The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe
Philipp H. Fluri ´ Gustav E. Gustenau Plamen I. Pantev (Editors)
The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism
Physica-Verlag A Springer Company
Philipp H. Fluri, Dr. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Rue de Chantepoulet 11 1211 Geneva 1 Switzerland
[email protected] Gustav E. Gustenau, BG Mag. Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence Stiftgasse 2 a 1070 Vienna Austria
[email protected] Plamen I. Pantev, Professor Institute for Strategic and International Studies P.O. Box 231 1618 Sofia Bulgaria
[email protected] Editorial Office: Mag. Walter Matyas Managing Editors: Mjr. Mag. Ernst M. Felberbauer and Frederic Labarre M. A.
The publication of this book was made possible through a generous contribution from the Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces ISBN-10 ISBN-13
3-7908-1572-1 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg New York 978-3-7908-1572-6 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg New York
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Preface by the Editors
As in the rest of Europe, September 11th and its global consequences have triggered an intensive security-political debate in the European Union, the effects of which will become noticeable in the field of the Reform of the Security Sector. Although there was considerable awareness for the dangers of terrorism even before the devastating attacks in the United States, which stem from memories of potential terrorists attacks by extremist political or religious groups, complete awareness of the dangers of terror were limited to few European countries (which experienced separatist movements). After 9/11, the “war on terrorism” was rapidly turned into the central security-political issue and found entrance into all strategic documents and policy and military planning scenarios. Nearly all over Europe, the increased attention security forces need to pay to preventing and defending against potential terror threats have lead to strains in civil-military relationships. On the one hand, civilians showed an increased need for security, but on the other hand, one fears that through concentration of power with security forces, civil rights could be undermined and democratic control of armed forces and the police weakened. Within the context of coping with these new security-political tasks, civil-military relations have become a new challenge to the reform countries in South East Europe. Different than in the well-established democracies and market societies in Western and Middle Europe, where the population demonstrates a high level of acceptance versus security institutions, South East European citizens fact their own security apparatuses with massive mistrust. The reasons for this damaged relationship are numerous: they range from negative experiences with security forces in the past authoritarian communist regimes, which dominated the region until 1990/91 to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s, which made it difficult to differentiate between the practices of paramilitaries and “regular” armed forces. Even following the end of the fighting, “weak states” in the Western Balkans struggle to make their population find confidence in government institutions again. In this context, the European Union and NATO play a central role. The perspective of future membership in these two organisations has become the main propulsive factors for reforms of the security sector. The EU and NATO will have to stand up to the responsibility of
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promoting the establishment of democratic mechanisms for regulating and controlling civil-military relationships – in spite of, or even in the face of the danger of global terror. European and Euro-Atlantic institutions have engaged South East Europe in a comprehensive discourse on the comprehensive reform of state and societal institutions. Structured and well-planned reform programmes aimed at creating integrated European institutions and norms have inevitably created a focus on Brussels, Strasbourg, The Hague, and Washington D.C., adding extra demands to each national government’s domestic, regional and international activities. This is not always to the advantage of the government in office: exceeding compliance with international reform programmes while at the same time under-focusing on the socio-economic needs of voters may lead to a failure to achieve re-election, as in the case of the last Bulgarian government. The explicit understanding is that all South East European states should be considered eligible for membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Reforms therefore coincide largely with programmes whose ultimate objective is integration. The tacit understanding is that security sector reform cannot ultimately be successful without democratic-institutional reform, and improvement of socio-economic conditions. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has explicitly made this three-pronged approach its own, and added a so-called ‘table’ for regional programmes to it. Other European and Euro-Atlantic organizations focus on one or the other point. The invitation to reform the security sector has as its objective an improvement of the security institutions and security-providing services as a change of the very ‘culture of security’. What is at stake is a shift from the ‘culture of state security’ to a ‘culture of cooperative security’, embedded in the Euro-Atlantic system of cooperative security. This again implies not only a process of insightful adaptation to EuroAtlantic standards, norms and procedures. It also implies a process of ‘unlearning’ the past. Accountability – the construction of transparent lines of responsibility for each individual regardless of their position in government – will need to replace the expectation of collective responsibility. Parliamentary and public democratic oversight of the security sector budgets and personnel will need to replace the expectation that state security comes before individual security, and that budgets are therefore best kept secret and security-providing services best kept beyond the reach of parliamentary and public control. Civil-military relations with a strong accent on civilian political leadership structures within Ministries of Defense, and the successful integration of the General Staff within them, will have to replace the expectation that the military forms a state within the state. Civil society organizations will develop the sufficient competence
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and expertise to independently assess security sector governance, replacing the para-state or para-party organizations that previously disseminated ideas to the public (for good or ill, as vested political interests dictated). Collective cooperative security, as provided by an alliance of sovereign states, will replace the expectation of a rigid system of artificially homogenized and integrated states and their militaries, as well as expectations of Darwinian battles of nation against nation. The concept of human security will replace the concept of security for one’s nation alone. Though the whole of South East Europe is engaged in a discourse on security sector reform, democratic oversight of the security sector, and civilmilitary relations, it would be incorrect to assume that the joint efforts of European, Transatlantic, regional and national actors (including the media, civil society and academia) have yet led to homogenous or at least symmetrical and sustainable progress. The added challenge of joining the global coalition in the ‘fight against terrorism’ has accelerated development in some departments of the security sector (even Bosnia-Herzegovina is preparing participation in peacekeeping operations). It has, however, at the same time led to a standstill if not a backlash in the evolution of a culture of human and civil rights, not to mention international humanitarian law. As security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, human rights and will need to triumph over all supposed justifications to curb them. While security sector reform undoubtedly progresses in South East Europe, the same can not be said about global developments in the security sector. As Robin Luckham points out in Governing Insecurity1, the triumphal advance of Western liberal democracy in some parts of the world is paralleled by international inequalities and a new form of military politics. Whereas coups and military governance have been on rapid decline, new forms of civilian autocracies are emerging, based on coalitions of the ruling elites with security services other than the traditional military. Whereas many countries are ‘in transition’, it remains doubtful what this transition will lead to. The image of one ‘happy Transatlantic security family’ as cherished by securocrats on both sides of the Atlantic is thus put seriously into question when we decide to apply finer instruments of heuristic concepts such as assessing ‘countries genuinely in transit’, those that are ‘challenged democracies’, ‘democracies managed by elites’, and those that are regressing toward authoritarianism behind a smoke-screen of democracy. In most ‘transition’ democracies there remains a struggle over who 1
Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds.), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transiational Democracies (London: Zed Books, 2003).
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defines ‘national security’ and national security policy. The revival of international realpolitik in the last two years could also raise a demand for strategically placed military regimes (in places such as in Pakistan and Colombia). The dissenting and disaffected in South East Europe, those who believe that things were better for everyone before, because in nostalgic retrospect they were better for them, will be hard to please. Their voices are hardly ever heard at meetings at the governmental level, for governmental policies foresee compliance with (or at least the need not to challenge) the stipulations of security sector reform. They are, however, most unlikely at this point in time to try to voice their grievances by means other than the democratically permitted ones: demonstrations; votes for opposition parties; and lengthy declarations read out at meetings (often made possible by well-meaning non-governmental organizations funded by the same governments which propose security sector reform as a transfer of norms). It would thus be insincere to claim that all citizens of South East European states (1) understand and (2) willingly accept security sector reform, or in fact, the trinity of democratic-, economic- and security sector- reform, as it would be insincere to claim that most citizens of the Euro-Atlantic community member states (1) understand and would (2) gladly accept farreaching interferences with their customary lifestyles, even though their ultimate goal may be substantial improvement of people’s welfare and security. Security sector reform because of its strong impact on society is a negotiated process. The incentive of ultimately being able to join the very institutions which propose security sector reform may, however, itself be as strong a motivation as added human security is. The present study, supported by many enthusiastic experts, provides and excellent outline to the status of civil-military relations in South East Europe – from Slovenia to Turkey – and reflects on the progress, problems and challenges to the Reform of the Security Sector. Additional value can be found that its authors seek to view these topics in the light of the current global security-political issues, above all in the war against terrorism. It is to be hoped that the effort to independently monitor South East European reforms in the security sector will be continued. Philipp H. Fluri Gustav E. Gustenau Plamen I. Pantev
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................ 1 Plamen I. Pantev
Part 1: Old and New Security Risks and Instability in the Balkans Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism: The View from South East Europe ........................................................ 11 Plamen I. Pantev State Violence, State Weakness – Explaining the Plethora of Security Risks and Instability in South East Europe ........................... 23 Henriette Riegler
Part 2: Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform During the Fight Against Terrorism Civil-Military Relations: Continuity and Change in an Age of Terror .................................................................................. 37 Richard Cohen Untying the Gordian Noose: Humanitarian Law, Democratic Control and the New Security Environment .................... 49 Jean-Jacques de Dardel
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Part 3: The Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Security Sector in South East Europe and the Impact of the Launch of the Counter-Terrorist Campaign: The National Perspectives Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector in Albania............. 67 Blendi Kajsiu Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina............................ 81 Bisera Turkoviü Bulgaria: Completing Requirements for NATO Membership, Accelerating the Security Sector Reform and Adapting to the Counter-Terrorism Era......................................................................... 101 Plamen I. Pantev, Valeri Ratchev, Todor Tagarev The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: The Case of Croatia ............................................................................... 115 Mladen Staniþiü The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: The Case of Greece ................................................................................ 131 Thanos P. Dokos Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy........................................... 149 Tibor Babos, Linda Royer Macedonian Reform Perspectives ........................................................ 169 Petar Atanasov Romania’s Participation in the Fight Against International Terrorism: Implications for Civil-Military Relations and the Security Sector Reform................................................................... 185 Claudiu Degeratu The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in FRY/ the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro ......................................... 197 Dragan Simiü
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Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia............................................................................................... 211 Marjan Malešiþ, Ljubica Jelušiþ Civil-Military Relations in Turkey....................................................... 229 Nilüfer Narli Analysis and Conclusions...................................................................... 259 Plamen I. Pantev
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................. 271
Editors and Authors .............................................................................. 273
Introduction Plamen I. Pantev
The study of evolving civil-military relations in South East Europe and the special accent on the continuation of democratic reforms while adapting to the needs of fighting terrorism is both a logical follow-up inquiry into the subject, and a reflection on the new challenges life posed to the peoples and states in the region after the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Studies published by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)1, by the Groningen Centre of European Security Studies2 and by the UK-run Civil-Military Relations Network Newsletter3 among others have showed the subject has attracted the interest of an increasing number of respected experts in the last five years. The present study was carried out by the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia as part of a collaborative effort with two long-standing partners – first, the Austrian Directorate General for Security Policy, the Bureau for Security Policy and the Austrian National Defense Academy, Vienna, and, second, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in the combined context of the Regional Stability in South East Europe Study Group and the Security Sector Reform Study Group of the PfP Consortium of the Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. The research effort, undertaken by ISIS with the support of the project co-partners was taking place when issues of civil-military relations and 1
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Ph. Fluri and Vel. Shalamanov (eds.), Security Sector Reform: Does It Work? Problems of Civil-Military and Inter-Agency Cooperation in the Security Sector (Sofia: CorectA 2003), 77–185; Jan Trapans and Ph. Fluri (eds.), Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives. A Self-Assessment Study, Vol. I and II (Geneva/Belgrade: Dragan Srnic, Sabac 2003); Ph. Fluri and David Law (eds.), Security Sector Expert Formation – Achievements and Needs in South East Europe (Vienna: NDA, IPSCM May 2003). David Greenwood and Peter Volten, Security and Defense in South East Europe: The ESCADA Report (Groningen: CESS 2003). Andrew Cottey, ‘Civil-Military Relations and Defense Diplomacy After 11 September: New Dynamics’, CMR Network Newsletter, http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk, Issue Five 2002; Tim Edmunds, ‘Security Sector Reform in Southeastern Europe’, CMR Network Newsletter, http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk, Issue Six, 2002.
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democratic control of the security institutions in the post-Cold War world were evolving and gaining support South East Europe or the Balkans as a valid theoretic assessment tool. We considered enough time has passed since the study of 2001 to come back to the topic, re-evaluate previous assumptions and try to understand better new processes and facts. The pressing needs of the security sector to reform and fight terrorism in a more efficient way were also calling for assessing the impact that this change will have on civil-military relations and democratic control over security and defense organizations in South East Europe. The need for having more homogeneous criteria, essential to assess recent developments was obvious during our first study. It was persistently stemming from the general trend of the emergence of a security community of nations in the Balkans – part of the enlarging Euro-Atlantic civic and security space. Both the theoretic progress and the practical needs to cope with a new threat – terrorism – intensified the need for greater homogeneity of standards for the evaluation of civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces and the other security agencies in the region. Another important reason to come back to the issue is the invariably high worth of the commodity called “regional stability”. As observed in the previous study, the maturity of civil-military relations and democratic control of the security institutions is reflected significantly in the general security situation of the region. A democratically- and legally-established system of transparency and accountability of security and defense institutions is a confidence-building measure with a broad positive effect on stability in bilateral, multilateral and regional relations in the Balkans. The study aims at outlining the theoretic preconditions of fighting terrorism and at reviewing the persisting old and the new security risks and instability in the Balkans. It aims at analysing continuity and change in civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces and the security sector reform during the fight against terrorism and at finding specific reflections of these developments on the Balkan countries and the region. Specific humanitarian law requirements for democratic control of the armed forces are analysed with the intention that this normative perspective will be realised and internalised by the security sector players from the region. There is a worrisome tendency of exaggerating protection of society and state at the expense of the individual’s freedoms and liberties – a tendency we consider should be temporary and proportional to the battle on terrorism. The study aims also to acquaint the reader with the specific national perceptions, wording, terminology, and expressions brought by the individual authors, to record the level of discussion in each of the countries of the region. Finally, the study aims at comparing the national
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perspectives of the discussed topics – a comparison – made according to a relevant methodology. The core of this methodology is the understanding that civil-military relations (CMR), democratic control (DEMCON) and security sector reform (SSR) are at different stages of their evolution in the different Balkan countries, as concluded in the first study on these issues in 2001. Being a significant component of the regional security and stability they need to be continuously monitored, studied and improved in each individual case. The need to adapt to the requirements of fighting terrorism has an impact on CMR, DEMCON, and SSR. The consequence of this adaptation on the individual nations deserves a special theoretic inquiry and may lead to adequate recommendations for the future. The harmonisation of activity of the South East European countries on CMR, DEMCON and SSR, considering the variety of levels of evolution in these areas of the individual national cases is more than a theoretic challenge – it is a practical need in the efforts of homogenising security and defense fields essential to the process of shaping a common Euro-Atlantic strategic culture. Another core element of the methodology is the tailoring of specific questions about the individual nations’ evolution of CMR, DEMCON and SSR. After the initial screening of the CMR in South East Europe in the study of 2000/01, the targeted state of these relations led us deductively to a definition of problem areas in each country. The ‘targeted state of affairs’ included the standard NATO/PfP requirements on CMR, DEMCON and SSR as well as developed and tangible normative expectations in the evolving security situation. The South East European experience is also expected to contribute to improvements in that field. There are three exceptions in the applied methodology, intentionally made in the study for the purposes of the geographic widening of the research. First, the inclusion of the Greek and the Turkish cases required some background information to cover the developing situation in the two old NATO states. Second, the Hungarian model case of scrutinising only one aspect of the SSR – the transformation of the intelligence system and what changes are required for the DEMCON of that particular sector. Third, the Romanian case, which concentrates on the priority security threat and interest – the fight on terrorism, and on the particular measures of responding to the requirements of having adequate DEMCON over the security sector while this fight continues. The most ambitious methodological novelty of the study was to try to outline the general regional picture of CMR, DEMCON and SSR in the period of fighting terrorism, basing the analysis, assessments and conclusions on all South East European countries’ experience without exception and in one and the same theoretic framework of study. We consider this approach
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both theoretically and politically correct. The process of homogenising the security attitudes, culture and standards of the ‘security community’ of South East Europe, which is in the process of progressively shaping itself, requires all national cases to be included. This is also politically correct since most Balkan countries are getting closer and closer to NATO and the EU: they are either NATO and EU members or aiming to be NATO, PfP and EU members. In a NATO and EU organisational setting, South East European countries need to speak the same language on security and defense issues, they need to share a common vision, regulative and behavioural culture on CMR, DEMCON and SSR. The very agreement of all national-case writers to be part of the same team under a single methodology, known by all in advance is a conceptual and intellectual breakthrough in the security studies of and in the Balkans. This is a strong reflection of the expectations by the South East Europeans of our common Euro-Atlantic future, which encourages various changes in specific ways in each of the countries towards common values, standards, norms and attitudes on CMR, DEMCON and the security sector relationships in general. The participation in the study of our Greek friends is especially valuable since Greece was until 2004 the only EU and NATO member country of the region and bears an incomparable experience. The participation of our Turkish colleagues is invaluable: Turkey is the most powerful state in South East Europe, a staunch NATO member and the enlargement of EU to the East would be incomplete without this country since we all need to get closer together on key strategic issues. The participation of our Slovenian colleagues gives another promise for the developments in the fields of CMR, DEMCON and SSR: Slovenia is a post-Communist and postYugoslav country, which proved that both legacies can be overcome and that membership in NATO and EU is possible for all the other countries of South East Europe with similar historical, social, economic, political and cultural experience. The participation of an expert writer from Bosnia and Herzegovina proves that even the hardest of all national cases bears both critical self-assessment and optimism potential of being an equal partner in the family of Balkan and European nations. The closure of the gaps in the fields of CMR, DEMCON and SSR bears a special meaning for the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole region towards EuroAtlantic integration. The theoretic developments which influenced this study deserve mention, as they are different from the previous one in 1999–2001. In the beginning of 2002 Anthony Forster outlined three major challenges of CMR which dramatically redefined our understanding of how the armed services interact with civilian authorities and more generally with civil society: epistemological, ontological and practitioner- and policy
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maker- led challenges, moving scholars towards a new research agenda4. Dr. Forster argues that there are increased possibilities of applying new knowledge to CMR issues; enhanced opportunities for interdisciplinary research, and, to root the study of CMR in approaches which have stronger theoretic foundations5. In late 2002 Gerhard Kümmel proposed to distinguish six interdependent and interpenetrated dimensions in an attempt to cover the full scope of CMR: economy, finance, technology, culture, society, and politics6. He adds an important aspect of the issue: CMR may look differently depending on the moment in time that they are observed. CMR should be differentiated, according to Kümmel in peacetime, crisis situations, traditional military operations (defense, deterrence, attack), and non-traditional military operations (peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, etc.)7. Kümmel highlights another key perspective on the issue of CMR: different dimensions have both a national/domestic and an international context8. Theodor Winkler9, Dylan Hendrickson, Andrzej Karkoszka10, and Heiko Borchert11 develop the concept of the security sector reform – a far broader concept than the traditional CMR, for addressing security problems. According to Th. Winkler the security sector reform is composed of five elements: (1) (2)
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5 6
7 8 9
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The reforms are guided by the political leadership, according to democratic principles and the needs of state and society, The starting point is a broad view of the term ‘security’, including military, societal, economic and environmental security risks, Anthony Forster, ‘New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agenda’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, I:2 (April 2002), 71. Ibid. Gerhard Kümmel, ‘The Military and its Civilian Environment: Reflections on a Theory of Civil-Military Relations’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, I:4 (December 2002), 67. Ibid. Ibid. Theodor H. Winkler, Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order, Occasional Paper – No. 1 (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF, October 2002) 40. Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, ‘The challenges of security sector reform’, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 175–201. Heiko Borchert, Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI): How to Advance Security Sector Reforms with the Help of a New Assessment and Development Framework, Paper of the WG on SSR (Berlin: PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 6th Annual Conference, 15–17 June 2003) 23.
