an economy in which telltale signs of stagnation and decay were already visible. II ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES

Let's begin with the central administration. Frederick, despite his grandiose claims of hereditary right and divine will, and further despite the evangelical calling that dominated his thinking from lt i°bt 0 ltS2b> w a s in n o position to claim more direct authority over his subjects than he could actually wield. Political debts and economic pressures forced substantial concessions from the day of his coronation, after which the royal court tried as best it could to regulate and standardize its remaining administrative initiatives. But in the short run, at least, it was surprisingly successful. Government became highly professionalized under Frederick, a fact which may owe something to the more developed parliamentary and administrative traditions among the Catalans who figured so prominently among his chief advisers. And the court had sufficient wisdom to create an administration of Sicilians, rather than repeating the Angevin mistake of monopolizing power for themselves. Owing to the fairly well developed juridical culture that had grown in the larger municipalities, an adequate, though still modest, pool of talent existed that the court could draw upon.41 Still, those who entered public service were motivated more by personal ambition than by commitment to a political ideal. The rewards for government service were handsome — duty officers, for example, frequently enjoyed salaries as high as one-third of the revenues they took in - and appointments were secure so long as one did not abuse one's authority too egregiously. More important still, the central administration responded more attentively to local needs than any previous government had done. 40 41

Ada curie n, pp. 211-321. See Andrea Romano, "Legum Doctores" e cultura giuridica nella Sicilia aragonese: tenderize, opere,

ruoli (Milan, 1984), Universita degli studi di Messina, Studi giuridici, vol. iv; and his earlier work, Giuristi siciliani delVeta aragonese: Berardo Medico, Guglielmo Perno, Gualtiero

Paternd, Pietro Pitrolo (Milan, 1979), Universita di Messina, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di scienze giuridiche, economiche, politiche e sociale, vol. CXVII.

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It had no alternative. Government officials faced annual reviews of their performances in the mandated parliament, where exposed abuses resulted in dismissal and heavy fines. Each demesne city sent a regular stream of envoys to court, where they expressed the urgency of local needs, detailed the long-suffering service the inhabitants had rendered the king, swore eternal outstanding loyalty, and usually returned with some grant, award, or favor for their pains. And the need to promote commercial growth became increasingly important as demesnal and feudal revenues fell, which fostered closer and more constant contacts between the court and the perimeter universitates. The sheer availability of the government formed the base of whatever popular support it commanded. It was not uncommon, in fact, for individuals without formal credentials of any sort to win access to the monarch himself. Despite declining economic and political fortunes, most cities remained relatively stable and law-abiding until sometime around 1320, after which Frederick all but disappeared from the Val di Mazara. It was this sense that the king had severed personal contact with any particular municipality that occasioned the onset of serious dissent and recalcitrance - which an illustration from Palermo amply shows. In 1322 one of the city'sjudices, Ruggero di Caltavuturo, was so angered over the monarchy's repeated equivocations and delays in response to Palermo's pleas (in this case, the request that the king forsake Messina and take up residence again in the official capital, where he might better address the mounting local difficulties) that he spat upon a newly received letter from Frederick, thus prompting a warrant for his arrest.42 The core of royal government lay in the Magna Regia Curia, or MRC. This amorphous group, comprised variously of the king's leading officials and ministers, plus a miscellany of notables and hangerson at court, derived its juridical authority from the fact that it was the body in charge of administering the demesne.43 Four groups, 42 43

Ada curie vi, doc. n (9 March 1322). Past writers have had some difficulty in differentiating b e t w e e n t h e M R C a n d t h e parliament, owing principally t o t h e fact that both institutions (a word which implies greater constitutional development than actually existed) are described in the sources by the oblique term curia. See Luigi Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano (Bologna, 1924; rpnt. 1968), R. Accademia dei Lincei, Commissione per gli atti delle assemblee costituzionali italiane, pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Antonio Rinaldi, // comune e la provincia nella storia del dritto italiano (Potenza, 1881), p. 216. For background on the curia regis, see Erich Caspar, Roger II

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broadly speaking, comprised its eligible membership: the major palace officials, the members of the royal family, the Sicilian bishops and archbishops, and certain magnates from the urban aristocracy. The first three can be identified with some precision. First, and most important, were the grand palace officials. These men - the chancellor, the seneschal, the chief justice (magister justiciarius), the treasurer, the harbormaster (magister portulanus), the protonotary, the procurator general, the marshal, the grand admiral, and the chief accountants (magistri rationales) -formed the MRC's permanent core and carried the greatest influence within it. Not surprisingly, they, unlike the other members, were in the most constant attendance at court, and hence their influence derived as much from default as design. Some lesser officials, such as the various vice-magistri and the paymaster (stipendiarius), also sat occasionally on the court. ThejudexMagne Regie Curie, a position that emerged after Caltabellotta, was technically an officer of the MRC (that is, a servant to it), although its possessor regularly sat with the other members.44 Members of the royal family formed the second part of the curia. The two queens - Frederick's mother Constance, and his wife Eleanor, who was present as lord of the camera reginale - served intermittently and were joined by the king's brothers Garcia and Sang, by his eldest son (and co-regent from 1321) Peter, and by his younger sons Manfred and William, the two dukes of Athens. No evidence survives of involvement in the MRC by any of Frederick's several bastards.45 The Sicilian bishops, the third component, (1101-1154) und die Grundung der normannisch-sicilischen Monarchic (Innsbruck, 1904), pp. 291-319; Horst Enzensberger, Beitrdge zum Kanzlei- und Urkundenwesen der normannischen

44 45

Herrscher Unteritaliens und Siziliens (Munich, 1971), Miinchener Historische Studien, Abteilung Geschichtl. Hilfswissenschaften, vol. ix, pp. 101-15; Frederick van Cleve, Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (Oxford, 1972), pp. 251-63; Emile Leonard, Les angevins de Naples (Paris, 1954), pp. 29-35, 80-5; Leon Gadier, Essai sur Vadministration du royaume de Sidle sous Charles Iet Charles IId'Anjou (Paris, 1891),passim. See the introductory essay "De magistratibus," in Testa, vol. 1. A C A Cane. Reg. 334, fol. 164, 165V, 165V-166; Cane. Reg. 335, fol. 228-9; Cane. Reg. 336, fol. 122—i22v; Cane. R e g . 339, fol. 185—6; Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9775—6, 9782—3, 9895, 9911, 10109. An interesting drama involving another apparent family member arose in the 1320s. A certain fellow from Messina named Melyadius came before the court with evidence that he was a long-forgotten bastard son of Frederick and James's father, Peter. For whatever reason, Frederick took Melyadius into service "not as a brother but just like anyone else." Shortly thereafter another courtier quarreled with Melyadius; blows were exchanged, and Melyadius killed his rival. Advised by the king to quit the kingdom, Melyadius joined the Genoese Ghibellines in Savona and saw a great deal of action

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numbered ten: seven bishops (Agrigento, Catania, Cefalu, LipariPatti, Malta, Mazara, Siracusa) and three archbishops (Messina, Monreale, Palermo). As major landholders, and as personal advisors to the pious king, they all exerted a strong influence, but only the three archbishops appear to have been present with any consistency - and none of them appeared at court after the reimposition of the papal interdict in 1321. Most difficult to fix is the fourth component of the MRC, the leading magnates of the realm. This group consisted of a select company drawn mostly from the wealthy urban elite, but from the ranks of the barony, the jurists, and other groups as well. What united them was their possession of the vague quality oifamiliaritas. To be a familiaris regis implied no particular constitutional authority, but meant only that one had access to the royal court the right to be present before the king and, when called upon, to be heard. But this did not oblige the king to ask their counsel; Frederick had manyfamiliares, but called upon few to be consiliarii.*6 Those who were called - like Riccardo di Passaneto, Berenguer d'Entenga, Giovanni di Cammarana, or Bertran Canyelles - were principally figures of urban society, more likely to be found in the town courts, squares, and markets than inland even though many of them owned estates.47 They were also frequently non-Sicilians, since discretion had dictated excluding most Catalans from landholding inland and from municipal office along the perimeter, leaving only this branch of the MRC as a means of granting power to those on whom the king relied.48

46

fighting throughout Lombardy, especially at Milan and Verona. He eventually returned to Sicily, and led several forays against the Angevins; and in 1324 he signed on with James to join in the Sardinian campaign. Although apparently not accepted as a family member, the fact that he carried a sword at court shows that he enjoyed the status of a./amiliaris of the king. See ACA Gartas James II, no. 10046-8. T w o studies are i m p o r t a n t h e r e , for M e d i t e r r a n e a n context: J o h a n n e s V i n c k e , "Los familiares de la C o r o n a a r a g o n e s a alrededor del afio 1300," Anuario de estudios medievales 1 (1964), 333-51; a n d H a n s Schadek, "Die F a m i l i a r e n der sizilischen u n d a r a g o n i s c h e n K o n i g e i m 12 u n d 13 J a h r h u n d e r t , " GAKS 26 (1971), 201-348. N o t e thatfamiliaritas w a s a gift that could b e revoked: t h e best e x a m p l e here is J a m e s ' s c o n d e m n a t i o n o f A r n a u d e

Vilanova in 1310; see ACA Cane. Reg. 336, fol. 22-3. The episode is discussed in Paul Diepgen, Arnold von Villanova ah Politiker und Laientheologe (Berlin, 1909), Abhandlungen zur Mittleren und Neueren Geschichte, Heft 9, pp. 80-4. 47

48

A C A C a r t a s J a m e s II, n o . 9757, 10001, 10181; C a n e . R e g . 334, fol. 162V-63; C a n e . R e g . 3 3 6 , fol. 122—122v. V i n c e n z o D ' A l e s s a n d r o , "La Sicilia d o p o il V e s p r o , " in XI Congresso 1, p p . 5 5 - 8 1 at

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A final factor influenced the makeup of the MRC - the king's indebtedness. Quite apart from his political debts, Frederick owed money - a very great deal of money - to more individuals than he could hope to repay. These were war debts, either obligations of money directly loaned to the crown or pledges to repay those who had led comitive into battle at their own expense in the understanding that the king would reimburse them as soon as funds were available. An initial wave of such claims poured in after Caltabellotta, and, given the lack of royal cash, repayment was made with appointments to government offices, or, when those were lacking, with memberships in the MRC. Thus Bartolotto Tagliavia, for example, who had assumed responsibility for the physical protection of the queen-mother Constance from 1296 to 1302, became royal treasurer, while his brother Guglielmo took the post of harbormaster at Agrigento. 49 Berardo Ferro of Marsala, a wealthy trader who had made numerous loans to the king, became magister rationalis and was further awarded an estate at Rometta. 50 The patrician Rosso family of Messina, headed by Enrico and his son Russo, held bonds from Frederick in excess of 1,000.00.00, after having financed the fortification of Agrigento and having purchased a stable of war horses on the government's behalf.51 The Rosso family in general preferred private life to government office; but even they recognized the market-place value of connections at court: Berengario Rosso served as magister rationalis in 1303.52 Enrico himself became difamiliaris and consiliarius, appeared regularly at convocations of the MRC, and began a long tenure as magister rationalis in 1312.53

As guardian of the demesne the MRC exerted influence throughout the entire realm. Only ecclesiastical holdings and the handful of alodial plots scattered through the Val Demone stood outside its 49 50 51

52 53

D ' A l e s s a n d r o , "La Sicilia dopo il V e s p r o , " p . 61; P e r i , L a Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p . 27. Cf. A S P C a n e . R e g . 1, fol. 41-41V. Schadek, "Die Familiaren," pp. 278-9. D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," p. 65 and notes. He records also that the Rosso family had loaned 400.00.00 to the commune of Florence, for an unstated purpose. See ASP Arch. Trabia, 1st ser., vol. DXXIII, fol. 443. Note that Enrico had been declared a traitor in the 1290s and a number of his estates were confiscated. Many Sicilian notables changed sides during the debate, after Anagni, whether or not to give the throne to Frederick. Eventually the Rosso family sided with Frederick and was restored to favor. See discussion below, and ACA Perg. James II, no. 641; Gartas James II, no. 9774. AGA Cane. Reg. 334, fol. 163V. AGA Cane. Reg. 335, fol. 228-9.

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reach. All baronial fiefs, for example, were held from the MRC rather than from the king himself; and whenever a tenancy was vacated it escheated not to Frederick but to his great council, through which he either reallocated it or reabsorbed it into his private domain. Even in the latter case, the MRC administered the land in the king's name through a network of local secreti and vicesecreti.5* These fiscal officers, and their judicial counterparts the royal justiciarii, divided the demesne into four districts which, confusingly, were also described as valli: the Val di Mazara, the Val d'Agrigento, the Val di Noto, and the Val di Castrogiovanni e di Demone. This division elaborated on the older administrative division of the kingdom into "nearer" and "further" river Salso provinces, but it also fostered a good deal of confusion among the administrators and anger among the administered, since the refinement of the extra and ultra boundaries recognized no obvious geographic boundaries. The Val di Mazara justiciarate, for example, wrapped around the western coast from Termini to Sciacca, then cut across the promontory in a near direct line between those two cities; no natural border or topographic feature guided it. This inland border was marked by the towns of Caltabellotta, Bivona, Vicari, and Caccamo. Thus the justiciarate represented roughly one-half of the naturally defined vallo of geography and economy. The Val d'Agrigento followed an even more curious pattern: it stretched along the southern coast from Sciacca to Licata, then reached inland to beyond the northern Madonie mountains, thus cutting across three dioceses and reaching into a fourth. Its northern reaches included Golisano and Gratteri, only ten kilometers from Cefalii; the border then fell directly southward, through the two main Madonie mountain passes and along the river Salso. But it also extended across 54

For example, Blase d'Alago's fief at Salemi carried the stipulation "quod ipse et heredes sui predictam terram sub predicto servitio in capite a nostra Curia teneant et cognoscant, et exinde servire ipse Curie teneantur"; see ACA Perg. James II, no. 629. For Sicilian fiefs in general, see Francesco San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi e dei titoli nobiliari di Sicilia dalle loro origini ai nostri giorni: lavoro compilato su documenti et atti ufficiali e legali, 10 vols.

(Palermo, 1924-41), here see 1, p. 1 (Caccamo), 1, p. 438 (Buccheri), 1, p. 500 (Butera), 11, p. 412 (Castelvetrano), v, p. 137 (Floridia and Monastero), vi, p. 331 (Saline). See also ASP Protonotaro, Reg. 2, fol. 316 (Roccella); Cane. Reg. 4, fol. 206. Cf. Giuseppe La Mantia, Codice diplomatico dei re aragonesi di Sicilia Pietro I, Giacomo, Federico II, Pietro e Ludovico dalla rivoluzione siciliana del 1282 sino al 1355 (Palermo, 1917)^ n, pp. 20,47,50, 77, 99, 205, 208, 211, 216, 221, 224; Rosario Gregorio, Considerazioni sopra la storia di Sicilia dai tempi normanni sino

presently 6 vols. in 3 (Palermo, 1808-16; rpnt. 1972-3), 11, pp. 151-2.

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the Salso to include Caltagirone, while excluding Mazzarino. The precise definition here is unknown and is nearly impossible to imagine, sensibly, from a relief map. The Val di Noto justiciarate took part of its irregular shape from that of its neighbor; its border vaguely resembled that of the Siracusan diocese, with the two exceptions of the sharp in-bite of the Val d'Agrigento to include Caltagirone and the equally sharp extension of its own boundary northward to include S. Filippo d'Agiro. Its jurisdiction thus swept through the area roughly defined by Licata, Terranova, Scicli, Siracusa, Catania, and S. Filippo, while avoiding Castrogiovanni, Piazza, and Caltagirone. Last, the cumbrously named Val di Castrogiovanni e di Demone began with the narrow coastal strip from Termini to Cefalu, then plunged southward to Castrogiovanni, whence it followed the main road to Nicosia and Troina and continued eastward to the coast, skirting Mount Etna.55 Only one explanation seems possible for this chaos: the MRC attempted to guarantee a rough equivalence of population under the authority of each royal justiciarius, and hence to achieve a rough parity of their power. These new zones appeared shortly after Caltabellotta, when the government was busy codifying tariffs, reviving municipal liberties and regulating municipal administration, restoring ecclesiastical lands, and enacting the resettlement program for entangled Sicilian-Catalonian affairs. This was the most ambitious reorganization of government that Sicily had experienced in a century, and it suggests something of the degree of confidence and energy that characterized life at the end of the Vespers. There is some evidence to suggest that these borders were altered several times from mid-reign in response to the demographic crisis. Certainly the bloated and agonized borders of the Val d'Agrigento indicate an attempt to compensate for the disproportionate decline of its population. As might have been expected, the constantly changing borders created no end of confusion about the jurisdiction of each sector's officers and opened 55

Gregorio, Considerazioni n, pp. 148—9, which takes its data from an inventory from the reign of Martin I. I have emended and adapted this with individual judicial records from various sites. Note that Gregorio assigns Roccella, a mountain townlet north of Randazzo, to the Val d'Agrigento. It is impossible to add this as a contiguous portion of that district and still retain any sense of order (already lacking) in the map. Either the data is in error, or Roccella formed a non-contiguous component of the justiciarate. Naturally, the map would be simplified if Galtagirone too represented a non-contiguous element of the Agrigentine province.

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the door to abuse. Throughout the 1320s and 1330s officials who depended upon their service revenues for their livelihood grew hostile towards any attempt by the MRC to curtail their jurisdictions; and unless the central government cared to use force to stop them, they simply asserted their power wherever they felt they had a right to do so. Honest confusion, rather than naked greed, may have lain behind most abuses in the early years, but it did not take long for extortion to enter the picture. The MRG released restatements of official itineraries and demarcations of bureaucratic districts with numbing regularity - a good example of which is the 1322 survey of the borders of the camera reginale lands around Vizzini - but these pathetic measures only made matters worse, as often as not.56 In the decade after Caltabellotta the MRC chose its officers for the four main sub-divisions of the demesne, and for the lesser precincts into which each vallo was in turn sub-divided, from its own class, that is, of the urban nobility - "nobles and natives of the realm, secure in riches." 57 By 1312 or 1313, however, more and more positions were taken up by milites who were no longer "secure in riches" and who needed the available stipends to support themselves. At this time too the first milites appear in the cities, installed in the roles of castellans, captains, municipal justices, bailiffs, and pretors with wide-ranging administrative and policing authority. In Palermo in that year D. Rainaldo Milite was installed as bailiff and D. Pong Caslar as municipal justiciar, while in Messina D. Riccardo Filangieri became stratigoto, and in Trapani D. Roderigo Garsia assumed the captaincy. All four royal justiciars, from 1312 onwards, also came from the knightly-baronial class; the first appointees were D. Francesco Scarpa (Val di Mazara), D. Francesco Riciputo (Val d'Agrigento), D. Enrico di S. Stefano (Val di Noto), and D. Giacomo d'Aceto (Val Demone). Traditional urban-rural tensions were quick to appear. Nicola Coppola, secrezie collector around Carini, used his office to harass a personal rival for four years by claiming jurisdiction over the rival's land; there was little the MRC could do to stop Nicola, who simply ignored a series of 56 57

ACA Perg. James II, no. 3893 (1 Jan. 1322, updating a survey originally performed in 1293). Const, reg., in Testa, ch. 7—8. For an example of local officials in action, see Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 17 (1 Feb. 1322), where Novello Montonino and Giovanni Ripolla perform an annual inventory and audit of Francesco Ventimiglia's holdings and revenues in the county of Geraci.

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royal writs commanding him to forgo collecting taxes on the disputed land until a settlement could be reached.58 Pedro Fernandez de Vergua, an ambitious Aragonese nobleman who married the wealthy widow of Frederick's first chancellor Corrado Lancia, habitually abused his powers in Caltavuturo, Caltanissetta, and Naro until the multitude of complaints brought against him finally led the MRC to force his resignation in 1311.59 D. Federico d'Algerio in Palermo, who used his new municipal power to begin a spree of violence, theft, and rape that literally terrorized the city in the 1320s, represented the worst of what was possible under such conditions.60 The MRC and its underlings provided a rather rough-hewn system of courts and appeals that heard civil and criminal cases in addition to disputes over taxation and complaints of administrative abuse. Most cases reached no higher than the four provincial justiciarii, but appeals to the full MRC were not uncommon. In these instances, if the king was not present, the magister justiciarius presided.61 The bureaucracy was cumbersome. After the MRC 58

59

60 61

ASP Tab. S. Martino delle Scale, perg. n-13, 17 (8 Jan. 1297-14 July 1301). Carini was the site of further difficulties in 1324, when D. Nicola Pipitone appealed to the MRC a curious case of administrative fraud. D. Nicola Abbate, the great lord who dominated life in Trapani, had evidently been extorting taxes from the Pipitone family, taking advantage of the fact that the actual tax collector in that district also happened to be named Nicola Abbate (but who seems to have been no relation to the nobleman). The MRC ultimately convicted D. Nicola of impersonating a royal official and fined him 50.00.00. See ibid., perg. 51 (20 Dec. 1324). There is a story behind Pedro. He was first employed by Eleanor as an official in the camera reginale and as a personal emissary. Through his contact with the queen he was introduced to his wife. After being fired by the MRC in 1311, and after his wife died shortly thereafter, Pedro presented to the MRC a forged will which supposedly awarded him permanent control of the entire Lancia family estate, including a legacy of 2,000.00.00 that Corrado Lancia had bequeathed to his nephew Pietruccio, which Pedro now claimed as his own by virtue of the supposed fact that he was also the heir of the recently deceased Pietruccio. The MRC ultimately banished Pedro from the realm. Only eighteen months later he appealed to Frederick from Tunis, requesting to be reinstated at court, a request that the king denied. Pedro meanwhile contracted a marriage with Bellina, daughter of the late count Aldoino Ventimiglia. The Ventimiglia family successfully blocked this marriage when it was brought before the MRC (as all marriages involving fiefs were). Ultimately Pedro, frustrated and enraged, hired an assassin to murder Frederick, but the conspiracy failed when government officials caught the would-be regicide as he prepared to spring at the king. See ACA Cartas James II, no. 9823, 9895, 10029; Perg. James II, no. 2790. The confession of the hired killer is in ACA Documents per incorporar, caixa 5, no. 21. The murder plot is discussed by Costa, "Un atemptat frustrat contra Frederic III de Sicilia" (see ch. 1, n. 29, above). See ch. 1, n. 28, above. Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano, p. xxxviii.

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heard a case and made its ruling, the decision was handed over to a royal vicarius or bailiff, who then issued a written mandate to the litigants. The litigants then presented the mandate to their local municipal court, where the official verdict or settlement was formally effected. Thus when Rinaldo Maratta stood accused of assaulting Angelo Muscanti of Palermo in 1308 with a knife, his case - a serious felony in light of the ban upon weapons - was appealed all the way to the MRC. The high court acquitted Rinaldo and the bailiff issued a mandate freeing him from any liability, which mandate Rinaldo then brought back to Palermo where a municipal notary, at the command of the local court, produced the formal acquittal.62 Some records give a specific sense of chronology and show the system in its best light. In a commercial dispute, when Pietro di Pontecorono and his son Bernardo sued Oberto and Enrico Kairo of Corleone over a grain contract (involving eighty salme of various grains), the MRC heard the case on 23 September 1329; it issued its decision on 17 October; and the local court in Corleone released the formal act settling the dispute on 23 October.63 In this way the government hoped to promote a sense of organic involvement among the independent-minded universitates, making a bow towards local autonomy while hopefully fostering greater cohesion in the realm. Towards that end the MRC and its subsidiaries even employed a corps of advocati who represented, at a fee, litigants without counsel.64 Ultimately, however, the system worked against itself, since the MRC had no effective means of enforcing its decisions in the face of local intransigence. If a local court failed to enact an MRC ruling, or if it delayed in doing so, or if either of the parties involved in a case simply refused to obey the mandate, there was little the high court could do except to issue a new mandate with stronger wording. When Bonsignore Unia of Naro refused to pay the rent he owed to Nicola d'Amantea for a casalis outside of that town, Nicola appealed his case all the way to the MRC. Despite repeated judgments against him and a long series of harshly worded mandates from the local bailiff, the justiciarius of the Val d'Agrigento, and the MRC itself, Bonsignore simply continued to 62 63 64

A S P M i s c e l l a n e a archivistica, 2nd ser., no. 127A ( B a r t o l o m e o di C i t e l l a ) , fol. 168—i68v. ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 170-1. ASP Tab. S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 66, 68, 73, 75.

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refuse payment for at least seven years, forcing Nicola to incur legal expenses over ioo.oo.oo.65 The reason for the MRC's increasing impotence is clear: as the kingdom's various crises grew more urgent it had fewer resources with which to enforce its rulings. It had no way to compel anyone to heed it and, consequently, from 1320 onwards, it tried to save face by refusing to hear many cases rather than risk parading its impotence. Moreover, the custom of reverting mandates to the municipal courts for enactment placed responsibility for enforcing the law on local officials who thus bore the brunt of popular resentment against the kingdom's failures, whether real or perceived. As a result many local officials dissembled and delayed when presented with an order from the high court, figuring that an angry mob at the door presented a more real danger to them than written decrees from non-plussed civil servants in Messina. Thus when a property dispute in Palermo was judged against Puccio Maccaiono in 1311, he armed himself with knife and sword and marched into the local court seeking revenge on the magistrates who had had the gall to impose the king's law upon him.66 In the face of such dangers, the safest path for the courts to follow was to fail to enforce the verdicts handed down to them, or to enforce them in such a way as to remove the immediate threat to themselves or to the city, as the magistrates in farsouthern Butera prudently chose to do in regard to Giovanni Dagnone, another violent criminal; they removed the danger by sentencing him to exile in Palermo, whence their own officers delivered him.67 Such failures to deliver justice, and such capricious ways of administering it, obviously did little to promote a sense of shared involvement and mutual concern. The parliament (colloquium generate, in the sources) might have done better in this regard, had circumstances been different. By the early fourteenth century most of the states in Europe had developed centralized representative institutions of some sort, and Sicily holds an honorable fifth place, chronologically, in the roll-call 65

66 67

Paolo Collura, Lepiu antiche carte dell'Archivio capitolare di Agrigento (Palermo, i960), DSSS, 1st ser., vol. xxv, see appendix 1, doc. 51, 51a, 51b, 53, 53a, 53b, 56, 56a, 56b, 56c, 59 (covering dispute from Nov. 1311 to Feb. 1318). There is no sign that Nicola ever received his money or ever regained possession of his casalis, or that Bonsignore ever suffered any sort of punishment for his recalcitrance. Ada curie 1, doc. 46 (20 May 1312). Ibid., doc. 62 (17 July 1312).

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of parliaments - despite some fanciful popular claims to the contrary.68 (England's parliament is usually dated to Simon de Montfort's 1265 summons to London of all the shire knights and town burgesses, or to Edward Fs convocation of the so-called "Model Parliament" of 1295; Catalonia's Cort first assembled in 1225; and the kingdom of Leon can trace its parliament to 1188, when Alfonso VII first summoned his townsmen to join the royal council. Pride of place belongs to Iceland's venerable Althing, which has met annually in an unbroken line since 930.) Earlier primitive assemblies had been convened in Sicily under the Normans and Hohenstaufens, but it was only with the establishment of the Communitas Sicilie after the 1282 rebellion that any significant power resided in the group. Under Peter and James, who introduced representatives from the demesne towns into the assembly, it began to take on muscle.69 At the assembly of 1285, for example, it overturned James's acceptance of a two-year truce with Naples negotiated on his behalf by Roger de Lauria, and compelled the king to abrogate the agreement, even going so far as to pass a sentence of capital punishment on de Lauria for his usurpation of parliament's authority to determine foreign policy.70 A statute from the Constitutiones regales represents the closest thing there is to a founding charter for the assembly: I have it in my heart gladly to direct this proposal of mine to the Lord namely, to govern the said island of Sicily well, in the manner of a loving tiller . . . so that the health of the republic and of all the Sicilian people may be improved with every desirable good fortune and be restored with a continuous increase of blessings, thus progressing from strength to strength. Therefore I order that a general parliament representing the whole of Sicily be held each year on the Feast of All Saints, and to it I command the presence, before me, of the counts, the barons, and the sworn syndics of 68

69

70

Some patriots have traced the origins of the Sicilian parliament directly to the court of King David. See Carlo Piazza, II parlamento siciliano dal secolo XII al secolo XIX (Palermo, 1974). More informed are Carlo Calisse, Storia del parlamento in Sicilia dallafondazione alia caduta della monarchia (Turin, 1887); Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano; Antonio Marongiu, // parlamento in Italia nel Medio Evo e nelUeta moderna, 2nd edn. (Milan, 1962); and Marongiu, "Sulle curie g e n e r a l i d e l r e g n o d i Sicilia s o t t o gli svevi, 1194-1266," Archivio storico per la Calabria e Lucania 18 (1949), 21-43, a n d 19 (1950), 45-53. L a M a n t i a , Codice diplomatico 1, p p . 31-2; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 1, ch. 25: "post h e c , syndicos universitatum Sicilie, qui Messanam jussu regis convenerant, rex Petrus alloqutus est." Cf. Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 23, 52-3. L a M a n t i a , Codice diplomatico, doc. 190, 206-7; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 11, ch. 11—12.

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the universitates, sufficient in number and knowledge, and whomever else may be suitable and useful, for the purpose of providing for, procuring, and elevating . . . the good health and well-being of My Majesty, of the island, and especially of all the Sicilian people. [I call this assembly] further for the purpose of investigating and punishing any failings and negligent or abusive actions taken by my justiciarii, judices, notaries, or any other officials. I command these syndics to show themselves fully informed [of these affairs] in order [justly] to charge and denounce the errors of those officials. At that time I will direct which of those charged officers it will be expeditious (if it will be expeditious) to subject to inquiry, for their sins. Thinking it most fair that a ruler too be held by his own laws and not to be suffered to permit to himself what he forbids to others, I wish those things which are ordained and established in that assembly to be observed inviolably by myself as well as by my subjects. Above all, I decree . . . that the counts, barons, and nobles of the land, together with the aforesaid syndics, meeting in parliament, should elect and appoint [a company of] twelve men of the kingdom, noble-born and prudent who . . . either within my presence or that of someone appointed by me, shall, following God's way, place on trial and investigate all criminal cases and inquiries, shall issue verdicts and pass sentences (whether of capital-, maiming-, or cbrporal-punishment) upon all nobles namely, the counts, barons, and feudatories . . . and their vassals living within the said island of Sicily. There shall be no appeal beyond [these twelve], and they shall remain in their office through the whole course of the year, until the next parliament convenes. And from all other [persons and institutions] this authority to investigate and adjudicate cases is absolutely removed.71 71

Const, reg., bk. i, ch. 3: "Cordi nobis existit propositum nostrum Deo feliciter dirigere: memoratam Sicilie insulam more diligentis cultoris et circumspecti rectoris provide gubernare, evellendo, dissipando, edificando, plantando; et evulsis inde ac extirpatis erroribus, et quibuscumque defectibus reformatis in certis virtutibus, et plantata justitia, nostre reipublice status et omnium Siculorum optatis prosperitatibus amplietur, et successivis beneficiorum augmentis de bono in melius reducatur. Ideoque providimus, anno quolibet in festo scilicet omnium sanctorum, in Sicilie partibus generalem curiam celebrari. In qua nobis adesse statuimus comites, barones, et universitatum quarumlibet syndicos ideoneos et sufTicientes, instructos, et alios ad hoc opportunos et utiles, ad providendum nobiscum, procurandum et exaltandum Nostre Maiestatis, ipsius insule et omnium specialiter Siculorum statum salutiferum et felicem; ad examinandum etiam et puniendum justiciariorum, judicum, notariorum, et officialium quorumlibet defectus, negligentias, et excessus. Ac prefatos syndicos, pro referendis et denunciandis officialium ipsorum erratis, apparere precipimus plenius informatos; ubi officiates eosdem de cunctis eorum peccatis mandabimus, quos expedient (et sicut expedient) syndicari; et que etiam in predicta curia ordinata fuerint et statuta, per nos et subjectos nostros inviolabiliter volumus observari, existimantes aequissimum principem legibus teneri suis, nee pati sibi licere, quod aliis interdixit. Ac insuper presenti nostra constitutione decrevimus, in prescripta curia per comites, barones, et nobiles dicte insule atque

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This decree marks a significant advance on earlier practice, and shows as much the limits of royal power as much as the king's supposed commitment to a parliamentary ideal. Through the mandate of an annual All Saints' Day convocation (the date of which commemorated Frederick IFs 1234 establishment of special courts on that day to hear complaints against his royal officials) the parliament in one sense summoned the king to its presence, rather than the reverse. Moreover, the assembly was now empowered to punish abuse and not merely to denounce it. Frederick tempered this concession by reserving for himself the right to specify which of the accused officials would actually stand trial, after complaints against all were heard, and by compelling the syndics to submit to an unspecified test of their qualifications. The "counts, barons, and feudatories" had to pass no such test, being entitled by birth to attend the assembly, but their power was somewhat checked by the overall parliament's (including the syndics') jurisdiction over criminal complaints against the landholding class. Since the king's Constitutiones gave parliament final authority over foreign policy issues - iri practice, through a veto of the king's initiatives rather than through the right to formulate policies of its own - the assembly had the potential to become an institution of great influence. In several instances it was able to restrain both the monarchy and the MRC. In 1322, for example, the assembly rejected a royal request for funds to contribute to Catalonia's newest plan to take Sardinia. Writing to his nephew Alfonso afterwards, Frederick described with some embarrassment how "it had been my intention to meet with my barons and other subjects" in order to win approval for the new taxes, but "I found it to be not only not easy but downright difficult," and in fact impossible.72

72

syndicos antedictos eligi et creari viros duodecim de dicta provincia, nobiles et prudentes, qui omnes (vel eorum pars major) existentes in presentia nostra (vel alterius a Nostra Maiestate statuti), questiones et causas criminales, vitam, membrum, vel corporalem poenam nobilium, videlicet comitum, baronum atque feudatariorum integra feuda habentium, seu vassallos dicte insule Sicilie contingentes, secundum Deum, et justitiam audiant, examinent, sententialiter terminent et decidant — appellatione remota; eorum officio usque ad anni circulum, et celebrationem sequentem curie duraturo; omnibus aliis cognoscendi vel judicandi in causis et questionibus supradictis potestate prorsus adempta, ut honorabilibus viris predictis honor debitus deferatur in eorum excessibus corrigendis." AGA CartasJames II, no. 9961: "erat nostre intentionis propositum cum baronibus et aliis nostris habere colloquium et tractatum, et subvenire vobis modo aliquo in predicto pecuniario subsidio, si [cut esset] nostri desiderii commode valeremus . . . [quod] non bene faciles invenimus, immo difficiles."

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O n other occasions the parliament forbade Frederick to leave the island, when he had determined to negotiate personally at the papal court. 73 Apart from these examples and a few others, however, the colloquium generate never achieved the permanence or the influence it might have done, and it never attracted popular loyalty as an institution designed to protect urban interests or to promote demesnal unity. There is no evidence that, despite Frederick's decree, the parliament actually met every year; specific references exist to assemblies in 1296, 1297, 1299, 1302, 1304, 1307-10, 1312-14, 1316, 1318-20, and 1322. After the final recommencement of the war the assembly seems not to have convened at all except for an urgent final meeting in 1327 to discuss Sicily's international situation in the light of J a m e s ' s death in Barcelona. 74 We know little about the meetings that did take place except that they certainly did not follow the norms laid out in the Constitutiones. Ignoring the All Saints' Day mandate, the 1304 meeting gathered in July, the 1316 meeting in December. Nor did they convene at the regular royal court in Messina: the 1313 parliament convened at Castrogiovanni, as did the last meeting in 1327; Terranova was the site of the 1314 assembly; and Palermo, the de jure capital, hosted only the 1318 assembly. O n many occasions, although summonses were issued to all constituent groups, the ecclesiastical branch absented itself in deference to the on-again off-again papal interdict and in protest over Frederick's confiscations of church property after 1320.75 And the urban syndics sent to these meetings were hardly free agents: after 1310 they were firmly under the control of the royally appointed bailiffs who accompanied each delegation. The king moreover could tailor each parliament to his liking by dictating the precise number of syndics he wanted from 73 74

75

FAA in, doc. 166-7; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. in, ch. 14. See Marongiu, II parlamento in Italia, p. 242; FAA 1, doc. 100; in, doc. 119, 121, 166, 167; Johannes Liinig, Codex italiae diplomaticus, 4 vols. (Frankfurt, 1725—35), at n, p. 1087; Acta curie 1, pp. 92-3,156; Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano, pp. xlviii-li, cxvii; Giuseppe Cosentino, "Un documento in volgare siciliano del 1320," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 9 (1884), 372—81 at 378. See also ACA Cartas James II, no. 9961, 10183; Cartas James II, apendice, no. 35; Perg. James II, no. 2035, 2037, 2039, 2042, 2070; Calisse, Storia del parlamento in Sicilia, p. 107, n. 1.

Genuardi, Parlamento siciliano, pp. civ-cv; Vilanova's Informacio espiritual inspired some of the institutional shake-up; it appears in Batllori, Obres catalanes (see ch. 2, n. 54, above) at 1, pp. 223-43.

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each city. For the 1327 assembly he even specified the individuals whom the various universitates were to send.76 In its practice, the parliament followed the same cumbersome methods as did the MRC. Decisions were formally enacted by the municipal council of the colloquium's host city, assisted by a regius publicus totius Sicilie notarius, rather than by the assembly itself, after which they were forwarded to the local courts throughout the realm for certification and official implementation.77 Although this policy, like the MRC's, attempted to recognize the importance of the autonomous universitates, it too had the effect of focusing resentment over unpopular decisions on the local officials who had to carry out the assembly's commands, since the parliament increasingly engaged in - to the virtual exclusion of other matters after mid-reign - the unpleasant task of raising new taxes to finance war concerns, to pay the census owed to Avignon, and to support the costs of a burgeoning bureaucracy. These three issues clearly dominated most parliamentary meetings. The 1299 assembly gathered in a tense atmosphere to discuss the strategic crisis caused by the disastrous defeat in the battle of Capo d'Orlando;78 the 1304 meeting debated the military alliance and dynastic union with the Crown of Aragon;79 the convocations of 1312 and 1313 focused on the new alliance with Henry VII, as the 1318 meeting did on the pact with the northern Ghibellines;80 in 1322 the parliament assessed the renewed war with Naples and debated responses to the famine of that year; and the last known parliament 76

77 78

79 80

Stefano Vittorio Bozzo, Note storiche siciliane del secolo XIV: avvenimenti e guerre che seguirono il Vespro dalla pace di Caltabellotta alia morte di re Federico II I'Aragonese, 1302-1337 (Palermo, 1882), appendix, doc. 30: "Cum . . . certos electos per curiam nostram syndicos civitatum et terrarum famosarum Sicilie in civitate Messane habere in proximo disponamus; qui universitatum civitatum et terrarum auctoritate sufTulti, quilibet pro universitate sua, ordinatione nostra predicta, interesse valeant . . . et de universitate ipsius urbis [Palermo] Thomasium Tallaviam, judicem Raynaldum de Milite, et Manfridum Bucca de Ordeo de eadem urbe, fideles nostros, in vestros syndicos in dicta civitate Messane eligendos et habendos duxerimus, fidelitati vestre mandamus quatenus statim, receptis presentibus, predictos Thomasium, judicem Raynaldum, et Manfridum syndicos vestros ad Nostre Maiestatis presentiam ad predictam civitatem Messane . . . mittere debeatis." For example, ACA Perg. James II, no. 1398, 2042; Cartas James II, no. 6217, 9874. Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. rv, ch. 13-16 gives an exciting narrative of the battle, in which over 6,000 Sicilians died. See also Heinrich Finke, "Die Seeschlacht am Kap Orlando: 1299 Juli 4," Historische Zeitschrift 134 (1926), 257-66; and Pryor, "The Naval Battles of Roger of Lauria" (see ch. 2, n. 35, above). ACA Cartas James II, no. 10205-10 illustrate the battle's aftermath. ACA Perg. James II, no. 2042. ACA Cartas James II, no. 6217, 10183.

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in 1327 turned its attention to James's death and the arrival of Louis the Bavarian's envoys.81 Given this context, it is hardly surprising to find that the assembly's actions focused almost exclusively on the raising of new revenues. After parliament began to resist demands for new taxes, in 1322, the king simply stopped summoning the assembly altogether (with the exception of 1327), and raised the cash he needed instead by confiscating vacancies and ecclesiastical lands and by resorting, in the end, to the hated direct tax the collecta - that had proved to be the Angevins' undoing. 82 One key to the parliament's failure may be found in Frederick's brief note to his nephew mentioned above: "it had been my intention to meet with my barons and other subjects." The urban populace by the 1320s had been relegated to secondary status, in terms of their political importance; and the barons, since their introduction into municipal government, had come to dominate public life - or at least they were perceived to have done so. Parliaments became occasions for requesting new taxes and parading baronial advances at municipal expense, and under these conditions the municipalities understandably lost whatever enthusiasm for parliament they may have had initially. As one example from Palermo illustrates, the colloquium generate after midreign generated excitement at the urban level only because it temporarily removed the baronial bailiff from the scene. In 1320 Senatore de Maida, the bailiff, led Palermo's syndics to the assembly at Messina amid the usual pomp and fanfare; and as soon as they had left the city the remaining judices rushed to enact a handful of laws ordering, among other things, that a new sea wall be built to protect against invasion, and that the costs be charged to the magnate Perrello di Cisario; that the authority to preside over the harbor be restored to a council of citizens drawn from each quarter of the city; that the city walls be repaired, at the expense of D. Rinaldo di Milite (the first baron-bailiff imposed on the city); and that the principal aqueduct bringing fresh water into Palermo from the river Ammiraglio also be repaired at baronial expense and 81 82

ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3684; Cane. Reg. 562, fol. 26-26V. ASP Tab. Commenda della Magione, perg. 371, 393, 470; Giuseppe Pardi, "Un comune della Sicilia e le sue relazioni con i dominatori dell'isola sino al secolo XVIII," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 26 (1901), 22-65, 310-66; 27 (1902), 38-109, at 67; Giuseppe Di Martino, "II sistema tributario degli Aragonesi in Sicilia, 1282—1516," ArchStperSic 4—5 (1938-9), 83-145 at 106. See Bresc, Un monde, p. 795, Table 183.

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afterward be maintained equally by all those whose lands lay alongside the aqueduct.83 When D. Senatore returned, he brought with him the king's responsiones to the various petitions presented by the Palermitan syndics. These illustrate some of the immediate concerns of the universitas that year, but they also suggest, more valuably, the growing distance between monarchy and municipality that was characteristic of the entire kingdom. To the plea that he vow to keep a number of Palermitans in his court at all times, the king replied that he had enough in attendance at present and that the composition of his advisory court was his concern and not theirs. The request to have Monte Pellegrino - the beautiful headland three kilometers north of the city, and home since the late twelfth century of the hermitage of Palermo's patron saint Rosalia awarded to their jurisdiction was denied with a sharp rebuke to be happy with the privileges they held already. He rejected their request for permission to gather wood from and pasture animals in the baronial and ecclesiastical estates throughout the city's districtus. He consented, however, to petitions awarding control of the armata Vallis Mazarie to Palermo, allowing the city's butcher's market to be moved, guaranteeing royal contributions to the fund needed to repair the city walls, and promising that either the king or his co-regent son would visit Palermo at least three months out of every year (to which he added the stipulation that they would only do so provided that no "impediment" stood in their way).84 As urban support for parliament waned, and as the monarchy effectively relinquished control of the western half of the kingdom to baronial forces, the universitates were compelled to strengthen their localist and self-preservationist tendencies. But in the face of economic decline and mounting public debt municipal power 83

84

BCP MS Qq F 31, fol.38v: "Inprimis quod porta maria edificetur per monasterium Sancte Katerine usque ad solarium, et deinde in antea edificetur per Sire Perrellum de Cisario, eorum sumptibus et expensis . . . Item quod custodia maritime fiat per viginti homines quolibet sero ana quatuor pro quolibet quarterio . . . Item quod defectus murorum videatur per vicepretorem et aliquem de judicibus et aliquem de juratis, et viso defectu predicto mandetur domino Raynaldo de Milite militi quod faciat reparari muros ipsos . . . Item quod aqueductus descendens per viam Gatalanorum reparetur expensis illorum qui reparare consueverunt, et quod dicto aqueductu reparato nunc ex necessitat[e] predicta aqua revolvatur ad flumen Ammirati expensis tarn illorum qui habent predia juxta predictam aquam tarn ex parte inferiori quam ex parte superiori." Ibid., fol. 50V-51.

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became monopolized by wealthy figures who alone possessed the capital to seize control of administration and command loyalty among a privately supported comitiva, and who increasingly acquired a stranglehold on the availability of credit.85 The contest for control of the universitates increased in bitterness throughout the 1320s and 1330s; but whether motives were ideological, political, or economic, loyalty to the local commune as an institution remained relatively strong. Whatever its faults, the universitas stood as the sole possible mediator between the rival social groups, classes, and families on each local scene. Jurists turned to it as a channel for advancement, hopefully to reach a royal administration which may have been disdained but which nevertheless offered handsome rewards to its officers. The milites sought to control it as a due recompense for the undermining of their traditional way of life in the interior. And to merchants the commune still offered the best opportunities for commercial growth, a mechanism to moderate foreign competition, and a platform from which to address complaints to the far-away king.86 Despite the animosity that existed between groups, a degree of equilibrium was maintained until 1325-7. Not only did these groups inter-marry, reside together, and do business with each other, but they also, on occasion, worked together to secure each municipality's economic and social autonomy. Hence their limited success in gaining control of the contadi that technically still lay outside their jurisdiction. Hence, too, the repeated instances of asserting local privileges to secure pardons for important local leaders who had broken the king's law, like Palermo's plea for mercy for Giacomo Cisario, who was guilty of murder but was also vital to the economic and political stability of the city.87 That equilibrium was short-lived however. When economic troubles worsened as a result of the two-year Angevin rampage through the countryside, and at least five food crises gripped the realm through the 1320s, the uneasy balance in the cities gave way to factional strife, family vendetta, institutional corruption, and blood in the streets. 85

86 87

Ada curie v, pp. xlii-xliii, doc. 164, 197. The elites were largely of the entrepreneurial classes, but they quickly developed close ties with the urban-knightly class in the 1320s and 1330s. In Palermo, for example, the daughter of the well-to-do merchant Guglielmo Ferrerio married D. Matteo Pipitone; ibid., doc. 21. See Pietro Corrao's comments, ibid., p. xlv-xlvi, and doc. 23, 70, 74-5, 90, 95, 158-9, 192. Ibid., doc. 155.

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily III SOCIAL TENSIONS AND CIVIL UNREST

Before the arrival of the barons the demesne cities drew their life from the activity of the merchants, traders, and craftsmen whose shops and workstalls surrounded the ports, lined the streets, and filled the squares of each universitas. Although a number of extremely wealthy entrepreneurs existed in each town, most commercial activity took place among and between this lively, disparate group of individual traders and tradesmen. Small businesses predominated, since severed family connections and the absence of artisan and trade guilds hindered the development of large-scale commercial concerns. The demographic mobility that brought new immigrants into the towns, especially in the eastern valliy ensured a certain amount of flux and chaos on the local scene but it also ensured the availability of a wide variety of skills, interests, and new contacts that made it possible for the eastern cities better to survive the challenges that emerged after 1320. Those challenges, as we have seen, were severe. Agricultural production in 1328 - a year of-relatively high yields in that decade was only one-fourth of what it had been twenty years earlier. Crime increased when local governments could no longer afford to pay for their own night-watch companies. Without sufficient public or private funds to invest in the upkeep of buildings, many of Sicily's cities literally fell apart. The open cesspools, garbage heaps, unburied bodies decaying in cemetery grounds, and polluted waters described earlier made unhealthy ruins of once thriving towns from west to east. An atmosphere of hopelessness, of intense misery and senseless rot came to dominate urban life and facilitated the development of gang factionalism. Individuals left without secure means to support themselves began to group under the leadership of major merchants, powerful urban magnates, or the newly arrived barons, to whom they gave whole-hearted political, economic, and, when necessary, violent physical support. Curial halls and public streets gradually filled with roaming bands of such partisan followers, turning some cities into congeries of armed camps. 88 88

The complexity of the urban scene has inspired a great deal of research. Among the most useful studies, see Vincenzo D'Alessandro, "Per una storia della societa siciliana alia fine del medioevo: feudatari, patrizi, borghesi," ArchStSicOr 77 (1981), 193-208; Mario Gaudioso, "Generi e aspetti della nobilita civica in Catania nel secolo XV," Bollettino storico catanese 6 (1941), 29-67; Mazzarese Fardella, "L'aristocrazia siciliana nel secolo XIV" (see

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On the political level, where public dignitates revolved among a heterogenous caste of jurists, merchants, and the emerging "civic nobility," the dominant figures were the judices, the chief administrators of the commune.89 These figures then appointed the remaining municipal officers according to each city's particular customs. Assisting thejudices were panels ofjuriste, apportioned one to each precinct of the city, who helped to administer the laws, heard pleas from their constituents, and organized the collection of local taxes. In addition, communal leaders appointed officials to preside over matters of public health, to undertake police work (the xurterii), the organization of night-watch companies, the maintenance of city walls and gates and, for harbor communities, the port chains that provided the first line of defense against naval attack. Service in the local government gave one considerable prestige (those who served a term asjudex afterwards held the right to adopt "Giudice" as an honorary lifetime title and practically as a new first name) and the opportunity for wealth, less so because of the salaries it paid than for the personal contacts it offered and the chance it gave one to plead for special privileges. Political patronage determined the makeup of urban government, since most positions were filled by appointment. Notaries too, semipublic officers who represented the chief point of contact between local merchants and the urban administration, commanded widespread respect and earned hefty fees for their services.90 On ch. 1, n. 24, above); Illuminato Peri, "Per la storia della vita cittadina e del commercio nel Medioevo: Girgenti, porto del sale e del grano," in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, 6 vols. (Milan, 1962), 1, pp. 529-616; Enrico Pispisa, "Stratificazione sociale e potere politico a Messina nel medioevo," Archivio storico messinese, 3rd ser., 32 (1981), 55—76; Romano, "Legum doctores" e cultura giuridica nella Sicilia aragonese (see n. 41, above); Marina Scarlata, "I

Chiaromonte a Palermo nel secolo XTV: uso della citta e gestione economica," Bullettino dell'Istitutostorico italianoperilMedioEvo

89

90

eArchivio muratoriano 90 (1982—3), 303—29; Scarlata,

"Strutture urbane ed habitat a Palermo fra XIII e X I V secolo: U n approccio al t e m a attraverso la lettura documentaria," Schedi medievali 8 (1985), 80—110; Scarlata, "Una famiglia della nobilta siciliana nello spazio urbano e nel territorio tra XIII e XTV secolo," Quaderni medievali 11 (1981), 67-83; and Laura Sciascia, "I c a m m e l l e e le rose: gli Abbate di Trapani da Federico II a Martino il Vecchio," in MM in, pp. 1171—1230. T h e judices were elected annually according t o a standardized plan drawn up by the king after Caltabellotta. This plan, in place throughout Sicily by 1311, called for the appointment each year of four probi homines in each city to serve as electors, each of whom would then select six candidates for the top office; the electors then retired from the action, and the incumbent officials - together with a tie-breakingpresidens electioni — would examine the twenty-four candidates and select their successors from among them. Henri Bresc, "II notariato nella societa siciliana medioevale," Estudios historicos y documentos de los archivos de protocolos 7 (1979), 169-92.

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account of these advantages, elections and appointments to public office were highly prized and hotly contested, whereas admission to the various corps of notaries was carefully regulated by royal and communal law. Owing to gaps in the extant records we know more about the municipal offices, and the increasingly bitter fights to control them, in the years after 1313 than in the years before. Quite full documentation survives for Palermo and Messina, but for sites like Agrigento, Catania, Cefalu, Polizzi, or Sciacca only a handful of names and events has come down to us. Even so, what survives is enough to suggest both the extent of internal rivalry that existed in each city and the increasing monopolization of power in the largest communities by a handful of wealthy families. The faintly observable spirit of public-mindedness that characterized the first decade after Caltabellotta decayed in these later years to a depressing cartelization of authority that paralleled, and was in fact directly linked to, the monopolization of commercial credit. Tables 1 and 2 (see pp. 308-11) list the leading municipal officers for the universitas of Palermo; This data, drawn from hundreds of scattered records, becomes detailed only after 1320, when the domination of city life by the bailiffs was firmly established. Nevertheless a number of important developments stand out, the most telling of which is the relatively small number of family names that appear and reappear in the chief offices. The Cassaro district, for example, as the well-to-do neighborhood preferred by the elites of Palermitan society (both urban and baronial), merited two judices and juriste annually. Here the Benedetto, Tagliavia, Lentini, and Milite families clearly formed the dominant core. Tommasso Benedetto, even though he had been convicted of larceny in office in 1311-12, returned asjudex in 1321, 1324, and 1329.91 The Milite family - a branch of the baronial family based near Polizzi represented the district over a period of at least thirty-eight years, from Vitale Milite in 1298 to Rinaldo Milite in 1336 (whereas Vitale himself appeared again asjurista for Cassaro in 1323). A crude sort of cursus honorum may have been in effect in the city, for we see 91

Ada curie i, doc. 42 (4 May 1312), in which the universitas petitions for a royal pardon of Tommasso's crime on the spurious basis that "the harm done to his good name" works to the city's disadvantage as well, and that similar crimes committed by others in other municipalities have received the very grace and forgiveness from the Palermitans that they now seek for one of their own.

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several instances of individuals or families working their way into ever higher offices, after 1320. In Albegaria, the southernmost district in the city, Filippo Campsore served as xurterius in 1321 (the same year in which his father wasjurista) and asjurista in 1329 (whereas his father advanced asjudex for the district in 1336). In some districts offices seem to have circulated among a wider group of families, yet it is likely that the recurrence of these individuals and relations would prove even greater if our records were better. Overall, municipal offices in Palermo were dominated by roughly a dozen major families or their allies. The data for Agrigento's, Catania's, Messina's, and Polizzi's judices, summarized in table 3 (pp. 312-15), is more consistent for the entire period and reflects a similar pattern of power revolving among a coterie of wealthy families. Merchant families figured large in Agrigento, since the port represented one of the chief points of entry and exit for grain, salt, and slaves; but their power was matched by the influence of local nobility.92 The Bernotto family, for example, trafficked in slaves at least from 1307, bringing into the market captives from one end of the Mediterranean to the other - from Granada in the west to Rhodes and Russia in the east.93 Local aristocratic families like the Mosca also exercised authority, especially in the post-Caltabellotta decade, when the resettlement program was in process, but still left many baronial families in power. Federico Mosca., judex for 1303 and 1308 (while a kinsman held office in 1305), was the count of Modica who had distinguished himself during the Vespers by leading his own comitiva of 500 almogavers in fighting in Calabria. His county of Modica later passed to Manfredi Chiaromonte, who had married Federico's daughter Isabella. In Messina the ruling caste remained remarkably stable, with power monopolized by a small group of families like the Ansalone, Salimpipi, Calciamira, Salvo, and Coppola families. Other families such as the Laburzi, Golisano, and Tattono appear less frequently but with some consistency. Polizzi, a particularly lively town on the southern slope of the Madonie chain, where fulling mills (bactinderia), cattle and sheep 92 93

Peri, "Per la storia della vita cittadina," outlines these relations. ASP Misc. archivistica, 2nd ser., no. 127B (Bartolomeo di Citella), fol. 24V—25,57V, 89-89V, 125,151,179V-180; no. 127C (Bartolomeo di Citella), fol. io6v, 146V-148, 217, 310-310V, 351V, 382, 412, 426; Spezzoni notarili, no. 20 (Ruggero di Citella), fol. 191.

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rearing, and wine production complemented a vibrant religious and social scene, was long a favorite for settlers from northern Italy- as shown by the surnames of the recurring judices.^ The Calvo and Leonardo families held sway here in particular. These families frequently exercised power far beyond the confines of their cities, especially in the cases of Palermo and Messina. The royal government commonly called upon them to serve in administrative posts and on diplomatic errands. Thus Guglielmo Saporito, for example, one of Messina's four judices in 1299 and 1302, and possibly afterwards, served as one of the three judices Magne Regie Curie in 1310, before returning to municipal service in 1317 and 1320. Moreover, his two partners on the MRC for 1310 were also his partners in the Messinese court: Giacomo Giordano and Santoro Salvo (his coterminous municipal judices in 1299 and 1302).95 Similarly, in 1335, three royal judgeships were held by leading urbanites: Antonio Carastono, from the Cassaro district in Palermo, and Franchino d'Ansalone and Ginuisio Porto, from Messina. Such consistent pairings of figures within local government and between the local and royal administrations illustrate the extent of patronage and factionalization. The leading demesne families were not always families of long standing. The Vespers had dispelled or destroyed many of the older urban-aristocratic and entrepreneurial families from Norman or Hohenstaufen days, leaving behind ample opportunities for ambitious and capable newcomers. A number of such families and individuals emerged after 1282; and those who were able to promote themselves through service to the new Catalan regime or who were able to capitalize on old local rivalries and new local needs established themselves as the new elites with surprising ease. This social transformation has received a fair amount of study, since it represents one of the most crucial developments of late medieval Sicily, affecting everything from political events to the physical layout of the municipalities. 96 Two examples will suffice. 94

95 96

Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 173, 195; Illuminato Peri, "Rinaldo di Giovanni Lombardo 'habitator terrae Policii'," in Studi medievali in onore diAntonino de Stefano (Palermo, 1956), pp. 429-506 at 448. For background, see Statuti ordinamenti e capitoli della citta di Polizzi-, ed. A. Flandina (Palermo, 1884), DSSS, 2nd ser., vol. 1. Bresc, Un monde, pp. 771-2. Scarlata, "Strutture urbane" and "I Chiaromonte a Palermo" (see n. 88, above) are two excellent studies that map out some of these changes in Palermo.

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Few families in Messina enjoyed higher regard, more solid wealth, or broader influence than the Rosso family. As important in commerce as in local politics, they exemplified in many ways the new urban aristocracy; and like others elsewhere, they were relative newcomers to the community they dominated. By means of service to the crown, carefully diversified commercial investments, and above all by a ruthless sense of family advancement at any cost, they rose with remarkable speed. Their founder was Enrico Rosso, a middling Val Demone miles who made, and twice very nearly lost, the family's fortune in the tangle of rivalries, betrayals, and misalliances after the Vespers. 97 Amalfitan in origin, Enrico probably came to Sicily as part of the Angevin campaign to install peninsular supporters on the island. However he arrived, he began his climb to prominence when he secured appointment as Charles Fs chief tax official (secretus) for Calabria sometime in the 1270s. Chancery records of the time identify Enrico as a Messinese - that is, as a citizen and town-dweller. His knightly status was honorific: grants of land regularly figured in the compensation of the most important officials. When the rebellion began in 1282 some locals might have regarded Enrico as an enemy. But he was lucky; had he been secretus for the island itself instead of for Calabria his fate might well have been sealed. His relatively benign presence within Sicily gave him sufficient time to gauge the likelihood of the rebels' success. A few days were all he needed to decide that Angevin power on the island was doomed, and so make a show of breaking with his patrons and cast his lot with the rebels. His administrative experience and personal wealth secured him a place as one of the leaders of the new commune. The former he put to use to help devise a workable framework for the "Communitas Sicilie," while the latter was carefully used to purchase arms and to hire soldiers. In a battle at Milazzo, the Angevins, who slaughtered hundreds of well-armed but poorly trained rebel troops, captured Enrico and held him prisoner in Naples for over two years. 98 His captivity - no doubt a 97

98

Laura Sciascia, "Nascita di u n a famiglia: i Rosso di Messina (sec. X I V ) , " Clio 20 (1984), 389-418 is the best account. M u c h o f what follows is based o n her article, which focuses chiefly on the recently discovered will left behind by Enrico; see ASP Archivio Trabia, 1st ser., vol. DXXIII, fol. 443—81 (inserted a m o n g the records presented in a court case in 1564). Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 35.

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harsh experience, considering the treatment Charles I usually meted out to those who had betrayed him - embellished Enrico's image as a loyal servant of the city and made it possible for him, once he had been released, to return to a position of influence, which he did with great assiduity but also with an eye cast over his shoulder, looking out for new rivals or threats to his position. An air of cold-bloodedness and calculation surrounded his actions, and those of his family, ever afterwards. The death of his wife's parents in 1287, for example, inspired him not to selfless aid to his kinsmen but to a lawsuit against the orphaned children of his wife's brother (who had died previously, leaving his children in the care of their grandparents) in order to gain control of their inheritance. His role in communal government gave him access to detailed information about the casualties from the war and the financial status of the dead rebels' families - information which he used to pursue an aggressive policy of purchasing real estate from cash-strapped war widows throughout the region, thus enriching himself while building a reputation as the supposed rescuer of the families of Sicily's fallen heroes." By 1293 he had secured Frederick's appointment asjusticiarius for the Val d'Agrigento; but when James, in 1294, blocked Frederick's further nomination of Enrico as royal treasurer for Sicily, Enrico responded hot-headedly by rebelling against both James and Frederick, declaring them usurpers, and calling for a new popular uprising to drive out the Catalans.100 Frederick ordered his possessions confiscated and might well have prosecuted Enrico, on James's behalf, for lese-majeste, but the on-going campaign in Calabria prevented any further action for the time being. The treaty of Anagni changed nothing. At least until 1297 the court in Messina considered Enrico a traitor.101 His brother Perrone and Perrone's son Federico, though, threw their support behind the Catalans and were rewarded with several military and ambassadorial missions; thus the Rosso family itself, despite Enrico's disgrace, retained its honored status. When both 99 100 101

Sciascia, "Nascita di una famiglia," pp. 391—3, citing AGA Perg. Alfonso II, apendice, no. 1 and 425. Peri, L a Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 27. ACA Perg. James II, no. 641 (2 May 1296), 854 (27 Aug. 1297), both of which describe Enrico as "rebellis noster," citing documents dating to 1294. Many Sicilians had abandoned Frederick in 1298 after James's invasion of the island; but Rosso's actions clearly had nothing to do with that, occurring as they did two years previously.

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Perrone and Federico perished in the battle of Capo d'Orlando, Enrico stepped forward again. Begging forgiveness from the Catalan usurpers was a small price to pay, evidently, for winning his brother's and nephew's inheritance. Besides, after the loss of 6,000 soldiers at Capo d'Orlando the royal court needed support anywhere it could find it; a repentant Enrico, who still commanded considerable popular support, would do just fine - especially considering the financial assistance he could lend the faltering throne. As early as June 1300, Enrico had been formally pardoned and once again held public office - this time as magister rationalise a position he held until his death in 1315.102 Meanwhile, other family members likewise moved into public life. Enrico's remaining brother, Cataldo Rosso, served asjudex of the MRC in the 1290s and at least once as ambassador to Barcelona, whereas Enrico's four sons - Damiano, Russo, Riccardo, and Vinciguerra - also began public careers in law, commerce, and real estate. The family's agricultural holdings grew exponentially after several more purchases and the award of several new fiefs, post-Caltabellotta. These gains were probably of a sort with Enrico's first wave of estate-grabbing in the late 1280s and early 1290s, being cast in the form of financial rescue operations for war-widowed families. Most importantly, the Rosso family's wealth was held in common in order to provide the largest possible pool of capital for investment. All family members shared according to a set percentage in the profits produced by the growing portfolio of farms, vineyards, taverns, warehouses, commercial contracts, and workshops they owned; and, as Enrico's will illustrates, this patrimony was to be held together at all costs, for the benefit of all. Since economic strength and political influence amounted to much the same thing in Messina, to divide the collective wealth would seriously threaten the power of the family itself and might even turn members of the family against one another. The patrimonial manse in Messina itself, Enrico

102

Sciascia, "Nascita di una famiglia," p. 395. The document Sciascia cites (Ada curie 1, doc. 58) actually dates to 1311—12. I have been unable to locate any direct confirmation that Enrico was returned to office as early as 1300. On 5 August 1304, however, Enrico wrote to James - whom he addressed flatteringly as "suo domino et benefactori precipue" — and offered to perform whatever service James may request of him; see ACA Cartas James II, no. 9774. It is certain that Enrico was restored to favor sometime after Capo d'Orlando and before Caltabellotta; James's role in the matter is less clear.

