The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law
Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development General Editor
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The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law
Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development General Editor
David Freestone This series publishes work on all aspects of the international legal dimensions of the concept of sustainable development. Its aim is to publish important works of scholarship on a range of relevant issues including conservation of natural resources, climate change, biodiversity loss and the role of international agreements, international organizations and state practice.
VOLUME 10
The titles published in this series are listed at the back of this volume, and also at: www.brill.nl/lasd
The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law By
Julio Barboza
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011
This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Barboza, Julio. The environment, risk and liability in international law / by Julio Barboza. p. cm. -- (Legal aspects of sustainable development, 1875-0923 ; v. 10) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-18878-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Liability (Law) 2. Government liability (International law) 3. Environmental law, International. I. Title. K579.L5B368 2010 344.04’6--dc22 2010039518
ISSN 1875-0923 ISBN 978 90 04 18878 5 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
To my grandchildren, Pedro, Santiago and last but not least, Violeta.
Contents Series Editor’s Preface ...............................................................................xiii Preface .........................................................................................................xv Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... xix Table of Cases ............................................................................................ xxi Table of Treaties....................................................................................... xxiii Chapter I: Introduction .............................................................................. 1 1. Liability and Redress for Lawful Activities Entailing Risk ............................ 1 2. What Is International Liability About?............................................................. 3 3. Liability and Preventive Measures .................................................................... 4 4. Liability Regimes ................................................................................................. 4 4.1. Requirements to Establish Liability .......................................................... 5 4.2. Available Remedies ..................................................................................... 6 4.3. The Role of Fault ......................................................................................... 6 (a) Exceptions to Liability ........................................................................ 6 (b) Criteria to Determine Compensation .............................................. 7 5. Acts and Activities .............................................................................................. 7 6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 8 Chapter II: Risk and Harm, Prevention and Liability ................................ 9 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 9 2. The Concept of Risk ............................................................................................ 9 3. The Concepts of Harm and Damage ..............................................................10 3.1. The Threshold of Harm ............................................................................10 3.2. Causality and Harm.. ................................................................................11 4. Activities Entailing Risk (hazardous activities) vs. Activities that Cause Harm ...............................................................................................12 5. The Relationship Between Liability and “Prevention” and the Influence of Risk .........................................................................................14 6. The Obligation to Prevent and Abate Significant Harm as a Complement to Liability ...........................................................................15 6.1. Prevention Obligations to Abate Harm and to Minimize Risk ......................................................................................15 (a) Risk Assessment ................................................................................15 (b) Notification and Information ..........................................................17 (c) Consultations and Balance of Interests. .........................................18 7. Conclusion .........................................................................................................18
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Chapter III: Responsibility and Liability in International Law ............... 21 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................21 2. Responsibility and Liability in International Law.........................................21 2.1. Responsibility and Liability: the Use of Both Terms ............................22 2.2. More on the Meaning of Certain Terms ................................................24 (a) Objective Liability .............................................................................24 (b) Strict Liability ....................................................................................25 (c) Absolute Liability ..............................................................................26 (d) Sine delicto Liability ..........................................................................26 (e) Responsabilité pour risque (Risk Liability) .....................................26 3. Liability Governed by Primary Norms...........................................................27 4. Distinctive Features of Liability.......................................................................28 5. Conclusions........................................................................................................28 Chapter IV: Conventional Law ................................................................. 31 1. Civil Liability Regimes in International Law .................................................31 2. Common Features of Conventional Law .......................................................32 2.1. Identification of Liable Parties: Channelling of Liability .....................32 2.2. Flexibility of Causal Links .......................................................................33 (a) Multiple Causation ...........................................................................34 (b) Scientific Uncertainty .......................................................................34 (c) Intertemporal Harm .........................................................................34 2.3. Liability.......................................................................................................35 2.4. Liability Caps .............................................................................................36 2.5. Layered Liability and Compensation Funds .........................................37 2.6. State Liability .............................................................................................38 2.7. The Obligation to Contract Insurance ...................................................39 2.8. Limited Exceptions to Liability ...............................................................40 3. Conclusion .........................................................................................................41 Chapter V: Other Aspects of International Practice ................................ 45 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................45 2. Reparation of Transboundary Harm Caused by Hazardous Activities ....................................................................................45 3. Some Cases to the Point ...................................................................................46 3.1. A Seminal Decision: the Trail Smelter Case (a Noxious Activity Transformed into a Hazardous One?) ....................................47 3.2. Cases of Wrongful Conduct for Lack of Due Diligence ......................50 (a) The Alabama Case.............................................................................50 (b) The Corfu Channel Case ..................................................................51 (c) The Sandoz Chemical Accident.......................................................52
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3.3. Invocation of a Treaty and of a General Principle of Law ...................53 (a) The Gut Dam Case ............................................................................53 (b) The Cherry Point Oil Spill, 1972 .....................................................54 (c) The “Cosmos” Incident.....................................................................54 3. 4. Ex-gratia and Other Payments or Government Commitments ........55 (a) Nuclear Tests in the Marshall Islands .............................................55 (b) Rongelap Atoll ...................................................................................55 (c) The Fukuyu Maru Fishing Vessel ....................................................56 (d) The River Mura Incident ..................................................................57 (e) The Colorado River Salinity Dispute ..............................................57 (f) The Tanker Juliana, 1971 ..................................................................58 (g) The Japanese Ship Showa Maru, 1975 ............................................58 3.5. Reservation of Rights and Invocation of Responsibility: Other Cases ....................................................................58 (a) France-Switzerland Border, 1892 ....................................................58 (b) Arcisate, Italy .....................................................................................58 (c) The Beaufort Sea Prospection .........................................................59 (d) A Mexican Highway .........................................................................59 (e) The Rose Street Canal .......................................................................59 (f) French and American Nuclear Tests in the Pacific and the Cannikin Nuclear Test in Alaska ..............................................59 (g) Peyton Packing and Casuco, 1961 ..................................................59 (h) A Belgian Refinery ............................................................................60 (i) Nuclear Reactor in Dukovany .........................................................60 3.6. The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) ................60 3.7. The IXTOC I blowout ..............................................................................61 4. Some Conclusions on the Cases Examined ...................................................62 5. Transboundary Damage in International Law: the Role of the State ..........................................................................................64 5.1. Learned Opinion.......................................................................................64 (a) Doctrines in Favor of the Existence or Emergence of a Principle of Liability Sine Delicto ............................................64 (i) The Abuse of Rights Doctrine. .................................................64 (ii) Ultra-Hazardous Activities: the Protection of the Environment........................................................................65 (b) Positions Contrary to Liability ........................................................68 6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................71 Chapter VI: The Development of the Subject at the International Law Commission. ................................................................. 73 1. Introduction.....................................................................................................73
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2. How the Commission Works ........................................................................74 2.1. The Line Followed by the Commission .............................................75 3. The Successive Drafts .....................................................................................78 4. Quentin-Baxter’s Conception........................................................................78 5. The Issues of the Subject ................................................................................81 5.1. Prevention..............................................................................................81 5.2. Prevention and Liability on Different Heads ....................................82 5.3. Scope of the Topic.................................................................................83 (a) Physical Consequences .................................................................83 (b) Situations ........................................................................................83 (c) The Environment ...........................................................................84 (d) Activities of Harmful Effects (Activities that Cause Damages) ............................................................................85 (e) Harm to the Global Commons ....................................................87 (f) The List of Activities ......................................................................88 6. Attribution (of Acts or of Consequences?) to the State .............................89 6.1. Attribution and Appreciable Risk .......................................................90 7. The Balance of Interests Test .........................................................................91 8. The Risk ............................................................................................................92 9. Harm (damage) ...............................................................................................95 9.1. The Items of Compensable Damage...................................................97 9.2. The Threshold of Damage....................................................................99 10. Liability ...........................................................................................................102 10.1. Why Civil Liability..............................................................................103 11. The Principles ................................................................................................104 12. The Three Stages Corresponding to the First and Second Special Rapporteurs ........................................................................106 12.1. Quentin-Baxter’s Schematic Outline................................................107 (a) Prevention ....................................................................................107 (b) Liability .........................................................................................107 (c) Overview of the Outline .............................................................107 12.2. The Regime of the Second Special Rapporteur’s Tenth Report ........................................................................................108 13. The 1996 Working Group ............................................................................109 14. The 1996 Draft ...............................................................................................110 14.1. The scope of the Topic........................................................................110 14.2. The Principles ......................................................................................111 (a) The Principle of Prevention: Freedom of Action of States and the Limits Thereto ...................................111 (b) Liability .........................................................................................112
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(c) The Principle of Non-Discrimination and the Domestic Channel ................................................................114 14.3. Interstate Negotiations .......................................................................115 14.4. The Unity of the Subject: the Title ...................................................116 15. Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................116 Chapter VII. The Development in the International Law Commission: Consideration of the Topic since 1997. ...... 119 1. The 1997 Group.............................................................................................119 2. The Scope of the Topic .................................................................................120 2.1. The 1996 Articles: Hazardous Activities ............................................120 2.2. The List of Activities .............................................................................120 3. The Principles ................................................................................................121 3.1. The Principles in the 1996 Draft .........................................................121 3.2. Later Developments .............................................................................121 4. The Principle of Prevention .........................................................................122 4.1. Later Developments in the Specific Obligations of Prevention: Defining their Legal Nature ...........................................122 (a) Impact Assessment .......................................................................123 (b) Procedure in the Absence of Notification..................................123 (c) Giving Information to the Public ...............................................124 (d) Consultation ..................................................................................124 (e) Emergency Preparedness .............................................................124 (f) Settlement of Disputes ..................................................................124 (g) Non-Discrimination .....................................................................124 5. Liability...........................................................................................................125 5.1. The Attack on Liability .........................................................................125 5.2. The Resurrection of Liability ...............................................................128 6. The Articles on Allocation of Loss..............................................................129 6.1. The Report of the 2004 Working Group ............................................132 6.2. The Scope of the Articles .....................................................................132 6.3. The Concept of Damage ......................................................................132 (a) The Threshold ................................................................................133 (b) Damage to Persons and Property ...............................................133 (c) Environmental Damage ...............................................................134 (d) The Injured Party ..........................................................................136 (e) The Intrinsic Value of the Environment ....................................137 6.4. Reparation .............................................................................................138 6.5. Paragraphs (iv) and (v) ........................................................................144 6.6. The Core Principles ..............................................................................145
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6.7. Response Measures...............................................................................147 6.8. International and Domestic Remedies ..............................................148 6.9. “Should”s and “shall”s ...........................................................................150 6.10. Development of Specific International Regimes ..............................151 6.11. Implementation.....................................................................................151 7. Present Status of Both “Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities” and “Allocation of Loss in the Case of Such Harm”..................................................................................152 Chapter VIII: Conclusions ...................................................................... 153 1. The Issue ...........................................................................................................153 2. Risk....................................................................................................................154 3. The Role of the State in the Management of Risk .......................................156 4. The Balance of Interests Test..........................................................................158 5. The Articles of the International Law Commission ...................................159 6. Parting Thoughts .............................................................................................160 Annexes Annex I: Schematic Outline ...........................................................................161 Annex II: Text of the Draft Articles Provisionally Adopted by the Commission Before 1996. ...............................................................168 Annex III: Articles on Liability Proposed in the Tenth Report of the Special Raporteur, Mr Julio Barboza.......................................173 Annex IV: Draft Articles Proposed by the 1996 Working Group. ................176 Annex V: Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001 Articles).................................................................182 Annex VI: Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities. .....189 Bibliography ..........................................................................................................193 Index ......................................................................................................................199
Series Editor’s Preface I am pleased to include this work by Professor Julio Barboza as the tenth volume in the Martinus Nijhoff series on Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development published under my general editorship. The aim of this series is to publish works at the cutting edge of legal scholarship that address both the practical and the theoretical aspects of this important concept. Professor Barboza’s very lucid exposition of the basic concepts of risk, harm, responsibility and liability under international law provides an excellent introduction to his consideration of relevant treaty law and state practice and of the work of the International Law Commission (ILC). The work also reproduces in its annexes some of the key texts adopted by the ILC on this subject. Professor Barboza is uniquely qualified to write on this. He is a former member of the International Law Commission and was from 1985 to 1996 its Second Rapporteur (after Professor Quentin-Baxter) on the issue of ‘International Liability For Injurious Consequences Arising Out Of Acts Not Prohibited By International Law.’ This work was completed a month before the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico from the BP drilling rig Deepwater Horizon. For that reason the Gulf incident is not referred to in this work, but it is worth recalling Barboza’s prescient words in his own Preface where he writes … ‘modern technologies have helped increase risks by introducing hazardous but socially useful activities and now nature itself feels the threat of human presence and action.’ Of course, in an era of anthropogenic induced climate change largely resulting from the unsustainable use of fossil fuels it is perhaps arguable whether oil drilling in very deep water constitutes a ‘socially useful activity’ within his definition, but the threat to nature and natural ecosystems that it poses have been demonstrated to us all too vividly. Deepwater Horizon shows us that this is a very real contemporary issue with which international law as well as national law needs to grapple. This volume provides us with the ideal tools to understand the issues more profoundly and the pointers as to what needs to be done in the future. David Freestone Washington DC
Preface Risk is, and has always been, an element of life—even in civilized society, where the individual lives with more protection from some of the threats of nature. In fact, modern technologies have helped increase risks by introducing hazardous but socially useful activities and now nature itself feels the threat of human presence and action. Hazardous but socially useful activities seem to belong to a grey area between legality and wrongfulness. They pose a problem to jurists and political leaders alike: is it legal to start an activity which may cause personal injury, and damage to property? That was the original question, but later on another was added regarding the common interests of Mankind: namely, is it legal to conduct an activity which is deleterious to the environment? From private to public interest, from individual concern to common concern—activities involving risk generate a growing preoccupation to our societies. Oliver W. Holmes put that question to himself and to his pupils in Lecture 1 at Harvard and gave us his answer: A man has an animal of known ferocious habits, which escapes and does his neighbor damage. He can prove that the animal escaped through no negligence of his, but still he is held liable. Why? It is, says the analytical jurist, because, although he was not negligent at the moment of escape, he was guilty of remote heedlessness, or negligence, or fault, in having such a creature at all. And one by whose fault damage is done ought to pay for it.1
That position is acceptable to those who believe that nothing but fault justifies responsibility, and here fault is something in the style of an original sin—a sort of fault which, by virtue of the damage caused, transforms itself from potential to actual. All this is, of course, a matter of controversy, but it is a fact that domestic legal systems accept the legality of hazardous activities on certain conditions, to wit, that all reasonable and available means or prevention should be employed by somebody or some entity deemed responsible for the operation of the activity, and that such person or entity should also be liable for compensating victims of damage. This relatively new type of accountability has been considered by some as a new form of liability—namely, a liability without fault—and by others as something different from the classical concept of responsibility—that is, a guarantee given by the person or entity conducting 1
O.W.Holmes, Jr. The Common Law (Lecture 1), Boston, 1881, p. 6.
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a hazardous activity as a pre-condition for its legality. Be that as it may—and the issue is dealt with in this book rather extensively—that legal technique of reparation for damage has been called something equivalent to “responsibility for risk”2 in most of the countries of civil law tradition and “strict liability” or “absolute liability” in Anglo-American law. René Lefeber calls it “sine delicto liability,” because the legal consequences of damage caused by hazardous activities follow without the breach of any obligation, and that is the name that we consider the most appropriate for it. There is a certain consensus among international lawyers, however, that general international law does not as yet admit such type of liability, whereas some others within that majority group believe that sine delicto liability, even if not a rule of positive law, is an emerging principle of general international law. But, on the contrary, conventional international law gives a considerable number of examples of such liability. And it is in the legal system created by those conventions where lies the close relationship of sine delicto liability with the protection of the environment: most conventions where such “liability” is applied have the protection of the environment as their main object and purpose. In general, those conventions regulate the risk to the environment inherent to a specific activity—like, for instance, the Conventions on nuclear activities, or the conventions referring to oil pollution, or those others regulating the risks created by activities in special regions, like Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antartic Treaty. Most of them are civil liability conventions—that is, intergovernmental agreements establishing liability on individuals under the domestic law of a State, either the State of origin (the normal situation) or some other State (normally, the affected State). There is one convention, the Convention on Space Objects, where sine delicto liability and responsibility for wrongful acts are exclusively centered on the State. That was due to the fact that the Parties to that Convention considered that only States should be in charge of spatial activities. In other instruments, like in the Paris Convention on nuclear liability, there is a subsidiary State liability and still in others there is no State participation. The point that we would like to make is that one of the important instruments of environment protection is sine delicto liability, as may easily be deduced from a quick glance at Chapter IV (Conventional Law). This is also the reason why we have submitted the present work to be included in a collection on sustainable development. Obviously, sustainable development is a key element in the protection of the environment and everything concerning
2
Or, better, sine delicto liability, since it is incurred without breach of obligation.
Preface
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environment protection is of high importance to sustainable development. We trust, therefore, that the present book will be useful to better understand why protocols on liability and redress are appended to most of the multilateral conventions on environment protection. The developments in the International Law Commission in relation to the topic of “International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law” will help to understand the doctrines behind sine delicto liability and also explain some of the circumstances surrounding the international debate on the codification and progressive development of the law in this field, as well as the difficulties surrounding the adoption by the international community of a general legal regulation of risk in international law.
Acknowledgments I would like to acknowledge here the invaluable help that in many ways I received from Soledad Aguilar, whose opinions and good judgment I consulted constantly. She had a special participation in Chapters II and IV. I would also like to render tribute to Professor Quentin Quentin-Baxter, who managed to keep his newborn subject alive in the International Law Commission, in spite of adverse circumstances.
Table of Cases Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain vs. France), 12 UNRRIA 281 (1957) (pp. 18, 52, 124) Alabama case. J.B. Moore: History and Digest of International Arbitrations, 1898, V.1, pp. 494 sqq. (p. 50) Chorzow Factory Case, PCIJ. Series A, Nº 17, 1928, pp. 47 sqq. (pp. 3, 47, 72, 100, 138, 139, 158) Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom vs.Albania), Judgment of April 9, 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, pp. 4 sqq. (pp. 14, 47, 51/52, 55, 89, 146, 154) Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, ICJ Reports 1974, pp sqq. (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany vs. Iceland.), pp. 3 sqq. (p. 18) Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia) Judgment ICJ Reports 1997, pp. 7 sqq. (pp. 17, 18) Gut Dam Case (Canada vs. United States of America, 1968, Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal 1968, IELR I, pp. 386 sqq. (pp. 53) Island of Palmas (or Miangas) Case, United States of America vs. Neatherlands, UNRRIA v. 2, 1928, pp. 280 sqq. (pp. 154) Legality of the Threat and Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 96 sqq. (pp. 51/52) Nuclear Tests Case, Australia v. France, Interim Protection Order of 22 June, 1973, ICJ Reports (1973), pp. 99 sqq. (p. 52) Nuclear Tests Case, New Zealand v. France, Interim Protection Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Reports (1973), pp. 135 sqq. (p. 51) Lodge Holes Colliery Co v. Wednesbury Corporation (1908) AC 323, reversing the Court of Appeals (p. 141) Patmos Case, Messina Appeals Court, 1986 (p. 141) The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Zoe Colocotroni, United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1979 (p. 140)
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State of Ohio v. Department of Interior, United States Court of Appeals, DC Circuit (1989) (p. 143) Trail Smelter Case, United States of America vs. Canada, Judgment of March 11, 1941, UNRRIA Vol. 3, pp. 1905 sqq. (pp. 7-11-15/16- 47/50-122146-154)
Table of Treaties Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association, 1968 [p. 148] Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989 [p. 17] Basel Protocol to the Basel Convention on Liability and Compensation, 1999 [pp. 32, 35, 36, 38, 39] Bonn Agreement on Co-operation in Dealing with the Pollution of the North Sea by Oil (Bonn Agreement), 1969 [p. 17] Brussels Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 [p. 67] Id. (as amended by the 1992 Protocol) [pp. 35, 36, 39, 40] Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1968 [pp. 148/149] Brussels Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 1962 [p. 39] Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 1992 [pp. 16, 31] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 1996 [p. 5] Convention between the Unites States and Canada for the Settlement of Difficulties Arising from the Operation of Smelter at Trail, 1935 [pp. 47, 49] Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972 [p. 134] Convention for the Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 (Paris Convention) [pp. 32, 34, 36, 39, 40, 67, 102, 103] Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 1998 [p. 149] Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 [pp. 2, 16, 31] Convention on Civil Liability Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), 1989 [p. 32]
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Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment of 9 March 1993 (Lugano Convention) [pp. 32, 34, 35, 39, 40, 113, 149] Convention on Damage caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Rome, 1952 [pp. 32, 36, 67] Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention), 1991 [pp. 16, 115] Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Space Objects Convention), 1972 [pp. 5, 21, 32, 34, 36, 54, 67, 102, 113] Convention on the Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 1974 [p. 115] Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 [p. 13] Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA), 1991 [pp. 16, 39,101, 140] Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954 [p. 134] Hague Convention Nº VII, 1907 [p. 51] Joint Protocol to the Paris and Vienna Convention, 1988 [p. 32] International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (Fund Convention) [pp. 32, 34, 36–40] Kiev Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters, 2003 [p. 102] Kuwait Regional Convention for the Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 1978 [p. 16] London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from the Exploration for and Exploitation of Sea Bed Mineral Resources, 1967 [p. 67] Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1987 [p. 13] Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South-Pacific Region, 1986 [p. 16]
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OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 1992 [p. 149] Protocol of Environmental Protection to the Antartic Treaty, 1991 [pp. 16, 35, 36, 38] Rhine Chemical Pollution Convention, 1976 [p. 17] Rio de la Plata Treaty, between Argentina and Uruguay, 1973 [pp. 67, 102] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1963 [p. 5] Treaty Between the United States and Canada authorizing Canada to build up a Dam in the Gut Channel, 1903 [p. 53] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 1967 [p. 5] Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997 [p. 101] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [pp. 16, 39, 154] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 [p. 13] United States-Mexico Treaty for Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman (Texas) to the Gulf of Mexico, 1944 [p. 57] Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 [pp. 5, 32, 34, 36, 38-40, 67, 102, 113]
Chapter I
Introduction 1. Liability and Redress for Lawful Activities Entailing Risk This book deals with the legal consequences of hazardous activities carried out in the jurisdiction or under the control of a State when those hazardous activities cause, or threaten to cause, transboundary harm. In international law, reparation is allowed when wrongful acts of States cause transboundary damages.1 In many domestic legal orders, reparation is also allowed—even if no fault intervenes. Mostly, such damaging acts fall within a framework of activities involving a certain level of risk2—that is, activities where there is a well-founded prediction that, somewhere down the line, damages, even important or catastrophic damages, would occur despite taking all reasonable precautions. Domestic legal orders permit those risky activities when they are socially beneficial, and the benefits they provide outweigh the foreseeable damages. Modern technologies have given origin to activities of great risk—for example, like inter alia nuclear or space activities or the transportation and disposal of dangerous wastes, which menace the persons, properties or environment in other States. That is why States have entered into bilateral and multilateral treaties in order to regulate some of those activities with regimes of sine delicto responsibility analogous to those of internal law. Some writers even maintain that, besides conventional regimes, there are principles of general international law imposing liability on certain type of activities (e.g., ultra-hazardous activities causing damages to the environment). During its examination of State responsibility for wrongful acts, the International Law Commission (ILC) came across the issue of responsibility for acts not prohibited by international law and decided to create a new topic
1
2
Cf. Art. 31 of the International Law Commission attached to United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res. 56/83. Compensation may also be in order for some acts or activities not involving risk, but those cases are a small minority.
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, pp. 1–8. © 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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apart from that of responsibility for wrongful acts. So the ILC started to consider “International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law” in 1973 and completed its work in 2006. Codifying such a topic presented many difficulties: even if a pattern is becoming increasingly discernible in bilateral and multilateral treaties that apply forms of risk liability to hazardous activities, customary international law is yet not fully developed in the field.3 The International Law Commission did not reach a consensus on a text for more than 30 years because of the inherent difficulties that the topic presented. The ILC eventually split the topic into “prevention” and “allocation of loss” and finally delivered drafts to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. These drafts have helped clarify ideas in the field. The works of the International Law Commission merit special attention, then, regarding both ex delicto responsibility and sine delicto liability. Regarding ex delicto responsibility, the ILC and the General Assembly have almost exclusively developed and codified the law up to now. Regarding sine delicto liability, some other groups have contributed to the development of the law—either by drafting conventions, reports or other instruments or by engaging in theoretical elaborations.4 In the International Law Commission’s parlance, thereafter generalized in the UN and among writers and international jurists, “responsibility” and “liability” became shorthand, respectively, for “State responsibility for wrongful acts” and for “international liability for acts not prohibited by international law,” independent of the technical meaning “responsibility” and “liability” have in Anglo-American law. In this book we shall employ the UN language. Finally, the relationship between “liability” and “responsibility” shall be thoroughly examined in these pages, since the idea that liability was simply part and parcel of responsibility has posed an obstacle to the correct understanding of liability’s legal nature. But first, one must start by distinguishing
3
4
Basically, risk liability (responsabilité pour risque of the French Law) is a sine delicto liability, since no breach of obligation is required. For example, inter alia, conventions and/or reports from the Council of Europe, the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Outer Space Committee and UN Environment Programme (UNEP); or from international organizations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or working within the framework of multilateral regimes like the Basel Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Climate Change Convention, as well as groups like the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and various non-government organisations (NGOs).