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(3)
The reforms include all services: military, police, intelligence agencies, state security, paramilitary organisations, and border guards, Security sector reform is not a one-off event, but a continuous process; it is not a goal in itself, but aims at providing security both to the state and to its citizens, The reforms concern both the organisation of the security sector (legal framework, structure of institutions, division of labour) and the human dimension of the security sector services, that is creating ser12 vices staffed with professionals .
(4)
(5)
Heiko Borchert, borrowing from Timothy Edmonds’ ideas of the first and second generations of reforms in the sector of CMR and DEMCON13, outlines the parameters of a third generation of SSR: provision of adequate capabilities and improvement of co-operability among Security sector actors14. All these and other contributions to the theory of CMR, DEMCON and SSR allowed the authors of this region-encompassing study to upgrade the applied theoretic framework. There are five specific features of the research framework that comprise the five main theoretical accents: First, the issues of CMR, DEMCON and SSR continue to be key problems of the transition of most of the societies and states in South East Europe from totalitarianism to democracy, from wars to post-war rehabilitation and from post-war reconstruction to normalcy. Without reforming the security sector the security institutions of the old regimes may continue to have a ‘say’ in the life of the new, democratic societies. The fight against organised criminality becomes more difficult or even impossible without the SSR as the example of Serbia and Montenegro showed most vividly, but examples of that kind could be noticed in all post-totalitarian societies and states with no exception. Lack of stability, dependence on criminal structures keeps foreign investors away from South East Europe and without substantial investments, the economic and infrastructure retardation of the region cannot be overcome. Second, CMR, DEMCON and SSR continue to experience the influence of ethnic pressures of the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and of ethnic clashes of 2000/01 in Southern Serbia and FYROM/Macedonia. 12 13
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Theodor H. Winkler, Managing Change... 10–11. Timothy Edmonds, Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation, Report for the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Geneva: DCAF website at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/E-packages/ws_criteria221101/DCAFSSRReport1.pdf, 2001). Heiko Borchert, Security Sector Reform Initiative… 4.
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Notwithstanding, CMR, DEMCON and SSR in South East Europe in general become more characteristic of the ‘regional security community’ that is emerging in the Balkans. Thanks to domestic stabilising effects, the growing transparency in the security sector of each country is perceived by neighbours as a de facto confidence and security-building measure. The general security situation in the Balkans is improving and efforts to prevent conflicts become more effective. The region becomes more predictable from a security point of view and the chances of diverting public attention and energy on economic and other constructive areas increase for the good of the people of South East Europe and the whole Euro-Atlantic zone. Third, on the conditionality of sound CMR, DEMCON and SSR policies, which are to be followed by NATO and EU accession, produces multiple effects. It improves the domestic and the broader regional security situation of the Balkans and increases the likelihood that current nonNATO and non-EU members will be integrated in the Alliance and the Union. PfP, the Stability Pact for South East Europe and OSCE also play driving roles in the evolution of the security sector towards integration in both major European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Without covering the requirements in the area of CMR, DEMCON and SSR, integration in NATO and EU becomes virtually impossible and this has been well understood by the leading elites of the Balkan countries. Fourth, a basic need of implementing the third generation of SSR, though in many individual cases fundamental, first or second-generation reform deficiencies are still to be observed, stems from the fight against terrorism. This would be impossible if on a domestic, regional and broader international level the different components of the security sector did not work cooperatively in identifying and neutralising terrorist groups. Of course, SSR should not be identified with anti-terrorism activities, but surely, it is a main motivation for reform of the security sector. The reform is also needed because of the obligation of new democratic societies (and older ones) in South East Europe to preserve the balance between the security interests and the support for democracy and human rights while the fight on terrorism still goes on. Fifth, the SSR focus of the countries of South East Europe is needed for plain good governance purposes of the security sector. People understand how important security is for their everyday life. What they understand in parallel is that the more economic the ‘security commodity’ is, the better their economy and standard of living is going to be. That is why state budgets and professionalism in the security sector are turning more and more into topics of public discussion and the interest on these topics will grow.
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Finally in this introductory part it could be shared that the present study bears features of more maturity in the perception and assessment of CMR, DEMCON and SSR issues in the Balkans, compared to the first one. A generally higher level of education and knowledge of indigenous experts on these topics, a general improvement of the domestic and regional security situation in South East Europe provide the opportunity the critical analysis and assessments of the individual authors to be translated in a logical and principled way into working practical recommendations for policy-making. The ‘spill-over effect’ of the intensified theoretic research in the field of CMR, DEMCON and SSR in the last years is paying back in a very practical way in South East Europe. The participation of scholars from Austria, Canada and Switzerland alongside with their colleagues from South East Europe in carrying out this study confirms this assessment.
Part 1: Old and New Security Risks and Instability in the Balkans
Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism: The View from South East Europe Plamen I. Pantev
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Introduction
Intellectual investment in the fight against terrorism comprises the widest spectrum of perspectives, issues, methods, approaches, instruments, etc. Definitely the new evil of the 21st century will induce reactions and preemptive acts by the developed world that may make more likely dealing away with terrorism or at least – strongly limit its potential. If we do not downgrade our level of analysis and responsibilities as students and doers of security, we shall avoid two mistakes: first, start believing that everything about terrorism is learned or written and that we should just implement what we know, and, second, ignore the possibility that terrorists may manipulate or influence structural trends of the international system to improve their chances of reaching ‘their ends’. There are “bodies of knowledge” that need to be constantly treated and developed – no matter how far we have come in our understanding of terrorism with the purpose of reaching success against it in the very, very long struggle ahead of us. One such ‘body of knowledge’ is about the deep philosophy and logic of the motivational model of terrorism. What makes terrorists prone to suicide acts? Which social systems and situations trigger the psychological mechanisms that create the phenomenon of terrorism with its specific motivations, aims, targets, instruments and methods? The answer to these questions may help go deeper into the motivational nature of terrorism. Another important ‘body of knowledge’ that needs to be further studied and improved is about the roots of terrorism as one form of psychological warfare. Modern, religious-motivated and large-scale deadly terrorism seeks particular effects on a target public so that its ends are reached more easily: “Re-establish the Muslim state throughout the world; overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’; remove Westerners from Muslim countries;
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kill US citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere; Jihad”.1 Fear, insecurity, panic, irrational reactions are just instrumental in influencing the people who can agree with the final ends of the terrorists. Many other such ‘bodies of knowledge’ need to be continuously studied and developed to enable us to fully grasp the phenomenon. In this study the possibility of terrorists influencing and/or manipulating international relations and individual countries’ foreign political behaviour is of special interest. Creating chaos in the most powerful country of the world is a priority of terrorists. Their dream, however, is the re-ordering of international development, and of individual countries, thus creating a more effective and instrumental environment to reach the goal of re-establishing the Muslim state throughout the world. Interest is further driven by the character and level of perception of terrorism in the individual Balkan countries and in the region in general. The differences in perceiving and reacting to the threat, the insufficient predictive power of evolving tendencies in global and regional international relations and of the potential utilization of these tendencies by terrorists may lead to negative consequences for South East Europe and for the broader international system. This is a development that should be prevented. There is another pressing reason to deal with these questions: the quest by some states for short-term financial, economic or geopolitical advantages because of the global character of terrorism and the mounted pressure on the United States to be the leader in reacting to the threat. We must be clear on this issue: the fight against terrorism does not mean utilizing the side-effects of the struggle of the active anti-terrorist states by some other countries. The fight against terrorism rather means a comprehensive national investment by all states into this struggle, since terrorists attack and aim at disrupting the very core of statehood and the trust of people in their elected governments. The aim of this chapter is to outline the scope and magnitude of the impact of terrorism on the present system of international relations and how this is reflected in the regional development of South East Europe. A critical assessment of the present anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism activities in the Balkans is made on this basis and some improvements of the strategic thinking to better cope with the challenge.
1
Ronald G. Bowdish, ‘Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces’, in Sam J. Tangredi (ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, D. C.: INSS, ND University, 2002) 84.
Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism
2
Modern Terrorism: Specific Challenges for the Structure and Functioning of the International System and for the Individual States
2.1
Main Features of Modern Terrorism
13
There is no formally recognized international legal definition of terrorism2. The US National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003) defines terrorism as: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”3. Magnus Norell, a Swedish expert on counter-terrorism, provides the following working definition: the “systemic use of illegitimate violence by non-state or sub-state actors, specifically aimed at non-combatants and/or civilians to achieve specific objectives. These objectives could be political, social or religious depending on the group in question. Terrorism becomes international when it is carried out beyond the borders that define a specific group’s country of origin, or when it is targeting foreign nationals within a specific group’s country of origin”4.
In addition it could be said that terrorism today is really global: terrorists are organised in networks and can operate from every corner of the world. The neutralisation of one segment of the organisation would not mean the end of the whole network. Next, we face terrorists who have religious motivation to strike, making them fanatical and ready to act in an indiscriminate manner. ‘Burning’ all infidels, including by nuclear and/or other WMD is a very significant part of the thinking of the new terrorists. The deep satisfaction of the leaders of Al Qaeda from the large casualties in the 2
3
4
At the Berne, Switzerland meeting of the PfPC ESSG on 22 April 2002 Col. Nick Pratt, USMC (Ret.) said there are 109 academic definitions of ‘terrorism’. On 2 April 2002 Islamic nations failed to come up with a common definition of ‘terrorism’ at a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Malaysia. The obstacle was the diverging views on the nature of the Palestinian struggle against Israel – ‘freedomfighting’ or ‘terrorism’ (FT, 3 April 2002, 2). Prof. Dr. Kemal Beyoghlow, a US counter-intelligence expert underlined on 16 September 2002 at a lecture to the Atlantic Club in Sofia that the best short definition of terrorism is ‘a politically motivated attack on civilian non-combatants’. Chris Donnelly of NATO focuses on terrorism as a ‘tactic’ (Donnelly/CND/2002/090/Spain/26.04.2002, 5). ‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’ (Sofia: Wireless Files, US Embassy, 18 February 2003) 2. Magnus Norrel, ‘The Role of the Military and Intelligence in Combating Terrorism’, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, VIII:4 (2002) 42.
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WTC in New York was recorded and distributed over the globe by the terrorists themselves. For the working purposes of this study it will draw arguments from the following key features and perspectives to the phenomenon of terrorism: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i)
2.2
It causes death to innocents and people removed from the conflict, It is an instrument/tactic of waging military activity, It has an unclear territorial and legal subject identification, It is becoming more lethal, It demonstrates a large-scale ‘suicide power’, compromising the traditional rational approaches in applying military violence, It is global in magnitude, It is fanatical and religiously motivated, It is becoming more indiscriminate towards its victims, The use of WMD is an irrational and yet direct purpose of terrorists.
The System of International Relations Under the Pressure of Terrorism
First, the main features of modern terrorism underline the increased role of non-state actors in global affairs, causing definite changes in the very morphology of the system of international relations. Non-state actors, even if they are just small groups, even if possessing powerful technological instruments, can cause damage that traditionally only national armed forces could inflict. Such small non-state actors operate in one third of the countries of the world (or maybe more). Even state actors may submit to the powerful network of terrorist non-governmental groups. Second, terrorism interacts also with the socio-economic environment of the system of international relations. Underlying conditions of poverty, economic backwardness, low level of health care and education create resentment for terrorists to exploit. This has been registered by the G-7/8 summits in the last two years and for sure will remain their major focus in the years to come. Ellen Laipson correctly highlights the inadequate explanatory power of poverty and humiliation as sources of terrorism5. Futile or failed attempts to interact with and adapt to the West are even stronger causes of becoming susceptible to recruiting as a terrorist. The interaction of terrorism with the socio-economic environment of the interna5
Ellen Laipson, ‘While America Slept: Understanding Terrorism and Counterterrorism’, Foreign Affairs, 82:1, January/February (2003) 143–144.
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tional system has another aspect too: billions of dollars and millions of jobs were lost only in the United States after the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001. Many financial relationships had to be rebuilt and many manufacture and trade activities reorganized. This is a serious reminder of the consequences of terrorism on the international system and individual state actors. Third, terrorism provoked the stability of the fluid configuration of centres-of-power relationships. Al Qaeda took the risk of polarizing further the natural differences of interests of the major power centres in the beginning of the new century. The expectations of the terrorist network are of sharpening those differences and portraying the role of the organization as an influential global political player. The instinctive reaction of the great powers to the terrorist provocation was taking anti- and counter-terrorism positions. This is a valid assessment almost three years after the tragic events of 11 September. As the crisis around Iraq proved, however, antiAmericanism is continuously exploited by global terrorism, and various international actors go on using hatred towards the USA as a political expedient. Neither the great and big, nor the small and less powerful states should be blind to the fact that the United States is openly targeted by terrorism as the world’s hegemonic and lone superpower. Any opportunistic exploitation of this targeting for balance of power (multi-polar vs. unipolar) purposes is counter-productive for the civilized progress of globalization and serves petty, short-term and narrow purposes. This is not a call for the launch of a global pro-US ‘PR-campaign’ by all anti-terrorist forces, but a reminder how blind anti-Americanism is pragmatically exploited for the ends of terrorism. The centres of power of the 21st century world bear a special responsibility to find a more stable and lasting state of interrelationships for the sake of depriving global terrorist networks from global destabilization potential. Fourth, the terrorist acts of 11 September had regional ripple effects. They polarized the Middle East, Chechen and other conflicts in Asia and Africa further. Another structural level of the system of international relations – the regional and local conflicting knots – also experienced the pressure of the new terrorist activity. South East Europe was no exception. However, the region was already on the way to its stabilisation and the negative effects of this pressure were rather limited. The regional destabilisation by global terrorism is neither cancelled, nor slowed down. Hence, South East Europe will continue to be susceptible to terrorist pressures and activity as long as it is not firmly anchored to the EU and NATO. Fifth, terrorism after 11 September caused re-conceptualisation and reformation of one of the priority sub-systems of international relations – security. The traditional ‘containment’ and ‘deterrence’ conceptual
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frameworks could no longer provide explanation and adequate response to such acts. The high probability of terrorists getting hold of WMD already puts global strategic stability under great risk. Because of the changed focus of terrorism, states neglect other grave global security threats: environmental, socio-economic, humanitarian, etc. Understanding and internalizing these effects is an indicator of the maturity of SEE countries, and their readiness to be effective partners in building-up cooperative security in the 21st century. Sixth, mass-scale terrorism had an impact on the regulatory system of international relations. Regulatory measures of coercion assumed new and sharper forms. The civilized existence of human society was jeopardized. A very drastic effort has been made in eliminating negotiation as a means of solving problems and reaching non-violent ends. The role of military force and, if needed – violence – have regained preeminence as a means of social stability and orderly existence. This is considered a legitimate reaction to the application of indiscriminate violence by terrorists. 2.3
The Risks and Challenges for the Democratic Society and State
The democratic and freedom-loving part of the world can hardly accept the situation described in the preceding paragraph but as a temporary one. No country with a democratic or democratizing society should stay aside of the effort of depriving terrorism from its blackmail and societydegradation capacity. People expect that the fight against terrorism will end with a victory and they will resume their way of democratic and free life as it was before 11 September 2001. However, this is only one of the concepts on how democracies must react to terrorism. Other- also quite sober- views reflect another thinking, which seek to to have society adjust to the phenomenon of terrorism rather than attempt at rooting it out, being part of social life as it is nowadays. The core of that thinking is that democratic countries with their open societies, freedoms and civil liberties are always going to be vulnerable to terrorism. These societies will never be able to protect all targets, all the time, against all possible attacks, which means that terrorism will always be attractive to foes of democracy. Though public and individual vigilance is constantly mobilized by the democratic state, fighting against terrorism, and the expectations from that fight should remain realistic while seeking to diminish the vulnerabilities of democratic open societies. Both concepts have legitimate arguments and a possible resolution of the dilemma seems to be in following two parallel tracks of behaviour:
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First, despite the necessary limitations of certain rights and liberties inherent to democratic society during its fight on terrorism, protecting the foundations of democracy and keeping all measures against terrorism within the confines of established- though more sophisticated democratic procedures- is mandatory for any democratic state. Balancing principles with interests is not an easy job, but it is the only way to overcome tensions or crisis of a democratic society in fight with itself while targeting and struggling against terrorism. US Secretary of State Colin Powell warned on 1 August 2002 in Brunei against “using the campaign against terrorism as a way to suppress legitimate dissent or as a way to suppress people presenting their views to government”6. Then he added that “if we are going to prevail over terrorism, really going to prevail over this plague on the face of mankind, then we have to do it in a way that respects human dignity and the rights of men and women”7. An area in which democratic governments and societies risk failing is an eventual excessive accumulation of power in any one too centralized institution. Ellen Laipson asks a very legitimate question, concerning US democracy: “Should terrorism push the United States to revise its core belief in checks and balances?”8 Second, efforts should be exerted to democratize Islam and prevent Islamic clerics from hindering the process. A bottom-line of discussing the issue is that Muslims are not the problem – radical Muslims are. Radwan Masmoudi, President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), a US-based think-tank, was quoted by the ‘Christian Science Monitor’ saying that “the key to a viable future is a coalition of moderate Islamists and non-Islamists committed to representative government”9. Nadcem Kazmi of the Al-Khoei Foundation in London supports this claim by saying that there is a “need for a diplomatic process to develop a ‘cohesive authoritative fatwa’ for delegitimizing terrorism”10. Of course, embarking, working on and fulfilling these ambitious goals would require the creation of civil societies with due respect to pluralism in Muslim countries. Muslims who study the integration of democracy into Muslim societies underline the key role of Muslim intelligentsia in 6
7 8 9
10
Colin Powell, ‘Rights Must Be Protected in Anti-Terrorism Fight’ (Sofia: Wireless Files, US Embassy, August 5, 2002) 10. Ibid. Ellen Laipson, ‘While America...’ 146. Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 2003, ‘Easing into Islamic Democracy (Convinced by their experience in the US, American Muslims are helping form democratic coalitions in the Muslim world and are building their case on Islamic principles)’, by Jane Lampman, staff writer to the CSM. Ibid.