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dictated, "ought to remain entirely intact in the control of the family . . . and is not to be alienated outside of the family for any reason or under any conditions; . . . moreover the manse and its vineyard are not to be divided into separate, smaller [inheritances] but is to be kept single, whole, and intact."103 Even the dowries received by Enrico's sons when they married — and those who married did so into wealthy, prominent families - were invested in the collective patrimony, until finally the family's wealth included well over a dozen residences and farms in and around Messina, wheat fields near Milazzo, more rental properties, workshops, and warehouses in Taormina, and taverns and vineyards as far away as Catania. Added to this, by the 1320s and 1330s, Enrico's sons and grandsons held in fief a number of large estates (casales) in the Val di Noto, which elevated one branch of the family to comital status and placed the rest among the most powerful barons in the realm. The Rossos showed this intense spirit of protecting themselves by any means available not only in the acquisition of properties but in the management of them as- well. Unlike the Ventimiglia family, who generally increased their profits by reinvesting capital in the improvement of its properties, usually at a rate of 10 percent annually, the Rosso clan were notorious landlords who never hesitated to raise rents, evict tenants, file law suits, break contracts, and capitalize on their access to privileged information and local channels of power. During the last two difficult decades of Frederick's reign they kept a large corps of armed thugs who served as bodyguards and kept those who opposed the family in any way in a terrified silence. In the wars that followed Frederick's death, the Rossos stood out even among the powerful gangsters of the time for their brutal treatment of the lands and subjects under their dominion, finding no action too extreme to stand in the way of exercising authority, collecting a rent, or forcing a profit. "Rather than following the path of the good shepherd who shears his sheep without harming them," wrote Michele da Piazza, "[they] so badly 103

Sciascia, "Nascita di una famiglia," p. 396, n. 36: "Item voluit et mandavit dictus testator quod quadam vinea magna... et predicta domus magna . . . semper remanea[n]t integra apud familias eiusdem . . . et nullatenus teaneant vel possint alienari extra familia aliqua conditione vel causa. Item voluit et mandavit quod predicte domus et vinea magna non recipiant particolares divisiones minimatim, sed quod unus heredum habeat totam et integram vineam ac domum eius."

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tear [their underlings] to pieces that these . . . have all they can do just to stay alive in their own homes." 104 The Rosso family exemplified the potential for advancement that existed by skillfully allying oneself with the political and commercial forces that governed the demesne cities. Originally a part of the urban aristocracy, they evolved into feudal magnates by virtue of service to the crown, but even so they remained centered in Messina itself and simply administered their feudal holdings through agents. To this extent they form an anomaly, an urban elite who penetrated the baronial world, when the dominant trend lay in the other direction. Nevertheless they provide a good example of the means employed by demesnal families for accumulating wealth and status, utilizing that position for gaining followers, and then putting those followers to work to force others by violence, if necessary - into doing their will. The Pontecorono family of Corleone provides an interesting contrast. 105 Here too, although the physical setting differed starkly from that of Messina, there lay a commercial crossroads that was vital to the realm and provided promising means for family advancement. Located some sixty kilometers (thirty-seven miles) from Palermo along the poor road that stretched southward from the capital and through Monreale, Corleone stood nestled in a barren hillside beneath the mountain wall of Rocca Busambra. Arabs had established the site in the tenth century and, in 1237, under Frederick II, it became home to a colony of Lombard refugees from Guelf-Ghibelline strife on the peninsula. 106 Despite the unwelcoming wilderness of its setting, though, Corleone had two key attractions: standing at the virtual center of the Val di Mazara, it provided a natural collection point for the vast agricultural produce of the region; moreover, from this point goods could be 104

105

106

Michele da Piazza, Historic sicula ab anno MCCCXXXVII ad annum MCCCLXI, ed. Antonino GiufTrida (Palermo, 1980), Fonti per la storia di Sicilia, vol. 111, p. 305: "non sequutus vestigia boni pastoris, qui oves tondit et non degluttit, immo in tantum ipsos dilaniabat, quod quasi frigore pressi in proprios lares commorari satagebant." Iris Mirazita, "Una famiglia 'lombarda' a Corleone nelPeta del Vespro," in MM in, PP- 9!3"52. Historia diplomatica Friderici secundi, ed. J. L. A. Huillard-Breholles, 6 vols. (Paris, 1852-61), v, pt. 1, pp. 128-31. Polizzi, Castrogiovanni, Patti, and Randazzo, plus a number of sites in the Val di Noto, likewise received large numbers of northern Italian immigrants in the Norman and Hohenstaufen periods; see Illuminato Peri, "La questione delle colonie lombarde in Sicilia," Bollettino storico-bibliograjico subalpino 57 (1959), 258-80.

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transported with as much ease as western Sicily could offer, either northward along the road to Palermo or southward along the Belice river (near the upper reaches of which the town stood) to Sciacca or Mazara. Corleone also stood only ten kilometers from the lower reaches of the S. Leonardo river, whose fertile valley stretched north and east past Vicari, Ciminna, and Caccamo, to reach the coast near Termini. Thus, goods shipped from Corleone could, in theory at least, be brought to any of four active ports. The commercial possibilities of such a site account for its surprising size; nothing else in the otherwise dreary landscape would lead one to expect the presence of a successful settlement there. But although it enjoyed numerous, if tenuous, links with the coast, Corleone was likewise characterized by an oppressive and almost impenetrable isolation. It felt, and still feels, cut off from the world. This striking solitariness contributed to its suitability for refugees like the Lombard immigrants, or for those who had need to hide, such as the condemned Spiritual Franciscans who took up residence around 1308 at nearby Calatamauro. 107 For such reasons, Corleone ranked a surprising fourth among all the demesne cities in the tax assessment of 1277, with nearly 7,000 hearths, or roughly 30,000 inhabitants. 108 The Pontecorono family numbered among those immigrants from the north. The date of their arrival is unknown, although they had probably settled there well before the Vespers. Bertolino Pontecorono, eldest son of the family's Sicilian founder Bernardo, appears in a record of May 1285 and is described as a citizen of Corleone, of Pisan origin.109 Already he was a figure to be reckoned with, engaged in trade with Tuscany, a business partner of prominent Corleonese merchants, and, like Enrico Rosso in Messina, the reputed leader of an armed gang - in this case a pirate crew haunting the waters off the coasts of Trapani and Pantelleria. A large family governed the large commercial fortune. Bernardo, the patriarch, had five other sons in addition to Bertolino, all of 107 108

109

See discussion in ch. 5, below. The town fell on hard times throughout the fourteenth century. By 1374—6 Corleone had shrunk to just over 1,100 hearths, or 5,000 inhabitants. See Epstein, An Islandfor Itself pp. 42,71. ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 7. Mirazita, "Una famiglia 'lombarda' a Corleone," has published the text in the documentary appendix to her article, where it appears as doc. 2.

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whom worked with and for one another. 110 Marriage links with leading native Corleonese families like the Cavallo and Nazano introduced the Pontecorono clan to society; business contacts with other families, such as the Cosmerio, helped secure their position. Soon they owned several houses within Corleone and a number of crop fields and pastures outside it, deriving considerable income from urban and rural rents. They also engaged in money-lending, traded in textiles and livestock, operated mills, and entered the professions. For them as for many other new families the notariate served as point of entry to public life. Like other new families, too, the Pontecorono brood worked together in order to compile a family treasure, a patrimonial inheritance that symbolized their unity, provided for their general welfare, and guaranteed their access to the avenues of power. A well-calculated series of marriages was arranged for the various females in the family, which linked them with other manses and helped to bring other inheritances into the general purse; but marriages for the men were actively discouraged, lest the family weaken its position by splitting, the family's treasure among rival inheritances. As with the Rosso clan, all the Pontecorono wealth including those properties and goods still held in Pisa - remained in the main trust. 111 So strong was this concern for consolidation that Guglielmo Pontecorono (one of Bertolino's many brothers, and one of those who never married) bequeathed his portion of the manse to all his surviving brothers and their families with the sole exception of one brother, named Vanni, who had been so errant as to marry and move away from Corleone. 112 Even bastard children were brought into the collective economic campaign, and into the family manse itself - as when, for example, provision was made for Perino, one of Bernardo's illegitimate sons, and his family "and his heirs in perpetuity, that they might have food, drink, and lodging in the house of his brothers . . . free and without any

110

111 112

Bernardo's possession of the titles dominus and sire (see ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 23, 50, 59) indicates his early prominence in urban life. The meaning of these honorifics is not always clear, but dominus tended to indicate landowners hip whereas sire usually denoted prominence in the professions, in commerce, and in city administration. See Pietro Corrao's introduction to Ada curie v, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii; Bresc, Un monde, p. 654; Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 129. Mirazita, "Una famiglia 'lombarda' a Corleone," pp. 923—5, and notes. 7&tfl\, p. 928.

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payment."113 Wary of losing the freedom of action he possessed on his own, Perino, in this case, resisted being brought into the family network, until finally giving in to their continued cajoling two years later. The economic blows of 1311-13 spelled ruin for many in Corleone, but the Pontecorono family, thanks to the diversity of their activities and the prudent management of their pooled assets, continued to prosper. The early deaths of several family members had the effect of concentrating the wealth among the survivors. An inheritance settlement between Perino and Giacomo in 1346 itemized their holdings; these consisted of no less than forty-eight houses (both individual residences and multi-family dwellings) in and around Corleone, two taverns, eight vineyards, a public oven, a stable, a warehouse, a courtyard, and three grain and livestock estates, in addition to the main family residence (hospitium magnum) on the Corleone street that by then bore the family's name (ruga pontecorono).114 In contrast to the Rosso family in Messina, Bernardo Pontecorono's descendants did not play a large role in municipal government and preferred instead to advance their interests through social and commercial contacts. A few, however, did serve the government in one way or another, beginning in the 1320s when the fast-faltering economy necessitated new means of protecting the family's position. Thus Pietro Pontecorono took office asjudex in 1325-6;115 Gandolfo Pontecorono (perhaps his son) was regius notarius terre Curilioni notarius in the same year.116 And in 1329-30 came the family's move to the capital and their political apotheosis, with Guglielmo's appointment as pretor of Palermo together with another kinsman's (the name is lost) selection as juratus for Palermo's Seralcadio district. 117 The move to Palermo is significant. By the late 1320s and early 1330s conditions in Corleone were dreadful, and the town had declined to a stagnant backwater. The decay of buildings, wells, and walls discouraged trade, and recurring famines spread disease. Mortality rose sharply, and when it became impossible to bury all of 113

114 115 116

Ibid., citing ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 44 (8 Aug. 1303): "et eius familia ac heredes ipsius Perini in perpetuum habeant et habere debeant esum, potum, et habitationem domus eorum dicti Guillelmi et Jacobi libere et absque aliquo pagamento." ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 277; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 683-4. ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 138 (8 Nov. 1325). 117 Ada curie HI, doc. 64 (4june 1326). Ada curie v, doc. 133 (9 Sept. 1329).

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the dead, corpses were simply piled up in the cemetery, where, as described before, they became the targets of herds of wild swine. Crime increased as agricultural production decreased. The MRC tried to bolster the economy by granting a fair to the city sometime before 1329, but nothing helped.118 A new wave of emigration ensued, as the town's inhabitants followed the very roads and rivers that had earlier carried their produce and manufactured goods to coastal markets, and abandoned Corleone by the hundreds. Palermo was a favorite destination.119 By 1336 the town was unable to pay its annual subvention to the royal court - the regular sum owed by all demesne municipalities - and had to request a restructuring of the gabelle that provided its funds.120 Unable to support themselves by commercial resources alone, members of the Pontecorono family - and notably Guglielmo himself, who was by then the patriarch - moved into government and military service, thus following the pattern established by the local barons of the vallo. They had also armed themselves and their followers. Guglielmo's role as pretor of Palermo shows him to be in command of a personal comitiva, since pretors at that time were expected to provide their own soldiers and weaponry. It is likely that his following was comprised of other immigrants from Corleone, owing to his relative newness on the Palermitan scene. Although the surviving documents fail us at this point, it is likely that the sudden rise of this known, yet still foreign, band of outsiders to police the capital did as much to frustrate on-going tensions in Palermo as it did to alleviate them. We can see in the examples of the Rosso and Pontecorono families a number of similarities. They were both "new" families in two senses: new to status and influence, and new to their cities as well. The changes of the thirteenth century had effectively reopened and reconfigured urban society, making it much easier for ambitious outsiders to establish themselves. Under the Angevins, the older urban elites from Hohenstaufen and Norman times had 118 119 120

Scarlata, "Mercati e fiere," p. 482. See, for example, two grants of Palermitan citizenship to refugees from Corleone, in ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 197-8 (both dated 30 Aug. 1333). Ada curie 11, pp. 125—30, 309-12 ("difficile et quodammodo impossibile eis fore quolibet anno Curie nostre solvere pecuniam contingentem per eos ipsi nostre Curie ad solvendum ratione annue subventionis nostre"). See also Starrabba and Tirrito, Assise e consuetudini della terra di Corleone (see ch. 1, n. 20, above), pp. 159-61.

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been largely purged - either sent into exile or put to death - if they failed to accept Angevin rule. Those who had acquiesced and supported Charles I and II found themselves out of favor as a result of the Vespers, and were themselves either exiled or killed. This left the demesne bereft of the older families who had traditionally exercised power and guided local commerce, making it possible, and in fact necessary, for new families to appear on the scene. The possibilities for advancement were clearly inviting, in both the commercial and administrative spheres. But whereas the Rosso family utilized its administrative position to advance its commercial interests, the Pontecorono family focused altogether on trade and turned to local government only in response to collapsing economic fortunes. In both cases, however, family ties remained supreme and individual ambitions were sacrificed to the interests of the clan. Public roles were not matched with a positive spirit of public service. Leonardo d'Incisa, the baron who became "treasurer of their Kingdom of Sicily" in 1311, exemplified the self-serving nature of the worst of the baronial vultures who swooped down on the courts, but Enrico Rosso's vacillating allegiances and crass opportunism revealed the pettiness that the urban magnates were likewise capable of. Even in the immediate post-war years, administrative work too often aimed solely to bolster the standing and wealth of the family, regardless of whatever arguments to the contrary any of these individuals might have offered. Such intense cohesion and single-mindedness had much to argue in its favor, but it clearly worked to the detriment of the towns themselves, once family fortunes were threatened. Faced with rising difficulties, many of these urban magnates readily cloaked themselves with auras of tired sacrifice and surrounded themselves with ragged, yet deadly enough, corps of armed followers. Some of these, shortly after Frederick's death, formed the most effective and brutal early units in the larger baronial and mercenary armies that tore the kingdom apart until 1398. The cities, of course, had always known a degree of violence and boisterous crime, even during the post-war decade. Passions aroused by real or perceived slights, by business deals turned sour, or by the simplest transgressions, easily erupted in fights, blows, and stabbings. Much of this agitation owed something to the violence of the climate. In the full blast of a Sicilian summer -when

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the scirocco blowing northward from the Sahara desert can send temperatures well above forty-four degrees Celsius (one hundred and ten degrees Fahrenheit) for days on end - tempers ran as short as the temperatures ran high. Much urban violence occurred during these angry months. 121 Economic difficulties and lingering grudges from the war added to the problem. As early as 1309, factional disputes between supporters of one or another local patron resulted in mass riots, property damage, and armed fighting in Corleone. 122 Defaulted loans and commercial failures inspired civil suits in Palermo regularly from 1308 onwards - and when the court failed to resolve matters to the disputants' satisfaction, conflicts were settled in the streets with knives. 123 These conflicts were often pitifully petty. Manfredi Silvestri and Giovanni Rosso, for example, fell victim to an armed gang of twelve hired by Notar Giacomo di Salvaggio in Corleone when they complained that some grain they had purchased was damaged by a few of Notar Giacomo's cows, and having been rebuffed when they sought compensation, they took matters in their own hands by stealing some empty barrels from his barn. 124 In Txapani some personal insults that Ciccio Testagrossa and a prominent widow named Anna flung at one another - evidently over an unpaid debt left by Anna's dead husband - resulted in Ciccio's hiring and arming enough ruffians to assault an entire squadron of the municipal night-watch company, solely because some friends of Anna's spouse happened to serve on that squadron. 125 As intense and occasionally violent as local rivalries undoubtedly were, large-scale and organized hostilities did not begin until the arrival of the first barons, and then the response was immediate. In 121

In July 1312 Giovanni Dagnone, in a fit of anger, ran a sword through one Berceraimo Cassio, with whom he had a longstanding grudge, in Butera, in the Val di Noto; see Ada curie 1, doc. 62. Manfredi Laccani was murdered in Palermo the following month; see ibid., doc. 69. For other examples, see Ada curie in, doc. 65 (17 June 1326); BGP MS Qq H 6, fol. 488-96 (24 August 1333); Ada curie 1, doc. 59 (3July 1312), 63 (3 Aug. 1312), 68 (26 Aug. 1312).

122 ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 65 (6 Jan. 1309). 123 ASP Misc. Archivistica, 2nd ser., no. 127A (Bartolomeo di Citella), fol. I68-I68V (24 April 1308): "[Angelus Moscanti - a merchant] dicebat dictum Raynaldum [de Maratta another merchant] percussisse ipsum Angelum cum quodam cultello mensali in capite ita quod ex percussione ipsa sanguis emanavit." For other examples, see Ada curie 1, doc. 10 (5 Nov. 1311), 17 (19 Nov. 1311), 24 (15 Jan. 1312), 44 (8 May 1312), 46 (20 May 1312). 124 Ibid., doc. 47 (30 May 1312). 125 Ada curie in, doc. 38 (16 Nov. 1325).

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the earliest known case, in Palermo in 1312, the king appointed Pong de Caslar as municipal justiciarius in order to restore order. It was an unfortunate choice. From the Palermitans 5 point of view, Caslar represented everything that the capital city should not have had to contend with: not only was he a baron but, as a Catalan, his jurisdiction over the city could only be regarded as unwarranted foreign meddling. No sooner had Caslar and his retinue taken up their posts than the local street patrols refused to perform their duties, arguing that they would not work for foreign masters. 126 With no effective police force on the job, crime soared and inevitably brought tensions between the Sicilians and Catalans to a head. One local figure, Manfredi Laccani, ventured to arm his own comitiva and drive out the foreigners. They failed, and sometime later a punitive gang tracked down Manfredi and murdered him, leaving his badly mangled body in the street. 127 The plague of violence prompted the royal government to repeat, with ever increasing frequency and urgency, its prohibition of all weapons - but to no avail. Indeed, the very repetition of the ban suggests the intractability of the problem. At Castrogiovanni, in 1325, the court issued several new laws. Clearly the increase in weapons had to be curtailed, but so did the tendency of the rival municipal leaders to organize themselves into factions and to grant protection to their followers who did the dirty work in the streets: In the desire that we might reign over a Kingdom of Sicily that is orderly and peaceable - which is something that we shall not easily attain unless we punish severely the patrons and protectors of those who commit the crimes (without whose help those evil-doers would not long be able to hide [from justice]) - we decree that no nobleman, count, baron, knight, burgher, or anyone else in the kingdom shall dare or presume to harbor or to hide anyone who has been accused or convicted by our royal officials.128 126 127

128

See ch. i, n. 33, above. Most of Manfredi's killers were later identified. They included Simon de Caslar (a kinsman of Pong), three other Catalans, one Angelono de Viccari, and a sixth, unidentified man. SeeActa curie 1, doc. 69 (26 Aug. 1312). Const. Castrogiovanni, in Testa, ch. 108: "Curantes, ut regnum Sicilie quietum pacatumque regamus, quod non de facili obtinebimus nisi fautores et receptatores delinquentium (sine quibus diutius malefici latere non possunt) acriter puniamus, presenti constitutione sancimus, ut nullus regni nostri nobilium — sive sit comes, baro, miles, burgensis — vel quicunque alius bannitum vel forjudicatum a quibuscunque ofiicialibus nostris in castris, terris, massariis, domibus vel locis aliis receptare vel occultare audeat vel presumat, nee occultatos vel receptatos deinceps detineat. Transgressores vero presentis laudabilis sanctionis infrascriptis poenis sine venia feriantur: comes videlicet, vel baro magnus, si

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But hidden henchmen were only part of the problem. Many faction members had taken to wearing armor beneath their clothing to protect themselves from the knives of their rivals. It is fitting for the general health of the Royal Majesty not only to punish evils already committed but to interdict the material and means by which those evils are committed. Moreover, it is better to stop criminals before they begin to act than it is to punish them with all the severity of the laws after their crimes have been committed. And therefore, seeing it proven that many of our subjects have begun the new and alien practice of wearing protective vests or iron breastplates, and of carrying hidden weapons beneath their cloaks, while passing themselves off as Sicilians, we propose and decree that the secret bearing of arms is entirely forbidden in the kingdom; for many murders and crimes of violence are easily brought on by immature and capricious impulses, when these figures secrete weapons under their clothing.129 So far had conditions degenerated by this time, the decree intimates, that the factions controlling the streets and squares no longer seemed to be of the same race as the people who had rebuilt society after the Vespers, and hence were not to be treated as such. They were an alien element in the eyes of the law. Although "passing themselves off as Sicilians," they were more foreign to the kingdom than the Pisan and Venetian merchants who traded in

129

contrafecerit, in unciis auri centum ipso facto multetur; ceteri vero in unciis quinquaginta,fiscalibuscommodis applicandis. Ad quarum exactiones sine accusatore ex officio judicis procedatur, cum genus receptantium delinquentes a sacratissimis legibus pessimum reputetur. Jubentes nostris officialibus, quamcunque a nobis jurisdictionem exerceant, quod si in exactione poenarum huiusmodi occasione aliqua fuerint tepidi vel remissi, tantundem aerario Magne Nostre Curie persolvere teneantur — poenis aliis in eos infligendis suo loco et tempore reservatis." Ibid., ch. 109: "Regie Maiestatis salubre debet esse propositum non solum puniendi maleficia iam commissa sed in committendis eisdem viam et materiam precludendi, cum satis sit melius obviare principiis delictorum quam post perpetrata legum severitatibus vindicare. Videntes igitur ab experto quosdam fideles nostros, morem novum et alienigenum usurpantes, pancerias seu coyratias de maleis vel arma privatim vel occulte deferre sub eorum coccardica vel indumento alio, sic alii a Siculis apparentes, proposuimus et deliberate decrevimus huiusmodi occultam apportationem armorum in regno nostro Sicilie penitus abolere, cum multa homicidia, multeque violentie juvenili levique motu ex huiusmodi genere delationis armorum - cum aliis offensibilibus armis, que secum portant, possent de facili evenire. Et volentes tanto pericolo tantoque facinori obviare, presentis constitutionis edicto sancimus, ut nullus in regno nostro fidelis, vel advena predicta arma occulta seu secreta modo et forma predictis deferre presumat, cum tarn arma defensoria quam oflensoria palam deferre guerrarum tempore unicuique sufficiat contra hostes. Contra presentem constitutionem Nostri Culminis venire tentantes infrascriptis poenis ipso jure decrevimus esse damnandos — videlicet, si comes fuerit vel baro magnus, uncias auri quinquaginta; si minor vel miles simplex, uncias viginti quinque; si burgensis, uncias decemfisconostro componat."

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the squares, the Greek slaves who worked in the shops and cleaned the homes, or the Catalan traders, financiers, ambassadors, and soldiers who sailed into the ports, guarded the royal garrisons, or served in the king's court. In order to attract more recruits to their bands or simply to impress cowed merchants and tradesmen into obeying their will, gang leaders competed with one another to promote the most convincing atmosphere of pomp, wealth, and power, for the image of influence and strength mattered as much as the reality. Thus among the new crowd of urban elites, whether of baronial or commercial origin, we find impressive displays of expensive dress, reckless gambling, ostentatious charity, and dramatic expressions of outrage against real or perceived slights against their honor. Giovanni Chiaromonte IPs smoldering vendetta against Francesco Ventimiglia on behalf of his sister, whom Francesco had repudiated as his wife in favor of his mistress, had some of these qualities. There is no indication that Giovanni had held any particular affection for his sister; rather, the insult against the family's honor, as it was perceived, permitted of no response other than violent revenge, even if that meant devastating the whole island in the process. In order to foster the proper image, many leaders even went into debt, borrowing money in order to pay rude wages to their followers or to provide themselves with the trappings fit for their assumed station in life. This happened again and again in Palermo, in Polizzi, in Messina, and wherever else influence could be bought or won through bullying.130 Capital that might otherwise have been directed at improvements in agricultural or industrial capacity went instead into the pockets of armed dandies whose claim to the cash was all the greater for coming on the point of a knife. Such debts, compounding the general problem of public and private indebtedness, led the government to produce ever stronger prohibitions of gambling, excessive displays of wealth or expensive clothing, and the providing of weapons to members of each faction. Much of this was inspired by the royal court's evangelical spirit, but much too resulted from simple pragmatism.131 Introduced in 1309, this legislation against the "damned and damnable" sin of dice and cards, "which leads to all manner of vices . . . since fraud, cheating, 130 131

Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 83—4, and notes. On the evangelical issue, see ch. 5, below.

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lying and blasphemy all too often make up part [of their practice]," had little result in a society that craved diversion and in which those with money felt a need to display it.132 Extravagant dress continued to be a problem, as did lavish wedding and funeral arrangements - occasions which the government not only disapproved of on account of their sumptuous display, but which they positively feared as potentially dangerous gatherings of crowds easily driven to emotional or intoxicated excess.133 Attacks on political, social, and commercial rivals were commonplace. Among the best documented instances, Giovanni Cisario, xurterius of Palermo in 1328-9 (and son of one of the immigrant families from Corleone), marched with some armed followers upon the house of D. Giovanni Aiello, the magisterjusticiarius for the vallo, and taunted him "with many and enormous slanders" until a street battle erupted between the two men's comitive.m Cisario's wrath resulted either from disappointment in Aiello's performance of his job, or more likely from envy that Aiello had secured the post in the first place. As witnesses recalled the conflagration, Cisario's followers advanced on the pretext of arresting a young client of Aiello's on an unnamed charge; when Aiello refused to relinquish the youth to the gang, sharp words volleyed back and forth until finally blows were struck. If the recorded testimony accords with the actual events, the first barbs were hurled in Latin, yet as tempers rose both fellows resorted to vivid dialect. Cisario began: "You whore with thieves, and I'll live to press my foot on your throat!" Aiello countered: "You lie shamelessly, like the bastard son of a priest - which you are!" To this Cisario, drawing out his sword and ordering his companions to do the same, shot back, "You're the 132

133 134

Ord. gen.y in Testa, ch. 77: "Damnosum atque damnabilem alearum ludus, sub quo comprehendimus tarn tabularem quam ludum quemlibet taxillorum, quern diversa sequuntur genera vitiorum, inhibere volentes — cum fraus, mendacium, perjurium atque blasphemie sepius committenrentur in ipsis, et ex ipsis postremo rerum damna et odia sequebantur - statuimus, ut lex ilia Greca divi imperatoris Justiniani sub titulo 'De aleatoribus' comprehensa, qua dictus usus alearum vetatur, que per contrariam consuetudinem quasi erat abolita, inviolabiliter observetur; tenorem cuius, ut reperiatur facilius, hac constitutione de verbo ad verbum duximus inscribendum, qui talis est." Cf. Codex Justinianus, bk. 3, tit. 43. Subsequent laws (ibid., ch. 73-81) reiterated the general prohibition, mandated public beatings of gamblers, and ordered the destruction and burning of any gaming tables. Ibid., ch. 98-100,105. Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 81—2 catalogs some of the wealth of the Cisario family in Palermo.

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disgusting liar, you filthy, wicked hoodlum! Rebel! Traitor! Woe to us, if the leaders of Palermo are to be the likes of you!" Then the bloodshed began.135 Their choice of words, interesting in itself, significantly reveals another aspect of the tensions rending the demesne world. Personal rivalries aside, Cisario hated Aiello, or at least rationalized his hatred of him, for his ties to the Catalan throne. Relations between ethnic Sicilians and the Catalans worsened steadily from the moment baronial influence was introduced in the cities, despite the fact that in several instances (such as Palermo) the king installed baronial pretors, castellans, and justiciarii at the cities' explicit request.136 Never warm, and often made much the worse by endemic Catalan piracy in the waters around the island, Sicilian-Catalan relations after 1317 cooled considerably, whether one speaks of official relations between the royal court and the populace, or of individual relations between merchants, tradesmen, clergy, or laborers.137 Except at the aristocratic level, where a handful of Catalan lords wedded available Sicilian noblewomen, both groups had avoided inter-marriage and indeed even most forms of everyday socializing, resulting less in the creation of a social chasm than in a general failure to create social cohesion. Complaints against Catalan trading privileges ("which have multiplied in no small degree as of late . . . such that they are prohibited to nobody") were commonplace, as were attacks on individual Catalans.138 But Catalans were not the only victims. Attacks on Sicily's Jews also suddenly increased.139 Numerically, Jews represented a tiny 135

136 137 138

139

Ada curie v, doc. 5 (12 Sept. 1328): "Tu es solitus tenere malandrinos tecum, sed amodo tenebo tibi pedem in gulam . . . Tu mentiris per gulam sicut filius presbiteris bastardus, qui tu es . . . Tu mentiris per gulam comu suczu malu ruffianu ravallasu tradituri. Ki eu su, si bonu hamu ilia terra di Panormu comu si tu . . . Suzu traduturi, eu ti mictiro lu calchi ala gula non ti cridi truvari ali altri . . . Suczu malu ruflianu raballasu maniaculatiki misser merda, ki eu ti mustriro dumani ki eu sugnu milloromu di ti." The epithets, as reported by the witnesses, continue for several pages. Ada curie in, doc. 60-3; rv, doc. 42; vi, pp. xxiv—xxv. On piracy, see ch. 6, below. Ada curie v, doc. 26 (18 Nov. 1328). For a representative example of ethnic violence, see Ada curie in, doc 65 (17 June 1326), recording judicial proceedings for the murder of a Catalan hide merchant in Mistretta. The crucial source for Sicily's Jews is Codice diplomatico deigiudei in Sicilia, ed. Bartolomeo and Giuseppe Lagumina, 3 vols. (Palermo, 1884—1909), DSSS, 1st ser., vols. vi, xn, XVII. Valuable studies are by Abulafia, "Una comunita ebraica della Sicilia occidentale" (see ch. 1, n. 19, above); Ashtor, "The Jews of Trapani in the Later Middle Ages" (ibid.); Cecil

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minority of the overall population. Even in a city like Trapani, where they had one of their largest and most vibrant communities, Jews made up no more than 5 percent of the populace. Many of them had arrived in the middle of the thirteenth century when Frederick II, who was then busily expelling Muslims from the island, began to entice Maghribi Jews from Tunisia with offers of royal protection, moderate taxation, religious tolerance, and opportunities for both administrative advancement and commercial prosperity. He had lied, of course, but manyJews came nonetheless, bringing with them skills in the production of dates and indigo that helped to diversify the rural economy. The fact that they were all Arabic-speaking made their assimilation somewhat easier, since life in the western half of the island where most of them settled still retained a strong Arab, if no longer Muslim, flavor. In most western cities, in fact, Jews and Christians lived side by side until the very end of the Vespers war. Relations between them were generally smooth, even if only because mainstream Sicily reserved its hatred for the Angevins; the Maghribi Jews, in fact, had greater difficulty in winning acceptance from the older, native Jewish population. In Palermo, disputes between the two proved so insurmountable that a separate synagogue had to be established for the newcomers and located outside the city walls. The Catalans probably imported some anti-Jewish feeling when they arrived in the 1280s, but this too lay in abeyance so long as the fight with Naples lasted. Things began to change shortly after Caltabellotta. The Jews by then had resolved most of their internal disputes, but suddenly had to contend with the intense, if rather jingoistic, quasi-"patriotic" feelings released by the successful conclusion of the war. The Sicilians - by which they meant the Christian Sicilians - had at last won their liberty and were free to create a "Sicilian" kingdom, which necessarily involved, even if only as a minor point, a reevaluation of the status of the Jews living in their midst. Distinct Jewish quarters began to appear, or in some cases to reappear, in cities with sizable Jewish populations. This happened first in Trapani, although the precise forces at work in this are still poorly Roth, "Jewish Intellectual Life in Medieval Sicily," Jewish Quarterly Review 47 (1956-7), 317—35; Shlomo Simonsohn, "Gli ebrei a Siracusa ed il loro cimitero," Archivio storico siracusano 9 (1963), 8-20; and Carmelo Trasselli, "Gli ebrei di Sicilia," in his collection Sicilianijra Quattrocento e Cinquecento (Messina, 1981), pp. 135—57. For general context, see Attilio Milano, Storia degli ebrei in Italia (Torino, 1963), Saggi, vol. CCCXVIII.

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understood. But after the evangelical wave struck in 1305, a fairly systematic campaign to order and restrict Jewish life became apparent. Anti-Jewish legislation began with the Ordinationes generates of 1309, when restrictions were placed upon their professional and social activities. Traditionally involved in commerce and the professions - they held a virtual monopoly over the dyeing industry, for example, in addition to being prominent in medicine — Sicily's Jews suddenly found themselves subject to increasing constraints on their public activities. Not all the laws were repressive. Certain limited provisions protected Jews from excessive bigotry - such as preserving the integrity of Jewish courts and administrative records, or mandating prison sentences for anyone found guilty of harassing Jewish converts to Christianity - but otherwise whatever tolerance existed towards the Jews in everyday life resulted not from the law of the land but from the casual, yet regular, ignoring of it.140 The law forbade Jews to own Christian slaves, for example, or to have "regular contact" with Christians, which included the formation of commercial societates, yet in actual practice the needs of the market place always took precedence over legal scruples, and the law was easily circumvented by describing one's Jewish partner as a conversus regardless of whether or not that was the case.141 But while most merchants were willing to trade with Jews, few were willing to enter closer relations or to permit them to express any aspect of their faith in public. Jewish marriages and funerals, for example, were subject to detailed prescriptions of what they could include by way of clothing, demeanor, songs and chants, and number of participants, for fear that such ceremonies, and the heightened emotions that attend them, might easily lead to unrest.142 Many comitive took advantage of these statutes to taunt Jewish groups and to extort money from them. In Palermo one of the magistri xurte, Simone di Notar Michele, and his men made a 140 141

142

Ord gen., in Testa, ch. 63, 67. Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 14; Thomas, Diplomatarium venetolevantinum, doc. 12,14,18. Some figures — even clerics — were bold enough openly to create societates with Jews regardless of the laws. Lorenzo Finocolo, a Palermitan friar who also engaged in business, formed a corporation with Solomon Mahalufo "in tenendo et faciendo et exercendo per dictum Salomonem mistio molaturie in apotheca Matthei de Chinisi" in November 1326; ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 76 (Ruggero di Citella), fol. 43; see also Reg. 2 (Salerno di Peregrino), fol. 49V-50 (9 Oct. 1336). BCP MS Qq E 28, fol. 19V; cf. Ada curie 11, pp. 229-30.

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habit of harassing the Jews of their precinct, threatening them with immediate arrest for their having supposedly violated the publicceremony ordinances, precisely when those Jews were en route to weddings, child-births, and funerals - that is, when they were in the greatest hurry and had no choice but to pay.143 The ingrained Sicilian tendency to distrust foreigners (in this case, perceived foreigners, since most of Sicily's Jewish communities had been established centuries earlier) here appeared in all its strength. Belief in Jewish evil-doing and obstinate hatred of Jews remained unabated despite the remarkably peaceful nature of Sicily's Jewish communities; even more than most other areas in Europe, the Jews of Trapani, Erice, Mazara, Messina, Palermo, Corleone, Siracusa, Caltanissetta and wherever else they settled had remained content to ply their trades quietly, avoid unnecessary contact with the majority society that might lead to misunderstanding, and adhere scrupulously to the laws of the land. Nevertheless the distrust remained. A heavy penalty awaited any Jewish physician who practiced medicine on or sold drugs to a Christian patient, for example, since "we cannot have any faith in those who do not share the Faith . . . and since they hate us"; any Jew found guilty of such a transgression was "held in prison for a full year, throughout which time he will eat the bread of tribulation and drink the water of misery."144 Attacks on Jews increased, though perhaps without any observably earnest intent (popular hatred of Catalans and northern Italians always ran higher and more durably). D. Federico d'Algerio and his comrades-in-arms, for example, attacked "a certain Jew, a member of the royal camera" at 143

144

BCP MS Qq E 28, fol. 48V (2 May 1321), where Frederick reprimands Simone for his actions and orders him "Judeos dicte civitatis non molestat nee ab eis aliquid exigat vel accipiat... eosdem Judeos ad nuptias alicuius ipsorum Judeorum de nocte vel ad partum alicuius mulieris Judee." Ord. gen., in Testa, ch. 70: "In iis confidere non possumus, qui fidem non habent, nee aliis poterunt esse fideles, qui eorum dominum prodiderunt. Eapropter providimus et jubemus, ut nullus Judeorum, qui, cum de illius spectaremus consilio sive cura, forte nobis (cum nos odio habeant) procurabit impendere dispendia vel nociva, medendi artem in Christianis audeat exercere, vel medicinas pro Christianis conficere aut medicinas eisdem Christianis vendere vel etiam ministrate. Quod si contrafecerint, jubemus, quod Judeus ipse per annum unum carceri detineatur inclusus, ducens per tempus predictum in pane tribulationis et aqua miserie vitam suam. Christianus vero, qui ad curam ipsum vocaverit vel a Judeo medicinam sibi aut suis propinari vel confici fecerit, vel medicinam aut medicinalia ab eo scienter emerit, carceri per tres menses detineatur in poenam, et totum, quod dederat aut daturus esset ipsi Judeo, salarii aut pretii nomine, ad Curie manus perveniat, per earn postmodum pauperibus erogandum."

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Ciminna in late 1328, while two allied thugs, in an evidently related action, murdered the prior of the church of the Teutonic knights at Vicari.145 Fraud against, and litigation with, Jews also increased in many sectors by persons trying to take advantage of an anticipated Jewish acquiescence. In Palermo a notary calmly received an itinerant Jewish merchant's money in deposit, to be paid to the Jew's creditor when he arrived a few days later, only to assert, when the creditor appeared, that the Jew had never left any funds in the first place;146 and in Sciacca Riccardo Vassallo took advantage of a law that gave ownership of a property, if two individuals offered the same price for it, to whichever of them was a Sicilian rather than a foreigner, in order to force a local Jewish resident to relinquish his ownership of two houses in the center of the city.147 One factor worked in the Jews' favor. They still controlled significant amounts of capital and had access to commercial contacts and credit abroad. Cash-poor elites who needed funds to further their schemes had good reason to cultivate beneficial relations with their Jewish neighbors; and many Jews, tired of being pressed for ever higher taxes by a government that already taxed Jews at higher rates than it did any other group within Sicily, eagerly sought refuge from the graspings of the court in Messina. 148 Consequently some unlikely alliances were formed, and some of the oppressed entered the protective shadow of the new oppressors. Many barons and urban magnates took individual Jews under their personal protection, offering them safety, anonymity, and guarantees of commercial contacts in return for financial support. As Frederick complained in 1325: "It has come to our attention that 145 146 147

148

Ada curie v, doc. 28-32 (23 Nov. 1328). BCP MS Qq F 31, fol. 27 (1 Dec. 1320). ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 117 (30 March 1321). For a similar case, see ACA Perg. Alfonso III, no. 624 (27 March 1332), in which Russo Rosso of Messina challenged a local widow's sale of an orchard in Catania — one that happened to be contiguous with a landplot of his own, and hence desired by him - to a Catalan named Pere Llopis. Citing the law that favored Sicilians, Russo offered to reimburse Pere for his purchase price (25.00.00), plus an additional ounce "for the expenses incurred by Pere in this matter." Pere had no choice but to accept. Frederick's anti-Jewish feelings were tempered somewhat in 1311 when the Jews of Trapani, where one of Frederick's sons had died, offered to provide a richly embroidered covering for the young prince's tomb in the church of S. Domenico. Touched by their offer, the king revoked a number of new statutes that restricted Jewish life, such as the ordinance that the Jews of Palermo had to live outside the city walls "in order to separate them from the Christian faithful." See Ashtor, "The Jews of Trapani," p. 3; Lagumina, Codice diplomatico, doc. 35 (27July 1312).

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some of ourfideles have had the audacity and temerity to take under their protection the Jews whom we have hitherto regarded as servants of the royal camera, and to establish themselves as their 'protectors,' not realizing in the process that by so doing they bring great harm upon the royal court in regard to the dues owed by those said Jews . . . O n this account we decree that no Sicilian count, baron, knight, burgher, or anyone else shall take any J e w under his protection or establish himself as intercessor or defender for those Jews or for the duties and services owed by them to our officials or our court." 149 But as usual, he acted too late. T h e rush to "protect" Jews, to secure whatever financial prizes they represented or were believed to represent, merely formed a more manic manifestation of the earlier desire to hide Jewish business partners under the guise of conversi. This offer of "protection" was probably coercive, and the above-mentioned incident of the Palermitan magistrate who extorted money from Jews as they ventured to their weddings and funerals probably reflects the heavy-handed tactics employed by most. But coerced or not, many Jews did accept whatever protection society allowed, as can be seen in the otherwise inexplicable rapid increase in the number of neophytes and conversi recorded in notarial acts from 1320 to 1337.150 With so many forces working to rupture urban life, it is a wonder that demesnal Sicily survived as well as it did. Broken into factions, and wasting away in depopulated, rotting cities, the demesne stayed alive thanks to the adaptability of the common artisans and 149

150

Const. Castrogiovanni, in Testa, ch. 112: "Ad Nostre Maiestatis pervenit notitiam nonnullos nostrorum fidelium tante audacie tanteque temeritatis existere, quod Judeos, quos servos nostre camere reputamus, in eorum protectionem suscipiunt et ipsorum se faciunt defensores, non advertentes, quod ex hoc curie nostre juribus debitis per Judeos eosdem vertitur detrimentum; circa quod merito providentes, presenti constitutione jubemus, ut nullus regni nostri nobilium, comes, baro, miles, burgensis vel quis alius Judeum aliquem sibi recommendatum accipiat nee eius se constituat protectorem; nee, cum a nostris oflicialibus jura et servitia a predictis Judeis nostre curie debita exiguntur, pro eisdem Hebraeis intercessor seu defensor accedat. Is autem, qui contrafecerit edicto presenti, si comes vel baro magnus fuerit, unciarum auri quinquaginta; si minor vel miles simplex, unciarum vigintiquinque; si burgensis vel aliquis alius, unciarum auri decem poenam se noverit incursurum. Judei vero, qui se aliquorum ex predictis nostris fidelibus recommendationibus, protectionibus et defensionibus modo et forma premissis, submitti presumpserint, poenam unciarum quinque se noverint soluturos, fiscalibus commodis applicandum. Quam poenam si dicti Judei solvere nequeant, eos luere volumus in personis." Bresc, Un monde, p. 630.

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shopkeepers, many of them immigrants from greater ruins elsewhere, to appalling circumstances and ever altering conditions. Scenes of chaos from Marsala to Sciacca, Palermo, Caltanissetta, Randazzo, Catania, and Noto provided numerous opportunities for the ambitious, whether through admirable avenues like learning new skills and extending one's contacts, or through less admirable alternatives like preying upon desperate widows or bullying one's way into communal offices with armed retainers. Fortunes were won and lost with dizzying speed, and each grand new success or miserable failure added a new twist to local rivalries, tensions, and feuds. But many of the miserable changes that took place in the fourteenth century made it possible for demesnal Sicily to recover so well in the fifteenth. The system of fairs, franchises, and privileges established in Frederick's time laid the basis for the resurgence of commerce and social cohesion in the reigns of Martin II and Alfonso V. Anecdotal horrors like Giovanni Chiaromonte II or the later Rosso and Pontecorono taskmasters should not blind us to the everyday toils of enterprising commoners - Sicilian, Jewish, Catalan, and northern Italian alike - w h o worked to make the best of straitened circumstances. For every loutish D. Federico d'Algerio there was an honest and industrious worker like Giovanni Gavaretta, a baker who began modestly in a small shop, married a nearby cobbler's daughter, eventually entered a partnership with another baker and purchased a taverna, and finally capped his career with two terms as municipal gabellotus (once for mills, in 1322, and once for bread, in 1333).151 Some credit is also due to the foreign connections of the new elites. The importance of overseas trade has always been exaggerated for medieval Sicily (the best and most recent estimate of the grain trade puts overseas exports at less than 5 percent of total production), but international connections and access to international systems of credit played a vital role in the rise of most non-baronial urban elites and thus helped to ensure a certain amount of revenue in local markets. 152 To the extent that these 151 152

Ada curie vi, pp. xxxiv-xxxv, and notes. On the grain trade figures, see Epstein, An Islandfor Itself, pp. 270-6. The calculation is surprisingly simple. Grain exports at the start of Frederick's reign (wheat and barley, in a three-to-one ratio) averaged 40,000 salme per year, rising occasionally to twice that amount. Given that the population of Sicily at that time was somewhere near 850,000 and that asalma itself was reckoned to be the amount of grain needed to keep one person alive

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connections brought commerce to the island, they did well. But for the Rossos in Messina, the Pontecoronos in Corleone, the Abatellis in Palermo, and for others elsewhere, connections on the continent provided armed support as well, either in the form of mercenaries, family supporters, or weaponry, and thus worsened the plague of corruption and violence.153 Given the persistence of the xenophobic atmosphere that settled on the demesne after 1320-1, it would seem that in regard to such people as these, as in regard to the kingdom's too numerous entanglements, the disadvantageous aspects of international contacts predominated.

153

for a year, it seems safe to assume that Sicily produced at least 900,000 salme annually, which places its exports at roughly 4.5 percent of production. S. Sambito Piombo, "Una famiglia lucchese a Palermo nei primi decenni del secolo XTV," Rivista di archeologia, storia e costume 9 (1981), 37—44.

CHAPTER 4

A divided society II: the rural—baronial world

Feudal Sicily - a crushingly poor, backward, agrarian world in which dull peasants sweated in rugged fields, tended meager crops and pathetic flocks, and bowed under the yoke of bellicose and brutal overlords who held themselves above the law while dominating their isolated fiefdoms from safe within their mountain fortresses - is the image that persists in the historical memory. Here we see Sicily's presumed backwardness in its fullest and most awful display. But the image is a caricature. After twenty years of suffering, rural-baronial Sicily sprang to surprising new life once peace had been established, and it adapted creatively to a series of upheavals in its economic and social organization. Certainly poverty and violence were part of the rural scene, especially in the Val di Mazara, but it would be an error to credit the common image as a faithful representation of the truth. In the brief period from 1302 to 1311 the feudal sector of the realm prospered as much as the fast rallying cities and showed a comparable, though somewhat slighter, enthusiasm for many of the spiritual and political ideas and developments emanating from the royal court. The combined disasters of the three-year drought and the parliament's decision to ally itself with Henry VII and the Ghibelline cause in northern Italy, however, marked the crucial turning point in the feudal world's fortunes, just as they did for the cities. Economic decline forced tens of thousands of peasants and village artisans to abandon their homes, and left their baronial landlords with insufficient labor to try to recover from the blow. The barons' acceptance of the new regime had been grudging and cautious from the start, and there is some evidence that the concessions granted in 1296, coupled with the prosperity that followed Caltabellotta, softened their resistance somewhat, even to the point where some of the greater landlords became evidently sincere supporters of the royal court. But among 156

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the lesser knights that court, with its foreign atmosphere of Catalans, commerce, and compromise, deserved no more loyalty than it paid for. They regarded developments like the Ghibelline alliance, the Athenian duchy, and the adoption of Franciscan Spiritualism as willful and self-serving actions that unintentionally but surely undermined the great cause of Sicilian independence. Why support a regime that had led the country into such troubles? The island had been betrayed yet again, they felt, and the only thing to do now was what should have been done all along: take whatever action was necessary to protect oneself and one's family. Economic integration and political unity for the kingdom as a whole meant nothing, compared to stability - even a brutally enforced stability at the local level. Hence baronial intransigence and its occasionally ruthless refusal to obey anyone's law but its own, and damn the consequences, was as much a reaction to the kingdom's unraveling as it was a cause of it. But before passing judgment on the feudal world, we must recognize the extent of the changes and challenges it faced.1 Feudal laws, and the rural societies they administered, were intensely conservative in nature. Based in theory on a recognition of mutual dependence and mutual obligation, feudal ties, once established, experienced qualitative change only slowly and reluctantly; the solemnities that accompanied the formal establishment of each link discouraged change, since feudal relations comprised a type of vow, and a vow's sacral nature did not allow for temporizing and innovation. Thus the feudal organization of the interior that confronted Frederick when he assumed the throne had, despite the dynastic upheavals of the thirteenth century, altered very little from Norman times. The names had changed, but not the basic structures of life. The Norman conquest represents the real and fundamental shift. In regard to how land was divided, held, worked, and administered, the Norman period marked a sharp break with the Muslim past. 1

The rural—baronial society has received considerable attention from scholars, and makes a lengthy analysis unnecessary here. See, for example, Henri Bresc, "La feudalizzazione in Sicilia dal vassallagio al potere baroniale," in SDS in, pp. 503-43; Alberto Boscolo, "La feudalita in Sicilia, in Sardegna e nel Napoletano nel Basso Medioevo," Medioevo: saggi e rassegne 1 (1975), 49—58; Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali (see ch. 2, n. 22, above). San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi (see ch. 3, n. 54, above) is an important reference work, but must be used with caution.

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The change was not only the replacement of Muslim landholders with Christian ones, but the very organization and atmosphere of the rural world. Apart from the continuation from Muslimintroduced crops like citrus and the preservation of Arabic place-names (Caltavuturo = Qalcat 'Abu Tawr, or "the stronghold of 'Abu Tawr"), Islamic ruralism largely disappeared, even though a few tenacious Arab hangers-on could still be found near Sutera (as remote a spot, lodged amongst dreary outcroppings of sulfurous rock, as one could find in all the island) as late as 1250. No longer independent domains of warlord-princes (qa'ids), rural lands were distributed among a smallish, but zealous band of crusaderconquerors who brought with them a considerable baggage of assumptions about their obligations to higher powers, their relations to their underlings, and their rights, whether commercial or political, over the territories under their sway. Independentminded, and with a long tradition of stiff-necked rebelliousness behind them, they tended from the start to regard themselves as autonomous powers, to pay homage and fealty grudgingly and only when it could not be avoided, and to exert virtually despotic authority over their fiefdoms, populated, as these were, with Muslim infidels. The Norman kings, to be sure, had ideas of their own about rights and responsibilities. The patchwork nature of their conquest, and the polyglot nature of the realm, which included southern Italy, produced a curious ad hoc miscellany of ideas regarding the nature of the monarchy, drawn more or less equally from northern French, Byzantine, Muslim, and papal sources.2 "Omnes possessiones regni mei meae sunt," as Roger II phrased it, neatly sums up the result. The entire kingdom was the personal possession of the king, his to do with precisely as he pleased, without having to answer to any higher authority and without having to justify himself to any of his subjects. Roger and his successors fancifully saw themselves as the descendants of the ancient Greek tyrants of Siracusa and even 2

Leon-Robert Menager, "L'institution monarchique dans les etats normands d'ltalie," Cahiers de civilisation medievale 2 (1959), 303-31 and 445-68 emphasizes French feudal influence; Walter Ullmann, "Rulership and the Rule of Law in the Middle Ages: Norman Rulership in Sicily,"Actajuridica 20 (1978), 157-85 stresses Byzantine factors. Others have taken sides with either Menager or Ullmann, or have branched out in new directions. On the whole, it is a dull debate. A good synthesis is Salvatore Tramontana, La monarchia normanna e sveva (Torino, 1986).

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minted coins that were fashioned after the ancients. The king was the source of all law, but at the same time he stood absolutely above it. "No one may question the king's judgments or decrees, for to dispute his decisions . . . is comparable to sacrilege." So long as fief holders paid their feudal dues and did not break into open disobedience, relations between barons and the crown remained generally stable. This was because the everyday life of the baronies — despite the Sturm und Drang of royal pronouncements — lay beyond the king's reach. Life for the peasant majority followed local customs and laws; the multi-cultural makeup of the populace meant that no central, standardized legal structure existed for the entire kingdom. Barons administered the territories under their control according to local practices, with themselves as the supreme arbiters of right and wrong. Two factors served to check their ambition. First, the problem of underpopulation. Rural Sicily had been engulfed in war since the fall of the Kalbite emirate in the tenth century; in the proliferation of petty princedoms that followed, civil strife and brigandage increased to the point that many peasant faithful quitted the island entirely. The arrival of the Normans inspired many others to do the same, either out of fear of persecution or in the belief that they had a religious obligation, as Muslims, not to serve Christian masters. 3 Their flight affected the Val di Mazara the most, since that was the most heavily Arabized territory. But it was also the center of cereal production and the site of most of the fiefs established by the conquering Normans. Countless entire villages were abandoned, farms left deserted and ruined, and the rural labor force left depleted. For safety, much of the remaining populace gathered together to form larger, but necessarily more isolated, estates and manses. Small freeholds slowly disappeared in favor of latifondi. Others moved into fortified towns under baronial control - that is, rural seats that were not part of the royal demesne; these sites, by the Catalan period, came to be called terre. Hence economic need served to check baronial excesses upon their local subjects, since egregious demands would only aggravate rural flight. The kings' efforts to draw settlers to Sicily from the continent, right through the thirteenth century, earned a measure of baronial gratitude and helped to smooth relations with the crown. 3

David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (Oxford, 1988), p. 40.

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Second, royal law prohibited sub-infeudation and the alienation offiefs.Knights received their fiefs directly from the king, without intermediaries, and could not further divide the land into parcels to be granted out to vassals of their own. Roger established some 230 feudal families, tying the amount of land awarded to each to the amount of military service rendered.4 Like the Norman kings in England, he dispersed large grants over a diverse area; that is, rather than awarding a large fief en bloc in the Val di Noto, he parceled out the same amount of land in a sprawl of scattered estates throughout the island. Thus sub-infeudation was rendered impractical, and even the most powerful barons were denied a strategic base from which to mount challenges to royal authority. Holders of multiple estates tended to reside in one particular casalis, which quickly became regarded as their patrimonial estate, and worked the others through agents or family members. The strife that marked the end of the Norman dynasty and long periods of the Hohenstaufen era extinguished many of the knightly families. The Angevin and Catalan arrivals replaced older families with new supporters of their own. Ninety percent of the feudal families established in the twelfth century were gone by 1296. Consequently, each new king, upon his coronation, took the opportunity to install new milites in the available vacancies. But the policy of non-alienation remained firm. As Frederick II of Hohenstaufen had expressed it: "By this edictal law, which will be valid in perpetuity, we forbid all thejideles of our kingdom -whether counts, barons, knights, or any other person or cleric — to dare to transfer any property upon which rents or services are due to our court, to any other person by any type of alienation whatsoever, either while they are living or [after death] by their wills; nor may they even alter that property in any way that results in our court losing those rents and services owed to it."5 This rigorous prohibition, coupled with the superimposition of royal rights "to the distance of a bowshot" over any fief that extended to the coast, effectively isolated the inland community from the rest of the realm and undercut its economic potential. 4 5

Bresc, "La feudalizzazione," p. 508. Liber augustalis, bk. in, ch. 57, in Die Konstitutionen Friedrichs ILJursein Konigreich Sizilien, ed. H. Conrad, T. von der Lieck-Buyken, and W. Wagner (Cologne, 1973). An English version is available as The Liber Augustalis or Constitutions ofMelfi Promulgated by the Emperor Frederick IIfor the Kingdom of Sicily in 1231, trans. James Powell (Syracuse, 1971).

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Landlocked by design as by nature, and cut off from the commercial centers of the demesne, the inland world formed a separate society, one whose fortunes depended wholly on agriculture. So long as demand for foodstuffs grew, this society was able to support itself with ease. Domestic and international demand for Sicilian wheat rose continually through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as the dramatic growth of Europe's population in those years generated a need for food production. Sicily's particular variety of wheat - a small, hard-kerneled species - grew abundantly and when properly stored lasted as long as three years without deteriorating, an important consideration in medieval times.6 (It also made, and still makes, delicious pasta.) But the sharp demographic decline of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a European-wide phenomenon - inevitably brought with it a decreased demand for food. The downward turn in revenue contributed to the further loss of the rural labor force, and made it virtually impossible for landholders to maintain a stable economic basis. In the west and south, labor-intensive crops like sugar, cotton (grown chiefly on Malta), and indigo were abandoned in favor of wheat monoculture; but the Val Demone retained its diversity. It was traditionally wine and swine country, with heavy investment in textiles, timber, and mining. But even many Val Demone milites were buffeted by the sagging economy. For many, the only way out was to enter the demesne cities as part of the "urban knighthood" that assumed police authority over the municipalities, or else to grab more productive farmland and pasturage from one's neighbors. The Vespers provided a golden opportunity for those who chose to steal. Driven by economic need and by lingering resentments between those who had opposed the Angevins and those who had supported them, knights turned on one another avidly, sometimes raiding and sometimes in essence conquering and appropriating vast segments of the rural world. Ecclesiastical estates, being unarmed, were a favorite target. So too were lands belonging to the king's private demesne, in the apparent hope (a reasonable enough one, given the circumstances) that the Catalan dynasty was doomed. Weapons and the will to use them, not the royal court, governed the interior. Giovanni Chiaromonte, for example, seized 6

Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 143—4.

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a cluster of farms near Agrigento that belonged to the bishop; Manfredi Lancia appropriated grain fields and mills near Noto; D. Oberto di Cammarana snatched up farms and vineyards near Monreale.7 Frederick's coronation hardly abated the land grab at all and, in fact, in some cases it aggravated matters. Enrico Rosso, Guglielmo Montacuto, Costantino di Naro and Guglielmo di Maniscalco, among many others, declared open revolt and in effect seceded from the realm, fortifying their manors and usurping several that belonged to the crown.8 Giovanni Callaro seized royal estates at Vizzini and Buccheri, while his brother sacked Noto, Buscemi, Palazzolo and Ferla; Napoleone Caputo and Virgilio di Scordia plundered demesne lands near Catania.9 Enrico Gioeni (who held estates at Motta Camastra in the Val Demone) revolted, as did Giovanni di Mazzarino (lord of Mazzarino, mid-way between Naro and Piazza) and Manfredi Maletta (who held estates at Cammarata, Pettineo, and Paterno).10 The mounting crisis led Frederick to change course and to alter fundamentally both relations between the crown and itsfideles and royal policies governing the administration of fiefs. This was the most important institutional shift regarding rural Sicily since the Norman conquest. The first thing he needed to do was to put more people on the land. With some difficulty, he managed to suppress the revolts that had broken out, which made it possible to remove his most recalcitrant critics and replace them with more loyal supporters - generally those knights, both Sicilian and Catalan, who had campaigned with him in Calabria - and also to make a show of leniency to others whose gratitude might some day come in handy.11 Fortunately a sufficient number of the milites in 7 8

9

10

11

RPSS i, pp. 627, 706-7; 11, p. 1200. For other examples, see 11, pp. 1247, 1294, and 1297. ACA Perg. James II, no. 641 and 854; Perg. Alfonso III, no. 351; ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 41-41V; Mazzarese Fardella,// tabulario Belmonte (see ch. 2, n. 50, above), doc. 13. See also ACA Cartas James II, no. 10262 for a rebel seizure of the stronghold at Gangi. Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. rv, ch. 5-7 (Buscemi, Palazzolo, Noto, and Ferla); bk. v, ch. 3 (Vizzini and Buccheri), and ch. 4-8 (Catania). Nearly the entire fifth book of Speciale's history is taken up with baronial plunderings. ASP Cane. Reg. 46, fol. 241—241V; La Mantia, Codice diplomatico dei re aragonesi, p. 427 (Mazzarino); San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi 11, p. 140 (Cammarata), v, p. 230 (Motta Camastra), v, p. 436 (Paterno), and v, p. 461 (Pettineo). The surrender treaty negotiated with rebels at Gangi and Pietraperzia, who had held out for three years, reflects the confusing political aims held by some of the rebels. Some wanted to evict all the Catalans and create a purely Sicilian realm; some rejected Frederick's rule but still proclaimed allegiance to James; others advocated a return of

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the regions of the two main cities remained loyal, or else his reign might never even have begun. Among these lords were the Aspello, Bagnolo, Bizino, Ebdemonia, Marchisano, Mastrangelo, and Pipitone families in the region around Palermo, and the Ansalone, Mostacci, and Scordia families near Messina. Other crucial support came from the Palmerio family in Licata, the Mari clan in Marsala, the Gavaretta and Lanzalotto families near Salemi, and the Abbate and Manuele families of Trapani. 12 On the day of his coronation, Frederick installed more than 300 new knights in inland fiefs and confirmed many of the older loyalists in new estates. Still others received higher honorific titles. 13 Inevitably, many of these awards went to his Catalan supporters. There was no way he could have avoided rewarding them, for they had not only dared Angevin and papal wrath on his behalf but had also stood with him in the strange pseudo-war against Catalonia itself, and many of them had consequently suffered from James's confiscation of their Iberian lands. 14 Local touchiness about landed foreigners, however, demanded restraint; and consequently the land tenures awarded to Catalans came from the royal estates themselves rather than from the confiscated or vacant "Sicilian" lands. 15

12 13

14 15

Angevin authority; and still others seem not to have wanted anything in particular except to rebel against anyone who held the throne. See ACA Cartas James II, no. 10262 (24 May 1299)Vincenzo D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," in XI Congresso 1, pp. 55-81 at 65. By Frederick's time the juridical distinction between milites and barones had blurred. In the Norman period the term milites referred strictly to urban knights, that is, to members of the garrisons defending each of the demesne cities, whereas the term barones referred exclusively to the rural knighthood, that is, to those who held agricultural estates in fief. By the fourteenth century no such solid distinction existed. The title of "baron" implied some sort of higher social standing than "knight," but it carried no clear meaning in terms of legal privilege or economic status. Indeed the term "baron" appears only in narrative sources like Speciale and in the hortatory sections of royal proclamations. In all legal documents — court records, land grants, commercial contracts, etc. — all members of the military caste, even those who held "baronial" rank, are described solely as milites. The honorific use of the prefix "Don" or "Dominus" before a knight's name was random, and its appearance implies nothing about the supposed distinction between "barons" and "knights." "Counts," however, were a distinct group, and will be discussed below. For some of these awards, see ASG Arch. Paterno di Raddusa, perg. 2 (Arcudaci); ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 48-48V (Polizzi); Protonotaro Reg. 2, fol. 316 (Roccella); and San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi 1, p. 1 (Caccamo), 1, p. 438 (Buccheri), 1, p. 500 (Butera), n, p. 412 (Castelvetrano), v, p. 137 (Floridia and Monastero), and vi, p. 331 (Saline). ACA Cane. Reg. 252, fol. 149, 165V, 167, 219; Cartas James II, 756, 9787,10207—9; Perg. James II, no. 629, 641, 855-6,1899; Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. 11, ch. 25. San Martino de Spucches, La storia deifeudi 1, p. 43 (Caltabellotta and Colamonaci, in the Val di Mazara, given to Berenguer Vilaregut), vi, p. 101 (Raccuja and Mandanici, in the Val Demone, given to Berenguer d'Orioles), vn, p. 417 (Palumba, in the Val di Mazara,

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The toll taken by the wars on the native knightly class meant that many of the most prominent surviving lords enjoyed multiple holdings, some of which gradually assumed the status of counties. This was partly an echo of the great Norman fiefs (more consolidated in southern Italy, more scattered in Sicily), but was also partly a new phenomenon. Not all possessors of multiple estates were counts. The Lancia family, for example, within a short time held a vast sprawl of fief estates at Naro, Delia, Borgetto, and Savoca in the west; at Caltanissetta, Ferla, Giarratana, Limbaccari, Osino, Longarino, Bonfali, Mutaxati, Scala, Pantano Gallo, and Taquida in the Val di Noto; and at Mongiolino, Ficarra, Galati, and Longi in the Val Demone. Yet theirs was not a comital family. Counties emerged from the formation of discrete territories of linked estates en bloc, and those who held them possessed jurisdictional rights considerably greater than those enjoyed by normal barons. In later years, when the monarchy was virtually paralyzed and had to dole out awards left and right in order to buy even a month's peace, the number of comital titles and grants of criminal and civil jurisdiction over fief lands increased dramatically; but originally there were only four counties. The two largest and most influential were the county of Geraci and Golisano, held by the Ventimiglia family, and the county of Modica and Mohac, held by their rivals the Chiaromonte clan. Less important were the counties of Garsiliato, awarded in 1301 to Riccardo Passaneto, and of Malta and Gozo, which passed in 1298 from Guglielmo di Malta to his wife Clara, and eventually to their daughter Lucchina. When Lucchina married into the Montcada family, this became the only Catalan-held county.16 Garsiliato consisted of a concentrated network of estates in the Val di Noto, stretching eastward from Mazzarino, through Palagonia, and towards Lentini; good farmland, it earned virtually all its income through cereals. Modica and Mohac, by contrast, was far grander. It was made up of the towns of Scicli, Modica, Ragusa, Monterosso,

16

given to Francesc Vallguarnera), and vm 125 (Tripi, in the Val Demone, given to Roger de Lauria). On the Chiaromonte, Ventimiglia, and Montcada families, see Vincenzo D'Alessandro, Michele Grana, and Marina Scarlata, "Famiglie medioevali siculo-catalane," Medioevo: saggi e rassegne 4 (1978), 105-26. To my knowledge no specific study of the Passaneto family exists. I recently discovered Guglielmo di Malta's last will, in which he bequeaths the county to his wife; see ACA Perg. James II, no. 1184 (8 Feb. 1298).

