The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813-1814

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 George F. Nafziger and Marco Gioannini

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nafziger, George F. The defense of the Napoleonic kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 / George F. Nafziger and Marco Gioannini. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–96797–2 (alk. paper) 1. Beauharnais, Euge`ne de, 1781–1824—Military leadership. 2. Napoleonic Wars, 1800–1815—Campaigns—Italy, Northern. 3. Generals—France—Biography. I. Gioannini, Marco. II. Title. DC216.35.N34 2002 945'.082'092—dc21 00–042772 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 䉷 2002 by George F. Nafziger and Marco Gioannini All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 00–042772 ISBN: 0–275–96797–2 First published in 2002 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America TM

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To our wives, Jan and Paola, who, despite the high rates of desertion that affected either party throughout the campaign, stood firm in the ranks, gallantly resisting countless waves of e-mail exchanges and providing us with invaluable logistic and moral support.

Contents Maps

ix

Preface

xi

Introduction

xxi

1.

War Comes to Italy

2.

The Defense of Eastern Italy, September 1813

37

3.

Euge`ne Withdraws Behind the Tagliamento and on the Adige, October and November 1813

67

December 1813: Murat’s Treachery, Affairs at Rovigo, Boara, and Castagnaro, and the Fall of Zara (Zadar)

103

Neapolitan Treachery Afoot: The Siege of Venice, Castel Sant’Angelo, Civitavecchia, Ancona, and Genoa, January 1814

129

6.

The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814

151

7.

Murat’s Treachery Exposed, February 1814

181

8.

Withdrawal over the Taro, Engagements at Parma and Reggio Emilia, and the Siege of Venice, March–April 1814

195

The Sieges of Venice and Genoa: Withdrawal and Surrender, March–May 1814

209

4. 5.

9.

1

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Contents

Appendixes

237

Notes

345

Bibliography

369

Index

373

Maps 1.

Italy in 1813: The Political Situation

xx

2.

Between the Drava and the Sava Rivers, August–September 1813

29

3.

The Engagement at Feistritz, 6 September 1813

40

4.

Lower Adige’s Area of Operations, November–December 1813

112

5.

Area of Operations between Garda Lake and the Po River

150

6.

The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 (Left Bank— Situation at about 9:00 A.M.)

156

The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 (Left Bank—French Attack on Pozzolo)

164

The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 (Right Bank— Austrian Attack on Monzambano)

172

Operations between Piacenza and Parma

198

Genoa and Its Surroundings

223

7. 8. 9. 10.

Preface In 1813 and 1814, while the great armies of Europe fought to determine the fate of a continent, another war was being fought in Northern Italy. The FrenchItalian army, under Napoleon’s stepson Euge`ne Beauharnais, fought a desperate delaying action against overwhelming odds. Never defeated, Euge`ne led his army of raw, untrained conscripts over some of the worst terrain in Europe. Covered with glory and undefeated, Euge`ne was finally forced to surrender by Napoleon’s abdication. With the end of this campaign the spirit of Italian nationalism would go underground for nearly 50 years before the numerous Italian states would finally unify and become what we know today as Italy. The region of Italy in which this campaign was fought was critical in 1796 and 1800 to the fortunes of Napoleon. Major French and Allied armies fought in Germany during those same years, yet the decisive battles were fought on the plains of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Venetia. It is interesting to speculate as to whether the spectacular victories of Marengo, Lodi, Arcole, Castiglione, and Rivoli could have been recreated in 1813 and whether they would have overshadowed events in Germany as they had in 1796 and 1800. The significance of those tiny battles, especially when viewed in comparison with the 1813 standard for a battle, far outweighed the indecisive battles of Germany fought between substantially larger armies. The contrast is even greater as 1796 and 1800 were years of French ascendancy, whereas 1813 and 1814 were years of French collapse. The comparisons between these four years are strong and striking. In all four years the French armies were significantly outnumbered, they were undersupplied and underequipped, and they fought against superior Austrian armies who had the active support of the British fleet operating against the French flanks. In 1796 and 1814 Genoa was to be the site of a major siege operation. And in

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1796, 1800, and 1814 the region around Lake Garda and the Mincio River would see the major battles of the campaign. Aside from the similarities, there are some striking contrasts. The most obvious was that in 1813–1814 the French were withdrawing before their enemies, whereas in 1796 and 1800 they were advancing against them. In 1796 the Italian states were allied with Austria, and in 1813–1814, with the remarkable exception of Murat’s Kingdom of Naples, they were either French departments or part of the Kingdom of Northern Italy, which were allied with France. Of course, a significant change between 1800 and 1813 was that by 1813 the Austrians had abandoned both the purely linear form of warfare and the cordon system, while learning the French system of war and adapting it to their national spirit. It is also difficult not to compare the two French generals that fought these two campaigns. In 1796 and 1800 the world saw the rising star of a young military genius, Napoleon, snatching victory after victory from his enemies. In 1813 we find Euge`ne Beauharnais, natural son of a revolutionary French general and adoptive son to Napoleon Bonaparte. Though not an explosive genius like his stepfather, he was a solid general with a good sense of strategy and tactics. Though his army was significantly better than that led by his adoptive father in 1796 and 1800, his enemy was also substantially superior to that faced by Napoleon. The comparison of son and stepfather is especially striking in 1814 when Napoleon raced around France, a wild and desperate gambler casting the dice at every opportunity with near reckless abandon. Napoleon repeatedly snatched major victories from the Allies, nearly destroying the Army of Silesia in a period of six days and yet a few weeks later barely escaping destruction by judicious retreat. Euge`ne, to the south, however, played the conservative game. Playing time and terrain in a brilliant delaying action, he locked nearly twice his numbers in Austrian troops in a theater far from the main theater of action. Not only did he contain and distract this force; he avoided every major effort it made to destroy him and push into southern France. Euge`ne’s 1813–1814 campaign is more akin to that of the great Roman general Fabius, though he faced no general comparable to Hannibal, than it is to the 1796 or 1800 campaigns of his mentor and stepfather Napoleon. Euge`ne Beauharnais’s military skills, as displayed in the 1809 Italian campaign, have recently been made the subject of careful examination by Robert M. Epstein in Prinz Eugene at War: 1809. In addition to its intrinsic merits, Epstein’s work has merit because it goads the reader into comparing Euge`ne’s situation in 1809 to that which he faced in 1813–1814. The 1809 spring campaign in Northern Italy, and later in Hungary and Austria, was Euge`ne’s first appointment as an independent army commander. In 1805, Napoleon had, in fact, believed that the time was not yet ripe for entrusting the young viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy with the command of an independent army.

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In the first phase of the campaign, Euge`ne paid dearly for his lack of experience and suffered a humiliating defeat at Sacile. As the campaign developed, however, the French commander was able and lucky enough to redeem himself, gaining two important successes on the Piave and the Raab. The latter was a decisive victory, as it prevented Erzherzog Johann from joining his brother Karl in time for the Battle of Wagram. Euge`ne, on the contrary, did not miss his chance to fight on the plain before Vienna. Euge`ne’s success in the 1809 campaign definitively established his reputation as a reliable, independent commander in the eyes of the emperor. The Italian campaign of 1809 bears a number of interesting similarities to the 1813 campaign. In 1813, as in 1809, Italy was a secondary theater of war, with the most decisive events occurring north of the Alps. Similarly, in 1809 the outbreak of hostilities saw the French-Italian army taking up a defensive position against an unusually aggressive Austrian army. In 1813, as in 1809, the Austrian plan called for a double-pronged thrust to be delivered from the Illyrian provinces and the Tyrol. In both campaigns, Euge`ne was in command of a relatively green army, mostly formed of French and Italian conscripts. However similar these two campaigns might appear, the similarities end here. The differences between the two campaigns are not only longer but also greater in their significance. The first difference is that in 1813 Euge`ne had to defend a much vaster extension of territory than in 1809. The Treaty of Scho¨nbrunn, signed at the end of the 1809 campaign, transferred the provinces of the Habsburg Empire on the eastern border of Italy—a portion of Austrian Carinthia and significant parts of modern Slovenia and Croatia—to the French Empire. Napoleon renamed these new territorial additions Illyrian provinces. When Austria joined the Allied coalition in the summer of 1813 and began massing troops on her southern border, the viceroy found himself obliged to watch not only the Alpine accesses to Northeastern Italy but also a relatively wide strip of country on the other side of the Alps. The border stretched eastward from Tyrol following the upper course of the Drava River up to Villach, then ran southeast up to Laybach (Ljubljana) along the upper Sava, including the cities of Karlstadt (Karlovac) and Fiume (Rijeka) at its southernmost end. A quick look at a modern map clearly shows that holding such an overextended front running across rough and impervious regions was a much more difficult task than guarding a limited number of passes across the Alps to the Venetian plain. Despite the fact that Euge`ne had more territory to defend, the military resources at his disposal in 1813 were not as substantial as they had been in 1809. Not surprisingly, after the disaster of Russia, Imperial Italy and the Kingdom of Italy had been effectively drained of resources to meet Napoleon’s incessant demands for more recruits to be sent to the Grande Arme´e in Germany. The new Army of Italy that the viceroy hurriedly raised in the spring of 1813 would only be strong on paper. As a matter of fact, despite Euge`ne’s tremendous

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efforts, the army never approached its expected strength and was desperately short of cavalry. Its green and badly equipped troops, moreover, did not receive adequate training. In 1809 the French-Italian army in Italy had benefited from a substantial numerical superiority over the Austrians (85,000 to 72,000). In contrast, during the 1813–1814 campaign the Austrian army outnumbered the Army of Italy from the beginning of the campaign, and its strength grew with Murat’s defection in January 1814 and the arrival of English forces. By the end of the campaign, the Allied forces in Italy (Austrian, Neapolitans, and British) outnumbered the Army of Italy by a ratio of two to one, or perhaps even more. In 1813 it was the weakness of Euge`ne’s army, not Euge`ne’s conduct, that was Napoleon’s main concern. The correspondence between the emperor and his stepson clearly shows this. The content of these letters also points at another remarkable difference between the two campaigns. At the outbreak of the 1809 campaign, Napoleon did not completely trust Euge`ne’s skills as an independent general, operating a hundred miles away from his mentor. Thus, in a series of very detailed letters, Napoleon lectured his stepson on how to wage the war in Northern Italy and put forward a list of principles concerning the defense of its eastern accesses. Admittedly, this was a subject for which he had a natural bent. Napoleon’s suggested strategy was designed to fully exploit the peculiar geographical pattern of the region, namely, the sequel of rivers crossing the Venetian plain and cutting across the enemy’s line of advance. By concentrating behind those natural obstacles, the French army could easily defend itself from frontal attacks and prepare to strike back. At the beginning, the viceroy did not follow Napoleon’s advice, and this failure almost cost him the campaign. After the battle of Sacile, however, Euge`ne learned his lesson and strictly adhered to Napoleon’s strategic guidelines. He never regretted it. Conversely, in 1813 Napoleon’s few letters to the viceroy rarely touched on the issue of the strategy required for the campaign. One may argue that the emperor, besides being too busy himself, now looked upon Euge`ne as a reliable, independent commander and one who knew how to fight in Italy. When comparing Euge`ne’s two campaigns in Italy, further differences are found in the country’s politics as well as the psychological and social situation of the Italian people. Unlike in 1809, in 1813 the Kingdom of Northern Italy was, in every sense, a war-torn country. It had been drained of every male fit for service and had suffered huge losses in the campaigns in Russia and Spain. Continuous taxation had also deprived it of all financial resources. Social discontent spread over a vast majority of the Italian people, who showed no interest in the prosecution of the war and the personal fate of the French viceroy, however personally respectable he might appear. They only yearned for peace. French departments in Italy were no better off at that time. Riots in the cities, popular insurgencies in the countryside, and high rates of desertion in the military had frequently dotted Italy throughout the Napoleonic years. In 1813, however, such problems became a constant plague that mirrored

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deep social dissatisfaction. In brief, in 1813 Euge`ne generally lacked the psychological and political support of the Italian people, whereas in previous years, most notably in 1809, he had benefited from it. Moreover, the idea of an independent nation was growing stronger among the political elites and the intelligentsia. Numerous patriotic secret societies were founded in the Kingdom of Italy after 1809 and other parts of the peninsula. Most of them had an explicit anti-French bias. In contrasting 1813 with 1809, however, it is at the highest strategic level that the most relevant differences between the two campaigns are observed. In 1809 the course of the war in Northern Italy developed as a consequence of the overall strategic evolution in both the Italian and Danube theaters. In the Danube Valley the Austrian defeat at Eckmuhl obliged Erzherzog Karl to retreat toward Vienna. Meanwhile, in Italy, Erzherzog Johann missed the opportunity to keep his demoralized enemy under pressure. The Austrians, failing to mount an effective pursuit after Sacile, allowed the battered Army of Italy to withdraw in relatively good order behind the strong defensive line of the Adige. At this juncture, the Austrian commander became progressively more concerned with the weakening of his field forces, due to the drainage of troops needed to watch his excessively elongated lines of communication. Upon receiving the unexpected news of the Austrian reverse in Bavaria, Erzherzog Johann immediately sensed that the strategic prospect in Italy was about to change radically. First, as war in the Danube Valley moved rapidly eastward, he perceived he ran the risk of being cut off from Vienna. Second, he correctly anticipated that the Austrian retreat from Bavaria would uncover the northern accesses to the Tyrol. After a few days, in fact, General Lefebvre’s Bavarian corps began invading the region. FML Chasteler’s column, which Erzherzog Johann had detached for operating down the Upper Adige Valley toward Trento and Verona, was then forced to interrupt his operations and withdrew. Thus vanished the Austrian plan of delivering a double-pronged thrust from Venetia and Tyrol. Erzherzog Johann now faced two alternatives. He could try to break through the line of the Adige by means of a frontal assault from the east. Or he could retreat. The former, admittedly, was not an encouraging prospect for an army that had to attack a numerically superior enemy occupying what was probably the strongest defensive line in Northern Italy. Erzherzog Johann wisely decided for the latter solution and withdrew toward the Austrian border. One may truly argue that by that time the Austrian commander in Italy had already let his chance of victory slip away. It is, however, hardly disputable that it was the strategic evolution of the war in the Danube Valley and, above all, what this may imply for Tyrol that hastened Johann’s decision to retreat from the Adige. In 1813, the course of the war in Germany was once again crucial to the outcome of the war in Italy. This time, however, Euge`ne was not as lucky as four years before.

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Both Napoleon and the viceroy were perfectly aware that Saxony was too far removed from Italy to allow any form of military cooperation between the French armies. However, as long as Bavaria remained in the Confederation of the Rhine and a French Ally, Austria would have problems implementing military operations in the Tyrol and the Upper Adige Valley. Rather unexpectedly, on 8 October 1813, a few days before the Battle of Leipzig, the king of Bavaria and Euge`ne’s father-in-law signed a treaty with the Allies. The Bavarian defection gave Austria a free hand in the Tyrol, and the Habsburg headquarters did not miss the opportunity to launch the classic “double-pronged attack” into Italy. A corps much stronger than that commanded by Chasteler in 1809 was sent down the Upper Adige Valley to menace Verona and Euge`ne’s rear. News of the Austrian advance from the Tyrol obliged the viceroy to order a hasty retreat from the line of Tagliamento to the Adige. In contrast to 1809 where the presence of the Bavarian army had prevented Austrian movement into the Tyrol that would have greatly worried the French army in Italy, in 1813 it was the Bavarian defection that made the Austrian advance down the Tyrol possible. A few days after his retreat behind the Adige, Euge`ne was informed of Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig. Besides a negative impact on morale, the outcome of the Battle of Nations did bear another important consequence on the war in Italy. It was, in fact, after Leipzig that Murat’s loyalty to the emperor abruptly vanished. The king of Naples hastened home and resumed with redoubled energy his negotiations with Austria and Great Britain. Unlike Napoleon, Euge`ne had never much relied on Murat’s army for help in Italy. But, beginning in November 1813, he had to constantly bear in mind the prospect of a Neapolitan threat from the south. This radically changed the strategic situation, reducing Euge`ne’s chances of victory to almost nil. With Murat’s defection, the viceroy could now only hope to gain time and bring the war to a stalemate, and this was what he succeeded in doing. When Euge`ne’s Neapolitan nightmare materialized in January, he had already taken his decision to withdraw behind the Mincio under the cover of the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera. Here the Army of Italy stood undefeated until Napoleon’s abdication in France and the armistice of Schiarino-Rizzino. One may conclude that in both 1809 and 1813 the evolution of the strategic situation north of the Alps did profoundly influence the development of the campaign in Italy. In 1809 Euge`ne strongly benefited from Napoleon’s victory at Eckmuhl, which led Erzherzog Johann to retreat. In 1813, on the contrary, the Bavarian early defection and Murat’s treachery after Leipzig put Euge`ne in a very precarious situation that sealed the final collapse of the Kingdom of Italy. In both situations, however, Euge`ne showed sufficient military skills to react to events that were largely out of his control. In 1809 he did not let his chance slip away and immediately set out in pursuit of Erzherzog Johann, setting up the premises for his victories on the Piave and the Raab. In 1813–1814, despite being pressed from every side and heavily outnumbered, he was able to adopt

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sound defensive countermeasures that—if they did not save him the kingdom— at least allowed him to escape defeat in the field. COMMENTS ON SOURCES This is one of the most poorly documented campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars. We are fortunate, however, to have uncovered some works from firsthand witnesses. Among these are an account by Vignolle, Chief of Staff to Euge`ne, who was a principal player in most of the actions in Northern Italy. If nothing else, he certainly read the official reports of the French participants in every action and possessed a full and complete knowledge of the military activity during the campaign. A second work is the account of the invasion of the Roman states by Bellaire, who was a staff officer to General Barbou. Barbou served during this campaign as commander of the fortress of Ancona, and Bellaire served with him at this time. A similar valuable firsthand account was identified in the form of Vacani’s account of the Battle of Mincio. Vacani had been a Chef de bataillon of engineers in the Army of Northern Italy. Vaudoncourt was a contemporary but not an eyewitness. We received a major blow when we reviewed Vaudoncourt’s account of the campaign. The blow was struck not because of its originality, its insight, or its contributions to the study of the campaign but because of its nearly verbatim plagiarism of Vignolle’s account. It varied only in its account of the Mincio and a few other minor events where some original research was apparently done. Not only were we disappointed with Vaudoncourt’s ethics, but we were distressed to find that what we had hoped would be a major contributing source was little more than simply another copy of Vignolle’s account. As a near contemporary, Sporschil provides more details from the Austrian perspective, an account highly prized. He obviously explored various Austrian archives and may well have interviewed participants of the wars for his Die grosse Chronik. However, he also seems to have been liberal in his use of other authors of his time, and his account of the Mincio is strongly reminiscent of that written by Vaudoncourt. Though they are not eyewitness accounts, von Welden’s and von Holtz’s accounts turned out to be very helpful sources on the Austrian actions. The single most significant source, however, was the much later multivolume work by Weil—Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat. Though we depended far more heavily on the contemporary works, Weil proved to have an imposing collection of documentation including an incredible number of Austrian official reports from the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna. Weil helped to clarify numerous points. As with all works, this work was a collective effort. Marco and I had been gathering materials independently for this work prior to our meeting. Upon our acquaintance, an exchange of data began until we discovered we were potential competitors. Our compromise resulted in a joint authorship and this work, an

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effort far superior to our individual efforts. Today, the Napoleonic community seems to be demanding more extensive joint efforts. Rather correctly, many individuals interested in the military history of the Napoleonic age seem to believe that international cooperation will play a key role in providing easier access to and use of archival and primary sources in different countries as well as knocking down those linguistic barriers that too often impaired truly objective and in-depth research. Marco and I do believe that this work, researched by two people living thousands of miles apart and assembled entirely via the Internet, is a step in the aforementioned direction. It is appropriate and necessary to acknowledge those who contributed to the preparation of this work. First, my coauthor Marco Gioannini never failed to amaze me with his linguistic skills, his adeptness at locating obscure documents, and his ability to squeeze a few more paragraphs out of a source document. It was his eagerness that brought this book to completion years before it might have otherwise seen the light of day. Marco was not without a support network, and jointly we owe considerable thanks to Giovanna Giacobello Bernard and Clara Vitulo, director and director assistant of the Biblioteca Reale of Turin; Giulio Massobrio, director of the Alessandria Civic Library; Piero Crociani of Rome; the staff of the Milan State Archives; Professor Maurizio Viroli and his junior assistant, Jason Scorza, who helped us to get access to the Beauharnais Archive at Princeton University; and Alberto Morera, who prepared the maps that appear throughout the book. There are also “the usual suspects” who assisted in this book’s preparation, plus a few new faces. Three close personal friends—Warren Worley, John Brewster, and Commander Chris Janiec, United States Navy—provided readings and commentaries that were of tremendous assistance and greatly appreciated. This time, however, source material was a considerable problem, and invaluable materials were graciously provided by Colonel John Elting of New York; Alfons Liebert of Louvans, Belgium; Digby Smith of Hanau, Germany; John Brewster, whose travels would make the gypsies jealous; and Colin J. Allen of London, England. All five men graciously provided copies of obscure works held in their personal collections or local libraries that made substantial contributions to this work. We also extend our thanks to Peter Hofscho¨erer, who lent his translation skills to the effort, ensuring that the translation of the Convention of Schiarino-Rizzino was perfect in every way, and to David Hollins, who sent us several useful Austrian sources. NOTE ON GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES The Italian modern form of the names of all the cities in Italy have been used throughout this text. In the case of the eastern provinces of what was then called Illyria and is now part of modern Slovenia and Croatia, the toponyms have changed frequently over time due to different German, Serbian, and Italian lin-

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guistic influences. In the text we used the original name from the period of this campaign, and the modern Slovenian and Croatian names have been placed in parentheses after the original name—for example, Karlstadt (Karlovac). This may help when using a modern map. However, the names of the various valleys in Austria and Tyrol appear in the English modern form, with the original German form in parentheses—for example, Drava Valley (Drautal).

Map 1 Italy in 1813: The Political Situation

Introduction The destruction of the Grande Arme´e in Russia had resulted in the withdrawal of the French armies into Germany, where war soon followed it. The debris of the Grande Arme´e, destroyed by the cold of winter, starvation, and disease, was unable to reunite until it was behind the Oder River and in the Prussian heartland, which seethed with anti-French hatred and treachery. Despite this, once free of the snow and ice of the Russian winter, Napoleon immediately began rebuilding his war machine. In January 1813, Prince Euge`ne, viceroy of Italy and Napoleon’s adopted son, was placed in command of the Grande Arme´e and told to hold the line in Germany against the advancing Russians. In fact, Napoleon had left Mare´chal Murat, king of Naples, in command as he returned to France to begin the effort of rebuilding his armies. Murat, however, had little stomach for the job, promptly dropped the command into Euge`ne’s lap, and headed south for the warm climes of Naples. Euge`ne’s efforts to stop the combined advance of the Russians and their new Allies, the Prussians, failed. He was obliged to withdraw before their combined superior numbers, but to be fair, though he displayed little inspiration for the task, he was bombarded with directions from Napoleon, who attempted to run the war from Paris and whose letters were always many days out of date. Euge`ne soon abandoned the line of the Oder and withdrew to the Elbe. Napoleon was furious at his abandonment of so much territory to the Russians and soon found it necessary to return to the army. On 15 April Napoleon departed France for Germany, and on 10 May Euge`ne was ordered to Italy. It is unlikely that he was dismissed because Napoleon felt him a failure. Instead, it is far more likely that Euge`ne’s trusted hand was required in Italy. As Napoleon had prepared for the Russian campaign in 1811 and early 1812,

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the formation of the first Corps d’Observation d’Italie (or IV Corps of the Grande Arme´e) had depleted the Kingdom of Northern Italy cadre of the French and Italian forces that occupied it. When this corps left for Russia, only a few battalions remained in the kingdom on a “wartime” footing. The regiments, which departed for Russia with the Italian Corps, had left behind only their weak depots and those incapable of a campaign. During the winter of 1812 a second Corps d’Observation was organized in Italy, and at the beginning of 1813, it was under the command of General Count Grenier and had orders to move to the banks of the Elbe—Germany! In order to organize this small army, it had been necessary not only to take all the field battalions left behind in Italy during the 1812 campaign but also to build new battalions to replace those destroyed in Russia. Those that were fit were taken from the hospitals, and those veteran soldiers still left in the depots marched with Grenier for Germany. Later a third Corps d’Observation was organized under the orders of General Count Bertrand. The greatest portion of this corps consisted of newly organized conscripts trained during the course of the year and leavened with those few veteran soldiers that were still to be found in the depots of the various regiments. Not only was it necessary to send every man capable of bearing arms into the line, but the depots were stripped of instructors and artisans. These specialists were pressed into active service.1 When Grenier’s Corps d’Observation left for Germany, the various garrisons in Italy found themselves totally stripped of troops. The returns of the regimental garrisons still in Italy contained quartermasters and a small number of soldiers too lame to march north. The subsequent conscription would rebuild these depots, but the fruits of this conscription were unable to consolidate around existing cadres. In theory, this lack of cadre was a disaster in the making. The function of the cadre is to train the new drafts by their example. This new conscription lacked those veterans, and these young soldiers, filled with zeal but deprived of experience, were obliged to find their guides and instructors within their own ranks. It is true that after Moscow, Napoleon reduced the number of battalions in his army and sent the cadres of those newly disbanded battalions to France and to Italy. However, few, if any, were actually sent to Italy. The small number that escaped from Russia found themselves closed up in the garrisons of the various fortresses that the defecting Prussians had placed under siege. The remains of the IV Corps were sealed in Glogau and lost to Euge`ne. In addition, because of the need to augment the troops in Germany, orders for the formation of several new reserve armies were issued in France and in Italy. A new conscription was necessary, and theoretically, the peace that existed in Italy as a result of the alliance with Austria should have given Euge`ne the time necessary to form these units. Indeed, Napoleon’s actions in Germany give considerable proof of Napoleon’s confidence in Austria’s willingness to adhere to this armistice. As already seen, the means necessary to refill the cadres as directed by the

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Imperial decrees were absolutely lacking in Italy. The greater part of the nucleus that was to organize this army consisted of no more than 20 individuals of all grades. Other forces ordered to Italy were provisional regiments. They were to come from France, and their formation was barely ordered. If one counts the Croatian troops (which could not be moved from their territory) and the Neapolitan troops, still theoretically allied to France, a substantial force was to be had. However, the 70 battalions and 24 squadrons that were to form this new corps in Italy existed only on paper.2 When Euge`ne returned to Italy, his first concern was to expedite, as much as possible, the formation of a new army. The success of this effort, however, was threatened by the barely concealed hostile intentions of Austria. Napoleon had given Euge`ne the greatest latitude and the greatest powers to complete his task. Euge`ne saw himself authorized to organize, according to the circumstances, the army that he was to command. In order to hasten its formation, he ordered a conscription in the departments of France closest to the Kingdom of Italy. Those departments were mostly Italian provinces incorporated into the French Empire but also included the few departments to the west and at the foot of the Alps. This recruitment occurred quickly because it was made on territory far from the heart of Napoleon’s France. However, one effect of this conscription was to strip Napoleon of troops that would have been most valuable in his defense of France in 1814. On the other hand, the immediate result of this action was that the Army of Italy became almost entirely Italian. By the time this army recrossed the Alps into France in 1814, national interests, if they had not changed, were at least divided. Before that, however, one could argue that this was the first truly Italian army fighting to defend an Italian homeland.3 The new Italian conscription was very successful. The conscripts from the French departments of Italy arrived in the interval between Euge`ne’s return to Italy and the outbreak of hostilities with Austria. The new units filled out quickly; however, they lacked officers, noncommissioned officers, and weapons. The depots and the corps magazines had been exhausted by earlier efforts and were insufficient to equip the army. Theoretically the army contained 80,000 men but would eventually only rise to 50,000 men. Napoleon had also issued orders authorizing the transfer of 300 officers and noncommissioned officers to Italy from Spain. Euge`ne had been authorized to recall these men from the various Spanish garrisons, including the one in Barcelona. However, it required time for those men to arrive, and during this time, the regiments were swelling their ranks with newly drafted conscripts. Despite the size of the task, Euge`ne’s extraordinary and indefatigable efforts managed to weld this collection of raw humanity into an army. Uniforms were obtained as quickly as possible and reduced to the absolute minimum necessity. Weapons of all types were gathered and repaired, then distributed to the various corps. The conscripts were constantly drilled and provided with noncommissioned officers as soon as they became available. When this new army went into the field, it was an army of recruits led by

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Introduction

other recruits. Though dressed in vests and fatigue hats, their pockets filled with cartridges, they would fight valiantly to sustain the reputation of the regiments to which they belonged. They had, however, received no inheritance beyond their regiment’s name. As the summer of 1813 and the armistice rolled on toward September, the negotiations with the Allied powers indicated that Austria would abandon its alliance with France and join the Allies. Napoleon pressed Euge`ne to hasten the formation of the Army of Italy while striving to hold the Austrian court to its alliance, as it had not yet filled out its cadres and was still well below its ordered strength. It was politically necessary for Napoleon to have an army on the eastern borders of Italy to unsettle Austria and to protect his other interests.4 The armistice in Germany broke on 15 August 1813, and the war resumed. When hostilities began with Austria, Euge`ne was immediately faced with an insurrection to the southeast, in Illyria. He hastened to move there with his army, such as it was. The results of Napoleon’s German campaign in August and September 1813 were painful but inconclusive. Had it been otherwise, Euge`ne should have been able to maintain his position in Italy long enough to complete his army and to successfully defend the eastern frontiers of his kingdom. However, the tacit neutrality and eventual betrayal of Napoleon by Bavaria freed Austria to invade part of the Tyrol. The defection of Bavaria to the Allied cause threatened the heart of the Kingdom of Northern Italy by opening up its northern flank to the possibilty of invasion. Furthermore, the defection of the perfidious Murat, king of Naples, carried away the provinces on the right bank of the Po River as he moved his army into the rear of the Kingdom of Italy. These different circumstances forced successive withdrawals by Euge`ne, behind the Isonzo, the Adige, and the Mincio. Euge`ne established himself firmly in this last position and remained victorious until the Allies had penetrated into the heart of France and forced Napoleon’s abdication. Ultimately, the events in Paris brought an end to the glorious yet unequal contest. The Army of Italy, undefeated in battle, laid down its arms, and the Kingdom of Northern Italy ceased to exist.5

1 War Comes to Italy At the end of March 1813 the III Corps d’Observation (later the IV Corps) left Northern Italy for Germany under the orders of General Bertrand. It soon took part in the Battle of Lu¨tzen and would fight until the Battle of Leipzig, when it effectively ceased to exist. When GD Bertrand took the III Corps d’Observation north, both the Kingdom of Italy and the French departments in the rest of the peninsula found themselves stripped of troops. The “army” that remained consisted solely of depots scattered throughout Italy. It was unorganized and incapable of service in the field. If united, they would have barely formed a handful of active battalions. Beginning in January, Napoleon had taken prompt and energetic measures to repair the effects of the disasters of the Russian campaign. Thousands of recruits were conscripted throughout both France and the Kingdom of Northern Italy. Various sedentary formations were drawn together. New units were constituted, and old ones were reconstituted, absorbing the new conscripts. However, all these reinforcements were destined to join the Army of Germany as it frantically reformed itself. Napoleon did not turn his attention to Italy until April, other than to address a couple of letters to General Fontanelli, Minister of War of the Kingdom of Italy, in January. Napoleon limited himself to recommending that the fortresses of Osoppo and Palmanova should be adequately armed.1 Despite being strenously engrossed in the reshaping of the Grande Arme´e and preparations for the forthcoming campaign in Germany, at the beginning of April, Napoleon started showing signs of concern with the situation of the Army of Italy. On 2 April he wrote again to Fontanelli, this time requiring a report on how, by the end of June, Euge`ne might organize three divisions, two French and one Italian, each formed with 16 battalions and supporting artillery, and

2

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

three cavalry regiments, one of which had to be French. This was to be the origin of the new Army of Italy. Meanwhile, General Fontanelli was not idling his time away. On 26 February he had called to arms the 1814 levy of the Kingdom of Italy. According to his conscription scheme, which was reported to the emperor on 7 April, all conscripts of the Class of 1814 would be called to their colors and join their units in the first 15 days of May. By that time the following units would be organizing: four battalions of the Guard Chasseurs a` pied in Milan, four battalions of the 1st Le´ge`re in Trento, four battalions of the 3rd Le´ge`re in Udine and Trieste, four battalions of the 2nd Line in Ancona, four of the 3rd in Venice, and four squadrons of the 2nd and 3rd Chasseurs a` Cheval in Lodi. In addition, the reshaping of the Army of the Kingdom of Italy would include two foot batteries, a sapper company, a military equipage company, and a divisional ambulance. Rather unexpectedly, the new levy was a great success, and by 8 May, Fontanelli could report to the viceroy, Prince Euge`ne, that 14,473 conscripts out of 15,000 had already reached their depots where they would soon begin their training.2 After rebuilding the Guard Chasseur a` pied Regiment, organization began on a battalion of velites, a battalion of grenadiers, a company of gardes d’honneur, a squadron of dragoons, a horse battery, a company of foot artillery, and two companies of guard train, all of which were to be completed in July. This would raise the Royal Italian Guard nearly up to its full strength. Shortly after, a small detachment of gendarmerie d’e´lite (40 men), four squadrons of the Queen’s Dragoons, and a horse and a foot battery would be completed. As soon as adequately refitted, the Guard Division was to move to Verona or Brescia and join the assembling army.3 Napoleon had ordered the Guard Division to move to Verona or Brescia and join the Corps d’Observation de Verona. An Imperial decree of 14 April set out a reorganization of the Italian troops in Spain. Two weak divisions were merged to form a stronger one. This new organization made possible the dispatch of many seasoned soldiers to Italy (30 men from each infantry regiment, 25 from each cavalry regiment). The veterans of Spain were destined to reinforce the cadres of the Italian Guard.4 The elite units being thus refitted, the line regiments were still lacking those veteran cadres desperately needed for training the conscripts. Despite Fontanelli’s efforts, the shortage of cadres was particularly felt in the Army of the Kingdom of Italy. The Italians were also short of greatcoats, shoes, trousers, and even muskets. While not seriously understrength, the six French regiments stationed in Italy (each comprising four war battalions plus a depot battalion) were in no better condition, as far as arms and equipment were concerned. There was no serious effort to rebuild the Army of Italy until the issuance of the Decree of 18 April. This decree directed the formation of a Corps d’Observation de l’Adige, and the organization of this force was temporarily entrusted to GD Vignolle, who, until Euge`ne returned from Germany, commanded all the troops stationed in the Kingdom of Italy. The cadre of this army

War Comes to Italy

3

was organized into four infantry divisions; three of the divisions were French and numbered the 46th, 47th, and 48th, and one was Italian, numbered the 49th. These four divisions would have a total of 64 battalions, including 36 French battalions (33,310 men), 2 Croatian battalions (1,680 men), 4 elite battalions formed from the 1st and 2nd Foreign Regiments (2,400 men), 16 battalions of Italians (13,440 men), and 6 Neapolitan battalions (5,040 men),5 representing, on paper, an effective strength of 55,870 men. In addition, there was a cavalry division with 18 squadrons. The king of Naples was to furnish 6 squadrons to this force. Strictly following Napoleon’s instructions, Clarke (Duc de Feltre and the French Minister of War) proposed the organization of two supplementary divisions for the Corps d’Observation de l’Adige. A fifth division (51st Infantry Division) was to be organized with three brigades, for a paper strength of 15,185 men. The 1st Brigade was to contain the 4th Provisional Croatian Regiment and a force of 3,000 drawn from 5 small fusilier battalions of the 1st Foreign Regiment. The 2nd Brigade was to be formed from 12 fusilier companies of the 2nd Foreign Regiment and the 25th Demi-Brigade (2/1st, 3/16th, 6/62nd Line Regiments). The 3rd Brigade would contain the 23rd (6/47th, 6/70th, 6/82nd Line Regiments) and 24th (6/15th, 6/121st, 6/122nd Line Regiments) Provisional Demi-Brigades. The 6th Division (52nd Infantry Division; expected strength: 16,800 men) was to be formed with 10 Italian and 10 Neapolitan battalions.6 However, as mentioned earlier, only conscription alone was able to fill out an organization whose base did not exist. The only regimental depots, which could be used to process drafts, were, for the most part, in the Kingdom of Italy or in that part of Italy that had become part of Metropolitan France. The conscripts were identified and finally sent to the depots, but with difficulty. The army existed only on paper. As for the conscription, the new recruits were identified and finally sent to the depots. However, lack of cadres made the reorganization proceed at a very slow pace. In compliance with Napoleon’s orders, the four divisions of the Corps d’Observation de l’Adige were to leave for Germany as soon as they were fit for active service, and the two remaining divisions were to be entrusted with the defense of the Italian borders. The new army, however, existed only on paper. The rates of desertion were increasingly high in both the Croatian and the other foreign units. Moreover, the Croatians were only too eager to return serving under the Habsburg banner. The three provisional demi-brigades were not yet en route from France and had a long journey before them. Worse still, Murat did not show himself particularly inclined to release the infantry and cavalry he had promised. The Imperial Decree ordering the formation of the Corps d’Observation de l’Adige had barely arrived in Italy when Lieutenant-General Count Grenier was sent back from Germany to assume the post of commander in chief. Until Grenier arrived, however, only the cadres could be organized.

4

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

On 12 May, 10 days after the battle of Lu¨tzen, Napoleon urged Euge`ne to leave that evening for Italy. Though his trip took him through several German capitals, including Munich, his duties did not permit him to delay his travels for the various receptions offered to him.7 Six days later, on 18 May, Euge`ne arrived in Milan to the cheers of the population. In his person, Euge`ne combined the positions of commander in chief of the Army of the Kingdom of Italy as well as of those French troops stationed in Illyria and in the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th French Military Divisions (Piedmont, Liguria, Tuscany, and Rome) with the appointment of senior magistrate of the Kingdom of Italy. Holding this double authority, plus that vested in him by Napoleon, Euge`ne hastened the formation of the army he was to command. The goal of this rearmament so far from the main theater of war was to intimidate Austria with a threat against its southern borders. It is quite possible that Napoleon considered this as at least the principal and possibly the only goal of the Army of Italy. Whatever the case may have been, it was more prudent to prepare for the eventuality of war with Austria than to ignore it, especially when Austria had historical claims on Italy. So while publicly preparing the larger and ideal force directed by the succession of Imperial decrees, Euge`ne occupied himself particularly with organizing a solid core for the army that he would command as he repulsed any possible invasion of Italy by the Austrians.8 The first measure taken by Euge`ne was to centralize the formation of the Corps d’Observation de l’Adige and to establish the conscript processing depots around it, so that at any time all available forces could be concentrated. The 46th Division, placed in the first line, was to be organized in Padua, Treviso, and Bassano. The 47th Division, the second line, was to be formed in Vicenza, Verona, and Rovereto. The 48th Division, the third line, was to reunite in Mantua, Bozzolo, and Montichiari. The 49th Division, the fourth line, was to be formed in Brescia, and the cavalry was to organize in Cremona, Valeggio, and Castiglione delle Stiviere.9 Shortly before Euge`ne returned to Milan, Peyri’s Italian Division (1st, 4th, 6th, and 7th Line Regiments, and Milan Guard Battalion) had departed for Germany, and subsequently several large groups of reinforcements (1st Italian Light Regiment and 2nd Italian Chasseurs a` Cheval) had also been dispatched north. However, veteran troops were expected daily to arrive from Spain, and the survivors of the Russian campaign were slowly flowing back. Arms and equipment were drawn from the French arsenals in Turin and Grenoble, whereas horses were being purchased wherever they could be found. Field batteries were being organized in Pavia, along with the bridging train and various other vehicles and horse gear. The army was expected to be ready to take the field in July 1813.10 On 23 May, Euge`ne informed the emperor about the location of the Italian infantry battalions. Twenty-two were in Germany, 8 in Spain, 1 in Corfu, 5 in Dalmatia, and only 16 in Italy, of which 4 had been recently formed from the levy of 1814 (6th and 7th Battalions of the 4th and 7th Line Regiments). Claim-

War Comes to Italy

5

ing the formation of a second Italian division was unfeasible, Euge`ne proposed to recall 3 veteran battalions from Cattaro and Ragusa, in Dalmatia.11 In the first days of June, Euge`ne learned that a dozen new French battalions were to join his army. The good news and the steady progress in the rebuilding of the Army of Italy caused Euge`ne to direct the organization of a fifth division and to begin concentrating the army on the eastern frontier of the kingdom. The 48th Division, which was to have 15 battalions, was moved to Udine, Cividale, and Gemona. The 46th Division, equally with 15 battalions, stood between Treviso, Bassano, and Pordenone. These two divisions were organized into the second Lieutenancy.12 The first Lieutenancy contained the 47th Division (15 battalions), placed in Verona and Vicenza, and the 49th Division, with 16 battalions, in Padua and Venice. A reserve division, with 15 battalions, was to organize in Montichiari, near Brescia. The cavalry, numbering 18 squadrons, was ordered to deploy between Castiglione delle Stiviere, Mantua, and Verona. The 6 battalions of the Royal Italian Guard were ordered to form a reserve at the general headquarters in Brescia.13 Though returns indicate the Army of Italy was so organized, this force was illusionary and far below its ordered strength. It contained, outside of the Croatian and Neapolitan troops, several regiments that had only just been ordered formed and had yet to join the army. To approximate the actual strength of the Army of Italy, it is necessary to eliminate more than 20 battalions from this force. Consequently, including the Royal Guard, no more than 60 battalions were in Italy at the end of June.14 Of those units actually present, not only were many far below strength, but all contained a high percentage of men who were not trained or equipped.15

MURAT’S CHANGING POSITION Murat was married to Caroline Bonaparte, Napoleon’s sister. This made him Euge`ne’s uncle. When Napoleon had made Euge`ne viceroy of Italy, the relationship between Euge`ne and his uncle, Murat, quickly soured. Murat had been disappointed that Joseph became king of Spain instead of him, and this was another major affront to his dignity. It is impossible to separate Murat’s ego from the pressures of his wife, whose serpentine whisperings in his ear provoked much discontent. Murat was not secure in his hold on the Neapolitan throne. Of course, there was the threat from the war, but he was also insecure because of his sense of falling from Napoleon’s favor. Murat had his throne solely because Napoleon had placed him there. When Napoleon quit the remains of the Grande Arme´e during its retreat from Moscow, he left Murat in command. Murat, however, had suffered a complete collapse of his spirit and soon threw the reins to Euge`ne without Napoleon’s knowledge or approval. This act of insubordination greatly exacerbated the re-

6

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

lationship between Napoleon and Murat, resulting in a sharp rebuke published in Le Moniteur, the official newspaper of the French government.16 A further prick to Murat’s security occurred on 26 February 1813 when a British expedition, under Lord Bentinck, seized the island of Ponza, on the Neapolitan coast, and held it against all Neapolitan efforts to retake it. No doubt Berthier’s comment that Murat, being a Frenchman, should be willing to sacrifice his throne for the benefit of the French Empire was ringing in his ears. Toward the end of February 1813, Murat sent Prince Cariati to Vienna to test the waters at that court for the establishment of some form of relations, perhaps to begin overtures that might lead to the security that Murat sought for his throne. Negotiations were opened at a Viennese court eager to exploit any cracks in Napoleon’s hegemony over Europe. Metternich was very sensitive to Murat’s situation and hesitation to plunge into treason. Geographically Naples was separated from Austria by French territory, so military cooperation would be difficult. Being the premier diplomat of Europe, Metternich, like a skilled angler, played the line to Murat slowly and with a gentle hand.17 Murat, however, was not willing to trust his fate solely to his negotiations with Vienna. Contacts were also made with the British, who seemed equally pleased with Murat’s diplomatic feelers, and serious contacts quickly developed. The British government pledged to aid the king in holding his throne if he would join the Allied field, separate himself from Napoleon, and proclaim the independence of Italy. Bentinck, Britain’s proconsul in Sicily, moved to Catania to pursue his negotiations with Murat. However, a series of dispatches from Napoleon, filled with glowing reports of the situation in France, caused Murat to vacillate yet again, and negotiations ceased. Murat resolved to remain faithful to Napoleon, and Bentinck took this rejection very badly. He resolved to never again treat with Murat, nor listen to any of the overtures that came as the fall campaign in Germany developed.18 From that point on, Lord Bentinck’s political opposition as well as personal ill will toward Murat was to become a major hindrance to any treaty between the Kingdom of Naples and the Allied powers. PLESSWITZ ARMISTICE After the French victories of Lu¨tzen and Bautzen, the Allies had been driven steadily eastward. They had great need of rest and refitting, not only after those two defeats but also to repair what they could of their losses from the 1812 campaign and the advance out of Russia. To give them the respite they needed, the diplomats had been called forward. On 2 June, plenipotentiaries representing the French and Allies met at Plesswitz and negotiated a 36-hour suspension of arms. With the suspension of arms in place, negotiations for an armistice began. On 4 June, the negotiations came

War Comes to Italy

7

to a conclusion. In the end, Napoleon accepted a seven-week armistice, subject to only a six-day notice of termination.19 This ended the Spring Campaign of 1813. As the armistice would nominally end in mid-September, for Italy it would mean three months of undisturbed but frantic preparations. Unfortunately for Euge`ne, not only did this pause mean that Napoleon would strip more troops out of his feeble army, but it also gave the Austrians equal time to prepare the army that was to face him. As if that weren’t enough, the armistice actually ended in mid-August, a month earlier than anticipated. THE ARMY OF ITALY GROWS Six battalion cadres from Durutte’s division were dispatched south from Augsburg to Verona on 9 June, where they were to arrive on 29 June to be filled out with 4,300 French conscripts and then returned north. Another unit belonging to the same division, the 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment, had reached full strength and was en route to Verona, where it was due to arrive on 14 June. Shortly afterward, the 1st Hussar Regiment and 31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment were ordered to join the 19th Chasseurs and would have their ranks filled out in Paicenza, where the latter had its depot. In two letters, dated 12 and 20 June, Euge`ne assured Napoleon that each regiment would contain two battalions, fully armed and equipped. Euge`ne went on to say that he anticipated having, by 1 July, 5,000 men per division, 1,500 cavalry, and all 120 guns fully equipped and ready for operations. Euge`ne believed that the 3rd and 4th Battalions of each regiment would be ready to rejoin their regiments by 1 July and that the troops coming from Piedmont would probably arrive by 10 July. The battalions en route from Rome were expected to contain only conscripts and would probably arrive on 8 July. The anticipated Neapolitan brigade was another story, and no news had been received on this subject. All in all, Euge`ne was confident that the 25,000 men in Verona on 20 June would rise to 40,000 by 1 July and to 60,000 by 10 July.20 However, the truth would not be as rosy as Euge`ne painted it. On 1 June the Army of the Kingdom of Italy contained 37,031 men, including 3,053 on leave, and 4,411 horses in Italy. It had a further 24,997 men and 5,945 horses serving with the Grande Arme´e in Germany and 8,528 men and 892 horses in Spain. There were a further 4,436 men in Illyria that could be used to defend Italy, 1,200 on the Ionian Islands, and 2,282 men on Corsica and the island of Elba, who theoretically could be used to defend Italy. There were also 14,230 French troops in regiments stationed in Italy, but they were almost entirely conscripts and lacked 6,100 men of their ordered full strength.21 The regiments in Piedmont and Tuscany were already en route, but those expected from Rome (6th Line and 14th Le´ge`re Regiments) had not even started incorporating their conscripts, let alone planning their march schedule. Another major problem Euge`ne was facing in this phase, and one that seriously delayed the reorganization of his

8

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

army, was a lasting shortage of superior officers, above all, division and brigade generals.22 JULY 1813 In the first days of July, Euge`ne received an Imperial Decree dated 18 June that renamed the Corps d’Observation de Ve´rone the Corps d’Observation d’Italie. This decree established the newly renamed corps with four French, two Italian, and one Franco-Neapolitan Divisions. It was ordered to be organized as follows:23 1st Division: (French) 9th Line Regiment (4 bns) 35th Line Regiment (4) 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3) 23rd Provisional Demi-Brigade (3) 2nd Division: (French) 84th Line Regiment (4) 92nd Line Regiment (4) 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3) 2 Battalions drawn from the cadres returned from Spain and presently scattered in the 7th, 8th, 9th, 19th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th Military Divisions 3rd Division: (French) 53rd Line Regiment (4) 106th Line Regiment (4) 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3) 24th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3) 4th Division: (French) 36th Le´ge`re Regiment (2) 42nd Line Regiment (2) 102nd Line Regiment (2) 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade (4) 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3) 1 Battalion drawn from the cadres returned from Spain and presently scattered in the 7th, 8th, 9th, 19th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th Military Divisions 5th Division: (Italian) 12 Battalions 6th Division: (Italian) Italian Guard (6 bns) Italian Line Troops (6 bns)

War Comes to Italy

9

7th (Reserve) Division: (Franco-Neapolitan) 47th Line Regiment (2) 86th Line Regiment (2) 122nd Line Regiment (2) Neapolitan Infantry (8 bns) Cavalry: 1 French Regiment 5 Italian Regiments 1 Neapolitan Regiment Artillery: 3 French Horse Artillery Batteries 1 Italian Horse Battery 1 Neapolitan Horse Battery 9 French Foot Batteries 4 Italian Foot Batteries 1 Neapolitan Foot Battery 2 French 12pdr Reserve Batteries Total: 94 infantry battalions (62 French, 24 Italian, and 8 Neapolitan) 5 cavalry regiments 158 guns (106 French, 38 Italian, and 14 Neapolitan)

Needless to say, it would take many weeks before the Corps d’Observation d’Italie could even draw near to its paper full strength. Nevertheless, Napoleon’s explicit aim was to intimidate Austria by making her intelligence believe that a strong army was about to gather in Northern Italy. At this time, it was still not obvious that Austria would abandon its alliance with France. In view of this, Napoleon decided that Grenier should rejoin the Grande Arme´e in Germany with 42 battalions and 8 squadrons. In late June, GD Grenier reported to the French Minister of War that the two divisions (47th and 49th) under his command were far from being ready for combat and that a great number of the units belonging to the 47th were still in the 28th Military Division. In the last few days of June, he had concentrated on the reformation of the 84th and 92nd Line Regiments. Like any other units in the Corps d’Observation d’Italie, these famous regiments were still unequipped and badly clothed. GD Grenier also worked on establishing a rudimentary organization for the artillery, cavalry, and sappers. Despite the strenuous efforts of Euge`ne and his subordinates, rebuilding an army from scratch was not as easy as putting it on paper. By June, Euge`ne recognized that the marching schedule the emperor had set for the Corps d’Observation d’Italie could not be

10

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

met and that it would take at least another month before his advanced guard would reach Laibach (Ljubljana).24 As for the reserve division, when the promised Neapolitan troops failed to appear, Euge`ne began forming it around two Croatian regiments and the elite battalions organized from the two foreign regiments.25 According to the Decree of 18 June, the reserve division should be completed by six French battalions of the 47th, 86th, and 122nd Line Regiments. While waiting for these units as well as the 23rd and the 24th Provisional Demi-Brigades (from Brittany), the 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade (from southern France), and the 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade (from Spain), the viceroy incorporated GD Durutte’s veterans (35th and 36th Le´ge`re Regiments) into the Corps d’Observation d’Italie.26 CONVENTION OF REICHENBACH On 14 June, Count Nesselrode signed a convention with the Russians and Prussians at Reichenbach in which Austria agreed to declare war on France, should France refuse any of five conditions. Napoleon was soon aware of this agreement. He confronted Metternich, and a heated series of negotiations began that would eventually fail.27 The terms of the Convention of Reichenbach and Napoleon’s unwillingness to accept them left little doubt of the resumption of hostilities. At this juncture, an attack on Italy seemed inevitable. One of the points Austria demanded for its neutrality was the cession to Austria of the Illyrian provinces and Trieste. Since Napoleon would never concede this, war was inevitable. The Army of Italy had to be expanded if Italy was to be defended from the inevitable Austrian attack. By 1 July, Euge`ne had decided that the 7th Division could not be formed because the Neapolitans were probably never coming and the Croatians and two foreign regiments could not be used in the line. Moreover, the French units that the Decree of 18 June theoretically assigned to the 7th Division were not expected to arrive until late in July (in fact, they never arrived). The other six divisions would have a strength of only 50,000 men until 15,000 more men arrived from the interior of France and were organized into provisional demibrigades.28 By mid-July Euge`ne had only 72 incomplete battalions, either in Italy or en route to Italy. His cavalry totaled only 12 squadrons. Euge`ne divided this force among the three Lieutenancies, two formed with French and one with Italian divisions. He formed a reserve and assigned the commanding officers to the various corps and divisions of his army. The records of the general staff provide the following organization for the Army of Italy.29 GENERAL STAFF30 First Organization31 His Highness Euge`ne of Italy, Commanding General

War Comes to Italy

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Aides-de-Camp: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Danthouard Ge´ne´ral de brigade Baron Triaire Ge´ne´ral de brigade Baron Gifflenga Colonel Baron Bataille Chef d’escadron Tascher de la Pagerie Chef d’escadron Me´jean Chief of General Staff:

Ge´ne´ral de division Count Vignolle

Artillery Commander:

Ge´ne´ral de division Baron St.-Laurent

Artillery Chief of Staff:

Major of Artillery Ravichio

Engineering Commander:

Colonel Moydier

Assistant Engineering Commander: Capitaine of Engineers Philabert Chief Director:

Commissary Director Regnault

Inspector of Reviews:

Assistant Inspector Chevalier Pradel de St.-Charles

Provost Marshal:

Chef d’escadron of Gendarmes Favier Dumoulin

Aide-de-camp to Chief of Staff:

Capitaine Me´nard

Assistant to General Staff:

Capitaine Fourn

Assistant to Staff:

Capitaine Caccia

Assistant to Staff:

Capitaine Pontheaux

Attached to Staff:

Lieutenant Maestrovich

War Commissioner:

Fourcade

Principal Physician to Staff:

Guillaume

Surgeon General:

Mocquot

Organization of the Lieutenancies 1st Lieutenancy: Commanding Officer: Lieutenant General Count Grenier Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Bazin de Fontenelle 1st Division: Commanding General: General Baron Quesnel Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Dupin 84th Line Regiment (4 bns) 92nd Line Regiment (4 bns) 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade (4 bns) Located in Verona & Vicenza with 7,777 men and 18 guns, including 4 regimental guns. 3rd Division: Commanding General: General Baron Gratien Chief of Staff: Chef d’escadron Castel-Labolbene 35th Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns) 36th Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns)

12

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 42nd Line Regiment (2 bns) 102nd Line Regiment (2 bns) 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade (3 bns)32

Located in Vicenza, Bassano, and Castelfranco with 8,200 men and 16 guns. 2nd Lieutenancy: Vacant 2nd Division: Commanding General: General Count Verdier Chief of Staff: Unknown 9th Line Regiment (4 bns) 35th Line Regiment (4 bns) 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3 bns) Located in Treviso and Pordenone with 7,486 men and 18 guns, including 4 regimental guns. 4th Division: Commanding General: General Marcognet Chief of Staff: Unknown 53rd Line Regiment (4 bns) 106th Line Regiment (4 bns) 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3 bns) Located in Udine and Palmanova with 7,189 men and 20 guns, including 4 regimental guns. 3rd Lieutenancy: Commanding Officer: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Pino Chief of Staff: Colonel Paolucci 5th Division: Commanding Officer: General Count Palombini Chief of Staff: Colonel Casella 2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (1 bn) 1st Italian Line Regiment (1 bn) 2nd Italian Line Regiment (4 bns) 3rd Italian Line Regiment (4 bns) Dalmatian Regiment (2 bns) Located in Padua and Mestre with 9,562 men and 16 guns, including 2 regimental guns. 6th Division: Commanding Officer: General Baron Lecchi Chief of Staff: Chef de bataillon Badalassi 1st Brigade: (in Brescia) Royal Velites (1 bn) Guard Chasseurs a` pied Regiment (4 bns)

War Comes to Italy

13

Guard Infantry Regiment (1 bn)33 2nd Brigade: (in Fiume & Trieste) 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (4 bns) 4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns) A total of 7,891 men and 16 guns. Reserve: Commanding Officer: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Bonfanti Chief of Staff: Chef de bataillon Bacarini Elite Battalions, 1st Foreign Regiment (2 bns) Elite Battalion, 2nd Foreign Regiment (1 bn) Located in Montechiari with 2,469 men. Cavalry: Commanding Officer: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet Chief of Staff: Vacant 3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4 sqns) 4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2 sqns) Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (4 sqns) 19th (French) Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2 sqns) Located in Cremona, Lodi, and Brescia with a total of 1,800 men. The artillery reserve consisted of two batteries, each with six 12pdr guns and two howitzers. The Grand Park contained a battery with six 6pdr guns and two howitzers. Artillery Reserve & Grand Park: Reserve Artillery 2 Foot Batteries (12-12pdrs and 6 howitzers) Grand Park 6-6pdrs & 20 howitzers

As one can see from this return, the force present consisted of 50,574 infantry and 1,800 cavalry. It needs to be noted that these figures contained many partially trained conscripts, most of whom had not yet arrived from the depots, and a few “march” units.34 The number of disposable men, which describes the number of combatants more accurately, is significantly lower and, according to Vignolle, was best estimated at 45,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. The 9th, 35th, 53rd, 84th, 92nd, and 106th French Regiments, the 2nd and 3rd Italian Line, the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re, the Dalmatians, and the 6 Guard Battalions had all fought in Russia.35 These 44 battalions were almost totally annihilated, and the debris of their cadres had not yet arrived in Italy. It was necessary, therefore, to reform them entirely by

14

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

conscription, organizing them with a small number of officers coming from other units and with noncommissioned officers who were selected from among the brighter conscripts. When all the circumstances are reviewed, it becomes apparent that in the space of the two months since the receipt of the first orders from the emperor, the cadres of the battalions could not be complete, nor could the men be ready for field operations.36 En route, but still in France, was a considerable force that was eagerly awaited. On 19 July these forces were as follows:37 23rd Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/47th Line Regiment (en route from Lorient) 6/70th Line Regiment (en route from Brest) 6/86th Line Regiment (en route from St. Malo) 24th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/15th Line Regiment (en route from Brest) 6/121st Line Regiment (en route from Blois) 6/122nd Line Regiment (en route from Vendoˆme) 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment (en route from Marseille) 3/16th Line Regiment (en route from Toulon) 4/62nd Line Regiment (en route from Marseille) (this battalion was formerly the 6/62nd) 1/,2/,3/,6/1st Hussar Regiment 3 French Batteries (24 guns)

Of these forces, however, the 23rd and 24th Provisional Demi-Brigades were destined never to arrive, as they were diverted to Germany. Only the 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade and the 1st Hussar Regiment would eventually join the Army of Italy, together with the 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade, which arrived from Germany.38 While personally caring for every detail of the reorganization of the army, in July, Euge`ne traveled throughout the concentration area, taking time to inspect the coastal defenses from Venice to Trieste and the naval forces.39 He also sent his geographer, the Italian Visconti, to the Illyrian provinces to make an accurate reconnaissance of the position of Villach as well as of the roads and the mountain passes connecting the Sava and the Drava Valleys. That was the area he had planned to occupy with his first line as soon as his forming divisions were ready to march off.40 FIUME (RIJEKA) FALLS TO THE ENGLISH Euge`ne’s concern about his vulnerability to naval attack was not misplaced. The Royal Navy had an unimpeded run of the Ligurian, Tyrrhenian, and Adriatic

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Seas, all of which washed the shores of the Italian Peninsula. They made numerous demonstrations, now near Ravenna, now near Venice. On 2 July, two British ships-of-the-line, two frigates, and a brig under Admiral Fremantle arrived before Fiume (Rijeka), which was defended by four batteries armed with 15 large-caliber guns. The following day, the British landed a force of 500 to 600 men. The guns on the city walls were soon silenced by the bombardment of the fleet. The 350 Croats of the 2/2nd Croatian Regiment charged with defending the city fled with their officers and the local governor of the city. The British seized 43 merchant vessels, large quantities of food, and material, which they hauled away or destroyed. On 4 July the British expedition reembarked, spiking 59 cannons, which they then threw into the sea.41 EUGE`NE MOVES TO PROTECT ILLYRIA AND DALMATIA With the British raid on Fiume (Rijeka), Euge`ne was forced to move to defend his coasts. Four battalions of the 4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment were already in Dalmatia with the 3/4th in Cattaro, the 4/4th in Ragusa, the 2/4th in Spalato with two companies in Lesina, and 1/4th in Zara. The elite companies were broken off these four battalions and organized in Zara into a battalion of converged grenadiers and one of converged voltigeurs. The 1st and 2nd Elite Battalions of the 4th Italian Line were then sent to Fiume (Rijeka) to reestablish French control of the city. Four of the six Croatian battalions were still in Illyria, not including the regimental depots. They were deployed with the 1/3rd Croat in Cattaro, the 2/ 4th Croat in Ragusa, the 2/1st Croat in Zara, and the 2/2nd Fiume, which had fled from the British with its detachment of three companies on the Quarnero Islands. The two other Croatian battalions, the 2/5th and 2/6th, had been assigned to the Reserve Division at Montechiari. This done, Euge`ne felt that French control in Dalmatia, despite the repeated British raids against the islands near Zara and Cattaro and the growth of popular discontent in Montenegro, was reestablished and secure.42

AUSTRIAN ACTIVITY ON THE NORTHERN ITALIAN BORDER If Euge`ne had organized his new army almost from scratch, so, too, had the Austrians. The Hilfkorps, under Prince Schwarzenberg, had taken part in the Russian campaign operating on the southern flank and had since returned to homeland, but in the spring of 1813, Austria had no army ready to be called up on war footing. This was due mostly to restrictions in organization and number imposed by the French after the war of 1809, as well as severe cuts to military

16

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

expenditures proposed by Austrian finance minister Wallis and accepted by the Austrian emperor over Metternich’s harsh opposition. By mid-spring, however, restless diplomatic exchanges between the Allied powers and the Habsburg house had significantly increased the probability that Austria would participate in the coalition against Napoleon. It soon became apparent that, as dictated by a long-standing strategy, Austria would probably wage war on its two traditional fronts, Germany and Italy. In the beginning of May, the Austrian emperor ordered that an army of 120,000 men be formed under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg to cooperate with the Russian and Prussian armies in Germany. The Army of Bohemia would absorb the Hilfkorps and the units then being organized in Bohemia and Galicia. With the offensive army forming, Prince Schwarzenberg suggested the creation of another army to defend the homeland. By the mobilization of all remaining war units, he expected to raise a force of 50,000 men, plus another 14,000 men to be kept in Vienna as a reserve. These forces were to become the backbone of the army that fought against Euge`ne in Italy. Finally, Schwarzenberg believed that another 60,000 infantry and cavalry could be organized by completing the depot battalions and squadrons and used for garrison duties throughout the empire as well as to form a small reserve army in Galicia.43 At the beginning of June, the Austrian emperor ordered that the landwehr be mobilized.44 Two weeks later, he issued instructions for a new organization of the Austrian military. Besides the steadily growing Army of Bohemia, two reserve corps were to be formed. The 1st Reserve Corps, under the command of Prince de Reuss, who was to report to Prince Schwarzenberg, would contain 43 battalions and 44 squadrons drawn from Lower and Upper Austria, Galicia, Hungary, Moravia, Slavonia, and Banat. The 2nd Reserve Corps was to draw its troops from Inner Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Galicia, and Slavonia. Its 31 battalions and 40 squadrons would be assigned to FZM Hiller. Finally, 11 battalions of landwehr out of a total of 22 were to be put on active service.45 In Galicia, not only was the landwehr being organized, but reserve battalions were being constituted. Austria mobilized a further 21,250 men. Each of the recruiting districts of the seven infantry regiments in Galicia formed a new sixcompany battalion, with a strength of 1,080 men, and a depot of two companies with a further 400 men. Moravia had 12 regiments organizing in each of the half districts, a battalion with 4 companies (720 men strong), and a depot company of 210 men. By July, 48,982 reservists and landwehr were called to arms.46 These war preparations did not go unnoticed by Euge`ne. On 26 June, for example, an intelligence report informed him that at the beginning of the month masses of Austrian troops were concentrating (12,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 1,500 artillery) in the city of Graz, plus a further 20,000 men in its environs. About half these troops were conscripts.47 The Austrians, in turn, were informed about the French movements in Friuli. The initial Austrian deployments along the empire’s southern border were

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defensive. Feldzeugmeister Hiller was to lead his army along the two banks of the Drave via Villach and Loibl as far as Cilli (Celje). He was to assume a defensive posture, establishing entrenchments at Sancta-Magdalena, on the Kanker, at Feistritz, on the Loibl, in Krumpendorf on the road from Klangenfurt to Velden, at Du¨rnstein below Freisach, and on the Po¨tschen, which formed the border between Styria and Austria. Finally, he was to occupy positions in Trautenfels in Styria as far as Ischel and Radstadt and place them in a state of defense.48 On 16 July the Aulic Counsel ordered Hiller’s II Reserve Corps to move to the interior of Austria and ordered FML Sommariva to set his troops in motion. The brigade of GM Vecsey, consisting of one battalion each of the Brooder and Gradiscaner Grenz, the 9th Ja¨ger Battalion, the 3/Lusignan Regiment, a landwehr battalion of the Lusignan Regiment, and six squadrons of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment, was to depart Gu¨ns on 19 July and to arrive in Marburg (Mariobor) on 29 July. GM Vlasitz’s brigade, consisting of six squadrons of the Merveldt Uhlans, had orders to leave Oedenburg on 18 July and to arrive in Mosskirchen and Kainach on 25 July. They were to be joined by six squadrons of the Stipsisch Hussars, which were scheduled to arrive in Feldkirchen by 28 July. The four squadrons of the Hohenlohe Dragoons and the four squadrons of the Savoy Dragoons, under GM Spleny, were expected to take up quarters in Lautschach and Marburg, respectively, on 28 July.49 The first columns of the Austrian II Reserve Corps arrived in Styria on 25 July. On the same day the Merveldt Uhlans had already reached Klagenfurt, and the 9th Ja¨gers were en route to Marburg (Maribor).50 According to a report dated 30 July, FML Frimont51 and FML Nowack’s52 divisions by that time occupied their assigned positions along the Mur River. INITIAL FRENCH DISPOSITIONS On 17 July, General Grenier assumed command of the 2nd Lieutenancy (quickly redesignated the 1st Lieutenancy) and moved his headquarters to Udine. He commanded the 2nd and 4th Divisions. Count Verdier assumed the command of the new 2nd Lieutenancy formed by the 1st and 3rd Divisions. General Rouyer took Verdier’s place at the head of the 2nd Division.53 Responding to reported Austrian movements, the 1st Lieutenancy moved into Friuli and deployed the four battalions of the 9th line, respectively, to San Daniele, Spilimbergo, Valvasone, and Pordenone. The four battalions of the 35th Line held Ceneda, Sacile, Serravalle, and Conegliano. The 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade put the 6/7th Line in Osoppo, the 6/52nd Line into the Osoppo Fort, and the 6/67th Line into Gemona. The divisional artillery and train were moved to San Vito. The 4th Division was organized such that it formed two lines along the Tagliamento and Isonzo, with four battalions of the 106th and two of the 53rd in Udine, two battalions of the 53rd in Cividale, 6/101st in

18

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

Cormons, the 6/112th in Gradisca, and its artillery and train in Palmanova. The 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade and the 4/20th were posted on the left bank of the Isonzo at Gorizia.54 When the movements were complete, the 1st Lieutenancy crossed over the Piave, placing the 4th Division behind the line of the Isonzo and the 2nd on the Tagliamento in the positions described. The 2nd Lieutenancy occupied Vicenza and Castelfranco with the 1st Division, Feltre and Bassano with the 3rd Division. The 3rd Lieutenancy was in Verona and Padua, with Bellotti’s brigade of the 6th Division detached to Fiume (Rijeka), Trieste, and Laybach (Ljubljana). The cavalry division moved to Treviso and Padua, whereas the largely incomplete 7th Division remained in Montichiari.55 THE OPERATIONAL THEATER With the Scho¨nbrunn Treaty of 1809 France had acquired from the Habsburg Empire a vast portion of its territories, including the district of Villach in Carinthia, Carniola, Istria, Gorizia, Dalmatia, with Ragusa and the Adriatic islands, and the districts of Karlstadt (Karlovac) and Banat, which were part of the socalled Military Borders. Napoleon renamed these newly annexed territories the Illyrian provinces. The whole area presented major problems for the combatants. Because of the steepness of the mountains in this region, the valleys were linked to one another only by the various passes, which were carved by streams that, with the exception of the Isonzo, ran from the west to the east, cutting across the operational front. The most notable valleys were those of the Enns (Ennstal), the Mur (Murtal), the Drau (Drautal), the Gail (Gailtal), the Sava, the Gurk, the Kulpa, and the Isonzo. The height and steepness of these mountain chains cut and directed the lines of communication into these valleys, restricting, if not totally eliminating, any freedom of maneuver. They impaired lateral movement and often forced difficult and time-consuming detours. The most prominent of these ranges were as follows: 1. The chain (Rhaetian Alps) dividing the Inn Valley (Inntal) from the Adige Valley and the Drava Valley (Drautal). 2. The chains (Hohe Tauern and Noric Alps) dividing the Salzach Valley and the Inns Valley (Ennstal) from the Drava (Drautal) and the Mur (Murtal) Valleys. 3. The Radsta¨dter-Tauern massif, a northern branch of the Noric Alps, which runs on the left bank of the Enns. 4. Another branch of the Noric Alps between the Drava and the Mur Rivers. 5. The mountain chain (Gailtaler Alpen) between the Drava and the Gail Rivers. 6. The mountain chain (Carnic Alps) that begins with Monte Croce and runs parallel to the Drava and Sava Rivers up to Agram (Zagreb).

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7. The Julian Alps, which depart from the Carnic Alps by Tarvis and run south through Krainburg (Kranj) to the Dinaric Alps, between the Upper Sava and the Isonzo.

The consistent west to east course of the valleys and the rivers provided Euge`ne with an almost endless series of strong natural defensive lines. In the first phase of the campaign, he selected the Drautal and the Sava Valley as his first defensive line, the second line being that formed by the Gail Valley (Gailtal) and the Isonzo Valley. In addition, the limited number of roads capable of handling military traffic clearly defined what positions would need to be held. The first road of significance was the road from Salzburg through Ischl and the Pstschen, or through Radstadt and on to Bruck am der Mur. These roads, however, were to remain outside the theater of operations. The second road was the great Italian road running from Verona to Treviso, Pordenone, Tarvisio, and Villach. From there it ran to Klagenfurt and Judenburg and on to Bruck am der Mur. By Villach this road met that coming from Trento and Brixen, which ran through the Pusteria Valley (Pustertal). The third road ran from Pordenone through Gorizia to Laibach (Ljubljana) and from there to Cilly (Celje), Marburg, Graz, and Bruck am der Mur or through Neustadtl to Agram (Zagreb). The fourth was the road from Gradisca to Trieste, Fiume (Rijeka), Carlstadt (Karlovac), and Agram. These roads were not totally isolated one from the other, and there were nine major lateral roads running through various valleys that permitted communications, among them:56 1. The Predil road from Tarvis to Gorizia that follows the Isonzo Valley. 2. The Wurzen road that runs from Villach to the Sava Valley at Krainburg (Kranj). 3. The Loibl Pass road, climbing up the Karawanken (Carnic Alps) and connecting Villach and Klagenfurt to Krainburg (Kranj). 4. The road from Adelsberg to Fiume (Rijeka). 5. The road from Adelsberg to Trieste.

The border line ran from Villach to the sources of the Sava River; then it approximately followed the ridge of the mountains north of the river. In proximity of Cilly (Celje), it followed the course of the Save. The shape of the border line was such that theoretically both parties could push forward their right wing in an attempt at outflanking the enemy left. But this was no advantage to the French-Italian army as the steep defiles of the Julian Alps on their right wing would hinder coordinated advances of large bodies of troops. Moreover, if Euge`ne ordered a major effort on the right wing, it would expose his lines of communication without placing him in the position to threaten the Austrian ones. On the contrary, the Drave River was not fordable beyond Villach, thus making an excellent defensive line on the Austrian right wing. The region between

20

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

Villach and Klagenfurt was also favorable to Austrian offensive actions, as it was not far from Tarvis, whose control gave an easy access to Italy.57 Besides Tarvis and Gorizia, which might be considered the eastern gates to Italy, there were a few other places of strategic significance in Illyria, among them: 1. The Loibl Pass, connecting the Drautal to the Sava Valley, and the position of Feistritz, which covered the access to Loibl from Villach by commanding the defile between the Carnic Alps and the right bank of the Drava. 2. Spittal an der Drau, a major crossroad northwest of Villach, which was vital to keep the line of communication between Carinthia and Tyrol, through Lienz and the Pustertal, under control. 3. The Upper Isonzo Valley and the Predil road, which provided the shortest and quickest link by interior lines between the southern and the northern portions of the theater of operations. 4. Bruck am der Mur, where all of FZM Hiller’s troops should concentrate in case of retreat to bar the southern access to Vienna.58

AUGUST 1813 On 2 August the Army of Italy was deployed as follows. Grenier’s headquarters of the 1st Lieutenancy was in Udine, as was the headquarters of the 4th Division. The headquarters of the 2nd Division was in Pordenone, about 30 miles to the west. The regiments of the 2nd Division were deployed with one battalion of the 9th Line in Osoppo, one in Buia, and two in San Daniele. The 35th Line had one battalion in Spilimbergo, two in Valvasone, and one in Pordenone. The 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade had a battalion in Venzone and Ospedaletto, one in Gemona, and the 6/67th Line in Villach, forming the first line. The division’s artillery was in San Vito. The 4th Division was on the right wing of the 1st Lieutenancy. The 106th Line had four battalions in Udine, one battalion of the 53rd was in Cividale, and three were in Udine. The 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade had a battalion in Gorizia, two in Cormons, and one in Gradisca. Its artillery was in Palmanova. The 2nd Lieutenancy, provisionally under Quesnel, had its headquarters and that of the 1st Division in Vicenza. The 84th Line had two battalions in Castelfranco, one battalion in Campo San Pietro, and one in Cittadella. All of the 92nd was in Cittadella, as was a battalion of the 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade. Its two other battalions were in San Pietro and Piazzola. The division’s artillery was in Verona, with orders to move to Vicenza. The 3rd Division had its headquarters in Bassano. Two battalions of the 35th Le´ge`re were also in Bassano, as were the three battalions of the 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade and the two of the 102nd Line. The two battalions of the 36th Le´ge`re were in Feltre, and two battalions of the 42nd were in Cornuda and

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Asolo. The division’s artillery was also in Verona but had orders to move to Bassano. The 3rd Lieutenancy, of General Pino, had its headquarters and that of the 5th Division in Padua with one battalion of the 1st Italian Line, one battalion of the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re, and the divisional train. The 5th Division had one battalion of the 3rd Italian Line in Treviso and two battalions of the Dalmatian Regiment in Mestre. The 3rd Lieutenancy was, by virtue of its positions, forming a second line centered behind the first two. Finally, the Italian Royal Guard was in Verona to its left. The four battalions of the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, belonging to GB Bellotti’s brigade, were divided up and deployed as garrisons in Illyria, Trieste, and Laibach (Ljubljana). The elite battalions formed from the 4th Italian Le´ge`re occupied Fiume (Rijeka). The 7th or Reserve Division was to form in Montechiari under the orders of General Bonfanti. At this time, it consisted solely of its artillery and three battalions of the 1st and 2nd Foreign Regiments. Despite Euge`ne being rightly skeptical about the prospect of raising this division to full strength, at this time it was still intended that the promised Neapolitan Brigade would join it, as would the 3rd Provisional Croatian Regiment and the 6/47th, 6/86th, and 6/122nd Line Regiments, which were supposedly en route from Lorient, Saint-Malo, and Vendoˆme. In fact, they were not. By this time the cavalry of the Army of Italy consisted of the 3rd Italian Chasseurs (four squadrons) en route to Conegliano, the 4th Italian Chasseurs (two squadrons) moving to Sacile, and the Queen’s Dragoons (four squadrons) in Padua. The 1st Hussars and 31st Chasseurs were still coming from France. The division’s artillery was in Verona, together with the army’s artillery reserve.59 The Army of Italy remained in these positions until 7 August without making any other movement than dispatching the 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade (2nd Division) to occupy Villach. As it became apparent that the armistice in Germany would not be extended, Euge`ne moved his headquarters to Udine on 10 August. The field artillery was distributed to the divisions, and the army began to deploy. During the first days of August, FZM Hiller arrived in Agram (Zagreb). His first act was to prepare the regiments he found in Austrian Croatia for war. He also sent agents over the Sava River in order to instigate an insurrection in French Croatia to facilitate his invasion.60 BRITISH LANDING AT ROVIGNO AND THE CAPTURE OF MEZZO On 2 August the British squadron with two ships-of-the-line and a frigate that cruised between Grado and the Tagliamento moved to Rovigno and then toward Ragusa. Near Ragusa stood the Islands of Mezzo and Giupana, which were

22

The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

garrisoned by 50 men. In a quick amphibious assault, the British landed more than sufficient forces to overrun the garrisons. Once ashore they destroyed the war materials they found and reembarked with their prisoners, taking what materials caught their fancy, like Caribbean pirates swooping down on their helpless prey. AUSTRIAN WAR PLANS War was fast coming. There were only a few days of peace left to Europe, and that war was about to reerupt was apparent to all. As war clouds were thickening on the southern Austrian borders, FM Bellegarde, president of the Aulic Council, sent instructions to FZM Hiller, commander of the II Reserve Corps, who received them on 8 August. The II Reserve Corps should operate to attain the following three goals: 1. Protect the border provinces as well as inner Austria from a French invasion from Italy. 2. Hold itself ready to support the army (I Reserve Corps under Prince de Reuss) operating in the Danube Valley, should Euge`ne move against it through the Salzburg region. 3. Dispatch an independent corps to Illyria to encourage revolts among those faithful former Habsburg subjects who barely tolerated French rule. In order to arm the insurgents, 12,000 muskets and other military equipment would be sent to the commander of this independent corps.

Recognizing the relative weakness of the II Reserve Corps, the Aulic Council suggested to FZM Hiller that he limit himself to defending only the main Alpine passes and keep his troops concentrated so as to be able to move rapidly against the enemy wherever they might attempt a breakthrough, be it Laibach (Ljubljana), Villach, or even the Salzburg region. Bellegarde’s orders to FZM Hiller seemed to mirror the exaggerated concerns of the Aulic Council and the emperor himself. Had Euge`ne been able to read the message that FM Bellegarde had addressed to FZM Hiller on 5 August, urging him to immediately put the state archives and treasures in safety at the first sign of a French invasion, he would probably have smiled. At the beginning of August, Euge`ne had, in fact, only 22,000 men in Friuli, of whom the greatest part were raw conscripts. Laibach (Ljubljana) contained only 650 Italian infantry and 40 horses. In any event, the weak and untrained Army of Italy was far from representing a serious threat to the Austrian provinces and could presently dare but very limited offensive actions. Surprisingly, the Aulic Council seemed to ignore this completely. As Napoleon had hoped, the Austrian headquarters behaved as if completely deceived about the real force of the new Army of Italy by Euge`ne’s intense activity.61 With the exception of three battalions from GD Verdier’s division that had

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moved to Villach, the Army of Italy had remained close to its original positions, as reported on 2 August: 1st Lieutenancy on the Tagliamento and the Isonzo; the 2nd in Vicenza, Castelfranco, Bassano, and Feltre, plus the Guard in Verona; the 3rd near Padua with a brigade detached in Illyria, the cavalry in Treviso, and the reserve division in Montechiari. On 7 August, however, it was ordered to march forward and to redeploy along the border with Austria.62 That same day, FZM Hiller arrived at his headquarters in Bruck to assume command of the Austrian forces facing Euge`ne. The Austrian deployment was not going well, and his firm hand was required. On 10 August, the last session of the Congress of Prague was held. The summer armistice ended, and a state of war was declared to exist between France and her Allies, on one hand, and Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and England, on the other. On 15 August Napoleon was formally notified of the rupture of the armistice and that hostilities would resume the morning of 17 August. Orders were sent to Hiller and Radivojevich, the designated commander of the independent Austrian force in Illyria, to coordinate the manner in which they would prosecute their war against Italy. Radivojevich’s corps, which was to form the extreme left of Hiller’s army, was to immediately assume the offensive and invade Croatia. In addition, it was to send flying columns into Istria and toward the Adriatic coast. The small corps under the orders of FZM Radivojevich consisted of one battalion of the Warasdiner Kreuzer, one battalion of the St.-Georger, one of the Gradiscaner, one of the Brooder Grenz Regiments, three battalions of the Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment (IR 52), and four squadrons of the Radetzky Hussars, with Generalmajors Nugent, Csivich, and Rebrovich. This detached division was to operate without interfering with the operations of Hiller’s corps. It was to arm the inhabitants of Croatia and, if possible, to occupy Dalmatia and push on to Trieste.63 In addition, the Austrians carefully assembled a list of retired officers living in Croatia who had influence with the population. These men, coupled with 12,000 muskets that were shipped to Ko¨rmend, were to be the core of a revolt in Croatia against the French. By stirring up insurrection among the population of Croatia, a region that had never liked French rule, the Aulic Council aimed at gaining three advantages: (1) speeding up the conquest of the Dalmatian coast and of its ports, which were now garrisoned mainly by Croatian troops; (2) weakening the Army of Italy, which still relied on the Croatian regiments that were, on the contrary, only too eager to desert and go over to their previous masters; and (3) by consequence, reinforcing their own army with new troops. The Austrian agents sent to Croatia to make preparations for the revolt received the awaited help of Croatian large landowners who had remained faithful to the Habsburg emperor.64 In order to prevent the French from forcing a passage on the Drava at Marburg (Maribor) and to keep a link between FML Radivojevich’s detached corps in

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

Croatia and the main body of the army concentrating by Klagenfurt, GM Fo¨lseis’s brigade was ordered to take positions at Cilly (Celje).65 On 12 August, the Army of Italy occupied the following positions. The 1st Lieutenancy was concentrated between Udine and Gorizia. The 2nd Lieutenancy was between Codroipo and San Daniele. The 3rd Lieutenancy pushed the 5th Division forward of Palmanova, and the Royal Guard Brigade was now in Pordenone. The cavalry occupied Latisana. Meanwhile, the Austrian Army of the Interior was forming for the invasion of Italy. On 12 August, Hiller established his army as follows:66

AUSTRIAN ARMY OF ITALY, 12 AUGUST 1813 Commanding Officer: Feldzeugmeister Hiller Brigade: Feldmarschal-leutnant Stanissavlevich (under Hiller’s direct command) (in the upper Inns Valley, within Upper Austria and the region of Salzburg) 2/Wallach Grenz Infantry Regiment (Nr. 17) (1,044 men) 1/,2/Szeckler Grenz Regiment (Nr. 15) (994) Frimont Hussar Regiment (Nr. 9) (2 sqns) (300) 12

⁄ 3pdr Battery

Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall (in the upper Mur Valley) Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (586) 2/2nd Szekler Grenz Regiment (Nr. 15) (1,029) Frimont Hussar Regiment (Nr. 9) (4 sqns) (509) 12

⁄ 3pdr Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian (Oberst Volkman interim commander) Duka Infantry Regiment (Nr. 39) (2) (1,622) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (Nr. 53) (2) (1,970) 1 6pdr Battery Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Frimont (in the Drava Valley between Klagenfurt and Vo¨lkermarkt) Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasitz 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (8 ⬎ 4 men) Peterwardiner Grenz Regiment (Nr. 9) (1) (934) Stipsisch Hussar Regiment (Nr. 10) (6 sqns) (783) 1 Wurst (horse) Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Pulsky (Oberst Gover interim commander) Hohenlohe Infantry Regiment (3 ⫹ 1 Landwehr) (3,884 men) 1 6pdr Foot Battery

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Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (Nr. 3) (6) (749) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (Nr. 1) (6) (796) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marziani (20 km from Unter Drauburg) Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer (Oberst Weigel acting commander) Reisky Infantry Regiment (Nr. 10) (3) (1,457) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (Nr. 27) (3 ⫹ 1 Landwehr) (3,761) 1 6pdr Foot Battery Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Sommariva (between Wildon, Ehrenhausen, and Leibnitz) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (Nr. 2) (4) (376) Savoyen Dragoons (Nr. 5) (6) (573) Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim Purcell Grenadier Battalion (534) Welsberg Grenadier Battalion (791) Chimany Grenadier Battalion (695) Faber Grenadier Battalion (442) 1 6pdr Foot Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis Brooder Grenz Regiment (Nr. 7) (1) (1,271) 3/Lusignan Infantry Regiment (Nr. 16) Landwehr/Lusignan Infantry Regiment Total for Lusignan Regiment (2,625) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (Nr. 5) (2) (261) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Radivojevich Brigade: Generalmajor Csivich Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz (Nr. 5) (1) (1,162) 3/Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment (Nr. 52) St.-Georger Grenz Regiment (Nr. 6) (1) (1,194) Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich Gradiskaner Grenz Regiment (Nr. 8) (1) (1,205) 1/,2/Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment (Nr. 52) (1,415) Brigade: Generalmajor Graf Nugent Radetzky Hussar Regiment (Nr. 5) (4) (595) Artillery Reserve: 2,829 men and 2,024 horses (in Graz)

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Fresh Food Depot (meat)—Radkersburg Butcher Annex—Eibiswald Hospitals and Medical Staff—Leoben, Graz, and Sachsenburg Army Headquarters—Kapfenberg General Infantry Staff Depot—St. Lorenzen Dragoon Depot—Kapfenberg 2 Companies of Pioneers and Bridging Train—Sebring Total: 34 Battalions 40 Squadrons 2 Companies and 102 guns 36,537 men and 6,646 horses

Attached to Hiller’s dispositions establishing this order of battle was a marching schedule for the period 12–14 August and the movements of Stanissavlevich, which was to maintain a link with the I Reserve Corps, Eckhardt’s brigade, and Frimont’s division, operating in the Murtal. By concentrating around Klagenfurt with GM Vlastiz’s brigade as an advanced guard,67 the main body of Hiller’s army seemed to threaten an attack on Villach and Tarvis. But apparently this movement was meant to be a feint to cover Hiller’s actual plan, which was to open hostilities on his extreme left by invading Illyria. It should be stressed that at this stage the Austrian commander was far from being tempted to make any serious penetration into the upper Drauthal (Drave Valley) toward Lienz, as he feared being entrapped between two enemy armies, Euge`ne’s Army of Italy and the Bavarian army. The latter, at that time, was still allied to Napoleon and was concentrating along the banks of the Inn, menacing Salzburg.68 About that time, FZM Hiller received reliable information that the strength of the Army of Italy was about 40,000 men and that most of them were still en route from their depots to Friuli. The Austrian commander knew, however, that Euge`ne had placed advanced guards at Villach and Spittal in the Drautal and at Laibach (Ljubljana).69 On 13 August, FML Frimont’s pioneers repaired a bridge over the Drava at Rosegg, while GM Vecsey’s brigade moved toward Sanct-Martin. That evening the Austrians learned that the French had evacuated Villach and withdrawn toward Tarvis. They also learned that Euge`ne had established himself in Udine with four infantry divisions and his guard echeloned between Udine and Palmanova, and of the movement of Euge`ne’s 3rd Division on Osoppo and Palmanova. Hard marching days ensued, as both armies proceeded with their concentration movements. By 16 August the French first and second lines were deployed as follows: GD Gratien’s division was at Tarvis, with three battalions around Villach; GD Quesnel’s division stood at Gemona; the 2nd Lieutenancy was scattered between Udine and Gorizia; the 3rd Lieutenancy had GD Palombini’s division at Palmanova, GB Bellotti’s brigade (GB Lechi’s division) at Laibach,

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and the Royal Guard in reserve at Pordenone; GB Jeanin commanded six Croatian depot battalions of dubious quality and loyalty in the Karlstadt (Karlovac) region, while GD Garnier garrisoned Fiume (Rijeka) with other 400 local troops and an Italian battalion. Euge`ne’s headquarters was at Udine. As for the Austrians, GM Stanissavlevich’s brigade watched the Ennstal; GM Eckhardt’s brigade, spearheading FML Marshall’s division, was approaching Spittal; GM Flseis’s brigade had entrenched itself in front of Cilly (Celje); and FML Radivojevich’s columns prepared to cross the Sava at different points in the Agram (Zagreb) area. The rest of the army was slowly concentrating at Klagenfurt, where FZM Hiller had set his headquarters.70 CROATIAN REVOLT At the first rumors of insurrection in Croatia, Euge`ne decided to move his right wing toward that province. He hoped to prevent an Austrian invasion by occupying the Sava line and supporting his left on the sources of this river before the Austrians could move out of Agram (Zagreb). The immediate result of this movement should have been the suppression of the Croatian revolt. In conformance with his plan, Euge`ne personally went to Gorizia on 19 August, where he issued a proclamation to his army. He stated that a new war would soon be declared and that the Army of Italy would be asked to take to the field in defense of the kingdom. When the hostilities finally resumed, he stated, “Your discipline and your valor assure me that you will sustain the ancient reputation of the units to which you belong and that, by your new efforts, you will contribute to the achievement of the peace which has not been given to you.” Soon afterward, the French army set off in march. On 20 August, the 1st Lieutenancy, containing the 2nd (GD Rouyer) and the 4th (GD Marcognet) Divisions, stood deployed between Wippach (Vipava) and Alpen (Planina), about 20 miles southeast of Gorizia. The 2nd Lieutenancy, following the movement on the right, shifted the 1st Division before Gorizia, while the 3rd Division occupied Tarvis and Villach, where the 35th Le´ge`re Regiment had since the 18 August replaced the 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade. The 5th (Italian) Division, under GD Palombini, covered Trieste, and the 6th (Italian) Division, under GB Lechi, had a brigade in Laibach (Ljubljana). The reserve (GD Bonfanti) marched on Verona to check any enemy advance from the Tyrol. The cavalry (GD Mermet) rode forward to join the army at Gorizia.71 While these movements occurred, the Austrians invaded Illyria. The summer armistice in Germany expired on 16 August, and on the morning of 17 August, two Austrian columns crossed the Sava at Sissek (Sisak) and Agram (Zagreb) and moved on Karlstadt (Karlovac) and Fiume (Rijeka).72 GB Jeanin, who was in Karlstadt, prepared to defend his position. He destroyed the bridge over the Korana on the road to Glina, but before he could destroy the bridge at Kulpa (Kupa), which was on the road to Agram, an insurrection erupted among the

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

city’s inhabitants. Seeing himself abandoned by the Croatian soldiers, deserted by everyone and menaced by the population, he was obliged to withdraw almost alone during the night of 18–19 August to Fiume (Rijeka). GD Garnier stood in the city of Fiume (Rijeka) with 400 Croats and an elite battalion of the 4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, which had been detained there when it was en route from Dalmatia to join the 6th Division. During the evening of 20 August, GD Garnier, believing himself faced by numerically superior forces, evacuated Fiume (Rijeka) and withdrew to Lippa (Rupa), from where GB Jeanin rejoined the army. However, as the Austrians did not appear in Fiume (Rijeka), GD Garnier returned to the city on the following day.73 The insurrection provoked in Croatia by the Austrians slowly grew and, by the same method, spread into Dalmatia around Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and along the mouth of the Cattaro, where Generals Montrichard, Roize, and Gauthier commanded. They had only a small number of Italian troops and a few Croatian battalions in their commands, which in view of the circumstances were more likely to assist the Austrians in their sieges than they were to assist the French in the defense of the region. After crossing the Sava at Agram (Zagreb), FML Radivojevich marched on Karlstadt (Karlovac), detaching a small force to clear and occupy Glina and Petrinia. Another battalion was detached up the Sava Valley toward Rann to cover the march of the main body on Karlstadt (Karlovac). Earlier, on 19 August, the French, under GB Jeanin, had abandoned Karlstadt. FML Radivojevich took possession of it without meeting any opposition, as the Croatian garrison left by the French had deserted. From there he detached GM Nugent, with a battalion of the Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment and a squadron of the Radetzky Hussars toward Fiume (Rijeka) and Oberst Milutinovich, with a battalion of the Gradiskaner Grenz Regiment against Neustadt (Novo Mesto). Oberst Milutinovich also had orders to occupy Stafzenknoten, through which the road to Agram (Zagreb) and Karlstadt (Karlovac) ran. On 23 August the 3rd Croatian Regiment deserted en masse and reached Karlstadt (Karlovac) to serve under the Habsburg banner.74 EUGE`NE’S MOVEMENT ON TARVIS According to French intelligence, by mid-August the Austrian army forming on the Illyrian borders could field about 60,000 men. It was deployed as follows: 20,000 men before Klagenfurt; 15,000 before Cilly (Celje), with outposts in Neumarkt, Volkermarkt, and Krainburg (Kranj); 10,000 moving from Austrian Croatia into Illyrian Croatia, near Karlstadt (Karlovac) and Neustadt (Novo Mesto); and 6,000 en route to Dalmatia. A corps of 3,000 men under GM Eckhardt was reported in the Spittal area, while another detachment of about the same force was at Radstadt, presumably to keep a watch on the Bavarian movements.75 These figures were certainly exaggerated, as by that time the Austrian army did not exceed 45,000 men.

