The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)

The European Union at the United Nations Intersecting Multilateralisms

Edited by

Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

The European Union at the United Nations

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics Edited by: Michelle Egan, American University USA, Neill Nugent, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK, William Paterson, University of Birmingham, UK Editorial Board: Christopher Hill, Cambridge, UK, Simon Hix, London School of Economics, UK, Mark Pollack, Temple University, USA, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Oxford UK, Morten Egeberg, University of Oslo, Norway, Amy Verdun, University of Victoria, Canada Palgrave Macmillan is delighted to announce the launch of a new books series on the European Union. Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics will publish research-driven monographs. The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of subject and academic discipline. All topics of significance concerning the nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall within the scope of the series. The series is multidisciplinary to reflect the growing importance of the EU as a political and social phenomenon. We will welcome submissions from the areas of political studies, international relations, political economy, public and social policy and sociology. Titles include: Heather Grabbe THE EU’S TRANSFORMATIVE POWER Lauren M. McLaren IDENTITY, INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Justus Schönlau DRAFTING THE EU CHARTER Rights, Legitimacy and Process Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (editors) THE EUROPEAN UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The European Union at the United Nations Intersecting Multilateralisms Edited by

Katie Verlin Laatikainen Associate Professor of Political Science Adelphi University, USA and

Karen E. Smith Reader in International Relations London School of Economics, UK

Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Katie Verlin Laatikainen, Karen E. Smith 2006 All remaining chapters © respective authors 2006 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–9534–6 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–9534–6 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The European Union at the United Nations : intersecting multilateralisms / edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith. p. cm. – (Palgrave studies in European Union politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–9534–6 (Cloth: alk. paper) 1. United Nations – European Union countries. 2. European Union. 3. International cooperation. 4. International relations. 5. Security, International. I. Laatikainen, Katie Verlin, 1965– II. Smith, Karen E., 1965 July 19– III. Series. JZ4997.5.E87E87 2006 341.23—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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Contents List of Tables and Figures

vii

Notes on the Contributors

viii

List of Abbreviations

xi

1 Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure? Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

Part I

1

Background and framework

25

2 EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations Mary Farrell

27

Part II The Politics of National Interest and EU Policy Coordination in the UN 3 The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas Christopher Hill 4 Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN Katie Verlin Laatikainen 5 Returned to Europe? The Central and East European Member States at the Heart of the European Union Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués

Part III

The EU in UN Policy Arenas

47 49 70

92

113

6 Effective Multilateralism and Collective Security: Empowering the UN Sven Biscop and Edith Drieskens

115

7 The EU in Geneva: Coordinating Policy in the Economic and Social Arrangements of the United Nations System Paul Taylor

133

v

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Contents

8 The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations Karen E. Smith 9 EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence and Effective Multilateralism Chad Damro

Part IV

Conclusions

154

175

193

10 Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union and Multilateral Institutions Knud Erik Jørgensen

195

Bibliography

212

Index

227

List of Tables and Figures Tables 1.1 EU member-state voting cohesion during UN General Assembly roll-call votes, 1991–2000 2.1 EU coordination at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council 2.2 EU statements at the UN 2000–05 3.1 EU states elected members of the UN Security Council, 1985–2006 4.1 Nordic cohesion on Roll-Call Votes in the General Assembly 4.2 Joint Nordic statements before the UN General Assembly and its Main Committees, 1990–2005 7.1 European Commission cooperation with UN bodies 8.1 EU statements and explanations of vote/position 8.2 Resolutions introduced by the EU

11 34 35 60 79 80 135 158 159

Figures 1.1 Organizational chart of the United Nations 5.1 Temporal evolution of the percentage of agreement between the EC/EU majority and selected CEECs (EC/EU ⫽ 100 per cent) for the period 1983–2003 8.1 EU voting cohesion in the CHR 8.2 EU voting cohesion in the Third Committee

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98 164 164

Notes on the Contributors Sven Biscop is a senior research fellow in the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), a Brussels-based think tank associated with the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is professor of European security at the University of Gent, associate lecturer in the MA in international politics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and cocoordinator for IRRI-KIIB of the Higher Studies in Security and Defence, co-organized with Belgium’s Royal Defence College. He has published The European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power (Ashgate, 2005). Chad Damro is Lecturer in Politics and Co-Programme Director of the MSc in International and European Politics at the University of Edinburgh. He received his BA in international studies and political science from the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, an MA in International Relations from Syracuse University, and a PhD in political science from the University of Pittsburgh. He worked in the European Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. In 2000, he was an EU Fulbright Scholar at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel in Brussels, Belgium. Most recently, he was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute’s Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies in Florence, Italy, in 2002–03. He has written a number of journal articles and contributions to edited volumes. His current research focuses on the European Union in international affairs and transatlantic economic (in particular trade and competition) and environmental relations. Edith Drieskens is working at the Institute of International and European Policy at Leuven University (KULeuven), Belgium. She holds masters degrees in Political Sciences, European Studies and American Studies. Her PhD research focuses on the representation behaviour of the EU member states in the UN Security Council, especially regarding the creation of multilateral economic sanctions regimes for security purposes. Mary Farrell received her PhD in 1996 from the London School of Economics, Department of International Relations. She is currently Senior Research Fellow at Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches viii

Notes on the Contributors ix

Internationales, and Associate Professor at Sciences Po, Paris. She is the author of Global Politics of Regionalism and editor of the special edition of European Foreign Affairs Review, Winter 2005, on ‘Exporting the EU Model of Governance?’. Her research interests include the reform of global governance; world order and regional order; the international relations of the EU; African regional integration. Christopher Hill has held the Sir Patrick Sheehy Professorship of International Relations at Cambridge University since October 2004. From 1991 to 2004, he was the Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is the author of 70 scholarly articles and book chapters, as well as the author, joint author or editor of nine books, including Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy (CUP, 1991), and (joint editor with Pamela Beshoff), Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas (Routledge, 1994). The most recent are: (joint editor with Karen Smith) Documents on European Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2000); The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Palgrave, 2003). Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués is a researcher at the Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. She holds a Master’s degree and is working on a PhD in International Relations from the same university. Her most recent publications include: ‘A “Ring of Friends”? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics; ‘The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the “Old” and the “New” Europe?’, European Foreign Affairs Review; and with Esther Barbé (eds) Beyond Enlargement: The New Members and New Frontiers of the Enlarged European Union, Bellaterra: Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2003. Knud Erik Jørgensen is Jean Monnet Professor in European Politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus. He is the editor of Cooperation and Conflict. He has previously edited (with Karin Fierke) Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 2001); (with Thomas Christiansen and Antje Wiener) The Social Construction of Europe (London: Sage, 2001); European Approaches to Crisis Management (The Hague: Kluwer International, 1997); and Reflective Approaches to European Governance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). He has published in journals such as Journal of European Public Policy, European Journal of International Relations, Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of International Relations and Development, and Journal of Common

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Market Studies. He has also contributed numerous book chapters. Currently he is preparing a handbook on EU politics. Katie Verlin Laatikainen (co-editor) is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Adelphi University in New York. Adelphi has NGO status at the United Nations and she serves as its representative. She has written a number of articles and book chapters related to EU and Nordic politics. Her current research focuses on the role of the EU at the United Nations, and recent relevant publications include ‘Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy on Nordic Cooperation in the United Nations’ in Cooperation and Conflict and ‘Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN’ in CFSP Forum, vol. 2, no. 1, 2004. Karen E. Smith (co-editor) is Reader in International Relations, and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit, at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has written extensively on the foreign relations of the European Union. She is the author of The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (2nd edition, Palgrave, 2004; 1st edition, Macmillan, 1999), European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Polity, 2003), co-editor (with Margot Light) of Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press 2001), and co-editor (with Christopher Hill) of European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (Routledge, 2000). She is the editor of CFSP Forum, the online newsletter of the FORNET research network on European foreign policy (www.fornet.info). Paul Taylor is Professor of International Relations, and, until July 2004, Director of the European Institute, at the London School of Economics. He specializes in international organization within the European Union and the United Nations system. Most recently he has published International Organization in the Age of Globalization (London: Continuum, 2003, paperback version, January, 2005); The European Union in the 1990s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), and International Organization in the Modern World (London: Pinter, 1993). His earlier work includes International Cooperation Today: The European and the Universal Pattern (London: Elek Books, 1971) and The Limits of European Integration (London: Croom Helm, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). He has edited and contributed to a number of books on international organization, with A.J.R.Groom, and with Daws and Adamczick-Gerteis (Documents on the Reform of the United Nations, Ashgate, 1997), and was editor of the Review of International Studies between 1994 and 1997.

List of Abbreviations ACP ASEAN AU CANZ CEECs CHR CFSP COHOM COP CSD CSP DG DPA DPKO DRC EC ECHO ECJ ECOSOC EEG EFTA EP EPC ESDP EU EUPM FAO G-77 GA GATT GNI GRULAC JHA JUSCANZ IAEA ICAO

African, Caribbean and Pacific countries Association of South-East Asian Nations African Union Canada, Australia, New Zealand (caucus group) Central and East European countries Commission on Human Rights Common Foreign and Security Policy Council Working Group on Human Rights Conference of the Parties Commission on Sustainable Development Country Strategy Paper Directorate-General Department of Political Affairs Department of Peacekeeping Operations Democratic Republic of Congo European Community European Community Humanitarian Office European Court of Justice Economic and Social Council Eastern Europe Group European Free Trade Association European Parliament European Political Cooperation European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Union Police Mission (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Food and Agricultural Organization Group of 77 (developing countries) General Assembly General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross National Income Latin America Group Justice and Home Affairs Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (caucus group) International Atomic Energy Agency International Civil Aviation Organization xi

xii

List of Abbreviations

ICC IFAD ILO IMF IMO ISAF ITC ITU KFOR MDGs MONUC NAC NATO NYLO OAU OCHA OECD OHCHR OIC OSCE P-5 PBC PHARE PSC TEU UK UN UNAIDS UNCED UNCTAD UNDCP UNDP UNECE UNEP UNESCO UNFCCC

International Criminal Court International Fund for Agricultural Development International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization International Stabilization Force (Afghanistan) International Trade Centre International Telecommunications Union NATO Kosovo Force Millennium Development Goals United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo New Agenda Coalition North Atlantic Treaty Organization New York Liaison Office Organization of African Unity Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Organization of the Islamic Conference Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Five (Members of the Security Council) Peacebuilding Commission Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies Political and Security Committee Treaty on European Union United Kingdom United Nations Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS United Nations Conference on Environment and Development United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations International Drug Control Programme United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

List of Abbreviations xiii

UNFPA UNGA UNHCR UNICEF UNIDO UNRWA UNSC US USSR WEOG WFP WHO WIPO WTO

United Nations Fund for Population Activities United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United Nations Security Council United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Western Europe and Other Group World Food Programme World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization World Trade Organization

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1 Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure? Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith*

As the United Nations approached its sixtieth anniversary, both supporters and critics of the UN were sounding grim warnings about the future of multilateralism and collective security. On 20 November 2004, The Economist ran an article on the United Nations entitled ‘Fighting for Survival’, which began ‘The United Nations and the rule of international law are in crisis. Their relevance is being questioned as never before.’ One year earlier, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported: ‘Rarely in its fifty-eight year history have such dire forecasts been made about the United Nations’ (United Nations, 2003, p. 1). He convened a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change, composed of eminent diplomats and politicians, to consider reforms to the UN system of collective security. Annan himself published a comprehensive assessment of the challenges facing the UN and his proposed reforms in a report entitled In Larger Freedom that would frame the discussion of UN reform at the 2005 session (United Nations Secretary General, 2005a). His effort to demonstrate the interdependence of collective security, development and human rights was understood as an effort to foster commitment to the reform project by constituents with widely divergent interests and assumptions about the proper priorities of the world organization. Perspectives on the origins of this crisis of multilateralism differ: one view suggests that the ‘crisis’ was generated by American unilateralism (the war against Iraq being the pre-eminent example of this) while another contends that it is the result of the sheer ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions to deal with security threats (terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction and so on). For some observers of the UN, the despondency might seem misplaced – after all, there has rarely been a time when there hasn’t been intense dissatisfaction with the UN. From paralysis during the Cold War to concern over peacekeeping 1

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overstretch in the early 1990s, from the periodic scandals over waste and corruption within the UN to complaints about its anachronistic and ossified institutional structure (particularly the Security Council – UNSC), from profound disgust at UN failures in Rwanda, Somalia and a host of other horrifying humanitarian disasters to profound disillusionment about its role in inter-state conflicts such as the Middle East … the success stories seem few and far between and ‘crises’ never-ending.1 But even the UN’s most ardent supporters insist that ‘this crisis of multilateralism is different’ (Ruggie, 2003a). One thing that certainly is different is the recent emphasis that the European Union (EU) – itself the world’s most successful case of multilateralism – has placed on strengthening the UN and the multilateral system in general. The EU declared in its December 2003 European Security Strategy that it will assume some responsibility for ensuring ‘effective multilateralism’, and supporting international organizations, above all the UN. And in the past few years, there have been numerous EU communications on strengthening the EU’s relations with the UN in a variety of areas, and several declarations on enhancing EU–UN cooperation, in areas from development aid to crisis management. ‘Effective multilateralism’ for the EU seems to imply making international organizations and agreements more effective.2 With regard to the EU at least, Kofi Annan’s appeal for effective UN reform is akin to preaching to the choir. The EU’s submission to the High-Level Panel mentioned above declared: In the view of the EU, multilateral institutions can remain effective only if they adapt to changing conditions, so that they remain capable of mounting an effective response to new threats and challenges as they emerge. At the same time, they must persist in their efforts to address long-standing challenges, taking into account on-going economic and social change as well as lessons learnt (Council of the European Union, 2004a). The EU submission recognized the diversity of challenges facing the UN at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In a later paper, it hailed the Secretary General’s reform proposals. The EU committed itself to the reform project, arguing that ‘it is crucial to agree on a package of development, human rights, security and United Nations reforms. The result should be a strengthened and more effective [UN] better able to address the interconnected and multidimensional threats and

Introduction 3

challenges to international peace, security and development’ (Council of the European Union, 2005b). The question we pose in the book is whether the EU, the smaller, regional multilateral institution, can be effective enough to act within, have influence on, and even lead the larger multilateral institution of the UN, and ensure that the UN does ‘remain effective’. Can the EU ‘rescue’ the UN? (Hannay, 2005). This of course depends very much on the EU’s capacity to reach internal agreement on what it will do within (and for) the UN, to muster the necessary resources to carry out that agreement, and then to carry through with implementation. The extent to which the EU can act as one – or ‘speak with one voice’ – within the UN is an important indicator of its development as a foreign policy actor. Yet the UN’s multilateral context poses interesting dilemmas for the EU as a global actor. While UN multilateralism involves bloc and regional political groupings in its institutional and political processes, it is foremost an intergovernmental organization premised upon, and protective of, state sovereignty: states are the key members, states control decision-making, and membership is a reflection of the sovereign equality of member states. This is interesting terrain for the EU, which has its own approach to multilateralism: the EU seeks to pool sovereignty and create a common foreign policy in many policy arenas, though many EU member states have traditionally viewed the UN as an arena for national diplomacy. This book analyses whether or not EU member states are increasingly conducting their UN diplomacy through the EU, and how the different approaches to multilateralism of the EU and UN intersect. Furthermore, a study of the EU at the UN is one of ‘intersecting multilateralisms’ in another sense – one multilateral, regional organization is interacting with another, universal multilateral one. Much theoretical work has been done on the possible synergies of, and limits to, the intersection of global and regional organizations, and this book focuses on whether the world’s most integrated regional organization can effectively act within the universal organization, and what impact such collective action has on both organizations. The book thus seeks to answer key questions, including: Can and does the EU lead within the UN? Can it promote ‘effective multilateralism’? Is regionalism compatible with global governance, as exercised through the UN system? This volume provides evidence of the growth of the EU as a foreign policy actor in addition to identifying important qualifications of the EU’s coherence and effectiveness as an actor within the UN context. This is of particular significance now because the UN’s future may depend on strong, supportive action by members and regional

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groupings. The UN has previously looked to regional groupings to share its burden – particularly in the early 1990s (examples include mandating NATO to enforce UNSC resolutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, controversially, approving a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Georgia) – and the experience was not always a happy one.3 Many regional groupings may be incapable of sharing the burden; others may not be desirable partners because they mask the interests of powerful regional actors. Regional groupings themselves may hesitate to act as the UN’s ‘subcontractor’, and prefer to maintain their autonomy of action even if this may undermine the UN. Will the EU–UN relationship display similar problems? One of the empirical puzzles addressed by this book is whether the EU is an actor in its own right within the UN or whether the EU merely serves as a diplomatic forum for member states. There is a great deal of ambiguity regarding the EU’s role within the UN because the EU has no legal standing within the main political bodies and the European Community (represented by the European Commission) has only observer status. Most EU member states were members of the UN before they were members of the EU (West Germany joined the UN only in 1973) and they have developed variant diplomatic relationships within the UN that existed long before the EU sought to create a common voice at the UN. Thus, the EU’s attempt to act in concert must be understood within the framework of group politics within the UN. There is a long-standing practice within the UN to have regional membership groups that elect members to limited body organs but whose members do not attempt to otherwise align their policies. Perhaps more importantly, there are caucasing groups such as the G-77, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Nordic Group, the Arab League and so on, which exist for political purposes and whose membership often transcends the above-mentioned formal regional groups. The EU has ambition to be more than a caucasing bloc for its members, but this long-standing UN practice of caucasing blocs certainly colours how the EU is perceived by others. The EU’s effort to be an international actor promoting multilateralism occurs in a resolutely intergovernmental context in which such ambitious multilateralism is highly unusual. The ambiguity of the EU’s role within the UN is heightened by the rotating Council Presidency in which the ‘voice’ of the EU is represented by a different EU member state every six months. Even if the EU’s actorness remains ambiguous, its preferences may be expanded and reinforced within the political bodies of the UN. Norms and principles of the EU may find purchase within the official discourse

Introduction 5

of the UN, in particular the concepts related to UN reform, and EU priorities may shape the UN agenda even if the EU is not an identifiable actor as such. By examining discrete policy issues, this volume measures the degree to which the EU influences UN politics and policies. The scope of this book is on the central political organs of the United Nations, including the General Assembly (UNGA) and its main committees, the UNSC and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its subsidiary bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights. The UN system is of course much broader than this and includes a vast array of specialized agencies and programmes (see Figure 1.1). There have been a few studies of the EU’s relationship with some of these organizations (see for example Lorenzo Smaghi, 2004, on the EU and the IMF), but a systematic analysis of the EU’s approach to the central political bodies of the UN has been lacking and comprises the scope of the present volume. Finally, because the effectiveness of the UN is dependent upon the effectiveness of its Secretariat to implement the decisions of member states, where possible the chapters in this volume assess the degree to which the EU has influenced and bolstered the capacity of the Secretariat.

Theoretical and conceptual issues This volume analyses the EU’s approach to UN politics through three theoretical and conceptual lenses: multilateralism, Europeanization and effectiveness. Multilateralism is both an institutional form and a policy objective (or principle). The classic definition of multilateralism is John Ruggie’s: an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct (Ruggie, 1992).4 Both the EU and UN can be classified as multilateral organizations. The ‘multilateral system’ is the universe of multilateral organizations, international law, and multilateral principles, norms and politics. Broadly speaking, this corresponds to the vision of liberal institutionalists or interdependence theorists, though some observers have gone further and either see in this system the incipient emergence of, or argue in favour of, ‘global governance’.5 It is the invocation of principles and norms defining such interaction, however, that distinguishes multilateralism from bilateral cooperation which places national interest front and centre, though of course interests are not absent from multilateral interaction. Multilateralism is often also used to describe the policies of states that are inclined towards cooperation with other states including (or mostly) through international organizations. ‘Among the principles of

UNOG – United Nations Office at Geneva UNOV – United Nations Office at Vienna UNON – United Nations Office at Nairobi

Programmes and Funds

Other Bodies Sessional and Standing Bodies Expert, Ad Hoc, and Related Bodies

Regional Commissions, such as: Economic Commission for Europe

UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ITC – International Trade Centre UNDCP – United Nations Drug Control Programme UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees WFP – World Food Programme UNWRA – United Nations Relief Works Programme UN-HABITAT – United Nations Human Settlements Programme UNAIDS – Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

Secretariat Departments and Offices, such as: OSG – Office of the Secretary-General DPA – Department of Political Affairs DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNHCHR – United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights DDA – Department for Disarmament Affairs DESA – Department of Economic and Social Affairs OLA – Office of Legal Affairs DPI – Department of Public Information DM – Department of Management UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime

Economic and Social Council Functional Commissions, such as: Human Rights Sustainable Development Status of Women Narcotic Drugs Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Science and Technology for Development Population and Development

Source: United Nations Online. Available at http://www.un.org/aboutun. This figure does not include all agencies, programmes, organs or bodies associated with these organs of the UN, nor is the Trusteeship Council or the International Court of Justice represented in this chart.

Figure 1.1 Organizational chart of the United Nations

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency WTO – World Trade Organization ICC – International Criminal Court

ILO – International Labour Organization FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Bank Group IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA – International Development Association IFC – International Finance Corporation IMF – International Monetary Fund ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization IMO – International Maritime Organization ITU – International Telecommunications Union UPU – Universal Postal Union WMO – World Meterological Union WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organization IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Development Organization WTO – World Tourism Organization

Specialized Agencies

Subsidiary Bodies Military Staff Committee Standing Committee & Ad Hoc Committees International Tribunals Peacekeeping Operations/ Missions

Related Bodies

General Assembly Subsidiary Bodies Main Committees Other Sessional Committees Standing Committees & Ad Hoc Bodies

Security Council

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Introduction 7

multilateral politics are an unlimited prohibition on the use of force in the pursuit of political goals, and the recognition that national interests can be better realized through co-operation than through nation-state competition’ (Gareis and Varwick, 2004, p. 244). In contrast, unilateralism is less often defined and is usually seen as anti-multilateralism which in turn seems to mean at the very least scepticism about international institutions and law – a classic realist vision (see, for example, Pollack, 2003). One of the most trenchant critiques of multilateralism is that it doesn’t work very well if at all: the process of reaching agreements is laborious and often results only in lowest-common-denominator solutions, and enforcing agreements is difficult and largely depends on voluntary compliance.6 States routinely violate international agreements, deviate from international norms, abuse exceptions and opt-out clauses built into lowest-common-denominator agreements, or are simply incapable of complying with international obligations, resulting in what John van Oudenaren (2003) calls ‘dysfunctional multilateralism’. The United States, for instance, is widely perceived to have given up on multilateralism because it is too messy, slow or inconvenient. In the current context, the one state that could have ensured ‘effective multilateralism’ appears instead to have opted out of a number of international agreements as well as violated a number of international norms. The US rejection of multilateralism is unfortunate because a considerable body of literature in international relations has emphasized the need for a powerful hegemon to ensure that multilateralism works. Only a hegemon can ensure that states will cooperate with each other and not defect from agreements, thus only a hegemon can guarantee the continued provision of public goods via the multilateral system. But as Robert W. Cox has noted, for the UN at the end of the Cold War, the problem shifted from concern about losing US financial and political support to concern about being seen to function only as the instrument of US foreign policy (Cox, 1992, p. 165). Arguably both concerns co-exist today. An underlying theme that recurs throughout this volume is the degree to which a harmonious or at least functional trans-Atlantic relationship is necessary for the United Nations to be effective. The contrast between the US and EU perspectives on multilateralism could not be more stark. While the EU has embraced effective multilateralism as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, the United States has embraced an aggressive policy of pre-emption and a diplomatic tone that is sceptical of and impatient with UN multilateralism. This is perhaps best exemplified by the

8

Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

George W. Bush Administration’s nomination of John Bolton as US Ambassador to the UN. Bolton is (in)famous for once having suggested that if ten floors of the UN Secretariat disappeared, it would have no impact. The assumption of EU policymakers appears to be that its own successful experiment in multilateralism is sufficient to revitalize the UN even with (or despite) US ambivalence. Those concerns about the US–UN relationship are to some extent replicated in the debates about the relationship between regionalism (and regional groupings) and universalism (and the UN system). Does strong and growing regionalism threaten universalism, or potentially save it? Does the EU’s own successful regional multilateralism replace the need for hegemonic commitment to international order, or does the EU’s hesitance to utilize coercive tools weaken its ability to support effective multilateralism (Smith, 2003)? The issue, as Andrew Hurrell and Louise Fawcett (1995) point out, is how the regional and global levels can reinforce each other or come into conflict. While the UN has urged regional groupings to assume greater responsibility for maintaining peace and security (thus alleviating the UN’s burden), there are disadvantages to relying on regional groupings to do this. Regional organizations can lack the necessary internal cohesion to be able to undertake international responsibilities, and the necessary resources; and they may provide a cover for a regional ‘bully’ to exercise influence (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, paragraph 64; Rivlin, 1992, pp. 100–4). And during the Bosnian war, for example, the relationships between the EU and UN, and NATO and the UN, were not always productive. But since then, there has been a much better relationship on the ground in south-eastern Europe, indicating that a modus vivendi can be reached. In other areas, too, the EU and UN have worked well together as partners – as in the ‘Quartet’ (along with the United States and Russia), which has tried to push a ‘road map for peace’ in the Middle East. Certainly, many commentators are optimistic: the new regionalism, with EU support, could represent an open ‘post-modern’ model of a ‘renewed international system’ (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2000, p. 579). But there is nonetheless the risk that strong regional groupings (such as the EU) prove able to protect and promote their own interests, and that of their members, in opposition to universalism/multilateralism. This has long been debated within the field of international trade policy, but the core questions are valid throughout the multilateral system. Will the EU act within the UN to promote and protect its own interests and thus potentially undermine universalism and the UN? Or will it act in the interests of a wider community?

Introduction 9

The EU’s embrace of ‘effective multilateralism’ also highlights the dynamics involved in ‘Europeanization’ of foreign policy. Johan Olsen reviewed how the concept has been used to describe different dynamics of both widening and deepening European integration. These conceptualizations are not always consistent. Europeanization can refer to: (1) changes in the external boundaries of the European governance system; (2) development of institutional capacity at the European level; (3) penetration of EU norms and policies in national systems of governance; (4) external diffusion of European norms and forms of political organization; and (5) a political unification project (Olsen, 2002, pp. 923–4). While enlargement and the EU’s constitutional project, reflective of the first and last conceptualizations of Europeanization respectively, have bearing on the EU’s ability to pursue and bolster multilateralism within the UN, the other three types are most relevant for this volume. This book explores how the growth of an EU voice within the UN involves the three types of Europeanization. The pursuit of a concerted EU approach within the UN system requires the development of institutional capability for coordinating the policies of 25 member states who are the de jure members of the UN. To pursue a common policy amongst 25 members will require an intensification of institutional coordination by expanded participation of European level institutions such as the Commission and the Council. Because individual member states remain the decision-makers within the UN’s multilateral context, an EU voice at the UN would thus also entail adaptation by individual members’ foreign policies at the UN to ensure consistency, at least if the EU voice is to be effective. Thus, we would expect to find changes and convergence among EU members in their individual diplomacy within the UN. Finally, Europeanization as used in this volume entails an external diffusion process of European ideas and/or institutions. Are European ideas and practices of multilateralism being reflected in the UN broadly? Are EU norms and principles related to human rights, security, and socio-economic cooperation being promoted and embraced by others within the UN context? Finally, this volume also critically assesses the concept of effectiveness. There are at least four ways in which ‘effectiveness’ could be defined in the context of EU–UN relations: ●

EU effectiveness as an international actor (in this case within the UN): do the member states want to act collectively at the UN through the EU (and do they prefer EU action to independent national action),

10 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

●

●

●

can they reach agreement on positions, policies, statements, etc., and is there therefore EU ‘output’? We label this dimension ‘internal effectiveness’. This entails more than just demonstrating cohesion in voting on UN resolutions: although there is evidence of such cohesion (see Table 1.1), it is only one indication of internal effectiveness. EU effectiveness at the UN: does it achieve its objectives, does it influence other actors at the UN or the general debate at the UN, is it a leader or ‘frontrunner’ at the UN, is it seen to be a unitary and influential actor? We label this dimension ‘external effectiveness’, and argue that it depends in the first place on internal effectiveness. This is related to the idea of Europeanization as external diffusion, mentioned above. EU contribution to the UN’s effectiveness: does the EU strengthen the UN’s capacity to act and have influence? We consider this to be one important goal under the rubric of ‘effective multilateralism’, though note that all four definitions given here could arguably fall under the same rubric. UN effectiveness: is the UN influential in international relations? Does it reduce security threats, protect human rights, foster development, and so on? Given all the current doubts about this, and the calls for reform, there is obviously much to explore here.

This book deals with the first three definitions; the last would widen the scope of the book too much, though the issue is one that permeates all discussions of EU–UN relations (arguably ‘effective multilateralism’ would not be an EU strategic goal if UN effectiveness was not in question). Knud Erik Jørgensen has usefully distinguished between the EU’s aspiration to be an actor and play a role in international organizations, rather than just be an international organization (see Chapter 10). We are interested in this book to explore how and whether the EU fulfils that aspiration, and what impact it has on the UN (and therefore the UN’s potential effectiveness), but not to engage in too much analysis of the UN itself.

Outline of the book The book begins with a chapter by Mary Farrell, which provides the necessary background to understand and conceptualize the intersecting multilateralisms of the EU and UN. The second part then examines more closely the key actors in both the EU and the UN: the EU member

52.7

Overall Cohesion*

54.8

82.2 60.3

81

87.3 100 100 98.4 95.2 82.5 Nonmember

No data 81

No data1 83.6

86.3 100 100 100 93.2 84.9 Nonmember

Nonmember 98.4 93.7 Nonmember 79.4

63

1993–94 (%)

Nonmember 100 93.2 Nonmember 90.3

73

1992–93 (%)

63.1

76.9

92.3 95.4 95.4 92.3 98.5 95.4 95.4

No data 95.4

75.4

95.4 98.5 93.8

95.4

65

1994–95 (%)

66.7

84.1

94.2 95.7 95.7 92.8 98.6 95.7 97.1

95.7 89.9

79.7

94.2 100 94.2

97.1

69

1995–96 (%)

77.0

91.9

91.9 98.6 97.3 95.9 98.6 95.9 93.2

97.3 Insufficient data

89

94.6 97.3 95.9

93.2

74

1996–97 (%)

78.3

88.4

94.2 97.1 95.7 97.1 98.6 98.6 94.2

98.6 97.1

88.4

98.6 95.7 94.2

95.7

69

1997–98 (%)

85.2

88.5

95.1 100 98.4 98.4 98.4 98.4 96.7

98.4 98.4

86.9

98.4 98.4 93.4

96.7

61

1998–99 (%)

78.2

88.4

92.8 98.6 98.6 97.1 98.6 98.6 94.2

95.7 98.6

84.1

98.6 98.6 98.6

95.7

69

1999– 2000 %

79.1

88.1

94.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 98.5 98.5 100

97.0 100

86.6

98.5 98.5 95.5

98.5

67

2000–01 (%)

76.1

88.1

91.0 95.5 97.0 100 97.0 95.5 94.0

98.5 98.5

86.6

100 95.5 98.5

95.5

67

2001–02 (%)

69.9

86.3

91.8 94.5 100 93.0 87.7 94.5 93.2

93.2 95.9

84.9

97.3 98.6 95.9

93.2

73

2002–03 (%)

Source: UN Index to Proceedings, 1991–2003.

Notes: * The overall cohesion score reflects the number of votes in which all members voted exactly the same way. National figures reflect the percentage of votes in which a country voted with the EU majority. When two member states dissented on the same vote, this was only counted as a single non-compliant vote in overall cohesion. Non-votes by member states were counted as non-compliant. 1 Data missing for Germany for entire session in the Index to Proceedings.

80.8

United Kingdom

Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden

83.6 98.6 100 97.3 91.8 78.1 Nonmember

93.2 75.3

Germany Greece

France

Belgium Denmark Finland

73

Nonmember 97.3 89 Nonmember 89

Austria

No. of votes

1991–92 (%)

Table 1.1 EU member-state voting cohesion during UN General Assembly roll-call votes, 1991–2000

11

12 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

states. The EU’s effort to speak with one voice in the UN runs up against the traditions of national diplomacy by member states, reflecting different national interests and prerogatives. Within the UN’s multilateral context, there are long-standing roles that member states play; reconciling these and crafting a European role within the UN is challenging. Three chapters assess how member states’ national interests and prerogatives promote or obstruct EU goals and objectives within the UN, thereby supporting or undermining the EU as an international actor. In chapter 3 Christopher Hill focuses on the more powerful of the EU member states, the permanent members of the UNSC (France and the United Kingdom – UK), while in chapter 4 Katie Verlin Laatikainen focuses on the so-called middle powers (the Netherlands and the Nordic countries), and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués on the Central and East European countries in chapter 5. We have obviously left out numerous member states, both new and old – even though some of them (Austria, Ireland) have been active at the UN. We did this principally for reasons of space and because these three groups of states highlight, sometimes quite dramatically, the tensions created by the intersecting multilateralisms of the EU and UN. Because these states have identifiable diplomatic traditions within the UN, they provide important test cases for the Europeanization of national diplomacy in the UN context. The third part of the book takes a more detailed look at the EU’s relations with the UN in four policy areas that are arguably the core of the UN’s activity: security (Sven Biscop and Edith Drieskensin in chapter 6), economic and social development (Paul Taylor in chapter 7), human rights (Karen E. Smith in chapter 8), and environment (Chad Damro in chapter 9). We have not included a chapter on trade or finance issues for two reasons. First, these issues are primarily dealt with not by the central UN system but by other UN agencies such as the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund. Second, there is already a considerable body of literature on the relationship between the EU and these agencies, as well as the EU’s role in international trade and finance in general (see, for example, Young, 2002; Lamy, 2004; Smaghi, 2004). Each of the chapters in this part analyses the capacity of the EU to act within specific policy arenas at the UN, and assesses the success of the EU in defending and promoting its common positions. Contributors consider which UN bodies the EU interacts with, and how that interaction is organized; the extent to which the EU produces common positions to present to the broader UN community, votes in the same way on resolutions presented in UN bodies, or otherwise manifests a common identity within the UN; and the EU’s effectiveness in this policy

Introduction 13

area at the UN. These chapters present the degree of Europeanization as reflected by the diffusion of EU preferences, norms and principles in the various policy arenas of the UN. The final chapter, chapter 10, by Knud Erik Jørgensen, sets out a research agenda for further exploration of the EU’s relationship with the UN. His overarching question is: why do states and other actors, such as the EU, choose to pursue multilateralism? He provides several possible explanations, based largely on the literature on the United States and multilateralism, stemming from internal factors, external factors, and perspectives that mix the two.

Findings Europeanization The results of the study in this book show that Europeanization is occurring in varying degrees across the UN system. With respect to the first dimension of Europeanization, Mary Farrell’s chapter traces the striking build-up of EU institutional capacity at the UN, especially in New York. While there is no single EU ambassador or seat in the UN’s political bodies, the system of the rotating EU Presidency supported by the Council Secretariat has become entrenched. The growth of the Presidency speaking on behalf of member states is also striking. This is bolstered even further by the Commission which raises the EU flag in its areas of competence. This system of consultation and coordination has resulted in greater coherence in EU positions in the UNGA (see Table 1.1) and in ECOSOC as Paul Taylor’s chapter demonstrates. And while Christopher Hill reveals how the UNSC permanent members France and the UK protect their prerogatives and uphold their ‘responsibilities’ in that body, he also acknowledges that a system of consultation among the 25 has emerged since the Amsterdam Treaty obliged these members to consult with other EU members on UNSC issues. Broadly speaking, the means and institutional mechanisms for EU action in the UN are in place even if there is no single seat or individual such as an Ambassador to represent the EU in UN diplomatic processes. While broader studies of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) tend to focus rather intently on the institutional arrangements for policy-making in Brussels,7 by contrast the UN context of intergovernmental bloc caucasing proves to be rather conducive for the EU’s existing, messy institutional architecture for foreign policy. Indeed, the fact that member states are the decision-makers within the UN context serves to streamline some of the institutional inertia that afflicts foreign

14 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

policy-making in Brussels. There are certainly fewer participants than is the case in Brussels where the Council of Ministers, Council Secretariat, Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), Political and Security Committee, Commission (and various directorate-generals within it), and Parliament – among others – may all weigh in on policy. At the UN, member states’ foreign ministries are the privileged players and remain central to the process. EU institutions such as the Commission serve supporting roles here, though as Paul Taylor demonstrates the Commission through its observer status tries to push forward a ‘logic of synthesis’ among member states. Turning to the second dynamic of Europeanization, national adaptation, the chapters by Hill, Laatikainen and Johansson-Nogués reveal considerable variation in the degree of adaptation of national diplomacy toward a European or EU diplomacy. One simple factor accounts for this: power. Power remains a divide among the EU-25 wherein the more powerful states, the British and French members of the UNSC, continue to protect national proclivities to a degree that middle powers and smaller states are unable to. Christopher Hill notes that their permanent position on the UNSC forces the UK and France together, but not necessarily to pursue a substantive EU agenda in the UNSC. One of the most salient characteristics of French and British approaches to the UNSC is their respective efforts to preserve their privileged national positions – the source of their power and influence – on it. Hill details how these two have rejected out of hand any effort to create an EU seat on the UNSC that would force them to give up their own. In fact, they pre-emptively announced their support for a permanent seat for Germany rather than open this debate within the EU context. However, Hill argues that the UK and France are not above using their EU credentials and drawing upon the EU’s weight in the UN in their negotiations with other states. In this limited way, the EU shapes their behaviour, but it most certainly does not constrain it. The UNSC is a locus of hard power and high politics, of tough choices and ‘special responsibilities’ in authorizing military force. Despite the language of human security and the multidimensional nature of security threats that have been endorsed by the EU and its member states (as Biscop and Drieskens detail in their chapter), the UK and France see their responsibilities as more important than a common EU policy. The privileged position of France and the UK on the UNSC is perhaps the most important political fault-line within the CFSP at the UN. By contrast, Laatikainen demonstrates in her chapter how the EU middle powers have adapted their diplomacy rather extensively to

Introduction 15

conform to the growth of EU policy at the UN. Middle powers are multilateral stalwarts and the EU’s embrace of UN multilateralism is in their view most welcome. The degree of adaptation is most readily apparent when examining the decline of the Nordic voice in favour of an EU position among the Nordic middle powers. Middle powers are among the most active in promoting an EU voice at the UN and their EU Presidencies are among the most vigorous. The only areas in which middle powers retain an independent role is in the few areas where the EU cannot reach consensus, such as questions of UN reform or the rights of indigenous peoples. In addition, because of their long-standing policy of meeting the UN’s 0.7 per cent GNI target for development assistance, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries have resisted efforts to have an EU approach in policies related to the UN specialized agencies, programmes and funds. This too, may change if the EU eventually reaches 0.7 per cent of EU GNI by 2015. The middle powers register some ambivalence about the lack of bold initiatives and the prevalence of least-common-denominator positions taken by the EU, but they still support a greater role for the EU on the UN stage. The middle powers see great consistency between their traditional diplomacy and the EU’s embrace of ‘effective multilateralism’, though Laatikainen raises questions about the viability of the EU embracing middle power multilateralism. The new EU member states from Central and East Europe are the most compliant. In this their diplomatic tradition has not changed dramatically, although the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) have traded the coerced cohesion of the Soviet era for the negotiated cohesion of EU foreign policy cooperation in the UN. Johansson-Nogués demonstrates that the new members have exhibited a great degree of convergence with the EU particularly in the UNGA. She also reveals how membership requires these states to take positions and pursue policies that are not part of the typical CEEC portfolio (for example, development assistance). While there is unmistakable evidence that the CEECs have converged toward the EU in their voting records, Johansson-Nogués notes that convergence may reflect dual processes of Europeanization. Certainly the new members have had to meet the political expectations of older EU members, but she highlights how the CEECs have forced the EU to pay more attention to certain global issues such as human trafficking because these problems are much more salient for the new members. Furthermore, Johansson-Nogués notes that the EU is not always a consistent ‘norm sender’ especially in the area of security as the Iraq war debate demonstrates. In general though, these states follow the

16 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

EU lead in UN politics when the EU is in fact providing leadership or at least a common position. Finally, Europeanization is also the externalization of European values, policies and norms. While we address the Europeanization of UN policies in the next section on external effectiveness, we note the impact of the EU on UN politics more generally here. Taken together, the contributions show a varied impact of the EU across the UN. The EU is a dominant player within the UNGA both in terms of diplomacy and the ability to muster significant numbers of votes, but it is less of an actor than it arguably should be in ECOSOC given the collective financing of the EU and its member states to a wide array of agencies, funds and programmes. The EU dances awkwardly around the status of the two permanent members of the UNSC. Aside from these standing bodies, the EU can make a difference in conference or summit diplomacy conducted under the auspices of the UN. Chad Damro makes precisely this case in his examination of the important diplomatic role played by the EU in the recurrent climate change negotiations related to the Kyoto Protocol. The EU’s dominance in UN bodies (aside from the UNSC) is such that one ambassador remarked that if the EU is united, they cannot be defeated. Effectiveness So what have the contributors found with respect to the three definitions of effectiveness which are outlined above? The chapters by Sven Biscop and Edith Drieksens, Paul Taylor, Karen E. Smith and Chad Damro – on four policy areas – deal most directly with the issues surrounding effectiveness. What comes through quite clearly is that the EU’s effectiveness varies – not just across policy areas, but within them. The internal dimension of effectiveness, that is, the ability of EU member states to agree and put forward common statements and positions, is clearly linked to the EU’s internal decision-making structures and procedures, but not as tightly as one might commonly assume. As Farrell illustrates, two factors in particular arise in this respect – competence (or authority to make policy) and the pillar division (primarily between the supranational European Community and the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy). There is, however, no neat correlation between internal effectiveness and a more supranational policy-making process. In fact, this volume does not cover trade policy (the most supranational, though not completely so, policy area), and the policy areas covered here are all areas where either the European Community and the member states share competence, or

Introduction 17

the member states alone have competence and must choose to coordinate their positions within the EU context. Only in the environmental policy area, as Damro shows, has the EU largely overcome the challenges posed by shared competence, and the European Commission asserted itself and played a major role in coordinating the member states and putting forward joint EU positions in UN environmental fora. Taylor’s chapter illustrates that in the UN’s economic and social organizations in Geneva, the European Commission is trying to design and pursue strategies to augment its role within both the UN and the EU, but still encounters resistance from the member states. Elsewhere, the Commission is either not a major player, particularly in security, as Biscop and Drieskens demonstrate, or is persistently sidelined, as with respect to human rights, as Smith argues. In these areas, member states either cooperate within the CFSP framework, or they go their separate ways. The EU is certainly not a unitary actor within the UN, and to deal with the UN it must overcome the limitations of its own multilateral system, mixed as it between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Thus in all four policy areas, the production of EU ‘output’ depends on the extent to which the member states, prodded more or less vigorously by the rotating Presidency, can coordinate their views and come up with common positions. Perhaps surprisingly, the four chapters show that the member states can produce common output – and increasingly do so. There are more and more EU statements and sponsored resolutions put forward in UN contexts, and fairly cohesive voting patterns (though this is quite variable, and the trend is not unambiguously towards common agreement on all resolutions, in any area). The EU can get its act together, and can speak with a single voice – on occasion, not always – even in the UNSC. Outsiders, however, remain confused about who speaks for Europe (a perennial challenge for the EU). And when the member states are divided, EU institutional mechanisms are not strong enough to force them to agree, though, as Smith notes, there is certainly socialization – Europeanization – taking place. Taylor argues that there are two ‘logics’ at work, one of synthesis (and common action) and one of diversity, and that of synthesis does not always trump that of diversity. Member states still want to act independently at the UN, particularly to express divergent national interests. As for external effectiveness, the EU is clearly a major force in the UN. Outsiders simply cannot ignore a grouping that comprises not just 25 member states (including two permanent members of the UNSC) but usually draws into its orbit neighbouring countries as well. But

18 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

exercising leadership, acting as a frontrunner, does not automatically follow from this impact. In fact, the EU’s size even acts as a brake: the amount of energy and time that is required to forge 25 national positions (assuming that each member state has a single, national position!) detracts from the energy and time that can be spent both presenting EU positions to the UN, and engaging in diplomacy with other UN actors to push those positions through. In the environment field, as Damro argues, the EU has most successfully overcome the challenges created by a system of shared competence, partly because environmental concerns have been such a priority for EU member states and they recognize that acting collectively they can increase their influence on international environmental negotiations. The EU thus has acted an influential frontrunner in UN environmental politics: for example, it was crucial in enabling the entry into force of the Kyoto protocol, by using its leverage to encourage Russia to ratify it. But in the other policy areas covered here, the EU’s influence varies more considerably. In the economic and social development field, Paul Taylor concludes that the EU tends to be reactive, not proactive. The problem is that the EU is not yet ‘good enough at multilateralism’ to act as a leader, much less counter US anti-multilateral tendencies. Biscop and Drieskens note that in addition to the familiar problems posed by diverging national interests, the EU (and the member states) is simply not punching its weight in international security matters. EU and member state contributions to international peacekeeping missions – those led directly by the UN and those conducted on behalf of the UN – are not as large as one might expect given the EU’s economic and political power internationally. The EU is not fulfilling a collective security role worthy of a leading actor in the UN – and thus its external effectiveness is not as great as it could be. In addition, Biscop and Drieskens point out that the EU may not necessarily want to be seen as a leader: avoiding the perception of European/western dominance in discussions of UN reform in the security field is important, since such perceptions might provoke outsiders to resist European positions and ideas. Smith finds this too: a common EU stance can even spark the automatic opposition of developing countries, because they perceive the EU as domineering and neo-colonial. What then about the EU’s impact on making the UN more effective? Again, contributors point to a mixed record. In environment, the EU has chalked up a considerable success in pushing for the ratification of the

Introduction 19

Kyoto protocol, even in the face of US hostility. In economic and social development, the EU has worked closely with UN agencies and bodies to foster policies and programmes, though it could certainly contribute even more. The EU has successfully lobbied countries and increased support for, in particular, its resolution in UN human rights bodies condemning the use of the death penalty. And its contribution to security – both military security and civilian aspects of security – is not without impact. Certainly in all these areas, without active EU support, the UN would struggle to be effective at all. But, curiously, the EU has taken a back seat position with respect to UN reform. It has not been actively pushing ideas for reform, and its support for specific reforms has sometimes been quite muted. There is no EU stance on UNSC reform so the EU cannot play much of a role in that respect, but its reticence to lead the reform agenda in other areas is more surprising. Yet, the varied national diplomatic roles of member states explains some of the EU impotence on reform: EU troop contributing countries demand a greater presence in the nascent Peacebuilding Commission which generates counter-demands by those that fund such peace operations; generous contributors of development assistance block EU efforts to ‘take over’ their areas of expertise. While less prominent than the dispute over UNSC membership, the varied traditions of member states are reflective of different visions and multilateral priorities. There remains a considerable gap between the EU intention to reform effectively the UN, and the actions and compromises by member states necessary to advance forcefully the reform agenda.