Introduction
3
“international liability” from other accountability mechanisms in international law. 2. What Is International Liability About? The most important feature of international liability is that compensation for transboundary damage is allowed even if no international obligation has been breached: only causation is relevant. Moreover, there is no act of the State if damage is caused by private persons. Liability is focused on the increased risk inherent to hazardous activities which, notwithstanding their nature, are permitted because of the social benefit they bring about. The transportation of oil by sea, the off-shore exploitation of oil, the production of energy (in particular, of nuclear energy), the transportation of nuclear materials, the launch of objects to outer space, the transportation of dangerous wastes (or other noxious substances) are among the examples of hazardous activities5 requiring liability regimes. Considerations of a pragmatic nature may prevail in their legal regulation. Liability helps ensure prompt reparation for damages caused—an impossible achievement if fault (culpa) has to be proved. Besides, if the economic viability of beneficial activities is to be preserved, reparation may fall short of the integral restitution established by the Chorzow Factory decision.6 Distributive justice demands that damages caused by such activities be internalized—that is, imposed on the persons who conduct them or most benefit from them— and not fall on victims alien to the enterprise or those who benefit little or not at all. Furthermore, liability channelled towards operators can help transfer costs to society at large because they may be in the best position to bear liability by increasing the price of their products. Also, private companies may find it in their best interests to provide an industry funding for damage caused by hazardous activities even if they did not directly cause the damage. Summing up, liability is part of a regime seeking to regulate certain socially useful but hazardous activities so that they continue being economically viable in spite of the damages they cause—without imposing undue burdens on victims or deteriorating the environment. 5
6
The handling and transport of genetically modified living organisms are also included by some authors among hazardous activities. Chorzow Factory Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, pp. 47-48. According to the famous ICJ Chorzow Factory decision, when there is “responsibility,” reparation must be in full (restitutio in integrum). In “liability,” there may be thresholds and caps to be more pragmatic.
4
Chapter I
3. Liability and Preventive Measures Experience shows that risk minimization up front is usually more effective than reparation after the fact. In the absence of a conventional legal regime, if the costs of preventive measures are borne by risk-bearers, those who benefit from the hazardous activity may be liberated from such costs. As such, the balance of interests between the State of origin and the injured State is affected.7 4. Liability Regimes Many conventions protecting the environment apply responsibility to States. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) are usually cited as legal basis justifying compensation for damages to the environment.8 The International Court of Justice, in its 1996 advisory opinion on nuclear tests, recognized that the general obligation of States to ensure that activities subject to their jurisdiction or control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national jurisdiction is already part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.9 These principles, which give legal ground to responsibility for environment protection may also indirectly be the basis of protective liability techniques. The present writer is of the opinion that the application of those principles should not be limited to the environment, since they find their original source in a still more general principle—that of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas10— which places a limit to the use and enjoyment of property. 7
8
9
10
The “polluter pays” principle, as will be seen, is not unanimously accepted as positive international law. It was born as a principle applicable in the field of environmental law placing costs of prevention of environmental harm on the polluter and was later extended to encompass compensation for damage caused by pollution. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration [11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)] Principle 21 reads: “States have, in accordance to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” The 1992 Rio Declaration from the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) replicates this principle as principle 2, adding a reference to development policies. International Court of Justice advisory opinion for the UN General Assembly on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996), para. 29, www.icj-cij.org. “So use your own as not to injure another’s property.”
Introduction
5
4.1. Requirements to Establish Liability The basic requirements to trigger liability are the occurrence of damage and a link of causality between such damage and a lawful activity entailing risk carried out under the jurisdiction or control of a State.11 The essentials of a liability regime would be that: a) A hazardous activity takes place within the jurisdiction or control of a State. b) The occurrence of damage is deemed significant.12 Moreover, there is also a threshold combining risk and harm: the International Law Commission’s articles may consider a legal activity “hazardous” (and, therefore, its risk is deemed relevant to liability) spanning from a high probability of causing significant harm13 to a low probability of causing disastrous harm c) The level of acceptable risk may determine whether a regime of liability or one of State responsibility is needed to regulate a certain activity. Activities exceeding the maximum threshold of acceptable risk may be prohibited and may fall under State responsibility if they are carried on despite the prohibition. Examples include nuclear weapons in outer space, prohibited by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, prohibited by the 1963 Test-Ban Treaty;14 and any nuclear test, according to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.15 In those cases, a regime of prohibitions was imposed, the breach of which would justify corresponding consequences under a responsibility regime.16
11
12 13
14
15
16
For example, see the UN Liability Convention on Space Objects and the Paris and Vienna Nuclear Conventions. The latter two conventions include a subsidiary liability of the State in certain cases. “Control” does not mean “control of the activity”, it means “control of a territory”; the word “jurisdiction” refers to a lawful control and therefore would not be applicable to the case of an illegal domination—for instance, the situation of what was then South West Africa under the control of South Africa. The issue of thresholds will be further analyzed in Chapter II. “Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities,” Art.2.c. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. Signed by the Original Parties, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at Moscow: 5 August 1963. Entered into force: 10 October 1963. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Opened for signature at New York: 24 September 1996. It must be underlined that a prohibited activity not only authorizes compensation or reparation of damage, but, for the sole fact of being developed, any of the other consequences of
6
Chapter I
4.2. Available Remedies Remedies in liability are a part of primary rules, therefore they are neither sanctions nor secondary obligations. The contents of primary rules determine the amounts of and limits to compensation; those rules admit of more flexibility than the secondary rules of a responsibility regime. In Chapter V, we will analyze the topic of compensation in detail. Other remedies—such as cessation, satisfaction and securities and guarantees of non-repetition—are linked to the breach of an obligation and therefore are not applicable as part of sine delicto liability. 4.3. The Role of Fault Fault, in principle, plays no part in a liability regime; victims of damage are relieved from the burden of proving fault. However, fault plays a positive role in the obligations of prevention, as part of due diligence obligations. Through prevention, an appropriate minimization of risk is possible: this is why due diligence—and, consequently, fault— finds a place in the regulation of hazardous activities,17 where obligations of prevention must coexist with liability. Prevention is placed in the domain of responsibility for wrongful acts, not in that of liability sine delicto. (a) Exceptions to Liability Some exceptions classically accepted in the field of state responsibility as precluding wrongfulness, such as force majeure or fortuitous events, are sometimes also applicable to liability. As we will see in Chapters III and IV, the number of exceptions is limited and those permitted are due sometimes to pragmatic reasons, such as requirements of the insurance industry in regimes of civil liability.18 In a regime of State liability some such exceptions have less
17 18
a breach of obligation is allowed even if no material damage ensues, including countermeasures as a dissuasive to repetition. As we will see in Chapter II. Civil liability regimes will be explained in Chapter IV. Basically, they channel liability to private persons, normally the operator. Lefeber correctly points out that “A limited number of exonerations have been proposed in doctrinal writings as circumstances precluding liability sine delicto, in particular acts of God and acts involving the use of force. The ratio of such proposals seems to have its origin in civil liability regimes. Exonerations of this kind have been introduced in civil liability regimes to safeguard their viability. The viability of these regimes depends on the insurability of the risk. Given present insurance market conditions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain cover for acts of God and acts involving the use of force” R. Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability, The Hague, 1996, pp. 151/152.
Introduction
7
reason to exist, since States are supposed to be their own insurers. Contributory negligence of the victim of harm is an accepted exception, even in State liability regimes.19 (b) Criteria to Determine Compensation In Chapter V, we will examine the rules of compensation in the fi elds of liability and responsibility: they do not necessarily follow the same criteria. The inherent flexibility of liability allows distributive criteria to allocate loss, whereas the existence of fault in responsibility imposes integral reparation for an unlawful act.
5. Acts and Activities A digression here: the distinction between “activities” and “acts” should be clarified at this juncture. Without trying to formulate a scientific definition of “activity,” it is helpful to note that an activity may be composed of many individual or group conducts with a common purpose. In other words, “activity” is a way of mentioning a large array of acts that have a certain affinity and a common purpose. “Industrial activities” are all activities connected with industry, and they may be infinite. “Activity” may also have a more specific scope: the activity of a particular industrial establishment, like that of the Trail Smelter in Canada. Certain conclusions may be drawn from this distinction between specific “acts” and generalized “activities”. Smelting metals is, broadly speaking, lawful. In the case of the Trail Smelter, however, some of the specific acts within that activity—together with certain atmospheric conditions (e.g., constant winds in certain direction)—produced persistent harmful transboundary effects. For the sake of discussion, let us then suppose that, somewhere in the smelting process, certain elements mixed under the effect of the fire created fumes which caused damage and that the replacement of those elements for others, together with the addition of a filter in the chimneys, could have prevented the undesired effect.20 It was the act of smelting the metal with those particular elements in the mixture and the omission of a filter that produced significant (and preventable) damage. Cessation of that particular act was called for, while 19 20
Id., p. 150. Which is what basically happened in the Trail Smelter Case: the Court imposed a régime that eliminated the harmful effects produced by certain acts of the activity. The activity then continued with the suppression or the diminution of the elements causing harmful fumes. See Chapter V.
8
Chapter I
the smelting activity continued to be lawful—once the defect was corrected. Naturally, if a wrongful act is absolutely inseparable from an activity, the activity itself cannot continue. It is reasonable to conclude that if certain acts cause harm in the normal course of an activity’s operation, the acts make that activity not inherently “dangerous” or “hazardous”, but have harmful or noxious effects.21 This is so because “danger” or “hazard” always contains an element of contingency which is missing in noxious activities. Such activities may be responsible for wrongful acts and, consequently, subject to cessation. The activity, on the other hand, is not wrongful if the acts producing the harm are omitted—or if the elements causing the damage are replaced by others which render the effects of the activity innocuous or the activity itself simply hazardous. 6. Conclusion The basic elements of liability were introduced in this chapter. Now we are better equipped to take a deeper look at certain key elements of liability— namely, “risk” and “damage.”
21
On “noxious activities” as opposed to “hazardous activities”, see Chapter V.
Chapter II
Risk and Harm, Prevention and Liability 1. Introduction In this chapter, we will examine the relationship between “risk” and “harm” and the parallel relationship between “prevention” and “liability” in the framework of a legal regime regulating a hazardous activity. 2. The Concept of Risk According to Ulrich Beck, we live in a “risk society”1 marked by the existence of hazards and insecurities introduced by modern technology. “Risk” is, therefore, a concept that must be progressively incorporated into modern legal systems. Members of our “risk society” must learn to live with an intangible, abstract probability of harm, threatening as a Damoclean sword above our heads. Risk itself cannot be “repaired”—due to its abstract nature—nor can it be absolutely “prevented” without jeopardizing human progress. Risk must, therefore, be “managed” and “minimized” using legal instruments and taking certain measures. Risk management, however, is a rather complex affair, demanding answers to questions like: How will a legal regime deal with risk? Should thresholds of acceptable risk be set and if so, where? Can excessively high levels of risk render an activity unlawful? How do risk and harm combine to trigger compensation? Should preventive measures be obligatory? Should the cost of preventive measures be reimbursed? According to Beck, “risk” is a concept created to “foresee and control the future consequences of human action. […] It is intimately connected with an administrative and technical decision-making process.”2 The difference between the type of risks created by high technology and those created by nature—such as plagues or natural disasters—lies in the human decision to accept or not to accept the risk.
1 2
Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society: Towards a new modernity, London, Sage, 1992. Id., p. 3.
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, pp. 9–20. © 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
10
Chapter II
Two key points that are relevant to the analysis of liability emerge from Beck’s definition of risk. First, there is the importance of determining the limits of a society’s tolerance for risk. Second, there is the complex question of risk in the relationship between human action and decision-making. Decisionmaking, in this case, should always calculate and evaluate the two main elements of risk: the probability of harm occurring and the dimension of the possible harm. Both elements are closely knit together in the couple “riskdamage.” Damage emerging as a consequence of risk is an essential component of a liability regime—i.e., a no-fault regime that allows compensation for the mere causal link between a hazardous activity and damage. Damage unrelated to an activity involving significant risk may be compensable in international law but not under a liability regime as is dealt with in this work. With the evaluation of both the probability of harm and of its potential dimensions, there is a component of human acceptance underlying the decision to allow an activity to impose a risk on society. Some degree of risk must be tolerated by all societies, but in many cases a discussion of the levels of risk acceptable to a determined society never takes place. In such situations, “acceptable risks are ultimately accepted risks.”3 3. The Concepts of Harm and Damage “Harm” is usually defined as “prejudice to a person or property”. It may also include harm to the environment or the costs of prevention or reparation measures taken after an incident occurs. For the International Law Commission, “harm” is used to refer to the adverse consequences that may ensue from a hazardous activity and “damage” to those consequences once they have materialized. “Harm” and “damage” are used in liability because they express the mere existence of adverse effects without reference to a wrongful act. The word “damage” may also refer to the amounts fixed or paid as compensation for harm actually caused. The word “injury” is not used because it has a connotation of unlawfulness. 3.1. The Threshold of Harm Fixing a threshold of harm is relevant to our subject. Harm that does not amount to a significant, tangible or appreciable degree is simply an unpleasantness that is to be endured. Hazardous activities conducted in a State, besides risking significant transboundary harm, may also cause some
3
Id., p. 58.
Risk and Harm, Prevention and Liability
11
minor inconveniences to other States, particularly neighboring ones. Such minor inconveniences must be tolerated for a number of reasons—namely, to avoid unnecessary litigation, to promote good neighborliness and, in particular, to acknowledge that modern technology has made every State both a victim and a source of inconveniences. A passage from the 1965 Trail Smelter award points toward the notion of threshold: “[…] no State has the right to use or permit the use of a territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”4 There is a vast consensus that, below a certain threshold, harm should be tolerated in a liability regime. Where should that threshold be fixed? In the International Law Commission, the issue was dealt with twice: first during the consideration of the subject of international waterways and then within the liability topic. In both drafts, the word “appreciable” was used to qualify the damage, although later on there was greater support for the word “significant”. 3.2. Causality and Harm The causality between an act and damage must be proven for liability to arise. Within the context of risk, proving causality may be difficult for the following reasons: • Temporal separation, where harm is visible only years after the act took place; • Multiple overlapping causes, where simultaneous or different acts or causes accumulate leading to harm; and • Uncertainty, where sufficient or conclusive scientific evidence is missing to link an activity with the occurrence of harm. “Damage,” according to the International Law Commission, must be a physical consequence of an activity falling within the scope of its prevention and liability articles. “Causality” refers to a causal chain occurring in a physical environment, and for that reason, “physical link” is preferable to “material link”. There was an early consensus in the ILC to discard other relationships— i.e., the transboundary effects of economic measures. However, modern legal systems have evolved towards the “loosening of causal links,” as Gunther Teubner explains. Teubner notes that the fields of environmental law and ecology open a world of tremendously complex interacting causes. 4
UNRIAA, Vol. 3, p. 1965 (emphasis added).
12
Chapter II
The complexities of causation in the three ecological media—air, water, soil— have frustrated lawyers in their attempts to construct causal links between individual actions and ecological damage. Accordingly, they tend to rely less and less on the underlying architecture of causation, resorting instead to rather audacious legal constructions that weaken the structures of individual causation. […] Causation in law, prima facie, enhanced res ipsa loquitur, reversing the burden of proof, probabilistic causation, joint and several liability in multiple causation, enterprise liability, market share liability, superfund liability—all these new forms of ‘risk liability’5 tend to reduce or even eliminate individual causal linkages between acts and damages and to replace them with an overarching cupola of quasi-collective responsibility for ecological damage.6
The analysis made by Teubner confirms that international liability schemes are evolving towards networks of liability. These networks tend to loosen causality links and prioritize the compensation of harm consequent to activities entailing risk. In this line of argument, the concepts that characterize civil liability regimes (which will be explained in Chapter IV)—such as the “channelling of liability,” “residual State liability,” and the formation of compensatory funds—are all evidence of the phenomenon that Teubner highlights in his study. The collective attribution of liability in the form of networks or layers counterbalances the uncertainty and complexity surrounding risk or harm in environmental or biological processes. The flexible character of “causality” in our topic facilitated, no doubt, the change of its title to “allocation of loss,” which is a more neutral mechanism. In fact, “liability” is more impersonal than “responsibility,” because in the latter, the emphasis falls on authorship and fault-finding. 4. Activities Entailing Risk (hazardous activities) vs. Activities that Cause Harm Some activities produce transboundary pollution or other effects that accumulate over time and end up exhausting nature’s capacity of absorption. Unexpected, significant harm may thus be generated and the normal operation of an activity may be revealed as producing such harm. Sometimes harmful activities are provisionally tolerated because they have been incorporated
5
6
Robinson, Glen O., “Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortuous Risk” (Journal of Legal Studies 14, 1985), pp. 779-798. Teubner, Gunther, “The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution in Ecological Liability”, p. 12. In Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self–Organisation. Ed. by Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer, Declan Murphy, (Chichester, N.Y : Wiley, c.1994).
Risk and Harm, Prevention and Liability
13
into modern life and cannot be interrupted abruptly, but tolerance may be conditional and such harmful activities are increasingly regulated. For example, catalytic converters and unleaded gasoline are increasingly required in developed countries in order to prevent the pollution of exhaust gasses from cars. Similar preventive measures are now taken in other fields of tolerated contamination.7 The above introduction to the concept of “risk” is sufficient to conclude that a legal regime applicable to noxious activities should be of a different nature than one applicable to hazardous activities. Professor Karl Zemanek remarked that the phrase “responsabilité pour risque” was not adequate to cover two different situations which presented themselves in the context of liability: one which was covered by what he called “l’activité risquée propre” and the other, which he characterized as “l’émission permanente de matières nuisibles,” where a certain measure of pollution is tolerated, but, if the limit of tolerance is passed, either by a change in the technological standard or by an accident, the resulting damage must be compensated.8 The essential difference between “hazardous” and “noxious” activities, pointed out in both remarks, calls for different types of accountability. For the Bruntland Experts Group, a “noxious activity” is one of which: “it is foreseeable that it will definitely cause substantial harm in an area under the national jurisdiction of another State or in an area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” A “hazardous activity,” on the other hand, is one that “merely” involves “a risk of causing extraterritorial harm…’” The Group considered that such activities should be subject to different legal regimes.9 Some overlap may exist between noxious and hazardous activities. For instance, there are cases when an activity which causes harm during its normal operation may additionally impose a risk to the environment due to some intervening circumstances. Yet purely “hazardous” activities are best regulated through collective liability schemes not suited to cover “noxious” activities. Individual liability based on the “polluter-pays principle” is the best
7
8
9
See Chapter VI, in particular the intervention of Ambassador Türk in a Sixth Committee debate. (Note 41). Regarding activities causing global warming, see Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer Vienna 1985, 26 ILM 1529 (1987); Montreal Protocol 26 ILM 1550 (1987); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 ILM 849 (1992). Zemanek, Karl “La responsabilité de l’État pour faits internationalement illicites ainsi que pour faits internationalement licites,” Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales de Paris, Impressions Granville, 1987, p. 17. Report on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (Bruntland Report) by the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development; Graham and Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1986, p. 86.
14
Chapter II
instrument to internalize external costs. Besides, some form of culpa lato sensu (negligence or dolus) seems to be readily discernible in a State which allows the continuation of an activity with the knowledge that it will continue causing transboundary harm.10 5. The Relationship Between Liability and “Prevention” and the Influence of Risk “Prevention” and “liability” certainly have a close relationship and that relationship is based on the risk inherent to hazardous activities—making prevention all the more necessary. In a liability regime, prevention may flow as a by-product: an operator’s knowledge that damages will have to be compensated regardless of fault should make him especially careful in handling a hazardous activity. Conventions on specific hazardous activities do not normally include ex ante11 prevention obligations; they may be the matter of domestic laws or of different international instruments. But that supposed caution may not be enough for a legal regime purporting to rule on a hazardous activity: making safety standards dependant on the perceptions of individuals regarding their potential liabilities may not guarantee adequate steps for prevention. Liable parties may be more or less careful or prudent in handling an activity according to their temperament, or the existence of insurance may leave them somewhat indifferent to the potential damages of the activity. Thus, in many cases, rules and standards of safety should be imposed, the breach of which constitutes a wrongful act entailing responsibility in order to make available the best possible prevention procedures that modern technology provides. The Bruntland Experts Group considered that a general obligation of prevention existed regarding activities that cause substantial harm or entail the risk of substantial harm.12 Article 10 of their “General Principles concerning Natural Resources and Environmental Interferences”, under the title of “Prevention and abatement of a transboundary environmental interference” reads: “States shall, without prejudice to the principles laid down in Articles
10
11
12
The dictum of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case seems to be clearly applicable to activities which cause harm in their normal operation: they breach “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” ICJ Reports (1949), p. 22 (emphasis added). That is, prevention to avoid an accident. The difference with ex-post prevention will be seen later. Op.cit., n. 9, pp. 75 et seq.
Risk and Harm, Prevention and Liability
15
11 and 12, prevent or abate any transboundary environmental interference or a significant threat thereof which causes substantial harm—i.e., harm which is not minor or insignificant.”13 In an international regime of prevention, the State of origin must impose some obligations on operators and take steps directly or indirectly connected with prevention—such as notifications or consultations with other States. A State must ensure that all obligations of prevention—its own or those imposed on private parties—are fulfilled. As to liability, it needs not be anchored to a determinate subject in all cases; it may be guided by the need to ensure a prompt and adequate compensation of damages or by other practical reasons. Liability may thus be channelled to suitable entities other than the operators, according to circumstances. 6. The Obligation to Prevent and Abate Significant Harm as a Complement to Liability According to Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, unilateral measures of prevention expected from a State of origin include formulating legislative and administrative policies intended to prevent or minimize transboundary harm. Those policies must be, then, implemented by enforcement devices. The standard of due diligence should be that which is generally considered to be reasonably proportional to the risk of transboundary harm in the particular case.14 Violation of these obligations may be incurred before any result intervenes—i.e., before any transboundary damage has occurred. The consequences following the breach would be all those included in the International Law Commission’s 2001 articles on State responsibility for wrongful acts. 6.1. Prevention Obligations to Abate Harm and to Minimize Risk (a) Risk Assessment Risk assessment is a key element of prevention when dealing with hazardous activities. It allows a risk-bearing State to make informed decisions as to the threshold of tolerance and the preventive measures to be taken. Risk assessment has been recognized as a State obligation as early as 1941 in the Trail
13 14
Id., p. 8. The standard of due diligence required by the 2006 Commission articles is the matter of Chapter VII, n. 12.
16
Chapter II
Smelter Case between the United States and Canada, where an arbitral tribunal, after making its own assessment of risk, recommended a regime for the operation of the smelter. That regime was implemented to prevent further damages by smelter fumes and the defendant, by its observance of the regime, fulfilled the duty of care required by the obligations.15 Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development also provides for impact assessment of activities which are likely to have a significant adverse effect on the environment.16 Various forms of impact or risk assessments have been incorporated as requirements in many international conventions17—notably, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (1991 Espoo Convention),18 which was devoted entirely to the procedure and substance of impact assessments. States are not obliged to require risk assessments for all activities undertaken under their jurisdiction or control, only for activities likely to cause significant transboundary harm. Such activities are recognizable because they have certain identifiable features: the type or source of energy used, the substances manipulated, the location of the activity and its proximity to State borders, the vulnerability of areas of the States situated within reach of the effects of the activity,19 etc. But besides those general criteria, some conventions include a list of substances that are considered to be dangerous or hazardous, and their use may be in itself an indication that an activity might cause significant transboundary harm. Other conventions incorporate a list of the activities presumed to be hazardous, thus signalling that those activities should be submitted for authorization and assessment before they can begin.
15
16 17
18
19
That assessment included comprehensive and long-term experiments and the analysis of collections of data in respect of the risk created by the smelter to the American territory. A/CONF.151/Rev.1 (vol. I) p. 3. For a more complete development of this point, see International Liability for injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by international law, Doc. A/CN.4/L.503, of 15 July 1994, pp. 2/4. See also Arts.204, 205 and 206 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Art. 4 of the 1991 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA); Art. 8 of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty; the 1986 Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South-Pacific Region; the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for the Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution; arts. 7.c) and 14.1)a) of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and art. 15 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 30 I.L.M. 802 (1991), Sands, et al. (eds.) Documents in International Environmental Law, p. 1333. Manchester University Press, 1994. For example, a national park within a risk-bearer State might be particularly vulnerable.