Map 2 Between the Drava and the Sava Rivers, August–September 1813

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

Euge`ne was also informed that the Austrians had pushed reconnaissance forces from Klagenfurt and Cilly (Celje) toward Neumarkt, Volkermarkt, and Krainburg (Kranj). When it came to exaggerating enemy strengths, the Austrians ran with the best. Yet despite having received a few intelligence reports that correctly estimated the enemy force, on 12 August FZM Hiller informed his emperor that a French-Italian army of no less than 60,000 men was concentrating on the northeastern borders of Italy.76 At this time, it had around 40,000 men total. By the time Euge`ne learned of these Austrian movements, he was obliged to wage a defensive war because of the numerical weakness and poor training of his army. His sole goal was to gain the time necessary to build his army. He was unable to consider retaking the line of the Sava, which the Austrians had already crossed. Meanwhile, after the opening move in Croatia, the bulk of the Austrian forces seemed to be moving through Klagenfurt, probably with the intention of forcing the positions at Villach and Tarvis. This movement would turn the left of the Army of Italy and open, by means of the Drautal (Drava Valley), Austrian access to Tyrol. Euge`ne was now facing two alternatives. He could either push forward to Laibach (Ljubljana), reinforce the garrison of that town, and deploy his army northwest as far as Villach, or he could retrace his steps up to Gorizia and follow the Isonzo Valley, via the Predil road, as far as Tarvis, while striving to keep the Austrians at bay on his right wing with a diminished force.77 He chose the latter and decided to shift the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Divisions, the Royal Guard, and a brigade of cavalry to his left wing. This movement began on 21 August, via Canale (Kanal), Caporetto (Kobarid), and Pletz (Bovec). The 5th Division was ordered to move to Laibach (Ljubljana). That same day, Euge`ne wrote the French Minister of War, Clarke, that the Austrians had entered Spittal with a force of cavalry and infantry and had a few divisions in Saint-Veit and Klagenfurt. Euge`ne advised Clarke that he was moving with three divisions and the Royal Guard to Tarvis to support the 3rd Division, which was then master of the defiles of the Sava and Drava. He anticipated he would be in Gorizia on 22 August, Caporetto on 23 August, and Tarvis on 24 August, though at that time the 2nd Division and the Guard would still be en route. The 3rd Division was in echelons between Villach and Arnoldstein, with a battalion in Vedsenfels observing the Sava Valley.78 On 24 August the redeployment was completed. As of 18 August GD Gratien had advanced on and occupied Villach with two battalions of the 35th Le´ge`re. He then deployed the remainder of the division in echelons in the Gail Valley (Gailtal). The 1st Division had moved, via Arnoldstein, to Finkenstein to support the 3rd Division. The 1st Lieutenancy (2nd and 4th Divisions) united itself in the entrenched camp at Tarvis.79 Disconcerted by this sequence of marches and countermarches, Euge`ne’s conscript army fell prey to desertion.

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FIRST ENGAGEMENT AT VILLACH—24 AUGUST Hostilities began on 19 August, as FML Frimont attacked the French advanced troops in Villach and St. Martin and GM Eckhardt attacked Paternion.80 Colonel Duche´, who commanded the 35th Le´ge`re, defended his position behind the Drava so vigorously that FML Frimont was obliged to abandon his effort to take the Drava bridge by direct assault. Correspondence from Laibach (Ljubljana) dated 22 August announced that the Austrian army had invaded Illyria without any formal declaration of war. Euge`ne was convinced of the reality of this announcement as a result of the dispositions made by the Austrian Court.81 On 21 August FML Frimont summoned the city of Villach, while threatening Arnoldstein and Federaun from behind. That same day GD Gratien sent a detachment from the 35th Le´ge`re on a reconnaissance toward St. Jacob. This movement informed him that the Austrians were moving from Rosegg through Gederaun against the Gail and threatened to strike Villach from the rear. Because of this threat, GD Gratien abandoned Villach and his other positions to FML Frimont on 23 August. The Austrians quickly occupied Villach with both infantry and cavalry. They rebuilt the bridge and placed two guns into a bridgehead on the Drava, below the village, to support their movement. GM Vlasitz crossed over the river with one squadron of the Stipsich Hussars and two companies of Croatians. At 8:00 P.M., a further force of Austrians arrived. GD Gratien moved his division behind the Gail to new positions by Federaun and Hart. On 24 August, GD Quesnel’s 1st Division arrived from Tarvis, and the two divisions linked up. GD Gratien then decided to retake Villach. Colonel Duche´ appeared before Villach with two battalions of the 35th Le´ge`re, plus the 2/36th Le´ge`re, which he had received as a reinforcement.82 The French stormed the city at the pas de charge, surprising the garrison, which included two squadrons of cavalry.83 They took prisoner 250 to 300 Austrian prisoners, most of whom were from the Hohenlohe-Bartenstein and Peterwardiner Regiments. FML Frimont, however, responded by advancing three battalions, one each from the Peterwardiner and Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Regiments, supported by the Stipsitch Hussars and the Merveldt Uhlans. Duche´ soon found himself facing a hugely superior number of Austrians. That evening Colonel Duche´ was ordered to abandon the city and return to the Federaun bridge, on the Gail. He had lost about 200 men during the day’s battle.84 SECOND ENGAGEMENT AT VILLACH—28 AUGUST Euge`ne moved into Tarvis with the 2nd and 4th Divisions, the Italian Guard, and his cavalry. On 28 August, he learned that the Austrians had erected bridges at Rosegg, a few miles east of Villach, and had covered them with an entrenched

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

bridgehead on the right bank of the Drava. Euge`ne sensed that FZM Hiller was planning to concentrate his forces behind the river for an attack on Tarvis. By becoming master of such a strategic position, not only would the Austrian army gain the easiest access to Italy, but it would also control the sources of the Sava River, forcing the French to abandon both Laibach (Ljubljana) and Trieste, then withdraw behind the Isonzo.85 In order to defend the line of the Drava as far as the Loibl Pass and, in case of need, deploy along the Upper Sava Valley, Euge`ne immediately decided to launch an attack on Villach and Rosegg. The 1st Division (Quesnel) marched from Riegersdorf on Rosegg, where it attacked the Austrians, forcing them to cross back over the Drava and break down their bridges. The 2nd Division moved into Riegersdorf to support GD Gratien. Around 2:00 P.M., GD Gratien began his march from Federaun with nine battalions. Leaving three battalions in Bains and three guns in reserve by Oberfederaun, he vigorously attacked Villach with his remaining six battalions. The Austrian resistance was stiff, and the city was so well barricaded that at first the French were only able to occupy the suburbs. However, once the attack on the newly constructed bridgehead at Rosegg succeeded, the Austrians were forced to evacuate Villach on 29 August.86 They marched out at about 11:00 A.M., after having torched the city. GD Gratien then occupied the charred remains of the city and moved his headquarters there.87 Probably planning to cross the Drava downstream by the Loibl Pass and move on Tarvis from the Upper Sava Valley, FZM Hiller made no further attempt to attack Rosegg and Villach. By the end of August, GD Rouyer had joined the Army of Italy. Euge`ne appointed him commander of the 2nd Division and put GD Verdier at the head of the 2nd Lieutenancy. After these changes, the Army of Italy was reorganized as follows88: 1st Lieutenancy: GD Count Grenier Total: 17,408 men and 38 guns 1st Division: GD Baron Quesnel Brigade: GB Campi Brigade: Colonel Pe´got 4th Division: GD Baron Marcognet Brigade: GB Dupeyroux Brigade: GB Jeanin 2nd Lieutenancy: GD Count Verdier Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Hector Total: 16,329 men and 34 guns 2nd Division: GD Baron Rouyer Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Demarzy

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Brigade: GB Schmitz Brigade: GB Darnaud 3rd Division: GD Baron Gratien Brigade: GB Piat Brigade: Adjudant-Commandant Montfalcon 3rd Lieutenancy: GD Count Pino Total: 16,786 men and 32 guns 5th Division: GD Count Palombini Brigade: GB Ruggieri Brigade: GB Galimberti 6th Division: GB Baron Lechi Brigade: GB Baron Lechi Brigade: GB Bellotti Reserve: GD Baron Bonfanti Total: 4,324 men and 16 guns Brigade: GB Mazzuchelli Cavalry: GD Baron Mermet Cavalry Brigade: GB Perreymond Total: 2,312 men and 12 guns Total: 57,15989

The reserve division, under GD Bonfanti, was ordered to take up a position in the Upper Adige Valley and watch the western mouth of the Pusteria Valley (Pustertal).90 The 2nd Lieutenancy occupied Villach and Federaun at the end of August. The 1st Division was placed in St.-Martin and Rosegg, and the 4th Division stood in Wurzen. GB Gifflenga, aide-de-camp to Prince Euge`ne, was sent with a party to Paternion to observe the Austrians on that side. While this disposition was made on the left wing of the French army, the Austrians continued their movement against the enemy right. Oberst Milutinovich occupied both Neustadt (Novo Mesto) and Rann.91 He was then ordered to push a reconnaissance from Neustadt (Novo Mesto) toward Weichselburg. The corps camped in Frautz, on the road to Cilly (Celje), and sent parties to the bridge at Tchernu¨tz. On 26 August, GM Nugent was in Kamenial. Here he learned that the French under GD Garnier had abandoned Fiume (Rijeka). GM Nugent then pressed forward and occupied that city on 27 August without opposition. On the following day, he pushed forward against the French, engaged them by Sapiane, and threw them back to Trieste. On 29 August, GD Garnier retired to Mate´ria.

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

AFFAIR AT KRAINBURG (KRANJ), 30 AUGUST/ 2 SEPTEMBER While Radivojevich’s columns were advancing deeply into French Croatia, the rest of the Austrian army was deployed as follows. At the extreme right FML Fenner had taken position by Sachsenburg in the Drauthal, sent reconnaissance patrols as far as the Pustertal, and was about to move on Lientz with a force composed of two squadrons of the Frimont Hussar Regiment, two companies of the 8th Ja¨ger Battalion, a battalion of Tyrolian Schu¨tzen, and half a battery. Fenner’s deployment was covered by General Stanissavlevich’s brigade, which was now in full control of the Salzach Valley. Threatened by an Austrian corps moving from Germany, the Bavarian army had in fact been forced to quickly abandon the region of Salzburg and concentrate on the Lower Inn. On Fenner’s left General Eckhardt’s brigade had occupied Spittal and pushed parties toward St. Hermagor in the Gail Valley. Hiller’s main body was around Klagenfurt with Vecsey’s brigade holding a bridgehead on the right bank of the Drave River at Feistritz and covering the line of communications between the center and the right wing. General Fo¨lseis’s brigade advanced from Cilly (Celje) and was now en route to Stein.92 General Pino was due in Laibach (Ljubljana) on 26 August, with the 5th Division and the Italian cavalry brigade (3rd and 4th Chasseurs). The brigade of General Bellotti (3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, 6th Division) garrisoned the city. The mission of the 3rd Lieutenancy was to face any Austrian movement coming from three different directions: northeast (Cilly/Celje), southeast (Rudolfwerth), and south from Fiume (Rijeka). The shortest route between Klagenfurt and Laibach (Ljubljana) at this time ran through the pass on Mount Loibl. Both army commanders considered this position of the utmost strategical importance. By remaining master of the Loibl Pass, the Austrians would block any direct communication between the 3rd Lieutenancy in the Sava Valley and the rest of the army, then in the Drauthal (Drava Valley). General Pino ordered Bellotti’s brigade to take the pass, with the understanding that it was watched only by a small Austrian picket. Bellotti moved from Laibach (Ljubljana) on 25 August with three battalions of the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re and came in sight of the Austrian position on the evening of 26 August.93 As his young soldiers were tired from the long march, Bellotti declined to launch a night attack. During the morning of 27 August94 the 3rd Le´ge`re advanced in two separate columns to attack the strong entrenchments on the Loibl Pass, which were defended by the 2nd Company of the 9th Ja¨gers (131 men), under Captain Moll,95 and a battalion of landwehr. The attack was badly coordinated, as the four-company column that was to outflank the Austrian position on the right had been delayed by the rough terrain. The Italian conscripts underwent their baptism of fire as they were repulsed in the first of three badly executed attacks. Failing in their efforts, they withdrew to St. Anne and Krainburg

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(Kranj). The regiment suffered 32 dead and 54 wounded and prisoners.96 Euge`ne, who had not ordered this action, harshly criticized General Bellotti for his reckless attempt against a strong position.97 Meanwhile, as Bellotti fought at Loibl, Pino received orders to move with his five battalions to Tschernutsch to cover the Sava River crossings. The other seven battalions and two squadrons were to advance as far as Weichselburg to counter the movement of FML Radivojevich.98 On 30 August two Austrian infantry detachments attacked Krainburg (Kranj). The first, consisting of the Chasteler Regiment and commanded by Colonel Baumgarten, moved from Windisch-Kappel; the second, under Colonel Go¨ldlin with the 9th Ja¨gers, descended from the Loibl Pass. The action was supported by two squadrons of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment.99 Krainburg (Kranj) was occupied by three battalions of the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re and by a French battalion of the 35th Line.100 This time it was the Austrians who poorly coordinated their advance. Having successfully repulsed three attacks, at 11:00 Bellotti launched a counterattack on the Austrians, recapturing the suburbs that had been lost. The ensuing fighting lasted from noon until 9 P.M. Without artillery support and with ammunition running low, Go ¨ ldlin withdrew about a half mile from Krainburg (Kranj). He allowed the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re to close his new position and lashed them with a well-aimed volley, breaking their order. Go¨ldlin then launched a perfectly timed cavalry attack against the Italians to complete their defeat. The 3rd Le´ge`re suffered 40 dead and about 100 wounded from this attack. As the Italians fell back, Bellotti completed establishing his hold on the first houses and stopped a renewed Austrian attack. Forced to withdraw again, Go¨ldlin finally sent a message to Baumgarten recommending that they coordinate their attacks on Krainburg. Their next attack occurred simultaneously, but again the Austrians were unable to dislodge Bellotti’s troops without artillery support. As night fell, they gave up their efforts.101 Despite the successful defense of Krainburg, Bellotti feared he might be cut off from Laibach (Ljubljana), so he had the bridge on the Sava River set afire102 and withdrew to Zwischenwasser overnight. Upon learning of Bellotti’s failure, Pino felt his position compromised. He recalled the seven battalions in Weichselburg and the five in Tschernutsch. Leaving Bellotti to watch the bridge over the Sava River at Tschernutsch,103 the entire Lieutenancy (beside the Italian Royal Guard, which was with Euge`ne) reunited in Laibach (Ljubljana). General Pino’s overcautious behavior dipleased Euge`ne, who was not on good terms with the Italian general after serving together in Russia. The affair at Krainburg (Kranj) had evidently been a demonstration, which did not presage a serious attack on Laibach. Instead, by withdrawing from Weichselburg and leaving this village in the hands of General Rebrovich, Pino had failed to properly carry out his mission of revealing Radivojevich’s intentions and delaying Nugent’s movement on Trieste. On 31 August, Euge`ne sent orders to retake Krainburg (Kranj) so as to rees-

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

tablish the communication with Laibach (Ljubljana). In the meantime, a detachment of three battalions of Palombini’s division was dispatched toward Lohitsch to clear the road between Laibach and Fiume.104 On 2 September the 3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, with 150 cavalry of the 3rd Italian Chasseurs, reentered Krainburg, which had been abandoned by the Austrian detachments who were short of ammunition.105 Two days later the Austrians made another attempt to retake Krainburg, but it was again repulsed.106

2 The Defense of Eastern Italy, September 1813 SEPTEMBER 1813 The movement of the Austrians on Krainburg (Kranj) appeared to indicate that they sought to make themselves masters of the Upper Sava Valley and, in cutting communication between the first two Lieutenancies and the third, force the Army of Italy to withdraw behind the Isonzo and the Julian Alps. In order to assure their passage of the Drava, which they had lost by the fall of Villach and the Rosegg bridgehead, the Austrians raised strong earthworks at Feistritz and Hollenburg. From this point, not only could they move right on Arnoldstein and Tarvis, but they could also invade the Sava Valley. Moreover, such a strong position could cover a wider movement aimed at bringing the Austrian center nearer to Radivojevich’s force via Windisch Kappel. The reconnaissance reports Euge`ne received did not prove very effective in acquainting him with the true intentions of the Austrians. By the beginning of September he had been informed that General Fo¨lseis had occupied Stein (Kamnik), from where he could threaten both Krainburg (Kranj) and Laibach (Ljubljana), and that General Nugent was in Lippa (Lipa) on the road to Trieste. This meant that communications with Fiume (Rijeka) were interrupted, at least temporarily. Though Euge`ne dismissed Pino’s ceaseless pleas for immediate help in the face of an allegedly pending menace to Laibach (Ljubljana) and Trieste as exaggerated, Euge`ne felt that his right wing was not as well supported as he had thought at the beginning of the campaign. Thus, he decided to extend the 1st and the 2nd Lieutenancies toward Krainburg (Kranj) and Laibach (Ljubljana) in order to establish communications with the 3rd Lieutenancy. To attain this goal the French had to attack the stronghold at Feistritz and occupy the Loibl Pass.

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

Nugent, while in Lippa (Lipa), detached Capitaine Lazaritch into Istria to raise the country against the French and to organize a force of landwehr, supplying them with English muskets. His efforts were quickly very successful, and on 3 September, the elite battalion of the 4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, marching from Pola (Pula) to Trieste, was surrounded by a band of local insurgents and taken prisoner along with two cannons.1 By 12 September, the Istrian peninsula was entirely lost.2 That same day the 4th Division (Marcognet) marched along the Upper Sava Valley from Wurzen (Kranjska Gora) on Assling (Jesenice) and Krainburg (Kranj). The general headquarters and the Royal Guard moved to Wurzen (Kranjska Gora). General Grenier received orders to march on Feistritz with the 1st Division (Quesnel) and the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division (Rouyer), which would move to St.-Jakob, and to establish 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, in a position at Hart. The 3rd Division (Gratien) was to remain in Villach. On the right, Ruggieri’s brigade of Palombini’s Division was ordered to Adelsberg (Postojna). On 5 September the 4th Division (Marcognet) arrived in Neumarkt (Bistrica), Vignau, and on the Loibl. The Guard moved from Tarvis to Assling (Jesenice).3 As these movements were executed along the whole front, Euge`ne ordered General Grenier to attack Feistritz the following day. AFFAIR AT FEISTRITZ, 6 SEPTEMBER The engagement at Feistritz was the first notable engagement of the campaign. The French had sent two reconnaissances against Feistritz on 1 and 6 September. These movements convinced Hiller that an attack was coming, and he decided to reinforce GM Vecsey at Feistritz and the posts at the Loibl Pass. During the morning, he established a reserve force in Weizelsdorf (1/Chasteler Infantry Regiment), about three miles east of Feistritz, and moved two grenadier battalions to Hollenburg. Vecsey and his force took up a strong position on the spurs that run northeast from the Karawanken Mountains and push up to the edge of the Drava. His position stood with its right on the Drava and its left on the wooded heights that were far too steep for formed troops or wheeled traffic to traverse. All along his front, the Ba¨renthal ravine ran tortuously to the Drava. The village of Feistritz was formed by three separate hamlets. Ober- and Mittel-Feistritz lay on the western ridge of the ravine. Nineteenth-century maps, however, differ as to the whereabouts of Unter-Feistritz, the third hamlet. It was certainly close to the Drava. Vaudoncourt’s map puts it on the eastern ridge, whereas, according to Jerabek, its few buildings were scattered on both sides of the Ba¨renthal ravine. Vecsey’s Austrians entrenched themselves and brought up eight guns to support their position. In order to support his line, Vecsey positioned a battery with two cannons and a howitzer on the left of the Drava at Ludmannsdorf, where they could enfilade the approach to his position. On his left he established a

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battery that was strongly entrenched.4 On the western ridge of the Ba¨renthal ravine he established fortified posts between Mittel- and Ober-Feistritz, in the Chaˆteau at Ober-Feistritz, with a garrison of about 400 infantry and some guns in support, and by the Holy Cross Cemetery.5 He established an intermediary redoubt halfway between the chaˆteau and the cemetery, the key to his position, where it covered a pass and could fire on the flank of any troops coming from Maria-Elend and Suetschach. The Austrians also strongly barricaded the bridge over the Ba¨renthal ravine a short distance from the cemetery. Other entrenchments were prepared on the eastern ridge just behind Unter-Feistritz. GM Vecsey commanded four companies of the 9th Ja¨ger Battalion, the Reisky Infantry Regiment (10 companies), the 1/Chasteler Infantry Regiment, and four squadrons of the Merveldt Uhlan Regiment.6

Austrian Order of Battle at Feistritz: (Under command of Generalmajor Vecsey) Reisky Infantry Regiment (10 cos) 1/Chasteler Infantry Regiment Landwehr Bn/Chasteler Infantry Regiment (4 cos) 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (6 cos) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (4 sqns) Reinforcements: Chimani Grenadier Battalion (53,61,62)7 (6 cos) Welsperg Grenadier Battalion (16,26,27) (6 cos) Grenadier Division/Wacquant Infantry Regiment (2 cos) French Order of Battle: 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pegot 1/,2/,3/,4/84th Line Regiment Artillery/84th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/,4/92nd Line Regiment Artillery/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers)

Map 3 The Engagement at Feistritz, 6 September 1813

40

41

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 4/4th Horse Artillery (4–6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion 7/5th (bis) Train Battalion 6/1st Sapper Battalion Det. 1/9th Equipage Battalion 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Brigade: GB Schmitz 1/,2/,3/,4/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade (3) 6/7th Line Regiment 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Artillery/35th Line Regiment Brigade: GB Darnaud 1/,2/,3/,4/35th Line Regiment Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 5/4th Horse Artillery (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 4/10th Train Battalion Det 3/1st Sapper Battalion Det 2/9th Equipage Battalion Attached: Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (4) Royal Italian Guard Chasseurs (2 bns)

Grenier wrote the orders necessary to execute Euge`ne’s orders to attack Feistritz. In the morning of 6 September the French began their movement from the St.-Jakob camp in three columns. The right column, commanded by General Campi, consisted of the 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade (three battalions), the 92nd Line, and the regimental artillery of the 84th Line. It moved on Matschach. Upon arriving there, Campi detached a battalion of the 92nd and two guns to serve as a reserve. This reserve established itself on the Feistritz ravine in order to cover the flank of the column. The column then continued its march along the hillcrest via Aitonisch, Prasinger, and the Storing settlement, leaving in Storing another battalion as a further reserve. From Storing the column advanced down the road from Bleyberg to Feistritz and moved onto the heights that dominated this position, taking up positions in Sampretsch and Oliptelschidolo as it prepared its attack.8 The center column, commanded personally by GD Quesnel and consisting of the 84th Line Regiment, half a battery of foot artillery, the Queen’s Dragoon

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Regiment, and a horse battery, set out immediately after the right column departed. It then moved to a position by Schwitschach, where it sheltered from the Austrian artillery until the moment of the attack. GD Quesnel established communications with the post at Matschach via a series of intermediary posts. Before crossing the Klein Du¨rrenbach ravine, two miles west of Feistritz, GD Quesnel cleared the woods on his flank of Austrian skirmishers. He then ordered a battalion of the 84th Line to take position in the part of this woods that extended to the left toward the Drava in order to observe the Austrian movements on the other bank of the Drava.9 Schmitz’s brigade,10 2nd Division, formed the left column and set out in march from its camp in St.-Jakob at 9:00 A.M., immediately after the division departed. It took up its first position on the edge of the woods, before the Klein Du¨rrenbach ravine. Its right supported on the left of GD Quesnel’s 1st Division, and its left stretched toward the Drava. A battalion of this brigade relieved the battalion of the 84th on its left, which then returned to its corps.11 GD Quesnel was ordered to form the 84th Line Regiment into two lines and throw skirmishers into the ravine below Ober-Feistritz so that they might move to the right bank, below the Austrian entrenchments. General Schmitz, under the orders of General Rouyer, was to form his troops into two lines. He was then to launch an attack against Ober- and Mittel-Feistritz, placing his troops into the houses of these two villages, where they could fire from cover on the Austrian gunners as they stood in their entrenchments. Ober- and Mittel-Feistritz were defended by 10 companies of the Reisky Infantry Regiment and the 2/Chasteler Infantry Regiment. Unter-Feistritz contained four companies of the Reisky Infantry Regiment and four squadrons of the Merveldt Uhlan Regiment.12 The road from Bleyberg was barricaded and covered by the 1st Company of the 9th Ja¨ger Battalion. The 1/Chasteler was in reserve a few miles east of Feistritz on the main road, and two divisions13 of its landwehr battalion covered the bridge to Hollenburg.14 All of the prescribed dispositions were executed. Campi’s brigade, placed on the extreme right, had no further orders. It was to await the outcome of the first attack on the center and react accordingly. Not only was it supposed to support the attacks of the other columns, but it was to second them by striking the Austrian rear. It also found itself sheltered from Austrian attacks, which could only strike it if they emerged from the various defiles.15 Campi’s judgment was crucial since his movements would vary depending on the success or failure of the other attacks. During the movement of these columns, Euge`ne directed two battalions of the Chasseurs of the Royal Italian Guard from Assling (Jesenice) through the mountain passes connecting the Upper Sava Valley to Feistritz. These units moved down the northern slope of the heights south of Feistritz and pushed back the Austrian advanced posts.16 They contributed to the day’s success by facilitating the march of Campi’s column, which performed as ordered. Finally, a battalion of the 35th Line Regiment remained in the St.-Jakob Camp with

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

orders to send frequent patrols along the Drava between the Rossegg Bridge and Maria-Elend and to push two companies onto the plateau by this village, where the reserve artillery of the 1st Division was posted. The first shots were exchanged at about 10:00 A.M., and by noon, skirmishings were reported all along the line. It was only at 3:00 P.M., however, that these small actions scaled up to a larger engagement. At that time, General Campi attacked the Austrians from the rear with part of his troops, while the 84th Line and Schmitz’s brigade struck the Austrians frontally. Schmitz’s brigade advanced with the 35th leading and the 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade in support. Four battalions of Campi’s brigade, in spite of the rough terrain, succeeded in crossing the Ba¨renthal ravine and moved down the slopes, their advance being hindered in vain by the Ja¨ger company covering the road from Bleyberg. Being informed of this movement, GM Vecsey saw the risk of his left being turned and asked for immediate support from Hollenburg.17 One group of Austrian troops attempting to withdraw into the Feistritz Chaˆteau were forced to surrender. During the movement of Quesnel’s column on the heights to the right of Schwitschach, a battalion of the 84th Line was heavily engaged. Soon the 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade (GM Schmitz’s brigade) came to its support, formed in two lines. The 4/9th Line formed the first line, and the 6/52nd formed behind it in the second line.18 Finally, it was necessary to storm the cemetery of the Holy Cross Church and the redoubt on the western ridge of the deep Feistritz ravine. The church was defended by the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the 9th Ja¨ger Battalion.19 Chef de bataillon Fonvielle, of the 6/7th Line (28th Provisional Demi-Brigade), was ordered to march his half battalion to the right, behind a line of skirmishers, and to attempt to carry the redoubt. Chef de bataillon Charrier moved the 4/9th Line Regiment on the skirmishing line to cover Fonvielle’s movement. Major Bruye`re followed him with the remainder of the 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade. Another battalion of the 9th Line attacked toward the church, with its two remaining battalions forming to the left of the attack, in the direction of Mitter-Feistritz, covered by their 2nd Voltigeur Company, which was deployed in skirmish order.20 The redoubt fell after weak resistance, and the garrison was put to the sword. As soon as the garrison of the Holy Cross Church cemetery, the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the 9th Ja¨gers, saw that Fonvielle’s forces had crossed the main ravine, they abandoned their post and withdrew toward the Ober-Feistritz Chaˆteau. General Schmitz, at the head of the 4th Grenadier Company, 9th Line Regiment, and its reserve platoon, advanced at the pas de charge21 toward the chaˆteau, supported by the 84th Line Regiment, which stood in closed column, on the hillside. To the right of the Ober-Feistritz Chaˆteau stood a covered abatis, which stopped General Schmitz’s troops for awhile, under brisk Austrian fire coming from all available loopholes. Schmitz, struggling under heavy Austrian musketry, found a small passage to his right and sent a few men through it to

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turn the chaˆteau in the hopes of forcing the Austrians to abandon it. However, they defended their position obstinately, despite various summons to surrender. General Schmitz then ordered the chaˆteau set afire, which was done. The Austrians quickly surrendered, yielding 112 men and four officers prisoner.22 The bridge over the ravine was defended by the 9th and 10th Companies of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment and a half company of the Reisky Infantry Regiment.23 The 84th Line attacked and carried the bridge, clearing it of the barricades and the chevaux-de-frise that the Austrians had placed there. Realizing that the bridge was now in French hands and their position had been turned, the Austrians abandoned the entire line of entrenchments and withdrew. The skirmishers of the 6/7th and 9th Regiments were thrown into the Austrian camp. The 84th Line supported their attack with four pelotons24 in the form of a mass, or dense column, supporting the skirmishers. It arrived in this order at the first village, which was Hunsdorf, while the troops of the 2nd Division took up position behind the ravine that covered the first Austrian position. Seeing the French infantry reduce its fire and withdraw its skirmishers, the Austrians launched a counterattack. However, General Schmitz, supported by part of the 84th Line Regiment advancing in colonne serre´e, resumed the offensive and pushed the Austrians to Saint-Jean. Once there, the Austrians engaged a battalion of Campi’s brigade in a lively fusillade. This battalion had descended the mountain in order to precipitate the Austrian withdrawal. At an earlier stage in the battle, on the French extreme left, two battalions of the 9th Line Regiment had advanced before Suetschach with 2nd Voltigeur Company of the 9th Regiment deployed before them in skirmish order. Suddenly, after crossing the Ba¨renthal ravine, the voltigeurs were charged by a squadron of Austrian uhlans.25 They received this charge with great intrepidity, standing firm, killing their horses with their bayonets.26 The Austrians had half an artillery battery positioned by Ludmansdorf on the left bank of the Drava to support the position of Feistritz. It had fired in support of the action until silenced by French conterbattery fire.27 At 5:30 P.M., and notwithstanding the heavy rain, the position and the entrenchments at Feistritz were completely captured. The Chimani and Welsperg (Hungarian) Grenadier Battalions, belatedly sent to support the already beaten Austrian force, formed a rear guard and covered the withdrawal of Vecsey’s forces.28 At 8:00 P.M., supported by the grenadier division of the Wacquant Infantry Regiment, the withdrawing Austrians threw back one final attack by a battalion of Campi’s brigade.29 Vecsey retreated behind the Drava, after having the bridge at Hollenburg demolished.30 The Austrians reported losing 67 dead, 364 wounded, and 394 prisoners, or a total of 825. The two grenadier battalions, which joined the battle late, lost another 88 men.31 The French lost 60 killed, including Chef de bataillon Charrier of the 9th Line Regiment, and about 300 wounded. In his after-action report, Euge`ne informed Napoleon that the Austrians had lost 400 dead and wounded, plus a further 350 prisoners, most of which came from the Reisky and Chasteler

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

Infantry Regiments, the Chimani Grenadier Battalion, and the Merveldt Uhlans.32 According to Vaudoncourt,33 the Austrians lost the Battle of Feistritz because of Hiller’s negligence. The commander of the Army of Inner Austria had apparently attached a great strategical importance to holding Feistritz, as it covered the bridge of Hollenburg and communications between his right and left wings. Feistritz was also in support distance from the Loibl Pass. For successfully carrying out his plan of extending the first two Lieutenancies from Villach to the Sava Valley and, thus, establish a link with the 3rd Lieutenancy in Laibach, Euge`ne had to take Feistritz. Probably overlooking this threat, Hiller made the mistake of leaving Vecsey’s brigade isolated and, as troops on the left bank of the Drava would take at least six hours to reach Feistritz, well out of support range. With the French master of Feistritz, the Austrian situation worsened considerably. Only one line of communication with the troops around Cilly (Celje) and the left wing still remained open to Hiller, which was via Vo¨lkermarkt. Euge`ne, conversely, had established communications from Tarvis to Laibach (Ljubljana) via the Loibl Pass, was now in a favorable situation, and could look confidently at the prospect of attacking the camp at Stein (Kamnik) from Laibach (Ljubljana) and Krainburg (Kranj). He could then drive Fo¨lseis’s force back to Cilly (Celje) or even behind the mountains. After the Battle at Feistritz, Hiller deployed his army as follows: Stanissavlevich (2 battalions, 2 squadrons, and a half battery) on the extreme right in Ischel, FML Fenner in Sachsenburg, and FML Marschall (Eckhard’s brigade—1 battalion, 2 squadrons, and 2 companies) and Winzian (5 battalions, 1 squadron, and a battery) in Spittal. General Frimont was in St. Lamprecht with Vlasitz’s brigade (3 battalions, 6 squadrons, and a horse battery) in Seebach and Gober’s brigade (3 battalions and a horse battery) in Lind. FML Marziani was in Hollenburg with Mayer’s brigade (3 battalions and a battery) and the battered remains of Vecsey’s brigade (3 battalions, 2 companies, 93⁄4 squadrons, and a horse battery). FML Sommariva was in Klagenfurt with 4 grenadier battalions from Stutterheim’s brigade and Wrede’s 10 squadrons and a horse battery. A small detachment under Kanker, consisting of 4 companies from the Chasteler Regiment and a cavalry platoon drawn from Mayer’s brigade, was established in Kappel. On the left stood Fo¨lseis’s brigade (3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and a half battery) deployed in echelon around Stein.34 Radivojevich’s corps continued to act independently in French Croatia. On 7 September communications between the French 1st and 4th Divisions was reestablished via Loibl. On 8 September, the headquarters of the Army of Italy was in Krainburg (Kranj). That same day General Bellotti was ordered to move his brigade from Krainburg (Kranj) to the Tschernutsch bridge and to occupy it, extending his troops as far as Saloch (Zalog).35 General Palombini was ordered to move Galimberti’s brigade, then before St. Marein (Smarje), down the road to Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) to keep watch

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on Radivojevich and prevent Nugent from marching on Trieste. All these movements were made on the understanding that an attack on Stein (Kamnik) would soon follow. However, false reports were received advising Euge`ne that the Austrians had marched on Trieste after the French had evacuated it. The increasing and almost pathological concern of General Pino for his extreme right wing caused Euge`ne to change his dispositions yet again. General Palombini was to move Ruggieri’s brigade to Adelsberg (Postojna) and from there to march on Lippa (Lipa) to push the Austrians back. Galimberti’s brigade was to send only a reconnaissance of two battalions toward Saint-Marein (Smarje) and Weichselburg (Visnja Gora). During the reconnaissance on Weichselburg (Visnja Gora), a small detachment of supporting Italian cavalry panicked and fled, chased by the Austrian cavalry. In their precipitous flight, they ran over the 4/3rd Italian Line, which was having a rest on the road to St. Marein (Smarje). The infantry suffered several wounded from this accident, and they even shot at their own cavalry.36 To support Ruggieri’s brigade, General Fresia moved from Trieste on Materia with about 2,000 infantry, 40 cavalry, and two guns. On 7 September, Ruggieri, with three battalions and six guns,37 encountered Nugent’s advanced guard at Jelsane and was forced to withdraw. Fresia did the same.38 BELLOTTI IS TAKEN PRISONER, 13 SEPTEMBER On 8 September, General Bellotti left Krainburg (Kranj) with the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re, two regimental guns, and 50 Chasseurs a` Cheval and made for the Tschernutsch bridge. However, instead of following either the main road to Laibach (Ljubljana) on the right bank of the Sava or the tracks that ran along the left bank, thus covering his movement with the hills that lined the river, Bellotti sought a better road to the east to move his artillery. This detour, however, brought him in proximity to the Austrian camps of Stein (Kamnik) and Stob. The latter was now occupied by Fo¨lseis’s brigade, while the former was garrisoned by another Austrian brigade.39 On the plain between Kaplavass and Tersain (Trzin), the Italians met the Austrian advanced posts, which alerted their main forces. The Austrian advanced guard consisted of a division (two companies) of the Lusignan Infantry Regiment and a half squadron of the Frimont Hussar Regiment, which stood in Stein (Kamnik). A second observation post, a division of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment, stood by Lusttal. Around 2:00 P.M., Bellotti’s column arrived at Moste. Here they engaged the detachment of the Lusignan Infantry Regiment left to watch the position. They were counterattacked by a platoon of the Merveldt Uhlan Regiment coming from Klein-Kahlenberg and the Landwehr Bn/Lusignan Infantry Regiment. The Austrian General Fo¨lseis then sent two companies from Aich (Vir) to Kahlenberg and two further companies to Gross-Mannsburg (Menges). Two companies were instructed to advance on Tersain (Trzin) and to attempt an attack toward Tscher-

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nutsch. A squadron of the Radetzky Hussars and the Merveldt Uhlans marched in two ranks on the level ground, but the soft ground obliged the artillery to move down the road. Bellotti was disturbed on his left flank by the Austrian advanced guard and, fearing to be cut off from his line of communications, marched on GrossMannsburg (Menges), where he encountered the 17th and 18th Companies of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment and once again engaged in a sharp skirmish. The flat terrain there was favorable to the stronger Austrian cavalry. The 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment formed its three battalions in echelons, with the guns and the cavalry in the intervals, and struggled to escape to the hills. Eventually it was dispersed and forced to scatter.40 Fo¨lseis’s reserve and his cavalry closed on Bellotti, and he also sent orders to his outlying detachments to move to Mannsburg (Menges). The advanced guard and the remainder of the two battalions of the Lusignan Infantry Regiment under Oberstleutnant Baron Neugebauer attacked the French in the rear, throwing them back to Klein-Mannsburg and Lack and pursuing them with a bayonet attack. Bellotti’s entire brigade was in tremendous disorder. The detachment of chasseurs had apparently already fled the field.41 Weil cites the Austrian casualties as 5 dead, 14 wounded, and 5 missing. Before reaching the Tschernutsch bridge on the following day, the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Infantry Regiment lost, as prisoners, its Colonel Bianchi, 20 other officers, Bellotti’s secretary, a war commissary, 60 dead, about 200 wounded, 600 prisoners, two flags, two guns, which were spiked, and three ammunition caissons. General Bellotti, whose reckless behavior caused this reverse, was wounded and taken prisoner.42 After this disaster, two skeleton battalions of the 3rd Le´ge`re joined the 5th Division, while another was sent to St. Marein (Smarje).43 What had happened at Tersain (Trzin) persuaded the hesitating General Pino, thinking himself menaced frontally by significant Austrian forces, to suspend the movement of Ruggieri’s brigade toward Fiume (Rijeka). General Nugent soon profited by Ruggieri’s retrograde movement and sent reconnaissances as far as Adelsberg (Postojna) and Materia. Euge`ne, with the intent of reassuring both Generals Pino and Fresia, in Trieste, decided to send the entire 5th Division against Nugent and to extend his army down the center as far as Laibach (Ljubljana). The movement of the 5th Division to Lippa (Lipa) (11 battalions out of 12, the 2/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment remaining at St. Marein (Smarje) together with a battalion of the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, 6th Division) began on 10 September, and the same day Euge`ne established his army behind the Drava and the Sava in the following order: The 2nd Lieutenancy was charged with the defense of the Drava, supporting its left on Paternion and its right on Feistritz, with two battalions in Villach and its headquarters in Finkenstein. The 1st Lieutenancy was charged with the defense of the Upper Sava. The 1st Division was established in Krainburg (Kranj) and Neumarkt (Bistrica), having two battalions

The Defense of Eastern Italy, September 1813

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before Loibl. The 4th Division stood before Laibach (Ljubljana), occupying the Tschernutsch bridge. On 11 September Euge`ne arrived in Laibach (Ljubljana) with the Royal Italian Guard and established his headquarters in the city. This was intended to be the prelude to a number of wide-ranging operations by the French. As we shall see, these plans failed due to dispersion of forces.44 Euge`ne was apparently aware of his problem with being overextended and grew concerned about the road to Neustadt (Novo Mesto). That evening he wrote General d’Anthouard45 that he could not spare a large force to guard the road to Neustadt (Novo Mesto). He advised d’Anthouard that he could permit General Galimberti to leave with two Dalmatian battalions and three battalions of the 3rd Italian Line Regiment and take up positions by St. Marein (Smarje). However, the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re and the remaining battalions of the 3rd Italian Line Regiment were to be left where they were. Furthermore, he advised d’Anthouard that he would be in Laibach in nine hours.46 AFFAIR AT ST. MAREIN (SMARJE), 12 SEPTEMBER In the meantime, the Austrians had been moving for several days. These movements were directed against the right wing of the Army of Italy, where Hiller appeared to be daily reinforcing the wing of his army while he stripped its center. The Franco-Italian reconnaissances pushed from Krainburg (Kranj) and Laibach (Ljubljana) toward Cilly (Celje), encountering only weak posts, whereas those pushed on Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) and Lippa (Lipa) found themselves facing major forces. Euge`ne’s attention was drawn to Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) and St. Marein (Smarje), as Euge`ne realized that to protect the action of Palombini toward Lippa (Lipa) he had to pin General Radivojevich’s forces in their actual position, thus preventing the Austrian commander from sending reinforcements to Nugent.47 On 12 September Euge`ne directed the Italian Royal Guard,48 plus a battery of horse artillery, from Laibach (Ljubljana) against St. Marein (Smarje), where two battalions of the 2/2nd and 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiments (Galimberti’s brigade) had been sent earlier, by his order, on a reconnaissance. The first attack on St. Marein (Smarje) was led by Euge`ne personally. At 8:00 A.M., the enemy pickets were pushed back to the village. Here the Austrian main body had taken a strong defensive position on a wooded hill. The Austrian force, under Oberst Milutinovich, consisted of six companies of the Gradiscaner Grenz, two of the St. Georger Grenz, two 3pdr cannons, and a platoon of the Radetzky Hussars. The remainder of Rebrovich’s brigade was too distant to provide any support. Three companies of the Broder Grenz and a hussar platoon were north, providing liaison with Fo¨lseis; two further companies and a cavalry platoon were on the mountainside near Laschitz (Lasce), south of Auersperg (Predstruge), watching the road from Adelsberg (Postojna) to Reifnitz (Lasce); two others were in Klein-Trebeleu (Veliko Trebeljevo), a day’s march to the

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814

northeast of St. Marein (Smarje), watching the road from Laibach (Ljubljana) to Littay (Litija) and Ratschach; and three companies were in Saint Rochus, Po¨sendorf (Draga), and Weichselburg (Visnja Gora).49 Milutinovich covered his left flank with a company, under Hauptmann Martini, by a small chapel known as White Church, and on his right, Niksich’s company stood against the mountain. The Gradiscaner Grenz sharpshooters occupied the houses in front of his position. Shortly before the French engaged him, Milutinovich received reinforcements in the form of two companies of the Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment and two 3pdr guns.50 At 9:00 A.M. Euge`ne arrived before the Austrian position with the Italian Guard,51 two squadrons of the Queen’s Dragoon Regiment, and a horse battery. Euge`ne sent one battalion to the right against the Austrian position on the White Church heights. A second battalion was sent to turn the Austrian right. At 10:00 A.M. Euge`ne had completed his dispositions, but the attack did not begin until about noon, because the flanking battalions were not yet in place. In the center the French pushed against Geweihter-Brunn. On the right the French moved against the half company deployed to the right of White Church, and after a short firefight the Austrian skirmishers were driven back. The French advanced with the two squadrons of dragoons on their flanks and the infantry behind them marching in square. Milutinovich spent this time watching the French deploy, desperately awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. He had decided to hold his positions to the last extremity.52 The battle was two hours old and at a critical place when a hussar arrived with bad news that nearly brought panic to his troops. He calmed them, but realized his situation was becoming critical. The second Guard battalion sent to turn the flank had reached its designated goal sometime around 4:00 P.M. Milutinovich detached one and a half companies to face this flanking battalion as it appeared on his flank. The ongoing fight on the right had inflicted a large number of casualties on both sides. Oberst Milutinovich was among the wounded. When the Guard battalion launched its attack on the flank, it rushed Hauptmann Niksich’s position, only to be greeted with a crashing volley, followed up with a sharp bayonet attack that drove it away. Euge`ne’s attack had failed, and he withdrew on Rudnik. Von Holtz says he left 300 dead and wounded, plus two officers and 95 men prisoners. Weil states that the French losses were 300. The Austrians lost 47 dead and wounded and 28 prisoners.53 This was a stinging repulse for the Italian Guard! That same day in the Laibach area (Ljubljana) two French battalions attacked three companies of the Broder Grenz Regiment, under Major Hugo Reinbach, that were posted by Saloch (Zalog), a few miles east of the city. The Grenz lost 11 dead, 21 wounded, and 28 prisoners before they were pushed back to their brigade’s position. On 13 September the Italian Guard in Rudnik was attacked. Its advanced posts were surprised, and it lost several men. In addition, two guns were captured by the Austrians. To redress the balance, Euge`ne left the 53rd Line Regiment

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at the Tschernutsch bridge and directed the rest of the 4th Division to St. Marein (Smarje). Now, faced by the Royal Guard and the 4th Division, General Rebrovich recalled Milutinovich’s detachment and retreated with his force to a position two miles east of Weichselburg (Visnja Gora), where he waited for reinforcements from Rudolfswerth. On 15 September, Colonel Peraldi’s Royal Guard Chasseur Regiment pushed forward as far as Weichselburg (Visnja Gora), where they remained in position. The 4th Division returned to its positions before Laibach (Ljubljana). AFFAIRS AT LIPPA (LIPA) AND FIUME (RIJEKA), 14–15 SEPTEMBER On 14 September, Nugent concentrated all his forces54 in a good defensive position at Jelsane, a few miles north of Lippa (Lipa) to guard the road to Adelsberg (Postojna). He deployed two companies of the Erzherzog Franz Karl, one company of Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz, a half squadron of the Radetzky Hussars, and one 3pdr in Jelsane; one company of the Warasdiner in Klana (five kilometers southeast of Lippa), charged with covering the right wing; and four companies of the Franz Karl Regiment, three companies of the Warasdiner Kreuzer, one half squadron of the Radetzky Hussars, and three 3pdrs in reserve behind Jelsane. He posted a company of the Grenz on his right flank.55 Though it was a strong position, his forces were not particularly substantial and certainly not enough to deal with a full Italian division. During this time General Pino completed the movement of his 5th Division, deploying a large portion of his forces on the heights along his two flanks. He sent five battalions to the right, with the 3/3rd Italian Line and two voltigeur companies of the Dalmatian Regiment leading a flanking movement along the hills. The other four formed a body on the left. At first, Nugent’s troops successfully resisted the overwhelming Italian forces. While the battle raged on the flanks, Pino deployed two battalions (1/,2/3rd Italian Line) on the plain before Jelsane on the two sides of the main road.56 Palombini engaged the Austrians with skirmish fire, while Pino deployed a battery of 10 guns behind his troops. When the battery was prepared, it immediately opened fire and quickly dismounted two of Nugent’s 3pdr guns. Just as his center seemed irreparably broken, Nugent launched a quick counterattack and reoccupied his positions. This was, however, only a momentary restabilization of the Austrian front. The superior Italian numbers quickly began to tell as the Italian forces began to turn Nugent’s left flank. Nugent was forced to refuse his flank, forming a right angle in his defensive lines. He then withdrew a 3pdr gun and two companies of the Franz Karl Regiment and placed them on a rise a bit behind his lines in a position that flanked the bend formed by his troops on his left. Pino then contented himself with bombarding Nugent’s center with his artil-

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lery, delaying his attack along the entire front until the bombardment had progressed sufficiently. And why not? Nugent now had only one 3pdr gun with which to respond. When he launched his attack, the Austrian right was threatened with being pushed back by overwhelming numbers. Nugent responded immediately by sending three companies of the Warasdiner Kreuzer to reestablish his line.57 Pino shifted his efforts and began to maneuver the bulk of his forces against Nugent’s left. This maneuver would have permitted the Italians to push down the road toward Lippa (Lipa) and into Nugent’s rear. Nugent responded by ordering a gradual withdrawal to a second position a short distance behind his original position. During his withdrawl, the Italian cavalry took advantage of the favorable terrain to launch an attack. However, two platoons of the Radetzky Hussars pushed through the intervals in the withdrawing Austrian troops and drove back Perreimond’s cavalry. At this moment Erzherzog Maximilian (Hapsburg) arrived from Fiume (Rijeka) and joined Nugent. Pino observed Maximilian’s arrival and the subsequent conference. He immediately assumed that Nugent was about to receive substantial reinforcements and slowed the advance of his troops so as to not be overextended when the expected reinforcements arrived. Nugent was quick to profit from this pause and hurriedly withdrew his troops to Lippa (Lipa). The engagement ended as a result. Night was falling as Pino’s troops arrived before Lippa (Lipa). That evening Nugent continued his withdrawal and moved the bulk of his brigade to San Mattia (Viskovo), about 18 kilometers south of Jelsane, after leaving a small picket in Skalnitza.58 Then he directed his troops in secret through the mountains to Istria, where they contributed to the eruption of a popular insurrection. During the engagement before Lippa (Lipa), Nugent lost 23 dead and 85 wounded, three dismounted cannons, and 200 prisoners.59 The Italian losses were about 500 hors de combat. Pino’s losses were high in comparison with the Austrians’ because the Austrians had fought most of the battle from behind their works, whereas the Italians attacked in masses. Also, there was no significant pursuit of the Austrians after the battle. On 15 September, Ruggieri’s brigade, reinforced by the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns) and the 3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment,60 drove the Austrian hussars from Skalnitza, marched on Fiume (Rijeka), and chased the enemy from it, taking two guns. The English, who were in Fiume (Rijeka), withdrew to their ship and stood off the beach, watching the French bayonets. Erzherzog Maximilian remained with General Nugent. After this engagement, General Pino left the 2nd Italian Line Regiment at Lippa (Lipa) and sent a battalion of the 3rd Italian Line back to Trieste, withdrawing the rest of the 5th Division to Adelsberg (Postojna).61 On 16 September, General Pino requested and received authorization to be relieved of his command on the pretext of his ill health. The plain truth was that Euge`ne and Pino had not been on good terms since the campaign in Russia,

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and the former was annoyed at Pino’s continuous hesitation. He was replaced by General Palombini.62 THE AFFAIR IN THE TYROL While these events occurred, the Reserve Division of the Army of Italy, commanded by General Bonfanti, left Montechiari en route for Trento, where it arrived between 8 and 12 September. It had orders to block Fenner’s advance from the Tyrol. At nearly the same time the Austrians took the fort at Mu¨hlbach that guarded the mouth of the Pusteria Valley (Pustertal), capturing the voltigeur company of the 1st Foreign Regiment posted there, and then marched on to Bozen (Bolzano). According to Vaudoncourt, the men of the 1st Voltigeur Company behaved very poorly, and many ran away at the approach of the Austrian advanced guard. The remainder of the company was taken prisoner.63 With its advanced post taken and desertion being high, the 1st Foreign Regiment was forced to withdraw to Trento.64 This movement raised several alarms in Trento, which had been abandoned on 15 September, only to be reoccupied on 17 September.65 A few days later Euge`ne replaced General Bonfanti with General Gifflenga as commander of the reserve in Tyrol. AFFAIR AT WEICHSELBURG (VISNJA GORA) General Lecchi remained stationary in Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) with the Italian Guard for a couple of days. On 15 September General Rebrovich decided to take advantage of this lack of activity and formed his troops into three columns to attack from different directions. The first was under Oberst Milutinovich and consisted of a battalion of the Gradiskaner Grenzer (six companies). It left Ba¨renburg at 9:00 P.M., on 15 September, and marched to Kriskovacs. From there it marched on the Laibach (Ljubljana) road to cut off Lecchi’s line of retreat and to attack Weichselburg (Visnja Gora). Rebrovich’s second column, consisting of three companies of Broder Grenz under Major Reinbach, was directed to act against the left of the Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) position. It departed at 11:00 P.M. and moved to support the march of the first column against Peschenik. It then detached a company to occupy the Smirck Castle (about a mile from Weichselburg (Visnja Gora)). The third column, containing one battalion of the Erzherzog Franz-Karl Regiment, three companies of Broder Grenz, two squadrons of the Radetzky Hussars, and half a position battery, departed at 1:00 A.M. and marched down the main road on Po¨sendorf (Draga) in total silence. The four battalions of the Italian Guard (Chasseur Regiment) were deployed in two lines separated by a ridge. The signal for the general attack was given at 5:00 A.M. by Oberst Milutinovich. Unfortunately, Milutinovich’s guide had misled the column, which found itself in a narrow and enclosed valley behind Peschenik. Despite that, Milutinovich launched an attack against the old Weichselburg (Visnja Gora)

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castle with three companies and resolved to send the rest of his column against the Peschenik heights, which were occupied by the three battalions and two guns of Lecchi’s second line.66 Despite the horrible terrain, Milutinovich’s infantry succeeded in carrying Sandberg and the old castle. The Austrians were momentarily thrown out of the castle, but Milutinovich launched a counterattack with bayonets and took permanent possession of the castle. He then led his other three companies against the flank of the Italian second line. Milutinovich pushed his men quickly across the valley, hiding them in the dead ground of the valley floor. He completely deployed his three companies, keeping only two formed Zu¨ge (sections) as a reserve. The Italian Guard opened a murderous fire on the Austrian skirmishers, but they were unable to deal with both Milutinovich’s skirmishers and the simultaneous attack of the third column that stormed down the Laibach (Ljubljana) road.67 Completely demoralized by the converging attacks, the Italian Royal Guard attempted to withdraw down the road to St. Marein (Smarje) under the cover of a battalion and two guns on the Gross-Lup (Groslupje) heights halfway between Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) and St. Marein (Smarje). Count Vincent Esterhazy led two squadrons of the Radetzky Hussars forward in a sharp pursuit of the Italian Guard, overrunning their guns and capturing one. The attack threw back the Guard battalion, capturing a flag and 40 men. The Italian Royal Guard fled down the road to St. Marein (Smarje) with the hussars in hot pursuit. Finally, the Italians succeeded in breaking contact under the cover of the Guard Dragoons.68 The Austrians lost 16 dead, 60 wounded, and 27 prisoners. They reported that the Italian Royal Guard lost 300 men hors de combat, 683 prisoners including one colonel and eight officers, a cannon, a howitzer, and a flag.69 In his after-action report, Euge`ne reported that the grenadier company of the 6/67th Line Regiment (28th Provisional Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division) executed a successful bayonet attack that had thrown the Austrians back. However, he added that it was soon overwhelmed with numbers and forced to withdraw. He credits the Austrian victory to the charge of the Radetzky Hussars and states that the French lost two guns, 300 dead and wounded, and at least 150 prisoners.70 It is unlikely that the Italian Royal Guard lost the number of prisoners that the Austrians claim, as that is a full battalion. However, the number of casualties and guns do coincide. Threatened on his right flank, Euge`ne called off the attack he had intended to launch toward Cilly (Celje) from Laibach (Ljubljana) with Marcognet’s 4th Division and the attack from Krainburg (Kranj) by several battalions of Quesnel’s 1st Division and the Queen’s Dragoons.71 Instead, he found himself obliged to move southeast of Laibach (Ljubljana) with a major force to oppose the movement the Austrians appeared to be making.72 On 17 September the 4th Division marched once again on St. Marein (Smarje), where it took up position, dislodging the Austrian outposts. Marcognet was joined there by the 53rd Regiment, which had been relieved from post at the Tschernutsch bridge by a brigade from the 1st Division.

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AFFAIR AT ST. HERMAGOR At this juncture, the Austrian forces in the Drava Valley (Drautal) were deployed as follows. On the extreme right, Fenner’s brigade occupied Lienz and had pushed its advanced guard as far as the mouth of the Pusteria Valley (Pustertal). Vlasitz and Gober’s brigades of Frimont corps were, respectively, at St. Leonard and Lind, some miles south of Sachsenburg, while Eckhardt and Winzian’s brigades, which belonged to FML Marschall’s division and were also under Frimont’s command, stood by Spittal and Seebach. FML Marziani had its brigades in position at Hollenburg (Mayer) and Eberndorf (Vecsey), while FML Sommariva kept the army reserve (Stutterheim’s grenadier brigade and Wrede’s cavalry) at Klagenfurt, where FZM Hiller had its headquarters.73 By extending into the valley of the Drava as far as Spittal and Sachsenburg, the Austrians were in a position to close on the left wing of the Army of Italy, which they overlapped and threatened to turn by seizing Tarvis. Planning to recross the Drava east of Villach and retake the crucial Loibl Pass, FZM Hiller ordered GM Eckhardt’s brigade to make demonstrations toward the Gail Valley from Sachsenburg and Greifenburg. By these movements the Austrian commander aimed at vexing General Verdier and forcing him to elongate further west the front of the 2nd Lieutenancy, which at that time ran from the bridge at Hollenburg to Villach. Moreover, by occupying the mountain passes between the Drava Valley (Drautal) and the Gail Valley, the Austrians would keep a watch on those two roads, respectively, through Paternion and St. Hermagor, which the French should necessarily pass along if they were to send reinforcements from Tarvis to Tyrol.74 Still awaiting two battalions that Hiller had promised to detach to Spittal in his support, on 12 September GM Eckhardt limited himself to sending columns of Ja¨gers, Grenzers, and a few hussars under Lieutenant-Colonel Mumb toward the Kreutzberg, the mountainous region between the Drava and St. Hermagor.75 Mumb’s advanced patrols occupied St. Hermagor on 13 September, without encountering any serious opposition, and informed General Eckhardt, who decided to cross the Drava east of Greifenburg with its main force. In the meantime, a battalion of the Jellacich Regiment, one of those detached in support of Eckhardt’s brigade, mounted a demonstration in front of Paternion, which was still in French control. Alarmed by the movements being made by the enemy, General Verdier detached GB Piat (1st Brigade, 3rd Division) to St. Hermagor with a battalion of the 35th Le´ge`re, one of the 102nd, and the 2/133rd Line supported by a few chasseurs a` cheval. On 16 September, Piat encountered Mumb’s detachment and, after a sharp fight, forced it to withdraw from St. Hermagor toward WeissKreutzberg. Once on the Kreutzberg, Mumb took up positions awaiting reinforcements from General Eckhardt, which arrived on 17 September. On 18 September, General Piat was attacked again by Mumb at St. Hermagor. Under a driving rain, an Austrian column pushed down the main road from Weissbriach, while a second column of Ja¨gers sought to outflank the French

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right by a forced march along the heights overlooking St. Hermagor. General Piat was about to successfully counterattack the Austrian main column at the head of three battalions, of which one was deployed as skirmishers, when the Ja¨gers fell on his flank, inducing a quick retreat to Arnoldstein. Piat had about 200 losses and 300 prisoners.76 Having succeeded in forcing Verdier to stretch and, consequently, weaken his line, FZM Hiller gave dispositions to cross the Drava in forces. Being informed that the enemy had 3,000 men at Villach, 1,500 at Rosegg, 300 at Feistritz, and weak pickets on the Loibl Pass, the Austrian commander accepted the plan thought out by General Vecsey. Early morning Mayer’s brigade would cross at Hollenburg and push toward Feistritz, while the left wing of Frimont’s corps would do the same at Rosegg, after an adequate artillery preparation. In the meantime, Vecsey’s brigade would cross the Drava downstream of Hollenburg in four columns and attack the position at the Loibl Pass from different directions. This plan was successfully put in practice on 19 September: The Loibl Pass rapidly fell again into Austrian hands, and the French outposts at Rosegg and Feistritz were easily driven away.77 This caused General Verdier to feel threatened on both sides. He judged it appropriate to withdraw the troops that occupied Villach and Paternion and had found their position compromised. He then concentrated all his troops between Arnoldstein and Regersdorf. With the Austrians now masters of the Loibl Pass, Verdier realized that his communications with the right corps had been interrupted as a result of the withdrawal and separation from the communication posts in Assling (Jesenice), Wurzen (Kranjska Gora), and Weissenfeld (Fusine). He did not know if the Austrian column, which had crossed the Drava at Rosegg and apparently had not moved up the Gail, had instead made for the Upper Sava Valley. He feared to be turned via Wurzen (Kranjska Gora) and decided to begin a withdrawal on Tarvis. However, at that moment, General Grenier informed Verdier that General Campi’s brigade still occupied the Upper Sava Valley, between Neumarkt (Bistrica) and Assling (Jesenice). Verdier then recalled his troops and reoccupied the position in Arnoldstein and Regersdorf.78 Grenier was on the way to Tarvis to take command of the left wing, his appointment resulting from a new organization of the Army of Italy. Euge`ne saw his right menaced by the massing of considerable Austrian troops before Cilly (Celje) and Neustadt (Novo Mesto) and had learned that the Austrians were maneuvering in force before Paternion, Villach, and Hollenburg, with the goal of crossing the Drava. He judged that his line was too elongated to allow the Army of Italy to remain organized as it was and reorganized his army. These changes divided the three Lieutenancies into two corps. The new organization came into force on 20 September.79

The Defense of Eastern Italy, September 1813 RETURN OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE TWO CORPS, 3RD ORGANIZATION General Staff Commanding Officer: HRH Euge`ne of Italy Chief of the General Staff: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Vignolle Assistant Chief of the General Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Morizot de Marzy Artillery Commander: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron S. Laurent Chief of Staff to the Artillery Commander: Major of Artillery Ravichio Engineer Commander: Colonel Moydier Engineering Chief of Staff: Capitaine Philibert Inspector of Reviews: Sous-inspecteur Chevalier Pfadel de S. Charles Director in Chief: Director Commissary Regnault Headquarters Commandant: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Fontane Remainder of staff as before: Right Corps: Prince Euge`ne Beauharnais 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lechi (Royal Guard) Brigade: Colonel Pe´got 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Marcognet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Dupeyroux Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Palombini Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti Cavalry: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Mermet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond Total: 23,834 men and 70 guns Left Corps: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Count Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Rouyer Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Gratien Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Piat Brigade: Adjutant-Commandant Montfalcon Detached Forces: Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi (in the Upper Sava Valley)

57

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 6th Division: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Gifflenga (in Tyrol) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Mazzuchelli

Total: 23,372 men and 50 guns

General Count Verdier was ordered to the headquarters of the Army of Italy and placed at the disposition of Euge`ne. On the same day, the Austrian commander in chief had also been busy modifying the organization of his army, notably the center and the right. Two wings were formed, respectively, under FML Frimont and FML Sommariva:80 Right Wing: FML Frimont Division: FML Marschall Brigade: GM Eckhardt 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (4 cos) Szekler Grenz Regiment (1) Jellacich Infantry Regiment (2) Frimont Hussar Regiment (3 sqn) 1 half Foot Battery Brigade: GM Vlasitz Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment (1) Hohenlohe Infantry Regiment (4) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqn) 1 Foot Battery 1 Wurst Battery Division: FML Merville Brigade: GM Winzian Duka Infantry Regiment (2) Reisky Infantry Regiment (1) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (6 sqn) 1 Foot Battery Brigade: Stutterheim Purcell Grenadier Battalion Welsperg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion 1 Foot Battery Left Wing: FML Sommariva Division: FML Marziani Brigade: GM Mayer

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9th Ja¨ger (2 cos) Reisky Infantry Regiment (2) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (2 Landwehr cos) 1 Foot Battery ⫹ 2 howitzers Brigade: GM Vecsey 9th Ja¨ger (4 cos) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (2) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (4 Landwehr cos) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (6 sqn) Cavalry Brigade: GM Wrede Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4 sqn) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6 sqn)

Generals Fenner, Fo¨lseis, and Stanissavlevich maintained their independent commands. On 20 September, General Hiller was also informed that an armistice between Bavaria and Austria had been signed. This meant that Bavaria was likely to join the Allies in the near future and that the Austrian lines of communication in Tyrol were now safe.81 The reassuring situation along the Bavarian borders enabled the Austrian command in Germany to detach some reinforcements to Hiller. Three battalions of the Spleny Infantry Regiment and two of the Bianchi Infantry Regiment were ordered to Klagenfurt, where they were due at the beginning of October.82 RECONNAISSANCE TO WEISCHELBURG, 22 SEPTEMBER The events in the Drava Valley (Drautal) rapidly evolved in favor of the Austrians, but on the other end of the line, Euge`ne had decided to put General Radivojevich’s corps under pressure.83 Consequently, the 4th Division was ordered to attack the Austrian posts in St. Marein (Smarje) on 21 September. This movement was to be supported by the 5th Division, which was to move from Adelsberg (Postojna) to Zirknitz (Cerknica) and Studenec. It would also launch patrols toward Seissenberg (Zuzemberk) and Treffen (Trebnje), thus threatening the Austrian lines of communication from Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) to Neustadt (Novo Mesto). Palombini left General Ruggieri with the 2nd Italian Line Regiment at Zaguria. Ruggieri was ordered to cover his right flank and rear from any Austrian movement from Fiume (Rijeka).84 Had Euge`ne succeeded in driving Rebrovich away from Weichselburg (Visnja Gora), the link between General Radivojevich’s corps and the rest of the Army of Inner Austria and, particularly, with Fo¨lseis’s brigade, which now ran through Littay (Litija), would have been severed. This would have forced Radivojevich to recross the Sava farther southeast to restablish contact. Moreover, Euge`ne, who at that time had not yet been informed that the movements of the Austrian

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center and right across the Drava were in full swing, hoped that FZM Hiller, seeing his left under pressure, would suspend its operations against Villach and Tarvis.85 The Austrian corps in St. Marein (Smarje) was not taken by surprise and withdrew that day, favored by a heavy fog that did not dissipate until very late in the morning. The local population, which kept a very hostile attitude toward the French and the Italians, helped and guided the Austrians through a maze of mountain tracks.86 The 4th Division sluggishly moved through St.-Marein (Smarje) and took up positions in Gros-Lup (Grosuplje). The following day, General Jeanin, with two battalions and a squadron of the 19th Chasseurs, advanced to Weichselburg (Visnja Gora). He took up positions in Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) and sent a reconnaissance on Posendorf (Draga). The contact with the Austrians had, however, been lost. During this time, General Palombini had occupied Zirknitz (Cerknica) and Studenec, forcing back a detachment of Croatians. Poor roads and rainy weather had delayed the march of the artillery. Palombini sent General Perreimond to Obergurk (Krka) with two battalions and a squadron and left three battalions and four guns on the heights by Laschitz (Lasce). The Austrian troops facing General Jeanin found themselves threatened frontally and in the flank. They then withdrew to Treffen (Trebnje) on one side and to Littay (Litija) on the other. A few prisoners were taken from the Franz Karl Infantry Regiment. On 23 September, Euge`ne, having at last received a detailed report about what was going on along the Drava by Villach, ordered the 4th Division to withdraw to St. Marein (Smarje). Rebrovich immediately reoccupied Gros-Lup (Grosuplje) and Weichselburg (Visnja Gora). A column of about 3,000 men under Colonel Starhemberg (commander of the Radetzky Hussars) trudged under a torrential rain toward Obergurk, which by that time had been evacuated by General Perreimond’s troops.87 The day the 4th Division withdrew to St.-Marein (Smarje), Palombini withdrew to Zirknitz (Cerknica), leaving Perreimond in Laschitz (Lasce) with some cavalry and three battalions (two of the Dalmatian Regiment, an elite battalion of the 4th Italian Le´ge`re).88 The 5th Division remained in Zirknitz (Cerknica) and Studenec, and General Perreimond was moved before Gross Laschitz (Lasce). In the Upper Sava Valley, Campi’s brigade, as a result of the requirements of the army’s reorganization and the movements of the Austrians through the Loibl Pass and the mountain track from Feistritz to Assling (Jesenice), had left its position between Neumarkt (Bistrica) and Assling (Jesenice). It moved to a new position supporting its right on that place and extending as far as Wurzen (Kranjska Gora). On 23 September, Campi was attacked in Assling (Jesenice) and forced to concentrate his forces at Wurzen (Kranjska Gora). After Verdier’s retreat to Arnoldstein, the Austrians had the luxury of access to numerous passes over the Julien Alps between Tarvis and St.-Hermagor and had daily probed Grenier’s advanced posts established to cover the defiles on

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his left. On the other side, the Austrian corps from Klagenfurt controlled the passages of the Drava between Hollenburg and Rosegg. In the evening of 21 September FML Marschall occupied Finkenstein and sent patrols toward Arnoldstein. By 24 September Eckhardt’s brigade, then in the Gail Valley, had linked with Frimont’s corps at Federaun. Frimont had, in his turn, been considerably reinforced by the arrival of General Vecsey’s brigade.89 The Austrians were now in a position to profit from the forced concentration of the left and right corps of the Army of Italy on the extremities of their lines. This movement had opened the interval between Krainburg (Kranj) and Assling (Jesenice). While large columns of Sommariva’s corps moved against Krainburg (Kranj), Neumarkt (Bistrica), and Ratmansdorf, the Austrians launched patrols down the valley of the Wochein Sava (Sava Bohinjska) as far as Tolmino (Tolmin) and Caporetto (Kobarid).90 The Pontebba defile was overrun by a party of Eckhardt’s brigade. Krainburg (Kranj), which had been evacuated by the French, was occupied on 23 September by Austrian cavalry patrols of FML Sommariva’s corps. In front of Laibach (Ljubljana), General Fo¨lseis’s brigade was concentrated around Stob with about 3,000 infantry and two squadrons. At 1:00 P.M., on 25 September, this force moved in several columns to attack the bridgehead at Tschernutsch, which was defended by about 1,200 men (a battalion of the French 84th Line Regiment, the 4/3rd Italian Line Regiment, and 100 Italian Guard Chasseurs a` pied) under the command of GB Fontana.91 The initial Austrian attack at 5:00 P.M. failed and was launched a second time with renewed fury, only to fail a second time. As the Austrians were slow in maneuvering, the French were able to fire several telling volleys, convincing them that their efforts were in vain.92 After some hours of battle and without having obtained the slightest advantage, the Austrians were obliged to withdraw with a loss of 400 to 500 men (according to Fo¨lseis, only 100). The French suffered 12 men killed and 76 wounded.93 Among the Austrian troops engaged in this fruitless attack were battalions from the Lusignan and de Chasteler Infantry Regiments and a few landwehr companies. Despite this small success, the situation of the Army of Italy was worsening day after day, and Euge`ne knew it. It had been impossible for the Army of Italy to concentrate enough troops at Krainburg (Kranj) to throw the Austrians back across the Drava, without uncovering or perhaps compromising the passes that would be used by the two wings in case of a retreat. It was still feared that the Austrians, who appeared in force to threaten the 5th Division, might succeed in forcing the post at Adelsberg (Postojna). Such an occurrence would severely compromise the Franco-Italian right wing. On the left wing, the line of retreat from Tarvis to the Tagliamento was no longer safe, as the defiles of Pontebba and Tolmezzo were exposed to Austrian raids from the Gail Valley. In addition, another eventuality would immediately influence the decisions of Euge`ne. That eventuality was the pending defection of Bavaria from its alliance with France.

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Bavaria’s actions, after the resumption of hostilities, had as its basis a neutrality that was more nuisance than help. The Bavarian army, which found itself on the Austrian frontier, remained inactive and made no movement to stop the Austrians as they advanced in force down the Drava Valley toward Tyrol. As the main body of the Army of Italy stood more distant from the Upper Adige than the Austrians, when Bavaria chose to detach itself from the interests of France, the Kingdom of Italy would immediately find itself threatened.94 Any attempt of the Army of Italy to retreat toward the mouth of the Po would be equally dangerous, as this would put it at the mercy of the Neapolitans, who were about to negotiate their defection. Euge`ne, therefore, decided to execute his first major strategic withdrawal, to take control of his movements, and to put the defiles leading to Italy between him and the Austrians. The dispositions were made for the army to occupy the line of the Isonzo. For his part, FZM Hiller, awaiting reinforcements and more details about the defection of Bavaria, did not show any will to hasten the course of operations. AFFAIR AT ZIRKNITZ (CERKNICA), 27 SEPTEMBER On 25 September, as Fo¨lseis probed against the Tschernutsch bridge, Starhemberg with two battalions of Grenzer and a single squadron of Radetzky Hussars attacked General Perreimond at Gros-Laschitz (Lasce). Having maintained a poor reconnaissance, Perreimond was taken by surprise. The chasseurs a` cheval and the elite battalion of the 4th Italian Le´ge`re soon fled under the cover of the Dalmatian battalion, losing about 200 casualties and withdrawing to Zirknitz (Cerknica). Palombini’s division responded promptly, to the surprise of the Austrian commanders, moving forward and deploying on the heights between Zirknitz (Cerknica) and Studenec, redressing the balance. Two days later, General Palombini was attacked in this position by the columns of Oberst Starhemberg and GM Csivich, amounting to about 9,000 men.95 Palombini then decided to withdraw as far as Manitz (Unec), after detaching a rear guard formed by the 2/2nd Italian Le´ge`re96 and the 1/1 Italian Line. After a lively engagement, the former was taken in the rear by a squadron of hussars. A few companies of the St. George and Szluiner Grenzer set off in pursuit of the rear guard without being ordered to do so and were briskly repulsed by a sudden Italian counterattack.97 After that the Austrians ceased molesting the Italian division as it retreated by e´chelons into the Manitz (Unec) defile. The affair settled down into a long-range artillery duel. Palombini had 300 men hors de combat and left about 400 prisoners to the Austrians, who, in turn, had about 100 losses. On the same day, Palombini ordered General Ruggieri, who felt himself threatened by a force of 5,000 Austrians moving from Fiume (Rijeka), to slowly retreat from Zaguria to Adelsberg (Postojna).98 As a matter of fact, FML Nugent, with the active support of the local insurgents and the British fleet under Rear Admiral Fremantle, had resumed his of-

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fensive operations in Istria. After dispatching a column to Lippa (Lipa) with orders to push forward as far as Adelsberg (Postojna), he moved on Trieste with 12 companies of regular infantry, a half squadron of hussars, and six companies of landwehr.99 On 28 September, Palombini’s division took up a position by Adelsberg (Postojna). The actions of the previous days had cost him nearly 400 prisoners, almost all coming from the 2nd Italian Line Regiment.100 Palombini expressed his unhappiness with the conduct of the 4th Italian Le´ge`re in the affair at Laschitz (Lasce), while he gave praise to the performance of the 1st and 3rd Lines, and the 3rd Le´ge`re, and to the platoon of chasseurs a` cheval under the command of Lieutenant Vicere´, which charged vigorously on several occasions and continually pushed away the Austrian hussars.101 The artillery had strongly supported the three-day withdrawal of the Italians, disputing the Austrian advance foot by foot and surrendering no more than three leagues a day. According to Euge`ne, in his report of the action to the Duc de Feltre, Palombini was obliged to withdraw by the Austrian pressure but was pursued only by a very small force. The following day Palombini was directed on Prewald to watch communications with Italy and, if possible, move to the relief of Trieste.102 The Austrian force opposing them contained about 7,000 men and consisted almost entirely of Croatians under the command of General Csivich. At the other end of the line, on 27 September, Frimont sent three columns of Vlasitz and Winzian’s brigades, supported by a half battery, against the advanced posts of Rouyer’s Division in Regersdorf and Hart, apparently with the goal of executing a reconnaissance of the French lines. However, despite all their efforts and the four guns they placed on the ravine before St.-Le´onard, and which almost constantly fired cannister, they were unable to move out onto the plain. They were repulsed with losses. This drawback made Frimont realize that Grenier’s right was strongly supported on the mountain chain.103 Two days after, a column detached from Eckhardt’s brigade, consisting of two companies of Ja¨gers and one of the Jellacich Infantry Regiment, was more succesful and overran the French position at the Pontebba defile, taking some prisoners, destroying the local depot, and damaging a bridge on the road from Tarvis to the plain. As evening fell, they retreated back into the Gail Valley.104 WITHDRAWAL ON THE ISONZO On 28 September, the 4th Division evacuated St. Marein (Smarje) to move to Ober-Laibach. The headquarters with the Royal Guard had already moved from Laibach (Ljubljana). Pegot’s Brigade, 1st Division, which formed the rear guard, left its positions at the Tschernutsch bridge during the night between 28 and 29 September. General Fo¨lseis’s brigade entered Laibach (Ljubljana) the following afternoon, followed by a detachment of General Rebrovich’s force coming from St.

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Marein (Smarje) with some guns. The small garrison, which had been left behind in the city fortress and consisted mostly of convalescents, surrendered on 5 October, any further attempt to fight being pointless.105 The retrograde movement of the Army of Italy obliged GD Fresia, the commander of Illyria, to completely abandon Trieste after leaving a small garrison in the fortress under the command of Colonel Rabie´. Rabie´ capitulated to the Austrians on 29 October 1813 after a stubborn resistance. The Right Corps continued its withdrawal by echelons. The 1st and 4th Divisions followed the main road to Gorizia, via Planina, Adelsberg (Postojna) and Wippach (Vipava), marching a day’s march from each other. The 5th Division, which had orders to keep a watch on the roads coming from Lippa (Lipa) and Trieste, moved from Prewald on Sensetch (Senozece) and Opschina (Opicina), then to Duino, where they resumed their march on Gorizia. The Austrians moved out of Zirknitz (Cerknica), following the Army of Italy very closely. Before reuniting with the columns of General Csivich and Oberst Starhemberg, Rebrovich and Fo¨lseis’s brigades attacked Pegot’s rear guard twice. The first attack was in Alben and Planina on 30 September, and the second attack was in Adelsberg (Postojna) on 1 October. Each time the Austrians were pushed back with substantial losses and subsequently ceased their pressure on the Army of Italy.106 On 1 October, Euge`ne sent a “strong reconnaissance” force down the road to Fiume. They encountered a small force of Austrians under Major Gavenda at Mautersdorf and pushed them back after an insignificant action.107 From now on the retrograde movements of the two columns were only disturbed by Istrian insurgents, now formed in landwehr and landsturm units, supported by small detachments of regular troops.108 On 3 October, after passing the defile of Prewald, Euge`ne took positions on the heights of Heilige Kreuz near Heidenschaft (Ajdovscina), and being aware that the Austrians were not in close pursuit, he accorded his tired troops a day of rest. The same day, Palombini’s division, having arrived in the vicinity of Opchina (Opicina), was surprised by a column of landsturm, and its outposts suffered a few losses.109 By 6 October the withdrawal behind the Isonzo was completed. Between Gorizia and the sea the Isonzo is a rushing torrent. However, there are some points where the river widens and is fordable. Small ramparts and artillery emplacements were built at several of these points.110 Marcognet’s 4th Division occupied the ground between Gradisca and Gorizia, along the right bank of the Isonzo. Palombini’s 5th (Italian) Division was below Gradisca and extended to the sea. Quesnel’s 1st Division stood in reserve behind Gradisca. Pegot’s brigade was placed in reserve behind Gradisca, which was occupied by the headquarters and the Royal Guard. The cavalry took up positions at the confluence of the Isonzo and the Torre. General Count Grenier strongly occupied Tarvis with the Left Corps and posted a few battalions along the road to Ponte´ba. General Campi was in Caporetto (Kobarid) with the 92nd Line Regiment to serve as the link between the two corps, covering the com-

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munications from Udine, via Cividale. This force was to throw back any Austrian forces that attempted to cross the river toward Caporetto (Kobarid) and Tulmino (Tolmin). A few more battalions extended toward the Right Corps and occupied Canale (Kanal) and Tulmino (Tolmin).111 At this juncture, Euge`ne hoped—as he confided in a letter to his wife—to resist on the line of the Isonzo no less than two weeks. On 6 October, General Radivojevich’s corps began its deployment along the left bank of the Isonzo River. By that time its strength was as follows: GM Nugent’s brigade was formed with three battalions and a half battery; GM Rebrovich’s brigade with five battalions and one battery; GM Csivich’s brigade with five battalions and a half battery; and Oberst Starhemberg’s detachment with one battalion, four squadrons, and a horse battery. A few companies of recently raised Istrian landwehr and landsturm were attached.112

AFFAIR AT BRIXEN, 25 SEPTEMBER In the Tyrol, General Gifflenga arrived in Trento on 21 September and put his division in march the same day for Bozen (Bolzano) and Brixen. The Austrians, after occupying Mu¨hlbach in the first days of September and sending a reconnaissance on Bozen (Bolzano), had withdrawn to Brixen. This reconnaissance force was a weak advanced guard and had little thought of sustaining itself at any distance from the main body. Once occupying Mu¨hlbach, in order to cover his movement, General Fenner, who advanced via Lienz, Toblach, and Pru¨necken (Bruneck), sent a detachment of about 800 men toward Aich (Vir), on the road to Brixen. General Gifflenga arrived in Brixen on 25 September after an unimpeded march. That same day General Mazzuchelli, who commanded the French advanced guard, attacked the Austrians in Aich (Vir), defeated them, took many prisoners, and threw them back on Mu¨hlbach, which was then abandoned. Fenner retreated on Pru¨necken (Bruneck). On 28 September he was pushed out of this position and was forced to withdraw to Niederdorf and Toblach.113 FZM Hiller was troubled by the situation in Tyrol, where General Fenner could not oppose Gifflenga’s advance with the weak force at his disposition. Hiller ordered GM Stanissavlevich’s brigade to march toward Lienz. At the end of September this reinforcement was still far away from joining Fenner in the defense of Tyrol. GM Stanissavlevich announced to Hiller that he did not expect to arrive in Spittal before 2 October.114 On the other hand, the more Gifflenga advanced into the Pusteria Valley (Pustertal), the more his line of communication elongated. In addition, he could not expect any reinforcement from Verona, whose depots were now devoid of troops.115 Consequently, after driving Fenner’s rear guard from Toblach and Innichen, Gifflenga halted his advance, leaving his advanced posts in these villages. Fenner took positions at Sillian. For the next several days neither general was active.

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ON THE ISONZO On the left wing, General Grenier learned at the end of September that the Austrians had occupied Tolmino (Tolmin) and were moving on the Isonzo, extended between Cana (Kanal) and Caporetto (Kobarid). He judged it necessary to begin his withdrawal. On 4 October he concentrated the 2nd and 3rd Divisions before Tarvis and sent Campi’s brigade to Weissenfels (Fusine). A battalion of the 92nd Line Regiment (Campi’s brigade) was sent to Caporetto (Kobarid) in order to hold the Peltz (Bovec) defile and keep the communications with the Right Corps. On 6 October the Left Corps began its retreat in echelons via the Fella Valley. Rouyer’s division took positions in Malborghetto, while Gratien’s division was to remain at Tarvis till 8 October, covering Rouyer’s and Campi’s retreat. This latter brigade moved via Pletz (Bovec) and Caporetto (Kobarid) to Gorizia, where it was to rejoin the 1st Division, to which it belonged. For about a week FZM Hiller’s right wing had remained substantially inactive, limiting itself to reinforcing its positions along the Gail River in front of the Tarvis camp. It is likely that Hiller did not want to risk a frontal attack on this entrenched strongpoint.116 However, his inaction was most probably motivated by the news of Gifflenga’s advance in the Tyrol as well as the letters sent by the Aulic Council advising him to act cautiously.117 Moreover, as time went by, Hiller’s army steadily grew stronger, so why not wait until overwhelming forces were concentrated and available? At the beginning of October FML Marschall’s division had received a substantial reinforcement in the form of two battalions of the Bianchi Infantry Regiment coming from Vienna, and three battalions of the Spleny Infantry Regiment were due in a few days.118

3 Euge`ne Withdraws Behind the Tagliamento and on the Adige, October and November 1813 THE AFFAIR AT SAFFNITZ (CAMPOROSSO), 7 OCTOBER Grenier’s brilliant echeloned retreat took FZM Hiller by surprise. Having received assurances about the Bavarian purposes and the situation in Tyrol, the Austrian commander had after all given orders for a frontal attack across the Gail River toward Tarvis.1 This attack should take place on 6 October with the support of several flanking actions through the mountains crowning the French positions, a few of them aiming at menacing Grenier’s lines of communication through the Fella and Predil Valleys. Rather unexpectedly, the reconnaissance parties sent by FML Merville and Marschall at daybreak informed the headquarters that the French had completely evacuated their positions on the Gail right bank. Being encumbered by an overdetailed but now largely useless plan the Austrian commanders lost many hours in discussions about what to do next. When a course of action was eventually agreed upon, it was now too late to implement it. Thus, the attack was postponed to the morrow. On 7 October the Austrians advanced in four columns against Tarvis. The 1st Column, under FML Marschall, moved from Feistritz, west of Arnoldstein, and contained two detachments. The first detachment under GM Winzian contained the Duka Infantry Regiment (2 bns) and moved over the mountains west of Goggau (Coccau) on Tarvis. The second detachment, under GM Eckhardt, consisted of the four companies of the 8th Ja¨ger Battalion, a squadron of the Frimont Hussars, five companies of the Reisky Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the Jellacich Infantry Regiment, and a battalion of the Splenyi Infantry Regiment. It moved through a mountain pass west of Tarvis, following a perilous track that ran along the Bartolo-Graben and debouched between Saffnitz (Camporosso) and Tarvis.

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The 2nd Column, on the left flank, was commanded by GM Mayer. It contained four companies of the 9th Ja¨ger Battalion, a battalion of the Reisky Infantry Regiment, and three companies of the Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment and moved toward Weissenfels (Fusine) via Greuth. At Weissenfels (Fusine) Mayer’s column was to reunite with the 3rd Column, under GM Vecsey, which contained two battalions and four landwehr companies of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment. The 4th Column, in the middle, was commanded by GM Vlasitz. It contained three battalions of the Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the Peterwardiner Grenz, two squadrons, and two batteries and advanced down the main road from Arnoldstein to Goggau (Coccau). FZM Hiller and FML Frimont marched with this column.2 At around 9:00 A.M. Eckhardt’s column, moving down the steep ravine of the Bartolo-Graben, came across the advanced posts of the French position at Saffnitz (Camporosso), which was guarded by three battalions drawn from the 42nd, 102nd, and 2/131st Line Regiments.3 The Austrian advance down the narrow mountain path was continuously hampered by several rows of abatis, which the French had warily set out. Eckhardt’s troops being unable to deploy, the three French battalions sustained the Austrian assault for many hours. Eckhardt did not receive adequate support on his left by Winzian’s column, which had in turn met overwhelming difficulties in reaching the valley bottom. As night fell, FML Marschall’s two columns retreated to Feistritz.4 The Austrian losses were over 600 men hors de combat and 80 prisoners from the Bianchi Regiment and the 8th Ja¨ger Regiment. The French losses were around 100 men killed or wounded.5 As these events developed, GM Vlasitz’s column marched down the main road and arrived within artillery range of the enemy position at Goggau (Coccau). It did not, however, go into action, as its attack was dependent on the success of Eckhardt and Winzian’s column on the right. On the left wing, Vecsey’s column easily took hold of Weissenfels (Fusine), while Mayer’s march was delayed by the French posts, and he could join Vecsey in Weissenfels (Fusine) only very late that afternoon. Beside Vecsey’s minor success, as night fell Hiller could but acknowledge that his plan had been largely unsuccessful and that Grenier was still master of the Tarvis position.6 On 8 October the French rear guard (Gratien’s division) abandoned Tarvis. The withdrawal of the Left Corps was completed on 11 October, when all of it was reunited in the Tagliamento Valley, at the mouth of the Friuli plain. The 2nd Division occupied Venzone, and the 3rd occupied Ospedaletto and Gemona. Since the engagement at Saffnitz (Camporosso), the Austrians had not disturbed the French withdrawal and followed it at a respectful distance. With the occupation of Tarvis and the movement of his left corps into Italy, Hiller had achieved his goal. He now had the road along the Adige, via the Tyrol, open to him, and it facilitated his movements. As this occurred, Campi’s brigade had marched from Pletz (Bovec) to Ca-

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poretto (Kobarid) and on to Tolmino (Tolmin). A small force under Oberstleutnant Mengen, of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlans, was attacked and dispersed, losing some prisoners to Campi. Oberstleutnant Mumb, of the 8th Ja¨gers, was killed in this action. After this small victory, Campi rejoined Quesnel’s division.7 On 13 October, General Grenier, seeking information about the Austrian position, pushed forward a strong reconnaissance force commanded by General Schmitz. It encountered Austrian outposts at Resciutta, launched a vigorous attack, threw them back, and took some prisoners from the Chasteler Regiment and the 9th Ja¨gers. Though effective, this was clearly a rear guard action. With the occupation of Tarvis FZM Hiller had achieved his main present goal. The road to the Upper Adige Valley, via the Puster Valley (Pustertal), was now completely open to his forces, and this was likely to facilitate his general plan. The campaign that had brought the Illyrian provinces back to the Habsburg Empire had lasted 45 days. Due to the mountainous nature of the terrain, the war had almost immediately broken up into a series of small and uncoordinated actions. Euge`ne unsuccessfully sought to control a large portion of the whole region, from the sources of the Drava River to Fiume (Rijeka) and the Dalmatian coast. Besides his desire of defending the Illyrian provinces and keeping war far from the Kingdom of Italy, the viceroy probably had another reason for following this course of action. He was aware that his new army, formed for the most part of young conscripts, would be no match for the Austrian army in the open field, where the latter’s superiority in cavalry would quickly begin to tell. On the contrary, he might presume that waging war in such an impenetrable region and avoiding major engagements could gain him time to better train his green army, minimize its losses, and feed it with new reinforcements. Last but not least, Euge`ne thought that the very nature of the terrain could favor the traditional French speed of maneuver, while delaying the Austrians, encumbered by their heavy and slow supply train.8 At the outbreak of hostilities, both armies were too scattered. The dispersion of forces, the exaggerated worries of some generals, notably Pino on the right wing, the poor quality of troops, and the trouble caused by the insurgents fulminated by Austrian agents in Istria quickly led the French to a standstill after their initial advance. The success at Feistritz could not be exploited adequately, as Euge`ne was not in the position to concentrate enough forces at any point without leaving another section of his overextended front undefended. The Austrian counterattack was conducted with more energy and thought. Realizing that a rapid movement through Istria would outflank his right, Euge`ne was forced to interrupt his actions toward Cilly (Celje), St. Marein (Smarje), and Weichselburg (Visnja Gora) and withdrew. It is true, however, that a major reason for the retreat behind the Isonzo is to be found in the evolution of the political and diplomatic situation. Much more than Hiller’s movements, it was the strategic implication of Bavaria’s defection and Murat’s plot, that is, the pending threat to the lines of communication in the Padanian plain coming from

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the north (Tyrol) and from the south, that obliged Euge`ne to abandon Illyria and prepare the defense of the Kingdom of Italy.

