The Environment, the Moralist, the Corp and Its Culture

"THE ENVIRONMENT, THE MORALIST, THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE" George G. Brenkert

Abstract: Contemporary society faces a wide range of environmental problems. In what ways might business be part of the solution, rather than the problem? The Moralist Model is one general response. It tends to focus on particular corporations which it treats as moral agents operating within our common moral system. As a consequence, it claims that, with various (usually modest) changes, corporations may become environmentally responsible. This paper contends, on the contrary, that business has its own special "ethics," which relates not simply to the internal nature of the corporation but also to the corporate (free market) system. Given this special ethics, business cannot in general be environmentally responsible in the manner that the Moralists demand. Instead, more far-reaching changes are needed within corporations and the economic system to promote environmental responsibility. Though the requisite changes are significant, there are forces pushing in the direction which the paper identifies.

n P H R E E observations serve as the springboard for this paper. Each one has X been nicely formulated by others. The first observation is that we face any number of environmental problems some of which are terribly serious. In 1988 Albert Gore remarked that "The fact that we face an ecological crisis without any precedent in historic times is no longer a matter of any dispute worthy of recognition.' The question, he continued, is not whether there is a problem but how we will address it (Hoffman, 1991: 170). The environmental crisis Gore referred to includes problems which range from the spectacular—such as the oil spill of the Exxon Valdez, Occidental Petroleum and Love Canal, Silver Bay Mining and the pollution of Lake Superior, depletion of the ozone layer, and global warming—to the mundane, such as the cotton industry's fight against tough standards on cotton dust (Jackall, 1983: 129), Manville's handling of asbestos, the auto industry's fight against tougher pollution and fuel efficiency standards, and so on. This list could quite obviously go on for some time. Some environmental problems relate to pollution, others concern the depletion of resources. Some entail direct moral obligations, others involve morally desirable, but not obligatory, courses of action that business might take. Some of these problems and their real (or potential) magnitude are unique to contem-

©1995. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 4. ISSN 1052-150X. 0675-0697.

676

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

porary business, while others represent ongoing environmental problems each society faces. Individually, environmental problems may vary a great deal in seriousness. Collectively, I will assume, they carry significant implications for business, government and society. The second observation is that many of the environmental problems we confront are linked with prominent, mainstream, American corporations. In short, problems of the environment do not simply attach to a few renegade corporations, but to mainline American business. Kenneth Andrews recently asked, in a broader but relevant context, "Why is business ethics a problem that snares not just a few mature criminals or crooks in the making but a host of apparently good people who lead exemplary private lives while concealing information about dangerous products or systematically falsifying costs?" (Andrews, 1990: 99).' Indeed, why is it that major, mainstream American corporations are so deeply caught up in the very environmental problems which our society needs to solve? How can business be part of the solution, rather than the problem? There are two standard responses to this situation. The Economist Model urges business to seek high levels of profit within the rules of the game which society, through its government, lays down. If business is to act in certain environmental ways, then government should say so. Otherwise, business should pursue its proper end of producing goods and services at a profit. High levels of profit, not (environmental) good deeds, are business's responsibility. It is the view defended by those such as Milton Friedman, Albert Carr, and Theodore Levitt. Second, the Moralist Model contends that businesses are moral agents which ought not simply to follow the law, but rather to act morally beyond what the law demands. Corporations must recognize that they have social and/or moral responsibilities to the environment. Because they have failed to acknowledge and act on these environmental responsibilities, we have at least some of the environmental problems we do. If, on the contrary, corporations would act responsibly in this broader manner, they would take an important step towards resolving our environmental problems.^ Though I believe that the Economist Model must be rejected, I cannot examine in this paper its shortcomings. Instead, I wish to focus on the Moralist Model. This model also has serious shortcomings in that it demands of business what it cannot, at least in its present form, fulfill. I do not deny that Moralists speak of changes that business must make in order to meet their prescriptions. What I do assert, however, is that the situation is much more demanding than they recognize. Much greater and more extensive changes will be required in order for corporations to meet the moral and environmental demands Moralists make. Accordingly, I will contend that business has its own special "ethics," which relates not simply to the internal nature of the corporation but also the corporate (free market) system. Further, this special ethics promotes policies and actions which are environmentally dangerous. Given this special ethics, business cannot in general simply adopt moral principles or be environmentally responsible in the manner that the Moralists demand.^

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

677

Consequently, we need to reach within corporations and the economic system to change this ethics and its corresponding structure. Unless we focus on this area of the issue concerning the environment, other differences between environmentalists, e.g., whether we should adopt a homocentric or a biocentric view, will be matters of indifference, if not cynicism, because the implications of either environmental approach need not be in the interest of this or that corporation or even the corporate/business system itself (qua business system). Finally, though the requisite changes are significant, there are forces pushing in these directions which need to be encouraged. This brings me to a third observation. Hazel Henderson contends that "the further one is drawn into environmental issues, the more the truth—long recognized by environmentalists—emerges. Environmentalism implies nothing less than a major emergent philosophy, global in scope, that challenges virtually every prior Western philosophical system" (Henderson, 1990: 287). I believe that Henderson is correct and that what she says applies to Western business corporations as well.

The Moralist Model argues that, in addition to its fiduciary responsibilities to its stockholders, businesses have various social and moral responsibilities, among which are included environmental responsibilities. Because businesses have not recognized and institutionalized such responsibilities they get into problems with the environment. Hence, business must recognize and institutionalize these responsibilities. Then many problems of the environment will decrease, if not be resolved.'* Moralists take diverse approaches. First, there is the substantive approach which portrays, derives, defends and/or justifies various moral maxims, principles, values and ideals according to which business should operate with respect to the environment. Holmes Rolston, for example, offers a number of maxims which business leaders should consider in directing corporate activities (Rolston, 1984). Michael Hoffman argues that business must respect "the intrinsic value of animal and plant life and even other natural objects that are integral parts of ecosystems" (Hoffman, 1991: 182). These are but two of many who take this approach. Second, there is the process approach. Kenneth Goodpaster lays out a method of ethical decision making which he calls PASCAL (Goodpaster, 1990). His argument is that if businesses would follow the various steps of perception, analysis, synthesis, choice, action and learning, then they would develop an environmental conscience within the corporation (Goodpaster, 1990). In either case, the Moralist Model contends that corporations do have moral (or social) responsibilities to the environment. Thus, Rolston contends that "business leaders ought not to be concerned merely with obeying the law. They will want to be sensitive to the right and wrong that underlie, or should underlie the law.... But how can we decide right or wrong in such cases? That is the central question that demands our attention" (Rolston, 1984: 325).