Intersecting multilateralisms There is no doubt of the EU’s good intentions to make the UN matter. The EU takes the UN seriously, and when it reaches consensus its position can command 25 votes of member states and an additional dozen or so from candidate and other states. The EU’s size and coordination mechanisms have made it a formidable presence in annual UNGA sessions as well as in protracted negotiations such as over climate change. Emergency or crisis situations pose greater difficulties for the European Union and consequently the EU has had less success in being a presence in the UNSC. However, there are important limitations in the intersecting multilateralisms of the EU and UN. There is a gap between the EU’s intention to make UN diplomacy effective and the impact that the EU actually has on UN politics. In venues such as the UNGA where the EU is most coordinated, the EU in

20 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

fact may be contributing to the dysfunctional politics in at least two ways. First, the EU contributes to the rigidity and stylized diplomacy of the UN which undermines effective multilateralism on the global level. Because of the need to foster consensus among 25 member states, the EU spends most of its time negotiating with itself. Once the EU takes a position, it rigidly maintains that position to preserve the carefully wrought consensus. Obviously, this makes the EU rather inflexible in negotiations. Because of its collective weight, others must bend to the EU for negotiations to proceed. But because the EU has to find consensus among its own 25 members, the position that others are accommodating is often a timid, vacuous position. This does nothing to enliven the debate within the UNGA which is already stultified and formulaic. Interestingly, however, the rigidity and inflexibility that the EU exhibits draws none of the fire that regularly rains down upon the United States when the US takes an inflexible position. Whereas US inflexibility, for example on issues related to the UN reform project, is criticized roundly, EU inflexibility is accepted with minimal complaint outside of the disgruntled non-EU middle powers. Because EU inflexibility is the result of multilateral processes rather than unilateral diktat as with the United States, other states seem to be less offended even if the outcome is the same: the absence of vibrant, meaningful debate over challenging issues. A second consequence of the EU approach to diplomacy is that it undermines the value of state membership in the UN. The EU, based upon its own approach to blended sovereignty, seeks to replicate regionalism within the UN. Diplomats have noted how the EU prefers to work with other blocs, especially the Latin American bloc, the African bloc, or even in a grand coalition, the G-77. This has a curious effect within the political space of the UN. Because the United States is not part of any effective bloc, the EU approach tends to crowd out the United States from those UN organs, such as the UNGA, where numbers (votes) count. This provides some explanation for why the EU draws support (though sometimes opposition) from various blocs comprising the G-77 such as the Africans and the Latin Americans. However, Europeans should ask themselves whether a UN that continues to marginalize the United States is one that will ever be effective or whether further alienating the United States from the UNGA will do anything to boost the much maligned, stultifying debate that characterizes it. This EU approach to negotiations also has the consequence of marginalizing those individual states that would be natural allies to the EU because they do not participate in the internal EU deliberations. Non-European middle powers that also support the UN and effective

Introduction 21

multilateralism are sidelined by the EU even as the EU strikes grand bargains with blocs of developing countries. If EU multilateralism marginalizes the champions of UN multilateralism, then the intersection of EU and UN multilateralisms is dysfunctional indeed. Jozef Bátora has raised the question of whether the EU transforms the institution of diplomacy, based as it is on Westphalian norms and principles. He examines the diplomacy of member states with one another, in the context of the Council and with third states, and concludes that ‘owing to its non-state nature and supranational character, the EU as a legitimate member of the global diplomatic field could imply the introduction of completely new [diplomatic] standards’ (Bátora, 2005, p. 62). Bátora claims that socialization among the diplomatic corps in Brussels and the adaptation of national ministries of foreign affairs challenge the Westphalian state order and modern diplomacy. Our examination of the EU within the UN diplomatic context comes to starkly different conclusions. The EU is neither unique in its collaborative processes at the UN (the Nordic states were arguably as coordinative) nor is it transcending the Westphalian order. Our contributors reveal how power continues to shape the progress and limits of EU diplomacy. When issues of high national priority emerge on the UN agenda, each member state has the capacity to reject a common EU approach and the most powerful among them are the most likely to take advantage of that potential. Knud Erik Jørgensen expresses some surprise in his chapter about how well intergovernmental, realist explanations appear to explain choices for multilateralism particularly given the penchant among EU scholars to accentuate the post-modern nature of EU foreign policy. While such post-modern accounts may hold true for the policies emanating from Brussels, it is indeed surprising the degree to which intergovernmental and even ‘realist’ theoretical approaches continue to have relevance in understanding EU diplomacy at the UN. We can question whether the EU – with its own remarkable internal integrative processes of multilateralism – is contributing to a more effective UN multilateralism. Like other members, the EU and its member states are opportunistic, self-interested and self-promoting, they cajole and harangue, though on occasion the coincidence of interests can move the system. But the authors here show that the EU most often fails to make the UN as effective as it should be in addressing global challenges. In this they are little different than other powers within the UN. This failure to make multilateralism matter was abundantly clear in the 2005 reform process. The lack of EU unity on issues such as Security Council reform and disarmament meant that the

22 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith

EU could not provide forceful, committed leadership on either issue nor promote UN effectiveness. But even in areas where the EU member states were in agreement, such as on proposals for a Human Rights Council, they could not bridge the diplomatic divide among UN members. The short-term picture, then, is quite dark: the EU is failing to lead within the UN, and is still developing itself as a credible and reliable partner for the UN. The abortive reform effort of 2005 was a missed opportunity for the EU to provide leadership and critical support for the battered and bruised UN organization at a crucial moment in the UN’s history. Kofi Annan implored the EU to lead in the reform effort and to serve as an essential partner to the UN. The EU stumbled, providing too little leadership far too late. It is certainly the case that the EU’s investment in UN multilateralism is in its infancy. This book has traced the strengthening of the EU’s institutional capacity at the UN, the – albeit halting – process of Europeanization of the member states, and the EU’s growing visibility at and even impact on the UN. Should these processes continue, the intersecting multilateralisms of the EU and the UN might produce more effective governance if the UN emerges from the reform shambles with any credibility. Neither the EU nor the UN will disappear from the multilateral stage, but both appear likely to reflect multilateral processes that muddle through rather than blaze new trails of effective multilateralism for the foreseeable future.

Notes * The editors thank especially Roy Ginsberg and Wolfgang Wessels for providing helpful comments on many of the draft chapters, which were presented at the 2005 EUSA conference in Austin, Texas. 1. On a previous ‘crisis of multilateralism’ (in the late 1980s and early 1990s), see Cox, 1992, pp. 163–6. For example, he cites a 1988 book entitled The UN Under Attack, edited by J. Harrod and N. Schrijver (Aldershot, 1988). 2. For Sven Biscop (2004, p. 27), ‘effective multilateralism can best be understood as an effective system of global governance, i.e. a system able to ensure at the global level access to the core public goods that at the national level the State provides – or is supposed to – to its citizens: stability and security, an enforceable legal order, an open and inclusive economic order and global welfare in all of its aspects (such as access to health, a clean environment, education, etc.)’. 3. Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, ‘regional arrangements or agencies’ should try to settle disputes peacefully before referring them to the UNSC, and can be utilized by the UNSC for enforcement action. The EU does not consider itself to be a chapter VIII organization (nor does NATO), but the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) does. As Kennedy Graham and Tânia Felicio (2005, p. 91) argue, the distinction between being a regional agency under Chapter VIII or not is of little significance right now: ‘any

Introduction 23

4. 5.

6. 7.

international organization … may be called upon by the Security Council for pacific settlement activities and, as appropriate, for enforcement of the Council’s decisions’. The EU is closely involved in discussions at the UN on the relationships between the UN and regional organizations, but clearly considers itself a rather sui generis organization. Formalizing the relationship between regional organizations (including the EU) and the UN may in future, however, be desirable. Successful cases of multilateralism generate expectations of diffuse reciprocity among the members (that is, aggregate benefits are equal over time). More radical conceptualizations of multilateralism would focus on economic multilateralism (the institutional arrangements for ‘managing’ the global capitalist economy) and the inequalities and stability (or stasis) that it produces; or on the mismatch between economic multilateralism and ‘political multilateralism’ (as in the UN and other international organizations where states are the main actors). See Cox, 1992, and Bøås and McNeill, 2003, pp. 4–11. Realists, of course, would add that multilateralism only masks the power of states, and cannot by definition ‘work’ if powerful states do not want it to. Brian White (2001), for example, focuses on the ‘comitology’ surrounding the arrangements in Brussels for making foreign policy, with the myriad array of committees and councils such as COREPER and the Political and Security Committee, along with the Parliament, Council Secretariat, General Affairs and External Relations Council, and Commission.

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Part I Background and Framework

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2 EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations Mary Farrell

The European Union (EU) may be considered to have reached a high point in its evolution as a political community with the recent enlargement that created a union of 25 countries, stretching from the Iberian peninsula to the borders of Russia. This latest stage of European integration coincides with the expressed intention of the EU to play a more influential role in global affairs, seeking to overturn the long-held view of the Union as a sui generis political entity that is an economic giant yet a political dwarf on the world stage. Despite the apparent difficulties associated with the limitations on its power to act coherently and speak with one voice on the international stage, the EU nevertheless has declared the collective will to enhance its international status. One illustration of this is its commitment to multilateralism as reaffirmed in the 2003 European Commission communication, ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism’, and the 2003 European Security Strategy (European Commission, 2003; European Council, 2003a; see also European Commission, 2001b). The focus here is the changing nature of EU multilateralism in the context of the Union’s relations with the UN. How does the principle of multilateralism operate in the EU’s actions at the UN? The chapter examines the relationship between the EU and the UN, tracing the institutional relationships that currently operate to link the EU’s different institutions to the multiple institutions that comprise the core UN system. The following sections concentrate primarily upon the mechanisms for representation and coordination between the Council, European Commission, and six-month rotating Presidency on the European side, and the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on the UN side.1

27

28 Mary Farrell

While the recent interest in multilateralism provides a good reason for examining how the EU is represented at the United Nations, there is also the empirical question of how two quite different organizations interact in practice. The UN is an intergovernmental organization of independent states, where the principle of respect for national sovereignty was contained in the UN Charter and continues to be reflected in its decision making. While blocs and groups are active within UN politics, only states have the right to vote within the UN’s main bodies. There are official regional groups that elect states to UN bodies and organs with limited membership: the EU-15 (through 2004) plus Malta are members of the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG),2 while the eight Central and East European countries belong to the Eastern Europe Group (EEG)3 and Cyprus is in the Asian Group. There are also unofficial caucusing groups, such as the Group of 77 (developing countries), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Non-Aligned Movement, or the Nordic Group,4 but individual states are still overwhelmingly the primary actors in the UN system. In the UN context, sovereign prerogatives of membership remain crucial, since it is countries rather than regional organizations or groups that have voting power. In contrast, the EU combines both supranationality and intergovernmentalism in a community of states that has agreed to balance national sovereignty with supranational decision making in some policy areas, and where Community (that is, supranational) law takes precedence over the national legal order. European integration has evolved institutionally since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community, the most important of the three European Communities.5 In this evolution, politics played its part, as did the legal order, and often the two interacted to create a dynamic process of integration. The European Union officially came into being on 1 November 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force and encompassed the European Communities. The Maastricht Treaty created a Union composed of three pillars or policy areas, with different decision-making rules associated with each: the European Community (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs.6 The Community pillar contains amendments to the treaties of the three original European Communities. The second and third pillars have roots in frameworks for intergovernmental cooperation among the member states that were established in the 1970s. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union has since been revised twice, with the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2003 Nice Treaty.

EU Representation within the UN 29

In the Community pillar, the main decision-making bodies are the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the directly elected European Parliament (EP). The European Council, composed of the heads of state or government, does not have a formal decision-making role in the EC pillar but has increasingly become the main arena in which decisions are ultimately endorsed or even settled. Every six months, a different member state assumes the Council Presidency, and is in charge of running the Union and managing its business. Most, but not all, EC legislation is proposed by the European Commission, passed by the Council by qualified majority vote, and approved by the European Parliament. Legislation is binding on the member states. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets Community law. The European Community has legal personality, and can thus conclude agreements with other international actors.7 The Community pillar is thus clearly supranational to a great extent. Pillar two, the CFSP’s institutional structure as set up under the Maastricht Treaty, is slightly different. The European Council sets the broad guidelines; the Council of Foreign Ministers takes decisions to implement them. The Council’s work with respect to CFSP items is prepared by the Political and Security Committee (PSC, composed of ambassadors). The PSC relies on the work of European Correspondents (foreign ministry officials) and CFSP working groups. The European Commission is fully associated with CFSP but does not have voting rights. The Parliament is informed of CFSP issues, and can make recommendations, but its views do not have to be incorporated into CFSP decisions. The CFSP does not fall under ECJ jurisdiction. Virtually all CFSP decisions are taken unanimously. The intergovernmental nature of the second pillar is thus obvious. These complex institutional arrangements influence EU–UN relations. The perennial issue for the EU is how to speak with one voice in the global forum, and to channel the political forces that have so successfully blended intergovernmentalism and supranationalism within Europe onto this global stage, where intergovernmentalism predominates. All the EU member states are members of the United Nations in their own right, and each has one vote in the General Assembly. Together, the EU-25 represents 13 per cent of the UN membership and is therefore a powerful voting bloc when the 25 are united. Because candidate and neighbouring states often associate themselves with EU statements and resolutions in the General Assembly, an additional dozen or so countries increase the EU’s influence. The Security Council is the most powerful organ within the UN system; membership is comprised of five permanent

30 Mary Farrell

and ten non-permanent members, and each of the five permanent members holds a veto. Two EU member states (France and the UK) have permanent member status; other EU countries are elected to the Security Council from the regional groups on a revolving basis.8 The next section examines the evolution of the EU’s relations with the UN.

The evolving institutional and legal basis of EU relations with the UN The theoretical framework for analysing EU–UN cooperation is sparse and diffuse, scattered throughout a variety of viewpoints and perspectives in the literature on international relations, international organizations, and integration theory (see Hix, 1999; Rosamond, 2000; Christiansen et al., 2001; Wiener and Diez, 2004). There are very few studies that examine the EU’s role in the UN, and in particular how the former coordinates its position on the many issues that come up for debate and discussion (Hill, 1993; Whitman, 1998; Ginsberg, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). Yet as the EU gradually evolves towards deeper integration, the issue of policy coordination in its external relations has become much more important. The member states have been ambivalent about the EU’s presence in international organizations since such membership might reduce their own role and significance in them, but they have nonetheless strengthened provisions for an EU ‘voice’ in other organizations. However, to most people inside and outside the EU, the question of ‘who speaks for Europe’ remains unclear. The confusion is compounded by the increasing complexity of the issues to be addressed at the international level. EU member states may be unwilling to delegate authority to the Commission or even the Presidency in matters over which they prefer to retain influence and direct participation. Indeed, a reading of the treaties serves to illustrate just how complex the situation is. On the Community side, the Treaty of Rome originally provided for the Community to establish relations with the UN (and other international organizations). Article 302 of the Treaty on European Union (1993) stipulates that the European Commission is to ensure the maintenance of all appropriate relations with UN organs and specialized agencies. But this is the case primarily in matters of EC competence. The Community has exclusive competence most notably in external trade policy, and some areas of agricultural and fisheries policies and the internal market. This essentially means that the member states do not have the power to act on a purely national basis

EU Representation within the UN 31

in those areas. In cases of exclusive competence, the European Commission usually speaks on behalf of the EC; in cases where competence is mixed (in brief, the Community can act, but so may the member states), the Presidency usually represents the EC (sometimes also in conjunction with the Commission). The EC is an observer at the UN and several UN agencies (see Table 7.1 in this volume), and a full member of the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Trade Organization alongside the member states (MacLeod et al., 1996, Chapter 7).9 As far as representation of the EU (and not the EC) at the United Nations is concerned, the treaty does not provide for a single institution to represent the EU on matters relating to CFSP. Member states must coordinate their positions to try to arrive at a common stance, and usually the Presidency is responsible for presenting that stance to the rest of the UN, with a more circumscribed role for the Commission. From the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the CFSP’s precursor, in 1970, the member states declared that they should try to coordinate their positions in international organizations and conferences. The 1973 Copenhagen Report on EPC stated: ‘the permanent representatives of the Member States to the major international organizations will regularly consider matters together and, on the basis of instructions received, will seek common positions in regard to important questions dealt with by those organizations’ (Hill and Smith, 2000, p. 87). By the time of the 1987 Single European Act, this aspiration was acquiring the tone of a commitment. Hence Article 30 (2d) declared, ‘The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to avoid any action or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations.’ Article 30 (7) stated, (a) In international institutions and at international conferences which they attend, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to adopt common positions on the subjects covered by this Title. (emphasis added) (b) In international institutions and at international conferences in which not all the High Contracting Parties participate, those who do participate shall take full account of positions agreed in European Political Co-operation. By the time of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, there was virtually an injunction to cooperate within international organizations, especially with

32 Mary Farrell

respect to issues that the member states had already agreed on within CFSP. Article J.2 declared, ‘Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such forums. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.’ And Article J.6 stated, ‘The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.’ The Amsterdam Treaty did not alter these provisions – though they were renumbered Articles 19 and 20 respectively. The UN Security Council poses a specific problem, because not all EU member states serve on it. Article 19 (2) of the Treaty on European Union aims to force the UN Security Council members from the EU to coordinate their actions and to speak with one voice: member states represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the member states participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member states which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other member states fully informed. Member states which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the UN Charter. The peculiarity of the EU division of competence between national and supranational level and the pillars has confused politicians and decision-makers in many countries and international organizations, and there is an ongoing problem of ‘who to call’ as well as the equally perplexing question of the capacity in which any one of the European actors (the Commission, the Presidency, the member states) might be speaking. If a country holding the rotating six-month Presidency of the EU speaks on an international forum, the listeners have to assess whether that country is speaking in its capacity as EU representative, or on its own behalf. Proposals have been made for the EU to have a seat at the UN (primarily by individual European Commissioners), though at the moment there is little support from the member states for this idea,

EU Representation within the UN 33

and in any event, Article 4 of the UN Charter provides that membership is open to states only. Despite the challenge of these contrasting approaches to multilateralism, EU–UN relations are strengthening. The EU now meets the UN Secretary General at ministerial level annually in New York as part of an agreed format for regular EU–UN meetings. The UN Deputy Secretary General and other senior UN officials also visit EU institutions in Brussels (where 16 UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes now have offices), Luxembourg, and Strasbourg. Regular meetings of senior UN officials with the PSC (under the CFSP pillar) are also being developed. The European Parliament is also included in the growing EU–UN coordination effort, with a growing number of high-level visits by members of the EP to attend major UN events. The issue of EU and UN reform will be addressed later in the chapter, but we turn now to the specifics of representation and coordination involving the rotating Presidency, the Council Secretariat, and the European Commission. EU representation at the UN undoubtedly offers many practical and political challenges as far as the coordination of national positions is concerned.

The role of the Council Presidency The six-month rotating Presidency gives each of the member states the opportunity to run the European Union for a brief period and to represent the Union internationally. The Presidency expresses the EU’s position on CFSP matters and can do so with respect to matters of mixed competence in the first pillar, and can speak on behalf of all the member states in international organizations and international conferences. The country holding the Presidency chairs EU coordination meetings, and represents the EU in discussions with other UN member states and/or regional organizations. Roughly 1300 EU coordination meetings are held annually in New York, 1000 in Geneva (See http://www.europa-euun.org, accessed 14 July 2005). During the UK Presidency in the second half of 2005, British officials planned for over 450 internal coordination meetings and nearly 60 meetings with other regional groups and countries. Statements by the EU to the UN are presented by the Presidency (see Table 2.1 on procedures). There has been a gradual increase in the number of EU common positions and statements presented to the UN General Assembly. This is partly due to the progress made in formulating agreed positions in the area of foreign and security policy and, on

34 Table 2.1 EU coordination at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council UN General Assembly 1. Agenda of the General Assembly is approved by member states and topics are considered either in one of the six main committees of the GA or in the GA Plenary 2. Debate takes place on a particular subject: – UN Secretariat or UN representative introduces the subject. – UN groups (EU, G77) make statements, on a first come-first served basis. – The EU Presidency makes its statement. – Individual UN delegations make statements. – Observers may make statements. 3. Introduction of Resolutions: An individual or group delegation provides a draft text. – Delegations and groups prepare amendments (in informal consultations/bilateral contacts/in writing). EU Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat, coordinates with the Commission and EU member states which consult their capitals. EU must reach a consensus or no EU position is taken. – Discussions on text of draft resolutions in GA committee sessions and in informal caucasing. – Delegations that wish to mark their support for a resolution become ‘co-sponsors’. 4. Voting on Resolutions in GA Plenary – Adoption in the General Assembly Committees by either consensus or vote. – Brought to Plenary. – Adopted by the Plenary where there might be a public vote. a. EU partners (including the Commission) may sit in on these (formal or informal) meetings to follow the procedures, but the discussion is conducted by the Presidency except on issues where the EC has competence. b. The EU Presidency may designate another EU delegation to represent the EU if it is not available. UN Security Council The EU has no status at the Security Council. Member states act individually and separately. Two member states have permanent seats (UK and France) and often at least two others have non-permanent seats on a rotating basis. At EU weekly meetings chaired by the Presidency, EU member states sitting on the Security Council take it in turn to brief the other EU member states on the previous week’s Security Council activities. The High Representative of the EU may be invited to speak to the UN Security Council on behalf of the EU. EU member states on the Security Council incorporate EU views and positions when they can in their statements. Source: web-site of the EU at the UN, http://www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 12 July 2005.

EU Representation within the UN 35

occasion, to the persistence and skill of individual Presidencies in shaping consensus on the issues that come up during the term of office. The degree of UN activity by an individual EU member state is not directly related to the size of that state and its diplomatic mission – the recent Danish, Dutch and Italian Presidencies were particularly active in presenting common positions to the General Assembly, and exceeded the diplomatic activity of the French Presidency. Small states can be as successful in securing the agreement of their partners to a common position as the larger, and often better-resourced, national delegations. National interests clearly play a part in both the agenda setting of individual Presidencies and decisions to commit to a common position. There may also be issues that arise in the international arena on which the EU member states can either reach agreement without much effort (such as the Middle East peace plan or the need for a unified front in dealing with international terrorism) or which are significantly divisive, such as the US war against Iraq. As Table 2.2 shows, the greatest number of EU statements is made to the Security Council and the General Assembly.10 It is comes as no surprise to note that by far the largest number of statements covers peace and security matters, followed by economic and social development and, some way behind, human rights. This is interesting because the greatest degree of activity by the EU at the UN (across the rotating Presidencies) is precisely in the areas where European integration has lagged thus far. In the area of peace and security, there is no common policy and no supranationality. Rather, decisions are made on the basis of intergovernmentalism, and policy initiatives are gradual and limited in scope. The EU’s identity as a Table 2.2 EU statements at the UN 2000–05 By Venue Security Council General Assembly 1st Committee 2nd Committee 3rd Committee 4th Committee 5th Committee 6th Committee ECOSOC Other

By Presidency 185 172 70 111 97 27 139 54 131 118

France (2000) Sweden (2001) Belgium (2001) Spain (2002) Denmark (2002) Greece (2003) Italy (2003) Ireland (2004) Holland (2004) Luxembourg (2005)

By Subject 112 92 149 99 126 76 136 75 149 83

General Human rights Peace/security Environment Economic/Social Humanitarian International law Trade Culture

Source: EU@UN web-site, http://www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 12 July 2005.

280 81 408 60 252 60 51 18 1

36 Mary Farrell

security actor is still evolving, and has not been fully embraced by member state governments, political elites, or national publics. Outside the EU, there is an equally sceptical view of the Union as a security actor, notwithstanding its recent peace-keeping operations in the Western Balkans and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The high level of EU engagement in security issues through the UN forum can help to counter this negative attitude and doubt over its capacity to play a meaningful role in international security. The Presidency also aims to get an EU consensus prior to voting on the resolutions before the Assembly. While this does not always happen, the divisions are less rancorous and less frequent than might be expected. During the 58th session of the General Assembly (2003–04), EU voting cohesion was 89.75 per cent, including consensus votes (See http://www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 14 July 2005). EU member states were divided on 32 resolutions before the General Assembly, including some on nuclear weapons and disarmament, decolonization and human rights (see also Table 1.1 in this volume). Paul Luif in 2003 reported an increase of identical votes by EU states in the UN General Assembly in parallel with the development of the CFSP, although there were sometimes quite considerable variations across issue areas. Luif found that there was high agreement among EU member states on the Israel–Palestine conflict and matters relating to human rights. On issues relating to questions of international security, disarmament and nuclear weapons, there was significant disagreement; even more so on issues relating to decolonization (Luif, 2003, p. 51). Luif also found that the voting patterns of the East European states that became members in 2004 moved closer to the EU position. Thus in terms of voting in the UN General Assembly, the EU appears to be emerging as an international actor.

The Council Secretariat The Council Secretariat services the Council, which is comprised of representatives of all the member states and is the primary decision-making body in all three pillars. Once the CFSP was instigated in the Maastricht Treaty, it was evident that some form of coordination of the member states’ positions would be required to give effect to the proposed common positions and joint actions. Two decades after the Commission delegation to the UN was officially set up (see below) the EU member states agreed in 1994 to open a liaison office of the Council secretariat in New York, to help ‘represent’ CFSP. This, somewhat surprisingly, was already preceded by a Council secretariat office in

EU Representation within the UN 37

Geneva that had been established in the late 1960s to deal mainly with negotiations within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Both offices are headed by an ambassador and a deputy head of office. According to the website of the New York liaison office, the Council Secretariat office is to 1. To provide information, reports and analyses on UN activities to the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP, to the General Secretariat of the Council, and to Council bodies; 2. To assist the Presidency and the member states in the day-to-day running of EU business and in the representation of the CFSP in New York; 3. To assist the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP in carrying out his activities; 4. To help in ensuring consistency and continuity across the rotating Presidencies (See www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 14 July 2005). The Council liaison offices host many coordination meetings, though as Paul Taylor points out in his contribution to this volume, not all coordination meetings in Geneva are held under Council auspices. In examining the coordination framework for the conduct of EU–UN relations, we could ask whether a new office was really necessary. It has been suggested that there is little spirit of cooperation between the two European institutions in New York (the Council office and the Commission delegation), and between the Council office and the Presidency (Creed, 2005). However, the sense of alienation and frustration about its position in the EU coordination framework must be understood in the context of the nature of the office as a liaison and information bureau rather than as a political institution. So far, it is the individual member states that call the shots as far as foreign policy initiatives are concerned and there is still much division among the member states as to the degree of delegation they are willing to make to the supranational level. By contrast, the European Commission is well resourced and has the capability to expand the scope of its activities in the areas for which it has competence by interpreting broadly such responsibilities. The Commission also has observer status and is a participant at the main meetings. This role is not open to the Council liaison office that performs, in this context, a more typical back office function. Presence counts for a lot in international diplomacy, because it provides the opportunity for a more distinct profile and influence as

38 Mary Farrell

an actor. However, profile raising seems to have been less of a priority in the minds of decision-makers when it came to the opening of the Council Secretariat liaison office. Rather the idea seems to be confined to maintaining an information bureau that supports member states’ coordination efforts.

The European Commission at the UN The European Commission presence at the UN began with the opening of an information office in New York in 1964, which became an official delegation office on 11 October 1974 when the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the EEC. The delegation is headed by an ambassador and effectively functions as an embassy with a core staffing level of around ten and a small number of locally engaged employees. Commission delegations now exist at all the major UN sites, including New York, Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris and Nairobi.11 Observer status allows the Commission, on the EC’s behalf, to participate in the proceedings of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its functional commissions, and the specialized agencies, in line with the responsibilities allocated to it under the treaties. In Brussels, the External Relations and Development DirectoratesGeneral (DGs) coordinate relations between the Commission and the UN, while many of the sectoral DGs also have close working relations with individual bodies in the UN system in their areas of competence. The general rule is that the European Commission has special responsibilities in areas where there is exclusive Community competence, which allows it to push for a common position and then represent the European Community (though not the EU as a whole) in the UN on such matters. In other areas of the first pillar where the EC does not have exclusive competence, the Commission tries to reinforce the coordination process and support the Presidency, particularly by helping to draft statements and foster EU unity in voting. The European Commission itself presents approximately 5–7 statements a year to the General Assembly – on areas for which it is directly responsible – compared to the hundreds issued by the Presidency (Creed, 2005, p. 6). Through European Commission representation, the European Community has taken part as a (special) ‘full participant’ in many major UN conferences, notably the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for Social Development; the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women; the 2000 World Food Summit in Rome; the 2002 Monterrey Financing for

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Development conference; and the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development.12 In 2001, the EU hosted a major UN conference, the Third UN Conference on Less Developed Countries, for the first time. This participation at global conferences establishes Europe’s profile as a global actor, and brings the EU’s voice to a global forum. Its presence in New York places the European Commission delegation at the heart of the UN system. And as the UN’s work has broadened in scope, so too have the areas of involvement for the European Commission. This enables the Commission to enhance its stature in the foreign policy arena through its engagement in the activities of the different UN entities. The Commission attends the regular meetings and high-level political dialogue between the UN Secretariat, the Council (EU) and the High Representative of the CFSP. The EU and the UN work together on development policy and humanitarian aid, areas in which the European Commission has significant responsibilities. The Commission’s relations with ECOSOC are important. The majority of the EU statements to ECOSOC are made by the Presidency, though the European Commission frequently plays a prominent part in the drafting of texts. ECOSOC is one of the most important organs of the UN system for the European Commission, since it promotes a broad-based agenda of economic and social development embodying significant synergies with the European policies and values. While European development policy is undertaken at both national and Community levels, the European Commission has taken a large role and growing profile on these matters in the UN framework. The result has been favourable to the Commission in terms of both profile and influence. The EU strongly supports the UN Millennium Development Goals and the Council in May 2005 adopted a series of ambitious new commitments, including collectively meeting an aid target of 0.56 per cent of GNI by 2010, while all EU-15 undertook to achieve the assistance target of 0.70 per cent of their GNI by 2015, and the new member states agreed to achieve a target of 0.33 per cent; policy coherence (in terms of policy synergies between development, trade, environment, agriculture, migration and security); and a specific focus upon Africa. This outcome was shaped in large part by the leadership role played by the European Commission, and the long-standing support that this institution has given to UN efforts in the area of development assistance. In this regard, the European Commission Communication ‘Building an Effective Partnership with the UN in the field of Development and Humanitarian Affairs’ (2001) moved relations with the UN into a new phase. Since then, five strategic partnerships in the field of development and

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humanitarian assistance have been concluded between the Commission and the UN bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As a result, policy dialogue and cooperation have intensified at both strategic and operational levels. The UN forum offers the European Commission a good way to pursue its own development agenda at a global level, while promoting European values of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law – but the coordination system keeps the member states in firm control of both the substantive nature of the European case and how it is presented to UN bodies. Although there may not be agreement over which European institutional body should take the credit for bringing the two international organizations into closer cooperation, the European Commission has certainly moved into the spotlight as a result of the efforts over the years. It is now well entrenched in the international diplomatic circle, and can justifiably claim international presence – one of the key prerequisites to actorness in the international system. But while actorness by the European Commission raises the EU’s profile it adds to confusion over who speaks for Europe.

Intersecting reform agendas? Both the European Union and the United Nations are currently undergoing internal debates over the future of their respective multilateral systems. What are the possibilities for implementing reforms, and to what extent are the two international organizations impacting upon each other’s reform agenda? Since 1958, the EU has successfully implemented reforms to the design blueprint set out in the Treaty of Rome. Reform has been incremental at times – the gradual shift in the status and powers of the European Parliament; or the informal meetings of the European Council (a body not even included in the Treaty of Rome) beginning in 1974 and subsequently formalized through treaty change. At other times, radical reform was preferred, such as replacing national currencies with the euro. Yet the most radical reform of all was made with hardly a murmur from the member state governments – the two 1960s decisions by the ECJ that gave rise to the principle of direct effect (European law has to be incorporated directly and without adaptation by the national

EU Representation within the UN 41

administration) and the primacy principle (giving EU law precedence over national law). The power of law and the pragmatism of national political actors (and the European Commission) together contributed to the EU’s success at achieving reform. In recent years, proposals for reform only succeeded if given the full backing of member states, and with a clear rationale linked to very concrete objectives – market integration, monetary union, democratic representation (in the case of the European Parliament). The extension of supranationality (and strengthening of the institutional framework) was facilitated through a combination of European leadership and national willingness to share sovereignty to promote common interests. From the beginning of the EC, there was the shared understanding among political elites, governments and citizens that the community was necessary for (re)establishing peace and security. This rationale no longer holds true and the beliefs that bound the post-war European leaders together are not evident among contemporary political leaders. What is the rationale for the contemporary EU? Where is it going, and what kind of future does the European community want? The lack of consensus about the purpose of the EU or a shared vision of Europe’s future were not rectified by the draft constitutional treaty, so it is perhaps not surprising that Europe’s latest reform effort was rejected in several national referenda. The question of UN reform has also moved to the top of the international debate – in large part, a debate that arose out of dissatisfaction and criticism over its effectiveness and relevance in the twenty-first century. The UN has had its critics from the beginning, though the voices have become louder in recent years, attacking the ineffectual bureaucracy, corruption and waste, and a general perceived lack of capability to deal with the conflicts, wars and ethnic rivalries that erupted over the past two decades. Conflict resolution, peace-keeping, the protection of human rights, and the reduction of poverty have all crowded the UN agenda in recent years. The failure to address these challenging issues undermines the UN’s reputation. Reform proposals have emerged from a variety of sources, including the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and Secretary General Kofi Annan himself. Central to the reform proposals is the notion that security threats have multiple origins, including international wars, civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. But other dangers emanate from poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation. The conclusion is for the global community to adopt a

42 Mary Farrell

more comprehensive view of what constitutes a security threat, and then construct a collective security system that can embrace the multiple causes of global insecurity. The UN reform debate has produced a set of proposals on institutional change, and also advocated strengthening the normative framework. Collective security is once more brought to centre stage as a core organizing principle in cooperative relations between states. Another principle, collective responsibility, is given stronger emphasis, while the Security Council’s role as the formal arbiter on the use of force against another country is emphasized. In the words of the Secretary General, ‘we need long-term, sustained engagement to integrate human rights and the rule of law into all the work of the UN. This commitment is as critical to conflict prevention as it is to poverty reduction, particularly in states struggling to shed a legacy of violence’ (Annan, 2005, p. 69). What are the prospects for realising these institutional changes at the UN? Currently, at least two proposals for reform of the Security Council have been put forward to address the representation deficit that exists at present; neither, however, has attracted sufficient support. One proposal is to expand the current membership, to have six new permanent members and three new non-permanent members; the second proposal is for nine new non-permanent seats. Both proposals leave the existing veto power currently enjoyed by the five permanent members unchanged. At best, it will take a long time for some consensus to form among the existing group of countries that hold the pivotal positions on the Security Council. A proposal for an EU seat on the Security Council is rejected outright by the two European states with permanent seats and it is difficult to imagine their willingness to give up their right to exercise the veto. Beyond this, the proposal for a European seat on the Security Council would have to be accepted by the other members of this organ and ultimately the members of the General Assembly. There has also been some discussion within the UN of whether the official regional groups should be reformed, and whether as part of such a reform all EU member states should be in the same group. While an ‘EU group’ would neatly coincide with actual on-the-ground coordination and activity within the UN, there is little enthusiasm to go down this route within the EU. With EU member states spread out across three groups, the potential for feeding more information into EU coordination is thus greater, as is the potential for electing more EU member states to UN bodies. Certain proposals on the UN reform agenda, however, have been given strong support by the EU. It welcomed the Secretary General’s

EU Representation within the UN 43

intention to further improve the coordination of the UN system including the grouping of the various agencies, funds and programmes into more tightly managed entities. Since the EU is a major contributor to the UN funds, paying around 38 per cent of the regular budget and 40 per cent of peace-keeping operations, it has consistently sought to impose fiscal discipline and greater responsibility for budgetary control (European Commission, 2003, p. 3). It supports a new security consensus, including criteria for the use of force, the notion of the responsibility to protect, and the inclusion of economic, environmental and social threats next to the so-called hard security threats. The EU supports the proposal for a Peace-Building Commission, on the basis that there is a need for a body to ensure long-term post-conflict reconstruction involving all major actors, international financial institutions, relevant UN entities and major donors. Similarly, there is European support for the Human Rights Council, as a way of making the UN human rights machinery more relevant and efficient. The stronger focus on democratization issues in UN reform proposals also meets with EU support and, in the development field, the EU strongly endorses the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Furthermore, the UK Presidency (July–December 2005) has called for a strengthening of ECOSOC, and for this committee to play a central role in the follow-up and implementation of the outcomes of major UN conferences and summits in the economic, social and environmental fields, and with reference to the work on the MDGs. The European proposal also recommended that ECOSOC could meet as a high-level development cooperation forum, where global, regional and national strategies and policies for sustainable development cooperation could be reviewed; ECOSOC could also become a voluntary MDG peer review mechanism, and contribute to post-conflict situations and humanitarian crises, to ensure coherence with long-term development goals. The EU asserts that the role of ECOSOC should remain at the level of policy coordination and review – there is no proposal to allow the ECOSOC to intervene directly in operational management. Many of the reform proposals were accepted in principle by the UN summit in September 2005 (a notable exception was UNSC reform), but the devil is as always in the details and negotiations on those were ongoing at the time of writing. While the reform process will yield some fruitful results, it is not at all certain they will be wide-ranging or effective in practice. To what extent have the EU and UN positions on multilateralism coalesced? In some respects there is evidence of shared positions. Both

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the EU and the UN give priority to the protection of human rights. On state sovereignty, the two organizations have their respective positions, but the UN has come closer to the notion that absolute sovereignty is not defensible on all occasions. The EU has endorsed the emerging norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ which may permit intervention when states prove unable or unwilling to ensure the human security of their citizens (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001; see also the Biscop and Drieskens contribution to this volume, Chapter 6). Although the use of force was prohibited under the UN Charter except in cases of self-defence or under authorization by the Security Council, recent action by the United States, justified on the basis of threat prevention and pre-emption, raised questions about when legitimate force might be used pre-emptively by the Security Council. The US case for intervention in Iraq was based upon an exaggerated notion of self-defence in the face of imminent threat, and justified on the basis of ‘a coalition of the willing’. But American efforts to push forward with military action without the approval of the Security Council ultimately raised opposition in the EU, and divided the member states in their understanding of reasonable force and the role of international law in determining how and when to use force. In the law and practice of European integration, the principle of state sovereignty has long been subsumed under the broader principle of the primacy of EC/EU law, and the notion of shared sovereignty. These recent proposals on UN reform imply the acceptance of limitations to sovereignty, not least in the new norm concerning the ‘responsibility to protect’. Yet the EU record on such issues as humanitarian intervention remains ambiguous at best. Even though the political rhetoric and policy documents reflect the European commitment to humanitarian intervention, at a practical level the EU is restrained by the limitations of its CFSP and limited military capability. The EU’s slow response to the problems in the Balkans over the course of the 1990s underscored the ambiguities in its position on humanitarian intervention. At a more general level, the institutional changes at the UN advocated or supported by the EU do not imply radical challenges to the national sovereignty of the European member states. It would seem that there are limitations to the sovereignty-sharing that European nation-states are willing to consider, even when they continue to support the principles of multilateralism. But we may also be witnessing limits to European integration, a combination of political, geographical, social and cultural constraints configured by the diversity of aspirations among political leaders, the unwillingness of citizens to support grand projects that have

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not been subject to the rules of democratic accountability, and that fail to offer a convincing rationale and distinctive unifying vision. The contemporary European malaise needs to be considered not just within the frame of balancing intergovernmentalism and supranationality. It goes beyond the issue of institutional over-reach to the heart of the question – what is Europe?

Conclusion – the challenges ahead There is no doubt about the EU’s commitment to strengthen relations with the UN, and the recent European Commission documents and Presidency statements can be regarded as a commitment towards intersecting multilateralism that has the support of both the intergovernmental and the supranational elements of the EU. The two multilateral systems have shared values – the protection of human rights, the respect for international law, the concern with democracy promotion, and a belief in the role of international institutions in fostering international cooperation. But effective participation by the EU in the UN multilateral system remains restricted by the peculiarities of the EU system, its mix of intergovernmentalism and supranationality that variously enhances the power and influence of individual member states and at other times places limitations on the supranational institutions, including the European Commission. In this regard, the European Commission produces the policy documents on multilateralism, while the Presidency acts as the voice of the EU states (when coordinated). Given that it appears that the draft EU constitutional treaty will not be ratified, and thus the institutional reforms proposed in it will not be enacted any time soon, it would seem that for the foreseeable future the EU effort to promote greater coordination within the UN system will rely upon the mechanisms that are already in place and the member states will continue to shape the relations with the other multilateral system. There is an inevitable and perpetual tension between the UN as an organization of sovereign states and the EU as an evolving political community of sovereignty-sharing member states.

Notes 1. The Economic and Social Council covers the broadest areas of activity in the UN system, the majority of expenditure, and more programmes and funds than any other part of the UN. The UN Charter established a wide remit for ECOSOC, including the coordination of the economic and social activities of the gamut of specialized agencies (ranging from the ILO, WHO, FAO, IMF, and

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2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

World Bank), conduct of research on economic and social issues, making recommendations and writing reports, preparing conventions, and convening conferences. With this broad agenda and a reach that extended across the UN system, ECOSOC represented an important strategic partner for a European Union in search of closer relations and an enhanced profile in international governance. WEOG also includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand Andorra, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland; the US is normally an observer but participates as a full member for the purpose of elections. Until 2004 Estonia was not a member of any group; it has now joined the Eastern Europe Group. JUSCANZ ( Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), meets occasionally to coordinate positions, somewhat more often in the CANZ formation. The EFTAns (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland) will sometimes operate with JUSCANZ. The other two are the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs until recently has had little direct relevance for the EU’s relations to the UN system. As the UN increasingly and authoritatively addresses issues such as human trafficking and terrorism, this pillar will grow in importance. The draft constitutional treaty proposed giving legal personality to the EU itself. There are two non-permanent seats on the Security Council that are filled by countries elected from the WEOG; one non-permanent seat is elected by members of the EEG; two non-permanent seats are filled by the Latin American Group and five non-permanent seats are filled by the Africa/Asia groups. Given this distribution, and the distribution of EU members among WEOG, EEG and the Asian group, it is possible though unlikely that in addition to the UK and France as members, there could be as many as four EU members elected to non-permanent seats. More common since the EU’s 2004 enlargement is two non-permanent Security Council members from Western Europe and one from Eastern Europe. The Community is also a full member of several fisheries organizations, UNCTAD’s Integrated Programme for Commodities, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The General Assembly is comprised of a number of Committees: the First Committee covers Disarmament and International Security; Second Committee – Economic and Financial; Third Committee – Social, Human and Cultural; Fourth Committee – Special Political and Decolonisation; Fifth Committee – Administrative and Budgeting; Sixth Committee – Legal. In Geneva, European Commission delegations are accredited to a number of UN bodies, including the OHCHR, UNHCR, UNCTAD, ILO, WHO, WIPO, ITU, UNECE and the Conference on Disarmament; in Paris, UNESCO; in Nairobi, UNEP; in Rome, the FAO, World Food Programme, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development; in Vienna, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN International Development Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. In these cases, the European Community participated in debates on an equal basis with member states at these meetings, but did not have the right to vote.

Part II The Politics of National Interest and EU Policy Coordination in the UN

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3 The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas Christopher Hill

If the United Nations is the universal form of multilateralism, the Security Council (UNSC) is its zenith. Within the UNSC resides the P-5 (the permanent, veto-bearing members) while within the P-5, Britain and France are themselves members of a formidable multilateral institution, the European Union. Our subject, then, presents us with a series of Chinese boxes, which need careful delineating and distinguishing. The UNSC is central to any understanding of the UN, and the five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) are the motor of the UNSC. Yet the unity of the P-5 cannot be taken for granted, and the pull of wider European solidarity is a significant factor in shaping the positions of Paris and London. Furthermore, while the two European members have much in common, they often publicly disagree, preferring alignments with other UNSC members, as the 2003 Iraq crisis graphically demonstrated. Thus there is no way in which a reductionist approach to explaining political outcomes in the UN could ever be justified; even the innermost box, occupied by the US, does not hold the key to its behaviour. While the focus of this book is on identifying and explaining the nature of the interaction between the EU and the UN, this chapter focuses specifically on the role of the two permanent European members of the UNSC. The analysis here revolves around three inter-related debates: that over national interest, in the sense that Britain and France continue to stress their separate UNSC membership and to pursue distinctive concerns; that over the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in terms of how far it is able to function without a single voice in the UNSC; and that over the reform of the Security Council, which began with the suggestion of German membership in 1993, has continued with proposals (from Italy inter alia) for 49

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rotating membership, and has persistently hinted at the idea of a single EU seat. These three perspectives are examined in turn with a view to tracing the interconnections between them, and to drawing conclusions about the importance of the European dimension to the UNSC, and conversely of the UNSC’s place in the foreign policies of the EU, collective and national. Before commencing, however, it is important to sketch the historical background of the European presence in the UNSC.

Historical background Britain and France are founding members of the UNSC, although the former’s status as an unambiguously victorious power in 1945, together with French problems in Algeria and Indo-China during the 1950s, meant that Britain carried the greater weight in the UNSC during the first two decades of the Cold War. In the Gaullist and post-Gaullist phase, however, it is arguable that France saw itself as a re-established ‘puissance mondiale’, while the United Kingdom (UK), at least for the period 1967–82, adjusted to its loss of primacy by taking refuge in the self-image of being a ‘medium power of the first rank’ (Edward Heath’s phrase, cited in Boardman and Groom, 1973, p. 6.). More recently, both powers have responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union by stabilizing their positions as amongst the most significant players in world politics after the US, while awaiting the rise to power of China, India and other large developing states. This has also meant vigorous opposition to the very idea of losing their status as members of the P-5. The two European states have much in common in their UNSC diplomacy and they shared a traumatic experience at the hands of the Security Council in 1956 over Suez. The invasion of Egypt which they launched with the connivance of Israel led to a US resolution in the UNSC demanding a ceasefire. This was vetoed by both London and Paris – and remains the only occasion on which either government has vetoed an American resolution.1 The US response was to use the ‘Uniting for Peace’ mechanism – first deployed during the Korean war to circumvent Soviet vetoes – to bring the matter before the General Assembly, which then condemned the Israeli-Anglo-French action by a majority of 65 to 4 (UN General Assembly Resolution 997, 2 November 1956, reaffirmed on 4 November by UNGA Resolution 999, http://www.mfa.il/MFA). This isolation, together with heavy pressure from the superpowers, convinced the two European states to withdraw their forces. The failure of

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such an ill-advised venture had various long-term consequences for British and French foreign policy, including damaging their status at the UN, both with the emerging group of newly independent states and in the UNSC itself, dominated by the superpowers for the rest of the Cold War. It thus became even more important to the two Europeans that they should retain nuclear weapons as an emblem of power. Their military posture was, however, largely defensive, in that there was little possibility (and no wish, in the case of the UK) of representing a third force in the Cold War, or even of constraining either superpower through action in the UNSC. This was partly because the UN as a whole had become paralysed as a forum for dealing with issues of peace and security, and partly because of the disparity between the enormous thermonuclear capacity of each of the superpowers and that of the other three permanent members. And if proactive diplomacy proved impossible in crises such as Cuba and Vietnam, even the negative power of the veto had evident limits. Up to the end of 2002, out of a total of 245 vetoes cast in the UNSC, Britain had been responsible for 30 and France for 18 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003a). The majority of these were in relation to post-colonial issues, notably in southern Africa, and not infrequently in conjunction with the US. In the case of the Arab–Israel dispute during the 1970s and 1980s it was more a case of Washington vetoing resolutions sympathetic to the Palestinians than of the Europeans facing choices over the veto, as the status quo favoured Israel and its American ally. Britain and France were unwilling to take a lead on a national, or even a bilateral basis. After 1985 the veto became apparently less important as its use became more infrequent, and British and French positions more significant, in the second wave of détente which eventually led to the end of the Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev’s early wish to rejuvenate the UN as part of his acceptance of the idea of an international community led to hopes that the P-5 would provide united and wise leadership in world politics, enabling the UN to resolve many problems along the lines of those settled in central America and southern Africa. The high point of this sense of cooperation occurred during the first Gulf War, when UNSC unity provided legitimacy for the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and in the subsequent smooth transfer of permanent membership from the Soviet Union to its successor, the Russian Federation.2 Given the vacuum created by the implosion of the communist bloc, Britain and France suddenly assumed a critical role and seemed to have new responsibilities in helping to fashion a new international order.

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Whether coincidentally or not, this was also the time of maximum aspiration within the EU towards a common foreign policy, expressed in the Maastricht Treaty in the format of the CFSP. In fact, the European Community had already been working for 20 years towards this project, in its previous incarnation of European Political Cooperation (EPC). There had not been much talk within EPC of the possibility of coordinated positions within the UNSC (let alone a single European seat) but this had nonetheless been the unstated hope of many of the smaller and/or integrationist member states.3 Indeed, despite many fits and starts, the Europeans had shown themselves capable of gradually converging in their voting patterns within the General Assembly, and in practice holding to common positions on many of the key issues which came before the UNSC, especially in relation to the Middle East. Thus Britain and France moved imperceptibly, in the eyes of the international community, in those of the West European and Other Group (WEOG), and perhaps most importantly in their own, towards a position where they were both independent sovereign members of the UNSC and informal mouthpieces for a collective European view, however unspecified and ephemeral. It was just at this point that the end of the Cold War brought forth new and contradictory possibilities, of Security Council reform to reflect the new geopolitical realities on the one hand, and the ‘quick fix’ proposal for making Germany and Japan into permanent members on the other. And from this point on the three debates covered in this chapter come into sharper focus. The three have taken centre stage, at least for European observers, for nearly 15 years now, and show no immediate signs of being resolved. It is to the first of them, on the national interests of Britain and France in the UNSC, that we now turn.

