The Deleuze Dictionary

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EDITED BY At-rnnr\r HAKr( Th is is t he f ir s t d i c ti o n a ry d e d i c a te d to th e ' w ork of Gi l l es D el euze. It provides an in-depth and lucid introduction to one of the most influential figuresin coniinentalphilosophy. The dictionary defines and contextualisesmore than 150 ter-rnsthat relate to Deleuzel philosophy including concepts such as 'becoming','body without organs','decerritorializatiqn','differenre','repetition','rhizome' and 'schizoanalysis'. The clear explanationsalso-addressthe main intellectualinfluenceson Deleuze as well as tl're influence Deleuze has had on suDiects such as feminism, cinema, postcolonial theory, geographyand cultural studies.Those unfamiliar with Deleuze will find the dictionary a user-friendlytool equippingthem with definitions and interpretations both as a study and/or a teaching aid. The entries are written by some of the rnost prominent Deleuze scholars inciudingRosi Braidotti,Claire Colebrook,Tom Conley,EugeneHollarrdand Paul Patton.Thesecontributors bring their expert knowledgeand critical opinion to bear on the entries and provide an enrichingtheoretical context for anyone interestedin Deleuze. Adrian Parr is Professor of contemporary art and designat the SavannahCollege of Art and Design. She is the editor, with lan Buchanan,of Deleuze ond the Contemporory World, f orthcom i ng from Edinburgh U n iversity Press.

IS SBN 0-7 186-1899-6

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Th e D e l e u ze Dicti onarv Editedby Adrian Parr

EdinburghUniversity Press

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@ in this edition, Edinburgh University Press,2005 @ in the individual contributions is retained by the authors Edinburgh University PressLtd 22 George Squarg Edinburgh Typeset in Ehrhardt by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Longsight, Manchester,and printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts A CIP record for this book is availablefrom the British Library ISBN 0 7486 18988 (hardback) ISBN 0 7486 18996 (paperback) The right of the contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct 1988.

Acknowledgements

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Introduction Claire Colebrooh Entries A-Z Bibliography

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Notes on Contributors

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Intr oduc ti on

A ckn o w l e d g e ments

First I would like to thank all rhe authorswho contributedto this proiect. Without you this dictionary would never have come into existence. Everyonewho hasentriesincludedhereand my editor,JackieJones,have beentremendouslycooperativeand helpful in more waysthan one.I would like also to thank Keith Ansell-Pearson,Ronald Bogue, Paul Patton and all of which havecerJamesWilliamsfor their commentsand suggesgions, tainly strengthenedthe theoreticalrigour of this dictionary; any shortcomingsareentirelymy own. I am very gratefulto MonashUniversityand SavannahCollegeof Art and Design for their continuingsupport.Lastly, the strongintellectand generosityof Ian Buchananand Claire Colebrook havebeena wonderfulsourceof inspirationfor me and I would iust like to extend my warmestthanksto you both; this project would neverhaveseen the light of day without your continuingencouragement and support. Adrian Parr

Claire Colebrook Why a Deleuzedictionary?It might seema particularly craven,disrespectful,literal-mindedand reactiveprojectto form a Deleuzedictionary. Not only did Deleuze strategicallychangehis lexicon to avoid the notion that his texts consistedof terms that might simply name extra-textual truths, he alsorejectedthe idea that art, scienceor philosophycould be understoodwithout a senseof their quite specificcreativeproblem. A philosopher's concepts produce connections and styles of thinking. Conceptsareintensive:they do not gathertogetheran alreadyexistingset of things (extension);they allow for movementsand connection.(The conceptof 'structure' in the twentieth century, for example,could not be isolatedfrom the problem of explaining the categoriesof thinking and the imageof an impersonalsocialsubjectwho is the effect of a conceptual system;similarly, the concept of the 'cogito' relatesthe mind to a movement of doubt, to a world of mathematicallymeasurablematter,and to a distinctionbetweenthought and the body.)To translatea term or to define any point in a philosopher'scorpus involvesan understandingof a more generalorientation, problem or milieu. This does not mean that one reducesa philosophyto its context- say,explainingDeleuze's'nomadism' asa reactionagainsta rigid structuralismor linguistics.On the contrary,to understanda philosophy as the creation of a plane,or as a way of creating someorientation by establishingpoints and relations,meansthat any philosophyis more than its manifestterms, more than its context. In addition to the producedtexts and terms, and in addition to the explicit historical presuppositions, thereis an unthoughtor outside- the problem,desireor life of a philosophy.For Deleuze,then, reading a philosopherrequires going beyond his or her produced lexicon to the deeper logic of production from which the relationsor senseof the text emerge.This senseitself canneverbe said;in repeatingor recreatingthe milieu of a philosopherall we can do is produce another sense,another said. Even so, it is this striving for sensethat is the creativedrive of readinga philosopher.Sq when l)eleuzereadsBergsonhe allowseachterm and moveof Bergson'sphilosophy to revolvearound a problem: the problem of intuition, of how the humanobservercan think from beyondits own constituted,habituated rrndall ttxl humanworld,

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It would seem,then, that offering definitions of terms in the form of a dictionary- as though a word could be detachedfrom its philosophicallife andproblem- would not only be at oddswith the creativerole of philosophy; it would alsosustainan illusion that the philosophicaltext is nothing more thanits 'said'andthat becoming-Deleuzian wouldbe nothingmorethanthe adoptionof a certainvocabulary. Do we,in systematising Deleuze'sthought, reducean eventand untimelyprovocationto onemore doxa? If Deleuze'swritings aredifficult and resistantthis cannotbe dismissed asstylistically unfortunate, asthough he really oughtto havejust sat down and told us in so many words what 'difference in itself' or 'immanence' really meant.Why the difficulty of style and vocabularyif there is more to Deleuzethan a way of speaking?A preliminary answerlies in the nexusof conceptsof 'life', 'immanence'and 'desire'. The one distinction that Deleuzeinsistsupon, both when he speaksin his own voicein Dffirence and,Repetitiozand when he createshis senseof the history of philosophy, is the 'imageof thought'. Philosophybeginsfrom an imageof what it is to think, whetherthat be the graspof ideal forms, the orderly receptionof senseimpressions,or the social construction of the world through language.The concepts of a philosophy both build, and build upon, that image. But if the history of philosophy is a gallery of such images of thought - from the conversing Socratesand mathematicalPlatq to the doubting Descartesand logical Russell- some philosophershave done , more than stroll through this galleryto add their own image.Somehave, in 'schizo' fashion, refused to add one more proper relation between thinker and truth, and havepulled thinking apart. One no longer makes one more step within thought - tidying up a definition, or correctinga seemingcontradiction.Only when this happensdoesphilosophyrealiseits power or potential. Philosophyis neither correct nor incorrect in relation to what currently countsas thinking; it createsnew modesor stylesof thinking. But if all philosophyis creation,rather than endorsement,of an imageof thought, somephilosophershavetried to givea senseor conceptto this creationof thinking: not one more imageof thought but 'thought without an image'. Deleuze's celebratedphilosophersof univocity confront the genesis, rupture or violenceof thinking: not man who thinks, but a life or unthought within which thinking might happen.When Spinozaimaginesone expressive substance,when Nietzsche imagines one will or desire, and when Bergsoncreatesthe conceptof life, they go someway to towardsreally askingaboutthe emergence of thinking.This is no longerthe emergence of thc thinker,or one who thinks, but the emergenceof somethinglike a minintrrlrclation,cvcntor pcrocptionof thinking,fronrwhich'thinkcrs'arc thcn cll'cctctl.'l'his nlcrulsthrrtthc rcrrlhistoryof'plrikrsophy rcquircs

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understanding the way philosophersproducesingularpoints,or the orientations within which subjects,objects,perceiversand imagesare ordered. Any assemblage such as a philosophicalvocabulary(or an artistic style, or a set of scientific functions) facesin two directions. It both givessome sort of order or consistencyto a life which bearsa much greatercomplexity and dynamism,but it alsoenables- from that order - the creationof further and more elaborateorderings.A philosophicalvocabularysuch as Deleuze'sgivessenseor orientationto our world, but it alsoallowsus to producefurther differencesand further worlds. On the one hand, then, a Deleuzianconcept such as the 'plane of immanence'or 'life' or 'desire' cstablishesa possiblerelation betweenthinker and what is to be thought, giving us somesort of logic or order. On the other hand, by coupling this conceptwith other concepts,such as taffectt'concept'and tfunctiont,or and 'imageof thought',we canthink not just about 'planeof transcendence' life or the planeof immanencebut alsoof how the brain imagines,relates to, styles,pictures,representsand ordersthat plane.This is the problemof how life differsfrom itself,in itself.The role of a dictionaryis only one side of a philosophy.It looks at the way a philosophy stratifiesor distinguishes its world, but once we haveseenhow 'a' philosophythinks and movesthis should then allow us to look to other philosophiesand other worlds. There is then a necessary fidelity and infidelity,not only in any dictionirry or any reading,but also in any experienceor any life. Life is both cffectedthrough relations,suchthat thereis no individual or text in itself; rrtthe sametime, life is not reducibleto effectedor actualrelations.There rre singularitiesor'powersto relate'thatexceedwhat is alreadygiven.This is the senseor the singularityof a text. Senseis not what is manifestlysaid rrr denoted;it is what is openedthroughdenotation.Sq we might saythat we needto understandthe meaningof Deleuze'sterminology- how 'territorialisation' is defined alongside 'deterritorialisation','assemblage', 'llody without Organs' and so on - and then how thesedenotedterms cxpresswhat Deleuzewantsto say,the intention of the Deleuziancorpus. llut this shouldultimately then leadus to the sense of Deleuze,which can only be giventhrough the productionof anothertext. 1 can say,here,that the senseof Deleuze'sworksis the problemof how thinking emergesfrom life, and how life is not a being that is given but a power to give various scnsesof itself (what Deleuzerefersto as'?being').But in sayingthis I have producedanothersense.Each definition of eachterm is a different path from a text, a different productionof sensethat itself opensfurther paths lirr definition.So, far from definitionsor dictionariesreducingthe forceof itn iruthoror a philosophy,they createfurther distinctions. 'l'his clocsr.rotmcfln, as ccrtirin popular vcrsionsof Frcnch poststructuralismmight irrclicrrtc, thilt tcxtshuvclro nrcanings rnd thrt onc ctn

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make anything mean what one wants it to mean.On the contrary, the life or problem of Deleuze's philosophy lay in the event: both the event of philosophicaltextsand the eventof worksof art. The eventis a disruption, violenceor dislocationof thinking.To readis not to recreateoneself,using the text asa mirror or medium through which one repeatsalreadyhabitual orientations.Just as life can only be lived by risking connectionswith other powers or potentials,so thinking can only occur if there is an encounterwith relations,potentialsand powersnot our own. If we take Deleuze'sdefinition of life seriously- that it is not a given whole with potentials that necessarilyunfold through time, but is t airtual power to createpotentialsthrough contingentand productiveencounters- then this will relatedirectlyto an ethicsof reading.We cannotreada thinker in order to find what he is saying'tous', asthoughtextswerevehiclesfor exchanging information from one being to another.A text is immanent to life; it createsnew connections,new stylesfor thinking and new imagesand ways of seeing.To read a text is to understandthe problem that motivated its The more faithful we are to a text - not the text's ultimate assemblage. messagebut its construction,or the way in which it producesrelations among concepts,images,affects,neologismsand alreadyexisting vocabularies - the more we will havean experienceof a style of thought not our own, an experienceof the powerto think in creativestylesassuch. One of the most consistentand productivecontributionsof Deleuze's thought is his theory and practiceof reading,both of which are grounded in a specificqonceptionof life. If there is one understandingof philosophy anddoxa,which wouldreturn andgoodreadingasgroundedin consistency logicandallowthoughtto remainthe same,Deleuze a text to an assimilable placeshimself in a counter-traditionof distinctionand paradox.Neither philosophynor thinking flowsinevitablyand continuouslyfrom life; reason is not the actualisationof what life in its potentialwasalwaysstriving to be, More than any other thinker of his time Deleuzeworksagainstvitalismor the idea that reason,thinking and conceptssomehowservea function or purposeof life, a life that is nothing more than changeor alteration for the sakeof efficiencyor self-furthering. If there is a conceptof life in Deleuze it is a life at oddswith itself, a potential or power to createdivergentpotentials.Admittedly,it is possibleto imaginethinking, with its concepts,dictionariesand organon,as shoring 'man' againstthe forcesof chaosand dissolution,but we can also- when we extendthis potential- seethinking asa confrontationwith chaos,asallowingmore of what is nrt ourselvesto transformwhat we takeourselvesto be.In this sensethought has'majoriboth a movementtowardsreducing tarian' and 'minoritarian'tendencies, and a tendcncytowards chnoticdiffcrcnccto uniformity and samencss I)clcuzc' opcninglhoscsrmcuniticsto n'stttttcring'orinconrprchcnsion,

IN TR OD U C TION

far from believingthat one might return thought to life and overcomethe submissionto system,recognisesthat the creation of a systemis the only way one canreally live non-systemically.One createsa minimal or dynamic order,both to avoidabsolutedeterritorialisation on the one hand and reactive repetitionof the already-ordered on the other.In this sense,Deleuzeis a child of the Enlightenment. Not only does he inhabit the performative self-contradiction, 'Live in such a way that one's life diverges from any givenprinciple,'healsodeducesthis 'principlethat is not one' from life. If one is to lioe, theremust both be a minimal connectionor exposureto the outsidealongsidea creationor perceptionof that outside,with perception being a difference. Deleuze'sontology- that relationsareexternalto terms- is a commitment to perceivinglife; life is connectionand relation,but the outcomeor eventof thoserelationsis not determinedin advanceby intrinsic properties. Life is not, therefore,the ground or foundation differentiatedby a set of ternls, such that a dictionary might provide us with one schemaof order amongothers.The productionor creationof a systemis both an exposure to thosepowersof differencenot alreadyconstitutedasproper categories of recognising'man' and a radical enlightenment.Enlightenment is, defined dutifully, freedom from imposed tutelage - the destruction of masters.Deleuze'sdestructionof masteryis an eternal,rather than perpetual, paradox. Rather than defining thought and liberation against anothersystem,with a continualcreationand subsequentdestruction,the challengeof Deleuze's thought is to createa systemthat containsits own aleatoryor paradoxicalelements,elementsthat are both inside and outside, orderingand disordering.This is just what Deleuze'sgreatconceptsserve to dol life is both that which requires some form of order and system (giving itself through differencesrhar are perceivedand synthesised)and, that which also opens the system,for life is just rhat power to d.ifferfrom which conceptsemergebut that can neverbe includedin the extensionof any concept. We canonly begin to think and live when we losefaith in the world, when weno longerexpecta world to answerto and mirror ourselvesandour already constituteddesires.Thinking is paradox,nor becauseit is simple disobedienceor negationof orthodoxy,but because if thinking hasany forceor distinction it hasto work againstinertia.If a body wereonly to connectwith whatallowedit to remainrelativelystableand self contained- in imageof the autopoieticsystemthat takesonly what it can masterand assimilate- then the very powerof life for changeand creationwould be stalledor exhausted by self-involved life formsthat livedin orderto remainthe same.Despitefirst appearances a dictionarycanbe the openingof a self-enclosed system.If we nrc faithfulto thc lifc of Dclcuzc'sthought- rccognising it as n crcation

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rather than destinedeffectof life - then we canrelive the production of this systemand this responseasan imageof production in general. (I must createa systemor be enslavedby anotherman's'- so declares Blake'sidealpoet in the highly contestedand chaoticagonisticsof his great poemJerusalem.Blake's aphorismswereindebtedto an enlightenmentlibitself in a seeminglyparadoxicalstructure. If we are erationismthat found condemnedto live in someform of systemthenwe caneitherinhabitit passivelyand reactively,or we canembraceour seemingsubmissionto a system Blake'searlyresponseproof relationsnot our own and respondcreatively. of the categoricalimperative the inescapability to vided an alternative which still hauntsus today:if I am to speakand act asa moral beingthen I can neither saynor do what is particular or contingent for me; living with othersdemandsthat I decidewhat to do from the point of view of 'humanity in general'.To speakor to live is alreadyto be other than oneself,and so recognitionof an initial submission.Such morality demandsa necessary a final consensusor intersubjectivity may neverarrive, but it hauntsall life and eternalaffirmationof nevertheless. By contrast,Deleuze'sparadoxical of a minimal system- to perceive inescapability begins from the creation or live is alreadyto be connected,to be other - but far from this requiring a striving for a systemof consensusor ideal closure,this producesan infinite opening.It might seemthat the Enlightenmentimperative- abandon all externalauthority - comesto function asyet one more authority, and it might alsoseemthat a fidelity to Deleuzeis a crime againstthe thinker of from difference.But the problemof Deleuze'sthought is iust this passage contradiction to paradox. To not be oneselfis contradictory if one must be eitherthis or that, if life must decideor stabiliseitself (form a harrative or imageof itself). 'Becoming-imperceptible',by contrast,is an enablingand productive paradox.One connectsor perceivesin order to live, in order to be,but this very tendencyis alsoat the sametime a becoming-other:not a nonbeingbut a?being.A Deleuziandictionarycomesinto beingonly in its use,only when the thoughts that it enablesopen the systemof thought to the very outsideand life that madeit possible.

ACTIVE/REACTIVE Lee Spinks The distinction between active and reactive forces was developed by Friedrich Nietzsche in his Oz the Genealogyof Morality and rhe notes posthumouslycollectedas The Will to Power.In his seminalreadingof Nietzsche,Deleuzeseizedupon this distinction (and what it madepossible) and placedit at the very heartof the Nietzscheanrevaluationof values.For Nietzsche,the distinction betweenactiveand reactiveforce enabledhim to present'being' asa processrather than 'substance'. The world of substantial being,he argued,is producedby the recombinationof multiple effectsof forceinto discreteideas,imagesand identities.There is no essential'truth' of being;nor is there an independent'reality' beforeand beyondthe flux of appearances; everyaspectof the realis alreadyconstitutedby quantitiesand combinationsof force. Within this economy of becoming,every force is relatedto otherforcesand is definedin its characterby whetherit obeysor commands.What we call a body (whether understoodas political, social, chemicalor biological)is determinedby this relationbetweendominating and dominated forces.Meanwhile Deleuze maintains that any two forces constitutea bodyassoonastheyenterinro relationship.Within this bodythe superior or dominant forcesare describedas 'active'; the inferior or dominatedforcesaredescribedas'reactive'.Thesequalitiesofactiveandreactive forceare theoriginal qualitiesthat definethe relationshipof forcewith force. If forcesare defined by the relative differencein their quality or power, the notion of quality is itself determinedby the differencein quantity betweenthe two forces that come into relationship. The characterof any relation,that is, is producedthrough forces.There are no intrinsic properties that dctcrmine how forccs will relate:a masterbecomesa master throughthe act
ACTI VE, / REACTI V E

force receivesthe quality that correspondsto its quantity. Forces are dominant,or dominated,dependingupon their relativedifferencein quantity; but they manifest themselvesas active or reactiveaccordingto their the quality of differencein quality.Once the relationhasbeenestablished forces- dominant or dominated- producesan activepower (that commandsthe relation) and a reactiyepower (definedby the relation).The differencebetweenforcesdefined accordingto their quantity as active or reactiveis describedin terms of a hierarchy.An activeforce is the stronger are domiterm and goesto the limit of what it can do. Its characteristics nating,possessing, subjugatingand commanding.The expressionof activity is the expressionof what is necessarilyunconscious;all consciousness doesis expressthe relation ofcertain reactiveforcesto the activeforcesthat dominatethem. Active force affirmsits differencefrom everythingthat is weakerthan and inferior to itself; meanwhilereactiveforce seeksto limit activeforce,imposerestrictionsupon it, and to recastit in the spirit of the negative.Crucially reactiveforcecannottransformitself into a fully active force; nor can a collection of reactiveforces amalgamatethemselvesinto somethinggreaterthanactiveforce.A slavewho gainspower,or who bonds with other slaves,will remain a slaveand can only be freed from slaveryby abandoningconsciousness. Consciousnessremains what it is, and is unlike and recognises the active force of difference. Consciousnessrepresents activeforces,therebyseparatingactivity from what it cando. Suchseparation constitutesa subtractionor division of activeforce by making it work against the power of its own affirmation. The remarkablefeature of the becoming-reactive of activeforceis that historicallyit hasmanagedto form the basisof an entire vision of life. This vision embodiesthe principle of 'ressentiment':a movementin which a reactiveand resentfuldenial of higher life begins to createits own moral systemand account of human experience.The reactivetriumph expressedin movementsof consciousnesslike ressentiment,bad consciousness and the asceticideal depends upon a mystification and reversalof activeforce: at the core of thesenew interpretations of life reactive force simulatesactive force and turns it againstitself.It is at preciselythe historicalmomentwhen the slavebegins to triumph over the master who has stoppedbeing the spectreof law, virtue, morality and religion. An active force becomesreactive when a reactive force managesto separateit from what it can do. The historicaldevelopmentof reactive forcesis itself predicatedupon the affinity betweenreactionand negation, an affinity which is itself a weakform of the Will to Powerin so far asit is of nihilismor thc will to nothingncss. Thc will to asceticism an cxprcssion rlr wrlrld-rcnunciittionis, lftcr rrll, still itn cxprcssionof rpil/. 'fhus, whilc rcnctivclirrccsrtrc wcnkcrthnn rctivc firrccs,thcy rlso posscssil

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potentiallysublimeelementin as much as they are ableto advancea new interpretation of life (the world of moral ideas, for example) and they supplyus with an original,althoughnihilistic,versionof the Will to Power. By inventinga transcendentideaof life in orderto judgelife, reactiveforces separateus from our power to createvalues;but they alsoteachus new feelings and new waysof being affected.What needsro be understoodis that there is a variation or internal difference in the disposition of reactive forces;theseforceschangetheir characterand their meaningaccordingto the extentto which they developtheir affinity for the will to nothingness. Consequentlyoneof the greatproblemsposedto interpretationis to determine the degreeof developmentreactiveforceshavereachedin relationto negationand the will to nothingness;similarlywe needalwaysto attendro the nuanceor relativedispositionof activeforce in terms of its development of the relationbetweenactionand affirmation. Connectives Bergson Genealogy Nietzsche Will to Power

ACTUALITY Claire Colebrook It might seemthat Deleuze'sphilosophyis dominatedby an affirmarionof the virtual and is highly critical of a wesrerntradition that hasprivileged arctuality. To a certainextent this is true, and this privilegecan be seenin the way philosophyhastraditionallydealtwith difference.First, rhereare deemedto be actualterms,termswhich areextendedin time- havingcontinuity - and possiblyalsoextendedin space.Theseterms arethen related to eachother, so differenceis somethingpossible for an alreadyactualised entity. Difference is betweenactual terms, such as the differencebetween consciousness and its world, or is a differencegroundedupon actuality, such as somethingactualbearingthe capacityfor possiblechanges.This understandingof actualityis thereforeried to the conceptof possibility. Possibilityis somethingthat can be predicatedof, or attributedto, a being which rcmains the same.Now againstthis understandingof actuality, l)clcuzcsctsr diffcrentcouplc:actuality/potenriality. If thereis something rctualit is not bccirr.rsc it trrkcsup timc,nor bccausc timc is that whichlinks

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from or containsthe changesof actualbeings;rather,actualityis unfold'ed' change and that from which actual not as see the potentiality. We should potentiality. differencetake place,but asthat which hasbeeneffectedfrom Time is not the synthesisor continuity of actualterms, as in phenomenconstitutestime by linking the past with the ology where consciousness is the potential for variouslines of actualRather, time presentand future. ity. From any actual or unfolded term it should be possible (and, for Deleuze,desirable)to intuit the richer potentiality from which it has emerged. As an avowedempiricistDeleuzeseemsto be committedto the primacy of the actual:one should remain attentiveto what appears,to what is, without invoking or imagining some condition outside experience. However,while it is true that Deleuze'sempiricismaffirmslife and experience,he refusesto restrict life to the actual.In this respecthe overturnsa history of western metaphysicsthat defines the potential and virtual accordingto alreadypresentactualities.We should not, Deleuzeinsists, define what somethingis accordingto alreadyactualisedforms. So we shouldnot, for example,establishwhat it is to think on the basisof what is usually,generallyor actuallythought.Nor shouldwe think that the virtual is merely the possible:those things that, from the point of view of the actualworld, may or may not happen.On the contrary,Deleuze'sempiriof the Idea to actualiseitself. cism is that of the Idea,and it is the essence There is, therefore,an Idea of thinking, the potentialor power to think, which is then actualisedin any singlethought. We can only fully understandand appreciatethe actualif we intuit its virtual condition, which is alsoa real condition.That is, real conditionsarenot thosewhich must be presupposedby the actual- such as assumingthat for any thought there must be a subjectwho thinks- rather,realconditionsare,for Deleuze,the potentialsof life from which conditionssuchas the brain, subiectivityor mind emerge. For example,if we want to understanda text historicallywe needto go beyondits actualelements- not iust what it saysbut alsobeyondits manFor ifestcontext- to the virtual problemfrom which anytext is actualised. instance,we should not readJohn Milton's ParadiseLost (1667)as a historical documentrespondingto the English revolution,a revolutionthat century. we might understandby readingmore textsfrom the seventeenth Rather,we needto think of the potentialor Ideaof revolutionassuch:how Milton's text is a specificactualisation,fully different,of the problemof how we might bc free,of how powermightrealiscitscl[,of how individuals Any lctu:rltcxt or cvcnt scrvituclc. tirlm imposccl rrrightrclclscthcmsclvcs il powcrto cxprcss rcrrlityhrrsl virtuitldintcttsion, orrlybccirusc is p
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rcvolution,the Russianrevolution,are specificand differentonly because rrctualityis the expressionof an Ideaof revolutionwhich can repeatitself infinitely. Connective Virtual/Virtuality

AFFECT Felicity J. Colman Watchme: affectionis the intensityof colour in a sunseton a dry and cold autumnevening.Kiss me: affectis that audible,visualand tactiletransformation producedin reactionto a certain situation, event or thing. Run irwayfrom me: affectedare the bodiesof spectreswhen their spaceis disturbed. In all thesesituations,affectis an independentthing; somerimes describedin terms of the expressionof an emotionor physiologicaleffect, but all the while trans-historical, trans-temporal, trans-spatial and autonomous. Affect is the change,or variation,that occurs when bodiescollide, or come into contact. As a body, affect is the knowable product of an cncounter,specificin its ethicaland lived dimensionsand yet it is alsoas indefiniteas the experienceof a sunset,transformation,or ghost. In its largestsense,affect is part of the Deleuzianproject of trying-to-understand,andcomprehend,andexpressall of the incredible,wondrous,tragic, painful and destructiveconfigurationsof things and bodiesastemporally mediated,continuouseyents.Deleuzeusesthe term'affection'to refer to the additiveprocess€s, forces,powersand expressions of change. Affectcanproducea sensoryor abstractresultand is physicallyand temporally produced.It is determinedby chanceand organisationand it consistsof a variety of factorsthat include geography,biology,meteorology, :rstronomy,ecologyand culture. Reactionis a vital part of the Deleuzian concept of affectivechange.For instance,describingBaruch Spinoza's study of the transformationof a body,a thing, or a group of things over a period of spaceand time, Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plu,teaus: iA.ffectsare becomings'(D&G 1987:256).Affect expresses the modificationof experiences asindependentthings of existence,when one produccsor rccognisesthe consequences of movementand time for (corporcirl,spiritual,:rnimirl,ntincral,vcgctlblcand or c
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A R B OR E S C E N T

AFFECT

it cancompelsystemsof knowledge,history, assuch,asDeleuzedescribes, power. memoryand circuitsof Deleuze'sconceptionof affectdevelopsthrough his entire oeuvre.In his study of David Hume in Ernpiricismand,SubjectiaityDeleuzediscussesthe linkagesbetweenideas,habitsofthought, ethics,patterns,and repetitions of systems;all the while describingthe relationshipbetweenaffect and differencein terms of temporally specificsubjectivesituations.Empiricism and,SubjectioityalsosignalsDeleuze'sinterest in Henri Bergson,a key thinker in the Deleuziandevelopmentof a theoryof affect.Bergson'sbook Matter and,Memory addressesthe corporeal condition of what he terms the 'affection'inrelationto perception(D 1988a:l7). Deleuzealsoengages work of Spinozaand the latter'saddressof affectionsand affectin termsof a modality of 'taking on' somethingin the Ethics(1677).In his essay'On the Superiorityof Anglo-AmericanLiterature', Deleuzedescribesaffect as verbs becoming events- naming affectsas perceivableforces,actions, and activities. In relation to art in What is Philosophy?he and Guattari describeaffectsasmore than sensateexperienceor cognition. Through art, we can recognisethat affectscanbe detachedfrom their temporal and geographicoriginsand becomeindependententities. In accounting for experiencein a non-interpretive manner, Deleuze's conceptionof affectexposedthe limits of semioticsthat tendsto structure emotional responsesto aestheticand physicalexperiences.Undeniably a romantic conceptwithin his discussionof the regulation and production of desire and energy within a socialfield, Deleuze'swritings of affect enablea material,and thereforepolitical, critique of capital nevertheless its and operations. Within a Deleuzian framework, affect operates as to manipulatemeaningand relaa dynamicof desirewithin an assemblage tions, inform and fabricate desire, and generateintensity - yielding different affectsin any given situation or event.Perceptionis a non-passive continual moulding, driven and given by affect. Closelylinkedto Deleuzeand Guattari'sconceptsof 'multiplicity','expein rience'and 'rhizomatics',the conceptof 'affect'shouldalsobe considered offlight'. Situatedaspart relationto theconceptsof'arborescence'and'lines of the Deleuzian'and'of becoming,the molecularthresholdsof bodiesand thingsaseventsaredescribedby Deleuzein terms of affectivehappenings; occasionswherethings and bodiesare altered.To this end, affectdescribes the forcesbehindall formsof socialproductionin the contemporaryworld, and theseaffectiveforces'ethical,ontological,cognitive,and physiological work with Guattari,affective powers.In Deleuze'ssingularandcollaborative firrccsarcclcpictedasreactiveor activc(followingFriedrichNietzsche),tacit or pcrfrlrmccl.As l)clcuzc portrtys it, nffcctivcpowcr cirnbe utilisedto limbrrrccrrtc, cotttroltnd crcntivity, rrbility,'rruthrlrity, cnrrhlc

S C H E MA

13

Connectives Active/Reactive Arborescentschema Becoming Experience Hume Lines of flight Multiplicity Rhizome

ARBORESCENT SCHEMA CIiffStagoll The arboreal schemais one of Deleuze's many potent and prominent biologicaland organicimages.His criticism,and his useof the schema,is to philosscatteredacrosshis corpus,at varioustimestargetingapproaches ophy psychiatry literature, science,theoretical criticism and even everyday living. The notion of an arborescentor tree-likeschemais Deleuze's counterpointto his model of the rhizome,which he usesto challengetendenciesin thinking and to suggestwaysof rehabilitating 'thought' asa creativeand dynamicenterprise. Deleuze'smodel of the tree-likestructure appearsto be quite simple. Typically, at its top, is some immutable concept given prominence either by transcendentaltheorising or unthinking presumption. In Deleuze's works on epistemologyand ontology, he identifies Plato's Forms, the modelsof the subjectespousedby Ren6Descartesand ImmanuelKant, as well as the 'Absolute Spirit' of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as cxamples.All other conceptsor particularsare organisedverticallyunder this conceptin a tree/trtnk/root arrangement.The ordering is strictly hierarchical, from superior to subordinate,or transcendentto particular, suchthat the individual or particularelementis conceivedaslessimportrrnt,powerful,productive,creativeor interestingthan the transcendent. The subordinate elements, once so arranged, are unable to 'move' lrorizontallyin such a way as to establishcreativeand productiveinterlclationshipswith other concepts,particularsor models. Rather, their position is final, accordingto an organisingprinciple implied or deterrnincd by the superiorconcept. lfurthermorc, thc trcc is a self-containedtotality or closedsystemthat is cqual just to tlrc sum of its parts.Rclationsbctwccnclcmcntsof the

t4

ARBO RESCENT

SCHEMA

systemare interior to and inherent within the model. They are stableor even essentialin so far as, first, the superior concept is the all-powerful definingforcethat dictatesthe positionor meaningof all elsein the system and, second,the tendency is to think of the systemeither as complete in itself or elseunconnectedto othersystemsin anymeaningfulway.The tree is 'fixed to the spot' and static. Any remaining movementis minimal and internal to the systemrather than exploratory or connective.Becausethe creativepotential of disorder and inter-connectivityis precluded, the potentialinherentin conceptualisingand thinking in this manneris very limited. Deleuze'smodelcallsto mind the porphyriantree,a deviceusedby the philosopher Porphyry to show how reality and our conceptsare ordered and how logicalcategorisationproceeds.The conceptof'Substance'can be placedat the top of the tree,and dichotomousbranchingat eachlevel obtainedby addinga specificdifferencesuchthat, at the lowestlevel,some individual canbe identifiedasa sub-setof 'Substance'. This versionof the arborealmodel alsohighlights somethingof its complexity and ontologicalimportancefor Deleuze.The differenceevident betweenparticularsis subsumedby the similarity that definesthem in terms of superior concepts in general and the transcendent concept (Substance)in particular.Rather than deriving conceptsfrom individual particulars(or interactionsbetweenthem), an abstractconceptis usedto organiseindividuals and determine their meaning relative just to the organisationalhierarchy.Differencehasto be addedbackto eachelement in order to define it asa particular,rather than having individual elements In contrast,Deleuzeholds serveasthe startingpoint for conceptualisation. that lived experiencecomprisesparticularity and uniquenessin each moment, experienceand individual, the inherent differencesof which ought always to be acknowledged.By positing the concept over the particular, thinking of the arborealkind abstractsfrom lived experiencein its very structure. For Deleuze,thinking in such a way stiflescreativity,leavessuperior conceptsrelatively immune to criticism and tends to closeone's mind to the dynamism,particularityand changethat is evidentin lived experience. Not only is suchthinking necessarily abstract,it alsoservesto protectthe status quo and relieve dominant conceptsand positions from productive critique. Conncctives Rhizomc Sullsllncc

ART

l5

ART Felicity J. Colman Deleuze'sdescriptionsof art remind us that it is one of the primary mediums with which humans learn to communicateand respond to the world. Art excitedDeleuzefor its ability to createthe domainsthat he saw,felt, tasted,touched,heard,thought, imaginedand desired.Besides publishing bookson singular writers and artists,including making specific manifestostylestatementsconcerningart asa categoryof criticalanalysis, Deleuze'sspecificactivitiesin respectto art extendedto writing short cxhibition catalogueessaysfor artists (for exampleon the French painter music(with RichardPinhas). G6rardFromanger),andmakingexperimental a range Deleuze'spreferredart works for his discussionsencompassed of mediums, including music and sounds (birdsong), cinema, photography,the plastic arts (sculpture,painting and drawing), literature and lrchitecture. Deleuze's philosophical interests also led him to discussa numberof performativeand theatricalworks,usingexamplesfrom anthropologyto makecultural and philosophicaldistinctions.Deleuzeaddresses the visual,aestheticand perceptualterms of art through distinctive polemical methodologiesdrawn from the sciences,such as biologicalevolution, geologicalformationsand concepts,and mathematics. Deleuzeleansupon a critical assortmentof art history critics, film critics, literarycritics,architecturalcriticsandmusicalcriticsthroughouthis philosophicalpractice: Wilhelm Worringer, Alois Riegl, Paul Claudel, Clement Greenberg,LawrenceGowing,GeorgesDuthuit, GregoryBateson,Andr6 llazin,ChistianMetz, and Umberto Eco.As a writer,Deleuze'sliterarypreclccessors figure prominently (seework in EssaysCritical and'Clinical). His cognitiveapproachtowardart comesfrom his adoptedphilosophicalfathers including Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche.In Nietzsche and.Philosophy,Deleuzeemploys'art' asa categoryof 'Critique', but trrkingon Nietzsche'sobservationthat the world is emotiveandsensory, rrny analysisof this world is bound by epistemologicalstructures. For l)cleuze,the descriptivenature of art lies with art's ability not merely to rcdescribe;rather art has a material capacityto evokeand to question throughnon-mimeticmeans,by producingdifferentaffects. l)eleuze treatsplastic art movementsincluding Byzantine,the Gothic, and Art Brut, t hc Baroque,Romanticism,Classicism,Primitive,Japanese, rrstrans-historicalconceptsthat contributeto the field of art through their virri
l6

ART

Henri-Beyle Stendhal, Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud, William S. Burroughs,Lewis Carroll,Leopoldvon Sacher-Masoch, FranzKafka,and Alain Robbe-Grillet are critically absorbedby Deleuze in terms of their respectiveenquiriesinto the creationof art forms that translate,illustrate and perform the forces of the world (such as desire), by making them visible. Deleuze mentions in passingan enormous range of artists of variousmediumsto makea point or an observation- from Igor Stravinsky to Patti Smith, from Diego Vel6squezto Carl Andre. The means and methodsby which art is ableto transformmaterialinto sensoryexperience is of course part of the modernist contribution to art in the twentieth century.In his discussions concerningart, Deleuzeis thus a contributorto the twentieth-centurymodernistcanon. The methodologyof art forms the core of Deleuze'sstudy of Marcel Proust's work A lo recherche du tempsperdu (1913-27), a book that examinesaspectsof temporality desireand memory.As in his bookco-authored with Guattari on KaJba,in Proust,Deleuzeunderstandsart asbeing much more than a medium of expression. Deleuze'sbook FrancisBacon: TheLogicoJ'Sensation works through the complicatedconnectionsof Deleuzeand Guattari'sBody without Organs (BwO) and English painter FrancisBacon'streatmenrof the power and rhythms of the human body, to a discussionof the differencesfrom and similaritiesto the work of French painter Clzanneof Bacon'sown work. In this book,Deleuzeprivilegespaintingasan art form that affordsa concreteapprehensionofthe forcesthat rendera body. In Deleuze'sfinal work co-authoredwith Guattari, What is Philosophy? 'art' is accordeda privilegedpositionin their triad of philosophy,art and science.Art is an integral componentof their three level operationsof the cerebralqualityof things(thebrain-becoming-subject). In this book,'art' as a categoryhasdevelopedinto the meansby which Deleuzeand Guattari can operateaffect, temporality,emotion, mortality, perception and becoming. The active, compounding creativity of artists' work are described as 'percepts'- independentaggregates of sensation that live beyondtheir creators.DeleuzeandGuattarisignificantlycommentthat theinspirationfor art is givenby sensations; the affectof methods,materials,memoriesandobjects: and write with sensations'(D&G1994:166). 'We paint,sculpt,compose, Connectives Affcct llacon l')xpcricncc Knlkrr

AXIOM ATIC

T7

ARTAUD, ANTONIN (1895-1948)- refer to the entries on 'art', 'becoming* performanceart', 'Bergson','Body without Organs','ethics', 'feminism'r'Foucault* fold','hysteria','Lacan'and'linesof flight f art * politics'.

AXIOMATIC Alberto Toscano Plateaus'axiomatic'is Proposedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, usedto definethe operationof contemporarycapitalismwithin universal history and generalsemiology.Originatingin the discourseof scienceand mathematicalset theory in particular, 'axiomatic' denotesa method that neednot providedefinitionsof the terms it workswith, but rather orders a givendomainwith the adjunctionor subtractionof particularnorms or commands(axioms).Axioms thus operateon elementsand relationswhose natureneednot be specified.They areindifferentto the propertiesor qualities of their domain of application and treat their obiectsas purely functional, rather than as qualitatively differentiated by some intrinsic by theorems,or modelsof realcharacter.Axiomsarein turn accompanied isation,which apply them to certainempiricalor materialsituations. An axiomaticsystemdiffers from systemsof codingand overcodingby its capacityto operatedirectlyon decodedflows.In thisrespect,whilstit implies a form of capture,its degreeof immanenceand ubiquity is far greaterthan thatof codingsystems, all of whichrequireaninstanceof externalityor transcendence.That is why Deleuze and Guattari defend the thesis of a formations:the latter differencein kind betweencapitalistand pre-capitalist without while the former operates coding. Within universal code flows, history the immanentaxiomaticof capitalismis activatedwith the passingof at the momentwhen, foll thresholdof decodingand deterritorialisation, klwing Karl Marx, we areconfrontedby barelabourand independentcapital. The axiomaticmethod,asinstantiatedby contemporarycapitalismand royal science,can be juxtaposedto schizoidpractice,which is capableof combiningdecodedflowswithout the insertionof axioms,aswell asto the problematicmethod in the sciences,which is concernedwith eventsand singularpoints rather than systemicconsistency. One of the bolderclaims mlde by Deleuzeand Guattari is that we shouldnot think of the axiomatic irsir notion analogicallyexportedfrom scienceto illustratepolitics.On the contrary,within scienceitself the axiomaticis deemedto collaboratewith thc Statc in thc fixation of unruly flows, diagrams and variations. rgcncythat subordinatcs the lisscntinllyit is rrstrrrtifyingor scmioticising

t8

transversalcommunicationsand conjunctionsof flowsto a systemof fixed pointsand constantrelations. As Deleuze and Guattari indicate,the unity of an axiomatic system and of capitalismin particular,is itself very difficult to pin down, since the opportunisticcharacterof the adjunction and subtractionof axioms opensup the question of the saturationof the systemand of the independenceof the axioms from one another. Moreover, though their dependenceon the axiomsmakesmodelsof realisationisomorphic (for exampleall statesin one way or anothersatisfythe axiom of production for the market),thesemodelscan demonstrateconsiderableamountsof heterogeneityand variation (suchassocialist,imperialist,authoritarian, social-democratic,or 'failed' states).The axiomaticsystemis therefore not a closed dialectical totality, since it also generates'undecidable propositions' that demand either new axioms or the overhaul of the system,and it is interrupted by entities(for examplenon-denumerable infinite sets)whosepower is greaterthan that of the system,and which thus open breachesto an outside. It is the capacityto conjugate and control flows without the introduction of a transcendent agency (a totaliser) that makes the capitalist axiomatic the most formidable apparatusof domination. Deleuzeand Guattariinsistthe capitalistaxiomaticestablishes relations and connectionsbetweendecodedflows,that are otherwiseincommensurableand unrelated,and subordinatestheseflowsto a generalisomorphy, such as the subjectwho must producefor the market.In this sensetoo, Deleuzeand Guattaridiscernthat the capitalistaxiomaticpointsto a resurgenceof machinicenslavement, onethat is all the morecruel because of its impersonality(its beyondforms of citizenship,sovereigntyand legitimation). In as much as its mode of operationcan entirely bypasssubjective belief or the codingof humanbehaviour,suchan axiomaticmovesus from a societyof disciplineto a societyof control,wherepoweractsdirectly on Deleuzeand Guattariarecareful a decodeddividualmatter.Nevertheless, to note,it is not simplythe casethat flowscontinueto evadeand evenoverpowerthe axiomatic,but that the globaland non-qualifiedsubjectivityof and is alwaysaccompacapitalneverattainsabsolutedeterritorialisation, nied by forms of socialsubjection,in the guise of nation-states,and a panoplyof territorialisations at the levelof its modesof realisation. Conncctives ( lrrpitrrlisrl Mirrx ,Sr'lt izortrtrrlv sis

BAcoN,

AXIOM AT IC

FRANcr s

( t gog- gz)

t9

BACON, FRANCTS (t909-92) John Marks Deleuze'saim in FrancisBacon:TheLogicofSensation,as with all his other work on art, is to producephilosophicalconceptsthat correspondto the 'sensibleaggregates'that the artist hasproduced.The 'logic of sensation' that Deleuzeconstructsshowshow FrancisBaconuses'Figures' to paint sensations that aim to act directlyon the nervoussystem.'Sensation',here, refers to a pre-individual, impersonal plane of intensities.It is also, Deleuzeclaims,the oppositeof the facileor the clich6sof representation. It is at one and the sametime the human subjectand alsothe impersonal event.It is directedtowardsthe sensiblerather than the intelligible. In developingthe use of the 'Figure', Bacon pursuesa middle path betweenthe abstractand the figural, betweenthe purely optical spacesof abstractart and the purely 'manual'spacesof abstractexpressionism. The 'Figure' retainselementsthat arerecognisably human;it is not a representationalform, but rather an attempt to paint forces.For Deleuze,the vocation of all non-representational art is to make visible forcesthat would otherwiseremaininvisible.It is for this reasonthat Bacon'sfiguresappear to be deformedor contorted,sometimespassingthrough objectssuch as washbasins or umbrellas:the body seeksto escapefrom itself. There are cven somepaintingsin which the 'Figure' is little more than a shadow within a 'scrambledwhole', as if it has been replacedentirely by forces. ln short, Bacon'spaintingscan be consideredas an artistic expressionof l)eleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof the Body without Organs. Generallyin his work, Deleuzeseeksto contradictthe receivedwisdom that artistssuchasBaconor FranzKafka arein somewayexpressinga deep tcrror of life in their art. For this reason,he is at pains to point out that llacon hasa greatlove of life, and that his paintingevincesan extraordinrrryvitality.Baconis optimistic to the extentthat he'believes'in the world, but it is a very particularsort of optimism. Baconhimself saysthat he is ccrebrallypessimistic- in that he paintsthe horrors of the world - but ar thc sametime nervouslyoptimistic. Bacon'swork may be imbued with irll sorts of violence,but he managesto paint the 'scream'and not the 'lrrlrror'- thc violcnceof the sensation ratherthantheviolenceof thespeclitclc- rnd hc rcpro:rchcs himsclf whcn hc feelsthat he haspaintedtoo tttttclrhorrot'.'l'hc filrccstlut cirusctlrcscrcirnr shouldnot bc confirscdwith

20

BA C o N ,

F R AN c Is

(tgog-gz)

The screamcapturesinvisbeforewhich one screams. the visiblespectacle becausethey lie beyondpain and ible forces,which cannotbe represented, feeling. So, cerebrally,this may lead to pessimism,since these invisible forcesare even more overwhelming than the worst spectaclethat can be represented.However,Deleuzeclaimsthat, in making the decisionto paint the scream,Bacon is like a wrestler confronting the 'powers of the invisible', establishinga combat that wasnot previouslypossible.He makesthe activedecisionto amrm the possibilityof triumphing overtheseforces.He allows life to screamat death, by confronting terror, and entering into combatwith it, ratherthan representingit. The 'spectacle'of violence,on the other hand,allowstheseforcesto remaininvisible,and divertsus, renderingus passivebeforethis horror. It is for these reasonsthat Deleuze talks at some length about the importanceof 'meat' in Bacon'spaintings.For Deleuze,Baconis a great painterof 'heads'rather than 'faces'.Baconseeksto dismantlethe structured spatialorganisationof the facein order to make the head emerge. Similarly, Baconsometimesmakesa shadowemergefrom the body asif it werean animal that the body wassheltering.In this way,Baconconstructs betweenman and animal, but rather azoneof not formal correspondences indiscernibility. The bonesare the spatialorganisationof the body,but the flesh in Bacon's paintings ceasesto be supported by the bones.Deleuze remarksupon Bacon'spreferencefor prone'Figures'with raisedlimbs, from which the drowsyfleshseemsto descend.This flesh,or meat,constitutesthe zone of indiscernibilitybetweenman and animal.The head, then, constituteswhat Deleuzecallsthe 'animalspirit' of man.Bacondoes not askus to pity the fate of animals(althoughthis could well be one effect of his paintings),but rather to recognisethat every human being who suffersis a pieceof meat.In short, the man that suffersis an animal,and the animal that suffersis a man. Deleuzetalks of this in terms of a 'religious'aspectin Bacon'spaintings,but a religiousdimensionthat relatesto the brutal realityof the butcher'sshop.The understandingthat we areall meat is not a moment of recognition or of revelation, but rather, for Deleuze,a moment of true becoming.The separationbetweenthe spectator and the spectacleis broken down in favour of the 'deep identity' of becoming. Connectives Art Becoming Intcnsity Scnsitlion

BEC OM IN G

BECKETI

2l

SAMUEL (190G89)- refer to the entries on 'art',

tspace'. 'minoritarian * cinema' and

BECOMING CliffStagoll 'logether with 'difference', 'becoming' is the key theme of Deleuze's corpus.In so far as Deleuzechampionsa particular ontology,thesetwo conceptsareits cornerstones,servingasantidotesto what he considersto be the western tradition's predominant and unjustifiable focus upon beingand identity.This focusis replicated,Deleuzeargues,in our everyday thinking, such that the extent of the variety and changeof the experienced world has been diluted by a limited conception of difference: difference-from-the-same.Deleuze works at two levels to rectify such habitual thinking. Philosophically,he developstheories of difference, rcpetition and becoming. For the world of practice, he provides challcnging writings designedto upset our thinking, together with a range of 'tools' for conceivingthe world anew.At both levels,becoming is critical, fbr if the primacy of identity is what defines a world of re-presentation (presenting the same world once again), then becoming (by which l)eleuze means 'becoming different') defines a world of presentation rlnew. Taking his lead from Friedrich Nietzsche'searly notes,Deleuzeuses thc term 'becoming' (deoenir)to describethe continual production (or 'rcturn') of difference immanent within the constitution of events, whetherphysicalor otherwise.Becomingis the pure movementevidentin changesbetween particularevents.This is not to saythat becomingreprescntsa phasebetweentwo states,or a range of terms or statesthrough which somethingmight passon its journey to anotherstate.Ratherthan a product, final or interim, becomingis the very dynamism of change,siturtlcd betweenheterogeneousterms and tending towardsno particular goal rlr cnd-state. llecoming is most often conceivedby comparing a start-point and an crrd-pointand deducingthe setof differencesbetweenthem. On Deleuze's irccount,this approachmeansfirst subtractingmovementfrom the field of rrctionor thinking in which the statesare conceived,and then somehow rcintroducingit as the meansby which anotherstaticstatehas 'become'. l'irr l)cleuze,this approachis an abstractexercisethat detractsfrom the liclrncssof our cxperiences. For him, bccomingis neither merely an rttlrillutcofl nor tn intcrmcditrybctwccncvcnts,but ir charirctcristic of thc

22

BEC OM IN G

BECO M I NG

very productionof events.It is not that the time of changeexistsbetween one eventand another,but that every eventis but a unique instant of production in a continualflow of changesevident in the cosmos.The only thing 'shared'by eventsis their havingbecomedifferent in the courseof their production. The continualproductionof uniqueeventsentailsa specialkind of continuity: they are unified in their very becoming.It is not that becoming 'envelops'them (since their production is wholly immanent) but that becoming'movesthrough' everyevent,such that eachis simultaneously start-point,end-point and mid-point of an ongoingcycleof production. Deleuze theorisesthis productive cycle using Nietzsche'sconcept of 'eternalreturn'. If eachmomentrepresentsa uniqueconfluenceof forces, and if the nature of the cosmosis to move continually through states without headingtowardsany particularoutcome,then becomingmight be conceivedasthe eternal,productivereturn of difference. Deleuzebelievesthat eachchangeor becominghasits own duration, a measureof the relativestability of the construct,and the relationship between forces at work in defining it. Becoming must be conceived neither in terms of a 'deeper' or transcendentaltime, nor as a kind of 'temporalbackdrop'againstwhich changeoccurs.Becoming-differentls itsown time, the real time in which changesoccur.This time which does not changebut in which all changesunfold is not a Kantian a priori form Rather dependingupon attributesof a particularkind of consciousness. it is the time of production,foundedin differenceand becomingand consequent to relations between internal'and external differences.For Deleuze,the presentis merely the productivemoment of becoming,the moment correlatingto the productivethresholdof forces.As such,it representsthe disiunction betweena past in which forces have had some effect and a future in which new arrangementsof forceswill constitute new events.In other words,becomingper seis Deleuze'sversionof pure and empty time. Such a view of the world hasimportant implicationsfor conceptstraditionally consideredcentralto philosophy.It undercutsanyPlatonictheory that privilegesbeing, originality and essence.For Deleuze,there is no asit were.Insteadof beingabouttransitions world 'behind appearances', that somethinginitiates or goes throggh, Deleuze'stheory holds that things and states are prod'uctsof becoming.The human subiect, for example,ought not to be conceivedasa stable,rationalindividual' experiencing changesbut remaining,principally,the sameperson.Rather,for l)eleuzc,one'sself mustbe conceivedasa constantlychangingassemblage of' lilrccs, rn cpiphcnomcnonarising from chanceconfluencesof lanlitwsitnclstl tln. cxpcctrttitlns, rlrgrtnisms, socictics, Hurl11c$,

+

M U SIC

23

Connectives l)uration Nietzsche

B E CO MI NG + M U S I C Marcel Swibod,a 'Becoming' and 'music' are two terms that can be brought together such that a becoming is capable of proceeding through music, for example through the musical operation known as 'counterpoint', or the interweaving of several different melodic lines horizontally where the harmony is produced through linear combinations rather than using a vertical chordal structure or setting. Counterpoint might most usually constitute a specifically 'musical' case in that when one speaksof musical counterpoint the ilssertions made regarding the term usually refer back to a given musical cxample: in short, counterpoint is something that we normally hear. However, when counterpoint describes the interweaving of different lines rs something other than what we can hear, then it opens up to a different function, a function that frees the term from a direct relation to properly musical content. Consider the work of the ethologistJakob von Uexkiill on the relationship between animal behaviour among certain speciesand the cnvironments inhabited by these speciesthat led him to propound a theory of this relationship based on a conception of counterpoint. To this extent, nature - in the very ways in which it can be figured through the interrction of different lines of movement, between animals and their environments, or between and across different species of animals - can be tunderstoodas constituting a counterpoint in a sensethat extends beyond rrstrictly metaphorical deployment of the term. From the perspective outlined here, music enters into a relation of proximity to nature where music hccomes nature. If the term 'nature' is somewhat problematic as a rule in cultural theory, it is to the extent that it cannot be unquestioningly presupposed as having rrny objective existence beyond the terms which define it, terms which are often loaded. In the present case,the term aims at neither an objective conccption nor a discursive one. Rather, this description attempts to restore to 'nilture' a material dimension that extends beyond the confines of discoLfrse,to the extent that discourse implies material processesthat cannot lrc rcduccd to intcrpretation or the status of fixed objects.To im-ply, in this irrstirncc,is to cn-{irld, whcrcby langurgc can in somc instrnccsbc dcploycd

24

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+

PERFO R M A N C E

ART

in waysthat foregroundits enfoldingof materialprocesses. Implicationin this senseis illustratedby the useof the term 'counterpoint',a term which haslargely beenretainedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus becauseit is highly amenableto a thinking orientedtowardsprocess. As was mentionedearlier,the term is mostoftenusedin a musicalcontextto figure the (harmonic)interactionsof melodiclines.As such it doesnot describe a fixed object and the term's linguistic or semanticsenseis insufficient to accountfor whatactuallyhappens when counterpoint takesplaceasit draws its contingentconnectionsbetweendifferentmelodiclines. This characteristicof the term makesit amenableto the task of constructing a different conception of nature, in that it is detachablefrom its strictly musicalcontext in such a way that it still retains its capacityboth to describeand at thesametimeto imply, or enfold process.This capacity is what allowsus to usethe term to describenon-musicalaswell asmusical interactions,wherethe ideaof the melodic line, strictly speaking,givesway to an expandedconceptionoflinear interactions,suchasthosetakingplace betweenthe bodies of different animals,animal species,their environments)and oneanother.This expandedsenseof the term permitsthe construction of a renewedconceptionof nature that puts it in proximity to music, where na,turebecomes music.hn example of this proximity is embodiedin the work of the French composerOlivier Messiaenwho famouslytranscribedthe songsof differentbird speciesbeforeincorporating them into his musicalcompositions.The territorial codingsbetween and acrosscertain bird speciesand their environments(transcodings)are carriedover into the music in the useof birdsong,such that therecan no longerbe a binary or hierarchicaldistinctiondrawn betweenthe productions of tculturetand thoseof 'naturet. Music becomes na,tureand naturebecomes musicand their resulting indiscernibility is the product of a philosophicallabour: to selecttermsbestsuited prlcess.Counterpoint is such a term to the tash of thinhing and,d,escribing becauseit is capableof putting music and nature into proximity and describingthe material implications that orient thought towardsprocess.

BECOMING + PERFORMANCE ART Ad,rian Parr The early era of performanceart from the mid-1960sand through the 1970s includcd such figures as Allan Kaprow, Vito Acconci, Bruce Nirunrirn,(lhris llurdcn, Adrian Pipcr, Lauric Anderson,Lacy lnd anclAnirMcndictrrin thc | ,lhowitz,I lannrrltWilkc,( llrolcc Schnccnrirnn,

BEC OM IN G

+

PER FOR M AN C E

AR T

25

United States;JosephBeuys,Marina and Ulay, Valie Export, Hermann Nitsch and the Vienna Actionismusin West Europe;Jan Mlcoch, Petr Stembera,Milan Knizak, Gabor Attalai, TamasSzentjobyin EastEurope; Stuart Brisley,and Gilbert and Georgein England;and Jill Orr, Stelarc and Mike Parr in Australia.More recentlyperformancehasbecomea significant, if not primary, ingredient of many artistic practices.Examples include but are not restricted to: Coco Fuscq Guillermo G6mez-Pefra, Ricardo Dominguez, Santiago Sierra, Franco B., VanessaBeecroft, Matthew Barney,TehchingHsieh, and AndreaFraser. Stronglyinfluencedby Antonin Artaud, Dada,the Situationists,Fluxus and Conceptual Art, performance art in its early days tended to define itself as the antithesisof theatre,in so far as the event wasnever repeated the sameway twice and did not havea linear structurewith a clearbeginning,middleandend.More importantly though,all performanceart interrogatesthe clarity of subjectivity,disarrangingthe clear and distinct positions that the artist, artwork, vieweq art institution and art market occupy. Trying to articulatethe changedrelationshipbetweenartist, artwork rnd viewer that performanceart inauguratedcan at times be difficult but the Deleuzian concept of 'becoming' is especiallyuseful here in that it allowsus to considerart in terms of a transformativeexperienceaswell as conceptualisethe processof subjectificationperformanceart sustains. 'Becoming'points to a non-linear dynamic processof changeand when usedto assistus with problems of an aestheticnature we are encouraged not just to reconfigurethe apparentstability of the art object as 'object' definedin contradistinctionto a fully coherent'subject' or an extension of that 'subject' but rather the conceptof art's becomingis a fourfold bccoming-minor of the artist, viewer, artwork and milieu. It is in this rcgardthat performancepromptsus to considerthe productionandappreciation of art away from the classicalsubject/object distinction that prcvailedby and largeup until the 1960s. A good example of this would have to be Acconci's Following Piece (1969)that beganwith a propositionrandomly to follow peoplein New Yrrrk.The ideawasthat the performancewould independentlyarriveat a krgicalendpoint,regardlessof the artist'sintention and despitethe 'goal' ot'the work beingachieved.Instead,it wasthe personbeingfollowedwho lrrought the work to its final conclusion,such as when she enteredher irl)ilrtmentor got into her car and droveoff. In this instancethe work was grrovisionally structuredby a proposition,'to follow anotherperson',but tlrc cvcntualform the work took wasstructuredby the movementsof the l)crsonbcing firllowcd.In fact, hcre the art can be consideredasa process scnsitivcto its own trrnsfilrmation;asthc artistwaslcd lround thc city at

26

BE R Gs o N ,

H E N R I ( r 859-

rg4r)

the whim of someoneelse.There is a propositionto do 'X' then the activity of doing 'X' activatesnew previously unforeseenorganisationsto take place;the art is in the 'becomingof art' that is in itself social.Art of this kind may be bestarticulatedas 'art without guarantees'; this is becauseit existsentirelyin durationand amidstthe playof divergentforcesthat typifiesDeleuze'sunderstandingof 'becoming'. What is more,with performanceart artisticvalueis producedsocially;it is not an abstractvalue that is imposedoutside the creativeprocessitself. Hence,what we find is that this kind of artisticpracticeconcomitantlyprovidesa radicalchallengeagainstthe wholeconceptof labourin a capitalist context.Valueis not decidedaccordingto profit marginsand the market, rather it is a particular kind of socialorganisation.For example,when Beuysarrivedat the Ren6Block Galleryin New York (May 1974)wherehe lived with a wild coyotefor sevendaysin the gallery,the art wasin how the two slowly developeda senseof trust in the other to the point wherethey eventuallysleptcurled up together.The meaningthat emergedout of the piecewas not universal,nor was it absolutelyrelative;as an a-signifying processthis wasan art practiceoccurringat the limits of signification. In the examplesgiven,the art wasboth sociallyproducedand conceived in terms of 'social formation', one that convergeddifferencesin their mutual becoming.Hence,what this demonstrates is that performanceart turns its backon the opticalemphasisthat oncegovernedart. Instead,such practicesaim at producing an encounteror event, not in the simplistic sensethat it'happened' at a particularmomentin time, but in so far asit aspiresto bring a variety of elementsand forces into relation with one another.Ultimately, performanceart involvesa multiplicity of durations, eachof which is implied in the art work asa whole. The crucialpoint is that performanceart cannotbedescribedwithin traditional aestheticparametersthat reinforcethe validity of subject/object distinctions,consequentlythe conceptualapparatus'becoming'offersus is descriptive. It helps us describe the processof change indicative of performanceart; an event that in its singularity concomitantlyexpressesa multiplicity of relations,forces,affectsand percepts.

BERGSON, HENRI ( 1859-1941) Felicity J. Colman I )clcuzchm bccncrcditedwith restoringFrenchphilosopherHenri Bergson Io lhc crrnonof'kcy thinkcrsof'his gcncration, and Bergson's work continrucsl0 irnprirct irllon disciplincsconccrncdwith timc, movcmcnt,nlcnlory

BERG SoN, HnNnr

( r 859- r g4r )

27

andperception.Along with the thoughtsof GottfriedWilhelm von Leibniz, Baruch Spinoza,Friedrich Nietzsche,David Hume, Antonin Artaud, Guattari and Lucretius, DeleuzeengagesBergson'sempiricism as a challengeto the rigidity of philosophy,especially in its useof transcendental elements,phenomenological assumptions, and the questfor 'knowledge'and 'truth'. Deleuze'sphilosophicalinterestin Bergsonis manifoldand central to his entire oeuvre.Although neglectedin philosophicalcanonsof the secondhalf of the twentieth century,in the early decadesof that century, Bergson'swork was well known and widely discussedin many artistic and literaryarenas,from the FrenchCubiststo the Englishwriter T E. Hulme. In BergsonDeleuzefinds an intellectualpartner for someof his core philosophicalpursuits: conceptsand ideasof temporality,the affective nature of movementand duration, the political implicationsof multiplicity and difference,the morphologicalmovementof genetics,and the temporal causalityof eventsashabitualand associated series.Deleuzesignals his interest in Bergsonin his essayon Hume, Empiricismand Subjectiaity. Then, in 1966,Deleuzepublishedhis book Bergsonism, in which he called for 'a return to Bergson',through an extendedconsiderationof what he sawasBergson'sthree key concepts:intuition asmethod,the demandfor an inventionand utilisationof a metaphysicalorientationof science,and a logicalmethodand theoryof multiplicities.Bergsonnot only questionsthe logisticsof existencein terms of movement,but his writing indicateshis genuinefascinationwith the subjectsand objectsof life - appealingto Deleuze'sown propositionsconcerningvitalism. Bergson'sconceptsare influentialfor Deleuze'swork in Dffirence and Repetition,where Deleuze developsideas of differenceand repetition, memoryand repetition,the intensiveand extensiveforms of time, and the physicalmovementsof time; all of which are indebtedto Bergson'sdiscussionof the paradoxicalmodalitiesof time in his book, Matter and MemorylMatiire etMimoirel (1896).Bergsonproposesa movingmodelof duration - a conceptof duration that is not spatiallypredeterminedbut continually alters its past through cognitive movement.Then, later in CreatioeEoolutionBergson incorporatesthe cinematic model into his philosophical expression,noting the cinematographicalcharacter of irncientphilosophyin its apprehensionof the thought of ordinary knowlcdge(B 19l 1: 331-33).From this model(andthe Kantiannotionof time, rrndHegelianconceptionof thought and movement)Deleuzedevelopshis cxplicationof how the perceptualrecognitionof moving imagesof the cincmaticscreenoperatesnot through the apprehension of that movement, br.rtthrough specificmoments of sound and optical registration.This f )clcuzcdiscusscs at lcngthin his two bookson the cinema,CinemaI : The trtt tttcrnutl-imageitncl()inL'ma2:'l'hc'l'irnc-I inuga.

28

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HO L E

Memory is conceivedof by Bergsonasa temporalblendingof perceptual in his discuscentralto Deleuze'shypothesis imageryandthis ideabecomes sion of the philosophicalimportanceof cinema.In his secondbook on cinema, The Time-lmage,Deleuze draws from Bergson'sinterest in the different types of possiblememory states- dreams,amnesia,d6ji-vu, and death.To theseDeleuzeaddsa breadthof memoryfunctions:fantasy,halluwhere we make a cinations,Nietzsche'sconceptof 'promise-behaviour' memoryof thepresentfor the futureuseof thepresent(nowaspast),theatre, Alain Robbe-Grillet'sconceptof the 'recognition'processwherethe portrayalof memoryis throughinventionandelimination,andnumerousothers. FollowingBergson,Deleuzedescribeshow the perceptualandcognitive abilitiesof the dreamor wakefulreceptorof memoryeventsor imageryare dependentupon a complexnetwork of factors.As Bergsondiscussesin Matter andMemory,systemsof perceptualattentionare contingentupon the 'automatic'or 'habitual'recognitionof things.Thesedifferentmodes of rememberingare further temperedthrough the degreeof attention givenin the perceptionof things,affectingnot only the descriptionof the object, but the featuresof the object itself. From Bergson,Deleuze's mature conceptionof duration and the movementsand multiplicitiesof time aredeveloped. Connectives Cinema Difference Duration Hume Memory Multiplicity

BLACK HOLE Kylie Message DeleuzeandGuattaribelievethatthe roleof philosophyis to inventnewconceptsthat challenge the waythat philosophyitselfis written andformulated. Because of this, they draw both from new ideasand from thoseof a multiplicity ofalreadyexistingdisciplines,includingbiologicalandearthsciences, coverage is designed to maketheirphiloandphysics. This interdisciplinary (n
BL AC K

H OL E

29

contribute to; philosophical or otherwise. These engagementsare at times fleeting and at times more sustained,and contribute to their strategy of preventing their position from stabilising inro an ideology, merhod, or single metaphor. In other words, they encouragephilosophy to occupy the spaceof slippage that exists between disciplinary boundaries, and to question how things are made, rather than simply analysing or interpreting the takenfor-granted final result or image. This provides the foundation for the work presentedin I nti-oed'ipusandA TkousandPlateaus,andthe seriesof renewed terms proposed by these texts (including schizoanalysis,rhizomatics, pragmatics, diagrammatism, cartography,and micropolitics). Appearing predominantly in A Thousand, Plateaus,the term .black hole, has been sourced from contemporary physics. Referring to spaces that cannot be escapedfrom once drawn into, Deleuze and Guattari describe the black hole as a star that has collapsed into itself. while although this term exists literally rather than as a metaphor (becauseit maintains an effect that is fully actualised, affective and real), it has been relocated away from its original source in scientific discourse.As with many of the terms appropriated by A ThousandPlareaus,it is presented as being engaged in its own processof deterritorialisation that is independent from the text that it has been woven into; these concepts do not exist for the newly bricolagedtogether text, but happen to come into contact with it or move through it as l condition or processof their own moving trajectory or line of flight. In the context of A Thousand.Pleteeus, the black hole is presented as being one - unwanted but necessary- outcome for a failed line of flight. l)eterritorialising movement strays away from the concept and state of molar identity and aims to force splinters to crack open into giant ruptures rrnd cause the subsequent obliteration of the subject as he becomes cnsconcedwithin a processof becoming-multiple. Engaged in this process, the subject is deconstituted, and becomes a new kind of assemblagethat occupies what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'plane of consistency', which is a spaceof creativity and desire. However, becausethis plane is also that of death and destruction, traps are scattered throughout this process. l')xisting as micro-fascisms across this plane, black holes threaten selfconscious acts of transcendence and self-destruction alike, which is why l)cleuze and Guattari advise nomads to exercise caution as they disorganise themselvesaway from the molar organisations of the State. So, in sirlple terms, the black hole is one possible outcome of an ill-conceived (which oftcn equates to overly self-conscious) attempt at deterritorialisation thirt is cirused by a threshold crossed too quickly or an intensity lrcconrcdangcrousbcciruscit is no longer bcarable. Arrotlrcrway of'thirrking lbout thc blrrckholc is in tcrms of how Deleuze i ttttl (i ttl tl ti tt' i r cwr it c lhc r clit t iot t shipphilosophyir nclpsychoir r r alysis hir s

30

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with desire and subjectivity. If the black hole is one possibleoutcome faced by the overly convulsive, self-consumed desiring subject, then it works to illustrate their contention that every strong emotion - such as consciousness or love - pursues its own end. As a potential outcome for both paths of transcendenceand destruction, the lure of the black hole indicates the subject's attraction toward an absolute (lack) of signification. This expressesthe absolute impossibility of representation at the same time as it actively works to show how grand narrative statementscontinually intertwine subjectivity and signification. In appealing to a deterritorialising activity, Deleuze and Guattari problematise the processof subjectification which, they claim, results either in self-annihilation (a black hole), or re-engagement with different planes of becoming. In addition to presenting the black hole as a possibleend-point to certain acts of deterritorialisation, Deleuze and Guattari use it as a way of further conceptualising their notion of faciality. In this context, black holes exist as the binary co-requisite of the flat white surface, wall or landscapethat nominally symbolises the generic white face of Christ. In order to break through the dominating white face,or wall of the signifier, and avoid being swallowed by the black hole, one must renounce the face by becoming imperceptible. However, Deleuze and Guattari advise caution when embarking on such a line of flight. Indeed, they claim madnessto be a definite danger associatedwith attempts to break out of the signifying system represented by the face.We must not, they warn, entirely reject our organising boundaries becauseto do so can result in the complete rejection of subjectivity. Recalling the slogan of schizoanalysis,they tell us not to turn our backs on our boundaries, but to keep them in sight so that we can dismantle them with systematiccaution.

Connectives Molar Schizoanalysis Space

BODY Bruce Baugh of parts,wherethese itsirnywholccomposed 'liocly'tirr l)clcuzcis clcfinccl lilr onc rlnothcr, rtncl hrs r citpacitv sl:rrrtl rclirtiorr to irr sorrrc tlc(irritc llrrlls Irt'in g:rlli't'tt'rl lr v ot lr c l lr or lic s . ' l' lr t ' lt t t r t t r t r t l l r x l v i s j t t s l o t t c c x i t t t t g l l t 'o l '

BOD Y

3l

such a body; the animal body is another, but a body can also be a body of work, a social body or collectivity, a linguistic corpus, a political party, or even an idea. A body is not defined by either simple materiality, by its occupying space('extension'), or by organic structure. It is defined by the relations of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speedand slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and to its internal milieu. The parts of a body vary depending on the kind of body: for a simple material object, such as a rock, its parts are minute particles of matter; for a social body, its parts are human individuals who stand in a certain relation to each other. The relations and interactions of the parts compound to form a dominant relation, expressing the 'essence'or a power of existing of that body, a degree of physical intensity that is identical to its power of being affected. A body exists when, for whatever reason, a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation that defines it, and which corresponds to its essenceor power of existing. Since nature as a whole contains all elements and relations, nature as a whole is a body, a system of relations among its parts, expressing the whole order of causal relations in all its combinations. Deleuze is fond of quoting Baruch Spinoza'sdictum that'no one knows what a body can do'. The more power a thing has, or the greater its power of existence,the greater number of ways in which it can be affected. Bodies are affected by different things, and in different ways, each type of body being characterised by minimum and maximum thresholds for being affected by other bodies: what can and what cannot affect it, and to what degree. Certain external bodies may prove insufficient to produce a reaction in a body, or fail to pass the minimum threshold, whereas in other cases,the body being affected may reach a maximum threshold, such that it is incapableof being affected any further, as in a tick that dies of engorgement. A body being affected by another, such that the relations of its parts are the effect of other bodies acting on it, is a passivedetermination of the body, or passion. If an external body is combined or 'composed' with a body in a way that increasesthe affected body's power of being affected, this transition to a higher state of activity is experienced as joy; if the combination decreasesthe affected body's power of being affected, this is the irffect of sadness.It is impossible to know in advance which bodies will compose with others in a way that is consonant with a body's characterist ic relation or ratio of its parts, or which bodies will decompose a body by c:rr.rsingits parts to enter into experimental relations. Whcther the effect is to increaseor decreasea body's power of acting and bcing 1ll'cctccl,onc body affecting;anothcr, or producing effectsin it, is in rcrrlityrrcrlnrbinirrgirnclrr mixing of thc tw
llI 1

l

i

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W I THO UT

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(as when food is alteredin being assimilated,or when a poison destroys a body's vital parts); sometimesit altersboth and producesa composite relationof partsthat dominatesthe relationsof both components(aswhen chyleand lymph mix to form blood,which is of a differentnaturefrom its components);andsometimesit preservesthe relationof partsamongthem both, in which casethe two bodiesform parts of a whole. The characteristic relationthat resultsfrom harmoniouslycombiningthe relationsof the two componentbodiesinto a'higher individual'or'collectiveperson',such as a community or an association,correspondsto a collectivepower of beingaffected,and resultsin collectiveor communalaffects. Since a body is a relation of parts correspondingto an essence,or a degreeof physical intensity, a body need not have the hierarchical and dominatingorganisationof organswe call an 'organism'.It is rather an intensivereality,differentiatedby the maximumand minimum thresholds of its powerof beingaffected. Connectives Body without Organs Power Space Spinoza

BODY WITHOUT

ORGANS

Kylie Message A phraseinitially takenfrom Antonin Artaud, the Body without Organs (BwO) refersto a substratethat is alsoidentifiedasthe planeof consistency (as a non-formed, non-organised,non-stratifiedor destratifiedbody or term). The term first emergedin Deleuze'sTheLogic of Sense,and was further refined with Guattari in Anti-Oedipusand A ThousandPlateaus. The BwO is proposedasa meansof escapingwhat Deleuzeand Guattari perceiveas the shortcomingsof traditional(Freudian,Lacanian)psychoanalysis.Rather than arguing that desireis basedon Oedipal lack, they claim desireis a productive-machine that is multiple and in a stateof constant flux. And whereaspsychoanalysis proclaimsclosureand interprettrtion, their critique of the three terms (organism, significanceand sr.rbjcctiticrrtion) that organiseand bind us most effectivelysuggeststhe possibilityof'opcnings nndsp:rccs ftrrthc crcationof ncw modesof cxpcricrtcc'.l{itlhcr tltiin llrrrcccdingdircctly to invcrt rlr dcc
BOD Y

WITH OU T

OR GAN S

aa

JJ

dominant in the production of identity and consciousness, they suggest that implicit within, between,and all around theseare other - possibly more affective- fieldsof immanenceand statesof being. Attention is refocusedawayfrom the subjectivity(a term which they feel is too often mistakenfor the term 'consciousness') traditionallyprivileged by psychoanalysisas Deleuze and Guattari challenge the world of the articulating,self-definingand enclosedsubject.The BwO is the proposed antidote(aswell asprecedent,antecedentandevencorrelate)to this articulate and organisedorganism;indeed,they claim that the BwO hasno need for interpretation.The BwO doesnot exist in oppositionto the organism or notionsof subjectivity,and it is nevercompletelyfree of the stratified exigenciesof proper language,the State, family, or other institutions. However, it is, despite this, both everywhereand nowhere,disparateand homogeneous. In terms of this, there are two main points to note: firstly, that the BwO existswithin stratifiedfieldsof organisationat the sametime as it offers an alternative mode of being or experience(becoming); secondlgthe BwO doesnot equateliterally to an organ-lessbody. In referenceto the first point, Deleuze and Guattari explain that althoughthe BwO is a processthat is directedtoward a courseof continual becoming,it cannotbreak awayentirely from the systemthat it desires escapefrom. While it seeksa mode of articulation that is free from the binding tropesof subjectificationand signification,it must play a delicate gameof maintainingsomereferenceto thesesystemsof stratification,or elserisk obliterationor reterritorialisationbackinto thesesystems.In other process.Instead,it is continuwords,suchsubversionis a never-completed ous and oriented only towardsits processor moyementrather than toward any teleologicalpoint of completion.Consistentwith this, and in order to be affective(or to have affect)it must exist - more or less- within the systemthat it aimsto subvert. Deleuzeand Guattari take Miss X as their role model. A hypochondriac, sheclaimsto be without stomach,brain, or internal organs,and is left with only skin and bonesto give structureto her otherwisedisorganisedbody.Through this example,they explainthat the BwO doesnot refer literally to an organ-lessbody. It is not produced as the enemy of the organs,but is opposedto the organisationof the organs.In other words, the BwO is opposedto the organisingprinciplesthat structure,defineand speakon behalf of the collectiveassemblage of organs,experiencesor privileges'lack' as the singular statesof being. Whereaspsychoanalysis lnd productiveforce that maintainsdesire,Deleuzeand Guattari claim that by binding and judging desirein this way,our understandingand rclati
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Elaboratingfurther on the natureof the BwO, Deleuzealsoinvokesthe German biologist,August Weismann,and his 'theory of the germplasm' (1885,published1893)to contendthat - like the germplasm- the BwO is alwayscontemporarywith and yet independentof its host organism. Weismannbelievedthat at eachgeneration,the embryo that developsfrom the zygotenot only setsasidesomegermplasmfor the next generation(the inheritanceof acquiredfeatures)but it also producesthe cells that will developinto the soma- or body - of the organism.In Weismann'sview, the somaplasmsimply providesthe housingfor the germplasm,to ensure that it is protected,nourishedand conveyedto the germplasmof the opposite sex in order to createthe next generation.What comesfirst, the chickenor the egg?Weismannwould insistthe chickenis simply oneegg's device for laying another egg. Similarly, Deleuzepresentsthe BwO as equivalentto the egg;like the egg,the BwO doesnot exist beforeor prior' to the organism,but is adjacentto it and continuouslyin the processof constructingitself. Insteadof slotting everythinginto polarisedfields of the norm and its antithesis,Deleuze and Guattari encourageus to remove the poles of organisationbut maintain a mode of articulation.They advisethat in seekingto makeourselvesa BwO, we needto maintaina mode of expression, but rid languageof the central role it has in arbitrating truth and reality againstmadnessand the pre*symbolicreal.Relocatingdesireaway from a dichotomouslinguistictrajectory,Deleuzeand Guattari presentit as being contextualisedby the field of immanenceoffered by the BwO rather than by the conclusivefield of language.As such, desireis always alreadyengagedin a continuousprocessof becoming.However,despite occupying(and in somecasesembodying)a field of immanenceor a plane ofconsistencywhich areoften describedasbeingdestratified,decodedand deterritorialised,the BwO hasits own modeof organisation(whoseprinciples are primarily derived from Baruch Spinoza).Rather than being a specificform, the body is morecorrectlydescribedasuncontainedmatter parts. or a collectionof heterogeneous

Connectives Becoming Body Desirc Lacirn l)sychorrnrrlysis Spinozit

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BREUER, JOSEPH (I8+2-I925) - refer to the entrieson 'hysteria'and tfeminismt.

BURROUGHS,WILLIAM (1914-97) - refer'to the entries on tart' * politics'. and'post-structuralism

CANGUILHEM, phrenia'.

GEORGES (1904-95)-referto theentryon'schizo-

CAPITALISM Jonathan Roffe In the periodbeforehis death,Deleuzeannouncedin an interviewthat he would like to composea work which would be called TheGrand.eur of Marx. positiveattitudetowardsthe philosoThis fact clearlyindicatesDeleuze?s phy of Karl Marx, which he neverabandoneddespitealteringmanyof its fundamentalelements.Certainlythe most important of theseelementsis capitalism.The Marxism of-Deleuzecomesfrom his insistencethat all politicalthought must take its bearingsfrom the capitalistcontextwe live in. While mentioningcapitalismin passingin a number of places,it is the two volumesof Caphalismand Schizophreniawhich contain the most sustainedand radicaltreatmentof this theme. Deleuze and Guattari insist any given social formation restricts or structuresmovementsor flows. They claim that theseflows are not just the flows of money and commoditiesfamiliar to economists,but can be seenat a variety of levels:the movementof peopleand traffic in a city, the flows of words that are bound up in a language,the flows of genetic code betweengenerationsof plants, and even the flow of matter itself (the movementof the ocean,electronsmoving in metals,and so forth). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's political ,thought begins with the prcmissthat nature itself, the Whole of existence,is at once a matter of fkrws,and that tny s
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pre-capitalist- on DeleuzeandGuattari'saccount,havesucha restriction of flows astheir basicprinciple. Deleuzeand Guattari call this processof restriction, or structuring, 'coding'. They conceivecoding as at once restrictive and necessary. Societies,as regimesof coding,aim to bring about certainfixed waysof existing(living, talking,working,relating)while denyingother more malleable ways. However, without some structure - our own coherent individuality and agencyfor example,which Deleuzeand Guattari considerspecificto eachsocialformationand alwaysoppressive - therewould be no basisupon which to challengeand attemptto alter the givencoding regime.Both Anti-Oed,ipusandA Thousand, Plateausinclude lengthy analysesof differentkinds of societiesand the waysin which they codeflows. Capitalismis the radicalexceptionto this basiccentralunderstandingof the nature of society.There are four featuresto this exceptionalstatusof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari. First, insteadof working by coding flows,capitalismis a regimeof decoding.Second,and in tandemwith this, the recodingthat would takeplacein non-capitalistsocietiesto recapture decodedflows is replacedby the processof axiomatisation.For example, the coding of sexualrelationsthrough marriage,the church, moralsand popularculture - which in different societieslocatethe practiceof sexin certaincontexts,whetherthat is marriage,prostitutionor youth culturehasbeendecodedin capitalistsocieties. This is first of all, for Deleuzeand Guattari, a good thing, making possiblenew kinds of relations that were excludedby the codingregimesin question.In capitalism,however,a correlativeaxiomatisationhas takenplacemaking possiblethe saleof sex as a product (what Karl Marx called a 'commodity'). Axioms operate,in short, by emptyingflows of their specificmeaningin their codedcontext (sexasthe act of marriage,the mealasthe centreof family life, and so on) and imposing a law of generalequivalencein the form of monetary value. Theseflowsremaindecodedin sofar asthey arefluid partsof the economy. They cannot,ascommodities,be bound to a certainstateof affairsto have value - for food to be a product it must be possibleto eat it in a context other than the family home,or tribe. The third important aspectof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari drawingon Marx - is that this processof decoding,/axiomatisation hasno real limit. Given that all such limits would be codes,this movement effectivelyand voraciouslyerodesall such limits. This accountsfor the sensein capitalistsocietiesof perpetual novelty and innovation, since codcd flows are continuallybeing turned into commoditiesthrough this proccss,furthcr cxtcnclingthe realmof monetaryequivalence. I krwcvcr,suclrir proccsscoulclncvcr bc total.Thus, fourthly,thc fact thrrtcrrllitirlisl srrcicty;rrocccds in this waycklcsnot mcanfor I)clctrzcrrnd

C A P ITA LIS M

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H IS TOR Y

JI

Guattari that codedelementsof socialformation are entirely absent.It is rather the casethat certain fragmentsof Statesociety(in particular) are put to work in the serviceof capitalism.Obviously,structureslike the governmentand the family still exist in capitalism.As they note, there could be no total decodedsociety- an oxymoronicphrase.Governments and monarchiesremain,while having their real juridical power substantially reduced,asregulativemechanismsstabilisingthe growth of decoding/ axiomatisation.The nuclear family in particular, the kind of coded entity that one might imagine would be dissolved by the decoding/ axiomatisingmovementof capitalism,is for Deleuzeand Guattari the site of a surprisingminiaturisationof Statesociety,where the father takesthe position (structurally speaking)of the despoticand all-seeingruler. None of thesepoints, howeveqmakesfor a celebrationof the liberatory effectsof capitalism.Deleuze and Guattari remain Marxists in so far as.they consider real freedom to be unavailablein the world of monetaryequivalenceenactedby capitalism.While imitating the decoding that makespossiblethe freeing up of flows and new ways of existing, capitalist society only produces a different, more insidious, kind of unfreedom. Connectives Freedom Marx Oedipalisation

CAPITALISM

+ UNIVERSAL HISTORY

EugeneHolland DeleuzeandGuattariarealoneamongpost-structuralists to resuscitate the notion of universalhistory. But by drawing on Karl Marx rather than GeorgWilhelm FriedrichHegel,they insistthat this is an'ironic'universal history,for three reasons:it is retrospective, singularand critical. [t is retrospectivein that the perspectiveof schizophreniaonly becomesavailable toward the end of history,under capitalism;yet at the sametime, capitalism doesnot representthetelosofhistory, but rather a contingentproduct of fortuitous circumstance.This confirms the singularity of capitalist socicty:it is not somehiddensimilaritybetweencapitalismand previous s
il

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UNIVERSAL

exposesthe sourceofvalue that previoussocietieskept hidden.And hence capitalismoffers the key to universalhistory becausewith capitalism, societycan finally becomeself-critical. Capitalistmodernity representsthe key turning point in this view of universalhistory,for a crucial discoveryis madein a number of different fields:by Martin Luther; by Adam Smith and David Ricardo;somewhat laterby SigmundFreud,who will thereforebe considered'theLuther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry'.The key discoveryis that valuedoesnot inhere in objects but rather gets invested in them by human activity, whether that activity is religious devotion, physicallabour or libidinal desire.In this fundamentalreversalof perspective,objectsturn out to be merely the support for subjectivevalue-givingactivity.Yet in eachof the threefields,the discoveryofthe internal,subjectivenatureofvalue-giving activity is accompaniedby a resubordination of that activity to another externaldetermination:in the caseof Luther, subjectivefaith freed from subordinationto the CatholicChurch is nevertheless resubordinated to the authority of Scripture; in Smith and Ricardo,wage-labourfreed from feudal obligationsis resubordinatedto private capital accumulation;in Freud, the free-form desireof polymorphouslibido is resubordinatedto heterosexualreproduction in the privatised nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex.To free human activity from theselast externaldeterminationsis the task of world-historicalcritique: Marx providesthe critique of political economy to free wage-labourfrom private capital; Friedrich Nietzscheprovidesthe critique of religionand moralismto free Will to Power from nihilism; Deleuzeand Guattari provide the critique of psychoanalysisto free libido from the private nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex. If capitalismmakeshistory universal,this is ultimately becauseit promotes multiple differences,becausethe capitalistmarket operatesas a For Marx, the key human universalwas production: 'difference-engine'. the species-beingof humanity was defined in terms of its ever-growing ability to produceits own meansof life rather than simply consumewhat nature offered.For Deleuzeand Guattari, the key universalis not just production(not evenin the very broadsensethey grant that term inAntiOedipus), but specificallythe production of differencefree from codification and representation. The marketfostersan increasinglydifferentiated network of socialrelationsby expandingthe socialisationof production alongwith the divisionof labour,eventhough capitalextractsits surplus from thc differentialflowsenabledby this network,by meansof exploitati
C APTU R E

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So while the capitalist market inauguratesthe potential for universal history in its productionof difference,it is the eliminationof capitalfrom the market that will multiply differenceand realisethe freedom inherent in universalhistory.

