The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

1

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

The author and publisher wish to express their thanks to ADI for their assistance in the preparation of this book.

Other books by this author The Citizen General Staff: The Australian Intelligence Corps 1907–1914 A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges, KCB, CMG Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia 1911–1986 No Australian Need Apply: The Troubled Career of Lieutenant-General Gordon Legge Action Stations Coral Sea: The Australian Commander’s Story The Third Brother: The Royal Australian Air Force 1921–1939 Edge of Centre: The Eventful Life of Group Captain Gerald Packer White Ensign 1939–1945: The Navy Goes to War (with Tina Coulthard-Clark) The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster (with Bruce Loxton) The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War 1962–1975 Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935–1995 Soldiers in Politics: The Impact of the Military on Australian Political Life and Institutions McNamara, VC: A Hero’s Dilemma Hit my Smoke! Targeting the Enemy in Vietnam From the Ground Up: The Training of RAAF Technical Ground Staff 1948–1993 Breaking Free: Transforming Australia’s Defence Industry Australia’s Military Map-makers: The Royal Australian Survey Corps 1915–1996 Edited Collections R.J. Brownell, From Khaki to Blue: The Autobiography of Air Commodore R.J. Brownell, CBE, MC, MM Gables, Ghosts and Governors-General: The Historic House at Yarralumla, Canberra The Diggers: Makers of the Australian Military Tradition

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

2

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles Chris Coulthard-Clark

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

3

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

First published 1998 This edition published in 2001 Copyright © Chris Coulthard-Clark 1998 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10% of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Allen & Unwin 83 Alexander Street Crows Nest NSW 2065 Australia Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218 Email: [email protected] Web: www.allenandunwin.com National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: Coulthard-Clark, C. D. (Christopher David), 1951- . The encyclopaedia of Australia’s battles. [New ed.] Includes index. 1. Battles—Encyclopaedias. 2. Battles—Australia—Encyclopaedias. 3. Australia— History, Military—Encyclopaedias. I. Coulthard-Clark, C. D. (Christopher David), 1951—Where australians fought. II. Title. 355.40994 Designed and set in 10 pt Fairfield by Steven Dunbar Printed and bound by South Wind Productions, Singapore 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

4

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

TO THE AUSTRALIAN MEN AND WOMEN WHO DIED IN WAR

Black Wars

Unknown

Maori Wars (1860–1866)

20 approximately

Sudan (1885)

6

Boer War (1899–1902)

606

Boxer Rebellion (1900–1901)

6

World War I (1914–1918)

61,919

World War II (1939–1945)

39,366

Korean War (1950–1953)

339

Malayan Emergency (1950–1960)

36

Indonesian Confrontation (1963–1966)

15

Vietnam War (1962–73)

520

Somalia (1992–1993)

1

East Timor (1999– )

2

The numbers cited here are taken from the national roll of honour at the Australian War Memorial.

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

5

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

Introduction

T

his book attempts to provide a record of all the major battles in which Australians have been involved, or which have taken place on Australian soil within recorded history. Listed are 311 actions covering more than 200 years since European settlement of the continent began. Included within its scope are not just formal engagements between armies, navies and air forces, but—using a somewhat more liberal definition of what constitutes a battle—many significant episodes of frontier conflict and and civil strife or unrest which have come to carry also the appellation of ‘battles’ in popular memory.

Thus the reader will find here such notable incidents as the use of troops to crush the 1804 convict revolt outside Sydney (Vinegar Hill) and the 1854 rebellion by miners on the Ballarat goldfield (Eureka Stockade), along with many of the clashes occurring between Aborigines and explorers, settlers, troops or mounted police. For other instances, though, the rationale for inclusion might not be so obvious, especially when the armed force applied came from non-military agencies—as in the case of the siege of Glenrowan in 1880. In these cases, the reader must look for the special circumstances associated with these events, either in terms of the nature of the violence used or the political overtones associated with either the motivating cause or the outcome. Although the object from the outset was to make the work as definitive as possible in its scope, this nonetheless entailed exercising an unexpected degree of choice over which episodes to include. After noting all the largescale and well-known engagements which obviously ought to go in, there remained a range of lesser actions which—when judged on other factors such as duration or intensity of fighting, number of casualties involved, or decisiveness (political as well as military) of the outcome— were also worthy of selection. When focusing on this range of ‘lesser’ actions, however, there was often considerable difficulty in separating out those that might be described as especially noteworthy from others which were essentially the same. For instance, the Pacific island campaign of the Second World War produced

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

6

many more actions than appear here, but it has been possible to recognise only a certain number which—for one reason or another—stand out. There is another sense, it must be acknowledged, in which this work could never hope to achieve the goal of being definitive. In dealing with the the drawn-out conflict which raged for almost the entire nineteenth century along the fringes of settlement in Australia, much transpired which remains unknown or only partially recorded today. Since one party to the conflict, the Aborigines, lacked the written means to document their experience, we are largely reliant on information left to posterity by their white opponents. Often it was not in the interests of the latter group to preserve details of what happened, but apart from this it can be seen that even what we do now know is purely one-sided in the accounts provided of events. Recognising this limitation also gives rise to the obvious further point that warfare did not suddenly come to Australian shores only four centuries ago with the arrival of the white man. Inclusion of the 1829 skirmish between Aborigines (Hyde Park) is a reminder that the continent’s indigenous inhabitants had their own experience of armed conflict which both predated and existed concurrent with European colonisation, but is something about which we know practically nothing. This only emphasises that the concept of a battle as a contest between formal military forces is not universally applicable to all cultures, and provides an impulse for adopting a wider view of what constitutes warfare for the purposes of this book.

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

Organisationally, the battles appear chronologically and with each episode shown by a title which refers to the geographic location of its occurrence. Listing by date order is intended to provide the general reader with a sense of the sequence of events and the correlation in time between battles in different theatres of operations. Naming actions according to their location is a widely accepted practice, but in this work results in some episodes being listed under titles other than those by which they are often better known. For example, the naval action referred to here as ‘Cocos Islands’ (1914) is perhaps more commonly called the Sydney–Emden clash, while few will recognise the 1941 action involving the second Sydney and the German raider Kormoran under the designation of ‘Carnarvon’ used here. In such cases, a check of the index for units or commanders known to have been participants will help identify the relevant entry. In more than a few instances, it may seem strange to the reader to include an action when there were very few Australian personnel involved. This is especially true of episodes in several of Britain’s colonial wars (such as Chitral, Hmawang and the early battles of the Boer War), but occurs even later in the World Wars (as in Ctesiphon or Dieppe). It should, of course, be clear that there is no intention of trying to ‘claim’ these as Australian battles; rather, the point is to establish the extent of Australian involvement in these actions and to place them, quite properly, within Australia’s military heritage. The criterion applied in these cases is that the personnel present were members of a formed Australian unit or involved in an official capacity, rather than serving as enlistees in the forces of another country. The only exception to this rule is where personnel formed a distinct or identifiably Australian component—as in the case of the Waikato Militia in New Zealand or the AIF men who late in the First World War were recruited directly into organisations such as Dunsterforce and the British North Russian

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

7

Relief Force. Where Australians serving as peacekeepers became involved in significant actions, as in the Gulf of Oman, these too have been included. Some episodes have been included which might best be characterised as non-events, such as the attack at Peitang in China in 1900 or the Royal Australian Navy’s expedition to Malaita in 1927. Their inclusion derives from the fact that Australians were involved in a theatre of active operations (which fact may itself be little known, as in the case of Malaita) or were intended to be involved in a specific action (as at Peitang). In case it might be argued that this provides examples of where Australians served rather than where they fought, it should be noted that the involvement of Australian personnel in some campaigns was occasionally in non-combatant roles—for example, radio operators in Mesopotamia in the First World War—but in performing their normal battlefield duty they frequently came under fire. Finally, it should be mentioned that the works listed at the foot of most entries serve two purposes. First, the items cited may be recommended as further reading where more information is sought. Second, the author’s role in this book was often to find the fullest and hopefully most reliable version, and to correct inaccuracies or update interpretive aspects of an incident’s significance. The listed works therefore frequently represent the best or most pertinent (but rarely exclusive) references utilised in compiling the relevant entry, and as such may be useful in identifying the source of a particular interpretation adopted. While the aim in all cases has been to provide the most authoritative yet brief factual account possible, the attempt has been made to reflect recent scholarship on the subject. This has meant that the account given may sometimes be at variance with the popularly-received version of events, but represents where the best available information or most cogent study has come up with a divergent view, which the author has accepted. Chris Coulthard-Clark

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

viii

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Chronology of Battles Date

Australian mainland

1789, Mar. 6 1795, June 1797, Mar. 1804, Mar. 5 1804, May 3 1816, Apr. 17 1819 1824, Sept.–Nov. 1826, Dec. 1829, Feb. 1829, Dec. 26 1830, Sept.–Oct. 1830, Oct.–Nov. 1834, Oct. 28 1836, May 27 1838, Jan. 26 1838, Apr. 11 1838, June 9 1840, Mar. 8 1840, May 1841, Apr. 16, May 13 1841, June 20, Aug. 26–27 1841, Sept. 6 1842, Mar. 28 1842, Aug. 7, 10, 18 1843, Sept. 19 (21?) 1845, June 28 1846, Feb. 1 1848, Dec. 1849, June 1849, July 9 1850, Aug. 1854, Dec. 3 1855, Sept. 23 1857, Oct. 27 1860, June 26 1860, Dec. 29–31 1861, July 14 1861, Oct. 17 1861, Dec. 1 1863, Sept. 14

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

8

External location

Botany Bay Richmond Hill Parramatta Vinegar Hill Risdon Cove Appin River Plenty Bathurst Emergency Pittwater Launceston Hyde Park Bathurst Rebellion Black Line Pinjarra Mount Dispersion Waterloo Creek Winding Swamp Barfold Fighting Hills Heidelberg The Islands Rufus River Sydney Town Port Lincoln Eumeralla One Tree Hill Nassau River Murrabit Geraldton Bingera Carbucky Paddy’s Island Eureka Stockade Rannes Hornet Bank Attack Creek Matarikoriko Lambing Flat Cullinlaringo Floraville Pukekohe East

State/theatre NSW NSW NSW NSW TAS NSW TAS NSW TAS TAS NSW NSW TAS WA NSW NSW VIC VIC VIC VIC NSW NSW NSW SA VIC QLD QLD VIC WA QLD QLD QLD VIC QLD QLD NT New Zealand NSW QLD QLD New Zealand

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

ix

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles Date 1863, Oct. 23 1864, Mar. 31–Apr. 2 1864, June 21 1864, Dec. 18 1865, Apr. 6 1865, May 1871, Mar. 1873, Sept. 6–7 1873, Nov. 5 1873, Dec. 1874, Feb. 23–25 1874, May 27 1874, June 13 1875, Oct. 16 1876, Apr. 19 1876, Sept. 1880, June 28 1884, Aug. 1884, Sept. 1885, Apr. 3 1885, May 6 1887, Mar. 22 1893, Sept. 1894, Nov. 16 1895, Mar.–Apr. 1897, Mar. 1899, Nov. 23 1899, Nov. 25 1899, Nov. 28 1899, Dec. 11 1900, Jan. 1 1900, Jan. 16; Feb. 9 1900, Feb. 12 1900, Feb. 13–15 1900, Feb. 17–27 1900, Mar. 7 1900, Mar. 10 1900, Mar. 29 1900, Mar. 31 1900, Apr. 30–May 1 1900, May 5 1900, May 10 1900, May 17 1900, June 11–12 1900, July 3 1900, July 19

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

Australian mainland

External location Titi Hill Orakau Te Ranga

Mitchell River La Grange Bay Coomooboolaroo Tam O’Shanter Point The Officer Battle Camp Gilberton Barrow Creek Palmer River Weld Springs Ularring Rottnest Island Creen Creek Glenrowan Anna’s Reservoir Battle Mountain Tamai Takdul Hmawang Behn River Windjana Gorge Chitral Oscar Range Belmont Graspan Modder River Magersfontein Sunnyside Slingersfontein Pink Hill Kimberley Paardeberg Poplar Grove Driefontein Karee Siding Sannah’s Post Houtnek Coetzee Drift Zand River Mafeking Diamond Hill Leeuw Kop Palmietfontein

9

State/theatre New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand QLD WA QLD QLD SA QLD QLD NT QLD WA WA WA QLD VIC NT QLD Sudan Sudan Burma WA WA India WA South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

x

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Date Australian mainland 1900, July 22 1900, July 24 1900, Aug. 4–16 1900, Aug. 16–17 1900, Sept. 25 1900, Nov. 6 1900, Nov. 29 1901, Feb. 14 1901, Feb. 18, Mar. 21 1901, May 15 1901, June 12 1901, Aug. 1 1901, Oct. 30 1902, Jan. 4 1914, Sept. 11 1914, Nov. 9 1915, Jan. 1 Broken Hill 1915, Apr. 2 1915, Apr. 25 1915, Apr. 25–30 1915, May 2 1915, May 8 1915, May 31–June 1 1915, July 31 1915, Aug. 6–9 1915, Aug. 7 1915, Aug. 8 1915, Aug. 21–22, 27 1915, Nov. 22–25 1915, Dec. 3–1916, Apr. 29 1915, Dec. 13 1915, Dec. 25 1916, Jan. 23 1916, July 19–20 1916, July 23–Aug. 5 1916, Aug. 4–5 1916, Aug. 8–Sept. 3 1916, Nov. 5, 14 1916, Dec. 23 1917, Jan. 9 1917, Mar. 11 1917, Mar. 26–27 1917, Apr. 11 1917, Apr. 15 1917, Apr. 19 1917, May 3–17

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

10

External location Koster River Stinkhoutboom Elands River Buffels Hoek Peitang Bothaville Rhenoster Kop Wolvekuil Kopjes Hartebeestfontein Grobelaar Recht Wilmansrust Grootvallier Bakenlaagte Onverwacht Bitapaka Cocos Islands First Wassa Anzac Cove Sea of Marmara Baby 700 Krithia Kurna Second Wassa Lone Pine The Nek Hill 971 Hill 60 Ctesiphon Kut el Amara Um Rakhum Gebel Medwa Halazin Fromelles Pozières Romani Mouquet Farm Gueudecourt Magdhaba Rafa Baghdad First Gaza First Bullecourt Lagnicourt Second Gaza Second Bullecourt

State/theatre South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa China South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa New Guinea Indian Ocean NSW Egypt Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Mesopotamia Egypt Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Mesopotamia Mesopotamia Egypt Egypt Egypt France France Sinai France France Sinai Sinai Mesopotomia Palestine France France Palestine France

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

xi

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles Date 1917, May 4 1917, June 7 1917, Sept.–Nov. 1917, Sept. 20 1917, Sept. 26 1917, Sept. 28 1917, Oct. 4 1917, Oct. 9 1917, Oct. 12 1917, Oct. 31 1917, Nov. 1–8 1917, Nov. 2 1918, Mar. 27–30 1918, Mar. 27–Apr. 5 1918, Mar. 28 1918, Mar. 28–30 1918, Apr. 4 1918, Apr. 5 1918, Apr. 7 1918, Apr. 14, 17 1918, Apr. 22–23 1918, Apr. 24–25 1918, Apr. 30–May 3 1918, May 4–9 1918, May 19 1918, June 1 1918, June 10 1918, July 4 1918, July 14 1918, Aug. 6–7 1918, Aug. 8 1918, Aug. 9–11 1918, Aug. 10–13 1918, Aug. 10–12 1918, Aug. 16–17 1918, Aug. 23 1918, Aug. 26–Sept. 14 1918, Aug. 31–Sept. 2 1918, Sept. 18 1918, Sept. 19–21 1918, Sept. 20 1918, Sept. 21 1918, Sept. 25 1918, Sept. 25 1918, Sept. 29–Oct. 1 1918, Sept. 30

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

Australian mainland

11

External location North Sea Messines Third Ypres Menin Road Polygon Wood Ramadi Broodseinde Poelcappelle Passchendaele Beersheba Khuweilfe Daur First Amman Hébuterne First Dernancourt First Morlancourt First Villers-Bretonneux Second Dernancourt Hangard Wood Hazebrouck Zeebrugge Second Villers-Bretonneux Es Salt Second Morlancourt Ville-sur-Ancre Heligoland Bight Third Morlancourt Hamel Abu Tellul Karawaran Amiens Lihons Etinehem Proyart Lille Chuignes Baku Mont St Quentin Hindenburg Outpost Line Megiddo Nablus Wady Fara Second Amman Semakh St Quentin Canal Kaukab

State/theatre North Sea Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Mesopotamia Belgium Belgium Belgium Palestine Palestine Mesopotamia Palestine France France France France France France France Belgium France Palestine France France North Sea France France Palestine Persia France France France France France France Azerbaijan France France Palestine Palestine Palestine Palestine Palestine France Palestine

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

xii

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Date Australian mainland 1918, Oct. 5 1919, Mar. 24 Merivale Street 1919, Aug. 29 1927, Oct.–Nov. 1929, Dec. 16 Rothbury 1934, Jan. 30 Dingbat Flat 1937, Apr. 3 (4?) Korewa Island 1940, May 10–June 22 1940, June 28 1940, July 9 1940, July 10–Oct. 31 1940, July 19 1940, Aug. 8–18 1940, Sept. 23–25 1940, Nov. 12 1941, Jan. 3–5 1941, Jan. 21–22 1941, Jan. 25–29 1941, Mar. 21 1941, Mar. 28–29 1941, Apr. 4 1941, Apr. 6–8 1941, Apr. 11–Dec. 7 1941, Apr. 11–13 1941, Apr. 18 1941, Apr. 24 1941, May 20–30 1941, June 9 1941, June 11–27 1941, June 20–21 1941, July 6–9 1941, Nov. 19 Carnarvon 1941, Dec. 22–1942, May 9 1941, Dec. 23–1942, Mar. 8 1942, Jan. 14–15 1942, Jan. 18–22 1942, Jan. 23 1942, Jan. 26–27 1942, Jan. 31–Feb. 3 1942, Feb. 8–15 1942, Feb. 19–1943, Nov. 12 Darwin 1942, Feb. 20–23 1942, Feb. 27 1942, Feb. 28–Mar. 1 1942, Mar. 3–1943, Aug. 16 Broome 1942, Mar. 3–23 Wyndham

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

12

External location Montbrehain Emptsa Malaita

France North of Benghazi Calabria Britain Cape Spada Berbera Dakar Strait of Otranto Bardia Tobruk (Capture) Derna Giarabub Matapan Er Regima Mechili Tobruk (Siege) Vevi Pass Tempe Gorge Brallos Pass Retimo Litani River Merdjayoun Damascus Damour Malta Rangoon Gemas Bakri Rabaul Jemaluang Ambon Singapore Timor Java Sea Bantam Bay

State/theatre France QLD North Russia Solomons NSW WA NT NW Europe Mediterranean Mediterranean UK Mediterranean Somaliland West Africa Adriatic North Africa North Africa North Africa North Africa Mediterranean North Africa North Africa North Africa Greece Greece Greece Crete Syria Syria Syria Syria WA Mediterranean Burma Malaya Malaya New Guinea Malaya Netherlands E Indies Malaya NT Netherlands E Indies Netherlands E Indies Netherlands E Indies WA WA

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

xiii

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles Date Australian mainland 1942, Mar. 4 1942, Mar. 14–Aug. 1 Horn Island 1942, Mar. 20 Derby 1942, Mar. 21–May 9 1942, Mar. 22 Katherine 1942, Apr. 5 1942, Apr. 9 1942, May 4–8 1942, May 31–June 1, June 8 Sydney Harbour 1942, June 8 Newcastle 1942, June 29 1942, July 26–29 Townsville 1942, July 27 1942, July 28–Nov. 2 1942, July 30–1943, Aug. 17 Port Hedland 1942, July 31 Mossman 1942, Aug. 9 1942, Aug. 19 1942, Aug. 25–Sept. 7 1942, Sept. 1 1942, Oct. 23–Nov. 5 1942, Nov. 22–Dec. 9 1942, Nov. 26–27 Brisbane 1942, Dec. 18–1943, Jan. 2 1943, Jan. 12–18 1943, Jan. 28–Feb. 1 1943, Mar. 2–3 1943 Rockhampton 1943, May 9–11 1943, May 20–22, Sept. 15–16 Exmouth Gulf 1943, June 20–23 1943, July 10 1943, Sept. 4–16 1943, Sept. 9–11 1943, Sept. 19–20 1943, Sept. 22–Oct. 2 1943, Sept. 26–27 1943, Oct. 3–Nov. 25 1943, Oct. 12–13 1944, Jan. 19–31 1944, Aug. 5 Cowra 1944, Oct. 25 1945, Jan. 5–9 1945, Mar. 19–Apr. 5 1945, May 11–15 1945, May 1

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

13

External location South of Java

Port Moresby Colombo Trincomalee Coral Sea

Salamaua Ruin Ridge Kokoda Trail

Savo Island Dieppe Milne Bay Tel el Eisa El Alamein Gona Buna Sanananda Wau Bismarck Sea Mubo Lababia Ridge Sicily Lae Salamaua Kaiapit Finschhafen Keppel Harbour Sattelberg John’s Knoll Shaggy Ridge Surigao Strait Lingayen Gulf Slater’s Knoll Wewak Tarakan

State/theatre Indian Ocean QLD WA New Guinea NT Ceylon Ceylon SW Pacific NSW NSW New Guinea QLD Egypt New Guinea WA QLD Solomons France New Guinea Egypt Egypt New Guinea QLD New Guinea New Guinea New Guinea New Guinea QLD New Guinea WA New Guinea Italy New Guinea New Guinea New Guinea New Guinea Singapore New Guinea New Guinea New Guinea NSW Philippines Philippines Bougainville New Guinea Borneo

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

xiv

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Date 1945, June 10, 16 1945, July 1 1950, Oct. 17 1950, Oct. 22 1950, Oct. 25–26 1950, Oct. 29–30 1950, Nov. 5–6 1951, Jan. 1–4 1951, Apr. 23–24 1951, Sept. 28, 30 1951, Oct. 2–8 1951, Dec. 1 1953, Mar. 16 1953, July 24–26 1953, Nov. 1956, Feb. 21 1956, June 22 1957, May 13–14 1958, Nov. 20 1964, Oct. 29–30 1964, Dec. 13 1965, May 27, June 12 1965, June 15 1965. July 12 1965, Nov. 8 1966, Jan. 8–14 1966, Feb. 23–24 1966, Aug. 18 1967, Feb.17 1967, Aug. 6 1967, Oct. 18 1968, Jan. 24–Mar. 1 1968, May 13–28 1969, June 6–7 1971, June 7 1990, Sept.–Oct. 1993, Feb.16–Mar.26 1999, Oct. 6 1999, Oct. 10 1999, Oct. 16

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPRELIMS_F

Australian mainland

14

External location Labuan–Brunei Bay Balikpapan Sariwon Yongju Kujin Chongju Pakchon Uijongbu Kapyong Han River Maryang San Sunchon Wonsan Samichon River Bongsu Forest Kluang Sungei Bemban Klawang Sungei Siput Sungei Kesang Singapore Strait Sungei Koemba Kindau Babang Gang Toi Ho Bo Woods Suoi Bong Trang Long Tan Ap My An Suoi Chau Pha Cape Lai Bien Hoa Coral–Balmoral Binh Ba Long Khanh Gulf of Oman Baidoa Suai Motaain Aidabasalala

State/theatre Borneo Borneo Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea Malaya Malaya Malaya Malaya Malaya Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Arabian Gulf Somalia East Timor East Timor East Timor

1-22-02, 1:40 PM

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Botany Bay, a clash between Gamaraigal Aborigines and convicts from the settlement at Port Jackson (Sydney), fought on 6 March 1789. The incident was triggered by the murder by Aborigines of a convict labourer who strayed from the brick-kilns at Rose Hill, near the head of Darling Harbour, in search of a herb known as ‘sweet tea’. The sixteen members of the brickmaker’s gang to which the man belonged decided to avenge his death and, taking up staves, marched to Botany Bay in search of the killers. When the party arrived at the bay, they were met by a larger number of Aborigines than they expected and these—having guessed the convicts’ purpose—attacked with spears, killing one man and wounding six or seven others. The next day the colony’s governor, Captain Arthur Phillip, RN, sent armed marines into the area to restore order. These found the body of the convict felled and another who had been left wounded at the scene of the fight. For disobeying his orders aimed at maintaining relations with the Aborigines, Phillip ordered those not already injured to receive 150 lashes and for the rest to receive the same punishment as soon as they recovered. George Barrington (1825) The History of New South Wales, including Botany Bay, Port Jackson, Parramatta, Sydney … , 2nd edn, London: M. Jones; Australia’s Heritage (1971), vol.1, Sydney: Hamlyn House

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

1

Richmond Hill, an encounter between Dharuk (Darug) Aborigines and troops of the New South Wales Corps, fought in June 1795 on the Hawkesbury River, New South Wales. When five settlers in the district were killed and others wounded in attacks by Aborigines within the space of a few weeks, the acting governor, Captain William Paterson, decided to send a detachment of 60 soldiers under Lieutenant Edward Abbott ‘to drive the natives to a distance’. The evening after this force arrived at the Hawkesbury, it fired upon and pursued a large body of Dharuks ‘who had concealed themselves in the neighbouring woods during the day, and at night came to a settler’s farm to plunder it’. Abbott reported seven or eight Dharuks supposed killed, while five (one man, four women) were taken prisoner. Historical Records of Australia, Series I, vol.1 (1914), Sydney: Commonwealth Parliament Library Committee

Parramatta, the site of a skirmish in March 1797 in which Bidjigal (Bediagal) Aborigines fought white settlers and troops of the New South Wales Corps. The clash followed depredations upon settlers in the Toongabbie district, led by the Aborigines’ noted guerilla leader Pemulwuy. An armed party was sent after the marauders, and following a pursuit lasting throughout one night came across their quarry—numbering about 100—the next day. The Aborigines fled, leaving the

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

2

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

The defeat of rebellious convicts at ‘Vinegar Hill’, as pictured by an unidentified artist. Source: Watercolour; 31.2 x 4.3 cm. Rex Nan Kivell collection NK10162, National Library of Australia T2495

spoils of their raids on the ground. The punitive expedition pursued the hostile band into the Parramatta district but—becoming fatigued—eventually retired into the town. The Aborigines followed them there, with Pemulwuy at their head threatening to kill the first white man who approached him. He effectively challenged the town’s military garrison to battle by hurling his spear at one of the soldiers. What was described as a ‘desperate fight’ followed, in which Pemulwuy and his followers pitted their spears against the muskets of the troops and settlers. Five Aborigines were killed and many more wounded, including Pemulwuy who was made prisoner with seven buckshot hits in his head and body. He was taken to the hospital, but subsequently escaped to play a leading role in numerous other incidents until he was finally shot dead by two settlers late in 1802. George Barrington (1825) The History of New South Wales, including Botany Bay, Port Jackson, Parramatta, Sydney … , 2nd edition, London: M. Jones

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

2

Vinegar Hill, the action which ended an insurrection by Irish convicts from the government farm at Castle Hill north of Parramatta, New South Wales, was fought on 5 March 1804. At 8 p.m. the previous day (a Sunday) 200 convict workers at the farm had overpowered officials, set fires and seized arms, then gathered to hear their leader—an ex-soldier named Philip Cunningham—outline plans for full-scale attacks on the main towns of Parramatta and Sydney. An official who had escaped ran to Parramatta and raised the alarm about 9 p.m., enabling the 60-strong garrison there to immediately embark on defensive arrangements with the assistance of civilian volunteers who joined during the night. By the time the rebels reached the outskirts some hours later, they found the town prepared and decided against making an attack. Before daybreak they withdrew westwards towards Toongabbie, with the apparent intention of marching on the settlement along the Hawkesbury River to induce other convicts to rise in support.

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

3

1797–1804 Meanwhile, news of the outbreak was received about midnight by the governor 25 kilometres away in Sydney. A detachment of 56 men of the New South Wales Corps was ordered to Parramatta under the regiment’s acting commander, Major George Johnston. Arriving at dawn after a forced march, Johnston immediately set off in pursuit of the rebels—his small force bolstered by some twenty local inhabitants who were armed. He took with him a Catholic priest, James Dixon, who had been transported after the 1798 uprising in Ireland but allowed by the governor to work as a clergyman among his countrymen. When the main rebel band, numbering around 260, was located near present-day Rouse Hill, Johnston sent forward a trooper under a white flag to counsel surrender; this suggestion was rejected. He next sent the priest Dixon up to them, but they refused to listen to him. Johnston himself then rode out in advance of the soldiers, accompanied by only one trooper, and demanded to parley with the rebel leaders. Cunningham and another man named Will Johnson stepped forward, carrying swords, and again refused the major’s call for surrender. Johnston then rode back to his troops to once more bring up Dixon to try reasoning with his countrymen, but in response to renewed demands for submission Cunningham replied in the same terms as the 1798 rebels, declaring ‘Death or Liberty!’. At this Johnston and the trooper quite dishonourably drew pistols which they had hidden on themselves, made prisoners of the two leaders, and forced them back to the military ranks. Orders were given at the same time for the soldiers to open fire and charge. A few shots were returned by the rebels, but the majority quickly broke ranks and scattered at the run with the soldiers in pursuit. Casualties among the convicts were at least fifteen killed and six wounded; another 26 were captured. The site of their defeat was dubbed ‘Vinegar Hill’, recalling the place in

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

3

Wexford, Ireland, where the British crushed the main body of Irish rebels in 1798. In the aftermath of the failed uprising, Cunningham was summarily hanged without trial at Green Hills (Windsor). A court martial promptly conducted at Parramatta convicted ten others and passed death sentences on them. Approved by the governor in all except two cases, these executions were carried out as public spectacles over three days, 8–10 March, in Parramatta, Castle Hill and Sydney as a warning to the rest of the convict population. Nine others received heavy floggings, while some 50 others were sent to labour in coalmines at a new settlement established at what is now Newcastle. K.S. Inglis (1974) The Australian Colonists, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press; Iris Nesdale (1987) The Fettered and the Free, Adelaide: Orchid Publications

Risdon Cove, a tragic encounter on 3 May 1804 between Moomairremener Aborigines and a detachment of troops of the New South Wales Corps protecting the new settlement established on the Derwent River, Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania), eight kilometres north of modern Hobart. When some 300 Aborigines were spotted during the morning descending the foothills in semi-circular formation towards the settlement, it was assumed that this was a war-party. In fact, the group—which included women and children—carried only waddies, not spears, and was almost certainly engaged in a kangaroo hunt, but this practice had not been observed before in the short period of the colony’s existence. As the Aborigines came within range at about 11 a.m., the detachment commander, Lieutenant William Moore, ordered his men to open fire. He later claimed to have done so only after ‘they had thoroughly convinced me of their Intentions by using violence to a Settler’s wife and my own Servant who was returning into Camp with some Kangaroos, One of which they took from him …’ Moore also maintained that the Aborigines would

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

4

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles not disperse until one of the carronades (cannon) in the camp was fired ‘to intimidate them’. Official reports maintained that only three Aborigines were killed, but other accounts put the death toll as high as 30– 60. An unknown number were injured; Moore himself conceding that there was ‘reason to Suppose more were wounded, as one was seen to be taken away bleeding’. No action was taken against him or any of his men. Historical Records of Australia, Series III, vol.1 (1921), Sydney: Commonwealth Parliament Library Committee; James Fenton (1884) A History of Tasmania from its Discovery in 1642 to the Present Time, Hobart: J. Walch & Sons

Appin, an encounter between Gundungurra (Gandangara) Aborigines and the grenadier company of the 46th Regiment under Captain James Wallis, fought on 17 April 1816 in the district south of present-day Campbelltown, New South Wales. In response to a series of ‘Acts of Atrocity being Committed by the Natives’ on the fringes of the settlement, Major-General Lachlan Macquarie—normally a humane and enlightened governor by the standards of the times—on 9 April ordered separate detachments of the 46th Regiment to undertake circuits of the outposts along the Grose, Hawkesbury and Nepean rivers, with instructions ‘to make as many Prisoners as possible’ of the hostile tribesmen. Any who resisted or fled were to be shot, and their bodies conspicuously hung from trees as a warning to others. The detachments set out on 10 April, two of them guided by Aboriginal trackers who effectively ensured that the troops got nowhere near their ‘wild’ compatriots. It was Wallis alone who—dispensing with Aboriginal guides—achieved any success. While at Appin, near Lachlan Vale farm owned by public servant William Broughton, a local convict led his grenadiers to an Aboriginal camp situated beside ‘the precipitous banks of a deep and rocky creek’

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

4

and he decided to mount a quick attack. The camp’s sleeping occupants were alerted when their dogs began barking at the sound of movement through the bush, so that by the time the troops were on the edge of the camp it was empty. Burning fires provided evidence of hasty vacation, however, and a child’s cry was heard from the surrounding scrub. Forming his men into line, Wallis ordered an advance through the campsite towards the precipice beyond. Dark figures were seen in the moonlight flitting across the steep rock-faces, and the troops began firing— shooting down men, women and children. Many of the Aborigines, however, perished by jumping in terror, falling, or being driven over the cliff. Fourteen bodies were later found, including those of Durelle and Kanabygal (Cannabayagal, or Camanbigal) who were on Macquarie’s wanted list as ‘Two of the most ferocious and Sanguinary of the Natives’. With considerable difficulty Wallis’ men retrieved their corpses from the gorge below the camp, in order to give effect to the governor’s instructions about displaying them, but the remainder were left where they were. Five survivors of the attack (two women and three children) who were taken prisoner were conveyed by cart back to Liverpool, where they were placed in gaol. Carol Liston (1988) Campbelltown, North Sydney: Allen & Unwin; J. Brook & J.L. Kohen (1991) The Parramatta Native Institution and the Black Town: A History, Kensington: NSW University Press

River Plenty, a tributary of the Derwent River lying ten kilometres to the west of New Norfolk, Tasmania, was the scene of a clash between Aborigines and British soldiers in 1819. The incident was allegedly triggered by the behaviour of white stock-keepers in detaining and maltreating an Aboriginal woman, the wife of a tribal elder or ‘chief ’. The Aborigines retaliated by spearing cattle and sheep, and in a collision one man on each side was killed. A party of the 48th

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

5

1804–1824 Regiment then pursued the Aborigines, killing seventeen of them. The Lieut.-Governor, Major William Sorell, reportedly provided for some of the children orphaned by this episode, including one who, christened George van Dieman [sic], was sent to England in 1821 aged about nine. Clive Turnbull (1948) Black War, Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire

Bathurst Emergency, a series of engagements between September and November 1824 which marked the final phase of resistance by Wiradjuri Aborigines to British settlement of New South Wales west of the Blue Mountains. An escalating series of clashes beginning in 1822, led by the Wiradjuri leader Windradyne (or ‘Saturday’ as he was called by whites), caused the governor, Major-General Sir Thomas Brisbane, to proclaim martial law ‘West of Mount York’ on 14 August 1824. A further 43 troops of the 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment were sent to Bathurst, bringing to 75 the strength of the garrison there under Major James Morisset. In addition, a paramilitary force of 50–100 men was raised from among local settlers. Few details of the military campaign which followed are known with certainty. Although the episode is often called the ‘Battle of Bathurst’, it was neither a single action nor focused exclusively in the immediate vicinity of the present-day city of that name. Grassby and Hill maintain that events began on 10 September with a clash about 80 kilometres north-west of Bathurst, between a 30–40strong Wiradjuri war-party and three station hands who were tracking cattle that the Aborigines had driven from the Cudgegong River area. The next morning the whites stumbled upon the war-party’s camp about 32 kilometres north of Bathurst—fortunately emptied of its occupants, who were burying three warriors killed the day before. Finding the camp laden with weapons, the station hands burned the greater part of this cache

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

5

before the tribesmen returned. Opposed now by largely defenceless Aborigines, the whites shot down sixteen of their opponents— including one of the Wiradjuri leaders nicknamed Blucher, after the Prussian commander at Waterloo—and forced the remainder to retreat with many wounded. In one stroke a major war-party had been eliminated. Following on this success, a week later the garrison at Bathurst itself took to the field in four ‘flying’ columns. The largest of these led by Morisset advanced north, while another moved west and two others headed east. Over the next fortnight a giant sweep was carried out across a radius up to 160 kilometres from Bathurst, covering as far east as Mount York and as far north as the Capertee district and Cudgegong River. The success of this operation was unarguable. By mid-October, the first Wiradjuri had begun to surrender; by 3 November Governor Brisbane was able to report that ‘hostile Natives were hourly coming in to tender their submission and sue for peace and protection’. Brisbane, evidently concerned to justify to London such an extreme measure as the resort to martial law, later admitted that the number of Aborigines who were killed in achieving his desired outcome ‘can only be gathered from conjecture’, but claimed that in all probability the figure was not much more than double the seven Europeans who lost their lives. Aboriginal tradition, however, presents a different picture, suggesting that tactics of the utmost severity bordering on extermination were employed. Two incidents alone—at Bell’s Falls Gorge, a few kilometres west of Sofala, and in another gorge near the headwaters of Clear Creek (east of Brucedale)—allegedly resulted in the systematic shooting of hundreds of Wiradjuri men, women and children. Another incident amounting to a massacre reportedly occurred at a camp established mainly as a refuge for women and children.

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

6

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles Brisbane’s own description of the campaign’s aims and methods—although superficially innocuous—lends support to the worst interpretations of what happened. The governor reported that: . . . the Detachment at Bathurst . . . [was] divided into various small parties, each headed by a Magistrate, and proceeded in different directions in towards the interior of the Country, and by previous arrangements were to form junctions at certain given points. This system of keeping these unfortunate People in a constant state of alarm soon brought them to a sense of their Duty . . .