The debate on national interests Any multilateral forum poses a dilemma for its members: do they see it simply as a framework in which the defence and assertion of national interests is played out, and indeed as a springboard for the projection of national concerns? Or is it to be treated mainly as the institutional expression of the need to constrain national egoisms, resulting in the compromises and acts of self-restraint so necessary if collective goods are to be achieved and some notion of community to be fostered? This dilemma is particularly sharp in the case of the UNSC, which deals with the most threatening of issues for states, that of security. Sovereignty itself often seems to be at stake, while the hierarchy of power in the international system is nowhere more painfully evident than in the

The European Powers in the Security Council 53

procedures of the Security Council, which institutionalizes three classes of states: permanent members, elected members, and states which have few chances of ever serving on the UNSC.4 As permanent members of the UNSC, Britain and France have obligations to uphold the Charter, but they also protect their own vital interests and promote the interests they hold in common with their EU partners. As the key players in European foreign policy cooperation they are naturally pushed together, but the pressures of Security Council business also expose important divergences between the two states’ views of the world. Iraq is the most recent and dramatic case in point. The dispute over Iraq in 2002–03 illustrated how the high responsibility implied by permanent membership can lead states into dramatic position-taking – even grand-standing. Among the P-5 only China has managed to resist this temptation over the years, preferring a low profile. Although many of the discussions in the UNSC take place in private – to the frustration of non-members – the issues attract a great deal of publicity, with the result that a state’s (and more pertinently a leader’s) image before domestic and world opinion is at stake. Furthermore the UN and the international law it embodies do not just constitute a set of constraining rules and procedures; they also represent a set of opportunities for powerful governments to mobilize support for a preferred policy, isolate opponents, promote a new norm or appease a domestic lobby. Thus during the Iraq crisis the Blair government saw the UNSC as an indispensable means of squaring the circle between its wish to support the US desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the need both to sustain domestic support within the Labour Party and to encourage other European states not to break ranks. Unfortunately for London, the French government had almost the opposite imperative: quite apart from the merits of the argument over weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and regime change it did not wish to alienate a domestic opinion which was clearly opposed to American policy; indeed President Chirac saw a good opportunity to bolster his flagging political position. France had also been consistently of the view that, where necessary, Europe should balance US power as part of a multipolar world, rather than accept the inevitability of US leadership. These competing concerns led to a dramatic showdown in March 2003, when Chirac announced that France would veto any proposed ‘second’ resolution which might be introduced in order to legitimise a military attack on Iraq. The Blair government, angry that it had thus been forced into the position of choosing between illegality and backing away from its support of President Bush, launched a hostile publicity

54 Christopher Hill

campaign against its French ally, accusing Paris of irresponsibility and betrayal. The freeze which then came down over Anglo-French diplomacy lasted at least a year and spilled over damagingly into intra-EU affairs. The Iraq case was exceptional in the degree of animosity which it generated between Britain and France, but there is a persistent tendency on the part of each of the two states to see the UNSC as a key platform for promoting their foreign policy priorities. That is why the position of ambassador to the UN is one of the most important and prestigious in their respective diplomatic corps, and why Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin chose the Security Council for his statement that the use of force was unacceptable over Iraq – a statement which Colin Powell subsequently regarded as an ‘ambush’, and which gained the attention of the world for France’s leadership of the anti-war party.5 The importance of the UNSC to Britain and France (proportionally much greater than its role in US foreign policy) does produce some shared interests, notably their determination to hold on to permanent membership at almost any cost. In particular, it may be surmised that a significant reason for both states holding to their nuclear weapons capacity, is to avoid calling into question their right to membership. This is paradoxical, or at least circular, in that rather than the UNSC reflecting military realities, we have a situation whereby two of the P-5 are shaping their force postures in part so as to preserve their position at the UN. London and Paris face some difficult choices within the next decade over the possible renewal of their current, ageing delivery systems, given the huge costs involved and the declining strategic rationale (Clarke, 2004). Another key shared interest which London and Paris have in this context is privileged access to the other members of the P-5, and the right to meet in conclave with them without necessarily being answerable to their European partners. They can thus have their cake and eat it with regard to the CFSP, by enjoying the benefits of group membership, such as ‘speaking for Europe’ (albeit in competition with each other at times), without suffering significant constraints. As a result, neither has any intention of giving up permanent membership, and each can count on the other for support of their historic positions on the UNSC. Accordingly the two European states also emphasize the importance of the UNSC as the main source of legitimacy for international action, and worry about any tendency to sideline it, which only exposes their lack of unilateral strength. There are, however, two caveats here: first, neither state would be prevented from pursuing what it regarded as a

The European Powers in the Security Council 55

vital interest by lack of UN authorization – the UK was delighted to have a UNSC resolution in its favour over the Falklands in April 1982, but a failure to get one would not have inhibited Mrs Thatcher from sending the task force to recapture the islands. Likewise, France pursued a policy of support for the repressive government in Algeria throughout the 1990s while actively trying to keep the issue from being discussed in either the UN or the EU. Second, Britain under Tony Blair has made a concerted effort to revise the norm of non-intervention contained within the UN Charter, as the result of the Kosovo experience, when a UNSC consensus over military action against Slobodan Milosevic could not be obtained. This attempt to establish a new right of humanitarian intervention has so far failed but it is revealing that Britain was anxious to change the rule rather than blithely ignore it (Wheeler, 2005). There is naturally a desire, especially for middle range states, to avoid the hard choice between on the one hand obeying the dictates of the Charter even if it prevents measures which might seem of vital importance, and on the other sidelining the UN in order to act, albeit in a proclaimed international interest. France, in contrast, while more sensitive to human rights criteria for foreign policy since the Great Lakes tragedy in 1994, has so far shown itself far less enthusiastic about the ‘responsibility to protect’ agenda, seeing it as a cover for US-led interventions. Conversely, it has increasingly sought to use the Security Council as a shield when entering the lists against American foreign policy. The Europeans are thus active within the UNSC, but by no means in harness. Since their common interest there is historically based, this particular forum has little or no ‘Europeanizing’ effect on their foreign policies. By comparison to Britain and France the US barely experiences the choice between legality and independence as a dilemma, such is its massive coercive power – and scepticism about the UN. Washington likes multilateralism under its own leadership, but is otherwise dismissive (Dunne, 2003). This opens up a space between US policy and that of the Europeans, even with a pro-American government in power in London. Britain and France therefore acquire another potential role by virtue of their UNSC membership – that of diplomatic balancers to the US. If this role tends to embarrass London, it is not wholly unwelcome in Paris. There is no question, of course, of making common purpose with Moscow and Beijing against Washington. Rather this is a matter of attempting to reinforce the multilateralists within the US policy-making system, and of providing an alternative point of reference within the society of states, in particular within the Western camp. The (perfectly rational) assumption here is that not every policy

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decided in Washington is ipso facto desirable or should be followed out of loyalty towards an ally. The period since the Cold War has been one of rising confidence among the Europeans in their ability to contribute to the making of international order on multilateralist principles. At the same time, individual EU member states, Italy, Germany and Spain, as well as Britain and France, have become much less defensive about their own national profiles and distinctive contributions. For the UNSC permanent members, as well as for the regularly elected, such as Italy and Germany, New York thus represents a simultaneous opportunity for consensus-building and for self-promotion. The discourse is that of rational cooperation – and discourses are not mere fig-leaves – but some of the reality is that of rational instrumentalism. Furthermore identity politics are at stake, in the sense that on a vital issue like Iraq, France and Britain differed partly because of genuine contrast between their visions of themselves and of world politics (Macleod, 2004). Those who think that the French position in 2003 was mere opportunism should bear in mind that France and Britain had been differing since at least 1998 on the question of Iraqi sanctions and the ‘no-fly zone’, ‘thereby treating the rest of the world to a permanent exhibition of European disunity’ (Mortimer, 2000, p. 9). It is the coincidence of the instrumental and symbolic sources of behaviour which causes confusion in the public domain, and sometimes tension with allies – whether the US inside the Security Council or EU partners outside it.

The debate about Europe’s voice in the UNSC Article J.5 of the Treaty of Maastricht states that Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter (Hill and Smith, 2000, p. 156). This statement was retained unaltered in the Treaty of Amsterdam version, although the relevant article is numbered J.9 (Hill and Smith, 2000, pp. 175–6). It is also contained in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Article III-206), although sandwiched between

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references to the need to keep informed on matters of common interest not only member states not represented in the UNSC (or other international gatherings) but also the proposed Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.6 The Maastricht formulation was included at the behest of Britain and France who wanted to ensure that there was no room for misunderstanding over the freedom of national manoeuvre which they intended to continue enjoying in the UNSC. They had no objection to consulting, informing and coordinating with their EU partners, but saw their UN status as representing a higher calling and would not be bound even by existing commitments to common European positions. Because EU foreign policy documents are also liberally sprinkled with references to the need to uphold ‘the principles of the UN Charter’, and because (as we have seen) Britain and France are themselves persuaded of the value of the legitimacy denoted by UN resolutions, some see no contradiction in the two halves of Article J.5 – in principle, ‘responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter’ should not contradict European positions and interests. Yet if the two permanent members had been so sure that practice would resemble the theory, they would never have insisted on drafting this article in the first place: an independent role in the UNSC is seen as a vital interest in both London and Paris. This means that the idea of a single European seat in the UNSC, long canvassed by both integrationist states within the EU and those in the outside world who wish to see reform of Security Council membership, has no chance of being implemented in the foreseeable future. The notion has been in the air since the end of the Cold War and the evident need for another round of reflection about the composition of the UNSC, but one reason for Britain and France acquiescing in both the Russian seat and the idea of German and Japanese accession in the early 1990s was the wish to prevent – by a ‘quick fix’ – a groundswell of demands for change building up, inside and outside the EU. As we shall see below this was successful in preventing the idea of a single EU seat ever getting on to the main agenda, but backfired inside the EU in that it provoked Italy into a furious campaign against the inside track for Germany. If the EU were to have a single seat in a radically restructured UNSC, as many (but not all) of the smaller member states, plus quite probably Germany and Italy, would prefer, it would actually reduce the European weight in the Security Council, given that at present there are usually one or two elected EU member states present (plus sometimes a non-EU ‘European’).

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The arguments from the viewpoint of European influence thus to some extent run contrary to those derived from an integrationist standpoint. In fact, there has been little attempt made to think through the tensions between these two sets of arguments. The draft Constitutional Treaty, for example, provides for a new EU President and a Union Foreign Minister without saying how these personalities could function without the right to speak in the UNSC. The current situation at least allows the rotating Presidency to give the Union’s view, which is amplified when the Presidency is held by one of the two permanent members or the elected member usually present from the EU. If the new proposals are actually implemented, the appointees will presumably have to speak to the UNSC through the medium of the EU member states present, which defeats the purpose, or by invitation. In any case, as former US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke has pointed out, the EU is unlikely to have the single foreign policy which would necessitate a single seat, precisely because of the position of Britain and France: ‘For those two, Security Council membership is the definition of their global role … they are not going to give it up in a hurry’.7 For London and Paris it is impossible to disentangle the global scope of their foreign policies from their UN status; the one implies the other, in a circular relationship. Conversely, if a solid CFSP is to develop, it will have to be based on agreement between these two major powers, which stand out among the EU-25 for more reasons than their UNSC role. They are nuclear weapon states, major ex-imperial powers, and states with the physical and political capacity to project military force beyond their frontiers, as they have shown in the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa. When they disagree fundamentally that not only inhibits consensus in the UNSC but also splits the CFSP down the middle. Given that one of the key fault-lines within European foreign policy cooperation is the issue of whether the EU should aspire to a global role, beyond its ‘near abroad’, the uneasiness of the relationship between the only two global players among the EU member states is a serious obstacle to the CFSP’s further development. A British minister remarked recently that ‘there is no bit of the globe now which we can neglect from our security viewpoint’.8 There are accordingly important elements of convergence, such as the quiet defence dialogue, including on nuclear weapons, which has taken place for more than ten years, and which culminated in the St. Malo initiative of December 1998 (Forster and Wallace, 2001, pp. 142 and 151). Also notable is the cooperation in west Africa, for so long a zone of intense rivalry, which even led to a joint visit

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by foreign ministers Cook and Védrine in 1999 (Hill, 2001, p. 347), and that on debt relief for the poorest countries (Chirac, 2004). Taking action all around the world, however, is another matter, in terms of resources, effectiveness and consensus. For example Britain and France have less than half the number of professional staff in their permanent missions of the UN than their fellow members of the P-5, and struggle to meet all the demands made on them (Global Policy Forum 2004, cited by Prantl, 2005, p. 569). Furthermore, the desire and capacity for shared leadership between London and Paris are never more than intermittent. This is why, whatever the theoretical and legal possibilities, the relationship between France and the UK in the UNSC falls well short of the ‘enhanced cooperation’ prefigured in the Treaty of Nice ( Jaeger, 2002, p. 301). What do the other EU states think of the privileged role of Britain and France in the UNSC? The short answer is that few are content, whether their preference is for a single seat or more opportunities for rotating seats. They know that the status quo inhibits EU solidarity in foreign policy. It is no accident that the tendency towards ever greater solidarity in voting in the General Assembly, for example, is qualified by the ‘dissident’ position of Britain and France. From the enlargement to 15 in 1995 until the end of the 1999–2000 session, Britain’s average figure for voting with its partners stands at 88.26 per cent, and France’s at 85.62 per cent. Most member states have a figure similar to that of Germany, at 97.14 per cent (Laatikainen, 2004, Table 1, pp. 7–8; see also Johansson-Nogués, 2004, p. 89). On the other hand, there is no lack of understanding of the price for global activism which the bigger states pay, not just financial and material but in terms of lives lost and political fallout. Even Germany, which wishes to become a permanent member of the UNSC, would continue its post-war policy of caution over major military commitments, once joined. Most EU member states are more content than they might admit to have Britain and France accepting the ‘responsibilities’ of the UNSC. It has been argued recently that the EU qua EU has significantly increased its presence in the UNSC through an increase in speeches, statements and documents presented (from 15 in 1990 to 86 in 2000), and through the creation of an ‘EU caucus’ consisting of the two permanent members plus the regular EU elected member(s), who seem increasingly to be states of some weight (Laatikainen, 2004, Table 3, p. 9; see also Dedring, 2004, pp. 1–3). Juergen Dedring says that: Whereas in the more distant past the two permanent UNSC members refused to consult or even inform the other EU member states on

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Security Council matters, they have had a much more accommodating attitude as it became clear to all concerned that the issues before the UNSC were of paramount importance for all EU member states and therefore needed to be aired in the wider circles of the EU group (2004, p. 3). Given the development towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) after 1998, as David Hannay points out, it certainly ‘would not make sense, politically or practically, if Europe’s security policy became a kind of Anglo-French preserve’ (2002, p. 367). Be that as it may, the fact remains that until there is a reform of UNSC membership, even the enlarged EU cannot always hope to have more than two elected members serving at any time on the Council, and they will often be small states, at odds with the trend towards a de facto foreign policy directoire of Britain, France and Germany, as evidenced in the diplomacy over Iranian nuclear weapons from 2003 on. It should not be forgotten that were Germany to join as a permanent member, as London and Paris had wished, that would institutionalize the directoire to the point where it would be difficult for the other member states to rein it in (Keatinge, 1997, p. 29). In practice, the directoire has existed in various forms from the founding of the western Contact Group on Namibia in 1977, through the G7 to the Contact Group and the Quint in the Balkans during the 1990s (Gegout, 2002; Prantl, 2005, pp. 575–8). Since 1987, ten member states have served a total of 30 years – or an average of three years each – as elected members of the UNSC (see Table 3.1). Given that Table 3.1 EU states elected members of the UN Security Council, 1985–2006 (total years served in brackets) Germany (6) Italy (4) Belgium (2) Spain (4) Portugal (2) Sweden (2) Netherlands (2) Ireland (2) Denmark (4) Greece (2) Note: A normal term is two years; thus Germany has served three terms. States have only been included if they were EU members when serving on the UNSC. For example Austria, which was elected onto the latter in 1991–92, has not been included as it did not join the EU until 1995.

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in the same period the elected members of the Council have served a total of 200 years, it can be seen that the EU presence (15 per cent of the total, but only 12 per cent if we discount Germany), and its capacity for caucusing, is limited. The Union is still heavily dependent on Britain and France for representation in the unreformed UNSC. It is also important to remember that while an increasingly large number of states takes part in the public meetings of the UNSC, this has the effect of driving much of the critical discussion into informal meetings and/or behind closed doors (Prantl, 2005, pp. 571–2). What is more, while the UK and France do not usually spurn European positions deliberately, they have a noticeable tendency to ignore them in the process of their own global self-projection. An examination of the speeches made in 2003 and 2004 on UN-related issues by President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair revealed few references to the EU, and no tendency to see themselves as following a European flight-plan. There were frequent references to their respective G8 presidencies, and to national initiatives, but the EU figured only instrumentally, or as context.9

The debate on Security Council reform As we have seen, the issue of the membership of the UNSC (which is only one dimension of the reform agenda) surfaced once more after the end of the Cold War. It had been in hibernation since the expansion of the elected members from six to ten in 1965. Given the sense of historical watershed, and the talk by President George H. Bush and others about a ‘new international order’, it was inevitable that questions would be raised about how far the structure created by the victorious powers in 1945 was still suitable for a system in which the number of member states had more than tripled and new powers were emerging from the shadows of the past. It is striking, but not surprising given the veto power exercised by the existing permanent members, that 15 years later no reform has been achieved. The debate which has taken place over that period has, however, often been fierce, with unpredictable consequences for relations inside the EU. Britain and France have, accordingly, found themselves both caught in the crossfire and uneasy about its implications for their own contested positions in the UNSC. The question of Europe has been central to the debate over Security Council reform, but neither the EU nor its main representatives have been able to lead that debate in a constructive way. The discussions about changing the UNSC membership began in 1992, with the idea floated by the US, and discreetly encouraged by the

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blushing candidates themselves, that Germany and Japan should simply be added to the P-5, largely on the grounds of their wealth and contributions to UN funding, but also as a sign of their reinstatement in the community of nations. This was the so-called ‘quick fix’. It led to the creation in 1993 of the ‘Open-ended’ GA Working Group on how to proceed, which is still meeting (Winkelmann, 1997, pp. 1–48; see also Hanson, 2004, pp. 3–10). It met more than 30 times in 1994–95 and collected a number of views from interested parties. Most accepted the principle that membership of the UNSC should be expanded, but there was little consensus on exactly how. From the European viewpoint, the most significant development was the rapidly rising discontent of Italy at the German candidature, which Britain and France had seemed to accept as unproblematic. By 1997, Italy had translated its anger at the idea that Germany should acquire the same status as Britain and France, regardless of the fate of other EU members – particularly Italy and Spain – into counter-proposals and an effective campaign among Third World states to prevent such an outcome. The aim was to create a new set of rotating seats, to be elected by the General Assembly, on a regional basis. This would naturally allow middle range powers such as Italy, and presumably Spain, to sit in the UNSC at regular intervals. The prime movers in this campaign were Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini and the Italian Ambassador to the UN, Paolo Fulci, without whose personal energy and lobbying skills Italy would have made much less of an impact (Fulci, 1999, pp. 7–16).10 This is not the place for a critical analysis of the various possibilities for UNSC reform. The central issue here is the attitude of the two permanent European members to the evolving debate. Their original preference was for a rapid German and Japanese accession. This would have spread the responsibilities for international peace and security more evenly among the tier of powers below the US while still leaving Britain and France with a leadership role among the western states, given the continued diffidence of Berlin and Tokyo over military action. They were dismissive of the pretensions of Italy to a more frequent presence in the UNSC, and probably underestimated Rome’s capacity to put together a blocking coalition. After all, at much the same time they had been collusive in excluding Italy from the Contact Group on the Balkans, despite its proximity to the conflicts raging there (Holbrooke, 1999, pp. 136–7). By the time they woke up to the facts it was too late to stop the bandwagon which the Italians had got rolling in the General Assembly.

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Britain and France have on the whole not disagreed significantly on the issue of UNSC reform, given their evident common interests in that particular forum. This applies to the acceptance of more transparent procedures and more effective ties with European efforts at conflict prevention/resolution, as well as to the dispute over membership. Such consensus has been maintained despite the special Franco-German relationship, and the regular difficulties in other areas of Franco-British diplomacy. Indeed, given the stalemate over membership, and the continued existence of the Open-ended Working Group, the focus has inevitably been more on pragmatic measures designed to make the UNSC work better and to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of states. Such a development cannot help but be welcomed in London and Paris as it implies accepting the status quo rather than a major re-evaluation over membership. The United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change dealt with the whole range of problems confronted by the UN, but kept the issue of UNSC reform to the fore (2004; Berdal, 2005). Nonetheless it too took care not to make the membership issue the sole litmus-test of change, giving far more attention to the implementation of UNSC decision making in conjunction with the rest of the international community.11 The Panel offered member states, meeting in New York in autumn 2005, two options, one with new permanent members and one with rotating seats, together with a full review in 2020 – by when European foreign policy might just have evolved closer to the point of envisaging a single seat. It stressed that the veto should neither be repealed for the current P-5 nor extended to new permanent members, which suited Britain and France. Instead the report made sensible suggestions for hemming in the actual use of the veto by making it inapplicable to cases such as genocide and through a round of ‘indicative voting’ to precede the final ballot (2004, paragraphs 244–60). This is a brave attempt to rescue the UNSC membership question from the stalemate into which it has fallen. But the only effect seems to have been to provoke a further round of competing proposals, in particular one from the ‘G4’ of India, Brazil, Japan and Germany. These states have agreed to support each other’s candidatures, and have also called for two permanent African seats. Britain and France are willing to support the G4, but this initiative seems no more likely to succeed than its predecessors (Price, 2005, pp. 8–9). Those with opposing interests, including Italy, have already mobilized and it will be difficult for any proposal to get both a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and

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ratification by two-thirds of the membership including all the permanent members. London and Paris have almost certainly discounted this (im)probability and factored it into their current behaviour – for example, they can afford to make some cheap promises of support to Germany, Japan, and other ‘rising powers’ in the knowledge that the cheque is not likely to be cashed in the near future. In December 2003 the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office presented a paper to Parliament on ‘the UK’s International Priorities’. It contained a more sophisticated analysis than most such public documents, but still found little space to do more than skim over the complexities of UN reform. It asserted that ‘our permanent membership of the Security Council will remain a crucial asset’, and also that ‘the UK will continue to advocate reform. Our priority will be to improve the Council’s ability to act promptly and effectively to maintain international peace and security’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003b, p. 24). In other words, Britain is more concerned with what the UNSC does than with what it looks like, not least because the status quo on membership suits it very well. In a long speech on the UN in September 2004, all that Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had to say about the issue of a larger membership for the UNSC was that: ‘we should be guided not just by a concern for representation, but by a recognition of the responsibilities which membership entails’ (Straw, 2004). By mid-2005, after the publication of the High-Level Panel’s Report, Straw was ready for a clearer commitment – to the inclusion of the G4 as permanent members, plus representation for Africa. Indeed Straw envisaged a Security Council of 25, one more than in the two models put forward by the Panel (Straw, 2005). In its own ‘Report on activities in 2003’, the French Foreign Ministry made plenty of reference to the UNSC, but always in a particular regional context. There is not one reference to the reform of the UNSC, let alone to the issue of membership, in the 68 page long document. By 2005, however, it had come up with a specific, if short, paper – ‘the French position’ – on the reform of the UN. This asserts the importance of reform and applauds the work of Kofi Annan. Like Britain, it stresses the need for a more ‘effective’ UN, but through strengthened ‘authority and legitimacy’ rather than the ‘credibility’ referred to in London. It makes the link to the EU’s increased cooperation with the UN, and to the goal of ‘effective multilateralism’ set out in the EU’s Security Strategy of December 2003. It points out that France had midwifed the first EU military operation, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as a way of supporting the eventual UN action. But only one sentence tackles the

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issue of membership: France supports ‘Security Council enlargement in both categories, permanent and non-permanent members, for the benefit of developed and developing countries’ (Reforming the United Nations). The two big European states have thus moved their positions in response to the serious attempt of the Secretary General finally to get the process of UN reform started. But as big contributors to the UN budget (at a share of 6 per cent each they are fourth equal behind the US, Japan and Germany) they are most concerned to get better value for their money without sacrificing a structural position of influence. They may well succeed in the second goal while failing in the first, which would mean the UN will once again be paralysed by competing interests. But at least they have seen the advantages of no longer standing aloof from their European partners when discussing the issue of UN reform. Both states are now keen to make the two forms of multilateralism, the universal and the regional, complementary where before they tended to be competitive. This is because the legitimization and economies of scale provided by the UN represent a major potential asset in a world where Europe seems ever more vulnerable, whether to terrorist outrages or US hegemony. The reform agenda offers London and Paris a way of taking the strategy of ‘effective multilateralism’ forward, notwithstanding the important differences of emphasis in their respective foreign policies. As Jeffrey Laurenti says, Europeans ‘have an interest in a Security Council that can decide and then implement’ (2005, p. 71).

Conclusions Institutions and roles do make a difference, as a great deal of International Relations scholarship has demonstrated. The fact that Britain and France among EU member states serve as permanent members of the UNSC undoubtedly gives them a distinctive set of preoccupations and creates a fault-line in the CFSP. The converse is also true, in that their positions as embedded and leading players in the EU shape their behaviour in the UNSC, pushing the two together, suggesting links between European foreign policy and the UN, and throwing up occasional sharp tests of obligation and loyalty. The Security Council itself exerts pressures towards conformity which may be at odds with those deriving from EU membership. Then there is the P-5, which despite being barely institutionalized still represents an important inner group which may at times be given priority over EU

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conformity by both Britain and France. And lastly there are the important bilateral ties represented within the UNSC, such as the UK’s leaning towards the US, or France’s historic ties with Russia. These diverging sets of privileged relationships all testify to the importance of institutional frameworks in pulling states in particular directions, and to the fact that differing arenas do generate differing interests. Since ‘multilateralism’ subsumes memberships of multiple groupings it is less a single process than a set of overlapping and cross-cutting obligations. The issue then arises in the particular case of the Europeans in the UNSC, of whether the push to follow the Security Council agenda causes problems for the pull of EU concerns. Is the inherently global focus of the UN in tension with the regional priorities (and capabilities) of the CFSP? The analysis here points towards a two-pronged answer. On the one hand, the status of permanent membership reinforces the backward-looking tendency which has been observed in both British and French foreign policies since the end of the Second World War. On the other, it provides opportunities for constructing new forms of cooperation across the regional and global divide. Continuity is not always synonymous with conservatism, let alone dysfunctionality. It is both inevitable and desirable in life, including foreign policy. It is only when continuity becomes an end in itself, turning into mere nostalgia, that the problems begin. Britain and France are particularly susceptible to this danger, given the importance of historical thinking in both countries, the relatively short time that has elapsed since the loss of empire – and their unchanging status in the UNSC (Hill, 1988). It is arguable that this inability to climb down from the pinnacle of international affairs has not done either country any favours, in that they still spend more time and resources on external policy than other similar states. They have persisted with an identity, or view of themselves, which has fuelled complacency over domestic problems. That is a discussion for another place. Here the main point is about how the role of Britain and France in the UNSC constitutes one part of a package which perpetuates, for good or ill, a sense of national exceptionalism in international affairs. This exceptionalism interferes with processes of Europeanization, at least in the UNSC. As argued above, the possession of nuclear weapons is intimately tied up with the veto power in the UNSC, and neither issue can easily be considered on its merits. The default position is, understandably, to continue the status quo in both aspects for fear of a wider unravelling of national foreign policy. The other side of this exceptionalism, however, is the

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assumption that, despite significant changes in world politics and national positions over the last 60 years, Britain and France should retain a leadership function in the world, whether as part of a westerndominated quasi executive, as in the G8, or (in the French view) in the form of a ‘soft balancing’ towards the US. Whatever the virtues of the Franco-British approach to the UNSC and the question of its reform, it undoubtedly represents a major challenge for EU unity in foreign policy. For one thing, there is the pull towards the global perspective which many of the 25 simply do not have as part of their foreign policy traditions. If Britain or France have entanglements in Africa, the Pacific or the Gulf there will not necessarily be the will elsewhere in the EU to go along with them. Moreover agreement between London and Paris cannot always be taken for granted over such issues, as with Zimbabwe and Iraq. Then there is the capabilities gap: if Britain and France are to be the vanguard of an increased European commitment to peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities around the globe it will make severe demands on financial and military resources when the EU is already stretched to meet existing commitments. The biggest weakness of the ESDP is the unwillingness, or political inability, of member states to increase defence spending, Together the EU states contribute about 38 per cent of the UN’s budget, and just under 7 per cent of the troops and civilian police involved in UN peacekeeping. Given the existing commitments of Britain and France, the two major European powers, and the inherent problems over P-5 states being too heavily involved in UN operations, this is unlikely to change significantly. It is why the EU continues to stress conflict prevention and other forms of soft power. But its humanitarian agenda is equally important, and if the UK and France contemplate further actions under the ‘responsibility to protect’ heading, this will bring the issues of political resistance and limited European capabilities to a head. There is a more positive way of looking at the European connection to the UNSC. Britain and France can be seen as states which have now recovered their confidence after the traumas of decolonisation, and which have significant contributions to make to the building of a more just and orderly international system – indeed, vital contributions given the trough into which post-Soviet Russia has fallen, and the continued political introspection of China. The two European states are relatively rich, stable, and in a class of their own compared even to European analogues such as Italy or Spain, which do not as yet have either the wish or the capacity to project force significantly beyond their borders

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or to act outside the collective European context. Thus London and Paris can provide leadership of the European caucus and stitch together the various complex forms of multilateralism in which the EU member states participate, notably the EU, the UN, the OSCE, the OECD and (variously) the G8. If they are able to achieve German membership of the Security Council, plus rotating membership for other Europeans, this will institutionalize the European G3, or directoire, in foreign policy, while attempting to ensure that the big three do not become detached from their hinterland. Such a vision almost certainly corresponds to the definition of ‘effective multilateralism’ prevalent in Paris and London. Whether such a top-down understanding of a process which by definition is pluralist is practical, or likely to be shared by the other members of the EU, is dubious. Rather more likely as a scenario is a period of continued ferment in both the UN and the EU, with continuing struggles for position and influence. Britain and France are well placed to protect their own interests in both institutions, but they should not imagine that this is the same as promoting collective goals or the institutional consolidation of either organization. While their discourse is that of cooperation tous azimuts, the practice is one of disjointed multilateralism and it is likely to remain so.

Notes 1. France would have vetoed the so-called ‘second’ Anglo-American Resolution over Iraq in 2003, but it was never formally presented. 2. It has been argued that Britain and France had an interest in not raising questions over Russia’s inheritance of the Soviet seat, as they did not wish to stir up a debate about the overall composition of the UNSC (see Bourantonis and Kostakos, 2000). 3. It is revealing that an authoritative survey of EPC in the UN written in 1992 did not even refer to the UNSC, talking instead of voting convergence in the General Assembly (Boselli, 1993, pp. 77–9). 4. Out of the 191 members of the UN by June 2005, there were still 64 which had never served on the UNSC (Wikipedia on-line encyclopaedia, ‘Elected Members of the UN Security Council’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Elected_members_of_the_UN_Security_Council, accessed 25 August 2005). 5. At the press conference after his formal speech. Quentin Peel, Robert Graham, James Harding and Judy Dempsey, ‘How the US set a course for war with Iraq’, Financial Times, 26 May 2003. 6. It should be noted that the Union Foreign Minister-in-waiting, that is High Representative Javier Solana, is already in close touch with both the European permanent members of the UNSC and Secretary General Kofi Annan. This represents a significant change in links with the EU over the situation in the 1990s.

The European Powers in the Security Council 69 7. Quoted in Quentin Peel, ‘A Breach in the Entente Cordiale’, Financial Times, 30 October 2002. 8. Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, in a talk to the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, 4 February 2005. 9. See http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5.asp; http://www.elysee.fr/ elysee/francais/bienvenue_a_1_elysee.2.html (accessed 13 September 2005). Ironically, the bilateral Franco-British summits produced not only much talk of cooperation between the two states, but also more references to the EU than in the UN-focused speeches. Like horses for courses, it is a matter of speeches for places. 10. See also Lamberto Dini, ‘L’ONU è invecchiata: Roma può aiutarla’ [The UN has aged: Rome can help her], in Corriere della Sera, 3 December 1997, in which he talked of a ‘harsh’ but necessary dispute, even between traditional friends and allies on the future of the UNSC. 11. It should be noted, however, that the report devoted only 16 paragraphs out of 300 to the UNSC.

4 Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN Katie Verlin Laatikainen

For decades, a group of countries known as middle powers have sought to bolster United Nations capacity for collective action. The Nordic countries as well as the Netherlands are among the best-known middle powers, like-minded about making multilateralism matter long before the EU sought to craft a common policy at the UN. Middle powers are bridge-builders and consensus-seeking interlocutors seeking to embed multilateral solutions across a range of UN activities. This traditional middle power role has conferred greater legitimacy and influence on these states within the UN context than their modest size and power might otherwise suggest. This chapter assesses the tradition of middle power diplomacy within the UN with a special emphasis on Dutch and Nordic middle power roles. The chapter then explores the ‘Europeanization’ of middle power diplomacy and the impact that EU multilateralism has had on the practice of middle power diplomacy for EU and non-EU middle powers. While the EU’s embrace of multilateralism and support for the UN appear to be compatible with the traditions of middle power multilateral diplomacy, the chapter concludes with an examination of some of the constraints that the EU faces in its embrace of effective multilateralism.

Middle power diplomacy at the UN Middle powers have been strategically important and they enjoy a great deal of credibility within the UN. Interestingly, it is easier to identify middle powers than it has been to define the concept. Traditional middle powers are widely understood to include countries such as Canada, Australia, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), the Netherlands and New Zealand. Non-Western 70

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middle powers include countries such as Brazil and India. But what exactly is a middle power? As the very name ‘middle power’ implies, there is a connotation related to the structural division of power in the international system. The earliest definitions of middlepowerdom rested upon a typology of great powers, middle powers, and small powers based upon capabilities to act and influence others in the international sphere. While the notion of great power or even superpower remains widely used, the other two categories have been rife with operational difficulties, and the structural approach to defining middle powers has been largely abandoned. This type of structural definition, as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal contend, ‘has its problems, particularly its dependence on quantifiable measures of power, but it does satisfy the intuitive desire to differentiate between those states which are clearly not great powers but are not minor powers either’ (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 17). Other conceptualizations of middle power based on geographical location have not withstood critical scrutiny and there has been little consensus on what the term means in the broader sweep of international relations. Nonetheless, while scholars have not agreed on the utility of the concept in international relations more generally, it is a commonly used concept among observers of UN politics. The middle power approach is unmistakably Canadian in origin and from the outset it was related to the UN system. Ravenhill notes that ‘only the persistent Canadian claims to middle power status after 1945 popularized the concept’ when Canadians argued for a special status for middle powers at the San Francisco conference based upon the normative approach that middle powers took toward multilateralism (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 309). Unlike smaller powers that were exposed and vulnerable, middle powers had options, and they chose to pursue a multilateralism reflective of the ideals of liberal internationalism. Middle powers in this way are seen as more virtuous and wiser than superpowers or lesser powers because they struggle to make the world more peaceful. ‘Because of this, countries located “in the middle” are portrayed as taking their responsibilities to the creation and maintenance of global order seriously; indeed, they have as a result appeared often less selfish than other states’ (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 18). As Gene Lyons has described, middle powers ‘do not pose a threat to weaker countries, they can run interference for stronger countries whose support for certain policies might be viewed suspiciously as a move for self-aggrandizement, and they can usually provide material and human resources that are required to implement operating programs’ (Lyons,

72 Katie Verlin Laatikainen

1995, p. 267). During the Cold War, middle powers served as mediators between the ideologically divided Soviet Union and United States as well as between the newly decolonized South and their wealthier peers in the North. Within UN politics, middle power diplomacy is perhaps best defined as a mode of statecraft rather than a particular ideological or philosophical position in world politics. Cooper et al. focus on a particular behavioural definition of middle power multilateralism that was first championed by John Holmes. ‘According to this approach, middle powers are defined primarily by their behaviour: their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their diplomacy’ (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 19). A prominent characteristic of middle powers is their commitment to strengthening the global institutional order that provides them – and others – with greater common security. This has been manifest in middle power support for multilateralism. In the post-Cold War era, middle power behaviour has become more multifaceted. By the mid-1990s, ‘middle power leadership and initiative-taking have been based on non-structural forms of power and influence associated with the imaginative and energetic use of their diplomatic capabilities’ (Cooper et al., 1993, pp. 23–4). Middle power diplomacy in this sense is understood to be a method of interaction rather than a position in the international distribution of power – a distinction which might even have relevance for the European Union. The European middle powers Neither as powerful as the superpowers during the Cold War nor as capable as the US in the twenty-first century, even the most powerful European states would be considered middle powers on the world stage under a structural definition of the term. But within the UN, Britain and France have permanent seats and veto power within the UN Security Council and hence qualify as the equals of the superpowers in this context. German aspirations to join permanent members of the Security Council suggests something greater than a middle power, even if Germany is not yet among the P-5 (permanent five) members of the Security Council. Spain and Italy are certainly among the more powerful European states if their voting weights in the EU’s Council of Ministers are any indication, but behaviourally they have not been as active in UN politics. They are not usually perceived by UN observers to be amongst the middle power group.

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There are several candidates for UN middle power status among the EU-15. The neutrals, such as Austria and Ireland, were deeply involved in peace-keeping during the Cold War when their neutral security status uniquely qualified them to serve as impartial peacekeepers trusted by both the Soviets and the West. Others such as Luxembourg have been generous donors of development assistance and have met or exceeded the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI devoted to aid. Spain has a fairly high profile in the area of international law. Many of the EU-15 are candidates for ‘niche’ middle power roles because in one way or another they have supported multilateral policies at the UN.1 However, much the same could be said of any member state at the UN – even the famously ambivalent US supports UN action in a few areas such as democracy promotion. If every country can be included in the behavioural definition of middlepowerdom, then the concept does not have much utility. A more stringent definition for inclusion into the middle power club, and one that is consistent with the traditional understanding of middle power diplomacy, would require actively supporting multilateralism across a broad range of UN activities. As a consequence, only a handful of European states qualify for inclusion into this club of ‘like-minded’ states: the Netherlands and the Nordic countries are foremost among the so-called good guys club which also includes Canada and Australia. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands have been activists at the UN in brokering compromise, seeking consensus, and supporting UN efforts across the full range of UN policy, including those covered in this volume: the Dutch and the Nordics are frequent troop contributors for peacekeeping operations as well as innovators in the areas of peace-building and civilian police functions; they have for many years met or exceeded the UN development assistance targets; they have been ardent promoters of human rights protections within the UN system; and they have enthusiastically embraced and integrated the concept of ‘sustainable development.’ While the EU declared its intention to make multilateralism (and the UN) matter only in the last few years, these middle powers have sought to do so for decades. The Dutch tradition of middle power diplomacy The Dutch approach to middle power diplomacy in UN politics must be read through the prism of the twentieth century Dutch history. The Dutch have simultaneous global, Atlanticist and European orientations in their foreign policy. At the century’s start, the Netherlands became synonymous with international law as the International Court of Justice

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was established in The Hague. A preference for international law and organization was evident from that point on, and the Dutch were active in the League of Nations. However, the experience of the Second World War and the German occupation injected a sense of insecurity about international organizations, and the Dutch in their own security policy embraced an ‘Atlanticist’ orientation by joining NATO’s regional defence community and created enduring links with the US. As Roel Janssen notes, ‘Keeping a balanced distance from the larger European countries has roots going back to the 17th century’ ( Janssen, 1995, p. 38). But this approach was ill suited to the post-war integration efforts that were seen as critical in preventing another European war. So added to the global and Atlanticist orientations was a commitment to foster regional European integration. For most of the Cold War period, then, the Netherlands pursued UN multilateralism to reduce tensions on the global level; in their own neighbourhood they fostered regional integrative efforts while sheltering under the umbrella of American security supplied via NATO. The Netherlands’ global approach can best be termed liberal both economically and politically. Dutch commercial power was at its height in the seventeenth century, but a proclivity for trade persists and the Netherlands has consistently supported the growth of multilateral free trade internationally through GATT (and later the WTO) while supporting market access for developing countries. The Netherlands was also a noted champion of human rights. Norwegian diplomat Jan Egelund remarked that ‘The Netherlands has probably become the most effective human rights advocate today’ (Egeland, 1984, p. 210). Known for their tradition of tolerance, the Netherlands has sought to promote humanism and human rights in an era of rapidly advancing globalization. At the same time, the Dutch favoured extensive aid to developing and newly independent nations to integrate those societies into the international system. High expenditures on development aid are publicly supported in the Netherlands and the Dutch are proud of the quality of their aid with its high proportion of soft loans and grant components. Dutch blue helmets have served in some of the most challenging peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, such as in Srebrenica and Kosovo. Dutch diplomats have frequently been found at the highest levels of the UN Secretariat, Ruud Lubbers being a poor but prominent recent example. Observers of Dutch foreign policy highlight three constants in Dutch foreign policy: maritime commercialism, pacifism and neutrality and international idealism (Voorhoeve, 1979). These substantive

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orientations may come into conflict with one another, but Kleistra and Mayer suggest that the Netherlands ‘traditionally plays two roles on the international stage: as a Calvinist minister and as a salesman. In most cases the two roles are combined pragmatically and this results in a carefully negotiated historical compromise and thereby continuity’ (Kleistra and Mayer, 2001). In other cases, however, there may be a dichotomy between bilateral and multilateral policy in which either the Dutch minister or the Dutch salesman prevails. Baehr, CastermansHolleman and Grünfeld have reservations about the Dutch middle power reputation (presumably represented by the minister persona) when they note, for instance, in meetings of the UN Commission on Human Rights it is human rights that have the central focus of attention of the Netherlands and other countries. In bilateral relations, human rights have always had to compete with other objectives of foreign policy such as the protection of national security and promotion of economic relations. This may help explain the good reputation of the Dutch in the field of human rights at the United Nations (Baehr et al., 2002, p. 994, italics added).

The Nordic tradition of middle power diplomacy That the Nordics have been deeply committed to the success of multilateral cooperation on the global level is clear to even the most casual observer of the UN. The first two Secretary Generals of the organization, Norway’s Trygve Lie and Sweden’s Dag Hammarskjöld, were Nordic. Since the late 1970s, Nordic citizens have accounted for about 10 per cent of all executive leadership positions at the UN, including Special Representatives and Assistant/Under-Secretary Generals (Hansen, 1991). In all of the areas of middle power diplomacy, the Nordic countries have a high profile (Resnick, 1995, pp. 34–40). For example, the Nordic countries are among the most prominent contributors to the specialized agencies and programmes; they have long supported international and multilateral efforts to ensure international peace and security, and during the Cold War Nordic forces made up 25 per cent of all peacekeeping operations; and the Nordic countries were among the earliest advocates of environmentalism, and the first UN environmental conference was held in Stockholm in 1972. Despite their varying regional affiliations in NATO and the European Community, in the UN the Nordic middle powers displayed a unique

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approach to multilateralism. For decades the Nordic countries sought to present a common Nordic position on a variety of issues across the UN agenda. While the positions of most middle powers are remarkably similar, the Nordics were unique for the level of integration that they exhibited in their foreign policies toward the UN (see especially Andrén, 1967 in the special edition of Cooperation and Conflict devoted to Nordic integration). They looked first to one another in collaborating and negotiations. This system of cooperation evolved over three decades and was so effective that observers thought of this group of countries as the Nordic group. Any mention of middle powers invariably included the Nordic countries – as Nordic countries, not individual states. Between 1983 and 2004, there were nearly 750 joint Nordic statements presented within the various bodies of the UN, most notably the General Assembly (see Table 4.2), while about 10 per cent of these were in Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).2 Nordic statements to the Security Council occurred much more rarely. The positions taken by the Nordics and other middle powers are quite similar, and voting cohesion3 between the Nordics and the Netherlands for instance exceeds that of EU cohesion and hovers around 90 per cent.4 While middle powers cooperated with one another, the Nordic countries coordinated in a degree matched only by the EU presently. The extensive interaction of Nordic foreign ministries before and during UN sessions meant that substantial national differences were smoothed over. The Nordics did not employ a rotating presidency as the EU does; rather, each Nordic state would speak on its own behalf, and the country designated as lead on that particular agenda item would rise and speak on behalf the Nordic states, with each Nordic state being named.5 While there is considerable harmony of interest among the Nordics in a wide range of areas, disagreements did occur and national perspectives often prevailed. Nonetheless, an identifiable Nordic identity emerged among the middle powers and this group identity became the central characteristic of the foreign policies of these countries at the UN. The Nordic countries worked out a system of mutual support for election to leadership and limited membership bodies of the UN system which enabled the Nordic countries to be present in nearly every body and to disseminate a Nordic position. The sum effect of these arrangements was extensive representation on a ‘Nordic’ basis for even if only one of them were present in a particular body, frequent and institutionalized consultations across all levels of the foreign ministries ensured that all were on the same page. This collaborative process created relationships and practices that extended into new areas as the UN agenda evolved.

Pushing Soft Power 77

The practice of consultation, harmonization and coordination of Nordic policies within the UN became the norm. The ease and automatic nature of consulting Nordic colleagues was described by one Nordic delegate as ‘as natural as breathing’.6 Finally, the Nordic middle power identity that developed within the context of the UN was based on being distinct from the rest of the West (or North). The role that the Nordics occupied was that of neutral bridgebuilders and mediators separate from all others in the industrialized world; in geo-political terms the Nordics were bridge-builders between East and West during the Cold War, and in geo-economic terms they mediated between the North and South during the divisive international economic debates of the 1970s. While the Netherlands could be included among the ‘like-minded’ in the latter global divide, they were certainly firmly planted in the West in the East–West conflict. The Nordics stood apart, even though three were part of that most Western of organizations, NATO.7 Fundamentally, while the Nordic states have exemplified western values – a commitment to democracy, a free market economy, rule of law – their effectiveness and reputation within the UN have rested on a perception of the Nordics as being different from the rest of the West (or North). Metzger and Piasecki found that ‘observers were united in their opinion that member states’ perception of the Nordic states as honest brokers, committed multilateralists, and even “model member states” was the Nordics’ greatest political asset’ (Metzger and Piasecki, 1991, p. 2). The perceived distinction between the Nordics and the rest of the North (or West) in the UN, their bridge-building and honest-broker role, their international pursuit of a just, secure world in which poverty is eliminated, reflects a particular Nordic self-understanding. Of course there are important differences between the Scandinavian states, but the sense of being part of an exceptional family of nations is apparent throughout the region. As Ole Waever succinctly puts it, ‘Nordic identity is about being better than Europe’ (cited in Lawler, 1997, p. 571).

The Europeanization of middle power diplomacy In 2003, the European Commission produced a report on the UN which proclaimed that the EU had made a ‘choice of multilateralism’ (European Commission, 2003; see also European Council, 2003a). A few months later the EU published its first security strategy which stated that the EU’s premier foreign policy objective is to bolster multilateralism generally and the UN in particular. Thus, the EU has professed a

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commitment to multilateralism, peacekeeping and peace-making as well as the promotion of social and human development. The EU appears to be making a serious, concerted effort to pool the influence of member states to make a difference at the UN. To do so requires extensive coordination practices that have been detailed elsewhere in this volume. It is important to note however that these efforts are having an impact. As the table in Chapter 1 revealed, there has been considerable growth in EU voting cohesion across the UN General Assembly. This embrace of effective multilateralism and the growth of the EU role within the UN had a dramatic impact on the traditions of middle power diplomacy. The Europeanization of the Nordic middle powers The impact of the EU’s effort to speak with one voice is most apparent for the Nordic middle powers because they had such a well-developed coordination process with considerable output in terms of voting cohesion, joint statements and co-sponsored resolutions. During accession negotiations, Finland, Sweden and Norway insisted that they would continue traditional Nordic cooperation (Stenbäck, 1995, pp. 4–9).8 But a survey undertaken by the Nordic Council of Ministers after Finnish and Swedish membership recognized that Nordic cooperation ‘should continue and become closer where this is feasible. … However, the EU’s aim of maintaining a common EU leadership leaves less scope for joint Nordic action’ (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). The Nordic position within the UN was a clear casualty of the growing effort by the EU in the late 1990s to have a single voice within the UN. The Nordics have not radically altered their beliefs or positions, and their voting cohesion across the UN agenda has not fallen below 85 per cent despite the expansion of Nordic-EU membership as Table 4.1 shows. However, these positions are no longer seen or are presented as Nordic. While Nordic cohesion is high, it exists now under the guise of Europeanization. Even non-EU Nordic states get caught in the EU slipstream within UN debates as Iceland and Norway frequently associate themselves with EU Presidency statements. More visible outputs of a joint Nordic approach within the UN have declined. The Nordic countries have not had a single joint statement in ECOSOC since the 1995 Nordic accession whereas in the period 1983–94 there were more than 70. As Table 4.2 shows, the number of joint Nordic statements and documents fell from more than 50 in the General Assembly and its main committees in the years before expanded Nordic membership of the EU in 1995 to ten or fewer in recent years.