CAPTURE Alberto Toscano The conceptof 'capture'is usedby Deleuzeand Guattari to dealwith two problemsof relationality:first, how to conceiveof the connectionbetween the State,the war machineand capitalismwithin a universalhistory of politicallife; and second,how to formulatea non-representational account of the interaction of different beings and their territories, such as to ground a thinking of becoming.In the first instance,capturedefinesthe operation whereby the State (or Urstaat) binds or encaststhe war machinb,therebyturning it into an objectthat canbe madeto work for the State, to bolster and expand its sovereignty.Apparatusesof capture constitutethe machinicprocesses specificto Statesocieties.They can be conceivedas being primarily a matter of signs;whencethe figure of the One-EyedEmperor who binds and fixes signs,complementedby a OneArmed Priest or jurist who codifiesthesesignsin treaties,contractsand laws.Capturecanbe understoodasconstitutinga control of signs,accompanying the other paradigmatic dimension of the State, the control of tools.The principalontologicaland methologicalissuerelatedto this conceptionof capturehasto do with the type of relationbetweencaptureand the captured (namely in the caseof the war machine as the privileged correlateof the apparatus). Deleuzeand Guattari'snotion of universalhistory evadesany explanation by strict causality or chronological sequence.Rather, it turns to notionsdrawn from catastrophetheory and the sciencesof complexityto revivethe Hegelianintuition that the Statehasalwaysbeenthere- not as an idea or a concept,but as a thresholdendowedwith a kind of virtual efficacy,evenwhen the Stateas a complexof institutionsand as a system of control is not yet actual.The logic of captureis such that what is captured is simultaneouslypresupposedand generatedby the act of capture, appropriatedand produced.Deleuzeand Guattari return to many of the key notions in Karl Marx's critique of political economyto bolster the thcsis of a constructivecharacterof capture,arguing, for instance,that surpluslabourcanbc unclcrst<xrd to cngcndcrlabourpropcr(th
40

CAPTURE

flight from labour). Capture is thus both an introjection and determination of an outside and the engendering of the outside as outside of the apparatus. It is in this regard that capture is made to correspond to the Marxian concept of primitive accumulation, interpreted as a kind of originary violence imposed by the State to prepare for the functioning of capital. Here Deleuze and Guattari are sensitive to the juridical aspectsof the question, such that State capture defines a domain of legitimate violence, in as much as it always accompaniescapture with the affirmation of a right to capture. In its intimate link to the notion of machinic enslavement,the apparatus of capture is proper to both the initial imperial figure of the State and to fullblown global or axiomatic capitalism, rather than to the intermediary stage represented by the bourgeois nation-state and its forms of disciplinary subjectivation. The notion of capture can also be accorded a different inflection, this time linked to the privileging of ethological models of intelligibility within a philosophy of immanence. Here the emphasis is no longer on the expropriation and appropriation of an outside by an instance of control, but on the process of convergence and assemblagebetween heterogeneous series, on the emergence of blocs of becoming, such as the one of the wasp and the orchid. What we have here is properly speaking a double capture or inter-capture, an encounter that transforms the disparate entities that enter into a joint becoming. In Deleuze and Guattari's KaJha, such a process is linked to a renewal of the theory of relation, and specifically to a reconsideration of the status of mimesis, now reframed as a type of symbiosis. Under the heading of capture we thus encounter two opposite but entangled actions, both of which can be regarded as schemata alternative to a dominant hylomorphic mode of explaining relation: the first, understood as the political control of signs, translates a co-existence of becomings (as manifested by the war machine) into a historical succession, making the State pass from an attractor which virtually impinges upon non-State actors to an institutional and temporal reality; the second defines a co-existence and articulation of becomings in terms of the assemblage of heterogeneous entities and the formation of territories. What is paramount in both instancesis the affirmation of the event-bound and transformative character of relationality (or interaction), such that capture, whether understood as control or assemblage,is always an ontologically constructive operation and can never be reduced to models of unilateral causation.

Connective ( lrrpit rrlisnr

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CAPTURE + POLITICS Paul Patton Deleuzeand Guattari deny that the Stateis an apparatuswhich emerged asthe resultof prior conditionssuchasthe accumulationof surplusor the emergence of privateproperty.Instead,they arguethat Stateshavealways existedand that they are in essencealwaysmechanismsof capture.The earliestforms of Stateinvolvedthe captureof agricultural communities, the constitution of a milieu of interiority and the exerciseof sovereign power. The ruler became'the sole and transcendentpublic-property owner,the masterof the surplusor stock,the organiserof large-scale works (surpluslabour),the sourceof public functionsand bureaucracy'(D&G 1987:428).Historically the most important mechanismsof capturehave beenthoseexercisedupon land and its products,upon labourand money. Thesecorrespondto Karl Marx's 'holy trinity' of the modern sourcesof capitalaccumulation,namely ground rent, profit and taxes,but they have long existedin other forms.In all cases, we find the sametwo key elements: general the constitutionof a spaceof comparisonand the establishment of a centre of appropriation.Together,these define the abstractmachine which is expressedin the different forms of State,but also in non-state mechanismsof capture such asthe captureof corporealrepresentationby faciality,or the captureof political reasonby public opinion. Consider first the capture of human activity in the form of labour. Deleuzeand Guattari arguethat 'labour (in the strict sense)beginsonly with what is calledsurpluslabour' (D&G 1987:490).Contraryto the widespreadcolonial presumption that indigenouspeopleswere unsuited for labour,they point out that 'so-calledprimitive societiesarenot societiesof shortageor subsistence due to an absenceof work, but on the contraryare societiesof freeactionand smoothspacethat haveno usefor a work-factor, anymorethan they constitutea stock'(D&G 1987:491).Inthesesocieties, productiveactivity proceedsunder a regimeof 'free action' or activity in continuousvariation.Such activity only becomeslabour once a standard of comparisonis imposed,in the form of a definitequantityto be produced or a time to be worked.The obligationto providetaxes,tribute or surplus labourimposessuchstandardsof comparison,therebyeffectingthe transformationof freeaction into labour. The sametwo elementsare presentin the conditionswhich enablethe extractionof ground rent, which Deleuzeand Guattari describeas 'the vcry modcl of an apparatusof capture' (D&G 1987:441).From an economicpoint of vicw,thc cxtrtrctionof grounclrcnt prcsllpposcs r mcansof thc prtlcluctivity ol'dill'crcntprlrtirlnsof' llrrrcl conrpirrirrg sinrrrltirrrcorrsly

42

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L Ew IS

(r832-98)

exploited,or of comparingthe productivity of the sameportion successively exploited. The measurementof productivity provides a general spaceof comparison;a measureof qualitativedifferences betweenportions of the earth'ssurfacewhich is absentfrom the territorial assemblage of hunter-gatherersociety.Thus, 'labour and surpluslabourare the apparatus of captureof activityjust asthe comparisonof landsand the appropriation of land are the apparatusof captureof territory' (D&G 1987:442). One further condition is necessaryin order for ground rent to be in productivitymustbelinkedto a landowner(D&G extracted:thedifference 1987: 441). In other words, from a legal point of view, the extraction of ground rent is 'inseparablefrom a processof relative deterritorialization' because'insteadof peoplebeingdistributedin an itinerantterritory,pieces of landaredistributedamongpeopleaccordingto a commonquantitativecriterion' (D&G 1987:441).The conversionof portionsof the earthinhabited by so-calledprimitivepeoplesinto an appropriable and exploitableresourte juridical of a centreof appropriation. thereforerequiresthe establishment The centreestablishes a monopolyover what has now becomeland and assigns to itselfthe right to allocateownershipof portionsof unclaimedland. This centreis the legalsovereignand the monopolyis the assertionof sovereigntyover the territoriesin question.That is why the fundamental jurisprudentialproblemof colonisationis the mannerin which the territoriesof the originalinhabitantsbecometransformedinto a uniform space of landedproperty.In thosecolonieswhich wereacquiredand governedin accordancewith British common law, the sovereignright of the Crown meantthat it hadthe powerboth to createandextinguishprivaterightsand interestsin land. In this sense,Crown land amountsto a uniform expanse of potentialreal property which coversthe earth to the extentof the sovereignterritory.It followsthat, within thesecommon-lawjurisdictions,the legalimpositionof sovereigntyconstitutesan apparatusof capturein the precisesensewhich Deleuzeand Guattari give to this term. The imposition ofsovereigntyeffectsan instantaneous deterritorialisation ofindigenous territoriesand their reterritorialisationas a uniform spaceof Crown land centredupon the figureof the sovereign.

CARROLL, LEWIS (1832-98)- referto the entrieson'art'and 'incorporeal'.

(lt'lZANNIi, PAUL (ltl39-1906)- rcfcr to rhc cnrricson 'irrr', 'sclrs:rt c:ittcrttlt'. liort',trtd 'scttsltlioit L

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CHAOS Alberto Toscano This term canbe saidto receivetwo maintreatmentsin the work of Deleuze and Guattari,one intra-philosophical,the other non-philosophical.In the first acceptation,chaos designatesthe type of virtual totality that the philosophyof differenceopposesto the foundationaland self-referential totalities proposedby the philosophiesof representation.In polemical juxtapositionto those systemsof thought that lie beyond the powersof representation, this Deleuzianchaos,in which all intensivedifferencesare contained- 'complicated'but not 'explicated'- is equivalentto the ontologicallyproductiveaffirmationof the divergenceof series.Put differently, chaosenvelopsanddistributes,without identifying,the heterogeneities that makeup the world. In other words,Deleuzianchaosis formlessbut not undifferentiated.Deleuze thus opposesthis Joyceanand Nietzschean chaosmos,in which the eternal return selectssimulacrafor their divergence)to the chaosthat Platoattributesto the sophist,which is a privative asthe chaosof non-participation.Moreover,he considerssucha chaosmos principal antidoteto the trinity sustainingall philosophiesof representation and transcendence: world, God and subject(man). In A Thousand, Plateaus,having moved away from the structuralistinspiredterminologyof series(which chaoswasseento affirm), Deleuze and Guattari provide a critique of both chaosmosand eternal return as an insufficientbulwark againsta (negative)return of 'the One' and of representation.Against this they proposethe conceptsof 'rhizome' and 'plane of immanence'.When chaosmakesits reappearancein What is Philosophy? it is asthe sharedcorrelateof the threedimensionsof thought (or of the brain), alsodesignatedas chaoids;science,art and philosophy. In this context,chaosis not definedsimply by the mannerin which it contains (or complicates)differences,but by its infinite speed,such that the particles,forms and entities that populate it emergeonly to disappear immediately,leavingbehind no consistency, referenceor any determinate consequences. Chaosis thus definednot by its disorderbut by its fugacity.It is then the taskof philosophy,throughthe drawingof planesof immanence,invention to of conceptualpersonaeand compositionof concepts,to giveconsistency chaoswhilst maintainingits speedand productivity.Chaosis thus both the intimatethreatand the sourceof philosophicalcreation,understoodasthe for examplea conimpositiononto the virtual of its own typeof consistency, or percepts. Phiklsophy can sistcncyothcrthrn thoscprovidcclby frrnctir)ns thusbc tccirstit1tcrtrtsof'iln cthicsof'chiuls,it pitrticularwrtyof'livirrgwith

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chaos- and againstthe sterile clich6sof opinion (doxa)- by creating conceptualformscapableof sustainingthe infinitespeedof chaoswhilst not succumbingto the stupidity,thoughtlessness or folly of the indeterminate. Philosophicalcreationis thus poisedbetween,on the one hand,the subjection of the planeof immanenceto somevarietyof transcendence that would guaranteeits uniquenessand, on the other, the surging up of a chaosthat would dissolveanyconsistency, any durabledifferenceor structure. Chaosand opinion thus provide the two sourcesof inconsistencyfor thought, the one determinedby an excessof speed,the other by a surfeit of redundancy.Though chaosis a vital resourcefor thought,it is alsoclear that the struggleis twofold through and through, in as much as it is the inconsistencyor idiocy of a chaotic thought that often grounds the recourse to the safety and identity of opinions. In the later work with Guattari it is essentialto the definition of philosophicalpracticeand its demarcationfrom and interferencewith the other chaoids,that chaosnot be consideredsimply synonymouswith ontologicalunivocity,but that it is accordeda suigeneris statusasthe non-philosophicaldimensiondemanded by philosophicalthought. Connectives Plato Representation Thought

CINEMA Constantine Verezsis Following his work on A ThousandPlateaus,Deleuze'sCinemabooksCinemal: The mooement-image and Cinema2: The tirne-image- understand film as a multiplicity, a phenomenon simultaneouslyoriented toward a network of reproductive forces, which make it a-signifying totality (a 'being-One'), and equally toward a network of productiae forces, that facilitate the connection and creation of an encounter (a 'becoming-Other').The first interpretation of film finds its clearesr expressionin two Breatmechanismsof cinematicovercoding- historical poeticsand textualanalysis- that havedominatedanglophone,academiciscclfilm intcrprctationsincethe mid-1970s.Eachof theseapproaches turrdcrstrrncls rcpctitionas a kind of rcdundirncy, one that contril'rutcs to lhc. huhiluul rccttgttitioltof'tlrc sllnlc: ilr.rindustrirl rcprcscrrtirtiorrirl

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model, a symbolic blockage. Within these totalising and homogenising approaches to film, repetition (redundancy) functions as a principle of unification, limiting - but never totally arresting - cinema's potentially active and creative lines of flight. In place of these nomalising - informational and/ or symbolic - accounts of cinema, another approach develops an experimental-creative understanding of film in which an attentive misrecognition abandons representation (and subjectification) to sketch circuits - and . . . and . . . and - between a series of images. The latter describes Deleuze's 'crystalline regime', an intensive system which resists a hierarchical principle of identity in the former present, and a rule of resemblance in the present present, to establish a communication betweentwo presents (the former and the present) which co-exist in relation to a virtual object - the absolutely different. This direct presentation of time - a becoming-in-the-world - brings cinema into a relation not with an ideal of Truth, but with powers of the false: opening, in the place of representation, a sensation of the present presence of the moment, acreative stammering (and . . . and . . . and). These two critical interpretations of film correspond to, yet cut across' the separateaspectsof cinema dealt with in each of the Cinema books. In Cinema 1, Deleuze identifies the classical or 'movement-image' as that which gives rise to a 'sensory-motor whole' (a unity of movement and its interval) and grounds narration (representation) in the image. This movement-image, which relates principally to pre-World War II cinema, contributes to the realism of the 'action-image', and produces the global domination of the American cinema. In Cinema 2, Delguze describes a post-war crisis in the movement-image, a break-up of the sensory-motor link that gives rise to a new situation - a neo-realism - that is not drawn out directly into action, but is 'primarily optical and of sound, invested by the senses'(D 1989: 4). As Deleuze describesit, even though this opticalsound image implies a beyond of movement, movement does not strictly stop but is now grasped by way of connections which are no longer sensory-motor and which bring the sensesinto direct relation with time and thought. That is, where the movement-image and its sensory-motor signs are in a relationship only with an indirect image of time, the pure optical and sound image - its 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns' - are directly connected to a time-im age- a 'chronosign' - that has subordinated movement. Appealing to Henri Bergson's schemataon time, Deleuze describesa situation in which the optical-sound perception enters into a relation with genuinely airtualelements. This is the large circuit of the dream-image ('onirosign'), a type of intensive system in which a virtual image (the 'diffcrcnciittor') bccomes actual not directly, but by actualising a different i nri tgc,w hi ch it sclf plays t hc r r llc of t hc vir t uit l im agc bcing r t ct ualiscdin

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another, and so on. Although the optical-sound image appears to find its proper equivalent in this infinitely dilated circuit of the dream-image, for Deleuze the opsign (and sonsign) finds its true genetic element only when the actual image crystallises with its own virtual image on a small circuit. The time-image is a direct representation of time, a crystal-imagethat consists in the indivisible unity of an actual image and its own virtual image so that the two are indiscernible, actual and,virtual at the same time. Deleuze says:'what we seein the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state'

(D 1989:82). In a brief example, Chinatown(1973) is a perfectly realised(neoclassical)Hollywood genrefilm bur one that exhibitsan ability to exceed itself. Chinatzwncanbeunderstoodasa representationaland symbolictext - a detectivefilm and an Oedipaldrama.But its subtlepatterningof repetitions- the motifsof waterand eye- while contributingto the film's narrative economysketch the complementarypanoramicvision of a large circuitindifferentto the conditionsof meaningand truth. Additionally,the film's final repetition- a woman'sdeathin Chinatown- brings the detective Gittes'pastandpresenttogetherwith hallucinatoryexactitudeto form a smallcircuit in which the virtual correspondsto the actual.The final act gesturestowardneithera diegeticnor oneirictemporality,but a crystalline temporality. Connectives Crystal Lines of flight Time imase

CINEMA + WERNERHERZOG Alberto Toscano Deleuze's affinity with WernerHerzog exceedsthe explicit references to the German filmmaker in the Cinema volumes. Herzog's films and documentaries of the 1970sare unmatched as contemporary representativesof a heterodox fidelity to romanticism, separating the latter from its Kantian presuppositions and Hegelian consequencesin order to discover a dimension in which materiality and ideality, nature and production, become irrdisccrniblc.'l'his is thc kincl of romanticism which, in the referenceto lf rrclrrrcrirt thc vcry ot.ltscrt ol' ,'lnti-Octlipus,is a progcrritorof thc schiz
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This thinking of the impersonal, of an earth beyond man, is given remarkable,albeit divergent expression in films such as Fitzcarraldo (1982) or Stroszek(1977), where it is accompaniedby the depiction of figures that approximate what Deleuze called structuralist heroes: pure individuals or larval subjects capableof sustaining their habitation by pre-individual singularities and deformation by spatio-temporal dynamisms, attaining a point of non-distinction between man and nature. Herzog immerses the viewer in the (micro- and macro-) cosmosof sensationborne by beings of remarkable fragility (akin to Bartleby) and great hallucinating, doomed visionaries.The cinematic ideasextracted from the work of Herzog intervene at two very significant moments in Deleuze's confrontation with cinema, first in terms of the large form and the small form of the action-image in Cinerna 1, then in Cinema2 with the momentous introduction of the crystal image. Herzog's 'action films' provide two extreme realisationsof those cinematic schematapreoccupied with the transformative interaction of action and situation. In the idea (or vision) of the large form (SAS'), a situation (S) poses a problem to a character requiring an action (A) whereby the initial situation (and the character herself) will be transformed (S'). Herzog's variation on this schemaentails the staging of actions whose delirium is to try to transform situations that does not make any such requirement on the character. These are in turn split between a sublime or hallucinatory aspectthat seeksto equal an unlimited nature, and a heroic or hypnotic one, which tries to confront, through an excessiveproject, the limits imposed by nature. What Deleuze isolatesin Herzog is thus a pure idea of the large, staged as a mad attempt to delve into the abyssof nature by linking man and landscapein the creation of a sublime situation. While Herzog operateson the large form by excess,making the two situations (S and S') incommensurable, he transforms the small form (ASA ) by weakening it to the extreme, such that the actions and the characters bearing them are stripped oftheir use, reduced to entirely inoperative and defencelessintensities (whether in Kinski's foetal figure in Nosferatu (1979) or in the films starring the schizophrenic actor Bruno S.). Sublimity and a kind of bare life are the metaphysical foci of Herzog's implementation of the action image, which reaches its most accomplished moments precisely when it stages their reversibility (the sublimity of bare life in Kaspar Hauser (1975), the destitution of visionary greatnessin Aguirre (1972)). The metaphysical import of Herzog's work is even more prominent in Cinema 2, where he is accorded the rare praise of having best realised the crystal image: the smallest possible circuit joining, in a kind of perpetual oscillation irnd indiscernibility, the actual and the virtual. This point of irrdisccrnibility signrrls il purc cxpcriencc of timc (indisccrnible from ctcrni t.y) i rr r d ol' c: r cr r t ion( indiscclr r iblc lir r r r t lhc int p: t ssivc) .I I cr z. og's

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Heart of Glass(1976) is the key locus for the cinematic manifestation of this exquisitelymetaphysicaltype of image.Following on from an intuition of Gilbert Simondon,Deleuzeunderstandsthis film in terms of the relation betweena germ capableof crystallisationand a milieu of application which is qualified as actually amorphous.But this amorphousnessis not that of a mere prime matter,sincefrom anotherperspectiveit is a virtually differentiatedstructure; and the germ, initially qualified a virtual image,is understoodasactual.Thus, thoughactualand virtual are ultimately indiscernible,they can be distinguishedby the perspecive taken on the relation at hand (for example germ/milieu). Heart of Glass is, in Deleuze'seyes,a kind of alchemicaladventure,haunted by the uncertainty of the crystal, in which what is at stake is the encounter betweenthe red crystalglassand the world, suchthat the former canpass from virtual to actualimageand effectthe passageof the latter from actual amorphousnessto virtual and infinite differentiation. We can thus see how the crystalimageis not simply a matter of a certainkind of intuition, but involvesthe construction of scenarioswith their own very special kinds of actions, revealing Herzog's genius for joining the most deprived and infinitesimal of creatures with the most cosmic and grandioseof projects,an inspiration that can perhapsbe tracked elsewhere in Deleuze'soeuvre.

COGITO James Williams

t"

Deleuze'scritical approachto the cogito of Ren6Descartes;the 'I think, thereforeI am' from the Discourse onMethodor the 'I think, I am' from the Meditations,can be divided into a critique of the Cartesiananalytic method, a critique of the self-evidenceof the cogitoand an extensionof the Cartesianview of the subject. Descartes'foundationalmethod is the rationalist construction of a systemof analytictruths. That is, he believesthat certainpropositionsare true independentlyof any others and that thereforethey can stand as a ground for the deductionof further truths accordingto reason.Deleuze's synthetic and dialectical method, developedin Dffirence and,Repetition, dependson the view that all knowledgeis partial and opento revision. Thus, any relativetruth is open to extensionthrough syntheseswith further discoveriesand through further experiments.The relation bctwccnthcsctruths is dialectical rathcrthananalytical and foundational, 'fhcrc is r rcciprtrcirlproccssof rcvisionand changcbctwccnthcm, as

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opposedto Cartesianmovesfrom secureand inviolable basesout into the unknown.Where Descartessituatesreasonat the heart of his method,as shownby the role of thinking in the cogito,Deleuzeemphasises sensation. Sensationis resistantto identity in representation.Thought must be responsiveto sensationsthat go beyond its capacityto representthem. Thesepoint to a realmof virtual conditionsdefinedasintensitiesand Ideas (the capitalindicatesthat thesearenot ideasto be thought of asernpirical things in the mind, rather they are like Kantian Ideasof reason). Deleuzeholdsthat no thought is freeof sensation.The cogitocannotbe self-evident,becausesensationalwaysextendsto a multiplicity of further conditionsand causes. The Cartesianhope of defeatingsystematicdoubt through the certaintyof the cogitomust thereforefail. Deleuzeoften turns to dramatisationsfrom art, literature and cinemato convinceus of the insufficiency of the cogito. Wherever we presume to have found pure thought,or pure representations, the expressivityofthe artspointsto sensationsand deeperldeas. A thought, such as the cogito,is thereforeinseparablefrom sensations that themselves bring a seriesof intensitiesandIdeasto bearon the subject. The 'I' is thereforenot independentbut carriesall intensitiesand all Ideas with it. These are related to any singularthought in the way it implies differentarrangements of intensitiesand differentrelationsof clarity and obscuritybetweenIdeas. You do not think without feeling.Feelingdefinesyou as an individual. That singulardefinition brings someintensitiesto the fore while hiding others(morehating,lessanger,greatercaring,lessjealousy).In turn, these intensitieslight up Ideas in different ways making somerelationsmore obscureand others more distinct (The Idea of love for humanity took centre stage,after their sacrifice). The subjectis thereforeextendedthrough the sensationsof singular individualsinto virtual intensitiesand Ideas.Unlike the Cartesiancogito, which is positedon the activity of the thinking subject,Deleuze'sindividual has an all-important passiveside.We cannot directly chooseour sensations, we are thereforepassivewith respectto our virtual 'dark precursorst. Deleuze'sphilosophydependson Descartes'rationalistcritics,notably BaruchSpinoza,for the syntheticmethodandfor the oppositionto the free activity of the subject, and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, for the extensionof the subjector monad to the whole of reality.Deleuzeis not simply anti-Cartesian;rather, he extendsthe activesubjectthrough passivity and through the conditionsfor sensation.The cogitois an important moment in philosophy,but it requirescompletingthrough synthesesthat bclic its indcpcndcncc,

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Connectives Kant Sensation

CONCEPTS CliffStagoll Deleuzeunderstandsphilosophyas being the art of inventingor creating concepts,or putting conceptsto work in new ways.He doesnot considerit to be very useful or productive,however,when it createsand usesconceprs in themannerthathethinkshastypifiedmuchof westernphilosophyto date. Too often, Deleuzeargues,philosophyhas used real experiencemerely as a sourcefor extractingor deducingabstractconceptualmeansfor categorising phenomena. [t hastendedthen to employthesesameconceptseitherto determineor expressthe essence of phenomena,or elseto order and rank them in termsof the concept.An exampleis Plato'sconceptof Forms,the absoluteand changeless objectsand standardsof knowledgeagainstwhich all humanknowledgeis but an inferior copy.Sucha conceptdoesnot help us appreciateor contributeto the richnessof lived experience,Deleuze argues,but only to order,labelandmeasureindividualsrelativeto anabstract norm. It is true, he argues,that conceptshelp us in our everydaylives to organiseand representour thoughtsto others,makingcommunicationand opinion-formationsimpler; but Deleuzeinsists such simplicity detracts from the varietyand uniqueness evidentin our experiences of the world. For Deleuzeand Guattari, conceptsought to be meansby which we movebeyondwhat we experienceso that we canthink of new possibilities. Ratherthan bringing things rogetherunder a concept,he is interestedin relatingvariablesaccordingto newconceptssoasto createproductiveconnections.Conceptsought to expressstatesof affairsin terms of the contingent circumstances and dynamicsthat leadto and follow from them, so that eachconceptis relatedto particularvariablesthat changeor ,mutate' it. A conceptis createdor thought anew in relation to every particular event,insight, experienceor problem,therebyincorporatinga notion of the contingencyof the circumstances of eachevent.On sucha view,conceptscannotbe thoughtapartfrom the circumstances of their production, and so cannotbe hypotheticalor conceiveda priori. l)clcuzc'stheoryof conceptsis part of a potentcriticismof much philosophyto drrtc.Hc is arguingthilt iuryphikrsophyfrrilingto rcspcctthc partictrlitlilyol' coltsc-iottsncss irr lirvoulol' broirdcorrccpluirl skctchcsis

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subject to metaphysicalillusion. The application of abstractconcepts merely gatherstogether discrete particulars despitetheir differences,and privilegesconceptsover what is supposedto be explained.For example, one might understandthings as instancesof Being or usefulness,thereby privilegefor the conceptof presupposingan ontologicalor epistemological 'Being' or 'utility' that is not evidentin immediateexperience.By bearing in mind that the conceptat work relatesjust to this being or this useful thing, hereand now,suchillusionsareavoided. In Deleuze'swork, conceptsbecomethe meansby which we move beyond experienceso as to be able to think anew.Rather than 'standing apart' from experience,a concept is defined just by the unity that it elements.In other words,conceptsmust expresses amongstheterogeneous descriptiveor simbe creativeor activerather than merelyrepresentative, plifying. For this reason,in his work on David Hume, Deleuzegoesto somelengthsto showhow causationis a truly creativeconceptby explaining how it brings us to expectand anticipateoutcomesbeforethey occur, and evenoutcomesthat we don't observeat all. In suchcases,anticipatory creationis so powerfulthat it becomesa normal part of life, and causation is a conceptthat representsthe creationof other conceptswithout the requirementfor senseperceptionsto ground them. Moving from a reiterativehistory of philosophyto the practiceof philosophymeansengagingwith inherited conceptsin new ways.This means for Deleuzethat philosophersought to engagein new linesof thinking and new connectionsbetweenparticularideas,argumentsand fieldsof specialisation.Only then doesphilosophytakeon a positivepower to transform numerous our waysof thinking. In his own work, Deleuzereappropriates conceptsinheritedfrom the greatphilosophersof the pastin termsof new problems,uses,terms and theories.Henri Bergson'sconceptsof duration and intuition, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz's monad,Hume's associationism, and numerousconceptsfrom literature,film, criticism, science and evenmathematicsare reworkedand put to work in new and creative ways. The apparent inconsistencyof their meaningsand uses,whilst a challengefor his reader,is a sign of Deleuze'srefusalto giveany concept a single purpose or referent. By cutting routinely acrossdisciplinary boundaries,Deleuzeabidesby his proposalthat concept-creationbe an 'open ended'exercise,such that philosophycreatesconceptsthat are as accessible and usefulto artistsand scientistsasto philosophers. Connectives llcrgson |)urrtion

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Hume Plato

CONCEPTS + UTOPIA EugeneHolland, The centralactivityof philosophyfor Deleuzeis the creationof concepts, and it is an activity forcedupon rather than initiated by the philosopher. What is it that befallsphilosophersthat forcesthem to think?In the course of his career,Deleuzehasgiventhreekindsof answerto this question.In his early works,it is paradoxthat provokesthought; here,the provocationto thoughtis internalto thoughtitself.In the latercollaborations with Guattari (and perhapsbecauseof that collaboration),the locus of the stimulusto thought shifts steadilyoutsideof thought, and eventuallyevenoutsideof philosophy.The secondkind of provocationconsistsof topicsor problems within philosophy(no longerlimited to logicalcontradictionsor paradoxes) that, in the estimationof a creativephilosopher, havebeenpoorlyconceived and hencedemandto be reconceived. The third kind of provocationarises from the connectionbetweenphilosophy and its socio-historicalcontext; herethe problemsare not strictly speakingor originallyphilosophical,but provokephilosophical theynonetheless thoughtto furnishsolutionstq or at leastnewand improvedarticulationsof, thoseproblems- solutionsor articulationsthat areindeedphilosophical. Here,philosophydoesnot respondto problemsof its own', but to problemspresentedto it or forcedupon it by its real-worldmilieu. And it is this kind of connection,betweenphilosophy and socio-historical context that Deleuzeand Guattari will call utopian: 'utopiais what links philosophywith its own epoch'(D&G 1994:99). One of Deleuzeand Guattari'smain concernsis to distinguisha properly philosophicalrelationbetweenconceptand context from the betterknown scientific(or socialscientific)relation basedon 'representation'. Unlike the socialand natural sciences,philosophyis creative,servingas a kind of relaybetweenone practicalorientationto the world and another, new and improvedone.Philosophyrespondsto problemsthat arisewhen a givenmodeof existenceor practicalorientationno longersuffices.Such problemsarerealenough,but they arenot reducibleto reality.The purpose of philosophyis not to representthe world, but to createconcepts,and thcscconccptsservenot to replicateaccuratelyin discoursespecificsegrrcntsof thc w
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So the connectionbetweenphilosophyand its socio-historicalmilieu is essentiallydiagnosticratherthan representative-scientific. Sciencesaim to graspstatesof affairsasthey are;the point is to get reality right, to settle on a correctunderstandingof the world. Philosophyaimsneverto settle, but on the contraryalwaysto unsettleand to transformour understanding of certainproblems,becausethey arethought to havebeenbadly posed,or not posedat all, by previousthinkers,and/or becausethe problemsarehistoricallynew or havechangedso radicallyover time asto renderprevious responses inadequate.HenceDeleuzeand Guattari insist that philosophy for them 'doesnot consistin knowingand is not inspiredby truth. Rather it is categorieslike Interesting,Remarkable,or Important that determine [its] successor failure' (D&G 1994:82).The creationof conceptsis thus cruciallyselectiveaswell as(or aspart ofbeing) diagnostic,and in extracting a philosophicalconceptfrom a historicalstateofaffairs, philosophical thoughtidentifiescertainaspectsof that stateof affairsasproblemsrequiring new solutions.The utopianvocationof concept-creation thus consists in proposingsolutionsto the pressingproblemsof the time; in this way, philosophybecomespoliticaland 'takesthe criticismof its own time to the highest level' (D&G 1994:99).

CONTROL SOCIETY John Marks Deleuzedevelopshis notion of the 'control society'at the beginningof the 1990s.In the 1970sMichel Foucaultshowedhow, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a d,isciplinarysociety had developedthat was based on strategiesof confinement.As Deleuze points out, Foucault carriedout this historicalwork in order to showwhat we had inheritedof the disciplinarymodel,and not simply in orderto claim that contemporary societyis disciplinary.This is the senseof the actualin Foucault'swork, in the senseof what we are in the processof differing from. Deleuzeuses Foucault'sinsightsasa startingpoint to claim that we aremoving towards controlsocietiesin which confinementis no longerthe main strategy. Deleuze reminds us that disciplinary societiessucceeded'sovereign' societies,and that they concentratedon the organisationof life and production rather than the exerciseof arbitrary entitlementsin relation to thesetwo domains.Disciplinarysocietiesdevelopeda networkof sitesand institutions - prisons,hospitals,factories,schools,the family - within which indiviclualswcrc locatcd, traincd ancl/
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observable,measurableobject, which is susceptibleto various forms of manipulation.Essentially, the disciplinarysystemis one of contiguity:the individual movesfrom site to site,beginningagaineachtime. In contrast to this, societiesof control - which emerge particularly after World War II - are continuousin form. The variousforms of control constitute a network of inseparablevariations.The individual, in a disciplinary society,is placedin various'moulds' at differenttimes,whereasthe individual in a contemporarycontrol societyis in a constantstateof mod,ulation. Deleuze uses as an examplethe world of work and production. The factory functioned accordingto somesort of equilibrium betweenthe highest possibleproduction and the lowest possiblewages.Just as the worker was a componentin a regulatedsystemof massproduction, so unions could mobilisemassresistance.In control societies,on the other hand,the dominantmodel is that of the business,in which it is more frequently the task of the individual to engagein forms of competitionand continuingeducationin order to attain a certainlevelof salary.There is a deeperlevel of modulation, a constantvariation, in the wagespaid to workers.In generalterms) the duality of massand individual is being brokendown.The individualis becominga'dividual',whilst the massis reconfiguredin terms of data,samplesand markets.Whereasdisciplinary individualsproducedquantifiableand discreteamountsof energy,'dividuals' are caught up in a processof constantmodulation.In the caseof medicine,which claimsto be movingtowardsa system'withoutdoctorsor patients',this meansthat the figurein the individualis replacedby a dividual segmentof codedmatter to be controlled. Although he is in no way suggestingthat we shouldreturn to disciplinary institutions, Deleuze clearly finds the prospectof the new control societyalarming.In the domainsof prison,education,hospitalsand business,the old institutionsare breakingdown and, althoughthesechanges may be presentedasbeingmore closelytailored to the needsof individuals, Deleuzeseeslittle more than a new systemof domination.It may evenbe the case,he suggests, that we may cometo view the harshconfinementsof disciplinarysocietieswith somenostalgia.One reasonfor this is obviously that techniquesof control threatento be isolatingand individualising. We may regret the lossof previoussolidarities.Another reasonwould be that we areconstantlycoercedinto forms of 'communication'.This means that we aredeniedthe privilegeof havingnothing to say,of cultivatingthe particularkind of creativesolitudethat Deleuzevalues.It appearsthat we will incrcasinglylack a spacefor creative'resistance'. He suggeststhat the movc towarclscontinuous:lsscssmcnt in schoolsis bcing cxtendedto socictyirt gcncral,with thc cll'cctthat muchof lif'ctrrkcson thc tcxturc
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The critiqueof contemporarysocietiesthat the notion of controlsociety entailsmight in somewaysbe unexpectedin Deleuze'swork, giventhat it sometimeslooks like a conventionaldefenceof the individual threatened by the alienatingforcesof globalcapitalism.One might expectDeleuzeto be in favourof a movetowardssocietieswhich do awaywith the constraints of individuality.However,it is the preciseway in which control societies dismantlethe individual that alarms Deleuze.Rather than encouraging a real socialengagementwith the pre-personal,they turn the individual no capacityto 'fold' the line of modinto an objectthat hasno resistance, of what ulation.Although the Body without Organslacksthe discreteness we conventionallyknow asan individual that is not to sayit doesnot have resistance. On the contrary,it is a zoneof intensity.It may be traversedby forces,but it is not simply a relay for those forces. Connectives Body without Organs Fold Foucault Intensity

CONTROL SOCIETY + STATE THEORY Kenneth Surin says In his shortbut prescientessay'Postscript on ControlSocieties'Deleuze (as the disciplinary sociof control opposedto that in the ageof the societies etiesof the previousepochfamouslyanalysedby Michel Foucault),capital hasbecomea vast'internationalecumenicalorganisation'that is ableto hareventhe most disparateforms moniseinto a singleoverarchingassemblage (commercial,religious,artistic,and so forth) and entities.In this new dispensation,productivelabour,dominatednow by the myriad forms of intellectuallabourandserviceprovision,hasexpandedto covereverysegmentof society:the exponentiallyextendedscopeof capitalis coterminouswith the Human conconstantavailabilityof everythingthat createssurplus-value. sciousness, leisure,play,andsoon, areno longerleft to'private' domainsbut The by the latestregimesof accumulation. areinsteaddirectlyencompassed boundarybetweenhome and workplacebecomesincreasinglyblurred, as doesthe demrrcationbetween'regular'work and'casual'labour.Capitalism teloshx cvcnasit bccomcsubiquitous.()apitalism's bccomcsinfilrmrrliscd, of irnccon
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STATE

with the State,and in its current phasethis teloshasbecomemore palpably visible.WhereDeleuzeis concerned,this development doesnot requirethe Stateandits appurtenances to beabolished. Rather,thetraditionalseparation betweenStateandsocietyis nowno longersustainable. SocietyandStatenow form one all-embracing matrix, in which all capitalhasbecometranslatable into socialcapital,and so the productionof socialcooperation,undertaken primarily by the serviceand informationalindustriesin the advanced economies,hasbecomea crucial one for capitalism. This needto maintainconstantcontrol overthe forms of socialcooperation in turn requiresthat education,training, business,never end: the businesstime-scaleis now '2+/7'so that the Tokyo stockexchangeopens when the one in New York closes,in an unendingcycle;training is'on the job' as opposedto being basedon the traditional apprenticeshipmodel (itself a holdover from feudalism); and education becomes'continuing education', that is, something that continues throughout life, and is not confined to those aged six to twenry-rwo. This essentially dispersive propensity is reflected in the present regime of capitalist accumulation, whereproduction is now meta-production,that is, no longer focusedin the advancedeconomieson the useof raw materialsto producefinished goods, but rather the sale of services(especiallyin the domain of finance and credit) and already finished products. Social control is no longer left to schoolsand police forces,but is now a branch of marketing, asevenpolitics hasbecome'retail politics', in which politicians seekdesperatelyfor an imageof themselvesto market to the electorate,and when public relations consultants are more important to prime ministers and presidentsthan goodand wisecivil servants.Recording,whetherin administration or business,is no longer basedon the written document kept in the appropriate box of files, but on bar-codingand other forms of electronictagging. The implicationsof the above-mentioned developments for statetheory are momentous. The state itself has become fragmented and compartmentalised,and has accruedmore power to itself in somesphereswhile totally relinquishingpowerin others.However,if the Statehasmutatedin the era of control societies,it retainsthe function of regulating,in conjunction with capital,the 'accords'thatchannelsocialand politicalpower. In his book on Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Deleuzemaintainsthat stateand non-stateformationsare constitutedon the basisof such 'concerts' or 'accords'.These 'accords'are organisingprincipleswhich make possiblethe grouping into particular configurationsof whole rangesof events,personages, processes, institutions,movements)and so forth, such that the resultingconfigurationsbecomeintegratedformations.As a setof rtcc
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of accumulation,capital is situatedat the crossing-pointof all kinds of formations,and thus hasthe capacityto integrateand recomposecapitalist and non-capitalistsectorsor modesof production.Capital,the 'accord phenomena, can bring togetherheterogeneous of accords'par excellence, and makethem expressthe sameworld, that of capitalistaccumulation. Accordsareconstitutedby selectioncriteria,which specifywhat is to be includedor excludedby the termsof the accordin question.Thesecriteria also determinewith which other possibleor actual accordsa particular accord will be consonant(or dissonant).The criteria that constitute accordsare usually defined and describedby narratives governed by a certainnormativevision of truth, goodnessand beauty(reminiscentof the so-calledmediaevaltranscendentals,albeit translatedwhere necessary into the appropriatecontemporary vernacular).A lessportentous way of making this point would be to say that accordsare inherently axiological, value-laden.What seemsto be happening today, and this is a generalisation that is tendentious, is that these superimposednarratives and the selectioncriteria they sanction,criteria which may or may not be explicitly formulated or entertained, are being weakenedor qualified in ways that deprive them of their force. Such selectioncriteria, policed by the State, tend to function by assigningprivileges of rank and order to the objects they subsume ('Le Pen is more French than Zidane', 'Turks are not Europeans',and so on), asthe lossor attenuationof the customaryforce of such accords makes dissonancesand contradictions difficult or even impossibleto resolve,and, correlatively,makesdivergenceseasierto affirm. Events, objects and personagescan now be assignedto severaldivergent and even incompossibleseries.The functioning of capital in the control societiesrequiresthat the Statebecomeinternally pluralised.

CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION Ad,rian Parr In developingthe idea of 'creative transformation' Deleuze draws on a variety of philosophicalsources.Initially in his work on Henri Bergson he picks up on the philosopher'sconceptof 'creativeevolution'and 'duration', revampingthesein Dffirence and,Repetitioninto a discussionof the productiveunderstandingof repetition,all the while embracinga concept of differencethat beliesthe negativestructureof a 'differenceto or from' in favourof 'differencein itself'. Keen to expandupon the generativeand dynamicimplicationsof Bergsoniancreativeevolutionhe turns to Baruch Spinoza'sEthic's,in particularthe conceptionof bodiesthat Bergsonand

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Spinozashare:a body is constitutedon an immanent plane. The next philosophicalinfluencein Deleuze'suseof creativetransformationwould haveto be Friedrich Nietzsche'sconceptof the 'eternalreturn'. Then, in his collaborationwith Guattari, creative transformation takes a turn through biophilosophy,bypassingboth the human condition and teleological theoriesof evolution characteristicof Jean-BaptisteLamarck in favourof a transhumantheoryof heredity. The questionof 'life', namelythe force that persistsover time and the changesthat ensue,is addressedby Deleuzeasan experimental,spontaneous, and open processof transformation. As it was articulated in Dffirence and Repetitiozl, evolutionis construedasa processof repetition that is inherently creative:it is productiveof difference.In the handsof Deleuze(remember,like Michel Foucault,conceptsaretools for Deleuze), creativetransformationbecomesa systemof involutionwheretransversal movementsengagematerialforcesand affects. In both his 1956 essayon Bergson and his 1966 book Bergsontsm (D 1988a)Deleuzeutilisesthe idea of 'evolution'proposedby Bergsonin terms of transmission.Expandingon this a little more,Deleuzeshiftsthe focusof inheritanceawayfrom determinationandthe continuance of a fixed to bring essence that is passedon overtime.Like Bergson,Deleuzechooses to our attentionthe creativedimensioninherentin evolution.It is the force of life that persists,thus,through change,the vitality of life and difference are affirmed.Accordingto this schemacreativetransformationis immanent, taking placeon a planeof consistencythat precedesunivocalBeing. In BergsonDeleuzefindsthe possibilityfor a philosophythat graspslife in termsof durationandthe inhuman.The temporalityof durationis not conceivedof chronologically,wherebythe end of onemomentmarksthe beginning of the next; nor is it a measurabletime, that is broken down into seconds,minutes,hours,days,months,or years.Put differently,Deleuzian durationneedsto be construedasthe flow of time; it is intensiveasmuchas it is creativein so far as it is the movementof time that marks the force of life. Hence,durationmaintainslife in an openstateof indeterminacy. The theory of creativeinheritanceand the emphasisplacedon nonorganiclife is then given a makeoverand turned into the conceptof the 'rhizome' in his collaboration with Guattari. Early on in A Thousand, PlateausDeleuze and Guattaricharacterise a rhizomeasindeterminateand interpretexperimental.Steeringthe emphasisawayfrom representational ative frameworks,they clearly state that a rhizome is a map not a trace. Explaining this distinction they write that what 'distinguishesthe map from thc tracingis that it is entirelyorientedtowardan experimentationin contlrctwith thc rcal' (D&G 1987:12).'l'hc rhizomcis conccivcclof asan o;rcnnrultiplicity,rrndrrlllifb is r rlrizonrlticnrrxlco1'clungcwithoutfirm

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and fixed boundariesthat proceeds'from the middle, through the middle, comingand goingratherthan startingand finishing'(D&G 1987:25).It is, however,importantto notethat their useof 'open' hereis not conceivedof negatively,which is to sayit is not the antithesisof being 'closed';rather, the machinic character of a rhizome arises out of the virtual and the dynamicboundariesthat constituteit. In A Thousand, Plateausthe force of life is describedby Deleuze and Guattari asinherently innovative and social.Inheritance is not articulated within an essentialistframeworkthat placesthe emphasison species,genes andorganisms,because Deleuzeand Guattarirecognisethat it is the power of affect that is creative- to produce affectsand being open to being affected.Here creativity is taken to be a machinic mode of evolution that is productivein and of itself. The whole question of transformationis clearlysituatedby both Deleuzeand Guattari in an experimentalmilieu and the creativityof this milieu is necessarily social. Connectives Bergson Difference Representation Spinoza

CRYSTAL Felicitjt J. Colm.an The multifacetednatureof a geologicallyproducedcrystalform fascinated Deleuze.Initially he co-joinsexistingscientificand artisticconceptionsof the formal properties and concepts of a crystal to work through the Platonic conceptionof a real image and its counterpoint:virtual image. The crystalthen becomesa conceptthat Deleuzemethodologicallyusesin his considerationof thought, time and differencesin becoming.The conceptof the 'crystal' is engagedby Deleuzein his book Cinerna2: The Time-Image asthe'crystallinesign'or'hyalosign',the'crystal-image',and the 'crystallinestate'.Thesevaryingconceptsareenmeshedwith the idea that the figure of the crystal is representativeof specificstatesof temporality, as discerned through images.The crystal is configured through Deleuze'samalgamationof writers, philosophersand filmmakerswhose workscrcatcdfigurcsof time-spacc.T'hescincludeHenri Bcrgson'svitalism; Mauricc Mcrlclu-Ponty'scxpcrimcntswith thc lrticulirtionof' thc

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perceptionof things; Friedrich Niezsche's suspicionof linguistic phenomenology; Gaston Bachelard'sstudy of reciprocal, affective imagery; and Alain Robbe-Grillet and Alain Resnais'play with socialfolds of time, contextand form. Deleuzedescribesa crystallinestructureas a processand placeof the 'exchange'thatis enactedbetweenthe actualand virtual (D 1989:69).This processis from Bergson'sconceptof'reflective perception',describedin his 1896bookMatter and.Memory (B 1994:105)that Deleuzereworksin his second book on cinema: The Time-Irnage(D 1989: 289). Deleuze describesthat the exchangestructureof virtual-actualrelationsmeansthat the crystal-image is an amalgamatedform of virtual and actual in its various stagestoward infinity. In The Time-Image,where examplesof the crystal-imageand the conceptof 'crystallinenarration' are discussedat length, Deleuzeequatesthe crystallinestructureof the cinemawith the nature of its self-reflexivity and the temporal medium. A crystal-image involves a multilayered and infinite register of montaged 'realities'. As Deleuzedescribesit, cinema'stechniqueof acknowledgement and experimentationwith the crystal-image's medium achieves divergentmodalities of the image. Dependent upon the component layers of time-space montage,the resultant crystal-imagein turn producesan external representationof an imageof thought.The crystalis thusa philosophicalmechanism that is illustrative of concept production, and in relation to the image,the crystalconceptis the productionand apprehensionof time. In TheTime-Image,Deleuze describesa threefoldsystemfor the crystal's variationsof past-present-futuretime. This systemis from St Augustine's understandingof temporalrelations,and Deleuzeutilisesit to describean image'sconfigurationof a memory,or recollectionof an event.Together with the Bergsonianconceptof time as a 'thought-image',Augustine's system enablesDeleuze to discuss the crystal-image as a modality of knowing time and its possibleconstitution. Over time, the effectsof time alter the molecularstructureof things (includingcinematicinformation), and the crystal-imageis employedby Deleuzeto encompass vastshifts in meaningcausedthrough the exchangesbetweenpast, presentand future images,in their variousstatesof virtual and real.Through thesethree variationsof the crystal-image, Deleuzedescribesthe cognitiveand physical apprehension of time asperceptual'affectation'and 'modification'. Configuringthe crystalasa temporalconceptwith affectiveproperties enablesDeleuze to addressthe associatedimplications for relationships generatedby movement,time, memory, perception and affect - each within a particular circuit of meaning,medium or surround. Deleuze's 'crystal' sccks to dcscribc a cognitivc processwhcrcby the temporal rcgistrltiono1'fhcmovcnrcrrts irnd firrnrsof lffcct lrc cxprcsscd, and put

D EATH

6T

into effect. Affection may not be instantaneous;affectiveexperiencesmay be delayedin their consciousor corporeal acknowledgement,perception and utilisation. The crystal'sspecificstatesof formation, mutation and of time. transformationarethus effectsof differentprocesses Connectives Actuality Affect Bergson Time-image Virtual/Virtuality

DEATH Bruce Baugh Death is many things: a state of affairs,when a body's parts, through external causes,enter into a relation that is incompatiblewith that body's continued existence;an impersonal event of dying, expressedthrough an infinitive verb (mourir,to die); the experienceof zero 'intensity' that is implicit in a body's feelingor experienceof an increaseor decreasein its forceof existence;a 'model' of immobility and of energythat is not organisedand put to work; and finally the 'deathinstinct', capitalism'sdestruction of surplusvaluethrough war,unempleyment,famineand disease. the sinA body existswhen its parts composea relationthat expresses gular forceof existenceor 'essence'of that body,and ceases to be when its parts are determined by outside causesto enter into a relation that is incompatiblewith its own. Death in this sensealwayscomesfrom outside and deterand assuchis both fortuitousand inevitable:it is the necessary mined resultof a body'schanceencounterswith otherbodies,governedby purely mechanicallawsof causeand effect.Sinceeverybody interactswith other bodies,it is inevitablethat at somepoint it will encounterbodiesthat 'decompose'the vital relation of its parts,and causethoseparts to enter into new relations,characteristicof other bodies. Dcath, as thc dccompositionof a body's characteristicrclation, forms thc brrsis of thc pcrsonal:rndprcscntclcathof thc Sclf or cgo.'lir thisclcath,

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asfoundedin the personalself and the body,Deleuzecontraststhe 'event' of dying, which is impersonaland incorporeal,expressedin the infinitive verb 'to die' and in the predicatemortal. Dying is not a processthat takes placein things,nor is 'mortal' a quality that inheresin things or subjects. Rather,the verb and the predicateexpressmeaningsthat extendover the past and future, but which are never physicallypresentin bodies and or actualises this dying. things,eventhoughthe deathof a body effectuates or finishesdying.The In impersonaldying,'one'dies,but oneneverceases to die and is actuallydead:when deathof the Self or 'I' is when it ceases or powerof existenceis its vital relationsaredecomposed, and its essence instant, impersonal dying makes reducedto zerointensity.Yet,at this very deathloseitself in itself,asthe decompositionof one living body is simultaneouslythe compositionof a new singularlife, the subsumptionof the deadbody'sparts under a new relation. bodiesexperienceincreases or diminutionsof their During its existence, poweror forceof existing.Other bodiescancombinewith a body either in a way that agreeswith the body's constitutiverelation,that resultsin an increasein the body'spowerfelt asjoy,or in a waythat is incompatiblewith Poweris that relation,resultingin a diminution of power felt as sadness. physicalenergy,a degreeof intensity,so that everyincreaseor decrease in poweris an increaseor decrease in intensity.When the body dies,and the Self or the egowith it, they are returnedto the zero intensityfrom which existenceemerges.Every transitionfrom a greaterto a lesserintensity,or from a lesserto a greater,involvesand envelopsthe zero intensity with Death its powerasincreasingor decreasing. respectto which it experiences is thus felt in everyfeeling,experienced'in life and for life'. It is in that sensethat the life instincts and appetitesarise from the emptinessor zero intensity of death. The 'model' of zero intensity is thus the Body without Organs(BwO), the body that is not organisedinto organswith specificfunctions performing specifictasks,the energy of which is not put to work, but is availablefor investment,what Deleuze calls death in its speculativeform (taking 'speculative'in the senseof financialspeculation).Sincethe BwO doesnot perform any labour,it is immobile and catatonic.ln TheLogicof Sense,the catatonicBwO arises from within the depthsof the instincts,asa deathinstinct, an emptiness disguisedby everyappetite.In Anti-Oedipus,Deleuzeretainshis definienergyavailablefor investment, tion of the deathinstinct asdesexualised and as the source of the destructivenessof drives and instincts, but arguesthat ratherthan a principle,the deathinstinctis a productof the sociallyclctcrmincclrclationsof procluctionin thc capitalistsystcm. | )crrtlrbccomcsrn instinct,a cliflirscdirndimnrirncntttnction of thc c:rpot'llrc surplusvirltrc crr;ritrrlisrrt's itbsorptiorr itrrlistsystcrrr. spccilicirlly,

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it producesthrough anti-production or the production of lack, such as war, unemployment,and the selectionof certain populationsfor starvation and disease.The death instinct is thus historical and political, not natural. Connectives Body Body without Organs

- referto theentrieson'becoming* DERRIDA, JACqUES (1930-2004) and'virtual/virtuality'. cinema','nonbeing'

- referto theentrieson 'arborescent DESCARTES, RENf (1596-1650) tplanet,'Spinozat tcogito','Hume',timmanence', and'thought'. schemat,

DESIRE Alison Ross 'Desire' is one of the central terms in Deleuze'sphilosophicallexicon. In his work with Guattari, Deleuzedevelopsa definition of desireaspositive and productive that supports the conception of life as material flows.In eachof the featuresusedto definethis conceptionof desire,an alternativeconception of desire as premised on 'lack' or regulated by 'law' is contested.The psychoanalyticconceptionof desire as an insatiable lack regulatedby Oedipal law is one of the main inaccuraciesof desire that Deleuze tries to correct. Instead of desire being externally organisedin relation to prohibitions that give it a constitutiverelation to 'lack', for Deleuzedesireis definedasa processof experimentationon a plane of immanence.Added to this conceptionof desireas productive, is the conceptionof desireaspositive.Whereasin psychoanalytictheory desireis locatedwithin the individual as an impotent force,the positive and productive dimension Deleuze ascribesto desire makesit a social Thus rcinterpretcd,desireis vicwcdnot iust as an cxperimental, flrrrcc. procluctivcfirrcc, but also as :r f
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DESI RE

used to distinguish the experimentationof desire from any variant of naturalism; and Deleuze defines desire accordingly in his work with Guattari as assembledor machined. This conception of desire works across a number of themes in Deleuze's writing with Guattari. Productive and positive desire works in their writing as an operative vocabularythrough which they explain fascismin politics as the desire for the repressionof desire,and they advancea new ethics of'schizoanalysis' whose task is the differentiation between active and reactive desires, all the while explaining simple activities such as sleeping walking or writing as desires. Desire is alsoa crucial elementin Deleuze'scritique of philosophical dualism.Such dualism,whetherin ImmanuelKant or psychoanalysis, is ableto submit desireto a iuridical systemof regulationpreciselybecause it first distinguishes the domain of existencefrom those transcendent valuesthat arrangeit in relation to ordering principles.In the caseof psychoanalysis this exerciseof transcendentregulationerroneouslycontainsdesireto the field of the subject'ssexualityandturns it into a problem of interpretation.Against psychoanalysis, Deleuzetries to de-sexualise and de-individualisedesire.Sexualityis one flow that entersinto coniunction with others in an assemblage.It is not a privileged infrastructure within desiringassemblages, nor an energyableto be transformed,or sublimatedinto other flows(D 1993b:140). Deleuzeis particularlycriticalof thealliancebetweendesire-pleasure-lack in which desireis misunderstood aseitheran insatiable internallack,or asa processwhosegoalis dissolutionin pleasure.Whetherdesireis relatedto the law of lack or the norm of pleasureit is misunderstoodasregulatedby lack or discharge. Againstthis allianceDeleuzedescribes desireasthe construction of a planeof immanence in which desireis continuous. Insteadof a regulationof desireby pleasureor lackin whichdesireis extractedfrom its plane of immanence, desireis a processin which anythingis permissible. Desireis accordinglydistinguishedfrom that which 'would come and break up the integralprocessof desire'(D 1993b:140).This integralprocessis described inA Thousand, Plateaus asthe constructionof assemblages. The term, which is developed in response to the subjectivistmisinterpretation of the desiringmachinesof Anti-Oedipus,underlinesthe view that desireis experimental and relatedto an outside.It is this relationto an outsidethat underpinsthe social dimension given to desire in Deleuze'sthought. Understood as an assemblage, desire in Deleuze'svocabularyis irreducible to a distinction between naturalism/artificeor spontaneity/law.For this reason when Deleuzearguesagainstthe dualismthat prohibitsor intcrruptsdesircfrom thc cxtcrnd pointsof lackrlr plcirsurc, hc alsomakcsasccsis an important conditiorrfilr thc proccsscs thirtc
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Connectives Immanence Kant Lacan Oedipalisation Psychoanalysis Schizoanalysis

DESIRE + SOCIAL-PRODUCTION EugeneHolland, Schizoanalysis usesthe pivotalterm 'desiring-production',in tandemwith to link SigmundFreud and Karl Marx: the term con'social-production', joinslibido andlabour-powerasdistinctinstances of production-in-general. of economic Justasbourgeoispoliticaleconomydiscoveredthat the essence value doesnot inhere in objectsbut is investedin them by subjectiveactivity in the form of labour-power,bourgeoispsychiatry discoveredthat the essence of eroticvaluedoesnot inherein objectsbut is investedin them by subjectiveactivityin the form of libidinal cathexis.Schizoanalysis addsthe discoverythat labour-powerand libido arein essence two sidesof the same coin,eventhoughthey areseparated by capitalismin its historicallyunique segregation ofreproductionfrom productionat largevia the privatisationof reproduction in the nuclearfamily. The conceptof desiring-productionpreventsdesirefrom beingunderstoodin terms of 'lack' (asit hasbeenin westernmetaphysicsfrom Plato to Freud): desiring-productionactually produces what we take to be reality (in the sensethat a lawyerproducesevidence)through the investment of psychicalenergy (libido), just associal-productionproduceswhat we take to be reality through the investmentof corporeal energy (labourpower).Desireis thus not a fantasyof what we lack:it is first and foremost the psychicaland corporealproduction of what we want - eventhough under certainconditionswhat we want subsequentlygetstakenawayfrom us by the repressivefigure of a castratingfatheror the oppressivefigureof an exploitativeboss(amongothers).By restoringthe link betweendesiring-production and social-production,schizoanalysisdeprives psychoanalysisof its excusefor and justification of repression;that psychic repressionis somehowautonomousfrom social oppression,and exists independentof socialconditions.Schizoanalysis insistson thc contrary thrt 'sucill-productionis purcly nnd simply dcsiring-prrrcluction itsclf

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under determinateconditions'(D&G 1983:29),and that psychicrepression therefore derives from social oppression: transform those social conditions,and you transformthe degreeand form of psychicrepression aswell. There are two basicforms of desiring-production:schizophrenia,the free form of desire promoted half-heartedly by capitalism and wholeheartedlyby schizoanalysis; and paranoia,the fixed form of desiresubjected to socially-authorised belief (in God, the father, the boss, the teacher,theleader,and soon). There arethreemodesof social-production, eachof which oppresses,/represses desiring-productionin a specificway. Of the three,capitalismis the mostpromising,because it at leastis ambivalent: it activelyfostersboth forms of desiring-production,whereasits predecessors alwaysdid their utmost to crush the one in favourof the other. Capitalism frees desiring-productionfrom capture and repressionby codes and representations,while at the same time it recapturesand represses desiring-productionin mostly temporarycodesand representations,but alsoin the moreenduringforms of State-sponsored nationalism, the Oedipuscomplexand the nuclearfamily. It is becauseschizoanalysis insiststhat social-productionalwaysprovidesthe determinateconditionsunder which desiring-productiontakes shapethat it can hold the mode of social-productionresponsiblefor that shape;that is, schizoanalysis evaluates a modeof social-production according to the form of desiring-productionit makespossible.The valueof capitalism as a mode of social-productionis not only the extraordinary materialproductivity so admiredby Marx, but evenmore its propensity for generatingschizophreniaas the radically free form of desiringproduction.And the correspondingchallengeto schizoanalysis asa revolutionarypsychiatryis to eliminatethe countervailingforcesthat recapture free desire and subject it to paranoiaand belief, forcesoperating in institutions ranging from the nuclearfamily and Oedipal psychoanalysis, to the bureaucracyof private enterprise,all the way up to and including the State.

DETERRITORIALISATION

/ RETERRITORIALISATION

Adrian Parr There are a variety of ways in which Deleuze and Guattari describe thc proccss
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(D&G 1987:88).In their book on the novelistFranzKafka, they describe a Kafkaesqueliterary deterritorialisationthat mutates content, forcing enunciationsand expressionsto 'disarticulate'(D&G 1986:86). In their -Deleuze and Guattari posit that final collaboration- What isPhilosophy? deterritorialisationcan be physical,mental or spiritual (D&G 1994:68). Given this seemingly broad spectrum of descriptions two questions emerge.First, how doesthe processof deterritorialisationwork?Second, how is deterritorialisationconnected to reterritorialisation?Perhaps deterritorialisationcan best be understood as a movement producing change.In so far as it operatesas a line of flight, deterritorialisation indicatesthe creativepotential of an assemblage. So, to deterritorialiseis to free up the fixed relationsthat contain a body all the while exposingit to new organisations. It is important to rememberthat Deleuze,as well as Guattari, is concerned with overcomingthe dualistic frameworkunderpinning western philosophy(Being/nonbeing,original/copyand soon). In this regard,the relationshipdeterritorialisationhasto reterritorialisationmust not be construednegatively;it is not the polar oppositeof territorialisationor reterritorialisation(when a territory is establishedonce more). In fact, in the way that Deleuzeand Guattari describeand usethe concept,deterritorialisationinheresin a territory asits transformativevector;hence,it is tied to the very possibilityof changeimmanentto a giventerritory. Qralitatively speakingthere are two different deterritorialisingmovements:absoluteand relative.Philosophyis an exampleof absolutedeterritorialisationand capital is an exampleof relative deterritorialisation. Absolutedeterritorialisationis a way of moving and assuchit hasnothing to do with how fast or slow deterritorialisingmovementsare; such movementsare immanent, differentiatedand ontologicallyprior to the movementsof relative deterritorialisation.Relative deterritorialisation movestowardsfixity and as such it occursnot on a molecularbut molar plane as an actual movement.Put succinctly,absolutedeterritorialising movementsare virtual, moving through relativedeterritorialisingmovementsthat areactual. There are severaldifferent theoretical contexts Deleuze and Guattari discussandusedeterritorialisationin. Theseinclude:art, music,literature, philosophyand politics.For instance,in the westernvisualarts,facesand landscapesare deterritorialised.Meanwhile in philosophy,thought is deterritorialisedby all that is outsideof thought.In this regard,it is not the questionthat is deterritorialisingbut the problem,becausethe question sccksan answcr,whcreasthe problcm positsall that is unrccognisable or 'l'hcy suggcsttlrlt whirt is dctcrriturialisccl unknowrrblc. irr music rrrc frtrnrrrrr voiccsirnd thc rcli'nirr(ritournrllt).A hclplirlcxirrrrplc hcrc would

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be the composerOlivier Messiaenwho, from around 1955on, usedbirdsongin his compositions.[n theseworkshe did not iust imitate the songs of birds; rather he brought birdsong into relation with the piano in a mannerthat transformedthe territory of the musicalinstrument (piano) and the birdsongitself Here the distinctiverone, timbre and tempo of birdsongswere fundamentallychangedthe moment theseelementsconnected with musical organisation.Similarly Messiaen'scompositional style alsochangedwhen it enteredinto a relationwith birdsong,whereby thesecompositionscould be describedin rermsof a becoming-bird. Yet asthe bird singsits songis it simply beingrerritorial?Here we may considerthe way in which the bird refrainis a territorial sign.Deleuzeand. Guattari usethe biologicalunderstandingof 'territoriality' asdiscussedin the studiesof birds conductedduring the earlyto mid-twentiethcentury; however,they push this work in a different direction. Bernard Altum, Henry Eliot Howard and Konrad Lorenz all suggested malebirds aggressively defenda particular territory as a way of sociallyorganisingthemselves.These studies of bird activiry undersrood territoriality as a biological drive pitched towards the preservationof species.Instead, Deleuzeand Guattari addressterritoriality from the position of what is produced by the biologicalfunction of mating hunting, earing and so forth, arguing that territoriality actually organisesthe functions. The problemthey havewith Lorenz, for example,is that he makes,aggressivenessthe basisof the territory'(D&G 1987:315).They claim functions, suchasmating,areorganised'because they areterritorialised'(D&G 1987: 3 I 6). In this wag they usethe undersrandingof territory advancedby the ethologistJakobvon Uexkiill, to help shift the focusawayfrom a mechanistic understandingof life onto an expressive one. Von Uexkiill proposed thar there is no meaning outside of a milieu (Umweh).For him a 'territory' refers to a specificmilieu that cannotbe separatedfrom the living thing occupyingand creatingthe milieu, so that the meaningof a milieu for Von Uexkiill is affective.This is important when we cometo considerthe supposedslippagebetweendeterritorialisation and decodingthat happensin Anti-Oedipusbutnot in A Thousand, Plateaus.To decode,in the waythat Deleuzeand Guattariintend it, means to strike out at the selfsamecodesthat producerigid meaningsasopposed to translatingmeaning.Rather than understandingdeterritorialisationas destabilisingthat which produces meaning, in A ThousandPlateaus Deleuzeand Guattariregardit asa transversalprocessthat definesthe creativity of an assemblage: a nonlinearand nonfiliativesystemof relations. Apart from biologythc tcrm'tcrritk Piltrfuutlutlltsc 'f crrilrrrirtf tt 'l'rtnstttrytlit(.llcra.

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69

it wasthe French psychoanalyst JacquesLacan who influencedGuattari. For Lacan, 'territorialisation'refers to the way in which the body of an infant is organisedaround and determined by erogenouszones and the connectionsit forms with part-objects.This organisationalprocessis one of libidinal investment.As the infant undergoesa processof territorialisationits orificesand organsareconjugated.In the psychoanalyticsense, to deterritorialiseis to free desirefrom libidinal investment.This freeing up of desire includes setting desire free from Oedipal investment (desire-as-lack). Accordingly,the upshotof Deleuzeand Guattari'sreconfiguration of Lacanian'territorialisation'is that the subjectis exposedto new organisations;the principal insight being: deterritorialisationshatters the subject. antecedents for the In additionto the bioethologicaland psychoanalytic concepts of deterritorialisationand reterritorialisation,Deleuze and Guattari extend a political use to them. Leaning upon Karl Marx, they posit that labour-poweris deterritorialisedthe momentit is freedfrom the meansof production. That selfsamelabour-powercan be describedas beingreterritorialisedwhen it is then connectedto anothermeansof production. Eugene Holland explains, when the English Enclosure Acts (1709-1869)enclosedcommon land for purposesof sheep-grazing,the peasants wereconcomitantlybanished(or 'freed') from one meansof production only to havetheir labour-powerreterritorialisedonto other means of production, such as when they becamefactory workers in the textile industry (H 1999: 19-20). During the early phasesof industrialisation when capitalismwas really gaining momentum, a systemof deterritorialising flows prevailed:markets were expanding,social activities were undergoingradicalchanges,and populationsmoved from rural to urban environments.In one sense rural labour-power was deterritorialised (peasantand landowner) but in another senseit was reterritorialised (factory worker and industrial capitalist).Commenting on capitalism, Deleuzeand Guattari insistthat deterritorialisedflowsof codearereterritorialisedinto the axiomaticof capitalismand it is this connectionbetween the two processes that constitutesthe capitalistsocialmachine. Connectives Becoming Lacan Lines of flight Nomadicism PirrtirlObjcct Ithizonrc

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POLITICS

DETERRITORIALISATION + POLITICS Paul Patton The concept of deterritorialisationlies at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari'smaturepoliticalphilosophy.Processes of deterritorialisationare the movementswhich definea givenassemblage sincethey determinethe presenceandthe qualityof 'linesof flight' (D&G 1987:508).Lines of flight in turn define the form of creativity specific to that assemblage,the particular waysin which it can effect transformation in other assemblages or in itself (D&G 1987:531).From the point of view of socialor political change,everythinghingeson the kinds of deterritorialisationpresent. Deleuzeand Guattari define deterritorialisationas the movementby which somethingescapesor departsfrom a given territory (D&G 1987: 508).The processes of territory formation, deterritorialisationand reterritorialisationare inextricablyentangledin any given social field: 'The merchantbuys in a territory,deterritorialisesproductsinto commodities, and is reterritorialised on commercial circuits' (D&G 1994: 68). Deterritorialisationis alwaysa complexprocessinvolvingat leasta deterritorialisingelementand a territory which is being left behind or reconstituted. Karl Marx's account of primitive accumulation in Capital illustratesthe operationof'vectors of deterritorialisation'in a socialand economicterritory: the developmentof commodity marketsdeterritorialisesthe socio-economicterritory of feudal agricultureand leadsto the emergenceof large-scale commercialproduction. Deterritorialisationis alwaysbound up with correlativeprocessesof reterritorialisation,which doesnot mean returning to the original territory but rather the ways in which deterritorialisedelementsrecombine and enter into new relations. Reterritorialisationis itself a complex processwhich takesdifferent forms dependingupon the characterof the processesof deterritorialisationwithin which it occurs. Deleuze and Guattari distinguishbetweenthe 'connection'of deterritorialisedflows. which refersto the waysin which distinct deterritorialisations can interact to accelerate one another,and the 'conjugation'of distinct flowswhich refers to the ways in which one may incorporateor 'overcode'another thereby effectinga relativeblockageof its movemenr(D&G 1987:220). Marx's accountof primitive accumulationshowshow the conjugationof the streamof displacedlabour with the flow of deterritorialisedmoney capital provided the conditions under which capitalist industry could dcvelop.In this casc,thc reterritorialisationof thc flows of capital and hbour lclclst
D IA GR A M

7l

When Deleuzeand Guattari suggestthat societiesare definedby their lines of flight or by their deterritorialisation,they meanthat fundamental socialchangehappensall the time, evenasthe societyreproducesitself on other levels.Sometimeschangeoccurs by degrees,as with the steady erosionof myths aboutsexualdifferenceand its role in socialand political institutions. Sometimes,changeoccurs through the eruption of events which breakwith the pastand inauguratea new field of social,politicalor legal possibilities.The rioting of May 1968 was an event of this kind, 'a becomingbreakingthroughinto history' (D 1995:153).Other examples include the suddencollapseof EasternEuropeancommunismor the dismantling of apartheidin South Africa. These are all turning points in history after which somethings will neverbe the sameasbefore.The key question,however,is not whetherchangeis slowor suddenbut whetheror not it is animatedby a positiveforceof absolutedeterritorialisation. Deleuzeand Guattaridistinguishfour typesof deterritorialisationalong the twin axesof absoluteand relative,positiveand negative(D&G 1987: 508-10).Deterritorialisationis relativein so far asit concernsonly movements within the actual order of things. Relativedeterritorialisationis negatiyewhen the deterritorialisedelementis immediatelysubjectedto forms of reterritorialisationwhich encloseor obstructits line of flight. It is positivewhenthe line of flight prevailsoversecondaryreterritorialisations, eventhoughit may still fail to connectwith otherdeterritorialisedelements Deterritorialisationis absolutein so far as or enter into a new assemblage. it concernsthe virtual orderof things,the stateof 'unformedmatteron the planeof consistency'(D&G 1987:55-6). Absolutedeterritorialisationis not a further stagethat comesafter relativedeterritorialisationbut rather its internal dynamic, since there is 'a perpetualimmanenceof absolute deterritorialisationwithin relative deterritorialisation'(D&G 1987:56). The differencebetweenpositiveand negativeforms of absolutedeterritorialisation correspondsto the differencebetweenthe connection and the conjugationof deterritorialisedflows.Absolutedeterritorialisationis positive when it leadsto the creationof a new earth and new people:'when it connectslinesof flight, raisesthem to the powerof an abstractvital line or drawsa planeof consistency'(D&G 1987:510).Sincereal transformation requiresthe recombinationof deterritorialisedelementsin mutually supportiveways,socialor politicalprocesses aretruly revolutionaryonly when of connectionratherthan conjugation. they involveassemblages

DIAGRAM - rcfcr to thc cntries on 'axiomatic'.'black hole'. 'fold'. * t'old','plirtciru','scntiotics'irncl'virtuitl/virturlity'. '[,'ouctrult

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DIF F ERENCE

DIFFERENCE CliffStagoll Deleuzeis often labelledas a 'philosopherof difference',an assessment that highlightsthe criticalplaceof 'difference'in his work. He is concerned to overturn the primacy accordedidentity and representationin western rationality by theorising differenceas it is experienced.In doing so, Deleuze challengestwo critical presuppositions:the privilege accorded Being and the representational model of thought. He considersboth to haveimportantand undesirablepolitical,aestheticandethicalimplications that a disruptionof traditionalphilosophycanhelp to surmount.Deleuze useshis notion of empiricaland non-conceptual'difference in itself in the serviceof sucha disruption. Differenceis usuallyunderstoodeither as'differencefrom the same'or differenceof the sameover time. In either case,it refers to a net variation betweentwo states.Sucha conceptionassumes that statesarecomparable, and that thereis at basea sameness againstwhich variationcanbe observed or deduced.As such, differencebecomesmerely a relative measureof sameness and, being the product of a comparison,it concernsexternal relationsbetweenthings. To think about such relationstypically means groupinglike with like, and then drawingdistinctionsberweenthe groups. Furthermore,overand abovesuchgroupingsmight be positeda uniztersal grouping, such as Being, a conceptionof presencethat alonemakesthe groups wholly consistentand meaningful.It is becauseGeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel drew a comprehensive and cohesiveworld of Being that madehim sucha significanttargetfor Deleuze'scritique. On such an account, difference is subordinatedto sameness,and becomesan objectof representationin relationto someidentity.As such, it is never conceivedin terms of 'difference-in-itself',the uniqueness implicit in the particularity of things and the momenrsof their conception and perception.Rather,differenceis understoodin terms of resemblance,identity, opposition and analogy,the kinds of relations used to determine groupings of things. Yet this rendencyto think in terms of samenessdetracts from the specificity of concreteexperience,instead simplifying phenomenaso that they might 'fit' within the dominant model of unity. Deleuze's'liberation' of differerrcefrom sucha model has two parts.First, he developsa conceptofdifferencethat doesnot rely on a relationshipwith sameness and,second,he challcngcs the philosophyof rcprcscntirti
D IFFER EN C E

1a

IJ

every asp€ctof reality evidencesdifference,and there is nothing 'behind' suchdifference;differenceis not groundedin anythingelse.Deleuzedoes not mean to refer, however,to differencesof degree,by which he means distinctionsamongstitemsthat areconsideredidenticalor in anysensethe same.Instead,he meansthe particularityor'singularity'of eachindividual thing, moment,perceptionor conception.Such differenceis internalto a thing or event,implicit in its beingthat particular.Evenif thingsmight be conceivedashavingsharedattributesallowingthem to be labelledasbeing of the samekind, Deleuze'sconceptionof differenceseeksto privilegethe individual differencesbetweenthem. Such individuality is, for Deleuze,the primary philosophicalfact, so that, rather than theorisinghow individualsmight be grouped,it is more importantto explorethe specificand uniquedevelopmentor'becoming'of eachindividual. The genealogyof an individual lies not in generalityor commonality,but in a processof individuationdeterminedby actualand specificdifferences,multitudinous influencesand chanceinteractions. Deleuze'sdifference-in-itselfreleasesdifferencefrom domination by Indeed, on this account,identity must alwaysbe identity and sameness. referredto the differenceinherentin the particularsbeing'sweptup'in the processof constructinga relationshipbetweenthem. To realisethis is to meetDeleuze'schallengeof developinga new perspectivein orderto resist However,to do so routinely is not easy.Only by destabilistranscendence. ing our thinking, disrupting our facultiesand freeing our sensesfrom tendenciesmight we uncoverthe differenceevidentin the lived established world, and realisethe uniquenessof eachmoment and thing. Deleuze'stheory of differencealso challengesthe traditional theory of representation,by which we tend to consider each individual as re-presenting('presentingagain')somethingas iust anotherinstanceof a categoryor original.On sucha view,differenceis somethingthat might be predicated of a concept, and so logically subordinated to it, whilst the conceptcan be applied to an infinite number of particular instances.To think in terms of difference-in-itselfmeansto set the conceptasideand of its producfocusinsteadon the singular,and the unique circumstances meansthat the notion of tion. Awarenessof such specificcircumstances some'thing in general'canbe setasidein favourof one'sexperienceof this thing, hereand now. Connectives Crcativetransformation T'ltcrnirlrcturn llcpctition

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DIFFERENCE + POLITICS Paul Patton Deleuze'sontologicalconceptionof a world of free differencessuggestsa defenceof the particularagainstall forms of universalisation or representation. Every time there is representation, he argues,there is an 'unrepresentedsingularity' which does not recogniseitself in the representant (D 1994:52).However,neither this critique of representationnor rhe onrologicalpriority of differenceestablishes a politics of difference.Identities presupposedifferencesand are inhabited by them, iust as differences inevitablypresuppose andareinhabitedby identities.A politicsof difference requiresthe specification of politicallyrelevantkindsof difference. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of minority and their support for minoritarian politics provides a novel understandingof the kind of differencewhich is relevantfor democraticpolitical change.They define minority in oppositionto majority,but insist that the differenceberween them is not quantitativesincesocialminoritiescanbe morenumerousthan the so-calledmajority.Both minority and majorityinvolvethe relationship of a group to the largercollectivityof which it is a part. Supposerhereare only two groups and supposethat there is a standardor ideal type of member of the larger collectivity: the majority is defined as the group which most closely approximatesthe standard,while the minority is defined by the gap which separatesits membersfrom that standard.In a socialcollectivity,majority cantakemany simultaneousforms: Let ussuppose thattheconstant or standard istheaverage adult-white-heterosexualEuropean-male speaking a standard language . . . It is obvious that'man'holdsthe majority, evenif heislessnumerous thanmosquitoes, children, women, peasblacks, ants,homosexuals, etc.That is because he appears twice,oncein the constantand againin thevariablefrom whichtheconstantis extracted. Majorityassumes a state of poweranddomination, nottheotherwayaround.(D&G 1987:105,cf.291) A liberal politics of differencewould simply defend the right of the minoritiesto be includedin the majority.In other words,it would seekto broadenthe standardsothat it becomesmaleor female- Europeanor nonEuropean- hetero or homosexualand so on. Social minorities are here conceivedas outcastsbut potentially able to be included among the majority.Deleuzeand Guattari insist upon the importanceof suchpiecemcll changcsto thc [
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levelof the axiomsis without importance;on the contrary,it is determining (at the most diverselevels:women)sstrugglefor the vote,for abortion, for jobs;the struggleof the regionsfor autonomy;the struggleof the Third World . . .'(D&G 1987:470-l). At the sametime, however,in order to draw attentionto the sensein which the reconfigurationof the majority is dependentupon a prior processof differentiation,they introducea third term in addition to the pair majority-minority,namely'becoming-minor' or 'minoritarian',by which they meanthe creativeprocessof becomingdifferent or diverging from the maiority. This processof becoming-minor,which subjectsthe standardto a processof continuousvariationor deterritorialisation(D&G 1987:106),is the real focus of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to the politics of difference.They do not denythe importanceof the installationof newconstantsor the attainmentof maiority status,but they stressthe importance of the minoritarian-becomingof everyone,including the recognised bearersof minority statuswithin a given maiority. They insist that the powerof minorities'is not measuredby their capacityto enter and make themselvesfelt within the majority system,nor evento reversethe necessarilytautologicalcriterion of the majority,but to bring to bearthe forceof the non-denumerablesets, however small they may be, against the denumerablesets. . .' (D&G 1987:471).By this they meanthat the limits of the potentialfor transformationarenot determinedby the normalising power of the majority but by the transformative potential of becomingThey do not mean to suggestthat minor, or becoming-revolutionary. produce effectsupon the majority. minoritiesdo not enter into and Their insistenceon the transformativepotentialof minoritarianbecomingsdoesnot imply a refusalof democraticpolitics.Thoseexcludedfrom the majority as definedby a given set of axioms,no lessthan thoseincluded within it, arethepotentialbearersof thepowerto transformthat set,whether in the directionof a new setof axiomsor an altogethernewaxiomatic(D&G 1987:471).Everyonemay attain the creativepowerof minority-becoming that carrieswith it the potentialfor new earthsand new peoples.