The tactics are recognisably those of marshalling terrorised Aborigines into areas where they could be attacked. It need scarcely be added that the presence of magistrates did no more than preserve the quasi-legal nature of proceedings, since at least one of these functionaries was a retired army officer anyway and another was Morisset himself, the very man authorised to employ ‘the Use of Arms . . . beyond the ordinary Rule of Law in Time of Peace . . . [including] Resort to summary Justice’. While a ruthless policy of extermination undoubtedly brought results, curiously Windradyne himself remained at large for several months after the terror began. Not even the offering on 25 August of a reward of a land grant of 500 acres (202 hectares) for his apprehension did anything towards inducing his hapless fellow tribesmen to betray him. Windradyne decided himself when resistance was useless and submitted personally to Brisbane at Parramatta on 28 November, described by some as a broken and defeated leader. On 11 December Brisbane formally repealed his martial law measures. Historical Records of Australia, Series I, vol.11 (1917), Sydney: Commonwealth Parliament Library Committee; Al Grassby & Marji Hill (1988) Six Australian Battlefields, Sydney: Angus & Robertson

Pittwater, near Sorell, Tasmania, was the scene

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

6

of a clash in December 1826 between a party of troops and field police and about 40 Oyster Bay Aborigines, in which fourteen of the latter were killed and ten captured. Lyndall Ryan (1981) The Aboriginal Tasmanians, St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press

Launceston, scene of a clash in February 1829 between British troops and Aborigines, in which nineteen Aborigines were killed and five captured, and one European speared. Among the casualties was an Aborigine named Boomer, who was guiding the soldiers in pursuit of the Aborigines; he allegedly struck the sergeant of the detachment, attempted to escape, and was shot as he did so. Lloyd Robson (1983) A History of Tasmania, Melbourne: Oxford University Press

Hyde Park, formerly the site of Sydney’s first racecourse, was the scene of a ‘desperate fight . . . between two hostile tribes’ of Aborigines on 26 December 1829. A number of the combatants were severely wounded and one killed on the spot. Although little is known about this incident’s causes, it remains a reminder that, both before and after the white settlement of Australia, the Aboriginal people practised forms of warfare among themselves. J. Henniker Heaton (1879) Australian Dictionary of Dates and Men of the Time, Sydney: George Robertson

Bathurst Rebellion, or ‘Bathurst Insurgency’ as it is sometimes called, was the name given to the shortlived bushranging episode involving a group of escaped convicts known as the ‘Ribbon Gang’ during September– October 1830. The outbreak is usually described as having its origins in a cruel act of injustice inflicted on a 25-year-old English convict-servant named Ralf (Ralph) Entwistle, who a year earlier had almost caused an embarrassing scene while the governor, Lieut.-General Ralph Darling, was visiting the Bathurst district. On a hot day

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

7

1824–1830 in November 1829 Entwistle and another convict had been swimming naked at a ford on the Macquarie River when the governor’s entourage happened to pass by. Although none of the visitors noticed the innocent incident, the pair were spotted by the local police magistrate who ordered that they be flogged. By most accounts, Entwistle harboured bitter resentment at his treatment and plotted an uprising in revenge. Given the interval before he took any action, however, and the apparent lack of planning involved, this seems a less plausible explanation than suggestions that the real cause was a grievance at being deprived of adequate food and clothing by a landowner keen to maximise the profitability of his farm—a practice common in the period. The trouble began on 23 September, when Entwistle and at least four others absconded from the farm where they were assigned in Fitzgerald’s Valley, some twenty kilometres south-west of Bathurst, after seizing firearms. Over the next two days they appeared at several other farms in the district, adding to their weaponry and forcing other convicts to join them. When the overseer at one of these places refused to join their ranks, he was shot dead. The insurgents’ numbers eventually swelled to around 80, but few of these men had any enthusiasm for the cause suddenly thrust on them and many deserted at the first opportunity. Entwistle was keen to dispel any appearance that his was a band of mere marauders, and even took to wearing white streamers on his hat as an emblem of leadership. This later led to comparisons being drawn with earlier nationalist rebels in Ireland known as the Ribbonmen, but significantly none of Entwistle’s followers— Irish or other—followed his example. Realising that little reliance could be placed on the majority of the men in the rebels’ ranks, Entwistle decided to divest himself of all except the most committed among the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

7

group, and at about 1 a.m. on 25 September rode off at the head of no more than a dozen others. In response to the activities of the gang, the local landowners held a meeting on 27 September at which a volunteer cavalry corps of twelve men was raised under William Suttor. With the help of two Aborigines, the settlers tracked the rebels the next day to the steep ranges alongside the Abercrombie River, 64 kilometres south of Bathurst. About a hour before sundown they located the band in a rocky glen near a point now called Captain Cook’s Lookout and immediately prepared to attack. While three men were sent to approach from the rear, the main body made a frontal assault. The rebels were alert, however, and strongly engaged the attackers in a gunbattle lasting about an hour, during which an estimated 300 shots were exchanged. With night coming on and his volunteers running short of ammunition, Suttor ordered a withdrawal. Some accounts suggest his leadership of the attack lacked both energy and courage, and was easily seen off. Entwistle’s group suffered two men slightly wounded. News of the volunteers’ defeat prompted the commandant at Bathurst, Major Donald McPherson, to send out the next day a detachment comprising mounted soldiers of the 39th Regiment and mounted police. Commanded by Lieutenant James Brown, this party—reinforced by a second group of volunteers—sighted the rebel gang on 30 September disappearing over the ridgeline at a place even then called Bushrangers’ Hill. Confident that they had their quarry on the run, Brown sent his force in headlong pursuit, but as they neared the summit they were met by a volley of gunfire which killed two men and five horses. The pursuers fell back and allowed the Ribbon Gang to continue their westward progress unhindered. During the next few days the gang was active along the Lachlan River, but then

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

8

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles dropped entirely out of sight. Entwistle and his followers were finally located on 13 October by a ten-man detachment of mounted police from Goulburn, led by Lieutenant Lachlan Macalister formerly of the 48th Regiment. In a sharp clash fought near ‘Borona Plains’ (possibly a reference to Borowa Plains) and lasting only twenty minutes, four of the police party were wounded—including Macalister, who was hit in the thigh—and three of the rebels were shot and captured. Again, the ‘banditti’ (as they were called) were allowed to depart when the police found themselves running low on ammunition, although it was evident now that the rebels’ situation was no better; an official report noted that the ‘worst shots [among the gang members were] loading for the good ones’, which was almost certainly a tactic to make every shot count. The next day the rebels found themselves up against a fresh detachment of troops of the 39th Regiment, recently arrived after being force-marched from Sydney under Captain Horatio Walpole. With the latter were the various parties of volunteers, along with the police and troops under Brown and Macalister, and a number of assigned servants and at least a dozen pensioner veterans. Faced with overwhelmingly superior force, Entwistle and the six men remaining with him—weary and suffering the effects of illness and minor wounds, and now desperately short of food and ammunition—surrendered without a struggle. Taken to Bathurst, all ten rebel prisoners were tried before a Special Commission consisting of the Chief Justice, Sir Francis Forbes, and a jury of military officers. The outcome of these proceedings was a foregone conclusion (the government executioner was despatched even before the trial began), and on 3 November the condemned men were publicly hanged at Bathurst. Eric Fry (ed.) (1983) Rebels and Radicals, Sydney: Allen & Unwin; Stephan Williams (1994), Ralph

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

8

Entwistle & the Bathurst Insurgency, Canberra: Popinjay Publications

Black Line, a famous episode in the history of Tasmania, in which an attempt was made during October–November 1830 to clear the eastern half of the island of its Aboriginal population by herding them into the confined space of the Tasman Peninsula, on the south-east coast. The lieut.-governor of the colony, Lieut.-Colonel George Arthur, conceived of the plan in an attempt to stem a growing list of depredations committed by the Aborigines. It followed the failure of earlier measures, such as ordering the arrest of the leaders of the hostiles in 1826, banning all Aborigines from settled districts in 1828, and the imposition of martial law later in the same year. Commencing on 4 October 1830 a string of military posts was established extending from St Patrick’s Head (near St Marys) on the east coast, through Campbell Town to the junction of the Macquarie and Lake rivers near Cressy, south of Launceston. The personnel in these posts began marching south three days later, and, in theory, they began forming a more solid line as the narrowing terrain compressed the distance between them. Their numbers were also augmented by thousands of volunteers drawn from the settler and town populations, and even 300 convicts. Meanwhile, a party moved down the east coast from the Swan River to Spring Bay; in the lakes district, in the centre of the island, other military parties aimed to push the Aborigines before them as they advanced due east towards the Jordan River; others swept the country from Norfolk Plains to the Ouse River, and from Lake Sorell to Lake Echo, where they remained as a blocking force to close off avenues of escape to the west. By 31 October the bodies coming south and east had closed into a tight cordon running from Prosser Bay to Sorell, and the operation moved into its final phase. Five parties were sent within this line to scour

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

9

September–November 1830

LAUNCESTON 7 Oc

St Patrick’s Head

t.

Great Lake

Campbell Town Lake Sorell

7 Oct.

Lake Echo

12 Oct.

Freycinet Peninsula

Oatlands 16 Oct.

Bothwell

ct.

O 20

v.

Richmond

o 2N

Sorell 2

New Norfolk HOBART

Tasman Peninsula

0

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

9

25

50

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

75 kms

10

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

the terrain for the Aborigines enclosed, and to capture or else drive them towards the Tasman Peninsula. The failure of Arthur’s elaborate scheme was apparent well before he eventually called an end to proceedings on 26 November. Writing a despatch to London a week earlier, he himself intimated an expectation that the vast expenditure of effort would prove to have been in vain. By that time it was widely reported that the Aborigines had got through the line of 5,000 troops, constables and volunteers and were continuing their attacks in the rear on homes and property left undefended. Numerous claims were made that escaped convicts had helped the tribesmen to evade the cordon, though the evidence of this was not especially convincing. The more plausible explanation for failure lay in the vastly superior bush skills of the Aborigines, especially in comparison with many town employees who treated the affair as a holiday; and growing disenchantment among the participants, especially as fatigue and bad weather sapped their spirit. In the event, two Aborigines only—a man and a boy of about fifteen years of age— were captured in the whole of the six-week campaign. Both were seized during a brush along the Prosser River on 22 October, when two other Aborigines were shot. Emphasising the lack of contact between the two sides was the fact that the whites also sustained few casualties, with one soldier wounded by a spear during an attempt by some Aborigines to breach the cordon on 27 October. More injuries, four or five reportedly fatal, were caused by accidents. The whole enterprise reportedly cost some £35,000 in direct expenditure by the government (equivalent to about $2 million today), and probably not much less in time and outlay by civilian volunteers. Though a spectacular waste of money and effort, the Black Line lived on in the popular memory of Tasmanians for a long time.

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

10

John West (1852) The History of Tasmania, Launceston, Tas. Henry Dowling; Clive Turnbull (1948) Black War, Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire

Pinjarra, a clash between Nyungar Aborigines and a party of 25 police, soldiers of the 50th (West Kent) Regiment and settlers personally led by Captain Sir James Stirling, RN, governor of the Swan River Colony (Western Australia), was fought 80 kilometres south of Perth on 28 October 1834. The expedition was undertaken in retaliation for several murders committed by members of the tribe—most recently in July when a private of the 21st Regiment (Royal North British Fusiliers) was killed near Peel Town (Mandurah)—and, Stirling claimed, because of Nyungar threats ‘to burn the Barracks and Houses on the Murray [River] and destroy all the whites in their District’. After assembling his force at Mandurah on Monday, 27 October, Stirling moved rapidly south-east towards the Serpentine River where fresh tracks of a large band of Aborigines were picked up and followed. The next morning the party located a camp of some 70–80 Nyungar under their leader Calyute, occupying flat ground on the east bank of the Murray about 2.5 kilometres south of the present-day town of Pinjarra. The river at this point was only 30 metres wide, and under the cover of rain the main body of the attacking force was able to adopt an ambush position on the six-metre high banks opposite the Nyungar camp. A five-man group, sent by Stirling to cross the river and approach from the eastern side, was also able to complete its circling movement undetected until within 200 metres of the camp. As the Nyungar warriors rushed to take up their weapons, the mounted party charged among the huts, firing as they came. Their initial resistance quickly overwhelmed, the Nyungar made for the river only to find themselves caught in a crossfire. Shooting reportedly went on for over an hour, during which not only men but some

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

11

1830–1836 women and children, too, were killed. In his report of the incident Stirling stated Aboriginal deaths as fourteen (three of them women and one child), but accounts of other participants indicated a more accurate figure may have been double this. Claims that the number killed was as high as 50 are probably exaggeration but, whatever the truth, it is clear that the majority of Nyungar men had been wiped out in the action. The attackers’ casualties were two policemen wounded by spears, one fatally. Commented The Australian Encyclopaedia (1958): Effects arising from the encounter were immediate—the natives of the district dispersed and ceased to cause trouble. Consequently, white settlers regarded ‘The Battle of Pinjarra’ as conclusive, which fact probably gave the incident greater stature than was really warranted. Al Grassby & Marji Hill (1988) Six Australian Battlefields, Sydney: Angus & Robertson; Henry Reynolds (1989) Dispossession, Sydney: Allen & Unwin

Mount Dispersion, a clash between Aborigines and a 23-man party of exploration led by Major Thomas Mitchell, SurveyorGeneral of New South Wales, fought on the northern bank of the Murray River southeast of Mildura on 27 May 1836. Mitchell’s actions on this occasion were probably prompted by difficulties he had experienced with Aborigines on previous expeditions in 1831–32 and 1835. On the second of these, he had been forced to turn back after a fight at Menindee on the Darling River in which several Aborigines were killed; a member of this expedition (Richard Cunningham, the superintendent of the Botanic Gardens in Sydney) who strayed from the main group and became lost was later found to have been killed by Aborigines. The next year Mitchell set off on a further attempt to establish that the Darling River emptied into the Murray, taking with him what he pointedly described as ‘the army with which I was to traverse unexplored

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

11

regions, peopled, as far as we knew, by hostile tribes’. While travelling west along the Murray to its junction with the Darling, Mitchell’s party encountered a band of some 180–200 Aborigines on 24 May at Lake Benanee near Euston, New South Wales, who for the most part kept their distance. When contact was finally made with this group, Mitchell claimed to straight away recognise many who had led the adversaries he encountered in 1835. During the next two days, while the expedition moved overland ignoring the southerly loop followed by the river, he was increasingly concerned by the continuing interest shown in his party. He became convinced that a corroboree performed by the Aborigines on the night of 26 May prefigured an attack, and he resolved to strike first. The next day, as the expedition rejoined the Murray at Tarpaulin Bend, Mitchell divided his men into two groups and set an ambush. This was almost immediately discovered, however, when one of his men open fire prematurely. The Aborigines quickly fled, though not before at least seven of their number had been killed. Mitchell recorded that: The Aborigines betook themselves to the river, my men pursuing them and shooting as many as they could. Numbers were shot swimming across the Murray, and some even after they had reached the opposite shore.

He commemorated the action by naming a nearby hill ‘Mount Dispersion’, before continuing on with his mission. An official inquiry into the affair held in December 1836 regretted that he had not been more conciliatory towards the Aborigines (whose true intentions had not, after all, ever been established), but declined to censure him severely. J.H.L. Cumpston (1954) Thomas Mitchell, London: Oxford University Press; Bruce Elder (1988) Blood on the Wattle, Frenchs Forest, NSW: Child & Associates

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

12

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

An engraving from Colonel G. C. Mundy’s 1852 book, Our Antipodes, based on reports he heard of the ‘Slaughterhouse Creek’ massacre. Source: Mundy, G.C. Our Antipodes London, vol. 1, 1852, facing title page, National Library of Australia

Waterloo Creek, a clash between Kamilaroi Aborigines and mounted police, fought 50 kilometres south-west of Moree, New South Wales, on 26 January 1838—the fiftieth anniversary of European settlement of Australia. The precise location of the affair is still debated, but is most likely to have been the extremity of Waterloo Creek known as Lower Water, and more specifically along the banks of what was subsequently called Snodgrass Lagoon on present-day Millie Creek. In response to alarming reports received in late 1837 regarding Aboriginal ‘outrages’ on the Liverpool Plains north of the Hunter River, on 19 December the acting governor, Colonel Kenneth Snodgrass, ordered the commandant of mounted police, Major James Nunn, to assemble and lead a party to the area. The details of what has subsequently become famous in bush lore as ‘Major Nunn’s campaign’ are shrouded in uncertainty and subterfuge, but there is no doubting that late the following month Nunn

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

12

was on the trail of a large band of Kamilaroi— who may or may not have been involved in depredations against the settlers—with 30 police and between ten and twenty heavily armed civilian auxiliaries. About midday on 26 January the column was moving along the bank of the creek when the leading elements, under the command of Ensign George Cobban, spotted smoke ahead and proceeded in the expectation that a camp had been found. The smoke turned out to be from a burning log and it was assumed that their quarry was still some distance away. On passing around a bend in the creekline a few hundred metres further on, however, the five or six troopers with Cobban suddenly spotted ‘a great number of blacks’ camped on the other side of a lagoon. As soon as the horsemen were seen by the Kamilaroi, the women and children in the camp fled downstream while the warriors scrambled for weapons to cover their retreat. Cobban and his men quickly forded the

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

13

January–April 1838 stream and galloped into the scrub, aiming to get around the flank of the camp and pin its occupants to the creek-bank between themselves and the rest of the mounted party following on the opposite bank. They were immediately engaged by the armed men, one of whom speared Corporal Patrick Hannan in the calf; the police later claimed that only after this did they open fire to defend themselves. What is clear, however, is that firing upon the Aborigines became general and continued for at least an hour as they were pursued west to where the lagoon drained into a swamp. Only here were the surviving Kamilaroi able to break contact and escape. By the time firing stopped, a great many Aborigines had been killed; subsequent accounts put the number at not less than 40–50 and more likely between 60 and 70. Later stories which circulated in Sydney claimed that ‘upwards of 120 were destroyed’, and Nunn himself reportedly boasted that the death toll was ‘two or three hundred’. While the latter may have been an exaggeration in response to public acclaim of his deed, there is no reason to doubt other references to ‘the greater part of the tribe’ having perished. Hannan was the only European casualty in the fight. Nunn’s party returned directly to Sydney, after 53 days in the field, and submitted brief and vague reports of what had transpired. An official inquiry conducted some fifteen months later got no closer to the truth of what has also become known to history as the ‘Slaughterhouse Creek massacre’. Peter Stanley (1986) The Remote Garrison, Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press; Roger Milliss (1992) Waterloo Creek, Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin

Winding Swamp, an encounter between Taungurong and Waveroo Aborigines and a party of shepherds and stockmen in the employ of brothers William and George Faithful (often spelt as Faithfull), fought on 11 April 1838 on the Broken River at the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

13

site of the present-day town of Benalla, Victoria. When George Faithful led off the party from drought-ravaged Goulburn, New South Wales (where William held Springfield Flat station), the object was to drive 395 cattle and 3,472 sheep belonging to both brothers overland to the newly opened Port Phillip Bay district in search of land which was suitable for squatting runs. When the Ovens River was reached about 4 April, George Faithful decided—in his words—‘to turn out of the beaten road and visit Oxley Plains’, sending the stock further on ‘to the finer lands spoken of by Sir Thomas Mitchell’ in the charge of James Crossley, his brother’s overseer. A more recent account suggests, however, that the real reason for adopting this course was an incident at the Ovens in which several Aborigines had been shot by members of the party for spearing some of the cattle, prompting Faithful to move on the men involved in the hope of avoiding further trouble. His instructions were for the party to wait at the Broken River, where he would join them. Moving in two groups or ‘divisions’, each with a dray, the eighteen-strong party under Crossley reached the river crossing known as the Winding Swamp on 6–7 April. When the first ‘division’ driving the cattle arrived on 6 April, a camp was established near the present Benalla railway bridge on the grassy eastern (right) bank of the river. Members of the party were to claim later that during the time spent resting here a small number of Aborigines were seen and spoken to, but without any hint of hostility. In reality, there are grounds for suspecting that the site chosen by the whites may have been a meeting place which the Aborigines were preparing to use for ceremonial purposes, and that there had also been instances of interference with some of the Aboriginal women. Apparently in an effort to put distance between themselves and the Aborigines, on 8 April Crossley ordered the stock to be

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

14

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

herded across the river and for camp to be re-established on the high western bank. While the need for fresh pasture may have been a factor behind this move, it was more likely in response to growing tensions between the two groups—including the taking of some sheep by the Aborigines. After spears were found hidden in reeds beside the river the next day the whites were well aware that an attack was a possibility. They also became suspicious when a group of about twenty Aboriginal men attached themselves to the party and refused to leave when instructed, until compelled to go at gunpoint on 10 April. They left only after first searching about in the reeds for their spears, which had been removed. Crossley was now eager to leave the area before a clash became inevitable, and ordered the camp to be struck at first light the next day. Later his decision would be attributed to him having heard about good grazing land further on along the Goulburn River, but it does not explain why he ignored the instructions he had been given to wait for George Faithful. On the morning of 11 April the camp beside the Winding Swamp was packed up by the cattlemen of the party, while the sheep ‘division’ set off to the south away from the river. The shepherds had travelled only some 800 metres before they were set upon by about twenty Aborigines and sent fleeing back towards where the drays were being loaded, with their attackers following in pursuit. Despite the fact that the numbers of Aborigines barely exceeded the size of the party they were attacking, and the latter had at least three muskets, only a fleeting defence was offered by the whites. Accounts mention just three shots being fired, only one of which hit its mark, before the whole party broke and ran in headlong flight. This allowed the Europeans to be picked off individually with ease, so that eight men were knocked down and killed. Some versions of the incident claim that the death toll was as high as ten

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

14

or fourteen, but such estimates are clearly exaggerated. Only seven bodies were later recovered and buried at the scene of the fight, and another found a month or so later and separately interred. The appearance of survivors at an outpost of a station on the Ovens some twenty kilometres away brought George Faithful and others to the scene of the raid the next day. They found the plundered drays and several wounded men, but apart from gathering together the widely scattered sheep there was little else that could be done. The affair subsequently entered white folklore, but in a form which included many erroneous details. Key among these concerned the number of Aborigines involved in the attack, sometimes put as high as 300. Such a figure, if true, would have made it unlikely for any whites to have escaped, but was probably offered to justify the action of members of the party in running for their lives. Bassett plausibly argues that no more than twenty Aborigines took part, and contends that this group had been sent to exact retribution for the shootings at the Ovens River rather than act to repel an unwelcome European intrusion into tribal territory. The whites had, after all, been tolerated for several days and were actually on the point of departing when attacked. The Faithful brothers decided not to venture further but to pull back to the Ovens and King rivers. Here they suffered attacks by Aborigines on 1–2 May, and fears of further attacks caused them and two other squatters nearby to abandon their runs in June, although they later resumed their occupancy. While the clash at Benalla was invariably referred to in subsequent years as the ‘Faithful massacre’, there is no reason to view this incident as anything other than a battle which the Aborigines won. Michael Cannon (ed.) Historical Records of Victoria, vol.2A (1982): The Aborigines of Port Phillip 1835–1839, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printing Office; Judith Bassett, ‘The Faithfull Massacre at the Broken River, 1838’, Journal of Australian Studies, no.24, May 1989

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

15

April–June 1838 Barfold, a clash fought on 9 June 1838 between Wurrunjerri (or Yarra) Aborigines and a party of white station hands along the Campaspe River, Victoria. The incident followed trouble in the area earlier in the year, in which Aborigines had pillaged the Pyalong station belonging to Alexander Mollison and the adjoining run at Sutton Grange held by Dr William Bowman. During May one of Bowman’s shepherds was found speared and disembowelled, as a result of which the police magistrate of the Port Phillip district, Captain William Lonsdale, ordered a detachment of mounted police to ‘show themselves thereabouts for a short time in order to inspire confidence [among the settlers] and to alarm the blacks’. The next month a group of about 50 Aborigines allegedly seized two flocks belonging to Bowman and his neighbour at Barfold, Henry Yaldwyn, after chasing off the shepherds. Yaldwyn’s overseer, John Coppock, immediately got together another three men and proceeded to the out-station some eleven kilometres away in search of the missing sheep, being joined by four or five of Bowman’s employees who were also armed. After following the trail of the sheep for more than six kilometres, it was nearly sundown when the party came across the Aborigines’ camp at a distance of about 400 metres. While some of the camp’s occupants were sitting around fires, others were engaged in building a bough yard to contain the sheep. As the whites approached at the run, the dogs accompanying them began to bark. Thus alerted, the Aborigines took up weapons and gave a great shout. One of the whites fired a shot, whereupon the Aborigines began throwing their spears. Taking shelter behind trees, Coppock’s men opened fire and in his words ‘a regular engagement’ followed which lasted for about three-quarters of an hour. By the time the attackers had fought their way into the camp, it was empty except for the bodies of seven

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

15

or eight Aborigines killed in the exchange. The rest of the occupants had retreated several hundred metres into the gathering darkness, driving the sheep before them. Afraid to remain more than a few moments where the campfires made them visible targets, and at the same time afraid to continue the pursuit in the dark, the whites quickly retreated and in Coppock’s words ‘went home’. Not until the next morning did he return to the scene of the fight with six men to continue searching for the sheep. These were found a short distance away, while of the Aborigines there was no sign. According to the later statement of one of those present, the bodies of the Aborigines killed the night before were found to have been placed upon the campfires and ‘partly consumed’ by the flames. When word of the incident reached Melbourne, Lonsdale promptly sent mounted police with a summons to Coppock to provide him with a full account. Official inquiries continued into the following year, with Assistant Protector of Aborigines Edward Parker being instructed to investigate reports that the pitched battle fought by the men under Coppock was actually a massacre. Suspicions were apparently raised by reports that, according to the ‘common fame’ of the district, Bowman was ‘in the habit of shooting every black man, woman and child whom he met on his run’, and had instructed his employees to carry out similar shootings. By one account, it was as a consequence of these investigations that the eight whites involved in the incident at Barfold were later sent to Sydney for trial but perished when the ship conveying them sank off the New South Wales coast; only Coppock survived, by virtue of having missed the vessel’s sailing. G.A. Bremner (1976) A Tour Brochure of Kyneton and District with Historical Background, 3rd edn, Kyneton, Vic.: Kyneton Guardian; Michael Cannon (ed.) Historical Records of Victoria: The Aborigines of Port Phillip 1835–1839, vols 2A (1982) and 2B (1983), Melbourne: Victorian Government Printing Office

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

16

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Fighting Hills, a clash between Aborigines of the Konongwootong (Jardwadjali) tribe and a party of white settlers, fought on 8 March 1840 on the Wando River about ten kilometres north of Casterton, Victoria. On 7 March, a month after five brothers named Whyte arrived from Melbourne to establish a pastoral station on the Wando, Aborigines stole over 120 of the settlers’ sheep. The brothers rode out to pursue the thieves, with four employees on foot, and the next day came across them camped in a clump of tea-tree by the river at The Hummocks, near Wando Vale. In the two-hour fight which followed every adult Aboriginal male except one was killed, this number being variously reported as between 25 and 51. Since the Aborigines had already killed 50 of the sheep, the bodies of the men and the animals lay all around in almost equal numbers—their bones ‘mingled together bleaching in the sun’. Only one European was injured in the clash, receiving a spear wound in the leg. Although many of the women and children escaped up the river while their menfolk fought the attackers, there is no reason to believe that some of these were not among the fatalities since Aboriginal tradition suggests a death toll perhaps as high as 80 people. Michael Cannon (1990) Who Killed the Koories?, Port Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia; Jan Critchett (1990) A ‘Distant Field of Murder’, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Heidelberg, now an outer suburb of Melbourne, Victoria, was in May 1840 the scene of an extraordinary confrontation between white settlers and Aborigines using European firearms seized in raids on shepherds’ huts. Early in 1840 a large band of Aborigines led by Jackie Jackie made their presence felt on the upper reaches of the Yarra River during several incidents in which firearms were used. Attempts were made by white authorities to retrieve the weapons, but were too late. In May, Armyne Bolden, a settler based several kilometres up the Yarra

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

16

from Melbourne, reported to the superintendent of the Port Phillip district, Charles La Trobe, that more than 200 Aborigines armed with about 30 guns were ‘shooting in every direction’ and threatening to burn down huts on his run. A detachment of mounted police was sent out from Melbourne, but by the time this arrived the Aborigines had disappeared. Several troopers led by Lieutenant F.B. Russell tracked the band, but when they were about 65 kilometres upstream they were ambushed by the Aborigines who had concealed themselves in dense scrub by a ford. The police were fired on as they attempted to cross the stream, three were wounded and all were forced to retreat. The incident is chiefly notable for showing the Aborigines acting virtually as guerillas in opposing white occupation of their lands. The solution adopted by La Trobe was to issue orders to police patrols to prevent any Aborigines from entering Melbourne, and in particular to impose severe penalties on shopkeepers supplying powder and shot to any Aborigines, especially women, who sneaked into the town. Michael Cannon (1990) Who Killed the Koories?, Port Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia

The Islands, a locality named by Captain Charles Sturt in 1830 in the extreme south-west corner of New South Wales, west of Lake Victoria, which became the scene of two sharp fights in 1841 between Milmenrura (Maraura) Aborigines and Europeans on the overland stock route to South Australia. The first clash occurred on 16 April, when an eleven-man party under Henry Field and Henry Inman (a former superintendent of police in Adelaide) was approaching the great northern ‘elbow’ of the Murray with 5,000 sheep. The party had been periodically harassed by the Aborigines from the time of leaving the Darling River, having had several ewes speared, but at this point they encountered 300–400 warriors

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

17

1840–1841 who showed their determination to bar the whites’ passage. The shepherds carried firearms, but these weapons proved to be of inferior quality and many did not discharge. Only a slow and ineffectual fire was consequently opened up on the attackers, who quickly surrounded and overwhelmed the whole party. Two men defending the party’s dray were speared before the rest fled through the scrub, abandoning the wagon and bullocks—and all their stores, as well as the sheep—to the Aborigines. Field managed to reach the station at Mount Dispersion (q.v.) to raise the alarm, and when news of the rout reached Adelaide from there on the evening of 21 April it caused a sensation. Eventually all members of the party were able to make their way to stations in the vicinity, and it was established that in fact no lives had been lost, but by then a force of police had already been despatched by the governor, Colonel George Gawler. The relief expedition which departed Adelaide on 22 April was led by the Commissioner for Police, Major Thomas O’Halloran, and comprised an inspector and thirteen police officers and privates, with a doctor to treat the injured. Two days later the party had grown in size to 23 (nineteen of them police), plus two Aboriginal guides; among the additions was retired naval Lieut. W.G. Field—a brother of the attacked party’s co-leader, and a part-owner of the flock which had been lost. By 30 April, O’Halloran was within 80 kilometres of the scene of the battle when a trooper arrived with a despatch from the governor ordering the immediate return of the force. Gawler—himself recalled to England and his successor already having arrived—no longer felt justified in allowing matters to proceed to the inevitable point of a collision, knowing that all members of the Field–Inman party had survived the attack and the only object to be gained was the rescue of the sheep. Angered by this development, on 1 May

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

17

Lieut. Field left the returning force of police and proceeded to raise a party of his own to go in search of the lost sheep. This expedition, which left Adelaide on 5 May, comprised twenty men—seven of them police constables who were ordered to accompany and assist Field only so far as the colony’s border with New South Wales. This separation occurred on 9 May, and Field additionally left some of his paid employees behind to protect the party’s dray, proceeding the next day with only ten mounted volunteers. The attack site was finally reached on the evening of 12 May, the main examination of the scene being held over until the following day. The next morning (13 May 1841) the dray seized the previous month was found, and while following sheep tracks a short time later the party came upon a large body of Aborigines lying in concealment, waiting for them. Field and his men rode towards the Aborigines, who promptly rose up—showing their number to be in excess of 200—and boldly advanced in a crescent formation to within 40 metres before throwing spears. The whites opened fire, expecting that the sight of warriors falling to their bullets would send the rest fleeing. The Milmenruras were not at all intimidated, however, even though at least eight of their number were killed, and pressed forward aiming to surround the horsemen. Field ordered the party to retire out of the closing ring of warriors, and began a fighting withdrawal. During this, the Aborigines determinedly continued to pursue the horsemen on foot. After an action lasting half an hour contact was finally broken, though not before both Field and his mount had been hit by spears and another member’s horse killed. While convinced that the surviving sheep were not far distant, Field recognised that the task of recovering the animals in the face of Milmenrura resistance was beyond his small party. Their numbers and courage made these tribesmen, he concluded, ‘a

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

18

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

much more formidable enemy than the colonists have generally any idea of ’. After Field’s return to Adelaide on 21 May, public agitation for measures to be taken to protect future overland stock parties led to the raising of another police expedition, which became involved in another incident the following month (see Rufus River). Alexander Tolmer (1882) Reminiscences of an Adventurous and Chequered Career at Home and at the Antipodes (2 vols), vol.1, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington; John Wrathall Bull (1884) Early Experiences of Life in South Australia, Adelaide: E.S. Wigg & Son

Rufus River, located between Lake Victoria and the Murray River 60 kilometres west of Wentworth, New South Wales, was the scene of two sharp fights in 1841 between Milmenrura (Maraura) Aborigines and Europeans using the overland stock route to South Australia. These clashes followed several similar incidents earlier the same year, which took place about twenty kilometres further west, just inside the border with South Australia (see The Islands). On 20 June a party of sixteen men under C. Langhorne, driving 700 cattle along the north bank of the Murray, suffered a similar fate to previous expeditions. The party had reached the Rufus River (at the point later given the name of Langhorne’s Ferry) when the overseer, Miller, sent several men back to gather in a part of the herd which had strayed. While the advance party was thus temporarily weakened it was heavily attacked by Aborigines, several of its members killed and two (including Miller) wounded. The survivors, who had taken to the safety of the river, emerged after the attackers had left and found three of their colleagues dead. These bodies they concealed, then—after recovering the drays, which had been looted of everything except part of the stock of flour—they hurried forward along the track, hoping to reach the safety of the nearest stations before the Milmenruras set upon them again. The drovers sent back for the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

18

strayed cattle subsequently overtook the advance group, but too late to be of assistance during the attack. Two days later, on 22 June, the survivors met up with a large expedition which had been sent out from Adelaide on 31 May purposely to provide protection for their passage through Milmenrura territory. The force—operating under the command of the Commissioner of Police, Major Thomas O’Halloran, and accompanied by Dr Matthew Moorhouse, the Protector of Aborigines, as an observer—numbered 68 police and settler volunteers who had been sworn in as ‘special constables’. It carried, however, specific orders preventing belligerent action from being taken against the Aborigines unless directly attacked, and, although the numerous Milmenruras encountered taunted and mocked the relief force, they were not so foolish as to take on such a large and well-armed group. All O’Halloran could do, therefore, was provide the Langhorne party with what assistance was possible. This amounted to collecting the scattered cattle, of which only seventeen ultimately could not be recovered. In the course of this effort vast heaps of carcasses and bones were found, which were the remains of some 2,000 sheep taken from the Inman–Field party two months earlier. The scene of the fight was also visited on 24 June to check for signs of the four men known or now believed killed. In the event, the body of only one man could be found and buried. Mounted parties scouring the country on both sides of the river attempted to take Milmenrura prisoners, but without success, and on 28 June the whole party began the return trip to Adelaide via Lake Bonney. Two months later, another party passing through the same area similarly came under attack—but this time with a somewhat different outcome. The party of 26 men driving 6,000 sheep and 500 cattle, led by William Robinson, had left Gundagai, New

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

19

June–September 1841 South Wales, on 1 July. When news of its embarking along the inland stock route was received in Adelaide, another armed expedition was raised and despatched on 31 July in an attempt to avoid a repetition of previous troubles. This mounted force of twelve police and sixteen volunteers was placed under Moorhouse’s command, with Sub-Inspector John Shaw of the Metropolitan Police as his deputy. On 25 August, as the expedition passed around the Murray’s northernmost bend, Moorhouse sent three Aboriginal guides ahead to tell the tribesmen of the whites’ superior firepower and advise against any interference with their progress. Disregarding this warning, an estimated 300 Milmenruras set upon Robinson’s overlanders about noon the next day (26 August 1841) as they approached the Rufus. The stock party was about three kilometres east of the river when they sighted the first warriors. Suspecting that their intentions were hostile, Robinson accordingly ordered the party’s three drays and other property drawn into as tight an area as possible, and set seven men to guard the stock. The remaining nineteen men—all well armed— he posted at the front in a single line. As the Aborigines advanced in a wide semi-circular formation, the riflemen opened fire and continued until each man had fired eight rounds. The Milmenruras—kept outside spear range, but having lost at least five killed and ten wounded—withdrew, and the stock party was able to continue their progress to the river where camp was made 1.5 kilometres below Langhorne’s Ferry. The next day, 27 August, Moorhouse’s party met up with Robinson’s party on the river at 10.30 a.m. The Protector of Aborigines had been hoping to avoid conflict with the local inhabitants, but when confronted soon after by an advancing group of 150 hostile Milmenrura warriors he concluded that a ‘contest’ was inevitable and handed over command to his deputy. Shaw

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

19

determined not to wait until the Milmenrura made their move at a time of their choosing, but to attack first while they were still beyond spear-throwing range. Supported from the eastern bank of the river by some ten riflemen of Robinson’s party (all that could be spared from the sheep, cattle and drays), Shaw ordered his own men on the opposite bank to advance and open fire. Faced with this combined onslaught, the Aborigines scattered—about 100 fleeing into the bush while the remainder sought concealment in the reed-beds beside the river. The latter group was pursued to the water’s edge by the gunmen who continued firing into them for 15–20 minutes. Thirty of the Milmenrura were killed, and approximately another ten wounded; four (one adult male who was injured, a boy and two women) were taken captive. The only casualty among the Europeans was Robinson, who was speared in the left arm. Moorhouse released three of his prisoners with a warning for their tribesmen, but took the wounded male back to Adelaide as a hostage; this man briefly escaped into the river but was retaken after receiving further gunshot wounds to the jaw and left arm. This clash on the Rufus, the largest to occur during the settlement of South Australia, ended serious Milmenrura attacks on parties using the overland trail along the Murray. Alexander Tolmer (1882) Reminiscences of an Adventurous and Chequered Career at Home and at the Antipodes (2 vols), vol.1, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington; John Wrathall Bull (1884) Early Experiences of Life in South Australia, Adelaide: E.S. Wigg & Son; Pastoral Pioneers of South Australia, vol.2 (1927), Adelaide: Publishers Ltd.

Sydney Town, was the scene of a public disturbance on 6 September 1841 which resulted in troops being called out to restore order. The trouble began on the 5th when about 50 sailors from HMS Favourite who were on leave while in port became involved in a fight with civilians in a theatre. After a ‘severe struggle’, a large number of people—

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

20

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

including ten of the seamen—were taken to the police lock-up. All those arrested were released the next morning, except two of the man-of-war’s crew who were remanded to their ship. Instead of being conveyed as ordered, however, they were taken by police to the watch-house in Cumberland Street and detained. When news of this proceeding reached the Favourite, the men’s shipmates came ashore and—joined by about 300 townsfolk—marched on the watch-house. The police there quickly fled, leaving the mob to wreck the building and release all the prisoners being held. The crowd then proceeded to St James’ watch-house and did the same, before turning their attention to the main police lock-up at the corner of George and Druitt streets. In the meantime troops had been called out to confront the demonstrators and the Riot Act was read. When the mob refused to disperse, blank cartridges were fired and, this having no effect while some in the crowd began showing ‘an inclination to violence’, the soldiers next fired some rounds of ball ammunition. At least one man was shot (who died the next day), and the rest of the throng duly broke up. J. Henniker Heaton (1879) Australian Dictionary of Dates and Men of the Time, Sydney: George Robertson

Port Lincoln, on the western side of the Spencer Gulf in South Australia, was the scene of a brutal attack by Parnkalla Aborigines on a sheep station on 28 March 1842. About 1 p.m. the owner, Rolles Biddle, an employee Charles Stubbs and his wife Elizabeth, with another man named Fastings, were about to have lunch when the station (situated some 30 kilometres from Port Lincoln) was approached by 36 Aborigines, including one who had previously worked for Biddle. The whites stepped outside the Stubbs’ hut where the meal was being eaten, and saw the Aborigines enter and begin looting Biddle’s hut nearby. When the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

20

Europeans attempted to keep them back, spears were thrown—the only casualty fortunately being a dog. The Aborigines left, but about an hour later returned. More spears were thrown, this time striking Fastings and also Stubbs, who opened fire and shot two of his attackers before retreating into the unpillaged hut with the others. They attempted to barricade themselves inside, but several Aborigines broke the windows and hurled in spears while others began dismantling a corner of the hut near the chimney. A spear thrown in from here fatally wounded Biddle, while Stubbs, standing with his weight against the door, received four more hits—three of them in the head which blinded him in one eye. When he fell the Aborigines surged inside, spearing Fastings to death and dragging Stubbs’ wife from under the bed where she had taken refuge. Shears which were hanging in the hut were then used to stab Mrs Stubbs, her cries being heard by her husband who was lying helpless on the floor blinded by his own blood. After robbing the hut, the Aborigines left, having set fire to the brush-fence beside the hut. Stubbs managed to take himself outside and prevent the fire spreading to the hut. He then dragged the bodies of Biddle and Fastings outside, and his wife—who was still alive—before laying down beside her while she died. The victims of this grisly attack were found about two hours later by shepherds bringing in their flocks for the night. According to local tradition, following this attack the settlement at Port Lincoln was almost abandoned as outlying settlers fled into the town, neglecting their farms in the face of the Aboriginal threat. The governor, Sir George Grey, sent a detachment of soldiers from the 96th Regiment, but this deployment proved to be something of a fiasco. While some Aborigines were captured, killed or wounded, in general the troops were no match for the tribesmen and

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

21

1841–1842

An 1864 newspaper illustration of a clash at Port Lincoln which was possibly meant to depict the clash at the Biddle Station more than twenty years before. Source: Samuel Calvert, 1828–1913. Wood engraving; 16 x 22 cm. National Library of Australia S4272

were withdrawn. They were replaced by police on 10 November, who within two days had captured two Aborigines on suspicion of taking part in the March attack. One of these, named Ngarbi (or Nulta) alias Little Jemmy, was tried at Adelaide, found guilty, and hanged in April 1843 on the site of the three murders. Neville & Margaret Wanklyn (1971) The Early History of the City of Port Lincoln 1802–1971, Port Lincoln, SA: self-published; Henry Reynolds (ed.) (1972) Aborigines and Settlers, North Melbourne: Cassell Australia

Eumeralla, the district around the Eumeralla River between Port Fairy and Portland, Victoria, was in August 1842 the scene of several violent clashes between Aborigines and whites over the ‘theft’ of sheep. On 7 August Aborigines attacked a shepherd employed by James Hunter, who held Eumeralla station with his brother John, and drove off his flock. The station manager,

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

21

Samuel MacGregor, and several hands pursued them and took back the sheep after ‘a severe skirmish’. On 10 August a group of Aborigines estimated to number more than 150 again appeared on the station, part of the group driving off the sheep while the rest attacked the shepherds. This time the latter were well armed and kept them at bay until help arrived, whereupon the Aborigines made off and the flock was recovered. Eight days later there was a third large-scale attack, with this time the tribesmen taking away over 1,000 sheep. A party from the station which went out in pursuit found the flock’s trail littered with dead carcasses. About thirteen kilometres from the station the party came up against the Aborigines, and only after overcoming ‘a vigorous resistance’ (during which three warriors were shot dead and several others wounded) were they able to retake the 500 or so sheep which remained alive.