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changing public attitudes and in logically discarding medieval models preached by some Islamic clerics. It would be in the interest of Islam and all other faiths if it improves its internal religion’s organization by establishing and strengthening supra-national leadership and control structures. A fundamental strategic goal, however, of both Muslim and nonMuslim intellectuals should be de-politicising the difficulties of the adaptation of Islamic fundamentalism to the requirements of globalisation. In the last decade adapting to the needs of the global international environment became the main focus of policy of the majority of states. Other states and non-state actors, however, perceived the new developments towards a global world as a danger for their existence. Hiding behind the existing differences of the religion and culture of the Middle East, which is also predominantly poor while the Western developed world is mostly rich, the proponents of radical Islam decided to attack. The terrorist acts of 11 September aimed at defining politically the format of the clash of radical Islamic religion and the approaching economic, political and cultural globalization. The advantageous form of the clash was ‘suffering Islam’ against the ‘Americanization of the world’. The ‘clash of civilization’ mentality, poverty in the Muslim world, failed states – especially Muslim ones are trends that terrorism tries to exploit. A major frustration of radical Islam is the readiness of individual Muslims all over the world to embrace globalisation as an opportunity to improve their living standards and to have a better life – with more and better chances to have a choice. This readiness of Muslims to embrace globalisation and to discard conservative Islamic fundamentalist habits and relations very probably unbalances all who profit from manipulating the souls of the believers. The success of globalization and democracy is the result of the victory of the struggle for democratic rights in the non-Western world and of the fact that state boundaries and sovereignty cannot save those who oppose social, political and technological progress. Another reason is the creation of more and more effective forms and institutions of global governance. Attacks against proponents of these tendencies and on global centres governing these processes is seen as the right way to save Islamic fundamentalism in its extremist and aggressive interpretation. Killing anything that is ‘global’ remains the only option for the ‘ultimate guardians’ of the fundamentalist traditions – a very radical interpretation of social and religious life indeed.
Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism
3
19
Threat Perception of Terrorism in South East Europe: Lessons Learned and Lessons Yet to Be Learned
Contradictory tendencies and processes characterize the real magnitude of the terrorist threat and its perception in South East Europe. On the one hand, terrorism has interests in the Balkans. SFOR and KFOR, NATO member countries and candidates for membership in the Alliance being allies of the United States are targets of terrorists. South East Europe bears the geopolitical potential to be a barrier to Islamic extremism and terrorism. Bulgaria’s ethno-religious model is an obstacle to the expansion of radical Islam of another type – cultural. The ‘clash-of-civilization’ philosophy of Al Qaeda simply evaporates on Bulgarian territory. This is due both to the specific interpretation of Islam by Bulgarian Muslims and to the well-developed political model of inter-ethnic relationships. The Balkans’ links with terrorism stem from the general criminological situation in a region torn of conflicts for more than 12 years. Mafia-like structures in the Western Balkans particularly could be motivated for more instrumental (political) purposes. Fighting organised crime, cutting the links of criminals with nationalist parties and separatist movements is a major step forward in preventing activation of terrorist cells. Balkan countries are involved in the global coalition against terrorism. Even Bosnia and Herzegovina is preparing to participate in peacekeeping operations as part of the counter-terrorist struggle and post-conflict reconstruction efforts – a development hard to imagine in the middle of the 1990s. Managing domestic affairs through the Western Balkan countries’ own institutions will be an important contribution by the region of South East Europe to the anti-terror campaign. External support in limiting Balkan terrorist activities came in the form of the US Administration’s designation on 3 December 2001 of two groups in the region – the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the National Committee for the Liberation and Defense of Albanian Lands (KKCMTSH) as extremist, thus permitting the US Treasury Department to block their US assets and stop them from conducting financial transactions with people in the USA. This measure was important, because the two groups’ violent tactics aimed at undermining democracy and threatened efforts to secure peace and stability in FYROM/Macedonia, Kosovo, southern Serbia and the region. The meaning of ‘extremist violence’ in the US Administration’s terminology includes inciting ethnic conflict or other obstructionist acts to promote irredentist or criminal agendas that threaten peace, stability and security. It is interesting to note that counter-terrorist forces in Afghanistan found Kosovo Albanian participation on the side of
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Al Qaeda and the Talibans. However, it would be a mistake to accept uncritically allegations in the Western Balkans of continuing Albanian links to bin Laden. Extremism and violence must be fought internationally, but educating and living in ethnic tolerance is an immanent element of civilised political order. On 2 July 2002 the US State Department blocked the assets of three individuals – Gafur Adili, Nevzat Halili, and Kastriot Haxhirexha for providing leadership or material support to armed insurgents in the Western Balkans. This activity threatened international stabilization efforts in the region. Armed insurgency is a most suitable milieu for terrorist activity in the Western Balkans. Special studies have proved this correlation of armed conflict and terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina11. There is evidence that peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, establishing decent inter-ethnic dialogue, and longer-lasting relationships are crucial to prevent terrorism. Tempering ethnic disputes or religious differences is a significant preventive aspect of the fight on terrorism in South East Europe. On the other hand, terrorism has not focused specifically on South East Europe. The developed democratic countries of the world, especially the USA continue to be more significant targets of terrorist networks. This tendency induces feelings of isolation from the evil of terrorism in some countries’ elites and broader publics of South East Europe. In Slovenia and Croatia, for example, the threats are perceived as and the dangers of terrorism do not have their rightful place. A similar perception to Al Qaeda terrorism could be noticed in a lesser degree in most of the other Balkan countries. It could be reasonable to claim that there is some pause of higher terrorist activity in South East Europe. It is equally incorrect to consider South East Europe and the individual countries of the region as exempt from the structural and functional influences of interactions in the system of international relations and the phenomenon of terrorism. A keen approach and study of the effects of terrorism on the international system by the decision-making elites in the security area of South East European countries is a practical necessity. The concept of political and military pre-emption towards terrorism will be accepted and applied in all South East European states as soon as the broader interactions of terrorism with the international system are understood well. There are other ‘incentives’ to take a better hold of the parameters of terrorism and reacting to it in South East Europe: the record of ‘failed 11
Alfred C. Lugert, Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vienna and Sarajevo: PfPC CMSEE SG, December 2002) 157.
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states’ in the region; the persistent ethnic strife and religious differences; and the fact that more Balkan countries become US allies – through NATO or directly. NATO itself is becoming more counter-terrorism oriented as an institution. Furthermore, evolving democracy in South East Europe and the enlargement of the EU to the region will inevitably lead to further integration of Muslim societies into a democratic mainstream. This development fully contradicts the aspirations of Muslim radicals and their terrorist instrument which is to close off the Muslim world from integration and globalization. Muslim people live almost everywhere in South East Europe. Dissident groups, formed within the Muslim communities of the Balkan countries, could easily attract terrorists’ attention. Disrupting connections between such groups and terrorist networks should be a priority of societies and state institutions in South East Europe. It would also be instructive to recall a study by Rohan Gunaratna about Al Qaeda’s agenda (for 2003)12: 1) Al Qaeda is increasingly seeking targets that can be attacked with least effort and least cost. Suicide terrorism is turning more against soft targets (the region of South East Europe falls into this spectrum) 2) Economic targets, especially the tourist and hotel industries, will suffer from terrorism. Churches, synagogues, and other nonIslamic institutions, as well as trade and investment will remain particularly vulnerable. Commercial maritime targets will be of special terrorists’ interest (the tourist industry in most of the Balkan countries is a real national economic asset) 3) Western targets in the countries with less security is an opportunity for terrorists (in South East Europe there are both Western targets and insufficient security) 4) Al Qaeda will generate support from low-level crime, organized crime, infiltrated charities, and from politicized and radicalized segments of their migrant communities (South East Europe has all these prerequisites.) The security threat perceptual system of South East European countries should take all these developments into consideration and overcome contradictory signals from the environment. Forward thinking, predicting, preventing and pre-empting are becoming key categories and catch words of the intellectual treatment of the issue of terrorism.
12
Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Agenda for 2003’, INTERSEC, 13:2 (February 2003), 58–60.
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4
Conclusion
Three concentric and simultaneous ‘strategic circles’ of dealing away with terrorism may be suggested. First, the long-term and broadest one: 1) Winning the hearts and minds of the potential victims of globalisation. 2) Proving them that terrorism is not their way out of the difficulties and negative consequences of human progress. 3) Depriving terrorist networks from impoverished, desperate and hopeless people. 4) Proving clearly that globalisation provides the civilised outcome from the hard situation, created during the adaptation to the needs of the new economic, technological and information environment. Second, in the mid-term: 1) Helping failed states become prosperous. The region of South East Europe is a particularly important case, whose success will stimulate similar positive processes in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea area. 2) Involving Islam in civil society, secularism and democracy building, influencing religious reforms that would deprive fanatic terrorism from confessional motivation. 3) Improving the cooperation and coordination of the leading centres of power of the world in their anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism activity. Third, the short-term, direct one: 1) Preventing the performance of WMD-capable terrorism. 2) Creating the instruments, institutions and individuals who can effectively carry out all operational aspects of the antiterrorist and counter-terrorist struggle. The successful fight against terrorism will inevitably accelerate the constructive tendencies of the international system, boost globalisation and its positive social and economic effects. The successes of the fight will provide opportunities for the religions of the world to interact in a more creative and humane way than now. The peoples and states of South East Europe are already involved in the ‘three-circles’ strategy. Getting rid of the region’s conflicts, stabilizing the security and economy of the Balkans, developing civil-military relations of modern democratic type, carrying out security sector reform, adequate to the needs of fighting terrorism – these are significant milestones of the broader contribution to coping with South East Europe’s own deficiencies and with the global evil of terrorism.
State Violence, State Weakness – Explaining the Plethora of Security Risks and Instability in South East Europe Henriette Riegler
In introducing and outlining the context of insecurity and instability in the region I shall point out that: 1) threats to security and stability are manifold in the region due to dramatic changes in the international system and the break-up of the Former Yugoslavia; 2) – regional and domestic heterogeneity make it difficult to present a regionally coherent South East European perspective at all; 3) that the history of war and organized violence in the region enables a critical view on the academic and political debate on terrorism and organized crime and last but not least, 4) that by analysing global terrorism we look at a global and globalizing phenomenon. It has to be considered and acted upon as such in South East Europe while being mindful of possible local effects.
1
The Context of Insecurity and Instability in South East Europe
Security risks and instability in the region have a specific context and a history. The violent and purposeful destruction of Former Yugoslavia is only the last chapter of a long story of conflicting and late nation state building efforts in the area. It is due to the Yugoslav wars that this area was and to a certain and a very unequal degree still is one of immense insecurity and instability. Not only did the Yugoslav wars bring with them “conventional” war-induced security problems i.e. (para-) military-induced death and destruction, movements of civilians we came to know as ethnic cleansing, the break-down of the state’s authority and public order in the war afflicted regions etc. Beyond these immediate and directly war-linked “results”, a deep transformation of the political power structure took place: a reshuffle from civilian to military power took place, a general dispersion of the state’s power that was transferred from the monopoly of power to regional and local ‘war-lordism’ as well as a substitution of formal political activities and procedures by mafia activities in many forms and variations. One could not say that this was a mere outcome of the war; this was rather the
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result of transformation activities carried out in the “form” of war. Or to put it even more bluntly: these wars have to be seen as organized political efforts to devaluate legitimate political structures, state sovereignty and national security and to eventually break and rearrange them on a new basis. These efforts were in some cases more successful than in others depending on the pre-war status and ethno-national structure of the former federal republics: in the case of Slovenia nobody (not even the JNA) could easily break the political make up of the state. The territorial defense/TO (teritorijalna obrana) was in the hands of the Slovene political elite and could act as a counter-force to the Yugoslav military. In addition there was no Serb minority that could act as agent provocateur to call in the military. In the case of Croatia the situation was much more delicate: the self-defense capacities had to be delivered to the army before the war, leaving Croatia without much material means to realize its sovereignty and act against efforts orchestrated from Belgrade to mobilize and arm the rural Serb minorities of the Krajina regions. Although this did not lead to the intended total breakdown of the political make-up of Croatia’s political structure, the control over the state’s territory – a central element of effective sovereignty- was deeply questioned. At the height of the war, about one third of Croatia’s territory was occupied by a mixture of autonomous local Serb forces and the federal Yugoslav (but in fact Serb-Montenegrin) forces. Much of the ethno-national question was only a pretext under which as much as possible strategically or otherwise important territory could be annexed and incorporated into Serbia making also cities that could not be “claimed” from an ethnic point of view (like Dubrovnik) war targets. For quite a period of time it was not at all clear if Croatia would survive this assault on its sovereignty. An even more extreme case was the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having the most complex ethno-national structure as well as the most intermingled settling structures of all the Yugoslav federal republics much more violence and ethnical cleansing as in the Croatian case was necessary to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a way that mono-ethnic chunks could easily be swallowed by the greedy “mother states”: Serbia and Croatia. Once again it was as in the case of Croatia impossible without the local help of the majority of the Bosnian Serb political elite that in the first instance helped to de-legitimise the multiethnic Bosnian leadership by leaving the multi-ethnic government that led Bosnia into independence and in a second phase to bring in those parts of the Yugoslav army that could be easily turned into the Bosnian Serb army thereby drastically changing the material basis of Bosnian politics. This move left Bosnia practically without any military that could have defended the country’s sovereignty and the civilian population that became the explicit target of manoeuvres of ethnic cleansing on an ever larger
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scale. So what was clearly dangerous in the Croatian case really became a question of outright survival in the Bosnian: in the first stage of the conflict (1992) and even more so in the second one when Bosnian Croats joined by Croatian forces left the Bosnian coalition (1993/94), Bosnia stood on the edge of collapse of sovereignty and state extinction with Bosniaks on the edge of physical extinction. What saved both the state and the people in the last minute was not international peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance – I would go so far to argue quite on the contrary – but external elements: American pressure on the Croatian side to (re)join a coalition with the Bosniaks and international intervention efforts in a twofold way: in the form of an embargo against Belgrade that led Milosevic to let down his Bosnian Serb allies and finally air raids against any agreement opposing Bosnian Serbs’ Republika Srpska. The results of the massive onslaught on Bosnia as a (multi)nation(al) state left two hundred thousand dead, millions uprooted and either internally displace or exiled and the state and its infrastructure as well as its society in shambles. Although in the Kosovo case many argued that as it did not share the federal status with the other republics it could not be included in a state security- and sovereignty-related analysis of the Yugoslav wars, there is an important reason why one should: Kosovo’s status of an autonomous province, as somewhat lesser than a federal republic, was in itself the result of sovereignty withheld and then granted but only up to a provincial degree within the Yugoslav state. The Kosovars were suspected to show too small a share of loyalty to the Yugoslav state and had a hidden agenda to secede. It is exactly because of its minor degree of sovereignty the operation of breaking-up Yugoslavia could start in Kosovo in the late 1980s. Kosovo functioned in a way as a training ground for the wars to come: open warfare to reach the goal of destroying the political and territorial make-up of Kosovo was not a necessary step up until the last phase of Milosevic’s reign in Belgrade. The destruction of Kosovo’s political system and its annexation by Serbia, as well as its military occupation by the Yugoslav army could well stay beyond under the threshold of war, because federal boundaries are unprotected and because there was greater room for manoeuvre as in the cases to follow. That all the federal republics understood quite well what was being done before their eyes and alarmed by it is illustrated by the strong criticism voiced by Slovenia and Croatia on the eve of the crackdown of Kosovo’s autonomy. The Belgrade regime had every interest to keep the Kosovo conflict at a low level especially during the other wars it instigated. So it was no coincidence that ethnic cleansing in Kosovo comparable to those in Croatia and Bosnia only started after other parts of Former Yugoslavia reached a stage of internationally recognized independence defended in war. Not only was Belgrade left with no political
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resources to fight anywhere else nor could it make legitimate claims for any other territory (an exception might have been Montenegro). The Kosovar Albanians saw their last chance for achieving sovereignty fading away since the Dayton peace agreement in its regional (Former Yugoslavia encompassing) dimension did not include any political solution for them. So the Yugoslav wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo could be understood as centralizing Belgrade-led fights against the federal republics and autonomous provinces demands for more sovereignty. The moment when Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia demanded their independence, the result was to localize these conflicts and to present them as internal civil wars. Nevertheless, the internationalisation of the wars took place in more than one respect (i.e. by international recognition of their sovereignty), but also by the stationing of international peacekeepers and later by NATO troops and international peace implementation forces. Having this in mind we should track down the phenomenon that we think is the most important, the central one in explaining insecurity and instability in the region. Is it a lack of sovereignty, state failure, or simply a legacy of wars that made for a lasting security vacuum? And is it really a vacuum? Maybe it is the opposite: too much sovereignty or rather a competition of colliding and conflicting demands for sovereignty at work in the region? In the post-war phase efforts made to rebuild have been slow. Even slower was the reconstruction of the political and social fabric of societies. This is happening within a system of manifold and parallel systems of sovereignty or rather sovereignties. Going beyond being a mere wartime phenomenon, they have a lasting effect on post-war reconstruction efforts and are reproduced (although in a much more civil and well-intended way) by the national-international division of power especially in places under international protection like Bosnia, Kosovo and, to a much lesser degree, Macedonia. We often see a rather unclear and fluid divide responding to the national-international division of power and authority. This divide is due to the fact that the formal political structure is often powerless unless it responds to the informal and hidden power base that was built during the war. That norms like accountability and trust in public offices could not develop and take root has therefore a domestic war time dimension to it as well as one that has to do with the fact that position- and office-holders are ‘internationals’ who neither owe their positions to the local electorate nor who have to legitimize their actions and policies before them.