Risk and Harm, Prevention and Liability
17
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized in the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Case between Hungary and Slovakia that both the “awareness of the vulnerability of the environment and the recognition that environmental risks have to be assessed on a continuous basis” have become much stronger in international law, and thus should be taken into account by States when implementing existing obligations or contracting new ones.20 (b) Notification and Information Notification and information are also instrumental for a risk-bearing State to reach an informed decision on whether or not to accept the inherent risk of an activity. Notification and information also help a risk-bearing State be in the best condition to negotiate a legal regime in order to re-establish the balance of interests between itself and the State of origin. If an assessment indicates a risk of significant transboundary harm, the State of origin must notify the potential risk-bearing States and provide them with information about the available technical, scientific, and other relevant data on which the assessment is based. Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration states that: “States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected states on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those states at an early stage and in good faith.” The above text may be considered to express a customary international norm embodied in international agreements, decisions of international courts, declarations and resolutions adopted by intergovernmental organizations, conferences and meetings and studies by intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations.21 Its binding character is even stronger when relating to emergency situations.22 ICJ found the duty to warn to be based on “elementary considerations of humanity.”23 It is on the basis of the above cited precedents that notification and information seem to be an established customary international norm. They also are an essential component of any prevention regime.
20 21
22
23
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Project cit., para. 112, in fine. Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 606. Lefeber, R., op.cit., p. 38, 39. 1976 Rhine Chemical Pollution Convention, art. 4.1.; 1969 Bonn Agreement, art. 5.1.; 1989 Basel Convention, art. 13.1. ICJ Reports (1949), p. 22.
18
Chapter II
(c) Consultations and Balance of Interests States have, in international law, the customary obligation of engaging in consultations and negotiations when facing international disputes.24 If the risk of transboundary harm is involved in such disputes, the State of origin and the risk-bearing State must consult with each other with a view to agreeing as to the measures to prevent or minimize the risk of significant transboundary harm and then cooperate in the implementation of such measures. That is the general rule, but in the case of a new hazardous—or suspected of being hazardous—activity, the obligations of States of origin to consult arises before any dispute takes place because the balance of interests may be in imminent jeopardy. It is at this juncture that the balance-of-interests test should come into play and some factors and circumstances should be taken into account.25 The balance-of-interests test is of the essence of a liability regime.26 When a new hazardous activity is starting under the jurisdiction of a State, the risk created alters the balance of interests and creates a new legal relationship between that State of origin and the risk-bearer States. The hazardous activity is, presumably, mainly of interest or benefit to the State of origin. In the meantime, on the other end of the balance, the hazardous activity may worry the risk–bearer States, require preventive measures or contingency plans, and could eventually cause damages. If consultations fail, the State of origin should still be able to authorize the activity in question, taking into account the interests of the risk-bearing States. Furthermore, the attitude of the authorizing State does not prejudice the rights of said risk-bearer States. (See Article 9 of the 2006 ILC articles.) 7. Conclusion As was already mentioned, risk cannot be “repaired,”27 as the damage it causes by its mere existence is not compensable. Nor can it be absolutely prevented 24
25
26 27
Sands, Philippe (1995), op.cit., p. 605. International Court of Justice: Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases. ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3 et seq. Lac Lanoux Arbitration 24 ILR, p. 119. These factors are mentioned in the schematic outline of Professor Quentin-Baxter, and survived practically untouched since then until they were finally included in Article 10 of the final version of Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. See Doc. A/ CN.4/L.503/Add.2, p. 13. Cf. Lefeber, op.cit., at p. 38. The creation of risk of imminent damage may require measures which might prevent or abate that damage, but the cost of the preventive measures themselves constitute a damage if taken by the affected State.
Risk and Harm, Prevention and Liability
19
without jeopardizing human progress. Risk must, therefore, be managed—i.e., minimized through regulatory instruments and measures. How can a liability regime, then, deal with risk? The first conclusion is that: in order to be effective, a regime that seeks to regulate risk must be focused on risk minimization and not solely on reparation. When dealing with risk, prevention is equal to risk minimization and risk management. Secondly, in order to provide reparation, thresholds of acceptability of risk must be set, including a combination of the probability of potential harm and its magnitude—as in the ILC articles. The third conclusion is that: in drafting any legal regime regulating hazardous activities, the challenges of proving a causal link must be taken into account. The objective of the regime should be equitable sharing of the burden of risk and harm, even when causal links are pervaded with scientific uncertainty. Fourthly, such regimes must seek to bring risks down to levels acceptable to the States concerned. Preventive obligations are thus necessary elements of any regime attempting to regulate lawful activities entailing risk. However, being primary obligations, as we have seen, their breach makes State responsibility applicable. Such are the obligations of making environmental impact assessments, sending notifications and information, as well as, in some cases, requesting the prior consent of the risk–bearing States.
Chapter III
Responsibility and Liability in International Law 1. Introduction In the present chapter, we will examine the various forms that responsibility and liability may assume in international law. Comparing the concepts of “responsibility” and “liability” will show which of the two adapts itself better to the regulation of hazardous activities. The comparison will also try to discern whether or not the International Law Commission’s decision to treat “liability” as a separate subject was a wise one. 2. Responsibility and Liability in International Law In response to modern technological risks, various forms of sine delicto liability have progressively evolved in most domestic legal systems. In international law, a number of specific (hazardous) activities are regulated by multilateral conventions where the liability for transboundary damages falls mainly on private persons or entities,1 and in some cases there may be a residual State liability. In one convention, there is exclusive State accountability.2 Within the International Law Commission (ILC), several members were of the opinion that the situations contemplated by the liability topic were well covered by the concepts of responsibility.3 However, authors like Rolando
1 2
3
These conventions are referred to as “civil liability” conventions. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Geneva, 29 March, 1972) is the only convention where liability is exclusively on the State, with sine delicto liability to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects. Art. II reads: “A launching State shall be absolutely liable for compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.” And Article III reads: “In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth to a space object of a launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object by a space object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.” 961 UNTS 187; Sands et al (eds) Documents in International Environmental Law, p. 1538. Manchester University Press, 1994. See Chapters VI and VII for an account of the development of this issue in the ILC.
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, pp. 21–30. © 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Quadri4 and Roberto Ago5 would use a different name: what is legally known as “liability” would be a guarantee given by an operator as a condition for the legality of the hazardous activity he conducts. In this chapter, the main features of international responsibility for wrongful acts will be compared with those of sine delicto liability, and consideration will be given to the practical consequences of differentiating one from the other. In order to be effective, risk regulation requires regimes with special features. Sine delicto liability has proved to be efficient in solving problems posed by the risk inherent to some modern activities. For instance, its special features include the irrelevance of fault, the possibility of prompt compensation, the flexibility in the appreciation of causality, and the allocation of the costs of reparation.6 2.1. Responsibility and Liability: the Use of Both Terms7 The meanings of the words “responsibility” and “liability” used nowadays by the ILC and most UN bodies—and as seen in most international legal literature—do not correspond with the words’ original meanings in AngloAmerican law. Besides, the Anglo-American issue of having two different words express the notion of responsibility does not exist in other legal systems. French (“responsabilité”), Spanish (“responsabilidad”), and Italian (“responsabilità”) have only one word to convey both “responsibility” and “liability”. The choice of the word “liability” in the English version of the topic stems from an exchange of views in the ILC during its twenty-fifth session, in 1973. It was suggested by Mr. Kearney, the American member, that: “[T]he term ‘responsibility’ should be used only in connection with internationally wrongful acts and that, with reference to the possible injurious consequences arising out of the performance of certain lawful activities, the more suitable term ‘liability’ should be used.”8 4
5 6 7
8
Quadri, Rolando, Diritto Internazionale Pubblico, (5a Ed., Napoli 1968), pp. 590/591. It must be noted that in Italian, as in French and Spanish, there is only one root word to refer to both responsibility and liability. In French, liability is known as “responsabilité pour risque,” in Spanish “responsabilidad por riesgo,” and something equivalent in many internal law systems in the world. It seems too late to change these names; but it is important to bear in mind that the concepts are different and they should be kept separate from each other. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1969, Vol. I, p. 105. See Chapter II. A complete discussion on this question may be found in the Preliminary Report of Professor Quentin-Baxter, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1979, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 250/252. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1973, Vol. I, p. 211.
Responsibility and Liability in International Law
23
So, the term “responsibility” refers to the legal consequences following the breach of an international obligation—i.e., it is “responsibility for wrongful acts.” That is the classical meaning of the word and it corresponds to the rooted belief that there can be no real responsibility unless there is a wrongful act. As L.F.E. Goldie puts it: “The term ‘responsibility’ thus includes the attribution of the consequences of conduct in terms of the duties of a man in society.”9 But “responsibility” has still another meaning: the word may be used to refer to a set of obligations that include a duty of care or vigilance, incumbent on a certain person. In the “Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Revision 2” of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, “States are responsible” is translated as: “…il incombe aux Etats de veiller…”. Also, the meaning of “responsibility” seems to be similar in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.10 The word is used with the same meaning in UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) of December 17, 1970, paragraph 14: “Every State shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the area…shall be carried out in conformity with the international régime to be established” (emphasis added).11 We would like to recall a remark by Goldie that: “[A]t times, publicists and judges may employ the two terms (responsibility and liability) almost interchangeably or synonymously.”12 He added that: “in certain general contexts, legal responsibility and legal liability may be given, in ordinary language, the same meaning, to say that a man is legally responsible for some act or harm is to state that his connection with that act or harm is sufficient, according to law, to render him liable to his victims for the consequences of his act or for the harm he has caused.”13 In fact, the only link between what came to be known as “liability” in ILC parlance and State “responsibility” is that they both deal with the consequences of certain acts. The difference is that the acts in one of them (“responsibility”) are wrongful and in the other (“liability”) are lawful. This places the
9 10
11
12 13
Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution, Paris OECD, 1977, p. 344. “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” “Concepts of strict and absolute liability and the ranking of liability in terms of relative exposure to risk” in the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1985, p. 182. Second Report (Barboza), Doc. A/CN.4/402, p. 3. Op.cit., p. 182.
24
Chapter III
consequences of those acts in different stages of legal norms: the former in the secondary norm and the latter in the primary norm.14 Rivers of ink have flowed to point out the subtle differences between such words within the Anglo–American legal system, as if those differences could automatically be transferred to international law. We might as well have called them “Accountability I” and “Accountability II” and describe the features of each one. Be that as it may, the fact is that “responsibility” in United Nations legal parlance has become shorthand for “State responsibility for wrongful acts,” and “liability” for “international liability for acts not prohibited by international law.” In this book, the terms will be used as in the ILC, unless otherwise stated. 2.2. More on the Meaning of Certain Terms (a) Objective Liability The word “fault” in English and “faute” in French have dual meanings: one refers to the breach of an obligation—i.e., to the mere contrast between the conduct required by that obligation and the conduct which the author State has in effect followed—and the other refers to culpa lato sensu—that is, to dolus or negligence. The latter meaning points to the “subjective” aspect of the conduct.15 Liability for lawful acts is sometimes also called “objective liability” because, if no duty has been violated, the subjective element of culpa cannot possibly exist. However, the breach of many international obligations does not require culpa and the correspondent responsibility is also objective, so trying to distinguish liability from responsibility by its “objective” character may lead to ambiguity.16 The difference between “objective
14
15
16
“In liability, the primary norm includes the legal consequences, because there is no breach of obligation. The primary norm may be expressed like this: “Damages caused by a lawful act of a legal hazardous activity must be compensated. The secondary norm would be: if compensation is not paid by the liable party, then there is a breach of obligation with legal consequences: these consequences are again compensation, satisfaction, etc, only that in this case, compensation may include interests, lucrum cessans, etc And of course, the injured State may also take countermeasures in order to force the reluctant State comply”. See Zemanek, op.cit. p.34. “Malheureusement, le terme ‘faute’ n’est pas employé uniformément dans les systèmes juridiques ou dans toutes les langages. Dans plusieurs systèmes, ‘faute’ signifie manquement à un devoir et est donc synonyme de délit…Dans d’autres systèmes, ‘faute’ implique une sorte de culpa, soit intention, (dolus, culpa gravis) ou négligence (culpa levis ou levissima) dans la violation d’une obligation.” It goes without saying that if there is no “manquement à un devoir”, there cannot be fault in the second meaning. As an example, the breach of most obligations of conduct of Part I of the ILC draft on State responsibility does not require the existence of fault (culpa).
Responsibility and Liability in International Law
25
responsibility” and “liability” is that, in the former, culpa is irrelevant but there is fault in the sense of a breach of obligation, whereas, in the latter, there is no breach of obligation (and therefore also no culpa). One is ex delicto and the other sine delicto. In fact, the double meaning of “fault” has lead to confusion between cases of strict liability due to the irrelevance of culpa—i.e., the subjective element of State responsibility notwithstanding the breach of an obligation—and sine delicto liability, where the breach of an obligation is not required. (b) Strict Liability “Strict liability” is the name employed in Anglo-American law for a no-fault liability applying mainly in the field of torts. There are writers who consider it as an “objective and relative responsibility”17—that is, a no-fault (in the sense of culpa) responsibility for wrongful acts which is not absolute—that is, which admits certain exceptions. Maybe that was the theory underpinning common-law “strict liability,” but not necessarily to “strict liability” as applied in some statutory fields. Referring to “abnormally dangerous conditions or activities,” William Prosser acknowledges that: … [T]he courts have in effect recognized a new doctrine that the defendant’s enterprise, while it will be tolerated by the law, must pay its way. There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is blame on neither side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the loss and then to shift the loss by creating liability where there has been no fault. An entire field of legislation, illustrated by the workmen’s compensation acts, has been based upon the same principle.18
According to Prosser’s description, “strict liability” is based on the idea that the defendant was engaged in some kind of lawful activity exposing others to a risk of harm under circumstances that justify allocating certain losses caused by such risk to the defendant, even if the defendant acted with reasonable care.19 There are cases, however, where liability is created by statute and does not correspond to a wrongful act or tort, such as happens in labor accidents. “Strict liability,” then, seems to be applicable both to torts (ex delicto) and to lawful acts causing damage—in the last case, as a form of sine delicto liability.
17 18 19
See e.g. B. Conforti, Diritto Internazionale, 3rd ed (1989), pp. 346/347. Prosser, The Law of Torts, St.Paul, Minessota, 1978, p. 494. See Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed.1984, p. 243/245.
26
Chapter III
(c) Absolute Liability The expression “absolute liability” also seems to originate in the AngloAmerican law to refer to a more rigorous form of liability. As L.F.E. Goldie writes: “The term ‘absolute liability’ has been revived… to indicate that a more rigorous form of liability than the usually labelled ‘strict’ is now before us, especially on the international arena.”20 Let us remember, however, that even “absolute liability” admits of exceptions in international practice. (d) Sine delicto Liability “Sine delicto liability” would exactly correspond to the original title of the ILC topic: “Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law.” Any regime of liability involving no breach of obligation is characterized by the fact that: “Liability arises from lawful activities, on the basis of the mere causal link between these activities and the damage done. For this reason, such form of liability is, by its own nature, objective and absolute.”21 Paradoxically, the word “absolute” is here only relative. The similarities and differences between “strict liability” and “liability sine delicto” were explained above. Changing the onus probandi is not a mechanism of “liability sine delicto,” but of responsibility for wrongful acts, since the absence of subjective fault (culpa) has to be proved in order to exempt the defendant from responsibility, whereas fault is irrelevant in liability. (e) Responsabilité pour risque (Risk Liability) Generally, in civil law countries, responsabilité pour risque (risk liability) is the liability which applies to a hazardous activity on the basis of the risk created by the activity. As pointed out above, it is a liability without breach of obligation and, consequently, also without culpa (lato sensu)—in other words, it is a form of sine delicto liability since it applies to lawful conduct. The term is, in this writer’s opinion, quite adequate in that it takes “risk” into account—a decisive factor in this book.
20
21
L.F.E.Goldie, “Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability in Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1985, p. 194. Ricardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, “Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm” in Francioni and Scovazzi (eds.) International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, Graham&Trotman, Ltd. London, 1991.
Responsibility and Liability in International Law
27
3. Liability Governed by Primary Norms It is generally agreed that in liability both the act causing harm and its legal consequences are contained in the primary norm. As a result, the consequence (the prompt payment of adequate compensation) does not correspond to the breach of obligation but to the fulfillment of a condition, namely the production of damage. Some writers assign this result to a compound obligation to prevent and abate transboundary environmental interference causing significant harm.22 Secondary obligations are the typical field of responsibility and were dealt with in the ILC in the topic called “State Responsibility.” They may take the form of reparation (restitution, compensation, and satisfaction23) or securities and guarantees of non repetition. An obligation of cessation may also arise if the primary obligation was breached by means of a continuous act.24 In other words, the primary norm would say something like: “Damage caused by the activity (hazardous but lawful) shall be compensated.”25 If the obligation to compensate is not fulfilled, then—and only then—there would be a breach of the primary obligation and a second obligation would arise in one of the above-mentioned forms (reparation, securities, and guarantees). Now we have entered into the domain of responsibility for wrongful acts. The distinction between primary and secondary norms and obligations was dismissed by some ILC members as being only “relative”; the implication being that the distinction between “responsibility” and “liability” was also “relative.” That sounds illogical: a human conduct has only two possibilities in relation with a legal obligation—either to fulfill it or to breach it. In the first case, the conduct remains within the domain of the primary norm. In the second case, the conduct enters into the domain of the secondary norm.
22
23
24
25
Lefeber R., Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability, Kluwer Law International 1996, pp. 230-232. However, such compound obligation implies a contradiction, since the breach of prevention carries responsibility. Prevention is an alien body in that primary obligation. “Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination …” (Art. 34 of UNGA Res. 56/83). Cessation implies stopping the continuous act which is producing an also continuous violation of the primary obligation. That primary norm may be contained in a treaty, like in the many existing conventions on civil liability mentioned in Chapter IV.
28
Chapter III
There is one type of norm for each possible conduct and there are no more than two such possibilities. The distinction, then, is not contingent but necessary; it cannot be cavalierly cast aside for having a “relative” value. 4. Distinctive Features of Liability In the opinion of the International Law Commission,26 “responsibility” should be carefully separated from “liability,” as was said in its Report on the occasion of the creation of the “liability” subject, in a much quoted paragraph.27 A comparison of the two terms’ elements and features shows that “responsibility” and “liability” are two different legal species.28 5. Conclusions The general examination of “liability” shows the absence of fault and the presence of risk. This combination makes possible the balancing of the different interests, as there is nobody to blame for subsequent damage and risk was accepted from the beginning by all concerned—as long as potential victims were compensated. Any legal theory that did not take into account the risks created by modern technologies would be blind to central aspects not only of liability, but of modern life. A third element of liability is the social interest in the acceptance of risk. Prompt and adequate compensation to victims is of the essence for the socially acceptable functioning of a hazardous activity: the irrelevance of fault makes establishing who exactly is to blame for the damage unnecessary. Only 26
27
28
Yearbook 1976, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 70. Even though the term used in this sentence is “responsibility for risk,” the subject created was called “International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law,” thus formally introducing the term “liability” into the subject. The transcribed paragraph reflects the opinion of the ILC as to the separation of the topics at the time, as well as the identification of “liability” as different from “responsibility”—though it might not have been the opinion of some of its individual members along the way. “Owing to the entirely different basis of the so-called responsibility for risk and the different nature of the rules governing it, as well as its content and the form it may assume, a joint examination of the two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to grasp.” Yearbook 1976, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 70. For a complete development of this reasoning, see Julio Barboza “Sine delicto (Causal) Liability and Responsibility for Wrongful Acts in International Law” in International Law on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century. Views from the International Law Commission, pp. 317/328.
Responsibility and Liability in International Law
29
proof of causality is required, and we have seen how that requirement has been made flexible in the framework of existing conventions. In summary, causation, not authorship, is the key element in liability. An international liability regime would, then, be more efficient in the regulation of risk than a traditional State responsibility regime. “Responsibility,” originating as it does in a wrongful act, provokes a legal reaction based on the individualization of both the wrongdoer and the attribution of consequences to the wrongful act. In that sense, “responsibility” is—in some aspects and somewhat paradoxically— stricter than “strict liability”: once the fault of a person has been established, total reparation (In integrum restitutio) is the response of the law. The above features require a legal regulation indifferent to fault, but sensitive to the costs of the enterprises conducting hazardous activities—i.e., sensitive to their economic viability and to the benefits that those activities bring to society. “Liability” is more concerned with statistics, costs, equitable distributions, insurances, and other practicalities than by culpa lato sensu, the breach of obligations and the integral restitution. More interest is vested in the continuous functioning of the hazardous but socially useful activity than in cessation: the consequences of damage may be collectively allocated among the different participants in the activity precisely to attain that objective. The convenience of liability regulation of hazardous activities has been acknowledged by most domestic legal systems, since liability has to do with conducts that are lawful and not wrongful. Compensation, however, is not the single goal of a legal regime intending to cope with risk. Equally important is the minimization of risk in order to lower exposure to significant harm—in other words: prevention for the sake of people and the environment. Some measure of prevention flows as a by-product of liability, since its exercise tends to reduce the number of accidents and, consequently, lower the cost of compensations. But that side effect of liability depends upon many subjective factors—such as the temperament of the operator and his social sensitivity (or insensitivity), which might make him indifferent to incidents because insurance pays—so that in order to reach the sufficient level of protection that society owes to risk-bearers, or a State owes to another State, an objective regulation of prevention is necessary. Besides, on the international plane, measures—like notifications and consultations to affected States—help establish cooperation and, therefore, diminish the risk of incidents. A regime of “hard” obligations of prevention is, then, a necessary complement to sine delicto liability in order to achieve an efficient regulation of a hazardous activity. Such obligations fall on the State, which must insure that the best conditions of safety are met in the handling of risk-threatening transboundary damage.
Chapter IV
Conventional Law 1. Civil Liability Regimes in International Law In this chapter we shall examine conventions on liability and compensation. Bearing in mind that the only clear-cut cases of liability in international law can only be found in the conventional field, an exploration therein seems necessary.1 Besides, the existence of conventional rules may be an indication -never conclusive, but always useful- of the status of such rules in customary law. In a civil liability regime primary liability falls on private persons or entities2 acting within the framework of the State of origin’s domestic law. Treaties between States provide an international legal framework to those regimes and may establish liability rules common to all States parties; other rules regarding the rights and obligations of private operators or other private parties are left to be regulated by the member States. International treaties establishing liability are related to specific activities particularly in fields like civil aviation, oil pollution, nuclear energy, transport of certain goods, product liability and hazardous wastes. Other agreements cover hazardous activities in certain regions, like Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antartic Treaty. There are other fields where negotiations are taking place with a view to create similar regimes -as in the framework of the Biological Diversity Convention.3 Liability is imposed on private parties, but States assume a number of important obligations, mainly to allow for prompt and adequate compensation to non-resident victims of the State of origin.4
1
2 3
4
For a rather complete exposé of individual existing conventions on liability and compensation consult the document of the Secretariat A/CN.4/453. With one exception, the convention on space objects. There is already an instrument, the Protocol of Cartagena on Biosafety, but it refers to prevention of transboundary damages caused by Living Modified Organisms, not to liability; there are ongoing negotiations on a Protocol on liability and compensation for damages to biological diversity. P.M. Dupuy states, with regard to civil liability conventions, “l’Etat, dans l’ensemble de ces traits, n’apparait pas en tant que personne du droit international public, mais pour ainsi dire en
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, pp. 31–44. © 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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2. Common Features of Conventional Law It must be recalled that primary obligations are the field of liability. In the conventions, primary obligations are the product of the common will of the parties to them. In fact, the parties may adopt the conditions and forms they consider convenient; the only limitation being the imperative norms of international law. That marks a difference with secondary obligations, usually imposed by international customary law following certain patterns already established –such as cessation, restitution, etc. Although such patterns may be modified by treaty, general law normally determines the obligations and consequences related to responsibility. 2.1. Identification of Liable Parties: Channelling of Liability Where liability is placed primarily on the State -like in the convention on Space objects- and in conventions where part of the damage is allocated on the State, such liability or allocations are independent of any act of the State. The conduct of the persons who caused the damage is not attributed to the State: only their legal consequences are. Most conventions channel liability to the operator of an activity. The operator is defined as the party who has control over the activity at the moment of the incident.5 However, some conventions establish that the party with control is the one appearing in the public register of the State of origin as the owner of the installation or of the vessel, etc. and where such registers do not exist the owner is generally presumed to have direct control. In the Basel Protocol the generator, the exporter, the importer and the disposer are successively liable. Exceptionally, the Space Objects Convention -which deals with State or State sponsored activities- does not channel liability to private parties. The carrier of dangerous goods is the liable party in the Convention on Civil Liability Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), the owner of the vessels in oil conventions. Channeling liability affords a guarantee of prompt compensation to the victims and facilitates the transfer of prevention and liability costs to the prices of goods. Some conventions allocate losses in such a way as to avoid
5
civil, agissant en effet à l’instar d’une personne privée” Jiménez de Arechaga seems to share this opinion. Inter alia, the Convention on Damage caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Rome 1952: arts. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3; CRTD: art. 1.8; The Paris Convention: art. 3; The Vienna Convention: art. 2; The Joint Protocol to the Paris and Vienna Convention: art. 2; The CLC: art. III.1; The Fund Convention: art. 3.2; The Basel Protocol: art. 6; The Lugano Convention: arts: 6.1, 7.1.