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and Comiso, plus all the lands between, in the Val di Noto. This, like the nearby camera reginale, was one of the fastest growing regions in the kingdom, a favorite site for western immigrants to settle. The Chiaromontes farmed, collected rents, ran mills, engaged in commerce, and derived administrative income from the large populace over which they had jurisdiction. They also acquired an important sphere of influence in Palermo when the old county of Caccamo, situated just south of Termini in the Val di Mazara, became theirs by marriage with the defunct Prefoglio family; rather than continuing as a separate county, however, Caccamo was incorporated by royal decree into the county of Modica and Mohac.17 Lastly, the county of Geraci, in the Val Demone. This, the site of Ventimiglia power, had the physical characteristics, at least, of the isolated mountain barony of stereotyped image. Located high in the Madonie mountains, it centered on the patrimonial estates (fortified, both) at Geraci and at Castelbuono. From here they dominated the local towns of Petralia Soprana and Petralia Sot tana, Polizzi, Golisano (Collesano), and Isnello. Their influence reached all the way into the busy harbor at Cefalii, where they engaged actively in trade in grain, wine, textiles, skins, and saltmeats. In addition to altering the roster of those who held lands from the crown, Frederick also changed the terms under which those lands were held. The majority of his coronation statutes were of a type with most such proclamations - that is, they were essentially conservative reiterations of longstanding customs, combined with a solemn vow to recognize and uphold established privileges. To be sure, he made a show of condemning the barons' most egregious abuses of recent years, such as the illegal charging of fraudulent "taxes," of forage and pasturage fees from peasants transporting their goods to markets; 18 the extortion of market-keepers, forcing 17 18

Bresc, Un monde, pp. 807-8. Const, reg., ch. 37: "Statuimus, quod nullus comes, baro, feudatarius, castellanus vel quicumque alius ausus sit exigere vel aliquod ab aliquo jure carnagii accipere pro animalibus per forestas et loca et territoria eorum transeuntibus, etiam si per duos dies et noctes duas in terris, forestis et locis eorumdem et territorii eorumdem morari et ibidem pascua sumere aliqua causa contigerint. Si vero ultra dies et noctes duas ibidem steterint, jus carnagii consueti et debiti exsolvatur. Sin autem dicti comes, baro, feudatarius, castellanus vel aliquis alius, huius nostre constitutionis contemptor extiterit, ille, a quo jus carnagii auferetur contra formam predictam, denunciet baiulo proximioris loci nostri demanii. Qui, constito sibi de hoc per sacramentum denunciatoris ipsius,

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them to sell only those goods from the farms and fields of the "potentes viri";19 or cattle rustling.20 But these actions, important as they were, had far less overall impact on landholders than did an extraordinary royal compromise: the Volentes law. It merits close attention.21 Interpretations of the law have differed, but its key significance is clear: the feudal monopoly on land established and so jealously preserved since the twelfth century had broken. Henceforth, fiefs were alienable.

19

20

21

solvat eidem pro proventibus baiulationis sue pretium carnagii supradicti, vel carnagiorum; quo facto, scribat idem baiulus per suas litteras justitiario regis, quod statim poenam unciarum auri duarum pro quolibet carnagio ab auferente prefato exigat, utilitatibus curie applicandarum. Qui justitiarii ad litteras dicti baiuli, quibus fidem habere volumus, premissa omnia exequantur. Si vero dictus justitiarius vel baiulus in hoc negligens fuerit, solvat poenam eandem. Et si forte dictus justitiarius a prefato auferente poenam ipsam non posset exigere, infra viginti dies denunciare Nostre Excellence teneatur. Et si non denunciaveret nostre Curie, poene nomine teneatur in duplum semper tamen dominis auferens ad poenam obligetur eandem." Ibid., ch. 38: "Ne potentes viri negotiatione licita uti prohibeant impotentes, et diversis oppressionibus et injuriis humiliores afficiant, sed unicuique vendendi res suas quando voluerit, facultas sit libera; et ut omnibus in observatione justitie servetur equalitas, nostre provisionis oculos convertentes, statuimus, ut nullus potens vel nobilis occulte vel publice prohibeat vel procuret macellarios, tabernarios et alios aliarum rerum venditores non prius vendere aliorum carnes, vinum vel res alias, nisi prius carnes, vinum et alie res ipsorum potentium vendite fuerint et distracte. Que ad solutionem baiulorum et judicum terrarum et locorum, ubi hoc perpetrari contigerit, volumus pertinere. Quod si aliquem presentis nostre ordinationis invenerint contemptorem, de quo tarn per sacramentum unius tantum macellariorum et tabernariorum et aliarum rerum venditorum quam quemcumque alium modum, eos scire volumus veritatem, statim ab eo unam libram auri exigant, pro parte nostre curie dicto baiulo persolvendam." Ibid.y ch. 39: "Preterea quia dicti p o t e n t e s et nobiles, eorum audaciam et potentiam in damnum et injuriam impotentium extendentes, et eorum negligentiam (seu procuratorum suorum) aliorum sollicitudini preponentes, animalia prius conducta vel locata per alios pro deferendis eorum vino, victualibus et aliis rebus auctoritate propria capiebant, et cum ipsis animalibus eorum victualia, vinum et res alias deferri primitus faciebant, quod grave gerentes non modicum et molestum, if omnino de cetero fieri prohibemus, statuentes, quod, si aliquis deinceps facere premissa tentaverit, ad solutionem auri unciarum quatuor poene nomine per baiulum et judices compellatur pro parte curie solvendarum. E[t] si dicti baiulus et judices in premissis duobus casibus fuerint negligentes, tantumdem poene nomine curie teneantur. Et si per potentiam aliquorum eos ad hoc compellere forte non potuerint, denuncient justitiario regionis, qui premissa exequatur et compleat; et si hoc dicto justitiario minime denunciare curaverint, ad poenam teneantur eandem. Sin autem dictus justitiarius negligens fuerit in premissis, ad duplicatam poenam curie teneatur." Indeed, it has received more attention than any other piece of his legislation. See Bresc, Un monde, pp. 871-5; Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 165-6; Gregorio, Considerazioni sopra la storia di Siciliay bk. rv, ch. 4, pt. 126-7. See also D'Alessandro, Politico e societd nella Sicilia aragonese, pp. 56-7; D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," pp. 71-2; Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali, pp. 66-8. Contemporary jurists had something to say about it too; see Trapani, Biblioteca Fardelliana MS 230, fol. 107V-109, for instance.

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Since we desire that the counts, barons, and noblemen [of the realm] who hold counties, baronies and fief lands from our Curia might be able to profit more greatly from those [lands] . . . and to find relief, for the time being, from their growing expenses without attacking our royal rights [as established in earlier laws forbidding the alienation of fiefs] . . . we decree that any count, baron, or nobleman in possession of a whole or partial fief may pledge [as collateral], sell, donate, exchange, and relinquish or bequeath it, or as much of it as he desires . . . to any person of equal or greater social standing (excepting all churches and clerics) - and may do so without the expressed permission or license of the royal court. However, a full tenth of the sale price is to be paid to our fisc. Moreover, Our Royal Majesty retains the right to first purchase of that fief, and at the agreed upon price. Subsequent clauses asserted the need for the new owner of the fief to perform homage and fealty to the throne, to owe the usual feudal services for the land, and to recognize all previously established royal rights over it.22 By liberating fief lands in this way, the king recognized not only his own dependence upon the good-will 22

Ibid., ch. 28: "Volentes igitur comites, barones, et nobiles comitatus, baronias, et feuda tenentes a Curia nostra comitatibus, baroniis, et feudis ipsis longius solito posse gaudere, et eorum emergentibus pro tempore necessitatibus absque nostrorum lesione jurius subvenire, intuitu servitiorum, que dominis regibus Sicilie predecessoribus nostris, et nobis, devotione non modica contulerunt et conferre poterunt in futurum, Constitutiones divi augusti imperatoris F[r]ederici (proavi nostri predicti) - per quas feudorum alienationes sunt inhibite — corrigentes, statuimus, quod comes, baro, nobilis seu feudatarius quilibet feuda tenens a Curia nostra, seu quandam partem feudi, absque permissione seu licentia Celsitudinis Nostre, feudum suum integrum (seu quotam partem predictam) possit pignorare, vendere, donare, permutare et in ultimis voluntatibus relinquere seu legare, et quolibet alienationis titulo transferre in unam tantum, eandemque personam digniorem vel eque dignam, seu nobilem, sicut venditor seu alienator idem extiterit, preterquam in ecclesias et ecclesiasticas personas. Dummodo de pecunia venditionis ipsius integre decima fisco nostro solvatur. Ita tamen, quod tempore venditionis feudorum huiusmodi Maiestati Nostre liceat, pro pretio venditionis ipsius, convento inter contrahentes eosdem, dictum feudum emere. Ita quod, si infra mensem unum a die, quo ad notitiam nostram pervenerit numerandum, feudum predictum vel quotam partem pro dicto pretio non elegerimus emere et pretium solvere, ut predicitur, venditio valeat et sit firma - nunquam per nostram Curiam in posterum infringenda. Si vero feudum in permutatione devenerit et pecunia intervenerit in premutatione predicta, quod de pecunia ipsa, in recognitionem nostri dominii in feudo vendito seu forsitan permutato, decimam habeat fiscus noster; et Nostra Maiestas ab emptore predicto recipiat fidelitatis et homagii tanquam a barone seu feudatario solitum juramentum. Sed si alio, quam emptionis titulo, feudum predictum alienari contigerit, ut predicitur, persona, in quam fuerit alienatum, infra annum (numerandum a tempore alienationis ipsius) Nostram adeat Maiestatem et in manibus nostris fidelitatis et homagii pro feudo predicto prestet juramentum. In his tamen et quibuscumque alienationibus terrarum feudalium et quote feudorum servitiis et integris juribus nostre Curie semper salvis, in feudo ipso indiviso et integro perdurante."

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of the milites whom he installed or reconfirmed on the land, but also the hard fact that such good-will would be short-lived without allowing them means to adapt to altered economic circumstances just as the communes possessed in their fairs and tax franchises. Royal intentions were laudable and probably somewhat more limited than the dramatic exchange of lands that followed.23 The fact that he aimed to provide debt relief "for the time being" suggests that he may have intended this as a temporary measure, a one-time-only spur to investment. If so, his hopes were quickly dashed. The court knew that it needed to take some sort of action to revive the agricultural sector and to provide landholders better access to market potentials, even if only to avoid jealousy over the urban world's newly awarded fairs and tax franchises. On the whole, this seemed the best approach. Even though it emphasized the transfer of entire estates, Volentes, in allowing for the partition of fiefs, opened the flood-gates on small-scale purchases, leasings, and barterings of farms and vineyards throughout the realm. Indeed, the vast resettlement of land tenures after the war would have been impossible without this concession, for it is unlikely that the government could have forced most of the barons to relinquish the lands they had seized without granting them some means of recouping their losses. Many were glad to release their grip on usurped territories in return for the opportunity to consolidate, through strategic purchases and trades, their holdings in a single region. Government insistence on limiting alienations to persons of equal or higher status soon relaxed, in practice, in the face of the continued need to place somebody on the land; consequently lands that were nominally feudal passed increasingly into the hands of the urban nobility, well-to-do merchants, and government officers.24 And thus, contrary to some views, the law must be seen above all as an act of economic strategy, and not as social engineering or political reward-paying to the high and mighty.25 23

24

25

See, for example, ASM Corporazione religiose, Provenienze incerte, perg. 130 (5 Nov. 1298); ASC Arch. Benedettino, Corda 107, fol. ioov— IOIV (7 April 1310); Corda 283, fol. 295-297V (30 Oct. 1301); BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 216-225V (2 July 1305). These land transfers do not include individual peasant farmers, whose alodial farms (a small percentage of the arable land overall) were centered in the Val Demone, the least "feudalized" region in the kingdom. D'Alessandro (see n. 21, above) is surely wrong in asserting that the law limited alienation to whole fiefs only, and only between nobles of equal rank, in order to reward the major aristocrats to whom the king was most indebted.

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Volentes certainly triggered the new investment it sought, and contributed directly to the creation of more concentrated spheres of land settlement. Thus when Francesco Ventimiglia, for example, was offered Alafranco di S. Basile's casalis at Pettineo, in the Val Demone, in exchange for his own larger casalis at Barrafranca, in the Val di Noto, he leapt at the opportunity since Pettineo lay close to Francesco's other holdings in the Madonie mountains. The exchange also benefited D. Alafranco since it gave him another land tenure near his own patrimonial estate outside Lentini. 26 The ability to direct funds into concentrated areas made farming more profitable and allowed many lords to dominate local markets. Of course, they still needed to put labor on the land. The trend towards formation oilatifondi was already well established, and the baronial resettlement advanced that process. It provided an organized, efficient structure, offered some degree of social cohesion, and gave peasants a measure of protection, in violent times, within a central, fortified castellum or fortalicium. These attractions drew sufficient laborers to keep the enlarged, though isolated, estates functioning. Thus, for example, the Chiaromontes drew new farmers to Favara and Montechiaro in the Val di Mazara, and to Gulfi in the Val di Noto, and Macalda Palizzi successfully rebuilt the once ruined casalis at Cianciana, near Agrigento. 27 Certain casales and terre grew so large as to become small towns. The handful of sites that actually gained in population over the course of the fourteenth century, even as overall population fell, illustrate the trend. In Val di Mazara, Favara's population increased from roughly 100 to 250 persons, between 1277 and 1374-6; Racalmuto from 100 to nearly 700; Giuliana rose from 200 to 2,000; and Ciminna grew from 500 to 1,700. In Val di Noto, Palazzolo increased from 100 to 1,000, Monterosso from 150 to 650, Sortino from 650 to 1,600, Caltanissetta 26

27

D'Alessandro, Politico e societa nella Sicilia aragonese, p. 53; A C A Perg. Alfonso III, maltratados, no. 9. For later Ventimiglia purchases in and around Pettineo, see ACA Perg. Alfonso III, no. 791, 840, and 900. From his strongholds, Francesco was able to plunder the Madonie region at will — and his importance to the king left him largely immune from retaliation (which was one of Giovanni Chiaromonte's chief complaints against him). See Giambruno, Tabulariodi S. Margherita diPolizzi, doc. 29 (29July 1326), 33 (2 July 1328), 43 (22 July 1331). D'Alessandro, "La Sicilia dopo il Vespro," p. 71; Carlo Alberto Garufi, "Patti agrari e comuni feudali di nuova fondazione in Sicilia, dallo scorcio del secolo XI agli arbori del Settecento: studi storico-diplomatici,"i4rcAiS/.Sic, 3rd ser., 1 (1946), 31—113; 2 (1947), 7—131. See also ASP Tab. Ospedale S. Bartolomeo, perg. 1 (29 Dec. 1305).

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from 750 to 3,300, and Modica itself (the center of the Chiaromonte's county) from 1,500 to over 3,000. Lastly, in Val Demone, Petralia Sottana grew from a pre-Vespers population of 250 to a high of nearly 1,500, Petralia Soprana from 300 to 1,500, Troina from 800 to 2,500, and S. Filippo d'Agiro from 2,800 to 3,100. Such growth occurred at the expense of emptying the surrounding countryside and leaving once thriving, if rather remote, villages and farms desolate ruins.28 The lords - whether baronial, in the first half of the reign, or urban and professional, in the second half- leased individual farms orfieldsparceled out from the organized whole. These farms, called massarie, measured anywhere from fifteen to forty hectares (six to sixteen acres) and were worked by tenants or by hired laborers from the village.29 The majority were engaged in cereal production. By northern European standards, agricultural technology in Sicily appeared backward, but was actually well suited to local conditions.30 The stony terrain of the eastern half of the island, where mountains predominate, and the heavy soil of the western half (or at least of the arable portions of it) made slow oxen preferable to horses for plowing. The island's rough wild grasses also favored oxen, who survived better on coarse pasturage, and made them considerably cheaper to keep. A horse, for example, sold for up to five times the amount of an ox, and fared less well in the countryside's intense heat and dryness.31 Moreover, that very heat and dryness discouraged the deeper furrowing of the earth associated with horse-drawn heavy plows, since such plowing resulted only in the baking and crumbling of the topsoil. Hence horses, of which there was a constant shortage anyhow, were reserved for personal use by the milites.32 Mules, though, were plentiful, sure-footed on the rugged terrain, and provided transport for most farmers bringing their crops to market. 28 29 30 31

32

S e e t h e population figures reported, as for the d e m e s n e cities, in Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 4 2 - 9 (Table 2.1). Bresc, Un monde, pp. 115—16; Epstein, An Island for Itself pp. 165—6. Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 57—65 details the "abbondanza continua" a n d the "ricchezza del paese" of the post-Caltabellotta economy. A S P Notai defunti, Reg. 1, fol. 37 (27 Sept. 1323), D . R a i m o n d o d e Burdilio sells "equum u n u m pili bay sauri" for 02.15.00; whereas in R e g . 2, fol. 61 (17 O c t . 1336) Lancia Calanzono purchases two o x e n for 00.40.00. ACA CartasJames II, no. 9981 (19 Feb. 1309), where the royal court sends representatives as far as Castile and Portugal in order to find horses to bring to Sicily.

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As on large feudal estates on the mainland, massari (the individuals who worked the massarie) shared tools and teams of livestock, and benefited not only from mutual labor but also from economies of scale: the ability to purchase seed and to transport harvests in bulk. This, combined with the relatively low rents charged by labor-dependent landlords, made farming profitable despite the decreased general demand for food. The "continuous abundance" of the post-Caltabellotta decade owed much to this arrangement. It owed much, too, to the availability of a primitive credit system.33 Lenders (often, though not necessarily always, the landlord himself) advanced capital to the tenant farmer in the form of land, livestock, seed, or tools, in return for a negotiated share in the harvest. A second type of credit mechanism eventually emerged in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries - the contralto di meta - in which merchants loaned cash directly to the massari and were repaid with grain at a price (meta, not meta) that included an interest profit; but this played virtually no role in Frederick's lifetime. Even during the profitable years the threat of default still existed, which, considering as well the relative isolation of the farms, made it likely that most of the lenders were well-known figures to the borrowers, local people who "knew the borrower's circumstances intimately and [were] able to enforce [their] claims easily."34 Therefore while it is probably the case that most lenders were the landlords themselves, it is almost certainly the case that the lenders were Sicilians rather than foreigners - and hence the eventual impoverishment of the rural world cannot be attributed to foreign debt bondage any more than it can be attributed to the collapse of foreign markets for, as we saw earlier, foreign trade accounted for only 4 or 5 percent of Sicily's overall trade. The vast stretches of open land created by population decline offered an opportunity to increase involvement in animal husbandry — either cattle, for meat, skins, and cheese, or sheep, for wool. Relatively low operating costs (i.e. labor wages) compensated for the high initial expense of establishing a herd, and hence for those capable of making an original investment in livestock the 33

34

This system emerged in the second half of the thirteenth century; see discussion by Abulafia, "II commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento," pp. IO-II; and Epstein, An Island for Itself, pp. 166-7. Epstein, An Island for Itself p. 167.

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possibility of earning handsome rewards certainly existed, especially in the first two decades of the century, when people had more disposable income and could afford to supplement their diets with animal products or to purchase greater quantities of wool and leather goods. Some regional specialization can be identified. Cattle predominated in the Val di Mazara; sheep in the Val di Noto. Val Demone's livestock was divided roughly equally between cattle and sheep, and also swine.35 Geographic and cultural distinctions explain the pattern: the west, being the most heavily and continually Arabized province, had a traditional disinclination to swine-herding that the Muslim expulsion of the thirteenth century was slow to overcome. Moreover, sheep require more water than do cattle (not to mention the water power needed in the milling and fulling of the wool they produce); hence Val di Noto and Val Demone, with their superior rainfall and mountain drain-off, had a natural advantage over the western half of the island for wool production.36 Livestock raising certainly paled in significance when compared to grain, yet the illustration of even one animal product - cheese - suggests the extent of the structural changes taking place in rural society. Between 1290 and 1299, according to notarial registers, Sicily exported a total of some 27,500 kg. (30 tons) of cheese to foreign markets; in the immediately succeeding decade, however, exports increased five-fold, to 153,000 kg. (168 tons). 37 The proliferation of sites with place-names rooted in the Arabic term rahl - meaning a cattleman's station or shepherd's rest - provides clear evidence of the growing popularity of animal husbandry. In Val di Mazara: Rachali (near Partinico), Rachalgididi (one near Trapani, another near Agrigento), Rachalmaymuni (near Caltabellotta). In Val di Noto: Rachalmedica (near Avola), and Rachalmeni (near Lentini). In Val Demone: Rachaliali (near Polizzi), and Regalbuto ([Racalbuto], near S. Filippo d'Agiro). So too does the growth of wool and wool cloth production which, on account of the notably poor quality of the Sicilian product, never overtook cotton textiles as a major manufacture, but did increase in

35 36 37

D ' A n g e l o , "Terra e uomini della Sicilia medievale" (see ch. 2, n. 12, above), pp. 82—4. H e draws his figures from the agricultural tax levied by Peter in 1282. Epstein, "The Textile Industry," is by far the best study of wool and cotton production. Bresc, Un monde, p. 569 (Table 147).

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importance after 1302. Clearly the rural sector was seeking and finding new ways to capitalize on the peace. All of these changes were predicated, however, on reestablishing order in the interior. The defense of the kingdom was at stake, too, since many milites had been notably lax in supporting the cause in the last years of the war. To that end the royal court insisted on the regularization of land-tenure contracts and the faithful reckoning of incomes, possessions, borders, and responsibilities. "For the good of the republic, the preservation of peace, and the pursuit of justice," the king wrote, "a carefully considered review of all feudal goods and lands [shall] be initiated . . . and therefore we decree that all baronies and fief lands shall be inventoried by the MRC - so that at the next outbreak of war those holding fiefs might be more ready and prompt in coming to the throne's aid." 38 He seems to have had in mind the sort of registration of tenurial contracts undertaken by Frederick IFs reintegratores in the 1230s. A few incidental references to a central archive exist, so it is likely that such registers were in fact compiled.39 This alone represents no mean achievement; even greater, though, was the court's apparent success in persuading the barons - those refractory toughs "presumed to be ignorant of the law" - to recognize the authority of written charters as the final arbiters of disputed rights and obligations. Unapologetic possession by might, during the war, gave way to an insistence on possession by right, afterwards, with surprising speed. When Da. Margarita di Scordia's tenure of a casalis near Lentini, and the nature of her tax obligation for it, was questioned in 1305, she instinctively went to court with her personal records "and asserted that necessity compelled her to present the aforesaid privilegia to the Royal Majesty . . . in order to secure all her rights in regard to that casalis . . . and since she fears that some evil might befall her in the 38

39

Const, reg., ch. 27: "lam Nostre Maiestatis d e m e n t i a circa Reipublice c o m m o d a oculum sue provisionis advertens, ea, que circa tranquilli status ministerium et cultum justitie necessaria visa sunt, constitutionibus salubribus atque benevolis declaravit; nunc autem ad nobilium compendia se benigne convertens, benevolam provisionem constituit, bonorum feudalium et feudorum reintegrationem perpensius subsequi in nostrorum augmentum fidelium juxta formam hereditarii regni nostri. Eapropter baronias et feuda, de quibus servitium nostro debetur demanio, reintegrare per nostram Guriam in forma predicta decrevimus, et mandamus, ut opportunis guerrarum temporibus feuda ipsa tenentes paratiores et promptiores ad nutum Nostre Maiestatis existant; sic enim utrumque tempus bellorum et pacis recta dispositione gubernatum videbitur, ut decet Regiam Maiestatem." A C A Perg. Alfonso III, no. 595 (Nov. 1331), 631 (May 1332).

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transmission and presentation [to the royal archives] of her privilegia, she requests to have them redacted in public issue."40 She had worse luck in November 1315, when the failure to locate an original charter or registered copy resulted in her loss of full rights to a network of vineyards, fields, a taverna, several castles, and a cemetery near Catania that she had also claimed as hers.41 Such behavior clearly marks a break with past belligerence such as that shown prior to 1302 by Enrico di Ventimiglia, when he asserted his right to a casalis usurped from the bishop of Agrigento solely because he needed it more than the bishop did. But even he eventually came around. Pressing his claim to the woodland at Caronia, which had been stolen from him during the Angevin years, yet unable to present any documentation to support himself, Enrico agreed to let the issue be settled by an investigation "among the old and honest men of the region" by the royal secretus and magister procurator, Baldovino di S. Angelo.42 With tenurial order somewhat restored, or at least with its problems brought into focus, the attempt to curb lawlessness and to enforce feudal law continued apace. The fast developing concentration of fiefs among the grander baronial families concerned the court, but there was little that could be done about it; for the time being, it generated new investment in the land and paid off political debts. The lesser barons were more troublesome, since their scattered holdings left them more vulnerable to economic downturn and hence made them more likely to rise up in protest. The best the court could do was to keep a close watch on royal rights, influence or dissuade potentially dangerous marriage alliances, and enforce the laws on childless or intestate vassals, all 40

41 42

A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 3446 (3 March 1305): "et exposuit, quod, cum sibi necessario expediat predicta privilegia Sacre Maiestati Regie presentare seu facere presentari pro ab e a d e m Sacra Regia Maiestate ipsius casalis juribus omnibus integre obtinendis, et dubitet exponens prefata ne forte in transmissionem et presentationem privilegiorum ipsorum (quod absit) e x privileges ipsis sinistrum aliquod eveniret, propter quod velit et cupiat exponens predicta privilegia in formam publicam habere redacta." A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 3413 (22 Nov. 1315). Baldovino's investigation decided the matter in Enrico's favor, and consequently a new charter was issued, awarding the woodland to Enrico, and as a precaution no fewer than four separate copies were made of it. See Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte^ doc. 10-12. It should be noted that Enrico was not always so patient with the law. When his claim to a vineyard outside Cefalu seemed unlikely to succeed, he hired a group of thugs to assault his rival claimant's witnesses, to prevent them from presenting their testimony at court; see ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 78 (12 April 1307).

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in the hope of eventually regaining control of the estates and reawarding them to milites more loyal to the crown or on a sounder economic footing.43 All of these actions indicate the court's awareness of the continued economic fragility of the interior. Attempts could be made to organize land tenure in a more efficient manner, to invest in new crops and herds, to curb political unrest, and to establish a central, recognized register of holdings, rights, and duties, but so long as the Mediterranean economy in general continued to decline and the rural population, in consequence, abandoned the land in favor of the coastal communities, danger lurked throughout the interior. 44 That potential danger turned real with the crisis of 1311-13. Crop failures were not uncommon in medieval Sicily, but this was worse than most because the recurrence of the poor harvests not only caused all reserves to be depleted but also eroded the capital available for other investment. Landlords who had advanced the usual credit to tenants - cash, livestock, seed, and tools - needed at least some return. Most could survive a single year of bad yields, but to endure three consecutive years without compensation was too much, especially when the famine coincided with the new demands placed on the realm by the German alliance and the Athenian duchy. Whether the result of bad weather, bad luck, or neglect of storage or distribution mechanisms, a shortage of grain plagued the kingdom at the very moment when its needs were greatest, which threw the entire economy into a tumble. 45 Making matters worse, the refuge granted in 1314 to the Franciscan Spirituals in flight from the mainland made Sicily a pariah just at the point when it had 43 44

45

A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 498 (25 April 1295), 4051 (20 Feb. 1323); A S P Tab. Ospedale S. Bartolomeo, perg. 1 (29 Dec. 1305). T h e feudal services owed o n these lands, as we shall soon see, varied considerably, but a fee of 20.00.00 annually was not u n c o m m o n . Although these funds obviously were directed to a great num ber of expenses, they provided a m e a n s of support for many of the migrants from the interior to the coast. Since few o f the landholding milites actually fought for the king after 1302, their military service w a s c o m m u t e d into cash payments that were directed t o supporting the naval forces that now formed the chief e l e m e n t in defense. At the base pay o f 00.00.03 per day given t o sailors and workers in t h e naval forces, the knight's fee of a single miles, at 20.00.00, could pay the entire yearly w a g e s of eleven m e n . It is wrong, of course, to assume a direct and complete transfer of feudal fees to maritime wages; but it is significant that at no time in Frederick's reign, even in the difficult 1320s and 1330s, was the government ever incapable of raising enough recruits to fill out a fleet. If the money was there, so too were the volunteers. Awareness of this opportunity doubtless drew at least some figures from the interior to the coast. See ch. 1, n. 1, above.

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started to recover from the blow. The first complaints of difficulties emerged as early as June 1311, and by July of that year a number of milites - who could not meet their expenses or who refused to serve in the king's peninsular campaign while their estates were failing at home - broke into open revolt.46 Within a year other barons generally those who held smaller fiefs, or scattered multiple holdings - began for the first time to sell their lands for ready cash to merchants from the demesne cities. 47 A new round of rural violence ensued; knights once again began to seize whatever lands they needed to survive, and even a dispute over a single cow could trigger a murder. 48 One miles whose usurpation was condemned by the local court reverted to old ways, stormed into the officials' hall "armed with bow and sword" and asserted his rights as he understood them, claiming, as he wrapped his hands around the bailiffs throat, that he was entitled to whatever he needed to survive. "By what right have you ordered that I may not see to it that those lands are worked? I won't give them up on any account . . . I'm not a fool like those other [barons] who come in here and [merely] file complaints!"49 There was no mistaking the disdain such people felt for the supposed new order of things, once that order failed to deliver. The absence of notarial registers or other detailed commercial records makes it impossible to gauge the extent of the economic harm occasioned by the crop failure and the violence it triggered. But numerous indirect clues exist. 50 By summer 1311 the king's most important backers, both urban and rural, began to press him for greater privileges. The bishop of Cefalii, for example, suddenly 46 47 48

49

50

A S C Arch. T r i g o n a della Floresta, vol. rv, fol. 93 (18 J u l y 1311). A S C Arch. B e n e d e t t i n i , C o r d a 283, fol. 299-301 (7 M a y 1312). Ada curie 1, doc. 46 (20 May 1312), N i n o Maccaione grabbed a vineyard belonging to Nicola Muschetto in Favara Vecchia; 64 (3 Aug. 1312), Nicola Coppola seized "quoddam casale habitatum vocatum 'Sanctus Stephanus,' quod est m a g n u m pheudum quaternatum" near Bivona; doc. 65 (19 Aug. 1312), Nicola Taguili usurped a "castrum et terram . . . quod est p h e u d u m quaternatum, cuius cognitio principaliter spectare asseritur ad M a g n a m [Regiam] Curiam" located near Aderno. Ibid., doc. 4 6 (20 May 1312): "Quare mandasti, quod non facerem laborari in predictis terris? . . . Ego non dimittam pro aliqua defensa, quin faciam laborari terras predictas!" tenens manus in collo equi b a i u l i . . . [et] irruens contra judicem . . . dixit versus e u m "Tu mentitus es per gulam! Quia e g o non sum fatuus supervenientibus quampluribus aliis fidelibus regiis tune ibi presentibus et ipsum de premissis increpantibus." T h e Latin of the court record no doubt fails to capture some of the color of what was actually said. See especially the documents in Acta curie 1,passim for the economic and social difficulties in Palermo caused by the famine.

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demanded that his church be given a waiver from having to pay all local gabelle and assizes to the local universitas.51 A new wave of vacancies appeared among feudal holdings, which the king rushed to fill; presumably, these arose from the abandonment of various fiefs or from the throne's confiscation of them after their previous tenant had staged a rebellion. 52 Trade privileges were extended to merchants from Perpignan, allowing them to export grain and other commodities at favorable rates, in the hope of regaining the international market share lost by the inevitably higher prices caused by decreased production. 53 The king, lamenting the "various and diverse debts" he had suddenly accumulated, had to refuse aid to Barcelona's Sardinian campaign for the first time. 54 Labor and capital shortages led to a frustrating repetition of the problem. Another poor harvest occurred in 1316, followed by failures in 1322, 1323,1324,1326,1329, and 1335. Even before the last cycle of famines had set in, we can see the result in the market place: by 1322 the prices of barley, oats, and wheat had doubled from what they had been in 1310, which caused Sicilian grains to lose market share even in the remaining years of good yields. 55 All of this accelerated the movement of peasants to the cities and undermined the security of the more marginal and vulnerable landlords. Seigneurial incomes dropped continually throughout the 1320s and fell quite dramatically in the 1330s. Even Francesco Ventimiglia, one of the wealthiest nobles, faced a severe drop in his income; an end-of-year reckoning of the receipts and costs on his extensive county of Geraci, made by his magister procurator and magister rationalis in early 1322 (for the fourth indictional year, from 1 September 1320 to 31 August 1321), showed that his net profit amounted to only 64.15.oo.56 Had it not been for the income he 51 52 53 54 55 56

ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 87 (20 July 1311). ASP Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 90-90V (10 Feb. 1312). Ibid., fol. 96—g6v (31 M a y 1313). ACA Cartas James II, no. 10222 (13 Jan. 1315). Ibid., no. 9961; GG, doc. 130: "quod victualia sunt modo in dupplo quam consueverint cariora." Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 17 (1 Feb. 1322). This document notes Francesco's review and approval of his accounts' report. The report itself filled two volumes, one devoted to "locationum, cabellarum et introitus pecunie, victualium, leguminum, lini, animalium, gallinarum, ovorum et aliarum rerum" [or Accounts Receivable], and the other devoted to "totius exitus sui predicte pecunie, victualium, leguminum, lini, animalium, gallinarum, ovorum et aliarum rerum" [or Accounts Payable]. See summary of the data in Bresc, Un monde, p. 676 (Table 170); and discussion in Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali di Sicilia, pp. 109-16.

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derived from his juridical lordship over the county- that is, his fees for supplying justice, providing mills and ovens, etc., which together represented just over one-quarter of his income - his accounts would have been deeply in arrears. In other words even this powerful landlord, with his vast, centralized estates on some of the most fertile land available in the realm, with his diversified production of grain, wine, saltmeat, cheese, wool, and leather, found that his agricultural income amounted to less than 75 percent of his annual expenditures. The drop in the market value of farms was quite astonishing. The two linked fief estates of Feminino and Veneroso, near Castrogiovanni, had overall revenues of 85.00.00 in 1321; the following year they were bartered for a castellum near Cefalu whose income was less than half that amount.57 The 1322 crop failure caused so widespread a famine that all grain exports were halted.58 Few barons enjoyed the variety of resources available to the grander barons, and hence faced a simple though harsh ultimatum: either find new sources of revenue or abandon the land. Some sought these new revenues by usurping lands that promised higher returns. Others demanded from the government the right to exercise over their fiefs precisely those lordship rights that great magnates like the Ventimiglias and Chiaromontes wielded over theirs.59 Still others, as we have already discussed, moved aggressively into the cities to assume administrative, military, and police duties. All of these options had deleterious effects on the countryside. Baronial extortion of bannitum vel forjudicatum — a bogus fee demanded by landlords in recognition of their de facto (though seldom de jure) possession of merum et mixtum imperium - became

commonplace in the highlands where the very remoteness of their lands made it as easy for them to escape punishment as it made it difficult for their victims to escape their demands. They even held government officials for ransom.60 When the Angevins invaded in 57

58 59

60

Bresc, Un monde, p. 879; ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 95 (5 Sept. 1321); Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 16. Their decline continued unabated into the fifteenth century; in 1433 their joint revenues amounted to only 15.00.00. ACA Cartas James II, no. 10531 (31 Jan. 1323). See, for example, ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 154 (25 May 1328) in which Frederick awards various new lordship rights and revenues to D. Filippo Curto, over a fief at Ravennusa. The crown condemned this practice in 1325, and imposed a penalty of 100.00.00 upon anyone guilty of such extortion. See Const. Castrogiovanni, ch. 108: "Curantes, ut regnum

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1325-6, many knights demanded money in return for letting peasants take refuge behind their walls. Not that the barons were not also the victims of extortion. The demesne officials of Castrogiovanni, for example, took advantage of the chaotic conditions to assert the right to impose new taxes on local fief holders.61 In the end, economic collapse and war drove so many people from the land, both peasants and milites alike, that the king appointed an entire new corps of feudal-relief collectors specially empowered and solely devoted to impound the assets of any estate, large or small, in order to raise the revenue needed to pay the escalating costs of the kingdom's foreign wars. Too often, the court complained, barons had escaped their relevium duties "via sham contracts" - that is, by alienating all or part of their lands to absent family members (usually younger sons or brothers who had gone off to sea or to service in one of the urban comitive) who technically bore the onus of paying the duty. Henceforth, if the relief was not paid in full at the proper time, the king's new officers simply confiscated whatever tools, equipment, animals, foodstuffs, linen, manufactured goods, cash, or valuables they found on the premises. 62 There is no indication that such heavy-handed measures produced anywhere near the revenues the government needed; depopulation and decline had made that all but impossible. Instead, they left only

61

62

Sicilie quietum pacatumque regamus, quod non de facili obtinebimus, nisi fautores et receptatores delinquentium (sine quibus diutius malefici latere non possunt) acriter puniamus, presenti constitutione sancimus, lit nullus regni nostri nobilum — sive sit comes, baro, miles, burgensis vel quicumque alius — bannitum vel forjudicatum a quibuscumque officialibus nostris . . . receptare vel occultare audeat vel presumat, nee occultatos vel receptatos deinceps detineat. Transgressores vero presentis laudabilis sanctionis infrascriptis poenis sine venia feriantur: comes videlicet vel baro magnus, si contrafecerit, in unciis auri centum ipso facto multetur; ceteri vero in unciis quinquaginta; fiscalibus commodis applicandis." Acta curie in, doc. 76 (15 Aug. 1326). By this time, the Angevin invasion had turned inland, driving still more people from the land and making it all but impossible for the central administration to keep track of, much less to rectify, such actions as Castrogiovanni's. Const. Castrogiovanni, ch. n o : "Eorum fraudibus obviantes, qui jura relevii pro comitatibus, baroniis et feudis aliis ab antiquis constitutionibus nobis debiti per simulatos contractus evitare nituntur, et cupientes in posterum, ne eorum machinationibus nostre Curie damnum aliquod irrogetur, perpetuo edicto sancimus et consulte decernimus, quod, si comites, barones et alii feudatarii comitatus, baronias et feuda in capite tenentes a Curia, donationis titulo inter vivos, vel causa mortis seu divisionis causa, ipsa in filios vel in alios eis ab intestato successuros alienaverint, si quis pleno jure sit adeptus possessionem ipsorum ex causis predictis, jus relevii Curie nostre debitum incontinenti solvere teneatur, non expectata morte donantis vel dividends." For two examples, see ACA Perg. James II, no. 4388 (27 Aug. 1327); and Acta curie v, doc. 2 (10 Sept. 1328).

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a lingering resentment and anger, one that flared into full-fledged rebellion once it was sparked by Giovanni Chiaromonte's revolt. Despite a promising start, therefore, the rural world after midreign began to resemble the violent, impoverished, desolate place of common image. The civil wars that followed Frederick's death did far more damage to the countryside than the Vespers had ever done, and might very well have spelled the permanent ruin of the interior; but the positive changes commenced after 1296 - and especially after 1302 - in freeing the real estate market, realigning land tenure in order to allow a more efficient organization of agricultural investment, the large-scale introduction of new crops and herds, and the lowering of tariffs in order to preserve overseas market share, all served to help the rural world recover even from the savagery of the internecine strife from 1337 to 1396. Intimations of the land's latent potential, and of the changes that had taken place in it over the course of Frederick's reign, are visible in a controversial and troublesome document reprinted in Rosario Gregorio's eighteenth-century anthology of narrative sources and discussed many times since.63 It is a detailed list of baronial fief holders in Frederick's kingdom and of the feudal dues owed to the central court. It appears here as table 4 (pp. 316-26). The list presents difficulties at every turn. First is the problem of

its dating. 6 4 Gregorio entitled it a Descriptiofeudorum sub rege Federico

and found the original material in a still older volume, published in Rome in 1692, called Sicilia nobilis.65 He dates the list to 1296, but this is impossible since Queen Eleanor appears in the catalog and she was not on the scene until early 1303. At the same time, listed among Eleanor's possessions is the terra of Avola; but Avola was awarded to Prince William in 1336 as part of his dowry. These, then, 63 64 65

RGBS 11, pp. 464-70. This has received m u c h attention. See Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 293-7, for full discussion and notes. Bresc, Un monde, pp. 670—1 (Table 169) s u m m a r i z e s the data by location. H e has corrected the data provided by Gregorio by comparison with a seventeenth-century manuscript in Palermo, Biblioteca della Societa siciliana di storia patria, MS Fitalia I B 2, fol. 237—47. For my own table, I have organized the material by fief holder, in order to provide a prosopographical approach. Gregorio's source was the extremely rare Sicilia nobilis sive nomina et cognomina comitum, baronum et feudatariorum regni Siciliae anno I2g6 sub Federico II vulgo III et anno 1408 sub Martino II Siciliae regibus eruta e celeberrimo Musaeo excellentissimi domini Don Antonii Amato de Cardona principis Galati, ducis civitatis Caccabi, domini Asti, equitis

Alcantarae, etc., by Bartolomeo Muscia di Caccamo (Don Bartholomaeus Muscia Caccabensem) (Rome, 1692).

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would appear to be the termini a quo and ad quern. Pettineo appears as a fief of Francesco Ventimiglia's, and since he acquired that site in 1334, it would appear that the catalog indeed represents the tenurial picture in the last two or three years of Frederick's reign; yet Cefala (in the Val di Mazara near Vicari) is assigned to Nicola Abbate, from the powerful baronial family traditionally centered in the region of Trapani. Nicola sold the fief to Giovanni Chiaromonte in 1329. Hence a somewhat earlier date seems warranted. But if the data presented are problematic, so too are the data omitted. Early in 1327, for example, Nicola Abbate and his brother Enrico settled a long-fought dispute with another baron, Riccardo Manuele, over the lordship of Culcasi, with both sides agreeing to share the tenure -yet Culcasi fails to appear among either Nicola or Enrico Abbate's holdings, and Riccardo Manuele himself is not included among the king's milites.66 Culcasi itself appears nowhere in the list. Neither do the names or the holdings of the Pinzaguerra family, headed by two brother barons, D. Lamberto and D. Nicola, who left behind them a variety of estates, scattered fields and vineyards, urban dwellings, and other goods that took five years to divide between their contending heirs.67 To make matters worse, other sites appear more than once, under different lords with different servitia assigned to them. Avola is credited to both Queen Eleanor and to Leone di S. Stefano. Giardinello appears under the names of Gandolfo Sofudi (who owed for it and a second casalis called Paranna a combined servitium of 20.00.00) and of Andrea Tagliavia (who owed for it alone a. servitium of 50.00.00). Chipulla, a fief near Castrogiovanni, also apparently served two masters: Filippo Castellano and Federico Mohac. The duplication of place-names explains some of these difficulties; medieval Sicily had two sites called Favara, for example, one near Agrigento and one near Caltagirone. Nevertheless, the list's shortcomings are evident. Even with its problems, however, the descriptio feudorum has much to teach us. Adjusting the figures to discount as many clear 66 67

Mazzarese Fardella, Tabulario Belmonte, doc. 19 (15 June 1344, containing the text of record from 27 Feb. 1327). Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 29,33,43. The years of litigation were 1326-31. Given the nature of the descriptiofeudorum and the troubled state of the kingdom at that time, it is all the more surprising that these lands were omitted. The king's reintegratores and relevium officials, one would expect, would be all the more assiduous in recording the dues owed to the crown for these lands, once the possession of them was resolved.

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redundancies as possible, it puts the king's regular feudal income at just over 20,000 ounces.68 A large sum, this still represented less than a fourth of the crown's overall revenues. Direct demesnal income and urban levies counted for much more. Moreover, the descriptio catalogs only baronial fiefs, which were rapidly declining in value, and omits all ecclesiastical estates and all non-landed fiefs such as government offices, annuities, and privileged commercial rights and holdings. Of those 20,000, over 10 percent derive from holdings which cannot be identified with any degree of certainty. The remaining 18,000 ounces clearly show the decline of the Val di Mazara in relation to the two eastern valli. Val di Noto, by quite a long lead, provided the most income for the throne - nearly 7,800.00.00. Val Demone supplied over 6,200.00.00. And Val di Mazara accounted for only 5,900.00.00, a clear indication of the decline in cereal production and the rural labor force. A second feudal levy, in 1343, shows that the decline charted here only worsened after Frederick's death; it gives total feudal revenues as only 16,000 ounces - a drop of 20 percent in only four years. The servitia covered a broad range, from the 03.00.00 owed by Manfredi Cardona for his single casalis at Varnina to the 1,200.00.00 owed by Matteo Sclafani and the 1,500.00.00 that Francesco Ventimiglia was responsible for, for his Val di Noto holdings. Two striking features of the list are the prominence of the terre - that is, the large rural townships that grew up around fortified estates at the expense of the abandoned countryside - and the number of merchants and professionals who made up the milites. Nineteen sites are formally designated as terre and together represent over 4,500.00.00, nearly one-fourth of the total. Their distribution tells much of the story. Only two terre appear in the Val di Mazara: Castronovo and Caltavuturo, under the control of Raffaele Doria (vice-admiral of the realm) and the heirs of Federico Manna, respectively. Sixteen terre dotted the Val di Noto, by contrast. The reason for this is simple. Such large settlements required greater and more varied production of agricultural produce and manufactured goods in order to survive, and these were to be found only in the east. Larger settlements also needed larger reserves of water, which was found most easily citra Salsum. 68

The actual amount was no doubt larger, owing to lacunae in the catalog — most notably the unfortunate omission of the amount owed by Giovanni Chiaromonte.

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Terre or not, fully three-fourths of feudal dues came from individual large holders paying at least 100.00.00 annually. Many of these figures came from the merchant and professional classes rather than the traditional military caste, and they provide further evidence of the growing cost of maintaining rural lands. Russo Rosso, scion of the great Messinese family, appears here as lord of the casales of Scordia Sottana and Luppino, both in the Val di Noto. His possessions included unspecified rights (jura) at Noto and Aidone as well; these were probably export licenses or tax immunities. In the 1320s and 1330s the king, no longer able to reward supporters with lands since to many those lands were no longer desirable, began to award larger numbers of the jurisdictional authorities and commercial privileges suggested here. 69 Since well-to-do Catalans figured large among urban-dwellers, they appeared with increasing frequency as landholding milites. No fewer than nine of the fifty-seven landlords owing 100.00.00 or more annually were Catalans or Aragonese: Ferrer d'Abella, Blase d'Alago, Sang d'Arago (Frederick's bastard), Joan d'Arago (Sang's son), Guillem Castellar, Guillem Ramon de Montcada, Simon de Montcada, Montaner Peris de Sosa, Garcia Eiximenis de Yvar. Still other Catalans, such as Josep Amat, the lord of three Val di Mazara casales near Caltabellotta, figured among smaller fief holders. In all, approximately one out of every seven landlords was Catalan or Aragonese, by Frederick's death - a situation that was unavoidable, given the need for investment in the falling rural market, but which was untenable to many Sicilians who found themselves once again in the very position that the Vespers revolution had attempted to overturn — that of working the land for foreign landlords who profited from special privileges granted by a foreign king while siphoning off the profits of the land to foreign shores. The changes that took place in rural life during Frederick's reign were sweeping and, like most such periods of dramatic change, much that occurred was for the better and much was for the worse. 69

ASC Arch. Trigona della Floresta, vol. rv, fol. 83 (21 May 1320), in which Frederick rewards D. Enrico Trigona for his service against the rebels who rose against the throne when the economic troubles of 1311 began. Unable to give Enrico more land, he grants instead the right to export 500 salme of grain annually from the port at Sciacca without paying duties; grant lasts until Enrico's death (which came in 1340). For other examples, see ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 29, 30V-31, 32, 32V.

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Clearly the most important single phenomenon was the steady depletion of the rural labor force. Most everything else that took place, from vallo to vallo, was in some regard a response to or consequence of the challenge of depopulation. Like urban society, the rural world showed a surprising resiliency and adaptability, once the economic fetters on it had been removed by Volentes. The subsequent reorganization of the baronial world not only helped put an end to civil strife, but also allowed for more cost-effective management of the land through the gradual formation of counties, centralized latifondi, and terre that possessed greater economic diversity and therefore viability. The influx of investment capital after 1296, and the clearly discernible increase in optimism throughout society after 1302, sparked a heady if short-lived economic boom in which cereal production increased and new ventures in animal husbandry and viticulture began. Much of this innovation and centralization came at the expense of the remoter areas of the countryside, many of which emptied of nearly all human habitation and became arid wastes. Curiously, while depopulation and land abandonment became quite serious problems by the 1320s, they may have helped inadvertently to alleviate the destruction caused by the Angevin rampage of 1325-6. The invaders, forced to march for dozens of miles at a stretch without crop fields, food stores, animal herds, or maintained aqueducts to sustain them, fell victim to starvation, thirst, and exposure much more than they suffered at the hands of Simon de Valguarnera, who pursued them with his own lean comitiva. The decline of the rural economy, and of the delicate social equilibrium that had temporarily appeared after 1302, began with the concatenation of disasters that occurred from 1311 to 1314. Crop failures meant, of course, not only insufficient food for the populace, but also for the herds of cattle, sheep, and swine that many landlords had recently invested in quite heavily, often on borrowed funds. This blow, though severe enough, was exacerbated by the contemporaneous diplomatic misfortunes and mishandlings that brought on a dramatically increased public debt, cost the island the majority of its continental markets, and left the realm a pariah on account of its decision to follow the evangelical path. The combination of vastly heightened financial demands and of suddenly interrupted, if not curtailed, commercial and feudal revenues, was a blow from which rural Sicily did not recover until

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the fifteenth century. By that point, however, the savage baronial struggles to dominate the interior had wholly altered the social makeup and organization of rural life, and permanently altered the relation of the interior to the coastal society. In sum, the weaknesses that had always existed in, and had always given shape to, inland Sicily - weaknesses that had long lain dormant or partially obscured under the often ruthless feudal centralization and efficiency of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries - emerged in full, dreadful flower in the fourteenth. Even the economic rebound of the fifteenth century could not undo the damage that had been done. By the time of Frederick's death, the inland world was a world apart - still capable of producing foodstuffs and raw material for textiles, and of generating considerable wealth for those in control of that production. But demographic change and the weighty, decayed feudalism of the great barons had created a world in which power was held firmly in the hands of the strong - a group of people determined to preserve their own petty princedoms, to mete out justice within their own territories and according to their own designs, and to reap all the benefits thereof.

CHAPTER 5

The religious scene: piety and its problems

Church life, church-state relations, and popular piety in Frederick's Sicily took place amid intense and opposing pressures: local churches fueled by parochial rivalries, a distant and disdained papacy intent on asserting its spiritual authority and restoring ecclesiastical discipline, a king eager to promote his allies and broaden the base of his political strength while furthering his evangelical scheme for purifying the realm, and an illiterate populace torn between its ardent piety, its confusion over widespread heterodoxy, and its growing hostility to clerical authority.1 The clergy, especially the higher prelates, stood to gain the most from a return to peace. They had traditionally exerted a pervasive influence on everyday Sicilian life. Collectively they represented one of the largest landholders in the realm, with fewer yet larger estates in Val di Mazara, where a bound peasantry could still be

1

The most crucial source for ecclesiastical history in medieval Sicily is Rocco Pirri, Sidlia sacra disquisitionibus et notitiis illustrata, ed. Vito Maria Amico, 2 vols., 3rd edn. (Palermo,

1733), cited hereafter as RPSS. See also Filippo Cagliola, Almae sidlianensis provindae ordinis Minorum Conventualium S. Frandsd

manifestationes novissimae sex explorationibus

complexae (Venice, 1644), reprinted with an introduction by Filippo Rotolo. O.F.M., as SidliaJrancescana: secoli XIII-XVII (Palermo, 1984), Gollana Franciscana, vol. 1. Important early studies include Mercedes van Heuckelum, Spiritualistische Stromungen an den Hofen von Aragon und Anjou wahrend der Hohe des Armutsstreites (Berlin, 1912), Abhandlungen zur

Mittleren und Neueren Geschichte, vol. xxvm; and Karl Leopold Hitzfeld, Studien zu den religibsen und politischen Anschauungen Friedrichs III von Sizilien (Berlin, 1930; rpnt. 1965). The

bulk of published documents appear in the DSSS series: in addition to Silvestri (see ch. 1, n. 14, above) and Giambruno (see ch. 1, n. 13, above), see I diplomi delta cattedrale di Messina raccolti da Antonino Amico, publicati da un codice delta Biblioteca comunale di Palermo, ed. Raffaele

Starrabba (Palermo, 1887-90), 1st ser., vol. 1; Catalogo illustrato del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in Monreale, ed. Carlo Alberto Garufl (Palermo, 1902), 1st ser., vol. xix; and Rollus rubeus: Privilegia ecclesie Cephaleditane a diversis regibus et imperatoribus concessa, ed. Corrado

Mirto (Palermo, 1972), 1st ser., vol. xxix.

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found in places, and with more numerous but smaller holdings in the two eastern valli. With their extensive privileges the churches also held prominent positions in trade and commerce, enjoying a number of lucrative monopolies on such things as tunny fishing in Cefalu harbor. 2 These assets had suffered greatly at Angevin hands prior to 1282 and at baronial hands afterwards, which caused the church to view itself as the maligned and battered bulwark of stable society. Thus, when the higher prelates gave their approval to the Catalan dynasty, and especially to Frederick's disputed succession to James, they assumed - in their own minds at least the aura of national saviors. Consequently they found themselves in the position of being able to dictate their demands to the king; that is, they were near enough to that position to make the attempt. Frederick, for his part, struggled to balance his own intense piety and sincere desire to treat the church with due reverence, with his equally intense need to curry favor with the barons and municipalities, without whose support also he could not long stay on the throne. The spread of Franciscan-inspired evangelism brought an emotive reformist urgency to the islanders' spiritual lives but further complicated relations between faithful and clergy, clergy and state, and kingdom and papacy.3 Caltabellotta released at a stroke two decades of pent-up spiritual energy among the populace, both high and low, for a papal interdict had long forbidden the performance anywhere within Sicily of the sacraments that were necessary to salvation. Moreover, all supporters of the Catalan regime (not to mention the regime itself) had been repeatedly denounced and excommunicated by every pope since Martin IV, on 7 May 1282, first likened them to the crowds who had called for Jesus' crucifixion.4 However cheered they were by their success in driving out the Angevins, the Sicilians could hardly bear such condemnation with equanimity. The prohibition of sacraments had been total. Although priests had remained free to preach and to lead their congregations in prayer (prayers 2 ASP Tab. Cefalu, perg. 68. 3 See my articles "The Papacy, the Sicilian Church, and Frederick III, 1302-1321" (see ch. 2, n. 52, above); "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily," (see ch. 1, n. 21, above); and "The Reception of Arnau de Vilanova's Religious Ideas," in Christendom and Its Discontents, ed. Scott Waugh and Peter Diehl (Cambridge, 1995). The present chapter draws heavily on these previous works. 4 Regestapontificum romanorum, ed. August Potthast, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1874-5), 11, pp. 1769-70.

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focused, one might assume, on repentance and pleas for mercy), no Sicilian had been baptized, confirmed in the church, forgiven of sins in the confessional, strengthened in faith at communion, married by a priest, or consoled with last rites since 1282. In other words, by 1302 an entire new generation of Sicilians had arisen for whom the church played little or no role in their daily spiritual lives.5 The consequences of this were enormous. For older Sicilians the long separation from the church caused considerable anxiety, anger, and self-doubt. While they did not waver, or did not much waver, in their opposition to Rome's political actions vis-a-vis their island, they nevertheless remained uneasy about the spiritual penalty their rebellion had brought upon them. What did it profit them to gain political independence, if they lost their souls in the process? The Vespers years were filled with such worries, and we see this concern reflected in the great number of gifts showered upon local churches and monasteries. By pledging one's wealth to the religious houses one curried favor, they hoped, with those figures whose prayers might do one the most good once the interdict was lifted. Relief at being restored to the church in 1302, though, was inevitably mixed with a lingering resentment over what they viewed as unfairly heavy-handed treatment. This resentment, as we shall see, easily bubbled over into zealous and sometimes violent anti-clericalism. For younger Sicilians the interdict had different results. They had grown to adulthood with a faith no less vital than their parents'; but their faith had focused by necessity on preaching, prayer, personal inquiry, and repentance rather than on sacramental life and obedience to an ecclesiastical hierarchy. It would be a mistake to overemphasize the subjective or self-fashioning quality of their popular piety; these were still committed, though rebellious, faithful who cherished the Catholic tradition as they understood it. The fact, though, of their growing

5

There is evidence that some clergy, from 1282 on, refused to recognize the interdict and continued to administer sacraments. They were probably few in number, and there is no evidence surviving that tells of the extent of their following. Needless to say, they were among the first individuals sought by authorities after the normalization of religious life. Assuming that these rebel priests had at least some popular support, it is clear that the effect of such open disobedience to the interdict would contribute to an atmosphere that welcomed the reformist ideals of the Spirituals. See discussion, below.

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up outside the church's sacramental life meant that there existed among them a common, though certainly not universal, tendency to view the clergy and their role in a new light, one that made it easier to ignore ecclesiastical authority when it seemed preferable to do so, and easier to oppose it outright when such seemed necessary. Priests, bishops, and archbishops in the kingdom thus found themselves confronted with an eager though hesitant sort of congregation in the cities - a young flock that was just as likely, under the right conditions, to suspect the clergy as to support them (and to embrace anti-clericalism for religious rather than political reasons), and an older group of faithful among whom relief was tinged with resentment, who felt that they had as much to forgive as to be forgiven. Complicating a smooth resumption of traditional religious life still further, a severe shortage of qualified priests existed throughout the kingdom, owing to the fact that no ordinations had been performed in twenty years. Vacant parishes and depleted canonries dotted the countryside, leaving even those sites that most ardently desired to return to ecclesiastical tradition bereft of spiritual leadership. Thus, if the clergy were to resume their pre-Vespers role in society, they had to pursue with great zeal a replenishment of their ranks and a restoration of the ecclesiastical structure that had been so battered by two decades of war. Organized religious life, in short, entered a period of extraordinary opportunity and challenge. Sicily's ecclesiastical organization consisted of three archbishoprics (Messina, Monreale, Palermo) and seven bishoprics (Agrigento, Catania, Cefalu, Lipari-Patti, Malta, Mazara, Siracusa). It is important to know the precise boundaries of these dioceses as well as they can be fixed, since so much of the difficulty that the king faced after Caltabellotta stemmed directly from the clashes between individual churches' zones of ecclesiastical authority and commercial interest. The diocese of Mazara is the most easily distinguished. Its border was defined by the Belice and Iato rivers, and it stretched eastward to the point where the rivers came nearest to each other, on the main road from Palermo to Corleone. The diocese's principal cities, apart from the cathedral town itself, were Trapani, Monte S. Giuliano, Alcamo, Salemi, and Marsala; the island of Pantelleria (important for cotton production and tunny

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fishing) also fell under its jurisdiction. The bishopric of Agrigento, to the south, is more difficult to specify. From the Belice it reached down the coast to the river Salso; but its inland border followed an indistinct line from Caltanissetta through Castronovo, then curved below Corleone until it reached, once again, the Belice. The major urban centers here included Sciacca, Agrigento, and Licata, along the coast, and Camarata, Prizzi, Caltanissetta, and Castronovo, inland. The diocese of Siracusa was the kingdom's largest in area. The river Salso, reaching northward from Licata, marked its western edge; thirty kilometers inland the border turned sharply to the east - above Mazzarino but below Barrafranca - then continued in a line along the Ferro river to the plain below Catania. In addition to the cathedral town, Ragusa, Lentini, Caltagirone, Scordia, Augusta, and Modica comprised the main municipalities of the diocese. Above it lay the diocese of Catania, in whose cathedral church Frederick lies buried. The southern border of this province lay along the Ferro, and the diocese reached as far inland as Castrogiovanni at the island's center. But the northern border is more difficult to trace. Beginning at the coast a few kilometers above Acireale, the border skirted the lower reaches of Mount Etna, passed north of Adrano and Agira, then dropped, perhaps through the mountain pass at Lago di Stelo, to reach the river Salso. North of this, in the island's most sharply angled promontory, lay the archdiocese of Messina. Excluding the episcopal see at Patti (whose diocese consisted of the cathedral town and the outlying Lipari islands), Messina's jurisdiction reached as far westward as the river Pollina, then southward along the uppermost reaches of the Salso. Its major cities included Randazzo, Troina, and Nicosia, as well as coastal Taormina and Milazzo. Cefalii's diocese was much smaller by comparison; it extended in a rough semicircle through a thirtykilometer sweep from the cathedral town, and included the towns of Polizzi, Caltavuturo, Sclafani, and Mistretta. The remaining territory was divided between the archbishoprics of Monreale and Palermo, with the former comprising the narrow strip of land connecting Monreale, S. Giuseppe Iato, Calatrasi, and Corleone, and with the latter occupying the quadrant defined by Termini, Caccamo, Lercara, Vicari, and Misilmeri. In terms of their ecclesiastical relations, Agrigento, Mazara, and Malta were suffragans of the metropolitan see of Palermo, just as Cefalu and Lipari-Patti lay under the jurisdiction of the archbishopric of Messina, and as the

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dioceses of Catania and Siracusa deferred to the authority of Monreale.6 Largely by coincidence, nearly all the episcopacies in the kingdom became vacant after Caltabellotta. Mazara's see had been empty since 1300, as had Cefalii's, leaving the churches there without direction or defense until after the war. Agrigento's bishop Roberto was translated to a see outside of Sicily in 1303. Catania's Gentile Stefanneschi died early in 1304, followed a few months later by Palermo's archbishop Tizio di Colle; and in 1305 death carried away Monreale's Ruggero Dommusco and Siracusa's Domenec de Zaragoza. Only the sees of Lipari-Patti and Messina remained undisturbed.7 Many Sicilians, frankly, were glad to see some of these figures depart. Gentile Stefanneschi, for example, a Dominican from Rome, had no sooner been appointed to the see in Catania in 1296 than he handed the city over to Angevin control, in whose hands it remained until 1300.8 And Siracusa's bishop Domenec, even though he was a Catalan who might therefore have been expected to favor the new dynasty, was likewise a Dominican appointee of Boniface VIII who continued to support the papalAngevin cause right through Caltabellotta. The opportunities available between 1302 and 1305 drew Benedict XI's earnest attention, for by regaining control of the episcopacies he hoped to mitigate some of the harm done to papal prestige at Caltabellotta; moreover, since the king was as beholden to clerical support for his kingship as he was to baronial and municipal backing, a strongly pro-papal roster of bishops offered a promising means to rein in the ambitions of the new ruler of "Trinacria." Consequently, citing his plenitudo potestatis, he insisted upon his 6

Rationes decimarum Italiae nei secoli XIIIe XIV: Sicilia, ed. Pietro Sella (Vatican City, 1944),

Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Studi e testi, vol. cxn provides basic information, although it lacks a map. I have supplemented this with information drawn from RPSS 1, pp. 1—313 (Palermo), pp. 414-50 (Messina), pp. 451—87 (Monreale), pp. 514-97 (Catania), pp. 598-690 (Siracusa), pp. 691-765 (Agrigento), 11, pp. 769-96 (Patti), pp. 797-840 (Cefalu), pp. 841-99 (Mazara), pp. 900-47 (Malta), and pp. 948-68 (Lipari); from Vito Maria Amico, Lexicon topographicum siculum, 6 vols. (Palermo, 1757—60), also available in Italian as Dizionario topografico della Sicilia, ed. and trans. Gioacchino Dimarzo, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1885-6; rpnt. 1975); and from Norbert Kamp, Kirche undMonarchic im stauftschen Konigreich Sizilien (Munich, 1975), Miinstersche Mittelalter-Schriften, vol. x, no. 1, in 4 pts.; see esp. pt. 3, pp. 1010-12, 1043—5, 7 8

1233-4-

IO

7^-9> 1110-11, 1146-7, 1172—3, 1184—5, 1202—4,

RPSS 1, pp. 154-5, 408-10, 463-4, 536-7, 626, 706-8; Reg. Benedict XI, no. 233-9, 274» 3*5Reg. Boniface VIII, no. 3874 refers to the city of Catania "qui nuper ad nostra mandata et Romane ecclesie redierunt."