678

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

Two caveats are appropriate at this point. First, the strength of the moral or environmental responsibilities attributed to corporations may vary from Moralist to Moralist. Such moral demands may run a wide gamut, from extremely weak to the strongest demands that a deep ecologist might impose. I will assume that, in general, the environmental demands of the Moralist Model fall somewhere in between. Even as such, it is important to note that they are rather strong. Hoffman urges a biocentric environmental ethic on business (Hoffman, 1991: 178). Goodpaster suggests the need for a "global consciousness" that would derive from a corporate (environmental) conscience, which he characterizes as "a practical surrender of self-centered thinking" (Goodpaster, 1990: 38).^ And French argues that only corporate entities can be assigned the responsibility of protecting the environment for future generations (French, 1990: 9). These views, we should recognize, demand that corporations engage in activities which not only do not always serve the self-interest (certainly not the short-term self-interest) of the corporation but also involve a substantial departure from traditional corporate modes of operation. In short. Moralists assign rather strong environmental responsibilities to corporations. My second caveat concerns some unclarity within the Moralist Model as to what might follow from its acceptance. At a minimum, it would seem. Moralists must believe that this is a way to (partially) resolve the environment problem. Hoffman suggests this in arguing for business's environmental responsibility: "activities which affect the environment should not be left up to what we, acting as consumers, are willing to tolerate or accept" (Hoffman, 1991: 174). What we need is corporate moral leadership (Ibid.). I wish to challenge this view, not because I disagree with what it says, but with what it does not say. My contention is that business is not in a position to be the moral agent which is required by the preceding demands. Since it cannot be the appropriate moral agent, the moral demands of the Moralist Model are (to varying degrees) inappropriate. My challenge is twofold. First, Moralists tend to treat businesses like ordinary moral agents in two senses. They imply, on the one hand, that a wide range of moral responsibilities is open to and possible for business. Hoffman, for example, comments that "we should promote business ethics, not because good ethics is good business, but because we are morally required to adopt the moral point of view in all our dealings—and business is no exception. In business, as in all other human endeavors, we must be prepared to pay the costs of ethical behavior" (Hoffman, 1991: 176). In addition. Moralists claim that corporations can and should subscribe to the same moral point of view that ordinary (human) moral agents do. Moralists may recognize that corporations have special responsibilities that ordinary moral agents do not have.^ But then physicians and lawyers have responsibilities that other ordinary moral agents also do not have. The point is that Moralists hold that corporations and ordinary moral agents both fall within the same moral point of view.^

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

679

On the contrary, I suggest, corporations are not similarly susceptible to moral responsibilities in this manner. The dynamics of formal social systems are not sufficiently similar to those of individuals acting within informal systems to allow Moralists to treat them like ordinary moral agents. Corporations and individual moral agents differ in distinct ways such that we cannot, at present, view both of them within the same moral point of view or as similarly accountable for environmental responsibilities. Second, by focusing on particular corporations or businesses, the Moralist Model neglects the system which defines the corporations that are part of it. The Moralist approach treats the problem on the level of the particular institution, not the system of business institutions. It tends to demand that each corporation exercise a moral will, rather than to focus on the need to restructure the system of which they are a part. As such it assumes that the constraints that are part of operating within this system do not tend to prevent individual businesses from acting on moral grounds. Once again, I wish to draw attention to these constraints. As a consequence, I contend that the Moralist Model can have only limited success as a moral doctrine—indeed, much more limited than it realizes and much less than it needs for its proposal to serve as a significant part of the solution to the problems of the environment. On the contrary, only to the extent that significant changes in corporations and corporate society occur, could this Model be more effective. Two qualifications are appropriate at this point. First, I do not deny that a variety of instances may be cited where this or that corporation has acted morally. But here our concern is with environmental questions which raise vastly more difficult issues for corporate moral behavior than allowing community organizations to use company auditoriums, contributing to a local school, or sponsoring the clean up of trash along a stretch of river. Further, we must look to the system level if the Moralist Model is to have any effect. It is with corporations as they operate within the corporate (or business) system that we should be concerned, not simply this or that corporation or business. Second, though Moralists do speak about the importance of institutionalizing ethics within the corporation to make adoption of their social responsibilities effective (for example, they speak about codes of ethics, ethics ombudsmen, and ethics hotlines), their major efforts focus on the nature of corporate social and moral responsibilities.* They give no indication that such changes as they mention are needed prior to attributing those responsibilities to corporations. The modifications they note are primarily to ensure that corporations fulfill the responsibilities they otherwise have.^ Given these assumptions, they proceed to identify the environmental responsibilities of business (or the methods of arriving at these responsibilities) and ask business to follow them. The argument of this paper is that something much more thoroughgoing is required. In short, I wish to suggest that we revisit the old maxim that "ought" implies "can" before we continue to attribute moral environmental responsibilities to corporations.

680

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

The preceding has simply leveled an attack on the Moralist view on the basis of two different assertions against the way in which Moralists have proceeded to impose or attribute moral environmental responsibilities to corporations. This charge and its bases must now be defended.

Almost a quarter century ago, Albert Carr argued that business operates according to a "special ethics" which does not (or should not) recognize the moral responsibilities Moralists attribute to business (Carr, 1968). His article has been much maligned by Moralists and many others as well. I find myself in the awkward position of agreeing (at least in part) with Carr rather than his critics. However, I agree with Carr's view for reasons and ends quite different than his. Nevertheless, it is because of our agreement that I have contended that the Moralist attempt to impose environmental responsibilities on business, in its present form, can meet, at best, with limited success. To begin with, when I say that business operates by its own ethics or has a special ethics I mean four things: First, business has a set of rules, virtues, values, and ideals, etc. (and their converse) which both overlap and differ from those in the rest of society. Some of the items of this ethics are part of ordinary morality. The rest of society may recognize and praise (or condemn) them. Other items, however, do not clearly apply to society at large. Conversely, some elements of ordinary morality are not part of this special ethics.'*' Second, the rules, virtues, etc. which overlap with ordinary morality exist in a different set of priorities and ordering. Ordinary society orders them differently. For example, efficiency may be extremely important in business, but less so in the rest of life. Honesty regarding one's political opinions may be less important in business than in ordinary life. The items of this special ethics are unified by their role in the production of goods and services for profit. Third, on occasion and as a matter of fact, these rules, virtues, etc. can and do override rules and virtues in the rest of society even though the claimed upshot of this overriding is the promotion of ends which society seeks. The rest of society may express its moral disapproval of some of these incursions, but by and large it has acquiesced. Only the most blatant examples have called forth sufficient response so as to result in new laws or regulations, or in social/moral condemnation that modifies these actions. Finally, these rules, virtues, values and ideals are part of a structure of relations and attitudes which are mutually self-supportive. The ethics is not simply an after-thought loosely appended to this system, but is definitionally and causally bound up with the system it supports and which supports it. In identifying what I mean by business having a special ethics I do not intend to defend ethical relativism. Rather I wish to point to a special set of values, principles and ideals which regulates behavior in business and to contend that we do well to recognize this fact. I have not as yet, it will be noticed, said what that special ethics is or given reason to believe that it exists.

