Robert Baer
The Devil We Know Table of Contents THE DEVIL WE KNOW PROLOGUE 1 THE IRANIAN PARADOX 2 HOW IRAN BEAT AMER...
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Robert Baer
The Devil We Know Table of Contents THE DEVIL WE KNOW PROLOGUE 1 THE IRANIAN PARADOX 2 HOW IRAN BEAT AMERICA 3 THE MASTER PLAN: HOW IRAN ARRIVED AT ITS SECRET BLUEPRINT FOR EMPIRE 4 FROM TERRORISM TO POWER POLITICS: HOW IRAN BECAME A STATIST POWER 5 LETHAL AND ELUSIVE: WHY IRAN’S WEAPONS AND TACTICS MAKE IT UNCONQUERABLE — EVEN WITHOUT NUKES 6 SEIZING THE WORLD’S ENERGY CORRIDORS: WHY IRAN WILL SHORTLY CONTROL THE MOST VITAL OIL AND GAS TRADE ROUTES 7
TOPPLING THE ARAB SHEIKHDOMS: HOW IRAN PLANS TO SEIZE THE PERSIAN GULF’S OIL 8 WHITE KNIGHTS: HOW IRAN’S SHIA ARE WINNING THE HEARTS OF THE SUNNI PALESTINIANS 9 WINNER TAKE ALL: WHY THE SHIA WILL PREVAIL — AND THE OPENING IT OFFERS 10 ULTIMATE SACRIFICE: MARTYRS, SUICIDE BOMBERS, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF ISLAM 11 MEMORIES THAT DON’T FADE: WHAT IRAN REALLY WANTS EPILOGUE GLOSSARY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ____________________
THE DEVIL WE KNOW PROLOGUE
____________________ I first visited Iran in October 1978, only months before Ayatollah Khomeini would return from exile and take power. I was twenty-four, on my way to my first CIA posting, in India, and had only the vaguest ideas about the Middle East. The kamikaze taxi driver who drove me into Tehran from the air-port that night taught me my first lesson: Iranians can’t drive. The way he swooped and darted between the army patrols, I was convinced he was trying to draw fire. And was it legal to drive down the sidewalk to get around traffic? My one-week stopover in Tehran did little to clear things up. I left not having the slightest idea what Khomeini would do with the mess when it was his. As I’d find out much later, Khomeini didn’t know either. Less than four years later, Iran was at war with the United States. On Tehran’s part it was undeclared; on Washington’s, it was ignored. In the middle of the Cold War, who had time for Tehran’s idiosyncratic, possibly insane mullahs? I served on the front lines of that war, declared or undeclared. I lost colleagues at the American embassy in Beirut, which Iran truck-bombed in April 1983. I lost Iranian friends assassinated by the regime. Like many, I was convinced that Iran’s revolution would drown in its own blood, the revolutionary zeal draining out just as it had with other violent rebellions in Islam. This seemed all but certain during the Iran-Iraq War, when Khomeini stubbornly refused to settle with Saddam Hussein, sacrificing
hundreds of thousands of Iranians for no other reason than that he believed God was on his side. But Khomeini’s regime survived, providing another lesson I needed to learn before Iran would come into focus for me. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War, not only did Iran still have fight in it, it was a lot smarter. Iran and its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, found out they could win by discarding terrorism for a radically new form of guerrilla warfare: roadside bombs, sophisticated precision-guided rockets, and the ultimate smart bomb, the suicide bomber. These are the same weapons and tactics that now have us stalemated in Iraq and Afghanistan. And along the way Iran just as certainly acquired an appetite for hegemony, a belief that it’s powerful enough to challenge the United States for dominance of the Persian Gulf — not just control of Iraq but of the Gulf’s oil, which is 55 percent of the world’s reserves. This isn’t a war the United States has years to prepare for. It’s half-fought and already half-won — by Iran. The sooner we understand the Iranian paradox — who they are, what they want, how they want to both humble us and work with us — the sooner we’ll understand how to come to terms with the new Iranian superpower. Twenty-six years after that first visit, I was in Tehran again. This time I was making a documentary with Britain’s Channel 4 and an Irish production company. In April 2005, I attended the Liberation of Khorramshahr celebration held at Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum not far from Tehran. Outside after the
ceremony, I caught up with Iran’s hard-line chief of staff. I asked him what the importance of martyrdom was for Iran’s armed forces. He was surprised to be questioned by an American, especially in a place foreigners rarely visit. But he answered anyhow. “In all religions martyrdom exists,” he told me. “Even in Ireland there are martyrs. Anyone who lives and fights for peace, unity, human rights is a martyr. And if his blood is shed, he is considered a martyr. In Islam, martyrdom is the reward for holy war — and whoever is with pure motive and knowingly gives his life, he sees the face of God. He will be received by the angels, who will take him to his paradise.” Of course. This could have been lifted right out of the Koran, the same religious propaganda we’ve been subjected to for so long. But what did it mean in practical terms to America? I asked. “ America should have understood by now that day by day they have to listen more carefully,” he said. “They should know that no army can stand in the way of martyrdom. The Islamic revolution has reached a point where it has access to modern weapons and the experience to plan and carry out its strategy. America should understand that if it takes on Iran today, it will lose its position of strength.” I knew Iran well enough now to know what its chief of staff was getting at. Iran has convinced itself it is America’s equal, a statist military power capable of thwarting American power in the Gulf. Iran believes that the new form of warfare it developed in Lebanon can fight a conventional army to a standstill. Iran also
believes it is now a global power, inasmuch as its advanced Silkworm missiles positioned along the Persian Gulf can shut off Gulf oil exports in a matter of minutes. The chief of staff’s message was clear: The game has changed. When Americans think about Iran, we see the blackturbaned, long-bearded, scowling Ayatollah Khomeini, a dark specter bent on vengeance. Or we remember young Iranian boys running across Iraqi minefields screaming allahu akbar, “God is great.” Or the American diplomats in 1979, blindfolded, hands tied behind their backs. It’s nearly impossible to get past those images. And Iran’s apocalyptic, Holocaust-denying president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, hasn’t helped. We have convinced ourselves that Iran is a historical aberration, a medieval throwback harboring an irrational hate for the West. Iranians are “Islamofascists,” we’ve been told, to be lumped in with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. And somewhere along the way, we’ve settled for the easy assumption that the Iranian regime will one day, inevitably, collapse under the weight of the twenty-first century. All we have to do in the meantime is make sure it doesn’t get a nuclear bomb, and that its proxy Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia political and military organization, stops rocketing Israel. Iran is a closed society and a remote enemy. It’s not surprising, then, that the United States missed how Iran has evolved over the last thirty years — how it has modernized, grown up, having abandoned both terrorism and Khomeini’s revolution. Iran is still riding the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that’s sweeping away
the last vestiges of a secular Middle East, but at the same time it’s now a rational actor, coldly and methodically pursuing its national interests. Scratch away the veneer of Islam, and what you find in an Iranian is old-fashioned nationalism — a deep, abiding defiance of colonialism. Keep scratching and what you find at the bottom of Iran’s soul is a newfound taste for empire. It runs through Iranian society, even among more secular Iranians. But Iran isn’t a new Rome, intent on naked conquest, cultural diffusion, settlements, and religious conversion. What drives Iran to empire is something different. Call it destiny, entitlement, or even manifest destiny: what’s critical to understand is that Iran today has an unshakable belief in its right to empire. It means to achieve this through proxy warfare and control over oil supplies. It’s not hard to understand where Iran got the confidence, misplaced or not, that it can beat the West. In Lebanon, from 1982 to 2000, Iran’s proxy Hezbollah beat the Israelis on the field of battle, the first time Israel’s army had lost since the country’s founding in 1948. Israel claims it wasn’t defeated militarily in the conflict, that they lost only the will to fight and not the war. But in the 34-day Lebanon war in 2006, the Israeli army was in fact beaten. It retreated from Lebanon with heavy losses and without obtaining a single objective. Iran’s star is rising. And now with a friendly Shia government in Baghdad, it will rise a lot faster. On the other hand, the old Sunni order — the foundation of American interests in the Middle East — is edging toward collapse. How long can Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
hold on? For the first time in the history of Islam, Shia domination of Mecca is not unthinkable. Nor is an Iranian empire in the Middle East. Was Khomeini right after all, that Iran would ultimately defeat America, the Great Satan? Defining Iran’s imperial drive is the subject of this book. The viewpoint is from the periphery, where empires are historically best observed, their character best understood. We better understand Rome’s imperial character by looking at Roman Gaul or Spain rather than at the metropolitan center. In the same way, we’ll better understand Iran’s imperial blueprint by looking at Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan rather than Tehran. Watching Iran over the last thirty years has been a personal voyage for me. I was fortunate enough to live on the periphery I’m writing about; I witnessed firsthand Iran’s seismic shift, its rise from anarchy to statist power. I saw Iran turn into a more conventional military power, one that perhaps cannot beat the United States in a traditional war but one that can make America’s long-term presence in the Middle East untenable. What it comes down to is this: Iran is the most powerful and stable country in the Middle East — a country the United States must either fight in a new thirty-year war or come to terms with. How Iran got there, where it goes from here, and what the United States should do about it is what this book is about. It’s a study in the transformation of Iran — the devil we know. 1
____________________ THE IRANIAN PARADOX One Friday morning in 2005, I attended prayer services at Tehran University. I was traveling with a crew from Britain’s Channel 4, and we were treated as VIPs. Security checks were waived and we were given the press booth right next to Ayatollah Kashani, who addressed the faithful for the next two hours. The vast hall was only half full, but Kashani’s sermon was long and furious, something straight out of 1979. Out on the street, a demonstration was forming. There were effigies of President Bush, blood running from his pointed teeth. Across the street, some demonstrators unfurled banners: Marg bar amerika — “Death to America.” I walked for a time among the demonstrators. There was one old man who seemed especially passionate about bringing death to America, shaking his fist and shouting. I walked up to him. “Do you mean all Americans?” I asked. He looked at me curiously. “Where are you from?” he said. I told him I was American. He winked and leaned in closer to me. “How can I get an American visa?” he asked. Iran is a country of nuances. Unfortunately, at just the time it most needs to, the United States doesn’t see those nuances, or understand Iran for what it is: a country that’s deeply pious, yet desperately trying to modernize. Iran’s religious parties generally
receive only about 10 percent of the vote — considerably less than in Turkey, a member of NATO and an American ally. Americans see Iran’s president and mullahs as relics from a dark age, when in reality they’re a driving force behind Iran’s modernization. Since the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, it’s true, there’s been a conservative retrenchment, with hardliners winning the presidency and a majority in parliament. A U-turn like this was all but inevitable with hostile armies on two of Iran’s borders. But once the wars are over, Iran will no doubt return to modernizing. Iranians watch our movies, read our books, listen to our music. They have taken to the Internet and modern technology with an obsession equal to our own. Today Persian is the most common language on the Internet after English and Mandarin Chinese. Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad writes his own blog. In some ways, Iran has matched our own modern standards. The country’s population growth has plummeted from a high of 3.2 in 1986 to 1.2 in 2001, only slightly higher than America’s. The Iranians also keep an old Shia practice with regard to pleasure and sex, one that Sunni Muslims consider morally forbidden: zawaj almita’ — “pleasure marriage,” or sanctioned prostitution. The way it works is, a mullah will grant a license for a man and a woman to marry for a set period — two hours, a week, a month. The mullah’s only concern is making sure the man pays for the child if the woman becomes pregnant. It’s paradoxes like these that make Iran so difficult to grasp. The signs of change are everywhere. One of the most
popular dramas on Iranian state television is about an Iranian diplomat who saves French Jews from the Nazis during World War II. The average age of marriage for an Iranian woman today is twenty-five; during the Shah’s last year in power, it was thirteen. And doctors reportedly perform more sex-change operations in Iran than in any other country except Thailand, with the Iranian government even paying up to half the cost for some transsexuals. If you stroll around north Tehran, the part that runs up into the hills, that’s where you’re really struck by the contrasts. There are food courts serving Thai and Chinese food, with plastic trays and soft drinks. Young unmarried girls and boys share hookahs at outdoor restaurants, the girls’ head covers pushed back, down around the neck. In Iran, unlike in Saudi Arabia, religious police aren’t on every corner to enforce the “moral order.” And unlike in The Sudan, there are no arrests in Iran for the grave offense of naming a teddy bear “Mohammed.” While I was in Tehran, I was regularly invited to parties; I’d heard rumors they were as hip and wild as anything that goes on in the cosmopolitan Western capitals of the world. But I figured I’d already pressed my luck even coming to Iran, and anyhow I couldn’t stay up that late to find out. What did all this tell me about Iran’s imperial grasp? The parties, the love affair with the Internet, the changing sexual mores — they augur a country modernizing, looking beyond its borders. One piece of Iran that’s trying to modernize but can’t is the economy. For the life of me, I couldn’t find a single good restaurant in Tehran. The restaurants reminded me of those in the Soviet
Union: buffets with lousy service. There were more waiters than needed, but all of them stood around, surly, turning away when you wanted something. Kitchens ran out of everything. And breakfasts were peculiar, with mountains of watermelon and boiled eggs and nothing else. Omelets were apparently an outrageous luxury, though with relentless charm and cajoling you might get one. Another thing that reminded me of the Soviet Union were the soulless, water-streaked cement apartment buildings, office buildings, and hotels. Concierges are invariably polite but hopeless in trying to help you with anything. Phones mostly don’t work, and Internet connections are erratic. To be sure, there are well-heeled Iranian elite reading Lolita and dining on nouvelle cuisine, but they keep out of sight. Tehran’s big problem is the internal combustion engine. The Iranian national car, the Peykan, is one of the noisiest, worstpolluting, and least fuel-efficient cars in the world. It was in production for forty years, and many of the cars on Iran’s roads predate the 1979 revolution. With gasoline running as low as 7 cents a gallon until recently, though, there wasn’t much incentive for change. Even so, in the last three years, 250,000 Iranian cars have been converted to natural gas or hybrids, and today Tehran’s smog has cleared up enough to see the snow-covered Elburz Mountains to the north. When I visited south Tehran’s Kumaila Mosque, ground zero of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution, I noticed the distinct smell of opium smoke drifting through the narrow alleys. This was a conservative neighborhood, the place where the Islamic revolution
started, yet there was an incomprehensible tolerance for a vice forbidden almost everywhere else in the world. And it wasn’t as if the Iranian government couldn’t close down the opium dens if it wanted to. Iran is a police state. Every day I drove around Tehran, or walked around the streets and bazaars, I was stopped and my papers checked — just because I looked out of place, a foreigner. The tamperproof ID card I was issued by the Ministry of Information was more sophisticated than those you’d find in the United States — a permanent digital record of the ex-CIA agent, now an accredited journalist in Iran. The contradictions continue. Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport is one of the most modern and least traveled in the world — and, I should add, the most polite. On arrival, I handed my passport to an immigration official wearing the hijab, or head covering. When she saw I was American, she said, “I’m so sorry.” She entered my name on the flat-screen monitor, then picked up the phone and called someone. A minute later, a man in a suit without a tie appeared behind her. He motioned for me to follow him. There’s no point in pretending I felt anything other than dread. I knew the reputation of the Iranian secret police during both the Shah’s regime and the revolution. I remembered how we came across pictures of Iranian dissidents in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison, left in the courtyard in the freezing cold, their legs broken with baseball bats. Or pictures of the CIA’s station chief in Beirut after he’d been beaten by Iranian proxies and left to die of pneumonia. Or of Iranian liberals in the late nineties, executed in
their homes. Even today, the Iranians still occasionally serve up medieval punishment for crimes, including amputations and public floggings. And Americans, even after a certain thaw in IranianAmerican relations, weren’t immune from the Iranian police state. On March 8, 2007, the former FBI agent Robert Levinson flew to the Iranian free-trade zone of Kish Island — and disappeared like a diamond in an inkwell. At this writing, the FBI’s best guess is that a rogue element of Iran’s intelligence service grabbed him. Not exactly what you’d expect from a modern country. But this is the most important nuance of Iran: It’s a country desperately trying to modernize, not one that has already modernized. I waited nervously until the man in the suit came back. “I’m very sorry,” he said, “but we must fingerprint you.” As I followed him to his office, he explained that his ministry had started fingerprinting Americans after the United States instituted the same practice for Iranians visiting the United States. It was a simple matter of reciprocity, equal justice. I had to stop him from apologizing. Iran still had the capacity to surprise me. A misconception Americans have about Iran is that Iranians hate us and our culture. But that’s not true. They simply hate what they consider our occupation of large swaths of the Middle East. I saw this most clearly when making a documentary about suicide bombers in southern Lebanon a couple of years ago. Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy whose name means “party of God” in Arabic, had invited us to film at its martyrs’ school in Nabatiyah, to see how their next generation was turning out — Allah’s little soldiers.
Nabatiyah itself holds a celebrated place in the history of Lebanon’s Shia. On October 16, 1983, on the Muslim observance of Ashura, an Israeli patrol tried to cut through a procession of Shia faithful. Rocks flew, and the Israelis fired back, killing two Lebanese. The incident sparked what came to be known as the Islamic resistance, an insurgency the Israelis couldn’t put down no matter what they threw back at it. Eighteen years of unforgiving war followed, until the Israelis finally pulled their troops out of Lebanon in May 2000. This was a critical turning point, the first time that Israel was forced to cede land under fire. The Middle East suddenly discovered Hezbollah, which emerged stronger than ever, both politically and militarily. For many Arabs, Nabatiyah was Hezbollah’s Boston Tea Party; Israel’s forced departure from Lebanon was its Waterloo. But Iran knew the fighting wasn’t over, and it built the school in Nabatiyah as an incubator for a new generation of suicide bombers, for the next war. As we pulled up to the three-story school building, perched on a bare hill, I was struck by the eerie silence. The only sound was the mean, thin wind that cut across the jagged limestone escarpment. Classes were in session, but there was none of the laughing or shouting you’d normally hear at an American school. There were no students out front. No cars or even a bicycle in sight — the students all walk from their homes in Nabatiyah. The grounds were immaculate, from the raked gravel walks to the avocado exterior and the whitewashed classrooms. The school was a model of order and cleanliness. But that’s something I’d noticed in the last twenty-
five years about Iran and its proxy Hezbollah: they manage to impose order where there was none before. The principal, in an ash-gray chador and steel-framed glasses, was waiting for us at the front door. The look on her face told me she wasn’t happy about our visit, but she didn’t have a choice — Hezbollah was now romancing the Western media. It had driven the Israelis out of Lebanon and was in charge now. Sloughing off old skin for new, guerrillas turned statesmen, they were determined to convince the West they’d left their terrorist past behind and were now perfectly comfortable opening up their inner sanctums. The principal led me up to the second floor and into a classroom. The twenty or so teenagers, all girls, were silent, attentive. The principal told me I should address my questions only to the teacher. I quickly got around to asking her about her special students, the daughters of suicide bombers. There were three in her class. She said they pay no school fees, they receive gifts every Father’s Day, and after graduation their university education is paid for. The other students and the teachers treat them with deep respect as living symbols of martyrdom, sacrifice, and Islam’s devotion to justice. “You have to be proud of your father,” the teacher said, looking at a petite girl in the front row, “because he defended the country. Because he is a hero.” The girl, whose father died in an ambush of an Israeli patrol, looked steadily at her teacher, neither smiling nor blushing. Her
chador barely covered her raven hair. Why, I asked the teacher, is martyrdom so important for Shia Islam? “Because it is at the heart of our religion.” Martyrdom in fact is a canon of Shia Islam, almost as important as the Koran, the mosque, and daily prayer. Hezbollah, like Iran, has turned martyrdom into a state religion. Iran’s Martyrs’ Foundation, a quasi-governmental institution founded to care for the families of Iranian soldiers who died during the Iran-Iraq War, funds the Nabatiyah school. But I was more interested in what the girls themselves had to say. “May I ask the students questions?” I asked. The teacher looked at the principal, who shot me a nasty look, but then nodded. “Who watches American TV?” I asked, addressing the class in Arabic. Every hand shot up. “What do you watch?” One girl giggled. “Oprah.” “You’re kidding,” I said, genuinely surprised at both the answer and the giggle. At that point the entire class leapt in, in English. “No, no, really!” they said, some of them laughing. “We love Oprah.” And that’s another paradox Americans need to understand: While the schoolgirls in Nabatiyah may watch Oprah and want iPods and flat-screen TVs, that doesn’t mean they want to be like us. They’ll never slip into bikinis and flip-flops to go to the beach, or watch our R-rated movies or listen to our garage bands. They take
from Western culture and technology what suits them, what fits their beliefs, convictions, and sense of propriety. And nothing more. But what they really don’t want forced on them is our politics. The sooner we understand how a girl from Nabatiyah’s martyrs’ school can watch Oprah, then strap on a suicide bomber’s vest and blow herself up in the middle of an Israeli patrol, the better prepared we’ll be to face what’s coming our way. Iran is complex enough that even the Iranians themselves have trouble understanding their own country. A conversation I had with one of Ayatollah Khomeini’s former aides, a man I will call Amin, illustrated this perfectly. We met at Amin’s bookstore in Paris, where he had emigrated after Khomeini’s revolution collapsed. “I sincerely apologize for the cliché, sir,” he said, moving a stack of books to see me better, “but Iran is a mosaic. Yes, ‘mosaic’ is the word I’m looking for.” As an aide to Khomeini, Amin had lived through the lowest point of American-Iranian relations, the 1979 hostage crisis. He later served in the Majlis, Iran’s parliament. Since he emigrated, he’s had a lot of time to think about Iran and Khomeini’s failed revolution. Amin admits that at times Iran is barely comprehensible even to Iranians. He told me the story of being in Tehran in 1981 when a terrorist group blew up Khomeini’s party headquarters, killing four cabinet ministers and leading to fears within the regime that Khomeini’s revolution was about to cross over into anarchy. But
even though an enormous bomb had just destroyed the building and you could hear sirens screaming through Tehran’s streets, no one had the nerve to tell Ayatollah Khomeini what had just happened. Amin was in the waiting area of Khomeini’s office when finally the intercom crackled on an aide’s desk, summoning him. The aide tiptoed into Khomeini’s office and came back ten seconds later: Khomeini had just heard the news on the BBC’s Persian Service — the source of most of his information about his own country. Even though Amin sat in the inner circle, it was difficult to know who really ran the country. Still, Amin believes the United States misunderstands Iran by an unnecessarily wide mark. On one level, Americans are too distant from the Middle East, too naïve to understand its complexities and history. On another, it’s the people who show up in Washington — Iranian and Arab exiles nursing a grudge, with time on their hands and money to pay for a hotel — who influence U.S. policy by default. They color Washington’s view of the world, drawing us into foreign adventures we have no business being in. And then there’s just plain shortsightedness, the distractions of modern life getting in the way of our understanding. The world is infinite in detail, and we are finite in our ability to select from it. There are just too many facts, and this is especially true with a country as complex as Iran. Amin pulled down a UNESCO book on migration to the Iranian capital. “Look here,” he said. “ Tehran is a Turkic city. Not Persian. How many Americans understand this?”