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right to overrule or frankly ignore elections by chapter and to appoint his own candidates directly to the sees.9 His first "appointments" in 1304 merely confirmed men who were still in office, perhaps simply a gesture but perhaps also a requirement resulting from the lifting of the interdict.10 But he pressed hard in his designs for the new vacancies and in so doing he precipitated the first outbreaks of local resentment. Obviously a kingdom that had explicitly forbidden its king to enter any sort of pact with the pope - as it had done in 1296 - would be slow to warm to direct papal reinvolvement in its ecclesiastical life. In 1305, when Benedict attempted to install two loyalists - in Mazara, one Fulco "who is a Catalan and was previous a deacon of Leon and a canon of Valencia and Majorca," and in Siracusa, one Domingos Penitencieiro "a Dominican from Portugal" - the chapters flatly rejected his appointees and elected bishops of their own instead: Goffredo Roncione and Felip Sang de Cisur, respectively, who were quickly confirmed in office by their metropolitans.11 Benedict's choice to succeed Gentile Stefanneschi in Catania was Leonardo Fieschi, a Genoese cleric, whom the Catanian canons accepted reluctantly. They and others in the diocese quickly found themselves at odds with their new bishop, though. One of Leonardo's first acts, implemented even before his arrival on the island, was to grant to the local Benedictine nunnery of S. Giuliano thefacultas of electing its own abbess; in 1306 he repossessed a woodland that had long before been granted to one of Catania's dependent churches. But 9

By the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries direct papal appointments were common but certainly not universally accepted. For dissenting arguments among orthodox contemporaries, see Hostiensis, Lectura in quinque decretalium Gregorianum libros;

10 11

and Aegidius Romanus, De ecclesiastica potestate. For discussion, see Robert L. Benson, "Election by Community and Chapter: Reflections on Co-responsibility in the Historical Church," TheJurist 31 (1971), 54-80; and Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Making of a Bishop in the Middle Ages: The Part of the Pope in Law and Fact," Catholic Historical Review 19 (1933-4), 275-319. Reg. Benedict XI, no. 233, 235-8. ACA Cartas James II, no. 4156 bis. This document is an unsigned and unaddressed report to James from an agent at the papal court. The entire text reads: "Sciatis etiam, quod dominus papa providit ecclesiis Scicilie [sic] omnibus de archiepiscopis et episcopis et nullum ad partes illustris domini Frederici; et sic creditur, quod non recipiantur. Tamen contulit episcopatum Marzariensis domino Fulconi, qui est catalanus et erat decanus Legionis et canonicus Valencie et Maioricarum. Contulit episcopatum Siracusanensis fratri Domenico Penitenciario, de ordine Predicatorum, qui est portugalensis. Omnes alios posuit quos voluit." See also Reg. Benedict XI, no. 234, 239; RPSS 1, p. 464; Garufl, Catalogo illustrato del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in Monreale, doc. 147.

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his greatest transgression was his decision in 1313 to establish a station of the Dominican inquisition at the monastery of Castel Orsini. After the monks there appealed to their metropolitan, and the full roster of built-up complaints against Leonardo had been presented at court, the unpopular bishop finally quitted the island.12 This left Catania without a leader until 1331 and opened the door to increased royal control, since traditionally the bishop had wielded considerable political authority over the city itself. After the Black Death, Catania became in fact the principal royal residence on the island. The king had an interest in the episcopacies as well, but was in even less of a position to influence successions than was the papacy. By asserting the legatine authority that Sicilian monarchs had claimed since the eleventh century, Frederick in theory might have claimed the right to appoint and confirm bishops, but his command of the realm was far too tenuous even to permit the attempt. 13 Instead, he championed the clergy's right to elections. Thus when the canons of Monreale elected Arnau de Rassach in 1305, only to find their choice rejected and themselves excommunicated by an unappreciative Benedict, Frederick intervened and negotiated directly with Avignon. Benedict refused to relent, but the Sicilians stood firm. Clement V's more conciliatory nature allowed him to give up the fight, recognize Arnau, and rescind Benedict's excommunication of the popular archbishop. 14 Frederick had another reason, less ideological, to support Arnau: Rassach had previously served as Frederick's treasurer and royal councillor; hence it is tempting to see the king's vigorous championing of him as another example of a political or personal debt to be paid. 15 If appointments were beyond his power, he was yet able to influence the dioceses' economic and jurisdictional life by other 12

13

14 15

Reg. Benedict XI, no. 2y^;RPSS i, p. 537. Leonardo returned to Genoa and became prior of the monastery of S. Leonardo di Calignano, although he never relinquished his episcopal title. Josef Deer, "Der Anspruch der Herrscher des 12. Jahrhunderts auf die apostolische Legation," Archivum historiae pontificiae 2 (1964), 117-86 is the best study of the development of this claim. The continuation of the legatine idea in the post-Norman period has received much less attention. RPSS 1, p. 464. Arnau is probably the "Raynaldus de Raxaco" referred to by Reg. Clement V, no. 220, where he is described as a cleric who had sided with Frederick during the war and was therefore excommunicated.

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means, the most important of which was the restoration of ecclesiastical privileges. The churches unanimously welcomed royal involvement in this regard and indeed came to expect it as the implicit price of their support. He had, after all, promised. At Caltabellotta it was agreed that Frederick would restore the Sicilian churches to all of the properties and privileges they held prior to 1282, which Frederick reiterated in a solemn decree to the Sicilian primate in August 1303: I further promise that I will allot and will cause to be allotted to every church and every religious now existing in Sicily and its said islands all the possessions, rights, and goods - both in Sicily and in the said islands which those churches and persons held therein from the time of king Charles of blessed memory (father of the present Charles) to the time when the Sicilians rebelled against the said Charles; and I shall do this within one month from the day when the proper reckoning of the said cities, lands, castles, villas, houses, and other fortified sites existing in the said lands of Sicily and the islands adjacent to it has been made to me, or to my representatives, by the said lord Charles or someone on his behalf (as they have been identified above) . . . Therefore I command you, Leonardo d'Incisa, knight and justiciarius of the Val d'Agrigento, that you should cause to be reckoned all the possessions, rights, and goods of the Palermitan church - both in the lands and areas of your jurisdiction as in the other lands and places of Sicily - along with all its rights in regard to the tenor of this said charter.16 The act exhibits a certain caginess on Frederick's part. He needed to curry support with the clergy, but clearly could not afford to do so at the expense of alienating the barons - and it was the barons, chiefly, who had confiscated the churches' goods and lands. In order to restore these, Frederick had to prove indisputably the churches' 16

RPSS 1, pp. 154—5: "Promittimus etiam, quod omnibus ecclesiis et personis ecclesiasticis in Sicilie et predictis insulis assignabimus et faciemus assignari, infra mensem unum a diem facte et complete assignationis predictarum civitatum, terrarum, castrorum, villarum, casalium, et aliarum quarumlibet fortiliciarium locorum existentium in predictis partibus Sicilie et insulis sibi adjacentibus nobis seu nostris nunciis per predictum dominum Carolum et ducem vel alium et alterium seu alias per se vel alterius eorum (sicut super plene distinguuntur) faciendum, in antea numerandum, omnes possessiones, jura, et bona existentia in Sicilia et predictis insulis, que tenuerunt ecclesie et persone ipse ibidem tempore bone memorie regis Caroli (patris dicti regis Caroli) usque ad tempus quo Siculi contra predictum regem Carolum rebellaverunt... Ideo tibi Leonardo de Incisa militi, justiciario Vallis Agrigenti mandamus, ut possessiones, jura, et bona ecclesie Panormitane sita, tarn in terris et locis jurisdictionis tue quam in aliis locis et terris Sicilie, cum omnibus juribus suis juxta tenorem predicti capituli assignari facias."

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legitimate claims to each holding, arrange suitable recompense for the nobles when appropriate or unavoidable, and accomplish all without offending either party. The clerics understandably wanted the restoration carried out as quickly as possible, but the king needed to set a more moderate pace. He therefore committed himself to a complete and timely restoration, but placed the burden for the pace of the process upon the Angevins, whom he required to deliver all administrative records and land registers. Charles had quitted the island too hurriedly, of course, to bring the entire royal archives with him and had no particular reason for wanting to share the information that he did have with the king who had just beaten him. Thus, Frederick's charter simply masked his need for adequate time to sort out the contested claims. The quantity and complexity of those claims presented an enormous problem, for the churches' lands and commercial holdings were extensive and, as suggested by the charter, not limited to their own dioceses. Compounding this difficulty, many of the churches had conflicting jurisdictional rights over religious establishments. The church of S. Lucia in Siracusa, for example, fell under the ecclesiastical authority of the bishop of Cefalii, who controlled the church precisely as though it lay physically within his diocese, awarding prebends, collecting tithes, appointing church officers, and overseeing the community's spiritual life.17 The archbishop of Palermo controlled secular estates within the diocese of Agrigento, and held ecclesiastical authority over the monastery of S. Onofrio in the diocese of Mazara. 18 The archbishop of Monreale in 1294 had authorized the construction and dedication of the church of S. Anna delle Scale in the Palermitan diocese, and owned, or claimed to own, lands held by the Basilian archimandrite in Messina.19 And the monastery of S. Maria Valverde, in the Messinese diocese, lay under Palermo's jurisdiction. 20 But the majority of problems concerned secular holdings - lands and goods that had been lost to the barons. Confiscation or theft of church property had been endemic during the war, energetically 17

18 19 20

ASP Manoscritti, Bacheca n, no. 5, fol. 72-87; RPSS 1, p. 626,11, pp. 807-9. T h e difficulty began with the donation of S. Lucia to Cefalu by countess Adelicia of Aderno in 1140; see RPSS 1, p. 655,11, p. 799. RPSS 1, pp. 54-5, 158. RPSS 1, p. 410. See also 1, p. 708,11, pp. 808, 846, for other disputes. A S M Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria Valverde, perg. 9 4 (12 Oct. 1315).

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committed by everyone from the great counts to the pettiest milites. Giovanni Chiaromonte, the count of Modica, along with his cohort Francesco Tuderto, for example, had stolen a handful of estates from the bishop of Agrigento, while Manfredi Lancia, a kinsman of Frederick's first chancellor, had seized a mill from the Benedictine nunnery of S. Maria in the city of Noto.21 On a less elevated social level, D. Oberto di Cammarana and his wife Giovanna had snatched several estates near Monreale from the monastery of S. Maria Nuova. Even the occasional municipality joined in the land grab: the universitas of Caltagirone, for example, concocted a fortuitous border dispute with the church of S. Filippo d'Agira in order to justify its seizure of an estate at nearby Scopello.22 The recovery and setting right of these holdings - a program that ran concurrently with the post-war settlement of the tangled commercial affairs between Catalonia and Sicily - occupied Frederick's attention for several years. By 1309 he had successfully restored dozens of holdings to their rightful owners by cajoling, persuading, threatening, and bribing those who had stolen them to relinquish their control, which had the beneficial effect of putting the king in the clerics' good graces but at the cost of increasing his political debt to the milites. The royal demesne also paid a price, since the only way to secure a peaceful settlement and to soothe any residual clerical or baronial resentment was, on many occasions, to compensate one party or the other — and sometimes both parties — with a new grant out of the king's private domain. Thus the Cistercian abbey of S. Maria at Novara, a twelfth-century foundation roughly forty kilometers southwest of Messina, gained for its sufferings not only the return of a usurped estate but also a compensatory package of new commercial privileges and control of a subsidiary monastic church, S. Maria di Stella in Troina, some fifty kilometers further to the southwest on the main road from Nicosia to Randazzo.23 Inevitably, the sheer number of restorations to be made, and the often intractable attitudes of both usurpers and usurped, slowed the process considerably, and prompted Frederick, in light of his vow at Caltabellotta, to request absolution from 21 22 23

RPSS 1, pp. 627, 706-7. Garufi, Catalogo illustrate del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in Monreale> doc. 131; RPSS 11, p. 1247 (S. Filippo d'Agira). RPSS 11, pp. 1294, 1297.

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Clement - an absolution that the pope, in an irenic mood, was pleased to grant. 24 These rights and properties, once restored and supplemented, provided a sudden increase in revenues ample enough to finance an impressive expansion of ecclesiastical holdings, the construction of new churches, the repair of others, and the operation of hospitals. Indeed, the years after Caltabellotta witnessed the most feverish activity in church building on the island since the twelfth century. In the south, for example, construction began on the imposing duomo of Agrigento, along with the abbey church of S. Spirito. The Chiesa d'Assunta in Giuliana and the Chiesa di S. Gherlando in Sciacca were both raised around 1305. Queen Eleanor, according to one tradition, personally funded the construction of the duomo of Castrogiovanni in 1307. In Nicosia, a portal inscription dates the building of that city's duomo to roughly the same time. The foundation of Taormina's Chiesetta di S. Antonio was laid, probably, by 1310 (although it was finished only in 1330). In western Trapani, work on the cathedral began in 1314, along with the Chiesa delPAnnunziata and the Chiesa di S. Agostino. And in 1315 Frederick himself built the Chiesa Madre in Monte S. Giuliano, next to the impressive campanile erected next to the city gate only three years earlier. 25 Nor was this all. A wide network of monasteries dotted the landscape and received new endowments. 26 Most of these houses pre-dated Frederick, but a number of new establishments appeared and quickly grew. The monastery of S. Maria del Bosco di Calatamauro, for example, was established near Corleone and Sciacca. A community of hermits resided on the site by 1308, and in 1309 bishop Bertoldo of Agrigento ordered the consecration of the church erected there, while granting to the 24

25 26

Reg. Clement V, no. 4727. C l e m e n t was so taken with Frederick's efforts, especially after the Sicilian campaign (led by R a m o n Muntaner) that seized t h e island of Djerba from Muslim control, that he wrote, i n a very complimentary letter to t h e archbishop o f Messina: "Zelo fidei et fervore devotionis accensus carissimus in Christo filius noster Fredericus Trinacrie rex illustris, que D e i sunt, sapit, et que divini cultus et catholice fidei incrementa respiciant, pro studio et laudabili intentione zelatur." Ibid., no. 6401. G i u s e p p e Spatrisano, Lo Steri di Palermo e I'architettura siciliana del Trecento (Palermo, 1972), pp. 229-30, 235, 238-40, 261. A study of Latin monasticism in late medieval Sicily is sorely needed. Paolo Gollura, "Vicende e problemi del monachesimo benedettino in Sicilia," Atti della Accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo (Palermo, 1980-1), 4th ser., 40, pt. 2, 31-64 is a start. On the earlier centuries, see Lynn White Jr., Latin Monasticism in Norman Sicily (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), Mediaeval Academy of America Monographs, vol. xm.

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brethren a licentia to hear confession for the local inhabitants. Adopting the Benedictine rule, this monastery acquired a considerable number of pious donations and enjoyed the particular support of Frederick's magister rationalis Matteo Sclafani.27 Another important new foundation was the Benedictine abbey of S. Maria di Altofonte. Meanwhile, a group of Dominicans en route to the Holy Land in 1313 received from Frederick a grant of housing in Trapani, which by 1318 had been turned into a permanent conventus regalis, with the friars appointed as royal chaplains and confessors.28 Many nobles and lesser barons also founded or reendowed monastic houses, perhaps to atone for their wartime sins, but it is just as likely they did so because they were inspired by the same spiritual revival that affected the rest of society. Giovanni Chiaromonte, for example, to recompense for his predations throughout the Val d'Agrigento, offered sizable grants to the Cistercian nunnery of S. Spirito in that diocese. Not to be outdone, the Ventimiglia family built the Abbazia di S. Maria del Parto near Castelbuono, to complement Frederick's own new foundation there, the Convento di S. Francesco di Polizzi. Artale d'Alagona established the monastery of S. Maria di Nuova Luce, outside Catania. An obscure baroness named Giovanna di Surdis funded the construction of a new nunnery of S. Caterina Vergine e Martire in Mazara; and an equally obscure miles, Rinaldo Bentivegna, and his wife built a chapel of S. Croce in Cefalu, which later received - according to one source - from Frederick's brother Sang the bequest of his entire worldly goods.29 These efforts to restore ecclesiastical rights and to found new houses for the propagation of the faith might have earned the Holy See's grudging friendship and a decrease in political tensions, had it not been for a combination of occurrences. The first of these was 27

ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 69, 528. See also P. Olimpio da Giuliana, "Istoria del monastero di S. Maria del Bosco di Calatamauro della diocesi agrigentina, in Sicilia, nella Valle di Mazara," BCP MS Qq A 12; and Achille Schiro, // monastero di S. Maria del Bosco di Calatamauro in Sicilia (Palermo, 1894). Cf. RPSS 11, p. 1331. 28 RPSS 11, p. 877. 29 RPSS 1, pp. 575,733,11, pp. 808-9, 873, 1184-96,1262-4,1289. For more examples, see Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 106—8; and Collura, "Vicende e problemi," p. 41. For a notable later gift by the Chiaromonte family, see E. Carraciolo, "La chiesa e il convento di Baida presso Palermo: rilievi e studi sull'arte gotica in Sicilia," ArchStperSic 3 (1936-7), 109—46. Francesco Ventimiglia also funded the construction of a church, dormitory, and office building for a group of Franciscan friars in the Messinese diocese, as late as 1318; see John XXII, Lettres communes, no. 7796.

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the establishment of the Athenian duchy, which flew in the face of Angevin rights and papal prerogatives and also cut off an important source of ecclesiastical revenue - since the Company not only blocked census payments to Avignon but also expressly forbade bequests to churches within the territories under their control.30 A second difficulty lay in Frederick's support for the Basilian monasteries in his realm. A thin network of these houses still stretched across Sicily-we know of thirty-three that existed in 1308 - from the archimandrite's church of S. Salvatore in Messina to the abbey of S. Maria della Grotta in Marsala.31 Though very much in decline, these churches still controlled a modest share of land and wealth (in 1308 at least nine of them had annual revenues above 20.00.00), and the archimandrite himself, with an income over 100.00.00, commanded considerable respect at court.32 The papacy, powerless to suppress them during the Norman and Hohenstaufen eras, had tolerated these Greek communities in later years and perhaps viewed them as a means to improve relations with the patriarchate in Constantinople. But the archimandrite's support for the Catalan dynasty - especially after his participation in James's coronation in 1286 - forced the pope to act. Honorius IV declared the archimandrite deposed and stripped the Basilian church of all its holdings. This prompted many ecclesiastical and lay lords, who were otherwise loath to condone meddling from abroad, to seize Basilian churches and their holdings across the kingdom. They plundered rapidly and repeatedly. The abbey of S. Nicola di Pergario, for example, was beset so often by pillagmg barons that by 1302 "it [had] no viable use or value . . . its vineyards cut down, devastated, and ruined . . . its land void of inhabitants ajnd left desolate and sterile."33 But Caltabellotta gave Frederick tjhe 30 31

32 33

Reg. Clement V, no. 3138, 7890-1, 8597. Scaduto, // monachesimo basiliano (see ch. 1, n. 19, above) is the most complete study to date; see esp. pp. 287—320. White, Latin Monasticism, pp. 3 8 - 4 6 estimates that as many as sijxtyeight Basilian abbeys existed by the end of the twelfth century. O n the privileges held by the archimandrite, see Raffaele Starrabba, "Di un codice vaticano contenente i privjlegi delParchimandrito di Messina," ArchStSic 12 (1887), 4 6 5 - 9 , with its discussion of Vatican Library, cod. 8201. A fragmentary text of the archimandrite's visitation registers survives, containing his notes on liturgical regularity, administrative problems, and ecclesiastical discipline within his subject churches for the years 1328-30,1332,1334, and 1336, see Codex Messanensis Graecus 105, ed. Raffaele Cantarella (Palermo, 1937), R. Deputazione di storia patria per la Sicilia, Memorie e documenti di storia siciliana, 2nd ser., vol. 11. Bresc, Un monde, pp. 5 8 9 - 9 4 a n d T a b l e 152. Silvestri, // tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala, doc. 6.

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

opportunity to rebuild the Basilian network as well as the Latin, although in the end his efforts proved unable to stem the decline.34 John XXII eventually reconciled with the Basilians; but Frederick's preemptive aid to his Orthodox subjects - coupled with the accidental acquisition of Athens - stood in the way of smooth relations with Avignon. All of this activity signals a remarkable release of spontaneous spiritual energy and enthusiasm. But it is clear that the spiritual revival was inspired and promoted by the royal court as well. Frederick, who was sincerely if conventionally pious in his early years, in 1305 became an enthusiast for Arnau de Vilanova, the Catalan physician turned mystic who took refuge in Sicily after barely escaping with his life from an inquisitorial proceeding at Perugia where he had not only stood accused of heretical prophecy but was also briefly suspected of having murdered Benedict XL This enthusiasm turned into ardent discipleship after Arnau's second visit in 1309, at which time Frederick, in James's words, "was inspired with the flame of the Holy Spirit, henceforth desiring to spread It with a fervent passion."35 At this time Arnau explicitly recognized Frederick as the "God-elected king" of Joachimite prophecy, the divinely appointed ruler who would aid in the purification of Christendom so that it could withstand the destructive workings of the approaching Antichrist - whose arrival, Arnau had calculated, would be no later than 1376. Frederick's advocacy of this apocalyptic reform undoubtedly lay behind his aggressive church building and the spate of social reforms enacted in his Ordinationes generates, and likely lay behind his appeal in 1309 for papal absolution for the delays that had dogged his restoration program. With royal support, the evangelizing spirit spread rapidly through Sicily, especially among the lower orders who had already begun to crowd urban streets. A few traces of this spirit had appeared in Sicily prior to Arnau's arrival, and likely came to the island with the Catalan army in the 1280s. Catalonia had long been home to an energetic tradition of 34

35

Frederick negotiated personally, for example, a border dispute between the archimandrite and the church of S. Giorgio di Triocala, and granted additional forest rights and the secrezie tax revenues from Troina to the abbey of S. Elia d'Ambula. See RPSS n, PP- 983, 1008, 1012; Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, p. 131. FAA 11, doc. 559; Francesco Bruni, "La cultura e la prosa volgare nel '300 e nel '400," in SDS rv, pp. 179-279 at 190-202.

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religious speculation, evidenced most famously in the works of Vilanova and Ramon Llull in Christian spirituality and by the Jewish Kabbalists. A number of manuscripts - alchemical treatises, works on astrological portents, a handsome copy of Abraham Abulafia's On the Light of the Intellect - attest to the presence of some of these ideas in Sicily. Abulafia himself is known to have visited Sicily sometime prior to his death in 1291, spreading his teachings among the Jewish community at Trapani. "Evangelical schools" were established throughout the realm, Vilanova testifies, "in which men and women, both rich and poor, are given instruction in that evangelical truth which is the true Christianity." 36 And a plethora of sermon collections, saints' lives, and catechetical dictionaries suggest that not only were exciting new ideas circulating but were being actively opposed by a suddenly present Dominican inquisition. 37 Ramon Llull in 1312 praised Frederick as "a most excellent, devout, and steadfast king," one who "has ordered and directed his entire realm to the purpose of knowing and loving God, and has pursued this goal with such tenacity that one is frequently made to think of the command that God made to all men" (namely, that they are to put God before everything else in life); furthermore Llull visited Sicily in 1313-14 and while there he wrote no less than thirty-eight opuscula to assist in the spiritual regeneration of the kingdom that he saw around him.38 Arnau became Frederick's religious mentor in 1305, and during this first stay on the island wrote a religious-political treatise for him called the Allocutio christiani de hiis que conveniunt homini secundum suam propriam dignitatem creature rationalis in which he explicated a rationalist view of mankind as God's supreme creation, uniquely endowed with the ability to perceive the divine plan of salvation in nature.39 Since Arnau, borrowing a vocabulary from his medical background, believed passionately that God's truth and heavenly plan for mankind are visible in the physical world just as the symptoms that identify an ailment are physically present in the patient, awaiting only a physician talented enough to read correctly 36 37 38 39

Arnau de Vilanova, Obres catalanes, i, pp. 220-1. For example: Messina, Biblioteca universitaria M S S 29-30, 149; Trapani, Biblioteca Fardelliana MSS 9,12; B C P MSS Q q A 21, Q q F 32, 2 Q q E 4, 2 Q q E 5, 4 Q q A 10. J . N . Hillgarth, Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1971), p. 109, n. 258, and pp. 132—3. Vatican City, Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Vat. Lat. 3824, fol. 217V—226.

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the evidence that is before the eyes of all, any man possessed of reason (and guided perhaps by a visionary like Arnau himself), he asserted, has the ability to perceive clearly the purpose to which he ought to turn his energies. And a prince has a unique obligation, in this view, to devote himself to bringing to effect those changes and reforms that are needed to further the spiritual purification of Christendom. Consequently, Arnau exhorted Frederick to continue to reform Sicilian life and to administer the realm in a spirit consonant with the duties of a perfect Christian king. "There are two fruits of God's love present in this life: prosperity and security," he wrote; "therefore every ruler, whether king, duke, count, or baron, who would govern men and exercise jurisdiction over them ought by all means to avoid four things: injustice . . . injury to others . . . the abuse of nature . . . and deceit against God or one's neighbor." Arnau's conception of the just ruler, epitomized in the God-elected king, merged secular and ecclesiastical concerns precisely as the Sicilian post-war reconstruction attempted to do. Individual spiritual reform had to be complemented by a conscious program of collective reform - and Frederick's kingdom, deservedly or not, appeared to meet those criteria. A just ruler, the Allocutio continued, knows that the wealthy always oppress the poor, and therefore he takes pains to ensure adequate review of all the officials under his control and to halt any favoritism in the administration of justice. Neither does he suffer any rich man to be pardoned for any civil or criminal offense, nor does he sanction the commutation of punishment in return for cash. Such a just prince, Arnau assured Frederick, shall never be defeated, whereas a ruler who neglects or abuses justice shall suffer rebellion, upset, and (the physician speaks) illness in both mind and body.40 The Allocutio prescribed few specific measures but clearly added vigor to the king's on-going policies and concerns. From 1305 onwards the royal court increased the pace of its ecclesiastical resettlement and church building, and made extra efforts to root 40

Arnau consistently merged his medical knowledge with his religious insight throughout his writings, drawing direct parallels between physical health and spiritual grace and employing a medical vocabulary both to describe the physical sensations of his mystical visions and to diagnose the spiritual ills besetting corrupt Christendom. In a number of works he invokes St. Luke as the prototype of physician—evangelists blessed with divine intellectus, while in others he refers to Christ as the medicus supremus of this world and the next. See my article, "The Reception of Arnau de Vilanova's Religious Ideas" (n. 3, above).

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out administrative corruption. From this time too Frederick evinced the first symptoms of an acute concern for his own physical health and for that of his family, evidently seeing in it a reflection of his and his family's political performance and spiritual wellbeing. Writing to James immediately after having read Arnau's work, Frederick entreated his brother: "Since I yearn with the greatest desire to be assured of the good health and happiness of you and yours, I beseech you as earnestly as I can to reassure me again and again in your letters to me that you and your family are hale and flourishing . . . And I assure you that by the grace of Him from whom all good things come I am enjoying the blessing of health in my island of Sicily."41 It is obvious from this letter, and many others like it, that Frederick took to heart Arnau's correlation of physical vitality and political and spiritual destiny. In fact, most of the extant letters of this sort date precisely to times of crisis, when the government faced daunting hardships and crucial decisions - in 1313, for example, when the court learned of Henry VII's death; in 1319, when famine struck again and a renewal of hostilities with Naples loomed; and in 1327, when James died.42 Arnau left Sicily in the spring of 1305 upon the election of Clement V as the new pope; Clement, when still archbishop of Bordeaux, had befriended Arnau around the time of an earlier inquiry into his teachings by the Dominican masters, and Arnau now hastened to the continent in the hope of gaining papal approval of his apocalyptic prophecy. If Frederick's evangelical zeal waned in his absence, there is no evidence of it. The successes of the Catalan Company in the east raised the idea of leading, in conjunction with James, the crusade against Islam that Arnau had urged upon him during his winter stay. By 1308 the Sicilians were ready to sail, but plans faltered when the Angevins, fearing the Sicilian build-up, 41

42

ACA Perg. James II, no. 9850 (30 Oct. 1305), writing to James: "Quam de salutari consistentia persone vestre ac successuum felicitate vestrorum certificari magno desiderio aflfectamus, Serenitatem Vestram qua possumus afiectuose rogamus quatenus placeat Excellentie Vestre statum vestrum incolumen et vestrorum successuum incrementa nobis per vestras litteras sepe sepius intimare, ut inde nostro desiderio satisflat de nobis autem Magnitudini Vestre tenore presentium intimamus, quod per Eius gratiam a quo bona cuncta proveniunt in insula nostra Sicilie pleno potimur beneficio sospitatis." See also no. 9852 (same date, writing to James's wife Blanche). A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10181 (23 M a y 1313), 10182 (29 J u n e 1313), 10184 (7 Aug. 1313), 9809 (28 Sept. 1319), 9440 (5 J u n e 1327). M a n y other e x a m p l e s exist, and indeed they m a y almost be taken, despite their innocuous appearance, as indices of crisis in the realm.

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threatened to invade. Instead, the court redoubled its effort to build its network of "evangelical schools" that was growing under the guidance of a company of friars - probably stayers-on from Arnau's visit. In these schools "some will be taught to preach while others will be trained in diverse languages, so that the truth of the Gospels may be made known to all, both pagans and schismatics." These last words evidently referred to Sicily's remaining Muslim population and to the Basilian monks. To meet their evangelizing goals these schools had "already procured evangelical teachers and writers in a number of tongues . . . and caused to be preached throughout the island that all who desire to live in evangelical poverty, from whatever land they be, may come [to Sicily], for there they will receive protection and supply of all life's necessities." Who these friars were we do not know - but Arnau is clearly referring to a distinct group dedicated to paupertat evangelical and therefore certainly sympathetic to, if not fully part of, the Franciscan Spiritual movement. Inspired by Sicily's activity in this area, Arnau at this time around 1309 - recognized Frederick as the "God-elected king." He had earlier been convinced that this figure would arise from the Catalan royal house but had been unable or unwilling to specify an individual. Frederick's evangelism though, coupled with Arnau's dramatic falling out with James, led the mystic to pin all his apocalyptic hopes on Frederick. The argument with James arose from two works that Arnau had recently penned: the Interpretatio de visionibus in somniis Jacobi et Frederici, and, in support of it, the Raonament

d'Avinyo. Arnau eagerly read the Interpretatio to Clement, still hoping to win papal support. But so eager was Arnau to secure such support before he died (he was then near seventy) that he evidently tried to give greater credibility to his prophecies by claiming explicit endorsements of them, in the Interpretatio and Raonament, by James and Frederick. Clement, who by this time considered Arnau to be merely a senile oddity of no real danger to Christian unity, let the episode pass; but when James learned that he had been implicated in Arnau's scheme, and when he was unable to get an acceptable explanation of the ruse, he angrily broke off relations with Arnau and encouraged Frederick to do the same.43 43

According to Clement: "While Arnau was reading I did not bother to apply my mind to what he said, and rather sat thinking about other, more important, matters. I did not

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Whatever its causes, Arnau's recognition of Frederick as the divinely appointed reformer of corrupt Christendom brought evangelical influence to a new peak, and apocalyptic expectations assumed an unprecedented urgency following Arnau's return to the island later in 1309. There he wrote another work on the king's behalf, one bolder and more prescriptive than the earlier Allocutio christiani: the Informacio espiritual. Here Arnau exhorts Frederick to a more rigorous and disciplined commitment to personal reform and a more diligent observance of his two greatest duties as an evangelical king - namely, to promote "la utilitat publica," and to provide justice equally for all his subjects, whether rich or poor, native or foreign. Arnau was keenly concerned with matters of economic status and social class, since the belief in the sanctity of poverty, at least in this period leading up to Antichrist's arrival, lay at the core of his religious thought. Thus he directed Frederick to support the poor against the rich; to keep a dozen paupers close to hand, whom he should faithfully feed before sitting down to his own meals; and to visit the ill in poor-hospitals at least three times a year (at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost) and to bathe them and help administer their medicines. Frederick had also to bring his wife into the evangelical process by urging her to take an active role in charitable work, which she did with great energy and commitment for the rest of her life, as evidenced in part by her activity in church building noted earlier. Eleanor was also given two rather curious duties in the Informacio, First, at the same times that Frederick was to minister to the sick, Eleanor and two ladies-inwaiting were to dress themselves in gowns of fine linen and, thus representing Faith and her handmaidens Hope, they were to visit the major churches and the poor and sick in the hospitals of whatever city they happened to be in, "so that in this way some of the people may have a vision [like that] of the Mother of God entering a place of misery to comfort those who are there." Second, then or later understand what his book said; nor have I ever placed any faith or credence in his ideas." See Miquel Menendez y Pelayo, Historia de los heterodoxos espanoles, ed. Enrique Sanches Reyes, 8 vols. (Santander, 1948), at VII, p. 315: "Verumtamen sciat Regalis Sinceritas, quod ad scripturam illam . . . nos, dum legebatur, cogitantes circa alia negotia graviora, que nostris tune cogitationibus imminebant, mentem nostram non curavimus apponendam, nee ad ilia, que prelibata continebat scriptura, tune vel postea direximus intellectum, neque illis fidem vel credulitatem aliquam diximus adhibendam." For James's breaking off of relations with Arnau, see AGA Cane. Reg. 336, fol. 22—3 (24 Sept. 1310).

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she bore the responsibility of censoring the books held by the royal family, and of purging from the library all "romances and books of worldly vanity"; she was also to read the Scriptures in the vernacular to all the royal children every Sunday and feast day. All the evidence we have suggests that the king and queen adhered closely to Arnau's directions. As noted, they both constructed and maintained many churches, schools, and hospitals - Eleanor at one point even sold off her personal jewelry in order to provide funds for her charitable work. Frederick, for his part, in his last known act before dying ordered the revenues from the county of Modica, which he had confiscated from Giovanni Chiaromonte II, to be distributed to all the poor in Sicily. By 1329, in fact, both king and queen had dispensed with so much of their personal wealth to churches and hospitals that there was little left for new grants to either baronial or ecclesiastical adherents; instead, they gave away their royal jura over lands held in fief from them. Arnau's message obviously hit its mark. Moreover, and more importantly, this treatise exhorted the Sicilians to implement a number of immediate reforms: ordering the public reading of Scripture in the vernacular; completing the restoration of the churches; expelling all "divines, sorcerers, and superstition-peddlers" from the island; reforming the practice of slavery; directly appointing, if possible, all the realm's prelates - or failing that, confirming and certifying their qualifications for church office; urging all Sicilian Jews to convert within one year or face uncompromising ostracism; and, finally, building special hospitals and hostelries for the poor in all major cities.44 The court responded with new legislation, the Ordinationes generates, that incorporated Arnau's instructions so thoroughly that they were long cataloged among Arnau's own writings. "So that we should not appear to have taken up in vain the name of Christ," these laws began, "it is fitting for our salvation that we should pass on the evangelical truth handed down to us by Him, to the praise of His name and the exaltation of the Catholic faith, and that we should 44

The Informacio espiritual appears in Obres catalanes, at i, pp. 224-43. For the reforms cited, see pp. 231—5. Note also the conclusion on p. 242: "E, jasie ago que tot princep de crestians me'n fos bo, e de qual que fos seria aytant alegre com si ere mon fiyll, pero natural amor me destreyn a desiyar e parcagar que vos o vostre frare fossets aquell. Mas yo veyg clarament que Deus appelle vos especialment a aquest ministeri, e, si en vos no roman, a vos vol donar aquesta honor."

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be watchful, with purified minds, that the errors of the unfaithful be checked effectively."45 This is an altogether different tone from that of the Constitutiones regales or the Capitula alia, which were the predictable products of a grossly indebted and still distrusted newcomer. Here we see an energized, activist Sicily, a kingdom with a mission to accomplish - a mission not to secure the recognition of individual privileges and the redress of legalistic grievances, but to attain salvation, to purify minds, to pass on a newer vision of Christendom. Accordingly, the laws mandated the baptism of all slave children and strongly urged slave holders to have evangelical Christianity taught to their adult slaves, while the beating or branding of slaves was prohibited.46 Moreover, local customs - such as those at Messina - which forbade Christians to testify against Jews were remanded, and all Christian subjects were warned against "excessive familiarity and speech" with them. 47 The laws 45

46

47

Ord. gen., ch. 59: "Ut Christi nomen, quo vocamur et dicimur Christiani, in vanum assumpsisse non videamur, expedit pro salute, ut illud efiectu operum inducamus in evangelicam veritatem ab e o nobis traditam ad laudem sui nominis et exaltationem catholice fidei, necnon ut infidelium revocentur errores efficaciter et puris mentibus observemus." Note that Testa's organization of the laws, and his dating, are faulty. Cf. ACA Cartas J a m e s II, no. 3792. Ibid., ch. 60: "Qualiter autem ipsos post dicti fontem baptismatis tractare debemus, docet Apostolus ad Philemonem, dicens 'Suscipe ilium i a m non ut servum sed ut fratrem carissimum in Domino, etc., in carne"'; ch. 61: "Ipsos siquidem servos eosdem, renatos baptismate, et penes suos dominos tarn salubre beneficium consecutos, dominis sui ferventius atque devotius servire mandamus, secundum verbum ipsius Apostoli, dicentis ad T i m o t h e u m 'Quicumque sunt sub jugo servi dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen Domini et doctrina blasphemetur.' Q u i autem fideles habent dominos non contemnant quia fratres sunt, sed magis serviant quia fideles sunt, et delecti, ac participes in beneficiis. Servos enim oportet dominis suis subditos esse, in omnibus placentes, non contradicentes, non fraudantes, sed in omnibus fidem bonam attendentes, ut doctrinam Salvatoris Nostri ornent in omnibus"; and ch. 62: "Ut autem dicta fraterna tractatio et humana benignitas inter alia pateat, qua ipsos neophytos prosequi debent ceteri Christiani, nullis licere providimus Christiana mancipia vulneribus ac flagellis afflcere aut aliquod membrum illis incidere vel devastare, in facie vel in fronte signare, aut in ea aliquatenus insaevire, cum, licet sint domini servorum suorum, tamen suorum membrorum domini non existunt. Eos tamen a dominis castigari permittimus, cum culpa precesserit et Christiana sint, juste, leviter, et benigne. E u m tamen, si fugitivis contumax fuerit vel protervus, poni in compedibus non vetamus." Ibid., ch. 67: "Prave constitutionis seu consuetudinis observantiam, qua Christianorum testimonia adversus Judeos in quibusdam locis Sicilie non admittebantur in causis, tolli volumus et jubemus, statuentes amodo standum fore super hoc juri communi, canonico, et civili"; and ch. 68: "Quoniam Judeorum mores et nostri in nullo concordant, et ipsi de facili ob continuam conversationem et assiduam familiaritatem ad suam superstitionem et perfidiam simplicium animos inclinarent, statuimus, ut Christiani cum Judeis de cetero nimiam familiaritatem et assiduam conversationem non habeant, nee cum eis comedant vel discumbant, nee Christiani Judeorum ipsorum servitiis in eorum domibus pro mercede aliqua aliquatenus se exponant."

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banned the evil practices of "sorcery, magic incantation, augury, divination, and soothsaying,"48 along with the sin of gambling at dice and gaming tables.49 Judicial fines for unlawful slaving practices were reserved for distribution to the poor; and wasteful (and sinful) expense upon luxury goods faced heavy penalties up to 20.00.00.50 Since circumstances did not allow this God-elected monarch to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, his holy mission could instead be accomplished through the spiritual reform of his own land by gradually suppressing Islam and Judaism, wiping out resurgent beliefs in pagan or folk magic, and rejuvenating the evangelical spirit in the Christian community. This charismatic enthusiasm was not a phenomenon of the king and queen alone. Frederick's brother Sang bequeathed his entire worldly estate, according to one source, to the church of S. Croce in Cefalu, and much of the money and effort put into the restoration of churches and monasteries came from the high magnates and lower barons 48

49

50

Ibid., ch. 76: "Nulli restat ambiguitatis suspensum, qui veneficiis, magicis incantationibus, auguriis, divinationibus, sortilegiis, ceterisque talibus innitentes, perversores sacre religionis fidei a Christi fidelibus reputentur, qui prophetie spiritum et habitum divine sapientie simulantes, humanas posse m e n t e s divertere, et scripturarum inspectione futura predicere falso promittunt, volentes D e o similes esse videri, prescientia futurorum, quam sibi D e u s ipse singulari privilegio reservavit. Igitur, ut, tarn causa profani erroris dissipentur actores, q u a m huiusmodi superstitionis materia precludatur et curiositas (scilicet divinandi antiquas leges ad hoc editas, que sub dissimulatione transibant), jussimus observandas, statuentes, ut nullus deinceps audeat in talibus perfidiis laborare, et quicumque post hoc edictum inventi fuerint in regno nostro, quacumque ex causa, magicas, veneficia, incantationes, auguria, divinationes, sortilegia, et huiusmodi talia exercere, tarn facientes quam ipsos ad huiusmodi provocantes, per officiates nostros ad quos tale spectat judicium poena capitis (videlicet exercentes) et deportationis (videlicet provocantes), prout leges ipse sanciunt et distinguunt, irremissibiliter puniantur nisi poenas ipsas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas. Quicumque a u t e m predictos exercentes aut provocantes in publicum detexerint a curia nostra unciam auri unam in premium consequentur." Ibid., ch. 77: "Damnosum atque damnabile alearum ludus, sub quo comprehendimus tarn tabularem q u a m ludum quemlibet taxillorum (quern diversa sequuntur genera vitiorum), inhibere volentes — c u m fraus, m e n d a c i u m , perjurium, atque blasphemie sepius committerentur in ipsis, et e x ipsis postremo rerum d a m n a et odia sequebantur statuimus, ut lex ilia Graeca divi imperatoris Justiniani sub titulo de aleatoribus comprehensa, qua dictus usus alearum vetatur, que per contrariam consuetudinem quasi erat abolita, inviolabiliter observetur. T e n o r e m cuius, ut reperiatur facilius, hac constitutione de verbo ad verbum duximus inscribendum, qui talis est." There follows, at ch. 78, the text of Codex Justinianus, bk. 111, ch. 43. Ibid., ch. 106: "Quod uxores c o m i t u m , m a g n a t u m , militum, et aliorum curialium n o n possint indui panno, cuius pretium transcendat tarinos X X V sub poena arbitraria a b unciis viginti infra, s e c u n d u m conditionem persone; et quod possint indui bis in anno ad plus, et habere duo guarnimenta et non ultra, de quolibet indumentorum absque vayris tamen, quos portare non audeant nisi in mantello, sub eadem poena."

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figures who were also commonly the very officials charged with enforcing the new laws, such as Ruggero Gala, the magisterjuratie for Paterno whose first responsibility in office was "to capture all blasphemers of God, the Blessed Virgin, and His saints."51 Encouraged by these developments, Arnau left Sicily, but before departing he extracted a solemn vow from the king never to withdraw his offer of protection to all observers of evangelical poverty.52 Shortly afterwards, in 1311, Arnau died in Genoa en route to the papal court, where he had hoped to plead once more on behalf of his prophetic reform movement. Meanwhile, further events in Sicily, many of them violent, illustrated the extent of local resentment against Avignon and its constant concerns for money. The parliament grudgingly gave the king the funds needed each year to pay the 3,000.00.00 census owed to the pope for a decade after Caltabellotta but, by 1315, when the economy had begun to constrict, the money was no longer forthcoming, which left the throne in arrears and resulted in extended periods of renewed interdict and numerous excommunications.53 Still more indicative of popular sentiment, overt anti-clericalism began to rise throughout the kingdom and to express itself in increasingly violent terms and actions. The Holy See had earlier attempted to repair relations with the common people not only by actively encouraging the ecclesiastical reestablishment program, but also by sending companies of mendicant friars, chiefly Dominicans, to preach throughout the land. The need for this was quite urgent owing to the severe shortage of clerics. These friars, armed with their 51

52

53

RPSS 11, pp. 808-9 (Sancio); ASP Cane. Reg. i, fol. 55-55V (Ruggero Gala). Note that fourth on the list of his duties is the responsibility of bringing to justice all those caught playing at dice. Jose Maria Pou y Marti, "Visionarios, beguinos y fraticelos catalanes: siglos XIII-XV," Archivo ibero-americano 11 (1919), 113—231 at 221. This article comprises the first installment in a series of twelve, all published in the same journal. The articles were later gathered and published as a volume: Visionarios, beguinosyfraticeloscatalanes: siglos XIII-XV (Vich, 1930), here see p. 102. In 1304 only 2,000.00.00 were paid; a full payment was made in 1305, and regularly thereafter until 1315. From 1315 to 1318 Sicily was again in arrears; John lifted the interdict when Frederick paid the 1^18 census, although the money for the preceding years was still lacking. There is no evidence that the census was paid after the final renewal of war in 1321, and indeed since at that time Caltabellotta was considered a dead letter, it is likely that the Sicilians considered their financial obligation to Avignon nullified. From 1321 onward Sicily was again under interdict. Reg. Benedict XI, no. 1279; Mansilla, "La documentation espafiola del Archivio del Castel S. Angelo, 395—1418," no. 107, 115; John XXII, Lettres communes, no. 5952, 7824.

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sermons and catechisms, traveled everywhere and did much to inspire the spirit of good feeling and high hope that characterized the post-war decade. In addition to the holy Word, they also brought gifts from the papal office in the form of indulgences, which aimed not only to encourage piety and repentance but also to provide revenue for the restored churches by bringing people into them. Thus, for example, Benedict XI in 1304 granted an indulgence of one year and forty days to anyone who had aided, or would yet aid, in the construction of the Dominican priory in Messina; a onehundred-day indulgence to all who visited the church of S. Filippo d'Agira for his feast; another forty-day indulgence to whomever visited the church of S. Maria Virgine in Messina on any of Mary's recognized feasts and memorials.54 Clement V followed with awards of one hundred days' indulgence to all penitents who attended the cathedral church of Siracusa on the feasts and octaves of Mary, St. Lucy, and St. Marcianus; and a year and forty days' indulgence to all attending S. Giovanni Battista in Butera on the feasts of either John the Baptist or John the Evangelist.55 Whether these grants, and others like them, succeeded in their aim is difficult to tell. Certainly in the second half of the reign the need or desire to attract more of the faithful to the churches was clear: with the population in rapid decline and anti-clerical sentiment rising just as rapidly, many of the new and restored churches began to fall into disrepair and decay, owing more to a lack of active support than to Angevin attack. In 1323, for example, the cathedral in Palermo

was in such a derelict state {diruta est et consumta . . . ecclesiam

derelicturam) that the prelates awarded a forty-day indulgence to anyone who visited the church on any of thirty-eight feast days, hoping thereby to increase revenues.56

54 55 56

Reg.Benedict XI, no. 327 (27 J a n . 1304), 588 (2 Mar. 1304), 1083 (10June 1304). Reg. Clement V, no, 896 (3 Mar. 1306), 2356 (9 J a n . 1308). BCP MS Qq H 3, fol. in-iiiv (14 Apr. 1323), indulgences on festivals of Assumption, Annunciation, Nativity, Conception, Purification, St. Nicholas, Christmas, Circumcision, Epiphany, Visitation, Presentation, Resurrection, Ascension, Pentecost, Corpus Christi, St. John the Baptist, SS. Peter and Paul, St. Andrew, All Saints, Holy Cross, St. Michael, St. Laurentius, St. Vincentius, St. Martin, St. Stephen, St. George, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Gregory, St. Augustine, St. Margaret, St. Catherine, Mary Magdalene, St. Agatha, St. Anne, St. Agnes, the eleven Noble Virgins, and St. Elizabeth; thus, observing octaves as well as feasts, it was possible to receive the indulgence for almost any visit to the church at any time. See also fol. 257V-258 (26 Aug. 1323): "diruta est et consumta"; and fol. 261 (30 Aug. 1325): "ecclesiam derelicturam."

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But dissatisfaction with the regular clergy, and especially with the papacy, expressed itself in more concrete ways. The first point of contention was one of the oldest: indignation at foreign control of domestic matters. Diocesan chapters - that is, the major demesne cities - again provided the venue. Local stubbornness had succeeded in checking Avignon's attempt to appoint its own episcopal candidates; but when the papacy failed to install bishops to its liking, it sought instead to control the canonicates within each cathedral chapter. This campaign - which had the immediate goal of controlling the various prebendary revenues associated with each canonry, and the long-term goal of eventually controlling episcopal elections - was undoubtedly a legitimate right of the Holy Pontiff; but it was also guaranteed eventually to foment bitter resentment and hostility among the Sicilians, both religious and lay, who saw no reason to have endured twenty years of war and interdict only to find their local churches once again under the direct control of a papal administration that had introduced Angevin rule. Throughout the post-war decade Avignon appointed, either directly or via those anti-royalist bishops whom they had managed to introduce in Sicily, scores of new cathedral canons, deacons, archdeacons, and prebendaries.57 The shortage of clerics provided the opportunity as well as the pretext. Many of these canons and deacons held double or triple tenancies, both within Sicily and without, which had the effect of enfeebling spiritual life on the one hand, since no church thus ever operated with a full complement of its servants, and of rousing public displeasure on the other hand, since the faithful in attendance not only saw their churches being administered largely in absentia but also witnessed the revenues associated with each canonicate leaving the parish, the diocese, and even the kingdom. Clement V, for example, appointed the young son of one of the papal court's advocati to the cathedral chapter of Palermo while bestowing upon him also the "beneficium, dignitas, et personatus" associated with the canonicate of the church of Perugia, in 1306, and in 1310 arranged a double tenancy for one Francesco Guidone Frangipani to hold the "canonicatus et 57

On Leonardo Fieschi, see Reg. Benedict XI, no. 315 (30 Jan. 1304), 636 (28 Feb. 1304). Benedict described the difficulties posed by the severe shortage of clerics in a letter to archbishop Tizio di Colle of Palermo, see ibid., no. 1093 (3 Apr. 1304).

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prebenda" of the Palermitan church along with (his true residence) that of the church of S. Maria Trastevere in Rome.58 The following year a young canon of Lichfield, who was also archdeacon of Stafford, was made canon of Agrigento; and the year after that the bastard son of a northern Guelf nobleman was placed jointly in the priorate of S. Pietro fuori della Porta at Spoleto and in the archdeaconate of Messina.59 Apart from any ideological opposition to this manipulation of the cathedral chapters that the Sicilians might have felt, they certainly had cause to be jealous of the sums of money thus drained away from local communities. The young cleric from Spoleto, for example, drew an annual income of ioo gold florins (roughly 35.00.00-40.00.00) from his Sicilian posting; nor was this the richest canonry available. One cathedral prebend in Siracusa in 1317 was valued at 300 florins (100.00.00-120.00.00) annually. On average, however, these positions enjoyed revenues of roughly twenty florins (08.00.00) a year - a small enough sum individually, perhaps, but one which meant in the aggregate a considerable loss of hard currency every year; perhaps 2,000.00.00 or more drained away to the continent annually.60 Inevitably the redirection of clerical revenues, coupled with more general economic problems, left many churches incapable of responding to the spiritual and material needs of the local communities. And what many concerned clergy lamented as an inability, angry populaces regarded as a callous refusal to help. Hence the otherwise inexplicable "mounds of filth heaped in the streets . . . piled so high as to block the entrance to the church" described in an earlier chapter. What better way to display animus towards a failed clergy than to block the entrance to their churches with offal and refuse? By 1318 resentment of this manipulation of the churches ran sufficiently high that the revenues owed to absentee canons were halted outright. The catalyzing event may have been John XXIFs appointment, in that year, of his personal chaplain (Guglielmo di S. Vittore) to the cathedral chapters of Palermo and Agrigento, adding the prebends of several rural churches in the diocese of Agrigento to the pot as well. At any rate, after 1318 all 58 59 60

Reg. Clement V, n o . 812 (17 M a r . 1306), 6054 (22 M a r . 1310). Ibid., n o . 6628 (10 M a r . 1311), 7726 (22 J a n . 1312). J o h n X X I I , Lettres communes, n o . 5970 (9 D e c . 1317), 300 florins; n o . 7723 (10 J u l y 1318),

20 florins.

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monies to non-resident canons were effectively and angrily stopped.61 More spectacular displays of anti-Avignon hostility abounded. In part, these were consonant with other expressions of resentment to the papal exile found throughout Europe, although the Sicilian actions were a good deal more severe than most. Signs of defiance emerged as early as 1310, when local churches and monasteries first refused to pay their tithes, and met papal tithe collectors with open hostility. It would seem that economic or demographic pressure had little to do with such rebellion by this date, since serious economic and social difficulties did not set in until three years later. Hence the likely cause is the long simmering resentment of papal attempts to reassert direct control over the island's churches. In 1310, Fr. Blasio d'Ardia, the abbot of the Cistercian monastery at Maniaci, refused to pay his house's annual dues to the Holy See, and fearing that his own superior (the archbishop of Messina) might not support him he fled instead to the court of archbishop Arnau de Rassach at Monreale. Clement V, in the full excitement then prevalent at the newly begun Council of Vienne, dispatched several representatives (another Cistercian abbot and a number of his monks) to Monreale to deal with the recalcitrant Blasio and his unrepentant protector. That is when the trouble began. Then Fr. Blasio and the archbishop's men - who acted not without the knowledge and consent of the archbishop - dared, sacrilegiously, to seize the abbot and monks [sent from Avignon], to tie them up, and to wound them with the most grievous injuries. Finally they even presumed to throw them into the most dire prison cells. But when they were not content even with these actions, they next besieged the monastery of Maniaci with an assembled army, in order that they might break in by force and strike down as their enemies those monks who were there having come with the [visiting] abbot and monks, and then they despoiled the monastery of all its goods.62

61 62

Ibid., no. 41804 (4july 1328, stating that no revenues have been forthcoming in ten years), 43622 (23 Dec. 1328). BGP, MS Qq H 4, fol. 198-201, at 198-198V: "Idem frater Blasius et gentes ipsius archiepiscopi, non absque eiusdem archiepiscopi conscientia et assensu, dictos abbatem et monachos ausu sacrilegio capere, ligare, gravibus injuriis lacessire, et demum diris detrudere carceribus presumpserunt. Nee hiis contenti, subsequenter congregato exercitu dictum monasterium Maniachi temere obsederunt, et tandem fratros eius

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

Blasio, Arnau, and their soldiers then threatened the Sicilian monks and forced them to renounce all their memberships, rights, and loyalties to the monastery, evidently concluding that the only way to guarantee the liberty of the monastery, at that point, was to dissolve it. At a papal inquiry that ensued, under the direction of cardinal Pietro Colonna, none of the Sicilians agreed to show up or participate, although they did submit an affidavit that mentioned that their opposition arose not only from their refusal to pay the tithe but more particularly from their resentment over the pope's forced placement of their monastery under the jurisdiction of the mainland Cistercian abbey of Marmassolio. This placement, in their eyes, was wholly unwarranted and merely provided a new example of how Avignon was trying to undermine Sicilian liberty in the monasteries, just as it was doing with the cathedral chapters. Similarly in 1312, the pope sent two Beneventan legates Bernardus Regis and Leo de Montecaveoso — to the prior of the church of S. Giovanni di Gerusalemme in Messina, Fr. Marti Pere de Ros, who as prior and as locumtenens magistri of the Knights Hospitallers throughout the kingdom had also refused to pay his dues. Once again words turned to blows: Then that prior, among his other acts, told the said archdeacon [Bernardus] that he would never pay the decima, shouting angrily that Bernardus had no right to treat with any other archbishop, bishop, or prelate [on the island]. To this . . . Leo took issue. And then the prior - this took place in the hospice where the archdeacon was staying - erupted in abusive words against Leo, showing no deference to the Apostolic See, and crying out that Leo was lying shamelessly. Placing a furious hand upon his sword he did not fear to run it through Leo and two others who were staying with him; and lest archdeacon Bernardus should respond he issued him too a grievous wound. Finally [Fr. Marti], still not content with the audacity of such rashness, and not fearing to add worse deeds to what he had already done, [ran off and] armed six friars from the convent of the Hospital and many other clerics and lay residents besides. They returned to Bernardus' hospice in order that they might again attack the archdeacon and magister Leo, and might forcibly take away all the money destined for the papal court that they had gathered and had with them. When they arrived at his room, where the severely wounded Bernardus was lying in bed, they were unable to advance any farther because of the hostiis monasterium ipsum violenter intrantes monachos, qui pro dictis abbate et conventu inibi morabantur, ausu nephario vulnaverunt ipsos et dictum monasterium Maniachi bonis omnibus spoliando."

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resistance given to them by the archdeacon's familiares. They turned instead to the weapons which the familiares had left in the hospice's front hall, and at the prior's command they carried these away.63 But rather than risk storming Bernardus' protecting, though unarmed, corps of familiares, the mob instead ran outside, into the stable, and stole the horses on which the papal party had arrived. We do not know what became of any of the participants in this fight. Frederick, feebly, tried to patch relations with Clement by presenting him with new horses to replace those which had been stolen. Such happenings clearly betoken a profound depth of feeling. To Sicilian eyes not only was the church guilty of having initiated all of Sicily's long suffering, but in allowing the people to languish under a decade-long interdict and then in trying to undermine - first overtly, then covertly - the liberty of the Sicilian churches, all for the suspected purpose of raising revenues to provide for another Angevin attack, the church had done more than anger the faithful who had responded with such zeal and joy to the reestablishment of peace - it had, for many, vitiated its spiritual authority. And thus, with the ground prepared for them by boiling popular resentments and by the preaching of Arnau de Vilanova's evangelical friars, the 63

Reg. Clement V, no. 8859 (23 Aug. 1312): "Idem prior inter alia archidiacono predicto [Bernardo] respondit se huiusmodi decimam nullatenus soluturum, dicens animo provocatus, quod ipsum sicut ceteros archiepiscopos, episcopos, et prelatos alios tractare non poterat nee debebat; ad quod, cum dilectus filius magister Leo de Montecaveoso, canonicus Beneventanus socius archidiaconi memorati, ibidem presens respondisset eidem. Prior ipse tune in hospitio dicti archidiaconi constitutus, nobis et Apostolice Sedi non deferens, contra eundem magistrum Leonem ad verba injuriosa prorupit, et sibi quod mentiebatur per gulam, insultans in eum, posita manu furore concitatus ad gladium, cum duobus domicellis suis, qui tune assistebant eidem, irruere non expavit; et nisi ei prefatus archidiaconus restitisset, lesissent eum graviter in persona. Et demum prefatus prior tante temeritatis audacia con contentus, sed peiora prioribus coacervare non metuens, sex ex fratribus de conventu predicti sui hospitalis et quamplures clericos et laicos domicellos eius armus munitos, ad hospitium dicti archidiaconi, ut eum et dictum magistrum Leonum in personis offenderent et pecuniam ad Gameram nostram spectantem (quam idem archidiaconus secum habebat) per violentiam asportarent, dampnabiliter accedentes. Cum ad cameram ubi gravatus infirmitate dictus archidiaconus discumbebat, familiaribus ipsius archidiaconi resistentibus eis, non possent ascendere; se ad arma, que familiares ipsi in eiusdem hospicii aula dimiserant, converterunt, illaque ad dictum priorem, prout eis mandaverat, detulerunt. Duos equos violenter de stabulo ipsius archidiaconi, in nostrum et dicte Sedis contemptum propria temeritate subripere, et secum ad prefatum priorem ducere presumentes." For the unfortunate Bernardus' appointment to Sicily, from his archdiaconate in Nimes, see ibid., no. 6371 and 6381.

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Spiritual Franciscans who arrived in Sicily in the autumn of 1312 found a warm welcome. Forty Spirituals from Tuscany, perhaps an offshoot of Henry of Ceva's group, fled to Sicily after the publication of Clement V's bull Exivi de paradiso at the Council of Vienne. This bull asserted the supremacy of ecclesiastical authority over the spiritual authority of St. Francis's rule in the on-going usus pauper controversy - the dispute over the wealth permitted to Franciscan friars (and by implication, to all clerics) - and although it avoided for the moment a formal decision on that vital question, the bull made Clement's intentions clear enough.64 Rather than wait for the inevitable suppression of their observance of poverty, the Spirituals - the Franciscan splinter faction devoted to the most radical form of evangelical poverty - fled to Sicily. Encouraged by the island's long tradition of granting refuge to dissident groups and by its apparent success in reforming society along the lines dictated by Arnau de Vilanova, they turned first to the local evangelical friars and clergy for support, but eventually pleaded their case before the royal court in Palermo. News of their arrival spread quickly. As the friars offered their prayers for Frederick's soul and pledged to preach for peace and repentance among all the Sicilian people, the Franciscan ministergeneral back in Avignon loudly condemned them as "degenerate sons . . . frauds made angels of Satan, who feign the image of sanctity" yet are "moved by diabolical motives."65 Clement cursed Frederick and recruited James in an attempt to dissuade the Sicilians from harboring the rebels. But he failed - perhaps because 64

For background, see David Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the Usus Pauper Controversy (Pennsylvania, 1989). Franz Ehrle's work on this topic was path-breaking, see esp. "Die Spiritualen, ihr Verhaltniss zum Franciscanerorden und zu den Fraticellen," in Archiv fur Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. Heinrich Denifle and Franz

Ehrle, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1885-1900), at 1, pp. 509—69, n, pp. 106-64, 249-336,111, pp. 553—623, rv, pp. 1-190. Still useful are Malcolm Lambert, Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order, 1210-1323 (London, 1961);

65

and Lambert, "The Franciscan Crisis under John XXII," Franciscan Studies, 2nd ser., 10 (1972), 123-43. For Clement's bull, see Corpus iuris canonici, ed. Emil Friedberg, 2 vols. (Graz, 1959), at 11, pp. 1193—1200; and the discussion in Geroldus Fussenegger, "Ratio commissionis in concilio Viennensi institutae ad decretalem Exivi de paradiso praeparandum," Archivumfranciscanum historicum 50 (1957), i55~77ACA Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 336V-337: "degeneres filii . . . imitatores efTecti angeli Sathane . . . pretendunt imaginem sanctitatis . . . diabolicis agitati stimulis."

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James himself, although he saw clearly the potential dangers in supporting the Spirituals, had a certain sympathy for the evangelical reform movement - and soon many other dissidents from the continent joined the first group of forty.66 As the pressure from Avignon increased, so too the government in Naples began to press hard its claim upon the Calabrian strongholds still under Sicilian control. Rumors spread of a possible crusade against the kingdom. As the threat grew worse, local discords and rivalries flickered into new life. These matters might have caused Sicilian enthusiasm for the renegade friars to flag but for the oblique encouragement given to their efforts by Ramon Llull, who made his first and only visit to the island in May 1313 at the venerable age of eighty-one. Llull was less an enthusiast for poverty than he was a champion of evangelical missions to Islam, and it was the Sicilian campaign of reform and mission - rather than the radical impulse behind it — that he admired. "[Frederick] has ordered and regulated his entire kingdom to the need to know and love God," he wrote with characteristic praise, "and he has done this with such fervor that it frequently calls to mind the commandment that the Lord made to man" - namely, that man's first and overriding obligation in life is to seek, serve, and love the Creator of all.67 It is unlikely that Llull had had any contact with Frederick before 1313, although he must have been aware, through Vilanova's writings, that the king had openly expressed his opposition to the papacy's policies, prior to the Council of Vienne, regarding evangelization of Muslims and Greeks, as early as 1308. During his year-long stay at the royal court Llull wrote no less than thirty-eight essays and tracts on Frederick's behalf, encouraging him to turn away from his domestic reforms and to devote his full evangelical efforts towards supporting a mission to Tunis. This mission, to be led by "christiani bene literati et lingua arabica habituati," would capitalize upon the reportedly imminent conversion to Christianity by the Tunisian ruler 'Abu Yahya Zakariya 'al-Lihyani, who owed his throne to aid he had received from Sicily. 66 67

P o u y M a r t i , "Visionarios," p p . 222—6; A G A C a n e . R e g . 337, fol. 337. Ramon Llull, Liber de quinqueprincipiis, Munich, Stadtbibliothek, Codices latini medioevali 10495, f°l- ! 9^ : "Ordinavit et regulavit totam suam provinciam ad Deum cognoscendum et diligendum, et in hoc conatu totis suis viribus, quare frequenter reminiscitur iussum quod Deus hominibus fecit." See M. C. Diaz,Indexscriptorum latinorum medii aevi hispanorum

(Madrid, 1959), no. 1896; and Hillgarth, Ramon Lull andLullism, p. 109 and n. 258.