87.6 (64)

Denmark

Overall Cohesion

93.2 (69)

100 (74) 94.6 (70) 100 (74) 98.6 (73) 97.3 (71)

(74)

(63)

85.7 (54)

98.4 (62) 92.0 (58) 98.4 (62) 98.4 (62) 92.0 (58) 87.3 (55)

100 (63) 95.2 (60) 95.2 (60) 96.8 (61) 93.7 (59)

(63)

(64)

89.0 (57)

96.9 (62) 96.9 (62) 100 (64) 98.4 (63) 93.8 (60)

(73)

84.9 (62)

98.6 (72) 97.3 (71) 98.6 (72) 95.9 (70) 94.5 (69)

(69)

86.9 (60)

98.5 (68) 100 (69) 100 (69) 92.7 (64) 92.7 (64) 86.9 (53)

100 (61) 95.9 (58) 96.7 (59) 98.3 (60) 96.7 (59)

(61)

91.3 (63)

100 (68) 98.6 (68) 98.6 (68) 95.6 (66) 95.6 (66)

(69)

94.0 (63)

100 (67) 97.0 (61) 100 (67) 98.5 (66) 98.5 (66)

(67)

(67)

89.6 (60)

98.5 (66) 95.5 (68) 100 (67) 98.5 (66) 94.0 (63)

(73)

90.4 (66)

98.6 (72) 95.9 (69) 100 (73) 98.6 (72) 93.2 (68)

Source: UN Index to Proceedings, 1990–2003.

Notes: * The overall cohesion score reflects the percentage of votes in which all Nordics voted the same way. National figures reflect the number of votes in which a country voted with the Nordic majority. When two Nordic countries dissented on the same vote, this was only counted as a single noncompliant vote in the overall cohesion score. Non-votes by member states were counted as non-compliant. The figures within brackets refer to the actual no. of votes.

Sweden

Norway

Iceland

Finland

(73)

97.3 (71) 90.4 (66) 98.6 (72) 98.6 (72) 94.5 (69)

Total no. of Votes

1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 46th 47th 48th 49th 52nd 51st 52nd 53rd 54th 55th 56th 57th Session Session Session Session Session Session Session Session Session Session Session Session

Table 4.1 Nordic cohesion* on Roll-Call Votes in the General Assembly (%)

79

12

42

GA Plenary

Total

61

10

3

7

16

2

7

14

2

55

11

3

11

19

1

6

2

2

50

4

–

7

20

4

6

8

1

48

15

–

10

7

2

11

3

0

5

1

–

3

0

0

1

0

0

Source: UN Index to Proceedings 1990–2000; UNBISNET 1990–2004.

Note: * The Special Political Committee was disbanded after 1933.

3

5

5

1

5

10

1

Special Political Committee*

6th Committee/ Legal

5th Committee/ Administration and Budget

4th Committee/ Special Political & Decolonization

3rd Committee/ Social, Humanitarian and Cultural

2nd Committee/ Economic and Financial

1st Committee/ Disarmament and Int’l Security

5

0

–

4

0

0

1

0

0

6

1

–

3

0

0

2

0

0

9

3

–

4

0

0

2

0

0

8

0

–

6

0

0

2

0

0

2

0

–

1

0

0

1

0

0

9

2

–

5

0

0

2

0

0

6

0

–

4

0

0

2

0

0

10

0

–

9

0

0

1

0

0

1990–91 1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2003–04 2004–05

Table 4.2 Joint Nordic statements before the UN General Assembly and its Main Committees, 1990–2005

80

Pushing Soft Power 81

The decline in joint Nordic statements is most notable in the Third and Fifth Committees of the General Assembly. These are precisely the committees in which the EU is increasingly active in presenting a common position (Laatikainen, 2004). In the Third Committee for instance, the Nordics present a common position only on issues where there is no common EU position, such as on the rights of indigenous peoples. Overall, common Nordic positions on a range of issues have been undermined by the growth of common EU positions. The Nordics now only present a common position on issues in which there is little chance of EU consensus or where the EU remains less active. For instance, the Nordic countries individually continue to champion nuclear disarmament while the EU position on nuclear disarmament is constrained by the UK and France. In recent years the Nordic countries have had a common position on Security Council and UN reform and have spoken jointly on these topics before the General Assembly as well as during the 2005 deliberations on UN reform. The Europeanization of Dutch middle power diplomacy Simultaneous to the EU’s effort to begin coordinating member state policies at the UN, the Netherlands reassessed its foreign policy in the mid-1990s, which culminated in a greater emphasis on ‘enlightened selfinterest’. Janssen notes that the Netherlands would incorporate a stronger sense of national interest in the formulation of policy: ‘Instead of preaching moral principles in foreign relations, more attention will be given to economic and national interest. It may sound incredible for outsiders, but the very notion that foreign relations should be an expression of national interests came as the biggest political challenge’ (Janssen, 1995, p. 39). In 1995, the Dutch visited China, and while they mentioned human rights in their bilateral talks, the mission included a large contingent of bankers and business people. The ‘minister’ has given way to the ‘merchant’ in Dutch policy: moral sentiments would become the provenance of EU statements. The impact of the EU on middle power diplomacy appears to be less acute overall for the Dutch than it is for the other EU middle powers. Indeed, the middle power role was worn more lightly by the Dutch than by the Nordics. With their colonial history and long association with European integration, Dutch foreign policy was not as dominated by the UN sphere as it was for some of the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, one Dutch diplomat interviewed expressed some frustration with the EU emphasis on the Presidency speaking on behalf of all members: Middle powers usually say the same things, but they said it in their national capacities. This advertised the middle power position in

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UN debates. What the EU does is speak in a single voice, and often if an EU representative speaks, no one else speaks in their national capacity [which may weaken the EU position]. … Another problem the EU has is the nature of what is said. Because it involves consensus among 25 states that are not so like-minded, EU positions are often watered down. There are few crisp, strong statements that could really send a message or take a bold stand. Middle powers could [traditionally] take more strongly worded stands.9 Finally, the Dutch along with the Nordics have sought to protect those areas of middle power dominance where the EU has not managed to act or contribute authoritatively. For instance, because they are among the most significant contributors to the specialized agencies and funds devoted to development, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries have opposed EU common policies in those areas because not all EU member states have met the target of 0.7 per cent of GNI devoted to development assistance. While the EU in 2005 committed to having all member states reach this target by 2015, the Dutch and the Nordics continue to pursue traditional middle power diplomacy in those contexts until all EU member states meet the target. Europeanization of other middle powers Europeanization has usurped Nordic processes of coordination and middle powers’ policies have become part of EU multilateralism. In addition however, there has been an external element to this Europeanization and the EU’s effort to speak with one voice has enmeshed even non-EU middle powers. The response to EU multilateralism by other middle power states is decidedly mixed. Perhaps the most difficult adjustment has been required of the Nordic middle powers that remain outside the EU. The Norwegians initially struggled to find a new mode of operating within the UN when the Nordic coordination system was abandoned in 1995. Former Nordic partners now have considerably busier schedules, and Norwegians remarked that the biggest struggle was getting information and having influence on European policy-making. Norwegian diplomats now spend more time caucasing with non-EU middle powers such as the Canadians.10 Most often, however, the Norwegians work with the EU and associate themselves with EU statements. Norway does not have a place at the EU negotiating table, but as one Norwegian diplomat noted, ‘this is a situation we in Norway have chosen’. There is a missing tool in the Norwegian foreign policy toolbox: ‘We can write wonderful

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speeches, and we do. But does it lead anywhere?’ The answer for Norwegians seems to be that it does not lead anywhere unless it is connected to the EU. In general, the Norwegians are supportive of the EU’s efforts at the UN, suggesting that ‘it is good for the EU and it is good for the UN’. Norwegian diplomats would prefer a little more transparency in the EU deliberation process, but caution that this is still a relatively new process for the EU, one with which they seem proud to associate. Non-European middle powers tend to be more critical of the EU’s impact on middle power diplomacy. There is a keen awareness among the non-European middle powers of the growing size and importance of the EU that comes at the cost of their own tradition of middle power diplomacy. One delegate to the UN from Eastern Europe noted the traditional middle power mediating role has been undermined by the EU: ‘The EU is more consolidated and integrated. There is a clear disappearance of the Nordic bloc, and Norway, standing alone, is no match for the EU.’ Another non-EU diplomat acknowledged that the EU had taken on an enlightened approach reminiscent of middle power diplomacy, but that The EU dominates the UN system in a way middle powers never did. … If there were a pure expression of middle power left it would be New Zealand. But even New Zealand has something like 100 per cent voting agreement with the EU. So middle powers have been pushed aside by the EU. Even Norway gets swept up into that because her Nordic neighbours are now EU members. It is hard to make a name for one’s national approach by following the middle power path. In the UN system of regional memberships that are used for elections to leadership positions and limited membership bodies in the UN, the EU is increasingly dominating the regional Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG). A non-EU middle power diplomat expressed frustration at EU dominance of WEOG and supported reform of the regional groups because non-EU members had a difficult time overcoming united European actions and the electoral group was ‘too preponderantly European’. Several non-EU middle powers supported an initiative of the High-Level Panel to reallocate the regional groupings to fit the new realities of regional politics. The effort failed for a variety of reasons, but the reality is that it leaves the EU with extensive influence over at least two regional blocs within the UN.11

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Middle powers, particularly the Nordic group, have been deeply affected by the EU’s effort to craft a single voice at the UN. The ranks of middle powers have been thinned considerably as several have been drawn into the EU’s orbit. One non-EU middle power diplomat noted with dismay that In the past, there were a dozen or so potential countries to seek out to promote a middle power agenda. Canada and Australia were very active with a number of states that are now trapped within the EU process. So that has disappeared. There is no common agenda building with the EU (by outsiders). Instead, the EU negotiate amongst themselves and present the EU position as a fait accompli – take it or leave it. It is therefore hard to be a bridgebuilder when you are not involved in the debate. What we find is that the EU reaches out to other blocs – the G-77, the African bloc – and leaves other like-minded countries behind.

Compatibility of EU multilateralism and middle power diplomacy The key components of middlepowerdom include multilateralism, compromise presumably through consensus, and a pre-disposition to emphasize shared normative values rather than narrow national interests. From EU positions and early efforts to define its profile, the EU indeed appears to seek an identity that is not based upon power as traditionally defined. In practical terms, this involves distinguishing the EU from the US within UN politics. An aversion to power, or the notion of EU civilian or normative power, is consistent with the practices of the middle powers (on civilian power, see Duchêne, 1973; on normative power, see Manners, 2002). Schirm sees this approach as more viable than one in which the EU develops military or traditional defence policy strengths because it ‘reflects the character of the Union as an organization promoting stability and wealth through the management of interdependence’ (Schirm, 1998, p. 79). Middle powers have traditionally premised their mediation efforts on the recognition of interdependence. Additionally, the normative orientation attributed to middle powers is emphasized by EU diplomats as Knud Erik Jørgensen details in this volume (Chapter 10). The EU has been called a ‘community of values’ rather than a state-like actor: foreign policy then is an externalization of

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the values that have developed in the European integration process (Richardson, 2002). These values are not the result of balancing of interests among member states but an expression of ‘fundamental values’ such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights, open market economics, social solidarity, environmental and economic sustainability, and respect for cultural diversity. In this perspective, EU foreign policy is essentially about values, while member states may continue to have realpolitik interests. These values often dictate EU policy in the UN as in its support for the International Criminal Court, increasing activity in the Third Committee, support for the WTO, support for development and humanitarian assistance, enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol, and sympathy to the Culture of Peace project. This value orientation is consistent with ‘normative power’ (see Manners, 2002). This normative orientation shares with the middle power tradition a rejection of realpolitik or the use of coercive foreign policy instruments. The Europeans in the EU appear to be crafting a presence in the UN which in substantive ways is similar to the middle power precepts (Laatikainen, 2003). It is clear that middle power statecraft could easily apply to the EU; while Cooper and others have conceptualized middle powers to apply to the behaviour of individual states, they note that a state-centred analysis ‘does not exhaust the potential for alternative types of niche-building diplomacy in the post-Cold War era’ (Cooper, 1997, p. 20). The EU’s commitment to creating and maintaining international order certainly applies, as does the idea of ‘good international citizenship’. In the post-Cold War era, the middle powers may be less visible in international relations and in fact there may be less of a need for a balancing bloc of small, neutral, wealthy countries within the UN to play a bridge-building role. While less visible, middle powers may in fact be more influential as the values that they have traditionally promoted find resonance in EU common policies in the world body. Several Nordic diplomats insist that their core values have not changed with EU membership. Rather than adjusting their policies toward some European position, it is common for Nordic diplomats at the UN to note that ‘Europe has become more Nordic’. This is precisely the prescription of Göran Therborn (1997) whose ‘Scandinavian Europe’ would promote human rights and democracy within the UN. Middle powers were always respected for the positions and principles that they held, but as Metzger and Piasecki have noted, they were criticized for having very little influence in convincing more powerful countries to invest in multilateral solutions. Middle power multilateral principles may gain

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greater currency as the middle power role wanes within the UN. As one Swedish diplomat reflected, ‘There is still a need for bridge-building in the UN, and perhaps Sweden can lead Europe there’. But will the EU be any more successful than the middle powers at generating broader support for multilateralism and the UN? Incompatibilities: too powerful and too ambitious for middle power credibility Ravenhill and others have identified the attributes that contribute to middle power credibility: middle powers have strong diplomatic capabilities; they lead not by force of authority but by the force of ideas; they build coalitions of like-minded countries; and their credibility is based in part on their relative weakness and disinterestedness in the issues at hand. These attributes of middle power diplomacy ‘provide a plausible means of distinguishing middle powers from both small powers and superpowers’ (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 313). How effective can the EU be as it embraces middle power multilateralism within the UN? The EU certainly fulfils the first criterion of middle power multilateralism and has extensive diplomatic capacity. Overall, there are more than 40,000 EU diplomats around the world and more than 1500 diplomatic missions (Cameron, 2004). All member states maintain their own missions to the UN as does the European Commission, while the Council Secretariat provides important diplomatic support in New York. The ability to mobilize 25 missions to support a particular policy in a forum of 191 member states should not be underestimated. However, there are some real challenges for EU multilateralism to reflect the normative middle power approach to multilateralism. One such challenge is to create coalitions of like-minded states. As the EU is so pervasive among the wealthy, industrialized democracies within the UN, there are not very many choices for building coalitions because many like-minded countries have been either subsumed by EU membership or alienated by the pervasive power of the EU in the deliberative process. Given the similarity of values between the EU and the US and industrial democracies, it is likely that the like-minded partners might include great powers or even the hyper-power itself. The community of (universal) values shared by the members of the powerful West may in fact impede broader coalition-building within the UN that is typical of traditional middle powers. For instance, middle powers traditionally often seek partners from other regions. A good example of this is the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). Promoted by Sweden, the NAC includes

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more than a dozen countries such as Mexico and South Africa that have agreed to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament agenda. Individual middle powers have an ability to foster these sorts of collaborations, while EU preponderance may impede them. Nor does the EU exhibit the sort of entrepreneurial diplomacy characteristic of middle power diplomacy. Whereas middle powers were flexible in framing the debate in order to bring divergent states together in consensus, the EU notably lacks this flexibility. The EU-25 work so hard to come to consensus that they are inflexible negotiators. One diplomat described a lumbering colossus with good intentions which, when it moved at all, it ‘lurched’ because it could not take the calibrated steps that successful negotiations require: ‘They can’t negotiate so they capitulate’. This inflexibility will impair the EU’s ability to foster effective multilateralism. Structurally, the power and influence of the EU is growing within the UN. While Cooper and others have rejected a structural definition of middle power diplomacy, it is not irrelevant. The relative weakness of middle powers is central to their credibility as interlocutors, but the EU is not weak within the UN. The EU dominates WEOG, and with the accession of eight members from Central and Eastern Europe, the influence of coordinated EU policy within the UN expands to the Eastern Europe Group (EEG). Indeed, Lithuania lobbied to be transferred to WEOG in order to cut associations with others from the defunct Soviet bloc. The EU opposed such a change. These regional UN groups may not be important politically for caucasing purposes, but they do matter administratively within the UN because they influence candidacies for leadership positions within the UN and determine representation on limited membership bodies such as the Security Council, ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights. This tremendous influence over outcomes undermines the typical middle power role of mediation. Another indication that the EU reflects great power modalities rather than middle power modesty is the financial clout that the EU brings to bear. In aggregate, the EU is the largest financial contributor to UN operations, with the EC alone providing more than 300 million euro annually to the UN budget. The EU and its member states provide the majority of global development assistance. Given the importance that the EU places on good governance and democratic conditionality in aid channelled through the UN Development Programme, the EU’s ‘disinterestedness’ is called into question. In the past middle powers were generous in their aid programmes, but not nearly as dominant as the EU is today. This is a real and important source of structural power.

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If the EU’s intention is to rally support for multilateralism and the UN, then the mode in which it conducts its diplomacy is at odds with the traditions of middle power diplomacy. Whereas middle powers in the past sought to mediate between antagonistic blocs by building broad-based coalitions of individual states that would commit to common action, the EU’s approach tends to be the reverse. The EU negotiates only amongst itself and creates a common position which it presents to other blocs such as the G-77. EU diplomacy introduces rigidity into diplomatic negotiations by promoting such inter-bloc negotiations instead of cultivating the commitment of individual member states to multilateral action. This tends to discount the importance of ‘small states’, even those that might be like-minded middle powers. Again and again, non-EU middle powers objected to not being able to participate in internal EU negotiations. As a non-EU diplomat described it, The EU approach reduces the value and visibility of [my own country] because we are not involved. So we have looked for alternatives but they are only marginally successful. … I don’t want to say we are implacably against the EU in the UN. We do cooperate with the EU on some issues, but this is really based on the EU’s agenda. We mostly end up supporting their agenda. Said another: The EU is effective at promoting itself, but I don’t know whether this is good for the UN. One problem is that when the EU speaks on behalf of all, there are fewer voices reflecting similar liberal values. Perhaps the most damning limitation on the EU embracing middle power multilateralism is the disconnect between the universalistic values and principles approach that the EU espouses and the middle power means of consensus-building. There is no doubt that the EU can build consensus because its foreign policy is premised upon building consensus among its 25 members. However, the values and principles underpinning this approach are largely shared among the Europeans and those in the West more generally. But within the broader confines of the UN with all its cultural diversity, a process of consensus-building at least as related to promoting values is problematic. Middle powers generally attempt to build consensus diplomatically through compromise. However, if the objective of the EU’s foreign policy is

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broader embrace of the universal values and principles that Europeans hold dear, then how is compromise possible? Compromising on fundamental, universal values would undermine the credibility of the EU’s normative approach. One does not compromise on values and principles. Traditional middle powers were deemed as moral actors for what they did – the EU’s ‘values diplomacy’ suggests that Europe’s normative power stems from what Europeans believe. In the end, the EU’s embrace of a values-based foreign policy is not matched by appropriate means. The middle power mode of diplomacy is inconsistent with the absolutist values orientation of EU policy at the UN. The modest, middle power multilateralism as the EU’s mode of statecraft is not matched by the bounded interests typical of middle powers.

Conclusion This chapter has suggested that the growth of EU foreign policy at the UN has overshadowed the tradition of middle power multilateralism. Among all the EU states examined in this book, the middle powers should feel the most comfortable with the EU’s embrace of the UN and effective multilateralism. Substantively the nascent EU approach to the UN is consistent with middle power diplomacy, and both the Nordics and the Netherlands have supported the EU embrace of multilateralism. Because of this, these middle powers have had a fairly easy time transitioning from middle power diplomacy at the UN to the EU coordination process. Ultimately, however, the EU may prove to be less effective at fostering support for UN multilateralism than traditional middle powers. Middle powers are states that engage in cooperation and coordination because they recognise interdependence. The EU as a foreign policy actor is arguably a different animal altogether – a post-modern, sovereigntypooling, values-espousing, financially powerful entity. This EU is disconcerting for non-EU middle powers for its insular approach, and it is structurally and financially powerful in ways that are all too clear to the developing world. The EU’s approach to UN diplomacy threatens the sovereign prerogatives of both groups and this undermines EU efforts to make the UN matter. To a considerable degree, the EU is caught in a dilemma between its promotion of values and its diplomatic interests. When it promotes universal values, the EU appears to be very much part of the larger West alongside the US, and this undermines middle power bridge-building in the North-South divide. But for the EU to acknowledge a power-balancing

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role vis-à-vis the US (which would increase its legitimacy with the developing world) would certainly undermine its normative orientation. Whether the nascent EU multilateral approach to the UN, crafted in comparison against the stingy and unilateralist depiction of the US, remains credible is questionable. As Clapham argues, ‘because the EU represents an ideological and powerful bloc, other blocs may have to redefine their identity and ideology in counterposition to the EU. There is division in the debate not despite EU consistency but because of EU coherence’ (Clapham, 1999, p. 649). Many of the traditional European middle powers, particularly the Nordics, defined their middle power role in opposition not only to the USSR and the US, but also Europe (see Rudebeck, 1982; Hansen, 1991). However, traditional middle powers were little guys, just like those they sought to influence. Like the less powerful, middle powers looked to the UN to protect their sovereignty. Their moral authority flowed from their relative lack of hard power. The Nordics were untainted by the colonial sins of the great powers of the twentieth century. For the Netherlands, middle power diplomacy in the UN was distinct from its ‘regional’ foreign policy engagement in building a powerful EU through the European integration process. As the EU becomes more assertive in the UN, the Dutch and Nordics cannot compartmentalize any longer. For less developed countries, the preponderance of EU power in the UN sits uncomfortably with memories of European colonial history, with the financial leverage the EU wields, and the universal values it hopes to project. As the middle powers disappear into the EU’s shadow, they continue to voice the same ideals and promote soft power in the EU’s diplomacy. The middle power mantle, which fit the lean middle powers so well, is a bit tight for the much bigger and much more inflexible EU.

Notes 1. Cooper, Higgot and Nossal argue that the concept of middle power has grown to include a number of new entrants in the aftermath of the Cold War, including countries such as Malaysia and South Africa, which increases the diversity of interests and behaviour of middle power entrepreneurs. And instead of brokering in the interest of compromise or conflict resolution, middle power activity begins to smack of competition for influence among ‘self-interested’ middle powers. This is quite different from the diplomatic modes of the so-called ‘good guys’ club. 2. Overall numbers for this period were obtained through the UNBISNET Index to Speeches section found on the UN documentation website. Electronic data available on UNBISNET currently covers only the period from 1983 onward.

Pushing Soft Power 91 3. In this chapter, voting cohesion is measured by the absence of any divergence among the states listed. One dissenting vote or a split vote are both calculated as a dissenting vote. 4. In 1998, Nordic-Dutch cohesion was 86.9 per cent; in 1999, 86.9 per cent; in 2000, 91.3 per cent; in 2001, 94 per cent; in 2002, 89.6 per cent; in 2003, 86.3 per cent. 5. By contrast, the EU’s approach to joint statements is increasingly to have only the Presidency speak on behalf of EU member states (which are not then named) and to have other state refrain from making a statement in debate in order to highlight the fact that the EU is an ‘actor’ in its own right. The Nordic joint statements, by naming all five states in every statement, instead emphasized that these were individual countries engaged in a voluntary, coordinative process. 6. Interview, Stockholm Foreign Ministry, 1991. 7. During the 1970s and 1980s, Denmark and Norway were known as resistant NATO members, and they held firm against placement of any nuclear weapons materiel by any NATO member within their boundaries in order to maintain a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone. 8. Iceland did not enter into accession negotiations. Norway concluded negotiations with the Union successfully but a no vote in the popular referendum scuttled Norway’s bid for membership. Sweden and Finland joined Denmark, which had been a member of the European Community since 1973. 9. Verbatim material in this section was obtained from participant interviews. I interviewed several diplomats from the EU member states, Commission, non-EU middle powers, and non-Western states in New York during the period 2003–05. Interviews were conducted on the basis of non-attribution in order to obtain maximum candour. I have identified by national identity only those who agreed to be so identified. 10. For example, in May 1997, Norway and Canada signed the Lysoen Declaration pledging to work together in nine different areas on the humanitarian agenda. 11. Because Cyprus is the only EU member in the Asian group, it is unlikely that the EU would wield the same influence there as it does in the EEG and WEOG.

5 Returned to Europe? The Central and East European Member States at the Heart of the European Union Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués

On 1 May 2004, ten Central, Eastern and Mediterranean European countries became members of one of the world’s most influential regional cooperation projects – the European Union. However, although the day was significant for its ceremonial aspects, in essence Welcome Day marked a continuation of a process of politico-economic harmonization that had begun many years before through the adoption of the acquis communautaire and the more informal ‘acquis politique’ of the European Union.1 Indeed, as Poland and Hungary (in 1991), Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (in 1993), and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (in 1995) signed their Europe Agreements with the Union, they committed themselves to a gradual convergence with the EU, through the means of a regular political dialogue on ‘bilateral and international issues of mutual interest’, which was to be established with the aim of, among other objectives, bringing about ‘better mutual understanding and an increasing convergence of positions on international issues’ (Preamble, Europe Agreement). The present discussion examines the evolution of nine Central and East European countries’ (CEECs’) foreign and security policy over the past decade and a half in the setting of the United Nations. The chapter focuses on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as it is the body where the CEECs have been the most active, taking independent initiatives, while activities in other UN bodies will be touched upon as relevant to provide a more nuanced picture of the presence of the Central and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania at the UN. The chapter will especially examine the UNGA voting records of 92

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Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, to see how these compare over time with EU member states prior to 2004.2 This inquiry is particularly relevant if one takes into account that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland once constituted the very core of the anti-Western Soviet bloc in the UNGA during the Cold War, together with their USSR patron and other territories that were subordinated to Moscow in terms of foreign and security policy. The break-up of the Soviet-controlled vote has been deemed as one of the most dramatic re-alignments in the UNGA in the history of the organization, and at the forefront of this most remarkable change one finds the Central and Eastern EU member states (Holcombe and Sobel, 1996, pp. 17–34). This chapter centres its discussion on a quantitative analysis of the voting behaviour of the EU member states in the UNGA and explores some of the individual, national motivations behind this behaviour in specific policy areas. However, the text does not presume to cover all topics on the agenda in New York, nor to provide more than a superficial insight into the functioning of the UN system. Rather this chapter points to general trends of the EU-25, with a particular focus on the seven Central and East European member states and two candidates, Bulgaria and Romania.

A dual-flow Europeanization process? The early 1990s affirmed a remarkable transition in the CEECs. Coming out of a semi-sovereign situation (or complete dominion, as in the case of the Baltic states) where everything about the recent past seemed unacceptable in new international circumstances, the newly instated Central and East European democratic governments began to search for models on which to anchor their new status. The early years of the CEECs’ transformation were very much linked to a need to redefine their foreign and security policy. They had to confront the simultaneous challenges to achieve international diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state, to build up the foreign and security establishment (creating ministries and hiring competent personnel), and to formulate an adequate foreign and security policy programme in the changing international climate. In such a state of flux, the West thus became an important reference point to which they could fix their transition in the field of foreign and security policy as they were feeling around for a way forward after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, by aligning the country’s foreign policy with the West, a newly democratic government gained

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popularity in its domestic constituencies, in that such alignment seemed to mark in a most definite way that the country was well on its way away from its communist past. For most CEECs the way forward meant above all setting their sights on a ‘return to Europe’, which essentially translated into undertaking the cumbersome process of implementing the legal and political membership criteria set out by the European Union. The convergence process that followed, as Radaelli has described, was composed of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies. (Radaelli, 2000) For the CEECs this process of ‘Europeanization’ has essentially meant a situation where the individual national systems of the CEECs became penetrated by EU structures and the obligation to take on the acquis communautaire and politique. However, this is not to say that the CEECs have Europeanized, or adapted, unreflectively, and pressured themselves to conform to some kind of abstract European foreign and security policy ideal, if indeed such an ideal exists. Prior to 2004 EU enlargement has shown in many ways that policy harmonization for new member states does not equal the extinction of a foreign policy with national characteristics. The CEECs have managed both to converge with the EU majority and to display signs that they are continuously acquiring a gradually more distinct foreign policy profile. The processes of institutional change in this set of countries are thus seen as complementary rather than exclusive. It is also worth noting that the very complexity of the Europeanization/ political unification process makes it a patchy or disjointed one. Europeanization is far from a uniform development, extending homogeneously to all public and political spheres of activity at once. Rather, the process may be uneven or fragmented, with some areas of social activity more Europeanized while others are to a lesser extent or even only marginally so. As we will see, the degree of Europeanization can also differ between different areas of international politics. As shown below, while on the whole CEECs’ records on environmental or developmental matters in Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or on human rights in the UNGA appear rather well fitted to the EU majority,

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on some matters of international security the match seems less clear. The explanation may partly be found in the fact that the norm-sender (EU) does not send equally strong and unambiguous signals in all fields of security, as it does, for example, in the fields of environmental issues or human rights. It may also be the burgeoning national interests of the Central and East European member states that account for divergence. From a cursory glance into the empirical evidence of the past decade’s enlargement process, the CEECs have clearly changed and adapted the most to the demands of the European Union rather than the inverse. However, on a much more subtle level, on several issues the CEECs have in the past decade also influenced the Union’s agenda and the way the European Union’s foreign policy is made. In certain cases the direction of the policy signals is inverted and the periphery takes on the role of norm-sender while the centre becomes the receptor. For example, the majority of the Central and East European member states are countries of complex minority compositions. It is thus not surprising that some of them show a measured reticence in view of debates on self-determination in the UNGA; while others, having ethnic diasporas beyond their borders, are passionate advocates for human rights, anti-discrimination, racism and minority rights. While hitherto a rather taboo subject for most EU member states, minorities, their treatment and rights, have during the last decade slowly seeped into the Union’s foreign agenda and become a regular feature in the European Union’s external action, not only in the shape of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria or initiatives such as the 1994 Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe, but also, to a very limited extent, in the UNGA.3 As the former head of the European Commission delegation to the UN noted, ‘The emphasis on minority rights within the Human Rights policies of the European Union and in the Copenhagen criteria can also be seen as an expression of solidarity with minority groups, who might otherwise feel disadvantaged by the operation of democratic decision-making at national level. It is currently playing an important role in ensuring that problems of minorities do not lead to unrest within some candidate countries’ (Richardson, 2003). In addition, priority issues for most CEECs such as those related to international security, have in different ways modified or added to the existing agenda of the European Union. The CEECs’ more exposed geographical position, at the fringe of integrated Europe, brings with it a host of concerns. For this reason these countries continue, to some extent, to feel a lingering concern over their freedom of action, sovereignty and stability in relation to their neighbours, particularly relations

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with Russia and/or post-armed conflict Western Balkans. They also show concern over the growing illicit flows across their relatively porous borders, such as the trafficking of small and light fire arms, human beings or narcotic substances, which is a ceaseless font of domestic insecurity in their countries. The national tradition, state formation and historical inclination of the CEECs have therefore naturally come to impinge on European policy in terms of adding new matters to the EU agenda. Many of these topics, which were either formerly absent from the European Union’s policy attention or largely ignored, have thus taken on a growing centrality in the European Union’s international activities, whether in the UNGA, ECOSOC or Security Council. It is thus fairly obvious to conclude that we are facing a scenario in which two actors are co-evolving simultaneously. This creates a space for interpreting Europeanization as a feedback process, where impulses of adaptation are issued both from the centre (EU) and from the periphery (national). Consequently, even for such a potent actor as the European Union the feedback loop of Europeanization/adaptation cannot be avoided. As Olsen has pointed out, it would indeed be difficult for the European Union to resist change, in that ‘[i]n complex and dynamic contexts like the European one, purposeful actors influence the processes and structures within which change takes place. Yet, no single group of decision-makers has the insight, authority and power to design and reform institutions at will and achieve pre-specified objectives’ (Olsen, 2002, p. 926). The Europeanization process must thus be understood in a dual sense, both of fomenting the recreation of EU norms and regulations at national level, as well as part and parcel of a political unification project that also moulds the centre.

The CEECs in the UNGA The 45th session of the General Assembly, inaugurated in the fall of 1990, marked a sea change for international relations and, as a consequence, for the UNGA as well (Holloway and Tomlinson, 1995).4 The collapse of the communist regimes across Europe in 1989 through 1991, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the newly independent countries applying for membership of the UN, as well as the first shots fired in what was to be a set of drawn-out armed conflicts in the Western Balkans, would all be reflected in the work of the UNGA during the course of the session.5 It would mark a distinct before and after in more ways than one. The 45th session also presented a distinctive turning point for the CEECs. The Soviet-aligned East European regional group had constituted

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the most homogenous bloc in the UN system during the Cold War. The Soviet-dominated bloc included the USSR, all the Central and East European satellite countries, Afghanistan, Cuba, Syria and Vietnam. From the late 1940s onward, the coincidence in UNGA voting of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany and Poland was consistently one hundred per cent, or very nearly so. This coherence was mainly a tribute to Moscow’s imposition of a tight reign on foreign and security policy for its eastern bloc satellite countries and to the USSR’s capacity to perpetuate its grip over these countries, with few slip-ups, for more than four decades. The sole exception to the rule of this tight-knit East European group was Romania, which gradually, from 1975 onwards, appeared to increasingly embrace the cause of the G-77 in the UNGA (Holloway and Tomlinson, 1995). As the CEECs broke out of their Soviet straitjacket in the early 1990s – symbolized above all by the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 – they would abandon their former voting loyalties in the UNGA, although the East European group as a feature of the UN system formally did not disappear. Indeed the Eastern Europe Regional Group continues today in the UN system, although it has reportedly ceased to be a medium of (effective) coordination of the positions of the region’s nations in the UN (Matuszewski, 1999, p. 46). The CEECs instead began to look around for new models for their incipient foreign policy and the rest of the decade of the 1990s was devoted to attempts to elaborate and consolidate such a policy, both regionally and in international organizations. Western Europe and the United States would automatically become two important reference points in this quest, primarily as a consequence of the Central and East European aspirations to NATO and EU membership. However, there were also attempts to find an individualized ‘third-way’ by some of the CEECs in the early to mid-1990s, as we will see below. The post-Cold War era has thus entailed a major re-alignment and complex adaptation for the CEECs under study here. The changing domestic and international circumstances of the CEECs are clearly visible in their voting record in the UNGA as compiled in Figure 5.1. The record presented here stretches back to the early 1980s, in order to better put the dramatic shift starting from the 45th session into relief. The figure shows the trend of convergence of the candidates’ voting patterns with that of the EU during the period 1983–2003. Also noted for the same years in the figure is the trend for the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation, as an additional measure of comparison of change in relation to the European Union.

98 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués Lithuania Estonia Latvia Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Bulgaria Romania

100

% of agreement with EU

80

USSR - Russia 60 100 40

95 90

20

85 80

0

56 52 54 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 (1995) (1991) (1999) (1983) (2003) (1987)

58

UNGA session (Year when session started)

Figure 5.1 Temporal evolution of the percentage of agreement between the EC/EU majority and selected CEECs (EC/EU ⫽ 100 per cent) for the period 1983–20036 Source: UN Bibliographic Information System (UN BIS).

In general, the rate of convergence of the CEECs in terms of their voting record with the European Union has been quite dramatic. If in the 43rd session (1988) the CEECs would score a below-40 per cent coincidence rate with the EC, only three years later, in 1991, a majority of them had shot beyond 80 per cent.7 This trend would continue upward throughout the remainder of the decade. Between the 45th and 55th session there was a steady trend of alignment to the EU majority vote, peaking at a 95 per cent plus in 2000. The convergence rate has oscillated slightly in the years since, but in general the current convergence rate for the CEECs taken as a group – above 90 per cent – is well within the limits of the European Union’s voting record taken as a whole ( Johansson-Nogués, 2004). The most notable change has been the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (Visegrad-4), which quickly strayed from Soviet voting patterns in the UNGA and moved to align themselves with the EU member states. It is curious to note that even during the chilliest

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years in the relations between Brussels and Bratislava – as the Meciar government grew increasingly undemocratic in the mid-1990s and the European Union’s subsequent diplomatic protest against the same in 1997 – the overall Slovakian foreign policy convergence with the Union in the UNGA did not alter substantially. This observation contrasts with the post-1989 trend of Bulgaria and Romania, as in the case of the three Baltic states, where the foreign policy alignment has been more gradual, even hesitant at times, but nevertheless also eventually closing in to the EU norm. Bulgaria (at least initially) and Romania tended to be laggards in converging with the European Union because of the fragility and weakness of their internal reform processes compared to Central and East Europe. The first post-communist elections in these two countries returned revamped communist technocrats and their old political allies to power. As a consequence, the rhythm and commitment to socioeconomic and political reform, as well as international adaptation to a new global order, was a bit slower and less steady compared to other countries in the region (Linden, 1997). Soon after democratizing, Bucharest and Sofia stated their interest in joining the European Union, but there seemed to be no rush to press for high rates of convergence with the European Union at the UN. In the case of the Baltic trio, their records from the early 1990s show an even more distinct sluggishness in their voting alignment with the European Union’s majority voting pattern in the UNGA. This fact can, to some extent, be attributed to the specific factors related to their lingering concern for their territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Baltic states, perhaps more than Central or East European states, have been caught between their wish to join the European Union and their security dependence on the United States. The Baltic states, which since the early 1990s have had troubled relations with their Russian neighbour, sought security through maintaining good relations and military cooperation with Washington while not losing sight of the economic promise of European markets and their goal of EU accession. Since Baltic independence, Russia has linked the treatment of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia to the final resolution of territorial disputes – a matter which is yet to be resolved.8 Another way to consider how Europeanized the Central and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania have become in the context of the UNGA is to consider them in relation with other individual EU members. Upon examining the past decade’s EU voting record in more detail one can discern the former EU-15 situating themselves

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along a continuum, where some member states are a little more closely grouped than others (Luif, 2003, p. 5). One might infer from such examination that there are four discernable EU voting clusters. The first group is the traditional EU core group, composed of Benelux and Germany, to which Denmark and Finland increasingly have aligned themselves. A second group, which is close to the first, but can still be denoted as distinct for their differentiated vote on certain issues, is composed of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Then we have neutral Austria, Ireland and Sweden, which show a divergent trend of voting pattern in that they tend to have very special views in regards to several issues of international security when compared to their fellow EU members (which are also in NATO). The remaining two countries – France and the UK – are more difficult to group together in that on some issues they concur, while on others they do not, but for all purposes they can be considered to constitute the fourth and final group. France and UK’s relative closeness in vote has been recorded in several studies, among them the by now classical work by Leon Hurwitz (1975). Both France and the UK have tended to diverge from the EU mean vote due to their more global outlook on international security, or as a consequence of their past as colonial powers. However, as previously noted, both France and the UK have in the past five years situated themselves closer to EU majority, thus benefiting the overall coherence of EU voting in the UNGA.9 As for the Central and East European member states, as well as the two candidates Bulgaria and Romania, there is no evidence that they simply joined the existing EU caucus haphazardly. Rather there is evidence of shopping around, shifting coalitions, and pragmatism in trying out what would serve the national interest best. In relation to the pre-2004 EU members, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Hungary have in the five years past increasingly aligned with the group which is considered the traditional core of the European Union: the Benelux and Germany. Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia situate themselves somewhere in between the first and the second groups described above, although the statistics indicate that prior to 2000 the Central and East European states tended to coincide with greater frequency with the southern EU member states – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – in relation to the issues raised in the UNGA.10 If this is the relative positioning of the CEECs vis-à-vis the existing member states, however, it should not be overlooked that the greatest voting concurrence of the Central and East European member states (with the exception of Hungary) and the Balkan twosome has in the past decade been with each other.11 This should not be a surprise given these

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countries’ similar recent history and parallel post-communist evolution. As always it is worth noting, however, that a similar vote may have many different rationales to why it happens to coincide. In other words, one should not automatically assume that the policy makers in these countries necessarily tend to think alike, or always act according to the same motivations, just because their votes coincide. However, this note of caution aside, one must insist that their fairly homogeneous record reveals that they have a set of interests in common. The regional and historical trajectories since formal independence in the early 1990s are partially responsible for such convergence.

The essence of political unification: bridging convergent and divergent votes in the General Assembly The Central and East European member states, together with Bulgaria and Romania, have thus successfully adapted their national foreign and security policy in the UN setting to a degree that they have situated themselves more or less at the traditional core, or the ‘heart’, of Europe. As noted previously, strong Europeanization processes of Central and East European adaptation on many issue areas are surely one of the explanations which lie behind such successful convergence with the European Union in the UNGA. However, as seen below, there are also a number of issue areas in which the Central and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania contribute to the EU agenda at the UN. The following discussion principally derives from the UNGA voting record presented above, but to give a more complete picture, Central and East European activity in other UN bodies, such as the Security Council and ECOSOC is also considered. The issue areas discussed here – environment/development, human rights and international security – reveal an interest and capacity continuum. On environment and development issues the eastern Balkan twosome and the Central and East European member states have shown relative little interest and generally can be characterized as EU followers, while they have shown greater or lesser degree of willingness to press the European Union to address issues of human rights and international security. Environment and developmental issues The environment and developmental cooperation are traditionally two issues that the European Union member states have taken special

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interest in, both on the continent as well as internationally, and over the years the Union has cultivated rather strong trademark policies in reference to these issues. For the CEECs, however, joining the rather cohesive and well-established European Union majority position in terms of these issues has not presented them with much of a problem. Environmental protection was largely a non-topic for the communist countries during the Cold War. Since the central priority of the East bloc was rapid economic development, the environment and natural resources were taxed heavily to achieve that goal. This was a trend that would continue during the early 1990s as the CEECs were trying to recover from the economic recession they had suffered from after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The reorientation of priorities in this sector would not begin until the prospect of European Union accession became more tangible in the mid-1990s. The first sign of Europeanization on the environment would thus not come until 1997 when the Commission’s Agenda 2000 Communication launched an environmental strategy for the CEECs and the PHARE financial assistance programme financed its implementation (Inglis, 2001, p. 307). As a part of the enlargement process the CEECs also had to adjust to the EU acquis in terms of international conventions and regulations related to enlargement. The first big international test for the EU hopefuls would be immersing themselves into the 1995–97 negotiation for the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, where they would learn the ‘hard way’ the difficulties of intersecting multilateralisms as the Kyoto negotiations proceeded in parallel both within the Union and within the UN system. However, in the absence of a properly formulated policy strategy of international calibre on environmental issues (indeed most of the CEECs lacked a ministry or even specialized governmental department dealing with issues of environmental protection), and due to the very complexity of all the ins and outs of the issue of CO2 emission reductions at hand, the Central and East European governments inevitably came to accept the European Union taking the lead. Since then there has been ample evidence that the Central and East European member states are taking more of an interest in environmental issues, readily supporting European Union views on fresh water supplies, land degradation, forests and oceans, and looking for new and additional sources for funding environmental clean-ups. However, one might infer that the environment is still far from being a national priority for most countries in the region, something which is well evidenced from the patchy implementation of environmental regulations and the recurrent low level of institutionalization of environmental protection in these countries.

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International development cooperation, in contrast to environmental issues, is not a new topic for the Central and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania. Together with the Soviet Union these countries were net donors to lesser developed countries during the Cold War. However, if the financial aid of the pre-1989 era was tied to ideological logics, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the economic crisis in these countries, Central and East European development cooperation aid almost completely ceased for the remainder of the decade. The late 1990s did, however, see a revival in Central and East European interest for development cooperation matters, mostly at the European Union’s prodding. Moreover, and also mostly as a consequence of insistence from Brussels, slowly governmental agencies or special budget lines dealing with development issues have been set up in most of the new member states. This has translated into greater Central and East European activity in terms of bilateral aid and in international organizations such as the UN, although few independent initiatives have been launched so far. The willingness to follow EU leadership on developmental issues and the awareness among the CEECs of their responsibilities as new EU members vis-à-vis the world despite their economic limitations, were perhaps well captured in the words of the Czech Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Kavan, speaking before the gathered delegates at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002: The Czech Republic, as a candidate for European Union accession, accepts its share of responsibility when solving the problems of the international community and is prepared to contribute to their resolution. As an emerging donor the Czech Republic intends to actively engage in international co-operation. (UN International Conference on Financing for Development, 2002) The Europeanization of the Central and East European development cooperation activity is also well illustrated from the geographical ambit which it now spans. Formerly limiting financial assistance to their closest neighbours in the post-Soviet space or the Western Balkans, the CEECs’ remit has now extended to include traditional EU development partners such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP), Mediterranean or Latin America. This is reflected both in budding Central and East European bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, as well as in their readiness to support, with only a few

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exceptions, the EU Presidency’s statements in the relevant UN bodies with regards to any of these of the European Union’s more far-flung partners. Human rights The Central and East European convergence with the EU majority in terms of human rights has also been smooth, although, as we will see, here some of these countries have profiled themselves a bit more. Although in the past required to adhere to a Soviet concept of human rights which centred on labour and economic rights, the CEECs embraced without much ado the European Union’s differentiated view on human rights. The European Union’s human rights focus in the UNGA has over the decades predominantly emphasized political rights and the rights of the individual (so-called ‘first generation rights’, or freedom and participation rights). The European Union has in this sense put much emphasis on the formal attributes of a state and its institutions to guarantee the civic rights of their citizens (democracy), as well as insisted on a de jure adoption of human rights norms (such as minority rights, gender equality and so on). While it has been generally sympathetic in terms of most of the issues plaguing developing countries, it has always sided with the West in carefully avoiding giving other dimensions of human development the status of a full-blown ‘human right’. This (rather limited, some critics would say) EU interpretation of human rights has been relatively easy for the majority of the CEECs to adapt to. Overall, the degree of their human rights convergence with the European Union was so spectacular as to become a bit unsettling for some erstwhile Soviet allies. For instance, on some occasions, one or other CEEC has willingly co-sponsored resolutions by EU member states in matters related to former allies as Cuba and North Korea. One such instance resulted in a stern admonition from the Cuban delegation when, in the general debate inaugurating the 58th UNGA session, the Czech Republic’s foreign minister advocated, along with some European Union countries, the release of political prisoners in Cuba (Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). In a similar vein, the Central and East European member states, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, have loyally supported other human rights related resolutions of great importance to the EU, such as for example, the battle between Brussels and Washington over the American wish to have its soldiers exempted from the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction or over the abolition of the death penalty.12

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If these are but a few examples of human rights issues on which the CEECs have supported the EU line, there are also a number of matters on which this set of countries, their situation and their national concerns have to some extent come to shape the Union’s agenda. It is worth noting that a general criticism of the EU majority stance on human rights – the Union’s fervent and formal embrace of political and civic values – is that it overshadows or neglects other human rights areas (Sano and Lindholt, 2001). There is, however, some activity registered on the part of the Central and East European member states in regard to these matters. For example, in the 55th session three out of six UN Committees emphasized the need to urgently address the situation of women in transition countries, in particular their vulnerability as victims of human smuggling, in response to joint Central and East European and EU insistence. As Sarunas Adomavicius, Under-Secretary of Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed to the UN Human Rights Committee (which monitors implementation of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights), ‘more international cooperation was necessary to ensure protection of victims’, adding that developing and coordinating a single Europe-wide strategy to combat trafficking should be seriously considered (United Nations, 2004). Another area of human rights which has registered some activity on the part of the Central and East European member states is, as previously noted, the matter of minorities. Perhaps the most active of all of the nine countries here under review in terms of human rights has been Hungary. The UNGA has become one of several international outlets for its aspirations in terms of the protecting minority rights. The Hungarian government has been vigorously promoting the rights of Hungarian minorities living beyond its frontiers (especially in Romania, Ukraine and Western Balkans), although careful to couch its ambitions in a language showing concern for minority rights all around the world. Hungary has thus consistently argued in the UNGA and in relevant specialized committees that ‘the international community should pay attention to the human rights situation of minorities not only when genocide or other tragic events were already taking place but much earlier, when catastrophes could be prevented’ (UN Information Service, 1999). As Janos Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, speaking before the UN Commission for Human Rights, has argued the ‘time had come for the United Nations to meet its historical debt with regard to the elaboration of the legally binding Convention on the rights of minorities’ (UN Information Service, 1999). Eastern enlargement has in this sense brought home the issue of minorities to the West European

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states and the international agenda of the European Union in terms of these issues are increasingly coloured by the state of the matter in the Central and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania. However, while EU member states are now quite aware of the importance of minority rights generally, several are still reticent to back Hungary’s diplomacy within the UN on this issue (primarily because they do not wish to implement international and European conventions on minority rights in their own countries). International security The activity of the Union on matters of security and disarmament has increased in the past decade. International security is a highly divisive issue in the different UN bodies and thus the divergence among EU countries is not surprising. The urgency of peace and security at the General Assembly and Security Council is also felt in Central and East European capitals. The European Union has in the past decade focused much of its activity in terms of international security on issues such as the ban of antipersonnel landmines (Ottawa Convention), working to eliminate the use of chemical and biological weapons, and contributing to peacekeeping/peace-building missions. On these matters Central and East European delegations have lent their solid support to the EU majority and have generally followed the line marked by the rotating EU Presidency in each UNGA session. Bulgaria and Romania have shown particular interest for the matter of anti-personnel landmines and been quite active in efforts by the UN to eradicate these artefacts in the Balkan area. Bucharest, for example, hosted in February 2004 an international workshop on ‘Progress in meeting the aims of the Ottawa Convention in South Eastern Europe’ together with others in the region, illustrating a dedicated regional and European interest for the unwinding of the Western Balkans wars. However, there are also a few areas in the field of international security that are of special importance to the CEECs, and where they have chosen to mark a rather distinct profile compared to some of their EU counterparts. This is an example of the ‘patchy’ Europeanization referred to at the beginning of this chapter. This patchiness is especially true for matters related to nuclear weapons, proliferation and/or their de-commissioning. It is perhaps in terms of resolutions related to nuclear matters in which one best can see the continued cohesion among Bulgaria, Romania and the Central and East European member states. At the 53rd General Assembly in 1998, Belarus introduced a maverick proposal to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Belarus submitted its resolution in the face of categorical

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opposition from the majority of states in the region and it was unanimously rejected (Matuszewski, 1999, p. 48). The matter of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe is a sore point for most countries in this region. The Central and East European member states, together with Bulgaria and Romania – all NATO members – would prefer to keep their options open for the future in terms of whether nuclear weapons should be stationed on their territory. On this, they are broadly supported by EU and NATO member states. But the issue illustrates how sensitive these countries are about their security, and particularly the perceived lingering threat from Russia. With a long and conflictual history with their great power neighbour to the east, the Central and East European governments at least for now want to hedge their bets against the return of a belligerent Russia. In that respect, the CEECs worry about a disturbing penchant among many EU (and NATO) members (for example, Germany) for a ‘Russia-first’ policy. This perceived favouritism towards Moscow is to some extent unsettling for a group of countries that have persistently in the past decade felt different gradients of insecurity in terms of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In other areas related to international security, common ground has been easier to find between new and old EU member states. The Central and East European UN representatives have, together with the rest of the European Union, become quite active in UNGA in terms of reducing conventional weapons, such as small and light arms. Being the ‘gatekeepers’ between the European Union and the outside the growing trend of small arms smuggling has become a disturbing phenomenon in these areas, with resulting destabilizing domestic effects. Some of the former Yugoslav republics in the Western Balkans have become veritable havens for buyers to acquire weapons of all kind, whether by mercenaries or by terrorists. Lithuania, for example, has argued for urgent international efforts to curtail proliferation of small arms – echoing strong EU support for international action in this area. Oskaras Jusys, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of this Baltic country, in the connection with the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, has urged the international community ‘to address critical issues in the field of transparency, legitimate transfers, accountability, enforcement of sanctions, and observance of moratoria. A commitment to elimination of land-mines [through the Ottawa Convention] should now be coupled with an effort toward putting small arms off-limits to belligerent cause’ (Lithuanian Permanent Mission to the UN, 1995). A final consideration worth making in the field of international security is the highly ambiguous relationship that it generates between

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Central and East European capitals, Brussels and Washington, as is well illustrated if one compares Central and East European voting records in the UNGA and Security Council. The Central and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania have at times seen themselves torn between loyalties, being both aspirants to join the European Union and NATO as well as dependent on Washington for military assistance. Statistics reveal that, out of the nine countries under consideration, Bulgaria, Poland and the Baltic states have been the most consistent supporters of US policy in the UNGA and Security Council in the past decade (most recently on Iraq, but also on a host of other matters). However, the Bulgarian, Estonian, Latvian (as of late), Lithuanian and Polish vote, put in perspective, have on average not tended to be much more pro-United States than, for example, Benelux, Germany and/or the UK. Perhaps part of the explanation for the Central and East European ambivalence between the European Union and the United States is also due to a tendency to view a close alliance with the United States as not only essential in terms of security, but also as a potential leverage which can be used, if needed, to enhance their individual position vis-à-vis other European partners (being small countries). As Zaborowski (2004) has argued ‘[t]he Poles as well as many other Central and East European nations are reconciled with the notion that they are unable to provide for their own security, consequently, they accept a hegemonic international system, so long as the hegemon is liberal-democratic and is not a nearby state’. However, the Central and East European governments are also readily aware of the necessity of performing a delicate balance act. As Ker-Lindsay (2003) has said of Bulgaria, and it can be extended as a valid argument for all the CEECs, ‘[i]t knows that it cannot afford to be seen as little more than a US mouthpiece within Europe, blindly accepting American positions. As a result it has taken steps to show that it understands and readily accepts the EU position on issues where the US holds a differing view’. The Central and East European member states, and the two candidate states have, in other words, found themselves in a similar position of delicate equilibrium as the other ‘Atlanticists’ in the European Union.