Indeed, it comes as a surprise to many Americans that of Iran’s 69 million people, just 51 percent are ethnic Persian. The largest minority is of Turkish origin — or Azeris, as they’re called in Iran. The rest of the population is a mix of Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, and others. “C’est un pays sous le voile des apparences,” Amin told me — it is a country that hides behind appearances. He went on, “It’s not the veil that blinds Iranians. It’s the veil that blinds you. Americans see the turban, not the brain.” That’s another thing Amin learned to do trying to explain Iran to outsiders: reduce complexities to sound bites we’re comfortable with. “You look at the Middle East from the cockpit of a B-52 bomber,” he said. “How many Americans realize one of Iran’s most sacred martyrs is an American?” Amin was referring to Howard Conklin Baskerville, a missionary schoolteacher in Tabriz, Iran’s sixth-largest city. During the constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, Baskerville was shot and killed while leading his Iranian students in an attempt to break the siege of Tabriz. To this day, Iranians put flowers on his grave, honoring him along with the hundreds of thousands of Iranians who died on the front in the Iran-Iraq War. As I left Amin’s bookstore, I couldn’t help but think he was on to something. The reason Americans find it nearly impossible to get a grip on Iran, an anachronism with one foot in the twenty-first century, is because it’s so damned complicated. Then again, Iran has done little to explain itself. Iran is a closed society, deeply xenophobic and paranoid. All foreign visitors
are seen as potential spies. Iranian leaders don’t expose in public Iran’s real policies. There’s no such thing as investigative journalism. You can only get at the truth in snatches, brief rays of sunlight shining through dark clouds. And this is certainly true when it comes to Iran’s pursuit of its core national security interests and quest for empire, subjects Iran never talks about frankly. The problem is exacerbated, as Amin said, by exiles — usually homesick Iranians who remember an Iran of their dreams. They make themselves indispensable in Washington, in its think tanks, and with Beltway contractors peddling expertise on Iran. But almost invariably the exiles’ only service is to promote their own personal interests, which usually come down to changing the regime in Tehran. This is the same malign influence we saw in the fifties when the China lobby convinced us to back Chiang Kai-shek, or today with the Cuban lobby blocking reconciliation with Castro’s Cuba. Iraq, though, is the real parable for exiles suckering Washington into a debacle. Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi has been publicly flayed for having prodded and misled the United States into invading Iraq, and for lying about weapons of mass destruction and the reception American troops would get in Iraq. But Chalabi’s most damaging deception may prove to be his dismissing Iran as a threat to Iraq. I got a glimpse of this in a conversation with a former deputy assistant secretary of defense under Reagan named Doug Feith. I went to see Feith in the summer of 2000, just about the time George W. Bush had won the Republican nomination for president, to talk about Iran. Feith was upbeat. He knew that if
Bush won the White House, he could pretty much pick any job he wanted. He was in private law practice then, but he was a star in the Republican foreign policy brain trust. Before we met, I had been certain Feith would understand the threat Iran posed to Iraq. When he was in the Reagan administration, he surely had read the intelligence reports that Iran was behind the bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and the Marine barracks in October 1983. Feith also had lived through Iran-Contra and should have remembered how exiles and middlemen manipulated policy to their own ends, ending up deceiving both sides — Iran and the United States. But as we sat at opposite ends of the couch in his office, Feith wanted to talk about Iraq, not Iran. Could the Iraqi exiles overthrow Saddam Hussein? Or more to the point, did Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress stand a chance of getting rid of him? Feith thought that Chalabi could, given a little help. Listening to Feith, I wondered why he wasn’t more skeptical of Chalabi, a lifelong exile who hadn’t seen Baghdad since he was a child. More to the point, I wondered why Feith wasn’t more suspicious about Chalabi’s ties to Iran. In the nineties, Chalabi had traveled through Tehran to get into Kurdish northern Iraq. He also had unexplained ties to Iran’s hard-line Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, one reason the Clinton administration dropped contact with him. I pointed this out to Feith, telling him how in 1994 and 1995, Chalabi had turned over Iraqi National Congress houses and cars to Iranian intelligence, which then used them to stage the
assassinations of Iranian dissidents living in the part of Iraq Saddam controlled. Didn’t this sound suspicious to Feith? And that wasn’t to mention Iran’s long-term interests in Iraq, with or without Chalabi. I also wondered why Feith couldn’t draw the obvious parallels between Iraq and Lebanon, which Iran was then effectively annexing. The longer Feith didn’t respond, the more I wondered whether he thought I was making all this up, trying for some inexplicable reason to undermine Chalabi. I told Feith that if George Bush won the presidency, he’d be in a position to confirm everything I’d just told him. At that, Feith stood abruptly and thanked me for my visit. “Ahmed Chalabi will be a wonderful leader of Iraq,” he said firmly, before showing me out and closing the door behind me. ••• This is a book about Iran, and Iraq at this point may seem like an unnecessary diversion. But in fact, the one certainty about the Iraq War is that the United States will see Iran’s imperial ambitions played out more clearly there than in Tehran. If it’s in Iran’s interests to have chaos in Iraq, then chaos there will be. If Iran intends to draw the United States into a quagmire, a quagmire is what we’ll get. Our war with Iran will be fought in Iraq, through proxies, on the periphery of Iran’s empire. How could we have missed this so badly? Ahmed Chalabi certainly deserves his share of the blame for
misleading Washington about Iran. In a tightly held paper meant only for the Iraq hawks in Washington, Chalabi had this to say about the Shia uprising in southern Iraq at the end of the 1991 Gulf War: The insurrection in the south that followed the uprising continues to simmer. The failure of the Islamic groups supported by Iran to wrest control from Saddam in the south has served to diminish any support or hope that the local population had in them. Their behavior during the Intifadah is increasingly believed to have been the cause of its failure. In other words, according to Chalabi, Iran’s proxies were a compromised and spent force. They — and Iran — had no future in Iraq, with or without Saddam. This, of course, could not have been more wrong. The same Shia groups Chalabi so easily dismissed would decisively win the parliamentary elections in 2005. They’re now the legitimate government of Iraq. Chalabi’s motives should have been transparent. He obviously had no interest in raising the alarm about Iran and its designs on Iraq. Why give the Bush administration second thoughts about invading? Chalabi’s only objective was to remove Saddam Hussein; he’d take his chances with Iran after he got home to Iraq. This was a gamble, no doubt. But it was better than finishing life as a parlor exile in London. Chalabi knew he could get away with misleading Americans on Iran because we know so little about the country. It was a
child’s game, playing off American ignorance, reciting a few facts sugared with clichés. Add to the mix Chalabi’s beautiful English and you get a glimpse at how he was able to blind Washington to Iran. Iran myopia is a national ailment in the United States. In his 1008-page memoir, My Life, Bill Clinton devoted a total of four sentences to Iran. And in three preinvasion opinion pieces titled “Thinking About Iraq,” New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman’s argument for the war boiled down to this: We needed to remove Saddam in order to plant democracy in the Middle East and force it to join the twenty-first century. Friedman’s argument was that “freedom, modern education and women’s empowerment” were the cure for whatever ailed Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. But not a word about Iran. Friedman, too, fell for Chalabi’s pretty narrative, apparently not foreseeing the certainty that Iran would meddle in Iraq as soon as Saddam’s police state was dismantled. Chalabi returned to Iraq in April 2003 — not as its triumphant new leader, as Feith had assured me he’d be, but riding in the back of an American military cargo plane. His political fortunes hit a low point in 2004, when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) accused him of leaking secrets to Iran. A proIranian member of the CPA appointed him deputy prime minister as a consolation prize, but it was a position with virtually no power. Chalabi had fallen hard — and he knew why. He wasn’t one of Iran’s chosen proxies. Chalabi lost his gamble. But then again, he’d bet with someone else’s money. And through the stress of it all, he still got to
vacation in Iran. Washington was taken by surprise when Iran swept in to fill the vacuum in Iraq. But it shouldn’t have been. If the United States had listened to its enemies — Iranian proxies who’d fought other wars for Iran, on other peripheries of Iran’s growing empire — it might have understood the problems of occupying Iraq. In February 2003, a little less than a month before Americans invaded Iraq, a contact in Hezbollah called me, gleefully announcing that the Iraqi-born members of Hezbollah were packing up to go home. Many of them hadn’t been back since 1980, when Saddam expelled them to Iran and Lebanon. “What are they going to do?” I asked, purposely sounding naïve. “Organize Iraqi Hezbollah, of course. Take over Iraq.” “But how many of them are there?” “I don’t know. Two or three hundred.” “Is that enough?” “It was in Lebanon, no?” he said as he hung up the phone. I was afraid he wasn’t far from wrong. Iran had incited a revolution in Lebanon building on a core of only a few hundred proxy fighters and co-opted clerics, who eventually turned half the country into an Iranian outpost. Iran knew that with Saddam gone, secular Iraq was dead, making the Iraqi Shia ripe for the picking to fight a holy war against Western occupation. The Iraqi Shia would reject occupation just as surely as the Lebanese had rejected it in 1982. And Iran also knew
Lebanon would be the strategic blueprint for its war of liberation: Iran would dominate Iraq not by invading it outright, but rather through proxies, spreading religious conviction, and employing the new form of guerrilla warfare it had learned in Lebanon. Granted, Iraq is not Lebanon. In some ways, the country of Iraq was permanently shattered by the Mongol invasion in 1258. The Ottoman Empire reconstituted Iraq into three provinces, but only under the force of arms. And Saddam held the country together only with extreme brutality. Iraq’s soft center, like that of Lebanon in the eighties, is what gives Iran the confidence the Lebanon model is transferable. Even the most nationalist and fractious Iraqi Shia can be manipulated, bribed, and cowed. So, inasmuch as the future in the Middle East can ever be predicted, with time and money Iran stands a good chance of dominating Iraq, annexing it all but in name. It will almost certainly try to do so after the United States leaves. What Washington missed, and what Chalabi didn’t want us to know, was that Iran understands how to manage chaos — that it knew exactly how to benefit from the U.S.-led destruction of the Iraqi army and state. I suspect Chalabi knew what was coming. His political education was in Lebanon; he saw firsthand what Iran could accomplish when there was an absence of central authority. I was never privy to what Chalabi was telling the White House, the neocons, and journalists, but I’m almost certain he didn’t point out that if there was one watermark running through the contemporary Middle East it was political Islam, a current the Iranians long ago learned to turn to their benefit. He also almost
certainly didn’t point out that a well-organized and well-funded surrogate force, driven by belief, could — and would — easily fill the vacuum in Iraq. The Iranians know exactly what they have to do in Iraq. They wrote the template in Lebanon, where they learned how to manage chaos, to create order where there was none before. And they know there’s nothing the United States can do to stop them from doing the same in Iraq. The U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, called it Iran’s “Lebanization” of Iraq. The question of who lost Iraq isn’t just water under the bridge. The truth is, nothing has changed since the Iraqi invasion. The Americans still do not understand Iran’s strategy — what it wants in Iraq and how it intends to get it. We still do not understand the nature of proxy warfare, and how Iran can get its way through manipulating proxies. We still reduce the threat of Iran to weapons of mass destruction — to a nuclear bomb — but it has started to dawn on those who deal in facts that in Iran we face a problem that demands a second look. Hopeful signs of this came when Washington’s Iranian policy seemed to turn on a dime in December 2007, after the director of national intelligence issued a judgment, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), stating that Iran had suspended its efforts to make a nuclear bomb. The NIE didn’t say it in so many words, but the implication was that Iran isn’t in a hurry to get a bomb. Nuclear weapons, then, are not vital to Iran’s national security. At the same time, the NIE did not diminish the threat Iran poses to U.S. interests in the region.
One Bush foreign policy adviser, a longtime Iranian specialist with whom I’d worked in the past, told me that he despaired of Washington ever really understanding the problem Iran poses for the United States. He said American understanding of Iran today is worse than it was under Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, or Bill Clinton. “[Washington officials] have no idea about the role the Iranians were playing in the eighties, the damage they did to our interests in the Middle East,” he told me. “Today, all across the government, you have young men and women who know about Iran from college text-books. They’ve absorbed a conceptual framework about the country that doesn’t even come close to matching reality.” And our understanding of Iran wasn’t that good to begin with, as he reminded me. In one incident in the eighties, it was discovered that an American who’d been held hostage for a time by an Iranian-controlled group had traces of arsenic in his fingernails. Washington’s conclusion was that the Iranians were poisoning the hostages. Never mind that hostages were a valuable commodity that the Iranians would give up only for a price. Or that if they really wanted to kill them, they’d shoot or hang them in front of a camera, as they’d done with an American colonel working for the UN. The Americans couldn’t understand, my friend at the White House said, that in the Middle East, small amounts of arsenic are a home remedy for stomach bugs. I could hear the resignation in his voice: the bureaucracy, the press, and academia would never catch up to reality in time for us
to change course. It was inevitable we would commit over and over the same blunders that got us into the current Iraq quagmire. We didn’t talk about confidence men like Chalabi. We didn’t need to. We both knew that exiles were still taking us on another bumpy ride, and Iran would be handed victory after victory. Even today, Iranian exiles showing up in Washington say Iran is teetering on the edge — that it will collapse with a real show of force. If we just stay the course in Iraq, squeeze Iran in Lebanon, get rid of the regime in Damascus, they say, we’ll win. They still can’t conceive that we lost in Iraq, or understand what we lost. Losing Iraq — ceding it to Iran — marked the first time in history Mesopotamia was ceded to a hostile power without a real fight. It’s the first time the Shia have ruled an Arab country since the Fatimids in Egypt in the twelfth century. It’s also the first time in modern history that an Arab country has been wiped off the map. How could something like this, a God-sent opportunity for Iran, not provoke serious change in the Middle East? The fact that the United States was the agent of this change, in a voluntary war, is tantamount to Rome’s willingly ceding the Mediterranean to Carthage, or Britain’s ceding the English Channel to Nazi Germany. The stakes in Iraq are just as high. Iran will fairly quickly take control of Iraq’s oil, which as of December 2007 was 2.3 million barrels a day. In the first days of the war, Iranian surrogates immediately started to steal hundreds of thousands of barrels. No one knows the exact figure, because the Iranian-allied oil minister refuses to provide an accounting. But Iran’s grip on Iraqi oil only promises to tighten with its plans for a
strategic petroleum alliance with Iraq. The American backers of the war claimed that with massive investment Iraq’s production could be taken to 6 million barrels a day. If they’re right, and if Iran proceeds with its de facto annexation of Iraq and its oil, the combination of Iran’s current production of 4.21 million barrels a day with Iraq’s 6 million would put Iran within range of becoming the world’s largest producer, ahead of Saudi Arabia. Under a scenario like this, Iran calls the shots in world oil markets, deciding levels of production that lower or raise world prices, which also aids Iran’s ongoing campaign to decouple oil from the dollar. If oil markets continue to tighten, it could fall within Iran’s reach to set the global price of oil. If Iran were to force a cutback of, let’s say, 5 million barrels a day, Americans could end up paying $10 a gallon for gasoline. If the cutback was compounded with an assault on the dollar, it would start something very much like a depression in the United States. Nightmare scenarios like this rarely come to pass. Historically, commodity markets have been too fractured, too large, and too subject to economic swings to allow one country to set oil prices. But with oil at $135 a barrel in May 2008, with Iran moving to take effective control of Iraq’s production and intimidating the Gulf Arabs with its eye on their 50 percent of the world’s proven reserves, Iran is not all that far from establishing the oil monopoly it seeks. Saudi Arabia, for one, takes the Iranian nightmare scenario seriously — the scenario Ahmed Chalabi never talked to Doug
Feith about. The Saudis are terrified the United States will abandon Iraq, and Iraq’s chaos will then spill into Saudi Arabia. They’re also terrified about an Iranian invasion. And they know that American staying power in the Gulf is fading by the day. What’s to keep the American people from returning to isolationism and leaving the Gulf? If and when the Americans do go, the Saudis are convinced the entire Gulf will fall to Iran. In the meantime, the Saudis have two choices: They can goad the United States into a war against Iran, or more likely, they can raise a white flag and hope Iran will be satisfied with dominion over the Gulf rather than occupation when the United States does leave. For the first time in its history, Saudi Arabia in 2007 invited an Iranian president to come to Mecca to perform the hajj. As soon as things in Iraq started to go badly in 2004, and Iran’s role became clear, the Saudi interior minister started flying to Tehran almost weekly, assuring the Iranians they would never join in an attack against Iran. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is buying all the arms it can, hoping against hope that they will serve as a deterrent against Iran. Iran’s rise couldn’t have come at a worse time for Gulf Arabs. The Saudis would never talk about it in public, but they certainly understand that the Sunni Arab order in the twentieth century has failed. The Sunnis have lost four wars against Israel — in 1948, 1967, 1973, and, indirectly, in 1982. Saddam Hussein, the “shield of the Arabs,” or more accurately the “shield of the Sunni Gulf Arabs,” lost every war he fought: the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1990-91 Gulf War, and now the Iraq War. The Saudis also
know that Arab nationalism — a mask for the Sunni order — has also failed. It failed to unite the Arabs. It failed to take an inch of land back from Israel. And it failed to attract support among the Arabs. A 2008 Zogby poll showed that among Arabs, the three most popular leaders in the Middle East are non-Sunnis: the Shia Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah; the Alawite president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad; and the Shia Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And a 2008 poll conducted by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland revealed that support for Nasrallah is growing. Sunni Islam is founded on victory and power, which are now fast slipping from Sunni hands into the hands of the Shia. It’s Iran’s arc that terrifies the Saudis. They haven’t missed the fact that over the last three decades Iran has quietly transformed itself from an irritating but essentially harmless revolutionary power into a pragmatic, calculating one that intends to undermine the old Sunni order. The Saudis have watched as Iran left its revolutionary tactics behind and became a skilled player in the game of nations, a country that understands how to exploit political vacuums and appeal to the poor and dispossessed. Who can stop it now? Whatever the rest of the Arabs thought about Saddam, they in fact looked at Iraq as their protector from Persian invasion. And though no one said it aloud, they also saw Iraq’s Sunni-led army as the thin membrane holding back a resurgent Shia Islam. Iraq’s army, once the fourth-largest fighting force in the world, was better equipped than most European ones. For years, the Iraqi army kept
Iran from invading the Arab Gulf states, America’s closest allies in the Middle East. For eight years, Iran tried, and failed, to defeat Iraq. Then, in the span of just over two weeks between March 20 and April 9, 2003, American Apache helicopters, F-16s, and Hellfire missiles obliterated the Iraqi army, unintentionally handing Iran a victory it could never have achieved on its own. The United States was the instrument of its own defeat in the Middle East. By decimating Iraq’s army, we opened the door for Iran to annex Iraq and its oil through proxies — a process that is now well under way. Destroying Iraq was the greatest strategic blunder this country has made in its history. Unless we change course, there’s every reason to believe the Iraq War will end up changing the United States more than it will ever change Iraq. 2 ____________________ HOW IRAN BEAT AMERICA Iraq is lost. Iran won it. To be sure, American and British armies won the campaign, routing what was once a truly formidable army. We accomplished what Iran failed to do over eight years of warfare, while suffering remarkably light casualties. The allies’ onslaught left Iraq’s cities standing, its infrastructure in place. There were relatively few Iraqi
civilian casualties. It helped, of course, that the Iraqis didn’t put up a real fight, but still, this was one of the most rapid, successful military campaigns in the last hundred years. And it was all the more remarkable a victory because, unlike in the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraqis were fighting for their own country. But as history has told us often enough, military victory does not necessarily translate into political victory. As it turned out, Iraq was a mirage, a country that had been Balkanized long before the first coalition soldier set foot in it. The Kurds were independent in all but name and had no intention, under any conditions, of again answering to a Sunni, or, for that matter, Shia central authority in Baghdad. The attitude of Iraqi Shia was similar: they would never again agree to be ruled by a Sunni. As for the Sunnis, they wanted nothing less than the old order back, with or without Saddam. Saddam had been holding on by only a thread. As the insurgency started, supporters of the war argued that the only problem was that there hadn’t been enough coalition troops at the beginning to hold Iraq together during those crucial first months. But how do you hold a nation together when there wasn’t one to start with? The Israelis had thirty years and more than enough troops to occupy and rebuild the West Bank and Gaza into a nation, but that failed as well. Even before the guns went silent, Washington became increasingly alarmed at how easily and quickly Iranians crossed the border into Iraq. The Iranians took command of their Iraqi proxies — the same Iraqis who had lived in exile in Iran for almost the last twenty-five years. Iranian clerics showed up in Shia mosques
around Iraq, claiming Najaf, Shia Islam’s holiest shrine city, and condemning American imperialism from the pulpit. Any Iraqi with aspirations of political power made the overland trek to Tehran to offer an oath of fealty to Iran. No Iranian regular troops entered Iraq, because they didn’t need to — Iran needed only proxies, money, and commerce. Iran didn’t publicly acknowledge what it was doing and made no declarations of victory. For form’s sake, Iran did demand the United States end its occupation. But it didn’t press the point. In fact, there was suspicion among Iran hands in Washington that Iran was happy the United States was bogged down in Iraq. The on-and-off insurgency and uncontrollable corruption undermined the legitimacy of the occupation, and also made Washington dependent on Iranian neutrality. Iran was delighted when its Shia allies won parliament, of course — Iran benefits from a gloss of legitimacy as much as the United States does — but Tehran knew this was only one milestone among many on the road to absorbing Iraq under its control. The Iranians are patient. They think in centuries, eras — unlike the Americans, who think in fiscal years. In Iraq, the Iranians will map progress over the next thirty years, not timed for the next Majlis or presidential election. If Iraq remains an ungovernable country for the next decade, debilitated by corruption and civil war, that’s enough to prove Iran’s point: American imperialism doesn’t work. All Iran has to do in Iraq is turn up the pressure when America’s attention strays, then turn it down when they see they’ve twisted the lion’s tail a little too hard. The Iranians know we’ll leave
sooner or later. “The Iranians have us on a slow boil,” as a former colleague assigned to Baghdad in 2004 put it to me. Iran senses that with Iraq failing, it’s on an equal footing with the United States in the Gulf. Along with that, there’s a growing confidence in Tehran today that the United States will finally have to come around to recognizing Iran’s true stature in the world as the only important player in the Middle East — a superpower, even. Iran is confident that America will have to accept the inevitable, that we’ve been wasting our time with the Gulf Arabs, and that we have to come to terms with Iran. Between March 20 and April 9, 2003, allied forces obliterated the state of Iraq, a nation that will never be put back together in any form resembling the old Iraq. What the war planners didn’t understand was that Iraq was an army rather than a country. In destroying the Iraqi army, the allies destroyed Iraq. Driving into Baghdad days after allied forces took the city, I saw how technology accomplished what Iran had failed to in eight years of warfare. The backbone of Saddam’s army, T-72 main battle tanks, lay strewn around the city — burned-out hulks. One tank I saw was wedged in a small alley between a couple of twostory buildings, where the driver had obviously parked it hoping to hide it from American Cobra helicopters and Hellfire missiles. It did no good — there was a neat hole in the tank’s glacis, a bull’s-eye. Other tanks had sought protection under trees and bridges, but they too had been hit. There was no place to hide from the technology of
a modern army. Another thing I learned firsthand was that allied forces had unchallenged control of Iraq’s airwaves, the brain of any modern army. Or, as the U.S. military puts it, the allies established from the war’s outset complete “information dominance.” Iraqi phones were either knocked off the air or intercepted, leaving Iraqi leadership with only commercial satellite phones for communicating. And those also were compromised, as I found out. Before the war started, I had planned to stay with a Sunni tribal chief near Ramadi, an old friend. But it was too early in the war to cross the border from Jordan — fortunately for me, as it turned out. The tribal chief’s house, the house I was supposed to stay in, was hit by six U.S. cruise missiles. A call had apparently been made on a Thuraya satellite phone from near the house. The military suspected it was made by Saddam. Why he was there was another story, but the point was, he had effectively lost contact with his forces the moment the war started. Saddam’s only link with the outside world was the equivalent of the corner pay phone. The allied victory was total. And now, with Saddam Hussein’s regime gone, two truths were immediately evident. First, the new occupiers would never be able to force Iraqis to live together within the same borders. Second, without the T-72 tanks whose burned-out hulks I’d seen in and around Baghdad, neither would whatever Iraqi regime replaced Saddam’s. The coalition understood too late that for Saddam, the tanks were an instrument of internal repression rather than a national army to defend against external enemies. It overlooked the fact that in March 1991, when
the Shia revolted in the south, it was these same T-72s — and helicopters — that kept Saddam from falling. The only real way to hold Iraq together was through the same kind of brutality Saddam had employed. Was the United States really ready to do that? In 1995, Saddam’s son-in-law Husayn Kamil defected with his brother to Jordan. He then proposed the United States overthrow Saddam and install him in Saddam’s place. As a qualification, he bragged that one way he intimidated Shia villagers was by making them drink gasoline, then firing a tracer bullet through their stomachs, causing them to explode. No, the United States never envisaged and would never consider using the level of violence needed to hold Iraq together. And the Iranians knew this before the war started. Without any Iraqi secret police — or really any police at all — Iranians went where they wanted and did what they liked. The borders were wide open, and they could bring anything they wanted into Iraq. The Iranians didn’t wear uniforms, and many spoke native Iraqi Arabic, so they could move around the country unnoticed. They were welcomed with open arms by the Iraqi Shia. And it wasn’t just in the Shia shrine cities like Karbala and Najaf that Iran was taking over through proxies. The Iranians quickly infiltrated the newly formed Iraqi security service and the army too. Members of groups that had been based in Iran during the eighties and nineties, such as the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party, were placed in key positions, awaiting Iranian orders. Iranian-affiliated militias assumed security for Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad, including
Baghdad’s vast Shia slum of Sadr City. Iran’s proxies were so confident of their place in Iraq, they still carried their Iranian identification cards. Iran also proved adept at co-opting the most militant Iraqi nationalists — those led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Though a devout Shia, Muqtada had never been a friend of Iran. The scion of one of Shia Islam’s most revered clerical families, Sadr is the son-in-law of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the founder of Iraq’s Da’wa Party. More important, he is the son of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a populist and revered ayatollah who Saddam assassinated in 1999, along with two of Muqtada’s brothers. Sadr City is named after Muqtada’s father. After the invasion in 2003, Muqtada attempted to build on his father’s popularity by trying to stir up class war and issuing an ultimatum that the coalition forces leave Iraq. In 2004, Muqtada’s militia, the Mahdi Army, fought the coalition for several months. They were defeated, and Muqtada went on the run — although he wasn’t happy about it — to Iran. There’s no evidence that Iran incited the 2004 fighting, and Iran was more often at odds with Muqtada than not — but the Iranians were certainly more than happy to offer him a hand, in the form of money and arms, knowing that one day they would be in a position to co-opt Muqtada’s movement. This wouldn’t be difficult, because Muqtada and his army were broke. At the start of the 2003 invasion, Iran gave responsibility for Muqtada and its other Iraqi proxies to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, if for no other reason than that the Guards were ruthless and knew
what they were doing, having meddled in Iraq and Lebanon for the last twenty-five years. The Revolutionary Guards — or as it’s known by its full name, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — was born in blood. Founded by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 to solidify control over Iran, the Revolutionary Guards started as a brutal vigilante outfit, torturing or assassinating anyone suspected of opposing the revolution. When the Iran-Iraq War started, the Revolutionary Guards were integrated into the military and sent to the front, where they learned to fight in a conventional war. During the war, the Guards benefited from the Darwin effect: the smart ones went home, leaving behind on the battlefield the ones who had only zealotry going for them. Today, almost entirely integrated into Iran’s regular armed forces, with their own air force and navy, the Revolutionary Guards are Iran’s special forces. They number about 125,000. Although on paper they’re part of Iran’s sovereign armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards are, in a sense, a state within a state. They own more than a hundred companies and control as much as $12 billion, possibly more, in assets. They have their own arms-procurement network, their own prisons. They have powers of arrest. The Revolutionary Guards are an exclusive fraternity, almost a rite of passage for Iranian men with political ambitions. President Ahmadinejad is a former Revolutionary Guard, as is a majority of the Iranian cabinet. Former Revolutionary Guard officers hold a plurality of the 290 seats in parliament.