REBUILDING THE ARMY OF ITALY Since his arrival in Gradisca, Euge`ne had sought, once again, to rebuild his army. It had suffered severe losses in the large number of small engagements in which it had been involved during the first phase of the campaign. Had Euge`ne commanded veteran troops accustomed to combat and easy to control in their movements, he would have certainly paid a lighter toll. In addition, the superior strength of the Austrian forces had pushed the Army of Italy onto the defensive and denied Euge`ne the opportunity to execute any offensive actions, which, if successful, would have raised the spirit of his soldiers.9 Besides battlefields casualties, the Army of Italy was also afflicted with a very high rate of desertion. Rather predictably, since the outbreak of hostilities most of the Croatian and Dalmatian troops had seized the first opportunity to go over to the Austrian camp. But also the French (Italy recruited) and the Italian regiments suffered heavily from the plague of desertion.10 As the viceroy wrote to the emperor, “Les conscrits de´sertent par bandes.” Last, but not least, a virulent spread of epidemics had strongly contributed to the weakening of the army. Thus, at the beginning of October the strength return of the Army recorded 44,641 men and 7,201 horses.11 The situation in Germany, which absorbed every available man, ensured Euge`ne could not hope to receive any active support from France. The 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade and the 1st Foreign Regiment, which were en route, together with the 31st Chasseurs and the 1st Hussars, were the last support Euge`ne would see from France. The defection of Bavaria had occurred and was known at this time. Euge`ne was aware that the time would come when he would have to draw nearer to the mouth of the Upper Adige Valley and stretch his meager resources even further. At the end of September, Euge`ne had decreed the formation of a National Guard company of 200 men in every department of the Kingdom of Italy.12 On 5 October Euge`ne, in Gorizia, ordered the formation of a reserve division under the command of General Pino.13 This division, consisting of three provisional regiments, was to organize itself in Verona. Its six Italian battalions were for the most part to be drawn from Italian Departmental Reserve Companies and from the depots of the 6th and the 7th Italian Line Regiments, of the 1st and the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiments, and of the Guard Foot Chasseurs and the Milan Guard. A squadron of the Napoleone Dragoon Regiment (150 horsemen) and a foot battery with four guns were attached to this new formation. The strength of the division was fixed at about 4,000 men. Other measures were taken within the Kingdom of Italy in order to call up any male fit for service. Many convicts of the fortress of Mantua were sent to

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the 7th Italian Line. Gendarmerie companies from alpine regions were put on active service and substituted in their duties by the National Guard.14 On 11 October a further levy of 15,000 conscripts from the classes of 1808 to 1813 was ordered by decree in the Kingdom of Italy. This manpower was to be distributed as follows: 9,000 to the infantry, 2,000 to the Line Chasseurs a` Cheval, 800 to the Line Dragoons, 700 to the artillery, 500 to the Foot Guard Chasseurs, 500 to the Milan Guard, 300 to the coastal artillery, 200 to the Venice Guard, 100 to the pioneers, and 100 to the train.15 A proclamation that accompanied the degree encouraged the Italians to unite all their efforts for the defense of their country. The finances of the Kingdom of Italy were, at the same time, the object of considerable attention, and a decree prescribed, in this regard, the necessary measures to support the army. In the French departments of Italy the state of the troops was possibly worse than in the Kingdom of Italy. On 11 September Clarke (French Minister of War) had sent to Prince Borghese a copy of the Decree signed in Dresden in April, which prescribed the formation of a legion of National Guards in the departments of Appennini and Genoa. At the beginning of October, Piedmont was literally emptied of troops. After the departure of two battalions of the Foreign Regiment, the 29th Military Division (Tuscany) was reported so much deprived of troops that rumors of a British embarkment at Palermo destined to attack the Continent raised serious concerns.16 General Miollis, who commanded the 30th Military Division (Rome), had at his disposal no more than 700 depot conscripts, a veteran battalion, a company of coastal artillery, and three companies of gendarmes.17 By late November the 30th Military Division had its strength raised to a force of some 4,000 men formed of the cadres of the 3/,4/6th Line Regiment, the 1/2nd Re´giment e´tranger, three companies of gendarmes, one of artillery, and two of coast guard gunners.18 PREPARATIONS FOR THE SIEGE OF VENICE At the same time the garrison of Palmanova was augmented by three battalions and that of Venice was ordered raised to 12,000 men. However, circumstances forced Euge`ne to withdraw his army beyond supporting distance before Venice could be fully garrisoned. The order was also given to complete the provisioning of the garrison of Venice to withstand a siege of six months. The commissioner general of the Navy, one Maillot, aided by the authority of the governor and the means put at his disposition by the Minister of War of the Kingdom of Italy, was to complete the task of provisioning Venice. A similar order was issued to the inhabitants of Venice and those in the surrounding region to put themselves in a state of defense, that is, lay in sufficient stores of food and so on. However, it is not difficult to imagine how poorly this order was obeyed. The land defenses of Venice, where BD Seras was governor, were divided

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into four districts. The naval defense was assigned to Rear Admiral Dupe`rre´.19 The first district of the Venetian defenses, commanded by GB Dupeyroux, extended from the mouth of the Adige to the Malmocco and contained the Cavanella redoubt, the works at Brondolo, Chioggia, and the forts of San Felice, Caroman, San Pietro, and the Palestrina shore. Rear Admiral Dupe`rre´, responsible for the naval defense of Venice, also commanded the second district. This district extended from the Malamocco Port to the mouth of the Piave and contained the Malamocco shore, the Lido shore, the Islands of Sant’Erasmo and Treporti, and the villages of Burano, Mazorbo, and Torcello and included the forts, redoubts, and other works forming the defense of these places. The third district, commanded by GB Schilt, consisted solely of the Fort de Marghera, which was the key to the lagoon. The fourth district, commanded by GB Daurier, consisted of Venice, Murano, Campalto, San Giacomo, Carbonara, Tessera, San Secondo, San Giorgio in Alga, and Sant’Angelo. At that time, General Seras had under his command only 2,344 infantry, about one sixth of what was theoretically necessary for the defense of Venice.20 On 14 October the Army of Italy underwent some minor changes. Campi’s brigade returned to the 1st Division, and the Royal Guard passed to the reserve under the army headquarters. GB Soulier replaced Colonel Pegot, now Ge´ne´ral de brigade, in the 1st Division. GB De Conchy replaced GB Dupeyroux in the 4th Division. GB Bonnemains was assigned to the cavalry division, which had been divided into two brigades after the arrival of the 31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment. Bonnemain’s brigade contained the 31st Chasseurs and the 4th Italian Chasseurs.21 ACTIONS IN TYROL At the beginning of October, General Gifflenga had advanced in the Tyrol from Brixen to Bruneck. On 3 October he had a sharp action with General Fenner’s advanced guard. The Austrians suffered 400 casualties, of which 25 were taken prisoner.22 However, the Austrian advanced guard found itself supported the next day by an army corps. Gifflenga felt obliged to withdraw on Bozen and then on Trento, which he abandoned on 15 October as he withdrew to Volano and took up new positions. (This occurred only after 12 days of strenuous resistance.)23 At the beginning of October, FML Fenner had received news of the imminent arrival of Stanissavlevich’s brigade in Tyrol. He thus decided that the time was ripe to put Hiller’s orders into practice and resume the offensive. On 3 October, at daybreak, he pushed his troops beyond Toblach and attacked the entrenchments that the French had established on the heights of Rasen and UnterWielenbach, a few miles east of Bruneck. The fighting raged for several hours, as the three understrength “elite” battalions of the 1st and 2nd Foreign Regi-

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ments put up stiff resistance.24 As night was about to fall, the French, being menaced on their rear by an Austrian flanking column, were forced to withdraw as far as Percha on the outskirts of Bruneck. Despite Gifflenga claiming to have caused the enemy 400 casualties,25 it was clearly an Austrian success, which, according to Fenner’s report, cost the French 500 men hors de combat and 50 prisoners.26 The following day Fenner’s reconnaissance parties discovered that the French had abandoned Bruneck, leaving a strong rear guard at St. Lorenzen. Gifflenga incorrectly believed that Fenner’s division exceedingly outnumbered his 3,000 men. He planned, however, to make a stand behind the fortified position of Mu¨hlbacher Klause at the mouth of the Puster Valley (Pustertal). The attack came on the morning of 7 October. Two French guns wisely deployed on the heights succeeded in paralyzing the Austrian advance for several hours. Finally, in the afternoon, a detachment of three companies sent by Fenner to outflank the enemy position found its way along a perilous mountain track, fell on the rear of the Mu¨hlbacher Klause defenders, and with the substantial help of a renewed frontal attack, stormed the position. Enervated by the recent setbacks, Gifflenga panicked and ordered a hasty retreat toward Bozen. On 8 October, Fenner had his main body billeted in Brixen. News of Gifflenga’s retreat in Tyrol spread rapidly and caused alarm not only in Trento and Verona but also in Milan.27 General Pino, who was organizing the six battalions of the reserve division in Verona, was persuaded that the entire Austrian army was marching down the Adige Valley behind the screen of Fenner’s advanced guard. He then started inundating the viceroy with more and more alarmed reports in which he asked for immediate reinforcements. In the following days the Austrian advance down the main valley was sensibly delayed by restoration works on the bridge at Blumau, which had been destroyed by the French rear guard. Fenner, however, did not lie idle and sent a small column to reconnoiter the lateral valleys of Fassa and Fiemme. This new threat was enough to convince Gifflenga to abandon Bozen and draw his rear guard back to Lavis, only a few miles north of Trento. Fenner entered Bozen on 11 October and ordered Stanissavlevich’s brigade to take positions in reserve at Brixen.28 In the meantime the right wing of the Austrian army was concentrating around Spittal on the Drava. It was now under the command of FML Sommariva, who had replaced Frimont and received orders to be ready to support Fenner’s advance down the Tyrol.29 Although exaggerated, Pino’s worries were not completely unfounded. The Austrian movements in the Tyrol indicated that Hiller’s plan for the campaign did not include a frontal attack against the Army of Italy deployed behind the Isonzo. This was a strong defensive position, and any attempt at breaking through it would result in heavy losses. Moreover, a westward movement from Friul would oblige the Austrians to attempt opposed crossings on a number of major rivers in the Venetian plain such as the Isonzo, the Tagliamento, the Livenza, the Piave, and the Brenta before they reached the line of the Adige.

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Erzherzog Johann had followed this course of action in 1809, with poor results. Rather, Hiller’s intention was to pin Euge`ne along the Isonzo with his left wing (Radivojevich) and maneuver with his right along the Tyrol and the Alpine Valleys. His advanced guard, Fenner’s division, would push toward Trento. In the meantime a column of five battalions, two squadrons of hussars, and a battery (about 3,000 men), under the command of GM Eckhardt, would descend the Piave Valley as far as Belluno and Bassano, where it would threaten Euge`ne’s lines of communication from Treviso to Vicenza and Verona.30 These maneuvers would oblige the Army of Italy to abandon the line of the Isonzo and quickly retreat or face being cut off from its depots. According to Hiller’s plan, Eckhardt’s main column marched rapidly from Sexten to Cortina d’Ampezzo and down the Piave Valley, covered on either side by small detachments. It easily overran the weak French outposts at Longarone and Belluno.31 On 24 October it moved onto the Venetian plain at Bassano. Leaving a strong garrison in Bassano, Eckhardt pushed forward as far as Cittadella and Castelfranco and sent patrols to the bridge over the River Brenta on the road from Treviso to Vicenza.32 MOVEMENT BEHIND THE TAGLIAMENTO AND ON THE ADIGE The viceroy had to the last refused to believe the menace of a pending Bavarian defection. For obvious reasons, the prospect of waging war upon his father-in-law clearly did not appeal to him. However, as soon as he learned of the Ried Treaties, and his subordinates’ reports informed him of General Fenner’s advance in Tyrol and Eckhardt’s penetration into the Upper Piave Valley, Euge`ne decided to resume his retrograde movement behind the Tagliamento, then successively toward the Adige. His plan was to be carried out by means of a timely echeloned withdrawal of his two wings. A strong screen of troops would maintain the position along the Isonzo so as to cover the withdrawal and keep the Austrian left wing at bay. By ordering a general retreat, Euge`ne’s first goal was to fight off the Austrian raid coming from the Upper Piave Valley, which threatened to debouch into the plain and cut his lines of communication. Second, the viceroy aimed at lending support to Gifflenga in Tyrol, by shortening the distance between the latter and his forces in the Venetian plain. To the same end, he had prescribed that new units be raised in Verona, drawing troops off from a number of gendarmerie companies of the inner departments of the Kingdom of Italy (around 800 cavalry and 1,200 infantry).33 To gain time Euge`ne also resorted to cunning. On 16 October, General d’Anthouard walked into an Austrian advanced post before Tarvis, bringing a letter of the viceroy to FZM Hiller, which contained an offer of truce. The French emissary was soon received by FML Marschall, but he insisted to be accorded an interview with the commander in chief. As FZM Hiller’s headquarters were miles far from the front, the parliamentary was likely, so hoped

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the viceroy, to take a couple of days to reach Hiller. This could grant Euge`ne a precious respite to carry out his preparations for the planned retreat and the defense of Venice.34 D’Anthouard’s mission was further delayed by torrential rain, which had swollen the rivers and made movements difficult. He eventually managed to have another meeting with FML Marschall at Resciutta, which bore no results.35 On 17 October, General Palombini was ordered to move with Galimberti’s brigade and to be in Conegliano on 20 October at the disposition of General Grenier. By directing Palombini into the Conegliano-Bassano area, Euge`ne explicitly meant to hinder any Austrian movement toward the plain through the Sugana and the Piave Valleys.36 This order, however, came too late to prevent Eckhardt’s advance from Belluno to Feltre and Bassano, which continued unopposed. Ruggieri’s brigade, of the same Italian division, left a single battalion on the Isonzo, reunited in Palmanova, and occupied the bridgehead on the Tagliamento, near Codroipo. On 20 October, General Grenier left his position in Venzone and Ospedaletto, with the divisions of Rouyer and Gratien, to cross the Tagliamento and move to Feltre and Bassano. Euge`ne was aware of the movements made by General Hiller toward Tyrol with the right and center of the Austrian army. With the Austrians masters of Trento and Belluno, Euge`ne judged that it was Hiller’s goal to move troops via Bassano and Ceneda against the left flank of the Army of Italy. He believed that General Grenier’s force of two divisions (plus Galimberti’s brigade), whose march was to precede the movement of the rest of the army by three days, would force the Austrian’s advanced corps to withdraw and reunite with the main body of their army, which at that time had not yet moved beyond Bruneck. With his left now free and assured of his communications with Verona, Euge`ne hoped to have time to take up a position behind the Piave and to hold it for a few days. He was to arrive there while Grenier was before Bassano. Quesnel’s division reunited with Campi’s brigade in Cividale, while Soulier’s brigade was sent to Ospedaletto to replace the Left Corps. Marcognet’s division withdrew from the right bank of the Isonzo and concentrated in Cormons. Bonnemains’s cavalry brigade, formed by the 31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment and the 4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment, joined General Grenier on the other side of the Tagliamento. The headquarters and the reserve remained in Gradisca. By 22 October the right wing of the Army of Italy, covered by its screens, had abandoned the line of the Isonzo. The Austrian left wing followed slowly and at a respectful distance. The day after, Euge`ne’s headquarters moved to Udine, and Soulier’s brigade received orders to move the following day to San Daniele. Before this could happen, a sudden attack of Mayer’s and Vecsey’s brigades forced Soulier to withdraw in good order under the cover of the garrison of the fortress of Osoppo.37 He arrived in San Daniele on 25 October and crossed the Tagliamento to establish himself in Spilimbergo. On 24 October, Marcognet’s brigades approached Udine, and the army headquarters was estab-

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lished in Codroipo. Strong garrisons were left in the two fortresses of Osoppo (800 men) and Palmanova (3,500).38 On 24 October an Austrian party of about 200 infantry and cavalry was sent eastward by General Eckhardt to seize the important bridge on the Piave at Nervesa. They were, however, intercepted near the Montello forest and pushed back by Grenier’s advanced guard before reaching their objective. On 26 October, Galimberti’s brigade (Palombini’s 5th division), which had in the meantime received orders to continue its movement to Verona and report to General Gifflenga, arrived in Castelfranco and pushed Eckhardt’s pickets back to Bassano. Under French pressure, the Austrian general started taking measures to defend this town.39 FZM Hiller had correctly anticipated the French withdrawal from the line of the Isonzo and ordered FML Frimont to set off in a lively pursuit with his light cavalry.40 Frimont, who was now in command of the Austrian left wing (27 battalions and 31 squadrons) reacted, however, rather lethargically. It is likely that the Austrian wing commander had been shaken by Grenier’s coup de main at Resciutta on the 13 October and had decided to act very cautiously. As a matter of fact, he summoned Hiller for more reinforcements, which the commander in chief curtly refused.41 Frimont’s hesitation was not, however, the sole cause of the Austrian belated pursuit. The French had destroyed the bridges on the Isonzo and the Tagliamento, and any movement was delayed by strong rains that lasted for several days. Frimont’s fresh appointment at the head of the Austrian left wing was not due to last for long. On 22 October he received an order to rejoin the main army in Germany. FML Radivojevich took over again.42 On 24 October, General Starhemberg, who commanded the advanced guard, eventually gave orders to cross the Isonzo. After taking positions on the right bank, he limited himself to pushing reconnaissances toward Udine and Palmanova and kept his men busy with the reconstruction of the bridges at Gorizia and Sagrado. The next day the main body of FML Radivojevich’s corps was across the river, and a junction was established with Vecsey’s brigade at Udine. On Vecsey’s right General Mayer had not yet reached Gemona, being satisfied with investing the fortress of Osoppo.43 On 26 October, Starhemberg occupied Codroipo but failed to give orders to repair the bridge on the Tagliamento. In the meantime Vecsey deployed his brigade along the left bank of the Tagliamento in front of Soulier’s troops, while Radivojevich arrived in sight of Palmanova and detached Csivich’s brigade with four battalions and six guns to invest the fortress. Mayer’s brigade marched on San Daniele.44 Two days later Starhemberg’s advanced guard crossed the Tagliamento on the repaired bridge and made for Pordenone. Nugent’s corps was still busy with the siege of the citadel of Trieste, which was carried out with the support of the British fleet of Admiral Fremantle.45

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THE AFFAIR AT VOLANO, IN TYROL, 26 OCTOBER After the capture of Bozen, GM Fenner had wisely allowed his troops some days of rest. This gave the Austrian main body in Tyrol time to draw closer to the advanced guard. However, realizing that Gifflenga had left his flanks uncovered, Fenner did not stay idle and promptly sent detachments down the lateral valleys. On 15 October, Gifflenga’s division, whose battle losses and desertions had now reduced it to a strength of only 1,600, evacuated Trento and withdrew on the strong positions of Volano and Castel Pietra, about 15 miles south of Trento. That same evening Fenner’s advanced guard was before the gates of Trento, laid siege to the city citadel defended by a small garrison, and sent parties toward Arco in Val Giudicaria and Primolano in Val Sugana so as to cover his corps on both flanks. In response to the evacuation of Trento, which raised new alarm in Verona and Milan, the viceroy declared a state of siege for the fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, Legnago and Verona. GM Fenner, however, did not intend to advance any further until being joined by Stanissavlevich’s brigade.46 On October 18 the Austrian forces in Tyrol were still loosely scattered along the Adige Valley and the Pusteria Valley (Pustertal). Stanissavlevich’s brigade had not yet arrived in Bozen. Vlasitz’s brigade of FML Marziani’s division was in sight of Brixen, while Winzian’s brigade of the same division had its head in Mu¨hlbach and its tail in Bruneck. GM Wrede’s cavalry followed closely. General Stutterheim’s grenadier brigade lagged well behind and was due in Toblach not before 20 October.47 This serpentine of troops trudged along the Tyrol defiles at a very slow pace. On the evening of 22 October Stanissavlevich’s brigade eventually arrived in sight of Trento. As the concentration of his corps around Trento was going on, albeit slowly, FZM Hiller’s plan began taking shape. In a letter to Frimont he envisaged two alternatives. In case the enemy made a stand along the lines of the Tagliamento and the Piave, he would march from Trento down the Sugana Valley to rejoin General Eckhardt in Bassano. On the other hand, should the viceroy continue his retreat toward the line of the Adige, the Austrian commander would launch his divisions on Verona so as to prevent the enemy rushing behind the walls of the fortress of Mantua. After a lull of a few days, GM Fenner planned to attack Gifflenga in his strong position in front of Volano. The action was due on 25 October, but it was postponed until the following day to allow FML Sommariva’s troops, which had just joined Fenner in Trento, some hours of rest.48 That morning rain and mist delayed the movements of the three columns and prevented any coordination. The left column (seven companies of the Szekler Grenzer and six of Tyrolian Schu¨tzen) moved from the lake of Caldonazzo down the rough road to Lavarone and attacked General Mazzucchelli’s troops at Folgaria. The fighting went on for several hours, and in the afternoon, Mazzucchelli received some reinforcements from Serrada. As the night fell, the Austrians were masters of

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Folgaria, but they had not made any further progress. The center column, composed of Stanissavlevich and Vlasitz’s brigade under the command of GM Fenner, started its attack at 1:30 P.M. They rapidly seized the village of Calliano, the bridge behind the village, and the fle`che covering the bridge. Their success, however, did not last for long—soon the French counterattacked and retook the bridge under the cover of strong artillery fire from the elevated position of Castel Pietra. In the fighting for Calliano, GM Fenner fell wounded and was immediately replaced by General Vlasitz. The third column (three battalions) advanced down the right bank of the Adige, but it did not take part in the fighting. Though the outcome of the battle had not been entirely negative for the French, during the night Mazzucchelli unwisely withdrew from Serrada. His right now uncovered, General Gifflenga was then obliged to retreat beyond Rovereto, which was occupied the following morning by General Vlasitz.49 Upon receiving some reinforcements from Verona, namely, a conscript battalion and a squadron of the 5/Napoleon Dragoons, on 28 October, Gifflenga tried to reverse the tide and attacked, in his turn, General Vlasitz’s positions at Marco. The beginning of the battle was advantageous to the 6th Division, but Gifflenga’s troops soon became disordered. A battalion of the 2nd Provisional Regiment, formed by the department companies of Lario, Alto Po, and Agogna, was attacked by a squadron of the Frimont Hussar Regiment, threw down its arms, and fled.50 The Austrians gained ground, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that General Gifflenga was able to rally his troops and stop the Austrians. According to French reports, the Dalmatian Regiment, which lost its colonel, and the light artillery performed exceptionally well in this engagement. Gifflenga was obliged to withdraw on the Rivoli defile, where he took shelter in a double line of entrenchments.51 Sources state that the Austrians lost more than 400 men in this action. The French lost 12 officers and 450 men prisoners, in large part from the departmental battalion that had broken and caused the disorder, plus another 500 killed and wounded. General Vlasitz sent reconnaissances from Rovereto toward Marostica to reestablish the link with Eckhardt’s column and toward Rocca d’Anfo to menace Brescia. With the news of the evacuation of Trento by the 6th Division, Galimberti’s brigade, which had marched on Conegliano, received orders to move to Verona to support General Gifflenga. On 28 October, Galimberti was in Verona.52 In the meantime, General Grenier had arrived in Postumia on 25 October, on the heights of Treviso. The following day he moved his two divisions and Bonnemain’s cavalry brigade toward Bassano. Eckhardt’s brigade, which occupied that position, covered it and faced Castelfranco. According to Euge`ne’s instructions, Grenier had to retake Bassano so as to allow the Army of Italy a safe retreat behind the Adige. Euge`ne was so worried about Eckhardt’s raid that he defensively deployed a large body of troops, among them the Italian Guard, that was posted in reserve at Castelfranco.53 On 26 October, General Grenier moved to take up positions in Rossano and

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San Zenone along two major roads leading to Bassano. An elite battalion and a platoon of chasseurs,54 which formed the advanced guard, engaged that day toward evening the Austrian advanced guard in a skirmish that ended at nightfall with no substantial advantage to either side. The Austrian outposts were pushed back on Ca Rezzonico, only a few hundred meters southeast of Bassano.55 An attack scheduled on 28 October was postponed, as the weather was very bad, with heavy rain falling almost continually.56 False reports exaggerated the Austrian strength in Bassano, and 27 and 28 October passed with only reconnaissances. Grenier’s unusual prudence, theoretically allowing time for FZM Hiller to send Eckhardt reinforcements from Trento, could make the already difficult situation of the Army of Italy even worse. Hiller, however, did not take advantage of this. Had he dispatched one or two brigades down the Sugana Valley to reinforce Eckhardt in Bassano, the course of the entire campaign might have changed considerably. In the meantime, Euge`ne had decided to abandon the line of the Livenza River, and his two divisions, together with the Royal Guard, were approaching the Piave. On 29 October the Austrian general Eckhardt had Casoni occupied with a battalion and some light troops. They were to observe and hinder communications between the 2nd Division in Rossano and the 3rd Division in San Zenone. General Grenier ordered General Bonnemains to attack and occupy Casoni. That same day, toward 5:00 P.M., General Bonnemains departed Bessica with a battalion of the 6/7th Line Regiment (from the 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade), two voltigeur companies of the 9th Line, and a squadron of the 31st Chasseurs a` Cheval. Another squadron of the same regiment was sent to Cassola to take the Austrians in the flank. Chef de bataillon Fonvielle, leading the 6/7th Line, arrived before Casoni and attacked it immediately. The Austrians resisted strongly, but they were overthrown and forced to withdraw to Bassano. Night brought the engagement to an end. French communications with San Zenone were reopened and a few prisoners taken. General Bonnemains left half a battalion, with a platoon of the 31st Chasseurs in Casoni. The remainder of the troops moved on to Ca-Mora castle to observe the main road from Bassano. Two companies of voltigeurs of the 9th Regiment were posted in echelons between Casoni and Bessica. A cavalry patrol was sent through Capo di Villa and San Marco to establish contact with Gratien’s division, then in San Zenone.57 During the morning of 30 October a body of infantry and a few squadrons moved from Bassano against Casoni to retake the village, to which the Austrians attached considerable importance. The half battalion, which was before the village, was forced to withdraw into the cemetery and defend itself. General Bonnemains advanced three more companies, which formed a reserve in Casoni, and ordered a squadron of the 31st Chasseurs to maneuver against the right of the Austrians. These dispositions sufficed to check the Austrian designs. They were beaten and forced to withdraw on Bassano. The Austrian losses in dead and wounded were significant, and they lost more than 100 prisoners.

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AFFAIR AT BASSANO Despite the failed attempt on 26 October,58 on 31 October, Lieutenant General Grenier received orders to renew his attack on Bassano. The viceroy had arrived at Rossano the day before, and after visiting Grenier’s positions, he realized that the presence of the Austrians in Bassano, where they held one of the two major bridges over the Brenta, was too dangerous for the retrograde movement of his army.59 On the morning of 31 October a strong rain swelled the rivers. After noon, as the storm began to abate, the French attack on Bassano began. The righthand column, formed with a brigade of the 3rd Division under General Gratien, advanced down the road from Asolo to Ca Piloni so it could turn the Austrians left at San Giacomo and rear by moving through the Brenta Valley, north of Bassano, and cut the road to Trento.60 The left-hand column, under General Rouyer, moved from Rossano down the main road from Castelfranco, marching against Bassano. The central column, under General Bonnemains, which consisted of his cavalry brigade and several battalions from Rouyer’s division, took a side road through Ca-Mora that ran from Castelfranco to Bassano. Sources conflict, but Euge`ne either advanced with the right column or advanced between the right and center columns. Grenier apparently advanced in a position between the center and left columns. The Italian Guard was to remain in front of Castelfranco in reserve. General Eckhardt occupied Bassano and supported his right wing on Ca Rezzonico. His left wing stood in San Giacomo. In front of his left wing, by Ca Negri, stood an advanced guard. Similar advanced posts stood before the center and right facing Cassoni and Rosa. The city of Bassano had been hastily prepared for the defense and stood in a good state to resist the French attack. The first engagement occurred by Ca-Negri. Gratien’s column quickly defeated the Austrians, passed Mussolente, and pushed on to Brenta, striking from Cornero left of Bassano toward the heights that dominated the road running down the Brenta Valley. General Eckhardt had slightly over 3,000 men facing two French divisions and a cavalry brigade. He pulled his forces into Bassano. When night fell and further defense of Bassano was impossible, Eckhardt withdrew his forces to the left bank of the Brenta and moved on Cismon. Oberst Bretschneider, commanding the rear guard, left Bassano a few hours after his commander, only to find that the road to Trento had been cut by Gratien, and was forced to withdraw over the Brenta bridge. From there he moved to Rubbio along the road to Asiago. General Grenier then moved into the Brenta Valley with his division, advancing to Cavallino (four miles north of Bassano) after detaching a force to secure Bassano.61 Euge`ne arrived in Bassano about 5:00 P.M. According to Vignolle’s exaggerated figures, the Austrian losses were 400 to 500 dead, a large number of wounded, 300 prisoners,62 and one cannon.63 During the retreat, the Bianchi, Jellacich, and a battalion of the HohenloheBartenstein Infantry Regiments and the Frimont Hussars suffered heavily.

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As Grenier was busy pursuing the enemy, the Italian Guard occupied Bassano that evening. The positive outcome of the affair at Bassano raised the morale of the Army of Italy. But it came too late to change the strategic situation and avoid a general retreat behind the Adige. NOVEMBER 1813 On 1 November the Army of Italy continued its withdrawal toward the Adige and moved on Legnago and Verona. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions passed Castelfranco and Vicenza. The 4th Division marched via Treviso and Padoua in order to cover the movement of the grand artillery park, which had taken the road from Legnago to Valeggio. A strong detachment of the forces that had fought at Bassano remained there with Euge`ne to cover the retreat of the main army over the Brenta at the Fontaniva bridge. On the same day the viceroy ordered a reconnaissance to ascertain whether the Austrians were still in control of the hills north of Bassano and Vicenza. General Grenier advanced as far as Cismon, where he encountered Eckhardt’s outposts. After two French battalions had failed to storm the Austrian position, an indecisive cannonade followed that lasted till late evening.64 By that time, the detachment sent by Eckhardt to guard his left had established a link northeast of Bassano with Radivojevich’s advanced guard on the right bank of the Piave, while to the west Winzian’s brigade had occupied the Sette Comuni plateau.65 It was, however, too late for the Austrians to seriously jeopardize the French retreat by threatening to fall on their right flank. Eckhardt’s repulse from Bassano and Radivojevich’s slowness, together with the swollen rivers, had gained the French enough time to execute their withdrawal safely. At the beginning of November, Eckhardt’s brigade was put under the command of Radivojevich. Wrede’s cavalry brigade was moved from the Tyrol, via the Sugana Valley, to the left wing so as to help Radivojevich in gaining control of the crucial position of Caldiero.66 On 2 November, Euge`ne was in Vicenza, and two days later, the army’s headquarters moved to Verona, where they joined Palombini’s division. Soon afterward the Army of Italy took up positions behind the Adige. The few troops left on the left bank to cover Verona were under the command of General Bonnemains and consisted of three battalions of the 1st Division and his cavalry brigade, which consisted of the 31st French Chasseurs and the 4th Italian Chasseurs. Rambourgt’s brigade was also in the rear guard. While in Bassano, Euge`ne had learned the results of the action at Volano. He responded by planning to attack the Austrian advanced guard in the Adige Valley. He hoped to push it back and induce an Austrian concentration toward Rovereto that would consequently delay any movement on Brescia and the rear of the Army of Italy. However, in order to execute this plan, it was necessary to relieve the pressure from the Austrian columns that were moving on Verona via Bassano and Castelfranco. In consequence, General Bonnemains was ordered

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to delay the march of these columns as much as possible by destroying all the bridges and fighting delaying actions. On 2 November, Bonnemains’s forces took up positions in San Pietro and destroyed the bridges at Bassano and Fontaniva over the Brenta. On 3 November, General Bonnemains destroyed another bridge and moved to Vicenza. On 4 November, after evacuating the magazines and hospitals, he moved to Soave and Villabella. During this march, he also broke down the bridges at Montebello and Villanova, which further delayed the Austrian advance. Bonnemains had another precious ally in the heavy seasonal rains that had so swollen the rivers that the Austrians did not harass or even follow the rear guard. In fact, it was only on 2 November that General Starhemberg’s advanced guard managed to cross the Piave at a ford near Cimadolmo facing Treviso, while the rest of the left wing was to follow the day after.67 Bassano was retaken on the 4th by Eckhardt’s brigade, which soon continued its march to Vicenza. Finally, on 6 November, General Bonnemains took up a position in San Martino Buon Albergo, before Verona, having his advanced posts in Vago and his reserve in San Michele.68 The first Austrian patrols (from Eckhardt’s brigade) arrived on the east bank of the Alpone on 7 November. Captain of Engineers Fallot had directed the destruction of the various bridges, which he carried out with great zeal. Further east, the remaining French forces prepared to sustain a siege. The garrison of Palmanova was not completed until the army crossed the Tagliamento. The Venice garrison received a reinforcement of a brigade and a half battery after the army recrossed the Piave. The naval defense of the Venice lagoons had yet to be organized. The Prame divisions, floating batteries, launches, and gunboats were stationed in all the canals accessible to the Austrians. All of the entrances were barricaded with stakes and floating booms. The first line of defense was protected by the fire of warships. The armament of the prames, floating batteries, and the like, amounted to 336 guns, consisting of cannons, carronades, and howitzers of all calibers. In addition to this armament, which was larger than it had ever been, a large number of boats of all types were built, to augment the armament of the city or to replace losses. The guns in these reserve boats were taken from the arsenal and from various ships. The garrison, including the reinforcement sent by Euge`ne and the army’s sick, came to about 8,000 soldiers, of whom 6,000 were fit for service. The naval troops ran to about 3,200 men. On 3 November, General Schilt departed Treviso, which he commanded, to move into the Marghera Fortress. That same day, at noon, Mestre was occupied by the Austrians. FML Marschall had been assigned to oversee the Austrian siege of Venice and cooperate with the British fleet under Fremantle. The Austrian general had at his disposal only the two brigades of Mayer and Rebrovich.69 The Army of Italy, upon arriving on the Adige, found itself considerably diminished. The detachment of garrisons for the various fortresses had greatly reduced the number of battalions.70 The number of engagements in which they

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had been involved and the sick had significantly weakened the remaining battalions. This circumstance prompted Euge`ne to dissolve the 3rd Division and absorb it into the others. He also reduced the number of battalions in each regiment. The cadres of the disbanded battalions were sent back to the depots, and to Alessandria, to be completed during the next conscription. The Army of Italy found itself reduced to four divisions, to which Euge`ne added two further detached corps. The Right Corps was charged with watching and defending the lower Adige, while that of the left was charged with guarding the valleys by Brescia. This new organization occurred on 6 November. The General Staff was unchanged, except that General Dode arrived to command the Engineers and had Chef de bataillon Beaufort d’Hautpoul as his Chief of Staff. 1st Lieutenancy: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Count Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3,6/42nd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment

In addition, the division had two companies of artillery, including one of horse artillery, two train companies, and 12 guns. The division had a total of 7,108 men. 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 1/,2/106th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment

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In addition, two companies of foot artillery, two train companies, and 12 guns. The division had a total of 7,117 men. 2nd Lieutenancy: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Count Verdier Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Querelles 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Bossi Sainte-Agathe Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/9th Line Regiment 8th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/7th Line Regiment 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 1st Foreign Regiment (4 bns)

In addition, one company of horse artillery, one of foot artillery, two train companies, and 12 guns. The division had a total of 7,696 men. 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 1/,2/,3/2nd Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/3rd Italian Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 2/,3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 1st Provisional Italian Line Regiment (2 bns) 2nd Provisional Italian Line Regiment (2 bns)

In addition, the division had one squadron of the Napoleon dragoons, a company of horse artillery, one of foot artillery, two train companies, and 12 guns. The division had a total of 5,659 men. Detached Right Corps: Adjudant-Commandant Montfalcon 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment Elite Battalion/1st Foreign Regiment

This detached corps had a total of 1,049 men.71

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Detached Left Corps: Ge´ne´ral Gifflenga 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment 2/6th Italian Line Regiment Foot Gendarmes (1 bn) Horse Gendarmes (1 sqn)

In addition, there was a detachment of 100 Dalmatians. This corps had a total of 3,700 men.72 Cavalry: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Derivaux Brigade: Colonel Rambourgt 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 3/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/,3/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1st French Hussar Regiment (21⁄2 sqns) 1/,2/,3/,4/Queen’s Dragoon Regiment

Plus a company of horse artillery, one of train, and six guns. The force had a total of 2,885 men. Reserve Artillery: 14 guns, 375 men, and 409 horses Grand Artillery Park: 1,661 men, 1,096 horses, no guns, but many artillery vehicles of all types, including munition and replacement carriages.

The Italian Royal Guard was as in the previous return.73 The Army of Italy reunited that day on the right bank of the Adige and occupied the following positions: The 1st Division was in Verona, extending to the right with posts as far as

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Zevio. The 4th Division was around Legnago, extending its left to Ronco. The 2nd Division was in Verona, with its left extending to Bussolengo. The 5th Division was in positions in Rivoli and Corona. The Right Detached Corps stood between Legnago and Roverchiara. The Left Detached Corps stood in Desenzano, Salo, and the Brescian Valleys. The rear guard, under Bonnemains, stood in San Michele, San Martino Buon Albergo, and Vago on the left bank of the Adige. The remaining two cavalry brigades were deployed with one in Isola Porcarizza and San Pietro di Legnago and the second in San Giovanni Lupatolo. The Italian Royal Guard was in Villafranca, and the army general headquarters was in Verona. The reserve artillery was in Goito and Roverbella, while the artillery grand park was in Valeggio. During his stay in Verona the viceroy took measures to hasten the completion of the 2nd Reserve Division. All gendarmes of the lost Venetian departments were assigned to this unit. The 1st and the 2nd Provisional Regiments were detached to Palombini’s division, together with a squadron of the 5/Napoleone Dragoons. In the meantime, after the garrison of the Trento Fortress had capitulated, leaving six guns and about 100,000 cartridges in Austrian hands,74 the situation along the Upper Adige was relatively quiet. The French held the entrenched positions at Rivoli, while the Austrian outposts stood at Borghetto covering Vlasitz’s main body, which had settled down in Ala. Small Austrian detachments were also sent on the right bank of the Adige to take hold of Avio and to reconnoiter the tracks on Monte Baldo, which in theory could allow the Austrians to outflank the French position at Rivoli. In fact, the fresh and untimely snow that fell at the end of October had made them unpassable. Two flying columns, under Captains Marinkovich and Rakowski, were detached toward Rocca d’Anfo with orders to penetrate into the Trompia and the Camonica Valleys. Their apparition raised an alarm in Brescia and its surroundings, forcing General Gifflenga to hastily move his detached corps from Salo to this city.75 Although the withdrawal from the Isonzo had been conducted in good order and without serious losses, and the present position behind the Adige had in several past occasions proved strong, the Army of Italy, mostly formed by conscripts, was now so tired and disheartened that most generals, with the exception of Grenier, had suggested the retreat continue. There were reasons for pessimism, not the least that the rate of desertion was increasing every day and that no further reinforcement was expected in the near future. It is true that on 2 November Berthier had ordered General Fontanelli to concentrate all Italian troops in Germany so as to hasten their return to Milan. But it took more than six weeks before the remaining 3,000 men and 500 horses (out of 28,500 men, 9,000 horses, and 46 guns, which formed the contingent of the Kingdom of Italy at the outbreak of hostilities) crossed the Alps.76 Euge`ne was also worried about his father-in-law’s defection and Neapolitan movements. His anxiety was well founded. Upon returning from Erfurt, where he had had his last rendezvous with Napoleon, King Joaquin Murat made a stop

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in Milan on 31 October. From the capital of the Italian kingdom he addressed a letter to the emperor renewing his pledge to contribute to the defense of North Italy an army of 40,000 men. In the very same letter, however, the king of Naples seemed to bind his intervention upon the emperor’s consent to his replacing Euge`ne at the head of the Army of Italy and establishing his rule over the Roman states. Such a mixture of promises and requests, together with the generally arrogant tone of the letter, indicates that Murat had not yet taken his final decision but that his mind still swayed between loyalty and treachery.77 On 4 November Murat was again back in Naples, from where he could renew his diplomatic moves toward the Allied powers. There were also problems on the Austrian side. A crabbed Hiller had in the last weeks fallen out with the Aulic Council, and this might partially account for his exaggerated laziness throughout this phase of the campaign. Eventually, a letter from the emperor dated 3 November communicated the decision to replace him with FM Bellegarde, who was then serving as the president of the Aulic Council. However, the new commander in chief was to join his army only at the end of the year.78 On 9 November an Austrian column penetrated into Valcamonica, advancing toward Brescia. General Gifflenga moved against it with part of his corps and forced it to withdraw back through the mountains. TYROLIAN AFFAIRS On 7 November FMZ Hiller was informed that the Aulic Council had decided to send substantial reinforcements to the Austrian army in Italy, in the form of 39 battalions and 14 squadrons. About a half of this force was to be drawn from Germany. About the same time Hiller issued orders to initiate a movement that would radically change the strategic situation of the whole campaign. Pflacher’s strong division, whose leading column was due to arrive in Trento by 10 November, would immediately leave Trento, after only a day of rest, and march on Bassano, moving southeast down the Sugana Valley. AUSTRIAN ARMY UNDER FZM HILLER (6 NOVEMBER 1813) Independent Divisions: FZM Hiller Division: FZM Hiller Brigade: Generalmajor Tomassich (in Dalmatia) 2 Battalions 1 Squadron 14

⁄ Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent (in Trieste) 3 Battalions 1

⁄2 Squadron

14

⁄ Battery

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 Brigade: Generalmajor Csivich (below Palmanova) 4 Battalions 2 Squadrons 34

⁄ Battery

Detachment: Major Novich (below Osoppo) 1 Battalion 1

⁄2 Squadron

Division: FML Marschall (in Padua) Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer (in Mestre) 3 Battalions 1

⁄2 Squadron

1 Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis (in Padua) 3 Battalions 1 Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich (in Chioggia) 3 Battalions 2 Squadrons 1 Battery Corps: FML Radiovjevich (in Cittadella) Division: FML Merville (in Vicence) Brigade: Generalmajor Starhemberg (between Legnago and Bevilacqua) 4 Battalions 7 Squadrons 1 Horse Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt (between Vicence and Caldiero) 4 Battalions 31⁄2 Squadrons 1

⁄2 Horse Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey (in Vicence) 4 Battalions 31⁄2 Squadrons 1 Horse Battery Division: FML Pflacher (marching on Bassano) Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim (in reserve between Bassano, Castelfranco, and Cittadella) 7 Battalions 1 Battery

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Corps: FML Sommariva (in Rovereto) Division: FML Fenner (in Ala) Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasitz (between Ossenigo and Peri) 3 Battalions 11⁄2 Squadrons 1

⁄2 Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Suden (between Ala and Borghetto) 4 Battalions 4 Squadrons 1 Battery Division: FML Marziani (in Rovereto) Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian (on Rocca d’Anof, Lake Garde, Monte-Baldo, SanGiacomo, Brentonico, and Tonale) 4 Battalions 1 Battery Artillery Reserve of Right Wing 6 12pdr cannons 9 Field carriages 16 Munitions caissons 1 Tool caisson 17 Miscellaneous wagons 1 Forge

Stutterheim’s grenadier brigade also was to march from Rovereto, via Schio, to Vicenza, where it was expected to arrive by 12 November. To Hiller’s mind, these movements had become necessary in order to prosecute a vigorous siege of Venice, as well as concentrating a body of troops on the Alpone sufficient to force a passage. The Alpone was watched over by a strong French rear guard. The Austrian leader felt, on the other hand, that FML Sommariva, who was in command of the Adige Valley sector, had enough troops and that these troops occupied a position that was strong enough to safely resist any French advance on Rovereto.79 Even so, General Fenner’s advanced guard at Ala had been reinforced by the arrival of Stanissavlevich’s brigade.80 As Euge`ne sent a reconnaissance in force on Rovereto, General Sommariva took measures to reinforce his positions on the two banks of the Adige and ordered Stanissavlevich to send detachments to the northern bank of Lake Garda. Sommariva, however, cautiously followed General Vlasitz’s advice and called off the projected raid against Madonna della Corona on Monte Baldo.81 On 9 November Euge`ne marched on Rovereto with the 2nd Lieutenancy. By pushing the Austrians back to Rovereto the viceroy, who was not yet informed

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of Hiller’s movement on Bassano, hoped to achieve the result of forcing the enemy to withdraw from the Brescian Valley and delaying the Austrian advance down the Adige Valley. Should the action on Rovereto succeed, Euge`ne, taking advantage of Hiller’s need to reorganize his corps after being repulsed, would rapidly countermarch his forces back to Verona so as to attack Radivojevich at Caldiero on the Alpone. The glorious memory of Napoleon’s strategy in the First Italian Campaign clearly lurked in Euge`ne’s plan.82 This strong reconnaissance was to advance in five different columns marching along parallel lines astride of the Adige River. At the extreme right, Schmitz’s brigade marched in two columns. The one on the right moved via Grezzana and Erbezzo in Pantena Valley to fall on the flank of the enemy at Ala. The second took the route through Valpolicella to debouch at Peri and Ossenigo. Darnaud’s brigade, supported by a detachment of Galimberti’s brigade (3rd Italian Line and two guns) that had crossed over the Adige at Rivoli, marched on the main road on the left bank of that river. The viceroy was with this column. The rest of Palombini’s Italian division moved via Rivoli in two columns. One, under the command of Palombini, advanced along the right bank on the road to Canale and Brentino. It consisted of the 2/,3/2nd Italian Line, two provisional regiments from the 2nd Reserve Division, the 5/Napoleone Dragoons, and some artillery. General Ruggieri was in command of the column at the extreme left, formed by the two battalions of the 2nd Italian Light and the 1/ 2nd Italian Line. His task was to move from Caprino via Corona and Ferrara di Monte Baldo along the heights commanding the right bank.83 To face the pending threat, FML Fenner could field about 32 companies, four squadrons, and six guns, most of them belonging to Vlasitz’s brigade. They were deployed along a line that ran from Brentino, on the right bank of the Adige, through Peri, on the left bank, to Erbezzo in the Pantena Valley. A few units were kept in reserve at Ala and Rovereto. Stanissavlevich’s brigade, then on the right along the bank of the Garda Lake, was temporarily out of reach.84 In the late morning General Darnaud’s brigade attacked the Austrians in a position at Ossenigo, above Peri, encountering stiff resistance. By that time the two columns on the right had already taken the village of Fosse and pushed the Austrian garrison back to Borghetto. On the right bank Palombini’s column cleared the hamlet of Rivalta of the Austrian pickets just before noon. He then ordered his artillery to unlimber just beyond Rivalta and open fire on the flank of the Austrian troops defending Ossenigo on the opposite bank of the river. These infantry were already under pressure by Darnaud’s column. With this substantial aid from Palombini’s artillery, GD Rouyer renewed his effort, and finally Darnaud’s men carried the position. The two columns proceeding along the opposite banks of the Adige managed to keep the same pace of advance, thus providing mutual support. Later in the afternoon, after a ferocious fight, two battalions of the 2nd Italian Line chased the Austrians from the entrenched village of Belluno Veronese. Palombini’s

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force bivouacked in Belluno for the night, together with Ruggieri’s column. The viceroy and Rouyer spent the night in Ossenigo, while Vlasitz, fearing his left flank would be turned, withdrew his troops from Borghetto to Ala. That night on the right bank the Austrians placed outposts in Avio. On 10 November, General Darnaud’s brigade kept advancing along the left bank, but it was continually slowed by all sorts of obstructions the Austrians had left along the defile between Ossenigo and Borghetto. This column, however, attacked and carried the entrenched positions at Vo, Sdruzzina`, and Ala, pushing the Austrians back as far as Marani. The 2/Duka Infantry Regiment occupied Ala, and its 4th Division (7th and 8th Companies) under Hauptman Rahn defended the bridge. Twice Rahn repulsed French attacks on the bridge. The Austrian position, however, became untenable, and the order to withdraw was issued. At about that time an attack by an Italian battalion was broken by a charge executed by a squadron of the Frimont Hussar Regiment. Elsewhere the 9th Company/Duka Regiment, under Hauptman Popparich, was cut off and nearly captured but succeeded in fighting its way to freedom.85 Darnaud’s attack was supported by Schmitz’s brigade, which moved on the Austrian flank debouching from Pantena Valley. This movement forced the Austrians to abandon Ala. That same day General Palombini carried the entrenchments at Campagnola and Avio after a lively engagement. This enabled his artillery to unlimber on the heights of Sabbionara and open an enfilade fire on the Austrian positions on the opposite river bank.86 As night fell, Palombini reached Pilcante, where his column rested for the night. The Austrians had already withdrawn their outposts as far as Villetta, on the right bank, and Serravalle, on the left bank.87 In these engagements the Austrians lost, according to French sources, about 800 men hors de combat and 800 prisoners from the Spleny, Duka, and Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiments, the Frimont Hussar Regiment, and the 8th Ja¨ger Battalion. In his report to FML Sommariva, GM Vlasitz recorded only 275 casualties and 500 prisoners. The French reported suffering 250 casualties, and GD Verdier was shot in the chest but not fatally, while leading an assault on the heights of Sdruzzina`.88 By 11 November, Euge`ne had accomplished his goal, which was to attract the Austrians’ attention to Rovereto and to oblige the withdrawal of the troops marching on Brescia. He withdrew the 2nd Lieutenancy to the positions by Rivoli. There was another reason why Euge`ne contented himself with a simple demonstration on Rovereto, without actually entering the city. This was the approach of the left wing of the Austrians, whose advanced guard (Eckhardt’s brigade) had already passed the Alpone and was beginning to threaten his rear guard at Caldiero. Meanwhile, the Allied pressure on the garrison of Venice increased. On 10 November an English vessel disembarked a mixed force of 500 Austrians and English at the mouth of the Piave. They attacked and carried the Cortelazzo Fort, and the following day, they took the Cavallino redoubt.

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That same day the Austrians advanced from Villanova to Caldiero. Colonel Desmichels, of the 31st Chasseurs, was ordered to lead a reconnaissance against Caldiero with 200 cavalry and a battalion of infantry, where they encountered an Austrian reconnaissance force a short distance from Vago and exchanged a few musket shots with it.89 The Austrian left wing was now under the direct command of FMZ Hiller, who had established his headquarters in Vicenza. The main body kept on concentrating between this city and Montebello. A brigade under GM Starhemberg watched the French posts behind the Adige at Legnago and had parties between Cologna and Lonigo.90 On 12 November three Austrian battalions and two squadrons, supported by four cannons, attacked the French advanced posts in Vago, on the main road to Verona. A company of voltigeurs and a picket of 50 cavalry held their positions behind the canal. General Bonnemains then advanced four companies of the 53rd Line, two squadrons, and a howitzer, under the orders of Chef de bataillon Moreau, to San Martino Buon Albergo. This reinforcement was sufficient to push the Austrians back to Caldiero. The Austrians lost about 20 prisoners and suffered about 50 dead.91 However, from the size of the engagement, these figures seem too high to be accurate. Upon his return from the reconnaissance up the Adige Valley, the viceroy had a meeting with General Fontanelli in Verona. Fontanelli, the present Minister of War of the Kingdom of Italy, had just come back to Italy from Germany, where he had taken part in the Fall Campaign as the commander of the 15th Division (Bertrand’s corps). Having the reputation of being a good soldier as well as a resourceful military organizer, Fontanelli’s arrival boosted the dispirited morale of the Italian army and of its generals.92 COMBAT AT CALDIERO, 15 NOVEMBER With the help of local manpower the Austrians had begun to build entrenchments on the hills between Caldiero and Colognola. By the evening of 14 November, Eckhardt and Vecsey’s brigades had taken position behind this naturally strong line, detaching two companies to Illasi on their right and another three to Bionde di Porcile on their left. The third brigade (Starhemberg) of Merville’s division had been trudging along the muddy roads and was forced to encamp between Lonigo and Arcole, well behind the first line.93 The rest of Radivojevich’s corps was slowly concentrating around Soave. The Austrian disposition appeared to indicate their intention to force passage over the Adige between Zevio and Ronco, as they had done in 1796. Euge`ne resolved, as a result, to attack the Austrians at Caldiero in order to destroy their works as well as to delay the advance of their left wing. Euge`ne’s attack dispositions were completed for 14 November. However, the bad weather required its delay until 15 November. GD Grenier deployed his forces with Quesnel on the left, Marcognet in the center, and Mermet with his

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cavalry and an infantry brigade on the right.94 The main thrust was to be delivered by the 1st Lieutenancy, supported by Rouyer’s division (2nd Lieutenancy). Marcognet’s division and Bonnemains’s cavalry brigade, with a dozen guns,95 departed Vago and moved to a position before Eckhardt’s positions in Caldiero. Quesnel’s division moved through Fontana, between Vago and Lavagno, directing his second brigade (Soulier) to the Austrian’s right (Vescey’s Brigade) by Colognola, and his first brigade (Campi) further to the left, toward Illasi, in order to pass the Austrian line, turn Colognola, and strike the Austrians in the rear. This division was accompanied by a squadron of the 31st Chasseurs and, moving over very mountainous terrain, had only a half battery in support of the second brigade.96 General Mermet, leading the first brigade of Rouyer’s Division, Perreimond’s light cavalry brigade, and six light guns, moved from San Martino Buon Albergo and marched between the Adige and the main road in order to cross the road from Caldiero to Arcole, turn the Austrian left, and attempt to seize the bridge at Villanova. General Rouyer, with his second brigade, was to support Marcognet. The Royal Guard remained in reserve at San Martino Buon Albergo, with two battalions in Verona. The 8/14th Le´ge`re (30th Provisional Demi-Brigade) was left on the Poiano heights to watch the mouth of the Pantena Valley.97 Quesnel’s attack on Colognola and Illasi began between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M. At around 10:00 A.M. three battalions of Campi’s brigade took hold of Illasi.98 By that time, Jeanin’s brigade (Marcognet) successively attacked and pushed back the Austrian posts as far as San Pietro, on the left of Caldiero, and carried this position with a brisk attack by the 53rd Line Regiment, commanded by Colonel Grobon. Having also passed beyond the rise, which was to the right of the road, and which was being attacked frontally by De Conchy’s brigade, they turned on it and took it from the rear. The entrenchments were occupied by the 1st Division99 of the Jellacich Infantry Regiment. A peloton of the 31st Chasseur a` Cheval, commanded by Lieutenant Charbonnier, and the 1st Hussars100 threw themselves into the entrenchments that crowned the rise, sabering all who resisted, and took many of its defenders prisoner. The Austrian Jellacich Regiment lost many prisoners as the voltigeurs of Mermet’s column, together with those of the center column, had already turned the position.101 Exploiting this first success, General Bonnemains pushed his battery of horse artillery forward, down the main road, and positioned it far beyond the Austrian first defensive line, supporting it with a few squadrons. Soon the battery opened a heavy enfilade fire at the range of a half musket shot against the Austrian entrenchments along the heights between Colognola and the road. The Austrians were unable to hold their position and withdrew just after 11:00 A.M. Its front now freed from any obstacle, both of Quesnel’s brigades proceeded toward Soave, pushing Vecsey’s brigade back from position to position, until they were finally driven into the village behind the Alpone stream. The Austrian center (Eckhardt’s brigade) was also thrown back over the Al-

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pone, where they rallied behind the cover of Stutterheim’s grenadiers.102 Mermet’s advanced guard took 23 prisoners on the Gombion heights. Vescey’s brigade moved to a position there and by Monteforte, and a battalion moved into the Soave castle. Soave sits on the valley floor and abuts the foot of a steep hill. On this hill stands a large ruined medieval fortress with curtain walls running from the hilltop, where the old dijon stands, down to the edge of the city of Soave. These curtain walls are close to a mile in circumference. While Soave soon fell into French hands, a battalion of the Chasteler Regiment, reinforced with three landwehr companies, occupied the ruined fortress. With the support of a grenadier battalion, they held this position until the evening, despite numerous French attacks.103 Eckhardt’s brigade occupied Villanova and the Chimani Grenadier Battalion of General Stutterheim was assigned to defend the bridge over the Alpone River. Bonnemains’s brigade, reinforced by a detachment from Quesnel’s division, pursued the Austrians down the main road to the Villanova bridge. The bridge was defended by Stutterheim’s brigade (Pflacher’s division). The Benjowsky Infantry Regiment and the Chimani Grenadier Battalion104 defended the bridge aggressively, launching several counterattacks against the French, but failed to recover any lost ground.105 Near Villanova, Bonnemains’s battery engaged in a heavy artillery duel with Stutterheim’s guns. A second battery had been placed at Bonnemains’s disposition by General Grenier, and it was deployed on Bonnemains’s left, moving against the Soave heights, where it helped keep pressure on the Austrians’ right to continue their withdrawal toward Monteforte. These two batteries, supported by Bonnemains’s brigade, continued their fire until nightfall. The Austrians, however, had deployed 16 cannons to support their new position, and the fire of these guns and their musketry greeted the advancing French warmly, stopping their advance. On the far left of the Austrian position, the companies that occupied Bionde di Porcile had not been engaged during the day. They, however, fell back on Arcole before the night.106 The French losses totaled about 500 men.107 The Austrian losses were about 1,200 to 1,500 hors de combat, 900 prisoners, and two cannons.108 FML Merville was wounded. The Jellacich Infantry Regiment was noted in official reports for its distinguished and honorable defense of its position at Caldiero.109 By that time, FMZ Hiller, who had arrived in Vicenza with his forces on 12 November, ordered three battalions of the Benjowsky Infantry Regiment to occupy Monte Bastia, above Illasi and Cazzano, and four battalions of the Hochund-Deutschmeister Regiment to take up a reserve position in Sorio and Montebello. He also dispatched Starhemberg’s brigade to take position at Arcole and Fo¨slseis’s brigade toward Legnago.110 On 17 November the army withdrew to Verona. However, Jeanin’s brigade, of Marcognet’s division, remained in a position by San Martino Buon Albergo

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and behind the Vago torrent. De Conchy’s brigade was detached and sent toward Ronco and Roverchiara. THE AFFAIR AT SAN MARTINO BUON ALBERGO, 19 NOVEMBER On 18 November Eckhardt’s brigade moved against Vago and pushed the French posts back on the hamlet of San Giacomo. In the meantime, GM Vecsey, who had orders to establish a link with Winzian’s brigade in Pantena Valley, sent reconnaissances from Illasi toward Lavagno. General Marcognet, seeing the Austrian movements on Lavagno and toward Montorio, feared an attack on his left flank. He then ordered Jeanin to withdraw to San Martino Buon Albergo and sent two battalions of the 102nd Line Regiment to hold Montorio.111 FZM Hiller ordered FML Radivojevich to execute a general attack on 19 November. Accordingly, GM Vecsey was to advance with the 1/,2/,3/Chasteler Infantry Regiment, 1/,2/,3/Benjowsky Infantry Regiment, and two squadrons of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment112 over the Lavagno heights and pass by Montorio, moving around the French left and attacking their forces behind Vago and by San Martino Buon Albergo. At the same time, General Eckhardt would move down the main highway with Stutterheim’s brigade as a second line support. His task was to strike the French frontally, while a detachment of the 8th Ja¨ger Battalion, under Hauptman Flette, was to pass through Campalto and fall on their right flank. FZM Hiller advanced with Pflacher’s division to the Colognola heights and Caldiero to support the attack as necessary. The attack began at 9:00 A.M. as ordered, with GM Vecsey easily overrunning the garrison of Musella Castle with the Chasteler Infantry Regiment. The heights by the castle before Montorio were attacked by the Benjowsky Infantry Regiment. The continued advance of these two regiments was to be coordinated. As a battalion of the Benjowsky Regiment overran the French position at Montorio, another battalion of the same regiment marched rapidly against San Michele, with the goal of falling on the French flank. The coordinated attacks of GM Vecsey and GM Eckhardt’s brigades, respectively, on the left flank and the center of the French position forced Marcognet to withdraw Jeanin’s brigade from San Martino Buon Albergo as far as San Michele. General Eckhardt quickly occupied San Martino Buon Albergo, while three battalions of the Hochund-Deutschmeister Regiment took position on the heights north of the village. San Michele was a key position along the ring of hills that formed a natural defensive line east of Verona. In his new strong position, General Marcognet supported himself with only six battalions (29th Provisional with 4/20th, 6/101st, and 6/112th Line Regiments and 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment) until late afternoon when he received reinforcements in the form of two battalions of the 1st Foreign Regiment, led by General Darnaud, of the 2nd Division. The 1st Hussar Regiment contributed by maintaining the communications between the troops who defended San Michele and those in Montorio.

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The attack of the Benjowsky Regiment on San Michele was against a strong French position. The attack stalled, so FZM Hiller ordered General Eckhardt to detach the 3/Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Regiment, under Oberstleutnant Kreyfelle, to strike the French right flank. At the same time Pflacher’s division marched on San Giacomo and Vago.113 The French vigorously defended their entrenchments. Kreyfelle’s battalion marched through the French cannon fire and on San Michele, turning to the left, storming a farm, and extended their left flank to the Adige. Meanwhile, the other three battalions of the Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Regiment pushed into San Michele.114 The Madonna di Campagna Church saw fierce fighting between the 53rd Line and the Bianchi Regiment, changing hands several times. Finally, the Austrian regiment was forced to retreat by the timely arrival of the 1st Foreign Regiment.115 The fight for San Michele lasted until nightfall. As the engagement ended, the French were in possession of only the last few houses.116 The Austrians had Vecsey’s brigade encamping at Montorio, Eckhardt’s brigade at San Martino Buon Albergo, Pflacher’s division with six battalions, eight squadrons, and one battery on the height north of San Martino Buon Albergo, Stutterheim’s grenadier brigade at San Giacomo, and the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment at Caldiero.117 The French estimated the Austrian losses over these two days at 1,200 men hors de combat and 200 prisoners. The Austrians claim that the French lost 700 at San Martino Buon Albergo and 5,000 over the two days. All three figures seem excessive. Though a hard-fought battle, it seems unlikely that either side lost more than 1,500 casualties. On 20 November, Jeanin’s brigade of Marcognet’s division, which was fatigued and had suffered during the previous two engagements, was withdrawn to Verona and was replaced by Rouyer’s entire division. This movement was executed in perfect order without any interference from the Austrians. The Austrians kept their advanced guards idle at Montorio and San Martino Buon Albergo, while De Conchy’s brigade remained in Ronco. While the viceroy fought these indecisive delaying actions along the Adige, the situation in Dalmatia became progressively worse for the French and their Allies. On 14 November the few Italian defenders (4th Light Regiment) of the Isle of Lesina had surrendered to a British landing force. They were repatriated and arrived in Ancona on 9 December.118 On 18 November an Imperial Decree was issued directing the conscription of a further 15,000 men for the Army of Italy and prescribing the formation of a reserve army with 43 battalions, organized in three divisions, which was to be organized in Piedmont and particularly in Turin, Alessandria, and Piacenza. Generals Gratien and Fresia were appointed to this task. However, subsequent events rendered the effects of this decree illusionary.119 On 24 November the viceroy gave instructions for the formation of two other Italian reserve divisions. These were to be organized in Milan under the super-

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vision of the Minister of War with 6,000 to 7,000 conscripts and the veteran troops recently arrived from Germany and Spain. New battalions of 600 men should be raised for the 1st (2 bns) and 2nd (2 bns) Light Regiments and for the 4th (2 bns, also incorporating the veterans of the 6th and 7th Lines coming from Germany) and the 5th (2 bns) Line Regiments. An artillery battery and a squadron from the depots of the Chasseurs a` Cheval and the Napoleone Dragoons were to be attached to each division.120 After a period of rest and reorganization, a veteran regiment from Spain (probably, the 5th Line) should make for Verona to reinforce Palombini’s division.121 New instructions on the conduct of the war and the organization of the reserve were sent by Napoleon. The emperor urged the viceroy to defend the line of the Adige at any cost and to reinforce the fortresses of Verona, Mantua, and Rocca d’Anfo. If forced to withdraw from the Adige, the Army of Italy would fight along the Mincio, the Adda, or the Ticino. At that time, however, Napoleon was still confident in Murat’s help to redress the balance of the war in Italy.122 To reinforce his depleted army, at the beginning of November the viceroy had issued a decree for the formation of battalions of Italian volunteers. A recruiting center was established in any prefecture of the kingdom, and the civil authorities were exhorted to foster the recruitment. The volunteers coming from the departments south of the Po were to be reunited in Bologna under the command of General Pino; those coming from the departments north of the Po in Milan, under the Minister of War. Because of the Italian population’s exhaustion and discontent, this call to arms yielded poor results. According to a report, on 18 November only 930 volunteers had been organized in Bologna.123

NUGENT’S OPERATIONS IN NOVEMBER After the reduction of Trieste, Nugent’s brigade was expecting march orders to rejoin the left wing of the army under FML Radivojevich. The young and ambitious GM Nugent had, however, other projects. After pondering over the reports received from British Commodore Rowley, a great expert of the Adriatic Sea and coasts, he had devised an audacious plan. The Goro Bay offered a wellsheltered berth nearby the River Po estuary. A landing operation at this point promised three main advantages. First, it would complete the blockade of Venice by cutting the lagoon city off from its communications with the mainland through the Adige and the Polesine. Second, it would fall on the rear of the Army of Italy and menace several cities of the Kingdom of Italy, such as Ferrara and Bologna, which apparently lay far from the front. Third, by foreboding the seizing of a crossing point over the Adige and, thus, a link with the main body of the Austrian army, it would seriously impair the whole defensive line the viceroy had carefully set along the Adige. Moreover, the operation seemed relatively safe. Should anything go wrong, the British fleet, master of the Adriatic Sea, would enable a prompt reembarkment. Well before receiving Hiller and

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Radivojevich’s authorization, Nugent began preparating his troops for the raid.124 During the night of 10–11 November, General Nugent’s corps departed Trieste embarked aboard a British fleet. Soon afterward part of the escorting fleet moved to blockade Venice from the seaward. The remaining fleet, consisting of the ships-of-the-line HMS Adler and HMS Tremendous, the brig HMS Wizard, two English and eight Austrian large transports, 16 “trabaccolis,” a bomb ketch, and four smaller Austrian vessels, initially set sail toward the Illyrian coast, then steered for the Po estuary and, after a stormy crossing, anchored off Goro on 14 November. Nugent’s corps (about 3,000 men) consisted of one battalion of the Erzherzog Franz Karl Regiment (IR 51), five companies of the Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment, 650 British infantry under Colonel Robertson (detachments from the 35th Foot, the Corsican Rangers, the Swiss Regiment de Roll, the Calabrian Free Corps), 73 Radetzky Hussars, and six Austrian and six British guns.125 The force under Colonel Robertson was formed from deserters of all nations, including many Croatians, Italians, and others more intent on criminal activity than the military goals of the expedition. The coast was heavily fortified. The armed redoubts and fortresses, surrounded by wet ditches, were, however, manned with second-rate troops (two companies of Veterans, Cannonier Guardacoste, and Finanzieri). During the night of 14–15 November, Nugent, after British Captain Birnstiel’s reconnaissance of the shore between the mouths of the Po di Volano and Po di Goro, landed two infantry companies, one each from the Franz Karl Infantry and Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiments. Their landing was covered by four British gunboats. They disembarked between the forts of Volano and Goro and, after putting a small French post to flight, took up positions along the Mesola canal. As soon as a second detachment of the Grenzer was ashore, Birnsteil’s advanced guard attacked the company of veterans defending the portion of the coast called Bosco Grande, took them prisoner, and then pushed forward again. At 8:00 A.M., the French, seeing themselves threatened from inland, abandoned Fort Volano. Fort Goro, Fort Gorino, and Fort Gnocca surrendered soon afterward. The Austrian landing force captured 12 cannons and a gunboat.126 Despite this the garrison of Fort Primaro repulsed three successive attacks.127 By the end of 15 November, General Nugent had totally disembarked his force at the mouth of the Po at Volano and Mesola. Erzherzog Maximilian was with General Nugent. The day after, while a battalion of the Erzherzog Karl Regiment moved east to the Pomposa Abbey and Codigoro, a detachment of the Warasdiner Kreuzer seized the now vacant Magnavacca Fort, which stood farther south nearby Comacchio. The feeble, scattered, and badly commanded Franco-Italian troops withdrew to Ravenna or Ferrara without presenting any serious resistance. On 18 November, Nugent’s main force moved on Ferrara, being covered on its right by Captain Birnstiel’s column, which marched along the south bank of the Po River, capturing several boats heavily loaded with

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supplies for Venice. The Austrian advanced guard entered Ferrara that evening without meeting any opposition.128 The military and civil authorities of the Reno department were panic-stricken and confused about Nugent’s intentions. Careless reports exaggerated the strength of the Austro-British force, and no action was taken to counter it.129 The Italian depots in Ferrara had been hastily transferred to Bologna, before Ferrara was occupied. On 19 November, Nugent pushed out of Ferrara and sent detachments toward Malalbergo (southwest), Bondeno (northwest), and Rovigo (north). It was only on 17 November that Euge`ne received the first word of this enemy disembarkation. He then detached Major Merdier, with a battalion of the 42nd Line, the 5/1st Foreign Regiment, a half squadron of Italian chasseurs, and four guns to cover Ferrara. If Ferrara was already occupied by the Austrians, he was to reoccupy it, with the support of General Pino from Bologna. Meanwhile, GM Nugent was making steady progress on the Lower Adige. On 22 November the Austrians feinted a crossing on the Middle Adige at Ronco. Meanwhile, Starhemberg’s brigade abandoned its previous position before Ronco and marched southeast to cross the Adige at Boara and proceed to Rovigo, where they were ordered to link with Nugent’s corps. At first, Jeanin’s brigade, of Marcognet’s division, was ordered to march on Isola Porcarizza, to a position in a second line behind De Conchy’s brigade. However, Euge`ne soon realized that the Austrian movement at Ronco was only a demonstration to cover operations on the Lower Adige and decided to send his troops there. General De Conchy, with the 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade and the 3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment, had instructions to make for Ferrara via Trecenta.130 RECAPTURE OF FERRARA, 27 NOVEMBER On 25 November, Major Merdier’s troops arrived in Malalbergo, 10 miles southwest of Ferrara. During its march this column had encountered an Austrian advanced post at Bondeno, taking a company of Hungarian infantry prisoner. From Malalbergo, Merdier could cover the approaches to Modena and Bologna. General Pino, who commanded the 4th Division in Bologna, marched to join him with a few troops assembled from the depots and the hospitals. No artillery was available to Pino and Merdier, as the few guns were trudging behind along the muddy roads.131 In the meantime, De Conchy’s column came near to Ponte Lagoscuro, just north of Ferrara.132 Upon receiving some guns on 26 November, Major Merdier, now under the orders of Pino, attacked the enemy and threw them back to the city, where they manned the walls and stopped the French advance with their fire. The AustroEnglish lost about 60 dead and 100 prisoners. Worried about the double threat from Malalbergo and Ponte Lagoscuro, and fearing for the presence of another column that had been reported around Comacchio, during the night GM Nugent evacuated the city and retreated back to

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Volano. Major Merdier’s troops entered Ferrara on the morning of 27 November. Pino decided not to pursue, alleging the fatigue of his troops and the bad weather. On 26 November the chasseurs of De Conchy’s column surprised the Austro-English advanced posts near Occhiobello, on the Po.133 At the same time De Conchy responded to a move by 3,000 Austrians against De Conchy’s position in Castagnaro. He commanded two battalions of the 106th Line and one of the 36th Le´ge`re on the canal located there and beat off their attack. Marcognet, upon learning of the attack, advanced to support him but apparently was not engaged. The French lost 10 dead and about 100 wounded. Euge`ne reported in his letter to the Duc de Feltre that the Austrians lost about 400 men, but these figures seem exaggerated.134 On 27 November, at the break of dawn, Euge`ne dispatched a strong infantry and cavalry reconnaissance force out of Legnago, under the orders of General Mermet. It was supported by a battalion of the 53rd Line and another of the 2nd Foreign Regiment. Euge`ne escorted this reconnaissance and was hit in the thigh with a spent musket ball. The French pushed the Austrians as far as Bevilacqua and took 75 prisoners from them.135 Meanwhile, FML Marschall, with the brigades of Rebrovich and Meyer, had moved to the land front of Venice and begun their blockade of the famous island city. The Benjowsky Regiment was detached, however, to occupy Boara. During the night of 29 November, General De Conchy marched against Boara, but because he lacked artillery support, he was unable to attack the Austrians he found there. He then withdrew to Villanova and Fratta, then back to Trecenta where he stopped to await the arrival of reinforcements and guns.136 ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY On 20 November d’Anthouard wrote Euge`ne advising him that Napoleon was making plans to dispatch to Italy parts of two conscriptions of manpower that he was issuing. The first was a draft of 120,000 men, and the second was for 300,000 men from the Class of 1815. Of these men, Napoleon had decided to send 16,000 men as reinforcements to the Army of Italy out of a draft of 120,000 men. These 16,000 men were to be distributed among the six corps that formed the army. These men were to consist of 4,200 new conscripts, plus 800 men drawn from the depot of the 156th Regiment for the 92nd Line, or a total of 5,000 men, and 7,000 men who formed part of the regiments that were in the Army of Italy and had depots below the Alps. Finally, 600 men from the depot of the 156th Line were designated for the 36th Le´ge`re; 600 men were designated for the 133rd Line, and a further 600 men were designated for the 132nd Line. These 16,000 men were destined for the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the regiments serving in the Army of Italy.137 Napoleon wanted Borghese to advise him on the quality of these men, the level of desertion from their ranks, and the availability of sufficient weapons with which to arm them.

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A decree issued on 19 November had also ordered the formation of a reserve army of 30,000 men to be drawn from Provence, Dauphine, and Lyon. They were to be united in Alessandria at the end of December. Assuming that arms and equipment existed, they were to be organized into three divisions. Those of the 1st Division, 9,000 men, were to be absorbed into the 4th and 6th Battalions of the Army of Italy. The 4th Battalions were then in Alessandria. Those of the 2nd Division, 7,500 men, were to join those battalions who had their depots in Piedmont. Those of the 3rd Division, 5,500 men, were to be used to form 11 or 12 5th Battalions in the 27th and 28th Military Divisions.138 Independent of these three divisions, Napoleon planned to form a reserve in Tuscany with the 3/,4/,5/112th Line Regiment and the 4/,5/35th Le´ge`re Regiment, which were to receive a draft of 2,500 men drawn from the overall conscription of 300,000. In Rome he intended to form a reserve with the 3/,4/22nd Le´ge`re and the 4/,6/ 6th Line Regiments, which were to receive a draft of 3,000 men from the draft of 300,000, not including what they were to receive from the other draft of 120,000 men.139 A further force of 2,000 was to be sent to join the artillery, sappers, and equipage units forming in Alessandria and Turin. Napoleon sent Masse´na (prince of Essling) to Genoa with 3,000 national guards that had been raised the year before in Toulon. Napoleon’s intention was to put him in command in the Reserve Army. However, Napoleon thought that he might have to replace him with General Caffarelli because of his age and health. Napoleon also had plans to increase Euge`ne’s cavalry. The Croatian Hussar Regiment, some 1,300 men and 600 horses, was in Lyon. Napoleon’s opinion of this unit was very low, and he ordered Corbineau to dismount this canaille (“rabble”) and send 300 of their horses to the 1st Hussars and another 300 to the 31st Chasseurs, then with Euge`ne. He also promised to send Euge`ne two “good dragoon regiments from Spain,” each with 1,200 horses.140 Unfortunately for Euge`ne and Napoleon the results of the conscriptions Napoleon ordered were very dissappointing. And of those that came in, desertion was high. Corbineau did disarm the Croatian Hussars on 26 November, when all the other foreign regiments in French service were disarmed and disbanded. He then dispatched 431 of their horses to the 31st Chasseurs and 208 to the 1st Hussars.141 Some Italian troops that had been serving in Spain were sent back in early December. The 1/2nd Le´ge`re, the 1/,2/4th Line, the 1/6th Line, the 5th Sapper Company, and the 10th Artillery Company began their march back to Italy on 24 November and were expected to arrive on 21 January 1814. They were, unfortunately, understrength. The infantry battalions averaged 450 men.142

4 December 1813: Murat’s Treachery, Affairs at Rovigo, Boara, and Castagnaro, and the Fall of Zara (Zadar) MURAT’S DIPLOMATIC GAME The Neapolitan army was finally on the move, heading north to reach the theater of war. But which enemy were they supposed to fight? Paradoxical as this may appear, probably none of the Neapolitan generals, let alone the rank and file, had at that time a definite answer to this crucial question. An extremely intricate diplomatic game had been under way since the first months of 1813, starring some of the most acute minds of Austria, Great Britain, and Naples. Strangely enough, the emperor and the viceroy of Italy played a minor role in the game, either remaining passive spectators or at their best limiting themselves to endeavor weak, useless, or even inexpedient countermoves (such as Fouche´’s mission in Naples) to the frantic exchanges between Naples, Vienna, Palermo, and London. In December 1813 the fruits of all these diplomatic efforts were almost ripe. However, as his divisions started leaving their encampments in Southern Italy, Murat was still awaiting the Austrian emperor’s last word to seal the desertion of the Kingdom of Naples to the Allied coalition. Perceiving after the retreat from Russia the inexorable fading of Napoleon’s star, Murat had at least one excellent reason to pass over to his brother-in-law’s enemies. He and his wife Caroline wanted to keep their throne at any cost. Consequently, sitting at the peace table beside the winning Allied powers seemed the only feasible way to meet their wishes. To be true, keeping his rule of Naples represented Murat’s minimum goal, as he was dreaming of a new territorial expansion either to the south, by reuniting Sicily to Naples, or to the north, by annexing part of the Papal States. Over the last months the king of Naples had given a very sensitive ear to the frequent pleas that came from a

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number of patriotic parties scattered throughout the Italian Peninsula. Italian patriots urged Murat to assume the leadership of a movement for the independence and unification of the country. On her part, Austria had since spring 1813 become very keen to enlist the Kingdom of Naples in the Allied coalition and was willing to pay a reasonable price to achieve this goal. Expecting to be heavily involved in the war that was about to resume in Germany, Austria would take advantage of the military support Murat could provide to drive the French from Italy and put the satellite Kingdom of Italy to an end. The Habsburg Court was therefore inclined to concede the territorial expansion Murat desired and even to take steps to have Great Britain make her best efforts to coerce the Bourbons into renouncing Naples. Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, felt himself obliged to support Bourbons’ rights to the Kingdom of Two Sicilies (Sicily and Naples). This point of view was apparently not shared by Lord Bentinck, the British military commander in Sicily. He was a political liberal who cultivated different plans for Sicily as well as for Italy. Despite this divergence, both Castlereagh and Bentinck were deeply concerned with the prospect of Murat reinforcing his position in Southern Italy. This made them rather cool to the project of bringing the Kingdom of Naples into the coalition. On the other hand, Great Britain did not want Austria wavering any further over her decision of entering once again into the fray against Napoleon. Nor would Castlereagh risk weakening Britain’s solid diplomatic relationship with the continental power, which was to give its best fruits at the Congress of Vienna. The foreign secretary was, therefore, strongly committed to support Habsburg political requests insofar as these did not impair British national interests. Unofficial and secret talks between Neapolitan Prince Cariati and Metternich had started in Vienna early in 1813, upon Murat’s return from Russia. At that time Austria still stood neutral, officially refusing to join the coalition against France. Nevertheless, Metternich was already intensely plotting with the Allied powers. On 20 April, Prince Cariati was named ambassador of the Kingdom of Naples in Vienna.1 This move, together with Murat’s refusal to personally rejoin the Grande Arme´e for the pending campaign and send a contingent of his troops to Germany, had the result of worsening the already strained relations between the emperor and the king of Naples. Although Metternich refused for the moment to take any pledge upon himself, the first step toward Murat’s defection had been made. Neapolitan diplomacy was also very busy on the British side, as the duke of Campochiaro, Murat’s minister of police, had at the end of April entered into unofficial negotiations with Lord Bentinck at Ponza. Apparently, at the beginning this was Campochiaro’s own game of which Murat remained unaware until the end of May. However, once informed about what was going on, on 2 June, Murat sent one of his representatives, Felice Nicolas, to meet Bentinck with the proposal to make his army march northward, had Great Britain consented to

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him to save the throne of Naples. Bentinck did not show himself very anxious to conclude on such terms.2 Then came the French victories at Lu¨tzen and Bautzen, followed by the summer armistice. Murat’s irresolution was at its zenith as the emperor’s star, against all odds, seemed shining again. Meanwhile, Great Britain and Austria had been discussing their diplomatic strategies in view of the latter joining the coalition upon the outbreak of hostilities. Metternich had almost succeeded in convincing his British counterparts that Murat’s military support in Italy was of paramount importance and that conserving him the throne of Naples was a price worth paying for. Any decision concerning the Spanish Bourbons’ rights on Southern Italy could be postponed till the end of the war. At the beginning of July a letter from Prince Cariati arrived in Naples that contained new proposals from Metternich. The king of Naples, however, could not read it, as he was already on his way to Dresden, where he had been summoned by an angry Napoleon. The emperor, after another of Murat’s refusals to send Neapolitan troops to Germany, had bluntly asked him to come over and clear himself of the charge of being in negotiations with the Allies. Murat was in a difficult situation. On the one hand, he was again the gallant and impetuous general commanding his horsemen from the front; on the other hand, he never ceased negotiating with the Vienna Court the conditions of his treachery. In the last few weeks, rumors of Murat’s plotting for desertion had been spread around Europe by several sources and newspapers, the French Moniteur included.3 Murat did not take any Neapolitan units to Germany. Upon his arrival, the “prodigal son” received, to his surprise, a warm welcome from the emperor. On the eve of a new war against the Allies, Napoleon desperately needed good commanders for his weak and badly drilled cavalry. Murat was the right man for the job, and thus Napoleon was disposed to forgive and forget Murat’s unfaithful behavior for the time being. The beau sabreur obliged and actually played an active role through the Leipzig campaign. However, Prince Cariati, Murat’s representative in Vienna, left the Habsburg capital at the resumption of hostilities and joined the Allied headquarters in the field, wherefrom he entertained an almost daily correspondence with the king of Naples, keeping him posted about Austria’s new offers. Meanwhile, von Mier, the Austrian ambassador in Naples and the alleged lover of Queen Caroline, had not left the city in spite of the harsh remonstrance from the French ambassador Durand. Only after a furious Napoleon had dictated Murat to expel the Austrian representative from Naples (and recall Prince Cariati from Vienna) did the king of Naples consent to give the duke of Gallo, Naples’ foreign minister, instructions to return passport and credentials to von Mier. This measure had, however, no effect, as Queen Caroline decided to ignore her irresolute husband and take personal control of the situation. Acting as regent on Murat’s behalf, she kept von Mier in Naples and refused to consider Durand’s repeated requests to send troops in support of Euge`ne’s Army of Italy. In midOctober, several days after receiving news of Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig,

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Caroline took a step forward and officially informed von Mier that she had the authority to officially enter into negotiations with Austria and that she had resolved to do so.4 The defeat at Leipzig had, however, shaken Murat’s unsteady loyalty to the emperor. Once again, political considerations and personal interest had the better of long-standing comradeship. The king of Naples realized that his time was running out, and any further delay could mean the Allies deciding that his support to the coalition was no longer needed. On the eve of the battle, a Neapolitan diplomat named Pescara had brought him new offers from Metternich.5 On 24 October he suddenly left the emperor’s headquarters at Erfurt, protesting to an enraged Napoleon that his presence in Naples was now urgently required. This was the last time they met.6 From the beginning of November up to January, Murat’s double game became progressively more intense and audacious. During his sojourn of 31 October in Milan on his way to Naples, Murat wrote an ambiguous letter to the emperor. While insinuating a suspicion about Euge`ne’s loyalty, he seemed to promise a military support of 30,000 men to the Army of Italy on the tacit understanding of being appointed commander in chief and having a free hand with the Papal States.7 In the meantime, he also wrote to Prince Cariati that he would soon declare for the Allies and deploy his army against the French in Northern Italy. In return, he would extend his rule to Sicily. However, should Great Britain keep on backing the Bourbons’ rule on the island, he would ask for a substantial part of the Papal States as a territorial compensation.8 Murat arrived in Naples on 4 November and repeated this request to von Mier during a nightlong meeting on 8 November. Despite deeming Murat’s terms exaggerated, von Mier did not raise any objections, fearing the irresolute king had changed his mind once again. Soon afterward, the Austrian ambassador made for Vienna to relate the news to Metternich. On 6 November a decree was issued in Naples abrogating the Continental System, and orders were given for the Neapolitan army to be ready to march northward. Murat announced to von Mier that his troops would enter the French departments in Italy as friends and continue as far as the Po Valley. By that time, Murat hoped that the agreement between Naples and Austria would have been finalized.9 In the days following Murat’s return, rumors of the Kingdom of Naples being about to join the coalition had started appearing again in local and foreign newspapers.10 Meanwhile, in spite of Lord Bentinck’s growing personal hostility against signing a treaty with Naples,11 negotiations with the British were also resumed. Murat sent his most reliable diplomat, Schinina, to Palermo. Over the last few weeks Austria and Great Britain had proceeded a great deal in devising a diplomatic scheme that would foster Murat’s adhesion to the coalition. On 28 October, Metternich wrote to inform von Mier that the Bourbons would waive their right on Naples and completely defer to the British and Austrian political will.12

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The long journey back to Naples had given Murat other things to ponder. In Milan and throughout the Italian peninsula he had been received enthusiastically by the people and many local notables as well. He had also met groups of patriots supporting the prospect of the reunification and the independence of Italy, who pleaded for his help. Thus, the idea of a new and wider Kingdom of Italy under his rule had started taking a more definite shape in his mind.13 The Austrian summer offensive had forcefully removed Fouche´ from his appointment as governor of the Illyrian provinces. He first visited a patriot to talk about the project of Murat taking the lead of a movement for Italian independence. Once in Naples, Fouche´ began stirring up Murat on this point. Soon afterward, both Murat and Fouche´ wrote, though separately, to the emperor proposing to split Italy into a kingdom of the north and a kingdom of the south, the latter under the rule of the king of Naples. Such was the state of diplomatic affairs as the Neapolitan army started marching north at the beginning of December. In short, Murat was seeking to devise a course of action that would meet the Austrian expectations without forcing him to seriously engage against the French-Italian armies, a prospect that clearly did not appeal to him. While waiting for the results of von Mier’s journey to Vienna, Murat had a difficult task before him. He had to act at once, as both the French and the Austrians would not tolerate any further hesitation and ambiguity. But he also needed more time for his diplomatic game to bear the expected results. MOVEMENTS OF THE NEAPOLITANS On 13 November, Euge`ne received a message from General Miollis, the military commander of Rome, informing him of the march plans of a corps of Neapolitan troops moving toward upper Italy. At this time the army of the Kingdom of Naples had four active divisions around the capital and another division in the Abruzzi, along the Adriatic coast. Some 25,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry were assigned to the corps that was to operate in upper Italy. Murat was making extraordinary efforts to expand his army. He called for volunteers from all classes of Neapolitan citizens. Subsequently, he also brought into service large numbers of thieves, vagabonds, and individuals forced by the justice system to serve in the military.14 Many noncommissioned officers and officers, however, were French, and they looked at Murat’s negotiations with the Allies with increasing apprehension.15 Following Murat’s orders, the 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Carascosa, with four infantry regiments (eight battalions) of infantry, two cavalry regiments, and eight guns, was to arrive in Rome between 25 November and 2 December. Between 4 and 8 December it was to be followed by the Royal Guard under the orders of Lieutenant General Millet, with five battalions (three of infantry, two of specialist troops) and eight squadrons (one of the Gardes du Corps, two of hussars, three of chevau-le´gers, and two of cuirassiers).16 The 2nd

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Division, commanded by Lieutenant General d’Ambrosio, with nine battalions (around 9,000 men), was to march up the Adriatic coast and arrive in Ancona between 2 and 4 December. Finally, the 3rd Division, with eight battalions under the command of Lieutenant General Pignatelli-Cerchiara, was due in Rome in early January 1814. THE ARMY OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES, 1 NOVEMBER 181317 Commander: Joachim Napoleon (Murat), King of Naples Chief of Staff: Lieutenant General Ayme´ 1st Division: General Carascosa Brigade: General Rosaroll 1/,2/,3/1st Line Regiment (63/1,981)18 1/,2/,3/2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (63/2,432) Brigade: General Filangieri 1/,2/,3/3rd Line Regiment (56/1,918) 3/,4/,5/5th Line Regiment (65/2,112) Artillery Foot Artillery (4/115) Artillery Train (1/92) Total: 8,902 2nd Division: General d’Ambrosio Brigade: General Guglielmo Pepe 3/,4/6th Line Regiment (48/1,458) 3/,4/8th Line Regiment (36/1,766) Brigade: General d’Aquino 1/,2/2nd Line Regiment (48/1,508) 1/,2/3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (43/1,488) Artillery Foot Artillery (3/114) Artillery Train (1/74) Total: 6,587 3rd Division: General Count Pignatelli-Cerchiara Brigade Guard Velites Regiment (n.a.) Canonniers de Marine Battalion (n.a.) Sapeurs du Ge´nie Battalion (28/790) Brigade 3/,4/7th Line Regiment (47/1,429)

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1/,2/9th Line Regiment (45/1,551) 4/,5/4th Le´ge`re Regiment (41/1,616) Artillery Foot Artillery (3/111) Artillery Train (2/137) Cavalry Division: General Livron (?) Brigade Guard Cavalry (n.a) Brigade 1/,2/,3/1st Chevaux-le´gers Regiment (39/557/552)19 1/,2/,3/3rd Chevaux-le´gers Regiment (33/606/659) Artillery Guard Horse Artillery (n.a.)