DIFFERENTIATION/DIFFERENCIATION Adrian Parr The conceptsof 'differentiation'and 'differenciation'are primarily elucidatcd by Dcleuzc in Bergsonism(D 1988a: 9G8) and Dffirence and (l) 1994:20tt-14)rnd the distinctionhe formsbetweenthe two Rcpctition is ln imporfiultinFrc(licntof'his dill'crcntialontrtkrgy.'ftr bcgin with hc

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appealsto the mathematicalconceptof differentiationin order to unlock his understandingof the Whole asa unified system,preferring insteadto think of openwholesthat continuallyproducenew directionsand connections. In effect, what are differentiated are intensitiesand heterogeneous qualities and this is what makesthe virtual real but not actual. In short, differentiationin the way Deleuzeintendsit happensonly in the virtual realm. Continually dividing and combining, differentiation can be likened to a zone of divergenceand as such it is fundamentally a creativemovement, or flow,that conditionsa wholein all its provisionalconsistency. Meanwhile,what is differenciatedis the heterogeneous seriesof virtual pointsout that differenciationis an differentiation.ln BergsonisrnDeleuze actualisationof the virtual. Actualisationcan be either conceptualor material such as an 'eye' which Deleuze describesin Dffirence and Repetition asa'differenciatedorgan'(D 1994:21l).The problemthis poses, given that Deleuze is not a representationalthinker, is how difference differenciates without itself turning into a systemof representation? That is to say,if differenciationis the processof actualisingthe virtual how does this avoidthe representational trap of similitude and identity?Why isn't differenciationsimilar to, or a version o( the virtual it differenciates? For Deleuze,the actualiseddifferencesof differenciationdo not enioy a privileged point of view over the differencesmaking up the flow of differentiation,nor is differenciationa processthat unifies heterogeneous qualities; rather it simply affirms these qualities and intensities without completelyhalting the flow in its tracks.The actualisationthat differenciationproducesis not'like'differentiation, as this would imply that the differentiationit is like is in itself a fixed subjectmore than an intensivesystemcontinually undergoingchange.Put simply, what this meansis that the processof differenciationis a questionof variationmore than identity and resemblance becauseDeleuzeprefersto think of it as a dynamicmovementthat bringsdifferencesinto relationwith oneanother. Overall,Deleuzeconsidersactualisationin termsof creativitll whereby the processdoesnot simply mark a changeinto what waspossiblein the first instance.To be truly creative,differenciationneedsto be understood assomethingnew insteadof somethingthat resembles virtuality.Carrying on from here he outlines that the virtual differenciatesitself; without this the virtual could not be actualisedbecausethere would be no lines of differenciationthat could enableactualisationto happen(D 1988a:97). Connectives Acturrlity Irrdivirlurrt ion

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Representation Virtual/Virtuality

DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS Claire Colebrook At its most general,the disjunctivesynthesisis the production of a series of differences. The significanceof the conceptof disjunctionin Deleuze's work is threefold.First, whereasstructuralismconceivesdifferencenegatively,suchthat an undifferentiatedor formlessworld is then differentiated by a structure.Deleuzeregardsdifferencepositively,so disjunction is a mode of production.There is a potentialin life to produceseries:a desire can attachto this, or this or this; a vibration of light can be perceivedas this, or this, or this. Second,the differencesofdisjunction aretransversal. There is not one point or term (suchas consciousness or language)from which differencesare unfolded or connected;consciousnesscan connect with a language,a machine,a colour, a sound, a body, and this meansthat seriesmay traverseand connect different potentials.Sexual desire,for example,might leavethe seriesof body parts- breast,or mouth, or anus, or phallus - and invest different territories - the desire for sounds,for colour,for movements.Finally, disjunctionis not binary.Life should not be reducedto the miserablelogic of contradictionor excludedmiddle eitheryou wantliberalismor you don't; eitheryou'remaleor female;either you're for the war or for terrorism - for disjunction is open and plural: neitherliberalismnor terrorism,but a further extensionof the series. The conceptof synthesisis centralto both Dffirence andRepetitionand Anti-Oedipus. ln Dffirence and, Repetition Deleuze rewrites Immanuel Kant's three syntheses(from the Critique of Pure Reason).For Kant, our experiencedworld of time and spaceis possibleonly becausethere is a subject who experiencesand who connects (or synthesises)received impressionsinto a coherentorder. For Deleuze,by contrast,there is not a subject who synthesises.Rather, there are synthesesfrom which subjects are formed; thesesubjectsare not personsbut points of relativestability resultingfrom connection,what Deleuzerefersto as 'larval subjects'.In Anti-Oed,ipu.r Deleuze and Guattari expand the concept of the three synthesesinto political terms: association,disjunction and conjunction. Association is thc connection, not justof data(asin Kant'sphilosophy), but alsoof'bodicsor tcrmsinto somcmanifillclrlr cxpcricnccd thing,an'asscmblitgc'.l)isjunclion,llrc sccorrcl possibiliry syrrtlrcsis, is lhc subscr;ucnt ot'

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relationsbetweenor among such assembledpoints of relative stability, while conjunctionor the third synthesisis the referralof thesetermsto the ground or planeacrosswhich they range. The disjunctivesynthesisis important for two reasons.First, Deleuze (or waysof thinking aboutthe world) havelegitarguesthat all syntheses imate and illegitimateuses,or an immanent and transcendentemployment. Synthesesare immanent when we recognisethat there are not subjectswho synthesisethe world; there is not a transcendentor external point beyond the world from which synthesisemerges.Rather, there are (desires)from which pointsor terms areeffected. connections,syntheses, No point or term canbe setoutsidean eventof synthesisasits transcendent ground,sotherecanbe no transcendental subjectasthere synthesising wasfor Kant. Second,the subjectionof modernthought liesin the illegitimate use of the disjunctivesynthesis.From relationsor syntheses(passions,sympathies)among bodiescertain terms are formed, such as the mother,fatherand child of the modern family.We should,then,.seemalefemalerelationsor genderasa production,asa way in which bodieshave beensynthesised or assembled. One canbe maleor female. The Oedipuscomplexis the disjunctivesynthesisin its transcendent and illegitimateform: eitheryou identify with your fatherand becomea subject (thinking'man') 0r yottdesireyour mother and remainother than human. An immanentuseof the synthesiswould refusethisexclusioe disjunctionof 'one mustbe this or that, maleor female'.Insteadof insistingthat onemust line up beneaththe signifierof man or womanand submit to the systemof sexualdifference,Deleuzeand Guattariopenthe disjunctivesynthesis:one can be this or this or this, and this and,this and,this: neither mother nor fatherbut a becoming-girl,becoming-animal or becomingimperceptible. Connectives Becoming Desire Kant Oedipalisation

DURATTON(DURir) CliffStagoll I lcrrrillcrgsonintcrcstsl)clcuzcbccrtusc of'hisrrrdicrrl dcparturcfiom philrr )unrtion solrfty's rlrlltockrxy. | kcy iclcirs Qlurttt)is orrcol'scvclirlol' llcrgs
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adoptedby Deleuzewhen developinghis philosophyof difference.Typical of Deleuze'susualapproachto Bergson,his interpretationand use of the conceptis at oncealmostentirelysympatheticbut strikinglyidiosyncratic. Accordingto Deleuze,one canonly comprehendthe notion of duration by using Bergson'smethod of philosophicalintuition (intuitionphilor ophique),a deliberatereflectiveawarenessor willed self-consciousness. (or, more generally,mental life) to be essenIntuition revealsconsciousness activity that constitutes,in its dynamism mental tially temporal; ongoing and the mutual interpenetrationof its states,a time internal to one'sself. anddurationis the immeMental life is, then,a kind of flowingexperience, diateawareness of this flow Bergsonbelievesthat intuition's findingsare bestexpressedin images, and soexplainsduration by usinganalogieswith music.Mental statesflow togetheras if parts of a melody,with previousnoteslingering and future onesanticipatedin the unity of a piece,the permeationof eachnote by of their interconnection.To try and othersrevealingthe extremecloseness graspthis flow asa completeset of notesis pointless,becausethe musicis alwayson the vergeof endingand alwaysalteredby the addition of a new systemis as a comprehensive note. To speakof 'mind' or tconsciousness' to ignore an analogousattribute of duration: it is alwaysflowing, overtaking what might be calledthe 'not yet' and passingawayin the 'already'. Bergsonconsidersquantificationof duration to be inconsistentwith its immediate,lived reality.It can be contrastedwith 'clock time', the time of time by situatingelemental physicsandpracticallife, which eitherspatialises grid or usesthe digitsof a time-pieceas instantsend-to-endon a referential with these a crassandimprecisephysicalimage.Whenarrangedin accordance is'situated' inst4nts,consciousness models,timebecomes a seriesof separable andmovementis conmentalstates, in time asa seriesof temporallydisparate positions. In other words,clock ceivedin terms of relationsbetweenstatic time abstractsfrom the notion of duration by distorting its continuity. But constitutiveintegrationof momentsof duration must not be overis not emphasised.Bergson'sintuition confirms also that consciousness mental states that 'one long thought', asit were,but a flowing togetherof are different from one anotherin important ways.Bergsoncontendsthat differencesbetweenmentalstatesallow us to mark one kind of thought or one particular thought from another,whilst constituting simultaneously As such,dura singularflow,a mergingof thoughtsasone consciousness. of the flow of changesthat simultaneously ation is the immediateawareness constitutedifferencesand,relationshipsbetweenparticulars. of durationarecriticalfor Deleuze.In his early Scvcralcharacteristics workson DrrvidHumc, l)clcuzcusccldurationasan cxplicatoryt<xrl,rcno1'hrbit,itssociittion lncl tintc.Subscqucntly, dcringlncw I lunrc'sirccounts

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Deleuzeadoptsit asa meansfor exploringdifferenceand becomingaskey elementsof life. If duration 'includes',as it were,all of the qualitative ('differences differences of kind') of one'slived experience, Deleuzeargues, then it also emphasisesthe productive, liberating potenrial of these differences.Even in the continuity of one'sconsciousness, there is a disconnectionbetweeneventsthat allowscreativityandrenewal.For example, one is ableto call upon new conceptsto reinterpretone'smemoriesor perceivesomevistaanewin the light of one'sexposureto a work of art. Deleuze usesduration to make some important philosophicalpoints abouttime and difference.For philosopherssuchasImmanuelKant, time is both a form ofreceptiveexperienceaboutthe world and a necessary condition for any human experienceat all. As such, for Kant, time is not an empiricalconceptbut an a priori necessityunderlyingall possibleexperience.Furthermore,he considerstime to comprisea homogeneous seriesof successive instants,standingin needof synthesis. In contrast,durationis alwayspresentin the'givenness'ofone'sexperience.It doesnot transcendexperience, andneithermustit be derivedphilosophically.Furthermore,duration, unlike matter,cannotbe divided into elementswhich, when dividedor reconstituted,remainthe samein aggregateas their unified form. Duration, as lived experience,brings together both unity and differencein a flow of interconnections. For Deleuze,these contrastsrepresentthe differencebetweena dictatorialphilosophythat creates'superior'conceptsthat subsumeand order the multiplicitiesand creativityof life and one that createsopportunitiesfor changeand variety. Connectives Bergson Intuition Kant

EARTH/LAND

(rrRR.E)

John Proteai As prrrt
EARTH,/LINo (rnnnn)

8l

'territory' (territoire) expressmanners of occupying terrestrial spaceby differentsocialmachines:the nomadwar machine,the territorial tribe, the overcodingState.Earth can also mean the virtual realm or Body without Organs(BwO), while 'a new earth' (unenouaelleterre),called,for at points in A Thousand, Plateausand madea focal point of What is Philosophy?, entails potentials new human relationshipsto the creative of material systemsto form consistencies, war machines,or rhizomesfrom a varietyof means. ln A Thousand, Plateau.s, Brian Massumi usestwo English words to translatethe French terrerwhichcanmeanboth'earth'in the astronomical senseofour planetand'land' in the geographical senseofa cultivatedarea. There is no consistencyin Deleuzeand Guattari'suseof the majusculein the French text; both Terre and,terre are used in the senseof 'earth' and 'land'. The anglophonereadershouldkeepin mind the closeproximity of terre('earth' and 'land') with territoire('territory'). First, 'earth'is equivalentto the BwO, otherwiseunderstoodby Deleuze and Guattari as the virtual plane of consistencyupon which strata are imposed(D&G 1987: 40). Second,'earth' is part of the earth-territory (terre-territoire)systemof romanticism,the becoming-intensive of strata. Hence 'earth' is the gathering point, outside all territories, of all selforderingforces('forcesof the earth') for intensiveterritorial assemblages (the virtual seenfrom the point of view of territorialisingmachinicassemblages).Third, the 'new earth' (nouaelleterre)is the becoming-virtualof intensive material. Put differently, the 'new earth' is the correlate of absolutedeterritorialisation(the leavingof all intensiveterritorial assemblagesto attainthe planeof consistency); it is the tappingof 'cosmicforces' (the virtual seenfrom the point of view of the abstractmachinescomposing it, not the machinicassemblages that actualisea selectionof singularities). Hence, it marks new potentials for creation (D&G 1987: 423; 509-10).In this sense,it is unfortunatethat Brian Massumi translateszae nouaelleterreas'a new land' (D&G 1987:509). Land,(terre)is constitutedby the overcodingof territoriesunderthe signifying regimeand the Stateapparatus(D&G 1987:440-l). Land refers exclusivelyto striatedspace,and is that terrain that canbe owned,held as stock, distributed, rented, made to produce and taxed. Land can be gridded, distributed,classifiedand categorisedwithout evenbeing physically experienced,and a striking exampleof this is the township-andrangesystemof the US that imparted striatedspaceto a vast part of the North Americancontinentaheadof actualsettleroccupation.The system of stockpilingterritories and overcodingthem as land for the Statedoes not stop at thc firrm or evcn thc ranch,but extendsto the forestlands(as 'nrttionrl'fbrcsts)irnd to thc unusablcspacesthat becomenltional parks, bi
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subiectswho seekto escapefrom private property to find some sort of becoming-earthcommons. ln What is Philosophy?,'a new earth' becomesthe rallying cry in the 'geophilosophy'of Deleuze and Guattari, in which 'stratification' is the processwherebythe implantationof codesand territoriesform dominating bodies.This is opposedto the constructionof a 'new earth' that entails new human relationshipsto the creativepotentialsof material systemsto form consistencies, war machines,or rhizomesfrom a varietyof means.In the constructionof the new earth, caremust be takennot to confusethe structural differenceof strata and consistencywith an a priori moral categorisation,but ratheralwaysto retainthe pragmaticand empiricalnature of Deleuzeand Guattari'swork and perform the ethicalevaluationof the life-affirming or life-denying characterof assemblages. Strata,along with codesand territories,are alwaysneeded,if only in providingrestingpointsfor further experimentsin forming war machines. Strataare in fact 'beneficialin manyregards'(D&G 1987:40),though we must be carefulnot to laud the stabilityof strataasinstantiatingthe moral virtue of unchangingself-identityespousedby Platonism.The mere fact that an assemblage or body politic is flexibleand resilient,however,does not guaranteeits ethical choice-worthiness,for what Deleuzeand Guattari call 'micro-fascism'is not rigid at all but rather a suppleand free-floating body politic.Eveniffascistsarereterritorialisedon the'blackhole'oftheir subjectivity:'thereis fascismwhen a war machineis installedin eachhole, in everyniche' (D&G 1987: 214)and not only thosepracticesthat 'intend' to producea life-affirmingassemblage will resultin such. Connectives Body without Organs Blackhole Deterritorialisation Plato Space Virtual/Virtuality

ETERNAL RETURN Lee Sltinks 'l'hc conccptof''ctcrn:rlrcturn', which l)clcuzcclrirwsfrom lfricdrich Nictzschc,is crucirll lo tltc rrrdicrtlcxlcrtsiot't ol'tlrc llhikrsollhyof'

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immanenceand univocity. In Dffirence and RepetitionDeletzearguesthat Duns Scotus,Baruch Spinozaand Nietzscheaffirmedunivocalbeing.It is only with Nietzsche,accordingto Deleuze,that the joyful ideaof univocity is thought adequately,and this is becauseNietzsche imaginesa world of 'pre-personalsingularities'.That is, there is not a 'who' or 'what' that then has variousproperties;nor is there someoneor somethingthat ri. Each differenceis a power to differ, with no event of differencebeing the ground or causeof any other. By going through this affirmation of difference,and by abandoningany ground or being before or beyond difference, both Nietzsche and Deleuze arrive at the eternal return. If differenceoccurredin order to arriveat someproperend - if therewere a purposeor properend to life - then the processof becomingwould have some ideal end point (even if this were only imagined or ideal). But differenceis an event that is joyful in itself; it is not the differenceo/this beingor for this end.With eacheventof differencelife is transformed;life becomesother than itself becauselife is difference.Consequently, the only 'thing' that 'is' is difference,with each repetition of differencebeing Time is what different.Only differencereturns, and it returns eterna,lly. followsfrom difference(time is difference);differencecannotbe locatedin time. Eternalreturn is thereforethe ultimateidea. This difficult and enigmatic idea, developedmost concertedly in Nietzsche'sThus Spake Zarathustra,has proved controversialin philosophicalcircleswhere it has generallybeeninterpreted aseither an existentialor inhumanvision of existence. Accordingto the existentialreading, the thought of eternalreturn compelsus to considerhow we ought properly to live. This thought can be expressedin the following way: were we suddenlyto recognisethat everyaspectofour lives,both painfulandjoyous, was fated to return in the guiseof a potentiallyinfinite repetition,how would we needto live to justify the recurrenceof eventhe most terrible and painful events?Conversely,the inhuman or cosmologicalreadingunderstandsNietzsche'spropositionasthe fundamentalaxiomof a philosophyof forces in which active force separatesitself from and supplants reactive forceand ultimatelylocatesitself asthe motor principleof becoming. Deleuze'ssignalcontribution to the post-warphilosophicalrevisionof Nietzschewas to establishthis secondreadingof eternal return as the return and selectionof forcesat the heart of modern theoriesof power.He explicitly repudiatesthe naivereadingof Nietzschethat envisages eternal return asa doctrineproclaimingthe infinite recurrenceof everyhistorical moment in exactlythe sameorder throughouteternity.The perversityof this naivcreading,Deleuzeargues,is that it convertsNietzsche'svision of bcingasthc cndlcssbccomingof clifl'crcntial furccsinto a simplcprinciplc ot'idcntity.Yctwc firilto undcrstirnd ot'it tlrcctcrnirlrcturnif'wc conccivc

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as the ceaselessreturn of the same; instead, eternal return inscribes differenceand becomingat the very heart of being.For it is not being that recurs in the eternal return; the principle of return constitutes the one thing sharedby diversity and multiplicity. What is at stakeis not rhe repetition of a universalsameness but the movementthat produceseverything that d,ffirs. Eternal return is thereforeproperly understoodasa synthesis of becomingand the being that is affirmed in becoming.It appearsasrhe fundamental ontological principle of the differenceand repetition of forces that will bear the nameof Will to Power. To think the eternal return is to think the becoming-activeof forces. The return selectsforcesaccording to the quantity of Will to Power that they express.Deleuze characterisesthis processas a d,oubleselectionby the activity of force and the affirmation of the will. In accordancewith the principle that whateverwe will, we must will it in such a way rhat we also will its eternal recurrence, the eternal return eliminates reactive statesfrom the becoming of being. This first selectioneliminates ali but the most powerfully reactive forces - those which go to rhe active limit of what they can do and form the basisof the nihilistic impulse and the will to nothingness.Thesestrongreactiveforcesaresubsequendyincorporatedinto the eternal return in order to effect the overcoming of negation and the transformation of reactive into active force. Such revaluationtakesplace becausethe eternal return brings the nihilistic will to completion:the absolutespirit of negationinvolvesa negationof reactive forces themselves.Within this negation of negation reactive forces deny and suppress themselves in the name of a paradoxical affirmation: by destroying the reactive in themselves, the strongest spirits come to embody the becoming-active of reactive force. This movement of affirmation constitutesthe secondor doubled selection undertaken by the eternal return: the transvaluationofreactive forcesby meansof an affirmation of negation itself. This secondselectiontransforms a selectionof thought into a selectionof being: somethingnewis now brought into being which appearsasthe effectof the revaluationof forces.The eternal return 'is' this movemeRtof transvaluation: according to its double selectiononly action and affirmation return while the negativeis willed out of being.The return eliminateseveryreactiveforce that resistsit; iu so doing it affirms both the being of becomingand the becoming-activeof forces. Connectives Active/reactive Ilccoming

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Difference Kant Multiplicity Nietzsche

ETHICS John Marhs Throughout his work, Deleuzedraws a clear distinction betweenethics and morality.Morality is a setof constrainingrules that judgeactionsand intentionsin relationto transcendentvaluesof good and evil. Morality is a way of judging life, whereasethicsis a way of assessing what we do in terms of waysof existingin the world. Ethics involvesa creativecommitment to maximising connections,and of maximising the powers that will expand the possibilitiesof life. In this way, ethics for Deleuze is inextricably linked with the notion of becoming.Morality implies that we judge ourselvesand others on the basisof what we are and should,be, whereasethicsimplies that we do not yet know what we might become. For Deleuze,there are no transcendentvaluesagainstwhich we should measurelife. It is rather 'Life' itself that constitutes,itsown immanent ethics.An ethicalapproachis, in this way,essentiallypragmatic,and it is no surprise that Deleuze admiresthe American pragmatist model that substitutesexperimentationfor salvation.Deleuzesetsthe ideal of this pragmatism- a world which is 'fn process'- againstthe 'Europeanmorality' of salvationand charity.It rejectsthe searchfor moral consensusand the construction of transcendentvalues,and it conceivesof societyas experiment rather than contract: a community of inquirers with an experimentalspirit. FriedrichNietzscheand BaruchSpinozaarethe two main influenceson Deleuze'snotion of ethics.From them, he takesthe idea that ethicsis a form of affirmation and evaluation.Such an ethics applies the acceptancethat the world is, asDeleuzeputs it, neithertrue nor real,but'living'. To affirm is to evaluatelife in order to set free what lives. Rather than weighingdown life with the burden of higher values,it seeksto makelife light and active,and to createnew values.Both thinkers reorientatephilosophyby callinginto questionthe wayin which morality conceives of the relationshipbetweenmind and body.For the systemof morality,mind as consciousness dominatesthe passionsof the body.Spinoza,however,proposesan ethicalroute that is lator takenup by Nietzsche,by rejectingthe supcriorityof mind ovcr body.It i$ not r cirscof giving ficc rcign to thc

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passionsof the body,sincethis would be nothing more than a reversal,a licenceto act thoughtlessly. Rather in claimingthat there is a parallelism betweenmind andbody,Spinozasuggests a new,morecreativewayof conceivingof thought. For Deleuze,Spinozais the greatethicalthinker who breakswith the Judeo-Christiantradition, and who is followed by four 'disciples'who developthis ethical approach:Nietzsche,D. H. Lawrence,Franz Kafka and Antonin Artaud. They areall opposedto the psychologyof the priest, and Nietzschein particularshowshow judgementsubjectsmanto an infinite debt that he cannotpay.This meansthat the doctrineof judgementis only apparentlymore moderatethan a systemof 'cruelty' accordingto which debt is measuredin blood and inscribeddirectly on the body,since it condemnsus to infinite restitution and servitude.Deleuzegoesfurther to showhow thesefour 'disciples'elaboratea wholesystemof 'cruelty' that is opposedto judgement,and which constitutesthe basicsfor an ethics. The dominationof the body in favourof consciousness leadsto an impoverishmentof our knowledgeof the body.We do not fully explorethe capacitiesof the body, and in the sam€ way that the body surpassesthe knowledgewe haveof it, so thought also surpassesthe consciousness we have of it. Once we can begin to explore thesenew dimensions- the unbnownof the body and the unconscious of thought- we arein the domain of ethics.The transcendent categories of Good and Evil canbe abandoned in favour of 'good' and 'bad'. A 'good' individual seeksto makeconnections that increaseher powerto act, whilst at the sametime not diminishing similar powersin others.The 'bad' individual doesnot organiseher encountersin this way and either falls backinto guilt and resentment,or relieson guile and violence. Deleuze'scommitment to ethicsis closelyconnectedto the conceptof becoming,and in particular that of becoming-animal.The ethical drive for the 'great health' that allows life to flourish is all too often channelled into serving the petty 'human' ends of self-consolidation and selfaggrandisement.One way of going beyondthis calculationof profit and lossis to'become'animal. The drive for justice,for example,must overcome itself by learning from the lion who, as Nietzschesays,refusesto rage againstthe ticks and flies that seekshelterand nourishmenton its body. In a more generalpolitical sense,it is a question of maintaining our 'belief-in-the-world'. We do this by creatingforms of resistanceto what we are becoming (Michel Foucault's 'actual') and not simply to what we are in the present. Rather than judging, we need to makc s
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Connectives Becoming Nietzsche Spinoza

EVENT CliffStasoU Deleuzeintroduced the conceptof the 'event' in The Logic of Senseto describe instantaneousproductions intrinsic to interactions between variouskinds of forces.Eventsare changesimmanentto a confluenceof partsor elements,subsistingaspure virtualities(that is, real inherentpossibilities)and distinguishingthemselvesonly in the courseof their actualisation in somebody or state.Loosely,eventsmight be characterised(as Deleuzedoes)in termsconsonantwith the Stoicconceptof lekta:asincorporeal transformationsthat subsistover and abovethe spatio-temporal world, but areexpressiblein languagenonetheless. As the prod,uctof the synthesisof forces,eventssignify the internal dynamic of their interactions.As such, on Deleuze'sinterpretation,an eventis not a particularstateor happeningitselflbut somethingmadeactual in the Stateor happening.In other words,an eventis the potentialimmanent within a particularconfluenceof forces.Take as an examplea tree's changingcolourin the spring.On Deleuze'saccount,the eventis not what evidentlyoccurs(the tree becomesgreen)becausethis is merelya passing surfaceeffector expression ofan event'sactualisation, andthus ofa particular confluenceof bodiesand other events(such as weatherpatterns,soil conditions, pigmentation effects and the circumstancesof the original planting).Thereforewe oughtnot to say'thetreebecamegreen'or'the tree is now green'(both of which imply a changein the tree's 'essence'), but rather'the tree greens'.By using the infinitive form'to green',we makea dynamicattribution of the predicate,an incorporealitydistinct from both the tree and green-nesswhich capturesnonetheless the dynamismof the event'sactualisation.The event is not a disruption of some continuous state,but ratherthe stateis constitutedby events'underlying'it that, when actualised, mark everymomentof the stateasa transformation. Deleuze'spositionpresentsan alternativeto traditionalphilosophiesof substance,challengingthe notion that reality ought to be understoodin

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terms of the determinatestatesof things. This notion was expressed clearlyby Platq who established a contrastbetweenfixed and determinate statesof things definingthe identity of an objecton the one hand and, on the other,temporalseriesof causesand effectshavingan impact uponthe object.Deleuzewould saythat thereis no distinct,particularthing without the eventsthat define it as that particular,constituting its potential for changeand rate of change.Instead,an eyentis unrelatedto any material content,being without fixed structure,position,temporalityor property, and without beginningor end. Deleuze'seventis a sign or indicator of its genesis,and the expression of the productivepotentialof the forcesfrom which it arose.As such, it highlights the momentaryuniquenessof the nexusof forces(whetheror not to someobviouseffect)whilst preservinga placefor discontinuity in terms of someparticular conceptor planeof consistency.Three characteristics highlighted in Deleuze's texts point to this distinctiveness. First, no event is ever constituted by a preliminary or precedentunity betweenthe forcesof its production, being insteadthe primitive effect or changegeneratedat the moment of their interaction.Second,events are produced neither in the image of somemodel nor as representative copiesor likenessesof a more fundamentalreality,being insteadwholly immanent, original and creativeproductions.Third, as pure effect, an eventhasno goal. Deleuzeis careful to preservedynamismin his concept.An event is neither a beginningnor an end point, but rather always'in the middle'. Eventsthemselves haveno beginning-or end-point,and their relationship with Deleuze'snotion of dynamicchange- 'becoming'- is neitherone of 'joining momentstogether'nor one in which an eventis the 'end' of one productiveprocess,to be supplantedor supplementedby the next.Rather, becoming'moves through' an event, with the event representingiust a momentaryproductiveintensity. In his theoryof the event,Deleuzeis not interestedjust in the machinationsof production,but alsoin the productivepotentialinherentin forces of all kinds.Eventscarry no determinateoutcome,but only new possibilities,representinga momentat which new forcesmight be broughtto bear. Specificallyin terms of his model of thinking, he doesnot meanjust that 'one thinks and thus creates'butthat thinking and creatingareconstituted simultaneously. As such,his generaltheoryof the eventprovidesa means for theorisingthe immanentcreativityof thifking, challengingus to think differcntlyand to considerthingsanew.This is not to saythat he meansto chrrffcngcurito think in termsof cvcnts,but rathcrt
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Connectives Becoming Plato

EXPERIENCE Inna Semetsky Deleuzeconsideredhimself an empiricist,yet not in the reductive,tabula rasa-like,passivesense.Experienceis that milieu which provides the capacity to affect and be affected;it is a-subjectiveand impersonal. Experienceis not an individual property;rathersubjectsareconstitutedin relationswithin experienceitself, that is, by meansof individuation via haecceity. The exteriorityof relationspresents'a vital protestagainstprinciples'(D 1987:55).Experienceis renderedmeaningfurnot by grounding empirical particulars in abstract universals but by experimentation. somethingin the experientialworld forcesus to rhink. This somethingis an object not of recognitionbut a fundamentalencounterthat can be 'graspedin a rangeofaffectiverones'(D 1994:139).In fact,novelconcepts are to be inventedor createdin order to makesenseout of singular experiencesand, ultimately,to affirm this sense. Experienceis qualitative,multidimensional,and inclusive;it includes 'a draft, a wind, a day,a time of day,a stream,a place,a battle, an illness' (D 1995:l4l): yet, an experientialeventis subjectless. we are madeup of relations,saysDeleuze(2000),and experiencemakessenseto us only if we understandthe relationsin practicebetweenconflicting schemesof the said experience. The difference embedded in real experience makes thought encountera shockor crisis,which is embeddedin the objective structureof an eventper se,therebytranscendingthe facultiesof perception beyondthe 'given' data of sense-impressions. Differenceis an ontological category,'the noumenonclosestto phenomenon'(D 1994:2zz), which, however,is neverbeyondexperiencebecauseeveryphenomenonis in fact conditioned by difference.Transcendentalempiricism is what Deleuzecalledhis philosophicalmethod:thinking is not a naturalexercise but alwaysa secondpowerof thought,born under the constraintof experienceasa materialpower,a force.The intensityof differenceis a function of desire,the latter embeddedin experiencebecauseits objectis .the entire surroundingl which it traverses' (D&G 1987:30). If rclati
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relationallogic is the logic of experimentationnot 'subordinateto the verb to be' (D 1987: 57). This logic is inspired by empiricism because'only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimension of the visible'(D 1990:20) without recourseto Ideas,moral universals,or value judgements.The experientialworld is folded,the fold being'the insideo/ the outside'(D 1988a:96),wherethe outsideis virtual yet realby virtue of its pragmatics.It unfolds in an unpredictablemanner,and it is impossibleto know aheadof time what the body (both physicaland mental) can do. Becausethe body, acting within experience,is defined by its affective capacity,it is equally impossibleto know 'the affectsone is capableof' (D 1988b:125):life becomesan experimentaland experientialaffair that requires,for Deleuze,practicalwisdom in a Spinoziansenseby meansof immanent evaluationsof experience,or modesof existence.As affective, experienceis as yet a-conceptual,and Deleuzeemphasisesthe passionate quality of such an experience:'perhapspassion,the State of passion,is actuallywhat folding the line outside,making it endurable. . . is about' (D 1995:116). The Deleuzianobjectof experience, beingun-thought,is presentedonly in its tendencyto exist, or rather to subsist,in a virtual, sub-representative state. It actualisesitself through multiple different/ciations. Deleuze's method,compatiblewith Henri Bergson'sintuition, enablesthe readingof the signs,symbolsand symptomsthat lay down the dynamicalstructureof Experience,in contrastto analyticphilosophy,is not limited to experience. what is immediatelyperceived:the line of flight or becomingis realevenif 'we don't seeit, becauseit's the leastperceptibleof things' (D 1995:45). Thinking enriched with desire,is experimentaland experiential:experiencethereforeis future-oriented,lengthenedand enfolded,representingan experimentwith what is new,or cominginto being.Experienceconstitutes a complexplace,and our experimentationon ourselvesis, for Deleuzerthe like a only reality.By virtue of experimentation,philosophy-becoming, witch's flight, escapesthe old frame of referencewithin which this flight seemslike an immaterialvanishingthrough someimaginaryevent-horizon, and createsits own terms of actualisationtherebyleadingto the 'intensificationof life' (D&G 1994:74)by revaluatingexperience. Connectives Difference Force Power Spinoza 'llnnsccnclcntnl cmpiricisnr

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9r

EXPERIMENTATION Bruce Baugh In French,the word expirience meansboth 'experience'and 'experiment'. To experimentis to try new actions,methods,techniquesand combinations, 'without aim or end' (D&G 1983:371).We experimentwhen we do not know what the result will be and haveno preconceptionsconcerningwhat it shouldbe. As an open-endedprocessthat exploreswhat'snew and what's cominginto beingrather than somethingalreadyexperiencedand known, experimentation is inseparable from innovationanddiscovery. The elements with which we experimentare desires,forces,powers and their combinations,not only to 'seewhat happens',but to determinewhat different entities (bodies,languages, socialgroupings,environmentsand soon) arecapableof. Deleuzeholdsthat'existence itself is a kind of test',an experiment,'like that wherebyworkmentestthe quality of somematerial'(D 1992:317).In literature, politics, painting, cinema,music and living, Deleuzevalorisesan 'experimentation that is without interpretation or significanceand restsonly on tests of experience'(D&G 1986:7), the crucial experiencebeing the affectiveone- whether a procedureor combinationproducesan increasein one'spowerof acting(ioy) or a diminution (sadness). Experimentationcanbe an investigativeprocedurethat seeksto explain how assemblages function by analysingthe elementsthat composethem and the links betweenthoseelements;an'assemblage'being anycompound in which the parts interact with each other to produce a certain effect. However, experimentation is also a practical dismantling of assemblages and the creativeproduction of new combinationsof elements;evenwhen experimentationconcernsthoughtsor concepts,it is nevermerely theoretical. Experimentationdoes not interpret what something,such as a text, an idea or a desire,'means',but seeksto discoverhow it works or functions by uncovering an order of causes,namely, the characteristic relations among the parts of an assemblage- their structures, flows and connections - and the resulting tendencies.Effects are demystified by being related to their causesthat explain the functions and usesof an assemblage, 'what it doesand what is done with it' (D&G 1983:180). Experimentationis necessary to reveal'what a body or mind can do, in a given encounter', arrangementor combination of the affects a body is capableof (D 1988c: 125);and alsoto revealthe effectsof combinationsof different bodiesand elements,and especiallywhetherthesecombinations or encounterswill increasethe powersof actingof the elementscombined into a grcatcrwhole,or whcthcrthe combinationwill destroyor'decomposc'onc or nlorc of thc clcmcnts.'l'hc conrpttibilityor incompntihility

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of differentelementsand bodies,and the effectof their combination,can only be ascertained through experience;we haveno a priori knowledgeof them through principlesor axioms.An experimentalmethodof discovery through the experienceof new combinationsof things encounteringeach other is contrary to any axiomatic-deductivesystemor any system of judgement using transcendentalcriteria. Becauseoutcomescannot be known or predicted in advance,experimentationrequires patienceand prudence,ascertaincombinationsmay be destructiveto the experimenter and to others.On the other hand, the knowledgegainedthrough experimentationwith differentconjunctionsand combinationsallowsfor an art (social, of organising'good encounters',or of constructingassemblages political, artistic) in which powers of acting and the active affects that follow from them are increased. Life-experimentation, through a set of practiceseffectingnew combinations and relations and forming powers, is biological and political, and often involvesexperientiallydiscoveringhow to dissolvethe boundariesof the ego or self in order to open flows of intensity, 'continuums and coniunctions of affect' (D&G 1987: 162). Active experimentation involves trying new procedures,combinations and their unpredictable effects to producea 'Body without Organs' (BwO) or a 'field of immanence'or 'plane of consistency',in which desires,intensities,movementsand flows pass unimpeded by the repressivemechanismsof judgement and interpretation. Experimental constructions proceed bit by bit and flow by flow, using different techniquesand materials in different circumstancesand under different conditions, without any pre-establishedor set rules or procedures,as similar effects(for example,intoxication) can be produced by different means(ingesting peyote or 'getting sousedon water'). 'One neverknowsin advance'(D 1987:47), and,if one did, it would not be an experiment.Experimentationby its nature breaksfree of the past and dis(socialformations,the Self),and constructslines mantlesold assemblages of flight or movementsof deterritorialisationby effecting new and previously untried combinations of persons, forces and things, 'the new, remarkable,and interesting'(D&G 1994:lll). In literature,politics,and in life, experimentsarepracticesthat discoverand dismantleassemblages, and which look for the linesof flight of individualsor groups,the dangers on theselines,andnewcombinationsthat will thwart predictionsandallow the new to emerge. Connectives Body withoutOrgans I)csirc

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Immanence Lines of flight

EXPRESSION Claire Colebrook 'Expression' is one of Deleuze's most intense concepts.If we take Deleuze'sdefinition of a concept- that it is a philosophicalcreationthat producesan intensivesetofordinates- then expressioncanbe understood astruly conceptual.Indeed,the conceptof expressionis tied to Deleuze's understandingof conceptuality.It is not that we havea world of set terms and relations, which thought would then have to structure, organiseor name- producing organisedsetsof what exists.Rather, life is an expressive and open whole, nothing more than the possibility for the creation of new relations;and soa concept,or the thought of this life, must try to grasp movementsand potential, rather than collectionsof generalities.A structure is a set of coordinates,a fixed set of points that one might then move among to establishrelations, and is extensive,with its points alreadylaid out or set apart from eachother. So a simple mechanismtakesthe form of a structure; if we read a poem as a set of words that might be linked in meaning,with the meaninggoverning the proper relation and order of the words, then we are governed by a structure. If however,we approach a poem asexpressive,we seethe words as having unfolded from a potential, a potentialthat will producefurther relations- all the readingsor thoughts producedby the poem. Thus, expressionis tied to a commitmentto the creationof concepts;for expressionis the power of life to unfold itself differently, and one would create a concept in trying to grasp these differentunfoldings. Conceptsarenot structuresbecausealthoughthey establishdifferences, the differencesareintensive.An extensiveterm - suchas'all the catsin the world that areblack'- is a closedset,whereasan intensiveconceptis infinite in its possiblemovements.In the caseof expression,this conceptcovers the potentialfor movements;it is not that therearepoints or potentialsin life which thenundergoan expression.Rather,thereare expressions, with the unfolding of life in all its differencebeingexceededby expressiveand potential.The conceptof expressionthereforerefersto intensity, excessive for it allowsus to think a type of relationbut not anyconcludedsetof relations,And it is an ordinatefield,establishinga temporalityratherthana set of terms.Thc conccptof cxpression is a styleor possibilityof thinking.We cannotundcrstrnclthis conccptof cxprcssionwithout bringingin a ncw

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approachto what it is for somethingto be, and what it isto thinb that being. - that which With expression,we no longerimaginea world of substance remainsin itself, remainsthe same,and then haspredicatesaddedto it accidentally.There is not a substancethat then expressesitself in various different styles.Rather, there are stylistic variations or expressions,and With substanceis the thought of the open whole of all theseexpressions. the conceptof expressionwe begin with a relation, rather than a being that then relates,but the relation is also external: nothing determinesin advancehow potentiality will be expressed,for it is the nature of expressive substanceto unfold itself infinitely, in an open seriesof productive relations. In his conclusionto his book on Baruch Spinoza,a book which is in philosophy,Deleuzedistinguishes avowedlydedicatedto expressionism the expressionism of Spinozafromthat of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. or perceivedby sepFor Leibniz thereis not a world that is then expressed arate subjects.Rather, the world is made up of monadsor points of perception. A being is just its specificperceptionof the world, and each perceivingmonad is an expressionof one being. God is the only being who perceivesthe world perfectlyand completely;eachfinite beinggrasps infinite being only dimly. For Spinoza, a more radical and immanent expressionis possible,one which allows Deleuze to imagine divergent expressionsor planesof life. While there is still not a self-presentworld that precedesexpression,Spinoza'simmanenceprecludesany point of perfect expressionthat would ground particular expressions.A being iust is its expression,its powerto act. The world is not an objectto be known, observedor represented,so much asa planeof powersto unfold or express differentpotentialsof life. Connectives Spinoza

EXTERIORITY/INTERIORITY Jonathan Rofe One of the underlying themesof Deleuze'sphilosophyis a reiection of the valueof interiority in its varioustheoreticalguises.In fact, he goesso far asto connectthe sentimentof 'the hatredof interiority' to his philosophy. On the other hand, tcrms likc 'outside' and 'cxtcriority' play a ccntrnlrolc.

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Deleuze'suse of the term 'interiority' refers to the thought, dominant in westernphilosophysince Plato, that things exist independently,and that their actions derive from the unfolding or embodying of this essential unity. The Cartesianegocogitowould be the most familiar exampleof this thought, whereby the human mind - indivisible and immortal forms the interior of the self,and where the body and the physicalworld in general form a contingent exterior. [n other words, 'interiority' is a word indexedto transcendentunities,things that haveno necessaryconnection to anything else,and which transcendthe external world around them. Deleuze'sphilosophy is rigorously critical of all forms of transcendence.FIe wants to come to grips with the world as a generalised exteriority. In his first book on David Hume (Empiricismand Subjectahy,1953), Deleuzeinsiststhat for Hume, there is no natural interiority (conscious willing, for example)involved in human subjectivity. Rather, the subiect is formed from pre-subjectiveparts which are held together by a network of relations.This is part of the Humean philosophythat strikesDeleuze as particularly important, and he comes back to it a number of times. DeleuzeconsidersHume to be the first to insistthat relationsareexternal to their terms - and this presagesmuch of Deleuze's mature philosophy. In other words,in order to understandany stateof affairs,we must not look to the internal or intrinsic 'meaning','structure' or 'life' of the terms involved(whetherthey be people,a personand an animal,elementsin a biological system, and so on). This will not provide anything relevant, sinceit is in the relationsbetween(or externalto) things that their nature is decided. Likewise,in his bookson Baruch Spinoza,he demonstratesthat organised beings are not the embodiment of an essenceor an idea, but are the resultof enormousnumbersof relationsbetweenpartswhich haveno significanceon their own. In other words, specificbeingsare produced from within a generalised milieu of exterioritywithout referenceto any guiding interiority. So, rather than being a philosophyconcernedwith showing how the interior reasonor structure of things is brought about in the world - the interior consciousintentions of a human speaker,or the kernel of social structure hidden within all of its expressions- Deleuze insists on three points. First, that there is no natural interiority whatsoever:the whole philosophical tradition beginning with Plato that wanted to explain things in referenceto their essenceis mistaken.Second,this meansthat the interior/exterior division lacksany substantialmeaning,and Deleuze somctimescaststhc distinctionasidc.Third - and this describesone of lahrur - hc insiststhrrtthc thc grcatcstnspcctsof I)clcuzc'sphilosophicrrl

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interior is rather produced from a generalexterior, the immanent world of relations.The nature of this production and its regulationproved to be one of the foci of his philosophy.Hence,human subjectivityasa produced interiority undergoeschangesaccordingto its social milieu, its relations,its specificencounters,and so forth: this is a topic that the two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophreniadeal with, and can be summed up in the following Deleuziansentiment:'The interior is only a selected interior.' Finally,on the basisof thesepoints,Deleuze'sphilosophyalsoembodies an ethicsof exteriority.In sofar asinteriority is a 'caved-in'selectionof the externalworld of relations,it remainsseparatedfrom the life and movement of this world. The aim of what Deleuzecallsethicsis to reconnect with the externalworld again,and to be caughtup in its life. Connectives Hume Immanence Plato Spinoza Subjectivity

FACIALITY Tom Conley The concept of faciality, theorised in detail in A Thousand. Plateausand applied to cinema in the chapters of Cinema I: The moztement-image devotedto the close-up,standsat a crossroadsof subjectivationand sig(how a nifiance.The former belongsto the languageof psychogenesis living beinggrowsinto and negotiatesthe ambientworld) and the latter to semiotics(denoting,contrary to polysemy,signsthat disseminateinfinite meaningin both consciousand unconsciousregistqrsand in directionsnot under the control of languagerules). Subjectivationand signifianceare correlated,respectively, with the 'blackhole' or unknownareaof the face in which the subjectinvcstshis or her affectivcencrgics(that can range from f'carto prtssioi)nnd with thc 'whitc wnll', a surfhccon which signs

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are projectedand from which they rebound or are reflected.Facialityis thus constitutedby a systemof surfacesand holes.The face'is a surface: traits, lines, wrinkles; a long, square,triangular face; the face is a map' (D 1987:170).A seriesof layersor strata,the facebecomesa landscape when it is abstractedfrom the world at large and understoodas a deterritorialisedspaceor topography.It is a displacementof what a perceiver makesof the milieu and the facesthat he or shediscerns. Deleuzerelatesfaciality to the close-upin film, the cinematictechnique that generallyusesa lens of long focal length to bring the faceforward and soften the edgesof the frame, or else,to the contrary,deploysa lens of shorterlengthto obtain afacialprojectionor distortionat the centreofthe imagewhile the surroundingmilieu is seenin sharpfocus.In either mode the rotundity of a person'scheekscanresemblehillocksor mesas;the eyes might be reflectivepoolsand ponds;the nostrilslairs and caves,and earsat oncequarriesand cirques.Yet the landscapeor facealsolooksat its spectators, calling their gaze into question or even psychically 'defacing' in a gooddeal them. Suchis the effectof close-upsthat establishsequences of classicalcinema (Deleuze's preferred directors being Jean Renoir, Alfred Hitchcock, David Wark Griffith, Georg Wilhelm Pabst, Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein,Luis Buffuel). The face emits signs from its surfaceat the sametime that the viewer seeksto fathom meaningfrom its darkeror hidden regions.If the faceis a 'white wall' it is connotedto be what resistsunderstandingor semiosisin general. He further elaboratesthe conceptthrough referenceto literature.For Marcel Proust,describingin Un amourd,eSwannthe faceof the beloved (but delightfully crassand despicable)Odette de Cr6cy in the eyesof the awestruckSwannis an abstractionthat allowshim - aesthetethat he is drawn from memoriesof to wax poeticalby recallinginfinite expressions, Yet once worksof art, musicalnotesand sculptedsurfacesin his fantasies. she disillusionshim the jealouslover discoversthat her faceis a fetish or even a black hole. Proust meticulously describesSwann's passionfor Odette's visage,Deleuze observes,in order to sanctify faciality in the name of art. To counter Proust's reductiveturn, he showsthat Henry Miller undoes the face by travelling over it with artistic dexterity. The than authorof Tropicof Capricorn(1939)makesit lessa goalor an essence a surface- a white wall or the blank sheetof a future map- on which a creative itinerary can be drawn. In Miller's descriptionof facesa processof deterritorialisationmakesthe work of art not an end in itself but a process and an adventurethat plots the faceinsteadof diving into it. In A ThousandPlateausfaciality is formulated to serve the ends of a political polcmic.To discerndetailsof the facewithout wishing to idenliscits iluril or charm constitutcsrrmicropoliticsthtrtcallsinto qucstion

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the powerof facialimages.Implied is that Deleuze(with Guattari) seeks, first, ro be finishedwith the facewhereit would be a site of psychological inquiry or of a reassuringhuman essenceor goodness.He and Guattari wish to divest the faceof any auratic or seductivepower of the kind that contemporarymedia- cinema,advertising,television- conferupon it. By turning it into an abstraction(but not an idea)and a siteof multiple possibilities of affectivity(and neithera hearthnor a site of warmth) they turn it into a zoneof intensity.The latter finds a powerful visual correlativein Deleuze'streatmentof the paintingsof FrancisBacon.The headsof the artist'sportraitsmeld the faceinto the body and thus confusethe facewith its tradition asa'veil of the soul'with the humananimal.In'the text of The Logic of Sensationthat studiesBacon'sportraiture Deleuzeshowsthat the head is not what lacksspirit; rather, it is the spirit in a corporealform, a bodily and vital breathwhoseend is that of und,oing thefoce.In sum, a forceful reconsiderationis madeof the facework in philosophy,aesthetics and political theory. Connectives Bacon Black hole Molecular Subjectivity

FASCISM John Protezsi ln Anti-Oed,ipus, the pole of paranoiddesireis opposedto schizophrenic or revolutionary desire.Perhapswe owe the impressionthat a major focus of Anti-Oed,ipzsis fascism to Michel Foucault's preface to the English translation,in which he callsthe text'An Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life' (D&G 1983:xiii). But in fact historicalmanifestationsof fascismasFoucaultacknowledges - are explicitly addressedin Anti-Oed,ipus relatively infrequently. Despite the lack of attention to historical fascism, Deleuzeand Guattari'scritiqueof analyses of fascismin termsof ideology is important. Ratherthan being the result of fooling peopleby falseconsciousness, fascistdesirehasits own properconsistency, and spreadsunder ccrtain social,economicand politicalconditions.Roughlyspeaking,in ,4nti-Ocdipu.r f'ascistdcsircis thc dcsirc for codesto rcplacethc dccoding thrttf rccsfklwsunttcrcrrpitrrlist lxiomltics; suchcoclcswould fix subjccts

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to rigid boundariesof thought and actionand fix bodiesto pre-established patterns of flows, thus attenuating the fascist obsessionwith erotic perversion. Deleuze and Guattari discuss both micro- and macro-fascismin A Thousand Plateaus.Micro-fascismis a cancerousBody without Organs (BwO). The cancerousBwO is the third type of BwO discussedin Plateaus,after the 'full' (positively valued in A Thousand, A Thousand, Plateous,thoughnotin Anti-Oedipzs,where the full BwO is catatonia),and the 'empty'. The cancerousBwO is the strangest and most dangerous BwO. It is a BwO that belongsto the organismthat resideson a stratum, rather than beingthe limit of a stratum. It is runawayself-duplicationof stratification.Sucha cancercanoccurevenin socialformations,not just in the stratanamedorganism,significanceand subjectification.The key to tracking down fascismlies here in the cancerousBwQ that forms under conditionsof runawaystratification,or more precisely,runawaysedimentation, the first 'pincer' of a stratum.By endlesslyrepeatingthe selection of homogenisedindividuals in a processof 'conformity' the cancerous BwO breaksdown the stratum on which it lodges:social cloning and personalities. assembly-line The cancerous BwQ then, occurswith too much sedimentation,that is, too much contentor codingand territorialising,with insufficientovercoding. The result is a cancerof the stratum, a proliferation of points of capture, a proliferation of micro-black holes: thousandsof individuals completeunto themselves;legislatorsand subjectsall in one; judge,jury and executioner- and policeman, private eye, home video operator, the neighbourhoodwatch organiser.Micro-fascism is then the construction of a 'thousand monomanias'in 'little neighborhoodpolicemen' resulting from 'molecularfocusesin interaction. . . rural fascismand city or neighborhoodfascism,youth fascismand war veteran'sfascism,fascismof the Left and of the Right, fascismof the couple,family, school,and office' (D&G 1987:214). Such micro-fascismsspreadthroughout a socialfabric prior to the centralisingresonancethat createsthe molar apparatusof the State.In micro-fascismeachbody is a 'micro-blackhole that standson its own and communicateswith the others' (D&G 1987: 228). Although Deleuzeand Guattari do not do so, we can call micro-fascism'molecular orientedto unity, an indimolarity': eachsubjectiveunit is self-contained, vidual (molar), but they interact in solely local manner,independently (molecular). In contrast to Anti-Oedipzs'srelative neglect of historical fascism, A Thousand Plateausdevotesat leasta few pagesto an analysisof histori(in its Nazi ftrrm rathcr than its of macro-firscism crrl manifcstirtions firlkrwirrg thc Italirrnor S;rirnishfirrrns).'l'hc Nazi rcginrcis charnctcriscd,

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analysesof Paul Virilio, as a 'suicidestate'rather than a totalitarianone, which is 'quintessentiallyconservarive'(D&G 1987:230;StalinistUSSR is the target here).Here it is not a State army taking power,but a war machine that takesover the institutions of State power.This triggers the last form of the line of flight, the self-immolating, self-destructiveline. This reversionof the line of flight to self-destructionhad 'alreadyanimatedthe molecularfocusesof fascism,and madethem interact in a war machineinsteadof resonatingin a State apparatus'(D&G 1987:231). Such a runawaywar machine,onceit reachesa consistencyenablingit to takeovera Stateapparatus,forms a 'war machinethat no longerhad anything but war asits objectandwould ratherannihilateits own servantsthan stop the destruction' (D&G 1987:231).ln A Thousand, Plateaus,then, fascismis too fast, a cancer;what we could call, echoingBataille,a 'solar nihilism', rather than being too slow or the freezing, paranoid, lunar nihilism it is portrayed,asin Anti-Oed,ipus.

Connectives Body without Organs Desire Stratification

FAMILY - refer to the entry on 'psychoanalysis'.

FEMINISM Felicity J. Colman Deleuze did not advocate'feminism' as the movementhas historically come to be known. Yet in his writings one messagethat is continually relayed is: Do not ever smugly assumethat you have reached the limit edges,or causalorigins of knowledgeof any forn.ror thought. To do so would be at once to assumeand position an organisationof recognition basedon prior resemblances, givenstructures,and relationshipsthat have beencodedaccordingto linguistic and economics_ystems. These systems operatemost efficientlythrough prescribedgenderwork and leisureroles. F'cminism'sthcorcticalhistory and legacyhavebeensuchthat its foun
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activitiesand theoriesconcerningsexuality,equality,difference,subjectivity, marginalisation, and economics.The conceptof a 'limit to be reached' is in itself one of the key critical systematicassumptionsthat Deleuzeand Guattari dismantle. With the exception of his cinema books,where core conceptualpoints are made through reference to canonical twentieth-century filmmakers including MargueriteDuras and ChantalAkerman,referencesto women are few in Deleuze's works. In A ThousandPlateaas,Deleuze and Guattari's discussionof 'becoming-woman'focuseson the processesof subjectiveformation,through the writing of Virginia Woolf. Indicativeof the twentiethcentury'sdivisionand demarcationof labourrolesaccording to normative patriarchal gender and biological functions, Deleuze'swritings are suffusedwith examplesof published male philosophers,writers, scientistsand artists. However,Deleuzeis attentiveto the genderbiasesof westernmythology and the patriarchallyproduced behaviourof both genders.The ethical constructionof the body asa constituent/contributorof a pre-configured (and hencegendered)organisationis continuallypointed out by Deleuze. ln Anti-Oed.ipusDeleuzeand Guattari attack and reject the psychoanalytically enframedfamilial unit and genderedhistorical zonesfor its bourgeois hierarchy and assumptionsof an Oedipally figured desire.Valuablefor feminism is Deleuzeand Guattari's discussionof a body in terms of its potentialitiesandcapabilities,onceit is conceivedof not in termsof its past structure,but in terms of a future modality.Deleuzedrawsupon Baruch Spinozato developthe playwright-poetAntonin Artaud's conceptof the Body without Organs(BwO). This 'body' is one that affordsa creativesite for the collection and expressionof the formation of desire. Placing the body on a platfurm of the systemsof exchangeprovides spatial and temporal zonesfor analysisof genderedcategorisations. Deleuzeand Guattari's phrase'becoming-woman'is a critique of all aspectsof anthropocentrism;that is, whereman is regardedasthe central and most important dynamicin the universe.Becoming-womanrefersto everydiscoursethat is not anthropocentric,and is thus codedby all economic, social,cultural, organic,and political circuits as 'minority'. With the conceptof a'minority discourset,and tbecomingwomant,Deleuzeand Guattari take the body not to be a cultural medium but a compositionof sociallyand politicallydeterminedforces. Deleuze'suseof the 'difference'of womenundergoestheoreticaldevelopment in the 1960s,in turn this changeinfluenceshis later theoriesof differenceand minority groups,as well as public and capitalistgenerated clcsircand its cffccton thingsin thc world. Deleuzc'stheoriesrecognisethe politicrrl culturitlrcrlm nnd milicu. rrnclpublicshapingof'an incliviclual's

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This philosophicalposition on the narrarionof the multiple may appear abstractand antitheticalto feministmethodologies that focuson the analysisand identificationof the personal.YetDeleuze'sideasconsistentlypoinr out how a method that points toward the 'truth' of a particular representation hasa universalisingtendencyand doesnot refer to the 'forces'that shapebeliefs,thoughtsor structures. Deleuze'swork demonstrates how,becauseof its history,subjectivityis a political constirurion not the result of an individual community. Individual historical figures are utilised by Deleuze to examinethe structuration of bodiesvia historicalorganisation,culturalaffiliationsand social differentiation.The formation and reformationof suchbodiesand things are questionedin terms of the waysin which relationshipsand qualities provide identity reality and virtuality.The economic,ethical,logicaland aestheticconstitution of these bodies is also consideredby Deleuze in terms of their structuraland systematicconstitution.Deleuze'ssystemof thinking through conceprsof identity givenby history,and maintainedin capitalism,providesa valuablerevolutionaryand unorthodoxapproachfor feminism'scritique of the surfaceeffectsof genderroles,as well as its projectof rewriting historiesof exclusion. Connectives Body Body without Organs Desire Oedipalisation Psychoanalysis Woman

FOLD Simon O'Sulliaan Although appearingthroughoutDeleuze'swork, the 'fold'is particularly mobilised in the books on Michel Foucault and Gottfried wilhelm von Leibniz. In eachcasethe fold is developedin relation to another'swork. We might even say that thesebooks, like others Deleuze has written, involvea folding- or doubling- of Deleuze'sown tliought into the thought of anothcr.We might go further and saythat thought itself,enigmatically, is rrkinclof ftlld,ln instanccof whatDclcuzecallsthc 'firrccsof thc outsidc' . thrrtfirkl thc irrsiclc.

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Specifically, the conceptof the fold allowsDeleuzeto think creatively aboutthe productionof subjectivityand ultimatelyaboutthe possibilities for,andproductionof, non-humanformsof subjectivity.In fact,on onelevel the fold is a critique of typical accountsof subjectivity,that presumea simple interiority and exteriority (appearanceand essence,or surfaceand depth). For the fold announcesthat the insideis nothing more than a fold of the outside.Deleuzegivesus Foucault'svivid illustrationof this relation,that beingthe Renaissance madman,whq in beingput to seain a ship becomes a passenger, or prisoner in the interior of the exterior; the fold of the sea.In Deleuze'saccountof Foucault this picture becomesincreasinglycomplex. There is a varietyof modalitiesof folds:from the fold of our materialselves, our bodies,to the folding of time, or simply memory.Indeed,subjectivity might beunderstoodaspreciselya topologyof thesedifferentkindsof folds. In this sense.the fold can alsobe understoodasthe namefor one's relation to oneself (or, the effect of the self on the self). The Greeks were the first to discover,and deploy,this techniqueof folding,or of (selfmastery'. They inventedsubjectivationtakento mean the self-productionof one's subjectivity.Subsequentcultures,suchasChristianity,haveinventedtheir own forms of subjectivation,or their own kinds of foldings;and of course it might be saidthat our own time hasits own folds, or eventhat it requires new ones.This imbuesthe fold with explicitly ethicaland politicaldimensions,for as Deleuzeremarks,the emergenceof new kinds of struggle inevitablyalsoinvolvesthe productionof new kinds of subjectivity,or new kinds of fold (hereDeleuzehasthe uprisingsof 1968in mind). As for Deleuze's use of Foucault and Leibniz, the fold names the relationship- one entailingdomination- of oneselfto (and 'over') one's 'self', Indeed, one's subjectivity for Deleuze is a kind of Nietzschean masteryover the swarm of one'sbeing.This canbe configuredasa question of ownership,or of folding. To 'have'is to fold that which is outside inside. Meanwhile, in the Leibniz book we are offered other diagramsof our subjectivity.One exampleis the two-floored baroquehouse.The lower floor, or the regimeof matter,is in and of the world, receivingthe world's imprint asit were.Here matteris foldedin the mannerof origami,whereby cavernscontainingother caverns,in turn contain further caverns.The world is superabundant,like a lake teeming with fish, with smallerfish betweenthesefish, and so on ad infinitum. There is no boundary between the organicand the inorganichereaseachis foldedinto the other in a continuoustexturology. The upper chamberof the baroquehouseis closedin on itself,without window or opening.It containsinnateideas,the folds of the soul,or if wc wcrc to folkrwGuattarihere,this might bc dcscribcdasthc incorporcal aspccto1'our subjcctivity.And thcn thcrc is tlrc firlclbctwccnthcsc

r04

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two floors. This fold is like one's sryle in the world, or indeed the style of a work of art. It is in this sensethat the upper chamber paradoxically 'contains' the Whole world folded within itself. This world is one amongst many 'possible worlds' each as different as the beings that expressthem. The world of a tick, for example,is different from that of a human, involving asit doesiust the perceptionof light, the smell of its prey and the tactile sensationof where best to burrow. This is not the tick's representationof the world but the world's expression,or folding in, of the tick. As with Deleuze'sbook on Foucault, the later parts of his Leibniz book attendto future foldings.Deleuzecallsattentionro rhe possibilityof a new kind of harmony,or fold, betweenthe two floorsof our subjectivity. This new kind of fold involvesan openingup of the closedchamberof the upper floor and the concomitantaffirmation of difference,contact and communication.Echoing his book on Foucault,here we might say that thesenew foldingsare simply the namefor thosenew kinds of subjectivity that emergedin the 1960s,in the variousexperimentsin communal living drug useand sexuality,aswell asin the emergenceof new prosthetic technologies. Connectives Foucault Leibniz Nietzsche Subjectivity

FOLD+ART+TECHNOLOGY Simon O'Sullitsan In his appendixto his bookon Michel FoucaultDeleuzecontinueshis naeditation on the fold, but looksto the future.If the fold is the operationproper to man, then the 'superfold'issynonymouswith the superman- understood as that which 'frees life' from within man. The supermanis in chargeof animals(the capturing of codes),the rocks(the realmof the inorganic),and the very beingof language(the realmof affect'below' signification).This new kind of fold no longerfiguresthe humanbeingasa limiting factoron thc infinite (the classicalhistoricalformation),nor positionspeoplesolely in rclationshipto thc frrrccsof finitudc,suchas lifc, labourand language (thc tirrnrrrtion of'thcninctccnth ccntury).llrrthcr,in thisncw kind of firld

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a personis involvedin what Deleuzeterms an'unlimited finity' (D 1988b: 131);that being a fold in which a 'finite number of componentsyields a practicallyunlimiteddiversityof combinations'(D 1988b:13l). This is the differenceand repetition of Deleuze, or what we might term his 'fractal ontology'. Put differently, it is the radical discoveryof a person'spotential / or the revolutionary activationof immanence. However,the'superfold' still involvesrelationswith an outside.In fact, for Deleuze,the superfoldwill be the result of three future folds: the fold of molecularbiology,or the discoveryof the geneticcode;the fold of silicon with carbon,or the emergenceof third generationmachines,cybernetics and information technology;and the folding of language,or the uncovering of a 'strangelanguagewithin language',an atypicaland a-signifying form of expressionthat existsat the limits of language.As with the other two this is a fold that openshumansout to that which is specificallynonto produce human.That is, forcesthat canbe foldedback'into' themselves newmodalitiesof beingandexpression.The first twofoldsinvolvethe utilisationof technologyin the productionof new kinds of life and new kinds of subjectivity.They might producedissenting,politicallyradicalsubjects: Donna Harraway's'cyborgs'orMichael Hardt and Antonio Negri's'New Barbarians'for example.But they might equally produce simply new comIt is in this modified and alienatedsubiectivities,or military assemblages. sensethe third fold is crucial. It is a fold that breaksdown, or deviatesfrom, dominant signification,counteractsorder-wordsor simply foregrounds the affective,intensiveand inherentlycreativenatureof both languageand life. This amountsto sayingthat the first twofolds must themselvesbe stammeredby the third. In Deleuze and Guattari's book on Franz Kafka this attention to stuttering or stammeringis seenas characteristicof a minor literature. A minor literatureutilisesthe sameterms asa major one,but in a different way (it producesmovement from within the major). Another way of putting this is that a minor literature namesthe becomingrevolutionary of all literature (the other two accompanyingcharacteristicsof a minor literature being its inherently collectivenature and its alwaysalready political nature).Can we perhapsextendthis notion of a minor literature to other realms?Might there be a sensein which a resistantand radical politics today must involve a stuttering, or stammering, of language?In the visual arts, for example,this might involve turning awayfrom dominant regimes of signification, or at least a stammering in and of them to producenew kinds of 'stuttering' subjectivities.This might be a description of some of the more radical avant-gardegroups of the twentieth ccntury,ftrr example,Dada or the Situationists(from collageto d'6tournemcnt). It might irls
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themselvesoutsidethe galleryor simply stutter the dominant languages of sculpture and painting. Examples would be art practices, from performanceand installation art to the relational aestheticsof today,that turn away from typical definitions of art, or indeed typical notions of political engagement.We might add that many of thesepracices are also often specificallycollectivein nature.In all thesecasesart doesnot transport us to an elsewherebut utilisesthe stuff of the world (we might say the stuff of capitalism) albeit in a d,ffirent way. Art here is the discovery of new combinationsand new waysof folding the world 'into' the sel{ or put more simply,new kinds of subjectivity. Of course there may still be other foldings, for example,the Oriental fold, that asDeleuzeremarks,is perhapsnot a fold at all, and consequently not a processof subjectivation.The relationof art to this non-fold might be one of ritual. Which is not to saythe productionof possibleworlds,or eventhe productionof subjectivity;rather it is both of these,in so far as they allow accessto something,suchasthe void from which theseworlds and subjectshaveemerged.There is an unfoldingthen that alwaysaccompaniesthe fold that, in turn, producesnew foldswhilst alsoopeningus up to that which is yet to be folded.

FORCE CliffStagoll Deleuze'sconceptionof force is clearestin his interpretativereadingsof Friedrich Nietzsche,but implicit throughouthis corpus.Much of what he writes on the subject is borrowed directly from Nietzsche,although the way in which he usesthe notion to theorise differenceand becoming is Deleuzetsown. For Nietzsche,the world comprisesa chaoticweb of natural and biologicalforceswithout anyparticularorigin or goal,and which nevercomes to rest at a terminal or equilibrium state.Theseforcesinteractceaselessly, constituting a dynamic world-in-flux rather than a collection of stable eptities.The world is alwaysin the processof becomingsomethingthar it is not, so that, for Deleuze,the principal(andeternal)characteristic of the world of forcesis differencefrom whateverhasgone beforeand from that which it will become. Neither Deleuzenor Nietzscheprovidesa clear definition of 'force'. Deleuzestatesovertlythat he doesnotmeanby it'aggression'or'pressure' (rrltlrotrghNictzschcis not so clclr). Ir'orl)clcuzc, wc ctn only tr:ulylrerrrizrclirrccslty intuitilg thcrrr;thirtis, lly grrrspit'lg thcm withoutrcf'crcncc

t07

FOR C E

to a conceptualunderstandingof existence.To try and capturein a few words or sentenceswhat is learned through intuition is impossible. Generally, though, 'force' means any capacity to produce a change or 'becoming',whetherthis capacityand its productsare physical,psychological,mystical,artistic,philosophical,conceptual,social,economic,legal of interactions or whatever.All of realityis an expressionand consequence betweenforces,with eachinteractionrevealedas an 'event' (in Deleuze's specificsenseof the term). Every event,body or other phenomenonis, then, the netresultofa hierarchicalpatternofinteractionsbetweenforces, colliding in someparticular and unpredictableway. This enigmatic characterisationof forces is developed in Deleuze's accountof their activity.Every force exertsitself upon others.No force can exist apart from its inter-relationshipswith other forcesand, sincesuch associationsof struggle are alwaystemporary,forces are alwaysin the processof becomingdifferentor passingout of existence,so that no particular forcecanbe repeated. Deleuze holds that types of forcesare defined in both quantitativeand qualitativeterms,but in specialways.First, the d,ffirencein quantity li the quality of the differencein forces.Second,a forceis'active'if it seeksdominance by self-affirmation, asserting itself over and above another, and 'reactive'ifit startsits struggleby first denyingor negatingthe other force. Whereas'quality' usually refers to a particular complex, or body that resultsfrom interactionsbetweenforces,Deleuzeusesit to refer insteadto tendenciesat the origin of forces,regardlessof the complexthat derives from them. On his reading,Nietzschefinds the origin of both quantitative of forcesin the Will to Power,and a kind of and qualitativecharacteristics genealogyshould be usedto tracequalitativeattributesof forcesto particular culturesand typesofpeople. I Having no substance,forcescan act only upon other forces,eYenthough the interactionsbetweenthem might result in an apparentlysubstantial reality.'Things'aremerelya temporaryoutcome,andsooughtnot to be conContraryto Immanuel or essence. sideredashavinganindependentexistence andnor Kant, for example,thereareon this view no 'things-in-themselves', are there, contrary to Plato,perfect originalsof which all things are but copies.Furthermore,a physicalworld cannotbe consideredasan inevitable of the cognitiveequipmentof a perceiveror of or permanentconsequence the natureof whateveris beingperceived. Indeed,for Deleuze,this dichotomousunderstandingof the perceiver and the perceivedis also groundless.In his view, the particularity of a pcncil, hereand now,involvesnot simply one'gazingupon' an object,but l complcx sct of circumstantialinteractionsinvolving a whole 'plane' of cvcntslncl orgiurisingprinciplcsrtnging from thc biologyof sightto the {l

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circumstancesof the pencil's being positionedhere, and the physicsof carbonstructures.As such,the theory of forceschallengesthe traditional philosophical dualism between essenceand appearance,and also draws attention to the contingent and infinitely complex nature of lived reality. Connectives Active/Reactive Body Event Nietzsche

FOUCAULT,

MICHEL

(1926-84\

John Marks Michel Foucaultand Deleuzeenjoyedan intensephilosophicalfriendship, and much of Deleuze'swriting on Foucaultmight be locatedwithin the tradition of the 'laudatory essay'that characteriseda certain strand of intellectualactivityin post-warFrance.Suchan essayis not a work of criticism, but rather a gestureof affectiveintensity.Talking abouthis writing on Foucault,Deleuzeemphasises that it is not necessaryto demonstrate great fidelity a to the work of a thinker, nor is it necessaryto look for contradictions and blind alleysin a thinker's \Mork:to saythat one part works, but another part does not. Approaching a writer's work in the spirit of 'friendship'is the sameasa personalfriendship.It is aboutbeingwilling to be carriedalongby the entiretyof the work, accompanying the thinker on it is aboutfollowingthe work, asonemight a person, a journey.Sometimes, to the point that the work becomesa little 'crazy',whereit breaksdown or comesup againstapparentlyinsurmountableproblems.Friendship in this hasthe sameideasor opinionsas sensedoesnot meanthat one necessarily somebodyelse,but ratherthat one sharesa modeof perceptionwith them. Deleuzeexplainsthat it is a matter of perceivingsomethingabout somebody and his wayof thinking almostbeforehis thoughtis formulatedat the level of signification.It is for this reasonthat Deleuzetalks of remembering something'metallic', 'strident' and 'dry' in the gesturesof Foucault. DeleuzeperceivesFoucaultasan individuation,a singularity,rather than a subject.It is almostasif Deleuzerespondsto Foucault'sthinking at the levelof his bodily materialityas much as a set of philosophicalpropositions.Abovcall, DclcuzcsccsFoucaultasa writcr
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love and passion.Love is a relationshipbetween individuals, whereas passionis a statein which the individualsdissolveinto an impersonalfield of intensities.For thesereasons,Deleuzeregardshis own book on Foucault as an act of 'doubling', a way of bringing out and working with minor differencesbetweenhimselfand Foucault.Both Deleuzeand Foucaulthad a similar conceptionof the art of 'surfaces',of making visiblerather than interpreting,and this is what Deleuzeseeksto do with Foucault'swork. As with his other readingsof other writers,Deleuzeextractsa dynamic logic- asopposedto a rational system- from Foucault's work. One of his main aims in Foucaultis to clear up someof the misunderstandings surrounding the transitionsin Foucault'swork. For example,Deleuzerejects the notion that Foucault'slate work constitutessomesort of return to the subject.Insteadhe seesthis later work asaddingthe dimensionof subjectification to the analysesof power and knowledgethat Foucault had previouslycarriedout. The subjectthat Foucaulttalksaboutin his final work is not a retreator a shelter,but ratherone that is producedby a folding of the outside.Deleuzealsorejectsthe simplisticnotion that Foucault'sformulation of the 'deathof man' might precludepolitical action.The figure of 'man'is simply one historicallydistinct form of the human.Human forces confront various other forcesat different times in history, and it is in this way that a compositehuman form is constructed. In a doublesense,Deleuzeperceivesthat which is 'vital' in Foucault's work. That is to say,he concentrateson what Foucault thought out of absolutenecessity, aswell asthe waysin which Foucault'swork expresses a commitment to life. Foucault may appearto be preoccupiedwith death, imprisonmentand torture, but this is becausehe is concernedwith the waysin which life might be freed from imprisonment.That is not to say that Deleuzeand Foucaultdid not feel there were points of real tension Foucault,for his part, found Deleuze'suse of betweentheir approaches. the term 'desire' problematic,since for him desire would alwaysentail some notion of 'lack' or repression.He preferred the term 'pleasure', which wasequallyproblematicfor Deleuze,becausepleasureseemsto be a transcendent categorythat interrupts the immanenceof desire.However, rather than thesedifferencesbeingthe basisfor a critical interpretationof Foucault'swork, they areactuallyconstitutiveof the 'tranv".rulfdiugorrol line that Deleuze attempts to trace betweenhimself and Foucault. It is in this way that he hopesto bring out what Foucaultwasstriving to do in his work, and it is in this spirit that Deleuzeoccasionallyfocuseson one of Foucault'sapparentlyminor concepts,suchasthat of the 'infamousman'. Deleuze finds this concept particularly resonant and respondsto its urgcncgsinccl,irucaultuscsit to attcmptto think throughdifficultprobof'powcr. lcmsrclatingto his own undcrstirncling

ll0

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f

n ' ol n

Connectives Desire Transversality

FOUCAULT

+ FOLD

Tom Conley The most terseand telling formulation of the fold is found in 'Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subfectivation)',the last chapterof Deleuze's Foucauhthat examinesFoucault'sthree-volumestudy of the history of sexuality.Michel Foucualt,saysDeleuze,took sexualityto be a mirror of subjectivityand subjectivation.Deleuzebroadensthe scopeby subsuming sexualityin a matrix of subjectivity.Every human being thinks as a result of an ongoingprocessof living in the world and by gainingconsciousness and agencythrough a constantgive-and-takeof perception, affect and cognition. Subjectivity becomesan ongoing negotiarionof things perceived,both consciouslyand unconsciously, within and outside the body.He builds a diagram, principally from TheHistory of Sexuality: VolumeOne (1976) and The Useof Pleasure(1984),on the foundation of the earlier writings to sketch a taxonomy and a history of the project. In TheArchaeologyof Knowledge(1972),Foucault had contendedthat the 'self', the 'I', is alwaysdefinedby the waysit is doubledby another,not a singleor commanding'other' or Doppelgringer, but simply any of a number of possibleforces.'It is I who live my life as the double of the orher,' and when I find the other in myself the discovery'resemblesexactly the invaginationof a tissuein embryology,or the act of doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop,and so on' (D 1988b:105).For Foucault,history wasthe 'doublingof an emergence'(D 1988b:98).By that he meanrthar what was pastor in an archivewasalsopassed- asmight a speedingcar overtaken or doubled by another on a highway - but alsomirrored or folded into a diagram.History wasshownto be what sumsup the pastbut that can be marshalledfor the shapingof configurationsthat will determine how people live and act in the present and future. Whether forgotten or remembered,history is one of the formativedoublesor othersvital to the processof subjectivation. Therein beginsDeleuze'srhapsodyof foldsandfoldings.When a doubling producesan inner and an outer surface- a doublurein French, meaningat once a lining stitchedinto a pieceof clothing,a stand-inin a cincmaticprocluction, and cvena douhleasAntonin Artaud had uscdthc

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term in his writings on theatre - a new relation with 'being' is born. An insideand an outsideand a past(memory)and a present(subjectivity) are two sidesof a singlesurface.A person'srelation with his or her body becomesboth an archive anda diagram,a collection of subiectivationsand a mental map charted on the basisof the past and drawn from eventsand elementsin the ambientworld. Deleuzeassertsthat four folds, 'like the four rivers of Hell' (D 1988b:104),affectthe subject'srelation to itself. The first is the fold of the body,what is surroundedor takenwithin corporealfolds;the secondis'the fold ofthe relationbetweenforces',or social conflict;the third is the 'fold of knowledge,or the fold of truth in so far as it constitutesa relation of truth to our being' (D 1988b:104),and viceversa;the fourth is the fold of 'the outsideitself, the ultimate' (D 1988b: 104) fold of the limit of life and death. Each of these folds refers to Aristoteliancauses(material,efficient,formal and final) of subjectivityand hasa variablerhythm of its own. We behooveourselves,Deleuzereminds us, to inquire of the natureof the four foldsbeforewe reflecton how subjectivityin our time is highly internalised,individualisedand isolated.The struggle for subjectivity is a battle to win the right to have accessto difference,variationand metamorphosis. The human subjectcan only be understoodunder the condition (the formula, it will be shown, is a crucial one) of the fold and through the filters of knowledge,power and affect. The fold, a form said to obsess Foucault, is shown as somethingcreasedbetweenthings stated or said, and things visible or seen.The distinction openedbetweenvisible and discursive formations is put forward in order to be drawn away from intentionality (as understood in Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) that would ally subjectivity with phenomenology. Things spokendo not refer to an original or individual subjectbut to a 'being-language',and things visiblepoint to a 'being-light'that illuminates'forms, proportions, perspectives'that would be free of any intentional gaze. Anticipating his work on Leibniz, Deleuze notes that Foucault causesintentionality to be collapsedin the gap between 'the two monads' (D 1988b:109)of seeingand speaking.Thus, phenomenology is convertedinto epistemology.To seeand to speakis to know,'but we don't seewhat we are speakingof and we don't speakof what we are seeing'. Nothing can precede or antedate knowledge (saaoir), even though knowledgeor knowing is 'irremediablydouble'- hencefolded as speakingand seeing,as languageand,light,which are independentof intending subjectswho would be speakersand seers. At this juncturethe fold becomesthe very fabricof ontology,the ateaof philosophywith which Deleuze claims staunchaffiliation.The folds of being (as a gcruncl)and of bcing (as a noun) are found in Foucault's

n2

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Heideggerand that of an outside is twisted, folded and doubled by an inside in the philosopher'sreading of Merleau-Ponty.Surely, Deleuze observes,Foucault finds theoreticalinspiration in the themesof the fold, the doublethat hauntsthe archaeologist of knowledge.As a doublingor a lining the fold separates speechfrom sightandkeepseachregisterin a state of isolationfrom the other. The gap finds an analoguein the hermetic differenceof the soundand imagetrack of cinema.From such a division knowledgeis dividedinto piecesor 'tracks'and thus canneverbe recuperatedin anyintentionalform (D 1988b:111).The dividednatureof communication has as its common metaphor the creaseor fold between visibility and orality. It is no wonder that in his studiesof differenceand resemblanceFoucault begins at the end of the sixteenth century, at the moment when writing evacuatesits force of visual analogyfrom its printed form. At that point, when print-culture becomesstandardisedand schematicreasoningreplacesmemory in manualsof rhetoric, or when wordsareno longeranalogous to the thingsthey seemto embodyor resemble, signsbegin to stand,in for their referentsand to be autonomousdoubles with respectto what they represent. To demonstratehow the fold is a figure of subjectivationDeleuzecalls history into the philosophicalarena.He asksin bold and simplelanguage: 'What canI do?WhatdoI know?Vl/hatam1? (D 1988b:I l5). The eventsof May 1968rehearsedthesequestionsby inquiring of the limits of visibility, of language,and of power.They brought forward thoughtsabouturopia, and henceaboutmodesof beingthat would enableresistance in repressive politicalconditionsand fosterthe birth of ideasvital for new subjectivities. In a historicalconfiguration'being' is chartedalongan axis of knowing. 'Being' is determinedby what is deemedvisibleand utterable;by the exercise of power,itself determined by relation of force and singularitiesat a given moment in time; and by subjectivity,shown to be a processor the placeswherethe fold of the self passesthrough.A grid or a new diagram makesclearthe oppositionby settingforward variationsof power,knowledgeandsubjectivity(in Frenchassauoir,pouaoir,soi).The lastis conceived asa fold. Foucault,Deleuzeadvances, doesnot divide a history of institutionsorof subjectivationsbutof theirconditionsandof theirprlcesseswithin creases and foldingsthat operatein both ontologicaland socialfields. There is openeda dramaticreflectionon rhe characrerof thinking which belongs as much to Deleuze as to Foucault. Historical formations are doubledand thus defineassuchthe epistemictraits of knowledge,powerand subjectivity:in termsof knowledge,ro think is to seeand to speak;in other words,thinking takesplacein the inrersticesof visibility and discoursc. Whcn wc think wc causclightningboltsto flashanclflickcr'in the midstof words,or unlcisht.cry in thc nridstof'visiblcthings'(l) lgtlttb:ll(r).

FR EED OM

ll3

Thinking makes seeingand speakingreach their own limits. In what concerns power, thinking is equivalent to 'emitting singularities', to a gambler'sact of tossinga pair of dice onto a table,or to a personengaging relationsof forceor evenconflict in order to preparenew mutationsand singularities.In terms of subjectivationthinking means'to fold to doublethe Outsidewith a coextensive inside'(D 1988b:118).Createdis a topologyby which inner and outerspacesarein contactwith eachother. History is takento be an archioeor seriesof stratafrom which thinking, a diagramrepletewith strategies,drawsits force and virtue. To makethe point clearDeleuzealludesindirectly to'A New Cartographer'(D 1988b: 2347), an earlier chapter that anticipatesmuch of the spatialdynamicsof The Fold,.When we 'think' we cross all kinds of thresholds and strata. Followinga fissurein order to reach,asthe poet Herman Melville callsit, a 'centralroom' where we fear no one will be and where 'man's soul will reveal nothing but an immense and terrifying void' (D 1988b: l2l). Ultimately,followinga line of 1,000aberrationsand moving at molecular speedleadslife into the folds and a centralroom wherethere is no longer any needto fearemptinessbecausethe self (a fold) is found inside.These ideasarch back to how Deleuze once describedthe history of forms or an archiveas 'doubled' (passedor folded over) by a becomingof forceswhere any number of diagrams- or folded surfacesof thought - plied overeach other. He calls it the torsion of the 'line of the Outside' that Melville described,an oceanicline without beginningor end, an oceanicline that turns and bumpsaboutdiagrams.The form of the line was 1968,the line 'with a thousandaberrations'(D1988b:44).

FREEDOM Paul Patton 'Freedom'is not a term that appearsoften in Deleuze'swritings,yet there is a distinctiveconceptof freedomimplicit throughouthis ethico-political texts written with Guattari. Thesedescribeindividual and collectivesubjectsin terms of differentkinds of assemblage, line or modesof occupying space.For example,they suggestthat we are composedof three kinds of line: firstly, molar lines which correspondto the forms of rigid segmentation found in bureaucraticand hierarchicalinstitutions; secondly,molecular lines which correspondto the fluid or overlappingforms of division characteristicof 'primitive' territoriality; and finally,lines of flight which arcthc pathsalongwhichthingschangcor bccomctransformcdinto somcthing clsc.'l'hc primrrcyof' lincs of'flight in this ontol(,gysystcnrilticillly

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privileges processesof creative transformation and metamorphosis through which assemblages may be transformed. Freedom is manifest in the critical points at which somestateor condition of things passesover into a different stateor condition. In contrastto the traditional conceptsof negative and positive freedom, freedom for Deleuze concerns those momentsin a life after which one is no longer the samepersonasbefore. This is an impersonaland non-voluntaristicconceptof freedom which refers to the capacityfor changeor transformationwithin or between assemblages. In the texts written with Guattari, this concept of freedom appearsonly in the guiseof other conceptssuchas 'line of flight', 'deterritorialisation'or'smooth space'. ln A Thousand, Plateaus,the authorsuseE ScottFitzgerald's novella,The Cracb-Up,to showhow this kind of transformationin a personmight be definedin terms of the differentkinds of 'line' which characterise an indi(D&G vidual life 1987:198-200).Fitzgerald distinguishesthree different kinds oftransition from one stateor stagein life to another:firstly, the large breakssuch as those betweenyouth and adulthood, betweenpoverty and wealth, betweenillness and good health, betweensuccessor failure in a chosen profession; secondly,the almost imperceptible cracks or subtle shiftsof feelingor attitudewhich involvemolecularchangesin the affective constitutionofa person;and finally the abrupt and irreversibletransitions through which the individual becomesa different personand eventually, Fitzgeraldwrites, 'the new personfinds new things to care about.' The subjectof the novellaundergoesa particularly severebreakdowninvolving lossof faith in his former valuesand the dissipationof all his convictions. He seeksto effectwhat he calls'a cleanbreak'with his pastself (F 1956: 69-84).Sucha breakamountsto a redistributionof desiresuchthat 'when somethingoccurs,the Self that awaitedit is alreadydead,or the one that would awaitit hasnot yet arrived'(D&G 1987:198-9). This kind of suddenshift towardsanotherquality of life or towardsa life which is livedat anotherdegreeof intensityis onepossibleoutcomeof what Deleuzeand Guattaricall 'a line of flight', and it is on this kind of line that freedomis manifest.The type of freedomthat is manifestin a breakof this kind cannotbe capturedin liberalor humanistconceptsof negativeor positive freedom,sincethesedefinefreedomin terms,ofa subject'scapacityto act without hindrancein the pursuit of its endsor in terms of its capacity to satisfy its most significant desires.Fitzgerald's characterno longer has the sameinterestsnor the samedesiresand preferences. In the relevant senseof the term, he is no longer the samesubject:his goalsare not the same,nor arethe valueswhich wouldunderpinhis strongevaluations. Whcrclsthc normativcstiltusof libcralfrccdomis unambiguously positivc.'ficcdonr'in this | )clcuzirrn scnscis morcitnrbivirlcnt. Frccdonrirr this

ll5

senseis indifferentto the desires,preferencesand goalsof the subjectin that it may threatenasmuch asadvanceany of these.It is not clearby what standardssuch freedom could be evaluatedas good or bad. There is no telling in advancewhere such processesof mutation and change might lead.Similar commentsmay alsobe madeaboutdeterritorialisation,Iines of flight or smoothspace.In the absenceof productiveconnectionswith other forces,lines of flight may turn destructiveor simply lead to new forms of capture.In the conclusionof the discussionof smoothasopposed to striated spaceat the end of A ThousandPlateaus,Deleuze and Guattari reaffirm the normative ambiguity of freedom: 'smooth spacesare not in themselvesliberatory.But the struggleis changedor displacedin them, inventsnewpaces' and life reconstitutesits stakes,confrontsnewobstacles, will sufficeto save space that a smooth Never believe switchesadversaries. prima facie,smooth us'(D&G 1987:500).The presuppositionhereis that, spaceis the spaceof freedom. It is the spacein which movements or processesof liberation are possible,evenif thesedo not alwayssucceedor evenif they are condemnedto the reappearanceof new forms of capture. Connectives Deterritorialisation Lines of flight Molar Molecular Space

FREUD, SIGMUND analysis'.

- refer to the entry on 'psycho(1856_1939)

GENEALOGY Bruce Baugh 'Genealogy'refersto tracing linesof descentor ancestry.Deleuze'suseof ol'Morals, thc tcrm dcrivcsfrom Fricdrich Nictzschc's On the Genculog.y

ll6

G ENEALO G Y

which traces the descentof our moral conceptsand practices.one key precept of the genealogicalmethod is that effecrsneed not resembletheir causes,asthe forcesthat producea phenomenonmay disguisethemselves (for example,a religion of love canariseout of resentment);anotheris that

'slaves',for whom 'good' is merely the negationof 'evil'). In Deleuze's hands,Nietzscheangenealogyis allied with the philosophiesof immanence (Henri Bergsonand Baruch spinoza), such that the 'past' from which a phenomenonis descendedis a set of forces immanent in the phenomenon that expressesthose forces, and thus coexistent with the present.

activeor reactive,is nothingbut the differencein quantitybetweena superior and an inferior force(D 1983:43), an inferior forcecan defeata superior one by 'decomposing'it and making it reactive,so that the genealogist must evaluatewhether the forcesthat prevailedwere inferior or superior, activeor reactive(D 1983:59-60).Poweror the will is eitheraffirmativeor negative,and designatesthe differentialrelation of forceswhich either dominate(active)or aredominated(reactive)accordingto whether the will affirms its difference from that difference it dominates and enjoys, or whether it negateswhat differs from it and suffers from that difference (often in the form of resentmen$.The affirmativewill, in affirming itsel{, wills that it be obeyed;only a subordinate will can obey by converting 'actions' into reactionsto an external forcg and this becoming-reactiveis the expressionof a negativewill. Genealogythus interprets and evaluatesthe hierarchicaldifference betweenactiveand reactiveforcesby referring theseto the hierarchical 'geneticelbment' of a 'will to Power' that is either affirmativeor negative. will to Powerdifferentiatesforcesasactiveand reactive,asthrough it one forcedominatesor commandsanorherthat obeysor is dominated(D l9g3: 49-51). However,will to Poweris not externalto the forcesit qualifiesor conditions,but is an immancnt principle of forcesand the relationsof forces,their 'internal gcncsis'by conditionsimmanentto the conditioncd(D 1983:9l). Gcncakrgythusconncctsconscqucnccs to premisses, principlc fo thc of' thcir ;rroducts llroduction,by scckingthc scnscof

cuArrARr,

prERRn-r'f,t-rx ( r g 3o-92)

tL7

phenomenain the forcesthey express(symptomology),interpreting forces as active or reactiye (typology), and evaluating the origin of forces in a quality of will that is either affirmativeor negative.For example,reason, a nihilistic rather than beingmerelya givenfaculty of the mind, expresses and negative will which negates the sensesand the sensory world to (D 1983:91,125,1+5). producea'True world'beyondappearances genealogical Deleuzecontinuesusinghis methodin laterworks.ln AntiOedipus,he traces memory and morality to the debtor-creditor relation and the primitive practice of inflicting physical pain for unpaid debts. Originally justiceis the assertionof an equivalencebetweenthe creditor's pleasurein paininflictedon the debtorand the injury causedby the unpaid debt; memoryis the product of marksinscribedon the body for a debt not paid, living reminders that produce the capacity to remember the future momentat which the promisemust be kept. The sovereignindividualwho can makeand keeppromisesand defineshimself by powerover himself is thus the product of punishment: how culture trains and selectsits members(D 1983:l34J; D&G 1983:144-5,190-2). Deleuzealsouses genealogyto show that the reactiveforcesand negativewill expressedby the priest type are also expressedin the figure of the psychoanalyst;both createguilt out of an infinite and unpayabledebt, whetherthat be to a God who sacrificeshimself for us, or to the analyst as cure for the condition the analystproduces(D&G 1983:108-12,269, 332-3; D&G 1987:154). Even at the basicontologicallevel, aswhen he finds 'the being of the sensible' in 'differencein intensity as the reasonbehind qualitativediversity' (D 1994: 57), Deleuze remains a genealogist,interpreting phenomena through the hidden relations of forcesimmanent in them. Connectives Active/Reactive Immanence Nietzsche

GUATTARI, PIERRE-FELIX

( 1930-92)

Garjt Genosko Pierre-F6lixGuattari was fifteen when he met psychoanalyst JeanOury, founderof Cliniquede la Borde,throughJean'sbrotherFernand,developer of institutionalpcdagogyin France.By the time he reachedtwentyyears GurrttrriwastnkcnundcrJcrn'swing.JcanconvinccdGuttttri to abtndon

l 18

cuArrARr,

pTERRE-FfLrx ( r g3o_ gz)

his study of commercialpharmacyand, in the early 1950s,he visited Jean at clinique saumery,a precursorof La Borde.saumerywasGuattari'sinitiation into the psychiatricmilieu. while a teenagerGuattari had met Fernandoury through the youth hostellingmovement(Fidiration (Jniedes Auberges d.eJeunesse). Fernandoury wasinstrumentalin gettingGuattari involvedin the summercaravanshe organisedin the paris suburb of La Garenne-colombes for working-class suburban youth like Guattari himself,who grew up in the samedepartmenrin nearbyVilleneuve. Guattari assistedin the foundationalwork at La Borde where he helpedwrite its constitutiond,elAn 1 the yearit openedin 1953.Guatari,s next task was to organiseintra-hospitalrherapeutic clubs for patients. Guattari'sinvolvementincreasedafter 1955. Guattari's career was also shapedby the friendly tutelage of another master,whom he had met when he wasjust twenty-three,JacquesLacan. It wasnot until 1962that Guattari graduatedto a didactictraining ar\alysiswith Lacan,joiningthe Ecolefreudiennede parisasan analyst in 1969.Guartari'sformativeintellectualmilieu wasLacanian. -"-u!, By the mid-1960s Guattari had developeda formidable battery of conceptsorganisedaround the problem of deliveringtherapyin institutional settings.Psychanalyse et tra,nsaersalitiexposedthe limits of the psychoanalyticunconsciousby arguingthat it wasnot a concernof specialists treating individualsbut rather perfusedthe socialfield and history.For Guattarithe subjectwasa group or collectiveassemblage of heterogeneous componentswhose formation, delinked from monadic individuals and abstract, universal determinationslike the oedipus myth, structural matheme and part object, could be seenthrough critical analysesof the actual vicissitudesof collectivelife in which patientsfound themselves. A Sartrean-inflectedtheory of groups emerged distinguishing nonabsolutelybetweensubject-groups(activelyexploring self-definedprojects) and subjugated groups (passively receiving directions), each affectingthe relationsof their membersto socialprocesses and shapingthe potentialfor subjectformation. The foundation of what Guattari called schizoanalysiswas laid in L'inconscient machinique. schizoanalysisrequiresa practical,detailed semioticsaswell asa politicallyprogressive and provisionaltransformation of situationalpowerrelations.The analyst'smicropoliticaltaskis to discern in a particularassemblage the mutationalpotentialof a given component and explorethe effectsof its passages in and betweenassemblages, producing and extracting singularitiesby undoing impasses,arienatingand dcadcningrcdundancies: 'Ratherthan indcfinitclytracingthe samccomplcxcs
cuArrARI,

pTERRE-r'6ltx (r93o-92)

l19

Micropolitical schizoanalysiswill map, in a way specific to each passage,delinguistifiedand mixed semiotic lines flush with matters of expression, rhizomes released from arborescent structures, molecular schizzeson the run from molar bureaucracies,faciality traits loosened from dominant overcodings,and new machinic connectionsand breaks, regardlessof their level of formation, elaboratingtheir becomingsand new terms of referenceacrossthe socialfield. This emphasison molecularity entailsa sociopoliticalanalysisthat privilegescreative,oppositional flight and eschewsso-calledprofessionalneutrality.Guattari introduced the machineasa productiveconnectivityirreducibleboth to technologies of componmachinesform assemblages and to foundationalsubstances; ent parts. The two editionsof La riaolutionmoliculaire(1977and 1980)contained advancedsemiotic methods, modified from Hjelmslevian and Peircean for engagingin a roots,adequateto the 'semioticpolycentrism'necessary genuinetransversalanalysisof the expandedfields of the unconscious, with a less woodenlydichotomoussenseof super ego on one side and sociuson the other. Guattari's writings on developmentsin Italy in the 1970sunderlined their potential for new molecular forms of collective action,what he called'generalizedrevolution'. and Chaosmose elaboratednonrepresenCartographies schizoanolytiques processes of subjectification,pragtationalmapsof the self-engendering matically attending to the specific ways in which singularitiescome together,through four ontological functions of the unconscious,their interfaces,and the characterof their components:material fluxes and machinicphylums; existentialterritoriesand incorporealuniverses.The former are actual and discursiveon the plane of expression;the latter virtual and non-discursiveon the planeof content.Emergentassemblages of enunciationare ontologicallycomplex becausein a given situation a schizoanalyst triesto bridgethe virtual and actualby discerningthe former and attending to how they actually work themselvesout relationally assubandexpressively betwixt manifestationandpossibility,processually jcctivity everemerges. Guattari is internationallyrecognisedfor his collaborationswith Gilles Plateau.s,and What is l)cleuze on Anti-Oedipus,Kafha, A Thousand' yet his key theoreticalstatementsremainvirtually unknown. l'hilosoph.y?, (lonnectives l,itcitn

l)sychornirlysis 'l i'ansvcrsrlity

120

HAECCEI TY

HAECCEITY - refer to the entries on 'experience',,individuation', * Husserl'and,post-structuralism 'percept+ literature','phenomenology * politics'.