I had my run-ins with the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon in the eighties, and more recently in Tehran when I tried to make a visit to the U.S. embassy, which the Revolutionary Guards still occupy. I found them to be a dour bunch, without the least sense of humor or willingness to engage a foreigner. I had a hard time reconciling the fact that a large percentage of them had voted for Iran’s reformist president Muhammad Khatami in 2001 — another Iranian paradox I decided to let pass. What particularly concerned the allies in Iraq was when the Quds or Jerusalem Force, the intelligence arm of the Revolutionary Guards, started showing up in Iraq, contacting their agents in the Iraqi Shia militias, Da’wa, SCIRI, and commanders in the Mahdi Army. Originally known as the birun marzi (“outside the borders”), the “liberation movements,” or Department 9000, the Revolutionary Guards finally settled on calling them the Quds Force, or Jerusalem Force. (Quds in Arabic means Jerusalem, a promise that one day the Revolutionary Guards would liberate Jerusalem from the Jewish colonizers and destroy Israel.) The Jerusalem Force has a long history of backing coups, assassinating dissidents, and kidnapping foreigners. It was behind the two U.S. embassy truck bombings in Beirut, the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, and most of the foreign hostage-taking in Lebanon during the eighties and early nineties. And now the American military has accused it of supplying to the insurgency in Iraq sophisticated curved platter charges, or “explosive formed projectiles” (EFPs), which can put a hole in the armor of a tank. At this writing, it hasn’t been proved that the Jerusalem Force is in fact
giving the in-surgency EFPs, but then again, it has a history of knowing how to hide its hand. Whether it’s supplying the EFPs or not, the Jerusalem Force has a well-deserved reputation for having been the most organized, disciplined, and violent terrorist organization in the world, arguably more so than even al Qaeda. When President Bush designated the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization in August 2007, he was referring to the Jerusalem Force’s past. All of which makes the administration’s 180-degree turnaround four months later the more telling. It’s evidence of how very tenuous our hold on Iraq has become, and of the compromises the United States is prepared to make in order not to lose it completely. In December 2007, the U.S. State Department’s senior official for Iraq, David Satterfield, gave an on-the-record interview in which he said the decline in attacks on American forces in Iraq “has to be attributed to an Iranian policy decision.” In thanking Iran for containing the violence in Iraq, Satterfield was thanking by extension the Jerusalem Force. It would have been unthinkable to have the Jerusalem Force as our new partners before the invasion of Iraq. And Satterfield certainly knows what the Jerusalem Force is. Satterfield and I served in Beirut together in the mid-eighties, at a time when it was established with complete certainty that the Jerusalem Force was kidnapping many of the American and other Western hostages. Now, some of those same Jerusalem Force operatives who were in Lebanon then — ones with American blood on their hands and indictable in a U.S. court of law — are helping
us maintain our hold on Iraq. Turning necessity into virtue, the Bush administration has tried to make the case that the Iranians were intimidated by the show of force on their borders, in Iraq and Afghanistan. But in the corridors of the National Security Council, the CIA, and the State Department, Middle East watchers realized that when we legitimized Iran’s presence in Iraq — even that single nod by Satterfield in Tehran’s direction — Iran was well on its way to forcing U.S. recognition of the flag it had planted in Iraq. Where were the moderate Iraqi Shia, the ones who were supposed to embrace the occupation and steer a course independent of Iran? How, in 2005, could the Shia vote Iranian allies — two prime ministers from Da’wa — into the Iraqi parliament? Why didn’t they vote in Chalabi, or any of the other exiles the United States flew into Iraq in April 2003? And what about the moderate Shia clergy? The Iraqi Shia were supposed to listen to us, if for no other reason than gratitude for our getting rid of Saddam when Iran couldn’t. Why weren’t the Iraqis helping us, instead of forcing us to deal with Tehran and the Jerusalem Force? Part of the answer lies in the fact that the Iraqi army wasn’t the only thing we destroyed when we invaded Iraq. We destroyed another institution as important: the moderate Shia clergy. In late April 2003, as T-72 tanks still smoldered across Iraq, with Saddam Hussein swallowed up somewhere in the desert and the Iraqis waking up from their long nightmare, the city of Karbala
prepared to mark Arba’in, the fortieth day of mourning after Ashura, the holiest day in Shia Islam. It was twenty years since the Ashura demonstration in Nabatiyah that set off the Islamic resistance against Israel in Lebanon. Saddam had kept a tight rein on Ashura observances, afraid they might spark a Shia uprising. In fact, with the Shia at roughly 65 percent of Iraq’s population, crushed under centuries of Sunni dominance, this was one of Saddam’s biggest fears, right after an Iranian invasion. But now, with no central government in Baghdad, the Shia could celebrate any way they wanted. By the time I got to Karbala, 60 miles southwest of Baghdad, the city was braced for the arrival of hundreds of thousands of pilgrims arriving from all across Iraq. Green and yellow banners fluttered across the streets. A thick haze from grilling lamb kebabs hung over the open-air markets. City workers watered the streets to keep the dust down. Families walked around town, the men arm-in-arm and greeting neighbors, women in chadors following a few steps behind. With their dark, indestructible faces, the Shia look different from other Iraqis — 1300 years of oppression shows. A couple of cops, still wearing the blue uniform of Saddam’s police, kept the peace, which as far as I could see meant chatting with local shopkeepers. No coalition troops were anywhere to be seen. I had my driver take me five miles south on the Basra road to watch the first groups of pilgrims approach Karbala. In groups of fifty or so, they spanned the two-lane road. There were people of every age, from swaddled babies to men and
women in their eighties. Families sat along the road on blankets, resting, eating slices of watermelon. Many had walked for hundreds of miles, some until their feet were so blistered they had to be trucked the rest of the way. Every mile or so there were mobile medical aid stations to help. Still, no one had any intention of turning back. Ashura commemorates the murder of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad. In A.D. 680, Husayn was on his way to Najaf in answer to an appeal from his followers there to overthrow the ruling Umayyid Caliphate. But no one moved to join Husayn, and when he reached Karbala an Umayyid force intercepted him and his small band. Husayn was beheaded, and his family killed. Sunnis also observe Ashura, as a day the prophet fasted. But in the Muslim popular consciousness, Ashura is associated with the Shia, marking the centuries of Sunni oppression. Ashura is the day the Shia betrayed the prophet’s line, by turning their backs on Husayn, and a believing Shia will spend a lifetime atoning for it. And Ashura is the foundation of another tenet of Shia Islam: martyrdom, the burning, endless readiness for sacrifice. Karbala is Shia Islam’s Calvary. I had no idea what the practice was for a foreigner, an unbeliever, to march in an Ashura procession. I asked a young man walking along if I could join him. He grabbed me by the arm and pulled me into the center of his group. As we walked he told me he was from Basra, a city 280 miles away. He had come much of the way on foot.
He talked about Iraq’s future — a very bright one, as he saw it. Like other Shia, he rejoiced at Saddam’s departure. But this was just the beginning. Soon, he said, the Shia would also rejoice at the departure of their deliverers, the Americans and the British. “And then, Iraq’s Shia will at last be free,” he said. I knew what he was getting at: the impossible Shia dream that history one day would reverse itself, that the Shia would unite with Iran and depose the Sunni usurpers. The Shia would then become the guardians of Islam’s holiest city, Mecca. This had long seemed a fantasy. But now, why not? No one had expected Saddam would have been gotten rid of so quickly and easily, after all. I didn’t ask him why he wasn’t worried Iran would just annex Iraq. The Sunni Iraqis I’d talked to over the last couple days had made up their minds that Iran had already started. After erasing the state of Iraq, they asked me, how would the United States keep Iran out? It was obvious that a National Guardsman from Kansas couldn’t do it. He was sent to Iraq to remove a regime, not build a new one. I wondered, too, if the Shia were going to try something this Ashura. Would they demand their independence? Ashura was often the occasion for some dramatic Shia political pronouncement. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini chose Ashura on June 3, 1963, to denounce the Shah and declare his rule illegitimate. Although Khomeini had spent a lifetime trying to distance himself from popular Shia custom, like Ashura, he knew that in order to attract a wide following he needed to tap the deep emotional wound of
Husayn’s martyrdom and the battle of Karbala. Back in Karbala, I asked around to find someone who could explain to me why the city’s Ashura was unfurling so smoothly. Ashura demonstrations I’d seen in Lebanon involved young men who pounded their chests and slashed their heads with razor blades. So far there was no sign of this. (It would come later, after I’d left Karbala, to the shock of television viewers in the West.) A policeman in front of the Imam Husayn Mosque pointed me toward a shabby, four-story cinderblock building across a narrow street from the mosque’s main entrance. “The imam will answer all of your questions,” he said. I was shown into a third-floor office with smudged walls and peeling paint. The furniture was filthy. Imam Karbalai appeared five minutes later. His black turban told me he was a sayyid — a descendant of the prophet, and of Imam Husayn. His woolen robes were neatly pressed. There was the scent of rosewater about him. He sat on the settee across from me. “It’s delightful to talk to an American,” he said, in beautiful classical Arabic, “especially on the occasion of Ashura. Who would have ever thought I would be receiving an American in these happy days?” We talked a little about the war, how quickly Saddam’s army gave up. I commented how with Iraq’s borders open, Iranian pilgrims were flooding into the city. You couldn’t miss them, particularly the women in their distinctive black abayas, chatting in musical Farsi. “Iranians, of course, are more than welcome,” Karbalai said.
“Thanks be to Allah’s grace, after all of these years, they’ve come back.” Ever since the Arabs converted Iran to Islam in the seventh century, Iranian pilgrims have been vital for the economies of Iraq’s shrine cities such as Karbala. That came to an end at the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, when Saddam closed the border and expelled tens of thousands of Iranians and Iraqis of Iranian origin. Many were pure-blooded Iraqis he just wanted to be rid of. But now it wasn’t just Iranian pilgrims coming across the border. I’d also seen Iranian produce in open-air stalls, everything from pomegranates to pistachios. For Iraq, a country that had been at war for most of the last twenty-five years, teetering on the edge of starvation, opening the border to Iran was a godsend. I knew nothing about the man sitting in front of me. “Karbalai” means “the man from Karbala.” It could have been an assumed name, for all I knew. He could even have been Iranian. Some estimates put Karbala’s residents at 75 percent Iranian or Iranian descent. I noticed that Karbalai never mentioned Baghdad; only Najaf, Karbala, Qum — the Shia shrine cities, a cosmopolitan link older and more enduring than Iraq itself. This wasn’t a surprise. A moderate Shia cleric like Karbalai gives temporal political capitals as wide a berth as possible, preferring to tend to the flock instead. “Who is the mayor of Karbala?” I asked Karbalai. He tilted back his black-turbaned head and laughed. “I suppose I am,” he said. “For now.” According to Karbalai, the American tank column that
dashed north through Karbala to Baghdad didn’t stop long enough to hand over the keys of the city to anyone. The Americans assumed order would somehow impose itself. And indeed it had, falling into the lap of the man sitting in front of me. No one had appointed Karbalai. He had, seemingly without dissent, stepped into the power vacuum left by the Americans. The citizens of Karbala accepted his authority as if Allah himself had appointed him. I couldn’t help but be reminded of Lebanon when the Lebanese state collapsed in 1984. Hezbollah filled the void like water finding its own level, and never stopped appropriating sovereign authority until it became a state within a state. In Lebanon, Hezbollah had proved Friedrich Engels right: “The state is not ‘abolished’; it withers away.” It was then, listening to Karbalai, that I finally understood that Saddam’s Iraq was gone for good. The Sunni were not coming back. The Shia were going to make a go of it on their own, even if it meant dividing up Iraq. Given the opportunity, they’d take the whole country. But the one thing they were absolutely determined to do was never again take orders from a Sunni. But what was going to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s exit? A Shia Islamic republic? Headed by whom? It did not seem possible that this very pleasant and sophisticated man’s religious authority was enough to withstand the inevitable political storm, one that every Iraqi was expecting. Could his tiny police force, with only their sidearms, stand up to the anarchy of Iraqi politics? Iraq is the toughest, most
uncompromising, xenophobic country in the Arab world. Worse, Iraq was afloat in arms — Kalashnikov machine guns and rocketpropelled grenades, the weapons that have made more than one revolution in the Middle East. And what about Karbalai’s boss, Ayatollah Sistani? Was he any tougher? Ayatollah Ali Sistani is very roughly the pope of Shia Islam. This is by virtue of the fact that Sistani has the most followers among Shia Islam’s largest subsect, “Twelver Shia,” so called because of its tenet that the prophet was followed by twelve divinely chosen successors. About 80 percent of Shia follow Sistani’s spiritual guidance. Generally viewed as apolitical, a moderate, and a rival to the Iranian clerics — a “quietist” cleric — he was the man the United States and Britain had pinned their hopes on to line up Iraq’s Shia behind the occupation and shepherd them into building a modern, secular, democratic Iraqi state. Our ayatollah on our white horse. There’s no doubt about Sistani’s religious credentials. Born in Mashad, Iran, Sistani, like many Iranian scholars, finished his religious studies in Najaf, Iraq. A brilliant scholar, in 1992 Sistani succeeded Iraq’s highest-ranking ayatollah, Abul-Qassim Khoei. But Sistani’s turban always sat uneasily on his head. He represented a threat to Iran’s political mullahs, who considered him too moderate, too independent, and too passive. Sistani also disagreed with Tehran about whether clerics should get their hands dirty in day-to-day politics. In contrast to Sistani, Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, both held that a Shia cleric must govern in a truly righteous Islamic republic — one
accountable for both the temporal and spiritual affairs of its citizens. Moreover, Sistani’s popularity and scholarship — in comparison with Sistani, Khamenei is a virtual illiterate in Islamic jurisprudence — was seen as a challenge to Ayatollah Khamenei’s authority. Sistani’s quietist doctrine also implicitly called into question the legitimacy of the regime in Tehran. According to Sistani’s interpretation of Shia Islam, the mullahs could be voted out, if that was the wish of Iranians, and replaced with a secular government. The fight between Sistani and Tehran came to a head in December 1993, when Shia Islam’s most senior ayatollah died. Sistani was clearly the most qualified candidate to succeed him, if the standard was religious scholarship. But Tehran supported a relatively unknown ayatollah instead, an old man practically on his deathbed. And he, unlike Sistani, had no significant popular following. Tehran prevailed; Sistani’s vastly larger following counted for nothing. Tehran’s passing over Sistani came close to causing a civil war among Shia. Lebanon’s highest-ranking ayatollah supported Sistani’s candidacy. But he was forced to keep quiet after the Iranians circulated a rumor that they intended to assassinate him. It was a credible threat — in 1985 the Lebanese ayatollah had been the target of a massive car bombing. Moreover, the Lebanese ayatollah’s body-guards were under the control of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. In March 2008, I went to visit this ayatollah. His house and office had been destroyed by Israeli air bombardment during the
34-day war of 2006. He himself escaped death when Hezbollah pulled him out of his house the day before it was hit. Immediately after the war, Iran rebuilt his house and office and supplied him with a new security detail, as well as the latest metal detectors, flatscreen closed-circuit TVs, and energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs. He was in an Iranian gilded cage. As for Sistani, he got the message: Stay out of Tehran’s way or else. But Tehran wasn’t Sistani’s only problem. Born in Iran, Sistani is a full-blooded Persian. He speaks Arabic with a heavy Persian accent. He cannot understand, let alone speak, colloquial Iraqi Arabic. And from 1980 on, he was under virtual house arrest under Saddam. Having had almost no contact with average Iraqis, Sistani comes across as cloistered, aloof, and elitist — in other words, little better than an exile. He may be more credible than Ahmed Chalabi, but the Iraqis can’t help but look at Sistani as a foreigner. Sistani isn’t as powerful as the raw number of his followers suggests. Before the invasion, I managed to meet a few of Sistani’s aides in Syria and ask them about what they intended to do after they got home. “We’ll see,” one of them told me. My impression was that they were anxious about how they would be received in Iraq’s shrine cities like Najaf and Karbala. The younger ones hadn’t even been born in Iraq. They too were exiles, even more out of touch with Iraq than their boss. And like Sheikh Karbalai, they were not prepared for a civil war. Other Shia exiled clerics I met over the years were the same.
Majid Khoei, the son of the Ayatollah Khoei (whom Sistani replaced in 1992), was one of the more articulate and sophisticated ones. Thoughtful and cosmopolitan, he spoke flawless classical Arabic and fluent English. He was a multi-millionaire, having inherited part of his father’s estate, which was estimated to be in the billions. But with no desire to stay in the West, he was determined to return to Iraq — he had fled in 1991 — and follow in the footsteps of his father, who was Iraq’s supreme religious leader for decades. Like the other exiles, Majid lived in the past. He had an outdated view of the place of Iraq’s Shia clerics in history, when the Shia clergy delved into politics only during periods of crisis, righting the nation when it was in trouble, in a kind of noblesse oblige. Majid was convinced that as soon as Saddam was gone, the clock could be turned back and the Shia clerics would smoothly resume their traditional role in Iraq, taking care of mosques, charities, and schools. “And what about Iran?” I asked him at a meeting in Paris in December 1990, not long before the Gulf War started. “The Iraqi Shia would never allow the Iranians to interfere in their country,” he told me. The foundation of his argument was that the Persians and the Arabs don’t mix. It was a question Majid had thought a lot about; his family was Iranian, though ethnically they were Turks. I intentionally pressed Majid on Iran, cautioning him to be careful about the Iranians. He was on his way to Tehran the next morning.
“Ya’badu an-nar, al-farsiin,” I said, laughing. The Persians worship fire. The allusion was to a prejudice in the Middle East, especially among Sunni fundamentalists, that the Persians never gave up Zoroastrianism, the ancient Iranian religion that worships fire. In other words, they’re not real Muslims. If I’d meant it seriously, Majid might have taken it as an insult. But he understood my intention was only to gently prod him. Majid coughed up a nervous laugh, no doubt wondering whether it was worth it to give me his frank opinion. He was mostly immune from Iranian political reprisal, thanks to his father’s standing, but then again he also knew how unpredictable Iran’s security services were. “Don’t worry,” he finally said, falling back on his old argument. “ Iran will never take Iraq. Ever.” It was only in April 2003, when I read in the newspapers that a Shia mob had hacked and shot Majid to death in the Ali ibn Talib Mosque in Najaf, that I fully realized just how wrong he’d been. It’s still not clear whether Majid’s murder was ordered by Iran or by Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, or whether he’d simply been murdered by an enraged mob. Either way, what was clear was that his father’s memory didn’t matter after all. And neither had the moderate Shia clergy — Najaf was a city Ayatollah Sistani was supposed to have sway over. The truth is that, as in Lebanon, the Kalashnikov, not the Koran, rules in Iraq. Both Sistani and Majid represented an old Shia aristocracy that never stood a chance in postinvasion Iraq. The
country they thought they knew had died under Saddam’s brutal regime, the eight-year war with Iran, and thirteen years of a crushing international embargo. It didn’t help that the Shia clergy had been in a steep decline under the assault of twentieth-century secularism. But it was the invasion that ripped away the last illusions. Washington and London had been encouraged when Sistani supported Iraq’s constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections. (Then again, Iran and Iran’s proxies did the same. With the Shia a majority in Iraq, this wasn’t a surprise.) But democracy wasn’t what was at stake in Iraq; armed force was. Without a militia, Sistani couldn’t control the street. He was unable to stop intra-Shia violence or Shia assassination squads, or influence the Shia government in Baghdad. Several of his assistants were assassinated. And so today — little different from Saddam’s era — Sistani rarely leaves his house in Najaf. He is no more capable of controlling Iraq than Karbalai was Karbala. The trouble in Karbala started in December 2003, when a suicide bomber attacked the Bulgarian base there, killing dozens. On Ashura the next year, nine explosions went off in Karbala, killing 178 and injuring 500. On April 14, 2007, a bomb went off in a bus station near the Imam Husayn Mosque. The shock waves from the blast would have shattered the windows in Karbalai’s office, where we’d met. Americans were not immune from Karbala’s violence. In January 2007, Shia militants executed five American soldiers visiting Karbala. Although the U.S. military was convinced Iran was behind it, there was nothing we could do. Iran’s proxies now controlled the
police — the same police Imam Karbalai had thought were under his control. Just as Iran knew how to capitalize on chaos, it also knew how to wield a stick. When Iran’s proxies started to fight street-bystreet for Karbala, Iran stepped in and imposed order. Shia militia commanders were summoned back to Iran and dressed down. The leader of the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al-Sadr, was given refuge in a religious school in Iran until the storm blew over. The head of Iraqi intelligence told me that in a couple instances the Revolutionary Guards themselves arrested renegade commanders. By 2007, there was little doubt Iran, rather than Sistani, was pulling the strings. It was again Iran that stepped in to calm the situation when fighting broke out between Muqtada al-Sadr and U.S. forces. With Sistani unmasked, Iraq’s independent, moderate clergy was shown to be irrelevant. The British, during the Iraqi mandate in the 1920s, used to talk about a Shia cleric’s authority “to loose and bind.” Now that’s an artifact of history, as quaint as afternoon tea and cucumber sandwiches at the Baghdad British residency. There’s a debate today within the U.S. government about how obligated the Shia Iraqi are to Iran. But in my run-ins with the SCIRI and Da’wa, they never bothered to hide their allegiance. They openly acknowledged that they depended on Iran for religious guidance, money, and sanctuary. Even after the invasion, their families would stay in Iran to avoid Iraq’s violence. But Iran’s support had come at a price. A contact in Da’wa told me that in 1982, Da’wa was given the choice of either
accepting Ayatollah Khomeini’s dictatorship, the “rule of the Islamic jurisprudent,” or leaving Iran. There was little choice but to accept. When I met representatives of the SCIRI in northern Iraq, they were accompanied by their Iranian handlers — a reminder to me that the SCIRI answered to Iran. The Shia who assumed police powers in Iraq, then, were Iranian proxies. Why do we care if Iran is hijacking Shia Islam and the shrine cities in Iraq? For a start, Iraq gives Iran a platform to recruit new legions of believers in its quest for empire. But just as important, with Najaf and Sistani under Iranian control, the world’s Shia now will have only Iran and its shrine city of Qum to look to for spiritual guidance. The rivalry between Iraq’s Najaf and Iran’s Qum had been the guarantor of an independent Shia clergy. But now the spiritual counterweight to the authoritarian clerics who run Iran is gone, along with the Iraqi army. Losing Karbala to Iran was a catastrophe few predicted. Just as few predicted the consequences of destroying the Iraqi army. There will be no de jure Iranian takeover of Iraq. No Iranian flag will fly over the Green Zone. Iranian troops will not occupy Iraqi cities, and there will be no declarations of victory. Iran will be happy to pull the strings behind the curtain, ruling through proxies and economic ties that bind. Iran will take over Iraq piece by piece. As I’ve said, it will start with oil, the lifeblood of Iraq. Even though Iraq’s southern petroleum-export facilities are nominally held by British forces, Iranian proxies have systematically looted them.