The Roman States, formerly known as the Papal States, had been part of the French hegemony of Europe since 1805. GD Miollis was the commander of the 30th Military Division, which encompassed Rome and the Roman States. At this time the French troops in the 30th Military Division did not exceed 4,000 men, of whom 2,500 were combatants, mostly stationed in Civitavecchia, in Castel Sant’Angelo, in Rome, and on the Tyrrhenian littoral. Miollis’s force consisted of the cadres of the 3rd and 4th battalions of the 6th Line Regiment, the depots of the 5/14th and 5/22nd Le´ge`re Regiments and the 2nd Foreign Regiment, a battalion of Roman Volunteers, a company of artillery, three companies of gendarmes, and two of coast guards.20 As these units were formed principally of Italian conscripts, foreign deserters, and former Papal troops, their average quality was rather poor. This force was further weakened by the new organization ordered for the 2nd Foreign Regiment. Napoleon had ordered the detachment of a large part of this regiment, the elite companies, and had them dispatched north to join Euge`ne in the spring. Shortly after the arrival of Joachim Murat in Naples, various seditious movements had manifested themselves in the Roman States that were indicative of a conspiracy to overthrow the French rule. The insurrections erupted around Viterbo and were directed by the priest Felice Battaglia, who styled himself as commander of an Italian League and led a band of partisans that pillaged French properties. Miollis had directed his troops to engage this insurrection and had substantially scattered and broken the bands of insurgents, capturing Battaglia and bringing him to Rome. Battaglia was secretly shot before the month was out. Subsequent investigations proved that he had acted at the instigation of Neapolitan Consul Zuccari, who had in turn received orders from Naples to fulminate these troubles.21

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The first Neapolitan division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Carascosa, arrived in Rome at the end of November. His arrival was heralded by substantial demands for logistical support and provisions for his troops. Despite the fact that rumors of his negotiations with the Allied powers had been spreading around Europe for many months, Murat continued to protest his intention to fulfill his obligations to Napoleon and deploy his army in support of the Kingdom of Italy. He consequently asked that a liberal disposition of food and munitions be accorded to his troops in the French departments of the peninsula as well as in the dependencies of the Kingdom of Italy. Napoleon, either being fooled by Murat’s promises or, more likely, wishing to temporize while awaiting the result of Fouche´’s mission in Naples, decided to comply with such a request and gave dispositions to General Miollis and the Grand Duchess of Tuscany to behave accordingly. Willy-nilly, Miollis did obey the emperor’s orders. Unable to put up any opposition with his weak garrison, he was forced to patiently tolerate the arrogant behavior of his alleged Allies, who went so far in their requests as to have 500 new muskets sent to Naples to arm a conscript regiment.22 The Neapolitans then established a 2,000-man force that would remain in Rome and that was twice the size of the French garrison of the city. In midDecember Carascosa’s division marched north in two columns directed, respectively, to Foligno and Florence, where they were due by 22 December.23 It was soon replaced in Rome by the first columns of the Royal Guard. The latter was to leave Rome on 19 December and make for Ancona where it was to arrive by 6 January.24 Far from being caused by their usual sluggishness, the slow pace of the Neapolitan army rather answered Murat’s wish to await the result of his negotiations before making any decisive movement. Thus, the Neapolitan generals intentionally left intervals between the march of their different columns. Beyond this, and in accordance with their instructions, they always found pretexts to prolong the sojourn of their troops at each stop along their march north. On 22 November, Murat sent General Colletta, of the Neapolitan engineer corps, to Bologna. His mission was to reconnoiter along the right bank of the Po River, collect information about the condition of roads and bridges, and make sure that the passes on the Apennine Mountains between Tuscany and Emilia were passable.25 Meanwhile, General Pignatelli-Strongoli, one of Murat’s aidesde-camp, was detached on mission to Florence, where he met the grand-duchess and discussed with her the creation of depots for the Neapolitan army in Tuscany and Romagna.26 General Pignatelli continued to Bologna and Ferrara, where he met with Generals Fontana and Pino. He refused, however, to give a positive answer to their request of sending Neapolitan troops against Nugent. No movement, Pignatelli explained, could be made without Murat’s personal approval.27 In Ancona the people and the local authorities welcomed the Neapolitan troops with open arms.28 While in Ancona, General d’Ambrosio was requested by General Barbou, the French commander of the fortress, to march in support

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of a small Italian column, under Colonel Scotti, operating around Ravenna against Nugent. Like his colleagues, D’Ambrosio denied his help on the argument that he had no order to this effect and that he was to keep the pace with the other columns coming from Rome.29 OPERATIONS ON THE LOWER ADIGE, DECEMBER 1813 On the evening of 1 December, after receiving a reinforcement consisting of a strong battalion of the 106th Line Regiment and two cannons,30 General De Conchy sought to cut the communications between Nugent’s forces and those of General Marschall. He then moved again on Rovigo and Boara to attack the enemy columns south of the Po and force them to recross the river. On 2 December the French took positions in Fratta. The reconnaissance found no Austrian forces in Lendinara, Villanova, or Costa. Aware of these movements, FML Marschall moved a battalion to Rovigo and sent a few detachments further south so as to cover Erzherzog Maximilian’s column. The latter had received orders to descend into the Po River as far as Mesola and rejoin Nugent in his entrenched positions nearby the Po River delta.31 AFFAIR AT ROVIGO, 3 DECEMBER During the night, General Marschall deployed the Benjowski Infantry Regiment in echelons along a small canal running south of the Adige. Garrisons were posted in Lendinara, Villanova, Costa, and Roverdiere. On 3 December, at 7:00 A.M., General De Conchy advanced on Rovigo, moving down the two canal banks via Villanova and Costa. On the left wing a squadron of the Italian chasseurs scouted the south bank of the Adige, while another did the same on the right wing. The attack on Villanova was launched under the cover of a thick fog. The French took the garrison by surprise, easily expelling it. After positioning a few companies of the 106th Line Regiment in this village so as to secure his line of retreat on Trecenta, General De Conchy resumed his advance with two battalions of the 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade and the remaining two squadrons of the 3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment.32 The Austrian posts in Costa and Roverdiere soon met the same fate as that in Villanova and were pushed back on Rovigo.33 FML Marschall’s forces occupied Rovigo with two companies of the Benjowski Regiment deployed on the left side of a dike and one on the right side. A reserve of four companies, under Oberst Senitzer, stood astride the road from Rovigo to the Adige and was covering the pontoon bridge by Boara. De Conchy attacked and threw back the right Austrian infantry company, overpowering it and taking it prisoner. As two other companies on the left of the dike rapidly fled, he pushed into Rovigo. De Conchy then sent his cavalry around the city walls to strike the Austrian reserve. Oberst Senitzer responded by withdrawing his force to the left bank of the Adige.34

Map 4 Lower Adige’s Area of Operations, November–December 1813

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Rovigo was taken, and the Austrians were chased beyond the Adige in disorder. The engagement, however, was not yet over, as the Austrian battalion in Lendinara threatened De Conchy’s rear. It was held off by two companies of the 106th Line Regiment, which had been recalled from Badia to join De Conchy at Villanova. During the night, the Austrians evacuated Lendinara and recrossed the Adige. According to French sources, the Austrian losses were 400 men hors de combat and 900 prisoners, including a major and 12 officers of the Stipich Hussar Regiment, some Tyrolian Ja¨gers, and the Benjowski Infantry Regiment, all of which had recently arrived from Germany. Earlier the Benjowski Regiment had found itself in combat on 19 November at San Martino, where it had lost nearly 1,000 men. The French losses were 40 dead and 135 wounded.35 Despite this success, the relative weakness of his troops, whose number apparently did not exceed the number of prisoners he had taken, greatly worried General De Conchy. He decided to withdraw that night to Fratta and Villanova. By allowing the Austrians precious hours to reinforce their positions, De Conchy’s overcautious behavior greatly hurt Euge`ne’s plans on the Lower Adige. Aware of the Austrian maneuvers on the Lower Adige, Euge`ne correctly judged that these were aimed at giving indirect support to the march of Nugent’s corps toward Ravenna and Rimini, while maintaining a link with General Marschall’s Corps.36 The Austrian pressure toward Rovigo and Ferrara as well as Nugent’s concern about reinforcing his bridgehead in the Po Delta were, among other things, a by-product of the negotiations going on between the Austrians and the king of Naples. Should the negotiations succeed, the Austrians would then link up with the Neapolitans through Rovigo and Ferrara. If negotiations failed, they were doomed, and a free passage over the Adige and the Po or a safe reembarking point would become crucial to assure Nugent’s withdrawal. Euge`ne eventually realized that other troops were needed to gain the upper hand on the Lower Adige and decided to detach Marcognet’s division. Campi’s brigade soon arrived in San Michele to relieve Schmitz’s brigade. The latter, in turn, occupied Ronco, replacing the 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade of Marcognet’s division. Once he had assembled eight battalions in Ronco, Marcognet began moving toward the Lower Adige. GD Marcognet had orders to take up a position between Lendinara and the river on 6 December, supporting his left on Rotta Sabadina and linking his right to General De Conchy in Villanova. By this time, GM Starhemberg’s brigade had reached Boara, established a link with FML Marschall’s troops, and taken hold of the bridgehead south of the Adige.37 AFFAIR AT BOARA, 8 DECEMBER On 7 December, General De Conchy resumed his movement on Rovigo, keeping a battalion of the 106th Line Regiment as a reserve in Lendinara. His cavalry pushed as far as Costa. However, being entirely in the dark about Marcognet’s

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actual position and hindered by muddy roads, he did not dare advance too aggressively. After a long and wearing march, Marcognet’s division had finally arrived in Badia. Arriving at dawn, it did not resume the march for the rest of the day. Later that morning, the Austrians launched a raid on Lendinara from the northern bank of the Adige with a battalion of the Benjowsky Regiment. The attack was foiled by the reaction of two companies of the 106th Line Regiment, which took many prisoners. Despite this minor success, another day had passed, lost to the French. GM Starhemberg was fully informed of all French movements and was prepared, once again, to defend the crossing over the Adige at Boara. His weak brigade was formed of the battered Benjowsky Regiment, one battalion of Gradiscaner Grenzer, one landwehr battalion of the Erzherzog Karl Regiment, two companies of the 8th Ja¨ger Battalion, and four squadrons of Radetzky Hussars.38 He commanded, in total, about 2,000 men. Concadirame was occupied by the Austrian Ja¨gers and a few hussars. The Grenzer and some more cavalry were in Rovigo. The rest of Starhemberg’s infantry was placed to defend the bridgehead at Boara, while the remaining cavalry stood on the northern bank of the Adige.39 Just before 9:00 A.M. on 8 December, Marcognet’s division formed in three columns to attack Boara. The left column, under General Jeanin, marched on Concadirame. The center column, under General Marcognet, moved via the left bank of the Adigetto, and General De Conchy, who commanded the right column, marched on the opposite bank of the same canal. The 2/131st Line Regiment was left in reserve to watch the river crossing at Badia. The left column attacked Concadirame at noon. Immediately, they found themselves locked in combat with the Austrian Ja¨gers. Despite an initial success, the French were pushed back. The center column, which had advanced the same distance, detached a battalion of the 53rd Line Regiment in support. This battalion fell on the Austrian left flank, and lively engagement ensued. General Marcognet judged, by the sound of the musketry coming through the heavy fog, which blocked his view of the fight, that the attack was going well. The Austrian garrison of Concadirame eventually retreated on Boara. On the right, Generals Marcognet and De Conchy continued their advance without meeting any serious opposition. Their columns rapidly occupied Rovigo and forced the Austrian left to withdraw into the bridgehead the Austrians had constructed at Boara. Facing the line of the Austrian entrenchments, the French advance lost momentum. For the rest of the day, every attempt to storm the Austrian positions was systematically baffled. Around 8:00 P.M GM Starhemberg concentrated his forces, including the cavalry on the opposite bank, within the bridgehead. As night fell, he launched a vigorous sortie, while ordering a resumption of the offensive on Concadirame. The unexpected night attack and the fog that had been present all day deceived General Marcognet. Erroneously fearing he was faced by overwhelming forces, the French general decided to withdraw his division back to its initial positions.40 Sporschil states that, ac-

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cording to Austrian figures, the French lost 800 dead and wounded and 102 prisoners. He also states that French reports indicate a loss of more than 300 men.41 On the following morning Starhemberg’s light troops reoccupied Rovigo, finding that the French had abandoned it. General Marcognet continued his retreat and on 10 December took up positions in Trecenta, Canda, Salvaterra, and Lendinara.42 Meanwhile, his pioneers made an attempt to destroy the pontoon bridge at Boara by sending floating projectiles downstream, but it was of no avail.43 On 11 December, in accordance with Euge`ne’s orders, Marcognet’s division withdrew behind Castagnaro, with its left on Villa Bartolomea and its right on Trecenta. The following days passed relatively quietly. By 14 December GM Starhemberg had pushed his advanced guard as far as Villanova and Fratta, but he did not seem particularly eager to attack Marcognet’s new line. The failure of the French to hold Rovigo and break the Austrian positions at the Boara bridgehead gave the Austrians the opportunity to definitively seal the blockade of Venice.44 Along the main front, from Ala to the Lower Adige, the Austrians showed no activity whatsoever for many days. Nonetheless, Euge`ne wrote in a letter of 11 December to the emperor clearly expressing his fear of being unable to resist the Austrian pressure, should the Austrians decide to resume the operations before the arrival of the Neapolitan troops. Euge`ne’s declared confidence in Murat’s help, at this juncture, may have been more wishful thinking. There were so many contrary indications that Euge`ne cannot but have had some doubts. With the French failing to take Boara, General Nugent’s communications were assured. He did not feel menaced by the apathetic General Pino, who was, at that time, looking to the future and more concerned with establishing good relations with the Austrians as well as the Neapolitans. At the beginning of December, Nugent had sent Oberstleutnant Gavenda down the coast with a squadron of the Radetsky Hussars and a detachment of about 1,000 infantry. On 5 December 1813, Gavenda arrived in Comacchio. The French garrison, 300 men of the 1st Foreign Regiment and two cannons, withdrew on Ravenna after a few shots. The following day, Gavenda ably led an attack against the Primaro Fort, forcing the defenders to a hasty retreat.45 The possession of this stronghold put the Austrians in a most favorable position for threatening the whole of Romagna. Gavenda then moved on Ravenna, pushing parties toward Forli.46 The 1st Foreign Regiment withdrew to Cervia. Nugent rejoined Gavenda in Ravenna on 10 December and issued a proclamation to the people of Italy. It was filled with many promises, assuring them of the benefits of Austrian rule versus French rule. Nugent was at this point forced to temporarily stop his unopposed advance into Romagna. Rather unexpectedly, on 8 December, a clear order from FZM Hiller dictated him to withdraw behind the Po River and join GM Starhemberg’s brigade. An enraged Nugent wrote to his commander in chief that obeying this

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order would mean breaking contact with the British fleet as well as foolishly wasting all advantages his operations in the Po Delta had gained so far. For the time being, however, Nugent could do nothing but oblige.47 On the extreme left of the French defensive line, an Austrian column formed with 800 men of the Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Regiment, a detachment of Walachian Grenz, and some Tyrolian Ja¨gers moved from Tyrol, passed Monte Tonale, and marched on Edolo in Val Camonica, which was the gate to Brescia. This column was attacked on 7 December by the 3/16th Line (25th Provisional Demi-Brigade) of Gifflenga’s brigade and by a small corps of Italian troops coming from Valtellina, under the command of Colonel Neri. Despite the snow and weather, the Austrians were beaten and pushed back to the mountains, losing many dead and wounded, 100 prisoners, and most of their baggage and munitions. The Austrian operations on the Lower Adige, together with the uncertainty about Murat’s intentions, obliged Euge`ne to pay close attention to the right bank of the Po. In order to deal with his concerns, he ordered the construction of a bridge at Borgo Forte and armed the Piacenza Fortress. THE FALL OF ZARA (ZADAR) After the expulsion of the French from the portion of Croatia and the Adriatic coastline they had occupied as a result of the 1809 campaign, FML Radivojevich ordered GM Franz Freiherrn von Tomassich to undertake the liberation of the remainder of Dalmatia. Lack of reliable troops and the fact that the Croatian units presently in French service were anxious to pass over to the Austrians obliged the French to limit themselves to the defense of fortresses and strongholds. Tomassich sent Grenz officer Lieutenant Herakovic to southern Dalmatia aboard a British brig. Herakovic landed on the island of Mezzo, near Ragusa (Dubrovnik), with a force of 200 Oguliner Grenz and 149 other men. With this force he began a blockade of the Forts Espagnol, Persato, and Castelnuovo.48 On 23 October, Generalmajor Tomassich moved from Gospic with a small column consisting of a battalion of the Liccaner Grenz, under Oberstleutnant Popovich, a division of Banderial Hussars, and a division of Banal Insurrection.49 On 27 October this force was joined by a battalion of the 1st Banal Grenz Regiment as it marched on Dalmatia. On 30 October, Tomassich’s column occupied Knin and blockaded its fortress. The following day, after a short fight, the fort was taken. On 1 November, Oberst Danese occupied Sebenico (Sibenik), and on 3 November, Fort San Nicolo was taken. Sometime shortly before this, an English naval officer, Captain Hoste, occupied Spalato (Split). He landed a force of English troops and a detachment of Oguliner Grenz, under Major Slosser, on the island of Lesina, which surrended on 14 November.50 After clearing the French along the coast, Slosser occupied Spalato (Split).51

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Zara (Zadar) was blockaded by the Austrians on 1 November. On 22 November four batteries were erected, and the commander of Zara (Zadar), the French General Roize, found himself formally under siege. Most of the city garrison was a Croatian battalion of the Liccaner Grenz Regiment. On 2 December, three companies of this battalion mutinied and overpowered a battery of eight heavy guns. With the besieging forces approaching the wall, General Roize succeeded in crushing the revolt just before the rebels could seize a hornwork and open the gates of the citadel. Though this threat had been beaten back, the French situation went from bad to worse when the remaining Croatian companies revolted and refused to fight against their fellows. They were barely contained within their barracks. The day after, General Roize allowed the rebels to leave the fortress and join the enemy. His force was now reduced to 600 men.52 On 5 December the citadel of Zara (Zadar) capitulated after a month of blockade and preliminary attacks. The terms of the surrender of the fortress stipulated that the garrison would be allowed to return to Italy but not serve in combat until they were exchanged. They surrendered to General Tomassich, commander of the Austrian troops in Dalmatia, and to Commander Cadogan, commander of the Naval Division of His Britannic Majesty.53 All of the military honors were rendered to the garrison, which was reduced to 840 men, including the 200 Illyrian sailors. These sailors had been part of the crews of the boats of the two flotillas54 of Albania and Dalmatia, commanded by Commanders Chadeneda and Taulignau. As they were all Dalmatians who had served in the defense of the fortress, when it capitulated they returned to their homes. The Italian troops, 73 gendarmes, and 45 French gunners, were taken by land transport, to the Army of Italy on the Adige. On 10 December, Oberst Danese, detached by General Milutinovich, began to siege the Clissa Fort. A heavy battery placed on a dominating knoll shelled the fortress for 13 days. Facing a revolt of his local troops, the French commander finally surrended on 28 December.55 THE SIEGE OF VENICE The desertions among the Italian troops began to be strongly felt in Venice as FML Marschall, at the head of two strong brigades (Mayer and Rebrovich), sought to tighten the blockade. On 10 December the Fort of Cortelazzo was taken by a raiding party of about 500 men, half of them being British. The following day it was Fort Cavallino’s turn.56 On 12 December the Austrians attempted to surprise the Treporti Redoubt but were repulsed. The same day General Dupeyroux executed a sortie from Chioggia with a detachment of two companies of the Venice Guard, 40 customs officers, and 60 sailors under the orders of Naval Lieutenant St. Priest. The sortie was repulsed with the loss of a few men. On 13 December the garrison of Cavanella executed a sortie, destroyed the Austrian entrenchments, and took eight prisoners, including one officer. This

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small success was due in part to two gunboats that fired on the entrenchments. On 14 December the Austrians executed a strong reconnaissance toward the Treporti Redoubt, with the support of armed boats along the Pordelio canal. It was repulsed with loss. By mid-December, the Austrians sealed up the blockade of Venice such that all communications with the outside became impossible. Small skirmishes daily animated the outpost life all along the lines. At the end of December, General Seras received a letter from Euge`ne informing him that, with the expected arrival of new reinforcements as well as the Neapolitan support, the Army of Italy would soon resume the offensive to free Venice from the blockade.57 AFFAIR AT CASTAGNARO, 24 DECEMBER An unreal quiet lay on the entire front, from the Upper Adige Valley to the Po delta. The Austrian inactivity was partly due to important changes going on at their headquarters. At the beginning of December the Aulic Council had removed FZM Hiller from his command in Italy with the charge of delaying the beginning of the new offensive on the Adige. FM Count Bellegarde, who had been the former head of the Aulic Council, was to replace him. In midDecember the new Austrian commander in chief arrived in Italy and established his headquarters in Vicenza. A new commander of the army artillery was also appointed, the chosen officer being GM von Smola. By that time the Austrian army in Italy was formed of 80 battalions, 8 independent companies, 49 squadrons, and 178 guns, with a strength of 53,046 infantry and 5,335 cavalry, including the troops operating in Dalmatia.58 Strong reinforcements were en route from Austria. The Hohenzollern Chevaule´gers Regiment and 14 battalions from the Erzherzog Karl, Kerpen, Liechtenstein, Coburg, Lindenau, and Wurtemburg Infantry Regiments (2 battalions from each regiment) were expected in Innsbruck by the end of the year.59 On 18 December, 6 other infantry battalions were ordered to join the army in Italy via Tarvis. Meanwhile, the positive outcome of the recruitment of local peasants in the Tyrol had yielded to the creation of 3 new battalions of Ja¨gers.60 Upon his arrival, Bellegarde found his army scattered in small packets. This dispersion of forces was the main reason that had prevented FZM Hiller from resuming the offensive. The right wing under FML Sommariva (14 battalions, 6 squadrons, 26 guns) was in the Upper Adige Valley. Vlasitz’s brigade occupied the advanced posts at Ala facing the French positions on Monte Baldo. The rest of the corps was echeloned between Ala and Rovereto, where Sommariva had his headquarters. Further west, detachments of Stanissavlevich’s brigade operated in the mountain region north of Lake Garda, watching the Trompia and Camonica Valleys as well as Rocca d’Anfo. It also had a few posts on the northern shore of the lake. The left wing was composed by General Nugent’s independent corps in Romagna and by General Marschall’s blockading

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force surrounding Venice (19 battalions, 12 squadrons, 32 guns). This latter had Mayer and Rebrovich’s brigades directly engaged in the blockade, Pulsky’s brigade in Padua, Fo¨lseis’s brigade on the northern bank of the Adige watching Legnago, and the column under GM Starhemberg on the Lower Adige at Boara. FML Radivojevich (26 battalions, 24 sqadrons, 34 guns) occupied the center, with Steffanini’s brigade manning a line of outposts between San Martino and Montorio just in front of Verona. Marziani and Merville’s divisions stood, respectively, in the second and third line. The reserve artillery park of the army was entirely assigned to the blockade of Venice, while Csivich and Bogdan’s brigades (7 battalions, 7 squadrons, 6 guns) were entrusted with the investment of the fortresses of Palmanova, Osoppo, and Grado.61 Upon his arrival in Vicenza, FML Bellegarde informed the Aulic Council that he would not resume the offensive until his troops were adequately resupplied. FM Bellegarde knew that during its long occupation of the Adige line the Army of Italy had stripped the region of all its resources. He consequently feared that, in case of advance on Verona, his army would be unable to “live off the land.” The Austrian commander, consequently, decided to equip a supply train with at least 14 days of rations. Another reason for Bellegarde’s cautious behavior was that he was awaiting news from his emissary in Naples, Count Neipperg, to remove any uncertainty about Murat’s desertion. Last but not least, he thought that his army was too scattered in order to successfully attack Verona, so that a few days were needed to concentrate his forces.62 On 27 December the Austrian commander in chief informed FML Sommariva that he should refrain from undertaking any action on the right wing.63 Unaware of Bellegarde’s reasons for postponing an offensive against Verona, Euge`ne worried about his overstretched front. Believing that the Austrian operations on the Lower Adige were exclusively aimed at enabling General Marschall to seal up the blockade of Venice, Euge`ne saw that the sudden waning of Starhemberg’s activities could be exploited to close the gaps between his units and thus reinforce his center. Consequently, on 19 December, Euge`ne gave orders to redirect Marcognet’s division on Roverchiara, a few miles upstream, leaving only General De Conchy in Castagnaro, with the 1/,2/106th Line and the 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiments. Darnaud’s brigade of Rouyer’s division would move to Verona, with Schmitz’s brigade remaining in Ronco. Campi’s brigade, of Quesnel’s division, would take positions as the advanced guard in San Michele.64 Two days later, however, the viceroy changed his mind and gave dispositions to countermarch Marcognet’s division back to its previous positions.65 On 24 December two Austrian columns (around 3,000 men) under GM Starhemberg moved on Castagnaro. Despite three successive attacks, the Austrians failed to storm the village and after a lively engagement were forced to retire on their original positions in Lendinara and Badia Polesine. Upon being informed of the attack, General Marcognet moved four battalions forward in support, but they did not arrive in time to take part in the combat. According to French sources, the Austrians lost 400 men hors de combat, whereas De Con-

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chy’s brigade suffered 110 dead and wounded.66 Euge`ne reacted to this new threat by readjusting his troops’ positions once more. Marcognet’s division shifted to the right as far as Villa Bartolomea, while Schmitz’s brigade moved to Roverchiara.67 No other remarkable event was to happen on the Lower Adige till the end of the year. Nugent had been waiting in Ravenna for orders for several days. It was not until 17 December that he received a letter from the new commander in chief, Count Bellegarde, who substantially confirmed his predecessor’s dispositions. Nugent was to leave a garrison in Comacchio and march to join GM Starhemberg in the region of Rovigo, between the Po and the Adige. In the same letter Bellegarde informed Nugent of the negotiations between Austria and Naples, advising him to refrain from any hostile action against the Neapolitan troops.68 Refusing to give up his original plan, Nugent wrote back to Bellegarde, proposing instead to seize Rimini and Forli, in Romagna, with the support of Starhemberg’s brigade. This would put the Austrian corps south of the Po and in a favorable position either to link with the Neapolitans or, should negotiations with Murat fail, to prevent the junction between the column coming from Ancona and the other coming from Tuscany. Count Bellegarde approved Nugent’s plan but did not allow Starhemberg to move from his present positions.69 On 24 December, Nugent, reinforced by three companies of Istrian landwehr, marched down the Adriatic coast. A small garrison was left in Comacchio. The French occupied Cervia with a detachment of 300 men from the 5/1st Foreign Regiment. Forli was occupied by 700 to 800 Italian National Guards and a march battalion70 of the 53rd Infantry Regiment under Colonel Armandi. On 26 December, Nugent attacked both towns. Cervia was assaulted for two hours by Hauptmann Iankovich of the Warasdiner Kreuzer, Rittmeister Grafen Hartig’s force of five Austrian infantry companies, a force of Italian volunteers, and 50 Radetzky Hussars. The Austrians frontally attacked the French in Cervia while at the same time turning their left flank. The attack succeeded in capturing two guns and part of the 5/1st Foreign Regiment, while the rest withdrew to the Cesenatico Fortress. Forli was attacked at dawn from two sides by Gavenda’s column. Armandi’s small force had deployed before the city but was driven back by the superior numbers of Austrians. In these two engagements the French lost 100 dead and wounded and another 400 prisoners and two guns. The survivors fled to Bologna, where they joined the Italian volunteer battalions that had been raised there.71 Informing Napoleon of these new setbacks, Euge`ne once again bitterly complained about the ambiguous behavior of the Neapolitans, who had refused to help the weak garrisons of Romagna.72 On 27 December, Nugent sent parties toward Rimini and Bologna. A small body of troops was also directed to the Apennines with the mission of linking with groups of Italian insurgents operating in this area. At the same time the first Neapolitan troops of Carascosa’s division arrived in Rimini and Imola. Though officially French Allies, they certainly took good

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care to spare the Austrian garrisons in Cesena and Faenza any disruption. Their commander, like several of his colleagues before him, refused to dispatch an expedition against Nugent’s corps under the pretext of an armistice with the Austrians. After a Neapolitan brigade, under General MacDonald, had entered Ancona in the name of their alliance and with the authorization of the French government, General Barbou, commander of the fortress, felt uneasy. Soon MacDonald formally demanded free access to the citadel, which Barbou curtly refused.73 On 30 December, the Neapolitan brigade of General Filangieri (Carascosa’s division) entered Bologna. General Fontana, who was temporarily in command of the city garrison,74 assigned the few remaining troops (including the survivors of Scotti’s column) to the two locally recruited volunteer battalions and dispatched them, along with the troops in the depots located in Bologna, to Milan and Mantua.75 At the end of the year, Nugent had his main body in Ravenna, while the advanced guard kept pickets in Forli, Cesena, Faenza, Imola, and facing the Cesenatico Fort. By that time the Neapolitans held Rimini and Bologna. Despite the two lines of outposts being in sight, not a single shot was fired between the two armies. No longer trusting their alleged ally, the French had evacuated the region almost completely, keeping only small detachments in Ferrara and Pontelagoscuro.76 In December, the first Italian troops returning from Spain and Germany arrived in Italy. In addition, several army units received a large number of replacements. These were armed, uniformed, equipped, and instructed in the Alessandria depot.77 Another 1,700 Italians belonging to the 1st and 7th Line Regiments, the 1st Chasseurs a` Cheval Regiment, and the 1st Sapper Battalion were marching to Italy from Spain. They had left Perpignan on 13 December but were not expected to arrive in Italy before the new year. As for the National Guard coming from Toulon, 200 out of 1,300 had already deserted. On the other hand, the new French levy had, surprisingly, exceeded all expectations. By 20 December around 12,000 conscripts had been received by the general depot of Turin. Despite the serious lack of uniforms and muskets, 4,700 had been fully equipped and were already marching for Verona.78 Since Marcognet’s retreat from Rovigo, on 8 December, the viceroy, fearing an attack on Mantua from the southern bank of the Adige, had urged Fontanelli to send reinforcements. According to his orders, Zucchi’s newly forming division was to join the garrison of Mantua as soon as fit for active service.79 The new Italian division was formed with the 1st and 2nd Le´ge`re Regiments and the 4th and 5th Line Regiments, each formed with two understrength battalions. The division had a total of about 3,000 men and actually arrived in Mantua on Christmas Eve. The veterans of the German campaigns did welcome the incorporation of the contingents of green troops.80

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With new forces coming, Euge`ne decided to reorganize his army into six divisions in the following manner: 5TH ORGANIZATION 1st Lieutenancy: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/,3/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade D’Arnaud 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 1st Foreign Regiment (3 bns) Total: 6,956 men and 12 guns 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment (1) 2/132nd Line Regiment (1) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 1/,2/106th Line Regiment Total: 6,257 men and 12 guns 6th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Zucchi Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade St. Paul 2/,3/1st Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,4/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/Italian Volunteers Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Paolucci 3/,4/4th Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/5th Italian Line Regiment Total: 3,383 men and 6 guns

December 1813 2nd Lieutenancy: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment Total: 7,384 men and 12 guns 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet Brigade: Adjudant-Commandant Monfalcon 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pegot 6/7th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment Total: 5,529 men and 8 guns 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 2/,3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 2nd Italian Line Regiment (3) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 1/,2/,3/3rd Italian Line Regiment 3/6th Italian Line Regiment Milan Guards (1 bn) Total: 5,355 men and 8 guns Cavalry: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 5/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 1/,2/,3/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 12

⁄ 4/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment

Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1st French Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) 1/,2/,3/Queen’s Dragoon Regiment Total: 3,010 men and 6 guns Reserve: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Royal Guard: Gardes d’Honneur Company Royal Velites (1 bn) Royal Grenadiers (1 bn) Royal Chasseurs a` pied (2 bns) Total: 3,148 men and 12 guns

Overall, the Army of Italy could field 64 battalions, 18.5 squadrons, 76 guns, and 41,022 men.81 The 1st Lieutenancy had its headquarters in Isola Porcarizza. The 2nd Division (Rouyer) occupied Vallese and Isola Porcarizza. The 4th Division (Marcognet) was in Legnago and Castagnaro. The 6th Division (Zucchi) was in Mantua. The 2nd Lieutenancy had its headquarters in Verona; the 1st Division (Quesnel) occupied Veronetta, the Verona suburbs on the left bank of the Adige, and San Michele; the 3rd Division (Fressinet) was in Verona; and the 5th Division (Palombini) was in Rivoli and Bussolengo. The cavalry occupied Vigo, San Giovanni Lupatolo, and Bavolone. The Royal Guard was in Verona by the army’s general headquarters and Villafranca. The Artillery Reserve, with 14 guns, was in Valeggio. The Artillery Grand Park, with its equipment, was in Mantua. The excess material was sent to Alessandria.82 Meanwhile, another Italian division under General Severoli was forming on the southern bank of the River Po.83

BRITISH LANDINGS ON THE TYRRHENIAN COAST While Murat was slowly disclosing his real intentions, Euge`ne saw other new threats materializing from the south. Fomenting and supporting local insurrectional movements had always been one of the fundamental tenets of Lord Bentinck’s strategy for driving the French out of Italy. Thus, when Lieutenant Colonel Catinelli, an Austrian officer in British service, submitted a plan to him for landing a small force on the Tuscany coast, the British commander in Sicily lent it an attentive and well-disposed ear. The proposed force would operate in the Garfagnana Valley, an impervious mountain region between Tuscany, Em-

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ilia, and Liguria, with the main aim of organizing bands of Italian deserters and insurgents. Besides its long-term implications, Catinelli’s plan could also serve more immediate strategic needs. At that time Bentinck was rather pessimistic about the war prospect in northern Italy. He thought that the Austrians were unlikely to force the lines of the Adige and of the Mincio in the next few weeks. Disconcerting the enemy by menacing Genoa as well as their lines of communication through the Apennines might thus help to weaken the French positions north of the Po.84 On 29 November Lord Bentinck ordered Commodore Rowley’s squadron to embark, at Milazzo, a landing force consisting of 1,000 men of the 3rd AngloSicilian Regiment (all local recruited volunteers) and two guns. This expedition, under Lieutenant Colonel Catinelli, sailed from Sicily on 1 December, heading northward. On 10 December a first landing was made on the Tuscany coast at Viareggio, assisted by some Italian insurgents. The garrison of the fort capitulated after a few hours. Catinelli’s force then moved against the city of Lucca, which was taken without opposition. Upon receiving news of the fall of Lucca, Prince Felice Baiocchi, commander of the French 29th Military Division,85 hastily reunited his weak troops, consisting of a weak battalion of the 112th Line and five guns. They were sent to Pisa, where they were joined by General Pouchain de la Roche with another small detachment from Leghorn (Livorno). Fearing this scratch force of French soldiers would cut him off from the British fleet, Catinelli evacuated Lucca and returned to Viareggio. On 12 December an engagement took place near this city. The French were pushed back after losing their two guns. Being informed by the prisoners that Leghorn’s garrison was now very weak, Catinelli decided to reembark and to attack this city from the sea. On 13 December the advanced guard of Catinelli’s force landed at Calambrone, two miles north of Leghorn. The day after, however, stiff resistance by Colonel Dupre`’s small garrison, supported by a force of National Guards, unexpectedly frustrated the first assault to the city ramparts. Then came a French counterattack, led by General Pouchain, who had succeded in rallying his troops after the engagement at Viareggio. It was, in turn, repulsed. Meanwhile, a meeting with a deputation of Leghorn civil authorities had the effect of convincing Catinelli that the people of Tuscany were attached to their grand duchess and that his plan of fulminating insurrectional movements was doomed to failure. Consequently, on 15 December he reembarked his troops, and the day after, the British squadron left Leghorn. After an irresolute movement toward La Spezia, Rowley and Catinelli decided to set sail back to Palermo.86 As 1813 was fading away, the prospects of the Army of Italy were far from exciting. While still in control of the line of the Adige, Euge`ne had to face new threats on both wings. To the southeast, the right wing was at risk of being outflanked on the Lower Adige, while in Romagna, Nugent’s corps was ready to link with the Neapolitans and strike a blow on the right bank of the River Po. Moreover, the possibility of British landings on the Tyrrhenian coast, in Tuscany or in Liguria, was now a real one.

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To the northwest, while the defile of Rivoli seemed substantially impregnable, the Alpine valleys from Tyrol up to the Simplon Pass were, after Napoleon’s defeat in Germany, open to Allied raids through Switzerland.87 Lastly, the increasing inequality of forces was now becoming a decisive factor. Substantial Austrian reinforcements from Germany were marching to the Tyrol, the first battalions being due in Bozen by the first week of the new year. Other troops were to follow soon. On 1 January 1814, the Austrian army had a strength of 68,949 men (10,573 of them reported wounded or sick), while the viceroy could field only 55,359 (12,464 at the hospital) including the conscript units still in the depots.88 Although the Army of Italy was likely to safely resist any attack on its left wing and the center, all these factors made Euge`ne’s position around Verona untenable.89 SETTING THE STAGE FOR NAPLES’ DEFECTION In mid-December, Metternich and Lord Aberdeen met in Frankfurt-am-Mein to discuss the scheme of an alliance treaty between Austria and the Kingdom of Naples. According to the treaty, in exchange for his active contribution to the war in Italy, the king of Naples would maintain his present possessions in the peninsula. An Austrian corps would join the Neapolitan army and act under Murat’s orders. Austrian FML Count Neipperg would go to Naples with full powers to sign a treaty on such terms. While giving his approval to the text, Lord Aberdeen asked and obtained from Metternich to make it explicit that an adequate compensation for the territorial losses was due to the Bourbon King of Two Sicilies.90 The stage was being set for the last act of Murat’s defection. Upon the failure of his official mission in Naples, Fouche´, the duke of Otranto, left Naples on 16 December. From Rome he addressed a letter to the emperor that, like Murat’s, repeatedly touched on the necessity of Napoleon’s becoming the midwife of the Italian independence.91 Upon hearing that the Neapolitan army was heading north, an anxious Euge`ne had immediately sent to Naples two of his aides-de-camp, Chef d’Escadron Mejan and General Gifflenga. The former brought a letter from Euge`ne confirming that every effort would be made to adequately supply the Neapolitans during their sojourn in the Kingdom of Italy and suggesting that Murat direct his troops on Bologna and Ferrara so as to contain Nugent’s penetration south of the Po.92 Nugent could, however, ignore the Neapolitan menace and sleep peacefully. On 4 December, Gallo had indeed urged Menz, the Austrian representative in Naples after von Mier’s departure, to inform FZM Hiller that the Neapolitan army had orders to avoid any hostile act against the Austrians. Moreover, they would not cross the Po River before the negotiations between Naples and Austria were positively concluded. Lastly, General d’Ambrosio, commander of the 2nd

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Division, would correspond daily with the Austrian commander in chief, keeping him informed of the Neapolitan movements.93 It was only after his aides-de-camp’s return from Naples, on 20 December, that Euge`ne became definitely convinced that Murat was no longer an ally. Among dozens of other signs, Murat’s true intentions leaked out from a letter sent on 15 December to Elisa, grand duchess of Tuscany, Napoleon’s sister, in which the king of Naples regretted being forced to put under his direct control any civil and military authority of the French departments his army was traversing.94 Four days later the advanced guard of the Neapolitan army, 2,000 men under General Filangieri, entered Florence. Their behavior during the march through Tuscany had been irreproachable. However, they had not presented themselves to the inhabitants as French Allies. They, rather, were an autonomous army fighting for Italian independence. Murat’s insistent attempts at resuming negotiations with the British in Sicily were not as successful. All Neapolitan offers received a harsh reply from Lord Bentinck. After several days of waiting, Schinina finally met the British commander on 12 December at Syracuse. The Neapolitan diplomat had been charged to submit a project of a treaty or, in a subordinate position, of an armistice. In spite of being formally authorized by Lord Castlereagh to sign a treaty with Murat, the British proconsul rejected any offer, informing Schinina 1. that no matter which party Murat should eventually choose to side with, the fate of Italy had already been decided elsewhere; 2. that since Italy had suffered the French yoke for too long, the Allied powers would certainly not allow Murat, a Frenchman, to rule Italy in the future. This was just another way to repeat the same point: Great Britain had no interest whatsoever in supporting Murat.

On 18 December, Schinina returned to Naples empty-handed. Though overtly in contrast with Castlereagh’s instructions, Lord Bentinck’s arguments were nonetheless perfectly consistent with his personal strategy with regard to Sicily. The reason was that he dreamed to put the island under direct British rule. Accordingly, the Bourbons should return to Naples and receive, together with political and diplomatic support, territorial or financial compensation for Sicily. In Bentinck’s scheme there was, therefore, no room for Murat’s maintaining his throne, and this accounts for his (not his government’s) opposition to sign any agreement with the king of Naples.95

5 Neapolitan Treachery Afoot: The Siege of Venice, Castel Sant’Angelo, Civitavecchia, Ancona, and Genoa, January 1814 THE ARMIES IN JANUARY 1814 At the beginning of the new year the Austrian army underwent a number of transformations, as it began incorporating several reinforcements from both homeland and Germany. A first minor change did occur on the first day of January, as FM Bellegarde assigned the newly arrived 11th Ja¨ger Battalion to Steffanini’s brigade. The Austrian commander also gave dispositions for the formation of a flotilla to cruise on Lake Garda in pursuit of the Italian gunboats.1 More substantial events were in sight. Strong reinforcements were expected from Klenau’s corps, which had besieged Dresden and fought at Leipzig. On 7 January the head of a long column coming from Germany arrived in Trento. It was under FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s command and included GM Abele and GM Suden’s brigades (GM Abele: 1 bn of the Coburg Infantry Regiment and 3 bns of the Liechtenstein Infantry Regiment; GM Suden: 3 bns of the Wurttemberg Infantry Regiment and 3 bns of the Lindenau Infantry Regiment). General Paumgarten commanded the attached cavalry, that is, six squadrons of the Hohenzollern Chevau-Le´gers. These units were to remain in the Upper Adige Valley. Another two new brigades (GM De Best: 2 bns of the Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment and 2 bns of the Kerpen Infantry Regiment; GM Quasdanovich: 2 bns of the Coburg Infantry Regiment) moved through Bassano to reunite with the main body of the army in Vicenza.2 Once in the Venetian plain, these brigades incorporated other units and were assigned to a new division under FML Mayer von Heldenfeld, which was formed of 13 battalions and two batteries.3

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Four more infantry battalions from the Reisky, Beaulieu, and Vacquant Infantry Regiments were due in Italy between 31 January and 7 February. Eventually, on 6 January the Austrian commander in Italy received from Prince Hohenzollern the orders of march of six infantry battalions and 12 hussar squadrons, which had been detached from the II Reserve Corps and were expected to arrive in Udine between 24 January and 10 February.4 As a result of these reinforcements, the Austrian army was reorganized, and on 17 January it had the following composition: Commander: Feldmarschal Graf Bellegarde Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Sommariva Brigade: GM Vlasitz (41⁄3 bns, 2 sqs, 11⁄2 batteries) Division: FML Fenner Brigade: GM Stanissavlevich (4, 2, 1) Brigade: GM Baumgarten (32⁄3, 6, 1⁄2) Brigade: GM Abele (3, 2, 0) Brigade: GM Suden (6, 0, 0) Division: FML Pflacher Brigade: GM Steffanini (5, 0, 0) Brigade: GM Gober (4, 0, 1) Brigade: GM Winzian (4, 0, 1) Division: FML Radivojevich Brigade: GM Starhemberg (4, 8, 1) Brigade: GM Bogdan (0, 18, 0) Brigade: GM Vecsey (4, 6, 1) Division: FML Marziani Brigade: GM Wattlet (6, 0, 1) Brigade: GM Eckhardt (5, 0, 0) Division: FML Mayer von Heldenfeld Brigade: GM Quasdanovich (5, 0, 1) Brigade: GM De Best (8, 0, 1) Division: FML Merville Brigade: GM Stutterheim (5, 0, 1) Brigade: GM Wrede (0, 12, 0) Siege Corps: FML Marschall Brigade: GM Fo¨lseis (6, 2, 1) Brigade: GM Rebrovich (Pulsky) (2, 2, 1) Brigade: GM Mayer (4, 2, 1)

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Brigade: GM Csivich (7, 31⁄2, 3⁄4) Brigade: GM Tomassich (in Dalmatia) (3, 1, 1⁄4) Brigade: GM Nugent (6, 4, 1⁄4)

The army had now a strength of 99 battalions, 701⁄2 squadrons, and 151⁄4 batteries.5 Despite the conspicuous enlargement of his army, a number of reasons led FM Bellegarde to postpone the beginning of new operations along the line of the Adige. A primary cause of inactivity was poor weather. A rainy fall followed by a rigid winter, with a lot of snow on the mountains and frozen mud on the plain, had in fact made most roads impassable, considerably reducing the number of possible lines of advance. Moreover, the Austrian army was now living in a state of constant sanitary emergency. Marsh fevers and a wide range of other diseases were considerably reducing the Austrian army. Fo¨lseis’s brigade, stationed in the Polesine swamps, suffered more than any other unit in the army, but epidemics struck mercilessly everywhere.6 The hospitals were full up with the sick, and the troops’ morale fell proportionally. Poor weather and diseases, however, were not enough to justify the Austrian lethargy. The Austrian commander was also dissatisfied with the results of the raids down the Brescian valleys on the right wing. After taking all these factors into account, the principal reason for FM Bellegarde’s fence-sitter attitude still remained his being suspicious of Neapolitan intentions. FM Bellegarde often revealed to his subalterns that he did not intend to resume his offensive until the king of Naples had effectively opened hostilities against his former Allies. He also informed the Aulic Council of his deliberation. In search for new means to soften Euge`ne’s resistance, at the beginning of January, FM Bellegarde reconsidered with new eyes Nugent’s position on the southern bank of the Po River, eventually realizing its strategic value. He then decided to reinforce this corps and push it forward as far as Piacenza, possibly with the help of the Neapolitans. Not only would such a threat to the French lines of communication force the viceroy to abandon the line of the Adige, but it should also make the line of the Mincio untenable. While reinforcing his left for a decisive blow, by assigning GM Starhemberg and Gober’s brigades to GM Nugent, the Austrian commander in chief would provide for disturbing actions in the Brescian valleys on his right. Bellegarde’s new plan was submitted to both the emperor and Prince Schwarzenberg on 23 January.7 On 31 January the Austrian army had grown again, and now it could field 107 battalions and 71 squadrons, including the small corps in Dalmatia.8 The Army of Italy under Euge`ne was also undergoing changes but did not receive its new major reorganization in January. At the beginning of the year, the strength of the front-line divisions was as follows:

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1st Corps: Grenier 2nd Division: 6,958 men 4th Division: 6,257 men 6th Division: 3,383 men 2nd Corps: Verdier 1st Division: 7,388 men 3rd Division: 5,529 men 5th Division: 5,355 men Cavalry: Mermet Perreimond’s Brigade Bonnemains’s Brigade Total: 3,010 men Reserve: Lecchi Infantry and cavalry: 3,440 men

Small numbers of reinforcements were on the move to join the Army of Italy. At the beginning of January, the 19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment arrived in Turin, soon followed by the depot of the 13th Hussar Regiment.9 The 300,000 levy did not bear, however, a constant flow of new recruits. On 12 January, only 5,439 men (out of the expected 24,800) had reached their depot in Turin.10 The third player in this campaign, the Neapolitan army, was about to take an active role in it. So far, Murat had been playing a political game and preparing himself for the upcoming break with Napoleon. His army was at full strength, and on 15 January 1814, it was organized as follows: THE ARMY OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES, BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY 181411 Commander: Joachim Napoleon (Murat), King of Naples Chief of Staff: Lieutenant-Ge´ne´ral Millet de Villeneuve ADCs: Mare´chal de Camp Caraffa, Mare´chal de Camp Romeuf, and Colonel Bonnafous Attached to the Army: Mare´chal de Camp Lavauguyon, Governor of Rome, and Mare´chal de Camp Pignatelli-Strongoli Generals of the Royal Guard: Cattaneo, Livron, Soye 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral Carascosa (in Emilia) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral Guglielmo Pepe 1st Line Regiment (2 bns) (1,867) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (2,039) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral Filangieri 3rd Line Regiment (2) (1,553) 5th Line Regiment (2) (1,965)

Neapolitan Treachery Afoot: January 1814 Artillery: Foot Artillery (8 or 10 guns)12 (164) 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral d’Ambrosio (in Emilia) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral d’Aquino 2nd Line Regiment (2) (1,752) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (1,775) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de Medici (?) 6th Line Regiment (2) (1,642) 9th Line Regiment (3)13 (2,241) Artillery: Foot Artillery (8 or 10 guns) (165) 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral Count Pignatelli-Cerchiara Brigade: Ge´ne´ral MacDonald (at the siege of Ancona) 8th Line Regiment (3) (2,626) Canonniers de Marine (1) (676) Sapeurs du Ge´nie (1) (674) Brigade: Brigade commander unknown (Lechi, Minutolo?) (in Tuscany)14 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (2,403) Guard Velites (2) (1,326) Detached Brigade: General Campana15 (in Emilia) 4th Line Regiment (2) (1,650) 7th Line Regiment (2) (1,779) Cavalry Attached to the Corps: (in Emilia) 1st Chevau-Le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (3) (667/546)16 2nd Chevau-Le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (3) (880/858)17 3rd Chevau-Le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (3) (763/641) Guard Cavalry (in Emilia) Guard Hussars (2) (354/393) Guard Chevau-Le´gers (5) (634/739) Guard Cuirassiers (1) (110/120) Gardes du Corps (1) (117/139) Guard Artillery: Guard Horse Artillery (8 or 10 guns) (110/121) Guard Artillery Train (146/226) Guard Infantry: (in Emilia) Guard Grenadier Regiment (2) (1,200) Guard Marins (1 coy) (100) (with Nugent on the Po)

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Artillery Park Reserve: 8 or 10 guns (634/720) Total: 31,912, 5,009, 32, or 40 guns

In January the Neapolitan army had a total of 28 battalions, 21 squadrons, 23,730 men, and 56 guns. The army may have been reduced, as Vaudoncourt relates that one month earlier it had 30 battalions, 16 squadrons, and a total strength of 34,000 men.18 Euge`ne faced a tremendous problem of overwhelming numbers and had to play a very cautious game. He had less than 50,000 facing a combined total of 104,000 Austrians and Neapolitans. To meet the pending Neapolitan threat in Emilia-Romagna, Euge`ne ordered General Gratien, who was organizing the 1st Division of the Italian Reserve Army in Alessandria, to move to Piacenza. This division was far from complete. It had received only 1,500 conscripts of the 300,000 levy, who were badly drilled and equipped. On his arrival in Piacenza on 28 January, Gratien’s division contained only 3,300 soldiers, including the depot of the 10th Line Regiment.19 On the same day, General Severoli’s forming division made for Casale Pusterlengo so as to put themselves in support distance to Piacenza.20 To make communications between Mantua and the right bank of Po easier, the viceroy had in mid-January made arrangements for the construction of a new bridge at Borgoforte.21 A new potential threat to the position of the Army of Italy came from the movements of Allied forces through the Swiss valleys. Fearing an attack from the Valais, the viceroy took measures for reinforcing the small garrisons watching the Alpine passes in Piedmont (Mont-Cenis, Fenestrelle, Saint-Bernard). Some 2,000 conscripts, who originally should have joined the viceroy on the Adige, were called on for these duties.22 On 5 January an Austrian raid under Colonel Simbschen, sent by Prince Schwarzemberg, made an appearance on the Simplon Pass.23 January was a relatively quiet month in Northern Italy. While awaiting Murat’s next diplomatic move, both Euge`ne and Bellegarde spent a few weeks reshaping and resupplying their armies. Only small actions were conducted along the line of the Adige, the most notable being the repulse of a detachment of 600 Austrian Ja¨gers from the village of Toscolano, on the west bank of Lake Garda. This happened on 18 January, when General Bonfanti ordered Colonel Duche´ to storm this position with a battalion of the 35th Le´ge`re and 150 horse gendarmes. The action got support from the flotilla of the lake.24 The Austrians had about 600 light infantry under Major Sieberer. They were forced back and moved up the valley. After the engagement, Duche´’s forces reoccupied their post in Salo`. During the evening of 18–19 January, an Italian gunboat, which was stationed in Torri, was surprised and taken by a company of Tyrolian Ja¨gers. The gunboat contained two cannons and was manned by a crew of 25 men.25

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In the Upper Adige and the Brescian Valley all was relatively quiet, the rigid and snowy winter preventing all but small reconnaissances. On the opposite end of the line, several skirmishes took place at Castagnaro, where the French outposts faced those of GM Starhemberg’s brigade, but none deserves special attention. SIEGE OF VENICE The cold weather enveloping Venice had caused much illness among the French-Italian troops, reducing their strength to 6,411 infantrymen and 916 gunners. Along the siege lines, small indecisive actions followed one another. On 5 January a sortie by 1,400 men, supported by 18 gunboats, marched out of Treporti and destroyed the Austrian entrenchments facing the island. On the morrow the garrison of Cavanella, at the opposite end of Venice defenses, executed another sortie and forced an enlargement of the Austrian siege lines.26 On 15 January, General Dupeyroux attempted to chase the Austrians from the Bebba Tower, where they were entrenched, using a force of 300 infantry and four gunboats. However, this effort was unsuccessful. The Grado Fortress, at the mouth of the Isonzo, found its supplies exhausted. As the garrison and its boats were withdrawn to Venice on 19 January, GM Csivich’s brigade took hold of the fortress.27 On 27 January, General Schilt executed a sortie from Marghera and carried the Austrian entrenchments, pushing the Austrians back to Mestre. A sortie made the same day from Chioggia captured 50 cattle. In the course of the month, French and Italian corsairs broke the siege and sent in several cargoes of grain and food. On 1 February the flotilla, which was in Ancona, returned to Venice. Meanwhile, the fortresses of Osoppo and Palmanova continued to withstand siege.28 At the end of January, FM Bellegarde decided to reinforce the blockading force by assigning to FML Marschall a cavalry brigade of 12 squadrons under GM Spiegel.29 AUSTRIA AND NAPLES SIGN AN ALLIANCE TREATY In January 1814, diplomatic negotiations evolved along two distinct patterns. On the one hand, Austria and the Kingdom of Naples made, with the approval of the British government, quick and substantial progress leading to the signing of an alliance treaty, which definitely sanctioned Murat’s desertion. On the other hand, Lord Bentinck, the British commander of Sicily, did not deflect from his personal plans with regard to Italy and resorted to all sorts of stratagems to prevent an armistice, not to mention a treaty, being stipulated between his country and Naples. To this end, Bentinck deliberately infringed the instructions he had received from Lord Castlereagh and Lord Aberdeen, which entrusted him with full powers to sign a convention with Murat.30 The most powerful tool Lord Bentinck had at hand to play his own role in the game was exploiting the

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long lapse of time required for a message to travel from London to Palermo, which allowed him plausible reasons to postpone any decision. Since December, Count Neipperg had been in Naples to discuss the details of the agreement with the duke of Gallo and Murat. The Austrian diplomat handled negotiations with great determination and energy. He succeeded in quickening the process without conceding too much to Murat’s attempts at raising the price of his treachery. Needless to say, Queen Caroline took an active role in the last phase of negotiations. At the beginning of January, Lord Bentinck sent Graham, one of his most loyal aides-de-camp, to Naples. This British gentleman had orders to stay a few days in the capital to see what was going on, then make for the Allied headquarters in Germany, where he would meet Lord Aberdeen. In any case, when in Naples, Graham should refuse to sign anything.31 On 5 January, Graham met Neipperg. Lying deliberately, he informed the Austrian diplomat that in the last two months Lord Bentinck had received no instructions from London or Lord Aberdeen. Neipperg then sought to rapidly update Graham about the military situation in Northern Italy. The Austrian emperor—he told Graham—dissatisfied with the conduct of operations, had replaced FZM Hiller with FM Bellegarde and considerably reinforced the army. Still, these measures were not reputed sufficient to break Euge`ne’s resistance. Consequently, signing the treaty with Murat was imperative for the Austrians, who desperately needed the Neapolitan military support to menace the French lines of communication in Emilia-Romagna.32 Before getting seriously involved in a war in Northern Italy, Murat, however, ought to be relieved of any British threat on his capital. For this reason, Neipperg expected that Graham had full powers for joining in the last drawing up of the treaty. To Count Neipperg’s surprise, Graham denied having such powers and refused to sign the treaty. On top of this, he illustrated to the dismayed Austrian representative Bentinck’s plan to wage war against Murat by invading Corsica. Bentinck’s and Graham’s deeds diverged considerably from their government’s will, and the proof is that on the very same day Lord Aberdeen wrote a letter from Germany to reassure Lord Castlereagh that he had good reasons to hope that Neipperg would succeed in concluding the treaty very soon, thus allowing the Neapolitan army to wage war against the French in Italy.33 At this juncture, Murat found the time to send another letter to Paris. While complaining to the emperor about being denied the command of the Army of Italy, the king of Naples once again implored Napoleon to make peace with the Allied powers.34 On 7 January, Neipperg tried again to convince Graham and informed him about GM Bellegarde’s plan for driving the French from Northern Italy by means of a series of coordinated military operations carried out by the Austrian and Neapolitan armies in Northern Italy, with the support of a British landing in Tuscany.35 In reply, Graham announced that he was about to leave Naples and make for the Allied headquarters. On his way to Germany, he would meet

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FM Bellegarde and GM Nugent. The true and secret aim of Graham’s visit to the Allied headquarters was to inform Lord Aberdeen that Bourbon Prince Ferdinand did not intend to renounce his rights on Naples. Thanks to Neipperg’s vigorous commitment, the last draft of the treaty between Austria and the Kingdom of Naples was ready on 7 January. It took, however, four more days to have it signed. The major points of the treaty were as follows: 1. Murat committed himself to field an army of 30,000 men, to which an Austrian corps would be attached. 2. The king of Naples would also command the attached Austrian corps. 3. In case of Murat’s absence from the field, an Austrian general would take over in command. 4. Austria committed herself to respect and guarantee the present territories of the Kingdom of Naples and recognize Joaquim Murat as the legitimate king.

In a couple of secret articles the Austrian emperor also gave his word to guarantee a territorial expansion of the Kingdom of Naples, by incorporating 400,000 subjects of the Roman States under Neapolitan rule. Meanwhile, the Bourbons would obtain an adequate reward for their territorial losses. Von Mier was back in Naples on 11 January, just in time to affix his signature to the treaty. He found the king deeply concerned about Bentinck’s hostile attitude.36 On 13 January the British commander of Sicily wrote to Castlereagh, protesting Murat’s being allowed too-favorable terms. In the following days Bentinck rejected two consecutive missions of Colonel Berthemy, one of Murat’s aides-de-camp, limiting himself to vague promises of sailing to Naples by the end of the month. Upon his second trip to Palermo, Berthemy brought Bentinck a few letters from Lord Aberdeen explicitly stating that the British government was for signing a treaty with Naples.37 From now on, Bentinck could no longer conceal his violation of the British government’s will under the veil of his alleged ignorance of orders. Far from giving up in the face of evidence, Lord Bentinck insisted on delay. Meanwhile, on 14 January the viceroy, still unaware of what was going on in Naples, had sent General Gifflenga on mission to Murat. Gifflenga was back in Verona two weeks later. He bore a letter in which Murat bound himself to notify in advance the opening of hostilities.38 On 23 January, Murat left Naples to reach his army in Bologna. On his way to Northern Italy, he made two stops in Rome and Ancona, everywhere receiving a warm welcome from the Italian people.39 By leaving his capital, the king of Naples had spared himself meeting with his intractable British adversary. Lord Bentinck, in fact, arrived in Naples only at the beginning of February.40 Again, he refused to subscribe an alliance treaty on the argument that the issue of the financial compensation to the Bourbons

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had not yet been adequately discussed. He, however, accepted to concede an armistice to Naples, which was signed on 3 February.41 Another document was also signed on that occasion. It contained a project drawn up by Lord Bentinck, Neipperg, and the duke of Gallo for the military cooperation of a British corps with the Austrian and Neapolitan armies in Northern Italy. According to this plan, FM Bellegarde would continue to operate on the northern bank of the Po. His main tasks were (1) trying to reunite with the Austrian army in the French Jura and (2) proceeding with the sieges and blockades of the main strongholds in Italy. The Neapolitan army would advance south of the Po, taking Modena, Parma, and Piacenza, and pushing forward as far as the strategic position of Stradella. It was expected to (1) cut off the French lines of communication with their bases of Alessandria and Genoa, and (2) force the Army of Italy to withdraw on the Alpine passes. Lord Bentinck would embark an expeditionary force in Palermo to set sail toward the Northern Tyrrhenian shores, its task being the capture of Genoa. To accomplish this, the British faced two alternatives. They would land either at La Spezia in Liguria or at Leghorn, the former representing the most audacious solution, the latter the safest. In both cases Lord Bentinck could ask FM Bellegarde for cavalry support coming through the Apennines. Besides, no other force, Austrian or Neapolitan, would operate in Tuscany.42 AUSTRIANS AND NEAPOLITANS IN ROMAGNA At the beginning of the new year, most of GM Nugent’s corps was stationed in Romagna, keeping a chain of garrisons in the triangle Ravenna-Forlı`-Faenza. By occupying the main road from Rimini to Bologna, the Austrians interposed between Carascosa’s and d’Ambrosio’s Neapolitan divisions, the former coming from Florence via Bologna, the latter from Ancona. While awaiting the outcome of diplomatic negotiations currently under way between Murat and the Austrian representatives, GM Nugent was well aware that doing nothing could throw away his strategically favorable positions to prevent the junction of the enemy columns. The real situation did not, however, present much of a risk for GM Nugent. Far from showing any hostile attitude, the Austrian and Neapolitan outposts had already started fraternizing, while their commanders kept a daily and amicable correspondence, just dimmed by a shade of residual suspicion and circumspection. GM Nugent had recently reinforced his positions by having the Fort of Cesenatico on the Adriatic coast captured by Captain Birnstiel’s column on 11 January.43 The enterprising general had also made up his mind about the best course of action to follow in the near future. He believed that the stalemate on the Adige was unlikely to end soon. Consequently, the operations in the theater on the southern bank of the Po could now play an even more crucial role in the campaign. The weak Austrian corps, however, was insufficient for the task of threatening Euge`ne’s line of communication along the Rimini-Bologna-Piacenza

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axis, and GM Nugent knew it. Nor had the arrival of two hussar squadrons, which FM Bellegarde had detached from GM Starhemberg’s brigade,44 significantly improved his situation. Thus, at the beginning of January, GM Nugent kept on pleading with FM Bellegarde for further reinforcements, actually aiming at obtaining at least GM Starhemberg’s brigade. Unlike his commander in chief, the Austrian general was more confident of Murat’s imminent desertion, and this made him address Generals Carascosa and d’Ambrosio in a very friendly manner. As a matter of fact, GM Nugent hoped for a quick Neapolitan involvement in the military operations against the French-Italians in Romagna.45 On 10 January an agreement was signed between GM Nugent and Mare´chal de camp Livron, an emissary of Neapolitan Chief of Staff General Ayme´. It indicated the Rubicone—the river made popular by Julius Caesar—as the dividing line between the chains of facing outposts.46 A week later, General Filangieri’s brigade (Carascosa’s division) left Bologna heading north with four battalions and six guns. The Neapolitans quickly took hold of Ferrara, which the French had hastily evacuated, and Ponte Lagoscuro on the Po, just in front of GM Starhemberg’s positions. The very same day as Filangieri arrived in Ferrara, GM Nugent allowed Neapolitan General Rosaroll’s brigade to traverse the Austrian lines and advance on the road to Bologna. He did refuse, however, a further request from General Ayme´ to let a Neapolitan column march up the coast as far as the River Po. FM Bellegarde, who was not yet informed that the treaty between Naples and Austria had been signed, heartily approved GM Nugent’s decision. In addition, he urged his subaltern to prevent any Neapolitan diversion from their route along the Rimini-Forli-Bologna road.47 FM Bellegarde would have been astonished to learn that GM Nugent had eventually resolved to give up all hesitation and collaborate with the Neapolitans. On 19 January he met Generals d’Ambrosio and Livron in Forli. A military convention was then signed, which provided for a combined plan of operations. Carascosa’s division, together with Livron’s Guard Cavalry Brigade, would concentrate around Modena and Reggio as soon as possible to watch any French movement from their positions along the Po at Borgoforte, Governolo, and Ostiglia. As for d’Ambrosio’s division, it would advance its head as far as Cesena. The Austrian troops in the Comacchio area, under Major Wittmann, were to reach Ferrara and join the Neapolitan brigade in that city. The rest of GM Nugent’s corps was supposed to take positions between Forlimpopoli and Castel Bolognese (five miles northwest of Faenza), wherefrom they could quickly close either on Carascosa or on the garrison of Ferrara, should the need arise. GM Starhemberg’s brigade was expected to take over at Ponte Lagoscuro and be ready to move south over the Po. A small detachment of cavalry was detached by GM Starhemberg to support Major Wittmann’s column.48 The following day, GM Nugent informed FM Bellegarde of the convention, specifying that the British contingent would remain for the time being in Comacchio, together with the Istrian Landwehr. In the same letter, GM Nugent re-

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ported his feelings about the quality and look of the Neapolitan army: “[T]he infantry is green, but well-dressed and equipped; the Guard horsemen look smart and well-mounted, while the rest of the cavalry are mediocre, with very poor mounts. The artillery is good, but, weighing too much, it lacks mobility. The number of horses in the Guard artillery train is inadequate, while the line artillery is equipped with mules.”49 Though still suspicious of the Neapolitans’ word, FM Bellegarde did not oppose GM Nugent’s plan and promised further reinforcements via Ponte Lagoscuro.50 The last week of January, General d’Ambrosio informed GM Nugent that the siege of the Ancona fortress had begun. Definitively reassured regarding the Neapolitans’ intentions, the Austrian general set his corps on the march. Major Wittmann’s column left for Ferrara; GM Nugent himself moved westward to Bologna with four battalions, four squadrons, and nine guns. Meanwhile, in view of his movement south of the Po and fearing that muddy roads and swollen rivers could delay it, GM Starhemberg had assembled a large number of boats at Polesella. On 25 January a small diplomatic incident occurred, when Major Wittmann’s column was temporarily refused access to Ferrara by Neapolitan General Filangieri. This episode had no lasting consequences.51 On 28 January, Filangieri abandoned Ferrara, and the Austrians took over again. GM Nugent arrived in Bologna by dusk to continue for Ferrara. Another meeting in Forlı` had persuaded him that the Neapolitan generals had no clear instructions from their king or, worse still, had orders to avoid any serious engagement with the French. The support of GM Starhemberg’s brigade was, then, urgently needed.52 At last, FM Bellegarde reacted positively to GM Nugent’s requests and on 29 January ordered the brigades of GM Starhemberg (8th Ja¨gers, two battalions of the Benjowski Infantry Regiment, one battalion, respectively, of Warasdiner-Kreuzer Grenzer, Istrian Landwehr, and Italian Legion, eight squadrons of Radetzky Hussars) and GM Gober (four battalions of the Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment, including one of attached landwehr, 3/ Lusignan Infantry Regiments) across the Po. They would join GM Nugent’s corps in Ferrara and act under this general’s command. GM Eckhardt’s brigade (seven battalions and two squadrons) would, in turn, replace GM Starhemberg on the Lower Adige.53 It was at this point that FM Bellegarde started realizing that an advance along the south bank of the Po, far from being just a diversion, might become the strategic focus of the campaign. At the beginning of February GM Nugent’s corps occupied the following positions: GM Nugent’s headquarters was in Bologna; the advanced guard under Lieutenant Gavenda held a line of posts from Castelfranco Emilia, on the main road between Bologna and Modena, to Bondeno, near the confluence of the Po and the River Panaro, via San Giovanni in Persiceto, Cento, and Finale d’Emilia; GM Starhemberg and Gober’s brigades stood in Ferrara. The British were still back in Faenza and Forlı`. On the evening of 31 January, the king of Naples, after visiting Ancona, made a triumphal entry into Bologna. By that time the Neapolitans had their advanced

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guard (General Campana) in Reggio Emilia. Filangieri and Rosaroll’s brigades, together with a portion of the Guard cavalry under General Livron, were in Modena, the rest of the Guard cavalry acting as reserve in Bologna. Of the two brigades of General d’Ambrosio’s 2nd division, MacDonald’s blockaded the Ancona fortress, while the other brigade had reached Imola. Pignatelli’s 3rd division was approaching Florence.54 BLOCKADES OF CASTEL SANT’ANGELO AND CIVITAVECCHIA Since the first days of 1814 the relations between the French garrison in Rome and the Neapolitan troops stationed in the city had been progressively deteriorating. The Neapolitans did not miss any opportunity to provoke their hosts, as a few examples will clearly show. On 7 January, General Pignatelli-Cerchiara addressed a formal request to General Miollis to house the depot of the 7th Line Regiment inside Castel Sant’Angelo. The French general politely refused. Five days later a furious revolt broke out in the new prison of Rome, which turned out to be fulminated by Neapolitan agents.55 After the signing of the treaty between Austria and Naples, the behavior of Neapolitan troops became more overtly hostile. New incidents occurred every day. Still, no formal declaration of war was made.56 On 19 January one of Murat’s general officers, Lieutenant General La Vauguyon, who commanded a corps of 5,000 men in Rome, declared himself the superior commander of the Roman States and took possession of the country in the name of Joachim Murat.57 The French posts were relieved by Neapolitan troops, and General Miollis with 1,800 men, among which were only 1,000 combatants, withdrew into Castel Sant’Angelo. Miollis’s garrison consisted of the depot and the cadres of the 3/,4/,5/6th Regiment and the 5/22nd Le´ge`re Regiment, the depot and cadre of the 1/2nd Foreign Regiment, a detachment of the 3/14th Le´ge`re Regiment, a detachment of the Roman Departmental Reserve Company, and a half company of the 2nd Foot Artillery Regiment. Other troops posted on the left bank of the Tiber and in the Trasimeno Department were sent to Tuscany. The Neapolitans began their blockade of Castel Sant’Angelo during the morning of 20 January and placed sentries and pickets along the glacis. A few days later they erected palisades on the streets opening up before the fortress and posted strong infantry forces, supported by artillery, behind them. A battalion was posted as a reserve at Borgo Santo Spirito, and a second was posted on the opposite bank of the Tiber. The Neapolitans then ordered the evacuation of all the houses near the fortress and filled them with troops. The windows and doors of these houses were then sandbagged, their walls were cut with loopholes, and they were generally prepared for defense. From the positions in the barricaded houses the Neapolitans were able to take

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the batteries of the fortress under musketry, so the fortress had effectively become a prison. Despite the weaknesses of his position, Miollis did his best to prepare for a vigorous defense of his Castel Sant’Angelo.58 Being surprised by the brisk declaration of the Neapolitans, he had not had sufficient time to provision the fortress. Only 15 cattle had been brought into the fortress, and no milled grain was available. The garrison had to eat horsemeat and construct hand mills.59 Under normal circumstances and confronted by a competent foe, Miollis’s tiny garrison would have been overrun in a few days or forced to lock themselves into the fortress keep, where starvation would have shortly forced their surrender. Fortunately for Miollis, the Neapolitan troops employed in the blockade were, as usual, of dubious quality, so his chances of withstanding their siege effort were fairly good. General La Vauguyon made attempts to negotiate Miollis’s surrender, but Miollis stood firm. He did, however, accept a 10-day suspension of hostilities, in which both sides promised not to build new entrenchments or to increase their armaments, except in the event that a relief column should arrive. The point of the convention was solely for General La Vauguyon to permit his troops to participate in the Roman carnival. In exchange for accepting this armistice, Miollis received the concession whereby the Neapolitans withdrew their advanced posts and accepted into their military hospital approximately 50 of Miollis’s sick.60 The garrison of Civitavecchia, commanded by General Lasalcette, consisted of 1,400 men, including 1,000 combatants. Its garrison was formed by the depot and cadres of the 3/,4/,5/14th Le´ge`re, a detachment of the 5/22nd Le´ge`re, a detachment of the 2nd Foreign Regiment, a detachment of the Roman Departmental Reserve Company, and a half company of the 2nd Foot Artillery Regiment. The fortress itself was protected by a single wall and a moat and covered way that were in very poor condition.61 The Neapolitans did not begin the blockade of this fortress until 27 January, so General Lasalcette took advantage of this delay to obtain abundant provisions for the fortress garrison and the 800 convicts imprisoned in the fortress. These convicts were to provide valuable labor for the fortress. This delay also permitted Lasalcette to make significant improvements to his defenses. When the Neapolitans began their blockade it was anything but close. They established their lines about two miles from the fortress, well out of cannon range. The Neapolitan general did push a strong reconnaissance force toward the castle, but it was dispersed by a few cannon shots. THE SIEGE OF THE ANCONA CITADEL While blockading Civitavecchia and Castel Sant’Angelo, the Neapolitans made themselves masters of nearly all of the Roman States. As for Tuscany, Murat ordered General Pignatelli-Cerchiara to send the 4th

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Le´ge`re Regiment to garrison Leghorn against the threat of new British landings. He also wrote to his sister-in-law Grand Duchess Elisa that detachments of troops would soon arrive in Florence to protect the surroundings from the growing audacity of local brigands and insurgents. In practice, on the pretext of defending Tuscany Murat set the premise for the military occupation of the whole region.62 In Ancona, General MacDonald prepared for the siege of the citadel where General Barbou had locked himself on the evening of 13 January. Prior to the beginning of the siege and the outbreak of actual hostilities, MacDonald complained that General Barbou treated him as an “enemy” and that Barbou “only awaited the arrival of fifteen hundred men, stationed between Macerata and Fermo, to assault him.”63 MacDonald occupied the Cappuccini Castle. He did not feel that he could depend on one of his regiments, the 9th Line Regiment. General Pepe, moving toward Ancona to support MacDonald, found himself in a difficult position as his brigade contained 47 French officers. He asked them if they would continue with their duties in the Neapolitan army, or if they felt that their honor would not permit them to fight against their countrymen. Apparently all of them chose to leave Neapolitan service and were honorably released. However, they were later detained by officers of the Neapolitan general staff and did not immediately succeed in returning to France.64 After Ancona was blockaded, General Pepe moved with Murat toward Bologna, leaving MacDonald to handle Ancona himself. The garrison Barbou had with him in Ancona consisted of the 5/4th Line Regiment, a company of miners, and a line artillery company in the citadel proper. A force of naval and coast guard gunners manning the artillery in the outer works, the 5/2nd Italian and 5/53rd Line Regiments, and a half company of line foot artillery manned an entrenched camp and its redoubt. In the Santo Stefano Lunette were the Chasseurs d’Orient, 50 men from the 2nd Line Regiment, and a half company of line artillery. Most of the troops were depot troops, and all, except for the 53rd Line Regiment, were Italians. In mid-January the garrison consisted of 1,587 men and 85 officers.65 General Barbou had also under his command a few detachments of troops stationed in the countryside to chase local brigands. He made a few attempts at recalling them back to Ancona, but apparently he failed.66 On 16 January at 5:00 P.M. General MacDonald officially summoned General Barbou to surrender the citadel to the Kingdom of Naples. Barbou categorically refused, and the siege formally began.67 Barbou’s garrison had to endure severe privations. Desertion was also a plague, especially with the Italian troops. During the night of 18–19 January, 44 veteran soldiers of the 4th Italian Line Regiment deserted from the entrenched camp and were easily taken captive by the Neapolitans. All pickets were increased to four men and commanded by a sergeant. As an extra security measure Barbou ordered that the magazines in the entrenched camp be guarded by a

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force of miners and line gunners. Barbou also gave orders to fire on deserters, not a few of whom were subsequently wounded. During the day of 20 January a Neapolitan officer appeared before the citadel and delivered a letter from General MacDonald relating to the pending attack and the defense of the citadel. MacDonald proposed that no military action take place on the city side of the citadel and that the citizens have free access to the port. There were also some proposals regarding artillery fire from two Neapolitan batteries. Barbou responded by stating that he would cease all hostile actions against the city if the Neapolitans would not fire on him from the batteries located at the Cappuccini Fort and Monte Gardetto. The two Neapolitan batteries in the Cappuccini Fort contained eight cannons and four mortars. On Monte Gardetto the Neapolitans had three batteries with seven cannons, two howitzers, and two mortars. The other two batteries with, respectively, four and six guns stood on the heights nearby. A further battery with two mortars was established by the French Gate. The siege appears to have been an extremely civil operation of the type common in the eighteenth century and in sharp contrast to the Allied behavior at Dresden and Danzig. The correspondence continued with a second letter from MacDonald being delivered on 21 January. This exchange was little more than a request that Barbou surrender the fortress to the Neapolitans. Barbou refused, politely.68 MacDonald had also ordered the citizens of Ancona who lived near the citadel to abandon their homes and remove any belongings that might be of some assistance to the French troops in the citadel. Later that evening the blockade became complete with the occupation of the Pastore heights by three battalions of Neapolitan infantry. On the morning of 23 January an English brig arrived at Ancona carrying GD Gauthier, his staff, and a few Italian troops who had been taken prisoner in Dalmatia at the mouth of the Cattaro and who were being transported to France. Barbou, however, was unable to communicate with them or provide them with anything they might need. The prisoners were then entrusted to MacDonald’s mercy and care.69 During the morning of 25 January bales of cotton and linen were brought forward and used by the Neapolitans to blockade the streets that moved from the fortress into the city. Covered ways and entrenchments were built to link the Cappuccini Fort and the Mont Gardetto batteries. Further, gun ports were opened at the other batteries. On the morning of 30 January, Murat’s arrival in Ancona was announced by salvos of artillery fired from the Neapolitan batteries in the city and the port. Murat visited the works at Mont Gardetto and sent a parliamentary, General Millet, to General Barbou. After the usual bad news about the condition of France, Millet called on Barbou to surrender, and Barbou politely refused. The following day the “honors of war” were offered to Barbou as well as an armistice. Barbou responded that he could not negotiate without the approval of Euge`ne and asked to send an officer for instructions. His request was accepted

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on the condition that an armistice be in effect between Ancona and the besieging Neapolitans until that officer returned. Barbou accepted, stipulating that the armistice not exceed 12 days. A French officer was dispatched on 2 February. He returned on 10 February with a response from GD Count de Vignolle, Euge`ne’s Chief of Staff. Vignolle advised Barbou that it was unlikely that Euge`ne and the Army of Italy would be able to send assistance of any sort to the citadel and added that, after expending all resistance possible by a “man of honor such as (Barbou),” he was granted the right to negotiate a capitulation. The staff officer had brought with him two letters from MacDonald as well. In these MacDonald proposed that the armistice be elongated until 14 February, that it could be extended by mutual agreement, and that the previous agreement not to attack the city be maintained. He offered, once again, the “honors of war” and to send a senior officer to negotiate a capitulation. Barbou responded that the armistice had terminated and that both sides were free to resume hostilities. As for not firing on the city, he accepted on the condition that the Neapolitans unconditionally agree not to use the batteries at the Cappuccini Fort and on Mont Gardetto. On 12 February the French executed a sortie with 300 elite men organized in two columns. The first had 150 from the 53rd Line and 50 Chasseurs d’Orient under Chef de bataillon Aragli, and the second consisted of 100 men drawn from the 2nd and 4th Italian Line Regiments under Adjudant-major Gariboldi.70 The “right” column was to attack down the road from the Saint-Etienne lunette, and the “left” was to take the heights of Mont Galeazzo and move toward Mont Pelago. If necessary, the left column was to take the hill that commanded Pie` della Croce. Initially the sortie was very successful. The Neapolitan advanced posts were thrown back or bayoneted. The left column moved to the SottoPelago where a rallied Neapolitan force stood, two battalions deployed in line. Maurice, the overall commander of the sortie, felt that the Neapolitan defenders were too superior to attack. The French withdrew, hotly pursued by the Neapolitans. The pursuit, however, was stopped by cannon fire from the fortress. The sortie was over, and when the casualties were counted, the Neapolitans lost about 30 men, whereas the Franco-Italian force lost 4 dead and 10 wounded.71 The siege settled down to its old routine again, but on 15 February, MacDonald sent another emissary requesting that the French capitulate. This time Barbou was of a mind that his honor and that of France had been served and that it was appropriate to surrender. Article 1. The garrison of the Ancona Citadel and its exterior forts, shall depart on the 18th with all the honors of war, arms and baggage, drums beating, flags flying, matches lit, having two field guns and an infantry caisson, depart for France, moving through Bologna, Plaisance, and Alessandria. They shall retain their arms to the banks of the Fiumesino, as is practical as had General Monnier, in the last siege of Ancona.

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 The officers and non-commissioned officers shall retain their swords and sabers. Accorded by sentiments of esteem which are due to the brave garrison of the citadel of Ancona.

Article 2. The garrison shall be accompanied and protected during its march, as far as the advanced posts of the French army, by a corps of Neapolitan troops of a force determined and commanded by an officer of the General Staff. Agreed and granted. Article 3. The subsistence, the means of transport, lodging, and forage, as authorized by grade, shall be provided by the military and administrative employees of the King of Naples, in conformance with French regulations. Agreed. Article 4. The daily pickets shall conform with those which are fixed by the Minister of War of Italy and cannot be doubled nor changed. Every four days of march there shall be a day of rest. Agreed. Article 5. King of Naples shall provide, at his expense, those vehicles necessary to transport the personal effects of the general staff and troops, and those employed by the administration and the corps depots. The number of vehicles shall be fixed according to the state of the needs which shall be prepared by the garrison’s commissioner of war. The vehicles for the troops shall be in the proportions established by the regulations for the staff officers, administrators, and employees. The number of vehicles supplied shall be established by the Italian and Neapolitan directors. Article 6. The division commander, the chief of staff, the fortification and artillery directors, the inspector and assistant inspector of reviews, the director and commissioner of war, and the French and Italian divisional paymasters shall each be authorized a covered wagon or forge to transport their administrative and other papers, their pay chests, and their personal effects, of whatever type they may be. Agreed on the condition that the functionaries designated in this article give their word of honor that the covered wagons contain nothing which belongs to the royal Italian Government or the people of Italy. Article 7. The sick and wounded who shall remain in hospital and those which find themselves in the citadel and which were evacuated to the Ancona Military Hospital, shall be covered by this capitulation until they are in a state to return to France. Agreed for the officers and military sick who find themselves actually in the citadel or which entered hospital after the beginning of the siege. Article 8. The troops of the garrison promise to not take up arms against the King of Naples and his allies. The coast guard gunners shall be considered as national guards and shall return to their homes. Agreed. Article 9. The officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers who make up the garrison of Ancona, and who, because of their entrance into the citadel, and who

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were unable to rejoin it for major causes, such as the sick in the hospital or in their lodging, shall be assimilated into the garrison of the citadel. Agreed, as it is already stated in Article 7. Article 10. The turnover of the St. Etienne lunette and the entrenched camp shall be effected two hours after approval of this capitulation by contracting generals. Agreed. The Neapolitan troops shall occupy the entrance to the entrenched camp from the side of the redoubt. Article 11. The garrison troops shall continue to occupy the citadel and entrenched camp until the hour of their departure. Agreed. Article 12. The fortification and artillery directors of the garrison shall provide to the Neapolitan troops an inventory of all the materials relating to their respective arms, as well as the plans and maps relative to the citadel. Agreed. These officers shall provide, in addition to the inventories of materials and plans and projects relating the Ancona citadel. Article 13. This capitulation is guaranteed and safeguarded by the King of Naples and his allies. Agreed. Article 14. Ge´ne´ral de division Barbou, commander of the 5th Military Division, Kingdom of Italy, is authorized to send a staff officer to the Prince Viceroy to deliver a copy of this capitulation. Agreed.

The garrison evacuated the citadel at 9:00 A.M. on the morning of 18 February and turned it over to the Neapolitans. While a portion of the inhabitants of Ancona expressed their concerns over the departure of the French and the new order of things, most citizens welcomed Murat and his promises of Italian independence. The garrison carried its arms to the bank of the Esino River, as authorized by the capitulation. However, the march was not happy, there being problems with the Neapolitans, and desertion was rife. Between the Esino River and the Taro 17 officers and 524 soldiers deserted the French ranks to return to their homes in Italy. Much of this occurred because the Neapolitan escort repeatedly told them that the capitulation would be breached; the French and Italian soldiers would be taken prisoner and pillaged. Of the 85 officers and 1,587 men who were with the garrison on 17 January 1814, and the 80 officers and 1,143 men present upon the capitulation, only 65 officers and 510 men passed through the Neapolitan lines and returned to the Army of Italy. THE DEFENSE OF GENOA At the end of January, Prince Camillo Borghese, governor general of the French Transalpine Departments, learned that the English were preparing an-

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other expedition from Sicily that was destined to land at Leghorn and attack Genoa. He then ordered Ge´ne´ral de division Fresia to take command of the city and the coastline, replacing General Montchoisy, who was ill. General Fresia was in Turin, occupied with the organization of a division of the reserve army that he was to command. Upon his arrival in Genoa, General Fresia quickly saw that he did not have enough troops to defend such an extensive coastline, nor did he have the provisions to sustain a long siege. He reported this to Prince Borghese, but circumstances did not permit the prince to react to his needs. General Fresia found only 4,500 soldiers in his command, which were spread between Spezia, Gavi, Borgo di Val Taro, Pontremoli, Genoa, Savona, and along the coast. He also lacked the funds to prepare the forts for the defense of Genoa and the coast. Fort Santa Maria had been raised for the defense of the Gulf of Spezia, but it was not reputed secure from a coup de main. Thus General Fresia believed it was necessary to evacuate the greater part of the materials and munitions, which were found in considerable quantities in Fort Santa Maria. Forty-four artillery pieces, in bronze, were carried to Genoa. Some funds were provided by Prince Camillo for the repair of the fort and the redoubts of La Spezia and that of other strongholds.72 The defense of the city of Spezia was subordinated to that of Borgo di Val Taro and Pontremoli, two big villages on the mountain road connecting the coast to the Po Valley. Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer St. Victor deployed his troops to defend against a crossing of the Magra River, which covered the southern approach to Spezia.

THE CAPTURE OF CATTARO AND RAGUSA (DUBROVNIK) At the beginning of February, Euge`ne learned from the reports of General Montrichard, commander of the 2nd Military Division of the Provinces of Illyria, that Cattaro had capitulated on 4 January, and Ragusa (Dubrovnik) had fallen on 29 January. The garrisons of these two fortresses consisted of Italian troops from the 4th Le´ge`re Regiment and a few hundred Croatians, which could not be counted on. The garrison of Cattaro found itself reduced to 200 men of the 3/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment and 10 gunners serving 65 guns. The garrison of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) had been reduced to 360 men of the 4/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, 30 gunners of the 2nd Foot Artillery Regiment, 22 French gendarmes, a few coast guards, and some volunteers organized into a company, which, like the national guard, daily deserted.73 At Cattaro, General Gauthier, who commanded the garrison, was abandoned by the major portion of his troops. After a blockade of three and a half months, a bombardment of 10 days, and after having consumed all his resources necessary for the defense of the fortress, he was obliged to surrender, via an hon-

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orable capitulation, to Captain Hoste, commander of all the British naval forces then in that part of the Adriatic. General Montrichard, in Ragusa (Dubrovnik), was similarly confronted. On 16 January the Austrians began the construction of three batteries before Ragusa (Dubrovnik), to be supported by a force of Grenzers. GM Milutinovich, a Croatian officer in command of the Austrian blockading force, had his problems in keeping under control the bands of insurgents participating in the siege.74 Captain Hoste arrived aboard a British frigate and provided the Austrians with two mortars, two 16pdrs, and six 18pdr guns for the batteries. The bombardment of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) began on 22 January. That same day the British attacked the fortress on the island of Croma while the Austrians attacked Fort Imperiale. By 26 January both fortresses were in Allied hands, and the French position in Ragusa (Dubrovnik) was untenable.75 During the night of 28–29 January, after 22 days Montrichard signed an honorable capitulation to the combined Austrian and English forces under GM Milutinovich and Captain Hoste. The local insurgents who had hoped to restore the Ragusa Republic were briskly dissuaded by GM Milutinovich, who received the city on behalf of his emperor. General Montrichard had held Ragusa (Dubrovnik) despite being cut off for four months from the Army of Italy, enduring 57 days of blockade, losing most of his troops by defection, and suffering a revolt in the surrounding province three months earlier and city riots in the last few days. Two capitulations were signed that accorded the honors of war to the French troops and stated they were to be transported by sea at the expense of the Allies to an Italian port and considered as prisoners of war until their exchange. The troops of the garrison of Cattaro were transported to Ancona, but those of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) were sent via land transport and arrived at the positions of the Army of Italy on the Adige, via Tyrol.

Map 5 Area of Operations between Garda Lake and the Po River

6 The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 MOVEMENT BEHIND THE MINCIO On 1 February 1814 Euge`ne issued a proclamation announcing to the Army of Italy that it was in a state of war with the Army of the Kingdom of Naples and that the imminent withdrawal from the Adige was the result. It was not that Murat had finally formally declared war but that the existence of the treaty completed on 11 January with Austria had become known. After three months of successful defense of the line of the Adige, Euge`ne decided that the time for retreat had finally arrived. The presence of an army of 40,000 Neapolitans and Austrians on the southern bank of the Po, threatening to seize Piacenza and cut the Army of Italy off from its natural line of retreat to Piedmont and France, made Euge`ne’s present position untenable. As long as he remained on the Adige, Euge`ne could not lend any support to his two weak divisions in Emilia. Moreover, in spite of the recent arrival of some reinforcements both from the veteran units in Spain and from the depots in northwest Italy, his army now faced overwhelming Allied forces, outnumbered by more than two to one. The only solution open to Euge`ne was to find a new strong defensive line, preferably one supported by natural obstacles and/or strongholds, which would allow Euge`ne’s army to considerably shorten its overextended front, maintain a central position between Bellegarde and Murat, and come nearer to Severoli and Gratien’s divisions in Emilia. The line of the Mincio River between the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera on Lake Garda, about 20 miles east of Verona, seemed to meet all these requirements. When Euge`ne took the crucial decision, the Army of Italy, excluding those detachments in Venice, Emilia, and the Brescian Valleys, occupied the following

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positions: The army headquarters was in Verona, together with Fressinet’s 3rd Division and the Royal Italian Guard; Quesnel’s 1st Division was at Veronetta and San Michele, Rouyer’s 2nd Division at Vallese and Isola Porcarizza, Marcognet’s entire 4th Division at Legnago, after De Conchy’s brigade had withdrawn from Castagnaro, and Palombini’s 5th Division at Rivoli and Bussolengo; the cavalry brigades were scattered between Vigo, San Giovanni Lupatolo, Vago, and Bovolone; and Zucchi’s 6th Division formed the garrison of Mantua.1 On 3 February the withdrawal of the Army of Italy behind the Mincio began. General Bonnemains had, since 17 January, been in Zevio with his cavalry brigade. He was charged with the evacuation of Verona and with the command of the rear guard. Supporting his two cavalry regiments were the 3/1st and 8/ 14th Le´ge`re from the 1st Division.2 The 1st and 2nd Divisions also remained as a screen on the Adige. The 3rd Division moved on Valeggio, while the 4th Division, together with the Royal Guard, made for Mantua, via Villafranca. The rest of the cavalry withdrew to Goito. The 5th Division received orders to reach Peschiera, making a stop at Castelnuovo and leaving a line of posts between Rivoli and Corona. To spare the good citizens of Verona any further hardship and trouble, Euge`ne negotiated with FM Bellegarde that the Austrian troops would be allowed to enter the city on 4 February, without meeting any opposition, just a few hours after the French departure. Only a small and militarily insignificant garrison of some 130 men, most of whom were retired veterans, would be left in the city castle.3 FM Bellegarde courteously accepted Euge`ne’s propsed convention but predictably profited by his knowledge of the French announced movement by having his army ready for the following pursuit. He then drew that part of the army under his direct orders closer to Verona. By the evening of 3 February FML Radivojevich’s corps, with Steffanini’s brigade in the van, established a tight crown of outposts on the heights east of Verona. The rest of the army soon followed at a short distance. The Austrian commander in chief also sent dispositions to FML Sommariva’s corps on the Upper Adige to concentrate all his troops between Trento and Rovereto and be ready to march on Peschiera, after crossing over the Adige at Dolce, a few miles north of the Rivoli defile.4 On 4 February at 8:00 A.M. the French rear guard left Verona, following the movement of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. By the evening, the army had moved into its new designated positions. The 1st Lieutenancy, under General Grenier, formed the right wing. Grenier’s headquarters and Rouyer’s 2nd Division (except two battalions detached at Borgoforte on the Po) were in Mantua, together with General Zucchi’s garrison division and the Royal Italian Guard. Marcognet’s 4th Division took position west of Mantua, on the River Oglio, so as to position itself within supporting distance of Severoli’s division south of the Po. The 2nd Lieutenancy under General Verdier formed the left wing and had its headquarters at Goito. Quesnel’s 1st Division stood at Sacca and Rivalta, just south of Goito, whereas Frassinet’s 3rd Division deployed along the Mincio between Goito and Borghetto, and Palombini’s 5th Division repaired under the

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walls of Peschiera. The cavalry were scattered in second line at different places west of Mantua, between this fortress and the Oglio. Euge`ne established his headquarters in Mantua. The Army of Italy also held two solid bridgeheads on the left bank of the Mincio by Goito and Monzambano. Steffanini’s advanced guard entered Verona at 10:00 A.M. on 4 February and immediately set off in pursuit of Euge`ne’s rear guard.5 AFFAIR AT VILLAFRANCA, 4 FEBRUARY By noon Bonnemains’s brigade was the only French force remaining between the Adige and the Mincio. They took up positions in Villafranca, posting a reserve in Mozzacane. That same evening, the Austrians, with six battalions and six squadrons under the command of GM Steffanini, sought to trap the French rear guard, but they were pushed back a league from Villafranca. A long-range artillery duel followed overnight. The French losses were 5 men killed and 25 wounded. Before dawn, Bonnemains retired undisturbed, crossing the Mincio at Valeggio. Soon afterward, the stone bridge by this village was partially destroyed.6 The rest of the Austrian army crossed the Adige on the afternoon of 4 February. By the following day, Steffanini’s brigade was deployed along the left bank of the Mincio between Valeggio and Salionze, with Radivojevich, Pflacher, and Mayer von Heldenfeld’s divisions passing through Villafranca and Roverbella. Marching at an unusual speed, FML Sommariva’s corps soon came in sight of Peschiera, supporting its right on the lake and its left on Castelnuovo. This deployment caused on 6 and 7 February a few modifications in the positions of the Army of Italy, the most significant being that Marcognet’s 4th Division was ordered to move from its too-eccentric position on the Oglio and rejoin General Grenier in Mantua.7 As for the cavalry, Rambourgt’s brigade was in Mantua, Bonnemains’s behind Goito, and Perreimond’s in Rivalta, Saraginesco, and Castellucchio.8 THE BATTLE OF THE MINCIO: GENERAL PLANS, TERRAIN, AND FIRST MOVES After the French retreat behind the Mincio, FML Bellegarde had taken measures for the blockade of the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera. The blockade of Mantua had been entrusted to FML Mayer von Heldenfeld, who had Eckhardt,9 Spiegel, Watlet, and Winzian’s brigades under his command and established a loose crown of advanced posts so as to keep a watch to the roads leading to the fortress. General Vlasitz’s brigade (six battalions, six squadrons, and six guns) occupied the heights of Cavalcaselle dominating Peschiera. Three brigades of FML Sommariva’s corps (Paumgarten, Suden, Abele) stood between Castelnuovo and Oliosi under the order of FML Fenner, providing the link between Peschiera’s blockading force and the main army, which was moving

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down the road from Verona to deploy along the Mincio. On 7 February FM Bellegarde moved his headquarters to Villafranca. The valley of the Mincio between Peschiera and Mantua, throughout the centuries a region of strategic importance for the control of Northern Italy, was about to become the theater of one of the most unusual, though indecisive, battles of all the Napoleonic Wars. Since he had decided to abandon the line of the Adige, Euge`ne had started devising a plan to exploit the benefits of his new strong position. Feeling relatively safe from any frontal attack from FM Bellegarde, who had so far showed a rather fence-sitter attitude, Euge`ne’s main concern was presently with the southern bank of the Po, where the French could field no more than 7,000 men vis-a`-vis an army of about 40,000 Neapolitans and Austrians. A strategic move had now become inevitable, which was transferring a substantial part of the Army of Italy to face this new threat. In order to execute such a movement and fall on the king of Naples, what Euge`ne really needed to do was to dishearten Bellegard and prevent him from doing any harm for a few days. Such a result could only be achieved, Euge`ne believed, by delivering a quick and unexpected blow on the Austrian army at Villafranca. In his last letters to Euge`ne, Murat had often promised to inform him before beginning any hostile action against the Army of Italy.10 Although the king of Naples was now officially an enemy of France and Italy, Euge`ne felt that Murat did not like the prospect of waging war against his former Allies. He then decided to take his risks and profit by Murat’s hesitation. Orders were given for the Army of Italy to be ready to cross over the Mincio at three different points (Monzambano, Goito, and Mantua) in the morning of 8 February and concentrate before Villafranca, where Euge`ne expected to take FM Bellegarde’s army by surprise. While hoping for a smashing victory, Euge`ne could nonetheless remain satisfied with a less decisive result of the battle, insofar as this enabled him to gain time for his present main objective, that is, Murat. In any case, Euge`ne estimated that the chances of a ruinous defeat were not high, as he firmly believed that his army could at any moment easily disengage and take shelter behind the Mincio and the walls of Mantua and Peschiera. As strange as it may appear, FM Bellegarde had just come to an unusual conclusion. He believed that Euge`ne could not feel safe behind the Mincio as long as the Neapolitan menace was aimed at his back. Such a correct guess made him mistakenly conclude that Euge`ne had abandoned the line of the Mincio and was already on the march with most of his army to retreat on Cremona behind the River Oglio. Consequently, FM Bellegarde estimated that besides the garrisons of Mantua and Cremona, only a few troops had been left to watch the passages on the Mincio. Poor intelligence, negligent cavalry scouting, and a number of carefully thought out feints on the French side hardly helped the Austrian commander in chief to change his mind. Thus, orders were given for the bulk of the Austrian army to be ready to cross over the Mincio in the morning of 8 February and set in pursuit of the allegedly retreating Army of

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Italy. Meanwhile, Mayer von Heldenfeld and Vlasitz’s blockading corps would prevent the garrisons of Mantua and Peschiera from making any sortie on the Austrian lines of communication. The Mincio runs about 18 miles between Peschiera and Mantua. Along this stretch the river bed is 40 to 120 yards wide and 5 to 7 feet deep. Although its current might be very fast in spring or after strong rain, the Mincio was at the time fordable at several points. Stone bridges were placed at Valeggio, Goito, and Mantua. On the right bank a chain of heights stretches southward for about 8 miles from the shore of Lake Garda to the village of Volta, followed by an open plain as far as Mantua. On the opposite bank another chain of height extends down the lake for 5 miles, ending just south of Valeggio. After Valeggio, there is open plain again, with just small rises here and there. The left bank had generally the command over the opposite ground, with the remarkable exception of the heights of Monzambano, on the right bank, which made an excellent strategic position commanding the other bank and the ford nearby the village. The whole region on either bank was at that time, and still is, crisscrossed with ditches and canals and interspersed with cultivated fields, enclosures, hamlets, and isolated farms, which were the realm of skirmishers and light troops but seriously hampered the full deployment of formed troops. On the left bank, the main road from Mantua to Peschiera ran in 1814 via Valeggio, which met the high road from Verona to Goito, via Villafranca, at the Roverbella crossroad. On the right bank a road roughly followed the course of the river linking Mantua with Peschiera, through Goito and Monzambano. A number of minor roads and dozens of country tracks were also available on either side of the river. Being misled to believe that the Army of Italy had abandoned the Mincio, on the evening of 7 February, FM Bellegarde ordered FML Radivojevich’s division (Bogdan, Steffanini, and Vecsey’s brigades) to cross the Mincio at Valeggio and Pozzolo at dawn. FML Pflacher’s division (Quasdanovich and De Best’s brigades) would remain in reserve in Valeggio. According to its original orders, FML Merville’s division (Stutterheim’s grenadier brigade and Wrede’s dragoon brigade) was merely to follow FML Pflacher’s movement and, like the former, take position by Valeggio. Overnight a new message from the commander in chief was received, which countermanded the original movement and redirected FML Merville’s division further south toward Pozzolo, wherefrom it could cross the Mincio, should the threat of a French counterattack materialize. In retrospect, FM Bellegarde’s providential afterthought probably saved the Austrian army from a crushing defeat in the upcoming battle. Without FML Merville’s stiff defense of Pozzolo, Euge`ne’s army would have had the opportunity to seize Valeggio easily, thus cutting the Austrian army into two hopeless stumps.11 Excluding the brigades of GM Stanissavlevich (detached in the Brescian valleys) and GM Fo¨lseis (watching Legnago), FM Bellegarde had at his disposal a total of 35,000 to 36,000 generally well-seasoned troops and 130 guns, 48

Map 6 The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 (Left Bank—Situation at about 9:00 A.M.)