Conclusions The Europeanization processes which have worked to integrate the Central and East European member states, and are on the verge of also incorporating Bulgaria and Romania, into the European mainstream in terms of international politics must be deemed as successful, if yet not

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concluded. The UNGA voting convergence between the new member states and the old ones has been well beyond expectation. If there were ever concerns that a group of countries with such a different background were to successfully adopt the norms and policies of the European Union such as the CEECs, these concerns must now have been irrefutably proven otherwise. However, the argument presented here suggests the Europeanization process is a two-way street; the European Union has inevitably been touched by the international concerns of the new member states. Evidence points to new sensibilities for the former Fifteen in terms of issues related to exploitation of women and the problems related to minorities, among others. It should also be noted, however, that the continued, lingering preoccupation for sovereignty and, in the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, territorial integrity, together with the historical view of the failure to enforce multilateral agreements have left the countries in Central and Eastern Europe a bit sceptical about the United Nations. In particular their wariness stems from the limited capacity of the General Assembly to make a difference in terms of international security. Thus, while they ably ‘play the UN game’, for a majority of the Central and Eastern member states the UNGA is not where the main decisions on security will ever be taken. Their ‘docile’ stance vis-à-vis other EU members, and the ease with which they fit into the EU continuum of national positions in the UNGA, could thus on another level be interpreted as a certain indifference against the UN as a forum. There is certainly an awareness in Central and East European capitals that, on issues that really matter to these nine countries, they have to seek alternative international fora to satisfy their foreign and security objectives.

Notes 1. The acquis communitaire is the body of European law and the acquis politique is the body of all EPC and CFSP decisions that new members are obliged to accept as a condition of membership. 2. Slovenia is not included in this study because it has had a highly particular foreign policy trajectory (due mainly to the Yugoslav wars) over the past decade and a half. 3. For example, at the 55th Session (2000) of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Austria introduced a resolution on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, which was co-sponsored by other EU members of CHR, but not supported by all EU member states. The resolution expresses concern about the ‘victimisation or marginalisation of minorities’ and the tragic consequences of the growing frequency and severity of conflicts regarding minorities in many countries, UN Commission on Human Rights, 1999. Another is

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4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11. 12.

the inclusion of references to minorities in such key documents as European Commission, 1999 and 2001d. Holloway and Tomlinson situate the year of change in terms of the 46th session, although they acknowledge that change had already begun in the 45th. During the Cold War era, the share of UNGA resolutions adopted by a vote was approximately half of the total number of resolutions introduced, which reveals the tense political climate that prevailed in the Assembly during those years. In the early years of the 1990s, nevertheless, the share of resolutions voted upon in the UNGA dropped to about a quarter of the total number of resolutions and has currently found a plateau at roughly 20 per cent of all UNGA resolutions. The lines, each with their respective indentifying symbol as according to the legend provided, represent the individual countries’ voting pattern. The lines are pictured as relative to EU majority vote, represented graphically as 100 per cent. Each stage of the curve has been considered for the number of EU members and thus the EU majority varies between EU-10, EU-12 and EU-15. In terms of EU-15, the majority vote equals unanimity or n ⱖ 8 in all two-way split, in a three-way split situation the majority may be at n ⱖ 6. A two-way split refers to when at least one of the member states abstains, while the rest vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ A three-way split, on the other hand, stands for a situation where at least one member state in the group voted ‘no’ while the rest voted ‘yes’, or a situation where at least one member state voted ‘no’ while the rest vote ‘yes’ and/or abstained. All cases where one or several member states have been absent, and thus not participated in the vote in question are not included in this survey. However, this fact does not significantly skew the final results, in that, for example, of the total votes in the period 1997–2002 (Sessions 52–56) approximately only 1.5 per cent of these votes were affected by one or more EU countries’ non-participation. Note that all years indicated here are the year when the UNGA session was inaugurated. The session, however, is biennial and runs from September/ October to September every year. Bilateral border treaties formalizing Estonia’s and Latvia’s borders with the Russian Federation were negotiated in 1996 and 1997 respectively, but neither has yet been signed and ratified by Moscow. Attempts to do so in 2005 failed. Lithuania signed a border treaty with Russia in 1999, but it still awaits ratification by the Russian duma. Prior to George W. Bush taking office in the White House in 2000, France and the UK’s coincidence with the US vote had reached heights of nearly 75–80 per cent. Today, although they both remain the most pro-United States General Assembly voters of the EU-25, this coincidence is down at 50.7 and 57.1 per cent respectively. US State Department, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, ‘Voting Practices in the United Nations’, annual. This voting alignment stands in sharp contrast to the pre-2000 period where the Central and Eastern European voting coincidence was the highest with the southern EU member states (second group). Hungary has consistently voted in agreement with Germany and Benelux since 1996. The ICC was created to defend against crimes committed against human rights. The matter became particularly sore between the United States and

Returned to Europe? 111 Europe as the Bush Administration in 2002 took the dramatic step of ‘unsigning’ the treaty, which the Clinton administration had signed in December 2000. However, even after considerable political pressure from the State Department, all Central and Eastern European candidate states refused to sign a bilateral treaty which would have the prosecution of US troops operating in a determined country in Central and Eastern Europe exempt from the court’s competence. ‘Brussels could intervene in ICC row,’ EU Observer, 4 July 2003.

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Part III The EU in UN Policy Arenas

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6 Effective Multilateralism and Collective Security: Empowering the UN Sven Biscop and Edith Drieskens1

In 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan launched a major debate on the rules and mechanisms of multilateralism by appointing a High-Level Panel to evaluate the challenges to collective security. This debate over collective security built on earlier UN reports produced by independent commissions and panels evaluating humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations (see United Nations, 2000; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). Simultaneously, in the wake of the Iraq crisis, the EU was grappling with debates over crafting a common defence and security policy. This chapter assesses the EU’s contribution to the UN debate over the future of collective security. After outlining the organization of EU–UN relations in the field of security, the chapter looks at how the EU is pursuing the European Security Strategy’s ambitious objectives at the UN. It then looks at the contribution which the EU is willing to make to UN actions in the field of security, notably in the fields of early warning/conflict prevention and crisis management, inter alia through the partnership for crisis management between the Commission and the UN Secretariat and the availability of EU forces for operations at the request of the UN. Finally, the chapter assesses the extent to which the EU has been able to realize its ambitions to be a major actor in the area of peace and security in the context of the UN.

Intersecting multilateralisms: a comprehensive definition of collective security At the European Council meeting of 12 December 2003, EU member states took a significant step forward in the development of their 115

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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), adopting for the first time a common security strategy. The European Security Strategy, entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, established effective multilateralism as the defining principle of the EU’s external relations. Building-blocks are the development of a stronger international society, well functioning institutions and a rule-based international order (European Council, 2003a). The document states that international organizations, regimes and treaties can only be effective if the EU is ‘ready to act when their rules are broken’, and that ‘there is a price to be paid’ when countries place themselves outside the bounds of international society. In other words, for the EU, effective multilateralism implies enforceable multilateralism. The European Security Strategy clearly indicates that for the EU, the UN is the central actor in achieving effective multilateralism. Yet, it does not explicitly say that the EU should seek a mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC) for coercive military action. The absence of such requirement could be read as allowing for a Kosovo scenario, that is, military action without explicit prior UNSC authorization. However, whereas the European Security Strategy states that ‘the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, the ‘EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, adopted at the same European Council meeting, explicitly refers to the UNSC as ‘the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance’ (European Council, 2003b). In case of non-compliance, when political and diplomatic instruments fail, ‘coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law’, including the use of force, can be considered. In other words, the EU recognizes military intervention as a real option, but as a last resort, to be used only with UNSC authorization. The EU confirmed this position through its contribution to the work of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The ‘EU Paper for Submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ of May 2004 repeats the mantra that if there are no other ‘valid options’, military action is permitted, but ‘military action going beyond the lawful exercise of the right to self-defense should be taken on the basis of Security Council decisions’ (Council of the European Union, 2004a). Accordingly, the December 2004 European Council welcomed the High-Level Panel’s final report, which reaffirmed the position of the UNSC as the ‘international community’s collective security voice’, stating that it is not a matter of finding ‘alternatives to the UNSC as a source of authority’ (United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level

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Panel, 2004). Moreover, the EU not only saw its attachment to collective security echoed in the Panel’s recommendations, but also its comprehensive approach to security, looking beyond traditional politicomilitary confines. According to the Panel, the security threats we face today ‘go far beyond states waging aggressive war’. Unlike in the early years of the UN, threats no longer originate from ‘state actors’ only but also from ‘non-state actors’, and not only endanger ‘state security’ but the ‘human security’ of individuals as well. The Panel concluded that a ‘new security consensus’ is needed, based on a ‘comprehensive vision of collective security’. This view was embraced by the reform proposals which Secretary General Kofi Annan presented on 21 March 2005 (United Nations Secretary General, 2005a). Arguing that present-day threats include not just war and conflict, but also poverty, deadly infectious diseases and environmental degradation, Annan recognized that security (‘freedom from fear’), development (‘freedom from want’) and human rights (‘freedom to live in dignity’) are intertwined. Incorporating the politico-military dimension in such a global, integrated framework, Annan’s view meshed perfectly with the integrative approach to security which the EU has been following for years (Biscop, 2005b). Consequently, it was no surprise that the EU welcomed Annan’s report at the March 2005 European Council meeting, calling it a ‘prime contribution’ to the preparations of the UN Millenium Review Summit in September of that year. Summarizing, since the 2003 Iraq crisis and throughout the ensuing debate on the role and position of the UN, the EU has emerged as one of the staunchest supporters of multilateralism. By drafting a number of common strategic documents, declarations and communications, and through its support for the recommendations made by the High-Level Panel and Kofi Annan, the EU has confirmed its belief in collective security. At the same time, its comprehensive approach has been endorsed by both the reports of the High-Level Panel and Kofi Annan. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that UN thinking has been Europeanized in terms of an ‘exportation’ of the European security model to the UN (Olsen, 2002). Undoubtedly, the European members of the High-Level Panel and the various EU documents have influenced the reports, reflecting a sort of external effectiveness. However, because of the confidential nature of the proceedings one cannot provide a decisive answer about whether or not the ‘export/import balance’ is positive, indicating that the EU has been able to exert more influence than others (Olsen, 2002, p. 924). Moreover, from the EU perspective, overemphasizing the

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similarities could be counter-productive. In order not to provoke resistance in other parts of the world, it is better to present the Panel’s and Annan’s proposals as the result of a broad consensus and avoid the perception of European – or western – dominance of the proceedings. Perhaps as important as the question to which degree the EU has been externally effective in shaping UN thinking is the conclusion that the UN redefining itself has been an excellent opportunity for the EU to further position itself as a foreign policy actor and consolidate the internal consensus on collective and comprehensive security. Discussions on UN reform have contributed to the process of Europeanization of security within the EU, with the exception of UNSC reform, on which the EU remains internally divided. The question then is whether the EU has been successful in translating its support for the UN at the strategic level into policy practice. In the introduction to this volume, Laatikainen and Smith argue that influence on UN decision-making or external effectiveness requires not only an institutional capability for coordinating the policies of the EU member states – its internal effectiveness – but also a certain degree of policy adaptation or Europeanization by member states themselves. In what follows, we analyse to which degree these conditions are fulfilled where security policy is concerned. Moving beyond the conceptual level, by analysing the status-quaestionis of EU actorness in the UNSC, we demonstrate the institutional constraints on effective multilateralism. Although we also discuss the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the main focus is the UNSC, as it remains the primary decision-making body in the field of peace and security. We conclude this chapter by focusing on how the EU applies effective multilateralism in practice, assessing its contribution of civilian and military capabilities to the UN.

Institutional constraints on effective multilateralism: about principals and agents On 24 March 2003, in an interview with Die Welt, the EU’s CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, alluded to the creation of a permanent seat for the EU in the UNSC. According to Solana, as differences of opinion had been running exactly between the four EU members of the UNSC, a possible explanation for the Iraq saga in the spring of 2003 could have been the lack of a single EU representation: ‘The EU is not represented by one seat in the UN. Yet, the problems started in the UN. What makes it difficult for the EU and me is that the EU has four members in the UNSC. (…) Imagine what influence Europe could have had if

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it had spoken with one voice. The lesson we learnt is that Europe is losing influence when it does not speak with one voice.’2 One year later, Solana put it as follows: ‘If France and the UK do not reach a common position, there will be no common EU position. Therefore, I advise all permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC to be aware that they are not just representing their own country but also the spirit of the EU – or at least should be representing the spirit of the EU.’3 As a uniform EU representation is expected to increase the bargaining power of the EU in the UNSC, Solana’s suggestion is illustrative of the ongoing debate about how to increase the EU’s international presence. Following Allen and Smith (1990), presence refers to ‘the ability to exert influence, to shape the perceptions and expectations of others’. In recent years, scholars have often enclosed this notion in a broader framework, applying the concept of actorness to describe and evaluate the EU as an international actor (see Hill, 1996; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Ginsberg, 2001; Vogler, 1999 and 2002; Joleka, 2002; and Laatikainen, 2003). To answer the question whether the EU can be considered an effective international actor in the dossiers tabled in the UNSC, we apply the ‘actor capacity’ criteria established by Jupille and Caporaso (1998, pp. 214–21): recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. As for the first criterion, Jupille and Caporaso note that third parties recognizing EU competence is a ‘minimum condition’ for actorness. Yet, such recognition does not necessarily imply diplomatic recognition under international law or formal EU membership of an international organization (de jure or formal recognition). It can also be the result however of third parties interacting with the EU rather than with the individual member states (de facto or informal recognition). Today, the EC and EU do not have the legal competence or authority to act on behalf of the EU member states in the UNSC, nor do they have a formal status as members or observers. Yet this is not to say that the positions and representatives of the EC and EU are completely absent from the UNSC. Indeed, the fact that the EU does not have a seat in the UNSC or formal authority does not mean that there are no legal impulses for the EU member states in the UNSC to speak with a common voice. Here, Article 19 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that EU members of the UNSC should ‘concert’ and keep their fellow member states ‘fully informed’ about their activities. In addition, those EU member states that are permanent members of the UNSC should ‘ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union’, be it ‘without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter’.

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Within this context, the degree to which the EU is recognized as an international actor can be positively influenced by the interaction between the other two criteria of actorness, cohesion and autonomy, which can create a situation of indirect authority. Recognition depends on whether the relationship between the 25 EU member states in the Council and the EU members of the UNSC as defined by Article 19 (2) TEU can be characterized as a relationship between principals and agents, that is, the degree to which the agents loyally resound the coordinated position of the principals. More specifically, the so-called ‘perfect’ principal–agent relationship can create a situation of de facto pooled international representation. If the EU member states reach a coordinated position at the level of the EU and the EU members of the UNSC echo this position at the UNSC, states like the US, China and Russia are sitting around the UNSC table with a number of European discussion partners who strike the same note, creating a negotiation context of bilateral cooperation between the EU and these states in a multilateral context. By contrast, when internal EU coordination does not result in a coordinated position, they face a number of European discussion partners who all strike different notes, resulting in a situation of multilateral cooperation in a multilateral context. This may also be the case if the EU member states do reach a coordinated position at the level of the EU, but the EU members in the UNSC do not echo this. In other words, for a ‘perfect’ principal–agent relationship, two conditions have to be fulfilled, referring to the criteria of cohesion and autonomy respectively: first, the principals have to succeed in reaching a common position at the level of the EU; secondly, the agents have to resound this position at the UNSC. In comparision to external trade negotiations, for example, in which the EU member states mostly delegate negotiation authority to the Commission according to a legally established procedure, when applying principal–agent concepts to EU decision-making in the UNSC, two things have to be kept in mind. First, as appears from Article 19 (2) TEU, the delegation of negotiating authority by the Council, and in practice by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), is neither formalized nor institutionalized. A formal negotiating mandate is not provided for in the TEU. As any delegation is an informal one, the agents may not only have the possibility to act autonomously, but also the ability to do so because there are no sanctions mechanisms. Second, whereas in the case of external trade negotiations there is mostly only one agent, here, there are a number of EU member states in the UNSC that could be assigned the role of agents. In addition, being a subset of the principals, that is, the Council, these member states are always part of the decision to delegate negotiating

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autonomy. For this reason, they could be in a position to develop a de facto initiating right in the Council, becoming first movers in EU decisionmaking. The question therefore is whether EU members in the UNSC view their seats as instruments of EU foreign policy rather than as expressions of national sovereignty, and themselves as European rather than as national agents. In answering this question, we will answer the questions if and to what degree the EU has developed internal effectiveness by establishing coordination mechanisms in the frameworks of the UNGA and UNSC, whether through Europeanization the EU member states tend to adapt their policy preferences to ensure a common EU voice at the UN in security dossiers, and to what extent the EU is externally effective in influencing UN decision-making.

Effective multilateralism in UNGA and UNSC: a single voice on security issues? Voting records of the UNGA reveal that towards the end of the twentieth century, EU member states have moved progressively towards speaking with a single voice. Overall EU voting cohesion in the UNGA increased from 74 per cent in the second half of the 1980s to 95 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, including consensus votes.4 Yet, the same voting records show the difficulty of bringing the EU member states, and especially France and the UK, into line on international security issues. Between 1995 and 1999 the General Assembly’s First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee) displayed the most two- and three-way split votes, with France and the UK often taking a different view than their fellow member states. Voting behaviour in the GA’s Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonzsation Committee), responsible for decolonization and the Middle East Peace Process, confirms the difficulty of speaking with a single voice on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) issues. Indeed, a gradual convergence notwithstanding, in the second half of the 1990s twoand three-way split voting proved to be unavoidable (Wouters, 2001, pp. 387–404). In addition, for international security and disarmament dossiers, during the 1990s a core group of member states including Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Denmark often constituted the EU majority in the UNGA (Luif, 2003, pp. 33–49). Since the mid-1990s, France and the UK have been more distant from this majority than other member states. Moreover, mainly because of similar policy preferences on nuclear

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weapons issues, in comparison to the other EU member states, the voting behaviour of France and the UK has been relatively close to the US. In its Communication ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice for Multilateralism’ of 10 September 2003, the Commission notes that while the practical implications of these split votes are generally ‘marginal’, their impact on the EU’s credibility is ‘disproportionate’ (European Commission, 2003). This is especially the case when common positions exist on the issues in question. According to the Commission, as they are ‘the result of a lack of consensus in Brussels’, split voting should be addressed by intensifying the coordination between member states at the level of the EU, improving its internal effectiveness. European Union member states have been streamlining their actions within the UNGA under the coordination of the Presidency. Since 1994, the Council’s Liaison Office in New York (NYLO) has been assisting the Presidency, providing not only secretariat services, but also functioning as institutional memory. To ensure consistency between the EU and UN levels, according to the Commission, the greatest possible use should be made of the relevant Council bodies. The PSC could perform a steering function to ensure cohesion between CFSP positions and the positions taken by the EU member states within the UN. As for coordination in the UNSC, the Commission argues that the ‘practical implementation’ of the obligations under Article 19 TEU could be improved ‘substantially’. Here, the text explicitly mentions that in case a common position exists on an issue under discussion in the UNSC, France and the UK could ensure that at least one of them presents it. The Commission also states it to be the future EU foreign minister’s task to ensure consistent common positions within the EU, as well as to present them at the UN, including in the UNSC. Today, in most scheduled UNSC debates, the country holding the EU Presidency is invited to participate in Security Council deliberations and directly represents the EU. In practice, it usually makes a statement on behalf of the EU, to which the other EU Security Council member states routinely refer. Most of the time not only the candidate countries, but also the countries participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries align themselves with these Presidency statements, which is one indicator of the EU’s external effectiveness. In 2004, the Irish and Dutch Presidencies issued 39 such statements to the UNSC. In line with the comprehensive security approach the EU stands for, the topics included conflict regions like the Balkans (8), West and Central Africa (5), the Middle East (4), Timor-Leste (4), Afghanistan (2), Sudan (1) and Haiti (1), as well as

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horizontal issues including terrorism (5), non-proliferation (2) and conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction (7). Moreover, the EU Presidency also invited Javier Solana twice. Solana delegated European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Deputy Director-General Peter Feith to speak on his behalf on cooperation between the UN and regional organizations on 20 July 2004, but attended the discussion on civilian crisis management on 22 September 2004 himself. While EU member states are full participants in the UNSC, neither the High Representative nor Presidency (as such) has voting rights. Moreover, the majority of the negotiations on draft resolutions are conducted by the UNSC members in the caucasing sessions or in informal meetings outside of formal UNSC sessions (Smith, 2005, pp. 223–4). As a result, notwithstanding the fact that the EU has been increasingly visible in the UNSC, the degree to which the EU is present in actual UNSC decision-making remains dependent on the degree to which the EU member states in the UNSC allow for this. Indeed, when Germany and Spain announced their intention to offer a seat to the EU Presidency within their delegation during their UNSC membership (2003–04), this was blocked by France and the UK. As Laatikainen already noted, there is a difference between presenting the European view on certain issues before the UNSC and joint European decisionmaking in the UNSC (Laatikainen, 2003, pp. 409–41). For many years, France and the UK have given their obligation under Article 19 of the TEU to provide information about the developments within the UNSC a minimalist interpretation, limiting themselves to answering questions at the weekly meetings of the EU heads of mission in New York (Luif, 2003, pp. 16–19; Sucharipa, 2003, pp. 773–97). In January 2001 this changed as the practice of Article 19 briefings was established. In these weekly briefings, chaired by the Presidency, one of the European UNSC members informs the permanent missions of the EU member states at the UN about the ins and outs in the UNSC. The Iraq crisis, during which these briefings were organized on a daily and even hourly basis in an attempt to settle the intra-European disputes, has given this development a new impulse as EU member states are now mostly briefed at an earlier stage. In addition, briefings are now forwardlooking, as the upcoming agenda and draft resolutions are tabled. According to an unwritten rule, when EU members in the UNSC distribute documents in the UNSC, they are also circulated among their fellow EU members. Yet, in comparison to the weekly meetings of the deputy heads of missions and the informal contacts in the corridors and antechambers of the UNSC, Article 19 briefings do not often provide

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new information. What is more, even if since 2002 the missions have appointed UNSC coordinators, these meetings are still devoted to information-sharing rather than coordination. Indeed, with the exception of the EU member states having agreed in the spring of 2005 to consult extensively on UNSC resolutions providing for the possibility of economic sanctions against individual Al-Qaida and Taliban members, systematic ex ante coordination on UNSC matters is, especially for the permanent members, still out of the question. An additional problem is that EU common positions, declarations and statements rarely present the right framework for representing the EU in the UNSC, as they are often too general in nature. At the same time, as the practice of EU participation in UN conferences reveals, too detailed and too rigid EU positions limit room for negotiation in the UNSC, which would be unworkable and unacceptable for the EU member states on the UNSC, specifically France and the UK, who greatly value their position as permanent members. The declaration that the Luxembourg Presidency issued on ‘The Report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’ on 8 February 2005 is a good example of the often difficult balancing exercise between direction (cohesion) and flexibility (autonomy) (European Union Presidency, 2005). Whereas France wanted a strong declaration in favour of the International Commission’s recommendation to involve the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UK preferred more flexibility in view of the need to negotiate with the US, as the latter had expressed its opposition to the implication of the ICC. The declaration adopted confirms the standing EU position, but at the same time can be interpreted as leaving considerable leeway to the member states on the UNSC: The Commission of Inquiry recommends that those responsible should answer for their acts before the International Criminal Court. In this context, the EU reaffirms its constant support for the International Criminal Court, and reiterates its common position on the ICC, while noting that it is for the United Nations Security Council to take a rapid decision on this matter. Moreover, although on occasion France in particular attempts to obtain a fixed position from the PSC as a function of its own needs, notably in cases when it can be expected that the view of Paris will be different from that of London, the agenda of the PSC is insufficiently aligned with the agenda of the UNSC. As a result, although member states’ permanent representatives in New York, who are often among their

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most senior diplomats, are not always looking forward to receive what may look like ‘instructions’ from their mostly junior colleagues in the PSC, it would be useful, when issues are up for discussion in the UNSC, to include them on the agenda of the PSC in order to frame the debate in New York, even if only by recapitulating EU positions formulated in Brussels. In conclusion, there appears to be substantive consensus between the EU member states on the long-term strategy of conflict prevention and stabilization, and the actions that this entails. As indicated by the Presidency Statements and the voting behaviour of the member states on such issues, despite imperfect coordination mechanisms (internal effectiveness) the EU finds it possible to act in a coordinated and cohesive manner at the level of the UN, including the UNSC. Moreover, its voice is heard by the other UNSC members. But in crisis situations, the degree of Europeanization and effectiveness are not a matter of course. As the Iraq crisis demonstrated, recourse to national approaches is not uncommon. While consistent with the EU position on conflict prevention and stabilization, recent French and British involvement in Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone respectively reveals the continued proclivities of national action as opposed to multilateral action. The problem with this for the EU is when member states look to the other side of the Atlantic for confirmation and guidance rather than promote a EU response. The fact that these countries not only see the US as their point of reference but also consider EU foreign policy to be a function of US foreign policy makes it difficult for the EU to develop into the determined and credible actor with the ‘strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ that the European Security Strategy calls for. As such, the conditions for establishing EU actorness in the UNSC do not differ from the conditions for establishing general EU actorness in the framework of the CFSP/ESDP.

Effective multilateralism in the field: contributing EU capabilities As it has proclaimed itself the defender of collective security, and with two of the permanent members of the UNSC in its ranks, the EU has been considered a primary addressee of the High-Level Panel’s and Annan’s reports, including by high-level UN officials. As Kofi Annan said to the December 2004 European Council: ‘As we move ahead, full European engagement will be essential. […] the world now looks to you to support a global multilateral framework’ (United Nations Secretary

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General, 2004). Because ‘the fit between the Panel’s proposals and EU objectives is astonishingly close’, Lord David Hannay, the British member of the High-Level Panel, identified the challenge these high expectations pose to the EU: ‘Can its foreign policy move beyond warm words and fine-sounding communiqués to action; and can it deploy its influence to convince less enthusiastic members to move forward’ (Hannay, 2005)? These expectations for an EU–UN partnership in the field of security were fostered by the earlier adoption, by the June 2001 Göteborg European Council, of a ‘Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management’, which named three priority areas of cooperation: conflict prevention, the civilian and military aspects of crisis management, and particular regional issues (the Balkans, the Middle East, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and West Africa). Moreover, on 24 September 2003 both organizations signed a ‘Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management’, with the aim of increasing coordination and compatibility of mission planning units, training, communication and best practices. A Steering Committee at working level was established in February 2004 to further these goals. Regular meetings now take place between staff from both organizations, involving, on the side of the EU, the Policy Planning Unit, the Military Staff, the Council Secretariat and the Commission, and, on the side of the UN, the Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the UN Situation Centre. The EU’s NYLO acts as support for these contacts. While there are three formal, high-level meetings between the EU and the UN per year, working contacts are almost daily. In a way, this cooperation has also served as an eye-opener for the UN, providing insight into the functioning and potential of the EU. The EU member states contribute about 40 per cent of the UN’s peacekeeping budget, the largest contribution by far (European Union, 2004), but their contribution in terms of manpower is rather smaller. In April 2005 the EU-25 provided 4533 military observers, civilian police and troops for UN operations or only about 6.8 per cent out of a total of about 66,500. In recent years, the absolute numbers of EU troop contributions have not varied that much, but the overall number of UN operations and of troops engaged has risen enormously, as a result of which, the relative weight of the EU contribution has greatly diminished. This is a distorted image however, since these figures only take into account operations under direct UN command. EU member states

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further contribute in much more substantial numbers to operations mandated by the UN but undertaken by the EU and NATO: about 7000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EU operation Althea), over 16,000 in Kosovo (about 70 per cent of NATO’s KFOR) and about 4000 in Afghanistan (over 60 per cent of NATO-led ISAF). If these operations are counted as well, EU member states are on average deploying some 32,000 troops in support of the UN, which represents about half of the average total deployment of European forces at any one time in 2003–05. Moreover, most EU member states seem to prefer such UNmandated operations, rather than contributing troops to UN operations directly under the command of New York. The motivation appears to be the experiences of Bosnia and Rwanda, when communications between the UN Headquarters and the force command on the ground, and hence decision-making, proved to be slow and cumbersome increasing the risks for the troops in the field. In all cases the political authority must remain with the UNSC, but in practice the exact nature of the relationship between the UNSC and a regional organization implementing an operation on its behalf is often far from clear. The first ESDP military operation which the EU implemented completely autonomously, that is without the use of NATO assets, was in fact at the request of the UNSC. Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) authorized the deployment of an ‘interim emergency multinational force’ in Bunia (DRC), where armed militias threatened the security of the local population and humanitarian aid workers, in order to allow the UN time to reinforce the military presence in the region by MONUC, the UN mission. The EU operation, code-named Artemis, was of limited scope, in terms of duration (12 June – 1 September 2003) and scale (about 2000 troops deployed, including 400 at the support base at Entebbe airport in Uganda to secure the town of Bunia), but it certainly was a high-risk operation in an extremely volatile environment undertaken at very short notice at a great distance from the EU. Its successful implementation served to boost Europe’s confidence in ESDP. Artemis can be seen as an expression of the EU’s commitment to the UN, as well as of its special interest in helping to maintain peace and security in Africa. The operation also, however, highlighted the need to detail the relations between the UNSC and the EU when the EU acts on behalf of the former (Tardy, 2004). On a practical level, the EU and leading nation France at first appeared reticent to communicate all information regarding the deployment. At the political level, the EU apparently did not accept any subordination of the PSC to the UNSC, though it did report on the implementation of the mandate as stipulated in Resolution 1484.

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Artemis subsequently served as a model for the so-called ‘battlegroup’ concept. In 2004, the EU decided to create 13 national and multinational 1500-strong battlegroups, which must be able to deploy no later than ten days after an EU decision to launch an operation and be sustainable for 120 days until the termination of the operation or relief by another force. By 2007 the EU aims to be able to undertake two concurrent battlegroup-sized operations. The explicit intention is to deploy the battlegroups primarily at the request of the UN, for small-scale standalone operations, as the initial entry force pending the deployment of a longer-term UN operation (or an operation by another regional organization, such as the African Union), or as an interim force between two such operations – the so-called ‘bridging model’. As the UN’s force generation process tends to be rather cumbersome, this would represent a welcome addition to the UN’s capabilities and is a critical example of how the EU is contributing to the UN’s effectiveness. However, a military contribution equal to its economic and political weight – and its share in the UN’s peace-keeping budget – seems to demand a greater effort from the EU than the implementation of the battlegroup concept. For example, one would expect an effective commitment to peace in the DRC also to be translated into long-term participation in peacekeeping, as in the case of MONUC. Even when taking into account the participation of member states’ forces in ‘subcontracted’ operations, the current contribution of about 32,000 troops does not seem proportionate to their combined capacity or to the position of the EU in the UN. In comparison, in April 2005, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Ghana and Nepal – countries that do not exactly have the same wealth or sophisticated military capabilities as the EU – together provided over 32,000 personnel for ongoing operations. It must also be noted that the UN-mandated EU and NATO operations are either taking place on the European continent, or, as regards Afghanistan, as a follow-up to an initial operation of self-defence. The EU thus seems to assume only a limited part of the UN’s responsibility for the maintenance of worldwide peace and security, apart from its financial contribution to the peacekeeping budget. Mainly financing other states’ troops falls short of the burden-sharing that can be expected from one of the most powerful global actors. Likewise, highly commendable efforts to empower other regional organizations to undertake peace support operations, such as the African Union (AU) through the African Peace Facility, do not absolve the EU from its own responsibility, certainly not while the AU’s capacity is still far from fully fledged (Gowan, 2004, pp. 8–17). Until then, a nucleus of European troops and

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EU logistic support would greatly enhance the effectiveness of any AU force. An increased EU contribution of military and police forces is thus of paramount importance if the UN is to fulfil its collective security role, for in view of the number of crises, ‘there remains a glaring gap between the demand and the supply of capable peacekeeping forces that the international community can mobilize’ (O’Hanlon and Singer, 2004). It has to be recognized, however, that currently the EU is constrained by the limited deployability of a large share of the member states’ armed forces and by capability gaps in the fields of intelligence, command and control, and strategic transport – exactly the fields in which the UN itself is lacking. It is recommendable therefore that in the framework of ‘effective multilateralism’ the EU would include a future larger-scale contribution to UN-led or UN-mandated peace support operations around the world in the objectives of the capability-building process in ESDP. While it is sometimes feared in New York that fewer EU troops will be available for UN operations, the further development of ESDP should precisely increase the number of deployable troops and thus enable the EU to contribute more (Guéhenno, 2005, pp. 7–12). Assigning forces to UN-led operations remains a national decision, on a case-by-case basis, and several member states have bilateral stand-by arrangements with DPKO in which they commit to maintain specific capabilities on stand-by in order to be able to react rapidly to requests from the Secretary General. This does not mean, though, that the member states cannot jointly undertake to increase their contribution, agree a quantitative objective and take that into account when planning capability needs and defining requirements in the framework of ESDP. In its June 2004 ‘Declaration on EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations’, the European Council further launched the idea of a ‘clearing house process’ as a complementary role for the EU in this regard, with the aim of providing a framework for member states to exchange information and coordinate their national contributions to UN operations. Similarly, a quantitative objective could be set, looking beyond the battlegroups and including both military and civilian capabilities, with regard to EU operations at the request of the UN, defining how many operations of which type – including peacekeeping – and at which scale the EU would be willing to undertake. These could be short- and longterm EU-led operations, such as Artemis in Congo and Althea in Bosnia, under EU command and under the political control of the Council and the PSC and only indirectly of the UNSC. Perhaps specific components

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or modules within the structure of a broader UN mission could also be envisaged, with an EU force commander in the field, but under the operational command of UN Headquarters in New York and under the direct political control of the UNSC. A specific type of high-intensity operation in which the UN is interested, but with regard to which the EU is very reluctant, is that of a ‘strategic’ or ‘over the horizon reserve’ or ‘extraction force’, that is, an EU reserve force that would be on standby if rapid response were required in support of a UN operation, such as to support or evacuate peacekeeping forces in the event of an escalation of violence (Tardy, 2005, pp. 49–68). To an increasing degree, the EU also has civilian capabilities to contribute to integrated civil–military operations or exclusively civilian missions. This is particularly relevant in the light of the High-Level Panel’s recommendation to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), to fill a gap in the institutional architecture of the UN and create a body that can identify states at risk of collapse and to coordinate international assistance to frail states and states in post-conflict situations (Biscop, 2005a, pp. 17–30). In view of its collective political and economic weight, it is advisable that the EU as such would be among the ‘standing members’ of the PBC, rather than a range of individual member states, in order to contribute in a coherent way its expertise and assets in many different relevant fields and maximize internal effectiveness. This expertise concerns inter alia the military and civilian ESDP missions, including in the field of the rule of law, an area specifically mentioned by the Secretary General for inclusion in the PBC, as well as in the field of security sector reform, a new area for the EU. In Bosnia, the EU has already taken over the police operation (EUPM) from the UN International Police Task Force. Returning to the conceptual level, another area with great potential for cooperation is the development of doctrines and concepts for integrated civil-military missions, in which both the EU and the UN are engaged. Finally, an issue meriting particular attention is the exchange of information on specific countries. Like the UN, the EU collects a wide range of country-specific data. The Commission’s Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit assesses the conflict indicators in its ‘Country Strategy Papers,’ for which the Commission delegations in the field are a vital source of information. In close cooperation with the Council Secretariat and the Joint Situation Centre, the Commission thus provides a watch list of potential crisis states (International Crisis Group, 2005). The watch list is confidential, but in the framework of EU participation in the PBC, an arrangement could be established to allow

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for the complete sharing of available information in order to ensure its optimal use. Ideally, joint action plans integrating different actors’ programmes for specific countries could eventually be drawn up.

Conclusion In view of its political and economic weight, and of its actual financial contribution to the UN, the EU as such enjoys the recognition of both the other members of the UN and the UN bodies as an indispensable partner in the field of peace and security. Since the Iraq crisis of early 2003, this recognition has increased as a consequence of the expression, throughout the debate on the future of the UN, of strong EU support for the collective security system. This recognition is an important part, though not in itself sufficient, of the EU’s external effectivness in influencing UN decision-making. EU member states have also shown a greater willingness to increase internal effectiveness and cohesion by coordinating their actions within the UN and contributing to the UN both financially and militarily. Still, more could be done and in the latter area an enhanced contribution of troops, be it through UNmandated but EU-led operations, is required to fully reflect the EU’s weight in the world body. The larger the material contribution of the EU in any given field, the more it is recognized as a significant player and the larger its external effectiveness. On the whole, on issues of long-term stabilization and conflict prevention, where Europeanization is strongest, the EU does usually speak with a single voice in the UNSC, in spite of the imperfections in the system of EU representation. The effect of these imperfections are revealed when the EU fails to achieve a common position. In such cases of a lack of cohesion, which is most likely to occur with regard to crisis response, the individual member states are then free to defend their often contradictory national positions and the EU as such is left without presence. A strong EU foreign minister could potentially stimulate cohesion, but only a single EU seat in the UNSC would completely resolve the issues of authority and autonomy. However, EU presence in the UN(SC) suffers from the same lack of Europeanization as EU presence does in general: the unresolved fundamental debate about the degree of ambition and autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the US. An increased contribution of military and civilian capabilities is meaningless without the political will to make use of such assets when the need arises. Only when this political issue is finally settled will the EU be able to emerge as a resolute international actor in the field of long-term

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conflict prevention and crisis management and be a true partner in effective multilateralism for the UN.

Notes 1. The authors wish to thank the various national and EU officials whom they interviewed for their kind cooperation and Valéry Arnoud, Tom Delreux, Roy Ginsberg and Bart Kerremans for their welcome intellectual input. 2. ‘Solana: Einheit Iraks muss erhalten bleiben’, Die Welt, 24 March 2003 (authors’ translation). 3. ‘Die EU ist ein wichtiger Mitspieler’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 2004 (authors’ translation). 4. Data based on Wouters, 2001. When consensus votes are excluded, the cohesion figures are much lower. See the table in the Introduction to this volume.

7 The EU in Geneva: Coordinating Policy in the Economic and Social Arrangements of the United Nations System Paul Taylor1

This chapter considers the arrangements for coordinating the policies of the European Commission, EU member states, and EU Presidency in those social and economic organizations of the UN system that are located in Geneva. The member states have long established mechanisms at the UN in New York to discuss, and, as far as possible, harmonize their policies towards issues that are under consideration in the General Assembly and Security Council. These arrangements largely fall within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but the extent to which they apply to economic and social matters was rarely addressed directly. According to the Commission there had been only ‘low-key EU co-ordination on United Nations policy and operational issues in the fields of development and humanitarian issues’.2 But in the early years of the new millennium, the EU member states and the Commission began to address the question of the EU’s relations with the UN’s economic and social institutions more directly and energetically (European Commission, 2001c and 2003). The EU and its member states have been committed to strengthening their coordination on economic and social questions in the UN system along two linked pathways: that of the intergovernmental CFSP mechanisms and that of Commission involvement. The two pathways imply an increasingly solidarist tendency with regard to EU positions and those of its member states in the economic and social arrangements of the UN system: on the one hand the member states are committed to enhancing mechanisms for coordinating their policies and activities; but on the other the Commission is seeking to expand its capacity to act in pursuit of agreed EU policies, and to represent the Union in these areas. This 133

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process follows what might be called a logic of synthesis. Yet there are also pressures in the opposite direction which might be called – using the traditional term as coined by Stanley Hoffmann – a logic of diversity. This chapter looks first at the European Commission’s activities and positions, and then at those of the member states. It then analyses the two logics affecting coordination of EU member states and institutions in Geneva.

The Commission In some areas, the European Commission acts as the EU’s agent in the organizations of the UN system, though its status and powers varies from institution to institution (see Table 7.1). The expansion of the Commission’s role has followed a principle enunciated in 1971 by the European Court of Justice, according to which it has the right to act externally if it has been allowed a competence in the area under consideration in the Treaty of Rome, and has actually exercised that competence (Hartley, 1981, p. 155). With amendments to the Rome Treaty this principle has been overlain by specific grants of external competence to the Commission. By the late 1990s the range of the Commission’s responsibilities had expanded, but it is still a moving frontier – which inevitably causes some problems, such as the lack of clarity about who is responsible for what. The Commission as the organizational embodiment of the EU has two major, related ambitions in its approach to the organizations of the UN system. First it is preparing for enhanced participation with selected organizations. The Commission has the ambition, supported by a range of experts and governments – though resisted by others – to upgrade its membership in the ILO and to become the EU’s main representative in other organizations (see especially European Commission, 2003). This was important though in practice behaviour was not necessarily constrained by treaty limitations. The Commission behaved ‘like a government’ in the ILO even though its status was that of observer and it formally could only speak when invited.3 The Commission aims to move up the hierarchy of forms of involvement from observer, to active observer, to privileged observer, to full member. Various concerns are related to this ambition. These include finding satisfactory financial arrangements with the UN organizations, so that the Commission can satisfy stringent EU auditing requirements, especially as they were tightened after the budget scandals of the late 1990s. The Commission has developed a ‘standard grant agreement with

135 Table 7.1 European Commission cooperation with UN bodies UN body or specialized agency

EC funding, 1999, million euro

EC representation in governing bodies

UN Development Programme (UNDP)

70.1⫹4.9 from ECHO

Active observer

UN Fund for Population Activities (UN FPA)

3.1

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

76⫹84.3 from ECHO

Observer EU coordination for annual Executive Committee meetings (on Presidency and Commission statements)

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

0.44

Observer

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

20⫹15.7 ECHO

Observer

World Food Programme (WFP)

184⫹18.3 ECHO

Privileged observer (Commission sits at table of Executive Board; its participation is deemed necessary for consensus)

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)/International Trade Commission (ITC)

-

Active observer

UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

-

Active observer

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)

21

International Telecommunications Union (ITU)

-

Active observer

World International Property Organization (WIPO)

-

Observer

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

-

Observer

International Labour Organization (ILO)

7.8

Member

Active observer Continued

136 Paul Taylor Table 7.1 Continued UN body or specialized agency

EC funding, 1999, million euro

EC representation in governing bodies

World Health Organization (WHO)

4.5⫹6.7 ECHO

Active observer

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

-

Observer

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

-

Observer

UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

-

Observer

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

-

Observer

UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

-

Observer

UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)

1.4

Active observer

Notes: Active observer entails participation in and contribution to the work of governing bodies including contribution to decision-making. Observer entails participating in meetings and reporting on the proceedings to headquarters. Source: European Commission, 2001c, Annex 2.

international organisations’ (December 2000) that puts into contractual, operational terms the clauses and principles set out in this agreement. It concluded that ‘this standard grant agreement … has, to the satisfaction of various UN entities, already substantially simplified and accelerated the preparation and conclusion of the specific grant agreements for the operations concerned’ (European Commission, 2001c). The EU wishes to have effective control over the way its money is spent, and to agree an appropriate financial process with the UN organizations with which it cooperates as a condition of a closer relationship, as was made clear in the Prodi Commission’s pronouncement that ‘the Commission is prepared to reduce or even suspend its support to UN partners, which fail to

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perform to an acceptable standard’ (European Commission, 2001c, section 2). However, the costs of auditing and controlling EU budgetary contributions to UN, and other external organizations, has since become an unusually high percentage of the net contribution compared with those of other donors.4 A further EC–UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement was signed on 29 April 2003, which allowed for multi-donor UN operations. The Commission has insisted that its role depends upon finding ways of adding value to the UN projects and that it does not wish to have its funding substitute for that of member states of the UN organizations, even when they are EU member states. The EU also has to choose partners that work in areas relevant to EU interests and consider where the EU can add value derived from its participation as a distinct organization. The Commission believes that there are some UN organizations with which it could be particularly promising to seek cooperation, such as the UNDP, IFAD, UNAIDS, UNCTAD, ILO and UNIDO. There are also indications that in the areas of EU–UN cooperation the Commission will act more often on behalf of the EU, that is, it has expressed an ambition to take over from the member states in areas where it has competence.5 The Commission sees its greater involvement in the planning processes of the UN organizations as a necessary contribution to this. Greater involvement is conditional on the UN organization offering ‘the Commission some form of permanent representation in the programming and administrative organs of its agencies and in their external audit arrangements’.6 Again an ambition is expressed to become an essential, if not primary, EU actor in these areas. For example, in the area of development the Commission has developed country strategy papers with partner states in the developing world and is aware that the UN system has similar strategic planning instruments, such as the UNDP Country Strategy Plans and the Development Assistance Frameworks of the UN Development Group. The Commission has realized that its plans and those of the UN need to fit together. This need also applies to the Consolidated Appeal arrangements which the UN’s Department for Humanitarian Affairs, later rechristened as the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), had long conducted. Thus, to further the process of achieving closer cooperation with the UN system the Commission has to set about identifying ‘strategic UN partners’ where there is policy convergence, increasing programme funding to those bodies, and strengthening dialogue with them on programming and policy-making.