Some estimates put the amount of theft as high as 600,000 barrels a day — nearly a third of Iraq’s production. The crude reportedly was barged to the United Arab Emirates, refined, and sent to Iran to meet its gasoline shortages. Iran will continue to eviscerate Iraq’s independent Shia clergy. It will buy off Sistani’s followers, appropriate his tithes, and undermine the seminary in Najaf. If it needs to, it will assassinate Sistani or any other cleric who challenges Tehran. Iraqis already believe that Iranian intelligence has bought houses around Sistani’s for that eventuality. Iran will not delve too deeply into Iraqi politics, or promote one faction over another. As Iran learned in Lebanon, pitting Shia against Shia doesn’t serve Iran’s interests. Iran found it was more effective to steer a careful course between Hezbollah and more secular Shia groups. Iran will play off differences between Iraq’s major Shia parties, gradually imposing its own order through money and arms. It will push them to undermine the occupation but rein them in when the situation threatens to turn into a full-fledged war. Iran is a patient, pragmatic player, and it knows exactly where the red lines are, although this scenario won’t hold if Iraq slips into an out-and-out civil war where Shia are slaughtered in large numbers. In that case, Iran would find it difficult not to intervene directly. Iran also has a geopolitical strategy in Iraq: Bleed the United States dry. Iran demands publicly that America withdraw from Iraq. But its real long-term interest in Iraq is to diminish the United States’ will to resist Iran’s expansion. Iran has a clear interest in keeping our military bogged down in war without end, which drains
our treasury and makes Americans reluctant to enter into another conflict in the Middle East. The Iranians read American newspapers; they understand that Americans are averse to losing soldiers and squandering hundreds of billions on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — wars with an end we can’t define. Iran knows that Iraq will remain a chaotic, corrupted, ungovernable country no matter what the United States does. Iran ignores the false hopes of the Bush administration, like those that accompanied the “surge.” Iran will hold back its proxies to make it appear things are getting better, but then let them loose when the United States looks as though it might achieve some passing order. By bleeding the United States, Iran knows it can keep it from acting against Iran’s allies Syria, Hezbollah, or Hamas. More crucially, a United States bogged down in Iraq will not attack Iran. Second — and again, this is in the long term — Iran intends to use Iraq as a platform for dominating the Persian Gulf. Given the world’s addiction to hydrocarbons, the Gulf is a body of water as strategic as the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Iraq is the first piece in Iran’s quest for hegemony, a reminder to the world that the Persian Gulf has that name for a reason. In this book, I will focus primarily on the single most important American interest in the Middle East: oil. Obviously, there are wider, more complex issues that drive the United States. But oil is the common denominator that all Americans, opponents and supporters of the Iraq War, share. Oil has apparently now become the official justification of the war. In a closed hearing to Congress
in April 2008, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, testified that once Iraqi oil is fully developed, it will be greater than that of Saudi Arabia. Oil, Crocker said, is our vital interest in the region: “An unstable Iraq,” he said, “equals an unstable region, equals unstable oil prices.” Iran believes that the Iraq debacle will force the United States to finally come around to an inevitable truth: that Iran has an undeniable place in Iraq, the Gulf, and the rest of the Middle East. Open-ended containment of Iran, with an American fleet and army perpetually in the Gulf, is too expensive for the United States to continue indefinitely. And so, for the first time in its undeclared thirty-year war with Iran, the United States will be forced to deal with Iran on an equal basis. America’s invasion of Iraq wasn’t supposed to turn out this way. Where did everything go wrong? And how did Iran become so strong, right under our noses — even as we crushed what was once the world’s fourth-largest army in two short weeks? 3 ____________________ THE MASTER PLAN: HOW IRAN ARRIVED AT ITS SECRET BLUEPRINT FOR EMPIRE Something extraordinary occurred in May 2000. For the first
time in modern Middle Eastern history a small guerrilla force defeated a committed, Western-equipped-and-trained conventional army. Until its defeat in Lebanon, Israel had never lost a war. This marked the first time Israel ceded land under the force of arms. Certainly there have been other guerrilla victories in the Middle East — Lawrence of Arabia’s legendary Bedouin tribesmen overrunning the Turkish garrison at Aqaba; Yemeni rebels in the sixties beating the Egyptian army. But the Turks at Aqaba were the remnants of a dying Ottoman Empire who didn’t have a fight in them. The Egyptian army in Yemen was anything but committed. In neither case were their armies in the same class as Israel’s, a juggernaut that had crushed every enemy it ever encountered. Israel’s retreat from Lebanon in 2000 is sometimes compared to America’s defeat in Vietnam — a political rather than a military defeat. An optional war that became too expensive. But the comparison doesn’t stand. First, the Vietcong were never a threat to America proper, as Hezbollah is to Israel. Second, Lebanon, with its relatively flat, open terrain in the south, should have been ideal for Israeli tanks and its total control of the air. Israel shouldn’t have lost to Hezbollah. The better comparison is Afghanistan, where Muslim guerrilla forces defeated the Russians, small arms overcoming heavy armor. Like the Israelis, the Russians were a modern army and were fighting on the border of their own country. And the long-term consequences for Israel may prove as dire as they were for the Soviet Union. Israel does not have an empire to lose, but it lost something as valuable: its deterrence credibility, the ability to
intimidate its enemies to a point where they deem it too costly to attack Israel. The Winograd Commission Report — the official Israeli investigation into the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the second conflict the Israelis lost — laid it out in stark terms: “Israel cannot survive in this region… unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her.” In Arab eyes, Israel is now beatable. It’s no longer the giant they thought it was. A dark shadow has been lifted from the imagination of the Arabs. Iran’s 2000 victory in Lebanon was never a foregone conclusion. In fact, almost everyone was convinced the Iranians’ stay in Lebanon would be a short and pointless one. On June 12, 1982, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who climbed out of the Iran Air 707 at Damascus airport didn’t look like liberators. There were only two dozen of them. More would arrive later. But there were never more than five hundred assigned to Lebanon at a time. Anyhow, where were they going to fight? Lebanon was bedlam. There were no battle lines; the roads were clogged with refugees. The main Damascus-Beirut highway was cut. The Israeli army was as ruthless as it was efficient. What could these taciturn, bearded young men in olive drab hope to do? There also was the question of whether the Lebanese would even accept them as allies. The Lebanese Shia had welcomed the
first Israeli troops as liberators, happy to be rid of the Palestinians, who had caused them nothing but misery. Generally, the Lebanese, even the Shia, look at the Iranians as foreigners; Persians are seen as a race almost as different as Eskimos are from Bulgarians. The Lebanese knew how Persians looked down on Arabs, how they considered all Arabs uncivilized nomads. And then there was the Iran-Iraq War. Even as the Revolutionary Guards were deplaning in Damascus, Ayatollah Khomeini was ordering wave after wave of Iranian martyrs to attack the Iraqi front lines — Persians killing Arabs, reopening ethnic divisions older than history. Although the Revolutionary Guards didn’t come to Lebanon to kill Arabs, the Lebanese still had Arab blood running through their veins. But it wasn’t all bad news. The Revolutionary Guards would count on historical ties between Iran and Lebanon’s Shia to at least get them a hearing. When the Safavid Dynasty came to power in Iran in 1501 and decided to convert the country from Sunni to Shia Islam, it sent envoys to Lebanon to recruit Shia clerics to teach Iranians the tenets of their sect. Ties between Iran and Lebanon remained unbroken in the intervening years. The Shah supported Lebanese Shia institutions, schools, and charities, and many opponents of the Shah took refuge in Lebanon. Iran’s first defense minister under Ayatollah Khomeini was in exile in Lebanon for years, where he had made close, lasting friends among the Shia. And several of the Revolutionary Guards who arrived in Damascus were Arabs from Iran’s Khuzestan Province who spoke Arabic fluently.
Still, the Syrian military intelligence officials who watched the Revolutionary Guards drive away in trucks, heading toward a camp on the Lebanese border, were convinced the Iranians were going to be nothing but trouble. They were right, in ways they couldn’t yet understand. During the first few years of the war in Lebanon, there was little the Revolutionary Guards could do other than cause trouble. The Guards truck-bombed the U.S. embassy in April 1983, the U.S. Marine and French barracks in October 1983, and the new U.S. embassy in October 1984. They kidnapped and killed dozens of Westerners. But in the end, all it won them was a reputation as ruthless murderers, spoilers, no different from the other foreign spoilers that came to Lebanon — Nasserists, Ba’this, Syrians, and Palestinians. The Revolutionary Guards had managed to drive out the West. But what good did it do the Lebanese? No one knows how or when, but along the way Iran’s Revolutionary Guards discovered two truths about Lebanon. First, there was a deep vein of nationalism to be tapped. The Lebanese didn’t want to be occupied — by Israelis, Syrians, Americans, or anyone else. Even supposedly pro-Syrian groups didn’t want Syrian troops quartered in their country. It was a sensitivity Iran would learn to guard against as well as exploit. Second, the Iranians discovered that there was an endless pool of street and guerrilla fighters, hardened in the crucible of Lebanon’s civil war. They were the best fighters in the world. Combine this with Lebanese rejection of occupation, add money and organization, and the Iranians discovered they would have at
their service the most lethal guerrilla army in modern history. During Israel’s eighteen-year war in Lebanon, until the day Israel brought the last soldier home in May 2000, the Israelis would constantly ask themselves, Where did these people come from? Answer that question and we start to answer what we face today in the Middle East. The Lebanon war is Iran’s blueprint for its new empire, fought for and held by proxies: the first Middle Eastern empire since the Ottomans, a superpower, as the Iranians intend to demonstrate to the world. Flush with victory and experience in Lebanon, the Iranians have set their sights on replicating their Lebanon campaign across the Middle East, claiming ever more pieces of it — and oil — for themselves. Gaza, Bahrain, Iraq — Iran will take them all, as long as there are proxies like Hezbollah’s soldiers of God, ready to take Iran’s money and pick up a Kalashnikov. The Iranians had no idea that within three years after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the United States would blunder into Iraq, destroy Iran’s historical enemy Saddam Hussein, and offer up Iraq on a silver platter. How could the Iranians not see Lebanon when they look at Iraq today? In October 2000, Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor as supreme leader — the only real executive power in Iran — made it clear what the victory in Lebanon meant for Iran. It was during a secret address to Iran’s National Security Council. After the usual long preamble, larded with quotations from the Koran, Khamenei put both his hands on the conference table.
He looked around the room to make sure everyone was listening. “ Lebanon,” he said, pointedly using the Arabic pronunciation Lubnan, “is Iran’s greatest foreign policy success. We will repeat it across Dar al-Islam (the Islamic world) until all of Islam is liberated.” This wasn’t the flowery propaganda Iranians were so used to hearing from their leaders. The men sitting around the conference table were already convinced it was within Iran’s power, its destiny even, to dominate the Middle East just as it had Lebanon. Most of them had served in Lebanon during Iran’s eighteen-year war there. Many of them owed their position to that war. They had tasted victory, and wanted more of it. And why not topple the vulnerable parts of the Middle East? Iran had already turned Hezbollah into a military force stronger than the Lebanese army. And Hezbollah’s political writ was such that it could block the election of a president. Now there was other lowhanging fruit: Kurdistan. Bahrain. Central Asia. And the rim of the Gulf, which is 90 percent Shia — the same place under which the world’s oil reserves lie. If the Iranians succeeded in raising armies of proxies in those places, like the one it raised in Lebanon — and who can stop them? — they would control up to 55 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Iran would have a hydrocarbon empire the likes of which the world has never seen. Then there’s the question of what Iran would do with all that oil. Iran has been at war with the United States for the last thirty years. It was never a classical military confrontation; the Iranians knew they could never win. Still, it was a war. The Iranians
understand how vulnerable we are thanks to our addiction to oil. If Iran were to dominate the Persian Gulf, along with its reserves, why not manipulate the price of oil in the interest of empire? When times are good, drive up the price of a barrel to $250. When times are bad, lower it, feed our addiction. Iran doesn’t care if Americans pay $15 a gallon at the pump, or heating bills of $2,000 a month, or $5 for a can of Coke. And while they’re at it, why not unseat the dollar as the currency the world uses to buy oil? It all sounds far-fetched. But so was Iran’s Revolutionary Guards creating the world’s most lethal guerrilla force out of the mess in Lebanon in 1982, and beating the Israelis. With Iran’s star on the rise, the worst-case scenario is often the most likely one. The will to empire is powerful, but especially so when there is the means — in this case, domination of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves. Prognostications like these invite the question: What do we do about it? As a start, we overhaul the way we think about Iran and the Middle East — stop taking our wisdom from White House press releases, the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, and TV pundits with Pentagon contracts. We must accurately define who the enemy is, his tactics, and what he wants. If we continue to fight on blindly in the Middle East, trying to contain Iran, spending trillions of dollars fighting wars without end, we will lose or be forced into a full-fledged war. It would be a war requiring we bring back the draft, settle into thirty years of conflict, and survive on the hope that a million soldiers permanently based in the Persian Gulf will change our luck. Or we could figure out how to settle with Iran. If we examine
Iran’s Lebanon war and the army that Iran rode to victory on, we will understand Iran’s coming campaigns, how Iran learned the lessons from a failed revolution and transformed itself into a Middle East hegemon. That knowledge will allow us to define our choices. South Lebanon , June 6, 1982 It went fast. Faster than anyone anticipated. At 11:05 A.M. the first Israeli tanks rolled across the Hamra bridge. By June 8, the coastal city of Sidon fell. The disorganized and underarmed PLO that occupied southern Lebanon was no match for the Israelis. By June 11, they were at Beirut’s edge, ready to invade the Arab world’s most modern and sophisticated city, the brightest light in the firmament of the Arab nation. The Israelis knew the PLO wouldn’t put up much of a fight; the PLO wasn’t much of an army. Hopelessly divided into two dozen or so corrupt, competing militias, which themselves were divided into factions, the PLO couldn’t even coordinate its retreat. And the Israelis knew the Lebanese army wouldn’t be an obstacle either. Like Iraq in 2003, Lebanon had stopped being a country in 1975, when the first shot of civil war was fired. The army, as well as the police, fractured along the lines of Lebanon’s three major sects — Shia, Sunni, and Christians. The three sects hated one another more than they hated the Israelis. That would change, but in 1982 the only question was how fast Israel’s tanks could cover ground. The PLO didn’t so much retreat as scatter like a flock of
pigeons hit by lightning. The PLO abandoned Beirut without a fight, fleeing to the Biqa’ Valley and to the far north of Lebanon. Yasser Arafat himself retreated through Lebanon’s northern port of Tripoli, and would be forced to leave there December 20, 1983, on a Greek ship, to enter into a long, inglorious, and irrelevant exile in Tunisia. Remnants of his forces would remain scattered around Lebanon, but they would never again pose a threat to Israel. Arafat would never return to Lebanon. Only after he signed what many Palestinians and Arabs considered articles of surrender, the 1993 Oslo Accords, did he return to the Palestinian territories to spend his last years under virtual Israeli house arrest. In the meantime, Israel had created the perfect vacuum in Lebanon. The Reagan administration was elated, at least for the first few months after the Israeli invasion, convinced that Lebanon, now free of the Palestinian terrorists, would go back to being the Switzerland of the Middle East — a Western outpost, a beacon of change. Lebanon would be the first domino in transforming the Middle East into a moderate, democratic, prosperous, proAmerican part of the world. Just as the neocons in 2003 would count on Iraq doing the same. Lebanon also seemed to the Reagan White House a far more solvable problem than the greater Arab-Israeli conflict. Who knew, it might even serve as a back door to peace. The Reagan administration was so confident of the success of Israel’s Lebanon war that even before the fighting stopped, it started pushing the Lebanese to recognize Israel. But there was one thing the Reagan White House and the
Israelis overlooked: the generation of tough, young Lebanese street fighters who were more comfortable with a Kalashnikov than a lever in a voting booth. Some had fought with and some against the Palestinians. But it didn’t matter. The point was they knew how to fight, and were ready to bleed and die, given a cause. And unlike the Palestinians, the Lebanese weren’t going anywhere. They could either fight for their country or surrender. The unexamined assumption of the Israelis and the Reagan administration, that the Lebanese would be happy to turn in their Kalashnikovs for the old Lebanon, overlooked these young men. In the meantime, the Iranians wasted little time crossing from their camps along the Syrian border into Lebanon. At first they camped in vacant houses just outside Balabakk, in a village called Ra’s al-‘Ayn. Those first Revolutionary Guard foot soldiers may not have looked as though they were about to change the course of history, but they were a promise of hope. The PLO may have rolled over, and the Israelis may have achieved total victory, but as the Iranians again and again reassured their hosts, they were there to stay. All the Iranians asked for was time. Balabakk was fine for a start, but what the Iranians really needed was to get a foothold in Beirut, the gateway to the Shia south, where the same Shia who had welcomed the Israeli invaders lived. The Lebanese Shia tolerance for the Israelis wouldn’t last long, the Iranians were certain. What tolerance for occupation does? The Iranians would turn the Shia in the south, convince them to fight against the Israelis. But first, Beirut.
The southern suburbs of Beirut are a miserable, dusty warren of one-and two-story cinderblock houses and apartment buildings. The apartment buildings, six and seven stories tall, were illegally built, many close enough to each other that the residents could reach across and touch hands. Telephone and electrical wires ran naked up the stairwells, and there were constant power cuts. The better-off bought 5-kilowatt generators and put them on their balconies; when the power was off, you’d have to shout to be heard over the generators. It was a chaotic, beaten-down slum, very much like Baghdad’s Shia slum, Sadr City. The neighborhood called ‘Ayn al-Dilbah was one of the poorest parts of the southern suburbs. Displaced Shia from the south lived there, and Palestinians too poor to live in their own camps, middle-aged men and women dying from tuberculosis and diseases the modern world had long ago stamped out. There were only a couple hours of electricity a day. The houses were crammed so close together that in the summer, you couldn’t even feel the breeze off the Mediterranean. On July 4, 1982, in a one-story house just off the airport road, a rail-thin, clean-shaven young Shia — a boy, really, with eyes the color of honey — sat in a bare room on mats, his legs pulled up underneath him, with two friends. There was no electricity or water — the Israelis had cut them off when they started their siege of Beirut. As he and the other two young men speculated about what would come next, they could hear the Israeli cannons pound Ramlat al-Bayda, a string of luxury apartment buildings along the Mediterranean. They knew it wouldn’t be long before the PLO
would give up and flee its headquarters in Verdun Street — the headquarters the PLO had operated out of since the early seventies. And then it would be over. All three young men had fought with the Palestinian resistance group Fatah in their teens, mostly sniping in a poor Christian neighborhood, Sin al-Fil, turning it into a pockmarked wasteland. The young man and his friends knew all about sudden death. They had learned to accept it the way we accept a cold. Approximately 100,000 Lebanese lost their lives in the 1975-90 civil war, a remarkable number considering Lebanon’s population is less than 4 million. Looking at the destroyed buildings in Sin al-Fil at the end of the civil war, one had to wonder how anyone had survived the fighting. These men were prodigies of street warfare: There wasn’t an AK-47 they couldn’t unjam or field-strip in the dark. They could drop a rocket-propelled grenade through a window at a hundred yards, or crimp a blasting cap with one hand and blindfolded. They knew as much about street fighting as anyone in the world. And now that the PLO was fleeing, they needed a new flag to fight under. They would soon find one. One of them, within a few years, would become the world’s most wanted terrorist — the commander of the “A team” of terrorism, as the Bush administration would come to call him. The three young men didn’t care about democracy, or restoring the old Lebanon. They were eaten up by resentment and anger. They were internal exiles, poisoned by poverty and exclusion from the larger Lebanese society.
‘Ayn al-Dilbah sits at Beirut airport’s edge. The planes landing at Beirut airport pass right overhead, day and night — planes filled with rich Lebanese vacationing in Paris, Rome, and London. Every day the young men had watched the chauffeured Mercedes as they jock-eyed in front of the airport to pick up pampered boys and chic women in scant dresses, speaking French, weighed down with duty-free bags of French champagne, Belgian chocolate, and Cuban cigars. They raced past ‘Ayn al-Dilbah on the way to their mansions in the hills around Beirut. To these angry young men, this was a constant reminder that they were second-class citizens — that Lebanon was, and always had been, occupied, by the Ottomans, the French, and now this Western elite that had “let” the Israelis invade their country. The airport was closed now because of the Israeli bombardment, but everything would resume as soon as the Israelis finished their dirty business. Yet that would come to an end if these young men had anything to do with it. The men were faithful Shia Muslims, but the war they were aching to fight was not a religious one. When they had fought the Maronite Christians, it was not because they were Christians but because they were the proxies of colonizers, the French. And when the Israelis invaded, it wasn’t because they were Jewish that the young men hated them. It was because they were colonizers too — proxies of America, as they saw it. The three young men knew the PLO was finished. Yasser Arafat had failed both the Palestinians and the Lebanese. He was finished too. But that didn’t matter; what good was someone with
no fight in him? They knew too, firsthand, that the rest of the Palestinians were as corrupt as Lebanon’s Westernized elite, the way they passed the days on Beirut’s Corniche, smoking hookahs, clubbing at night. They weren’t fighters. All the Palestinian leaders cared about was stealing as much money as they could from their Gulf Arab patrons, who were an even more corrupted race. They only gave money to the Palestinians out of guilt. Either way, the Palestinians, or even the other Arabs, were never going to take back Lebanon, let alone Palestine, from the Israelis. So where were the young men — and the thousands more like them across Lebanon — to turn? Who could organize them to fight back against the latest colonizers? Who would be clever enough to tap this vast, seething, powerful resource to put an end to the colonization of Lebanon? The honey-eyed young man stood up to leave. He said he was going to walk north and take a service, a shared taxi, to Balabakk to meet a man who went by the name of “Sheikh Hossein.” All he knew about Sheikh Hossein was that he was an ethnic Arab, a Shia who was an officer in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. He was making the trip to see for himself whether Sheikh Hossein was serious about fighting Israel and the American and French soldiers who would soon be arriving in Lebanon. He’d find out for himself whether or not Sheikh Hossein would flinch at shedding blood. Days after the first Revolutionary Guard officers started crossing the border from Syria into the Biqa’ Valley in June 1982, a
former schoolteacher turned Shia zealot, Husayn al-Musawi, offered himself as the public face of Iran. “We are the children of Iran!” Musawi announced to the world. Musawi loved the limelight. He delighted in sending shivers down the backs of the Western media, coming across as half insane. The group he led was called the Islamic Amal, a breakaway faction from Amal, the mainstream Shia political party. But in fact Islamic Amal was only a false front, little more than a family enterprise. It didn’t have enough soldiers to fight the Israelis or anyone else. They were smugglers, hashish farmers, and common criminals. Iran gladly funded them anyway, to draw the attention of Israel and the West away from what the Revolutionary Guards were really doing. The Iranians were following a long tradition: Persians through history have believed that any serious work is done in the dark. Whenever Iran deviated from this practice, it got into trouble, including in Lebanon. In July 1982, the Revolutionary Guards hired a gang of Palestinian thugs to kidnap the acting president of the American University of Beirut, in hopes of trading him for the Iranian chargé d’affaires, who had also been kidnapped. Iran would have kept its hand hidden had it not made the mistake of putting its American hostage in the back of a truck, driving him to Damascus, and sending him to Tehran in a cargo plane. The American was held in Tehran’s Evin Prison. The United States found out and raised hell with the Syrians, and Iran was forced to release him.
The Iranians would never again make the same mistake. From then on, proxies would take care of the hostage business, as they would terrorism. Which is why no one knew about Sheikh Hossein’s invitation to the Lebanese Shia to come to Balabakk, except the courier who delivered it. Imad Fayez Mughniyah sat down in the chair across from Sheikh Hossein and listened without even nodding, his honey eyes barely blinking. That’s the thing most people remembered about Mughniyah, his unnerving stare. A stare that said I would as soon kill you as shake your hand. It was clear what Sheikh Hossein was proposing: a war with the United States and Israel; driving the West out of Lebanon — the Americans, British, French, and Italian troops that were coming to replace the Israelis in Beirut. The Western diplomatic missions and even the press would have to go too, to purge Lebanon of all Western influences. Iran would put an end to colonialism in Lebanon forever. Were Mughniyah and his followers ready, Sheikh Hossein asked. He already knew Mughniyah’s answer because he already knew a lot about him. The war Sheikh Hossein proposed would be fought entirely by Lebanese. The Iranians were there only to provide money and weapons. Mughniyah would receive an officer’s commission in the Revolutionary Guards. He would be head of a secret unit called Amin al-Haras — the Security of the Guards. Everything he did, and the names of his fighters, would be a tightly held secret. Only Sheikh Hossein and a handful of Revolutionary Guard officers in Tehran would even know that Mughniyah worked for Iran.