HARDY, THOMAS (1840-1928)- refer to the entries on ,art, and 'percept * literature'.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831) - referto the entries on tarborescent schema', tBergson', tcapitalism * universal history', tcapture', 'cinema * Werner Herzog', tdifference', ,immanencet, 'phenomenology'and'Spinoza'.

HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889-1976)- refer ro the entries on 'Foucault+ foldt, tnonbeingt,tontology',tphenomenology,,.socius,,.substance'and 'thought'.

HUME, DAVID (l7tt-76\ CIiffStagoll David Hume was a Scottish philosopher,historian,economistand religious theorist,and perhapsthe best known of the philosopherscommonly designated'empiricisrs'.Although Hume's grouping with such thinkers as John Locke'and George Berkeleyis questionable,mid- to late-twentieth-centuryhistoriesof philosophyplacedthem togetherroutinely.In a chapteron Hume, typically one either encountersa naturalist extendingand radicalisingthe work of Locke and/or Berkeley(or Ren6 Descartesand NicolasMalebranche),or a scepticwhosecontributionsto philosophyare largelyor wholly critical. Perhapshis best-knownphilosophicaltheoryis that ideasnot clearlyoriginatingfrom senseimpressions ought to bc'committcdto flames'.only in thc latc 1960sand early 1970s

HUM E,

DAVI o

( r 7r t - 76)

t21

did the focusof Anglo-AmericanHume studiesmoveawayfrom such striassertionstowardshis analysisof the passions,prindent epistemological and suchfeaturesof the mind asinstinct,propensity, ciplesof association, belief, imagination, feeling and sympathy.Deleuze had adopted this emphasisin 1952and 1953,focusingmainly upon the naturalismevident in Hume's principlesof human nature. Deleuze'sshift in emphasisextendedfurther. Whereasit is commonly held that Hume, finding himself unableto counter his scepticalepistemological conclusions,turned to history,sociology,religion and economics out of frustration,DeleuzeconsidersHume's entire corpus to comprise variousstagesin the developmentof a 'scienceof human nature'.Just as and aestheticdimensions,so human life involvesethical,epistemological too it involveseconomic,religiousand historicalones.For Deleuze,one cannotproperly understandHume's philosophywithout referring to his work in other disciplines. In his publishedworks and interviews,Deleuzereturns time and again to Hume's empiricism.His most detailedand sustainedaccountof it is Empiricismand,Subjectitsity,hisfirst full book. Deleuze focuseson three aspectsof Hume's philosophyin particular.The first is Hume's commitment to a philosophy founded upon direct experience,a position that reappearsas a key tenet of Deleuze's'transcendentalempiricism'. On Deleuze'sreading, Hume begins his philosophicalinvestigationswith straightforwardobservationsabout the world: humansseeobiects,posit the existenceof gods,make ethical judgements,plan work to meet ecoin somesense.Deleuze nomicimperatives,and remainawareof themselves find in thought any element initially to arguesthat, becauseHume is unable (constancy or universality'to which he might refer a psychologyper se' of he developsinsteada 'psychologyof the mind's affections',a theoryabout socialandpasthe regular'movement'of the mind accordingto observable philosophical edifice, some building than sional circumstances.Rather however,Hume readsthe conceptsneededto explainsuchdynamicsfrom out of the reality of experience,treating them as contingentexplanatory toolsthat canalwaysbe replacedor supplemented. The secondof Deleuze'semphasesis upon Hume's 'atomism'.Hume conceivesof the mind asa set of singularideas,eachwith a distinct origin Ratherthan arguingthat the mind precedes or setof originsin experience. ideasso that experienceis given ro the mind, Hume holds that the mind just ls theseradicallydisparateideas.On this reading,nothing transcends the ideasof the mind, and sothe connectionsbetweenthem arein no sense 'pre-programmed'. Sinceideas Deleuze'sthird emphasisis upon Hume's'associationism'. that they can ways any number of are there lrc not inherently structured,

122

HYSTERI A

be brought together to generatenew patterns of understanding,new behavioursand so on. For Deleuze,Hume discountsthe possibility of any universalprinciple or capacityto govern such connections.Ratheq such creativepotentialis realisedunder the influenceof the life of practice (that is, pressuresarisingfrom economicand legalstructures,family, languagepatterns, physical requirementsand so on). The tendencies evident in human responsesto such influencesmight be called 'general rules', but rather than trulestin the usualsense,theseare contingentand impermanent. The epiphenomenonarising from such complex, contingent and changingrelationshipsand tendenciesis the human subject,that we call 'I'. This Humean subject is understood by Deleuze as a fiction, sufficiently stable to have identity posited of it and ro exist in a social realm, but 'containing' elementsof dynamism with the capacityto transcend hierarchicalthinking of a human being in favour of rhizomatic thinking of non-humanbecoming.Whilst porrionsof the model become targetsfor Deleuze'ssubsequentattackson the ontology of identity and being,othersprovide him with meansof escapeto a radicalmetaphysics of becoming. Although Deleuzeis usually faithful ro Hume's writings, his readings are idiosyncraticand go well beyond the original texts. His focus upon generalrules, artifice, habit and stabilisingfictions carry an inordinate weight in Deleuze's early theorisation of the human individual. Nonetheless,whilst his interpretationof Hume is unusual,it is far less radicalthan his versionsof Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Friedrich Nietzsche. Connective Transcendental empiricism

HYSTERIA Jonathan Roffe A frequent method to be found in Deleuze'sphilosophyis the use of non-philosophicalterms and perspectivesin a philosophicalmanner. Particularly good examplesof this are availablein Anti-Oediltusand A ThousandPlateaus,where Deleuzeand Guattari generaliscand altcr cortrrinpsychoanalytic conccpts(particularlyschizophrcnia and parrrnoia) in ordcr to r.rsc tlrcnrin srrcialirrrrlysis. lt is in thisscnscthlt l)clcuzctrkcs

H Y S TE R IA

123

the term 'hysteria',derivedfrom nineteenth-centurypsychiatricthought, and appliesit to the art of the Irish painterFrancisBacon.For Deleuzeand Guattari, hysteriadescribes- in this generalphilosophicalsense- the attempt to escapefrom one's own body which is experiencedas a trap. However,it is not that the hystericis trying to liberatehis soul from the body - that would be a very traditional philosophicalnotion - but rather that the organisationof the body itself is oppressive.Hysteria is a namefor the friction betweenthe body itself and the organisationsthat it undergoes sociallyand politically. So, in this context,the body is two things at once.On the one hand, it socialand habitualactswhich makeup is the set of politically acceptable, a person.On the other, the body is malleableand transient,without any fixed organisation.It is in a certain sensethe reality of living life otherwise, of being-otherwise.Drawing on the writings of Antonin Artaud, Plateauscall this malleablebody the Deleuzeand Guattariin A Thousand, 'Body without Organs' (BwO). In contrast is the social and politically organ-isedbody. Baconcan be seenasa painter of hystericsbecausehis figuresexpress both the senseof strain that bodies are under (the pressureand structure of organisation),and the attempt of these bodies to escapetheir organisation.For example,Deleuzethinks that Bacon'sfamouspainting Stud,yAfter Wldzquez'sPortrait of PopeInnocentX (1953) - otherwise referredto asthe ScreamingPope- showsa body trying to leavethrough the mouth of the figure. Likewise, the link betweenbodies and meat or fleshshowshow life doesnot take placebeyondthe body,in the mind or soul, but in the body itself. Rather than seeing Bacon as a painter of horror and existential meaninglessness,Deleuze proposes that we see him asa painterof life, depicting the struggleof bodily or fleshlylife with the shapesthat it is forced to assume.This is the hystericalaspectof Bacontsart. Finally,Deieuzearguesthat the term 'hysteria'can be usedto describe paintingitself.While all art, he insists,mustbe understoodin termsof how it expressesthe imperceptibleforce of life, painting hasa certain privileged itself to the relation to the body.Pictorial art, Deleuzeclaims,addresses of the disembodied cye.However,rather than placingthe eyeon the side mind of the spectator,the encounterwith the forceof painting- which in thc caseof Baconis particularlymanifestin his useof colour- returns the cyc to the fleshlybody.In other words,the forceof painting dissolvesthe rnind/body hierarchy of the organisedbody, offering the spectatoran opportunity to frcc up the BwQ and therebyto becomeconcretelyfreerin :r gcncrirlscnsc.'l'his proviclcsthc link bctwcenptlliticsand irrt that occain l)clcuzc'swork. siorrally cnrcrgcs

t2+

I DENTI TY

Connectives Bacon Body without Organs Schizoanalysis

IDENTITY James Williams In Deleuze'swork, identity is perhapsthe most heavilycriticisedconcept from the philosophicaltradition. That criticism takesmany forms and dependson many different argumentsand aestheticexpressions.However, these can be simplified through the claim that Deleuze's opposition to identity is directed at the falsifying power of identity in representation. Identity works against and covers deeper pure differences.It does so because of the dominanceof the demandto representin the historyof philosophy.Objects,subjects,faculties,feelings,ideasand thoughtsmust be representedfor them to becomea legitimatepart of philosophicaldebate. For this representationto takeplacethey must be identified. There is a strong descriptionof this historicaldominancein Dffirence and,Repetition,where Deleuzecharacterises it accordingto a seriesof 'postulates' presupposedby a certain 'image of thought'. When thought is associatedby right with truth and with the good, certain unexamined premissesare at work. Most notably,that truths and goodscan be representedin thought and most properly by thought. So what concernsDeleuze is not only the claim that truths and goods must be represented, but alsothe belief that thought is dependenton representationand on identity for its path to the good and the true. His critiquesof other philosophers.often dependon showinghow this imageof thought is operatingunconsciouslyand damaginglyin their works. The damageis causedbecausereality is a processof becoming,which involves pure differencesthat cannotbe represented. By turning us awayfrom reality,the commitmentto identity in representationfurthers an illusion that leadsus to repressprocesses of becoming at work in our own existence. The effects
IMMA N E N C E

125

In termsof identity,Deleuze'sphilosophycanbe seenasa critical attempt to cure us of the self-destructivedependence on identity. But what is identity accordingto Deleuzel ln Dffirence and.Repetition he gives an account of it in terms of concepts (though in lMhat is Philosophy? he and Guattari usethe term in a different sense).Identity is opposedto multiplicity, in that multiplicity is both uncountableand not open to a reductive logical or mathematicalanalysis.Thus, if any concept is definedasa seriesofidentifiable predicatesor properties,then to saythat all things must be representedthrough conceptsis to further a falseimage of reality.An identifiablepredicatewould itself be simple,limited and welldetermined, something that could be checkedempirically or through reasonwith certainty. Accordingto Deleuzenothing canbe checkedin this way.Conceptsand representations do not correspondto anythingin reality.This is because all things are connectedto multiplicities, that is, to uncountableand unidentifiableprocesses of becoming,rather than existingasfixed beings with identifiableand limited predicatesor essences. But this showsthe extremedifficulty of Deleuze'sposition,not only in terms of communicability,but alsoin terms of how it can be understood. Do we not needto be ableto representsomethingin order to be ableto talk aboutit in an open and effectivemanner?Do we not needto be ableto identify somethingin order to be ableto understandit truthfully? His answeris that communicationis expressive aswell asidentifying.So though we representwhat we think and talk about,a seriesof unidentifiableprocesses arealwaysat work behindthat representation. There canbe no identity without pure differencesstandingin the backgroundasa condition for the illusory appearance of a pure, well-determinedidentity. Connectives Difference Multiplicity Representation Thoueht

IMMANENCE James Williams 'Ihe distinction drawn between immanenceand transcendenceis allimportantto I)clcuzc'sphikrsophy. It charactcriscs his oppositionto mony

t26

IM M ANENCE

metaphysical positions- criticisedasphilosophiesof transcendence. It also aligns his philosophy with philosophiesof immanence,most notably Baruch Spinoza. Immanenceand transcendence are terms about the relationsthat hold at the heart of different metaphysics.Are the privileged relationsin a philosophyof the form of a relation 'to' something,or of a relation 'in' somethinglIf it is 'to' then it is philosophyof transcendence. If it is 'in' then it is immanence.Deleuzeis radical about immanence,that is, his philosophyis to be thought strictly in terms of relations'in'. In thehistoryof philosophy, relationsof transcendence canbe tracedback to theologicalroots, where a lower realm is related to a higher one: ('Everythingdownhereis relatedto andacquiresvaluesthroughits relation to God.'). For example,in Ren6Descartes, relationsof transcendence hold from bodyto mind andfrom createdsubstance to God. Mind is independent of body and yet body is secondaryto mind and in its grasp.God is independent of his creation,yet the creationmust be referred to God, for example, wherehe actsa guarantorfor the validity of clearand distinct perception. The objectionto relationsof transcendence is that they involve founding negations(for example,that mind is completelyseparatefrom body).Such negationsare the groundsfor negativevaluations,both in the senseof a 'lower'realm finding its valueor redemptionin a'higher'one, and in the senseof the lowerrealmdependingon the higherone for its definition. For example,if the human realm is seenas transcendedby God, then definitionsof humanessence may be turned towardsthat higherrealmand awayfrom a purely humanone.The humanbody and mind will be turned awayfrom itself and devaluedin the light, for instance,of a transcendent soul.This leadsto an interestingconcernin Deleuzewith notionsof eternity that resistdefinitionsin termsof transcendence. We arenot immortal in the way we can rise to a differentrealm (of God or of PlatonicIdeas), but in the way we participatein eternalprocesses. This explainsDeleuze'sappealsto, anddeepinterpretationof, Friedrich Nietzsche'sdoctrine of eternal return (in Nietzscheand Philosophyand Dffirence and,Repetition)amongothers). Eternal return is an immanent processthat brings differentiatingand identifying processes together.In eternalreturn, differenceretufns to transformidentities(the same).This is why Deleuzealwaysinsiststhat only differencereturnsandnot the sarne. Deleuze's philosophy of immanence emphasisesconnectionsover forms of separation.But this connectionmust itself be a connectivity betweenrelationsand not betweendifferentidentities.This is becausean external principle would be neededto ground those identitics (for cxample,identitydcpcndedon the humtn mind - thcrebysettingit up irs trrnsccnclcnt).

IN C OR P OR E A L

t2t

In his Nietzscheand,Philosophy,Deleuze turns on one of the main targetsof his philosophyof immanencethrough a critique of Hegelian dialectics,where a principle of negationitself becomesthat which transcends.In contrast, Nietzsche's idea of affirmation emergesout of processesof negationbut frees itself from them. A creativerelation of affirmationdoesnot dependon negatingthings,though it may emergeout of pastnegations. In Dffirence and Repetitioz,the philosophyof immanenceis set out in ontologicalterms through a succession of argumentsfrom Duns Scotus, through Spinoza, to Nietzsche.In these arguments,the difficulties in developinga philosophyof pure immanencebecomeapparent,as Scotus then Spinozaare shownstill to dependon someforms of transcendence. Only Nietzsche'sdoctrineof the eternalreturn of pure differencesallows for a full immanentontology,becauseall things, whether identifiableor not, are positedas completeonly through their relation to an immanent (virtual'). field of pure differences(Deleuze's transcendental It is important to note that theseclaims on immanenceand the distinction betweenactual and virtual are a key place for criticisms of Deleuze, notablyby Alain Badiou. His critical claim restson the idea that the virtual itself is a transcendentrealm. But this is to missthe necessaryinter-relation of virtual and actual through a reciprocal determination. Neither is independentofthe other and cannotthereforebe said to enter into a relation of transcendence. Connectives Nietzsche Spinoza Virtual/Virtuality

TNCORPOREAL TamsinLorraine In The Logic of Sense,Deleuze characterisesthe distinction made by the Stoicsbetweenmixtures of bodiesor statesof affairsand incorporcal entities that 'frolic' on the surface of occurrences(D 1990: 5). According to Deleuze, this distinction refers to two planes of being, onc of which concernsthe tensions,physicalqualities,actionsand passionsof bodics;and thc othcr of which concerns'incorporeal'cntiticsor cvcntsthrt do not cxist.lrut rrthcr 'subsistor inlrcrc'in stirtcsof'rrllirirs.

t28

IN D IVID U ATION

INCORPOREAL

Although incorporealentitiescan neverbe actuallypresent,they are the effectof mixtures of bodiesand canenter into quasi-causal relationswith other incorporeals. The clearestexampleof the incorporealis an eventof sense.A proposition like 'The sun is shining' expressesa sensethat 'inheres' in the proposition, but is neverreducible to the stateofaffairs ofeither one specific or even an endless series of specific instances of a shining sun (D 1990:cf. l9). Deleuze claims that while sraresof affairs have rhe remporality of the living present, the incorporeal eventsof senseare infinitives (to shine, to be the sun) that constitute pure becomingswith the temporality of aion - a form of time independentof matter that always eludesthe present.Thus, no matter how manytimesthe stateof affairsof a shining sun is actualised,the senseof 'The sun is shining' is not exhausted.It is this 'frontier of sense'betweenwhat words expressand the attributes of bodies that allows languageto be distinguishedfrom physicalbodies.If the actionsand passionsof bodiesmake sense,it is becausethat senseis not itself either an action or a passion,but is rather an incorporealeffectof a stateof affairs that entersinto relations of quasicausality with other incorporeal eventsof sense.The virtual relations of the events of senseconstitute the condition of any given speech-act. Deleuze refers to the work of Lewis carroll asa revealingexampleof how these quasi-causalrelations can form a 'nonsense' that subsists in tcommonsense'language. rn A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari characterisea socialfield in terms of a 'machinicassemblage' and a 'collectiveassemblage of enunciation'(D&G 1987:88).In additionto bodiesandtheactionsandpassions affectingthosebodies(the'machinicassemblage', for example,the body of the accusedor the body of the prison),thereis a set of incorporealtransformationscurrent in a given societythat are attributed to the bodiesof that society(for example,the transformationof the accusedinto a convict by the judge'ssentence)(D&G 1987:cf. 8l). We can view the incorporeal effectsof statesof affairs in terms of either the 'order-words' that designate fixed relations between statementsand the incorporeal transformations they express,or the deterritorialisingplay of carroll's Alice in (1865).ln TheLogic of Sense,Deleuze Wond,erland, describesthe actor or stoic sageassomeoneableto evokean instantwith a taut intensityexpressiveof an unlimited future and past,and therebyembodythe incorporeal effectsof a stateof affairsratherthan merelyits spatio-temporalactualisation (D 1990:147).Suchactorsdo more than merelyportray a character's hopesor regrets;they attemptto 'represent'a pure instantat thc point at whichit dividesinto futurcandpast,thuscmbodyingin thcir performirncc an intintittiontlf'virtual rclationsbcyondthoscirctunliscd in thc situirtion

r29

portrayed.If one wills to be just in the mannerof a Stoic sage,one wills not the repetitionof pastactsof justice,but a justicethat hasalwaysbeen and hasyet to be - the incorporealeffectof justicethat is nevermadefully manifestin any concretesituation.When the incorporealeffectsof sense arereducedto order-words,we ignore the pure becomingsof senseand territorialise the infinite variability of meaning into stale repetitions of the past. When we allow the variablesof corporealbodiesand eventsof sense to be placedinto constantvariation, evenorder-wordsbecomea passageto the limit. The movementof new connectionsamongthesevariablespushes languageto its limits and bodiesto a metamorphicbecoming-other(D&G 1987:108). Connective Becoming

INDIVIDUATION Constantin V Bound,as Deleuze'sconceptof individuation' is a geneticaccountof individuals. The conceptemergesfrom a critique of hylomorphismthat exposesthe error in thinking of an individual asthe end point of a progressivespecificationof the species.Substitutingthe imageof 'the mould' for a processfriendly idea of modulation,this critique alsorepudiatesthe idea that an individual is mouldedin a specificway.As he developshis theory of individuation, Deleuzeborrows and transformsanalysesmade by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Gilbert Simondon. - in the processof virtual, Deleuze'stheory of individuation addresses continuous(intensive)multiplicities becoming(extended)discrete- the apparentlycontradictory co-existenceof the continuum and the discrete. The processof individuation is called 'differentiation' with respectto the continuum, and 'differenciation' with respectto the discrete. Given that Deleuze'sconcept of becoming is basedon the co-imbrication of the virtual real and the actualreal,the conceptionof the virtual is in terms of a differentiatedflow of events,singularitiesand intensities.Meanwhile,the actualis understoodasthe differenciatedrealm of bodies,their mixtures, and statesof affairs.Actualisationdoesnot meanthe deathof the virtual. a robusttheoryof individuationthat Hence,Deleuze'sontologygenerates aroundnot iust the non-fixityof dcvelopcd sustainsa crcativccvolution aswcll. spccicsbut tlrrttof inclividuirls

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I NDI VI DUATI O N

For the elaborationof his theory,Deleuzeappealsto Leibniz - first, to Leibniz'sconcepts,eachof which correspondsto an individual;second,to the Leibnizian method of vice-dictionthat understandsan individual as the product of the law of a seriesand the internal differencethat distinguishesone moment of its becoming from another. Ultimately, though, Deleuze movesbeyond Leibniz's theory of individuation becauseof the latter's relianceon a priori harmony the compossibilityof the series,and the bestpossibleworld. Finding fresh inspiration in Simondon's theory of individuation Deleuzeconsiders'modulation'(insteadof the mould of the old imageof thought) as the processby which metastable(virtual/real) systemsexplicatethe potentialenergyimplicatedwithin them. Populatedby singularities and eventsthesesystemsbring about new (acual/real) metastable systemsin the processof their explication.Their metastabilityis due to the fact that the virtual does not consist only of elementsand flows differentiatedfrom one another.Rather the differentiatedvirtual is differenceitself - differencedifferenciatingitself. The modulatingprocessof individuationis the transduction(Simondon'sterm) of the virtual continuum of intensitiesto the discreteextendedactual,all the while remembering that the actual is never totally devoid of the dynamism of the pre-individual virtual. Thus, the actual is capableof being reabsorbedby the virtual. Intensity is what makes the passagefrom the virtual to the actual possible.Themodulation is in a stateof permanentvariation- a promiseof becomings- disallowingpredictionsof what an individuation is capableof Individuals are not subjects.Deleuze understands'haecceities'as degreesof intensity (a degreeof heat,a certaintime of the day) that, in combinationwith other degreesof intensity,bring aboutindividuals.The individuals they bring about retain the anonymityof the pre-individual realm.First, haecceities consistentirelyof movementand rest (longitude) betweennon-formedmoleculesand particles.Second,they havethe capacity to affect and be affected(latitude). As in Baruch Spinoza'sessences, haecceitiesco-exist on a plane of consistency,eachone of which is compossiblewith, and responsiblefor, the generationof the others.In otder to accentuatetheir impersonality,Deleuze arguesthat we need a new languageby which to refer to them, one that consistsof proper names,verbs in the infinitive,and indefinitearticlesand pronouns. l Connectives Actuality y'| )iff'crcnciltion I )if}'crcntiatiorr

IN TE N S ITY

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Leibniz Virtual/Virtuality

INTENSITY Corustantin V Boundas 'Intensity' is a key notion in Deleuze'sphilosophicalproject: it manifests itself asthe intensivevirtual of his ontology;asthe affirmativeand creative desireof his ethicsand politics;asthe affectof his aesthetictheory;as the empirimotivationfor his methodological decisionto opt for transcendental cism;and asthe guarantorof a theoryof difference(different/ciation). Deleuze's ontology of becoming denouncesthe error we commit when we think exclusivelyin terms of things and their qualities,because by privileging extensionand extendedmagnitudeswe bypassthe intensive genesisof the extended(transcendentalillusion). In an ontology of forces like Deleuze's. force refers to the relation between forces. Forces are experiencedonly through the results they render; and the results of forcefields are extensive and qualitative. Transcendental empiricism, therefore,demandsthat the intensitiesthat constitutean extensivebeing It needsto be noted that be sensed- the famousDeleuzian'sentiend,um'. this sensingcannot be achievedthrough the ordinary exerciseof our sensibility.Intensity can be remembered,imagined, thought and said. Intensitiesarenot entities,they are virtual yet real eventswhosemode of existenceis to actualisethemselvesin statesof affairs. The following caveatsthat punctuate Deleuze's writings must be heeded.First, a virtual intensity existsnowhereelsebut in the extended that it constitutes.Despitethe fact that it is not identicalwith the extended, a virtual intensity does not entail ontological separation.Second,the imperativesthat help us grasp intensity no longer circumscribe the deontologyof pure reasonalone;they enlargethe scopeof this deontology so that it encompassesall faculties: from sensibility, to memory, and to thought. Nevertheless,the encounterof intensity - being the taskof sensibility - is the first necessary link in the interactionof all facultiesstriving to generatethe differentiatedvirtual within thought.Third, intensityis not anldea/paradigm for particular instantiationsor for screeningout false pretenders.Intensity is a singularity capableof generatingactual cases, none of which will evercometo resembleit. Dcleuze'sontologyis built arounda notion of differencethat is not contrincclin thc 'from' of thc 'x is differentfrom y', bnt rather he aimsat ditl'crcnccin itsclf. (,onscrlucntly,l)clcuzc givcs wcight to intcnsity

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IN TU ITION

I NTERI O RI TY

becauseunlike extendedmagnitudeswhosepartesextra,pertespermit their division without any correspondingchangein their nature, intensities cannot be subdividedwithout a correspondingchangein their nature. (distance' Therefore,intensitiesare incommensurable and their from one another makeseachone of them a veritable differencein itself. Intensive magnitudesdo not add up; insteadthey average.Placedin the context of the two sidesof the Deleuzianontology- the virtual and the actual- intensitiescatalysethe actualisationofthe virtual, generatingextension,linear, successivetime, extendedbodies and their qualities. The relation of reversibilitythat obtainsbetweenthe virtual and actualguarantees intensitieswill not suffer the fate of negentropicdeath. The role of intensity in Deleuze'sethics, politics and aestheticsis also pivotal. Deleuze'sethics revolvesaround two axes.The first is the Stoic/ Nietzscheanimperativethat we becomeworthy of the virtual event.The secondis the Spinozistadmonitionto live a life of joy andto multiply powerenhancing'goodencounters'.The ethicsofjoy and the preferencefor good encounters increasingour powercouldbelongto a'feel good',self-helptype of psychologyif it werenot for the intensityof the virtual.Becomingworthy ofthe event,however,requiresthe ascesisofthe counter-actualisation ofthe accidentsthat fill our lives,and asa result, our participationin the intensive, virtual event.Similarly,Deleuze'spoliticswould be a banalcelebrationof multitudes,if it werenot for the fact that the multipleis not the sameas'the many'. In the counter-actualisation of the revolutionthat befallsus, the revolution that never comesand yet never ceasesto passis graspedas the untimely, virtual, intensive event; the affirmation of which renders us worthy of our fate. Finally, when in his aestheticsDeleuzesubstitutessensation for form, intensity is what is given priority. What the artist aims towardsis indeedsensation. Sensationis intimatelyrelatedto the intensity of the forcesthat it doesnot represent.Sensationis the affect,which is neithersubjectivenor objective;ratherit is both at once:we becomein sensationand at the sametime somethinghappensbecause of it.

Connectives Differentiation/Differenciation Nietzsche Spinoza Transcendental empiricism

INTERIORITY : rcf'crto thc cntryon 'cxrcrioritv/intcrioritv'.

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INTUITION CliffStagoll Deleuzeusesthe conceptof intuition' in two distinct ways.In someof his later works (for example,What is Philosophy?,which he co-authoredwith Guattari), it refers to one of the elementsof a plane of immanence. Whereasconceptsdefinethe pointsof intensityon a plane,intuition refers to movementsupon it. As such, intuitions can be consideredas ideasor even 'lines of thinking' in a general sense,immanent to a particular problemand the circumstances of its consideration. Deleuze usesintuition to refer to a kind of More frequently, though, philosophical method borrowed from Henri Bergson. This is not to suggestthat Deleuzechampionsany particular philosophicaltechnique. He would opposeconsistentadoptionof a methodbecauseof the tendency for anysingleapproachto limit perspectives on a problemand soto hinder refer to method, he often creativethinking. However,when Deleuzed,oes meansa modified version of Bergson'sphilosophicalintuition (intuition philosophique). According to Bergson, evolution has resulted in the human mind becomingable to conduct rational investigationsand make consequent decisionspertainingto the worldsof scienceand practice.The mind is not so well adaptedto conductingmetaphysicalinquiriesinto the dynamicsof one's life. Indeed, for Bergson,efforts to turn our analyticalintellect to philosophicalproblemsresult inevitablyin our consideringlived reality in terms of somestatic,materialimageupon which we'gazd and which we then theoriseabstractly. For Bergson,our lived reality comprisesa flow of consciousstates. is essentiallytemporal:ongoingmental activity constitutConsciousness ing the kind of time internal to one'sself.The continuity and persistence of this flow makesup our personhood,and its particularity definesour individuality.Oncewe turn our analyticalmind to lived, consciousexperience,however,we tend to think insteadin terms of successiveinstantsand imagessituatedin space.As such, philosophicalprecisionis lost because reality is no longertheorisedon its own terms. methodthat Bergsonchampionsto avoidthe Intuition is the philosophical analyticalmind's tendencyto abstraction.He arguesthat one must enter into an experience directly,so asto'coincide' and'sympathise'withit. The rranner in which one achievesthis, though, is notoriously difficult to as scholarlycommentaries. Someclcscribe, with as manycharacterisations or a timcs llcrgsondigns intuition with artisticsensibilityand awareness, it with purcinstinct. dctlchmcntlrom rcrrlity.At othcr tinrcshc lssociatcs

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On Deleuze'sinterpretation,intuition is somewhatlessmysteriousbut no less problematic.He conceivesof intuition as a deliberatereflective awareness or willed selfconsciousness) a concentratedand direct attention to the operationsof consciousness (in contrastwith mediated'observations of'consciousnessby consciousness in a quest for transparencyof thoughtto itself).This depictionalignswith Bergson'saccountof the intuition of consciousness asthe attentionthat mind givesitself,continuingits normal functionsyet somehowdiscerningsimultaneously the natureof its workings.If our naturaltendencyis to graspthingsin terms of spaceand quantity,such an effort must be extremelydifficult to achieve.(Deleuze and Bergsonboth suggestat varioustimesthat intuition hasno limits, and can take us beyond the human condition to 'sympathise'and 'coincide' with animalsandeveninanimateobjects,but the meansof doing soremain mysterious.) Deleuzeis particularlyattractedto intuition becausehis desireto move from experienceto the contingentconditions of experiencein order to rediscoverdifferencedemandsa meansfor accessingthe particularityof consciousness without metaphysical illusions.If he wereto considerreality in termsof conceptssupposedto makeit (or experienceof it) possible,then he would substituteone kind of abstractionfor another.Deleuzeinstead needsto dissociateaspectsof the whole that is called 'I' accordingto natural articulations,and to graspconsciousand materialaspectsof life without recourseto abstract or general concepts.Bergson'sintuition enableshim to achievethis by creating conceptsaccordingto natural articulationsof experience.From the lived reality of a flow of consciousness,Deleuze'sintuition revealssuch articulationsas memory,faculties, dreams,wishes,jokes, perceptionsand calculations.As such, Deleuze maintainsthat there is a resemblance betweenintuition as a method for division and asa meansfor transcendental analysis. Interestingly,Bergsonsometimesseemsto hold morereservations about the precision and generalapplicability of intuition than Deleuze. He remindshis readersthat to expressin languagethe resultsof an intuitive study of consciousness is to conceptualiseand symbolise,'andthus to abstract.Yethe meansintuition to be freefrom formalconceptualandsymbolic constraints.Accordingly,to communicateaboutintuition, he argues that we shouldusemetaphorand suggestiveness to point towardswhat is otherwiseinexpressible. Deleuzeexpresses few such reservationsovertly, althoughhis languageusehints at his havingfollowedBergson'ssuggestion. Connective Ilcrgson

KAFKA,

I NTUI TI O N

FRANz ( r 88: - r 924)

r35

KAFKA, FRANZ (1883-1924) John Marks In KaJba: Towarda Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari seekto overturn much of the receivedcritical wisdomon Franz Kafka'swork by presentinghim asa joyful and comic writer, who is positivelyengagedin the world. Kafka was,Deleuzeand Guattari claim, irritated when peoplesaw him asa writer of intimacy'.In Deleuzeand Guattari'shandshe becomes a politicalauthor,and the prophetof a future world. It would, they claim, be grotesqueto opposelife and writing in Kafka. Kafka seeksto graspthe world rather than extract impressionsfrom it, and if he is fixated on an essentialproblem,it is that of escaperatherthan abstractnotionsof liberty. The tendencytowardsdeterritorialisationin Kafka'swork, for example,is evidentin his useof animalsin his short stories. Ratherthan interpretation- sayingthat this meansthat - Deleuzeand Guattaripreferto look at what they call 'Kafka politics','Kafka machines' Many interpretationsof Kafka haveconcenand 'Kafka experimentation'. whilst othershave tratedon themesrelatingto religionand psychoanalysis, seenin Kafka'swork the expressionof his own acutehuman suffering:his work becomesa tragiccri d,ecuur.In contrastto this, Deleuzeand Guattari three passionsor intensities:fear, show how the Kafka machinegenerates flight and dismantling.ln TheTrial (1925)it is lessa questionof presenting and unknowablelaw,andmorea questionof an an imageof a transcendental investigationof the functioning of a machine.In contrastto the psychoanalyticalapproach,which reducesKafka's particularly intenseattachment to the world to a neuroticsymptomof his relationshipwith his own father, with writing they showhow Kafka'sinaptitudefor marriageand obsession havepositivelibidinal motiyations.Kafka'sapparentlysolitarynature- his existenceas an unmarriedwriter - shouldnot be viewedas evidenceof a withdrawalinto an ivory tower - but rather one componentof a 'bachelor machine'.This machinehasmultiple connectionswith the socialfield, and allowsthe bachelorto existin a stateof desirethat is muchmoreintensethan categoriesof incestuousor homosexualdesire.Kafka's the psychoanalytic strategyin 'Letter to his Father'is to inflatethe fatherfigureto absurdand comicproportions,so that he coversthe map of the world. The effectis to a linc of flight awayfrom providcr wily out of thc psychoanalytical impasse, iI llcw sct o1'conncctitlns, into wrlrkl: thc thc fhthcrirncl

136

KAFKA,

FRANZ

( r 88: - t g z 4 )

The book on Kafka constitutesDeleuzeand Guattari's most detailed readingof literatureasmachine. They claim that Kafka'swork is a rhizome or a burrow,in which no entranceis more privilegedthan another.They alsoclaim that the Kafka-machine,composedasit is of letters,storiesand novels,movesin the direction of the unlimited rather than the fragmentary.Kafka'sceuvreis completeyet heterogeneous: it is constructedfrom componentsthat do not connectbut are alwaysin communicationwith each other. The Kafka machine is, paradoxically one of continuous contiguity. Such a machinic reading of Kafka is called for by Kafka's own approach, which goes against representation, allegory, symbolism and metaphor. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari show how he works with the componentsof reality: objects,charactersand events.The evolution of Kafka's work is towards a sober 'hyper-realism'that dispenseswith impressionsand imaginings.Ratherthan metaphor,Kafka'shyper-reality constructsan immanentassemblage of metamorphosis,a continuum of reversibleintensities. For Deleuzeand Guattari,Kafka'swork is a'minor'literature par excellence.A minor literature'deterritorialises'language andprovidesan intimate and immediateconnectionbetweenthe individual and the political.It is also a form of literature in which everyrhing is expressedin collective terms and everything takes on a collective value. In short, there is no subjectin a minor literature,only collectiveassemblages of enunciation.In a 'major' literature there are forms of individuated enunciation' that belongto literary masters,and individual concernsabound.Minor literature can afford no such luxuries, since it is born out of necessityin restricted conditions. Since major literature is essentiallyrepresentational in orientation,it movesfrom contentto expression, whereasa minor literatureexpresses itself out of absolutenecessityand only later conceptualises itself. Expression breaks establishedforms and encourages new directions.This commitment to expressionis evidentin Kafka's interest in 'musical' soundsthat escapeany form of signification,composition or song. Deleuzeand Guattari repeatedlyemphasisethe fact that Kafka's solitude giveshim an acutelypolitical,and evenprophetic,vision. Kafka the bachelor-machineperceivesthe 'diabolical powers of the future' Americancapitalism,Sovietbureaucracyand EuropeanFascism- that are knockingon the door of his study.The literary machineenablesthis vision becauseit functionsnot like a mirror of the world, but rather like a watch that is running fast. The tendencyof Kafka's work towardsproliferation opensup a field of immanencethat takeshis socialand politicalanalysisout of thc domainof the actualand into the virrual.

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Connectives Desire Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Intensity Lines of flight Minoritarian Psychoanalysis Rhizome

KANT, TMMANUEL (1724-1804) Alison Ross Immanuel Kant's critical philosophymarks a turning point in modern thought. Kant distinguishesthe 'critical' inquiry he conductsinto reason from the 'fanaticism'that afflicts the 'dogmatic' philosophyof his competiof rationalism- which confuseswhat it is postors.Againstboth the excesses sibleto think with what it is possibleto know- and empiricism,which scuttle the possibility of systematicknowledgealtogether,Kant's self-described Copernicanrevolutionin philosophyfollowsa languageof 'moderation'. Deleuze rejects the self-conceptionof Kantian philosophy on two fronts: first, as his own pantheonof selectedinfluencesin the history of philosophyindicates,his practiceof philosophyunderminesKant's claim to haveconsignedrationalismand empiricismto history; second,he disputes the style of Kant's philosophyin which thinking is guided by the moderatinginfluenceof 'commonsense'.The centraltaskof Kantian philosophy is the 'critique' of the faculties of the subject. For Deleuze, Kantian 'critique' does not extend to the orientating moral valuesof the Kantian philosophy,and it is Friedrich Nietzsche'spursuit of the critique againstmoral idealsthat makeshim, in Deleuze'seyes,the truly critical philosopher.At the same time that Deleuze rejects the false limits that Kant placeson 'critique' he alsoadaptsthe Kantian project of a critique of the facultiesof the subjectfor his own proiectof 'transcendental empiricism'. Kant's importancefor Deleuzecanbe describedin terms of the way he altersKant's languageof the 'faculties'to caterfor the primacy of affect. Deleuze'srevisionof the languageof the 'faculties'callsinto questionthe dualiststructureof Kant's thought accordingto which a iuridical conception of rcasonrcgulatcsthc ficld ofexperience.

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KA N T , T M M AN U E L

( r7 24-

r 8o4)

In Kantian philosophythe subjectoccupiesthe positionof an interface betweennatureand experience. The subiect'scategories of understanding constitutethe organisingstructurefor sensationand form the conditionof possibilityfor experience.Accordingto Kant, the coherenceand form of experienceare the work of the mind rather than the 'givens'of sensible experience. Further,the conditionof possibilityfor thecognitionof objects is the mind's own activity.Hence Kant's famousdictum that'the conditions of the possibilityof experiencein generalare alsothe conditionsof the possibilityof the objectsof experience.'But if Kant viewsexperience as a compoundof the dataof impressionsand what our faculty of knowledgesuppliesitself, he alsoconceivesof the task of philosophyas a critique of the categoriesthat redeem experiencefrom the irreducible particularity of sensibleperceptions.The adjunct of this critique is the revivalof the pursuit of knowledgeoutsideof sensibilityand the field of possibleexperience,critical philosophyaimsto securethe ground of this extensionby its investigationinto the faculty of reason.In stark contrasr, Deleuzeusesthe languageof the facultiesto demolishthe positionof the subjectas the pivot betweennatureand experienceand to overturn philosophy'srole as a court that adjudicateson the proper limits of reason. Instead of a subject with predeterminedfacultiesordering the field of experience,Deleuzeusesthe languageof the facultiesto describea register of affect. The Deleuzian force of affect drives the facultiesconstantly to surpasstheir acceptedlimits. This is a transcendental projectbecause, like Kant, Deleuzethinks that philosophyshouldcreateconceptsthat do not merely trace the 'givens' of sensibleexperience. Although Deleuze's transcendentalempiricism adapts elementsof Kant's thought, specificallyhis conceptionof the faculties,it doesso in order to critique the implacable dualism of Kantian philosophy. Kant's first two critiques establisha division berweenfreedomand the sensible world. In the critique of PureReason,the taskof critical philosophyis to restrainreasonfrom the illusory usethat consistsin confusingwhat it is possibleto think with what may be known accordingto the sensibleconditions of thought (K 1996:8). The risk of sucha confusionof ideasand objectsof possibleexperienceis that a fabrication of reasonmay be confusedfor somethingthat existsin the domainof experience.The critique of PracticalRea'son)onthe other hand,locatesa dangerin the influenceon moral action of circumstance.Here the sensibleworld and the subject's feelingsdo not provide a necessaryorientation for ideas of reason,so much asthreatento leadit astray.Accordingly,the formalismof the moral law guardsthe possibility of a moral acrion in the world of sensibility, clcliningsuch irction:rs r strict adhcrcnccto thc principlcsof rcas
KANr ,

I M M ANUEL

( t lz+- r 8o4)

139

Whether it is reason'stendencyto fanaticism- an error that follows the hubris of limitlessness- or the claim circumstancesmake upon it and constrainit under a falselimitation, critical restraintin either casefollows a juridical model. Kant's textsreinforcethe senseof renunciation- of desiresor of errant speculation- in the recurrent referencesto 'the court of reason'which legislatesthe proper use and safeextensionof reason'sideas.Hence the 'revolution' that proceedsby pleasfor moderation is fought on two fronts: againstthe illusionsof a reason'independentof all experience',aswell as againstthe claim of circumstanceon action.The final work of the critical trilogy, the CritiqueofJudgement,tries to mediatethis split betweenexperienceand freedomthrough the faculty of judgement.It is in this work that Kant's positive influence over Deleuze is strongest.In Deleuze and Guattari'sWhatis Philosophy? they arguethat Kant's final Critique marks a significantdeparturefrom the termsof the first and secondCritiques:the CritiqueofJudgement is'. . . an unrestrainedwork of old agewhich [Kant's] successors havestill not caughtup with: all the mind's facultiesovercome their limits, the very limits that Kant had so carefully laid down in the worksof his prime' (D&G 1994:2). The juridical conceptionof the facultiesand the legislativerole it gives philosophyto establishthe limits of reasonunravels,accordingto Deleuze, in Kant's conceptionof the sublime.It is important to point out that Deleuze'sreadingof Kant's appendixon the sublimeis an idiosyncratic account. Within Kant's thought the sublime is used to confirm the subject'sfacultyof reasonasthat which surpasses any naturalform, and is arguablythe jewelof Kant's metaphysics. Arguing againstKant's attempt to confine the faculties to their proper limits - to their nth power Deleuze'saccountof this appendixarguesthat in the caseof the sublime the facultiesenter into unregulatedrelationsand this is what drives the faculties(seeD 1983,D 1984,and D 1994). Aside from these points of direct influence over Deleuze's project, Kant's position within Deleuze'stopography of philosophersis highly unusual. Deleuze describeshis Kant book as an attempt to know his 'enemy'and this book is the only book that Deleuzedevotesto a thinker who is not part of his pantheon of selectedinfluences.Kant's peculiar position needsto be seenas a consequenceof Deleuze'sdescription of his own proiect as 'transcendentalempiricism'. Deleuze returns to the very rationalist and empiricist thinkers that Kant believedhis critical philosophyhad consignedto the past.Deleuze'sreturn, however,is concluctcdthrough thc Kantian languageof 'faculties'and 'transcendental' thinking.

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Connectives Desire Transcendentalempiricism

KLEE, PAUL (1879-1940)- refer ro the entrieson .art, and ,utopia'.

LACAN, JACqUES (1901-81) Alison Ross JacquesLacan wasa French psychoanalystmost famousfor his structuralist interpretationof Freudian psychoanalysis. Despite his ,structuralist' famehis work canbedividedinto manydifferentphases, includingan early fascinationwith surrealismand the avant-garde,an interestin the 1950s and 1960swith saussurianlinguisticsand srructuralism,aswell ashis late preoccupationwith Borromeanknots and his attemptto mathematisehis ideas.It is only in this final 'phase'that Lacanposesfor the first time the questionof what the hitherto distinct elementsof the system,reallimaginarylsymbolic (RSI) havein common. Deleuze's relationshipwith Lacan is complex. There are placesin Deleuze'soeuvre,suchashis essayon Leopoldvon sacher-Masoch, which demonstrateexperr familiarity with the labyrinthinedetail of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Despite rhis essay'scritique of the Freudiancategoryof 'sado-masochism', Deleuzeuseselementsof Lacanianpsychoanalysis as an operative framework for his own analysisof 'masochism'.similarly, in the two volumes of capitalisrn and,schizophrenia,Lacan is occasionally a target of the authors' anti-psychiatric polemics,but he can alsobe cited as an influenceon their own attempt to liberatedesirefrom its oedipal ordering in classical,Freudianpsychoanalysis. In this respectthe important features of Lacan's thought include his uneven verdicts on the differentlayersof the subject(RSI) and his interestin psychoticspeech. on the other hand,Lacanianpsychoanalysis givesa superbillustration of thc gcncralcomplaintirgainstpsychoanaly sisin Anti-oerlipus,conccrning rhc crrorsrrf'clcsirc. Lacirncxcnrplificsthc 'crror' thrt clcsircis ,lirck'.

LAcAN, JACeuEs (r9or-8t)

l+l

For Lacan desireis the product of the split betweendemandand need. Demandis the alienationof 'need'in language.It is the failureof language (demand)adequatelyto represent'need'that producesan impotentdesire figuredaround'lack'.Although Deleuzeand Guattaricriticise'lack'asone of the errors of desire they applaud the fact that desire is continuous in Lacan, despitecontestingthe way it earnsthis statusonly on accountof its definitionasa 'lack' regulatedby the law of the symbolic. The complexityof Lacan'splacein the thoughtof Deleuzeand Guattari can be describedin relation to the genesisand explanatoryscopeof their conceptof the Body without Organs (BwO). In psychoanalyticdoctrine the developmentof the individual is describedin the normativeterms of a gradual shift awayfrom the polymorphous perversity of the infant's body to the hierarchicalorderingor codingof the body'serogenouszonesin an ascendingscalefrom pathwaysof fore-pleasure(such as kissing)to endpleasure(genital).Accordingto this model,the subjectand its sexualidentity arenot given,but theseemergeby orderingthe drivesthat arein turn regulatedby Oedipal relations.In the paper Lacan wrote on the 'mirror stage',this processis describedas the movementfrom organswithout a clearly defined senseof a body, to the (tenuous and fictional) hold of socio-sexual identity. (organs In contrastto the without a body' that precedesthe processof acquisitionof socio-sexual identity in Lacan,the BwQ a t€rm that Deleuze and Guattari take from Antonin Artaud, is deployedto denaturalisethe processof developmentdefinedby psychoanalysis. Against the codingof the body'spartsaccordingto 'natural' functionsand the conceptionof the organismas a functioning hierarchyof parts on which it depends,this conceptaims to explain and to maximisepossibleconnectionsbetweenthe differentparts of the body and its 'outside'.In particular,the authorsuse this conceptto de-Oedipalisethe descriptionof such connectionsin classical psychoanalysis. Instead of framing breast-feedingin terms of a primary anacliticrelationshipbetweenmother and infant that will needto be brokenby the secondaryidentificationwith the authority of the father, this connectionis describedas an assemblage of desirein which 'mouth' and 'breast'replacethe terms'infant' and 'mother'. Despitethe genesisof this concept in Anti-Oedipusin a polemic against psychoanalysis,a strategicalliancewith aspectsof Lacaniantheorycanbe discernedin their use of this concept. Accordingto Lacanthe infant'sstateof physiologicalfragmentation(the real)is sealedinto an illusory formation of unity in the mirror stage.Here thc child foundsits senseof integratedidentity through a visual percepfragmentation of unity thrrtdividesit from its 'real'stateof physiological 'l'his pcrccption by Lacrrn irs thc tion. of unity, dcsignrrtcd 'imlginary',

t+2

LA MAR C K ,

J EA N -B Ap rrs rE

(r744-t8zg)

establishes the basisof socio-sexual identity asa unity. This unity is paradoxicalhowever,giventhat the agencyof its unity is external.For Lacan, unity only becomesfunctionalwhen the subjectrelinquishesits relation with the (M)Other in order ro occupya placein the symbolicorder as a speakingsubject.The primary senseof unity developedby the subjectin the mirror stage,is dividedin the subjecr'ssecondary identificationwith the Law of the Father.Deleuzeand Guattari disengage the oedipal narrative that regulatesthe organisationof socio-sexual unity in psychoanalysis. Yet in many respectsLacanis an ambiguousresourcefor the hold of the organisedBwo is describedby him asrenuous.It is alsointeresringto norethar Lacan occasionally sideswith the imaginaryfield of connectionsprior to symboliclaw and sometimesemphasises the unsurpassable forceof the real in psychiclife. Thus, despitethe limitationsof his framework,the work of Lacan differs from his precursorsin classicalpsychoanalysis in that he proposesa porousrelationbetweenthe body and its 'outside'. Connectives Desire Freud

LAMARCK, JEAN-BAPTISTE 'creativetransformationt.

LEIBNIZ,

GOTTFRIED

(1744-1829)- refer to the enrry on

WILHELM

VON (1646_1716\

Brett Nicholls Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz is drawn into Deleuze'sengagementwith the history of philosophy with a book length study,TheFrjld: Leibniz and, the Baroque,and he is presentat strategicmomentsin Deleuze,swider thinking. ln The Fold Deleuze reinvigoratesLeibniz's concept of the monad with the notion that the world is 'a pure emissionof singularities' (D 1993a:60).Leibniz insistedin Monad,ology (written 1714,published 1867)that the universeconsistsof discreteentities:monads.Monads are simple substances,indivisible and indestructible. with no windows through which anythingcanpass.The world that we inhabitis constituted by monadsthat convcrgcin serics.And, for I_,eibniz,varying scricsconvcrgciu ir hrrrnoniousunity thrrtis prccstirblishcd by G
LErBNrz) corrFRIED

wILHELM voN (r7 44-t8zg)

143

Existencefor Leibniz and Deleuzebursts forth in its variousforms from one plane of singularities.This plane can be understoodas the inexhaustibleand unknowabletotality of monadsthat provide the substance from which subjectsand objectsin their multifariousmannersemerge'It would not be remiss,however,to saythat Deleuzeseeksto rescueLeibniz asimmaterial.For from idealism.Leibniz ultimatelyconsideredsubstance Deleuzethe 'pure emissionof singularities'is an organicfield of life forces. His interestis in what he callsan'animal monadology'(D 1993a:109),in which the 'animal in me' is lessopposedto the alter ego (as in Edmund Husserlt1859-1938])and rather,an aggregateof vital forces,monads,that areorganisedor folded in variousways. The conceptof the fold, expoundedasit is via Leibniz'sinsistenceupon one substance,enablesDeleuzeto think the order of things in waysnot determinedby dualism.The distinction betweenthe mind and the body, for instance,is producedby a kind of matter that hasthe capacityto fold in upon itself in order to perceive.Matter outsidethe mind doesnot perceive.Enfoldingbringsthe relationof an inner and outer world into being. Unlike the body, the mind is enclosedmatter, an interior that doesnot responddirectlyto the outsideworld. This enclosurecanbe understoodas a form of theatre,one in which thinking, imaginingand reflectingoccur. Deleuzelinks the form of this theatre to baroquearchitecture,art and music,which he admiresas'Fold afterfold'(D 1993a:33). The subject emergesin Deleuze's work upon Leibniz not as an but as a point upon which seriesconattribute of substance,an essence, (pure emissionof singularities'is thus as the universe verge.At one level, reflectedin everyindividual asa virtual predicate,but with a limited point of view (D 1993a:53). An identity emergesin and through the convergenceof a seriesof singularities.This meansthat the subject is determined rather than determining, and for Leibniz, writing within a Christiancosmology,the stabilityof the determinedsubiectis guaranteed by God. This position is outlined in Leibniz's Theodicy(1890).He held of what he callsa 'comthat the subjectis determinedin the convergence law,governedby the the same is by that bound Any series possibleworld'. principle of non-contradiction,belongsto the sameworld. It is not possible,in this view, for Adam to be both a sinner and not a sinner in the sameworld. And while we can imagine other realities' say a world in which Adam is not a sinner,the principle of sufficientreasoneffectively guaranteesthat this and not that is the best possibleworld. Leibniz thus claimedto havearrived at a solution to the problem of evil; other worlds would simply be incompossible. of worlds signalsthe impossibilityof thc co-existence Incompossibility in all of )clcuzc, htlwcvcr, I thrrtdivcrgcfrom thc hw of'non-contrrdiction.

r4+

L 6 v rN A S,

EMMA N U EL

(rgo6-95)

his engagements with Leibniz, goesto work upon this solutionand alters the trajectoryof Leibniz'sthought.He proposesthat incompossibilityis a conditionof compossibility. Ratherthan governedby the metaphysical law of non-contradiction,the world is multiple and the subjectcanbe defined in relation to foldable, polychronic temporalities, where incompossibles and compossiblesco-exist.we might think, therefore,of the divergenceof seriesnot asnegationor oppositionbut aspossibility. This emphasisupon divergenceas possibility is sustainedin Dffirence andRepetition(D 1994:123)whereDeleuzereadsagainstLeibniz'sinsistenceupon compossibilitywith the notion that'basic seriesare divergent' sincethey are (constanrlydisplacedwithin . . . chaos'.rn TheLogicofsense (D 1990:109-17),incompossibilitybecomesthe ground for the overlapping of senseand non-sense.And in Cinema2: The TimeImage(D 1989: 130-l), Leibniz figuresas a thinker who has unwittingly openedup the problemof time and truth. In eachof theseworks,DeleuzedrawsLeibniz into his rejectionof dualismand his critique of the order of things.He is concernedwith pushing Leibniz beyond the limits of the principle of sufficientreasonto affirm that incompossibles belongto the sameworld. Living involves,after Deleuze'sLeibniz, not the relation of truth and falsity but the affirmarion of possibilities,the work of unfoldins and folding compossible and incompossible series. Connectives Fold Force Substance

LEVINAS, EMMANUEL and 'phenomenology'.

(1906-95)- referto rheentrieson ,ontology'

LINES OF FLIGHT Tamsin Lorraine ThroughoutA Thousand Plateaus,Deleuze and Guattaridevelopa vocabulary that emphasises how things connectrather than how they ,are',and tendencics that could evolvein creativemutationsratherthan a 'rcality' thlt is an invcrsion.of'thc pllst.IJc lncl(iuattrriprcf'cr to consiclcrthirrgs

LIN E S

OF

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or multiplicities,focusingon things not as substances, but asassemblages in terms of unfolding forces- bodiesand their powersto affectand be A 'line of flight' is a path of mutation affected- ratherthan staticessences. precipitatedthrough the actualisationof connectionsamong bodiesthat new powersin the werepreviouslyonly implicit (or'virtual') that releases capacitiesof thosebodiesto aq and respond. Every assemblage is territorial in that it sustainsconnectionsthat define is also composedof lines of deterritorialisation it, but everyassemblage that run through it and carry it awayfrom its current form (D&G 1987: in terms of three 503+). Deleuze and Guattari characteriseassemblages kinds of lines that inform their interactionswith the world. There is the 'molar line' that forms a binary, arborescentsystem of segments,the and the line of 'molecularline'that is morefluid althoughstill segmentary, flight that rupturesthe other two lines(D&G 1987:205).While the supple segmentarityof the molecularline operatesby deterritorialisationsthat may permit reterritorialisationsthat turn backinto rigid lines,the line of and the of the assemblage flight can evolveinto creativemetamorphoses it affects.In what they admit is a 'summary' example(since assemblages the threelinesco-existand canchangeinto oneanother),they suggestthat the Roman Empire could be said to exemplify rigid segmentarity;the migrant barbarianswho come and go acrossfrontiers pillaging, but also reterritorialisingby integratingthemselvesinto indigenouscommunities, supplesegmentarity;and the nomadsof the steppeswho escapeall such territorialisationand sow deterritorialisationeverywherethey go,a line of flight (D&G 1987: 222-3). (for example,an assemblage of the book, On the one hand an assemblage assemblage' A Thousand, Plateous,and a reader)is a 'machinic of actions, passionsand bodiesreactingto one another(paper,print, binding, words, feelingsand the turning of pages).On the other hand it is a 'collective assemblage of enunciation',of statementsand incorporealtransformations attributed to bodies(the meaningof the book'swords emergesin a reading assemblage in terms of the implicit presuppositionsextant in the social field concerningpragmaticvariablesin the useof language)(D&G 1987: producevariouseffectsin 88). Both aspectsofthe book-readerassemblage (for example, the assemblage of their engagementwith other assemblages of a reader bookand handripping out pagesto feeda fire or the assemblage pluggedinto aestheticassemblages inspired by the notion of 'becomingimperceptible'to createa work of art). Deleuzeand Guattari deliberately designedA Thousand. Plateausto foster lines of flight in thinking thought-movementsthat would creativelyevolvein connectionwith the producingnew waysof thinklincsof flightof othcr thought-movcmcnts, of what ing rathcr thnn tcrritorirrlisinginto thc rccognisitblc[4r(x)vcs

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'passes'for philosophicalthought. Interpretations,accordingto Deleuze and Guattari,tracealreadyestablished patternsof meaning;mapspursue connectionsor lines of flight not readily perceptibleto the majoritarian subjectsof dominant reality.Deleuzeand Guattari wrote their book as sucha map,hoping to elicit further maps,rather than interpretations,from their readers. Although Deleuzeand Guattari clearly value lines of flight that can connectwith other linesin creativelyproductivewaysthat leadto enlivening transformationsof the social field, they also caution againsttheir dangers.A line of flight can becomeineffectual,lead to regressivetransformations,and evenreconstructhighly rigid segments(D&G 1987:205). And evenif it managesto crossthe wall and getout of the blackhole,it can presentthe dangerof becomingno more than a line of destruction(D&G 1987:229).Deleuzeand Guattari advocateextending lines of flight to rhe point where they bring variablesof machinic assemblages into continuity with assemblages of enunciation,transformingsociallife in the process; but they neverminimisethe risks the pursuit of suchlinesentails. Connectives Deterritorialisation /Reterritorialisation Majoritarian Molar

LINES OF FLIGHT

+ ART + POLITICS

Ad,rian Parr understandingthe politicalpotentialof art hasbeena concernthat goesas far backasthe Middle Agesand Renaissance, wherepoliticaland religious influenceoften definedthe content of art commissionsinscribingpublic space,this beingthe key concernshapingRichardC. Trexler'sPublicLife in Renaissance Florence(1980).During the early twentieth century,Bertolt Brecht,GeorgLuk6s,and Ernst Bloch examinedGermanExpressionism, boldly denouncingthe aestheticisation of politics;this was a debatethat carried enormous influence for both Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin'sexaminationof the industriesof culture and their subsequent critique of bourgeoisculture. In the latter part of the twentieth century Edward Said, and postcolonialtheory in general,insistedin Oriantalism (1978)that the representation of colonisedpeoplcby thcir coloniscrsis inhcrcntlypolitical: rcprcscnting an-
LIN E S

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but on the basisof what the occupyingculture believesis relevantand important.So what might Deleuzecontributeto this longstandingdiscussion concerningthe connectionbetweenpoliticsand art? To begin with, art at its most creativemutatesas it experiments,producing new paradigmsof subjectivity.What this meansis that art has the potentialto createthe conditionswhereinnew connectionsand combinations can be drawn - socially,linguistically,perceptually,economically, conceptuallyand historically.For example,Antonin Artaud, a favouriteof both Deleuzeand Guattari,whoseanimateddrawingsexecutedduring his confinement in a mental institution, captures a senseof physical and psychicexhaustion,an exhaustionthat is intensifiedby the anarchiclanguagehe developsthrough the combinationof colours,words,soundsand forms. Artaud's drawings both document and constitute a processof sensoryoverload,the linesof which strip awaysystemsof signification.In this way we could useDeleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof a 'line of flight' to considerhow Artaud's work prompts us to think,differently,to sense anew and be exposedto affectsin unpredictableways.Hence, by gdnerating new perceptsand affects,art could be describedasan 'affectivesystem' of change. When consideringthe political potential of art, we often look to the way in which certainpracticesareimmanentto the socialfield and the changes theseinvoke.A practice that dismantlesconventionalways of thinking and acting,or one that stimulatesupheavalby looseningup someof the rules and ordersthat organiseindividualsand socialbodiesis inherently political. This prompts two key questionsto bubble to the surface.First, how can politics condition art? Second,and more pertinently,how do we gaugethe politicalforceof art? Art at its most socialexposesthe desiring production that organises space,using desirein its most productive senseto bring to life the affective dimensionof art. To this extent,the linesof flight emanatingout of certain practices,suchasArtaud's,resultnot so much from what an audiencecan seebut more from what they cannotsee.That is to say,the movementof linesbetweenprimary points of subjectivity- curator,critic, client, artist, madmanand spectator- and signification- exotica,erotica, insanity,consumerism,history and value - can locatethe majoritarianlines striating spacein order to extractthe minoritarianforcesimmanentto a particular space.The reality of such art work is qualitativelydifferent from art that 'representsthe real' or eventhe real of 'reality TV', as this kind of art is determinedneitherdialecticallynor purely assymbolicgesture.This is an art practicethat simply makesthe coherencyand rigidity of socialspace lcak.In thc spirit of l)clcuzc and Guattarithc politicsof art cxposcsthe of tlight arc l)lutcu'tls:'l,incs vcry propositionput firrwitrtlin tI 'l'housurul

r48

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realities;they are very dangerousfor societies,althoughthey can get by without them, and sometimesmanageto keepthem to a minimum'(D&G 1987:.204).From this viewpoint, art functions asa line of flight, traversing individual and collectivesubjectivitiesand pushingcentralisedorganisations to the limit; it combinesa varietyof affectsand perceptsin waysthat conjugateone another. In many respectsthe connective,expansiveand deterritorialisingcharacter of lines of flight, when consideredin terms of art, draws our attention to the ethical dimensionof art. Here the questionof ethics in relation to art is primarily takento be a problemof organisation.Art makespossible,it enablesus to broadenour horizonsand understanding,sensitising us to our own affectivedimensionin relationto the world asa whole.It is, therefore, no accident that art often becomesthe primary target once repressionsinksin, usually setting off alarm bells,and warning us that the socialsphereis on the vergeof becomingfascistic. As Deleuzeand Guattari insist in A Thousand, Plateaus,when desire turns repressiveit finds investmentin fascisticsocialorganisations; at this point the activelines of flight indicativeof the political undercurrentsof art aresusceptibleto blockage.This is not to suggestthat art is immune to fascisticinvestment.It, too,canbe turned againstitself;that is whenart is consumedby the blackholethat annihilatesthe innovativeradicalityof art. For example,althoughmanyof the GermanExpressionists wereexemplified asproducersof degenerate art by the GermanNazisin the 1937exhib(in DresdenTown Hall), Luk6s insistedthat ition, Reflections of Decad,ence the artists in question in fact participated in the selfsame irrational impulsesmotivating Nazism. In other words, when positive lines of flight arewithdrawnor usedto prop up the regulativenatureof negativelinesof flight, what we are left with is an ethicaldistinctionformed between'the politics of art' or 'the art of politics'. In effect,then, the politics of art politicalsubjectivitysustainingan impersonal comesfrom how art engages reality that allowspre-individual singularitiesto structure and collectively to orient subjectivity.The politics of art survivesalong the mutative dimensionspositive and creative'lines of flight' expose;it is not fully (yet apparentand still it existsasa to come'.

LINES OF FLIGHT

+ SUICIDE

RosiBraid,otti Thc Dcleuziansubjectis a singularcomplexity, onc that enactsirndrrctu'l'his 'subjcct'simultrncously rrliscsa radicrrlcthics of transf
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rejectsindividualismand the nihilism of self-destruction.In an ecosophical sense,Deleuzethinks of the subjectin terms of a connection,one that takes place between self and others, pushing the subject beyond selfcentredindividualismalsoto includenon-humansor the earth itself. On the issueof suicide,Deleuze is as clear as Baruch Spinoza:the choice for self-destructionis not positive,nor can it be said to be free, becausedeathis the destructionof the conatus- definedas the desireto actualiseone's power of becoming. Self-preservation,in the senseof a desirefor self-expression, constitutesthe subject.A conatuscannotfreely wish its own self-destruction;if it does,this is becausesomephysicalor psychicalcompulsionnegatesthe subject'sfreedom.As connectivityand mutual implicationare the distinguishingfeaturesof an intensiveunderstandingof the subject,dying assuchmeansceasingto partakein this vital flow of life. Hence. the inter-connectednessof entities means that selfpreservationis a commonlysharedconcern. Joining forceswith others so as to enhanceone's enjoymentof life is the key to Deleuzianethics;it is alsothe definition of a joyouslylived life. The greatestethical flaw is to succumbto externalforcesthat diminish one's capacityto endure. From this viewpoint, suicide is an unproductive 'blackhole'. of finitude. Deleuze'sview of deathis far removedfrom the metaphysics Death is neithera matter of absoluteclosure,nor a borderthat definesthe differencebetweenexistingor not existing.Instead,the Deleuziansubjectis producedthrougha multiplicity of connectionsthat unfold in a processof becoming.This affirmativeview of life situatesphilosophicalnomadicismin the logic of positivity,rather than in the redemptiveeconomycommonto classicalmetaphysics. What is more is that this vision of death-as-process, or a Nietzscheanvision of the 'eternalreturn', emergesout of Deleuze's philosophyof time: enduranceand sustainability. Life is the affirmation of radical immanence.What gets affirmed is the ofdesireor the intensityandacceleration ofexistentialspeedcharacteristic potentia. nomadic subjects asserts the positivexpressionof The ethicsof ity of potentiaitself. That is to say,the singularity of the forces that composethe specificspatio-temporalgrid of immanencecomposesone's life. Life is an assemblage, a montage,not a given;it is a set of points in spaceand time; a quilt of retrievedmaterial. Put simply, for Deleuzewhat essence. makesone'slife unique is the life project,not a deep-seated Commentingon the suicidesof Primo Levi andVirginia Woolf,Deleuze - who alsochoseto end his own life - stressedthat life can be affirmedby supprcssingyour own life. This he felt wasespeciallytrue in the caseof failinghcalthor whcn lif'cis spcntin dcgradingsocialconditions,both of which scriouslycripplc orrc'spowcr to itflirnr lnd cnclurclil'c with ioy.

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We do needto exercisesomecautionhere,though,becauseDeleuzeis not proposinga Christian affirmation of life gearedtoward a transcendent enterprise; rather he is suggestinglife is not marked by any signifier or proper noun: Deleuze'svision is of a radicallyimmanentfleshedexistence intensivelylived. Deleuze introduces a fundamental distinction between personal and impersonaldeath.Death is the empty form of time, the perpetualbecoming that canbe actualisedin the presentbut flowsbackto the pastandseeps into the future. The eternalreturn of death is 'virtual' in that it has the generativecapacity to engender the actual. Consequently,death is the ultimate manifestationof the activeprinciple that drivesall living matter, namely the power to expressthe pre-individualor impersonalpower of potentia,.Death is the becoming-imperceptibleof the nomadic subjectand assuchit is part of the cycleof becoming.Yet,deathis still interconnected with the 'outside'and alwayson the frontiersof incorporeality.

MAJORITARIAN Tamsin Lorraine Deleuzeand Guattaridescribea majority asa standardlike 'white-man'or 'adult-male' in comparison to which other quantities can be said to be minoritarian(D&G 1987:291).Human life in a capitalistsocietyoperates on the strataof the organism(variouscorporealsystemsorganisedinto the functioning wholesof biological organisms),'signifiance'(systemsof signifiers and signifieds that interpreters interpret), and subjectification (systemsthat distributesubjectsof enunciationand subjectsof the statement - that is, subjectswho are speakers, and subjectsof what is spoken about). Rather than assumethat the subject is somehowprior to the societyof which it becomesa member,Deleuzeand Guattari take the Foucaultianstancethat collectivesystemsof enunciation(thesecould be comparedto Michel Foucault'sdiscursivesystems,for examplelegal dis(thesecould be comparedto Foucault's course)and machinicassemblages nondiscursivesystems,for examplethe bodies,lay-out and behaviours relatedto the court room) are the condition of the subjectsthey produce. What countsasmcaningfulspeechis dictatednot by an individualsubjcct, but by tlrc svstcmsof 'signifiancc'thtt clctcrnrincwhat nrlkcs scnscin

M AJOR ITAR IAN

t5l

a givensituation.What countsasa recognisable subject(to oneselfaswell as others) is dictated by systemsof subjectificationthat determine a subject'sposition vis-i-vis others. Deleuzeand Guattari insist it is the 'axioms'of capitalistsocietythat constitute majorities (D&G 1987: 469). The axioms of capitalismare primary statementsthat arenot derivablefrom other statementsand which enterinto assemblages of production,circulationand consumption(D&G 1987:461).The functional elementsand relationsof capitalismare less specifiedthanin otherforms of society,allowingthem to be simultaneously realisedin a wide variety of domains(D&G 1987:454).Whether you are the workeror businessman or consumerdependsmoreon the function you are performingand the relationsinto which you enter,than who or what you are. This gives capitalism a peculiar fluidity. Deterritorialising flows canbe masteredthroughthe multiplicationor withdrawalof axioms(in the latter case,very few axiomsregulatethe dominantflows,givingotherflows only a derivativestatus)(D&G 1987:462).The operativestatementsof various regionsof the socialfield (statementsconcerning,for example, schooland the student,the prison and the convict,or the political system and the citizen)constitutethe majoritarianelementsof a denumerableset. The majoritarian standardconstituted through thesestatementsspecifies recognisablepositionson points of the arborescent,mnemonic, molar, structural systemsof territorialisation and reterritorialisationthrough which subjectsare sorted and significationsmake sense(cf. D&G 1987: 295). Systemsof signifianceand subjectificationsort socialmeaningand individual subjectsinto binary categoriesthat remainrelativelystableand render 'minor' fluctuations invisible or derivative.Minorities are defined by the gaps that separatethem from the axiomsconstituting majorities (D&G 1987:469).These gapsfluctuatein keepingwith shifting lines of flight andthe metamorphoses of the assemblages involved.Minorities thus constitute 'fuzzy' sets that are nondenumerable and nonaxiomisable. Deleuzeand Guattaricharacterise suchsetsas'multiplicitiesof escapeand flux'(D&G 1987:470). From the polyvocalsemioticsof the body and its corporealcoordinates, a single substanceof expressionis produced through the subjectionof bodiesto disciplineby the abstractmachineof faciality(a'blackhole/white wall system');the fluxesof the organicstrataare supersededby the strata of signifianceand subjectification(D&G 1987: 18l). The 'white, male, adult, ttrational,ttetc.,in short the averageEuropeantis the tcentral'point by referenceto which binary distributions are organised.All the lines definedby pointsreproducingor resonatingwith the centralpoint arepart of thc arbrlrcsccnt systcmthat constitutes'Man' as ir 'giganticmcmory' (l)&G lt)li7: 293). 'l'hc nrnjoritlrirn strndrrcl is thus this 'irvcnrgc'

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European constituted throughout the social field in its myriad forms through the systemsof signifianceand subjectification of variousdomains. Connectives Arborescentschema Black hole Deterritorialisation Foucault

MARX, KARL (1818-83) Kenneth Surin Karl Marx doesnot receive dealof explicit attention in the writings ^great of Deleuze and Guattari, though it is clear that the Marxist paradigm is a crucial if tacit framework for many of the conceptionsdevelopedin the two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophrenia.Especially significant is Marx's dictum in The Germanld,eology(1932)that 'the nature of individuals dependson the materialconditions determiningtheir production'. Deleuze,of course,interprets this dictum in a distinctive and even 'postMarxist' fashion.The necessityfor this (Deleuzian)reconsrirutionof the Marxist project stemsfrom the crisis of utopia representedby the demise of 'actuallyexistingsocialism',markedin particularby the eventsthat led to the collapseof the SovietUnion in 1989(it should,however,be noted that for Deleuze and Guattari this crisis had its beginningsin 1968). Marxism is depictedby them asa set of axiomsthat governsthe field that is capitalism,and so the crisisof utopia poses,asa matter of urgency,the questionof the complianceof this field with the axiomsthat constitute Marxism. To know that capitalismin its current manifestationis congruent with the Marxist axiomaticresort has to be made to a higher-order principle that, necessarily, is not'Marxist': this metatheoretical specification tells us in virtue of what conditionsand principlesthisfield (capitalism) is governedby this axioma,tic(Marxism). Deleuze and Guattari provide this metatheoreticalelaborationby resorting to a constitutive ontology of power and political practice.This ontology is influencedby Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche,and Henri Bergson more than Marx, which perhapsaccountsfor the chargethat the authorsof Capitalism and,Schizophrenia are'post-Marxist'. Ccntral for the authors of Caltitalismand Schizophrenia is thc dclincirti
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Marx, but the analysisof which had fallen somewhatinto abeyanceas a result of the emphasison the commodity promoted by the Frankfurt Schooland cultural studiesin recentdecades.But Deleuzeand Guattari give this notion a novel twist. First, they eschewdialectics,asa matter of philosophicalexigency.As they seeit, dialecticsis a speciesof the logic of identity which collapses'difference' into the rational 'same', and so inevitablyensuesin a disavowalof multiplicity. Secondly,production is not simply understoodby them in terms of such items as investment, manufacturing,businessstrategies,and so on. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari accordprimacy to 'machinic processes',that is, the modes of organisationthat link attractions,repulsions,expressions,and so on, which affectthe humanbody.For Deleuzeand Guattari the modesof production are thereforeexpressionsof desire,so that it is desirewhich is truly productive;and the modesof production aremerelythe outcomeof generativedesire. Desire has this generativeprimacy this ceaselessly becauseit is desire, which is alwayssocial and collective, that makesthe gun (say)into an instrument of war, or of hunting, or sport, and so forth (asthe casemay be). The mode of production is on the samelevel asany other expressionsof the modesof desire,and so for Deleuze and Guattari there is neither base nor superstructure in society but only stratifications, that is, accumulations or concatenationsof ordered functions which are expressionsof desire.What enableseach mode of production to be createdis a specific amalgam of desires,forces and powers, and the mode (of production) emergesfrom this amalgam.In the process,traditional Marxist conceptions are reversed:it is not the mode that enablesproduction to take place (the gist of these accounts);rather, it is desiring-production itself that makesthe mode what it is. Capitalismand,Schizophreniais this ontology of desiring-production. Marx maintainedthat it is necessaryfor societyand the State to exist beforesurplus value is realisedand capitalcan be accumulated.Deleuze and Guattari alsosaythat it is the Statewhich givescapitalits 'modelsof realisation'.Before anything can be generatedby capital,politics has to exist.The linkagebetweencapitaland politicsis achievedby an apparatus that transcodesa particularspaceof accumulation.This transcodingprovidesa prior realisationor regulatedexpenditureof labourpowerand it is the function of the Stateto organiseits membersinto a particularkind of productiveforce.Today capitalhas reacheda stagebeyond the one prevailingat Marx's time. Capitalis now omnipresent,and links the mosthetcrogeneouselements(commerce,religion, art, and so forth). Productive labour is inscrtcclinto cvery componentof society.But preciselybecause capitrrlis ubiquitous,and hirsa prior socialc<xtpcrrtionas its cnrrbling

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condition, it hasits unavoidablelimits. capital needsthis prior organisation of cooperationin order to succeed,and it followsfrom this that collectivesubjectshavea potential powerthat capitalismitself cannotcapture. The questionof revolutionis thus the questionof finding a politics that will usethis collectivesubjectivitysothat the productiveforceof societyis subjectedto nothing but the desireof its members. Connectives Capitalism Stratification

MARX + ANTONIO NEGRI Alberto Toscano Deleuzeencountered the work of Antonio Negri andthe traditionof Italian workeristMarxism (operaismo) via Guattari,who waspersonallyinvolved with the free radio movemenrand other politicalinitiativesin the Italy of the late 1970s,and who met Negri when rhe latter was invited by Louis Althusser to lecture on Karl Marx's Grundrisseat the Ecole Normale Sup6rieure,in a seriesof lectureslater publishedasMarx Beyond, Marx. During Negri'simprisonmentfor his politicalactivitiesin Italy in rhe'years of lead'(1970s), Deleuzecameto his defencewith a publicletter.It hasbeen Negri's greatmerit to emphasise the persistence of Marxist themesin the writings of Deleuzeand Guattari,and to appropriateand recasta number of their concepts in his own attempt to transform the vocabulary of Marxism in light of new modesof political subjectivity,new regimesof capitalaccumulationand new strategiesof commandand control. whilst Deleuzeand Guattari'sinfluencecanalreadybe felt in Negri's textsof the 1980s,it is most evidentin Empire(with MichaelHardt), wherenotionsof virtuality, deterritorialisationand smooth spacefeatureprominently in the attemptto schematise the changesin the structuresof sovereigntyand the dynamicsof resistance. The influqnceis by no meansunilateral:alreadyin A Thousond' Plateaus,the work of Mario Tronti and Negri's uptakeof it is identified asan important precursorfor an understandingof contemporary capitalismthat acknowledges the paradoxical centralityof 'marginal'forms of subjectivity(students,women,domesticwork, unemployment,and so on). Ratherthan speakingof influences,it might be preferableto consider therelationship of Dcleuze(andGuattari)to Negri in termsof a significant ovcrhpin whrt thc.yrcgardrrsthc kcy problcmsfircingcontcmprlrrrry phikr-

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sophicaland politicalthought.Among the questionsthey sharearethe following:How canwe be faithful to the legacyof Baruch Spinoza?What are the stakesof contemporarymaterialism?How can the thought of Marx be rescuedfrom both structuralismand humanism?In what sensecan contemporarycapitalismbe consideredas both immanentand transcendentl How canwe articulatenewmodelsof subjectivationin light of the critiques of Cartesianand Kantian imagesof the subject? Deleuzeand Negri repeatedlysituatetheir work in terms of a continuation of Spinoza'sontology.Both locatein Spinozaa singularbreakwith the philosophiesof transcendence and legitimation,driven by the constitution of a thoroughgoingimmanentphilosophy.WhereasDeleuze'swritingson Spinozahighlight the mannerin which Spinoza'sthoughtprovides us with a practicaland affirmativeextensionof Duns Scotus'thesisof univocity, Negri's The Sazsage Anomaly (1981), taking into account the Spinoziststudiesof Deleuze,Pierre Machereyand AlexandreMatheron, pointsinsteadto the tensionsopenedup at the heartof Spinoza'sontology by the emergenceof capitalismin seventeenth-century Holland and the formulationof a notion of absolutedemocracy.Though their methodologiesdiverge,Deleuzepreferring a far more internalistreadingto Negri's historical materialist approach,both concur on the need to think the flattening of substanceonto its modes,understoodas centresof force and compositionlaid out on a planeof immanence.It is on the basisof a directly politicalunderstandingof ontologyasinextricablefrom practice(whether as communist revolution or ethology) that Negri and Deleuze wish to extracta materialistlineagein the history of philosophy,one that can be seento combat the attemptsto legislateover the contingencyof being through variousforms of representational thought. In this respect,Negri and Deleuzeconsiderthe critique of transcendence as an eminently political matter, linked to the liberation of forces capableof entering into compositionwithout the aid of supplementary dimensions(for examplesovereignty).Their concurrentattemptsto move with andbeyondMarx in an analysisof contemporarycapitalismandpolitical subjectivity can thus be graspedas passaBes from a transcendentalor dialecticalmode of thought to an immanentor constructivistone. Their rcsearchprogrammesconvergeon the notion of contemporarycapitalasa vcry particularadmixtureof immanenceand transcendence, oneno longer thinkablein terms of a dialecticaltotality.This is encapsulated in Deleuze by the conceptof the axiomaticand in Negri by that of Empire. In both cirscsdialecticalantagonismis transformedinto a figure of conflict that sccsfirrms of subjcctivityirreducibleto the figuresof peopleor citizenry (thrrtis collcctivcirsscmblagcs of cnunciirtion,thc multitude)confronted with it pitritsiticllilgcncytlut scckst() cilpturc,controlrrrclcxpklit thcm.

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It should be noted that Negri's abiding preoccupationwith the Marxian concept of real subsumption and his refashioningof class struggle differentiatehis approachfrom the definitionof capitalismasan axiomatic (which still demandsmodelsof realisation)and of resistancein terms of minority (which seemshostileto norionsof classcomposition).