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But a second way in which the EU, through the Commission, can enhance its involvement in the UN organizations is a somewhat different one. In this the concern is to establish the EU as an effective participant in the decision-making of the international organization, so that it becomes more like an ordinary member, with more wide-ranging responsibilities regarding the activities of the UN organization. This would not be limited to the role of developing projects in which the EU could have programmatic or operational interests, but would include helping the UN organization to formulate and discharge its own mandate. In this area the Commission would be charged with following policies which reflected the positions agreed by the member states in the European Council or the Council of Ministers, or formulated by itself with the explicit or implicit support of member states. This input would impact upon what the UN organization did, but not necessarily involve EU involvement at the operational level, or EU funding. But after negotiations with the UN, the EU would also be committed to following and applying the agreed resolutions of that organization.

The member states There have been two tracks that enhance EU member-state cooperation in the UN’s economic and social organizations in Geneva. The first is the enunciation of principles of policy to which all members are expected to adhere. These are expressed in declarations or conclusions resulting from the meetings of the member states in the relevant EU institutions – Council of Ministers, European Council, Intergovernmental Conferences. These principles are to be respected in general, both in the bilateral and the multilateral context. These include declarations about development policy in September 2001, the commitment to move together towards the goal of providing 0.7 per cent of GNI in development aid, as agreed in the UN development programmes, and agreement on the principles of development support to which all member states should adhere, as well as the conditionality of aid programmes with respect to democratization and the support of human rights. Such common declarations imply a commitment to coordinating EU member-state policies in UN organizations, but they cannot be seen as constituting a legal obligation to do so. There are also areas where the EU member states have worked together to develop international arrangements, or alter existing organizations, as with the pursuit of changes in the working arrangements of the Economic and Social Council in the 1980s and 1990s (see Taylor, 2000).

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The second track is more explicitly related to tightening the coordination of the activities of the EU members of specific UN organizations, and part of the requirements for improving this process is improving coordination within the EU itself. Even in the context of the preparation of the EU’s Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) there has been scope for improving consultation between the Commission and EU member states. Joint consultation between the European institutions (the Commission and the European Investment Bank) and the member states concerning country analysis should be strengthened as CSPs are seen as a major tool to ensure the complementarity of the co-operation activities of the Community and the member states. Strategy papers have become a standard coordination instrument in the UN and it is a problem that the two levels of organization have duplicated rather than consolidated such plans. But in the EU it is progress that the Commission and the member states have agreed to share their analysis of the political, social and economic context of the target country at an early stage. This is a labour-intensive process and its success depends on good initial planning, maximized exchange of information, of expertise and labour input, and rapid and relevant on-the-spot feedback. Active data sharing with multilateral agencies is also an essential part of the process. On 18 May 2000 the Council of Ministers presented recommendations on the basis of the evaluation of development instruments and programmes by the Commission and the member states.7 As regards internal coordination, it asked the Commission and the member states to take advantage of the potential for complementary action on a country-bycountry and sector-by-sector basis [italics added]; to adapt the partner country strategy documents taking account of the need for a poverty reduction strategy; to pinpoint obstacles to more frequent use of cofinancing among member states and draw up proposals for harmonizing procedures and financial rules; to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian aid; and to step up the exchange of information. The Council of Ministers stressed the importance of strengthening the partner country’s ability to assume responsibility in working out development programmes and strategies. But clearly the main concern was the weakness of coordination with regard to development policy among EU member states and between them and the Commission.

Coordinating EU action in practice in Geneva In this section the practice of coordination of EU policy in Geneva is examined more closely. The argument focuses on a policy nexus, rather

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than on particular international institutions, involving labour standards, trade, human rights and poverty reduction. The development of the coordination of the policies of the EU and of its member states in forums such as the UN specialized agencies in Geneva can be examined from two opposing perspectives, that of the logic of diversity and that of the logic of synthesis. The analytical task here is to trace the line between these two opposing tendencies. This involves delineating the interrelationships between one coordinated multilateral system, the EU and its member states, and a set of other multilateral systems, the UN agencies, with imperfectly overlapping memberships and various degrees of internal and system coordination. The logic of diversity The pattern of EU involvement in external forums often illustrates a logic of diversity, in contrast to the linear process of enhancing EU cohesiveness in external frameworks implied in the first part of this chapter. In practice the external involvement of the member states takes the form of a large number of overlapping and differentiated multilateralisms. There is an aspiration, reflected in the doctrine of Community liturgy, to coordinate members’ policies, and an ambition to play a stronger role in this on the part of the Commission. But against that is an irresistible tendency to differ, symbolized, first, by the lack of effective coordination at the national levels among the different parts of national bureaucracies, each with multiple, divergent departmental interests and varying links with particular international organizations, and, second, by the different ways in which member states relate to their international environment. In the UK there have sometimes been disagreements between the Department for Development and the Department of Trade and Industry: for ILO matters these two departments tend to a divided mandate. One official commented that on social, development and trade matters ‘it was hard to get an integrated view out of a country’.8 The logic of diversity is encouraged in this world of overlapping multilateralisms by the wish of member states that contribute more financially to the budgets of the UN specialized agencies and programmes to get full credit for their contribution in each policy framework.9 They object to other EU members’ ‘free-riding’ and getting credit for contributions which they have not made. And they lack the mutual confidence to balance a credit in one policy dimension against a deficit in another. Diversity is also encouraged by EU member states’ reflecting the views of outsiders in diplomacy between member states, and, at its strongest, entering into alliances with outsiders against insiders, though

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this is less common in the ILO and more common in OECD. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the EU is a multilateral organization made up of sovereign states which are of necessity free to pursue their interests with outsiders as well as insiders. For instance the UK in 2002 supported a Canadian proposal on humanitarian policy in Sierra Leone in defiance of an EU alternative. In the absence of an exclusive commitment to cooperate with those inside the EU, it is always on the cards that there could be dalliance with non-members. What has been lacking here is an effective mechanism for enhancing an EU collective presence in international organizations. There is, for instance, no agreed strategy between EU states on their membership of the executive committees of other international organizations. The pattern of intense disagreement with regard to membership of the Security Council amplifies a general discord with regard to membership of any outside forum. For the limited-membership executive boards and committees that direct the UN specialized agencies and programmes, the EU has not agreed upon a common strategy for mutually supporting EU member-state election.10 Similarly there are no strong methods for coordination of policy on EU initiatives and on the other organization’s own agenda. A comparison of coordination between a principal organ of UN system – the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – and the EU is revealing. In its coordinating function, the ECOSOC defines agendas for development in particular countries. By the early twenty-first century, this process tended to embed multilateralism.11 In this case, there are ways of strengthening the commitment of participants, companies, states and individuals to an agreed agenda and the programmes to which it leads. This is achieved by effective monitoring in a common framework and the range of pressures that derive from an anxiety about the provision of finance. This is a way of working which might also be found in the EU pattern of involvement in an agency such as the ILO, and indeed the EU had an additional element of coordination in the collective institution of the Commission. The latter is potentially a far more powerful agency of coordination in the EU context than ECOSOC and its subordinate bodies. One view in Geneva is that integration is helped by the tendency for the same people to crop up in different policy contexts. But this argument, that informal networking is a valuable coordination asset, is indicative of the weakness of the integrative mechanisms. The common institutions, particularly the Commission, have yet to get a hold on the coordination mechanisms in Geneva. This is also indicated by what can only be judged as a major structural problem of the EU in its dealings with the outside world: the problem

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that outsiders have in finding any single representative of the EU which can be judged to have the responsibility to deal. Being effective in areas of external relations, in the whole range and not just in that of CFSP, is a real problem and the lack of an authoritative foreign policy representative causes Europe to punch below its weight. But the problem also reflects the absence of a strong mechanism for policy coordination in non-EU multilateral frameworks. The Commission has tried to develop a logic of synthesis. There is often an awareness, among officials and diplomats, of commitment to general policies, but an inadequate authoritative direction about how these generalities work out in particular policy and institutional contexts. This combination of a known commitment to a generality, but uncertainty about detail, is bound to be debilitating in dealing with outsiders. It is understandable that outsiders should find difficulty in identifying the right person from the EU to talk to in Geneva. One problem is that of the differentiation of competences between the Union, in the form of the Commission, and the member states. EU and member-state officials (insiders) can steer delicately round areas of responsibility of the Commission and the areas of member-state responsibility; outsiders have greater difficulty in doing so. A linked problem is irregularity in Commission and EU member states’ involvement, which surely appears impenetrable to outsiders. There is an abundance of informal and formal meetings among national officials in Geneva. There are formal meetings of individuals from national missions to discuss particular business, such as proposals for the preparatory committees of agencies such as the WHO and ILO, annual meetings, meetings of executive boards, meetings of plenary assemblies, ECOSOC commissions. The Commission might or might not take part. The lines of responsibility of the Commission and the Presidency are steadily being redrawn in Geneva and it is hard for outsiders to be sure how things stand. It was pointed out that the Commission tended to be more strident when its status was less certain, therefore the volume of the Commission’s voice at times might be misleading. The question of who is responsible for what is a difficult one and on the intergovernmental side it is answered by EU insiders on pragmatic grounds. In the last few years the Presidency had tended to initiate more and more specialist meetings for political questions, or in times of crisis. More technical questions, such as the business of the Universal Postal Union or World Intellectual Property Organization tend to be left to more expert committees, and dealt with more frequently in a technical way. Indeed, in the latter area of work the self-identification of the EU

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member states as an international actor tends to be at its weakest. In this way the formal arrangements move from higher to lower level, from more to less expert, from active to little Commission involvement, according to judgements made on the hoof, rather than according to any overarching principle of responsibility. Certainly there is no principle which might be understood by someone who lacks the arcane knowledge of the EU insider. The difference between the EU’s intergovernmental arrangements and the arrangements proposed by the Commission is, however, clear enough. The former tends to diversity, whereas the latter tends to synthesis and is often resisted by member states precisely because of that. In Geneva, the appeals to organize EU meetings coming from the Bunker, a name given by government officials to the EU Council Secretariat’s liaison office reflecting member-state resistance, are often ignored or rejected. The Council Secretariat is in charge of organizing meetings of EU representatives in Geneva, though there are also meetings which are not organized in that framework. It was reported in 2003 that the Secretariat was unhappy with the holding of such extra-mural meetings, but found it impossible to stop them happening in the course of the hectic business periods of the various institutions. Officials in the Council Secretariat took on the job of counting the meetings not held under their auspices after January 2001. While between the mid-1990s and 2002 the total number of meetings of EU representatives increased from a mean of around 450 to around 650 in each Presidency, the number organized by the liaison office went up less noticeably.12 In January– June 2002 there were 422 meetings of this type, while in January–June 1997 there were 390. The policy sectors where the increase in meetings organized by the Bunker was most striking were that of human rights and humanitarian affairs, though meetings for the WTO were consistently the most numerous. The EU members did at least emerge as a group within which mutual consultation was expected in the conduct of business in Geneva, but not necessarily in a framework of leadership by the common institutions. In the absence of strong coordination mechanisms it is always likely that the logic of diversity would be sustained by the lack of effective coordination within the administrations of the separate states. And the lack of coordination in that context is reflected in the lack of coordination between the three EU pillars. One official regretted that the foreign policy offices, and the CFSP procedure, were not more directly involved in, for instance, the discussions about core labour standards in the

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ILO: ‘There was a need for multi-pillar committees.’ The inconsistencies among the policies of different parts of national administrations inevitably reinforce the differences between the member states in the different multilateral frameworks in which they are involved. There is a logic of diversity here which can only be defeated by a qualitative change in the way the EU relates to these forums, by having both an agreed EU mode of participation – agreed membership on committees including the executive committees – as well as coordination on policy which includes effective coordination within governments as well as between them. The logic of synthesis On the other side, however, there is a logic of synthesis which is supported by the overlapping agendas of the EU and UN systems in these fields as well as the interest among the EU’s common institutions in having stronger coordinating procedures which will enhance their own role. One interesting nexus of agendas is that linking human rights, labour rights, trade and the work of the ILO. Former Trade Commissioner Lamy was anxious to promote more liberal international trade arrangements but realized that such arrangements would have to be deliberately shaped to avoid the kind of severe social costs that had plagued neo-liberal market strategies. These had both a moral dimension as well as an economic one, as lower social costs outside Europe could lead to lower production costs for competitors. This concern also worried the European Parliament. Accordingly these two EU institutions, which are commonly understood to support greater supranationalism, were clear that they needed to develop their own strategies on such questions as human rights and core labour standards. But they also needed to work with the ILO to form an alliance for a socially responsible liberalization of trade in the WTO. Hence Lamy cultivated close relations with the ILO, and the European Parliament produced the Gillig Report on promoting core labour standards and improving social governance in the context of globalization (European Parliament, 2002, paragraph F, p. 7). This is also a way of enhancing the roles of the EU’s supranationally inclined institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, within Europe. It is part of a more widespread evolution of machinery and activities to promote social codes in an important area of the wider agenda of human rights. In this context it is likely that any aspects of core labour standards, and more refined human rights will redound to the benefit of the common institutions. As a general rule, when external

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standards are approved requiring Commission supervision, the European Parliament would also play an enhanced role in overseeing and shaping the agreed policies. The codes of the ILO are ratified by governments not the Community, but the Commission has a strong interest in the question of their application. In this way increasing standards in the external context is also a valued strategy for them, not only because it goes along with the further liberalization of international trade, but also because it contributes to greater integration within the EU. A number of points have frequently been placed together by the Commission: the need for higher international standards, the need for European businesses and governments to be bound to uphold those standards in their work in third countries, the need for all EU member states to ratify the agreements concerning these standards, and the primary role of the Commission in promoting and supervising the system. The formal mandate for the Commission to act for the EU-25 in the social area is not strong, as social policy is a late addition to the list of areas which involve Community competence, and is not spelled out in detail. Nevertheless the external activities could have implications for the extension of Commission competence. Even if there are no direct consequences for enhancing the Commission’s executive capacity, there would certainly be more to do: there would be an expanding agenda of work. The Commission would be involved in monitoring the standards outside the Union and seeing that they were applied within. And the primary responsibility of the Commission for the Union’s external trade makes it easier to expand its competence externally and internally with regard to an expanding agenda. This also makes it seem logical that the Commission should be the Union’s representative in an increasing number of institutions. The pursuit of higher standards externally could be linked with a renewal of efforts to improve them internally. The Gillig report made the point that the Commission ‘mainly concentrates on the strategy needing to be implemented in the developing countries at the risk of over-estimating the level of application of the core labour standards in Europe. … it is therefore necessary to guarantee the actual application of these standards in Europe’ (European Parliament, 2002, paragraph G, p. 7). The report also called on member states and candidate countries which had not yet ratified the ILO conventions on core labour standards to adopt them ‘as soon as possible’ (European Parliament, 2002, paragraph 4.1, p. 8). Here is a case of an external agenda driving an internal one. The EU states need to make more explicit their commitment internally to standards that they need to apply externally.

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The point here is an important one – that it is becoming more apparent that the strengthening of international standards and machinery could have the effect of expanding the role of the common institutions within a region like the EU. In this way regional integration can follow from the strengthening of international governance, which now seems all the more necessary because of globalization. The EU strategy reflects moral concerns, but is also a way of avoiding some of the costly effects of its own more advanced welfare systems. It can conceal its economic self-interest by linking its efforts to a global movement. The Commission can even take advantage of these overlapping agendas in pursuit of its own interest. For instance, the Commission has a motive for working closely with organizations like the ILO not only in the context of trade liberalization, but also in the accession process. The level of coordination as regards the latter may be described as enhanced, since the ILO developed a specific office (in Budapest) to work with the Commission on the development of core labour standards, as well as the Social Dialogue, in Central and Eastern Europe. This is a form of interinstitutional collusion which some Central and East European states found objectionable.13 Enlargement had rightly been made subject to conditionality: the accession states had to meet standards in their social and labour standards which had been defined in successive EU documents. But there is a tactical advantage in having outside organizations like the ILO involved in this, since it means that the Commission has a neutral organization by its side to judge deficiencies. It would thus be less vulnerable to the charge of acting as judge and jury. This phenomenon also appears in the case of international trade. The Gillig Report asserted that those states which do not respect core labour standards could be subject to trade sanctions by the ILO – which it is allowed to do under its constitution – and that the WTO should agree that such sanctions would not be incompatible with its own founding Treaties. It was stressed, though, that a shortfall in labour standards should not be used as a justification for protectionism, and the EU states were very anxious to make this point. The Union has an interest in working with global organizations, such as the ILO, the IMF and the World Bank, that are committed to higher standards in labour practices and human rights, fundamental social rights and poverty reduction, because through such alliances it is easier to maintain and extend its own high internal standards. The logic of synthesis illustrates the way in which regions may begin to express themselves in global forums. It suggests that the processes by which regions can embed themselves as actors in other forums is a

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complex one. It is not just that regions form and then act in the other forums, but that, in addition, dynamic processes appear among the various representatives of the regions in the other forums which themselves promote greater regional coherence. There are, of course, pressures the other way, which will be discussed below, but the logic of synthesis is nonetheless real. The regional secretariat may also take on the role of promoting among members within the region policies which they have helped to approve in the global organization. This is another route by which globalization might be promoted but also reconciled with regional preferences, and illustrates the symbiotic relationship between regionalization and globalization.

EU strategies for increasing policy coordination Two strategies may be identified by which the Union, through its common institutions, seeks to pursue its policies in outside forums. The member states, in contrast with the common institutions, are broadly in favour of an extensive, rather low-key, multilateral process in Geneva which falls short of anything that could be called ‘enhanced’. National representatives in Geneva often complain about particular procedures and proposed amendments to these. For instance, the EU Presidency is often overloaded and other EU ambassadors are seen as not doing enough. EU ambassadors in Geneva usually meet no more than once a month. The Portuguese Presidency tried to solve the problem of being overburdened by employing an individual, chosen on the basis of ability and status rather than nationality, to take responsibility for a particular area of policy coordination (a procedure used in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE). But such proposals are adjustments in the existing low-key multilateralism rather than attempts to go beyond it. The first strategy used by the common institutions to increase coordination can be described as one of incorporation. This is rather like the process of embedded multilateralism in the UN, previously mentioned. It contains, as has been reported elsewhere (European Parliament, 2002, paragraph F, p. 14), a series of steps. The first is agreement of a general statement of position and principles by the member states, such as the Council conclusions of October 1999 on trade and labour, which indicated strong support for the protection of core labour rights, and agreed that the ‘WTO should encourage positive incentives to promote observance of such rights’ (European Commission, 2001f, Annex 1). The next step is to develop more detailed proposals which have the effect of incorporating the member states in a common effort to apply

148 Paul Taylor

the principles in specific contexts and policy areas. The Commission has taken on the task of pushing a more focused and proactive role by member states in the ILO/WTO policy nexus: member states had already unanimously suggested that the WTO set up a working party to look at the relationship between international trade and working conditions (European Commission, 2001f, p. 7), but the Commission has now proposed seven specific actions in support at the international level, and eleven actions at the EU level. The former include specific injunctions on behaviour in the ILO to seek to reinforce the effectiveness of ILO supervision, and respect for core labour standards, as well as a review of social policy at the country level in all international organizations of which they were members. At the EU level, specific recommendations were made to member states to increase the range of incentives offered to non-members, in, for instance, the context of the General System of Preferences (GSP), to respect the new standards. The Union would seek policy coherence among its members in this area, and the Commission explicitly identified four instances where member states and the Commission would have to act, such as policies of social labelling in developing countries in order to get ‘premium market access opportunities in the EU’ (European Commission, 2001f, p. 22). In this way the Commission has attempted to tie the member states down to the implications of their own commitments in the same way that UN members were tied down to the agendas of the global conferences by procedures involving the reformed ECOSOC. The Commission has considerable resources to help it with this strategy – much more than the functional commissions around ECOSOC, or, indeed, ECOSOC itself – but its success depends on the constant reiteration of the policy agenda and its implications. The Commission hopes to socialize governments into a habit of good practice externally, and matching good practice internally with a clear legal basis. The second strategy may be dealt with more briefly. It is that of the Commission deliberately building inter-institutional linkages as appropriate to the particular policy nexus, a strategy which has two dimensions. First the Commission identifies international institutions which are active in the area of the policy agenda it is pursuing, and attempts to manage the related processes in the different frameworks. In this case the two primary institutions to be linked are the ILO and WTO, but others include UNCTAD and the World Bank. Secondly the Commission does as much as possible to ensure that positions of members and the EU in the various UN institutions are compatible and mutually reinforcing.

The EU in Geneva 149

It has no formal powers to achieve this, but could set out often and at length the implications of policy positions in one context for those in other contexts, and the costs of holding contradictory positions. The Commission could reinforce the overall rationality of the diplomacy pursued by EU members in different multilateral frameworks. This process is similar in many ways to that in the UN system itself which I have described as one of embedded multilateralism. It involves relating collective intentionality to collective action (see Taylor, 2000, pp. 134–8). In this case, however, there is the additional problem for analysis caused by the need to deal with relationships between a cluster of multilateral frameworks with overlapping memberships, one of which is a relatively strong regional framework with two kinds of participating actors, collective institutions and member states.

Conclusion In conclusion it would be useful to summarize the main arguments concerning the logic of synthesis and the logic of diversity. Concerning the logic of synthesis there have been a range of positive developments including ●

●

●

●

●

Commitment to enhanced coordination and the definition of common policies has been expressed in the amended EU treaties and in the various agreed codes and targets. The Commission is involved in an increasing range of UN institutions and is seeking to expand its role. There is explicit commitment by member states to an active role for the Commission in enhancing coordination between members in the non-EU institutions. Two strategies are available: incorporation and institutional linkage. The Commission is helped by the role it was given explicitly in a number of areas to prepare policies for the implementation of the agreed codes; it could also use the implicit assumption that a code or declaration logically implies particular policies which it articulates. One interesting aspect of the logic of synthesis is that the strengthening of global governance is positively related to the strengthening of regional governance in a system of overlapping mulilateralisms, since norms and procedures agreed for the outside world also need to be reflected in the norms and procedures of the inside world. This implies a stronger role for the regional executive, the Commission. There has developed a greater need for cross-sector and cross-pillar polices, for example on trade, labour standards and human rights,

150 Paul Taylor

●

●

which again presents an opportunity for the EU institutions to enhance their role, since they are well placed to achieve an overview of policy sectors across institutions. The next steps include the coordination and pursuit of EU positions in the agendas of the external international organization, not just on immediate EU issues and interests. Enhanced policy linkage in the external frameworks is likely to increase pressure on national administrations to enhance their own internal bureaucratic coordination. The EU has an opportunity here to leverage national administration coordination.

But, concerning the logic of diversity, there are various disincentives to coordination: ●

●

●

●

●

The outside forums are themselves political systems which generate outcomes that are not necessarily coordinated with EU positions, and might reinforce the problems of coordination in the EU by attracting the support of some member states but not others. These are contexts where external alliances can be formed which then get in the way of internal coordination. Similarly: ‘very often the agenda of bilateral meetings between the EU and its partners does not reflect the objective pursued by the Union in multilateral forums and vice versa’ (European Commission, 2003, paragraph 1.2 (b)). This is the result of a lack of coordination in at least three directions: between the states and the EU, between the departments of the individual states, and between the pillars of the EU, especially CFSP and the social and economic areas. There is a lack of capacity for deciding priorities across the range of policy sectors – and instead reliance on informal arrangements and the chances of one or other government taking the lead. There is no agreement on the appointment strategy. EU membership arrangements in most external institutions are more or less disputed, this despite the advantages that having an agreed EU team could bring. Member states also pay little attention to the voting behaviour of other EU states in the executive and plenary meetings despite the publication of the voting records in the outside institutions and pointing to infidelities. They had agreed to take partnership seriously but in this matter at least did not seem to do so! The EU representations in Geneva are either overwhelmed with work, as with the Presidency, or short of business, as with the other EU

The EU in Geneva 151

●

●

●

ambassadors, or they are battling to keep themselves up with the game, as with the Council Secretariat’s liaison office (the Bunker). But among officials there is a certain pride in the informal reactive system in Geneva which member governments are reluctant to change by placing under a single authority. One defence of the status quo is that there is indeed agreement about a wide range of the social and economic issues that come up. But in some ways this is debilitating, since it leads to a less proactive stance. There is weak EU coordination of its response to the agendas of the Geneva institutions in their executive committees, or plenary meetings, be they agencies, funds and programmes, especially when the link with current EU policies from Brussels is not obvious and immediate – for example, the EU is not proactive in relation to the agendas of the other institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF. In the latter there is a weakness in the EU states’ capacity and willingness. This has been acknowledged by some US officials who prefer a single EU seat in the Washington institutions because if the EU states vote together the US will always be out-voted! There is no clear locus of EU responsibility for particular policies visible to non-members: the system is one of opaque informality. Henry Kissinger would still have the problem of whom to call if he wanted to know the EU policy on an ILO debate on core labour standards. The budgetary arrangements are also dysfunctional from the point of view of coordination. EU contributions are carefully managed to avoid duplication of national contributions to international institutions. This tends to preserve a situation in which states seek to promote national rewards for what they put in and see EU contributions as getting in their way. The budgetary system is a pluralist one and contains a self- perpetuating element, which can only be avoided by setting up an EU system for UN system budgetary contributions. (The US government hates this idea as it emphasizes that the EU pays 38 per cent of the UN-assessed budget as opposed to the US contribution of 22 per cent).

Turning to the notion of effectiveness as an indicator of the impact of the EU in the UN system, the editors specified three ways in which to judge effectiveness. First, they asked whether there was an EU output. The evidence here suggests that in the sectors discussed there is a considerable output in terms of codes, declarations and the like, and some achievement in developing and implementing more specific policies.

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Second, does the EU get its way in the UN system? The conclusion has to be that the EU is not a unitary actor in the UN system though the logic of synthesis suggests there is a move in that direction; nor is it a front-runner. The conclusion has to be, rather, that the EU tends to be reactive in the outside institutions, and to respond to their agendas and timetables rather than imposing its own.14 The arrangements in Geneva encourage this; the Presidency is often overloaded, many meetings take place outside the framework of the EU, and there is too much reliance on informal meetings. There is, in other words, no clear EU agency in Geneva. Third, the question was put of whether the EU contributed to the UN’s effectiveness. The answer to this must be strongly positive. The above discussion contains many examples of the two working together in specific policy sectors and territories.15 The question however has to be put of whether the EU could contribute even more, and the answer to that has to be ‘yes’. Hence the long list of recommendations proposed by the Commission in 2003 (European Commission, 2003, especially Annex 1). The system is a weak multi-centred one, without a unified mechanism for producing EU policy, and no obvious organizational direction, nor uncontested management centre. Hence the EU tends toward weak compromise, and is opaque to those who are not insiders, including the governments of non-members. It lacks capacity for EU proactivity, and is dominated by a habit of reaction to the agendas of others. These shortcomings are clearly relevant to contemporary discussions about the relative power and world role of Europe and the United States. Joseph Nye (2005) made a useful distinction between soft power and hard power, the latter being military capacity and coercive, and the former being non-military, especially economic, and persuasive. The argument was that Europe was good at soft power but not at hard power, whilst the US forte was hard power. In the words of Robert Kagan (2003), Europe was from Venus and the US from Mars. But he misleads in asserting that Europe is good at multilateralism: in fact the opposite is the case. Europe is not good enough at multilateralism, as the behaviour of the EU in Geneva reveals. Hitherto the US could afford to downplay the role of the multilateral institutions, in the UN system and outside it, because it had been able to do enough unilaterally to frustrate any policies or actions of which it disapproved. The US never faced a united, purposeful group of states in any of the multilateral frameworks in which it was involved. If the EU member states consistently acted together in the multilateral institutions they would consistently get

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their way, even if opposed by the US. The EU problem is not that it is necessarily weak, even at the present level of military spending, but rather that it is wilfully ineffectual.

Notes 1. Research for this chapter was carried out in the period 2000–03 and included extensive interviews with national and EU officials in Geneva. I am grateful to them for their help. 2. Bulletin of the EU, no. 5, 2000 at paragraph 1.6.56. 3. A comment made to the author by an official in Geneva. 4. Interview with UN official, Geneva, 2002. 5. Bulletin of the EU, no. 5, 2000 at paragraph 1.6.56: ‘the Commission recommends … extensive devolution of project management to the Commission’s delegations’. 6. Ibid. 7. Bulletin of the EU, no. 5, 2000, paragraph 3.9. See also Council of the European Union, 1997, point 1.4.53, and Council of the European Union, 1998, point 1.3.41. 8. Interview with an official, Geneva, 2002. 9. See the Laatikainen contribution (chapter 4) to this volume which highlights this position taken by the Netherlands and the Nordic EU member states. 10. By contrast, the Nordic states have traditionally supported a Nordic electoral strategy. 11. A term coined by John Ruggie, who also discussed the entrenchment of multilateralism with regard to the Global Compact (see Ruggie, 1998 and Taylor, 2003, pp. 135–66). 12. Data shown to the author by an official in Geneva, January 2002. 13. I am indebted for this point to my colleague Abby Innes. 14. The situation is captured neatly in the Commission’s own recommendation: ‘Opting for a front-runner approach would make it necessary for the EU to establish common positions as early as possible in major UN events and meetings, including those of the Security Council, and to build alliances with its partners so as to create the ‘critical mass’ necessary for the success of important multilateral initiatives’. European Commission, 2003, paragraph l.1. 15. A range of EU contributions are outlined in European Commission, 2003, paragraphs 1.1. a, b, c.

8 The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations Karen E. Smith

For several years now, the European Union has repeatedly and prominently declared that it seeks to promote human rights issues within the United Nations, in line with its commitments to the UN and to promoting respect for human rights in third countries. This chapter analyses the EU’s activity to promote human rights at the UN, and specifically in the two main intergovernmental bodies on human rights, the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly’s Third Committee. It also considers the EU’s support for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and its position on the reform of the UN’s human rights machinery. Throughout, the chapter addresses the core questions at the heart of this book: To what extent is the EU a unified actor at the UN in this area? How ‘Europeanized’ are the member states? What sort of ‘output’ does the EU produce at the UN? How effectively does it promote its positions on human rights at the UN? Does it play a major role at the UN in this area?

The EU and the UN’s intergovernmental human rights bodies1 The UN’s two most important human rights bodies are the General Assembly Third Committee, which meets every autumn in New York, and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which meets every spring in Geneva. The Third Committee and CHR are made up of states, as opposed to the committees created by the international human rights treaties, which are composed of independent experts. Human rightsrelated resolutions for the General Assembly are initially considered by the Third Committee, on which all UN member states sit.2 The CHR is a permanent subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council 154

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(ECOSOC); ECOSOC elects 53 states to serve on the CHR, so not all (or even a majority) of the EU member states serve on it at any one time.3 The CHR discusses human rights violations in particular countries as well as broader human rights issues, and standard setting. For Jack Donnelly, ‘the commission has been the single most important institution of the global human rights regime’ (Donnelly, 1998, p. 52). The EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council has stated that ‘EU priorities in human rights policy include a strong performance in and valuable contribution to the main multilateral human rights fora, the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the Third Committee of UN General Assembly (UNGA)’ (Council of the European Union, 2004c). The Third Committee and the CHR have been the primary fora in which the EU acts; the EU’s human rights policy is, as Andrew Clapham points out, almost completely sealed off from the discussion of human rights in the UN Security Council (Clapham, 1999, p. 682).4 The EU has also presented initiatives at human rights conferences, including the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, and the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban. But EU coordination on human rights issues across the UN system is not always attempted or successful. The EU did not have a unified stance on the drafting of the statute of the International Criminal Court, although it did push to make conscripting or using children in war a recognised war crime (Clapham, 1999, fn. 65; Council of the European Union, 1999). Although the EU’s external human rights policy is carried out by the first and second pillars, its implementation through UN bodies and conferences is mainly a matter for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar. Coordination of member state voting positions and agreement on presenting EU positions, resolutions and statements, all take place in ‘coordination meetings’ in Geneva and New York, with some preparatory work done in the Council working group on human rights (COHOM) in Brussels. The rotating Council Presidency is in charge: it chairs all coordination meetings (and COHOM), tries to foster EU unity, and speaks and presents resolutions on behalf of the EU. The Presidency also leads EU discussions with other actors at the UN.5 A strong (committed, efficient, effective) Presidency can project a strong position, a weak one can be ignored. The European Commission, in contrast, plays only a small role in EU–UN relations in the area of human rights: it participates in coordination meetings, but tends not to say much although some Presidencies ask the Commission for help in drafting statements – particularly to add the Community’s angle – or finding

156 Karen E. Smith

a consensus. The Commission has observer status at the CHR and General Assembly, and delivers a statement on Community human rights initiatives to the Third Committee and CHR.6 The EU framework is not the only collective framework in which the member states could choose to act at the UN – assuming they do not act on a purely national basis. For a start, there are the official regional groups: the EU-15 (through 2004) plus Malta are members of the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG), while the eight Central and East European countries belong to the Eastern Europe Group (EEG) and Cyprus is in the Asian Group.7 Other regional groupings also act together in the UN, and of particular relevance here is the Nordic Group (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden), which has traditionally been very visible in the UN. Thus a key issue is the extent to which EU member states choose to work through the EU, through other groupings or with other UN states, or alone. Coordination of member-state positions and presentation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) statements in the Third Committee began in the early 1980s, a decade after EPC (the precursor of the CFSP) was launched. At the same time, there was little EPC coordination and no EPC statements were made in the CHR, because there was ‘an established pattern of WEOG consultations there’ (Dutch Presidency, 1986, p. 160). The first Presidency speech to the CHR did not occur until 1990. The first time the EU-12 introduced a joint resolution to the CHR was in 1989; to the Third Committee, in 1992. What is striking now is the sheer amount of time member-state diplomats spend in EU coordination meetings, and their dedication to the process. During the Third Committee, they meet for at least two hours a day; during the CHR in Geneva, they can meet for five or more hours a day.8 Though coordination meetings can be tiresome, requiring line-byline negotiations on draft statements or resolutions, EU diplomats regularly attend meetings and take them seriously. According to participants, there is massive pressure to converge on a common position, even if a lowest common denominator or unsatisfactory position is the result.9 For many, there is a ‘consensus reflex’ (not just a coordination reflex) and a culture of EU unity is developing via what some even described as a process of socialization. EU diplomats interviewed claimed that most of their work on human rights at the UN is conducted through the EU; some estimated that the percentage of space for national initiatives and diplomacy at the UN in this field was 15–25 per cent – the rest was EU.10 Why the devotion to EU coordination? In addition to the apparent socialization effects taking place, diplomats cited typical

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intergovernmentalist reasons for the dedication to EU coordination: coordination meetings are an incredible pool of information and expertise, especially for small and/or new member states. The EU is seen to carry more weight than individual member states, which magnifies their own influence: the ‘politics of scale’ (Ginsberg, 1989) are clearly at work. Furthermore, agreeing an EU position can provide a convenient shield against criticism from outsiders (and domestic public opinion). There is thus much evidence of Europeanization, in the sense of both penetration of EU norms in national systems of governance, and the development of institutional capability. But, as discussed below, this does not necessarily translate into consistent and effective EU policy. What does all this coordinating produce? Three EU ‘outputs’ are presented here: the statements and explanations of vote or position given in debates on behalf of the EU; resolutions introduced on behalf of the EU; and voting cohesion – all three in both the CHR and Third Committee.11 The first two indicators are clearly and directly related to the coordination process: without EU coordination, there would be no EU statements, explanations of vote or position, or EU-sponsored resolutions. The last, however, is less clearly the outcome of coordination. After all, there is evidence to suggest that well before EPC was created in 1970, the member states tended to vote the same way most of the time on human rights issues within the UN General Assembly.12 But it is reasonable to expect that coordination would bring that record to close to 100 per cent cohesion.

Statements and explanations of vote/position In both bodies, the Presidency makes numerous statements and explanations of vote/position on behalf of the EU (see Table 8.1), including a general statement in which it comments on the EU’s position on thematic issues and on the human rights situation in a wide variety of countries. Explanations are most often given when the EU member states are either all voting against a resolution or are abstaining: the EU explains why it could not support the resolution. Sometimes even when there is a split vote (that is, the member states vote differently), the EU will issue an explanation. While the number of EU statements has increased over time, it must also be stressed that the EU member states (including even the Presidency13) also make their own statements and explanations of vote, and what is EU and what is national are not necessarily obvious to observers.

158 Karen E. Smith Table 8.1 EU statements and explanations of vote/position Commission on Human Rights

Year

EU statements (made during general debates)

EU explanations of vote or position (made at the time of voting)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

3 5 5 9 11 11 11 10 10 11 12 14 12 10 14 14

1 1 8 4 0 5 4 5 11 18 24 32 33 30 32 24

Third Committee

EU statements

EU explanations of vote or position

6 6 6 5 10 9 9 6 11 15 12 9 12 10 23

9 7 6 10 8 4 7 2 5 9 6 7 8 8 20

Source: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations General Assembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.

EU resolutions The EU introduced the same number of resolutions in the Third Committee (four or five) for several years until 2004 when it presented seven, while the number of EU resolutions introduced at the CHR increased quite dramatically through 2003, but has more recently decreased (see Table 8.2).14 The subjects of resolutions tend to be fairly steady over time: for a few years now, the EU has always presented a resolution (together with GRULAC) on the rights of the child to both the Third Committee and the CHR, and on the death penalty to the CHR. Most EU resolutions cover countries, most of which are put forward at the CHR, and there is remarkable consistency over time in the countries that the EU focuses on. The EU is quite conservative in that it does not push ‘new’ issues.

159 Table 8.2 Resolutions introduced by the EU

Year

EU-sponsored resolutions CHR

Third Committee

1990

China Iran Israeli settlements

—

1991

Iran Israeli settlements

—

1992

Albania China Iran Iraq Israeli settlements

Iran Iraq Plight of street children

1993

China East Timor Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Former Yugoslavia Plight of street children

Iran Iraq Street children

1994

China Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Street children

Iran Iraq Street children

1995

China Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Nigeria Myanmar Zaire Centre for Human Rights Rights of the child

Iran Iraq Nigeria Strengthening the OHCHR

1996

China Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar Nigeria Zaire OHCHR Rights of the child

Iran Iraq Nigeria Strengthening the OHCHR

Continued

160 Table 8.2 Continued

Year

EU-sponsored resolutions CHR

Third Committee

1997

East Timor Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar Nigeria Zaire Centre for Human Rights Rights of the child

Iran Iraq Nigeria

1998

Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) East Timor1 Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar Nigeria Rights of the child

Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Rights of the Child

1999

Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar Sudan Rights of the child Death penalty

Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Sudan Death penalty (withdrawn) Rights of the child

2000

Chechnya Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar Sudan Rights of the child Death penalty

Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Sudan Rights of the child

2001

Chechnya Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar Sudan Rights of the child Death penalty

Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Sudan Rights of the child

Continued

161 Table 8.2 Continued

Year

EU-sponsored resolutions CHR

Third Committee

2002

Chechnya Democratic Republic of Congo Iran Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar South-eastern Europe Sudan Zimbabwe Rights of the child Death penalty

Democratic Republic of Congo Iraq Myanmar Sudan Rights of the child

2003

Chechnya Democratic Republic of Congo Iraq Israeli settlements Myanmar North Korea Sudan Turkmenistan Zimbabwe Rights of the child Death penalty

Democratic Republic of Congo Myanmar Turkmenistan Rights of the child

2004

Belarus Chechnya Israeli settlements Myanmar North Korea Turkmenistan Zimbabwe Rights of the child Death penalty Religious intolerance

Democratic Republic of Congo Myanmar Sudan Turkmenistan Zimbabwe Religious intolerance Rights of the child

2005

Belarus Myanmar North Korea Sudan (withdrawn) Rights of the child Death penalty Religious intolerance

Note: Those in italics were not adopted. 1 This resolution became a Chairman’s statement. Source: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations General Assembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.

162 Karen E. Smith

In fact, the Dutch failure to push a new resolution on violence against women through the 2003 Third Committee, and the recent Brazilian failures to get a resolution on human rights and sexual orientation passed by the CHR reinforce the views of some within the EU that the EU should not take risks. The EU is thus inhibited from being innovative within the UN. The yearly decisions to introduce new resolutions or to drop resolutions are motivated more often by member state interests than by changing priorities in the EU’s external human rights policy or its foreign relations in general. For example, the resolution on Zimbabwe at the CHR in 2002 resulted from the pressures of one member state in particular, the UK; it sought an EU initiative because a national initiative would have been counterproductive (given the tensions between the UK and Zimbabwe), and a Commonwealth initiative was extremely unlikely. According to several EU diplomats, they consider whether the EU has a dialogue on human rights with the third country; if not – and all avenues of influence have been exhausted – the EU will run a resolution. And they will consider how successful the EU has been in winning it in the past: resolutions which the EU loses are more easily dropped. But while the selection of countries as ‘targets’ of resolutions is certainly justifiable on the basis of their human rights records, the same cannot be said about those countries dropped from the list of resolutions introduced by the EU (not to mention those that have never been the subject of EU-sponsored resolutions). China was an early and notorious case of this. Following disagreements between member states in 1996 and 1997 over whether the EU should sponsor a resolution condemning China at the CHR, in 1998, the British Presidency brokered a deal allowing the EU to achieve unity on one point. The EU would not table or co-sponsor a resolution on China at the CHR, but EU member states would vote against a no-action motion (General Affairs Council, 1998). This has been the stance ever since. More recently, the EU has dropped several resolutions that have not been successful at the CHR: since 2003, it no longer runs a resolution on Iran; in 2004, it shunted the resolution on Sudan off to the African Union;15 in 2005, it dropped resolutions on Chechnya and Zimbabwe. In none of those cases did the human rights situation improve enough to justify dropping the resolutions; in fact, the EU re-introduced a resolution on Sudan to the 2004 Third Committee – an indication that dropping at the CHR was not justified. Furthermore, in those countries with which the EU has a human rights dialogue (China, Iran, Russia), the dialogue has produced little of substance to justify

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dropping resolutions (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2005). And in the cases of China and Iran, commercial interests were widely felt to be behind the reticence of some member states to push EU-sponsored resolutions condemning those states.16 The decrease in the number of country resolutions sponsored by the EU at the CHR contrasts with a declaration by External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner that ‘the likelihood of defeat does not, in itself, constitute an overriding reason to refrain from running a resolution: as human rights defenders constantly attest, the very act of tabling a draft resolution sends a clear signal to the government and people of the country concerned’ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). Yet the likelihood of defeat seems in fact to be a key reason the EU refrains from running a resolution – to the dismay of human rights organizations. For Human Rights Watch, the EU’s contribution to the 2005 CHR was ‘terribly disappointing’.17 It certainly appears that the EU, by not pushing for the condemnation of glaring examples of human rights abuses in the face of opposition, has been complicit in ‘dysfunctional multilateralism’ in the area of human rights. EU member states also present their own resolutions – some are very active in doing this, others much less so – indicating that they still consider it their prerogative to act outside the EU framework. Examples include: France and extreme poverty, arbitrary detention and involuntary disappearances; Portugal and economic and social rights; Austria and minority rights; Nordic group members and indigenous people’s issues; Denmark and torture. Occasionally a national resolution at the CHR has become an EU resolution, such as on the death penalty (initially introduced by Italy), Mynamar (France), rights of the child (Sweden), and religious intolerance (Ireland). In the case of France and Ireland, the switch coincided with their Council Presidencies. Voting cohesion Despite EU coordination, voting cohesion is not visibly improving, though fears that the 2004 enlargement would lead to much less cohesion have not, as yet, been realized.18 Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show the trends in the percentage of ‘split votes’ since 1990. The issues which divide the member states range from the obviously controversial (the Middle East) to the mundane (the Cuban resolution on mercenaries: every year until the 2004 CHR the member states split on it). No one is happy with the splits, and there are intensive discussions to try to avoid most of them. Why, then, are there splits? EU diplomats offered a variety of explanations, not all of them consistent with each other. First, there are issues

164

Split votes as a percentage of total votes

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year

Figure 8.1 EU voting cohesion in the CHR Sources: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations General Assembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.

45

Splits as a percentage of total votes

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year

Figure 8.2 EU voting cohesion in the Third Committee Sources: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations General Assembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.

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on which the member states are traditionally divided, and are unlikely ever to reach agreement in the near future, such as prostitution or indigenous peoples’ rights. These are fundamental disagreements, over basic principles. The member states will not even hold discussions if these issues arise in resolutions. Second, there is the simple lack of time available in EU coordination to try to heal the splits. Not only are EU coordination meetings overloaded, but the member states must operate according to UN schedules and react to others’ initiatives. If they had more time, the diplomats on the ground might be able to overcome the intra-EU divisions. Third, there is ‘interference’ – or not – from national capitals. Some diplomats said the lack of interference from capitals has a negative effect, because impetus from capitals forces everyone to privilege EU unity. Others said that when capitals intervene, they give instructions that prevent EU unity because they reflect national interests. Fourth, in New York and Geneva there has been a trend towards more voting on resolutions, rather than passing them by consensus, which reflects an increasingly disputatious atmosphere in both fora. When there is actual voting, the splits appear because the details of the language used in the resolutions become more important. For example, at the 2003 Third Committee, member states split on a resolution on self-determination, which had been passed by consensus since 1995 (and through 1994 had divided the member states). This means that we should take previous evidence of unity in voting with a pinch of salt. Fifth, several EU diplomats pointed out that it is not so obvious in Geneva or New York (in contrast to Brussels) that there should be EU unity. The UN has traditionally been an arena for national diplomacy, and the EU diplomats are not always ‘CFSP minded’ enough (but see below for a contrasting view). Finally, the overall political atmosphere within the EU can play a role. The difficult relations between the member states in 2002–03 over Iraq and the US – especially evident at the UN – were not conducive to healing splits within the Third Committee or CHR. Nonetheless, diplomats (from within and outside the EU) are adamant that the EU is seen as an influential, united bloc within UN. The EU certainly has the potential to lead within the UN, because it consists of 25 states and heavily influences the positions of states in its ‘orbit’: aspiring EU members, EFTAns, and countries with whom member states have close relationships. But this does not mean that the EU is seen as a force for good in the UN system – in fact, some view it as neo-colonial and domineering, and the EU can spark the automatic opposition of

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developing countries to its statements or initiatives. In 2002, relations with the Africa group were particularly problematic; in 2003, relations with the Arab group were difficult. As Andrew Clapham argues, ‘because the EU represents an ideological and powerful bloc, other blocs may have to redefine their identity and ideology in counterposition to the EU. There is division in the debate, not despite EU consistency, but because of EU coherence’ (Clapham, 1999, p. 649). Nearly all resolutions introduced by the EU are adopted, though it should be noted that the vast majority of all resolutions introduced at both fora are approved.19 It has, however, lost more resolutions in the past few years at the CHR, and for the first time in 2004 at the Third Committee. Majorities for many of its resolutions at both fora have been declining, a reflection also of more contentious ‘North–South’ relations within the UN.20 The colossal investment of time spent in EU coordination takes a toll: as a result, the EU has little time for ‘outreach’, for working with other groups or states or lobbying them to support particular resolutions.21 One diplomat said the problem is that some member states have only the goal of EU unity in mind and not the EU’s effectiveness within the UN. The Council admitted that at the 2001 CHR, collective action by the EU ‘required very intensive internal coordination’, which meant that ‘the time for consultation with other non-EU delegations remained very limited’ (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 58). The time spent in coordination also means that the EU can be extraordinarily slow and inflexible: whatever EU position emerges from the process cannot easily be altered. Outsiders can get frustrated with the lumbering EU, and EU diplomats have been studying and recently implementing ways to stream-line coordination, to make it more efficient. Time is one commodity that the EU cannot control at the UN: it must fit into the UN’s schedule, not vice versa. Furthermore, it must act according to an agenda fixed by others (several EU member state diplomats noted that the EU does not have much influence at all on the agenda of UN meetings), and often must react to the initiatives of others. As numerous academic observers have noted, the EU in reactive mode is much less effective and cohesive than the EU in proactive mode (see, for example, Tonra, 2001). There are two additional obstacles to EU’s effectiveness. First, there is not always much concrete support for EU diplomacy at the UN from Brussels and national capitals, such as asking third countries’ capitals to back the EU’s stance. A strong Presidency can be better at this than a weak one, but it still depends on the member states’ will to expend the

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necessary resources. Sometimes the EU will remind third countries of how much aid they are receiving from the EU, but explicit threats to reduce that aid (for example) if support is not forthcoming are never made. The Commission has urged that the EU’s bilateral political dialogues reflect the objectives pursued by the EU in the UN (European Commission, 2003, pp. 10–11), which could back up the diplomacy in the UN. Second, there is little time in coordination meetings or COHOM to devote to the broader picture. Some Presidencies try to do this, but their work is rarely continued into the next few Presidencies. This is not just about better linking what the EU does in the UN with what it does outside it, but about deciding what the EU’s priorities will be, where to run resolutions (and why), and who to work with on the EU’s and others’ resolutions. All of the EU diplomats want this problem to be addressed, and the General Affairs and External Relations Council (2003) acknowledged ‘the need for a more focused and strategic approach in the speedy identification of its objectives and in developing a leading role in achieving them through more effective and result-oriented coordination’. The EU’s influence within the UN’s intergovernmental human rights bodies is thus rather disappointing: internal coordination leaves little time for outreach, and the EU machinery is not geared up to exercising the sort of leverage that might increase the EU’s influence – such as arranging for coordinated demarches to third countries to ask them to support EU resolutions. It does not appear that the EU could easily assume a leadership position (or what the European Commission (2003) terms a ‘frontrunner’ position) within the UN without fundamentally reforming the coordination process.