Sheikh Hossein would never call Mughniyah. He would convey orders and money face-to-face, at meetings in Balabakk, where Sheikh Hossein was out of reach of the Israelis and the Americans. Even Iran’s host, Syria, wouldn’t know about the relationship between Mughniyah and Sheikh Hossein. In return, Mughniyah would offer the same strict degree of secrecy. He would recruit trusted relatives and fighters from his Fatah days, people who would never betray him. Even between them, there would be no communication by phone. There would be no payroll; all expenses would be handled in cash. In other words, there would be no record at all of a relationship between Mughniyah, the Revolutionary Guards, and the young men shedding the blood. There would be no trail to follow back to Iran; no return address. Mughniyah, the guerrilla, didn’t need to be told why. Iran was the rear base. You protect the rear base at all costs. As Mughniyah got up to leave, Sheikh Hossein remembered one last thing to tell him. He had come up with a name for Mughniyah’s group: the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). The Iranians were always in charge of the IJO, using it to establish a beachhead in Lebanon. Every attack, car bombing, kidnapping, and assassination carried out by Mughniyah was approved by the Revolutionary Guards, which in turn was approved by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and after Khomeini’s death, by his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei. In almost every other way the Iranians don’t behave like us. They are some of the most secretive people in the world. They
don’t keep bureaucratic records. They don’t rationalize their decisions on paper. They don’t leak. They don’t splash mistakes or scandals on the front pages of their newspapers. They don’t hold parliamentary hearings, or allow anyone to write frank memoirs. The Islamic Jihad Organization would soon become the most mysterious, elusive terrorist organization in the world thanks to Iran’s ability to hide its hand. The Iranians calculated well that Husayn al-Musawi and his Islamic Amal would distract us. It was not unlike the French Resistance during World War II: Charles de Gaulle was only the face of it. Killing or capturing him would have made no difference to the resistance cell leaders fighting the Nazis in France. The execution was left to the anonymous captains — men like Sheikh Hossein and Mughniyah who did the real work underground. Sheikh Hossein was one of the best the Revolutionary Guards had to offer. He understood how to make himself invisible. Although a devout Shia, he avoided large Shia assemblies and the mosque, where he might be recognized or have his picture taken. Indeed, the United States doesn’t know of any existing photo of Sheikh Hossein. He was a man who would never be able to understand America’s cult of celebrity. Sheikh Hossein was a brilliant general in a war of proxies, the perfect handler for someone like Mughniyah. From the beginning, he rigorously vetted and tested Mughniyah and his cell. Discipline was crucial. Sheikh Hossein had to know exactly who was picking up a gun in Iran’s name. Just as important, no attack could fail. The Islamic Jihad Organization had to appear invincible, striking where
and when it wanted. And it made sure that the world knew only what the IJO wanted it to know about its attacks. To this day, we don’t know the name of the suicide bomber who drove a van into the Marine barracks in 1983. And the mirage wasn’t just in Lebanon. Iran, too, is a mirage of sorts. President Ahmadinejad is supposedly the executive power in Iran. He’s the man Iran puts on CNN, who speaks at the UN and Columbia University, who writes a weekly blog. But little real power resides with Ahmadinejad. Instead, it lies with Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s security apparatus, the Revolutionary Guards, the army, and other influential ayatollahs. “Ahmadinejad is just a spokesman for the Revolutionary Guard and the hardcore commanders in the Revolutionary Guard Corps,” Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistani intelligence who has spent years dealing with Iran, told me. “Khamenei is primus inter pares — maybe even the final word, depending on the issue.” Iran’s executive authority sits not in the office of the president, but in an informal politburo that has no name, whose deliberations are never made public, and whose membership shifts with the currents of regime politics. For example, the reformist president of Iran before Ahmadinejad, Muhammad Khatami, had absolutely no voice in Iran’s national security decisions. None of this is new, as Persia has been governed in a secretive way forever, from the Achaemenid Empire (550-330 B.C.) until today. “Many of the shrewdest and most influential political figures in Iran have intentionally avoided the blinding sunlight of publicity and have sought to exert power in the more shadowy corridors of
the political system,” Iranian scholar James Bill writes in The Lion and the Eagle. “Here they presented no targets to potential enemies and their influence often transcended that of those who have held ministerial positions.” Iran is a culture completely alien to ours, one more reason Americans are confused about the country. Even when it comes to the face of Iran, President Ahmadinejad, we know very little about him. The few hard facts we know are that he was in the Revolutionary Guards and served as Tehran’s mayor. He’s an apocalyptic Shia who believes in the “end times,” but then again, so are many other Iranians. We also know virtually nothing about the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Muhammad Jaafari. This would be as if Americans had no idea who the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was, other than a name and a rank. The Iranians laugh at the idea of our publishing photos of our military commanders playing Pee Wee football in elementary school. Iran’s embrace of secrecy and deception has proven to be extraordinarily useful. In November 1982, an armed force seized the Lebanese government’s police barracks in Balabakk. Husayn al-Musawi’s group, Islamic Amal, took credit, but in fact it was the Revolutionary Guards who ordered it. Staying behind the silk curtain spared the Iranians worse international condemnation than they were already receiving. When the Iranians use proxies to seize the Sheikh Abdallah barracks, rocket the Green Zone in Iraq, or invade a sovereign state, they stymie the traditional international response. The West is so used to thinking in legalistic black-and-white it doesn’t know
how to respond. A state either commits an act of aggression or it doesn’t. If a fictitious organization takes credit, even when it’s clear Iran is behind it, Iran gets away with saying, “It wasn’t us. But let’s see what we can do to help.” So not only do they get away with it, they also get credit for trying to solve it. In this way, the Iranians have managed to undermine the international state system to a degree the West hasn’t experienced since Communism. One reason this worked was that Tehran had confidence in its civil servants, enough to delegate complete authority. When Sheikh Hossein got on the plane for Damascus, his orders were clear and simple: Turn the fanatics and believers into a force for destruction, and convince the United States and Israel that the war is unwinnable. Sheikh Hossein didn’t need to report back to Tehran, write quarterly reports, or chart his progress in graphs. Tehran would hear about his successes on BBC Persian Service. The Revolutionary Guard headquarters in Tehran gave Sheikh Hossein carte blanche to do whatever he needed to succeed, and all the money he needed. The money passed through the ultrasecret Jerusalem Force. Even before Sheikh Hossein arrived in Balabakk, he knew he’d be looking for recruits from the PLO, and not just from among Lebanese Shia. The PLO’s leadership may have been feckless, but like Mughniyah, its foot soldiers knew how to fight. It also helped that many were believers; in the seventies, the PLO had set up an Islamic wing to accommodate them. One of Sheikh Hossein’s first acts was to get his hands on the Islamic wing’s membership list. The timing couldn’t have been better for Sheikh Hossein.
With the Israelis shelling Beirut, deepening Lebanese and Muslim grievance and humiliation, he knew he could turn it all to Iran’s benefit. The argument was easy: The Arab leaders had failed to do anything for Lebanon other than watch the invasion on TV. They hadn’t even mounted an oil embargo as they had in 1973. One more Arab failure, no doubt to be followed by more. Sheikh Hossein reminded the young men who came to see him that the secular Arab states and the PLO had never taken back an inch of land seized by Zionists. Now was the time to forget Persian-Arab enmity and think about what they could do to right history. It was a persuasive argument, and the PLO was unable to put up a good counterargument. In fact, the PLO was forced to cede the mantle of resistance to Iran. On October 18, 1979, at a meeting between Ayatollah Khomeini and Arafat, Khomeini declared that “the matter of Palestine is an Islamic issue.” A month later, on November 18, Arafat issued orders to Palestinian cadres “putting the PLO on alert to protect the Iranian revolution.” The honeymoon between Palestinians and Iranians would end when Arafat backed Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, but there was no way to undo the Palestinian-Iranian ties. The PLO cadres now had a new beacon. Over the next three decades, the Palestinians and their Lebanese followers would drift over to Iran, if for no other reason than that Iran was the only state to show itself willing to fight Israel and the United States. Iran’s ability to impose order and discipline was something the PLO always lacked. It’s impossible to overstate how important it was that Iran
won over these Palestinian and Lebanese resistance fighters. Khomeini had humiliated the United States when Iranian forces toppled the Shah and seized the American embassy in 1979. But in a sense that was a parochial issue, a symbolic act of Iranian defiance that had little to do with the Arabs. At that point, the United States was the Iranian revolutionaries’ enemy but not the Arabs’ enemy. If Khomeini wanted to expand his revolution beyond Iran’s borders, he knew he needed to universalize it — to encompass the Arabs and make common cause with them against their enemy, Israel. The war on Israel would be Khomeini’s fulcrum for staking out something bigger than Iran. Khomeini intended to fire Arab anger as he had that of the Iranians. His message was simple: If Iran could beat the United States — David slay Goliath — then the Arabs could beat Israel. Another pool Sheikh Hossein recruited from was the Iraqi Da’wa Party. For many Shia, this came as a surprise. The founder of Da’wa was a rival of Ayatollah Khomeini. His writings directly challenged many of Khomeini’s own innovations to Shia jurisprudence. The Revolutionary Guards’ embrace of the Da’wa, so soon after the revolution, showed a pragmatic streak that would serve them well in the future. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the founder of Iraqi Da’wa, shared with Khomeini the belief that a regenerated and purified Shia Islam would liberate the Shia from colonialism and Sunni oppression — that justice could be obtained in the here-and-now and didn’t have to wait until the afterlife. But Sadr and Khomeini differed over
a major doctrinal tenet: velayat-e faqih, the rule of the jurisprudent. Khomeini believed that a truly Islamic republic had to be ruled by a cleric with the highest level of scholarship, someone with an unfailing understanding of the Koran, the sayings of the prophet, logic, and Islamic jurisprudence. Such a man — the representative of God on Earth — was divinely ordained to hold executive power in an Islamic republic. Sadr, on the other hand, was wary of having clerics running a state; clerics had enough to do saving the souls of men. Even when Khomeini was in Najaf, there was a running dispute between him and Sadr. Sadr was a powerful and charismatic leader, and an influential writer. And because Sadr, rather than Khomeini, posed a threat to Saddam Hussein, Sadr’s authority was seen as a challenge to Khomeini’s. In 1980, after Da’wa attempted to assassinate Iraq’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, Saddam ordered Sadr executed and his followers arrested. The Da’wa members who could fled to Lebanon and Iran. Those who ended up in Iran were forced to adopt Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih, abandoning Sadr’s more pragmatic political theory. It came as a surprise, then, when contrary to Khomeini’s interpretation of Shia doctrine, the Revolutionary Guards took Da’wa under their wing — with or without acceptance of velayat-e faqih. The Guards were more interested in Da’wa’s capacity to stir up problems in Iraq than obscure points of theology. In time, the Guards would treat other Islamic groups the same way — groups such as the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood that shared almost nothing
with Khomeini’s brand of Islam. Because in the end, all that mattered to the Revolutionary Guards was that these groups were prepared to confront their common enemy at the time, Iraq. Pragmatism like this is rare in revolutionary movements, especially religious ones. The Spanish Inquisition could never have embraced the Protestants. The Bolsheviks could never have compromised with the Mensheviks, nor Mao with China’s Nationalists. But Iran was more than happy to cross sectarian lines; in lumping Iran into a monolithic “Islamofascism,” Western pundits couldn’t have it more wrong. Tour Tehran’s Martyrs’ Museum and you’ll find memorials to every sort of martyr, from Hezbollah to Da’wa, from Egypt’s Sunni Muslim Brotherhood to Zoroastrians — and, oddly enough, Iranian Jewish martyrs who died in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s pragmatic, almost ecumenical approach to anti-imperialism gives it a much wider, much more supple base. The foundation for an empire. Unlike any other power in the Middle East, Iran learned how to harness the millions upon millions of oppressed. The angry, proud, dispossessed Shia; the frustrated Sunni — anyone with a grudge and a readiness to fight. Iran stole the Promethean Islamic fire when the Sunni couldn’t, organizing the faithful into a disciplined military force, unlike anything the world has seen since the Ottomans. Iran may not have liked Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, but it understood how his 1980 execution infuriated and galvanized the Shia. In 2005, two years after the United States invaded Iraq, I asked a Hezbollah cleric what it meant to the Lebanese Shia when
the Iranians showed up in 1982. His name doesn’t matter; he spoke not for himself but as the voice of the party. Which is why his response was so extraordinary. “The 1979 Islamic Revolution caused an earthquake that shook the Islamic consciousness,” the imam said, pulling at his beard. “It was a new dawn.” Khomeini’s message alone accomplished that? I asked. No. “The martyrdom of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq,” the imam told me, “is the symbol of the oppression of Shia.” Evoking Sadr’s name wasn’t what surprised me. It was the fact that it came out of the mouth of a Hezbollah cleric — an Iranian loyalist who should have been regurgitating Khomeini’s doctrine. Once again, Iran and its proxies were proving to be far more pragmatic than anyone expected. It wasn’t just Khomeini’s revolution that provoked the Shia revival, the Hezbollah imam went on. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was the first ayatollah executed in modern times. His execution deeply shocked all Shia, a reminder of the unacceptable oppression they had suffered for 1300 years. Saddam had crossed a line, and Sadr would be avenged. The imam wanted me to know that Sadr wasn’t just another ayatollah. Ever since the disappearance of the legendary Twelfth Imam in the ninth century — the imam who, many Muslims believe, will return to save the world in the end times — the Shia believed there was no point in revolt, in fighting for justice in the here and now. Justice would return only when the Twelfth Imam reappeared. But Sadr reversed this, arguing that Imam Husayn hadn’t
died at Karbala in A.D. 680 for nothing. He had fought back. And as Sadr taught it, his defiance — rather than his murder — was the true metaphor for the Shia. Iran was not above co-opting that message as its own. The Iranians cared only that it appealed to the angry and the dispossessed.
When you fly into Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport, the thing you can’t see but should know is that everything, from the concession stands to the jet fuel supplies, is owned by the Revolutionary Guards. In a famous incident the day before Iran’s reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, was to dedicate the new airport, Revolutionary Guard forces simply rolled up in tanks and seized it. Another business, another piece of Iran the Revolutionary Guards own. Ever the pragmatists. On Iran’s face, it’s impossible to tell whether religious authorities or the military is in charge. Ask the question on any street in any of the world’s major capitals, and you’ll hear that Iran is a theocracy, run by religious ideologues. But that view is dated, by twenty-five years. While theology forms a basis for many of Iran’s beliefs and policies, the men who hold the power derive it from the military and security services, even if they are themselves clerics. Even before Khomeini’s death, Iran stopped being a country run by mullahs and Islamic militias and turned into one run by the “power ministries,” as they’re called in military dictatorships. Almost within months after Khomeini returned to Tehran in February 1979, he had to quietly concede that he couldn’t make Iran a theocracy overnight. It could take decades. Or maybe even centuries. Still, Khomeini never abandoned his belief that the Koran, properly interpreted, contained all the laws necessary to govern the ideal Islamic society. A mujtahid, a Shia jurisprudent, alone could bring justice and God’s will to the affairs of man. This wasn’t too far from Plato’s rule of philosopher king — along with all the idealistic baggage that came with it. The only problem was that once in
power, Khomeini could never figure out how to translate that idea into day-to-day politics. He couldn’t find the passage from rebellion to governance. Khomeini openly acknowledged failure when in 1989 he removed Ayatollah Montazeri as his successor. Montazeri was the most learned mujtahid after Khomeini, so when Khomeini passed him over, he abolished velayat-e faqih in all but name. Khomeini instead named as his successor Ayatollah Khamenei, a man who was not really even qualified to be a mujtahid. But Khamenei had the following and political skills to control the Revolutionary Guards and the secret police. So Khomeini, as it turned out, was as pragmatic as Sheikh Hossein. If there were any doubts about this shift, they were put to rest in 1995 when Ayatollah Khamenei removed Khomeini’s son from power and later, it is believed, had him poisoned. Khamenei needed Khomeini’s son out of the way, because he was a rival for the loyalty of Iran’s security services. Also, Khamenei early on in his rule had arrested the closest advisers of Ayatollah Montazeri, including Montazeri’s son-in-law, who was executed. And Khamenei put Montazeri himself under house arrest. When he needed to, Khamenei made Joseph Stalin look soft. Iran prevailed in Lebanon not by religious conversion or cultural diffusion but by sheer power — guns and money. It prevailed just as the Soviets had conquered their empire, not through Lenin’s words but with the Red Army. The French Revolution succeeded not as a war of ideas but thanks to Napoleon’s army. Iran’s “ideological” war was, like so many
others, won on the field of battle, not from the pulpit. Americans generally are blind to complexities like these, finding it easier to simply reduce Iran to a theocracy. This is a mistake that has led the United States to appeal for democracy and Western values in order to bring down the Iranian regime — to reveal the mullahs as false prophets. What we miss is that our ideals will never bring down the mullahs, because the mullahs long ago gave up the Koran for the Kalashnikov. That metaphor may be a slight exaggeration, but still, it helps make the point that the Shia approach the world from a perspective completely alien to ours. They have suffered repression and economic privation for 1300 years; they have been slaughtered at the hands of Sunni; they are too tough, and too bloodied, to be appeased with our faith in nineteenth-century democracy and liberalism. Combine this with their secretiveness, clannish loyalties, and piety, and the courage not to run under fire, and the Shia come close to being an undefeatable foe. The Israelis in Lebanon were fighting not so much an army but a fierce tribe that would rather die than surrender. Indeed, it is blood ties that have made the Shia so strong. The Shia who live in Beirut’s southern suburbs all know one another, with whole families and clans settling in the same block. They know about the birth of a child, a marriage, who’s doing well and who’s not. They know who the believers are, the alcoholics, the philanderers, who they can trust and who they can’t. They know who will fight and who won’t. There is no way for outsiders to break down these bonds, not even through one of the most massive
aerial bombardments in history, such as the one Israel launched in 2006. The Shia also don’t talk freely. Their sect has a peculiar tenet called taqqiyah — permission for a Shia believer to lie in order to protect the faith. This kind of sanctioned deception spills over into every aspect of a Shia’s life, in particular when dealing with outsiders. In conversation, or even listening in on a conversation among other Shia, it’s nearly impossible to distinguish what’s true and what’s not. There’s an inner meaning to every sentence, one that a Shia will instantly pick up on but a non-Shia can’t comprehend. Taqqiyah is one reason that American and Israeli intelligence were never able to effectively penetrate Hezbollah. Even the Iranians were astonished by Hezbollah’s ability to keep a secret, a key to fighting any guerrilla war. In 1996, when Hezbollah launched an offensive against the Israelis, the Iranians called Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah to Tehran. They wanted to be certain that Hezbollah fighters wouldn’t reveal Iran’s role. Nasrallah reassured Iran that Hezbollah’s cadres would never betray Iran. They would lie, cover up, obfuscate — whatever was necessary — to keep Iran’s involvement secret. Hezbollah also knew how to compartmentalize information — its fighters were only told what they needed to know for their missions. So even if they were caught and somehow forced to talk, they knew only about their own cells. In the battle between America’s college-educated, Internet-surfing “experts” on Lebanon and Hezbollah’s tough, street-smart, loyal fighters, we were hopelessly outmatched. As,
apparently, were the Israelis. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 passed without any serious comment in this country, because it was a war the Americans didn’t know. It dragged on for eighteen years, but it wasn’t fought on the front pages of newspapers. It was a confusing war. There were no set battles, no major cities that fell. With Iran using proxies, and the fact that there were no victory parades in Tehran, no campaign ribbons, no after-action press briefings, no white flags, it was difficult for Americans to put a face on the war. Even today, the Americans and the Israelis don’t know the names of Hezbollah’s field commanders. Israel fought and lost to a phantom. Americans should definitely be scared about Iran and the Middle East, but not for the reasons the Bush administration has put forth. Iran’s foot soldiers are no longer terrorists. They’re a formidable army, which makes Iran something much more dangerous. And the creation of that army can be told through the story of one man, Imad Mughniyah: a terrorist turned guerrilla fighter. 4 ____________________ FROM TERRORISM TO POWER POLITICS: HOW IRAN BECAME A STATIST POWER
George Orwell would have laughed at the charade, the way the United States portrays Iran. Black is white, two plus two equals twenty-two. The way our government declares something as fact, and we just accept it, uncritically and unexamined. Nearly everything the average American has been told about Iran is wrong. Iran is not fighting a crusade. It does not want to convert us to Islam. Iran truly believes that for the last thirty years, it has been fighting a straightforward war against occupation. Iran is not a totalitarian state run by “Islamofascists” who believe they’re in some quixotic war with the West and Western civilization. President Ahmadinejad is not intent on starting World War III; he’s a figurehead no more able to take Iran to war than Joseph McCarthy was able to take America to war against Communism. Iran’s real leaders are rational, pragmatic, and calculating. We live in the past; Iran lives in the future. We think of Iran as a terrorist state, and of Hezbollah as a terrorist cult. Yes, Iran seized our embassy in Tehran in 1979, bombed the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983, and bombed the U.S. Marine barracks there the same year. But that was more than a quarter-century ago. In the meantime, we’ve missed what Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, has turned into. Hezbollah fights for an unambiguous national cause. It operates openly on the battlefield, seizes and holds territory, and exerts sovereignty over a civilian population. In other words, Hezbollah fits the definition of a guerrilla force, not a terrorist group.
Americans have missed Iran’s critical transition, its metamorphosis from a Shia rebellion and a terrorist state to a classic military power. And absent a bloody confrontation with the United States or Israel, Iran will continue to act in this same pragmatic, calculating way. Until we’re prepared to see facts when it comes to Iran, we’ll never understand how to either confront it or settle with it. Nor will we ever understand that “victory” in the Middle East isn’t a question of rooting out small terrorist cells, a finite war with finite ends, as Washington would have us believe. In Iran we are fighting a war of conviction, against an enemy with a bottomless pool of potential recruits. If America keeps acting on a flawed understanding of this conflict, it will lose to Iran. The transformation of Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, from a small terrorist group into a classic guerrilla army didn’t happen overnight. It took place over two decades — legacy of the 1982-2000 Lebanon conflict that’s still reshaping Middle East dynamics. The transformation can be traced through the career of Imad Faiz Mughniyah, the honey-eyed Lebanese man who went from Fatah street fighter looking for a war, to the world’s most wanted terrorist, to military commander, and finally to someone pensioned off in Damascus — all in the space of about ten years. His story serves as both illustration and warning of what we face in Iran. His birth certificate said he was born in the village of Tayr Dibba, a small Shia village in the hills above Sidon. In fact, he was
probably born in Beirut, his father a poor farmer and vegetable salesman who pushed a cart around the dusty squalor of the Shia southern suburbs. His family was well known in the neighborhood of ‘Ayn al-Dilbah. Like everyone else who lived there, they were economic refugees. The Mughniyah family wasn’t without name; one distant cousin was a renowned Islamic scholar whose books are still read. At fifteen, angry over Israel’s first invasion of Lebanon in 1978, Imad Mughniyah joined Fatah’s student cells, a clandestine organization headed by a Lebanese Christian who had converted to Islam. The student cell members were outsiders: Lebanese Shia and Christians, Islamic fanatics, mercenaries, and anyone else ready to take Fatah’s money. It was then that Mughniyah started to fight in the Beirut neighbor-hood of Sin al-Fil, almost as an after-school activity. Mughniyah attended the American University of Beirut for a year, where he studied business administration. But as a Shia, he knew he could never get a job in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else in the Gulf where the work was. So he dropped out and again picked up his Kalashnikov. For a young man like Mughniyah, this was a natural step. Lebanon was an emporium of terrorism, a refuge for almost every terrorist group in the world, from the Baader-Meinhoff Gang to the Japanese Red Army. It had also endured unrelieved occupation — by the Ottomans, French, Israelis, Syrians, and Palestinians. Mughniyah was born four years after President Eisenhower sent the U.S. Marines to Lebanon. He was fourteen when the Syrians sent
their troops to Lebanon in 1976. But as with Osama bin Laden, the real turning point in his anger came when the Israelis shelled Beirut in 1982 — the first time in modern history that foreign invaders destroyed an Arab city. In the four years Mughniyah fought with Fatah, he made a name for himself as a smart, fearless fighter. By the time he met with Sheikh Hossein and joined the Revolutionary Guards in 1982, he had vaulted to another level altogether. And when he hijacked TWA flight 847 in 1985, Mughniyah became the emblem of Iran’s terrorist war in Lebanon — a hero within the ranks of Hezbollah, or at least to the ones who knew about him. Mughniyah wasn’t a thoughtful or tutored believer in Islam. Nor did he blindly accept Khomeini’s inter-pretation of Shia Islam. But his ability to make good on his promises was enough for him to become a captain in what the BBC would call “the most effective guerrilla army in the world.” Though there’s no conclusive evidence for it, Mughniyah may have been at the center of the most notorious terrorist acts of the 1980s: the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut and the October 1983 Marine barracks bombing there. He may have been the man who turned the twentieth century’s dream of the car into the nightmare of the car bomb. But it’s known that it was Mughniyah who took dozens of foreign hostages in Lebanon, turning it into a country as hostile to the West as Pol Pot’s Cambodia. Until his assassination, on February 12, 2008, there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Mughniyah for the TWA-847 hijacking and the subsequent murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert
Stethem. Mughniyah’s fingerprints were found on the airplane. But although Mughniyah lived until 2008, his final act of international terrorism came twenty years earlier, with the hijacking of Kuwait Airways flight 422 in April 1988. That hijacking is a metaphor for Iran’s evolution from terrorist state to a Middle East superpower. It shows Mughniyah as both terrorist and soon-to-bemilitary-commander. It also shows the sophistication of a wellplanned commando operation, more precise and disciplined than those undertaken by al Qaeda — one reason Mughniyah and Iran’s other proxies were more dangerous. That statement might raise eyebrows, considering the slaughter al Qaeda inflicted on September 11, 2001. But we have to remember that the objective of the 9/11 attacks was simply to kill as many people as possible as a way to horrify the world. As carefully planned as the attacks themselves were, nothing lay behind them but a determination to create anarchy. After all, what did al Qaeda gain from 9/11? Absolutely nothing. No territory, no concessions, no goodwill. What’s left of its leadership is living deep in caves just as before, as if the towers never fell. Iran, on the other hand, even during the bloodiest stage of the revolution, knew what it wanted and what it was doing. It always focused on the objective, to establish a foothold in Lebanon, rather than on the act itself. The Iranians are too smart and too insightful to kill simply for the sake of it, like an insane gunman opening fire in a McDonald’s. This is what makes them so much more of a threat: they learn from their mistakes, and adjust tactics and strategy accordingly. And the hijacking of Kuwait Airways 422 marks one
such adjustment — one of the Iranians’ last attempts to use terror as a means to an end. The hijacking was Mughniyah’s idea. His brother-in-law had been locked up in a Kuwaiti prison for nearly five years, as one of seventeen Da’wa members arrested for attacks on the American and French embassies in Kuwait in December 1983. Those attacks had come at the behest of Iran, which had taken in the Da’wa members after Saddam Hussein expelled them from Iraq. Mughniyah knew his brother-in-law would die in that Kuwaiti cell if he didn’t do something. Along with Iraqi Da’wa, he had already made several attacks on the Kuwaiti regime in an effort to get the men, known as the Da’wa 17, released. But Kuwait always held firm. By 1988, Mughniyah was frustrated that the Iranian government hadn’t done more to free his brother-in-law. To Mughniyah the loyalist, Iran had an obligation to leave no soldier on the field of battle. Moreover, Kuwait had supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, so why should Tehran have any reluctance to do the Kuwaitis harm? With the same single-mindedness and anger that had fueled him this far, Mughniyah badgered the Iranian government to let him hijack a Kuwaiti airliner. But in Tehran, a shift was under way. There had already been several attempts at freeing the Da’wa 17, none successful. Why would this time be any different? And in a larger sense, why spend all this time fighting the Arabs, when the real enemy — Israel — still occupied Lebanon? The Iran-Iraq War was at last coming to a definitive end, and the time was right for the shift. The
pragmatists in Tehran thought it was time for Iran to look at the bigger picture, to become better disciplined and concentrate on Israel. But Iran wasn’t completely finished with its transformation, so in a nod to their tireless fighter Mughniyah, the Iranian government gave him the green light to hijack a Kuwaiti airliner in April 1988. This was one of the last gasps of the zealots, and Iran would begin to regret it even before the hijacking had ended. The outcome would serve only to confirm that Iran’s move from terrorist to military struggle would be the right one. Mughniyah wasted no time once he’d received his permission. On April 5, eight hijackers operating under Mughniyah’s orders seized flight KU 422, which was nearing Kuwait after a long flight from Bangkok. Three of the hijackers, armed with hand grenades, entered the cockpit and informed the captain they were taking control of the plane. The plane first put down in Mashad, Iran, where it remained for several days. The Iranians wouldn’t let the hijackers deplane, as they had in the past. This was Mughniyah’s first hint things weren‘t going well. Mughniyah’s hijackers were proficient, professional terrorists. They understood the psychology of hostages — how to keep them quiet, obedient, disoriented, and terrified. From the moment the flight was hijacked in Bangkok, even though Mughniyah himself was not on the plane, his handpicked team demonstrated they were in charge, making decisions that reflected sharp military precision.