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(eight batteries) of which formed the army artillery reserve. To this force, Euge`ne could oppose no more than 30,000 men and 90 guns, excluding the troops left in garrison at Mantua, at Peschiera, and at various places along the River Po. As we know, Euge`ne’s was basically a conscript army.12 General Fressinet had been charged to keep a watch to the passages on the Mincio between Borghetto and Pozzolo. During the night of 7–8 February he ordered his advanced posts to withdraw and rejoin the division, which had received orders to cross over the Mincio at the bridge of Monzambano just after dawn. Such an incautious decision did allow FML Radivojevich to concentrate his troops along the river bank at Valeggio without their movement being spotted. Between 3:00 A.M. and 4:00 A.M. strong parties of Austrian light troops (10th Ja¨gers, Steffanini’s brigade) and pioneers were launched across the Mincio. Encountering no significant opposition,13 they took hold of Borghetto and started repairing the stone bridge linking this village to Valeggio. The specialist troops also began to build a couple of pontoon bridges near the stone bridge. By dawn, Bogdan’s and Steffanini’s brigades crossed the river under the cover of a thick fog hanging over the river valley. De Best’s brigade, part of Pflacher’s division, was to follow Bogdan and Steffanini to the right bank of the Mincio around 8:00 A.M. The second brigade of Pflacher’s division, under GM Quasdanovich, was held in reserve near Valeggio.14 Once on the right bank of the Mincio, Steffanini’s brigade continued its movement as far as the Volta heights, about two miles southwest of Borghetto. Meanwhile, two squadrons of the Frimont hussars spurred on to scout in the direction of Monzambano. In the vicinity of the hamlet of Olfino, a mile north of Borghetto, the hussars ran across a battalion of Fressinet’s 3rd Division and the 4th Italian Chasseurs a` Cheval. The Austrian light cavalry was quickly repulsed.15 At about 6:00 A.M., Generalmajor Vecsey’s brigade, consisting of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment, six squadrons of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment, stood by a mill on the Mincio not far from the village of Pozzolo. As his troops were waiting for the specialist troops to finish the pontoon bridge, Vecsey ordered an uhlan squadron to ford the Mincio and reconnoiter as far as Goito. FML Merville’s division had, at 4:00 A.M., moved from Sommacampagna, and by 8:30 A.M. it joined Vecsey’s brigade on the Mincio. With Stutterheim’s grenadier brigade and the Savoy and Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiments under his command, FML Merville took a position between Valeggio and Pozzolo.16 By 9:00 A.M. the pontoon bridge was finally completed, and Vecsey’s brigade, with three squadrons of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlans and a cavalry battery, proceeded unopposed with their movement over the Mincio. A battalion of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment remained to cover the bridge. As GM Vecsey positioned his troops on the Volta heights not far from Steffanini’s brigade, a cavalry reconnaissance, formed from a detachment of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment, moved on Cereta and Cerlongo, where they encountered and captured most of Bonnemains’s baggage train. Very little of it managed to escape to Goito.17 Soon Vecsey’s infantry moved into Cereta, where

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it encountered a force of French. Vecsey ordered his infantry into battalionsmasse as the battle now raged. Oberst Baron Paumgarten, commander of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment, without waiting for orders, pushed into Goito and engaged the French there.18 The Army of Italy set on the march early in the morning of 8 February. It was divided into three main columns, with two other minor columns covering both flanks. The 2nd (Rouyer) and the 4th (Marcognet) Divisions, the Royal Guard, and General Perreimond’s cavalry brigade formed the right main column, with a strength of 12,000 to 13,000 men (24 battalions, seven squadrons, and 36 guns). Commanded by General Grenier, it moved out of Mantua and had orders to march on Roverbella and Villafranca, via San Brizio, along the high road to Verona. Euge`ne placed himself at the head of the central main column, which debouched from the Goito bridge and moved on Roverbella, via Villabona and Marengo. It was formed of the 1st Division (General Quesnel, eight battalions and eight guns) and an advanced guard under General Bonnemains including the 3/1st and the 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiments (30th Provisional Demi-Brigade), the 31st Chasseurs a` Cheval, and four guns. Euge`ne had about 7,000 men under his direct command. Farther north, the left main column gathered about 5,000 men on the heights before the village of Monzambano. General Verdier commanded the 3rd Division (General Fressinet), with 10 battalions and eight guns, to which the 3,4/4th Italian Chasseurs a` Cheval were attached. According to the original plan, Verdier’s column should cross over the Mincio at the bridge near Monzambano and move on Villafranca via Valeggio, following the ridge of the Valeggio heights. Grenier’s and Euge`ne’s columns were expected to reunite between Marengo and Roverbella, whereas Verdier’s column would join the other two in front of Villafranca. Euge`ne believed that the main body of the enemy army stationed in Villafranca. Consequently, he had given dispositions for a general concentration of his army in front of this village, where he wished to join battle with FM Bellegarde. As far as the flanking columns were concerned, on the extreme left wing 5,000 men of the 5th Division (Palombini’s Italians) moved out of Peschiera with orders to pass over the Cavalcasella and Salionze heights and make for Castelnuovo and Oliosi.19 On the extreme right, the 6th Division (Zucchi’s Italians) and Rambourgt’s cavalry brigade,20 for a total of 3,500 men, would screen a wide region northeast of Mantua to contain and observe the Austrian left flank. Zucchi’s division advanced in three small columns. The first column was formed by two battalions of the 3/,4/4th Italian Line and marched down the road to Legnago, with the light cavalry in the van. The second column, with the 3/,4/ 2nd Italian Le´ge`re, made for Castelbelforte on the road to Isola della Scala. The rest of the division with three battalions of the 1st Le´ge`re, of the 2nd Le´ge`re,

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and of the 5th Line under the command of General Zucchi left Bancole at 7:00 A.M. directed toward Castiglione Mantovano. Each column had two guns.21 THE BATTLE ON THE LEFT BANK: ENGAGEMENT BY ROVERBELLA Euge`ne accompanied the central column, under General Quesnel, as it moved over the Goito bridge to the left bank of the Mincio. Bonnemains’s advanced guard encountered and evicted the first Austrian pickets from the hamlets facing Goito. The advanced guard pushed across the bridges over four or five canals, which stood along the road from Goito to Roverbella, before and behind Villabona. Once Bonnemains’s scouts had cleared the bridges, his cavalry extended out into the plains between Massimbona and Marengo, pushing FML Meyer’s advanced troops (Watlet’s brigade) back to Roverbella. While General Bonnemains formed his troops on the plain, two pelotons of the 31st Chasseurs captured 150 Austrian infantry near the village of Massimbona. At the same time, Chef d’escadron d’Espinchal, with a squadron of the 31st, captured 300 infantry, including 12 officers, between Marengo and Roverbella. The French central column then extended its scouts to the right, toward the road from Marmirolo. So did Grenier’s column, which approached Roverbella from the south. Scouts were sent also to the right toward Santa Lucia to keep contact with Zucchi’s advanced guard. The Austrian posts in Soave, Marmirolo, San Brizio, Santa Lucia, and the hamlets along the canal from Castiglione Mantovano as far as the road to Legnano were garrisoned by weak detachments from Watlet’s brigade. By 9:15 A.M. all these posts were cut off and captured.22 A lively engagement took place around the hamlet of Santa Lucia, where the retreating Austrian pickets sought to rally under the cover of a strong cavalry detachment. The 3/2nd Italian Le´ge`re, preceded by the voltigeur company of the 4/2nd Italian Le´ge`re, pushed them back toward Castiglione Mantovano.23 Having easily disposed of the enemy outposts, Quesnel’s Division cleared Marengo and extended its front to the left of the road to Villafranca, deploying into a series of columns. Bonnemains’s advanced guard supported Quesnel’s left, pushing forward as far as Belvedere. Rouyer’s and Marcognet’s 4th Divisions moved to Quesnel’s right and positioned themselves by Rotta and Casteletto. Following Euge`ne’s original plan, which provided for a concentration of four divisions on the battlefield in front of Villabona, Quesnel’s 1st Division started advancing in order of battle toward the villages of Belvedere and Quaderni in an effort to link with Fressinet’s 3rd Division near the latter village. Unfortunately, they did not know that Fressinet’s 3rd Division, which was supposed to be moving through Valeggio on Villafranca, had been forced to remain on the right bank of the Mincio and had taken up a defensive position by the unforeseen advance of FML Radivojevich’s corps over the river. Till late morning, however,

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the thick fog hanging over the Mincio prevented the French operating on the left bank of the Mincio from forming a clear view of what was happening on the other bank. Euge`ne had been misled in believing that the bulk of the Austrian army would concentrate by Villafranca, and thus he still expected to encounter a strong enemy advanced guard by Roverbella. A strong enemy force stood, in fact, behind the Roverbella position. These troops, however, were not the advanced guard of the main army but FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s reserve (four battalions, a half squadron, a half battery), which had acted as a rallying point for those troops repulsed from their outposts around Mantua.24 Marcognet’s 4th Division was ordered to attack Roverbella. Under strong French pressure, at about 11:00 A.M. FML Mayer von Heldenfeld refused to be engaged in a hopeless combat and decided to withdraw his troops on Mozzacane, halfway between Roverbella and Villafranca. From his new position, FML Mayer sent a message to Bellegarde’s headquarters in Valeggio, promising that “he would be doing his best to keep the road to Villafranca.” The Austrian general was tragically aware that losing Villafranca would mean for the entire Austrian army being cut off from its lines of communication with Verona.25 On the French right flank General Zucchi’s force continued to advance on Castiglione Mantovano. This village was garrisoned by another body of FML Mayer’s blockading force. At this juncture, Euge`ne realized that the battle was about to develop along patterns radically different from those he had originally foreseen. Riding to a ridge to the left of Massinbona, wherefrom his eyes could sweep the right bank of the Mincio as far as the Volta heights, he was shocked when he saw strong Austrian forces (Steffanini’s and Vecsey’s brigades) spreading over the plain before Goito. Even more worrying was that he could hear the sound of heavy cannon fire coming from Monzambano. Aware that his original assumptions about the Austrian intentions were wrong, Euge`ne estimated that about half the Austrian army had already crossed the river. Earlier he had hoped to engage Bellegarde’s entire army with his four united divisions by Villafranca. What he saw on the opposite bank caused him to correctly conclude that the rest of Bellegarde’s army was likely to station by Valeggio, awaiting its turn to cross the Mincio. Euge`ne had to decide between two alternative courses of action. He could either retire his forces back to the right bank of the Mincio to cover Goito and lend support to Verdier’s column, which he estimated was being overwhelmed by the enemy, or deliver an immediate attack against that portion of the Austrian army that was still on the left bank of the Mincio. The former solution would take no less than six hours to be carried out and had a number of disadvantages. The first one was uncovering Zucchi’s left flank and the main road to Mantua. Moreover, even assuming success in retaking the positions on the Volta heights, he could hardly hope to rejoin Verdier before the night. This would imply that the day after Euge`ne would be facing the entire Austrian army strongly established in its bridgehead

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around Borghetto with his own army split in two parts. Attacking that part of the Austrian army still on the left bank of the river, and thus leaving on Verdier’s weak column the whole burden of sustaining the enemy pressure on the opposite bank, was certainly an audacious solution, which, however, seemed to have little chance of success. As long as FML Radivojevich’s troops were pinned down by General Fressinet by Monzambano, the Austrian commander in chief could not, in fact, order a disengagement and recall them across the Mincio, unless risking control of the bridge at Borghetto. By immediately redirecting his army on Valeggio, Euge`ne saw an opportunity to inflict a smashing defeat on the Austrians, and as such, the possibility of the decisive victory that would liberate Italy and send the Austrians back to their alpine passes was too great to miss. Aides and orders flew to inform Euge`ne’s generals that the plan had changed. Euge`ne redirected Quesnel’s 1st Division to make a turn to its left and gave it orders to take the village of Pozzolo, on the road to Valeggio. Rouyer’s 2nd Division would follow Quesnel’s, whereas Marcognet’s 4th Division was to remain in Roverbella to prevent FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s troops from linking up with those of FML Merville by Pozzolo. At this time, Perreimond’s cavalry brigade stood in Marengo. It was ordered to move to the left of Quesnel’s 1st Division and to engage the Austrian cavalry by Pozzolo. After the first few exchanges of skirmish fire, the French advanced guard had pushed beyond Belvedere, in the direction of Villafranca. As soon as General Bonnemains received the new orders, he directed his force to make a change of direction to the left toward Valeggio. They were now positioned on the extreme right of the army, that is, to the right of Rouyer’s Division. During this movement, in the vicinity of Belvedere the scouts of the 31st Chasseurs a` Cheval captured an Austrian baggage column, which was moving into Villafranca with its escort.26 Seeing the Austrian columns spreading from the Volta heights down the plain and, thus, fearing that the Goito bridge could fall into Austrian hands, Euge`ne sent the company of the Italian Gardes d’honneur to occupy it. Soon the commander of the Gardes informed Euge`ne that the bridge was threatened by a body of Austrian uhlans that stood around Volta and Cerlongo. This was probably a squadron of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment that had been sent on a reconnaissance to Goito to see if the French had returned and with the hopes of gathering more booty.27 The Italian Guard that was acting as the army reserve was then redirected to Goito with orders to cover the bridge, thereby assuring a clear line of retreat, should Euge`ne be forced to withdraw on Mantua. Later on, the Gardes d’honneur rejoined Euge`ne and the rest of the Guard Cavalry around Marenghetto.28 Euge`ne had taken an audacious decision, that is, keeping on with his offensive action on this side of the Mincio by means of a concentration on Valeggio. However, he did not seem to have thought out all the consequences of his choice. By leaving the entire Royal Guard in Goito and Marcognet’s 4th Division in Roverbella, he, in fact, doomed himself to deliver the decisive blow

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against Pozzolo and Valeggio with less than 13,000 men, a force clearly inadequate to the task of gaining him that crucial victory he sought. THE BATTLE ON THE LEFT BANK: ENGAGEMENTS BY POZZOLO AND REMELLI Late in the morning Quesnel’s division deployed by the village of Massimbona, as Perreimond’s cavalry brigade moved to the left down the road from Marengo to Valeggio. Rouyer’s division followed Quesnel’s in division columns. Bonnemains’s advanced guard was now on the extreme right wing of the French line facing the hamlet of Remelli. Marcognet firmly occupied Roverbella.29 Meanwhile, Merville’s division stood on the small rise behind Pozzolo, with their front facing the village. Stutterheim’s grenadier brigade was in the first line with five battalions deployed, with the Faber Grenadier Battalion (48,52) on the extreme right and the Von Best Grenadier Battalion (3,4,63) on the extreme left. Just after 10:00 A.M. an officer from the Austrian general staff, Lieutenant Kohl, who was in search of FML Mayer von Heldenfeld, precipitously rushed into FML Merville’s headquarters and advised the local commander that a significant force of French infantry had been spotted on the Massimbona heights, bearing down on his position. He also reported that further French columns were marching down the road from Goito to Pozzolo.30 FML Merville urged his cavalry to remain ready for a charge from behind the earthen embankment running past Pozzolo, as the uhlan squadron in reconnaissance toward Massimbona returned and announced being pursued by the French cavalry. As soon as the enemy battle line came within sight, GM Wrede’s dragoon brigade and four squadrons of the Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (Vecsey’s brigade), under Oberstleutnant Mengen, were sent forward. Soon Mengen found his cavalry facing GB Perreimond’s cavalry brigade. The Austrian uhlans quickly engaged two squadrons of the French 1st Hussar Regiment, which were in the French front line. Instead of countercharging, the French commander made the mistake of receiving the Austrian attack at the standstill. Apparently, the hussars were, for the most part, new recruits and badly mounted.31 They were thrown back in disorder. FML Merville reinforced the engagement by sending Wrede’s brigade forward, with the Savoy Dragoons in the lead, to engage the French. The Savoy Dragoons attacked the French frontally, while the Hohenlohe Dragoons attacked their right flank.32 The Italian Queen’s Dragoons, which stood in the second line, were also overthrown and driven back, being unable to defend the six guns of the accompanying 6/4th Horse Artillery, which were captured. The disorder of the cavalry spread to the adjacent troops, and the situation would have become serious if Euge`ne, who was present, had not deployed the two left-most battalions into square. Unfortunately for the Austrian cavalry, they were not supported by infantry. The French deployment into square stopped the

Map 7 The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 (Left Bank—French Attack on Pozzolo)

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Austrian pursuit of the retreating French cavalry, which could rally behind the infantry cover. Finally, the blown uhlans were forced back by a counterattack of the Italian Queen’s Dragoons.33 As the Austrians tried to drag off the captured guns, they found that the French had taken all the limbers. As a result, they were able to seize just one of the six guns as proof of their bravery. After this fighting, Perreimond’s brigade was hors de combat and, for the rest of the battle, was in no condition to deploy in the front line again. While the Austrian and French cavalry were engaged, Stutterheim deployed his troops on the gentle rise stretching northeast from Pozzolo to the hamlets of Remelli and Vanoni, with their front facing south.34 He formed in divisionsmassen two grenadier battalions in his first line, with four guns, and two more in his second line, supporting his left on Remelli. The terrain in front of Stutterheim’s line was completely open. The fifth battalion, the Purcell Grenadiers, with a half battery, was detached to defend the pontoon bridge at Pozzolo.35 FML Merville reported that the French were advancing on Pozzolo and that a second column had pushed between his forces and the blockading corps, engaging Mayer’s forces. Euge`ne pushed his advanced guard toward Remelli so as to outflank the Austrian left. Soon Bonnemains’s brigade was engaged by Wrede’s cavalry that had been entrusted to support the grenadiers. General Bonnemains immediately deployed the two battalions of the 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade en bataille,36 covering them with four guns, and placed the 31st Chasseurs on their left to face the Austrian cavalry. The 31st Chasseurs obliged the Austrian cavalry to withdraw by maneuvering so as to threaten their flank. Colonel Chevalier, once in Murat’s service and now serving with the 31st Chasseurs, was killed in this action. The advance of the French right wing ground to a halt as the enemy artillery opened a murderous fire on them.37 The defeat of Perreimond’s cavalry brigade had delayed the arrival of Rouyer’s division on the battlefield by no less than 45 minutes. Once this division was in place, Euge`ne deployed his army with Quesnel’s 1st Division in the first line and Rouyer’s division in the second line. They dressed on Bonnemains’s advanced guard. Euge`ne had meanwhile noticed that the Austrians on the right bank of the Mincio were no longer moving on Goito. He then gave orders to the Guard cavalry to draw forward and place it in the first line on the left wing, retiring Perreimond’s brigade behind them. The Royal Italian Guard infantry remained in the vicinity of Goito, taking positions on the right bank of the Mincio at Arco. Once Quesnel’s and Rouyer’s divisions were completely deployed in two lines of battalions, they launched their attack. GB Forestier’s brigade (Quesnel’s division) advanced, apparently under the orders of General Mermet, the French cavalry commander, against Pozzolo, which was occupied by part of the Chasteler Regiment.38 The second brigade of Quesnel’s 1st Division advanced to attack Stutter-

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heim’s grenadiers. About 30 French guns began a terrible bombardment on the Austrian grenadiers, wreaking havoc in their ranks. The Austrians could only respond feebly with their four guns. The Welsperg Grenadier Battalion (16,26,27), unable to bear this fire idly, threw its three divisionsmassen forward at geschwindschritt and succeeded in capturing Bonnemains’s battery for a while.39 Soon the Austrian grenadiers came under the counterattack of several French battalions and were forced to retire under the cover of the Chimany battalion. The French cavalry now moved to turn the Austrian left flank and, debouching from between the hamlets of Remelli and Vanoni, appeared on the flank of the Faber Grenadier Battalion (48,52).40 The 31st Chasseurs, without awaiting orders from Bonnemains, executed a charge against this infantry. The charge failed, as Stutterheim’s artillery poured canister into the French ranks. The 31st Chasseurs withdrew without disorder under the protection of the two battalions of the 3/1st and 8/14th Le´ge`re (30th Provisional Demi-Brigade), which by that time, profiting by the cavalry advance, had taken hold of Remelli and Vanoni. At this point, five squadrons of the Savoy Dragoon Regiment, which had advanced to the left of Stutterheim’s grenadiers, moved forward to support a battalion entrusted to retake the hamlets.41 The 31st Chasseurs, which had 500 men and was supported by an Italian horse battery, charged home and threw them back in disorder on Quaderni. This charge inflicted 150 casualties on the Austrian dragoons.42 The success of this charge opened up the Austrian left, causing it to withdraw. The battalions of the 3/1st and 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiments followed them closely, inflicting heavy losses on them. Mussita’s company of Italian horse artillery, which had supported the charge of the 31st Chasseurs, advanced at the same time and, by its fire, dispersed the Austrian cavalry that had rallied behind the second line and was deploying to execute a new charge.43 At this juncture, Stutterheim withdrew his grenadiers to the hamlets of Mazzi Campagnola and Pasini, a half-hour march north of Pozzolo and Remelli. He had his men occupy these farms and prepare their position for the inevitable attack. Wrede’s dragoons withdrew to Quaderni.44 THE BATTLE ON THE LEFT BANK: AUSTRIAN LAST STAND AT MAZZI AND FURONI On the left wing of the French line, Forestier’s brigade had stormed the village of Pozzolo by 3:00 P.M. The Austrian defenders hastily thronged to the pontoon bridge behind the village to retreat on the other bank of the Mincio.45 The Purcell Grenadier Battalion and the half battery, charged with the defense of the pontoon bridge, also gave way. The half battery quickly crossed over the river, redeployed by the Volta mill, and began to fire on the French infantry on the other bank. The Austrian bridging equipment was also withdrawn.46 At about 3:30 P.M. FML Merville’s battered troops licked their wounds in a

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new position between Mazzi and Furoni, on the road to Valeggio, and prepared for another French assault. Their gallant resistance against an overwhelming foe had stopped for a few hours the French advance on Valeggio, thus, gaining FM Bellegarde enough time to take those measures that were urgently needed to rescue his precarious situation. FM Bellegarde’s headquarters in Valeggio was placed in a prominent location on relatively high ground (130 to 140 meters above sea level). This gave the Austrian commander in chief a good view of the battlefield on either bank. Since noon he had realized that the main body of the Army of Italy was making its main effort on the left side of the river and that his lines of communication, running from Valeggio through Villafranca, were in danger. A ceaseless inflow of messages from FML Mayer von Heldenfeld and FML Merville, who were under French pressure and desperately required reinforcements, had removed any further doubt about Euge`ne’s real intentions. FM Bellegarde had Quasdanovich’s brigade in reserve at Valeggio and FML Fenner’s division staying idle at Oliosi, a mile north of Valeggio. He could, moreover, recall a few units of FML Radivojevich’s corps from the right bank and release them against Euge`ne’s forces, without being forced to disengage from the fight with Verdier at Monzambano. Still, FM Bellegarde hesitated to make up his mind. The only thing he did before 3:00 P.M. was dispatch two battalions of the Coburg Infantry Regiment (Quasdanovich’s brigade) in support of FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s corps at Mozzacane. The rest of Quasdanovich’s brigade (2 bns of the Coburg Infantry Regiment, 2 bns of the Saint Julien Infantry Regiment, and one 6pdr battery) together with two heavy 12pdr batteries taken from the artillery reserve, kept on standing idle at Valeggio. Better late than never, spotting FML Merville’s retreat on Mazzi and Furoni, less than a mile south of Valeggio, just after 3:00 P.M. the Austrian commander did finally resolve to commit his reserve. He then ordered the Saint-Julien Infantry Regiment (2 bns) and the three batteries to rush forward in rescue of FML Merville. He also decided to recall two battalions of the Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment (GM Bogdan’s brigade) from the Monzambano heights. FML Merville’s tired men welcomed the long-awaited reinforcements at 3:30 P.M., just as the French drums were beating the pas de charge once again.47 Euge`ne had 10,000 men under his immediate control as he began his new attack, leading Campi’s brigade (Quesnel’s 1st Division), Rouyer’s division, Perreimond, Bonnemains, and the Guard cavalry brigades against Valeggio. Forestier’s brigade was kept in reserve by the pontoon bridge near Pozzolo.48 Firstline units were now exhausted, and on either side, the burden of the fighting fell on fresher troops. By that time, General Grenier had moved one brigade of Marcognet’s division from Roverbella in the direction of Mozzacane. The other brigade, under General De Conchy, remained in reserve at Roverbella until it was redirected to

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support Quesnel’s and Rouyer’s advance on Valeggio. De Conchy was unable, however, to reach his new position before the battle abated. The French resumed their advance against the Austrian positions in Mazzi Campagnola and Pasini, which were rapidly stormed, driving the defenders back on Furoni. Soon afterward, GM Stutterheim led forward an attack of the von Best and Welsperg Grenadier Battalions, aiming at retaking the hamlets of Mazzi and Pasini. Quasdanovich’s fresh troops also joined in the attack and moved so as to fall on the French right flank. At the beginning, the attack succeeded, the French fled in disorder, and the farms were once again in Austrian hands.49 Around 5:00 P.M., however, Euge`ne, informed of the imminent arrival of De Conchy’s brigade (Marcognet’s 4th Division), gave dispositions for a general attack all along the line. He sought to block any Austrian attempt to recross the Mincio as well as to relieve the pressure on Fressinet’s 3rd Division, which was still engaged in an ongoing struggle with FML Radivojevich’s corps. In spite of the Austrian artillery pouring canister on them, the French infantry progressively gained ground. GM Quasdanovich was severely wounded, and his troops wavered as their commander was carried away from the field.50 The combat now raged by Furoni, the Austrian grenadiers desperately fighting against all odds to keep control of the farms. Eventually, the French occupied the houses of Furoni on the road to Valeggio. The last Austrian counterattack of the day developed at sunset, as Oberst Erdmann led the 1/Hoch-und-Deutschmeister forward and struck the French in the flank, while Major Ta¨sche led 3/Hoch-und-Deutschmeister forward in a frontal assault. These battalions had been belatedly recalled from the other bank of the Mincio. Advancing at the sturmschritt (storm assult pace), with their regimental band playing, the Austrian infantry drove forward and chased the French out of Furoni.51 As the night fell, the front stabilized and the battle settled down into a long-range artillery duel as the Austrians brought up their 12pdr batteries.52 Austrian sources report that the engagements by Pozzolo, Remelli, Mazzi, and Furoni had cost Stutterheim’s Grenadier Brigade 32 officers and 758 men dead and wounded and another 400 to 500 prisoners.53 The Austrian cavalry had also suffered heavy losses. On the right wing of the French army, for the rest of the day Zucchi’s Italian division (6th) faced several units of FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s corps. After repulsing the posts at Santa Lucia in the morning, General Zucchi’s 6th Division occupied the crossroad just behind Castiglione Mantovano with two battalions, thus gaining control of the road from Castelbelforte to Roverbella. Light troops were ordered forward as far as Pellaloco. Meanwhile, three companies of the 4/ 2nd Italian Le´ge`re, belonging to the column directed to Castelbelforte, took position at Canedole and made a link with the column engaged at Castiglione Mantovano.54 By 1:00 P.M., FML Mayer von Heldenfeld succeeded in reuniting with his

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reserve as well as rallying his scattered troops by Mozzacane. Fearing being outflanked on his left by Zucchi’s advanced guard at Pellaloco, FML Mayer von Heldenfeld moved three battalions of the Spleny Infantry Regiment (GM Winzian’s brigade) down the road to Roverbella as far as the crossroad to Castiglione Mantovano. GM Watlet’s brigade, with three battalions, two squadrons, and a half battery, garrisoned Mozzacane, while GM Spiegel’s cavalry stood in the third line behind the village. Early in the afternoon, a battalion of the Spleny Infantry Regiment advanced on Pellaloco, while four other companies turned the enemy position and fell on their flank. The Italians were soon repulsed back on Castiglione Mantovano. By seizing Pellaloco, FML Mayer von Heldenfeld regained control of the road to Villafranca. Around 3:00 P.M., the Austrians made an attempt at retaking Castiglione Mantovano but were in turn repulsed.55 Down the road to Legnago, General Rambourgt’s cavalry brigade forced the scattered enemy pickets to hastily withdraw behind the River Tartaro.56 Small skirmishing actions followed for the rest of the afternoon. According to General Zucchi, more than 500 Austrians had been taken prisoner in the engagements on the right wing.57 According to FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s official report after the battle, the blockading corps under his command suffered a total of 1,540 losses (killed, wounded, and prisoners).58 THE BATTLE ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE MINCIO: ENGAGEMENT BY MONZAMBANO After the early engagement with the Frimont hussars by Olfino, General Verdier had quickly realized that his situation was really dangerous, as he was facing the main body of the Austrian army. He then immediately sent orders to Palombini’s 5th Division to countermarch behind the walls of Peschiera and rushed Fressinet’s 3rd Division to occupy the heights above the Olfino stream, stretching west from the river bank. The 4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment covered this movement by means of some demonstrative charges against the advancing Austrians.59 As soon as they debouched from the Borghetto defile, FML Radivojevich’s corps started deploying at the foot of the Olfino heights in front of Verdier’s line. The first Austrian attacks, however, apparently went in uncoordinated. Fressinet’s 3rd Division had barely settled in when it was attacked by the 1st Landwehr Battalion, Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Regiment, led by Oberst Ru¨chler. Their initial attack was very successful, rolling back the French troops they had engaged. The Austrian landwehr fought with great bravery but were soon pushed back on the plain. The 3/Hoch-und-Deutschmeister, under Oberstleutnant Kreyfelle, joined the landwehr, and the two combined battalions again attacked the French line, with some cavalry in support. Two further battalions of the Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment had originally been directed to march against Volta but were recalled and joined in as the fighting became too severe.60 This new

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attack, however, did not gain any ground, and soon GM Bogdan’s battalions withdrew. French prisoners revealed to GM Bogdan that he was facing the entire 3rd Division and that Palombini’s 5th Division stood in close support at Peschiera. The French positions along the Olfino, with the guns so placed to effectively batter with enfilade fire the whole extension of the small plain on their front, seemed strong enough to resist any direct attack. Unfortunately, General Fressinet had neglected to occupy Monte Olivetto, a small knoll some hundred meters farther west of his present position. Soon FML Radivojevich’s sharp tactical eye realized that Monte Olivetto might be the key position to force Fressinet’s line, by outflanking it on his right so as to corner the French against the Mincio, while their left, supported by the Mincio, was frontally pinned. By 9:00 A.M. FML Radivojevich had been reinforced by the arrival of De Best’s brigade (Pflacher’s division). He then decided to send the Erzherzog Karl Regiment, under Oberst Graf Salis, and the 1st Landwehr Battalion, Kerpen Infantry Regiment, and a half battery to seize Monte Olivetto.61 Realizing the danger of being outflanked on his right, GD Verdier anticipated this movement and withdrew Fressinet’s 3rd Division from Olfino to a position where his left wing stood in the village of Monzambano, his right wing supported on Mereghetto, and the Monzambano stream ran before his position, separating his troops from the Austrians. A battery was placed in a good position on Monte Giacomotti, about a kilometer southwest of Monzambano, which could sweep with its fire all Austrians approaching tracks.62 The French also held the bridgehead over the Mincio in front of Monzambano. FML Fenner’s division had received orders to advance from Salionze and Oliosi on the bridgehead. The Austrian efforts on this side reduced, however, to a weak attack carried out before 11:00 A.M. by a few companies of the 4th Ja¨ger Battalion, who were easily repulsed, followed by a long-range artillery bombardment, to which the French guns by Monzambano replied with energy.63 The Austrian attacks on Monzambano followed one another during the day, but they were constantly repulsed. The battle raged fiercely for several hours. The terrain before the French position near the village was crisscrossed with ditches and ravines, which made it impossible for the Austrians to obtain any substantial gains. At a certain point, however, the French ammunition began to run out. General Verdier realized that his troops were about to succumb to the Austrian masses. He quickly ordered forward the Reserve Park of Palombini’s 5th Division, which was retreating to Peschiera, and the troops were reprovisioned with ammunition. However, the lack of ammunition at that time had already caused a situation that was difficult to repair, and the situation became, moment by moment, more critical.64 On the left side of the battle line, the Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment under Oberst Salis pushed onto the heights and found itself separated from the French by a narrow plain. The 3/Kerpen Regiment moved forward to link up on Oberst Salis’s left.65 The 3/Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Regiment, which was fighting

Map 8 The Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 (Right Bank—Austrian Attack on Monzambano)

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to its right, found itself out of ammunition and was obliged to withdraw to the ridge, where the 1/Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Regiment stood in reserve. The 10th Ja¨ger Battalion also ran out of ammunition. Fearing being outflanked, Verdier moved some troops from left to right. Probably realizing that the French left was now weaker, the 2/Kerpen, under Major Wo¨ber, attacked Monzambano and drove the French from the first houses of the village. Once the Austrians occupied these buildings, they resisted several French attempts to expel them. To reinforce his left Verdier then ordered the 4th Italian Chasseurs, under Colonel Erculei, to keep the enemy at bay. Despite the broken nature of the terrain, the Italian regiment deployed several platoons en tirailleurs and charged the advancing Austrian infantry, which stopped its movement and formed masse.66 Eventually, Fressinet’s tired men received some reinforcements from Palombini’s 5th Division. It was now the turn of the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, covered on their flanks by the 4th Italian Chasseurs, to renew the attack. Apparently, the Italians succeeded in retaking that part of the village that had fallen into enemy hands. About 2:30 P.M. FML Radivojevich received a message from Bellegarde, urging him to disengage his troops from Monzambano and withdraw on the positions of Monte Olivetto and Monte Olfino. The Austrian commander in chief was clearly taking measures to cover a general retreat of his army across the Mincio at Borghetto. The last phase of the battle saw the French infantry on the offensive all along the front, in the vain attempt at driving the retiring Austrian back on the plain before Borghetto. The orderly defense of a few Austrian battalions quickly stopped their advance.67 The fall of night ended the battle, and the Austrians camped on the battlefield. However, as the Austrians broke out their cooking pots and began to prepare dinner, orders arrived for them to withdraw to the far bank of the Mincio and move to Valeggio that night. By sallying in the early morning from Peschiera, General Palombini had sought to keep the blockading force under GM Vlasitz as well as FML Sommariva’s corps occupied. He drove the first Austrian outposts back and took hold of the Cavalcaselle heights. The French advance was temporarily delayed by a gallant charge delivered by a half squadron of the Stipsich Hussar Regiment. Meanwhile, FML Sommariva had concentrated part of Fenner’s division at Salionze to watch the bridgehead on the Mincio by Monzambano. About noon, FML Sommariva’s corps linked with GM Vlasitz’s brigade, which was charged with the blockade of Peschiera. Palombini’s advance ground to a halt as FML Sommariva’s and GM Vlasitz’s forces concentrated before him. A battalion of the Hohenlohe Bartenstein Infantry Regiment impetuously joined in the fighting, making the enemy advanced guard waver. At this juncture, Palombini received General Verdier’s orders to withdraw behind the walls of Pescheria. While retreating, he dispatched toward Monzambano his Reserve Park

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to resupply Fressinet’s 3rd Division. The 3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment was already in position between Peschiera and Monzambano and could easily move in support of Fressinet’s tired men.68 Despite his failure to inflict any significant punishment on the Austrians, Palombini, like Zucchi on the other side of the river, succeeded in tying up a major portion of the Austrian force and prevented their transferring significant reinforcements to the central portion of the battlefield. As for GM Steffanini and GM Vecsey’s brigades, which during the morning had spread over the Volta heights and down the plain toward Goito, they lay idle for the rest of the day, without spotting any French troops in front of them. After 3:00 P.M., GM Vecsey received a message from the commanding officer of the Purcell Grenadier Battalion, charged with the defense of the pontoon bridge at Pozzolo, informing him that his unit had been forced to retreat on this side of the river and that the bridge was now in French hands. GM Vecsey immediately gave orders to his brigade to withdraw and approach the river bank. Upon being recalled late that afternoon, both brigades withdrew unopposed and encamped for the night at Borghetto.69 THE BATTLE OF THE MINCIO: FINAL POSITIONS AND LOSSES On the evening of 8 February, the opposing armies occupied the following positions. On the French left wing, Palombini’s 5th Division had returned to the fortress of Peschiera, while Fressinet’s bivouacked by Monzambano. On the right wing, General Zucchi had reunited most of his troops behind Castiglione di Mantovano, while a brigade of Marcognet’s 4th Division held Roverbella. On the center, the French line had drawn back about a mile from the position it occupied at the end of the battle. Bonnemains’s advanced guard encamped for the night somewhere between Pozzolo and Roverbella, with Quesnel and Rouyer’s infantry behind them. Perreimond’s battered brigade had been withdrawn into the second line and stood, with the Royal Guard Cavalry and Euge`ne’s headquarters, by Marengo. The Royal Guard Infantry slept in Goito. A chain of French outposts stretched along the left bank of the river as far as Pozzolo. As for the Austrian army, Vlasitz’s brigade had retaken its original position on the heights of Cavalcaselle, while FML Fenner’s division occupied Salionze. FML Radivojevich’s corps had two brigades (Steffanini’s and Vecsey’s) still on the right bank of the Mincio between Olfino and Borghetto and the rest by Valeggio. De Best’s brigade of Pflacher’s division bivouacked in Borghetto. What remained of FML Merville’s division, plus Quasdanovich’s brigade of Pflacher’s division, occupied the line between Furoni and Mazzi, which they had so gallantly defended for several hours. On the Austrian left, FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s blockading corps recovered by Mozzacane, being sheltered by a crown of pickets stretching from Remelli as far as Castiglione Mantovano.

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According to figures given by FM Bellegarde himself, the Austrian army had 16 officers and 533 men killed, 1 general (GM Quasdanovich), 104 officers and 2,094 men wounded, and 1,208 prisoners or stragglers.70 Sporschil mentions Austrian sources stating that Bellegarde’s army lost 3,939 men hors de combat, whereas the French-Italian army lost about 6,000 men.71 Von Holtz states that the French lost around 6,000 dead and wounded and a further 3,000 prisoners. He claims that the Austrians lost 3,940 dead and wounded and 7,000 prisoners.72 Euge`ne claims that the Austrians lost 6,000 men hors de combat and 2,500 prisoners, whereas the French lost 2,500 men hors de combat. Vignolle states that Austrians lost, this day, 5,000 hors de combat and 3,000 prisoners. He states that Bonnemains’s advanced guard alone inflicted 800 casualties on the Austrians. Vignolle gives the French losses at 2,500 men hors de combat.73 It seems probable that the Austrians actually lost about 4,000 men killed and wounded and that their losses in prisoners figured somewhere between 2,500 and 3,000 prisoners. The French losses are less clear, but it is certain that the true figure lies between the Austrian claim of 6,000 and Euge`ne’s figure of 2,500. That Vignolle and Euge`ne agree is little indication of the truth, as Vignolle was Euge`ne’s Chief of Staff.

AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE The aftermath of the Battle of the Mincio was as peculiar as the battle itself. In a most uncommon historical situation, neither party claimed the victory. FM Bellegarde did not dream of writing such a word in any report, official or unofficial. Though perhaps more entitled to do so, Euge`ne also refrained from spreading any substantial claims, at least as far as his address to the Army of Italy and his letter to the emperor were concerned. In the latter he limited himself to declaring that he had obtained “un avantage assez marque´ sur l’ennemi” (a marked advantage over the enemy), while in the meantime regretting that “le re´sultats n’en aient point e´te´ assez decisifs pour l’avenir” (the results were not as decisive as promised). Only in a letter to his wife did Euge`ne venture to speak of a “bataille gagne´e” (a battle won).74 On the contrary, both commanders acknowledged, more or less explicitly, that they had not succeeded in fully attaining the objectives they had set themselves before or during the battle. FM Bellegarde had evidently failed to force the line of the Mincio. In addition, he had barely escaped seeing his army cut in two pieces at Valeggio and the French falling on his line of communication at Villafranca. Euge`ne had, in turn, missed the chance of inflicting on the Austrians that crushing defeat he had hoped for in order to turn southeast and deal with the Neapolitans. While the Battle of the Mincio is worth remembering for a few gallant deeds at the tactical level, such as Wrede’s charge on Perreimond’s brigade, Stutterheim and Fressinet’s stiff defense of their positions in the face of overwhelming

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forces, it was also the scene of several strategic, operational, and tactical blunders. Bellegarde had planned to force the line of the Mincio and move on Cremona and Piacenza to support Murat’s advance from Emilia. He also planned to turn northwest, then climb up the mountain passes of Piedmont and Lombardia with the double goal of joining the Allied armies beyond the Alps and meanwhile cutting off the Army of Italy from its natural line of retreat to France. Bellegarde’s overall plan was sound beyond dispute. Such a plan had, however, little chance of being successful without the wholehearted support of Murat. As the Austrian commander belatedly realized, the right thing to do would probably have been convincing Murat to move first and resolutely advance on Piacenza, thus inducing Euge`ne to eventually detach a few of his divisions in defense of that city. This done, FM Bellegarde would have been in the position of delivering a decisive blow against the strong French positions on that river. It was, however, at the operational and tactical level that FM Bellegarde made his worst blunders. Throughout the campaign the Austrian army enjoyed an undisputed superiority in cavalry and light troops. The poor quality of the Austrian reconnaissances before the battle seems, in the face of this, absolutely inconceivable. The Austrian commander had been misled to believe that by the evening of 7 February the bulk of Euge`ne’s army was already on its way back to Cremona. How could he fail to take the simplest measures to check this piece of information? As FML Radivojevich started moving his brigades over the Mincio on the morning of 8 February, he had been informed that the French had abandoned their posts at Borghetto, while keeping two bridgeheads at Monzambano and Goito, respectively, a few miles north and south of his crossing point at Valeggio. FML Radivojevich knew nothing of the whereabouts of those French divisions allegedly left as a rear guard. Another mistake was selecting Valeggio as the main crossing point, without first clearing the two French bridgeheads, from whence they could easily fall on both Austrian flanks. Moreover, while FML Fenner’s three brigades were positioned so as to prevent any serious menace from the Monzambano bridgehead, it is arguable that the blockading corps around Mantua was too weak to effectively control the swath of ground stretching from the hamlets facing the bridgehead at Goito to Legnago. When Euge`ne’s troops crossed the bridge at Goito, they easily dispersed the few posts established by Watlet’s brigade at Villabona and Marengo. Already engaged on his front by Grenier’s column advancing from Mantua, FML Mayer von Heldenfeld could hardly give any support to his right wing. The latter was then forced to fall back on Roverbella, thus opening a gap in the Austrian line, which the French immediately exploited by deploying in the plain between Massimbona and Marengo. FM Bellegarde had been lucky (or prudent) enough to countermand at the last minute FML Merville’s orders and detach this force to Pozzolo. Otherwise, the road to Valeggio would have been completely open to the French reunited columns. As the battle developed along unforeseen patterns, FM Bellegarde and his

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lieutenants, notably, FML Radivojevich, made two other gross errors and a minor one. Steffanini’s and Vecsey’s brigades lay idle for too many hours on the heights of Volta before their tardy recall to Borghetto. In such an isolated position they were practically useless, whereas their presence at the engagement by Monzambano might have greatly improved FML Radivojevich’s chances of breaking Fressinet’s resistance. Also, most of FML Sommariva’s corps spent the day twiddling their thumbs on the heights between Peschiera and Valeggio. Besides supporting Vlasitz’s brigade as it kept Palombini’s 5th Division at bay, FML Sommariva’s three strong brigades, under FML Fenner, neither exerted any serious pressure on the French bridgehead at Monzambano nor moved down to Valeggio, where their arrival might have convinced FM Bellegarde to release his reserve more promptly to support Merville’s battered troops by Pozzolo. The latter was FM Bellegarde’s last sin, though probably a minor one. He, in fact, hesitated too long before sending Quasdanovich’s brigade, his only available reserve, to rescue Merville’s grenadier brigade, which had suffered alone under the French attacks for many hours and had consequently suffered horrible losses. FM Bellegarde’s belated decision might, however, be partially excused on the old, but not necessarily sound, argument that any commander should wait to the last minute before committing his last reserve. Napoleon did not do any better at Waterloo. Euge`ne’s behavior was not faultless either. Providing for a battlefield concentration of three columns, whose departure points stood several miles apart on the far bank of the Mincio, his general plan was a risky one. He probably wished to repeat the feat of the Battle of the Piave in May 1809, when he, with admittedly a good run of luck, succeeded in crossing the river at two different fords and reuniting enough troops on the opposite bank before Erzherzog Johann could mount a counterattack. The fact that Euge`ne, before climbing up the Massimbona rise at 10:00 A.M. and seeing the Austrian columns marching down the Volta heights on the other bank, had no idea of FM Bellegarde’s intentions may be partially explained by his shortage of good cavalry. The lack of cavalry had limited his reconnaissance capabilities throughout the campaign. Leaving his left wing in such an isolated position on the heights of Monzambano was, nonetheless, a bad mistake and one that could have cost him that day and the campaign as well. As soon as Euge`ne managed to form a more precise idea of what was going on, on either side of the river, he reacted quickly and positively. His quickness in redirecting the bulk of his army on Valeggio by shifting to the left two and a half infantry divisions and three cavalry brigades was a move that actually deserves praise. Euge`ne, however, failed to understand all the consequences of his decision. By not committing the Royal Guard Infantry, which stood in reserve at Goito, and Marcognet’s 4th Division, which for too long remained in position before Mozzacane, he probably deprived his attack of the weight needed to break the Austrian line by Pozzolo. However, it is true that Euge`ne could not know that Steffanini’s and Vecsey’s brigades would not advance beyond Volta

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for the rest of the day. Thus, in view of his fear that Austrians might seize the important bridge by Goito, his decision to keep the Royal Guard at Goito might seem justified. On the other hand, the French commander did not realize that Zucchi’s division was probably sufficient to keep FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s weak and by now battered force at bay. Had this been apparent, Marcognet’s 4th Division could have disengaged from Mozzacane and joined in the assault on Pozzolo. At the tactical level, and with the remarkable exception of Fressinet’s 3rd Division, the Austrians performed, on the average, better than their French and Italian counterparts. This is not surprising, as most of Euge`ne’s army consisted of green and demoralized troops, whose battlefield training had been very limited, whereas FM Bellegarde could rely on generally seasoned, if not first-class, troops, among them the famous Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment and several veteran units, which had fought at Dresden and Leipzig. The day after the battle, 9 February, Euge`ne wished to reestablish communications with General Verdier’s left column and recrossed the Mincio with his army. General Bonnemains covered this movement as far as Goito. By 9:00 A.M., Quesnel’s 1st Division, the Royal Guard, and Perreimond’s and Bonnemains’s cavalry brigades occupied the line behind the Mincio between Goito and the Volta Mills, in front of Pozzolo. Marcognet’s 4th Division established itself in Volta, while Rouyer’s division remained in reserve by Guidizzolo. On the right wing, Zucchi’s division and Rambourgt’s cavalry brigade returned behind the walls of Mantua, whereas on the left Fressinet’s 3rd Division remained in Monzambano and Palombini’s 5th Division inside Peschiera. Euge`ne moved his headquarters to Volta. During the night of 8–9 February, all but one of FML Radivojevich’s brigades had recrossed the Mincio and stood by Valeggio. Steffanini’s brigade remained entrenched in Borghetto to cover the bridge, which clearly indicated FM Bellegarde’s intention to renew the attack in the following days. The main body of the army was echeloned between Valeggio and Villafranca, where it encamped for a well-deserved day of rest. FML Sommariva’s corps received orders to carefully watch the Peschiera fortress and prevent any further sortie of the garrison. For the rest of the day, all was quiet along the front, with only a few movements of the scouts and patrols.75 AFFAIR AT BORGHETTO, 10 FEBRUARY On 10 February a lively combat took place by Borghetto, which started at about 10:00 A.M. and lasted until before dusk. Sources disagree with regard to the reasons leading to this new engagement. According to Vignolle, Vaudoncourt, and Sporschil,76 during the night of 9–10 February the Austrians had sent about 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry across the bridge in Borghetto, in an effort to establish a foothold on the right of the Mincio. In response, Euge`ne and General Grenier marched from Volta with Marcognet’s 4th Division, sup-

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ported by the cavalry of Perreimond and Bonnemains, striking at the Austrian left. Meanwhile, Verdier, with Fressinet’s 3rd Division, marched from Monzambano against the enemy right flank.77 According to Weil,78 however, the combat occurred as the Austrians reacted to a French advance on Borghetto. Far from devising a new major attack on the Mincio, when FM Bellegarde saw Steffanini’s brigade, at Borghetto, being threatened by the French movements from Volta and Monzambano, he limited himself to sending Bogdan’s brigade across the river. Later on, as the engagement grew longer, he sent a few other units. As soon as Bogdan’s troops started replacing his brigade in the village, GM Steffanini sent his men to a position by La Gobbina (less than a mile southwest of Borghetto), where the roads from Volta and Goito met. In order to hold the whole extent of his new front, GM Steffanini deployed swarms of skirmishers. By noon, however, they had suffered heavy losses and were forced to fall back on the village by strong French pressure. On the other side, Fressinet’s 3rd Division moved on Borghetto to engage the Austrian right. The village had, however, a ring of old walls and solid stone buildings, which greatly helped the defenders. The Austrian garrison of Borghetto also received substantial aid from several artillery batteries, which had been placed on the heights of Valeggio. The intense fire of those guns swept the plains before the village and stopped the French in their tracks. As night fell, Euge`ne suspended his attack, and FM Bellegarde took advantage of the situation to evacuate Borghetto and retire all his troops behind the river. According to French sources, the Austrians lost about 400 men, including 200 prisoners, at Borghetto. The French recorded between 100 and 150 losses.79 That very evening, FM Bellegarde decided to reinforce Mayer von Heldenfeld’s blockading corps by attaching GM Quasdanovich’s brigade and the Savoy Dragoon Regiment.80 On 11 February, Marcognet’s 4th Division deployed with its left in Borghetto and its right facing Pozzolo. Rouyer’s division dispatched a brigade to Volta. FML Bellegarde limited his daily movement to transferring his headquarters from Valeggio to Villafranca. FML Mayer moved his forces to Mantua, General Valssitz moved to blockade Pescheria, and the remainder of his forces deployed by the Mincio. The Austrians were experiencing supply problems and took this time to restock and resupply their army as well as to care for the sick and wounded.

7 Murat’s Treachery Exposed, Feburary 1814 RAIDS IN THE BRESCIAN VALLEYS As soon as it became evident that Euge`ne would abandon the line of the Adige, GM Stanissavlevich was ordered to move to the region west of Lake Garda, with the goal of keeping the French garrison of Brescia on tenterhooks. His brigade, based in Trentino, could field six regular infantry battalions, a squadron of hussars, and eight mountain guns, about 4,000 men. Since October a force consisting of two regular battalions, three platoons of hussars, two guns, and 26 companies of landschu¨tzen had been operating in the area. On 5 February a battalion of the Walachian Grenzer Regiment, under Major Masberg, embarked at Riva del Garda and set sail to Gardone Riviera.1 They had orders to push forward as far as Salo`. This village stood on a promontory protruding from the west shore of the lake and was garrisoned by the French. The rest of Stanissavlevich’s brigade advanced in two columns against the entrenched camp of Rocca d’Anfo on the Lake Idro. The first column moving from the Vestino Valley to the Sabbia Valley had a number of small engagements with the garrison of Rocca d’Anfo. The other column made a long and fatiguing detour, via the Maniva Pass, so as to turn Rocca d’Anfo from the west. On 10 February the first Austrian column reunited in Vestone, southwest of the Lake Idro. The day after, instead of taking the most obvious course of action, that is, directing all his forces southeast toward Salo` to link Major Masberg’s force, Stanissavlevich decided to pass over the mountains that separated the Sabbia and Trompia Valleys and reunite with the second column, which was already in the latter valley at Bovegno. A battalion was left to watch Rocca d’Anfo, while another column moved on Salo` to reinforce Major Masberg. On 12 February two Dalmatian companies in French service were repulsed

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from Lavone and fell back on Brescia.2 General Bonfanti, the commander of Brescia, was deeply concerned about the Austrian movements and detached a reconnaissance force from Brescia with the 2/35th Le´ge`re and the 1/6th Italian Line Regiments, the two companies of the Dalmatian Regiment, and 150 to 200 horse gendarmes. On 13 February, Bonfanti took position in Sarezzo.3 AFFAIR AT GARDONA, 14 FEBRUARY On 14 February, GM Stanissavlevich’s brigade descended the Trompia Valley with the goal of striking southward toward Brescia. That night they camped within sight of Sarezzo. At dawn on 15 February the Austrians were surprised by a sudden French attack on Ponte Zanano over the Mella Creek. General Bonfanti attacked the Austrians with the 2/35th Le´ge`re, the 2/6th Italian Line, and 150 gendarmes. Though the bridge was fiercely contended by a detachment of the Lindenau Infantry Regiment, at the end the Austrians were repulsed and driven back to Gardone Val Trompia, where GM Stanissavlevich kept his reserve. The French closely pursued the Austrians up the valley, but two Austrian companies fell on their flank coming down from the heights crowning the main road and brought their pursuit to a halt. The French withdrew in good order on Brescia. Losses were severe on both sides. According to French sources, the Austrians suffered 300 casualties and 70 prisoners from the Lindenau Regiment, including three officers. They reported 120 French casualties.4 In his report, GM Stanissavlevich recorded 22 killed, 52 wounded, and 36 prisoners on his side and about 300 French taken prisoner.5 ` , 16 FEBRUARY THE AFFAIR AT SALO On 12 February, Major Masberg had attacked Salo`, forcing the small garrison to retire at dusk. The village fell into Austrian hands on the following morning, and reconnaissances were sent as far as Desenzano.6 By 14 February the Austrian garrison of Salo` had been reinforced to 2,000 men by the arrival of the column from the Sabbia Valley. Realizing that Bonfanti’s forces were too weak to deal with GM Stanissavlevich and Major Masberg’s separated columns at the same time, Euge`ne resolved to send the Italian Guard toward Salo`. Euge´ne took personal command of the Guard as it left Volta for Desenzano. On 16 February, he attacked the Austrians in Salo`, after having thrown back all their advanced posts at Padenghe, north of Desenzano.7 The 2/Italian Guard Chasseurs was directed, through Polpenazze, on the road from Brescia so as to outflank the enemy positions and fall on them from the west. The main column attacked along the road from Desenzano, with Colonel Peraldi taking the lead with the 1/Italian Guard Chasseurs and two guns. After clearing the heights of Santa Caterina, where Major Masberg had placed a strong detachment, the Guard Chasseurs stormed the city gate, with two guard grenadier companies in support.

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After fierce street fighting, the Austrians were thrown back to Maderno. By 4:00 P.M. the engagement was over. Peraldi’s Guard Chasseurs took positions on the road to Maderno, while the Italian Guard Grenadier Battalion watched the access from Brescia. The Velites and the Guard Dragoons remained in reserve at Salo`.8 The Lake Garda fleet, under Captain Tempie´, contributed to the success of 16 February by cannonading the Austrian troops as they passed down the road along the edge of the lake and forcing them to withdraw through the mountains, which increased their losses through straggling. On 17 February, Colonel Peraldi, with his regiment and a few Guard Dragoons, attacked Maderno and dispersed the Austrians again. Those who attempted to reunite had to withdraw precipitously on Toscolano. In two days, Major Masberg’s column had lost about 600 men, including 360 prisoners. The French losses were 22 dead and 62 wounded. Colonel Peraldi pursued Masberg as far as Tremosine, and on February 24, he took positions on the Monte Nota. Being informed of the retreat of Masberg’s column from Salo` and fearing being cut off from his line of communication, Stanissavlevich hastily cleared Val Trompia and Val Sabbia. On 20 February he withdrew on Val Ledro, via the Maniva Pass and Bagolino. By 22 February General Bonfanti had moved his troops into the Sabbia Valley at Vestone and repulsed the enemy body blockading Rocca d’Anfo.9 Still lacking the formal declaration of war, the movements of the Austrians on the right of the Po and the commencement of actual hostilities by the Neapolitans, held Euge`ne’s complete attention. The city of Piacenza found itself menaced, although it was securely occupied by Gratien’s division, from the reserve, and covered by Severoli’s division, which had returned from Spain and was now formed by two battalions of the 1st Italian Line, one battalion of the 7th Italian Line, two squadrons of the 1st Italian Chasseurs a` Cheval, and one foot battery.10 However, these two divisions were too weak to stop the opposing Allied force of 25,000 men, which included the Austrian corps of General Nugent. As a result, the prince sent his first aide-de-camp, Ge´ne´ral de division d’Anthouard, to Piacenza to take command of the troops on the right bank of the Po and sent Rouyer’s division to Cremona, where it arrived on 13 February.11 LULL ON THE MINCIO Although at the operational and the tactical levels the Battle of the Mincio could be considered a draw, it instead gave the French a remarkable strategic advantage. As a result of the battle, FM Bellegarde gave up any further thoughts of breaking the line of the Mincio and adopted an overcautious attitude. He now believed that the time had come for Murat to fulfill his promises and launch his assault south of the Po. Though in the second half of February no military events interrupted the undeclared yet very real lull along the Mincio, an enervating and totally unfruitful argument developed between FM Bellegarde and Murat, both com-

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manders blaming each other for not collaborating in the execution of the general plan (see “Neapolitan Declaration of War” section later in this chapter). Before receiving the ratification of the treaty from Vienna, the king of Naples saw no reason for opening the hostilities with his former Allies. The Austrian commander in chief did not like, in turn, the prospect of a new battle to force the French line on the Mincio. Military reasons apart, it must be considered that the whole Austrian army was experiencing, by that time, serious supply problems that had also recently begun to effect Sommariva’s corps, previously exempted from any shortages of food and equipment. FM Bellegarde did not hesitate a moment to interrupt military operations and take this time to restock and revive his army, as well as to care for the sick and wounded. Discipline in the Austrian rank and file had also become a problem, which superior officers could hardly deal with.12 Epidemics and disease continued to cut down the ranks. In the meantime, a few changes in the Austrian chain of command had been decided. FML Radivojevich was now the commander of the Austrian first line along the river, while FML Count Neipperg, after successfully completing his diplomatic mission, had been put at the head of a so-called advanced guard division.13 GM Rebrovich replaced GM Steffanini at the head of a brigade. On 17 February, FM Bellegarde gave orders to build an entrenched camp before Verona. The following week he allowed FML Radivojevich’s and Merville’s troops to retire into winter quarters, leaving just a few pickets along the Mincio. On 24 February the same order was extended to the rest of the army. Such measures decreed de facto the end of hostilities north of the Po. Needless to say, Euge`ne was delighted to let the sleeping Austrian dog lie. He had problems himself, and one was how to answer to the emperor’s last message. On 9 February, Napoleon had ordered, by means of a dispatch of the Minister of War, that, upon a formal Neapolitan declaration of war, all French troops on Italian soil should immediately return back to France through the Alpine passes. After leaving only the troops of the Kingdom of Italy to defend their homeland, Euge`ne was to join the emperor in Paris.14 This prospect, in practice, implied the renunciation of the Kingdom of Italy. Consequently, it obviously did not excite Euge`ne, who, besides his military duties, also had to keep a careful eye to the political side of the whole affair. After a week, he replied to the Minister of War that he had not yet received any formal declaration of war from Murat, which was presently the case. He added that in case of war with the Neapolitans he would expect a new formal order of retreat from the emperor, the execution of which, he warned, would result in a substantial reduction of the Army of Italy, as it was mainly composed of Italians in French service. As he dictated his answer, Euge`ne was not aware that upon Napoleon’s meeting with Colonel Tascher de La Pagerie, an aide-de-camp sent to Paris with a report on the Battle of the Mincio, Napoleon had canceled the evacuation orders.15

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF ITALY Profiting by the lull along the line of the Mincio, the viceroy found the time to define the details of a new organization of his army. Two battalions of the 3rd Light Regiment were assigned, respectively, to Rouyer’s and Fressinet’s divisions. The latter also incorporated a battalion of the 6th Italian Line Regiment.16 More important, Euge`ne decided to employ part of the 5th and 6th Divisions to form garrisons for Mantua and Peschiera and to serve as a reserve. Desertion had begun to rear its ugly head in the Italian divisions, but Euge`ne hoped to minimize this problem by locking them in garrisons. As a result, few of the Italian troops were employed in the line after this time. Euge`ne retained in the field only the French and Italian Guard divisions. The active army was reorganized once again, as follows:

6TH ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF ITALY The staff of the army remained in Volta. There were no changes in the composition of the Army General Staff. 1st Lieutenancy: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Count Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Chief of Staff: Chef de bataillon Ernouf Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/,3/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 4/3rd Le´ge`re Regiment 1st Foreign Regiment (1) Total: 6,668 men & 12 cannons 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant De Brest Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 36th Le´ge`re Regiment (1 bn) 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 1/,2/106th Line Regiment Total: 6,679 men and 12 cannons

2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Count Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Dupin Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment Total: 6,463 men and 12 cannons 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet Chief of Staff: Adjudant-Commandant Vermasen Brigade: Adjudant-Commandant Monfalcon 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment ?/,3/,6/42nd Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pegot 3/7th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment 2/6th Italian Line Regiment Total: 6,440 men and 14 cannons Cavalry: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2 sqns) 5/Napoleon Dragoon Regiment 19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (3)

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Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2) 31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Gentil Saint-Alphonse 1st French Hussar Regiment (4) 1/,2/,3/,4/Queen’s Dragoon Regiment Total: 3,429 men and 8 cannons Reserve: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Gardes d’Honneur (1 co) Royal Velites (1 bn) Royal Grenadiers (1 bn) 1/,2/Chasseurs a` pied Regiment Total: 3,148 men and 12 guns

Because of the new organization, the Army of Italy could now field 47 infantry battalions (four French divisions and the Royal Guard), 22 squadrons, and 70 guns, for a paper strength of about 34,000 men. However, only about 28,000 were actually fit for active duty. The 2nd Division was about to move on Cremona and Piadena to watch the movements of the Neapolitans. The 4th Division was in Montalto, near Volta. The 1st Division was in Goito, facing Pozzolo. The 3rd Division was in Pilla and Monzambano. The cavalry was in Guidizzolo, Cereta, and Foresta. The Royal Italian Guard and the headquarters were in Volta.17 Gratien and Severoli’s small divisions, which were deployed between Piacenza and the Taro, were pompously redesignated the Corps of the Right. They had, however, a force of only 6,500 combatants (14 battalions, two squadrons, 14 guns). Luckily, reinforcements would soon arrive.18 THE BLOCKADE OF VENICE As far as the blockade of Venice was concerned, February passed by without remarkable events along the front. A couple of French sorties to relieve the pressure on the Cavanella Fort were easily repulsed. An Austrian attempt at paying for General Seras’s treachery and surrender failed. Starvation and disease made the garrison and the population of the city suffer greviously. The rate of desertion among the file and rank was predictably increasing.19 NEAPOLITAN DECLARATION OF WAR As an unreal calm hung over the Mincio, with both parties resting in their recently established winter quarters, war clouds were, instead, rapidly thickening

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in Emilia. The theater of this new phase of the war was a wide, flat, and intensely cultivated region bounded to the north by the River Po and to the south by the foothills of the Apennine Mountains. Several tributaries of the Po, descending from the Apennines, flow from the south to the north, cutting through the plain. An ancient Roman road, called Via Emilia, ran parallel to the Po from the southeast to the northwest and connected a string of rather important cities, from east to west, Bologna, Reggio, Modena, and Piacenza. This road was to become the main axis of the military operations south of the Po. According to the treaty between Naples and Austria, Nugent’s corps (8,000 Austrian and British troops, with 14 Austrian and 7 British guns) was meant to operate under Murat’s command. FML Nugent interpreted, however, his state of subordination in a rather loose fashion, showing, to Murat’s displeasure, too great a propensity for independent action. At the beginning of February he ordered his corps into Modena, with GM Starhemberg’s brigade in the van. By that time the Neapolitan army had its advanced posts, under General Campana, along the Enza River, a few miles west of Reggio. On 7 February, General Livron and FML Nugent signed a convention regulating the military and logistic cooperation between the Neapolitan army and the Austrian corps, which clearly demarcated the areas of provisioning on either side. By this convention, the Austrians were assigned the region between the right bank of the Po and the Reno and the districts of Cento and Crevalcore. The Neapolitans were to control the Emilia Road. Should operational reasons cause either army to cross over the demarcation line, the burden of supplying and foraging the newcomers would fall on the host.20 Two days later, FML Nugent took official possession, on behalf of the Austrian emperor, of the territories of the former Duchy of Modena, the region between the Po and the city bearing the same name. Though not directly influential on military matters, this was a move of great political significance, as it gave Murat a clear warning that Austria would oppose any attempt at unifying under Neapolitan rule that part of the Italian peninsula lying south of the Po. From then on, Murat’s indolent behavior and his hesitation at opening hostilities against the French increased, if possible. The strong suspicion that he had been caught in a diplomatic web, which gave him no real advantage, began to grow in the shallow mind of the king of Naples.21 On 9 February a curious incident occurred that showed how weak and unsure the French defensive lines were on this front. A small party of Austrian hussars advanced undisturbed as far as Parma, entered the city gates undetected, and succeeded in capturing French General Schreiber, the military commander. On their way back to Reggio, the hussars unfortunately ran across a peloton of French horse gendarmes and, before disengaging, were forced to release the prisoner. The French garrison of Parma, however, was so shocked by the incident that they quickly decided to abandon the city and withdraw on Castelguelfo, behind the Taro.22 The next day GM Starhemberg occupied Reggio with five battalions, four

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squadrons, and a cavalry battery. He sent detachments to the Po to join GM Eckhardt’s posts on the opposite bank. He also informed General Campana, who was in command of the Neapolitan advanced guard, about his intention of crossing over the Enza on the morrow and attacking the French outposts. This was fairly consistent with FM Bellegarde’s plans. After the battle of the Mincio, Bellegarde had strongly encouraged a resolute move on Piacenza and took it as the necessary precondition to resume his offensive on the Mincio. At the beginning, the Neapolitan general strictly stuck to Murat’s dispositions, which were marked by the greatest caution, and refused to authorize the Austrian move. Later on, however, he decided to spare himself any further dispute with the new ally and gave his consent. Profiting by Neapolitan idleness, GM Starhemberg’s brigade thus became the spearhead of the whole army. Nugent’s main body was by that time echeloned along Emilia Road, with Gober’s brigade in Modena. A British force was sent to S. Benedetto Po with orders to cover the right flank of the Allied army and keep a watch to the French outposts on the left bank of the Po at Governolo and Borgoforte.23 By mutual consent, both headquarters agreed that this force was to be replaced on 13 February by a detachment of Neapolitans, including a squadron of the 3rd Chevau-le´gers and four companies of the 1st Line Infantry Regiment. In the following days the British pushed as far as Torricella, about 40 miles upstream, leaving a number of posts spaced out along the river bank. By that time, Severoli’s small division (three battalions, eight squadrons, one battery: total of 2,227 men) had its infantry and artillery deployed behind the Nure, leaving only small parties of cavalry between this stream and the Taro in Cadeo, Roncaglia, Zena, and Pontenure. Besides the threat of the Allied armies, the Italian general was very concerned with the increasing number of desertions among his troops, formed of veterans of Spain who had remained far from home for many years and of newly recruited conscripts.24 Unlike Nugent’s corps, which had displayed a fairly high degree of initiative during the first half of February, the Neapolitan army in Emilia-Romagna continued to lie idle. Murat’s main concern was, presently, with the Roman States as well as Tuscany. Besides the fortresses of Castel Sant’Angelo in Rome, of Civitavecchia, and of Ancona, all of which were formally under siege with no hope of being rescued, the rest of the Roman States were under Neapolitan rule. As for Tuscany, the king of Naples wished to complete his military occupation of the region as quickly as possible. Being probably aware of Lord Bentinck’s plan for landing an expeditionary force on the shore of Tuscany and consequently afraid of what this might mean for the integrity of his new territorial additions, Murat selected Tuscany as his priority target. General Minutolo had arrived in Florence at the end of January. On 9 February he was replaced by General Lecchi, the brother of the Italian Guard commander who, in the name of the king of Naples, took possession of Tuscany and placed a strong garrison into Florence. French general Pouchain placed a 700-man garrison into Leghorn, but on the night of 16–17 February, these troops

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moved to Pisa. The next morning Minutolo appeared before the city with a force of Neapolitan troops. Meanwhile, Fouche´, the duke of Otranto, who presently resided in Lucca, informed General Minutolo that he had been given full powers to negotiate the conditions of the evacuation of Tuscany and the Roman States. After seeking the advice of General Nugent and von Mier, Murat authorized General Lecchi to confer with the French plenipotentiary. On 18 February the city of Leghorn was evacuated, only a small garrison remaining in the local fort, which was immediately put under blockade by a force of 3,000 Neapolitans. Although the convention for the evacuation of Tuscany was signed only on 24 February, the orders for leaving the fort of Leghorn in Neapolitan hands were received and carried out four days before. The garrison immediately left for Genoa, via Pisa. A similar fate befell the other garrisons of the region, all of which moved to Genoa by 22 February. The convention stipulated that the evacuated French troops, most of whom had not yet fired a single shot, should not participate for the following 12 months in any fights against the Allies.25 On 15 February the formal declaration of war by Murat was eventually transmitted by his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Millet, to General Vignolle, Chief of Staff of the Army of Italy. The pretext was a sortie executed by the garrison of the Ancona citadel against the Neapolitan troops that were blockading it. As soon as the Neapolitan declaration of war was presented to Euge`ne, the army of the king of Naples set in motion. Carascosa’s division reunited at Reggio, while d’Ambrosio’s made for Modena. A Neapolitan brigade, under General Pepe, supported by six guns, was ordered to the bridge over the Enza, with orders to be extremely cautious.26 On 16 February, Nugent’s corps, which marched ahead of the Neapolitan army, had its advanced guard, under GM Starhemberg, at Fiorenzuola d’Arda. Detachments were sent to Busseto, on the right wing, and in the direction of Salsomaggiore and Pontremoli, on the first buttresses of the Apennines. Carascosa’s division was in Reggio, with d’Ambrosio’s division a day march behind. On 17 February, GM Starhemberg’s hussar squadron attacked and drove off the cavalry pickets of Severoli’s division by Fontana Fredda. Later on, the hussars also engaged the enemy rear guard, which had stopped to allow the routed cavalry to rally. The Italian general, after suffering a few losses, soon realized he was facing overwhelming forces and withdrew to Piacenza, thus letting the Austrians deploy on the eastern bank of the Nure stream undisturbed.27 At this juncture, however, an astonished FML Nugent received a letter from General Millet, Murat’s Chief of Staff, urging the Austrians to delay their movement on Piacenza for a couple of days, the pretext being that the king of Naples wished to personally supervise the operation. Though enraged, FML Nugent could but oblige.28 Murat had several reasons to act as he did. First, his attention was fixed on

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the annexation of Tuscany. Second, he had not yet received the ratification of the treaty from Vienna, and this made him feel unsure about his political situation. Finally, he had a strong military argument providing the rationale for delaying any action on Piacenza. While his first-line troops were engaged in front of this city, a sudden French advance across the Po at Borgoforte, only a few miles off Mantua, could rapidly fall on his right strategic flank and cut the Neapolitan army off its line of communication. Murat would move on Piacenza—so he wrote to the Austrian commander on 16 February—only after receiving Bellegarde’s word that the Austrians were about to cross the Mincio on the very same day.29 A few days later, FM Bellegarde firmly replied to Murat’s proposal by reaffirming that a move on Piacenza was what he believed was necessary to distract the enemy and allow his army to safely cross over the Mincio.30 The relations between the two commanders in chief had already started deteriorating. By the time such an exchange of letters took place, the opportunity of seizing Piacenza at low cost faded away. On 20 February, Darnaud’s brigade of Rouyer’s division arrived in the city, soon followed by Schmitz’s brigade. Meanwhile, Jeanin’s brigade, of Marcognet’s division, moved from its position on the Mincio and made for Cremona. They reached that city on 21 February, together with General Grenier, who had been placed in command of the forces on the right bank of the Po, now officially called the “Detached Corps of the Right.” Rambourgt’s cavalry brigade was also joined to this corps. Grenier immediately had Rouyer’s 2nd Division reunited and ordered Jeanin’s brigade forward to Codogno, where it arrived on 22 February.31 Meanwhile, FML Nugent had been ordered to retire on Fiorenzuola and Parma, leaving only a few pickets on the Nure. Before the end of February, General Grenier decided that the time had now come for the French to profit by the Allied indecision and regain the lost ground in Emilia. On 22, 23, and 24 February, he sent strong reconnaissance forces toward Castel San Giovanni and the mountains to scout out the Austrian movements. FML Nugent had a force of 1,500 infantry and cavalry, including a few Neapolitan lancers, between the Nure and Trebbia Rivers, supported by the mountains. He had dispatched parties to Castel San Giovanni and Stradella to cut communications between Piacenza and Alessandria as well as to arouse the population. The presence of French reconnaissance forces, led by Chef de bataillon Desbeck, of the 1st Foreign Regiment, convinced GM Starhemberg to recall this force. The isolated Austrian detachment at Pontremoli suffered the same fate. In fact, on 18 February it was chased out as far as Fornovo by the troops of General Rouyer St. Victor, moving up from the Tyrrhenian coast.32 On 24 February General Grenier advanced and took positions on the western bank of the Nure. General Gober’s forces were in a second line on the Taro, keeping a separated corps of 1,200 to 1,500 Austrians detached at Sacca on the Po River, just in front of Casalmaggiore. They were supported by a Neapolitan detachment con-

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sisting of an infantry battalion, about 200 cavalry, and a body of Guard Marines, who had orders to build a pontoon bridge, a bridgehead on the left bank, and artillery entrenchments on the right bank. On the night of 23–24 February, Captain d’Aspre, with 400 men, crossed over the Po and, to the French shock, seized the small town of Casalmaggiore, without meeting any serious resistance. By evening, all pioneer works had been successfully completed.33 Meanwhile, FML Nugent established his headquarters in Parma where he held a third line, formed with two British battalions and some Neapolitan troops commanded by General Campana. In addition, the 1st Neapolitan Division was placed, in echelons, along the Enza as far as Reggio. General Grenier, being correctly informed of the Austrian dispositions, decided to attack GM Starhemberg at Pontenure on 25 February. Three columns were organized for the attack. The first column, commanded by General Severoli, consisted of three small Italian battalions and four French battalions, under General Soulier, drawn from Gratien’s division. The column consisted of from between 1,600 and 1,700 infantry and 200 cavalry. It was sent via San Polo against San Giorgio. The second column consisted of the 2nd Division (Rouyer) and the major portion of Rambourgt’s light cavalry brigade. It moved on Pontenure along the main road, as the third column, 200 cavalry commanded by General Jeanin, moved on Roncaglia via the right bank of the Po. The three columns were ordered to advance as far as the Chiavenna Creek. The Austrians fell back before the French columns. A few cavalry charges occurred on the main road. The first column took up a position before San Giorgio and occupied Carpaneto. The center column stood before Cadeo on the Chiavenna, with its advanced posts in Fontana Fredda. The third column was in Chiavenna and pushed parties toward the Po. On 26 February the first column was ordered to march on San Protaso, throwing troops into Lugnano and Fornovo. The second column moved on Borgo San Donnino, and the third column marched on Cortemaggiore. The Austrians offered some resistance at Seno, but General Grenier, having turned their left at Castelnuovo di Terzo, forced them to continue their withdrawal. They were closely pursued as far as the Taro, where they had established a second line and stopped the French pursuit. On 26 February, General Bonnemains was ordered to move from the outskirts of Mantua to Marcaria on the Oglio, then to Casalmaggiore, with his brigade (plus a battalion of the 52nd Line Regiment and a battery). On 27 February, Bonnemains attacked the Austro-Neapolitan bridgehead on the left bank, and despite their superior numbers, their batteries, and the strength of their position, he obliged them to recross the river and join General Nugent’s forces that were concentrated by Parma. That evening French engineers destroyed the bridge and almost all of the boats that had been accumulated in Casalmaggiore. General Grenier had also pushed the Austrians before him. He then moved on the Taro and took positions on it. On 27 February his advanced guard stood before Castelguelfo, while the 2nd Division was in echelons behind this village.

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The troops of General Severoli, who had made a fatiguing march, were in reserve at Borgo San Donnino, and Jeanin’s brigade was in Busseto. On 28 February the various columns were concentrated on the western bank of the Taro, facing GM Starhemberg’s outposts on the opposite bank.34 With his weak corps, General Grenier had admittedly gained a significant advantage over his enemies and temporarily averted any threat from Piacenza. This had been made possible mostly by Murat’s hesitation and the lack of coordination between the Allies. As a matter of fact, the state of the relations between the two chief commanders could not be worse. Upon being informed that the Neapolitans had abandoned their posts at San Benedetto, a few miles downstream from Borgoforte, FML Bellegarde had apparently lost any hope of receiving any active Neapolitan help against Piacenza at that time. On 28 February FML Bellegarde expressed all his reservations concerning Murat’s elusiveness in a letter to his emperor, wherein he explicitly stated that he could not break the stalemate on the Mincio as long as Murat stood idle on the defensive in Emilia.35 The Austrian commander in chief undoubtedly had good reasons for complaining about Murat’s lack of collaboration. His decision to send most of his troops in winter quarters did not, however, witness a genuine offensive inclination on the Austrian side. Indirect evidence that FML Bellegarde’s behavior was not completely flawless is provided by Count von Mier, who strongly criticized the Austrian commander in chief for not resuming the offensive on the Mincio and stood by Murat’s side in censuring FML Nugent for his insubordination.36 LORD BENTINCK’S EXPEDITION LEAVES SICILY On 28 February the new British expeditionary force left Sicily and set sail toward Leghorn. Lord Bentinck was personally in command of this corps, which had a strength of about 8,000 men and consisted of the 1/21st Infantry Regiment (British), the 1/62nd Infantry Regiment (British), the 3rd, 6th, and a detachment of the 8th KGL Battalions,37 the 3rd Anglo-Italian Infantry Regiment,38 the Calabrian Free Corps, a detachment of the Duke of York’s Greek Light Infantry, the 2nd Sicilian Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Sicilian Cavalry Regiment (1 squadron), and some artillery. Once this first contingent had landed on the Tuscany shore, the transports were to rush back to Sicily to embark another division, under General MacFarlane. This second body of troops was formed of the 2/14th Infantry Regiment (British), the 1/31st Infantry Regiment (British), a detachment of the 8th KGL Battalion, the 3rd and 4th Infantry Regiments (Sicilian), a few companies of Sicilian Grenadiers, two more squadrons of the 2nd Sicilian Cavalry Regiment, and some artillery.39 Lord Bentinck had carefully planned his new military operation, to which he also assigned a strong political significance that was totally consistent with his peculiar views about the British role in the future of Italy. Even after being forced by his government to sign an armistice with the

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Kingdom of Naples, the British commander of Sicily had never restrained himself when it came to showing his deep aversion to Murat and the Allied complaisance toward him. He, therefore, could not permit the Neapolitans to establish a stable control over central Italy and, particularly, over Tuscany. Leghorn was, after all, a port traditionally open to the British fleet. Around mid-February, Lord Bentinck’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Catinelli, was sent on a mission to FML Bellegarde’s and Murat’s headquarters. With the Austrian commander in chief, Catinelli discussed the British plan in detail. Although stressing that for the time being the British advance up the Tyrrhenian coast should be considered an “isolated” operation, rather than a portion of a general coordinated plan, FML Bellegarde, nonetheless, promised a substantial military support to Lord Bentinck. This was to consist of a strong cavalry detachment (no less than 400 men) and a body of specialist troops. He suggested the British, however, choose the gulf of La Spezia as a landing point, providing political as well as military grounds for his preference. La Spezia was, in fact, closer to Genoa, which was Lord Bentinck’s main military objective. Seasonal reasons preventing landing in the vicinity of Genoa, La Spezia seemed to be the obvious second-best choice for conducting a military operation in Liguria. FML Bellegarde, moreover, already had his own problems trying to convince Murat to collaborate and did not like the prospect of interceding with the king of Naples for obtaining the access to Leghorn and other portions of Tuscany on behalf of the British. Colonel Catinelli replied that in order to wage war in Italy the British needed a safe inland base, and this was Tuscany. Two days later, on 17 February, Catinelli was in Bologna to confer with Murat. Apparently, Murat denied previous knowledge of Bentinck’s plan, which seems hardly possible in view of his former great concern with bringing Tuscany under his rule. The king of Naples, who desperately sought a peace treaty with the British and whose political position was becoming progressively weaker vis-a`-vis the Allied diplomatic mastery, was forced, after a feeble attempt at negotiating a favorable compromise, to entrust himself to Lord Bentinck’s will. Not only did he allow the British to land by Leghorn, but he also promised to clear a major portion of Tuscany.40

8 Withdrawal over the Taro, Engagements at Parma and Reggio Emilia, and the Siege of Venice, March–April 1814 ALONG THE SWISS BORDER Euge`ne was in a most difficult position. Before him was an army, not including the blockade forces around Venice, that contained 60,000 men. On the other side of the Po, a second Allied army of 50,000 men moved against this flank. In addition, the British threatened his rear with landings around Genoa. He had 35,000 to face the two Austrian armies and only 4,000 to defend Genoa. Should Genoa fall, Piedmont would be open to invasion by a force of 20,000 to 25,000 English, Sardinians, and Sicilians. In addition, the Swiss border area was almost entirely unguarded. The weak French force that had defended it had been thrown back toward Lyon by an overwhelming Allied force. At the end of December an Austrian force had occupied the Great Saint-Bernard Pass. At the same time Oberst Simbschen had moved into Valais and captured the Simplon Pass. The region surrounding the Simplon then broke into rebellion and supported his movement. From here, Simbschen threatened Milan, where Euge`ne had left only two weak battalions of the 1st and 2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiments, three squadrons of the Napoleon Dragoons, which were almost entirely without horses, and the depots of the Italian Royal Guard. The first contained about 2,000 men, but they were mostly unarmed. To cover Milan, Euge`ne could only deploy two regiments of Italian volunteers, which had been detached from the Italian divisions, but they were destined for the garrisons of Mantua and Pescheria. Two battalions of these regiments, about 750 men, were sent to Arona to watch the road to the Simplon Pass. Another battalion, about 350 men, was sent to Colico to serve as a reserve to the detachments in the Valtellina. Bonfanti, who was charged with defending the Brescian Valleys, had only a battalion of the 35th Le´ge`re, one of the 6th Italian Line, and 150 horse gendarmes.

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During the first days of February a battalion of the 1st Italian Volunteer Regiment, which was in Arona, was ordered to move to the frontiers of Valais to cover the passes from Switzerland into the kingdom. On 28 February it arrived at Simplon and threw back the Austrian forces on the mountain. On 2 March Oberst Simbschen, having united his infantry and cavalry and joined a Valais militia regiment to them, attacked the Italian battalion. The Italian volunteers, all of them new conscripts, broke and fled, abandoning their officers, who were taken prisoner along with 160 of their numbers.1 Despite holding the passes the Austrians in Switzerland were more concerned with their advance toward Paris and did not take advantage of Simbschen’s success to advance into Northern Italy. THE AFFAIR AT GUASTALLA, 1 MARCH 1814 On 1 March, Ge´ne´ral de brigade Villata, who commanded the advanced posts on the left bank of the Po, left Borgoforte with a battalion of the 5th Italian Line, a detachment of about 200 cavalry, and four guns, and marched on Guastalla. Euge`ne personally accompanied Villata’s force to deceive the enemy about the real importance of this diversion. At Guastalla they encountered a small Austro-Neapolitan force. The Austrians were put to rout and lost five officers and 95 men as prisoners and 250 muskets. The Neapolitans refused to fight the Italians and withdrew on Reggio Emilia.2 The next day a voltigeur company of the 5th Italian Line, together with a platoon of the 3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment, executed a reconnaissance as far as Brescello, where they encountered a Croatian squadron, killed several men, and took 20 prisoners.3 DISPOSITIONS TO EFFECT THE PASSAGE OF THE TARO, 2 MARCH Neither the French nor the Austrian armies had moved since the Battle of the Mincio, with the exception of the Italian Royal Guard and Rouyer’s division. The strength of troops, not including the troops detached on the right bank of the Po (Gratien and Servoli’s division) came to 1,289 officers, 31,643 men, and 6,961 horses, plus 14,841 that were either on leave or in hospital.4 General Grenier had been in position on the Taro since 28 February with the intention of crossing it and had, during the previous days, sent strong reconnaissance forces along the entire Allied line. And in view of the dispositions of the latter, which were deployed to defend against a river crossing, he established several batteries to cover his operation.5 That same day, after having thrown parties into Fornovo, and forcing back the Allied detachments that covered the mountains, Grenier moved his various bodies of troops into line. He made his dispositions to cross the Taro at daybreak on 2 March. Everything having been prepared at this time, Schmitz’s brigade crossed between Noceto and Castel Guelfo, and Jeanin’s brigade would cross

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at the Delia ford, in the vicinity of Bianconese. Jeanin was to turn the Allied position and to move on San Pancrazio at the same time as Darnaud’s brigade and Rambourgt’s cavalry moved on Ponte Taro, attacking the Allied center. General Severoli’s troops formed the reserve. Grenier’s forces advanced in two columns, through terrible weather. When they encountered the Allies, it appeared that the Allies had withdrawn their artillery and that only observation posts remained on the Taro. These were handily thrown back, offering no significant resistance. On the canal running from Collecchio, which offered good points of resistance, 100 men were taken prisoner. The 19th Chasseurs executed a charge along the main road, near San Pancrazio, and threw back a dozen Radetsky Hussars.6 THE BATTLE OF PARMA, 2 MARCH General Grenier was informed that the Austrians were still in Parma, whereas Murat, after the affair at Guastalla, had made an error in retiring behind the Enza. He, therefore, made his dispositions to attack Parma.7 General Nugent was so badly supported by his Allies that he decided to abandon the town. To cover the withdrawal of his main force the Austrian general detached two battalions of Starhemberg’s brigade, one from the Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment and the 8th Ja¨ger to cover his withdrawal.8 He supported these with a half squadron of hussars and two guns that had been detached to the right of his position in Parma.9 At that time Parma was a walled city with three stone bridges crossing over the Parma River, a small tributary to the Po River, which traverses the city center from south to north. To the west of the river, only two gates enabled access to the city, the Santa Croce Gate, on the Piacenza–Reggio Emilia road, which ran through Parma from east to west, and the San Francesco Gate on the road to Fornovo, to the southwest. Three other gates were situated along the walls in the quarters east of the river: the San Barnaba Gate to the north, the Porta Nuova Gate, dominated by a citadel to its south, and the San Michele Gate, at the east end of Parma, on the road to Reggio Emilia. The battalion of the Erzherzog Karl Regiment, with a couple of guns, was deployed on the southwest ramparts. A militia company defended the San Francesco Gate. The 8th Ja¨ger Battalion had orders to defend the Santa Croce Gate and the Ducal Hanging Gardens on the northwest wall sector. According to Grenier’s plan, Schmitz’s brigade of Rouyer’s division with five or six battalions, and a detachment of the 1st Italian Chasseur Regiment, was to march in such a manner so as to arrive via the road that ran from Parma to Fornovo with the order to carry the San Francesco and the Porta Nuova Gates.10 General Jeanin’s brigade (two battalions of the 102nd Line, 3/6th Line, 4/20th Line, a battalion of the 106th Line) and the major portion of Rambourgt’s cavalry (four squadrons of chasseurs) were to move down the road from San Secondo with the order to pass the Parma River and force the San Barnaba Gate.11

Map 9 Operations between Piacenza and Parma

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General Darnaud, with his brigade and two artillery batteries, had orders to attack the Santa Croce Gate frontally. Severoli’s division was kept in reserve. Grenier observed that Nugent proposed to defend the Taro and took measures to counter Nugent’s defensive dispositions. Schmidt’s brigade was to turn Parma from the south. It had orders to cut the road from Fornovo and to attack Porta Nuova. Jeanin’s brigade, with the majority of Rambourgt’s brigade, was to follow the road to San Secondo, then move against Parma, striking the Santa Barbara Gate. Darnaud’s brigade was to attack the Plaisance Gate. As Grenier’s force advanced toward the walls and Starhemberg’s rear guard prepared to give them a warm welcome, the rest of Nugent’s troops (including some British infantry and artillery) were hastily scurrying along Parma’s narrow streets and bridges to reach the eastern gate and evacuate Parma.12 The battle started just after 8:00 A.M., as the thick fog started lifting and the French columns came in sight of the defenders of Parma. Soon a lively cannonade and musketry erupted from the ramparts, which forced General Grenier to deploy Arnaud’s brigade and the Napoleon Dragoons, which marched as a reserve to this brigade. The artillery of the 2nd Division was put into battery, with the Napoleon Dragoons to its left, in order to attract the attention of the Allies to that side and to facilitate the passage of the columns on the right and left as well as their escalade of the city’s walls. At this time Schmitz, who had formed his brigade by pelotons, ordered Colonel Broussier, with a battalion of the 1/9th Line Regiment, to direct his march down the length of the ramparts with a picket of the 1st Italian Chasseurs commanded by Captain Serapica. When the battalion’s voltigeurs arrived at the San Francesco Gate, with Sous-lieutenant Hutinet at their head, they scaled the wall and chased off the militia troops guarding it. They opened the gate and allowed the entry of the 1/9th Line and the detachment of the 1st Chasseurs a` Cheval.13 The Allies began to withdraw. On learning this, Schmidt immediately ordered forward another battalion of the 9th Line. Colonel Broussier’s leading troops crossed the Parma River on the Caprazucca Bridge, not far from the main square. Upon establishing a foothold on the right bank, Schmitz’s brigade split in two. A detachment of two battalions directed to the Porta Nuova Gate and the Citadel, while the other battalions, quickly moving down the main street, made for the San Michele Gate in order to entrap the tail of the retreating Allied corps within the city walls. Two companies of the Erzherzog Karl Regiment, which realized they were cut off on the west bank of the Parma River, bravely launched an assault on the bridge but were obliged to surrender and were taken prisoner.14 General Jeanin maneuvered, at this time, on the Parma River, directing the elite companies of the 102nd Line Regiment, followed by three grenadier companies from Severoli’s division, toward the walls of the Ducal Gardens. Meanwhile, two companies of the Erzherzog Franz Karl Regiment crossed a bridge over the river. Colonel Broussier, followed by a few men, advanced to summon the Austrians to surrender. Oberstleutnant Metzko and Major Wittman ordered

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a bayonet charge in response to the French demand to surrender. Broussier, thrown from his horse by the thrust of a bayonet, was taken prisoner. Fortunately for him, a party of chasseurs a` cheval arrived and obliged the Austrians to abandon their prisoners as they fled to safety. It was now Metzko’s turn, and after a short struggle, he and his soldiers were taken prisoner. The battalion of the 52nd Line moved against the Porta Nuova, and that of the 67th Line moved against the Citadel, forced the gates, and found themselves in possession of a tiny garrison of an officer and 36 men.15 Lieutenant Dussert at the head of a small force of voltigeurs climbed the walls and, with the assistance of an inhabitant of Parma who had secretly retained one of the keys to the garden gates, opened them and allowed several French companies into the city at this point.16 Jeanin’s leading troops met no opposition in this sector, as the 8th Ja¨ger was heavily engaged by Darnaud’s brigade at the Santa Croce Gate. On Jeanin’s right three companies of grenadiers, from the French 92nd and 106th, and the Italian 7th Line Regiments, from the reserve division and under the command of Captain Boniotti, aide-de-camp to General Severoli, scaled the city walls. All of the French columns penetrated the city at different points. Darnaud’s brigade eventually stormed the Santa Croce Gate and pursued the Ja¨gers into the city. A couple of guns were brought forward and unlimbered by the main road so as to fire on the retreating foe. The Italian chasseurs a` cheval and the leading infantry of Schmitz’s brigade arrived at the San Michele Gate at the moment that the Allied reserve made the greatest efforts to reenter it. They were seeking to cover the retreat of the Austrian troops that had not had time to escape. But the city doors had been closed by a local civil officer or, according to another source, by a Catholic priest, trapping many Austrians within the walls. Twelve hundred troops were taken prisoner in the city, along with the lieutenant colonel and a major of the Franz Karl Infantry Regiment, 10 captains, and 25 other junior officers. Later in the afternoon, by Sorbolo, General Jeanin and Rambourgt’s cavalry met a retreating Allied column of infantry, with two guns, a hussar platoon, and some Neapolitan cavalry. General Jeanin attacked them and put them to rout. General Rambourgt profited from this and charged vigorously with the 1st and 3rd Italian Chasseurs, who took 400 prisoners, two guns and three caissons, and several wagons of engineering tools, along with all of their horses. The Allied main body was chased down the highway to Reggio Emilia by Schmitz’s brigade, supported by the Napoleon Dragoon Regiment, which, with Rambourgt’s chasseurs, pushed them across the Enza in disorder.17 The Allies arrived in the entrenchments that they had raised on the right bank and that they sought to defend, but as soon as they saw the French columns deploy to cross the Enza below the bridge, they withdrew in great haste on Reggio Emilia, after having barricaded the bridge over the Enza.18 The French were, as a result, masters of both banks of the Enza, and their advanced posts were established near Sant’Ilario.