MATERIALISM John Marks Deleuze'swork is undoubtedlymaterialistin orientation,but this materialism must be consideredin the light of the vitalismand empiricismthat also characterises this work. Deleuzedrawsinspirationfor his materialismfrom a varietyof sources, but BaruchSpinoza,FriedrichNiezsche,Henri Bergson and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz are all extremely important in this respect.Spinozaand Nietzschechallengethe devaluationof the body in favourof consciousness, and in this way proposea materialistreadingof thought.They showthatthoughtshouldno longerbeconstrained by theconsciousness wehaveof it. BergsonandLeibniz- Deleuzeis alsoinfluencedby challengeto the matter-formmodel pur forwardby Gilbert SimondoninfluenceDeleuzein the way he developsa challengeto the hylomorphic model: the metaphysicaldoctrine that distinguishesbetweenmatter and form. In contrastto this, Deleuzeclaimsthat matteris in continuousvariation, so that we shouldnot think in termsof formsasmoulds,but ratherin terms of modulationsthat produce singularities.In A ThousandPlatenus, Deleuze and Guattari talk of destratified and deterritorialised 'marrermovement'and (matter-energy'. FollowingSpinoza,theychallenge the hierarchyof form andmatterby conceiving of animmanent'plane of consistency' on which eyerythingis laid out. The elementsof this planearedistinguishableonly in termsof movementand velocity.Deleuzeand Guattarialsotalk of the planebeingpopulatedby inifinite 'bits' of impalpableandanonymous matterthat enterinto varyingconnections. Deleuze'slater work on Leibniz develops this theme,againemphasising thatmatteris not organised asa series of solidand discreteforms,but ratherinfinitelyfolded. In order to graspthe originalityof Deleuze'smaterialismit is necessary to understandwhat he meanswhen he usesthe terms 'machine' and 'machinic'.In his bookon Michel Foucaulr,he speculates on rhe possibilities for new human forms openedup by the combinationof the forcesof carbonand silicon.However,this statementshouldnot necessarily be read in termsof the humanbody beingsupplemented or alteredby meansof 'l'hc sort of nrlchinc thirt I)clcuzcconccivcs
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abstractphenomenonthat does not depend entirely upon physicaland mechanicalmodificationsof matter.The machineis insteada function of what might be thought of as the 'vital' principle of this planeof consistency,which is that of makingnew connections,and in this way constructing what Deleuze calls 'machines'. Nor should Deleuze's machinic materialismbe seen as a form of cybernetics,accordingto which the organic and the mechanical share a common informational language. The fact that cinemaand painting are capableof actingdirectly upon the nervoussystemmeansthat they function as analogicallanguagesrather than digital codes.In common with the sort of materialismfavouredby cyberneticsand theories of artificial intelligence,Deleuze rejects the notion that there is brain behind the brain: an organisingconsciousness that harnessesand directs the power of the brain. He conceivesof the humanbrain asmerelyone cerebralcrystallisationamongstothers:a cerebral fold in matter. Deleuze's particular formulation of materialism depends upon the counterintuitive Bergsoniannotion that matter is already'image':beforeit is perceivedit is 'luminous' in itself; the brain is itself an image.However,he alsoeschewsthe reductivemolecularmaterialism upon which artificial intelligenceis based.According to such a reductive materialism,all processesand realities can be explainedby reducing them down to the most basic components - atoms and molecules- from which they areconstructed.Again,the fact that he insists that painting and film can act directly upon the nervoussystemto create new neuralpathwaysindicatesthat he is not a reductivematerialist. Ultimately,Deleuzeis unwilling to reduceall matter to a singlestratum of syntax. Computer technologymay well transform the world of the future, but it will not be by meansof the developmentof a computational languagethat is common to the brain and the computer.It will insteadbe the resultof computersexpandingthe possibilitiesfor thought in new and perhapsunpredictableways.In this manner,the brain and the computer will take part in the constructionof an abstractmachine.In his work on cinema,Deleuzedevelopsthe notion of the brain as a fold of the outside or a'screen'.He considers,for example,MichelangeloAntonioni'sfilms to be an explorationof the way in which the brain is connectedto the world, and the necessity of exploring the potential of these connections. Antonioni drawsa contrastbetweenthe worn-out body,weigheddown by and a tcreative'brain,strivingto createconthe pastandmodernneuroses, ncctions with the new world around it, and experiencingthe potential rrmplificationof its powersby 'artificial'brains.For Deleuze,thinking takes pl:rccwhcn thc brain asa stratum comesinto contactwith other strata.In 'andintensiacmaterialsunrmary,| )clcuzc thinks in tcrms <>fan expressiae nriltcriillisnr. isnrirsrrlrlroscdl
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Kenneth Surin For Deleuzeand Guattari,traditionalphilosophyhasalwaysfunctionedon the basisof codesthat haveeffectivelyturned it into a bureaucracyof the consciousness. Traditional philosophyhasneverbeenableto abandonits originsin the codificationsof the despoticimperialState.The taskof philosophynow is to controvertthis traditionalphilosophyin a waythat canbe revolutionary only if the new or next philosophyseeksto 'transmit something that doesnot and will not allowitself to be codified'.This 'transmission' will eschewthe drama of interiority that traditional philosophy had perforce to invest in as a condition of being what it is, and will instead involve the creation of conceptsthat can registerand delineatethe transmissionof forcesto bodies,that is, it will be a physicsof thought, the thinking of a pure exteriority,in the mannerof Deleuze'stwo greatprecursors, Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche,and as such will be irreducibly materialist.For Deleuzeand Guattari,philosophythat hasleft behindthe codificationsof the Statewill be aboutbodiesand forces,and the concepts designedto bring theseto thought.It will thereforehavean essentialrelation to nonphilosophyaswell, sinceit will be rootedin perceptsand affects. This materialismthat is philosophywill bring somerhingto life, it will extricatelife from theplaceswhereit hasbeentrapped,andit will createlines of flight from thesestases. The creationof theselinesof flight constitutes eventsand,asevents,they arequite distantfrom the abstractions that constitute the staplediet of traditionalphilosophy.Deleuzeis emphaticthat abstractions explainnothing,but rather are themselves in needof explanation.So the newphilosophythat will experimentwith the real,will eschew suchabStractions asuniversals, unities,subjects,objects,multiples,and put in their placethe processes that culminatein the productionof the abstractionsin question.Soin placeof universals we haveprocesses of universalisaplace tion; in of subjects and objects we have subjectificationand objectification; in placeof unitieswehaveunification;in placeof themultiplc we havemultiplication;andsoon. Theseprocesses takeplaceon the plancof immanence,sincecxpcrimentationcan only takeplaceimmancntly.In thc cnd ir conccptis only rr singulrrrity ('rrchild', 'a thinkcr','a musiciirn'), irnd

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that constitute philosophy is the task of arranging theseinto assemblages Plateaus multiplicities.Deleuzeoncesaidthat eachplateauof A Thousand, Philosophyis not so much a form of wasan exampleof suchan assemblage. institutedon the planeof immanence. reflectionasa kind of constructionism At the sametime, philosophyis not just a kind of physicalism,insisting on the substantialityof Being,that is setentirelyapartfrom noology,which asan immaterialisminsistson the primacyof thought,and in particularthe image of thought. For Deleuze,the image of thought is a kind of prephilosophy,and thus is inextricablybound up with philosophy.The image of thought operateson the plane of immanence,and constitutesa prephilosophicalpresuppositionthat philosophyhasto satisfy.The imageof thought,evenif it is an immaterialism,is not antitheticalto a strict materialism.The planeof immanencerevealsthe 'unthought' in thought,and its absoluteincompatibilitywith materialismonly comesaboutwhen philosophers forget that thought and the constitutionof matter havethe fundamentalontologicalcharacterof events,and insteadidentify 'matter' with Body,and 'thought' with Mind, in this way saddlingthemselveswith an impassethat cannotbe resolvedbecauseMind and Body are saidto possess mutuallyincompatibleproperties('inert'vs'active','material'vs'spiritual', and so forth). The ontology of events,by contrast,allowsthe material and dynamism.Thus, immaterialto be interrelatedand integratedin a ceaseless the eventof 'a housebeingbuilt' requiresmanymaterialthingsto be given functions (windows let in light, doors protect privacy stairs enableaccess, and so on), and these functions in turn involve (immaterial)concepts (unlessone has the conceptof stairsbeing able to provide accessin this rather than that way,a ladder,lift or hoist could servejust effectivelyas stairsin enablingaccessto an upper floor). So conceptsare returned to materialthings via functions,and things are integratedwith conceptsvia functions,while functions are immaterialbut can only be embodiedin in concepts.All the time a radical thingsevenasthey canonly be expressed immanenceis preserved.For Deleuze the materialismof philosophyis compromisedonly when the immaterialis harnessedto the transcendent: without resortto the transcendent,immaterialismand materialismcan be kept on the sameplane- immanence- and madeto interactproductively.

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object,say,can be re-presentedand re-cognisedas the se,lneone as that experiencedin the past.But such a view ignoresthe fact that today'srecollectionis quite a differentexperiencetemporallyand contextuallyfrom either the original experienceor previousrecollections.To theoriseaway such differencesis to discount the productive potential that Deleuze considersinherentin the operationof memory in favourof tying oneself to the past. Despite proclaiming his lack of enthusiasm for memory as a topic, Deleuzenonetheless reworkedhis conceptionof it severaltimes.In early work on David Hume, Deleuzedealt with how the reproductiveand representationaleffectsof memoryarecritical to the fiction of personalidentity becauseof their role in establishingrelations of resemblanceand causation.In his writings on Henri Bergson,though, and in his own philosophiesof difference,Deleuzemoved beyond such 'habit memory' to theorisehow 'blocksof history' might be brought into productiveassociations with the present,such that the past might be lived anew and differently. Deleuze'sBergsoniantheoriesof consciousness outline two kinds of operation.One is the 'line of materiality',upon which he theorisesrelationshipsbetweenthe mind and the materialworld (including the body). Such activity alwaysoccursin the present,understoodas a purely theoreticaldemarcationbetweenpastand future. On this line, our relationship with matteris wholly materialandunmediated:the world of consciousness is reconciledwith the world of matterby meansof differentkindsof movement. Such activity is alwaysorientedrowardsthe practicallife of action rather than pure knowledge.As such, the form of memory at work is 'habit memory', reflex determination of appropriatebodily responses conditionedby whateverhasprovedusefulin the past,but without'pure recollection'. Being distinct from consciousness,the line of materiality cannot account for the temporality of lived experience.Consequently,Deleuze invokesBergson'stheory of pure memory on a 'line of pure subjectivity'. Bergsonbelievesthat pure memorystoreseveryconsciouseventin its particularity and detail.The perceptionsof acrualexistenceareduplicatedin a virtual existenceas imageswith the potentialfor becomingconscious, actualones.Thus everylived moment is both actualand virtual, with perception on one side and memory on the other; an ever-growingmassof recollections. Taking his lead from Bergson,Deleuze contendsthat the virtual is definedby its potentialfor becomingconscious.Ratherthan merelysimulating the real (as in 'virtual reality' media), the virtual might bc mlclc tctual irnds()hirvcsomcconscqucntncw cffcct.How this potcntirrl

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might be realisedwill be determinedby the precisecircumstancesof its actualisation. As a collectionof purely airtual images,memory hasno psychological existence,being insteada purely ontological'past in general'that is preservedneitherin time nor space.(As such,lossof memoryought not to be conceivedas a lossof 'contents'from pure memory,but merely a breakdown of recall mechanisms.)The virtual imagesare arrangedin various patternsthat might be conceivedas 'planes'or'sheets', with everyplane containing the totality of the experiencedpast distributed relative to some particularvirtual image,the one from which all otherson the planederive their meaningand history. whenthe relevantvirtual Purememorywill be revealedto consciousness imagesare actualised,a matter rarely mentionedin Bergson'stexts but central to Deleuze.Such actualisationis the processof recollectionin which the virtual differentiatesitself by becoming somethingnew - a recalledmemoryimagerelevantto someactionor circumstance- and thus assumingpsychologicalsignificance.Deleuze'senigmatic descriptionof by meansof a 'leap the processhas two parts.First, memory is accessed into the past', enabling the most relevant plane to be located. Second, memory is brought to presenceand givena new'life'or contextin terms of current circumstances.In this moment, psychology interacts with ontologyin the constitutionof the lived present,a specialkind of synthesisthat Deleuzeconsidersto be essentialto the flow of lived time. Two aspectsof Deleuze'sBergsoniantheory of memory are critical to his anti-foundationalism.First, it showsthat one need not conceiveof a transcendentsubject'owning' memory in order for recollectionto occur. Indeed, Deleuze arguesthe opposite:memory helps to give rise to the impressionof a consistentand unifying self.Second,it showsthat memory, ratherthan merelyredrawingthe past,constitutesthe pastasa new present relative to presentinterestsand circumstances.Thus conceived,memory is a creative power for producing the new rather than a mechanismfor reproducingthe same.

Connectives Bergson Virtual/Virtuality

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MICROPOLITICS Kenneth Surin Deleuze and Guattari opposemicropolitics to rhe politics of molarisation. Where the molar (or'arborescent', to use their equivalentterm) designatesstructuresand principlesthat arebasedon rigid stratifications or codingswhich leaveno room for all that is flexibleand contingent,the molecular which is the basis of micropolitics allows for connections that are local and singular.A molecular logic of production is basically self-organisingor auto-poetic,whereasits molar counterpart finds its generating principle in some feature or entity that is external to what is being produced. The necessityof micropolitics for Deleuze and Guattari stemsfrom the current conjuncture of capitalistproduction and accumulation. In this conjuncture,capitalhasbecomethe ever-presentcondition that ensuresthe harmonisationof eventhe most disparateforms (businessand finance,the arts,leisure,and so forth). This is the agethat Deleuzetitles 'the societiesof control' and it contrastswith the disciplinary societiesof the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries.[n this coniuncture, the scopeof labour hasbeen amplified exponentially,ascapital permeatesevery interstice of society:the ubiquity of capital coincides with the expansionof everything capableof creating surplus-value,as human consciousness and all that was hitherto considered(private' is relentlesslyincorporated into the latest structures of accumulation. Capitalism has always had as its 'utopia' the capacity to function without the State and in the current coniuncture this disposition has become more profoundly entrenched. On the other hand, for Deleuze and Guattari this is not becauseState apparatuseshave disappeared (clearly they havenot); rather the rigid demarcationbetweenState and society is no longer tenable.Society and State now constitute one allencompassingreality, and all capital has becomesocial capital. Hence, the generationof socialcooperation,undertakenprimarily by the service and informational industries in the advanced economies, has become a crucial one for capitalism. In a situationof this kind, a molar politics with its emphasison standardisationand homogeneitybecomesincreasinglyirrelevant,as the traditional dividing line between'right' and 'left' in politicsbecomesblurred, and such notions as 'the radical centre' gain credencedespite being patentlyoxymoronic;and as traditional classaffiliationsdissolveand the socialdivisionof labouris radicallyrransformedby theemergencc of information and serviceindustrics.Thc cnablingconditionsof micrupolitics 'l'hc upslrotis thrrtthc orchcstrttion clcrivcfrom this sctilf'dcvclopnlcnts.

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of affectanddesirehasnow becomemuchmoresignificantfor determining linesof affiliationin contemporarypolitics. The orchestrationof desire in micropolitics will have an oscillating logic,asthe desireconstrainedby the ordersofcapital is deterritorialised, so that it becomesa desire exterior to capital, and is then reterritorialised or foldedbackinto the socialfield. When this happensthe liberateddesire integratesinto itself the flows and componentsof the Socius or social field to form a 'desiringmachine'.The heart of micropoliticsis the construction of thesenew desiring machinesas well as the creationof new linkagesbetweendesiring machines:without a politics to facilitatethis constructionthere can be no productivedesire,only the endlessrepetition of the non-different, as what is repeated is regulated by logics of identity, equivalenceand intersubstitutability(this being the underlying logic of the commodity principle as analysedby Karl Marx). In micropolitics the fateof repeatinga differencethat is only an apparentdifference is avoided,and capitalism'snegative,wasteful and ultimately nonproductive repetition, a repetition of nonbeing,is supplantedby the polytopia of a micropolitics that brings together the strata of minorities, becomings,incorporealities,concepts,'peoples',in this way launchinga thought and practice capableof expressingand instantiating a desire to undo the prevailingworld order. Micropolitics, therefore,createsan 'ethos of permanent becomingrevolutionary',an ethosnot constrainedby a politicspredicatedon the now defunct forms of Soviet bureaucraticsocialismand a liberal or social democracy.In this ethos, our criteria of belonging and affiliation will alwaysbe subject to a kind of chaotic motion, and a new political knowledgeis createdwhich dissipatesthe enablinglie told us by thosewho now havepoliticalpower,with their lovefor nation-states, tribes,clans,political parties,churches,and perhapseverythingdone up to now in the nameof community.At the sametime, this ethoswill createnew collectivesolidarities not basedon theseold 'loves'. Connectives Affect Becoming Control society Desire lioucault Molar Molccuhr S
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MINORITARIAN VerenaConley 'Minoritarian' is often used in relation to postcolonial theory and the conceptof minor literature. The term is developedin connectionwith languageand the 'order-word',that is, a pass-wordthat both compelsobedience and opens passages. In this senseDeleuze arguesthat language, because it dealswith the art of the possible,is fundamentallypolitical.The scientific undertaking of extracting constantsis alwayscoupled with the politicalenterpriseof socialcontrol that worksby imposingthem on speakers and transmitting order-words.In order to cope with this condition Deleuzestatesthat we needto distinguishbetweena major and minor language,that is, betweena power (pouaoir)of constants and,a power Qpuissance)of variables.In the political spherewhere a 'maior' languageis seen and heard,there alsoinheresin its form a 'minor' elementthat doesnot exist independentlyor outsideof its expressionand statements. The morea languagehasor acquiresthe characteristics of a major form, the more likely it is to be affectedby continuousvariationsthat can transposeit into a minor language.A languagealwayshas internal minorities. No homogeneoussystemremainsunaffectedby immanent processes of variation.constantsdo not existsideby sidewith variables;theyaredrawn from the variablesthemselves.Major and minor aretwo different usagesof the samelanguage.A minor languageopensa passagein the order-word that constitutesany of the operativeredundanciesof the major language. The problemis not the distinctionbetweenmajor and minor languagebut one of becoming.A person(a subject,but alsoa creativeand activeindividual) has to deterritorialise the major languagerather than reterritorialiseherself within an inherited dialect.Recourseto a minor languageputs the maior languageinto flight. Minoritarian authorsarethosewho areforeignersin their own tongue. A minority is not definedby the paucityof its numbersbut by its capacity to becomeor, in its subjectivegeography,to draw for itself lines of fluctuation that openup a gapand separateit from the axiomconstitutinga redundantmajority.A majorityis linkedto a stateof poweranddomination.what definesmajoritiesandminoritiesarethe relationsinternal to number.For the majority,this relationconstitutesa setthat is denumerable. The minority is nodenumerable,but it may havemany elements.The non-denumerableis characterised by the presenceof connections, that is, the additiveconjunction 'and' or the mathematical sign' * ': a minoritarianlanguage is ,x t y and b f traitsa * a and. . .'. It is producedbetween setsandbclongsto ncithcr. It cludcsthcmrnclcunsritutcs rrlincof flight.In mrthcmatical tcrmsl)clcuzc

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remarksthat the axiomaticworld of the majority manipulatesonly denumerablesets.Minorities,by contrast,constitutenon-axiomatic(or axiomisable)sets,that is, massesor multiplicitiesof escapeand flux. The majority assumesa standardmeasure,representedby the integral integer,say,an armedwhite maleor thoseactinglike one.Domination alwaystranslatesinto hegemony.A determination that differs from the constant is considered minoritarian.Majority is an abstractstandardthat canbe saidto includeno oneandthusspeakin the nameof nobody.A minority is a deviationfrom the modelor a becomingof everybody(toutle monde). The majoritarianmodeis a constantwhile its minoritariancounterpartis a subsystem.Minoritarian is seenaspotential(puissance), creativeand in becoming.Blacks,Jews,Arabsor possiblea becoming,but neverthrough making womencan only createby ownership.Deleuzestatesclearlythat a majorityis nevera becoming. Deleuzeobserves thatour ageis becomingtheageof minorities.Minorities aredefinednot by numberbut by becomingand by their lines of fluctuation. Minorities areobjectivelydefinablestates.One canalsothink of them asseeds of becomingwhosevalueis to trigger uncontrollablefluctuationsand deterritorialisations.A minor languageis a major languagein the processof becoming minoq and a minority a majority in the processof change. Becoming asDeleuzestatestime and againin his work on politics,literature and the arts, is creation.It is the becomingof everybody.In the processof becomingminor,the figureof death(nobody)giveswayto life (everybody). Connectives Becoming Deterritorialisation Maioritarian Order-word Power

MINORITARIAN + CINEMA Constantine Verezsis ln Cinerna2: Thetirne-image, Deleuzeinvokeshis writing (with Guattari) on Franz Kafka and minor literatures to describea 'minor cinema'firundedin the Third World and its minorities - that connectsimmediirtclyto the qucstionof politics.Sucha (modern)politicalcinemais charrctcriscd(rnd oppuscdto clirssicirl cincma)in thrcc wirys.First, a min
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people,but rather anticipatesa peopleyet to be created,a consciousness to be brought into existence.Second,a minor cinemadoesnot maintain a boundary betweenthe private and the public, but rather crossesborders, merging the personalwith the social to make it immediately political. And third, recognisingthat the people exist only in the condition of a minority, political cinemadoesnot identify a new union (a singularity), but rather creates(and recreates)a multiplicity of conditions.Deleuze describesthis minor cinemaasone that setsout, not to representthe conditions of an oppressedminority, but rather to invent new valuesand facilitatethe creationof a peoplewho havehitherto been missing.Like Kafka's minor literature,a minor cinemais interestedneither in representationor interpretation,but in experimentation:it is a creativeact of becoming. Deleuzerelateshis accountof minoritariancinemato the work of Third World filmmakers (Lino Brocka, Glauber Rocha, Chahine Nasserism) and in doing so implicitly recallsthe notion of 'Third Cinema',advanced by Latin Americanfilmmakersin the late 1960s.In their founding manifesto - Towardsa Third Cinema- Fernando Solanasand Octavio Getino calledfor a cinemathat wasmilitant in its politicsand experimentalin its approach.The manifestodescribed'First Cinema'- the so-calledimperial cinema of big capital - as an objective and representationalcinema. 'SecondCinema' - the authorialcinemaof the petty bourgeoisie- was describedas a subjectiveand symbolic cinema. By contrasr, 'Third Cinema'- a politicalor minoritariancinema- wasan attitude,one concerned neither with representation(a being-whole)nor subjectification (a being-one),but with life-experimentation - the creationand exhibition of localdifference.In later writing, Solanasexplainedthat Third Cinema, though initially adaptedto conditionsprevailingin Latin America,could not be limited to that continent;nor evento the Third World, nor evento a particularcategoryof cultural objects,but rather constituteda kind of virtual geographyand conditionalobiecthood.For Solanas,Third Cinema (as opposedto Third World cinema) was broadly concernedwith the expressionof new culturesand of socialchange:Third Cinemais ,anopen category,unfinished,and incomplete'. Third Cinema- minor cinema- is a researchcategoryone that recognisesthe contingencyand multiplicity - the hybridity - of all cultural objects.Paul Willemen, in 'The Third Cinema Q3restion',explainsthat practitionersof rhird cinema refusedro opposeessentialistnotions of 'national identity and cultural authenticity' to the values of imperial powers,but rather recognisedthe multiplicity or 'many-layeredness of their own cultural-historicalfrrrmarions'.That is, a minor cincma (a nrrtionalcincml) is not singulirr,but shtpcclby complcxrrnclnrultiplc

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betweenlocaland internationalforcesand condiconnectionsestablished tions. A film such as Tran Anh Hung's Cyclo (France-Vietnam,1995) understandsthis type of approach.On the one hand, the local (or intraof Cyclais evidentin its useof variousregional national)multi-layeredness of the film's title and his sisterspeak for instance, the cyclo-driver dialects: in the vernacularof the North and of the South of Vietnam.On the other hand,the hybridisationof global(or international)forcesis evidentin the film's useof music(Tranh Lam, Radiohead,RollinsBand) and its expressive vocabulary,one that drawsupon influencesas diverseas TheBicycle Thid(Yittorio De Sica, 1948), Taxi Drizser(Martin Scorsese,1976), and Himatsuri(Mitsuo Yanagimatchi,1985). As in the minor useof language,minoritariancinemaceasesto be representationaland moves instead towards its limits. This is evident in Cyclo,where the beginning of the film, situated in the streetsof neorealism,and in the daily toil and routine of a cyclo driver, soon takesthe viewer- through its wayward and itinerant movements- in unpredictable and evendangerousdirections.The focusof this movementis on becoming, on relations,on what happensbetween:betweenactions,between affections,betweenperceptions.For Deleuze,a minor cinemais situated in a logic and an aestheticsof the 'and'. It is a creativestammering(and . . . and . . . and), a minoritarian use of languagethat the FrenchVietnameseTran would sharewith Deleuze'sfavouredexamples(Kafta, SamuelBeckett,Jean-LucGodard). Cyclocanbeapproachedasa kind of living reality,a type of creativeunderstandingbetweencolours,between people,betweencinemas- betweenthe red (of the poet) end.the blue (of the cyclo) ond,the yellow (of the fish-boy); betweenthe First, and the Second.and the Third.

MINORITARIAN

+ LITERATURE

Ronald,Bogue In a l9l2 diary entry, Kafta reflectson the advantagesCzech and Yiddish writers enioy as contributorsto minor literatures,in which no towering figuresdominateand the life of lettersis consumedwith collectivesocialand politicalconcerns.Deleuzeand Guattariarguethat Kafka'scharacterisation of minor literaturesactuallymapsKafka's own conceptionof literature's properfunctionand guideshis practiceasa PragueJew writing in German. 'l'hc csscnccof Kafka'sminor literatureDeleuzeand Guattarifind in three of langulgc,thc conncctionof thc individf'caturcs: 'thc clctcrritorillizittion ol'ctttnciation' p
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(D&G 1986:l8). Kafka discoversin PragueGerman the instabilitiesof a deracinatedgovernmentlanguagesubtlydeformedthroughCzechusage, and in his writings he further destabilisesthat alreadydeterritorialised German in an asceticimpoverishmentof diction and syntax.Throughout his storiesand novelsKafta directly links psychologicaland family conflicts to extendedsocialand political relations.And though he necessarilywrites asa solitaryindividual,he treatslanguageasa collectiveassemblage of enunciationandtherebyattemptsto articulatethe voiceof a peopleto come(since a positive,functioningcollectivityis preciselywhat Kafka findslacking). In the conceptof minor literature Deleuzeand Guattari connectthe political strugglesof minoritiesto the formal experimentations typical of the modernist avant-garde.What makespossiblethis rapprochementof politics and formal innovation is Deleuzeand Guattari's view of language asa modeof actionin continuousvariation.Everylanguageimposespower relationsthrough its grammaticaland syntacticregularities,its lexicaland semanticcodes,yet thoserelationsare inherently unstable,for linguistic constantsand invariantsare merely enforcedrestrictionsof speech-acts that in fact are in perpetualvariation.A major usageof a languagelimits, organises, controlsand regulateslinguisticmaterialsin supportof a dominant socialorder,whereasa minor usageof a languageinducesdisequilibrium in its components,taking advantageof the potentialfor diverseand divergentdiscursivepracticesalreadypresentwithin the language. A minor literature,then, is not necessarily one written in the language of an oppressedminority,andit is not exclusivelythe literatureof a minority engagedin the deformationof the languageof a majority.Every language,whetherdominant or marginalised,is open to a major or a minor usage,and whateverits linguistic medium, minor literature is defined by a minor treatment of the variablesof language.Nor is minor literature simply literaturewritten by minorities.What constitutesminoritiesis not their statisticalnumber,which may in actualitybe greaterthan that of the majority,but their positionwithin asymmetricalpower relationshipsthat are reinforcedby and implementedthrough linguistic codesand binary oppositions.Western white male adult humans may be outnumbered worldwide, but they remain the majority through their position of privilege, and that privilege informs the linguistic oppositionsthat define, situateand help control non-westernand non-whitepopulations,women, childrenandnon-humanlife forms.Minorities merelyreinforcedominant powerrelationswhen they acceptthe categories that definethem. Only by undoing such oppositions as western/non-western,white/non-white, male/female,adult/child, or human/animalcanminoritieschangcpower relations. Only by becoming'other', by passing betweenthc polcsof binary oppositionsanclhlurring clcirrcirtcgorics crrnncw possibiliticsfilr social

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interaction be created.Such a processof becomingother is central to minor literatureand its minor usageof languageand this minor becoming otheris that which turns a dominatedminority into an activeforceof transformation. Hence, minor literature is less a product than a processof becomingminor, through which languageis deterritorialisedimmediately of enunsocialand political issuesareengaged,and a collectiveassemblage ciationmakespossiblethe inventionof a peopleto come.

MINORITARIAN

+ MUSIC

Marcel Spibod.a African-Americanand Afro-Caribbeancultures, under certain circumtminort culture, and in both casesthere stances,constituteinstancesof have been a substantialnumber of cultural formations that one could describeasbeing'minoritarian'.Among theseone might number the folP-funk, lowing:bhes, jazz(traditional,be-bop,electric,free,avant-garde), techno,hiphop, all largely developedaspart of African-American culture; and ska, roots, reggae and dub, all largely developed as part of AfroCaribbeanculture. They constitute instancesof minor culture 'under their historicaldevelopmentis complexand certaincircumstances'because one cannot locate every developmentexclusivelywithin minoritarian instances.Sometimesthe creativeand transformativepotential of these formationsgivesway to the pressuresof capitalismor of appropriationas part of the dominant(usuallywhite) cultural formations,pressureswhich often collectivelyconspireto exploit or limit this potential.To the extent that any of thesecultural developmentscan be said to constitute instances of the 'minor', it is largelyowing to the followingreasons. Where it is a questionof language,the variousmusicaldevelopments listed aboveare subjectto linguistic mediationas part of a languagethat reinforcesdominant culture. In each and every case,this languageis English.In order to developa minor useof this language,minor cultural formations, such as those of Black America, the Caribbean or South London, haveall had to find waysof altering or recombiningelementsfrom the dominant languagein order to render them sonorous,as a meansto foregroundingtheir transformativepotential.That is to saythat minor cultural formationshavehad to deterritorialisethe English language.This indeed is the first characteristicof a minor cultural formation. For cxamplc,considerthe work of the African-Americanwriter-activistAmiri l']arakaand his nsc of thc English language.His writing distorts and cxposcstlrc nrlrnrntivc,cxpklitirtivcopcrltionsot'thc donrinitntlangttitgc

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throughthe wayin which he recombinesits elements,structuredaccording to an aestheticderivedfrom jazzmusic.Alternatively,considerthe work of the Jamaican-Britishdub poet, Linton Kwesi Johnson,combining elements from JamaicanCreoleand British English in the productionof an oral poetry performedover dub music.When written, his poetry deploys portmanteaucombinationsof wordsor partsof wordsin order to politicise the language. In both theseinstances, the majoritarian,dominantuseof the Englishlanguageis renderedminor in relationto the musicsof the writers' respectiveculturalmilieus,and in eachcasethe languagebecomesmusical, or sonorous in its expressions.Consider the title of Linton Kwesi Fren (Linton Kwesi Johirson, Mi Johnson's poem Mi Reztalueshanary Repalueshanary Fren: Selected, Poems),written as it is performed with the word 'revolutionary'phoneticallyrenderedin Creole-Englishas'revalueshanary'and therebyconnotingnot only revolution,but alsore-evaluation. The manipulation of the relation between the sound,of the word and its written inscription is purposely developedto challengethe alienation of ethnic groupsasembodiedin a dominant language,and to addressthe specific concerns of these groups in ways that provoke or challenge the oppressionexpressedin the language'sdominating operations.This is minor culture'spoliticalfunction. The third and final criterion for assessinghow thesemusically-derived or orientedcultural formationsbecomeminor is the extent to which they movebeyondthe positionsof individual subjectsor personstowardscollectiveutteranceor enunciation.In order to examinethis aspect,it is necessaryto recall that - for Deleuzeand Guattari - enunciationfunctions collectivelyin relationto a machinicassemblage of bodies,both humanand non-human,for examplegeologicalor technologicalbodies.What all these differentbodieshavein commonis that they operatethrough the inscription of surfaces:the layersof rock beneaththe surfaceof the earth, the skin and its markings,the striation of the muscles,or the groovesof a record. . . Considerearlyhiphop culture or 'wildstyle',and its characteristics such as 'bombing' (graffiti) or the isolation of a musical passage ('break'or 'breakdown')by scratchingvinyl records,or eventhe bodiesof breakdancers whosemovesare only legiblein relation to the surfaceson which they dance.Theseinscriptionsand their interactingsurfacesat least partiallyconstitutethe machinicassemblage of earlyhiphop.To the extent that thesebodiesproduceutterancesor enunciationsit is via the MC whose rappin' skillsostensiblymark her out asan individual,and yet their function remainscompletelytied into the hiphop collectiae, comprisingall thc other aspectsof the hiphop assemblage. Furthermore, rappin' providcs anotherinstanccof r stratcgicor minor dcploymcnt
MOLA R

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MOLAR Tom Conley The adjective'molar' belongsto a chemicalidiolect that Deleuzeusesto inform his work on aestheticsand politics.In a strict sensethings molar of matter and not to either their molecularor atomic relateto aggregates properties,or their motion. In a geologicalsense,'molar' is understoodto It also be what pertainsto mass,ground, continenceor telluric substance. pertainsto the generalpatternsofbehaviourtakenby an organor anorganism, and thus the term can describea trait of personalityor the character of the ego.Deleuzetendsto jettisonthe psychologicalinflectionsin order to correlatemolarity with his differentwaysof describingthe world; this is especiallythe casein his treatmentof 'wholes' (Tout and touts)thathe describesas being composedof a compact and firm terrestrial oceanic mass.A molar form caneitherriseup and commanda greatdealof earthly spaceor be seeneither afloat or drifting in great bodies of water (a point developedin a very early pieceof writing called'Causesand Reasonsof the DesertIsland'). Broadeningthe biologicaldefinitions to include philosophy,geologyand aesthetics,Deleuze conceiveslandscapesas massesof greater or lesser molarity. He draws Lucretian and pre-Socratic philosophy through the human sciencesand into an aesthetic domain such that he can detect difference,vibration, disaggregation,deterritorialisationand metamorphosisin terms of molecularactivitiestaking place in and about molar in its range from masses.The term assistshim in studying Perceqtion 'macro' or totalisingprocessto 'micro' or keendetectionof infinitesimal differencesin the physicaland biologicalworld. In his work on cinema,the dyad of molar/molecularis usedto discern effectsof convectionand atmosphere.When contrastingthe four great schoolsof montage- American,French, German, Soviet- that grew in the first thirty yearsof cinema,he notesthat the signatureof poeticrealism in directors ranging from Ren6 Clair to Jean Vigo and Jean Renoir is markedby emphasisingthe 'molar' (and not moral) aspectof the physical world: social contradiction is conveyedthrough imposing and massive monumentsof Paristhat humblethe lost citizensin TheCrazyRay Q924); in Vigo's L'Atalante (1934)the cobblestonestreetson the edgesof the Scine makeobdurateand unyielding stonethe antithesisof fluidity; the incrt piles of old editions and lithographs cluttering the walls in the b<xrkscllcr's apartmentin BouduSuaed.fiomDrortning(1932)attestto a nrolirrityrtgitinstarrclwith whiclr irtrnosphcrc- firg,clrizzlc,mist - clcfincs r gcrrcritl tttrxxlor stiltcot thingsirr thc tintcof'thc(ircat l)cprcssion.

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ln A Thousand, PlateausDeleuzeand Guattari apply the 'molar' and 'molecular'to political bodies.Molar entiriesbelong to the State or the civic world. They are well defined,often massive,and are affiliatedwith a governingapparatus.Their molecularcounterpartsare micro-entities, politicsthat transpirein areaswherethey arerarelyperceived:in the perceptionof affectivity,wherebeingsshareineffablesensations; in the twists and turns of conversationhavingnothing to do with the stateof the world atlarge; in the manner,too, that a pedestrianin a city park seeshow the leavesof a linden tree might flicker in the afternoon light. The shifting to and from molar and molecularforms canbe associatednot only with deterritorialisationbut alsothe very substance andeffectof eoentsthatbeginand end with swarmsand massesof micro-perceptions. Moleculesoften aggregate and swarminto activemasses of molar aspect and viceversa.In TheFoldDeleuzesuggeststhateaents) the very productof philosophyand determiningfeaturesof perception,dependon the prehension of the texturesof elementsin termsof their wholesand the partsthat swirl and toss within them or on their very surfaces.The processentails graspinga 'chaosmos'that becomesdiscerniblethrough the categoriesof the molar andmolecular.Deleuzeis in turn enabledto study matterasa function of mass,hardness, andof 'coherence, cohesion'(D 1993a:6). He projectsthe distinction onto the body in sofar asit canbe appreciatedin its elasticityand fluidity. Thus, with the 'molar' the philosophercorrelatessurfaceswith structures,masses with territories,and vibrationsor waveswith landscapes. Connectives Body Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Event Molecular

MOLECULAR Tom Conlejr Deleuzepairsthe adjective'molecular' with'molar'. Informedby atomistic philosophy and biology that runs from Lucretius to Gabriel Tarde, Deleuzestudiesobjectsnot asthey seemto be beforethe nakedeyebut as dynamic massesof molecules.The chemicaldefinition is broadenedto include subjectivity.In a psychoanalytical sensemolecularityrclnrcsto (rs opp
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behaviour.Henceanyperceivedobject,organicor inorganic,hasa life of its own and is felt through the tensionof its moral massand molecularparts and pieces.Deleuze uses molecularity to counter the orthogonal and massivepensive- seeminglyheavyand unwieldy - systemof Cartesian philosophyto arrive, by way of Leibniz, at a sensibilitytouching on the chemicalanimismof all things,'the actionof fire,thoseof watersand winds on the earth,'in varioussystems'of complexinteractions'(D 1993a:9). Molecular action becomesa vital element in what Deleuze uses to describethe processes of things and of creation.At a decisivemoment in his presentationof Bergson'stheseson movementin relation to cinema, Deleuze uses molecularity to illustrate how wholes (worlds or spatial aggregates) arerelatedto duration.When a teaspoonof sugaris dissolved glass in a of waterthe 'whole' is not the containerand its contentsbut the actionof creationtaking placein the ionisationof the moleculesof sugar, a sort of 'pure ceaseless becomingwhich passesthrough states'(D 1986: 10). Molecularity goes with the perception of wholes (such as molar masses) that areopenand dispersethemselvesin a continuumof duration. Surelythe most compellingcorrelativeto the Bergsonianthesis,not mentioned in either of the books on cinema, is the sequencein Jean-Luc Godard's2 or 3 ThingsI Knop AboutHer (1965),a film in which a man in a Parisiancaf6,in the midst of the clatter of porcelainand glassesstriking the zinc surfaceof the bar in the background,contemplatesa cup of coffee. He dropsa cubeof sugarinto the brown liquid, stirsit with a teaspoon,and watches.In an extremeclose-upgalaxiesseemto grow from the swirl of bubblesjust as Godard'sown voice-offspeaksin the name of the man's thoughtsabout the end of the world and time. Beforea puff of cigarette smokewaftsoverthe cup,an endlessmomentof pure duration is felt in the sight of a cosmosbecomingmolecular. The molecularsensibilityis found in Deleuze'sappreciationof microscopicthings,in the tiny perceptionsor inclinationsthat destabiliseperception asa whole.They function,he says,to'pulverize the world' and,in the sameblow,'to spiritualizedust' (D 1993a:87).The microscopicperspective arerent throughby molarand hasa politicaldimensionaswell. All societies molecularsegmentarities. They areinterrelatedto the degreethat all action is conceivablypolitical if politics are understoodto be of both molar and superstructure, doesnot dismolecularorders.The former,a governmental allow the presenceof the latter, 'a whole world of unconsciousmicropercepts,unconsciousaffects,rarefieddivisions'that operatedifferentlyfrom civic and politicalarenas.Molecularityis tied to a 'micropolitics'of perception, affcct,and evenerrantconversation(D&G 1987:220). 'l'hc molcculirrcnrblcsDelcuzeto movc from philosophyof relation(or of bcing,anclthcn on to dclicittc difl'crcnccrnd rcpctition)to chcnristrics

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issuesof perceptionin cinema,music, literatureand painting.As in the dyad of the 'root' and the 'rhizome', that of molar and molecularforms bearsno privilegedterm. In Deleuze'sreadingof subjectivationand predication in Leibniz. both terms arein and of eachother. Each is usedheuristically to test and to determine sensarionbeyond and within the limits of perception and cognition. The molecular atteststo a creative processat work in Deleuze'sconcepts,and it alsoindicatesthe mannerin which he usesconceptsin the contextofphilosophy,scienceand aesthetics. Connectives Deterritorialisation/ Reterritorialisation Leibniz Molar Rhizome Sensation

MOVEMENT-IMAGE Tom Conlejt The mooement-image is the title of the first panelof a historicaldiptych, CinemaI andCinema2,that classifies modesof perceptionand production of film from its beginningsin 1895up to 1985.In this work and irs complement,The Timelrnage,Deleuzeusescinemato showhow philosophyis not constrainedto a canonor an academicworld but to life at large.Cinema is a surface on which viewers reflect their thinking, and in itself it is a mediumor a machinethat thinkswith autonomywith respectto its viewers and creators.The movement-imagedefinesand describesthe quality of cinematicimagesthat prevailin the mediumoverits first fifty years.From 1895to 1945cinemabecamethe seventhart by embodyingimagesnot in movement but as movement.Motion was at that time the essenceof cinema. By way of Henri Bergson Deleuze shows that cinema does not furnish the spectator with 'an image to which it adds movement', but rather, 'it immediatelygivesus a movement-image'(D 1986:2). A cut betweentwo shotsis part of the image,and thus a temporalgapthat allows the eye to perceivean effectof movement.The latter is gainedby a successionnot of staticphotographicposesbut of instantsof any kind whatsoever'(D1986:7-8), thatis,of instantsequidistant from oneanother. Thc cvcnt of thc moving imagethus owcsto a 'distributionof thc pointsof' il sl)ilccrlr 0f'thc nrr)t'ncnts
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space'(D 1986:7-8). The two componentsof the movement-imageare partsor objects,and in what expresses the found in what happensbetween duration of a wholeor a sum, that which might be indeedthe world in the field of the image. The cinema most characteristicof the movement-imageis based on action and its intervals.It is seenin the comediesof Charlie Chaplin and BusterKeaton,to be sure,but alsoin the molecularagitationof wind, dust or smokein the films of Louis Lumidre. Movement-imagestend to attach to the sensori-motorreflexesof the viewer who is drawn to them. The movement-imageis made of momentsin a given whole, such as a single it canbe felt in the panoramicor trackingshots shotor aplan-siquence,and that confer motion upon the field of the image. At a crucial point in his treatment Deleuze delineatesand redefines three kinds of movement-images that renew and energisethe traditional lexiconof cinema.The 'action-image',generallya medium shotor a plan amiricain, organises and distributes movement in space and time. Characterisedby a hold-up or a heist, it abounds in film noir. The often a long shot and a long take,conveysa 'dramaof 'perception-image', the visibleand invisible'within the stagingof action.The spectatorperceivesthe origins and limits of visibility in imagesthat are common to the classicalwestern.The'affection-image'isbest seenin close-upsin which facestend to occupythe greaterareaof the screen.Eachof thesetypesof movement-imageconstitutes'a point of view on the Whole of the film, a way of graspingthis whole,which becomesaffectivein the close-up,active in the medium shot, and perceptivein the long shot' (D 1986:70). Other typesof imagesthat he takesup - the memory-image,the mental-image, the relation-image- derive from thesethree principal categories. The movement-imagereachesthe end of its tenure at the time of World War II, concludesDeleuze,for five reasons.It no longerrefersto a totalising or syntheticsituation,but a dispersiveone.Charactersbeginto multiply and becomeinterchangeable. It losesits definition as either action, affectionor perceptionwhen it cannotbe affiliatedwith a genre.An art of wandering- the cameraseemsto moveon its own - replacesthe storyline, and plots becomesaturatedwith clich6s.Finally, narrativesare driven by a needto denounceconspiracy.Realityitself becomes'lacunary and dispersive'.At this point, generallyat the end of World War II, the time-image beginsto mark cinema.Yet, asin most of Deleuze'sdyads,the one term is alwaysa function of the other that is tied to it. Movement-imagestend to be the substanceof narrative cinema while time-imagesare especially cvidentin cxpcrimentalfilm. A studyof genresand stylescouldbe based on thc rchtion of'movcmcnt:rncltimc and thc typesof imagcsthat define thcir trrritsanclqualitics.

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Connectives Cinema Faciality Time-image

MULTIPLICITY Jonathan Roffe 'Multiplicity' is arguablyDeleuze'smost important concept.It is found throughouthis work, and is the basisfor other important conceptssuchas rhizome,assemblage, and 'concept'itself. It is alsoone of Deleuze'smost difficult conceptsto graspbecauseof the many different waysand contexts in which he puts it to work. Yet,therearesomeessentialtraits to be noted. A multiplicity is, in the most basicsense,a complexstructurethat does not referencea prior unity. Multiplicities are not parts of a greaterwhole that havebeenfragmented,andthey cannotbeconsideredmanifoldexpressionsof a singleconceptor transcendent unity.On thesegrounds,Deleuze opposesthe dyadOne/Many,in all of its forms,with multiplicity.Further, he insiststhat the crucialpoint is to considermultiplicity in its substantive form - a multiplicity - ratherthan asan adjective- asmultipliciry of something. Everythingfor Deleuzeis a multiplicity in this fashion. The two peoplewhom Deleuzeregularlyassociates with the development of the conceptof multiplicity arethe mathematicianGeorgRiemann,and the French philosopherHenri Bergson.From Riemann,Deleuzetakesthe idea that any situationis composedof different multiplicities that form a kind of patchworkor ensemblewithout becominga totality or whole.For example, a houseis a patchworkofconcretestructuresand habits.Eventhoughwe can list thesethings, there is finally no way of determining what the essenceof a particular houseis, becausewe cannot point to anything outside of the houseitself to explainor to sumit up - it is simply a patchwork.This canalso be takenasa gooddescriptionof multiplicities themselves. Deleuze'sdebt to Bergsonhere is more profound. It is in Bergson'ism (1966)that Deleuzefirst discussesmultiplicity, which receivesan exrended elaborationin Bergson'sphilosophy.Deleuzenotesfirst of all that thereare two kinds of multiplicity in Bergson:extensivenumericalmultiplicities and continuousintensivemultiplicities.The first of thesecharacterises spacefor Bergson;and the second,time. The differencebetweenextensive and intensiveis perhapsthe most important point here. In contrast to spacc,whichcanbedividedup into pnrts(thisis why it is callednumerical),

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intensivemultiplicity cannotbe dividedup without changingin nature.In other words,anyalterationto an intensivemultiplicity meansa total change in its nature- a changein its intensivestate.This is important for Deleuze of particularmultiplicitieswhich becauseit meansthat thereis no essence can remain unaffectedby encounterswith others. Deleuze also makes the important link betweenthe concept of the virtual and that of multiplicity in the context of his readingof Bergson, and it is in connectionwith the themeof virtual intensivemultiplicity that Deleuzemost palpablyremainsa Bergsonian.Frequentlywhen discussing the virtual, DeleuzequotesMarcel Proust'sadagein relation to memory: 'Real without being actual,ideal without being abstract'.Virtual multiplicity,then, is realwithout beingnecessarily embodiedin the world. And, rather than expressingabstractalternativepossibilities,virtual multiplicity forms somethinglike the real opennessto changethat inheresin every particularsituation. This is perhapsthe most difficult point to graspin Deleuze'sdoctrineof virtual multiplicities.While virtual multiplicitiesareembodiedin particular statesof affairs,they must not be consideredto be somehowtranscendent or essentiallyimmutable. As Deleuze shows in his discussionof Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz in Dffirence and,Repetitioa,the virtual and the actualare interrelated,and effectchangesin eachother. So, while the virtual is embodiedin actualsituations,the changesin actualsituationsalso effectchangesin the virtual multiplicity. Existence,then, is a combination of actual multiplicities - states of affairs - and virtual multiplicities particular intensivemovementsof change. While these conceptsseemparticularly abstract,they offer Deleuze groundsupon which to developa very practicalpicture of the world. The conceptof multiplicity makesno referenceto a transcendentrealmof the world that contains the structures or laws of existence.Since we live among actual multiplicities (and are ourselvesmultiplicities), we are alwayselementsand actorswithin the world. In this sense,both philosophy and human existenceare eminently practical.The virtual counterparts of our actualmultiplicities alsomakepossiblecontinuedmovement and change,even at the points where the world of actualityseemsmost rigid and oppressive. Connectives Bergson Concepts Rhizome Virtual/Virtualitv

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F R T E D R T c H (r8 44-tgoo)

NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH (1844-1900) Lee Spinks

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The importanceof Deleuze'sreadingof Friedrich Nietzschecannot be over-estimated. Although Deleuzeengagescontinuallywith the work of Baruch Spinoza,Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, David Hume and Henri Bergson (and wrote books on all these philosophersand what they enabled),his approachto the philosophicaltradition is markedfundamentally by the Nietzscheangoal of an affirmative philosophy.When Deleuze readsa philosopher,he follows Nietzschein examiningwhat their work enables,what conceptsthey create,the positiveeffectsof the questions they ask and how their philosophiesrespond to life. While Deleuze is carefulto locatethe ideaof a practicalphilosophyin the work of Spinoza, he glimpsesthe radicalpotentialof this tradition for modern thought in Nietzsche'sdevelopmentof a numberof Spinozistideas. One way in which Nietzsche'swork becomescentral to Deleuze is through Nietzsche'sreworking of the Spinozist idea of expressivism. Expressivismdemandsthat we no longerconceiveof an eventasa predicateattachedto a prior substance;there is not a matter or uniform substancewhich thenbecomesor takeson a form or quality. On the contrary, expressivism suggests that thereis nothingotherthanthe becomingof specific and singularqualities;and thesequalitiesor eventsdo not needto be related back to someneutral ground or substance.Deleuzearguesthat Nietzscheis the first philosopheractuallyto considera world composedof these'pre-personalsingularities'.As Nietzscheargues,we do not needto relateactionsback to a subjector tdoer', nor do we needto seeeventsas effectsor as having a pre-existingcause.These ideasprovided Deleuze with a way of developinga philosophyof immanenceand an understanding of beingasunivocity.If thereis not a substance which thenbecomes, or a substance which thentakeson qualities,it followsthat thereis no dualist distinctionbetweenbeingand becoming,or identity and difference.There is no prior ground, unity or substancewhich then differentiatesitself and becomes;insteadthere is only a univocalfield of differences.Difference conceivedin this way is not d,ffirencefrom someoriginal unity; if there is only one univocalbeing,then differencesthemselves becomeprimary and constitutiveforces.There is not a hierarchyin which an original unity or bcingthcnbccomes; thcrcis an originalbccomingwhichexpresscs itsclfin

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the multiplicity of events.The apprehensionof immanent and univocal being demandsthat we accountfor the eventsof existencefrom existence condition(suchasGod, the subject itself without positinga transcendental whosesignificance or being).Deleuze'sstresson Nietzscheasaphilosopher lies in the tradition of univocity differs from the dominant AngloAmericaninterpretationof Nietzscheasa moreliterarywriter who avoided argumentsand principles. Alongsidethe developmentof the conceptof immanent and univocal being,Nietzschealsopresenteda vision of life seenas a conflict between singularand antagonisticforces.Deleuze'suseof the conceptof 'life' in his readingof Nietzscheis neither biologicalnor humanist. Life is neither matter(asin biologism)nor the properform or end of matter(asin humanism or vitalism). Life is a power of singularisation;a power to create For Nietzsche,phenomena,organisms,societiesand Statesare differences. nothing other than the expressionof particular configurationsof forces. One of his mostinfluentialcontributionsto the understandingof life, consciousness and moral thought wasto conceiveof eachof them asthe effect of a primary distinction between actioe and reactiaeforces. Nietzsche's diagnosis,in particular,of the connectionbetweenreactiveformations and the asceticidealon onehand,and suchasressentiment, badconscience modesof subjectivityand formsof life on the otherhad a profoundimpression upon Deleuze'spoliticalthought. Similarly,Nietzsche'sidentification of Will to Power as the basis for a positive vision of life influenced Deleuze'selaborationof an immanentand anti-humanistmodeof philosophy. The postulationof such an immanent principle - a principle that acceptsnothing other than life - enablesthought to focus upon the production and legitimationof divisionsbetweendifferentforms of life. Life, in Nietzsche'sview,is constitutedby a commonand inexhaustiblestriving for power; human life (with its regulativenorms, moral judgementsand This Nietzschean socialtruths) is merely a form through which life passes. philosophy,which envisageda plurality of forcesacting upon and being affectedby eachother,and in which the quantityof powerconstitutedthe differential element between forces, remained of lasting importance to Deleuze'sown philosophyof life. Following Nietzsche, Deleuze sought to move beyond the human investmentin transcendence: the ascriptionof ideasbeyondlife that determine the goalandvalueof life. His work is markedby the attemptto engage with the broadermovementsof becomingfrom which our idea of life is constituted.This led him to concentrateupon a numberof d,ffirentforms andmutations,social of difference(suchaslanguage,geneticdevelopments firrms,historicalcvcntsand so on) that bring the imageof the human into rcintcrprctationof fircus.Dclcuzc alsoclcvclopsNictzschc'sgcncalogicrrl

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moral ideaswhile taking it in a wholly new direction. Where Nietzsche exposedthe originsof morality in the manipulationof affectby regimesof cruelty and force, Deleuze developedthe concept of affect to rethink the meaningand functionof ideologyand politics.Workingagainsta visionof the 'political' that conferred privilege upon the ideologicaldetermination of social codes,Deleuze explored the production of 'politics' and 'ideology' througha seriesof pre-subiectiveor 'inhuman' stylesand intensities. Beforethere is a political or ideologicaldecision,Deleuzeclaimed,there is first an unconsciousand affectiveinvestmentin an imageof life and a style of morality that is subsequentlyreconceivedasthe moral ground of life itself. Connectives Active/Reactive Becoming Difference Eternalreturn Plato Will to Power

NOMADICISM Claire Colebrook The conceptsof 'nomad','nomadology'and 'nomadicism'arespelledout most explicitly inA ThousandPlateaus,butthe conceptdoeshavea significant philosophicalheritage.In 1781,in the prefaceto the Critiqueof Pure Reason,Immanuel Kant lamented that whereasdogmatistshad maintaineda certaindespotismof reason- givingreasonfixed but unjustifiable rules - a certainbarbarismhad allowedfor 'a kind of nomadswho abhor all permanentcultivationof the soil'(K 1998:99).Deleuzeis anythingbut a Kantian philosopher,for Kant's aim of limiting the principlesof reason to a legitimateand harmonioususeis counteredby Deleuze'snomadicaim of allowingprinciplesto be pushedto their maximumpower(D 1984). Kant's dismissalof the nomadicismthat would be precipitatedby a loss of dogmaticlaw - a law that is fixed and determinesspacein advance- is wardedoffin the Critiqueof PureReasonbyan appealto the properdomain of anyprinciple;while reason,for example,hasa tendencyto think beyond its own domain(trying to know the unknowable) it oughtto bc contnincd within its prirtciplC - it shouldonly actaccordingto whatit canckrin rcrms

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of goodand commonsense.Reasonhasa properdomain,just asthe power to feel has a proper domain (art) which should not be carried over into morality. Deleuze,by contrast, rejectsthe idea that a principle, or a power or tendencyto think, should be limited by somenotion of common sense and sound distribution. Nomadicism allows the maximum extensionof principlesand powers;if somethingcan be thought, then no law outside thinking, no containmentof thought within the mind of man shouldlimit thinking'spower(D 1994:37). In Dffirenceand,Repetition,Deleuze beginsa definitionof nomadicdistribution from the oppositionbetweennomosandlogos.If,asDeleuzeinsists, we cannothavea hierarchyof beings- such asthe dominanceof mind over matter, or actualityover potentiality,or the presentover the future - this is becausebeingis univocal,which doesnot meanthat it is alwaysthe same, but that eachof its differenceshasas much being as any other. You do not which is primary and then varying havesomeideal'whiteness'oressence, derivativet"gt."r of white; for degrees,differencesand intensitiesare all there are still individreal, are all differencesof one being.Nevertheless, uationsand hierarchies, but thesecanbe regardedin two ways. The first, the point of view of logos,worksby analogy:somebeingsare truly real(the actual,what is present,what remainsthe same),while others are only real in relation, or by analogy.And this subordinationof some differencesto othersis, evenin this earlywork of Deleuze's,relatedto territoriesand the agrarianquestion;a spaceis divided,distributedand hierarchisedby somelaw,logic or voice (logos)that is outside or abovewhat is distributed. The secondpoint of view of noTnos or nomadiclaw hasits principle of distribution within itself. That is. there are still hierarchiesbut theseare not determinedby a separateprinciple; rather by the power of the principle itself.This is extremelyimportant for Deleuze'sphilosophy.Deleuze wantsto getrid of transcendentandexternalcriteria- say,judgingphilosophy accordingto whetherit will help us to acquiretransferablelife skills, or judging art accordingto whether it will makeus more moral - but he doesnot want to get rid of distribution and hierarchyaltogether. Nomadic distribution judgesimmanently(D 1994:37). A philosophy would be a great philosophy,not if it could be placedpithin a specificand delimitedterritory of reason(suchasa correctand consistentlogic)but if it maximisedwhat philosophycould dq and createda territory: creating conceptsand stylesof thought that openednew differencesand pathsfor thinking. An artwork would be greatnot if it fulfilled alreadyexistingcritcria for what counts as beautiful, but if it took the power for creating bcauty- thc powcr to prompt us to bathein the sensible- and produced ncw nnclrliffcrcntwaysof confiontingscnsibility.

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Even as early as Dffirence and RepetitionDeleuze's referenceto the 'agrarianquestion'marksa politicsof nomadicism:the differencebetween immanentand transcendentcriteria. If we subjectdifferenceto a logical distribution then we havea principle that determineslife in advance,just asland would be distributedaccordingto someexternallaw (say,its most efficienteconomicuse,or its history of ownershipaccordingto a general law of property).This is sedentaryspace;the spaceremainswhat it is and is then divided and distributed. Nomadic space,howeveqis produced through its distribution. So we canconsidernomadicspace,not asa spacewith intrinsic properties that then determinerelations(in the way chesspiecesdeterminehow movementsmight be enacted),but asa spacewith extrinsicproperties;the spaceis producedfrom the movementsthat then givethat spaceits peculiar quality (just asin the gameof Go the piecesare not codedaskings or queens but enter into relations that produce a field of hierarchies). Nomadicspaceis, in this sense,smooth- not because it is undifferentiated, but because its differencesarenot thoseofa chessboard (cut up in advance, with prescribedmoves);the differencescreatepositionsand linesthrough movement.A tribe dreamsabout,crossesand dancesupon a spaceand in so doing fills the spacefrom within; the actualspace- the materialextension ownedby this tribe that might then be measuredand quantifiedby a Statestructure- would be different from (and dependentupon) virtual, nomadic space,for if the tribe moved on, dancedand dreamedelsewhere, then the original spacewould alreadyhave been transformed,given a different depth and extension,now part of a whole new seriesof desires, movementsand relations.And if other tribes crossedthat first space,the spacewould be traversedby differentmaps.On nomadicdistributionthere is not one law that standsoutsideand determinesspace;law is producedin the traversalof space. With Guattari, in A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuze writes a manifesto for 'nomadology',which is here tied far more explicitly to the 'war machine'. The idea of the war machine does have a clear relation to Deleuze'searlierreiectionof logos.Itis not that there are proper beings, eachwith their identity,that must then be distributedaccordingto their essenceand definition, and that.then enter into relation. It is not, for example,that there are masterswho then dominateand govern the slaves or slavish;rather,one becomesa masterthrough an exerciseof force and in so doing the master-slaverelation is effected,a certain distribution occursin and through the act. Everythingbeginswith forcesor'the war machine;Statesdo not havean existenceor power outsidetheir warring power.The distribution of land or territory - its use,seizure,occupation and measurcrnenf - producesdistinct hierarchiesand identitics,In this

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sense,the war machineis not somethingexercisedby the State,for the State's sovereigntyand law, or the power to distribute space,has to be carved out from a radical exteriority of war, of forces and dominations which the Statemay or may not harnessasits own. Connectives Desire Kant Nomos Smoothspace Space

NOMADICISM + CITIZENSHIP EugeneHolland, The conceptof 'nomadicism'that Deleuzeand Guattarideveloprefersless to placeless, itinerant tribes-peoplethan to groups whoseorganisationis immanent to the relations composingthem. Put differently, the organization of a nomadic group is not imposedfrom aboveby a transcendent command.An improvisationaljazzbandforms a n6madicgroup, in contrast with a symphonyorchestra:in the former, group coherencearises immanentlyfrom the activity of improvisingitself, whereasin the symphony orchestra,it is imposedfrom aboveby a conductorperforming a composer'spre-established score. Until recently,citizenshiphas been thought and practisedmostly in relationto the nation-state.SocialBroupsconsideredon this scalehaveof groupingsof coursealwaysincludeda rich entanglementof heterogeneous varioussizesand kinds,involvingvaryingdegreesof allegianceto families; neighbourhoods;professionalorganisations;ethnic, sexual, and other affinity groups;religiousdenominations,and so on. But Statecitizenship commandsallegianceof a qualitativelydifferent and homogenisingkind, it candeclarewar and therebylegitimatekilling in its name largelybecause and demandthe sacrificeof citizens'lives for its own sake(asformulated in Carl Schmitt's rna,gnum opus,TheConceptof thePolitical). This 'vertical' master-allegiance to the Statetranscendsall other'horizontal'allegiances within the State,making State citizenshipliterally a matter of life and death. Nomad citizenship is a utopian concept createdto re-articulateand suggestsolutionsto the problem posedby the lethal nature of modcrn

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nation-statecitizenship.Terrorisedcitizens- citizensterrorisedin large part by their own Stategovernmentsby the hypedspectreof someenemy or other- areall too easilymobilisedto givetheir livesand takeothers'lives in war; in fact, little elseStatesdo inspire in citizensthe kind of devotion that war does.At the sametime, war wagedin the nameof the Stategives capitalisma longer and longer leaseon life by forestallingits perennial crisesofoverproduction:nothingaddresses over-productionandkeepsthe wheelsof industry turning like a good war - especiallytoday'shigh-tech wars in which eachguided missile strike or smart bomb explosionmeans instantmillionsof dollarsin replacementcosts.In this context,the concept of nomadcitizenshipis createdin order to breakthe monopolyexercised by the Stateover conceptionsand practicesof citizenship,and to add or substitutealternativeforms of belongingand allegiance. Of course,all kindsof heterogeneous groupsandallegiances alreadyexist, someof whichwerelistedabove;to the degreethatthesegroupsself-organise moreor lessspontaneously or immanentlyratherthanundercommandfrom above,they could imply nomadicforms of citizenship.Yer mosr of these groupsinvolveor require somedegreeof face-to-facecontactand are hence understoodto take placeamongfriendsin a sharedspace.But thereis another, properlyplaceless dimensionto nomadcitizenshipwhich is linked to the burgeoningworld marketandexemplifiedin the fair trademovement.Wemighr call this the economicor market componentof nomad citizenship,for it dependson the capacityof marketexchange to link far-flunggroupsor individuals togetherin a socialbond that definesthem neitherasfriendsnor as enemies, but simply as temporarypartnersin exchange.In this way, the marketis ableto capitaliseon differenceswithout turning them into enmi- providedofcoursethat it is volunties.For the virtue ofmarket exchange tary and fair; that it is apost-capitalistmarket- is that it enrichesthe livesof nomad citizens by making regional, ethnic, religious, cultural (and many other) differencesavailableto everyone,regardlessof who or wherethey are.

NOMOS Jonathan Roffe 'Nomos' is the namethat Deleuzegivesto the wayof arrangingelementswhetherthey arepeople,thoughtsor spaceitself- that doesnot rely upon an organisationor permanentstructure. It indicatesa free distribution, rather than structuredorganisation,of certainelements. Thc Greck w
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work, that it is derivedfrom the root word nem,which means'to distribute'. He givesthe exampleof the related word,nem6,which in ancient (pasture livestock'- in otherwords,to sendout the animals Greekmeantto to an unboundedpastureaccordingto no particularpattern or structure. Deleuzeopposesn0/n0sasdistribution to anotherGreek work, logos.While difficult to translate well, it means 'word' or treasont.However, for Deleuze,it canalsobe understoodas'law'. This is becausethe picture of the world indicatedby logosis one in which everythinghasits right place: it is a structured and ordered conception of existence.Logosalso implies, then, a conception of distribution, but one that is founded on a previous structureand is well-organised.To this well-organisedlegal distribution of the logos,Deleuzewill opposethe anarchicdistribution of the nomos. The senseof nomosasanarchicdistribution canbe understoodin referenceto the nomad.Ratherthan existingwithin a hierarchicalstructurelike a city, nomadic life takesplace in a non-structuredenvironmentwhere movementis primary.In this context,Deleuzemakesa link betweenlogos andpolis,wherethe political orderingof statesdrawsits main coordinates from a prior structuredidea of existence(this is Plato'sprocedurein the Republic,for example).Fixed points like dwellingsare subordinatedto this fundamental and lawlessmovement. In other words, while there may be points of significancein nomadic life, they do not form fixed references which divide up the movement of life into discreteelements(inside/ outside,the citylthe wilds). As Deleuzegoeson to suggestwith Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus,lifeitself is nomadic. first Deleuze employsthe figure of nomosin Dffirence and,Repetition. Here, it is a matter of consideringthe nature of Being itself in terms of non-ordereddistribution rather than the fixed coordinatesof a logically and hierarchicallystructured universe,such as we find in Plato and Aristotle. The most elaboratedevelopmentsof nomos,in contrast to logos,take placeinA Thousand, Plateaus-Here,Deleuzeand Guattari usethe distinction to discussopposingmodels of science,mathematicsand space.In termsof science,Iogosasthe structuredand'good'distributionof elements leadsto what they call'royal' science,one basedupon universalvalues.It is alsoa scientificmethodthat naturallyleadsto truth, and is at oncebased on the valuesof the State and supposedto be unrelatedto the concrete practicesof life. Scienceundertakenin the nameof nomos,on the other hand,is an ambulantor minor science.It doesnot proceedfrom universals, but rather keepscloseto the movementof eventsthemselves- it 'follows' rirther than 'copies'.Only the practiceof scienceas nomoscan be said to presumesthe havc nttaincda truc cxpcrimcntal method, sincc thc /ogo.s Anrbuhntscicncc rcsultsin ldvlncc in thc firrmof'glollrrlplcsuppositions.

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is thus profoundly engagedwith life rather than examiningit from a supposedneutraloutside. The two conceptionsof mathematicsare closelyrelatedto this. On the onehand,thereis the geometricconceptionthat presumesuniversalstructures: straightline, uniform field and parallellines.This mathematicsis underwrittenby the ordereddistribution of the logos.On the other hand, nltvtzssupportsmathematicsin the form of arithmeticsproceedingby local operations,without presupposinggeneral structures.In this context, Deleuze also privileges differential calculus in so far as it takes the local operationof numericalvaluesand determinestheir movement,one that is unboundedby any one point and cannot be understoodin terms of the absolutefixity presumedby geometricmathematics. In keepingwith the two polesof distribution indicatedby nomosandlogos, DeleuzeandGuattarialsodistinguishtwo typesof space.Logos,theordered conceptionof existence, offersa pictureof spacethat is primordiallycut up in variousways,onethat includesintrinsicboundaries. This spaceis termed the contrary,not only doesnomos 'striated'.On indicatethat spacedoesnot haveanyintrinsicorganisation, and mustbe consideredto be open,or what Deleuzeand Guattaricall 'smoothspace',but this spaceitself is something that must be created.The politicalradicalityof nomos, and of nomadicdistribution, is that it proposesthe dissolutionof the imposedstructuresof logosaslawful structure, and a creationof smooth spacein which encounters outsideof the orderedconceptionof existence canbecomepossible. Connectives Event Plato Space

NONBEING Claire Colebrook Perhapsthe most profound challengeof Deleuze'swork today is its rejectionof nonbeing.The questionof nonbeinggoesback to the very - andthe twentieth-century originsof westernphilosophy- in Parmenides critique of westernmetaphysics.Traditionally,and this is the problem openedby Parmenides,if we try to speakof nonbeing,or say what is not, then we havealreadysaidthat nonbeingri. Negativit$ negationand nonbcing havebeensubordinatcdto the thought of what is, not only bccausc

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in speakingwe attributebeingto nonbeing,but also- asMartin Heidegger insistedin his readingsof Parmenidesand Plato- we passover nonbeing becausewe havealwaysbegunthinking from the simplebeingsbeforeus, thosethings which arepresentand remainthe same.The challengewhich Heideggerput to this tradition, and one which is continuedin different ways by JacquesDerrida and JacquesLacan, is that before we can have beings- things that are or are not - and beforewe seenonbeingas the simpleabsence of being,thereis a nonbeingat the heartof being.First, any experienceof somethingthat rs must come into presenceor be revealed through time; being is never fully and finally revealedfor there are always only by further experiences. Second,we experiencesomethingassomething bringing it into the open, and therebydisclosingit; it was,therefore,not alwaysfully present,but must come to presenceor come into being.This emphasison the nonbeingin being or presenceis intensifiedby Derrida, who arguesthat presence,or the possibilityfor experience,dependson a processof tracingwhich is not. And for Lacan,while we live and desirein oriented a world of structuredand meaningfulbeings,we arenevertheless towardsthat which is otherthan or beyondbeing,that inarticulabledesired fullness,Tbelrssa,nce or plenitude that is not a being, not a thing, nothing. Now Deleuzewill havenone of this death,nonbeing,or negativityin life; in effectthis is the main affirmativethrust of his work and the inspiration for all his philosophy.There may be effectsof nonbeing,but theseare productionsfrom the fullness of life. If I experiencemy life as governed by 'lack' - that I am forced to decide among things but never arrive at the thing - then this is only becauseof a structure of desire (such as the Oedipalfantasy)which hasproducedthis negativebeyond.And Deleuze and Guattari spend much time in showing how this nonbeing beyond desiredthingsis produced;from all the beingsof life we imaginesomeultimatenonbeingor beyond,but this is only becausewe havea far too miserableand limited conceptionof being.From the ordersof speech,structure andculture,we assumethat what cannotbe namedor givenextendedexistenceis nothing,or nonbeing.Againstthis paltry oppositionbetweenbeing and nonbeingDeleuze,in Dffirence and,Repeition,refersto '?being'.That is, being cannotbe reducedto the world of presentbeingsor things, or what we can sayai,but this doesnot meanwe shouldposit somenegative beyondbeing or nonbeing.Rather,being (as?being)is life understoodas the potentialfor creation,variationand production in excessof what we alreadyknow to haveexistence(or beingin its traditionalsense). Deleuzetendsto readthe historyof philosophyasthoughit is alwaysthe productionandaffirmationof life,but he drawsparticularlyupon Friedrich Nictzscheand Henri Bergsonin his criticism of nonbeing.For Nietzsche, all philosophgcvcn the most morirland flricetic,nccclsto trc undcrstoodas

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flowing from life. Those philosopherswho attendto nonbeingaresuffering from reactivenihilism; they posit someultimategood or being,and when this cannot be found their piety merely directs itself to nonbeing,the absence,lack or negationof values.For Bergson,similarly,nonbeingis formed from a failure to think life in due order.We may perceivean absence or 'lack'andassumethat somethinglike nonbeinghastorn a holein life; but we arereallyperceivingmore ratherthanlesslife.If I go into an untidy room I do not seeanabsenceof order.I seethe room, and thenadd,toitmy expectation of how it ought to be.Following Bergson,who insistedon the fullness and positivity of life (and who arguedthat negationwassecondaryand illusory),Deleuzerejectsthe negativeideaof nonbeingwhich hasbeenat the heart of westernmetaphysics. Deleuzewantsto rejectthe strong idea of negativityor nonbeing,so he doesnot attributea lacb ofbeing or realityto error, destruction,the assertionthat somethingis not, or evenchangeand development.But Deleuzealsowantsto affirm a positivenonbeing,which he alsowritesas?being.On this understanding, nonbeingis not the lackof presence, suchaswhen we saythat somethingis missingor lackingor not the case.Nonbeing(as?being)is the positivepowerof life to poseproblems, to say 'no' to the commonsensical, self-evidentor universallyaccepted. This nonbeingis fully realand positive. Connective Bergson

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(phenomenology) nor ideas(ideology) a studyor sciencenot ofappearances but noology.If therearepure noema- or 'thinkables'- we canalsoimagine but as a approachinglife, not as grounded in personalconsciousness, Ideology, as thinking. history of variousimagesof thought,or what counts for example,is the imageof a mind that canthink only throughan imposed is the imageof a mind that forms its or externalstructure;phenomenology arestructuredby a subjectoriented experiences ideas and whose world and towardstruth. In general,noologycanbe opposedto ideology.Insteadofarguing that we, as proper subjects,are subiectedto ideasthat are false and that might be demystified,Deleuzearguesthat it is the ideaof a proper'we' and assumption of the good self or 'mind' which precludesus from actualisingour Plateaus,is not only the potential.Noology,as it is definedinA Thousand study of imagesof thought,but alsoclaimsa 'historicity' for images.The modern subjectwho is subjectedto a systemof signifiersis thereforeproducedand hasits genesisin previousrelationsof subjection.In additionto that if imagesof thoughthave its criticalfunction,noologythereforeassumes beencreatedthey can alwaysbe recreated,with the ideal of liberation from some proper image of thought being the ultimate aim. In Dffirence and, arguesthat we havefailedto think truly preciselybecause Repetition,Deleuze an 'imageof thought'. Not only philosophy,but we assumeor presuppose everydaynotionsof commonsenseand goodsensefail to questionjust what it is to think. In this regard,the conceptof mind (or,in Greek,nous)hasbeen an unargued,implicit andrestrictivepostulateof our thinking.Noologydoes not only studywhat it might meanfor humansubjectsto think; it alsostrives to imaginethoughtcarriedto its infinite power,beyondthe human.

NOOLOGY Connective Claire Colebrook The conceptof 'noology' canbe setagainstphenomenology, or the grounding of thought in what appearsto consciousness, and ideologyor the idea that thereare systemsor structuresof ideasthat areimposedupon thinking. Deleuze's early work The Logic of Sense,while critical of phenomenology neverthelessdrew upon Edmund Husserl's 'noeisis/noema' distinction: the noeisisis the act or subjectiveaspect- remembering, imagining,desiring,perceiving- while the noemais the obiectivepole- the remembered,imagined,desiredand perceived.Even in TheLogic of Sense DeleuzecriticisedHusserlfor restrictingthe noemato being an objectof consciousness and argued that there were pure noematicpredicatescolouritself,for example,which is still a relation- betweenlight and cyc but a relationlibcratcdfrom anyspccificobscrvcr. Nookrgywould,thcn,bc

Thought

OEDIPALISATION Tamsin Lorraine I)clcuzc nnd Guattrrridcscribchumirnbcingsasunfolding ln Anti-Ocdip,rs, in constflntintcrrctionwith thcir surrttltntlings, proccsscs of individurrtion

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and they characterisethree synthesesof the unconscious:connective syntheses that join elementsinto series('desiring-machines', for example, mouth and breast),disjunctivesyntheses that resonateseriesin metastable states('Bodieswithout Organs'(BwO), for example,mouth and breastor head and arm or milk and stomachresonatingin a state of bliss), and conjunctivesynthesesthat gather metastablestatesinto the continuous experienceof consciousawareness. They proposethat Oedipalsubjectivity is but one form that human sentiencecan take. The synthesesthey describehaveanoedipalaswell asOedipalforms.'Oedipalisation, is a contemporaryform of socialrepressionthat reducesthe forms desiretakesand thus the connectionsdesiremakes- to thosethat sustainthe social formationof capitalism. Capitalism'semphasison the abstractquantificationof money and labour(what mattersis how capitaland labourcirculates- not the specific form wealth takesor who in particular doeswhat) encouragesdesireto permute acrossthe social field in unpredictableways. Oedipalisation reducesthe anarchicproductivity of unconsciousdesireto familial forms of desire.Productivedesirethat flows accordingto immanentprinciples becomesorganisedin terms of 'lack', thus reducingthe multiple forms desirecantaketo thoseforms that canbe referredto the personalidentities of the Oedipaltriangle.On the BwQ desireis the only subject.It passes from one body to another,producing partial objects,creating breaksand flows, and making connectionsthat destroythe unity of a 'possessive or proprietary' ego (D&G 1983:72). Oedipalisationmakesit appearthat partial objectsare possessed by a person and that it is the person who desires.Productivedesirethat would fragmentpersonalidentity is reduced to the desireof a personwho wants to fill in a lack. Oedipalisationthus ensuresthat the innovationsof deterritorialisingcapitalareconstrainedby the tightly bound parametersof personalidentity and familial life (or the triangulatedauthority relationshipsrhar mimic Oedipus in the public realm). According to Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipalisationconstitutesan illegitimate restriction on the productive synthesesof the unconscious becauseit emphasisesglobal persons(thus excluding all parrial objectsof desire),exclusivedisjunctions(thus relegatingthe subjectro a chronologicalseriesof momentsthat can be givena coherentnarrativeaccount), and a segregativeand biunivocaluse of the conjunctivesyntheses(thus reducingthe identity of the subjectto a coherentor staticset of one side of a set of oppositions).The subjectionof desireto a phallic paradigm resultsin a subjectwho experiences himselfas'having'an idcntitythat is fixedon cithcr onc sidcor the othcr of variousoppositional dividcs(mrrlc or fcmitlc,whitc or hlack),rrndwho dcsignltcsthc virriousplcnsurlblclncl

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painful statesthrough which he passesin terms of the attributes of a fundamentallyunchangingidentity. Capitalism'sdrive for ever-newsourcesof profit fostersinnovatingflows could so altercapitalistformationsthat of desirethat, if left to themselves, the latter would evolveinto somethingelse.Oedipalisationis a form of socialrepressionthat funnels the productive capacityof the unconscious back into the constrictingchannelsof Oedipal desire.Following Oedipal subjectivityto its limits and beyond entailsliberating unconsciousproductionsothat desirecancreatenew realities.WhereasOedipaldesireconstitutes the subjectas lacking the object desired,the goal of anoedipal desireis immanentto its process:it seeksnot what it lacksbut what allows it to continue to flow. In order to flow, anoedipaldesire must mutate and unfoldingimplicatedwith the socialfield transformin a self-differentiating of forcesof which it is a part. Deleuzeand Guattari rejectthe psychoanalytic contentionthat the only alternativeto Oedipal subjectivityis psychosisand insteadexploreanoedipalflowsof desireand the schizowho is a functioningsubjectof suchdesire.Their notion of the unconscioussugBestswaysof approachingits 'symptoms' that point to possibilitiesfor creativetransformationinevitablylinked with socialchange. Connectives Body without Organs Capitalism Desire Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Psychoanalysis Subjectivity

ONTOLOGY Constantin I1 Bound.as For Deleuze,philosophyis ontology.In this sense,he is one of only two philosophers(the otherbeingEmmanuelL6vinas)of the generationwe call 'poststructuralists'not to demur in the faceof ontologyand metaphysics. Deleuze'sontologyis a rigorousattemptto think of processand metamorphosis- becoming- not as a transitionor transformationfrom one substanccto anotheror a movementfrom onepoint to anothcr,but ratherasan It prcsupposcs, thcrcforc,an initial attcmptt
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for points.The real bifurcatesin two inextricablyinterlinkedprocesses the virtual and the actual- neitherone of which canbe without the other. Presentstatesof affairs,or bodieswith their qualitiesand mixtures,make up the actualreal.Meanwhile,incorporealeventsconstitutethe virtual real. The natureof the latteris to actualiseitself without everbecomingdepleted in actualstatesof affairs.This bifurcationof the realdoesnot enshrinetranscendence andunivocity:becomingis saidin oneandthe samesenseof both the virtual andthe actual.It shouldbe notedherethat thereis no separation or ontologicaldifferencebetweenthe virtual andactual.Deleuzeclaimsthe virtual is in the actual;it is conservedin the pastin itself.Meditating on temporality,Deleuzeretrievesthe Bergsoniand,urrle,working it into three interrelatedsyntheses. First, the time of habit;second,the time of memory; and third, the empty time of the future. Substitutingforce for substance, and thinking of processes in terms of series,requiresan ontology of multiplicities.This is becauseforce exists only in the plural - in the differential relation between forces. Series diverge,convergeandconjoinonly in the deterritorialisation of themselves and other series.In the Deleuzian ontology multiplicities, unlike the 'many' of traditionalmetaphysics, arenot opposedto the one becausethey (they are not discrete are not multiplicitiesof discreteunits or elemenrs), with divisionsand subdivisionsleavingtheir naturesunaffected.They are intensivemultiplicitieswith subdivisionsaffectingrheir nature.As such, multiplicities have no need for a superimposedunity to be what they become.Forcesdeterminingtheir becomingoperatefrom within - they do not needtranscendentforcesin order to function. It is in the virtual that intensivemultiplicities of singularities,seriesand time subsist.It is the virtual that is differentiatedin terms of its intensivemultiplicities.As the virtual actualises anddifferenciates itself the seriesit generates becomediscrete,without evererasingthe tracesofthe virtual insidethe actual. Hence,the ontologyof Deleuzeis firmly anchoredby difference,rather than being.This is differencein itsel{ not a differenceestablished postquo betweentwo identities.The ontologicalprimacyDeleuzegivesdifference can no longerbe sublatedor eliminatedby either resemblance, analogyor the labour of the negative.In the spaceinscribedby Martin Heidegger with his Being and,Time, Deleuze erects his ontology of Dffirence and, Repetition.Being is the d,ffirent/ ciation at work in the dynamic relationship betweenthe virtual and the actual.Actualisationoccursin a presence that can neverbe sufficientunto itself for three reasons.First, the actual carriesthe trace of the virtual differencethat brought it about, Second, actualisationdiffersfrom the 'originary' difference.Third, actualisationis pregnantwith all the differencesthat the never-before-actualised virtual is capableof precipitatingat any (and all) time(s),

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Connectives Actuality Becoming Differentiation/Differenciation Force Post-structuralism Virtual/Virtuality

ORDER-WORD VerenaConley The 'order-word'is a function immanentto languagethat compelsobedience.The fundamentalform of speechis not the statement(6noncd)of of afeeling,but the command. a judgementor the expression(inonciation) Languagegiveslife-orders,and asa resulthumansonly transmit what has been communicatedto them. All languageis expressedin indirect discourse;thus the transmissionof order-wordsis not the communicationof a sign in so far asit is understoodto containinformation. Order-wordsarenot restrictedto commands.They arealsothe relation of every statementwith implicit presuppositionsand speech-actsthat are realisedin statementsthemselves.The relation between a statement and speech-actis internal. It is one of redundancy,not of identity. Newspapersuse redundancyto order their statements;they tell people what to think. Seenthus,the redundancyof the order-wordis its mostpertinent trait. Information is only the minimal conditionfor the transmission of order-words. An expression always contains collective assemblages; statementsareindividuatedonly to the degreethat a collectiveassemblage requiresthem to be transmittedasthey are. Order-wordstransformbodies.It is the judge'ssentencethat transforms the accusedinto a convict.What takesplacebeforehand(the allegedcrime the accusedis saidto havecommitted),or afterwards(the enactmentof the penalty)are actionsand passionsaffectingbodies(that of victim, convict transformationfrom the or prison)in the largestsense.The instantaneous suspectinto the convict is a pure incorporealattributethat takesthe form of content in a judge's sentence.Order-words are thus alwaysdated. History recountsthe actionsand passionsof bodiesthat developin a social field. Yet, history also transmits order-words from one generationto anothcr,Performativestatementsarenothingoutsideof the circumstances apply to boclicsbut arc, that qunlifythcm to bc assuch,Transformations

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themselves,incorporeal.In the political spherelanguagemobilisesthe order-word, causingvocabularyand sentencesto vary and changeas also do the order-words. Order-words function as explicit commandsor implicit presuppositions. They lead to immanent actsand the incorporealtransformations expressedin their form. They alsoleadto assemblages of expressions. At a certain moment thesevariablescombine into a regime of signs.New order-words ariseand modify the variableswithout being part of a known r6gime. The scientific enterprise that claims to extract constants is coupledwith a politicalenterprisethat transmitsorder-words.Constants, however,are alwaysdrawn from variablesso that certain linguistic categories- such as languageand speech,competenceand performancebecomeinapplicable.Languageconsistsof a major and a minor mode. The former extractsconstantswhile the latter placesthem in continuous variation. The order-word is the variable that defines the usageof language according to one of these two treatments. As the only metalanguage,it is capableof accountingfor a doubledirection: it is a 'little' (or simulated)death,but it is alsoa warning cry or a messageto takeflight. Through death the body reachescompletion in time and space.As a warning cry or harbingerof deaththe order-wordproducesflight. All of a suddenvariablesfind themselvesin a new stateand in continuousmetamorphosis.Incorporealtransformationsare again attributed to bodies, but now in a passageto a limit-degree.The questionis lesshow to elude the order-word than how to avoid its impact as a death-sentenceand, in turn, to developa powerof escapefrom within the scope(expressionand statement)of the order-word. It is thus imperative that life answerthe order-word of death not by fleeing but by making flight, in order to accentuateactive and creative attributes.Beneathorder-words,Deleuze adds,there exist pass-words, what he otherwisedescribesas words that passand are componentsof passage.In strong contrast, order-words mark stoppages,they are arrestive,and in massiveshapethey organisestratifiedcompositions.Yet, every singlething or word has this twofold nature,a capacityto impose order and to inspirecreativepassage. For the benefitoflife and flight it is necessaryto extract the one from the other, that is, to transform the compositionsof order into componentsof passage. Connectives Body Death

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ORGANISM tohn Proteoi An 'organism' in the way that Deleuze and Guattari intend it is a centralised,hierarchised,self-directedbody.It is akin to the'judgementof God' (He who providesthe model of such self-sufficiency);it is also a molarisedand stratifiedlife form. The organismis an emergenteffectof organisingorgansin a particular way,a 'One' addedto the multiplicity of organsin a'supplementarydimension'(D&G 1987: 21,265).Also important to note is that an organis a 'desiring-machine',that is, an emitter and breakerof flows, of which part is siphoned off to flow in the economyof the body.Organsare a body'sway of negotiatingwith the exteriormilieu, appropriatingand regulatinga bit of matter-energyflow. The organismis the unifying emergenteffectof interlocking homeostatic mechanismsthat quickly compensatefor anynon-averagefluctuationsbelow by certainthresholdsto return a bodyto its 'normal'condition(asmeasured norms; henceDeleuzeand Guattari'ssenseof 'molar'). The species-wide organism as unifying emergent effect is a stratum on the Body without Organs(BwO),it is hencea construction,a certainselectionfrom the virtual multiplicity of what a body canbe,and thereforea constraintimposedon the BwO: 'The BwO howls:"They've mademe an organism!They've wrongfully foldedme! They'vestolenmy bodyl"' (D&G 1987:159). While all actualor intensivebodiesare 'ordered'.that is. containsome probabilitystructureto the passage of flowsamongtheir organs(only the virtual BwQ at 'intensity = 0', has removed all patterning among its organs),the organismis 'organised',that is, its habitualconnectionsare centralisedand hierarchical.The organsof an organismare patternedby 'exclusivedisjunctions',that is, seriesof virtual singularitiesactualisedin of other,alternative,patterns;in sucha wayasto precludethe actualisation is locked into a basinof attraction, organism complexitytheory terms, an or stereotypedset of such basins.As such a fixed habitualpattern locked averagevalues,the onto normalfunctioningasdeterminedby species-wide organismdeadensthe creativityof life;it is'that which life setsagainstitself in order to limit itself' (D&G 1987:503).Like all stratification,however, the organismhasa certainvalue:'stayingstratified- organized,signified, subjected- is not the worst that can happen'(D&G 1987:16l), although this utility is primarily asa restingpoint for further experimentation. Constructingan organismout of a body (centralisingor molarisingthe body)is oneof the threeprinciplestrataseparatinghumansfrom the plane of consistcncy(abng with signifianccand subicctivity),As a stratum,

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we canusethe terminology of form-substanceand content-expressionwith regard to organisms,though we must remember that on the organic stratum,contentand expressionmust be specifiedat manydifferentscales: genesand proteins,cells,tissues,organs,systems,organism,reproductive community,species, biosphere.At the levelof genesand proteinsthe substanceof content consistsof amino acids.Meanwhile, the form of content or codingof theseacidscanbe understoodasaminoacidsequences or proteins.Expression,aswe recall,is the putting of contentto work, sothe form of expressionat this scaleis composedof nucleotidebasesequences that specifyamino acids,while the substanceof expression,the emergentfunctional unit, is the gene,which determinesprotein shapeand function. It is importantto notethat in this treatmentwe areoverlookingthe DNA/RNA relation,the dependence of geneson cellularmetabolism,and the role of genesin interveningin the self-organisingprocesses of morphogenesis. Skipping over severalscales(cell, tissueand organ)for simplicity's sake,we arrive at the levelof organicsystems(for examplethe nervous,endocrine and digestivesystems),where the substanceof content is composedof organsand the form of contentis codingor regulationof flowswithin the body andbetweenthe body and the outside.The form of expressionat this levelis homeostaticregulation(overcodingof the regulationof flowsprovided by organs),while the substanceof expressionis the organism,conceivedas a processbinding the functionsof a body into a whole through coordinationof multiple systemsof homeostaticregulation. Contemporarytreatmentof Deleuze'sbiophilosophybeginswith Keith Ansell Pearson's Germinal Life. Other treatments include Manuel Delanda, A Thousand, Yearsof NonlinearHistory and,Intensizse Scienceand Virtual Philosophy.While Delanda interprets Deleuzeand complexity theorysideby side,Mark HansenseesDeleuzeand Guamari'sbiophilosophy as incompatible with complexity theory. For Hansen, Deleuze and Guattari's devalorisationof the organism, while resonatingwith the 'molecularrevolution'in twentieth-centurybiology,is in markedcontrast to the treatmentof the organismasirreduciblein the autopoietictheoryof Humberto Maturana and FranciscoVarela.as well as the valorisation of speciesas'naturalkinds' found in the complexitytheorybiologyof Stuart Kauffmanand Brian Goodwin. Connectives Body without Organs Molar Stratification Virtull/Virtuulity'

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PARTIAL OBJECTS Kenneth Surin SigmundFreud'smetapsychology wasin essence a theoryof drives,in that it invokedthe conceptsofenergy and structureto showthat everyhuman action has its basisin a fundamentaland irreducibleinstinctualground. Two drives were pre-eminent:the sexualdrive and the drive for selfpreservation.Connectedwith the conceptof drive was the notion of an object- the psychiceconomywaspopulatedby a plethoraof suchobjects, with the objectsin questionbeingrelatedto the 'discharge'of an underlying drive. Interestingly,Freud himself was not alwaysclear or consistent on the relationbetweendrive and object,and changedhis positionin subsequentwritings or sometimessaid incompatiblethings about objectsin differentparts of the sametext. Yet, the fundamentalpoint remained:the psychic object is a result of the drive, and the relation to an object is the function of a drive'sdischarge.Freud and his followersconstruedsuccessful psychicdevelopment,then, asthe capacityan individual psychehasto form relationswith wholeobjects.Subsequentthinkersin the psychoanalytical tradition criticised this emphasison the individual psyche,and chargedFreud with de-emphasising socialrelationsand group ties,despite his attemptsto dealwith suchissuesin, for example,Totemanrl Tabooand Mosesand,Monotheism. Freud wassaidto havefailedto consideradequately the mechanismsthat link objectsto drivesand objectsto eachother.These mechanisms- introjection and proiection - are highly flexible in their operation, and blend objects with each other, as well as decomposing objectsinto 'partial' or'part' objects.Objectcreationcanalsobe enhanced by the particulardealingsan individual haswith the externalworld. The positionstakenby DeleuzeandGuattarion psychoanalysis belongto this deviantor post-Freudiantradition. Perhapsthe most significantfigure in this post-FreudianmovementwasKlein. Klein differedfrom Freud in her insistencethat the drivesare not merestreamsof energy,but possess from the beginninga directionand structure,that is, they areobject-focused. For Deleuzeand Guattari, though, Klein remainedwithin the psychoanalytic tradition: while Klein acknowledgedthe centrality and power of partial objccts,with thcir changesof intensity,their variableflows,and havingthe capacityto cbb or cxplodc,shc still locatcdthc tirskof intcrprctingthcsc objcctsirr rt cotrtritctullrchtion bctwccnirnirlystanclgrllicnt.'l'hc rrrrrrlyst

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providedan interpretationof thesepsychicobjectsin the contextof the contract that existedbetweenher and the patient.EvenWinnicott,who moved further from Freudianismthan Klein becausehe dispensedwith the contractualrelationbetweenanalystand patient,wassaidby Deleuzeto have remainedwithin the psychoanalytic paradigm.For Deleuze,the analystand patienthaveto sharesomethingbeyondlaw,contractor institution.But the primary disagreementthat Deleuze and Guattari had with the psychoanalytic tradition arose from the latter's insistencethat psychic well-being residesultimately in a relationshipwith a wholeobject, therebyconsigning partial objects(the mother'sbreast,the penis,a whisper,a pain, a pieceof cake,and soon) to a necessarily inferior or prolepticpositionin the psychoanalyticschemeof things- partialobjectswerealwayssomethingthar one movedon from, a stagethat onewentthough,in attainingpsychicmaturity. For Deleuzeand Guattari,however,partialobjects(andevendrives)are not mere structural phenomenaor stageson a developmentaltrajectory, but, asthey put itinA Thousand, Plateaus,'entrywaysand exits,impasses the child livesout politically,in other words,with all the forceof his or her desire'(D&G 1987:13).Psychoanalysis forcesthe desireof the patientinto a grid that can then be traced by the analyst,whereasthis desireneedsto be kept awayfrom any pre-tracedidentity or destiny.Only in this way can the patient (and the analyst)experimentwith the real. But to underrake this experimentationit is necessaryto treat psychicobjectsas political optionsand just as significantly,to refrain from relegatingpartial objects to a merelysecondaryor provisionalstatusin relationto wholeobjects. Partialobjectsare invariablysomething'menacing,explosive,bursting, toxic,or poisonous',and it is this flexibleand plasticquality which makes them inherentlypolitical.For parts follow a specificcoursewhen they are detachedfrom a whole or from other parts,or when they are collectedinto other wholesalongwith one or more otherparts,and sothe questionof the specific processesthat underlie this detachment or reattachment is absolutelycrucial: is a particular attachment,detachmentor reattachment menacing,reassuring,painful, pleasurable,tranquillising, alluring and so on? What makesit any one (or more) of thesethings?For Deleuzeand Guattariit is absolutelyessential that weseetheseprocesses andtheir meaningsasinherentlypolitical,asphenomena that movepeopleon, or hold them back,in the coursestakenby their lives.As they seeit, psychoanalysis, by privilegingthe wholepsychicobject,canneverdo justiceto politics. Connectives Psychoanalysis Rcrrl

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PERCEPT + LITERATURE John Marks Deleuzeis particularlystruck by the way in which the great English and Americannovelistswrite in percepts,claimingby comparisonthat authors suchasHeinrich von Kleist andFranzKafka write in affects.The'percept' conceptionof literature,whereby is at the heart of Deleuze'simpersonal conventional literary categorieslike character,milieu and landscapeare read in new ways.In order to explore how the percept works in literature it is necessary to understandhow Deleuzeis preoccupiedwith all that leads to the dissolutionof the ego in art. This might manifestitself in the capacity of Virginia Woolf's charactersto merge with the world, in T E. Lawrence'sdevastation of his own ego,or evenBartleby'spersistentrefusal to be 'particular'.The perceptalsohassomethingof childhoodperception in it, given that small children are unableto distinguishbetweenthemselvesand the outsideworld. By meansof the percept,literaturebecomes a wayof exploringnot how we existin the world, but ratherhow webecome with the world. It has the capacity to explore our existenceas haecceities on the planeof consistency;to remind us that we ourselvesarepart of these compoundsof sensation.The percept makesvisible the invisible forcesof the world, and it is the literary expressionof the things that the writer has seenand heardthat overwhelmher or him. Consequentl$it hasa visionary potential.The perceptchallengesconventionalnotions of forms and in that it enablesus to explore subjects.It alsohasa political significance, an impersonaland pre-individualcollectivitythat might be the basisfor a particularsort of ethicalcommunity. The authors that Deleuze initially refers to in order to illustrate the function of the percept in literature are Herman Melville and Virgina Woolf. Moby Dicb is a particularly important referencepoint for Deleuze. Through his perceptions of the whale, Ahab passesinto the landscape, form. Ahab which in turn becomesa planeof pure expressionthat escapes enters into a relationshipof becoming with the whale, and the ocean Another important emergesasa pure percept,a compoundof sensations. referencepoint is Virginia Woolf, who talksof 'momentsof the world', in into'the town. Similarly, which a charactersuch asMrs Dalloway'passes Deleuze alludesto the way in which the moor functions as a percept for Thomas Hardy, as doesthe steppefor Anton Chekhovand the desert for T, E. Lawrence.It canbe seen,then, that the perceptimpliesa particular relationshipbetweencharacterand landscape.Essentially,the landscapcis no longcran cnvironmcntthat cithcr mirrors,mocksor firrmsthc pcrccivcstlrc lrrndscitpc by chirrirctcr. Nrlr is it thc cirsctlut tlrc clritrirctcr

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directing a gazeat it. Rather,Deleuzefeelsthat the perceptin literature showsus how the mind is a sort of membranethat is both in contactwith, and is actuallypart of, the externalworld. The selfis not a thing that is distinct from the externalworld, but somethingmorelike a 'fold' of the external world, a membranethat capturesother things. The intimate contact between the outside and inside means that literature can explore the 'private desert' (T E. Lawrence),or the 'private ocean'(Melville) that results from this contact. As Deleuze puts it, every bomb that T E. Lawrenceexplodesis a bomb that explodesin himself. He cannot stop himself from projecting intenseimagesof himself and others into the desert,with the resultthat theseimagestakeon a life of their own. Given this emphasison impersonalityand the dissolutionof the egq it is not surprisingthat the literary hero of the perceptis the 'man without qualities'.This sort of character- closelyrelatedto what Deleuzecallsthe 'seer' (le aoyeur)in his books on cinema- ultimately has the tendency,at once modest but also crazy, to'become' everyoneand everything.He might be a characterwho is literally 'on the road',and an obviousexample from popular literature would be the opennessto experienceof Jack Kerouac'snarratorin On theRoad.ln 'taking to the road' and beingopen to all contacts,Deleuzetalks about how a particular,pragmaticnotion of democracyis expressedin the way the soul in Americanliterature seeks fulfilment, rather than salvation.The perceptis primarily a literary form of experimentation,but it has somethingto contribute to politics. In simple terms, the percepthasthe effectof drawing us out of ourselvesand into the world, and of challengingthe individualisingand infantilising tendencyof much contemporaryculture. It is not enough,Deleuzeand Guattari argue,to turn our own perceptionsand affectionsinto a novel,to embarkupon a journey in searchof the father who ultimatelyturns out to be oneself.