Conventional Law
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excessive costs to the industry by fixing limits to the operator’s liability and then including second and third tiers of liability to ensure adequate compensation to victims.6 Risk management - by means of pools and the identification of proper liable parties - might be crucial to achieve a proper balance between prevention and compensation within any regime dealing with liability and risk. 2.2. Flexibility of Causal Links Regimes establishing liability for hazardous activities - especially in regard to the environment -, are forced to address an issue that is particularly uncomfortable for lawyers: the complexity and uncertainty inherent in causal links. In principle, the damage must be caused by the inherent risk or risks of the activity which was the object of the Convention. It is not any damage caused by the activity that is subject to liability. In the Green paper on remedying environmental damage,7 the three main problems regarding causal links are identified. The first is the problem of cocauses, i.e. when the results of many different activities combine and overlap to cause certain damage and their individual contributions cannot be ascertained. The second is the problem of intertemporal harm that takes place when damage does not manifest itself until after an extended lapse of time. The third is scientific uncertainty as to the relationship between pollution and different kinds of damage to health or to the environment.
6
The Lugano Convention, for example, states in its art. 6 that: “1. The operator in respect of a dangerous activity mentioned under Article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraphs a) to c) shall be liable for the damage caused by the activity as a result of incidents at the time or during the period when he was exercising the control of that activity. 2. If an incident consists of a continuous occurrence, all operators successively exercising the control of the dangerous activity during that occurrence shall be jointly and severally liable. However, the operator who proves that the occurrence during the period when he was exercising the control of the dangerous activity caused only a part of the damage shall be liable for that part of the damage only. 3. If an incident consists of a series of occurrences having the same origin, the operators at the time of any such occurrence shall be jointly and severally liable. However, the operator who proves that the activity caused only a part of the damage shall be liable for that part of the damage only.”
7
Article 7, paragraph 4 is also relevant: nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of the operator against any third party”. This makes it clear that it is national law which must provide for the recourse in question and also that this Convention does not follow the pattern of the conventions on nuclear damage, where the operator is barred from recovery. Document COM (93) 47 final, Brussels, 14 May 1993, p. 10. Item 2.1.8.
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(a) Multiple Causation Multiple causation is dealt with in the Paris and Vienna Conventions: in case of damage caused jointly by nuclear and other incidents, the damage which is caused by such other incident shall, to the extent that it is not reasonably separable from the damage or loss caused by the nuclear incident, be considered to be damage caused by the nuclear incident.8 The Space Objects Convention also establishes joint and several liability when two space objects owned by different States are involved in an incident.9 The Lugano Convention reverses the burden of proof, making operators - of several installations or several sites where dangerous activities are conducted - jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from connected incidents, unless operators can prove that they caused only part of the damage.10 (b) Scientific Uncertainty The Fund Convention allows compensating pollution damages when the protection afforded by the Oil Pollution Civil Liability Convention (CLC) is inadequate. Victims of damage may get compensation under the Fund Convention unobtainable under the CLC for “scientific uncertainty” by proving that harm was caused by an incident involving one or more ships in the territory of a contracting State.11 (c) Intertemporal Harm The compensation of intertemporal harm is provided for in the Lugano Convention: “If an incident consists of a continuous occurrence, all operators successively exercising control of the dangerous activity during that occurrence shall be jointly and severally liable.” (art. 6.2) Operators are allowed to prove they caused only part of the harm and therefore are liable only for their portion, thus reversing the presumption previously established. A provision in the Lugano Convention instructs the court, when considering evidence of a causal link between an incident and its consequent damage - or between the activity and the damage - to take due account of the increased danger of causing such damage inherent in the dangerous activity.12 8 9 10 11 12
Paris Convention: art. 3; Vienna Convention: art. IV, 4. Space Objects Convention: arts. IV, V. The Lugano Convention: arts: 6.3, 11. The Fund Convention: arts: 2.1, 4. Article 10. “When Considering evidence of the causal link between the incident and the damage or, in the context of a dangerous activity as defined in Article 2, paragraph 1,
Conventional Law
35
Also, in matters relative to complex causation, alternative options are sometimes offered in civil liability regimes - such as compensation funds formed by contributions of all entities and individuals taking part in the activity in proportion to their participation. Another alternative is the relaxation of scientific evidence requirements and the reversal of the burden of proof - whereby an operator benefiting from an activity or a decision-maker accepting a hazardous activity will have to prove that the damage was due to a cause alien to the activity. 2.3. Liability Multilateral conventions primarily concerned with navigation, oil, nuclear materials, hazardous wastes and other noxiuous substances, impose liability on operators or other suitable parties and sometime on States.13 That is probably the most important feature of these regimes: they emphasize the growing importance of risk as a trigger of liability in lawful activities, and as a consequence the diminishing role of due diligence in matters of compensation for the damages caused. Some conventions -like the Oil Pollution Civil Liability Convention- have a dual compensation scheme, providing for limited compensation in the case of liability and unlimited compensation if fault is proved.14 The Basel Protocol has a similar scheme providing for limited sine delicto liability for the operator, and unlimited responsibility for other liable parties.15 The Kiev Protocol,
13.
14 15
subparagraph (d), between the activity and the damage, the court shall take due account of the increased danger of causing such damage inherent in the dangerous activity.” Lugano Convention, art. 10. It is stated, in the Explanatory Report, that: “This article encourages the Court, when it considers the evidence concerning the causal link between the incident and the damage or, in the context of a site for permanent deposit of waste, between the activity and the damage, to take account of the increased risk of damage from a specific dangerous activity. In order to assist the person suffering damage to obtain compensation, account is taken of the specific risks created by certain dangerous activities of causing a given type of damage. The Convention does not create a true presumption of a causal link. The provision operates as a complement to the system of strict liability. It therefore forms part of all the rules which are designed to assist the person who has suffered damage to prove the causal link which may, in practice, be difficult.” See addendum to CDCJ (92) 50, p. 35. “Multilateral treaty practice touching on the issue of liability may be divided into three broad categories: first, civil liability conventions addressing the question of liability of operators and in some circumstances of States, in terms of both substantive and procedural rules; secondly, treaties which hold the State directly liable; and thirdly, treaties which make a general reference to liability without specifying any further the substantive or procedural rules related thereto”. Survey, cit., p. 44. CLC: art. V.1 and 2 (as amended by the 1992 Protocol). Basel Protocol: arts. 4 and 5.
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besides placing liability on the operator for damage caused by an industrial accident, also attaches liability on any person for damage caused - or contributed to- by his or her wrongful intentional, reckless or negligent acts or omissions. This is in accordance with the relevant rules of applicable domestic law -including laws on the liability of servants and agents.16 The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) establishes liability on the sponsoring State if damage caused by the operator would not have occurred but for the failure of the sponsoring State to carry out its obligations in respect of the operator.17 Liability schemes aim to a more equitable distribution of the consequences of risk. Such schemes –as we have seen above- have no punitive objectives and choose the operators as liable parties because they are easily identifiable and have the capacity to internalize the costs of prevention and translate them to the prices of goods. In most Conventions, “corrective justice” is not a prime concern, which allows establishing limits to liability in order to permit the survival of a determined industry. 2.4. Liability Caps The establishment of liability caps is the mechanism employed to enable a hazardous industry to continue functioning. Unlimited liability would prevent insurance coverage of risks and place excessive costs on the industry. Liability caps balance the interests of industry against those of victims. The establishment of caps means that full compensation may not be accomplished but that objectives beyond full compensation of harm may be attained. In this sense, civil liability schemes differ from those of traditional responsibility: instead of full reparation, they pursue compensation proportionate to the financial possibilities of the industry engaged in the hazardous activity. It is still possible, nevertheless, to accomplish full compensation if industry funds are created and eventually States assume a residual liability to better balance industrial and citizen’s interests. Most civil liability regimes examined contain limits to liability.18 However, there are exceptions -like the Space Objects Convention,19 and the Lugano
16 17 18
19
Survey…cit., p. 59, para. 164. See Art. 8. Inter alia, The Rome Convention of 1952, art.12; the Paris Convention: art. 7.b; The Brussels Supplementary Convention: art. 3.a; The Vienna Convention: art. V; The CLC: art. V; The Fund Convention: art. 4.4; The Basel Protocol: art. 12; Annex VI to the Protocol of Environmental Protection to the Antartic Treaty, The Space Objects Convention: art. XII.
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Convention, which impose no caps. Limits are sometimes imposed in the internal law of the parties. Where this is so, they vary in their amounts and may be the object of periodical review. Limits are an important feature of these regimes and in some cases make their effective implementation possible. 2.5. Layered Liability and Compensation Funds The establishment of different tiers of liability according to the extent of the harm acts as a safety net for hazardous activities. The layers of liability contribute to the effective allocation of risk burdens. Since operators –including their insurance- may be incapable of covering the full amount of damage caused by certain hazardous activities, supplementary liability is extended to other parties benefiting from that activity - even if they had no participation in the incident causing the damage. Layers of liability, together with channeling, provide the materials for risk management schemes by requiring a joint effort by different social actors: that is the substance of the collective liability mentioned in Chapter II.20 Allocation of potential liability between the State and private parties -individually through operator’s liability or collectively through insurance schemes- is a key factor in enabling activities to prosper and provide social benefits, notwithstanding their inherent risk. For example, the Fund Convention of the oil pollution regime sets out a financial fund supported by all those persons receiving oil cargos in the territory of contracting States. The Fund acts as a second tier of liability to cover the compensation costs that exceed the operator’s limit to liability.21 The Brussels Supplementary Convention directs States parties to it to create a third layer of liability for damage caused by nuclear activities, to compensate for harm. The third layer of liability is a fund constituted with public moneys made available by the State of the nuclear installation and all Contracting Parties according to a formula for contributions.22 The compensation fund is another example of collective attribution of liability, where parties cooperate through their contributions, to redress
20
21 22
“[A]lthough all the nuclear conventions focus liability on the operator as the source of damage or pollution, the … Supplementary Conventions clearly recognize that this approach is insufficient, and involve States in meeting substantial losses in excess of the operator’s capacity to pay or cover through insurance. It cannot be said that any of the nuclear conventions fully implements the ‘polluter pays’ principle, or recognizes the unlimited and unconditional responsibility of States within whose border nuclear accidents occur: what they recognize, if imperfectly, is that the scale of possible damage has to be widely and equitably borne if nuclear power is to be internationally accepted.”20 Birnie and Boyle, p. 481. The Fund Convention: art. 4.1.c The Brussels Supplementary Convention: arts: 3.b.(ii) & (iii).
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incidents in which they took no part. Such collective liability serves the purpose of allowing a swift development of a determined industry by translating costs of risk minimization and prevention to the price of goods.23 2.6. State Liability Residual State liability is provided for in some civil liability conventions. There is a general reluctance of States to accepting any kind of liability unless they themselves fall within the definition of operator. However, in the field of nuclear activities, The Vienna Convention provides that States must ensure: “[…] the payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage which have been established against the operator by providing the necessary funds to the extent that the yield of insurance or other financial security is inadequate to satisfy such claims, but not in excess of the limit, if any, established pursuant to article V.”24
There could be three different types of State liability, two of them established in some international conventions and one proposed de lege ferenda. Starting with the last one, alternative liability would imply the substitution, in certain circumstances, of the State for the private party in the primary liability, like where the intervention of several sources of pollution makes the individual participation of each one difficult to establish25, or the operator cannot be identified,26 or the transboundary damage is the result of cumulative effects27. There is subsidiary liability when the primary liability of the State of origin is substituted for that of the operator if the latter does not possess sufficient financial security to cover his liability up to the financial limit. This sort of 23
24 25
26
27
The Brussels Supplementary Convention provides for the formation of a Fund financed by all contracting parties, (art. 12). The Fund Convention provides for a Fund to be financed by oil retailers (those receiving determined quantities of oil in Contracting States). (See The Fund Convention arts. 10, 11). The Basel Protocol considers the possibility of creating a special Fund, and allows the use of its Trust Fund to cover potential liability in excess of the limits provided therein; (art. 15.) The Vienna Convention: art. VII.1. As proposed by Mc Caffrey, see Lefeber. Op.cit., n. 244. p. 301. According to that author, this type of liability may arise in the following cases: 1) no causal link may be established between the operator and the harm, 2) the operator can avail himself of exonerations, 3) the operator’s liability is limited in time and 4) to provide interim relief. (Id., P. 300). As suggested by Njenga Ibid., and by the Second Special Rapporteur (Barboza) A/CN.4/ SER.A/1991, p. 94, para. 68. As proposed by Pawlak. Lefeber, op.cit., n. 244, p. 301.
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accountability would be ex-delicto for the State if it is due to the State failure in the exercise of its supervisory duties.28 Finally, the State’s supplementary liability takes place when the operator’s liability is limited in amount and the damage sustained exceeds that amount. The 1963 OECD Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Art.3 states that a causal link must be found between the operator and the damage and liability does not exist for the State if the operator can invoke an exception. Lefeber observes that: 1) supplementary liability is sine delicto, 2) The State of origin may be free to settle State to State transnationally or by providing the operator with the necessary funds to cover the liability and 3) There are not many sources of International law providing for State liability in the abovementioned case.29 2.7. The Obligation to Contract Insurance Most civil liability regimes require operators to contract insurance or to provide some other financial guarantee to cover either a sum equal to the maximum compensation -where there is a fixed limit- or another sum to be determined by the national authority.30 Owing perhaps to the magnitude of the risks and corresponding insurance premiums, some instruments bar the operator from recovering against whomsoever he may be entitled so to do (for example, against a supplier who sold the defective material causing the accident), and thus he remains the only party who needs to be insured. Such is the solution found by the Vienna Convention, the Paris Convention, the Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, as well as the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
28
29 30
See 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antartic Mineral Resources Activities, Arts. 8(3)a) j.37(3). The State obligation may be of due diligence or strict according to how it is worded. See Lefeber, op.cit., p. 302. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides in article 139 that States parties to the Convention shall ensure that activities in the Area, whether carried out by the State or its nationals, are in conformity with the Convention. When a State party fails to carry out its obligation, it will be liable for damage. Other examples are Regulation 30 of the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area and clause 16 of the Standard Clauses for Exploration contract. Id., pp. 305/6. The Paris convention: art. 10, The Vienna Convention: art. VII; The CLC Convention: art. VII.1; The Basel Protocol: art. 14; The Lugano Convention: art. 12; the Fund Convention: art. 4.2.a.
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Pollution Damage resulting from the Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources. 2.8. Limited Exceptions to Liability The existence of special cases in which there is no liability, or in which liability is not applicable to certain persons in certain circumstances, is common to most of the conventions we are examining -even if the liability they impose is absolute or strict. However, these exceptions are narrower than those included in the State responsibility rules, and have a different nature.31 Exceptions -based on incidents due to acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection- are included in most instruments, as are grave natural disasters of an exceptional character.32 To the list of exceptions, the Lugano Convention adds damage “caused by pollution at tolerable levels under local relevant circumstances”, -which seems to refer to the threshold of damageand damage caused by a dangerous activity taken lawfully in the interests of the person who suffered the damage, whereby it was reasonable towards this person to expose him to the risks of the dangerous activity.33 The Basel Protocol includes in article 4.5 the possibility to prevent the attribution of liability if those liable according to the Convention prove that the damage was: a) the result of an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection: b) the result of a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, unforeseeable and irresistible character; c) wholly the result of compliance with a compulsory measure of a public authority of the State where the damage occurred;34 or d) wholly the result of the wrongful intentional conduct of a third party, including the person who suffered the damage.”35 A general exception in article 9 also states that: “Compensation may be reduced or disallowed if the person who suffered damage, or a person for
31
32 33 34 35
As mentioned above, they are not causes of exemptions of wrongfulness, since liability is not based on wrongful acts, but simple exceptions consequent to certain conducts precluding liability. Also different motivations are behind them; they are usually due to pragmatic reasons whereas exemptions precluding wrongfulness may be perhaps attributed to doctrinaire reasons, like the absolute lack of participation of human will in some of them ( force majeure) or the absence of culpa lato sensu, like in the state of necessity. Paris Convention art. 9; Vienna Convention art. IV.3; CLC art. 2.3. Lugano Convention, art. 8. Also in Lugano Convention art. 8.c. Art. 2.3 of the CLC and Art. 4.3 of the Fund convention include similar provisions.
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41
whom he is responsible under the domestic law, by his own fault, has caused or contributed to the damage having regard to all circumstances.” 3. Conclusion As we have stated in previous chapters, effective risk management requires legal instruments taking account of risk peculiarities. In this chapter, salient specific features of civil liability regimes were summarized considering that such regimes contain the international mechanisms currently used for the regulation of transboundary risk. Undoubtedly, they are more useful than traditional rules of State responsibility for wrongful acts, among other reasons for the absence of key aspects of State responsibility like fault and breach of obligations in the regulation of domestic activities, where States are sovereign. Their sovereignty, however, as proclaimed by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, is limited by their responsibility to ensure the respect for the rights of other States within their own jurisdictional space. Authors like Pierre-Marie Dupuy36 and Jiménez de Aréchaga object to the argument that these conventions establish obligations on the international plane.37; adducing that the obligations on individuals or private entities that result from those conventions are, in fact, imposed by the States parties to their subjects through their municipal law. Consequently, they argue, those liability obligations have no international character. That is correct. But there is one convention, as we saw, that makes primary liability fall squarely on the State. Furthermore, allocation of part of
36
37
[T]outes ces conventions internationales n’établissent qu’un régime de droit uniforme en droit international privé: la personne responsable, sans qu’on ait a établir l’existence a sa charge d’une faute y est responsable civilement, directement vis-à-vis des personnes privées ou publiques qu’elle affecte. Ce responsable peut eventuellement etre un Etat si celui-ci correspond a la definition du responsable au sens définie par les conventions parce-qu’il est, au meme titre que pourrait l’etre une societé privée, operateur de plate-forme ou de centrale núcléaire, par exemple. Autrement dit, l’Etat dans l’ensemble de ces traités, n’apparait pas en tant que personne de droit international public, mais pour ainsi dire en civil, agissant en effet a l’instar d’une personne privée” (Droit International public, Paris 2000, p. 444). “These conventions do not primarily involve State responsibility, but civil liability under the applicable domestic law. They restrict the imposition of absolute liability on States in their capacity as operators”. “…this type of responsibility …has no basis in customary law or general principles and since it deals with exceptions rather than general rules, cannot be extended to fields not covered by the specific instruments” (Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1978, V. 159, p. 273).
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the loss on the State -as in the layers of compensation of the nuclear and oil industries- may be considered a form of subsidiary liability, not just a gracious contribution of industry or State. True, contributors may not have had anything to do with the incident, but they were chosen because of their close relationship with the activity and their benefit from it. Given that the legal nature of liability is very flexible, those types of allocations are some of the forms liability assumes. If this reasoning is correct, States too have certain liability on the international plane. These conventions contain other State obligations, different from those derived from liability. The long and short of these obligations being that States, when they are not operators themselves, have to ensure prompt and adequate compensation to non-resident victims. States must enact legislation necessary to adapt their internal legal systems so as to give victims access to their courts and provide these courts with appropriate jurisdiction and adequate remedies -all under the aegis of the non-discrimination principle.38 That seems to be the real role of States in international conventional law whenever they are not operators: they ensure that compensation is paid under the rules of sine delicto liability. That obligation of States seems to be one of due diligence. As to domestic law, it is but an instrument of the international conventions, which set out in all cases a form of sine delicto liability on operators –or whichever private party is designed as liable. The next chapter will show that in cases where no convention exists to assign responsibility to States or operators, States usually act as if they had some sort of liability. The objective of the present chapter is to identify common criteria applicable to risk regulation in different international regimes. Besides those classically stated - like the redress of the balance of interests or the internalization of costs-, there are two at least which may be called “rational attribution of liability according to capacity for risk management” and “preventive compensation”. Channeling of liability towards determined categories of persons is a rational way of achieving risk minimization. All the regimes examined attribute liability so as to balance the interests of victims with the interests of those conducting the hazardous activity beneficial to society as a whole. Attribution does not follow classic criteria related to intention and causality, rather a flexible approach taylor-made to the type of activity being regulated. Compulsory insurance, liability caps, different tiers of liability and collective
38
Besides, States have obligations of a customary character, like those included in the 2001 prevention articles of the ILC but they do not have to do with liability.
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funds all preserve this first criterion of “rational attribution of liability according to the capacity for risk management”. The principle of preventive compensation, i.e. compensation for preventive measures is closely connected to the rational attribution of liability. Compensation for preventive measures purported to avoid imminent and more extensive harm upon the occurrence of an incident -or before that occurrence in case of the threat of an imminent incident- is included in many regimes as a form of damage suffered by the risk – bearer.39 In a nutshell: regimes dealing with risk have two clear objectives that make international liability for lawful acts a meaningful development for international law. The first is prevention and the second distributive equity. To achieve both of these objectives, one principle may be used as guide in the regulation of risk: the attribution of liability should be according to the best capacity for risk management. The consequence is the preventive aspect of compensation. Both prevention and distributive equity give fundament to a special liability regime for the regulation of risk, since they would not be easily incorporated into a traditional international state responsibility regime.
39
In the text, italics signaled that circumstance.
Chapter V
Other Aspects of International Practice 1. Introduction The present chapter deals with international practice other than conventional law regarding reparation of damages caused by hazardous activities. International practice should be revised to detect whether the classic formative elements of customary rules exist—namely, generalized practice and opinio juris—understood not as a subjective State conviction but as an objective acceptance of the rule, either expressly or by implication in the conduct of States. It is important to find out if the international community has pronounced itself, one way or another, regarding the existence of that customary rule.1 2. Reparation of Transboundary Harm Caused by Hazardous Activities States are uneasy about reparation of transboundary harm caused by hazardous but lawful activities. That unease has not helped the formation of clear rules on the matter in general international law. Extreme caution is shown towards the development of binding rules: in making ex gratia payments, for instance, States have usually proclaimed their feeling of being under no obligation to pay. Conventions have provided compensation for the most frequent cases of transboundary harm caused by specific activities, as explained in Chapter IV, but the number of ratifications or adhesions to those conventions does not show a wide acceptance of their norms by the international community. Moreover, the relative progress in conventional international law has
1
For a more complete explanation of the author’s views regarding the customary law formation process, see “The Customary Rule: from Chrysalis to Butterfly”, in Liber Amicorum in Memoriam of Judge José María Ruda (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, Boston, 2000), pp. 1–14.
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, pp. 45–72. © 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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not been matched in the customary field, where sporadic incidents trigger individual responses in the form of judicial decisions or unilateral or negotiated compromises by governments. The international community seems to slowly advance in the development of general principles through episodes where—often not expressly stated—liability is the source of the obligation to provide reparation. Not all incidents lead to perceive compensation for the harm caused as a clear matter of law; States’ reluctance contributes to a skeptical climate regarding the existence of customary rules imposing State liability for the injurious consequences of non-prohibited hazardous activities. Some authors believe, however, that a principle exists at present in an embryonic state and that its full development is highly dependent on political will and the whims of international relations. In the analysis of international practice, some confusion is incurred regarding two types of damage. There lacks a clear distinction between damages caused by lawful hazardous activities, where liability applies, as opposed to those caused by noxious activities, where responsibility should be in order. Damages caused by hazardous activities and by noxious activities are not comparable: the former are generally tolerated if prompt and adequate compensation follows. Moreover, the hazardous activity causing damages, far from ceasing, is legally allowed to continue. It is permitted because continuation of the activity is allowed due to its social benefits. Noxious activities, on the other hand, may lead to the prohibition of the activity, but they are not the same as prohibited activities. For example, nuclear tests could very well have been considered noxious activities, but they were prohibited after treaties forbidding them came into existence. Under those treaties, States subject to the obligation of abstaining from making such tests incur the breach of an international obligation by the mere fact of making a test, whether or not subsequent material damage may be proved. Furthermore, all the consequences of a breach of obligation are applicable (cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, guarantees and securities of non-repetition)—including procedural consequences, such as countermeasures meeting the legal conditions for their exercise.
3. Some Cases to the Point Some of the cases which will be commented upon presently have already been the object of many analyses and interpretations. The present writer will give his own thoughts about them.