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In addition, Llull hoped, "well-educated Saracens would likewise come to Sicily, to dispute with knowledgeable Christians in regard to their faith; and perhaps in this way there might be peace between Christians and Muslims [in Sicily] - which would set a model for the entire world, and henceforth Christians [from any locale] would not need to set out to destroy Muslims, nor Muslims kill Christians."68 Such a mission appealed to the Sicilians, who stood to gain much by improving relations with their southern neighbors, not least an end to fighting for control of Djerba, and safer commerce out of Sciacca and Agrigento; but in 1313 their eyes were drawn northward and eastward, to Itafy and Greece, where they had already committed themselves. Thus their evangelical efforts aimed only at preaching to the Muslim and Greek populations already present within the kingdom. Llull's presence no doubt encouraged the evangelicals; but their failure to respond to his call for international action caused him to quit the island in May of 1314.69 The most crucial factor in the Spirituals' success was their welcome reception by the local clergy who initially were no doubt somewhat suspicious of the friars' orthodoxy but who were eager to accept any help they could offer for revivifying religious life on the island. The Spirituals, having made their way to the royal court and having gained the royal family's support, agreed to submit to an inquiry into their teachings by the chief Sicilian prelates. This inquiry was conducted on 3 June 1314, only days after Llull abandoned the island; the proximity of the two events makes it likely that Llull foresaw the outcome of the inquest, and that he left Sicily precisely because he recognized that the Spirituals would be 68

R a m o n Llull, Liber departicipatione Christianorum et Sarracenorum, in Miscelldnia lulliana, ed. Helene Wieruzowski (Barcelona, 1935), pp. 425-6: "Raymundus . . . proposuit venire ad nobilissimum virtuosissimiim dominum Fredericum regem Trinaclie, ut ipse, cum sit fons devotionis, ordinet cum altissimo et potentissimo rege Tunicii, quod Ghristiani bene literati et lingua arabica habituati vadant Tunicium ad ostendendum veritatem de fide, et quod Sarraceni bene literati veniant ad regnum Gecilie disputatum cum sapientibus Christianis de fide eorum; et forte per talem modum posset esse pax inter Ghristianos et Sarracenos, habendo talem modum per universum mundum, non quod Ghristiani vadant ad destruendum Sarracenos nee Sarraceni Christianos." See also Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq, "Les activites politiques et economiques des Gatalanes en Tunisie et en Algerie orientale de 1262 a 1377," Boletin de la Real Academia de Buenos Letras de Barcelona 17

69

(1946), 5-96 at 60-4, 73-6. Hillgarth, Lull andLullism, pp. 132-3. Frederick, ever impressionable, s e e m s to have taken m u c h o f Llull's m e s s a g e t o heart, for h e nurtured t h e dream to lead a crusade-cummission to Tunis as late a s 1316, and possibly later; see FAA 11, p. 715.

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successful in seeking refuge, which meant that Sicily's eyes would remain inward-turned, towards domestic reform, rather than outward, towards missionary work on the international scene. Of course, it is also possible that the inquiry into the friars' teachings was intentionally delayed until after Llull left the island, for a formal ratification of their religious program might have resulted in a highly publicized rebuke from the prominent Llull, who, after the Council of Vienne, was at the height of his respectability within Latin Christendom; but LlulPs writings give no clue of his sentiments at the time he set sail. At the end of the Liber de civitate mundi, the last work he wrote while in Sicily, he introduced the allegorical figure of Justitia, who directed him to venture to the papal court in Avignon and other princely courts throughout Europe, in order to broadcast his teachings there. This was, for Llull, a common device for ending a treatise and a stay at court. But here, interestingly, he adds that he will reject Justitia's suggestion, since he is tired of parading his inspired ideas before princes who by and large have only mocked him, on occasion struck him, and called him, derisively, a "phantasticus." Instead, he declares, he will go directly to the Muslims in Tunisia "and see if he can win them for the Catholic faith."70 It is difficult not to see in these words a veiled complaint against the refusal of the Sicilian high court to accede to his missionary appeals. The inquiry that met in late May or early June, according to a letter from Frederick to James, convened at the king's request after the rebel Franciscans pleaded with the crown for refuge. The investigating council apparently was headed by Archbishop Arnau de Rassach of Monreale; he was joined by a vicarius of Archbishop Francesco d'Antiochia of Palermo "and various other prelates and religious trained in theology, plus several doctors of both canon and civil law."71 The choice of Arnau de Rassach was significant and 70

71

R a m o n Llull, Liber de civitate mundi (see Diaz, no. 1941), in Raimundi Lulli opera latina, ed. Fridericus Stegmuller, 3 vols. (Palma de Mallorca, 1959), n, pp. 200-1: "Sed Raimundus excusavit se. Et dixit, quod pluries fuit a Curiam et ad pluries principes fuit locutus, quod fides esset exaltata per universum mundum; et fecit libros, in quibus ostenditur modus per quern totus mundus posset esse in bono statu; sed nihil potuit impetrare cum ipsis; et pluries fuit derisus et percussus et phantasticus vocatus. Et sic Raimundus excusavit se et dixit, quod iret apud Saracenos, et videret, si posset ipsos Saracenos ad fidem sanctam catholicam reducere." See Hillgarth, Lull and Lullism, p. 133. ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 3871: "ac convocatis ibidem ad nos venerabili in Christo patre archiepiscopo Montis Regalis et vicario venerabilis in Christo patris

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virtually guaranteed the outcome. Arnau was the king's closest confidant among the island's prelates and remained one of his most trusted advisors and familiares until his death in 1324.72 It was Arnau, for example, who had harbored Fr. Blasio d'Ardia in 1310 when he refused to recognize papal authority over his Cistercian monastery at Maniaci, and who had placed extra arms and men into the rebel abbot's hands in order to attack the papal envoys then inhabiting the settlement. 73 Arnau was, moreover, a Catalan; and thus while he may or may not have been an overt supporter of the evangelical movement, he was at least likely to be familiar with it, since the Catalan pedigree of religious heterodoxy was by then entering its third decade. Catalan evangelicals had been at work in Sicily for at least ten years by 1314, if we can take Arnau de Vilanova's writings at their word, preaching poverty, repentance, and reform in their schools; and a link between Vilanova and the Spirituals existed at least from the time of the trial at Perugia. The specific issue confronting Arnau's panel was whether or not to accept Clement's judgment in Exivi de paradiso that whereas the Franciscan vow of poverty, being a vow sub certo, bound one only to those obligations specifically and explicitly demanded by the Franciscan rule, the vague wording of Francis's precepts required that final authority for determining the rule's meaning lay with the order's ecclesiastical superiors - and thus, ultimately, with the Holy See. The council, however, put the question in a much simpler manner; they sought to determine solely "whether or not the friars were true Catholics and faithful disciples of Jesus Christ" and whether they were "true servants of the Holy Gospels." The friars offered in their defense a copy of the Franciscan rule and Clement's bull. After examining both, the court concluded that "these friars agree with and adhere to both documents" and that "in their Gospel truth and purity the brethren live justly as zealous followers of the Franciscan rule, and thus, by the clemency of the Supreme Pontiff of blessed memory . . . they are

72 73

Panormitani archiepiscopi, et quibusdam prelatis aliis necnon personis religiosis in theologica facultate peritis ac juris doctoribus utriusque." The entire text of this hitherto unknown letter (about a hitherto unknown inquiry) appears as an appendix to my article "Arnau de Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals in Sicily." Garufi, Catalogo illustrate del tabulario di S. Maria Nuova in Monreale, doc. 144; Reg. Clement F , no.

220.

See n. 62, above.

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received into the apostolic protection of the Holy Roman Mother Church."7* Despite appearances, the panel emphasized, this decision did not refute papal claims; rather, it represented the bull's pronouncements in action. Clement had died in April, and a hopeless split in the College of Cardinals had left a vacancy in the Holy See that ultimately lasted two years. Thus the Sicilian council represented the very ecclesiastical superiors referred to in Exivi deparadiso, upon whose judgment, in the absence of papal leadership, the fate of the Spirituals was to be decided. "In receiving these poor Catholics into our land, fugitives that they are from undeserved attack and persecution, we do not offend God or the church; neither do we detract from the religious teaching of Blessed Francis, nor do we displease any of the Catholic faithful, nor do we do anything which may reasonably be refuted."75 Since the Spirituals were merely adhering to a rule already sanctioned by the Holy See, and since the Council of Vienne had not only failed to condemn the Spirituals dogmatically - and had even approved of one aspect of their overall program (namely, the training of missionaries in Arabic and Hebrew) - there could be no alternative but to welcome them. The two-year vacancy in Avignon provided the friars with a temporary respite and gave the Sicilian action the chance to stand unchallenged. New protests arrived from mainland and mainstream Franciscans when still more groups of evangelicals took advantage of the hiatus to join the group already at work in Sicily, but these admonitions were easily ignored.76 The rebel friars set to 74

ACA Perg. James II, extra inventario, no. 3871: "factaque coram nobis per eos examinatione solenni de Fratribus antedictis, utrum essent vere Catholici et fideles discipuli Jhesu Ghristi, ad nostram conscientiam serenandam Fratres ipsi per predictos prelatos et personas alias sunt inventi veraces Sancti Evangelii servatores. Ipsique eisdem prelatis et personis aliis atque nobis cum declaratione papali Beati Francisci regulam ostenderunt. Hos enim Fratres invenimus consentientes et adherentes eis, qui pro Evangelica veritate et puritate eorum recte existunt prefate Beati Francisci regule zelatores et a dementia summi pontificis memorie recolende (prout continebatur in suis sanctitatis apicibus bulla papali plumbea roboratis) in protectione apostolica et Sancte Romane Matris Ecclesie sunt recepti." 75 Ibid.: " p a u p e r e s G a t h o l i c o s . . . i n t e r r a n o s t r a r e c e p i m u s t a m q u a m a v e x a t i o n i b u s e t persecutionibus indebitis fugientes, non Deum et Sacrosanctam Romanam Ecclesiam Matrem nostram offendimus, non religioni Beati Francisci detrahimus, non viris Gatholicis displicemus, non aliquid agimus, unde nobis redargutionis nota rationabiliter impingatur." ™ ACA Cane. Reg. 337, fol. 337.

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work principally in the two eastern valli, spreading their message among the poor immigrants from the west. Val di Mazara, with the exception of Palermo itself, saw relatively little evangelical activity. Additional churches and schools were built, more sermons on poverty delivered, more Greeks, Muslims, and Jews pressured to convert, and Frederick once more took up the idea of a possible mission to Tunis. But the election of John XXII in 1316 brought swift changes.77 His opening salvo was surprisingly restrained - a polite letter that bemoaned the Spiritual controversy as an obfuscating element in Christian life and sought the Sicilians' help in healing the church's wounds.78 But he was determined not to yield. A delegation of Spirituals from the Midi who arrived in Avignon to explain their teachings and to seek clemency was refused a hearing and imprisoned; eventually four of them were burned at the stake. As tensions escalated it became evident that a doctrinal decision on poverty could no longer wait. But John, as his detractors then and now have delighted to point out, had no formal theological training, which made it unlikely that he would soon be able to render a sufficiently knowledgeable decision that would be accepted by all. Nevertheless he set himself to intense study of the doctrinal issues at stake.79 In the meantime he exerted a variety of pressures on the Sicilians in order to persuade them to relinquish their support of the rebels, including a long series of cajoling letters, appeals to James, threats of military reprisal, and an effective campaign to solicit the assistance of Sicily's anti-royalist bishops, notably Leonardo Fieschi of Catania and Giovanni of Lipari-Patti.80 On 15 March 1316 he wrote a scathing letter to Frederick, demanding the immediate arrest of the Spirituals on the island, whether of Tuscan or other origin - a command which suggests that some of the friars who had fled to Sicily may have come from the Midi, since Tuscany and the Midi were at this time the two principal 77 78 79 80

Lambert, "The Franciscan Crisis under J o h n X X I I , " pp. 128, 132. ACA Cartas James II, no. 5503. Lambert, "Franciscan Crisis under J o h n X X I I , " pp. 126-8. A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 5567-8, 5697, 10248, 10257, 10264—7, 10272, 11766; Cartas J a m e s II, apendice, no. 36; Pou y Marti, Visionarios, beguinos y fraticelos catalanes, pp. 107-8; Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 32, 36; Harold Lee, Marjorie Reeves, and Giulio Silano, Western Mediterranean Prophecy: The School of Joachim of Flore and the Fourteenth-Century

Breviloquium (Toronto, 1989), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. LXVIII, p. 45.

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centers of Spiritual activity, and that the friars had picked up some native Sicilian adherents as well.81 There is no evidence of a continued flight of evangelicals to the island after this point, so it is possible that John's action had the chilling effect it desired, even though it failed to engineer the surrender of those friars already granted refuge. By autumn of 1317, however, John's intense study of the theology of poverty was well advanced, and he stood ready to promulgate his three bulls that permanently altered the situation, for Sicily as for the rest of Europe: Quorumdam exigit (October 1317), Sancta Romana (December 1317), and Gloriosam ecclesiam (January 1318).82 The pronouncements, even though they still avoided the vexing issue of clerical poverty jter se, largely settled the matter by mandating obedience to the Holy See as the unfailing arbiter of the Franciscan rule. As John wrote: "Poverty is great, but unity is greater, and obedience is the greatest good . . . for the first is concerned with objects, the second with mortal flesh, but the third with the mind and spirit."83 Church opposition to the radical Franciscans, while it still stopped short of doctrinal censure, now wielded as much force as that censure; in other words, whereas the Spirituals' teachings were not declared explicitly heretical (a declaration that would not come until November 1323, with Cum inter nonnullos), to persist in their practice despite papal orders to the contrary could now be condemned not merely as ecclesiastical disobedience but as heresy.84 Specifically, Quorumdam exigit asserted the church's unique and insuperable authority to define poverty, both as a virtue and a practice; Sancta Romana condemned various recalcitrant bands of "fraticelli seu fratres de paupere vita aut bizocchi sive beghini," whether these were comprised of professed friars or tertiaries, who broke away from the main Franciscan order; and Gloriosam ecclesiam censured for the first time certain of the evangelicals' apocalyptic views, notably those on the advent of Antichrist (or indeed his supposed arrival already in the person of, according to some, John 81 82 83

84

Bullariumjranciscanum, ed. Conrad Eubel ( R o m e , 1898), vol. v, no. 256. Ibid, v , no. 289, 297, and 302, respectively; s e e also Corpus iuris canonici 11, pp. 1213-14, 1220-4, 1225-9.

Bullarium franciscanum v , n o . 2 8 9 (at p. 130b): " M a g n a q u i d e m paupertas, s e d maior integritas; bonum est obedientia maxima... nam prima rebus, secunda carni, tertia vero menti dominatur et animo." For Cum inter nonnullos, see ibid, v, no. 518; cf. Corpus iuris canonici 11, pp. 1229-30.

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himself). Of these three, the last aimed directly at the Tuscan-Sicilian faction, whose apocalyptic convictions had reached the most radical development. John identified four principal errors in their beliefs, which taken together were tantamount to heresy: namely, the dual existence of a "carnal church" and of a "spiritual church" in contest for the mastery of Christendom; the denial of the Roman church's spiritual authority and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the assertion that sacraments performed by a priest in mortal sin were void of grace; and the belief that only the Spiritual brethren represented the ideal of evangelical perfection. "All these, which I recognize as part heresy, part insanity, and part pure lies, I condemn as things to be damned outright," he decreed, before ordering the Sicilian clerics and government to proceed immediately with the friars' arrest and extradition.86 After this, there was little the Sicilians could do, at least officially. Now that Avignon had finally pronounced a formal decree regarding the Spirituals' teachings, they announced their willingness to conform. Indeed, they even anticipated the Holy See's decision. A parliament had convened at Messina in May of that year, and the high clergy used the forum to announce a change of heart in their support for the rebels. To defend traditional ecclesiastical rights was one matter, they asserted, but to oppose declared doctrines of the church was quite another. As one eyewitness described it: "the notables at Messina told [the king] that they would suffer anything for him except to be branded heretics." A charge of heresy, if it came, would invite a crusade against the kingdom, and the island's resources were already stretched beyond the breaking point. Thus the council altered course and ordered the Spirituals to be arrested and deported without delay to Tunis, where 'al-Lihyani had already agreed to receive them in peace provided that they refrained from preaching.87 85 86

87

Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty, p. 181. Bullariumjranciscanum, no. 302: "quae omnia, quia partim haeretica partim insana, partim fabulosa cognoscimus, damnanda potius cum suis auctoritatibus quam stilo prosequenda aut repellanda censemus." The bull further condemned the Spirituals' apocalyptic prophesies and their rejection of the sacrament of marriage. ACA Gartas James II, no. 5669 (in 6 folios), at fol. 6: "Sabet encara Senyor que'l rey Don Fradrich envia en Tunez todos los Frayres Menores, aquellos qui seran hexidos de la horden, de los quales el se era enparado, e deven partir d'aqui en una terida dentro en VIII dias de la data d'esta carta; e entiende acabar con el rey de Tunez que finguen en su terra assi enpero que nohi prehiguen; e en aquest comedio manda que finguen en Gerba

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The specifics of this notice are of great interest. First, the chronology of events. This action followed closely upon the publication of Gloriosam ecclesiam, and yet by the time the parliament had met, arrangements had already been concluded with the Tunisian ruler to grant refuge to the friars. Clearly the parliament took seriously the implied threat of a punitive crusade, since the intervening months had provided sufficient time for an attacking force to be marshaled and the sailing season was entering its high point. Thus the parliament had no sooner made its decision than an urgent embassy set out for Avignon to inform the pontiff of its change of heart. John welcomed the news, and rewarded the Sicilians by ordering the withdrawal of Angevin raiding forces who had been harassing the northern coast of the island for over a year.88 Second, the friars who were transferred to Tunis embarked upon a single ship, a terida. These were far from the largest ships in Mediterranean fleets; most galleys and cogs were considerably larger. Used principally to accompany galleys and cogs on long voyages, or for coastal shipments or fishing expeditions, the average terida in the fourteenth century had a maximum load capacity of thirty to forty persons for a voyage of the length such as that from Messina to Tunis, which could take up to a week. Allowing for the size of the crew, and assuming that part of the ship was laden with commercial goods as well as the emigrating rebels (perhaps as gifts for the accommodating 'al-Lihyani), it is unlikely that all of the Spirituals — of whom there were, according to sources, at least fifty by 1317 - were intended for deportation. Rather, the ship probably carried whatever Spirituals wished to move to North Africa and left many others in Sicily - either to be hidden or to continue openly in their rebellion against Avignon. Having at least gestured towards compliance with John's directive, the Sicilians' relations with Avignon rallied briefly. But the gesture was not likely to placate John for long, and therefore the

88

et entendet que aquesto non faze el plazentament antes muyt forcado por miedo que'l papa les le mande prender e enviar a su poder; en en aquesto ay tenido buen lugar lo que'l rey Don Fradrich assentido en los Sezilianos, 50 es, que'l querian hitar las coces d'aquest feyto, que paladinament et acordada le dixieron los prohomens de Mecina que toda cosa sufririan por el mas que non sufTririan titol d'erges, 50 es, factores et mantenedores d'ereges." ACA Cartas James II, no. 10144,10270,11766. The Angevins had attacked first at Marsala, with a fleet of seventy ships, and then had moved successively eastward until they reached Reggio di Calabria.

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parliament suddenly announced its eagerness to resolve the Calabrian castle dispute and agreed to deliver the strongholds into church hands until a final solution with Naples could be reached. In return for the double compromise, John granted a forbearance of the census payments owed to the Holy See, which were then deeply 89 in arrears. Most of the Spirituals found asylum in Tunis, but a few others migrated to Naples where Queen Sancia received them into her care and where they perhaps encountered fellow exiles from the evangelical movement at Ancona.90 But a fair number remained in Sicily, hidden under new habits and relying on the collusion of the local clergy and populace for their safety. Monasteries such as S. Maria Nemoris Clausa, near Paterno, and S. Placido di Calonero Vecchio, in Scaletta Zanclea, were two such houses.91 Both were good choices, for purposes of hiding. Scaletta Zanclea, though near to the coast, was all but immune from outside interference. A thirteenth-century castle, lying just beneath Monte Poverello at one of the highest points in the Peloritani chain, defined the site; it could be approached, and today can still be approached, only by a single, narrow road that stretched upwards from the coast at a point roughly fifteen kilometers down the coast from Messina. Paterno, located some twenty kilometers northwest of Catania at the base of Mount Etna, was an even safer site, inhabiting a sprawling ledge beneath another thirteenth-century tower from which the entire Simeto valley is visible. Anyone approaching either town could be immediately spotted, leaving more than ample time to secrete any resident evangelicals in prepared hiding places or in the wilderness beyond. Other monastic houses were built specifically to shelter the evangelicals. The site of S. Maria del Bosco di Calatamauro, for example, had been settled by a group of evangelicals as early as 1308. Bishop Bertoldo of Agrigento consecrated the church there on 22 June 1309. After Gloriosam ecclesiam and the expulsion order in 1317, this church became a central haven for the remaining 89 90

91

Mansilla, "La documentation espanola del Archivo del Castel S. Angelo," doc. 113, 115; A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 10265; GG, doc. 114. Ronald G. Musto, "Queen Sancia of Naples (1286-1345) and the Spiritual Franciscans," in Women in Medieval Europe, ed. Julius Kirshner a n d Suzanne F. W e m p l e (Oxford, 1985), pp. 179-214. RPSS 11, pp. 1137-50,1314.

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Spirituals, and was in fact given even stronger support by Bertoldo, who raised the church to the status of a priory (under the Benedictine rule) and appointed one of the original Tuscan refugees, Giovanni Castelluccio, to be its first prior.92 Popular support for S. Maria was widespread; Frederick's magister rationalise Matteo Sclafani, reportedly figured among its most generous patrons.93 The evangelicals who took refuge there included, to judge from their names, a number of Sicilian adherents, suggesting that the friars had succeeded in converting at least some of their protectors.94 From these places the evangelicals continued to preach their radical reform in the countryside, while a few brave souls still haunted the streets of the major cities and summoned large crowds to reform and poverty. It did not take long for word of their continued activity to reach Avignon. In 1321 John complained that the Sicilians were still harboring the Spirituals "and others who go by the tainted name of Beguins." No new expulsion ruse was attempted this time, since the renewal of the war with Robert and John's renewal of the interdict (because of royal confiscation of ecclesiastical lands to help pay for the new war effort) made further dissembling pointless; and consequently the kingdom openly repeated its offer of refuge to the Spirituals and all other disaffected religious groups.95 Many friars emerged from seclusion and redoubled their preaching efforts in the cities, some of which were now in quite desperate condition. Throughout Castrogiovanni, Catania, Corleone, Palermo, Sciacca, and Trapani the bodies of starved paupers and bloodied victims of factional struggles were strewn everywhere. Hatred of the clergy and the fear of apocalyptic portents grew. One of the most telling phenomena was a widespread renewal of an ancient folk custom called the ripitu, which reappeared as early as 1309 and regularly after 1322, as a means of lamenting the dead 92

ASP Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 69,528; see also RPSS1, pp. 707—8. Giovanni remained in office until his death in 1334. » BCPMSQqAi2,fol. 18. 94 A S P Tab. S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 263 (dated 11 July 1343, but containing t h e text o f an earlier d o c u m e n t dated 20 March 1318). T h e n a m e s given are Nicola d'Alcamo, Andrea di Corleone, Pace di Corleone, Marchio di Messina, Nicola di Messina, and Alessandro di Milazzo. The letter also cites two Spirituals from the mainland: Pietro di Catanzaro and Angeluccio di Marchia. 95 A C A Cane. Reg. 338, fol. 31V—32; Pou y Marti, Visionarios, beguinosyfraticelos catalanes, p. n o .

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whose bodies were piling up in the streets. Despite the interdict, priests could officiate at burials but the crowds no longer desired their presence and indeed seem to have regarded their participation as an evil to be avoided. Mass burials and individual funerals alike became occasions of apocalyptic keening, led by female "wailers" (reputatrices) who organized and directed the proceedings. Crowds filled the squares and by-ways, beating drums, ringing bells, waving crosses, striking their breasts, and weeping inconsolably - lamenting not only the death of those being buried but also the very hopelessness of life when men and women must come to judgment without even the benefit of worthy clergy to guide and support them. This was by no means strictly a lower-class phenomenon. In a particularly long and passionate series of ripitu ceremonies in Palermo in 1336, for example, the streets filled with such large crowds of elites, merchants, and workers that the universitas had to request aid from the king in dispersing the people and in persuading the local clergy to overcome popular sentiment against them and to take some sort of action to restore order: When people die in the city, whether they be magnates, burghers, or commoners, the clergy and monks of the city refuse to attend to the ceremonies [of the dead] or to their burial. . . Instead the people take up crosses, strike bells, and carry the bodies of the dead to the church, where they bury them in the cemetery, utterly inconsolable and without the presence of any religious or clergy. Indeed, the people of the city are often in such turmoil that they cause riots and no end of unrest. And so, in order to quell this tumult, this war and rumble, may Your Benign and generous Excellency (upon whom your faithful citizens have always relied in times of adversity, and which others, given the evils of the present times, are frequently willing to accept) provide some relief and, we pray, a solution.96 96

Ada curie vi, doc. 214 (9 Oct. 1336); cf. BCP MS Qq H 3, fol. 243—243V, for a nearly identical text, probably a draft. My translation is based on the BCP manuscript, which provides a more readable text: "Maiestatem Vestram scire cupimus presentium serie litterarum, ut, cum aliqui in urbe ipsa tarn magnates et mercatores quam populares obeant, clerici et religiosi urbis predicte in eorum exequiis et sepulcris noluerint adesse nee vadere, velati cum superpelliceis vel sine ipsis sed homines per se accipientes crucem et pulsantes campanam corpora mortuorum deferunt ad ecclesia et sepeliunt in ipsorum cimiterio inconsolabiliter et absque illorum religiosorum presentia et clericorum; et iam exinde sepius homines urbis predicte turbati sunt et fecerunt et faciunt tumultum et murmur non modicum inter eos; et ad eximendum ab hominibus ipsis tumultum, guerram et rancorem, Vestra se interponat Benignitas et Excellentia generosa (que semper suis fldelibus consuevit in adversitatibus huiusmodi, et aliis quibuscumque quas nequitia temporis faciente sepius sunt perpessi adhibere) consolationem et remedium juxta votum."

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The wording of the request was hardly likely to win royal sympathy for the communal leaders, but the urgency of such occasions is nevertheless evident. A large mob wild with grief and fear, in times of extraordinary hardship, can pose a significant danger, especially if a part of their misery is directed at the religious or political authorities whom they blame, rightly or not, for their difficulties. Frederick had explicitly forbidden such demonstrations as early as 1309, although it is unclear how widespread the phenomenon was at that date.97 Laws in the Ordinationes generates had established firm restrictions on female participation in burials throughout the kingdom; it is difficult, given the wording of these laws, not to associate the behavior they aimed against with ripitu: No woman, noble or common, shall dare to proceed with a bier, or to follow it, as it carries its dead to any church or burial site, regardless of the woman's relation to the deceased, or whatever tie of affection joined her to the dead. The penalty for this of 4.00.00. All bodies of the dead are to be brought covered to the church or graveyard; failure to comply with this entails a penalty of 4.00.00.98 Since cries, chants, and wailings offered on behalf of the dead throw the spirits of any nearby women into a state of grief and persuade them to behavior [that is] injurious to Our Creator, we forbid criers (reputantes) to be present at all funerals, along with all other women who customarily attended to funereal matters . . . Neither shall they ring bells, play musical instruments, or beat drums . . . at a penalty of 4.00.00 . . . If any such criers are unable to pay this penalty on account of their poverty, they are to be driven through the city and countryside with cudgels."

97

98

99

Bresc, Un monde, p. 621, n. 167. A noteworthy wave of ripitu riots plagued P a l e r m o throughout 1329 and 1330 a s well, and prompted Frederick t o order the public whipping o f the reputatrices w h o led the processions; seeActa curie v, doc. 141 (6 Sept. 1330). Ord. gen., c h . 100: "Quod nulla d o m i n a sive mulier audeat ire c u m feretro, s e u post feretrum, c u m corpora defunctorum deferuntur ad ecclesias vel sepulturas, quantumcumque defunctus consanguinitate vel afiinitate sibi junctus fuerit, sub poena unciarum quatuor. I t e m quod huiusmodi corpora defunctorum deferantur cooperta per totum ad ecclesias vel sepulturas easdem; et si quis contrafecerit, solvat uncias quatuor." Ibid., ch. 101: "Item quoniam reputationes et cantus et soni, qui propter defunctos celebrantur, muliebriter animos astantium convertunt in luctum et movent e o s quodammodo ad injuriam Creatoris, prohibemus reputantes funeribus adesse, vel alie mulieres, quae earum utantur ministerio nee in domibus seu ecclesiis vel sepulturis vel alio quocumque loco; n e e pulsentur circa funebria, guideme vel timpana vel alia solita instrumenta . . . poena unciarum auri quatuor . . . que reputatrices, si poenam solvere propter pauperitatem non possint, ne poenalis prohibito eludatur, fustibus caedantur per civitatem et terram ubi prohibita tentaverunt."

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We prohibit all women, noble or common, regardless of their relation to or affection for the deceased, to visit churches or burial sites on feast days or on any other occasion when they might be expected to bewail the dead . . . at a penalty of 4.00.00. And we decree that only the sons, daughters, and wives of deceased persons - and no one else - may dress the dead in burial clothes, at a penalty of 6.00.00.100 No one, regardless of relation to or especially affection for the deceased, may go unshaven for eight days beyond the death of the person involved, except for sons and brothers ... who may grow beards and wear mourning clothes for one month . . . Penalty: 4.00.00.101 Obviously, the reputantes described here are related, etymologically at least, to those involved in ripitu. This concern with funerals had nothing to do with decorum; the law clearly prohibited what it feared - massive ritual outpourings of uncontrollable grief and dismay, ceremonial expressions of wild hopelessness and misery that are wholly consonant with apocalyptic fears. Such spontaneous riots frightened both local and royal government not only for the potential damage to property they could bring but also for their debilitating effect on the general social outlook. Recovering from disease and economic depression, not to mention continuing the kingdom's multiple war efforts, required, if not straightforward optimism, at least a sustained sense of stoic determination and resolve, neither of which was given much encouragement by the ripitu's enervating surrender. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the various factions and comitive contending to control the cities throughout the 1320s and 1330s directly promoted this cult of despair by their conspicuous expenditures on public ceremonies like funerals in order to display their wealth and the supposed extent of their popular following. Few things better symbolized the respect or fear in which comitive leaders were held than ostentatious mass grief over the death of one of their fallen members. 100

101

Ibid., ch. 102: "Prohibemus etiam a dominabus et mulieribus aliisque quantumcumque consanguinitate vel affinitate jungantur iam mortuis ire ad ecclesias seu sepulcra defunctorum diebus festivis vel aliis occasione consuetudinis ad plorandum ibidem propter defunctos . . . Item statuimus, quod filii, filie et uxores defunctorum, et non alii vel alie, lugubria induant ob interitum eorum." Ibid., ch. 103: "Nullus preterea consanguineus vel afFinis maxime defunctorum audeat ultra octo dies barbam deferre, propter obitum eorum, exceptis filiis et fratribus, qui juste dolorem prosequuntur, quibus permittetur usque ad mensem, si voluerint barbam et lugubres vestes portare."

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Still other signs indicate the continued influence of the evangelicals. As late as September 1328 an evangelical friar named Roberto preached throughout the Val di Mazara - his base of operations was likely S. Maria di Calatamauro, although there is no direct evidence of this - on the doctrine of Christ's poverty and the necessity of defying ecclesiastical authority. When he spread his message in the streets of Palermo, and was contradicted by various Dominicans, the people were thrown "in magna perplexitate," according to curial records. The archbishop - Giovanni Orsini, a papal appointee installed early in 1320 to restore order - had Roberto seized and brought before an ecclesiastical hearing. Roberto flatly refused to speak at the inquest, and was imprisoned for heresy. But so great a "rumor et turbatio in populo" erupted that the archbishop's inquisitors ordered Roberto to be released.102 It is significant that this "riot and mob-scene" resulted less from the supposed confusion between Roberto's message and the orthodox teaching of the Dominicans than from Roberto's imprisonment. The evangelical message was deeply rooted. This particular crisis was further complicated, however, by events on the mainland. Louis the Bavarian, who had recently entered Rome to receive his imperial crown, had appointed an anti-pope (Nicholas V) who was a Franciscan Spiritual. Louis's emissaries to Palermo attempted to propagandize on behalf of the rival pontiff, in addition to their principal mission of renewing the Sicilian-German alliance. Frederick, however, balked at recognizing Nicholas; John XXII might be Sicily's implacable foe, an evil-doer and, perhaps even, to the most radical friars, Antichrist himself, but he was the sole legitimate pope. To reject John's legitimacy would be to invite the crusade that the Angevins had long wanted but had thus far failed to secure. Frederick forbade the German ambassadors to speak on Nicholas's behalf; but this prohibition was ignored, causing ever greater confusion in the streets of Palermo as the word was spread from square to square. Eventually the government was able to silence the propaganda, but matters only grew worse when, after asserting the dangerous errors of the German position, the kingdom then

'°2 BGP MS Qq H 3, fol. 268-9V (13 Sept. 1328); cf. Ada curie v, doc. 8; Bozzo, Note storiche, doc. 59.

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renewed its pact to support and defend the now openly heretical Louis.103 Other figures, not affiliated with the evangelicals but still engaged in popular, personal ministries among the urban poor, also acquired significantfallowings.One of these was Guillem de Cut, a Catalan friar of the Teutonic order, housed at the church of S. Trinita in Palermo. When Guillem had been in charge of the local chapter it had been renowned for its goodness and charity. He had allowed the people full access to the church's lands and pastures and shared with them the food and goods at his disposal, even while caring for the inmates at a leper hospital that was under his administration. His successor, however, proved to be such a disappointment - "one who acts atrociously to the people in regard to the woods and pastures, and who daily engages in law suits regarding his properties, causing riots and demonstrations to become a regular event. . . and who has loosed the lepers, allowing them to wander everywhere throughout the city, spreading disease and fouling the air" - that the universitas petitioned to the grand master of the Teutonic order in Italy for Guillem's return.104 Another popular figure was Salvo di Messina, an Augustinian monk noted for his piety and charity. The examples of Salvo and Guillem illustrate a growing problem: as social conditions worsened, many members of local churches, monasteries, priories, and chapterhouses turned rapacious, and either halted whatever charitable activities they had earlier engaged in, opting instead to guard with increasing jealousy what little remained to them in straitened circumstances, or they took advantage of chaotic social conditions to ignore their obligations and devote their energies instead to increasing their holdings. Often only a single, saintly leader like Salvo or Guillem kept their ambitions in check. Once these figures were gone, however, the others "in acting like vipers bring about the ruin of their own church . . . which causes the people of the city to abandon them and to forsake the churches altogether."105 103

104 105

Joachim Leuschner,Deutschlandim sp'dten Mittelalter, 2nd edn. (Gottingen, 1983), Deutsche Geschichte, vol. in, pp. 134—41; FAA 1, doc. 296; AGA Gartas Alfonso III, no. 3683; Cane. Reg. 562, fol. 26-26V, 31-32V; A;ta curie v, doc. 8. Ada curie v, doc. 49 (5 Jan. 1329). Ada curie vi, doc. 212 (8 Oct. 1336): "ut vespiliones, qui ecclesiam ipsam spoliant, nedum sanctitate intacta verum etiam rebus eiusdem quas dilapadant evidenter... ob qua causa persone prenominate urbis . . . ab ecclesia ipsa totaliter deseruerunt et deserunt."

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Fr. Salvo and Fr. Guillem may have been saintly, but they were not saints. Only one figure from Frederick's long reign achieved that status - William the Confessor, or Beato Guglielmo, a hermit from Polizzi, whose cult was established as early as 1326, according to the surviving text of his celebratory officium.106 Guglielmo died, the text says, in 1321 after a lifetime of pious service, solitary penance, and prayer in the region of Petralia Soprana - a settlement on a rocky spur at the foot of the Madonie mountains fifteen kilometers west of Gangi. Living as he did within the county of Geraci, Guglielmo became a special patron of the Ventimiglia family. He died an old man, we are told, but was in the prime of life at the time of Frederick's coronation; hence he may have been born sometime around 1250. His officium offers a fascinating glimpse into the spiritual and moral world of the Vespers era. Its general tone and message is penitential, portraying as it does a tortured soul whose better nature is forever attacked by evil temptation; his is a desperate soul, hobbled by weakness, in a parlous and malevolent world.107 Guglielmo's embattled life was representative of a strain of Basilian asceticism that had close links with the Franciscan movement - both orthodox and heterodox - within Sicily, but especially in the Val Demone. Records from 1308 count no fewer than 101 abbeys and priories in the Val Demone, thirty-four of which were isolated hermitages where souls such as Guglielmo's sought to escape the ruins of the world and to prepare themselves for judgment. Guglielmo was particularly active in promoting the ascetic movement as the sole, or at least the best, means to salvation; he is credited with establishing at least five isolated cloisters in the Madonie mountains. In these hermitages the brethren turned to the urgent business of reform, repentance, and attacking sin in all its forms. Guglielmo's officium consists of eleven readings, each of which is devoted to a particularly important episode in the saint's life and 106 107

BCP MS Qq F 32, fol. 14.V-23. On the ten Sicilians canonized between 1260 and 1360, see Ottavio Gaetano, Vitae sanctorum siculorum ex antiquis graecis latinisque monumentis et ex MSS codicibns collectae aut

scriptae et animadversionibus illustratae, 2 vols. (Palermo, 1657), 1, pp. 230—51; see also Henri Bresc, "L'eremitisme franciscain en Sicile," in Francescanesimo e cultura in Sicilia, secoli XIII-XV (Palermo, 1982), pp. 38-42; Bresc, Un monde, p. 607.

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which illustrates his heroic virtue. They also provide us with a glimpse of the concerns and values of the intensely felt spiritual existence and worldly concern of the ascetic movement. The first reading tells us that Guglielmo spent four years in solitary life at Gonato, a barren site near Castelbuono, in honor of the Blessed Virgin. But as his saintly reputation spread and the settlement filled with other seekers after God, Guglielmo was beset by "various temptations sent by demons." Those demons ultimately led him to journey to Petralia Soprana, where he hoped to purify himself by performing acts of charity on behalf of the poor. En route to his purification, however, he stopped at an inn for the night where he was tempted in the middle of the night by the brazen female innkeeper. Having driven her, shame-faced, from his room he fell back into a fitful sleep, only to have a vision of the same woman slipping into the bedroom of another unsuspecting boarder; although he remained asleep, the office says, he sent his spirit into the dream in order to castigate the woman a second time, from doubly afar. From this episode alone, it is clear that Guglielmo's great weakness, and the great lesson of the reading, is the evil of the carnal, material world, exemplified chiefly in the female form, although there is a clear suggestion that his first temptations focused upon the male would-be ascetics who had clustered around him at Gonato.108 Having returned at some point to Gonato, the readings continue, Guglielmo found that life in the hermitage still presented too many temptations and distractions; hence he departed abruptly to seek peace in a nearby mountain cave. Entering the cavern, however, he came upon "two black-skinned Ethiopians, their eyes burning [with fear] and their hands tied behind their backs." Obviously, these were runaway slaves. But rather than take pity on them, he turned q p 32, foi ^v: "devertet annis ibi completis quatuor et in honore Virginis reparata ecclesia ad locum solitarium, qui 'Gonatum' dicitur . . . Cum autem fratres ibi aliquos aggregasset, et varias demonum temptationes perferret, contigit virum beatum pro helemosina Petraliam Superiorem accedere. Quern videns inproba quedam, ut videbatur devota mulier, hospitio invitavit; sed dum de nocte vir Dei Guillelmus, divus orationi vacans corporis lassitudine nuda humo cepisset dormitando quiescere, mulier, temeraria spiritu diabolico istigata, surgens de stratu servum Christi ad opus illicitum invitabat. Ipse vero Dei famulus 'Desine!' ait, *O infelix mulier, Sathane vinculis alligata! O mente perdita impudens et effrons desine talia dicere, que nefanda sit.' Que, rubore suffusa, ad stratum rediens; sed temptamenta diaboli non obmittens, denuo intempeste noctis silentio surgit et tractare manu illicite cepit juvenem dormientem."

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on them in fury before they scarcely had time to ask for food or to beg him not to turn them in to the authorities. "O, most vile and stupid of men!" he cried, cuffing one of them on the head. "Your entreaties will win nothing from me. A place stands prepared for you already in Hell!" The text is obscure, but Guglielmo seems to have been angered by their intrusion of his planned solitude, rather than by their obvious status as runaways. It is likely, too, that the poor slaves may have been Muslims - most African slaves in Sicily were at least nominally Muslim, until the legislation of 1309 heightened efforts to convert them to Christianity - and thus earned his enmity for religious reasons. At any rate, he drove them from the cave - "I advise you to return to the world, and not to bring your evils into this lonely place; by entering, you may have already assured your [eternal] death!" - by summoning a deep "sound like a terrible thunderclap" from the depths of the cave; after this he always kept the entrance to the cave blocked, whenever he was not there.109 He was next summoned, in the fifth reading, by another vision of the Virgin, this time to build a new church at Fabaria, on the northern side of the Madonie mountains. But his plans fell apart when he suffered "a sickness while on the midpoint of his journey - a rupture of his bowels" that forced him to return to Gonato. Overwhelmed by his sense of failure, he prayed constantly for forgiveness before a statue of Mary. If he stopped praying for even the briefest moment the "infestations of countless demons made him tremble violently"; and hence he halted his prayers only when overcome by sleep. But as soon as he was asleep recurring dreams of falling from the top of a tall tree plagued him until, desperate for reassurance and rest, he took to tying himself to his bed, lest he fall out.110 Eventually his nightmares and sense of shame at having failed Mary passed, and with this passing Guglielmo had survived his own 109

110

Ibid., fol. I6-I6V: "duos Ethyopes intus nigerrimos cernit oculis ardentibus et manibus post terga ligatis. Sed ut clarius ut qui essent agnoscerent [sic], vir Dei caput altius extulisset, alteri dixit Ethiopei: 'O vilissimi hominum! Insensate! Nihil vel modicum tibi tua deprecatio prodest, quia pars tua reservatur InferniP . . . 'Revertere,' inquit alteri, 'ad mundum. Revertere consulo, et ne in hac solitudine male port as. Et tuum hie intrando forte interitum procurasti!'... Subito sonus ut tonitrui terribilis de spelunca intonuit, et eos in momento fugavit." Ibid., fol. 17V—18: "recessus in itineris medio rupture infirmitatem viscerum passus e s t . . . demonum infestationes nimium perhorresceret."

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long dark night of the soul. Henceforth his life increased in holiness and peacefulness. Not coincidentally, Guglielmo's realization of a brightening future corresponded temporally with Frederick's coronation; according to the office, the saint foresaw all the difficulties of the reign that was then just beginning, and predicted the wars and famines that would ensue. But rather than bewail the new king as the bringer of evil times, Guglielmo instead saw the coming hardships as opportunities to bear witness to the Holy Spirit and turned joyfully to widespread preaching among the rural populace. He did not have to wait long for the hardships to arrive. The eighth reading (the last substantive passage, before a rather formulaic treatment of his death) tells us of a dire famine in the land - probably the crop failures of 1311-14 - that brought starving peasants from miles around to the doors of the hermitage. The brethren at Gonato, whose own stores were low, carefully rationed small portions of grain to the miserable wretches; but when Guglielmo saw what they were doing, he hurried over to them and asked with a kindness that the two African slaves would have thought impossible: "Why do you ration? There is no charity in this. God will provide for all!" And when the brothers consequently threw open their entire granaries to the poor, they found that their stores were miraculously replenished and that each vessel in their storehouse was filled to the brim. This marks a clear break from his past. No longer the tortured ascetic, he devoted himself wholeheartedly to preaching and to the practical care of the poor, and in so doing took on a role comparable to that of the itinerant friars. His concern with sin was not yet over, but his reaction to it in others softened. When another vision came to him, in which he sensed evil-doings in the hermitage, he rose from his bed and found one of his fellow monks, one Fra Alberto, in the cellar cavorting with a young woman. Guglielmo hesitated, though, to lash out against the girl, as he would certainly have done in the earlier phase of his career, and instead urged penance on Alberto, who eventually, we are told, bolted from the hermitage and rejoined the world. The girl was evidently seeking food by whatever means lay at her disposal in dire times, and was thus more to be pitied and cared for than punished. Still more remarkably, when on a different occasion another young unmarried woman (femina, not mulier), nearly dead from an exhausting and difficult childbirth, was brought to the hermitage to receive the holy man's prayers, he sadly

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refused, saying with regret that as a sinner himself his prayers would be of no use to the poor girl. Just as the girl was on the brink of death, however, the Holy Mother - taking pity, we are told, on Guglielmo's sorrow rather than the girl's suffering - appeared and assured him that his prayers were heard in Heaven. Thus consoled, he prayed; the child was born, and the young mother recovered.111 This qfficium is a highly suggestive and fascinating text. The bulk of the readings deal with the pre-Caltabellotta years, when war filled the land. Too sick at heart to be part of the world yet too weak to avoid its temptations, Guglielmo took flight into the raw countryside where he devoted himself exclusively to the honor of Mary, the intercessor. His reputation for sanctity - a reputation based on his contemptus mundi and his frightened repentance earned him an avid following, but his physical temptations (initially homoerotic, then, when brought into contact with women, exclusively heterosexual) forced him to seek a more complete ascetic life. It is clear that the saint, and those devoted to him, whether in his lifetime or afterwards, viewed the world as a malevolence, a pitiless abode of sin and evil. Even helpless and hungry runaway slaves cowering bound in a remote cave represented not objects of pity but agents of Satan sent to bring the ruin of Guglielmo's soul. Guglielmo's God, in these readings, is the Supreme Judge rather than the beneficent Creator and loving Redeemer, and His judgment is close at hand. After the darkest of his trials, though, it is significant that he turned, seemingly for the first time, to preaching; this change of heart and of practice directly coincided with Frederick's accession to the throne and the end of 111

Ibid., fol. igv—2ov: "Cum autem nocte quadam in cella quiesceret, vidit per sompnium hircumdamule commisceri, sed cum de tarn rubitu disparim miraretur vox a Deum Toras pollitum, foras veneficium' ei celeriter facta est. Ad cuius vocem perterritus surgens cellasque visitans cum femina fratrem Albertum colloquentem invenit. Qui cordis tactus dolore intrinsecus utrumque pro peccato corripiens feminam cum ignominia procul pulsa, Albertum vero aspere increpans, ut culpam propriam hortatum penitentia purget. Sed cum post dies aliquod dum in stratu quiescens pater dormiret, super montem de quatuor turribus unam cadere et redigi in pulverem videns, vocem Babilon 'cecidet' audivit dicentem sibi. Qui citus surgens eundem fratrem, qui quartus erat, in consortio reperit afifugisse. Fama tandem sanctitatis vulgate beati Guillelmi nimium crebrescente, contigit feminam de Asinello, cui vis pariendi non erat morti iam proximam sibi, per intimos presentari, ut earn suis precibus a tarn gravi mortis periculo liberet, deprecantes. Qui, omnino renuens hoc cum sit peccator se non posse facere affirmet, tandem propinquiore femine devictus, instantia ad periclitantem accedens Sancta Maria succurre miseris devotissimi dicere cepit. Sed cum verbum innapusillanimes iam proferret, ibi continuo puerum peperit femina et incoluminis iam surrexit."

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the war. It also corresponded with the reintroduction of evangelical missions from Catalonia, some of which had begun as early as the 1280s but which received an additional burst of popular and royal support around 1300. Guglielmo was not a Spiritual, but the message he began to propound after 1300 and his sudden activity on behalf of the poor clearly reflects a vital new element in Sicilian religious life, one that is consonant with Spiritual beliefs. In citing (as the ninth reading) the parable of the lamp from Luke's gospel — "No one lights a lamp and puts it in some hidden place or under a bowl, but on the lampstand so that people may see it when they come in" - the office suggests that Guglielmo's sudden evangelical activity resulted from a spiritual enlightenment, a new charity that came to him as reward for his longsuffering penance and faith.112 Like the parable's lamp, Guglielmo, after 1300, had a need to be seen and be useful to the needy people around him. The tortured ascetic turned into a holy and beloved popular preacher. The text also provides an example of a local cult, and how it was used to promote local ends. The Ventimiglia family is referred to three times, suggesting that they played an instrumental role in establishing and promoting the cult. Guglielmo's church at "Fabaria, where the land is abundant with water" was built, we are told, "out of the neverending generosity of D. Aldoino, the great count of Geraci."113 It is possible, too, that D. Aldoino or another family member was the "certain man" who appeared one day, at the end of the third reading, at the entrance of Guglielmo's cave, bearing a loaf of bread and inviting the saint to share with him in a Mass. Aldoino, who died in 1289, was the one who restored the family fortunes; his father, Enrico Ventimiglia, had been an ardent supporter of the Hohenstaufen ruler Manfred, and had lost his life at the battle of Benevento in 1266, after which the county of Geraci had fallen into Angevin hands. Aldoino had been among the first to support Peter of Aragon in 1282, and as a result had the patrimony returned to him. In 1289 he built the stronghold of Castelbuono and transferred to it the populace from his casalis at Fisauli. Hence the establishment of the new site and Guglielmo's rise to prominence 112 113

Ibid., fol. 20V-21. Ibid., fol. 17 (fourth reading): "vulgo enim Tabaria' ubi aquarum est habundantia locus dicitur . . . domini Aldoyni magnified Giracii comitis assiduis helemosinis."

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114

were linked from the start. The county of Geraci is mentioned next in the seventh reading, when the saint made his prophecies regarding Frederick's reign, noting with particular dismay that there would be "war spreading throughout Sicily and Gangi on account of the shortage of food."115 Since this manuscript dates to 1326, the reference clearly is to the destruction of the land caused by the massive Angevin invasion. The final passage, left incomplete, appears at the end of the text, where after detailing the saint's peaceful death the manuscript concludes: "In the year of Our Lord 1326, on the 25th day of the month of February - the first day of Lent - the magnificent D. Francesco Ventimiglia [Aldoino's son and heir] the count of Geraci and Ischia Maggiore, who has remained devoted all his life to the aforesaid Beato Guglielmo on account of the purity of his life, acting as much out of great honor and reverence as on behalf of many priests and laymen, and especially in honor of Holy Mary, went devotedly to the church of S. Maria de Partu taking [the remains of] Guglielmo with him . . . " [text abruptly ends]. 116 From this it is clear that the great count was the chief force behind the establishment of Guglielmo's cult, having personally conducted his translatio into Castelbuono's principal church (the Matrice Vecchia, which still stands, though much restored). And given the prominence accorded in the office to Guglielmo's miracle of the grain stores, it is equally clear that one purpose of the cult was to allay fears regarding the continuing shortages in the region from 1323 onwards. This famine had not only driven people from the land, but it had also seriously undermined Francesco Ventimiglia's own economic position. Long one of the kingdom's most prosperous and capable landlords, one who regularly reinvested at least a tenth of his revenues back into his lands (diversifying into cotton crops, vineyards, and milling, in the process), by the time of Guglielmo's 114 115 116

D. Aldoino died in September 1289 in a storm at sea as he was returning to Sicily from Gaeta, where he had journeyed while on an embassy for James. BGP MS Qq F 32, fol. igv: "cum autem guerra in Sicilia et castro Gangii crebrescente ex victualium defectu quasi et elemosine defecissent." Ibid., fol. 23: "Item anno Domini M CCC XXVI mense Februarii die XXV, prima die Sancte Quatragesime, magnificus dominus Franciscus comes Vintimilii Giracii et Issclie Maioris, qui predicto beato Guillelmo in vita sua ex sue vite puritate semper fuit devotus, tarn maximo honore et reverentia quam pluribus sacerdotibus et populis, inprimis Sancte Marie de Partu devote accedens Guillelmo secum venire ad una locum Sancte Marie de Partu."

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canonization Ventimiglia's agricultural revenues had declined severely and according to extant records made up barely threefourths of his annual expenditures.117 Indeed the very fact of the new cult indicates the extent of the famine, since the text tells us of the enormous crowd that had gathered at the site. Since the kingdom in 1326 still languished under the reimposed interdict, Guglielmo's canonization was of necessity popular rather than formal. No clerics appeared at the parading of the relics and the establishment of the cult; but it is also indicative of the prevailing anti-clericalism in the kingdom — here the rural segment of it - that the new saint himself was not a member of the institutional hierarchy. At no point in the text does Guglielmo have the slightest contact with any ecclesiastical figure. He is in every way a popular saint and one fit for the specific society in which he lived: a man of obscure birth, a lonely seeker after God, a despiser of sin yet no friend of any churchman, a zealous ascetic hostile to and suspicious of this world and everyone in it, though gradually, through the patient workings of divine grace, reconciled at least to pitying the sinful poor who surrounded him. In Guglielmo's spiritual world and in the cult that came to venerate him, he stood as a solitary figure in a blasted landscape, outside the reach of any sacramental priesthood. His salvation, the officium suggests, depended wholly upon grace, which in turn depended wholly on the reform of his heart - that is, on his transition from a furious hermit who drove frightened slaves from their refuge with blows and curses to a saddened but softened popular preacher who urged spiritual reform among the poor and boundless charity towards them, and who was able at last to have mercy even upon desperate temptresses and unmarried mothers. There is no sign that his cult was recognized outside the confines of the county of Geraci. Nevertheless, Guglielmo's life as described and honored in the office of his celebration was strangely emblematic of the fiery, profound, and problematic piety of his times. Evangelical challenges and popular anti-clericalism were not the only difficulties confronting the religious establishment. Economic problems dogged Sicily's churches and monasteries despite royal 117

Epstein, An Islandfor Itself, p. 316; Bresc, Un monde, pp. 675-6 and Table 170; Mazzarese Fardella, Ifeudi comitali, pp. 109-16.

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support and the extraordinary recovery of the post-Caltabellotta years. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the very success of the clergy in recovering their estates and privileges contributed to the troubles after 1313, since many religious houses, eager to capitalize on their restoration to wealth and power, invested too aggressively in real estate and trade and consequently found themselves overextended once the economy began to falter. Making matters worse, much of their investment came on borrowed funds, with church properties and goods used as collateral; thus, when the economy constricted, those churches with heavy debt loads lost not only their investments but also large portions of their recently recovered patrimonies. The most spectacular case was the cathedral church of Agrigento. After lengthy efforts to win back its vast territorial holdings in the Val di Mazara, the cereal-producing heartland, the Agrigentine church earned robust profits for a few years but saw those profits melt away as exports declined and peasant laborers joined the exodus of people to the two eastern valli. The church's investments lay almost entirely in cereal and vine production, there being few mining or manufacturing options available in that part of the realm until the fifteenth century, and consequently the collapse of its grain-based wealth meant the painful collapse of its overall vitality. Continuing struggle with aggressive barons after the poor harvest years from 1311 to 1313 are thus a result of, rather than a cause of, this decline. Since the landholding barons suffered just as much as the church, their only alternative to ruin was to acquire more land by force. Giovanni Chiaromonte thus seized a hillside estate called "Mosarius" on the simple excuse that he needed it - although he later offered the bishop another casalis in exchange after the bishop had appealed all the way to Avignon for help in ousting him. 118 The church became increasingly dependent on loans in order to meet the operating costs of its extant estates and of the church itself. When credit ran short, the bishop was forced to sell property. By 1329 Agrigento's slide into insolvency had become precipitous. It defaulted on a loan made to it by a local baron, D. Ugolino Labro, who responded by arming some thugs and snatching up "various estates and 118

John XXII, Lettres communes, no. 7690 (8 July 1318) \RPSS 1, p. 627. The casalis that Giovanni offered in exchange, called Margidirani, was one which he had previously stolen from the church during the war.

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landplots, a mill, 170 salme of grain, a number of horses belonging to the bishop, the bishop's pearl-encrusted miter, his silver-and-gold crozier, various rings, robes and accoutrements, and several books on civil and ecclesiastical law." D. Ugolino still held these goods two years later, in 1331, and there is no evidence that they were ever returned.119 Two years later Agrigento's fortunes had sunk so low that the bishop was compelled to sell "all the temporal rights, revenues, and receipts of the principal church of Agrigento for two years" to a local notary for ready cash of 600.00.00.120 This may have been the worst case, but comparable difficulties beset all the other major religious houses. The archbishopric of Palermo, which began borrowing money for investment purposes as soon as the ink on the Caltabellotta treaty was dry, was defaulting on loans by the 1320s.121 Here too ecclesiastical property used as collateral to secure the loans was lost, along with the investment.122 Many of the predations on church lands after 1313 probably resulted from bad loans and the resentment they created, and among their consequences was the ruin of contested estates, houses, and mills, along with the gradual decay of the principal churches themselves, owing to a lack of funds for their upkeep.123 Palermo's cathedral was "derelict and decayed" by 1323, well before the ruinous Angevin 119

120

121

122 123

BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 38&-93 (8 Oct. 1329): "casalia seu tenimenta, videlicet unum quod dicitur Facuma et alius quod dicitur Margidirami [the stolen estate returned by Giovanni Chiaromonte in 1318] . . . et molendinum unum . . . necnon salmas frumenti centum septuaginta, ac certos equos dicti quondam episcopi, et mitram cum perlis, et crocem seu baculum pastorale de argento cum capite deaurato, annulos, et alia pontificalia et paramenta, et libros legales utriusque juris." The dispute was appealed to the archbishop of Palermo, who decided, in 1331, in favor of the church. D. Ugolino then angrily refused to relinquish his booty, claiming that justice from Palermo was impossible and announcing that he would, in effect, secede from the kingdom. At the time when the case was delivered to the archbishop, the Agrigentine church and D. Ugolino had both sworn to abide by his decision regardless of its outcome. When declaring his secession from the kingdom, however, Ugolino justified himself by declaring that his promise to abide by Palermo's decision was not binding since he was an excommunicate and, besides, the island lay under interdict. See ibid., fol. 457—70V (20 Aug. 1331), esp. 464—5V. Ibid., fol. 480-3 (7 Sept. 1333). The inhabitants of a number of estates refused to pay their rents to the notary, one Goffredo Curatore, which forced the church to send agents into the countryside along with GofTredo's men, to explain the situation. Reg. Benedict XI, no. 1090 (3 April 1304), in which Benedict gives permission for a particular loan of 1,000 florins. For the start of the defaults, see ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 76, fol. 17V-18 (29 Sept. 1326), after failing to repay a large loan within the five years stipulated by the original contract. Reg. Clement V, no. 9324 (5 June 1313) is an example. Ibid., no. 9680 (9 Oct. 1313), which describes the dilapidated state of the church of S. Maria d'Ustica and the pillaging of its treasures.

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attack of 1325, because of the community's inability or refusal to come up with funds for its care.124 In Catania, despite the city's constant growth in population and in importance as a commercial center, the cathedral church by mid-reign was in danger of falling to the ground because of its decrepitude. As the pope pointed out in 1318, the church had become so desolate and neglected a site that whereas thirty canons had resided there before the Vespers, only five remained to carry on religious services in spite of the city's growth.125 He might as well have considered this a blessing, for no sooner did the Catanian church profit from some new investments than it began to use those funds to aid the northern Ghibellines.126 But cathedral churches were not the only religious houses to suffer from the general economic malaise. Parish churches and monasteries everywhere saw their financial bases erode, and here too the problems appear to have arisen with the crop failure that began in 1311. A handful of ecclesiastical estates, located chiefly in the Val Demone, still utilized bound peasant labor and thus were partially immune from the worst blows the market could deliver; but by the early 1320s few houses failed to feel the pinch.127 Faced with declining agricultural incomes and insufficient public or private largess, churches and monasteries throughout Sicily took to leasing their lands rather than working them. The resulting income was smaller but more reliable. Most church estates and farms had been worked by tenant farmers in the past, with the church landlord receiving an annual rent plus a percentage of the harvest; in the second half of the reign, however, these leases were jettisoned in favor of direct emphytheusis contracts whereby the churches eschewed crop percentages and demanded instead heavier direct cash rents, thus becoming, in effect, distant absentee landlords. These new arrangements appeared everywhere in the 124

BCP MS Qq H 3, fol. 257V—258 (26 Aug. 1323): local universitas grants 20.00.00 "in subsidium reconstructionis magne domus majoris Panormitane ecclesie secus eandem ecclesiam existentis, que ob ipsius vetustatem diruta est et consumpta." Cf. Ada curie 111, doc. 17. Physical decay had set in even before this; the walls of the church itself were "ex corrusione . . . vastata" as early as 1317; see Qq H 3, fol. 241V-242 (1 July 1317). 125 John XXII, Lettres communes, no. 7688 (8 July 1318). 126 Ibid., no. 14102 (22 Sept. 1320). 127 B C P MS Qq H 6, fol. 386 (1 May 1322), discussing the decayed state of the monastery of S. Nicola Gonfessore, beneath the city of Agrigento in the Valley of Temples. The church, which was indeed rebuilt in 1322, still stands. For an example of Val Demone bound peasant labor, and the attempt by some laborers to escape it, see Silvestri, Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala, doc. 10 (29 June 1335).

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1320s and 1330s. The church of S. Maria Latina in Agira, for example, between 1327 and 1336 began to lease houses, workshops, farmlands and vineyards throughout the region by emphytheusis to the virtual exclusion of all other economic activity, even though its records suggest the complete lack of such arrangements in earlier years.128 Likewise in Paterno, above the broad Simeto valley at the southernmost edge of the slopes of Mount Etna, the church of S. Maria di Licodia began abruptly to lease by emphytheusis the farmlands and estates under its control that otherwise would be "of no use whatsoever to our said monastery" owing to its lack of capital to work the lands itself.129 These arrangements often centered on farms and vineyards that had fallen into disrepair and consequently needed an immediate and considerable expenditure of funds merely to restore them to operation, such as, for example, S. Maria del Carmelo's decision to lease to Guglielmo Panturno, a wealthy notary from Messina, "a certain homestead of ours that is now empty and wholly destroyed on account of fire."130 These arrangements quickly became the norm in the eastern valli. Indeed, they provided an ideal vehicle for the reestablishment of the dislocated populace and offered an alternative to merely crowding people into dead cities. With so much rapid change in land tenure, the government took notice and did its best to keep abreast of the altered picture. The results of one government inquiry into the leasing patterns of a church has survived more or less intact, and offers a useful illustration of the situation. The royal justiciarius of the Val di Noto in 1329 compiled an inventory of all those who held lands in emphytheusis from the bishop of Siracusa, plus the amount of the rents they owed. Although the lands themselves are not identified, nor are their sizes given, the list is instructive.131 It identifies thirty-four separate landholdings, held 128 129

130

131

Mons. Pietro Sinopoli di Giunta, // tabulario di S. Maria Latina di Agira (Catania, 1927), doc. 323-34. ASC Arch. Benedettini, Corda 107, fol. 103V-104.V (10 June 1322), leasing "quandam clausuram cum terra vacua et arboribus domesticis et silvestris in ea existentibus sitam et positam in territorio Paternionis . . . de qua nulla utilitas predictum nostrum monasterium contingebat"; also fol. 102-102V (15 June 1322), and 102V—103V (20June 1323). ASM Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria del Garmelo, perg. 37 (8 May 1321): "quoddam casalinum nostrum vacans et derutum totaliter propter ignis incendium"; see also perg. 87 05J u ty I32I)> 88 ( l 6 A u g- J32I)y a n d 41 (27July 1332). BCP MS. Qq H 5, fol. 88-9V (22 Feb. 1329). The lessees appear as follows. Bartolomeo Galfono: 01.03.00; Silvestro Golfo and his brothers: 01.18.00; Marchisio Giafierno:

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by thirty-three separate individuals or families (one trio of brothers had two leaseholds). The rents charged were with one exception uniformly low, ranging from 00.01.00 owed by Giacomino Traversa to 19.09.04 owed by Gregorio Maniscalco. Gregorio's census is entirely out of scale with the rest, however; only two others paid rents above 03.00.00, and the average of all rents owed (omitting Gregorio) is just over a single ounce per year. The Siracusan bishop received a total income of slightly more than 60.00.00 from these leaseholds - all of which appear to have been vineyards. Moreover, each of these holdings was rather small, with the exception of Gregorio Maniscalco's, and was leased, with two exceptions, to a commoner rather than a member of the baronial class. Clearly the bishop wanted to avoid excessive commercial dependency on a coterie of wealthy and powerful barons and preferred instead to offer contracts to the many common laborers available in the region. The list suggests as well the continuing relative vitality of the Val di Noto economy, in comparison with the west, since these vineyards, though small, were highly valued and profitable. Their average census of approximately 01.20.00 was many orders of magnitude greater than those for leased vineyards elsewhere in the kingdom. Vineyards of comparable size near Polizzi, for example, leased at that time for as little as 00.00.05 o r 00.00.07 P e r y ear > even though they often included a house as well as the vineyard itself.132 This difference cannot be attributed solely to the relative quality of these two sites for wine production; in the fifteenth century Polizzi became one of the largest wine producers in the realm, far surpassing Siracusa. The high value of the Siracusan vineyards resulted instead from the high demand for leaseholds created by the influx of free laborers in the district and the church's eagerness

132

01.02.00; Pachio Guigia: 00.15.00; Giacomino Traversa: 00.01.00; Bertino Salimbene: 00.12.00; Giovanni Nicodemo and his brothers: 01.12.00; Nicola Comiti: 00.24.04; Enrico Giunta: 02.26.08; Gregorio Maniscalco: 19.09.04; Giacomo Manchino: 00.12.00; Giacomo Traversa: 01.24.08; Orlando Galvano: 00.12.06; Stefano Galfono: 00.20.00; Lorenzo Arubella: 01.18.00; Antonio Burgo: 01.25.12; Bernardo d'Abruzzi: 01.06.00; Giovanni Falabrino: 00.18.16; Orlando Pica: 01.06.00; Nicola Gucciana: 01.04.16; Silvestro Francomisso: 02.26.00; Giovanni Mergulensis: 01.27.00; Bartuccio Favaciu: 00.21.12; Andrea Favaciu: 02.16.08; Francesco Scanavino: 05.17.04; Bartuccio Gucciano and his brothers: 00.16.00; iidem: 01.07.04; Nicola Gucciano: 01.22.00; monastery of S. Maria Moniale: 02.04.00; idem: 01.27.00; idem: 00.10.08; N. Parisio de Mabilia: 05.25.12; D. Manfredi: 01.24.00. Giambruno, Tabulario S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 35 (1 Aug. 1329), and 42 (16 June

1330-

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to take advantage of that demand by forming contracts with as many of these workers as possible. Siracusa's relative prosperity was, however, a rather lone phenomenon. The churches and monasteries throughout the kingdom attempted to alter and reform their commercial strategies, as the economy worsened, but there was little they could do in the face of mass depopulation in the rural sector and passionate anticlericalism in the cities. With their numbers declining radically, their economic base crumbling and their spiritual authority ignored, resented, and attacked, the Sicilian clergy had little to hope for except that a change in royal policy, if not a change in the dynasty itself, might someday bring about a change in Avignon's relations with the rebellious island, a lifting of the interdict, a rescinding of excommunications, an end to the war, a halt of baronial theft and thuggery, and everywhere a renewal of "that true spirit of Christianity" which Arnau de Vilanova had promoted with such vigor and which had produced such surprising and disturbing results.