PHENOMENOLOGY Tamsin Lorraine Phenomenologyas a philosophicalmovementwas founded by Edmund Husserl.Ren6Descartes,ImmanuelKant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegelarbimportantprecursorsto this movementthat insistsupon returning to 'the things themselves',or phenomenaas they appearto us, in order to ground knowledgein the apodictic certainty of self-evidcnt truth. Husscrl institutcda methodof 'bracketing'that suspcndsmctirphysicrrlqucstions.ab
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phenomenological descriptionsof experienceitself. Husserl took from is intentional- that is, that Franz Brentanothe notion that consciousness it is alwaysconsciouso/something.To investigatewhat liesoutsideof conis fruitless.Instead,we shouldinvestigatethe structureandconsciousness By suspendingthe 'natural attitude' tents of our consciousexperiences. (that is, the assumptionthat our experienceis causedby something'out there')with its reifyingprejudices,we candiscoveranddescribethe'eidetic This, in turn, will revealhow our essences' that structureconsciousness. knowledgeis constitutedand will give us a new method for grounding knowledgein our'pre-predicativeexperience'(that is, experiencethat has not yet beenpositedfrom the perspectiveof the naturalattitude). Martin Heidegger,EmmanuelL6vinas,Jean-PaulSartre,and Maurice Merleau-Pontyweresomeof thoseinspiredby Husserlto developvarious But whereasHusserlthought of responses to versionsof phenomenology. thesephilosophers phenomenology asa rigorousscienceof consciousness, emphasisethe notion (createdby Heidegger)of 'being-in-the-world'and direct their attentiontoward the lived experienceof an embodiedsubiect always already immersed in a world from which she cannot separate herself. Phenomenology'sinsistenceon describingphenomenaas they appearthus openedup to philosophicalreflectionthe realm of experience by ordinaryindividualsin everydaylife prior to the theasit is experienced oreticalattitudeof 'objective'thought.It wasembracedby manyasa revitalising alternativeto forms of philosophicalthought such as positivism (anotherimportant philosophicalmovementprominentin the earlytwentieth century) that took the methodsof natural scienceas their paradigm. emphasison lived experienceterOn Deleuze'sview,phenomenology's philosophy habitual forms of perceptionand conception ritorialises onto (perceptionformed from the point of view of the selfor thoughtin keeping with the form of the 'I'). Deleuzesoughtto determinean 'impersonaland pre-individualtranscendental field' that is the conditionof anyactualcon(D 1990: 102). In Foucault,Deleuze lauds Michel scious experience There is a gap Foucaultfor convertingphenomenologyinto epistemology. betweenwhat we perceiveand what we say'asthoughintentionalitydenied itself' (D 1988b:109).There is no suchthing asa pure or'savage'experienceprior to or underlyingknowledge.The gap betweenwhat we sayand what we feel and perceive(aswell asthe Bergsoniangap Deleuzecharacterisesin his Cinemabooks that can open up betweenperceptionand action)indicatesimplicit tendenciesor forcesthat insistin what we sayand of an individual are the emergenteffectsof do. The consciousexperiences virtual, as well asactuallyunfolding, forcesof which the individual is, for thc most part, unawarc.Thc singulariticsor cvcntsdcfiningtheseforccs ficld of'thc virturrlthrrtmayncvcrbc rctuitlisccl constitutca trirnsccndcntrrl

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in individualbodies.Eventsof sense(for example,rhe conceptsof philosophy), as well aseventsof physicalprocesses(for example,the capacityto fall, to run, to sweat)and their virtual relations'insist' in concretestatesof affairs,whether or not they actually unfold in specificspeech-actsor physical states. Philosophyas 'genuine thinking' does not attempt to representor describe,but ratherto makethingshappenby creatingconceptsin response to the problemsof life that actualisethe virrual relationsof rhe transcendental field in novel ways.Phenomenology's invocationof the 'primordial lived'rendersimmanence in termsof whatis immanentto a subject'sexperiencerather than processes unfolding at levelsbelow as well as abovethe thresholdof consciousness, thus groundingits investigations in whatare,in Deleuzeand Guattari'sview, opinions that are alreadyclich6sextracted from experience(D&G 1994:150).The notion of a world 'teaming'with anonymous, nomadic,impersonaland pre-individualsingularitiesopensup the field of the transcendental andallowsthinkingof individualsin termsof the singularitiesthat are their condition,rather than in terms of the synthetic and analyticunitiesofconsciousexperience (D 1990:103). Connectives Bergson Experience Foucault Singularity

PHENOMENOLOGY

+ HUSSERL, EDMUND (1859-1938)

Alberto Toscano Deleuze's relationship to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is split between a critical hostility toward the methodologicalprinciples and overall aims of his phenomenologyand the isolation, extraction and transformationof certain moments in Husserl'soeuvreto sustainconceptual developmentsof his own. The most significant among these Husserlianinsertionsoccur with regardto the elucidationof (the genesis of) sensein The Logic of Sensaand in the discussionof the machinic phylum in A Thousand Plateausinspiredby Gilbert Simondon.Deleuze finds support for his discussionof sensein Husserl'sdelineationof thc nocm:rtaand his scparationof a logicof cxprcssion(scnsc)from thc logics of'dcnotirtion,manif'cstirtion irnclclcmonstrati
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is linked to the key Stoic insight, prolonged by mediaevalnominalism and by Meinong, regardingthe autonomyof sensewith regardboth to physical causalityand to the logic of propositions.However,while Husserl is commendedfor having identified the paradoxicalcharacterof sense,its statusas both impassiveand genetic,he is criticised for having shirked from drawing the ultimate conclusionsof his (re)discovery,and falling back, via his notion of Urdoxa, on the requirementsof generalityand recognitionthat define the image of thought as a convergenceof good senseand common sense.Deleuzearguesthat to be faithful to the inaugural Stoic insight one must conceivethe nucleusof the noemaas verblike, asan eventand not an attribute or predicate,aswell asmaintain the paradoxof sense,rather than transcendentally neutralisingit in a Kantian recourseto an object = x. Otherwise sensebecomesa mere shadowor doubleof the proposition and is subordinatedto the genericdemandof unificationprovidedby the concept,on the one hand,and the form ofthe person,on the other. Following the arguments put forward by Jean-Paul Sartre in the Transcendence of the Ego (1937), Deleuze demands a more radical reduction, becausemoreimpersonal- treatmentof the phenomenological pre-individual singularitiesat the such that it would allow accessto the heartof genesisand sense.This canstill be regardedasthe contextfor his work Plateaus,where the phenomenologist's useof HusserlinA Thousand in is mined for the notions of anexactitudeand morphologicalessences, (without, incidentally, resortorder to distinguishorganismsfrom bodies ing to Husserl'sown Leib/ Korperdistinction),nomad from royal science (via Husserl'sintimation of a protogeometry),and to delineateprocesses of transformation,distortion, ablationand augmentationon the machinic phylum. Onceagain,Husserlis criticisedfor a certainKantian inspiration that doesnot allowhim to determineindependentlya dimensionof events and becomingsthat would be neither objectivenor subjective.Husserl's commitment to transcendental philosophy forces him instead to subordinatethe eventsof senseand the anexactbecomingsof matterto an instanceof legislation(in this case,royal science).The situationis much the samefor the notion of passivesynthesis,borrowed from Husserl and translated into empiricist, biophilosophical terms in Dffirence and Repetition. Deleuzedevelopshis ontologyof multiplicity againstall dialectics,from the work of Henri Bergson.Husserl,like Bergson,tried to draw the philof the work of Bernhard osophicaland methodologicalconsequences vitalist thesetwo standpoints, Ricmannon topology.What distinguishes Whilc llcrgsonandDclcuzc towitrdmultiplicitics? lncl phcnomcnologicirl, proposcthnl rr distinctionltctwccntwo typcsof'nrultipliciticsclln ()pcn

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onto an understandingof becomingthat would not be subjectedto extrinsic measurement,Husserl adopts the notion of multiplicity to formulate a universalisticand homogeneoustheoreticalscienceof theory (or metascience),for which the mathematicalconceptof multiplicity could serveas the commonformal term. Husserlexplicitly usesmultiplicitiesto distinguish object-fieldsof theoriesand to ground the unity of explanationin eachfield. In this regardhis interestonceagainis with thosequestionsof foundationand legitimationthat Deleuze'sformulation of an immanent and intensivelogic of multiplicitiesis designedto undermineor evade. Theseencounterswith Husserl,aroundthe ideasof sense,the machinic phylum and multiplicities,permir us to identify rhreealternativenotions of phenomenologypunctuatingDeleuze'sphilosophicalitinerary: a phenomenologyof events(or rigorous scienceof surfaceeffects),a phenomenology of material fluxes, breaks and assemblages (or phenomenologyof production),and a phenomenology of the concept.Respectively, thesecan be linked to the autonomyof sense,the autonomyof a nomad scienceof (or of the practiceof the artisan)and the autonomyof philosohaecceities phy.Thesearelike the threemomentsof an-otherphenomenology, oneno longertied to the teleological programmeof makingimmanenceimmanent to consciousness or subjectivity.

PLANE CliffStagoll Deleuzeusesthe imageof the 'plane'in numerouscontexts.Typically,it is employedto explaina type of thinking that mediatesberweenthe chaosof chancehappenings(and the complexityof their ever-shiftingorigins and outcomes)on the one hand,and structured,orderlythinking on the other. Deleuzerevealsthe former in his theoriesof multiplicity, becomingand difference.He proposesthat the lasttypifieshow we dealwith suchchaos: by imposingstructures,creatinghierarchies,conceivingof things as (the same'from one moment to the next, using definitionsto limit meanings, and ignoring new and potentiallycreativeinquiries.The imageof a'plane of consistency'or 'plane of immanence'both explainsthe relationship between these two ways of thinking and revealsmore fully the creative potentialevidentin thinking aboutthe world. A plane of immanencecan be conceivedas a surfaceupon which all eventsoccur, where eventsare understoodas chance,productive interactions betweenforcesof all kinds. As such, it representsthc field of bccoming,a 'spircc'containingall of rhc possibilitics inhcrcntin firrccs.

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On this plane,all possibleeventsare brought together,and new connectionsbetweenthem madeandcontinuouslydissolved.To think of this field of possibilitiesmeansarrangingit accordingto someconcept(in Deleuze's specificsenseof the word), thereby constructing a temporary and virtual arrangementaccordingto causal,logical and temporal relations.Such thinking is alwaysa responseto some particular set of circumstances, which might be as complex as a philosophicalinquiry or as seemingly simple as feeling hungry. In the former instance,one might constructa complexmodel to which one returns time and again over the courseof one's life whereas,in the latter, it might involve no more than acting to satisfy hunger. In either case,though, one's world is organisedanew aroundsomerelevantconceptor setof concepts,suchthat a new planeof immanenceis constructed,providingthe temporaryconsistencyof thinking upon which meaningdepends. For Deleuze,philosophyis all aboutthe creationof new concepts.Each new conceptcreatesa new plane;that is, a new imageof thought providing theoreticalconsistencyfor how life is experiencedand understood.For example,the cogitoof Ren6Descarteswasthe essentialpreconditionupon which the Cartesianunderstandingof the world could be developedand its conceptsusedas explanatorytools.Deleuzeholds that, by thinking in new waysand proposingnew concepts,everygreatphilosophycreatesits own planeof immanence.The planecan only be definedin terms of the conceptsoperatingupon it, and the concept canonly havemeaningrelative to the,forcesat work on the plane.The conceptsact like 'coordinates' for thinking,providingpointsof focusfor realisingthe potentialof chance eventsoccurring upon the plane. Deleuzeusesthe imageof the planequite variously.In his Bergsonian model of recollection,for instance,Deleuzerefersto 'planes'and 'sheets' of memories.His explorationsof art refer to a 'plane of percepts',and A Thousand. Plateausis structured around a range of planesthat seemto ground life and thinking. However,the key characteristicsascribedto a planeare alwaysconsistent.First, a planeis alwaysa virtual construction ratherthan an actualone,unextendedin spaceand imperceptible.Second, production upon a plane (that is, interconnectionof events)occursat a 'speed'specificto the particular terms of the changesinvolved.Third, a plane is not the theoreticalfield of some pre-existing subject or self. Nothing is superior to the plane'smovement.Fourth, a plane doesnot precedethe connectionsand synthesesbrought aboutbetweeneventsby a concept,but is constructedpreciselyas they are created.Taken together, thcsccharactcristics comprisea plane's'immanence'. Vcry latc in his carccr,Delcuzcraiscda rangcof new issueswhen he 'l'hc implicrrtions of'thisconrplcx wrotcitbout"l'l lli plrtncof immirncncc',

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variantof the model are debatable.Deleuzeclearlydoesnot meansome superiorplaneupon which particular planes(of conceptualconsistency, art or memory,for example)are inscribed.Rather,he seemsto be pointing out that there is a planeof immanenceimmanentto all thinkableplanes, such that eachplaneis merelyone centreof activity or perspective.THE planeis the field of all events.As such,the unity of rhe cosmosought not to be thought assometranscendentcontainingthe immanent, but only the immanentitself conceivedasthe transcendentally necessary conditionfor all life: everythingis unified in so far aseverythingis becomingand flux. whilst this notion is certainlynor new in itself,the modelof the planedoes provide a new imagefor thinking about the universalityof immanent production and becoming. Connectives Art Becoming Concept Event Immanence Memory

PLATEAU Tamsin Lorraine Rather than plotting points or fixing an order,Deleuzeand Guattari wrote their book, A ThousandPlateaus,as a rhizome composedof (plateaus'. They claim that the circular form they gave it was ,only for laughs' (D&G 1987:22).The plateausaremeantto be readin any order and each plateau can be related to any other plateau. Deleuze and Guattari cite Gregory Bateson'suse of the word 'plateau' to designatea ,continuous, self-vibratingregion of intensities'that doesnot developin terms of a point of culminationor an externalgoal.Plateausareconstitutedwhenthe elementsof a region(for example,the microsensations of a sexualpractice or the micreperceptionsof a mannerof attending)arenot subjectedto an externalplan of organisation.An externalplan imposesthe selectionof someconnectionsrather than othersfrom the virtual relationsamongthe elementsthat could be actualised,actualisingvarying capacitiesto affcct and be affectedin thc process.A plateauemergcswhen the singulariticsof an indiviclurrl
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affairsareput into play through the actualisationof connectionsthat defy the impositionof externalconstraints(for example,tantric sexualpractices in which orgasmis not the goal or meditativestatesthat deliberatelyavoid goal-orientedthinking). Deleuzeand Guattari deliberatelyavoidedwriting I Thousand, Plateausin a stylethat movesthe readerfrom oneargumentto the next, until all the argumentscanbe gatheredtogetherinto the culminatingargumentof the bookas a whole.Insteadthey presentfifteen plateausthat aremeantto instigateproductive connectionswith a world they refuseto represent.Throughout Deleuze'swork and his work with Guattari,he and Guattari createphilosophicalconceptsthat they do not want to pin down to any one meaning. Insteadthey let their conceptsreverberate,expressingsomeofthe variations in their sensethroughthe shiftingcontextsin which they areput to use.In A Thousand, Plateaus,they characterisesuchconceptsasfragmentarywholes that canresonate in a powerful,openWholethat includesall the conceptson one and the sameplane.This planethey call a 'planeof consistency' or 'the (D&G planeof immanence planomenon' 1987:35). of concepts,the Deleuze and Guattari advocateconstructinga Body without Organs (BwO) and 'abstractmachines'(with a 'diagrammatic'function D&G 1987:cf. 189-90)that put into play forcesthat are not constrainedby the habitual forms of a personalself or other 'molar' forms of existence. A BwO is a plateauconstructedin terms of intensitiesthat reverberatein keepingwith a logic immanentto their own unfoldingrather than conventional boundariesof self and other. An abstractmachine 'placesvariables of contentand expressionin continuity'(D&G 1987:5l l). It (for example, the Galileoabstractmachine)emergeswhen variablesof actionsand passions (the telescope,the movementof a pendulum, the desireto understand) are put into continuous variation with incorporeal eventsof sense (Aristotelianmechanicsand cosmology,Copernicanheliocentrism),creating effectsthat reverberatethroughoutthe socialfield (D&G 1987:cf. 5l l). There are variouswaysin which an assemblage's capacityto increaseits number of connectionsinto a plane of consistencycan be impeded; creative connectionscan be replacedwith blockages,strata, 'black holes', or the that multipliesconnectionsapproaches 'lines of death'.An assemblage 'living abstractmachine'(D&G 1987:513). Connectives Actuality lllack hole Rhizomc Wholc

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PLATO (c. 428-c.348 nc) Alison Ross Plato's philosophy exerts a profound influenceover modern thought. ImmanuelKant's 'Copernicanrevolution'in philosophywas styledas an invertedPlatonismin which the dependence of a finite consciousness on sensibleforms to think ideasreversedthe Platonichierarchybetweenthe intelligible and the sensible.Friedrich Nietzsche,who found Kanr's critical philosophy inadequatefor such a reversalon account of the primacy in Kant of the moral idea,definedthe task of the philosophyof the furure as the'reversalof Platonism'inwhich the distinctionbetweenthe realandthe apparentworldswouldbe abolished.DeleuzefollowsNietzschein this task of a reversalof Platonism,but also refines the 'abstract' Nietzschean formula of this task by askingabout the motivationof Platonism.In his analysisof this motivationDeleuzefindsin Plato,unlikeNietzsche's(external' critique,the conditionsfor the reversalof Platonism.For this reason, Deleuze'sreversalof Platonismis also better equippedto critique the dualistontologyof Platonismthat continuesto operatein Kant. The motive of Plato'stheory of the Ideasneedsto 'be soughtin a will to selectand to choose'lineagesand 'to distinguishpretenders'(D 1990: 2534).In Plato,the hierarchythat distinguishesIdeasfrom modelsand copiesdescribes a degradation ofuse andknowledge. Accordingto Plato,the sensibleworld is derivedfrom and modelledasa 'copy' on the realmof the Ideas.'Copies',that comprisethe sensibleworld, mark a gradeddescent awayfrom therealmof theIdeasto themerely'apparent' world of the senses. The copyingof thesecopiesin art marksa further declinein ontology(use) and epistemology(knowledge).In the Republic,the mimetic mechanismof art leadsto Plato'shostility to art as a 'copy of a copy' and to the dramatic arts in particularwhich dissimulatetheir statusasa copyof a copy.The Idea of 'a bed' is a modeluntrammelledby sensibilityand containsonly thosefeaturesthat are the necessary conditionsfor any bed (that it is a structureable to supportthe weightof a person).A sensible'copy'of this ldeanecessarily placescertainlimitationson this form by makingit a certainheight and colour.However,the painterwho paintsa copy of this bed copiesall the things about the bed that are inessentialto its use (that it is a particular colour,a particularheight,in a particularsetting),but is unableto copyany of thosefeaturesof the bed that relateto its function(that it hasa structure ableto supportthe weightof a person).The restrictionof paintingto the copyingof the mereappearance of the objectshows,for Plato,that thc artist producesthings whose internal mechanismsthey arc ignorant of. This dcgradltionofiltsclncl knowlcdgc in thc fabricrrtccl objcctnrlkcsrrt I futilc,

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but harmlessactivity.Dramatic poetry,however,is dangerousbecauseit proof dramaticpoetry ducesa spectacle ableto suspenddisbelief.The spectators areinductedinto the world of the performancewherean actor playingthe roleof a statesman or a philosopher'is' this role.For Platothis dissimulation of its statusasa copyrendersdramaticpoetry dangerousto the proper order it trainsin the soulsof its citizensa disregardfor the disof the Statebecause tinctionbetweenthe true and falsecopy.This distinctionin Platobetweena harmlesscopy and the malevolentcopy,that itself becomesa model, is the key to Deleuze'sproject of a 'reversalof Platonism'. According to Deleuze the pertinent distinction for the reversal of The simulacraare those Platonismis not model-copybut copy-simulacra. falsecopiesthat place'in questionthe verynotationsof copyandmodel'and by Deleuzeastherepresthe'motivation'ofPlato'sphilosophyis transcribed sionof the simulacrain favourof the copies(D 1990:256-7).Simulacraare imageswithoutresemblance to theIdea.As suchtheyunderminethedualism betweenIdea and imagein Platonicthought, which regulatesand grades to the Ideas.It is relationof resemblance termsaccordingto a presupposed becausethe simulacraare not modelled on the Idea that their pretension, their merely externalresemblanceto the Idea, is without foundation.But it that the simulacrasuggest is alsobecauseof this merelyexternalresemblance a conceptionof the world in which identity follows 'deep disparity', and contestthe conceptionof the world in which differenceis regulatedaccording to a prior similitude (D 1990: 261). Thus, Deleuze's'reversalof Platonism'assertsthe rightsof the simulacraoverthe copy.He arguesfor a pop art ableto 'be pushedto the point whereit changesits nature'asa copy of a copy(Platonism)to be 'reversedinto the simulacrum'(anti-Platonism) (D 1990:265).In this way,the essence-appearance or model-copydistinctions usedby modern philosophersto tacklePlatoare shownby Deleuze's genealogyof Plato to be ineffectivein reversingPlatonism. Connectives Kant Nietzsche Thought

POLITICS + ECOLOGY RosiBraidotti Adlpting llaruch Spinoza'smonism to an ccosophyof transccndcnttl incorpornting cmpiricism,l)clcuzcconstructsthc conccptof''inrnrlncncc':

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strainsof vitalismand yet still bypassingessentialism. Choosingto move beyond the dualism of human/non-human,Deleuze'secosophyrejects liberal individualismas much as it does the holism of 'deep ecology'. Primarily,the ecosophyof Deleuzeaspiresto expressthe rhizomaticstructure of subjectivity.The subject'smind is 'part of nature'- embeddedand embodied- that is to sayimmanentand dynamic.As the structureof the Deleuziansubjectis interactive,it is inherently ethical.In this manner, when Deleuzeimbues ethical agencywith an anti-essenrialist vision of 'commitment'he accordinglydisplacesthe anthropocentricbias of communitarianism. The ecosophical ethicsof Deleuzeincorporaresthe physicsand biology of bodiesthat togetherproduceethologicalforces.Insteadof the essentialist question-'What is a body?'- Deleuzeprefersto inflect his questions slightlydifferently.He asks:'What cana body candol'and'How much can a body can take?'.We are thereforeinvited ro think about the problemof ecosophyin terms of affectivity:How is affectivityenhancedor impoverished?In this way,ethicalvirtue,empowerment,joy andunderstandingare implied. However,an act of understandingdoes not merely entail the mental acquisitionof certain ideas, but it also coincideswith bodily processes. It is thus an activity that actualises what is goodfor the subject, for examplepotentia.Mind and body act in unisonand are synchronised by what Spinozacallsconatus,that is to saythe desireto becomeand to increasethe intensityof one'sbecoming. The selectionof compositepositivepassions,that constituteprocesses of becoming,worksasa matterof affectiveandcorporealaffinity.An ethical relation is conduciveto joyful and empoweringencountersthat express one'spotentiaand increasethe subject'scapacityto enter into further relations.This expansionis boundboth spatially(environmental)and remporally (endurance).By entering into ethical relations,nomadicbecomings engenderpossiblefutures in that, as they produceconnections,they in turn producethe affectivepossibilityof the world asa whole. Vitalist ecosophyalso functionsto critique advancedcapitalism;more specificallycapitalistconsumerismand the over-indulgentconsumptionof resources. As a temporalsequence, capitalismengenders the schizophrenic simultaneityof oppositeeffectsand thereforeit short-circuitsthe present. Thus, it immobilisesasit saturatesthe socialspacewith commodities.The temporal disjunction induced by the speedyrurnover of availablecommodities is not different from the jet-lag one suffers after flying from London to Sydney.Capitalisminducesa perverselogic of desirebasedon the deferral of pleasurefulfilment, deferring the gratificationonto thc of tcchnological 'next generation' commoditics andgadgcts:thc picccmcal instalmcnts of popillarculturcin thc filrm of''infirtirinmcnt'thirtbccomc

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obsolete at the speed of light. These legal addictions titillate without release,inducing dependencywithout any senseof responsibility.This mixture of dependencyand dissatisfactionconstitutespower as a nucleus of negativepassions, suchasresentment,frustration,envyand bitterness. Deleuze'secosophyof radical immanenceand intensivesubjectsresponds to the unsustainable logic and internal contradictionsof advanced capitalism.This Deleuzianbody is in fact an ecologicalunit. Through a structureof mutual flowsand data-transfer,one that probablyis bestunderstoodin referenceto viral contaminationor intensiveinterconnection,this body is environmentallyinterdependent.This environmentally-bound intensivesubjectis a collectiveentity; it is an embodied,affectiveand intelligent entity that captures,processesand transforms energiesand forces. Being environmentally-boundand territorially-basedit is immersed in fieldsthat constantlyflow and transform. All in all, Deleuzeexpandsthe notion of universalismto be more inclusive.He doesthis in two ways.First, by affirming biocentredand transspeciesegalitarianismasan ethicalprinciple,he opensup the possibilityof conceptualising a post-humanity.Second,a new senseof globalinterconnectionis established asthe ethicsfor non-unitarysubjects,emphasisinga commitmentto others(includingthe non-human,non-organicand 'earth' others).By removingthe obstacleof self-centredindividualism,the politics of Deleuzianecosophyimplies a new way of combininginterestswith an enlargedsenseof community.Deleuze insists that it is the task of philosophyto createforms of ethicaland politicalactivitiesthat respondto the complex and multilayered nature of 'belonging'. In other words, philosophyin the handsof Deleuzebecomesa nomadicecosophyof multiple beings.

POSTCOLONIAL THEORY VerenaConlejt Postcolonial theory is derived from terms such as 'minoritarian', 'nomadism', 'becoming' and their variants. A worldwide becomingminoritarian bearsa potential Qpuissance or virtuality) that can affectbodies politics, and words.The contextis oneof sexual of underminingthe power (pouaoiror givenforce)of the white malewho hasorder-wordsat his disposal.Minorities havenothing to do with numbersbut with internalrelations. Of importancc are the connectionsbetween bodies and words, cspccially conjunctivcfrrrms(suchils'and' and 'plus')that irugmcntvaluc to thc tcrmsbctwccnwhichtlrcylrc firund.l')vcrynujor hnguirgcis ridcllcd

2r2

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with minor languagesthat transform order-wordsand deterritorialise or dispersetheir mortifying effects.The more a languagehasthe characteristics of a major language,the more,toq it is affectedby continuousvariations that transform it into a 'minor' language.Insteadof criticising the worldwide imperialism of English in our time by denouncingthe corruption it introducesinto other languages,one can say that the idiom is necessarily workedupon by all the minorities of the world that imposediverseprocedures of variation:in the handsof minoritariansEnglish becomes-pidgin, a form that mocksits lawsandstricturesandreterritorialises it for newends. It is clearthat two languages neverexistadjacentto eachother,and that as a resulttwo idiomsarereallyonly two treatmentsof the samelanguage. Ratherthanoperatingbetweensomethingseenand somethingsaid,languagegoesfrom sayingto saying,utteranceto utterance,and from aphorism to aphorism.Postcolonialtheory does not deal with the 'look' of phenomenologybut with the transmissionof language.It dealsespecially with the order-word,or password,that it replaceswith passages. When, in passage a to the limit, languagelosesits fixed meaning,bodiesenter into a processof metamorphosis.They losetheir identities and becomecommon and totalised,the idioms of everybody(tout le monde). The becoming-minoritarianof bodiesand languageis linked to creativity. Literature is a privileged field for a becoming-minoritarian.A minor literature works the maior languagefrom the inside. In a postcolonial context,minor literaturedealswith the undoingof the majorlanguage, not by reterritorialisingby mere usage of a dialect but by transforming imposedor inheritedorder-wordsthat giveit meaningand direction. The processof becoming-minoritariancan be acceleratedby what Deleuzecallsthe'war machine'.That is, the axiomaticof the white,monolingual,English-speaking maleand the worldwideinstitutionof capitalism needsto be challenged.It is only by leaving,and by neverceasingto leave, the plan(e)of capitalthat masses from the Third World and the ex-colonies shift the forcesin the dominantequilibrium. If minoritiesdo not constitute viableStatesin a cultural,political,or economicsense,it is because the State-form,the axiomaticrule of capitaland their correspondingculture may not be appropriatefor them. Capitalismmaintainsand organisesnonviable States for the precise purpose of crushing minorities. Devolving upon minorities is the task of countering the worldwide war machine by meansothor than thoseits juggernaughtimposesupon them. To becoming-minoritarianis tantamountto undoing closuresand transforming striatedspacesinto smoothand unimpededspaceswhere words and bodiesmoveat top speedin an ongoingproc€ssof deterritorialisation. Becoming-minoritarianis linked to physicaland mental nomrdism. I'br nomtds,contrirryto migrirntswho g
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point they reach is a relay. Nomads and migrants can mix, yet their conditions are not the same.The nomads' trajectory distributes people. Sedentaryor dominant spaceis striated with walls and roads. Nomadic spaceis markedonly by'traits'that areeffacedand displacedby the movement of trajectories.The nomad doesnot want to leavethe smooth space left by the receding forest where the desert advances.Nomadism is inventedasa responseto this challenge.Nomadshaveabsolutemovement, that is, speedwhich is intensive.The migrants' movementsare extensive. Vorticalor swirlingmovementis an essentialfeatureof the war machineof the nomad. Contrary to the migrants who reterritorialisethemselves, nomadsfind themselvesin ongoingdeterritorialisation. In an era of global capitalismorder-wordsare the sameeverywhere. Minoritarian massesare at the sametime engagedin a worldwideprocess of becomingand in a creativetransformationof the order-wordsimposed in the nameof democraticcapitalism.Postcolonialtheory,arguesDeleuze, is built from these processes.Its practice assumesdifferent forms and shapesaccordingto the natureofgeography,historyand the inheritedconditions of conflict. Connectives Creativetransformation Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Minoritarian

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Alberto Toscano The post-structuralist,or evenanti-structuralist,characterof Deleuzeand Guattari can be said to rest on four elements:a theory of subjectivation, a critique of the notion of ideology,the ontologyof control and an analysisof capitalism.Deleuze'spost-structuralismis bestgauged,not only by his attack on structuralismin the 1970s,but by consideringhis earlier appropriation of structuralist themes, especiallyhis formulation of the fundamental criteria for structuralism in 'How do we Recognize Structuralism?'(1967,seeStivale1998).This essaystandsout for its attention to how structuralismarticulatesthe empty placeat the heart of the symbolic,the accidentsof structure (or spatio-temporaldynamisms)and pcrhapsthc kcy issuc irn instirnccof subjcctivity. Rlr Dclcuzc,it inclicatcs of thc politiurl,undcrstoodrrsthc problcmof novclty(or bccoming),

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By portraying the structuralist subject (or hero) as comprising impersonalindividuations and pre-individual singularities,affectedby eventsimmanentto the structure,Deleuze,in 1967, formulatedone of the few,if not the only, consistentdefinition of post-structuralism.By emphasising the importanceof praxis in the mutation of structures,Deleuzelays the ground for a conceptionof politics that leavesstructuralismbehind. Treating the unconscious,with Guattari, as a factory driven by flows of Deleuzebreakswith the desire,rather than asa theatreof representation, whole thematic of ideology (and its critique) that defined the FreudoMarxism of the 1960s(and thus continuedhis earlierempiricistconcern with institutionsand jurisprudence).The emphasison a sub-representational, libidinal dimensionto socialand psychic(re)productionheraldeda movefrom a focuson structuresto what might be calleda constructivistor ethologicalapproach,aimed at discerningthe modalitiesof synthesisat work in the collectiveproduction of subjectivity.Accompanyingthis shift wasone from an earlierconcernwith problemsof organisationand genesis to (seethe discussionof the ideaof revolutionin DffirenceandRepetition) plane (haecceities) populating immaa of focus forms of individuation a on nencethat cannotbe capturedby any structureof placesand differences. By shifting the focusof an analysisof capitalismfrom value and labour to codificationand desire,whilst retaining many elementsof the Marxian problematic,Deleuzeand Guattarievadea dialecticalcorrelationof political subjectivityand systemicchange.Insteadthey prefer an inventoryof wherebydesiringsubjectivityis prothe typesof operations(or syntheses) duced and an outline of how capitalismand its Statesare able to axiomatise and capture subjectivity,in order to bend it to the imperativesof surplusvalue. Now it is the materialeffectsof the axiomatic(or of capitalistsubjectivity) on subjects,and not their placementin a structurethrough ideological interpellation that areat stake.It is not only from the sideof commandthat Deleuzeand the systemiccorrelation(whetherstructural or dialectical) betweenpoweror dominationand subjectivationareundermined.In their formulations of the conceptsof 'minority' and of the 'war machine', Deleuzeand Guattari alsodelineatethe constructiveautonomyor externality of certain forms of subiectivationto the mechanismsof control and exploitation.Rather than identifying the subject with an instancethat accompanies the structureand appropriatesit heroically,the minoritarian subject(or the subjectof the war machine)is definedby a line of flight, which signalsboth its capacityfor independentontologicalcreativityand the mannerin which it affectsthe societythat perpetuallyseeksto capture
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On the one hand, Deleuzeand Guattari'sphilosophyis determinedby an anti-dialecticalimpetus:to think the independenceof becoming,and the possibilityof an ethicsoutsideany frameworkof legitimationor regulation. Consider their separationof becoming and history, such that becoming-revolutionaryis a trans-temporal event that can detach itself from the fateof an actualrevolution.In conjuncturalterms,Deleuze'sdefinition of the society of control, following William S. Burroughs and Michel Foucault,arguesthat we areno longerin a situationwhere,evenat the formal level,we could speakof a correlation or transitivity betweenthe systemand its individual subjects.As mechanisms of disciplinecometo be superseded by technologiesof control, politicsis more and more a matter of 'dividuality', such that the impersonaland the pre-individualbecome the very materialof control,but alsoof minoritariansubjectivationand the constructionof effectivealternatives.Whence Deleuze'spreferencefor notionsof combator guerrillawarfareover thoseof antagonismor (class) struggle: for Delduze, the combat betweenand within individuals, as becoming,is the preconditionof the combatagainstor resistance. This is what differentiatescombat from war, which takesthe confrontationof subjectsasprimary.

POWER Claire Colebrook Although the conceptof powerin Frenchphilosophyis usuallyassociated with Michel Foucault,and althoughDeleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, Plateausareexplicitlycriticalof Foucault'suseof the word 'power' (rather than their own 'desire' which they seeas creatingrelations through which powermight operate),it makesa greatdealof senseto locateDeleuzewithin a tradition of the philosophyof power.This is not power in the political sense- a powerexercisedby one body overanotherbody - but is closerto the positiveidea of plver t0. Deleuze'santecedents in this tradition are BaruchSpinozaand FriedrichNietzsche.For Spinozaa beingis definedby its power,its striving or its potential to maintain itself. Rather than seeing human life ashavinga proper form which it then ought to realise,so that potentialwouldbe properlyorientedtowardsactualisation, Spinozaregards potentialityas creativeand expressive;if all life is the striving ro express substance in all its differentpotentialsthen the fulfilment or jo.yof human life is the cxpansionof power.Joy,as the realisationof power,is therefore diffcrcntfrom thc moral oppositionof grxrdirnclcvil, an oppositirlrr that powcrby constririning im;rcdcs it withinsomcrlrcirdygivcnnrlrnr.

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Nietzsche, whose 'Will to Power' for Deleuze is also an affirmation of life (and not the assertion or imposition of power), extended Spinoza's expressivephilosophy. Instead of there being bodies or enrities that have a certain power or potential, Nietzsche begins with powers or forces, from which beings are effected. A master does not have power because he is a master; rather, it is the exercise of a certain power which produces masters and slaves.Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche is concerned primarily with Nietzsche as a philosopher of power and forces, where force has a strict metaphysical function. There are powers (or quanta of force) that in their encounter or connection with other powers produce relations, but nothing in the power itself determines how it will be actualised, and any power has the potential to be actualised differently. Deleuze's repeated insistence that relations are external to terms has a twofold significance. First, in line with a philosophy of power, Deleuze does not begin from beings that then enter into relations; rather, there are powers to be, powers that are actualised only in their relation to other powers. So what a power ej is secondaryto its potential; the virtual precedes the actual. Second, if powers are, in this world, actualisedin a certain way, through the particular relations that have been effected, it is also possible for different relations to produce different worlds; powers might be actualised through other relations. For Deleuze, power is positive; there are not beings who then have the power to act, or who then suffer from power (where power would be the corruption of, or fall from, some passivestate). Rather, a being is its power or what it can do. For Deleuze, then, power posesa problem: How is it that beings can be separated from their power? Why does power appear to be something from which we suffer; why does power seem to be repressive? For Deleuze, this is becausewe rest too easily with the effects of power its manifestations, what we already are - without intuiting power's force how points of power emerge, what we might be, and what we can do. More importantly, and following Nietzsche, Deleuze makesan ethical distinction between active and reactive powers. An active power maximises its potential, pushes itself to its limit and affirms the life of which it is but one expression.A reactive power, by contrast, turns back upon itself. The usual concept of political power is reactive.We imagine - from the image of individuals who exist together in a possible community - that we then need to form some form of political relation or system (so power in this senseis power between or among beings). But there can only be a polity or individual beings ifthere has already been an active power that has crcirtcclsnch a community or assemblagcof pcrsons;oncc wc rcaliscthis thcn wc nright think of politics ts thc rccrcafion
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- referto theentrieson 'art', 'faciality', PROUST, MARCEL (1871-1922) and'thought'. 'multiplicity','semiotics'

PSYCHOANALYSIS _ FAMILY, FREUD, AND UNCONSCIOUS Alison Ross Farnily theory;its The 'family' hasa pivotalconceptualrole within psychoanalytic primacy in psychoanalysis is neither limited to the bourgeoisnuclear family nor the therapeuticpracticeof analysisthat dealswith it. Rather, through the organisingrole given by Sigmund Freud to the Oedipus complex,the 'family' actsasan explanatorymodel for the organisationof desirein the individual- asseenin his therapeuticpractice- but extends aswell to the historicalforcesinvolvedin the shapingof instinct described writings on civilisation. in his meta-psychological The Oedipuscomplexintroducesthe senseof an externalprohibition under which infantilelibido is definitivelyshaped.The significanceof this complex is that unlike the other forcesshapingthe libido, which Freud describesasstandingin a relationof psychicaloppositionto unrestrained expenditureand which appearto be internally generated,the Oedipus the tricomplextakesthe form of an externalprohibition and presupposes angularrelationbetweenthe child and its parents.The universalityof this complexis usedby Freud to explainthe agencyagainstincestthat setsup the necessary division for civilisationbetweenwishesand the law Its universalityis alsoindicativeof the primacyof the family unit asan explanatory categoryin psychoanalysis. The libidinal relationswithin the family havea crucialrole to play asthe prototypcfor adult relations,in which an externalprohibitionorganises It is importirntto remember,however, rttcmptsirt instinctuals:rtisflaction. upon arrirctuirlnuclcurf'anrily tlut lhcsclillidinrrltics rrrcnot clcpcnclcnt li;ltrrcot' rrrrdllrrrsrrrr()ctlillrrscorrrlllcxt'rrrrbc lirrrttctlwilh it llitlct'ttitl

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structureof authority,or, in the work of JacquesLacan, an institutional force such as language,rather than an actualfather.Here, as in Freud's writings on phylogenesis, the important themein the negotiationof libidinousrelationswithin the family is the credenceof the threatof the prohibition placed on incestuous relations. The writings on the topic of phylogenesisexamine a similar theme in the prohibitive force of the 'primal father' over the'primal horde'. In Deleuze's writing on psychoanalysis,he attacks the use of the model of the Oedipal family becausehe seesit as justifying a particular for instance,he and Guattari conceptionof desire.In the Anti-Oed,ipu.s, complainnot only aboutthe unhistoricalprojectionof the familial structure acrosscultures and history, so that some psychoanalystslocate the figure of the 'primal father' in Neo- and Paleolithic times, but alsq that the psychoanalyticuse of a familial structure containsdesire to sexual relations within the family. These relations do not simply constitute desirein relation to the shapingforce of an externalprohibition but also mark out intellectual,political and cultural formationsassubstitutesthat compensatefor the prohibition placed on desire by the incest taboo. Against the 'daddy-mummy-me' formation of desire described in Freud's case study of little Flans, or the explanation of Leonardo da Vinci's curiosity in terms of his infantile memories, they propose a defamilialisationof desire and consecratethose writers, such as D. H. Lawrence, who write against the trap of familialism. In particular, Deleuze and Guattari are critical of the interpretativelicencegiven to psychoanalysisby its postulate of the familial organisationof desire: through this postulate, psychoanalysisneither explains desire nor renders cultural formations legible but, on their view, justifies the misinterpretation of desireas a libidinal force capturedwithin and shaped by familial dynamics. This critique of the psychoanalyticaccountof the family derivesits force from Deleuzeand Guattari'sanalysisof the reterritorialisingfunction of capitalism in the two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophrenia. Capital operatesaccording to a logic of deterritorialisation in which the flowsofcapital areno longerextractedfrom agricultural labour,but, rather than being tied to the produceof the land, are transnationalor global. Although capitaltendstowarda deterritorialisation familof geographical, ial and sogialties,it defersthis limit by reiteratingartificialterritorialities. In this contextpsychoanalysis, but particularlyits useof the family asan explanatoryunit for desire,is criticisedasone of the paradigmaticmovementsby which the family is reiteratedand the logic of deterritorialising flowsis capturedby a function of reterritorialisation.

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Freud, Sigmund ( I 856-1939) Sigmund Freud wrote conventionalmedicalcasehistories;studiesin the particularcategoriesof psychoanalyticresearch:the unconscious,narcissism, dreamsand infantile sexuality;aswell asanalysesof cultural institutions and practicessuch as art and religion. His postulate of a repressed infantile sexualityat the core of the pathologiesof civilisedlife led to his isolationfrom the medicalestablishment.This postulate,which formed towardculthe basisfor the interpretativeposturetakenby psychoanalysis its counter-cultural underpinned material, also tural and therapeutic status.Freud's approachto art and religion was,for instance,a radically demystifying one, which held that religious belief was an infantile desire for an irreproachablefather figure and that the products of high culture were financed by, and legible as, displacedlibidinal drives. Deleuze, however,is scepticalof the radical statusclaimed by Freudian psychoanalysis.His criticismsof Freud relateto the way he insistson the Oedipal orderingof desire,evendespitethe questionsraisedagainstit by clinical of other psychoanalysts. evidenceand the researches important pointsof departurefor someof Deleuze'sideas Nonetheless, can be found in Freud's thought. In the two volumes of Capitalismand and Guattari try to marry Freud's conceptionof Schizophrenia,Deleuze libidinal flowswith Karl Marx's conceptionof capital.This project,which refusesthe dualismbetweenpsychicand materialreality,involvesa recuperationof someof the elementsin Freudianthought. Hence they reject the way desire'sproductivity is confinedto a psychicalreality,but in so doing they developand radicalisethe Freudian insight that wrests desire from pre-ordainedfunctions such asreproduction. Asidefrom rejectingthe impotent,psychicalconfinementof desire,the constantcomplaintof the authorsin this studyagainstFreud concernshis willingnessto acceptEugeneBleuler'snegativeaccountof schizophrenics asautisticfigureswho are cut off from reality.Even here,however,Freud alsoprovidesan important point of departurefor their defenceof schizophrenia.They argueagainstconfusing,asFreud does,the'clinical'schizophrenic who is rendered ill and autistic with the connective practice of desire,which fusesconventionallysegregatedstatesand producesassemIn this project,they blagesthat they believearemodelledin schizophrenia. follow the practicein someof Freud's writing in which literary and cultural productionsbecomethe diagnosticsourceableto correctand develop 'clinical' terms.Hence,the evidenceof the schizopole of desireis found in Antonin Artaud and Henry Miller, ratherthan the clinicalcontextthat pathokrgiscs rncl rcndersimpotcntconnectivcdcsircs.

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This strategy,which formed the basisfor Deleuze'sunfinished'critique and clinical' project, callsinto questionsomeof the central diagnosticcategories of Freudian psychoanalysis.Freud's conception of 'sadomasochism'asa couplet,for instance,is refutedby Deleuze'sexamination in which he showssadism of the writing of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch rather than inverseand compleand masochismto be completelydistinct, mentarydisorders. Finally,Deleuze'scriticalrelationto Freud canbe summarisedin terms of the Freudian drive to teleology.In his meta-psychologyand therapeutic practice,what was of interest to Freud was an accountof the 'origins' For the psychoanalyst underpinningcurrent circumstances. 'origins' play a role in two distinct senses:as an explanatorymodel that the analyst, blockedfrom direct access,had to fathom - in this sensefinding the origin for the symptomsof neurosisalso has a curativefunction. But Freud's mode of accessto theseorigins,the interpretativeframe he usedto locate the eventsthat had becomepathogensin an individuals' life, ought not to obscurethe fact that the interpretative force he gaveto theseoriginating eventscameto be usedasa predictorfor developmentand a theory,therefore,of the differentcoursesit waspossiblefor psychiclife to follow.It is this teleological orientation and its installation of a dualism between 'nature' and 'civilisation'that Deleuzerejectsand that underpinshis critical reworkingof key Freudianideas. IJnconscious The'unconscious'inpsychoanalytic terminologyrefersto the accretionof instinctual drives that are repressedby the individual in the processof adaptationto social demands.Nonetheless,these drives remain active forceson the psycheandbehaviourof individuals.Dreams,parapraxisand somatic displacementsof instincts in casesof hysteria provide Freud with the proof of the unconscious not as a sealedoff locality, but as processes and lawsbelongingto a system.In Freud'sfirst topographyof the psychical apparatus(unconscious,pre-conscious,conscious),the unconsciousdesignatesthosecontentsbanishedby repressionfrom the pre-conscious--conscious system. In his second,dynamic conception of the psyche(id, ego, superego)the unconsciousis replacedby the id or instinctualpoleof the psyche.Here instinctshavethe statusof agenciesin the psychicalapparatus.In both cases,the dynamicrole of the unconscious or instincts takes psychoanalysis away from a descriptive,phenomenologicalapproachto the 'facts'of psychiclife, and designates the activerole of the analyst in the interpretation of the work of systematisation pcrftrrmcdby thc unconscious.

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of this psychoanalytic accountof the In Deleuze'sthought,heusesaspects unconsciousto argueagainstboth the conceptionof desireasconfiguredin principleof'lack', andthe interpsychoanalysis in relationto a transcendent pretativerelationto psychiclife that this relationlicenses.In Anti-Oedipus the 'desiringmachine'is modelledon a conceptionof the unconscious, which is without the regulatingfunctionof a limit that containsit to an indi- that it ascribedby Freud to the unconscious vidualsubject.The processes - dovetail operateswithoutconcedingto the demandsof socialacceptability with the features that Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to the desiring machines- thesemachinesform, for instance,conjunctivesynthesesthat operateaccordingto an expansive senseof possibility.However,insteadof an impotent manifestationof unrealisablewishes, interpretable by psychoanalysisin the form of their distorted manifestationin consciouslife, the desiringmachinesaredefinedin termsof their capacityto forgelinks to an outsideand thereforein terms of their capacityto surpassthe regulating force of a higher principle (such as the superego)or natural limit. Reinterpretedin theseterms,the unconscious is not an interior localeonly ableto be interpretedin its impotent and distortedformations,but is the or made. logicaccordingto which anarchicconnectionsareassembled positive psychoanalytic give a accountof the Although desiringmachines the term 'unconscious'is not directly transcategoryof the unconscious, posableto that of the 'desiringmachine',or the term 'assemblage' usedin A ThousandPlateaus.This is becausethe unconsciousdesignateswhat gets left overin the process of the constructionor shift from onemachine/assemis not reconcilable blageto another.In suchuses,however,the unconscious to the Freudianconceptionof a registerof submergedaffects,but refersto prior, fractal,materialcomponentsof desiringmachines/assemblages.

Connectives Desire Lacan PartialObjects Schizoanalysis

REA(;'tIVli - rcf'crto thc cntrv on 'itctivc/rcilctivc'.

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REAL James Williams Deleuzesubyertsthe concept'real' throughhis distinctiondrawnbetween the 'actual'andthe'virtual'. For him, the actualis morelike what we would ordinarilyunderstandasthe real,that is, a realmof thingsthat existindependently of our ways of thinking about them and perceivingthem. Whereasthe virtual is the realmof transcendental conditionsfor the actual, that is, thingsthat we haveto presuppose for thereto be actualthingsat all. More seriously,with respectto any discussionof his work in terms of realism,Deleuzedeniesany priority accordedto human subjects,to their minds, ideas,perceptualapparatuses or linguistic capacities.If we traditionally frame the oppositionbetweenreal and unreal through the distinction drawn betweena thing that is dependenton us (the chair I dream of, or imagine)and an independenrexistenr(the real chair),then we shall havestartedwith a conceptualframework that doesnot fit Deleuze'sphilosophywell at all. Rather, Deleuze provides us with critical angles against traditional realismand a new metaphysicalframework for developinga conceptof the real. Accordingto this conceprthe real is the virtual and the actual.It is hencebetterto think of realthingsin termsmoreof completethingsrather than independentones.Note that this commits Deleuze to degreesof realityand unrealityor illusion.We shouldnot sayrealor unreal,bur more or lessreal,meaninga more or lesscompleteexpressionof the thing. It is questionablewhetherwe can saythat a thing is completelyreal,in Deleuze'swork, other than the metaphysicalstatementthat the real is all of the actualand of the virtual. Wheneverwe givean expressionof a thing it will be under an individual form of expressionthat allowsfor further completion.More importantly,that completionwill involve a synthetic alterationof the componentsof any earlierreality,to the point whereno componentcanbe claimedto be finally realor complete. For example,for Deleuze,a mountainexistsasrealwith all the waysit has beenpainted,sensed,written aboutand walkedover.It alsoexistswith all the virtual conditionsfor them, such asideasand different intensitiesof sensations. The real mountain changescompletelywhen it is paintedand sensed anew:whenits namechanges,whenit is mined,or movedthroughdifferently. This meansthat traditionalformsof realismarecomplerelyat oddswith Deleuze'sphilosophy,sincethe notion that the realstandsin oppositionto somethingunrealor imaginaryalreadysetsthe real as somethingincomplete.So to speakof thc realchairasif it couldbe identifiedinclcpcndcntly of onr idcrslbout'it is rr mistarkc conccrningthc significirncc of'things,

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Reality goeshand in hand with ideal and emotional effects,rather than being free of them. Does this mean that Deleuze is an idealist, denying the existenceof an independentexternal reality and bringing all things into the mind? Deleuze'sphilosophyis beyondthe idealistand realistdistinction.There are actualthings and we should pay attention to them. Without them it doesnot makesenseto speakof virtual ideasor intensities.But, reciprocally,it makesno senseto speakof real or actualthings asif they could be abstractedfrom the idealand emotionalfieldsthat makethem live for us.

Connectives Actuality Virtual/Virtuality

REICH, WILHELM

(1897-1957)- referto the entry on 'schizoanalysis'.

REPETITION Ad,rian Parr The conceptof 'repetition',asit appearsin the Deleuziancorpus,encompassesa variety of other conceptssuch as 'difference','differentiation', 'deterritorialisation',and 'becoming'.To begin with, it should be noted that for Deleuze,repetitionis not a matterof the samething occurringover and over again. That is to say,repetition is connectedto the power of differencein terms of a productiveprocessthat producesvariationin and through every repetition. In this way, repetition is best understoodin terms of discoveryand experimentation;it allowsnew experiences, affects and expressionsto emerge.To repeatis to begin again;to affirm the power of the new and the unforeseeable. In so far as life itself is describedas a dynamic and active force of repetition producing difference,the force of which Deleuze encouragesus to think of in terms of 'becoming', forces incorporate differenceas they repeatgiving rise to mutation. The first question that arises is: How is repetition produced?For Deleuze, repetition is produced via difference, not mimesis. It is a processof ungrounding that resiststurning into an inert systemof replication.In fact,thc wholePlatonistideaof rcpcatingin ordcr to producc copicsis complctcly unclcrmincclby l)clcuzc. lior l)clcuzc maintirins

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this approachis deeplyflawedbecauseit subsumesthe creativenature of differenceunder an immobile systemof resemblance.Deleuze refusesto seekan originary point out of which repetition can cyclically reproduce itself. He insists that the processdoes not depend upon a subject or object that repeats, rather it is self-sustainable.Whilst repetition is potentially infinite, consistingof new beginnings,it is crucial we do not mistake this to be a linear sequence:the end of one cycle marking the beginningof the next. In his innovativediscussionsof Friedrich Nietzsche'sconceptof the eternalreturn, Deleuzeturns his backon a teleologicalunderstandingof repetition condemning such interpretations to be flawed. Instead, he insiststhat the processNietzscheoutlines is considerablymore complicated than that: the return is an activeaffirmation that intensifiesas it returns. Put differently, heterogeneityarisesout of intensity. In addition, the return pointsto a wholethat emergesthroughdifferenceand variation: one and the multiple in combination.In his readingof Nietzsche,Deleuze explainsin his 1968work Dffirenceand,Repetitionthatthis is the'power of beginningand beginningagain'(D 1994:136). This now leadsus on to the secondquestion:What is repeated? First, it is important to notethat repetitionis not unidirectional,thereis no object of repetition,no final goaltowardwhich everythingthat repeatscanbe said to direct itself. What repeats,then, is not models,stylesor identitiesbut the full force of differencein and of itself, thosepre-individualsingularities that radicallymaximisedifferenceon a plane of immanence.In an earlyessayfrom 1956on Henri Bergson,Deleuzeinsistsrepetitionis more a matterof coexistence than succession, which is to say,repetitionis virtual more than it is actual.It is this innovativeunderstandingof the processof difference and differentiation that mutates the context through which repetitionoccurs. Thus, in a very real sense,repetitionis a creativeactivityof transformation. When Deleuzespeaksof the 'new' that repetition invokes,he is likewise pointing to creativity, whereby habit and convention are both destabilised. The'new', for Deleuze,is filled with innovationand actually preventsthe trap of routines and clich6s; the latter characterisehabitual waysof living. As a power of the new,repetition callsforth a terr&incognita filled with a senseof noveltyandunfamiliarity.For instance,this is a far cry from Sigrqund Freud who posited that we compulsivelyrepeat the past, whereall the materialof our repressedunconsciouspushesus to reiterate the pastin all its discomfortand pain.Actually,psychoanalysis limits repetition to representation,and what therapyaims to do is stop the process entirelyalongwith the disordersit givesriseto. Deleuze,on the othcr hirnd, cncourirgcs us to rcpcirthccausc hc sccsin it thc possibilityof rcinvcntion,

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that is to say,repetitiondissolvesidentitiesasit changesthem, giving rise to somethingunrecognisableand productive. It is for this reasonthat he of transformation. maintainsrepetitionis a positivepower(puissance)

Connectives Active/Reactive Becoming Difference Eternalreturn Psychoanalysis

REPETITION + CINEMA Constantine Vereois and Cinema Deleuze'sbookson cinema- CinemaI: Themooement-image 2: Thetime-imoge- are about the possibility of 'repeating' a film (or films) within the institution of cinemastudies.As in RolandBarthes'accountof re-reading, this repetition would not be the re-presentation of identity (a re-discoveryof the same),but the re-production- the creationand the exhibition- of the differencethat lies at the heart of repetition (B 1974). For film studies,Deleuze'sCinemabookscanbe seenasan attempt to negotiate the tension between(film) theory and history via a non-totalising - the local conceptofdifference,one which canattendto the heterogeneity and specificrepetitions- of historicalmaterial. In Dffirence and,Repetition, Delettze puts forward two alternative theoriesof repetition. The first, a 'Platonic' theory of repetition, posits a world of difference based upon some pre-established similitude or identity; it definesa world of copies (representations).The second,a 'Nietzschean'theory of repetition suggeststhat similitude and identity is the product of some fundamental disparity or difference; it defines a world of simulacra(phantasms).Taking theseformulations as distinct interpretationsof the world, Deleuze describessimulacraas intensive systems constituted by the placing together of disparate elements. Within these differential series,a third virtual object (dark precursor, eternal return, abstract machine) plays the role of differenciator,the in-itself of difference which relates different to different, and allows divergcntscricsto rcturn asdivcrsityand its rc-production.As systcms thrrtincluclcwithin thcnrsclvcsthis diff'crcntialpoint of vicw,sinrultcrit

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c l Nrtre

evadethe limit of representation(the model of recognition)to effectthe intensity of an encounter with difference and its repetition, a pure becoming-in-the-world. The idea of the intensivesystem,and its frustration of any attempt to a hierarchyof identity and resemblance establishan order of succession, betweenoriginaland copy is nowheremoreevidentthan in the serialrepetition of new Hollywood cinema,especiallythe film remake.The majority of critical accountsof cinematic remaking understand it as a one-way process:a movementfrom authenticityto imitation,from the superiorselfof the remake.For identity of the original to the debasedresemblance instance,much of the discussionaroundthe 1998releaseof Gus Van Sant's closeremake('replica') of Alfred Hitchcock'sPsycho(1960)wasan expression of outrage and confusion at the defilementof a revered classic. that VanSantmadetwo fundamental Reviewers and 'Hitchcockians'agreed mistakes:the first, to haveundertakento remakea landmark of cinematic history; and the second,to have followed the Hitchcock original (almost) shotby shot,line by line.Evenfor thosewho notedthat the rpmakediffered in its detail from the Hitchcockfilm, the revisionsaddednothing to what remainedan intact and undeniableclassic,a semanticfixity (identity) against which the new versionwasevaluatedand dismissedasa degradedcopy. Rather than follow theseessentialisttrajectories,Deleuze'saccountof repetitionsuggeststhat cinematicremakingin its most generalapplication might - more productively- be regardedasa specificaspectof a broader and more open-endedintertextuality. A modern classic,Psychohas been retrospectivelycodedas the forerunnerto a cycleof slashermoviesinitiatedby Hallopeen(1978)andcelebratedin the sequelsand seriesthat followed.More particularly,the 1970sinterestin the slashermovie sub-genre sawthe characterof Norman Batesrevivedfor a number of Psychosequels notably QI-I\, and the Hitchcock original quoted in a host of homages, the films of Brian De Palma.Eachof theserepetitionscan be understood as a limited form of remaking,suggestingthat the precursor text is never singular, and that Van Sant's Psychoremake differs textually from these other examplesnot in bind,,but only in degree. While the aboveapproachestablishesa largecircuit betweenPsycho-60 andPsycho-98,there is anotherposition: namely,that Van Sant'sPsychois not close enough to the Hitchcock version.This suggestion- that an betweenthe mostmechanicalof irreduciblgdifferenceplayssimultaneously repetitions- is bestdemonstratedby an earlierremakeof Psycho,Douglas Gordon's24 Hour Psycho(1993).So namedbecauseit takestwenty-four hoursto run its course,Gordon'sversionis a videoinstallationthat re-runs Ps.ycho-60 ntapproximately two framesper second,just fastenoughfor cach imagcto bc pullcclforwardinto thc ncxt. Gordon'sstrltcgy clcmonstratcs

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that eachand every film is remade- dispersedand transformed- in its every new context or configuration.Gordon doesnot set out to imitate Psychobut to repeatit - to changenothing, but at the sametime allow an absolutedifferenceto emerge.Understood in this way,Psycho-98is not a perversionof an original identity,but the productionof a new event,one that addsto (ratherthan corrupts)the serialityof the former version.

REPRESENTATION lohn Marks 'Representation',for Deleuze, entails an essentiallymoral view of the world, explicitly or implicitly drawingon what'everybodyknows',and he conceivesofphilosophy asan antidoteto this view.Representation cannot help us to encounterthe world asit appearsin the flow of time andbecoming. It constitutesa particularly restrictedform of thinking and acting, working accordingto fixed norms, and which is unableto acknowledge difference 'in itself'. ln Dffirence and RepetitionDeleuze challengesthe representational conceptionof philosophy.Here, he contraststhe 'poet' to the 'politician'.The poet speaksin the nameof a creativepower,and seeks to affirm differenceas a stateof permanentrevolution:he is willing to be destructive in the searchfor the 'new'. The new, in this sense,remains forever new, since it has the power of beginning anew every time. It enablesforcesin thought which are not the forcesof recognition,but the powersof an unrecognisable terra incognita.The politician, on the other hand, seeksto deny that which differs in order to establishor maintain a particularhistoricalorder.In philosophicalterms, Deleuzeproposesto 'overturn'Platonism,which distinguishesbetweenthe original- the thing that most resemblesitself, characterised by exemplaryself-identity- and the copy,which is alwaysdeficient in relation to the original. Platonism is incapableof thinking differencein itself,preferringto conceiveof it in relation to'the thing itself'. In order to go beyondrepresentation,it is necessary,therefore,to underminethe primacyof the originaloverthe copyand to promote the simulacrum, the copy for which there is no original. A key influenceon Deleuzeas far as the anti-representational orientation of his thought is concerned,is Friedrich Nietzsche.Nietzsche's speculationson metaphorshowthat thereis no 'truth' behindthe maskof appearances, but rather only more masks,more metaphors.Deleuzeelevatesthis insight into somethinglike a generalmetaphysicalprinciple.For him, thc world is composecl of simulircra:it is a 'swarm'
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important elementof his challengeto representation.In his books on cinem" in particular,Deleuzedraws on Henri Bergson'svery particular materialismin order to claim that life is composedof images.Rather than illuminating the world like a searchlight,it is the case human consciousness that the world is 'luminous' in itself. Bergson'scritique of the problematics of perceptionand action, and matter and thought, springsfrom the claim that we tend to think in terms of spacerather than time. This tendency immobilisesintuition, and to counter this Bergson conceivesof materialityin terms of imagesthat transmitmovement.This hasimportant consequencesfor perception, which can no longer be conceivedof as All life perceivesand is necesknowledgethat is rootedin consciousness. sarilyopen to the 'outside'and distinctionsbetweenautomatismand volurrr"ry u"t, ,r. only differencesof degree,rather than differencesin kind. This alternative,non-psychologicalmetaphysics,accordingto which the world is 'luminous in itself', rather than being illuminatedby a beamof consciousness.is at the heart of Deleuze's non-representationalproiect, and is exploredat length in his books on cinema.Following Bergson's materialisi ontology,accordingto which our body is merely an image among images,Deleuze opens the self to the outside, the pure form of time. The self comes into contact with a virtual, non-psychological memory,a domain of diversity,dffirence, and with potentiallyanarchic that ieopardisethe senseselfhood' associations, Such forms of anti-representationalthought arethreateningand potentially disorientaring.As Bergsonargues,human beingschooseon the basis of what is the most useful. As such they tend to spa'tialisethe fluidity of duration, reducingit to a staticand impersonalpublic form. we separate duration into dissociatedelementsand reconfiguretheseelementsin a homogeneousspatial form organisedaround the conventionsof 'public' language that conveys widely recognised notions' We like 'simple thoughts" Bergsonremarks,and we prefer to rely on customand habit, replacingdiversitywith simplicity,foregoingthe noveltyof new situations. This In-short, we prefer the comfortsand conventionsof representation. such an helps to explain why art - literature, painting and cinema- plays important patt itt Deleuze'swork. For Deleuze,art is not a way of represer,ting experiencesand memoriesthat we might 'recognise':it doesnot showus what the world ri, but rather imaginesa possibleworld. Similarly, art is concernedwith 'sensation',with creating 'sensibleaggregates', rather than making the world intelligible and recognisable.In order to challenge representationalviews of art, Deleuze talks of 'affects'and 'percepts'.These are artistic forcesthat havebeenfreed from the organising Instcad'thcy givcus framcwgrkof pcrceivingindividuals. rcprcscntational In this way,I)clcuzcsccs ..."*, to I prc-indiiidualworlclof singularitics'

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art asa wayof challengingthe interpretativetendencyof representation to tracebecomingsbackto origins. Connectives Affect Art Becoming Difference Sensation

REPRESSION Claire Colebrooh On the one hand,Deleuzemight appearto be a philosophersetagainstthe dominantimageof repression,that being repressionin its everydaysense and in its technicalpsychoanalyticsense.At its most generalthe concept of 'repression'would seemto imply a natural self or subjectwho precedes the operationof power of socialisation(so that all we would haveto do is lift the stricturesof repressionto arriveat who we reallyare).The concept of repressionseems,then, to be associatedwith the ideaof a pre-socialself who must then undergosocialisationor structuration.Deleuzewants to avoid this naivety, and so to a certain extent he acceptsthe productive nature of repressionas it was put forward by Sigmund Freud and then JacquesLacan.It is only becauseof our existencewithin a symbolicorder, or perceivedsystem,that we imaginethat theremust havebeena real .me' prior to the net of repression.For psychoanalysis, then, it is not the self who is repressed,for the self - the fantasyof that which exists before speech,relationsand sociality- is an effect of the idea of repression. Repressionis primary and producesits own' before'.Deleuzeacceptsthis Lacanirn/Freudian picture up ro a point. with Guattari he arguesthat thereareOedipalstructuresof repression.Living in a modern age,we are indeedsubmittedto a systemof signification.we then imaginethat there must have been a moment of plenitude and,jouissanceprior to Oedipal repression,and that we must thereforehavedesiredthe maternalincest prohibited by the structures of the family. But Deleuze and Guattari regardrepression- or the internalisationof subjection- asa modernphenomenonthat nevcrtheless drawsupon archaicstructuresand imagcs. Dclcuzc ancl Gurttirri's mnin rttack on whirt Michcl I,bucault (in T'hc Ilistor.,yol' ,\t.t'uulit.y: l4tlumt Olr,) rcf'crrcd to rrs .tlrc rcPrcssivc

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hypothesis'occurs in Anti-Oedipzs.WhereasFreud's Oedipus complex seeksto explainwhy and how we arerepressed- how it is that we submit to law and renounceour enjoyment- Deleuze and Guattari arguethat we sufferfrom the ideaof repressionitself, the ideathat thereis someultimate object that we haveabandoned.Psychoanalysis supposedlyexplains our repressionby arguing that we all desired our mothers but had to abandonincestfor the sakeof socialand cultural development.Deleuze and Guattari arguethat this repressiveidea of renunciationand submission is a historical and political development.Desire, they insist, is not the desirefor someforbidden object, a desirethat we must necessarily repress.Rather,all life is positive desire- expansion,connection,creation. It is not that we must repressour desirefor incest.Rather,the idea of incest- that we are inevitablyfamilial and desireonly the impossible maternalobject- is itself repressive.What it repressesis not a personal desire,but the impersonality of desire or the intense germinal influx. To imagine ourselvesas rational individuals, engagedin negotiation and the managementof our drives- this idea of ourselvesas bourgeois, selfgoverning, commonsensicalagents - represses the desire for non-familial, impersonal,chaoticand singularconfigurationsof life. We arerepressed,then, not by a socialorder that prohibits the natural desire for incest,but by the imagethat our desires'naturally' take the form of Oedipal and familial images. The latemodernunderstandingof the selfor subjectasnecessarily subjectedto law is the outcomeof a history of politicaldevelopmentthat has coveredover the originally expansive,excessiveand constructive movements of desire.A number of philosophicalmovements,including psychoanalysis,have explainedlife from the point of view of the already repressedsubject,the bourgeoisindividual who hassubmittedhis desires to the systemof the polity and the market. Against this, Deleuze and Guattari aim to revealthe positivedesirebehindrepression.In the caseof, Oedipal repression,it is the desire of the father - the desireof white, modern, bourgeoisman - that lies at the heartof the ideaof all selvesas necessarily subjectedto repressivepower. Connectives Desire Foucault Freud Oedipalisation Psychoanalysis Woman

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RETERRITORIALISATION tion./reterritorialisation'.

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- referto the entry on'deterritorialsa-

RHIZOME Felicity J. Colman the connectionsthat occurbetweenthe mostdisparate 'Rhizome'describes and the most similar of objects,placesand people;the strangechainsof eventsthat link people:the feelingof'six degreesof separation',the sense of bodies.Deleuze and of 'having been here before' and assemblages Guattari'sconceptof the 'rhizome' drawsfrom its etymologicalmeaning, where 'rhizo'means combining form and the biologicalterm 'rhizome' describesa form of plant that can extenditself through its underground horizontaltuber-likeroot systemand developnew plants.In Deleuzeand Guattari'suseof the term, the rhizomeis a conceptthat 'maps' a process of networked,relational and transversalthought, and a way of being without'tracing' the constructionof that map asa fixed entity (D&G 1987: 12). Ordered lineagesof bodiesand ideasthat trace their originary and individual basesare consideredasforms of 'aborescentthought', and this and forms hismetaphorof a tree-likestructurethat ordersepistemologies torical frames and homogeneousschemata,is invoked by Deleuze and Guattari to describeeverythingthat rhizomaticthought is not. In addition,Deleuzeand Guattari describethe rhizomeasan actionof many abstractentities in the world, including music, mathematics,economics,politics, science,art, the ecologyand the cosmos.The rhizome conceives how everything andeverybody- all aspectsofconcrete,abstract and virtual entities and activities - can be seenas multiple in their interrelationalmovementswith other things and bodies.The nature of the rhizomeis that of a moving matrix, composedof organicand non-organic partsforming symbioticand aparallelconnections,accordingto transitory and as yet undeterminedroutes(D & G 1987:10).Such a reconceptualof any isationconstitutesa revolutionaryphilosophyfor the reassessment form of hierarchicalthought, history or activity. In a world that builds structuresfrom economiccircuits of difference and desire, Deleuze responds by reconsideringhow bodies are constructed.He and Guattari arguethat such structuresconstraincreativity and position things and people into regulatory orders. In A Thousand Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari stagedthe entire book as a seriesof networkcd rhizomatic'plateaus'that operateto counter historicaland philpositionspitchccltowardthc systcmof rcprcscntntion thatIix thc osophicol

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flow of thought. Instead,through a virtuoso demonstrationof the relational energiesable to be configured through often disparate forms and systemsof knowledge,they offer the reader an open systemof thought. Rhizomaticformations can serveto overcome,overturn and transform structuresof rigid, fixed or binary thought and judgement- the rhizome is 'anti-genealogy'(D&G 1987:ll). A rhizomecontriburesro rhe formation of a plateauthroughits linesof becoming,which form aggregateconnections.There are no singular positions on the networkedlines of a rhizome,only connectedpoints which form connectionsbetweenthings. A rhizomaticplateauof thought, Deleuzeand Guattari suggest,may be reachedthrough the considerationof the potentialof multiple and relational ideasandbodies.The rhizomeis anynetworkof thingsbroughtinto contact with one another,functioning as an assemblagemachine for new affects,new concepts,new bodies,new thoughts;the rhizomaticnetwork is a mapping of the forcesthat move and,/or immobilise bodies. Deleuzeand Guattari insist bodiesand things ceaselessly takeon new dimensions through their contact with different and divergent entities over time; in this way the conceptof the 'rhizome' marksa divergentway of conceptualising the world that is indicativeof Deleuzianphilosophyas a whole. Rather than reality being thought of and wrimen as an ordered seriesof structuralwholes,wheresemioticconnectionsor taxonomiescan be compiled from complete root to tree-like structure, the story of the world and its components,Deleuzeand Guattari propose,can be communicated through the rhizomatic operations of things - mevements, intensitiesand polymorphousformations.In opposition to descendent evolutionary modelsof classification,rhizomeshaveno hierarchicalorder to their compoundingnetworks.Instead,Deleuzianrhizomaticthinking functions as an open-ended productive configuration, where random associationsand connectionspropel, sidetrack and abstract relations between components.Any part within a rhizome may be connected to anotherpart, forming a milieu that is decentred,with no distinctiveend or entry point. Deleuze'sapparatusfor describingaffectivechangeis the 'rhizome'. Deleuze viewed every operation in the world asthe affectiveexchangeof rhizomatically-produced intensities that create bodies: systems, economies,machinesand thoughts. Each and every body is propelled and perpetuated by innumerable levels of the affective forces of desire and its resonatingmaterialisations.Variationsto any given systemcan occur becauseof interventionswithin cyclical,systematicrepetition. As the rhizome may be constitutedwith an existingbody - including existing thoughts one might bring to bear upon anotherbody - the rhizome is nccessarilysubject to thc principlcs of divcrsity and cliffercncc

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through repetition, which Deleuzediscussedin his booksNietzscheand. Philosophyand Dffirence and,Repetition. Deleuze acknowledgesFriedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the eternal return as the constitutionof things through repeatedelements(existing bodies,modesof thought)that form a'synthesis'ofdifferencethrough the repetition of elements(D 1983: 46). 'Synthesis' is also describedby Deleuzeand Guattari as an assemblage of variablerelationsproducedby the movement,surfaces,elusionsand relations of rhizomes that form bodies (desiring machines) through composite chains of previously unattachedlinks (D&G 1983:39, 327).As a non-homogeneous sequence, then, the rhizome describesa seriesthat may be composedof causal, chance,and/or randomlinks.Rhizomaticconnectionsbetweenbodiesand forcesproducean affectiveenergyor entropy.As Deleuzedescribesin his work on David Hume, the interaction of a socially,politically, or culturally determinedforceand any givenbody both producesand usesassociations of ideas(D l99l: ix, 103).The discontinuouschain is the medium for the rhizome'sexpandingnetwork,just asit is alsothe contextualcircumstance for the chain'sproduction. Rhizomaticwriting, being,andlor becomingis not simply a processthat assimilatesthings, rather it is a milieu of perpetualtransformation.The relationalmilieu that the rhizome createsgivesform to evolutionaryenvironmentswhererelationsalter the courseof how flowsand collectivedesire develop.There is no stabilising function produced by the rhizomatic medium;thereis no creationof a wholeout of virtual and dispersedparts. Rather,through the rhizome,points form assemblages, multiple journey systemsassociate into possiblydisconnectedor brokentopologies;in turn, suchassemblages and typologieschange,divide,and multiply throughdisparateand complexencountersand gestures.The rhizome is a powerful way of thinking without recourseto analogyor binary constructions.To think in termsof the rhizomeis to revealthe multiple waysthat you might approachany thought, activity,or a concept- what you alwaysbring with you are the many and various ways of entering any body, of assembling thought and actionthrough the world. Connectives Affect Becoming Desire Hume Intensity Lincs of Flight

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RHIZOME + TECHNOLOGY VerenaConley The'rhizome' replacesan arborescent structurethat hasbeendominating the west and the world for centuries.The rhizome carriesimagesof the natural world, of pliable grasses,of weightlessness, and of landscapes of the east. It is horizontal and flat, bearing what the mathematicianin Deleuzecalls'n-l dimensions'.It is alwaysa multiplicity; it hasno genealogy; it could be takenfrom different contexts(including Freudian psychoanalysis);and is neither genesisnor childhood.The rhizome doesaway with hierarchies.It augmentsits valencesthroughhybrid connectionsthat consistby virtue of addition, of one thing 'and' another.The rhizome operatesin a spacewithout boundariesand defiesestablishedcategories suchasbinariesor pointsthat would mark-offand be usedto fix positions in extensivespace.It ceaselessly connectsand reconnectsoverfissuresand gaps,deterritorialisingand reterritorialisingitself at once.It workstoward abstractmachinesand produceslinesof flight. The rhizome doesnot imitate or represent,rather it connectsthrough the middle and inventshybrids with virusesthat becomepart of the cells that scramblethe dominant lines of genealogicaltrees. The'rhizome createsa web or a network; through capture of code, it increasesits valencesand is alwaysin a stateof becoming.It createsand recreatesthe world through connections.A rhizome has no structure or centre, no graph or regulation.Models are both in constructionand collapse.In a rhizome, movement is more intensive than extensive. Unlike graphic arts, the rhizome makes a map and not a tracing of lines (that would belongto a representationof an obiect).It is a war machine:rhizomatic or nomadic writing operatesas a mobile war machinethat movesat top speed to form lines, making alliancesthat form a temporary plateau. The rhizome is in a constantprocessof making active,but alwaystemporary,selections.The selectionscan be goodor bad. Good or bad ideas, stat'esDeleuzein consortwith Gregory Bateson,can leadto good or bad connections. The proximity of the rhizometo digital technologyand the computeris evident.The connectionwith Donna Haraway'scyborg has often been made.YetDeleuzeandGuattarido not write muchaboutcomputers.They derive someof their ideason rhizomesfrom Bateson'sS/epsto an Ecolog.y of Mind,. They connect with the anthropologist'spronouncementsin which biology and information theory are conjoined.Batesonarguesthat a person is not limited to her or his visible body.Of importanceis the pcrson'sbrainthattransmitsinfurmationasdiscrctediffcrcnces. The brain

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fires electronsthat move along circuits. Through the transmissionof differences,the person connects and reconnectswith other humans, animalsand the world. Deleuze and Guattari see the potential in Bateson'swork for rhizomatic thinking. The nervous system is said to be a rhizome, web or network. The terminology is the sameas for computersthough it does not pertain to them exclusively.Clearly, computers do offer possibilities. Not only the brain, but humans and the world consist of circuits in which differencesare transmitted along pathways. Through computerassistedsubjectivity,humans can increasetheir valences.Deleuze and Guattari write about a 'becoming-radio' or 'becoming-television'that can yield good or bad connections;productive or nefariousbecomings. Computers and the internet have great potential as rhizomatic war machines.The way they are being capturedby capitalism,that deploys order-words, consumer codes, and their multifarious redundancies makesthem too often becomeendsin and for themselves,in a sphereof what Deleuze calls a generalised'techno-narcissism'.The scienceof technologytakesover with its order-words.Yet, in Deleuze'spractical utopia, iust as every major languageis worked through by minor languages,so the capitalist war machine is always being threatenedby mobile nomadic war machinesthat use technolosiesto form new rhizomesand open up to becoming.

SACHER-MASOCH, LEOPOLD VON (1835-95)- refer to the entrieson tart', 'Lacantand tpsychoanalysis'.