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

681

In addition, I do not suggest that the forms this special ethics takes may not be subject to criticism by the ethics of everyday life. Far from it. My argument might be said to be an exercise in what has been called descriptive ethics, rather than normative ethics. However, that would only be partially correct because this special ethics does carry some genuine moral force. It may be not only psychologically but also morally difficult for individuals within corporations to violate this ethic. Doing so may imperil the efforts and livelihoods of many other individuals. Further, the production of goods and services by the corporate system as well as various aspects of its special ethics carry moral force within ordinary morality as well. However, since the two ethics do not coincide, individuals and corporations may face various moral dilemmas between conflicting sets of duties and values. Accordingly, the point of Carr's claims about a special ethics for business should be taken to be correct in this present, complex sense. Unfortunately, Carr thought that he could spell out a special ethics for business that was normatively correct and immune to ordinary moral criticisms. In rejecting this his critics were correct. •• The significance of an account of this special ethics is that it identifies the reasons why corporations—and people in business—are unable or able with considerable difficulty—to do the moral thing.'^ We must focus on what the institution of business in its present corporate form promotes, rather than what the exceptional individual or business does on special occasions. It is, as they say, the exception that proves the rule. Though there may be many shining points of light across the corporate firmament, these points of light only reveal the background against which they contrast. It is on the background—the common condition—not the exceptional points of light that we should concentrate. The reason is not that we are pessimists, but that we are realists. IV What reasons are there, then, to contend that, in their present state, corporations and their members, can fulfill the environmental and moral responsibilities attributed to them with great difficulty (if they can at all)? Three different aspects of contemporary corporate life are relevant: I) Prominent altitudes and ideals; II) Internal structures which mutually support and are reinforced by these attitudes and ideals, etc.; Ill) Market structures. My account can only be extremely abbreviated. The hope is that it is recognizable and thereby plausible. First, business tends to promote or encourage certain psychological characteristics, values and virtues as supportive of its aims and activities.*^ The business life is the active, not the contemplative, life. More than this it is the active life as directed towards the production and sale of goods and services for profit. As such, it is only part of life. For an individual to maintain this activity, and to succeed against significant odds with hard competition, various virtues, values and attitudes come to the fore. Without commenting on them I shall simply list a number of the prominent ones which authors such as Michael Maccoby, Albert Carr, Carl Madden, Henry Mintzberg, Robert Jackall, and others have noted.

682

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

These include: an energetic spirit, "a bold front," a "can-do" mentality, loyalty, commitment, optimism, positive thinking, self-control, self-discipline, competitiveness, team playing, growth, material success, concealment of one's strengths and intentions with regard to one's competitors, distrust of competitors, selfprotection, survival, willingness to exploit the psychological and financial weaknesses of one's competitors, and the importance of winning.•"* It is not by chance that people in business frequently compare themselves to members of athletic teams who must energize themselves to play at their highest levels or to combatants in a war in which one must give one's all. Now if these are the attitudes, values and virtues which predominate in, and are supported by, corporations, when they seek to produce goods and services for profit in a highly competitive, but relatively unregulated (legally), atmosphere, then various choices either cannot be made, or can be made with great difficulty. Not only can corporations (or their members) not readily choose all of the moral alternatives which ordinary persons can choose, but their response to moral wrong doing must also be limited by attitudes which reject admissions of weakness, doubt, and uncertainty. Further, decisions with regard to various policies such as limiting growth, pursuing non-material forms of success, doing good for members of the community, and being environmentally conscious will also be severely limited.'^ Accordingly, if the attitudes enforced are those of optimism, achievement, if one's role is ever to be a booster and team player, then such an individual will inevitably find his or her moral views and actions limited. To maintain one's attitude one cannot dwell on the negative or the divisive. It is not surprising in this atmosphere that we find endless "motivational seminars" in which individuals are to get "pumped up" to carry on, and that the expression of moral or political qualms is discouraged (Jackall, 1983: 123) Consequently, in this situation, it seems unlikely that the full environmental appeal of Moralists will or can be heeded. The most we could hope for would be piece-meal agreements to modify or help in some limited manner with this or that environmental problem.

The preceding attitudes and values are not simply free floating. They rest upon and are supported by various structural features. These too should be recognizable. There is the bureaucratic structure of business. People's positions and relations are defined through various rules and roles which assign (and limit) responsibilities and functions. As a consequence, there is "distantiation" among members of the organization and between organizations and society. The effects of one's actions need not be directly felt by the actor. One may not know the people one affects. To the extent that large corporations rely on specialization and sharp role differentiation, one's knowledge of the larger picture may be terribly fragmented and limited. As a consequence, the information that one passes back up the

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

683

corporate hierarchy may itself suffer from an incompleteness that cannot be made whole from above. If Jackall is correct, it may be quite possible for managers to outrun their mistakes because ofthe lack of tracking systems (Jackall, 1983: 126).'*Conceni for the effects of one's actions gets translated into concerns about legal liability or inability to outrun one's mistakes. Except at "blame time," Jackall also contends, managers do not publicly criticize or disagree with one another or with company policy (Jackall, 1983: 127). Similarly, Waters cites the presence of strict lines of command which discourage questioning various practices as a block to legal and ethical conduct (Waters, 1978: 6).^^ There is always pressure from the top to set higher goals (Jackall, 1983: 120). These are rarely, if ever, higher moral goals. Rather they are higher goals of productivity, sales, profitability, growth, etc. Madden has referred to this as a "performance ethic." There are also numerous reports of managers expressing their concern that they may be pressed to do something which violates their conscience (Mintzberg, 1983: 8).** Apart from the bureaucratic structure, the organization and the economic system encourage (i.e., reward) narrow goals. Surely there is debate over whether profit is to be maximized, optimized, realized at a reasonable rate,etc.'^ What seems clear, however, is that a profitable return has a special place within business (which it need not have for ordinary moral agents) and that this encourages the attitudes, values and virtues noted above. The pursuit of profit, market position, growth, etc. tend to be dominating strategies within a free market system (and world order) in which religious, moral, and social infrastructures have broken down (or are breaking down). Further, because these ends tend to be viewed within a short-term focus, quarterly reports assume a great significance. This is especially true today with current pressures due to leveraged buyouts and takeovers. This has a tendency to encourage giving everything a price which must itself enter into the calculation concerning this productive return. Those who focus more narrowly may enjoy a competitive advantage that others do not have, since, the game is won or lost in terms of market shares, profitability, etc. By this I mean that businesses may fail (i.e., cease to exist) because of their economic condition. Businesses do not fail simply because of their moral condition. If their moral condition were corrupt, they would only fail because some additional outside condition were also affecting them: e.g., the law or the market. As such business's special ethics relates to the special or primary nature, if not of profit, then of the welfare of the firm. Its members must focus on the self-interest of the firm.2O Accordingly, a corporation with significant available resources must use them to justify its existence. It has to use them to produce something; in short it has to develop something. Resources which are not revenue producing, e.g., scenic river valleys, wilderness areas, undeveloped seashores, etc. can have little basis for valuation on this view. Thus, one can understand the importance of the