CHAPTER 6

In the margins: slaves, pirates, and women

At a distance from the main developments of politics, the economy, and spiritual life, though still intimately connected to each, lay a number of important, if marginalized, groups and activities. Documentation for them is both scattered and scanty, and our narrative sources - so copious for battles and intrigues - are all but silent regarding their more mundane activities; yet enough survives to allow us an occasional glimpse of their actions and stratagems. They seem at first a strange trio: slaves, pirates, and women. But they shared a number of characteristics apart from their marginalized fates. Of the three, slaves numbered the fewest; it is unlikely that the total slave population - that is, the slaves who lived and toiled in Sicily, as opposed to those who appeared briefly on local auction blocks en route to miseries elsewhere - numbered more than a few thousand, far less than it had been only a century before. But they were important beyond their number and affected developments in government policy, regional commerce, and family dynamics, for they stood at the nexus of the kingdom's international and spiritual crises. Their history in the early fourteenth century illustrates powerfully the variety and strength of the forces that were at work in altering the fabric of Sicilian society. Slaves spent their lives well away from history's spotlight, but at least they can be identified as a discrete group. Few medieval individuals could be classified exclusively as pirates, by contrast (although one does occasionally encounter a bold signature like "Ego Petrus, piratus, testatus sum" in the witness lists of otherwise bland documents), because of the nature of piratical activity. A quasi-legal enterprise, piracy was practiced in one way or another by all Mediterranean states and by most seagoing merchants. The threat of piracy haunted the sea lanes as fully as the danger of highwaymen plagued ground routes, for the simple reason that 247

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such avenues stood well outside the de facto ability of most states, whether large or small, to patrol them. Unlike land-based theft, however, piracy followed more or less universally accepted rules, and so long as any would-be buccaneer obeyed them his activities were regarded as an acceptable liability of trade on the high seas, a risk that international merchants willingly assumed in return for large potential profits. Sicily's activities in this area were unremarkable - especially in comparison with the notoriously aggressive Genoese and Catalans - but they engaged the energies of most people with access to ships and weapons. As with slavery, late medieval Sicily's relatively minor involvement in piracy had major consequences and affected everything from diplomatic relations with Catalonia to the weakening of trade in the eastern valli and the collapse of the royal-ducal demesne in Athens. Hardly a minority group, women made up well over half the early fourteenth-century population and their number increased proportionately to men with every decade from 1300 to 1350. The vast slaughter of males in foreign and civil wars accounts sufficiently for this, but other factors existed too. Yet Sicily's women to date have received virtually no attention from scholars. It is an undeserved fate, for women played crucial roles in economic and religious life. War casualties created tens of thousands of widows who found themselves, temporarily at least, in control of a considerable share of property. Moreover, the traditional homekeeper role ascribed to them limited many of their activities but elevated the significance of their child-rearing duties in the face of Sicily's long periods of interdict, clerical shortage, and hostility to institutional faith; they became the chief transmitters of rudimentary religious education and thus bear much responsibility for the direction that Sicily's spiritual life took. The queer significance of the reputatrices is but one aspect of their pervasive influence. As with the more prominent groups of merchants, officials, clergy, and baronial landlords, the daily lives of these three groups confronted ever increasing challenges and disappointments; and like their mainstream compatriots, they frequently displayed considerable ingenuity and adaptability in rising to those challenges. The picture that emerges from our poor records is all too often little more than a sketch, but one that can enlighten, and at times move, anyone interested in understanding the cause and extent of the decay of Sicilian life.

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I SLAVES

From the time of the Norman conquest, and indeed even earlier, slave labor and slave trading played prominent and emblematic roles in Sicily's economic and social life.1 Whereas pride of place in terms of the amount of revenue produced, the bulk of goods brought to market, and the number of people involved - belonged to the grain trade, medieval Sicily owed much of its renown to its reputation as a clearing house for slaves. Its location at the nexus of the east-west sea lanes made the island a natural and much coveted base for the gathering and distribution of captives. Slaves were brought in from many areas: from Muslim North Africa and the sub-Saharan lands, from Greece, the Black Sea, and especially, for a time, from the Levant. Indeed, apart from providing the setting for Richard the Lionheart's famous quarrel with Philip Augustus and his furtive meeting with Joachim of Fiore, Sicily's main contribution to the crusade movement was its role in bringing to European markets the captive Muslims of the Holy Land. And from Sicily this cargo was transported throughout both Mediterranean and northern Europe. Traders from Iberia, the Italian communes, Provence, and the Midi, as well as England and Germany, all appeared in the major ports to buy and sell slaves.2 The importance of this trade is suggested by an 1190 contract between a Genoese slaver, Enrico di Buonfantello, and a fellow merchant, Rubaldo Mallone, for the purchase of a Muslim slave from a section of the southern Regno that was then outside Sicilian control. Enrico accepted liability for the safe delivery of the slave against all impediments "except any violence from the king of Sicily," whose forces stood ready to interdict any such commerce that circumvented Sicilian restrictions or trespassed Sicilian commercial rights. The kingdom, in other words, clearly was willing to use force of arms to protect its share of the trade.3 1

2

3

These comments originated as a paper on "The Sicilian Slave Trade ca. 1300," presented at a Festschrift conference "Medieval Spain in the Western Mediterranean: A Conference in Honor of Robert I. Burns, S.J.," sponsored by the UCLA Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 25-6 October 1991. Only Palermo, Messina, Trapani, Agrigento, and Siracusa have left any consistent record of involvement in the slave trade. Other sites (like Sciacca, Marsala, and Catania) played a much smaller role, owing in part to tariff barriers and in part to geographic features. Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 179-80 and notes.

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By the Vespers era, however, the slave trade had undergone a number of important changes.4 First and most important, the sheer volume of trade had declined sharply. Several hundred slave records survive for the years from 1282 to 1337, some of which describe whole shipments of slaves brought into or out of the kingdom; but the overwhelming majority of these documents involve only the purchase, sale, or manumission of individuals or of solitary slave mothers and their children. This trade is a mere shadow of its heyday. The intense piety of the age had relatively little to do with this radical downturn, although strong efforts were made to convert slaves to Christianity, with consequent implications for their legal status. Far more important factors were the now familiar pattern of economic hardship, depopulation, and social factionalization. These were local causes with local consequences, but the decline of slavery was a Mediterranean-wide phenomenon, as well, that resulted from the simplest of causes: as Europe's international expansion halted in the face of Turkish strength and Mongol aggression, fresh supplies of slaves diminished. The Iberian reconquest brought few captives to the auction block since the defeated Muslims were needed in situ to continue working the land and producing their manufactures; indeed, Muslims from yet unconquered territories were actively courted for resettlement in Christian-held areas. With fewer slaves available, trade inevitably diminished and the costs - whether monetary or personal - of acquiring slaves for trading rose precipitously, which drove many would-be slavers from the profession. For Sicily, this meant that control of the trade passed largely outside Sicilian hands, for few natives had the capital to devote to the risky venture and fewer still had the inclination, given all the other difficulties at hand. The Sicilians who appear in the 1282-1337 records are consumers rather than traders, individuals seeking or disposing of domestic servants, but not otherwise engaged in the large-scale commerce. 4

The only specific study to date is Charles Verlinden, "L'esclavage en Sicile sous Frederic II d'Aragon, 1296-1337," in Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1965—7), 1, pp. 675-90. More wide-ranging are Bresc, Un monde, pp. 439-75; D. Ventura, "Aspetti economico-sociali della schiavitu nella Sicilia medievale, 1260-1498," Annali della Facolta di Economia e Commercio dell'Universita di Catania 24 (1978), 77—130; and Matteo Gaudioso, La schiavitu domestica in Sicilia dopo i Normanni: legislazione, dottrinayformule (Catania, 1926; rev.

edn. 1979), Biblioteca siciliana di storia e letteratura, vol. in.

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The collapse of the crusader states in the Levant (Acre fell only five years before Frederick's coronation), the protectorate established over Tunisia, and the growing dominance of Pisan and Venetian merchants in Egypt meant the loss of the most important sources of new Muslim slaves. Muslim slaves, whether of Levantine or African origin, had long comprised the majority of captives brought to Sicily's markets. Since the island's native Muslim population decreased throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, large numbers of new captives could be brought to market only through foreign conquest.5 But the conquest of Djerba was Sicily's only success against international Islam; consequently a diminution of supply had its expected effect on overall trade.6 Sicily was successful, however, in another arena: Greece. A ready supply of captive Greeks "de Romania" did much to fill, after 1305, the need left by the declining availability of Muslim servants, but in the process, as we shall see, it profoundly if inadvertently altered the tenor of slave practice. Arnau de Vilanova's second visit to Sicily in 1309 came at a high point of his interest in Greek Christendom. An embassy of monks from Mount Athos, which was then under siege by the Catalan Company, had met with Arnau at Marseilles in 1308 as they journeyed westward to seek James's aid in lifting the siege. That meeting fired Arnau's mind with the idea of utilizing Frederick's increasing hold in Greece as a means of bringing the lost, schismatic Greeks back into the fold of true - evangelical - Christianity. He arranged for, and perhaps personally prepared, a Greek translation of nine of his eschatological works, and sent the manuscript eastward with the returning monks.7 Thus, when he arrived for the second time at Messina, he urged the government to undertake a vigorous reform of its slave legislation, both in regard to Muslim slaves but 5 6 7

Abulafia, "The End of Muslim Sicily" analyzes this decline. On the Djerban campaign, see Muntaner, Crdnica, ch. 248-59. The manuscript is now in St. Petersburg, Publichnaja Bibliotheka, MS CXIII, in 222 folios. To my knowledge, none of the Greek texts has ever been edited. One of the texts is the only surviving version of an otherwise lost work (De humilitate etpatientiajesu Christi). For a description of the manuscript, see Joaquim Carreras i Artau, "Una versio grega de nou escrits d'Arnau de Vilanova," Analecta sacra tarraconensia 8 (1932), 127—34. Miquel Batllori, "Opusculum Arnaldi de Villanova nondum editum," in Miscellanea Melchor de Pobladura, ed. Isidorus a Villapadierna, O.F.M. Cap., 2 vols. (Rome, 1964), Bibliotheca seraphico-capuccina, vols. xxn—xxni, at 11, pp. 215—23, offers a Catalan translation of the Greek version of De humilitate et patientia, in an attempt to approximate Arnau's lost Catalan original.

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especially regarding the Greeks who were, as a result of the Company's military successes, appearing in ever larger numbers on the Sicilian market. The Sicilians responded quickly with their Ordinationes generates, in 1310. But before these new laws are examined, the normative practices of the trade up to that point require attention. Slaves were generally not used for farming. This had long been the norm in Mediterranean practice, but particular reasons existed for Sicily's avoidance of putting slaves in the field. These reasons were largely structural, as outlined earlier. In those few places where bound peasant manorialism was still practiced, slave labor would have been redundant. 8 And the great bulk of agricultural labor was drawn from the nearby towns and villages, owing to the mingling of the rural and village micro-economies; workers were hired in the towns and given wages in lieu of plots of land. Moreover, the war years before 1302 and after 1317 disrupted agricultural life to a sufficient degree that despite the flight from the land surplus pools of agricultural labor still existed in many areas, which forced a decline in wages for field workers. Putting slaves, whom it required a significant outlay of capital to acquire, to work on the land was thus neither necessary nor financially sensible. Thus slavery remained essentially an urban phenomenon, and the slaves, whether Muslim or Greek, female or male, were pressed either into domestic service or shop labor. A general sense of their tasks and relative status emerges from a close reading of the extant documents, since slave records utilized a consistent vocabulary in describing types of slaves. Among females, for example, an ancilla was a general house-servant or lady's maid, whereas a serva commonly worked at menial tasks either in the family shop or in the kitchen. Thus the wealthy Messinese merchant Nicola Cappellano, in his 1296 will, bequeathed the ancilla Giovanna to tend to his widow's personal needs in the house in which, although he bequeathed it to the Greek monks of S. Giorgio, his wife would live out her days.9 References to ancillae appear most frequently in wills like this, especially in well-to-do merchant and professional families, and reflect a dying husband's last attempt to provide for 8 9

Silvestri, Tabulario di S. Filippo di Fragala, pp. 34-6, 57-8, 59-61. ASM Corporazioni religiose, S. Maria del Carmelo, perg. 26.

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the wife he is leaving behind; but they are common as well in records of purchases made directly by the wives themselves, either when their husbands were still alive (in order to acquire the necessary help in maintaining the daily household) or after their deaths. 10 Widowhood prompted many women to purchase new domestics, possibly as much for companionship as for services rendered. In these cases, the ancilla was usually purchased with funds specifically bequeathed for that purpose. Other widows, needing ready cash to settle their late husbands' debts, found it necessary to sell their ancillae as soon as their mates had departed. This was the case with Margarita Ricci of Palermo, who had to sell her "ancillam nigram sarracenam nomine Misuda" in June 1308 in order to cover an outstanding debt to the Messinese merchant Filippo Lacerta. 11 Lastly, foreign merchants residing in Sicily, prominent figures who required servants to provide for them on their travels, also owned domestic workers. Resident traders from Majorca, Barcelona, Tarragona, Genoa, and Pisa all purchased or sold ancillae in Palermo, for private domestic use, in a single ninemonth period according to Bartolomeo di Citella's notarial register for 1307-8.12 The higher price commanded by ancillae, compared to servae, and the fact that no minor age ancillae appear anywhere in the extant records, whereas servae are documented as young as two years of age, further suggests that just such a division of labor existed among female captives. A differentiation between male slaves can also be discerned. The fundamental distinction lay between slaves used for the most menial tasks - perhaps including some field work but more likely centering on brute labor such as heavy carrying - and those who were shop servants of some sort. Several records classify slaves as laboratores rather than servi - as, for example, in D. Lamberto d'Ingorgiatore's sale of his "laboratorem Sarracenum nomine Jacob" to the Palermitan Rinaldo Ruggero - while others carefully identify certain slaves as possessing physical handicaps (epilepsy, the possession of only one eye, etc.) that rendered them useful for only limited tasks. These laboratores may well have been employed 10 11

12

ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 29-29V. Ibid., fol. 194.V (5 June 1308). For another example, see fol. 99 (3 Dec. 1307), in which the newly widowed Macalda Scaletta leases the "servitia et operas" of Anna, her "ancillam de Romania" to M. Pagano Barberio for twenty-two years, in return for 4.15.00. Ibid., fol. 29-29V, 38V, 39V, 57V, 184.V, 213.

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in loading and unloading cargo in the ports, where no particular quality other than physical strength mattered.13 Purchasers of slaves for personal use expressed concern for a broad range of qualities in their servants. Most common among the characteristics given overt mention were whether or not the slave {laborator or servus) was mentally ill, a fugitive, a noted thief, a drunkard, or, curiously, a bed-wetter.14 Any of these qualities rendered a slave less desirable, though not necessarily unsellable. One record from S. Filippo d'Agiro documents the purchase of a male slave from a merchant in Catania despite the fact that the slave was "possessed of every possible vice and weakness" that the Sicilians most dreaded.15 The great majority of slaves, whether female or male, were Muslim; prior to the eastern conquests, only 5-10 percent of slaves were Greek. No Jewish slaves were to be found, of course, since Jews remained technically under the protection of the church and were therefore supposedly immune from slavery - but also because, by a longstanding cultural tradition, any captive Jew who might have shown up in port was usually purchased and manumitted by a fellow Jew. Slaves were brought to market from Rhodes, from "Turkia," from "Russia," from "Dalmatia," and from the "partibus Sclavonic," showing the broad compass of the international shipping that passed through Sicily's waters.16 Females were strongly preferred to males, as shown not only by their more frequent appearance in sales records - they represented 60-65 percent of all slaves sold - but also by the higher price they commanded. The mean price of a young adult female slave was 5.15.00, compared to 4.15.00 for males. The domestic uses to which slaves were put did not generally require the males' superior strength. Female procreative ability, quite apart from whatever specialized skills they might have possessed, clearly was the dominant factor in causing their higher price levels, as the children of female slaves - fathered at will, presumably, by the slave owners themselves - were likewise enslaved, thus giving the slave owner a 13

14 15 16

Ibid., fol. 22, I8IV.

ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127B, fol. 41 v; Notai defunti, Reg. 1, fol. 25V-26; BCP MS QqF3i,fol. 15V. ASP Tabulario S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 71 (12 May 1310). ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 24.V-25, 57V, I8IV; no. 127B, fol. 412; no. 185, fol. 14V, 45, 46V.

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steady supply of captive labor without the additional expense of new purchases. Moreover, Muslim slaves, unlike Greek or Slavic ones, were always identified as being either white (albus), olive-skinned (olivacius), or black (niger), with the lighter-skinned captives being much preferred. These classifications may delineate ethnic differences between Arabs, Persians, and Turks; but they also help, on occasion, to identify slaves of sub-Saharan origin, when they are accompanied in the document by the slave's name. Thus, for example, the olive-skinned Fatima whom Pachomeo Bernotto sold to Giovanni Malfrida on 26 September 1307 was likely an Arab woman, whereas the black-skinned Busa sold the following day by Nicoloso Mostardo of Genoa to Orazio Cansario of Palermo was, to judge by her name, perhaps Ethiopian. 17 Other names of darkskinned Muslims that suggest African origins are Massandi, Amiri, Hamutus, Ashera, Musata, and Sadona, although such attributions are tentative, owing to problems of medieval orthography. Two remaining factors determined a slave's value: faith and age. To be disarracenus in Sicily was a matter of race rather than religion, and consequently the market differentiated between Muslim Saracens and Christian Saracens - that is to say, slaves who had been baptized. The latter comprised two types, those who had voluntarily converted to Christianity, and those fathered by the Christian slave owner, who automatically received baptism, though not freedom, at birth. No clear pattern emerges when one compares the data on baptized Muslims with unbaptized, except for the fact that Jews were not allowed to own Christianized slaves. (They appear frequently as owners of Muslim slaves, however.) 18 Mean prices for converted and unconverted captives are virtually identical, although the figures may be somewhat misleading since the ages of Christianized slaves were, for reasons that are not clear, seldom recorded.19 Age was an important factor, though one not applied systematically. In general, slaves under the age of five were of little value, since health hazards made their survival a matter of some doubt; they often sold for as little as 00.15.00. Similarly, slaves over the age of thirty saw their market value decline sharply unless 17 18 19

ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 37V, 38V. Ibid., fol. 41,45V, 46V, 68v; Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 14; Thomas, Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum, doc. 14, 18. Two exceptions: ASP Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 102; no. 185, fol. 7.

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they possessed a unique skill. The price required, however, for their manumission, if they were in a position to bargain for it, rose steadily beyond that age. This trend possibly hints at the general life expectancy of slaves, and certainly suggests a cynical attempt by slave owners to take advantage of a growing sense of desperation felt by aging slaves - a willingness to pay even grossly inflated prices in order to live free in one's last years. Thus Matteo Synga of Palermo and his wife Giovanna were able to demand 10.00.00 (the price of two average-sized houses in the capital) from their aging Fatima, although in this case they mercifully granted her freedom on credit.20 Slave owners came from the professional classes; they comprised a cross-section of the leading merchants, artisans, jurists, and urban magnates. Silk weavers, dyers, cloth merchants, grain merchants, goldsmiths, coopers, shipbuilders, notaries, judges, and tax officials, plus a dozen other professions, made up the caste of slave holders. Merchants and artisans purchased their slaves indiscriminately, apart from market influences: cutlers, for example, evinced no discernible preference for Muslims over Greeks, apart from the greater availability of Muslim slaves prior to 1305. But if surviving records provide a representative picture, municipal officials, notaries, and judges unanimously preferred Greek slaves to Muslim. These slaves, coming from the more literate east, may have been put to use as elementary tutors to children or else employed in minor clerical tasks. It is likely too that the possession of literate Greeks played a role in asserting one's social prominence in the status-conscious juridical classes. Slaves were brought to Sicily in a variety of ways. Some adventurers, like Guglielmo di Malta, captured individuals from the Muslim and Greek communities on the peninsula during the recurrent struggles with Naples. Guglielmo's will, dated 3 February 1298, directed that compensation be made to those people in Calabria from whom he stole money, horses, and servants during his campaigns there.21 But most slaves were brought to the island by professional slave traders who traversed the sea lanes in galleys 20

A S P Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127B, fol. 137, 244V. Cf. Polica, "Carte adespote dell'Archivio Gargallo," doc. 3 (20 Oct. 1325), in which 10.00.00 could purchase "quoddam palatium . . . sine solario, cum domo antigua" in Siracusa. 21 A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 1184.

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filled with fresh war captives or with slaves purchased in one location and sold in another. Once arrived in port, the slavers presented their inventory to the harbormaster (magisterportulanus), who was responsible not only for collecting duties on imported and exported goods but also for authorizing and advertising all slave cargoes to be sold.22 At Sciacca in June 1310, for example, the royal harbormaster Corrado Lancia di Castromainardo posted the following representative notice: Nos Gonradus de Castromaynardo miles tenore presentium notumfieri volumus universis, quod comitiva comitis Francisci de Viginti Miliis, cum galea Henrici de Manria, ducit de conscientia nostra in Siciliam de insula Gerbarum, quod habuit in cavea ad certum pretium servos Sarracenos subscriptos - videlicet, servum unum nigrum nomine Adde, annorum undecim; servum alium olivacium nomine Aris, annorum quindecim; servum alium olivacium nomine Yseyt, annorum decem et octo; et servum alium olivacium nomine Ayre, annorum viginti sex. De quo presentem sibi ad sui cautelam fieri fecimus nostro sigillo munitum.23 These four slaves, captured during the fight for Djerba, probably were not sold at Sciacca, which was simply the first port that the ship put into upon returning to Sicily. Instead, Francesco Ventimiglia, armed with this royal confirmation of his cargo, probably moved on to the large bazaars at Trapani or Palermo before auctioning off the slaves. Slave traders usually worked as asocietas, or ad hoc corporation, in order to share the burdens and risks of the profession. Those risks were considerable. Compounding the general decline in the trade itself were the difficulties of trying to make a profit in a Mediterranean beset with piracy and with closely guarded privileges in every port. In 1304, for example, a Genoese slaver named Ottobono della Volta joined with one Georgios Grecos, a merchant from Crete, "and a certain Simone Gavata of Sicily, plus another [Sicilian] fellow who used to be a Jew but is now a Christian going by the name of Marco Cantareno," in an attempt to unload a large shipment of more than fifty slaves at a Cretan port without paying the heavy Venetian duties. The Venetian duke of Crete caught the traders in the act, and, in addition to collecting the 22 23

Pietro Corrao, "L'uflicio del maestro portulano in Sicilia fra Angioini e Aragonesi," in XI Congresso n, pp. 419-32. ASP Tabulario S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 72.

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necessary dues and a penalty, confiscated the slaves themselves; the traders lost well over ioo.oo.oo.24 A successful venture could pay handsomely, however. Pachomeo Bernotto and his socii sold a shipment of seventeen slaves, all Muslims, in auction at Palermo after arriving in port on 26 September 1307; their gross receipts totaled over 50.00.00. Unsold slaves would then be placed back on the ship and taken to the next port, where they would be auctioned yet again.25 Frequently a single slave would be bought and sold several times. An unfortunate woman named Aziza, a white-skinned Muslim ancilla from Nocera, was owned by Tommasso Lamatu, a goldsmith who probably captured or purchased her during the war and took her to his home in Messina. At some point she converted to Christianity and took the name Rosa. In May 1308 Tommasso sold Aziza/Rosa to a Catalan merchant from Tarragona with the unlikely name of "Aglinus Pagllarisius," who returned with her to Tarragona. Once there, Aglinus promptly sold her to another merchant, Ramon Peris. In December of that year Ramon, deciding for whatever reason to be rid of her, gave Aziza/Rosa to his procurator (a Valencian, Jaume Tredes) who took her to Palermo, where on 8 December she was at last sold to 'Abdul 'al-Salaam ibn Il-fa'it, a prominent Muslim merchant from her native Nocera. 26 The slave trade prior to 1310, then, was in many ways emblematic of the overall Sicilian experience - a chaotic struggle during the war, in which trade declined sharply and foreign investment fell largely into the hands of the Catalans, followed by a rapid rebound after 1302, when Sicily once again had wide though weakened trade connections but was increasingly dependent upon foreign merchants to brings goods into and out of Sicily's ports. The Ordinationes generates had much to say about slave practice. As discussed earlier, the legislation of 1310 evinces a powerful sense of dread and urgency, a conviction that Sicily stood at a crossroads no less fateful and permanent in its implications than the rebellion of 1282; but unlike the merely political and economic consequences 24 25 26

T h o m a s , Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum, doc. 12,14, 16,18. A S P Misc. archivistica, ser. 2, no. 127A, fol. 37V, 38,39V—40,41,47V, 53V, 57V, 57V—58,58 (top, middle, and b o t t o m ) , 59V, 59V-60, 78V. Ibid., fol. 184V; no. 127B, fol. io6v, 107V-108. It is possible that Abdul al-Salaam purchased her in order to ransom her from a Christian faith that had been forced upon her.

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of the Vespers, the issue confronting the kingdom in 1310 was nothing less than the fate of its soul, and indeed (in some minds, at least) the kingdom's role in the salvation of Christendom itself. Only by such a thoroughgoing reform could Antichrist be overcome. Essential to these apocalyptic concerns was Sicily's new position in the east, where the Company, having moved from Asia Minor to Greece, was gradually securing its control of a large portion of the Greek heartlands, and where Arnau de Vilanova's teachings had arrived, thanks to his hastily prepared manuscript. One assumes, although no evidence attests to it, that at least one or two evangelicals followed the book-laden monks to Mount Athos, in order to assure the propagation of their message, either among the Greek populace or among the Company members settling in the Greek lands. The laws, like the Informacio espiritual which inspired them, sought to root out evil rather than injustice, and to promote piety rather than social equity. In addition to condemning all forms of gambling, promoting public, vernacular, Scripture readings, and ordering the expulsion of all "spell-casters, divines, sorcerers, and superstitionpeddlers," this new program aimed to promote "the evangelical truth handed down to us by Him, to the praise of His name and the exaltation of the Catholic faith" by regulating all aspects of inter-faith and inter-ethnic contact within the kingdom. But in the normally segregated life of medieval cities - in which Sicily was, despite the heterogeneity of its ports, no exception — most of the regular contact between Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Muslim populations was limited to the market place. The persistence of slavery in the demesne cities meant that, by Frederick's time, the greatest amount of inter-ethnic or inter-religious contact occurred, as it were, under captive circumstances. As Arnau saw it, the imminence of Antichrist's arrival demanded the immediate removal of all potentially harmful contacts, if possible; but if such drastic surgery proved impossible, the only other course was to promote the Christianization of the contaminating influences. Thus, most of the new slave laws aimed to bring slave ownership more in line with Christian values as the evangelicals understood them, and to make it easier to spread the faith among the Muslim and Greek captives. All slave owners, for example, were henceforth forbidden, on penalty of a year in prison, to oppose or hinder such conversion

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attempts. Conversion did not bring freedom, however; at best it merely protected the slave by entailing the owner with a legal, in addition to a moral, obligation to treat the convert with the respect and brotherly love required of, and towards, all Christians. If anything, baptism placed an increased burden upon the slave, since he or she, as a Christian, henceforth was expected to treat his or her owner with an increased respect; to violate one's duty to a fellow Christian added a moral stain to the merely legal transgression of one's obligation to one's dominus. Citing Paul's first epistle to Timothy: All slaves "under the yoke" must have unqualified respect for their masters, so that the name of God and our teaching are not brought into disrepute. Slaves whose masters are believers are not to think any the less of them because they are brothers; on the contrary, they should serve them all the better, since those who have the benefit of their services are believers and dear to God.

The new law placed the slave owner in the position of spiritual mentor, at whose urging the slave had been brought to baptism, and to whom the saved slave should henceforth remain especially 27

Ord. gen., ch. 59: "Ut Christi nomen, quo vocamur et dicimur Christiani, in vanum assumpsisse non videamur, expedit pro salute, ut illud efTectu operum inducamus in evangelicam veritatem ab eo nobis tradita ad laudem Sui nominis et exaltationem catholice fidei, necnon ut infidelium revocentur errores efficaciter et puris mentibus observemus. Cum igitur veritate non agnita Saraceni servi vel liberi vendant cum eorum erroribus in sue salutis dispendium, et ruinam, quos forte, aut ipsorum aliquos, doctrinam Christi sepius audientes, ad sancti fontem baptismatis divina dementia revocat, evangelica inspirante doctrina, providimus illos coadunari ad audiendum sepe sepius verbum Dei, proponendum ab apostolicis religiosis et aliis personis, ad quas huiusmodi spectat offlcium predicandi, ut ingrediendi ad januam omnium sacramentorum, que est ipsum baptisma, liber sit aditus, et introitus planus pateat et suavis, omnem clausure materiam ad impedimentum huius itineris providimus removeri. Hac igitur perpetuo valitura constitutione sancimus, ut nullus de cetero tante temeritatis existat, ut servum suum Saracenum, qui ad idem baptisma adductus aspirare voluerit, vel huiusmodi sancto proposito retrahat, revocet vel perturbet, quinimmo ipsum ad hoc aspirantem, tanquam id gratum habens, adjuvet, et moneat, et si forte quis contravenire presumpserit, de hoc apud judicem loci contra dominum ipsi servo deponendi querelam tribuimus potestatem; qui dominus in judicio presentatus ad consentiendum baptismati servi sui post aliquos dies, juxta arbitrium Ecclesie, coercione debita compellatur, et per unum annum continuum in vinculis deputetur. Idem de extraneo, qui alienum servum Saracenum vel liberum baptizari volentes impediat, duximus ordinandum. Si vero domini presentia haberi non poterit, vocatus ad hoc per duos dies vel tres expectari, nichilominus absque molestia baptizentur. Et nihilominus prefati servi ad assumendum ipsum baptisma per suos dominos impediti, hoc legitime constito, statim sine calumpnia baptizati adipiscantur premia libertatis, nisi poenas ipsas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas."

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loyal.28 But the slave owner likewise faced heightened responsibilities to treat his slaves humanely. The branding of slaves, and the infliction of any form of physical punishment, stood condemned. The prohibition of branding served two purposes: first, it protected the slave from a harsh and potentially dangerous practice; second, it ensured that baptized Muslims would be treated, in the event they ever gained their freedom, as Christians. The brandings suffered by many slaves had served not only to mark them as slaves, but also as Muslims. Unless a second brand were to be added, identifying a person as a baptized Christian, a freed slave faced the potential danger of being mistaken for a Muslim - and hence being forced back into slavery.29 A desire for the humane treatment of all Christians, whether slaves or not, and regardless of ethnicity, inspired the next law in the code. It forbade anyone, but especially the owners of converted slaves, from hurling the insult of "renegade dog!" at anyone known to be a Christian or capable of proving his or her faith, whether the person vilified was Arab, African, Jewish, Greek, or of any other nationality. 30 This epithet was, and indeed still is, a particularly 28

29

30

Ibid., ch. 60: "Qualiter a u t e m ipsos post dicti fontem baptismatis tractre debemus, docet Apostolus ad Philemonum [v. 16], dicens: 'Suscipe ilium iam n o n ut servum, sed ut fratrem carissimum in D o m i n o et in carne'"; and ch. 61: "Ipsos siquidem servos eosdem, renatos baptismate et penes suos dominos tarn salubre beneficium consecutos, dominis sui ferventius atque devotius servire m a n d a m u s , secundum verbum ipsius Apostoli, dicentis ad T i m o t h e u m [16.1—2]: 'Quicumque sunt sub j u g o servi dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne n o m e n D o m i n i et doctrina blasphemetur.' Q u i a u t e m fideles habent dominos n o n contemnant, quia fratres sunt, sed magis serviant, quia fideles sunt et delecti ac participes in beneficiis; servos enim oportet dominis suis subditos esse, in omnibus placentes, non contradicentes, non fraudantes, sed in omnibus fidem bonam attendentes, ut doctrinam Salvatoris Nostri ornent in omnibus." Ibid., ch. 62: "Ut a u t e m dicta fraterna tractatio et h u m a n a benignitas inter alia pateat, qua ipsos neophytos prosequi debent ceteri Christiani, nullis licere providimus Christiana mancipia vulneribus ac flagellis afTicere, aut aliquod m e m b r u m illis incidere vel devastare in facie vel in fronte signare, aut in e a aliquatenus insevire; cum, licet sint domini servorum suorum, t a m e n suorum membrorum domini non existunt. Eos t a m e n a dominis castigari permittimus, c u m culpa precesserit, et Christiana sint [sic], juste, leviter et benigne; e u m tamen, si fugitivus contumax fuerit vel protervus, poni in compedibus non vetamus." Ibid., ch. 63: "Verumtamen, quia predicti neophyti post tantam divinam baptismatis gratiam non sunt afTiciendi contumeliis ac injuriis exprobandi, quinimmo caritate fraterna ac humana debent benignitate tractari, statuimus, quod nullus dominorum neophytorum dictorum, vel extraneus tarn temerarius existat, quod predictos servos neophytos de cetero audeat exprobare conviciis et contumeliis afficere, videlicet vocando eos vel aliquem ex eisdem sends, canes renegatos. Per que videatur eidem baptismati derogari, quoniam sic eos vocando et exprobando videatur innuere, quod de fide ad perfldiam et de veritate declinaverint ad errorem; c u m renegare secundum fidem hoc

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offensive insult in Sicily, one that probably entered the culture with the arrival of the Arabs, among whom it is also a strong vulgarism. Dogs, because of the dirt and disease associated with them, were considered to be among the lowest forms of life, and were never domesticated. Instead, they roamed the streets, eating scraps of refuse and spreading filth. To throw such an epithet at anyone, but especially at a co-religionist, was an offense that could not be ignored, and one which usually resulted in an altercation. Sicilians, with their highly developed sense of personal honor, were particularly sensitive to any such personal slight. A commercial dispute between Ruggero di Giudice Marchisio and Filippo Carastono, in 1312, for example, turned abruptly violent after a careless personal snub interrupted the hitherto peaceful proceedings. Similarly the public quarrel between Giovanni Aiello and Giovanni Cisario in Palermo, for all its bitterness, seemed about to subside until Cisario offended his rival's personal honor by calling him "as great a liar as any bastard son of a priest - which you are!" Such name-calling could not be condoned, and knives emerged.31 The concern for the "renegade dog" insult shows a sensitivity to the particular disgust held by Sicily's Muslims for that epithet. By prohibiting the insult, the law hoped to forestall any hotheaded reaction to it that might result in charges being brought against the slave. The Ordinationes dealt with many other issues. All children born of slaves, regardless of the race or religion of the parents, were ordered to be baptized; and if any owner attempted to prevent this action, the child automatically received his or her freedom. Clearly, such an order effectively sealed the future of Islam in the realm. Few free Muslims remained in the kingdom except for an active community on the western island of Pantelleria, and mandatory baptism of all slave children assured the gradual winnowing of the community still further. The law had a second consequence as well. It guaranteed the eventual nullification of the rights of Sicily's Jews to possess slaves, since all Muslims were to be converted at birth, and since Jews were expressly forbidden to possess Christian slaves.

31

sapiat veritate relicta erroribus ad errorem et canes vocari, secundum usum loquendi, Judei tantum sint soliti ac pagani. Hoc idem de Judeis ad fidem Catholicam redeuntibus duximus statuendum. Quod si quis contra fecerit per annum unum stet in vinculis carceratus, nisi poenas ipsas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas." Ada curie 1, doc. 24 (15 Jan. 1312); v, doc. 5 (12 Sept. 1328): "Tu mentiris per gulam sicut filius presbiteris bastardus, qui tu es!"

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Thus Jews retained the right of slave ownership, but eventually would have no slaves left to own.32 Turning finally to the question of the increasingly numerous Greek slaves in the realm, the laws stated that any Greek who returned to Roman Catholicism was to receive his freedom automatically - that is, without compensation for the owner - after a period of seven years.33 Clearly, the court (and Arnau) hoped that by winning substantial numbers of Orthodox faithful back to Catholicism, they might significantly improve their relations with Avignon, and so assume their proper place as the leading Christian state in the reform and evangelization movement. The seven-year delay had two aims: to placate those who had recently purchased Greek servants and did not wish to see their investment wasted, 32

33

Ord. gen., ch. 64: "Ad pullulandum etiam et augmentandum dictam fidem Catholicam, et ut parvuli, in infantia baptizati, crescant et roborentur in ipsa, perpetuo mandamus edicto, ut domini servarum — sive Christianarum sive Saracenarum parientium - partum ipsum, postquam ad lucem pervenerit, sicut assuetum est, in suis filiis facere, baptizari procurent. Quod si contrafecerint, infantes ipsi nihilominus sine calumnia per ecclesiam baptizati, liberi statim fiant." And ch. 65: "Cum indignum sit Christianos servos per baptismatis dignitatem efTectos Christi filios et fideles Judeis, quos propria culpa suppressit, perpetue servituti vel ceteris etiam infidelibus ministrare; itaque volumus et districte mandamus, ut nulli Judeo aut Saraceno vel alicui alii infideli baptizatum vel baptizari volentem emere liceat vel in suo servitio retinere. Quod si quern nondum ad fidem conversum causa mercimonii emeret et postmodum factus sit vel fieri desideret Christianus, datis pro eo duodecim solidis, ab illius servitio protinus subtrahatur. Si autem infra tres menses ipsum venalem non exposuerit vel ad sibi serviendum tenuerit eundem, nee ipse vendere nee alius audeat comparare, sed nullo dato pretio, perducatur ad premia libertatis. Venditor autem, qui servum Christianum scienter vendiderit infideli, poenam carceris per annum continuum sustinebit; et nihilominus servus ipse premio gaudeat libertatis, nisi poenas predictas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas. Si vero servi Judeorum, non emptitii sed nati in domibus fuerint eorumdem, statim cum baptizati fuerint, eisdem dominis nullo dato pretio, libertatis premia consequantur." Ibid., ch. 72: "Licet Greci de Romania hucusque se ab obedientia Sedis Apostolice subtrahentes fuerint abominati Latinos; tamen quia eis, qui oderunt nos, benefacere ac esse misericordes, evangelica doctrina constringimur, etiam Grecis ipsis providimus caritatis opera non negari — quapropter, salva ordinatione ac provisione Sedis Apostolice (cui, si circa hoc aliquid ordinavit ac statuit, quod penitus ignoramus, aut de cetero forsan statuetur, sincere capita nostra submittimus Eius provisioni atque arbitrio, stare ac obedire), protinus disponentes statuimus, ut quicunque de predictis Grecis Romanie emerit captivum et detulerit tanquam servum, eum non nisi per septem annos audeat retinere, cum ipsum dicto completo septennio reddi providimus sue pristine libertati. Quam constitutionem non tarn ad emendos extendimus, quam iam ad emptos. Hoc tamen beneficium ad eos porrigimus, qui firmiter credent et simpliciter satebuntur articulos fidei, prout Sancta Romana Mater Ecclesia credit et tenet, ad veritatem redeuntes ipsius, earn unam et solam omnium ecclesiarum magistram et dominam recognoscant. Quod tempus septennii ex eo tempore jubemus incipere, ex quo coeperint credere et firmiter confiteri articulos fidei, ut Sancta Romana Ecclesia credit et tenet, ut superius declaratur."

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and, more importantly, to guard against any relapse to Orthodoxy on the part of the slaves. Seven years of adherence to the Latin faith, it was felt, adequately proved the sincerity of the conversion. Another statute offered them a unique, extraordinary protection: no Greek slave, whether Catholic or Orthodox, could be resold without his own expressed permission. If a slave, or any other involved person, declared any reservation over the morals or character of the proposed new buyer, the sale was illegal; anyone contravening this law, except in cases of urgent necessity, forfeited the price received for the slave and was further sentenced to a month's imprisonment.34 And finally, fearing the reputed Hellenic predisposition to "perform acts hateful to Christ and contrary to evangelical truth," unlawful - i.e. homosexual - sexual contact with Greek slaves was vehemently forbidden.35 These laws, and others in the package that deal with topics other than slavery, are more than reformist. They do not represent an attempt merely to regulate an important trade that was undergoing profound change, or to rejuvenate a commerce in decline. Rather, they provide further evidence of the storm of evangelicalism that swept over the land. By seeking to take one aspect of a spiritual ethic that was gathering force, and to turn it into the law 34

35

Ibid., ch. 73: "Quoniam durum interdum atque crudele videbatur, Christiana mancipia videlicet de partibus Romanie de dominio unius ad alterum quacunque alienationis causa transferri, c u m forte ipsa mancipia sub dominio patroni prioris pacifice honeste devoteque diutius conversata, doleant ad alium ignotum dominum transitura verentia, ut sub novi emptoris dominio honeste vivere nequeant, n e e per emptoris abusum absque detrimento anime conversari, providimus, ut nullus aliquod mancipium Christianum de Grecis de Romania vendere audeat persone suspecte, de qua evidenter appareat aut conjecturari possit aperte, ipsum non nisi ad turpe servitium sive questum velle habere, aut si forte ipsum mancipium tarn magnam devotionem ad dominum priorem habuerit, ut nullo modo videatur eidem cum alio vivere bene posse. Q u o casu sine voluntate dicti mancipii de ipso alienatio ulla fiat, nisi forte urgens causa atque necessitas immineret. Quod si contrafecerit, servus protinus fiat liber, pretio, quod venditor inde perceperit, emptori protinus restituto. Et nihilominus venditor ipse per unum m e n s e m carceri mancipetur, nisi poenas predictas in alias arbitrati fuerimus commutandas; hoc tamen, ut supra." Ibid., ch. 74: "Quamvis mancipia suis dominis obedire teneantur, domini tamen ipsi eisdem mancipiis, et maxime Christianis, nihil audeant injungere vel mandare, quod sit in Christi opprobrium, qui est Dominus Dominorum et prejudicium evangelice veritatis. Quapropter dominis ipsis, sub poena heretice pravitatis, injungimus, ut aliquod tale dictis eorum mancipiis non audeant injungere vel mandare." Compare Arnau's teaching in the Allocutio christiani that "every ruler - whether king, duke, count, or baron - who would govern men and exercise jurisdiction over them ought by all means to avoid four thing: injustice . . . injury to others . . . the abuse of nature [i.e. homosexuality] . . . and deceit against God and one's neighbor."

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of the land, the new slave legislation, and the extent to which those laws were obeyed, provide a measure of the extent to which that new ethic was felt. As it turned out, these laws may have been the only ones that Frederick had anything like complete success in persuading his subjects to observe; this was especially true in regard to Muslims. Efforts to convert Muslim slaves and to cater to the perceived needs of the Greeks continued throughout the second half of the reign. Surviving records go to some pains to emphasize their full compliance with the new laws. As early as 4 January 1311, for example, Giovanni Guini purchased a "mulierem de genere Grecorum Romanie," whom he acquired, it is emphasized, "juxta ordinationem regiam huiusmodi Grecis de Romania specialiter factam, prout hec et alia in quodam instrumento publico de venditione et traditione serve predicte plenius continetur."36 Most purchase contracts of Greek slaves after this date make a specific point to emphasize, often laboriously, that the sale was performed "secundum statuta." But other sorts of records reflect the spread of the evangelical reform. The last will and testament of Giovanni Fidanza of Catania, for example, dated 30 August 1317, provides an inventory of the slaves he left behind for his heirs: item servam unam nigram veteram Ghristianam, nomine Benevenutam; item servam unam Ghristianam, nomine Geram; item servum unum Christianum, nomine Philippellum, fllium dicte Gere; item servam unam Ghristianam, nomine Soldellam, filiam dicte Gere; item servum unum puerum, nomine Faivum [?], fllium dicte Cere.37

These were all converted Muslims, since not only were Greeks always identified as such, regardless of their Orthodoxy or Catholicism, but only converts from Islam took Latin names. Efforts to convert adult Muslim slaves, and the required baptism of all Muslims born into slavery, had resulted in the virtual disappearance of Islam in Sicily's captive populace as early as six years after the Ordinationes. The conquest of Djerba temporarily added a large number of new Muslim slaves to the scene; but the evangelical project ran its course in regard to them as well. In 1336, when the brothers Giovanni and Bartolomeo Garresio inherited 36 37

Verlinden, "L'esclavage e n Sicile," p. 680. A S C Arch. B e n e d e t t i n i , Corda 283, fol. 1-4.V, at 3V (record d a t e d 11 D e c e m b e r 1317 but containing text of will from 30 August).

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their parents' estate, they were able to itemize the family's slaves as follows: servum unum Christianum, nomine Petrucium; item alium servum nigrum, nomine Sayd; item alium servum nigrum, nomine Musudum; item alium nigrum Christianum, nomine Guillelmum; item servam aliam Girbinam Christianam, nomine Griginninam, cum filio, nomine Marachio; item servam aliam nigram Christianam, nomine Agatham; item servam aliam nigram Christianam, nomine Franciscam . . . servum unum nigrum Christianum, nomine Matthaeum Coscinum; item servum alium Christianum, nomine Gerlandum; item servam aliam, nomine Zarolam, cum filia, nomine Palmucia; item servam aliam, nomine Luchiam.38 The final decline of Muslim Sicily is here on display. But what of the enslaved Greeks who came to dominate the market? Charles Verlinden, in his well-known article, proceeded almost document by document through the extant records, carefully noting for each one that it scrupulously adhered to the 1310 laws. The phrase "secundum statuta" appears over and again, in these documents; but clearly not all Sicilians were pleased with the new regulations and the consequent curtailment of their slave profits. A slave who could veto his owner's attempt to sell him to another had an obviously declining commercial value, especially as he grew older and became more aware of the advantages given to him by the Ordinationes. And the mandated manumission of Catholic converts, without compensation, could hardly have delighted many slave owners. Since the penalties for disobeying any of the ordinances were quite severe, however, one had to find other means of avoiding the force of the law. Verlinden failed to notice, or neglected to emphasize, that many slave-owning Sicilians indeed found a way to circumvent the legal constraints placed upon them. Rather than sell the slave, they sold his labor. These work-leases, as one might call them, became increasingly common after 1320. The owner sold (vendidit) the "work and labor" (servitia et operas) of the slave for periods ranging from twelve to twenty-five years; but they often fixed no specific time to the contract. Perro Cisario, for example, purchased the servitia et operas of Ioannes, a sixteen-yearold Greek, from Pere Ancaroll of Tortosa, on 16 June 1327, on the understanding that he would free Ioannes after twelve years. But 38 BCP MS Qq H 6, fol. 530-5, at 531V-532.

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Perro remained free to sell Ioannes' labor and service to another buyer at any time before 1339; this new buyer, should he follow upon the terms of Perro's original contract with Pere, had until 1351 to "liberate" the lad's labor, unless he chose to sell that service to still another purchaser. In this way Ioannes could theoretically pass the remainder of his life in slavery, being traded from one "lessor" to another, while Pere Ancaroll, technically, retained ownership over his person, back in long-forgotten Tortosa.39 Some contracts stipulated that the slave in question was to be "liberatus ab omni vinculo servitutis" after the initial leasing; but these were rather few in number.40 The overwhelming majority of Greek slave sales after 1320, and particularly those of males, follow the servitia et operas stratagem. In brief, the changes that took place in Sicily's slave trade mirrored the challenges that rocked the island in the Vespers age. From an international commerce that it had dominated in the central Middle Ages, slavery had become an increasingly minor affair in terms of its economic importance; and it had become increasingly under the control, even within the kingdom itself, of foreign merchants who commanded the sea lanes and therefore, in a sense, commanded the Sicilian ports. The religious crisis altered for a time the way that Sicilians viewed the world and the way that they practiced slavery, although even here they found ways to circumvent the demands of their own faith. As with the larger economic strategies of the demesne cities, Sicilians showed a resilience and adaptability that no one expected but which enabled them to continue their activities profitably for at least another decade. But finding ways to escape legal strictures and moral scruples, however unfair or unworthy these may have been regarded, is not necessarily the same thing as a positive social or economic advance. Political coincidence provided a fresh supply of Greek captives at the precise moment when the availability of Muslim slaves ran short, and allowed a temporary continuance of the trade even while it introduced a new element in the spiritual debate that engulfed the island. And the development of the 39 40

A S P Notai defunti, Reg. 76, fol. 121V-122. Ibid., Reg. 77, fol. 132—132V (10 May 1329), leasing the "servitia et operas unius sclavi de genere Sclavorum de Sclavonia, nomine Martinus" to a hosteller of Palermo for a period of twelve years, with the stipulation: "ita quod completis dictis annis duodecim dictus sclavus sit liber et absolutus a servitute."

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work-lease allowed slavers to dodge the force of evangelical legislation for which they had little empathy. But these evolutions did not resolve the central problem at issue. That issue is not slavery jter se. It is wrong to judge fourteenth-century activities like slave trading and slave owning by the standards of twentiethcentury morality. The issue at stake is instead one of social commitment and self-deception. Urban Sicily's glad seizure of Greek slaves, despite the economic motives that lay behind it, made no sense in light of the numerous political and spiritual troubles that gripped the island. Hauling shiploads of captives to Messina hardly ingratiated the Sicilians with their new subjects in the eastern duchy and did nothing to foster better relations with Naples, whose subjects they were enslaving. It also widened and deepened the rift that existed between the commercial and the administrative sectors of society, as the communal jurists and officials feigned a cultivated air in their high-gated mansions with supposedly more civilized Greek servants, whereas the cities' merchants toiled away with their less chic Muslim maids and retainers. Moreover, the work-lease loophole represented a sensible but callous avoidance of self-imposed constraints and commitments. Far better to repudiate the law than to mock it - and certainly the coastal towns never shirked from repudiating or cheerfully ignoring any other royal mandate with which they did not agree or which they felt ran contrary to local needs. Only on this issue, out of all the problems confronting the kingdom, did the communes consistently pay lip-service to the law's ends while openly repudiating its intent and its content. Statutes regarding marriages, arms-bearing, inheritances, taxation, dress, and assembly could be, and were, avoided or ignored with impunity and, indeed, a certain brio. But when it came to the high moralism of slave owning and slave trading, they deemed it better to trumpet their faithfulness to the law's letter while avidly avoiding its intent. And that trumpeting is the problem. Too many Sicilians accommodated their own understandable, indeed practical, desires with arguments fit for that purpose alone, without seeing a contradiction between what they professed, rightly or wrongly, and what they did, rightly or wrongly. Emblematic of many of the difficulties confronting them in the early fourteenth century, "evangelical slavery" was a problem that they never solved but only rephrased.

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II PIRATES

For the merchant societies of the medieval Mediterranean piracy was a growth industry, one that afforded handsome opportunities for financial gain, personal notoriety, and risky pleasures. It was not a new phenomenon. Robbery on the seas had been commonplace since ancient times and had figured large in the political fortunes of many individuals and states; but the decline in Mediterranean trade during the early Middle Ages inevitably brought about a concomitant decline in maritime thievery. To the pirate enthusiast, these were indeed the dark ages. The commercial revolution of the central Middle Ages, however, had allowed this shadow industry to spring to new life. From the twelfth century onwards, piracy was rampant, indeed endemic, throughout the Mediterranean. Every maritime city or state, and often, it seemed, every individual, with access to ships and weapons engaged in it. Crews were cosmopolitan, made up of volunteer adventurers from all locations; and they were ecumenical in their targets, caring far more for the size and contents of the victimized ship's hull than for the religion or ethnicity of its crew. The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries - that is, the period when the western Mediterranean societies surpassed their Byzantine and Muslim rivals and seized effective control of the entire sea — marked a high point in piracy, as the newly victorious Latin states competed for individual mastery of the sea lanes. Certainly this is the period, too, when the distinction between pirates and corsairs sharpened. It had to be so, for the moral question of what one might call "confrontational commerce" only became ambiguous when the attackers' victims were no longer infidels or schismatics, but fellow Latin Christians.41 41

These pages are based on a paper, "Piracy and the Kingdom of Sicily," that I delivered at a conference on "European Expansion before Columbus, 1250-1492" at Fordham University, New York, 27-8 March 1992. On medieval piracy in general, see P. Adam, "Esquisse d'une typologie de la course et de la piraterie," in Course et piraterie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975), XVe Colloque international d'histoire maritime 11, pp. 917-55; Helene Ahrweiler, "Course et piraterie dans le Mediterranee orientale aux IVeme—XVeme siecles (empire byzantin)," in Course et piraterie 1, pp. 7-29; Henri Bresc, "Course et piraterie en Sicile, 1250-1450," Anuario de estudios medievales 10 (1980), 751-7; Robert I. Burns, S.J., "Piracy as an Islamic-Christian Interface in the Thirteenth Century," Viator 11 (1980), 165-78; Peter Charanis, "Piracy in the Aegean during the Reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus," Annuaire de VInstitut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves 10 (1950), 127-36; M.-L. Favreau, "Die italienische Levante-Piraterie und die Sicherheit der Seewege nach Syrien im 12. und 13.

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

Sicily in particular had a long experience with piracy. From the Athenian seizure of the Siracusan coastline in the fifth century BGE, to the Company's seizure of the Athenian duchy, piracy was inextricably part of the warp and woof of daily life. It was also one of the most useful tools of colonial rule by Sicily's many conquerors; the success story of the Norman kingdom, for example, was largely a hymn to the potentialities of piracy, as any of the press-ganged silk weavers of Thessaloniki could have attested. Dominion over Sicily changed repeatedly over the centuries, passing continually from eastern to western hands, but the importance of piracy as a tool of that dominion remained constant. Only with the arrival of the Catalans, however, did the Sicilians themselves become true aggressors in the sea lanes; prior to this they - virtually alone among Mediterranean peoples - had not developed a maritime capability of any considerable size. Their foreign rulers had seen to that: control of the ports and of all ships larger than fishing vessels had rested almost exclusively with the colonial powers. As we saw earlier, very few Sicilian merchants sailed the seas or brought Sicilian goods to continental markets on Sicilian ships. This had an enormous, and wholly deleterious, effect on the island's economic and social development, for not only did the bulk of commercial profits follow the goods themselves (namely, away from the island), but the Sicilians never developed a carrying trade of their own, neither did they grow in maritime capability and exposure to more developed financial and commercial technologies. And since naval warfare in the Middle Ages, whether individual pirate sorties or full-fledged war between states, depended heavily on naval militias made up of merchant vessels and merchant crews, Sicilians had not developed any organized capability of defending themselves or of exerting a force of their own in the Mediterranean. Under the early Catalan rulers, however, things began to change. The Catalans certainly strove to protect their own controlling share of overseas trade and command Jahrhundert," Vierteljahrschriftfor Wirtschafts- undSozialgeschichte 65 (1978), 265—338; Michel

Mollat, "Guerre de course et piraterie a la fin du moyen age: Aspects economiques et sociaux - Position des problemes," Hansische Geschichtsbldtter 90 (1972), 1—14; Mollat, "De la piraterie sauvage a la course reglemente, XTVe—XVe siecle," Melange de I'Ecolejrangaise de Rome 80 (1975), 7—25; Carmelo Trasselli, "Naufragi, pirateria e doppio giuoco," in La gente del mare mediterraneo, ed. R. Ragosta (Naples, 1981), pp. 499-510; and Anna Unali, Marinai, pirati e corsari catalani nel basso medioevo (Bologna, 1983).

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of the ports; but from the 1280s onward we begin to encounter the first notices of Sicilian-owned and Sicilian-controlled seagoing vessels.42 A good example of the new Sicilian merchant marine was the San Giorgio, a two-masted galley owned by the Palermitan merchant Giuliano di Bennama. Giuliano used the San Giorgio to trade in the east, principally with Constantinople but also with Egypt and Athens. 43 He also leased the ship and its crew to other merchants. In 1334, for example, Filippo Parisio of Catania rented the ship for a trade voyage to Negroponte, paying a hefty price of ninety-five perperi of gold for the privilege. The San Giorgio came prepared for action — "well furnished, armed, and staffed with a crew of twentyfour oarsmen" - as a safeguard against piracy. But the presence of a large armed crew betrays the ship's own military capacity; the San Giorgio also doubled as a pirate ship. 44 Having given the Sicilians their first significant access to the sea, the Catalans also introduced them to their own long tradition of piracy and corsairing. It is worthwhile repeating the distinction between the two activities. Corsairs plied their trade legally, either with the tacit consent or explicit license of their governments, whereas pirates acted without sanction. Corsairs in fact represented a branch of the military, a type of ad hoc naval militia, and their campaigns were aimed at specific enemy targets with the goal (apart from making money) of disrupting the trade and harbor life of the state against which the corsairs' government had already begun hostilities. Pirates on the other hand acted independently, chose their targets indiscriminately, and worked solely for their own profit and perhaps adventurous enjoyment. Of the pleasure involved it is difficult to speak, but the profits for corsair or pirate 42

43

44

Charles De Simon, "Actes passes a Famagouste de 1299 a 1301 par devant le notaire Lamberto de Sambuceto," Revue de I'Orient latin 1 (1893), 58-139, 275-312, 321-53; see doc. 324, 338. Trade with Egypt remained brisk, partially on account of commercial relations forged by Peter and James of Catalonia. See, for example, ASP Notai defunti, Reg. 77, fol. 27V, 28, 99; Reg. 79, fol. 170V. Pegolotti's handbook cites the weight conversion for dry goods, for comparing measures of Messina and those of Alexandria; see Pegolotti, La pratica della mercatura, p. 74. A S P Tab. Ospedale Grande di Palermo, perg. 7: "bene furnitam, a r m a t a m et preparatam remigeris viginti quatuor." O n the interchangeability of merchant and military vessels — a common phenomenon in the Mediterranean, though much less so in in the North and Baltic seas — see Richard W. Unger, "Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe,'* Technology and Culture 22 (1981), 233-52.

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were consistently good and could on occasion be spectacular. Roger de Lauria, the Catalan admiral of the Sicilian fleet, acquired a personal fortune from his booty sufficiently large that he was able to make loans to the government. 45 Ramon Muntaner claimed to have gained more than 25,000 gold ounces in coin and jewelry in a single campaign to the east in 1308, only to lose it on the voyage back to Messina to a band of Venetian pirates who, as he described it, "came against our ship, and especially against mine, for the news was out that I was carrying from Byzantium the greatest treasure in the world."46 By 1363, when the Venetian doge Lorenzo Celsi ordered a reckoning to be made, Sicilian pirates and corsairs had stolen approximately 21,000 ducats from Venetian merchant ships in the Aegean sea alone. 47 Under kings Peter and James, the Sicilian fleet, whether military-cum-corsair or private-cum-pirate, remained firmly under Catalan control with only a handful of Sicilians added to the fighting force. But in Frederick's time the makeup of the maritime forces began to change, to include ever larger numbers of native Sicilians. It had to be so, since the defection of Roger de Lauria's forces during James's pseudo-war after 1297 left many vacancies in the naval ranks that had to be filled immediately. Sicilian rowers and Sicilian deck-hands were to be found in every port, but Sicilian officers were still in short supply. Their inexperience at sea, in relation to the Genoese and Catalan veterans who were available, made it difficult for them to move into officer ranks, and this became a constant source of irritation in later years, as when, for example, the 1321 loss of four galleys to a storm at sea instigated a riot in the streets of Palermo. The majority of the men who had died were Sicilian sailors; but the officers who had failed to guide them safely through the storm had been Genoese. Until the islanders became more at home on the sea, Sicily's early naval and pirate efforts tended not to roam far from native shores. Most 45

46

47

ACA Cane. Reg. 90, fol. iv-2, gv, 6iv; Cane. Reg. 192, fol. 3V-4; Cane. Reg. 260, fol. 1-3. See also Hans Rohde, DerKampfum Sizilien in denjahren i2gi-ijO2 (Berlin, 1912), p. 79; and Pryor, "The Naval Battles of Roger of Lauria" (see eh. 2, n. 35, above). Muntaner, Crbnica eh. 234-7 narrates the entire tale; quotation at ch. 235: "E con fom e n terra, les galees del venecians v a n correr sobre les nostres, e senyaladament sobre la mia, cor era veu que j o traia de R o m a n i a tot lo tresor del mon." Irene B. Katele, "Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma of Maritime Defense in the Fourteenth Century," Speculum 63 (1988), 865-89 at 882 and n. 115.

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pirate activity prior to the Company's opening up of the east focused on the Straits of Otranto. 48 The court's policy towards piracy was of a sort with that of most Mediterranean powers: it avidly sponsored corsair activity and sought to curb piracy - the latter out of concern for lost licensing fees rather than to promote peaceful trade. Virtually the first action Frederick took after seizing command of the naval forces in 1291 was to organize a privateering raid. After some adventurers returned from plundering the Greek island of Khios and the Peloponnesian harbor city of Monemvasia, "with the greatest part of the wealth of that island" and the archbishop of Monemvasia in tow, he organized a large-scale corsair force of forty galleys "along with 2,000 almogavers and a like number of Messinese foot-soldiers" to scourge the Amalfitan coast.49 Court-supported privateering continued right up until the king's death, although various political and economic pressures forced a curtailment and redirection of the activity after 1325. The eastward drift of the population, combined with the near monopolization of Val di Mazara ports by Catalan and Genoese merchants, meant that piratical efforts focused increasingly on eastern waters. Sicily's seagoing ships after 1325 were to be found in Messina, Catania, and Siracusa rather than Palermo, Sciacca, and Marsala, which resulted in the forced focus on piracy in Aegean waters (while avoiding Venetian territories, of course) and the sea around Cyprus and Crete. Corsairs attacked specific targets selected or approved by the government at the time of the licensing. In addition to the licensing fee, the king also received a percentage of the booty, the calculation of which was one of the duties of the magistri portulani. Strict rules of engagement applied. These were, naturally enough, the customs eventually codified in the Catalan Consulate ofthe Sea. Specific cities, ships, and sometimes specific merchants were identified as the target of the raid. A crew was appointed, and their wages or percentages of acquired booty established. Any merchants who wished to invest in the campaign - underwriting the costs in return for a share in the spoils — received full information about the target, 48 49

J o h n H . Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 640-1571 (Cambridge, 1988), Past and Present Publications, p. 157. Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 122-3: "cum maxima parte divitiarum suarum illius insule . . . XL galeas armare propono, et II M almugabarorum ac totidem Messanensium peditum mecum ferre."