State Violence, State Weakness
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Is There a South East European Pattern of Insecurity and Instability?
As I have tried to show in the first part of the article the break-up or rather the demolition of Former Yugoslavia and the consequent wars did nothing but produce an even more heterogeneous picture. As the various federal units in the Former Yugoslavia had all a different fate with regard to their individual state structure and corresponding make up of the various nation(s) majority-minority relation in each of the republics, the wider South East European region is all the more heterogeneous including such warunaffected states like Bulgaria and Romania that had on the other hand a more complicated transformation projects which had to start from Soviettype Communist legacies both in the economic as well as in the political sphere. Even Albania has still to recover from decades of autarchic isolation and short-lived tactical international alliances1. So one could extract what all states have in common : they were non-Western, i.e. non-pluralist in political terms, and non-market orientated to varying degrees. Some of the Former Yugoslav republics were more Western than the others and more Western than the non-Yugoslav ones. Whereas there is not much analytical value in constructing a coherent regional approach, a comparative approach should have some. Although one could read it differently and describe the Yugoslav wars and the ideology they were built on as at least partly being built upon transformation-overload, I would clearly make a distinction and concentrate on war-inherent and in a wider sense break-up-induced security and stability problems in the cases of the Yugoslav successor states and transformation-induced security and stability problems in the post-Soviet-type cases and Albania. This would leave enough ground to talk about similar security and stability problems but not about identical ones. What distinguishes them from one another is simple: the post-Communist cases only had no additional problems with nation state building because they simply had ones in whose institutional framework they could inscribe their new political and economic projects. The Yugoslav case (i.e. all the Yugoslav successor states project encompassed) differs: during and after the destruction of the multinational and federal political project, all the former federal republics had to overcome the Yugoslav structural nation-state building gap and to “reinvent” themselves on a nation state basis which is as a matter of principle a politically ambitious, resource-demanding and long-term project. In addition, some of them had 1
Ivan Krastev comes to a similar conclusion, see Ivan Krastev, Facing the Political Risk in South-Eastern Europe, in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 39 (1999) 2.
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their sovereignty simultaneously challenged. So from my point of view, incomplete and colliding nation-state-building are both reasons for wars as well as for the quasi-state building projects that arose within Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and to a much lesser degree in Macedonia. Though with the notable exception of Republika Srpska none of them succeeded, they were the visible signs of the political and spatial vacuum the break-up instigated. Comparatively-speaking we might come up with the example of Albania and its internal turmoil, that was also accompanied by the emergence of local territorially- based political rivalries in the late 1990s, which had their roots in the unfinished Albanian nation-state building project. But beyond that almost no questioning of ethno-political boundaries took place in South East Europe. Does this give us any insight when it comes to the issues of security and stability risks? It might, as one of the implicit hypotheses is, that only state violence or state weakness can be the source of insecurity and instability in the region.
3
Terrorism, Organized Violence and Organized Crime
After September 11th, the all-too-fashionable debate on terrorism and organized crime finally reached SEE and the region changed labels from being perceived as a region of eternal and inexplicable conflicts, to one equally stigmatised as a hotbed of criminal activities and terrorist networks. This led to an inadequate understanding why and in which ways the region might indeed be a re(source) for international terrorism and transnational criminal activities. It is the break-up of Yugoslavia and the resulting wars that could be identified as large scale state-instigated criminal manoeuvres and analysed accordingly. Not only this, but the wars and the way they were led fundamentally changed what was legal and illegal. What was part of civil politics and what were (para)military affairs became blurred. The wars and the various forms of organized violence surrounding them could be read and interpreted as acts of state and (para-)military terrorism against a largely unprotected civilian population. What could the ethnic cleansing campaigns be but orchestrated criminal efforts? What else could the sieges of Vukovar and Sarajevo be but well planned and carefully executed acts of terrorism? In which other way could Srebrenica be described more adequately? But it was always the others that were declared terrorists – e.g. the UÇK in Kosovo – and the international community validated Belgrade’s evaluation of Kosovar terrorism far too long and far too willingly. A move to officially acknowledge the UÇK came only after Milosevic did
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not compromise on any political solution for Kosovo in 1999. A similar attempt vis-a-vis Albanian guerrilla fighters-turned-politicians in the wake of the events of 11 September by Macedonian politicians, interestingly enough, did not work out in the expected way but earned Western criticism. It is due to the Yugoslav wars that this area was and to a very unequal degree still is one of immense insecurity. Not only did the Yugoslav wars bring with them “conventional” war-induced security problems (i.e. death, destruction, flight movements etc.) It also brought about the breakdown of the state’s authority and public order not only in the war-afflicted regions, but to varying degrees in all the successor states directly or indirectly engaged in war. It even set a bad example by demonstrating how far the destruction of state and society could go without triggering any major international outcry. It was on the road to war that the established norms and forms of legitimacy were purposefully destroyed. They were erased by highly skilful bureaucratic and organizational means and were for a time almost nonexistent. These manoeuvres were to a large degree successful and had a devastating effect on the norms of legality, the rule of law and accountability. The most criminal actors – that many are now in The Hague should be considered a huge progress and a success in fighting organized crime – were for years the ones that were legitimised internally by election results and externally by international diplomacy. How could the citizenry even fully understand that they were criminals? The leading paramilitaries that were responsible for the most atrocious crimes against civilians could at the same time be deputies in national Parliaments (like Seselj and Arkan) and thereby embody and symbolise the highest authority. Or even worse: exactly because they were in charge of ethnic cleansing operations they were officially honoured with the most prestigious posts in the political system. If this is a phenomenon and a process in which the political system has turned into a criminal one, or in which the criminals overtook the political sphere is nearly irrelevant and for both aspects evidence could be found easily. Arkan and his political master Milosevic are an illustrative example of the mechanism at work: to make his way to the top, Milosevic needed to destroy the old system and get rid of competing politicians, an honest police force and a working judiciary. Instead he used criminals as a cheap political labour force. They were already outside any form of legality, had nothing to lose but everything to win by serving their political master. The politician is the one who gives him credit and in addition legalizes him. When the criminal’s services are no more needed and his actions or even more importantly his knowledge become a threat to the master, he gets laid off – and that is exactly what happened to Arkan and
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several others that operated in the tightly-knit net between politics and criminality. That this network is not yet destroyed and criminals and Mafiosi acquired a lot of power, all and foremost, in the police and the military is best illustrated by the recent murder of Serb Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. An additional transformation of the political power structure occurred when the war effort almost totally succeeded, Bosnia being the most prominent case. A reshuffle from civilian to military power took place that made control over the means of violence and not legality the most crucial precondition for getting and holding on to power. A general dispersion of the state’s power saw a transfer of the monopoly of power from central to regional and local war-lords as well as a substitution of formal political activities and procedures by mafia activities in many forms and variations. One could not say that this was a sheer outcome of the war; rather these transformation activities were carried out in the “form” of war. Or to put it even more bluntly: these wars have to be seen as organized political efforts to devaluate legitimacy, legitimate political structures, state sovereignty, national security and to eventually break them. Having this in mind we should track down the phenomenon that we think is the most important, the central one in explaining insecurity in the region and the most hindering fact in order to cut back criminality and other illegal activities. I argue that it is a lack of state and institution building – primarily a legacy of the wars but to a minor degree also a legacy of totalitarian party control over the state – that made for a lasting security vacuum. The main dilemma of credibility at work here is that on the one hand the international community asks for legitimacy and the rule of law, on the other it recognized and legitimised warlords and their success (e.g. with the Dayton peace accord and the recognition of Republika Srpska or with the decade long support for the Milosevic regime). And, one might add, by neglecting to take a close look at the region once other more interesting or burning issues are thought to be at stake2. In the post-war phase some efforts were made to repair war damages, even a modest reconstruction of the political and social fabric of warridden and almost destroyed societies takes place. This is done, however, within a system of a many-fold and parallel system of sovereignty or rather
2
This negligence vis-à-vis the periphery was also the main failure to stop the Yugoslav wars in the first place, see Richard H. Ullman (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, New York (1996) and James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York (1997).
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sovereignties3 Going beyond to be mere war time phenomena they have a lasting effect on post-war reconstruction efforts and are re-produced although in a much more civil and well-intended way by the nationalinternational division of power especially in those places that are under international protection like Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia. Not only do we see at times a rather unclear and fluid divide responding to the nationalinternational division of power and authority but also one due to the fact that the formal political structure often is rather powerless unless it responds to the informal and hidden power base that was built during the war. That norms like accountability and trust in public offices could not develop and take root has therefore a domestic war time dimension to it as well as one that has to do with the fact that the owners of positions and offices are internationals that neither owe their positions to the local electorate nor do they have to legitimise their actions and policies before them and in this way contribute to a sovereignty dilemma.
4
Global Terrorism, Local Bases
The main argument of this article is that state violence and state weakness alike account for insecurity and instability in the region and incomplete and colliding nation-state-building are at its core. The chances and hindrances for global terrorism taking root in the region have to be analysed within this context. In general terrorism is a rather fluid concept it could be organized by (para)state actors, political groups and/or individuals. Organizations like Al-Qaeda think in global terms and act globally. Although organized on a network basis they are in need of local territorial bases of various kinds. One sort of territorial bases is comprised by the weak, often rather internationally-isolated states that they can easily and almost officially infiltrate and regularly retreat to, like Afghanistan. The circumstances of the Yugoslav wars and especially Bosnia could have made for a similar European basis4 but only as long as no one in the West was especially worried about Bosnia’s fate. Islamic fighters from all over the world joined the Bosniak side during the Bosnian war with motives other than 3
4
See Attila Agh, Processes of democratization in the East Central European and Balkan states: sovereignty-related conflict in the context of Europeanization, in Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32 (September 1999) 3. It is worth noting from a comparative perspective that there were also rumours that Albania under Sali Berisha was involved in accepting Islamic support from rather dubious sources in the 90s, see Stephan Lipsius, Politik und Islam in Albanien – Instrumentalisierung und Abhängigkeiten, in Südosteuropa 47 (1998) 3–4. As in Bosnia in Albania a few Arabs with the countries citrizenship were arrested and exiled.
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the survival of Bosnian statehood. They rather had the idea of participating in a global jihad in (local) Bosnia. Not that the Bosniaks and even almost all of the Bosniak political elite itself thought in these terms, on the contrary, they were with some exceptions orientated towards a European secular idea of state and society. They looked for the help of Islamic states, welcomed Islamic welfare organizations and accepted even armed Islamists because of sheer despair at being a weak and nearly destroyed state. As a result Bosnian leadership had some difficulties to control them efficiently. After the war some of these individuals, bearing Bosnian passports, were arrested for their involvement in criminal and what might be terrorist-related activities in Europe.A lively public debate started in Bosnia over the political influence of the Mujaheddin . In addition the acceptance of Islamist ideas by some Bosniak politicians was questioned and criticized by many. After 11 September most of these fighters were exiled primarily due to American pressure but also because Bosnia wanted to get rid of them once and for all. So what the Bosnian case clearly demonstrates is that weak states and war-ridden areas might be temporary bases for infiltrating the European continent and a last resort for submerged terrorists. But as we saw in this and other forms of terrorist activities in Europe, such groups make use of well-organized European centres for their activities in a much more comprehensive way. Thus, South East Europe is not a particularly terror-prone region, on the contrary. It is rather a European periphery in this field with rather fewer than more people interested in Islamic fundamentalist ideas and terrorist practice than in the rest of Europe. What is much more likely is that the events of 11 September and the way they were interpreted might have made it easier or to trigger a local reaction in South East Europe of a different sort. In this part more than in other parts of Europe an autochthonous thread of Muslimophobia and Islamophobia has been woven into the political and social fabric of these societies in accordance with the high time of nationalism and later phases of nation state building. It was a defensive reaction directed against the successor states of the Muslim Ottoman Empire, but did not die out as an ideology with the founding of nation-states in the region. On the contrary Muslimophobia was used extensively to justify the Bosnian war. It did not fall on deaf ears in the wider region but also in Europe. If these local sentiments join with fears about global Islamist terrorism they, might result in
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holding the Muslim minorities of South East Europe responsible for it, in this way opening up new sites of insecurity and instability5.
5
A very good book on the relationship of Islam and politics in South East Europe that deals with all the Muslim nations and nationalisties of the Former Yugoslavia too is Xavier Bougarel/Nathalie Clayer (ed.), Le nouvel Islam balkanique, Les Musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990–2000, Paris (2001).
Part 2: Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform During the Fight Against Terrorism
Civil-Military Relations: Continuity and Change in an Age of Terror Richard Cohen
1
Introduction
Many of the domestic and international security measures adopted after the shock of 11 September 2001 pose new and unwelcome risks to both the old and the new democratic systems. The relationship between the armed forces, the security services and the society they are designed to serve and protect requires renewed attention and vigilance. Achieving the right relationship between soldiers and the elected politicians and their civil servants has posed a dilemma for policymakers, civilian bureaucrats and the professional soldiers of the state since the birth of democracy. The existence of an armed, disciplined group governed by their own, often-secretive hierarchy within the framework of a state, is in many ways the antithesis of the democratic ideal. For much of the past century, however, the issue of the subordination of the military to its elected civilian masters did not find a place at the top of the list of concerns in western democracies. Still, there have been disturbing instances of a breakdown of the oftenuneasy truce between soldiers and their civilian masters even within the relatively solid framework of the established democracies. These events, especially when they became public, have cast a harsh and unwelcome light on this sensitive and sometimes prickly issue. The well-known attempt by General Douglas McArthur, during the Korean War, to decisively influence the major strategic decisions of the U.S. Government regarding the conduct of the conflict brought him into direct confrontation with President Harry Truman. Even in a well-established democracy like the United States, it was not immediately clear that Truman would prevail given the huge popularity and respect enjoyed by McArthur amongst the general public and many of the politicians of the day. This event rekindled concern over the issue of the coexistence of a powerful, ‘parallel’ and clearly undemocratic element within a free and democratic society. It was a reminder that all was not necessarily well in the area of civil and democratic control of armed forces even in those
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countries with a long history of relatively successful civil-military relationships and democratic institutions. Instances such as this notwithstanding, during the long years of the Cold War most western countries had become pretty complacent about the state of civil-military relations within their societies. It was an issue that rarely registered as a concern amongst the general public or the media. The sudden end of the apparent stability of the Cold War, in 1989–91, forced a refocus of thinking on civil-military relations by western governments and their armed forces. The new cooperation between the West and the newly established democracies of the former Soviet bloc highlighted the issue in stark terms. The problem of the correct relationship between armies, security services and their civilian leaders became evident even to those in western countries who had not previously paid much attention to it. It became clear that an essential priority in helping former Communist states move toward western-style democracy was to ensure that newly elected democratic leaders had both the will and the tools to guide and control the uniformed services in accordance with their mandate from their voters. This realisation spurred a re-examination of the civil-military ‘models’ in the ‘old’ western democracies engaged in the process of helping their new friends in the east. It became obvious that the West had no single model to offer. Each of the old democracies had its distinct approach to the issue of civil-military relations and very few of them had formally codified it. Most western models had proved relatively successful but all had evolved from long and unique political and historical experience. A major difficulty in introducing democratic and civilian control of the armed forces in the emerging democracies lay in the fact that many of these countries had no recent tradition to fall back upon. To make matters more complicated, the out-going Communist system had blurred the dividing line between generations of military officers and the party officials and bureaucrats that ran the state apparatus.
2
From ‘Civil Control’ to ‘Civil-Military Relations’
It became clear to the western officials and military officers working with their counterparts in the defense establishments of the former East bloc countries that a major change of attitude amongst the soldiers and their civilian leaders was an immediate priority. But acceptance by both sides of a system of ‘civil’ control developed only haltingly.
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Part of the difficulty lay in the definition of the terms. The expression used by most early western advisers was ‘civil’ control. To most westerners ‘civil’ and ‘democratic’ control of armed forces seemed synonymous. Elected politicians in the old democracies are almost without exception, civilians. However, for our new partners from the former Socialist bloc, the terms ‘civil’ control and ‘democratic’ control were not self-evidently the same thing. Indeed, rigid and intrusive civil control by the party apparatus was part and parcel of the Communist system. This problem of the definition of terms became a cause of some confusion on both sides. It became responsible for difficulties in the transition process. The term ‘democratic control’ to describe the relationship between soldiers and government seemed a better way to approach the issue. The subordination of the military to a democratically elected government was more easily understood by the armed forces, in particular, as a key element of the democratic process. ‘Civil control’ was not as self-evident. It was also clear that ‘control’ itself was only part of the issue. There were many elements aside from control, which are no less important to the relationship between the armed forces and the security services and society at large. The broader term, ‘civil-military relations’, encompasses a more inclusive approach to what is in fact a very complex and subtle relationship. This term gradually replaced ‘civil’ control and ‘democratic’ control as a more accurate and ultimately more acceptable description of the relationship and the process.