684

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

demand for growth. Indeed, it is said that if a corporation is not growing then it is losing out and that the opposite of growth is death. Such demands place pressure on resource depletion; they may also foster pollution. Hence, development for development's sake is encouraged by the context within which the corporation operates. Now, given these characteristics, it would appear, once again, that the moral agency of corporations is severely restricted. If one tends to consider primarily the short run, then those moral and environmental considerations which require long-term planning will suffer. One becomes unable to entertain seriously such considerations. The demand for growth and profit, not wrong in themselves, may be forced upon those making corporate decisions to the exclusion of other moral ideals and reasons. A mentality develops in which other considerations cannot be heard. To the extent that one does not have an overview because of one's specialization, cannot or does not experience the effects of one's actions, is pressured from outside to accomplish goals one cannot reasonably accomplish, we have a situation in which moral considerations which presuppose contrary conditions must suffer. Further, if due to the lack of tracking systems, individuals become responsible for situations they did not create and can outrun those they did create, then we have a situation in which moral response, moral agency and the environment must suffer. I come, then, by way of a rather different route to a view similar to that of Alasdair Maclntyre who has argued that "corporate structures fragment consciousness and more especially moral consciousness" (Maclntyre, 1979: 122). Only where his conclusion seems to leave little hope, I will suggest that through changes in structure such fragmentation can be importantly lessened. VI Finally, there are several features of the market which constrain the moral choices of business. I will mention only two. First, as is widely recognized, the nature of the environment itself is a good which does not naturally lend itself to the invisible hand approach of the market. Lowe and Lewis comment that "the environment is not a product that is easily traded between interested parties, consequently there are few price signals which help guide the decision makers' courses of action" (Lowe and Lewis, 1979: 421). Garrett Hardin reminded us some time ago about the problem of the commons and the difficulties of procuring joint action by individuals who do not mutually agree to coerce themselves. Indeed, he thought that there was no moral solution to this problem (Hardin, 1968). Second, the extent to which business determines consumer behavior or consumer behavior determines business may not be easily ascertained. But surely it would be obtuse to deny that business responds to consumers. And consumers, to the extent that they seek simply the cheapest products, the easiest ways of acting, the most convenient forms of consumption, have driven business away

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

685

from environmentally sound policies (Chamberlain, 1973). Mark Sagoff has vividly portrayed the schizophrenic view that many people have of themselves as consumers, on the one hand, and as citizens with concerns about society and the environment on the other (Sagoff, 1981). But if the moral agent is the citizen, and not the consumer, then the demands of the consumer must be viewed with circumspection. The corporation that would be a moral agent itself cannot simply appeal to consumer desire as a justification for its own activities.^! VIl Now if the preceding is correct, then we can see why corporations have an inherent tendency to violate the environmental responsibilities which have been attributed to them. The problem of the environment for corporations is not simply that of the commons, but also of the structure of the game by which they define themselves. Until now this game has discouraged individuals in business and corporations themselves from acting upon various environmental (and other moral) responsibilities. Accordingly, it is not a question of businesses pulling themselves up by their moral boot straps. It is not a question of moral or environmental voluntarism. It would appear that corporations are trapped in systems which they have helped to create (Chamberlain, 1973: 4). Hence, time spent on elaborating the nature of a moral conscience and the principles of moral responsiveness to the environment are of dubious worth until we solve a prior problem: what would it take to enable a corporation to act according to moral guidelines? Or, more generally, how can we construct a system of moral business institutions? One of the main thrusts of my argument is that it is here that business ethicists need to spend more time. Before we can fruitfully attribute various environmental responsibilities to corporations we need to pursue much further than we have heretofore the conditions for business institutions to act as moral agents within effective moral systems. At a minimum, changes are needed so that moral and environmental principles can readily be acted upon. Further, given the above structural features, the changes cannot amount simply to seeking some gaps or "zones of discretion" within the corporation within which what is moral can be willed (Mintzberg, 1983: 13). The nature of these changes must correspond with the requirements for an effective moral system of corporate moral agents. I suggest that the following must be included among the minimal conditions for such an effective morality under partial compliance (i.e., some corporations will continue to adhere to the Economist Model and not the Moralist Model). First, choice. A moral agent must be able to choose alternative courses of action. The agent is not coerced or constrained to follow a particular course of action. It must be possible to choose moral (as well as immoral and non-moral) actions. On the other hand, it must be conceivable that a moral agent could act wholly morally. If moral agents are constrained to act primarily in self-interested

686

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

manners, then such constraint limits or may even eliminate their moral agency. They do not have "free" choice.22 -phis is not to deny that some individuals may, even in extremely difficult and constraining situations, choose to do what is morally required. They remain moral agents. However, the design of an effective moral system should not require that individuals be moral heroes in order to be moral. It should foster moral behavior, not erect obstacles to it. This condition also implies that moral agents can control their actions. Choice would be empty if it did not result in corresponding action. This requires that moral agents can know and experience the effects of their actions, not only on themselves but also others. Accordingly, this condition also implies that moral agents have foresight and can anticipate consequences and implications of their actions. Consequently, the agent must be able to plan for the future and act appropriately. Second, motivation. A moral agent must be able to act from moral reasons. This implies that other members of the moral community can have input into those moral reasons. Other moral agents do not act upon a moral agent simply through self-interested or monetary means. In short, a moral agent must be part of a moral community. Absent such a community, development of a moral point of view would be extremely difficult if not impossible. Further, the reinforcement required for one's moral motivation not to he extinguished would be lacking.^^ Similarly, moral agents must be susceptible to emotions such as guilt, pride, shame, remorse, as well as esteem and admiration (Brandt, 1979: 166ff). Unless this is possible, other moral agents cannot effectively reason with and seek to guide such an agent's behavior. Third, comparability. No one is so powerful as to be able to circumvent morality. Conversely, no one is so low or alienated, that they simply cannot (or will not) go along. In short, there is rough equality or comparability amongst the members of the system either in themselves or through external monitoring systems which may work to reduce or compensate for disparities in power. However, comparability is only partially a matter of raw power. It is also a question of having roughly similar needs, desires and vulnerabilities. The openness to moral reasons of moral agents who do not share these rough similarities is diminished. With such comparability, moral agents may more readily listen to moral claims. They may be more willing to cooperate, at least to the extent of not attempting to injure others. Occasionally they may help others when, for example, they are in need or distress. Fourth, sanctions. There is a link among actions, effects and reward or punishment. Sanctions include informal measures such as reprimand, criticism, shunning, as well as praise and commendation. They may also include measures such as physical force, coercion, penalties against one's holdings and honors for outstanding behavior. Accordingly, moral agents must be susceptible to a variety of mechanisms whereby the moral community may exercise its active role in shaping the behavior of its members. A moral community could not exist in which its members were significantly impervious to each other. In short, an