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the ships, and the crew; investors furthermore had the right to inspect the corsair fleet, in order to determine whether or not to proceed with their investment. An interesting provision of the Consulate stated that the corsair commander "shall carry out all the promises he makes to anyone, whether that be a shareholder in the ship, an outfitter, a navigator, a section-leader, an armed sailor, servant, or merchant - whether any of these parties be a Saracen, a Christian, or a Jew." If the attack failed, the investors lost their capital, but the government lost only its anticipated portion of the booty. The licensing fee was always paid in advance. The government, in fact, could lose money only in two ways: either through the proliferation of unsanctioned piracy, which it understandably struggled to check, or through the demand for reparations made by the attacked party. Victims of corsair attack appealed to their government officials, who in turn brought suit against the government that had sponsored the strike in the first place. If the victim was able to identify his attackers - a difficult task, given the common practice of leasing ships to merchants of different nations and the polyglot makeup of the crews - and could accurately itemize the goods stolen from him, the sponsoring government would pay reparations out of the royalfisc.In Sicily, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean, the expense of paying reparations evidently never matched the income derived from successful privateering, since government sponsorship of corsairs never slackened either throughout Frederick's reign or throughout the century. The ubiquity of the practice is striking, but so is its routine character. Since nearly all Mediterranean communities were guilty, few were outraged. Working through the extant records, one gets the impression that nearly everyone with access to a ship tried their hand at piracy at one time or another.50 Indeed, some documents even record foreign diplomats interrupting their embassies briefly to race out to sea in order to plunder approaching trading ships, only to return afterwards, and without embarrassment, to their official duties at their victims' government's courts. In June 1308, for example, Bernat de Sarria - Catalonias' chief admiral, a personal friend of both James and Frederick, and the duly 50

Mediterranean communities were not alone in all of this. See ACA Perg. Alfonso III, no. 908 for a reference to English pirates preying upon Mediterranean trade routes.

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appointed ambassador to the Sicilian court - abruptly cut short his diplomatic mission in Messina upon hearing of a large merchant ship then returning to Siracusa, laden with spices, silks, and gold from Alexandria. Bernat and his men, on board the government ships that had brought them to Messina in the first place, hurried to Siracusa, robbed the returning merchants (who were Catalan residents of Sicily) of all their goods, and then held both the ship and its crew for ransom. Having filled his purse, Bernat then returned with a straight face to Messina to resume his diplomatic duties.51 Given the curious and embarrassing circumstances of this 51

ACA Gartas James II, no. 9939 (7 July 1308). As Frederick pointed out, in this letter to James about the incident, the kingdom had suffered numerous similar outrages in the past, some at Bernat's hands and some at the hands "of various others under your command." The complete text runs as follows: Serenissimo et spectabili principi domino Jacobo Dei gratia illustri regi Aragonum, Valencie, Corsice et Sardinee comitique Barchinonie ac Sancte Romane Ecclesie vexillario, ammirato et capitaneo generali, reverendo et karissimo fratri suo, Fridericus tertius eadem gratia rex, cum fraterna dilectione salutem et prosperos ad vota successus. Dum infra proximo preteritum mensem Junii huius sexte indictionis, Matheus Oliverdarii de Barchinonia mercator (fidelis vester, devotus noster) cum quadam navi sua diversis eius et ceterorum aliorum mercatorum Catalanorum rebus et mercibus onerata, de partibus Alexandrie in Siciliam sub nostri securitate dominii veniens pro suis mercationibus exercendis, ad portus Syracusie declinasset, hoc audiens nobilis Bernardus de Sarriano miles ammiratus et fidelis vester, devotus noster, cum duabus galeis (cum quibus ipsum ad nos in vestrum ambassatorem et nuncium pridie destinastis) ad portum ipsum festinanter se contulit, et inventa ibidem navi predicta, exonerata tamen in dicta civitate predictis rebus et mercibus dictoque etiam patrono et personis aliis eiusdem navis ob ipsius ammirati metum in eadem latitantibus civitate, navim accepit, eandem securitatem nostri dominii inibi violando. Et requisivit deinde baiulum et judices civitatis ipsius, ut merces et res ipsas caperent et assignarent eidem, quas, cum eas propterea iidem baiulus et judices accepissent, assignare tamen eidem ammirato penitus recusarunt diversas causas rationabiles pretendentes et maxime quia nullum a nobis mandatum exinde receperunt. Sed tandem predictus Matheus, cum secus inde facere non valeret, eisdem rebus et mercibus per eum a predictis baiulo et judicibus cum instancia petitis et habitis, assignavit eas ammirato predicto per eum abinde cum predicta navi Messanam ferendas et sub nostro posse et dominio deponendas, ut de hiis fieret id quod exinde diceremus, sicut ex pacto adjectum extitit inter eos et constat nobis per litteras predictorum baiuli et judicum proinde nobis missas, quas quidem navis merces et res sibi retinens ammiratus predictus penes nos aut aliquem alium deponere deinde non curavit easdem in predictorum Mathei et aliorum mercatorum prejudicium atque dampnum, et omnia quamquam patienter tulerimus et feramus, ob vestri tamen reverentiam et honorem, cum multo certe graviora, ubique locorum nostri dominii nedum per dictum ammiratum, verum etiam per quoslibet alios de vestro dominio fieri similiter pateremus, omneque onus proinde quantumlibet importabile ultronei subiremus. Tamen, quia firmiter credimus et tenemus talia vobis admodum displicere, providimus ad vestram notitiam deferenda Fraternitatem et Serenitatem

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incident, Frederick sent his complaint to James under his small, or privy, seal, hoping thus to bring the matter directly to the king's eyes and to keep word of the incident from spreading. But this was an exception. Most notices of corsair or pirate attacks, and the demands for reparations that accompanied them, were routine matters. Indeed the most surprising characteristic of the extant demands for reparations is their civility, the sheer dull monotony of their bureaucratic tone. In January 1297, for example, James described for Frederick how a Sicilian captain acting "on your behalf" pirated a shipload of cotton cloth from a Catalan trading ship that was returning to Barcelona from Armenia. Without any note of rancor or alarm, he noted that the captain "took the ship, with the cloth and other goods aboard it, and proceeded to hand them over to your Curia," and then calmly asked for the usual compensation.52 In April 1302, when a Sicilian corsair company commanded by Ruggero di Brindisi plundered several targets along the Catalan coast, James again filed the usual complaint. But this time Frederick, while accepting responsibility for the attack, simply postponed the reckoning of reparations until sometime "at the beginning of next year, when it will be more convenient" because he was at present busy with more important matters. 53 Problems arose, and tempers with them, whenever corsairs either attacked the wrong targets or used unnecessary force to accomplish their ends. Exposure to risk in international waters was one matter - an acceptable hazard or a bearable liability in a region where profits could be made if one accepted responsibility for one's own safety, being beyond the protection of any law - but senseless, unnecessary violence could not be condoned. Piracy, for good or ill, was an aspect of business - indeed, it was itself a type of business. Vestram aflectuose rogantes, quatenus consideratis premissis eidem Matheo et mercatoribus aliis super restitutione et emenda navis, rerum et mercium predictarum debitum complementum justitie fieri jubeatis, necminus misericordem gratiam nostri a nominis intuitu et precium nostrarum instantiam conferre velitis, si placet. Datum Messane sub parvo sigillo nostro secreto VII Julii, VI indictione. 52 53

Ibid., no. 297. Ibid., no. 10259 ( I2 April 1302): "Super quo Excellentie Vestre rescribimus, quod pluribus et diversis negotiis multipliciter propediti ad expeditionem dictorum vestrorum fidelium quo ad presens intendere et vacare non possumus. In principio autem sequentis anni prime indictionis nuncii eorum ad presentiam nostram accedant et ad expeditionem predicti negotii, prout conveniens fuerit, procedimus."

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But to take lives, to inflict needless and gratuitous harm, or to cause senseless destruction on the seas where one's life was already at risk every moment, was nothing more than cheap, hateful villainy, and it never failed to raise a protest. In the summer of 1317, for example, the court awarded privateering licenses to Guglielmo Limogia and Francesco Guallacia of Messina - "to perform certain tasks in foreign lands" is the coded phrase - and provided them with two armed ships. Those "certain tasks" most likely included the forced gathering of slaves, as well as commercial plunder; but that is not how the affair turned out. Guglielmo and Francesco, whether they had planned all along to do so or not, used their king's forces to lead a series of attacks on nearby merchant ships who had themselves just returned to Sicily from the east, laden with highquality textiles. The outrage resulted in, as Frederick recollected, "a tremendous complaint to be brought before me"; and at least part of the extreme anger expressed by the victims in this case resulted, as did the attack itself, from ethnic tensions. The attackers were Sicilians, while the victims were Catalan. Guglielmo and Francesco may have acted out of mere opportunism, and may have taken a certain delight in using the arms and ships of a Catalan king, sailing under his license, to attack Catalan merchants. But a commercial rivalry of long standing inevitably played a role, too. The pirates had deposited their booty with their friend and presumed accomplice Benenat Sevellera, an entrepreneur from Barcelona, who raced back to Catalonia with the goods. Upon arriving in port, however, Benenat lost the treasure to the local bailiff, who had been informed by a harbor official about the suspicious cargo, and had sequestered the goods. Thus Frederick, in trying to arrange the proper compensation for the original victims, found himself in the embarrassing position of begging the return of goods which his own privateers had stolen with his own ships from his own subjects.54 54

Ibid., no. 10268 (30 Aug. 1317): "Cum Guillelmus de Limogiis et Franciscus Guallacia de Messana, fideles nostri, olim infra presentem annum quintedecime indictionis missi fuerint per Curiam nostram cum duobus lignis armatis eiusdem Curie ad diversas partes pro certis Curie nostre servitiis, iidemque Guillelmus et Franciscus cum predictis lignis disrobaverint quosdam amicos et devotos nostros, per quos gravis querimonia est coram Celsitudine Nostra proposita; et eis de predictis disrobationibus emendam facere nos oportet; ac inter alia res et merces violenter captas et ablatas per eos a devotis et amicis nostris eisdem fuerint panni et res subscripte, quos et quas iidem Guillelmus et Franciscus recomendaverant Benenato Sevellera, civi Barchinone devoto nostro, per eum

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The curious moral world of piracy reserved its greatest venom for the extreme use of physical force. Lost goods could be returned or recompensed, but lost lives were another matter altogether. And while some sort of compensation could, in theory, be expected for the loss or destruction of a ship, the extraordinary expense it represented gave incentive to the desire to curb unnecessary violence. Thus we find the strongest expressions of outrage reserved for pirates or corsairs who followed up their successful thefts with wholly gratuitous violence, or who violated the safe harborage granted to merchants who had survived their perilous voyages. In June of 1318, for example, two Genoese privateers attacked a ship laden with foodstuffs that Frederick had sent from Messina to Trapani, in order to alleviate yet another food shortage there. According to the complaint lodged against them, the Genoese not only captured the ship but had jettisoned all the foodstuffs they did not care to steal, and had subjected the ship's captain, one Antonio Cumarello, to a number of severe beatings. They then scuttled the ship. Outside of Palermo harbor they encountered another vessel, bearing a physician who was being sent to treat the outbreak of disease that had also occurred in Trapani. He too was beaten; the pirates hurled his medical books into the sea and dragged him back to Marseilles, where they demanded 100 florins in ransom, lest he be killed. Outraged by these excesses, the Sicilians appealed directly to John XXII. The pope shared in their wrath, and personally directed the Genoese commune to pay compensation, which he reckoned at 200.00.00 for the scuttled ship, plus whatever could be determined to be the just reparation for the captain's beatings, the physician's ransom, the cost of the lost books, and the value of the grain.55 A still graver case occurred in 1322, when four Genoese ships entered the port of Trapani, attacked a number of Barcelonan merchants docked there, and stole their entire cargo "which was of

55

ad partes Sicilie deferendos, ac Guillelmus de Lacias, baiulus civitatis Barchinone, predictos pannos et res a predicto Benenato abstulerit et sequestraverit... [Then follows an inventory of the stolen goods] . . . Fraternitatem et Magniflcentiam Vestram [i.e. James] rogamus, quatenus predictos pannos et res discreto Petro de Montemulono (generali procuratori agendorum nostrorum, et Magne Nostre Curie magistro rationali consiliario, familiari, et fldeli nostro) vel cui ipse requisiverit assignari mandetis et faciatis, si placet, deferendos aut mittendos nobis, ut eos personis a quibus ablatos fuerunt restitui faciamus." John XXLItLettres communes, no. 7563 (20June 1318).

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inestimable value." Not content simply to steal the goods, the Genoese, who had gained entrance to the port by pretending to represent the Ghibellines at Savona, had "cruelly murdered" some of the Barcelonan crew. "It is unheard of and absurd," the court complained, "that merchants and friends in commerce should fall upon one another violently... and make enemies out of friends over such things." 56 The seizure of goods could be pardoned as commonplace thuggery, but to assault Catalan merchants while they were under the Sicilian king's protection in harbor - and to do so by means of posturing as the Sicilians' Ghibelline allies - exceeded all bounds of acceptable piratical behavior. The Genoese, in breaking the most central rules of engagement, had caused the Sicilians to suffer "a molestation whose excesses are so enormous . . . that it is thought that they cannot ever henceforth be removed or wiped away."57 This case was upsetting not only because of the gratuitous murders but because all the ships and crews involved, both the attackers and the attacked, were under the king's peace. Sicilian law, like that of most Mediterranean realms, granted royal protection to all men, ships, and cargoes admitted into port. A welcoming port, after all, was the safe haven guaranteed to all who survived the parlous voyage over the seas; hence a pirate or corsair raid upon ships in port represented not only an assault on the victimized merchants but an attack on the royal authority itself. Such trespasses presented continuous concerns to the attacking pirates' home governments as well, for such unwarranted attacks could, by their very nature, occasion a state of war. Indeed most full-blown naval attacks in a declared war took place precisely in harbors, rather than on the open seas; tactical reasons were the main cause of this (it being far easier to attack a ship that is at rest), but nevertheless harbor raids were associated in Mediterranean minds with open war. Pirates were expected to assume their own portion of risk by venturing further out to sea. Whenever untoward 56

57

A C A Cartas J a m e s II, no. 9948: "inauditum et absurdum videtur, quod mercatores et amici in mercatores irruant et amicos eosque violenter capiant predentur et de amicis propterea tales et tantos sibi faciant inimicos." Ibid.: "Quapropter quantum predictus dominus noster rex moleste gerere habeat excessus predictos sit enormiter, ut prefertur, commissis, et cogatur nee ab re proinde moveri multipliciter et turbari maxime propter dispendia gravia que dicta pars gybellina proinde incurrere posset sane menti clarissime indicatur causis et rationibus infrascriptis."

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port violation occurred, the Sicilians responded, as in 1322, not only by seeking reparation and apology from the raiders' home country but by sending out punitive raiding forces of their own, either to apprehend the culprits and return them to Sicily, or to seek retribution upon their sponsors. These transgressions also broke the routine civility of reparation demands and inspired distinctly angry, indeed outraged, responses. In the forty-one years of Frederick's reign, Sicilian piracy passed through three distinct phases in terms of its venues and victims. Until 1302 all activity centered upon the western Mediterranean and involved all the participants in the war and their occasional allies. Thus direct military strikes were made against the Angevinheld coastline, as a matter of combat; but private-sector privateering attacks were launched upon the merchant ships of Genoa and Pisa (the Angevins' on-again, off-again allies) in order to raise revenue. So long as the Sicilian adventurers did not violate safeharbor statutes in those republics, such privateering was generally regarded as part of the normal risk of trade; and demands for reparations followed the regular bureaucratic channels. Other sites were targeted too. Interestingly, a considerable amount of privateering took place between the Sicilians and the Crown of Aragon, their not-so-secret allies in the Vespers fight. This constant give and take paralleled the tangled diplomatic and economic relations that existed between the two realms in the last seven years of the war. Perhaps in order to mask Catalonia's feigned involvement in the war - although that imposture fooled no one - Catalans and Sicilian preyed upon each other's commerce from 1296 to 1302 even while Catalan arms and materiel poured into Sicily in order to further the fight against Naples. Ironically, some of the privateering and piratical attacks that Barcelona and Palermo launched against each other were comprised of the same ships and crews that brought Catalan arms to the island and Sicilian grain to Iberia. Licensing fees and booty were collected and distributed at either end of the journey, just as commercial goods passed constantly to and fro.58 Given the mutual benefits garnered by this curious relationship, excessive violence (such as that committed in 1298 by, once again, Bernat de Sarria and his accomplice Berenguer Vilaregut) or unlicensed raids - anything that resulted in true 58

See, for example, ACA Cartas James II, no. 297 (24 Jan. 1297).

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harm to the delicate diplomatic and military arrangement merited the fiercest cries of outrage. 59 Such excesses clearly did not ease Sicilian anxieties about the Catalans in general and forced the government to exaggerate the outrage that it no doubt sincerely felt, solely in order to placate and assure the more suspicious natives. This accounts for the almost exhibitionist tone present in the fiercest of the diplomatic protests. 60 During the fifteen years after Caltabellotta, Sicily turned its 59

60

Ibid., no. 10158 (13 Feb. 1298). This is an open letter from the Sicilian court to the people of Barcelona, fulminating against Bernat and Berenguer's senseless violence in a series of unwarranted attacks on Pantelleria, Malta, and Gozo. Here is the central portion of the lengthy text: "Nam Beringuerius Villaragutus, qui Siculos et fideles nostros offendere causam et materiam non habebat, recepti honoris et gratie tanteque acquisite opulantie ingratus et immemor, pro dilectione odium, pro utilitate dampnum, et pro honoribus injurias inferens, plures et diversos fideles nostros cum una navi et una galea armatis cepit, disrobbavit, et carceri mancipavit, comburendo vassella et alios excessus graviter irrogando. Subsequenter etiam Bernardus de Sarriano cum viginti galeis et aliis vassellis armatis, necnon militibus et navibus, insulam nostram Pantellerie perveniens et depopulare disponens, cepit non modicam quantitatem Sarracenorum eiusdem insule cum pluribus et diversis rebus eorum, et contra plures ex eis quos habere non potuit clades exercuit; et tantis excessibus non contentus immo desiderans prioribus graviora committere, et ad insulas nostras Malte et Gaudisii hostiliter proficiscens obsedit easdem, combuxit casalia, et homines tarn in mari quam in terra cepit, disrobbavit, et diro carceri maceravit. Que quam sint gravia quamque detestabilia advertere et considerare potestis, unde credimus in premissis absque predicti domini fratris nostri conscientia et voluntate fuisse processum, et dampnorum emenda seu restitutio dampna passis fieri de jure deberet. Sane multorum frequens et crebra docet relatio, quod predictus dominus frater noster, ad suggestionem et instantiam quorumdam emulorum et inimicorum nostrorum et domus nostre, contra nos et Siculos fideles nostros suum extolium preparat suamque gentem et exfortium aggregat, ut insulam nostram Sicilie a nostris manibus et hereditate eripiat, ipsamque comitis Provincie nostri nostreque domus antiqui hostis et emuli subiciat potestati. O Deus, destruatur et tabescat hostium nefanda malignitas, dolosa seductio, prevaricationis congeries et totius calliditatis inventio et inexecrabilis cause misterium, que inter fratres discordias seminant, bellicos actus astruunt, eorum mortem et stragem scitientes appetunt, in quo probabiliter et manifeste cognatur predictum comitem Provincie et eius fautores esse tante pravitatis auctores. Quorum detestabiles et frequens austutia anelanter intendit fratres (immo patrem et filium) ad bellum adducere, ut (quod absit) nostram altero patiente ruinam, quid de facili dubius bellorum requirit eventus alterius strages et excidium, per eos facilius procurentur." In order to broadcast the outrage further, similar open letters were sent on the same day to Daroca (no. 10143), Palma de Mallorca (no. 10144), Lerida (no. 10147), Burriana (no. 10149), Cardia (no. 10150), Gerona (no. 10151), Tortosa (no. 10152), Murella (no. 10153), Tarascon (no. 10154), Valencia city (no. 10155), Calatayud (no. 10156), Tarragona (no. 10157), Xativa (no. 10159), Jaca (no. 10160), and Castellon (no. 10161). It also accounts for the concern many natives showed for improving their defenses. Weaponry, harbor chains, port towers, etc. began to be gathered and built, either at communal expense or under the aegis of the urban elites; see, for example, Giuseppe Agnello, "Le torri costiere di Siracusa nella lotta anticorsara," Archivio storico siracusano 9 (1963), 21—60; 10 (1964), 25—74; 15 (1969), 2—29; and 2nd ser., 1 (1971), 17—30.

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pirating eyes eastward. From 1302 to 1317 those eyes focused almost exclusively on the vulnerable Byzantine rump states in the Aegean. The Catalan Company, after severing its loyalties with Constantinople, fended for itself and remitted none of its booty homeward until after the duchy was established; but Sicily continued to send privateers of its own, either to offer the Company some sort of indirect strategic aid or to gather its own treasure. Here Pong Hug d'Empuries, one of the strongest supporters of the post-Vespers kingdom, again proved himself an invaluable ally by directing privateering campaigns away from Achaea and into regions further to the south and east. In so doing he spared the kingdom the papal wrath that would inevitably have followed upon any semi-official Sicilian encroachment upon Athens and would consequently have threatened the 1302 peace. Better to leave Athens to the renegade Company, for a while. In fact, Pong Hug's campaigns in the eastern reaches of the Mediterranean even pleased Clement V, who was delighted to see Venetian dominance in the region challenged.61 The establishment of the duchy in 1311 made further excursions easier, at least in the tactical sense of having a foothold in the region, until the disastrous treaty with Venice of 1317 made privateering out of Athens much more difficult. These sorties, when they occurred, had two principal objectives: to prey upon the eastern trunk routes for booty, and to raid the vulnerable Aegean islands and coastal villages for slaves. It is in fact not uncommon to find privateering investment contracts in these years that provide ships, personnel, and arms for voyages to the east to seek out "slaves and other treasure." The sudden domination of the Sicilian slave market by Greek captives "de Romania" resulted directly from these privateering ventures, since there is no evidence that the new slaves were taken from the duchy itself; indeed, given the underpopulation of the duchy's rural lands, such a mass deportation made little sense. Hence the connection between Sicily's slave practices and its piratical activities stands out clearly. After 1318 Sicily's pirate and privateer campaigns became markedly random, dispersed, and largely uncontrolled by the government, and for these reasons far less effective but far more likely to increase diplomatic tensions. Pirates and corsairs roamed 61

Mansilla, "La documentation espafiola," doc. n o (21 Dec. 1310); cf. Reg. Clement V, no. 6438.

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everywhere and chose their targets indiscriminately. The Ghibelline alliance of that year reopened the Tyrrhenian and western Mediterranean seas to raids out of Messina and Palermo, and the permanent renewal of hostilities with Naples after 1321 heightened the importance of the Gulf of Otranto as a venue, since this latter region, being a poorer zone of the Angevin kingdom, had fewer defenses. This meant that Sicily's already stretched maritime forces were henceforth divided between the proximate war in the Mezzogiorno and the northern wars precisely when Venice, prompted by Alfonso-Frederick's arrogance, opened a new offensive against the Athenian duchy. So a two-front naval war became a battle on three fronts; and when the Catalan sailors in Sicily, who still dominated the officer class in both the commercial and military fleets, wanted to assist James in his renewed campaign to conquer Sardinia, Sicily's maritime forces, both licit and illicit, were scattered to the seas. Renegade piracy prevailed over licensed privateering throughout the 1320s and 1330s, as more and more individuals, faced with economic ruin, sought to secure their fortunes by reckless attacks on whatever ships they encountered. They preyed upon all shipping everywhere, and for that reason proved to be both annoying and ineffectual; but the indiscriminate nature of the attacks did produce one wholly negative result: a growing general avoidance of Sicilian ships and harbors by international merchants, which only exacerbated the commercial decline. Far better to avoid the island altogether than to risk ubiquitous harassment and loss of one's goods. Moreover, the Sicilians also found themselves increasingly the victims of indiscriminate attacks. Sailors out of Catalonia, angered by the harassment they faced by their supposed allies and quasicompatriots, especially in the waters around Sardinia, armed their ships and turned them once again towards Sicily, whose harbors they assaulted repeatedly and with increasing violence. These attacks focused on the poorly defended coastal cities of the Val di Mazara and nearly brought their commercial life to a standstill at times.62 Trapani, the most difficult port to 62

AGA Gartas James II, no. 9960 (27 Oct. 1322), 8536 (10 Feb. 1327); Cartas Alfonso III, no. 1453 (Feb. 1331), no. 2630 (2 May 1334), no. 2643 (20 May 1334) - these last two being angry complaints from, respectively, the Portuguese royal court and the jurati of Majorca that their trade with Sicily has been repeatedly interrupted by Gatalan pirates operating in Sicilian waters.

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defend because of its large exposed promontory, was the favorite target. Complicating matters still further, Catalonia's conquest of Sardinia, when it finally came about, opened a new round of hostilities between the Crown of Aragon and the Genoese and Pisans whom they had displaced. Both the Guelfs, who were in power in each commune, and their hapless Ghibelline exiles, had a stake in regaining control of the island, and both took advantage of the conditions in Sicily to strike back at the Crown. Throughout the 1330s Genoese and Pisan ships, both Guelf and Ghibelline, as they traded for Sicilian grain, used the harbors at Palermo, Trapani, and Mazara as bases from which to attack trading ships out of Barcelona and Cagliari. The Sicilians, whose central and local governments were by then all but paralyzed, were helpless to do anything about it, but they nevertheless showed little compunction in allowing their ports to be used in such a way, since they desperately needed whatever commerce the northerners had to give them. When Alfonso voiced the growing complaints of his Barcelonan merchants, the royal court responded peevishly that the Genoese were just as often the victims of Catalan attacks in Sicilian waters, and hence the government "ought reasonably to be excused" from doing anything about it. The most the Sicilians would offer was a half-hearted promise to dissuade any Sicilian officials from actively assisting the Genoese and Pisans — a promise which suggests that a number of those officials had in fact already taken part.63 Sicily's active role in piracy declined sharply throughout the 1320s and 1330s as a result of the indiscriminate nature of its attacks, since the consequence of its actions was simply a dramatic increase in attacks upon the island itself. Furthermore, as Catalan resentment of Sicily's oblique assistance to Genoese and Pisan piracy increased, many of those Catalans who made up the officer class in Sicily's merchant and military fleet cut off Sicily's access to the seas by resigning their posts and taking up new positions in 63

ACA Cartas Alfonso III, no. 3837 (20 December 1331): "nos attente rogastis, ut substinere nolemus quin potius prohibere ne in mari seu portubus ditionis nostre subditis vestris dampna seu injurie per dictos Januenses aut alios aliquatenus irrogentur, nee ipsis Januensibus aut aliis dictis subditis vestris nocumentum inferre volentibus subsidium seu refriscamentum aliquod per officiates nostros aut subditos prebeatur . . . nos exinde habere debetis rationabiliter excusatos." See also no. 3681 (26 Dec. 1331).

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defense of Sardinia, which left the kingdom with ships but an insufficient corps of experienced navigators to guide them. In piracy, as in the diplomatic and political goals of which it was once a part, Frederick's realm had vastly overplayed its hand. Ill

WOMEN

Sicily's women have always been shadowy figures, crouched quietly in doorways or gazing down the crowded streets from balustraded or shuttered windows. For most of the medieval period they have left no direct record of themselves, since, with a few exceptions, they could neither read nor write - and even the possession of literacy, for those few lucky enough to enjoy it, did not give one the right to act or speak independently. As a consequence, very few records survive to shed light on their activities, and virtually none of the records we have present the women in their own voices. In the intensely conservative society of Sicily, women lived their lives under tight constraints; the traditional roles that society gave them gravely limited their freedom to act and ours to behold. Local customs, in general, were designed to isolate and protect women from the outside world, to keep them safely ensconced in their fathers' homes until they could be safely and just as absolutely ensconced in their husbands' homes, or, for the devout and dowry-less, dedicated to God in a nunnery. Not until the Vespers era - an era inaugurated with a rebellion sparked by an Angevin outrage against a native woman - do Sicily's women come into view with any meaningful detail of focus. Our view of them is still partial and imperfect, given the limitations of even this improved documentation. But the extant evidence holds a few surprises.64 64

The study of medieval women has progressed remarkably in the last twenty years; but in this area as well medieval Sicily has been all but ignored. On medieval women in general, see Shulamith Shahar, The Fourth Estate (London, 1983), Edith Ennen, Die Frauen im Mittelalter (Munich, 1984), and Susan Mosher Stuard, Women in Medieval History and Historiography (Pennsylvania, 1987), the last of which contains a fifty-page bibliography of scholarship on women in England, France, Germany, and northern Italy. For Sicily, there are only a few incidental remarks; see Jean-Pierre Cuvillier, "Famille et societe en Mediterranee orientale chretienne: analyse comparative des modeles sicilien et Catalan," Melanges de la Casa de Velasquez 15 (1979), 187-204; D'Alessandro, "Famiglie medioevali siculo-catalane" (see ch. 4, n. 16, above); Carlo Alberto Garufi, "Ricerche sugli usi nuziali nel Medio Evo in Sicilia," ArchStSic, 2nd ser., 21 (1896-7), 209-307.

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The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

The most visible figures belong of course to the aristocracy. After 1282, and as a result of it, Sicily's queens played important roles in society. The Catalan dynasty placed the bulk of its claim to the throne on its marriage link with Constance, the last of the Hohenstaufens. Consequently, the right to inherit title and property through the female line was well established. Frederick's and James's father, although he had conquered the realm and had received the acclamation of the Communitas Sicilie, consistently emphasized his right to rule through his marriage to Constance; and Frederick too, as we saw earlier, asserted his inheritance of Constance's patrimony, rather than his election by parliament, as the chief legitimation of his kingship. As queen, Constance began the practice of sitting in the MRC and taking her place in the king's inner circle of advisers. Extant records show her working to reconcile the church to the new dynasty, to foster greater unity of action among Sicily's contending factions and regions, and to educate the new ruling caste to Sicilian customs. When Peter left the island in order to tend to matters in Catalonia, Constance headed the lieutenancy council that governed the realm in his absence; and she continued to advise the throne during James's reign. As late as 1296 her aid was still sought by those who wanted to influence decisions at court, although the extent of her influence by that time had clearly waned.65 Frederick's wife Eleanor likewise was a member of the council and exerted a fair share of influence. As with Constance, this influence had more to do with economics than ideology. As independent ruler of the camera reginale, the queen controlled a large segment of the vital Val di Noto, the most important city in which was Siracusa, with a steady population of nearly 8,000 throughout the reign. Adding the other sites that made up the apanage, she ruled a population of some 20,000 individuals. Her camera was the site of two of the most important trade fairs - at Siracusa, beginning on the Feast of the Nativity of the Virgin, and at Lentini, at the Feast of the Ascension - and represented as well a significant venue for wine, grain, and salt exports.66 Siracusa itself, in fact, held a monopoly on all exports from the confines of the city northward 65 66

Mansilla, "La d o c u m e n t a t i o n espafiola," doc. 103 (2 J a n . 1296); cf. Reg. Boniface no. 858. Caruso, De rebus siculis, no. 708.

VIII,

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through all the coastal territory of the Gulf of Augusta. So important had the city become as a trading center, especially for the eastern and southern trade routes connecting Sicily with Greece, Egypt, and Malta, that the Siracusan salma was made the standard measure for all agricultural produce in the eastern half of the kingdom.68 In 1299 the government awarded the city a toll franchise that freed its produce of the inland duties levied upon other domestic trade; the franchise was to be lost, however, if the land under the city's control was alienated or enfeoffed. This resulted in a rather static social structure, since land seldom changed hands. In later years, when the queen wanted to reward anyone or felt the need to make additional grants in order to purchase loyalty, she circumnavigated the prohibition of alienating the land by granting instead various rights (pasturage, herbage, water access, etc.) over the land, but not the land itself.69 The general strength of the commercial economy, however, made Siracusa, and the entire camera, for that matter, an attractive site for the thousands who fled the decay and poverty of the Val di Mazara. It was the sole region in the kingdom that experienced an increase in its population, in absolute numbers, during Frederick's reign. Eleanor held full powers of criminal and civil jurisdiction over the district, and, through her hired agents, administered an independent machinery of tax collection. Few records survive from her administration. But what evidence we have indicates that she took her responsibilities seriously, even though she did not always choose well in appointing her officials. A personal favorite whom she introduced at court in 1307 and to whom she entrusted some minor diplomatic errands, Pere Ferrandis de Vergua, proved to be a flatterer and opportunist, a corrupt official who wooed and wedded a series of wealthy widows and young heiresses. On Eleanor's recommendation, the MRC appointed Pere Ferrandis royal tax collector for Caltavuturo, where his flagrant abuse of his position led to vehement popular protests and ultimately to his 67

68 69

A S P Cane. Reg. 2, fol. 73V-75, 116; T e s t a , De rebus et gestis, pp. 244-5; Serafino Privitera, Storia di Siracusa antica e moderna, 3 vols. ( N a p l e s , 1978-9), 11, pp. 4 9 8 - 9 ; Speciale, Historia sicula, p. 338. Epstein, An Island for Itself, p. 121. Scholars today use the Siracusan salma as the standard for all studies of the Sicilian economy. A S C Arch. Benedettini, Corda 50, fol. 9V—10 (23 J a n . 1334), 10-12V (15 J a n . 1334).

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impeachment; and when Pere later was found to have forged a number of documents - most notably his first wife's will, arranging a bequest of 2,000.00.00 to himself - he was banished from the realm. Ultimately, he conspired to murder Frederick, whom he blamed for his failure to win the position in society that he felt he deserved.70 Eleanor was intensely pious. From the day of her arrival in Sicily - she married Frederick as a stipulation in the Caltabellotta treaty - she threw her considerable energy into rebuilding the kingdom's shattered churches and monasteries, and to raising new houses, hospitals, and evangelical schools. She funded the construction of Castrogiovanni's duomo in 1307, according to tradition, by selling the entire collection of her royal jewels. She generously endowed any number of religious houses, within her camera and without. In the area around Paterno, for example, she granted lands, curial rights, and cash to the monastery of S. Maria di Licodia, in return for the monks' prayers on behalf of the royal family. The gift was prescient, in its way, since Frederick died in Paterno while en route to Castrogiovanni. 71 Her advocacy for religious houses continued well after their founding and endowment. Especially in the case of nunneries, Eleanor remained involved in their daily lives by observing elections to abbacies, the recruitment of nuns, the regularity of their worship, and their treatment of relics.72 She visited nunneries throughout the realm, often with her children in tow, and regularly participated in their worship, showing an early preference for Franciscan houses. 73 Above everything else, she seems to have considered it her fundamental responsibility to promote religious observance and moral reform. Although overt, specific evidence about her relationship with the evangelical movement is lacking, a number of clues survive that show her to have been an enthusiast for the Spirituals. We have seen already that she took seriously Arnau de Vilanova's injunction that she and her handmaidens should perform public rituals in every duomo and hospital in every city they 70

71 72 73

ACA Cartas James II, no. 10029 (14 June 1311), a long letter to James which narrates Pere Ferrandis' brief career. The murder plot is discussed by Costa, "Un atemptat frustrat contra Frederic III de Sicilia." ASC Arch. Benedettini, Gorda 50, fol. gv (13 July 1329). Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizzi, doc. 40 (30 Nov. 1330). Reg. Clement V, no. 1042 (3 March 1306).

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visited, dressed as personifications of Faith and Hope, "so that in this way the people may have a vision [like that] of the Mother of God entering a place of misery to comfort those who are there."74 It was probably in such garb that she led the procession of the relics of St. Agatha around the confines of Catania, during the eruption of Mount Etna. She not only held vernacular readings of the Scriptures on Sundays and feast days, but she further commissioned a vernacular translation of the Dialogues of Gregory the Great, for the edification of the royal children, one of the few substantial texts in Sicilian dialect that survives from Frederick's reign.75 Even in a mundane duty like appointing a new bailiff to preside over her territory at Paterno her concern for the spiritual life of the community dominated all other considerations. When she appointed Ruggero Gala to be bailiff, in 1311, at the height of Sicily's flirtation with Arnau's prophesies of the kingdom's apocalyptic role, she specified that his first and foremost duty was "that he should take diligent care, if he should find anyone blaspheming against God, the Blessed Virgin, or the saints, or anyone speaking ill of the Royal Majesty, that he should take no sureties [i.e. promises to appear in court as summoned] from them, but should immediately seize their persons and take them captive to the justiciar of the province." Under Sicilian law, most accused criminals had the right to post bail and remain free until their trial; but the passionate atmosphere of the evangelical realm would permit no such freedom to those who were even rumored to be guilty of blasphemy. In lock-step with Arnau's teachings and the Ordinationes generates, the queen directed her bailiffs also to arrest anyone caught playing at dice or cards.76 74 75

S e e A r n a u d e V i l a n o v a ' s Informacio espiritual, in Obres catalanes i, pp. 229—32. Rome, Biblioteca Vittorio Emmanuele, MS 20. The manuscript (150 folios, in total) is in two parts. Folios 107—37 a r e m a Sicilian hand and date to Frederick's reign. The remaining folios are in a Calabrian hand, dating to the second half of the fourteenth century. The text begins with bk. 1, ch. 5 of the Dialogues. The translation was the work of Fra Giovanni Campulu, a Messinese cleric. Two later manuscripts also survive, both from the fifteenth century: Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale, MS 7703 (it. 88); and Florence, Biblioteca Ricciardana, MS 1310 (P.I. 35). See Lu Libru de lu Dialagu de Sanctu Gregoriu per Jratri Iohanni Campulu da Messina, ed. G. B. Grassi Privitera and A. de Sanctis (Palermo, 1913), DSSS 1st ser., vol. xi (an edition of the Rome manuscript only); and Libru de lu Dialagu de Sanctu Gregoriu traslatatu pir Frati Iohanni Campulu de Missina, ed. Salvatore

76

Santangelo (Palermo, 1933), Atti delFAccademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo, Supplement no. 2 (an edition of all three manuscripts). ASP Cane. Reg. 1, fol. 55—55V: "Inprimis, curet attente predictus baiulus, quod, si tempore sui oflicii aliquos blasfemantes Deum, Beatam Virginem et sanctos suos ac maledicentes

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But Eleanor, for as much as she helped to establish a general atmosphere of family concern and reformist piety, was merely one woman, and hardly representative of the majority. For the rest of Sicily's women, life in the early fourteenth century still followed the norms and constraints of its traditional, conservative society, a society that sought above all to protect its female members from the harshness of life by restricting their involvement with the world. Women, so long as they were marriageable or married, kept the homes, cared for the children, worked as midwives, worked in family-owned shops, and occasionally, though seldom, received a modicum of education. For the most part, their lives were dominated, if not dictated, by the needs of their families. Only with widowhood did women achieve a degree of socially sanctioned independence. Having carried out their duties to their families, it was felt, and having relatively little hope of remarriage after the child-bearing years had passed, they received society's imprimatur to control their own fates. But the straitened circumstances of the 1320s and 1330s effectively denied them even that temporary reprieve, as their economic independence (for those fortunate enough to have achieved it) eroded along with the urban structures around them, forcing them in many situations to pool resources and live in groups. Law and custom set the sexual style of the period. Despite the unique circumstances that led up to them, Sicily's laws regarding women were consonant with cultural norms of much longer standing. Above all, those norms mandated modesty. Juridically as well as culturally, modesty, humility, and obedience were the supreme virtues demanded of Sicilian women. Hemlines of gowns could be no higher than four palm-widths from the ground - at a penalty of 06.00.00 to the woman who wore the dress and of 03.00.00

quoscumque de Celsitudine Regia in terra ipsa contingent inveniri, nulla ab eis fideiussione recepta, statim capiat de personis, et captos ad justiciarium regionis sub fida custodia debeat destinare cum litteris suis continentibus nomina et cognomina illorum, quos propterea capiet, et mittet causam, per quam capti fuerint, et nomina et cognomina custodum, per quos ipsos ad eundem justiciarium duxerit destinandos." And later: "Item, quod, si contingat predictum baiulum invenire aliquos ludentes ad azardum, idem baiulus recipiat ab eorum quolibet fideiussionem ydoneam de solvenda pena statuta in talibus dicto justiciario et statim per suas litteras nomina illorum, quos ludentes ad azardum invenerit, et fideiussores, quos ab eorum singulis propterea receperit, eidem justiciario debeat nunciare." Cf. Ord. gen., ch. 77-81.

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77

to the one who made it. No more than seven plain buttons were allowed on any woman's attire. 78 Not wanting to hinder commerce, the law allowed dressmakers to make fancier outfits for nonSicilian women, provided that a special government license was first acquired; and an unintentional effect of this was that ethnic tensions in the 1320s and 1330s were easily exacerbated by the perceived affluence of foreigners resident in the kingdom, as they enjoyed their finery while Sicilian females sweated under their heavy, rough orbace woollens. Silks were likewise forbidden, even to women of the nobility. Since the penalties for violating this prohibition were particularly high - 12.00.00 to the wearer of the garment, and 06.00.00 to the garment's maker - it is likely that the law aimed not only to mandate modesty of dress but also to maximize the availability of silks, whether raw or finished, for export.79 The center of silk manufacture lay in the Val Demone (silkworms were bred in Messina and at the royal residence at Castroreale, in addition to Aci and Catania); and the export duty on silk provided significant income to the government's coffers. Further statutes regulated the wearing of pearls, decorative feathers, and jewelry. These sumptuary laws, like all medieval sumptuary legislation, illustrate the paternalistic attitude of the lawgivers who considered it their responsibility to guide the moral as well as the economic activity of their subjects. Luxury was disdained as an unnecessary expenditure of wealth and as a sign of moral decay. Only by demanding propriety and strict personal economy could the 77

78

79

Ord. gen., ch. 90: "Quod nulla domina sive mulier audeat portare sive induere vestes cuius fimbrie sive falde sint ultra palmos quatuor, et quod nullus sutor audeat facere vestes habentes majores faldas seu fimbrias, sub poena unciarum videlicet sex, a portantibus, et unciarum trium, a facientibus, exigenda." Ibid., ch. 91: "Item quod non audeant portare in vestibus, quas induerint, nisi septem bottonos ad plus, quorum cuiuslibet pretium non possit transcendere tarenos vigintiduos, et quod nullus aurifex audeat facere bottonos majoris pretii nee ponderis, et quilibet bottonorum ipsorum sit ponderis uncie unius ad plus, sub poena libre auri unius." Ibid., ch. 93: "Item quod nulla domina sive mulier audeat portare cappam pro equitando de samito vel de aliquo panno aureo vel serico, nisi tantum de panno laneo vel jamellocto, absque omni infrixatura, cuius panni pretium sit ad libitum earum; et quod nullus sutor cappam pro equitando facere possit, nisi de panno laneo vel jamellocto, ut supra, sub predicta poena unciarum duodecim, a portante, et unciarum sex, a faciente, ut supra ponitur, exigenda. Sed si aliquis sutor alicui extero, qui non sit incola predicte insule, cappam alio modo, quam quo supra notatur, facere voluerit, petat idem sutor licentiam a curia, et concedatur sibi per eandem curiam ipsa licentia, sicut supra." "Jamelloctum" refers to camel hair.

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particular reform of urban society begun in 1302 reach fruition. These laws thus reflect the strength of the post-war recovery - for the royal court, no matter how unconditional its acceptance of evangelical dictates and warnings, need not have bothered to restrict women's use of silks, gold, pearls, and precious stones unless a significant number of women actually were in a position to afford them. The "euforia dei consumi" described by Peri affected monied females fully as much as it did the men. With surplus income at hand, the stage was set for a joyous reaction against the material deprivations that the Vespers had occasioned; and hence the indulgence in finery occurred hand in hand with, and perhaps in part as a personal reward for, the popular reendowment of monastic houses and parish churches after 1302. This was indeed a widespread phenomenon. The fact that the laws emphasized that these prohibitions extended even to the nobility clearly indicates that noblewomen were not the only figures capable of affording such luxuries; if anything, it suggests that the non-noble women of urban society predominated in the aggregate, though not per capita, consumption of luxury items. But where did this wealth come from? For the landed class, the key lay in an old statute. "So that no doubt at all can arise in the future regarding the inheritance of counts, barons, and all who hold fiefs from us, we order . . . that children, then grandchildren, then great-grandchildren and so on ad infinitum . .. can freely and absolutely inherit [lands and wealth] regardless of sex . . . But the prerogative of gender must be preserved, so that the male is preferred to the female, and the elder to the younger." In the absence of a male heir, women had the right to inherit full control and ownership of land; the law applied equally to the demesnal and rural worlds, and guaranteed the right of female ownership of farms and estates, businesses, commercial rights, and trade privileges.80 Given that thousands of men had died in the wars and that hundreds more had fallen victim to banishment or execution, a large share of land and a large percentage of urban businesses and wealth — we cannot know the precise figures - had fallen into female hands by 1302; moreover, the continued loss of lives in the foreign and civil wars from 1321 onwards placed even more wealth, proportionally speaking, in the hands of widows and orphaned daughters. Thus, for example, 80

ASM Corporazioni religiose, Ospedale di S. Giovanni, perg. 93 (20 Jan. 1310).

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Macalda da Palizzi, the daughter of the royal chancellor Vinciguerra da Palizzi, inherited the family estate in the barony of Cammarata in 1305 upon the death of her father and her elder brother Cristoforo. Although married at the time of her inheritance, Da. Macalda received the estate as her personal possession, over which her husband had no authority, and her later decision to lease the estate provided her personally with an income of 20.00.00 a year. Such women knew their rights. When Margherita da Scordia inherited a manor near Lentini which her father had received as a papal fief, and an unscrupulous tax official attempted to extort feudal dues from her on the assumption that she was ignorant of the law, she sued the official and presented an arsenal of documentation to prove the legitimacy of her inheritance and the manor's tax-exempt status. She won her case, and the official was dropped from the rolls.81 These were hardly isolated incidents. The surviving records of land tenure, purchase, cultivation, litigation, rental, and leasing are thick with references to widows and heiresses, giving ample testimony to a significant, and long overlooked, demographic change. Widows and orphaned heiresses appear everywhere in the archival remains, and must have appeared everywhere in society at that time. It is in fact hard to avoid them. No less than 20 percent of all extant land transactions from 1291 to 1337 involve individual women - usually widows, less so heiress daughters - as one of the principal actors, and the percentage increases for the years from 1322 to 1337. The fact that widows outnumber daughters, especially in the later years, points to the increased mortality rate for men, who evidently died before producing either male or female heirs. From Iaquinta Viola's inheritance of her father's Val Demone vineyard just outside of Messina, valued at 40.00.00, in 1291, to Da. Perna Fisaula's leasing to D. Giovanni Calvellis of a small farming residence in Cassaro that she had inherited from her late husband, an exceptionally large portion of Sicily's land lay in female hands. 82 81 82

A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 3446 (3 March 1305). A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 144 (22 July 1292), d o c u m e n t i n g Iaquinta's suit for the balance owed her from t h e sale of half o f her vineyard o n 20 July 1291 t o D . Federico Rosso of Messina; B C P M S 2 Q q H 230, fol. 379 (7 Nov. 1334), recording Da. Perna's emphytheusis contract with D . Giovanni for a two-thirds portion o f her domicellus in Cassaro. O t h e r e x a m p l e s are t o o numerous t o cite in extenso. A sampler: Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita diPolizzi, doc. 20 (10 Sept. 1310), 27 (14 Sept. 1324), 28 (8 March 1326), 29 (29July 1326), 39 (6 Sept. 1330); B C P M S 2 Q q H 230, fol. 363 ( i o j u n e 1331), 370 (7 Nov. 1334).

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A clear majority of these holdings were to be found in the Val Demone and the Val di Noto, where landholdings were smaller and more numerous. One such smallholding near Aidone belonged to Sybilla Calvino "and her wife Ruggero" who resided in Castrogiovanni, along with Sybilla's daughter from an earlier marriage; Sybilla and her daughter controlled the land outright. When they decided to sell a portion of it to a local farmer, the hapless Ruggero could only stand by and consent to the sale, although he no doubt muttered under his breath about the notary's slip of the pen when he reviewed the deed.83 The accidental survival of more records from these two regions may account for this distribution; but the Val Demone, although its economic diversity made it more secure than the rest of the kingdom, was also the site of much of the most intense baronial infighting as well in the later decades, owing largely to the wide Ventimiglia and Chiaromonte holdings located there. Hence the prevalence of female-controlled estates and vineyards illustrates powerfully and soberly the extent of violent social unrest and rivalry in the rural sector.84 Women figured large in the urban economy too, where we find them engaged in a range of trades. Most often, of course, they worked in the shops of their husbands and fathers, commonly engaging in some manufacture like weaving or dressmaking, or working in a taverna, or collecting rents. Given the relative prosperity of the post-Caltabellotta years and the fact that women retained possession of the resources they brought into marriage, the possibilities for generating wealth were everywhere. But women 83 84

A C A Perg. J a m e s II, no. 2433 (28 J u n e 1307): "Sybilla d e Alberto Calvini . . . habitatrix Castrijohannis . . . et uxor sua Rogerius." Giambruno, Tabulario di S. Margherita di Polizri, doc. 20 (10 Sept. 1308), D a . Giovanna d e Galatafimi (widow of D . Giovanni di Ventimiglia) appoints a procurator to negotiate a dispute over properties near Petralia Soprana and Petralia Sottana; doc. 27 (14 Sept. 1324), the widow of Piero de Paricia sells a "plantam et terram vacuam" near S. Maria de Latina for 01.04.00; doc. 28 (8 March 1326), Isola Pinziguerra (widow o f D . L a m b e r t o Pinziguerra), along with her daughters Giacoma and Giovanna, inherits fief estates at Pinziguerra, Rassafica, and Malconsiglio (see also doc. 29-30, 33); doc. 35 (1 Aug. 1329), selling a vineyard and land-plot owned by Da. Matilda d'Augusta (see also doc. 37); doc. 39 (6 Sept. 1330), Genova Castellana (widow of Pregadeo Carella) sells a "tenimentum terrarum" to the same Da. Matilda; ACA Perg. James II, apendice, no. 94 (22 Feb. 1322), challenging Da. Belladonna di Scordia's ownership of a Val Demone vineyard; Perg. Alfonso III, no. 624 (27 March 1332), Bella Markisana (widow of Gualtiero Markisana) sells an orchard valued at 25.00.00 to Pere Llopis, a Catalan inhabitant of Catania; BCP MS 2 Qq H 230, fol. 363 (10 June 1331), Galgana Sardo (widow of M. Giacomo Sardo) sells a domus in Cassaro to a local notary.

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were greatly restricted, at least during their wedded years, in the types of business they were allowed to conduct. They were prominent as urban and rural landlords, for example. Some women, like Rosa Nazano in Corleone and Giovanna d'Esculo in Monreale, owned and operated mills.85 A woman in Cefalu named Margherita Romano had the distinction of being landlady to the bishop; evidently a pious woman, she charged him an annual rent of only 00.01.00 for a large domus in the town's upper piazza, near the cathedral.86 Female tavern- and inn-keepers were particularly numerous and had particularly varying fortunes, ranging from Giacoma Baldinoto's taverna in Sciacca, which was described in a court record of 1294 as "a ruin, wasted with age and practically useless," to Vircella Garsia's inn at Palermo, which she sold in June 1318 for 30.00.00, or to Genesia Lentini's establishment in Siracusa, valued in 1325 at io.oo.oo.87 Still more spectacularly, Donna Abinanta, a woman of Castrogiovanni, owned a profitable tenimentum in Naro which she leased to a variety of tenants until September 1334 when she sold it for no less than 130.00.00.88 For the majority of women, however, life was a more modest and mundane affair, centered around the home and the daily cares of family life. Marriage was for most of them the defining event in their lives, the rite of passage that largely determined their economic and personal fates. As a sacrament and a means for the transfer of wealth, marriage stood at the center of urban life. It established one's position in society and provided society with one of its most traditional and popular festivals (and one that leaders of rival comitive quickly seized upon as occasions for broadcasting their real or claimed wealth, status, and influence). Among traditional wedding customs was a torch- or candle-lit parade through the streets of the city or village by the crowd in attendance, or by the wedding party itself, stretching usually from the bride's house to the church where the ceremony was performed, and then from the church to the home of the bride's new husband, where the crowd stood vigil until the marriage was consummated. The 85 86 87

88

A S P T a b . S. Maria del Bosco, perg. 22 (7 Sept. 1299). A S P T a b . Cefalu, perg. 8 4 (6 March 1309). ACA Perg. James II, no. 465 (8 Feb. 1294): "ruynosa et vetustate corrupta et prorsus inutilis"; ASP Tab. S. Martino delle Scale, perg. 36 (18 July 1318); Polica, "Carte adespote dell'Archivio Gargallo," doc. 3 (20 Oct. 1325). A C A Perg. Alfonso III, no. 823 (14 Sept. 1334).

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revelries that followed could easily last the entire night and, like many such affairs, lead on occasion to unintended turmoil. Local officials in the 1320s and 1330s came to dread weddings as much as they dreaded ripitu processions. Like most popular festivals weddings drew large crowds, and given the centrality of the torchlit consummation vigil to the overall festivities, this raised the danger of accidental fires. The cities, of course, were still constructed of wood; usually only the royal residence, the duomo church, grand elites' residences, and the castellan or bailiffs quarters (and their prison cells) were built of stone. Mass revelries could easily raze the entire city. Cynical manipulation of these enthusiasms by rival gang leaders only heightened the general danger. And hence the feeble attempts by local and central governments to limit the size and zeal of urban festivals - as much out of an inherent fear of all crowds as out of concern for fires.89 Weddings proliferated after 1302. This is often the case when a society readjusts to peace after protracted war, and Sicily was no exception. With a modicum of order restored and the potential for a reinvigorated economy looming on the horizon, men scurried to win brides for themselves. There was certainly no shortage of marriageable women available.90 Marriages multiplied accordingly, which led to the government's concerns over the potential dangers of excessive urban revelry. Moreover, the new evangelical atmosphere cautioned against immodesty. A sole capitulum in the Ordinationes generates was devoted to

wedding solemnities. Custom required that all marriages be celebrated "solemnly and publicly" - that is, with a priestly blessing. Moreover, all marriages wherein either the bride or her groom were landholders had to apply for a government license before the wedding could take place. But for the rest of the festivities, the law sought to curb popular enthusiasm by decreeing that: 89 90

T h e only study of marriage customs is Garufi, "Ricerche sugli usi nuziali" ( s e e n. 64, above). Six thousand Sicilian m e n had died in the battle of C a p o d'Orlando alone, leaving behind numerous widows. Speciale, Historia sicula, bk. iv, ch. 13-16 describes t h e battle, which took place o n 4 July 1299; s e e also Pryor, "The Naval Battles o f Roger of Lauria," pp. 204-8; and Finke, "Die Seeschlacht a m K a p Orlando" (see ch. 3, n. 78, above). For the battle's aftermath, see ACA Cartas James II, no. 10205-10. For Sicilians killing Sicilians, see Neocastro, Historia sicula, ch. 75; Desclot, Crdnica, ch. 100, 119; and Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro, pp. 4, 14, 33, 36.

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no one shall be allowed to travel to any wedding that takes place thirty miles or more from the city or village in which he or she lives, under penalty of 04.00.00, unless he or she is the mother, father, son, daughter, brother, sister, or first cousin of either the bride or groom. Moreover there are to be no costumes worn, and no superfluous theatricals performed . . . on penalty of 04.00.00. It is permitted to celebrate the solemnities as one wishes during the daytime; but at night no one may attend the nuptials, or remain at them, regardless of whether or not they are carrying torches. If the people getting married are widows, however, then six people for the groom and six people for the bride may accompany them to the church and thence to their home, carrying torches; but the number of torch-bearers may never exceed twelve . . . and afterwards they must return immediately to their own houses . . . All rings, jests, gifts, and surprises that have customarily been given to the bride on the second day after her nuptials are prohibited, on penalty of 04.00.00. And all large-scale celebrations are prohibited; this applies equally to those related to either the bride or the groom, regardless of degree, and to those who have come to the wedding from a distance. It is permitted for them to celebrate during the day of the wedding and no more, on penalty of 04.00.00.91

From this it is clear that the municipalities feared spirited gatherings on at least two levels - one the quite sensible level of wishing to ensure against fires in the crowded, wood-built cities, and the other the less overt level of dreading excessive, immodest comportment among the populace. This latter was not necessarily the result of concern over the possible incitement of political passions and social riots, although there was probably a measure of that at work. Cultural taboos against any public display of strong emotion, whether it be wine-induced revelry or personal affection, ran strong and deep, and still do. Modesty, and the aura 91

Ord. gen., ch. 98: "Quod nemini liceat ire ad nuptias faciendas extra civitatem vel terram de qua vel in qua habitat ultra milliaria triginta ad plus, nisi forte sit pater vel mater, filius vel filia, frater vel soror, primus consobrinus vel consobrina sponsi vel sponse, sub poena unciarum quatuor. Item quod in nuptiis non fiant indumenta donantia sive dari solita histrionibus . . . sub poena unciarum quatuor. Item quod licitum sit de die facere in nuptiis solemnitates ad libitum; de nocte autem nullus vadat ad nuptias vel moretur in eis cum blandonibus vel sine blandonibus — nisi nubentes sint vidue, ad quas liceat ire cum eis ad ecclesias et deinde redire ad domos suas cum blandonibus usque ad sex, qui sint sponsi, et sex sponse. Ita quod numerus blandonorum duodecim nullatenus excedatur. Volumus tamen quod persone ipse possint ire de domibus earum ad domos nuptiarum et abinde redire ad domos suas . . . Item quod annuli, jocalia, et alia dona et exenia dari consueta sponse secundo die post nuptias eodem die vel alio dari prohibentur, sub poena unciarum quatuor. Item prohibentur generalia convivia nuptiarum, et quod tantum illis, qui attinent sponso quam sponse in primo et secundo gradu, et iis aliis venientibus de exteris partibus ad nuptias, possit parari et fieri convivium durante tempore nuptiarum per diem unum tantum, sub poena unciarum quatuor."

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of self-mastery that it creates, ranked high among popular values. To allow one's emotions to take control of one's behavior violated society's comfortable norms and threatened social order. Urban Sicilians especially placed a high value on maintaining a public image of self-discipline, of reserved strength and cultivated ease, and found emotional behavior - especially any behavior that betrayed the weakness or indiscipline of the reveller — discomforting and distasteful. But the tight lid placed on everyday passions, at least in their public expression, occasionally failed and triggered precisely the sudden bursts of rage that plagued the cities in times of distress. The explosive and immediate violence of the Vespers rebellion on Easter Sunday 1282 is only the best-known example of the phenomenon; the sudden riots that shook the cities from 1321 onwards are less well known but in the end proved to be more harmful. It is interesting that so many of these occurrences were associated, in Sicilian minds, with women. As passionate creatures and as the cause of passion in others, women figured prominently in the social outlook of the culture. The Vespers riot erupted after an Angevin soldier offended the modesty of a Sicilian woman as she made her way to church (either raping her or attempting to do so, depending on the source). Within hours nearly every Frenchman in Palermo was dead, and within a week the rebellion had spread throughout the realm. Giovanni Chiaromonte's insurrection, which so many disgruntled barons were so quick to join, justified itself by asserting the dishonor done to his family by Francesco Ventimiglia's repudiation of his sister. To judge from the dedications of churches and abbeys, medieval Sicilians venerated far more female saints than most communities did, and most of these were martyrs who died as a result of the erotic, political, or religious passions that they had inspired in their killers. Weddings obviously were feared as much as they were celebrated, for their potential to draw and stir a crowd; and the torch-lit processions from home to church and back again, followed by the outside vigil maintained during the wedding-night's consummation, all worked to solemnize male possession and mastery of female passion. And perhaps most strikingly, women were associated with emotive unrest in regard to the popular death rituals led by the female "wailers" or reputatrices, who organized and presided over the ripitu. The law feared their power as early as 1309, decreeing that "no woman shall dare to

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accompany or follow any funeral biers that carry the bodies of the dead, whether these go to the church or to the graveyard, regardless of however closely the deceased was connected to her by either blood or affection," for fear of their ability to incite mass outpourings of woe, rage, and despair.92 The folkloric power of these women dated to ancient Roman times and the dirge singers mentioned by Cicero and Horace.93 Their ability to drive crowds wild with grief still was not doubted. "Since the wailings, songs, and chants offered on behalf of the dead by women turn the souls of those present to grief and move them to the injury of the Creator, we prohibit these wailers from being present at all funerals, along with all other women who work in their line; neither may they appear in homes, churches, or graveyards . . . nor may they ring bells, pluck strings, pound drums, or play any other of the instruments which their art uses to bring men as much to a state of joy as to one of grief." These wailers, despite their folkloric origins, evidently had some connection, or were perceived to have some connection, with the evangelical movement as well, since the law added that they could not escape paying for their actions "propter paupertatem." If necessary, they were to be paraded through the streets of the city and beaten with cudgels.94 If the emotive power of women represented so grave a danger to society, then it was better to ban them from occasions which might give rise to that emotion and its power to disturb, distract, and intoxicate a crowd. Consequently all Sicilian women, whether they were reputatrices or not, were forbidden to mourn their dead in any church or at the grave on any feast day, "regardless of however closely the deceased was connected to her by blood or 92

93 94

Ibid., ch. 100: "Quod nulla domina sive mulier audeat ire cum feretro seu post feretrum, cum corpora defunctorum ad ecclesias vel sepulturas, quantumcumque defunctus consanguinitate vel afflnitate sibi junctus fuerit, sub poena unciarum quatuor." Cicero, De legibus, 2, 24, 62; H o r a c e , Carmina, 2, 20-1; s e e also St. A u g u s t i n e , De civitate Dei, bk. vi, ch. 9. Ord. gen., ch. 101: "Item, q u o n i a m reputationes et cantus et soni, qui propter defunctos celebrantur, muliebriter animos astantium convertant in luctum et movent eos quodammodo ad injuriam Creatoris, prohibemus reputantes funeribus adesse, vel alie mulieres, que earum utantur ministerio, nee in domibus seu ecclesiis vel sepulturis vel alio quocunque loco; nee pulsentur circa funebria, guideme vel timpana, vel alia solita instrumenta, que ars magis ad gaudium, quam ad tristitiam adinvenit, poena unciarum auri quatuor multandis iis, qui eas admiserint circa hoc, et ipsis reputatricibus similiter, que reputatrices, si poenam solvere propter paupertatem non possint, ne poenalis prohibitio eludatur, fustibus cedantur per civitatem et terram, ubi prohibita tentaverunt."

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affection." And they were permitted to wear mourning clothes only for the death of their husbands.96 This association of women with mourning and death, with uncontrollable emotion and a kind of seductive hysteria, accords with the evangelicals' teachings about the approaching apocalypse and the urgency behind the reforms that sought to save the kingdom, and all Christendom, from the spiritual rot that threatened it. But this regulation of women further suggests that the death rate in the kingdom, and especially in the cities, was on the rise as early as 1309, for it is extremely unlikely that such severe regulations would have been crafted and enforced - regulations, as too with the wedding laws, that uprooted centuries-long popular traditions - unless a powerfully felt need for them had arisen. But what caused these deaths? No major food crises occurred until 1311, and war with Naples did not recommence until 1312. Pirate attacks on the port cities can hardly have caused so many deaths; even brutes like Bernat de Sarria and Berenguer Vilaregut killed no more than a handful of people. No doubt some of the mourning was for the fallen members of the Company that was just then settling into Achaea; as the Company tightened its relations with Sicily, the full extent of their losses over the years probably only then became well known. But even this accounts for several hundred deaths, at most. Instead, the increase in mortality was likely the result of demographic displacement. Peasants driven from the land, or willingly fleeing from it, streamed into the demesne cities in order to create new lives for themselves, and in so doing placed intolerable burdens on the resources of the unprepared municipalities. Despite the skills brought by traders and artisans who migrated, especially for those who made the difficult trek eastward from the Val di Mazara, integration into their new communities could not have been easy, given the different trade practices and market structures of the eastern valli. 95

96

Ibid., ch. 102: "Prohibemus etiam a d o m i n a b u s et mulieribus aliisque q u a n t u m c u n q u e consanguinitate vel affinitate jungantur iam mortuis ire ad ecclesias seu sepulcra defunctorum diebus festivis vel aliis, occasione consuetudinis ad plorandum ibidem propter defunctos, vel temporibus statutis, poena unciarum auri quatuor transgressore multando." Ibid., ch. 104: "Item quod domine vel plebee, scilicet maritate, propter mortem consanguineorum non mutent sibi vestes, nee aliquam novitatem in vestibus et habitu faciant, sicut hactenus consuevit, nisi pro morte maritorum suorum tantum, sub poena unciarum auri sex a transgredientibus petenda."