3
The Transition
To make sense of the evolution of civil-military relations in the countries of Central, Eastern and South East Europe and the former Soviet Union, a simple 3-stage model can be used to describe the evolution from total integration of the state and the security apparatus inside a closed and secretive bureaucracy into a more open system of democratic separation and control. These stages overlap but one can only begin following significant progress in the preceding stage or stages: Disentanglement
Integration
Modernisation
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3.1
Disentanglement
Dominance by the Party. As we have seen, the armed forces and the security agencies of the former Soviet bloc were both military and political structures. A form of ‘civil’ control existed but it was distorted and superficial. The most senior military officers, including the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, were at once uniformed commanders and senior political figures within the Communist party and the government. In this way, the army and the state were inextricably bound together. At the lower levels, membership of the Communist party amongst military officers varied from state to state. But almost without exception, the reach of the party, often represented by ‘political officers’, who operated largely independently of the military chain of command, extended deep into the structure of the armed forces. Any officer who wished to have a successful career in the military or the security services had to become, sooner or later, a member of the Party. Many officers with no real belief in the tenants of Marx or Lenin joined a political system, which would enable them to exist comfortably within their profession and within a society ruled and dominated by the Communist party. Monopoly of Resources. One important result of the blurring of the line between the state and the armed forces was an assumption that whatever state resources military commanders demanded were provided, almost without question. In the command economies that formed the basis of the socialist state, the actual economic value of these resources, both in terms of capital and of manpower, were not and could not be accurately determined. Until the twilight years of the Communist system, most governments did not even try to calculate the true cost of their armed forces. The result was a militarised society in which the demands of the population at large on the wealth of the state took a distant second place to the real or imagined requirements of military and of state security. The immense long-term burden of a ‘war economy’ on the relatively slender resources of inefficient state economies was perhaps the most important factor in the eventual demise of the Communist system. An Intellectual Vacuum. Another example of entanglement and dependence was the almost total concentration of control of defense policy and military doctrine in Moscow. Nominally independent states like Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria had no decisive say in how their armed forces were structured and equipped. As satellite states they had no independent foreign and defense policies and their armed forces’ operational plans were formulated and coordinated in the Kremlin. This situation left a huge intellectual gap. After the demise of the Soviet Union, there was virtually no defense and security policy planning expertise
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within the ranks of the military and the governments of the former Warsaw Pact states. Secrecy. In the Soviet Union and its satellite states, military and state security matters were the almost exclusive preserve of the general staffs and the security services. Civilians, outside of a few selected senior party officials, were not trusted to participate in this highly compartmentalised and secretive world. Thus knowledge and discussion of military and security affairs was limited to the military and to a handful of the most senior members of government and the party. The media, academics and members of Parliament were not privy to this sensitive domain, which was jealously guarded by the generals and their staffs. Military Entanglement. The Communist system left a legacy of senior military officers hopelessly entangled in a discredited political/military/ economic embrace. Even those ‘progressive’ professional officers who had no real interest in politics or ideology were locked within a rigid framework of Soviet doctrines and ideas. Many of them found it impossible to break out. Prominent among these attitudes was a deep-seated reluctance on the part of military officers to share knowledge and opinions with the newly elected civilian politicians and the small number of government officials who attempted to penetrate the closed world of defense and security. Identification with the Old Regime. Another barrier in the way of a satisfactory relationship between military officers and their civilian colleagues was that the armed forces and the security services were perceived by society in most of the newly democratic states as being closely connected with the now discredited Communist and Soviet system. This identification with the ‘old regime’ alienated them from the public, most politicians and the newly independent media. Unpopularity and Lack of Resources. Many young people shunned the military and did their best to avoid national service. The brightest and the best would not seriously consider becoming career officers in an institution that society saw as a relic of a deeply discredited system. New democratic governments and their Parliaments understood and cared little for the military and this was reflected in an ever-diminishing allocation of money for defense. Dealing with the Legacy. The new democratic and independent governments tackled this unsatisfactory situation in a variety of ways. On the one hand most Central European governments took radical steps to clear out officers most closely identified with the old political apparatus. On the other, Russia and the most of other states of the former Soviet Union, took a much slower, softer approach. Actions ranged from ruthless ‘lustration’ of thousands of officers associated with the old regime in Czechoslovakia
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to a largely ‘business as usual’ approach in Russia, Central Asia and the south Caucasian states. In most of these countries, senior party officials continued to govern, having transformed themselves overnight into ‘social democratic’ politicians. Soviet era officers continued to lead the armed forces and the security services. Newly created or reborn states with no national armies such as the Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries faced fewer problems with disentanglement than those with existing Soviet style armies like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. These new independent states formed armed forces, which immediately became symbols of national pride and regained sovereignty. But even here many of the officers in the new national armies came from the ranks of the Red Army. In almost all the former East bloc countries, therefore, the Soviet legacy continued to create barriers for the new political parties trying to build new apolitical armed forces and security structures. Constitutional Factors. For many countries it took a decade, at least, before the old thinking began to give way to the ideals of wholly professional forces untainted by the legacy of the Soviet past. Democratic control was won only gradually and not without considerable pain. In Poland, Hungary and other countries, the vagaries of hastily drafted post-Communist constitutions allowed the army to play off the President and the government against each other and so to remain largely independent of civil or democratic control. Despite the many difficulties, by the end of the 1990s, military ‘Disentanglement’ from the old political order had been, with some notable exceptions, generally successful in countries of the former Soviet bloc, from Estonia to Kazakhstan. 3.2
Integration
‘Integration’ of the armed forces and the security services into the society of the state is a slower and even more difficult step than Disentanglement. This stage of the civil-military transition has been more successful in some states than in others. History, culture as well as political and economic factors have affected progress. Integration of the armed forces in states like Poland and Romania has been promising. They are countries with no obvious military threats. They have long military traditions, which are seen as closely tied to a national pride and identity. In Tajikistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, states with little recent military tradition, but which are engaged in civil conflicts or wars with their neighbours, the army has become a source
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of national pride and a guarantor of territorial sovereignty and individual security making integration a speedier process. Integration has not been as successful in a wide spectrum of other states. The Czech Republic and Hungary have few security threats. They also have a history of deep suspicion of the military stemming from disappointment with recent historical failures to preserve their national independence. In Russia, the on-going war in Chechnya and the failure to prevent high profile terrorist attacks inside Russia itself has helped to erode public support for the armed forces and the other internal security bodies. In these countries, integration has been less successful. As we have seen, a further important obstacle to integration is that very few people outside the armed forces and the security apparatus had even the faintest understanding of their structure and policies. Military officers also had little or no appreciation of how the armed forces fitted politically or strategically into the overall framework of a democratically formulated foreign and defense policy. And neither civilians nor soldiers had a clear perception of the place of the armed forces, a major consumer of resources, in the economic structure of their country. This lack of understanding helped to maintain a significant gap between the military and the politicians, the media and the public. The armed forces were seen as tools of the old establishment and unreasonable and insatiable consumers of the nation’s wealth. Newly elected governments and Parliaments were reluctant to devote scarce money to armed forces and security services, which they neither trusted nor considered necessary. Large, unreformed Soviet-style armies were perceived as making huge and wasteful demands on state resources. In most countries, hugely redundant military manpower and infrastructure reinforced the attitude amongst the public and the politicians that the armed forces must be cut and reformed as quickly and radically as possible. Universal conscription was viewed as a waste of time and an unnecessary burden on young people. This heightened the alienation. This alienation in turn meant less public money devoted to armed forces struggling to come to terms with the new realities of democracy, a transformed strategic situation, new thinking and a requirement for drastic reduction and restructuring. All these factors have made integration of the armed forces into the life of many of the transition states a difficult process. External Factors. A welcome external stimulus to reform and integration has been the prospect of NATO and EU membership for many of the new democracies. In many countries these realities and pressures have helped to change attitudes on both ‘sides’. The events of 11 September and
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its aftermath have highlighted the imperative for a quick transition to smaller, more flexible armed forces and security services. The integration process has been given a boost by considerable overt pressure from allies and future allies, which has forced defense and security establishments to radically revise old doctrines and to develop rational security and defense policies. In addition, military officers, politicians, officials and members of the media trained and educated in western institutions have come home with a new level of understanding of the place of defense and security in democratic societies. The gap in mutual knowledge and understanding is gradually narrowing. Universities in many of the transition countries have begun to offer courses in security and strategic studies and defense-related issues. Military educational establishments have also made considerable efforts to reach out to civilians, politicians, officials and members of the media by providing courses and seminars on security issues. Many younger journalists now take a lively interest in defense and security sector issues. 3.3
Modernisation
The third phase in the civil-military relations transformation is modernisation. Modernisation of the armed forces and the security services is a continuing process even in the long-established systems of the ‘old’ democracies. It is, however, a more difficult and more necessary part of the civilmilitary relations equation in the transition countries. Not only is the need for modernisation more radical here, but it is also immensely more difficult as it encompasses a real revolution in thinking. The simultaneous demands of democratisation, development of a free market economy and reform of the military and the security services has placed considerable strain on the management of security sector reform and civil-military relations. This multiple transition has resulted in an acute lack of resources for armed forces reform and modernisation. Modernisation is not solely a question of money. It requires a sea change of thinking. As the old generation of military and security services leaders gradually disappear from the scene, younger, more open and increasingly western-trained and oriented officers move into positions of command. Simultaneously, an increasing number of knowledgeable civilian officials, academics and politicians are gaining positions of influence and power within the defense and security establishments. The fast changing strategic developments in Europe and beyond have made the process of ‘intellectual’ and structural modernisation even more complex. New security threats require new responses, new doctrines, new structures and new weapons and equipment of almost every kind.
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Modernization is an uphill struggle. Its success will require teamwork and mutual understanding between civilian politicians and bureaucrats and a new generation of military and security officers.
4
Civil-Military Relations in a New Era
The quickly changing demands by old and new allies in Europe and North America on their armed forces and security services in the fight against terrorism and defense against weapons of mass destruction has increased the pressure for reform and modernisation. At the same time it has made the ultimate goals of reform less certain and the process more complex. How can and should military forces contribute to the anti-terrorist campaign? How should they interact with the other security services? Should armed forces have a role in internal security? How should they be structured and equipped to face the new challenges? What is the future for conscription in a world of increasing professional and technical demands on soldiers at every level? What effect will the new security concerns have on transparency and civil-military relations? There are no easy answers to these questions. The armed forces of the new democracies and their political leaders have few clearly defined models of reform to choose from. Western countries are struggling with a bewildering array of new policies and structures. There are common themes but modernisation in each country is taking place at varying speeds and directions in accordance with unique political, economic, historical, and geographic factors. The new democracies and their civilian and military leaders therefore face a puzzling landscape. They know that modernisation must take place but are often unsure in which direction to move. Tight budgets and the continuing legacy of high manpower levels and redundant infrastructure make meaningful reform in many countries often appear insurmountable. This is a source of continuing friction both within defense establishments and between the soldiers and their political masters. Conflicts in and around countries like Russia and the South Caucasian and the Central Asian states compound the difficulties. In these countries, longer-term reform and modernisation are understandably subordinated to the immediate demands of the crises at hand. These governments and their armed forces have little time to think about radical doctrinal and structural reform. The real and perceived demands of secrecy in the name of the supreme interests of the state have further increased the strain on civilmilitary relations.
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5
The War on Terror: Its Effect on Civil-Military Relations
The longer-term effect of the war on terror on civil-military relations in both the old and the new democracies is not yet clear. As nations react to threats and perceived threats to their national security, society seems more ready to accept constraints on traditional freedoms. In many countries, people are submitting to increasing secrecy and inconvenience in exchange for better security for themselves and their families. The activities of security services are becoming more intrusive and widespread especially in societies such as the U.S., France, Germany, Britain and other western European countries, which have grown increasingly uneasy about their large Muslim immigrant populations. As the armed forces are drawn into the ‘war’ on the home front, openness and transparency may be in danger of being clouded by the perceived needs for security and secrecy. The war on terrorism may also begin to blur the traditional division of responsibilities between the military and the security and intelligence services. The effect of this development is not clear but it certainly will present new challenges to good civil-military relations in many countries. At the moment, few of the new democracies appear to face the same threat from terrorists as do the United States and Western European countries. So the implications of the ‘war on terror’ for the progress of civilmilitary relations in these countries is perhaps less ominous. Whether this continues to be the case is impossible to predict. But it does give most transition states the opportunity to concentrate on the many ‘traditional’ issues of the civil-military relationship outlined above. A worrying development, however, in the months following the attacks on 11 September, is that some governments, especially in Central Asia, have used the ‘war against terror’ to tighten constraints on fledgling democratic freedoms. The security services and in some cases the armed forces are being used to enforce restrictions on individual and group liberties. This trend could endanger the delicate progress made so far in rebuilding trust between the security forces and society. Disentanglement and integration of the security forces could be seriously set back. Modernisation will also suffer if armed forces are once more encouraged to turn their efforts toward the preservation of the political power of the regime rather than to the security of the state as a whole and the protection of its citizens.
Civil-Military Relations
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Conclusion
Encouraging progress in civil-military relations has been made during the past decade in the new democracies. The three essential steps, disentanglement, integration and modernisation are useful measures of progress in this area. These stages overlap but their sequence of implementation and their dependence on each other probably cannot be changed. The armed forces and the security services in many of the new democracies, especially in Central Europe, have successfully disentangled themselves from the legacy of the past and they are well placed to achieve successful integration and increasing modernisation. However, other countries, especially those further east, are still struggling with disentanglement. The war on terror poses a potential problem for satisfactory civilmilitary relations in all democratic countries. In the new democracies in particular, however, curtailment of freedoms in the name of security must not be allowed to damage the growing ties between the soldier and the society that he or she is entrusted to protect.
Untying the Gordian Noose: Humanitarian Law, Democratic Control and the New Security
Environment Jean-Jacques de Dardel
1
What Seems to Be the Problem?
‘International humanitarian law’, ‘democratic control of the armed forces’, as well as the ‘new security environment’ are all notions that encompass multifarious elements and sub-elements. Each has given rise to an abundant literature, and their precise definitions and contours are still a matter of study and controversies. Hence, binding them all together to come up with a clear consequential line establishing their operational interrelations is no easy task. Moreover, none of our main subject matters is inert enough to allow for simple intellectual constructs around established certainties. However different the pace of evolution may be between the slow advancement of a body of law and the haphazard turmoil of new security threats, all are today in a state of flux. In times of accelerated transformations, a functional balance between different societal dimensions requires a wide set of – at best – simultaneous adjustments. Finding a smooth path in the maze of contradictory trends and value-systems is a challenging endeavour indeed. The problem we aspire to solve has, quite obviously, legal aspects. We must look at international humanitarian law and closely related bodies of law, such as human rights law, and examine their relevance in different situations, as well as the evolving nature of their interrelations. Our puzzle has, furthermore, political overtones, as the drive towards democratic control and legal supremacy necessitates steadfast decision making and role model setting, conducive to changes in paradigms and ‘better educated’ instincts. It has, finally, a wide set of practical implications, as it must translate into applicable and clearly understandable rules and guidelines. As a matter of fact, security sector reform, that wider scope of thought and action linking the democratic control of the armed forces and the answers
The views expressed in this article are of the author in his personal capacity and do not necessarily represent his government’s.
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to the new security threats cannot be left to the upper crust of theoreticians and high level decision makers. It must also effectively trickle down, so as to be understood and applied – indeed embodied – by the wider whole of individuals who play a part in our societies’ answers to looming threats. In the following pages, we propose to delve shortly into the intricacies of humanitarian law requirements for the transitional and post-conflict societies of South East Europe by examining in turn these three sets of aspects. In so doing, we will make special reference to the fight against terrorism as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. We will thus come to list a set of simple and operable humanitarian law requirements that should serve as a rule of thumb for all endeavours striving towards a more ethical and humane institutional security environment.
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International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law
International humanitarian law – jus in bello – regulates the conduct of hostilities and protects persons particularly affected by armed conflict. Its objective is to prevent and alleviate human suffering during armed conflicts. Its rules apply equally to all parties to a conflict, regardless of the lawfulness of the resort to force. The laws of war date back many centuries and owe much to the European Enlightenment and intellectuals such as Emmer de Vattel, Hugo Grotius and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, not to speak of the founder of the Red Cross, Henry Dunant, whose vision fathered the very first Geneva Convention of 1863, as well as the Hague Convention adopted in 1907. But whatever the historical importance of such stepping stones, we can admit, for all practical purposes, that the main body of present day international humanitarian law (as the law of war has come to be better known) is made up of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. As a response to the horrors of the Second World War, these conventions established humanitarian laws that applied to all aspects of truly international conflicts. Even though article 3 common to all Geneva Conventions did refer to non-international conflicts, it was soon overtaken by the multiplication, in the following years, of internal conflicts and the emergence of a wide variety of non-state actors. That led to the adoption, in 1977, of two Additional Protocols codifying humanitarian law applicable in noninternational armed conflicts. Then, as a result of the acceleration of history after the fall of the Berlin Wall, new developments in humanitarian law bolstered the Geneva Conventions. New laws on chemical and laser weapons, as well as land mines were adopted, UN Tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia, as well
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as a Special Court for Sierra Leone were set up, and a ground-breaking Rome Statute for the newly-created International Criminal Court has been ratified, by the end of July 2003, by 91 states. Beyond these new laws and institutions, jurisprudence also set in to strengthen the widened scope of application of humanitarian law. For instance, following the juxtaposition of international and intra-state conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia clearly ruled that humanitarian law also applies to non-international armed conflict, as it asked: “Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a [single] sovereign State?”1
Thus international humanitarian law expanded at a slowly accelerating pace. It came to encompass different kinds of situations: international armed conflicts, non-international armed conflicts as well as internal strife. After having avoided the entrapment of legal immobility, it extended to new categories of combatants2, weapons and means to wage war. However, it has remained true to its initial purpose, which is to regulate armed conflicts in the name of humanity, and do not apply in peacetime. Parallel to the evolution of humanitarian law, human rights law was codified at the international level with the adoption of the UN Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The last decades witnessed a multiplication of treaties dealing with various human rights issues, at the UN level (such as, among others, the Convention against Torture), or within regional frameworks, such as the Council of Europe. But these two bodies of international law have different goals and different areas of applicability. Human rights law safeguards the fundamental rights of individuals against abuse of power by the State or by whichever authority exercises de facto power over individuals. Its provisions are generally applicable in all circumstances. However, in case of particular emergency or exceptional 1
2
The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, ILR, vol 105, 506. For a thorough analysis of humanitarian law’s extension to freedom fighters, see: M. Veuthey, Guérilla et Droit Humanitaire (Genève, Comité International de la CroixRouge 1983).
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circumstances, certain rights can be abrogated for a limited time, and protection reduced or made subject to strict procedural requirements. International humanitarian law, for its part, applies to international and non-international armed conflict. None of its provisions may ever be suspended in precisely those circumstances in which it is meant to apply. On the other hand, it is not applicable in peacetime, an aspect at times overlooked, particularly in the ongoing discussion on the response of international law to terrorism.3 Does this mean that there is a clash between humanitarian and human rights law? Or that there could be a set of loopholes between them that would entail voids in the protection of those victims they aim at guarding? Common sense readily indicates that this could not have been the intention of the lawmakers, and that there can be no legal exceptions to human dignity and basic human rights. As H.-P. Gasser recalls, the longstanding “principle of humanity” is the common denominator of both bodies of law. Hence – an ongoing rapprochement between the two is a fact, conducing not to an unnecessary merger, but to a full coverage of different situations, whatever the type of crisis. And indeed, in recent years, advances have been made in linking together humanitarian and human rights law, in the quest to achieve a universal guarantee of elementary human rights in both times of peace and times of war.4 In particular, the complementary role of both sets of laws allows for extensive applicability to asymmetric wars and terrorism, whatever the definition of the terrorist and the terrorist act. By all tokens, existing norms of humanitarian law are appropriate and sufficient when the war on terror amounts to armed conflict5 – and remains applicable in the aftermath of such a conflict to prisoners made during operations. Domestic and international laws and institutions of crime and punishment, on the other hand, usually suffice when terror and counter-measures do not rise to the level of armed conflict.