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

22

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

These clashes were repeated on neighbouring stations of the district to the north-west of Port Fairy over the next five years, reaching a peak of ferocity from early in 1845. Tom Browne—a local squatter who wrote novels under the pseudonym of Rolf Boldrewood—characterised this period as ‘The Eumeralla War’ in his 1884 book of recollections Old Melbourne Memories. Michael Cannon (1990) Who Killed the Koories?, Port Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia; Jan Critchett (1990) A ‘Distant Field of Murder’, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

One Tree Hill, a clash between Jagara Aborigines and white settlers, fought on 19 or 21 September 1843 only nine kilometres north-west of present-day Toowoomba, Queensland. The incident was triggered when about 100 tribesmen, under their leader Multuggerah (called ‘Chief Moppy’ by the Europeans), blockaded a road in a scrubby gorge on the upper reaches of the Lockyer Creek valley. Logs were dragged across the road, while saplings were tied to trees to fence off the roadsides. Three drays carrying supplies west to Francis Forbes’ station at Clifton on the Darling Downs were duly ambushed here, the eighteen teamsters travelling with the wagons abandoning them without firing a shot and leaving the loads to be looted. On learning of the raid, about twenty local settlers organised themselves into ‘a kind of drive’ and went in pursuit of the Aborigines. The tribesmen were tracked as they moved west towards several tall hills, one of which they occupied. This was a narrow conetopped hill liberally strewn with basalt boulders named ‘Hay’s Peak’ by explorer Allan Cunningham in June 1829, but known locally as ‘One Tree Hill’. The position was nearly impregnable but, instead of following the Aborigines up the spur they had used, the whites attempted to charge up the steep slopes. The Aborigines responded by rolling large boulders down onto the attackers and hurling stones. With horses knocked off their

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

22

feet, and riders thrown from their saddles or injured by the fusillade of rock missiles, the whites hurriedly retreated—though reportedly not before many of the Aborigines had been shot. Defeated for the time being, the whites returned to the plundered drays and camped there. During the next three weeks a group of the settlers headed by the Crown land commissioners for Moreton Bay and Darling Downs, Stephen Simpson and Christopher Rolleston respectively, backed up by an officer and ten soldiers of the 99th Regiment, continued to hunt the Aborigines who participated in the incident. They were pursued through the Rosewood Scrubs until they sued for peace and returned the property they had stolen. As a further measure to ensure the incident was not repeated, in October a six-man military detachment was stationed at Helidon, at the foot of the Great Dividing Range, to escort drays through the gorge. ‘Hay’s Peak’ has since become better known as Mount Davidson or Sugarloaf. Matt. J. Fox (1921) The History of Queensland: Its People & Industries, vol.2, Brisbane: States Publishing; Maurice French (1989) Conflict on the Considine, Toowoomba, Qld: Darling Downs Institute Press

Nassau River (or Dunbar Creek as it is actually), was the scene of a surprise attack on 28 June 1845 by Aborigines on the exploring party led by Dr Ludwig Leichhardt, which comprised six white men and two Aborigines (who were from New South Wales tribes). The party was camped about 60 kilometres inland from the Gulf of Carpentaria, on the western side of Cape York Peninsula, Queensland, when it was attacked at about 7 p.m. Leichhardt recorded that members of the expedition had mostly retired to their tents, and he himself was dozing on the ground near a fire, when the camp was suddenly showered with spears. The attackers then swarmed into the camp and assaulted several of the men with waddies.

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

23

1842–1849 After the two Aborigines in the party succeeded in discharging muskets into the attackers, the latter then fled; one of the whites who had been able to take shelter behind a tree before suffering any injury had also managed to fire his weapon, severely wounding one attacker. Among the exploring party there were three casualties, including naturalist John Gilbert who was killed by a spear which struck him in the neck. Coming out of his tent, he only had time to hand a gun and ammunition to one of the party’s Aborigines before he dropped down dead. The other two men injured suffered multiple spear and waddy blows, but quickly recovered from these so that the expedition was able to resume its journey on 1 July. The attack was seemingly unprovoked, but in September 1849 naturalist John MacGillivray recorded having been later told by a member of Leichhardt’s party (while intoxicated) that it had actually been prompted by ‘a gross outrage . . . committed upon an aboriginal woman a day or two previously by the two blacks belonging to the expedition’. Robert Logan Jack (1921) Northmost Australia (2 vols), vol.1, London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co.

Murrabit, a clash between Aborigines and Native Police, fought on 1 February 1846 between the present town of Koondrook, Victoria, and the junction of the Loddon River with the Murray. Escalating violence between local tribesmen and shepherds during the previous year had prompted the despatch of a detachment of fourteen police under William Dana (the younger brother of Henry, commander of the Native Police Corps) to ‘pacify’ the area. On the afternoon of 1 February the troopers were riding through a swampy bed of reeds when they encountered a group of Aborigines estimated to number 200 warriors. Dana claimed that he tried to avoid the hostilities, but was pursued onto dry ground where one of his men and two horses were speared. He

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

23

accordingly ordered a charge, resulting in a mêlée in which the troopers fired at least 100 rounds. Dana later reported seeing ‘several dead bodies’ and stated that ‘there must have been a great many wounded’. Michael Cannon (1990) Who Killed the Koories?, Melbourne: William Heinemann

Geraldton, in the Champion Bay district of Western Australia, was the scene of a notable clash in December 1848 between Amangu Aborigines and an official party which included the governor of the colony, Commander Charles FitzGerald, RN. Having arrived only in August, FitzGerald had become caught up in the mineral fever which followed the discovery of lead at Northampton, 50 kilometres north of Geraldton, and insisted on being taken to the site of the find by its discoverer, Augustus Gregory. The expedition had tragic consequences because, although the local Aborigines had previously appeared friendly, an incident took place in which FitzGerald received a spear wound in the knee and was reportedly fortunate to escape with his life. At least three Aborigines were shot dead. Paul Hasluck (1970) Black Australians, 2nd edn, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press; C.T. Stannage (ed.) (1981) A New History of Western Australia, Nedlands, WA; University of Western Australia Press

Bingera, a clash fought between Taribelang Aborigines and white settlers in mid-June 1849 nineteen kilometres west of Bundaberg, Queensland, at a spot near Bingera later known as The Cedars. The action came about after an incident on 4 June at Tirroan (subsequently renamed Gin Gin) station, about 50 kilometres west of Bundaberg, in which Aborigines speared two white shepherds, brothers in their teenage years, and drove off half the flock they had been minding. A punitive expedition numbering some 50 well-armed and well-mounted men assembled at Tirroan under the leadership of Gregory Blaxland

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

24

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

(seventh and youngest son of the famed Blue Mountains explorer) and his nephew, William Forster. Tracking the offending tribesmen in the direction of the coast, the force of whites located a camp of about a hundred Aborigines supposedly feasting on roast mutton in thick scrub a short distance from the Burnett River. Blaxland decided to attack the following morning, and led his horsemen into a night bivouac. At dawn the next day the party crept through the tangle of vines and undergrowth on foot, approaching the sleeping camp from three sides before opening fire. Despite descriptions of the camp’s occupants putting up a strong resistance before those that remained fled to safety across the river, the struggle which followed was clearly a very one-sided affair. No whites were killed, and injuries among the attackers were evidently confined to flesh wounds. On the Aborigines’ side, however, there was reportedly a heavy slaughter—to the extent that more than 60 years later ploughmen on the sugar plantation operated at Bingera by the firm of Gibson & Howes were said to have unearthed skulls, bones and weapons where the fight occurred. Clem Lack & Harry Stafford (1964) The Rifle and the Spear, Brisbane: Fortitude Press; Janette Nolan (1978) Bundaberg: History and People, St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press

Carbucky, a clash which took place between Aborigines and Native Mounted Police on the western edge of the Darling Downs, Queensland, on 9 July 1849. The police detachment of ten troopers under their commandant, Frederick Walker, reached the lower Condamine River from Callandoon (near present-day Goondiwindi) on 24 June, and found the district in a ‘most disturbed state’ due to frequent Aboriginal attacks on the settlers. According to Walker, the greatest danger existed at John Dangar’s Wallann Creek station, where the store had been robbed before being burnt and a hutkeeper

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

24

killed. It was believed that some 150 Aborigines from the Fitzroy, Dawson and Condamine areas were gathering on Dogwood Creek in preparation for a repeat attack on Dangar’s station—a situation which brought on two collisions with the police. Walker reported that on the first occasion (date unknown) the ‘Fitz Roy Down blacks . . . suffered so severely that they returned to their own country, a distance of 80 miles’. Subsequently, when informed that some Aborigines were gathered on the Tannin, near Dangar’s, Walker gave pursuit and tracked them for eight or nine days before finally coming upon them near Carbucky at sundown. The police party found that they were within two kilometres of the camp, which lay on the opposite side of the flood-swollen Condamine. On swimming the river at midnight, the pursuers found the water so cold that two of three squatters accompanying the detachment were nearly drowned and had to be rescued by the troopers. They approached the camp on foot at dawn, and Walker later claimed that as soon as the Aborigines sighted the police ‘they seized their spears, and an engagement ensued’. A press account of the action gave the following description: Mr. Walker and party fired at twelve paces, and we are informed that spears and boomerangs were flying in every direction, the flashing of the fire-arms showing the blacks the position of their assailants; the yells of the savages, answered by the war-cry of the police, and the ring of the carbines, must have had a most exciting effect.

At one stage Walker, with the three squatters (Augustus Morris, Charles Marshall and a man named Rens) and a few troopers, were separated from the rest of the detachment and engaged the Aborigines at close quarters: Mr. Rens was wounded by a boomerang, and Edgar, Mr. Walker’s orderly, wounded in the leg by a spear, while in the act of rushing on a black he

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

25

1849–1854 had wounded; the gallant fellow, however, drew out the spear, and drove it into the breast of the black who had thrown it . . . .The blacks must have suffered severely, as the trails of blood were very conspicuous, and one body left dead on the field.

After gaining possession of the Aborigines’ camp, the attackers recovered a great deal of damaged property which was identified as belonging to Dangar. While the punitive measures taken by Walker’s troop won the general approval of settlers on the Downs, the government was initially critical of his methods as demonstrated at ‘the Battle of Carbucky’. On 8 August 1849 the Colonial Secretary in Sydney cautioned him against committing ‘acts of aggressive warfare against the Aborigines’, and pointed out that the command of the Native Police Force had been entrusted to him ‘for the maintenance of peace and not for the purpose of carrying war into the Aborigine’s country’. Regardless of any misgivings voiced on this occasion, the Native Police remained a significant factor in the violent and bloody struggle waged on the frontier for many years. Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 1849; L.E. Skinner (1975) Police of the Pastoral Frontier, St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press

Paddy’s Island, a clash between Taribelang Aborigines and white settlers, fought on the Burnett River in August 1850 near the later site of Youngs’ Fairymead sugar plantation outside Bundaberg, Queensland. The incident followed the murder of Gregory Blaxland, part-owner of Tirroan (later known as Gin Gin) station, who was clubbed to death about the end of July within 200 metres of his homestead—presumably in reprisal for his role in leading an expedition against the Aborigines the previous year (see Bingera). In response to this killing a call for volunteers went out to surrounding stations, and about a week later a force of more than 100 men were sworn in as ‘special constables’ apparently by Maurice

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

25

O’Connell, the Commissioner for Crown Lands in the Burnett district. Proceeding to Paddy’s Island—the known crossing point on the Burnett used by local tribesmen—the punitive party came across a camp estimated to contain close on 1000 Aborigines. Without attempting to identify any individuals directly implicated in Blaxland’s death, the party attacked the whole camp in a mounted charge which reportedly resulted in death for hundreds of its occupants. Aborigines who sought shelter in the dense scrub were hunted down on foot, and many others were killed while attempting to swim the river to the safety of the Woongarra (the brigalow thicket on the southern side). No record exists of any casualties suffered among the attacking force. According to O’Connell, who appears (from evidence he gave to a parliamentary committee ten years later) to have been present, the punitive party afterwards burned the camp and all the Aborigines’ possessions in it. In view of his official position and background as a former regular army officer (he subsequently became a colonel and commandant of Queensland’s volunteer military forces), it seems probable that O’Connell was the leader of this expedition. Clem Lack & Harry Stafford (1964) The Rifle and the Spear, Brisbane: Fortitude Press; Janette Nolan (1978) Bundaberg: History and People, St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press

Eureka Stockade, a clash between gold-miners and a force of soldiers and police fought at Ballarat, Victoria, on 3 December 1854. It was the culmination of widespread unrest on all the main Victorian goldfields over the denial of full civic rights, unfair taxation through licence fees on mining activity, and police repression when enforcing the licence system. In the face of several public meetings at Ballarat during November attended by as many as 10,000 diggers, the government responded by despatching detachments of troops as well as police

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

26

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

J. B. Henderson’s painting of the storming of the miners’ stockade at Ballarat. The artist has correctly portrayed details of the soldiers’ uniforms and the dress of the miners, but reportedly did not reach the scene until several hours after the fight. Source: Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW, SSV 2B/BALL/7

reinforcements. On 30 November about 1,000 of the more militant miners had taken up position on a hill at the Eureka lead under an Irish engineer, Peter Lalor, whom they named as ‘commander-in-chief ’. A crude fort of upended log slabs and earth had been thrown up, from within which it was intended to resist any further arrests for non-possession of a licence. By the evening of Saturday, 2 December, a large government force had already been assembled at Ballarat and more troops were known to be on their way from Melbourne accompanied by the commander-in-chief of Imperial troops in Australia, Major-General Sir Robert Nickle. Learning that the numbers of miners manning the stockade had been steadily dwindling in subsequent days as tempers cooled and men returned to their diggings, the local gold commissioner, R.W. Rede, gave instructions for an attack the following morning on those who remained. Plans were drawn up for an assault under Captain John Thomas at the head of 276

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

26

men—30 cavalrymen and 87 soldiers of the 40th Regiment and 65 of the 12th Regiment, along with 70 mounted and 24 dismounted policemen. At 3.30 a.m. the attack force set off to silently march the 2.4 kilometres from the government camp, along the Yarrowee Creek and into the cover of dead ground on the northern side of the stockade. Here the troops and police took up assault formations before beginning a slow, silent advance in the pre-dawn gloom, approaching simultaneously from the north and north-west as well as the west and south-west. Most of the 150 or so miners who remained inside the stockade were still asleep when their sentries spotted the advancing troops less than 300 metres away at 4.45 a.m. and fired several warning shots. The attackers immediately came on at a slow run, receiving a ragged volley from behind the stockade’s frail ramparts which felled several soldiers. Two strong volleys were fired in return before bayonets were fixed and the position stormed.

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

27

1854–1857 Apart from possessing the advantage of surprise and superior numbers, the soldiers and police also completely outgunned the miners. Only about 100 of the latter had firearms; another twenty or so carried steel-tipped pikes, but the remainder were unarmed. All resistance was overcome within fifteen minutes and predictably casualties were heaviest among the miners. Lalor later calculated that 22 of his men had been killed or died subsequently while another twelve (including himself) were wounded; 125 were taken prisoner. Some of the miners who died in the following days were still being concealed by friends and sympathisers, so that only twenty of their number were buried at Ballarat. One officer and four soldiers had also been killed, while twelve soldiers and a policeman were wounded. The disproportionate number of casualties from the one-sided affair led to allegations of a cowardly massacre, a description given some validity by disgraceful conduct on the part of members of the police towards wounded miners and even uninvolved bystanders. The incident attracted attention around the world, but especially in London where Karl Marx hailed it as ‘a symptom, a concrete manifestation [of] the general revolutionary movement in Victoria’. This was a total misreading of the climate and causes of the miners’ stand, or what was needed to effect change in the colony. Although the miners were defeated at Eureka, public sympathy was huge and enabled them to subsequently gain full satisfaction on all their grievances following a commission of inquiry into conditions on the goldfields. This fact has caused what was a relatively minor affair to assume a central, and perhaps exaggerated, significance in Australian historical tradition. John Molony (1984) Eureka, Ringwood, Vic.: Viking

Rannes, a clash fought on 23 September 1855 about 120 kilometres west of Gladstone, Queensland, between Darambal Aborigines

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

27

and a detachment of Native Mounted Police made up of Aborigines who were ‘foreign’ to the district. The attack came as the seven police troopers were asleep in their camp. A small group of the local tribesmen crept into the camp and removed the troopers’ carbines and pistols. Once this had been accomplished, a larger number of Aborigines rushed from the nearby scrub and speared the troopers as they slept. Two troopers were killed on the spot; a third who suffered a spear thrust in his lungs died some days later. Another three received wounds from which they recovered within a few days. Only one escaped with slight wounds and was able to remain on duty. The Aborigines who carried out the attack immediately fled to the bush, taking with them four carbines, five ramrods, and blankets and shirts from the camp. Over the next few weeks further Native Police sent to the scene pursued the large number of tribesmen who had congregated in the Rannes area, while a patrol under Sub-Lieutenant Frederick Walker carried out an unsuccessful search for those directly responsible for the attack. L.E. Skinner (1975) Police of the Pastoral Frontier, St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press

Hornet Bank, an attack mounted on 27 October 1857 by Yiman (Yeeman) Aborigines against a pastoral station on the Dawson River, 40 kilometres south-west of Taroom, Queensland. In an unprecedented act of revenge for past mistreatment by the Fraser family, who had leased the station since 1854, a war-party of over 100 warriors surrounded the station buildings during the night of 26 October. They attacked at dawn, killing nine of the ten people inside—including Mrs Martha Fraser (widow of a Toowoomba carpenter) and seven of her nine children, and the children’s male tutor. Two shepherds camped in the woolshed about a kilometre from the homestead were speared and clubbed to death later in the morning while

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

28

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Image rights unavailable

The Fraser family’s ‘Hornet Bank’ station on the Dawson River. Source: John Oxley Library, Brisbane, 16985

washing. The only survivor of the attack was a 14-year-old boy, Sylvester Fraser, who— though clubbed and left for dead—managed to reach a neighbouring station sixteen kilometres away and raise the alarm. On the night of 27–28 October, some of the Aborigines involved in the Fraser murders also attacked a four-man party searching for new pastoral land, which had camped at Conciliation Creek. Ironically this included Frederick Walker, a former officer in the Native Police noted for his enlightened views on racial harmony until dismissed for drunkenness in 1854. Walker and his colleague Arthur Wiggins were saved by the Aboriginal ex-troopers with them, though both suffered spear wounds. When he recovered, Walker raised a new force of ex-troopers which helped patrol the Dawson River district until ordered to disband on instructions from Sydney. The unusual ferocity of the attack at Hornet Bank—involving rape of three of the women and castration of the tutor— especially shocked the white community of the colony. The eldest of the Fraser children, William, had been away in Ipswich at the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

28

time of the attack. He subsequently took a leading role in the savage reprisals exacted by at least four posses against all members of the tribe encountered in succeeding weeks, and within a year claimed to have personally killed 100 Aborigines. Attack Creek, a clash between Aborigines of the Warumungu tribe and a party of explorers led by John McDouall Stuart, was fought 70 kilometres north of Tennant Creek in the Northern Territory, on 26 June 1860. Stuart was making his fourth expedition into central Australia, having left Chambers Creek, South Australia, in March with the aim of finding a route with sufficient water that would lead north-west to the far side of the continent; with him were two other men and thirteen horses. On 25 June Stuart’s party came across a creek which they decided to follow up after spending the night by a pool. Setting off the next day, the Europeans passed an Aboriginal camp beside the water and—perhaps unusually among explorers—Stuart was careful to avoid giving any offence to the local inhabitants. When the creekline being

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

29

1857–1861 followed was found to peter out into the scrub, he decided to return forthwith to the previous night’s campsite. In passing the Aborigines’ encampment he found it to be abandoned. Crossing the creek at this point, Stuart’s party was suddenly confronted by some 30 warriors ‘all dressed for war’. The Europeans sought to avoid a confrontation, but found themselves under a barrage of boomerangs— one of which struck Stuart’s horse. The Aborigines also set fire to the grass, in an apparent attempt to stampede the packhorses. At this Stuart gave the order to open fire, sending one man to rein in the frightened animals while he and the other covered their retreat across the creek. The Aborigines followed, keeping up their fearful yelling while continually lighting new fires. Eventually Stuart and his men left their pursuers behind, but dared not halt at the previous night’s stop. Instead they rode on until 11 p.m., before camping in more open country on the banks of a different creek. This clash, which seemed to Stuart to be prompted by nothing more than Warumungu resentment at the intrusion of strangers into their territory, caused him to abandon his attempt to reach the Gulf of Carpentaria on this occasion. As he recorded in his journal, he feared that there might be ‘far worse in advance of us’. William Hardman (ed.) (1865) Explorations in Australia: the Journals of John McDouall Stuart, 2nd edn, London: Saunders, Otley & Co.

Matarikoriko, one of the pas (forts) comprising the main Maori stronghold on the Waitara River in New Zealand’s Taranaki district, was besieged by troops under Major-General Thomas Pratt (commander-in-chief of British forces in Australia) on 29–31 December 1860. Located eight kilometres from the sea, on the river’s southern shore, it was the first-encountered of three formidable fortifications sited on the Kairau plateau and was accordingly the first tackled by Pratt when he took to the field on 28 December. Moving

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

29

up with 900 men and four guns, the next day the British began constructing a redoubt able to accommodate 500 men about 730 metres from the Maori positions. This was intended to serve as a depot and start-point for a sap to facilitate an attack against the pa, and also for an attack on the next Maori work at Huirangi. Under a brisk fire from well-concealed rifle pits less than 150 metres away, the British troops laboured all day and received little rest during the night from incessant Maori harassing fire. The exchange of fire on this day was remarkably heavy, with the British alone using an estimated 70,000 bullets along with 120 artillery rounds. The next day, Sunday, a white flag was flown over the stockade and its defenders insisted that they did not wish to desecrate the Sabbath by shedding blood. An armistice was accordingly arranged for the rest of the day, although this did not stop the British from working to finish and improve their redoubt’s parapets, and in preparing barbettes and platforms for mounting two 8-inch guns. Next morning it was found that the Maoris had abandoned the pa, leaving twelve of their dead buried within it. The cost to Pratt’s troops had been three killed and twenty wounded. The action is principally of note because of the involvement in the British force of a naval brigade of 138 officers and men. Included in this corps were two officers and 30 sailors from the Victorian government’s auxiliary-screw warship Victoria (variously described as a barque, sloop or corvette), this being the first military operation carried out by any Australian armed unit overseas. James Cowan (1922–23) The New Zealand Wars, 2 vols, Wellington, NZ: W.A.G. Skinner; Tom Gibson (1974) The Maori Wars, Wellington, NZ: A.H. & A.W. Reed; Colin Jones (1986) Australian Colonial Navies, Canberra: Australian War Memorial

Lambing Flat, an armed clash on 14 July 1861 between police and miners near Young,

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

30

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

New South Wales, which was the culmination of several anti-Chinese riots on the newly proclaimed Burrangong goldfield. After serious disturbances in December 1860 and January 1861 to protest against the large Chinese population on these diggings, the police presence had been bolstered in an effort to keep the peace. On 25 February a contingent of 130 officers and men of the 12th Regiment, supported by a 42-man detachment of artillery manning three 12-pounder guns, was also despatched from Sydney, arriving on 11 March. After two months of peaceful inactivity the military were withdrawn on 24 May, however, and on 30 June there followed an even worse demonstration of the hostility felt by the 15,000 European miners towards their 2,000–3,000 Chinese counterparts. The party of twenty police remaining were powerless to intervene as a mob estimated to number 3,000 sacked the two main Chinese camps, and viciously assaulted and robbed their inhabitants. Reinforcements of mounted and foot police were sent to the scene from surrounding districts to bring the police presence up to 60. On Sunday 14 July three men held to be ringleaders of the violence a fortnight before were arrested and confined in the police camp. In an attempt to force the release of their colleagues, about 1,000 miners marched on the lock-up that evening in heavy rain and seemed ready to storm the camp. As the crowd became more unruly, the Riot Act was read. When this failed to disperse the gathering, foot police fired a volley over the heads of the crowd. After shots came out of the mob aimed at police horses, the police lowered their aim to fire directly into the miners. Several men were wounded and one was shot dead. When this still failed to disperse the crowd, troopers were twice ordered to charge with drawn cutlasses. Eventually the miners’ ranks broke and fled, but only after about twenty of their number had been injured, along with several constables.

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

30

By morning peace had been restored, but the police—fearing a repeat attack—decided to retire to Yass 90 kilometres away. They vacated their camp, taking the prisoners with them and accompanied by the local goldfield administrators who judged it prudent to depart as well. The miners were left to bury their fallen comrade on 16 July with what were described as ‘informal military honours’, and to begin drilling in preparation for a further encounter. In response to this crisis the colonial government returned the military detachment sent before, this time with another 75 volunteers and a naval gun from HMS Fawn, a British warship then in harbour. On the arrival of this force—ready for action—on 31 July, the miners’ resistance evaporated and their leaders fled. The naval contingent was withdrawn on 6 August, followed on 18 September by all except 50 soldiers with one gun who remained until July 1862. When anti-Chinese elements tried to stage a rally in Sydney in support of the miners, the government called out the volunteer militia; in the event the public meeting was washed out by rain and no further trouble arose. Thirteen of the participants in the events at Lambing Flat were subsequently arrested and charged, but acquitted by sympathetic juries; only one man was gaoled for taking part in the disturbances. The anti-Asian hostility expressed in the riots was later given legal status in discriminatory legislation passed to restrict Chinese immigration. K.S. Inglis (1974) The Australian Colonists, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press; P.A. Selth, ‘The Burrangong (Lambing Flat) Riots, 1860–61: A Closer Look’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol.60, pt1, March 1974, pp.48–69; J.B. Hirst (1988) The Strange Birth of Colonial Democracy, Sydney: Allen & Unwin

Cullinlaringo, an attack mounted on 17 October 1861 by Gayiri (Kairi) Aborigines against the residents of a newly established pastoral station on a tributary of the Nogoa

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

31

1861–1863 River about 40 kilometres south-west of Emerald, Queensland. The tribesmen struck in the afternoon, while station personnel were resting after a morning spent constructing slab huts and stockyards. The owner, Horatio Wills, the only man in the camp who was armed, succeeded in firing one shot from a revolver as he stepped from a tent before he was struck down. A total of nineteen people were killed—eleven men, three women and five children—the largest loss to Aboriginal attack ever experienced in a single incident. The only survivors were a station hand who hid and two shepherds who were some distance from the scene, one of whom later rode to an adjoining station and raised the alarm. The attack was apparently in revenge for past killings of Gayiri by Native Police, an activity in which the recently arrived Wills party could not have been involved. To that extent, the targeting of Cullinlaringo was unfortunate and undeserved. The outcome of this episode, however, was further killings of Aborigines, as posses of settlers and workers from other stations assembled to make indiscriminate reprisals. The arrival of squads of Native Police in subsequent days ensured that this retaliation continued for the next two months. D.J. Mulvaney (1989) Encounters in Place, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press

Floraville, a clash on 1 December 1861 between Aborigines and a party of four whites and five Aboriginal troopers searching for the lost explorers Burke and Wills, which took place ten kilometres north of the present-day town of Floraville, Queensland. The search party was under Frederick Walker, a former commandant of the New South Wales Native Police Corps, and the few details known of the incident are drawn from his diary. This records that while the party was camped beside a small creek on the east bank of the Leichhardt River, Aborigines attacked but were repulsed; ‘their

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

31

[the Aborigines’] right wing, which was the strongest, got over the river and were off, but the centre and left wing suffered a heavy loss’. What that meant in terms of the number of casualties is unknown. Robert Logan Jack (1921) Northmost Australia (2 vols), vol.1, London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co.

Pukekohe East, an action fought on 14 September 1863 about eleven kilometres south-west of Drury, New Zealand, between British troops and Maori insurgents. A seventeen-man garrison, comprising a militia detachment from Auckland and volunteers drawn from among farmers of the surrounding district who had been forced to abandon their properties, manned a small and still incomplete log stockade built around the local Presbyterian church. This occupied a ridge in an open area surrounded by forest which on all sides was never more than 100 metres distant, and in places as near as 40 metres; while most of the trees close by had been felled, the ground around the building was pitted with stumps and low bushes. Although alerted to the presence in the district of a Maori war-band on 13 September, when four of the volunteers had a narrow scrape while seeing to stock on the farm belonging to one of them, the hillside outpost was nonetheless surprised at breakfast the next day when attacked at about 9.20 a.m. The stockade’s defenders estimated that they faced 300–400 warriors, although a later Maori account put the number at no more than 170–200. These now surged up to the stockade, at times grabbing the muzzles of the defenders’ muskets and attempting to drag them through the loopholes cut in the log walls. After the initial rush failed to take the position, the action settled into a six-hour siege. The Maoris were well supplied with ammunition and kept up an extraordinarily heavy fire from behind trees, logs and stumps, whereas the stockade’s defenders were obliged to exercise extreme care to

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

32

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

The battle around the Presbyterian Church at Pukekohe, as drawn in 1921 by A. H. Messenger. Source: James Cowan (1922–23), The New Zealand Wars, vol.1, facing p. 27

conserve their limited supply. About 1 p.m. the garrison’s situation received a boost when a group of 33 regulars—men of the 70th Regiment who had hurried from Springfield (Ramarama) in response to the sound of firing—reached the scene of the battle and fought their way through the cordon of Maoris. This reinforcement arrived none too soon, as some members of the original garrison were then down to one round apiece. About 4 p.m. a further relief column of regulars, comprising 150 soldiers of the 18th and 65th regiments under captains Inman and Saltmarshe (or Saltmarch), also arrived and joined in the defence. The newcomers reported having overtaken nearby a party of 25 militiamen of the 1st Waikato Regiment, under Captain Moir, who were escorting three ammunition carts to Pukekohe. These had been despatched earlier in the day but delayed by the state of the road. When this party came into view a short time later, the Maoris were surging to within 40 metres of the stockade and it was necessary to clear a path for them to get inside. To this end the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

32

troops at the church charged down the road while the Waikato men simultaneously pushed on up the hill, a combined movement which effectively cut through the Maori ranks. After a further hour of hard fighting the tribesmen broke off the fight and retreated, taking with them the majority of their dead believed to have numbered about 40. The troops had lost three men killed and eight wounded, including one man of the Waikatos who was shot in the knee and received a tomahawk cut to the head. The defence of Pukekohe East was later described as one of the ‘pluckiest’ actions of the campaign fought in the South Auckland area. James Cowan (1922–23) The New Zealand Wars (2 vols), vol.1, Wellington: W.A.G. Skinner; John Featon (1923) The Waikato War, Auckland: Brett Printing & Publishing; Leonard L. Barton (1979) Australians in the Waikato War 1863–1864, Sydney: Library of Australian History

Titi Hill, a skirmish fought on 23 October 1863 at Mauku, New Zealand, between Maoris and members of the colonial militia.

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

33

1863–1864 During the morning, troops manning a stockade at St Bride’s Church (one of two defensive works guarding this point inland from the shores of Manukau Harbour) heard firing to the south of them. Scouts sent out to investigate sighted Maoris shooting cattle in the valley beyond Titi Hill, about two kilometres away. The commander of the garrison, Lieut. D.H. Lusk of the Forest Rangers, called for reinforcements from the neighbouring strongpoint 1.5 kilometres away, which contained a detachment of the 1st Waikato Regiment (a unit largely recruited in Australia). The officer in charge of the Waikatos, Lieut. John Perceval, led forward a section of twelve men. Instead of joining the church defenders, however, he rashly took his men up Titi Hill and into bush at the crest in an apparent attempt to catch the Maoris by surprise. The detachment was immediately confronted by a war-party of about 150 warriors and, finding itself hotly pressed and outflanked on both sides, began a hasty but orderly retreat. Observing the sudden turn of events from the church, Lusk led a group from the stockade to the rescue and arrived in time to prevent Perceval’s small group from being overrun. Thinking that the 50 men now under his command might be sufficient to drive back the Maoris, Lusk initially ordered an attack with fixed bayonets which succeeded in pushing beyond a patch of felled timber amid a clearing. When the Maoris again began rapidly skirmishing forward, threatening to outflank him on the left with their superior numbers, he realised that there was no option but to withdraw. As the militiamen began falling back, using the cover provided by the tree stumps and logs which littered the ground, the emboldened Maoris threw their full weight against the Europeans. The gap between the two forces was closed to only twenty metres, with both sides firing at each other as fast as they could reload. Some of the Maoris then threw down their

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

33

rifles and charged forward to engage in hand-to-hand combat, pitting their long-handled tomahawks against the militia bayonets. As numbers of his men started to fall Lusk ordered cover to be taken in bush to the right, and from here a volume of accurate fire was maintained which forced the Maoris out of the smoke-filled clearing. Using this hard-won breathing space, the militia made their way safely back to the stockade using fire and movement by sections. The Maori war-party then broke off the action and withdrew, regaining the far bank of the Waikato River before other contingents of troops could intercept them next day. They carried with them their casualties, estimated to include 20–30 killed and many more wounded. The Mauku garrison had suffered eight dead, including Perceval and another officer—all except one being from the 1st Waikatos. As four of these men were believed to be from Victoria, they are probably the first Australians killed in a foreign war. James Cowan (1922–23) The New Zealand Wars (2 vols), vol.1, Wellington: W.A.G. Skinner; Leonard L. Barton (1979) Australians in the Waikato War 1863–1864, Sydney: Library of Australian History

Orakau, a famous action fought in the Upper Waipa district of New Zealand on 31 March– 2 April 1864, when British troops under Brigadier-General George Carey—including a portion of the Waikato militia which had been recruited in Australia—besieged 300 Ngati-Maniapoto Maoris in their pa (fort). On 30 March Lieut.-Colonel T.M. Haultain, commanding officer of the 2nd Waikato Militia and then in charge of a redoubt at Kihikihi, sent a report of rebel activity on a ridge amid peach-groves at Orakau to the headquarters camp at Te Awamutu. At dawn the next day Carey moved with several columns which quickly and effectively surrounded the Maori outpost. An attempt to rush the pa was repulsed with loss, as was a second assault supported by two 6-pounder

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

34

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Armstrong guns. Realising that the Maori defences were stronger than first thought, Carey gave orders for a sap to be driven against the north-west corner of the position and at the same time called for reinforcements which—when they arrived that same evening—brought his strength to nearly 1,500 men. Meanwhile, the work of digging towards the Maoris’ entrenchments was continued throughout the night under a heavy fire. About noon the next day, 1 April, a rebel relief force of 150–200 Ngati-Haua and Ngati-Raukawa warriors appeared on the ranges to the east, and it was anticipated that these intended to try to reinforce the pa’s defenders. A party of troops (which included a company of Waikato militiamen) made sure this did not happen, and a sortie mounted from within the pa to make contact was also beaten back. Despite intermittent volleys fired by the Maoris, the digging of the sap continued unchecked. To forestall the British advance, an attack by 20–30 young warriors was launched against the mining party during the night, but this attempt was repelled by a volley from men of the 3rd Waikato Militia, under Captain Walter Herford, who were posted to guard the trench. Herford, a South Australian barrister before his enlistment, was picked off later in the day by a Maori sniper who wounded him with a shot to the head which took out an eye. At 9 a.m. on the morning of the third day, Lieut.-General Duncan Cameron arrived with a cavalry escort from Pukerimu (near present-day Cambridge) to find the troops still digging their way forward and now within eight metres of the palisade in front of the outer Maori trenches. He sent an interpreter forward with a message calling on the pa’s garrison to submit but, although surrounded now by some 1,800 troops and having spent two days without water and only limited food, the tribesmen would neither surrender nor accept an offer of safe passage for about 50

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

34

women or children who had been helping in the pa’s construction when the battle began, declaring that all would remain to the death. About noon, one of the Armstrong guns was brought into the sap and used to breach the parapet of the outer wall. From the safety of the trench short-fused hand grenades were also lobbed over the parapets among the Maori defenders, causing scores of injuries. Two attempts by men of the Waikato Militia and others to storm the north-west outwork were nonetheless repulsed with loss, but soon afterwards the miners succeeded in connecting the sap with the trench of the outwork and the troops now had entry into the position. The garrison withdrew into the main bastion and continued the fight, but it was clear that the end was near. At 3.30 p.m. the Maoris, recognising the gravity of their situation but still uncowed, chose to abandon the pa in a final show of defiance. Suddenly breaking down the south-east corner of their redoubt, they emerged in a silent compact body—the warriors forming a protective shield around their women and children— and proceeded to hack an escape path out of entrapment. After the remnant of the Maoris had burst through the British cordon, troops converged on the point of their breakthrough and poured a heavy fire into them as they disappeared into the thick tea-tree at the rear of the pa. Other troops, some mounted and others on foot, continued the pursuit over several kilometres. Only about 100 defenders, including their leader, Rewi Maniapoto, escaped by this desperate means but it ensured that the Orakau siege—one of the most important episodes of the Waikato war—could be judged as only partly successful from the British point of view. Between 130–160 Maoris had been killed and another 33 taken prisoner (all but seven after being wounded). The attackers lost sixteen killed and 52 wounded; five of the casualties were members of the 2nd and 3rd Waikato regiments, two of them being

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

niu

Pu

R.

Kihikihi M

ai n bo

dy un

de

redoubt

rG

en.