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

687

effective moral society must be able to exercise some control over its members. This obviously also requires that the moral community can have knowledge of the actions and effects of its members. Fifth, compliance. If the preceding conditions hold, there will be general compliance. However, this is, in itself, yet another condition for there to be a successful and effective morality. For if individuals have reason to believe that others will violate their moral duties, then they too will have reason not to follow those rules and hence may tend not to do so. Contrariwise, if most others are seeking to fulfill their moral responsibilities, this can act as a further reason for them to do so. If the preceding is plausible, then for corporations (and their members) to be capable of the moral agency Moralists demand of them, various significant changes will be required. These changes must occur not only within but also between corporations themselves, as well as the rest of society. Too many Moralists tend to assume intellectualistic models of the corporation which focus simply on reasons, intentions, choices and actions that a corporation might have or make, without reference to conditions regarding motivation, comparability and sanctions. Likewise, their models of the corporation tend to be too individualistic, thereby neglecting the community required for any agent to be a moral agent. This is not to suggest that appropriate changes caq make corporations moral agents in the full sense that humans may be. On the contrary, corporations can, at best, be regarded as secondary moral agents. Still, even for this, if corporations and their members are to follow the moral prescriptions that Moralists recommend, a number of significant implications follow for the structure of business organizations. Without such changes, the present corporate environment can only support morality in a limited fashion. As a consequence, individual corporations will comply with morality less frequently and individual moral agents will be forced to work in environments that do not support their efforts to be ethical.24

VIII It is not the place for business ethicists, as such, to say specifically what those changes should be. However, they may suggest criteria and standards according to which such changes should proceed. Once again, I can only be very brief. Authority and Accountability. Corporate structures must be designed to acknowledge moral reasons, to minimalize forces which inhibit them, and to act on them when decisive. For example, to avoid the practice of placing pressures on subordinates who are unable to meet their assignments without breaking the law or engaging in immoral acts, the structure of power and authority must be reworked. Otherwise moral reasons can not be effective and moral choice is restricted. Accountability must flow not only from bottom to top, but also top to bottom. Subordinates must be able to evaluate superiors as well as superiors evaluate subordinates. Without such measures the effectiveness of moral sanctions is restricted and the incomparability of individuals increased.

688

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

This requires broad knowledge of the actions and responsibilities of others within the organization. As Christopher Stone has emphasized, knowledge must be able to make its way up and down the organization (Stone, 1975). Claims of lack of knowledge must be skeptically received. Executives, as well as subordinates, within organizations must be held accountable for their actions, and not simply the organization itself (Singer and Wooten, 1976: 96). Accordingly, different forms of power sharing through participation might be extended throughout the organization. The organization which could fulfill the Moralist Model must be one whose bureaucracy is much flatter and more democratic than traditional bureaucracies. In making such changes, organizations must set up clear and direct tracking and accountability systems. The incentive structure must not favor those who use moral short-cuts. In addition, if there is to be moral accountability of corporate members and corporations themselves, then corporate structures must not only protect or foster the attitudes, values and virtues noted above (Section IV), but they must do the same for other attitudes and moral emotions such as regret, remorse, shame, joy, and pride. Since an effective moral system requires such reactions and responses, we can only doubt the moral possibilities of institutions which seek, by all means, to avoid public admission of guilt, shame or remorse for morally (and legally) wrong actions. It is clear that corporations have long worried about their public image a great deal, but this worry is distinct from concern about the moral quality of that image. Consequently, measures must be developed within the corporation to register "disturbances" perceived by its members which arise due to transgression of moral standards. These "disturbances" are the corporate equivalent of human emotional upset. Such corporate measures must be able to translate these "disturbances" into corporate perception of and response to the (moral) evaluations implicit in these forms of upset. In short, a corporation must be capable not simply of ego concerns surrounding its public image, but also moral emotion and concern regarding its activities.^^ Rationality. If the corporation's prime directive is not simply a narrow economic one, that is, simply to follow efficiency directives as the Economist Model prescribes, then it will also come under new standards for the determination of what is rational for the organization to do. Rationality can no longer be viewed simply as what most efficiently leads to some narrow end. In short, the standard functional rationality which has characterized corporate activities must be supplemented by a substantive rationality—the process of analyzing and judging events on their substantive merits, "revealing intelligent insight into the interrelations of events in a given situation" (Singer and Wooten, 1976: 93). Only if some move is made in this direction, can we overcome the tendency of many managers, noted by Singer and Wooten, to be "... so caught up in the procedural demands of their work that they easily lose sight of the important end results of their activities" (Singer and Wooten, 1976: 98f)- Accordingly, if the corporation is going to respond as a moral agent, then it must adopt a

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

689

theory of moral reasons and at the same time be part of a community of corporations which does likewise. This means that the self-interest ofthe corporation will, at times, take a back seat to other considerations. It also means that both within and among corporations (and society) mechanisms and processes must be constructed for developing (or trying to develop) consensus regarding moral reasons and ends.^^ This leads to the next point. Cooperation. There must be much greater cooperation both within and among corporations, as well as between corporations, government and the public. The we/they mentality that has characterized much of these relations must be replaced by a much more cooperative mentality. This cooperation must be instilled in the very ideology of business. It is nonsense for business to continually speak as if government is enemy number one, and for the public to feel similarly about business. Part ofthe point of Bowen McCoy's essay, "The Parade ofthe Sadhu," is that without support systems it is impossible for individuals to act on their moral visions (McCoy, 1983). This is true not only of individuals within corporations, but also corporations within the business system. But such support systems are systems of cooperation. Increasingly today we see mutual cooperation between formerly opposed corporations. IBM and Apple, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, General Motors and Toyota have teamed up for mutually beneficial economic projects.^' If they can cooperate in these ways, they must be encouraged to do so for environmental reasons.^* Laws and regulations which might inhibit environmental alliances must be revised. Such cooperation should not be mistaken for simply the willing agreement by all to do (or not to do) various things. It may also take the form of creating incentives which would encourage and reward agreements as well as and mutual activities which promote common well-being. In addition, it may include a system of mutual coercion which corporations (states and citizens) mutually agree to exercise upon each other (Hardin, 1968: 1247). However, if there is to be such mutual coercion and this is to be mutually agreed upon, then it is important to say who is included within the mutuality of these agreements. Since the moral community of which corporations are a part is not limited simply to the collection of corporations, the mutuality of these agreements must extend to the whole of society. Democratization. If the future is to be decided, as it must and will be, by such clusters of cooperating corporations, then the issue of the legitimacy of such efforts arises before us. Milton Friedman was correct to maintain that if corporations undertake such roles they are no longer exercising simply private roles but also public ones (Friedman, 1962). Indeed, the distinction itself between private and public is undergoing significant change. But then much greater roles for citizens must be involved. We may need formal involvement of the public and the community in company decisions. Already various companies are engaged in initial experiments along these lines.2' However, these efforts should not simply take the form of studies and