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3.1. A Seminal Decision: the Trail Smelter Case2 (a Noxious Activity Transformed into a Hazardous One?) The Trail Smelter is a classic case regarding an industrial activity that caused, in the course of its normal operation, transboundary harm that reached unacceptable levels. In the 1940’s, a private smelter in Canada, through the ongoing emission of deleterious fumes, affected some woods and arable lands in the State of Washington. The damages caused, even if economically significant, were small in proportion to the value of the smelter’s production. The first part of the decision on the Trail Smelter illustrates the application of the sic utere tuo principle; it does not seem to give any argument in favor of the existence of State liability in general international law. This is so because the activity of the smelter, in the conditions in which it was conducted, was not a hazardous activity but a noxious one. Due to certain factors—like the permanent meteorological conditions in the Columbia River Valley and the composition of the fumes—the damages to fields in the State of Washington were not contingent, but a necessary consequence of the activity. The tribunal was satisfied that the obligation—confirmed later on by the Corfu Channel decision—not to use or permit the use of a State’s territory against the rights of other States had been breached.3 The agreement provided to the tribunal was to “apply the law and practice followed in dealing with cognate [i.e., similar] questions in the United States of America as well as International Law and Practice,” and to give “consideration to the desire of the High Contracting Parties [i.e., the U.S. and Canada] to reach a solution just to all parties concerned.”4 2 3
4
UNRIAA, Vol. III, p. 1963; IELR, I, 326. Trail Smelter Case 1938–1941, Part Five. The Corfu Channel decision added the concept expressed by the word “knowingly.” Cf. Corfu Channel Case. (Assessment of Compensation). ICJ Reports 1949, p. 244. The Trail Smelter tribunal, moreover, stated that the solution proposed was “just to all parties concerned” “as long, at least, as the present conditions in the Columbia River valley continue to prevail” (Id., p. 1965)— i.e., those conditions making of the smelter’s activity a noxious one. Under the April 15, 1935 agreement between the United States and Canada an arbitral tribunal was created which was to determine: 1.Whether damage caused by the Trail Smelter in the state of Washington had occurred since the first day of January, 1932, and, if so, what indemnity should be paid therefore? 2. In the event of the answer to the first part of the preceding question being in the affirmative, whether the Trail Smelter should be required to refrain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the future and, if so, to what extent? 3. In the light of the answer to the preceding question, what measures or regime, if any, should be adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter? 4. What indemnity or compensation, if any, should be paid on account of any decision or decisions rendered by the tribunal pursuant to the next two preceding questions? UNRIAA, Trail Smelter Case 1938–1941, Vol. 3, p. 1939.
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The arbitral tribunal’s conclusion regarding the source of the obligation to compensate was categorical: […] under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.5
The arbitral tribunal considered, then, that an international obligation had been breached and compensation was in order: even though the activity in itself was lawful, the way in which it was conducted in the circumstances of the case had transformed it into a noxious one. The Court held “… that Canada is responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter” and that “it is the duty of the Government of the Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of the Dominion under international law as herein determined.”6 The tribunal found support in Eagleton (“A State owes at all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts from individuals within its jurisdiction”) and in international practice “since the Alabama case onwards”.7 The tribunal did not consider the issue of fault of the Dominion: it simply decided that the Dominion had to pay compensation for the damage done. The language used in the commented paragraph: “No State has a right,” etc., is equivalent to “A State has the obligation not to” or “A State must abstain from doing”. The tribunal most likely thought that the compensation international law imposed on Canada was a secondary obligation and fault was irrelevant, as it is in most international obligations. In that case, the conduct of Canada in inflicting on the United States territory injury by fumes was a wrongful conduct. Moreover, risk was not mentioned at all in the judgment: the activity must have been recognized by the tribunal as a noxious conduct. There is, however, another aspect of that case of interest to our research. As is known, the court prescribed a regime for the functioning of the smelter, which would result in preventing thereafter any material damage in or to the State of Washington: The Tribunal is of opinion that the prescribed regime will probably remove the causes of the present controversy and, as said before, will probably result in 5 6 7
Id., p. 1965. Id., p. 1966. Id., p. 1963.
Other Aspects of International Practice
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preventing any damage of a material nature occurring in the State of Washington in the future. [However,] if any damage […] shall occur in the future, whether through failure on the part of the smelter to comply with the regulations herein prescribed or notwithstanding the maintenance of the regime, an indemnity shall be paid for such damage.8 (Emphasis added.)
This paragraph, in conjunction with Egleaton’s citation, may be interpreted as the imposition by the Court of sine delicto liability on the State of Canada in the future, since it stressed the irrelevance of due diligence (due diligence being represented in the case by the fulfillment of the Court’s prevention regime) in the determination of the duty to compensate.9 The tribunal makes Canada “responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter” and indemnity is payable “whether through failure on the part of the smelter to comply with the regulations herein prescribed or notwithstanding the maintenance of the regime.” (Emphasis added.) An act of the State was not envisaged in this paragraph. Following, the court added: “… but only when and if the two Governments shall make arrangements for the disposition of claims for indemnity under the provisions of article XI of the Convention.…”10 Under the new regime, the Dominion had apparently a vicarious liability with respect of the conduct of the smelter. Such type of accountability is, in this case, a form of sine delicto liability, because fault in both its meanings would not intervene in determining the liable party. In short, in this part of the tribunal’s judgment regarding the future activity of the Smelter, such activity was considered a hazardous one, because after having introduced a complete set of prevention measures (the regime), the causation of an accident would be evidence that even the exercise of the due diligence measures of prevention advised by the court had not completely eliminated the possibility of accidents happening. This margin represented the notion of risk which was missing in the first part of the judgment and the activity—subject to the prevention regime fixed by the tribunal—was now considered, whether explicitly or not, a hazardous activity. The tribunal, furthermore, did not determine that the activity should cease in case of accidental damages occurring, only that such damages had to be compensated, which meant that the smelter’s activity, the way it was now
8 9 10
Id., 1980 Ibid. Ibid. The pertinent part of Article XI read: “Upon receiving such report”—the tribunal’s report to the Governments of its final decisions—“the Governments may make arrangements for the disposition of claims for indemnity of damage, if any, which may occur subsequently to the period of time covered by such report.”
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conducted, ceased to be considered a noxious one. We might finally add that the conclusion in favor of the interpretation that the court imposed a sine delicto liability regime is reinforced by the fact that flexible methods for the disposition of claims were left to the mutual agreement of the Governments concerned. 3.2. Cases of Wrongful Conduct for Lack of Due Diligence (a) The Alabama Case As will be explained a little further, some writers opine that risk can be best managed by imposing stringent prevention obligations proportional to the risk inherent in an activity. That is correct, but their concept of “proportionality” seems to be that of requiring such a high standard of diligence as to virtually annul the possibility of avoiding responsibility. The Alabama tribunal chose a standard of diligence “in exact proportion to the risk to which either of the belligerents may be exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligation of neutrality on their part”11—in other words, a higher degree of diligence than that invoked by Great Britain. This case is not an example of liability sine delicto but one where the British were found plainly negligent in the fulfillment of their own duties. In our opinion, however, the case does not prove much: the real degree of diligence actually employed by the British seems to have been much lower than that proposed by Great Britain herself as the right standard (“such care as Governments ordinarily employ in their domestic concerns”).12 The British conduct was found to be far from proportional to the exigencies of the situation, even from a reasonable conception of proportionality.
11 12
J.B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations, Volume I (1898), p. 654. The tribunal found that: [T]he British Government failed to use due diligence in the performance of its neutral obligations; and especially that it omitted, notwithstanding the warning and official representations made by the diplomatic agents of the United States during the construction of the said No 290 [the Alabama], to take in due time any effective measures of prevention, and that those orders which it did give at last, for the detention of the vessel, were issued so late that their execution was not practicable. Besides, “after the escape of the vessel, the measures taken for its pursuit and arrest were so imperfect as to lead to no result and therefore cannot be considered sufficient to release Great Britain from the responsibility already incurred.”(Id., p. 656)
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(b) The Corfu Channel Case13 The general rule14 stated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel decision declaring the obligation of every State not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States15 seems to apply to cases of responsibility for wrongful acts rather than cases of liability. The word “knowingly” used in the famous passage of the Corfu Channel decision implies fault (culpa lato sensu) of the State; in the instances now under examination, “knowingly” implies the omission of measures which could have prevented the damage.16 The court found that the mine field in the channel could not have been settled without the knowledge of the Albanian Government: whether or not the court arrived at that conviction through a “liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence”17 is immaterial to our analysis. The fact is that the court reached its conviction and decided Albania was responsible for the damage. Responsibility also applied, as we have seen, in the first part of the Trail Smelter, for the reasons given above, and it applied in nuclear tests18, because the case was rather one of a noxious activity of France19 and the court indicated
13 14
15 16
17 18
19
Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), p. 4. “It should be noted that in this passage the Court was making a general statement of law and policy, not limited or narrowed to any specific case. When the Court renders a decision in a case in accordance with Article 38 of its Statute, it may also declare general statements of law. The aforementioned passage is among such statements.” Survey of liability regimes, etc., Doc. A/CN.4/543, p. 79. Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom v. Albania) ICJ Reports 4 (1949), p. 22. The present writer finds some difficulty in classifying the Corfu Channel decision as one simply based on the lack of due diligence on the part of Albania; in his opinion there was an innuendo of something more than that in the language employed by the court: “The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” Corfu Channel case cit., p. 6. (Emphasis added.) Corfu Channel case cit., p. 6 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Reports (1973), p. 135. The fact that there could be some accidental damage due to the “widespread radioactive fallout” on Australian and New Zealand territory and “elsewhere in the southern hemisphere” did not change the basically noxious character of the nuclear tests. See following note.
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a provisional measure based on the consideration that, if the concerns of Australia and New Zealand were justified, a judgment in their favor was possible.20 It would also have been applicable to Lake Lanoux, where the court left it to be understood that France would have incurred responsibility for an internationally wrongful act either by diminishing the volume of waters due to Spain or altering their quality.21 (c) The Sandoz Chemical Accident In 1986, fire broke out at a warehouse which contained agricultural chemicals belonging to Sandoz S.A. in Switzerland. The water used to douse the fire led to the release of water heavily polluted with toxic substances into the Rhine River, with grave damage to fishing and the extraction of drinking water. France and Germany claimed compensation to both Sandoz and the Swiss Government for an amount of close to 100 million Swiss francs. “The Swiss government acknowledged its lack of due diligence in preventing the accident through adequate regulation of its own pharmaceutical industries.”22 And both Sandoz and the Swiss Government paid a considerable sum to French and German Governments and claimants as compensation. Later on, Sandoz created a fund to help return the Rhine River to its previous condition and made donations of $7 million to the World Wildlife Fund with the same purpose. Lack of due diligence seems to have been the legal justification for the payments made by both.23
20
21 22 23
The Court, in its Order of 22 June, 1973, took note of the Australian concern that “the atmospheric nuclear explosions carried out by France in the Pacific have caused widespread radioactive fall-out on Australian territory and elsewhere in the southern hemisphere, have given rise to measurable concentrations of radio-nuclide in foodstuffs and in man, and have resulted in additional radiation doses to persons living in that hemisphere and in Australia in particular; that any radio-active material deposited on Australian territory will be potentially dangerous to Australia and its people and any injury caused thereby would be irreparable; that the conduct of French nuclear tests in the atmosphere creates anxiety and concern among the Australian people; that any effects of the French nuclear tests upon the resources of the sea or the conditions of the environment can never be undone and would be irremediable by any payment of damages; and any infringement by France of the rights of Australia and its people to freedom of movement over the high seas and superjacent airspace cannot be undone;” ICJ Reports (1973), p. 99. Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. France) 12, UNRRIA 281 (1057) at para. 6. Id., p. 143. In n. 624, quoting Pisillo-Mazzeschi. Ibid., in n. 625, quoting Schwabach.
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3.3. Invocation of a Treaty and of a General Principle of Law (a) The Gut Dam Case24 The Gut Dam case provides another precedent of sine delicto liability in international law. As a consequence of the construction of a dam in Canadian territory in 1903—which was built in order to improve navigation in the Saint Lawrence River—the waters reached unprecedented levels in 1952–53. The increase in water levels—caused by the dam plus storms and other natural phenomena—resulted in extensive flooding and erosion, causing injury to the shores of Lake Ontario in the United States. The United States presented a claim for damages against Canada before the Lake Ontario tribunal, established in 1965 to resolve the matter.25 The tribunal recognized the liability of Canada without finding any fault or negligence. The source of the duty to compensate was the Treaty signed by both parties, which stated that: … [I]f the construction and operation of the said dam shall cause damage or detriment to the property owners of Les Gallops Island, or to the property of any other citizens of the United States, the government of Canada shall pay such amount of compensation as may be agreed upon between the said government and the parties damaged, or as may be awarded the said parties in the proper court.…26
Both parties to the treaty had decided to apply liability to compensate for damages caused by a lawful hazardous activity (the construction and functioning of a dam). Moreover, Canada did not oppose exceptions, (force majeure due to atmospheric conditions which contributed to the damages caused or due diligence) which confirms her liability had a sine delicto character. In 1968, Canada paid the United States a lump-sum of $350,000 as full and final satisfaction for all claims.27 This sum did not have a direct relation with proved damages; it apparently was based on the Parties’ negotiated appreciation of the amount necessary to re-establish their balance of interests, without direct reference to fault or the type or amounts of damages taken into account. Considering that the rule applied by the Parties originated in a treaty between them, this episode does not tell much about the existence of such rule 24
25 26 27
Gut Dam Case (Canada/ United States of America), 1968, I.L.M. [8:1969], pp. 118 and 128/138; IELR, I, 386. Id., pp. 118 and 128/138. IELR, I, 393. Id., p. 423.
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in general international law, but it does point to the opinion of those Parties as to the correct way of regulating in law a hazardous activity between them. (b) The Cherry Point Oil Spill, 1972 A Liberian registered oil tanker engaged in unloading operations at Cherry Point, Washington State, suffered an accident the result of which was the spilling of some 12,000 gallons of crude oil, fouling the waters and about five miles of Canadian coast. Canada claimed “full and prompt compensation” for all damages suffered and full clean-up costs to be paid by those responsible.28 Canada invoked the “…principle established in the 1938 Trail Smelter arbitration between Canada and the United States. This has established that one country may not permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury to the territory of another and shall be responsible to pay compensation for any injury so suffered.”29 The Canadian allegation may have extended the scope of a principle applied only to willful or negligent conduct to also cover accidents. The private company responsible for the pollution offered to pay the costs of the clean-up operations; the official United States response to the Canadian claim remains unclear.30 (c) The “Cosmos” Incident31 Following the “Cosmos 954” incident, in which a nuclear-powered Soviet surveillance satellite crashed on Canadian territory in January 1978, Canada formally presented a claim to the U.S.S.R. based on the provisions of the 1972 Convention on Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects (the 1972 Convention)32 to which both countries were parties. The damages that were claimed included mostly those clean-up activities that were performed to prevent further damages (costs of response measures). It seems, however, that such damage may not have been clearly recoverable under the 1972 Convention and so Canada invoked, together with the said Convention, the U.SS.R.’s duty
28 29 30
31
32
Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XI, 1973, 333 at p. 334. Ibid. “Survey of State practice relevant to international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1985, Vol. II, part one (Addendum) p. 100. Claim against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, 18 ILM. 899–901 (1979) and additional Annex A, 18 ILM 902–908 (1979). Also in Sands, et al. (eds.) Op.cit., p. 1550. 1972, Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects. (The Space Objects Convention.)
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to compensate based on the general principles of international law which established liability for damage caused by space activities. Canada made no reference to the breach of an obligation or of fault of the U.S.S.R. to support its claim.33 The U.S.S.R. offered to Canada, as compensation, $ 3 million for damages. According to a note of 21 March 1978 from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, “[T]he Soviet side, as a party to the 1972 Convention on international liability for damage caused by cosmic objects, will consider the question of such damage in strict accordance with the provisions of that convention.”34 3.4. Ex-gratia and Other Payments or Government Commitments (a) Nuclear Tests in the Marshall Islands Between 1946 and 1958, the United States, which was administering the territory of the Marshall Islands as trustee, conducted 67 atmospheric nuclear tests in this territory: 43 at Enewetak Atoll, 23 at Bikini Atoll, and one approximately 85 miles from Enewetak. The most powerful of those tests was called the “Bravo” test—a 15-megaton device detonated on March 1, 1954, at Bikini atoll. That test alone was equivalent to a thousand Hiroshima bombs.35 Most of these tests are not really cases of hazardous activities: the deleterious effects of nuclear experiments on the environment and human beings were generally known to the acting State. The fact that it was not formally prohibited does not mean that the acting State did not have any obligation to compensate for the damages caused, since it is not lawful to knowingly causing damage (Corfu Channel dictum). Some of these cases, where damage done to the environment of some places made them inhabitable, are rather examples of noxious conducts. However, some other ex-gratia payments corresponded to activities or acts which could be considered hazardous, as in the following examples. (b) Rongelap Atoll In this case, a report of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States Senate stated that: owing to an unexpected wind shift36
33
34
35 36
Sands, et al. (eds.) Op.cit., p. 1556. “Canada-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Protocol on settlement of Canada’s claim for damages caused by ‘Cosmos 954.’ ” Moscow, April 2, 1981. Unofficial translation of the note quoted from Texts of Diplomatic Communications Between the Department of External Affairs and the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 18 ILM, pp. 922/923. This “unexpected wind shift” moved us to present this case as probably one of a hazardous nature.
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immediately following a nuclear explosion in 1954 in the Trust territories administered by the United States, the 82 inhabitants of the Rongelap Atoll were exposed to heavy radioactive fallout.37 This was an accident in the framework of an activity whose inherent risk was that the effects of a nuclear explosion would get out of control. The U.S. at that time did not recognize having violated any obligation under international law even though the report concluded that: “It cannot be said, however, that the compensatory measures heretofore taken are fully adequate.…”38 The report indicated, however, that bill No. 1988 (on payment of compensation) presented in the House of Representatives was “needed to permit the United States to do justice to these people”. On 22 August 1964, President Johnson signed into law an act under which the United States assumed: “compassionate responsibility to compensate inhabitants of the Rongelap Atoll, in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for radiation exposures sustained by them as a result of a thermonuclear detonation at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands on March 1, 1954,”(emphasis added) and authorized $950,000 to be paid in equal amounts to the affected inhabitants of Rongelap.39 The conclusion of the “Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association” included extra compensation for the people of Rongelap, setting aside $37.5 million to the Rongelap Distribution Authority in payment of claims arising out of the Nuclear Testing Program for loss of or damage to property and person. (c) The Fukuyu Maru Fishing Vessel The first hydrogen bomb was detonated on the waters surrounding the Marshall Islands in March 1947 and, despite the fact that the government of the United States took precautions to seal off a very wide area around the site of the detonation to prevent harmful consequences, the test caused severe nuclear fallout extending far beyond the established 30,000-square-mile danger zone. The effect of natural unpredictable systems—such as the wind—caused exposure to severe radioactive fallout to the crew of the Fukuyu Maru, a
37
38 39
“Survey of State practice relevant to international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law”, prepared by the Secretariat. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1985, Vol. II, Part One, p. 99. ILC Reports 1996, Annex I. Comments on article 5. M. Whiteman, ed., Digest of International Law (Washington D.C.), Vol. 6, pp. 258–259; Vol. 4, 567.
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Japanese fishing-vessel that was out of the danger zone. The government of Japan claimed compensation for the injuries to Japanese fishermen and for the contamination of the atmosphere and the fish, which seriously disrupted the Japanese fish market. In a note dated 4 January 1955, the United States Government, completely avoiding any reference to legal liability, agreed to pay compensation for injury caused by the tests in the quantity of $2 million.40 (d) The River Mura Incident In 1959, Austria accepted to pay monetary and other forms of compensation to Yugoslavia for the economic loss incurred by two paper mills and damage to fisheries as a result of pollution in the River Mura, a watercourse forming the frontier between both countries. Pollution was caused by sediments and mud which several Austrian hydroelectric plants had released by partially draining their reservoirs in order to forestall major flooding.41 (e) The Colorado River Salinity Dispute The construction by the United States of the Imperial Dam in 1961 resulted in an increase in the salinity of the waters of the Colorado River received by Mexico, frustrating the use of those waters for irrigation in the Mexicali Valley. Both countries were parties to a 1944 bilateral treaty42 where the amounts of water to be received by Mexico were specified, but nothing was said of the quality of those waters. Mexico argued that the conduct of the United States was a violation of the treaty and the U.S. maintained that the treaty did not expressly deal with the quality of the waters and only referred to water quantity share. Mexico also argued that: “Any contamination of international water by one of the riparian partners that causes damage or loss to the other riparian party is in itself an act clearly and specifically condemned by international law.”43 The dispute was referred to the U.S.A.-Mexican International Boundary Waters Commission, an interstate negotiating body. In 1965, both countries reached a provisional agreement and, in 1972, a definitive one which solved the problem: the United States agreed to provide an annual delivery of good 40 41 42
43
Id., p. 136 Ibid. United States-Mexico Treaty for Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande(Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman (Texas) to the Gulf of Mexico. See Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, pp. 945–966. Note from the Embassy of Mexico No. 4012 of November 9, 1961.
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quality water and contribute to the improvement and rehabilitation of the Mexicali Valley. This is a case where the U.S. implicitly recognized that Mexico had a right—even if, perhaps, not strictly derived from the treaty—not to suffer transboundary damage. (f) The Tanker Juliana, 1971 Juliana, a Liberian tanker, suffered an accident off the west coast of the Japanese island of Honshu. The oil it was carrying damaged shores and local fisheries extensively. Liberia offered 200 million yen to fishermen for damages, which they accepted. This is a case where the Government of Liberia accepted liability for private entities acting under its jurisdiction without any official allegation of wrongdoing on its part.44 (g) The Japanese Ship Showa Maru, 1975 An accidental oil spill in the Singapore Strait caused pollution damage to three States—namely, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia—the three of which claimed $28 million for damages and clean-up costs. Japan compensated partially. The affected parties also obtained from Japan help in installing safety devices for navigation in the straight.45 3.5. Reservation of Rights and Invocation of Responsibility: Other Cases (a) France-Switzerland Border, 1892 In a border incident between France and Switzerland, the 1892 French Government decided to halt its military practice exercise near the Swiss border until steps had been taken to avoid accidental transboundary injury.46 (b) Arcisate, Italy In 1948, Switzerland complained to Italy that a munitions factory in Arcisate, close to the border, had caused some damages in Swiss territory and demanded reparation, invoking the principle of good neighborliness.47
44 45
46
47
Survey of Liability Regimes…etc. Doc. A/CN.4/543, p. 141. Quoted in Nathalie L.J.T. Horbach, Liability versus Responsibility in International Law, Amsterdam 1996, p. 277. P. Guggenheim, “La pratique suisse (1956)”, Annuaire suisse de droit international (Zurich), Vol. X IV (1957), p. 168. “Survey…” cit., p. 141.
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(c) The Beaufort Sea Prospection The Canadian Government undertook to guarantee compensation for any damage that might be caused in the United States by a prospect that was to be undertaken close to the Alaskan border by a private corporation. The Canadian Government accepted liability on a subsidiary basis for payment of the cost of transfrontier damage should the bonding arrangement provided by the company proved to be inadequate.48 (d) A Mexican Highway The United States Government considered that a highway being constructed in Mexico and crossing two canyons draining northward into the United States, could flood in certain circumstances and did not offer sufficient guarantees for the security of property situated in United States territory. In a note presented to the Mexican Government, the United States reserved its rights under international law in the event of damages resulting from the construction of said highway.49 (e) The Rose Street Canal In the correspondence concerning the Rose Street Canal, both the United States and Mexico reserved the right to invoke the accountability of the State whose construction activities caused damage in the territory of the other State.50 (f) French and American Nuclear Tests in the Pacific and the Cannikin Nuclear Test in Alaska Regarding the United States Cannikin underground nuclear tests on Amchitka Island, in Alaska, Canada reserved its rights to compensation in the event of damage in the Pacific Ocean. Also, Japan and New Zealand reserved their right to hold the United States and France liable for any loss or damage inflicted by further nuclear tests. However, no claims were made.51 (g) Peyton Packing and Casuco, 1961 In 1961, the activities of two United States companies, Peyton Packing and Casuco, located on the border between Mexico and the United States, were 48 49 50 51
Id., p. 143. Id., p. 135. Ibid. Ibid.