Care

am

tre

iS

ho

ao

Ma ng

Rangiaohia redoubt

y

l in

redoubt

0

1

(see inset)

2

0

3

4

5 kms

10 15 20 25 metres

Parawera

5

denotes tunnels under the parapet, connecting the ditch and interior of the pa

post and rail fence

ditch

;;;; ; ;; ;;;; ;; ; ; ;; ; ;;;; ;

sap

Orakau Pa

cap e eo f es i’s Ma or

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

M

lewitt ajo

35

the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

B pt. a C rB ly

Te Awamutu

March 1864

35

36

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

among the dead—in addition to Herford who subsequently died of his wound. Apart from Herford, Carey also singled out Lieut. H.B.R. Harrison (2nd Waikato Regiment) for gallantry during the siege. James Cowan (1922–23) The New Zealand Wars (2 vols), vol.1, Wellington: W.A.G. Skinner; John Featon (1923) The Waikato War, Auckland: Brett Printing & Publishing; Leonard L. Barton (1979) Australians in the Waikato War 1863–1864, Sydney: Library of Australian History

Te Ranga, an action fought on 21 June 1864 between rebel Maoris and British forces in the Tauranga district of New Zealand. In late April British troops had suffered a serious reverse in this area, when a formidable force assembled by Lieut.-General Sir Duncan Cameron took heavy casualties unsuccessfully assaulting a fieldwork at Pukehinahina (known as the Gate pa) which the Maori leaders then surrendered only after the bulk of their warriors had got away. In the wake of this debacle the officer left in charge at Tauranga, Colonel H.H. Greer, was instructed to be vigilant for any further attempts by the local Ngaiterangi tribe to erect similar fortified positions. On 21 June a reconnaissance patrol returned to Greer’s camp at Te Papa, beside the Bay of Plenty, to report having sighted a large band of hostile Maoris engaged in digging a new fort across a ridgeline at Te Ranga. This was five or six kilometres inland from the Gate pa, at a point where the road from Tauranga to Oropi and Rotorua headed into forests to the south. Greer hurriedly moved out with 600 men in an attempt to disperse the enemy before they were able to develop their defences into a position of strength. Arriving on the scene at Te Ranga, Greer discovered that the earthworks had not so far progressed beyond a single line of rifle pits, but the number of Maoris manning these—members of the Ngaiterangi and allied tribes—was estimated to equal the size of his own force. After sending back to the camp on the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

36

coast for a 6-pounder Armstrong gun and every soldier who could be spared (another 220 men), Greer immediately sent forward a party of skirmishers to drive the Maoris’ sentries back into the shelters of their trenches. At 10.30 a.m. he moved up his troops and placed them across the front and on the flanks of the position, while opening up a sharp fire intended to prevent the Maoris from retreating without suffering heavy losses. The rebels returned the troops’ fire and the fight continued for the next two hours, until Greer was joined at about 12.30 p.m. by the reinforcements he had summoned from Te Papa. Upon the signal to advance being sounded on a bugle, troops of the 43rd and 68th Light Infantry regiments, and a detachment of the 1st Waikato Militia under Captain William Moore, all charged forward. They were met by a tremendous fire from the Maori positions, most of which fortunately went high, and moments later the attackers were into the trenches and locked in furious hand-to-hand combat. After a short but determined struggle, the Maoris broke and fled. The Colonial Defence Force Cavalry attempted to pursue the survivors with their sabres, but the deep ravines leading off from the ridgeline and swamp areas beyond aided the escape of the majority of the warriors. Remaining in the captured rifle pits were the bodies of 68 defenders, including the Ngaiterangi leader Rawiri Puhirake and several other important figures who had distinguished themselves at Pukehinahina. The recovery of another 40 bodies from the surrounding area, and fifteen subsequent deaths from wounds among the 43 prisoners taken, brought the Maori losses to 123 killed. Greer’s troops suffered 52 casualties, including thirteen killed—all from among the light infantry units. Apart from partially redeeming the earlier disaster at the Gate pa, the outcome at Te Ranga forced the surrender of the Ngaiterangi and was effectively the last

1-22-02, 1:36 PM

37

June–December 1864

Painting by H.M.L. Atcherly (a colour sergeant in the 1st Waikato Regiment from 1863 to 1867) of the action at Te Ranga. Source: Australian War Memorial 19817

engagement of the Waikato campaign. Paradoxically, the action at Te Ranga was also the first pitched battle in which Australians enlisted into any of the four Waikato militia regiments took part. James Cowan (1922–23) The New Zealand Wars (2 vols), vol.1, Wellington: W.A.G. Skinner; Leonard L. Barton (1979) Australians in the Waikato War 1863–1864, Sydney: Library of Australian History

Mitchell River, a clash between Aborigines and a droving party, fought on 18 December 1864 on the western side of Cape York Peninsula about 95 kilometres east of the mouth of the Nassau River. Following a visit of northern ports by Sir George Bowen, governor of Queensland, in August 1862, plans were made for the establishment of a settlement at Somerset, on the northern tip of Cape York Peninsula, under the police magistrate at Rockhampton, John Jardine. To help meet the new settlement’s anticipated needs for fresh food, especially meat, Jardine proposed that his two eldest sons, Frank and Alexander, take a herd of cattle overland to set up a cattle station. This expedition got underway in October 1864,

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

37

when a ten-man party (six Europeans and four Aboriginal troopers) set out from Carpentaria Downs (190 kilometres west of Ingham) with 250 cattle. The party reached Somerset five months later, on 13 March 1865, after a journey across nearly 1,500 kilometres of what was previously barely explored country. Reporting its arrival to Brisbane, John Jardine declared that a successful outcome had been achieved despite the ‘determined hostility of the natives’, who were almost continually on the overlanders’ track and annoyed them ‘on every favourable opportunity’. This opposition had reached the peak of its ferocity as the Mitchell River was neared about 240 kilometres north-north-east of Normanton. On 16 December the Jardine brothers were riding ahead of the main party when they were confronted by a group of Aborigines who jeered and brandished spears. A fight ensued in which eight or nine Aborigines were shot down before the remainder fled. The next day was spent negotiating the many channels of the Mitchell, and the next in moving down what

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

38

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

appeared to be the main stream. This waterway was 30 metres wide, deep and running strongly, and a halt had to be called for several hours while a suitable crossing point was located amid the dense foliage on both sides. The Jardine brothers, accompanied by one of the Native Police, had scouted downstream about two kilometres when they disturbed a number of Aborigines fishing. These quickly swam to the opposite bank and were initially assumed to be fleeing; instead they returned in strength and swam back towards the intruders, having collected their spears and clubs. Realising the situation which was developing, the horsemen headed back towards their camp, the heavy timber limiting their speed to a canter. This retirement was interpreted by the Aborigines as flight, and they pushed their pursuit harder. Once within throwing range, the Aborigines’ spears began passing in close proximity to the backs of the retreating overlanders, prompting Frank Jardine as leader to decide on making a stand. Suddenly turning on their pursuers and galloping up to them, they poured a volley among the leaders before dismounting and maintaining a destructive fire. The sounds of this skirmish quickly brought the rest of the droving party downstream to join the fight. The Aborigines had largely expended their spears in the initial pursuit and were effectively defenceless against the combined fire of ten carbines, with the result that some 30 Aborigines were killed and many more wounded before the survivors managed to escape. None of the expedition’s members suffered any injury in the affray, although one man had a narrow escape during the return to camp when a spear was thrown by a lone warrior waiting in concealment, who was also shot down. Subsequently recounted as one of the few instances in which Queensland Aborigines stood up to whites in a pitched engagement, showing ‘no sign of surprise or fear at the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

38

report and effect of fire-arms’, it was apparently this aspect which caused the one-sided affair to be dubbed the ‘Battle of the Mitchell’. The precise location of the action is not known, but is believed to be about five kilometres west of Koolatah station homestead. R. Logan Jack (1922) Northmost Australia (2 vols), vol.1, Melbourne: George Robertson & Co.

La Grange Bay, a clash between Karadjari Aborigines and whites, fought on the north-west coast of Western Australia on 6 April 1865. The incident was triggered by the despatch from Fremantle in March of a party to search for three white men, who had disappeared in November the previous year while examining new pastoral country south of Roebuck Bay and were believed to have been murdered by tribesmen. The expedition initially comprised four Europeans (a 22-year-old expert bushman named Maitland Brown, two police constables and a white ‘navigator’) and three Aboriginal boys; later it was joined by two private citizens named David Francisco and Lockier Burges. Despite his youth, Brown was placed in charge and instructed to act entirely on his own judgement while ‘avoiding by all possible means any hostile collisions’ with the local Aborigines. On arriving at Roebuck Bay, Brown promptly raided Aboriginal camps and seized hostages who were taken on board the ship attending the expedition. With eleven Aborigines in chains he then sailed to La Grange Bay, where the bodies of the three missing men were located a short distance inland. While the remains were being prepared for return to Perth for a state funeral, two of the hostages attempted to escape and were shot dead by one of the Aboriginal boys. Having loaded the bones of the three murdered whites into the expedition’s support vessel on 6 April, the main party started out the same day to make the journey back to Roebuck Bay overland.

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

39

1864–1865 They had not gone very far when two Aborigines were seen and pursued. One threw a stone axe at Brown and was promptly killed by Burges. What happened subsequently is the subject of some debate. According to the diary of one expedition member, four white members of the party rode over the crest of the next hill and found themselves in the midst of a camp of about 50 Aborigines— men, women and children. As a result of a brief skirmish, ‘Five or six were left dead upon the field and about twelve or thirteen wounded’, the latter taking refuge with the rest in a mangrove thicket where pursuit was impossible. Brown himself later described the incident as an ‘ambush’, a term which overstated what was almost certainly an accidental collision given the presence of so many women and children. Moreover, as Hasluck observed, ‘Eighteen casualties among only twenty-five men of this group, inflicted by four white men in ten minutes, certainly makes the “ambush” a dismal failure for the native plotters’. The party was, of course, justified in acting in self-defence, and in this case was particularly well equipped to do so. Burges later wrote that each of the four whites engaged in the fight carried ‘a six-chambered revolver, with six spare sets of chambers loaded ready for insertion, in addition to our double-barrelled guns or carbines, giving us each 44 shots without reloading’. In the circumstances, it seems more probable that the consideration foremost in Brown’s mind was actually—in his own words—‘the best mode of teaching . . . a severe lesson . . . [in] the superiority of civilised weapons over savage’. It was certainly striking that the two members of the expedition who did not participate in the fight were ‘disappointed at not having arrived in time to share it’. Although officials in Perth and London recognised that the expedition had probably used force against the Aborigines ‘without sufficient necessity’, among the settler

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

39

population in the colony Brown was regarded as a hero and received enthusiastic praise. His report to the government on the incident, first published in the Perth Gazette in May, was reprinted as a very popular pamphlet. Press reports also took to describing the slaughter as though it was a battle of heroic dimensions, depicting the whites as opposed by over 100 ‘fully armed’ warriors. Later accounts—most notably Burges’, first published in 1913—added to this process of exaggerating the scale of the clash by inflating the number of Aborigines present to ‘between 200 and 300 men’. Despite these attempts to elevate the incident in importance, in reality it was nothing more than a savage punitive affair involving the exacting of cruel vengeance against Aborigines who may nor may not have been responsible for the three white deaths earlier. Paul Hasluck (1970) Black Australians, 2nd edn, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press; C.T. Stannage (ed.) (1981) A New History of Western Australia, Nedlands, WA: University of Western Australia Press

Coomooboolaroo, an episode in late May 1865 in the Springsure district near Emerald, Queensland, which affords a rare instance where Aborigines bested elements of the Queensland Native Police Corps with which they clashed. A spate of Aboriginal ‘outrages’ along the McKenzie River, culminating in the murder of a shepherd on the Thomson family’s Coomooboolaroo run (referred to in official reports as Coomooboolano), led to the settlers apprehending ‘a renewal of wholesale massacres’ by the large number of Aborigines who had gathered in the area— Coomooboolaroo being in the immediate neighbourhood of Cullinlaringo (q.v.), site of an infamous mass killing of whites in 1861. While on its way to the scene of the shepherd’s murder, a detachment of four Aboriginal troopers under Acting Sub-Inspector Cecil Hill (brother of W.R.O. Hill, who was also an officer in the corps at this time) was surprised in their camp at

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

40

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

night. Hill was killed, apparently as was one of his men, while another trooper was severely wounded. In response to this reverse, on 26 May a further four detachments of Native Police (under sub-inspectors Paschen, Blakeney, Beevor and Bailey) were sent into the area with orders ‘to restore order and protect the lives of the settlers’. These reportedly had ‘sundry collisions’ with groups of Aborigines, with Paschen recording four clashes between 4 and 10 June (the last involving all four detachments) before the tribesmen ‘dispersed’ into scrub country in the Lower Dawson district on 22 June. A year later the Commissioner of Police, David Seymour, voiced his suspicion that Paschen had ‘very much exaggerated the number of his collisions with the aborigines’, since the behaviour attributed to the latter did not accord with their known tactics. Consequently he believed that the encounters described in Paschen’s report ‘refer in a majority of cases to a few spears thrown, and a few shots fired at a distance with little or no loss of [sic] either side’. If this was so, the whole episode had definitely been a win to the Aborigines, since contact with the Native Police nearly always resulted in a heavy death toll. J.C.H. Gill, ‘Governor Bowen and the Aborigines: A Documentary Review’, Queensland Heritage, vol.2, no.7, November 1972

Tam O’Shanter Point, opposite Dunk Island at the northern end of Rockingham Bay on the east coast of north Queensland, was the scene of two clashes between whites and Aborigines in March 1871. In the early hours of 26 February the old brig Maria (167 tonnes), after barely surviving shipwreck while taking 67 members of a prospecting expedition to New Guinea, struck on Bramble Reef on the south side of Rockingham Bay. The captain of the vessel, taking in secret five other men and the best boat (which would have held twenty) and leaving before daybreak, effectively deserted

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

40

the ship on the pretext of going to Cardwell— about 50 kilometres to the west—to obtain assistance. Those left on board (all except nine men) got off the vessel in the remaining two boats and two hastily constructed rafts shortly before the vessel sank later that same day; several men were seen clinging to the single arm of one mast which was left protruding above the water. While the rafts made for the nearest land, the boats made for Cardwell—which they duly reached on 3 March, after spending five wretched days stranded on Hinchinbrook Island due to bad weather. This was the first the town knew of the disaster, and early the next morning a vessel was chartered to proceed to the scene of the wreck and begin the search for other survivors, especially those on the rafts. While this effort was still underway, two members of the party which had gone with the captain walked into Cardwell on the morning of 6 March, naked, completely exhausted, and with one carrying a fearful wound from an Aboriginal ‘sword’. These men told how their boat had come ashore at Tam O’Shanter Point on 29 February, only to be immediately attacked by Aborigines. Having seen one man killed and the captain mortally wounded, and knowing nothing of the fate of the others, the two survivors had taken to travelling only at night and hiding up during the day. Later that same day Navigating Lieutenant Sabben of HMS Basilisk, who had been left at Cardwell in charge of the schooner Peri, hurried to Tam O’Shanter Point in a gig with two of his own men and six volunteers from the town, arriving at about 4 p.m. The Maria’s boat was found drawn up into the scrub, where preparations had been made to burn it, and it was hauled back down to the water. Before setting off, Sabben’s party paused to cook a meal on the beach—having been without food for twelve hours. While engaged in this activity they were suddenly rushed by about 120 Aborigines, who emerged from

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

41

1865–1873 the mangroves armed with spears. The attack was beaten off after eight Aborigines had been killed and another eight wounded. The party then returned to Cardwell in the gig and the captain’s boat. Upon the arrival of Basilisk at Cardwell on 9 March the local Police Magistrate, Brinsley Sheridan, appealed to its commander, Captain John Moresby, RN, for assistance in mounting a punitive expedition against the Aborigines at Tam O’Shanter Point who had already claimed four white lives, having reportedly come to the conclusion that the hostility of these tribesmen threatened the existence of the settlement itself. Lieutenant Francis Hayter was despatched in Peri with two other officers and a dozen men from the warship, accompanied by a detachment of Aboriginal troopers led by Sub-Inspector Robert Johnstone. A surprise attack was made before daylight on an Aboriginal camp in the area, and a bloody vengeance reportedly meted out before the punitive party returned to Cardwell, bringing with them a six-year-old Aboriginal boy. Moresby was apparently under the impression that only a few Aborigines had fallen in this action, notwithstanding his knowledge that the Aboriginal troopers had shown an ‘unrestrained ferocity’ which disgusted Hayter and his officers. Other contemporary accounts suggest that the retribution inflicted by Johnstone and his men amounted to a wholesale massacre which accounted for all but five members of the tribe. Nasty rumours circulated for some time, with Johnstone finally forced to deny the allegations to parliament. While events were taking place at Tam O’Shanter Point, Moresby took the Basilisk to locate those survivors of Maria who had come ashore on the rafts. Of thirteen on the larger of these craft, eight were found on 12 March in the care of friendly Aborigines at Cooper’s Point (just north of modern Innisfail); the other five had drowned or gone

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

41

insane and died. That same day a party in Basilisk’s cutter, under Lieutenant Sydney Smith, found the remains of the smaller raft on the beach some ten kilometres away (south of Gladys Inlet, the mouth of the Johnstone River on which Innisfail now stands). The bodies of nine of the twelve men on board this craft were subsequently located—seven of which bore evidence of having been killed by Aborigines. Why this party had been set upon while the other not far away was given succour remains a mystery. Robert Logan Jack (1921) Northmost Australia (2 vols), vol.1, London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co.; Dorothy Jones (1961) Cardwell Shire Story, Brisbane: Jacaranda Press

The Officer, a skirmish between Pitjantjatjara Aborigines and members of a four-man exploring party led by Ernest Giles, fought on 6–7 September 1873 in the Musgrave Ranges at the far north of South Australia near the non-perennial stream which Giles named The Officer. Giles and a colleague were riding ahead of the others on 6 September, reconnoitring a stretch of running water, when they disturbed a large band of Aborigines who ‘raised a most frightful outcry at our sudden and unexpected advent amongst them’. Sending their women and children away into the hills, the warriors—numbering more than 200— became increasingly menacing. Yelling and gesturing violently, they waved their spears threateningly while the intruding pair sat motionless on their horses; one Aborigine who plainly had previous contact with Europeans was heard to call out, ‘Walk, whitefellow, walk’. When the Aborigines made a rush towards the horsemen, Giles fired a round from his rifle which broke some boughs between several of the leading Aborigines. This action momentarily silenced the group, enabling the two whites to retreat and join the other members of the party travelling with the horses. The Aborigines remained near at

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

42

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

The exploring party led by Ernest Giles clashes with Aborigines in the Musgrave Range. Source: Giles, E. Australia Twice Traversed, 1889, London, vol.1, facing p. 176. National Library of Australia

hand but did not make any further attacks until the explorers had finished setting up camp in a small clearing at the base of a hill. After the horses were fitted with nighthobbles and set free to graze, however, the Aborigines launched what Giles termed ‘a grand sortie’ by rushing down from the hill behind the camp with spears readied for throwing. Judging that their lives were in imminent danger, Giles ordered two rifles and a shotgun to be fired in the attackers’ direction—but without, at this stage, aiming to hit any adversaries. After dodging a volley of spears which landed among them, the whites then ran forward themselves while firing pistols. This tactic had the desired effect in forcing the Aborigines to flee and leave the party in peace for an hour. An attempt was made in the camp to eat a meal, but this had not been completed before another, more stealthy, advance was observed. This attack

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

42

too was broken up by a volley fired so as to throw up dirt and stones from about the attackers’ feet, but did not deter yet one more onslaught. This time, convinced that the party’s firearms were noisy but harmless, the Aborigines made taunting and defiant gestures which Giles felt compelled to answer by placing further rounds in even closer proximity as evidence of real capability. This was enough to cause a retreat which left the camp undisturbed—though not unvigilant—throughout the night. The following morning Giles remained for a short time alone in the camp while one man went to collect the horses and the other two scaled a hill to take some bearings necessary for the day’s travels. He recorded that no sooner had the Aborigines observed this situation than they ‘recommenced their malpractices’, forcing him to open fire—first in the air, ‘then on the ground, at one side of them and then at the other’. By these means

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

43

September–November 1873 they were kept at bay until the others returned, and although they stayed nearby as the party moved off—watching and yelling constantly—there was no further hostile action. Perhaps unusually among explorers, Giles was able to boast that the collision between European and Aboriginal cultures on this occasion had ended with no blood shed and ‘only the loss of a little ammunition’. The incident was later referred to as the ‘Battle of The Officer’. Ernest Giles (1889) Australia Twice Traversed (2 vols), vol.1, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington

Battle Camp, a clash between GuuguYimidhirr (Kokowara) Aborigines and miners bound for the Palmer River goldfield, fought 60 kilometres west-north-west of Cooktown, Queensland, on 5 November 1873. Reports received early in September that year of the discovery of payable quantities of gold on the Palmer had triggered a rush to the area, and by 20 October some 600 miners were already on the new goldfield. Anticipating that many more would follow, the Queensland government immediately sent an expedition north in two small chartered cutters to establish a seaport to handle the influx. The mouth of the Endeavour River was chosen as the site for this port (now Cooktown) on 24 October, and the next morning the steamer Leichhardt arrived carrying a police contingent, gold commissioner Howard St George and a road engineer, Archibald Macmillian, who had instructions to find and make a road to the diggings. Also on board were 96 miners, including twenty Chinese. Five days later, the first party of diggers bound for the Palmer set off from the Endeavour River. They were loosely under the control of St George and Macmillan, and enjoyed the protection of a troop of Native Police under Sub-Inspector George Dyas which was accompanying them to take up station on the goldfield. Unlike the government men, who rode on horseback,

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

43

the miners (joined now by some seamen who had jumped ship) were on foot, either carrying their food supplies and other needs on their own backs or else in wheelbarrows or on packhorses. All up, the party numbered about 130 men. After crossing the Normanby River on 4 November, the party travelled along the southern bank before establishing camp for the night. The site was close to the place where an exploring party led by William Hann had been attacked by Aborigines on 17 September the previous year, and this was probably sufficient to prompt additional precautions to be taken against the possibility of an attack. Other accounts state that while the camp was settling in for the night, a digger who went to the nearby creek for water came across footprints in the soft sand which could only be fresh and brought this warning back to his fellows. As a result, as well as stacking saddles and items unloaded from the horses and carts into a circle, boughs and saplings had been cut and piled up to form a rough barricade. At 5 a.m. the next morning, it was still dark when the camp began to stir prior to moving off. A barking dog drew attention to movement in bushes not far from the barricade, and the camp’s occupants had just come to the alert when the Aborigines attacked. William Webb, a miner in the party, recounted that: . . . a crowd of natives came up yelling out a terrible war cry, and they reached to about 70 yards from where we lay all over the ground. There were about 40 in the first rank and as many more in reserve some distance behind.

Some twenty warriors fell to the first volley from the defenders, many of whom carried breech-loading Snider carbines. A second volley, fired as the attackers were almost up to the barricade, dropped many more. A third volley—more ragged as the diggers and police hurried to reload—was needed to end the hand-to-hand fighting that was then

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

44

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

underway and cause the Aborigines to retreat and drop down into surrounding grass. Even this did not end the action, as spears continued to shower the camp. Under the weight of bullets poured out by the defenders, however, the attack began to fade away. When the Aborigines eventually rose and fled, Macmillan and St George led the troopers in pursuit as far as a large lagoon, and in Webb’s words ‘all that went there stayed there’. Meanwhile, a group of Aborigines had managed to panic the party’s horses, and driven fourteen of the animals—still with their hobbles and night-bells on—about a kilometre away from the camp. Four men mounted a few of the terrified horses that came into the camp and rode out to stop this. Further shots were fired on this front, before the Aborigines disappeared into the bush and the horses were caught and returned—fortunately without injury. The fight, which gave the scene of the action the name ‘Battle Camp’, was quickly over. About 8 a.m. the party moved out, and ten days later the Palmer was reached without further incident. Many subsequent accounts of the incident have tended to magnify both its nature and intensity. The Aboriginal war-party (said to have been 500 strong initially) suffered an unknown number of casualties, and the casualties of the camp’s defenders are also unknown—although it seems there were some. The chief effect of this action was to cause the tribesmen to abandon mounting large-scale open attacks, and resort in future to guerilla-style tactics against intruders attempting to reach the Palmer goldfields. Robert Logan Jack (1922) Northmost Australia (2 vols), vol.1, Melbourne: George Robertson & Co.; Hector Holthouse (1967) River of Gold, Sydney: Angus & Robertson

Gilberton, a boom town of the goldrush era situated on the Gilbert River 185 kilometres north-north-west of Hughenden, Queensland, which became a rare example of a town

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

44

actually abandoned as a result of attacks by Aborigines. Founded in 1869, the town’s population had grown to several thousand by 1872 when the first serious incident occurred. Late in that year, the local clans raided the Chinese mining camp by the river and killed five of its occupants while putting the rest to flight. The probable cause of this onslaught was the drying up of surface water supplies at the end of the long northern dry season, which forced the Aborigines in towards the main river. In September 1873 news of fresh discoveries of gold along the Palmer River caused an exodus from the town, reducing the population to 110 Europeans and a larger number of Chinese. The withdrawal of the local police presence in November that year left the town without protection, and immediately the Aborigines moved in again. Within ten days two white residents had been killed and several attacks had once more driven the Chinese from their riverside camp into the town, leaving behind their stores and large quantities of washdirt which was being stockpiled for the commencement of the rains. With that the Chinese left the town. For the remaining population the position had become perilous. The wet season was imminent and it was certain that swollen streams would soon cut movement along the roads in and out, and teamsters were refusing to come to the town because of the fear of Aboriginal attack (and the better profits to be made from supplying the Palmer goldfield). Accordingly, in December 1873, the last residents of Gilberton loaded what they could of their belongings for removal, before burning the rest in the town’s main street and departing. Henry Reynolds (1987) Frontier, Sydney: Allen & Unwin; W. Ross Johnston (1992) The Long Blue Line, Brisbane: Boolarong Publications

Barrow Creek, an action fought on 23–25 February 1874 when some twenty Kaytej (Kaititja) Aborigines made a planned assault

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

45

1873–1874

The Aboriginal assault on Gilberton which led to the town’s abandonment began with attacks on the nearby camp of Chinese miners. Source: Sydney Illustrated News, 15/2/1873, p.16. Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW FM4/4302

on the Overland Telegraph repeater station located 240 kilometres north of Alice Springs in the Northern Territory. The attack began after the evening meal, while the few staff were sitting—unarmed—outside the north-west corner of the building. The station was a strongly built square structure, with an internal courtyard and a single entrance on its rear (eastern) side facing a hill. It was down this slope that the Aborigines descended while the Europeans were still enjoying the cool of the evening air. When several were spotted approaching the station’s northern side, the staff ran around the southern side making for the gateway— only to find it already blocked by another party of armed warriors. Faced with no option but to run the gauntlet of spear-thrusts, the whites rushed the gateway. A linesman was stabbed in the heart and died instantly and both the station master and his assistant received serious wounds, but the rest got safely inside with only a few scratches and reached their firearms. The Kaytej then withdrew, leaving the station master (who died from his injuries a few hours later) to transmit news of the incident over the telegraph. The attackers returned the next day, but this time the station’s occupants were ready for them and

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

45

opened fire; they withdrew again, after one of their number had been killed. Another attempt was made to surround the station on the following day, but three shots were sufficient to again force a retreat after one more warrior was killed. The station remained under siege until a line party working to the north arrived on 27 February, after itself having encountered hostile Aborigines about 32 kilometres away. Further reinforcements were received on 1 March, enabling a party of volunteers to go out in search of the attackers the next day. A fight took place at dusk near where the relieving linesmen had their ‘brush’, after the volunteers were lured into an ambush along Taylor Creek in which ‘several’ Kaytej were killed. Further punitive operations were mounted after additional volunteers arrived on 31 March, resulting in an action along the Hanson River some twenty kilometres south of Central Mount Stuart on 10 April in which at least three Aborigines (but almost certainly many more) were shot. Gordon Reid (1990) A Picnic with the Natives, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Palmer River, a clash which took place on 27 May 1874 along the stretch of river between Palmerville and Maytown, Queensland, between Aborigines and a party of white prospectors led by James Mulligan. The Europeans were attacked while panning for gold, and had repulsed three charges by the Aborigines when subjected to another ‘furious rush’ as they were leaving their camp. Mulligan later wrote that: I never saw blacks so determined. The long grass, scrub and high ridges were greatly in their favour. Three of us got marked by them. They will, however, for the future, know the effect of the rifle in that locality.

From this last observation it can only be assumed that casualties among the Aborigines were heavy. Only one of the prospectors was seriously injured, and he

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

46

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

was reported to be nearly well again eight days later. Robert Logan Jack (1921) Northmost Australia (2 vols), vol.2, London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co.

Weld Springs, a skirmish between Aborigines and an exploring party under John Forrest (a later premier of Western Australia), was fought on 13 June 1874 at a point on the Canning Stock Route about 65 kilometres north-east of Mount Salvado. With his younger brother Alexander as deputy, and accompanied by four other men and twenty horses, Forrest led his expedition out from Geraldton in April to follow a route across the central desert. Finding an abundant water supply at the Weld Springs on 2 June, the party rested for more than two weeks while making several unsuccessful sorties to the east in search of water. Alexander Forrest and another man were out on a reconnaissance on 13 June when those remaining in camp were attacked by some 50 Aborigines armed with spears. The tribesmen appeared at about 1 p.m. on a rise overlooking the camp, reportedly painted and dressed in war costume. The expedition’s members were alert, however, and a volley drove the attackers off. Retiring to their initial vantage point, the Aborigines regrouped before making a second assault which was similarly repelled by a rifle-shot from John Forrest. The Aborigines withdrew, carrying at least two of their number wounded. The explorers hurriedly built a small stone hut for added protection against further attacks at night, and used this rough shelter as their base until shifting to a fresh campsite on 19 June. The cause of the Aborigines’ attack is nowhere explained, although one Forrest biographer speculates that the party may have camped inadvertently on a sacred site. Equally likely is the possibility that the tribesmen resented being deprived of a watering point which was important to their own existence. Ernest Favenc (1908) The Explorers of Australia

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

46

and their Life-Work, Christchurch, NZ: Whitcombe & Tombs; F.K. Crowley (1971) Forrest 1847–1918, vol.1 (1847–91: Apprenticeship to Premiership), St Lucia: University of Queensland Press

Ularring, a clash between Aborigines and a small exploring party led by Ernest Giles, fought about 145 kilometres north of Coolgardie, Western Australia, on 16 October 1875. Giles had left Beltana, South Australia, in May at the head of a well-equipped camel train, in an attempt to find an overland route from central Australia to the western coast. Resting up after having successfully crossed the Great Victoria Desert, on 6 October the party set off for Mount Churchman 560 kilometres to the west. After covering 320 kilometres in seven days, the expedition reached a waterhole which Giles learnt from Aborigines was called Ularring. At first the local inhabitants were friendly, and the explorers’ camp was joined by two men who brought with them a girl about nine years of age. Pleased to be getting on so well with the Aborigines, Giles allowed the trio to stay. On their third day at Ularring, however, the members of the expedition were concluding their evening meal when one of the whites spotted the two visiting Aborigines making signs to two others in adjoining rocks. Moments later this man’s attention was caught by movement on a nearby ridge, and he realised that those in the rocks were scouts for ‘a grand and imposing army’ who were approaching ‘painted, feathered and armed to the teeth’. The alarm was given, and the rest of the exploring party leapt to their feet and grabbed for their weapons. According to Giles’ journal, the Aborigines numbered over 100 warriors and formed what he described as a ‘drilled and perfectly organised force’—although this is more likely to have been a European’s projection rather than a reflection of true military discipline. He was nonetheless struck by the fact that they advanced in serried close-packed ranks, forming ‘a solid

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

47

1874–1876

An artist’s rather fanciful depiction of the attack on Ernest Giles’ party at Ularring while finding an overland route from central to western Australia. Source: Giles, E., Australia Twice Traversed, 1889, London, vol.2, facing p.223; National Library of Australia

phalanx of five or six rows, each row consisting of eighteen or twenty warriors’. Deciding to have ‘the first discharge at them’ before the Aborigines got within spear-throwing range, Giles told his men to open fire. He had no sooner done so than one of the hitherto friendly Aborigines in the camp rushed at him and grabbed him around the neck to prevent him firing his own rifle. Unable to shoot the assailant who was pinning his left arm, Giles used his free right arm to swing his weapon as a club and managed to strike the man’s head with the rifle’s stock. At this he suddenly let go, disappearing behind thick acacia bushes before Giles could do him any further harm. By this time—no more than a few seconds— the attack by the war-party had begun to falter. The shot which the expedition’s leader now fired was followed by their retreat, as Giles vaguely recorded, ‘carrying their wounded’.

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

47

An odd aspect of the brief episode had been the behaviour of the little girl, who throughout the affray ran about excitedly patting the white men on the back as each was about to fire, and generally treating the whole business like some new game. Her adult companion, meanwhile, had taken no part in the fracas, and both shortly afterwards quietly left the camp unobserved. They returned the following day but Giles sent them away. Left alone by the Aborigines for the next two days, on 18 October the expedition set off again and a month later reached Perth in triumph. Ernest Giles (1889) Australia Twice Traversed (2 vols), London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington

Rottnest Island, a minor naval incident involving an American whaling vessel Catalpa and a government ship Georgette which took place in waters off Fremantle, Western

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

48

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Australia, on 19 April 1876. Although the shots fired were only in warning, the clash almost caused an international incident between the British and United States governments. Following the abortive 1865 uprising in Ireland organised by the Fenian brotherhood, several members of the revolutionary movement were transported to Western Australia as convicts. One of those who reached the colony in 1868 was John O’Reilly, a former soldier convicted of sedition and ordered to be shot but whose sentence was commuted to twenty years imprisonment. The next year he managed to escape aboard an American whaler called Gazelle and reached Philadelphia, eventually settling in Boston where he became famous as an author and editor while maintaining his devotion to the Irish nationalist cause. Early in 1875 O’Reilly and others organised an attempt to free six other Fenian prisoners still held in Fremantle’s gaol. For this purpose the 200-tonne barque Catalpa was purchased, the master of which, Captain George Anthony, was willing to perform the rescue. An American named John Breslin, using the name John Collins, also arrived in Fremantle late that same year and obtained employment at a carriage factory while finalising the plan of escape. This called for the prisoners being sprung at a suitable moment—they not being strictly supervised because of their good behaviour—and making their way to Rockingham Bay, 25 kilometres to the south. Here they would be taken off the beach in a whaleboat, which would then meet up with Catalpa in international waters the following day. Anthony arrived at the port of Bunbury (150 kilometres south of Fremantle) on 28 March 1876, only to find an unexpected impediment in the form of an armed colonial schooner, Conflict, which was in port at Fremantle. Postponed until after this vessel sailed on 11 April, the rescue attempt was put in motion four days later when the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

48

Catalpa also left port, on Easter Saturday. The following Monday, 17 April, the six prisoners—who were out on a working party from Fremantle—dashed into the scrub where horses were waiting for them, and galloped away. Their break was witnessed by many people and the police alerted, the latter eventually learning that the fugitives had been picked up by a waiting whaleboat. Such was the confusion of the numerous conflicting reports which reached the authorities that initially there were fears the colony faced a seaborne Fenian invasion. Since Catalpa was the only whaler known to be on the coast at the time, the police returned to Fremantle and a police cutter was sent out to search for her. The governor, William Robinson, also ordered the requisition of the screw steamer Georgette to join in the hunt and it was the latter vessel which encountered Catalpa the next morning. When questioned about the escapees, Captain Anthony denied having them on board—which was true, since at this stage the barque’s rendezvous with its whaleboat had not been made. The police cutter kept the American ship under observation as it moved north, however, and eventually a whaleboat was seen making towards her. A chase ensued, but the police vessel was unable to prevent the boat being picked up and had to return to Fremantle. Georgette being a faster vessel, the steamer was now hastily prepared for a showdown in the event that she could still catch Catalpa in territorial waters. Preparations were conducted with all speed, and a company of infantry and a 12-pounder field-gun were also taken aboard before the vessel put to sea again that night. Delayed by light overnight breezes, Catalpa was overhauled off Rottnest Island about 7 a.m. the next day and two shots fired across her bows. When the superintendent of police demanded the return of the convicts and warned that he would shoot down the American ship’s mast if they were not handed

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

49

1876–1880 over, Captain Anthony defiantly responded: ‘If you fire on this ship, you fire on the American flag’. Recognising the grave diplomatic ramifications of carrying through with his threat, the Georgette’s captain made no further effort to prevent Anthony continuing on his way. Catalpa reached New York with her cargo of Fenians still safely on board in August 1876. J.S. Battye (1924) Western Australia, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Colin Jones (1986) Australian Colonial Navies, Canberra: Australian War Memorial

Creen Creek, a skirmish between Aborigines and Native Police, fought in September 1876 on the road from Georgetown to Normanton, Queensland, about 30 kilometres north-west of Croydon. Several hundred Kumulmar (or Walangama) Aborigines, who had gathered on the creek for a bora initiation rite, proceeded to attack the telegraph station. Two detachments of Native Police under sub-inspectors William Armit and L.J. Poingdestre were immediately despatched to the area from Georgetown and engaged in a fight which ‘lasted a considerable time . . . [before] the blacks eventually were dispersed’. Armit had his horse killed under him, and a white traveller on the road who inadvertently stumbled onto the scene narrowly escaped being speared, but otherwise the government forces escaped without loss. No estimates of casualties among the Aborigines are known, but contemporary reports cited the police officers as saying that they had ‘never met with such a determined resistance’ so losses were unlikely to have been light. Henry Reynolds (1989) Dispossession, Sydney: Allen & Unwin

Glenrowan, the famous siege which brought to an end the bushranging career of Edward (‘Ned’) Kelly and three others, was fought in the Victorian town of this name located 190

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

49

Drawing of the clash at Creen Creek from the Illustrated Sydney News of 12 October 1876. Source: Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW FM4/4303 Spectators to the last stand of the Kelly gang line the platform of the Glenrowan railway station. Their proximity to the scene of the fight can be gauged from the fact that the Glenrowan Inn where the gang was besieged is the building in the left background. Source: Used with the permission of the Victorian Police Historical Unit

kilometres north-east of Melbourne on 28 June 1880. At one level the incident was purely a law enforcement matter, since the four were criminals who had been outlawed under a revived medieval English measure. The destruction of the Kelly gang was, moreover, accomplished solely as a result of police action. Nonetheless, their ‘last stand’ was also the culmination of an audacious guerilla-style campaign against authority lasting twenty months which—in its final stages, at least—was reportedly waged in support of a wider insurrection.