690

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

surveys of the public's "willingness to pay." The issue here is not simply economic, but also moral and political. The separation of the political and the economic has been a false one. Instead, it is at least initially plausible that the forms of legitimacy that such cooperative enterprises will have to invoke will require various forms of democracy which include the community. This would be in line with Garrett Hardin's comment that "the great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both the custodians and the corrective feedbacks" (Hardin, 1968: 1246). Openness. If corporations are to fulfill the above criteria, then they must be much more open in providing information to their own members and to those in the community about their activities, as well as the goods and services they provide. This flow of information must also include information about potential problems, both inside and outside major facilities (Kleiner, 1991: 41). Companies have resisted this for fear that they would give away something to a competitor or give environmental groups the rope to hang them with (Kleiner, 1991: 41). There is evidence, however, that such open information need not be harmful, and may be rather beneficial, to corporations. For example. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (1986) required companies to report their emissions levels of 300 chemicals (Kleiner, 1991: 41). One of the beneficial consequences has been that the corporations involved finally troubled to see what they were doing and, as a consequence, made economic gains from recovering wasted resources. This suggests that a rather full system of reporting need not be injurious to corporations and may have unexpected beneficial results. An implication of this criterion deserves notice. Madden notes business's lack of credibility with the public (Madden 1977: 75). Openness can only be effective, i.e., people will believe it and act on it, if it can be examined. In short, corporate America can ask that it be trusted. But that trust must exist upon a basis of action and verified openness. Further, this openness will only be effective to the extent that local groups are able to know how to use the information that becomes available (Kleiner, 1991: 41). As such, the effectiveness of greater openness will depend on the development of a different community (Rienow, 1978). Environmental groups, as well as the government, must play an important role in monitoring such information. Environmentalism. Finally, mechanisms which fulfill the preceding criteria will not by themselves answer the environmental crisis we face. Singer and Wooten report how humanistic administrative systems can lose sight of the ends they are pursuing (Singer and Wooten, 1976). We must not only consider the means whereby to foster environmental ends but also those ends themselves. The substantive ends which corporations ought to follow require detailed argument. This is another forum for applied (i.e., business) ethicists. Instead of growth we must look to sustainable development, instead of maximizing profits we should look to sustainable profits. Business should increasingly take as its aim the fulfillment of a function and not simply the production of a product. Thus, we need corporations which seek to provide transportation.

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

691

not simply automobiles, nourishment not simply food, health not simply drugs, healthy crops and not simply pesticides. We are told that business gives the consumer what he or she wants. But we also know that this responsiveness can lead business away from environmentally responsible actions. Business can no longer assume that such responsiveness is productive of the greatest good. If business is to get on the environmental bandwagon it will have to be a leader and not use the appeal to consumer responsiveness—which it has had a role in creating—to justify its actions. Instead of the fulfillment of individual desires, a theory of community interests must be developed. It is to this that ultimately business must have its primary responsibility. IX I have argued that, if the Moralist Model is to be taken seriously, the corporation must be restructured so that it (and its members) can act as moral agents. Moral demands on corporations are not neutral with regard to the organization of the corporation or the system within which it functions. Accordingly, ethics courses for those going into business risk irrelevancy if the institutions they join are structured to resist, deflect or discourage moral behavior. Though the implications for corporations are significant, I do not believe that they are unrealistic or Utopian. There are important experiments by various corporations in accord with each of the criteria I have noted above. In addition, there are any number of forces which are pushing in the directions of the above argument. Among them are empowerment movements, the green movement, feminism, post-modernism, and changes in societal values. As such, the above criteria and standards do not call for the total replacement of the present socioeconomic system, though they do require substantial changes in it. Not only does the above argument carry implications for the environmentally responsible corporation, it also carries implications for business ethics as well. Business ethicists need to look much more at descriptive ethics. Jackall comments quite appropriately that "philosophers...have done little detailed investigation of the day-to-day operations, structure, and meaning of work in business and of how the conditions of that work shape moral consciousness" (Jackall, 1988: 5). They need to look more closely at the conditions under which practical morality can be effective. Defenders of the Moralist Model need to be more candid about the implications for business of the views they defend. If what business ethics says requires significant changes within business^-and I think it does—then business ethicists should come clean. If the Moralist Model does not have such radical implications for business, then it should say more clearly how we are to avoid the "cultural" problems I have noted. Finally, a prominent role for applied business ethicists concerns the appropriate structure of corporations. They must continue to refine and develop accounts of the environmental responsibilities of business. But they need to spend more time reflecting on the organizational implications of these responsibilities. If business is

692

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

to operate in an environmentally responsible manner, then much more is required than codes of ethics, environmental responsibility officers and ethics hotlines. Henderson has commented that "nothing less than a social, economic, and philosophical revolution...has already begun. Implementation of these new environmental insights and goals will require a greater restructuring of today's industrial societies than even the extraordinary restructuring we witnessed in the late 1980s" (Henderson, 1990: 290). I think that she is correct and that the Moralist Model must grasp this fact by focusing on the moral conditions according to which corporations would be able to respond effectively and generally to environmental demands. The University of Tennessee/Knoxville Notes *I would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper: Michael K. Green, John Hardwig, Caroline Henderson, and John Nolt. 'The concern over ethics, not to mention environmental ethics, is widespread. An article in Fortune claimed, in 1988, that "the business climate has become less ethical than it was in the relatively aboveboard period from the Depression's end until the mid-Seventies" (Magnet, 1988: 65). ^In one sense, I am focusing in this paper on what Edwin M. Epstein has called "business ethics" (as opposed to "corporate social responsibility" and "corporate social responsiveness") (Epstein, 1987). However, Epstein himself admits that there is great ovedap between "business ethics" and "corporate social responsibility" movements. Hence, in another sense I am not concerned with labels as with how we should respond to those (whomever) who contend that corporations have social and moral responsibilities regarding the environment and that acting upon such responsibilities would significantly help to resolve our environmental problems. ^It is not surprising, then, that D. Kirk Davidson, after a survey of the business community, comes to the conclusion that "while some individual companies are making strong commitments in this area [of the environment]..., these are isolated examples" (Davidson, 1990: 57). "^For example, Donaldson gives the example of the response to the mercury spills of Chisso. Though Chisso did not break any legal prohibition, many people contended that it had "disregarded its moral responsibilities" (Donaldson, 1982: 2). On these grounds a court forced Chisso to make massive payments. The suggestion, I take it, is that if business will recognize its moral responsibilities, it will not only avoid problems of the environment, but also it will help to solve these and other problems. In short, we do not need more government regulations. We need corporations to recognize and act on their moral and social responsibilities. ^In another article, Goodpaster defends the view that "nothing short of the condition of being alive... [is] a plausible and nonarbitrary criterion" for being morally considerable (Goodpaster, 1978: 310). He allows that if this criterion is "...taken seriously, [it] could admit of application to entities and systems of entities heretofore unimagined as claimants on our moral attention (such as the biosystem itself)" (Ibid.). ^Donaldson notes, for instance, that not every responsibility of a corporation (stockholders) is a responsibility that individuals also have; and the converse is also true (e.g., voting) (Donaldson, 1982: 15-16, 20, 30).