SARTRE, JEAN PAUL (1905-80)- refer to the entrieson 'Guattari', 'phenomenology'and'phenomenology* Husserl'.

- referto theentrieson SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE (18.57-1913) significcl'. 'scmiotics'rrncl'significr,

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s c H rz o A N A L YS Ts

SCHIZOANALYSIS EugeneHolland, Schizoanalysisis the revolutionary 'materialist psychiatry' derived priAs the concept'schizoanalysis' marily from the critiqueof psychoanalysis. indicates,SigmundFreud'stheoryof the Oedipuscomplexis the principle drawing substantiallyon Karl Marx, object of critique: schizoanalysis, transformspsychoanalysis so asto includethe full scopeof socialand historical factorsin its explanationsof cognitionand behaviour.Yet psychoanalysisis not rejectedwholesale:schizoanalysis alsodrawssubstantially on Freud and especiallyon JacquesLacan to transform historical materialism so as to include the full scopeof libidinal and semiotic factors in its explanationsof social structure and development.Ultimately, though perhapsleast obviously,both structuralistpsychoanalysis and historical materialismaretransformedby Friedrich Nietzsche'scritique of nihilism and asceticismand his transvaluationof difference,which inform both the libidinal and the socialeconomiesmappedby schizoanalysis. Ultimately, universalhistory for schizoanalysisoffers the hope and the chancethat the developmentof productive forcesbeyond capitalismand the expansionof Will to Powerbeyond nihilism will lead to greaterfreedomrather than enduringservitude. The basic question posed by schizoanalysis(following Baruch Spinozaand Wilhelm Reich)is: Why do peoplefight for their own servitude asstubbornly asif it weretheir salvation?The answeris that people have been trained since birth in asceticismby the Oedipus complex, which relayssocialoppressioninto the heart of the nuclear family. Social two sides oppressionand psychicrepression,thus, arefor schizoanalysis of the same coin, except that schizoanalysisreversesthe direction of causality,making psychic repressiondepend on socialoppression.It is not the child who is father to the man, asthe psychoanalyticsayinggoes, rather it is the bosswho is father to the man, who is in turn father to the child: the nuclearfamily imprints capitalistsocialrelationson the infant psyche. Just as capital denies (through primitive accumulation) direct accessto the means of production and the means of life, and mediates betweenthe worker, work, consumergoodsand eventualretirement,so the father denies(through the threat of castrationenforcing the incest taboo) direct accessto the mother (the means of life), and mediates betweenthe child, other family members and eventualmarriage with a mother-substitute.By denyin"gthe child all the peopleclosestto her, the nuclcar family programmespeople from birth for asceticismancl sclf'-clcnirrl.

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The critique of Oedipusis mounted on two fronts. Internally, schizoanalysis models the psyche on schizophreniarather than neurosis, thereby revealingthe immanent operationsof the unconsciousat work beneaththe levelof representation.The Oedipuscomplexis shownto be a systematic betrayal of unconscious processes,an illegitimate metaphysicsof the psyche.But it is a metaphysicsthat derivesdirectly from the realityof capitalistsociety.For in the externalcritique of the Oedipus, through a comparisonof the capitalistmodeof production with two other libidinal modesof production, schizoanalysis showscapitalismto be the quantitative only social formation organisedby rather than qualitative relations. Capitalism organisesthe socialby the cashnexus of the market rather than by codes and representation. Furthermore, this is the only social formation where socialreproduction is isolated from socialproduction at large,through the privatisationof reproductionin the nuclear family: the nuclearfamily,but alsoOedipalpsychoanalysis itself,are thus revealedto be strictly capitalistinstitutions.Yet at the sametime that the nuclear family is capturing and programming desire in the Oedipus complex,the market is subvertingcodesand freeingdesirefrom capture in representationthroughout society at large, thereby producing schizophrenia as the radically free form of semiosisand the potential hope of universal history. Connectives Desire Freud Marx Oedipalisation

SCHIZOPHRENIA RosiBraidotti The touchstoneof Deleuze and,Guattari's conceptualcritique of psychoanalysisis their emphasison the positivity of schizophreniclanguage. Refusingto interpret desireassymptomaticof 'lack' or to usea linguistic paradigm that interprets desire through the system of metaphor and metonymy,they insistwe understanddesirein termsof affectivity,asa rhizomicmodcof interconnection. AlthoughSigmundFrcud rccogniscs thc structurcof affcctivityand thc pcrvcrsity',hc hctcrogcncorrs urcl conrplcxplcrstrrcsof' 'polyrnor'phous

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endsup policing desirewhen he capturesit in a normativetheory of the drives. The Freudian theory of drives codesand concentratesdesiring affectsinto erotogeneouszones.Thus, psychoanalysisimplementsa functional vision of the body that simply turns schizoidlanguageand expression into a disorder.This is in stark contrastto the schizoanalyticvision both Deleuzeand Guattarioffer us. Building on GeorgesCanguilhemand Michel Foucault,Deleuzeand Guattari blur the distinctiondrawn betweennormal/pathologicaland all the negativeconnotationsthat this model of desireimplies. Castingaffectivity, the passions and sexualityalongthe axesof eithernormativeor pathological behaviour,they say,is complicit with thoseselfsamepolitical forcesof biopowerthat disciplineand control the expressivepotentialitiesof a body.The doubleburden that comesfrom medicalisingemotionsand affects,in conjunction with reducingsexualexpressionto genitalia,leavesbodily affectsand intensitiesin animpoverishedstate.Their theoryof the Bodywithout Organs (BwO) not only critiquespsychoanalysis' complicityin repressionbut the functionalistapproachto human affectivityas well. Instead,Deleuzeand Guattariassertthe positivenatureof unruly desirein termsof schizoidflows. For Deleuze,the distinctionbetweenproperand abjectobjectsof desire is implementedasa normative index to police and civilise behaviour.The more unmanageable aspectsof affectivityhaveeither to come under the disciplinary mechanism of representationor be swiftly discarded. Deviance,insanityand transgression arecommonlyregardedasunacceptablefor they point to an uncontrollableforceof wild intensity.Thesetend to be negativelyrepresented:impersonal,uncaringand dangerousforces. Concomitantly such forces are both criminalisedand renderedpathological.The schizophrenicbody is emblematicof this violent'outside',one that is beyondproprietyand normality. Deleuze'seffortsto depathologise mentaland somaticdeviancy,unconventional sexualbehaviourand clinical conditions - like anorexia,depression, suicide,and so forth - is not a celebrationof transgressionfor its own sake.Instead,it is integralto his intensivereadingofthe subjectasa structure of affectivity.That is, Deleuzemapsout alternativemodesof experimentationon the levelof sensation,perceptionand affects.The intensity of thesestatesand their criminalisedand pathologicalsocialstatusoften makesthem implode into the black hole of ego-indexednegative forces. Deleuzeis interestedin experimentingwith the positivepotentialof these practices.What is at stakein this reappraisalof schizophrenia is how other modesof assemblage and variationsof intensityfor non-unitary subjects are gesturedto. A subjectis a gcnealogical entity,possessing a minoritaritn,or countcrmcnrory, which in turn is irn cxprcssion
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Genealogical ties createa discontinuoussenseof time, closerto Friedrich Nietzsche'sDionysiacmode.Hence, spatially,a subjectmay seemfragmented and disunited; temporally, however,a subject developsa certain amountof consistencythat comesfrom the continuingpowerof recollection. Here Deleuzeborrows the distinction betweenthe molar senseof linear,recordedtime (chronos) and the molecularsenseof cyclical,discontinuoustime (aion)that the Greeksoncedescribed.Simply put, the former is relatedto being/the molar/the masculine;the latter to becoming/the molecular/thefeminine.The co-occurrenceof past and future in a continuouspresentmay appearschizophrenicto thosewho uphold a vision of the subjectasrationaland self-contained,however,we needto havesome caution here as Deleuze'sphilosophyof immanencerestson the idea of a transformativeand dynamicsubjectwho inhabitsthe activepresenttense of continuous'becoming'.Using Henri Bergson'sconceptof 'duration' to guide him, Deleuze proposesa subjectas an enduring entity, one that changesas much as it is changedthrough the connectionsit forms with a collectivity. Also important to note is that Deleuze disengagesthe notion of 'endurance'from the metaphysicaltradition that associatesit with an essenceor permanence.Hence, the potency of the Deleuzian subject comesfrom how it displacesthe phallogocentricvision of consciousness, one that hingeson the sovereigntyof the 'I'. It can no longer be safely assumedthat consciousness coincideswith subjectivity,or that either consciousness or subjectivity chargesthe course of events.Thus, the image of thought implied by liberal individualism and classicalhumanism is disrupted in favour of a multi-layered dynamic subject.On this level, schizophreniaactsas an alternativeto how the art of thinking can be practised. Together with paranoia,schizoid loops and double-bindsmark the political economy of affectivity in advancedcapitalism. These enact the doubleimperativeof consumerconsumptionand its inherent deferralof pleasure.With capitalismthe deferral of pleasureconcomitantlyturned into a commodity.The saturationof socialspace,by fast-changingcommodities,short-circuitsthe presentinducing a disjunctionin time. Like the insatiableappetiteof the vampire,the capitalisttheft of 'the present' expressesa system that not only immobilises in the processof commodity over-accumulation,but also suspends active desiringproduction in favour of an addictive pursuit of commodity goods.In response,Deleuzeposits'becoming'as an antidote:flows of empowering dcsircthat introducemobility and thus destabilise the sedentarygravita'l'his pull tionrrl of molar formations. involvcscxpcrimcntingwith nonunititryor sclrizoidnrodcsot'bcconring.

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Connectives Becoming Bergson Black hole Body Body without Organs Duration Molar Nietzsche Representation

SEGMENTARITY Kjtlie Message 'Segmentation' is a fundamental structuring principle that contributes to organisingthe individual and sociallife of all humans.While Deleuze and Guattari explore the superficially dichotomous relationship of the dominant segments- primitive, suppleor molecular,that aredifferentiated againstthe rigid or molar statesegment- they do so in order to contend that each of these dominant segments can themselves be subcompartmentalised into binary,circularand linearforms.More important than the distinctionsexistingwithin eachof the terms of the dichotomy, however, is the idea that yet another - far less discernible and easily defined- spaceexistsin betweenthesetwo segments.This liminal third spaceis producedby one or severallines of flight that binds the binary terms into dialoguewith eachother at the sametime asit worksto enforce a kind of decodingprocedurefor eachof the segmentedforms. In other words,it both binds and separates the terms,but ensuresthat a continual mutability carrieson existingbetweenthe two. Although Deleuze and Guattari acknowledgethat binary couplings appearat the basisof their approachto the conceptof segmentation,this mode of differentiation is consciouslyand cautiouslyinvoked in order to show that even the most formalised of dichotomous stateshave a relationship that is in fact more pliable or porous than would first appear. In this senseeverything is political: every politics is alwaysboth macropolitics and micropolitics.Illustrating the inter-relationshipof the binary term that is alwaystied into dialoguewith its contrastingfigure (via the third, liminal spacethat tendsto be occupiedby deterritorialisinglincs of flight) whilc rrt tho sirmctimc bcing dift'crcntiatcd agrrinstit, indiviclurrls

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and societies are understood as being organised according to two dominant and interwoven modes of segmentation:one molar, the other molecular. These terms are alwaysclosely related becausethey co-exist and crossover into eachother. Exploring the dominant forms of segmentation,Deleuzeand Guattari contrastthe ideaof a primitive or supplekind of segmentarityagainstthe notion of modern statehood,whereprimitive societiesexist without dedicatedpolitical institutions.Considerablemanoeuvrabilityand communicability aremaintainedbetweenthe differentiated,heterogeneous fieldsof primarily thesesocieties, becauseof the segmentedrelationshipthat each of thesefieldsor units shareswith the other.Operatingaccordingto discrete,localisedforms of management,Deleuzeand Guattari characterise this primitive segmentarityas functioning through polyvocalcodesthat emergeasa resultof variousrelationshipsand lineages,and asan itinerant territoriality that is basedon local divisionsthat overlaprather than exist in any discretestate.Communication,codificationand territorialisation occur in thesesocietiesvia a processof shifting relationshipsand intersections,rather than any centrally organisingpower. While these systems of organisation are perhaps more molecular (focusedon small-scaletrajectoriesand local environments)than thoseof modern societies,it would not be true to claim that they are more organic or lesssystematic,and in accordwith their contentionthat the molar exists within the molecularand vice versa,Deleuze and Guattari explainthat it is a mistakesimply to contrastthis primitive, suppleor molecularsegmentarity againstthe more rigid global organisationsthat characterisethe modern Statesociety.Acknowledgingthat the modern political systemis a unified and unifying globalapparatus,they maintainthat it is organised in a formationof clearlyorderedsubsystems. However,despitethe reaching agendathat motivatesthis inclusive process,it cannot be entirely differentiatedfrom the primitive system out of which it has evolved. Accordingly,the overarchingsystemis neverfreefrom gaps,displacements and partial processes that interconnectwith eachother and yet it never attainsproper signification. To ignore thesespacesof slippagethat exist in betweenthe privileged or State-sanctifiedunits is a mistake, Deleuze and Guattari counsel, becausetheseoften indiscernible spacesmay contain either - or perhaps both in somecases- the rumblings of popular massdissatisfactionwith the dominantand determining Statebody (asin the socialupheavalsof May 1968),or the quotidian embodiment of extreme State power whereby cvcrydaycitizensadopta self-regulating attitudeor beliefthat is basedon thcir inclividualintcrnalisationof a particularpoliticirlcodcor idcalpromotcdby thc Statc(irsin Nnzi (icrmany).In hothcilscs,tlrcscrupturcsilrc

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micro-fascismsthat threaten to disorganiseor destabilisethe dominant segmentswithin which they exist. Just as neither molecularnor molar segmentscan resistbeing entirely differentiated from the other, Deleuze and Guattari explain that rather of the rigid or Statesegment,fascismis than beinga distinctcharacteristic dangerousbecauseof its molecularor micropoliticalpower; as a mass movementit is more threateningthan a totalitarianorganisation.As such, fascismattainsmolar (State)significancenot becauseof the public profile of its leader(evidencedby the larger-than-lifeposters),but becauseit is imbricated and interiorised throughout the molecular level of everyday experience. Connectives Lines of flight Molar Molecular

SEMIOTICS Inna Semetsky 'semiotics' is, in general, the study of signs and their signification. Deleuzeand Guattari'ssemioticspresenta conceptualmix of CharlesS. Peirce'slogic of relativesand Louis Hielmslev'slinguistics;both frameworks are taken to opposeSaussureansemiology.ln A ThousandPlateaus, Deleuze and Guattari assertthat content is not a signified, neither is expressiona signifier:insteadboth are variablesin common assemblage. An a-signifying rupture ensurestransfer from the form of expressionto the form of content.Dyadic, or binary significationgivesway to triadic, a-signifying semiotics,and the authors employ the Peirceannotion of A diagramis a bridge, a'diagram'as a constructivepart of sign-dynamics. a diagonalconnectionthat, by meansof double articulations,connects planesof expressionand contentleadingto the emergenceof new forms. Fixed and rigid signifiedsgive way to the productionof new meaningsin accordwith the logic of sense(D 1990).Conceptsthat exist in a triadic relationshipwith both perceptsand affectsexpresseventsrather than essencesand should be understood not in the traditional representational mannerof analyticphilosophy,which would submit a line to a point, but as a pluralistic, a-signifying distribution of lincs and phncs. 'l'hc (l) l9tltla; l9t)3t) dclicssigniticittion. Ontokrgically,''bciirg-its-firkl'

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transformationalpragmaticsconsistsof destratification,or openingup to a neq diagrammaticand creativefunction. Accordingto the logic of multiplicities,a diagramservesasa mediatoryin-betweensymbol,'a third'(D 1987: 131)that disturbs the fatal binarity of the signifier/signifieddistinction. It forms part of the cartographicapproach,which is Deleuzeand Guattari'ssemioticspar excellence,that replaceslogicalcopulaswith the radicalconjunction'and'. For Deleuze,the theory of signs is meaninglesswithout the relation betweensignsand the correspondingapprenticeshipin practice.Reading MarcelProustfrom the perspective of triadicsemiotics,Deleuzenoticesthe dynamiccharacterof signs,that is, their havingan 'increasinglyintimate' (D 2000:88) relation with their enfoldedand involutedmeaningsso that truth becomescontingentand subordinateto interpretation.Meaningsare not givenbut dependon signsentering'intothe surfaceorganizationwhich ensuresthe resonance of two series'(D 1990:104),the latterconvergingon a paradoxicaldifferentiator,which becomes'both word and objectat once' (D 1990:51).Yet,semioticscannotbe reducedto just linguisticsigns.There are extra-linguisticsemioticcategoriestoo, such as memories,imagesor in termsof neitherobjectimmaterialartisticsigns,which areapprehended ivenor subjective criteriabut learnedin practicein termsof immanentproblematic instancesand their practicaleffects.Analogously,a formal abstract machineexceedsits applicationto (Chomskian)philosophyof language; insteadsemioticsis applied to psychological,biological,social,technological, aesthetic and incorporeal codings. Semiotically, discursive and non-discursiveformationsareconnectedby virtue of transversalcommunipsychic,socialand cation,'transversality' beinga conceptthat encompasses evenontologicaldimensions.As a semioticcategory,transversalityexceeds verbalcommunicationand appliesto diverseregimesof signs;by the same and cartographiesof the token, Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis unconsciouspresupposea different semiotictheory from the one appropriThe semioticprocess, basedon the logicof atedin Lacanianpsychoanalysis. includedmiddle,is the basisfor the productionof subjectivity.The line of flight or becomingis a third betweensubjectand objectand is to be understood 'not so much . . . in their oppositionas in their complementarity' (D 1987:13l). The relationshipbetweensubjectand objectis of the nature of reciprocalpresupposition. Brian Massumipoints out that Deleuzereinventsthe conceptof semiotics in his various books: in Proustand Signs,Deleuze refers to four differently organisedsemioticworlds (M 1992).In Cinema-1he presents sixtecn diffcrent types of cinematic signs. Rlr Deleuze, philosophers, writcrs and artistsarc first and forcmostscmioticilnsrrndsymptomirt
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life . . . There is a profound link betweensigns,events,life and vitalism' (D 1995:143).The task of philosophyis the creationof concepts,and a concept, in accord with a-signifying semiotics,has no reference;it is positingitself togetherwith its obiectat the momentof its autoreferential, own creation.A map,or a diagram,engendersthe territory to which it is supposedto refer;a staticrepresentationof the order of referencesgiving way to a relationaldynamicsof the order of meanings. Connectives Lacan Schizoanalysis Signifier/Signified

SENSATION Tom Conlejt Biology infusesmuch of Deleuze'sphilosophyespeciallyin the domainof sensation.It remainsat the basisof perception,perceptionin turn being what bringsaboutthe creationof events,the very mattercommonto philosophy,art, and science.Sensationopensat the thresholdofsense,at those momentsprior to when a subjectdiscoversthe meaningof somethingor entersinto a processof reasonedcognition.Sensationtakesplacebefore In film it is graspedin what takes cognitionand thus pertainsto signifiance. grasped, asin Jean-LucGodard'stitle, placebeforewordsand imagesare Prinorn: Carmen,in which the field of sensationinheres in what comes prior to the name,beforethe naming of 'Carmen', in what is felt and experiencedbefore the name is understoodin a common way (D 1989:154). In aesthetics,which Deleuzetakesup through his study of FrancisBacon in TheLogic of Sensation,sensationis what strikesa viewer of a painting or the readerof a poem beforemeaningis discernedin figuration or a thematic design.It has the productivelydeformativepower of defacingthe representations that causeit to be felt. It is alsowhat vibratesat the threshold of a given form; in other words, what causesthe 'appleness'of the painter Paul C6zanne'sapplesto be felt as the geometricand painterly abstractionsthat they becomein the field of his still lifes. One of Deleuze'smostfamousfigures,the Body without Organs(BwO), of a textureand elasticityof cqual is conceivedas a surfaceof sensations, passcs tlvcrand filrccand intcnsityovcr thc cntircty
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through the body in wavesand rhythms that meld its perceptiblesitesor organisationof partsinto vibrationsand spasms.Borrowingfrom Wilhelm Wiirringer'swritings on the generativityof 'gothic' linearity,Deleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof BwO is in continuousand autonomousmovement, endlesslyemanatingsensationlessin its designthan in its process.The line is continuallybecomingof itself,exudingforce;whatDeleuzecallsthe 'condition of sensation'.Of animaland vegetalcharacter,it hasthe capacityof turning inward and outward, into the body and along different trajectories, makingpalpablewhat otherwisecould be sensedin sensationitself. Deleuze explainsthe point through C6zanne,whom he championsfor having made visiblethe folding characterof the Mont-Saint-Victoire,the germinating forceswithin seeds,or the convectionand heat transpiringin a landscape. Theseelementsarewithin sensationprior to becomingfelt or visualised. DeleuzeusesBacon'sdistinctionbetweentwo typesof violenceto refine his 'logic' of sensation.A violenceof public spectacle, seenin athleticand political arenasand in traditional 'theatresof torture' must be refusedin orderto reacha kind of sensationthat the British paintercallsa'declaration of faith in life'. Many of the paintingsplacedeformedbodiesin arenasso that their abstractioncan embody invisible forces;forcesthat accordingly condition the uncannysensationthe spectatorfeelsin view of both familiar and monstroushuman forms. When seenin series(many are diptychs and triptychs),the paintingsexuderhythms thar are tied to what Baconcalls 'figures',which areneitherfigurativenor beyondfigurationbut accumulations and coagulations of sensation.In anothercontexthe links composite units of perceptsand affectsto blocksof sensation,in themselvesbeings that existautonomously, asmuch in paintingsasin the spectatorswho look at them. The artist finds in the areabetweenthe perceiverand the work a field of sensation,one that is 'sculpting,composing,writing sensations. As percepts,sensations arenot perceptionsreferringto an object'(D&G 1994: 166)but somethingthat inheresin its beingand its duration. The taskof the artist,ashe showswith Baconand C6zanne,is to extractfrom a'block of sensations, a pure beingof sensation'(D&G 1994:167). In this respect,in his unique galleryof naturalhistory two of Deleuze's totemsof sensationarethe tick and the dog.The tick is a creaturethat feels rhythmic sensationsthat inspire it to fall onro the skin of the animal it covets.A melodyor 'block' of sensationcausesit to leap.The dog that is eatingat its food bowl sensesthe arrivalof the masterthat will flog it, prior to the flogging,with thousandsof sensations that anticipatethe eventitself: a hostileodour,the sound of footsteps,or the sight of a raisedstick, that 'subtendthe conversionof pleasureinto pain'.Sensations arc mixed with 'tiny pcrccptions'that are'thc passagc from onc perccptionto an
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in Readersof Deleuzenotethat sensationacquiresincreasingresonance of speculation on It a common term after 1980. becomes works written the aesthetics, biologyand philosophyat the sametime asit retrievesthe vitalism and intuition of Henri Bergson'sformative work written from the early 1950s.Sensationbecomesa decisiveelementin the style and texture of Deleuze'swriting, for in its rhythms,its 'blocks'of reflectionand its own conceptualfigures,conceivedin a manner akin to thoseof his favourite painters,the writing exudesthe forcesthat it describes. Connectives Art Bacon Bergson Body without Organs Faciality

SENSATION + CINEMA Constantine Vereois ln Dffirence and Repetition,Deleuzestatesthat the modern work of art leavesthe domain of representationin order to becomepure experience: 'a transcendentalempiricism or scienceof the sensible'(D 1994: 56). Deleuze developsthis idea in FrancisBacon: TheLogic of Sensation,sugof both illusgestingthat modern paintingtranscendsthe representation trative and narrativefiguration by moving either toward a pure form of abstraction(asexemplifiedby, say,Piet Mondrian or WassilyKandinsky) or toward what Deleuzecalls(followingJean-FrangoisLyotard) the purely figural. For Deleuze (as for Bacon, who refusesboth straight abstraction and figurative illustration), the preferred option is the latter, for the abstractpainting,like the figurativeartwork,is ultimatelydirectedtoward ordinary thought or to the brain, whereasthe figure is the sensibleform or to 'vital movement'.Citing relatedto sensation,to the neraoussystern Paul C6zanne,Deleuze describesa 'logic of the senses'that is neither rational, nor cerebral,but a bodily sensation- an unequal difference betweenforces- that overflowsand traversesall domains. Sensation(figure)shifts attentionfrom the form of the artwork, be it representationalor abstract,to the nature of its encounterwith othcr btdics, lncl thc'-bccomings- hccoming
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becoming-intense- that they bring about. Deleuze says: ,I becomein sensation, andsomethinghappens throughsensation, onethroughthe other and one in the other' (D 1993b:187).In rhe caseof cinema,narrariverepresentational film canbe understoodasa machineassemblage - a potentiality of intensitiesor sensations- that, on the one hand, is organised (represented) by an activityof figuration,and on the other,is reproducedmultiplied and intensified- as a creativefigure of sensation.The first describesa habitualrecognitionwherethe film is familiar and banalbecause it is represented in termsof its identity and sameness. The latter describes a moment of attentiverecognition(of dis-figuration)in which the object doesnot remainon the oneandthe sameplane,but passes throughdifferent planes.This is the momentof the crystal,wherepastand future collide;the momentwhererepetitionis the eternalreturn: differencerepeating. Sensationcan be related to the concept of'cinephilia,, an obsessive passionfor cinema- in particularthe Hollywood films of 1940sand 1950s - that developedin the front rows of the Pariscinimathiques in the 1950s and 1960s.Paul Willemen suggeststhat the phenomenonof cinephilia, influencedby still activeresiduesof surrealismin post-warFrenchculture, involvesa sublime moment of defamiliarisation.an encounterwith the unpresentable sublime.willemen links cinephiliatoJeanEpstein'snotion of photoginie,a fleeting moment of experienceor emotionalintensity a sensation- that the viewercannotdescribeverballyor rationalisecognitively (W 1994).As in the caseof Deleuze'stime-image,photlginie is a direct representationof time, a 'crystal-image',or direct sensationof a presentpresence.Focusingupon that aspectof cinephiliawhich escapes existingnetworksof critical discourse,willemen describesan encountera 'dangerousmoment' that points to a'beyond of cinema'(241).Ina brief example,one can find this potential dislocationin the films of David Lynch: the anamorphicdeformity of the dream in The ElephantMan (1980),Ben'slip-syncingof 'In Dreams'in Blue ltelaet(1986),the lighting of a cigarettein Wild,at Heart (1990). Contemporarycinephilia - which embracesnot only the Hollywood films of classicalcinephilia and the work of the nouoelle,)ague,but also Hollywood's delayednouaelleaague(Francis Ford Coppola, Brian De Palma,Martin Scorsese),the newFrench new waye([ean-Jacques Beineix, Luc Besson,Leos Carax),and internationalart cinema(PedroAlmodovar, Takeshi Kitano, Abbas Kiarostami) - can be seenas one of the many diversereadingstrategiesencouragedby recentcultural technologies. The developmentsinclude not only new storageand information technologies(television, video,internet)and agencies of pr
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Understoodin this way, intertextualnetworkof masscultural discourses. the reproduction of the cinephile is a type of infinite representation,an extensivefunction of a standardised,serialproduct designedto be consumed within globalisedand/or specialisedniche markets.But equally, the intensive experienceof cinephilia, the resonancecreated within the proliferating,differentialseries,canbe describedasa momentof sensation, a glimpse over the edge of cinematic representation.Contemporary cinephiliathus becomesboth a generaleconomyof viewing' one which of the cinematicinstitution, guaranteesthe endlesscirculation (sameness) and also a point of resistanceto these forms of re-presentation- the moment at which the founding principle (Idea)breaksdown to become a positive event, a universal un-founding. The serial repetition of the (global Hollywood) film product, and the reproduction of the new cinephile,becomeboth the confirmationof identity and the affirmationof multiple sensation,the return of the absolutelydifferent.

SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED Claire Colebrook a language Accordingto the structuralistlinguist,Ferdinandde Saussure, is madeup of signifiersor differential marks,which then organiseor strucof our ture, not only our language,but also the very conceptualisation insistence on lay in the linguistics of structuralist The revolution world. prohighly contingent on the and both the arbitrarynatureof the signifier duction of the systemof signification.Whereaslinguistics prior to structuralism might havestudieda word diachronicallyby looking at the way the Latin wordratio comesto form a commonroot (andmeaningfulcause) treason',trational','rationalise','irrational' and so for the modern words, on, structuralistlinguisticsis synchronic.One shouldnot study the emergenceor genesisof signs,for this is vague,but only signsas they form a system. So it would be significantthat one languagemight mark a differencebetweengrey and blue, or like and love,while anotherlanguage of this supposed would not mark out sucha difference.The consequences primacy of the signifierextendedwell beyondlinguistics.If it is the case that we think only within a systemof differences,then thought depends upon a prior structureand that structurecanonly be studiedor criticised asa whole.There canbe no intuition of anyterm or thing in itself,for we only know and think within a systemof differenceswithout positivetcrms' Not only doesDeleuzefavour the linguisticsof Louis Hiclmslcv ovcr thilt ilrc not Sirussurcso that ihcrc irrc irlrcndyf
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the effect of a languageor conceptualscheme,he also (with Guattari) conducted an intensepolitical assaulton the ideology or despotismofthe signifier.How is it that we come to think of thought as reducible to a systemof linguisticsigns?Not only do Deleuzeand Guattari insist, positively, that there are r6gimes of signs beyond language,ranging from musicand the visualartsto the signsof the inhuman world - smokebeing a sign of fire, light being a sign for a heliotropeor a bird's refrain being the sign of its territory, they also conduct a critique of the modern concept of signification, the idea that we are submitted to a system of signsbeyondwhich we cannotthink. On the structuralistunderstanding of the signifier, all thought takes place in a system of signs and all differencesare mediatedthrough this systemsuch that nothing can be consideredin itself. Structuralism is often, therefore, consideredto be a 'break' in this history of westernmetaphysics,for it concedesthat there can be no knowledgeof pure presence,only knowledgeof the world as mediated through signs. According to Deleuze and Guattari, however, the signifier is yet one more way in which we fail to think differencepositively; one more way in which we mistakealreadystructuredexperience for the positivestructuring powerof life to differ. Signifiers,Deleuzeand Guattari argue,are just examplesof the waysin which life is expressedor differentiated.Deleuze'sargumentfor positivedifferenceis in direct contrast with the ideathat there is a systemof relationsthat determineslife in advance.On the contrary, Deleuze saysthat while languagecan overcode other systemsof difference,for we can speakabout other systemsof signs,it is also possiblefor languageto be deterritorialisedthrough the positivepower of difference.If, for example,our r6gimeof visualsignsis overturned by an event in cinema, then we might be forced to think differently and createnew concepts.In sucha casethinking would not be governedby a precedingsystem,but would be violated by the shockor encounterwith life, a life that emits signswell beyondthoseof the system of signification.

Connectives Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Difference

SIMONDON, GILBERT (1926-87)- referto the entrieson'cinema* * itnd'phcnomcn
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SIMULACRUM Jonathan Roffe In his 1990'Preface'toClet-Martin'sbookon his work, Deleuzestatesthat the conceptof 'simulacrum'wasneveran essentialpart of his philosophy. However,it doesoffer one of the strongestforms of his critique of identity, and the affirmation of a world populated by differences-in-themselves which arenot copiesof any prior model. Simply put, 'simulacrum'means'copy'. It is in Deleuze'sdiscussionof Plato in TheLogic of Sensethat simulacraare most closelydiscussed.Plato offersa three-levelhierarchyof the model,the copy,andthe copyof the copy which is the simulacrum.The real concern for Plato is that, being a step removed from the model, the simulacrum is inaccurateand betrays the model.He usesthis hierarchyin a numberof places,and in eachcaseit is a matterof distinguishingthe 'falsepretender'or simulacrum.For example, in the Sophisf,Socratesdiscussesthe meanswith which we might distinguishbetweenthe philosopher(thegoodcopy),who is in searchof the Good (the model), and the sophist(the simulacrumof the philosopher- the bad copy),who usesthe sameskillsasthe philosopherin searchof profit or fame. Deleuzenotesthat while the distinctionbetweenthe modelandthe copy seemsthe mostimportantone for Plato,it is ratherthe distinctionbetween the true and the falsecopieswhich is at the heartof Platonism.The copy of the copy,cut offfrom referenceto a model,puts into questionthe modelcopy systemasa whole,and confronts it with a world of pure simulacrum. This reveals,for Deleuze,the moral natureof Plato'ssystem,which fundamentallyvaluesidentity, order, and the stablereferenceto a model over the groundlessmovementsof simulacra.This doesnot meanthat Deleuze considersthe world to be madeup of appearances, 'simulations'of a real itself world that hasnow vanished.It is the senseof the word 'appearances' that is in question.Simulacrado not refer to anythingbehind or beyond the world - they make up the world. So what is being underminedby Deleuze here is a representationalunderstandingof existence,and the moralinterpretationof existencethat goesalongwith it. Furthermore,this understandingembodiesa certainnegativitythat is alsoproblematic.For a copy to be a copy of any kind it must havereferenceto somethingit is not - a copy standsin for somethingthat is not present.It requiresthis other thing (whatlinguisticswould call the'referent')to giveit senseand importance. The simulacrum,on the otherhand,breakingwith this picture,doesnot rely upon somethingbeyondit for its force,but is itself forceor power;able to do thingsandnot merelyrepresent.It is asa resultof this positivepower

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that simulacracan produceidentitiesfrom within the world, and without referenceto a model,by enteringinto concreterelations- in this case,the philosopheris not the one searchingfor the Good, but the one who is able to createnew conceptsfrom the material availablein the world; concepts which will do something.We can seehere a hint of the understandingof the world as a productive-machinethat will emergein Anti-Oedipusand A Thousand, Plateaus. Deleuze also connectsthe thought of the simulacrum to that of the eternal return. As Deleuze frequently argues,we must understandthe eternal return in terms of the return and affirmation of the different, and not of the Same.Ratherthan distinguishingbetweengoodand bad copies, the eternal return rejects the whole model/copy picture - which is groundedon the valueof the Sameand infusesnegativityinto the world in favourof the productivepowerof the simulacrathemselves. Connectives Difference Eternal return Plato Representation

SINGULARITY Tom Conley In the historiesof cartographyand of the cognition of terrestrialspace, 'singularity'is a term that replacesthat of the mirror. It is first seenin the earlymodern period. In the Middle Agesthe 'mirror of human salvation' (speculum humanesalaationis)charteda typology of eventsin human and divine time that madeclearthe order of the world on the basisof eventsin the Old Testamentthat alsohaveanaloguesin the New Testament.The mirror wasthat which assureda reflectionof a totality and the presenceof God, a reflectivesurface,resemblingperhapsthe pupil of an eyeon which were gatheredand assembledthe variety and wealth of divine creation, When, in the later fifteenth century,oceanictravellersventured south and eastfrom Europe to the Indies by way of Africa or west to the Caribbean of the world could o!easterncoastof SouthAmerica,mostrepresentations no long conform to the figure of the speculummund,i.Discovery and encounterpromptedcosmographers,to registernew,often conflicting,and sometimesunthinkablethings into works of opcn form. As singularitics

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theseworks were subjectto changeand revision- indeedwhat Deleuze often calls'open totalities'.For a brief time, the world itself wastakento be a massof islandsand continents,of insularshapesthat containeda possibly infinite measureof singularities.Thus are born works such as Les singularitisde la Franceantarctique(by Andr6 Thevet) or isolarii ('islandbooks', by BenedettoBordone, TomassoPorcacchiand others). They are conceivedto accountfor, recordand copewith new shapesofalterity and differencecomingfrom distantspaces. WhereverDeleuzeinvokessingularityit can be understoodagainstthis historicalbackground.As a philosopherhe embracesthe idea of virtual travel, along infinite trajectoriesor lines of flight that lead the thinker anywhere about the world, but first and foremostamongand betweenconceptual islandsor points of singularity.As islands,they are alsopoints that can be seenin series,asinflexionsor emissionsof events.A singularity,alsoinsularity,is a decisivepoint anda placewhereperceptionis felt in movement.In Leibniz'sconceptof the monad,Deleuzenoteshow a 'singularity'is frequentlyassociated with condensed events.Singularities arethe'zoneof clear expression' of the monad.Lessabstractly, in termsof civic geographya singularity would be a county,a regionaldepartment,or evena topography. The singularitiesof the monad are what assurethe presenceof a body in or through which they vibrate.They arethe eventsthat makeit both unique and common,both an entity of its own perceptualdataand a groundfor the relationthat the monadholdswith its environs.They arethe placeswhere the 'singularitiesbelongingto each. . . areextendedup to the singularities of others'(D 1993a:86).The world asa wholeis perceivedinfinitesimally in microperceptionsand gigantically,in macroperceptions. Singularity allows the subject to perceivethe world in both ways,infinitesimally and infinitely, in hearing the whir of a familiar watermill, in being awareof wavesof water striking the hull of a boat, or even in sensingmusic that accompanies a'danceof dust'(D 1993a:86).TheseformulationsaboutsingularityinflectDeleuze'swork on styleand the creativeimagination.With the samevocabularyhe notesthat greatwriterspossess'singular conditions of perception'(D 1997b:116).Indeed singularitiesallow greatwriters to turn aestheticperceptsinto veritablevisions;in other words,to movefrom a unique site of consciousness to an oceanicone. Such is what makesthe writer changethe world at large through microperceptionsthat become translatedinto a style,a seriesof singularitiesand differencesthat estrange common usagesof languageand make the world of both the writer and thosein which the readerlivesvibratein unforeseen and compellingways. Weresingularityassociated with the 'Causesand Reasonsof the Desert Island',(oneof Deleuze'sfirst piecesof philosophical writing)it wouldbc conncctcdwith differcnccand rcpctition,onc of thc bascsof'his wurk on

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duration,identity and ideationin Dffirence and,Repetition.A singularityis and of a unique point but it is alsoa point of perpetualrecommencement personal shifts keywords in his dictionary, singularity variation.Like other and bearsdifferent inflections in different contextsbut is alwaysrelated to perception,subjectivity,affectivity and creation. Connectives Event Leibniz Lines of flight

SMOOTH SPACE Tarnsin Lorraine ln A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuze and Guattari characteriseliving orBanisms in terms of interior milieus' (cellularformation, organicfunctions) and 'exterior milieus' (food to eat, water to drink, ground to walk on). Milieus are vibratory blocks of space-timeconstituted by the periodic repetition of the configurationsof forcesthat makesthem what they are (D&G 1987:313).All the milieusof the organismhavetheir own patterns and thesepatternsinteract with the patternsof other milieus with which they communicate.The rhythm of the interactionsbetweenthesedifferent blocksrather than one homomilieus operatesin terms of heterogeneous geneousspace-time.Thus, an organismemergesfrom chaos('the milieu of all milieus') as vibratory milieus or blocks of space-time that create rhythms within the organismas well as with the milieus exterior to the organism.Territorial animals(includinghumanbeings)arenaturalartists who establishrelations to imperceptibleas well as perceptibleforces through the refrainsof song (birds)or movementsand markings(wolves, rabbits)that createthe rhythms of life-sustainingregularitiesfrom cosmic chaos.The variousrhythms of the human subject'scomponentsand their relations to interior and exterior blocks of space-timebecome territorialised into the sentient awarenessof one organism living in the 'striated' spaceof sociallife, cancellingout anomalousinteractionsamongmilieusin the process.The conventionalnotion of spaceas a homogeneouswhole within which movement unfolds is thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, a blocksof totalisedconstruct of spacethat emergesfrom heterogeneous sprcc-timc.'I'hcy contrastthcir conccptof 'smrxlthspacc'to thc morc notion of spilcc;'snlrxrthspircc'hrunts itnd citn disru;rtthc convcntionirl

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striationsof conventionalspace,and it unfoldsthrough 'an infinite succession of linkagesand changesin direction' that createsshifting mosaicsof space-timesout of the heterogeneous blocksof different milieus (D&G 1987: 494).Deleuzeand Guattari are interestednot in substitutingone conceptionofspacewith another,but ratherin how forcesstriatespaceand how at the same time it developsother forces that emit smooth spaces (D&G 1987:500). In a discussionof the conceptof the (movement-image'inspired by Henri Bergson, Deleuze distinguishesmovement from space: 'space coveredis past, movementis present,the act of covering' (D 1986: l). Spacescoveredby movementaredivisibleand belongto a single,homogeneous space while movement changesqualitatively when it is divided. Movements, of what Deleuze and Guattari in A ThousandPlateauscall 'deterritorialization',areactsofcoveringthat arenot referredto spaceconceivedasa uniform areaof measurable units within which changesoccur. A subjectwho orients himself with respectto movements,rather than a retrospectively createdconstructof space,experiences spacenot in terms of a totality to which it is connected(I walk acrossthe snowfive milesfrom the centreof town), but rather in terms of pure relationsof speedand slowness(snowunder moving feet aswind lifts hair) that evokepowersto affect and be affected,both actualand potential (pushingfeet againstground, could alsojump or run). A personon a trip to anothercity might orient himself by followingthe roadmappedout through socialconventionfrom one point to another.A nomadof the desertin searchof food might orient himselfdifferently,travellingnot from onepoint to a predesignated destination, but rather travelling from one indication of food to the next as the need arises.In the former case,local movementsare charted with respect to alreadyspecifiedpoints(thusimposinga planeof organisationupon the movementsthat unfold). In the latter case,spaceshifts with eachmovement in keepingwith shifts in meetingthe needfor food. Theseshifts do not occur in space;rather they establishdifferent configurationsof nomad and vegetationand landscape that unfold asthe smoothspaceof the search for food. The smooth spacesharedwith othersemergesnot with reference to an 'immobile outside observer',but rather through the tactile relations of any number of observers(D&G 1987: 493).It is thus a space- like that of the steppes,the desertor polar landscapes - occupiedby intensities, forcesand tactilequalities,with no fixed referencepoint (D&G 1987:479). Connectives Deterritorialisation/ Rcterritorialisation Nomadicism

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SOCIUS Kenneth Surin Traditional philosophyrelied overwhelminglyon the operationof transcendentalprincipleswhich wererequiredto makeclaimspossible,aswell as moral aestheticjudgements.There are also transcendentalprinciples, perhapslesswidely acknowledgedthan the onesthat underlie traditional philosophy,which subtendthe constitutionof the socialorder.Theseprinciplesare embodiedin what Deleuzeand Guattari call the 'socius'.The well-known philosophical counter-tradition inaugurated by Friedrich Nietzsche,and continuedby Martin Heidegger,undertooka dismantling of the transcendentalbasis of traditional philosophy,and the work of Deleuzeis to be locatedin this tradition. For Deleuze,asfor Nietzsche,an entire tradition extendsfrom Plato to Kant. in which it is declaredthat the yardstick of knowledgeis verisimilitude.In Plato's caseverisimilitude derivesfrom an ideal 'world of Forms' (the transcendent),whereasfor ImmanuelKant this world of the transcendentwasbanishedto the realm of the 'noumenalabsolute'.Kant, though,insistedthat the counterpartto the noumenalworld, for examplethe world of phenomena,wasconstituted (or non-empiricallygiven)subjectof by the activity of the transcendental possibleexperience.In their reflection on the socius,conducted throughout the two volumes of Copitalism and, Schizophrenia,Deleuze and, undoing of the transcenGuattari seekwhat amountsto a comprehensive dentalbasisofthe constitutionofthe socialorder.In sodoing,they adhere (transcendental empiricism',in which the basisfor the constitution to the (as possible) to experienceis sought.This proiectis 'tranof real opposed scendental'in so far as the conditionsfor real experiencerequire a nonempirical organisationof the objectsof experience,though the sourceof this organisationis not a transcendentalsubjecti la Kant, but rather the very form in which real objectsareexperiencedasactiveand dynamic. the sociusis said to be necessarybecausedesiringln Anti-Oed,ipus, productionis coterminouswith socialproductionandreproduction,andfor the latter to takeplacedesirehasto be codedand recoded,so that subiects canbe preparedfor their socialrolesand functions.The sociusis the terrain of this codingand recoding.Anotherrationalefor the sociusstemsfrom the part it playsin consolidating thc capitalistordcr.l)csirc is simultancously by crrpitrrl, whiclrtrccsit fi'onrits prcviouscntboclinrcnts cnablcdrrndlirrritccl

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or codingssothat it canbe placedat the disposalofcapitalisr expansion;and desire,after this decodingby capital, is reined in or recodedso that it can subservethe novel requirementsof capitalistproduction. Coding or 'inscription' are thus central to the constitution of the socius, and Deleuzeand Guattarirespondto the crucialquestionof the surfaceon which inscriptiontakesplaceby invokingthe notion of the earth.The earth precedesthe constitution of the socius,and is the primordial unity or ground of desireand production.As suchthe earthis the preconditionof productionwhile alsobeingthe objectof desire.The first form of the socius has thereforeto involve a territorialisation,undertakenby a 'territorial machine',which parcelsout the earthinto segmentsof socialmeaning. Once territorialisationhas occurred, it becomespossiblefor social machines(the coreof the socius)to operate.Socialmachineshavehumans as their parts and are essentialto the generationof cultural forms, these forms being neededto link humansto their (technical)machines.Social machinesorganiseflowsof powerand desireby codingthem. There areall kinds of flows:differentkindsof humans,vegetation,non-humananimals, agricultural implements, flows that involve bodily functions and organs, and soon. Nothing escapes coding,and sonothing canescapethe purview of the socius. If the sociusis a megamachine, the fuel that drivesthis machineis desire, though desireis shapedand orchestratedby its insertioninto this megamachine.In modernsocieties, the natureof this insertionof desireinto the socialmegamachinehas been significantlyrransformed.To facilitatethe functioning of capitalism,flows havehad to becomemore abstract,since capital requires intersubstitutibility,homogeneity,relentlessquantification, and exchangemechanismsto work. Hand in hand with this abstraction goes a privatisationof the social, since an over-valuationof the individual is requiredto compensatefor the massivecollectivedisinvestment that takesplacein the socialas a result of the inexorablegrowth of the processes of abstraction.The vehiclesof this privatisationareruled by the Oedipusprinciple,which functionsasa kind of transcendental r6gime for the investmentof socialdesire.Other principles,primarily concerned with morality and punishment, but alsowith death and cruelty, are effective in this domain too. Dispensingwith psychoanalysis asthe ontology for how a sociusis constituted, Deleuze and Guattari find it necessaryto replace Freudianism with a different ontology. The alternative- called 'schizoanalysis'or 'nomadology'- beginsby refusingany kind of transcendentalprinciple purporting to serveas the ground of the socius.In placeof the logic of necessityand continuity that characterisedprevious social ontologies, I)clcuzc and Guttttri opt firr onc that is markcclby rupturcs,limits,

singularities,ironies and contingencies.Traditional logic displacesdesire asthe motor driving the socialmegamachine.Schizoanalysisor nomadology provide a new conception of experienceand desiring-production, emphasisingforms of experimentation not constrained by the ego or Oedipal structures,aswell asthe needto createnew forms of collective(as opposedto merelyindividual) liberation.Importantly,this kind of liberation cannotbe sponsoredeither by the Stateor capital. Connectives Capitalism Desire Earth/Land, Guattari Psychoanalysis Schizoanalysis

SPACE Tom Conlejt In a view of a port seenat night at the beginningof Jean-Luc Godard's Pierrotlefou (1965),one of Deleuze'smodelfilms in his work on the timeimage, a voice quotes a passagefrom Elie Faure on Velasquez:'Space reigns'. The remark could apply to all of Deleuze'swritings. For the philosopher,spaceis what is at oncecreatedand exhaustedor annihilated in the creationof an event.Whereverphilosophycreatesevents,it recoups literatureandthe artsin general.In an importantessayon SamuelBeckett, Deleuzenotesthat spaceis rich in potentialitybecauseit makespossible the realisationof events.A given image or concept,when it is seenor engaged,createsand dissipatesspacein the time of its perception.Space is somethingthat is at the edgesof language.Deleuzecallsthe apprehension of spacean 'exhaustion'of meaning.The artist dissipatesmeaningin order to makespacepalpableat the moment it is both createdand annihilated.For both Godard and Beckettit could be saidthat the stakesarethose of 'exhaustingspace'(D 1997b:163).Only then can it be seenand felt in an event, in a sudden disjunction, that scatterswhat we take to be the reality in which we live. The almost mystical tenor of Deleuze'swork on spaceand the event (cspeciallyin "I'hc Exhaustcd'in .Es.ra.y.s Criticaland Clinical)is cxplained by whatthc historirrnof rcligionMichcl clc(lcrtciruwritcsin a l9ll4 study

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of the inventionof everydaylife: Spaceis a discursivepracticeof a place. A placeis a givenarea,namedand mapped,that canbe measuredin terms of surfaceor volume.It becomesspaceonly whenit becomesa siteof existentialengagemenr amongliving agentswho mark it with their activitiesor affiliate with dialogueand acriveperception. Placein this senseis equivalent to Deleuze'sconceptof an espace quelconque, 'any-space-whatsoever', that is determined and given to be what it is without being inflected by a useror a traveller.The taskof the philosopherand artist is to takethe most innocuous or ineffectual of all placesand to fragment (even atomise or molecularise)or strip them of their potenrial.The taskof the filmmakeris to make visible these non-placesbefore fracturing and dispersing them through creative manipulation. Roberto Rossellini, in Paisan (1947) or Germany,YearZero (1948)extendsbeforethe eyesof the spectatorproliferationsof any-spaces-whatsoever,'an urban cancer,an indifferent surface, a wasteland'(D 1986:212) that haveas rheir counterpartsthe clich6sof everydaylife, that his cameramakesuntenableand inhuman. Accordingly, the taskof the philosopheris to turn'commonplaces'into matterfor more exhaustivespeculation.Therein are engenderedother spacesthat can be hypotheticaland utopian or evenvirtual. Spaceis elsewhere measuredin Deleuze'spoliticalwritingsaccordingto degreesof smoothness and striation.A 'smoothspace'is onethat is boundlessand possiblyoceanic,a spacethat is without borderor distinctionthat would privilegeonesiteor placeoveranother.It doesnot belongto a prelapsarianworld from which humanshavefallen (asRousseaumight argue),nor is it utopian unlessit can be thought of in coniunctionwith irs 'srriated' counterpart,a spacedrawn and riddled with lines of divide and demarcation that name,measure,appropriateand distribute spaceaccordingto inheritedpolitical designs,history or economicconflict.Without boundariesor measure,smoothspaceis frequently affiliatedwith the unconscious. It is 'occupiedby eventsor haecceitiesmore than by formed and perceived things', and thus it is more a spaceof affectsor sensations than properties (D&G 1987:479).It is definedby a flow of forcesand henceis perceived hapticallyinsteadof optically.It is 'intensive'wherestriatedspaceis 'extensive'.A Body without Organs(BwO) bearsa surfaceof smoothspacethat lackszonesor organsthat haveaffectiveprivilegeoverothers.Striatedspace is one wherelinesand pointsdesignateitinerariesand trajectories. Smoothspacecanbe perceivedin andthroughstriatedspace,indeedwhat is seenandexperienced in the world at large,in orderto deterritorialise given places.In Deleuze'slexiconthat pertainsto spaceandplace,deterritorialisation andreterritorialisation areat thebasisof mosrbiologicalandphilosophicalactivity.In this respectthenomadis the personor thinkerwhoconstantly createsspaccby movingfrom placcto placc.Thc nomacl,thc phiklsophcr;

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and the scientistand artist alikeare capableof creatingspacesthrough the trajectoriesof their passages that movefrom one territory to anotherand from givenstriationson the surfaceof the world to smoothand intensive areas,areasthat aretantamountto the folds and creases of eventsthat vibrate in the body,itself a placethat canbe affectivelyspatialised in infinite ways. Connectives Body without Organs Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Nomadicism Smoothspace Utopia Virtual/Virtuality

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VerenaConlelt Open spaces,smoothspaces,absenceof boundaries,speed,the firing of electrons, blurrings of sexualor speciesboundaries,rhizomatic connectivities and the creation of hybrids: all of thesedescriptivesabound in Deleuze's writings and asa result they makehim a favouriteof digital artists.Deleuze puts in questiontraditionalconceptsofspacethat, asreselctens&,served asa passivebackground against which humans stagedtheir dramatic actions. giveswayto rhizomaticthinking, spacecanno longerbe When arborescence separatedfrom human actors.Spaceendowedwith virtual qualitiesexists betweenrhizomatic lines and is more intensivethan extensive. Rhizomaticthinking makesits way into the virtual spacesof computers and digital art. It setsout to undo limits and collapsebinaries- nature versusculture, human versusmachine,human versusanimal,or human versus cyborg - and creates new spaces.On their computers, network digital artists experimentwith connectionsbetweendifferent speciesto create hybrids and becomings.Like philosophers,many digital artists questionlimits in order to destabilisethe selfthat is definedby the position it occupiesor owns in the world. Working with Spinozist questions'What cana bodydo?'and'Wheredo the senses end?'- digitalartistsundo thc barriersusedto fix and definethe 'Self'. Digital artistsquestionthe mrrrkcdand finitc body by disembodying it, by producingrrlloclywithout Organs([]wO) :rnda machinicboclyof dcsirc.A wcb of'coltncctivitythrrt is pcrccivcclto hc inlinitc opcnsonlo ncw lrrrdothcr spilccs.'l'his wcb

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replacesa stable,finite self and increasesthe possibilitiesof becomingfor human beings.Digital art emphasises permanentflux, magneticstreams and fluid desires.In virtual spaces,where experienceis mediatedthrough the medium rather than narure,digital art createshybrids and opensto becomings.simulation replacesrepresentation.Emphasisis placed on constructionand not on finality. Networks are in incessantcirculation, makingpossiblethe creationof virtual spaces. Digital art seemsat times to be an extensionof conceptsthat Deleuze developedwith Guattariin the conrextof informationtheoryand biology. The philosophers drawfrom GregoryBateson'snotionof the world asa circulation of differencesalong circuits that function as forebearersof com-

philosophyasmuch ascyberneticsand computerscreens. If they seepossibilitiesof becomingthroughconnectionsbetweenhumansand machinesor the creationof new spaces)they also flatly condemnthe political abuses through the world of the digital mediaand the internet.Technology,they argue,can be liberating.It can help createand recreatea world that no longerexiststo be represented. It canbreakdown barriersbetweenhuman and machine.It canopento new virtual spacesand infinite becomings.They warn us that humansshouldnot deludethemselves: information science, like everyother science,is alsoconstructedaroundorder-words.It exracts constantsand discouragestrue becomings.Computersand the internet are presentlyunder the spellof financecapitalism,the latter deploysits orderwords to build barriersand arrestmovementsthat it would otherwisebe unableto channelfor its own ends.It extractsconstantsand helpsconsolidatea societyofcontrol. Spaceslosetheir virtual qualities. Art, however, has the potential of escaping the capitalist economic sphereascapitalismconsolidates throughcontrol,whilst digitalart experimentsin and with virtual spacesand, while unravellingboundariesat vertiginous speed,it continuously createsand recreatesrrew virtual spaces through hybrid connections.

SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632_77\ Kenneth Surin In the last few dccadcsthc writingsof Louis Arthusscr,Eticnncllalibar, Picrrc Mrrchcrcy,Antonio Ncgri, I)clcuzc rncl rthcrs. hrvc nrrrrkcdir

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resurgenceof interest in the thought of Baruch Spinoza, in which Spinoza'smaterialistontology has been used as a framework for constructing a matrix of thought and practice not regimented by the axioms of Platonicmetaphysics, the epistemologyof Ren6Descartes,andthe transcendentalrationalismof ImmanuelKant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.Also important for thesethinkershasbeenthe useof spinoza asa resourceto reconceptualisesome of Karl Marx's more important categoriesand principles.coupled with this resurgencehas been a parallel developmentin the areaof more technicalcommentaryon Spinoza,associated primarily with the massive works of Martial Gueroult and AlexandreMatheron.Deleuzehimselfdealtwith Spinozain two texts:his 1968doctoralthesisSpinozaet leproblimed,el'expression (D 1992)and the 1970 shorter text Spinoza: Philosophie pratique (D 1988c),though the thoughtof spinozapermeatesall his works,including the textsco-written with Guattari. Deleuzeviews Spinozaas the first thinker to make judgementsabout truth and virtue inescapablysocial.Hence,for spinoza, notionsof moral culpability,responsibility,good and evil haveno reality exceprin so far as they stemfrom the dispositionto obeyor disobeythosein authority.The Statecannotcompel the individual as long as she is seento obey,and so DeleuzecreditsSpinozawith beingthe first philosopherto placethought outsidethe purview of the Stateand its functions:Spinoza,saysDeleuze in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,'solicitsforces in thought that elude obedienceaswell asblame,and fashionsthe imageof a life beyond good and evil, a rigorousinnocencewithout merir or culpability' (D 1988c:4). Life for Spinoza,since it cannot be constrainedby the state or milieu from which it emerges,is irreducibly positive:life cannotbe enhancedif it is trammelled by the interdictions of priesrs, judges, and generals whoseown livesare markedby an internal sado-masochism. Needlessto say,Deleuze's use of Spinoza is inevitably selective.There are many Spinozas,iust as there are many Platos and Hegels, and Deleuze's Spinozais a Spinozaread through the eyesof Friedrich Nietzsche,and especiallyNietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return. For Nietzsche. accordingto Deleuze,the eternal return meansthat one will be willing to experiencelife over and over againin exactlythe sameway.Similarly, where Spinozais concerned,the person who will not be a victim of the sad passions,the aspirant for beatitude,will be someonewhoseactions cannot be an occasionfor regret. In both cases,therefore,the individual concernedwill not want the terms undcr which shc lives life to be any diffcrcnt. lror spinozir,tlrcrc ilrc two primirry kirrdsof'firrccs wlriclr dinrinish lifb - hrrtrcd,whichis tttrttcdtowirldsllrc olhrrr;irrrdllrc birdcorrscicncc.

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which is turned inwards.Only a new kind of life, capableof sustaining experimentationand a new appetitefor living, can overcomethesenegative and reactive passions.Spinoza's works, primarily the Ethics, delineatean intellectualframework(going under the name of an 'ethics') for leadingthis new life. In this new ontology,a body is definedby its speeds and slownesses, not its forms and functions, as it was in the age-old Aristotelianmetaphysicsthat dominatedphilosophyuntil the Enlightenment. Also important in this ontology are the linkagesbetweendifferent bodies,culminating in the forming of a nexusof connections,eachconnection or set of connectionsproceedingwith its own speedand slowness. Knowledge understood in this way is essentiallymaterial and contingent, since no individual knows aheadof time what their bodily affectsare and what they are likely to involve in relation ro other individuals and forces. Deleuzeand Guattari'skinship with Spinozastemsfrom their perception that philosophytodayhasto cometo termswith the emergence of new knowledgesthat havebeen accompaniedby the explosiverise of a whole rangeof new sciences, basedon the creationof'nonstandard' logicsand topologiesof changeand relation,and typically devisedto dealwith situations that have the characterof the irregular or the arbitrary (what Deleuzeand Guattaricall'nomad thought','rhizomatics','schizoanalysis'). These new logicsand topologiesconcernthemselvesnot only with the structuralprinciplesofchangeand process,but alsowith surfaces, textures, rhythms, connectionsand so on, all of which can be analysedin terms of suchnotionsasthoseof strings,knots,flows,labyrinths,intensitiesand becomings.Spinozais viewedby Deleuzeasthe pre-eminentprecursorof this'nomadthought',thoughclearlyfor them Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergsonarealsoexemplarypredecessors. The appropriationof Spinoza'sthought by Deleuze(and Guattari) is undeniablyselective.There is a rationalismin Spinozathatisdownplayed in Deleuze'sinterpretationof him, and while Spinozawascriticalof State power,he cannoteasilybe madeto sharethe sametheoreticalpremissesas the anarcho-Marxismof Deleuzeand Guattari.All this notwithstanding, Spinoza'srigorous immanentismand materialism,mediatedin complex waysby the thought of severalother thinkers,are very much in evidence in Deleuze'soeuvre. Connectives Eternal return Immanence Materialism

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sPrNozA + ETHTCSOF JOY Constantin Il Bound,as Deleuzehasoften beenpraisedfor his (Stoic)commitmentto the ethicsof the event - our becomingworthy of the event through the processof counter-actualisation of that which is happeningto us. But Deleuzehas alsolaid claim to an ethic of joy, the articulationof which is the result of his many encounterswith Baruch Spinoza.The nodal point that representsthe linkageof this commitmentis the Nietzscheanaffirmationof the 'eternalreturn' - the lynchpin of Deleuze'sontology and the indispensableimperativeof his ethics. Deleuze thinks of desire as an affirmative,non-intentionalintensity, producingconnections- real in their function and revolutionaryin their multiplicity. Deleuze'sdesire is modelled after Spinoza'sconatus;it is neithera 'want' nor 'lack' but the effort of an individualentity to persevere in its own existence,Spinozaalwaysthinks of conatus asbeingdetermined by its capacityto affect and to be affected;it is not, therefore, difficult to think of czna,tus as desire.Providedthat we do not separateessencefrom action,a czna,tus canbe understoodasthe essence ofan entity or its degree of power.Actions themselvesconstitutea person'saffirmationof life and his will to exist. Spinozaspeaksof an order of essences, that is, of an order of intensities, within which all singularessences cohereand aremutually responsiblefor eachother'sproduction.In Deleuze'swork, this order helpshim articulate the virtual/real.But in Spinoza,thereis alsoan orderof organisation,with its own lawseternallydeterminingthe conditionsfor the cominginto being and the enduranceof singularentities.On this plane,arrangementsare made ad infinitum, but not every arrangementis compatiblewith the others. Spinoza recognisesan order of fortuitous encounters:bodies encounterotherbodiesand in somecasesthe singulararrangements of one body are suchthat they 'fit' the singulararrangementsof the bodiesthey encounter; together they increase each other's power of affectivity. Sometimeshowever,somebodiesare incompatiblewith others' arrangements,thus when they meet they decrease the powerof one another. In an effort to think aboutdesireasjoy,Deleuzeborrowsfrom Spinoza's schemaof intensities.To the extentthat desireis not phantasmatic, desire is the power that one has, which allows one to go as far as this power pgrmits: the powerto annexbeing.Here the distinctionbetweenprogressive and regressiveannexationbecomesthe urgent task of the ethicist. Deleuze'sallegianccto Spinozapermits him to arguethat the questionof the effort of thc individualto maintainand prokrnghis cxistcnccis tlso

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a questionof how to enablethe maximumexperienceof activeaffects.The order of fortuitousencountersdoesnot giveus an edgebecauseit leadsto the formation of inadequateideas- an inadequareidea being the idea whosecauseis not in our own powerto understand.Nevertheless, evenan inadequateideacausesan affect,and an affect,whoseadequatecausewe are not, is a passion.Conversely,an adequateidea finds its formal causein our power to think and to understand,and also generatesan affectin us, an affectwhoseadequatecauseis our own powerto think and is, therefore,an action.In this case,we no longercount on accidentalencountersto multiply joyful passions. An entire geneticphenomenologyof the becoming-activeof human beingscanbe found in Spinoza'sEthics,and this is what inspiresDeleuze's ethicsof joy. We begin with passivedesires/joysthat increaseour power ro act despite the fact that they are at the mercy of inadequateideas.But, then, thanks to thesedesiresand passions,we begin to form common notions, or adequateideas.Active desire/joy accompaniesthe common notionsasour powerto act increases. Finally,activeioy replacespassions, filling us with new capacitiesto be affected;this combinationconsrirutes the activelife of the individual.In turn our capacityro understandsadness and contrariety is enhanced,and as we developa better understandingof theseaffectionsour activejoy increases. At this time, the influenceof Friedrich Nietzschein Deleuze'sethicsof joy is revealed:the pedagogyfor the formulation of adequateideas becomesthe processof the counter-actualisation of that which happensto us. It is no longerthe generalityof the commonnotion that standsfor the cogitandum of practicalreason;it is the eventthat must be graspedthrough the processof counter-actualisation.The sadnessin the stateof affairspassively affecting us is transformed into a ioyful affirmation of the event. Passiveaffectionsare turned into activeonesthat are capableof transvaluing and transformingstatesof affairs.

STATE Kenneth Surin Deleuzeand Guattarihavea conceptionof the Statethat is indebtedto the work of the anthropologistand anarchistPierre Clastres.Clastreshad arguedagainstthe conventionalevolutionistaccountof the emergenceof the Stateas a form of political and socialorganisation.Accordingto this traditional account,the Statecan developonly when a socictyrcnchcsir ccrtaindcgrccof complcxity,cvidcnccdprimrrrilyby its capacityto crciltc

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and sustaina more sophisticateddivision of labour. Against this view, Clastresarguedthe Stateis the condition for undertakingsignificanteconomic and political projectsand the division of labour that ensuesfrom theseprojects,and so logically and empirically the division of labour does not condition economicand political projects.Deleuzeand Guattari follow Clastresin repudiatingthis evolutionisttheory. In CapitalismandSchizophrenia,Deleuzeand Guattari view the Stateas an overarchingpowerthat bringstogetherlabourpowerand the prior conditions for the constitution of labour power, enabling the creation of surplus-value.As a result, there is a constitutive antagonisticrelation between the State and labour, especiallysince the State supplies capital with its modelsof realisation,and sothereis alsonecessarily an antagonism betweencapitaland labour.Capitalexistsand perpetuatesitselfby organising itself to orchestrateand contain this proletarianantagonism.The necessary concomitantof the State'sapparatuses'capacity to engagein this task of organisationis the production of surplus-valueand facilitating accumulation.As a result,capitaland the Stateareunder unceasinginternal pressureto neutraliseand containthe antagonismthat, paradoxically, is the very thing that enablesit to exist. The assemblages createdand maintained by the Stateand capital createa collectivesubiectivity which establishes the material aspects of the productive forces that generate surplus-valueandby sodoingmakeproductionandaccumulationpossible. Along with the formationof collectivesubjectivitygoesthe (State's)power of subjection. The State'scapacityto engagein the formationof a collectivesubjectivity, neededto constitute labour as a productive force, doesnot remain the samethroughout history. The despoticState in early historical times used slaveryand serfdomwith their accompanyingforms of subjectivity for this task;industrialcapitalismusedthe figureof the massworkerand disciplinary socialformations;and today, in the age of a globalisedand worldintegrated capitalism,the State is still neededto regulate the flows of productionand to reproducethe forms of accumulation.But this powerof dominationis no longermediatory,as wasthe casewith the previouseconomic dispensations,in as much asthe State is no longer neededto create and maintain classesand other socialand economicsubgroupings.Instead, the function of the State/capitalin the current phaseof capitalistaccumulation is to engagein the work of disaggregation,to segment,through administrativeproceduresand the useof mediaand informationalsystems, the countervailingpowerthat the proletariathasdeveloped.Capital/State hasa negativerelationshipto the forcesand forms that opposcit. In thc prcscntcapitalistc
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that is like a single City, megalopolis, or 'megamachine' of which the States are parts, or neighbourhoods. Towards this end, capitalism will cven create States that are not viable, like Somalia and Rwanda, for its own purposes: subjugating minorities through forced integration and extermination. In the present conjuncture, that is, the age of the societies of control (as opposed to thc disciplinary societies of the previous epoch), capital has become the ubiquitous milieu that secures the isomorphism of even the most disparate forms (commercial, religious, artistic, and so forth). In this milieu, productive labour is inserted into every section of society: the universality of capital is simultaneous with the omnipresence of everything that createssurplus-value, as human subiectivity' leisure and play, and so on, are incorporated into the latest regimes of accumulation. Capitalism has always striven to create an economic order that is able to function without the State, and in its current phasethis propensity has become more marked than ever. However, for Deleuze and Guattari this is not because the State itself has been abolished, but rather because the separation between State and society can now no longer be maintained. Society and State now constitute a single and unified nexus, and all capital has become social capital. Hence the production of social cooperation, undertaken primarily by the service and informational industries in developed countries' has become crucial for capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the deterritorialising effect of State/Capital merely produces an even more powerful reterritorialisation, that is, State/Capital only breacheslimits in order to impose its own limits.

Connective Capitalism

STRATIFICATION K1lie Message Deleuze and Guattari explain 'stratification' is an ongoing, rhizomatic processthat contributes to the line of emergenceor becoming.This processmay (or may not) lead to our reiectionof a unifying subiectivity and embraceinsteadthe forever-formativeBody without Organs(BwO). alsorefersto whatis cssentially However,the process/term'stratification' writersin thcir rrttcmpt it assists whercby sorts, of an organisingprinciple l)ltrlcttrts (.1 'l'httusttntl iclcas irctivclyto ilpply- or put iuto prircticc thcir r rirls t1 p rrt tillt h ir s c lic s of ' ' 1' r r : t gt t t r t lit ' s 't r t l l t c t 'l l t r t t t r t b s t t 'i t c t t h c o l i e s ) .

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As such, the term provides both an organising form for discussion, as well as the subject matter or content contained by that form. The processes(rather than just the effects) of everyday experience are invoked by Deleuze and Guattari in order to show interweaving journeys between statesofconsciousnessand unconsciousnessthat we both take and make routinely and repetitively. These often forgotten journeys and the non-cognitive decisions that accompany our movements are precisely where a potential line of flight or becoming may be located, and in evoking largely taken-for-granted State systems,all processesof becoming occur at lcast initially - within these systems. In what is perhaps the most useful and accessibleparadox of Plateau 3 of A Thousand. Plateaus,a primary point of discussionemergesas the relationship betweenthe production and reception of language(via theoriesof semiotics). As paradoxicalmeta-narrativeforms, the chaotic principles motivaring maintenanceof the conccptsof the carth and God function to destabilisethe claims for truth or universality that are often associatedwith somehowmore seamlesssemiotic theorics that attempt to provide a generalisingexplanation for all aspectsof reality. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari show that language, like all systemsand all aspectsof life, is constituted by a seriesof strata that have been traditionally contained by physiochemical,organic or anthropomorphic catcgories.Straddling these fields, languageaffects every aspectof the universe by contextualisingthem within a singlc sphere of interaction. For Deleuze and Guattari, every articulation (or stratum) consists of abstract and discrete components. In accord with this, language(and semiotics as the scienceof language)can clearly be seenas an organising principle that presumes to make senseof our experienceof these components that, when combined, produce realit,v.However, while acknowledging that they need to invoke the system they aim to critique (languagemust be used for generalcommunication to occur between writers and readers),Deleuze and Guattari also show that linguistic terms or signifiers rend ro be used in such generalisingand structural ways that they ceaseto function linguistically in relation to a specific idea or field of content. As such, the signifier comes ro adopt instead a kind of physical or distinct independenceand objecthood, whereby the relationship betweensignifier and signified is further obliterated. Deleuze and Guattari contend that all articulations are always already a double articulation becausethey are consrituted by the dual components of content and expression. We can understand this to mean that strata come in pairs and are themselvesmade up of a double articulation that can then be recognisedas molar and molecular (and bound by the third evcn more varirblc tcrm/linc
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the more generally acceptedbreakdown in referential relations between the signifier and signified, it is important to note that the layers, planes or discrete strata of content or expression are arbitrary. There is no referential, signifier-signified, or cause-and-effect relationship regulating their production or existence, despite the fact that the layers may cooperate with each other or bleed into one another in order to produce new strata or lines of deterritorialisation. The concept of 'stratification' is an attempt to promote a new kind of thinking about the way language produces an image of reality (and is itself reframed as a product of this same activity). Language is an important point of focus becauseit is both a grand and minor narrative, and an organising as well as organised principle through which our subiectivity is only ever provisionally contained.

Connectives Becoming Body without Organs Lines of flight Rhizome Semiotics Signifier/signified Subjectivity

SUBJECTIVITY Constantin V Boundas or founDeleuzeabandonsthe old imageof the subiectasa fixedsubstance dation stone, in favour of a subject that is the provisionaloutcomeof of heta processof subjectivation.The Deleuziansubiectis an assemblage the traditional of interiority elementswhosesourceis not the erogeneous imageof thought.Deleuzeinsiststhat subiectivityis not given;it is always underconstruction. At first glance,Deleuze'sshiftingattitudesaboutsubiectivityseemto defy (a he outlinesthat subject and,Subjectialry reconciliation.First, in Empiricism (D l99l: 85' 86). is definedby themovementthroughwhichit is developed' he explainsthat thereare 'no more subiccts,but Second,in the Dialogues collcctivcilsscmwhichconstitr,rte subjects, without dynamicindividuations shapcrtccording f:tkc haccccitics but subjcctivc blirgcs. . . N
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in Foucault he writes that 'the struggle for [modern] subjectivity presents itself, therefore,as the right to difference,variation and metamorphosis' (D 1988b: 106).The reconciliationof thesepositions hinges on our ability to read each one of them as a separateanswer to a distinct question. ln Empiricismand Subjectioity, Deleuze outlines that the inrensive, inregrative act of our practical interesr (extension of an initially intensive - yet narrow - moral sympathy over those who are not our kin), together with the associativerules of our speculative interest, make the organisation of subjectivity possible.Far from establishingthe seamlessidentity of the subiect, this organisation shows us that the subiect's constitution is a fiction, for the subject is an entity out of joint (cracked).There would be no belief in the subject without the (illegitimate and fictitious) belief in God and the World - illegitimate, becauseneither God nor World can evcr be objects of knowledge. Yet, these fictions act as the horizons of all possiblebeliefs, including the (illegitimate and fictitious) belief in the subject and its unity. For Deleuze in Dffirence and Reltetition, the subject is the tensive arrangement of many larval subjects. A self exists as long as a contracting machine, capableof drawing a difference from repetition, functions somewhere. There is a self lurking in the eye; another in the liver; a third in the stomach.A subject is the inclusive disjunction borne from the contracrion of all these selves. In Cultitalism and,Schizophrenia, the subject's recognition of itself as subject is described by Deleuze and Guattari as 'retrospective'. It emerges not as the agent of selection but as an after-effect of desiring-production. Capitalism and the isolation of the nuclear family from society that capitalism facilitates provide a perfect rraining ground for the ascetic subjectivity that capitalism requires. It also reproduces patriarchy by producing hicrarchically gendered subiects in accordance with specific values and imperatives that thrive within the nuclear family. Meanwhile, in The Fold a subject is that which comes ro a poinr of view, or rather that which remains at the point of view, provided that the point of view is one of variation. It is not the point of view that varies within the subject; on the contrary it is the condition through which an eventual subject apprehendsvariation. A subject is a monad that includes in itself and also conveys - the entire World obscurely, by expressing clearly only a small region of the world. Deleuze and Guattari propose in Foucault that the inside is an operation ol the outside or a doubling up of the outside. Here, rhe subject is the result of a processof subjectivationin accordancewith four foldings. These are as foll
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also being folded, henceforming a self within a person.Folding is the memoryof the outside. Further, the 'other' asit is discussedin TheLogicof Sensemakespossible the categoriesof 'subject'and 'object'. The other is the structureof all possible worlds: it inhabits the transitionsfrom one object to another;it relativisesdistancesand differences;it forms the backgroundfrom which forms riseup; and the otherspatialises and temporalises. The intensivebracketing of 'the other', therefore,is tantamountto the intensivebracketingof 'the Self'. The familiarworld and the subjectsthat inhabitit, in the presence of others,release andmolecularise the elementsandsingularities that werepreviously sedimentedand stratified inside them. The ideology of 'lack' and negationthat kept the subject'sdesirecaptiveis now shownto be the result of socio-historicalprocessesof subjectivation,rather than the irreducible datum of subjectivity.What emergesafter the bracketingof the other as structureof all possibleworldsis the 'otherwiseother'- l'autrement qu'autre. Connectives Capitalism Desire Fold Memory

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+ ART

Simon O'Sullizsan Deleuzehasbeenportrayedasa philosopherof dissolution,asa thinker of flowsand intensitiessomehow'outside'ofior'beyond', the human.Indeed a cursoryreadingof A Thousand, Plateausmight leadone to supposethat Deleuzeand Guattari are interesredin 'escaping'lived life. Certainlythis trajectory is there, perhapsmost infamouslyin the notion of the Body without Organs (BwO), understood as a srrategythat helps free us from the strata that constitutesus aJ human (that is to say,in a particular configuration). However Deleuze's philosophy is also very much one of caution,for it is nevera questionof wildly destratifyingbut of dosages, of finding creatioelinesof flight that leadsomewhere and from which one can 'return'. Deterritorialisationalwaysendsin a reterritorialisationandin fact needsa territory from which to operate. It is in this sensethat Deleuzemight alsobe understoodasa construc(lcrtainlyhc is involvcdin thc prodigionsconsrruction tivephilosophcr. of

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concepts,asevidencedby this dictionary.However,we might alsoseehim, specificallyin his collaborations, asbeinginvolvedin the parallelprojectof the construction,or production,of subjectivity.This is evenmore the case with Guattari's own work, which wasalwaysinvolved in thinking through what Guattaricalled'resingularisation': the potentialityfor, and practicalities o( reconfiguringour subjectivities.For Guattari, asfor Deleuze,this is a pragmaticand specificallymaterialistproject. Through involvement with certain materialsof expression,with groups and individuals,and alwayswith an toutside'we can open up new universesof reference:new waysof seeingand beingin the world. For Guattari La Borde clinic operatedasjust sucha siteof transformation.It encouragednew relationships At stakehere wasnot the reintegrationof a 'cured' and new experiences. individual into society,but an encouragementto becomeinvolved, to participate,in one'sown processualself-creation.Whateverthe successes or failuresof the clinic, we havehere an interestingframeworkfor thinking thosecollaborativeand collectiveart practicesof todaythat might be seen as producingcommunitiesand subjectivitiesin preciselythis sense.This field of expandedpractice,or 'relationalaesthetics'asit hasbecomeknown doesnot requirespectatorsassuch,but participantswho are'transformed' through their interactionwith the practice. We might recognise Deleuze's Spinozism here. Indeed Baruch Spinoza'sethicsinvolvesa similar mappingto the above:the organisation of one'sworld so as to produce productive- that is joltful - encounters. Involving the coming togetherof two 'bodies'that essentiallyagreewith oneanother,suchencountershavethe concomitantresultof increasingour capacityto act in the world. We might call this a 'rhizomaticsof friendship', the latter understood in its broadest sense.For Spinoza, ethics involvesexploring what a body,in both the individual and collectivesense, is capableof that beginswith ethical principlesor guidelines,but ultimately it producesan understandingof one'sself and world - and in fact a certainovercomingof one'sseparationfrom the world. Perhapsthe key factor preventingthesetransformationsis habit. Here 'habit' is takento meannot just our daily routinesbut alsoour dominant refrainsand typical reactionsto the world. In this senseaestheticsbecomes important.For namingasit doesa'disinterested'response to the world, aesthetics can operateas a rupture in otherwisedominant r6gimesof significationand expression(the clich6sof our beingand indeedof our consumer culture).Aestheticshereneednot be a transcendent category,ratherwe can think of it simplyasthe generationof unexpectedaffectsin andon thebody. This rupture canand doesproducepossibilitiesfor resingularisation. Anothcrwayof thinkingthis 'immancntacsthctic'is asinvolvinga kind of'hcsitationor gilp bctwccnstimulusrnd rcsponsc.In his uscof'llcnri

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Bergson, Deleuze attends to this: the pause between action and reaction is what constitutes the human as a particularly complex brain-body assemblage. This pause allows a certain amount of freedom and the possibility for a more creative responseto the world. Put differently, in today's world it is important to change speed, to slow down sometimes and even at times to remain still. Art, in fact the contemplationof art, might have a role to play here (this is also the sensein which meditation can be understood as a creative technology of self production). In some sensessuch an 'aesthetic' is 'beyond' subjectivity. Throughout his work, Deleuze attends to those experiences that are atypical and 'non-ordinary'. For example, what happens to an individual in a 'world without others'? Here the interaction with the world takes on an idiosyncratic and perverted character. The individual harnesses cosmic forces and 'becomesworld'as it were. Again this might be a name for certain art practices from prehistory to today, those that allow accessto a kind of immanent beyond to the everyday, and to everyday consciousness.We might say, then, that this is the aesthetic - and,ritualistic - function of art that always accompaniesthe latter's ethical or indeed political character.

S UB S T A NC E Claire Colebrook Deleuze might appear to be a purely inventive philosopher, avowedly creating concepts and vocabularieswhile rejecting the constraints of already formed metaphysical systcms.Certainly, he would seemto be a far cry from the project of Martin Heidegger that approached Being through its philosophical history. Central to Heidegger's destruction of the history of philosophy was the way in which the concept and grammar of 'substance' had dominated thinking. In Dffirence and Repetition,Deleuze repeatedly refers to Heidegger's project of re-activating thinking, and part of this reactivation depends upon avoiding the logic of a certain understanding of substance.However, it is not only in his early works on the history of philosophy but also in his later work with Guattari that Deleuze cngageswith the concept of 'substance'. There are two reasons for the importance of this concept. Philosophically, the concept of susbstancegoes back to the Greek term, hypoheimenon,or that which underlies, and to the concept of ousia, or that which remains present through a series of changcs. We can think of a substanccthat thenhas variousaccidentalqualitics or ;rlcclicittcs. 'l'lrc lrist
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part in, at the same time as he overturns this debate. For Deleuze, part of this overturning is to think of substance,not as a noun - something that is - but as an infinitive: not, 'The tree li green,' but a power 'to green'. So, Deleuze acceptsthe function of substance- that from which differentiated beings are expressed- but he does not seesubstanceas some ultimate bcing or entity, but as a power of creation and expression. If we think of substance(as it is traditionally defined) as what exisrs in itself before all relations, requiring no other being in order to be, then this has two resonances in Deleuze's philosophy. First, following Baruch Spinoza, Dcleuze argues that substance cannot be numerically several. This is becauseSpinoza adoptsthe traditional definition of somethingthat exists iz itself,,but also saysthat substanceis conceived through itself,We do not need more than one substance- say,the substanceof mind that will represent or know the substanceof matter. Substance- or what is - unfolds in two modes: the mode of extension (or spatial matter) and the mode of thought or mind. So there is iust one substancethat is then expressedboth in thought and in body. If there were more than one substance- say mind and body (which is the Cartesian answer) - then we would have to explain a relation between the two. But it is the very nature of substanceto be independent of its relation to anything else. Substancemust then be one, but it must also expressitself differently. Indeed, real difference is only possible on such an account. We should not, for example, think of different minds as different substances.What is numerically several - all the different minds in the world - is substantially univocal; each mind is an expression of the one power of life to express itself in the arrribute of mind; each is a different mode of the one attribute. Becausethere is only one substance we cannot say that mind is the origin or author of matter, or vice versa; all dualisms arc invalid and arise from mistaking the expressionsof substance - the relations unfolded from substance- for relations between substance. No substanceis the causeor ground of any other; there is just one univocal substance that expressesitself infinitely, and cannot be reduced to any of its expressions,effects or accidents. This allows Deleuze to think of substance in terms of powers or potentials. We cannot reduce life to already effected relations, for there is alsoa power or potential to produce relations. In this sense,then, the metaphysical function of substance,as that which exists in itself before relations, and through itself, forms a vital role in Deleuze's work. In traditional metaphysics,a substanceis whatever can exist without requiring :rny other being in order to be. For instance,there cannot be whitcncss without somc thing that is whitc; substirnccis thc bcarcr of prccl i ci ttcso r pr opcr t ics. l) clcuzc's phikr sophy is conccr r r cd wit h t hc t sr r llslir r r cclr llows fnthl utt ol ' st t bslit t t cc, lir t 't hc t t st r t l cor r r r r r it nr cr rlo

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philosophersto establishan ultimate reality or ground - what really is before its different expressionsor perceptions.Even more importantly, God wasestablishedasthe only true substance,while all other beingswere saidto 'be' only by analogy.Againstontologyand the notion of substance full realityasa precedingground,Deleuzearguesthat all beingspossess whiteness,a memory,a smile, a potentiality - and are equally real and are formally distinct while numericallyone (that is, are truly different only and sonothing is a lesserbeingin relabecausethereis only one substance tion to anyother). Connectives Memory Real Spinoza

TERRITORY Kylie Message Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari privilege ideasof spatiality ln A Thousand, (evidencedby the privilegedterm of'plateau') and the geographiesand cartographiesof movement,presentingtheseas an informal antidoteto history (here they can be distinguishedfrom Michel Foucault).Even in historyis presentedasbeingsubsirmedwithin their geologicaldiscussions, the constitutionof space;it is significantfor the role that time plays in movement acrossfields (in, for example,its relations of speedand slowness),but nobfor its institutionalisedmodeof categoricaldating. Rather than denying the affectivityof history Deleuzeand Guattari reject the universalisingchronologicalgrand narrativestrategiesthat are frequently associatedwith it. In their preferencefor lines of flight and becoming,they critique history for beinga tool of the unitary Stateapparatus.These,linesare understoodnot only as a deterritorialisingimpulse, compon-' but they alsocontributeto the spatial,materialandpsychological ents that constituteor deconstitutea society,group, or individual (those of apparatusesthat comprisehistory as a lived, experientialassemblage All thesecomponentshclp producethe concept eventsandcircumstances).

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the conceptsof 'deterritoof a 'territory' that concomitantlyaccompanies rialisation'and'reterritorialisation'. ratherthan The conceptof'territory' evadeseasycategorisation because being a sedentaryplacemaintainingfirm bordersagainstoutsidethreat, As an assemblage, it exists the territory itself is a malleablesiteof passage. in a stateof processwhereby it continually passesinto somethingelse. However,it alsomaintainsan internal organisation.A territory is alsoan componentof deterritorialisation,accomassemblage that, asa necessary paniesthe conceptof 'nomadology'.A territory refers to a mobile and shifting centre that is localisableas a specific point in spaceand time. It doesnot privilegeor maintain the nostalgicor xenophobicprotectionof any particularhomeland;instead,this centre(that may be more correctly calleda 'vector' becauseit can resideoutsideof the assemblage/territory) expresses an experientialconceptthat hasno fixed subjector object.It is neither symbolicnor representational, and doesnot signify.As an assemblage,a territory manifestsa seriesof constantlychangingheterogeneous elementsand circumstances that cometogetherfor variousreasonsat parconnectionsfrom the areas ticular times.Although a territory establishes of representation,subject,conceptand being, it is distinct from a fixed image, signification or subjectivity.Through this, we can seethat a territory is primarily marked by the ways movementoccurs over the earth, rather than by Stateborders.A territory is necessarily lived and produced by language asa vagueentity becauseof this desireto avoidcategorisation or other Stateapparatuses. Hence,it is closelyconnectedto molecularcognitiveand non-cognitive- modesof movement. A territory doesnot simply hold backthe processof deterritorialisation, nor doesit provideit with an opposingor dichotomousterm (Deleuzeand Guattari contendthat there is no needto leavethe territory to follow a line Neither doesa territory providea baseor originary of deterritorialisation). (home) from which deterritorialisationmay occur.Instead,it is a conterm stantaccompaniment to (andevenproponentfacilitating)the linesof flight deterritorialisationproposes. o In addressingthe idea of territory, Deleuzeand Guattari discussmany examples,from the refrain of the birdcall (which they describeasa mode of expressionthat both draws a territory and envelopsinto territorial motifs and landscapes)to the role played by the artist's signature,that equateswith placing a flag on a pieceof land. However,they frequently return to the relationshipbetweenterritory and the earth in order to show that the territory does not escapefrom maintainingits own organising principleand structure.This exampleis usedto illustratethat sucha relationship is not dichotomoussimply,in the sensethat one term can be differentiatedin a straightforwardmanncr from the othcr. lnstead,takcn

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together, these terms show the magnetic pull that often works toward accumulating a synthesisof apparently disjunctive terms. As such, territories cannot contain or encompass the earth, but neither can the earth be fixed to a single territory. On the other hand, even though the earth embraces all territories (as a seriesof molecular or nomadic moments collected bytheconjoining'. . . and. . . and. . . and' logic that motivatesit), it is also the force of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation since its continuous movements of development and variation unfold new relations of materials and forces (predicated on a relationship of speed and slowness).So, in contrast to the specific or localisabletime and place offered by territories, the earth offers up an alternative complex assemblage(and various productive lines of becoming or fligh$ - the Body without Organs.