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

50

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

The action was purposely brought on by the gang itself, two of whom murdered a police informer named Aaron Sherritt at his home in the Woolshed district near Beechworth, east of Wangaratta, at 7 p.m. on 26 June. This was expected to trigger a vigorous response, entailing despatch of a flying column by rail from the regional police headquarters at Benalla to engage in a pursuit. Accordingly, the gang gathered at Glenrowan—midway between Benalla and Wangaratta—with the intention of wrecking any train as it sped through the township the next day (a Sunday, when a special police express would be the only user of the line), and killing or capturing any survivors of the disaster. A combination of factors delayed the police response, however, with the result that the gang was left cooling their heels throughout 27 June. Faced with the problem of preventing word of their presence leaking out, they took captive more than 60 town residents and held them at the Glenrowan Inn, only several hundred metres from the railway station in the centre of town. By late on Sunday night, as it was becoming increasingly apparent that the gang’s plan had miscarried, about a third of these people were allowed to return to their homes. When the train carrying 24 police officers under Superintendent Francis Hare finally arrived on the town’s southern outskirts soon after 2.30 a.m. on 28 June, they were warned by one of the residents just released of the trap that lay in store. The train did not therefore speed on through to its destruction, but halted at the Glenrowan station and immediately disgorged its passengers. A gunbattle broke out straight away—the police not troubling about the safety of the more than 40 civilians still held in the hotel building—and continued intermittently for the next twelve hours. Some fifteen captives managed to scramble to safety in a lull at about 5 a.m., and the remainder got away during a ceasefire at 10 a.m., but not before

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

50

five of them had been wounded by police bullets—three fatally. At 5.30 a.m. Ned Kelly—who had spent most of the previous two hours in the bush surrounding the hotel unconscious from wounds received in the opening moments of the fight—attempted to disperse the cordon of attackers on the hotel’s northern side. His appearance here in body armour fashioned from plough mouldboards, including a cylindrical headpiece, created momentary panic among police ranks as he emerged from felled timber, a huge grotesque figure in the early morning mist. He was finally felled by shotgun blasts directed at his unprotected legs, disarmed and captured. One other gang member by this time lay dead inside the besieged building, a victim to the police fusillade which perforated its thin timber walls. With nothing known of the two gang members remaining, however, the siege dragged on into the afternoon. Fresh arrivals throughout the day brought police numbers to more than 50. The whole affair was watched by several hundred spectators who gathered on the railway platform and other vantage points, many within gunshot range of the hotel. In the expectation that more firepower might be needed, an artillery detachment with a field-gun left Melbourne by train at 2.30 p.m. but had only reached Seymour when word was received that the siege was over. The end came shortly after 3 p.m. when a constable crept up to the hotel’s southern wall and set fire to it, the building becoming an inferno within minutes. A Catholic priest on the scene dashed into the flames to offer the last rites to the gang members inside. He emerged moments later to announce that the two men were already dead, having apparently suicided using poison. More than just the siege of Glenrowan reportedly thus came to an end. According to tradition, bands of Kelly supporters had gathered in a valley near Greta, awaiting a pre-arranged signal before proceeding to

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

51

1880–1884 proclaim a ‘Republic of North-eastern Victoria’. Hard evidence for such claims is not compelling, but cannot be discounted completely. Little about the self-entrapping conduct of the Kelly gang at Glenrowan makes sense in the absence of some underlying plan of this nature. Some accounts maintain that, moments before Ned made his final effort to break the police cordon, he met with sympathisers and instructed them to stay out of the fight which he already knew to be lost. Only this—it is claimed—ensured that the assembled ‘army’ numbering anywhere between 30 and 150, and the planned republic, remained carefully obscured elements of the whole affair. Ned was initially committed to trial at Beechworth in August, but proceedings were transferred to Melbourne after authorities realised that a local jury might not be willing to convict him. Duly found guilty, he was hanged on 11 November 1880. John Molony (1980) I am Ned Kelly, Ringwood, Vic.: Allen Lane; Ian Jones (1995) Ned Kelly, Port Melbourne: Lothian

Anna’s Reservoir, a pastoral station situated 190 kilometres north-west of Alice Springs in the Northern Territory, was the scene of extensive bloodshed in 1884. In August Unmatjera warriors attacked and burned the homestead, possibly in retaliation for shootings by mounted police based at Barrow Creek, although another account suggests it was because drovers had sexually molested a female Aboriginal child. The two white men at the station at the time—Harry Figg and a cook named Thomas Coombes—were trapped inside the building, suffering burns from the blazing roof falling in on them and spear wounds when they ventured outside. Eventually the Aborigines were driven off when Figg put his arm out a partly opened door and fired indiscriminately with a revolver, hitting one or two of the attackers. Although they survived, both men were left with permanent injuries. In response to this incident, Constable

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

51

William Willshire set out at once with a troop of police and captured four Aboriginal women from whom he extracted ‘useful information’. This led his party to the location of a camp containing over 60 warriors, which was surrounded before dawn on 29 August. According to Willshire, two of the camp’s occupants were killed resisting arrest and another three wounded. Before the party returned to Alice Springs on 17 September another two Unmatjera had also been shot, resisting arrest. This was just the start of a ten-month campaign of terror by Willshire which resulted in the Unmatjera being virtually wiped out. At Italinga, on the northern edge of Hart’s Range, at least 50 Aborigines— men, women and children—were, according to local tradition, shot down probably during Willshire’s drive; the place is accordingly known as Blackfellow’s Bones. Willshire’s own writings make clear that his Native Police on occasions operated without his supervision, attacking and shooting other Aborigines while taking no prisoners. D.J. Mulvaney (1989) Encounters in Place, St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press; Gordon Reid (1990) A Picnic with the Natives, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Battle Mountain, arguably the most famous engagement of Australia’s frontier wars, was fought between Kalkadoon (Kalkatunga) Aborigines and a mixed force of white civilians and Native Mounted Police in the Argylla Ranges 95 kilometres north-west of Cloncurry, Queensland, in September 1884; the precise date is not recorded. The culmination of ten years of vicious conflict with settlers, the action marked the end of active Kalkadoon resistance to European expansion. When the body of a murdered Chinese shepherd employed on Granada station was discovered in September, a reprisal expedition was assembled by the commander of the Cloncurry Native Police detachment, Sub-Inspector Frederick Urquhart. Many of

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

52

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

the district’s pastoralists and their station hands joined for what was widely regarded as a final showdown, so that the party eventually numbered possibly in excess of 100 men. After much tracking, a large assembly of Kalkadoons was found on a boulder-studded hill at the head of Prospector’s Creek. According to some accounts the group contained 1,000 people, including 600 warriors, but considering the tribe’s losses in numerous previous encounters this estimate seems improbably high. The hill the Kalkadoons occupied was 244 metres high and overlooked the plain below, its

Image rights unavailable

Battle Mountain: scene of the dramatic set-piece engagement between the Kalkadoon tribe and a large force of police and pastoralists. Source: Mulvaney, D.J. Encounters in Place, 1989 UQP

excellent defensive qualities seeming to indicate a determination to fight. Urquhart’s call to them to ‘Stand in the Queen’s name’ was met with a shower of rocks and verbal abuse. He thereupon ordered his men to advance at the gallop up the lower slopes of the hill, evidently hoping such an awesome spectacle would stampede the tribesmen. The Kalkadoons stood their ground, however, and responded with volleys of spears. The horsemen were soon forced by the terrain to dismount and proceed slowly on foot, firing as they went. At this juncture Urquhart was knocked unconscious by a hurled piece of rock-hard

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

52

antbed which hit him in the face. The attack halted while he and several other wounded men were carried down the hillside. Once he had recovered, Urquhart decided to try supporting the main assault party with a flanking movement by some of his Native Police. This tactic proved effective in throwing the Kalkadoons into confusion, prompting what was interpreted by the whites as a valorous gesture on their opposition’s part but which may actually have been simply an attempt to escape. Without warning the tribesmen formed ranks and—carrying their spears ‘before them like lances’—advanced down the slope into the rifle-fire of the whites. As this apparent ‘battle formation’ was lashed by a hail of bullets, the Aborigines wavered and retreated, only to reform and repeat the movement. The Kalkadoons had been a formidable guerilla foe, but in a set-piece battle of this sort their courage was clearly no match for European technology. Battle Mountain—as the episode subsequently became known—represented the tribe’s ‘last stand’. The slaughter was so immense that the hill reportedly remained littered with bleached bones for decades afterwards. Although the attackers’ accounts of the action referred only to the bodies of warriors, there is no doubting that countless women and children were killed too. Many more deaths occurred in the following several days as Urquhart’s party continued a ‘clearing-up’ operation. R.E.M. Armstrong (1980) The Kalkadoons, Brisbane: William Brooks & Co.

Tamai, an action involving members of the New South Wales military contingent sent to Sudan, fought on 3 April 1885 about 38 kilometres south-west of the Red Sea port of Suakin. This clash was the largest and most significant engagement in which the 770-man Australian force (comprising an infantry battalion, an artillery battery and a

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

53

1884–1885

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

53

HANDUB Sua kin -Be rbe rr oa Hashin (wells)

ea Red S

K.S. Inglis (1985) The Rehearsal, Adelaide: Rigby

OTAO

l reef Cora

field ambulance unit) took part during the six weeks they spent with British units of the Suakin Field Force commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Graham. Following the arrival of the contingent from Sydney on 29 March, the battalion was allotted to the Guards Brigade under Major-General Arthur Fremantle and prepared for action. On 2 April a force of over 8,000 men (which included the New South Wales infantry, but not the artillery) moved out from Suakin to attack the headquarters of the local Arab guerilla leader, Osman Digna, at Tamai. After bivouacking several kilometres short of the objective, they resumed the advance early the next morning. Tamai was reached about 9 a.m. and found to have been abandoned, although parties of Arabs could be seen in the hills beyond. These were filling in the permanent deep wells to deny water to the attackers, while maintaining a desultory harassing fire at long range. The advance was carried on through the village to the edge of a deep ravine beyond, and Fremantle’s command took up position along the northern ridgeline to cover the movement of its companion brigade across this gully. While engaged in this manoeuvre, the Australians actually came under enemy fire—although the bullets were mostly spent rounds by the time they landed. Three men (two infantry privates and a corporal of the ambulance unit) nonetheless received minor wounds. At this stage the Arabs broke contact and retreated deeper into rugged mountain country to the south-west, leaving the British with little course but to return to Suakin the way they had come. Before departing soon after 10.30 a.m., the wretched grass huts of the village were set on fire and ammunition concealed in them duly destroyed. Suakin was reached at about midday the following day. By 18 May the contingent’s members were on their way back to Sydney.

d

Takdul

SUAKIN Tofrik

0 2 4 6 8 10 kms

Tamai

Takdul, a minor action involving members of the New South Wales military contingent sent to Sudan, fought on 6 May 1885, 28 kilometres west of the Red Sea port of Suakin. A fortnight after an earlier skirmish at Tamai (q.v.) on 3 April, the commander of the British field force at Suakin, Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Graham, decided to raise a 500-strong camel corps using mounts recently arrived from India. One of the five companies (No.3) comprised 50 volunteers from the New South Wales infantry battalion under Lieut. H.G.B. Sparrow, and an equal number from a British regiment. After receiving reports that a sheikh of the Amarar tribe was assembling a Dervish force at Takdul (T’Hakul) in the Abent Valley to harass his force, on 5 May Graham decided to launch a two-pronged attack. At the same time as a 1,300-man column of mounted infantry, cavalry and cameliers made an overnight march from Suakin via Hashin, aiming to reach the south-eastern entrance to the valley by daylight, another column comprising the 15th Sikh Regiment was ordered south from Otao (sixteen kilometres north of Takdul) to block the enemy’s northern escape routes from the valley. Graham led the main column out of Suakin about midnight and was in position at 5 a.m. the next day, as planned. The mounted infantry leading the advance up

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

54

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

the valley were soon in contact with hostile Arabs, who exchanged fire as they fell back before the troops. Although surprise had been achieved, the success of the attack was largely negated by the late arrival of the Sikhs in their cut-off position. This enabled the bulk of the enemy force to get away into the hills, although pursued for about five kilometres by some of the camel corps. The main part of the action was over by 7 a.m. The only tasks remaining were to destroy the enemy’s abandoned camp and everything in it, gather up the large flock of sheep and goats left behind, and to deal with small groups of marksmen who remained in hiding in the numerous rocky hills and ravines. The Australians in the camel corps were notable at this stage, at one point engaging Arabs moving about on a high hill on the right flank. According to W.J. Lambie, a Sydney journalist with the expedition: The Australians opened fire on these fellows at a range of eight hundred yards, and did some splendid shooting. Their bullets struck alongside the Johnnies, and brought some of them down, while others got away badly wounded. The hill was so steep that some of the bodies dropped several yards down the surface until they were caught on the rocks.

The two attacking columns then returned to their respective bases, those going to Suakin taking with them the three men wounded (none Australians) who were the only casualties on the British side and ten Arabs taken prisoner. About 100 Arabs were reportedly killed in this skirmish. Ralph Sutton (1985) Soldiers of the Queen: War in the Soudan, Sydney: New South Wales Military Historical Society & the Royal New South Wales Regiment

Hmawang, a minor action of the Third Anglo-Burmese War, fought on 22 March 1887 south of Mandalay. A fortnight after the war’s commencement in November 1885 the object of the conflict (the deposition of King Thibaw) had been accomplished, and

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

54

the royal capital of Mandalay captured. The decision to annex the region of Upper Burma followed on 1 January 1886, but—despite this being quickly achieved—the British government in India found itself committed to a protracted period of military operations. The local soldiery raised to defend Thibaw were demobilised and dispersed to their villages, but once there joined in either guerilla operations or dacoitry (group banditry) to contest the British occupation for more than three years. Overcoming this resistance saw the number of British troops deployed rise from 24,000 in December 1886 to 32,000 by February the next year, along with 8,500 military police. After reading reports in the Sydney press of a plea for more officers by General Sir Frederick Roberts, commander-in-chief in Burma, Captain Henry Airey of the New South Wales Artillery offered to go as a special service officer, and was accepted in late 1886. He was the only member of the Australian colonial forces to so serve. Attached to a column of 523 men led by Colonel Lacy Bance, he was placed in command of two Gardner guns— multi-barrelled mechanical machine-guns which were wheel-mounted and crankfired—supporting an attack on a rebel stockade eleven kilometres from Thabiutdown (Thabyedaung). While directing the fire of his guncrews shortly before the position was successfully stormed, Airey received a serious bullet wound in the left arm which necessitated his evacuation. For his part in this action he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order—a decoration for gallantry instituted only in 1886—and was thus the first Australian ever to receive it. H.P. Airey, ‘On Active Service in Burma, 1887’, Sabretache, vol.18, no.4, October 1977.

Behn River, a tributary of the Ord River in the East Kimberley district of Western Australia now submerged under Lake Argyle,

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

55

1885–1895 the scene of a clash between police and Aborigines which took place in September 1893. The police were endeavouring to make arrests for horse and cattle stealing, but the Aborigines resisted and one constable was fatally wounded by a spear. According to the police report, ‘Twenty-three natives were shot before they could be driven off ’. Paul Hasluck (1970) Black Australians, 2nd edn, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Windjana Gorge, a skirmish between Panuba (Banuba) Aborigines and police troopers, fought in the Napier Range about 140 kilometres east of Derby, Western Australia, on 16 November 1894. The Panuba were led by Jandamarra (Jundamurra or Sandawara), who was known to whites by the nickname of ‘Pigeon’. He was a former police tracker who had rebelled a fortnight earlier after being required to take part in the arrest of sixteen of his own people. He killed the constable with whom he had been working, released the prisoners, and began planning a campaign against white settlers. Firearms were captured by his party a few days later, during an attack on a cattle party passing through Windjana Gorge in which two white stockmen were killed. Fearing a general uprising by the district’s Aborigines, the commander of the police detachment in Derby, Sub-Inspector Edwin Drewry, gathered together fifteen police and fifteen settlers sworn in as special constables to pursue Jandamarra and his band of about 30 men and women. Dividing into groups of ten, Drewry’s force entered the gorge from three directions at daybreak on 16 November and began a fight which lasted until 2 p.m. In this action Jandamarra suffered three serious wounds before collapsing through loss of blood. Other leading figures in the Aboriginal band were also wounded, but escaped into the innumerable caves which line both sides of the gorge. Drewry’s force withdrew in the belief that Jandamarra was among the dead. He was thereby enabled to

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

55

resurface and continue his armed resistance until finally shot dead in a running gun battle with an Aboriginal trooper in April 1897. Howard Pedersen ‘ “Pigeon”: An Australian Aboriginal Rebel’, Studies in Western Australian History (no.8, 1984), Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press

Chitral, a famous incident in the Dardistan region on India’s north-west frontier, fought during March–April 1895. When the British garrison of the fort at Chitral was besieged on 4 March by a mixed force of Chitrali and Pathan tribesmen, a relief effort was organised which succeeded in rescuing it 46 days later. The main component of the relieving force was a division of nearly 15,000 men under Major-General Sir Robert Low, which marched northwards from Nowshera (near the Punjab capital, Peshawar) on 1 April. Meanwhile a smaller, lightly equipped column (comprising 400 men of the 32nd Pioneer Regiment and 100 native levies under Colonel James Kelly) pushed west from the Kashmiri base at Gilgit and approached Chitral from the north-east, aiming to reinforce the garrison until Low arrived. As Kelly’s force neared the fort, the investing tribesmen fled during the night of 18 April and his column entered unopposed two days later. While the glory of lifting the siege went to Kelly, Low’s troops nonetheless saw some heavy fighting. At Malakand—one of the three passes at an altitude of 3,500 feet (1,067 metres) allowing passage into the Swat River valley—he was opposed by up to 12,000 Pathans, although probably less than half these possessed firearms. The pass was stormed in a five-hour action on 3 April, and a further clash with 2,000 hostile tribesmen ensued the next day around the walled village of Khar, just beyond the pass on the northern side of the range. The Australian association with the Chitral episode, which became a classic of the imperial frontier because of the publicity it received at the time, was in the person of

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

56

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Gi

lgi

tR

.

Col. Kelly’s relief force Gilgit

Chitral

.

lR

a itr

at R

.

h

s du

Sw

C

R.

In

ko

ra

PUNJAB

nj

Khar

Pa

R.

Malakand Pass

Gen. Low’s relief force

Kab

ul R

. Nowshera

PESHAWAR Captain James Macarthur-Onslow of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles. One of four officers of the New South Wales military forces selected to gain experience with Indian Army units from November 1894, he had just finished his period of special training with the 1st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, when the crisis in Dardistan arose. Instead of embarking for Sydney, Macarthur-Onslow volunteered to accompany (at his own expense) the KRRC battalion when this was attached to Low’s relief expedition. He thus became the only member of the colonial forces to receive the Chitral medal with the Malakand clasp. H.C. Thomson (1895) The Chitral Campaign, London: William Heinemann; Sir George

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

56

0

20

40

60

80 kms

Robertson (1977) Chitral, Karachi: Oxford University Press; Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol.10 (1986), pp.196–7

Oscar Range, a pastoral station north of Fitzroy Crossing in the West Kimberley district of Western Australia, was the scene of an attack in March 1897 by Aborigines led by the Panuba (Banuba) rebel called Jandamarra (nicknamed Pigeon by whites). Although his support was weakened in numbers by a clash in 1894 at Windjana Gorge (q.v.), Jandamarra continued to elude police pursuit using the cave complex at Tunnel Creek, 50 kilometres to the south, as a hide-out. After several daring and provocative escapades, including raiding Lillimooloora police station on three

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

57

1895–1899 occasions, he led his band of twenty men and women against the homestead of Oscar Range station. The night before mounting an attack, a small group killed a visiting stockman who was camped some distance away and took his firearms. The next morning the rebel band began firing on the homestead. After the station manager succeeded in getting out word of the siege to Fitzroy Crossing, a six-man police detachment arrived and surprised the attackers from the rear. Two of Jandamarra’s supporters were killed and others were wounded, but the rest made their escape and headed north-west towards the greater safety of the Napier Range. Within days, four different police parties were scouring the country for them. When four members of the rebel band were captured at Mount Hardman Creek by a party under a Corporal Cadden, these men were put in chains and forced to assist in tracking their leader. The next day Jandamarra was sighted by Cadden’s party while making his way towards Tunnel Creek with eight women. An Aboriginal tracker from the Pilbara region named Micki was sent in pursuit, and succeeded in wounding Jandamarra although he again escaped—but not before suffering a second, more serious gunshot wound in the chest. When it appeared that their quarry had again disappeared into the mountains, Cadden decided to return to Derby the following day. Before the party set off the next morning Jandamarra attacked the police camp, apparently in an effort to effect the release of the members of his band who were chained up as prisoners. Although he managed to keep Cadden’s men pinned down, the sound of gunfire attracted another patrol led by a Constable Buckland. With his situation now hopeless, Jandamarra made a dash for the sanctuary of his Tunnel Creek hide-out, but he was pursued by Micki and killed in a running duel with the police

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

57

tracker. On his death the Panuba rebellion promptly collapsed, allowing for the process of the tribe’s dispossession to be completed. Howard Pedersen, ‘ “Pigeon”: An Australian Aboriginal Rebel’, Studies in Western Australian History (no.8, 1984), Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press

Belmont, a railway station in Cape Colony close to the western border of the Orange Free State, was the scene of an action fought on 23 November 1899 (in the opening stages of the Second South African or Boer War) between British troops under Lieut.-General Lord Methuen and a Boer force attempting to frustrate efforts to relieve the besieged diamond-producing town of Kimberley, 90 kilometres to the north. When Methuen marched out from the Orange River on 21 November, he had about 8,500 men and sixteen guns. Mounted patrols informed him that some 2,000 Boers were entrenched 30 kilometres ahead, atop a range of kopjes (small hills) dominating Belmont station from the east. In response to this information, the next day Methuen marched his infantry to a farm situated about three kilometres to the south of the station and west of the railway line. From here, he began reconnoitring the enemy position in preparation for an attack to sweep aside this blocking force. Among the mounted troops engaged in this effort was a small group of 29 members of the New South Wales Lancer Regiment under Lieut. S.F. Osborne, part of an advance element of 72 men on this unit which had arrived at Cape Town on 2 November. The remainder of the New South Wales contingent had been sent to serve with forces in the Colesberg area under Major-General John French, but Osborne’s troop had been attached to the 9th Lancers—which comprised the main element of Methuen’s limited force of cavalry—and while carrying out patrols became the first Australian troops to come under fire during the Boer War. Based on the information available to him,

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

58

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Methuen decided to attack on 23 November and began moving his troops across the Great Karoo plain towards the enemy positions at 2 a.m., in preparation for an assault at first light. The ground held by the Boers was inherently strong for defence, comprising a succession of rocky ridges rising from 30 to 75 metres above the level of the surrounding plain. About 2,000 Boers were waiting in well-placed stone breastworks on each crest, supported by five guns. At about 4 a.m. the advancing British troops came under heavy fire and the fighting soon extended across an area of thirteen square kilometres. The engagement ended with the Boers breaking off at about 7.30 a.m. and making an orderly retreat across the open veldt. About 70 were left behind as prisoners, 24 of whom were wounded; other Boer casualties were unknown, but reckoned at about 100 killed. Methuen was unable to disrupt the enemy withdrawal, both because the 900 cavalry and mounted infantry which he had was insufficient to mount a pursuit and also because the horses of his mounted units were too exhausted from their work prior to the battle. For this victory, his force had suffered 295 casualties (75 of whom were killed)—the worst loss occurring among the Grenadier Guards, which lost 22 killed and 114 wounded; among the dead was Private Henry Schultze, a native of St Arnaud, Victoria, who had enlisted in this regular British regiment. W. Baring Pemberton (1964) Battles of the Boer War, London: B.T. Batsford; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Graspan, an action also referred to as the Battle of Enslin, was fought on 25 November 1899 (during the Second South African War) by a British force of 8,500 men under Lieut.-General Lord Methuen while attempting to break the Boer siege of Kimberley. After an earlier engagement at Belmont (q.v.), eighteen kilometres to the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

58

south along the single-track railway line which formed the axis of the British advance, Methuen found the Boers occupying a line of kopjes (small hills) about 60 metres high to the east of the railway station at Graspan. Information from British reconnaissance parties indicated that only about 400 enemy were present, supported by two guns. To prevent the enemy escaping as had happened at Belmont, Methuen decided to engage the Boer position first with artillery fire while working the 900 mounted troops available to him around both flanks. Once these were in position, a frontal assault was to be mounted by the small Naval Brigade operating with his force. Unfortunately for this plan of attack, unknown to Methuen— whose scouts were unable to observe into the enemy position from closer than about two kilometres—the original Boer defenders were reinforced late on the afternoon of 24 November by 2,000 Free State burghers under Commandant Jacobus Prinsloo. When the British field batteries opened up soon after 6 a.m. the next morning, the answering fire from the Boers came from five guns instead of two—not including a Hotchkiss quick-fire weapon and a Maxim machine-gun. Realising that his original scheme was unworkable, Methuen promptly opted for an all-out attack on conventional lines. This effort would pit the Naval Brigade with some infantry detachments against the Boers’ eastern (left) flank, while the rest of the British force sought to immobilise the enemy elsewhere and prevent reinforcement of the sector under attack. This plan worked, but not before the 245-strong assault force had lost 15 killed and 79 wounded. By the time the crest of the hill was reached, the enemy had all gone except for a small group which resisted until only one man remained alive. The British could observe the Boers retiring in good order across the plain back into Free State territory, but a shortage of mounted troops meant that a vigorous pursuit

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

59

November 1899

to Boer cu s a t o tte ff p mp urs t ue rs

To Kimberley

Boer line of retreat

(in

clu Mo din unt g N ed SW forc La e nc

ers

)

Enslin Siding

Graspan Siding 0

British 1 2

Boers 3 kms

was not possible. The British weakness in this regard was graphically demonstrated at one point during the Boer retreat, when a large body of burghers suddenly turned and attempted to ride down the lesser number of British horsemen from the 9th Lancers trying to follow them. The threat was averted by the response of some mounted infantry who, along with a detachment of 29 members of the New South Wales Lancers under Lieut. S.F. Osborne, occupied a fold in the ground and poured a heavy fire into the advancing Boers. The incident reportedly won for Osborne and his men the nickname of ‘The Fighting Twenty-Nine’. The engagement had demonstrated once again that the Boers were more than a match for Methuen despite his numerical superiority. While he responded by complaining about the deficiency in the number of mounted troops available to him, and confirmed his disappointment in the part played by his cavalry by removing the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

59

commander of the 9th Lancers, nothing could disguise his own tactical incompetence which saw his force suffer total casualties at Graspan of seventeen dead and 168 wounded. Among the dead of the Naval Brigade was 19-year-old Midshipman C. Huddart of Ballarat, Victoria. W. Baring Pemberton (1964) Battles of the Boer War, London: B.T. Batsford; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service; L.M. Field (1979) The Forgotten War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Modder River, an action fought on 28 November 1899 (during the Second South African War) between Boer and British forces, took place in the vicinity of the railway station situated near the junction of the Riet and Modder rivers. A week earlier the British force had set out from the Orange River under Lieut.-General Lord Methuen, driving north along the axis of the railway line to Kimberley which was then under siege from the Boers. In two sharp actions, at Belmont (q.v.) and Graspan (q.v.), Methuen’s men had been forced to turn enemy detachments out of prepared delaying positions at disproportionate cost to themselves. Although increased in strength to over 10,000 men, Methuen’s force still suffered a shortage of mounted troops which meant that the Boers could not be prevented from making orderly retreats free from interference. This enabled between 4,000 and 6,000 burghers under generals Piet Cronje and J.H. (‘Koos’) De la Rey to occupy a fresh defensive position dug in sandy soil along the east–west line of the Riet, about a kilometre south of Modder River station. Although warned of the Boer presence in strength, Methuen continued to place his trust in scouts’ reports that the crossing was only weakly held by probably no more than 400 men. In the early morning hours of 28 November he advanced directly over open flats towards the river, his object being to secure the ground on either side of the bridge

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

60

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

over which the railway passed (which in any event had been destroyed). The fallacy of the information upon which he was acting was demonstrated at 5.15 a.m., when patrols of the 9th Lancers approaching to within 1,600 metres of the river drew heavy fire from positions extending for 2.5 kilometres east of the bridge—establishing that the area was anything but lightly held. Despite these serious warning signs, Methuen remained convinced that he faced only a rearguard attempting to make a gesture of defiance and pressed blindly on. The whole British movement was stopped cold 45 minutes later when the Boers opened fire at a range of 1,100 metres and forced the troops to go to ground. By crawling and then making short rushes, the British succeeded in reaching to within about 730 metres of the enemy lines on the right, but could then get no further. Methuen brought up artillery and commenced shelling the Boer trenches. Although this fire helped cut down the volume of Boer bullets sweeping the ground covered by the troops, only a few casualties were caused among the defending burghers. Unable to either advance or retire, the bulk of Methuen’s force were kept pinned down all day in torturous heat of more than 42˚C. Only on the left flank was any progress made, when troops succeeded in reaching the Riet and forcing the Boers defending posts on the south bank back across the river. By 2 p.m. British troops were occupying the hamlet of Rosmead on the far bank, on the Boer’s right flank, but this threat posed to the enemy centre could not be exploited after reinforcements failed to reach here and the troops’ own artillery accidentally fired on them. When the fighting halted for the night at about 7 p.m., the enemy remained in full possession of all their other positions. Darkness at least enabled medical attention to reach the wounded, and food and water to be delivered to men who had been without either for more than ten hours.

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

60

The cessation of firing also allowed the Boers to again abandon their positions during the night without hindrance. Although Methuen was thus left in possession of the battlefield and able to take his entire force across to the northern bank the next morning, this hollow victory had been won at a cost of 70 British dead and 313 wounded. Australian participation in the action once more took the form of the 29 men of the New South Wales Lancers under Lieut. S.F. Osborne, who acted as escort to the artillery on the field throughout the day. At least one of the Australians had his horse shot from under him, but otherwise the little band passed through the engagement without loss while sharing the deprivations of the whole force. W. Baring Pemberton (1964) Battles of the Boer War, London: B.T. Batsford; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Magersfontein, scene of a heavy British defeat by Boer forces on 11 December 1899, during the Second South African War. For nearly three weeks the British under Lieut.-General Lord Methuen had been pressing north towards Kimberley (then languishing under a Boer siege) though forced to fight three sharp and costly engagements against enemy detachments seeking to impose delay (see Belmont, Graspan and Modder River). Following the last of these actions, Methuen had rested his troops for more than a week, while building up supplies and taking reinforcements—including several Canadian detachments, and a contingent of Victorian Mounted Rifles which joined a small party of 29 men of the New South Wales Lancers already serving with the force. By 10 December, his division now comprising some 15,000 men, Methuen prepared to brush aside yet another Boer blocking force about 24 kilometres short of his objective. The enemy occupied the Magersfontein Range which ran from north-west to south-east across the British

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

61

November–December 1899

Railway & road to Kimberley (16 km)

CAPE COLONY Magersfontein Hill

Boer trenches

G Bty RHA

Methuen’s HQ 11 Dec.

Modder River Stn

r R.

Modde

Rosmead

ORANGE FREE S TAT E Methuen’s HQ 28 Nov.

Riet

Rive

r British

0

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

61

1

Boers

2

3

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

4

5 kms

62

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

axis of advance along the railway line to Kimberley. The strongpoint to this position was a dominating hill at the southernmost end of the range, to the right (east) of the railway, which rose to a height of 60 metres above the surrounding veldt. Separated by a gap of a kilometre was a lower extension of the range, in the form of a series of scrub-covered ridges which never rose more than 18 metres as they made a more southerly sweep towards the banks of the Modder River. To defend his position, the Boer commander (General Piet Cronje) had about 8,000 men. These were deployed in sangars across the forward slopes of the high ground, though the bulk occupied rifle pits constructed at the level of the veldt, carefully concealed so as to be barely visible at a distance of 100 metres while commanding sweeping arcs of fire across the open plain in front of them. These trenches formed a broken but formidable defensive line covering the base of Magersfontein Hill and the ridgeline, as well as the flat ground (or pan) in between. Pom-pom quick-fire weapons and Maxim machine-guns were placed below the crestline, while the Boer field-guns were positioned out of sight on reverse slopes from where their fire could be directed by observers. Although once more denied detailed knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, Methuen prepared to launch a dawn assault against the bluff which he correctly identified as the key to the Boer position. He effectively announced his intention on the wet afternoon of 10 December by ordering an advance by the Black Watch to within about a kilometre of the hill; these retired, without drawing a shot from the Boers, after removing several wire fences which blocked their path. This demonstration was then followed at 4.30 p.m. by a two-hour bombardment from the 31 guns and howitzers available in the British train. Although the barrage looked spectacular, the enemy defenders were

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

62

actually sheltering out of harm’s way in rear positions and reportedly suffered no more than three men wounded. Any element of doubt in Cronje’s mind regarding the actual direction of attack had, however, now been eliminated. Methuen’s approach on the night of 10 December took place in pitch-dark and amid driving rain which, while it helped conceal movement, added immeasurably to the discomfort of the troops and the problem of control. The principal attack formation, a brigade of 4,000 men from four highland regiments under Major-General A.J. Wauchope, was forced to move into position in mass of quarter-column, a formation which effectively had the troops advance on a very narrow front, packed together shoulder-to-shoulder. The intention was to take the units to their start-point by this means, before shaking out into extended deployment about an hour before daybreak when they would fix bayonets and charge. This plan miscarried horribly when the formation for the movement was retained too long, and the dense mass of men blundered on until only 400 metres from the Boer trenches in the gloom of approaching dawn at about 4 a.m. The storm of bullets which the Boers suddenly poured into the packed ranks of the Highlanders rivalled a First World War battle in its intensity. Though much of the fire was high, many British fell—including Wauchope—and the rest either sought refuge on the ground or broke and ran to the rear. By the time daylight finally arrived, the makings of a disaster were already evident. As at Modder River, retreat was impossible, so that survivors of the failed British assault remained largely pinned down where they were for the next fourteen hours. Whereas they were formerly sodden from the night’s storm, now they were forced to endure the burning sun without shade, food or water, and were subjected to searching enemy fire in response to any visible movement.

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

63

December 1899–January 1900 Only the supporting fire of the British artillery could do anything to mitigate the troops’ plight, by forcing the Boers to periodically seek shelter from shells. The Royal Horse Artillery’s G Battery had come forward to within 1,300 metres of the low ridgeline on the right and 1,800 metres of the bluff, and maintained a heavy and effective fire for the rest of the day and throughout the night until the next morning. The mounted escort for this battery (which included the New South Wales Lancers) stayed with the guns for the whole of that time, deploying forward to help suppress Boer sniper fire and themselves being hotly engaged. When withdrawn the next day they were almost the last British troops to retire from the battlefield. All hopes which Methuen might have entertained of retrieving the situation evaporated shortly after 1 p.m., when an order to retire, given to a small group of men being troubled by enfilading fire, was taken by adjoining troops as a general instruction to fall back. The mass retirement which resulted was accompanied by a withering fire from the Boers which caused the most severe losses of the entire day. Only with the arrival of dusk were survivors of the most advanced attacking units able to withdraw safely, and ambulance parties to begin clearing the field of casualties. The failed attack had produced British losses totalling over 900, with 220 of these killed; Boer losses were only one-third this number, and included 87 killed. Unlike at the Modder River battle, the Boers did not vacate their position under the cover of darkness on this occasion, and the morning of 12 December found them still holding their ground in strength; the trenches before Magersfontein were not, in fact, abandoned by the burghers until twelve weeks later. In the meantime Methuen pulled his mauled division back to its previous camp at Modder River on the night of the 11th. Here he was ordered to stay by

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

63

the British commander-in-chief in South Africa, General Sir Redvers Buller, while rebuilding the strength for his force in preparation for a renewed drive towards Kimberley. W. Baring Pemberton (1964) Battles of the Boer War, London: B.T. Batsford; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Sunnyside, an action fought on 1 January 1900 during the Second South African War, in which a ‘flying column’ of less than 500 British, Canadian and Australian troops under Lieut.-Colonel T.D. Pilcher of the Northumberland Fusiliers attacked a laager (camp) of some 180 Boers near the township of Douglas on the western border of the Orange Free State. Elaborate security precautions masked Pilcher’s departure from Belmont on 31 December 1899 and ensured that when he began his attack on the enemy camp the next day at 11.25 a.m. with a barrage from two guns, the Boers were taken completely by surprise. While many of the enemy were seen to immediately take flight, the remainder adopted a defensive position on a kopje (small hill) in front of their laager and opened fire on a company of advancing Canadians and some 40 British mounted regulars. Meanwhile, two companies of the Queensland Mounted Infantry Regiment (who had joined Pilcher’s garrison at Belmont less than two weeks earlier) were sent around the right flank. The Queenslanders came into action about an hour later, suffering their first casualties—also the first of any contingent sent from the Australian colonies to the war—when a five-man scouting patrol rode into Boer fire. The enveloping movement was continued and progressively pushed to within 50 metres of the Boer position. Although some more of the enemy had managed to escape while this movement was being carried out, the rest were now trapped and, after another 45 minutes of

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

64

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

firing, were forced to hoist the white flag of surrender shortly after 3 p.m. Boer losses in this action were 14 dead and 38 prisoners taken (seven of whom were wounded), along with all their stores and wagons. Pilcher’s force had only two men killed and two wounded—these all being from the Queensland Mounted Infantry. The commander of the company to which the dead men belonged, Captain Harry Chauvel, recorded after the action that: ‘We had great difficulty in preventing the men from bayoneting the Boers as they fired a few shots after they put up the white flag’. Although the action was only a minor success, wide publicity given to the steadiness of the Queenslanders under fire helped to modify the unfavourable opinion of colonials which was then current among British regulars. The engagement also enabled Douglas to be entered the next day and its British population freed from the Boers, who hastily fled. Although the inhabitants implored Pilcher to leave a detachment of troops to defend them, he refused this request as being beyond the scope of the expedition. When the column marched out on 3 January, it was accordingly accompanied by some 90 loyalist refugees. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.3 (1905), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; F. Maurice (ed.) History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.1 (1906), London: Hurst & Blackett; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Slingersfontein, in central Cape Colony about eighteen kilometres east of Rensburg station on the railway line between Naauwpoort and Colesberg, was the scene of two actions between Australian troops and Boers in early 1900 during the Second South African War. The first engagement occurred on 16 January, when part of a patrol comprising men of the New South Wales Lancers and the 1st Australian Horse (another New South Wales unit) were ambushed by Boers. Before dawn

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

64

that day the party had set out from Slingersfontein camp with orders to reconnoitre north towards Norval’s Pont on the Orange River. After proceeding a few kilometres the patrol split into two groups—the first under Lieut. R.M. Heron of the Lancers, the second under Lieut. W.V. Dowling of the Australian Horse. The former took his men on a route which carried them past Norval’s Farm, where they halted to make inquiries of the Boer owners. Heron had taken the precaution of posting a sentry to watch the rear of the farm, however, and when this man rejoined the party he reported that as soon as the Australians departed the place an enemy force had openly ridden in. When making his way back to camp at 1 p.m., Heron accordingly made a wide detour around the farm. Meanwhile, the 21 men with Dowling (fourteen Lancers and seven Horse) had an uneventful patrol before turning for their base that afternoon. Dowling, too, decided to check out a Boer farm located eight kilometres short of his destination— accounts are unclear if it was the same farm—and, after being well received by the family there, rode on at about 2 p.m. Being so close to the main camp it seems probable that the members of the patrol were less vigilant than they should have been, although it is also clear that the Boers (who had been lying in wait all day for Heron’s return, not noticing when this group passed it by in the distance) had made cunning use of a concealed fold in the apparently open plain. The Australians suddenly came under fire from about 50 Boers who rode towards them at full gallop from 500 metres away. Caught by surprise and clearly outnumbered, the men made towards a kopje (small hill) some 250 metres off with the idea of mounting a stand until help arrived. The troopers had actually dismounted and begun opening fire on their pursuers, when they were themselves heavily engaged on all sides by more

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

65

January 1900 Boers who were lying in concealment— including on the hill they had occupied. With Dowling already out of action, a warrant officer gave the order to mount up again. The harried band then raced in the direction of the camp, until they found their escape route impeded by a tightly stretched six-strand farm fence topped with barbed wire. The horses of several of the men were shot from under them during this flight, with those dismounted being immediately taken up behind other riders. Although six men managed to find gaps in the wire through which they were able to ride clear of the trap, the remainder were left with nowhere to go. Fourteen of the Australians were taken prisoner—including Dowling who, like several others, was wounded. One man had been shot dead and another who was mortally wounded were left on the scene; the latter, found the next day crudely bandaged by the Boers, died while being conveyed back to camp in an ambulance. An inquiry into the incident found that no blame attached to anyone, but the Australian cavalry—both the Lancers and the Horse—were retired down the railway line to a rest camp at Arundel. Moreover, they took no further part in operations in the Colesberg sector before being transferred west early in February to join the forces being prepared on the Modder River for a renewed push to relieve Kimberley. The second action, on 9 February, saw men of the West Australian Mounted Infantry (WAMI) involved in a gallant stand which did much to erase the stain of Dowling’s defeat the previous month. That afternoon a troop of twenty men of the WAMI under a British officer, Captain Hatherley Moor, accompanied a squadron of Inniskilling Dragoons on a reconnaissance to the east. After proceeding only some five kilometres, the patrol made contact with a 400-strong Boer commando which was in the process of preparing gun positions from which to shell the British camp at

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

65

Image rights unavailable

The orderly lines of the camp established by the British forces at Slingersfontein, within a few miles of which Australians were twice engaged in January– February 1900. Source: Australian War Memorial A4416

Slingersfontein. Subjected to a hot fire by the enemy force, the Dragoons turned and got away to take up a defensive position some distance off. Moor’s West Australians retired to an isolated kopje on one flank and decided to make a fight of it. The WAMI men maintained their position until nightfall, even though effectively surrounded by Boers occupying hills on three sides and subjected to artillery fire. During this time, they defied all efforts to overrun them. When called upon to surrender, Moor ordered his men to display their fixed bayonets and challenged the enemy to come and get them. Under cover of gathering darkness, the Australians then braved the Boer riflemen covering the rear slopes of their kopje by retiring two or three at a time, carrying their wounded. By this means they got clear, and the frustrated commando made off. Moor’s party suffered three men killed in the action (one of whom was initially reported as missing), and six wounded. One of the latter was so badly hit that he had to be left behind during the retirement; later that night an ambulance went to the scene and retrieved him, but he died a month later in

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

66

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

hospital near Cape Town. The West Australians’ performance was highly praised in a brigade order issued the day after the fight, and the scene of their stand subsequently became known as ‘West Australia Hill’ or often ‘Australian Hill’. P.L. Murray (1911) Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents to the War in South Africa, Melbourne: Government Printer; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service; L.M. Field (1979) The Forgotten War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Pink Hill, a famous action during the Second South African War, fought between Australian (and British) troops and a Boer force on 12 February 1900 some thirteen kilometres north-west of Colesberg in central Cape Colony. The engagement occurred after the Boers, realising the weakness of the column of 6,600 men under MajorGeneral R.A.P. Clements which opposed them about Colesberg, moved to drive in the British flanks and force a retreat back down the railway line towards Naauwpoort. Clements’ left flank rested on a low rocky ridge known as Pink Hill, which was held by 75 men of the Victorian Mounted Rifles, 20 South Australians and 100 British regulars (50 Inniskilling Dragoons and an equal number of infantry of the Wiltshire Regiment). When the enemy assault began shortly before noon, carried out by the bulk of General E.R. Grobler’s force of 1,500–2,000 men, the post was commanded by Major G.A. Eddy of the Victorians who had just taken over from an Imperial officer that morning. Soon the defenders were being lashed by close-range fire from three pom-pom quick-fire weapons and a field-gun, as well as innumerable Mauser rifles. Throughout the battle Eddy moved among his men, giving encouragement and directing their fire. After two hours, however, it was obvious that the position must eventually fall. Eddy accordingly instructed

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

66

the Wiltshires to retire while the mounted troops continued to provide covering fire. Once the infantry were safely away, he then gave the order for the rest to follow, but no sooner had he done so than he was killed by an enemy bullet through the head. The action ultimately cost six Australians killed (one of whom died of wounds the following day) and 22 wounded; two of the wounded and one other man were taken prisoner, although one of these (a wounded officer) was released the following day. The gallant defence maintained on the hill ultimately proved to be a futile gesture. By 3 p.m. Pink Hill was in Boer hands. Since the right flank was also successfully pushed back by the Boers, Clements had no alternative but to withdraw south and adopt a new defensive line around Arundel. The action in this quarter has been likened by Field to ‘a little Anzac’ (q.v.): It was a defeat which led to a major withdrawal from the area; it involved proportionately high casualties; and it was praised as a great display of Australian courage and honour in war.