Throughout the hijacking, the team stayed hooded. They spoke to one another in classical Arabic, to hide their Lebanese accents. They swapped clothes. They kept the plane fueled up and the doors roped closed to defeat a rescue attempt. They turned the lights and air conditioning off and on. They prowled the aisles, picking out passengers and shining lights in their faces, making them believe they were about to be executed. From his base in Beirut, Mughniyah ordered the pilot to fly to the Beirut airport, which Hezbollah controlled. But even as the plane was in midair, someone on the Iranian side began to have second thoughts. The Iranians had given Mughniyah the go-ahead for this hijacking, but several days into it, they wanted no part of having the plane touch down in Lebanon — they didn’t want to risk losing the foothold they’d won in that country. The Iranians lied to the Syrians, who had troops around the airport, telling them they had nothing to do with the hijacking. The plane circled the airport for hours, and Mughniyah realized that Syria and Hezbollah wouldn’t let it land. Dramatically, Iran seemed to have reached an ideological turning point right in the middle of its own hijacking. He directed the hijackers to fly to Larnaca, Cyprus, deciding Cyprus was the next best airport to put down after Beirut. The Cypriots didn’t have a particularly good hostage rescue team, and Larnaca International Airport was small, with a view of all directions. But just as important, Mughniyah had a network in Larnaca that would alert him to any suspicious movement of troops preparing for a rescue.
On April 10, as the plane sat on the tarmac in Larnaca, Mughniyah radioed the airplane in the open: “Golden fiat 101 for this 3.” The message was indecipherable to anyone listening in, as was the follow-up message: “We 209 true as a sign everything cold sun.” The coded communications displayed a level of sophistication not seen before in terrorist acts of this type. In the course of just a few years, Mughniyah had clearly come a very long way from jagged-edged street fighter. As the days dragged on, however, the Kuwaitis still wouldn’t bend, refusing to release Mughniyah’s brother-in-law or any other members of the Da’wa 17. Mughniyah’s frustration and anger grew. He knew he had to up the stakes — to murder passengers. He issued the order, and the hijackers shot and killed two of them. It had no effect. The Kuwaitis would not give in. Mughniyah next directed the hijackers to fly the plane to Algeria, where PLO negotiators became involved. Soon enough, it became clear to Mughniyah that nothing would budge the Kuwaitis. Finally, fifteen days after it began, the drama of KU-422 came to an end when the eight hijackers were granted safe passage back to Lebanon in exchange for abandoning the plane and freeing the remaining hostages. In the end, Mughniyah’s hijacking accomplished absolutely nothing, except perhaps to display the level of discipline and skill he and the Iranians had achieved during the Lebanon conflict. Though it was perfectly executed, it still didn’t work — one reason it would be one of the last hijackings Iran would back. The times had changed, as had Iran’s objectives. It was time for Iran to grow up,
get serious in Lebanon, concentrate on capturing ground from the Israelis, and act like the mature power it had become. But Mughniyah wasn’t interested in Iran’s transformation, and when the Iranians told him his terrorist days were over, he didn’t take it well. He had lived by the sword for too many years; it was all he knew. For a few years Iran put him on the front against the Israelis. He fought well, leading several ambushes of Israeli patrols. But he never adjusted to his new role, there were dozens of other independent Hezbollah commanders he had to compete with, and he started to fight with his Iranian handlers. By now, like Leon Trotsky after the Russian Revolution, or Robespierre after the French, he was considered irrelevant, even a liability. When the revolutionaries settle into power, the firebrands aren’t so useful: Mughniyah was too radical, so the Iranians marginalized him. There had been no military academies for Mughniyah, no awards or medal ceremonies, no cash bonuses, no photo ops. He lived and operated in the pitch black, with recognition from only a handful of people. Anger alone kept him in the battlefield. But the same anger that had made him such an effective fighter and terrorist had now made him dangerous to Iran. Mughniyah, like so many other young Lebanese men, was a nihilist: he wanted to bring down the Lebanese temple around him — the constitution, the political parties, the secular political leaders, anything tainted by the West. For a while, that was exactly what Iran wanted too. But because in the late 1980s Iran had made the transition from being a revolutionary troublemaker trying to export a
Shia uprising, to statist, Napoleonic-like conquest, the goal was no longer to destroy and sow unrest. It was to impose order, to take ground, to expand. Even Mughniyah understood that his skills were no longer wanted. He was resigned to end his career training a new generation of Iran’s foot soldiers. In 1996, Iran offered Mughniyah his choice of two missions: to collect intelligence, or to train its two client Palestinian groups, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Iranians ignored Mughniyah when he asked to carry out attacks against Israel during the Israeli elections. Iran had too much to lose at that point. Hezbollah was in parliament now; the oppressed were in power. Attacks on Israel would have to wait. Mughniyah, the good soldier, had no choice but to salute. Not everyone adjusted so easily. Mughniyah’s brother-inlaw, the man he had tried to free with the KU 422 hijacking, eventually escaped from his Kuwait jail and returned to Lebanon. Mughniyah arranged to appoint him to a senior military command in the south. But the brother-in-law went back to his old ways and started kidnapping foreigners — without Iran’s permission. He had no idea how much had changed since his imprisonment seven years before. The Iranians released the hostages and removed him from his post. Later, he complained bitterly to his friends that everything had changed — that Iran had abandoned Khomeini’s revolution. Another Mughniyah lieutenant also couldn’t make the adjustment, and when he kidnapped the children of a rich Lebanese businessman, Iran’s response was draconian. He was arrested and executed, his past service to Iran forgotten.
The arc Imad Mughniyah traveled is unambiguous — from rootless teenager with a Kalashnikov, fighting for secular Fatah, to Islamic terrorist, then to military commander fighting to liberate Lebanon. He was invaluable to the Iranians because he was inured to the prospect of death, he took orders, and he terrified the West. But it was only his military role Iran wanted him to be remembered for. After Mughniyah was assassinated in February 2008, the Syrian foreign minister, speaking for the Iranians, said in a press conference, “The fighter Imad Mughniyah was the target of lots of intelligence agencies — he was the backbone of the Islamic resistance.” In acknowledging Mughniyah’s role as military commander, but not his terrorist role, Syria’s foreign minister wanted to put the past behind him and force the world to focus on the military struggle against Israel. Within Hezbollah, Mughniyah is a legend — Hezbollah’s Patrick Henry. After his assassination, Hezbollah put up his poster all over Beirut’s Shia southern suburbs. But in a sense, that’s all that he was: an iconic figure, a hero of the early days of the resistance, revered but irrelevant to Iran’s larger, new conflict. And at the end of the day, he was only one among the thousands of young fighters recruited out of the chaos of Lebanon. Foot soldiers ready to die for Iran and for Allah. Iran’s transformation from terrorist state to classic military power will have a profound long-term effect on the world’s geopolitics. It produced historic victories in Lebanon in 2000 and
2006, victories that became Iran’s paradigm for expansion. What does it mean for the next ten years? And what can the West do about it? The answer lies in Basra, which is in the middle of a transformation of its own. The city of Basra offers Iraq’s only maritime access and its main oil export route. A half-million barrels of oil a day pass through Basra, heading to offshore oil terminals in the Gulf. Iraq’s Shiadominated south produces 1.9 million barrels a day, accounting for the bulk of the country’s production. The south also possesses 71 percent of Iraq’s proven oil reserves, and accounts for 95 percent of Iraq’s government revenues. Basra is the beating heart of Iraq’s economy. Yet Basra and its surrounding area are not really part of Iraq anymore. Quietly, without firing a single shot, the Iranians have effectively annexed the entire south, fully one-third of Iraq. In Basra today, the preferred currency is the Iranian rial. The Iraqi police, the military, and at least one of its intelligence services answer not to Baghdad, but to the Iranian-backed political parties, SCIRI, Da’wa, and other Shia groups under Tehran’s control. But it’s not just the police; the same Iranian proxies run the universities, the hospitals, and the social welfare organizations. They exert more control over daily life in Basra than the central government does — and clearly more than Britain or the United States. Iran supplies Basra with refined fuel and nearly every other raw commodity that keeps the city alive. An Iranian-allied faction is in charge of Iraq’s oil exports, siphoning off hundreds of thousands of barrels a day to support the faction and its sponsors in Iran. Iran
takes a direct role in reviewing lists of foreign companies bidding on Iraq’s mega oil fields in the south. In other words, you can’t do business in southern Iraq without a green light from Tehran. And no one even bothers to hide Iran’s role. Iraq’s Shia oil minister was quoted in the Iranian press as saying there was an agreement between Iran and Iraq to jointly invest in Iraq’s oil fields. Iran specifically demanded a say in the development of Iraq’s huge Majnoun field, which contains approximately 30 billion barrels of oil. As I pointed out earlier in this book, if Iran’s annexation of the south holds — and nothing seems likely to turn it back — the almost inevitable implication is that Iran will one day have de facto control of Iraq’s oil, giving it considerably more weight in OPEC. If the Majnoun oil field and other untapped Iraqi fields were to be developed, Iran’s and Iraq’s total production would begin to rival that of Saudi Arabia. And if Iran were able to fulfill its ambition of producing 8 million barrels a day by 2015, its combined total would surpass Saudi Arabia’s. How did Iran manage to annex southern Iraq right under every-one’s noses, without a military incursion? First, Iran applied the lessons it learned in Lebanon, compelling, cajoling, and persuading warring factions that it was in their best interest to follow Tehran’s orders. It took nearly fifteen years, but Iran eventually forced Hezbollah and the more secular Amal Party to cooperate. It was also in Lebanon that Iran learned how to corral normally independent Shia clerics by taking control of their bank accounts and charities, systematically destroying
Lebanon’s moderate, nationalist, independent clerics — anyone who called into question the legitimacy of the mullahs in Tehran. Second, Iran demonstrates extraordinary patience and longterm vision when moving its pieces on the chessboard. It’s able to tolerate chaos for long periods of time, waiting for local players to fail and then come to Iran for help. And by the 2003 Iraq invasion, Iran had truly absorbed the lesson that the Kalashnikov rules — not Adam Smith, Jeffersonian democracy, or even the Koran. Unless it is some-how miraculously contained, Iran will end up fulfilling Ayatollah Khamenei’s 2000 promise to repeat in Iraq Iran’s victory in Lebanon. Iran knows it can’t simply march its army across the border and impose order in Iraq. It tried that in 1982, laying siege to Basra in its long, ultimately unsuccessful war against Saddam Hussein. Military incursion didn’t work then, so why try it again now? Instead, Iran has decided on a soft takeover, offering a gentle hand, tamping down the fighting when it can, taking control of mosques and charities, keeping Iraq supplied with refined oil products, keeping city services running, gradually building up Shia militias for the day they’ll expel the new invaders and take Baghdad. Above all, the Iranians know that they cannot appear to be colonialists in Iraq. Better to let the Iraqi Shia arrive at the conclusion that they can’t do without Iran. And Basra certainly did need a strong Iranian hand, as the place was in utter chaos: car bombings, assassinations, attacks on bars and restaurants. Through the early years of the Western occupation, the situation worsened by the day, but Iran waited
patiently rather than taking action, knowing that the chaos by itself would eventually drive out the foreign occupiers, the British army. Just after the 2003 invasion, British TV audiences had been reassured when they saw their troops patrolling Basra in regimental berets and without armor. This was so different from the heavyhanded Americans, who patrolled Baghdad in tanks. The ready explanation was the British knew what they were doing, having learned about occupation in Northern Ireland. But the calm was not to last. In the January 2005 elections, the Da’wa and other Islamic parties won 38 out of 41 seats in the Basra provincial elections, as well as 35 of 41 seats in Maysan, another Shia province in the south. The SCIRI and Da’wa had been in exile in Iran for twentyfive years, and for moderate Shia nationalists, their election victory was far from welcome. Soon, factions of the SCIRI and the Mahdi army started to fight for control of Basra. (The SCIRI had renamed itself the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to put space between its present incarnation and the years it spent in exile in Iran. But no one was fooled.) The British forces might have had the upper hand militarily, but they were utterly powerless politically. And as they soon learned, the struggle for Iraq at this stage was not military, it was political. Britain had lost long before the first British soldier ever set foot in Iraq. Though they did get support from a few Shia tribes, this was no match for the SCIRI and Da’wa. The British soon realized they were helpless against Iran’s proxies — they weren’t even able
to sort out who was who. They were fighting a war they couldn’t understand, let alone win. Unlike Britain, Iran had been preparing for this day since the start of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980. It fed, clothed, and armed the SCIRI and Da’wa. It filtered out cadres who wouldn’t go along with Iran’s agenda. Thanks to SCIRI and Da’wa agents in Basra, Iran understood the politics there better than the British ever could. It took only a matter of months for the Iranian proxies to eliminate their — and by extension, Iran’s — opposition. The Iranians clearly knew what they were doing. “The Iranians aren’t crazy or naïve enough to send their own secret service agents, nor do they have to,” one Shia politician in Basra told the independent International Crisis Group. “Thanks to the parties that used to be exiled in Iran and those that currently dominate the local government, they already have Iraqi accomplices on the ground.” As for the Iraqis in Basra, whether they’re completely controlled by Tehran or not, they’re pragmatic and take Iranian support when they need it, whether in the form of rations, bandages, ammunition, or anything else. They’re coming to learn that they cannot survive without Iran. And Iran, as it demonstrated in Lebanon, will work with any Shia group that matters, regardless of any differences in ideology. It won’t be long before the Iranians in Basra will start corraling the fanatics — the ones who kill women for wearing lipstick — and the criminal groups kidnapping and ransoming for money. It’s all the same to the Iranians, who will work with any armed groups that can
impose order and one day force Britain and the United States to leave Iraq. Iran will allow the Iraqi army to take Basra, knowing one day the Iraqi army will answer to Tehran. Basra in 2007 resembled nothing so much as Beirut in 1982. The shootings, bombings, grotesque corruption, and political and social anarchy weren’t identical, but the situations were similar enough to give Iran the confidence it needed to annex Basra. All this raises a question: If Iran is able to annex a large chunk of Iraq without ever firing a shot, what can the United States do about it? We could send tanks into Basra, but what good would that do? We couldn’t hope to do what the British failed to do. Just rolling into town with conventional arms and armor would do nothing in terms of winning Basra back politically. And if we were to try to use force, as we did in Fallujah, whom would we fight? We could shell Basra, but we’d only succeed in creating more hatred, just as Israel did in 2006 when it bombed Beirut’s Shia southern suburbs. Even assuming the Americans could temporarily impose order, it would be little more than symbolic. And then who would we turn Basra over to — the Iranian-allied government in Baghdad? The Iraqis will continue to embrace the order Iran brings. Either way, the Iranians win. Here’s a quote from Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah about Israel’s war in Lebanon. Substitute “American forces in Iraq ” for “ Israel ” and you’ll have Iran’s blueprint for
how they intend to beat us in Iraq. “It is impossible for us to fight the Israelis through traditional and classical methods, but rather through a war of attrition, whereby we drain its energy, weaken it, then one day force it to withdraw.” The Iranians know the official estimates of the Iraq War’s cost will soon surpass one trillion dollars, and that America will eventually run through its money and political will. But the Iranians would like to keep the United States engaged in Iraq as long as possible, as it serves their long-term interests, giving them more time to consolidate control over the Shia south. In the long term, Iran intends to wear down the United States to the point that it will not want to confront Iran anywhere in the Middle East. But there’s another option for the United States, one that is neither clean nor risk-free: simply getting up and leaving, dropping the Iraqi mess in Iran’s lap. All of a sudden, it would be Iran deciding whether it wanted to be directly responsible for keeping a lid on the anarchy, and whether it wanted to send in its own troops and start killing Iraqis. A direct Iranian role in Iraq would involve Iranians killing Sunni and even Shia, turning the conflict into a civil war. Everything Iran achieved in Lebanon, turning the Shia and the Sunni against Israel and the United States, would be lost. The Iranians would suddenly be the occupiers, and as such would absorb the full political impact of running a foreign country. They’d no longer be able to hide behind their proxies. It is unlikely Iran would do well as pure colonial power, burdened by the inevitable blame that comes with occupation.
Withdrawing is a high-risk gamble, of course — a threat to the Arab peninsula, as the Arabs on their own cannot hold back Iran. But in staying in Iraq indefinitely, the only thing the United States can absolutely count on is going broke. Removing Saddam in March 2003, destroying Iraq’s military, exposing the moderate Shia clerics as powerless, and creating another vacuum for Iran to fill was a colossal blunder. The United States effectively offered up another Arab country to Iran — another jewel in Iran’s imperial crown. Iraq isn’t just a quagmire, another Vietnam we can just walk away from without consequence. If we were to withdraw today, what would stop Iran from pushing the chaos into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, starting a Shia insurgency along the rim of the Gulf, which is 90 percent Shia? Yet if the United States sticks it out and spends twenty or more years holding Iraq together, we’ll still have a messy, impermanent solution, one that will quickly fall apart the moment we leave. There are three main reasons why: First, any government the United States installs in Iraq, no matter if it includes our avowed enemies, will always be viewed as a puppet regime. We are outsiders, and Iraqis, the most xenophobic people in the Middle East, will never see us as otherwise. Second, Iran’s interest in Iraq is considerably stronger and more enduring than America’s, its will is stronger, and it will never overcome the temptation to meddle, to undermine us in Iraq. Iran also cannot afford to allow Shia Islam’s historical center of learning
in Iraq, Najaf, to return to being a moderate rival of the Iranian learning center, Qum. Iran will not abandon its quest for control over Shia Islam, nor allow a quietist form of Shia Islam to challenge the legitimacy of Iran’s mullahs. Third, and most important, Iran has a pragmatic, realistic strategy and the United States doesn’t. It knows that in one way or another, every major Shia political party in Iraq will ultimately have to answer to Tehran, whether it’s for money, for arms, or just to keep a safe rear base. Iran knows how to use its strengths. Iranians are Muslims, and like the majority of Iraqis, they are Shia. The two countries’ histories are intertwined and their bloodlines mixed, as are their economies, which both depend on oil. In other words, Iran is only half-foreign. Iran will always have more pieces to play with than the Americans do. To Iraqis, Tehran matters. Washington doesn’t. 5 ____________________ LETHAL AND ELUSIVE: WHY IRAN’S WEAPONS AND TACTICS MAKE IT UNCONQUERABLE — EVEN WITHOUT NUKES The United States cannot stop Iran’s rise short of an open-
ended, thirty-year policy of containment or a full-scale war. Alliances, unenforceable sanctions, threats — none have worked so far, nor will they. But even a war against Iran is not a real option. America can’t bomb Iran without starting a war in the Gulf. There aren’t enough soldiers to invade Iran, let alone hold it. And that’s not to mention that a war would break the bank, turning the United States into a country with a Third World economy. In May 2008, there were rumors the United States was going to bomb Jerusalem Force training camps in Iran to end the Shia insurgency in Iraq. I asked the former head of Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence organization, Hamid Gul, what he thought about the rumors. Gul had spent much of his career trying to contain Iran, both in Pakistan, with its 20 percent Shia population, and in Afghanistan. “You never slap the king; you kill him,” Gul told me. “You mean the United States has to invade?” I asked. “Maybe,” Gul replied. “But don’t forget: You can occupy Iran, but you cannot defeat it.” We both knew that Iran’s military wasn’t the same one Iraq fought to a standstill in the eighties. Over the course of the Iran-Iraq War, and the eighteen-year conflict in Lebanon, Iran learned how to fight a modern guerrilla war. It learned how to defeat a conventional military, taking and holding ground in the name of a nationalistic cause. But more important, Lebanon was a tactical proving ground for Iran, a place where it learned to combine asymmetrical warfare with both advanced and primitive weapons.
The superiority the United States had in weapons, training, and tactics was effective in fighting a Soviet-trained and equipped army like Saddam’s. But that effectiveness is undercut when confronted by small, highly mobile units armed with rockets, car bombs, and advanced improvised explosive devices that can defeat tanks and evade air superiority. An American conflict with Iran would be met with these deadly tactics — the same tactics the Iranians used to beat the Israelis. Over the last three decades in Lebanon, the Iranians constantly adapted, innovated, and tested new weapons and tactics. Advanced shaped charges, car bombs, precision-guided rockets, ambushes, swarming, decoys, and underground bunkers halted an Israeli advance into Lebanon in 2006. The sheer number of rockets Hezbollah fired into Israel in 2006 blanked out Israel’s defense radar network. And the same tactics lie in wait for the United States should it try to invade Iran. There’s a good argument that Iran’s modernization of guerrilla warfare is a military development as important as the introduction of the machine gun was to World War I, or the tank to World War II. In April 2008, a Hezbollah official told me, “We studied the United States and Israel. We knew they could not sustain many losses, that the drip-drip of casualties would turn the people against the war and they would leave. And that’s what we will do for the next war.” The United States can send the Marines to Iran’s shores, even push on to Tehran, but what would it do after that? A truck bomb here and there, and America could be losing hundreds of soldiers a week. How long would Americans stand for that — three
or four C-17s a week full of caskets coming back home? Just as the Vietcong melted into the jungle, Iran’s fighters will melt into the population and into caves. And because they have perfected asymmetric guerrilla tactics in their wars in Iraq and Lebanon, they’d make American occupation a living hell. Iranian “resistance” would always be there, bogging us down forever. We could turn Tehran into a pile of rubble, but we never could really defeat Iran in the sense of controlling it. In the bloody, eight-year Iran-Iraq War, only one side came away with a battle plan for how to win future such wars. And despite the fact that Iraq had the stronger army, its failure to learn the lessons of asymmetrical warfare would ultimately doom it. The Iran-Iraq War began on September 22, 1980, with a full-scale Iraqi invasion of Iran. As Iraqi air force planes quickly breached Iran’s airspace, Saddam Hussein’s troops crossed the border lightly opposed. In the first days of the war it looked as if Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime, not even two years old, would collapse. Saddam had several motivations for invading Iran. But the event that finally provoked him to give the order was what he considered an attack on his regime, Da’wa’s assassination attempt on Tariq Aziz. Saddam was convinced that Iran was behind it, and that unless he did something about it, he would be next. He also dreamed of seizing Iranian oil, most of which was in ethnic Arab Khuzestan. Khuzestan’s Arabs, he thought, wouldn’t be able to resist the call of Arab nationalism. Finally, he intended to occupy the
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, arguably the most strategic delta in the world. Iraqi troops quickly captured the Iranian port city of Khorramshahr, but the Iranians stopped them just short of taking Abadan, Iran’s oil-processing center just 10 kilometers away. And despite Saddam’s hopes, the Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan stayed loyal to Tehran. By December 1980, two months after the invasion, Saddam’s offensive was halted, and by 1981, Iraqi troops were already falling back. In 1982, the Iranians recaptured Khorramshahr. Saddam tried to sue for peace, but Ayatollah Khomeini thought the Iranians could not only repel the Iraqis but also capture Baghdad, so he ordered the Iranian army to take the offensive. It made only small advances. No one in the Iranian military could convince Khomeini of the futility of the war; he believed that Iraqi Shia, the bulk of Saddam’s army, would not fight — that given the chance, they would side with Shia Iran and not a Sunni Arab regime. At the bottom of it all, though, Khomeini believed God was on Iran’s side, and that Iran would be graced with certain victory if it just kept fighting. The blood flowed. Iran fell back on World War I trench warfare tactics, throwing waves of infantry against fixed Iraqi positions. Hundreds and thousands of young Iranian men, many without guns, died for no other purpose than to affirm the mullahs’ faith. Iranians answered the call to martyrdom, but rather than fulfilling Khomeini’s dream of getting rid of Saddam, their sacrifices turned into pointless death.