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H.-P. Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Noninternational Armed Conflict: Joint Venture or Mutual Exclusion?’, in: German Yearbook of International Law (Berlin, Duncker&Humblot, 2002) 150. H.-J. Heintze, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the Implementation of Human Rights Standards During Armed Conflicts’, in German Yearbook of International Law (2002) 61. G. Rona, ‘Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the ‘War on Terror’, The Fletcher Forum on World Affairs, Vol. 27:2 (Summer/Fall 2003) 57.
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The Transformation of the Security Sector and Its Effects on Humanitarian Law
Democratic control over all armed forces has become, throughout the postBerlin Wall decade, an avowed priority of most transitional societies. Liberated from despotic rule, freed from the widespread abuse by formerly omnipotent military, paramilitary and police forces, most of these bornagain countries have adopted democratic ideals, which they strive to implement institutionally. Not so slowly and surely, the common truth is sinking in: that established democracies are unlikely to experience civil war – and that less rooted democracies are still better able than authoritarian regimes to cope with political unrest. Why? Probably because democracies, unlike dictatorships, offer non-violent ways of resolving political conflicts, and opposition groups have reason to hope that their turn will come6. Thus, the democratic control of the armed forces is not put into question anymore, as at least a working objective of all South East European countries. As the UNDP ascertains: “Since the early 1990s many Central and Eastern European countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and to a lesser extent Bulgaria and Romania – have been democratizing civilmilitary relations. With few exceptions, there is little threat of direct military intervention in domestic politics. New legal and institutional mechanisms for civilian oversight of military affairs have created opportunities for greater transparency and for participation in security policy by Parliaments, media, academics and civil society organizations. In forging a more holistic approach to civil-military relations, these democratic reforms have buttressed steps in many countries to establish civilian mechanisms for making defense policy and managing the security sector.”7
If a number of South East European countries do not yet qualify for UNDP recognition, the trend, at least, is set throughout the area. The notion itself of democratic control of the armed forces is not yet passé, for sure. But the order of the day in Europe, as elsewhere, is rather more that of security sector reform, which goes a number of steps further than mere democratic control. It is as much topical in an old democracy such as Switzerland as it is in transitional societies. Security sector reform implies a myriad of small and big changes. It too, is well underway, and 6
7
‘Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace’, in Human Development Report (UNDP, New York 2002) 85. UNDP, Human Development Report (2002) 92.
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even in such troubled countries as Bosnia and Herzegovina, not since the end of World War II has the international community committed such resources to reform a country’s security sector8. As the necessity for reform sets in, as adjustments take hold, as change becomes the more obvious path, the perception of ongoing transformations widens. A form of ‘new think’ becomes prevalent, as a burden for some and as a welcome evolution for others. This development, a bit paradoxically perhaps, may be fraught with dangers for humanitarian law. Indeed, in this widening sea of change, a tendency may well settle in to put into question a larger set of rules and landmarks than need be. We may come to witness an uncanny leniency towards reshuffling all cards, not only the badly trumped ones. That is why under the fallacious pretext of new implementation of security sector reform, international humanitarian law may start being questioned. The temptation may come about to embark on its redrawing, not to widen its grasp on behaviour in times of crisis, but, quite to the contrary, to limit its effects, or tamper with its requirements and deeper meaning. Such a pernicious erosion of humanitarian law is nothing new. There have been, traditionally, different types of reasoning that have brought the military – not to speak of less disciplined armed groups – to attempt to put limits on the applicability of international humanitarian law. Hugo Slim has described five main strands of the ‘long and gruesome tradition of rejecting the civilian idea’9: the trumping of the notion of civilian identity with a single, absolute and death-justifying identity that people cannot negotiate in any way (paramount to racist, genocidal or totalitarian ideology); the deliberate choice of terror as an effective political and military strategy; the ‘blurring’ of the identity of the civilian, perceived to come from the civilian person’s moral, political or material relationship with the enemy war effort. ‘Rejectionism’ may further derive from wayward passions and hatred, the frustrations of injustice and loss, sheer fear or the excitement of murderous power and the thirst for revenge. Finally and particularly relevant to our train of thought, there are the more practical concerns of technical impossibility and military necessity, the claim that, in practice, protecting civilians is often neither possible nor desirable in the urgent pursuit of legitimate war aims. Ideas of military necessity or collateral damage are recognized as valid and acceptable. Of course, such views do not imply a rejection of humanitarian law requirements in principle. But, 8 9
UNDP, Human Development Report (2002) 95. H. Slim, ‘Why protect civilians? Innocence, immunity and enmity in war’, International Affairs, Vol. 79, no. 3 (May 2003) 481–501.
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as Slim puts it: there is often a slippery slope from a pragmatic position of regrettable accident to an incremental if suppressed anti-civilian policy. Today, these various excuses for rejection of the obligations of humanitarian law on grounds of relativism are compounded by at least three damning factors of particular relevance in South East Europe. The first hinges on the new theories and experiences related to ‘humanitarian intervention’. Indeed, ever since the interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania – not to mention similar actions from Somalia to Haiti, from Rwanda to Sierra Leone – it has become rather widely accepted that when egregious breaches of human rights amounting to crimes against humanity are committed10, force may have to be used to end the offending behaviour11. This may lead to unwarranted interrogations as to the scope and purpose of humanitarian law, perceived by some as it may come to be as a mere excuse for intervention or aggression. The second relates to the overall trauma of the Balkans, where the innumerable and indescribable horrors of recent wars have carried as many violations of all rules of humanitarian law. As a matter of consequence, humanitarian law has perhaps become irrelevant to many who deep down inside, seek revenge, or would be ready to exert it at the next occasion instead of reasoning and appeasing their anger. The former Yugoslavia, it must be recalled, had ratified both the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, and both Bosnia and Croatia announced their adherence to these rules at the beginning of their wars. But what was left of these commitments at the end of the disaster? The third factor is linked to the policies and actions taken by the United States since the September eleven attacks. As of the military actions taken against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and more recently in Iraq, the USA has contributed to a certain regression of humanitarian law. In effect, the pendulum is now swinging away from the protection of the rights of the individual towards the protection of the safety of the community12.
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A. Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are we Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’, and B. Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, European Journal of International Law website, at: http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/com.html. A. Roberts, ‘Law and the Use of Force After Iraq’, Survival, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003) 31–56. T. Winkler, Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order, Occasional Paper No. 1 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, October 2002) 29.
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Granted, all is not black and white, the American psyche has not thrown legalism overboard overnight, and the great weight of American opinion does take the view that the U.S. should act unilaterally if necessary, but multilaterally if possible – and it remains understood that multilateral action should almost always be possible13. However, in effect, the opposite rules the day14. Current U.S. policies often contradict established rules of law, as there seems to be a tacit assumption shared by many American decision-makers and scholars that while international ethics and morality does count to a certain extent in international relations, international law does not15, as exemplified by the fuzzy status afforded to the Guantanamo detainees16. Even strong supporters of the United States initial efforts at combating the scourge of terrorism are put off by some of its attitudes, deemed ‘illiberal, unjust and likely to be counter-productive for the war against terrorism’17. Hence the official rejection of advances in humanitarian law, such as the Ottawa Convention on landmines. The epitome of this unilateralist attitude is to be found in Washington’s treatment of the International Criminal Court established by the Rome Treaty. In rejecting the ICC and in pressuring its allies and friends so as to corner them into signing bilateral agreements providing for the immunity of its own soldiers, the USA does nothing to strengthen the international jurisdiction over war criminals and to establish the universal validity of all aspects of humanitarian and human rights laws.
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W. B. Slocombe, ‘Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy’, Survival, IISS, vol. 45, no. 1 (Spring 2003) 117–130. Ethics do play a part in mustering support for use of force, but they do not drive the decision-makers as they would like to portray it: “Even if, in the end, a U.S.-led war effort serves to strengthen American power in the region more than anything else, the use of ethical rhetoric will have been a necessary ingredient in furthering that national security agenda.” L. H. Gelb and J. A. Rosenthal, ‘The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2003) 5. Y. Onuma, ‘International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society’, European Journal of International Law, EJIL 14 (2003) 113. “The strangeness of the U.S. position, under current international law, thus is plain. It claims that the United States is at war with al Qaeda, giving U.S. soldiers the freedom to attack al Qaeda fighters anywhere it finds them. Yet it claims that al Qaeda members are as a collective group and by definition ‘unlawful combatants’, with no right to use force against members of the U.S. military.” A. Dwarkin, Revising the Laws of War to Account for Terrorism: The Case Against Updating the Geneva conventions, On the Ground That Changes Are Likely Only to Damage Human Rights, http://www.findlaw.com (February 2003). Unjust, unwise, un-American, The Economist (July 10, 2003).
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Well, it just so happens that the USA exerts great pressure on South East European countries, and ‘new Europe’ as a whole, to meet its goals in this respect. The combined effect of these simultaneous factors is to possibly facilitate a change of hearts and minds about the essence and the applicability of international law, and more particularly international humanitarian law. Why respect this law, why consider it intangible and universal, many may ask, when your main partner and role model of sorts acts in such a defiant and self-serving manner? Add to that the fact that international humanitarian law, as we have established previously, is in a process of expansion and bridge-building to human rights law, and it readily appears that the danger is real to see reform endeavours in the security sector bring about a turn away, not towards, the rigor of international humanitarian law, and its role as a bulwark against barbarity. In the face of a possible corrosion of ideals, it is worth stressing that everything must be undertaken to prevent reforms and reformists from falling into a trap. As the Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces puts it: Particularly “in the fight against terrorism and barbarism, the ends do not justify all means, if we do not want to jeopardise, and eventually lose, the very core of our value-system: democracy, justice and human dignity. For how could we otherwise convince the young democracies of what used to be Eastern Europe and the successor states to the former Soviet Union to move forward in their difficult transition towards democracy and the rule of law? (…) How could we maintain the moral high ground, indispensable for forging a genuinely global coalition, and strategy, against terror?”18
Certain truths borne out of civilisation must indeed be reaffirmed. As so many before him, the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, was right when he reaffirmed in London the primacy of law over force: ‘La force n’est pas le privilège des uns, le droit l’alibi des autres’19. In the particular case of international humanitarian law, the ICRC has stressed that it is ready to engage in an ongoing analysis of how to improve this body of law further and how to contribute to the clarification of certain of 18
19
T. Winkler, Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order, 30. D. de Villepin, Le droit, la force et la justice, Conference at the IISS, London, 27 March 2003. He went on to say: “Il n’y a pas d’un côté le choix de la force, de l’autre le choix du droit. (…) La primauté du droit n’est pas un aveu de faiblesse, ni un facteur d’impuissance. Elle est une exigence morale et politique, la condition de la justice, mais aussi de l’efficacité. Seule la justice en effet garantit une sécurité durable.”
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its key concepts20. But it has also made clear that any attempt to re-evaluate its adequacy can only take place after it has been determined that it really is the law which is lacking and not, in fact, the political will to apply it. It has also underlined that it will not engage in a development of the law if this is an excuse to reduce existing standards21. Most specialists of international humanitarian law share this attitude and ponder over its adequacy and disavow attempts at bending it to fleeting political circumstances. In February 2003, a number of government and independent experts gathered at Harvard to address the issue of adequacy of international humanitarian law. Most concluded that the law is satisfactory, and does not need mending. They established, among other conclusions, that there is a danger that reopening the debate on re-evaluating the Geneva Conventions would enable groups to push for other changes in the law, such as allowing the military to attack some civilian targets, that could set back humanitarian values. The question of when, if ever, civilians could legitimately be attacked, and the related question of how much care must be taken to avoid civilian casualties, would likely be intensely controversial.22 Thus, as security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, just as elsewhere, the permanence and lasting validity of international humanitarian law must go on looming large over all temptations to justify, in retrospect, the ghastly violations of the past, as it remains axiomatically true that no amount of wrongs makes a right.
4
Practical Steps to Ensure Understanding of and Compliance with Humanitarian Law
Security sector reform hinges on the oversight and control of all security forces by the institutions of the democratic state, the government, Parliament and the judiciary, and in a wider sense the democratic mechanisms of 20
21
22
The doctrine on Humanitarian and Human Rights law is the subject of constant research and international specialized meetings, such as the ‘Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’, The Responsibility to Protect, of December 2001, the Symposium in Kiel (Germany) on ‘The Fusion or Co-existence of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’, held in September 2002, or the Harvard ‘Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law’, held in February 2003. Statement by the President of the ICRC, J. Kellenberger, at the 59th Annual Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 18 March 2003. Revising the Laws of War to Account for Terrorism: The Case Against Updating the Geneva Conventions, On the Ground That Changes Are Likely Only to Damage Human Rights.
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civil society at large23. It also aims at improving and strengthening interaction between the armed forces, the various police corps and other internal security agencies, as well as border guards and the intelligence community. What is strived for is better cooperation between different forces with different expertise and training, so as to tackle various security threats in a concerted and comprehensive manner. As is already often the case, such concerted action implies use of synergies and cross development of supportive roles. For instance, Army logistics come in support of border guards and police, or police forces supplement Army contingents not geared for law and order or crowd control work. Anti-terrorist units of different armed services may join forces, just as intelligence services of both the police and the military may come to exchange information within the relevant legal framework allowing for such cooperation. As cooperative habits develop, the overall efficiency of the security sector should gain strength, and the benefits of Army, police and border guard collaboration will become more obvious to all. However, as more detailed divisions of labour set in, special attention will also have to be given to what rules of humanitarian law, human rights or other bodies of law apply. This is most likely to be the case in peacekeeping operations abroad, an activity which is definitely on the rise: the UN, for instance, has embarked on more peacekeeping missions since the early 1990s than in all the previous decades since its inception24. In view of this trend, South East Europe is likely to be not only the locus of foreign involvement in peace support, but also a net provider of peace support units and personnel for multilateral operations. Even in Bosnia, a newly created Peace Support Operations Training Centre aims at enabling that multinational country to develop a peacekeeping capability tasked with missions abroad. Such developments automatically imply a widening set of civil-military interactions, with particular overtones as to the application of humanitarian and human rights rules. As the complexity of integrated operations rises, so must develop rule-setting and the appropriate training. However 23
24
It may not be superfluous to underline in this context that the main responsibility for effective control rests with the civilian actors, who must develop the necessary savvy to live up to their task. Indeed, Effective accountability in security matters will never materialize if oversight institutions lack the capacity to assess security activities. Without that capacity, a cycle of ignorance will persist. UNDP, Human Development Report (2002) 89. It is worth noting that the applicability of humanitarian law to forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control was reaffirmed in the Bulletin of the UN Secretary-General issued on 6 August 1999 to mark the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
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complex the situation, expediency, military or police necessity must not be used as a convenient excuse to renege humanitarian obligations. The apparent innocuousness of mere ‘collateral damage’ cannot be allowed to distract from the central obligations of the rule of law, lest the conduct of peace support operations, police actions or counter-terrorism measures add incrementally to a tendency to throw humanitarian law overboard as cumbersome and impractical. In other words, however complex the environment or the combined operations, prioritisation of duties and mission goals, as well as all relevant training must not be conducted to the disadvantage of humanitarian law. The first challenge in this field is often to not overdo legal perfectionism. Theoretical debating and fine-tuning will go on being as vivid and vital to legal advancements as juridical dissertations and rulings. However, what is more needed than ever in a changing world with moving bearings and evolving security threats is the ability of experts and legal advisers to reach out to laymen, soldiers, policemen and border guards, to the foot soldiers as it were, to teach them simply but comprehensively the relevant provisions of humanitarian and human rights law. Above all, the recipients should come out of all training convinced of the merits of humanitarian law, so as to develop proper instincts and attitudes. To achieve this goal, trainers should rely on tried and tested methods of training and teaching – IHL manuals and courses are quite widespread, if not all up to date. But they should also develop new arguments derived from recent conflict experience and case studies. Indeed, morals, ethics and a sense of humanity will in most instances readily remain at the core of starting explanations and argumentation. But there is abundant proof that this cannot suffice. The sad truth laid out about civilians holds true in the wider context of all humanitarian concerns: “even when people start by believing in the idea, they may not be able to hold on to such a belief in the face of the threat posed against them, the charisma of their leaders, and the sheer force of the systems of power, ideology and indoctrination constructed around them.”25
The best way to counteract at all levels the quicksand of purpose alienation is to put the accent on a new understanding of the general, political, strategic and individual benefits of the observance of humanitarian and human rights law. Isn’t it uncanny that essays upon essays and books upon books tread on the more legal and intellectual points about these bodies of law, 25
H. Slim, Why protect civilians? Innocence, immunity and enmity in war, 484.
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but that only the odd sentence will refer to the fact that abiding by humanitarian law is best to avoid acts of revenge? A feeling of obviousness as to the merit of humanitarian law permeates the relevant literature to the point that its actual concrete benefits are seldom discussed. Yet that is precisely the level at which training and teaching should concentrate on instilling a deeply rooted personal understanding of the advantages of humanitarian rules, whatever the scope of responsibilities of the individual grappling with the notion. Added to that, it must be said that ongoing developments around and beyond international humanitarian law proper have increased, rather than diminished the difficulty for the layman to grasp once simple and one-dimensional rules26. As a matter of fact, today’s wars are different from the ones of yore. They often lack continuity, times of active hostilities coming to alternate unpredictably with quieter phases. Those phases of open fire are more often than not relatively short, though not always less bloody. As exemplified by the latest war on Iraq, or previous to that by the military actions undertaken by coalition forces in Kosovo or Afghanistan, modern conflicts tend to be protracted, with rather short outbursts of open military campaigns, followed by very long stabilisation and reconstruction phases. There are exceptions, naturally, as exemplified by the dire Chechen situation. But as more and more wars are fought by coalitions purporting to save a population through humanitarian intervention, or to re-establish democracy so as to lastingly pacify a region, the post-conflict era represents a challenge more daunting than the conduct of war operations themselves. More and more reference is made these days to the fact that winning the peace in Iraq is going to be more difficult than winning the war27. As it becomes ever more obvious that no pacification and reconstruction can succeed rapidly without the active cooperation of the local civilian population, perceptions widen as to the backlash of all humanitarian law abuses during the conduct of war operations. The level of civilian consent and acceptance of foreign forces, of cooperation in peace-building efforts and of institution re-creating is directly dependant on the level of resentment of the local population and its deep-seated hatred of the perceived enemy. Basil Liddell Hart’s said that ‘the object of war is a better peace – 26
27
W. Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Fusion or Co-existence of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’, Symposium held in Kiel (Germany) 19–22 September 2002. Introductory Remarks’ in German Yearbook of International Law (2002) 55–59. F. Barton and B. Crocker, ‘Winning the Peace in Iraq’, The Washington Quarterly, 26 (2003) 10–11; A. Wenger, ‘Krieg und Frieden im Irak: Internationale Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel’, Bulletin 2003 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, 25.