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The Neapolitan troops, commanded by General Campana, had evacuated by 5:00 A.M. The only exceptions were a few infantry companies and a detachment of cavalry that made up part of the Allied column encountered by General Jeanin at Sorbolo and the two English battalions, which were in Parma. According to French sources, the Neapolitan brigade, under the command of General Pepe, which was in reserve on the Enza, withdrew on Reggio Emilia at the sound of the first cannon shots coming from Parma. Pepe, however, states that he was conforming to orders and formed the head of Nugent’s column during his retreat. Pepe states, however, that Murat had issued him orders not to expose his troops to any danger in supporting Nugent earlier at Parma. Nugent apparently discovered this fact but still developed a warm friendship with Pepe, though they did not hesitate to voice their anger to Murat for his lack of support at Parma.19 The Allied losses exceeded 600 dead, and they lost 37 officers and 1,682 men as prisoners. In addition, they lost two guns and their caissons, five engineering wagons and their tools, and 3,000 muskets. The 19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment is reported to have done great damage to the Radetzsky Hussar Regiment, but its losses cannot be determined. Grenier reported his corps losses at 230 men hors de combat, but Vignolle related that they lost 500 to 600 men.20 Ninety Neapolitans, who were found among the prisoners, were disarmed and returned to Murat. Euge`ne announced the success of the attack on Parma in an order of the day. On 3 March Rambourgt’s brigade moved to Reggio Emilia, where the Allies had left only a weak advanced guard formed from Starhemberg’s brigade. The city was occupied by the French cavalry after a quick melee with the enemy cavalry. A few prisoners were taken.21 The 2nd Division took up positions on the Enza. On 4 March, General Severoli, with four battalions of Gratien’s division, and three Italian battalions,22 supported by Rambourgt’s cavalry brigade, arrived in Reggio Emilia, where he took up positions, pushing his advanced guard, composed of the 1st Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment and two voltigeur companies, to Rodano, between Reggio Emilia and Rubiera. The Austrians withdrew on Modena, which had already been evacuated by the Neapolitans.23 General Gratien occupied, on 5 March, positions on the Enza with four other battalions.24 Soon after this expedition ended, Euge`ne, fearing new attacks on the Mincio, recalled General Grenier, who recrossed the Po at Borgoforte with Rouyer’s division and Jeanin’s brigade. They were reunited with the main army on 6 March. Only the two weak divisions of Severoli and Gratien remained south of the Po. At this same time, on 5 March, General Paolucci dispatched a strong reconnaissance force of 600 men from the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, divided into two equal columns, from Governolo to Casale. In Casale it easily brushed aside the feeble opposition of the Croat companies defending it, destroyed the entrenchments it found there, and took one officer and 56 men prisoner.25 On 7 March the army occupied the following positions: Fressinet’s division

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before Borghetto and in Monzambano; Quesnel’s division, between Montalto and a position before Pozzolo; Marcognet’s division in Goito and Cerlongo; Rouyer’s division in Mantua, from which, on 9 March, it moved to Marcaria and Bozzolo; and the Royal Guard in Mantua. The cavalry stood in the second line.26 While Grenier recrossed to the left bank at Borgoforte and rejoined Euge`ne behind the Mincio, Gober’s brigade, part of Nugent’s Austrian army then in Capri, was reinforced by the addition of a Neapolitan brigade. AFFAIR AT REGGIO EMILIA, 7 MARCH On 6 March the Austro-Neapolitan Corps, seeing that it was no longer pursued, became aggressive. Murat, who now had an army of about 18,000 men, sent General Starhemberg to the Secchia reinforced with a Neapolitan infantry regiment and a Neapolitan cavalry division. He then pushed a strong reconnaissance, consisting of General Carascosa’s Neapolitan 1st Division and part of Nugent’s forces, against Severoli’s division.27 Starhemberg, followed by Carascosa, moved from Rubbiera toward Reggio Emilia. Between 3:00 and 4:00 P.M. on 6 March they stood on the Masone heights facing Severoli’s advanced guard of two voltigeur companies and the 3rd Italian Chasseurs a` Cheval. The Austrian force consisted of four companies of the Benjowsky Infantry Regiment and two squadrons of the Radetzky Hussars.28 A squadron of the Radetzky Hussars, under Hauptman Graf Esterhazy, charged the Italian chasseurs and drove them off, pursuing them to San Maurizio. The voltigeurs, abandoned to their fate, quickly formed square and bravely held off the hussars until the Austrians brought up artillery. After suffering under the relentless fire of the cannons, the survivors surrendered.29 This rear guard action cost the French a total of nearly 300 prisoners. The fields were impracticable for maneuver, owing to a heavy snow that had fallen. The Austrian troops led the advancing column and engaged the main body of French at the San Maurizio bridge, on the high road.30 General Severoli had left General Soulier in Reggio Emilia with three or four French battalions. Three Italian battalions (two of the 1st Line Regiment and one of the 7th Line Regiment) were in the first line at San Maurizio, east of Reggio Emilia, with outposts along the west bank of the Secchia. Rambourgt’s cavalry brigade was in the second line.31 Meanwhile, General Villata, with three Italian battalions, some cavalry, and two guns, had been sent by Euge`ne in support of Severoli. According to his orders, Villata should move from Guastalla down the Crostolo Valley as far as Ca del Bosco di Sotto and establish a link with the troops in Reggio Emilia.32 On 7 March at 9:00 A.M. Murat’s leading elements attacked the Italian outposts to clear the way to Reggio Emilia. Severoli’s advanced guard at Rubiera on the Secchia was too far from the main body to be supported. General Starhemberg attacked frontally with a battalion of the Benjowsky Regiment, which

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despite the resistance of the Italian battalions opened up a passage down the main road. The Neapolitans deployed their forces with the three battalions of Pepe’s brigade in the first line and the four battalions of Majo’s in the second line. Pepe was ordered to send a battalion of the 1st Neapolitan Line to the left, while the other two battalions, one of the 2nd Line and one of the 1st Line, moved to the right with orders to cross the Rodano and fall on the French flank. As Starhemberg attacked, General Pepe attacked with two battalions of the 2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment, two squadrons of lancers, and two cannons.33 The Italian general Severoli, seeing his first line attacked, went there in person and found himself at the head of the troops closest to the Allied troops; there he lost his arm to a cannon shot. 34 Severoli’s Italians were thrown back, losing a number of voltigeurs. General Rambourgt, who succeeded Severoli at this point, was obliged to slowly withdraw to Reggio Emilia under the cover of a fighting rear guard, composed of some Italian elite companies, which contested the crossings over the small river Rodano. The Neapolitan first line stopped after their advance and reorganized, while the second line, under General Majo, pushed forward against the San Nicolo` Gate. Two companies of the 2nd Neapolitan Line advanced to the Modena Gate, and the 3rd Neapolitan Line moved to a position before the San Nicolo` Gate.35 Murat, despite his superior numbers, proposed a cease-fire to Rambourgt in return for his evacuation of Reggio Emilia. The French general accepted and crossed over the Crostolo, reuniting on 8 March with General Gratien behind the Enza and continuing the retreat to Parma. Despite being forced into this retrograde movement, Severoli’s and Gratien’s small divisions succeeded in delaying the advance of the entire Neapolitan army and Nugent’s corps and caused them losses, notably by the road to Scandiano. As the Allies redoubled their efforts at the gate of the castle dominating this village, General Rambourgt ordered an attack executed by an Italian infantry battalion and a squadron of the 19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment. According to French sources, more than 60 Hungarian grenadiers were killed in this charge. At the end of the day the French losses were 520 men, including killed and wounded. Those of the Allies were considerably more and included more than a hundred prisoners. On 9 March, General Gratien withdrew behind the Taro, where he took up positions with his advanced guard in Castelguelfo, Soulier’s brigade behind it and Vandedem’s brigade in Sanguinara.36 THE BLOCKADE OF VENICE, 8 MARCH TO 1 APRIL On 8 March the Cavanella redoubt on the Adige was attacked by 800 Allied infantry and five guns. The attack was repulsed with losses. A new attack, on 13 March, had the same results. On 19 March part of the Treporti garrison pushed back the Austrian advanced posts on that side and lengthened their

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blockade. The following day and the days after that, the Austrians renewed their attacks on Cavanella without success. General Seras, perceiving that the Austrians would employ all their forces to capture this post, removed the artillery, munitions, and provisions on 22 March. On 23 March the Austrians crossed the Adige in force and carried the Sant’Anna Redoubt. The Cavanella garrison found itself cut off. They abandoned their post and cut their way through the Austrians with their bayonets, who, despite their superiority of numbers, were unable to prevent their passage. On 1 April the two gunboats stationed in Alletresse were attacked by 300 infantry with three field guns. They were obliged to execute a fighting withdrawal. RECONNAISSANCES ALONG THE LENGTH OF THE LINE, 10 MARCH At the beginning of March that part of the Army of Italy stationed north of the River Po was still in its positions behind the Mincio. Its bulk was mostly concentrated around the two fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, with detachments along the right bank of the river. A tight chain of Austrian outposts stretched from Peschiera as far as Ostiglia, keeping a watch on their French and Italian counterparts from the far bank. After the battle of 8 February, no large-scale action had taken place on the line of the Mincio. The Austrians had since then been displaying a rather sluggish attitude and seemed unwilling to take any serious initiative. Bellegarde, being informed of the evolution of the war in France, had no need to take a risk. Moreover, he was evidently awaiting the outcome of the campaign south of the Po. Despite his deteriorating situation, Euge`ne was more active. Although unable to mount a decisive attack across the river, he had, however, decided to keep the Austrians on the lookout by teasing them with repeated reconnaissances all along the line. These actions were often carried out by strong parties of all three arms. Short-range sorties were executed by the Italian garrison of Mantua toward Legnago, Marmirolo, Castelbelforte, and Governolo, respectively, on 17, 22, 23 February, and 6 March.37 This disturbing strategy reached its apex on 10 March when Euge`ne ordered a series of coordinated reconnaissances in force, along the entire line, especially in the direction of Roverbella, Villafranca, Castiglione Mantovano, Castel d’Ario, and Ostiglia. Five main columns were formed under the command of, respectively, Generals Jeanin (Marcognet’s 4th Division), Pegot (Fressinet’s 3rd Division), Galimberti (Palombini’s 5th Division), and Colonels Paolucci (Zucchi’s 6th Division) and Ceccopieri.38 General Pegot’s column consisted of the elite companies stripped from the 7th, 9th, 10th, and 42nd Line Regiments organized into three combined battalions.39 The three battalions under Pegot moved across the bridgehead at Monzambano. Two of the battalions immediately deployed completely into skirmishes. They overthrew the Austrian posts at Pra Vecchia and the post at

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Brentina. The French advance was stopped by the fire of the Austrian Ja¨gers in trenches, who were supported by a battery, and the troops sent by General Bogdan. Pegot and Fressinet decided to withdraw. As they withdrew they were pursued by a battalion from the Duka Infantry Regiment drawn from Paumgarten’s brigade.40 Jeanin’s reconnaissance force moved out during the night of 9–10 March from Goito at the head of two battalions of the 20th and 101st Regiments and a squadron of the 4th Italian Chasseurs a` Cheval. This force was supported by a battalion of the 6th Line Regiment. They established a bridgehead and then moved via Marengo toward Roverbella. The battalion left at the Goito bridgehead sent three companies toward Marmirolo. Jeanin drove the Austrian posts out of Rotta and Marengo, taking Roverbella. Austrian Generalmajor Spiegel responded quickly, and a very successful charge of the Merveldt Uhlans encouraged the French to withdraw. The Austrian attack aside, having completed his mission, Jeanin withdrew his troops to Marengo, taking with him four officers and 63 soldiers as prisoners.41 Two reconnaissances were directed from Mantua. One consisted of two battalions of the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re under General Galimberti. It moved down the road to Castiglione Mantovano, clearing out the Austrian posts in Santa Lucia and Castiglione Mantovano, where they encountered three companies of the Ottokaner Grenz, under Oberstleutnant Rukavina, positioned in the local castle. After three hours of fruitless combat and the loss of three officers and 160 men hors de combat, plus 40 prisoners, Galimberti withdrew back to Mantua. He’d inflicted only about 100 casualties on the Austrians. Zucchi’s reconnaissance left Mantua at the break of day with Colonel Ceccopierri leading three battalions of the 4th Italian Line, a handful of chasseurs a` cheval and two cannons. They marched down the high road to Castel d’Ario and Legnago, pushing to Gazzo and Susano.42 At the hamlet of Gazzo, he discovered that the line of earthworks and entrenchments had been hastily abandoned by the Austrians. Later in the afternoon his men stormed the village of Castel d’Ario. The Austrians responded at 3:00 P.M., with Generalmajor Suden leading a slightly larger force. A furious fight ensued in which General Suden had two horses killed under him. After four Austrian assaults, the Italians were obliged to withdraw. Ceccopierri’s forces lost 22 dead and one officer and 75 men wounded.43 A sortie made on 11 March by the garrison of Peschiera did not make much headway, as the enemy occupied the heights of Cavalcaselle in force. The effect of these reconnaissances was that the Austrians were deceived into thinking that the Army of Italy was ready to cross the Mincio and advance in force on Legnago, thus preventing the possibility of a link between Bellegarde and Murat. The Austrian commander cautiously decided to concentrate in Verona, with his advanced guards in Villafranca, Valeggio, and Castelnuovo and their baggage behind the Adige. During this day the Austrians lost 400 men

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hors de combat and 100 prisoners. Generals Jeanin, Pegot, and Galimberti and Colonels Paolucci and Ceccopieri, each having been charged with the command of one of the five columns, performed their duties exceptionally well. After the success of these reconnaissance probes, Euge´ne thought it would be worthwhile to continue to alarm and fatigue the Austrian troops with a series of small probes. On 11 March General Bertoletti, commanding Peschiera, executed a sortie with a small column under the orders of Colonel Dubois of the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re Infantry Regiment. Dubois’s attack pushed back the Austrian posts and occupied the houses on the edge of Ronchi, about a mile (2 km) north of Peschiera. Protected by the cannons of Peschiera, which fired on the Austrian position at Castelnuovo, Dubois and his force withdrew without incident. However, Dubois’s effort forced Sommariva to reinforce the posts along his extreme right and to take measures to prevent any subsequent coup de main.44 As Dubois launched his attack, a French column of four weak battalions, two squadrons, and five cannons, some 1,500 men, marched out of the Monzambano bridgehead and attacked the Austrian posts to the south of Brentina. The two attacking French companies occupied the posts while a battalion moved against the adjacent heights and forced the forces of Paumgarten and Bogdan to evacuate Brentina and fall back on their second line. Their goal achieved, to disquiet the Austrians, the French withdrew slowly back to Monzambano. During the night of 30–31 March, General Villata, on learning that the Austrians had light troops into Gonzaga and Suzzara, moved from Borgoforte with a detachment of the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment and a few chasseurs a` cheval from the 3rd Italian Regiment. He attacked the Austrians, who defended themselves with vigor. The French inflicted on the Austrians a number of casualties and took 43 prisoners, including a hussar major and two company officers.45 After General Severoli had been wounded, Euge`ne detached General Maucune in mid-March to take command of the detached corps on the right of the Army of Italy, as it guarded the line of the Taro. Ge´ne´ral de division Maucune, commander of the detached corps, had under his order Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien as divisional commander. The corps was organized as follows:

1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Vandedem 1st Provisional Demi-Brigade 10th Line Regiment (1 bn) 4/84th Line Regiment 4/92nd Line Regiment 2nd Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/9th Line Regiment 4/35th Line Regiment

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2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3rd Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/53rd Line Regiment 106th Line Regiment (1 bn) 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (1 bn) 42nd Line Regiment (1 bn) 4/137th Line Regiment 3rd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 1/1st Italian Line Regiment 1st Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4 sqns) 3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2 sqns) 19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (3 sqns) Total: 11 battalions, 9 squadrons, and 12 guns

During the remainder of the month of March would have been no events of note for this army if it were not for the small naval action on Lake Garda, near Torri, between the French fleet commanded by Captain Tempie´ of the Italian Navy and the Austrian fleet composed of eight gunboats. The engagement lasted two hours, with three Austrian gunboats being sunk and the rest of their fleet obliged to retire and lock itself under the protection of the Torri batteries and the musketry of its infantry. The Austrians suffered 35 men hors de combat, and the French lost 1 dead and 6 wounded, among the latter being the brave Captain Tempie´, who suffered a cannister shot to the thigh. Euge`ne made mention in an order of the day to the army his satisfaction with the commander, officers, and men who formed the Lake Garda Fleet, who had obtained this success.46 SURRENDER OF CASTEL SANT’ANGELO AND CIVITAVECCHIA During the first days of March, General Miollis received a letter from the Fouche´, Duke d’Otranto, and a copy of the Luques Convention, which had been signed on 24 February by the duke and Lieutenant General Count Lecchi, aidede-camp to Murat. This convention related to the evacuation of Castel Sant’Angelo and the Civitavecchia Fortress. Article 1. Castel Sant’Angelo, in Rome, and the Fortress of Civitavecchia, are at this time the two positions occupied in central Italy by the troops of the Emperor Napoleon. Their respective garrisons shall turn over to the troops of the King of Naples these places on the day of notification of this convention to their commanding officer.

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Article 2. The French troops shall depart from Castel Sant-Angelo and the Fortress of Civitavecchia with all the honors of war. They shall be sent to the points of embarkation of their choice to be transported to France by sea. Article 3. The ships necessary to transport these troops, as well as the food for their sustenance and all objects which they need for this move, shall be furnished by the Neapolitan authorities. Article 4. There shall be a specific agreement between the commandants of the two garrisons and the Neapolitan officers charged with directing the movement of the French troops to prevent all disorders, be it in the march or at the place of embarkation. Article 5. The embarkation and the departure of the French troops shall take place with the minimum delay possible and their debarkation on the French coast shall be effected at the point which their commanding officers choose, between Nice and Marseille. Article 6. In the case where said troops are unable to embark or they must move by land, they shall be directed, under the escort of Neapolitan officers, via Siena, Pisa, and Genoa, to the Alps, Mont Cenis and Brianc¸on. The necessary food shall be provided by the Neapolitans. Article 7. The troops forming the garrison of Fort of Sant-Angelo and the Fortress of Civitavecchia engage themselves not to serve in Italy for the period of a year, be it against the King of Naples or his allies. This obligation, which applies to officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers alike, shall be established in the usual manner. Article 8. The food, munitions, and all other objects of what ever nature, which are in these two aforementioned places and which are not the private property of the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, shall be turned over to the King of Naples. Commissioners shall be named by both parties to verify and sign the inventories and a signed receipt provided. The return and receipt of the artillery shall be effected in the same manner by officers of that branch nominated by the two parties. Article 9. This convention shall be effective relative to all French troops that may find themselves at various points in the Roman States and Tuscany and which are not governed by some other specific convention or agreement.47

The commissioners required by this agreement were appointed and established a convention on 6 March to govern specifics of the evacuation of Sant’Angelo and Civitavecchia on 10 March. The fortresses were turned over as required, and the arrangements for the transportation of the French troops were begun. The troops, with the exception of the depot of the 2nd Foreign Regiment, were picked up by ships on the Tyrrhenian coast and transported to France.

9 The Sieges of Venice and Genoa: Withdrawal and Surrender, March–May 1814 SIEGE OF GENOA On 28 February, Lord Bentinck embarked his multinational force in an English fleet consisting of two ships-of-the-line, three frigates, three corvettes, and 42 transports and departed Palermo. On 9 March 1814 he landed his 1st Division in Leghorn. The disembarkment was completed in three days, and by 13 March, the transports set sail back to Sicily, where they were due in about 10 days to embark General MacFarlane’s division.1 Contrary to Lord Bentinck’s expectations, the Neapolitan garrison had not yet evacuated Leghorn. Upon his arrival, the British commander was received with full honors by General Lechi, commander, and General Filangieri, whom the king of Naples had expressly sent to welcome Bentinck. Acting on Murat’s orders, the Neapolitan generals offered to care for any logistic support the British expeditionary force might need. Lord Bentinck, however, coolly refused and, in return, started complaining about the Neapolitan occupation of Leghorn and Tuscany. This unresolved issue about the possession of Tuscany was to become an open sore in the relations between Murat and Lord Bentinck, offering to the British proconsul a strong reason (or a pretext) to deliberately strain diplomatic relations with Murat to a breaking point. This was to become evident in the following days.2 Once in Leghorn, the British force did not hasten to leave this city and march northward toward La Spezia and Genoa, their military objectives. As his troops slowly prepared for action, Lord Bentinck departed for Reggio Emilia, where he intended to meet the king of Naples for a decisive conference. It was a troubled and politically hesitant Murat who received his British adversary on 16

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March. Bentinck soon came to the point and formally made his request for having a free hand on Leghorn and Tuscany, thus giving his force a safe base. Murat replied that, like the British, the Neapolitan army also needed Tuscany as a base for waging operations in Northern Italy and assuring a good line of communications with Rome and Naples. Moreover, having occupied it a few weeks before the British landing, Murat maintained to have a priority claim on the region. Murat’s arguments were not as strong, however, as those put forward by Bentinck, which relied on the agreement concerning the strategic cooperation between the Austrian and the British armies. This document, signed in Naples by Bentinck and Count Neipperg at the beginning of February, contained a passage explicitly stating that the British expeditionary force against Genoa might find themselves in need of using Tuscany as their base of operations. His back now to the wall, the king of Naples offered Bentinck the military command on Tuscany, keeping for himself the civil administration and deferring to Lord Castlereagh’s judgment for a definitive solution. Predictably, Bentinck disdainfully refused a proposal that, so he said, would make him Murat’s lieutenant.3 In the following days negotiations continued, this time between Lord Bentinck and the duke of Gallo, the Neapolitan foreign minister. But, again, Lord Bentinck did not seem willing to make any concession to the king of Naples. With the exception of Nugent, who heartily shared Bentinck’s hostility toward Murat, the Austrians felt rather uncomfortable with the intransigence of the British commander. Though still very suspicious of the Neapolitan conduct, FM Bellegarde had nonetheless received Murat’s pledge to follow his plan and cooperate with the Austrian army. A resolute advance of the Austro-Neapolitan corps on Piacenza would force Euge`ne to detach reinforcements to this city, thus weakening the French line on the Mincio and making things easier for Bellegarde.4 The prospect of eventually obtaining the much-needed military support from the Neapolitans gave the Austrian commander a good reason for trying to soften Bentinck’s claims, when he met the British proconsul in Italy on 22 March in Verona. Another reason was that, unlike Bentinck, Bellegarde intended to strictly adhere to the directions he had received from his government, which urged him to incessantly seek the military cooperation of both the British and Neapolitan allies. Bellegarde then willfully strove to act as a mediator between Murat and Bentinck, trying to convince the litigants that their united forces were needed to drive the French from Italy. During his conference with Bentinck, he tactfully questioned the British claims on the whole Tuscany, suggesting that it would be advisable for the sake of alliance not to insist on the Neapolitan evacuation of Leghorn and Tuscany. Bellegarde evidently feared that Bentinck’s intransigency could make Murat’s loyalty to the Allied cause waver once again. His concern was not exaggerated. Two days after his disappointing meeting with Bentinck, the king of Naples had, in fact, sent a new friendly letter to the viceroy, which was clearly aimed at probing Euge`ne’s feelings toward him.

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Complying with Napoleon’s advice, initially Euge`ne tried to prevaricate. A new exchange of correspondence between uncle and nephew then followed, which was definitively to cease in the first days of April because of Caroline’s harsh opposition.5 At the end of March, Russian General Balachoff arrived in Italy with full powers to sign a treaty with Naples on behalf of the czar. He and von Mier made several other attempts to settle the matter between Murat and Bentinck in the most convenient way for the alliance, but they failed. Lord Bentinck, visibly annoyed at the Austrian hesitation in backing his requests to Murat, eventually left Verona and returned to Leghorn. Sir Robert Wilson remained in Verona to continue negotiations for the British. The expert general and diplomat was not, however, too eager to follow Bentinck in his hazardous diplomatic game. He, rather, stuck conscientiously to the instructions received from Lord Castlereagh, who, like Bellegarde and Metternich, was strongly determined to come to an agreement with the king of Naples and speed up the course of the campaign.6 Lord Bentinck’s stubborn and repeated efforts to throw Murat out of the coalition were hardly surprising. He had several reasons for showing himself more and more hostile toward Murat. One was that he “dreamed” of annexing Sicily to Great Britain and restoring the Bourbons on the Naples throne as a compensation for the loss of the island. The British government resolutely opposed any project of annexation and, eventually, decided to remove their representative from his Sicilian appointment. By spring 1814, however, Lord Bentinck had not yet fully abandoned his ambitions on the island.7 Bentinck’s personal politics provide another reason that convincingly explains his opposition to Murat. Personal interest apart, Lord Bentinck was a genuine “whig,” a liberal who firmly believed in the ideal of national independence. Coherently, he spent most of his life trying to export constitutional experiments, like that of 1812 in Sicily. He had long cherished the illusion of raising Italy (more precisely, Northern and central Italy) and persuading the Italian people to fight for their homeland and independence. He also believed that the birth of a strong and independent state in the Italian peninsula, which could make a powerful barrier against France and Austria, fit with British interests in the Mediterranean. During his Spring Campaign in Tuscany and Liguria, he never concealed his feelings about the British role in supporting the struggle for the independence of Italy. Upon his landing at Leghorn, on 14 March he issued a proclamation to the Italian people, urging them to rely on the British help to throw off the French yoke and establish an independent nation. Accordingly, the Italian regiment that was part of his expeditionary force sported a banner bearing the words “Italian Union-National Independence.” In view of this, it is hardly surprising that Bentinck feared the other man on the spot who cultivated a project for the independence of Italy and had an army to back it up. That man was Murat. Not only did Bentinck know that the king

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of Naples aimed at presenting himself as the champion of the Italian unification and independence, he was also aware that in 1814 a vast majority of the Italian people did prefer Murat to the Austrians or the French. This was apparent from the warm popular welcome received by the king of Naples throughout his journey back to Naples in November 1813. Several hints led Bentinck to believe that, after the treaty with Austria, Murat’s project had more chances of success. He responded by redoubling his efforts to make any form of cooperation between Naples and the Allies fail.8 BRITISH ADVANCE ON GENOA Upon his return at Leghorn, Lord Bentinck found that his troops had finally begun its movement, heading northward toward Genoa. By that time the AngloSicilian Corps fielded 8,000 English and Sicilians, together with Hanoverian troops of the King’s German Legion.9 Cautiously advancing along the Tyrrhenian coast at a relaxed pace of five to six miles a day, on 20 March the leading elements of the Anglo-Sicilian Corps appeared at the mouth of the Magra River, by Sarzana. Beyond this river, at the northern end of a deep and wide gulf, lay the important port of La Spezia. After remaining idle before the Magra for three days, the British moved forward to cross the river, with the sharpshooters of the 8th King’s German Legion (KGL) Battalion, deployed in skirmish order and under Captain Poten, leading the advance. They found that the French had withdrawn all boats from the east bank. Three soldiers swam across the river, under French fire, and brought back a boat. The KGL then began sending over more men, who captured several abandoned guns and a considerable quantity of ammunition.10 Before retreating, the German light troops exploded the magazine of the San Teresa Battery. The explosion was so strong that it produced, on the east bank of the gulf, a fog that lasted an hour. That same day there were several engagements on the Magra. Fort Santa Croce, at the river’s mouth, was stormed and taken. On 25 March a small fleet composed of the warships America, Edinburgh, Swallow, Cephalus, and Aurora, under Sir Josias Rowley, arrived before Lerici, some miles north of the Magra’s mouth. After bombarding the French coastal batteries for some hours, the British disembarked a few companies of marines under Captain Dundas. Meanwhile, General Montresor ordered Colonel Travers to make an outflanking movement and cross over the Magra a few miles upstream of Sarzana. Perceiving that the troops that had landed at Lerici could rapidly approach the Vara River, GD Rouyer St.-Victor decided to withdraw his 800 men on Sestri Levante.11 He left a garrison of 80 men at Fort Santa Maria, entrusted the custody of the convicts held in the city fortress to the civil authorities of La Spezia, and withdrew on 26 March. This retreat was even more necessary than he had imagined, for if the Anglo-Sicilians were to land at either Chiavari,

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Rapallo, or Recco, GD Rouyer would be cut off and the city of Genoa deprived of its means of defense. On 27 March, Colonel Travers led an Allied force to La Spezia and occupied the city without meeting any opposition.12 BENTINCK’S CORPS, MARCH 181413 Commanding General: Lieutenant General Bentinck 1st Division: Major General Montressor Brigade: 1/21st Regiment of Foot 1/62nd Regiment of Foot Brigade: 3rd KGL Foot Battalion 6th KGL Foot Battalion Sharpshooter Detachment, 8th KGL Foot Battalion Brigade: 2nd Sicilian Cavalry Regiment (1 sqn) 2nd Sicilian Infantry Regiment Artillery: Section 3rd KGL Foot Battery14 Sicilian Artillery Battery 2nd Division: Major General MacFarlane Brigade: 2/14th Regiment of Foot 1/31st Regiment of Foot 8th KGL Foot Battalion Brigade: 2nd Sicilian Cavalry Regiment (3 sqns) Sicilian Grenadier Battalion 3rd Sicilian Infantry Regiment 4th Sicilian Infantry Regiment Artillery: Sicilian Artillery Battery

As of 28 March, GD Rouyer St.-Victor commanded a force that ranged from 3,000 to 4,500 men drawn from various posts and the garrison of Genoa.15 He deployed his forces in positions on the Sestri di Levante Heights to cover Chia-

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vari and the Rapallo battery.16 He also garrisoned the San Pietro di Vera Heights to cover any British advance toward the source of the Magra River. The Anglo-Sicilian Corps pressed vigorously against the Santa Maria Fortress. A breaching battery was established, with the sharpshooters from the 8th KGL Battalion to cover it.17 The breaching battery did its job, and in four days, on 30 March, the fortress capitulated. At the beginning of April, more Allied troops disembarked at La Spezia. At the beginning of April (probably on 7 April), General MacFarlane’s 2nd Division disembarked at La Spezia. With the arrival of these reinforcements, Lord Bentinck’s expeditionary force could now field about 14,000 men, although figures seem rather uncertain.18 By 2 April the British had established a link with Nugent’s Austrians between Pontremoli and Borgotaro on the Apennine Mountains.19 It should be noted that by these movements the Allies, who were now masters of La Spezia and the Magra Valley, had achieved a triple strategic result: approaching Genoa, establishing contact with Murat and Nugent’s forces in Emilia, and threatening the right of the French defensive line on the Taro River. On 31 March, General Fresia, commander of the 28th Military Division, declared the city of Genoa in a state of siege.20 Measures for the provisioning of the fortress and the citizenry as well as for the suppression of insurrections were taken in concert between General Fresia and the local authorities. The public order, above all, was the object of the greatest concern and required an active surveillance by the civil and military authorities. Not only did British intelligence succeed in gathering information, but they also operated so as to fulminate insurrections both in the city and in the surrounding villages. Signals were coordinated with the fleet to give reports of the countryside and the movement of troops between Rapallo and Savona. On 3 April the British had advanced posts in Levanto and Borghetto, facing a French force of about 1,600 men between Sestri Levante and Chiavari. In the following days, English ships approached the coast below Genoa. On 4 April they threatened disembarkations near Voltri, west of Genoa. However, all of these demonstrations were designed to conceal the movements they were making to the east and distracted the attention of the Genoa garrison. On 6 April, General Callier, commander of the Montenotte Department, ordered 200 men of the 102nd Line to leave Savone and occupy positions in Voltri and Sestri (di Ponente) in order to protect the coastal batteries and to oppose the small landings that the English made daily against their communications.21 On 8 April, GD Rouyer St.-Victor’s troops were attacked in Sestri Levante by superior Allied forces. The engagement lasted all day. The gallant stand of the French grenadiers and voltigeurs of the 101st Line Regiment notwithstanding, the French position was weak and open to being turned by a movement

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through the Fontanabuona Valley, where several popular movements against the French had begun. Rouyer then abandoned, according to his instructions, Sestri, during the night and withdrew on Rapallo. He took up positions near the Portofino Mountain, with his right on Castel San Giorgio, his center at Santa Margherita, and his left in Pietra-Ritta. He left a small advanced guard in Rapallo and scouted the crest of the mountains toward Scafera to observe the Fontanabuona Valley. Lord Bentinck had sent a local man named Liveroni, an expatriot serving as major in the British army, ashore to foment popular movements in this valley. During the night of 7–8 April the English made several small landings to sound the moorings in the bay. The English landings continued without stop up the coast from Nervi to Camogli. On 9 April seven ships fired on Recco between daybreak and 10:00 P.M. that evening. They had troops on board, but the presence of a strong French detachment impeded the landing. The fire of a howitzer and a mortar placed on a height between Recco and Camogli obliged the supporting frigates to hold themselves at a distance. The detachment at Rapallo was cannonaded again. That same day General Pegot, who Euge`ne had sent to Genoa, was charged by General Fresia with replacing General Rouyer St.-Victor, who was old and sick.22 During the evening of 9 April, General Pegot learned that an Austrian detachment, from Nugent’s corps, had joined the insurgents at Fontanabuona. As a result, when he saw that the English had stopped the bombardment on Recco and Sori, he decided to quit his positions that night. His withdrawal was made in good order, and during the morning of 10 April, he occupied a position on the heights of Monte Fasce, two miles northwest of Nervi. The walls of Genoa were just a few miles behind the French line. Nonetheless, the Monte Fasce position would have been excellent, had it contained a larger number of troops.23 The English had nine ships-of-the-line and three or four frigates standing off Genoa, as well as a large number of transports. They were seen to move toward Savona, which caused the French to fear for the coastline between Sampierdarena and Arenzano. This beach was guarded by only three detachments drawn from the 102nd Line, posted in Arenzano, Voltri, and Sestri. On 11 April the English captain commanding the Aboukir sent an emissary ashore with a letter from his admiral to General Fresia. This letter contained proposals for arrangements for coastal trade and bitter complaints about his ships being fired upon. Fresia limited himself to remarking to the emissary, “The ridicule and ill will of this posturing were too visible to warrant response.” On the morning 12 April General Montresor’s British troops attacked General Pegot’s positions on Monte Fasce. The fight lasted throughout the day, but Pegot soon found resistance futile and withdrew during the night, occupying a position at Sturla, on the Albaro heights. On his right stood the sea which was covered by a battery of four guns. On the left was Fort Richelieu. That same night the

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English attempted a landing at Arenzano, seven miles west of Genoa, but it was repulsed. BLOCKADE OF VENICE, APRIL 1814 At this time the English tightened their naval blockade of Venice. They had three more ships-of-the-line and several light ships there under the command of Rear Admiral Sir John Glover. Two Italian frigates, the Principessa di Bologna and La Piave, were anchored in the Chiogga roads and were likely to suffer from a longer stay. On 6 April they profited by a momentary opening in the British blockade and slipped into the port of Venice. They were placed at the mouth of the San Marco Canal, alongside the ships-of-the-line Castiglione, Re´ge´ne´rateur, and Saint Bernard. At the beginning of April the French fleet in Venice, under Rear Admiral Duperre´, consisted of five ships-of-the-line (three French and two Italian), three Italian frigates, one xebec, four brigs, one schooner, and 132 smaller armed boats. The Italian vessels carried 528 guns and 5,000 hands, while the French had 148 guns and 1,500 hands.24 The garrison of Venice was now considerably understrength, due to maladies and to a very high rate of desertion, especially among the Italian units.25 Meanwhile, the Austrians did not stop making attempts to bribe the French commander of Venice. They even ventured to offer him 500,000 francs for capitulating.26 Loyal General Seras disdainfully rejected all offers. NEW NEGOTIATIONS IN MODENA, BOLOGNA, AND REVERE A new and relatively unexpected event played a role in leading Murat and Lord Bentinck to a definitive breaking off of diplomatic relations. On the verge of his fall, Napoleon had at last freed Pope Pius VII from his exile at Fontainebleau. The pope hastened his return to Italy, and on 31 March, he arrived in Modena to meet Lord Bentinck. Pius VII wanted to regain possession of the territories of the Roman States that Murat had recently annexed. The British commander then offered him his patronage and protection. A few hours later Pope Pius VII had a conference with Murat in Bologna. The king of Naples tried to obtain substantial territorial concessions, but the pope, now relying on British support, did not change his mind. On 1 April the king of Naples and the duke of Gallo met Sir Robert Wilson once again, receiving from him a long letter from Lord Bentinck, who harshly reproached the Neapolitans for their unwillingness to cooperate with the Allies as well as their renewed attempts at negotiating with Euge`ne. Upon reading this, an exasperated Murat abandoned the conference, furiously communicating to Sir Robert Wilson that from now on he would break any diplomatic relations with Lord Bentinck and talk only with Lord Castlereagh.27

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On 7 April FM Bellegarde, the king of Naples, the duke of Gallo, von Mier, and Russian General Balachoff organized another military conference in Revere, to which Sir Robert Wilson was also invited. A gloomy Murat, who, unlike Bellegarde, probably already knew of the fall of Paris, definitively accepted the Austrian plan of operations and bound himself to advance on Piacenza in the next few days. In the course of the conference Sir Wilson and the duke of Gallo also agreed that the Anglo-Sicilian Corps would clear Tuscany, which for the time being remained in Neapolitan hands.28 AFFAIR ON THE TARO, 13 APRIL In spite of this entente of Revere, Murat, the king of Naples, waited six more days before putting his army on the move.29 The Taro can be a difficult river to cross. In the winter it flows heavily, and in the summer, rain in the mountains can turn it into a torrent very quickly. However, under most circumstances it was fordable most everywhere and provided a very poor defensive military position. Despite the unfavorable military situation, the Allies had not made any effort against the French positions along the Taro between 9 March and 13 April. This was to change. Murat ordered Nugent’s division, which had been joined by three Neapolitan battalions and a squadron of Neapolitan chevau-le´gers, to move against the French positions along the Taro in three columns. The first column, or left column, was under the orders of General Gober and contained three companies of Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz, two battalions of the Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry, two squadrons of the Radetzky Hussar Regiment, and three light guns. This column was to cross above Medesano (51⁄2 miles—9 kilometers—south of Ponte di Taro and the road from Parma to Piacenza). From there it was to move north on Noceto (31⁄2 miles—6 kilometers—northeast of Medesano) in order to move against the southern face of Castelguelfo.30 The right column, under Oberstleutnant Bourguignon, contained a battalion of the Lusignan Infantry Regiment, a squadron of Radetzky Hussars, and two cannons. After crossing the Taro at Grugno it was to march to the left before arriving in Fontanella, so as to be able to take Castelguelfo in the rear. The central column was commanded by General Nugent personally. Generals Starhemberg and Senitzer marched with the column, as did three battalions of Austrian infantry, 12 cannons, two battalions of the 2nd Neapolitan Light Regiment, and a battalion of the 1st Line Regiment, belonging to General Pepe’s brigade. This force was to move frontally against Castelguelfo, followed by the rest of Carascosa’s Neapolitan division. On 13 April at 5:00 A.M. Murat’s and Nugent’s corps attacked General Maucune, who commanded the right wing of Euge`ne’s army, on the line of the Taro. The attack developed along a front of about 15 miles from Medesano to S. Secondo Parmense. Nugent’s column marched down the Emilia road. After a brief cannonade,

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Maucune’s outposts were pushed back from the main bridge and the river bank by a mixed force of infantry and cavalry and took cover in Castelguelfo. Despite the fordability of the Taro, a number of Neapolitan infantry were swept away and drowned. Castelguelfo and the fields nearby were held by the 1st Italian Line Regiment and a battery. Some Neapolitan and Austrian cavalry tried to charge and take the guns but were repulsed. When the left column appeared on the rear of Castelguelfo, Maucune was obliged to withdraw on Fiorenzuola. Maucune’s withdrawal was not without loss. Two companies of voltigeurs, serving as a rear guard, were surrounded by Borgo San Donnino and taken prisoner by the Austrians as they covered Maucune’s withdrawal.31 Oberstleutnant Bourguignon’s column had encountered significant resistance in Grugno. Only with the greatest effort was it able to oblige the battalion of the 106th Line Regiment stationed there to withdraw. The 106th, after losing three officers and 100 men, withdrew to Borgo San Donnino. In contrast, Gober’s column only exchanged a few musket shots with some weak cavalry pickets by Medesano. Otherwise his advance was uneventful. With Castelguelfo taken the central column reorganized itself and marched in pursuit of the retreating French behind a screen of cavalry. The pursuit was marked by a constant series of exchanges between the stubborn French rear guard and the aggressive Austrian advanced guard. Allied sources indicate that the engagements relating to the capture of Castelguelfo had cost the AustroNeapolitan forces 300 casualties and Maucune’s division 900 casualties and 400 prisoners. French sources, in contrast, indicate that the French lost 300 to 400, and the Allies lost 800 to 900 men hors de combat.32 During the night of 13–14 April, the withdrawal continued in good order as far as Pontenure. On the following morning all of the French and Italians troops crossed safely over the Nure River, taking position between San Polo and Roncaglia. The morning of 14 April, d’Ambrosio’s Neapolitan division occupied the following positions: The 1st Brigade (d’Aquino) had eight companies of the 3rd Neapolitan Light Regiment in Suzzara and four others in Guastalla. Guastalla was also occupied by six companies of the 2nd Neapolitan Line. A company of the 2nd occupied Gualtieri, one was in Boretto, and three more were in Brescello. The 2nd Brigade was established as a second line with one battalion of the 6th Line in Reggiolo, where General Majo had his headquarters. The other battalion of the 6th was in Moglia. The 9th Line Regiment had four companies in Reggio, a battalion at Santa Vittoria, and two companies in Brescello protecting General d’Ambrosio’s headquarters. The 1st Chevau-le´ger Regiment was moving to Reggio and was to relieve the 3rd Chevau-le´ger Regiment, which was returning to Carascosa’s division. General Begani commanded a battalion of the 4th Line, which was to defend the bridgehead at Panaro.33 General Paolucci was ordered to take 11 companies of the 4th Italian Line Regiment and execute a reconnaissance on Guastalla. The goal was to distract

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the Neapolitans and prevent them from moving all of their forces against Piacenza. Paolucci succeeded in his mission, crossing in broad daylight and causing great discord among the Neapolitans. An hour after noon, three small French columns moved out of Borgoforte, the first advancing on Suzzara, which was occupied by eight companies of the 3rd Neapolitan Light Regiment. The second column moved against Reggiolo and the third on Brugneto. All three columns were ordered to cut the communications between Reggiolo and Guastalla. The French column attacking Suzzara surprised the Neapolitan garrison and easily evicted them. The French roamed almost at will, their sudden appearance shocking the six Neapolitan companies near Casoni. They pursued the fleeing Neapolitans over a mile (two kilometers) to Guastalla, where they regrouped under the cover of a Neapolitan battalion posted there. Having accomplished their mission brilliantly, the French withdrew. Their total losses were 32 killed, 43 wounded, and 8 missing.34 Neapolitan General d’Ambrosio modified his positions as a result of this and placed a battalion of the 3rd Light in Brugneto in order to assure his communications between Reggiolo and Guastalla. He also reinforced the garrison of Santa Vittoria. Pignatelli-Cerchiara’s division moved to Fiorenzuola to support Carascosa and Nugent. Filangieri’s brigade moved alongside Pepe’s brigade, near Fiorenzuola. That morning Murat gave orders to resume the march on Piacenza. The first Allied column, three companies and one and a half squadrons under Colonel Gavenda, moved to the left on San Giorgio Piacentino. On the right Austrian Oberstleutnant Bourguignon led his column toward Muradello with the objective of seizing the stone bridge over which passed the highway from Cremona to Piacenza. The remainder of the troops formed a single, central column under Nugent’s orders and marched down the main road on Ponte Nure. Starhemberg’s brigade led the march, followed by Gober’s division. GD Maucune withdrew his advanced posts to Cadeo and took up a strong position on the left bank of the Nure, occupying Ponte Nure with a small force and Cadeo with a few weak pickets. Around 4:00 P.M., the Allied advanced guard, consisting of a battalion of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, arrived on the heights before Ponte Nure. The French evacuated the village practically without a fight. A French battery of six guns and some skirmishers on the left bank did take part of the advanced guard under fire. Starhemberg brought up a second battalion and engaged in a lively firefight for the next hour or so until, suddenly, the French took the offensive. Crossing upstream from Ponte Nure, the French drove resolutely against Starhemberg’s two battalions. Only the timely arrival of a third Allied battalion prevented them from being overwhelmed by the French attack. Instead of a victory, the French found the tables turned and withdrew. The stone bridge was taken by the Allies, and their two wing columns, encountering no opposition, advanced until nightfall.35

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The line on the Nure was abandoned, and Maucune’s tired men spent the night in San Lazzaro, a suburb of Piacenza. On 15 April the withdrawal was successfully terminated under the cover of the 1/1st Italian Line Regiment, who acted as rear guard defending the fortified convent at San Lazzaro until their comrades were in safety behind the walls of Piacenza.36 Between 13 and 15 April, Raumburg’s brigade, which had borne most of the brunt of the fighting retreat from the Taro to Piacenza, suffered 266 casualties, including 151 prisoners.37 Upon learning of the Allied movements against the right of the army, Euge`ne sent the Royal Guard to Bozzolo (the grenadiers), Gazzoldo sull’Oglio (the velites), and Casalmaggiore (the chasseurs). Rouyer’s division moved to the second line on the left, at Guidizzolo, while the other divisions remained in their positions. The last shots on the Taro and the Nure echoed those fired on 14 April around Guastalla during the last reconnaissance ordered by General Paolucci from Borgoforte. The campaign in northeast Italy was nearly over.38

CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF ITALY At this time Euge`ne was informed by the Allies, in such a manner as to leave no doubt of the truth of the communications, of the reverses suffered by the French armies in France and of the fall of Paris. Even though Euge`ne was not yet aware of the emperor’s abdication, he had heard, however, that the French Senate was taking steps to recall the Bourbons. This reinforced his perception that the war in the rest of Europe was definitely lost and that an unreasonable obstinacy in continuing it in Italy would seriously put at risk his legal claim to the Kingdom of Italy. Thus, though his army had never suffered a serious defeat since August 1813, Euge`ne consented to the proposal made by Marschal Bellegarde to treat with him for the evacuation of Italy. Commissioners were named by both sides. General, Chief of Engineers Dode de la Brunerie and General Zucchi, Governor of Mantua, were nominated by Euge`ne. Marschal Bellegarde nominated Generalleutnant Neipperg, commander of the Austrian advanced guard. On 16 April a military convention was signed in the Castle of SchiarinoRizzino. It allowed that the French troops, under Euge`ne’s orders, should return to France, that the Italian troops would continue to occupy that part of the Kingdom of Italy where they were located, and that the fortresses of Osoppo, Palmanova, Venice, and Legnago would be placed in the hands of the Austrians.39 TEXT OF THE CONVENTION OF SCHIARINO-RIZZINO We the undersigned, invested by our commanders-in-chief with full negotiating powers, have come to an agreement on the following points. This agreement is to be ratified by the above mentioned commanders-in-chief.

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1. With effect from the day of this convention an armistice will be in force between the French and Italian troops, under the command of His Imperial Highness, the Prince Viceroy, and the Austrian army under the command of His Excellency Marschal Count of Bellegarde, the troops under the command of His Majesty the King of Naples, and the troops under the command of Lord Bentinck. 2. The armistice between the French and the Allied troops will continue to be valid for eight days after the French troops clear those parts of France in Allied control, by following the assigned routes. 3. The French troops belonging to the army commanded by the Prince Viceroy must return within the old borders of France beyond the Alps. 4. If no instruction from the French government is received within two days after the ratification of this convention, the French troops will immediately begin their march back to France by divisions or by brigades, according to the circumstances. They will follow a daily march schedule with regular stops. 5. The French troops, including those coming from Piacenza, will follow the route along the left bank of the River Po as far as Turin. Commissaries and officers of the French and Austrian staffs will then march ahead of these columns so as to ascertain that the roads across the Montgene´vre and the Colle di Tenda are presently passable to troops and artillery. This being the case, the French troops will then follow these routes to France. Otherwise, they will march across the Montcenis and the Savoy, in compliance with (2). The above mentioned commissaries will be charged with the organization of marches, supplies, transports, and housing, in compliance with military regulations. 6. The Italian troops under the command of the Prince Viceroy who are located in that part of the Kingdom of Italy not yet occupied by the Allied armies, will remain in control of their present positions and of their fortresses. 7. The Austrian troops will be allowed to pass through the Kingdom of Italy along the routes of Cremona and Brescia, avoiding Milan. Their movement will not be allowed before ten days having elapsed since the departure of the French troops in route to France. Italian commissaries will always accompany the Austrian troops within the Italian territory so as to provide them with food, forage, housing, and transports. No other request by Austrian troops on the Italian soil will be authorized. 8. A delegation of the Kingdom of Italy will be authorized to reach the Allied headquarters (in Paris). In the case of the delegation being unable to get satisfaction to their requests, at least fifteen days since the allied powers’ resolutions would elapse before a new outbreak of hostilities between the troops of the Kingdom of Italy and the Austrian and allied troops may occur. 9. The cities of Osoppo, Palmanova, Venice, and Legnago, and their fortresses, will be entrusted to the Austrian army immediately after the ratification of this convention, precisely on 20 April. 10. Upon leaving these places, their garrisons will be awarded full military honors and will be allowed to take with them arms, personal belongings, military cases, clothes from the unit’s store, field guns, caissons, administration files, and so on. The artillery and engineer corps officers will hand all maps, plans, and other related materials concerning the fortress over to their Austrian counterparts.

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11. All local civil and legal authorities who intend to leave the fortress together with the garrison will be allowed to do so and to take all personal belongings as well as the documents relative to their service with them. Upon their departure, they will hand all documents and archives concerning the administration of the fortress over to the Austrian authorities. 12. The French and Italian troops belonging to these garrisons will be subjected to the same rule as their fellow countrymen. 13. Should any of these fortresses capitulate before the ratification of this convention, all agreements made on signing the capitulation would be kept. In any case, the garrisons will be allowed to rejoin their armies. 14. The troops coming from these four fortresses will pass through the territories in control of the Austrian armies by daily marches. They will be provided with food, forage, housing, and transports. 15. As for the evacuation of and the carriages to be assigned to the wounded and the sick, or, alternatively, their being left behind in the hospitals, specific conventions will be agreed upon by the commanders of these places and the Austrian officers in charge of the blockade or siege. 16. The staff officers in charge of accompanying the movement of these garrisons will see that the carriages are replaced after any daily stop. The column commander will be held responsible for the execution of this provision. Should any claim be made, the Austrian commissaries will be competent to examine it. 17. French and Italian staff officers will be immediately sent to the fortresses to inform the local commander of the armistice as well as of the dispositions contained in this convention. 18. In case of ratification, the relevant documents will be exchanged as soon as possible.

The convention was ratified by the viceroy and General Bellegarde on 17 April. SIEGE OF GENOA On 13 April, General Callier was ordered to depart Savona with all his troops, his mobile artillery, and all serviceable muskets and to move to Sestri Ponente. He was to protect the Sestri battery and to inhibit any landing at Sampierdarena. The bridge at Cornigliano was to be occupied, as it was the only line of retreat open to the French, were they forced out of Sestri. That same day the British landed a force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery at Nervi and attacked the French positions at Sturla. At the beginning of the action the coast guard gunners of the Sturla battery spiked their guns and abandoned their post. General Pe´got chased them back to their posts with his sword, had the guns unspiked, and resumed fire. Shortly later this general was wounded, and General Piat, who found himself nearby, replaced him. The engagement lasted all day on the Albaro heights, and near the evening, the English howitzers succeeded in destroying the Sturla battery. That night the French position was adjusted, and a link was established with the battery in the Amour Tower. The

Map 10 Genoa and Its Surroundings

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gunners of this battery, and that of Lavagno-San Michele, had abandoned their posts and were replaced by line gunners.40 On 14 April the Anglo-Sicilians renewed their efforts on Albaro, under the command of Lord Bentinck, who personally led the attack. The engagement throughout the day was heated. Relying on the superiority of his forces to take the city, Lord Bentinck sent an emissary to Genoa to announce his arrival the next day below the city walls. These measures threatened to cause some unrest in the city, and General Fresia sought to invite the city to call up the national guard to duty, despite the fact that there was already smoldering resentment in this force. However, there was no other method available to maintain tranquility. Desertion had reduced the French naval forces until only one brig could be manned. That same day Lord Bentinck, whose emissaries were no longer being received, had a letter delivered to Genoa containing the news from Paris, which had already been received from Turin, but not officially, from de Brissac, the prefect at Alessandria. On 15 April the fire resumed near Albaro and lasted nearly all day. The day after a copy of the Parisian paper Le Moniteur arrived from Turin, increasing the growing unrest among the people. Together with administrative orders, the civilian authorities received a decree for the organization of a provisional government. However, the governor general received no official news. During this time the English brought their frigates and transports closer to the coast, making preparations for a general attack on the French position at Albaro. Civil unrest was also high in the city and on the coast. The people, who were tired of war, hoped to reestablish their ancient form of government, in accordance with Bentinck’s proclamation to the Italian people. At Porto Maurizio, on the west coast of Liguria, the people tried to stop the gunners from firing on the English ships. The companies of the 1st Mobile National Guard Regiment of Toulon, which had been moved to Porto Maurizio and Alassio, were moved out of these towns to take the positions occupied by the French 102nd Line Regiment in Savona.41 On 16 April the British deployed their forces for the next day’s engagement. The sharpshooters of the 8th KGL Line Battalion and English 1/31st Regiment, under General Montressor, formed the left wing. Lt. Colonel Travers commanded the right, and General Honstedt’s brigade, 3rd and 6th KGL Line Battalions, was ordered to move around the mountains north of Genoa in order to take the French in the rear. The second line and reserve, under General MacFarlane, consisted of the English 1/62nd Regiment of Foot, a combined force of troops drawn from the other line regiments and the KGL battalions, a detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons, three English batteries, a rocket battery, a detachment of English staff and engineering officers, plus a force of Italian, Calabrian, and Greek troops.42 On 17 April, at 2:00 A.M., Admiral Pellew’s fleet, coming from Toulon, launched a feint attack between Sestri Ponente and Sampier d’Arena, supporting it with heavy bombardment.

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To the east of Genoa hostilities erupted at 5:00 A.M., as a battery that the British had erected on the left of Sturla opened fire. Soon Sir Josias Rowley brought his fleet closer to the coast and started bombarding the French positions from the sea. That was the signal for the British corps facing Sturla to attack with all their forces the posts at San Martino and San Francesco d’Albaro. The Allied 3rd Italian Line Regiment, under Colonel Ceravigna, captured three mountain guns on one of the heights across from Fort Santa Tecla.43 The Calabrian and Greek troops, plus the sharpshooters of the 8th KGL, under Captain Poten, moved from Monte Fasce and occupied the heights overlooking Fort Richelieu. As a detachment of skirmishers pushed up against the walls of Fort Richelieu, the garrison thought it was preparation for a storming of the fort and abandoned it. The same fate awaited Fort Santa Tecla. With the abandonment of this fortress the French left collapsed, and a general withdrawal began. The 8th KGL Battalion and English 1/21st Regiment advanced against the French right and San Martino d’Albaro, but with less success. The French took up positions in the village’s church, where the English attacked them. This post was the key to the French position, and it was held firmly until the British drew up more forces from their reserves. The French then evacuated it, taking up positions in the houses and gardens between there and the sea. The French withdrawal was not overly hasty initially, but the British turning movement forced them to speed their retreat.44 By that time, the French line was also threatened on its right, as Sir Josias Rowley had put his ships back to the shore and ordered his marines and fusiliers to disembark. The landing parties, however, did not meet any serious opposition and soon took hold of the coastal batteries that had been timely evacuated. French troops evacuated their posts at San Martino d’Albaro and San Francesco d’Albaro, as well as the plateau between Forts Richelieu, San Tecla, and Madonna del Monte. The batteries in Tour d’Amour and San Michele de Lavagno, attacked from the rear, were taken. By noon, almost all the French troops were behind the Bisagno Creek, just east of Genoa. Soon the British were before the walls of Genoa and began to bombard it. This engagement cost the AngloSicilians one officer and 36 men killed, seven officers and 167 men wounded. The fleet under Josias Rowley lost one officer and 2 men killed, 10 wounded, and 1 missing.45 The civil unrest was such that the mayor and bishop went to General Fresia to request he capitulate.46 Fresia, therefore, permitted the municipality to send a deputation to the English general to establish a suspension of hostilities. Lord Bentinck refused all propositions and demanded that the city capitulate to him. The French troops would withdraw, in good order, behind the Bisagno, and the English would not go beyond San Martino d’Albaro. The disturbances in the city grew during the night of 17 April, and the national guard made no effort to calm them. On 18 April, popular demonstrations reached their peak, and the Genoese flag flew publicly in the streets. The British general encouraged the insurgents in the city by hoisting the same flag on Monte Fasce

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and had several copies of his proclamation promising independence to the Italian people distributed in the city. His emissaries distributed money. Bentinck hoped, by these means, to intimidate the commanding general and the garrison. He also played on the goodwill of the people by promising them a return to their ancient republic. REDUCTION OF GENOA, 19 APRIL On 18 April, toward noon, Lord Bentinck sent Lieutenant General MacFarland to Genoa to hasten its reduction. He threatened, in case of a refusal, to begin the attack and to bombard the city. The day passed in discussions, and that night, a convention for the evacuation of Genoa was signed. On the following morning, three British warships entered the port of Genoa. On 21 April, at 8:00 A.M., the garrison departed with its arms, baggage, and six guns, matches lit, and marched on Savona, where they arrived on 22 April. From Savona they marched in two brigades, the first commanded by General Morangie´ and the second under General Piat on Acqui. From this town they resumed their march on the morrow. With the capture of Genoa the British captured a considerable quantity of naval and military stores, including six ships of war.47 Savona capitulated two days later. The English land and naval forces employed in the siege of Genoa consisted of 16,000 to 18,000 soldiers, of whom 6,000 to 7,000 were English and the rest were Italians, Sicilians, and Hanoverians in English service. The squadron was commanded by Admiral Pellow (later Lord Exmouth) and contained three tripledecked ships-of-the-line, six 74s, seven frigates, 12 to 15 brigs, and a large number of transports.48 These forces were augmented a few days later with 6,000 Sicilians, an English regiment, a few detachments of cavalry, two ships-of-the-line, and 150 transports. The expedition was destined for the siege of Toulon, but peace stopped the project. On 26 April Lord Bentinck issued a proclamation, stating that the Constitution of the Genoese Republic of 1797, a heritage of the French Revolution, was reestablished, with only those slight modifications induced by popular wishes. The Genoese people seemed very happy with this. Predictably, the Allied powers, who had been announcing the return of old sovereigns all over Italy, were not as happy. Lord Castlereagh had formerly suggested that his proconsul not commit himself to the restoration of any sovereign but the king of Piedmont and the grand duke of Tuscany. Bentinck’s violation of the spirit of the entente among the Allies with regard to Italy was, however, so blatant that the British Foreign Secretary felt obliged to intervene and disavow his representative’s proclamation. Consequently, Genoa was later annexed to Piedmont, which had been evacuated by French troops after the agreement of 27 April between the Austrians and Prince Camillo Borghese.49

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For Castlereagh, whose patience Lord Bentinck had already challenged far too many times in the last few months, this was probably the feather that broke the camel’s back. Bentinck’s appointment in Italy was not to last any longer.50 REDUCTION OF VENICE On 12 April, artillery salvos all along the lines surrounding Venice announced the successes of the Allied armies in France. On 16 April, the English admiral in command of the blockade, Rear Admiral Sir John Glover,51 sent an emissary to the governor with proposals for the surrender of the city. He took with him news of the Allied occupation of Paris and of Napoleon’s abdication. The admiral’s proposals were rejected. However, on 19 April, the content of the convention concluded between Euge`ne and FM Bellegarde was officially communicated to General Seras. The Austrians entered into the lagoons on 20 April and began to occupy the posts. The Schiarino-Rizzino Convention had not determined in a clear or precise manner the fate of the Venetian navy. On 21 April an English captain from the British fleet renewed the propositions for the surrender of Venice. He and his admiral were either ignorant or feigned ignorance of the convention of 16 April, although copies of the convention had been in Venice since 19 April.52 It is true that this convention was concluded without the participation of Sir John Glover. It is highly unlikely, however, that he was entirely ignorant of it. It is more likely that in his capacity as commander of the blockading fleet, he continued to seek the placing of the Venetian fleet at the disposal of his government, as the English had that of the Genoese.53 There was also the consideration of the prize money that would be his as a result of the capture of these vessels. Rear Admiral Dupe`re requested instructions from Euge`ne as to how to handle this situation. He received them on 22 April, and they contained an additional article establishing that all of the French arsenals and naval materials of the Italians and French were to be turned over to the Austrians.54 Sir John Glover was, no doubt, furious. The Italian troops left Venice on 26 April, the navy on 29 April, and the French troops on 1 May.55 THE EVACUATION OF ITALY On 19 April the French army of Italy evacuated its positions on the line of the Mincio and Po and began its march back to France. The previous day Euge`ne addressed the following proclamation to the army: French Soldiers! Great misfortunes have befallen our homeland. France seeks a remedy to its wrongs, yet it is replaced under an old aegis. The sentiment of all the sufferings efface themselves in the hope of a rest so necessary after such action.

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In learning the news of the great changes, your first thoughts are carried to your dear mother, who calls you back to her care. French Soldiers! You will be taking the road to your homes. It would have been happier to send you there. In other circumstances I would not give to anyone to direct the term of the repose of those brave men who have followed with such a noble and consistent devotion the sentiments of glory and honor. French soldiers! While I remain with the Italian people, be certain that I will never forget the confidence that you have witnessed to me in the middle of dangers as well as the most thorny political circumstances and my gratitude will always be with you.

As the army began its withdrawal, Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Grenier took command of it, executing the convention of 16 April. Upon his assuming command, he expressed to Euge`ne his sentiments as follows: Having set the French army in march to return to its homeland, it executes its duty to deposit at the feet of Your Imperial Highness the sense of gratitude and veneration which it feels towards your august person. The Army of Italy will always glorify its commander by saying, “Having served under Your Imperial Highness” has become a title of honor. May it always enjoy the good will and glory that it merits by its great and noble qualities. It is the voice of the entire army, which values and which it will retain always as supreme. Mantua, 18 April 181456

That day Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Grenier published the following order of the day: French Soldiers! The proclamation of His Imperial Highness, the Prince Viceroy of Italy, has explained to us the reasons for our return to France. The great changes that have occurred in France have been announced, but nothing official has yet reached us. In awaiting what the line that we have drawn brings, we shall continue to march on the road of honor, retaining the calm, noble, and proud attitude which merits for us the esteem of our Prince, that of the Italian people, and his army, and that of the enemy. The governmental orders that we will receive have no doubt arrived at our borders and it is our duty to obey them. We cannot deliberate them. In not submitting to foreign ideas, in not deviating from the sentiment of honor, in conserving that discipline which distinguishes the French army, our homeland sees an army that honors it and always defends its cause.

After the troubles in Milan, the army marched to Ticion, and by 4 May it was across the Sesia, where it reunited with the right corps. The right corps was then absorbed into the four divisions of the main force. On 25 April, Commanding General Count Grenier issued from his headquarters in Pavia the following order of the day, which directed the wearing of the white cockade.57

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Soldiers! You have always punctually followed the order of the day, dated the 18th of this month. You have calmly accepted the events that occurred in France as they were officially transmitted. You have remained on the path of honor and in the line of your duties. I thank you. Today I must meet my obligation towards you. I am obliged to inform you: That the acts of the government since 1 April, which we had heard from foreign sources, have now been announced by bulletins of law, which are official. That the abdication of the Emperor Napoleon from the French empire is formal; that the senate, the people, and this abdication itself, have released us from any obligation towards him. That a constitutional act by the senate and the voice of the people have recalled the Bourbons to the throne, that they have graced during so many centuries, and on which Louis-Stanislas-Xavier is proclaimed King of the French. Soldiers! Honor and the homeland arrange us under his banner. Released from the old vows let us offer to him the pure homage of our fidelity and our devotion. His rise to the throne presages to us great happiness. The great days of France will be reborn under the throne of Louis XVIII and soon his virtues will assure to all the rights of his ancestors to the love of the French. Copies of the present order of this order of the day shall be sent to his Excellency, the Minister of War, in Paris. I await his subsequent orders for the presentation of the assurances of fidelity which we owe to Louis XVIII. In the meantime, the French Army in Italy, honoring its name, its King, and its homeland, shall wear as of this day the white cockade, dear rallying point of the French. The Generals and corps commander shall take the necessary measures to procure and distribute them to all individuals upon arriving in Turin.58

At this time the organization and strength of the army was: Commander in Chief: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Count Grenier Chief of Staff: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Count Vignolle Artillery Commander: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Baron St. Laurent Chief of Staff: Colonel Ravichio Engineering Commander: Colonel Moydier (acting in the absence of General Dode, who was on mission to Paris) Chief of Staff: Chef de bataillon Beaufort d’Hautpoul Unassigned Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Maucune Mare´chal de camp Baron Soulier (left in Turin to attend to the various garrisons) Adjudant Commandant Morizot de Marzy (Assistant Chief of Staff) Sous-Inspector Pradel (Inspector of Reviews) Director Regnault (Chief Director) 1st Lieutenancy: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Grenier Chief of Staff: Adjudant Commandant Bazin-Fontenelle 2nd Division: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Rouyer

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The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814 Chief of Staff: Chef de bataillon Ernour Brigade: Mare´chal de camp Baron Schmitz 1/,2/,3/,4/,5/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 52nd Line Regiment (1) 67th Line Regiment (1) Brigade: Mare´chal de camp Baron Darnaud 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns) 86th Line Regiment (2 bns) 1/,2/,3/,4/35th Line Regiment Total: 3,527 men present, 4,297 in hospital, 12 guns

4th Division: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Marcognet Chief of Staff: Colonel Desbrest Brigade: Mare´chal de camp Baron Jeanin 102nd Line Regiment (2 bns) 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 36th Le´ge`re Regiment (1) 101st Line Regiment (1) Brigade: Mare´chal de camp Baron Roque 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment 1st Foreign Regiment (1) 106th Line Regiment (3) Total: 4,855 men present, 3,961 in hospital, 12 guns 2nd Lieutenancy: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Count Verdier Chief of Staff: Adjudant Commandant De Querelles 1st Division: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Quesnel Chief of Staff: Adjudant Commandant Dupin Brigade: Mare´chal de camp Baron Campi 1/,2/,3/,4/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (3 bns) 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 10th Line Regiment (2 bns) Brigade: Mare´chal de camp Baron Forestier

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35th Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns) 1/,2/,3/,4/84th Line Regiment Total: 5,367 men present, 3,324 men in hospital, 12 guns 3rd Division: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Fressinet Chief of Staff: Adjudant Commandant Vermusen Brigade: Mare´chal de camp de Montfalcon 7th Line Regiment (1 bn) 53rd Line Regiment (4 bns) Brigade: Mare´chal de camp Baron Grosbon 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment 42nd Line Regiment (4 bns) Total: 4,630 men present, 2,669 in hospital, 8 guns Cavalry: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Mermet Brigade: Mare´chaux de camp Bonnemains and Gentil-Saint-Alphonse 19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (3 sqns) 31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (3 sqns) 1st Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) Artillery Reserve: 18 guns, 444 men present, and 17 in hospital Grand Park: 9 guns, 1,408 men present, and 212 in hospital Recapitulation 77 cannons Infantry

18,379 men present

Cavalry

2,352 men present

Artillery

3,348 men present

Total

24,079 men present

In hospital

14,977 men

Total effective

39,056 men59

The Army of Italy marched on Turin and arrived in its vicinity on 5 May. On that day the following order of the day was issued, in which General Grenier expressed his satisfaction with their conduct:

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Soldiers! You have justified the confidence I have in you and I cannot but praise your conduct and the discipline you have observed in crossing Italy. Continue thus on our return to French territory. This part of our country which you will find on our passage is poor and stripped of resources. It is possible, despite those precautions that will be taken, you may suffer some privations. You are to be sure that the first concerns of the generals who command you, and my first concerns, shall be to minimize this as much as possible. I hope that always your good order and discipline will be maintained and that your compatriots shall find in the Army of Italy its renowned dignity. Soldiers! I would be unfaithful to the confidence I have in you, if I spoke of desertion. I am confident that you will remain faithful to your flags and that you not wish to lose, by cowardice, the honor of returning to your families without a stain, and the glory of stating that, “I was with the Army of Italy.” I am obliged to state, that if, contrary to my request, some of you forget your duties, abandon your flags, they will be pursued and judged in the field, according to the rigors of the law. Executed in Turin on 5 May 1814

On 9 May the Army of Italy marched by division through the Alps at four points: the Col di Tenda and the County of Nice; the Val di Stura and the Col de la Maddalena; the road to Fenestrelle and Mont Gene`vre; and Mont Ce´nis. The artillery park moved over this last road and moved to Valence. Marcognet’s division moved via the Val di Stura and its artillery and equipage via Fenestrelle. During the month of June, the Army of Italy reentered France and occupied the following positions: Rouyer’s Division: Aix, Headquarters, Toulon, Brignolles, and St.-Maximin Marcognet’s Division: Digne, Headquarters, Marseille, and Sisteron Quesnel’s Division: Valence, Headquarters, and Montelimart Fressinet’s Division: Embrun, Headquarters, Gap, Brianc¸on, and Mont-Dauphin Cavalry: Carpentras, Headquarters, Avignon, Arles, Tarascon, and Cavaillon

On 20 June the Army of Italy was dissolved.60 RISING IN MILAN, 20 APRIL The armistice of Schiarino-Rizzino did not jeopardize the existence of the Kingdom of Northern Italy. The whole of Lombardy firmly stood in Euge`ne’s hands, and the Army of the Kingdom of Italy had not been disbanded. This made Euge`ne hope for a few days that he could survive the fall of Napoleon and remain the sovereign of an independent kingdom. He then decided to stay in Mantua, after the French troops had left for their homeland. Euge`ne’s hopes, however, were not to last long.

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Although many Italian personalities continued to hold the viceroy in high esteem, the people of Northern Italy had now had enough of French rule. Giuseppe Prina, the finance minister, was bitterly loathed because of his severe tax policies over the last years. Euge`ne, moreover, found himself in a difficult position with the Allied powers, who would not forgive him for his obstinate loyalty to Napoleon. In Milan only a small minority was now disposed to back him as an independent sovereign. In the last few months at least four other political factions in the capital had grown stronger than that in favor of Beauharnais as sovereign. First, a party called Italici puri (Pure Italians) wanted to free Italy from any French influence. Party leader Count Federico Confalonieri was confident that, with British support, Italy might be allowed to elect a prince acceptable to the Allied powers, thus escaping the prospect of a return of the Austrians. Another party supported the election of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Este, a Milanese aristocrat who would later become the duke of Modena. The idea of Italian unity to be pursued under the leadership of the king of Naples did excite several groups of patriots throughout Italy; and in Milan the Muratians were strong enough to play a political role. However, most aristocrats were in favor of mere restoration of the past and looked forward to seeing the return of Habsburg rule. On 17 April the Milanese Senate convened a special sitting. On its agenda was selection of the members of a deputation to be sent to Paris with the aim of obtaining the recognition of an independent state from the Allied powers. After a tumultuous discussion, not only did the Senate vote the mission of the deputation, but they also summoned the electoral constituencies. These measures caused great civil unrest in the capital, as many, rather correctly, feared that a pretext had been given to Euge`ne to nominate himself as king of Italy. The Italici puri protested, as they claimed that the Senate had no right whatsoever to take such decisions. A popular rising, probably fulminated by different factions as well as Austrian agents, erupted on 20 April. An enraged crowd forced the Senate to dissolve, after recalling the deputation that was already on its way to France. Afterward, the insurgents swarmed into the palace of Minister Prina and savagely murdered him. Neither General Pino, who was the military commander in Milan (and a supporter of the Austrian party) nor Giacomo Luini, the police chief, raised a finger to avoid this crime and the spread of riots throughout the city. A provisional government was established during the night between 20 and 21 April, which rather easily succeeded in calming the insurgents. The violent and confused uprising in Milan yielded a double result: It convinced Euge`ne that any attempt to keep his throne had no chance of success. More important, it gave Austria legitimate power to do what was needed to restore law and order in Lombardy on behalf of the Allied powers.61

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EPILOGUE After the Convention of Schiarino-Rizzino and the departure of the French troops, the viceroy had reorganized the army of the Kingdom of Italy as follows: 1st Division: General Zucchi 2nd Division: General Bonfanti 3rd Division: General Fontana Royal Italian Guard: General Lechi Cavalry Division: General Palombini Artillery: Colonel Beroaldi Engineer Corps: Major Vacani

General Mazzucchelli was appointed Chief of Staff of this small army, which at the end of April could field about 15,000 men, 2,500 horses, and 36 guns, not including the Italian contingents of the garrisons of Osoppo, Palmanova, Venice, and Legnago, which were still on the move to rejoin their parent units. In compliance with the convention of 16 April the Italian army did not leave its positions on the Mincio.62 The evolution of the political situation and the rising in Milan had, however, quickly put Euge`ne’s hopes of retaining his throne to an end. He then concluded a new convention with the Austrians. It was signed in Mantua on 23 April and superseded that of Schiarino-Rizzino. According to the new convention, all Italian territories and fortresses still in control of the troops of the Kingdom of Italy should be yielded to the Austrian army. On 28 April the Austrian troops of General Neipperg entered Milan.63 Any decision concerning the fate and survival of the Italian army was now to be taken by the Austrian emperor. The signing of the Convention of Mantua, Euge`ne’s departure to Bavaria, a general feeling of uncertainty with regard to the future, and rumors suggesting that the Italian troops would be incorporated into the Austrian army greatly agitated the remaining Italian troops. Episodes of rebellion occurred among the Italian troops forming the garrisons of Milan, Cremona, Brescia, and Como, and scuffles between Austrian and Italian soldiers were frequent.64 Metternich and the Habsburg emperor had decided that the Italian army would meet the same fate as the Kingdom of Italy—dissolution. However, Marschal Bellegarde, for reasons of his own, plead the cause of its incorporation into the Austrian army. He realistically feared the threat to public order that would arise from the sudden disbanding of an army of 15,000 men in a country already swept by winds of popular revolts. He also recognized that thousands of nonFrench veteran soldiers and officers seasoned under the flags of Napoleon could usefully serve in the Austrian army. A decision was made at the end of May, and Bellegarde’s arguments prevailed. All officers not born in Lombardia and

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Veneto were put on leave. The Italian troops were reorganized into four line regiments, four light battalions, a cavalry, and a gendarmerie regiment. As no equivalent existed in the Austrian army, the Royal Guard was disbanded and incorporated into the forming line units. Among the senior officers, some, like Bartoletti, Fontanelli, Mazzucchelli, Palombini, Severoli, and Villata, entered Austrian service. A few, like Bonfanti, emigrated to South America. Others joined secret societies of Italian patriots, which were to have an important role in the first movements of the Italian Risorgimento. General Pino retired with the title of feldmarschal.65 So ended the campaign that definitively drove the French, albeit undefeated, from Italy and restored the ancient order throughout the peninsula. Many scholars believe that in the first months of 1814 the Italian people may have succeeded in turning the last Napoleonic campaign in Italy into the first war of Italian independence. For several reasons, whose treatment lies beyond the scope of this book, the political situation in Italy was not yet ripe—and thus the chance slipped away. Italy was to wait a half century before succeeding in shaking off the foreign yoke and building an independent nation.

Appendixes Appendix 1 Report of Mr. de Charnage, Intendant of Carthenia, Dated 29 August 1813, to the Prince Viceroy of Italy Sir, During the evening of 20 August the Austrians appeared before Villach. On the 21st they established themselves in the suburb situated on the left bank of the Drave. Colonel Duche´, of the French 35th Le´ge`re Regiment, had the bridge broken, at the entrance by which the Austrian General Fremont presented himself in person and notified the Colonel to evacuate the city and take up positions elsewhere, threatening to burn Villach if he persisted in maintaining himself there. This officer refused to listen and the enemy general caused two guns and a howitzer to fire on the city. The bombardment began at 9:30 P.M. and finished the following day at 4:00 A.M. Some skirmishers dispersed along the left river bank and fired for the rest of the day on our patrols. On the 23rd, at 2:00 P.M., Colonel Duche´ advised me that he had issued the order for the immediate abandonment of the city and to take up positions by the Federaun bridge, on the Gail, a league and a half from Villach. Seeing that my continued presence would be useless at the moment the city was occupied by the enemy, and not believing it was my duty to concur with the measures that the local authorities judged necessary to receive them, I resolved to follow the movement of the regiment, and I warned the French employees that were still in the city. The municipal authorities awaited the Austrians on the bridge. Mr. Nicolle, Secretary General of Intendance, was at their head. The General was immediately followed by a squadron of the Stipsich Hussars and two companies of Croats. At 8:00 A.M., another unit of the same nation arrived. The 24th at 5:00 A.M., Colonel Duche´ returned to the city and remained there until that evening. At the moment of the withdrawal of this officer, seven soldiers of the Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Regiment, which had remained hidden in Villach, ran to the bridge and placed their hankerchieves on the points of the

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Appendix 1 (continued) bayonets, calling their comrades to return to the city immediately. Generals Fenner and Vlasich were at their head. A major was charged with barricading the city. The Hungarian Duka Infantry Regiment, 800 strong, replaced the Croats. The day of the 27th remained tranquil. During the 28th several soldiers were wounded and an officer was killed. On the 29th the Duka Regiment placed itself in line before the place, supporting itself on the gate that led to the bridge. At 9:30 A.M., they retreated and the Austrian batteries in the suburb threw a few bombs into the city. The fire struck the gate to the northwest and sent five or six different places afire. By 6:00 A.M., three quarters of the city was burnt, despite the assistance brought by the military and the French civilian employees. Generals Hiller, Fremont, Fenner, and Monshal returned to Villach. The enemy regiments which occupied the village were those of Duka, Jellachich, and HohenloheBartenstein. The officers told the inhabitants that their orders were to maintain themselves in Villach until they learned of the results of the movements of the Army of Bohemia. Source: Vignolle, 196–198.

Appendix 2 Proclamation of Lord Bentinck in Livorno, 14 March 1814 Italians, England has landed its troops on your coasts. It has come to deliver you from the iron yoke of Bonaparte. Portugal, Spain, Sicily, and Holland are proofs of the general principals and disinterest which animates this power. Spain, by its resolution, by its valor and the efforts of the Allied powers, has succeeded in this sublime enterprise. They have chased out the French. Their independence is assured and its civil liberty established. Sicily, protected by the same power, was saved from the universal deluge. It has not suffered. By the effect of the good character of its Prince, it has passed from slavery to liberty. It hastens to reestablish its splendor among the independent nations. Holland has advanced to the same goal. Italy alone remains under the yoke. Italians fight against Italians in favor of a tyrant, for the slavery of their country. Italians, hesitate no longer, be Italians! And you, the Army of Italy, the cause of your country is in your hands! Warriors of Italy, we do not require that you unite with us, we ask only that you value your rights and that you be free. Call on us, and we will rush to join you. Then our united efforts will cause Italy to return to what it was in happier times and as it is now in Spain. Source: Vignolle, 198–199.

Appendixes Appendix 3 Corps d’Observation d’Italie, 12 January 1813 Corps d’Observation d’Italie—General Bertrand Division: 5th Provisional Regiment 7/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 6/18th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,4/52nd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/137th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/156th Line Regiment Sources: Bonaparte; Belhomme.

Appendix 4 French Corps d’Observation d’Italie, 15 June 1813 Commanding Officer: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 46th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi (in Trevise on 10 July, except as noted) 1/,2/,3/,4/9th Line Regiment (80/2,300) Regimental Artillery Detachment (2/68) To be incorporated Det/101st Line Regiment (0/400) 1/,2/,3/,4/35th Line Regiment (80/2,457) Regimental Artillery Detachment (2/68) To be incorporated Det/102nd Line Regiment (0/250) Det/112th Line Regiment (0/100) Det/14th Le´ge`re Regiment (0/100) 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire (3) 6/7th Line Regiment (20/820) (in Trevise 29 June) 6/52nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Trevise 5 July) 6/67th Line Regiment (20/820) (in Trevise 6 July) 23rd Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/15th Line Regiment (20/820) (Brest) 6/70th Line Regiment (20/820) (Brest) 6/121st Line Regiment (20/720) (Blois) Det 42nd Line Regiment (0/100) (Alexandria)

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Appendix 4 (continued) Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Trevise 10 July) 5/4th Horse Artillery (3/100) (in Trevise 10 July) 4/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/113) (in Trevise 10 July) 47th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Callier (in Verona on 10 July, except as noted) 1/,2/,3/,4/84th Line Regiment (80/2,380) Regimental Artillery Detachment (2/68) To be incorporated into 84th Line Det/112th Line Regiment (0/200) Det/22nd Le´ge`re Regiment (0/300) 1/,2/,3/,4/92nd Line Regiment (80/2,715) Regimental Artillery Detachment (2/68) To be incorporated into 92nd Line Det/13th Line Regiment (0/400) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Delaunaya 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Line Regiment (20/820) (in Marseille) 3/62nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Marseille) 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 8/6th Line Regiment (20/820) (in Verona 5 July) 3/10th Line Regiment (20/780) (in Verona 10 July) To be incorporated into 10th Line Det/102nd Line Regiment (0/40) 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment (15/700) (in Verona 3 July) 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment (20/780) (in Verona 10 July) To be incorporated into 1st Le´ge`re Det/3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (0/40) Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery (2/121) 4/4th Horse Artillery (3/100) 1/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/113) 48th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Castella de Berlens (in Udine between 5 and 14 July) 1/,2/,3/,4/53rd Line Regiment (80/2,150) Regimental Artillery Detachment (2/68)

Appendixes

241

Appendix 4 (continued) To be incorporated into 53rd Line Det/112th Line Regiment (0/150) Det/22nd Le´ge`re Regiment (0/400) 1/,2/,3/,4/106th Line Regiment (80/2,546) Regimental Artillery Detachment (2/68) To be incorporated into 53rd Line Det/13th Line Regiment (0/500) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Combelle 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line Regiment (20/820) 6/101st Line Regiment (20/820) 6/112th Line Regiment (20/820) 24th Demi-Brigade provisoire 5/26th Line Regiment (20/320) (in Napoleonville) To be incorporated into 26th Line Det/20th Line Regiment (0/250) (in Verceil) Det/67th Line Regiment (0/250) (in Genoa) 5/82nd Line Regiment (20/420) (in La Rochelle) To be incorporated into 82nd Line Det/101st Line (0/400) (in Genoa) 6/5th Le´ge`re Regiment (20/820) (in Cherbourg) Artillery: 23/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) (Udine 10 July) 25/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) (Udine 10 July) 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/116) (Verona 4 July) 49th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Se´me´le´ (in Bassano 30 June, unless otherwise noted) 1/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (20/120) To be incorporated into 35th Le´ge`re Det/14th Le´ge`re Regiment (0/100) Det/53rd Line Regiment (0/370) 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (20/600) 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (20/120) To be incorporated into 36th Le´ge`re Det/9th Line Regiment (0/470) 3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (20/120) To be incorporated into 36th Le´ge`re Det/35th Line Regiment (0/470)

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Appendix 4 (continued) 3/42nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Bassano 13 July) 6/42nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Alexandria 13 July) 3/102nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Bassano 5 July) 6/102nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Bassano 6 July) 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment (20/820) (in Marseille) 3/16th Line Regiment (20/820) (in Toulon) 4/62nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Marseille) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line Regiment (20/80) To be incorporated into 131st Line Det/84th Line Regiment (0/510) 2/132nd Line Regiment (20/80) To be incorporated into 132nd Line Det/92nd Line Regiment (0/510) 2/133rd Line Regiment (20/80) To be incorporated into 133rd Line Det/106th Line Regiment (0/510) 6/66th Line Regiment (20/380) (Blaye) To be incorporated into 133rd Line Dets/Misc corps (0/440) (to be designated) Artillery: (in Bassano 10 July) 6/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) 17/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) 2/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/110) 53rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini (in Pavia on 10 July unless otherwise noted) 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 2/2nd Italian Le´ge´re Regiment (20/820) 1/3rd Italian Line Regiment (25/885) 2/3rd Italian Line Regiment (20/780) 3/3rd Italian Line Regiment (20/780) 4/3rd Italian Line Regiment (20/730) 1/Dalmatian Regiment (20/820) 2/Dalmatian Regiment (20/820) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 6/1st Italian Line Regiment (20/820)

Appendixes Appendix 4 (continued) 1/2nd Italian Line Regiment (35/710) 2/2nd Italian Line Regiment (20/710) 3/2nd Italian Line Regiment (24/710) 4/2nd Italian Line Regiment (21/710) Artillery: 5th Italian Foot Battery (3/120) 11th Italian Foot Battery (3/120) 1/,2/1st Italian Train Battalion (4/158) Det/Italian Artillery Artisans (0/5) 54th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Bonfanti 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Gardes d’Honneur (1 co) (4/116/126)1 (Bresica 6 July) 1/Italian Velite Regiment (15/585) (Bresica 6 July) 1/Italian Guard Infantry Regiment (15/385) (Bresica 11 July) 1/Italian Guard Chasseur Regiment (15/485) (Bresica 5 July) 2/Italian Guard Chasseur Regiment (15/485) (Bresica 5 July) 3/Italian Guard Chasseur Regiment (15/485) (Bresica 5 July) 4/Italian Guard Chasseur Regiment (15/485) (Bresica 5 July) 2nd Brigade: 1/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (25/790) (Gorizia) 2/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (15/780) (Guadisca) 3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (15/780) (Triest) 4/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (15/760) (Triest) 1/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (20/820) (Zara) 2/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (20/820) (Zara) Artillery: 19th Italian Foot Battery (3/120) (Bresica 6 July) 1st Italian Guard Horse Battery (2/78) (Bresica 6 July) 3/1st Italian Train Battalion (1/89) (Bresica 11 July) 1st Guard Train Company (2/86) (Bresica 11 July) 55th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Se´ras 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lasalcette 4/47th Line Regiment (20/820) (in l’Orient) 6/47th Line Regiment (20/420) (in l’Orient) To be incorporated into 47th Line Det/7th Line Regiment (0/400) (in Turin) 2/86th Line Regiment (20/820) (in St. Malo)

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Appendix 4 (continued) 6/86th Line Regiment (20/340) (in St. Malo) To be incorporated into the 86th Line Det/52nd Line Regiment (0/480) (in Genoa) 2/122nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Vendome) 6/122nd Line Regiment (20/170) (in Vendome) To be incorporated into the 122nd Line Det/67th Line Regiment (0/650) (in Genoa) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pamplona 1/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 2/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 3/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 1/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 2/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 3/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 1/3rd Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820)2 2/3rd Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) 1/4th Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) 2/4th Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) 1 Elite/1st Elite Foreign Regiment (20/580) 2 Elite/1st Foreign Regiment (20/580) 1 Elite/2nd Elite Foreign Regiment (20/880) Artillery: 2 Foot Companies (6/240) (yet to be designated) 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/116) (in Verona 4 July) Corps Cavalry: 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Guyon 1/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (15/215/240) 2/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/215/220) 3/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/215/220) 4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/215/220) 3/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (15/215/240) 4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (10/210/220) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1/Italian Guard Dragoon Regiment (15/215/240) (Bresica 5 July) 2/Italian Guard Dragoon Regiment (10/210/220) (Bresica 5 July) 1/Italian Dragoons de la Reine Regiment (15/215/240) 2/Italian Dragoons de la Reine Regiment (8/215/220)

Appendixes Appendix 4 (continued) 3/Italian Dragoons de la Reine Regiment (8/215/220) 4/Italian Dragoons de la Reine Regiment (9/215/220) 1/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (20/240/276) 2/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (10/240/244) 3/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (10/240/250) 4/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (10/240/250) 3rd Brigade: French Light Cavalry Regiment to be organized (6 sqns) (60/1,440/1,560) French Heavy Cavalry Regiment to be organized (4 sqns) (36/764/830) Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery (3/100) (Verona 10 July) 1st Italian Horse Artillery (4/100) (Verona 10 July) Det. 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion (2/68) (Verona 23 July) 4/1st Italian Train Battalion (1/87) (Verona 10 July) Artillery Park and Reserve: 4/4th Foot Artillery (3/120) (Verona) 19/4th Foot Artillery (3/120) (Verona) 1st Neapolitan Horse Artillery (2/88) (Naples) 1 French Foot Battery (3/120) (to be designated) 1st Neapolitan Foot Battery (2/118) (Naples) Det. 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion (2/60) (in Verona 12 July) 7/5th (bis) Train Battalion (2/118) (in Montechiaro 21 July) 1st Neapolitan Train Company (2/98) (Naples) Det/10th Artillery Artisan Co. (0/15) 3/1st Sapper Battalion (2/148) (Alexandria) 6/1st Sapper Battalion (2/148) (Manuta) 8/3rd Sapper Battalion (2/148) (Alexandria) 2nd Italian Sapper Company (2/120) (Mantua) 3/6th Principal Train Battalion (2/118) (Verona 8 July) 1

Numbers are officers, men, and horses. All Croatians and the foreign regiments were en route to Montechiaro. Source: French National Archives, Carton AFIV* 1342.