Apart from the laudatory comments made at the time about the Australians’ performance, however, there was also some criticism of Eddy for not having given the order to evacuate sooner and reduce needless losses. F. Maurice (ed.) History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.2 (1907), London: Hurst & Blackett; P.L. Murray (1911) Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents to the War in South Africa, Melbourne: Government Printer; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service; L.M. Field (1979) The Forgotten War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Kimberley, a major operation undertaken by British forces on 13–15 February 1900 (during the Second South African War) to break the Boer siege of the diamondproducing town of that name on the western border of the Orange Free State. After the campaign to relieve the town mounted by

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

67

February 1900 Lieut.-General Lord Methuen during November–December 1899 ended at Magersfontein (q.v.), a second attempt was prepared by Field Marshal Lord Roberts who arrived to supersede General Sir Redvers Buller as British Commander-in-Chief in South Africa in January. This effort entailed massing 45,000 combat troops (30,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry and 3,600 mounted infantry), along with 120 guns, in the area between the Orange River and Modder River stations (q.v.). Included in this formidable army were about 500 Australians—men of the Queensland Mounted Infantry, New South Wales Mounted Rifles, and New South Wales Lancers—who were incorporated into the cavalry division commanded by Lieut.-General John French. By 11 February Roberts was ready to move. While ordering Methuen to again take his 1st Division forward in a feint towards Magersfontein—thus tying the Boer general, Piet Cronje, to the defences the enemy had carefully developed there—at 2 a.m. the next day he began moving his main force north towards Modder River, as though confirming Boer expectations that the next major thrust would be along the axis of the railway. The cavalry division was used to guard the British right flank, moving out into Orange Free State territory to secure crossings on the Riet River for use by the 7th Infantry Division. On the morning of 13 February, Roberts inspected the cavalry division before instructing French to proceed with the next step in his bold plan. Instead of continuing a slow ponderous advance via Magersfontein, Roberts had decided to cut the cavalry loose from the main body and send it on a rapid sweep forward to achieve the relief of Kimberley within two days. French’s route from deep inside the Free State would carry him across Cronje’s line of communications and threaten to cut off all Boer forces assembled on the western border unless these quickly fell back. Roberts himself was

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

67

preparing to make an easterly thrust with his main force aimed at capturing the Free State capital at Bloemfontein. Proceeding in scorching summer heat across the waterless veldt, both horses and riders in French’s force suffered terribly; hundreds of mounts dropped in their tracks and had to be destroyed. Added to the hardships imposed by the country was the spirited resistance of the Boers, who realised they had been thoroughly wrong-footed and sought desperately to impose delay on the British cavalry’s progress from the line of the Riet towards the Modder. Throughout the next two days, the Australian horsemen in French’s division were in the vanguard and often under fire. The Lancers in particular were hotly engaged on 14 February at Klip Drift, where a large Boer camp beside the Modder was taken by surprise and captured. When Cronje realised the significance of French’s appearance off his left flank, he despatched 900 men with guns to block any British attempt to push further north away from the drift. The obstruction presented by this force was swept aside on the morning of 15 February with a mounted charge which sent the enemy scattering in all directions— mostly back towards Magersfontein. British casualties during this day’s fighting were five dead and ten wounded, but nearly 70 horses were lost through exhaustion. The way to Kimberley was now wide open, and by early that same evening General French with his staff and nearly 5,000 men finally rode in through the hastily abandoned Boer lines, to the immense relief of the town’s 48,000 residents. Despite the Australians’ prominence during the advance, the only element to actually accompany the relieving troops into the town was a bearer company of the New South Wales Army Medical Corps; this was, in fact, the only medical unit able to keep up with the horse-killing pace of the dash. If the Queensland and New South Wales

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

68

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

horsemen were denied a share in the glory of breaking the siege, they still found some hard fighting in securing areas out from Kimberley. On 16 February, for example, both the QMI and NSW Lancers were involved in an action at Dronfield (eleven kilometres north of the town) against an entrenched Boer party who eventually left of their own accord. R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service; L.M. Field (1979) The Forgotten War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Paardeberg, a major action of the Second South African War, which was fought in western Orange Free State and ended with the surrender of 4,000 Boers under General Piet Cronje to British forces under Field Marshal Lord Roberts after a siege lasting 17–27 February 1900. The battle arose after Roberts bypassed Magersfontein (q.v.), which Cronje had been occupying to block British attempts to break the siege of Kimberley along the direct northern route of the railway line, by pushing Lieut.-General John French’s cavalry division around the Boer’s left flank. With Kimberley relieved on 15 February and the British now astride his lines of communication, Cronje had no choice but to hurriedly withdraw east towards Bloemfontein to avoid being cut off entirely. The Boer retirement initially evaded attempts at capture, despite the fact that Cronje was encumbered with a huge train of ox-wagons and large numbers of families who had joined the men in the field. On the bright moonlit night of 15 February, the commandos succeeded in passing unobserved just five kilometres to the north of Roberts’ army. A force of 2,000 mounted infantry (including the New South Wales Mounted Rifles) was sent out the next morning under Colonel Ormelie Hannay, to pursue Cronje and hold him until the slower infantry could arrive and prevent his further escape. This attempt failed when Hannay’s

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

68

men encountered a determined Boer rearguard and were forced to fall back in the face of accurate light artillery fire. Amid the confusion of the retirement, the inexperienced British horsemen (regular infantrymen who had been recently mounted) raced over a steep embankment and into the river. Hannay reformed his troops and resumed the attack, but again they ‘fell back in some confusion’. Cronje was finally brought to bay at Paardeberg on 17 February, when three batteries of British horse artillery operating with French’s advanced elements succeeded in getting into a position from which they could shell the head of the Boer column as it attempted to cross to the south bank of the Modder River at Vendutie Drift (ford). Forced into a defensive laager (camp) extending for three kilometres along the north bank, Cronje was quickly encircled and besieged. Over the next two days Major-General Lord Kitchener, Roberts’ chief of staff who held local command while the field marshal recovered from a cold, attempted to take the Boer position before it could receive reinforcement. He ordered a series of hasty piecemeal frontal assaults which resulted in over 1,260 British casualties (including 320 dead). During these preliminary skirmishes on the periphery of the Boer position, Hannay’s mounted infantry was again involved on 18 February. In response to vague orders from Kitchener which appeared to direct him to rush the laager ‘at all costs’, Hannay prepared his force to carry out an assault—evidently determined to eliminate the stain of the fiasco a few days earlier. This attempt was cut short at 3 p.m. when Hannay was killed while riding bravely at the head of a small token band of his men. For the next ten days the British vice around the laager was contracted mainly by the digging of trenches rather than direct assault, and the main form of pressure on the Boers came from the heavy bombard-

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

69

February 1900 To Kimberley (38 kms) Gen. Fren ch’s Cavalry Division

Ferreira Koodoosrand

De Lisle

British advance by 27 Feb.

m

ou

M

nte

OD

DE

Hannay

R

R.

Broadwood

d in fa n try

Ba nk

Dr ift

Dr ift

nted infantry mou

De Beer

Cronje’s laager

Steyn

Vanderberg Drift Vendutie Drift

Gun Hill

Paardeberg

De Wet

iv D

ment maintained by the 91 guns with Roberts’ force. By 26 February the trenches on the eastern side had reached to within 230 metres of the Boer position, and a decision was taken to advance the line with a pre-dawn attack by the Canadian battalion which was present. This succeeded in bringing the British to little more than 80 metres away, in a position which enfiladed all the Boer trenches parallel to the river. At 7 a.m. that morning Cronje finally accepted the inevitable and rode to Roberts’ headquarters to offer his capitulation. By chance, Major Thomas Fiaschi of the New South Wales Army Medical Corps was

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

0

1

2

3

4

5 kms

h

9th Div HQ

6t

Dr

ift

H

Q

Kitcheners Kopje

69

reputed to have received the enemy’s formal surrender. While Fiaschi and members of his corps were collecting Canadian wounded close to the Boer lines, a group of 209 enemy displayed a white flag, filed out of their positions and offered their surrender to him as the senior officer present. In fact, at the same time as this incident was taking place, elsewhere Roberts was personally receiving Cronje’s surrender. Nonetheless the story later grew that the honour of receiving the surrender of the whole Boer position at Paardeberg had gone to Fiaschi. Other Australians played various parts in the action while attached to British units as

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

70

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

‘special service officers’. Two members of the New South Wales permanent military forces present were Major (later Major-General Sir) William Bridges, attached to the artillery accompanying the cavalry brigade commanded by Colonel R.G. Broadwood, and Lieut. G. Grieve, who was killed on 18 February leading a company of the 2nd Battalion of the Black Watch. Lieut.-Commander W. Colquhoun of the Victorian Naval Forces was also present, in command of one of two 12-pounder naval guns used to shell the laager. When both guns became immobilised through wheel problems on 26 February, Colquhoun took them to Kimberley for repair and succeeded in getting them back in time to take part in Roberts’ subsequent operations. Victory at Paardeberg—coincidentally achieved on the nineteenth anniversary of the defeat suffered by British forces at Majuba Hill in the First South African War— had cost the British 1,540 casualties, compared to probably less than 100 Boers, but it was the last large-scale action of that second conflict. The capture of Cronje, then the most famous Boer general, had ramifications well beyond the loss of the men and equipment with him at the surrender. Some 14,000 Boers had rushed to his assistance but had been held off by the encircling British; these demoralised forces now rapidly dispersed in disorder towards the east. Faced with growing British strength in conventional military forces, the Boers resorted to guerilla tactics to prolong the Second South African War for a further fifteen months. F. Maurice (ed.) History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.2 (1907), London: Hurst & Blackett; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service; L.M. Field (1979) The Forgotten War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Poplar Grove, a minor action of the Second South African War, fought on 7 March 1900 during the British advance on Bloemfontein

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

70

following the capture of Cronje’s force of Boers at Paardeberg (q.v.) a week earlier. In an effort to delay the progress of Field Marshal Lord Roberts’ large army, 7,000 burghers under General Christiaan De Wet prepared to make a stand on ridges near a drift (ford) over the Modder River some 90 kilometres west-north-west of the Orange Free State capital. Although occupying strong ground on both sides of the river, the enemy were dispirited by their recent defeat. By 7.30 a.m., and before the British artillery could be brought into action, the Boers began abandoning their positions. They had seen Lieut.-General Sir John French’s cavalry division embarking on a wide flanking movement to their left and panicked at the idea of being cut off. During the battle the New South Wales Mounted Rifles and Queensland Mounted Infantry were attached to the 14th Infantry Brigade, which was assigned the role of harassing the enemy on the south bank of the river and diverting attention from the main attack being delivered by French. Although the British infantry was soon in possession of the enemy’s prepared trenches, some of which would have proved almost impregnable if defended, the cavalry’s flanking move had been too slow to catch the better-mounted Boers. Losses on the British side amounted to no more than 50 casualties, including five men killed. De Wet’s forces remained intact to mount a renewed defensive effort. R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Driefontein, an action of the Second South African War, fought on 10 March 1900 during the advance on Bloemfontein by a large British force under Field Marshal Lord Roberts. Following the fiasco at Poplar Grove (q.v.) on 7 March, Boer General Christiaan De Wet succeeded in persuading 5,000– 6,000 burghers to mount a further delaying effort about 30 kilometres east, along a line

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

71

February–March 1900 of ridges south of the Modder River. Although aware that the enemy was holding the hills near Abraham’s Kraal beside the river, and those a little further to the south-east at Damvallei, the British did not initially realise that other parties were occupying the Driefontein–Boschrand ridges as well. This fact only became apparent during the morning of the 10th, as elements of the British force progressively scouted and probed the enemy lines. From 3.30 p.m. the British began steadily pressing in against the 1,500 burghers holding the Driefontein kopjes (hills), judged to be the key to the position, until from about 5 p.m. it was observed that there was a growing trickle of Boers leaving the battlefield in twos and threes. This led to the mounting of a final charge at 6 p.m. which carried the position and sent the Boers streaming away to the north-east. Although British mounted troops (including some Australians) attempted a pursuit from the southern flank, these were unable to intercept a withdrawal in such a direction— because of the poor condition of their mounts—and returned empty-handed as dusk fell. Although the Boers were still in possession of the northern hills, the retention of these was now pointless and they were evacuated, too, during the night. The day’s fighting cost the British 424 casualties, 82 of whom were killed or died of wounds; the Boers lost about 300 men, including about 100 killed. In the morning’s fighting, Captain John Antill’s squadron of New South Wales Mounted Rifles was engaged in reconnoitring the limits of the enemy’s right (north) flank near the river. While performing this work, the Australians had one man killed by a shot fired from a farmhouse flying a white flag of neutrality. Also during the morning, the squadrons of the New South Wales Lancers and 1st Australian Horse (another New South Wales unit) were active on the same flank—both units being attached to the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

71

cavalry brigade commanded by Colonel T.C. Porter. Shortly before midday, however, these were switched to Colonel R.G. Broadwood’s brigade opposite the enemy’s left flank. Here, they took part in the later cavalry movement to follow up the Boer retirement, until forced to retire by enemy artillery and pom-pom fire. Also among the British casualties for the day was a Victorian, Lieut.-Colonel C.E. Umphelby, serving as a special service officer with the artillery, who was mortally wounded by a sniper late in the afternoon and died three days later. R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Karee Siding, an action during the Second South African War, fought on 29 March 1900, some 30 kilometres north of the Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein. After the British army under Field Marshal Lord Roberts entered the town on 13 March, Boer forces under General J.H. De la Rey continued to occupy the hills through which the railway line passed to Brandfort. Deciding to eliminate the menace which the enemy presence here presented, and having selected Karee Siding as a suitable place for an advanced supply base, Roberts began concentrating troops at the Glen Siding—the point eleven kilometres south of Karee where the railway crossed the Modder River. By 28 March 9,000 British troops were at the Glen, comprising the 7th Infantry Division of 6,000 men, two cavalry brigades totalling 2,000 horsemen and a 1,000-strong mounted infantry brigade. Supporting this force were 30 field-guns and two pom-pom quick-fire weapons. Lieut.-General John French had been sent to take command of the cavalry, but Lieut.-General C. Tucker held command of the infantry and the brigade of mounted infantry led by Colonel P.W.J. Le Gallais. Among the regiments of Le Gallais’s brigade was the New South

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

72

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Wales Mounted Rifles under Lieut.-Colonel G.C. Knight, while the 1st Cavalry Brigade led by Colonel T.C. Porter contained a squadron of the New South Wales Lancers commanded by Captain Charles Cox and another of the 1st Australian Horse (also a New South Wales unit) commanded by Captain Elworthy. Generals French and Tucker both arrived at the Glen on the evening of the 28th, the day before that set for the advance to begin. Although lacking reconnaissance information regarding enemy positions—or even whether any enemy actually remained—they determined on making an infantry advance directly along the rail-line accompanied by turning movements on both flanks, by the cavalry on the west (left flank) and mounted infantry on the east respectively. Though unknown to them, available to oppose this plan were 3,500 Boers led by General Tobias Smuts in the absence of De la Rey. The bulk of the enemy forces were deployed east of the railway, in three parallel ranges of hills running across the proposed line of advance, but a portion also held a plateau called Houtenbeck on the other side of the tracks. When launched the next morning, the British advance initially met no resistance. The flanking movements encountered no opposition, and consequently Tucker’s infantry set off to take the first of the ridgelines, finding it already abandoned by the enemy. The second parallel was also seized by 1.30 p.m., after the leading battalion had only a few shots fired at it. It was only on the last ridge that the Boers disclosed their presence in strength, opening a heavy fire from positions concealed in the brushwood covering the hillside. For about an hour a firefight took place on this front, and also on the left where the British line had now encountered the Boers on the Houtenbeck feature. Artillery was brought up to deal with the enemy on both sides of the railway, and shortly after 4 p.m. a bayonet

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

72

charge against the Houtenbeck trenches found the Boers already in flight across the bare open plain towards Brandfort. Meanwhile, the cavalry and mounted troops—whose movement had been intended to smooth the infantry’s progress and ensure that any enemy encountered were not merely dislodged but severely dealt with—remained effectively out of the battle. In the judgement of The Times history of the war, French’s movements had been ‘unaccountably slow’ while on the eastern flank: Le Gallais had chased some parties of Boers from the outlying ridges . . . , but only with the result of sending them to reinforce the main body opposed to Tucker; and in the afternoon he had allowed his whole brigade to be delayed by a small party of Boers on an outlying spur. The consequence was that he never got round.

In this whole poorly managed operation the British sustained 189 casualties (including members of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles and Australian Horse), compared to Boer losses of only 34. The victory was important, nonetheless, in opening the way for Roberts to resume his advance across the northern half of the Free State and on to the Transvaal. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1906), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; John Stirling (1907) The Colonials in South Africa, 1899–1902, Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons

Sannah’s Post, an action fought on 31 March 1900 during the Second South African War, after the British army commanded by Field Marshal Lord Roberts occupied the Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein, on 13 March. Two days after the town’s capture 300 mounted infantry were sent to Sannah’s Post, situated on the Modder River 34 kilometres to the east, to secure the pumping station which supplied Bloemfontein’s water supply. As it was known that a strong Boer commando under General J.H. Olivier was

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

73

March 1900 in this area, on the 18th another force—a 1,500-strong column of cavalry and mounted infantry under Lieut.-General John French—was sent to take up a defensive position at Thaba ’Nchu, a further 34 kilometres east. On the 26th French had departed to resume command of his cavalry division, leaving the garrison at Thaba ’Nchu under command of Colonel R.G. Broadwood. When Broadwood found himself seriously menaced by Olivier’s force of 5,000 men, he decided on 30 March to withdraw in towards Bloemfontein—taking with him any of the town’s pro-British residents who wished to be evacuated. Unknown to him, his movement coincided with a bold plan by another Boer leader, General Christiaan de Wet, who had moved south from Brandfort with a column of 1,600 men and seven guns, with the intention of seizing control of the Sannah’s Post waterworks and placing himself astride the escape route which Broadwood would use once Olivier launched his planned attack. By 4 a.m. on the 31st he had his men in position: 400 under his own command west of the waterworks, the rest east of the Modder. De Wet’s plan called for the larger force to mount the initial attack on the Sannah’s Post garrison, in the expectation that the defenders (reduced now to only 200) would abandon the place and head to the capital—and straight into the ambush laid for them. Intelligence reports delivered during the night told De Wet that a convoy had been despatched down the road from Thaba ’Nchu the previous afternoon, but he did not know that Broadwood’s whole force was on the move. When he learned of this fact shortly before dawn, he decided to continue laying in wait even though Broadwood’s much larger force (about 1,800)—which he could actually see bivouacking nearby on the west bank of the Modder—could potentially overwhelm his own meagre numbers. While various minor skirmishes before sunrise at

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

73

6 a.m. should have given warning that Boers were in the vicinity, the nature and scale of the threat which was actually present was not evidenced to Broadwood until shells from the north-east started falling around the waterworks bivouac site at 6.20 a.m. Assuming that Olivier’s commando had caught up with them, the British column and its convoy rapidly took to the saddle and moved out along the road to the west. When it was reported to Broadwood that 300 Boers had been sighted along hills to the north, he deduced that an enemy force was trying to interpose itself along his escape route from that direction. He accordingly ordered one of his two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery with a mounted escort to occupy rising ground on this flank, retaining the bulk of his mounted infantry to provide a rearguard at the Modder. The battery proceeded towards the head of the supply convoy, which had become bottlenecked in a gully fifteen feet below the level of the plain—not realising that this was due to the action of De Wet’s men, who were silently disarming and making prisoners of the teamsters as they entered the trap. The lead battery of guns was already in the enemy’s hands when the true position was discovered by the following (‘Q’) Battery. This immediately turned about, with its escort, and galloped back to where a railway station was under construction—under heavy fire from the Boers after De Wet decided the time was right to reveal his hand. With the ambush sprung, Broadwood proceeded to try and fight his way out of the predicament. Despite severe losses suffered during its flight out of the Boer trap, Q Battery brought four of its guns into action beside the unfinished railway buildings. Among the officers and men working these weapons was Lieut. J.C. Walch, a member of the Tasmanian Defence Forces on special service duty; he was severely wounded. Aided by the fire of the guns, Broadwood sent cavalry elements around by the south with

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

74

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

orders to move into the gully and take the Boers from the right flank and rear. When these moves failed to ease the pressure which the Boers continued to apply, at 10 a.m. Broadwood felt obliged to order a general retreat towards the south-west. In preparation for this movement, volunteers braved a storm of rifle-fire to pull back four of the guns and limbers from their exposed positions and thus prevent them being left for the enemy. While two-thirds of Broadwood’s force made good their escape, the various Boer forces now moved in to press the mounted infantry covering the rear—while also collecting up the spoils left behind. The leading elements of the British 9th Infantry Division began reaching the battlefield in the hour before midday, after marching from Bloemfontein, but these were too late to prevent the Boers making an orderly withdrawal by 1 p.m., taking with them 421 prisoners, seven guns and 83 wagons of stores. Broadwood had also suffered 159 officers and men either killed or wounded. The considerable disaster which befell the British in this action might have been avoided, or at least attenuated, by the skilful intervention of a brigade of mounted infantry which had also arrived three kilometres in De Wet’s rear at about 8 a.m. but then wasted the opportunity which its appearance presented. This brigade, ordered by Lord Roberts from Springfield when he first heard of Broadwood’s planned retirement, was commanded by Colonel C.G. Martyr and comprised two British battalions and the Queensland contingent (commanded by Lieut.-Colonel St G.C. Henry)—a total of 600 men. A force of this size might have materially altered the course of events, but Martyr chose to split it up and disperse it. While one battalion was sent to join in the belated cavalry movement Broadwood had initiated against De Wet’s right flank and rear, the other British unit and the QMI had been sent north-east to aid an isolated outpost at

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

74

Waterval Drift, an important crossing on the Modder north of the waterworks. Here Henry’s Queenslanders came into action after crossing the river for a distance, until recalled to take part in a short-lived defence of the ford. When the QMI was forced to join in the abandonment of Waterval to the enemy, they left behind two killed, two wounded and five men who became prisoners. The position at Sannah’s Post was not restored to British control until 23 April. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1906), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Houtnek, an action fought on 30 April–1 May 1900 during the Second South African War, which effectively marked the start of the march by the British army under Field Marshal Lord Roberts from the Orange Free State capital to Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal republic. The engagement followed Roberts’ decision to straighten the alignment of his forces around Bloemfontein (captured on 13 March) by moving north the column commanded by Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton from Thaba ’Nchu, east of Bloemfontein, to Winburg via Jacobsrust. He was, however, unaware that a large enemy force under General Philip Botha was holding positions in ridges astride this route—principally near Houtnek where the road passed through a defile. Hamilton commenced his march early on 30 April, but his progress was checked soon after 9 a.m. as the mounted infantry leading his advance were approaching Houtnek. Seeing the high ground in front and on both flanks to be held by enemy parties, Hamilton decided to make an attack on Thoba Mountain—a large feature at the western end of the ranges which dominated a pass through which a second road ran to Jacobsrust. Using his mounted infantry to keep the Boers on his right flank and front

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

75

March–May 1900 engaged, he sent infantry towards the mountain on his left. The troops cleared the lower slopes without difficulty but were unable to carry the position before nightfall, forcing them to bivouac where they were, while Hamilton telegraphed for cavalry reinforcements from Thaba ’Nchu. According to their custom, during the night most of the burghers returned to laagers (camps) behind the hills. By the next morning Botha had already determined to abandon his position and sent away his supply train. Only a portion of his force resumed the defence, but despite this the British assault on Thoba Mountain was strongly opposed so that it was 1 p.m. before the feature was in Hamilton’s hands. Just as this issue was decided, squadrons of British cavalry were sighted approaching around Thoba Mountain from the west. With the Boer positions in the east now outflanked as well, the remaining defenders promptly mounted and rode off. By 3.30 p.m. Hamilton’s transport was able to use the road over the mountains to Jacobsrust. The two-day delaying action had cost the British 103 casualties, including four members of E Squadron of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles under Captain William Holmes. The latter squadron— minus 25 men detached for scouting duty—had been sent to occupy an advanced post on a hill located less than 1,500 metres from several enemy guns. Holmes’ men were subjected to intense shrapnel and rifle-fire throughout the first day’s fighting and until ordered to withdraw about noon the next day. It was while galloping away from the position in groups of four that one of the Australians was fatally wounded. P.L. Murray (1911) Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents to the War in South Africa, Melbourne: Government Printer; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Coetzee Drift, an action during the Second

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

75

South African War, fought on 5 May 1900 along the Vet River in Orange Free State. After seizing the town of Brandfort two days earlier, the British commander, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, sent forward mounted forces to meet Boer forces under General J.H. De la Rey who were preparing a new line of resistance at the Vet River. The advance was conducted with Major-General Edward Hutton’s brigade (which included several Australian units) on the left of the northern railway, and the mounted infantry division commanded by Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton on the right. The latter had secured Welkom Drift (ford) on 4 May and camped there overnight in readiness for Roberts’ general push across the river the next day. When the advance began on 5 May Hamilton had an easy march to Winburg, which he occupied that afternoon. Hutton, meanwhile, faced a more difficult task on the western flank, where the bulk of De la Rey’s 1,500 burghers were posted in widely dispersed positions at the main crossing points. Arriving at noon at Coetzee (or Misgunstfontein) Drift, ten kilometres west of the railway, Hutton found this so strongly defended that he was deterred from making a frontal attack. Learning from a local farmer of the existence of another disused ford four kilometres further west, he sent a British battalion supported by two companies of Canadians across in a flanking movement at this point. Once he saw that these troops were in a position to bear in against the right flank of the Boers occupying the high ground overlooking the main drift, he ordered the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, supported by the Queensland Mounted Infantry and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, to cross the river and attack. The task given to the men of the NSWMR was a difficult one, for once on the other side they found themselves within a sort of basin formed by steep mimosa-covered banks which the Boers occupied in increasing strength. The pressure on the attacking

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

76

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Australians was relieved by the action of a flanking British battalion, which—having discovered another ford further east—took the initiative of crossing without waiting for orders and began driving in against the enemy’s left. At this, the Boer defenders yielded the high ground and began withdrawing. An impetuous assault by the New South Wales men surprised the enemy party covering the retirement of several guns, and inflicted 23 casualties on this rearguard. By 4.45 p.m. Hutton himself crossed over the river to take possession of the Boer positions. The action had cost his force only four men wounded, due to the effective way in which it was managed rather than being indicative of the severity of the fighting involved. Although Roberts now had both his flanks across the Vet, he was still held up in the centre where De la Rey had posted commandos on two kopjes (low hills) south of the river. When a body of the 2nd West Australian Mounted Infantry operating in advance of the 11th Division came within range of the Boer guns mounted on these hills, they were unable to make much headway until these weapons were subjected to counter-fire from three field batteries and other heavy guns. The kopjes were not occupied until just on dusk, after the WAMI made a spirited bayonet charge which prompted the Boers to withdraw before the attack’s full weight could be delivered. The hour was now too late for the British to take effective follow-up action, so that the Boers were able to maintain their pattern of avoiding significant defeat and simply falling back in front of the British advance while imposing delay. L.S. Amery (ed.) (1906) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.3 (1908), London: Hurst & Blackett; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

76

Zand River, an action during the Second South African War, fought on 10 May 1900 in northern Orange Free State as Boer forces attempted to check the advance of the British army led by Field Marshal Lord Roberts. Following the action on 5 May, when the British forced their way over the Vet River (see Coetzee Drift), the Boers had retreated hurriedly to the Zand. It was here that a reconnaissance by the mounted infantry brigade commanded by Major-General Edward Hutton (which included several Australian units) found them strongly entrenched around Virginia Siding on 7 May, confirming that this was to be the focus of the burghers’ next major show of resistance. A squadron of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles reached within 500 metres of the river, but were driven off by enemy shellfire. Since the defence on the Vet, the commandant-general of the Boer forces (General Louis Botha) had arrived at Virginia Siding on 7 May to take personal charge of operations, bringing with him some 3,000 reinforcements from the Transvaal. All the Free State burghers still under arms— probably not numbering more than 5,000—were also now concentrated at the Zand. Their object was to attempt to prevent the capture of Kroonstad, 64 kilometres to the north, which was the Free State capital since the fall of Bloemfontein in March and an important supply centre in its own right. The terrain held a major advantage for this purpose, chiefly in the form of a ridgeline running along the river’s north bank which formed a useful basis for the defence of the Boer centre covering the railway line and the left flank in the east. The weak point was the western flank, which was susceptible to a British turning movement, and Botha was obliged to adopt dispositions which took this possibility into account. Although Roberts recognised the potential for a wide sweep past the Boer flank to carry his cavalry to Kroonstad and beyond, such

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

77

May 1900 as he had used to relieve Kimberley (q.v.), he was not prepared to risk the attrition which that tactic had previously caused. The cavalry division, under Lieut.-General John French, had only just been returned to strength in time to rejoin the army for the Zand operation. He nonetheless decided to attempt to envelop Botha’s forces by sending two of French’s brigades and Hutton’s mounted infantry—4,000 men in all— around the enemy’s right flank, meeting up around Ventersburg Siding with another cavalry brigade which was to come in from the east after turning the enemy’s left. Implementation of this plan began on 9 May, when Colonel T.C. Porter’s 1st Cavalry Brigade (which included the 1st Australian Horse, the New South Wales Lancers and New South Wales Army Medical Corps) seized control of a ford just west of the furthermost Boer outpost at Diamant Drift, some ten kilometres from the railway. French and his staff, along with Hutton’s mounted infantry brigade, joined him here later in the day. The rest of Roberts’ army—totalling 38,000 men with 100 fieldguns and twelve pom-poms—had closed up on the river, but apart from a crossing made at Koolspruit Drift (in the centre) by some mounted infantry the forcing of the Zand was left until the following day. When French set off on 10 May with Porter’s brigade, pushing rapidly north-east, Botha was initially unaware that there was any British activity on his flank. Only with the approach of the cavalry towards Vredes Verdrag, a ridge sixteen kilometres directly north and behind him, did he discover the peril confronting the entire Boer defence. After sending off a 200-man reserve to oppose any further progress by French, Botha ordered a general retirement; only a small rearguard was left at Virginia Siding to delay Roberts’ main advance. The measures taken by the Boer commander were just in time. French’s efforts to capture Vredes Verdrag and cover the last

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

77

eight kilometres east to Ventersburg Siding were vigorously opposed, in the first instance by fire from two Boer guns covering the approaches to the ridge. In an attempt to outflank these weapons, the Australian Horse and three other squadrons were sent to seize an apparently unoccupied kopje (low hill) on the left. The troops gained the hill and dismounted, but were then ambushed by a party of Boers who had been lying in wait. Caught in a crossfire and lacking a unified command, the troopers were quickly driven off the hill in confusion. Left behind were fourteen killed and 63 prisoners, 36 of whom were wounded; at least one Australian Horse officer was among those captured. Attempts by the Boers to capitalise on their success were beaten off, but French— anxious to maintain the momentum of his advance—decided to bypass the enemy position by moving west around Vredes Verdrag and on to the next hill to the north. This movement was constantly harried by the Boers, who were in sufficient strength to keep French’s horsemen away from the railway line. Hutton’s mounted infantry, following along behind, also encountered some hard fighting. Among the casualties suffered by his brigade were eight men of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, which regiment had been temporarily assigned to his command. Meanwhile, Roberts’ main column made an easy crossing of the river while his mounted elements in the lead pursued the Boers up the railway to Ventersburg Siding. Although more strongly opposed on the right, the British were again able to drive the Boers back and get across the Zand with light casualties. The flanking movement from this side, planned to have been executed by Colonel R.G. Broadwood’s cavalry brigade, was late in starting out and played little part in the course of the day’s operations, which in effect decided the fate of Kroonstad itself—occupied with minimal opposition two days later.

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

78

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1906), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; John Stirling (1907) The Colonials in South Africa, 1899–1902, Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons; History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.3 (1908), London: Hurst & Blackett

Mafeking, an action during the Second South African War, resulting in the lifting of the Boer siege of this town in north-western Cape Colony, opposite the western border of the Transvaal, on 17 May 1900. The town, defended by about 1,000 men under Lieut.-Colonel Robert Baden-Powell, had been invested by 5,000 Boers since 14 October 1899. The enemy’s grip was finally broken when a flying column of cavalry and mounted infantry under Colonel Bryan Mahon covered the 380 kilometres north from the Vaal River in twelve days, riding past Boer forces to link up with another small force which had pushed south from Rhodesia to operate beyond the encircling Boer lines for the previous two months. On 14 May the latter column, commanded by Colonel Henry Plumer, was reinforced at Sefetili by a battery of Canadian artillery which arrived after a forced march from Beira, escorted by 100 members of the 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry (Bushmen) under Captain Charles Kellie. The next day Plumer’s column was joined by Mahon at Jan Massibi’s kraal (fenced enclosure), 32 kilometres west of Mafeking, and on 16 May this combined relief force met and defeated an opposing force of 2,000 Boers in a five-hour action near the Molopo River, north-west of the town. For most of this day’s fighting the QMI men remained in the rear, having been assigned the unglamorous job of guarding the supply wagons. Late in the day, however, when the infantry was sent to clear the enemy from trenches near a farmhouse with the bayonet, they refused to be so constrained and—in defiance of their orders—joined in the assault. As the British troops rose in extended

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

78

order to make their final dash to the enemy lines 400 metres off, they heard fiendish yells like the sounds of a band of Red Indians from behind and found the Queenslanders running alongside them as they completed the remaining distance. Although a stirring exhibition of brave spirit, the Australian Bushmen’s wild rush had also been an act of folly. Whereas the British troops had been carefully advancing in bounds, making maximum use of cover, the Queenslanders had thrown caution to the winds and would have suffered accordingly if they had been attacking a more disciplined foe. Losses in this action were minor on both sides (the British suffering seven killed and 24 wounded, the Boers reportedly one-third that total), but the victors were too exhausted to attempt a pursuit and bivouacked where they were. Later that night, after word arrived from the town that negligible enemy opposition remained to bar their progress, a party of volunteers was assembled and made a dash for Mafeking—only eight kilometres away—in advance of the main column. By 3.30 a.m. on 17 May the seven-month siege was broken, the task of relieving the town being completed at daybreak when the Boers were shelled out of their main camp with the loss of some wagons and a 9-pounder gun. News that Mafeking had been liberated prompted scenes of jubilation across the British empire. James Green (1903) The Story of the Australian Bushmen, Sydney: William Brooks & Co.; L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1906), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Diamond Hill, an action fought on 11–12 June 1900, during the Second South African War, between British forces under the direct command of Field Marshal Lord Roberts and the main Boer army of the Transvaal republic under General Louis Botha. The latter, comprising 6,000 men and 23 guns,

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

79

May–June 1900 was menacing the Transvaal capital, Pretoria, which the British had entered with 25,000 men on 5 June, by occupying a 50-kilometre front east of the town. To deal with this threat Roberts moved out on 11 June with 14,000 men and 70 guns—all he could spare from the protection of his lines of communication. His plan called for attacks by Lieut.-General John French’s cavalry and mounted infantry in the north and Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton’s infantry and mounted infantry in the south, which were intended to tie up both enemy flanks before a main attack was attempted against the centre. Botha had accurately anticipated Roberts’ tactics, and was ready to deal with both

flanking movements. French’s force comprised only 1,400 horsemen (including ten members of the 1st Australian Horse and 35 of the New South Wales Lancers) and, although supported by a dozen fieldguns, was easily stopped by General J.H. De la Rey and forced to remain in defensive positions for the night. In the opening moments on this flank, a troop of the New South Wales Lancers which was sent forward on scouting duty was mistaken for Boers and shelled by the British guns, fortunately without any of the Australians being hit. Not so lucky was the New South Wales Ambulance, which was later struck by an enemy shell and damaged while moving about in the frontline.