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even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire28 is as relevant as ever. Conversely, ideological and indoctrinated hatred is more likely to subside in the face of restraint and humane treatment. So, for the civilian or military administrator of a region, a town or a neighbourhood, for the squadron leader, the private, the military or civil policeman the track record of humanitarian law observance by his own forces directly affects his personal security and his ability to go on with his task. This is just as true in lengthier conflicts, such as those that ravaged the Former Yugoslavia, where spiralling into barbarism was a direct result of the unabated resort to the law of the talion to counter atrocities. Although this may be commonly sensed, it may be best to insist on factual examples so as to drive humanitarian concepts into the deepest levels of consciousness of individuals. As for the fight against terrorism and its apparently necessary rules of exception, it must be stressed that any crackdown and outright frontal counter measure will be short lived if the feeding grounds of terrorism do not subside. Whatever the measures taken, popular support for terrorist organisations is unlikely to dwindle at a fast pace if serious breaches of humanitarian rules and ideals feed general resentment in those communities from which the terrorists originate. All the more so that terrorists usually seek not so much destruction in itself, but rather to demonstrate the inherent weakness of the opponent29, a flaw paradoxically exposed when the reaction to the attack is more medieval than measured. In this context, the benefits of a certain form of restraint and the upholding of higher values will always outweigh those of unruly coercion, especially when it comes to fighting an ideological battle for the soul of the social and political nextof-kin of terrorists.
5
A Set of Humanitarian Law Requirements to Be Computed into any Security Sector Reform
To conclude, we can outline a set of humanitarian law requirements of universal relevance, to be reckoned with at all times, but most particularly when defining and operating security sector reform to meet today’s security challenges. 28
29
Quoted by: BG. R. Lane, The 3-Block war: Challenges of Command in Afghanistan 2002, Speech at the 6th Annual Conference of the Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Berlin, 17 June 2003. J. Baud, La guerre asymétrique, ou la défaite du vainqueur (Monaco: Editions du Rocher 2003) 199.
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First, humanitarian law must be upheld under all circumstances. It may seem to some opportune and convenient, or trendy and forward-looking to press for an aggiornamento of international humanitarian law to suit the needs of policies defined in a particular context. This must not be allowed to happen. International humanitarian law (IHL), and its human rights counterpart applicable in non-armed conflict situations, cannot be made to bend and flex to the point of compromising on their substance. Second, IHL training should be adapted to include references to the expanding body of humanitarian law. If the core rules remain the same, we have seen that the body of humanitarian law does expand. New bans on weapons, new international tribunals, evolving jurisprudence and customary international humanitarian law must all be taken into account. IHL teaching material should be adapted correspondingly, lest an apparent inadequacy of the material raises doubts as to the present validity of the rules it describes. Third, IHL and Human Rights Law must be considered part of basic military, police and otherwise security-related activities training. Rules and references should be explained in a simple and logical manner, which is all the easier since notions such as unnecessary suffering, protection of the sick and wounded or the detained, among others, are universally and cross-culturally understandable. In the long run, there is no substitute for training and education to teach soldiers and policemen the respect of human rights and abide by principles of democratic governance. That must be accompanied by a clear demarcation between military duties and police tasks, however closely these different institutions come to cooperate. Fourth, understanding should be developed both at the legal and practical, goal-oriented level. IHL observance is a must, legally and above all morally. Its true basis is the individual’s conscience, and his institution’s ethics. However, when that conscience is lacking or ideals seem too lofty for the realities of armed conflict, IHL should be understood as remaining relevant not so much to avoid prosecution, but because it makes military, political and social sense, particularly in view of the long-term objectives of the armed conflict and the reconstruction period. There always is a strategic interest to remain on the moral high ground in an armed conflict so as to win the ensuing peace. Fifth, IHL must be part of the whole chain of procurement and command. Humanitarian law must be of concern in the drawing rooms of weapons systems and in munitions factories, as much as in the headquarters of the general staff and parliamentary cenacles. It does not only apply to the soldier in the field or the policeman in action. It is referential to all levels of responsibility.
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Sixth, breaches of humanitarian law must be prosecuted. However difficult it may be at times to pursue the due process of law to its full completion, prosecution and accountability are as necessary to the instinctive respect for humanitarian law as are the rules themselves, lest they be seen as second-rate or superfluous. That, for instance, is the ultimate objective of Milosevic’s trial: demonstrating that administering justice can contribute to reconciliation by shaming the perpetrators and soothing the victims30. Seventh, the efficacy of international humanitarian law is to be measured in terms of lives saved and injuries not suffered, not by the number of prosecutions and convictions31. Humanitarian law may go on being trampled on and discarded, horror will not disappear. But each time humanitarian law is observed, every time an unnecessary suffering is avoided, it is that law’s full purpose that is met, as are vindicated all efforts that go into promoting it. More requirements can be added to this list, to accommodate special cases or operational concerns. But, for a start, the ones listed above may serve as seven humane pillars of wisdom that no democratic society should do without.
30 31
G. J. Bass, ‘Milosevic in the Hague’, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2003) 84. W. Fenrick, ‘The Law Applicable to Targeting and Proportionality After Operation Allied Force: A View from the Outside’, in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 3 (2000) 79–80.
Part 3: The Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Security Sector in South East Europe and the Impact of the Launch of the Counter-Terrorist Campaign: The National Perspectives
Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector in Albania Blendi Kajsiu
1
Introduction
The process of civil-military relations and security sector reform is very complex since it takes place at different levels and within the context of political, social and economic developments in Albania. The reform process cannot and should be not analyzed in isolation from the larger social context. Of particular importance in the Albanian case is the element of state weakness that reflects itself in every step of the reform process. Another important factor that has conditioned reforms both in the civilmilitary and the security area is the legacy of the past. This legacy will be dealt with in both cases. It is important to emphasize that civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces are an area that is quite separate from the security sector in the case of Albania. The Albanian Constitution of 1998 introduced a new concept to the definition of armed forces. According to this concept the armed forces no longer include the security services and police forces. This step was taken in order to enhance the civil control of the security sector. Therefore, for the purpose of clarity in this paper they will be analyzed separately, although they have many problems in common.
2
Reform of the Military
At the core of the military reform is the establishment of a force with western orientation that is based on professionalism. This means that the peacetime active military units will be mostly based on a professional force, and only a few of them will be completed by the conscript service. The aim is to build a force with an increased operational capability than the actual forces to defend the country’s interests, and capable to participate in international operations. A special importance will be given to the joint operations of two or three forces/services, based on ‘The Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces’, which has already been prepared but awaits approval. Special units and segments of the armed forces will be able to
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participate in joint operations with other NATO and partner forces. In order to achieve the above the government would increase the defense budget by 0.1 percent every year so that by 2010 the military budget would reach 2 percent of GDP. All these measures and the reform itself will be implemented by keeping in mind the requirements for NATO membership. In addition to political, economic and legal aspects, reform of the armed forces is crucial for membership in NATO. Professional armed forces will be organized and trained to fully operate according to NATO standards by 2006. The goal is to achieve interoperability in terms of organizational structures, work procedures in the military headquarters, military doctrine and training, operational level proficiency of the English language, and in the long term to acquire equipment and systems that NATO countries have.1 Despite a multitude of problems the Albanian armed forces have made considerable progress. In fact one could argue that the process of reform in the Albanian armed forces has been more successful than in most, if not all, other areas. First of all, the armed forces have been increasingly adapting themselves to the new circumstances and NATO requirements, despite the pronounced lack of financial and logistical resources. Besides their more traditional role of securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, according to the new Defense Policy Document of Albania, the mission of Albanian Armed Forces is also to contribute to regional stability through participation in crisis management missions and in peace support operations mandated by UN, OSCE, NATO or EU. For this purpose a special commando unit has been created and prepares to undertake difficult tasks and special missions, including peacekeeping missions. This unit is trained and equipped also with the contribution of the partner armies of NATO through PfP programs and joint exercises. They have participated in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in SFOR, as part of the German contingent near Sarajevo. Also during 2002 a special commando unit of 30 soldiers was dispatched to Afghanistan for a period of 6 months as part of the Turkish mission unit attached to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This marked the first time in which Albanian armed forces were deployed outside South East Europe. Finally, an Albanian commando unit has joined the Coalition Forces engaged in Iraq led by the U.S. as a combat support force. As the above measures indicate the process of military reform has been one of the most2 successful reform processes in Albania. Part of the reason 1 2
I. Totozani: The Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania, DCAF Papers. Gj. Gace: Peace Keeping and Regional Security, DCAF Papers.
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is the fact that clear goals are set and NATO membership conditionality provides a good road map in this aspect. Another important factor that has contributed to the relative success of the military reform is the very nature of the military. First of all it has a clear hierarchical nature and clear line of command, which has facilitated reforms since part of the institutional behavior of the military is to follow and obey orders. In this respect the military are very different and a lot more efficient than the civil sector where the implementation of the reforms presents more challenges. This is not to say that there have not been shortcomings in the reform process of the military. Yet these shortcomings are mostly a result of limited financial resources and they originate mostly from the civilian sector rather than from the military themselves. It is for this reason why we now turn to the civilmilitary relations.
3
Civil-Military Relations
The military was one of the most important institutions of the Albanian Communist regime. However, in order to complete their control on society at large the Communist elites were careful not to allow too much autonomy to the military. Nothing was outside the control of the Communist party. This was especially the case with an institution as important as the military which, given too much independence, could of course threaten Communist rule. In order to realize such a control, the Communists made sure that the recruits from reliable families would fill key positions. To further enhance its control over the military, the Communist Party also utilized the institution of the kommissars who were party representative and co-commanders with the commanding officers of the army units. The regime also frequently purged the military in order to subordinate it. Thus, only from 1965 until 1980, 2500 trials were set up for military personnel.3 It goes without saying that all these measures were taken within a framework of constant indoctrination. It is important to emphasize that these measures resulted in the subordination of the army to political control, a legacy that is still with us. On the positive side this has meant that throughout transition the army has not interfered in civilian matters, while the reverse has been a constant concern. The army has been deeply politicized which in turn has undermined its professionalism and the process of reform itself. Therefore, in the 3
E. Leci, Eleminimi I Lidershipit Ushtarak, Instituti I Sigurimit dhe Mbrojtjes. Tiranë, 2002, p 185.
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Albanian scenario we are faced with a challenge that is almost the opposite of the one many other countries, and especially those of Latin America, are being faced with. This challenge is twofold. On the one hand the military has to create its own institutional autonomy, away from political control and intervention and once this has been achieved, or simultaneously, the military should remain within the scrutiny of democratic civilian control. 3.1
Legal Framework for Civil-Military Relations
However, before we begin to analyze civil-military relation and the process of reform, it is necessary to have an outline of the legal framework within which such a relationship takes place. This legal framework regulates civil military relations and is found in the new constitution approved in November 1998. The Constitution and the legal acts on civil-military relations provide a clear delineation of authority and a system of subordination of control and command of defense structures in times of war and peace. However, a certain period of time would be necessary in order to identify loopholes or contradictions that might exist in the legislation regarding civil-military relations. In this section we will briefly look at the hierarchy of authority with regard to the armed forces. According to law 8671, dated 26 October 2000, ‘On the powers and command authority and strategic direction of the armed forces of the Republic of Albania’, these powers and authorities have the following hierarchical order: the Parliament, President, the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, general staff, Chief of Staff, and the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As the above hierarchical order shows, the Parliament is the main institution of oversight and control of the military. Its role has been further enhanced in the new Constitution. The Parliament approves strategic documents on national security and documents on defense policy and other laws in the field of defense; approves the budget; exerts parliamentary control over activities connected with the armed forces; decides on expeditionary missions; allows the passage or stationing of foreign troops and their status; ratifies or annuls treaties and international agreements that are connected to the territory, alliances, political and military matters, and membership in international organizations in cases of threats or international requirements for collective action. It may, upon the proposal of the President, declare a state of war, and issue mobilization orders; and declare the end hostilities. Unlike in the case of the Parliament, the new Constitution has reduced the powers of the President, who no longer enjoys law-making authority, and has few appointment competencies. The President is Commander-in-
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Chief of the armed forces, and in peacetime the President exercises its authority over the armed forces through the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, while in wartime the President leads the armed forces directly or through the Commander of the Armed Forces. The main advisory organ to the President of the Republic according to article 1683 is the National Security Council. The advisory concept is new in comparison to the previous constitutional framework, where the National Security Council was foreseen to be a decision-making body. While the general tendency in the Constitution is to reduce the competencies of the President on military affairs, the National Security Council, due to its advisory role does not limit the President. The Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister also exert considerable control over the armed forces. Among other things the duties of the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister are to prepare the legal framework and documents on Defense policy; to propose the budget, salaries and other financial elements, policies toward recruitment and conscription, propose extraordinary measures on part of or the whole territory in emergency situations. The Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister also exert their control over armed forces through the Minister of Defense who is a civilian and represents the highest official in peacetime of all military and civilian personnel of the armed forces. He is responsible to the Parliament, the President, and Prime Minister for implementing Defense policy. In his daily work, the Minister of Defense cooperates with the Chief of General Staff who is elected to a three-year mandate with an extension option. The President appoints the Chief of General Staff, who should have the rank of ‘General’ and the necessary experience, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister. The Parliament has no role in this process, as it is in general the case with high-ranking officials. In times of war, the Chief of General Staff may be elected as Commander of the Armed Forces. The Chief of General Staff is responsible to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Defense Minister. This relationship assures the neutrality of the Chief of General Staff that might have not been the case had he been responsible to only one authority.4 3.2
Transparency and Accountability
As the brief outline of the military hierarchical and legal framework shows, the Parliament is the main body of control and oversight of the 4
M. Nazarko: The Relationship Between the Armed Forces and the New Institutions in Albania – a Model in the Making of Civil and Democratic Control, DCAF Papers.
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military. It usually exercises its oversight functions through parliamentary committees, one of which is also the Defense Committee. Although there is a legal framework in place, a variety of shortcomings can be identified in the parliamentary oversight of armed forces. They are an outcome of weak state institutions, and absent parliamentary and democratic traditions. In order to explore them we will take a brief look at the parliamentary oversight of armed forces and especially the defense committee that bears primary responsibility for such oversight. The powers of the Albanian Parliament and the Defense Committee have been modeled after some of the best practices of the parliamentary oversight of the security sector. First of all the Defense Committee functions according to rules of procedure sanctioned by law, which is one of the basic requirements of parliamentary oversight. Judging from the powers and competencies of the Parliament we should not rush to the conclusion that transparency and accountability have been guaranteed by law. Thus, while the Defense Ministry has the obligation to provide an annual budget and report to the defense committee and Parliament, there are no laws or regulations that require the Defense Ministry to do so periodically. The Defense Ministry has not yet begun to provide periodic reports, the socalled “Defense White Papers” on short, medium- and long-term resources management. This has direct bearing on the level of accountability as well as on the level of transparency as far as the budget and the policy making process is concerned. There exists a legislative or procedural vacuum in this respect. Information is not provided regularly, except for the yearly report and budget, but when the Defense Ministry is asked to do so. This is not to say that there is no exchange of information between the Defense Ministry and Parliament. Yet, a better regulated periodical exchange of information between the Executive and Parliament would certainly enhance the level of transparency and accountability. A regulated periodical exchange would not only increase the amount of information but also improve it qualitatively. This in turn would make it easier to trace funds and the execution of government policies, which in turn would improve the level of accountability and transparency. Legislative and procedural deficiencies also exist with regard to cooperation between different committees. Such cooperation and coordination happens, if at all, only on an ad hoc basis and it is not regulated by rules of procedure beyond very general principle such as the right that committees have to cooperate, or the right of one MP to participate in more than one committee. The absence of legislation in this respect is even more acute in the Albanian case given the lack of parliamentary tradition. To enforce transparency and accountability, not only on budgetary issues, there has to
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be consistent inter-committee coordination relevant to the security sector: such as defense committee, home affairs committee, budget committee, finance committee as well as foreign affairs committee. When such coordination is absent by tradition, it might be advisable to guarantee and enforce it through rules of procedures. Yet the absence of rules of procedure and the presence of legal loopholes are only part of the problem. Even in the hypothetical situation where all the necessary legislation, rules of procedures and tradition were in place, the Albanian Parliament would still not be capable to successfully perform its oversight on the executive as a whole and on the security sector in particular. Although the reasons for this are numerous and interrelated, I will classify them into two categories: resource-related deficiencies and political deficiencies. Although none of these is unique to the Albanian case, of the two categories the first one is more characteristic of the Albanian setting. As far as resources-related deficiencies are concerned, the most acute is the lack of both required and qualified staff. Parliament and especially its committees cannot yet afford the necessary numbers of personnel and even less the needed quality. Although there has been improvements recently, the trade off is between quality and quantity. Practically both are needed if a given committee is to perform oversight and ensure transparency and accountability. For example, in the case of the committee on defense there is only one adviser to the committee and one secretary. In the given case there is more expertise among the MPs, some of which have a long experience with the military, than among the “hired experts”. With such a limited staff it is impossible for this committee to challenge the expertise of the Ministry of Defense, which has numerous staff, and experts who have had most of their career on defense and military matters. There exists a disturbing asymmetry since even when the defense committee reviews the budget or reports of the defense or security sector, they rely on government expertise; the very expertise they have to pass judgment upon. This is not to say that there is no oversight of the defense policy or budget but that under these circumstances it becomes difficult to ensure transparency and even more challenging to secure accountability. Limited staff implies that parliamentary committees do not perform some of their central duties, to which they owe part of their existence. Thus, the reader should remember that one of the duties of the parliamentary committees – and the defense committee is no exception in this case – is to prepare draft laws. Such duty, or competency, remains in the realm of the theoretical dimension only, since practically, and this has been the experience of the defense committee, all the draft laws or draft acts were and still are prepared by the Ministry of Defense. Even when performing its
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duties, it has been the case that in the defense committee, the budget has passed after only three meetings, while on average there is a two-week period for the budget (which is not much given that committees usually meet only three times a week).5 Therefore, a better-regulated timeframe is necessary to avoid this practical deficiency. Given the limited resources of the defense committee even in important matters such as the defense budget the final word belongs to the committee of finance. ‘Verdicts’ on budgets are given by this committee, especially due to its political composition and leverage. Here too there is a very limited and unregulated timeframe. Thus, so far budgets have been approved within a two to three week period on average, while in more consolidated functioning western democracies the budget approval period would take two to three months on average. Furthermore, the budget is approved en bloc, which makes transparency very difficult to enforce. Quite often there are discrepancies between the fiscal package and the government program, yet there is neither the time nor the resources, or the political will to explore them.6 In the case of the military reform process this has meant that objectives have not been backed by financial resources, which in turn has produced more rhetoric than concrete results. Due to scarcity of resources there is as yet no expert on national security in the Albanian Parliament, thus government policy has to be judged through government experts, and again transparency and accountability remain rhetorical. Lack of resources also means that many of those powers that are vested upon MPs, committees and subcommittees through legislative acts, rarely, if ever, materialize. Thus, although an MP may take or propose a certain initiative which entails a certain cost, the MP or group of MPs should also suggest the budget change, i.e., reallocation of funds within the given budget items. Of course this would entail research and expertise, which of course is not available, which is why budgets rarely go through radical revisions or amendments. Even the Government, despite a larger staff and greater expertise at its disposal, does not have all the necessary information and administrative capacities to prepare accurate budget and/or short-, medium- and long-term strategies. A lot of guesswork goes into preparing draft budgets and calculating economic growth. Many estimates are calculated based on unreliable information that are rarely updated and seldom disseminated properly. 5
6
Personal interview with Eranda Fejzullahu, Secretary to the Committee of Defense. 5 November 2002. Personal interview with Genti Arapi. Adviser to the Committee of Finance. 8 November 2002.