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

693

^Moralists also view the problem of corporate ethics as an individual problem when, for example, they attribute unethical conduct on the part of members of corporations (and hence of corporations themselves) to excessive greed, desire only for personal gain, individual weakness, ignorance, or the failure of managers to insist on high ethical standards (cf. Hilgert, 1990). Similarly, Patrick Murphy claims that "the key source of ethical problems in most business firms" is "overzealousness" (Murphy, 1989: 81). I do not wish to deny that the preceding items are factors in unethical conduct. My point is that the structures within which people work also play an extremely important role as well. It is striking that Murphy contends that we must create "ethical corporate structures," but then limits his discussion to "corporate credos," "ethics programs," and "tailored corporate codes" (Murphy, 1989). With each of these he notes important limitations. Nevertheless, he does not look beyond the ethical patina that these structural changes might bring. My contention is that Moralists must look more closely at the very structures by which the corporation is run. *It is tiot obvious that codes of ethics make corporations more ethical. Ronald Berenbeim reports on a study by M. Cash Williams which "compared 202 manufacturing companies that have codes to 104 that do not. Written codes, she found, do not decrease the number of corporate violations of the law. A company with a written ethics code was just as likely to dump toxic wastes illegally as one without such a code" (Berenbeim, 1988: 16). ^Donaldson notes that under certain conditions, which he seemingly suggests are extreme, a corporation may fail to be a moral agent and hence not have the responsibilities that he and other Moralists would attribute to them (Donaldson, 1982: 124-125). "^or example, the following values and ideals of ordinary life do not seem to be part of the special game of business or they play a subsidiary role: the ideal of the moral ascetic, the perfect spouse, the obedient child, selfless action, leisure, contemplation, love of family. On the contrary, the following appear to be values and ideals within business that are given greater weight or scope than in ordinary life: making a sale, efficiency, greed, accumulation, economic growth, predictability, espionage, shading the truth (puffery), various forms of deception, ending relationships on economic grounds, agreeing with superiors to curry favor, etc. ^'i am indebted to John Hardwig and John Nolt for suggestions on how best to portray this special ethics I am attributing to corporations. '^I refer here to what is moral according to ordinary morality, or at least ordinary morality as corrected through philosophical reflection. It has been objected that I am slipping between "cannot" and "can with difficulty" at this point in the text and that my argument requires "cannot," since if corporations can act morally, though with difficulty, then (significantly) they still can act morally. In response, I hold that any which system which requires that, in order to be moral, one must in effect be a moral hero (i.e., one who overcomes great difficulties to be moral), is a morally defective system. It requires change. l^It will quickly be obvious that I have drawn heavily on the account of Robert Jackall in his article "Moral Mazes" (Jackall, 1983) as well as his book (Jackall, 1988) of the same title. ''^In contrast, doubt, dread, anxiety, fear, the open expression of one's emotions, political or religious views etc. are not attitudes, values or character traits which are functional in business. This emphasizes that business fosters only part of life. Consider the extent to which these notions have played an important part in human life. A Kierkegaardian "sickness unto death," a Sartrian afflicted with existential anxiety simply do not have a place in today's business—nor do the mystic, the philanthropist, the Mother Teresa, the Don Quixote, the Schumacher, or the deep ecologist. '^Davidson asks why such reports as Limits to Growth and Our Common Future have received little attention from corporate America. I suggest that my argument gives at least part of the answer (cf. Davidson, 1990: 59).

694

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

'^By manipulating the numbers, e.g., reducing assets while maintaining sales, by deferring capital expenditures (from maintenance to innovative investments) as long as possible, managers may either starve or milk the plants with which they are associated (Jackall, 1983: 127). In this sense, Jackall suggests, bureaucracies may be thought of as vast systems of organized irresponsibility (Ibid.). '^Andrews notes that we "...hear little public comment from business leaders of integrity when incontestable breaches of conduct are made known—and silence suggests to cynics an absence of concern" (Andrews, 1989: 104). Similarly, Madden has noted that "the plain truth of the matter is that the ethics of leading business organizations rarely extend to acknowledging criticism of the business community or of specific members for inappropriate conduct, or even to expressions of moral outrage regarding events such as Watergate" (Madden, 1977: 58). '^Madden also reports on various studies which demonstrate the same pressures on ethical behavior (Madden, 1977: 66). Barbara Toffler refers to these pressures and the consequent manner of acting as "the 'move it' philosophy" (Toffler, 1991: F13). '^Jackall contends that productive return is the only rationale that carries weight within the corporate hierarchy (Jackall. 1983: 129). Madden offers as "a key theme: the internal master ofthe executive is the bottom line, guarded relentlessly by the investment analyst" (Madden, 1977: 72). Donaldson notes that Boulding denies that profit is the only factor in corporate decision making. He proceeds to list other non-profit corporate motives: security, expansion, technological advance, avoidance of failure, group loyalty, and organizational diffusion of responsibility (Donaldson, 1982: 94). Even so, these motives remain strikingly narrow in nature. ^''Of course individuals (outside of business) may be self-interested, have fragmentary knowledge, evade responsibility by various "internal" stratagems, etc. However, they are not supported in this by an explicit and forceful structural system as are individuals within the corporate arena. For example, ordinary morality counsels against self-interest in ways that the special ethics of business does not. Further, individuals don't have to adopt the competitive "success ethics" in the way that corporations must. ^'Chamberlain and many others have described public resistance to environmentally sound efforts (Chamberlain, 1973). On the other hand, McDonald's switch from the use of polystyrene to the use of paper products is often said to be an instance of public pressure of a major corporation to act in environmentally friendly ways. There is some controversy, however, over this case. It has been argued that the use of polystyrene is environmentally friendlier than the use of paper products (Naj, 1991: B8). Finally, I do not wish to deny that corporations are partially responsible for the ecologically unfriendly habits of consumers. In short, the relations here are exceedingly complex. ^^it is obvious that whenever moral agents exist they do so within some system that will structure their moral choices. This structure may enter into the very definition of that agent. This is not problematic so long as the system itself passes normative muster. I read the Moralist Model to say that the present business system does not, with regard to environmental responsibilities, pass moral muster. ^^Colin Turnbull's account of the Ik, an African tribe which due to environmental pressures declined into depravity and inhuman behavior, is relevant (Tumbull, 1972). ^'*John Hardwig contributed to my formulation of this paragraph. ^^If the possibility of various (moral) emotions is crucial to moral agents, then corporations, as moral agents, must be susceptible to something similar. These comments attempt to suggest how corporations might be said to be susceptible to (a kind oQ emotional state. I draw on William Alston's suggestion that an emotional state is "...a more or less disturbed state ofthe organism, together with the bodily sensations produced by this state, arising from a perceptual evaluation of something" (Alston, 1967, 2: 485).