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The difficulties of cultural dislocation should not be overlooked either; compounding many Sicilians' ingrained distrust of strangers was the simple, though substantial, problem of dialect. The city of Ragusa, for example, had three separate dialects spoken within its confines, which must have made it hard for newcomers to adapt and establish themselves. Inevitably, unemployment resulted, and the proportionate increase in the urban labor pools drove wages down and resulted in the formation of those crowds of urban poor who became the targets of the preachers and later of gang recruiters. As city streets filled with the poor, despair rose and public health declined even while many thrived. The build-up of resentment against the monied, and especially against the monied Catalans, Pisans, Genoese, and Florentines present in their fine silks, continued without abatement. Hunger, disease, and crime did the killing. In this atmosphere women who had acquired property of any sort, whether from their dead husbands or dead fathers, became the targets of ardent suitors and the objects of aggressive economic opportunism. Some women, like the young widow Isabella di Federico in Palermo, found that their very bodies became the key objects of inheritance disputes. When Isabella's husband died in late 1320 she was pregnant with their first child; but her brotherin-law Bernardo di Federico was suspicious of her claim. Fearing that Isabella was dissembling, or worse that she might suddenly get herself pregnant in order to keep her husband's inheritance under her control, Bernardo petitioned the universitas to force Isabella to submit to an inspection by four court-appointed midwives. When the midwives confirmed that Isabella was indeed pregnant and was in fact already in her sixth month, the matter appeared to have been settled. But as her pregnancy came to term the dispute took a suspicious turn. On 28 February 1321 Bernardo again petitioned the court, this time to force Isabella, then in her ninth month, to leave her own house and to take lodgings instead with another woman, named Fia Murchio, who would presumably care for her and the child. Isabella had misgivings about this strange request. Her inheritance from her husband certainly was sufficient to enable her to afford a midwife's attention and a servant or two to help her in the first months after her child's birth - and so Bernardo's new petition could not be based on altruism. If anything, she feared, Fia Murchio was in Bernardo's hire and was plotting to kill the baby

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(Fia is described only as a "widow," not as a midwife). Despite a court injunction to move herself into Fia's house, Isabella refused, declaring that she would remain in her own house until well after the child was born, after which she would decide for herself where she wanted to live. In her condition, she could not be physically forced, and her defiance was brave. Nevertheless she had to bear the insult of receiving a court-appointed notary, one Matteo de Notario, as "curator of her womb" until she delivered.97 The study of Sicily's women in the late Middle Ages has scarcely begun. Admittedly they left few records, but enough remains to encourage us that such a study is possible and worthwhile. As these pages have tried to show, they had an importance in the life of the realm that has been altogether unappreciated and misunderstood. That importance may perhaps be an indirect and strangely passive one for the historian, for the women of Frederick's Sicily were more acted upon than actors; but in viewing the forces that were at work in shaping and controlling women's lives, we come to understand the range and power of the forces that were at work unraveling the social fabric. The dramatic ubiquity of widowhood, the scramble to seize control of female inheritances, and the popularity of, yet too the dread of, the apocalyptic "wailers," all bear witness to the desperate conditions within the realm and the desperate remedies for them it sought. 97

BCP MS Qq F 31, fol. 31 (17-18 Dec. 1320), 42-42V (27-8 Feb. 1321): "notarius Matheus de Notario idem curator datur per curiam ventris dicte Ysabelle." Coercion was used in other cases too, often to force an unwilling woman to wed, in order either to secure a commercial link or to rid the family of an unwanted burden. One such case was Costanza di Monteleone of Milocca who, in 1330, was forced by her parents and brothers to marry one Paolino di Castronovo "per vim et metum cohacta minis et verberibus ac cruciatibus parentum et fratrum suorum." See BCP, MS Qq H 6, fol. 476-8 (23 Nov. 1332), which is the record of Costanza's successful suit to have the marriage annulled; and Collura, Le piii antiche carte (see ch. 3, n. 65, above), doc. 76. For another annullment, see BCP MS. Qq H 6, fol. 276-80 (11 June 1313); cf. Collura, Lepiu antiche, doc. 55,55a. See also ACA Perg. James II, no. 3374 (6 July 1315).

Conclusion

Could anything have been done to avoid the social and economic decay portrayed here? Certainly the challenges confronting the island were great, when Frederick first took the throne, but the situation was hardly hopeless. Indeed it was the very persistence of hope for the future that brought an end to the war and inspired the creative adaptations of the post-Caltabellotta years. In some ways, that decade was the high point not only of Frederick's reign but of the entire medieval era for Sicily, for it was the time of the greatest native achievement in commerce, spiritual renewal, public building, military strength, and rudimentary education. The romanticized Norman era, by contrast, had achieved most of its glories - which were, anyways, limited to the royal court - by the importation of what had been accomplished elsewhere. A palpable atmosphere of excitement and confidence was present. As it happened, the excitement was justified, but not the confidence. The coincidence of political, economic, and religious disaster in 1311-14 turned the tide and exposed all the weaknesses in Sicilian life. No single explanation can suffice to account for what happened to Sicily. The unraveling of the kingdom in the first third of the fourteenth century progressed so relentlessly, and to so great an extent, that in order to explain it one must look for either a single, cataclysmic event that suddenly and irretrievably altered everything - something along the lines of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia, for Asia Minor - or for an entire network of innate local weaknesses, a congeries of fault lines in the very structure of society that prevented it from adapting to the challenges that confronted it. For many commentators from the fourteenth century to the present, from Nicola Speciale to Benedetto Croce and his disciples, the Vespers conflict alone answers all; it was the 303

304

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

cataclysm that altered everything in Sicilian life and initiated the downhill slide from which the island has even yet to recover. As Speciale wrote, Sicily (the ruined beauty with whom this book began) had become a land with "an abundance of grain and many other fruits, which are taken from her shores by foreign sailors and sold at terrific prices . . . [a kingdom] attacked by foreign kings and princes . . . cut by the wounds of war . . . coveted by people from the remotest lands. And for this reason it is a land reared in the calamity and strife of war, where peace and quiet have long been unknown." Belief in the centrality of the Vespers undergirds all the thinking of the economic "dualists," for whom Sicily without her peninsular territories was an unviable society doomed to failure. But the war with Naples, for all its severity, can hardly be blamed for everything that went wrong, or simply was wrong already, in Sicilian life. The recovery after Caltabellotta alone shows this. War inevitably aggravates, deepens, and embitters ethnic hatreds, for example, but it is not necessarily the cause of them. Bigotry and xenophobia have genealogies all their own. Nor does the war sufficiently account for the kingdom's economic difficulties. Val Demone's trade with Calabria, long regarded as so crucial, continued, after an initial hiatus after 1282, throughout the period of Frederick's reign and contributed greatly to Messina's considerable resilience. Moreover, whatever trade was lost with the peninsula was amply made up by commercial links with Catalonia, Tunis (long the most important consumer of Sicilian wheat), and temporarily at least with Athens and the rest of rump Byzantium. Vespers lamenters have long emphasized the permanent harm done to the economy by the omnipresence of foreign traders and their omnipotent control of exports, but foreign control of international commerce, while it may no doubt enrich the foreigner, does not necessarily imply the impoverishment of the native. Sicily's domestic economy was always more crucial to its overall well-being than its overseas commerce, and the conflict with the Angevins affected domestic trade only marginally. Moreover, as shown most convincingly by Epstein, Sicily's economy recovered to an astonishing degree in the fifteenth century, when the kingdom was still, or was once again, under the rule of Aragon-Catalonia: the population increased, manufacturing expanded and diversified, credit and market structures became more sophisticated, wages rose, and prices stabilized. Had

Conclusion

305

the Vespers caused the irrevocable ruin that many claim for it, such a recovery would be difficult to explain. Epstein, of course, accounts for the recovery by arguing precisely that the Vespers was of little importance for Sicily's long-term development, and that the local economy, when examined in terms of its domestic rather than its foreign trade, possessed hitherto unappreciated strengths and an admirable ability to adapt to radically new circumstances. Thus the roots of Sicily's now entrenched poverty and backwardness must be sought elsewhere - as he suggests, in the seventeenth century. The argument of this book had been two-fold. First, any attempt to evaluate the impact of foreign affairs on the kingdom, whether political and dynastic or social, economic, and religious, must examine those affairs in a broader context than scholars hitherto have done. Sicily's difficulties with Naples formed only one thread of an enormously tangled web of alliances, animosities, commitments, reluctant obligations, and desperate hopes - a web in which the Vespers has appeared to be the most important thread only because of the politically driven bombast that makes up most of the extant narrative sources — the sources on which so much modern scholarship has depended. By broadening one's field of vision, and by focusing instead on the archival records that lie scattered between Palermo, Messina, Barcelona, Naples, and Rome, a different picture emerges, one of an island society made newly vibrant and activist by its separation from the rest of the Regno - a kingdom with an extraordinarily energetic zeal to reform itself and the larger Mediterranean world of which it was, in more than one way, the center and linchpin. Freed from the war, Sicily rebounded with impressive speed and in a relatively short period of time had standardized its system of weights and measures, codified and simplified its cumbersome tariff code, reorganized land tenure, created a system of government as near to efficiency and fairness as anything it had seen in previous centuries, built or rebuilt scores of churches and monasteries, established a network of evangelical schools, reformed its slave practice, improved its manufacturing base, and (accidentally) conquered much of Greece. Clearly the physical destruction caused by the Angevin war, and the obstruction or diversion of trade it contributed to, had not dealt anything like a death blow to society. Indeed, the first half of Frederick's reign was singularly successful. Catalan cash and organizational ability accounts for some of

306

The decline and fall of medieval Sicily

this, but the majority of the credit must go to the long-frustrated desires of the Sicilians themselves for peace, a surer prosperity, a measure of self-determination, and a fuller spiritual life. Once presented with the opportunity, however brief or tenuous, to pursue these goals with a minimum of interference, they responded with ingenuity and energy. Immense problems remained, yet demographic mobility gave people the chance to pursue a better life elsewhere if they were unable to make a living on the land. Social tensions and rivalries remained sharp, but disputes were increasingly settled in court rather than on the street. Difficulties with the Holy See persisted, but Sicily worked as well with Avignon in these years as did any other state in Europe. Had Frederick died at midreign - perhaps, as he might have hoped, on a battlefield next to Henry VII - he would likely have been remembered as one of Sicily's greatest kings, and his reign as a time of prosperity and promise rivaled only by that of "Good King William" (who really wasn't so good, anyhow) in the twelfth century. But the successes of his early years, though impressive, were painfully short-lived; even with its relentlessly dreadful last years from 1317 to 1337, Frederick's reign has been portrayed all too frequently with an undeserved roseate glow by writers in the lachrymose tradition. Second, innate weaknesses existed in the social fabric that affected the island much for the worse and prevented its long-term recovery from the fourteenth-century disasters, even in spite of the impressive economic recovery of the fifteenth century. Once again, one must broaden one's view. Just as more factors than the Vespers alone must be considered in order to understand Sicilian history in these years, so must one recognize that the Sicilian crisis was more than just economic. Despite an encouraging new beginning after 1302, political development was arrested, stunted, and paralyzed. Government - whether central or local, demesnal or feudal - could not deliver even the minimum of what society expected of it, once trouble began, and hence could not command popular support. Allegiance to "their Kingdom of Sicily," as Leonardo d'Incisa so revealingly phrased it, was a sham, an empty platitude mouthed whenever a favor was sought. Demographic mobility had done nothing to relieve the island's intense and unshakeable localism. The concern for individual self-preservation and felicity is a universal trait, but Sicily's belligerent particularism was a species apart. For most, nothing beyond oneself and one's family mattered.

Conclusion

307

It is, of course, anachronistic to expect to find modern notions of public service or communal identity fully developed and championed by a considerably pinched fourteenth-century world, but Sicilian society cheerfully evinced a cynical loyalty to the notion even long after it had failed to uphold the ideal. The realm as a realm, or the local community as a community, had value only in order to justify, with a suspiciously convenient constancy, violence against the perceived tyranny and meddling of foreigners. The Vespers did not directly cause all of this suffering, but it did serve to catalyze, highlight, and extend the forces so furiously at work in tearing apart Sicilian society. When Frederick died, the worst crises were yet to come, in the forms of the Black Death and the baronial wars. But the groundwork of ruin had been firmly laid, society's fault lines and frayed nerves exposed. In the face of economic collapse, political disaster, and spiritual crisis, Sicilians turned ferociously inward - and like Giovanni Chiaromonte they nursed passions of anger and suspicion, resentment and outrage over wounded honor. The dreadful consequences of their suffering, both real and imagined, ought not to cloud the record of their accomplishments, however. The odds against Vespers-era Sicily succeeding and prospering had been against it all along. So long as the Angevins were determined to regain the island - "striking not hard, but repeatedly, like a chisel hollowing out a stone" - there was little the Sicilians could do but to fight back as best they could. Unfortunately Henry VIFs promised conquest of the peninsula and Arnau de Vilanova's promised apocalypse never materialized, which left the kingdom worse off than it had been in decades. Even so, the record of the adaptability, resourcefulness, and industry of the people in the face of such awful difficulties, their stubborn refusal to submit and their determination to keep struggling either to win a permanent political independence, on the large, public level, or merely to scratch a better life for oneself from the soil under a blazing sun, with the sounds of war and wailing all round, on the small, private level - is a tale of admirable courage and strength.

Table i

3 o8

Table i. Judices ofPalermo Year

Gassaro

1296 (IX) 1 2 9 7 (X) 1298 (XI)

Albegaria _

Seralcadio _

_

Chalcia _

Porta Patitellorum _

*Vitale de Milite

1299 (XII) 1300 (XIII) *Giovanni Lampo 1301 (XIV) 1302 (XV) i3°3 (I) 1304(11) 1305 (HI) 1306 (IV)

•Leotto Grillo Tommasso Benedetto •Atterio d'Attelorio

*Andrea Graziano

1307 (V) 1308 (VI)

*Gerardo Cavalcanti 1309 (VII) Bartolomeo de Capua; Filippo Carastono

*Simone di Marco

1310 (VIII) 1311 (IX) 1312 (X)

J. Ruggero Carastono; J. Piacenzo da Capua

1313 ( x i ) 1315 (XIII) 1316 (XIV) *Bernardo 1317 (XV)

1318 (I)

1319 TO 1320 (III)

Marca •Filippo di Giudice; *Riccardo da Lentini

J. Alderisio Lanfredi

J. Simone Baratta

J. Corrado J. Rinaldo Firma Ruggero

Table 1

3O9

Table 1 (cont.) Year

Cassaro

1321 (IV)

J. Tommasso Benedetto; Andrea Murra *Angelo Palumba J. Filippo Lentini; J. Piacenzo da Capua J. Tommasso Benedetto J. Rinaldo de Milite; Giovanni Maramma J. Tommasso Benedetto; J. Tommasso Tagliavia *Fazio da Lentini •Nicola Tancredi •Matteo Sergio J. Rinaldo de Milite; Antonio d'Afflitto -

1322 (V) 1323 (VI)

1324 (VII) 1325 (VIII) 1326 (IX) •327 (X) 1328 (XI)

.329 (XII)

1330 (XIII) 1331 (XIV) 1332 (XV) >333 (!)

i334(H) 1335 (HI) 1336 (IV)

•337 (V)

J. Rinaldo de Milite; Michele Iardo -

Albegaria

Seralcadio

Chalcia

Porta Patitellorum

N. Andrea di Geraci

J. Enrico Martino

Lemmo Paganello

Alderisio Lanfredi J. Giacomo Lanfredi

J. Filippo Gorsibile

J. Giacomo J. Ricco Ricomanno Arenzano

J. Bartolomeo Guerrisio J. Simone d'Esculo

Bernardo Bicaro J. Matteo Sergio

Vanni de Gampo N. Matteo Salvatico

Francesco Graziano Federico Arenzano

J. Stefano d'Atterio

J. Filippo d'Albaneto

Cinno Vernacalli

M. Matteo Scarano

Stefano d'Accio

Bartolomeo di Gitella

Massimo Michele

Bartolomeo d'Afflitto

-

-

J. Stefano d'Atterio Perri Gampsore

-

J. Tommasso Puccio Garbonito Giacomo -

-

Ruggero d'Alberto

-

Bartolomeo d'Afflitto

-

Years are indictional, revolving on the preceding 1 September. Thus "1312 (X)" represents the tenth indictional year from 1 September 1311 to 31 August 1312. When the precinct is unknown, name appears with an asterisk.

Table 2

310

Table 2. Jurist e and xurterii of Palermo Year

Cassaro

Albegaria

Pietro Andrea Falcilia; Campsore Pietro // Diomiludedi M. Filippo Gampsore 11 Simone de N. Michele 1322 (V) J. Vitale J. Simone 1323 (VI) de Milite; d'Esculo Nicola // Monteliano Raimondo Battista 11 Riccardo Villano N. Enrico 1324 (VII) Francesco Lignamine de Burgio // II Giacomo Muni Torrrello Michele 1325 (VIII) 1326 (IX) 1327 (X) N. Enrico Simone 1328 (XI) Puteo; Burgio Michele // N. Giovanni Iardo Mursello II Giacomino Malaspina M. Filippo 1329 (XII) Nicola Gampsore d'Algerio; // Matteo N. Giovanni Misudo Cisario II Giunta Vilano 1330 (XIII) 1331 (XIV) 1332 (XV) 1333 (I) 1321 (IV)

Seralcadio

Ghalcia

Porta Patitellorum

Matteo di Maida

Puccio Giacomo

Giacomo Arenzano

II

II

II

N. Andrea Pipitone

Puccio Guercio

J. Nuccio de Sanguino

II

II

II

Angelo d'Aquino

Lombardo di Roberto

II

II

M. Nicola Arnono Lando Pullisio

Nicola Rustico // Giovanni Busacca Nicola Gabriele

II

II

II

Manfredi Bocca de Ordeo

Cancellario Andrea de Beni Dandi

Giulio di Emma

Fulco di Emma

Simone de Ginnario Princivallo di Pietro

II

Tommasso d'Afflitto

M. Enrico M. Riccardo Carpinterio Fartitario

II

II

Colo Vinci Bambuccio Bondi

-

-

-

—

-

—

Table 2

3 11

Table 2 (cont.) Year 1334 (H) 1335 (HI) 1336 (IV)

Albegaria

-

-

Nicola Vermilla; Matteo Capusudo

II 1337 (V)

Gassaro

-

-

N. Guglielmo Panevino

II

-

Seralcadio

Chalcia

Porta Patitellorum

-

-

-

N. Blasio Giacomo

Vanni Gampo

Guglielmo Martino

II

II

II

-

-

-

Unknown prior to 1321. Names ofjuriste precede those of xurterii, separated by double diagonal lines //.

312

Table 3 Table 3. Judices ofAgrigento, Catania, Messina,

Year

Agrigento

Catania

1297 (X) 1298 (XI) 1299 (XII)

-

-

-

-

1300 (XIII) 1301 (XIV) 1302 (XV)

-

-

1304 (II)

1305 (HI)

1306 (IV)

Polizzi

Bartolomeo d'Ansalone

1296 (IX)

1303 (!)

Messina

-

-

-

-

Buonsignore d'Ansalone; Gualtiero Bonifazio; Nicola Salimpipi; Guglielmo Saporito; Santoro Salvo; Giacomo Giordano -

Filippo Geremia Nicola Salimpipi Tomasso Santoro Salvo; Ravello Guglielmo Saporito; Giacomo Giordano Federico Mosca Roberto Calciamira; Filippo Ricco; Filippo Calciamira Perrono Guercio; Nicoloso — — Chicari; Bartolomeo di Maestro; Nicola Salimpipi Guglielmo Giacomo Vallariano; Sanduccia _ Urso Mosca; Ruggero di S. Filippo Filippo Bartolomeo Manganario di Parigi; Roberto Calciamira

-

-

Giovanni Mancusio; Ruggero Perricoli; Ruggero Lazaro

—

_

Nicola d'Egidio

Table 3

313

Table 3 {cont.) Year

Agrigento

Catania

Messina

1307 (V) 1308 (VI)

Federico Mosca -

1309 (VII) Gaddo Gallo _

1310 (VIII) Salimbene Medico; Perino Bonaposa

_

.311 (IX)

Giovanni Pisis

1312 (X)

1313 (xi) .3.4 (XII) 13.5 (XIII)

-

Giacomo Sanduccia Federico di D. Massaro

1316 (XIV) 1317 (XV)

1318 (I)

-

Gaddo Marrono; M. Pietro de Spina

Giovanni Pisis

Roberto Galciamira; Antonio Gangi Roberto Galciamira; Bartolomeo d'Isola; Nicola Tattono Nicola Salimpipi; Giovanni Calvarosso; Francesco Manna Nicola Bella; Bartolomeo Peregrino; Nicola Chicara; Ansalone di Castiglione Ginuisio Porto; Antonio Geremia; Filippo Ricco Francesco Marino Roberto Galciamira Bartolomeo Peregrino Giacomo Saporito; Francesco Coppola Franchino d'Ansalone; Federico di Perugia

Polizzi Orlando Calvo; Stefano Rosa Orlando Calvo; Stefano Rosa

_

_

Simone Verticula

Nicola Costa de Rami Giovanni Marino Orlando Calvo Giovanni di N. Pagano di Milite

Table 3 Table 3 (cont.) Year

Agrigento

Catania

I3i9 TO

1320 (III)

Dato Mohac; Nicola Crissenco

1321 (IV)

Dato Mohac; Pietro da Patti

1322 (V) 1323 (VI) 1324 (VII) 1325 (VIII) 1326 (IX)

1327 (X)

1328 (XI)

1329 (XII)

-

Teodoro Gutrone -

Messina

Polizzi

Francesco Marino; Buongiovanni Familiare Giacomo Saporito; Gregorio di Gregorio Franchino d'Ansalone; Francesco Coppola Guido Diamanti Giovanni Laburzi

Dato Mohac; Parisio Bonaposa

Lapo Tusco Simone Conventi; Andrea Fornerio; Bartolomeo di Catanzaro

Francesco Coppola; Franchino d'Ansalone; Bartolomeo Peregrino Giovanni Ruggero di Gastrogiovanni; Laburzi Simone Pucci di Ducatu; Guglielmo di Squillace Simone Fagilla; Guglielmo di Squilacce Rinaldo Ghicari; Francesco Bonifazio; Damiano Golisano

Orlando Leonardo; Rimbaldo di N. Matteo; Puccio di Giovanni Bentivigni d'Oddone

Table 3

315

Table 3 (cont.) Year

Agrigento

Catania

Messina

1330 (XIII) Giacomo Luparello 1331 (XIV) Giacomo Luparello; Ruggero Bernotto; Filippo Arcario

Adinolfo Manetto da Alaimo Tattono Pulet to Soris; Filippo Cultellis; Teodoro Cutrone; Riccardo Rizari

1332 ( x v )

Puletto Soris; Filippo Cultellis; Teodoro Cutrone; Riccardo Rizari

Simone Fagilla; Riccardo Porto; Orlando Maniaci; Damiano Golisano

_

_

333 W

Ceppo Sigerio

1334 (n)

Ceppo Sigerio

1335 (I«)

Vanni de lu Gransignore; Ruggero Bernotto

J

1336 (IV)

1337 (V)

Giovanni Laburzi; Nicola Astasio Riccardo Rizaro; Gandolfo Enrico Leone; Perromagno Ruggero di Castrogiovanni; Giacomo Migliarisio Antonio di Giovanni; Bernardo Bonainsinga _

Filippo Arcario

Indictional years, as in tables 1 and 2. Precincts unknown.

Polizzi Giovanni di Ruggero Longo Giovanni di Ruggero Longo; Pagano Guastalacqua; Orlando Leonardo Rimbaldo di N. Matteo; Roberto Fasano; Rimbaldo Calvo N. Giovanni di Cosenza; Ruggero Massa _ Orlando Leonardo

N. Guido di Caltavuturo

316

Table 4 Table 4. Feudal dues Name

Abbate, Enrico Abbate, Nicola

d'Abella, Abello d'Abella, Ferrer

d'Abella, Jaume Abrazaleni, David d'Alagd, Blase

d'Alagd, Roberto Alberti, Lupo Alberti, Ugolino Aldoini, Aldiono di Aloisio, Nicola Aloisio, Vitale

Altavilla, Enrico Amat,Josep Ansalone, Ansalono Antiochia, Federico Antiochia, Pietro

d'Arago, heirs of Sang

Location

Servitium

M: Salemi M M: Vicari M M: Termini M: Carini M: Monte S. Giuliano M: Monte S. Giuliano

p

Holdings Sala (c) Isnello Cefala Chamirichi Ciminna Terrasini Cabiscudia Inici "certe terre" S. Filippo d'Agira Milazzo Oliveri "certe terre" Scanzafriddi (f) Naso (t) Capo d'Orlando (c) Aci (t) Valcorrente Monforte Butera (t) "certe terre" Venetico Burdiscati (f) Carmiti (f) Mirto (f) Capri (f) Fitalia (f) Ganziria (f) Scilinda (c) Villanuova (c) Callisi (c) Longarino (f) Boccetta Mistretta Regitano Capizzi Cerami (2/3) S. Marco (f) Cammarata (t) Xibeni (f)

N: Scicli D D D: Milazzo N: Scicli p

600.00.00

25.00.00 200.00.00

15.00.00 20.00.00

D D D N: Paterno N

150.00.00

N

100.00.00

70.00.00

N: Scicli D: Milazzo p p

06.00.00

M: Partinico M: S. Marco M: Vicari N: Caltagirone M: Caltabellotta M: Bivona M: Caltabellotta N: Siracusa D: Messina N N: Mistretta N N D: Patti N N: Noto

40.00.00

05.00.00 10.00.00

10.00.00 30.00.00

20.00.00 20.00.00 300.00.00

600.00.00

Table 4

317

Table 4 (cont.) Holdings

Name

d'Arago,Joan d'Asciz, Gil d'Augusta, Giuliano Barba, Accardo

Barresi, Abbate

Baxerio, Guglielmo Berga, Michele

Bergerio, Enrico Bombarone, Guido Bonguido, Nicola Branciforte, RafTaele Brindisi, Bartolomeo di

Bubitello, Teodaldo Bucalta, Soldano Bufalo, Giacomo Gacciaguerra, Antonio Caldarera, Guglielmo Gallaro, Federico Callaro, Manfredi Galtagirono, Giovanni di Calvellis, Giovanni

Cancieri, Giacomo

Bovario (c) Monaci (c) Danchiridie (f) Bombunetto (f) Tavazia (f) Stafende 'Cartini' 'Changemi' 'Gerardi' (c) Pietraperzia Militello Galtabellotta (0 Busascuti (f) Sigona (f) Nicosia (t) Fessima (t) Grandinille (0

Location M N: Mineo p N: Noto Malta N: Noto p p N: Galtanissetta D M p p D N: Piazza p

p

Darfudi (c) Mazarino (c) Gilbiseno Chincave (c) Mortilli Fontana Rossa Bubitello (f) Bucalta (0 Pantano Salso Catuso (f) Favarotta (f) Piscasia (f) Gavaniorum Rachalburduni (f) Misilmeri S. Stefano (c) Ficalda (c) Sirronti (c) Malcellorii (c) Asinello (c) "certe terre"

Servitium 115.00.00 20.00.00 25.00.00 100.00.00

350.00.00

10.00.00 160.00.00

05.00.00 20.00.00

M: Caltanissetta N

N M: Cammarata M: Monreale N: Gatania p p N: Lentini M: Polizzi M: Licata p p p

M: Palermo D: Cefalu D p p D: Cefalu N: Scicli

40.00.00 200.00.00 50.00.00

36.00.00 15.00.00 30.00.00 03.00.00 30.00.00 20.00.00 20.00.00 05.00.00 100.00.00 250.00.00 200.00.00

10.00.00

Table 4

3i8

Table 4 (cont.) Name

Baccarato (f) Salma Eraclea Bocale Gomiano Diesi Mulotta Ragalmalo Dammisa Cappello, Nicola Ghamemi (f) Carbonelli, Orlandizio Varnina (c) Gardona, Manfredi "certe terre" Garpinsano, Goflredo Chicallo (f) Garresi, heirs of Rinaldo S. Lorenzo (f) Galligano (c) Gasaromana, Pietro Gassaro, heirs of Giovanni Gassaro (f) Diodino (f) Ghipulla (f) Castellano, Filippo Castellar, heirs of Guillem Bibino (f) Palazzolo (t) Gatalano, heirs of Accollo Michiforo "certe bone" Ghaula, Guglielmo Gomiso (c) Ghiaromonte, Giovanni Favara Muxaro Ragalnoto S. Vioganni Chiaromonte, Giovanni Mistretta (c) Risigalla (f) Ghiaromonte, Manfredi Favara (f) Murbano (f) Ciullo, Guillotta Gochumino (f) Gochumino, Riccardello Golari, Manfredi Butraido (c) Gurla, heirs of Guglielmo "certe terre" "certe feuda" Gurtibus, Simone de Dena, heirs of Sancio Musubini (f) Alfana (f) Bumusti (f) Doria, heirs of Brancaleone Galatabiano Racalmuto Cannata, Pietro Cannariato, Luca Gapece, Mariano

Location

Holdings

N: Aidone p M: Agrigento M: Agrigento M: Agrigento M

Servitium 80.00.00 50.00.00 250.00.00

M

N: Naro p p N: Scicli p N: Noto p N: Siracusa p D: Gastrogiovanni N: Palazzolo

10.00.00 15.00.00 03.00.00 30.00.00 30.00.00

p 60.00.00 80.00.00 03.00.00 100.00.00

N

p p N

M M p M: Gaccamo D D: Castrogiovanni

03.00.00 50.00.00

p

40.00.00 130.00.00

D p

04.00.00

p

08.00.00

M

15.00.00

N: Ragusa M: Salemi N N

60.00.00

p 30.00.00

N

D: Acireale M

400.00.00

Table 4

319

Table 4 (cont.) Name Doria, Raffaele Ebdemonia, heirs of Filippo de Eleanor, the queen

Esculo, Giovanni Falcone, Pietro Ferrisi, heirs of N. Fieschi, heirs of Luca Filangieri, Anastasia Filangieri, heirs of Goffredo Filangieri, Riccardo Fimetta, Simone Folio, Giacomo Folio, Giacomo (idem) Formica, Pietro Fratta, Bartuccio de Genovese, Simone

Gerardo, Ugolino Geremia, Giovanni Gollesio, Manfredi Graffeo, Orlando Gregorio, Atanasio Guadagno, Nicola Guarna, Giovanni Guercii, Andrea

Holdings Gastronovo (t) Rachalmeni (f) Montesi (f) Momlisano (f) Silvestri (c) Avola (t) Gastelluccio (f) Gisira (0 "certe terre" Ghavestri (f) Protonotaro (c) Caropepe (f) Alfano (0 Bommurmusino Linguaglossa Rachalmeni (f) Licodia (t) Montemaggiore (f) Fiumefreddo (c) "certe terre" "pro Ampellono di Ferla" Marineo (c) Fratta (f) Renda (f) Alfano (woodland) "certe terre" "certe terre" Rachalgiovanni (f) "certe terre" Partanna (c) Randacino (c) S. Martino (c) "certe terre" Callari (c) Rapsi (f)

Location M N: Lentini ?

Servitium 230.00.00

50.00.00

?

N

120.00.00

N: Siracusa N: Noto N

N: Ragusa p D: Milazzo N: Gastrogiovanni N: Noto p D: Messina N

N: Vizzini M: Termini D: Calatabiano N: Scicli p

60.00.00 20.00.00 80.00.00 15.00.00

70.00.00 15.00.00

140.00.00

80.00.00 25.00.00 40.00.00

N: Vizzini p

40.00.00

N: Siracusa

40.00.00

10.00.00

N

N: Ragusa N: Ragusa

08.00.00

M

80.00.00

N: Scicli M: Monreale N: Lentini D: Milazzo N: Scicli N: Militello N: Lentini

20.00.00 200.00.00 30.00.00

10.00.00 30.00.00 40.00.00

Table 4

320

Table 4 (cont.) Name

Bufanini (f) Giffira (0 Homodeo, heirs of Nicola Maletta (f) Frazzano (f) Li Martini (f) S. Bartolomeo (c) Incisa, Aloysio di Misilini (c) Incisa, Giovanni di Inveges, heirs of Berenguer Galamonaci (f) Rachalmaymuni (f) Ucria Isola, Guglielmo di Rachali (f) Jaconia, Ruggero Rachalgididi (0 Buchalef (0 "certe terre" Jusia, Allegisto Arcudachi (f) Lac, Lanzalono di Mazzarone (f) Lamia, Giovanni Ghadra Lamia, Nicola Lamia Sabuchi Menyolio Lancia, Blasio Ficarra Galati Longi Sinagra (c) Lancia, Manfredi Giarratana (t) Lancia, Nicola Ossena (c) Ferula (t) Murchella (c) Delle Scale (f) Mangone (f) Burgio (f) Bolo (wood) Bonfala Longarino Mutassaro Pantano Salso Taguida Naro (t) Lancia, Pietro Galtanissetta (t) La Delia (t) Sabuchi (c) Gurgia, Pachisio

Location

Holdings

p p D: Mt. Etna D: Naso D: Patti M: Sciacca M: Sciacca M: Sciacca M: Caltabellotta D: Patti M: Partinico M: Trapani p N: Scicli M: Trapani N: Galtagirone N: Lentini N: Mineo N: Licata p D D D D: Patti N

Servitium 15.00.00

100.00.00

30.00.00 250.00.00 06.00.00

30.00.00 30.00.00

20.00.00 60.00.00 60.00.00 130.00.00

400.00.00

20.00.00 300.00.00

N: Militello p p p N: Piazza M

M N: Noto N: Siracusa N

N: Lentini p N N p N: Licata

1000.00.00

Table 4

321

Table 4 (cont.) Name Lancia, Ugolino Landolina, Giovanni

Lentini, Alfonso Licchari, Liveto Licodia, Gualtiero Limogiis, Aloysio Linguida, Guglielmo Linguida, Pietro

Lochirra, Giovanni Lopis, heirs of Asuero Lopis, wife of Miquel Luchisio, Nicola Maida, Matteo and Giovanni Maletta, Matteo Manganello, Riccardo Maniavacca, Francesco Maniscalco, Bartolomeo Manna, heirs of Federico Manna, heirs of Giovanni

Manuele, Gorrado

Location

Holdings Limbaccari (c) Fargintino (f) Grampolo (f) Cannatini (f) Cammarata (f) "certe terre" Ixiri (f) S. Basilio (c) Laudi (c) Tursi (0 Gallura (f) Racagliusi (f) Abbice (0 Grimasta (c) Burgarami (c) Cazulutu (c) Gatani (c) Burgatello (f) Lalia (0 Scanzafriddi (f) Ficarazzi Misilcassimi (c) Rahalmingino (f) Adernico (c) Furnari (c) Galtavuturo (t) Bavuco (c) Rapano (c) S. Andrea (c) Paradiso (c) Roccavaldina (c) Valdina (c) Rasinacchi (c) Gattaino S. Lucia (c) S. Pietro Patti (c) Girami (c) Menfi (c)

p p N: Noto N: Noto

Servitium 20.00.00 115.00.00

M

N: Ragusa p p p p

p N: Lentini p p p p p

15.00.00 15.00.00

15.00.00 110.00.00

p 130.00.00

50.00.00

p

20.00.00

N: Licodia

80.00.00

p

20.00.00

M: Vicari

p

M: Sciacca M: Cammarata p p

250.00.00

M D D: Milazzo D: Milazzo D: Milazzo D: Milazzo D: Milazzo p D: Randazzo D D p

100.00.00

M

20.00.00 30.00.00 40.00.00

250.00.00

100.00.00

Table 4

322

Table 4 (cont.) Name Manuele, Rodolfo Marquet, heirs of Berenguer Marrasio, Giovanni Marti, heirs of Pere Marturano, Matteo Medico, Cristoforo Michele, heirs of Martino Michele, Massimo Migiiotta, heirs of Buongiovanni

Location

Holdings

Burgo de Gristani (c) M "certe terre" N: Scicli

Mazanchini (f) Ghanu (f) Rahalmallino (f) Gisira (c) "certe terre" Galbace (c) Ghandicatini (f) Racaglia (f) Maronno (f) Rachalceri (f) Odogrillo (c) Milia, Orlando Lalia (c) Milite, heirs of Matteo Carbinicauli (f) Milite, Orlando "certe terre" Miroldo, Donadeo Riesi (0 Mohac, Federico Ghipulla (0 Gonforti (f) Mohac, Giacomo Burchidiano (f) Sortino (f) Mohac, Pietro Barchiferza (f) Ridino (c) Bimisca (c) Rimadali (c) Buxello (c) Burgilferza (f) Monachella, Pietro Racharchitira (f) Buffato (f) Nadufri (f) Montalbano, Nicola Montalto, heirs of Gerardo Buccheri (t) Rachalmeni (c) Libigini (c) Montaperto, Bartolomeo Rachalcirachi (c) Gontessa (c) Luchatini Butumu Guastanella Raffadali Antichellis

?

N: Augusta M: Licata N: Augusta N: Scicli p N: Siracusa p p N N: Licodia M: Polizzi N: Scicli N: Gastrogiovanni N: Gastrogiovanni ?

Servitium 50.00.00 25.00.00

20.00.00 15.00.00 30.00.00 08.00.00 15.00.00 80.00.00 60.00.00

150.00.00 10.00.00 20.00.00 25.00.00 100.00.00

12.00.00

?

N p

p N: Noto p p N: Modica N: Noto N: Noto N: Galtanissetta N

N: Lentini p p M p p M M: Agrigento p

300.00.00

30.00.00

20.00.00 160.00.00

300.00.00

323

Table 4 Table 4 (cont.) Name

Holdings

Location

N: Lentini Scordia Soprana (f) N: Lentini Bulfida (0 Chaliruni (f) N: Caltanissetta Augusta (f) N: Augusta Curcuraci (f) N: Augusta N Melilli (0 Caltagirone (p) N: Caltagirone Montcada, Simon de Bivona (c) M: Bivona p Montefusco, heirs of Enrico p p Minalai (f) Monteliano, Nicola N Mortillari, heirs of Adinolfo Gadra (c) Sabuchi (f) N: Noto M: Vicari Mosca, Giovanni ?(o p Vaccaria (f) Muletta, Francesco Dardara (f) N: Butera Milocca (f) M: Mussomeli Mulotta, Antonio Cipunia (f) p Mustaccio, Federico Tumbarello (f) N: Lentini Rahalbiato (f) N: Naro Mustaccio, Giacomo S. Teodaro (c) M: Trapani p Mustaccio, Leonardo Grimasta La Targia (f) Mustrola, Oberto N: Siracusa Obertis, Berengario Raccuja D: Messina D: Messina Mandanici (c) terragium of Olea, Gonsalvo M: Caltabellotta Caltabellotta M: Sciacca Safridi (c) Olea, heirs of Graziano Solarino (f) Oliva, Gualtiero N: Siracusa p Padula, Guglielmo Chanzeria (f) Fabare Galtagirone (f) N: Galtagirone p Padula, heirs of Guglielmo Mulara (f) Palermo, Guglielmo di N: Caltanissetta Capodarso (f) Pancaldo, Roberto N: Lentini Pancali (c) p Pardo, heirs of Alaimo Ghiri (f) p Passaneto, heirs of Baida M Trapani(p) Bernardo Passaneto, Ruggero Garsiliato N: Mazarino N: Siracusa Palagonia (c) N: Lentini Passaneto (c) N: Assoro Tavi Montcada, Guillem Ramon de

Servitium 400.00.00

300.00.00 05.00.00 04.00.00 80.00.00

30.00.00

20.00.00 30.00.00 18.00.00

15.00.00 05.00.00 15.00.00 40.00.00

30.00.00

40.00.00 10.00.00 100.00.00

06.00.00 15.00.00 20.00.00

p 100.00.00

900.00.00

Table 4

324

Table 4 (cont.) Name

Magliauti (f) Li Milgi (f) Cattail (c) Patti, Nicola da Pelisdarbes, heirs of Miquel Monasteri (f) Gagliano (t) Peris de Sosa, Montaner Rainerio (c) Perrutta, heirs of Enrico Longi (c) Petramala, Bartolomeo "certe terre" Magione (f) Pifliculi, Giovanni Rahalmingino (f) Pipitono, Matteo Grignorum (f) Podio, Gombaldo Casibili (f) Pomar, heirs of Garsia Tortorici Pullicini, Giordano Manchina Raimondo, Bernardo Carcari (c) Rainerio, Bartuccio "certe terre" Rainerio, Roberto Rieni (c) Regina, Gorrado di Gulustu (f) Rhetis, Riccardo de Risigalla (f) Risigalla, Andrea Rocca, Appollonio "certe terre" Romeo, Francesco S. Martino (c) S. Anna (c) Partiniti (c) Crippati (c) Pichuli (c) Floccari (c) Piedaci (c) Rosso, Andrea Xirumi (c) Randasino (c) Scordia Sottana (c) Rosso, Russo Luppino (c) Noto (j) Aidone (j) RufTo, heirs of Guglielmo Anichara (f) Monte Glimiti Salvaggio, Pandolfo de Milgis Salvaggio, Porcotto Catalimita (c) Salvo, Aldoino Gurafti (c) Passaneto, Salvo

Location

Holdings

p M: Naro M N: Siracusa D p D

N: Scicli M: Salemi M: Cammarata N: Noto N: Siracusa D: Capo d'Orlando D: Taormina D: Randazzo N: Scicli M: Castronovo p N: Castrogiovanni N: Scicli p p p p p p N: Lentini N: Lentini N: Lentini N: Lentini N: Monterosso N: Noto N: Aidone p N: Siracusa M: Licata D: Milazzo D: Petralia

Servitium 15.00.00 10.00.00 25.00.00 150.00.00 15.00.00 45.00.00 20.00.00 40.00.00 70.00.00 25.00.00 60.00.00 40.00.00 70.00.00 03.00.00 20.00.00

p 30.00.00 25.00.00 20.00.00

90.00.00

260.00.00

10.00.00 40.00.00 20.00.00 20.00.00

Table 4

325

Table 4 (cont.) Name S. Basilio, Alafranco

S. Gregorio, heirs of Riccardo S. Miniato, Giorgio S. Lucia, Antonio S. Stefano, Leone S. Stefano, Oddone Sano, Nicola Saporito, heirs of Perrone Sciacca, Nicola di Sclafani, Matteo

Ses Gudines, Ursett Sicamino, Ambrosio Sigonia, Federico

Siracusa, Bernardo di Sofudi, Gandolfo Sosa, Eximenis de Sosa, heirs of Eximenis de Spatafora, Damiano Speziario, Federico Tagliaferza, heirs of Guglielmo Tagliavia, Andrea Tagliavia, Nicola

Holdings

Location

Servitium

S. Basilio (f) Siccafari (f) Gommichio (f) Dardara (f)

p M: Licata M: Caltabellotta N: Butera

Rachali (f) Amimello (f) Dardara (f) Avola (f) "certe terre" Nasari (f) Rachalmingi (f) Rasalgone (f) Darfudi (c) Adrano Genturipe Ghise (c) Sclafani Ciminna Manchina (c) Sicamino (c) Monte Pellegrino (f) Mutonello (f) Ralbamitri (f) Gollesano Garruba (f) Giardinello (c) Perana (c) Rambici (f) Bordonari (f) Raululia (Q Bordonari (f) Roccella Gomiso (f) "certe terre"

M: Partinico

50.00.00

p

06.00.00

D p M: Agrigento p p N: Gastrogiovanni p N: Gastrogiovanni D: Randazzo N: Gomiso N: Ragusa

Giardinello (c) Ravanusa (c)

M: Agrigento M: Agrigento

M: Butera N: Avola N: Ragusa D: Gastroreale p N: Piazza N: Galtanissetta N: Adrano N: Paterno

264.00.00

120.00.00

50.00.00 30.00.00 100.00.00 15.00.00 50.00.00 1200.00.00

p M

M: Giminna D: Taormina p M: Palermo p

20.00.00

p 60.00.00

p

300.00.00 20.00.00 20.00.00 40.00.00 150.00.00 15.00.00 10.00.00 50.00.00 50.00.00

326

Table 4 Table 4 (cont.) Name

Summaci (c) Castelvetrano (c) Petra de Belici (c) Bunello (f) Tavelli, Nicola Ghamirichi (f) Trara, Andrea Serravalle (0 Tratto, Goflredo "certe terre" Turla, heirs of Giovanni Assoro Ubertis, Scaloro La Gatta (f) Chindrono (f) "certe terre" Vallano, Giordano Nicosia (p) Vallono, Ruggero Rachalsuar (p) Fiumedinisi (c) Vassalo, Vassallo Giacomo Bauso (0 Sperlinga Ventimiglia, Francesco Crista Pettineo Buscemi (c) Ventimiglia, Guglielmo Barcluni (c) Yvar, Garcia Eiximenis de Milia Belripairi (wood) Billichi Tagliavia, Nino

(c) = casalis

(f) =feudum

Location

Holdings

(j) —jura

p M: Gastelvetrano M: Castelvetrano p M: Palermo M: Lentini N: Scicli N: Assoro N: Piazza

Servitium 150.00.00

20.00.00 30.00.00 06.00.00 30.00.00 250.00.00

p

p

20.00.00

D: Nicosia p D: Messina p

160.00.00

D: Nicosia D D: Pettineo N p

1500.00.00

p p p

(p) = proventus

03.00.00

50.00.00

200.00.00

(t) = terra

D = Val Demone M = Val di Mazara N = Val di Noto Wherever possible, I have indicated the nearest town or city.

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Index

Abbate family (lords of Trapani): D. Enrico, 181; D. Guglielmo, 181; D. Nicola, 16,11711 d'Aceto, D. Giacomo (justiciar of Val Demone), 116 Acireale, 14, 9411,190 agriculture, xii—xiv, 45—6, 76-7, 93, 101—2; crop failures, 2-3, 38, 70, 97,175-7; decline of, 33,128; foreign exports of, 64—5,154—5,161; freehold nature of, 17; grain production, 93,107,161,165; indigo, 161; manorial organization of, 16; massarie, 170-1; trend toward grain monoculture, 30, 161; see also, sugar production, wine production Agrigento, 15, 98,101,103,106,108, 113,130, 131—2; bishop of, 37,161,174,191, 226, 241-2; diocese of, 190; migration to, 82, 100

Aiello, D. Giovanni (justiciar of Val di Mazara), 147-8, 262 d'Alago, Blase, 2in, 46, ii4n Alcamo, 2,189 Alfonso-Frederick (royal bastard), 56n, 60-1, 63, 283; see also, Athens, duchy of d'Algerio, D. Federico (baron-bailiff of Palermo), 23-4,117,151-2,154 alum manufacture, xiv, 3, 95,105; see also, textiles Anagni, Treaty of, 44,134 Andronicus II Paleologus (Byzantine emperor), 54-5 animal husbandry, 17, 93, 131-2,171—3,184 d'Ansalone, Franchino (judex of Messina), 132 anticlericalism, 20, 91-2,186,187-9, 2O9~I^i 227-30; attacks on papal representatives, 213-15; ecclesiastical lands sacked, 161-2,195-9; see also, evangelicalism, Franciscan Spirituals, ripitu

Aragon-Catalonia, campaign against Sardinia, 1-2, 48-50, 64,72, 120, 284; military alliance with, 4, 46, 47-8, 72-3, 124; pseudo-war with, 45—6, 88; relations with, post-1295, 42-6; relations with, post-1302, 46-8; trade with, 10, 101,154—5,161, 304; see also, James II armies, private, see comitive arms, prohibition of, 92,118,144—6 Athens, duchy of, 1, 30, 40,54—64, 68, 72, 199, 282—3; as source of Greek slaves, 62—3, 251—2; governance of, 57; relations with Venice, 57, 60-1, 63; trade with Sicily, 59-60; see also, Alfonso-Frederick, Gatalan Company Augusta, 82, 94n, 190 Avola, 82,180-1 barons, 4,5, 22-3, 77-80, 84, 86-7,161,163-4, 165-6, 173-5; attitudes towards urban society, 21—4, 80; control of mountain passes by, 14—15; counts, 22—3,164—5; extortion of upland traders, 178-80; outrage over Treaty of Anagni, 44—5; relations with royal court, 73, 77-80, 114,156-7,158-9; usurpation of lands by, 161—2,176-7,195-9; see ak°>laws, feudal "Beato Guglielmo", 233-40 Benedetto, Tommasso (Judex of Palermo), 25n-26n, 130 Benedict XI, Pope, 191—3, 200, 210, 21 in Bivona, 106,113 Black Death, xvi, 5, 22, 30,39,193 Bocca de Ordo, Manfredi, i24n Boniface VIII, Pope, 27,40,42,48,191 Brucato, 32 Buccheri, 82 Butera, 106

348

Index Caccamo, 95,106,113,165,190 Calabria, 58, 67-8; trade with, 93-4 Calatafimi, 35, 3611 Caltabellotta, 8, 82, 86, 95,106,113; Treaty of, 4,29,41-2,46,58, 66-8,104-5, "5 Caltagirone, 82,115,181,190,196 Caltanissetta, 15,36,106,117,151,154,190 Caltavuturo, 106,117,158,190 Caltavuturo, Ruggero di (judex of Palermo), no camera reginale, 85,116, 165, 286-8 Cammarana, Giovanni di (consiliarius regis), 112 Cammarana, Oberto di, 162 Cammarata, 106 Canyelles, Bertran (consiliarius regis), 112 Capo d'Orlando, battle of, 39,124,135 Carastono, Antonio (Judex of Palermo), 132 Carastono, Filippo, 262 Caslar, Pone, Hug de (justiciar of Palermo), 26,116,144 Castellamare, 1,103 Castrogiovanni, 15,19, 35, 85, 87, 93, 95, 106, 115,123,144,178,179,181,227 Castronovo, 35, 106,190 Catalan Company, 55-6, 68 Catania, 19, 22, 82, 9411,115,130,131-2,154, 190; damaged by Mount Etna eruption, 14, 75—7; diocese of, 190,191 Cattolica, 82 Cefalu, 15, 35, 94n, 103,106,114,115,130; bishop of, 37,52,176-7; diocese of, 190 Charles I of Anjou, king of Sicily, 4,12,133, 142 Charles II of Anjou, king of Sicily, 12, 67,142 Chiaromonte family (counts of Modica and Mohac), 10; Giovanni I, 72, 161,164—5, 196,198; Giovanni II, i6n, 77-80, 97, 146,154, 180,181, 206, 298, 307; Manfredi, 78,131 churches, 5,42, 73; construction of, 52, 197-8; economic problems of, 240-6; papal control of local canonries, 211-13; see also, clergy

Ciminna, 106,152 Cisario family (magnates of Palermo), 22, 26n; Giovanni di, 127,147-8, 262; Perrello di, 125 Citella, Bartolomeo di (notary of Palermo), 106, 253 cities, 19-21, 83, 85-155; administration of, 129-32; anti-Catalan sentiment in, 144, 147-8; attitudes toward baronial society, 21—4; attitudes towards royal court, 85-7, 96-7,119; baronial entry

349

into, 22-3; control of surrounding countryside, 92-5, 99; ethnic violence in, 19, 32—3, 272—3; municipal courts, 118-19; municipal liberties, 51, 90, 96; outrage over Treaty of Anagni, 44—5; public health dangers in, 38, 39, 128; regulation of labor markets, 99-100; resistance to parliament, 125—7; r * se °f urban magnates, 100,130-42; urban strife, 20-2,75, 83, 86, 91,127, 142-53 Clement V, Pope, 52-3,193,197, 203, 204, 210, 213, 215, 216, 282

clergy, 91,186-7, I^9> 218—21; bishops, 111-12; episcopal vacancies post-1302, 42,191-3; organization of, 189-91; see also, churches comitive (armed urban factions, or private armies), 10, 5on, 83,113,127,136,138, 141, 144,150, 230, 296 Corleone, 19,35, 36, 82,91,98,106,118, 137-42,143,151,189; see also, Pontecorono family court, royal, see Magna Regia Curia Croce, Benedetto, xii, 29-30, 303 Crown of Aragon, see Aragon-Catalonia Demone, Val, 13,18, 35-6, 38, 41,54,107, 161,172,182, 222, 294 Doria, Corrado (Sicilian admiral), 33n, 48 Doria, Raflaele (Sicilian admiral), 71,182 economic dualism, xii-xiv Egypt, trade with, 94 Eleanor, queen of Sicily, 76, i n , H7n, 180, 181, 197, 286-8; as evangelical reformer, 205—6, 288-9; personality of, 41—2; see also, camera reginale

d'Empuries, Berenguer Estanyol (vicargeneral of Athenian duchy), 56 d'Empuries, Pong Hug (royal marshal), 47, 282 d'Entenga, Berenguer (consiliarius regis), 112 d'Entenga, Guillem, 46 Epstein, Stephan, xiv, 6n, 304—5 Eraclea, 106 evangelicalism, xv—xvi, 20—1,52—4,146—7, 187, 215, 217-18, 231-2; see also, anticlericalism, Franciscan Spirituals, ripitu, Vilanova, Arnau de fairs, 98-9,168, 286 familiares regis, see Magna Regia Curia

Ferla, 82 Ferro, Berardo, 113

35°

Index

Filangieri, D. Riccardo (stratigoto of Messina), 116 Florence, xiv, 64—5 Francavilla, 85 Franciscan Spirituals, 27,53,74,138,175, 187, 216-32; inquest of, by royal court, 219-21; condemned by John XXII, 222—4; granted safe-hiding post-1317, 226-7; emerge from hiding post-1321, 227; ordered to leave for Tunis, 224; see also, anticlericalism, evangelicalism, Vilanova, Arnau de Frederick III, king of Sicily, xv—xvi, 2—3, 24-6, 32, 39, 44-6,51, 62, 69, 80, 86-7, 109, 120,134, 152-3,193, 196, 216-17; as evangelical reformer, 20, 52, 200, 201, 202-9, 216-17; confiscation of church lands by, 73-4; financial debts of, 113; land-tenure policies of, 162-70; marriage to Eleanor, 41; personality of, 11—12, 27; popularity of, 24; restoration of churches post—1302,52, 197—8; royal title of, 4, i2n, 41, 66-7; support for Basilian monasteries by, 199-200; see also, barons, cities, laws Gangi, 24, 35,106,162 Garsia, D. Roderigo (captain of Trapani), 116 Genoa, xiv, 41; piratical raids from, 32, 278-9; trade with, 10, 33, 46, 64-5,101 Geraci, 106 Ghibellines, Sicilian alliance with, 6, 30, 40, 70-2, 74-5,124, 279, 283 Golisano, 114 Gratteri, 114 Henry VII of Luxembourg, 1-2,12, 40, 64-5, 68-9, 84, 88,124, 307; see also, Ghibellines d'Hixar, Pere Ferrandis, 34 d'Incisa, Leonardo (royal treasurer), 26, 142,194, 307 James II of Aragon-Gatalonia, 40, 47-9,54, 272, 276; as King of Sicily, xv, 4, 23, 43, 120,134; see also, Aragon-Catalonia Jews, 19, 148-53* 207, 254, 255, 257-8, 274; legislation against, 150-1; under protection of urban magnates, 152—3 John XXII, Pope, 12,53, 62, 200, 212, 222-4, 225 Lancia, Corrado (royal chancellor), 117,164 Lancia, Manfredi, 162,196

land, desertion of, 37-8, 73-4, 156, 159; ecclesiastical holdings, 91—2, 113—14, 194-7; feudal dues owed for, 180-3; prohibition of alienation of baronial fiefs, 160; reorganization of, under Frederick, 168-70; rise ofterre, 159, 169-70,182,184 Lauria, Roger de (admiral of Aragon— Gatalonia), 45, 88,120, 272 laws, feudal, 21—2, 157, 160 laws, royal, 89-92,184, 290-2; Cap. alia, 89; Const. Castrogiovanni, 89,144—5; Const. Palermo, 89; Const, reg., 89-91, 165-7; Ord. gen., 89, 206-9, 258-65, 289, 296-8; Strat. Messina, 89; Volentes, 166-70; see also, arms, women Lentini, 82, 85, 87, 95, 99,173,190 Licata, 15, 82, 95,106,113,115,190 Licodia, S. Maria di, 14 Llull, Ramon, 201, 217—19 Louis IV the Bavarian (German emperor), 4<>> 74-5> 7&-9> 80,84,88,125, 231-2 MagnaRegia Curia, 110-19,132; annual vetting of its officials, 90, no; composition of, in—13; familiares regis, 112; popular disdain for, 118-19 Maida, D. Senatore di (baron-bailiff of Palermo), 125-6 Malta, 36, 41,56n, 77,164, 256 Maniscalco, Guglielmo, 162, 245 marriage, 39-40, 78,150, 296-8; changing patterns of, 100-1; customs, 2 9 5 - 8 ; ^ also, women Marsala, 82, 95, 97,103,154,189, 225n Marseilles, trade with, 10 Mazara, 32, 73, 82, 90, 97,98,103,151,156, 159; diocese of, 189-90, 191; Val di, 18, 35-6, 64, 81, 99, no, 172,182, 222 Mazzarino, 115,190 Melyadius (bastard royal half-brother), inn—i2n Messina, 2,19, 38n, 39,51, 87, 97, 98,106, 107, 108,123,131—2,151; archdiocese of, 190; economic strategies of, 92-5; see also, Rosso family Milazzo, 13, 93,133,136,190 Milite, Rinaldo di (baron-bailiff of Palermo), 116,12411,125,130 Milite, Vitale di (judex of Palermo), 106,190 Mineo, 85,95 Mistretta, 106,190 Modica, 36, 82,190 Monreale, 106,162,190; archbishop of, 73—4; archdiocese of, 190

Index Monte S. Giuliano (Erice), 2, 97,106,151, 189 Montpellier, trade with, 102 Mosca, Federico (judex of Agrigento), 131 Mount Etna, 14, 75—7 Muntaner, Ramon, 7, 12,13, 272 Naro, 82,85, IQ6> "7 Naso, 99 Nicholas V (anti-pope), 74, 231—2 Nicosia, 36, 95,115,190, 196 night-watch companies, see xurterii Notar Michele, Simone di (xurterius of Palermo), 150-1 Noto, 36, 82,154, 162; Val di, 18, 35-6, 54, 107,172, 182, 222, 294 Palazzolo, 82 Palermo, 14,15, 19, 32-3, 36, 51, 72, 95, 97, 98,108,123, 144,151, 152,154; archdiocese of, 190, 242-3; economic strategies of, 102-4; local officials of, 130—2; migration to, 59, 82, 106, 140; urban strife, 74—5, 149 Palizzi, Vinciguerra da (royal chancellor), 22, 68, 293 parliament, 10,47, 65, 71, 89, 90-1,119-27, 224; foundation of, 120-2; meetings of, !23-5 Passaneto, Riccardo di (consiliarius regis and count of Garsiliato), 22,112, 164 Paterno, 14 Patti, 94n, 100, 190 Pellegrino, Salerno di (notary), 83 Peralta, Ramon de, 73 Perpignan, trade with, 102, 177 Peter I of Aragon—Catalonia, king of Sicily, 4, 42-3,54, 88,120, 272 Petralia Soprana, 17, 95,106, 165 Petralia Sottana, 106,165 Piazza, 85, 98,106,115 piracy, 72, 269-85; as distinct from corsairing, 271—4; by the Athenian duchy, 60—1; Catalan promotion of, 272-3; compensation paid for, 274-6; exceptional violence in, 278-81; Frederick's role in, 273; Genoese, 278-9; targets of Sicilian attack, 280—4; Tunisian, 13,15, 61 Pisa, xiv, 41, 74; piratical raids from, 32; trade with, 10, 64—5, 101 Polizzi, 85,130,131—2, 165,190 Pontecorono family (urban magnates of Corleone), Bertolino, 138-40; Bernardo, 118,138-40; Guglielmo, 140; Pietro, 118, 140

351

population, 18, 85, 97, 138,159, 169-70; decline of, 5, 34-6, 82-3; mobility of, 10, 16-17, 37-8> 93> 99-IOO> Io6> n 5- l 6 > 273; see also, marriage Porto, Ginuisio (judex of Messina), 132 Pucci, Simone (judex of Catania), 23 Ragusa, 82,190 Randazzo, 15, 35, 97,154,190, 196 Rassach, Arnau de (archbishop of Monreale), 193, 213—14, 219-20 Ravennusa, 73-4 Riciputo, D. Francesco (justiciar of Val d'Agrigento), 116 ripitu, 227-30, 248, 293-4, 302 rivers, 15—16; r. Ammiraglio, 125; r. Belice, 189; r. Ferro, 190; r. Iato, 189; r. Salso, 15, 18, 114,115, 190 roads, 15 Robert I, king in Naples, 1-3, 30, 34, 68, 79, 80; invasion of 1325-6, 30-1, 32 Rosso family (urban magnates of Messina), Berengario, 113; Cataldo, 135; Enrico, n 3> !33~7> l3&> J42> *62; Federico, 134—5, 293n; Perrone, 134—5; Russo, 113, 135, 140, i52n, 183 S. Mauro, 106 S. Stefano, D. Enrico di (justiciar of Val di Noto), 116 Salemi, 82 saltworks, 95 Salvo, Santoro (judex of Messina), 132 Saporito, Guglielmo (judex of Messina), 132 Sardinia, 1-2, 31,40,48-50, 54, 64, 69, 72, 120,177, 284 Sarria, Bernat de (admiral of Crown of Aragon), 68, 274-6, 280-1, 300 Scarpa, D. Francesco (justiciar of Val di Mazara), 116 Sciacca, 35, 51, 82, 90, 95, 96, 97, 101, 103, 106, 113, 130,152, 154, 190, 227, 257 Scicli, 82, 115 Sclafani, 106,190 Sclafani family, 22,5on, 198, 227 ships and shipping, 13, 49-50, 65, 93, 106-7, 225, 270-1 Sicily, xi-xii, 12-13, 29-30, 40-1, 42-4, 73, 81-4, 104, 270-3; aid for Sardinian campaign, 48-50; alliance with Aragon-Catalonia, 4,46, 47-8, 72-3, 124; census owed to Holy See by, 42, 52, 209; geography of, 13—19; mountains of, 13—15; pseudo-war with Aragon— Catalonia, 45-6, 88; regional

352

Index

Sicily (cont.) characteristics of, 17-19,172-3; see also, valli Siracusa, 19, 36,51, 82, 85, 87, 9411,95, 97, 108,115,151, 275, 286-7; diocese of, 3811, 115,190,191,244-5 slaves, the slave trade, 3, 62,150, 207, 208, 249-68, 282; changes in, during thirteenth century, 249-51; domestic uses of, 252-3; evangelical reform of, 258-65; factors determining the value of, 253-6; increased use of Greek slaves, 251—2; racial distribution of, 254—5; societates, 257-8; use of laborleases, 265—7 Solanto, 103 Speciale, Nicola, 3,5, 6, 34, 69, 75-7, 81, 3O3-4 Spinola, Gerardo (royal marshal), 71 sugar production, xiv, 95, g6n, 99,161 Tagliavia, D. Bartolotto, 113 Tagliavia, D. Tommasso, i24n, 130 Taormina, 136,190,197 taxation, xv, 85, 91,103,106, 108-9,125> parliamentary role in, 124—5; partial exemptions from, 96-8; toll franchises, 51, 168, 287 Termini, 18, 32, 98,103,106, 113,115, 190 Terranova, 35, 82, 95,108, 115,123 textiles, cotton, xiv, 3, 99, 161; silk, 3, 93, 291; wool, 95,105,165 Trapani, 2-3,10,15,19, 36, 82, 95, 97, 98, 100,103,105,108,138, 149, 151, i52n, 189; urban strife in, 32-3, 73,143, 227 Troina, 115,190 Tunis, 58, 67-8, 101, 102, 304 valli, xv, 18-19,103-4, 222 J a s discrete economic units, 15,18; as juridical

districts, 114-16; see also, Val Demone, Val di Mazara, Val di Noto Venice, 41,57, 59, 272; relations with duchy of Athens, 60-1, 63; Sicilian trade with, 10,101

Ventimiglia, Francesco di (count of Geraci and Golisano), 10, 38n, 77-80, n6n, 136, 146,164-5, l69> !74» I77~8> !98> 238~4OJ 298 Vergua, Pedro Fernandez de, 117 Vespers rebellion (1282—1302), xii, 4, 6-8, 54, 88,132,133, 149,161,180,187-9 Vicari, 113,152,190 Vienne, Council of, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221; see also, Clement V Vilanova, Arnau de, xv—xvi, 12, 27, 52, 54, 66, ii2n, 200-9, 215, 246, 302; Allocutio christiani, 201—3; Informacio espiritual, 205, 259; Interpretatio de visionibus, 204; Raonament d'Avinyo, 204; interest in

converting Greeks, 251-2; see also, evangelicalism, Franciscan Spirituals Vindicari, 95 Vizzini, 85 Volentes, see laws, royal

water, 13, 22; aqueducts, 16,125-6; irrigation, 16; rights to, 16; see also, rivers wills, 39-40,100-1 wine production, 3,15, 93, 94n, 107,132, 165 women, 285-302; laws governing, 290-2; reputatrices, 227—30, 248, 296, 298—300, 302; widows and widowhood, 39-40, 134, 135, 293-4, 301-2; see also, Eleanor, marriage, ripitu xurterii (night-watch companies), 20, 26,129, 131,143,147,150-1