Eight years later, after a generation of Iranians had died, Khomeini finally understood that Iran could not win a conventional war against Iraq. The casualties, between one and two million, were staggering. But Iran did come away with a lesson: It could never again fight a war like that one. The next war — and Iran was certain there would be more — would be different. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iran recognized that it won more engagements through unconventional tactics and asymmetrical warfare than it did through mass, frontal assaults. But more important, the Lebanon War, waged in the same time frame, had emerged as a paradigm. By 1988, the war in Lebanon was in its sixth year, and Iran couldn’t miss the fact that the Islamic resistance there, just a couple of thousand guerrillas, had taken relatively more ground than the Iranian army had in the entire Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s Lebanese proxies were on to something. The first thing the Iranians learned from the Lebanon War was that small is better. Large formations in an open terrain are easily detectable from air, either by the Israeli F-16s that made twice-daily passes over Lebanon, by satellites, or by drones with cameras. But Islamic resistance fighters moving in groups of two or three were indistinguishable from farmers. They of course never wore uniforms, so they moved easily among the civilian population. Israeli aerial reconnaissance was virtually worthless. This lesson was reaffirmed in the 1990-91 Gulf War. Allied precision munitions obliterated Iraq’s conventional army in a matter of days. Western technology advances now made troops in the open fatally vulnerable. Again in 2003, Iran could see for itself that
even the thickest armor is vulnerable. Immediately after the war’s end, Revolutionary Guards were in Baghdad inspecting the damage caused by American armor-piercing Hellfire missiles that destroyed Saddam’s T-72 tanks. The lesson: If a piece of equipment is in the open at the start of a war, you might as well consider it lost. Iran adapted the same technology to build its own advanced anti-tank weapons. Modern antitank missiles borrow their design from shaped charges, which are explosives molded in a way that concentrates the energy of the blast on the smallest point possible, causing a tank’s armor to “spall,” or melt, showering the inside of a crew cab. Iran now has an advanced shaped charge that can penetrate armor steel to the depth of ten times the diameter of the round. So tanks have been forced to add layers of armor, and even explosives or sand to the outside of the armor, to dissipate the shaped charge’s impact. But this in turn weighs down the tanks, making them less maneuverable. And even with the extra armor, an antitank round still can penetrate a tank’s armor at its vulnerable points. The second thing Iran learned in Lebanon was that Israel can be beaten in a war of attrition. In a full-fledged war, the Arabs might lose ten million men to one million for the Israelis. But can the Israelis afford that? Like the drip-drip of casualties described by the Hezbollah official, this slow attrition, and the associated cost and emotional expense, isn’t something the Israelis can accept forever. Iran also realized that increasing the size of its army wouldn’t necessarily give it an advantage. Currently Iran has 325,000 men in uniform; 125,000 Revolutionary Guard troops, which are now more
or less integrated into the army; and a million reservists. Iran’s army outnumbers any Arab army in the Gulf. But at the same time, Iran understands it’s no match, in conventional terms, for two or three U.S. carrier groups in the Gulf and U.S. strategic bombers, cruise missiles, and tactical nuclear warheads. And Iran also doesn’t spend much money on its army. In 2006, Iran spent 2.5 percent of its GDP on the military — a fraction of the 10 percent Saudi Arabia spends. Recognizing these inequities, Iran spent the nineties quietly buying advanced weapons from Russia and China — weapons that would level the playing field but not bankrupt Iran. Every time there was an arms show anywhere in the world, Iranian officers from both the army and the Revolutionary Guards would show up to inspect the latest Russian and Chinese arms. The Iranians never bought anything openly, but instead turned to trusted intermediaries in Russia and Eastern Europe to do the purchasing for them. They wanted to avoid a splash in the press, and they often got better deals that way. Still, Iran couldn’t always hide its hand. For the last ten years the Iranians have had their sights on the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile defense system, which would give Iran an enormous advantage in controlling the Gulf’s airspace. It would prevent a surprise Israeli attack by air, and would make it considerably more costly for the United States to go to war with Iran. The terms of the deal are already set, and now the Russians are just waiting for the right time to let it go through, when Washington is distracted by some unrelated crisis. In the meantime, the Iranians bought all the weapons they
needed to wage an asymmetrical war. In one deal the United States failed to stop, Iran bought highly advanced HMX explosives from Pakistan. In another, it bought a different sophisticated explosive, RDX. Both were ingredients for Iran’s rocket production. Some of Iran’s most sophisticated new equipment came from rogue states like North Korea. One item Iran bought from that country in large quantities was crystalline graphite, used in rocket nozzles. The sale was made quietly so neither the United States nor Israel could stop it. For many purchases, Iran used false end-user certificates. In one deal, it bought advanced MiG-29 jets from the former Soviet republic of Moldova, handing over end-user certificates that stated the air-planes were going to the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan. In return for its help, Moldova got $250-$300 million in Iranian light crude. And the Iranians also secretly bought laserguided missiles from corrupt Russian officials. Wherever there were cheap, sophisticated weapons for sale, the Iranians were there, ready with money. Many of the advanced airplane parts the Iranians bought went through Swiss firms — entities that were nothing more than shelf companies, each set up for that particular transaction, often with false Russian destinations provided in the paperwork. One Turkish company took Iranian oil in exchange for Iran’s purchase of equipment for a Russian-manufactured reactor. China, of course, was more than willing to sell its advanced weapons to Iran for oil and oil concessions. In the mid-nineties it started selling C-801b cruise missiles to Iran — the prototype for the missile that knocked
out an Israeli frigate during the 34-day war of 2006. In another quiet deal, Russia sold Iran 500 T-72 battle tanks — 25 percent newly produced T-72s, and the remainder T-72M1 tanks, refurbished according to Iran’s specifications. Iran paid $1 million each for the new T-72s, and $315,000 for the refurbished tanks. The high-explosive heat-seeking missiles for the tanks went for $650 a round. Iran couldn’t buy enough SA-16 and SA-18 shoulder-fired missiles, missiles it was prepared to hand out to not only its regular troops but its proxies as well. At $40,000-$60,000 per missile, they were wonderful bargains. Had Iran bought similar equipment from a Western country, it would have paid ten to twenty times these amounts. Everything from Russia came at fire-sale prices. Through the 1990s, the Russian army was broken and its soldiers starving — and Iran had money. There were few consequences for Moscow in making these deals. Arms were bought and shipped sub rosa, from fictional companies with untraceable post office boxes. They were exported from Russia as “civil aviation” equipment. There was nothing the United States could or would do about it; embargoes don’t work, especially when the seller is an ally on the brink of collapse. And the flow of advanced weapons to Iran continues today. On January 6, 2008, five small boats from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards challenged a three-ship U.S. Navy convoy in the Strait of Hormuz. This wasn’t supposed to happen. The United States owned the Gulf, not Iran.
The fast boats raced toward the ships, clearly challenging the Americans. Though Iran’s boats were a fraction of the size of the American ships, those on board remembered the devastating October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, which proved that all it takes is one small craft with a bomb to cripple one of the most advanced ships in the U.S. fleet. This was a mock attack, a not-so-subtle message that Iran hadn’t accepted American suzerainty in the Gulf. But more ominously, it was another warning that the United States didn’t enjoy the military superiority it thought it did. President Bush was on his way to the Gulf; the timing of the incident wasn’t a coincidence. For a start, the Iranians were warning the Gulf Arabs not to join an American coalition against Iran, which was clearly what was on Bush’s mind. In October 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had traveled to the Middle East in an attempt to rally “emerging moderate forces” against “the Iranian threat.” This was the only thing the Bush administration could think to do in response to Iran’s solidifying its control over Iraq. Iran’s choice of Hormuz for the confrontation also wasn’t a coincidence. The Iranians wanted to remind Bush of the stakes of any confrontation. The only real egress for Gulf oil, Hormuz is the world’s oil spigot. If Iran turns it off, America goes into a depression. The small-boats incident didn’t come out of nowhere. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the destruction of its army, there’s been increasing euphoria in Tehran that the military balance in the
Gulf is finally tipping in Iran’s direction. Iran’s asymmetrical warfare in Lebanon, which was now about to be applied in Iraq, was finally paying off in larger strategic terms. Iran had made an enormous blunder in the eighties, taking on Iraq head-on. But since then, the Iranians had figured out how to win Iraq — and just maybe the rest of the Gulf as well. Soon the clock would be turned back to 1763, the year the first British warship passed into the Persian Gulf and Iran formally lost control of it. This was when it just became the Gulf, rather than the Persian Gulf, and the Arabs became subjects of the Crown of England. In the eighteenth century, the Iranian Dynasty was weak because it couldn’t fight a modern navy — the British boats could have sunk the Iranian fleet in a day. And today, while the Iranians have no illusions that their navy can sink an American carrier group, they know they can do enough damage to stop the United States from attacking. The tide is turning. Iran is calculating that the United States will get tired of Iraq, pull out, and let fall the first domino in a Persian reconquest of the Gulf. In December 2007, when Iranian President Ahmadinejad crowed that the National Intelligence Estimate — the document that confirmed Iran had stopped building a nuclear bomb — was a “declaration of surrender,” he had the Gulf in mind. The United States couldn’t beat Iran in the Gulf and it couldn’t stay there forever — and when it left, Iran would fill the void. This is precisely what the Revolutionary Guards have in mind. The Iranians understand perfectly that the only reason we care about that miserable body of water called the Persian Gulf is
that 55 percent of the world’s reserves lie beneath its shores and 17 million barrels of crude oil pass daily through the Strait of Hormuz. Given Iranian military dominance in the Gulf, Iran would be delighted to use oil for political dominance as well. So it definitely was no accident that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards chose Hormuz to put down a marker, ruin Bush’s visit to the Gulf, and remind everyone that worse would come if they weren’t careful. But it wasn’t the politics the U.S. Navy was thinking about when the fast boats challenged its ships on January 6. It was the Iranians’ military tactics. According to the New York Times, during a classified simulated war game in 2002, the Iranians were able to sink sixteen U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf. Surface-to-sea missiles, the element of surprise, and the tactics in which small, fast, agile boats swarmed the ships were able to defeat the Navy’s sophisticated defensive weapons. The Iranian tactics of approaching at high speeds, from multiple directions, left the bigger ships highly vulnerable. “The sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability, both mentally and electronically, to handle the attack,” said a retired Marine officer who participated in the war games. “The whole thing was over in maybe 10 minutes.” The American military command was forced to admit that these new Iranian tactics, as simple as they seemed, could seriously challenge our dominance of the Gulf. “It’s clear, strategically, where the Iranian military has gone,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Mike Mullen said after the January 2008 encounter. “For the years that this strategic shift toward their small, fast boats has taken place, we’ve been very focused on that.”
Another officer who participated in the 2002 war game said the idea of a “swarming attack” was taken from nature, where insects and small animals — from ants to wolves — can overwhelm a much larger animal using speed and simultaneous attacks. The banding together of many small fighters to defeat a powerful, looming threat — it’s a perfect metaphor for the Islamic fight against the Western superpower. Iran’s naval “swarming tactics” follow a trend of using relatively unsophisticated weapons to cause heavy damage. The 9/11 hijackers used ordinary box cutters and civilian airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and attack the Pentagon. The USS Cole was attacked by a small launch. In each case, less was more: simple weaponry was used to inflict massive damage of the sort usually caused by bombers or heavy artillery. Innovative tactics like these are virtually impossible to defend against, showing once again that while the United States could “conquer” Iran by bombing it into submission, it will never be able to hold Iran. There are other such tactics: Evading overhead surveillance and aerial bombardment. The Iranians know about our satellites and have buried their rockets, surface-to-air missiles, and even tanks underground and in caves, planning to pull them out minutes before an engagement. During the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israelis were constantly surprised when rockets were fired from areas they had thought were clear of Hezbollah forces. Iranian Silkworm missiles
are buried all along Iran’s shore on the Gulf, ready to be unearthed and fired at tankers or oil facilities to close Gulf shipping routes, and there’s nothing we can do about it. Secure communications. In early 1979, when Iran’s new revolutionary government broke into the Shah’s intercept sites along the Caspian Sea, they were amazed to discover how many Soviet communication channels the Shah’s secret service had been listening in to. It was a lesson the Iranians never forgot. In the eighties, the Revolutionary Guards took their communications off the air, both on the Iraq front and in Lebanon. When they did talk on the telephone or walkie-talkies, they coded their conversations, making them indecipherable to anyone listening in. They also never discussed their plans in the open, either on the phone or in large meetings. Everything important was discussed face-to-face or conveyed orally or by hand-carried messages. In the 2006 war, Hezbollah used sophisticated computer codes and electronic drop sites, defeating Israel’s most advanced intercept systems. And today, Hezbollah uses fiber optic cable technology for telephone communications, which can’t be intercepted by Israel or the United States. If Iran ever decided to attack the Gulf’s oil facilities or the United States in Iraq, we wouldn’t know about it until the first shot was fired. Secrecy. After Imad Mughniyah was assassinated, his family told the press that they’d had no idea he was a senior commander in Hezbollah’s military wing. This level of secrecy has made it nearly
impossible to place spies inside Hezbollah. To this day, the United States doesn’t know who Hezbollah’s senior field commanders are. Hiding in plain sight. Iran learned to disperse its fighting forces throughout the civilian population. Hezbollah, the allvolunteer Basij military force, and the Jerusalem Force are scattered throughout built-up urban areas, rendering our weapons virtually useless unless we’re prepared to inflict massive civilian casualties. Hezbollah picked up wide popular sympathy across the Middle East when Israel bombed Beirut’s southern suburbs, killing civilians. If America was forced to do the same, any chance of spreading a pro-democracy, pro-freedom, populist message would be lost. Car and truck bombs. Iran turned the car into a weapon as effective as heavy artillery or airpower. There’s not a tank in existence today that can’t be destroyed by a truck bomb. The immediate consequence is that Iranians can stop a conventional army from securing cities or any built-up area with heavy traffic. A couple of years ago, Hezbollah escorted me through its “battlefields” — a tour of charred car hulks and pieces of tanks and armored personnel carriers, all destroyed by car bombs. Even traditional ambushes were initiated by a car bomb to block off the front, followed by an attack at the rear, which boxed the Israelis in. In Baghdad today, the same tactics learned in Lebanon have forced U.S. troops behind blast walls and into heavier and heavier armor, isolating them from the population. Just as the Crusaders were isolated in their castles.
Code-cracking. Hezbollah and Iran learned how to crack Israeli communication codes, perhaps the first time an enemy has been able to do this since Israel’s founding in 1948. “We were able to monitor Israeli communications,” a Hezbollah official has been quoted as saying, “and we used this information to adjust our planning.” It is still not known how Hezbollah was able to make advancements in this normally esoteric side of warfare. Explosives. The Iranians are ingenious in their ability to disguise and ship explosives around the world. In one incident, a shipment of olives destined for the United States was discovered to have C-4 plastic explosives inside, shaped and painted like olives and sealed in cans. In another incident in November 1989, Spanish police seized the Cedar, a commercial cargo ship that was carrying nearly a halfton of C-4 plastic explosives surreptitiously smuggled on board by Hezbollah operatives. Sealed in 193 tin cans along with 258 20millisecond-delay electronic detonators, the explosives were of French origin and were probably headed for Western Europe, to be either sold or used for future attacks. It is suspected there were another dozen shipments like it, some undoubtedly headed for the United States. Although Iran has moved away from terrorism, its explosive caches and skills still make it potentially one of the most dangerous terrorist states in the world. This is a capability Iran would not hesitate to unleash if faced with a major war. There are thousands
of Hezbollah cadres around the world, many with European passports, ready to carry out acts of terror on Iran’s orders. Shaped and platter charges. Curiously, it was probably the United States who first convinced Iran of the effectiveness of platter charges. In the early eighties, we taught the Afghan mujahideen to pack their small iron stoves with explosives, with the stove lids acting as projectiles to penetrate light Soviet armor. The Iranians advanced the technology, shaping and milling the projectiles for a vastly more lethal effect. The U.S. military has seen the results of this advancement in both Lebanon and, today, in Iraq. Platter charges, or “explosively formed penetrators” (EFPs), have reportedly put holes in our heavy armor, including Abrams tanks. This was a remarkable battlefield shift; the Abrams tanks were supposed to meet American military needs for decades. Shaped charges can be concealed in the doors of cars or in the sides of buildings, or simply buried in the road. There is no certain defense against them. If the Iranians were to introduce EFPs in great numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan, our troops would have to retreat to fortified areas and never leave — castles we’d have to resupply by air. Electronics. When I was in Beirut in the eighties, the United States came across an Iranian explosive “firing train” that showed a sophistication we hadn’t suspected the Iranians had. “It’s pretty goddamned amazing,” the tech who looked at it told me. “A 567 tone detector… in an integrated circuit board that
activates a 555 timer IC — only precisely when the relay was open for seven seconds.” Don’t ask. But the point was that at times Iranian technical skills were as advanced as any. And Iran’s technical sophistication was found in more than just its terrorist devices. Hezbollah learned to thwart Israeli countermeasures such as radio jamming, securing its own communications. Among other things it switched to detonating bombs by lightemitting diodes that are virtually impossible to protect against. With Iran’s advancing technology and tactics, the nature of warfare in the Middle East will never be the same. Iran’s transformation to an elite asymmetric war machine certainly got Israel’s attention. As the Winograd Commission Report, the official Israeli investigation into the 34-day war of 2006, put it, “A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technological advantages.” And Iran and Hezbollah are only getting better. Deterrence credibility. Iran has convinced its enemies that attacking it comes at too high a price. As the rhetoric picked up with the United States in 2007, Iran sent emissaries to all the Gulf states with one simple message: If the United States attacks us, we will destroy your oil facilities. The Gulf Arabs closely watched the Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006. They saw how Israel was unable to protect its cities, how forty-three Israeli civilians were killed, forcing Israel to retreat from Lebanon without achieving any of its stated objectives. What could
Iran do to the Arabs, whose military isn’t even a shadow of Israel’s? What’s particularly odd about Iran’s advancement in conventional military tactics is that the West has largely ignored it, choosing instead to focus almost obsessively on whether Iran is developing nuclear weapons. It’s more evidence that we are miscalculating the nature of the Iranian threat. Right now, at least, the Iranians don’t need a nuclear bomb. If a war is to be fought in the Gulf, Iraq, or Lebanon, Iran will almost certainly fall back on its asymmetrical tactics and weapons. There are also innumerable drawbacks to rushing the development of a nuclear weapon in today’s global atmosphere — and few benefits. One reason we’re obsessed with the idea of Iran’s developing nuclear weapons is that we’re once again fighting the last war rather than this one. We remember it was Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons that stopped Iran from taking Basra. We’re worried that the Syrians intend to put chemical warheads on their Scud missiles and fire them at Tel Aviv. We’re blinded by the worst-case scenario, which happens not to be Tehran’s preferred scenario. That’s not to say Iran has lost complete interest in a nuke. As early as 1989, a year after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran started buying electromagnetic isotope separators from China, installing them in Karaj, a city just west of Tehran. The Chinese Precision Machining Import/Export Company sold Iran a three-axis
turntable, which could be converted for grinding explosive lenses for a nuclear triggering device. Iran also bought bomb technology from the rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. These were all signs that Iran planned to secretly build a bomb. The question was: Why? First, Iran wanted to counter Pakistan’s bomb — the “Sunni” bomb, as it was called — and they also believed Saddam Hussein was building one. Second, Iran wanted to be taken seriously as a major power, in the same way it wanted to control Hormuz and the world’s oil. But at the same time, the Iranians see a nuclear bomb as nice to have but not crucial to their survival. The Iranians are too smart to risk the gains they’ve made in Iraq and Lebanon by forcing the issue. The National Intelligence Estimate reflected this calculation, offering the estimate that Iran had only suspended its nuclear bomb building, rather than stopping it permanently. The neocons and Bush administration officials challenged the estimate — but to anyone who’d really been paying attention to Iran’s actions in the last six or seven years, it shouldn’t have come as a surprise at all. Iran may not yet have nukes, but it has three things that are vastly more important: highly developed asymmetrical fighting skills and weapons; a growing army of hungry, disaffected, street-smart fighters; and an invincible anticolonial message. With that, Iran has set the stage for its push toward empire — a push they’ve already begun. The next target: Turkey. 6
____________________ SEIZING THE WORLD’S ENERGY CORRIDORS: WHY IRAN WILL SHORTLY CONTROL THE MOST VITAL OIL AND GAS TRADE ROUTES There was no mistaking it: In the wake of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 revolution, Iran attracted legions of angry young Shia from across the Middle East. It didn’t matter whether they embraced the revolution in full or not — Iran was happy to have them, especially if they were prepared to fight under Iranian orders. With time, though, Iran started to look across sectarian lines, to the Sunnis — notably, to the Sunni Kurds. By the early nineties, the Iranian revolution had started to look less like a Shia revolution and more like one with universal appeal. Iran’s shadow takeover of a small piece of Iraqi Kurdistan in the mid-nineties is a perfect metaphor for Iran’s evolving tactics and strategy. There are two different notions of “Kurdistan” in the Middle East today. First, there’s Iraqi Kurdistan, which has been a more or less independent state since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Since the 2003 invasion, Iraqi Kurdistan has been governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government, a sovereign government in all but name, although it doesn’t print its own currency or legally export its oil.