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causing some damages in Mexican border cities. As a consequence of representations made by the Mexican Government before the American Government, measures were adopted by the companies to prevent the continuation of damages in Mexican territory.52 (h) A Belgian Refinery In 1973, the Netherlands Government communicated its concern to the Belgian Government regarding the planned construction of a refinery at Lanaye, near their common border, which threatened the nearby Netherlands National Park. The Belgian Government, asked by the Belgian Parliament about the issue,53 gave assurances to the Parliament about its intention to respect the principle of mutual information about activities that may have adverse consequences on each other of the States’ territory contained in the Benelux accords. (i) Nuclear Reactor in Dukovany In Dukovany, close to the frontier of former Czechoslovakia with Austria, two nuclear power reactors were scheduled to begin operating by 1980. The Government in Prague accepted the Austrian request for talks between the two countries regarding the safety of the plant.54 3.6. The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) By its Resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council made the State of Iraq liable under international law for any direct loss, damage—including environmental damage—and depletion of natural resources or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. A fund was created in paragraph 18 of the resolution to pay compensation for the claims falling within paragraph 16 and a Commission (the UNCC) was created to administer the fund.
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24 M. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law (Washington, D. C.), Vol. 6, pp. 258–259. The Netherlands Government declared that it was an established principle in Europe that negotiations with affected States were obligatory before the initiation of any activities that might cause injury to their territory (Belgium Parliament, regular session 1972–1973, Questions et reponses, bulletin No. 31. Osterreichische ZeitschriftfiirAussenpolitik, Vol. 15 (1975), cited in G. Handl, “An international legal perspective on the conduct of abnormally dangerous activities in frontier areas: The case of nuclear power plant siting”, Ecology Law Quarterly (Berkeley, California), Vol. 7, No. 1 (1978), p. 1.
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The Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) in its first resolution interpreted “direct loss” as resulting from, among other things: “(c) Actions by officials, employees or agents of the Government of Iraq or its controlled entities during [the period 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991] in connection with the invasion or occupation; (d) The breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq during that period. It thus suggested the responsibility of Iraq for damage to the environment caused by Iraqi servicemen, even acting in a wholly private capacity, such as private soldiers looting and destroying property in their retreat.55
In practice, claimants were only required to prove the direct causal link between the environmental loss and the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and the value of the alleged loss.56 3.7. The IXTOC I blowout The IXTOC I oil well in Campeche Bay blew out in 1979 resulting in a fire and flow of oil into the sea, fouling territorial waters of the United States and reaching the shores of Texas. Mexico rejected any responsibility for damages caused to the United States and apparently, “due to the fact that the United States found it politically undesirable to bring action against the Mexican Government,” civil claims were presented and the matter was finally resolved in an agreement. The agreement settled the claims arising from the blowout between the United States and Sedco, the company which chartered the drilling rig to the Mexican Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos). Neither party admitted or conceded fault, negligence or legal liability for the initial blow-out, the subsequent pollution or any damages actually or allegedly suffered by any party.57 This case would have been a good testing ground for the objective of the present research had the United States Government attempted a formal claim against the Mexican Government in international law. Since it did not, the
55 56
57
See Survey 2003 cit., p. 134. Mojtaba Kazazi, “Environmental Damage in the practice of the UN Compensation Commission”. p. 210 in, Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law. Bowman and Boyle eds. Oxford 2002, pp. 111–131. Id., p. 140. Sedco agreed to pay $2 million in full and final settlement, and in exchange, therefore, the United States offered a full and unconditional release of Sedco, with full reservation of its rights against Perforaciones Marinas del Golfo (Permargo) (the Mexican drilling contractor) and Pemex. On 22 March 1983, Sedco also agreed to pay $2.14 million to settle four lawsuits filed by fishermen, resorts and others affected by the oil spill. 22 ILM (1983) 580, at p. 583.
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path left to the victims was hindered by State immunity in a domestic court. However, a private entity took charge of the liability and compensated for the damage caused.58 4. Some Conclusions on the Cases Examined The conclusion reached in the 2003 Secretariat Survey on the reservation of rights and invocation of responsibility was that: Judicial decisions, official correspondence and inter-State relations show that, in certain circumstances, States are held accountable for the private activities conducted within their territorial jurisdiction and for the activities they themselves conduct within or beyond the limits of their territorial border. Even when States have refused to accept liability as a legal principle, they have nevertheless acted as though they accepted such liability, whatever the terms used to describe their position.59
The present writer agrees with that conclusion. All the cases under examination here show that claims for transboundary damage have not been left without response even where conventional rules were not applicable: either the State or a private party, normally the operator or the owner of the concern, or another person related to the activity causing the damage, pays for the compensation. A valid conclusion may be that transboundary damage is a matter where States of origin do not feel detached when foreign claims are presented and that transboundary damage should be compensated, whether it is caused by wrongful (intentional or negligent) conduct or by the authorization of a hazardous activity by the State of origin. That concern of States is reflected in the liability and compensation conventions, where States are obliged to give access to their courts to non-residents, provide their courts with adequate remedies and, in general, ensure that foreign claims be judicially adjudicated through due process and prompt and adequate compensation. Wrongful conduct and risk make damages compensable, not prohibited. If transboundary damage were prohibited, as some authors pretend, there would be no need for the complex conventions that exist; one article would be more than enough. Surely the States feel responsible for taking some preventative measures (notification, consultation, information, authorization of the activity, etc.), the
58 59
Natalie L.J.T. Horbach, op.cit., p. 297. Survey of Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic of International Liability…etc. Doc. A/ CN.4/543, p. 135.
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omission of which would originate responsibility.60 That belongs to the field of prevention, but regarding remedies and compensation, the States have important roles to play, and they know it. Sometimes, like in the “Cosmos 954” incident, the State of origin pays a certain amount as a result of an agreement with the affected State. In such cases, when the claim is formally advanced and seriously pursued, the payment looks more like a whole or partial admission of the claimant’s right and a transaction of compensation than it does an ex-gratia payment. Even so, ex-gratia payments strongly suggest the State of origin’s inner conviction regarding its liability: they would not be made but for the belief that some sort of compensation is due in law. Governments are not prone to give public money away and, although they enjoy certain discretion in matters of foreign relations, expenses incurred must be justified internally at least as having some legal ground. The expression “compassionate” qualifying “responsibility”—as used by the U.S. Government in the Rongelap Atoll case— seems hardly enough to deprive that word (responsibility) of all its legal weight and leaves floating in the air a suggestion that legal accountability has not been entirely alien to the decision of compensating the damage. Ex-gratia payments may also intend to avoid the creation of a precedent analogically applicable to other cases where, perhaps, the circumstances would be somewhat different or less clearly justifying compensation. Precedents are particularly valuable—or dangerous, depending on the situation—in a decentralized order like international law: their accumulation may give rise to a customary norm of a scope larger than wished by the State making, out of caution, compassion or guilt, the ex–gratia payment, or may give arguments to opponents in possible future controversies or may run counter the actual position of States making them.61 The above payments were intended as compensation for harm originated in hazardous activities. The fact that there was no breach of obligation seems to give some evidence of the acceptance of international sine delicto liability by States for harm caused by their own hazardous activities. In the particular cases examined concerning the United States, the U.S. Government
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61
States must also ensure that private operators, owners, carriers, etc., take in the actual conduction of the activity all reasonable measures to prevent the occurrence of accidents causing harm. An upper or lower riparian State, for instance, will never make compensation in whatever field which may compromise its position in the field of watercourses; neither will an important pollution exporter regarding liability for transboundary damage. Therefore, ex-gratia payments are made.
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did not go into the matter of whether fault was required to justify the payments, thus going a certain way in expressing its own opinio juris on this practice. 5. Transboundary Damage in International Law: the Role of the State Are States of origin accountable in international law for transboundary damage caused by hazardous but lawful activities? If so, are they subject to liability or to responsibility? In conventional international law, some forms and degrees of liability are assigned to the State, in a gradient going from the convention on responsibility for objects launched to the space—where State liability is primary and absolute62—down to conventions on nuclear and oil industries, where the State has subsidiary liability. As regards international practice, other than in treaties, opinion is divided. A brief review of learned opinion will show different positions vis-à-vis the existence and role of liability in general international law. 5.1. Learned Opinion Learned opinion is divided between (a) those who believe that there is for either State or individual liability no place at all in general international law and (b) those for whom liability either exists as an exception in certain sectors, like ultra-hazardous activities and environmental law, or is an emerging principle of international law. Before entering into the examination of doctrines, a caveat should be made—i.e., that reversing the onus probandi is not a form of objective liability, even if the effects of both mechanisms are not far from each other. Reversing the burden of proof only changes the party who must prove the existence of the subjective element of fault (culpa). (a) Doctrines in Favor of the Existence or Emergence of a Principle of Liability Sine Delicto (i) The Abuse of Rights Doctrine The doctrine of abuse of rights belongs to something like the pre-history of legal opinion on this matter. It was abandoned in the middle of the 1960s. F.V. García Amador, as the first Special Rapporteur of the responsibility topic,
62
See n. 2.
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considered that States had the right to conduct or allow the conduction in their territory of all sorts of activities, but permitting hazardous activities in detriment of other States was an abuse of rights (abus de droit). The doctrine of abuse of rights found little support in learned opinion. Ian Brownlie resumes: “In conclusion, it may be said that the doctrine is a useful agent in the progressive development of the law, but that, as a general principle it does not exist in positive law.”63 Abus de droit, moreover, is not an exception to the alleged general principle that only wrongful acts give rise to State accountability, because if a general rule of international law prohibits the abuse of rights, any abuse of right means a breach of that general rule and is, therefore, an international wrong. (ii) Ultra-Hazardous Activities: the Protection of the Environment As a reaction to the eruption of industrial and technological activities, and the ever growing risks they have brought about, as well as the increasing preoccupation for the environment, some writers were inclined to admit in international law principles of strict liability which were well known and applied in domestic legal systems.64 Ultra-hazardous activities (Wilfred Jenks,65 L.F.E.Goldie66) were proposed de lege ferenda as an adequate field of application of no-fault (culpa) liability, whereas other writers went farther by accepting that liability applied to those activities as a principle of positive law
63 64
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66
Principles of International Law, 3d ed., Oxford 1979, pp. 443 ss. A precursor was Max Sorensen, (Cf. Principes de droit internacional public, Cours général, Recueil des cours. Vol. 101, 1960, III, p. 222). In his general course at the Hague Academy of International Law, he proposed to extend no-fault (culpa) liability to international law in order to indemnify damages caused by high-risk activities. To Jenks, international law was moving towards admitting strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities. He proposed a UN Declaration that States would be responsible for ultra-hazardous activities developed within their jurisdiction or undertaken on their behalf or with their authorization. V. Jens, “Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law” in RC, Vol. 117, 1966, I, pp. 99 ss. Goldie followed Jenks’ general ideas. He based them on legal principles like the balance of interests between the victims of damages and the society. Hazardous activities, despite the risks they entailed, should continue for reasons of social benefit, but damage due to an act, even a lawful act amounted to an expropriation of amenities as well as an unjust enrichment if uncompensated. (“Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk” in the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XVI, 1985, pp. 175, ss, esp. p. 189). Liability was an emerging principle of international law because of the number of conventions adopting it. V. Goldie, “International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution” in Columbia JTL, Vol. 9, 1970, pp. 283 ss, esp. p. 295.
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(R.Luzzato,67 Philippe Cahier,68 J. Kelson69) and other writers extended that principle to the protection of the environment (Jan Schneider,70 A.L.C. De Mestral71). In relation to transboundary pollution, M. Politi72 and Tullio Scovazzi73 perceive an evident trend in international law to admitting an objective form of liability for ultra-hazardous activities. Meanwhile, J.G.Lammers74 believes in the existence, in respect of international watercourses, of a due diligence obligation of the State to prevent and abate transboundary pollution, the breach of which would constitute a wrongful act of the State. However, State conduct is stripped of wrongfulness if there is force majeure, a fortuitous event, distress or a state of necessity: those would be cases of liability if compensation is allowed in international law. (Art. 27 (b), 2001 ILC articles). Lammers adds to that category “noxious activities” (causing damage in their normal operation) if there is a great disproportion between the cost of prevention or abatement and the cost of the damage itself. As to the activities “merely” entailing risk— he is referring here to the so-called “ultra-hazardous” activities—there is strict liability neither in customary international law nor as a general principle of 67
68
69
70
71
72
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Luzzato, “Responsabilità e colpa in diritto internazionale” in RDI, Vol. 51, 1968, pp. 53 ss, esp. pp. 85–107. “Le problème de la responsabilité pour risque en droit international” in Les relations internacionales dans un monde en mutation, Institut de hautes études de droit internacional, Leiden, pp. 427/428. It may be recalled that no-fault liability is a liability without subjective fault; Cahier goes further and thinks of liability sine delicto—i.e., without breach of obligation. However, Cahier limits this reasoning to activities operated by the State; in case of private operators, the State will be responsible only for the due diligence employed in the fulfillment of its obligations. Id., pp. 431/432. “State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity” in Harvard ILJ, Vol. 13, 1972, pp. 197 et seq. “State Responsibility for Environmental Protection and Preservation: Ecological Unities and a Fragmented World Public Order”, in Yale Studies on World Public Order, Vol. II, 1975, pp. 32 et seq. “The Prevention of Pollution of the Marine Environment Arising Out from Offshore Mining and Drilling” in Harvard ILJ, Vol. 20, 1979, pp. 469, esp. pp. 485 ss. “Miniere d’uranio nelle Alpi Marittime, inquinamento transfrontaliero e tutela internazionale dell’ambiente” in RDIPP (Rivista di diritto internazionale pubblico e processuale), Vol. 17, 1981, pp. 552 a 581. The obligation of prevention exists only for very exceptional cases of environmental alteration (space activities, extraction and transportation of hydrocarbons, nuclear activity). He also admits exceptional cases of objective responsibility for violations of the innocuous use of the territory. “La responsabilità internazionale in caso d’inquinamento transfrontaliero” in Rivista Giuridica Ambientale, Vol. I, 1986, pp. 272/289 and pp. 274/281. Pollution of International Watercourses, Boston-The Hague-Dordrecht-Lancaster, 1984, pp. 629/661.
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law of Art.38 of the ICJ Statute. But he admits a clearly perceptible trend in the domestic law of States to admit a principle in that sense. In the opinion of the Bruntland Experts Group,75 ensuring that compensation is provided for substantial harm caused by an environmental interference resulting from hazardous activities carried out or permitted by a State is a condition for such activities to be lawful. Although the rule was formulated as applying to an environmental interference, it may perhaps be also extended to any other kind of significant transboundary damage caused by a hazardous activity. For the Group, compensations should be established under no-fault liability—the basis for which is to be found in a number of treaties and other international instruments. The Group considers, however, that international practice shows a very varied picture and it does not yet allow definitive conclusions as to the (non) existence of a customary rule or principle of international law imposing liability upon States on account of ultra-hazardous activities.76 Günther Handl, dealing with transfrontier pollution, considers that there is responsibility for wrongful acts if the principle of innocuous use of a State’s own territory is violated.77 There would be no objective responsibility for accidental pollution78 but, in very special cases, a primary obligation of reparation would exist if there is “relevant recognizable” transboundary risk inherent to an activity that cannot be eliminated even taking reasonable precautions. Handl considers this opinion supported by equity, by a general principle of law and the sovereign equality of States.79 75
76
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Bruntland Report on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development. Expert Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Graham and Trottham /Martinus Nijhoff, London, Dordrecht, Boston, 1986, pp. 80 et seq. The Group quotes the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects and the Rio de la Plata Treaty between Argentina and Uruguay (Article 51 on water pollution) as an example of State strict liability but points out that the State of origin may fulfill its obligation by imposing such liability upon the developer or operator and in support of this solution several international instruments are quoted which are well known in the field: the 1952 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Vienna Convention, both on liability for nuclear damages; the 1967 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from the Exploration for and Exploitation of Sea Bed Mineral Resources and the 1969 Brussels Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. “Balancing of Interests and International Liability for the Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revisited”. In CYIL, Vol. 13, 1975, 158/162, “Responsabilità internazionale nell’inquinamento marino” in Starace (ed), Diritto internazionale e protezione dell’ambiente marino, Milán, 1983, pp. 144 ss. Id., p. 149. Ibid., p. 156 y p. 175.
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(b) Positions Contrary to Liability Contrary to the above positions, some authors maintain that all accountability in international law is exclusively based on wrongful State conducts. The neminem laedere principle underpins doctrines limiting the sovereignty of States by means of primary obligations—like the innocuous use of State territory, good neighborliness or no transboundary pollution. If the obligations imposed by the principles these doctrines proclaim are breached, responsibility for wrongful acts arise. Leading the way was Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice80 who declared in the ILC debates on the reports of García Amador that there is no liability for lawful conduct in international law. A similar position was adopted by E. Jiménez de Aréchaga,81 B. Greafrath,82 B. Conforti,83 P-M. Dupuy84 and others. With regard to the conventions usually deemed to apply international liability sine delicto, Pierre-Marie Dupuy85 believes that improving the regime of the proof in charge of the victims in order to facilitate their access to reparation is the real issue in this matter.86 States, in dealing with dangerous activities carried on in their territory, must deploy a degree of diligence proportional to the danger created in order to prevent the harm: to ultra-hazard corresponds ultra-prevention.87 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, referring to the liability subject in the ILC, said: “The difficulty of making such codification is that this type of responsibility only results from conventional law, has no basis in customary law or general principles and, since it deals with exceptions rather than general rules cannot be extended to fields not covered by the specific instruments.”88
80 81 82
83 84
85
86
87
88
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1957, I, p. 164. “International Law in the Past Third of Century”, RC, Vol. 159, 1978, I, pp. 267/269/271. “Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship Between Responsibility and Damages.” In RC, Vol. 185, pp. 34 ss, esp. pp. 20 and 104/118. Diritto internazionale, 3a Ed., Napoli 1987, pp. 378/379. Cf. “La responsabilité internationale des États pour les dommages causés par les pollutions transfrontières”, pp. 374 ss. In OCDE Aspects juridiques…pp. 369/395. See also La responsabilité internationale des États pour les dommages d’origine technologique et industrielle, Paris, 1976, p. 33. Droit internacional public, 5th ed., Paris 2000, p. 444. He makes an exception with the liability for space objects convention. “Le problème réel ne réside pas dans une appréciation de liceité mais dans la recherche d’une amélioration du régime des preuves mis à la charge de la victime afin de faciliter dans toute la mesure du possible son accesión aisée à la réparation”. Op.cit., p. 445. “Celui-ci”(the State) “précisement parce que l’activité est dangereuse, doit déployer la diligence requise pour en eviter, dans toute la mesure du possible, les consequences dommageables.” Ibid. Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, 1978, V. 159, p. 273.
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Paul Reuter also maintains that a norm imposing liability is not to be found in international practice, but that the practice existing in some sectors—like in neighborhood relations or nuclear and space activities—could be validated by a presumption that the State did not employ all the precautions required by the high risk inherent to the activity.89 Quadri shares the general skepticism of this current of opinion, and maintains that liability is not really a form of accountability, but a guarantee granted by the State. Quadri also maintains that the legal basis of reparation is not a general principle of law but the fact that activities such as nuclear tests, notwithstanding their lawful character, are limited by very severe obligations of prevention, like avoiding any predictable damage.90 Brownlie also agrees, in general, with this position.91 After exploring the opinions of writers, the case-law, the treaty practice and the State claims in the matter of transboundary damages, Birnie and Boyle are skeptical about the existence of a rule imposing liability in general international law—at least regarding pollution damage.92 They admit, however, that “an argument based on general principles cannot be dismissed,” since general principles of law in Article 38 of the Court’s Statute are not imported into international law, as Lord McNair would say, “lock, stock and barrel, readymade and fully equipped with a set of rules,” so the matter is thus one of “legal policy and principles.”93 But Birnie and Boyle do believe that “objective responsibility for breach of an appropriately defined obligation is a firmer foundation for a standard of responsibility not depending on a failure of due diligence.”94 René Lefeber recognizes that there is a gap in the international legal system which the proliferation of special civil liability regimes has not managed to fill. That task, he suggests, could be done by an obligation of the State to ensure prompt, adequate and effective compensation as part of a compound obligation to prevent and abate transboundary environmental interference causing significant harm.95 In his view, the obligation to ensure prompt, adequate and effective compensation is a primary norm, the non-observance of which would result in liability ex-delicto.
89
90 91 92 93 94 95
“Le dommage comme condition de la responsabilité internationale” in « Estudios de derecho internacional. Homenaje al profesor Miaja de la Muela”, Vol. II, pp. 839/840. Quadri, Rolando, Diritto Internazionale Pubblico, 5a Ed., Napoli 1968, pp. 590/591. Principles of International Law, 3d ed., Oxford 1979, pp. 443 et seq. Patricia W. Birne and A.E. Boyle, op.cit., pp. 141/147. Id., p. 148. Ibid. Lefeber R., Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability, Kluwer Law International 1996, p. 230–232.
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Lefeber wonders96 whether or not liability sine delicto is likely “to become part of extra-conventional international law, at least in the near future,” and arrives at a negative conclusion because: “The apparent repudiation of liability sine delicto by major industrialized States, including the majority of the G-7 … is likely to prevent the adoption of a framework agreement as initially envisaged by the Special Rapporteurs of the ILC,” and that: “their persistent opposition in combination with the fragmentary state practice will furthermore prevent it from entering the body of customary international law.”97 In international environmental law, Lefeber finds two major obstacles: namely, the no-act-of-the State exemption98 and the due diligence exemption.99 He does not find in his panoramic exploration of the law—domestic and international—the existence of a principle imposing the abandonment of those exceptions. Another point in Lefeber’s analysis is that: [T]he proliferation of harmonized special civil liability regimes has superseded the developments of state-to-state liability and should not be cited in support of a general principle of law amounting to the abandonment of the no-act-of-thestate exemption and/or the due diligence exemption in international environmental law. It affirms that one should be careful in transplanting concepts of municipal law into international law.100
Lefeber also quotes Birnie and Boyle, referring to the general attitude of States in this matter: “[i]nstead of developing the law they have de-emphasized their own responsibility by adopting civil liability schemes or encouraging equal access to national legal remedies for private parties.”101 Louise de Lafayette, in an article referring to the ILC treatment of liability, seems to believe that an important part of the problems facing the ILC originated in confusion between the legality of the activity and the illegality of causing damage. She states: Serious misunderstandings have been caused by the emphasis on the legality of the activity. For example, some members of the Commission and of the Sixth 96 97 98
99
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Op.cit., Chapter 7. Lefeber R., op.cit., p. 232. No consequences to a State for an act which is not an act of that State. No State has to “assume liability towards persons who suffer harm outside its jurisdiction if these persons have suffered harm caused by activities within its jurisdiction or control”. Id., p. 182. No consequences to a State for a result which has happened in spite of the due diligence of that State in trying to prevent it. “The due diligence exception permits the source state to evade liability for harm caused by non-governmental activities if it has exercised its governmental functions in respect of such activities with due care” Id., p. 182. Id., p. 230. Ibid.
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Committee have wondered why compensation should be paid for damage caused by an activity that was perfectly legal. However, what matters is not that the activity is legal, but that the causation of damage is illegal.102
She believes, in conclusion, that: [T]he ILC should recognize that what it is really addressing is a specialized area of state responsibility and that there are two obligations involved: an obligation of conduct to prevent transboundary harm and an obligation of result, to ensure on the basis of strict or objective liability that transboundary harm does not result from activities within a state’s jurisdiction or control.103
6. Conclusion However we look at it, damage is never indifferent to law, and transboundary damage is not indifferent to international law. All the arguments examined above seem to indicate that a risk of damage to States created by a hazardous activity in the territory of another State or under its control places that activity in a grey zone in general law; it is not illegal but must be permitted only under certain implied conditions, one being the exercise of maximum care in the prevention of transboundary harm and the other re-establishing the broken balance of interests by compensating any damages done. In all the cases examined, the claims for either the damage caused by a wrongful conduct or due to the risk created have not been left without response.104 The lawful character of activities implies no breach of primary obligations, which makes for more flexible standards applying to compensations. Two distinct thresholds of risk may be identified in the light of the above considerations. The first would determine that harm caused by lawful hazardous activities exceeding the level of accepted harm should be compensated. The second would define the ceiling beyond which an activity may be declared
102
103
104
Louise de Lafayette, “The ILC and International Liability: A Commentary” Reciel. V.6, Issue 3, 1997, p. 327. Ibid. After this sentence, she more realistically admits that the Commission was operating under some constraints, and wonders what the Commission should do “when comments made by states in the Sixth Committee and elsewhere are based in ignorance of the law? Or if states reject in the context of the draft articles proposed by the Commission concepts and rules of law that have been willingly accepted in other contexts? Can a general principle of law be changed through the objection of some states to the work of the Commission, with the result that a set of articles may be adopted that is contrary to existing law? Ibid. Good question, but States make international law, not professors. See Chapter VIII. As concerns the Chernobyl accident, no formal claims were presented. In the case of the IXTOC I blow-out and other cases the response came from the private sector.