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

695

^*The importance of groups of individuals (and organizatinos) having processes for developing a consensus regarding their (moral) purposes and plans is part of the point of the essay by Bowen H. McCoy, "The Parable of the Sadhu" (McCoy, 1983). At the outset of McCoy's article it is noted that "each climber gave the sadhu help but none made sure he would be safe" (McCoy, 1983: 103). If one substitutes "the environment" for "the sadhu," "McCoy's views take on significance for the topic of this paper. ^^This list could continue at great length. Other significant agreements have been made between Ford and Mazda, Alcoa and Kobe, and Time Warner and Toshiba. ^^E. S. Woolatd, Chairman of Du Pont, has suggested the notion of "partnering" which would be an instance of the present point. According to Woolard, partnering involves breaking down artificial boundaries within corporations and among corporations, government and environmentalists so as (among other things) "to analyze the problems of economy and to deal with the infTastrucnires of transportation, waste handling and disposal, and land use" (Woolaid, 1990). ^^E. S. Woolard has noted that "respect for local communities means involving residents in discussions about activities that potentially affect their safety, health and environment" (Woolard, 1989: 6). Such discussions, as well as citizen advisory boards that Du Pont is also experimenting with, are an important flrst step. Bibliography Alston, William P. (1967) "Emotion and Feeling," in Paul Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 2: 479-486. Andrews, Kenneth R. (1989) "Ethics in Practice," Harvard Business Review 89: 99-104. Berenbein, Ronald E. (1988) "An Outbreak of Ethics," Across the Board 25: 15-19. Brandt, Richard B. (1979) A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Carr, Albert Z. (1968) "Is Business Bluffing Ethical?," Harvard Business Review 46: 143-153. Chamberlain, Neil W. (1973) The Limits of Corporate Responsibility, New York: Basic Books. Davidson, D. Kirk (1990) "Straws in the Wind," in W. Michael Hoffman, Robert Frederick and Edward S. Petry, Jr., Business, Ethics, and the Environment, 2 vols.. New York: Quorum Books. Donaldson, Thomas (1982) Corporations and Morality, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Epstein, Edwin M. (1987) "The Corporate Social Policy Process," California Management Review 29: 99-114. Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Goodpaster, Kenneth E. (1978) "On Being Morally Considerable," The Journal of Philosophy 75: 308-325. (1990) "Can a Corporation Have an Environmental Conscience?," in W. Michael Hoffman, Robert Frederick and Edward S. Petry, Jr., Business, Ethics, and the Environment, 2 vols.. New York: Quorum Books. Hardin, Garrett (1968) "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 62: 1243-1248. Henderson, Hazel (1990) "From Environmentalism to Ecophilosophy: Retooling Cultures for the Twenty-first Century," in W. Michael Hoffman, Robert Frederick and Edward S. Petry, Jr. (eds.). Business, Ethics, and the Environment, 2 vols.. New York: Quorum Books.

696

BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY

Hilgert, Raymond L. (1990) "What Ever Happened to Ethics in Business and Business Schools?," in John E. Richardson (ed.) Business Ethics 90/91, Guilford, CT: The Dushkin Puhlishing Group. Hoffman, W. Michael (1991) "Business and Environmental Ethics," Business Ethics Quarterly 1: 169-184. Jackall, Rohert (1983) "Moral Mazes: Bureaucracy and Managerial Work," Harvard Business Review 61: 118-130. (1988) Moral Mazes, New York: Oxford University Press. Kleiner, Art (1991) "What Does It Mean to he Green?," Harvard Business Review 69: 38-47. Levitt, Theodore (1958) "The Dangers of Social Responsihility," Harvard Business Review 36: 41-50. Lowe, J. and Lewis, D. (1979) "Economic Approaches to Environmental DecisionMaking," Omega 1: 421-430. Maccoby, Michael (1976) The Gamesman, NY: Simon and Schuster. McCoy, Bowen H. (1983) "The Parahle of the Sadhu," Harvard Business Review 83: 103-108. Maclntyre, Alasdair (1979) "Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: Are They Mutually Exclusive?," in Kenneth Goodpaster and Kenneth Sayre (eds.). Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Madden, Carl (1977) "Forces Which Influence Ethical Behavior," in Clarence Walton (ed.) The Ethics of Corporate Conduct, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, Inc. Magnet, Myron (1988) "The Decline & Fall of Business Ethics," in John E. Richardson (ed.) Business Ethics 90/91, Guilford, CT: The Dushkin Puhlishing Group. Mintzherg, Henry (1983) "The Case for Corporate Social Responsihility," The Journal of Business Strategy A: 3-15. Murphy, Patrick E. (1989) "Creating Ethical Corporate Structures," Sloan Management Review 30: 81-87. Naj, Amal (1991) "Foam Cups Damage Environment Less Than Paper Cups, Study Says," Wall Street Journal 218, 23: B8. Rienow, Rohert (1978) "Business Corporations and Environmental Protection," National Forum 58: 20-22. Rolston III, Holmes (1984) "Just Environmental Business," in Tom Regan, ed.. Just Business, NY: Random House. Sagoff, Mark (1981) "At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions are Not All Economic," Arizona Law Review 23: 1283-1298. Singer, Ethan A. and Wooten, Leland M. (1976) "The Triumph and Failure of Albert Speer's Administrative Genius," The Joumai of Applied Behavioral Science 12: 79-103. Stone, Christopher (1975) Where The Law Ends, New York: Harper & Row. Toffler, Barbara Ley (1991) "When the Signal is 'Move It or Lose It,'" The New York rimes 141 (November 17): F13. TurnhuU, Colin (1972) The Mountain People, New York: Simon and Schuster. Waters, James A. (1978) "Catch 20.5: Corporate Morality as an Organizational Phenomenon," Organizational Dynamics 6: 3-19.

THE CORPORATION AND ITS CULTURE

697

Woolard, E. S. (1989) "Remarks Presented at the World Resources Institute (Washington, D.C.)" Wilmington, DE: Printed by Du Pont. (1990) "Remarks Presented at the Detroit Economic Club (Detroit, MI)" Wilmington, Delaware: Printed by Du Pont.

©1995. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 4. ISSN 1052-150X. 0673-0697.