To Pretoria

Pienaarspoort Station

Diamond Hill

British

De Lisle’s mounted brigade

Elands River Station

Boers

0 1 2 3 4 5 kms

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

79

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

80

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

On the right flank, meanwhile, Hamilton found himself strongly opposed by Boers under General Piet Fourie who occupied a long rocky ridgeline dominated by Diamond Hill. In attempting to press ahead in the face of fierce resistance, part of the British force was almost surrounded when night ended the first day’s operations. In the face of the situation which now confronted him, Roberts was reluctantly forced to contemplate a costly frontal attack in the centre against enemy positions which had been barely touched. Reports during the night, however, persuaded him to lend his support for a main thrust to be mounted by Hamilton against the Boer strongpoint at Diamond Hill. The assault which was finally launched shortly after noon the next day entailed five battalions moving against the western slopes leading onto the Diamond Hill plateau. Although successful, the effort soon became bogged down when the Boers retreated to covering positions and the attackers were exposed to murderous fire from high ground on both flanks. This pressure was only relieved when the brigade under Colonel H. De Lisle, which contained a battalion of British mounted infantry along with both the New South Wales Mounted Rifles and West Australian Mounted Infantry, made an assault onto the Rhenosterfontein kopje on the British right. This position was effectively the eastern extension of the Diamond Hill ridgeline, and the source of much of the fire which pinned down the main assault force. De Lisle, sent to concentrate his efforts against the Rhenosterfontein position during the morning, had used the two pom-pom guns with his force to cover the men of the 6th Mounted Infantry Battalion as they began steadily working their way forward on foot until they were close under the hill. By 2 p.m. De Lisle ordered the Mounted Infantry to advance. As soon as he saw that the leading troops had gained a foothold, he moved his pom-poms up to within 1,300 metres and—in the words of The Times

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

80

history of the war—‘let go the New South Wales Mounted Rifles’. The four squadrons of the New South Wales regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel G. Knight, came under fire as they galloped in long well-spaced lines across the broad grass-covered valley to where the local farmhouse stood among a grove of gum trees. Leaving their horses in dead ground here, they rushed forward still widely spaced—27 metres between men and 45 metres separating the ranks formed by squadrons. According to The Times account: Extended in this way the 350 men of the corps created the appearance of a much larger force, and as they swarmed over the crest of the hill with fixed bayonets, the Boers without waiting for the attack retired to a second position some 1,200 yards away.

With darkness now beginning to fall across the hill, the Boers opened up a ‘furious fusillade’ along the whole line of the position. Botha, however, upon hearing of De Lisle’s success, realised that that part of the ridgeline which his men still held would be untenable as soon as Hamilton brought up heavy artillery onto the plateau. He accordingly gave orders for his commandos to disperse during the night, the retirement commencing at 11 p.m. and being carried out so quietly that it went undetected until the next morning. Roberts was therefore initially unaware of the victory which his force had obtained, at a cost amounting to less than 200 casualties (including two officers killed and six men wounded among the New South Wales men engaged). Boer losses were probably heavier than the 24 killed and wounded that were admitted, but were still minor nonetheless. The only pursuit of the retreating enemy was carried out on 13 June by a detachment of 150 Australians, mainly men of the West Australian Mounted Rifles under Major Hatherly Moor with some members of C

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

81

June–July 1900 Squadron of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles. This force followed the Boers for nearly seventeen kilometres, to near Bronkhurst Spruit station, and fought a brief action with an enemy rearguard in a laager (camp). The role of the Australians during the action at Diamond Hill—the last great defensive battle fought by the Boers—was much praised, and during a review at Elands River on 14 June Knight’s men were cheered by British troops for the gallantry they had displayed there. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1906), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Leeuw Kop (also known as ‘Bakenkop’), was an action fought during the Second South African War on 3 July 1900 in the northern Orange Free State, during a British advance from the north-west against the town of Bethlehem. During fighting the previous day a British column under Major-General A.H. Paget had succeeded in pushing back the right wing of an opposing Boer force under General Piet de Wet, and occupied the ridgeline known as Plesierfontein thirteen kilometres east of the town of Lindley. Among the 1,000 mounted troops included in Paget’s column was a battalion of 400 Imperial Bushmen from South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania commanded by Major Rose (a West Australian). Following Paget’s success de Wet retired to Leeuw Kop, about ten kilometres to the south-east, and established a new defensive line along a ridgeline running north-east which had Bakenkop as its most prominent feature. On 3 July Paget moved his infantry and two guns into the intervening valley towards Leeuw Kop, while sending 800 of his mounted troops with six guns against Bakenkop on the left. The commander of the latter detachment, Colonel A.M. Brookfield, took his men onto a ridge 4,000

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

81

metres from his objective and returned the fire of five Boer guns which had begun to engage him. The British guns were distributed in pairs along the ridgeline, and although not spaced widely the undulations of the ground meant that no section could actually see any of the others. The mounted troops covering the artillery were also positioned at intervals along the ridge, mostly in rear of the guns. After an inconclusive duel, it was found that the guns of Brookfield’s detachment were beginning to run short of ammunition. The artillery commander accordingly gave the order to cease fire and the crews were ordered to lie down beside their guns. At this point the Boer guns suddenly renewed their fire with increased intensity, causing the British mounted troops not already sheltering behind the ridge to fall back for cover. The heightened barrage was, however, also the prelude to an assault by two Boer parties—each 100–200 strong—who had crept up through fields of Indian maize flanking the British position on both sides. When delivered, this attack caught the guns effectively without any protection. The left flank guns saw the danger of the approaching Boers and opened fire on them, but on the right the enemy approach was not observed until too late and the position was quickly taken. The centre section immediately limbered up and made to join the left section; one crew mistakenly went towards the right section, however, and both men and horses were promptly shot down so that a third gun was added to the Boer booty. Amidst this confusion, an artillery officer managed to mount a horse and gallop to the rear. Here he came upon a detachment of South Australians under Captain A.E.M. Norton who had been ordered to retire, and these he led back to the ridgeline in time to prevent the Boers from carrying away the captured guns. When confronted with the Australians’ fire, the burghers promptly retreated, taking some of the captured

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

82

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

gunners with them as prisoners. The enemy party attacking the left gun section also now broke contact and withdrew. Meanwhile Paget had seized Leeuw Kop and from here was able to direct flanking fire from his guns against the Boers’ artillery, whereupon de Wet abandoned Bakenkop and made off towards Bethlehem. During the short but sharp battle, Major Rose and about a dozen South Australians were wounded. The Tasmanian squadron, having been kept on other duty near Lindley, did not join in the fighting until the action was in its final stages with the Boers already being driven off. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1906), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.3 (1908), London: Hurst & Blackett; John Stirling (1907) The Colonials in South Africa, 1899–1902, Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons

Palmietfontein, an action fought on 19 July 1900 (during the Second South African War) some 75 kilometres east of Kroonstad in the Orange Free State, during the first British attempt to hunt down and capture the Boer general, Christiaan de Wet, while he was making north towards the Transvaal with 1,500 men. The engagement took the form of a running fight over about thirteen kilometres, after two British brigades came upon de Wet’s supply convoy at 2 p.m. and tried to halt it. While horse artillery in the British centre shelled the last wagons in the enemy column, which extended over five kilometres, the mounted infantry commanded by Brigadier-General C.P. Ridley (which included the New South Wales Mounted Rifles and Army Medical Corps, along with the West Australian Mounted Infantry) continually pressed in against the Boer flanks. De Wet had assigned a small division of his commando under the noted scout leader, Danie Theron, to protect the convoy, while he travelled about twenty kilometres behind with the bulk of his men to guard its

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

82

movement. Theron mounted a vigorous defence against the harrying tactics of the British, suffering little damage himself but successfully mauling the West Australians under Major Hatherley Moor. At dusk Theron broke contact and disappeared after the convoy, which by now had made good its escape, and the pursuit was broken off. In the day’s fighting the WAMI had five men killed—including Major Moor—and the NSWMR also had three men killed and a number wounded. John Stirling (1907) The Colonials in South Africa, 1899–1902, Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Koster River, a controversial action fought on 22 July 1900 (during the Second South African War), on the road between Rustenburg and Elands River in western Transvaal. After a Boer commando led by General H.L. Lemmer had cut the westward route towards Zeerust and Mafeking, thereby preventing supplies from reaching British forces stationed at Rustenburg under Colonel Robert Baden-Powell, late on the afternoon of 21 July a detachment of 270 Australian Bushmen (from New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia) was sent from Magato Nek (or Pass) under Lieut.-Colonel Henry Airey with orders to ‘brush aside’ the enemy and return with a convoy from Elands River. At about 8 a.m. the next day Airey’s column was ambushed by Lemmer at Koster River, a tributary of the Selons. The Boers allowed the Australians’ advance guard and flanking scouts to pass before opening a heavy fire on the main body from a horseshoe of kopjes (low hills) 730 metres away. Forced to seek concealment in the long grass beside the road, in an area offering little cover such as stones or boulders and only a few thin trees, the Bushmen were pinned down and over 200 of their horses stampeded or shot. Airey, finding that his force was unable to

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

83

July 1900 move, determined to hold out until help arrived. The action accordingly lasted throughout the day, with the Boers’ numbers—initially put at 400—increasing to about 1,000. At one stage in the heated engagement, an isolated party of an officer and ten men raised a white flag to give themselves up. Airey considered that this act compromised the integrity of the defence, and felt honour-bound to surrender his entire command. His decision was flatly opposed by the officer commanding the Western Australians, Major Harry Vialls, who reportedly ‘stamped and swore’ at what he regarded as a shameful order. Attempts to surrender were ignored by the Boers anyway, and in the face of the enemy’s unrelenting fire the column was obliged to keep fighting. After word of the Australians’ predicament was carried to Magato Pass by a young Englishwoman who lived on a farm at nearby Woodstock, a relieving force (comprising 200 Australians from Magato Nek and a portion of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Regiment sent out from Rustenburg) proceeded to the scene. When these reinforcements arrived at about 2.30 p.m. and began to threaten the flanks of the Boer position, the enemy broke off the action and rode away. There were 39 casualties incurred by Airey’s men in the six-and-a-half hour fight: six killed, three later died of wounds, 23 wounded, and seven men missing. James Green (1903) The Story of the Australian Bushmen, Sydney: William Brooks & Co.; John Stirling (1907) The Colonials in South Africa, 1899–1902, Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons; P.L. Murray (1911) Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents to the War in South Africa, Melbourne: Government Printer; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Stinkhoutboom, located some 70 kilometres north of Kroonstad in the Orange Free State and just ten kilometres south of the Vaal River, was the scene of an action during the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

83

Second South African War fought on 24 July 1900. British forces had pursued the Boer commando led by General Christiaan de Wet north to this point, seeking to prevent his passage into the adjoining Transvaal republic and forcing him to take refuge in the Reitzburg Hills beyond the town of Vredefort. On 24 July elements of Brigadier-General C.P. Ridley’s mounted infantry brigade (which included both the New South Wales Mounted Rifles and Army Medical Corps) learnt that de Wet had passed through the town the previous night, commandeering men, food and horses. Ridley’s men sped on in pursuit. At a farm called Stinkhoutboom some of the NSWMR, working with men from other units in the brigade, came upon part of de Wet’s rearguard with six grain wagons. In the farmhouse they also captured several exhausted Boers who were asleep in bed still fully clothed. De Wet responded to the sound of firing by sending back Danie Theron’s Scouts to make a counter-attack, supported by two guns which opened fire from concealed positions on high ground to the right. The hour-long action which followed saw the small open plain near the farm filled with several hundred men from both sides, who engaged each other at a distance often no more than 200 metres. Initially the mounted infantry were unable to hold their ground, and were forced to make an orderly retreat with the captured wagons. The end came when two guns from Ridley’s brigade arrived on the scene and began shelling the Boers, forcing them to withdraw with seventeen casualties, including two men killed. The British suffered 39 casualties, reportedly including three South Australians killed and several wounded. The engagement was principally notable for the act of a medical officer with the New South Wales Army Medical Corps, Captain Neville Howse, who—at the height of the fighting—rescued a young trumpeter who

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

84

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

lay wounded without shelter in the field of fire. This act of gallantry earned Howse the Victoria Cross, the first awarded to a member of any Australian unit. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1906), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Elands River, fought on 4–16 August 1900 during the Second South African War, entailed the heroic defence of a staging post in Western Transvaal by a mixed force of British colonial troops. The defenders comprised some 300 Bushmen from various Australian colonies (105 from New South Wales, 141 from Queensland, 42 Victorians, nine West Australians and two Tasmanians), along with 201 Rhodesians, two Canadians and three from British units—the whole commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Charles Hore, a British officer. The garrison was supported by only one Maxim and an old 7-pounder screw gun. Opposing this force were 2,000–3,000 Boers armed with six 12-pounder field-guns and three quick-firing automatic guns known as pom-poms, commanded by General J.H. De la Rey and General H.L. Lemmer. The garrison was there to guard a large accumulation of supplies intended for other British columns operating in the region, and the latter represented the Boers’ primary reason for attacking. The main camp occupied a small rocky ridge situated in the centre of a natural amphitheatre about two hectares in extent, about a kilometre east of the river, but detachments of troops also held two small hills on the riverbank. An attack on the exposed outpost had been anticipated before the siege began on 4 August, although it was hoped that a column of 1,000 New South Wales Imperial Bushmen and South African irregulars under General Sir Frederick Carrington would arrive before this eventuated. As a pre-

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

84

caution, though, a defensive perimeter was hastily improvised using ox-wagons and boxes and bags taken from the stores depot. These preparations enabled the defenders to withstand the enemy’s initial onslaught, during which the compound was subjected to a heavy bombardment. In the first two days over 2,500 shells hit the camp, killing most of the 1,500 horses, oxen and mules, blasting stores in all directions and causing numerous human casualties. On the second day of the investment, the leading elements of Carrington’s force were spotted on the rising ground three kilometres to the west. Hopes of relief were cruelly dashed, however, when the column—advancing without the use of scouts—rode into an ambush and was put into headlong retreat, albeit after sustaining only seventeen minor casualties. Left to their own resources, the garrison completed the digging of rifle pits and building of stone sangars to provide shelter from enemy fire. Some relief was also afforded by the fact that the Boers badly wanted the stores being defended, and hence eased up on the weight of their artillery barrage. The battle was nonetheless maintained using smaller calibre weapons, and the colonial troops were kept under fire from all directions, around the clock. This fire had to be braved during the night, when small parties were sent of necessity to carry drinking water into the lines from the river. Occasional night-time forays were also made to deal with particularly troublesome Boer positions. During daylight hours, however, the defenders remained pinned down in their pits, enduring the heat, thirst and overpowering stench from the carcasses of dead animals. After a week of fighting the Boers called on the camp to surrender. As a mark of respect for the gallant defence which had been made, De la Rey was prepared to allow officers to retain their sidearms and the garrison was guaranteed a safe passage to the nearest British position. This offer was

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

85

T

RUS

Pom Pom 2100 yds Gun 2100 yds

000 Maxim 2

G

y ds rs13

00 y

tish

Entrenched snipers 1500 yds

British Outpost

onte

fonte

Store

Kitchener’s relief column Boer Snipers

Vlakf

Mill

Brak

ELAN

tp Ou

Bri

ds

. DS R

n Gu er o B

ost

7lb Gun

e Snip

ER ENB

M ax im

7lb Gun

12 lb Gun Po m Po m

August 1900

in Dr

ift 12 lb

in Dr

ift

hed c n tre s En Boer

Pom

Gun 3000 yds

Pom 300 0 yd s

Gun 4300 yds Snipers posted in trees

Pom Pom

To Zeerust

From a contemporary sketch

refused and the battle continued. Meanwhile, a second attempt at lifting the siege was being undertaken from the east by Colonel Robert Baden-Powell at the head of a column 2,000 strong. This reached within 30 kilometres of the post but received orders to turn away in the belief that the defenders had already capitulated. Not until 13 August was the true position learnt, after a native runner was picked up on the Mafeking railway with the news that the camp was still holding out. A new effort to break the siege was immediately ordered, and columns totalling 10,000 men under General Lord Kitchener started out on the 15th. In the face of the overwhelming strength of the advancing British force, De le Rey withdrew his burghers before Kitchener rode into the Elands River camp the next day. By this stage twelve of the garrison had been killed, along with seven native porters, and another 58 wounded. The siege was perhaps the most notable action involving Australians in South Africa, earning high praise from even the Boers’ senior commander, Jan Smuts, who said:

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

85

Never in the course of this war did a besieged force endure worse sufferings, but they stood their ground with magnificent courage. All honour to these heroes who in the hour of trial rose nobly to the occasion . . . James Green (1903) The Story of the Australian Bushmen, Sydney: William Brooks & Co.; History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.3 (1908), London: Hurst & Blackett; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Buffels Hoek, an action fought on 16–17 August 1900 during the Second South African War, near Ottoshoop in the western Transvaal some 40 kilometres north-east of Mafeking. A 1,500-strong British column commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Carrington (which included over four squadrons of Imperial Bushmen from all six Australian colonies) was ordered to advance from Mafeking to Zeerust, which he had abandoned just a week or so earlier, but was halted by a Boer force under General H.L. Lemmer holding a line of kopjes (hills) about four kilometres long.

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

86

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

On the morning of the 16th Carrington sent the bulk of his force forward under Brig.-General the Earl of Erroll to attempt to turn the Boer left. Several hills were taken at bayonet-point, but although weakened the Boer resistance held and the British troops were forced to spend the night in the positions they had won. The next morning Lemmer’s men counter-attacked but were repulsed by mid-afternoon and withdrew from the field. The action reportedly cost the Boers nearly 70 casualties and Carrington’s force lost about 50 killed, wounded and missing. Among the latter were five Australians killed and eleven wounded. John Bufton (1905) Tasmanians in the Transvaal War, Hobart: S.G. Loone; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Peitang, the only combat operation involving Australian troops sent to northern China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, was fought on the shores of the Gulf of Chihli (now called the Bohai Wan) 40 kilometres east of Tientsin on 25 September 1900. The Australians were members of a naval brigade offered to Britain in June, at the time that a multi-national force was being assembled to lift the siege of foreign embassies in Peking (now Beijing) by a Chinese cult of extreme nationalists nicknamed ‘Boxers’. The brigade, comprising 200 men from the naval forces of Victoria and another 260 from those of New South Wales, arrived on 8 September and was absorbed within the British contingent of the international field force, with their quarters at Tientsin. By this stage, however, most of the fighting was already over. Troops of the eight participating powers had landed on the China coast in mid-June, captured Tientsin a month later, and relieved the besieged diplomatic missions in the capital a month after that—whereupon military resistance from the Boxers quickly dissipated. Not until a fortnight after their arrival did the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

86

Image rights unavailable

New South Wales Imperial Bushmen in action in the vicinity of Ottoshoop, western Transvaal, in September 1900. Source: Australian War Memorial 4281 All that remained in 1984 of the Peitang fort which Australians were sent to attack in September 1900; the main building was blown up by Chinese Nationalist troops in 1949. Source: Bob Nicholls

Image rights unavailable

Australians have any prospect of seeing action. On 24 September, 300 men of the brigade (150 from each colony) formed part of a four-nation force of 8,000 men—1,500 provided by Britain—which was ordered to move against the Chinese fort at Peitang. Moving initially by lighter down the waterways towards the coast, the next day the Australians were obliged to travel the last 30 kilometres by foot. Urged on by the sounds of battle ahead and the sight of rising pillars of smoke, they covered the remaining distance in a gruelling forced march. All this effort proved wasted when, coming across a Russian field hospital at 6 p.m., they learnt that the Russians had gone ahead and

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

87

September–November 1900 stormed the fort on their own an hour earlier. The only consolation to be had was that the Chinese had chosen not to hold the position in strength, but left a single four-man guncrew to delay the attackers; this they had achieved, at the cost of their lives, while the Russians suffered seven men killed and 30 wounded. During the following month the Victorians took part in a similar expedition to capture Pao-ting fu (now Baoding), the capital of Chihli Province situated about 115 kilometres south-west of Beijing. This also did not see any Australians come under fire, as on the force’s approach Chinese officials surrendered the city without offering any resistance. Thereafter the Australians filled only garrison duties at Beijing and Tientsin until their return home. Bob Nicholls (1986) Bluejackets and Boxers, Sydney: Allen & Unwin

Bothaville, an action during the Second South African War, fought on 6 November 1900 around Doornkraal farm eight kilometres south of this town in the Orange Free State, between a Boer commando under General Christiaan de Wet and British forces commanded by Major-General C.E. Knox. During the previous afternoon, patrols from a mounted column led by Lieut.-Colonel P.W.J. Le Gallais had picked up the Boers’ trail some sixteen kilometres east of the town and began following it. On nearing the village (which had been destroyed during an earlier British visitation), the troops came under fire from Boer guns positioned south of the Valsch River. Approaching darkness, however, prevented any action to follow up the enemy more closely until the next day. Resuming their saddles at 4 a.m., Le Gallais’ troops crossed the river and were steadily advancing south when at 5.30 a.m. the leading element stumbled across a Boer picket of five men fast asleep; these were captured, without a shot being fired. Realising that the enemy laager (camp) was

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

87

close by, the officer in command despatched a message for the column’s guns to be sent forward before leading the 70 men with him forward at the gallop to a low hill to their right front. On gaining this ground, the main Boer camp was found to lie no more than 300 metres beyond. Immediately taking up position along the crest, the troops opened a rapid fire with their magazine rifles into the sleeping laager, taking its occupants completely by surprise. The majority of the Boers made no resistance but simply leapt upon the nearest available horses and fled, among them de Wet and President M.J. Steyn. Some 130 of the enemy were unable to find mounts, however, and took shelter behind the low stone wall of the farm’s garden in an attempt to defend their own guns and camp equipment. The arrival of additional troops soon brought the number on the British side up to about 170, but this was none too many when de Wet began rallying his men who had escaped the commencement of the attack and began harrying the British flanks. A four-hour engagement followed, which only ended when Knox reached the scene at the head of another mounted column commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H.B. De Lisle which included the New South Wales Mounted Rifles under Colonel G.C. Knight and West Australian Mounted Infantry. The New South Wales men were posted on the British left, while the West Australians were sent to the right to engage the Boer defenders of the garden and laager from the north. When De Lisle’s last reserve—80 men of the WAMI under Lieut. H.F. Darling— were brought up at 9.30 a.m., these were ordered to join with men of the British 5th Mounted Infantry in charging the enemy position with the bayonet. According to The Times History: ‘But at the first flash of the steel a white flag went fluttering up, and amid the shouts of the victors, the Boers held up their hands and surrendered’. The Boers had lost at least seventeen men

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

88

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

killed in the action, along with 114 taken prisoner (of whom seventeen were wounded); British losses amounted to 38 killed and wounded, among them Le Gallais who died of wounds that night. Serious losses of materiel had also been inflicted on the enemy, including six field-guns, a Maxim and a pom-pom, all de Wet’s wagons carrying gun and small-arm ammunition as well as clothing and other supplies. Despite this de Wet remained in the field, and within a fortnight struck back at the British at the head of 1,500 burghers. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.5 (1907), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Rhenoster Kop, an action during the Second South African War, fought on 29 November 1900 about 32 kilometres east of Pretoria. A British column commanded by Major-General A. Paget, comprising two infantry battalions, nine guns and a mounted brigade which included Australian Bushmen (from Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria) and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, attacked a 1,200-strong commando with two guns led by General Ben Viljoen which had been harassing the railway line to Delagoa Bay. Although numerically weaker, the Boer main body of 650 men occupied a strong defensive position atop a crescent-shaped line of kopjes (hills) covered with rocks and small bushes. The feature—known generally as Rhenoster Kop after the highest point on the south-western end—gave a commanding view of the northern approach over a wide open slope, while deep ravines on both flanks restricted the scope for attacks from these quarters. Paget marched out at 4 a.m. to begin the action with a frontal infantry assault across hundreds of metres of flat grassy ground against the Boers’ left and centre. This movement was soon stalled by the enemy’s

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

88

fire. On the infantry’s left, the Queenslanders and New Zealanders also went into action in a dismounted role—the latter reaching within 400 metres of Boer positions. At the far end of this flank were the Victorians and West Australians, who advanced on foot under the covering fire of a British field battery. This enabled them to secure a rocky ridge opposite the far right end of the enemy’s line, but they were prevented from making further progress by deep ravines across their front; the bulk of the Bushmen were—like the rest of the British force engaged along a front of more than six kilometres—pinned down on the open veldt. The stalemate which had been reached by 7.30 a.m. lasted for the next twelve hours, with the attacking troops forced to remain in their exposed positions under a glaring hot sun while suffering great thirst. At 7 p.m. part of the Boer force under Vecht-General C.H. Müller launched an unsuccessful hour-long counter-attack against the New Zealanders, whose gains were closest to the enemy. Thereafter the troops worked under the cover of darkness to begin digging trenches, aiming to make their positions more secure when the fight resumed next morning. This effort proved to be pointless, as when dawn arrived it was found that the Boers had abandoned the fight and safely withdrawn. In this action—the last pitched battle of its kind during the war—the Boers had suffered 31 casualties and a few men captured, compared to British losses totalling 85 (30 of whom were among the mounted troops). L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.5 (1907), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.3 (1908), London: Hurst & Blackett; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Wolvekuil Kopjes, an action fought on 14 February 1901, during the guerilla phase of the Second South African War, as a result of

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

89

November 1900–February 1901 British attempts to capture the 1,400-strong Boer commando led by General Christiaan de Wet into central Cape Colony from the south of the Orange Free State. On 12 February de Wet failed in an attempt to obtain supplies by raiding Philipstown, 68 kilometres north-west of Colesberg. He was subsequently pursued by a column of nearly 1,100 mounted troops—mainly Australians (from Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia) and New Zealanders— with eight guns and a pom-pom gun, formed into two corps with the whole commanded by Brigadier-General Herbert Plumer, which had been sent south from the Transvaal to help deal with the incursion. Plumer’s force followed de Wet in torrential rain until able to force the Boers to fight a rearguard action at Wolvekuil Kopjes, 32 kilometres north of Philipstown, two days later. The British attack began at 8.45 a.m. with an advance by two squadrons of King’s Dragoon Guards against a salient hill in the Boer’s left centre. This movement was unsupported, and resulted in the party being surrounded and captured. The corps led by Lieut.-Colonel Cradock, composed almost entirely of Australians and New Zealanders, was next sent to attack the enemy right. After a ‘very dashing assault’, during which 23 casualties were sustained, the Boer flank was turned and de Wet forced to abandon the position. Further rainstorms hindered the British effort to bring his flight to a standstill. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.5 (1907), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Hartebeestfontein, an action fought on 18 February 1901 (during the Second South African War) about 25 kilometres north-west of Klerksdorp in western Transvaal. On receiving information on the 17th that scattered bands of Boers from several

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

89

commandos were concentrating on the village of Hartebeestfontein, Lieut.-General Lord Methuen moved out to attack them with a column of 900 men which included Victorian Bushmen. He was not aware until he approached the enemy position, occupying the Cyferlaagte ridge north of the town, that the burghers originally reported there had been reinforced by a roving force under General J.H. De la Rey and now numbered 1,300—1,400 men. Undeterred by his inferior strength, Methuen resolved to press ahead with his planned attack. The assault which was begun at 8 a.m. initially made no impression on the Boer defence, even after reinforcements (including the Victorians) were sent to bolster the pressure applied against the enemy’s right flank. At 11 a.m. De la Rey made a counter-attack against the British left which was also unsuccessful. Later that afternoon he decided to abandon his positions, leaving eighteen dead on the field. The sharp little action had cost Methuen 49 casualties, three of the dead and eleven of the wounded being Victorians. A month later, the area around Hartebeestfontein was the scene of further clashes between two British columns pursuing De la Rey, after the latter had staged a raid on Lichtenburg in the north on 3 March. A party of New Zealanders and Australian Bushmen from the column led by Major-General J.M. Babington reportedly fought an action on 21 March which was notable for entailing an ‘old-fashioned cavalry charge’ which forced the Boers to flee in terror. While details of this incident are difficult to verify, the New Zealanders and Bushmen undoubtedly played a leading role in chasing down De la Rey’s Boer wagon train three days later at Wildfontein, taking 140 prisoners, several guns and large quantities of rifles and ammunition. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.5 (1907), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; John Stirling

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

90

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

(1907) The Colonials in South Africa, 1899–1902, Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons; M.H. Grant, History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1910), London: Hurst & Blackett; L.M. Field (1979) The Forgotten War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Grobelaar Recht, near Carolina in the eastern Transvaal, was the scene of a severe engagement on 15 May 1901 involving Boers and a British column commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Bindon Blood which included the Fifth and Sixth West Australian Mounted Infantry contingents. During this action the WAMI lost five men killed (one account says seven) and eight wounded, one of whom later died. The fighting continued next day near Brakpan, at one stage during which the British right flank was forced to retire. Withdrawing under heavy fire, Lieut. Frederick Bell of the Sixth WAMI contingent noticed a wounded man without a horse and returned to take him up behind him. The horse collapsed under their combined weight, whereupon Bell sent the man back on the horse alone and covered his escape by rifle-fire until he was out of danger. For this action Bell was awarded the Victoria Cross. R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Wilmansrust, a humiliating disaster suffered by a portion of the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles (5 VMR) on 12 June 1901 in the eastern Transvaal, during the Second South African (or Boer) War. Since arriving the previous March, the Victorian regiment had been divided into two battalions and British officers placed over the unit’s own commanders. While containing a leavening of officers and men with military training, including some veterans of earlier contingents who were on a second tour, the great majority of its members were civilian recruits. In just two months the regiment’s strength had also been heavily reduced by sickness, from over 1,000 to little more than

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

90

700—a proportionately far higher rate than experienced in other Australian contingents. On 10 June a column led by MajorGeneral Stuart Beatson, an Indian Army regular, arrived at Olifant’s River 40 kilometres south-west of Middelberg. Here Beatson sent off a flying column, comprising 270 men of the 2nd Battalion, 5 VMR, with two Vickers-Maxim quick-firing guns (popularly known as pom-poms) mounted in Cape carts, to look for a small Boer force reportedly at Boschmansfontein, 40 kilometres to the east. While Major William McKnight was the senior Victorian officer present, the detachment—totalling about 350 men—was under the command of Major Morris, a British artillery officer who had arrived from India with Beatson. After finding that the Boers had already evacuated their camp, Morris began making his way back to rejoin the main body. At about 5 p.m. on 12 June, while still some eighteen kilometres east of Beatson, Morris established a night bivouac on the Middelburg–Ermelo road close to a farm named Wilmansrust. The camp was sited on a slight rise about 100 metres square, with a steep-sided gully all round, and overlooked by higher hills at a distance. The guns were sited in the centre, most of the horses tethered down one side, and the mule wagons secured in the farm’s cattle-kraal nearby which had strong stone walls 1.5 metres high. Outlying picket posts were established by Morris’ adjutant, another British artillery officer. The largest post—comprising an officer and 30 men—occupied a small hill about 1,500 metres to the south-east of the camp. In all, including a party of a dozen men posted within the kraal, some 70 of the camp’s personnel were nominally on guard duty at any one time. (The Times History of the War in South Africa gives a figure of 120, but other accounts contradict this.) The posts, however, were too few in number and spaced too widely apart to effectively provide

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

91

May–June 1901

The disaster which befell the Victorian Mounted Rifles at Wilmansrust, as drawn by English battle artist R. Caton Woodville. This illustration was reproduced in several British war histories, in one with the caption ‘The Australians dropped like rabbits’.

advance warning. Moreover, they had been positioned during daylight hours when their location was easily noted—both by local Boers and a group of General Ben Viljoen’s commando who had been shadowing the column throughout the day at a distance of about two kilometres and frequently engaging in sniping. Having observed the camp’s disposition and security arrangements, the trailing force of Boers—numbering about 150 men under Vecht-General C.H. Müller—decided to attack. Leaving 30 men with their horses, the Boers were guided through the darkness by the farm’s owner along a slight depression between the hills and reached the foot of the camp without being detected. Their approach was also apparently aided by coinciding with the replacement of the personnel manning the daytime observation posts with the night pickets at about 7 p.m., the noises of this changeover having cloaked the enemy movement. By 7.30 p.m. the camp was at rest, the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

91

troopers having settled down to sleep or read mail just received from Australia. Despite the known proximity of an enemy force, the VMR’s weapons were neatly stacked in piles near where they slept, rather than right alongside them. This was allegedly at Morris’ order, in compliance with drill regulations which were rarely observed during operations on the veldt. The 120 Boers, advancing in extended line, got to within 40 metres of the front of the camp before a whistle blast at 7.45 p.m. signalled the attack. The first Boer volley, fired from the hip as the attackers ran forward, turned the surprised camp into a shambles. Many horses were killed or wounded in this opening fusillade, but the rest stampeded and knocked down men and tents. Some of the VMR reached their rifles but were shot down before they could use them. The fight was over in less than ten minutes, leaving at least fourteen Australians killed and 42 wounded (some accounts refer to eighteen dead and as many as 60 wounded). About 50 men

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

92

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

evaded capture by fleeing into the darkness, but the remainder of the camp’s occupants were taken prisoner. Taking up lanterns, the Boers collected their own casualties (claimed by McKnight to number ten dead and 30 wounded) then began looting the camp of its two prized guns, plus the Victorians’ rifles, ammunition and stores. Since they did not have the facilities to hold prisoners, the Boers marched their captives nearly two kilometres out onto the veldt and simply released them before themselves making off. They took with them, too, over 100 of the column’s horses, all that had not been killed or broken loose and bolted. Throughout this, the outlying pickets made no attempt at intervention, although their combined numbers nearly matched the remaining Boer strength. The action at Wilmansrust was the most serious reverse to befall any overseas colonial force sent to the conflict in South Africa, and unfortunately was taken as an indictment of the courage and soldierly qualities of Australian contingents generally. There was no denying that a deplorable lack of vigilance and attention to security had been displayed—although the responsibility for this rested squarely on an Imperial and not an Australian officer. Moreover, when the Boer attack began, the camp was overtaken by a mass panic which defied commanders’ efforts to rally the men. Compounding the serious embarrassment engendered by the affair back in Australia was news which became public late in September that three members of 5 VMR had been tried at court martial for inciting mutiny, found guilty, and sentenced to death; these sentences had been subsequently commuted to gaol terms, however, and the men were already in military prisons back in England. Outrage at the secrecy surrounding these proceedings—of which the new federal government was initially ignorant—was fuelled by further press reports that the mutineers had actually been provoked by

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

92

the ‘hostile and offensive attitude’ shown by General Beatson, who had referred to the defenders of Wilmansrust as ‘a lot of white-livered curs’ and uttered other grossly disparaging remarks. These revelations caused debate to refocus on the competence of Imperial officers to command irregular corps, and raised concerns over the situation where Australian soldiers were subject to British military justice—an issue which was a foretaste of the controversy soon engendered by the executions of two other Australians, lieutenants P.J. Handcock and H.H. Morant, in February 1902. In the case of the Wilmansrust mutineers, there was a happier outcome. A review of the court martial discovered flaws in the trial proceedings (the charges having been laid under the wrong sections of the Army Act) and the War Office consequently quashed the convictions on 26 October. The men were immediately released from prison and returned to Australia by the end of the year, albeit still under a cloud of ignominy. Gavin Souter (1976) Lion and Kangaroo, Sydney: William Collins; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service; L.M. Field (1979) The Forgotten War, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

Grootvallier (also known as Grootvlei), an action during the Second South African War, fought on 1 August 1901 near the Vaal River in the north-west Orange Free State. A detachment from a British column commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H.B. De Lisle, comprising 200 South Australians led by a British officer, Major J.S.M. Shea, succeeded in locating a night laager (camp) being used by a Boer commando on a farm. Unknown to the British, this camp actually contained the noted enemy general, J.C. Smuts, who was resting while attempting to evade an extensive drive which the British commander-in-chief, General Lord Kitchener, had launched on 29 July. After a silent approach and stealthy

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

93

June–October 1901 reconnaissance, the Australians prepared to assault the enemy position after dark. When they attempted to gallop in on the laager from three sides, however, they met an unexpected obstacle in the form of wire fences and were forced to dismount and rush forward on foot ‘with bayonets fixed’. This delay enabled nearly all of the camp’s 300 occupants (including Smuts) to escape. Nonetheless six Boers were killed in the hand-to-hand fighting which raged at the farmhouse, and twelve prisoners (including two officers) were captured along with a large number of horses. The Australians’ losses were just two men wounded, though Shea’s Indian orderly was killed while riding behind him. The incident was significant enough that several participants were mentioned in Kitchener’s despatches and one man was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.5 (1907), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; M.H. Grant, History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.4 (1910), London: Hurst & Blackett; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

Bakenlaagte, an action during the Second South African War, fought on 30 October 1901 some 35 kilometres north-west of Bethal in eastern Transvaal, in which Boers attacked and crippled a British column commanded by Lieut.-Colonel G.E. Benson. The column, comprising 600 infantry, 800 mounted infantry (including several squadrons of Scottish Horse, which had been partially raised in Victoria) and 300 wagons, had paused on 28 October at Zwakfontein, 24 kilometres from Bethal. Low supplies prompted Benson to make for Brugspruit on the Delagoa Bay railway, setting off at 4.30 a.m. on the 30th across the open veldt that was still soggy after heavy rain the day before. By 8 a.m. the column came under heavy sniping fire from 500 Boers of the Bethal commando under their commandant, H.S. Grobler, and under this harassment

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

93

and accompanied by cold wind-driven rain showers the advance continued. At about 1 p.m. another commando of 500 burghers arrived under General Louis Botha after a forced ride from near Ermelo. This additional force immediately placed the British rearguard under severe pressure, forcing Benson to return from the main body at the head of two squadrons of Scottish Horse totalling just 96 men (nearly all of them Australians). Realising the gravity of the situation, he ordered a defensive position be taken up on a bare ridge some two kilometres short of where the main body had stopped to establish a new camp. Two 15-pounder guns occupied the centre of the ridge, with mounted infantry and an infantry company hastily adopting posts at some distance on each flank; the 64 gunners crewing the guns were protected by the Scottish Horse and the 30 members of their original escort, making a total of 190 men on what became known as Gun Hill. The Boers concentrated their fire on the guns and within minutes had accounted for all but three of the men manning them. They then charged forward, before dismounting in an area of dead ground just 40 metres in front. Two companies of infantry sent to relieve this pressure failed to reach a position from which they could intervene before the end of the Boer assault came. The enemy simply rose in lines and fired from where they stood, then swept forward to seize the hill from the few defenders still capable of resisting. Despite the efforts of other British guns in the main camp to prevent the Boers carrying away the two 15-pounders, once darkness came these weapons were quickly removed. The Boers also took anything of value from their prisoners, and even from the dead and wounded, leaving most of the British casualties stripped naked on the ground. British losses in the action totalled 238 killed and wounded, and another 120 taken prisoner—about a quarter of the column’s