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unlawful and State responsibility would be triggered by the mere existence of the unlawful activity, without any relationship with the damage caused. In the former case, compensations may take different forms of restoring the balance of interests. In the latter, criteria of responsibility for wrongful acts have a clear objective: “Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”105 As to the illegality of certain activities, the consent of risk-bearers may depend on the tolerance different societies may have regarding high degrees of risk. That may also affect the level of thresholds and ceilings if the activity is accepted internationally. Reparation for sine delicto liability is an “in between” solution that allows activities to continue functioning while enabling the equitable shift of external costs towards suitable individuals or entities. The fact that sine delicto liability has a distributive, and not a corrective, aim strengthens the idea that compensation for the risk or damage beyond a certain threshold should be provided for and the burden of damage channeled to the most suitable party, according to chosen ways of distribution. In integrum restitutio is not indispensable, but compensation should ensure that costs related to the bearing of the risk or consequences of harm are rationally or equitably allocated. In this sense, criteria such as “adequate” and “prompt“ compensation seem to be the most often used to find a balance between the interests of parties involved in sine delicto liability cases.
105
Chorzow Factory Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, pp. 47–48.
Chapter VI
The Development of the Subject at the International Law Commission 1. Introduction Telling the story of the development of the subject of liability at the International Law Commission has a twofold purpose. One is to give the reader a glimpse of the discussions and reflections of Commission members and Special Rapporteurs on the topic and thus provide a better understanding of how its theoretical bases were debated and decisions adopted. The other is to note the particularly difficult circumstances confronting the topic, mainly because of States’ reluctance to accept compromises of a general character, especially on a new field like liability, where their preference was clearly for international conventions on specific activities. Consider that only a few conventions on specific activities set up residual State liability; most of them had none. The novelty of the subject, the said reluctance of States and the paucity of international practice on the matter caused the first two Special Rapporteurs and the Commission itself to approach the topic of liability by trial and error,1 starting with the search for a conceptual basis for the subject by the first Special Rapporteur. Texts were proposed and changed in the light of observations made in the Commission and in the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee, instead of sending them straight to the Drafting Committee for it to make a formal proposal. Trying to obtain a more or less general agreement on the aspects examined before covering new ground made for a lot of comings and goings which slowed down the progress of the subject2 and made the task difficult for commentators and scholars interested in following the work of the Commission on the conceptual basis for the topic.3 1
2
3
At least, that was the case of the present writer, who succeeded Professor Robert QuentinBaxter and was Special Rapporteur for 12 years. The first Special Rapporteur, Professor Quentin-Baxter, submitted after six years of work a Schematic Outline of the Topic and five articles, which were reconsidered by the Commission at the suggestion of the second Special Rapporteur. Many times articles provisionally proposed by the Special Rapporteur were taken as definitive by commentators.
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, pp. 73–118. © 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.
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The Second Special Rapporteur (the present author Barboza) felt himself obliged to clarify that: Starting from the sixth report, given the very special nature of the topic and the absence of precedents for a general instrument such as the one the Commission might be putting forward, most of the articles are completely experimental, since they were intended simply to elicit the reaction of colleagues and of the Sixth Committee and to give a full picture of the possible range of the draft articles.4
In fact, that could be said of all articles proposed—including those of the 1996 Working Group but excepting those provisionally approved by the Commission. 2. How the Commission Works The Commission has working methods of its own.5 There is a single consolidated method for both codification and progressive development of international law. The Commission appoints a Special Rapporteur for each subject, who develops particular aspects of his topic through successive reports submitted to the consideration of the plenary until its completion. There is a plenary debate on each report. The articles considered in those debates are sent to the examination of the Drafting Committee (DC). In spite of its name, this Committee is more than a drafting body: it is the core of the Commission, being the only forum where members may informally discuss their differences and reach compromises.6 The texts as approved and reported to the Commission by the Drafting Committee may, of course, be modified by the plenary, but such modifications are usually minor since the debates in the Drafting Committee are open and offer to all members of the Commission the opportunity of expressing their views. If the DC does not settle down to working on a draft, the draft is paralyzed.7 There are two successive readings of each complete draft, the second
4
5
6
7
Eighth report on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, by Mr. Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur. Doc. A/CN.4/ 443, p. 61. The Commission speaks through the articles it proposes. In the annual reports presented to the General Assembly, those articles are accompanied by conceptual considerations and commentaries. With the exception of the working groups, which are being increasingly in use by the Commission. That is what happened with the liability subject due to the commented hesitations and very late remission to the DC of the corresponding articles.
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one normally taking shorter time than the first, then the draft articles as approved by the plenary are sent to the General Assembly (GA) with a recommendation on their final destiny. They may be the basis of a convention if the General Assembly convokes a codifying conference,8 they may be the matter of a normative resolution of the GA9 or they may simply be taken note of by that body. 2.1. The Line Followed by the Commission The prevailing preoccupation in the International Law Commission—and apparently also of the General Assembly at their first contact with the liability topic—was that of getting it out of the way of State responsibility for wrongful acts. That is confirmed by the following paragraph of the 1973 Commission’s report on the responsibility topic: From the outset of its work on the topic of State responsibility, the Commission agreed that that topic should deal only with the consequences of internationally wrongful acts, and that, ‘in defining the general rule concerning the principle of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, it was necessary to adopt a formula which did not prejudge the existence of responsibility for lawful acts’. That conclusion met with broad acceptance in the discussion of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, in 1970.10
The result of the ILC’s stance was faithfully reflected in the much quoted paragraph of its 1973 Report: Owing to the entirely different basis of the so-called responsibility for risk and the different nature of the rules governing it, as well as its content and the forms it may assume, a joint examination of the two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to grasp. Being obliged to accept the possible risks arising from the exercise of an activity which is itself lawful, and being obliged to face the consequences—which are not necessarily limited to compensation—of the breach of a legal obligation, are two different matters. It is only because of the relative poverty of legal language that the same term is habitually used to designate both.11
That was, of course, the firm conviction of the influential Special Rapporteur of the responsibility subject, Roberto Ago, who was completely convinced that
8
9
10 11
As was the case in several Vienna Conventions, like those on the law of treaties, diplomatic and consular relations, State succession, etc. The draft on arbitral procedure may be an example at hand; its articles were recommended by the General Assembly as guidelines for States to follow in arbitration procedures. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1978, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 149. Id., pp. 152/153.
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responsibility and liability were two entirely different species and consequently wanted to rid his subject of an alien body. In the 1973 debate on Art.1 of his subject (State responsibility) these were his words: “If injury caused by a lawful activity—that was to say, one that was not prohibited, such as activities in outer space—entailed an obligation to make reparation, that was not, strictly speaking, a matter of responsibility but of a guarantee.”12 The mandate of the General Assembly and the report of the Working Group appointed to give a preliminary opinion on the new topic only confirmed the same line of research.13 The 1978 Working Group14 noted that the topic was a new one. Reference was made to the relation of the subject with the nuclear industry, the regime of outer space, the principles of the Stockholm Conference on the Environment and transactions of a regional or local character in relation to shared resources, the work of the Third Law of the Sea Conference regarding maritime pollution and the risks attendant upon the sea carriage of oil. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration was also mentioned. The obligations to be considered were distinguished from those owed by a State to aliens who placed themselves or their property within that State’s territory; there was neither a presumption of willingness to accept risks or harmful consequences nor a requirement to seek an effective remedy offered by municipal law. A positive comparison was instead drawn with obligations of riparian States of a watercourse, which demand a balance between the purposes to be served by a given use of territory and the unwelcome consequences that such a use could entail for other States and their nationals. The essential obligation owed by a State in such a context was one of care or due diligence, in relation either to its own activities or to private activities within its jurisdiction or control. No criterion of this kind could of itself provide a means of regulating liability for the dangers inherent in certain major fields of activity made possible by modern technology: however stringent the standard of care observed, an accident—if it did occur—would probably be large in scale and in the extent of its injurious consequences. The Group noted the practice of States to resort to a rule of “absolute liability” in regard to those dangers on specific activities, often accompanied by a limitation of the extent of liability. A further and more
12 13
14
Yearbook…1973, Vol. I, p. 14. “Report of the Working Group on international liability for injurious consequence arising out of acts not prohibited by international law”, Yearbook…1978, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 150. The Working Group was composed of Robert Quentin Baxter (Chairman), Roberto Ago, Jorge Castañeda and X.J.C.Njenga. Id., pp. 152/153, 171.
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extensive responsibility based on the duty of care or due diligence could or could not be excluded. The Group acknowledged that the most fundamental connections of the new topic were with that of State responsibility. The Group admitted the need to clarify the relationship between the liabilities of conventional regimes and the obligations owed by States under customary law. The use of the term “liability” did indicate, however, that the topic could be approached largely in terms of the primary rules contained in conventional regimes, and “should not attempt to parallel the extensive consideration that the Commission is giving to secondary rules in the course of its study of State responsibility.” The topic was pronounced suitable for codification and progressive development in accordance with the Commission’s usual working methods. The Commission thus went ahead with the subject with a considerable number of its members as well as delegations in the Sixth Committee dead set against the idea of the existence of State liability in general international law and, consequently, against the codification of the topic. Progressive development of the law being, however, also one of the objectives fixed in Article 13.1(a) of the UN Charter, the Commission directed the exercise towards the regulation of risk on the international plane. Such an objective could have been attained through a comprehensive and detailed set of rules or by a small number of principles, leaving their fleshing out to practice. However, the schematic outline already involved a rather complex and detailed procedure and more contributions from different sectors of the Commission were incorporated to the draft articles as the subject developed in the hope of satisfying a greater number of members and reach some consensus on the topic. The stubborn fact remained that a sizeable number of Commission members and an important group of States in the Sixth Committee continued to be uncomfortable with liability, and that they—right or wrong—represented the opinion and the interests of a very important sector of the General Assembly. The fact also remained that another section of the same Assembly wanted to linger on with the topic in the hope of reaching some sort of compromise. To judge by the annual Resolutions directing the Commission to continue with the subject, the latter position represented the majority of the General Assembly. Finally, the Commission drafted a more or less complete and detailed set of articles on “prevention.” Meanwhile, on “allocation of loss” (previously “liability”), only eight general principles were proposed.15
15
That was what the second Special Rapporteur thought in 2002, after the end of his mandate. See Julio Barboza, “Liability: Can We Put the Humpty-Dumpty together again?” in Chinese
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3. The Successive Drafts In order to guide the reader through the labyrinth of proposed articles, some overlapping each other, it will be necessary to examine the drafts presented up to 1997. Then we shall proceed to examine the 2002 articles on “prevention” and those of 2006 on “allocation of loss.” As to the drafts presented up to 1997, these were: • The five reports and the schematic outline of the first Special Rapporteur (Quentin Baxter) • The complete system proposed in the tenth report of the second Special Rapporteur (Barboza). • The reports of the 1996 and 1997 working groups. 4. Quentin-Baxter’s Conception It may be worthwhile to review, in a nutshell, the main ideas of Professor Robert Quentin-Baxter as the first Special Rapporteur of the Commission’s liability topic before entering into the analysis of the liability topic’s issues. In his task, Professor Quentin-Baxter was very concerned with two taboo-like hurdles: he did not want to trespass into the Commission’s topic of “responsibility” and, at the same time, he did not want his topic to be assimilated into “strict liability.” This Scilla-Caribdis sort of situation influenced his writings, and—considering the absence of any other known form of accountability in law other than “responsibility” and “liability”—he found himself—as did the next Special Rapporteur—with very little in his hands. In the view of the late Professor Quentin- Baxter, State liability was interpreted as a continuum that started with prevention and minimization and then ended with compensation.16 He asked himself: “But what is prevention and what is reparation? Reparation has always the purpose of restoring as fully as possible a pre-existing situation; and in the context of the present topic, it may often amount to prevention after the event.”17
16 17
Journal of International Law, 2002, Number 2, p. 523. “A consensus should be looked for on the core of a liability regime and proposed by the Commission to the GA for a general normative declaration—not for a convention—which could serve as the point of departure of a customary development. We all know the place that custom occupies in the international community nowadays and how it develops with relative rapidity from texts through the general acceptance by the States.” Id. By a “consensus on the core,” the author meant a consensus about the main principles underpinning the subject. Ibid. René Lefeber, op.cit., p. 195/197. Yearbook… 1983, Vol. II, Part One, p. 214 (Doc. A/CN.4/373).
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Prevention, Professor Quentin-Baxter maintained, was governed by a primary norm. That primary norm was a compound one providing prevention and imposing reparation in the case of harm. Reparation could loosely be considered a “secondary element”—i.e., an element proper of a secondary rule— within the primary norm.18 The idea of a compound primary norm, with due respect, does not seem correct. The breach of prevention rules leads to the realm of responsibility and therefore to secondary norms imposing obligations of a secondary nature. Compensation in case of damage belongs, in a liability regime, to the primary norm and comes about without the breach of any obligation. The times of prevention and of reparation are different: mixing them up in the primary norm forces the logical structure of the norm beyond acceptance.19 In the same context, there was another dilemma: though on one side, prevention offered the only firm basis on which to ground the topic in general international law, on the other, prevention was managed through primary obligations the breaches of which constituted wrongful acts. There was an obvious invasion by “responsibility for wrongfulness” into a subject from whence it was banned by hypothesis and by the title itself. That was surely the reason why, in the procedure installed by Professor Quentin-Baxter’s schematic outline, the obligations of prevention, notwithstanding their prestige, were of a “soft” nature: their breach did not give the injured State any right of action. So, the purification of the schematic outline was achieved at the cost, alas!, of logic.20 Equating reparation with prevention after the event was, however, a subtle and ingenious thought. It certainly was impossible to put it in normative terms the way Quentin-Baxter suggested because of the reasons stated above. But the substance of the reasoning was impeccable: why should law treat in an opposite manner two elements which had the same finality, being both legitimate and legal? Prevention as well as reparation were intended to protect a certain status quo, one from risk of harm, the other one from damage. Was not, then, conceptually obtuse to set at the same time the compulsory nature of prevention against the risk created and the impunity of the damage
18
19
20
Ibid. Lefeber also affirms the existence of a single compound obligation of the source State “to take all procedural and substantive measures that may be necessary to avoid, minimize and repair environmental interference causing significant harm during the life cycle of an activity”, René Lefeber, op.cit., pp. 34 ff. Besides, the fact of putting both prevention and compensation in one norm does not extend to compensation the quality of positive law that has prevention. The next Special Rapporteur (Barboza) found himself in the same predicament and followed, for a time, the same path.
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caused by effect of the risk? Particularly when that attitude violated both the sovereign equality of States by giving the State of origin an unjustified advantage and permitting the violation of the risk-bearer State’s territorial integrity? Those two are well established principles of international law, from which to deduct the principle of liability. That is why we believe that sine delicto liability is in reality not an emergent principle of international law, but an actual principle which is not applied. The first Special Rapporteur apparently looked upon liability as, eventually, inevitable and so displaced its encounter with the Commission topic towards the end of the line. At the very end of the day, when all the opportunities of regime building have been set aside—or, alternatively, when a loss or injury has occurred that nobody foresaw— there is a commitment, in the nature of strict liability, to make good the loss. The Special Rapporteur finds it hard to see how it could be otherwise, taking into account the realities of transboundary dangers and relations between States, and the existing elements of a developing chapter of international law.21
Professor Quentin-Baxter had recourse to some devices to mitigate the effect of the collision between the strict liability to which he had to resign himself “at the very end of the day” and the foreseeable reaction of those opposing the topic. One such device was the notion of “shared expectations.”22 Another was represented by the principles of Section 3, a reasonable preventive conduct of the source State, the relevant factors of Section 6 and the matters of Section 7. Professor Quentin–Baxter’s proposals invoked existing general principles of international law on the support afforded by prevention: he conceived the existence of a wide duty of care, based on the principle of neminem laedere. The duty of care gave origin to several obligations, among them that of minimizing risk and making reparation for the damage done by a lawful but hazardous activity. “The measure of a State’s obligation to ensure that other State’s right are not infringed by the harmful effects of things done or omitted within its territory 21 22
“Third Report…” A/CN.4/360, p. 60, para. 41. Section 4, Art.2 Art.3 went on to say: The reparation due to the affected State under the preceding article shall be ascertained in accordance with the shared expectations of the States concerned and the principles set out in section 3; and account shall be taken of the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties having regard to the record of any exchanges or negotiations between them and the remedial measures taken by the acting State to safeguard the interests of the affected State. Account may also be taken of the relevant factors, including those set up in section 6 and guidance may be obtained by reference to any of the matters set out in section 7.
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or jurisdiction is still the duty of care, but that duty extends to making good any harm that is fairly attributable to the lawful conduct of a lawful activity,” Quentin-Baxter wrote.23 5. The Issues of the Subject All the debates within the liability topic turned on some basic concepts and on the above-mentioned dilemmas regarding prevention and liability. 5.1. Prevention The mandate of the Commission was to examine international liability for the injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by international law. The idea of incorporating articles on prevention into the liability subject was born, perhaps, in the mind of the first Special Rapporteur for the reasons suggested above, but in any case the Sixth Committee and the ILC followed suit, under the motto “prevention is better than cure.” Particularly regarding the environment, it was widely believed that reparation could often prove to be an unsatisfactory form of redress for the damage caused. As already pointed out, prevention inexorably lead to the first taboo—i.e., responsibility for wrongfulness. Besides, a liability system imposing due diligence obligations of prevention and, whether or not they are satisfied, compensation if damage occurs may be contradictory: it would mean establishing obligations of a dual nature—i.e., of due diligence and of result at the same time and on the same subject. Civil liability conventions generally refer only to what may be called prevention ex-post—that is, to measures adopted once an accident has occurred either to prevent the transboundary damage or contain it within certain limits. Some measure of prevention may arise as a simple by-product of sine delicto liability, as this one provides an incentive for the operator to exercise care and thus avoid accidents followed by an automatic obligation of compensation. What’s more, specific preventive measures are no doubt expected for the parties to adopt either internationally or, more currently, in domestic law. In his Fourth Report, the second Special Rapporteur (Barboza) proposed for the first time an article on prevention.24 Successive reports incorporated 23 24
“Second Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Quentin-Baxter” Doc. A/CN.4/346, p. 112. “Source States shall take all reasonable preventive measures to prevent or minimize injury that may result from an activity which presumably involves risk and for which no regime has been established”. Doc. A/CN.4/413, p. 34.
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articles on prevention (ex ante) and finally the Commission provisionally adopted a principle and a number of obligations in 1995. The principle was thus formulated: “States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent or minimize the risk of significant transboundary harm.”25 The other articles on prevention referred to prior authorization (Art.11), risk assessment (Art.12) pre-existing activities (Art.13), measures to prevent or minimize the risk (Art.14), non-transference of risk (Art.14 bis), notification and information (Art.15), exchange of information (Art.16), information to the public (Art.16 bis), consultations on preventive measures (Art. 18), rights of the States likely to be affected (Art.19) and factors involved in an equitable balance of interests (Art.20).26 The articles on prevention finally adopted by the Commission in 2001 generally followed those texts. None of these obligations of prevention was a “hard” obligation in the drafts proposed up to the Sixth Report (Barboza).27 Like in the Schematic Outline,28 no element of responsibility for wrongful acts was, strictly speaking, present in the liability draft, since no compulsory consequences followed the breach of prevention obligations. 5.2. Prevention and Liability on Different Heads The inclusion of “hard” preventive obligations in the second Special Rapporteur’s Tenth Report was facilitated by placing them on the State whereas liability for transboundary damage was imposed on the operator or on some other private party. States of origin were in charge of notification, consultation with likely affected States, as well as the assessment of risk and authorization of the activity. In particular, States of origin had to ensure the taking by operators of specific measures of precaution aimed at preventing transboundary harm. States were obliged to use administrative and judicial means to enforce such obligations, as well as to permanently monitor the authorized activities: in other words, to use due diligence in the enforcement of these prevention measures.
25
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It was Article C (8 and 9 proposed originally). See Yearbook…1995, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 92. As we shall see, the Commission appointed a working group in 1996, chaired by the second Special Rapporteur, who adopted the former articles and at the end of his mandate the Commission was renewed and a new Special Rapporteur, Mr. Penmaraju Sreenivassa Rao, was appointed in 1997. The renewed Commission left aside these articles in 1997, although the end-result of the new work on prevention was a set of texts quite alike those of 1966. With an alternative offered in the Eighth Report, for the provisions on prevention to have a recommendatory character and be confined in an annex. See Section 2.8 and Section 3.4.
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In the Tenth Report, the same obligations of prevention were maintained, but this time they were shifted into “hard” obligations and their breach entailed, therefore, all the consequences following breach of obligations in the responsibility topic.29 5.3. Scope of the Topic Issues associated with the scope of the topic are varied. In fact, practically every article in the draft had to do with the scope of the subject. Many such issues referred to the concept of “activities”—i.e., What types of activities were to be included: hazardous or ultra-hazardous? All hazardous activities or only those in a list? Activities causing transboundary harm together with those that may cause such harm? Other issues were related. Was the topic to be restricted to damage to the environment? Or only to activities the existence of which is known to the State? And so on and so forth. We shall refer to the principal problems dealt with by the Commission on this score. The first version of the schematic outline described the topic in regard to: “[…] activities within the territory or control of a State which give rise, or may give rise, to loss or injury to persons or things within the territory or control of another State.”30 It was a vast and ill-defined territory, particularly considering that “activity” was referred to as “any human activity” and possibly also included omissions.31 (a) Physical Consequences Some members feared the possibility that consequences of certain activities in one country which have effect in other countries, like for instance the devaluation of a State’s currency, would be brought into the subject. It was soon clarified that only activities having “physical” transboundary consequences would be included. (b) Situations “Activity,” as defined by the schematic outline,32 included any human activity. It was not really a definition; it rather intended to determine the scope of the 29
30 31 32
The Tenth Report of the second Special Rapporteur was never properly considered by the Commission. Section 1.1. Section 1, Art. 2 (b). In Section 1, Art. 2 on definitions.
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topic by way of deciding if “activity… should also include a lack of activity to remove a natural danger which gives rise, or may give rise to loss or injury to another State,” as said in the footnote to the article. Later, that idea materialized in the first article of the five proposed by Professor Quentin-Baxter in his Fifth Report and was baptized a “situation.” The examples given were the approach of an oil slick, danger from floods or drifting ice, or risks arising from an outbreak of fire, pests or disease. From the Fifth Report (Barboza) on, the notion of “situations” meaning “a state of affairs, within the territory or control of the source State, which does or may give rise to physical consequences with transboundary effect”33 was left aside.34 (c) The Environment Notwithstanding some “injudicious reliance upon references to ‘environment’ or ‘physical environment’ ” said to have been detected in connection with the scope of the topic,35 no doubts could remain on that score in the Fourth Report: “[T]here was never an intention to propose a reduction of the scope of 33 34
35
Fifth Report of the first Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/383) para. 31. The exclusion of “situations” was thus explained: An initial review makes it possible to distinguish at least two different types of situations. First, there are those arising from a human activity, as in the construction of a dam with its resulting artificial lake, or the accumulation of highly toxic materials. Second, there are those situations which arise naturally, in the absence of human activity, as in the case of spontaneous forest fires, pests, floods and the like. The following reflections seem pertinent to the line of thought we are pursuing: a) Situations of the first type would fit with no difficulty whatsoever within our regime, because they arise from activities involving risk. If a dam bursts or if its floodgates have to be opened to save it and that causes transboundary injury, the situation created by the existence of this dam and its artificial lake would obviously be a direct consequence of an activity arising from a particular use of the river in question. It would therefore be sufficient to include in article 1 a few words covering such situations; b) Situations which arise naturally without human intervention would be a different matter. In such a situation, the responsibility incumbent upon the territorial State would derive from an act or omission on its part in respect of the situation. For instance, a State which has the ability to do something to prevent a pest or an epidemic in an area under its jurisdiction from spreading to a neighbouring country does nothing; or an internal measure which is to the advantage of the territorial State becomes a major disadvantage for a neighbouring State. (Third Report… cit., p. 11.) As regards the case of b), presuming—as is the case—that the State has a general duty of preventing transboundary harm, it seems clear that the State has breached its obligations. That places the matter in the field of responsibility for wrongful acts and therefore not within the scope of our articles. There was, therefore, no need to open a new chapter for “situations.” Yearbook… 1983, Vol. II, Part One, p. 206.