The EU and the OHCHR In 1993, the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was created, accountable to the Secretary General. The office of the high commissioner (OHCHR) is based in Geneva, and, among other activities, engages in dialogue with and/or establishes field presences in particular countries. Its finances come from UN member states and other non-state actors – including the EU, which strongly supported its creation from the outset. Until recently, the relationship between the European Commission and UN in the field of human rights was minimal. The EU channelled very little political assistance through the UN (and other multilateral organizations). Gordon Crawford found that in 1993, 1.7 per cent of EU

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political assistance was channelled through multilateral organizations, which rose only to 3.9 per cent in 1994 (Crawford, 2001, p. 134). In 1995, the Commission recommended developing cooperation with the UN (European Commission, 1995, pp. 24–5). But the report on the implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 1996–99 says virtually nothing about cooperation with UN, except – notably – to indicate that cooperation with international organizations depends on the Commission identifying activities of interest with due regard to the Community’s visibility (European Commission, 2000b, p. 82).22 Greater participation by the EU in UN human rights activities has been hampered by concerns to ensure EU visibility, and demands that the UN account for how it spends EU funds. In August 1999, the European Commission and UN Secretariat concluded an overall agreement on contractual issues, which allows cooperation on a more systematic basis on human rights issues. But the European Commission has indicated that that it will seek cooperation strategies with the UN that are coherent with the EU’s strategic plans, and on issues identified as a priority for the EU (European Commission, 2001d, p. 19). In 2003, the Commission agreed a cooperation plan with the OHCHR, which identifies thematic priorities for cooperation under the EIDHR (European Commission, 2004b, p. 17). That year, the Commission contributed just over USD 4.2 million (making it the third largest donor to the OHCHR); in 2004 it pledged almost USD 6 million (the second highest), but contributed USD 540,437; as of May 2005, it had contributed over USD 1.1 million in 2005.23 As Clapham points out, EU funding can be critical for UN human rights activities, but if the UN cannot attract those funds, then UN operations could go unfunded. Therefore, UN missions have to be popular with the EU (and perceived as consistent with EU interests). So, for example, UN human rights field offices for Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia have attracted little attention from the European Commission (Clapham, 1999, pp. 651–2).

The EU and UN reform in the area of human rights In 2004–05, discussions on UN reform included proposals for radically changing the CHR and strengthening the OHCHR. Reforms of the CHR were initially suggested by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in its report of December 2004, and were picked up and modified by Secretary General Annan in his report ‘In Larger Freedom’

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in March 2005 (United Nations Secretary General, 2005a, especially addendum 1). The High-Level Panel noted that the CHR has been undermined by eroding credibility and professionalism, and that enlarging the CHR’s membership to the entire UN membership would be one way to foster a greater commitment to protection of human rights by all states. An advisory council or panel of 15 independent experts could support the CHR’s work (United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel, 2004, pp. 89–90).24 Annan’s report noted that the CHR had been undermined by ‘the politicization of its sessions and the selectivity of its work’, and proposed that the CHR be replaced by a smaller Human Rights Council (United Nations Secretary General, 2005b). The Human Rights Council would be a permanent, standing body, elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, and charged with evaluating the human rights records of all states. Those elected ‘should have a solid record of commitment to the highest human rights standards’. Thus the Council would ‘allow for a more comprehensive and objective approach’. These proposals have been broadly supported but were not put forward by the EU: its paper for submission to the High-Level Panel, agreed on 17–18 May 2004, emphasized the importance of respect for human rights, but did not suggest changes to the UN’s institutional framework to try to ensure this. Instead, it suggested that the UN needed to assess better the human rights situations in internal conflicts, and that the OHCHR and CHR special rapporteurs could help do that (Council of the European Union, 2004a). After Annan’s report was published, the European Commission recommended that the EU fully support the proposal for a Human Rights Council, and suggested that prospective members of it should ‘be expected to demonstrate a readiness to examine and improve their own human rights record’. The Human Rights Council should measure progress against a wider range of human rights standards, not just those instruments ratified by particular states, and should be able to censure states if they do not measure up. In addition, it should be able to draw attention to sudden and significant deteriorations of the human rights situation in a particular country, rather than wait for that country to go through a peer review process (European Commission, 2005c, pp. 12–13). During informal consultations on CHR reform in June 2005, the EU (and acceding and associated countries) was one of only four groups of states that made formal statements (the others were the Africa Group, the Arab Group and the Organization of the Islamic Conference)

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(United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2005; see also Council of the European Union, 2005a). The EU supported the strengthening of the OHCHR and its role in interactions with other UN bodies, and supported the elevation of the CHR to a standing Human Rights Council, based in Geneva, as a principal and autonomous body. Its membership should be elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly on the basis of fair geographical balances, and candidate states should commit themselves to upholding the highest human rights standards. The EU supported retaining the special procedures system developed in the CHR framework (rapporteurs, special representatives, and so on). While it would consider the proposed peer review mechanism, it emphasized that this should not enable states to avoid considering urgent and acute human rights situations. The June 2005 Brussels European Council, infamous for the fallout over the budget and the future of the draft constitutional treaty, nonetheless approved conclusions on UN reform. It welcomed ‘the prominent place given to human rights, the rule of law and democracy in the reform proposals’, and supported the establishment of a Human Rights Council and strengthening the OHCHR. It shared ‘the concern to place human rights on the same footing as development, peace and security matters’ (European Council, 2005, point 37). Thus there seems to be broad agreement among EU institutions and member states on reforms to the UN’s human rights machinery. And while the EU does not appear to be leading the way on reforms in this particular issue area, its support will be crucial (but not sufficient in and of itself) if change is to occur. Although the September 2005 UN summit agreed in principle to set up a Human Rights Council, it could not agree on the details. And at the time of writing (autumn 2005), the prospects for UN agreement on a strong Human Rights Council did not appear to be bright.

Conclusion The commitment of the member states to act together within the UN is unquestionably impressive, a consensus reflex has clearly developed, and there is evidence of increasing EU ‘output’ at the UN since the early 1990s. But limits to the EU’s unity are posed mainly by conflicting national interests and the persistent desire of member states to act independently at the UN. Furthermore the energy required to reach internal agreement restricts the EU’s influence within the UN system. The implications of this in the divisive political climate at the UN are depressing.

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The impact of enlargement on EU coordination could be negative, given these weaknesses. There are clearly already socialization effects, and increasing alignment of positions between the acceding countries and the rest of the EU (Luif, 2003; Johansson-Nogués, 2004). But with more participants, EU agreements will take more time to negotiate and EU positions will become even more inflexible. Enlargement brings with it the potential for more vetoes, more split votes, and more national ‘pets’. The EU could be even less able to do outreach. But EU diplomats argue that with new streamlined procedures, more advance preparation in Brussels, and strong leadership, the potential problems posed by enlargement could be minimized. And the desire of EU diplomats, echoed in policy recommendations by the Council and European Commission, for a stronger and more effective role at the UN indicates that there is much will to redress the difficulties the EU faces when interacting with the UN. But if the EU is to be frontrunner on human rights issues at the UN, the member states must also be less inward-looking (and therefore more engaged with outsiders) and more willing to innovate and push EU initiatives. This requires a fundamental strengthening of the CFSP, not just on the ground in Geneva and New York, but in Brussels and national capitals too. Two further issues arise with respect to EU action within the UN on human rights. First, the EU wishes to retain considerable freedom of action in the field of human rights, has the policy goals and instruments to promote human rights, and has the capacity to act vis-à-vis human rights violators, when action at the international level can often prove illusory. For example, as part of its human rights policy, the EU imposes political conditionality (albeit inconsistently). The EU may thus suspend aid or diplomatic relations with other states, but does not seek authorization or legitimation for such actions from the UN. For Katarina Tomasevksi (1993, p. 122) donors that impose bilateral conditionality act as prosecutor and judge, and therefore undermine the UN multilateral system. As Crawford points out, however, the UN system itself is not impartial or consistent, and frequently takes no action whatsoever towards human rights violators (Crawford, 2001, p. 34). But the EU’s autonomy may not help that system become less partial and inconsistent. Preserving the EU’s freedom of action while strengthening the capacity to enforce standards at the international level remains a core dilemma. Second, the EU is not subject to international scrutiny of its own human rights record. The EU is not a party to any international human rights treaty. Human rights within the EU are protected principally by

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the member states, not the EU. The member states have subscribed to the major international human rights instruments, allowing outside scrutiny of their human rights records. EU statements to the UN have addressed internal EU developments in the area of human rights, but there is still no formal scrutiny of the EU’s record. The draft constitutional treaty (Article I-9) would have allowed the EU to sign up to the European Convention on Human Rights, but did not specify any other international human rights treaty. Members of the proposed Human Rights Council are to supposed to prove their human rights credentials: while the EU would not be a member of the Council itself (should one be set up), if it wishes to play a major role in it, its own house must be seen to be in order too.

Notes 1. This section draws on and updates material in Smith, 2006. 2. The Third Committee deals with social, humanitarian and cultural issues; human rights questions dominate the agenda, but it also considers issues relating to social development, crime prevention and cultural heritage. This chapter covers only the human rights questions. 3. States are elected to the CHR from the regional groups; now that EU member states are spread across three regional groups, the proportion of EU member states within the CHR could increase. 4. Human rights are often discussed in the Security Council: the obvious examples are discussions of how to respond to cases of massive human rights violations (as in Sudan). 5. In 2000 the Portuguese Presidency set up a system of burden-sharing, to allow the Presidency to allocate tasks, such as lobbying UN members, to other member states. It also created two clusters of issues for coordination in New York, so that now two coordination meetings can be held in parallel. In Geneva, there are three clusters. This creates a dilemma for small member states with fewer diplomats available to attend all the cluster meetings. 6. It will also make similar statements to human rights conferences, such as the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban. 7. Not much coordination on substantial issues goes on in most regional groups, although WEOG, the Africa Group and the Latin America group (GRULAC) have been quite active in the CHR. Other groupings, such as the Nordic Group, the Group of 77 (developing countries), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Non-Aligned Movement, are also active in the human rights fora discussed here. An informal grouping of non-European western countries, JUSCANZ ( J apan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), meets occasionally to coordinate positions, somewhat more often in the CANZ formation. The EFTAns (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland) will operate with JUSCANZ on procedural issues but are well known for aligning themselves politically to EU positions, statements, and for co-sponsoring resolutions with the EU.

The EU, Human Rights and the UN 173 8. Although only some of the EU member states are CHR members at any one time, all EU member states participate in coordination meetings. The Presidency speaks even if the member state holding the Presidency is not a full member of the CHR; non-member states are observers, and can participate in debates. 9. I conducted several interviews with diplomats from the member states, EU institutions, and non-member states (the then candidate states and other third countries) in London, New York and Brussels (almost all of whom also had experience at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva). Because the community of diplomats involved in EU coordination in this area is so small and all those interviewed wished to remain anonymous, I have not revealed their names or national affiliations. All interviews took place between December 2003 and April 2004. 10. And for the Nordic members, this has meant that Nordic Group activity – statements, sponsored resolutions – has distinctly declined as a result. 11. An additional ‘output’ is EU co-sponsorship of resolutions introduced by other states, but there is as yet no policy on co-sponsorship though in the last few years have there been attempts to have an EU position on co-sponsoring particular resolutions. EU diplomats realize that they could exercise leverage if they promise to co-sponsor resolutions together. For example, at the 2003 Third Committee, the EU held intensive discussions with Japan over its resolution on Cambodia, and when Japan took into account EU suggestions, the EU member states all agreed to co-sponsor it. Several EU diplomats, however, treasured the opportunity allowed by co-sponsorship to stake out a national position, and every single one of them said that the priority should be to get rid of the split votes before tackling common EU co-sponsorship of resolutions. 12. Leon Hurwitz found that the ‘index of voting cohesion’ on human rights issues of the original EEC member states from the 3rd session of the General Assembly (1948–49) to the 27th (1972–73) was 93.44 (out of a maximum 100), which Hurwitz classified as ‘high’ (the average level, across all issue areas, was 84.14). This does not include West Germany (which did not join the UN until 1973), and includes Ireland and Italy only from 1955, when they joined the UN (Hurwitz, 1975, pp. 231–2, especially Table 1). 13. When the Presidency made statements or explanations, and it is not explicitly stated in the UN record that this was on behalf of the EU, I have not counted this in the EU figures. The UN record may be incomplete or the Presidency may have neglected to state that it was speaking for the EU, but it also may have been speaking purely in a national capacity. EU diplomats have recently agreed that national explanations of vote or position should be avoided. 14. However, it is not always clear in the CHR documents that a resolution was introduced on behalf of the EU: this can be inferred, if the Presidency introduced it and all member states co-sponsored it, but only the EU records confirm it. This is obviously, then, a factor that has limited the EU’s visibility in the CHR. The Third Committee records are clearer about EU involvement. 15. The EU acquiesced in watering down the resolution which stopped short of formally condemning Sudan; only the US voted against the resolution. Anne

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16.

17. 18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23. 24.

Penketh, ‘UN Criticism of Sudan “Watered Down” ’, The Independent, 24 April 2004. Of course, Iran has also been the subject of European diplomacy on the sensitive issue of nuclear weapons proliferation, which might have been a factor in the decision not to press Iran on human rights at the UN. David Cronin, ‘Can Annan Rescue the UN’s Champion for Human Rights?’, European Voice, 14–20 April 2005. But cohesion on human rights issues is higher than that on other issues. Luif compared EU voting cohesion on recorded votes in the General Assembly on four topics, and found that between 1995 and 2002, there was more often an EU consensus on human rights issues (between 72.7 and 92.9 per cent of votes) than on security (between 52.9 and 76.9 per cent) and decolonization (between 37.5 and 70 per cent), but not as often as on the Middle East (between 84 and 100 per cent) (Luif, 2003, pp. 28–9, 55). At ad hoc conferences, the EU has also had some success. At the Vienna world conference on human rights in 1993, the EU’s position paper provided much of the basis for the final document of the conference, especially the appointment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (European Commission, 1995, pp. 7–8). An exception to this is the resolution on the death penalty, which has been the focus of considerable EU diplomatic activity – arguably then reflected in increasing votes in favour of it within the CHR (Council of the European Union, 2004b, p. 54). During the Italian Presidency in fall 2003, 132 coordination meetings involving Third Committee experts were held, only eleven of which were meetings with other UN member states (mimeo from the Council secretariat liaison office, New York). The EU has, however, been a regular contributor to international tribunals, including the UN tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court: its contributions are around euro 6 million a year (European Commission, 2001e and 2004d). These figures are available on the OHCHR fundraising website: http://www. ohchr.org/english/about/fundraising.htm (accessed 30 June 2005). One of the most notorious incidents illustrating the CHR’s lack of credibility was the election of Libya as chair of the 2003 session, which was opposed vociferously by the US but not overtly by the EU.

9 EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence and Effective Multilateralism Chad Damro1

The most important international initiatives to protect the global environment have been negotiated in the United Nations (UN) system. Despite the absence of environmental protection provisions in its Charter, the UN has brokered a number of multilateral agreements to address various international environmental concerns.2 The UN’s ability to advance an international environmental agenda has depended on support and pressure from many of its influential member states, not least, the members of the European Union (EU). The EU is now frequently considered a ‘frontrunner’ or leading – if somewhat complex and uncertain – actor in international environmental initiatives within the UN system.3 The EU’s role in international environmental affairs has been rather confusing for non-members who have not always perceived the Union as a unified actor. Much of the confusion surrounding the EU as a negotiator within the UN system stems from its unique legal competencies in international environmental affairs. The EU is neither a state nor a traditional international organization, which creates legal and practical questions about who is negotiating, signing, ratifying and implementing international environmental agreements on behalf of the Union. Unlike some other policy areas, the institutions of the EU and its individual member states share legal competence to engage in international environmental affairs. Given this shared competence, one might wonder how the EU could ever become an effective proponent for change in international environmental politics. Therefore, this chapter sets out to answer the following question: To what extent has the EU overcome the obstacle of shared competence to pursue effective 175

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multilateralism in UN environmental politics? In answering this question, the chapter reveals important insights related to the central themes of this volume, in particular, the capacity of the EU to act within environmental politics at the UN and the success of the EU in defending and promoting its common positions. The analysis speaks directly to the central question raised in the volume: can the EU be effective enough to act within, have influence on, and even lead the UN? This chapter assesses the EU’s effectiveness along internal and external dimensions.4 The EU’s internal effectiveness is discussed in terms of the historical, legal and political development of its system of shared competence. The exact division of this legal competence determines the practical means through which the EU participates in UN environmental negotiations. This participation is broken down into the EU’s ability to represent the Union at international negotiations, to sign and ratify agreements reached at the negotiations and to implement the domestic measures necessary to meet commitments under such agreements. The EU’s external effectiveness is discussed in terms of the Union’s institutional relations with the UN system via two of its key bodies for dealing with environmental issues: the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). External effectiveness is also assessed in terms of the Union’s ability to attain its objectives and to manage lengthy UN negotiations on climate change. The chapter first investigates the shared competence of the EU in this policy area in order to reveal the historical, legal and political foundations of the Union’s internal effectiveness. Second, it discusses the EU’s institutional relations with the UN system, in particular, the UNEP and CSD. Third, the chapter investigates the EU’s external effectiveness in UN environmental negotiations, focusing in detail on developments in the ongoing international policy debate on climate change. This case reveals the EU’s ability to manage the challenges of shared competence and to become a frontrunner in the pursuit of effective multilateralism. Finally, the chapter offers concluding remarks on the EU’s ability to promote effective multilateralism in international environmental affairs.

The EU’s shared competence in international environmental affairs The EU engages quite frequently with the UN system in international environmental affairs. This should not be surprising given the integrative

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nature of the EU and the cross-border nature of global environmental challenges. These features tend to create a complementary relationship between the EU and UN. As Eeckhout points out, ‘It is of course in the nature of many environmental problems that they cross borders between States, and increasingly such problems are of a global character. Therefore, much of [the EU’s] involvement is logical’ (Eeckhout, 2004, p. 119). As the EU deals with cross-border environmental protection within the Union, so too does it engage in environmental protection initiatives that are increasingly pursued through multilateral environmental agreements. The UN also offers the EU a forum through which it can increase its international profile and enhance its credibility in the eyes of its member states and European citizens. The work programme of the UN bodies also encourages EU participation in international environmental affairs because it complements the Union’s active, public, pro-environment advocacy and reflects a shared emphasis on the need for sustainable development.5 However, this seemingly natural, logical and somewhat symbiotic relationship has not always been the norm, and even today, EU–UN relations in environmental affairs are not wholly unproblematic. The 1957 Treaty of Rome did not explicitly cover cooperation in environmental policy, an omission that restricted the EU’s ability to operate in international environmental affairs. Nevertheless, the European Commission gradually acquired authority in international environmental politics. The acquisition of this authority was based on a number of legal and political decisions that created a system of shared, or mixed, competence. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) 1971 ERTA decision provided an important, but not specifically environmental, legal basis upon which the Commission could begin to Europeanize environmental policy and act in international environmental affairs. According to this ECJ decision, when the European Community (EC) has the right (that is, acquires legal competence) to legislate internally, it also has the right to act externally in matters that might affect that internal legislation. During the early 1970s, the European Commission also began including environmental cooperation with third parties in its Environmental Action Programmes, the first of which was issued in 1973. The Commission linked its competence over environmental policy with its competence in trade policy by arguing that implementation of international environmental agreements could affect EU competitiveness. Consequently during the 1970s, the EC became a party to a number of international environmental agreements, such as the 1974 Paris

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Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution, the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea and the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. While the EC’s involvement in international environmental agreements in the 1970s resulted from the ERTA case and ad hoc political decisions, the Single European Act (1986) incorporated environmental policy for the first time into the EU’s treaty structure (Eeckhout, 2004, p. 40). The Maastricht Treaty (1992) then afforded the EC competence ‘to conclude international environmental agreements, which then are binding on the institutions of the Community and on the Member States’ (Krämer, 1995, p. 84). Under the current arrangement, both the EC and the member states are legally competent to act in international environmental affairs. Within the international community, this legal system of shared competence creates immediate questions about the precise extent to which the EU can be effective in the UN because it raises three important questions related to international negotiations: Who represents? Who signs and ratifies? Who implements? To answer the first question, the EU has developed a system of dual representation in UN environmental negotiations. Both the Commission and the member state holding the Presidency are responsible for representing the Union in different instances. This stands in stark contrast to policy areas that fall under the exclusive competence of the EC, such as trade policy. Under shared competence, member states and the EC could, in principle, each negotiate independently in those areas falling under their respective competences. In practice, however, it is ‘rare for the Community and the Member States to negotiate independently, and co-ordination, or at least consultation, among the Member States and the Commission generally takes place’ (Macleod et al., 1996, p. 152). The Commission speaks for the EU when areas under the EC’s exclusive competence are being discussed and the member state holding the Presidency speaks for the Union when areas of shared competence are being considered. Despite this legal distinction, the Commission can be asked and frequently does represent the EU when areas of mixed competence are being discussed (Sbragia, 1998, p. 293). Representation in international negotiations often requires membership in the associated international organization or at least recognition by negotiating partners. The EU’s institutional relationship with the UN system is based on a General Assembly Resolution that grants the EC only permanent observer status, including participation rights, in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).6 Thus, the EC (represented by the European Commission) and not the

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EU, formally possesses permanent observer status. The reasons for this limited status ‘are as much located in resistance by international organizations themselves and by third countries, as in traditional concerns over sovereignty in the [EU] Member States’ (Eeckhout, 2004, p. 224). The answer to the second question must consider the competencies of both signing and ratifying international environmental agreements. The EU treaties do not specifically designate responsibility for signing international environmental agreements. Environmental agreements negotiated under shared competence are known as ‘mixed agreements’. Because they often touch upon a number of different policy areas, such mixed agreements must be signed by both the EC and the individual member states. Regarding ratification, shared competence also requires the involvement of both the EC and the member states. Prior to ratification, the Council will make a formal statement – a Council Conclusion – ‘of the legal bases upon which the agreement is concluded, involving citation of the relevant Treaty articles’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, p. 96). As Vogler notes, ‘Implementing legislation, if this is required, must be on the table at the same time [as ratification]. The process can extend over two years or more, but it involves the EU, through its common legal system and the supervisory role of the Commission, operating as a single actor’ (Vogler, 1999, p. 38). For the actual ratification of the agreement, procedures differ between the EC and the individual member states. According to Macleod et al., The procedures by which the Community and the Member States approve or ratify agreements depend on their respective institutional requirements. For the Community, conclusion of an agreement will require the adoption of an act in accordance with the appropriate legal basis approving or authorizing the conclusion of the agreement on behalf of the Community, and authorizing the Commission or the Presidency, or both, or some other representative of the Community, to communicate the fact of the Community’s approval to the other party or parties to the agreement by arranging for deposit of the instrument of approval with the depositary, or otherwise as provided in the agreement. Each of the Member States would likewise have to arrange for formal approval of the agreement in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. (Macleod, et al., 1996, p. 154) The answer to the third question – who implements – varies depending on whether the Union and/or the member states have competence over the policy area in question. This is so because the implementation of UN

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environmental agreements can potentially touch upon a number of policy areas that move beyond traditional environmental policy and do not fall under the EC’s exclusive competence – for example, industrial policy, consumer policy, overseas economic development policy, science and research policy, agricultural policy, marine/fisheries policy, technology policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, transport policy and humanitarian assistance policy. Under shared competence, the EC and the member states have to agree internally how they will implement any international commitments adopted at UN or international environmental conferences that might affect these various policy areas. This can be a time-consuming process that typically requires the creation of new legislation. Based on the ECJ’s Ruling 1/78, the EC can only implement those provisions of a mixed agreement that come under its legal competence. Provisions not under EC competence can only be implemented by the member states. Similarly, the European Commission can only monitor member state compliance with mixed agreements in those areas that come under EC competence (Eeckhout, 2004, p. 220). The implementation of mixed agreements can create problems for the EU in UN environmental negotiations. Third parties tend to dislike the uncertainty caused by negotiating with a partner who offers confusing and complex implementation and monitoring arrangements. And even if that partner professes vigorous implementation and monitoring arrangements, ongoing suspicion may linger. Despite these legal complexities and the suspicions they can engender, the EU has engaged in active implementation of a number of multilateral environmental agreements, some of which have required the creation of quite extensive new legislation. According to Vogler, the EU’s record across these agreements ‘does not indicate that national differences and problems of implementation result in inertia or acquiescence in the lowest common denominator in terms of environmental protection’ (Vogler, 2005, p. 848). Because of the EU’s shared competence, the Union may encounter difficulties at UN environmental negotiations over who represents, signs, ratifies and implements agreements. Despite this apparent limitation, the EU has seemingly become an important, if not leading, participant in UN environmental negotiations. Much of the EU’s success in this regard follows from the internal effectiveness generated by the system of shared competence. The end-product of the legal and political development of this system now provides the institutional basis through which the EU participates in UN environmental negotiations.

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The EU’s institutional relations with the UN system The EU’s external effectiveness in this policy area depends in large part on the internal effectiveness generated by its system of shared competence. However, the external effectiveness can also be discussed in terms of the EU’s ability to establish formal relations with various UN bodies. The EU’s environmental relations with the UN system rely heavily on institutional links with two key bodies: the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). UNEP The UN’s role in international environmental politics has become particularly important since 1972, when the UN Conference on the Human Environment established the UNEP. The UNEP is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly (GA) whose Governing Council consists of 58 members that are elected by the GA for four-year terms, taking into account the principle of equitable regional representation. In 2005, ten members of the EU were members of the UNEP Governing Council. While the EC is a major donor to a number of UN-related funds for environmental protection, ‘collectively the EU Member States are the largest donor to the UNEP’s Environment Fund’ (European Commission, 2005d, p. 39).7 In addition to the substantial funding provided by its member states, the EU also has a physical presence at UNEP. The EC delegation responsible for relations with UNEP is located at the institution’s headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. The head of delegation is accredited to UNEP as the EC permanent representative with observer status and the delegation is in the process of securing the accreditation of the Rural Development and Conservation Advisor as deputy permanent representative (European Commission, 2001a). In addition, the Commission recently announced that, in order to express its commitment to and increase cooperation with UNEP, it ‘has also decided to post a senior official to its Delegation in Nairobi … to follow UNEP’s day-to-day activities’ (European Commission, 2004c). For its part, UNEP also maintains a physical presence in the EU. It has an office in Brussels that produces a newsletter (EU Environment News) every two weeks. The stated goal of this office is to identify links between UNEP and EU environmental policies. This example suggests intersecting multilateralisms can create synergies among interacting international institutions which effectively further distinct institutional programmes and agendas.

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The EU’s status in the UNEP has been modified ‘to allow regular consultation and exchanges of documents between the Commission and UNEP’ (Vogler, 1999, p. 33). In September 2004, EU Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström and UNEP Executive Director Klaus Töpfer signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the stated intent of strengthening ‘their cooperation to fight global threats to the environment more effectively’ (European Commission, 2004c). This cooperation is intended to support implementation of a number of commitments, including ● ●

●

●

‘Sustainable production and consumption; Capacity building in developing countries and countries in transition to assist them in reaching sustainable development and environmentrelated targets, enforcing international environmental agreements and integrating environmental considerations into their trade policies; Supporting the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements, with an initial focus on the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity and agreements on regional seas; and Providing global access to clean water and sanitation and sustainable energy’. (European Commission, 2004c)

The EU and UNEP are also considering possibilities to widen their financial cooperation. The Memorandum provides a framework for structured and consistent collaboration that envisages regular meetings at senior and expert levels, strategic policy discussions and financial cooperation. According to the Commission, ‘these activities are expected to intensify the partnership between the two institutions, increase the effectiveness of their work, and strengthen international environmental governance’ (European Commission, 2004c). The first High Level Meeting to take place under the Memorandum was convened in Brussels in May 2005, and was co-chaired by Klaus Töpfer and Catherine Day (Director-General of DG Environment). The meeting produced a Joint Work Programme to reinforce EU–UNEP policy dialogue and collaboration and to support commitments on sustainable development (European Commission, 2005b). Both sides at the High Level Meeting ‘also discussed the desirability of upgrading UNEP into a specialized UN Environment Organisation’ (European Commission, 2005b), a position echoed soon afterward in the European Commission’s ‘Strategy for Successful UN Summit’ (European

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Commission, 2005d).8 Therefore, both the EU and UNEP are collaborating closely not only on substantive environmental matters, but also on trying to shape the future of environmental governance – a process through which the EU could significantly influence the UN’s organization and effectiveness.9 CSD The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was created in December 1992 to ensure effective follow-up of the agreements reached at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The CSD is a functional commission of the ECOSOC. It has 53 members who are elected for a three-year term by ECOSOC. As of its thirteenth session (CSD-13) in April 2005, the CSD’s members included nine member states of the EU. The EC is not a member of the CSD. In fact, its exact status in this UN body was quite controversial – ECOSOC argued over the participation of the European Commission and the EC’s status in the CSD for two years (Vogler, 1999, p. 34). In the end, the EC was granted special ‘full participant’ status, which confers significant rights of participation without the voting rights afforded by ‘full member’ status. The EU exercises a significant presence at the annual CSD meetings, which are convened at UN headquarters in New York. For example, participants at CSD-12 (April 2004) included numerous EU memberstate delegations and a 19-member EC delegation comprised of Environment Directorate-General (DG) and other Commission officials. Prior to CSD-13, in March 2005, the EU Environment Council met in the presence of the CSD-13 Chair, Dr John Ashe, to exchange views on the preparation of the conference. The Luxembourg Presidency expressed the main positions of the EU for CSD-13: ●

●

●

●

The need for CSD-13 to pay more attention than in the past to intersectoral questions; A requirement for CSD-13 to set out a clear position and to insist on the environmental dimension of each of the Millennium Objectives; The need for governments to reach agreement on operating political guidelines, that can be translated into concrete actions to be put into practice by clearly identified stakeholders; The crucial necessity for the CSD-13 to adopt follow-up and control mechanisms. (United Nations Environment Programme, 2005, p. 4)

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During CSD-13, the Luxembourg Presidency spoke on behalf of the Union. It is notable but not uncommon that, in the opening remarks, the representative from Luxembourg mentioned that not only was she speaking on behalf of the EU, but that the Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate Countries Turkey and Croatia, the Countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declaration. (Colotte, 2005) It is also notable that EU Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas made two interventions during High Level Panel discussions at the CSD-13 to address the impact of natural disasters and the ways in which the EU was meeting its commitments to sustainable development.10 The EU clearly participates actively in the work of the CSD. In conformity with the procedures of shared competence, the Presidency plays a particularly prominent role at the annual conferences. And while the EC is not a member of the CSD, its hard-fought status allows the Commission to make its presence felt. Ultimately, such formal arrangements with the CSD – like those with UNEP – provide the EU institutional avenues through which to exercise its own external effectiveness and promote its desire for effective multilateralism within the UN system.

The EU’s role in UN environmental negotiations – the case of climate change This section provides a case study of the EU’s role in UN climate change negotiations. Climate change is a useful case because it sheds light on the EU’s engagement with a long-term, deliberative process from 1992 to the present. The EU’s internal and external effectiveness and its ability to become a frontrunner can be judged more accurately from an empirical analysis of this lengthy process. The case reveals the EU’s ability to manage the challenges of shared competence and to promote effective multilateralism in this policy area. It also illustrates how the EU actually represents itself and signs, ratifies and implements agreements reached at a series of UN conferences that took place outside of UN institutional bodies such as UNEP and CSD.

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Launching the climate change negotiations The most significant and comprehensive advance in international environmental negotiations since the 1972 Stockholm Conference occurred in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This ‘Earth Summit’, which was attended by over 100 heads of state, launched the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).11 The UNFCCC also raised a number of questions about the EC’s legal ability to represent the Union in such negotiations. Despite lacking exclusive competence over the myriad policy areas to be addressed at UNCED, the Council of Ministers decided that the EC should participate with the member states on equal grounds (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998, pp. 213–29). Thus, UNCED’s draft rules of procedure were amended and the EC ‘briefly acquired rights equivalent to those of participating states, except for voting and the submission of procedural motions’ (Vogler, 1999, p. 33). The international community, therefore, acknowledged the EC’s internal effectiveness and potential contribution to the work programme of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC generated a number of UN negotiations on climate change during the 1990s. These UN negotiations were driven by a follow-up working group – known as the Conference of the Parties (COP) – also established at the Earth Summit. The COP’s first annual meeting, COP-1, was held in Berlin in 1995. At this conference, the Berlin Mandate was agreed: Annex-I (industrialized) states would negotiate real cuts in their greenhouse gas emissions, to be concluded by the end of 1997, when the COP-3 was scheduled to be held in Kyoto, Japan. Representing the EU position Due to shared competence, the EU’s representation of its position was influenced throughout the UNFCCC by the Commission, the ‘Troika’, the EU Presidency and individual member states.12 Despite these numerous actors, the EU’s position was undertaken in accordance with guidelines decided by the Council of Ministers and likely seen by third parties as representing the Union’s position (Sbragia with Damro, 1999, p. 61). These pre-negotiation positions, which follow coordination meetings and signal the extent to which the member states agree to Europeanize their positions, may contribute to EU coherence. As Bretherton and Vogler argue, after some early problems, Once a coordination meeting has taken up a position all are bound by it. Both Member State and Commission sources have attested to

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the improvement in Community/Member State consistency at negotiations. One Member State negotiator observed to us that over the past three years, in which he had been an active participant, there had been a notable ‘tightening up’ allowing Member States ‘less space to go their own way’. (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, p. 95) Thus, in practice, these pre-negotiation positions and subsequent Council decisions (see below) may actually help to establish internal effectiveness and provide a degree of certainty for COP negotiating partners. This characterization, however, of internal effectiveness is disputed. For example, some questioned the EU’s ability to negotiate/represent at Kyoto because of internal divisions. EU climate policy was still controversial and the EU spent much time negotiating with itself: ‘The coherence of the US administration contrasted with … the unwieldy (and introspective) morass of EU decision making during the negotiating process’ (Grubb et al., 1999, p. 112). Also, the optimism created in Kyoto was short-lived and the EU demonstrated no impressive leadership at the next COP. In fact, it has been noted that the EU was not able to present one single proposal at COP-4 in Buenos Aires in 1998 due to internal strife (Hovi et al., 2003, p. 17; see also Tangen, 1999). Notwithstanding these examples, it is best to judge the EU’s effectiveness at these negotiations in light of the entire process and the results achieved. As will be discussed below, the empirical record to date suggests considerable EU effectiveness despite its relative incoherence and possible shortcomings at individual COPs. The Kyoto Protocol The COP-3 meeting was held in Kyoto in December 1997. Prior to the meeting, the EU Council of environment ministers adopted a prenegotiating position in which they called for an ambitious emissions reduction target of 15 per cent below 1990 levels by the year 2010 (European Commission, 1997). In response, the US announced its less ambitious plan to reach 1990 levels by 2010 and obtain a further 5 per cent reduction by 2015. After eleven days of negotiating at Kyoto, the parties compromised and adopted a set of legally binding greenhouse emissions targets: Annex-I countries would reduce emissions of six greenhouse gases from 1990 levels by at least 5 per cent during the period 2008–12. As a ‘frontrunner’, the EU committed to the highest reduction target of 8 per cent. Eleven other (at-the-time) non-EU European countries also

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committed to an 8 per cent reduction, which suggests the pressure felt by EU applicants to Europeanize their positions. The US agreed to a 7 per cent reduction. Developing countries were temporarily excluded from the reductions largely based on the argument that they had not been responsible, as yet, for significant greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature on 16 March 1998, but negotiations over the agreement were far from finished. The agreement only provided basic features and outlines of the Kyoto mechanisms and compliance system; it did not elaborate the precise rules for how they would operate. At COP-6 in The Hague in 2000, negotiations broke down largely over disagreements between the EU and US about how they could meet their emission reduction targets. In March 2001, the new George W. Bush Administration announced that the US would not ratify the Protocol.13 In July 2001, the COP-6 was reconvened in Bonn. The parties eventually adopted the Bonn Agreements and agreed to pursue the ratification of the Protocol by 2002. The US had effectively pulled out of the Kyoto process by this point and failed to contribute to continuing negotiations in the run-up to COP-7 (Environment Watch, 2001, pp. 1–2). The scene now appeared set for the EU to assume a leading role in the Kyoto process. At COP-7, held in Marrakech, Morocco, from 29 October to 9 November 2001, the parties adopted the Marrakech Accords, a comprehensive set of detailed rules for implementing the Protocol. In order to persuade other Annex-I countries to participate in the final stages of the Kyoto process, the EU conceded a number of requirements demanded by Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia, including issues upon which the Union had previously refused US demands (Hovi et al., 2003, p. 19). The signing of the Marrakech Accords marked a milestone in the Kyoto process. The next major cycle in this negotiation saga began with the onset of the ratification process. Ratifying Kyoto According to the Kyoto Protocol’s ratification requirements, at least 55 Parties to the Convention were required to ratify the agreement for it to come into force. In addition, those 55 parties had to include enough Annex-I countries to account for at least 55 per cent of total global greenhouse emissions from that same group of states in 1990. The EU signed the Kyoto Protocol on 29 April 1998. In 1999, at the COP-6 in Bonn, the EU urged all Parties to ratify the Kyoto Protocol as soon as possible (European Commission, 2000a). After the US’s

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withdrawal from the process in March 2001, the EU decided it would set an example for other Parties by heading for its own swift internal ratification of the Protocol (Hovi et al., 2003, p. 18). By setting an early example, the EU acted as a frontrunner, hoping to persuade enough followers to ratify for the Protocol to come into force. In October 2001, the implementation process began in earnest as the Commission issued its proposal for the Council to approve the Kyoto Protocol (European Commission, 2001g). In December 2001, the Laeken European Council announced that the EU wanted the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force ahead of the World Summit on Sustainable Development to be held in Johannesburg in August–September 2002. To that end, the Council approved the Protocol on behalf of the Community in April 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2002). The member states were to coordinate their action to deposit their instruments of ratification at the same time as the Union by 1 June 2002. The EU met its deadline and ratified the Protocol on 31 May 2002. The extent to which the EU actually acted as a frontrunner in the Kyoto process is, of course, open to debate. Many countries signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol before the EU. However, the EU’s actions should be assessed in relation to other Annex-I countries. Of all Annex-I countries, only one signed the Protocol before the EU and four ratified before the EU – two of which (Iceland and Norway) ratified only a week before the EU. By its sheer number of signatories, the EU has contributed significantly to the signing and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. When the 15 members of the EU originally signed the Protocol, they represented 27 per cent of the 55 countries necessary for the agreement to come into force. They also represented 24.2 per cent of the emissions necessary to meet the 55 per cent threshold of gas emissions necessary for the agreement to come into force. After the EU’s enlargement in 2004, the Union’s contribution to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol increased substantially. At present, the EU-25 represents 45 per cent of the 55 countries necessary for the agreement to come into force. The EU also now represents 30 per cent of all Annex-I emissions of greenhouse gases, which accounts for over half the 55 per cent threshold of emissions necessary for the agreement to come into force. Without ratification by the US – the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases – the final fate of the Protocol remained in limbo. To meet the thresholds required for the agreement to come into force, it soon became clear that Russia would be the pivotal state. By 2004, 124 countries had ratified the agreement, but they only represented 44 per cent of

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global greenhouse gas emissions. If Russia, representing 17.4 per cent of greenhouse emissions, were to ratify the Protocol, the thresholds would be achieved, and the agreement would come into force. Courting Russia Initially, Russia expressed scepticism toward the Kyoto Protocol as a form of potentially growth-threatening environmental regulation. In order to cajole Russia into supporting the agreement, the EU needed to employ leverage from another policy area. The EU found this leverage in linking Russian support for Kyoto to EU support for Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The EU did not officially announce the linkage of its support for WTO membership with Russian support for Kyoto. However, many signals suggest this linkage was clear in the minds of negotiators from both the EU and Russia. In May 2004, EU environment ministers downplayed, in a rather transparent manner, the linkage between the two issues. British Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett said ‘I don’t think that you would ever find that the one is a trade-off for the other. On the other hand, there is no doubt that there are economic advantages to Russia. … They’re part of the same overall picture. That’s not the same as saying they’re part of the same negotiation.’ Another minister added ‘The Russians see a very tight connection there. … We would never speak of a link. We believe that we can solve both on a parallel basis.’14 The ‘linkage’ negotiations began to intensify in late April 2004, in Moscow, during a meeting between European Commission President Romano Prodi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Prodi urged Russia to ratify the Protocol, and Kyoto and WTO membership were discussed as part of a possible package deal to be agreed at an upcoming EU–Russia Summit to be held one month later.15 On 21 May 2004, at the EU–Russia Summit, the deal was sealed when the EU announced its support for Russia’s WTO accession, and President Putin announced that he would ‘speed up’ the process for Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.16 More directly, Putin declared ‘The EU has met us halfway in talks over the WTO and that cannot but affect positively our position on the Kyoto Protocol’.17 Notably, the formal agreement reached at the EU–Russia Summit included only provisions on WTO membership. But Putin’s promise to speed up the ratification process was fulfilled in October 2004, when the Russian State Duma gave its first reading of the draft law on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. On 18 November 2004, Russia ratified the

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Protocol, which put the number of parties (141) and the total emissions output they represented (61.6 per cent) beyond the required thresholds. On 16 February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The EU’s active efforts to court Russian support for Kyoto are clearly evident. However, the extent to which Russia really conceded much is questionable. Russia desired and won EU support for its WTO membership bid. In addition, the emissions trading system envisaged under the Protocol offered potentially lucrative gains for Russia.18 The agreement limits emissions to 1990 levels, a time when the remnants of inefficient Soviet industry were still producing very high levels of greenhouse gases. Since 1990, Russia’s economic slowdown has reduced dramatically its emissions levels, which means that, in effect, it has already exceeded the reduction targets under the Protocol. As a result, Russia will have an excess of emissions quotas that it can sell for billions of dollars within the emissions trading system.19 Thus, Russia’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol appears to be entirely consistent with national preferences rather than bending to European priorities. But, regardless of Russia’s motives, this decision also reveals the importance of issuelinkage as a tool available to the EU for increasing its external effectiveness in international environmental negotiations.

Conclusions This chapter set out to investigate the extent to which shared competence limits the EU’s ability to pursue effective multilateralism in UN environmental politics. Ultimately, the EU does seem to have overcome the obstacle of shared competence to become internally and externally effective in this important policy area. Internally, environmental policy has been Europeanized through legal developments and policy decisions. The EU’s internal effectiveness is reflected in the resulting Council decisions, Commission communications and the ability of the Council, Presidency and Commission to coordinate international representation and sign, ratify and implement multilateral environmental agreements. Without such Europeanization of domestic policies and positions, the EU would be a hopelessly ineffective actor at the UN. But through these changes, the EU is able to increase its internal and, therefore, external effectiveness to the extent that it has become an influential – though not unitary – frontrunner in UN environmental politics. Externally, the EU has pursued and attained a number of its common objectives and, thus, has been able to Europeanize certain aspects of

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environmental policy in the UN system. The EU has developed formal institutional relations with a subsidiary body of the General Assembly (UNEP) and a functional commission of the ECOSOC (CSD), through which it maintains an active role in the UN system and endeavours to promote effective multilateralism and influence the institutional structure of international environmental governance. It has also employed a new tool of issue-linkage to obtain its objectives in the decade-long UN negotiations on climate change. The EU’s ability to act as a frontrunner becomes clear in the Kyoto process where, despite occasional setbacks during the lengthy negotiations, the Union ultimately managed to encourage Russia to ratify the Protocol. To be sure, the EU does remain a complex and sometimes confusing actor in UN environmental politics. And even its apparent success in the Kyoto process can only really be judged once the agreement becomes fully operational in 2012. Despite these caveats and the potential problems arising from shared competence, the EU’s capacity to act in international environmental affairs must now be taken seriously by the UN’s institutions and member states. And while questions should remain about its ongoing effectiveness, the EU does seem at this point to have become effective enough to act within, have influence on, and even lead the UN in international environmental politics.

Notes 1. The author would like to thank Caroline Bouchard for research assistance on this chapter. 2. For a useful treatment of the UN’s role in global environmental politics, see Elliott, 2004. 3. While the EU is often referred to as a ‘leader’, it is important to note that this chapter does not employ the concept of ‘leadership’ for analytical purposes. For useful discussions of the concept of leadership in international negotiations, see Hovi et al., 2003, p. 16; Andresen and Agrawala, 2002; and O. Young, 1991. 4. For a useful discussion of more general means of assessing the effectiveness of international organizations in international environmental politics, see Biermann and Bauer, 2004, pp. 189–93. 5. The link between environmental protection and development has become particularly salient since the early 1990s. The European Commission has adopted development-specific action plans on both climate change and biodiversity (European Commission, 2005a). The EU has also been an active participant in discussing the linkages between environmental protection and development at the UN’s Millennium Summit in 2000, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. For example, the UNGA agreed that one or more representatives of the EU could participate and be included in the list of speakers for the plenary meetings of the Millennium Summit (UNGA resolution A/RES/54/281).

192 Chad Damro 6. UNGA Resolution 3208 (XXIX), 11 October 1974. In 1979, the EC was also granted the status of Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO), which allows it to participate in multilateral environmental negotiations. 7. In terms of funding, the EU has clearly taken a prominent role in international environmental initiatives: ‘The EU Member States are also major contributors to the Montreal Protocol Fund [UNDP], the Global Environment Facility [UNDP and UNEP], and the UN Forum on Forest [ECOSOC, UNDP, UNEP]. Together with the Community, the Member States provide almost half of the basic funding for the major Rio Conventions (Desertification, Climate and Biodiversity) and an even higher proportion of the financing made available through these Conventions to assist developing countries’ (European Commission, 2005a, pp. 39–40). 8. Similarly, at the 23rd session of UNEP’s Governing Council (February 2005), the EU pushed for transformation of the 58-member UNEP Governing Council into a universal body, but was opposed by the US, Russia, Japan and other members (UNNGLS 2005, p. 3). 9. For a useful discussion of the EU and international environmental governance, see Vogler, 2005, pp. 835–50. 10. For more on the EU’s role in the daily negotiations at CSD-13, see the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2005. 11. The Earth Summit was also notable for the launch of the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Convention on Bio-diversity and the establishment of the CSD. 12. Until the Amsterdam Treaty was ratified, the Troika was comprised of the past, present, and future holders of the EU Presidency. In the case of the 1997 Kyoto Summit, the Troika consisted of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. After 1999, the Troika comprised the present and future presidencies and the High Representative for the CFSP (with Commission involvement). 13. The Bush Administration withdrew its support over questions about the accuracy of scientific evidence supporting climate change, the strains that emission reductions would put on the US economy and the fact that developing countries were not obligated to participate in emission reductions. 14. Jeff Mason, ‘EU Sees Russia Ratifying Kyoto – Environment Mins’, Reuters, 16 May 2004. 15. ‘EU, Russia Extend Trade Deal, Discuss WTO, Kyoto Protocol’, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol. 8, no. 15, 28 April 2004. 16. ‘EU Suggests Terms for Russia’s WTO Entry, Putin Signals Support for Kyoto Protocol’, Bridges Weekly Trade New Digest, vol. 8, no. 19, 2 June 2004. 17. ‘EU Supports WTO Membership for Russia’, Associated Press Newswire, 21 May 2004. 18. For more on Kyoto’s emissions trading system, see Damro and Méndez, 2003. 19. Anders Aslund, ‘Kyoto Could Be Russia’s Ticket to Europe’, International Herald Tribune, 6 April 2004.