2

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Appendix 5 Corps d’Observation d’Italie as Established by the Decree of 18 June 1813 1st Division: 1/,2/,3/,4/9th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/35th Line Regiment 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/7th Line Regiment 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment 23rd Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/15th Line Regiment 6/70th Line Regiment 6/121st Line Regiment 2nd Division: 1/,2/,3/,4/84th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/92nd Line Regiment 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 8/6th Line Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment Battalions formed from cadres in Spain (2) 3rd Division: 1/,2/,3/,4/53rd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/106th Line Regiment 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 6/112th Line Regiment 24th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4th Division: 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 5 (continued) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment 2/133rd Line Regiment Battalions formed from cadres in Spain (2) 5th Division: 12 Battalions from the Kingdom of Italy 6th Division: Italian Royal Guard Regiments (6) Italian Line Regiments (6) 7th Division:1 47th Line Regiment (2) 86th Line Regiment (2) 122nd Line Regiment (2) Neapolitan Infantry (8) Artillery 3 French Horse Artillery Batteries (18 guns) 1 Italian Horse Artillery Battery (6 guns) 1 Neapolitan Horse Artillery Battery (6 guns) 9 French Artillery Batteries (72 guns) 4 Italian Artillery Batteries (32 guns) 1 Neapolitan Artillery Battery (8 guns) Artillery Reserve 2 French Batteries (16 guns) Cavalry 1 French Regiment (4 sqns) 3 Italian Regiments (12 sqns) 1 Neapolitan Cavalry Regiment (4 sqns) 1

None of these units ever joined Euge`ne.

Appendix 6 1st Corps d’Observation d’Italie, 25 June 1813 47th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Dupeyroux 1/,2/,3/,4/84th Line Regiment (4) (2,593) 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment (1,680) 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment (1,680)

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Appendix 6 (continued) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Delaunay 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire (2,520) 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 6/112th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/92nd Line Regiment (4) (2,900) Artillery: 2 Foot Batteries (246) (12 guns and 4 howitzers) 1 Train Company (120) Ouvriers (5) 1 Artillery Train Company (117) 49th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (3,120) Elite 1/,2/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (1,680) 1/,2/Dalmatian Regiment (1,120) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 1/,2/,3/,4/2nd Italian Line Regiment (2,850) 1/,2/,3/,4/5th Italian Line Regiment (3,100) Artillery: 2 Foot Batteries (246) (12 guns and 4 howitzers) 1 Train Company (163) Ouvriers (5) 1 Artillery Train Company (117) 1 Sapper Company (123)

Appendix 7 New Army of Italy, 15 July 1813 Commanding Officer: Prince Eugene Viceroy of Italy Chief of Staff: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Vignolle Artillery Commander: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron de St. Laurent Engineering Commander: Colonel Moydier Ordonnateur in Chief: Commissaire Regnault Inspector of Review: Sous-Inspecteur Pradel 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Quesnel (7,777)

Appendixes Appendix 7 (continued) Brigade: Ge´ne´raux de brigade Campi and Pegot 1/,2/,3/,4/84th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Line Regiment 8/6th Line Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 4 Regimental guns 14 Field guns 6 Field guns 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Gratien (8,200) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Piat 1/,3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment 2/133rd Line Regiment 16 Field guns 2nd Lieutenancy: Vacant 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Verdier (7,486) Brigade: Ge´ne´raux de brigade Schmitz and d’Arnuad 1/,2/,3/,4/9th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/35th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/7th Line Regiment 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment 4 Regimental guns 14 Field guns 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Marcognet (7,189) Brigade: Ge´ne´raux de brigade Dupeyroux and Jeanin 1/,2/,3/,4/53rd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/106th Line Regiment

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Appendix 7 (continued) 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 6/112th Line Regiment 4 Regimental guns 16 Field guns 3rd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Pino 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Palombini (9,563) Brigade: Ge´ne´raux de brigade Ruggieri and Galimberti 2/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 1/1st Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/2nd Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/Dalmatian Regiment 2 Regimental guns 14 Field guns 6th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Lecchi (7,891) Royal Guard: Royal Velites (1) 1/,2/,3/,4/Regiment de Chasseurs a` pied de la Garde Guard Infantry Regiment (1) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bellotti 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment Elite 1/,2/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 16 Field guns Reserve Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Bonfanti (2,469) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Mazzuchelli Elite Battalions of 1st Foreign Regiment (2) Elite Battalion of 2nd Foreign Regiment (1) Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Baron Mermert (1,800) Brigade: Ge´ne´raux de brigade Perreimond and Guyon 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/Queen’s Dragoon Regiment 5/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 7 (continued) Artillery Reserve: 12-12pdr guns 6 howitzers Artillery Park: 6-6pdrs 2 howitzers Source: Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes.

Appendix 8 French Corps d’Observation d’Italie, 15 July 1813 Commander in Chief: Ge´ne´ral de division Prince Euge`ne Chief of Staff: Ge´ne´ral de division Danthouard Artillery Commander: Ge´ne´ral de division St. Laurent Engineer Commander: Colonel Simon Moydier Wing Commanding Officers: 46th and 48th Divisions—Vacant 47th and 49th Divisions—Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 53rd and 54th Divisions—Ge´ne´ral de division Pino 46th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (in Verona except as noted) 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Callier 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/84th Line Regiment (88/2,385) 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/92nd Line Regiment (73/2,350) (in Vicenze) 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 8/6th Line Regiment (7/332) 3/10th Line Regiment (20/820) 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment (20/820) 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment (10/705) Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Venice) 4/4th Horse Artillery (3/100) 1/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/115) 47th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Dupeyroux 2nd Brigade: Vacant 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/9th Line Regiment (80/2,088) (in Trevise)

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Appendix 8 (continued) 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/35th Line Regiment (82/2,412) (in Trevise) 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/7th Line Regiment (14/800) (in Ceneda) 6/52nd Line Regiment (12/820) (in Sacile) 6/67th Line Regiment (15/820) (in Pordenone) Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Verona) 5/4th Horse Artillery (2/90) (in Verona) 4/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/118) (in Verona) 48th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (34/1,200) (in Bassano) 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (30/1,190) (in Bassano) 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment (40/1,600) (in Bassano) 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment (36/1,600) (in Castelfranco) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Combelle 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment (20/820) (in Verona 2 September) 3/16th Line Regiment (20/820) (in Verona 6 September) 4/62nd Line Regiment (20/820) (in Verona 6 September) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line Regiment (18/600) (in Bassano) 2/132nd Line Regiment (12/600) (in Bassano) 2/133rd Line Regiment (17/600) (in Bassano) Artillery: 6/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Palmanova) 17/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Verona) 2/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/112) (in Verona) 49th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Piat 2nd Brigade: Vacant 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/53rd Line Regiment (78/2,556) (in Udine) 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/106th Line Regiment (64/2,390) (in Udine) 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire (in Udine) 4/20th Line Regiment (15/810) 6/101st Line Regiment (15/800) 6/112nd Line Regiment (12/800)

Appendixes Appendix 8 (continued) Artillery: (in Verona) 23/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) 25/2nd Foot Artillery (3/120) 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/117) 53rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 2/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (20/820) (in Padua) 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/3rd Italian Line Regiment (75/3,190) (in Venice) 1/,2/Dalmatian Regiment (40/1,120) (in Padua) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 1/1st Italian Line Regiment (20/820) (in Padua) 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/2nd Italian Line Regiment (72/2,600) (in Padua) Artillery: 5th Italian Foot Battery (3/120) (in Mantua) 11th Italian Foot Battery (3/120) (in Venice) 1/1st Italian Train Battalion (2/81) (in Padua) 2/1st Italian Train Battalion (1/81) (in Padua) 54th Division: 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi (in Bresica) Gardes d’Honneur (1 co) (4/120/128)1 1/Italian Velite Regiment (20/600) 1/,2/,3/,4/Italian Guard Chasseur Regiment (52/1,950) 1/Italian Guard Infantry Regiment (16/330) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bellotti 1/,2/,3/,4/,Art/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (75/3,150) (in Gradisca) 1/,2/,Art/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (40/1,600) (in Zara) Artillery: Major Clementi 1st Italian Guard Foot Battery (4/76) (in Brescia) 1st Italian Guard Horse Battery (2/76) (in Brescia) 3/1st Italian Train Battalion 1st and 2nd Guard Train Companies Total train (4/220) (in Brescia) 55th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Seras 1st Brigade: 1 Elite/1st Foreign Regiment (14/600) (in Montechiaro) 2 Elite/1st Foreign Regiment (14/600) (in Montechiaro) 1 Elite/2nd Foreign Regiment (21/792) (in Montechiaro)

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Appendix 8 (continued) 1/3rd Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) (en route to Montechiaro) 2/3rd Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) (en route to Montechiaro) 1/4th Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) (en route to Montechiaro) 2/4th Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) (en route to Montechiaro) 2nd Brigade: 1/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 2/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 3/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 1/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 2/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) 3/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (20/820) (in Naples) Artillery: 19/6th Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Verona) 21/6th Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Verona) 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/118) (in Verona) Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Guyon 1/,2/,3/,6/1st Hussar Regiment (40/960/1,040) (organizing in Lyon) 1/,2/,3/,6/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (40/960/1,040) (organizing in Vienne) 5/,6/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (15/480/500) (organizing in Plaisance) 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (39/860/924) (organizing in Cremona) 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (20/450/461) (organizing in Lodi) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1/,2/Italian Dragoons de la Garde Royale (14/240/260) (in Bresica) 1/,2/,3/,4/Dragoons de la Reine (36/800/870) (organizing in Cremona) 1/,2/,3/,4/Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (39/971/1,050) (in Naples) Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery (2/90) (in Verona) 2nd Italian Horse Artillery (3/100) (in Pavia) 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion (1/70) (in Verona) 3rd Italian Train Company (1/88) (in Pavia) Artillery Park and Reserve: 19/4th Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Verona) 24/4th Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Verona) 1st Neapolitan Horse Artillery (3/90) (in Naples) Dets. 6/,7/5th (bis) Train Battalion (1/124) (in Verona)

Appendixes Appendix 8 (continued) 1st Neapolitan Train Company (1/90) (in Naples) Det/10th Artillery Artisan Company (0/5) (in Verona) 3/3rd Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Verona) 1st Neapolitan Foot Artillery(3/120) (in Naples) Det 7/5th (bis) Train Battalion (0/66) ( in Verona) 3/6th Principal Train Battalion (1/120) (in Verona) 1st Neapolitan Train Company(1/80) (in Naples) Det/10th Artillery Artisan Company (0/10) (in Verona) 3/1st Sapper Battalion (3/150) (in Verona) 6/1st Sapper Battalion (3/150) (in Verona) 8/3rd Sapper Battalion (3/150) (in Verona) 2nd Co, Italian Sappers (3/120) (in Mantua) 1

Numbers are officers, men, and horses. Source: French National Archives, Carton AFIV* 1343.

Appendix 9 French Army of Illyria, 1 August 1813 Commanding General: Ge´ne´ral de division Fresia Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Montrichard (in Ragusa) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Roize (in Zara) Staff/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (in Trieste) 1/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (19/834) (in Trieste) 2/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (19/792) (in Laibach) 3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (16/641) (in Laibach) 4/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (19/640) (in Fiume) Staff/4th Le´ge`re Regiment (3/3) (in Ragusa) 1/4th Le´ge`re Regiment (17/570) (in Zara) 2/4th Le´ge`re Regiment (15/469) (in Spolato) 3/4th Le´ge`re Regiment (18/559) (in Cattaro) 4/4th Le´ge`re Regiment (14/576) (in Ragusa) Artillery Det./4th Le´ge`re Regiment (3/57) (in Trieste) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin (in Carlstadt) Recruiting detachments Trieste (5/10) Laybach (4/12) Carlstadt (2/9)

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Appendix 9 (continued) Villach (3/6) Zara (2/8) Staff/Dalmatian Pandors (3/0) 1/Dalmatian Pandors (11/169) 2/Dalmatian Pandors (11/171) 3/Dalmatian Pandors (11/138) Croatian Regiments: 2/1st Croatian Regiment (23/1,131) (in Zara) 2/2nd Croatian Regiment (18/1,086) (in Fiume) 1/3rd Croatian Regiment (18/1,061) (in Cattaro) 2/4th Croatian Regiment (23/1,096) (in Ragusa) 2/6th Croatian Regiment (21/784) (in Triest) Other: Staff/31st Imperial Gendarme Legion (2/0) (in Trieste) 1/31st Imperial Gendarme Legion (5/136) (in Laybach) 2/31st Imperial Gendarme Legion (4/64) (in Villach) 3/31st Imperial Gendarme Legion (3/95) (in Trieste) 4/31st Imperial Gendarme Legion (5/80) (in Carlstadt) 5/31st Imperial Gendarme Legion (5/102) (in Zara) 6/31st Imperial Gendarme Legion (4/67) Source: French Archives, Chaˆteau Vincennes, Carton C6 13.

Appendix 10 Army of Italy, Mid-August 1813 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (7,777) 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment (3) 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment (3) 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 4/4th Horse Artillery (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion

Appendixes Appendix 10 (continued) 7/5th (bis) Train Battalion 6/1st Sapper Battalion Det 1/9th Equipage 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien (8,200) 35th Le´ge`re Regiment (1) 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 106th Line Regiment (2) 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment (1) 2/132nd Line Regiment (1) Artillery: 17/2nd Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 23/2nd Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 1/10th Principal Train Battalion 2/10th Principal Train Battalion 6/1st Sapper Battalion Det 1/9th Equipage Battalion 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer (7,485) 9th Line Regiment (2) 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/7th Line Regiment 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 5/4th Horse Artillery (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 4/10th Principal Train Battalion Plus detachment Det 3/1st Sapper Battalion Det 2/9th Equipage Battalion 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet (7,189) 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/106th Line Regiment

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Appendix 10 (continued) 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment Artillery: 6/2nd Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 25/2nd Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 5/10th Principal Train Battalion 6/10th Principal Train Battalion Det 3/1st Sapper Battalion Det 2/9th Equipage Battalion 3rd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Pino 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini (9,562) 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 2/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 1/1st Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/2nd Italian Line Regiment Artillery/2nd Italian Line Regiment 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 1/,2/Dalmatian Line Regiment Artillery/Dalmatian Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Line Regiment Artillery/3rd Italian Line Regiment Artillery: Major Bezoldi 5th Italian Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 11th Italian Foot Artillery (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 1st Italian Principal Train 2nd Italian Principal Train 2/1st Italian Sapper Battalion 3/Italian Transport Battalion 6th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Lecchi (7,891) 1/Royal Grenadier Regiment 1/,2/Re´giment de Chasseur a` pied Guard Dragoons (1) 1/Velites Royaux Artillery: 2 Foot Batteries

Appendixes

259

Appendix 10 (continued) 1 Horse Battery 12 guns Reserve Brigade: Bonfanti (2,469) 3 Infantry Battalions Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet (1,800) 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/Queen’s Dragoon Regiment 5/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Park 12-12pdrs 6 howitzers 6-6pdrs 2 howitzers

Appendix 11 Army of Inner Austria, 12 August 1813 Commanding Officer: Feldzeugmeister Hiller Directly under Army Command Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich (upper Enns Valley on the Austria/Salzburg border) 1/2nd Szeckler Grenz Regiment 2/Wallachen Grenz Regiment Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 12

⁄ 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall (in upper Mur Valley) Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (4 cos) 2/2nd Szekler Grenz Regiment Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqn) 1

⁄2 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian (later Oberst Volkmann) Duka Infantry Regiment (2) Hohenlohe Infantry Regiment (1) Frimont Hussar Regiment (1 sqn) 6pdr Brigade Battery (6-6pdrs)

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Appendix 11 (continued) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Frimont (in Drau Valley, between Klagenfurt and Vo¨lkermarkt) Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasitz Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment (1) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (2) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (6 sqns) 1 Wurst Battery (6 guns) Brigade: Generalmajor Pulsky (later Oberst Gober) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (4) 6pdr Brigade Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (6 sqns) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (6 sqns) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marziani (between St. Andre, Lavamu¨nde and Hohemauth) Reisky Infantry Regiment (3) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (4) 6pdr Brigade Battery (6–6pdrs) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Sommmariva (between Wildon, Ehrenhausen, and Leibnitz) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6) Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis Purcell Grenadier Battalion Welsperg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion 6pdr Brigade Battery (6-6pdrs) Directly under Army Command Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis (by Cilli) Broder Grenz Regiment (1) Lusignan Infantry Regiment (2) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 1

⁄2 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Radivojevich (by Agram) Brigade: Generalmajor Csivich

Appendixes Appendix 11 (continued) Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (1) Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment (1) St. Georger Grenz Regiment (1) Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment (1) Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment (2) Brigade: Generalmajor Ungent Radetzky Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) 12

⁄ 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

6pdr Brigade Battery (6-6pdrs) Source: Von Welden.

Appendix 12 French Corps d’Observation de Italie, 1 September 1813 Commanding Officer: Prince Eugene Beauharnais Chief of Staff: Ge´ne´ral de division Vignolle Artillery Commander: Ge´ne´ral de division St.-Laurent Engineering Commander: Colonel Moydier 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Colonel Pegot 1/84th Line Regiment (27/619) 2/84th Line Regiment (22/531) 3/84th Line Regiment (24/604) 4/84th Line Regiment (22/655) Artillery/84th Line Regiment (2/48) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/9th Line Regiment (27/527) 2/9th Line Regiment (20/569) 3/9th Line Regiment (18/460) 4/9th Line Regiment (20/578) Artillery/9th Line Regiment (2/44) 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment (21/780) 3/10th Line Regiment (19/472)

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Appendix 12 (continued) 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment (22/740) 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment (13/645) Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (3/109) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 4/4th Horse Artillery (2/98) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion (2/128) 7/5th (bis) Train Battalion (2/115) 6/1st Sapper Battalion (2/75) Det 1/9th Equipage Battalion (1/61) 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 1/53rd Line Regiment (32/683) 2/53rd Line Regiment (18/471) 3/53rd Line Regiment (17/427) 4/53rd Line Regiment (18/637) Artillery/53rd Line Regiment (2/45) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Dupeyroux 1/106th Line Regiment (35/655) 2/106th Line Regiment (16/585) 3/106th Line Regiment (16/450) 4/106th Line Regiment (15/489) Artillery/106th Line Regiment (2/38) 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/20th Line Regiment (21/786) 6/101st Line Regiment (18/747) 6/112th Line Regiment (17/573) Artillery: 6/2nd Foot Artillery (3/117) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 25/2nd Foot Artillery (3/111) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/97) 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/98) Det 3/1st Sapper Battalion (1/75) Det 2/9th Equipage Battalion (1/60) 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Verdier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/9th Line Regiment (23/520) 2/9th Line Regiment (21/455)

Appendixes Appendix 12 (continued) 3/9th Line Regiment (21/514) 4/9th Line Regiment (23/412) Artillery/9th Line Regiment (2/41) 2nd Brigade: 1/35th Line Regiment (24/617) 2/35th Line Regiment (20/577) 3/35th Line Regiment (19/626) 4/35th Line Regiment (21/512) Artillery/35th Line Regiment (2/49) 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/7th Line Regiment (14/793) 6/52nd Line Regiment (15/762) 6/67th Line Regiment (16/802) Artillery: Capitaine Rousseau 4/2nd Foot Artillery (2/100) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 5/4th Horse Artillery (2/95) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 4/10th Principal Train Battalion (3/132) Plus detachment (2/10) Det 3/1st Sapper Battalion (2/62) Det 2/9th Equipage Battalion (1/60) 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Piat 2/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (16/522) 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (18/640) 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (19/500) 3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (13/481) 3/102nd Line Regiment (18/758) 6/102nd Line Regiment (11/735) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 3/42nd Line Regiment (16/776) 6/42nd Line Regiment (14/770) 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment (16/497) 2/132nd Line Regiment (13/476) 2/133rd Line Regiment (20/534) Artillery: 17/2nd Foot Artillery (3/108) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 23/2nd Foot Artillery (3/112) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers)

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Appendix 12 (continued) 1/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/80) 2/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/75) 6/1st Sapper Battalion (2/72) Det 1/9th Equipage Battalion (1/60) 3rd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Pino 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 2/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (11/548) 1/1st Italian Line Regiment (16/572) 1/2nd Italian Line Regiment (36/548) 2/2nd Italian Line Regiment (14/545) 3/2nd Italian Line Regiment (13/562) 4/2nd Italian Line Regiment (10/577) Artillery/2nd Italian Line Regiment (0/11) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 1/Dalmatian Line Regiment (24/510) 2/Dalmatian Line Regiment (17/508) Artillery/Dalmatian Line Regiment (0/12) 1/3rd Italian Line Regiment (26/650) 2/3rd Italian Line Regiment (15/560) 3/3rd Italian Line Regiment (11/485) 4/3rd Italian Line Regiment (13/520) Artillery/3rd Italian Line Regiment (0/23) Artillery: Major Bezoldi 5th Italian Foot Artillery (4/95) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 11th Italian Foot Artillery (4/112) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 1st Italian Principal Train (2/107) 2nd Italian Principal Train (2/111) 2/1st Italian Sapper Battalion (3/138) 3/Italian Transport Battalion (3/102) 6th Division: 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi 1/Gardes d’Honneur (6/143/160) 1/Velites Royaux (29/640) 1/Italian Chasseur a` pied Regiment (24/488) 2/Italian Chasseur a` pied Regiment (14/398) 3/Italian Chasseur a` pied Regiment (14/417)

Appendixes Appendix 12 (continued) 4/Italian Chasseur a` pied Regiment (14/400) 1/Italian Guard Infantry (22/538) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bellotti 1/3rd Le´ge`re Line Regiment (20/835) 2/3rd Le´ge`re Line Regiment (19/796) 3/3rd Le´ge`re Line Regiment (16/640) 4/3rd Le´ge`re Line Regiment (18/630) Artillery/3rd Le´ge`re Line Regiment (3/56) Elite 1/4th Le´ge`re Line Regiment (15/508) Elite 2/4th Le´ge`re Line Regiment (14/500) Artillery: Major Cle´mens 1st Guard Foot Artillery (4/68) 1st Guard Horse Artillery (2/54) 1/,2/Guard Train Companies (4/274) 1/Italian Guard Sailor Company (3/100) 4th Italian Military Transport Company (2/115) 7th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Bonfanti 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Mazzuchelli 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment (10/654) 3/16th Line Regiment (17/710) 4/62nd Line Regiment (19/663) 1 Elite/1st Foreign Regiment (15/589) 2 Elite/1st Foreign Regiment (13/585) Elite Battalion/2nd Foreign Regiment (21/806) 1/3rd Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) 2/3rd Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/820) 2nd Brigade 1/,2/,3/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (60/2,460) 1/,2/,3/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (60/2,460) Artillery: 3/3rd Foot Artillery (3/108) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/75) Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (14/221/238) 2/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (6/170/174)

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Appendix 12 (continued) 3/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/145/145) 4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (6/160/148) 3/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (10/150/181) 4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/144/162) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains (proposed) 1/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (14/151/157) 2/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (5/107/121) 3/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (7/118/137) 4/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (7/102/133) 1/Italian Guard Dragoon Regiment (11/140/165) 2/Italian Guard Dragoon Regiment (7/126/144) 5/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/233/246) 6/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/240/255) (organizing in Plaisance) 3rd Brigade: 1/1st Hussar Regiment (18/223/258) Co. 2/1st Hussar Regiment (4/122/130) (organizing in Lyon) Co. 2/1st Hussar Regiment (4/125/134) (in Verona on 10/5/13) 3/1st Hussar Regiment (6/252/268) (in Verona on 10/5/13) 6/1st Hussar Regiment (8/242/257) (organizing in Lyon) 1/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (12/217/235) (in Verona on 10/14/13) 2/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (5/222/231) (in Verona on 10/3/13) 3/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4/223/235) (in Verona on 10/3/13) 6/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/240/255) (organizing in Vienne) 1/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (15/200/230) (in Naples) 2/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/182/195) (in Naples) 3/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/182/195) (in Naples) 4/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/182/195) (in Naples) Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery (2/95) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 4/,5/,6/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/50) 2nd Italian Horse Artillery (4/102) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 3rd Italian Train Company (2/112) Artillery Reserve: 19/4th Foot Artillery (3/112) 24/4th Foot Artillery (3/114) 1st Neapolitan Horse Artillery (3/90) (in Naples) 3/6th Principal Train Battalion (2/138)

Appendixes Appendix 12 (continued) Det. 1/10th Principal Train Battalion (0/47) 1st Neapolitan Train Company (2/60) (in Naples) Artillery Park: 19/6th Foot Artillery (3/104) 21/6th Foot Artillery (3/108) 1st Neapolitan Foot Artillery (2/120) 8/7th (bis) Train Battalion (0/89) 2nd Neapolitan Train Company (2/65) Det 10th Artillery Artisan Company (0/23) 8/3rd Sapper Battalion (3/147) 4th Italian Sapper Company (3/145) Source: French Archives, Carton C2 708.

Appendix 13 Austrian Army of Italy, 7 September 1813 Commanding Officer: Feldzeugmeister Hiller Brigade: Feldmarschal-leutnant Fenner 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (2 cos) Frimont Hussars (1 sqn) Tyrolian Schu¨tzen (1 bn) 1 Foot Battery Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (4 cos) Szekler Grenz Regiment (1) Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqn) Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian Duka Infantry Regiment (2) Hohenlohe Infantry Regiment (1) Frimont Hussar Regiment (1 sqn) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Frimont Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasitz Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment (1) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (2) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (6 sqns) 1 Wurst Battery

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Appendix 13 (continued) Brigade: Oberst Gober Hohenlohe Infantry Regiment (3) 1 Foot Battery Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marziani Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer Reisky Infantry Regiment (3) 1 Foot Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (1 bn) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (2 bns, 2 cos) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (33⁄4 sqns) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (6) 1 Wurst Battery Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Sommmariva Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim Purcell Grenadier Battalion Welsperg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis Chasteler Infantry Regiment (1) Lusignan Infantry Regiment (2) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2) Battery (3 guns) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6) Garrison of Kanker Pass (drawn from Mayer’s Brigade) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (4 cos) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (0.25 sqns) Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich Szekler Grenz Regiment (1) Valaques Infantry Regiment (1) Frimont Hussar Regiment (2) Half Foot Battery Source: Wiel, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat.

Appendixes Appendix 14 French Observation Corps of Italy, 15 September 1813 Commanding Officer: Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy Chief of Staff: Ge´ne´ral de division Vignolle Artillery Commander: Ge´ne´ral de division St. Laurent Engineer Commander: Colonel Moydier 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel 1st Brigade: Colonel Pegot (acting) 1/84th Line Regiment (27/621) 2/84th Line Regiment (22/536) 3/84th Line Regiment (24/601) 4/84th Line Regiment (22/661) Artillery Co./84th Line Regiment (2/48) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/92nd Line Regiment (27/560) 2/92nd Line Regiment (20/570) 3/92nd Line Regiment (18/520) 4/92nd Line Regiment (20/573) Artillery Co./92nd Line Regiment (2/44) 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 8/6th Line Regiment (21/775) 3/10th Line Regiment (21/485) 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment (22/736) 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment (13/642) Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (3/108) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 4/4th Horse Artillery (2/97) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion (2/129) Det 7/5th (bis) Train Battalion (2/116) Det 6/1st Sapper Battalion (2/71) Det 1/9th Equipage Battalion (1/61) 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Dupeyroux 1/53rd Line Regiment (32/671) 2/53rd Line Regiment (17/457) 3/53rd Line Regiment (15/405)

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Appendix 14 (continued) 4/53rd Line Regiment (18/640) Artillery Co./53rd Line Regiment (2/37) 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line Regiment (21/779) 6/101st Line Regiment (19/700) 6/112th Line Regiment (17/559) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 1/106th Line Regiment (30/674) 2/106th Line Regiment (15/557) 3/106th Line Regiment (18/437) 4/106th Line Regiment (15/465) Artillery Co./106th Line Regiment (1/38) Artillery: Capitaine Ponceton 6/2nd Foot Artillery (3/111) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 25/2nd Foot Artillery (3/101) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/120) Det 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/59) Det 3/1st Sapper Battalion (1/74) Det 2/9th Equipage Battalion (1/60) 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/9th Line Regiment (24/544) 2/9th Line Regiment (18/444) 3/9th Line Regiment (19/498) 4/9th Line Regiment (19/396) Artillery Co./9th Line Regiment (2/43) 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/7th Line Regiment (20/739) 6/52nd Line Regiment (23/751) 6/67th Line Regiment (17/794) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/35th Line Regiment (23/660) 2/35th Line Regiment (20/602) 3/35th Line Regiment (18/597) 4/35th Line Regiment (21/582) Artillery Co./35th Line Regiment (2/49)

Appendixes Appendix 14 (continued) Artillery: Capitaine Bonneau 4/2nd Foot Artillery (3/115) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 5/4th Horse Artillery (2/95) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 4/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/135) Det 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (0/39) Det 3/1st Sapper Battalion (2/62) Det 3/9th Equipage Battalion (1/60) 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pait 2/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (18/389) 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (20/547) Det 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (19/434) Det 3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (17/384) 3/102nd Line Regiment (23/745) 6/102nd Line Regiment (13/713) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 3/42nd Line Regiment (15/768) 6/42nd Line Regiment (14/756) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line Regiment (19/477) 2/132nd Line Regiment (17/434) 2/133rd Line Regiment (22/521) Artillery: Capitaine Mauregnault 17/2nd Foot Artillery (3/105) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 23/2nd Foot Artillery (3/106) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 1/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/80) Det 2/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/75) Det 6/1st Sapper Battalion (2/72) Det 1/9th Equipage Battalion (1/60) 3rd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Pino 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 2/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (17/522) 1(bis)/1st Italian Line Regiment (18/554) 1/2nd Italian Line Regiment (33/530) 2/2nd Italian Line Regiment (15/533) 3/2nd Italian Line Regiment (14/559)

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Appendix 14 (continued) 4/2nd Italian Line Regiment (14/527) Artillery Co./2nd Italian Line Regiment (0/11) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 1/Dalmatia Line Regiment (26/465) 2/Dalmatia Line Regiment (17/476) Artillery Co./Dalmatia Line Regiment (0/10) 1/3rd Italian Line Regiment (28/651) 2/3rd Italian Line Regiment (16/553) 3/3rd Italian Line Regiment (18/482) 4/3rd Italian Line Regiment (14/514) Artillery Co./3rd Italian Line Regiment (0/23) Artillery: Capitaine Beroaldi 5th Italian Foot Battery (4/95) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 11th Italian Foot Battery (4/111) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 1st Italian Train Company (2/108) 2nd Italian Train Company (2/111) 2/1st Italian Sapper Battalion (3/139) 3rd Italian Transport Company (3/102) 6th Division: 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Gardes d’honneur (6/1,123/149)1 1/Royal Velites (27/512) 1st Italian Guard Chasseur a` pied (18/305) 2nd Italian Guard Chasseur a` pied (12/242) 3rd Italian Guard Chasseur a` pied (11/221) 4th Italian Guard Chasseur a` pied (7/143) Italian Guard Regiment (26/528) 2nd Brigade: 1/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (10/603) 2/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (11/394) 3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (11/402) 4/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (15/397) Artillery/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (2/52) Elite 1/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (11/460) Elite 2/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (12/482) Artillery: Major Cle´mens 1st Italian Guard Foot Artillery (4/73) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 1st Italian Guard Horse Artillery (2/58) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers)

Appendixes Appendix 14 (continued) 1/,2/Italian Guard Train Companies (4/254) 4/Italian Sapper Battalion (3/115) 1/Italian Guard Marine Company (3/118) 4th Italian Military Transport Company (2/98) 7th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Bonfanti 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Mazzuchelli 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment (11/531) 3/16th Line Regiment (14/671) 4/62nd Line Regiment (16/688) 1 Elite/1st Foreign Regiment (16/587) 2 Elite/1st Foreign Regiment (12/558) 1 Elite/2nd Foreign Regiment (20/799) 1/4th Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/882) 2/4th Provisional Croatian Regiment (20/754) 2nd Brigade: 1/,2/,3/1st Neapolitan Line Regiment (60/2,460) (in Naples) 1/,2/,3/2nd Neapolitan Line Regiment (60/2,460) (in Naples) Artillery: 3/3rd Foot Artillery (3/105) (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/62) Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet 1st Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (14/216/236) 2/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/149/169) 3/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/132/145) 4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (6/149/147) 3/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (10/146/179) 4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/141/162) 2nd Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemain 1/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (14/134/147) 2/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (5/105/115) 3/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (7/103/116) 4/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (7/102/116) 1/Italian Guard Dragoon Regiment (11/127/155) 2/Italian Guard Dragoon Regiment (7/120/140) 5/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/199/216) 6/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/250/264) (organizing)

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Appendix 14 (continued) 3rd Brigade: 1/1st Hussar Regiment (12/188/217) Co. 2/1st Hussar Regiment (4/125/134) (organizing in Lyon) Co. 2/1st Hussar Regiment (4/125/134) 3/1st Hussar Regiment (6/252/268) 6/1st Hussar Regiment (8/245/260) (organizing in Lyon) 1/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/268/295) 2/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (5/222/231) 3/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4/233/235) 6/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/245/255) (organizing) 1/,2/,3/,4/1st Neapolitan Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (30/750/815) (in Naples) Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery (3/98) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Det 4/,5/,6/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/39) 2nd Italian Horse Artillery (4/93) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) 3rd Italian Train Company (2/108) Artillery Reserve: Capitaine Oudry 19/4th Foot Artillery (3/107) (6-12pdrs and 2 howitzers) 24/4th Foot Artillery (3/115)(6-12pdrs and 2 howitzers) 1st Neapolitan Horse Artillery (3/97) (4-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) (in Naples) 3/6th Principal Train Battalion (2/131) Det 1/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/70) 1st Neapolitan Train Company (3/67) (in Naples) Artillery Park: Colonel Pont-Bodin 19/6th Foot Artillery (3/101) 21/6th Foot Artillery (3/108) 1st Neapolitan Foot Artillery (3/120) (in Naples) 8/7th (bis) Train Battalion (0/139) 4th Italian Train Company (1/75) 2nd Neapolitan Train Company (2/88) (in Naples) Det 10th Artillery Artisan Company (0/23) 8/3rd Sapper Battalion (3/144) 1 Numbers are officers, men, and horses. Source: French National Archives, Carton AFIV* 1344.

Appendixes Appendix 15 Austrian Army of Italy, 17 September 1813 Commanding Officer: Feldzeugmeister Hiller Directly under Army Command Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich (in Salzburg region) Szeckler Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Wallachen Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 1

⁄2 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey (by Windisch-Kappel) Reisky Infantry Regiment (2 bns) 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (2 cos) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (1 landwehr bn) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (6 sqns) Wurst Battery (6-6pdrs) Corps: General der Cavallerie Baron Frimont Brigade: Generalmajor Fenner (by Lienz) 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (2 cos) Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqn) Tyrolian Ja¨ger Battalion (5 cos) 12

⁄ 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt (by Spital and Saxenburg) Szekler Grenz Regiment (1) 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (2 cos) Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian (by Villach) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (2) Riesky Infantry Regiment (1) Duka Infantry Regiment (2) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasich (St. Leonhard) Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment (1) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (6 sqns) Wurst Battery (6-6pdrs) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marziani Brigade: Generalmajor Pulsky (around Rosegg) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (3)

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Appendix 15 (continued) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (landwehr bn) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer Chasteler Infantry Regiment (2 bns) 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (4 cos) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (4 sqns) 1 Wurst Battery (6-6pdrs) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Sommmariva Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim (in and around Klangenfurt) Purcell Grenadier Battalion Welsperg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede (in and around Klangenfurt) Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4 sqns) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6 sqns) Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis (in Sau Valley by Podpetsch) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (1) Lusignan Infantry Regiment (2) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 1

⁄2 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Radivojevich Brigade: Generalmajor Uebrovich (near Neustadtl) Warasdiner St. Georger Grenz Regiment (1) Broder Grenz Regiment (1) Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment (1) Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment (1) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) Det/3pdr Brigade Battery (2-3pdrs) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent (between Adelsberg and Fiume) 2/,Res/Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (2) Banderial Hussars (1 sqn) Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment (1)

Appendixes

277

Appendix 15 (continued) Szuliner Infantry (2 cos) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 1

⁄2 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Source: Von Welden.

Appendix 16 Austrian Army of Italy, 29 September 1813 Commanding Officer: Feldzeugmeister Hiller Directly under Army Command Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich (in Tyrolia) 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (2 cos) Szeckler Grenz Regiment (2 bn) Wallachen Grenz Regiment (4 cos) Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 1

⁄2 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Detachment: Major Eisenstecken (in Tyrolia) Tyrolian Volunteers (1 bn) Detachment: (by Radstadt) Wallachen Grenz Regiment (2 cos) Frimont Hussar Regiment (1⁄2 sqn) Detached from the Army of the Donau Szekler Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis (near Laibach) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (1) Lusignan Infantry Regiment (2) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (13⁄4 sqns) 12

⁄ 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Corps: General der Cavallerie Baron Frimont Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall (on Windisch Heights and Gail Valley) Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt 8th Ja¨ger Battalion (2 cos) Reisky Infantry Regiment (1) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (2) Frimont Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 3pdr Brigade Battery (4-3pdrs)

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Appendix 16 (continued) Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasich Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment (1) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (4) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (6 sqns) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Wurst Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian (by Fo¨deraun and on the Bleiberg Heights) Ducca Infantry Regiment (2) Bianchi Infantry Regiment (2) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Merville (by Fo¨deraun and on the Bleiberg Heights) Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey Chasteler Infantry Regiment (2) Benjowski Infantry Regiment (3) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (4 sqns) Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim (by Rosegg) Purcell Grenadier Battalion Welsperg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Sommmariva Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer (in Sau Valley) 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (1) Reisky Infantry Regiment (1) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (1 landwehr bn) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) Brigade: Oberst Weigl (by Hollenburg) Reisky Infantry Regiment (1) Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4 sqns) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs and 2 howitzers) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede (by Klagenfurt) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6 sqns) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Radivojevich (on the Laibach, Fiume, and Triest Road) Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent, Rebrovich and Csivich Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment (2) Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (2)

Appendixes Appendix 16 (continued) Warasdiner St. Georger Grenz Regiment (2) Broder Grenz Regiment (1) Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment (2) Szluiner Grenz Regiment (1) Ottochaner Grenz Regiment (2) Liccaner Grenz Regiment (1) (forming) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (4 sqns) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (41⁄4 sqns) 6pdr Wurst Battery (6-6pdrs) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) 1

⁄2 3pdr Brigade Battery (3-3pdrs)

Source: Von Welden.

Appendix 17 Left Wing Austrian Army of Italy, 11 October 1813 Commanding Officer: Feldmarschal-leutnant Graf Radivojevich Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Merville Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent 1/Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment 2/,Res/Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment Istria Landwehr (1) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (2) 1

⁄2 3pdr Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich 3/Chasteler Infantry Regiment 2/,Res/Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment 2/,Res/St. Georger Grenz Regiment 12

⁄ 3pdr Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Graf Fo¨lseis 2/Broder Grenz Regiment 2/Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment 3/Luisgnan Infantry Regiment 1st Landwehr Bn/Luisgnan Infantry Regiment (1) 6pdr Position Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Csivich Szluiner Grenz Regiment (1 newly raised battalion) Oguliner Grenz Regiment (1 newly raised battalion)

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Appendix 17 (continued) 2nd Banal Grenz Regiment (1 newly raised battalion) Ottochaner Grenz Regiment (1 newly raised battalion) 2 3pdr Cannons Brigade: Oberst Graf Starhemberg Radetzky Hussar Regiment (4) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (4) Wurst Battery (6 guns) Brigade: Generalmajor Graf Tomasich Liccaner Grenz Regiment (1 newly raised battalion) Banderial Hussar Regiment (1) 2 3pdr Cannons 1st Banal Grenz Regiment (1) Reserve Artillery Source: Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat.

Appendix 18 Austrian Order of Battle in Italy, Left Wing, 12 October 1813 Commander in Chief: General of Cavalry Frimont Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Merville Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich Chasteler Infantry Regiment (1) Sanct-Georger Grenz Regiment (2) Gradiskaner Grenz Regiment (2) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (2) Merveldt Regiment (2) 1

⁄2 3pdr Battery

1 Position Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis Lusignan Infantry Regiment (1) Lusignan Landwehr Regiment (1) Broder Grenz Regiment (1) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (4) 1 Wurst Battery Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Radivojevich Brigade: Generalmajor Csivich Franz-Karl Infantry Regiment (1)

Appendixes Appendix 18 (continued) Szluiner Grenz Regiment (1) Oguliner Grenz Regiment (1) Ottokaner Grenz Regiment (1) Licaner Grenz Regiment (1) Banal Grenz Regiment (2) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (1⁄2) Banderail Hussar Regiment (1) 1

⁄2 3pdr Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent Franz-Karl Infantry Regiment (1) Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (1) Isterian Landwehr Regiment (1) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (1⁄2) 12

⁄ Position Battery

Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (1) Peterwardeiner Infantry Regiment (1) Reisky Infantry Regiment (1) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (2) 1

⁄2 Position Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey Chasteler Infantry Regiment (2) Chasteler Landwehr Regiment (1) Archduke Karl Uhlan Regiment (6) Reisky Infantry Regiment (2) 1 Wurst Battery 12

⁄ Position Battery

Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Fenner Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich 3 Battalions 13 Companies 4 Squadrons 1 Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt 4 Battalions 4 Companies

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Appendix 18 (continued) 2 Squadrons 1 Battery Right Wing: Feldmarschal-leutnant Sommariva Division: Generalmajor Marziani Brigade: Generalmajor Winziani Sanct-Hermagor Infantry Regiment (5) Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasitz 4 Battalions 4 Squadrons 1 Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim Paternion Infantry Regiment (4) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede 10 Squadrons Reserve Artillery

Appendix 19 French Troops in Illyria, 20 October 1813 Commanding Officer: Fouche, Duc d’Otrante (in Bologna) Garrison of Zara: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Roize 1/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (8/601)1 2/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (8/622) 2/1st Croatian Regiment (23/1,131) 13/2nd Foot Artillery (2/92) 6th Italian Foot Artillery (2/26) Garrison of Ragusa and Cattaro: GB Gauthier (64/3,423) 3/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (10/545) 4/4th Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (8/572) 1/3rd Croatian Regiment (18/1,061) 2/4th Croatian Regiment (23/1,096) 14/2nd Foot Artillery (3/64) 113th, 114th, and 115th Coastal Gunners (2/85) 1 This and the other three Italian le´ge`re battalions in this state had their elite companies detached. Source: French Archives, Chaˆteau Vincennes, Carton C6 13.

Appendixes Appendix 20 Army of Italy, 6 November 1813 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (7,108) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery 4/4th Horse Artillery 6/5th (bis) Train Battalion 7/5th (bis) Train Battalion 6/1st Sapper Battalion 1/9th Equipage Battalion 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet (7,116) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 1/,2/106th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment Artillery: 6/2nd Foot Artillery 25/2nd Foot Artillery 5/10th Principal Train Battalion 6/10th Principal Train Battalion

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Appendix 20 (continued) 3/1st Sapper Battalion 2/9th Equipage Battalion 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer (7,696) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/7th Line Regiment 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/1st Foreign Regiment Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery 5/4th Horse Artillery 4/10th Principal Train Battalion 3/1st Sapper Battalion 2/9th Equipage Battalion 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini (5,650) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 1/,2/,3/2nd Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/3rd Italian Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 2/,3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/1st Italian Provisional Line Regiment 1/,2/2nd Italian Provisional Line Regiment Attached: 5/Napoleon Dragoon Regiment Artillery: 5th Italian Foot Artillery 11th Italian Foot Artillery 1st Italian Principal Train 2nd Italian Principal Train 2/1st Italian Sapper Battalion 3/Italian Transport Battalion

Appendixes Appendix 20 (continued) Detached Corps of the Right: (1,049) Brigade: Adjutant Commandant Montfalcon 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment Elite Battalion, 1st Foreign Regiment (1) Detached Corps of the Left: (3,500) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Gifflenga 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment Gendarmes a` Cheval (100) Reserve Guard Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Lecchi (2,500) Royal Velites (1) Royal Grenadiers (1) Regiment de Chasseur a` pied (2) Guard Dragoons (1) Artillery: 1st Guard Foot Artillery 1st Guard Horse Artillery 1/,2/Guard Train Companies 1/Italian Guard Sailor Company 4th Italian Military Transport Company Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet (2,885) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1st (French) Hussar Regiment (21⁄2) 1/,2/,3/,4/Queen’s Dragoon Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 1/,2/,3/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 5/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2) 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4) Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery Det 4/,5/,6/10th Principal Train Battalion 2nd Italian Horse Artillery 3rd Italian Train Company

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Appendix 20 (continued) Artillery Reserve: (375) 19/4th Foot Artillery 24/4th Foot Artillery 3/6th Principal Train Battalion Det 1/10th Principal Train Battalion Artillery Park: (1,661) 19/6th Foot Artillery 21/6th Foot Artillery 8/7th (bis) Train Batalion Det 10th Artillery Artisan Company 8/3rd Sapper Battalion 4th Italian Sapper Company Sources: French Archives, Carton C2 708; Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes.

Appendix 21 Austrian Army of Italy, 6 November 1813 Direct to Army Command: Brigade: Generalmajor Tomassich (in Dalmatia) Liccaner Grenz Regiment (1) Banal Grenz Regiment (1) Banderial Hussar Regiment (1) 2-3pdr Guns Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent (by Trieste) Erzherzog Franz Carl Infantry Regiment (1) Reserve Bn/Warasdiner Grenz Regiment (1) Istrian Landwehr Regiment (1) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (1⁄2 sqn) 2-3pdr Guns Brigade: Generalmajor Csivich (by Palmanova) Erzherzog Franz Carl Infantry Regiment (1) Szluiner Grenz Regiment (1) St. Georger Grenz Regiment (1) Reserve Bn/St. Georger Grenz Regiment (1) Mervelt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) 4-3pdr guns Detachment: Major Norich (by Osoppo) Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (1⁄2 sqn)

Appendixes

287

Appendix 21 (continued) Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer (by Mestre) Reisky Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Oguliner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Banal Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (11⁄2 sqns) 6pdr Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generlmajor Fo¨lseis (by Padua as a reserve) Reisky Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Reserve Bn/Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) 3pdr Battery (6-3pdr guns) Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich (by Chiozza) Broder Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Ottochaner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Lusignan Landwehr Regiment (1 bn) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) 6pdr Battery (6-6pdrs) Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Radivojevich Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Merville Brigade: Generalmajor Starhemberg (advanced guard in the direction from Legnano by Bevilaqua) 9th Ja¨ger Battalion Lusiganan Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (51⁄2 sqns) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) Horse Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt (advanced guard over Vicenza in the direction of Caldiero) 8th Ja¨ger Battalion Bianchi Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Frimont Hussar Regiment (31⁄2 sqns) 1

⁄2 3pdr Foot Battery (3-3pdrs)

Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey (by Vicenza) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (4 bns) Erzherzog Carl Uhlan Regiment (6 sqns) Horse Battery (6-6pdrs)

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Appendix 21 (continued) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Pflacher (between Bassano, Castelfranco, and Citadella as a reserve) Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim Benjowski Infantry Regiment (3 bns) Purcell Grenadier Battalion Welsperg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Gober Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment (4 bns) Erzherzog Carl Landwehr Regiment (1 bn) Kerpen Landwehr Regiment (1 bn) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6 sqns) Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4 sqns) Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Sommariva Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Fenner Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasitz (advanced guard by Osenigo and Peri) 4th Ja¨ger Battalion Tyrolian Volunteer Regiment (1 bn) Szekler Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Frimont Hussar Regiment (11⁄2 sqns) 1

⁄2 3pdr Battery (3-3pdrs)

Brigade: Generalmajor Suden (by Ala and Borghetto) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (4 bns) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marziani Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian (by Roveredo and Ala) Duka Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Spleny Infantry Regiment (2 bns) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich (by Rocca d’Anso Lago di Garda, Brentonico, and Donale)

Appendixes Appendix 21 (continued) Tyrolian Volunteer Regiment (1 bn) Szeckler Grenz Regiment (1 bn) 2nd Wallachen Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Spleny Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Frimont Hussar Regiment (1 sqn) 1

⁄2 3pdr Battery (3-3pdrs)

Note: According to von Holtz, this organization is valid for 1 November. Sources: Von Welden; von Holtz, 78-79.

Appendix 22 French Army of Italy, New Organization, 6 November 1813 Commander in Chief: Prince Euge`ne de Beauharnais First Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (7,108) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 20th Line Regiment (2) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment Artillery: 2 Artillery Batteries (12 guns) 2 Artillery Train Companies 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet (7,l17) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment 1/,2/106th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment

289

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Appendix 22 (continued) Artillery: 2 Artillery Batteries (12 guns) 2 Artillery Train Companies Second Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Rouyer 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier (7,696) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/9th Line Regiment 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/7th Line Regiment 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Unknown 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/1st Foreign Regiment Artillery: 2 Artillery Batteries (12 guns) 2 Artillery Train Companies 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini (5,659) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 1/,3/,4/2nd Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/3rd Italian Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 2/,3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/1st Italian Provisional Regiment 1/,2/2nd Italian Provisional Regiment Artillery: 2 Artillery Batteries (12 guns) 2 Artillery Train Companies 16 guns Cavalry: 5/Napoleon (Italian) Dragoon Regiment Detached Corps: Adjudant commandant Montfalcon (1,049) 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment Batallion d’elite of the 1st Foreign Regiment (1) Left Corps: Ge´ne´ral de division Gifflenga (3,500) 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 22 (continued) 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment 2/6th Italian Line Regiment Foot Gendarmes (1 coy) Detachment of Dalmatian Regiment (100 men) Horse Gendarmes (100 men) Reserve: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi (2,500) Royal Velites (1) 1/,2/Guard Chasseurs Regiment Guard Grendier Regiment (1) Guard Dragoon Regiment (1) Artillery: 2 Artillery Batteries (12 guns) Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet (2,885) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1st Hussar Regiment (21⁄2) 1/,2/,3/,4/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (1) 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: Colonel Rambourgt 5/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Artillery: 1 Horse Artillery Battery (6 guns) 1 Artillery Train Company Reserve Artillery: (375) 14 guns Grand Park: (1,661 men)

Appendix 23 Army of Observation of Italy, 20 November 1813 Commander in Chief: Prince Euge`ne de Beauharnais Chief of Staff: Count Vignolle Adjudant Commander, Assistant Chief of Staff: de Marzi

291

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Appendix 23 (continued) Adjudant Commander, of the Chief of Staff: de Querelle Superior Commander of the General Staff: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Fontane Commander of Artillery: Ge´ne´ral de division Saint-Laurent Chief of the General Staff: Ravicchio Commander of Engineers: Colonel Beauford d’Hautpoul Commander of the Gendarmerie: Petit Baggagemaster General: Jayamebon Inspector of Reviews: Pradel Ordonnateur en Chef: Regnault First Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Grenier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/92nd Line Regiment (24/646) 2/92nd Line Regiment (22/650) 3/92nd Line Regiment (22/626) 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Le´ge`re (23/605) 8/14th Le´ge`re (20/622) 3/10th Line (18/346) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 1/84th Line Regiment (26/591) 2/84th Line Regiment (20/553) 3/84th Line Regiment (21/490) Art. Co./84th Line Regiment (2/41) 3/42nd Line Regiment (16/553) 6/42nd Line Regiment (17/506) Artillery: 4/4th Horse Artillery Batteries (3/89) 9/4th Foot Artillery (3/102) 7/5th Artillery Train (bis) (1/99) 1/,2/10th Principal Train (1/80) 1/9th Train (2/92) 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 3/102nd Line Regiment (13/512) 6/102nd Line Regiment (18/441) 1/53rd Line Regiment (25/441)

Appendixes Appendix 23 (continued) 2/53rd Line Regiment (14/379) 3/53rd Line Regiment (9/370) 4/53rd Line Regiment (2/39) 1/106th Line Regiment (26/679) 2/106th Line Regiment (18/625) Art. Co. /106th Line Regiment (2/43) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line (13/448) 6/101st Line (19/497) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line (19/356) 2/132nd Line (20/346) Artillery: 6/2nd Foot Artillery Company (3/103) 25/2nd Foot Artillery Company (3/101) 5/10th Principal Train (1/127) 6/10th Principal Train (1/50) 2/9th Principal Train (2/91) Second Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Verdier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/9th Line Regiment (23/515) 2/9th Line Regiment (21/439) Art. Co./9th Line Regiment (2/48) 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/7th Line (19/564) 6/52nd Line (24/619) 6/67th Line (17/590) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/35th Line Regiment (33/644) 2/35th Line Regiment (17/565) 3/35th Line Regiment (17/590) Art. Co./35th Line Regiment (2/43) 1/1st Foreign Regiment (28/574) 2/1st Foreign Regiment (16/427)

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Appendix 23 (continued) 3/1st Foreign Regiment (18/364) 4/1st Foreign Regiment (15/392) Art. Co./1st Foreign Regiment (2/64) Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery (2/91) 5/4th Horse Artillery (2/84) 4/10th Principal Train (2/130) 6/10th Principal Train (0/33) 3/1st Sapper Battalion (3/117) 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 1/2nd Italian Line Regiment (24/341) 3/2nd Italian Line Regiment (13/390) 4/2nd Italian Line Regiment (2/278) Art. Co./2nd Italian Line Regiment (0/10) 1/3rd Italian Line Regiment (26/414) 2/3rd Italian Line Regiment (17/362) 3/3rd Italian Line Regiment (16/395) Art. Co./3rd Italian Line Regiment (0/10) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 2/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (22/348) 3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (15/353) Art. Co./3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (0/8) 1/1st Italian Provisional Regiment (18/444) 2/1st Italian Provisional Regiment (?/357) 1/2nd Italian Provisional Regiment (15/341) 2/2nd Italian Provisional Regiment (12/447) Artillery: 5th Company Italian Foot Artillery (4/97) 1/1st Italian Horse Artillery (5/98) 2/1st Italian Horse Artillery (2/97) 5/1st Italian Train Battalion (2/109) 2/1st Italian Sapper Battalion (3/71) 3/1st Italian Transport (3/87)

Appendixes Appendix 24 Austrian Army of Italy, 30 November 1813 Commanding Officer: Feldmarschal Graf Bellegarde Direct under Army Command: Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent (by Ferrara) Istrian Landwehr (1 bn) Erzherzog Franz Carl Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Reserve Bn/Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Lusignan Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Erzherzog Carl Landwehr Regiment (1 bn) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (2 sqns) 2-3pdr guns Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Marschall Brigade: Generalmajor Fo¨lseis (by Bevilaqua) Lusignaner Landwehr Regiment (1 bn) Benjowski Infantry Regiment (3 bns) Broder Grenz Regiment (1 bn) 6pdr Position Battery (6-6pdrs) 6pdr Brigade Battery (6-6pdrs) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich (by Pieve di Sacco) 8th Ja¨ger Battalion Ottochaner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Oguliner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Reisky Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (11⁄2 sqns) 2-3pdr guns Brigade: Generalmajor Mayer (by Mestre) Reisky Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Reserve Bn/Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment Banal Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (2 sqns) 6pdr Battery (6-6pdrs) Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Radivojevich Division: Generalmajor Sutterheim Brigade: Generalmajor Starhemberg (by St. Georgio and Etsch) 9th Ja¨ger Battalion Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment (1 bn)

295

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Appendix 24 (continued) Landwehr Bn/Kerpen Infantry Regiment Radetzsky Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) Horse Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Eckhardt (around Lonigo) Bianchi Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Frimont Hussar Regiment (31⁄2 sqns) 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim (Montebello) Purcell Grenadier Battalion Welsperg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion 6pdr Foot Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede (Montechio-maggiore) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (4 sqns) Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4 sqns) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Pflacher Brigade: Generalmajor Vecsey (St. Martino and St. Giacomo) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (3 bns) Erzherzog Carl Uhlan Regiment (6 sqns) Horse Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Winzian (at Montorio) Spleny Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Brigade: Generalmajor Gober Warasdiner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment (4 bns) 6pdr Position Battery (6-6pdr guns) Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Sommariva Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Fenner Brigade: Generalmajor Vlasitz (by Ala) 4th Ja¨ger Regiment Szekler Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Frimont Hussar Regiment (11⁄2 sqns) 3pdr Battery (6-3pdrs)

Appendixes Appendix 24 (continued) Brigade: Generalmajor von Suden (by Serravalle) Hohenlohe Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (4 bns) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (4 sqns) 6pdr Battery (6-6pdrs) Division: Independent: (in Roveredo) Duka Infantry Regiment (2 bns) Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich (by Mori, Rocca d’Anfo, and Donale) Spleny Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Szekler Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Wallachian Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Frimont Hussar Regiment (1 sqn) 6pdr Battery (6-6pdrs) 1

⁄2 3pdr Battery (3-3pdrs)

Under Direct Army Command: Brigade: Generalmajor Tomassich (in Dalmatia) Liccaner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Banal Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Banderial Hussar Regiment (1 sqn) 2-3pdr guns Brigade: Generalmajor Esivich (by Palmanova) Erzherzog Franz Carl Infantry Regiment (1 bn) Szluiner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Warasdiner St.Georger Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Reserve Bn/Warasdiner St. Georger Grenz Regiment Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (2 sqns) 4-3pdr guns Detachment: Major Noraich (by Osoppo) Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment (1 bn) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (1⁄2 sqn) Source: Von Welden.

Appendix 25 Army of Italy, 26 December 1813 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer (6,956) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz

297

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Appendix 25 (continued) 1/,2/,3/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/1st Foreign Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 4/2nd Foot Artillery 5/4th Horse Artillery 4/10th Principal Train 6/10th Principal Train 3/1st Sapper Battalion 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet (6,257) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 1/,2/106th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment (1) 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 6/2nd Foot Artillery Company 25/2nd Foot Artillery Company 5/10th Principal Train 6/10th Principal Train 2/9th 6/10th Principal Train 6th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Zucchi (3,383) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Saint-Paul 2/,3/1st Italian Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,4/2nd Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/Regiment of Italian Volunteers

Appendixes Appendix 25 (continued) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Paolucci 3/,4/4th Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/5th Italian Line Regiment 6th Italian Foot Artillery (6 guns) 1st Italian Train Battalion (1 co) 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (7,388) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 4/1st Horse Artillery Battery 9/4th Foot Artillery 7/5th (bis) Artillery Train 1/,2/10th Principal Train Battalion 1/9th Train Battalion 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet (5,529) Brigade: Adjutant Commandant Montfalcon 25th Provisonal Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment 3/,6/42nd Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pegot 6/7th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment Artillery: 1 Horse Battery 1 Train Company 8 guns

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Appendix 25 (continued) 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini (5,355) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 1/,3/,4/2nd Italian Line Regiment 2/,3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti 1/,2/,3/3rd Italian Line Regiment 2/6th Italian Line Regiment Milan Guard Battalion Artillery: 1/1st Italian Horse Artillery ?/1st Principal Train Battalion (1 co) 2/1st Sapper Battalion 3/1st Transport Reserve Guard Division: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi (3,440) Gardes d’Honneur (1 co) Guard Velite Regiment (1) Guard Grenadier Regiment (1) 1/,2/Guard Chasseur Regiment 1/,2/Royal Dragoon Regiment Artillery: Guard Foot Artillery Company Guard Horse Artillery Company Artillery Train Guard Marine Company 4/1st Equipage Militaire Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet (3,010) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1st French Hussar Regiment (4) 1/,2/,3/Queen’s Dragoon Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 1/,2/,3/,4/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 5/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery (6 guns) 6th Principal Train Battalion

Appendixes Appendix 25 (continued) Artillery Reserve: Colonel Pont-Bodin 3/3rd Foot Artillery 2/1st Italian Horse Artillery 3/6th Principal Train Battalion 3/1st Italian Train Battalion Grand Artillery Park: 17/2nd Foot Artillery 23/2nd Foot Artillery 24/4th Foot Artillery 19/6th Foot Artillery 21/6th Foot Artillery 11th Italian Foot Artillery 10th Artillery Artisians 2nd Artillery Artisians 6/2nd Pontooneer Battalion 6/5th Train (bis) Battalion 7/5th Train (bis) Battalion Det/10th Train Battalion Italian Train Battalion 3/1st French Sappers 6/1st French Sappers 8/3rd French Sappers Engineering Train Source: Vaudoncort, Histoire des campagnes.

Appendix 26 Austrian Order of Battle in Italy, Left Wing, December 1813 Feldmarschal-leutnant Baron Radivojevich Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Merville Brigade: Generalmajor Nugent 1/Archduke Franz-Karl Infantry Regiment 2/ and Res/Warasdiner Grenz Regiment Istrian Landwehr Battalion 1

⁄2 3pdr Foot Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Rebrovich 3/Chasteler Infantry Regiment 2/ and Res/Graiscaner Infantry Regiment

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Appendix 26 (continued) 2/ and Res/Sanct-Georger Infantry Regiment 1

⁄2 3pdr Foot Battery

Brigade: Generalmajor Baron Fo¨lseis 2/Broder Grenz Regiment 3/Lusignan Infantry Regiment 1st Lusignan Landwehr Battalion 1 Position Battery Brigade: Generalmajor Baron Csivich Szluiner Grenz Regiment (1) Oguliner Grenz Regiment (1) 2nd Banal Grenz Regiment (1) Ottochaner Grenz Regiment (1) 2 3pdr guns Brigade: Colonel Count Starhemberg Radetzky Hussar Regiment (4) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (4) Wurst Battery (6-6pdrs) Brigade: Generalmajor Tomassich Liccaner Infantry Regiment (1) Banderail Hussar Regiment (1) 2 3pdr guns 1st Banal Grenz Regiment (1)

Appendix 27 The Army of the Kingdom of Naples, Mid-December 1813 Commander: Joachim Napoleon (Murat), King of Naples Chief of Staff: Lieutenant-General Ayme´ 1st Division: General Carascosa Brigade: General Rosaroll 1st Line Regiment (2 bns) (2,000) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (2,000) Brigade: General Filangieri 3rd Line Regiment (2) (n.a.) 5th Line Regiment (2) (n.a.) Artillery 8 or 10 guns

Appendixes Appendix 27 (continued) Attached Cavalry 1st Chevau-le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (3) (680/580)1 3rd Chevau-le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (3) (740/660) 2nd Division: General D’Ambrosio Brigade: General Guglielmo Pepe 6th Line Regiment (2) (n.a.) 8th Line Regiment (2) (n.a.) Brigade: General D’Aquino 2nd Line Regiment (2) (n.a.) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (n.a.) 3rd Division: General Count Pignatelli-Cerchiara Brigade: General MacDonald 9th Line Regiment (3) (2,500) Canonniers de Marine (1) (800) Sapeurs du Ge´nie (1) (800) Brigade: Brigade commander unknown 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (n.a.) 7th Line Regiment (2) (n.a.) Guard Cavalry: General Livron Guard Hussars (2) (580) Guard Chevau-le´gers (3) (600) Guard Cuirassiers (2) (300) Gardes du Corps (1) (100) Artillery Guard Horse Artillery (8 guns) Guard Infantry: General Millet (as of 25 November) Guard Infantry Regiments (3) (1,800)2 Guard Marines (1 co) (100) 1 2

Numbers for cavalry regiments are men and horses. The Guard Infantry was probably one Velite and two Grenadier Battalions.

Appendix 28 French Army of Italy, 1 January 1814 Commander in Chief: Prince Euge`ne de Beauharnais Chief of Staff: Count Vignolle Adjudant Commander, Assistant Chief of Staff: de Marzi

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Appendix 28 (continued) Commander of Artillery: Ge´ne´ral de division Saint-Laurent Commander of Engineers: Colonel Moydier Commander of the Gendarmerie: Chef d’escadron Petit Baggagemaster Ge´ne´ral: Chef de bataillon Jayamebon Inspector of Reviews: Chef de bataillon Pradel Ordonnateur en Chef: Chef de bataillon Regnault First Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/9th Line Regiment (21/482) 2/9th Line Regiment (21/493) 3/9th Line Regiment (18/460) Artillery Co/9th Line Regiment (2/45) 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/52nd Line (21/838) 6/67th Line (19/836) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/35th Line Regiment (38/586) 2/35th Line Regiment (23/548) 3/35th Line Regiment (24/542) Artillery Co/35th Line Regiment (2/43) 1/1st Regiment Etranger (31/569) 2/1st Regiment Etranger (17/496) 3/,4/1st Regiment Etranger (22/380) Artillery Co/1st Foreign Regiment (2/63) Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery (2/94) 5/4th Horse Artillery (2/83) 4/10th Principal Train Battalion (2/130) 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (0/33) 9th Equipage Militaire 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 3/102nd Line Regiment (17/526) 6/102nd Line Regiment (15/495) 1/106th Line Regiment (26/683) 2/106th Line Regiment (15/685)

Appendixes Appendix 28 (continued) Artillery Co/106th Line Regiment (2/43) 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (22/491) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line (13/840) 8/6th Line (16/437) 6/101st Line (12/840) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line (17/289) 2/132nd Line (19/33) Artillery: 6/2nd Foot Artillery Company (3/103) 25/2nd Foot Artillery Company (3/104) 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/127) 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/50) 9th Equipage militaire (1/51) 6th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Zucchi Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Saint-Paul 2/1st Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (22/390) 3/1st Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (19/374) 3/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (18/357) 4/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (13/349) 1/Regiment of Italian Volunteers (21/255) 2/Regiment of Italian Volunteers (17/230) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Paolucci 3/4th Italian Line Regiment (18/301) 4/4th Italian Line Regiment (16/203) 1/5th Italian Line Regiment (27/400) 2/5th Italian Line Regiment (30/308) 1st Italian Train Battalion (2/94) 6th Italian Foot Artillery (2/71) 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/92nd Line Regiment (2/730) 2/92nd Line Regiment (20/703) 3/92nd Line Regiment (21/676)

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Appendix 28 (continued) Artillery Co/92nd Line Regiment (2/36) 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Le´ge`re (15/1,132) 8/14th Le´ge`re (17/586) 3/10th Line (16/558) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (23/610) 1/84th Line Regiment ( 20/614) 2/84th Line Regiment (20/522) 3/84th Line Regiment (20/505) Artillery Co./ 84th Line Regiment (2/42) Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (3/104) 4/4th Horse Artillery Battery (3/89) 7/5th Train (bis) Battalion (1/100) 1/ and 2/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/78) 1/9th Equipage Battalion (1/57) 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment (22/437) 3/16th Line Regiment (19/523) 4/62nd Line Regiment (22/548) 3/42nd Line Regiment (16/491) 6/42nd Line Regiment (13/899) Brigade: Unknown 6/7th Line Regiment (17/810) 1/53rd Line Regiment (30/459) 2/53rd Line Regiment (16/443) 3/53rd Line Regiment (18/450) Artillery Co/53rd Line Regiment (2/40) Artillery: 19/4th Foot Artillery (3/104) 8/7th Train (bis) Battalion (1/93) 5th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Palombini Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Ruggieri 1/2nd Italian Line Regiment (27/403)

Appendixes Appendix 28 (continued) 3/2nd Italian Line Regiment (17/387) 4/2nd Italian Line Regiment (15/342) 2/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (26/436) 3/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (20/405) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Galimberti (26/477) 1/3rd Italian Line Regiment (17/468) 2/3rd Italian Line Regiment (15/465) 3/3rd Italian Line Regiment (12/535) 2/6th (bis) Line Regiment (12/535) Milanese Guard (20/450) Cavalry: 5/Italian Napoleon Dragoon Regiment (9/146/170) Artillery: 5th Company Italian Foot Artillery (4/87) 1/1st Italian Horse Artillery (5/97) 2/1st Italian Train Battalion (2/96) 5/1st Italian Train Battalion (2/109) 2/1st Italian Sapper Battalion (3/71) 3/1st Italian Transport (3/84) Royal Italian Guard: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Guardes d’honneur (1 co) (8/111/140) 1/Royal Velites (27/517) 1/Guard Infantry (24/512) 1/Guard Chasseurs (30/559) 2/Guard Chasseurs (18/508) 1/Guard Dragoons (14/150/184) 2/Guard Dragoons ( 7/130/151) Guard Foot Artillery Company (4/74) Guard Horse Artillery Company (3/53) 1/,2/Italian Artillery Train (4/219) Guard Marine Company (3/86) 4/1st Equipage Militaire (3/83) Cavalry: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 1/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (16/91/115)

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Appendix 28 (continued) 2/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/97/88) 3/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/98/108) 4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/85/83) 5/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/146/171) 6/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (6/146/163) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 3/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (12/108/137) 4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/103/125) 1/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (16/234/272) 2/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/210/223) 3/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/193/114) 4/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (3/111/115) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1/1st Hussar Regiment (13/226/257) 2/1st Hussar Regiment (8/183/203) 3/1st Hussar Regiment (7/187/103) 6/1st Hussar Regiment (6/157/169) 1/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (13/143/194) 2/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (8/93/123) 3/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (8/93/113) Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery (3/90) 6th Principal Train Battalion (1/65) Artillery Reserve: Colonel Pont-Bodin 3/3rd Foot Artillery (3/99) 2/Italian Horse Artillery (4/81) 3/6th Principal Train Battalion (2/110) 3/1st Italian Train Battalion (2/75) Grand Artillery Park: 17/2nd Foot Artillery (2/103) 23/2nd Foot Artillery (3/97) 24/4th Foot Artillery (3/105) 19/6th Foot Artillery (3/97) 21/6th Foot Artillery (3/105) 11th Italian Foot Artillery (1/53) 10th Artillery Artisians (0/8)

Appendixes Appendix 28 (continued) 2nd Artillery Artisians (1/28) 6/2nd Pontooneer Battalion (1/36) 6/5th Train (bis) Battalion (2/142) 7/5th Train (bis) Battalion (0/44) Det/10th Train Battalion (5/289) Italian Train Battalion (1/48) 3/1st French Sappers (3/117) 6/1st French Sappers (2/118) 8/3rd French Sappers (3/119) Engineering Train (0/35)

Appendix 29 Austrian Army of Italy, 1 January 1814 Commanding Officer: Feldmarschal Count von Bellegarde Chief of Staff: Feldmarschal-leutnant Richter Artillery Commander: Generalmajor Smola Engineer Commander: Generalmajor Benczur Feldmarschal-leutnants: Marquis von Sommariva Knesevich Radivojevich Mayer Marziani Pflacher Fenner Marshall Merville Grammont Generalmajors: Tomassich Nugent Stutterheim Watlet Weczay Eckhardt von Best

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Appendix 29 (continued) Wreden Vlasitz Baumgarten Czivich Pulsky Stanisslavlevich Quasdanovich Mayer Fo¨lseis Abele Suden Rebrovich Gober Steffanini Bogdan Troops (Brigade assignments unknown): 4th Ja¨ger Battalion 8th Ja¨ger Battalion 9th Ja¨ger Battalion 10th Ja¨ger Battalion 11th Ja¨ger Battalion Broder Grenz Regiment Gradiscain Grenz Regiment Ogulin Grenz Regiment Szluiner Grenz Regiment Ottochan Grenz Regiment Liccaner Grenz Regiment Kreuzer Grenz Regiment St.-Georges Grenz Regiment Banat Grenz Regiment Peterwardeiner Grenz Regiment Szeckler Grenz Regiment Wallachian Grenz Regiment Velsberg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion

Appendixes Appendix 29 (continued) Von Best Grenadier Battalion Purcel Grenadier Battalion Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment (3) Kerpen Infantry Regiment (3) Hoch-Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment (3) Lusignan Infantry Regiment (3) Chasteler Infantry Regiment (3) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (3) Reisky Infantry Regiment (3) Alois Liechtenstein Infantry Regiment (3) Coburg Infantry Regiment (3) Wu¨rttemberg Infantry Regiment (3) Lindenau Infantry Regiment (3) Bianchi Infantry Regiment (3) Duka Infantry Regiment (3) Spleny Infantry Regiment (3) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (3) Benjowkski Infantry Regiment (3) Erzherzog Franz Karl Infantry Regiment (3) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (6) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (6) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (12) Frimont Hussar Regiment (12) Radetzky Hussar Regiment (12) Hohenzollern Chevaux Leger Regiment (6) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6) Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (6) 29 Infantry Battalions at 600 men (17,400) 49 Infantry Battalions at 500 men (24,500) 66 Cavalry squadrons at 130 men (8,580) Artillery and engineers (4,800) Total 55,280 Source: Koch.

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Appendix 30 Army of the Kingdom of Northern Italy, 21 January 1814 In Kingdom: General Staff (94) Fortress Staff (51) Royal Guard: Depot/Guards of Honor (0/13)1 Depot/Velite Regiment (14/97) Depot/Grenadier Regiment (19/103) Depot/Chasseur Regiment (12/160) Depot/Dragoon Regiment (4/101) Depot/Artillery (1/6) Line Infantry: Depot/1st Line Regiment (14/313) Depot/2nd Line Regiment (10/723) Depot/3rd Line Regiment (0/0) 4th Line Regiment (2 bns and depot) (46/1,760) 5th Line Regiment (0/0) 6th Line Regiment (1 bn and depot) (23/703) 1/7th Line Regiment (20/723) 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (18/614) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (21/446) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (0/0) 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns) (19/746) Dalmatian Regiment (2 bns) (32/1,823) Colonial Regiment (0/0) Bersaglieri Company (2/116) General Infantry Depot (0/0) 1st Volunteer Regiment (37/890) 2nd Volunteer Regiment (30/597) General Depot (6/125) Cavalry: 1st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2 sqns) (20/179) 2nd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0) 3rd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0) 4th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0) General Depot (29/407)

Appendixes Appendix 30 (continued) Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (8/48) Napoleon Dragoon Regiment (35/431) Artillery: Foot Regiment (13 cos) (47/740) Coast Guard Gunners (3 cos) (8/346) Depot/Horse Artillery Regiment (2/0) Train (2 cos and depot) (25/205) Engineers: Engineering Officers (9/0) Fortification Officers (9/0) Engineer Guards (0/59) Sapper Battalion (1 co) (2/94) Other: Royal Gendarmes (40/840) Invalid Regiment (5/178) Military Equipage (1 co and depot) (14/117) Geographical Engineers (16/0) Medical Companies (2 cos) (3/259) Milan Guard (1 co and depot) (5/147) With the Army: General Staff (64/0) Fortress Staff (65/0) Royal Guard: Guards of Honor (1 co) (7/130/151)2 Velite Regiment (1 bn) (29/630/25) Grenadier Regiment (1 bn) (24/522/19) Chasseur Regiment (2 bns) (49/1,324/42) Dragoon Regiment (2 sqns) (21/290/333) Artillery (19/533/415) Line Infantry: 1st Line Regiment (2 bns) (40/1,194/5)3 2nd Line Regiment (4 bns) (75/1,904/39) 3rd Line Regiment (4 bns and depot) (95/3,198/45) 4th Line Regiment (2 bns) (37/768/5) 5th Line Regiment (2 bns & depot) (82/1,742/8)

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Appendix 30 (continued) 6th Line Regiment (1 bn) (16/476/15) 7th Line Regiment (1 bn and depot) (78/1,432)4 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns and depot) (57/1,508/5) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (3 bns and depot) (64/1,631/11) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns and depot) (81/1,945/37) 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns and depot) (65/1,568/23) Dalmatian Regiment (32/410/14) Colonial Regiment (0/0) Bersaglieri Company (0/0) General Infantry Depot (0/0) 1st Volunteer Regiment (0/0) 2nd Volunteer Regiment (0/0) General Depot (0/0) Cavalry: 1st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0)5 2nd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0) 3rd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4 sqns) (25/424/453) 4th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4 sqns) (47/658/712) General Depot (0/0) Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (3 sqns) (29/390/421) Napoleon Dragoon Regiment (1 sqn) (9/163/170) Artillery: Foot Regiment (11 cos) (58/897/15)6 Coast Guard Gunners (5 cos) (11/751/2) Depot/Horse Artillery Regiment (3 cos) (17/275/294) Train (6 cos) (58/685/1,010) Engineers: Engineering Officers (27/0/18) Fortification Officers (8/0/0) Engineer Guards (0/95/0) Sapper Battalion (4 cos and depot) (20/637/26)7 Other: Royal Gendarmes (47/373/368) Invalid Regiment (2 bns) (42/834/3) Military Equipage (2 cos) (8/247/420) Geographical Engineers (4/0/9)

Appendixes Appendix 30 (continued) Medical Companies (1 co) (2/77) Milan Guard (3 cos) (18/377/2) Venice Guard (42/1,961/0) 1

Numbers are officers and men present. Numbers are officers, men, and horses. 3 Two battalions in Spain with 39 officers and 1,229 men. 4 One battalion in Spain with 24 officers and 831 men. 5 Two squadrons with 20 officers, 261 men, and 240 horses were serving in Spain. 6 One company was in Spain with 4 officers and 66 men. 7 One company was in Spain with 3 officers and 29 men. Source: Euge`ne Beauharnais Papers, Princeton University. 2

Appendix 31 State of the Italian Army, 1 February 1814 General Staff: (64) General Staff of Fortresses: (65) Guard: Gardes d’honneur (1 co) (7/130/138) Velites Regiment (29/639) 1/,2/Grenadier a` pied Regiment (24/521) 2/Chasseur a` pied Regiment (49/1,283) 2nd Dragoon Regiment (21/284) 4 Artillery Companies (20/352) Infantry: 1st Line Regiment (2) (40/1,189) 2nd Line Regiment (4) (75/1,904) 3rd Line Regiment (2) (95/3,198) 4th Line Regiment (4) (77/1,671) 5th Line Regiment (2) (88/1,887) 6th Line Regiment (2) (30/1,020) 7th Line Regiment (1) (67/1,413) 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (3) (77/2,327) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (4) (92/2,127) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (81/1,945) 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (65/1,568) Dalmatian Regiment (4 companies of elites) (38/252)

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Appendix 31 (continued) Cavalry: 3rd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4) (42/621) 4th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4) (49/643) Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (3) (30/406) Napoleon Dragoon Regiment (1) (9/163) Artillery: 11 Foot Companies (55/960) 5 Coast Guard Gunnery Companies (11/751) 3 Horse Artillery Companies (16/273) 6 Train Companies (13/614) Engineers: 3 Sapper Companies and Depots (28/666) Gendarmerie (46/851) Invalids and Veteran Battalions (2) (43/739) Military Equipage Companies (2) (8/231) Milanese Guard (3 companies) (19/378) Venitian Guard (2 battalions and artillery) (42/1,961) 4 Reserve Companies (12/321)

Appendix 32 French Army of Italy, Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 Commander in Chief: Prince Euge`ne de Beauharnais First Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/9th Line Regiment (26/919)1 2/9th Line Regiment (22/876) 3/9th Line Regiment (21/471) Artillery Co/9th Line Regiment (2/54) 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 6/52nd Line Regiment (21/1,010) 6/67th Line Regiment (21/1,042) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/35th Line Regiment (24/796) 2/35th Line Regiment (24/796) 3/35th Line Regiment (25/852)

Appendixes Appendix 32 (continued) Artillery Co/35th Line Regiment (2/43) 1/1st Regiment Etranger (33/659) 2/1st Regiment Etranger (18/646) 3/,4/1st Regiment Etranger (28/619) Artillery Co/1st Regiment Etranger (2/66) Artillery: 4/2nd Foot Artillery (2/118) 5/4th Horse Artillery (2/103) 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (0/33) 9th Equipage Militaire (1/52) 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 3/102nd Line Regiment (22/849) 6/102nd Line Regiment (20/863) 1/106th Line Regiment (28/1,095) 2/106th Line Regiment (17/1,041) Artillery Co/106th Line Regiment (2/52) 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (23/813) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line Regiment (17/1,242) 8/6th Line Regiment (18/769) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line Regiment (19/1,149) 2/132nd Line Regiment (22/516) Artillery: 6/2nd Foot Artillery Company (3/118) 25/2nd Foot Artillery Company (3/119) 5/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/143) 6/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/54) 9th Equipage Militaire (1/51) 6th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Zucchi Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Saint-Paul 2/1st Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (22/472) 3/1st Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (19/413) 3/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (18/381) 4/2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (14/371)

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Appendix 32 (continued) 1/Regiment of Italian Volunteers (21/255) 2/Regiment of Italian Volunteers (17/230) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Paolucci 3/4th Italian Line Regiment (18/334) 4/4th Italian Line Regiment (16/226) 1/5th Italian Line Regiment (27/492) 2/5th Italian Line Regiment (32/377) 1st Italian Train Battalion (2/94) 6th Italian Foot Artillery (6 guns) (2/82) 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/92nd Line Regiment (25/975) 2/92nd Line Regiment (20/901) 3/92nd Line Regiment (21/919) Artillery Co/92nd Line Regiment (2/45) 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Le´ge`re (15/1,319) 8/14th Le´ge`re (18/830) 3/10th Line (16/772) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (25/765) 1/84th Line Regiment (29/926) 2/84th Line Regiment (20/682) 3/84th Line Regiment (21/711) Artillery Co./ 84th Line Regiment (2/48) Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (3/113) 4/4th Horse Artillery Battery (3/93) 7/5th Train (bis) Battalion (1/109) 1/ and 2/10th Principal Train Battalion (1/87) 1/9th Equipage Battalion (1/57) 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment (22/519)

Appendixes Appendix 32 (continued) 3/16th Line Regiment (21/731) 4/62nd Line Regiment (22/597) 3/42nd Line Regiment (21/710) 6/42nd Line Regiment (18/1,181) Brigade: Unknown 6/7th Line Regiment (17/1,037) 1/53rd Line Regiment (30/617) 2/53rd Line Regiment (18/588) 3/53rd Line Regiment (18/707) Artillery Co/53rd Line Regiment (2/49) Artillery: 19/4th Foot Artillery (3/104) 8/7th Train (bis) Battalion (1/94) Royal Italian Guard: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Guardes d’honneur (1 co) (2/119) Royal Velites (29/638) Guard Infantry (24/522) 1/Guard Chasseurs (31/691) 2/Guard Chasseurs (18/633) 1/Guard Dragoons (14/153) 2/Guard Dragoons (7/136) Guard Foot Artillery Company (4/75) Guard Horse Artillery Company (4/54) Artillery Train (4/221) Italian Guard Marine Company (3/92) 4/1st Italian Equipage Militaire (3/98) Cavalry: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 3/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (13/135) 4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (10/126) 1/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (16/259) 2/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/229) 3/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/216) 4/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (3/115) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1/1st Hussar Regiment (13/242)

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Appendix 32 (continued) 2/1st Hussar Regiment (8/194) 3/1st Hussar Regiment (7/201) 6/1st Hussar Regiment (6/158) 1/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (13/164) 2/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (8/130) 3/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (8/14) Artillery: 6/4th Horse Artillery (3/99) 6th Principal Train Battalion (1/65) Artillery Reserve: Colonel Pont-Bodin 3/3rd Foot Artillery (3/115) 2/1st Italian Horse Artillery (4/85) 3/6th Principal Train Battalion (2/110) 3/1st Italian Train Battalion (2/81) 1

Strength figures as of 1 January 1814. They represent officers and men.

Appendix 33 Austrian Army the of Italy, Battle of the Mincio, 8 February 1814 Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Radivojevich Brigade: Generalmajor Quasdanovich (formerly Bogdan) 11th Ja¨ger Battalion Hoch-Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment (3) Beaulieu Infantry Regiment (3) Frimont Hussar Regiment (8) Brigade: Generalmajor Steffanini 10th Ja¨ger Battalion Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (1) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (6) Brigade: Generalmajor Vescey Chasteler Infantry Regiment (4) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (6) Reserve: Division: Generalmajor Pflacher Brigade: Generalmajor de Best Kerpen Infantry Regiment (4) Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment (3)

Appendixes Appendix 33 (continued) Division: Generalmajor Merville Brigade: Generalmajor Stutterheim Velsberg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion Von Best Grenadier Battalion Purcel Grenadier Battalion Brigade: Generalmajor Wrede Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6) Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (6) Arrived as Battle Developed Corps: Feldmarschal-leutnant Sommariva Brigade: Generalmajor Stanissavlevich Szeckler Grenz Regiment (1) Wallachian Grenz Regiment (1) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (1) Lindenau Infantry Regiment (3) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (3) Division: Feldmarschal-leutnant Fenner Brigade: Generalmajor Paumgarten 4th Ja¨ger Battalion Hohenzollern Chevaux Le´ger Regiment (6) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (3) Brigade: Generalmajor Suden Duka Infantry Regiment (3) Brigade: Generalmajor Abele Alois Liechtenstein Infantry Regiment (3)

Appendix 34 Army of Italy, 11 February 1814 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer (6,668) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/,3/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 6/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment

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Appendix 34 (continued) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment 6/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 1st Foreign Regiment (1) Artillery: (12 guns total) 4/2nd Foot Artillery 5/4th Horse Artillery 6/10th Principal Train Battalion 9th Equipage Militaire 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet (7,679) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment 1/,2/106th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment (1) 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 6/2nd Foot Artillery Company 25/2nd Foot Artillery Company 5/10th Principal Train 6/10th Principal Train 2/9th 6/10th Principal Train 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (6,463) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 34 (continued) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 4/1st Horse Artillery Battery 9/4th Foot Artillery 7/5th (bis) Artillery Train 1/,2/10th Principal Train Battalion 1/9th Train Battalion 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet (6,440) Brigade: Adjutant Commandant Montfalcon 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment ?/,3/,6/42nd Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pegot 6/3rd Le´ge`re Regiment 1/7th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment 2/6th Italian (bis) Line Regiment Artillery: 19/4th Foot Artillery 8/7th Train (bis) Battalion Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet (3,429) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (2) 1/,2/,3/,4/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Alphonse 1/,2/,3/,4/1st French Hussar Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 5/,6/19th French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,3/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 5/Napoleon Dragoon Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 6/4th Horse Artillery

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Appendix 34 (continued) 3/1st Train 1/2nd Italian Train Det 6th Principal Train Reserve Guard Division: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi (3,148) Gardes d’Honneur (1 co) Royal Velite Regiment (1) Royal Grenadier Regiment (1) Guard Chasseur Regiment (2) Guard Dragoons (2) Artillery: (12 guns total) 1 Foot Company 1 Horse Battery 2 Train Companies 12 guns Right Corps: Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien (5,071) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Vandeden 1st Provisional Demi-Brigade 10th Line Regiment (1) 4/84th Line Regiment 4/92nd Line Regiment 2nd Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/,6/9th Line Regiment 4/35th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3rd Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/53rd Line Regiment 106th Line Regiment (3rd or 4th Bn) 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (1) 42nd Line Regiment (1) 137th Line Regiment (1) Artillery: (8 guns total) 1 Foot Company 1 Train Company 8 guns Division: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Severoli (2,460) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Severoli 1/,2/1st Italian Line Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 34 (continued) 1/7th Italian Line Regiment 1/,2/1st Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Artillery: 1 Foot Company 1 Train Company 6 guns Artillery Reserve: Park: Source: Vandoncourt, Histoire des campagnes.

Appendix 35 Austrian Army of Italy, 11 February 1814 Commanding Officer: Feldmarschal von Bellegarde Field Army: 1st Lieutenancy: Sommariva Brigade: Stanissavlevich Szeckler Grenz Regiment (1) Walachian Grenz Regiment (1) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (1) Lindenau Infantry Regiment (3) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (1 sqn) Division: Fenner Brigade: Paumgarten 4th Ja¨ger Battalion (1) Hohenzollern Chevau-le´ger Regiment (6) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (3) Brigade: Suden Duka Infantry Regiment (3) Brigade: Abele Alois Liechtenstein Infantry Regiment (3) Division: Radivojevich Brigade: Bogdan 11th Ja¨ger Battalion Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Infantry Regiment (4) Beaulieu Infantry Regiment (3) Frimont Hussar Regiment (8)

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Appendix 35 (continued) Brigade: Steffanini 10th Ja¨ger Battalion (1) Warasdiner-Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (1) Jellachich Infantry Regiment (2) Merveldt Uhlan Regiment (6) Brigade: Vecsey Chasteler Infantry Regiment (4) Erzherzog Karl Uhlan Regiment (6) Division: Pflacher Brigade: von Best Kerpen Infantry Regiment (4) Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment (4) Division: Merville Brigade: Stutterheim Velsberg Grenadier Battalion Chimani Grenadier Battalion Faber Grenadier Battalion von Best Grenadier Battalion Purcel Grenadier Battalion Brigade: Wrede Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (4) Savoy Dragoon Regiment (6) Division: Generalmajor Nugent Brigade: Starhemberg 8th Ja¨ger Battalion Warasdiner-Kreuzer Grenz Regiment (1) Istrie Landwehr Regiment (1) Italian Friekorps (1) Benjowski Infantry Regiment (2) Radetzsky Hussar Regiment (6) Brigade: Gober Ferdinand Karl Infantry Regiment (3) Luisgnan Infantry Regiment (1) Erzherzog Karl Landwehr (1 bn) Siege and Blockade Forces: Mayer von Heldenfeld Brigade: Vlasitz (blockade of Mantua) Szeckler Grenz Regiment (1)

Appendixes Appendix 35 (continued) Hohenlohe-Bartenstein Infantry Regiment (1) Wu¨rttemberg Infantry Regiment (3) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (2) Brigade: Fo¨lseis (blockade of Legnago) Broder Grenz Regiment (1) 1st Banat Grenz Regiment (1) 2nd Banat Grenz Regiment (1) Alois Liechtenstein Landwehr Battalion Stipsich Hussar Regiment (1) Brigade: Tomassich (in Dalmatia) 1st Banat Grenz Regiment (1) 1st Liccanier Grenz Regiment (1) 2nd Liccanier Grenz Regiment (1) Banat Hussar Regiment (1) Division: Grammont (blockade of Mantua) Brigade: Eckhardt Gradiscainer Grenz Regiment (1) Bianchi Infantry Regiment (3) Frimont Hussar Regiment (4) Brigade: Spiegel Ottocainer Grenz Regiment (1) Lusignan Infantry Regiment (3) Radetzsky Hussar Regiment (4) Division: Marziani (blockade of Mantua) Brigade: Watlet 9th Ja¨ger Battalion (1) Reisky Infantry Regiment (4) Hohenlohe Dragoon Regiment (2) Brigade: Winzian Spleny Infantry Regiment (3) Vacquant Infantry Regiment (1) Brigade: Eberle de St. Julien Cobourg Infantry Regiment (3) St. Julien Infantry Regiment (2) Division: Marschall Brigade: Pulsky (blockade of Venice) Ougliner Grenz Regiment (1) 2nd Kerpen Landwehr Regiment (1)

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Appendix 35 (continued) 1st Hoch und Deutschmeister Landwehr Regiment (1) Stipsich Hussar Regiment (2) Infantry Regiment (4) Brigade: Mayer (blockade of Venice) St.-Georges Grenz Regiment (1) 2nd Banat Grenz Regiment (1) Gradiscaner Grenz Regiment (1) Wu¨rttemberg Infantry Regiment (1) Lindenau Infantry Regiment (1) Stipsich Regiment (2) Brigade: Csivich (blockade of Palma Nova and Osoppo) Szluiner Grenz Regiment (1) 1st Liccanier Grenz Regiment (1) 2nd Liccanier Grenz Regiment (1) Source: Koch.