Connectives Body without Organs Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Earth/Land Lines of flight Nomadicism

THEORY Bruce Baugh Deleuze'smost interestingthoughtson theory comein a discussionwith Michel Foucault,where he puts forward the following idea: 'A theory is exactlylike a box of tools . . . It must be useful.It must function' (D&F 1977:208).A theory is somethingthat we must constructasa responseto to be usefr,rl, then 'we haveno choicebut to cona problem,and if it ceases struct others'. This approachto theory is inherently practical,although Deleuzedistinguishesbetweentheoreticaland practicalactivity while at the sametime arguingthat theoryis neithera foundationfor practicesthat nor the resultof would merelyapply universaltheoriesto particularcases) a reflectionon particularpracticesthat extractuniversalnorms from particular cases.Rather than being universal,a 'theory is alwayslocal and relatedto a limited field'. Extendingtheory to practiceis not merely the applicationof universalrules or theoremsto particularcases,but a 'rclay' to a 'more or lessdistant field of practice'in responseto 'obstrcles,walls lly 'rclirying'to anclbkrckrrgcs' within thc thcory'sown immirncntcl
I

2t7

practice as a way of overcoming its internal difficulties, making practice serye as 'a set of relays between one theoretical point and another' (D&F 1977: 206). Conversely, theory can serve as a relay from one practice to another, connecting one practical field to a different one in order to overcome a practical impasse. In the latter case,theory does not represent or 'speak for' practice, any more than practice 'applies' theory: 'there's only action - theoretical and practical action' connected in networks and relays. As an example, Deleuze refers to his and Foucault's work with prisoners as a way of connecting 'official discoursesof confinement' to the discourse of the confined themselves,a move that is simultaneously theoretical and practical. As Foucault puts it in the same dialogue, 'Theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice' (D&F 1977:208). Nowhere else does Deleuze offer such a positivc appreciation of theory, which he usually downgrades in contrast with thought: 'Thinking's never just a theoreticalmatter. It has to do with vital problems' (D 1995:105).Yet thought sharesmany characteristicswith what he said about'theory'in the dialogue with Foucault. Thought is a practical activity, work; philosophy, specifically,is thought-experimentation through the creation of concepts, each concept being a responseto a problem whose conditions and scopethe concept helps define, and each concept being created in the midst ofalready existing concepts which encounter impassesor blockagesthat require new conceptsas'bridgesor crossroads'enablingthem to join up with other concepts responding to problems subject to the same conditions (D&G 1994: 27).'A concept lacks meaning to the extent that it is not connected to other concepts and is not linked to a problem that it resolves or helps resolve' (D&G 1994:79). Problems necessarilychangealong with the changing conditions of thought and action. Thought, then, is a strategy in the face of problems, and seekssolutions through creating concepts, ways of thinking, and a system of coordinatesthat dynamically relatesthoughts and problems to one another. On this conception, the 'practice' that serves as a relay between one theoretical point and another is thought itself, and the singular theoretical points are concepts in the caseof philosophy, affectsand percepts in the caseof art, and functions in the caseof science. Deleuze's pragmatic conception of theory also extends to his explanation of Foucault'sdistinction betweenthe'classic'intellectual,who'could Iay claim to universality' in virtue of the writer's social position being on a par with jurists and lawyers who represent the universality of law, and the 'specific intellectual' who 'tends to move from one specific place or point to anothcr', 'producing effectsnot of universalitybut of transversality,and f r,rnctioning:rs :rn cxchangcr'betwccn cliffcrcntthcorcticirlficlcls,br.rtin thc corl tcxt of' ;rr r t ct icr t rl ur t l polit ic: r l st lugglcs ( l) l9f ilib: 9l) . 'l'hc syr ccif ic i nl cl l ccl rrrtl ' cxpcr s t isc or llt cot 'yis ir lwr r yslot : ir l,t 'xllr cssir r gir li'ir gr r r cnlur y

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totality that is necessarily limited and necessarily runs up againstimpasses or 'walls' that can be breachedby a strategicrelay or detour through other theoreticalfields.No intellectual,andno theory cantotalisethe entirefield of knowledgeand action. A theory multiplies and eruprs in a totally different areaby finding 'lateral affiliationsand entire systemof networks', or else it loses its efficacy(D&F 1977: 212). Transversalconnections betweentheory and practiceon the part of specificintellectualswould include nuclearphysicistsusing their expertiseto speakagainstnuclear weapons;a transversalrelayfrom one theoreticaldomainto anotherwould be Deleuzeand Guattari'sstrategicshift of FriedrichNietzschefrom philosophyto ethnologyin their own theoretical-politicalAnti-oed,ipus(D&G 1983:190-l). Connectives Concepts Foucault

THOUGHT John Marks In his earlier work, and in particular Dffirence and,Repethion,Deleuze talksof a dominant'Imageof thought'that he setsout to challenge,exploring the possibilityof a 'thought without image'.The imagethat Deleuze challengesis essentiallydogmaticand moral. In this sense,it is representational in nature, in that it presupposesthat 'everyoneknows, what it meansto think, and that the only prerequisitefor'thought'is an individual in possession of goodwill and a 'natural capacity'for thought. Ren6 Descartes,for example,presumesthat everybodyknowswhat is meantby self, thinking and being. For Deleuze, this image of thought as cognito natura is extraordinarilycomplacent.Instead,he claims that we think rarelyand more often under the impulseof a shockthan in the excitement of a tastefor thinking. Genuinethinking is necessarilyantagonistictowards the combinationof good senseand common sensethat form the d,oxaof receivedwisdom,and it frequentlyrequiressomethingmore than the formulationsof commonlanguage.In generalterms,Deleuzechallengesthe assumptionthat thought hasa natural affinity with the (true'. rnstead,he claimsthat thoughtis an actof problematisation. Thought may,in this way, hnvca prophctic rolc in anticipatingthc forcesof thc futurc. It is, morcovcr'itblcto bring out thc 'ncw', ilsopposcdto cstablishccl valucs,

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Deleuze also arguesthat there is something that he calls an 'image of thought' that changesthrough history. Works such as The Logic of Sense,Proust and Signsand A Thousand,Plateausall contribute to the study of imagesof thought, or 'noology' as Deleuzecalls it. Noology is different from a history of thought, in that it does not subscribe to the notion that there is a narrative developmentin thought. It is not the casethat there is a sort of long-term debatein the courseof which either some ideas and concepts win the day, or disagreements are eventuallyturned into consensus.This would be a history of thought as the uncovering or construction of universals.Deleuze talks instead in terms of 'geophilosophy';the superimposition of layers of thought. Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the 'untimely', Deleuze suggeststhat what is new in a philosopher'swork remainsneq and the reactivationof theseuntimely elementsis an important component of Deleuze'swork. As far asnoologyis concerned,an imageof thoughtis a systemof coordinates or dynamics:a sort of map that showshow we orientate ourselves within thought. One of Deleuze'sinfluenceshere is Martin Heidegger, who claimsthat to think is to be under way,to be on a path that one must clearfor oneself,althoughone canhaveno certain destinationin mind. For Deleuze,we must initially makea decisionasto our orientationin relation to the verticaland horizontalaxes.Should we stretchout, and follow the 'line of flight' on the horizontalaxis,or should we erect vertical axes?In other words,this constitutesa choicebetweenimmanenceand transcendence.If we choosetranscendence, this entailsa further choiceto be made betweenthree types of 'universal': contemplation,reflection and communication. Immanuel Kant seemedequipped to overturn the Image of thought, but ultimately he was committed to an orientation in which thought would havean upright nature. Deleuzeclaimsthat philosopherstend to invent 'conceptualpersonae' who will help the philosopherin questionto negotiateand establisha new image of thought that springs from a seriesof intuitions. The conceptual personafunctionssomethinglike the detectivein crime fiction. He is the everymanwho must orientatehimself within the imageof thought. So,for example,Deleuze shows how the 'rational' man of scholasticthought is replacedby the Cartesian'idiot', who is later replacedby the Russian 'idiot'. This 'undergroundman' haswhat Deleuzecallsin a characteristically wry statement,the 'necessarymodesty' not to manageto know what everybodyknows.He is like a characterin a Russiannovel,paralysedand stupefiedby the coordinatesofproblems that do not correspondto represcntationfllprcsuppositions.Thought may not havcrr history,but it drrcs hirvcir drrnrttis pcrsonnc.

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This approachto thought leads Deleuze to value and promote the 'private thinker', asopposedto the'public professor'.The model for this sort of thinker is Baruch Spinoza,who pursuesa frugal and itinerant lifestyle,and is in this way ableto avoidthe pitfall of confusinghis purpose with that of the Stateor religion.Ratherthan a modelof opinion and consensus,Deleuzepreferswhat he callsa 'nomadic'or 'clandestine'form of thinking. The only form of 'communication' that is suitable ro the contemporaryworld is the Nietzscheanarrow or Adorno's 'messagein a bottle'. Thought is fired like an arroq in the hope thar another thinker a 'friend'- may pick up the arrow and fire it in turn. Connectives Lines of flight Nomadicism Noology Spinoza

TIME-IMAGE Tom Conley The time-imageis what tends to govern cinemafrom the end of World War II until the present. It is the title of the secondor dexter panel of Deleuze's historical taxonomy of film. It designatesimages that Henri Bergsonqualifiedas imbued with duration: a componentof time that is neither successive nor chronological.Seenlessasmatter than felt aspure duration time-imagesrelatea changein the configurationof the world. They draw attention to the qualitiesof their own oprical and aural properties asmuch asthe signsor matter they represent.They tend not to favour narrativeor beg the spectatorto identify with their content.For Deleuze the time imageis apt to be read- itis a legibleimage- asmuch asit is seen or given to visibility.It prompts the spectatorto rhink through the signs with which it articulatesnarrativemarter. In the r6gime of the movement-image,intervals are vital to the perception of motion, sensation,affectionand change;in the time-image,perceptionbecomesa 'perceptionof perception',offeringa shift of emphasis that is witnessedin the image itself rather than the linkages(or cuts) betweenimages.What this meansis that whenmontage,the foundationof classical cinema,losesits hold time beginsto bc increasingly spntirrliscd. li
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through his or her point of view is shown in flashbacks.This classical devicegivesway,in the era of the time-image,to a perpetualduration that cannotbe locatedin one moment or another.Memory elidestemporal distinction in wayssuch that only 'is it in the presentthat we makememory, in order to make use of it in the future when the presentwill be past' (D 1989:52).The time-imagefrequentlybecomesa siteof amnesiawhere wavesof actionturn the world at largeinto a matrix in which personages seemto float indiscriminately.Certainfilms, suchasJeanRenoir'sLa rigle duj eu (1939)or Orson Welles'TheL ad,yfr om Shanghai (1946),suggestthat subjectivitycan only be felt through the perceptionof time: humans,be they spectators or charactersin film aredeterminedby the environsof time in which they are held. Deleuzecallsthe effectthat of a 'time-crystal',a way of being that is discoveredin a time insideof the eventthat allowsit to be perceived.ln La rigle d.ujeuthe time-crystal might be the illuminated greenhouse or the chateauin which the charactersareheld. In Welles'film it would be the hall of mirrors in which the charactersshatterthe narrative to pieces. The time-image(and its crystals)is often discernedin deepfocusphotography, the model par excellencefor Renoir and Welles, for whom montage is folded into the spatial dynamics given in a single take. Yet it acquires legibility in Godard's cinema, such as Pierrot le fou (1965) in which a 'depth of surface'is createdby patterns of writing or abstract forms paintedon wallsagainstwhich humanplayersseemflattened.Timeimagesare seenin nappesor 'sheets'in what Deleuzecalls 'mental cartographies'of cinema (D 1989: l2l). In Alain Resnais'Hiroshirna, rnon &mour(1959) the past is a matte surfaceon which traumatic memoryimagesare reflectedand meld into one another.Time is bereft of dates, thus inheringin the body and soulof the two loversestrangedin the places wherethey happento meet. In this continuum,cinemabecomesa site wherethought itself acquires a force of becoming unknown to historical time. It is a power of the irrational or unthought that is essentialto all thinking: somethingincommunicable,somethingthat cannot be uttered, somethingundecidedor undecidable. represented, Where the movement-image time,the time-image is'no longerempirical,nor metaphysical; it is "transcendental"in the sense that Kant givesthe word: time is out of joint and presentsitself in the pure state' (D 1989: 271). Through the concept of the time-image Deleuze (with Guattari) notes that the questionat the basisof all film theory 'What is cinema?'-that Andr6Bazinposedturns into the question'What is philosophy?'. Thc time-imagedernonstrates that cinemais a new practiceof imagcsrrndsignsfirr which phikrsophyis summoncdto constructir prrcticc.'l'hus,with thc crlrrcsponcling thcoryitndlt concc;)fr,rill corrccptol'

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the movement-image an enduringinquiry into the natureof cinemais set in place. Connectives Becoming Cinema Duration Event Memory Movement-image

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CIiffStagoll Empiricism refers to the view that the intelligible derivesalwaysfrom the sensible,whilst transcendentalism assumesthat experiencemust rest upon somelogically necessaryfoundation. The former position is typified by the work of David Hume, who argued that ideasof consciousness are just derived from sensoryimpressions,and that any test of soundreasoning shouldrefer to the natureof the connectionbetweenthe two. On this view,ideasand philosophicalconceptscanneverfound or logicallyprecede senseperceptions. In theorisingthe human subject,ImmanuelKant developedperhapsthe bestknown form of transcendentalism. He soughtto identify all of the conditions of the possibilityof attaining distinctively human knowledge.It is only becausehumanspossessparticularcognitivecapabilities,he argues, that we experience the world aswe do andareableto makeclaimsaboutthe world as it appearsa priori. This set of capabilities- the 'forms' of sensfor ibility, understandingand reason- is universaland logicallynecessary human knowledge.On Kant's account,without time and space,a rangeof basicconceptsof reason(suchasmodality,quantity and quality), and 'Ideas' founding a kind of rational faith, there would be no knowledgeof the kind and evidentin the humanexperienceof the world. As such,the categories conditionsuncoveredby Kant areclaimedto be true of all selves. Accordingto Deleuze,this argumentfails on two counts.First, it does not accountfor differencesbetweenwhateveroneknowsofa phenomenon in advanceand what one learnsabout it a posteriori.Second,Kant conin ceivesof experienceonly in terms of re-presentation and consistencies pcrson pcrson. functioning from timc timc irncl to As such, mcntll to

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Deleuze argues,transcendentaldeduction reproducesthe empirical in form and then shieldsit from further critique.The Kantian transcendental subject,for instance,is constructedas an explanationfor how diverse experiences are synthesisedand unified, and then employedas the essenprecondition for any human experiencewhatsoever. tial Deleuze'sdescription of his philosophy as a transcendentalempiricism is a challengeto thesepositionsrather than a unified counter-theory.In contrastto transcendentalism, Deleuzeseeksafter the conditionsof actaal possible rather than all experience.These conditions are not logically necessar$but contingent upon the nature of experienceas it is lived. Therefore, for Deleuze as for Hume, philosophy must begin with the - without presupposingany immediategiven- real consciousawareness categories,conceptsor axioms.Only then should it begin to developconceptsthat might refer to objectsand their relations,perceptionsand their causes, or anyofa rangeofpsychologicalor physiologicalrelationsevident in consciousness. It is preciselythe actualityof the empiricaland the priority accordedrealexperiencethat, for Deleuze,arewaysof avoidingtranimprecisionand universalisingabstractions. scendentalism's Deleuze's approach is a transcend,ental empiricism becauseit is an attempt to deducethe conditions of the possibility of consciousexperience (such as the apparentconsciousimmediacy to which one refers when saying'I'). Realityasit is experienceddoesnot revealthe preconditionsof experienceand, becausesuch elementsare inaccessible to consciousness, they necessitate transcendental,deductivestudy of their implicit conditions.Unlike Kant, Deleuzedoesnot conceiveof theseunthought conditions as abstract or necessaryphilosophical entities, but as contingent tendenciesbeyond the reach of empirical consciousness. As such, he preDeleuzefinds that the'I' only sumesno beingor subjectrohoexperiences. everrefersto contingenteffectsof interactionsbetweenevents,responses, memory functions,socialforces,chancehappenings,belief systems,economic conditions,and so on that togethermake up a life. By taking a philosophersand movingbeyond differentapproachto the transcendental a view of empiricism based upon just the epistemologicalrelationship between ideas and senseimpressions,Deleuze shifts the philosophical focus from determining a foundation of likenessamongst humans to revealingand celebratingthe contingency,dissimilarityand varietyof each individual life. Connectives Actuality FIunrc

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Bruce Baugh Deleuzeoften quotedAlfred North Whitehead'sdictum that the abstract doesnot explain,but needsto be explained.This thought standsat the basisof both Deleuze'stranscendentalempiricism that searchesfor the real conditions of actual experiencerather than for the abstractconditions of and of his politics.Empiricismwantsto hold onto any possibleexperience, the concreterichnessof experience,and to resistabstractuniversalsby insistingon the situatedand historicalnatureof the conditionsof experience.Deleuzianpolitics likewiseinsistson the singularityof experiences and practices,rather than merely seeingtheseas either instancesof some universalrule or exceptionsto the rule. Yet, in contrast with classical empiricism and liberalism, transcendentalempiricism holds that the empirical is not composedof discrete givens,but of concreteparticulars (individuals,groups)definedby the history of their contingentand actual relationswith other beings.Againstidealismand Marxism, transcendenuniversalsand structuresas tal empiricismseesall supposedlynecessary beingeithercausallyor logicallydependenton contingentparticulars,and contingent. thus asthemselves Classical empiricism (fohn Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume) holds that universalclassterms, predicatesand relations('dog', 'black', 'next to') are derived through abstractionfrom particular experiences, (constant and linked together through habits of associationbasedon the conjunction' of those experiences;pnlike in Plato, universals have no independent standing, and particulars do not depend on universals. Classicalliberalism(ThomasHobbes,John Stuart Mill andJohn Locke) similarly holds that aggregatessuch as 'society' and 'the State' are nothing over and abovethe individuals which composethem, and so are dependenton individuals,rather than the reverse.The'independence'of individuals in classicalliberal theory is the basisof its demandfor individual rights and liberty, understoodas freedom from the coercionof societyor the State. Although Deleuzeagreesthat the universaldependson the particular, and of individuals.For Deleuze, he rejcctsthc 'atomism'of experiences involving itrc not 'givcns',but musthc cxplaincdby crtnditittns scnsntions

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a complexand mostly unconscioussetof relationsamongdifferentbodies' powersof acting and reacting.Similarly,individualsare conditionednor just by other individualswith whom they interact,but by factorscommon to all ofthem (language, socialrelations,biologicalstructures,technology). Liberalism's'individual' is supersededby what Deleuzecalls an 'assemblage'(agencement): a conjunctionof a numberof persons,forcesand circumstances, capableof its own collectiveexperiencesand actions.Rather than the rights and libertiesof individuals,power or agencyis the prime concernof Deleuzianpolitics.Ratherthan universalprinciplesbeing the criteriaby which practicesareevaluated,pracricesarejudgedentirelywith respectto whether their effectsincreaseor decreasesomeone'sor something's power of acting. Principlesemergeas a reflectionon how much certain practicesincreaseor decreaseagency,as an a,posteriorigeneralisation, rather than an a priori necessary condition. Like Deleuze,Marxismalsoarguesthat socialrelations- particularlyeconomic relations- condition individual experienceand agency.Yet, unlike classicalMarxism,Deleuzedoesnot believethat'classes'are basicunits of analysis,or that the economicbaseis more fundamentalthan the ideological superstructure.Socialand economicstructures,forms of thought, norms of action, are all producedthrough particular and contingentconjunctionsof desires,actionsand affects,and are all part of an assemblage in which each elementis conditionedby all the others.'Classes'are abstractin relation to assemblages that are not just subdivisionswithin classes,but can cut across differentsocio-economic classes. To someextent,classicalMarxism retains the precedenceof abstractuniversalsover singular assemblages that whethertheuniversalbe a class,aparty,the Stateor history- suppresses creativity and blocksthe emergenceof the new.Subjectionto higher universals cuts offassemblages from their powerand is alwaysreactive. Transcendentalempiricismwould be the basisof a politics of positive individuality and difference,valorisingagencyand creativepower, but mindful of the oppressiveconditioning of individualsand our voluntary servitudeto universalnorms.

TRANSVERSALITY Ad,am Bryx and,Gary Genosho A. critical conceptfor literary criticism, 'transversality'is introducedby Deleuzein the secondedition of Proustand Signs.Thc conccptconcerns the kind of communicationpropcr to thc trnnsvcrsirldimcnsion of' machinic litcrlry ;rrrxluction.'l'rlnsvcrsalitydcfincsir nrodcrn wiry of'

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writing that departsfrom the transcendentand dialecticpresuppositions andenvisionsan immanentandsinof the Platonicmodelof reminiscence. gularisingversion instead. heterogeneous Also termed an' anti-logosstyle', transversalityassembles is far from totalising. Unlike componentsundera unifyingviewpoint,which the Platoniccounterpartthat strivesto imitatethe Ideaand thus reproduce Proust'sreminiscencedepartsfrom what is both stableand transcendent, in an originatingviewpoint. The criand culminates associations subjective tique of Platocentreson the issueof intelligencealwayscomingbefore,where the disjunctive useof facultiesmerely servesas a prelude for the unifying dialecticfound in a singlelogos.Thedisiunctiveuseof facultiesin Proustis unhinged from this transcendentand dialecticmodel, and works on an after. immanentprinciple where intelligencealwayscomes The transversaldimension of fiction fundamentallycountersthe principles of the world of attributes, logos,analytic expression,and rational thought with the characteristicsof the world of signsand symptoms,pathos, hieroglyphs,ideogramsand phoneticwriting.Whereorderhascollapsedin statesof the world, the viewpointprovidesa formulaby which fiction can constitute and reconstitutea beginning to the world. Such a beginning is necessarilysingularising;the transversaldimension or the never-viewed pieces viewpoint drawsa line of communicationthrough the heterogeneous and fragmentsthat refuseto belongto a whole,that are parts of different wholes,or that haveno wholeotherthanstyle.The ephemeralimages,memories and signsof the odours,flavoursand drafts of particular settingsare swept along at various rhythms and velocitiesin the creation of the nontotalisingtransversaldimensionof fiction that is not reproductive,imitative but dependssolelyon its functioning. or representative, Deleuzefinds third partiesthat will communicateaberrantlybetween partitioned partial objects of hermaphroditic bodies and plants. The famous apiarianbestiaryof Deleuze showsitself here.But the pollinating transversalinsectis not simply natural or organic,for that is a trope of the /agas.Rather, it is a line ofpassage,azig-zaggingflight, or eventhe narraTransversality tion of involuntarymemory,that productivelytransverses. is machinic.The literary machineproducespartialobjectsand resonances betweenthem. The fore-mentionedviewpoint,understoodasan essential singularity,is superior to the partitioned obiects,yet not beyond them, for the self-engenderingliterary machineworks in and upon itself. Connectives Guattari Psvchoanalvsis

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Gary Genosko 'Transversality',is a corecriticalconceptintroducedby Guattari in a conferencepaper 'Transversality'in 1964and published,in psychanalyse et transaersaliti. The conceptof 'transversality'is usedas a therapeuticand political tool by Guattari in his analyticalcritique of experimentationwith institutional formarions of subjectivity at clinique de la Borde in courChevernyFrance,wherehe workedfrom 1955to his deathin 1992. Guattari reintroducedsocialdemands,problemsand realitiesinto the analyticencounter.Guided by sigmund Freud's remarkson the fundamentally socialbeing of individualsin the survivalof sourcesof anxiety beyond the stagesof psychogenesis, Guattari consideredthe object of institutional analysisto be outside both family, linguistic structure and oedipal myth. The problemof socialreproductionsof superegos (political leaders,for example,despitetheir actualinfluence)as constantsourcesof anxiety in advancedindustrial societies(capitalist and socialist) led Guattari provisionally to 'arrive at a modification of the superego's "accommodation" of databy transmuting this data in a kind of new,,initiatic" reception,clearingfrom its path the blind socialdemandof a certain castrativeprocedurero the exclusionof all else'(G 1972:75).The goalis to bring aboutacceptance of new data,rather than interminablecastration anxietyprecipitatedby everysuperegofigurehead,primarily by establishing new demands and setting up innovative points of reference within existing attachmentsto institutions. Guattari's therapeutic focus shifted awayfrom the dual analysisof psychotherapy andonto'real patientswhere they actuallyfind themselves'in clinicalsetrings.This directly challenged innumerableinheritedanalyticmethods. Guattari foregrounds institutional attachmentsby analysing groups. The desireof a de-individuatedsubject,understoodasa group or collective assemblageof heterogeneouscomponentsfreed from abstract determinationssuchasthe archaicinheritancesof Freudiananalysis,or the official objectsthat supportthe symbolicorder (definedby JacquesLacan,D. W. winnicott, and Melanie Klein) is undersroodthrough critical analysesof the organisationaltexturesof actualgroups. Guattari distinguishednon-absolutelybetweensubject(activelyexploring self-definedprojects) and subjugatedgroups (passivelyreceiving directions), each affecting the relations of their members to social processes, shapingtheir potentialfor subjectformation,the amountof risk they can tolerate,and how they can usesuch groups.'l'hc moclilicationof alicnatingfirntnsicswould pcrmit crcativit$ rcnr(,vcirrhibitions,rrnd

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encourage the self-engendering of group-subjects, whereas a subjectgroup could decay into a subjugated group through bureaucratic automutilation by reversing its transversal potentiality. Guattari set about experimenting with ways to heighten and maximise an institution's 'therapeutic coefficient' by unfixing rigid roles, thawing frozen hierarchies, and opening hitherto closed blinkers. He accomplished this through an institutional technique called 'the grid', a complex, rotaring system of tasks and responsibilities that he developed with colleague Jean Oury ('La grille'[1987] 1998). This role redefinirion scrambled existing relations of power between doctors and nurses, interns and nurses, nurses and patients, medical and non-medical staff, bureaucrats and unions, hospital bureaucraciesand State funding bodies. tansversality replaced the psychoanalytic concept of transference (movement of positive and negative affect back and forth from patient and doctor). Guattari placed rapport in a collective clinical context beyond the dual analytical situation. If rransference is the artificial relation in which the unconscious becomes conscious, transversality is the measure of an institution's influence on all its denizens. It is the group's unconscious, which entails that a descriptive analytics of overt power relations and objective laws inscribed in either verrical (pyramid) or horizonral (field of distribution) terms is insufficient. This is an unconscious that perfuses the social field and history. Transversality: 'tends to be realisedwhen communicationis maximisedbetweendifferentlevels and aboveall in differentdirections.It is the objecttowardwhich a subject-group moves.our hypothesisis this: it is possibleto modify the differentcoefficientsof unconscioustransversalityat differentlevelsofan institution. (G 1972:80) Among a group of interns there may exist great potential for transversal relations. As a group, interns normally have little real power, work long hours, are dangerously tired, and so on. Their high level of transversality would remain latent to the extent that its the group's institutional effects would be extremely limited. It is not an easy task to find the group rhat actually holds the key to 'regulating the latent transversality of the entire institution'; objectively weak interns may engage in intimate and authentic relations among themselves or with nurses which have therapeutic effects for patients. tansversality in an institution is thus uneven. But this is the task of institutional analysis:to locate the group's unconscious desirc in relation to every member's attempt to negotiateit. 'The grid' madc it possiblcto :rnalyscactualrclationsof firrcc by proviclirrg:lcorltcxt irr whiclr t hc t lir r r s v cl s adl i n rc rrs i o no f' fh c i n s ti tu l i o n coukl l l c l crrctrcd.

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TRUTH James Williams Deleuze's work is opposed to the coherence theory of truth and to the correspondencetheory of truth. The first claims that the truth of a proposition depends on its coherence with some other propositions. The second claims that the truth of a proposition depends on its correspondence to some objective facts. So a proposition is either true due to certain logical relations or due to a relation to things in the world. For Deleuze, both theories are wrong-headed from their very premisses. That is, propositions are false simplifications of reality and cannot be bearers of truth in any significant sense.Objective facts do not exist and cannot be identified or shown, becausereal things are limitless and always caught in endlessprocessesofbecoming. To abstract from these processes is to give a false irnage of reality. So, in contrast to the two traditional and dominant theories of truth, Deleuze defines truth in terms of creativity and construction. We create truth in complex constructions of propositions and sensationsthat express the conditions for the genesis and development of events. Truth then would not be a property of single propositions in a book or in a paper. It would be a property of a seriesof them through a work as it captured and changed our relation to the events expressedin the'work. Deleuze is apt to mock philosophical theories based on simple propositions that say little of the world. According to him, it is a mistake to begin an enquiry about truth with abstracted propositions such as 'The cat is on the mat'. Instead, truth only appears in more complex works such as a series of paintings or literary and philosophical works. It is a mistake to think that the truth of such works depends on the truth of their components becausethe significanceof the components only appears when they are in context. It is not so much that simple propositions have no relation to truth at all. It is rather that truth is a matter of degrees.The more a work, or a proposition in a work, expressesabout reality and the inter-relation of all things, and the more a work creates with that inter-relation in order to be able to expressit, the more truth it will carry. This carrying is itself a matter of the transference of significance and intensity in the event, rather than a representation of it. Thus, to say something is true is not to say somethingverifiablcin somc way,but to sirysomcthing that vivifics irnd nltcrs it situation. A pocrr itbout l lt it ir r it dillcr cr r t it ir r r dlivc t hlough r r r r rwit W l rl cl W u' I t hlr tr r r ukcsus scr 'r sc is t t ol r t ct r r t r r pr r t r itlt'tyl w i ry i s trrrtlr lir l. A slr t t ist iclt llor t l llt c wiu'lllill

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sensations andtransformationsis not truthful. The lessstatisticstransform and giveus signsof the deeperideasand intensesensations at work in the war, the lesstruthful they are. This meansthat Deleuzeis caught in a difficult position of opposing conceptsof truth, but without beingableto saythat we cansomehowmove beyondtruth or stop usingthe conceptat all. In Nietzsche andPhilosophy, he noteshow truth and the searchfor truth fixes worlds, in the senseof settingdown truths that becomeimmutableand settledrepresentations of statesof things.Instead,truth should be a destructiveand transforming process.Similarly, traditional conceptsof truth turn us away from the world, in the senseof searchingfor truths that are not here or missing; whereas,for Deleuze,truths are alwayslatentand it is a matter of dramatising them, of bringing them out and allowing them to transform us, rather than a matter of projectingourselvesinto an identifiabletruthful future. Again followingFriedrich Nietzsche,Deleuzeseestruth asnecessarily involvedin moral presuppositions. Truth is associated with the morally goodand it is assumedthat throughtruth we arriveat the moral good.For Deleuzethis cannotbe the casebecauseboth the moral goodand truth are part of a strugglebetweendifferentvalueswith no externalway of dividing them into true and false,goodand evil. Instead,the goodand the true arerelativeto differentattitudesto life - whereDeleuzeand Nietzscheseek thosethat affirm becomingoverbeing,transformation(or transvaluation) over identity and sameness. In Cinema2,Dele:uzeextendsthis view of truth asbecomingand part of the complex struggle for life, by pointing out rhar there are no simple oppositionsof the true and of the false.This is alreadyan idea from his Dffirence and,Repetition,where the false can have an affirmative power and where the deep opponentof both the rrue and the false(and life) is stupidity - definedasthe desirefor simpleoppositions,for commonsense and for transcendentlife-denying values.Thus, in Cinema2, Deleuze emphasises the variationof truth over time and hencethe powerof falsehoodsto vary thosetruths (anygivensettledseriesof truths must be challengedby falsehoodsfrom their angle,but truths from a different one). Falsehoods, for examplein cinematicnarration,havethe power to reveal differentand more affirmativeviewsof life. It could be objectedthat when Deleuzemovesawayfrom truth as an arbiter of propositions,it is as if he doesnot careabout factsand logical necessity. That is not the case.He believesthat factsand logicalnecessity haverolesto play,but theseare secondaryto a much highcr voclltionfor truth; which is to rcvcaldccpconnections hctwccnall thingsanclto:rlklw us to livc rrp to thc cvcntsthirtnukc:rnd trirnsfilrrrr us. In llris rcsllcct,

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a temperaturereading has some importance but a film capturing the significanceof the crackingice-capsis more truthful. Connectives Difference Nietzsche

UEXKULL, JACOB VON (1864-1944)- refer to the entrieson 'becoming* music' and'deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation'.

UNCONSCIOUS - referto the entry on'psychoanalysis'.

UNIVOCAL Claire Colebrooh Accordingto one of Deleuze'smost important critics,Alain Badiou,'univocity' is the central concept of Deleuze's proiect. ln Dffirence and, Repetition,Deleuzedescribesan alternativehistory of philosophycomprising thosephilosophersdaring enoughto think of being as univocal: John Duns Scotus,Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche.If philosophy has been dominated by Platonism, this is becausebeing has been deemedto be equivocal:only one being truly is, while other beingsare dependent,secondary,either not truly substancesor different types of Mind is elevatedabovematter; original is elevatedabovecopy; substance. the actualis the privilegedand properlocusofthe potential;only the actual is realor proper being,while the potentialcannotbe saidto be in the same sense.Against this equivocity,Deleuzearguesfor univocity: no eventor phenomenon is morerealthananyother.There is only onc bcing:perccpmcmoricsand fictionsarcasrcll ts iltoms,univcrsitls, tions,anticipirtions, phikrsophcrs, l)clcuzc conccptsor bodics.l"rom his lristuryof'univocrrl idcits. thrccrcvrlluIirlttitt'y cnrphlsiscs

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From Duns Scotus,Deleuzeinsiststhat only with univocity can there be real difference. If there is only one being then we cannot relate differences- say,differencesof colour - asdifferencesa/some grounding neutral being,a beingwhich is, and which then hassecondaryor lessreal qualities.Rather,eachdifferenceis fully real: eachshadeofa colour, each fleck of light, each sound or affect is fully real and therefore different in itself, not merely a different way in which someother subtendingbeing is grasped.From Spinoza'sunivocity,Deleuzearticulatesthe conceptof immanence.If there is only one substancethen there cannot be a creating God outside creation;the divine is nothing outside irs expression. Mind and matter are,accordingly,not two distinct substances; nor does one depend on or derive from the other. Mind and matter are attributes of the one divine substanceand eachbody - such as a human body - is just one expressionor mode of the attribute of mind and the attribute of matter. There is not some transcendentbeing which then createsor grounds different beings,beingsthat can be said to be only by analogy.Each being is fully real and is so becauseit just is the expressionof the divine substance,which is nothing outsideits expressions. Immanencefollowsfrom univocity preciselybecausethe commitment to one substanceprecludes any point outside being; everything that is rs equally, possessingfull reality. From Nietzsche, Deleuze's favoured philosopher of univocity, (eternal Deleuzeaffirms the conceptof return'. There is only one being but this does not mean that there cannot be radically new events and futures.On the contrary,eternalreturn and univocity precludethe idea that a stateof completion or rest will ever comeabout. We should neither wait nor hope for a better world, nor should we imagine an apocalyptic break with this world in order to achievea radical future. If there is only one being then all life, all futures,all events,will be actualisationsof this immanent life, which in all its virtual power can continually create and differentiatenew experiences.Eternal return describesa future that is positive becauseit repeats and affirms this life. There are two ways in which this one immanent life can be affirmed univocally.The first would be a biologistor vitalist account,wherebylife could be identifiedwith the actual, material being that already exists - nature as it is commonly understood; if this were so then futures, events and becomings would already exist in potential and would then unfold. So we could say, for example, that the potential that createdWilliam Shakespearewould, eventually,produceanotherShakespeare. After all, there is only one life, and all potential would eventually be repeated. But this is where Deleuze's conception of life differs from a grounding on actual life.

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Imagine that we were to find someof Shakespeare's DNA and were to we not have a Renaissance bard who would clone Shakespeare; would then write Hamlet. Why? Becausethis would only be possiblein an equivocal life, one where life in all its becoming and difference was submitted to pre-given forms, 'a Shakespeare' would have had to emerge.But becauselife is univocal, becausethere is no form, idea or principle that governsor grounds life, all we have is the potential for differenceand variation.Cloning would not producelife's effects;indeed really to repeatlife is to repeatcreation,difference.By life Deleuzerefers not to what actuallyis, but the virtual power from which life is unfolded. The potential that produced Shakespearewould, if it were repeated, produce as much differenceand variation as the 'original'. And this is becausethe original life was not an actuality - something that simply was,and then had to go through time and alteration- but a 'pre-personal singularity', a power of variation that is singularbecauseit is radically different from the stable, definable and general forms it effects.Only if we seerepetition as a pale copy or resemblancedo we need to think of the radically new as other than this already full life. If, however, we graspeachrepetition of the world's virtual power asthoroughly new we will recognisethat univocity - one life, one being yielding infinite difference - is also difference and futuritv. Connectives Eternal return Immanence Nietzsche Spinoza

UTOPIA Jonathan Roffe The term 'utopia' designatesfor Deleuzethe political vocationof philosophy:the attempt to bring about different ways of existihg and new contextsfor our existencethrough the creation of concepts.The word with manydifferent conceptionsof 'utopia', however,hasbeenassociated political thought and actionin ways that would seemantitheticalto the philosophyof Deleuze.On the one hand, there is the real naivety with which doctrines of utopia are often propounded,On thc othcr, as the word itself indicntcs(u-topia,no-place),thc iclcnof utopia$ccmstrl rcfcr

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to a world totally disconnected from the real social engagementsthat characterise life hereand now,asif we could leapoutsideof our concrete existenceinto a fundamentally different kind of society,free of any kind of strife. Despite these concerns, Deleuze makes pivotal use of the concept (while noting thesepotential problems),even if theseusesare few in number. The primary locationof the useof utopia in his philosophyis in l[/hat is Philosophy.z, written with Guattari. Utopia namesthe point of contact between the present state of affairs and the activiry of philosophy. No ideal future is involved, but rather the view that the present can always be negotiatedwith philosophicallyin order to bring aboutmore freedom. Philosophy therefore has two temporal loci: the present and the future. While engaging with the concrete present situation as it in fact is, philosophy'saim ought to be the breakingwith or resistingof the presentfor the future. We can think here of Friedrich Nietzsche's statement in his UntimefuMed,itations,that philosophy actson the present, and therefore against it, for the benefit of a time to come. This task is undertaken by philosophybecauseit is, accordingto Deleuze and.Guattari, the creation of concepts.Unlike many other ideasof philosophy,conceptsare not to be thought of as representationsof reality or tools for uncovering the truth. Rather,conceptsaretrue creations,and philosophyasthe creation of conceptsmakespossiblenew waysof existingthrough them. Art and science also undertake the same creative task, but through their own waysof thinking that do not include the concept.In the context of discussionsabout the creation of concepts,Deleuze often brings up the artist Paul Klee's claim that the audiencefor a work of art doesnot preexist the artwork itself - the peopleare lacking,ashe says- but is called into being by it. For Deleuze,all creativethought calls for a new people and a new earth. So utopia is what links philosophywith its own time, but is alsothat which givesit the forum for its criticalpoliticalactivitythat hasits focusin the future (D&G 1994:99). This conception of politics clearly doesnot concernstatementsaboutthe idealnatureof socialexistence(unlikemany utopianphilosophies), but seespoliticsasthoseactsthat offer resistance to the norms and valuesof the present.Finally, for Deleuze,we cannotclaim in advancethat certain conceptswill necessarilylead to a better future. While reSistingthe present and opening up the f,uturefor us, there is no guaranteethat the world thus opened will be freer. These decisionscan only be made on the difficult path of practical,empiric4l learning and'" carefulattention.

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VAN GOGH, VINCENT (1853-90)- referto the entry on 'art'.

VARIATION Jonathan Roffe Deleuzemobilisesthe conceptof variation in order to insist on what is perhapshis most fundamental theme, that existenceis not characterised primarily by unities, but rather by a continual senseof movementand change.That is, to recall the philosopherHeraclitusas Deleuzedoeson occasion,beingis becoming.In turn, the unitiesand structuresthat we find in life are thereforethe result of organisingthis fundamentalmovement, and not the other way around. Deleuzeoffersa numberof examplesfor the conceptof 'variation'in his work, oneof which is music.Music is traditionallyunderstoodon the basis of scalesthat are fixed moments of pitch extracted from the whole range of frequencies.In westernmusic,there is alsothe conceptof the octavethat dividessoundup into repeatablescalarunits. For Deleuze,we must considerthesestructuresto be secondaryin relationto the movementof sound itself,which hasno intrinsic notesor scales.There is, fundamentally,only the continuousvariationof pitch - a pure movementof differencewithout identity. Likewise, for Deleuze,if we examinelanguageuse,we do not find the fixed categoriesof a logicaFgpmmar or innate structure. Rather, the useof wordsis alwaysshifting around,dependingon the context.ofits use. In A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuzeand Guattari describethis as the inherent variability of language.The fact that languageuse does not remain fixed but is fluid is the very natureof languageitself.We can alsoconsider the importantexampleof space.Deleuzeand Guattariofferthe opposition

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betweensmooth and striated space.Smooth spaceis the type of spacein which thereare no fixed points or boundaries,and in which movementis uninhibited.In smoothspace,movementis thereforecontinuousvariation. In contrast, striated spaceis structured and organised,creating fixed pointsand limits betweenwhat movementscanbe undertaken.As a result, thereis a senseasa resultthat the natureandconstructionof certainspaces formsoneof the primary concernsof politics,sincesmoothspaceis by definition the spaceof freedom.on a morefundamentallevel,natureitself for Deleuzeis continuousvariation.Even animalspeciesmust be understood in termsof a movementof life which hasbeenstructuredinto localisedpatterns of stability. Perhapsthe fundamentalpoint with regard to variation in Deleuze's work comesin connectionto the theme of difference-in-itself,pursued most systematicallyin Dffirence and Repetition.Rather than seeing differenceasa differencebetweentwo things,differencemust be thought of asthe continualmovementof self-differing,like the continualvariation of a soundrising and loweringin pitch without stoppingat notesin a scale. In other words,differenceis continuousvariation.This is in contrastto the bulk of the westerntradition of philosophysinceParmenid,es that from the outsetpostulatesa primary identity.The wholeof Deleuze'sthought is in this sensebasedupon the primary valuehe givesto continuousvariation. As a result,Deleuze'sbooksand conceptsmust alsobe consideredaccording to the principleof continuousvariation.No one on its own canbe consideredto be definitive,but each works best when placedalongsidehis other texts and concepts,that vary from eachother,outlining the movement of his thought rather than the doctrinesthat he espousesalong the way. Connectives Difference Freedom Space

VIRTUAL/VIRTUALITY Constantin 11Boundas In Deleuze'sontology,the virtual and the actualare two mutually exclusive,yet jointly sufficient,characrerisations of the real.The actuirl,/rcirl irrc 'l'hc virtrrirl/rcirl strttcsof itfthirs,brrlics,bodilymixturcsand incliviclr.rals.

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are incorporealeventsand singularitieson a plane of consistency,belonging to the pure past - the past that can never be fully present.Without hasthe capacityto beingor resemblingthe actual,the virtual nonetheless bring aboutactualisationand yet the virtual nevercoincidesor canbe identified with its actualisation.Deleuze leansupon Duns Scotus when he insiststhat the virtual is not a potential.Other philosophicalinfluencesfor his conceptof the virtual include Henri Bergsonand his critique of the possible,Baruch Spinoza'sidea of one substancethat is differentiatedin its infinite attributesand alwaysin the processof being further differenciatedin its modes,and finally Friedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the teternalreturn'. One way of characterisingbecoming is with the following schema: virtual/real<+actual/real<+virtual/real. What sucha diagrampointsto is that becomingis not a linear processfrom one actualto another;rather it is the movementfrom an actualisedstateof affairs,through a dynamicfield of virtual,/realtendencies, to the actualisationof this field in a new stateof the reversiblenatureof virtual and actual affairs.This schemasafeguards relations. Meanwhilein differentcontextsDeleuzehascharacterised the virtual as the d,urieand ilan oital in his studiesof Bergson;as Ideas/structures and the realm of problems in Dffirence and Repetitiozwhereby the diverse actualisationsof the virtual are understood as solutions; and finally throughout many of his texts he referredto the virtual as an event.The given the virtual by Deleuzeraisesthe quesvariety of characterisations tion of how the virtual ought to be understoodand the extentto which each is complicit in the next. That the virtual is the Bergsonian characterisation d,urdeand 6lan oital stemsfrom the basicagreementbetweenDeleuzeand Bergsonregardingthe structureof temporality.Any actualpresentpasses only becauseall presentsareconstitutedboth aspresentand aspast.In all pastpresentsthe entirepastis conservedin itself,and this includesthe past that hasneverbeenpresent(the virtual). The idea of a past that has never been present(the immemorialpast) canalsobe foundin the writingsofJacquesDerridaandEmmanuelL6vinas. The reasonsfor its postulationvary from one thinker to another,but there is onething that they havein common:anyphilosophythat puts a premium on the de-actualisation of the present,in order to tap the resourcesof the pastor the future, runs the risk of reifying the past(asin Plato'srecollecTo preventthis tion) and the future (asin someapocalypticeschatologies). reification,the notions of the immemorialpast and the messianicfuture (Deleuzcprcfersto talk of the purc pastirndof thc ctcrnalrcpctitionof the diffcrcnt)succcccl in safcgr.rarding thc idcirof ir proccssthirl prcsupposcs 'l'hc non-tlctcrrttittirtg tcndcncics. pitstis citllcd'pttrc'itt ordcrlo cntphitsisc

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that it is the site of problems and the source of actualisations;that the realm of solutions is limited in numbers and, unlike the virtual past, it is rich in extention and poor in intensity; and that, occasionally,a great artist may assist something past to reveal its real being as if in a time that has been nobody's present. To the extent that both Deleuze and Bergson agreed,urtie is not empty; rather it is an immanently differentiated dynamic processof the real whose nature is always to actualiseitself in novel differenciations. Hence, the appropriate name 'dlan aital . Boldly transforming Kantianism in Dffirence and,Repetition,Deleuze begins to identify the virtual with Ideas. An ldea, for Immanuel Kanr, has no instantiations in the empirical world, yet at the same time it must be thought. Deleuze retains this imperative when he thinks of the virtual (for example, the cogitandum)but he moves beyond pure Kantianism when he multiplies Ideas by making them the gerundives of all faculties (the memlrandum, the loquend,urn, and so on). The claim that Ideas are structures in large part comes from the prevailing structuralist vocabulary Deleuze uses throughout Dffirence and Repetition. ln later work, Deleuze elaborates upon this claim that Ideas are structures when he describes the nature of the virtual in terms of a plane of consistency.Most important for Deleuze is that the virtual is not to be understood as duplicating or resembling the actual, nor should it be taken to mean transcendence.Simply put, problems do not resemble or represent their solutions. Were we to understand the relationship between virtual singularities and actual individuals in terms of resemblanceor analogy,we would reduce the notion of repetition that Deleuze advancessimply to a repetition of the same.To understand how the virtual may be characterisedas an event we need to recall Deleuze's theory of sense,which is given in the infinitive of verbs (a verb, unlike a noun or an adjective, is better suited for an ontology of becoming). In their infinitival modes, verbs best introduce the untimely nature of the virtual, and the absenceof subjects or objects; yet they also introduce the strange combination: the impassive and dynamic aspectsof multiplicities in the processof actualisation.

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Connectives Becoming Bergson Differentiation /Differenciation Duration Eternal return Event Spinozir

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As early as his first book, Empiricism and Subjectiuity, Deleuze rejects the idea of total unities, and works to analysehow things which are practically speaking unified - like human beings, societies and ideas of God and the world - come to be so. Deleuze's procedure for coming to grips with the thought of unity throughout his philosophy is threefold. First of all, he maintains that there are no pre-existent wholes. Not only does nature itself not make a whole, but things themselves exist only one by one. They do not fit into an overarching structure and cannot be 'added up' to make a total picture of existence becauseeverything is unique. We simply do not have any grounds for taking the unique things which make up existenceas members of a species which could ground a unifying perspective.This point is closely connected to Deleuze's concept of 'multiplicity' that describesunique things in terms of their own complex constitutive relations. The most substantial treatment of the concept of the 'whole' in this senseis given in the discussion of Stoic philosophy in The Logic of Sense. Second, it is important to note we seem, in fact, to be surrounded by unities of many kinds: human subjectivity, a unified and coherent basis for thinking, the unity of natural languages, and so on. For Deleuze, these kinds of transcendent totalities are fundamentally illusory. They are the product of certain habitual ways of thinking common to western culture and the metaphysical tradition Deleuze calls 'dogmatic image of thought'. The most significant discussion of the illusory nature of such totalities is undertaken in Dffirence and Repetition. Finally, Deleuze goes on to argue that there are, in fact, unities but that these are produced by and in very particular social contexts. The unity of human experience, for example, or the idea of the world as a whole, is the very real and concrete result of the kinds of social experience that we have. As such, produced wholes are subject to the variations in the social context that is theirs. Their wholeness cannot be guaranteed, since it has no transcendentalprinciple of unity but only the support of thc sociirlfrrrccsof its 'l'irkcn togcfhcr,tlrcscthrcc gcncsisand thc nririntcnirnccof its c
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sense), illusory (with regard to thinking), and concretely produced in a certain way by our social context. At certain points, Deleuze himself seems to be advocating a kind of primary oneness to existence, particularly concerning his thesis of ontological univocity, or the univocity of being. In shorr, this is the position that claims all existing things are within a single world - everything rhat exists is 'said' in the same way ('uni-vocalised'). Univocity disqualifies in advance any thought of a transcendent ordering realm that is higher or more pure than the world of events.Ontological univocity is closely related to the thesis of monism that claims there is a single substancefrom which individual things are formed. Whilst this emphasis in Deleuze's work involves a certain thought of unity, we cannot consider him to be a 'holist' in any direct sense.Univocity must be understood rather as the emphasis on the common world of relations for everything that exists - a certain thought of general interconnectednessand proximity that would allow us to consider Deleuze's ontology as a kind of ecology of being. As he states in Empiricism and,Subjectiaity, nature is unique - but this does not mean that it is unified.

Connectives Multiplicity Singularity

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Lee Spinks Friedrich Nietzsche's famous formulation of the 'Will to Power' represents the culmination of his attempt to develop an immanent and inhuman vision of life. Its image of existenceas a ceaselessstruggle for power and dominion is 'inhuman' becauseit claims that alllife, not just human life, is united by a common striving for power. The conception of the Will to Power also afforded Nietzsche the opportunity to overcomethe 'metaphysical' distinction between being and becoming or appearanceand reality by conceiving of a principle of life immanent and interior to life rather than elevatedabove and beyond it in the form of transcendentalreason.According to this principle, the whole of life is a single field of forces expressingan inhuman Will to Power that produces forms such as consciousncss,languagc :rncl nrorirl iclcitsits scctlnclaryirnclrcuctivccft'ccts.'l-hc cntirc gcncsislncl clcvcklpnrcnl of ' lilc is t lc t c rn ti n c tlb y th c c o n l l i c l b c tw c c nthc w i l l to l hc rrccrrrrrrrl rrtiol on '

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force and everything that resists subordination to stronger will. Life at a primordial level 'is' this struggle between appropriation and resistance;the issue at stake in every event of life is the quantity of superior power it expressesand the quantity of resistancethat opposesit. The Will to Power is the genealogical element of force: it is both an expression of the constitutive conflict between forces and the differential element internal to force itself. Will to Power is internal to force becauseit interpretsrelative levels of force by establishing the extent to which one has successfully incorporated another into its domain. 'Force' in this senseis defined by the quantitative difference that obtains between different forces; we know this quantitative difference as a force's quality. The Will to Power, Deleuze emphasises,should be understood as the principle of the synthesis of forces: it names the element that establishes the quantitative difference between forccs and the element of quality that this difference expresses. Within this synthesis, forces contend continually over the differential relation that defines them; the eternal return is therefore the mode of synthesis that expressesthe genetic and differential element of the Will to Power. The vision of life as Will to Power revealsthat there is no other form of causality than the movement of domination between one will and another. 'Will' must therefore be rigorously detached from anthropomorphic psychologicalcategorieslike'desiring'and 'demanding'which posit an ideaor subjectivity behind and before the expression of forces. The Will to Power is not a secondary effect of force nor is it separablefrom a determined configuration of forces. Yet if Will to Power cannot 6e separatedfrom force neither should itbe confused, with force. The concept of 'force' names what is triumphant in the struggle between forces; but the outcome of this struggle remains perpetually indeterminate unless another element is introduced to gauge the quantitative difference between forces that determines their relative difference in quality. It is this element that Nietzsche and Deleuze describe as the Will to Power. The Will to Power is therefore both the genetic and differential element of force: the element that produces the quality accorded to each force within a particular relation. Because the Will to Power determines the relation between forces, it divides force into its active and reactive components. The difference between a dominant and dominated force is determined by a quantitative difference; the distinction between active and reactive forces manifests a difference in quality. The quantitative difference between forces is exprcsscd by their relative difference in quality. The clistinction bctwccn qu:rliticsof firrcc is dcfincd by thc tcrms':rctivc'irncl'rcrctivc'; but thc corrsti ftrti vcqur r lit yot 't lr c Will t
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negationgo beyond action and reactionbecausethey are interior to the movementof becomingitself. Affirmation is the power to becomeother; negationis the processof becoming-reactive.These powersare interior to actionand reactionand bring thesequalitiesinto being.What is at stakein the distinctionbetweenaffirmationand negationand actionand reaction is nothing lessthan the distinctionbetweeninterpretationand evaluation. Interpretation, Deleuze points out, determinesthe relation of forces; evaluationdeterminesthe Will to Power that confers value upon a thing. It is the elementof Will to Powerthat determinesthe nature of values:the value of a value is establishedby the quality of Will ro Power that it expresses. The valueof value inheresin this differentialelement;consequently genealogical and immanentcritique seeksro establishthe quality of Will to Powerat the origin of everyevaluativegesture. Connectives Active/Reactive Nietzsche

WOMAN RosiBraidotti Like all formationsof identity in Deleuze'sthought, 'woman' is a molar entity that pertainsto and sustainsthe political economyof a majority. However,in a much broaderphallogocentrichistoricalsystem'woman'is alsopositionedas'other'. Deleuzeshowsgreatsensitivityin his treatment of 'woman'neithercastingher asthe mistressof alterity,nor fetishisingher as the privileged object of masculinedesire.Rather Deleuzeavoidsthe tropescommon to philosophicaldiscourseon the feminine,choosingto remain polymorphouson the topic of sexuality,all the while performing a doubledisplacementat the levelof both Platonicrheoriesof representation and psychoanalytic theoriesof desire. Deleuzerejectsthe speculativeself/other relationshipof dialecticsand arguesinstead that these terms are not linked by negation, but are two positively different systemseach with its specificmode of activity. Thus 'woman'is not the sexualised 'secondsex'of the phallicsystem,but a positive term: as the other, she is a matrix of becoming.Deleuze also rejectsthe psychoanalytic emphasison negativity(lack)andthe equationof bodily matcrialitywith the originarysite of rhe maternal.Insteadof thc r6gimcof'thc phrrllusirncl
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heterogeneous multiplicitiesand internal differentiation.In this sensehe empowers'woman' through positivefigurationssuch as the non-Oedipal little girl of Alice in Wonderland,who hasnot yet beendispossessed of her body by the phallic law of the father; or in the equally empoweredposition fianc6ewho expresses the femininefaceof phiof Ariadne,thephilosopher's losophyand is alsothe sourceof ethicaltransmutation,turning negativeor reactivevaluesinto affirmativeones.Transcendingthe negativepassions that the Oedipalisingeconomyof the phallusinducesis in effecta Deleuzian engineof the transformation,what Deleuzeotherwisecalls'becoming'. The role of 'woman' in Deleuze'stheory of becomingis noteworthy. 'Becoming'is the actualisationof the immanentencounterbetweenforces which areapt mutually to affectand exchangepartsof eachother in a creativeand empathicmanner.The notion of 'forces'accomplishes a double aim, which is centralto Deleuze'semphasison radicalimmanence:on the one hand it givespriority to affectivity in his theory of the subject;and on the other,it emphasises the embodiedstructureof the subjectand the specific temporalityof the embodiedhuman.A forceis a degreeof affectivity or of intensity,in that it is openand receptiveto encounteringotheraffects. The transformationthat occurs in the processof becomingassertsthe affirmative,joyful affectsover and abovethe negativeones. Womannot only can enactprocesses of becoming-minoritarianbut also, especiallyfor Guattari, constitutesthe main bloc of becoming for all processes is both integralto the of deterritorialisation. 'Becoming-woman' conceptandprocessof becomingand alsouncomfortablywritten into it asa constitutiveparadoxof Deleuze'snomadicsubjectivity.The womanin question hereis not an empiricalreferent,but rather a topologicalposition,which marksdegreesandlevelsof intensityandaffectivestates.It expresses impersonaland ungenderedforces;and, asis to be expected,this hasgenerateda lively andoftencriticaldebatewith feministpoststructuralist philosophers. Moreover,tbecoming-woman'is a moment, a passaBe, a line of flight which bypassesempirical women per se. Processesof becoming are not predicatedupon a stable,centralised'self' who supervisestheir unfolding. Rather, they rest on a non-unitary, multilayered, dynamic subject. Becomingwoman,/animal/insectis an affectthat flows;like writing it is a composition,or a location that needsto be constructedin the encounter with others.All becomingsare minoritarian,that is to saythey inevitably and necessarily moveinto the directionof the 'others' of classicaldualism (suchassexualised, racialisedand/or naturalised'others').Yet becomings do not stop there; they becomedisplacedand are reterritorialisedin the process.Thus, 'becoming-woman'marks thc thresholdof pattcrnsof thirt crossthrough thc lnimrrl irnclgo into tlrc 'bccoming-minoritariirn' ltnd llcyottd.'l'hcrc ru'cn(, syslcrnirtic, lincitror 'bccoming-irrtpcrccpriblc'

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teleologicalstagesof becoming;eachplateaumarks a framed and sustainableblock or moment of transformation that is actualisedimmanently. Alternatively, patterns of becoming can be visualisedas an affirmative deconstructionof dominant subject-positions(masculine/white/heterosexual/speaking a standardlanguage/property-owning/urbanised and so on). Or else,becomingscanbe understoodassteppingstonesto a complex and open-endedprocessof depersonalisation of the subject.Internally self-contradictory, becomingcanbestbe expressed by figurations:the wasp and the orchid;the womanand the turning of the waves;the soundand the fury, signifyingnothing.In this way,the processof becomingis not about signification,but aboutactualisingnew modesof affectiveinteraction:it assertsthe potency of expression.Expressionis the non-linguistically coded affirmation of an affectivity whose degree, speed, extension and intensitycanonly be measuredmateriallyand pragmatically,caseby case. And it is thereforeinterestingto note that womenarenot a priori molecular; they too haveto becomewoman. Connectives Becoming Expression Force Lines of flight Molar Psychoanalysis

wooLR vrRGrNrA(1882-1941) Claire Colebrook One of the challengesDeleuzepresentsto late twentieth-centuryphilosophyand theory is his critique of linguisticism,or the idea that we can only think within a languageand that languagestructuresour perception. His ideathat true thinking must plungebackinto the life from which languageemerges,rather than remain within a language,is profoundly modernist and continuesan early twentieth-centuryconcernwith the genesis of systemsof signs.Although Deleuzewrites positivelyabout a seriesof modernist writers and artists,including JamesJoyce,his and Guattari's celebrationof virginia woolf inA Thousand, Plateausis significantfor two reasons.First, Woolf's own work is contemporaneous with Henri Bergson who wasso importantfor Deleuze.It is possiblethat woolf 's concernwith

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pre-linguistic perception may well have emerged from the same intellectualmilieu to which Deleuzeappeals.Woolf's Bloomsburycircle wasconcernedwith the autonomy of the aestheticand its differencefrom the fixed categories of logic.Bergson'sappealto the undividedflow of creativelife from which fixed terms emergewaspart of a broadermodernist reactionagainstreification,intellectualismand technologicalrationalisation of which Woolf 's styleis perhapsthe greatestexpression.Second,the most explicit appealmade by Deleuze and Guattari to Woolf is in the 'becoming-woman'sectionof A ThousandPlateaus. If modernism in generalsharesthe Bergsoniandistastefor a world reducedto clock time, mathematicalspaceand impoverishedexperience, Virginia Woolf 's response.is uniquely positive and affirmative. Unlike other modernistswho used techniquessuch as the fragmentationof language,quotation,allusion,punning and parataxis* linguistictechniquesto showsignsoperatingasmachinesbeyondhumanintent, Woolf usedliteratureto think and expressthe extra-literary.This is perhapswhy, when Deleuze and Guattari want to think about becoming, they turn to becoming-womanand Virginia Woolf. Whereas'man' is the presupposeduniversalsubjectof the systemof speechand the being to whom all becomingis represented,womanis the key to all becomings.Womanis not the Other of man, not that which lies negativeand undifferentiated.If we outsidelanguageas unrepresentable, want to think the life, becomingor perceptionsfrom which the subject emergesthen we need to move beyond 'man' as subject or ground to woman as becoming,expressionand creation.Woolf is crucial here not becausesheis a womanwriter, expressingwomen'sexperiencein language (for shearguesin A Roomof One'sOwn(1929)that it is fatal,when writing, to think of one'ssex).Rather,Woolf's style is becoming-woman. in On the one hand,Woolf's writing is aboutperception;her sentences (1931)createcharacterswho are their perceptions,and whose The Watses world is not a setof staticobjectssomuch asa perceptionof others'worlds. Charactersreceiveimpressionsnot as extendedobjects in time but as intensitiesor becoming,'blocksof becoming'.On the other hand,Woolf's work is not just about perceptionand a world of impressions;she also enactsbecomingand intensity at the levelof style,with many of her sentences complicating and subverting the subject-predicatestructure of standardspeechand logic. Connectives Becoming Bergson

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Power Woman Writing

WRITING RosiBraidotti Deleuze'sphilosophicalmonism makesno categoricaldifferencebetween thinking and creating,painting and writing, conceptand percept.These areall variationsof experimentation, morespecifically, an experimentation with intensities that foster patterns of becoming. Experimentation expresses differenttopologicalmodes;they enacta creativeprocessthat is not configured by unfolding a fixed essenceor telos.Creativity is understoodasa multiple and complexprocessof transformation,otherwisethe flux of becoming.Put simply, creativity affirms the positive structure of difference. Writing then, is not the self-assertion of a rationallyordainedimaginative subject,rather its eviction. It has to do with emptying out the self, openingit up to possibleencounterswith a number of affectiveoutsides. The writer's eye capturesthe outside world by becomingreceptiveto minute and seeminglyirrelevant perceptions.During such momentsof floatingawareness, when rationalcontrol releases its hold, 'reality' vigorously rushesthrough the sensorial/perceptive appararus.This onslaught of data,information and affectivitysimultaneouslypropelsthe self out of the blackhole of its atomisedisolation,dispersingit into a myriad of dataimprints. Ambushed,the self not only receivesaffects,it concomitantly recomposes itself aroundthem. A rhizomic bond is thus establishedthat, through the singulargeometryof the affectsinvolvedand their specific planeof composition,confirmsthe singularityof the subjectproducedon a particularplaneof immanence. One needsto be ableto sustainthe impactof affectivity:to'hold'it. But holding or capturing affectivity does not happen dialecticallywithin a dominantmodeof consciousness. Instead,it takesthe form of an affective, depersonalised, highly receptivesubjectwhich quite simply is not unified. The singularityof this rhizomic subjectivityrestson the spario-temporal coordinatesthat make it coincidewith nothing more than the degrees, levels,expansionsand extensionsof the 'outside' as it rusheshead-on. moving inwardsand outwards.What are mobilisedare one'scapaciticsto process feel,sense, andsustainthe impactin c
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that is porous to the outside.Our culture has stream-of-consciousness tendedto codethis as 'feminine'. Pure creativity is an aestheticmode of absoluteimmersionalongwith the unfolding and enfoldingof one'ssensibility in the field of forcesone inhabits- music,colour,light, speed,temperatureand intensity. Becauseof the historicalbond that ties writing to r6gimesof power,the activityof writing playsa specialpragmaticrole;it is a tool that canbe used to decodethe despoticpower of the linguistic signifier.In this way,the intensivewriting style particularto Deleuzespellsthe end of the linguisthe subjectfrom the cageofrepresentationalthinktic turn, ashe releases ing. Writing is therefore,not explainedwith referenceto psychoanalytic theoriesof symbolic'lack', or reducedto an economyof guilt, nor is it the linguistic power of the mastersignifier.Writing is an intensiveapproach that stressesthe productive,more than the regressive.Put differently, Deleuzeinsists writing is the structure of affectivity that animatesthe subject.At the heart of Deleuze'srhizomaticsis a positivereadingof the human as affirmative,a pleasure-pronemachinecapableof all kinds of empoweringforces.It is just a questionof establishingthe most positiveor evenjoyful connectionsand resonances. For Deleuzewhat is at stakein writing is not the manipulationof a set of linguisticor narrativeconventions;nor is it the cognitivepenetrationof an object;nor eventhe appropriationof a theme.Writing is an orientation; it is the skill that consistsin developinga compassof the cognitive,afftictive and ethicalkind. It is quite simply an apprenticeshipin the art of conceptual and perceptualcolouring. A new image,or philosophicalconcept,is an affectthat breaksthrough It illuminatesa territory through establishedframesand representations. the orientationof its coordinates;it makesvisible/thirikable/sayable/hearableforces,passionsand affectsthat were previouslyunperceived.Thus, the questionof creationis ultimately technological:it is one of 'how?'.It is alsogeological:it is about'where?'and'in which territory?'.Ultimately, it is ethical:it is concernedwith wherelimits canbe setand how to sustain ofchange. alteredstatesor processes Connectives Black hole Creativetransformation Difference Immancncc Powcr Rcprcscltlitl iott

B IB LIOGR A P H Y

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D 1993b Deleuze,Gilles (1956),'La conceptionde la diff6rencechez Bergson', Les Etudes Bergsoniennes, vol. 4, Paris: Presses Universitairesde France,pp.77-1I3. Deleuze,Gilles(1965), Nietzsche,Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Deleuze, Gilles (1977), 'Nomad Thought', in David B. Allison (ed.), The New Nietzsche:ContemporaryStyles of Interpretatioz,New York: Delta Books, pp. 142-9. Deleuze, Gilles (1983), Nietzscheand Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson,London: Athlone Press. Deleuze, Gilles (1984), Kant's Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London: Athlone Press. Deleuze,Gilles(1986),CinemaI: Thernoaement-image)trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress. Deleuze, Gilles (1987), Dialoguespith Clare Pa,rnet,trans. Hugh Tomlinsonand BarbaraHabberjam,London: Athlone Press. Deleuze,Gilles (1988),Bergsonism, trans.Hugh Tomlinson and BarbaraHabberjam,New York: Zone Books. Deleuze, Gilles (1988), Foucault, trans. Sean Hand, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. Deleuze,Gilles ( 1988),Spinoza: PracticalPhilosophy, trans. RobertHurley, SanFrancisco:City Light Books. Deleuze,Gilles(1989),Cinema2: Thetime-image,trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta,Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. Deleuze,Gilles(1990),TheLogicof Sense, trans.Mark Lester with CharlesStivale,ed. ConstantinV. Boundas,New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress.

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D&G 1987 Deleuze, Gilles and F6lix Guattari (1987), A Thousand, Plateaus : Capitalismand,Schizophrenia, trans.Brian Massumi, Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress. D&G 1994 Deleuze, Gilles and F6lix Guattari (1994), What is Philosophy?,trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York: ColumbiaUniversitv Press.

BIBL IOGR APH Y

K 1996 K 1998

L 1977 L1982

DELEUZE AND FOUCAULT D &F 1977 Deleuze,Gilles and Michel Foucault(1977),'Intellectuals and Power'in Michel Foucault,Language,Counter-Memory, Practice. trans. Donald tr Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell Universitv Press.

M 1959

M 1970 M1992

OTHER TEXTS CITED W 1994 BI97+ B l9ll B 1994 JD 1973

F 19 5 6 G 1972 G 1979 G 1995

H1999 K1992

I

t

K 1993

Barthes,Roland (197+),S/2, trans.Richard Miller, New York: Hill and Wane. Bergson,Henri (1907), CreatiaeEaolution,trans. Arthur Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt and Co. Bergson,Henri (1994),Matter and,Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer,New York: Zone Books. Derrida, Jacques(1973), Writing and Dffirenre, trans. Alan Bass,London: Routledgeand KeganPaul. Fitzgerald,Scon(1956),TheCrackUp,ed.EdmundWilson, New York: New DirectionsPublishingCorporation. Guattari, F6lix (1972), Psychanalyse et transaersalit|,Paris: Maspero. Guattari, F6lix (1979),L'inconscient rnachinique, Fontenaysous-Bois:Recherches. Guattari, F6lix (1995), Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Parad,igm,trans. P. Bains and J. Pefanis,Bloomington and Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress. Holland, Eugene (1999), Deleuze and, Guattari's AntiOed,ipus: I ntrod,uct i on t o Schizoanalysis, London : Routledge. Kant, Immanuel (1992),Critiqqeof judgement,trans.J. C. Meredith, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. Kant, Immanuel(1993),Critiqueof PracticalReason,trans. Lc'wisWhitc Bcck, 3rd edn, New York: MacMillan.

3il

Kant, Immanuel (1996), Critique of Pure Reason,trans. Werner S, Pluhar,Indianapolis:Hackett. Kant, Immanuel(1998),Critiqueof PureReason,trans.Paul GuyerandAllen W. Wood,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Lacan,Jacques(1977),Ecrits,trans. A. Sheridan,New York and London:W W. Norton and Co. Lacan, Jacques(1982),FerninineSexuality:JacquesLacan and the Ecole Freud'ienne)trans.J. Rose,ed. J. Rose and J. Mitchell, London: MacMillan Press. Mishima, Yukio (1959),The Templeof the Gold'enPaailion, trans. Ivan Morris. introd. Nancv Wilson Ross. Tokvo: CharlesE. Tuttle. Mishima, Yukio (1970),Sun and Steel,trans.John Bester, Tokyo:Kodansha. Massumi, Brian (1992), A User's Guide to Capitalismand Schizophrenia: Deaiations from Deleuze and' Guattari, Cambridge:The MIT Press. Willemen, Paul (199+), 'Through the Glass Darkly: Cinephilia Reconsidered',in Looks and,Frictions: Essaysin Cuhural Studies and' Film Theorv. London: British Film Institute, pp.223-57.

USING DELEUZE (AND GUATTARI) Ansell Pearson, Keith (ed.) (1997), The Deleuze and' Philosophy: The Dffirence Engineer,London: Routledge. Ansell Pearson,Keith (1999),GerminalLife: TheDffirence andRepetition of Deleuze,London: Routledge. Badiou, Alain (2000), Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. Louise Burchill, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. Bogue,Ronald(1989),Deleuzeand,Guattari,London: Routlege. Bogue, Ronald (2003), Deleuzeon Music, Painting and the Arts, London: Routledge. Bogue, Ronald (2004), Deleuze'sWahe: Tributesand,Tributaries,Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press. Boundas, Constantin V. and Dorothea Olkowski (eds) (1994), Gilles New York: Routledge. Deleuzeand the Theaterof Philosoph.y, Embod'iment andSexualDiffbrence Braidotti,Rosi(1994),NomatlicSubjects: (krlumbia Univcrsity Prcss. Ncw York: in Cznleml)nrll1FeministT'hcor,y,,

3t2

BIBL IOGRAPHY

Buchanan,Ian (ed.) (1997),A DeleuzianCentury?,specialissueof The SouthAtlantic Q,tarterly96: 3 (Summer). Buchanan, Ian (2000), Deleuzism:A Meta-Commentar)l,Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversityPress. Buchanan,Ian and Claire Colebrook(eds)(2000),Deleuzeand Feminist Theory,Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press. Buchanan,Ian and Marcel Swiboda (eds) (2004), Deleuzeand Music, Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press. Clet-Martin, Jean (1993), Variations:La philosophied,eGilles Deleuze, Paris:Payotet Rivages. Colebrook, Claire (2002),GillesDeleuze,London: Routlege. Critical Horizons:Journal of Socialand Critical Theory,(2002)4:2. De Certeau,Michel (1984),ThePracticeof EaerydayLrfe, trans.Sreven rendall,Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress. Del-anda,Manuel (1997),A ThousandYearsoJ'Non-LinearHistory,New York: Zone Books. Delanda, Manuel(2002),I ntensip eScienc e and VirtuaI Philosop hy, London: Continuum. Goodchild, Philip (1996a),Deleuzeand Guattari: An Introtluctionto the Politicsof Desire,London: Sage. Goodchild,Philip (1996b),GillesDeleuzeand theQtestionof Philosophy, London: AssociatedUniversity Press. Grosz, Elizabeth(ed.) (1999),Becomings: Explorationsin Tirue,Memory, and,Futures,Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Grosz, Elizabeth (2001),Architecturefrom the Outside,Massachusets: MIT Press. Guattari, F6lix (1977), La riaolution moliculaire, Fontenay-sous-Bois: Recherches. Guattari, F6lix (1980),La riaolution moliculaire,Paris:Union g6,n6raIe d'6ditions. Guattari,F6lix ( 1989),Cartograp hiesschizoanalytiques, Paris:Galil6e. Guattari,F6lix (1992),Chaosmose, Paris;Galil6e. Hansen,Mark (2000),'BecomingasCreativeInvolution?:Contextualizing Deleuze and Guattari's Biophilosophy', Postmod,ern Culture ll.l http:,//muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture Hardt, Michael (1993a),GillesDeleuze:An Apprenticeshilt in Philosolth.y, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. Hardt, Michael (1993b),GillesDeleuze,London: UCL Press. Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2000),Empire,Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. Kaufmrn,IifcirnorandKcvinJonIlcllcr(ctls) (l99tt),Dcltuxt:unlOrtrtuttri :

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New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture, Minneapolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress. Lorraine, Tamsin (1999),Irigaray and Deleuze:Experimentsin Visceral Philosoph.y, Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Massumi, Brian (1992),A User'sGuide to Capitalismand Schizophrenia: Deaiations from Deleuzeand Gualtari, Cambridge:MIT Press. Olkowski,Dorothea(1999),GillesDeleuzeand theRuin of Representation, Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress. Parr, Adrian (2003),Exploringthe Workof Leonardoda Vinci in the Context andArt, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. Philosolth.y of Contemporar.y Patton, Paul (ed.) (1996), Deleuze:A Critical Read'er,London: Basil Blackwell. Patton,Paul (2000),Deleuzeund thePolitical,London: Routledge. Patton,Paul andJohn Protevi (eds)(2003),BetpeenDeleuzeand,Derrida, London: Continuum. Pisters,Patricia(ed.) (2001),Miuopolitics of Media Culture:Readingthe Rhizomesof Deleuzeuntl Guattari,Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversity Press. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Raichman,John (1998), Constructions, Rodowick,D. N. (1997),GillesDeleuze'sTimeA4achine,Durham:Duke University Press. Stivate,CharlesJ.(1998),The Tpo-Fold Thoughtof Deleuzeand Guattari: Interseclions andAnirnatiozs.New York: Guilford Press.

OTHER REFERENCES IN ENGLISH Foucault,Michel (1966),TheOrderof Things,London: Routledge. Practice,Oxford: Foucault, Michel (1977), Language,Counter-Memor.y, Blackwell. Foucault,Michel (1979),TheHistory of Sexuality: Volumel: TheWill, the Knowled,ge, London: Allen Lane. Foucault,Michel ( I 980),Power/ Knowledge,Brighton: Harvester. Foucault,Michel (1986),TheHistory of Sexuality: VolumeII: The UseoJ' Pleasure,London: Penguin. Foucault,Michel (1988),TheHistory of Sexuality: VolumeIII: TheCare of theSelf,London: Penguin. trans.K. Jones,New York: Freud,Sigmund(1939),MosesandMonotheism, VintageBooks. ( 19.50),'l'o t cu unl.' l'uhoo.Lonclon: Routlcclgc. Frcud,Sigrrrunrcl 'l'ht(luttttri IIcultr,Orfirrcl:Ilrrsillllirckwcll. (irrr_y (icrr
314

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Genosko,Gary (2002),Filix Guattari: An AberrantIntroduction,London: Continuum. Guattari, F6lix (1984), Molecular Reztolution, trans. RosemarySheed, London:Penguin. Guattari, F6lix (1995),Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm,trans. Paul BainsandJulianBefanis,Sydney:PowerPublications. Guattari, F6lix and Antonio Negri (1990), Communists Lihe {./s,trans. Michael Ryan,New York: Semiotext(e). Harraway,Donna (1991),Simians,Cyborgs and Women:TheReinaention of N ature,London: Routledge. Hume, David (1985),A Treatiseof Human Nalure, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hume, David (1993), An Enquir.y ConcerningHuman Understand,ing, Indianapolis:Hackett. Fren: Selected Poems, Johnson,Linton Kwesi (2002),Mi Reaalueshanary New York and London: PenguinBooks. Kafka, Franz (1954), DearestFalher, trans. Eranst Kaiser and Ethne Wilkins, New York: SchockenBooks. Leibniz, Gottfried (1973), PhilosophicalWritings, ed. G. Parkinson, London:Dent. Leibniz, Gottfried (1988),G. W Leibniz: Philosophical Texts,trans.R. S. Woolhouseand RichardFranks,Oxford; Oxford UniversityPress. Nietzfche, Friedrich (1969), Thus Spahe Zarathusra, trans. R. S. Hollingdate,Harmondsworth:Penguin. Reich,Wilhelm (1961),Selectedl4/ritings,New York: Farrar, Straussand Cudahy. Reich,Wilhelm (1969),TheSexualReoolution, London: Vision. Fernandoand OctavioGetino(1983),'Towards Solanas, a Third Cinema: Notesand Experiencesfor the Developmentof a Cinemaof Liberation in the Third World', in Michael Chanan(ed.), Twent.y-Fioe Yearsof the N ewLatin AmericanCinema,London:British Film Institute, pp. l7 -27 . Spinoza,Baruch(1989),Ethics,ed., with rev.trans.G. H. R. Parkinson, London:J. M. Dent. Uexkiill, Jakobvon (1957),'A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men', in Claire H. Schillcr (ed.), InstinctiaeBehaaior,New York: InternationalUniversities. Weismann,August (1893), The Theory of Heredit.y,trans. W. Newton Parkerand H. Ronnfeldt,London: WalterScott. Willemen,Paul(1994),'The Third CinemaQuestion',in PaulWillemen, LooksundFriclions:Essu.ys in CulturulStudicsuntl,Itilrn'l-hutry,London: llritishFilm Institutc,pp. 175-20.5.

N otes on C ontr i butor s

Bruce Baugh is AssociateProfessorof Philosophyat the University Collegeof the Cariboo.He is the author of FrenchHegel: From Surrealism (2003),aswell asseveralarticleson Deleuze. to Postmod,ernism Ronald Bogue is Professorof ComparativeLiterature at the University of Georgia.He is the author of Deleuzeand Guattart(1989),Deleuzeand theArts (2003),andDeleuze'sWabe(2004). Constantin V. Boundas is ProfessorEmeritus in the Department of Philosophyat Trent University. He is the editor of The DeleuzeReader (1993),and (with Dorothea Olkowski) of GillesDeleuze:The Theaterof Philosophy(1994). Rosi Braidotti is Professorof Gender Studies in the Humanities at (2002);Nomadic Utrecht University.She is the author of Metamorphoses (1991),aswell asof severaledited Subjects(199+)andPatternsof Dissonance volumeson Continentalphilosophyand feminism. Adarn Bryx is a graduatestudentin Englishat LakeheadUniversity.He has co-translated,with Gary Genosko,interviews and articles by Jean Baudrillardand Paul Virilio. Claire Colebrook is Professorof Literary Theory at the University of Edinburgh. She is the author of New Literary Histories(1997),Ethicsand (1999),GillesDeleuze(2002), [Inderstand,ing Deleuze(2003), Representation Ironlt: The New Critical ld,iom (2003), Irony in the Work of Philosophy (2003) and Gender(2003).She is also the editor (with Ian Buchanan)of Deleuzeand FeministTheory(1999). Felicity J. Colrnan teachescontemporarytheoriesof commodity cultures) avant-garde,experimental,and feminist practicesof visual and screenculture in the CinemaProgramat the University of Melbourne. Torn Conlcy is l)rotcssorof ltomitnccLitnguagcsin thc Dcpartmcntof llirrvirrdLJnivclsity. llc is tlrc atttlrot'of 'l'ht:^StllIt
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Papers(1996).He has translateda number of books,including Gilles Deleuze'sTheFoldandwritten on Deleuzein Le CinimachezDeleuze. Iris, Discourse, TheSouthAtlantic Qrarterly and other journals. Verena Anderrnatt Conley teaches in Literature and Romance Languagesand Literatures at Harvard University. She has written on Marxism in post-warFrance,theoriesof feminism,technologiesand the environment.Sheis currently interestedin space,subjectivityand globalisationin Frenchthought. Gary Genosko is CanadaResearchChair in Technocultureat Lakehead University. He has publishedextensivelyon the life and work of F6lix Guattari. Eugene W. Holland haspublishedextensivelyon Deleuzeand Guattari, including a book on Baud,elaireand. Schizoanalyvs(1993) and an Introd,uctionto Schizoanalysis(1999). Tarnsin Lorraine is an associate professorat SwarthmoreCollege.Sheis the author of lrigara.y and Deleuze: Experimentsin VisceralPhilosophy (1999)and is currently at work on a book tentativelytitled Feminismand. DeleuzianSubjectiaitlt. John Marks is Readerin FrenchStudiesat NottinghamTrent University. He is the author of GillesDeleuze: Vitalismand Multiplicity (1998) and is the editor of a forthcomingissueof Paragraphon Deleuzeand Science. Kylie Message is ResearchFellow in the Centre for Cross-Cultural Researchat the AustralianNationalUniversity.Prior to this shewasPostdoctoral ResearchFellow in the Department of English with Cultural Studiesat the University of Melbourne.Publishedwidely,her work uses the interdisciplinarymethodologyof cultural studiesto engagecritically with the new museummodelasit is emersinEacrossthe world.

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Adrian Parr is Professorof Contemporary Art and Design at the SavannahCollegeof Art and Design.Shehaswritten a book that explores the notebooksof f,eonardo through the philosophicallens of Deleuze (2003), and is the editor, with Ian Buchanan, of Deleuze and the Contemporar.y l4orldalsoforthcomingfrom EdinburghUniversity Press. Paul Patton is Professorof Philosophyat the University of New South Wales.He translatedDifibrenceand,Repetition,edited,Deleuze:A Critical Rearlerand is the authorof Deleuzeand thePolitical(2000). John Protevi is AssociateProfessorof French Studiesat LouisianaState University.He is the authorof TirueandExterionty(1994),PoliticalPh.ysics (2001)andco-authorof DeleuzeandGeophilosoph.y (2004).He is alsoeditor of the forthcoming EdinhurghDictionar.yof ContinentalPhilosophy. Jonathan Roffe is convcnor of the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy.He is thc co-editorof Untlerstanding Derrid,a(2004)with Jack Reynolds,and Derrida'sHeidegger(forthcoming) with Simon Critchley. He is currently working on the relationbetweenthe work of Alain Badiou and Deleuze,and on a Deleuzianunderstandingof cities. Alison Ross teachesCritical Theory in the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studiesat Monash University.She specialises in modern philosophy,aestheticsand contemporaryFrench thought. Her book, TheAestheticAnomaly: AestheticPresentationin Kant, Heid,egger and, Nancy, is forthcomingin 2006. Inna Sernetsky is an honorary researchassociatein the School of Philosophyand Bioethics,Monash University.In 2002shedefendedher Ph.D. dissertation'Continuities,Discontinuities,Interactions:Gilles Deleuzeand the DeweyanLegacy'at ColumbiaUniversity.She won the KevelsonMemorial Award from the SemioticSocietyof America(1999).

Brett Nicholls lecturesin Film and Media Studies at the University of Otago,and is the author of variousarticleson art, politics and digital technologies.

Lee Spinks is a senior lecturer in English Literature at Edinburgh University. He is the author of Fried,richNietzsche(2003) andJamesJoyce (2005) and is currently completing a study of Michael Ondaatje for ManchesterUniversity Press.

Sirnon O'Sullivan is a lecturerin Art History/VisualCultureat GolclsmithsCollege,Universityof London.Hc is thc authorof thc forthconring (lo bc Art Encountars Dclauzcurul()ualturi: 7'houghtllc.yondllcfrascnkt,tioz irsplrrlof'l)algrirvc Mircnrilliur's llcurtt,irt,ti l'hilosophl, scrics). lrrrlrfislrcrf

Cliff Stagoll complctcclhis Ph.D. in Philosophyat thc Univcrsity of Warwick,with :rtlisscrlatiotr on l)clcuzc'slhcorisatiorr of'tlrchrrnr:rn irrclividtrrrl. Ilc is rrt'cscitt'clt ol'thc |)cprrrtrrrcrrl itssocirtlc ol'l)lrilosolllry rrttht: [.Jnivclsity ol' Ncw SorrtlrWrk's.

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Kenneth Surin is basedin the Literature Program,Duke University. Marcel Swiboda receivedhis Ph.D. from the Universityof Leedsin 2003 wherehe currently worksasan associatelecturerin the Schoolof Fine Art, History of Art and Culrural Studies.He is the co-editor,with Ian Buchanan, of Deleuzeand,Music,publishedby Edinburgh University Press(2004). Alberto Toscano teachesin the SociologyDepartment at Goldsmiths College.He haspublishedarticleson Italian Marxism, Alain Badiou and Nietzsche.He is the editor of Alain Bad,iou:TheoreticalWritingswith Ray Brassier (forthcoming) and Antonio Negri: The Political Descarteswith Matteo Mandarini (forthcoming). Constantine Verevis lectures in the School of Literary, Visual and Performance Studies at Monash University. His book Film Remakesis forthcomingfrom EdinburghUniversity Press. Jarnes Williams is Readerin Philosophy at the University of Dundee. His books include Gilles Deleuze'sDifferenceand Repetition:A Critical Introduction and, Guid,e(2003) and The TransaersalThought of Gilhs Deleuze(2005).Jamesis grateful for the support of the AHRB Research LeaveSchemeand the CarnegieTrust for the UniversitiesScotland.