At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that the Iraqi Kurds only agreed to join the American-created Iraqi government after they were promised the Iraqi presidency. The position, currently filled by Jalal Talabani, a Kurd from a small village in northern Iraq, is largely ceremonial. But after hundreds of years of Sunni Arab and Ottoman subjugation, this acknowledgment of Kurdish ethnicity and equality was enough. And the Kurds also believe that they received an implicit promise to absorb the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, along with Kirkuk’s million barrels of oil a day. The other “Kurdistan” is Greater Kurdistan, which loosely refers to ethnic Kurds dispersed among northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, eastern Syria, and northwestern Iran. The Kurds, an IndoEuropean people who speak an Iranian language, are estimated to number anywhere from 25 to 35 million. They make up 15-20 percent of Iraq’s population, 20 percent of Turkey’s, 7 percent of Iran’s, and 8 percent of Syria’s. As the Kurds will tell you, they are the largest ethnic group without their own country. While the rest of the world dismissed Greater Kurdistan as strategically insignificant, Iran saw that the Kurds sit astride the most strategic areas of the world — a crossroads between Iraq and Europe, between the Arab peninsula and the Caucasus, between Iran and Europe. Iran also saw the Kurds as a convenient proxy to stir up problems in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, inciting them when it served Iran’s interests. It didn’t matter in the least to Tehran that the Kurds were overwhelmingly Sunni, just as long as they were a thorn in their neighbors’ side. Iran’s interests in the Kurds are several. Iran would like to
position itself as the predominant influence among Kurds — as their protector, even. At the same time, Iran intends to keep a brake on the creation of a greater Kurdish state, which Iranian Kurds would clamor to be a part of. Iran’s offer to the Kurds is that it will grant the Kurds a large degree of suzerainty over their own lives, but it will not tolerate a completely independent Kurdish state — in Iraq, Iran, or anywhere else. But on a more tactical level, the Iranians see in the Kurds an instrument to undermine their neighbors: if Turkey or Iraq opposes Tehran on some issue vital to Iran, Tehran will fund and arm Kurdish guerrillas in those countries to hit back. It’s another side of proxy warfare. The moment Saddam Hussein lost control of Iraqi Kurdistan at the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Iran sent officers from the Revolutionary Guards into Iraqi Kurdistan. Their first objective was to hunt down Iranian Kurds who had taken refuge there. At the same time, the Guards started to recruit and arm Iraqi Kurds to raise an insurgency against Baghdad. Recruits against Saddam weren’t hard to find. The Kurds historically never wanted to be a part of Arab Iraq, and they had fought the regime off and on for years. But by 1991, ravaged by war, the Kurds were on the edge of starvation. They needed everything, from gasoline to wheat to guns and ammunition. Iran kept its border wide open to Iraq’s Kurds — a sign of goodwill the Kurds wouldn’t forget. At some point, the Revolutionary Guards started to fund and arm the Turkish guerrilla group called the Kurdistan Workers’
Party, or the PKK. Although the PKK is made up entirely of Kurds with Turkish citizenship, their only sure sanctuary from the Turkish army is the high mountains of Kurdish Iraq. The PKK’s goal is to establish a socialist, independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Iran’s motivations at first weren’t completely clear. Did they want to provoke a civil war in Turkey? Or somehow drive a wedge between Turkey and the European Community, by forcing the Turks to clamp down and anger the Kurds’ European supporters? It was known that Iran was determined that if Turkey were to have one important alliance, it would be with Iran rather than NATO, which Turkey already belongs to, or the European Union, which Turkey would like to join. Still, funding the PKK seemed an odd way for Iran to win Turkey. Iran’s inroads into Iraqi Kurdistan went largely unnoticed, because it’s one of the most desolate, remote parts of the world. With few exceptions, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran banned the press from entering northern Iraq. And there were no air links into Iraqi Kurdistan until after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. So, as with many vital strategic shifts in the world, Iran managed to impose its will quietly. By the time anyone in the West noticed what Iran was doing, it was too late to do anything about it. In the mid-1990s, when I was in Iraqi Kurdistan and still working for the CIA, I got a glimpse of how the Iranian takeover worked. I knew, of course, that Iran had its eye on the Shia-
dominated south of Iraq. But Iraqi Kurdistan, in the north, was another story. We had little idea what was going on there, because the only American view was from 25,000 feet — the F-16 jets that enforced the no-fly zone over Kurdistan. I was there only a week when I started hearing rumors that Iran had annexed a thin slice of Iraqi Kurdistan along the mountainous Iranian border, including the town of Hajj Umran. Frankly, this didn’t seem likely. The Kurds who live in those mountains have a reputation for being stubbornly independent, prepared to die to defend their steep, bare defiles. Historically, they had nursed a deep hatred for Persians, a hatred that was only exacerbated by Khomeini’s revolution. Taking into account Iran’s geopolitical interests, one could understand why Iran would want to control Kurdistan, which was located in a sensitive border area. But why would Sunni Kurds go along with it? Had Iran really succeeded in breaching this sectarian divide — and no one noticed? When I asked, I was told there were no Iranian troops actually in Kurdistan. Rather, Iran had created a surrogate army, Kurdish Hezbollah, a name borrowed from the more famous Hezbollah in Lebanon. (This is Iran’s version of branding.) Iran’s intent was to have control over the area without invading it, I was told. The Revolutionary Guards funded and trained Kurdish Hezbollah, and worked side by side with the man who headed it, Adham Barzani, a Sunni Muslim. He was a man worth talking to. Even today, I laugh when looking back at that trip. It was something out of an Evelyn Waugh novel — this stealth invasion of a land in the back of beyond, the naïve adventurer in his pith helmet
unearthing a momentous truth. But then again sometimes that’s all spying is about, a windshield tour of someplace the average American would never dare go. In a bitter early-February cold, two other CIA officers and I set out from Salah ad-Din, a small town in the north we were based in. There was never much traffic on the roads in Iraqi Kurdistan, but that morning we had the road completely to ourselves. It had rained all night, a chilly downpour that kept promising to turn to snow. After a two-hour drive, we descended into a broad valley. Patches of low-lying clouds obscured most of the surrounding mountains, which rose to nearly 4,000 meters. The snow line was just above the valley floor. I had a sense now of just how cut off northern Iraq was from the rest of the country, and how easily and quickly Saddam must have lost it. He would have had a hard time supplying his troops there, let alone retaking those mountains. I was starting to see how it was possible for Iran to quietly annex this piece of Iraq. You couldn’t miss Adham Barzani’s lair, a fortified stone house on an outcrop looking out over the Zagros Mountains where they spill into Iraq. A tangle of barbed wire, trenches, and sandbagged, belt-fed machine guns covered the approach to the house. An antiaircraft gun sat perched on the roof. Barzani’s guards fixed us with a steady stare as we drove up. With their trimmed beards, olive-drab jackets lined with synthetic fur, and scuffed boots, they could have passed as Revolutionary Guards. They had the same messianic look I’d seen in Revolutionary Guards’ eyes in Balabakk in the eighties. They were
believers who knew the apocalypse was near and felt contempt for us, the unbelievers, who couldn’t see it. One of the gunmen showed us into a room with a half-dozen filthy mattresses on the floor. He watched as we took off our shoes and sat down. Noticing the cold, he went off to find mazout for the stove. He came back with a bucket, poured it into the cast-iron stove, and lit a match to get it going. He then turned around and left without saying a word. Five minutes later, Adham Barzani walked in. Like his soldiers, he was dressed in olive-drab. We shook hands and sat back down. Adham noticed we didn’t have the customary green tea and called out for one of the guards to bring us some. It was Ramadan, and Adham was fasting, but that didn’t stop him from being a good host. Adham grinned. He said he’d just had a visit from a couple of Iranians, who knew that we were on the way to see him. “And how could they possibly have known that?” he said, his smile widening. “You were supposed to be here yesterday, not today.” We both knew who’d told the Iranians about our visit: Masud Barzani, the pro-American head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and our host in northern Iraq. Masud was Adham’s cousin. But that wasn’t what led Masud to tip off the Iranians. Like the rest of the Kurds, Masud depended on Iran for refined gasoline, wheat, and anything else the Kurds still needed to stay alive. There was no chance that Masud or his cousin would go behind Iran’s back, especially when it came to dealing with the
CIA. Today, Masud is the head of the Kurdistan Regional Government. We continued with small talk. Adham spoke about the fighting going on between the Iranian-backed Kurdish Hezbollah and a Kurdish group headed by Jalal Talabani — the same Jalal Talabani who is now the president of Iraq. “I didn’t start it,” Adham said defensively. “Talabani did.” At the time, Talabani was in a hot war with both Barzanis, Masud and Adham. But it was a turf war that had nothing to do with Iran, because when it came to economics, Talabani was as beholden to Iran as the Barzanis were. All these Kurdish groups were, to some degree, allies of Iran. We sat sipping our tea, not saying anything. I was deciding how to bring up Iran’s rumored annexation. It’s not the kind of question you ask someone on Iran’s payroll, or at least not out of the blue. Instead I offered my usual boilerplate: It would be a good idea if the Kurds stopped fighting one another, I suggested, and turned their guns on the common enemy, Saddam Hussein. Adham ignored my suggestion. “Why doesn’t America stop Muslims from being killed in Bosnia and Chechnya?” he asked. “How can the United States remain silent, a country that is supposed to stand for human rights?” Naturally, I thought. I wondered if he’d just finished reading an editorial in Kayhan, Iran’s hard-line, regime-backed newspaper that reminds its readers every morning that Islam is locked in a war for its very existence, that Muslims are oppressed everywhere, and that if the Russians kill a Chechen, they might as well have killed an
Iranian. The unspoken thought that hung in the air was that we didn’t have a lot to say to each other. Barzani was relieved when I said I wanted to see the Iranian border before dark. He offered to send an escort with us. Outside, the marble sky dropped its first snowflakes. A pair of Nissan pickups stood idling, belt-fed machine guns perched over their cabs. The gunners wore bug-eyed goggles and old-fashioned hunting caps with the flaps down but untied. I had to hold back a laugh. A slight man in a heavy, olive-drab wool coat climbed into the passenger seat next to me. “My name is Dulayr Surkan. I’m an officer in the Sepah.” Sepah is short for the Revolutionary Guards. Okay, I thought. I had no idea whether Dulayr was an Iraqi or an Iranian Kurd. But the message was clear: The Iranians had their eyes on us. As we were about to pull away, there was a tap on the window. It was Adham, a plastic bag in his hand — sandwiches for lunch. “Why not stop in Choman on your way?” he asked. “You can talk to my Shura. I’ve already arranged it.” The Shura is Hezbollah’s politburo. The road north to Choman took us even higher into the mountains. The farther we went up, the more red triangles we saw alongside the road — warnings of buried land mines. Dulayr said some of the heaviest fighting of the Iran-Iraq War had occurred here. Choman had been flattened, as had Hajj Umran. Iranian
troops had occupied large parts of the north during much of the war. Saddam hadn’t had the troops to dislodge them. We pulled into a walled compound on the outskirts of Choman, stopping in front of a one-story unfinished cinderblock building. Rebars stuck out of the roof, someone’s promise to add a second story one day. Dulayr jumped out and shook hands with a bearded man standing at the front door. He was wearing a Central Asian chopan, a tube-shaped cloak. He pointedly ignored us and led Dulayr into the building. We filed in after them, into a room with cheap synthetic carpets and recently whitewashed walls. There was no furniture, and we sat down on the floor facing a photograph of Ayatollah Khomeini staring down at us accusingly. This time no one bothered to turn on the heater or bring us tea. In the distance, east of Choman, there was the sound of heavy artillery. Someone outside cleared a.50-caliber machine gun, rattling the windows in their frames. Ten minutes later, Adham’s Shura walked in: six bearded men in their thirties and forties, all wearing black clerical robes. They sat down across from us on the other side of the room. They didn’t say a word, waiting for me to start. Suddenly realizing that Adham hadn’t explained to them who we were, for a moment I had no idea what to say. Finally, in the most formal Arabic I could muster, I offered the same boilerplate I’d offered Adham: Let’s get rid of Saddam. But even as I said it, I knew I wasn’t helping. All six men looked at me blankly, no doubt
wondering whether my words contained some coded message. Had we come all the way from America to tell them that? I asked a few questions about the road to Hajj Umran, land mines, the economy. “Good. Thanks be to God,” they replied. I ran out of questions, and we were left with an uncomfortable silence. They were as relieved as Adham had been when I thanked them for our talk. But the real eye-opener was still ahead. After an hour’s drive, Dulayr motioned for me to stop in the middle of a couple of dozen mounds of snow, with an occasional brick or two-by-four sticking out. “Welcome to Hajj Umran,” Dulayr said. Iranian artillery barrages during the Iran-Iraq War hadn’t left a house standing. The only building in sight was an Iranian blockhouse on the other side of the border, about a hundred yards away. A half-dozen Iranian border guards watched us through binoculars. So, being good tourists, we got out our cameras and started taking pictures of them. Almost immediately the driver of the escort pickup, walkietalkie in his hand, came running toward us. He whispered to Dulayr, who turned to me. “ Iran does not allow pictures here,” he said, apologetically. I knew what was going on but still asked, incredulously, “ Iran’s in charge on this side of the border?” Dulayr’s silence answered my question. Iran, of course, owned both sides of the border, and the rumors were right: Iran had annexed a piece of Iraq. It didn’t matter that there were no Iranian troops inside Kurdistan. Iran didn’t need them as long as they had
their proxy Adham Barzani watching out for their interests. The answer to my question of what Iran intended to do with Kurdistan wouldn’t come until later, when it was learned that Adham, only months after my visit, had started shipping weapons and ammunition to the PKK — Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party. At the time, the PKK was preparing for a new offensive against the Turkish government. Barzani, we knew, was acting on the orders of the Revolutionary Guards. Passing the arms and money through Kurdish Hezbollah provided Iran another layer of deniability. The question then was: Would Iran get away with it? It was assumed in Washington that the Turks would find out and take some sort of reprisal. Turkey could either close the border with Iran in a diplomatic protest, or turn the tables on Iran by arming Iran’s Kurds. On the face of it, it seemed that Iran’s backing of Turkey’s Sunni Kurds was a risky policy. Wasn’t Iran worried about causing the blow-back that comes with inciting ethnic and sectarian divisions, Turks versus Kurds? Iran had already had one bad experience with this in the past. In November 1979, a radical Saudi messianic sect seized Islam’s holiest site, the Mecca Mosque, shaking the Muslim world to its core. In the long, bloody siege that followed, the attackers were killed or executed before the Saudis could properly interrogate them. But it’s generally accepted that Khomeini’s revolution in February 1979 and the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, were the catalyst for the Mecca
attack. The attackers were inspired by Iran’s revolution, and at the same time they were convinced that because of the weakness of Al Saud, Sunni Islam itself was under threat from the Shia — a prelude to end times. And they believed that true Muslims — Sunnis — had to have undisputed control of Mecca when the apocalypse arrived. The Sunni reaction to Khomeini wasn’t confined to Saudi Arabia. In Pakistan, another Sunni state with a tradition of strong Islamic fundamentalism, the government declared Islamic law, along with steps such as banning liquor in military messes and pouring money into its conservative madrassas, or schools. Things turned violent on November 21, 1979, the day Mecca was seized, when Pakistani students burned the U.S. embassy in Islamabad while the Pakistani government stood by and watched. The students were incited by rumors the United States was somehow behind the Mecca attack. But Khomeini’s revolution also played a part, with Pakistan unsure how its own Shia would react to it. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in December 1979, Pakistan’s insecurities only worsened. Pakistan insisted that American money and arms in Afghanistan be funneled to Sunni Afghan fundamentalists, intending that they serve as a quarantine to keep Khomeini’s revolution from infecting Pakistan and its Shia. Pakistan was too absorbed by its war of conviction with Iran to realize it was indiscriminately funding the most radical Sunni fundamentalist movements. Even today, Pakistan’s greatest worry after India is Iran. With 20 percent of Pakistan’s population Shia, and the country seemingly ripping apart at the seams, Pakistan’s leadership feels that
it has no choice but to fall back on political Islam as a last defense. As late as May 2008, the Pakistani government was backing Sunni militants in Taliban-dominated northwest frontier tribal areas to fight against the small Shia enclave Parachinar — a place Pakistan believes Iran is meddling in. Pakistan had to overlook the fact that the money it sent was ending up in the hands of the so-called Taliban takfiris. The Middle East is a world of shifting definitions. But the word takfiri generally refers to a Sunni Muslim who looks at the world in black-and-white: there are true believers and then there are nonbelievers, with no shades in between. A takfiri’s mission is to re-create the Caliphate according to a literal interpretation of the Koran. Anyone who is not a true believer is by definition a kafir — an atheist — who either submits to second-class citizenship under Islamic rule or is destroyed. Along with convictions like these comes a readiness to slaughter, assassinate, and ethnically cleanse nonbelievers. Takfiris are not unlike the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian Communists who slaughtered a million people to “purify” Cambodia; or the terrorists who truck-bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden often are classified as takfiris in the larger definition of the term. Takfiri demands are impracticable. They propose turning the clock back to seventh-century Arabia, living under nomadic tribal customs that were never meant to adapt to the twenty-first century. The Taliban banned toothpaste, for example, because the prophet
didn’t use it. Unlike Hezbollah and Iran, the takfiris care less about occupying ground and more about overthrowing “apostate regimes” in the Middle East, from Mubarak’s Egypt to the Al Saud in Saudi Arabia — a world Islamic revolution. Their failure to establish a lasting takfiri government in Afghanistan under the Taliban wasn’t a deterrent in the least; divinely ordained revolutions don’t worry about small setbacks like this. In looking at Iran’s support to the PKK and the risk Iran took in attempting to undermine a Sunni country, it’s important to understand the wider context: Sunnis, in supporting takfiri movements, suffer a morbid, existential angst. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are relatively new nations — Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932, Pakistan in 1947. Both bank on Islam, if for no other reason than to hold their countries together. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan almost seem to have been a religion first, upon which they then built their nations. To a lesser degree, Turks are from the same mold. Today, they’re increasingly falling back on Sunni Islam as a bond to overcome their ethnic and sectarian divides. And for the Sunni Turks, like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s revolution will always be the joker in the pack: a resurgent, victorious Shia order challenges both Sunni supremacy and its legitimacy. With Sunni Islam under a worsening threat, takfiris lash out blindly and viciously — against Shia, the United States, the West, or anything else they feel threatens their existence. Area weapons, weapons of mass destruction — whether car bombings, massacres, or flying planes into buildings — are directed against civilians. The
Sunni takfiris react against inanimate objects as well, as when the Taliban blew up two massive Buddha stone carvings near Bamiyan, Afghanistan. The Sunni saw the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and his Shia followers as the end of their world — an imperative to use any weapon available to stop the fall. Was Iran worried about a Sunni backlash in Turkey, rousing Turkish takfiris? Or that the Turks might back Sunni takfiris in Iran? Again, we have no public record of the motives behind Iran’s decision. But one thing is clear: By 1996 Iran, thanks to its experience in Lebanon, understood a lot more about managing an insurgency and overcoming sectarian divisions than it did in 1979. When Iran started arming and supplying Turkey’s Kurds, urging them to launch attacks inside Turkey’s borders in an attempt to destabilize the government, it underscored Iran’s transition to a more calculating, pragmatic power that aggressively pursues its core foreign policy interests. But now it was minus religion and ideology. The Iranians would never admit they had abandoned Khomeini’s revolution, but that’s what in fact had happened. Funding the Kurdish PKK — a Marxist-Leninist cult with few beliefs in common with Shia Islam — was a radical departure from the early, radical sectarian ideology of revolutionary Iran. Iran’s incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan turned out to be an unqualified success. First, since Iran knew from the Lebanon experience how to hide its hand in a proxy war, Turkey was never able to make a case against Iran. Second, Iran also knew how to keep a tight rein on its proxies, on men like Adham Barzani. And
finally, the Iranians knew how to tread lightly in Iraqi Kurdistan. They never attempted to spread Persian culture, garrison Iranian troops there, or convert the Sunni Kurds to Shia Islam. One irony of it all is that today there are hundreds of American missionaries in Iraqi Kurdistan, attempting to convert the Kurds to Christianity. The Kurds ask themselves the question: Who are the religious fundamentalists here, the Americans or the Iranians? The United States didn’t fully grasp Iran’s inroads into Kurdistan, partly because it didn’t understand Iran’s tactics or strategy. Washington still looks at Iran through the prism of World War II. We’re comfortable fighting a war of fixed battles, fixed objectives, and easily definable enemies such as Nazi Germany or Saddam’s Iraq. Where our vision fades is where the enemy doesn’t follow these rules. When we invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, we went to war against the Taliban and al Qaeda not understanding that they are religious convictions, not countries. Neither Osama bin Laden nor Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s leader, can be neatly classified as a head of state, a military commander, or even a religious leader. Unable to define the enemy, the United States declared war on an idea — one that now spans the Afghan and Pakistani borders and is spreading like a virus around the world. How do you wage war against an idea, a way of thinking? America is not only still fighting World War II, it also sees the world through nineteenth-century ideologies of fascism, communism, liberalism, and democracy. Reducing the Taliban to
Islamofascists obscures the terms of the conflict. And again, by lumping Iran into that same category, we are seriously mistaken. For a start, unlike Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, Iran manipulates belief, allowing it to adapt and appeal across sectarian and political lines. In contrast, the Taliban and al Qaeda can’t cross that divide, because their doctrine forbids them to deal with Muslims like the Shia, who are apostates, according to the takfiris’ dualistic view of the world. Iran has also been helped by its hybrid political system, which allows it to manipulate international law. Iran doesn’t accept Western definitions of how the world should be organized. The way Iran sees it, Iran didn’t sign the Peace of Westphalia, which established the modern nation-state system in 1648, so there’s no need for Tehran to pay any attention to it. Iran’s lines of power and authority are almost impossible to follow. They seem to change between morning and night. But again, what’s critical to understand is that real executive authority doesn’t reside with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but rather with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Khamenei is part cleric, part mediator, part dictator, part military commander, and part police chief. He governs more like a twelfth-century pope than an American president. But what he definitely is not is a totalitarian fascist like Adolf Hitler. The Revolutionary Guards, Khamenei’s Praetorian Guard, is a hybrid too. Only half integrated into Iran’s military, it is a blend of paramilitary force, conventional military, and business conglomerate whose interests are almost impossible to follow for anyone outside
the system. It would be incomprehensible to Americans if the Pentagon were to open up a tire factory and go into competition with Goodyear. But that’s more or less what the Revolutionary Guards do. Iran is not a totalitarian state. It has checks and balances, and Khamenei rules by a consensus obscure even to insiders. During the Lebanon hostage crisis, for example, when Iran kidnapped dozens of hostages, it was difficult to tell who was in charge in Tehran. At one point a family friend of Ayatollah Rafsanjani, who served as Iran’s president from 1989 to 1997, came to Lebanon to look for his brother, who had been kidnapped in 1982. After failing to negotiate his brother’s release, the man started kidnapping Westerners himself, intending to exchange them for his brother. This man didn’t belong to any official Iranian government agency; his mosque in Tehran underwrote the kidnappings. But when the Revolutionary Guards complained about him, Rafsanjani told them it was none of their business. No one dared refer the matter to Khomeini, because the man’s family was politically important. The man never did get his brother released — as it turned out, he’d been murdered — but the point is that there are nonstate actors in Iran who assume the role of the state. The lines are blurred. Iran, then, saw no contradiction in confronting Turkey in an underhanded way, ignoring the nation-state system. Undermining Turkey using Sunni Kurds — proxies — was a legitimate tactic as far as Tehran was concerned, just as long as it didn’t get caught red-handed. Only Iran’s interests mattered, not the West’s rule of law. And again, the Iranians asked themselves, why should Iran
care about the nation-state system anyway — a system that puts Iran at a clear disadvantage? Finally, unlike Washington, Iran views its vital interests through the prism of history — history we either never knew or have chosen to ignore. Iranians are still driven by ancient conflicts and grievances, ones dating back to the Achaemenid empire of the fifth and sixth centuries B.C., the Crusades, the Persian-Ottoman wars, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonialism. The Iranians remember as if it were yesterday when the Soviet Union used the Iranian Communist Tudeh Party to undermine Iran. Today’s Iran sees the West through the prism of the Crusades, with NATO as the modern-day Crusader alliance and Turkey as NATO’s foothold in the Middle East. This perception is only rein-forced by the alliance between Turkey and Israel, and the large U.S. military base in Incirlik, Turkey. What’s to stop the United States from using Turkey to invade Iran — to launch the kind of modern-day crusade Bush has threatened? Or for that matter, what’s to stop the United States from arming Iranian Kurds and using Turkey as a rear base? Just as the Americans reduce war to a fight against totalitarianism and fascism, the Iranians reduce war to defensive struggles against occupation and colonialism. The Iranian regime, rather than justifying its aggressive foreign policy in terms of spreading the faith or creating an empire, falls back on a claim of righting historical wrongs. This makes it a lot easier to rouse the average Iranian or Hezbollah’s faithful. And by defining its wars as defensive, Iran can justify enlisting non-Shia allies, whether they’re
Sunnis or the Marxist PKK. It’s within this greater historical and geopolitical context — Iran’s sense of the drift of history — that Iran decided it could risk a conflict with Turkey. There’s another side to Iran that makes it difficult for Americans to understand the country. Iranians look at geography differently from the way we do. When we look at a map of Iran and Turkey, we see a bold, fixed border separating the two countries. An Iranian may see that same line, but he also sees the Royal Road, the ancient trade route that ran from Iran, across Mesopotamia and Anatolia, to Europe. When he looks at a map of China and Central Asia, he’s reminded of the Khorasan Highway, the trade route that linked Persia with the East. These are historic corridors of commerce and corridors of invasion, and today they’re corridors of energy. The Silk Road and the empires along it were arteries of invasion and trade, and the Iranians today look at trade routes to export the Middle East’s oil and natural gas. Dominating these trade routes not only means securing energy export routes for Iran’s exports, it also means controlling Iran’s neighbors. If Saudi Arabia can’t export its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, it collapses. If Iran stops gas exports to Turkey, the lights go off in Ankara. Not surprisingly, Turkey discovered that Iran was arming the PKK. But the Turks chose to ignore it, deciding they couldn’t risk confronting Iran and losing it as a source of gas. Putting its anger aside, Turkey went ahead and signed a 10-billion-cubic-meter
natural gas deal with Iran, to extend over twenty-five years. Turkey also signed a parallel deal to buy gas from the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan, which would transit through Iran. The United States actively opposed the deal, but Turkey turned a deaf ear. Economics trumped politics. In 2001, again over strong, public U.S. protests, Iran and Turkey signed a deal to invest $3.5 billion in Iran’s South Pars megafield. The South Pars/North Dome gas condensate field, which sits in the middle of the Persian Gulf and is shared by Qatar and Iran, is the biggest gas field in the world. With South Pars’s 1900 trillion cubic feet of gas, Turkey knew that the field could keep it and Europe warm for the next thirty years. The United States would counter the South Pars deal by offering Turkey natural gas from Iraq’s Anbar Province, but the Turks knew that one way or another gas would have to pass through a route effectively controlled by Iran — through either Syria or Iraqi Kurdistan. If Turkey had to deal with Iranian-allied Kurds, it asked itself, why not just deal with Iran directly? Nothing the United States said could deter Turkey. “ Iran and Turkey are two friendly countries,” Turkey’s prime minister said in late 2007, “and Turkey will continue to import gas from Iran.” Turkey’s alliance with Israel also apparently didn’t figure into Turkey’s calculations. “ U.S. and Israeli opposition to importing gas from Iran is not important,” the prime minister declared, “because they cannot meet Turkey’s need for energy, and Turkey must fulfill its needs from
Russia and Iran.” At the end of the day, the raw economic numbers were on Tehran’s side rather than Washington’s. As the world’s secondlargest producer of natural gas after Russia, Iran is Turkey’s only alternative supplier if relations with Russia go sour. And as the second-largest producer of oil in OPEC, Iran could meet much of Turkey’s increased demand for oil over the coming years. As global energy markets have tightened, it has become evident that Iran doesn’t need to invade northern Iraq or Turkey to exert its influence. Iran’s gas and oil, and the energy corridors it sits on, are more effective. Iran’s bet in Kurdistan paid off, convincing the Iranians more than ever that controlling the world’s energy bloodstream is the way to become a superpower. And now there were other energy corridors to conquer. Afghanistan has long been a source of instability and strategic interest for Iran. Under both the Shah and Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran demonstrated that it will take almost any measure to keep western Afghanistan out of the hands of its enemies. In 1996, for instance, Iran’s National Security Council voted in an emergency meeting to invade Afghanistan and capture Herat to stop the Taliban from marching on Iran’s border. Ultimately, the Taliban threat subsided and Iran didn’t need to invade