Part IV Conclusions

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10 Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union and Multilateral Institutions Knud Erik Jørgensen

Introduction: a new research agenda According to an EU pamphlet, ‘the European Union believes in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems. It therefore attaches great importance to effective multilateralism, with a strong United Nations at its heart. The UN, with its universal mandate and legitimacy, is uniquely placed to respond to our common challenges’ (European Council, 2003a, p. 16). Ambassador John Richardson, former head of the European Commission delegation to the UN, argues that two paradigms of international politics are competing to become the ordering principle of world order. The first is associated with interest-based power politics, whereas the second ‘points to the growing economic and ecological interdependence of our societies and the necessity of new forms of global governance to complement national action. … The experience of the Union with the sharing of state sovereignty is clearly related to the second paradigm and also to the EU’s firm support for the development of the United Nations as well as other elements of multilateral governance’ (Richardson, 2002, p. 13). For Robert Cooper, Director-General of External and Politico-Military Affairs for the Council of the EU, ‘Multilateralism and the rule of law have an intrinsic value. We value pluralism and the rule of law domestically, and it is difficult for democratic societies – including the USA – to escape from the idea that they are desirable internationally as well. … Those who want pluralism and multilateralism to survive have a duty to make the United Nations effective (as the leaders of the democracies strikingly failed to do in the case of the League of Nations)’ (Cooper, 2003, pp. 164, 168). According to 195

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Espen Barth Eide, ‘the EU is in many ways becoming the UN’s main Western partner’ (Eide, 2004, p. 3). Most contributors to the present volume suggest that EU–UN relations have become a key feature in the global web of influence. Though pamphlets, diplomats and analysts should not always be taken at face value, the quotations (and other indicators) suggest that it is worthwhile to explore why pluralistic, liberal societies choose to pursue multilateralism. To specify the subject matter, I begin by explicating different meanings of the key notion ‘intersection’. This is followed by an outline of an agenda for research on the relationship between the EU and multilateral institutions, including the UN. The current unsatisfactory state of affairs – characterized by the absence of such an agenda – implies that we lack comprehensive and systematic research. At least two avenues of inquiry are capable of contributing to such an endeavour. The first begins with the rich literature on global governance which takes as its starting point a complex international system in which multilateralism is but part of a global governance system (for overviews, see Rosenau, 1995; Weiss, 2000; Fomerand, 2002). In this literature, the state-centric character of the multilateral system is often bemoaned and multilateralism is at best regarded as the Westphalian system’s cooperative face, as a mechanism which consolidates state sovereignty and represents unequal power relationships. In contrast, the global governance perspective is claimed to represent the vision and realities of a globalized twenty-first century in which both state and non-state actors engage in world politics. Though all sorts of actors have been included in the category of non-state actors, the EU has for some reason been systematically excluded. The aim of this chapter is not to explain the exclusion of the EU in analyses of global governance but to understand the EU’s policy of supporting ‘effective multilateralism’ and to ‘try on for size’ a number of potential factors explaining EU policy making. For this reason, it seems to me that a most suitable source of inspiration for such research is the extensive and analytically rich literature on the US and the multilateral system (see Karns and Mingst, 1990; Ruggie, 1993, 1998; Luck, 1999; Patrick and Forman, 2002; and Foot et al., 2003). Whereas each work has its own core assumptions and agenda, that is, preferred questions to ask and answer, each shares an interest in exploring a range of common core issues. While mechanical application should never be attempted, this literature provides a wealth of information and inspiration. Hence, I examine the proposed explanations – internal, external and constitutive factors – for why the EU and its members might have made a choice for effective

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multilateralism. In the third section of the chapter, I pay special attention to the issue of the EU’s impact on multilateral institutions. In short, multilateralism will be assessed from an (unusual) actor perspective.

Intersections Three major perspectives on the nature of intersecting multilateralism avail themselves for our inquiry. The first is an EU perspective: the EU itself is or has been a prominent example of multilateralism. According to Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘the institution of multilateralism, which in the postwar era has given rise to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European Community (EC), or even the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), represented a demanding organizational form that is quite at odds with the simple bilateralism which we would expect if (structural) realism were indeed the sole organizational model for international politics’ (Kratochwil, 1994, preface). Intersecting multilateralism comes into play in two different ways: partly due to different preferences within the EU regarding the institutional infrastructure of an ‘ever closer Union’; partly due to member states and EU institutions’ conceptions of global multilateralism. In this respect, Lisbeth Aggestam points out that the EU’s flagship initiative of supporting global multilateral institutions has been preconditioned by a fairly recently emerged consensus among key-EU member states (see Aggestam, 2004; for the opposite view, see Krause, 2004). Others argue that perhaps the EU has been an important example of regional multilateralism in the past, but the Constitutional Treaty would have implied a qualitative leap, essentially moving the EU beyond the sphere of inter-state relations and into the sphere of domestic hierarchical order. When exploring this issue we need not subscribe to simplistic formulae, because ‘the simple dichotomy between horizontal and vertical forms of organization (anarchy versus hierarchy) may need refinement if we want to explain both order and the variety of organizational forms that we encounter in the international and domestic arena’ (Kratochwil, 1994, p. x). The second major institutional perspective on intersecting multilateralism focuses on the relationship between a regional multilateral institution, the EU, and the most universal of all multilateral institutions, the UN, and the multilateral system more generally. This perspective also comes in two versions. Scholars working within the first version believe the EU basically is an international organization, perhaps a special organization but nonetheless an international organization (Foot et al., 2003, p. 15; Guigner, 2006). In such a perspective, important

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issues on the research agenda comprise the development of interorganizational networks as well as cooperation, conflict and competition among multilateral organizations. Scholars working within the second version take as their point of departure the EU’s aspiration to act in international organizations not to be an international organization. They tend to conclude that the EU sometimes displays a capacity to live up to its ambitious global aspirations (Ginsberg, 2002). There is no need to make an a priori choice between the two kinds of relationship, particularly because both kinds may prove relevant to varying degrees across issue areas. The EU and the UN display a range of intersecting and contrasting multilateralisms. While the UN has universal membership, the EU has a limited (regional) membership open to European states only. Furthermore, apart from apartheid no kind of political regime has been a hindrance to UN membership whereas for the EU democratic rule is a standard of civilization. Finally, the EU combines two distinct modes of being: on the one hand, a (dense) multilateral system of states and, on the other hand, a hierarchical (domestic) order. For these reasons, the projection of the EU’s self internationally has to be a mixed and somewhat vague message. A third, political, perspective focuses on the intersecting multilateralism of the EU and the US respectively, pointing to the more or less diverging conceptions that inform European and American policy making. It is significant that ‘multilateralism’ has become a contested concept, in particular if it indicates that the US and the EU have different visions of world order and consequently different ideas concerning which means to apply in order to achieve desirable political ends (Kupchan, 2002; van Oudenaren, 2003; Eide, 2004; Koops, 2004). According to the 2003 European Security Strategy, one of the Union’s key objectives is the pursuit of effective multilateralism and support for international organizations, above all the UN. This illustrates well the deeply embedded differences between US and EU conceptions of multilateralism. For the Union, multilateralism is both a means and an end in its own right, hence a key component of world order, understood as the domestication or the legalization of world politics. For Union policymakers it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of world order without the UN (reformed or not). The three types of intersection are analytically distinct, but overlapping. In this chapter, I will primarily focus on the second perspective, that is, the relationship between the EU and multilateral institutions, which is the main theme of the present volume. However, due to the presence of

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overlaps, comments on the two other perspectives will be sprinkled throughout the chapter.

Explaining EU policy concerning multilateral institutions First of all, to understand fully the rationale of specific studies, it is crucially important to pay attention to the context in which they have been prepared. Margaret P. Karns and Karen Mingst explore patterns of changing instrumentality and influence in the light of the image of declining US power. In the late 1980s, it was a fairly common perception that American power was declining and Karns, Mingst and their team analyse how the US handled this decline as regards multilateral institutions (Karns and Mingst, 1990).1 The context of both Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman’s Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy and Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane and Michael Mastanduno’s US Hegemony and International Organizations is the unilateralism/multilateralism schism, which was lurking during the Clinton Administration and rapidly surfaced during the George W. Bush Administration. These volumes raise questions about the relationship between power, perceptions of power, and support for multilateralism or unilateralism. The context of the present volume is also the unilateralism/multilateralism schism but it focuses on the EU and the UN. Power remains a key dimension. At a general level, scholars have mixed messages concerning the EU. Some foresee The End of Europe thus demonstrating that the EU has got its own decline of power literature (Ferguson, 2004). Others argue that Europe is weak and therefore pursues multilateral strategies (Kagan, 2003). Still others argue that the image of increasing international clout is what adequately characterizes the contemporary role of the EU in world politics (Moravcsik, 2002; Reid, 2004). In any case, a research agenda on the EU and multilateralism should take the contested assessment of European power into consideration. The question remains: why does the EU choose multilateralism? In the three following sections, internal, external and constitutive factors will be examined as potential factors capable of explaining emerging EU practice concerning multilateral institutions. Internal factors Concerning changing patterns of US engagement, Karns and Mingst conclude that domestic political factors explain changing support for multilateralism significantly better than external factors, such as

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variation in the international distribution of power. Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno also find that domestic factors determine policy towards multilateral institutions, most notably American exceptionalism, ‘when based on a definition that emphasizes US beliefs that its national values and practices are universally valid and its policy positions are moral and proper and not just expedient’ (Foot et al., 2003, p. 268; on American exceptionalism, see Ruggie, 2003b). John Ruggie also highlights the role of domestic values, images and principles as well as domestic institutions (Ruggie, 1993). Interest groups and private companies constitute a factor that should not be dismissed. Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno (2003, p. 9) believe that the influence of ‘interest-groups’ is ‘potentially considerable yet likely to be most significant in the economic and environmental areas’. This is a reasonable expectation. In a comparative perspective, however, it is intriguing that exactly the economic and environmental areas constitute the field where the EU plays the role as ‘front-runner’, that is, has assumed varying levels of global leadership, as Paul Taylor and Chad Damro demonstrate in this volume (though Taylor shows that EU leadership is somewhat shaky in the broad economic and development field ). Hence, one may wonder how two domestic processes – in the US and the EU – can have such different outcomes. To be sure, European interest groups have to lobby both national and EU officials, yet such bifurcation of lobbying should not have a significant impact because interest groups have adapted their strategies. Traditionally, the political system of an international player has been among the most popular and most significant factors explaining foreign policy. What would this look like from a European perspective? The EU’s political system is notoriously complex and dynamic (Hix, 1999).2 Furthermore, the EU polity is itself characterized by elements of multilateralism, and presumably these elements are most widespread in the field of foreign affairs. This kind of intersecting multilateralism is a convenient fact, particularly when policy-makers present reasons for political action, and not least when such political action consists of supporting the UN and the multilateral system. It is equally convenient when self-images are contrasted to images of others. Then the argument goes: we support the UN because we have multilateral genetic codes or important experiences with multilateral processes. Others, and particularly the one significant other, have no such codes and no such experiences. Fraser Cameron notes that the EU’s preference for multilateralism predates the Iraq crisis: ‘Partly because of its own history and constant

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intergovernmental negotiations, Brussels has been more willing than Washington and many other countries to work through multilateral institutions. The EU itself is an example of multilateralism at work’ (Cameron, 2004, pp. 157–8). Indeed, in most examples of official EU reasoning, this domestic–international linkage is a recurrent theme. The former Development Commissioner, Poul Nielsson, provides an illustrative example, ‘The European Union knows better than most that multilateral processes tend to be slow and difficult, and rarely do their results satisfy every participant’ (cited in Jørgensen, 2003). Could it be then that the mode of diplomacy – multilateralism – rather than specific European values and principles, is at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy identity? The role of the political system comes in a second version. It is well known that the projection of domestic institutions and practices in foreign policy is a common phenomenon. The constitutional treaty negotiations displayed many examples of member states trying to project their domestic institutions. Historically, France, for example, has proposed the Fourth Republic as a model (strong executive and a weak parliament). With respect to the US and multilateralism, it has been argued that the multilateral system launched after the Second World War was modelled on US domestic institutions (Goldstein, 1993). Similarly, the EU has consistently been presented as a model for other regional groupings. The argument has been, ‘We have been successful in creating a security community, an integrated economy and a system of dense political coordination. Imitate us and you – ASEAN, Mercosur, etc. – will be successful too.’ From time to time, and increasingly so, the EU has also been presented as a model for the emerging world polity and for global governance: ‘Copy this successful regional arrangement and introduce it at the global level’ (see Jørgensen and Rosamond, 2002). Divisions within the executive branch are pronounced, not least because the executive branch is bifurcated in Europe. That is, apart from the EU institutions characterized by their internal divisions, the EU has 25 ministries of foreign affairs, 25 ministries of defence and 25 prime ministers/heads of state. If seen as a comprehensive system, this is wonderland for bureaucratic politics. The fact that not even the traditional engine of European integration, France and Germany, has managed to make the structures of the ministries of foreign affairs Euro-compatible suggests the persistence of significant bureaucratic politics at the member state level (Güssgen, 2002; Hocking and Spence, 2004). At the same time, the multilateral system is inherently an inter-state institution, created by and for states. From time to time most EU member states, some

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more than others, forget about their multilateral genetic codes and enjoy the power, pride and prestige resulting from being an international actor. Changing configurations of mixed, exclusive and absent competence as regards representation in international institutions makes a most difficult exercise – as all the chapters here show again and again. This suggests the usefulness of liberal intergovernmentalism, not least if the third component – institutional design – concerns member state preferences on multilateral institutions. Chapters by Christopher Hill, Katie Laatikainen and Elizabeth Johansson-Nogués demonstrate how variations in these preferences remain considerable. The notion of political culture is one of these ubiquitous notions that are intuitively relevant yet difficult to catch in terms of substance. Nonetheless, let us try to focus on two different but overlapping aspects. Both have important things to say about the relationship between domestic politics and EU behaviour towards international organizations. First, discursive structures have been identified as a strong explanatory factor, that is, discourses about the UN and international organizations are relatively stable structures determining legitimate and illegitimate political speech. In Europe, the UN is part of a discursive structure on international cooperation and development connoting something positive. Hence, political reasoning questioning the basic value of the UN has a hard time whether such reasoning takes place at national, EU or international level. Similarly, international law and treaties are regarded as constitutive elements of international society. The notion of global responsibility and obligations that cannot be questioned because they are owed to both one’s self and others, plays a key role in European discourse, and part of the multilateral system is seen as instrumental for achieving the objective of international development (on the EU’s lack of response to such responsibility, see Karagiannis, 2004). Second, the role of values, images and principles in EU foreign policy has been analysed and could help illuminate EU behaviour in international organizations (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). When Robert Cooper points out that ‘multilateralism has intrinsic value’, and Javier Solana claims that European values inform foreign policy making, both illustrate perfectly well how values, images and principles have a function in reasons for political action. From a different perspective, Robert Kagan argues that multilateral strategies reflect power or, rather, the absence of power, that is, weakness. Because Europe is weak, Europe pursues multilateral strategies: ‘Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak’ (Kagan, 2003).

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Joseph Grieco (1997) also argues that small (weak) states prefer multilateralism. Kagan’s is a somewhat flawed argument. First, he overlooks the fact that the US was not particularly weak when multilateral strategies were introduced after the Second World War (Nau, 2002; Schake and Becher, 2002; Ruggie, 2003b). Second, he overlooks the fact that the EU, along with multilateral strategies, also cultivates bilateral relations and occasionally engages in unilateral action. It is somewhat surprising that Kagan takes rhetoric coming out of Brussels at face value. In essence, Kagan presents a version of the well-known dispute between realism and idealism-liberalism. He employs realist arguments against idealism and claims that Europe plays the part of idealism-liberalism (coming from Venus), whereas the US plays the part of realism (coming from Mars), without critically examining actual policy. John Mearsheimer (1995) uses a similar approach directed against liberal thinking of all sorts (see also Krauthammer, 2004). Patrick and Forman (2002) have a particularly strong interest in explaining why the US has an ambivalent attitude to multilateral cooperation, and they want to assess the costs and benefits to the US of this ambivalent engagement. While there seem to be good reasons to ask such questions concerning contemporary US politics it is an open question whether it is equally relevant concerning the EU and multilateral institutions. Perhaps ambivalent engagement is not an exclusive American feature: after all, EU member states are often highly ambivalent concerning the question of whether or not to give the EU a strong role in the multilateral system and, furthermore, whether multilateral solutions to global problems should be tried. This kind of ‘squared’ ambivalence is likely to have its own pattern of costs and benefits, but due to limited research we do not know precisely what the balance is in the EU case. It is clear however, that the inability to reach a European agreement on UN reform significantly harms the EU’s efforts at promoting effective multilateralism, in particular because it demonstrates that the EU’s own multilateral machinery is far from being ‘effective’ (Ortega, 2005). External factors Findings that emphasize the explanatory power of internal factors have a logical flipside. They point to the relatively weak power of external factors. However, this should not dissuade us from including external factors in our ‘factor portfolio’ because the EU case might lead to different findings. Among external factors, the international distribution of power is often the first that comes to mind. In explanations of state

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behaviour informed by structural realism, the change from Cold War bipolarity to post-Cold War polarity plays an important role. However, neorealists have great difficulty in reaching a consensus position as regards the key independent explanatory variable: do we now have a unipolar or multipolar world (Waltz, 2000). This problem apart, and though it is one of the state-centric approaches par excellence, it may nonetheless be possible to factor in the EU, for instance asking whether or not the end of the Cold War constitutes the permissive variable that allows the EU to significantly upgrade its international engagement, including the sponsorship of multilateral institutions. The distribution of power may also assume other forms. Presumably neither multilateral organizations nor multilateral systems constitute a power-free zone. According to John Ikenberry, the United States ‘has systematically used multilateral agreements as tools of grand strategy and world order building’ (Ikenberry, 2002, p. 122). In other words, it is misleading to separate issues of grand strategy from issues related to multilateral institutions. Furthermore, he emphasizes US ambivalence about multilateral institutions precisely because multilateralism for a leading state is about losing something and winning something else. Then he asks a significant question, ‘Why did the United States seek to establish order after World War II in Western Europe through multilateral commitments while pursuing a series of bilateral security agreements in Asia?’ The essence of his answer is that power relations between the leading state (the US) and the subordinate states differed: ‘The basic difference between Asia and Europe … was that the United States was both more dominant in Asia and wanted less out of Asia’. (…) ‘In Europe, the United States had an elaborate agenda for uniting the European states, creating an institutional bulwark against communism, and supporting centrist democratic regimes’ (Ikenberry, 2003, p. 58). During the last decade, all three US rationales for Cold War transatlantic multilateralism have disappeared: communism has gone, democratic regimes have been consolidated in Western Europe (and introduced in Central and Eastern Europe). Furthermore, if Europe were to become more united politically, Europe would constitute not only a strong partner but also a potential rival to the United States.3 It is tempting to suggest that in the future the US will handle the world more equally, that is, Asia in the past (and present) provides a model of the future world order.4 Ikenberry argues in this way that multilateralism reflects asymmetrical power relations. When applying Ikenberry’s argument to the EU, we should ask four key questions: What does the ends–means relationship look like? To

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what extent, if at all, is the EU ambivalent about multilateralism? How dominant is the EU? What does the Union want from the major world regions? In this perspective, the European Union’s promotion of ‘effective multilateralism’ may be based on a fatal misreading of opportunities. It does not have a grand strategy or, rather, it has too many (multiple member-state determined strategies) and, consequently, they cannot be ‘grand’. There is no clear hierarchy between strategy and tactics. It follows that the Union cannot use multilateral agreements as tools of grand strategy. In short, when applying Ikenberry’s argument to the EU, all sorts of problems emerge. Further analysis is required to determine whether these problems are worse for the EU or for Ikenberry’s argument. Essentially the jury is still out: the chapters in this book demonstrate both increasingly close ties between the EU and UN – something that is an anomaly in Ikenberry’s state-centric world – and the continuity of member states’ ambivalent attitudes to effective European representation at the UN. Spanish and Italian opposition to German permanent membership of the Security Council can also be interpreted as a relative gains logic that is alive and kicking. Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno point to the possible influence of other governments on US behaviour towards multilateral organizations. In explanations of EU foreign policy concerning international organizations, the external factor, ‘other governments’, also seems highly relevant. Furthermore, we may also include ‘other organizations’, as in efforts by ASEAN to influence EU policy on Myanmar, or OAU efforts to influence EU policy on the Sudan/Darfur crisis. Among other governments, the US can be singled out as a particularly important other. As Ivo Daalder notes, the US veto in 2000 of the EU’s IMF director-candidate demonstrated instant American power yet had also more lasting effects. According to the German diplomat Michael Steiner, ‘The way this case was handled tells us something about how the United States now thinks it can throw its weight around as the world’s most powerful nation. … It really is a demonstration of how the United States lacks sensitivity towards its allies, and the response has been to unite the Europeans more than ever against American bullying’ (cited in Daalder, 2001).5 In general, the EU’s embrace of effective multilateralism may have been caused by the Union’s own genetic codes, yet the Bush Administration’s preference for selective multilateralism has been instrumental in activating these codes. However, the war over Iraq and many other cases demonstrate that US pressure on Europe does not always breed European unity. Hence, it is an important analytical objective to determine under what circumstances the European Union opts for unity and

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diversity, when feeling the diplomatic efforts of other governments or organizations. Alexander Wendt (1999) has forcefully pointed to the importance of international social structures in explanations of state behaviour. In a more precise manner, Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein (1996) have argued for the existence of an important causal impact flowing from the international cultural environment to policy via identity and interest. The application of their theory to the case of EU policy making amounts to a research agenda in its own right. The reason for including their theory in the present context is that it raises some intriguing questions about explaining the EU’s policy on supporting multilateral institutions by reference to some foundational multilateral identity. The theory leads one to expect that international interaction during the last decade has prompted the EU to make a priority of the multilateral system. In other words, the hypothesis is that had the US not been ambivalent or excessively instrumentally minded, the EU would not have launched its high-profile endeavour in support of multilateralism. Finally, EU policies and policy-making processes may have been influenced by international organizations. Martha Finnemore (1996) has demonstrated how international organizations can ‘teach’ states what they want, and influence the definition of national interests or state preferences. Her cases include UNESCO, the International Red Cross and the World Bank, yet her book is otherwise state-centric, which implies that the EU is excluded from her analysis. However, based on Finnemore’s approach and findings, we may expect that international organizations can also teach the EU. In several policy fields, the EU has been an inexperienced newcomer for whom teaching and nursing is crucially important in the process of defining European interests. Examples include relations between the EU and the WHO (Guigner, 2006), or the fact that EU conditionality has been copied from the World Bank. In other policy fields, the EU has experienced a ‘melt down’ of a policy and subsequently received advice on best practice from international organizations. One example is EU development policy which in 1998 was severely criticized by the OECD and subsequently reformed. Another is that NATO has served as a very experienced teacher, and the transfer of Javier Solana from NATO to the EU has been instrumental in facilitating the process of learning (de Witte, 2004). Constitutive factors Our search for explanatory factors has so far been structured by the inside/outside dichotomy. The distinction may still be relevant and it

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may also be applicable when analysing EU behaviour towards multilateral institutions. However, if there is anything to studies of globalization and Europeanization, then the distinction is in severe trouble and the search for complementary perspectives should begin. At an abstract level, Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall have made a plea for constitutive, structuration approaches in studies of relations between international institutions and states. Instead of beginning with the ‘interest, powers, and choices of already constituted state actors’ they suggest integrating agent-centric and institution-centric approaches, preferably by means of bracketing (Duvall and Wendt, 1989). It should be possible to translate this abstract reasoning into a concrete research agenda that is capable of conceptualizing the EU as actor, institution and arena. In the following, I present three illustrative examples of constitutive factors before I arrive at tentative conclusions. First, Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno regard the performance of multilateral institutions to be as much an internal as an external factor to the US (Foot et al., 2003, p. 13). While performance as such is an external factor, US perceptions of performance constitute an internal factor. This solution raises two important issues. Is it possible to analyse performance as such? And, is it possible to factor out a constituent member of an institution, for instance the US, when analysing the performance of the institution as an external factor? While there are pros and cons to solutions to these problems, a possible third way might be comparative studies. In a comparative perspective, the performance of, say, the UN may be perceived in significantly different ways. Research on the EU and multilateralism could contribute to such comparative studies and thereby reduce the risk of case-biased findings. Second, Ben Rosamond (2006) has demonstrated how discourses on globalization often have an EU-domestic origin, yet they frame globalization as an external factor that we should either greet or fear. For instance, former Commissioners Chris Patten and Pascal Lamy welcomed, even praised globalization, whereas Directorate-General (DG) Agriculture regards globalization as an external threat against which the EU should build a protective shield. When officials at DG Trade take an issue to the level of international multilateral organizations, they influence at the same time the domestic balance of power between promoters of and protectors against globalization. The launch of the 2001 Everything But Arms initiative thus influenced simultaneously the position of both domestic and international actors in trade and agriculture. Third, whereas various multilateral institutions have been teaching the EU what it wants, there have been cases in which the relationship is

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more complex. The relationship between the WHO and EU has for years been highly asymmetrically in favour of the WHO, yet the balance of power seems to be changing. Furthermore, when the OECD reviewed EU development policy in a very critical fashion, was the study an autonomous OECD initiative or did (some) EU member states ask the OECD to evaluate the performance of DG Development? Intersecting multilateralism is often an intricate phenomenon, and third parties often play key parts. In conclusion, we should take note of the serious problems and challenges that flow from attempts at assessing multilateralism from a constituent actor perspective. Most scholars in their effort to evaluate effectiveness or influence of a particular actor tend to dichotomize the international organization and the actor whose influence they want to explore. Yet, international organizations are constituted by these very member states. When we analytically split off constituent parts from the organizations, we are in some sense erasing an important, fundamental part of (intersecting) multilateralism. These problems are even further complicated when we begin analyzing the EU. On the one hand the EU is not formally a constituent part of the UN and does not have legal personality. On the other hand, the EU can in practice be regarded as a de facto constituent member of the UN that has been recognized as such by both EU member states and other members of the UN.

Analysing external effectiveness? In the introduction, the editors defined effectiveness in four different ways, one of which is the influence of the EU on the UN itself – ‘external effectiveness’. This is frequently referred to in the literature as ‘impact’, and with reference to this, it has often been suggested that the US has an ‘instrumental’ mindset and the EU a ‘process’ mindset. Instead of rejecting such views with reference to their political-ideological nature, we should include them in our research agenda. It is highly relevant to include measurement of impact. At the same time, one may wonder if we have here an example of ‘we become what we study’? That is, if the US is predominantly instrumental, scholars tend to search for the US impact on the UN. In any case, the instrumentality/process distinction can be seen as a hypothesis that can be examined by means of empirical analysis and subsequently rejected or confirmed. In US-centric studies, a key concern is measurement of the impact on multilateral institutions, that is, the degree to which the US influences either concrete policy making or broader institutional dynamics, for

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example, the design, reform, or (rarely) closure of organizations. Multilateral institutions are analysed ‘as instruments of American policies’ (Karns and Mingst, 1990, pp. 6–8). Impact is also very present in John Ruggie’s explication of the concept of multilateralism, though the kind of impact he has in mind is more indirect and institutional than direct and policy instrumental in character, ‘it was the fact of an American hegemony that was decisive after World War II, not merely American hegemony. And that in turn makes the role of multilateralism in the current international transformation of even greater interest’ (Ruggie, 1993, p. 31). Others pay close attention to ‘The Impact of the United States on Multilateral Organizations’, and emphasize that ‘America’s decisions to cooperate in multilateral forums will be determined predominantly by the extent to which any specific organization is perceived by important US domestic actors to be an effective and congenial vehicle for the promotion of America’s objectives (Foot et al., 2003, pp. 14–19). As for multilateral institutions themselves, they will continue to operate within the direct and indirect constraints that US instrumentalism imposes’ (Foot et al., 2003, p. 272). Turning to the EU, we can observe that according to the 2003 European Security Strategy, one of the EU’s key objectives is to support multilateral institutions and the UN in particular, as if support alone were the objective. Such phrasing suggests the kind of disinterested public service approach that is legion in EU documents and speeches given by EU officials. However, why not look for the EU’s impact and influence on UN politics? A policy or issue specific approach can be recommended. The case of UN financing may serve to illustrate this point. Among intersections between the EU and the UN system, the financial flow is very significant. The EU and its member states are the biggest financial contributor to the general UN budget and many of the specialized agencies. However, the EU has seldom proved capable of translating financial means into political ends. In other words, the power that could potentially flow from this source, evaporates in the hands of the EU and its member states. Concerning international financial institutions, the EU has for years aimed at strengthening its impact. These institutions are somehow special in the sense that both the IMF and the World Bank operate on the basis of weighted voting. While the US is the single largest state contributor, the EU-25 collectively contribute about twice the amount of the US but collectively control one-third of the votes. In addition, the EU’s voting power is diluted amongst several voting constituencies that include non-EU contributors. However, the financial

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input pattern is not reflected in political impact: the design of the international financial institutions as well as concrete policy making are grossly determined by the US and the launch of the euro has not changed this. The structural inability of the EU-25 to make use of financial power is a mystery that cries for explanation. However, with a few notable exceptions, the topic has not caught the attention of scholars (McNamara and Meunier, 2002; Horng, 2004; Smaghi, 2004).

Conclusion and perspectives In Europe, multilateralism has predominantly positive connotations and is related to images of international cooperation and world order. Similarly, it is considered a fact of life that international society is pluralist in the sense of being constituted by all sorts of regimes. This basic belief is being reflected in European approaches to the multilateral system. To specify the prime focus of the chapter, I introduced three different kinds of intersection and made relations between the EU and the multilateral system a priority. This choice is justified by the main themes of the volume but also by the kind of sequencing that is at play: without a significant degree of consensus among member states and EU institutions, the EU’s aspiration to play a role in the multilateral system will have a hard time; without such a role, there will be no potential conflict with the US concerning the deeds and vices of multilateralism. Hence, the three kinds of intersections are three distinct fields of study and their relative relevance is consequently determined by the research question of specific studies. In the second part of the chapter, I began searching for explanatory factors. Existing studies of the US and multilateralism serve as a powerful point of departure. It has been truly astonishing to realize the degree to which it makes sense to use such state-centric studies as a source of inspiration for analysing the EU’s foreign policy objective of effective multilateralism. Among internal factors, I focused on five promising factors (interest groups, the political system, the executive, political culture, military weakness). Among external factors, the chapter examined four potential factors (distribution of power, other governments, international interaction and international organizations). In order to escape the inside/outside dichotomy, I included a section on so-called constitutive factors. They contribute to a potentially more nuanced understanding, but more conceptual and theoretical reflection is necessary before we can arrive at solid conclusions. It is difficult at this stage of research on the intersecting multilateralisms

Intersecting Multilateralisms 211

of the EU and the UN to conclude which factors work and which do not work in explaining the choice for multilateralism – they have to be tried out in further empirical studies. The final part of the chapter addressed the issue of impact. Although the notion of European interests is absent from the official vocabulary, analysts should assess the degree to which the EU influences multilateral institutions. The EU declares that in several UN policy fields, it is a frontrunner. Against this background one wonders whether the theory of hegemonic stability is going to experience a renaissance among European policy-makers and policy-analysts. In a broader perspective, it is the significant variation of impact across policy fields that should attract attention and analytical energy – as demonstrated in this volume. Finally, while I acknowledge the usefulness of existing analytical frameworks designed for studies of state behaviour towards multilateral institutions, I would like also to point to some of their limits. One such limit is not inherent to the studies as such, but refers to the need to adapt existing analytical frameworks for research on EU policy on multilateral institutions. A second limit is perhaps most pronounced in studies of the US and multilateralism. Comparative studies of a range of actors would alleviate some of the limits and biases, particularly if new studies were based on a plurality of conceptions. In other words, the application of the European formulae – unity in diversity – within research would potentially make a valuable difference.

Notes 1. To be sure, the image of decline was contested (Nye, 1990) and the disappearance of the Soviet Union did much to enforce his argument. 2. If the EU’s political system was a federal system, it was probably as decentralized as it could be without losing its essence as a system. 3. According to William Pfaff, ‘A prominent theme of neoconservative writing and television talk is that a Franco-German-dominated European Union, rebuilt according to the new Giscardian constitution currently under debate, threatens to become “superpower Europe” and a mortal danger to the United States’ (International Herald Tribune, 2 July 2003). See also Ash, 2003. 4. By contrast, Nau (2002), makes a plea for transforming US–Asia bilateral relations into a multilateral relationship. 5. After leaving Auswärtiges Amt, Michael Steiner joined Solana’s office and was closely involved in outlining the European Security Strategy.

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Index actorness, 4, 40, 118–20, 125 Adomavicius, Sarunas, 105 Afghanistan, 97, 122, 127, 128 Africa, 39, 51, 58, 63–4, 67, 122, 126–7 Africa Group, 20, 46, 84, 166, 169, 172 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, 103 African Union (AU), 128–9, 162 see also Organization of African Unity Albania, 159, 184 Amsterdam Treaty, 13, 28, 32, 56, 192 Annan, Kofi, 1, 2, 22, 41, 64, 68, 115, 117–18, 125, 168–9 In Larger Freedom report, 1, 168–9 see also United Nations Secretary General Arab Group, 166, 169 Arab League, 4 Ashe, John, 183 Asia, 204, 211 Asian Group, 28, 46, 91, 156 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 201, 205 Australia, 46, 70, 73, 84, 172, 187 Austria, 11, 12, 60, 73, 100, 109, 163 Balkans, 36, 44, 58, 60, 62, 96, 103, 105–7, 122, 126 Beckett, Margaret, 189 Belarus, 106, 161 Belgium, 11, 35, 60, 121 Blair, Tony, 53, 55, 61 Bolton, John, 8 Bonn Agreements, 187 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 4, 8, 127, 129–30, 184 Brazil, 63, 71, 162, 185 Bulgaria, 92–3, 97–101, 103–4, 106–8, 184

Bush, George H., 61 Bush, George W., 8, 53, 110–11, 187, 192, 199, 205 Canada, 46, 70, 73, 84, 91, 172, 187 Canada, Australia, New Zealand group (CANZ), 46, 172 Central and East European countries (CEECs), 15, 92–109 see also under individual countries’ names Chechnya, 160–2 China, 49–50, 53, 67, 81, 120, 159, 162, 163 Chirac, Jacques, 53, 59, 61 climate change, 16, 19, 102, 176, 184–6, 191–2 collective security, 1, 18, 42, 115–18, 125, 129 Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 109, 154–74 Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), 176, 181, 183–4, 191–2 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 13–14, 16–17, 28–9, 31–3, 36–7, 39, 44, 49, 52, 54, 58, 65–6, 109, 116, 121–2, 125, 133, 142, 143, 150, 155–6, 165, 171 Commonwealth of Independent States, 4 comprehensive security, 118, 122 Conference of the Parties (COP), 185–7 conflict prevention, 42, 63, 67, 115, 123, 125–6, 130–2 conflict resolution, 41, 63, 90 Constitutional treaty, 41, 45–6, 58, 170, 172, 197, 201 Cook, Robin, 59 227

228 Index Council of Ministers of the EU, 9, 14, 21, 23, 27, 29, 32, 39, 72, 120–1, 129, 138–9, 155, 166–7, 171, 179, 183, 185–6, 188, 190, 195 Presidency, 4, 13, 17, 27, 29–39, 43, 45, 58, 76–7, 81, 91, 104, 106, 122–5, 133, 135, 142–3, 147, 150, 152, 155–7, 162, 166, 172–4, 178–9, 183–5, 190, 192 Secretariat, 13, 23, 33–4, 36–8, 86, 122, 126, 130, 143, 151 Council Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM), 155, 167 Country Strategy Paper (CSP), 130, 137, 139 crisis management, 2, 115, 123, 126, 129–30, 132 Cuba, 51, 97, 104, 163 Cyprus, 28, 91, 156 Czech Republic, 92–3, 98, 100, 103–4 Day, Catherine, 182 death penalty, 19, 104, 158, 160–1, 163, 174 decolonization, 36, 80, 121, 174 democracy, 40, 45, 73, 77, 85, 104, 170 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 36, 63, 127–9, 160–1 Denmark, 11, 35, 60, 70, 79, 91, 100, 121, 156, 163 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 6, 126, 129 Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 6, 126 development, 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 15, 18–19, 35, 38–40, 43, 73–4, 78, 82, 85, 87, 94, 101, 103–4, 117, 133, 137–41, 170, 172, 180, 200, 202, 206, 208 see also sustainable development Dimas, Stavros, 184 Dini, Lamberto, 62 disarmament, 21, 36, 46, 80–1, 87, 106, 121 Earth Summit, 185, 192 East Timor, 159–60 see also Timor-Leste

Eastern Europe Group (EEG), 28, 46, 87, 91, 97, 156 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 5, 13, 16, 27, 35, 38–9, 43, 45–6, 76, 78, 87, 94, 96, 101, 141–2, 148, 155, 178, 183, 191–2 effectiveness, 3, 5, 12, 16, 22, 31, 41, 59, 77, 125, 128–9, 148, 151–2, 166, 176, 182–3, 186, 191, 208 definition of, 9–10 external, 10, 17–18, 117–18, 122, 131, 176, 181, 184, 190, 208 internal, 10, 16, 118, 121–2, 125, 130–1, 176, 180–1, 184–6, 190 Estonia, 46, 92–3, 98–100, 108–10 European Commission, 4, 9, 13–14, 17, 23, 27, 29–34, 36–41, 43, 45–6, 77, 86, 95, 102, 115, 120, 122, 126, 130, 133–53, 155–6, 167–9, 171, 177–85, 188–91, 195 European Community (EC), 4, 16, 28–31, 34, 38, 41, 44, 46, 52, 75, 87, 91, 98, 119, 135–7, 177–81, 183, 185, 192, 197 competence, 13, 16–18, 30–4, 37–8, 119, 134, 137, 142, 145, 175–81, 184–5, 190–1, 202 European Council, 29, 40, 115–17, 125–6, 129, 138, 170, 188 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 29, 40, 134, 177, 180 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 46, 122, 165, 172, 184 European Parliament (EP), 29, 33, 40–1, 144–5 European Political Cooperation (EPC), 31, 52, 68, 109, 156–7 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 60, 67, 123, 125, 127, 129–30 European Security Strategy, 2, 27, 115–16, 125, 198, 209, 211 European Union (EU) coordination at the UN, 9, 13, 19, 27, 30, 33–4, 36–8, 40, 42–3, 45, 78, 89, 97, 120–2, 124–5, 133–5, 139–44, 147, 149–51, 155–7, 163, 165–7, 171–4, 185, 201

Index 229 European Union – continued frontrunner, 10, 18, 167, 171, 175–6, 184, 186, 188, 190–1, 211 see also Council of Ministers of the EU, European Commission, European Court of Justice, European Parliament European Union Police Mission (EUPM), 130 Europeanization, 5, 9, 10, 12–17, 22, 66, 70, 77–8, 81–2, 93–4, 96, 101–3, 106, 108–9, 118, 121, 125, 131, 157, 190, 207 Everything But Arms initiative, 207 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 163 Finland, 11, 70, 78–9, 91, 100, 156 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 6, 40, 45–6, 135 France, 11–14, 30, 34–5, 46, 49–68, 72, 81, 100, 110, 119, 121–4, 127, 163, 201 Fulci, Paolo, 62 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 74, 197 General Assembly (GA), see United Nations General Assembly Georgia, 4 Germany, 4, 11, 14, 52, 56–7, 59–65, 72, 97, 100, 107–8, 110, 121, 123, 173, 201 Greece, 11, 35, 60, 100, 121 Group of 4 (G-4), 63–4 Group of 8 (G-8), 61, 67–8 Group of 77 (G-77), 4, 20, 84, 88, 97 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 1, 2, 41, 63–4, 83, 115–17, 125–6, 130, 168–9 Holbrooke, Richard, 58 human rights, 1, 2, 5, 9–10, 12, 17, 19, 22, 35–6, 40–5, 55, 73–5, 81, 85, 87, 94–5, 101, 104–5, 110, 117, 138, 140, 143–4, 146, 149, 154–74

Human Rights Council, 22, 43, 169–70, 172 Human security, 14 Humanitarian affairs, 35, 80, 133, 141, 143, 172 Humanitarian aid, 39, 40, 85, 127, 139, 180 Humanitarian intervention, 44, 55, 115 Hungary, 92–3, 97–8, 100, 105–6, 110 Iceland, 46, 70, 78–9, 91, 156, 172, 184, 188 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 6 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 6, 136 International Criminal Court (ICC), 6, 85, 104, 110, 124, 155, 174 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 6, 136–7 International Labour Organization (ILO), 6, 40, 45–6, 134–5, 137, 140–2, 144–6, 148, 151 International law, 1, 5, 35, 44–5, 53, 73–4, 116, 119, 202 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 5, 6, 45, 146, 151, 205, 209 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 6, 135 International Stabilization Force (ISAF), 127 International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 6, 46, 135 International Trade Centre (ITC), 6, 135 Iran, 60, 159–63, 174 Iraq, 1, 15, 35, 44, 49, 53–4, 56, 67–8, 108, 115, 117–18, 123, 125, 131, 159–61, 165, 200, 205 Ireland, 11, 12, 35, 60, 73, 100, 163, 173 Israel, 36, 50, 51, 159–61 Italy, 11, 35, 49, 56–7, 60, 62–3, 67, 72, 100, 121, 163, 173 Japan, 46, 52, 62–5, 173, 187, 192 Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (JUSCANZ), 46, 172 see also Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ)

230 Index Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 28, 46 Jusys, Oskaras, 107 Kavan, Jan, 103 Kosovo, 55, 74, 116, 127 Kyoto Protocol, 16, 18, 19, 85, 102, 186–90 Lamy, Pascal, 144, 207 Latin America Group (GRULAC), 20, 46, 158, 172 Latvia, 92, 93, 98–100, 109, 110 Libya, 174 Lithuania, 87, 92, 93, 98, 100, 105, 107, 109, 110 Lubbers, Ruud, 74 Luxembourg, 11, 33, 35, 73, 121, 124, 183–4, 192 Maastricht Treaty, 28–9, 31, 36, 52, 56–7, 178 Malaysia, 90 Malta, 28, 156 Marrakech Accords, 187 Martonyi, Janos, 105 Mexico, 87 Middle East, 2, 8, 35, 52, 121–2, 126, 163, 174 Millennium development goals (MDGs), 43 Multilateralism, 1–4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20–2, 27, 28, 33, 43–5, 49, 55, 65–6, 68, 70–1, 77–8, 82, 84, 86, 88–9, 115, 117, 141, 147, 149, 152, 163, 195–7, 199–211 definition of, 5–7 dysfunctional, 7, 163 effective, 2–3, 7–10, 15, 20, 22, 64–5, 68, 70, 78, 87, 89, 116–19, 125, 129, 132, 176, 184, 190–1, 195–6, 198, 203, 205, 210 intersecting multilateralism(s), 45, 197–200, 208 middle power multilateralism, 15, 72–5, 86, 88–9 Myanmar, 159–61, 205

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), 127 Netherlands, 11, 12, 15, 60, 70, 73–7, 81–2, 89–90, 121, 153, 192 New Agenda Coalition (NAC), 86 New York Liaison Office (NYLO) [Council of the EU], 37 New Zealand, 46, 70, 83, 172 Nice Treaty, 28, 59 Nielsson, Poul, 201 Nigeria, 159–60 Non-aligned movement (NAM), 4, 28, 172 Nordic Group, 4, 28, 75–7, 84, 156, 163, 172–3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 8, 22, 74, 75, 79, 91, 97, 100, 107, 127–8, 131, 197, 206 North Korea, 104, 161 Norway, 46, 70, 75, 78, 79, 82–3, 91, 156, 172, 184, 188 Nuclear weapons, 36, 51, 54, 58, 60, 66, 91, 106–7, 174 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), 6, 126, 135, 137 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 46, 154, 159, 167–70, 174 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 205 see also African Union Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 68, 141, 206, 208 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 28, 169, 172 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 22, 68, 147 Organized crime, 41 Ottawa Convention (landmines), 106–7 Patten, Chris, 207 Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), 19, 130 Peacekeeping, 4, 6, 18, 36, 41, 43, 67, 73, 74, 75, 78, 106, 115, 126, 128–30

Index 231 Permanent Five (P-5), 49–51, 53–4, 59, 62–3, 65, 67, 72 see also United Nations Security Council Poland, 92–3, 97–8, 100, 108 Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies (PHARE), 102 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 14, 23, 29, 33, 120, 122, 124–5, 127, 129 Portugal, 11, 60, 100, 121, 163 Presence, 19, 30, 37–40, 59, 61, 85, 119, 131, 141, 181, 183–4 Prodi, Romano, 136, 189 Putin, Vladimir, 189 Religious intolerance, 161, 163 ‘responsibility to protect’, 43, 44, 55, 67 Rights of the child, 158, 159–61, 163 Romania, 92–3, 97–101, 103–8, 184 Russia, 8, 18, 27, 49, 66–8, 96, 98–9, 107, 110, 120, 162, 187–92 see also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Rwanda, 2, 127, 174 Security, 1–3, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17–20, 21, 35–6, 39, 41–4, 51–2, 60–1, 72, 74–5, 77, 92–3, 95, 97, 99, 100–1, 106–9, 115–18, 121–3, 126–31, 170, 201, 204 see also collective security, comprehensive security, human security Security Council, see United Nations Security Council Single European Act, 31, 178 Slovakia, 92–3, 98, 100 Slovenia, 109 Solana, Javier, 68, 118–19, 123, 132, 202, 206, 211 Somalia, 2, 95 South Africa, 87, 90 Soviet Union, see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Spain, 11, 35, 56, 60, 62, 67, 72, 73, 100, 121, 123 Straw, Jack, 64 Street children, 159 Sudan, 122, 160–2, 168, 172, 173, 174, 205 Suez Crisis, 50 Sustainable development, 6, 39, 43, 73, 176, 177, 181–4, 188 see also development Sweden, 11, 35, 60, 70, 75, 78, 79, 86, 91, 100, 156, 163 Switzerland, 46, 172 Terrorism, 1, 35, 41, 46, 53, 123 Third Committee, 46, 81, 85, 154–62, 164–6, 172–4 Timor-Leste, 122 see also East Timor Töpfer, Klaus, 182 Treaty of Rome, 28, 30, 40, 134, 177 Turkey, 184 Turkmenistan, 161 United Kingdom (UK), 12, 13, 14, 30, 33, 34, 43, 46, 50–6, 59, 61, 64, 66, 67, 69, 81, 100, 108, 110, 119, 121–4, 140–1, 162, 192 United Nations (UN), 1–22, 27–31, 40–6, 49, 51, 53, 55, 63, 65–8, 70, 75, 83, 92–3, 97, 102, 105, 109, 115–18, 121–32, 133–8, 141, 144, 147–9, 152, 154, 156, 162, 165–8, 170–3, 175–6, 181, 190–1, 195–6, 198, 199–200, 202–3, 205, 207–9, 211 UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS), 6, 137 United Nations charter, 56, 57, 119 Chapter VII, 116 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 6, 135 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 185 United Nations Conference on Small Arms, 107

232 Index United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 6, 46, 135, 148 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 40, 135, 137, 192 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), 46 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 6, 46, 136, 206 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 4, 46, 135, 176, 181–4, 191–2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 102, 185 United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), 6, 135 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 5, 13, 15, 19, 20, 50, 92–109, 118, 121–2, 155, 158, 161, 164, 174, 191 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 50 see also Third Committee United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 6, 40, 46, 135 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 6, 136, 137 United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), 6, 136 United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 127–8 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 136 United Nations Secretariat, 5–6, 8, 34, 39, 74, 126, 168 United Nations Secretary General, 1, 2, 5, 33, 41–3, 65, 68, 75, 115, 117, 129–30, 167–8 see also Annan, Kofi

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 6, 32, 43, 49–69, 56, 116, 118–25, 127, 129–31 Authorization of the use of force, 44, 55, 116, 171 EU seat, 14, 42, 50, 57, 131, 151 Reform, 19, 43, 61–5, 118 Vetoes, 50, 51, 171 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 50, 51, 72, 90, 93, 96–8, 103, 211 see also Russia United States (US), 7, 8, 13, 18, 19, 20, 22, 35, 44, 46, 49–51, 53–6, 58, 61, 62, 65–8, 72–4, 84, 86, 89–90, 93, 97–9, 108, 110–11, 120, 122, 124–5, 131, 151–3, 165, 168, 172–4, 186–8, 192, 195–6, 198–211 Védrine, Hubert, 59 Vietnam, 51, 97 Visegrad-4, 98 Wallström, Margot, 182 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 1, 41, 53, 116 see also nuclear weapons Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG), 28, 46, 52, 83, 87, 91, 156, 172 World Food Programme (WFP), 6, 46, 135 World Health Organization (WHO), 6, 40, 45–6, 56, 136, 142, 206, 208 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 6, 46, 135, 142 World Trade Organization (WTO), 6, 12, 31, 74, 85, 143–4, 146–8, 189–90, 192 Yugoslavia, 159, 174 Zaire, 159–60 Zimbabwe, 67, 161, 162