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the topic to questions of an ecological nature, or to any other subcategory of activities involving the physical uses of territory.…”36 Protection of the environment was thought to be included as an objective of the draft articles, but risk assessments proposed in the articles were not limited to environmental impact assessments. (d) Activities of Harmful Effects (Activities that Cause Damages)37 Until far along in the consideration of the subject, activities actually causing transboundary harm in the normal course of their development were included in the topic. That was so in all the reports of Professor Quentin-Baxter as well as in the first eight reports of the second Special Rapporteur (Barboza), who thought that the regime could perhaps encompass both types of activities, as they were not easily separable. In the view of the second Special Rapporteur, concerned States were to confront a similar situation whether the activity to be initiated was of one or the other type: in both cases the State of origin had to notify, consult and eventually negotiate with the affected State or States a régime for its legal regulation. This notion found support in the statements of the Expert Group of the World Commission of Environment and Development for which an activity “causing harm that is substantial but far less than the overall technical and socioeconomic cost or loss of benefits involved in preventing or reducing such interference” gave rise to an obligation for the source State to “enter into negotiations with the affected State on the equitable conditions, both technical and financial, under which the activity could be carried out.”38 A common regulation on prevention for both hazardous and noxious activities seemed feasible. The reasons for including them in the draft articles were given in the Fifth Report (Barboza): The difficulty with these kinds of activities is that their polluting effect and thus the injury they cause is normally foreseeable: it is an inevitable consequence of the activity itself. If an industry uses certain ingredients which are known to be pollutants and if certain conditions exist that are also known, transboundary injury may be bound to occur. Since the element of contingency of the injury was lacking, it was difficult to speak of risk. However, the Fourth Report advocated including these kinds of activities in the scope of the topic, for if activities involving risk, or contingent injury are included, then it is all the more logical that
36 37 38
Id., pp. 205/206. See Chapter II for a complete development of this point. Op.cit., p. 85, Art. 12. (Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, London, Dordrecht, Boston, 1986).
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those which are bound to cause injury should be included. That was the logic underlying their inclusion, assisted by the broad wording of the topic (activities not prohibited…) which lent itself to including them even though they might not strictly ‘involve risk’; it was also thought that general international law did not impose a prohibition which might exclude them from the topic.39
In the first reports, activities of harmful effects (activities that cause transboundary harm in their normal operation) were identified as “polluting activities” and included in the scope of the draft articles. In the Eighth Report (Barboza), Article 4 proposed that: “Before undertaking or authorizing an activity with harmful effects, the State of origin should consult with the affected States with a view to establishing a legal regime for the activity in question that is acceptable to all the parties concerned.” The reason for that proposal was “[…] to the degree to which an activity in the normal course of its operation causes transboundary harm, it must become suspect as a wrongful activity.…” What’s more: “…the State of origin is obliged to require of the applicant for authorization to take the necessary preventive measures, or else such harm is unavoidable and in this case no further steps can be taken without some kind of consultations with the affected States in which the latter can if they wish make counterproposals regarding the conduct of the activity.”40 In Article 5, it was proposed that: If such consultations show that transboundary harm is unavoidable under the conditions proposed for the activity, or that such harm cannot be adequately compensated, the affected State may ask the State of origin to request the party requesting authorization to put forward alternatives which may make the activity acceptable.41
However, the Commission decided not deal at that stage with other activities which in fact cause harm: “Attention should be focused at this stage on drafting articles in respect of activities having a risk of causing transboundary harm and [that] … the articles should deal first with preventive measures in respect of activities creating a risk of causing transboundary harm.…”42 Noxious activities were excluded in the Ninth Report (Barboza). Seen in perspective, that was a wise decision, since conceptually the differences are
39
40 41 42
Fifth Report of the Special Rapporteur…, Doc. A/CN.4/423, pp. 5/6. That position was changed later on. Id., p. 23. Id., p. 24. Yearbook…1992, Vol. II, Part Two, para. 346.
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quite neat between hazardous and noxious activities. Those differences had already been the matter of reflection in some quarters.43 (e) Harm to the Global Commons The issue of harm to places beyond national jurisdiction was only explored in a preliminary way in the Sixth Report (Barboza) and the corresponding plenary debate in the Commission did not clarify what should the Commission do about that issue. The general feeling was that the subject was already too complicated as it was without including such debatable aspects as harm to the global commons. Also, that perhaps the question of harm to the global commons should be postponed or made the object of a different topic. Similar reasons were behind the omission of the issue for ILC consideration, under the guidance of the last Special Rapporteur, Mr. Rao.44
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Following is the statement by Ambassador Helmut Tuerck to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on 2 November 1988, provided to Sixth Committee delegations by the Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations: It should be borne in mind that the concept of liability for acts not prohibited by international law in reality relates to two fundamentally different situations which require a different approach: one situation relates to hazardous activities which carry with them the risk of disastrous consequences in case of accident, but do not have an adverse impact on other States or on the international community as a whole in their normal operation. It is thus only the accident that needs to be covered by liability—which might be called the premium for the tolerance of such an activity by other States. By its very nature this liability must be absolute and strict, permitting no exceptions. The task of the International Law Commission, however, also relates to a fundamentally different situation, that is, transboundary and long-range impacts on the environment. In this case the risk of accident is only one, and even a minor, aspect of the problem. It is through their normal operation that some industrial and energyproducing activities, but also for instance the driving of cars and the heating of houses, cause prejudice to the environment of other States. Moreover, this harm is not caused by a single, identifiable source as in the case of hazardous activities; there is a multitude of sources which produce harmful effects through accumulation. For a long time these emissions have been generally accepted because every State was producing them and their nefarious consequences were neither well known nor obvious. The growing awareness of their harmful influence has, however, reduced the level of tolerance to a limit that is formed by the highest state of the art in technology, on the one hand, and economic feasibility, on the other. In respect of this situation liability has two distinct functions: as with hazardous activities, it should on the one hand cover the risk of an accident, such as a fortuitous emission exceeding the generally accepted limits; on the other hand, it must also cover—and that is its essential function— significant harm caused in the territory of other States through a normal operation. Liability for risk must thus be combined with liability for a harmful activity. See the Sixth Report of the second Special Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/428/Add.1. Also, Chapter XIII of Barboza’s Hague course (“International Liability for the Injurious
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(f) The List of Activities A recurring issue in both the Commission and the Sixth Committee was the inclusion in the draft articles of a list of activities falling within the pale of the articles. The purpose of that list was to more precisely delimit the topic, thereby facilitating its acceptance by States. The concern of the Commission and of the Sixth Committee for that list reflected the repeatedly mentioned reluctance of engaging in somewhat imprecise commitments regarding liability. Some members thought that the list could help to overcome the objections against a convention envisaging all sorts of hazardous activities. The main objection to the list was that it would soon become obsolete, in view of the acceleration of technological developments and the foreseeable appearance of new dangerous activities. There were many industrial activities which could be considered hazardous according to the criteria proposed to make the list, but it would be very difficult and perhaps rather pointless, to enumerate each of them because the risks they created were contingent on many circumstances. An industrial plant producing emissions, such as the Trail Smelter, would have been included in our list if its emissions crossed some political boundary but not if it was located at a safe distance of the frontier. It became clear that practically no specific activity could safely be incorporated in the list without qualifications such as those. Moreover, if several activities were to be put together under a common denominator, the accusation of generalizing would have remained. The purpose of the list was to bring the articles into line, as far as possible, with the practice established of drafting conventions regulating specific activities. Clearly, States were more prepared to accepting commitments in regard of activities the individual features of which were well-known, as was the case in civil liability conventions. Each one of them regulates a specific activity, the risks inherent to which as well as the obligations of the parties regarding prevention and liability are more or less precisely known. It is also important to consult the opinion of the insurance industry and consider contingency plans which may be required in relation with the risks inherent to the particular activity regulated by the convention. In such circumstances, the second Special Rapporteur felt that—rather than attempting the impossible, and perhaps undesirable, task of imitating the method applied to regulate specific activities—a definition as complete as possible of the type of activities proposed would be better than a list.
Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law and Protection of the Environment”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1994, III, p. 392 et seq.)
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The Commission shared that conviction and the list never found its way into the articles. 6. Attribution (of Acts or of Consequences?) to the State Until the task of the second Special Rapporteur was well advanced, the draft articles envisaged the State as the party liable in principle for significant transboundary harm caused by hazardous activities. The conditions underlying that responsibility were stated in the following paragraph by the first Special Rapporteur, Professor Quentin-Baxter: “[…] whenever a State within whose territory or control substantial transboundary harm is generated has knowledge of the harm, or means of knowledge, and opportunity to act, the rule enunciated by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case establishes that the test of attribution has been satisfied.”45 In the field of responsibility, the acts of certain individuals (the organs of the State, for instance) under certain conditions, are imputed to the State whereas in the field of liability the conduct of the human or legal person leading the activity is not. In the logic of liability, reflected in the liability and compensation conventions, there is no point in attributing a certain conduct to a certain State; whatever liability corresponds to a State is due to the fact that the hazardous activity causing the transboundary harm was performed in its territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction or control.46 It is rather the consequences of such acts the State is sometimes liable for by operation of that logic. In article 4 of the draft proposed in the Third Report (Barboza), certain conditions were previous to the attribution of sine delicto liability: the State of origin must have known or had the means to know both that the activity was carried out within areas under its jurisdiction or control and that the activity created an appreciable risk of causing transboundary harm.47 This clause was included with a view to protecting developing countries, particularly those having vast extensions of territory—especially maritime zones—if they did not know and had no means of knowing what went on in such spaces. The Special Rapporteur (Barboza) thought that knowledge as to the existence and nature of the activity was a condition necessary for liability to be established,48 and that both the means to know and the specific 45 46 47 48
Yearbook …1981, Vol. II, Part Two, Doc. A/36/10, p. 147. “Control” here means control of the territory, in lieu of legal jurisdiction. Doc. A/CN.4/405, of 16 March 1987, p. 7. That knowledge, in fact, seems to be a condition necessary for giving rise to any form of accountability.
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knowledge could be presumed—the onus being, then, on the State of origin to prove its ignorance of the facts. “Knowingly,” as in the statement of the Corfu Channel decision, was the clue to liability—or, if preferred, the very floor on which liability found support. “All this would be consistent with the principle embodied in the Judgement in the Corfu Channel case and also—with respect to harmful smoke emissions—in the Trail Smelter case.…”49 The second Special Rapporteur was convinced that even sine delicto liability— notwithstanding its objective character—required a minimum of participation of the will of the liable party, which would not exist without its knowledge about the existence of the hazardous or noxious activity. International practice, however, seems to have pragmatically moved towards an “allocation of loss” having, at times, little to do with the authorship of the damage, and so have the articles of the Commission. The requirement was abandoned in later reports. The absence of the “no-act-of-the-State” exception is considered, in some quarters, an insurmountable obstacle for the establishment of State liability in international law.50 6.1. Attribution and Appreciable Risk The requisite that risk should be “appreciable” focuses, of course, on the level of risk required to trigger the mechanisms of liability; but it was also originally related to the idea of knowledge dealt with above. Among other motives, the utilization of this notion was, again, to protect developing States that lacked the technology required to know that a certain activity indeed created a risk, or the nature or magnitude of that risk. This was the first time that the term “appreciable risk” was introduced in the draft.51 It was then identified 49 50
51
Doc. A/CN.4/405, pp. 20/21. Cf. Lefeber, op.cit., pp. 56/60. However, that exception does not exist in other forms of indirect liability or responsibility or in the loss allocation set forth in instruments like the Oil Fund Convention. The responsibility of masters for certain acts of their servants, or of fathers for certain acts of their children, is well known and does not surprise anybody. Is not the accountability of States in international law always indirect? After all, States are made accountable for the acts of people who are not the State, only its organs. In fact, it is the national community, personified in the State, which is made accountable for the acts of some of its members. The community is responsible for having selected its organs and in our field it is liable because such organs permitted a hazardous activity to be carried on in its territory. “The adjective ‘appreciable’ indicates that the risk involved must be of some magnitude and that it must be either clearly visible or easy to deduce from the properties of the things or materials used. This is the corollary to the requirement that the injury must be appreciable in
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as a risk “objectively” appreciable to anyone who looked carefully at the activity concerned. “Appreciable,” however, has two different meanings. One is that of “perceptible”—something perceivable at first sight or after summary investigation. The other is that of “significant”—i.e., of a certain magnitude. This dual meaning of the word seemed to the second Special Rapporteur ideal for the protection of developing countries, but later on the Commission, by choosing “significant”, subtracted from the notion of threshold the meaning of “perceptible” as something that may be perceived. This was the first attempt to establish a threshold; the final one referred to a combination of risk and harm. 7. The Balance of Interests Test The issue of the balance of interests is important. As we have seen, whenever transboundary harm is caused by a hazardous activity, there is a disruption of that balance between the States concerned. But even if the State of origin fulfils its duty of care and even if no harm is actually caused by the activity, the balance of interests is altered. The basic legal principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas seems to apply at the very moment when risks are created benefiting States of origin and threatening harm to risk-bearer States. Territorial sovereignty protects the freedom of action of the State of origin and, at the same time, the right of the risk-bearer State not be affected by actions from abroad. The collision between the two contradictory aspects of sovereignty would be inevitable and the prevalence of one upon the other would breach the principle of sovereign equality: ergo the need to make them compatible and the application of neminem laedere. Following the logic of that principle, damage resulting from culpa lato sensu is sanctioned by wrongfulness and risk is conditioned to the exercise of prevention and compensation if damage occurs. The contingent character of the damage consequent to an inherent risk of the activity prevents its being prohibited, but only if its usefulness is considerably higher than the harm it threats with and a legal regime of prevention/compensation sits on the other plate of the scale. Thus, the balance of interests is restored.
order to be covered by these articles. It would be useful to include the adjective, bearing in mind that the description in article 1 (‘which do or may give rise to a…consequence…’) is too broad and covers any type of risk. Introducing a nuance by using ‘appreciable’ does not, in our view, mean introducing a new, unquantifiable dimension, but simply gives expression to what was implicit in the logic of the text.” Doc. A/CN.4/405, p. 21.
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That restoration requires a procedural step from the State of origin: it must negotiate, in good faith, an agreement for a regime of prevention and, eventually, compensation for damages.52 In fact, one of the purposes of the draft articles was to encourage States to enter into such agreements and guide them in their drafting. If no agreement is reached, then the State of origin had the obligation of exercising its utmost care to prevent and minimize the risk by monitoring and regulating the activity in question and, in case of transboundary harm, by compensating the affected State. That compensation does not need to reach the level of in integrum restitutio of the Chorzow factory rule, but rather be sufficient to re-establish the balance of interests, taking into account a number of factors such as the distribution of costs and benefits of the States concerned with regard to the activity. 8. The Risk Needless to say, “risk” is one of the key concepts in this topic, where “risk” and “harm” cannot be understood if not tied to each other: risk being potential harm, and harm the consequence of risk. Damage caused by a non-hazardous activity53 does not fall within the purview of the ILC’s articles, due to the definition of Art. 1.54 Dispensing with risk and considering only damage means ignoring an essential aspect of our topic: it is by no accident that one of the names for “liability” is precisely “liability for risk.” In the context of sine delicto liability, harm is not compensable merely because it has occurred, but because it corresponds to a general prediction that it could occur, since the activity was hazardous. As a consequence, transboundary damage resulting from other causes is not relevant to our subject. In the schematic outline, no attempt was made to define risk. The matter found some place in the Fourth Report (Barboza) where risk was related to the use of certain substances.55 In the Sixth Report of the same Special 52
53
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55
The State of origin is, in international law, under an obligation to negotiate. The content of that obligation is to sit to the negotiating table in good faith with a view to establishing a legal regime on the activity in question. That is, one that does not create a risk of significant transboundary harm, according to the definition of the 2001 articles. Liability sine delicto has a somewhat wider scope than risk liability. It may arguably envisage cases like where an act has been excluded of its wrongfulness, as well as expropriation. Article 2 (a): “ …the risk occasioned by the use of substances whose physical properties, considered either intrinsically or in relation to the place, environment or way in which they are used, make them highly likely to cause transboundary injury throughout the process”.
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Rapporteur, activities involving risk were identified in relation with their use of dangerous substances, technologies or genetically altered organisms and micro-organisms. Having identified the activities dealt with in the draft, there was no need for a general definition of risk. However, the concept of “appreciable” risk, or “significant” risk—as it could be called depending on what the Commission decided—was an issue and the Sixth Report56 included the relevant definition in article 2 (e), as: “ ‘[Appreciable][significant] risk’ means risk which presents either the low probability of causing very considerable [disastrous] harm or the higher than normal probability of causing minor, though [appreciable] [significant] transboundary harm.”57 The Commission decided later on against introducing the notion of dangerous substances or any other attempt at a detailed identification of hazardous activities that would fall within the scope of the articles. The Commission finally chose a general formula to cover prevention measures.58 There were few examples to follow regarding risk, as conventions on specific activities do not need to deal with the concept of risk in order to define their scope: the activities covered are presumed to have the level of risk necessary to require a legal regime. The only general convention on dangerous activities was—and still is—the Lugano Convention on Activities Dangerous to the Environment, at that time only a draft produced by the Council of Europe. A definition of “risk” existed in relation to the accidental pollution of transboundary inland waters.59 The Convention on the Transboundary Impacts of Industrial Accidents,60 in article 1 (d), also defined the concept of “risk.”61 The Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of
56
57 58
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Fixing the threshold by a combination of risk and the extent of the harm expected was, then, done as early as in the Sixth Report (Barboza). The words in between brackets were offered as alternatives, following UN practice. As we shall see, the Commission decided in 1997 to separate prevention from liability and re-start the work on prevention. The Code of Conduct on this subject, in article 1, defines three closely related concepts: in subparagraph (f) “risk” meant the combined effect of the probability of occurrence of an undesirable effect and its magnitude; in (g) “hazardous activity” meant an activity which by its nature involved a significant risk of accidental pollution of transboundary inland waters; and in (h) “hazardous substance” meant any substance or energy involving a significant risk of accidental pollution of transboundary inland waters, including toxic, persistent and bioaccumulative substances and harmful micro-organisms. ENVWA/WG.1/R.1. “Risk” here was defined as the combined effect of the probability of occurrence of an accident and the extent of its impact.
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Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD) did not define “risk,” only “dangerous goods” (in art. 1, paragraph 9), and did so simply by reference to certain lists contained in European agreements. The draft Framework Agreement on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context established the need for impact assessment in respect of certain activities, but also did so by means of lists.62 To sum up, in the models at the disposal of the Commission, there were various elements and conditions associated with risk: (a) the activities themselves, in terms of the magnitude of their inherent risk and foreseeable transboundary effects; (b) the location of the activity in relation to the international frontier or to sensitive areas in neighboring States that might be particularly affected; and (c) the objects the activity dealt with. “Objects” were taken to mean such things as technologies, substances, and dangerously genetically modified organisms or dangerous micro-organisms. The Fourth Report of the second Special Rapporteur identified only activities involving dangerous substances, but some of the concepts used also applied to the activities themselves and not to the substances involved.63 The Special Rapporteur considered that an identification of hazardous activities could begin using criteria such as those of the CRTD: magnitude, location and effects. With the intention of improving on the definition of his Eight Report, he suggested the following draft definition: “ ‘Risk’ means the combined effect of the probability of occurrence of an accident and the magnitude of the harm threatened. ‘Activities
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Article 2, paragraph 5, defined planned activity which should be assessed in terms of its transboundary impact, stating that “planned activity” meant “any activity or any major change to an activity, particularly those listed in Appendix I hereto, and subject to a decision in accordance with an applicable national procedure” Appendix I cites as planned activities likely to have a transboundary impact such works as major agricultural projects, major crude-oil refineries and installations for the gasification or liquefaction of coal, thermal power stations and other combustion installations, nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors, etc. See ENVWA/AC.3/6, annex. Dangerous substances are dangerous intrinsically, but also in relation to the place, the environment or the way in which they are used or in relation to a combination of the former factors. Intrinsically (explosives, radioactive, toxic or inflammable materials, etc); in relation to the place (those conducted close to the international border or threatening a region ecologically sensitive, or where the winds extend their effect beyond the State of origin’s borders, etc.); in relation to the environment in which they were used, when the substances in question have a particular effect on certain media; in relation to the way of their utilization (substances used in space activity or aviation, or wherever adequate arrangements are not made for their storage, or substances accumulated in large quantities, such as oil, which may be harmless in small quantities and becomes dangerous when 200,000 tons of it are transported by ship or water in a dam retaining in its impoundment a quantity sufficient to cause damage of various kinds), etc.
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involving risk,’ for purposes of the present articles, are activities where the result of the above combination is significant.”64 Neither this general definition, nor perhaps any other way of approaching the issue—including the provision of examples in annexes—afforded guarantees that all activities involving risk would, a priori, be satisfactorily identified in the draft articles. However, the Special Rapporteur thought that something along the lines of the above text could provide guidance to Governments regarding how the articles would operate. The final formula adopted by the Commission did not differ too much from that just transcribed above.65 9. Harm (damage) Art. 2.4 of Professor Quentin Baxter’s last report66 approached “injury” by defining “transboundary effects” as a physical consequence of the activity or situation within the territory or under the control of a State affecting the use or enjoyment of areas within the territory or control of any other State. The Third Report (Barboza) pointed out a difference between the concept of damage in the fields of State responsibility and of liability. In the former, the law attempts to erase all the consequences of the wrongful act (Chorzow factory rule). In the latter, a more complex situation arose, and it was necessary: “[…] to bear in mind that the adverse effect which is the source of the injury occurs as a result of an activity which is lawful and which has been approved, notwithstanding the danger it involves, because a comparison of the various interests and factors at stake has shown that it is preferable to face the consequences which might arise than to prohibit the activity outright.”67 Damage was defined in the Third Report (Barboza, articles 2.5 and 2.6) as a “physical consequence” of an activity within the territory or control of a source
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The text went on to say that “This situation may arise when the effects of the activity are threatening, as when dangerous technologies, substances, genetically modified organisms or micro-organisms are used, or when major works are undertaken, or when their effects are accentuated by the location of the sites at which they are carried out, or by the conditions, ways or media in which they are conducted.” Doc. A/CN.4/443, p. 31. “Article 2. Use of terms. For the purposes of the present articles: (a) “Risk of causing significant transboundary harm” includes risks taking the form of a high probability of causing significant transboundary harm and a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary harm.” The text proposed in the Fourth Report was more flexible than the final formula, which demands “a high probability”—i.e., implying a high risk, whereas the text in the Report is contented with a “significant risk.” Yearbook…1984, Vol. II, Part One, p. 156. Third Report…Doc. A/CN.4/405, p. 17.
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State, affecting persons or objects and the use and enjoyment of areas within the territory or control of an affected State.68 It should be noted that, although physical causality was the vehicle of harm, harm itself was to be reflected in social terms: a loss of certain advantages, replacement costs, a variety of inconveniences, deterioration of the health of certain persons, harm to the environment and other ill effects, which generally would have to be assessed and compensated in economic terms. It is explained later in the same document that, in reality, damage was conceived of as a disruption of the balance of factors and interests at stake.69 Because the factors involved were complex, and sometimes not easy to quantify, the need for negotiations arose. The obligation to negotiate was later considered to be the only really compulsory consequence of the production of transboundary harm.70 The obligation to negotiate was necessary if no compulsory method of deciding controversies was to be introduced in the draft articles.71 Besides the procedural obligation to negotiate in good faith, the solution proposed in the third and consecutive reports was to measure damage according to the extent of the disruption to the balance of interests. The definition of “transboundary harm” in the articles proposed in the Fourth Report (Barboza) had some slight changes, but it was essentially equivalent to that of the Third Report72 and the Fifth Report repeats the same text with the important
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Id., p. 7. “The magnitude of the injury will be directly proportionate to the resulting imbalance: the extent of the imbalance will determine the extent of the injury.” Id., p. 17. Today, the present writer would not present the matter in such absolute terms, he would be more inclined to consider the re-establishment of the balance of interests as one of the factors in the calculation of the reparation due. But the baseline on which reparation should start being calculated is the Chorzow Factory rule and that is confirmed by international practice. Orientating that negotiation was always the principle that the innocent victim should not be left to bear his loss. In the view of the Second Special Rapporteur, the obligation to negotiate in international law was a consequence of its decentralized nature. Indeed, a similar obligation is not to be found in domestic law systems because, due to the compulsory character of the courts’ jurisdiction, anybody considering himself aggrieved may seize a competent law court of his claim and the defendant will be obliged to appear and defend his position or take the consequences. “Transboundary injury” means the effect which arises as a physical consequence of the activities referred to in article 1 and which, in spheres where another State exercises jurisdiction under international law, is appreciably detrimental to persons or objects, or to the use or enjoyment of areas…”(Art.2.c). The expression “spheres where another State exercises jurisdiction under international law” had in mind places like ships flying that State’s flag.
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addition of a primary notion of environmental harm.73 Also, the last paragraph is a new one: “Under the regime of these articles, transboundary injury always refers to ‘appreciable injury’.” Which lead us to the notion of a “threshold” of harm, as will be seen later. In the Sixth Report (Barboza), there were more precisions added74 but no definition of “environmental harm.”75 An approach to a definition of “environmental harm” was tried in the Eleventh Report by describing “environment”76: “The environment includes ecosystems and natural, biotic and abiotic resources, such as water, soil, fauna and flora and the interactions among these factors.” 9.1. The Items of Compensable Damage Compensable damage—i.e., items of damage covered by compensation—