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

94

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Bakenlaagte Farm Camp

Nooitgedact Farm

Scottish Horse

0

Onverwacht Farm 2 3 kms

1

original strength—while Boer casualties were reportedly about 190, including 60 killed. British losses were worse on Gun Hill, where the defence was practically annihilated; only seventeen of the 190 troops there got away unwounded. Of the Scottish Horse, 33 were killed and another 57 were wounded. Also among the wounded was Benson, who died from his injuries the following morning. The rest of the column remained holed up in the main camp, and succeeded in beating off a night attack after hastily digging trenches and throwing out barbed wire defences. Their position was relieved on the morning of 1 November by the arrival of a column which comprised 700 mounted infantry (including some South Australians) who had made a forced ride of nearly 90 kilometres from Standerton. Although the battle became known as Bakenlaagte after a Boer farm in the vicinity,

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

94

Gun Hill

Kruismentfontein Farm the position of the main camp was actually at the junction of the boundaries with two other farms—Schaapkraal and Nooitgedacht—and the action at Gun Hill took place wholly on land within the latter. While the Scottish Horse was a unit privately raised by the Marquis of Tullibardine, and the Victorians in it were not members of an official contingent of the colonial government, the disaster suffered at Gun Hill was later commemorated by a memorial erected by the Victorian government at Primrose near Germiston, about ten kilometres east of Johannesburg. John Bufton (1905) Tasmanians in the Transvaal War, Hobart: S.G. Loone; L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899– 1902, vol.5 (1907), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

95

October 1901–January 1902 Onverwacht, an action fought on 4 January 1902 (during the closing stages of the Second South African War), in south-eastern Transvaal about 30 kilometres east of Ermelo. The engagement arose from British efforts to end the activities of a 750-man force led by the Boer commander-in-chief, General Louis Botha. On New Year’s Day three mounted columns were sent out from Ermelo in an attempt to pin the enemy against another British column operating along the border with Swaziland. On 3 January the column commanded by Brigadier-General Herbert Plumer suffered an embarrassing minor reverse when New Zealanders forming the advance guard were mauled by the enemy, suffering 28 men captured along with several casualties. The next day the Boers succeeded in ambushing one of the two corps comprising Plumer’s column—that led by Major J.M. Vallentin (a British officer), comprising 110 men of the 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen under Major Frederick Toll along with British mounted troops. After posting part of his command on the main ridge of a group of kopjes (hills) known as Bankkop, there to wait for the arrival of Plumer and the main body, Vallentin took the rest of his corps forward to the next high ground comprising a line of hills called Onverwacht. Riding in advance of this new position with a party, Vallentin was suddenly attacked by a force of 300 Boers who had been waiting concealed in a deep hollow. These pursued Vallentin and his men back to the Onverwacht ridge and immediately forced the entire column to defend its ground. With their numbers swelling to more than 500, the Boers made a determined push to capture the Maxim quick-fire gun (known as a pom-pom) accompanying the corps and prevented its escape by shooting down the horses which pulled it. The gun was pushed into a gully, and the Queenslanders and Hampshire Mounted Infantry defending the weapon were forced to retire. Major Toll led

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

95

his men back from the main ridge on foot, losing one small detachment to enemy capture after all except three men in the group were wounded. Under Vallentin’s orders the Queenslanders and Hampshire then attempted to make a last stand on a confined knob of a small ridge which was practically devoid of cover. Assaults on this position by the Boers twice came to within 30 metres and several enemy were shot down just ten metres in front. After the enemy succeeded in getting in the rear of the knob and effectively isolating it, leaving the defenders subjected to heavy fire on all sides at a range of less than 50 metres, continued resistance became useless. The Boers rushed in to make prisoners of the 70 who remained uninjured, and to take possession of weapons and anything else of use to them. Clothing, including boots, were stripped from the prisoners and even from the dead and wounded. With Plumer’s main body fast approaching, the burghers did not linger for long, but promptly turned loose their captives as they made off with their spoils—using 30 captured horses to carry away this material and their dead and wounded. Fortunately, the pom-pom gun was not part of the booty removed by the departing enemy; this was retrieved by men of the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles who arrived on the scene, and taken to a new defensive position. Although a pursuit was mounted under the direction of Major Harry Vialls, a West Australian, the Boers made good their escape and were not again engaged. They had lost at least nine men killed (including their leader, Commandant Oppermann), whereas the British column had suffered 65 casualties (29 dead, 45 wounded). Major Vallentin was among the dead. The Queenslanders alone had thirteen men killed and seventeen wounded. Despite the humiliation of this reverse, which demonstrated the military capabilities of the Boers into the war’s very last stages, Plumer was satisfied that no

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

96

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

96

Kabakaul Bay

Au ad stra va lia nc n e

To Herbertshöhe (3 Germans, 20 Natives)

N (9 o. 1 20 Ge tre N rm nch at an iv s, es )

Bitapaka, the only significant action arising from the Australian seizure of German New Guinea at the start of the First World War, was fought on 11 September 1914 south of Kabakaul on the north-east coastline of the Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain. At dawn that day a joint army–navy contingent (the Australian Naval & Military Expeditionary Force, or AN&MEF) arrived off Rabaul in ships of the Australian fleet commanded by Rear-Admiral George Patey, to demand the German colony’s surrender. Meanwhile, a 25-man party of naval reservists (with about fifteen others who were to provide medical support and maintain communications) was landed at Kabakaul with orders to capture a radio station believed to be in operation at Bitapaka, seven kilometres to the south. At about 9 a.m., as the Australians pushed inland following a jungle-edged road, two scouts surprised an enemy party of about twenty Melanesian soldiers led by three Germans apparently setting an ambush. They opened fire, wounding one of the Germans and scattering the rest. In addition to the wounded man who surrendered, the other two Germans were soon afterwards captured (one of whom turned out to be the captain commanding the Bitapaka section of the German forces). Reinforcements were called up from the beach at the same time as the advance was resumed. The Australians had only gone some 500 metres when they came under fire from a strongly held trench dug across the road. Joined here by about

No. 2 trench (3 Germans, 20 Natives)

No. 3 trench radio stn Police Barracks

L.S. Amery (ed.) The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, vol.5 (1907), London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; P.L. Murray (1911) Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents to the War in South Africa, Melbourne: Government Printer; R.L. Wallace (1976) The Australians at the Boer War, Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australian Government Publishing Service

50 more men from the ships, a flanking attack was launched under Lieut.-Commander Charles Elwell shortly after 1 p.m. which caused a white flag to be raised by the trench’s defenders and terms of surrender requested. To this point the Australians had suffered Elwell and three men killed, and five others wounded (two fatally). Accompanied by two Germans from the captured trench to serve as interpreters, the Australians proceeded along the road carrying a flag of truce. The Germans persuaded the garrisons of three more trench obstacles to surrender also—though not before a brisk skirmish took place at the last of these in which three Australians were wounded (one fatally) and one of the interpreters and several Melanesian soldiers killed. Another group of German-led Melanesians was encountered and disarmed before the radio station was reached about 7 p.m. This was found to have been abandoned, the mast dropped but its instruments and machinery intact. The

(12 Germans, 80 Natives)

blame attached to the Queenslanders and pointedly commended Toll for his leadership while recommending several of the Australians for gallantry awards.

(8 Germans, 20 Natives)

Bitapaka

0

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

1

2 kms

97

September–November 1914 AN&MEF personnel killed during the day’s fighting were the first Australians to fall in the First World War. Although successful, the operation could scarcely be rated as well managed. The Australian advance had been effectively delayed by a half-trained force of native police and plantation labourers, and this opposition had been overcome only at a cost of seven officers and men killed or died of wounds and five wounded; some Germans present later claimed that two of the Australian fatalities had been shot by their own side in the confused engagement. Against this, Bitapaka’s defenders had suffered one German NCO and about 30 Melanesians killed, and one German and ten Melanesians wounded. It has been claimed that the heavy losses among the Melanesian troops were the result of the Australian practice of bayoneting all those that fell into their hands during the fighting. S.S. Mackenzie (1927) The Australians at Rabaul, Sydney: Angus & Robertson; Hermann Joseph Hiery (1995) The Neglected War, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press

Cocos Islands, the first engagement fought by a warship of the Royal Australian Navy, occurred on 9 November 1914 off this British-ruled group of 27 small coral islands situated in the Indian Ocean 2,800 kilometres north-west of Perth, Western Australia. The action came about after the light cruiser Emden (3,600 tonnes), a unit of the German Pacific Squadron then enjoying a highly successful career raiding Allied shipping, anchored off Direction Island early on 9 November and sent ashore 43 officers and men to destroy the vital radio and cable station there which connected the Australian, African and Indian telegraph systems. Before this aim could be achieved, the staff of the station managed to send off warning messages of the presence of a ‘strange warship’. Unknown to the Emden’s commander, Captain Karl von Müller, a convoy of 38

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

97

transports carrying the first contingents of Australian and New Zealand troops overseas was at that moment passing just 80 kilometres to the east, escorted by the Australian light cruisers Melbourne and Sydney (5,400 tonnes) and the powerful Japanese battle-cruiser Ibuki (10,000 tonnes). Until the previous day the convoy had been led by the British armoured cruiser Minotaur, but, after that vessel was called away to Mauritius, Melbourne (under Captain Mortimer Silver, RN) had taken over this role. On receipt of the signals from Cocos, Silver’s first instinct was to himself go and investigate. Appreciating his wider responsibility, however, at 7 a.m. he detached Sydney—which was, in any event, then posted on the convoy’s port side nearest to the reported trouble. He had to restrain Ibuki’s captain, Vice-Admiral Kato Kanji, who wished to accompany Sydney. As Sydney steamed westward at 20 knots, her smoke was spotted on the horizon by Emden soon after 9 a.m. At first von Müller thought this came from the collier, Buresk, which was supporting his operations, but less than fifteen minutes later he realised his mistake as what was plainly a British cruiser bore down on him from the north-east. Without waiting to collect the landing party ashore, he moved out to sea to gain room to manoeuvre and prepared for combat. On identifying the class of the enemy ship he had discovered, the commander of Sydney (Captain John Glossop, RN) consulted standard references on board and decided to close to 9,500 yards (8.7 kilometres) before engaging. He believed that this would place him just outside the range of his opponent’s 4.1-inch guns while bringing Emden fully under the fire of his own 6-inch armament. Unknown to him, however, was the fact that the mountings of the German’s guns had undergone elevation modifications which increased their range. No sooner had Glossop closed to 10,500

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

98

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

yards (9.6 kilometres) and swung onto a parallel course at 9.40 a.m. than Emden opened fire at extreme range. The five shells of this first salvo passed over the top of Sydney but still splashed down within 200 metres of their target, and a hail of further rounds quickly followed. Von Müller had ordered rapid fire so that Emden was reportedly sending off a salvo every six seconds. At least fifteen shells thus found their mark on Sydney—although fortunately no more than five of these actually exploded. All the Australian cruiser’s casualties of four men killed and twelve wounded occurred during these first ten minutes of the action, before Glossop moved back out beyond his opponent’s reach. Initially hampered in returning effective fire through having both range-finders put out of action, Glossop used his superior speed of 27 knots (compared with Emden’s seventeen) to thwart any attempt to get close enough to torpedo him. Once Sydney’s shells began to find their mark, moreover, their effect was decisive, since each 6-inch shell weighed 45 kg (compared with the 17 kg of Emden’s shells) and Sydney eventually succeeded in landing about 100 of these hammer blows upon her lighter adversary. Soon the German vessel was totally wrecked, with its hull holed at numerous points, its superstructure a blazing shambles, half the crew disabled, and steering only possible using the screws. But the Emden continued to fight, with at least one gun still firing at 11 a.m. Realising the hopelessness of his position, von Müller chose to run his ship onto the reef at North Keeling Island to prevent it sinking with so many wounded on board. Once Emden was aground by 11.15 a.m., Glossop decided to go after the enemy’s supply ship, Buresk, which had been hovering on the edge of the action apparently looking for an opportunity to ram him. When the collier was eventually overtaken shortly after noon, a prize crew put on board discovered

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

98

that the German crew had already taken measures to sink the ship and it was beyond saving. On returning to Emden’s shattered remains at 4 p.m., Glossop found the enemy ship still flying its battle ensign. After demands to surrender were ignored, he considered that von Müller was declaring an intention to continue resistance by whatever means was still open to him; he accordingly ordered a further two salvos fired into the wreck. Only then was the white flag raised and the German colours hauled down. There was later some criticism of Glossop’s action at this point, which inevitably caused needless casualties, but there was no doubting that he behaved correctly according to the usages of naval warfare. Even now, Sydney was unable to move directly to the aid of Emden’s surviving crew, since there was still the group of Germans ashore on Direction Island to be dealt with. It was subsequently discovered that this party had commandeered a schooner during the action and managed to sail away in the dusk; after an adventurous journey, they managed to reach Arabia and eventually made their way back to Germany. Not until late on 10 November was Sydney finally able to render medical assistance to the 190 of Emden’s officers and men who had survived the fight, 65 of whom were wounded; eight officers and 126 other ranks had been killed, twenty of them during the final two salvos. After transhipping the survivors into Sydney, Glossop made for Colombo to rejoin the convoy. Despite the immense and widespread jubilation at news of Emden’s destruction, and especially the fact that this had been achieved by a warship of Australia’s new navy, it had been a markedly one-sided contest. Interviewed shortly after the action, Glossop expressed his horror at what he saw of the effects of his fire on his opponent, declaring:

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

99

November 1914

NORTH 10.50

KEELING

10.20

ISLAND

11.00 10.40

10.30

10.50 10.00

10.20

Sydney

10.40 9.50 10.10

9.50 10.00 9.40

T

FIRS

VOS SAL

9.40

Direction Is. Emden

Home Is.

SOUTH KEELING ISLANDS West Is. South Is.

0

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

99

2

4

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

6

8 kms

100

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

My God, what a sight! Her captain had been out of action ten minutes after the fight started from lyddite fumes, and everybody on board was demented . . . by shock, and fumes, and the roar of shells bursting among them. She was a shambles. Blood, guts, flesh, and uniforms were all scattered about. One of our shells had landed behind a gun shield, and had blown the whole gun-crew into one pulp. You couldn’t even tell how many men there had been. They must have had forty minutes of hell on that ship, . . . and the survivors were practically madmen.

In reality, Emden’s fate at Sydney’s hands was almost comparable to that which befell HMAS Yarra in a clash with Japanese cruisers 28 years later (see South of Java). Arthur W. Jose (1928) The Royal Australian Navy, 1914–1918, Sydney: Angus & Robertson; A.B. Paterson (1934) Happy Dispatches, Sydney: Angus & Robertson

Broken Hill, an affray on 1 January 1915 caused by two Moslem men who raised the Turkish flag and began shooting at residents of this mining centre in western New South Wales. The men—both longtime residents of the district—were actually Afghans not Turks, though one (an ice-cream vendor) had at one time served in the Sultan’s army and reportedly remained fanatically devoted to Turkey’s cause in the First World War. The other was a former camel-driver who acted as the mullah (religious leader) of the local Moslem community. The first target attacked was a train of 40 open ore-trucks crowded with 1000 people on a holiday picnic to Silverton. Shortly after 10 a.m., as the train was heading west about three kilometres from the town, the two Afghans opened a heavy fire into the exposed passengers from a bank close beside the tramway. The three people killed and six wounded were of all ages, and both sexes. The train was not stopped until out of range, then the alarm was raised by telephone. Police and available troops, as well as some members of the local rifle club,

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

100

were hurriedly assembled to begin a pursuit. In the meantime the two riflemen had gone to a cottage on the town’s outskirts and shot its elderly male resident, before retreating to a low rocky hill north of the town. A policeman who stumbled upon them here was wounded, but the two fugitives were now promptly surrounded. In the firefight which followed, lasting until after midday, one of the Afghans was killed and the other seriously wounded before capture. That night, a large group of outraged citizens gathered in the town centre. In the belief that local residents of German origin had instigated the attack and supplied the weapons used, this mob marched on the nearby German Club and burned the building down. Members of the crowd also decided on a similar demonstration against the Afghan camel camp situated beyond the town limits, but police prohibited a march en masse. When smaller parties eventually reached the camp they found it guarded by ten police and 50 armed soldiers. Rather than take on the inhabitants’ protectors (who were, in any event, the same men who had earlier subdued the two murderers), the crowd of intending avengers dispersed without any further disturbance. E. Scott (1938) Australia during the War, Sydney: Angus & Robertson; Brian Kennedy (1978) Silver, Sin, and Sixpenny Ale, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press

First Wassa (also Wozzer or Wazzir), the appellation given to the first of two unheroic riots in the Haret el Wassa (the brothel quarter of Cairo, Egypt) involving troops from Australia and New Zealand. The initial incident occurred on 2 April 1915 (Good Friday), after units of the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) received news that their period of training was at an end and that orders had been received for them to embark for long-awaited action. Causes of this disturbance reportedly lay in a desire to exact revenge for past grievances arising from dealings with the district’s

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

101

January–April 1915 denizens—such as diluted liquor, exorbitant prices, and high rates of venereal infection— although wild rumours of stabbings of Anzac men by locals also appear to have played a part. Trouble began soon after 5 p.m. when soldiers began evicting whores and their pimps into the street, and tossing their possessions out after them. Bedding, furniture and clothing—even pianos—were thrown from windows of buildings several storeys high. These materials were piled in the road and set alight. The town picket, drawn from the Australian 9th Light Horse Regiment, came on the scene and tried to clear the men out of the houses being attacked. Five arrests were made, although the crowd—growing larger by the minute— refused to let these men be taken away, snatched rifles from some of the troopers and threw the weapons onto the fires, and succeed in freeing four of the prisoners. British military police (MPs) were summoned, about 30 arriving on horseback to choruses of abuse and a shower of stones and bottles. An ill-advised effort by the MPs to gain control by firing their pistols, supposedly over the rioters’ heads, resulted in the wounding of four men in the throng estimated at 2,000–3,000. This only served to further inflame matters, and forced the police to hastily withdraw. Efforts by the Egyptian fire brigade to douse the bonfires were also frustrated, its hose-lines being cut, its members manhandled (especially after they turned a hose onto the crowd), and the engine itself finally pushed into the flames. Left to themselves, the more unruly elements began to loot some shops and put the torch to a Greek tavern. Shortly after 7 p.m. a second fire engine arrived, this time under cavalry escort which exercised extreme tact, and the various fires were tackled while a still sizeable crowd looked on. Since the ‘Wassa’ was close by Shepheard’s Hotel, where the Anzac commander had his headquarters, armed troops had also been

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

101

called out. After Lancashire Territorials (non-regular British troops who were popular with the colonials) were drawn across the road, the rioters wisely began to disperse and order was eventually restored by 10 p.m. A formal inquiry was convened the following day under Colonel Frederic Hughes, commander of the AIF’s 3rd Light Horse Brigade, to investigate the causes of the riot and establish responsibility for its outbreak. Many New Zealand officers attempted to disclaim that their men had played any part, although the evidence of their presence was quite conclusive—the officer leading the Australian picket was adamant that ‘New Zealanders predominated’. In any event, nine-tenths of those present had been merely spectators. Apportioning blame was next to impossible, however, with few of the 50 witnesses able (or willing) to provide precise information. As the number of men injured by the MPs’ bullets (three Australians and one New Zealander) was roughly in proportion to the size of the respective contingents, it could be said that the ‘honours’ were about equally shared. So too was the damages bill of £1,700. (See also Second Wassa.) Bill Gammage (1974) The Broken Years, Canberra: Australian National University Press; Suzanne Brugger (1980) Australians and Egypt 1914–1919, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press; Kevin Fewster, ‘The Wazza Riots, 1915’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, no.4, April 1984

Anzac Cove, the name given to the stretch of Turkish coastline on the west coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula upon which the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) made an invasion landing on 25 April 1915. The landing, and others by British and French forces further south, marked the start of an eight-month campaign aimed at seizing control of the Dardanelles, the 60-kilometre long strait connecting the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmara. Since this waterway was strategically of utmost importance as a naval route between the

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

102

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and also for the defence of the Turkish capital at Constantinople, the Allied incursion was fiercely (and ultimately successfully) resisted by the Turks. While the concept of the operation was sound, the Allies made the mistake of signalling their intention by using solely naval units to bombard the Turkish forts on the peninsula during February, then attempting to force the strait a month later. The latter effort failed disastrously, thus necessitating a military expedition. At the time of the preliminary bombardment the Dardanelles were only lightly held by two Turkish divisions, but by the time the landing forces arrived this number had risen to six— compared to the five divisions of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force commanded by General Sir Ian Hamilton. Added to the loss of surprise, planning and other arrangements for the landings were mostly inept and inadequate. The northern landing was assigned to the Anzacs under Lieut.-General Sir William Birdwood, whose force comprised the 1st Australian Division (Major-General William Bridges) and the New Zealand & Australian Division (Major-General Sir Alexander Godley). Once ashore, Birdwood’s task was to press inland and sever the Turks’ lines of communication with their forces further south. Bridges’ division was ordered to land first, its objective being a sandy beach north of Gaba Tepe. When the flotilla of lighters and rowing boats began taking ashore the first wave of troops from the transport ships shortly after 4 a.m., however, unsuspected currents swept these craft nearly two kilometres northwards. The covering force was accordingly deposited on more difficult terrain on either side of the headland of Ari Burnu. While this greatly increased the difficulties of the landing, it actually meant the invaders encountered lighter resistance at first than would have been the case had they reached their designated beach.

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

102

Image rights unavailable

The scene in Anzac Cove at about 10.30 a.m. on the day of the landing. Source: Australian War Memorial A834

Four hours after the initial landing, a significant portion of the Australian division was safely ashore and the leading elements were pushing inland through dense scrub amid a maze of steep ridges and narrow gullies. Their advance was cut short when the local Turkish commander, Mustafa Kemal (later known as Kemal Attatürk), rallied his troops in time to seize the crucially important Chunuk Bair and Sari Bair ridges. The Australian failure to take these dominating heights on the first day meant that the beach-head gained was successfully contained by the enemy to a triangular area of about 160 hectares within a perimeter of less than two kilometres; a similar fate met the British landings at Cape Helles. Although both Bridges and Godley argued for the Anzac troops to be immediately re-embarked, this advice was refused. A prolonged siege followed, during which both sides struggled to gain advantage (see Baby 700). A general

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

103

April 1915 Turkish assault on 19 May, undertaken by four divisions totalling 42,000 men, resulted in 10,000 enemy casualties—roughly 3,000 of whom were killed. Notwithstanding a second British landing aimed at expanding the original beach-head, undertaken in August at Suvla Bay six kilometres north of Anzac (see Lone Pine, The Nek and Hill 971), the stalemate continued. On 19–20 December the Allied garrison of Anzac and Suvla was evacuated without loss in a brilliantly executed secret operation, followed by that at Helles on 8 January 1916. The Gallipoli campaign had been a costly failure, claiming 180,000 casualties out of the 480,000 Allied troops committed to the fighting; no precise figure is available for the Turks, but their losses were probably about 220,000. Some 50,000 Australians served at Anzac, and of these more than 26,000 became casualties (some sources say 27,500) including nearly 8,000 killed or died of wounds or disease. In Australia, the experience of Anzac took on a powerful nationalist meaning from 1916, embodied ever since in annual commemoration of the landing anniversary as ‘Anzac Day’. C.E.W. Bean The Story of Anzac, vol.1 (1921) & vol.2 (1924), Sydney: Angus & Robertson; John Robertson (1990) Anzac and Empire, Melbourne: Hamlyn Australia

Sea of Marmara, a naval episode on 25–30 April 1915 in which the Australian submarine AE2 succeeded in penetrating Turkish defences and passing the length of the Dardanelles, the 60-kilometre channel linking the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea, at the same time that an Allied expeditionary force was attempting to seize the Turkish land forts controlling the southern entrance to this strategic waterway (see Anzac). Two submarines (one French, one British) had previously been lost to the strait’s hazards which—apart from natural obstacles such as an unpredictable outward current which could render a submarine

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

103

almost uncontrollable—included minefields, searchlights, shore batteries and naval patrols. If able to reach Chanak, on the eastern shore of the stretch known as the Narrows, the boat’s captain, Lieut.Commander Henry Stoker, RN, was ordered to ‘run amok generally’ by interfering with enemy shipping moving to support Turkish forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula. An initial attempt made during the early morning hours of 24 April turned into a false start, after damage sustained to a hydroplane shaft during a hurried dive forced the submarine to return to base at Tenedos (an island near the mouth of the Dardanelles). Repairs were carried out in time to enable a second attempt to be made at the same time the next day. Cruising slowly on the surface under cover of darkness, AE2 made its way into the entrance of the strait at 2.30 a.m. Two hours later, after about nine kilometres had been covered, the boat’s wash was spotted in the flat calm water by enemy lookouts on the north bank, a gun opened fire and it became necessary to dive. Stoker proceeded through the enemy minefields while still submerged, with tethering wires constantly scraping against the submarine’s hull. By 6 a.m., while approaching the Narrows off Chanak at periscope depth, the boat was engaged by gunfire from forts on both sides of the waterway, and by warships which attempted to ram it. AE2 sank a gunboat with a torpedo before again being forced to submerge during the rest of this critical part of the passage. Twice the vessel hit bottom and slid up on the bank, exposing part of its conning tower to enemy observation and fire, but the crew was able to extricate it on each occasion. When Stoker rose to periscope depth to check position a short time after the second grounding episode, he discovered that the Narrows were well behind but that AE2 was now at the centre of a flotilla of enemy craft which included destroyers and gunboats. At 8.30 a.m. he attempted to throw off his

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

104

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

pursuers by lying submerged on the bottom, staying thus concealed until the movement of searching vessels overhead ceased during the early hours of the evening. After surfacing during the night to recharge batteries, by 9 a.m. the next day, 26 April, AE2 was able to complete its passage of the Dardanelles and gained the wider spaces of the Sea of Marmara. For the next four days AE2 remained at large within waters which then formed vital lines of internal communication for the Turks. It several times made torpedo attacks on vessels—both warships and freighters— which were encountered, although without succeeding in sinking any of these. The submarine was itself frequently forced to take evasive action against small enemy craft which attacked it, since it lacked a gun with which to defend itself. On the morning of 29 April AE2 was joined off Kara Burnu (at the western end of Artaki Bay) by E14, a British submarine commanded by Lieut.-Commander Edward Boyle, which had followed the Australian boat in making the difficult passage. An arrangement was made to rendezvous again at 10 a.m. the next day, before Stoker took his vessel to a bay north of Marmara Island where the night was spent resting on the bottom. When AE2 arrived at the rendezvous point the next morning, 30 April, it was approached by a torpedo-boat (Sultan Hissar) and forced to dive. At about 10.30 a.m. the submarine inexplicably lost trim, its nose suddenly rising to break the surface about 1.5 kilometres from its original pursuer and a gunboat which had come to its assistance. An attempt to dive became uncontrollable, and efforts to arrest what had become an alarming plummet only led to the submarine again bursting to the surface stern first. Enemy fire quickly holed the engine room, and with no ability to either resist or escape Stoker considered that he had no choice but to scuttle the vessel. After ordering his men onto the deck to be taken off by the Turkish

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

104

torpedo-boat, he took action to flood AE2’s tanks and send it to the bottom in 55 fathoms some 5.5 kilometres north of Kara Burnu at 10.45 a.m. The twenty-man crew became prisoners of the Turks for the next three years. Although AE2 had caused little real damage before being sunk, its penetration of the Dardanelles was of immense psychological importance both for the Turks and the Allies—and notwithstanding that the feat was quickly duplicated by Boyle’s boat, and also E11 commanded by Lieut.-Commander Martin Nasmith. Although the next two submarines were far more effective in disrupting Turkish maritime traffic, the fact is that Stoker’s presence in the Sea of Marmara undoubtedly began that process. Strangely, though, while Boyle and Nasmith were both immediately awarded the Victoria Cross and promoted for their exploits, Stoker’s achievement was recognised with only the Distinguished Service Order, belatedly awarded in 1919. The success of AE2 in getting through had also played an indirect part in influencing the army operation at Gallipoli, being specifically mentioned on 26 April by General Sir Ian Hamilton, the commander of the army expedition, in refusing to countenance proposals from subordinates that his force should be immediately taken back off the peninsula. Although Hamilton had already made his decision to stay, the news of the Australian boat’s success helped to lighten the gloom of events immediately following the Gallipoli landing. Robert Rhodes James (1974) Gallipoli, London: Pan Books; T.R. Frame & G.J. Swinden (1990) First In, Last Out: The Navy at Gallipoli, Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press

Baby 700, a height at the extreme northeastern angle of the Allied beach-head gained at Anzac (q.v.) in April 1915, became the scene of a major attack by Australian and New Zealand troops on 2 May 1915. Because this feature—in many respects the key to the

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

105

April–May 1915

The Nek

Rid

ge

Hi

ll

Baby 700

Po pe ’s

Ru sse ll’s

To p

Wa lke r’s

Quinn’s Post Plugge’s Plateau

JOHNSTON’S JOLLY

LONE PINE

Anzac positions

0

500

Turkish positions

1000 metres

Anzac position—was in Turkish hands and enabled the enemy to dominate movement along the valley between the first and second line of ridges inland from the beach, the commander of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Lieut.-General Sir William Birdwood) decided that it must be captured. He therefore ordered an attack by the New Zealand & Australian Division, with the Australian 4th Brigade (Colonel John Monash) climbing the southern slopes while the New Zealand Infantry Brigade scaled those on the western side, the movement of both brigades being preceded by a combined naval and artillery bombardment. While the Australians went forward at the appointed time of 7.15 p.m. with great gusto, the New Zealanders were delayed during their approach march and were not ready to attack until 90 minutes later. With a tremendous volume of enemy fire sweeping their unsupported left flank, the Australians became pinned down, and by the time the

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

105

New Zealanders joined in they, too, could make no progress. Further efforts to carry out the plan were made during the night, but these proved futile. At dawn some British Marines were also pushed into the fight on the western slopes in a final useless attempt. No accurate tally of casualties was made (or was possible, particularly among the New Zealanders), but it is estimated that about 1,000 men were lost in this action. The effort was wholly in vain, as the crucial apex of Baby 700 stayed in enemy hands for the rest of the campaign. C.E.W. Bean (1921) The Story of Anzac, vol.1, Sydney: Angus & Robertson; Christopher Pugsley (1984) Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story, Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton

Krithia, a Greek village situated seven kilometres from the toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula at Cape Helles and lying at the base of the peak named Achi Baba, was on 8 May 1915 the scene of an attack undertaken by the Australian 2nd Infantry Brigade under Colonel James M’Cay. To assist British forces attempting to advance against growing Turkish opposition to the beach-head established there on 25 April, two brigades— the Australian 2nd and the New Zealand—were transferred from Anzac and brought ashore on 6 May. Both this day and the next the Anzac troops watched French and British forces attempt to advance across the open ground leading to Achi Baba, before the New Zealanders were added to the struggle on the morning of 8 May. When this latest attempt also gained little ground, yet another attack was ordered for 5.30 that same afternoon—this time with the Australians taking part in the centre. No advance warning of involvement was received in the brigade until shortly before 5 p.m. when the order arrived, at which time M’Cay was away visiting the New Zealanders and his men were preparing their evening meal. Despite this inadequate notice, the troops were in position to join in the assault, as required. After advancing over open ground

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

106

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Image rights unavailable

The dead of the 2nd Brigade lie in no-man’s-land following the attack at Krithia on 8 May. Source: Australian War Memorial C1079

under fire to reach the leading trenches occupied by British soldiers, within minutes the Australians were called out from this shelter by their brigadier to continue the advance. Pressing on under increasingly heavy fire from enemy small arms and artillery, the Australians covered another 500 metres before being forced to a standstill by their losses. The leading Turkish positions could be observed only some 400 metres ahead, but the village of Krithia was still some 2,000 metres away. The hour-long advance entailed by this attempt had cost 2nd Brigade 1,000 casualties, or one-third of its strength. C.E.W. Bean (1924) The Story of Anzac, vol.2, Sydney: Angus & Robertson

Kurna, fought between British and Turkish forces on the Tigris River, Mesopotamia (modern Iraq), on 31 May–1 June 1915. The 6th (Poona) Division of the Indian Army, commanded by Major-General Charles Townshend, undertook a risky frontal assault against the fortified Turkish position which— because of seasonal flooding—stood out of the river’s marshy flats like a string of islands.

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

106

Because of this, Townshend was obliged to embark two of his infantry brigades in some 500 pole-propelled Arab barges called ‘bellums’, which had been armoured with captured steel railway plates. Supporting mountain guns and machine-guns were also mounted on rafts, while heavier artillery were placed aboard accompanying barges and steamers. The sight presented by this curious fleet subsequently caused the battle to be referred to as ‘Townshend’s Regatta’. The operation was a signal success which cost the Turks two gunboats sunk, and seventeen guns and 2,000 men taken as prisoners. Despite the elaborate nature of the works they had been occupying for five months, the bewildered defenders mostly fled after attempting ‘only the merest appearance at a fight’. The Turkish collapse was so dramatic that Townshend’s personal appearance in a gunboat at Amara (145 kilometres upstream) on 2 June was sufficient to bluff the garrison there into surrendering, too, without a shot being fired. The Australian involvement in the action was in the form of several pilots, members of the 45-man detachment of the Australian

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

107

May–August 1915 Flying Corps serving with the composite unit known as ‘Mesopotamian Flight, Royal Flying Corps’. These partly crewed two aircraft which reconnoitred from a landing ground south of Kurna and brought vital and timely information to Townshend’s headquarters regarding the battle’s progress, including news on 1 June that the Turks were abandoning their main position at Bahran Island. They also dropped 20-pound aerial bombs on targets of opportunity and added to the confusion of the enemy’s withdrawal. F.M. Cutlack (1923) The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War 1914– 1918, Sydney: Angus & Robertson; T.W. White (1928) Guests of the Unspeakable, Sydney: Angus & Robertson

Second Wassa, the second riotous outbreak in the Haret el Wassa (the brothel quarter of Cairo, Egypt), occurred on 31 July 1915 before the departure of the AIF 2nd Division for the Gallipoli Peninsula. As with the First Wassa (q.v.), this incident also involved several thousand troops, nearly all Australians although a few British and New Zealand soldiers were present, and again its origins apparently lay in disagreements with some of the Wassa’s prostitutes. Here, too, matters were aggravated by the appearance of military police (MPs) and pickets, both British and Australian, and the fire brigade. MPs attempting to disperse the crowd were beaten back with rocks, bricks, bottles and other missiles, but eventually about 100 gained the upper hand by working their way along the street from both ends simultaneously. A special court of inquiry was convened on 3 August, and at least after this incident attempts were made to provide alternative recreational outlets for military personnel stationed in the Cairo area. The significance of the two riots is open to varying interpretations. The official historian, Charles Bean, saw little difference from ‘what at Oxford and Cambridge and in Australian universities is known as a “rag” ’,

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

107

but for others such as Bill Gammage both incidents ‘betrayed some of the worst aspects of Australian character’. Bill Gammage (1974) The Broken Years, Canberra: Australian National University Press; Suzanne Brugger (1980) Australians and Egypt 1914–1919, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press; Kevin Fewster, ‘The Wazza Riots, 1915’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, no.4, April 1984

Lone Pine, an action fought on the southern flank of the Anzac (q.v.) position at Gallipoli on 6–9 August 1915, which has become famous as a glorious débâcle. The operation was planned purely as a diversion aimed at drawing Turkish reserves away from a major attack to be launched from the northern end of the perimeter (see Hill 971). It involved the Australian 1st Brigade dashing across the lower half of a wide flat hump known as the 400 Plateau and seizing a network of trenches along its eastern edge. In preparation for the assault, the intended objective was pounded by slow artillery shoots at intervals over the preceding three days. At 4.30 p.m. on 6 August the rate of fire of the guns was increased, and an hour later the troops scrambled out of the trenches in which they had assembled and rushed forward with the setting sun behind them. They were virtually upon the enemy positions before the Turks were able to bring effective fire to bear, but only now discovered that the trenches were roofed over with pine logs which prevented their entry. While some began tearing at the logs to create openings through which to get at their opponents, the majority continued on past the main parapet to the open communication trenches in the rear. Most men jumped down into these and began fighting back towards the covered firing line, using mainly their bayonets to deal with the enemy garrison as they went. A few went on further still, until they stumbled into a depression known as the Cup which sheltered the enemy’s battalion headquarters and support units. Here they were stopped by Turkish troops who quickly

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

108

The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles

Image rights unavailable

Men of the 3rd Battalion pictured at 4 p.m. on 6 August while waiting for the start of the assault on Lone Pine. The white armbands and patches were to help distinguish friendly troops once darkness fell. Source: Australian War Memorial G1124

came up to hold this ground. While the attack had achieved its primary goal within half an hour of its commencement, the Australians now in possession of the main Turkish trench-line found themselves in a desperate struggle to maintain their hold. Parties of the troops quickly threw up sandbag barricades to block any enemy approach along communication trenches or continuations of the trenches they were manning. As darkness fell the Turks made their first attempt to push the Australians out using hand grenades, and this effort continued without relent for the next three days. So fierce was the fighting which followed that the 1st Brigade and the 3rd which reinforced it suffered 2,277 casualties; Turkish losses were claimed as 5,000. Seven Victoria Crosses were awarded for this battle. Even though the Australians still held the ground they had won when fighting here subsided on 10 August, in every other respect the battle was a disaster. Apart from being immensely costly as a feint, it had actually succeeded in drawing towards this sector of

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

108

the line major Turkish reinforcements. But as soon as the enemy realised that these were not needed at Lone Pine they were readily at hand to deal with the main British attack as this developed—thereby helping to frustrate the overall plan behind the August offensive. C.E.W. Bean (1924) The Story of Anzac, vol.2, Sydney: Angus & Robertson

The Nek, a narrow saddle running east–west between the ridgeline known as Russell’s Top and Baby 700—the strongest position at Anzac (q.v.)—which was the scene of a tragic assault on 7 August 1915 by Australian lighthorsemen fighting as infantry. Passage over this strip of ground was barred by opposing Turkish and Australian trenches, which faced each other at distances varying from 20 to 60 metres; the edges of both firing lines fell away at each side to the valley floor 150 metres below. Behind the Turkish front-line, moreover, were eight more trenches rising in tiers to the summit of Baby 700, so that annihilating fire could be brought to bear upon any movement not

1-22-02, 1:37 PM

109

August 1915 just from rifles but no fewer than five groups of machine-guns. In ordering a feint to be launched here at dawn the day after Lone Pine (q.v.), aimed at ensuring that Turkish attention continued to be focused on the main Anzac position rather than on activities underway further north (see Hill 971), British commanders were not unmindful of the futility of attacking ‘unaided’. The assault was therefore planned to proceed only after supporting movements had taken place, designed to silence some of the enemy machine-guns or draw off fire while the attack went in. In the event, these other operations either failed or were delayed, so that at the time designated for the attempt the 3rd Light Horse Brigade received no relief from any of them. To make matters worse, an intense artillery barrage that was to begin half an hour before the troops attacked at 4.30 a.m. was mistimed due to the synchronisation of watches having been overlooked. The barrage ended seven minutes earlier than expected, and the Turks were given ample opportunity to recover and re-occupy their parapets. Accordingly, when the first assault line of 150 men rose to the attack—the ground being so narrow that there was no room for more—most fell dead or wounded before they had covered ten metres under the withering fire directed at them. Three more waves were sent forward at intervals and each met the same fate. Since no-one in the later assault lines can have doubted the outcome, there were poignant scenes as men farewelled each other while they waited for the order to attack. By 5.15 a.m. some 300 men of the 8th and 10th Light Horse regiments lay in a huddled mass within an area no larger than a tennis court. In the words of the Official History: At first here and there a man raised his arm to the sky, or tried to drink from his waterbottle. But as the sun of that burning day climbed higher, such

M7.38517_NEWAUSTBATTSPAGES_F2

109

movement ceased. Over the whole summit the figures lay still in the quivering heat.

At most, the bo