Appendix 36 French Army of Italy, 1 March 1814 Commander in Chief: Prince Euge`ne de Beauharnais Chief of Staff: Count Vignolle Commander of Artillery: Ge´ne´ral de division Saint-Laurent Commander of Engineers: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Dode Commander of the Gendarmerie: Chef d’escadron Petit Baggagemaster Ge´ne´ral: Chef de bataillon Jayamebon Inspector of Reviews: Chef de bataillon Pradel 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/9th Line Regiment (22/546) 2/9th Line Regiment (20/526) 3/9th Line Regiment (20/544) Regimental Artillery Company (2/46) 28th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/52nd Line Regiment (21/662) 6/67th Line Regiment (19/704)

Appendixes Appendix 36 (continued) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 1/35th Line Regiment (32/555) 2/35th Line Regiment (16/489) 3/35th Line Regiment (33/572) Regimental Artillery Company (1/46) 1st Foreign Regiment (25/487) 6/3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (20/722) Artillery: Brossard 4/2nd Foot Artillery (2/79) 5/4th Horse Artillery (2/71) 4/10th Principal Train (2/107) 6/10th Principal Train (1/57) 6/1st Sapper Battalion (3/105) 2/9th Equipage Militaire (1/49) 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 3/102nd Line Regiment (17/646) 6/102nd Line Regiment (16/640) 29th Demi-Brigade provisoire 4/20th Line Regiment (13/675) 8/6th Line Regiment (20/445) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade De Conchy 1/106th Line Regiment (27/711) 2/106th Line Regiment (23/703) Regimental Artillery Company (2/41) 2/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (23/463) 3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment (12/308) 31st Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/131st Line Regiment (18/749) 2/132nd Line Regiment (16/728) Artillery: de Colliere 6/2nd Foot Artillery Company (2/93) 25/2nd Foot Artillery Company (2/93) 5/10th Principal Train (1/113) 6/10th Principal Train (1/51) 3/1st Sapper Battalion (2/85) Det 9th Military Equipage (1/50)

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Appendix 36 (continued) 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Count Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/92nd Line Regiment (18/570) 2/92nd Line Regiment (19/532) 3/92nd Line Regiment (21/604) Regimental Artillery Company (2/35) 30th Demi-Brigade provisoire 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment (24/707) 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment (21/478) 3/10th Line Regiment (17/568) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment (23/560) 1/84th Line Regiment (29/599) 2/84th Line Regiment (24/508) 3/84th Line Regiment (22/496) Regimental Artillery Company (2/43) Artillery: 9/4th Foot Artillery (2/94) 4/4th Horse Artillery Battery (2/72) 7/5th Artillery Train (bis) (1/95) Det 10th Principal Train (1/75) Det 1st Sapper Battalion (1/66) Det 1/9th Train (1/54) 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Montfalcon 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment (18/378) 3/16th Line Regiment (19/631) 4/62nd Line Regiment (21/571) 3/42nd Line Regiment (22/562) 6/42nd Line Regiment (14/594) 2/6th Italian Line (17/399) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pegot 3/7th Line Regiment (12/506) 1/53rd Line Regiment (25/444)

Appendixes Appendix 36 (continued) 2/53rd Line Regiment (14/424) 3/53rd Line Regiment (12/353) Regimental Artillery Company (2/44) 1/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (25/330) 2/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment (19/311) Artillery: Audry 19/4th Foot Artillery (2/98) 8/7th Train (bis) (1/97) 1st Italian Horse Artillery (5/84) 5/1st Italian Train (2/118) Det 3rd Sappers (1/66) Royal Italian Guard: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi Guardes d’Honneur (1 co) (8/113/152) Royal Velites (26/410) Guard Infantry (24/475) 1/Guard Chasseurs (28/405) 2/Guard Chasseurs (16/424) 1/Guard Dragoon Regiment (14/145/177) 2/Guard Dragoon Regiment (7/136/156) Guard Foot Artillery Company (5/72) Guard Horse Artillery Company (4/68) 1/,2/Italian Artillery Train Companies (4/241) 4/1st Italian Military Equipage Battalion (3/86) Cavalry: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 1/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (14/121/160) 3/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/116/136) 5/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (11/181/207) 6/19th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (17/16/2,169) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 1/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (16/131/187) 2/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/100/125) 3/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/98/115) 4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (9/92/1,113) 1/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (18/306/343)

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Appendix 36 (continued) 2/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/192/261) 3/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (8/165/181) 6/31st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (7/175/199) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Perreimond 1/1st Hussar Regiment (18/198/217) 2/1st Hussar Regiment (9/177/194) 3/1st Hussar Regiment (8/180/194) 6/1st Hussar Regiment (12/177/200) 1/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (14/98/135) 2/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (8/90/108) 3/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (7/83/95) 5/Italian Napoleon Dragoon Regiment (9/136/136) Artillery: Delort 6/4th Horse Artillery (2/68) 3/1st Horse Artillery (5/47) 1/2nd Italian Train (2/59) Det 6th Principal Train (1/58) Source: French Archives.

Appendix 37 The Army of the Kingdom of Naples, Beginning of March 1814 Commander: Joachim Napoleon (Murat), King of Naples Chief of Staff: Lieutenant-General Millet de Villeneuve ADCs: Mare´chal de Camp Caraffa, Mare´chal de Camp Romeuf, Colonel Bonnafous Attached to the Army: Mare´chal de Camp Lavauguyon, Governor of Rome, Mare´chal de Camp Pignatelli-Strongoli Generals of the Royal Guard: Cattaneo, Livron, Soye 1st Division: General Carascosa (in Emilia) Brigade: General Guglielmo Pepe 1st Line Regiment (2 bns) (1,494) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (1,632) Brigade: General de Majo1 3rd Line Regiment (2) (1,243) 5th Line Regiment (2) (1,572) Artillery: Foot Artillery (8 or 10 guns) (150)

Appendixes Appendix 37 (continued) 2nd Division: General d’Ambrosio (in Emilia) Brigade: General d’Aquino 2nd Line Regiment (2) (1,402) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (1,420) Brigade: General de Medici (?) 6th Line Regiment (2) (1,112) 9th Line Regiment (3) (1,800) Artillery: Foot Artillery (8 or 10 guns) (150) 3rd Division: General Count Pignatelli-Cerchiara Brigade: General MacDonald (en route from Ancona) 8th Line Regiment (3) (2,100) Canonniers de Marine (1) (664) Sapeurs du Ge´nie (1) (660) Brigade: Brigade commander unknown (Lechi, Minutolo?) (in Tuscany) 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (2) (2,083) Guard Velites (2) (1,200) Detached Brigade: General Campana (in Emilia) 4th Line Regiment (2) (1,320) 7th Line Regiment (2) (1,424) Attached to the Corps in Emilia: 1st Chevau-le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (3) (600/500)2 2nd Chevau-le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (800/770) 3rd Chevau-le´gers Regiment (Lancers) (3) (700/580) Guard Cavalry (in Emilia) Guard Hussars (2) (220/260) Guard Chevau-le´gers (5) (570/660) Guard Cuirassiers (1) (100/110) Gardes du Corps (1) (106/116) Artillery: Guard Horse Artillery (8 or 10 guns) (100/110) Guard Artillery Train (132/204) Guard Infantry: (in Emilia) Guard Grenadier Regiment (2) (1,180) Guard Marines (1 co) (100) (with Nugent on the Po)

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Appendix 37 (continued) Artillery Park Reserve: 8 or 10 guns (560/650) Total: 26,494 men, 4,425 horses, 32 or 40 guns 1

At the beginning of March, General Filangieri, commander of the 2nd Brigade of Carascosa’s division, was on mission at Bentinck’s headquarters in Leghorn. He was probably replaced for some weeks by General de Majo, who apparently was in command at the engagement of 7 March by Reggio. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 338. Later in March, Filangieri rejoined his brigade. 2 Apparently, this regiment was in Tuscany as of 11 March. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 375. In April, however, it was back in Emilia with Carascosa’s division. Sources: Order of battle constructed using Naples State Archives, Segreteria de Guerra, Folder 1125; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat; Pepe; Cortese.

Appendix 38 Army of Italy, 1 April 1814 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer (6,553) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/,3/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Arnaud 6/3rd Le´ge`re Regiment 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/35th Line Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 9/4th Foot Artillery 4/4th Horse Artillery Battery 7/5th Artillery Train (bis) Det 10th Principal Train Det 1st Sapper Battalion Det 1/9th Train 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet (6,370) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Larrouque 1/,2/106th Line Regiment 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 38 (continued) 2/132nd Line Regiment 1st Foreign Regiment (1) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 4/20th Line Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 6/2nd Foot Artillery Company 25/2nd Foot Artillery Company 5/10th Principal Train 6/10th Principal Train 3/1st Sapper Battalion 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (6,376) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment 3/10th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/84th Line Regiment Artillery: (12 guns total) 9/4th Foot Artillery 4/4th Horse Artillery Battery 7/5th Artillery Train (bis) Det 10th Principal Train Det 1st Sapper Battalion Det 1/9th Train 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet (4,947) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Montfalcon 25th Demi-Brigade provisoire 2/1st Line Regiment

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Appendix 38 (continued) 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment 3/42nd Line Regiment 6/42nd Line Regiment 2/6th Italian Line Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Pegot 3/7th Line Regiment (12/506) 1/,2/,3/53rd Line Regiment 1/,2/3rd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment Artillery: Audry (14 guns total) 19/4th Foot Artillery 8/7th Train (bis) 1st Italian Horse Artillery 5/1st Italian Train Det 3rd Sappers Right Corps: Ge´ne´ral de division Maucune Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Gratien (6,288) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Vandeden 1st Provisional Demi-Brigade 10th Line Regiment (1) 4/84th Line Regiment 4/92nd Line Regiment 2nd Provisional Demi-Brigade 4/,6/9th Line Regiment 4/35th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Soulier 3rd Provisional Demi-Brigade 53rd Line Regiment (1) 106th Line Regiment (3rd or 4th Bn) 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (1) 42nd Line Regiment (1) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Rambourgt 1st Italian Line Regiment (1) 1st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (3) 1/,2/,3/,4/1st Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/3rd Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 38 (continued) Artillery: (14 guns total) 9/4th Foot Artillery 4/4th Horse Artillery Battery 7/5th Artillery Train (bis) Det 10th Principal Train Det 1st Sapper Battalion Det 1/9th Train Reserve Guard Division: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Lecchi (3,062) Guards of Honor (1 co) 1/Royal Velite Regiment Guard Grenadier Regiment 1/,2/Guard Chasseur Regiment Royal Dragoon Regiment (2) Artillery: (12 guns total) Guard Foot Artillery Company Guard Horse Artillery Company 1/,2/Italian Artillery Train Companies 4/1st Italian Military Equipage Battalion Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet (3,115) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains 1/,2/,3/,4/4th Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: General de brigade Gentil St.-Alphonse 1/,2/,3/,4/1st French Hussar Regiment 1/,2/,3/Italian Queen’s Dragoon Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/Italian Napoleon Dragoon Regiment Artillery: (8 guns total) 6/4th Horse Artillery 3/1st Horse Artillery 1/2nd Italian Train Det 6th Principal Train Artillery Reserve and Park: (2,384) 21 guns Source: Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes.

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Appendix 39 Army of the Kingdom of Northern Italy, 11 April 1814 In Kingdom General Staff (82/0) Fortress Staff (67/0) Royal Guard: (as of 21 May) Depot/Guards of Honor (1/24)1 Depot/Velite Regiment (11/29) Depot/Grenadier Regiment (22/178) Depot/Chasseur Regiment (9/36) Depot/Dragoon Regiment (3/36) Depot/Artillery (1/4) Line Infantry: 1st Volunteer Regiment (0/0) 2nd Volunteer Regiment (29/507) 1st Line Regiment (26/320) 2nd Line Regiment (3/72) 3rd Line Regiment (0/0) 4th Line Regiment (3/80) 5th Line Regiment (0/0) 6th Line Regiment (0/0) 7th Line Regiment (21/325) 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (0/0) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (0/0) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (0/0) 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (0/0) Bersaglieri Company (3/83) Dalmatian Regiment (0/0) Colonial Regiment (0/0) General Infantry Depot (0/0) Cavalry: 1st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0) 2nd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0) 3rd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0) 4th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (6/12) General Depot (0/0/0)

Appendixes Appendix 39 (continued) Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (3/13) Napoleon Dragoon Regiment (16/124) Artillery: Foot Regiment (8 cos and depot) (23/200) Horse Artillery Regiment (depot) (4/28) Train (4 cos and depot) (12/104) Engineers: Engineering Officers (5/0) Fortification Officers (9/0) Engineer Guards (0/43) Sapper Battalion (0/0) Other: Royal Gendarmes (36/379) Invalid Regiment (0/21) Military Equipage (2/42) Geographical Engineers (17/0) Medical Companies (1 co) (2/65) Milan Guard (8/177) With the Army General Staff (80/0/218) Fortress Staff (63/0/7) Royal Guard: (as of 21 May) Guards of Honor (1 co) (8/119/156) Velite Regiment (1 bn) (29/339/24) Grenadier Regiment (1 bn) (24/320/19) Chasseur Regiment (2 bns) (32/1,391/41) Dragoon Regiment (2 sqns) (21/282/338) Artillery (4 cos) (20/380/408) Line Infantry: 1st Volunteer Regiment (2 bns and depot) (49/920/21) 2nd Volunteer Regiment (0/0) 1st Line Regiment (3 bns) (68/1,862/16) 2nd Line Regiment (4 bns) (73/1,710/30) 3rd Line Regiment (4 bns) (93/2,831/46) 4th Line Regiment (3 bns) (83/1,314/14)

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Appendix 39 (continued) 5th Line Regiment (2 bns and depot) (83/1,974/9) 6th Line Regiment (2 bns) (39/384/16)2 7th Line Regiment (1 bn and depot) (67/1,104/5)3 1st Le´ge`re Regiment (3 bns and depot) (96/1,845/12) 2nd Le´ge`re Regiment (4 bns and depot) (99/1,358/21) 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2 bns and depot) (80/1,912/21) 4th Le´ge`re Regiment (6 cos and depot) (35/1,168/3) Bersaglieri Company (0/0/0) Dalmatian Regiment (40/173/7) Colonial Regiment (0/0/0) General Infantry Depot (0/0/0) Cavalry: 1st Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4 sqns) (47/478/482)4 2nd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (0/0/0) 3rd Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4 sqns) (45/382/466) 4th Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment (4 sqns) (42/479/534) General Depot (43/397/174) Queen’s Dragoon Regiment (34/361/353) Napoleon Dragoon Regiment (41/461/527) Artillery: Foot Regiment (16 cos) (74/1,164/43)5 Horse Artillery Regiment (3 cos) (20/365/305) Train (8 cos) (18/638/1,280) Engineers: Engineering Officers (33/0/20) Fortification Officers (7/0/0) Engineer Guards (0/101/0) Sapper Battalion (7 cos) (31/538/100) Other: Royal Gendarmes (26/407/379) Invalid Regiment (2 bns) (46/937/4) Military Equipage (2 cos and depot) (18/274/409) Geographical Engineers (3/0/9) Medical Companies (1 co and depot) (2/136/0) Milan Guard (3 cos) (19/378/2) Venice Guard (2 bns) (42/2,078/2)

Appendixes Appendix 39 (continued) Units assigned to Zucchi’s Division—strengths date from 1 April. Units assigned to Maucune’s Division—strengths date from 16 May. Units assigned to Mermet’s Division—strengths date from 16 May and 1 April. 1

Numbers are officers and men present. Detachment with French Army of Spain—9 officers and 313 men. 3 Detachment with French Army of Spain—3 officers and 103 men. 4 Detachment with French Army of Spain—3 officers, 68 men, and 68 horses. 5 Detachment with French Army of Spain—6 officers, 98 men, and 10 horses. Source: Euge`ne Beauharnais Papers, Princeton University. 2

Appendix 40 The Army of the Kingdom of Naples in Emilia, 16 April 1814 Commander: Joachim Napoleon (Murat), King of Naples Chief of Staff: Lieutenant-General Millet de Villeneuve 1st Division: General Carascosa Brigade: General Guglielmo Pepe 4 Infantry battalions (2,800) 4 Cavalry squadrons (400) Brigade: General Filangieri 4 Infantry battalions (3,000) 4 Cavalry squadrons (400) 2nd Division: General d’Ambrosio Brigade: General d’Aquino 4 Infantry battalions (3,000) Brigade: General de Majo 4 Infantry battalions (2,800) 2 Cavalry squadrons (180) 3rd Division: General Count Pignatelli-Cerchiara Brigade: General Campana 3 Infantry battalions (2,500) 1 Guard Cavalry squadron (120) Brigade: General Caraffa 3 Infantry battalions (2,000) 4 Cavalry squadrons (480) Artillery: 28 guns and 12 howitzers

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Appendix 41 Army of Italy, 1 May 1814 Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Ge´ne´ral Grenier Chief of Staff: Ge´ne´ral de division Vignolle Artillery Commander: Ge´ne´ral de division St. Laurent Engineer Commander: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Dode 1st Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Grenier 2nd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Rouyer (5,387) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Schmitz 1/,2/,3/,4/,6/9th Line Regiment 28th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/52nd Line Regiment 6/67th Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Darnaud 3rd Le´ge`re Regiment (2) 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/35th Line Regiment Artillery: 1 Foot Battery 1 Horse Battery 2 Train Companies 12 guns 1 Sapper Company 4th Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Marcognet (4,855) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Larroque 1/,2/,?/106th Line Regiment 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/131st Line Regiment 2/132nd Line Regiment 1st Foreign Regiment (1) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Jeanin 29th Provisional Demi-Brigade 8/6th Line Regiment 2/,3/36th Le´ge`re Regiment 6/101st Line Regiment 3/,6/102nd Line Regiment

Appendixes Appendix 41 (continued) Artillery: 2 Foot Batteries 2 Train Companies 12 guns 1 Sapper Company 2nd Lieutenancy: Ge´ne´ral de division Verdier 1st Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Quesnel (5,367) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Campi 1/,2/,3/,4/92nd Line Regiment 30th Provisional Demi-Brigade 3/1st Le´ge`re Regiment 8/14th Le´ge`re Regiment ?/,3/10th Line Regiment (2 bns) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Forestier 2/,3/35th Le´ge`re Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/84th Line Regiment Artillery: 1 Foot Battery 1 Horse Battery 12 guns 1 Sapper Company 3rd Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Fressinet Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Montfalcon 3/7th Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/53rd Line Regiment Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Graosbon 25th Provisional Demi-Brigade 2/1st Line Regiment 3/16th Line Regiment 4/62nd Line Regiment 1/,2/,3/42nd Line Regiment Artillery: 1 Horse Battery 1 Train Company 8 guns 1 Sapper Company

343

344

Appendixes

Appendix 41 (continued) Cavalry Division: Ge´ne´ral de division Mermet (1,950) Brigade: Ge´ne´ral de brigade Bonnemains ?,5/,6/31st Italian Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment 1/,2/,3/,4/31st French Chasseur a` Cheval Regiment Brigade: General de brigade Gentil-St.Alphonse 1/,2/,3/,4/1st French Hussar Regiment Artillery: 1 Horse Battery 1 Train Company 6 guns 1 Sapper Company Artillery Reserve and Park: (1,852) 27 guns Source: Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes.

Notes INTRODUCTION 1. When an army begins stripping its training cadres of its instructors and artisans, it is an indication of the level of desperation of that army and the seriousness of its situation. Vignolle, 1–3. 2. Ibid., 4–5. 3. Ibid., 6–7. 4. Ibid., 8–9. 5. Ibid., 10–11.

CHAPTER 1 1. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 10. 2. Official report of General Fontanelli to the Viceroy, Milan State Archives, 8 May 1813, ASM-MG 1067. 3. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 7. 4. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 13. 5. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 203. 6. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 10. 7. Ibid., 1–2. 8. Vignolle, 14. 9. Ibid., 15. 10. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 77. 11. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 21. 12. For some reason Euge`ne chose to replace the term corps with lieutenancy. Operationally, however, each lieutenancy should be considered to be a corps. 13. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 210. 14. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 13.

346

Notes

15. Vignolle, 16; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 78–79. 16. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 49. 17. Ibid., 55. 18. Botta, 345–346. 19. Nafziger, Lu¨tzen and Bautzen, 270–272; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 87. 20. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 92–93. 21. Ibid., 94. 22. Ibid., 108. 23. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 111. 24. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 115. 25. Ibid., 116. 26. Nafziger, Napoleon at Dresden, 8–11. 27. Ibid. 28. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 125. 29. Vignolle, 17; Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 115–117; Anonymous, Guerres des franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 421. 30. Vignolle, 19–20. 31. The greater part of the generals of brigade announced by the Minister of War had not yet arrived with the army, and this is the reason that the officers of this rank are not indicated on this return. 32. It is not clear from the sources whether the 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade was in Italy on 15 July or still en route from Germany. See earlier note. 33. Most probably the Guard Grenadier Battalion. 34. The French had the practice of organizing “march” companies, battalions, and regiments by pulling together groups of trained conscripts, organizing them into temporary formations, and “marching” them to the army, where these temporary units were pulled apart and their soldiers then dispatched to their parent units. The reason for this formation was to control the delivery of new conscripts and to prevent desertions as they marched to the front. 35. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 216. 36. Vignolle, 21–22. 37. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 151. 38. There is a considerable confusion in the available sources about the Provisional Demi-Brigades that were expected to join the Army of Italy. Weil, ibid., describes a 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade en route to Italy as formed by the 4/,6/47th Line Regiment, the 2/,6/86th Line Regiment, and the 2/,6/122nd Line Regiment. Apart from the rather unlikely event of a Provisional Demi-Brigade fielding six battalions, instead of the standard three, it should be noted that the six battalions of the 47th, 86th, and 122nd already appeared in Weil’s note at page 151 as belonging to the 23rd and 24th Provisional DemiBrigades. However that may be, the listed units, which according to the Decree of 18 June were destined to form the 7th Division together with the Croats and the Foreign Regiments (that is, two battalions of the 47th, 86th, and 122nd Line Regiments), never arrived in Italy. In fact, on 15 August they are reported in Mainz with the 53rd Division. The “true” 31st Provisional Demi-Brigade, formed of the second battalions of the 131st, 132nd, and 133rd Line Regiment, originally belonging to Durutte’s 32nd Division in Germany (see Nafziger, Lu¨tzen and Bautzen, 299), arrived in Italy probably before the outbreak of the hostilities and served in the Army of Italy throughout the campaign.

Notes

347

39. At the beginning of summer 1813 the Italian navy was commanded by Admiral Duperre´ and drew up about 50 boats divided into three squadrons. The first squadron was in the Adriatic Sea and had its base in Ancona, the second was in the Venetian lagoon, and the third in Corfu. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 28. 40. Ibid., 27–28. 41. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 126–127. 42. Ibid., 138. 43. Ibid., 30–31. 44. Ibid., 89. 45. Ibid., 106–107. 46. Ibid., 125–126. 47. Anonymous Intelligence Report, Trieste, 26 June 1813, ASM-MG 168, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 205. 48. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 137–138. 49. Ibid., 147–148. 50. Ibid., 156. 51. FML Frimont’s division was formed with GM Wrede’s brigade (two battalions of the Szekler Grenzer Regiment and six squadrons of the Frimont Hussar Regiment) and GM Stanissavlevich’s brigade (8th Ja¨gers, one battalion of the Peterwardeiner Grenzer Regiment, the 2/Valaque Grenzer Regiment, and two battalions of the Duka Infantry Regiment). Ibid., 163. 52. FML Nowack’s division was formed with GM Eckhardt (two battalions of the Reisky Infantry Regiment and two battalions of the Jellachich Infantry Regiment) and GM Stutterheim’s brigade (four grenadier battalions—Purcell, Welsberg, Chimani, and Faber). Ibid. 53. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 30. 54. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 148–149. 55. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 17; Vignolle, 23. 56. Von Welden, 6–9. 57. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 39–40. 58. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 214–215. 59. Ibid., 165–167. 60. Vignolle, 23. 61. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 169–171. 62. Ibid., 179–180. 63. Ibid., 186–189. 64. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 19. 65. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 191. 66. Ibid., 194–197. 67. Ibid., 194. 68. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 17–18. 69. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 198. 70. Ibid., 211–212. 71. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 19. 72. Anonymous, Guerres des Franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 423. 73. Vignolle, 26–27. 74. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 20. 75. Anonymous, Guerres des Franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 424.

348

Notes

76. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 199. 77. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 22. 78. Beauharnais, Memoires et correspondance, Vol. IX, 335–336. 79. Vignolle, 28–29. 80. Von Welden, 19–20. 81. Anonymous, Dernie`re campagne, 5. 82. Beauharnais, Memoires et correspondance, Vol. IX, 340. 83. Anonymous, Dernie`re campagne, 6. 84. Vignolle, 30. 85. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 22. 86. Von Welden, 21–22. 87. An exact description of what occurred in the city and suburbs of Villach during the nine days that it was occupied by the Austrians was documented in a letter to Prince Euge`ne by the Carinthia Intendant, Mr. de Charnage, who was in the vicinity. See Appendix 1 for the text of this letter. 88. Vignolle, 31. 89. This summary figure includes several units destined for the army but not yet present. 90. Zanoli, 256. 91. Von Welden, 19–20. 92. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 26–27. 93. According to Vaudoncourt, at this time Belotti’s brigade was apparently reduced to the three battalions of the 3rd Italian Le´ge`re. Two battalions of the 4th Italian Le´ge`re had been retained by General Garnier, and the third was in Pola. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 235. 94. According to Vignolle, 32, and Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 235, this action occurred on 29 August. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 45–46, provides evidence that it occurred two days before. 95. Jerabek, 21; Von Welden indicates that the company had only 92 men (24). 96. Zanoli, 237. 97. Correspondence of Major Filippo Bonfanti, of the 3rd Le´ge`re, quoted by Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, and letter from General Vignolle to General Bellotti, quoted in Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 308. 98. Von Welden, 24. 99. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 320, 328–329. 100. Correspondence of Major Filippo Bonfanti, of the 3rd Le´ge`re, quoted by Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria. It seems unlikely that a battalion of the 35th Line was in Krainburg, as the 2nd Division, to which it belonged, was in the Drava Valley. 101. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 329. 102. Zanoli, 237. 103. Von Welden, 24. 104. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 29. 105. Correspondence of Major Filippo Bonfanti, of the 3rd Le´ge`re, quoted by Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria. However, Zanoli, 38, states that it was the 2/3rd Le´ge`re and only 25 chasseurs. 106. Vignolle, 32–33.

Notes

349

CHAPTER 2 1. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 238. 2. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 54. 3. Von Welden, 25. 4. According to Jerabek, 66, this battery was on the right-wing Austrian line in the entrenchments behind Unter-Feistritz. 5. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 377. 6. Ibid., 378. 7. The numbers are the numbers of infantry regiments from which the grenadier companies were drawn to form these combined grenadier battalions. 8. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 241; Vignolle, 34–35. 9. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 379. 10. Schmitz’s Brigade consisted of the 9th Line and the 28th Provisional DemiBrigade. 11. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 243. 12. Jerabek, 66, gives a rather different disposition of the Austrian troops in the three hamlets of Feistritz. One and a half battalions of the Reisky Infantry Regiment dug themselves in the entrenchments behind Unter-Feistritz. They were supported by a battery and four Uhlan squadrons and had just one company garrisoning Unter-Feistritz. The positions between Mittel- and Ober-Feistritz, including the redoubt, the cemetery, and the castle, were occupied by two more companies of the Reisky Infantry Regiment, five companies of the Chasteler Infantry Regiment (probably the landwehr battalion), and three Ja¨ger companies. 13. A “division” of infantry, in this situation, is two companies. 14. Von Holtz, 23–24. 15. Vignolle, 36–37. 16. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 32. 17. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 382. Von Holtz, 26, indicates that Campi led forward two battalions of Italian Guard in this attack. Though the two guard battalions certainly took part in the operation, it is unlikely that they were involved in the fighting. 18. Gerthoffer, 132. 19. Von Holtz, 23. 20. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 245–246. 21. The pas de charge, or attack pace, was a cadenced march of 120 paces per minute. 22. Vignolle, 38–39. 23. Von Holtz, 26. 24. A “peloton” and a company are identical in this situation, except that a peloton is a combat formation and a company is an administrative organization. The distinction is more semantical than substantive. The mass, or colonne serre´e, was a specific formation where the pelotos (companies) are closed up to within 13 inches of one another. It is designed to defend the unit against cavalry attack but is not very maneuverable. It was used only when time did not permit the infantry to form a square. 25. Uhlans are lancers, that is, light cavalry carrying lances. The Austrian army had three regiments of these troops in 1813.

350

Notes

26. Vignolle, 41. This seems a little far-fetched, since the Uhlans would normally have all the advantages in such a fight, the lance being far longer than a musket with bayonet. However, this strongly indicates that the skirmishers had formed some sort of “hasty square” as a defense against the cavalry, which surely would have destroyed them otherwise. 27. Vaudoncourt, Vol. II, 34. 28. Vignolle, 40–41. 29. Von Holtz, 27. 30. Vaudoncourt, Vol. II, 35. 31. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 385. In Anonymous, Guerres des franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 425, the Austrian losses are indicated to have been 350 dead, 400 wounded, and 500 prisoners. 32. Letter from Euge`ne to Napoleon, dated 7 September 1813. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 111. 33. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 36. 34. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. I, 389. 35. Vignolle, 42–43. 36. Historical report by Colonel Rossi, of the 3rd Italian Line, quoted by Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 227. 37. Vaudoncourt indicates that it was only four guns. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 253. 38. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 54. 39. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 38. 40. Anonymous, Guerres des franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 427. 41. Von Holtz, 33. 42. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 51–53; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 10. 43. Zanoli, 259. 44. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 54–55. 45. Apparently d’Anthouard was the chief of staff to GD Pino, commander of the 3rd Lieutenancy. 46. Letter from Euge`ne to d’Anthouard, dated 3:00 A.M., 11 September 1813. See Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 356. 47. Vignolle, 44–45. 48. Sources do not agree on the number of Royal Guard battalions engaged on 12 September: only four for Vignolle, Weil, and Vaudoncourt; six for Zanoli (259–260). The latter, however, seems more reliable as it describes in some detail the actions performed by each unit. According to Zanoli (261), it was on 16 September at Weichselburg that the Royal Guard infantry was reduced to the four battalions of the Chasseur Regiment, the Velites and the Grenadier battalions being at Laybach and Rudnik. 49. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 32. 50. Von Holtz, 34–35. 51. See previous note regarding the organization and strength of the Italian Guard Infantry. 52. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 33. 53. Von Holtz, 35–36; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 34. 54. One battalion of the Franz Karl Regiment, five companies of the Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenz, three zu¨gen of the Radetzky Hussars, and 4–3pdr guns.

Notes

351

55. Von Holtz, 39–40; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 45. 56. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 57–61; official report by Colonel Rossi of the 3rd Italian Line Regiment, quoted in ibid., 227. 57. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 46. 58. Ibid., 47. 59. French sources indicate that Austrian losses were higher, though these are probably greatly inflated. They list the Austrians as losing about 150 dead, 150 wounded, 200 prisoners, and 1 gun. Anonymous, Guerres des Franc¸ais en Italie, Vol. II, 429. 60. Zanoli, 262. 61. Vignolle, 46–47. 62. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 57–61. 63. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 265. 64. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 44. 65. Exaggerated concern was, in fact, misplaced, as the raid on Mu¨hlbach had been carried out by a small Austrian advanced guard. GM Fenner’s main body was miles behind, trudging on the road from Lienz to the Pusteria Valley. 66. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 62. 67. Von Holtz, 38–39. 68. Zanoli, 261. 69. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 65. 70. Letter from Euge`ne to Clark, dated 17 September 1813. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 361–362. 71. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 42. 72. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 55–57. 73. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 39. 74. Ibid., 25. 75. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 49. Vaudoncourt and Weil are in disagreement with Vignolle in regard to the dates of the events around St. Hermagor. As Weil quotes original sources from the K.u.K Kriegsarchiv, and his presumed dates perfectly coincide with those provided by Vaudoncourt, it is arguable that despite being the Chief of Staff of the Army of Italy this time Vignolle is wrong. 76. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 80. 77. Ibid., 84, 90. 78. Vignolle, 50–51. 79. Ibid., 50; see also Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 45–46, and Beauharnais, Memoires et correspondance, Vol. IX, 267. Von Welden, 35, provides the same organization by divisional commanders, but the numbers he assigns to the divisions are in error. Vignolle, being the chief of staff, most certainly provides the correct divisional numbers, which are shown in the text. 80. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 97–98. 81. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 62. 82. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 98. 83. By 21 September FML Radivojevich, having completed the organization of a few new territorial units, had 15 battalions and 8 squadrons under his command. Two squadrons of the Merveldt Uhlan Regiment, detached from Frimont’s corps, were en route to join Radivojevich. Ibid., 116. 84. Historical Journal of the 5th Division from 18 September to 31 December 1813, ASM-MG 47, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 235.

352

Notes

85. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 46. 86. Historical Journal of the 5th Division from 18 September to 31 December 1813, ASM-MG 47, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 235. 87. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 47. 88. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 63–64. 89. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 111, 130. 90. Vignolle, 54–55. 91. Ibid., 52–53. 92. Anonymous, Dernie`re campagne, 21. 93. Historical report of Colonel Rossi, commander of the 3rd Italian Line Regiment, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 228. 94. For Euge`ne, Bavaria’s defection had a very strong personal consideration. The King of Bavaria was his father-in-law. 95. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 51. These figures seem exaggerated. As sources agree that Colonel Starhemberg had about 3,000 men, it is unlikely that General Csivich’s force, which was formed by one battalion of the Szluiner Grenzer, two platoons of hussars, two 3pdr guns (and perhaps a few companies of locally raised troops), plus a detached column of three companies of Oguliner Grenzer, could field 6,000 men. 96. According to Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 273, the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re did not deport itself well during (“fort mal”) this operation. 97. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 154. 98. Historical Journal of the 5th Division from 18 September to 31 December 1813, ASM-MG 47, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 236. 99. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 156. 100. Anonymous, Guerres des franc¸ais en Italie, Vol. II, 433. 101. Vignolle, 56–57. 102. Beauharnais Papers, CO645, Box 26, Folder 4, Document #90. 103. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 151. 104. Ibid., 150. 105. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 56. 106. Vignolle, 58–59. 107. Beauharnais Papers, CO645, Box 26, Folder 4, Document #90; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 181–182. 108. Historical report of Colonel Rossi, commander of the 3rd Italian Line, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 229. 109. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 194. 110. Historical Journal of the 5th Division, from 18 September to 31 December 1813, ASM-MG 47, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 36. 111. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 273–274. 112. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 192. 113. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 56. 114. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 162, 168. 115. Ibid., 124. 116. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 57. Also see letter of Hiller to the Emperor (1 October 1813), quoted by Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 180. 117. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 141. 118. Ibid., 188.

Notes

353

CHAPTER 3 1. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 209. 2. Von Holtz, 58–59. According to Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 58, about 40 Austrian battalions were employed in this action, which seems rather exaggerated. 3. Anonymous, Guerres des franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 436; Anonymous, Historique du 42e re´giment d’infanterie, 339. 4. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 234. 5. Vignolle, 60–61; Anonymous, Historique du 42e re´giment d’infanterie, 339. 6. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 237. 7. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 291. 8. Vaudoncourt, Historie des campagnes, 52–53. 9. Vignolle, 62–63. 10. An excellent study of the problem of desertion in the Army of the Kingdom of Italy is Della Peruta, 62. 11. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 246. 12. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 69. 13. Prince Viceroy’s Decree of 8 October, ASM-MG 337, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 250–251. 14. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 71. 15. ASM-MG 150, quoted in ibid., 253. 16. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 158. 17. Ibid., 248. 18. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 361. 19. Vignolle, 64–65. 20. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 222. 21. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 62. 22. Vignolle, 66–67. 23. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 297. 24. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 62. 25. Vignolle, 66–67. 26. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 199. 27. Ibid., 231. 28. Ibid., 261. 29. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 63. 30. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 76. 31. Ibid. 32. Letter of the Prefect of the Bacchiglione Department in Vincenza to the Minister of War, 25 October 1813, ASM-MG 47. Ibid. 33. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 281, 302. On the other hand, the gendarmerie detachments belonging to the border departments were hastily put on active service so as to repulse any Austrian raid within their own territory. 34. Ibid., 300. 35. Ibid., 339–340. 36. Letter of the Prince Viceroy to the Duke of Lodi, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Italy, 12 October 1813, Zanoli, 362. 37. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 66.

354

Notes

38. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 358. 39. Letter of the Prefect of the Bacchiglione Department in Vincenza to the Minister of War, 28 October 1813, ASM-MG 47. Ibid. 40. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 274–275. 41. Ibid., 285. 42. Ibid., 341. 43. Ibid., 363. 44. Ibid., 372. 45. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 67–68. 46. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 302–303. 47. Ibid., 322–323. 48. Ibid., 355. 49. Ibid., 365–368. 50. Report to the Minister of War, 30 October 1813, ASM-MG 47. 51. Zanoli, 266. 52. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 78. 53. Ibid., 78. 54. According to Austrian sources, the French strength was at least 1,500 men with 12 guns. See Weil, Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 369. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., 388. ¨ sterreicher, 54. 57. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 58. Historical Journal of the 5th Division from 18 September to 31 December 1813, ASM-MG 47, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 240. 59. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 75. 60. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 80. ¨ sterreicher, 55. 61. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 62. Vignolle, 72–74. 63. The cannon was taken by a battalion of the French 42nd Line Regiment. Anonymous, Dernie`re campagne, 25, and Beauharnais, Memoires et correspondance, Vol. IX, 404. 64. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 81. 65. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 438. 66. Ibid., 428. 67. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 78. 68. Vignolle, 74–75. 69. Ibid., 76–77. 70. The garrison of Osopo contained a total of 639 men from the 5/106th Line Regiment, plus detachments from the 7th, 35th, and 52nd Line Regiments. 71. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 87. 72. Ibid. 73. Vignolle, 78–80. 74. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 411, 429. 75. Ibid., 466. 76. Ibid., 435. 77. The King of Naples to Napoleon, Milan, 31 October 1813, in Archives de la Guerre, quoted in ibid., 415. 78. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 85.

Notes

355

79. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 468. 80. Ibid., 475. 81. Ibid., 486. 82. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 86. 83. Vignolle, 80–81. 84. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 2. 85. Von Holtz, 80–81. 86. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 9. 87. Historical Journal of the 5th Division from 18 September to 31 December 1813, ASM-MG 47, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 244. 88. Anonymous, Dernie`re campagne, 29. 89. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 412. 90. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 19. 91. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 412. 92. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 92. 93. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 28, 40. 94. Beauharnais Papers, CO645, Box 26, Folder 4, Document #98. 95. This is also indicated as 16 guns by Anonymous, Guerres des franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 447. 96. Sporschil, Die grosse Chronik, indicates that only a half squadron accompanied Quesnel’s division, 60. 97. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 25; Vignolle, 85–86; Anonymous, Guerres des franc¸aise en Italie, Vol. II, 448. 98. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 41. 99. A “division” of infantry in this situation is two companies. The 1st Division contained the 1st and 2nd Companies. 100. Anonymous, Dernie`re campagne, 29. ¨ sterreicher, 60. 101. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 102. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 91. 103. Von Holtz, 83. 104. The Austrians organized their grenadier battalions by converging the grenadier companies of the line infantry regiments. The Chimani Grenadier Battalion was organized with six companies, two each from the Jellachich, St. Julien, and Wacquant Infantry Regiments. 105. Von Holtz, 83. 106. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 44. 107. Vignolle, 86–87. 108. Beauharnais Papers, CO645, Box 26, Folder 4, Document #98; Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 414. 109. Zanoli, 269. 110. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 93. 111. Ibid. 112. Von Holtz, 84. According to Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 93, Vecsey’s brigade had been reinforced by the Spleny and Duka Infantry Regiments. ¨ sterreicher, 62. 113. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 114. Von Holtz, 85. 115. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 95. ¨ sterreicher, 63. 116. Sporschil, Feldzug der O

356

Notes

117. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 78. 118. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 95. 119. Vignolle, 88–90. 120. Letter of General Fontanelli to the Viceroy, 30 November 1813, ASM-MG 47. 121. Letters of the Viceroy to General Fontanelli, Minister of War (12 and 24 November 1813), quoted in Zanoli, 371–372. 122. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 96–97. 123. Ibid., 98. 124. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 447–449. 125. Janson, 26; Cotturri, 31. ¨ sterreicher, 64. 126. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 127. Zanoli, 271. 128. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 75. 129. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 98–99. 130. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 98. 131. General Pino to Minister of War, 26 November 1813, Milan State Archives, ASM-MG 47. 132. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 100. 133. Ibid., 101. 134. Beauharnais Papers, CO645, Box 26, Folder 4, Document #120. 135. Vignolle, 92–93. ¨ sterreicher, 65. 136. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 137. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 422. 138. A Military Division was an administrative district within metropolitan France, not a field or combat formation. 139. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 423. 140. Ibid., 426. 141. Boppe, 157. 142. Letter from Napoleon to Euge`ne dated 3 December 1813. Beauharnais, Vol. IX, 476.

CHAPTER 4 1. Atteridge, 247. 2. Ibid., 250. 3. On his way to Dresden, Murat had actually met the courier bringing Cariati’s letter to Naples. But, unfortunately, he could not read it as it was written in cipher and Murat did not have the key at hand. Ibid., 254–255. 4. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 339. 5. Ibid., 479. 6. Atteridge, 262. 7. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 415. 8. Ibid., 463. 9. Ibid., 481. 10. Ibid., 559. 11. Candeloro, 356. 12. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. II, 422.

Notes

357

13. Atteridge, 264. 14. Bellaire, 5–7. 15. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 103. 16. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 129, 554 (appendix). 17. The organization of the army of the Kingdom of Naples, particularly during the campaign of 1813–1814 in Central and Northern Italy, was a very difficult subject to investigate for two reasons. First, like the Milanese, the Naples State Archives suffered irreparable document losses during World War II. Second, King Joseph and King Murat’s efforts to obtain decent standards of efficiency and accuracy from the kingdom military administration were not met with brilliant results. Those few documents that were not lost are often confused, if not contradictory. As a result, the authors of this book found themselves gathering what tiny bits of information were available from different sources (above all, Weil and the memoirs of Generals Pepe and Pignatelli Strongoli), checking them one against other, and trying to reconstruct a very complex puzzle. We are most indebted to Mr. Piero Crociani of Rome; he kindly gave us access to materials he collected over many years of study that turned out to be incredibly helpful. Order of Battle constructed using: Naples State Archives, Segreteria di Guerra, Folder 1051; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat; Pepe; and Cortese. 18. Numbers are officers and men. 19. Numbers are officers, men, and horses. 20. Vignolle, 94–95. 21. Bellaire, 9. 22. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 161. 23. Ibid., 202. 24. Ibid., 273. 25. Ibid., 113. 26. Ibid., 193. 27. Ibid., 208. 28. Ibid., 159. 29. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 104. 30. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 102. 31. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 154. 32. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 103. 33. Vignolle, 96–97. ¨ sterreicher, 66. 34. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 35. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 103. 36. Vignolle, 98–99. 37. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 104. ¨ sterreicher, 67. 38. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 39. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 198. 40. Ibid., 199. ¨ sterreicher, 67. 41. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 42. Vignolle, 100–101. 43. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 204. 44. Ibid., 237. 45. Ibid., 176. 46. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 106.

358

Notes

47. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 201. 48. Von Holtz, 98. 49. In this instance, a “division” is two companies of infantry. 50. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 110. 51. Von Holtz, 99. 52. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 110–111. 53. Vignolle, 102–103. 54. Originally there were 17 boats, but they were reduced to 11 by this time. 55. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 112. 56. Ibid., 109. 57. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 279–280. 58. Ibid., 239. 59. Ibid., 258. 60. Ibid., 263. 61. Ibid., 246–248. 62. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 108. 63. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 308. 64. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 107. 65. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 270. 66. Ibid., 285. 67. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 108. 68. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 266. 69. Ibid., 283–284, 289. 70. March battalions were formed of newly trained recruits and used as the method of moving them to their parent formations. Their combat worthiness was minimal, as they lacked the depth of veterans, and they were “unblooded.” According to Vignolle, 106, it was no march battalion in Forli but a war battalion of the 53rd Line. Vaudoncourt (Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 373), however, very clearly says it was a battalion of conscripts. 71. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 109. 72. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 288. 73. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 112. 74. General Pino was in Ferrara, and the newly nominated commander of the garrison of Bologna, General Mazzucchelli, had yet to arrive. Zanoli, 274. 75. Ibid. 76. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 310, 315. 77. At the end of 1813 the active troops of the Kingdom of Italy belonging to the Army of Italy amounted to 19,438 men, 4,100 horses, and 52 guns. Together with the veterans from Spain and Germany, two new volunteer regiments (each on two battalions) and a corps of Brescia bersaglieri had contributed to reinforce the depleted ranks. The expected levy of 15,000 Italians, on the contrary, had not been as successful as that in France due to the loss of the departments of Romagna and those east of the Adige. Very few conscripts had been recruited. Zanoli, 274–275. 78. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 260, 269. 79. Viceroy’s letter to the Italian Minister of War, Verona, 10 December 1813, quoted in Zanoli, 375. 80. Strength report of 3 January 1814, Carteggio Zucchi, Vol. IV, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 282.

Notes

359

81. Vignolle, 106–107. 82. Ibid., 107–109. 83. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 112. 84. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 141–143. 85. A “Military Division” is not a field formation but a regional military government, responsible for the military operations in that region. It was separate from the civil government. 86. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 213–220. 87. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 114. 88. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 321. 89. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 112. 90. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 227–229. 91. Ibid., 262. 92. Ibid., 159. 93. Ibid., 166. 94. Ibid., 250. 95. Ibid., 179–182.

CHAPTER 5 1. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 330–332. 2. Ibid., 363–364. 3. Ibid., 425. 4. Ibid., 362. 5. Ibid., 620–621. 6. Ibid., 440. 7. Ibid., 468–469. 8. Ibid., 501. 9. Ibid., 330. 10. Ibid., 407. 11. Order of Battle constructed using: Naples State Archives, Segreteria di Guerra, Folder 1125; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat; Pepe, Vol. I; Cortese. 12. Sources disagree with regard to the number of guns in divisional batteries. A battery with 10 guns seems, however, a very unusual organization for a Napoleonic army. Regimental guns might also be attached to the infantry, but there is no available information on this. 13. The 8th, which originally belonged to this brigade, was replaced by the 9th Regiment. The 8th apparently had good morale, but the 9th suffered heavily from desertion. Pepe, Vol. I, 329. 14. This brigade was reinforced at the end of January by the arrival of 800 veterans from Germany, under the command of General Minutolo. These troops belonged to the 4th Le´ge`re Regiment, the so-called Neapolitan Elite Regiment (formed with the elite companies of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Line Regiments, which had been part of the Danzig garrison) and perhaps a few survivors of the Guard Velite Regiment, which had suffered enormous losses in Russia. 15. At the beginning of 1814, General Campana acted as the commander of the Neapolitan advanced guard in Emilia. It is likely, however, that this corps was formed from

360

Notes

some infantry units from Carascosa’s division, plus a few cavalry pelotons. Campana took command of the 4th and 7th Line Regiments only after General Pepe replaced General Rosaroll at the head of Carascosa’s first brigade, personally leading the advanced guard. 16. Numbers are men and horses. 17. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 524, mentions this regiment as attached to the Neapolitan army in Emilia. It might be guessed that the veterans came from Germany. Weil, Vol. III, 316, states that a weak cavalry regiment had arrived from Saxony at the end of 1813 and that it had been reunited with their fellow squadrons arriving from Naples. 18. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 101. 19. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 421. 20. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 119. 21. Zanoli, 276. 22. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 331. 23. Ibid., 335, 357. 24. Zanoli, 278–279. 25. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 388–389. 26. Ibid., 356–357. 27. Ibid., 426. 28. Zanoli, 278. 29. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 500. 30. Ibid., 325. 31. Ibid., 327. 32. Ibid., 351. 33. Ibid., 356. 34. Ibid., 336–340. 35. Ibid., 380–383. 36. Ibid., 395–397. The text of the treaty is published in the Appendixes. 37. Ibid., 411, 437. 38. Ibid., 452. 39. Ibid., 463. 40. Ibid., 496. 41. Ibid., 518. 42. Ibid., 515–517. 43. Ibid., 365. 44. Ibid., 329. 45. Ibid., 445. 46. Ibid., 391. 47. Ibid., 417. 48. Ibid., 423, 446, 627. 49. Ibid., 445. 50. Ibid., 461. 51. Ibid., 474. 52. Ibid., 482. 53. Ibid., 487. 54. Ibid., 523–525. 55. Ibid., 385, 406.

Notes

361

56. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 116–117. 57. Bellaire, 13. 58. Ibid., 19–20. 59. Vignolle, 110–111. 60. Bellaire, 24–25. 61. Ibid., 22–23. 62. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 384. 63. Pepe, Vol. I, 325. 64. Ibid. 65. Bellaire, 48–49. 66. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 422. 67. Ibid., 424. 68. Bellaire, 49–52. 69. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 472. 70. Bellaire, 61–62. 71. Ibid., 65. 72. Vignolle, 112–113. 73. Ibid., 114–115. Sporschil, Die grosse Chronik, gives the strength of the garrison at 700 Italians, 50 Szluiner Grenz, and 400 National Guards and states that the city’s walls had 165 guns defending them (76). According to Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, by the end of the siege, the garrison had been reduced to 980 men and 76 officers. 74. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 368. ¨ sterreicher, 76. 75. Sporschil, Feldzug der O

CHAPTER 6 1. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 504–505. 2. Vignolle, 116–117. 3. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. III, 506. 4. Ibid., 520–521. 5. Ibid., 526–527. 6. Ibid., Vol. IV, 6. 7. Ibid., 20. 8. Vignolle, 118–119. 9. Apparently, Eckhardt’s brigade was delayed on its march beyond the Adige and did not arrive before Manuta in time to join the battle. 10. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 22. 11. Ibid., 33. 12. Ibid., 45–46. ¨ sterreicher, 104, Borghetto was garrisoned 13. According to Sporschil, Feldzug der O by four companies of French voltigeurs, which were repulsed by the Ja¨gers. The presence of French troops in Borghetto during the night of 7–8 February, however, is not confirmed by any other source. 14. Ibid. 15. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 48. 16. Von Holtz, 131–133. 17. Beauharnais, Vol. X, 17.

362

Notes

18. Von Holtz, 134. Paumgarten’s advance on Gioto and his successive engagement with French troops are not, however, confirmed by any other source. 19. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 134–135; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 26–28. 20. Two squadrons, respectively, from the 3rd Italian Chasseurs and the 19th Chasseurs, had been detached to Grenier’s corps and acted as the advanced guard of the 4th Division. General Zucchi’s Correspondence, Vol. III—BRT, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 292. 21. Historical report of General Zucchi to the Viceroy, 9 February 1814, General Zucchi’s Correspondence, Vol. III—BRT, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 296. 22. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 136; von Holtz, 132. 23. Historical Report of Colonel Varese, commander of the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re, ASMMG 51, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 299. ¨ sterreicher, 105; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. 24. Sporschil, Feldzug der O IV, 57. 25. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 60. 26. Vignolle, 120–121. 27. Von Holtz, 135. 28. Zanoli, 279–280. ¨ ster29. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 139–140; Sporschil, Feldzug der O reicher, 106. 30. Von Holtz, 135. 31. Beauharnais, Vol. X, 21. 32. Von Holtz, 135. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 66, provides another version of the Austrian cavalry attack, according to which it was the dragoons who frontally charged Perreymond’s brigade, while the uhlans made their way through the flank of the enemy formation. 33. Galliani, Parisini, and Rocchiero, 26. 34. A few sources on either side (Vignolle, Vaudoncourt, Sporschil) state that Stutterheim’s grenadiers deployed on the “heights” of Pozzolo—by this, seemingly implying a relatively elevated and strong defensive position. This might be a bit of an exaggeration. Today the battlefield on the left bank of the Mincio between Roverbella, Pozzolo, and Remelli is relatively flat and open ground. Moving from Roverbella (42 meters above sea level), it gently rises up to 60 meters at Remelli, more than three miles north of Roverbella. At Pozzolo it is 50 meters above sea level. Even admitting that the terrain morphology has changed since then, it seems rather unlikely that in 1814 real “heights” stood northeast of Pozzolo. 35. Von Holtz, 136. 36. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 141. It seems rather unusual, albeit not impossible, that coming in sight of the enemy heavy cavalry the French infantry deployed en bataille, that is, in line. 37. Beauharnais, Vol. X, 22; Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 141. Both works indicate that during this action 18 Austrian guns opened fire on Bonnemains’s brigade. This is probably a mistake as, according to all Austrian archival sources, quoted by Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, 67, during this phase of the battle only 4 guns (a half battery) were available to FML Merville, the other half battery being detached to the pontoon bridge at Pozzolo. Artillery reinforcements (three batteries) joined FML Merville only late in the afternoon, when FM Bellegarde committed his reserves.

Notes

363

¨ sterreicher, 38. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 142; Sporschil, Feldzug der O 107. 39. Von Holtz, 136. 40. Ibid., 137. 41. Vacani indicates that this attack was executed by the Savoy Dragoon Regiment, which bore the name Savoy in honor of its earlier commander, Eugene of Savoy. The Savoy Dragoons were part of Wrede’s brigade, which also included the Hohenlohe Dragoons. The activities of the Hohenlohe Dragoons at this time are not known. They were either held in reserve by Merville, or they were detached. Similarly, the location of the sixth squadron of the Savoy Dragoons is not known. Vacani, 29. 42. Vignolle, 124–125; Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 142. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 71, gives quite a different version. He did not record any charge of the 31st Chasseurs. Instead, he argues that the Savoy Dragoons mistook their orders, and by going off in the direction of Quaderni, they opened a gap in the Austrian left, which the French rapidly exploited, causing FML Merville’s division to retire. 43. Vignolle, 124–125. 44. Von Holtz, 138. ¨ sterreicher, 45. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 142; Sporschil, Feldzug der O 107. 46. Vignolle, 124. 47. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 75–76. 48. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 143. 49. Von Holtz, 140; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 77. 50. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 77. According to other sources, like Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 142, GM Quasdanovich’s brigade took part in the earlier fighting by Remelli, and their general was wounded on that occasion. Being based on Austrian sources, Weil’s Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat is likely to be a more reliable account of this action. 51. Von Holtz, 140. 52. Ibid., 139–140. 53. Ibid., 23–24. 54. Historical report of Colonel Varese, commander of the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re, ASMMG 51, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 300. 55. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 82–83. 56. Zanoli, 280. 57. Historical report of General Zucchi to Viceroy, 9 February 1814, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 297. 58. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 83. 59. Ibid., 48. 60. Von Holtz, 141. 61. Ibid.; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 52. 62. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 54. 63. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 144. 64. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 79. 65. Von Holtz, 141. 66. Historical report of Colonel Erculei, commander of the 4th Italian Chasseur Regiment, 25 February 1814, ASM-MG 48, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 295. 67. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 80.

364

Notes

68. Ibid., 80–81. 69. Ibid., 72, 81–82. 70. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 88. Stutterheim’s grenadiers reported a total loss of 790 men; FML Mayer von Heldenfeld’s blocking corps reported 1,540. One of the units that suffered the most was the Erzherzog Karl Infantry Regiment (De Best’s brigade), which lost 203 men hors de combat. ¨ sterreicher, 110. 71. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 72. Von Holtz, 142. 73. Vignolle, 126–127. 74. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 91. ¨ sterreicher, 111. 75. Ibid., 106–109; Sporschil, Feldzug der O 76. Vignolle, 132–133; Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 149; Sporschil, Feld¨ sterreicher, 112. zug der O ¨ sterreicher, 112. 77. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 78. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 112–114. 79. Vignolle, 132–133; Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 149; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 114. 80. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 115.

CHAPTER 7 1. De Rossi, “La difesa di Rocca d’Anfo nel 1813,” 466. 2. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 124. 3. De Rossi, in MSM, 469–470. 4. Beauharnais, Memoires et Correspondance, Vol. X, 139. 5. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 145–146. 6. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 128. 7. Vignolle, 132–133. 8. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 196. 9. Ibid., 198. 10. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 131. 11. Vignolle, 136–137. 12. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 212–213. 13. The composition of the advanced guard division is unknown. 14. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 105. 15. Ibid., 192. 16. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 128. 17. Vignolle, 135–137. 18. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 120. 19. Ibid., 126, 253. 20. Ibid., 36–37. 21. Ibid., 38. 22. Ibid., 110. 23. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 133. 24. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 136. 25. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 161–163; Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 200.

Notes

365

26. Pepe, Vol. I, 337. 27. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 164. 28. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 201–202. 29. Ibid., 207–208. 30. Ibid., 223–225. 31. Vignolle, 144–145. 32. Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes, 164. 33. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 244–245. 34. Vignolle, 146–149. 35. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 271–273. 36. Ibid., 273–274. 37. The KGL was the “King’s German Legion” and served as part of the British Army. Initially they were formed of Hanoverian Germans who escaped the French occupation of Hanover, but the wastage of the Peninsular campaign had drained off many of their Hanoverian troops, and they were replaced by German deserters from the Napoleonic armies in Spain as well as a mixture of other manpower. 38. The 3rd Anglo-Italian Infantry Regiment was formed of Italians in British pay. 39. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 149–150. 40. Ibid., 157–192.

CHAPTER 8 1. Vaudoncourt, Histoire politique et militaire, Vol. II, 454–455. 2. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 281. 3. Zanoli, 292–293. 4. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 283. 5. Murat had arrived during the evening of 29 February and visited the line of advanced posts escorted by a group of cavalry. General Rambourg, seeing a group of cavalry, fired three cannon shots at them, which forced them to disperse. 6. Vignolle, 152–153. 7. For the following reconstruction of the battle of Parma, the last victory of Napoleonic armies in Italy, the authors heavily relied on Zannoni’s “La battaglia di Parma del 2 marzo 1814.” ¨ sterreicher, 120. 8. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 9. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 285. 10. Sources disagree with regard to the composition of Rouyer’s division. According to Weil, ibid., 40, Schmitz’s brigade was formed by three battalions of the 9th Line, the 3/52nd Line, the 7/67th, and the 6/3rd Light, whereas Vignolle, 136, put the latter in Darnaud’s brigade, together with two battalions of the 35th Line and one battalion of the 1st Foreign Regiment. 11. Again, sources disagree with regard to the position of Rambourg’s cavalry brigade (two squadrons of the 19th Chasseur Regiment, two squadrons of the 3rd Italian Chasseur Regiment, one squadron of the Napoleon Italian Dragoon Regiment) in the order of battle. In contrast with Vignolle, Zannoni, 9, states that all five squadrons were to support Darnaud’s brigade in his attack from the west. 12. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 286. 13. The action of the voltigeurs scaling and storming the ramparts was reported by

366

Notes

the brigade commander to General Grenier. See Vignolle, 155. According to Weil, ibid., Vol. IV, 286, on the contrary, the first troops to enter the San Francesco Gate were the Italian chasseurs a` cheval. Probably made blind by the thick fog, the militia company defending the gate mistook the chasseurs for Neapolitan cavalry as they trotted down the road from Fornovo (Allied troops had been retreating through that gate earlier that morning) and kept the gate open. When they realized their mistake, it was too late. 14. At this moment Colonel Broussier, as he summoned these troops to surrender, fell from his horse and was quickly surrounded by the enemy, who bayonetted him. However he was soon liberated by his troops. 15. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 287. 16. Vignolle, 154–155. 17. Ibid., 156–157. ¨ sterreicher, 121. 18. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 19. Pepe, Vol. I, 338–339. 20. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 290. 21. Official report by Colonel Vallata, commander of the 1st Italian Chasseurs, ASMMG 48, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 318. ¨ sterreicher, 121. 22. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 23. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 136. ¨ sterreicher, 121. 24. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 25. Official report by Colonel Varese, commander of the 2nd Italian Le´ge`re Regiment, ASM-MG 51, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 306–307. 26. Vignolle, 162. ¨ sterreicher, 122. 27. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 28. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 337. 29. Ibid., 327. 30. Pepe, Vol. I, 339. ¨ sterreicher, 123. 31. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 32. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 136. 33. Pepe, Vol. I, 340. 34. Vignolle, 163. 35. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 338–339. 36. Vignolle, 164–165. 37. Official report of General Zucchi, commander of the Manuta garrison of 11 March 1814, ASM-MG 2962, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 329–330. 38. It is unclear to whom Ceccopieri reported. He was apparently the colonel of the 4th Italian Line Regiment. Unfortunately, the 4th Italian Line Regiment does not appear in the period orders of battle as being assigned to any of the main field forces. 39. Vignolle, 166–167. 40. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 363. 41. Ibid., 364. 42. Zanoli, 297, indicates only two battalions were present. 43. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 365. 44. Ibid., 371. 45. Vignolle, 168–169. 46. Ibid., 170–171. 47. Bellaire, 25–27.

Notes

367

CHAPTER 9 1. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 359. 2. Ibid., 375–376. 3. Ibid., 388–391. 4. Ibid., 397. 5. Ibid., 401, 468. 6. Ibid., 414–426. 7. Rosselli, 120–138. 8. Ibid., 126–142. 9. Schwertseger, 491. 10. Beamish, 307. 11. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 434–435. 12. Vignolle, 172. 13. This order of battle, however, is probably incomplete, as it does not mention other Sicilian, Italian, and Greek units in British service that took part in the campaign and appear in documents of the Record Office, War Office, Sicily, quoted by Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 149. 14. According to Beamish, 306, this was a “rocket battery” commanded by the German Captain Bindseil. 15. In spite of GD Rouyer St.-Victor’s several pleas for more troops, Prince Camillo Borghese could only send an artillery company, 50 sappers, and 200 men of the 1st Le´ge`re Regiment. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 440. ¨ sterreicher, 139. 16. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 17. Schwertseger, 491. 18. Beamish, 66. 19. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 449. 20. General Fresia’s declaration, 31 March 1814, ASG, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 331. 21. Vignolle, 173. 22. Ibid., 174. 23. Ibid., 175. 24. Zanoli, 300–301. 25. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 155. 26. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 500. 27. Ibid., 456–465. 28. Ibid., 480–483. 29. Zanoli, 299. 30. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 505–506. 31. Ibid., 506. 32. Ibid., 508. 33. Ibid., 514. 34. Ibid., 515. 35. Ibid., 516–517. 36. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 141–142. 37. Returns of Raumburg’s brigade, 16 April 1814, ASM-MG 48, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 333.

368

Notes

38. Vignolle, 176–177. 39. Beauharnais, Vol. X, 164–167. 40. Vignolle, 178–179. 41. Ibid., 180. ¨ sterreicher, 141; Beamish, 309. 42. Sporschil, Feldzug der O ¨ sterreicher, 141. 43. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 44. Beamish, 310. 45. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. V, 539. 46. Vignolle, 181. 47. Beamish, 312. 48. Vignolle, 182–183. 49. Weil, Le Prince Euge`ne et Murat, Vol. IV, 576. 50. Rosselli, 168–169. ¨ sterreicher, 138. 51. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 52. It should be recalled that the English had significant commercial interests in the Mediterranean and that the Genoese and Venetians were major economic competitors that were to be dealt with in any manner possible. Duplicity had, since the surrenders of Danzig and Dresden in 1813, replaced the honor of generals and admirals, the honors of war, and honor in general. 53. Vignolle, 185. ¨ sterreicher, 138. 54. Sporschil, Feldzug der O 55. Journal of the blockade of Venice by General Seras, Seras Family Archive, quoted in Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 358. 56. Vignolle, 186–187. 57. The white cockade, a circular patch of cloth worn on the hat, was the symbol of the Bourbons and replaced the colored cockade of the Republic. 58. Vignolle, 180–189. 59. Ibid., 190–192. 60. Ibid., 193–195. 61. Candeloro, 371–377. 62. Giacchi, Gli Italiani nell’Illiria, 183. 63. Ibid., 185. 64. Della Peruta, 416. 65. Ibid., 420.

Bibliography ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS Euge`ne Beauharnais Papers. Princeton University. Series CO645, Box 26, Folders 1–5. French Archives. Section Historique de l’Arme´e du Terre (SHAT). Cartons C6 13 and C2 708. French National Archives. Cartons AFIV* 1342, AFIV* 1343, and AFIV* 1344. Milan State Archives. Minister of War. Folders 43, 45, 47, 48, 51, 146–152, 377, 399– 423bis, 1065–1068bis. Naples State Archives. Segreteria di Guerra. Folders 1051, 1125.

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Index Abele, General, 129, 130, 153 Aberdeen, Lord, 135, 136, 137 Adelsberg, 19, 38, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64 Adige, 2, 3, 4, 18, 33, 62, 68, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99, 118, 119, 120, 129, 131, 134, 135, 138, 140, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 181, 203, 204, 205 Adriatic Sea, 14, 18, 23, 97, 107, 108, 116, 120, 138, 149 Agram, 18, 19, 21, 27, 28 Aich, 47, 65 Aitonisch, 42 Alessandria, 83, 96, 101, 121, 134, 138, 145, 191, 224 Ancona, 2, 96, 110, 120, 133, 135, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 189, 190 Anglo-Sicilian Corps, 212, 214, 217, 224, 225, 226 Arcole, 92, 93, 94 Arenzano, 215, 216 Arnoldstein, 30, 31, 37, 56, 60, 61 Asolo, 21, 80 Austria, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45,

46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 226, 227, 233, 234, 235 Avio, 91 Balachoff, General, 211, 217 Barbou, General, 110, 121, 143, 144, 145, 147 Ba¨renthal ravine, 38, 39, 44, 45 Bartolo-Graben, 67, 68 Bassano, 4, 5, 12, 18, 20, 21, 23, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 88, 90, 129 Battaglia, Felice, 109

374

Index

Baumgarten, General, 35, 129, 130 Bautzen, Battle of, 6, 105 Bavaria, 26, 28, 34, 59, 61, 62, 67, 69, 70, 74, 234 Beauharnais, Prince Euge`ne, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 99, 100, 101, 107, 115, 119, 131, 134, 136, 138, 144, 145, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 190, 195, 196, 201, 202, 204, 206, 207, 210, 215, 216, 220, 227, 228, 232, 233, 234 Bellegarde, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 22, 87, 118, 119, 120, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 161, 168, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 189, 191, 193, 194, 204, 205, 210, 211, 217, 220, 221, 222, 227, 234 Bellotti, General, 18, 21, 26, 33, 34, 35, 46, 47, 48 Bentinck, Lord, 6, 104, 105, 106, 124, 125, 127, 135, 136, 137, 138, 189, 193, 194, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 221, 224, 225, 226, 227 Bevilacqua, 88, 100 Bianco Canal, 111 Bleyberg, 42, 43, 44 Bogdan, General, 119, 130, 155, 158, 168, 171, 180, 205, 206 Bologna, 97, 99, 110, 120, 121, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145, 188, 194, 216 Bolzano, 53, 65 Bonaparte, Queen Caroline, 5, 103, 106, 136, 211 Bonfanti, General, 13, 21, 27, 33, 53, 134, 182, 183, 195, 234, 235 Bonnemains, General, 72, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 92, 93, 94, 123, 132, 152,

153, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 175, 176, 179, 180, 187, 192, 231 Barbou, General, 121 Borghese, Prince Camillo, 71, 100, 147, 148, 226 Borghetto, 86, 89, 90, 91, 152, 158, 162, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 202, 214 Borgo San Donnino, 192, 193, 218 Borgoforte, 134, 139, 152, 189, 191, 193, 196, 201, 202, 206, 207, 219, 220 Bozen, 53, 65, 72, 73, 77 Bozzolo, 4, 202, 220 Brenta, 73, 74, 80, 81, 82 Brentina, 205, 206 Brescello, 196, 218 Brescia, 2, 4, 5, 12, 13, 78, 81, 83, 86, 87, 90, 91, 131, 135, 151, 155, 181, 182, 183, 195, 221, 234 Britain, 6, 103, 104, 211 Brixen, 19, 65, 72, 73, 77 Bruneck, 65, 72, 73, 75, 77 Caffarelli, General, 101 Calabrian Free Corps, 98, 193 Caldiero, 81, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 Camonica Valley, 86 Ca-Mora castle, 79 Campagnola, 91 Campana, General, 133, 141, 188, 189, 192, 200 Campi, General, 32, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 56, 57, 60, 64, 66, 68, 69, 72, 75, 83, 93, 113, 123, 168, 186, 230 Ca-Negri, 80 Caporetto, 30, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68 Cappuccini Castle, 143, 144, 145 Carascosa, General, 107, 108, 110, 120, 132, 138, 139, 190, 202, 217, 218, 219 Cariati, Prince, 6, 104, 105 Carinthia, 18, 20 Caroline, Bonaparte, 5, 103, 106, 211 Casalmaggiore, 191, 192, 220 Castagnaro, 100, 119, 135, 152 Castel Sant’Angelo, 109, 141, 142, 189, 200, 207, 208

Index Castelbelforte, 159, 169, 204 Castelfranco, 12, 18, 20, 23, 74, 76, 78, 80, 81, 88 Castelguelfo, 188, 192, 203, 217, 218 Castelnuovo, 152, 153, 159, 192, 205, 206 Castiglione Mantovano, 160, 161, 169, 170, 175, 204, 205 Castle of Schiarino-Rizzino, 220 Castlereagh, Lord R.S., 104, 135, 136, 137, 210, 211, 216, 226, 227 Cattaro, 5, 15, 28, 144, 148, 149 Cerknica, 59, 60, 62, 64 Cerlongo, 158, 162, 202 Chioggia, 72, 88, 135 Cilly, 19, 23, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 46, 49, 54, 56, 69 Cismon, 80, 81 Cividale, 5, 17, 20, 64, 75 Civitavecchia, 141, 142, 189, 207, 208 Clarke, H., 3, 30, 71 Coccau, 67, 68 Codroipo, 24, 75, 76 Colognola, 92, 93, 95 Comacchio, 98, 99, 139 Conegliano, 17, 21, 75, 78 Continental System, 106 Convention of Schiarino-Rizzino, 220, 227, 232, 234 Corbineau, General, 101 Cornigliano, 222 Corona, 86, 89, 90, 152 Corsica, 7, 136 Cortina d’Ampezzo, 74 Costa, 111 Cremona, 4, 13, 154, 177, 183, 187, 191, 219, 221, 234 Croatia, 21, 23, 28 Crostolo River, 203 Crostolo Valley, 202 Csivich, General, 23, 25, 62, 63, 64, 65, 76, 88, 119, 131, 135 Dalmatia, 4, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21, 23, 28, 49, 51, 60, 62, 69, 70, 78, 85, 87, 96, 116, 131, 144, 181, 182 d’Ambrosio, General, 108, 133, 138, 139, 140, 141, 190, 218, 219

375

d’Anthouard, General, 49, 74, 75, 100, 183 Danzig, 144 d’Aquino, General, 133, 218 Darnaud, General, 33, 42, 57, 84, 90, 91, 95, 119, 122, 185, 191, 197, 199, 200, 230 De Best, General, 129, 130, 155, 158, 171, 175 De Conchy, General, 72, 83, 93, 95, 96, 99, 100, 111, 114, 119, 122, 186 Desenzano, 86, 182 Dode, General, 83, 220, 229 Drava River, 18 Drautal, 18, 19, 20, 26, 30, 34, 55, 59 Drava Valley, 14, 20, 23, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 43, 45, 46, 48, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 69, 73 Dresden, 71, 129, 144, 179 Dubrovnik, 28, 116, 148, 149 Dupeyroux, General, 32, 57, 72, 135 Durutte, General, 7, 10 Eckhardt, General, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 34, 55, 58, 61, 63, 67, 68, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 130, 140, 153, 189 Emilia, 110, 124, 132, 133, 134, 136, 140, 151, 177, 188, 189, 191, 193, 214, 217 Enza River, 188, 189, 190, 192, 197, 200, 201, 203 Faenza, 121, 138, 139, 140 Federaun, 31, 32, 33, 61 Feistritz, 17, 20, 34, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 56, 60, 67, 68, 69 Fenestrelle, 232 Fenestrelle Pass, 134 Fenner, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 34, 46, 53, 55, 59, 65, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 89, 90, 130, 153, 168, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178 Ferrara, 97, 98, 99, 100, 121, 139, 140 Filangieri, General, 121, 132, 139, 140, 141, 209, 219 Finkenstein, 30, 48, 61 Fiorenzuola d’Arda, 190, 191, 218, 219

376

Index

Fiume, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 27, 28, 33, 34, 36, 37, 48, 51, 52, 59, 62, 64, 69, 145 Fo¨lseis, General, 23, 25, 34, 37, 46, 47, 48, 49, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 88, 94, 119, 155 Fontana, General, 61, 93, 190, 192, 234 Fontanabuona, 215 Fontanabuona Valley, 215 Fontanelli, General, 1, 2, 86, 92, 121, 235 Fontaniva, 81, 82 Forestier, General, 123, 166, 167, 168, 186, 230 Forli, 120, 121, 139 Fornovo, 191, 192, 196, 197, 199 Fort of Cesenatico, 138 Fort of Saint Angelo, 208 Fort Santa Croce, 212 Fort Santa Maria, 212 Fouch, J., 103, 190, 207 Fremantle, Admiral, 15, 62, 76, 82 Fressinet, General, 123, 152, 158, 159, 160, 162, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 185, 186, 201, 204, 205, 231, 232 Frimont, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 17, 24, 26, 31, 34, 46, 47, 55, 56, 58, 61, 63, 67, 68, 73, 76, 77, 78, 80, 91, 158, 170 Friuli, 16, 17, 22, 26, 68 Fruoni, 167, 168, 169, 175 Gail, 18 Gailtal, 18, 19, 30 Galimberti, General, 33, 46, 47, 49, 57, 75, 76, 78, 84, 90, 204, 205, 206 Gallo, duke of, 136, 138, 210, 216, 217 Garnier, General, 27, 28, 33 Genoa, 71, 101, 138, 147, 148, 190, 194, 195, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 222, 224, 225, 226 Gifflenga, General, 11, 33, 53, 58, 65, 66, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 85, 86, 87, 137 Gober, General, 46, 55, 130, 131, 140, 189, 191, 202, 217, 218, 219 Goito, 86, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159,

160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 187, 202, 205 Gonzaga, 206, 207 Gorizia, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 30, 64, 66, 70, 76 Gradisca, 19, 20, 64, 70, 75 Grande Arme´e, 104 Gratien, General, 11, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 38, 57, 66, 68, 75, 79, 80, 96, 134, 151, 183, 187, 192, 196, 201, 203, 206 Grenier, General, 3, 9, 11, 17, 20, 32, 38, 42, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 86, 92, 94, 122, 132, 152, 153, 159, 160, 168, 177, 179, 185, 191, 192, 193, 196, 197, 199, 201, 202, 228, 229, 231 Guastalla, 196, 197, 202, 218, 219, 220 Guglielmo Pepe, General, 108 Guidizzolo, 179, 187, 220 Hapsburg, Erzherzog Maximilian, 52, 98, 111 Heldenfeld, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 153, 155, 161, 162, 163, 168, 169, 170, 175, 177, 179, 180 Hiller, Feldzeugmeister, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 34, 38, 46, 49, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 115, 118, 136 Hollenburg, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 55, 56, 60 Illasi, 92, 93, 94, 95 Illyria, 4, 7, 10, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 31, 63, 69, 70, 98, 148 Imola, 120, 121 Isola Porcarizza, 86, 99, 124, 152 Isonzo River, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 30, 32, 37, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 86, 135 Istria, 18, 23, 38, 48, 49, 52, 62, 64, 65, 69, 139, 140 Italian League, 109 Julian Alps, 19, 37, 60 Kamnik, 37, 46, 47 Karlovac, 18, 19, 27, 28

Index Karlstadt, 18, 27, 28 Kingdom of Naples, 103 Kingdom of Two Sicilies, 104 Klagenfurt, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 46, 55, 59, 60 Krainburg, 19, 28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 61 Kranj, 19, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 56, 60, 61 Kulpa, 18 La Spezia, 125, 138, 148, 194, 209, 212, 213, 214 Laibach, 10, 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 61, 63 Lasce, 49, 60, 62, 63 Laschitz, 49, 60, 62, 63 Lavagno, 93, 95 Lecchi, General, 12, 26, 27, 33, 53, 54, 57, 124, 132, 133, 187, 189, 190, 207, 209, 234 Legnago, 119 Leipzig, 1, 105, 106, 129, 179 Lendinara, 111 Liguria, 4, 14, 125, 138, 194, 211, 224 Lipa, 37, 38, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 62, 64 Lippa, 28, 37, 38, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 62, 64 Livron, Mare´chal de Camp, 109, 132, 139, 141, 188 Ljubljana, 10, 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 63 Loibl, 16, 17, 19, 20, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 46, 48, 55, 56, 60 Lombardy, 177, 232, 233, 234 London, 103 Lucca, 125, 190 Ludmannsdorf, 38, 45 Lu¨tzen, Battle of, 1, 4, 6, 105 Lyon, 101, 195 MacDonald, General, 121, 133, 141, 143, 144, 145 MacFarlane, General, 193, 209, 213, 214 Maderno, 183 Magra River, 148, 212, 213, 214

377

Maniva, 183 Maniva Pass, 181 Mantua, 4, 5, 70, 77, 97, 121, 124, 134, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 161, 162, 177, 179, 180, 185, 191, 192, 195, 202, 204, 205, 220, 228, 232, 234 Marcognet, General, 12, 27, 32, 38, 54, 57, 64, 75, 83, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 152, 153, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 168, 169, 175, 178, 179, 180, 185, 191, 202, 204, 230, 232 Marengo, 159, 160, 162, 163, 175, 177, 205 Marschall, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 24, 46, 55, 58, 61, 66, 67, 68, 74, 75, 82, 111, 113, 117, 118, 119, 130, 135 Marziani, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 25, 46, 55, 58, 77, 89, 119, 130 Massimbona, 160, 161, 163, 177, 178 Maucune, General, 206, 217, 218, 219, 220, 229 Mayer von Heldenfeld, Feldmarschalleutnant, 130 Mazzi Campagnola, 167, 169 Mazzucchelli, General, 77, 78, 234, 235 Mermet, General, 13, 27, 33, 57, 85, 92, 93, 94, 100, 123, 132, 166, 186, 231 Merville, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 58, 67, 88, 92, 94, 119, 130, 155, 158, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 175, 177, 178, 184 Mesola, 111 Mesola Canal, 98 Metternich, Prince, 6, 10, 16, 104, 105, 106, 126, 211, 234 Milan, 2, 4, 70, 71, 73, 77, 86, 96, 97, 106, 107, 121, 123, 195, 221, 228, 232, 233, 234 Millet, General, 107 Milutinovich, General, 28, 33, 49, 50, 53, 54, 117, 149 Miollis, General, 107, 109 Mincio, 97, 125, 131, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175,

378

Index

176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 187, 189, 191, 193, 196, 201, 202, 204, 205, 210, 227, 234 Mincio, Battle of, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179 Modena, 99, 138, 139, 140, 141, 188, 189, 190, 201, 203, 216, 233 Mont-Cenis Pass, 134 Monte Croce, 18 Monte Fasce, 215, 225 Monte Tonale, 116 Montebello, 92, 94 Montechiari, 13, 15, 21, 23, 53 Montorio, 119 Montrichard, General, 28, 148, 149 Monzambano, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 161, 162, 168, 170, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 187, 202, 204, 206 Mozzacane, 153, 161, 168, 170, 175, 178, 179 Murat, King Joachim, 3, 5, 6, 69, 86, 87, 97, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 119, 120, 124, 126, 127, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 151, 154, 166, 177, 181, 183, 184, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 219, 233 Naples, 3, 6, 87, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 119, 120, 126, 127, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 146, 147, 151, 154, 184, 188, 189, 190, 194, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 216, 217, 221, 233 Napoleon, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 18, 22, 23, 26, 45, 70, 78, 84, 86, 90, 97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 120, 126, 127, 132, 136, 154, 178, 184, 186, 195, 199, 200, 207, 210, 216, 227, 229, 232, 233, 234, 235

Neipperg, Count, 119, 126, 136, 137, 138, 184, 210, 220, 234 Neumarkt, 28, 30, 38, 48, 56, 60, 61 Neustadt, 19, 28, 33, 49, 56, 59 Novo Mesto, 28, 33, 49, 56, 59 Nugent, General, 23, 25, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 62, 65, 76, 87, 97, 98, 99, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 125, 126, 131, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 183, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 197, 199, 201, 202, 203, 210, 214, 215, 217, 219 Oglio, River, 152, 153, 154, 192 Oliosi, 153, 159, 168, 171 Osoppo, 1, 17, 20, 26, 75, 76, 88, 119, 135, 220, 221, 234 Ospedaletto, 20, 68, 75 Ossenigo, 89, 90 Ostiglia, 139, 204 Padua, 4, 5, 12, 18, 21, 23, 119 Palermo, 71, 103, 106, 125, 136, 137, 138, 209 Palmanova, 1, 12, 18, 20, 24, 26, 71, 75, 76, 82, 88, 119, 135, 220, 221, 234 Palombini, General, 12, 26, 27, 33, 36, 38, 46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 75, 76, 81, 84, 86, 90, 91, 97, 123, 124, 152, 159, 170, 171, 174, 175, 178, 179, 204, 234, 235 Papal States, 109 Parma, 138, 188, 191, 192, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 217 Paumgarten, General, 153, 159, 205, 206 Pegot, General, 63, 64, 72, 123, 186, 204, 205, 206, 215 Pepe, General, 132, 143, 190, 201, 203, 217, 219 Peraldi, Colonel, 50, 182, 183 Perreimond, General, 33, 52, 57, 60, 62, 85, 93, 124, 132, 153, 159, 162, 163, 166, 168, 175, 176, 179, 180 Pescheria, 174, 180, 195 Pflacher, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 87, 88, 94, 95, 96, 130, 153, 155, 158, 171, 175 Piacenza, 96, 116, 131, 134, 138, 151,

Index 177, 183, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 197, 210, 217, 219, 220, 221 Piave River, 18, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 91, 178, 216 Piedmont, 4, 7, 71, 96, 101, 134, 151, 177, 195, 226 Pignatelli-Cerchiara, General, 108, 133, 141, 142, 219 Pignatelli-Strongoli, General, 110, 132 Pino, General, 115 Plesswitz Armistice, 6 Po, River, 62, 97, 98, 106, 110, 111, 113, 115, 118, 120, 126, 131, 133, 134, 138, 139, 140, 183, 188, 189, 191, 195, 196, 197, 201, 204, 221, 227 Pola, 38, 49 Pontenure, 189, 192, 218 Pontremoli, 148, 190, 191, 214 Pordenone, 5, 12, 17, 19, 20, 24, 27, 76 Postojna, 38, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64 Pozzolo, 155, 158, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 187, 202 Predil, 19, 20, 30, 67 Pula, 38, 49 Pusteria Valley, 33, 53, 55, 65, 77 Pustertal (Valley), 19, 33, 34, 53, 55, 65, 77 Quasdanovich, General, 129, 130, 155, 158, 168, 169, 175, 176, 178, 180 Quesnel, General, 11, 20, 26, 31, 32, 38, 39, 42, 43, 54, 57, 64, 69, 75, 83, 92, 93, 94, 119, 123, 124, 152, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 175, 179, 186, 202, 230, 232 Radivojevich, Feldmarschal-leutnant, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35, 37, 46, 49, 59, 65, 74, 76, 81, 88, 90, 92, 95, 97, 98, 116, 119, 130, 152, 153, 155, 158, 160, 162, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 184 Ragusa, 5, 15, 18, 21, 28, 116, 148, 149 Rambourgt, General, 81, 85, 123, 153, 159, 170, 179, 186, 191, 192, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 207

379

Rann, 33 Ravenna, 15, 98, 111, 113, 115, 120, 121, 138 Rebrovich, General, 23, 25, 35, 49, 50, 53, 59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 82, 88, 100, 117, 119, 130, 184 Reggio, 139, 188, 190, 192, 218, 219 Reggio Emilia, 141, 196, 197, 200, 201, 202, 203, 209 Remelli, 163, 166, 167, 169, 175 Rijeka, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37, 48, 51, 52, 59, 62, 69 Rimini, 113, 120, 121, 138, 139 Rivoli, 78, 86, 90, 124, 126, 152 Rocca d’Anfo, 78, 86, 97, 181, 183 Rodano, 201, 203 Roize, General, 28, 117 Romagna, 110, 115, 118, 120, 125, 134, 136, 138, 139, 189 Rome, 4, 7, 71, 101, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 126, 132, 137, 141, 189, 207, 210 Roncaglia, 189, 192, 218 Ronco, 86, 92, 95, 96, 99, 113, 119 Rosegg, 26, 31, 32, 33, 37, 43, 56, 61 Rotta, 160, 205 Rotta Sabadina, 113 Rouyer St. Victor, General, 17, 27, 32, 38, 42, 43, 57, 63, 66, 75, 80, 84, 90, 93, 96, 119, 122, 124, 148, 152, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 175, 179, 180, 183, 185, 191, 192, 196, 197, 201, 202, 212, 213, 214, 215, 220, 229, 232 Roverbella, 86, 153, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 168, 169, 170, 175, 177, 204, 205 Roverchiara, 86, 95, 119, 120 Roverdiere, 111 Rovereto, 4, 78, 81, 89, 90, 91, 118, 152 Rovigno, 21, 49 Rovigo, 99, 111, 113, 114, 115, 120, 121 Rowley, Commodore, 97, 125, 212, 225, 226 Ruggieri, General, 33, 38, 47, 48, 52, 57, 59, 62, 75, 84, 90, 123 Russia, 103

380

Index

Sabbia Valley, 181, 182, 183 Sachsenburg, 26, 34, 46, 55 Saint-Bernard Pass, 134 Sant’Angelo, Castel, 109, 141, 142, 189, 200, 207, 208 Salzburg, 19, 22, 24, 26, 34 San Brizio, 159, 160 San Daniele, 17, 20, 24, 75, 76 San Giorgio, 192, 219 San Giovanni, 140 San Giovanni Lupatolo, 86, 152 San Martino, 113, 119, 225 San Martino Buon Albergo, 82, 86, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 San Martino d’Albaro, 225 San Maurizio, 202 San Michele, 82, 86, 95, 96, 113, 119, 124, 152, 199, 224 San-Maurizio, 202 Sant’Angelo, 72 Santa Croce Gate, 197, 199, 200 Santa Lucia, 160, 169, 205 Sava Bohinjska, 61 Sava Valley, 14, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 43, 46, 47, 48, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61 Savona, 148, 214, 215, 222, 224, 226 Schiarino-Rizzino, Castle of, 220 Schiarino-Rizzino, Convention of, 234 Schmitz, General, 33, 42, 43, 44, 45, 57, 69, 84, 90, 91, 113, 119, 120, 122, 185, 191, 196, 197, 199, 200, 230 Schwarzenberg, Feldmarschal, Prince, 15, 16, 131, 134 Sebenico, 116 Seras, General, 71, 72, 118, 216, 227 Severoli, General, 124, 134, 151, 152, 183, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 235 Sibenik, 116 Sicily, 6, 103, 104, 106, 124, 125, 127, 135, 137, 148, 193, 194, 209, 211 Smarje, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 59, 60, 63, 69 Soulier, General, 72, 75, 76, 83, 93, 192, 202, 203, 207, 229 Spain, 121

Spalato, 116 Spiegel, General, 135, 153, 170, 205 Spittal, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 46, 55, 65, 73 Spleny, General, 17 Split, 116 St. Hermagor, 34, 54, 56 St. Marein, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 59, 60, 63, 69 Stanissavlevich, General, 24, 26, 27, 34, 46, 59, 65, 72, 73, 77, 78, 89, 90, 118, 130, 155, 181, 182, 183 Starhemberg, General, 60, 62, 64, 65, 76, 82, 88, 92, 94, 99, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 130, 131, 135, 139, 140, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 197, 199, 201, 202, 203, 217, 219 Steffanini, General, 119, 129, 130, 152, 153, 155, 158, 161, 175, 178, 179, 180, 184 Studenec, 59, 60, 62 Stutterheim, General, 25, 46, 55, 58, 77, 88, 89, 94, 95, 96, 130, 155, 158, 163, 166, 167, 169, 176 Suden, General, 89, 129, 130, 153, 205 Sugana Valley, 75, 77, 79, 81, 87 Suzzara, 206, 207, 218, 219 Tagliamento River, 17, 18, 21, 23, 61, 68, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 82 Taro River, 147, 148, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 196, 197, 199, 203, 206, 214, 217, 218, 220 Tarvis, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 46, 55, 56, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 74, 118 Tomassich, General Franz Freiherrn von, 87, 116, 117, 131 Tonale, 89 Toulon, 14, 101, 121, 224, 226, 232 Trecenta, 99, 100, 111, 115 Trento, 2, 19, 53, 65, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87, 129, 152 Treviso, 4, 5, 12, 18, 19, 21, 23, 74, 78, 81, 82 Trieste, 2, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 23, 27, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 46, 47, 48, 52, 62, 63, 64, 76, 87, 97, 98

Index Tschernutsch, 35, 46, 47, 48, 50, 54, 61, 62 Turin, 4, 96, 101, 121, 132, 148, 221, 224, 229, 231, 232 Tuscany, 110 Tyrrhenian coast, 109, 124, 125, 138, 191, 194, 208, 212 Tyrrhenian Sea, 14 Udine, 2, 5, 12, 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 64, 75, 76, 130 Valeggio, 4, 81, 86, 124, 152, 153, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 168, 169, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 205 Vecsey, General, 17, 25, 26, 34, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 55, 56, 59, 61, 68, 75, 76, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 130, 155, 158, 159, 161, 163, 175, 178 Venice, 2, 5, 14, 15, 71, 72, 75, 82, 89, 97, 98, 99, 100, 115, 117, 118, 119, 135, 151, 187, 195, 203, 216, 220, 221, 227, 234 Verdier, General, 12, 17, 22, 32, 55, 56, 58, 60, 84, 91, 123, 132, 152, 159, 161, 162, 168, 170, 171, 174, 179, 180, 186, 230 Verona, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 65, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 119, 121, 124, 126, 137, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 161, 184, 205, 210, 211, 227

381

Vicenza, 4, 5, 11, 12, 18, 20, 74, 81, 82, 89, 92, 94, 118, 119, 129 Vienna, 103, 104 Vienna, Congress of, 104 Villach, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, 46, 48, 55, 56, 60 Villafranca, 86, 124, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 168, 170, 176, 179, 180, 204, 205 Villanova, 82, 91, 93, 94, 100, 111, 113, 115 Visnja Gora, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 59, 60, 69 Viterbo, 109 Vlasitz, General, 17, 24, 26, 31, 46, 55, 58, 63, 68, 77, 78, 86, 89, 90, 91, 118, 130, 153, 155, 174, 175, 178 Volano, 72, 77, 81, 98, 100 Volta, 155, 158, 161, 162, 167, 170, 175, 178, 179, 180, 182, 185, 187 Weichselburg, 33, 35, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 59, 60, 69 Winzian, General, 24, 46, 55, 58, 63, 67, 68, 77, 81, 89, 95, 130, 153, 170 Wrede, General, 25, 46, 55, 59, 77, 81, 130, 155, 163, 166, 167, 176 Wurzen, 19, 33, 38, 56, 60 Zadar, 116, 117 Zagreb, 19, 21, 27, 28 Zara, 15, 116, 117 Zucchi, General, 121, 122

About the Authors GEORGE F. NAFZIGER, USNR-Ret., has authored numerous books and articles on the subject of military history. Nafziger is a former Director of the Napoleonic Society of America and the Napoleonic Alliance. He is also owner of The Nafziger Collection, a publishing house specializing in the Napoleonic Wars and World War II history. MARCO GIOANNINI is the Public Relations Manager of the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, one of Italy’s leading research institutions in the social sciences. He has a long-standing interest in the military history of the Napoleonic era and has published several articles in Napoleonic journals. The military history advisor of the Marengo Bicentennial, he is also the author of a book on the Battle of Marengo.