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Thus, even if the Parliament and its committees had the necessary staff, expertise, time and political will to ensure transparency, they would have to face further structural challenges that reflect Albanian transition realities. The scarcity of reliable and accurate information is important to emphasize since transparency is that state of affairs where the Parliament has the necessary information at its disposal to make sound policy decisions. The absence of such information, combined with administrative deficiencies, not only makes the decision-making process less transparent but also produces mismanagement and waste of resources, which in turn feeds perceptions of corruption way beyond actual corruption levels. At the same time mismanagement might also create more room and incentives for corruption, especially as in the absence of transparency, accountability remains nothing more than rhetoric. Lack of resources means that independent expertise – much needed given the political context – cannot be brought in. This is even more so in the case of the defense and security sector. While there are few wellfunctioning independent think tanks in Albania in general, for a variety of reasons, there are even fewer on defense or security matters. This is due to the fact that think-tanks and NGOs in Albania are donor-driven and there is not much funding for NGOs by foreign donors, especially in the area of defense since in the case of Albania it is not perceived to be one of the top priorities.
4
Secret Service
While the armed forces do not constitute a priority or concern for the Albanian society at large, the secret and security services attract a lot more attention due to a variety of reasons. First of all it is important to emphasize the legacy of the past as far as secret services are concerned. During the Communist dictatorship the secret police (Sigurimi) was the most important instrument of control. It permeated society at an unprecedented degree and instilled fear and terror in the population at large. At the time, the workings of the intelligence service had very little in common with those of democratic countries. Therefore, notwithstanding efforts to place this service under democratic control, certain institutional traditions and attitudes still persist. Democratic control of intelligence services is challenging in a country with a long democratic tradition, let alone a country that has recently emerged from totalitarianism. Throughout the Albanian transition, opposition parties have accused government of using the intelligence services in order to control and restrict their activity. It is an unfortunate
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fact that given the lack of a democratic tradition in this sector the government often views intelligence services as an instrument of control. Many of the problems that exist with the civilian control of the military can also be found with the secret services. However in this area the problems are even more acute due to the very nature of this sector. Nevertheless some considerable progress has been made so far both from the legislative perspective as well as regarding the actual degree of parliamentary oversight of the security sector. This is even more so if we consider the problematic legacy of the Communist past where secret services were the major instrument of control and not at all open to the general public. While some of the old mentalities persist the process of reform has considerably changed although there is much room for improvement. From the legislative standpoint, the Parliament has the necessary competencies to perform oversight. Besides the ordinary forms in which parliamentary oversight is exercised, specific instruments are used of to monitor the security services. As it is foreseen in law no. 8391 mentioned above, the Parliament establishes a special sub-committee in order to oversight the State Intelligence Service (SIS). The Permanent Parliamentary sub-committee of SIS is made up of five members and a chairman and a deputy chairman is elected out of the five. Parliamentary groups are represented in the sub-committee in accordance with the general principle, while preserving the proportion they have in the Parliament. Three out of the five members belong to the opposition, and two of them represent the majority.7 Besides the permanent sub-committee of SIS another important instrument of parliamentary oversight are committees of inquiry. In early May 2002, the Parliament of Albania passed the law on the organisation and functioning of the Parliament’s committees of inquiry.8 The investigative parliamentary committees are important instruments to conduct parliamentary oversight of the Government, and collect information on important issues of public interest so as to reach particular political conclusions. Their constitutional basis lies in Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, which stipulates for “the Assembly has the right and, upon the request of one-fourth of its members, is obliged to designate investigative parliamentary committees to review a particular issue. Its conclusions are
7 8
S. Berberi: Civil Control of Intelligence Services in Albania, DCAF Papers. Law no. 8891, dated 2 May 2002 “On the Organization and Functioning of the Parliament’s Investigatory Committees”.
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not binding in a court of law, but they may be made known to the office of the prosecutor, which evaluates them according to legal procedures.”9 Committees of inquiry are a relatively new way of parliamentary oversight. Recently an committee of inquiry was set up by the opposition in order to investigate the activity of the SIS regarding alleged abuses with funds and hostile activity against the opposition. No matter how one interprets the work of such committee, which received some diametrically opposed evaluation, the fact remains that it did set a precedent. One could argue that it did also serve as a preventive measure against the use/abuse of the SIS against the opposition or for political ends, a practice that has been far too common in the past.
5
The Fight Against Terrorism and the Process of Reform
The events of September 11th had a major impact in rethinking global security threats. These events immediately affected the Albanian security sector in general and the armed forces in particular. Soon after the attacks the Center for Strategic and Historic Studies a small think tank of the Defense Ministry organized an international conference entitled “Terrorism a Challenge of Our Times: A Major Threat to the Security Environment”. This conference was the first step in a variety of initiatives that were undertaken by the Albanian armed forces, or in which the armed forces personnel and representatives participated, in order to explore the new dimensions of terrorism and the way in which this major security threat could be handled. Such initiatives were necessary in order to better understand security threats posed by terrorist attacks and adapt the security forces to this phenomenon. Partly as a result of these initiatives, the General Staff of the Command of the Albanian Armed Forces redefined and updated the concept of terrorism in its military doctrine. In all the academic programs of the Military Academy, terrorism was introduced as a major security threat and methodologies of military exercises based on terrorist threats were developed. Based on the findings that resulted from these initial efforts to explore the new dimensions of terrorism the Albanian military organized a number of military exercises based on terrorist attack simulation. The training of the special military and commando units was intensified while emphasizing 9
Personal interview with Pajtim Ribaj director of Center for Strategic and Historic Studies, Ministry of Defense, 10 May 2003.
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more terrorist attack scenarios. On that ground the fight against terrorism was reflected in tightening security measures in army depots.10 Reconnaissance and counter-espionage personnel were trained in order to improve their efficiency. In this framework, attempts were also made in order to better coordinate efforts both at the national and regional level. At the national level armed forces began to cooperate and coordinate their work and information with other security actors such as the State Secret Services and the Ministry of Public Order. Training was also organized with the assistance of U.S. government agencies in which representatives from different security institutions took part. At the regional level joint military exercises were organized with the Macedonian Armed Forces focusing on possible terrorist activity. Furthermore, Albania contributed quite directly to the war on terrorism by sending some of its commando troops in Afghanistan. However, despite the above-mentioned efforts it is important to emphasize that the war against terrorism in Albania has produced a lot more rhetoric than concrete results. Many of the shortcomings reflect the challenges that the reform process of armed forces and security sector is facing in Albania. At the risk of repeating some of these problems I would like to mention just a few that are more exemplary. First of all both the armed forces and the security sector lack the necessary expertise and resources needed to employ think tanks or other similar research institutes in order to perform professional analysis of security threats. This problem is further compounded by the fact that defense and security structures still sustain an institutional culture of closed decision-making dynamics. A good example here is the National Security Strategy. This fundamental document was produced through a closed decision-making process without the participation of relevant actors and experts from the so-called civil society. This was not only due to closed decision-making dynamics, but also because security matters are still perceived in the narrow sense of defense measures, and are better left to the Ministry of Defense and its structures. Another important factor is limited financial resources. In the framework of the war against terrorism and in the reform process in general, the Government and politicians set lofty objectives. However the necessary financial resources did not back such objectives, which is why they added to the existing rhetoric. The importance of budgetary restriction can hardly be exaggerated. Thus, according to the Military Strategy document, 10
Ribaj, Pajtim. ‘Terrorism a Challenge of Our times, its impact on security environment and policies’. Defense: A Theoretical and Cultural Publication of the Ministry of Defense, Nr 1, 2002. p 37, Tirana, Albania.
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expenditure on the Albanian armed forces will increase by 0.1% of GDP every year for ten years until it reaches a more acceptable 2% of GDP. This limited budgetary increase, combined with limited analytical capabilities in order to better evaluate security threats, make it impossible for the armed forces, especially given their present situation, to adapt to new security threats appropriately. Besides the armed forces, the Ministry of Public Order was one of the institutions that was most directly affected by the changed security climate due to the rise of terrorism. Although Albania is not yet on the list of terrorist attacks it is still a potential target. Partly for this reason, but mainly due to the international security climate and donor initiatives, many training projects were organized and carried out through U.S. Government programs such as ICITAP and PAMEKA under the focus area of terrorism. The idea was to increase police force capacity in fighting terrorism. In this framework the Anti-Terror Department in the Ministry of Public Order was strengthened both in terms of improved human capacities but also logistically. Furthermore this department is working to prepare a national Action Plan and a draft law on terrorism.11 Some of the measures taken in the framework of the campaign against terrorism reflect very well the overall dynamic of the reform process in Albania. As the above-mentioned examples indicate, the major drive behind the reform process is the promise of membership into Euro-Atlantic structures. The measures taken by the Albanian armed forces and security sector are above all an indication of willingness to be part of western coalitions, more than a reflection of the security threat posed by terrorism for Albania. Although Albania actively participates in anti-terrorist coalitions it can be hardly argued that terrorism is one of the major security threats Albania is being faced with. Such a willful participation is expected to bring benefits for Albanian society, the armed forces and security sector in general, especially given the important geo-strategic position of the country. It is expected that Albania will receive more support in its efforts to join NATO due to its stand in the war against terrorism. This was also shown by the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell in Tirana in order to sign the Adriatic Initiative. Although the challenge does remain for Albania to redefine its priorities in the new security environment, the war against terrorism provides an opportunity especially for the armed forces in order to raise public awareness, on the necessity of armed forces and security services. This 11
Ylli Dylgjeri, Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Order. Personal Interview, 12 May 2003.
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awareness is necessary especially with regard to the integration into EuroAtlantic structures in general and NATO membership in particular. The latter is mistakenly understood as simply a military matter. Although there is a wide public support for NATO membership the process is strictly understood in terms of military reforms and separate from other crucial social and institutional reforms13. In the absence of such awareness, the reform process will be difficult since the sector will remain at the bottom of the priority list while it will be increasingly difficult to justify spending in the defense sector as security threats from neighboring countries are negligible and the country faces a multitude of immediate problems. The war against terrorism is also a good opportunity to involve civil society to a greater extent in defense and security issues. This has not been the case so far partly because the Albanian civil society does not have the expertise necessary to deal with military matters. Local Albanian NGOs are donor-driven and deal with issues that are closer to donor programs such as democratization, gender issues, corruption, and economic development. Donors do not usually fund projects that deal with the military matters. Thus, as of now there are no, or very few NGOs or think tanks that deal with military issues. The media on the other hand, an important part of civil society does not have a sufficient level of competence and analytical capability to deal with defense and security issues. Combined with the lack of public interest, this results in the very low – not to say inexistent – role of civil society in security and defense matters. The fact remains that partly due to the legacy of the past and also due to present developments the military is not an important actor on the Albanian political scene. Recent developments on the global scene could provide a good opportunity for this to change so as the reform process in the defense and security sector can receive more attention. Yet for this to happen developments on the international scene are not sufficient. These sectors have yet to better define Albania’s national security threats and adapt themselves accordingly. As developments have indicated, such threats are not international but internal in nature, which makes the challenge at hand even more daunting.
Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina Bisera Turkoviü
1
Reforms in Civil-Military Relations: A General Assessment
In every state the military and its control is of special significance. In democratic societies the role of the state can be split into two categories: relations with civil authorities, and relations with the whole population. Establishment of civil-military relations should aim at creating a firm democratic control over the military force. Such control can be realised by way of exercising authority of the sate on the whole security sector. The civil authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are aware of this, although they still have not managed to establish full democratic control, nor ‘healthy’ civilmilitary relations in the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from a four-year war as a destroyed and a poor country. The war damage is estimated to amount to over 200 billion US dollars.1 No segment of society has been left untouched by war. Reconstruction thus had to encompass not only material goods but also all aspects of the functioning of a state. Due to the multiplicity of important issues that required immediate attention (reconstruction of houses, return of refugees, infrastructure in the country), the civil-military relations were left on the margins. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a state, hence did not keep-up with the trends in Eastern Europe in respect to civil military relations. State influence on the creation and development of civil-military relations is reflected in the normative basis and institutions, which regulate this complex issue. In the normative field, Bosnia and Herzegovina was from the very beginning hampered from regulating the civil-military relations, for it did not adopt its own Constitution – rather the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a result of the peace negotiations held in
1
Estimate given by Dujko Hasic, Institute for War Crimes, in an interview to Radio Free Europe, 19 November 2002. See www.danas.org/programi/haaska.
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Dayton in November 19952. As shown below, no special attention during the negotiations was paid to the civil-military relationship. Hence, Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement (the Constitution) does not clearly define this relationship. The situation is similar in respect to the establishment of institutions, which are tasked with the realization of civil-military relations. After the war, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, but it did not include a Committee for Defense and Security. The executive government was composed of only five ministries, which had nothing to do with the military. At the state level, the most significant institution, which deals with military issues, is the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), but this institution also paid no attention to the establishment of civil-military relations. As a result of war, weak economy, multiplicity of overlapping legal provisions and non-existence of state military institutions the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not exert significant influence on the creation of civil-military institutions.
2
Internal Political and Ethnic Tensions
In addition to legally and institutionally regulating civil-military relations, the state is also responsible for creating an atmosphere, which would determine the best possible model for democratic control of the security sector. Let me point out that the aim of democratic control is the democratic and not only civil control of armed forces. However, control by civil authorities in itself is not enough. There are many countries in which civil structures are in the position of authority with armed forces subjugated to them while the society, as a whole is not democratic. Here I am particularly referring to the European states, which were formerly to the east of the ‘iron curtain’. As a sovereign and an independent country, Bosnia and Herzegovina freed itself of the Communist heritage and introduced a multi-party system. Today, the armies of Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer have to guarantee the political monopoly of the Communists. However, by no account have the interior relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina been sorted out. Weak economy directly effects civil-military relations. Funds put aside for the armies of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not cover all the expenditures of 2
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris, France.
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the military apparatus. Inadequate salaries of officers and soldiers and inadequate work conditions have all contributed to a generally ill feeling of soldiers. The primary concern of soldiers was to maintain their status and have an income; civil-military relations were thereby put into second plan. Till now, the civil authorities or for that matter the Parliament has never called on any military official to explain their activities. It seems that the defense budgetary discussions are the only time when civil authorities inter-relate with the military. It is almost as if both the military and civil authorities are satisfied with such interaction. As shown below, however, these relations have begun improving and intensifying. The second factor impeding the development of civil-military relations are ethnic tensions both within the military and civil structures of government. Bosnia and Herzegovina has two armies: Army of Republika Srpska, which is a mono-national army, and Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is composed of two components (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatian Defense Forces). These armed forces, without a common command, function on the basis of national key and on the principle of ‘non intervention in the affairs of the other’. It is therefore questionable whether in say a foreign attack on Sarajevo (today a city with majority Bosniak population), the Army of Republika Srpska would defend this capital city. Such situation and ethnic exclusivity does not however seem to worry the civil authorities. The justification frequently given for such a situation is that war wounds still have not healed and that mixing of soldiers of different nationalities would be counter-productive. Hence we have the situation where the politicians of Serb nationality control the Army of Republika Srpska, the Bosniaks control the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one component of the Army of the Federation, and the Croats control the other component, i.e., the Croatian Defense Council. Through these civil-military relations there is limited control over the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is clearly not democratic. To illustrate the functioning of civil-military relations according to the ethnic key and the non-existence of democratic control, let me give an example of an event that occurred in March 2001, at the time of the proclamation of the so-called “Croatian self-rule”. At that time the leaders of the Croatian Democratic Union (the strongest Croatian political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina) called on the officers and soldiers of Croatian nationality in the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to disobey the orders and not to report to their barracks. The soldiers of Croatian nationality responded by obeying the instructions of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).
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With concerted efforts of SFOR, strong international pressure and active engagement of the Minister of Defense (who at the time was a Croat but was not a HDZ member), this part of the Armed Forces of the Federation was however put under control of legal authorities.
3
Weakness of the Central State and Government Institutions
Bosnia and Herzegovina has a very complex state-legal system. The authority is realized on five levels: municipality, city, canton, entity and state. The civil-military relations are however mainly realised at the level of entities. This is understandable given that the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been formed at entity level and that it is the entity Parliaments, which are to conduct control over them. A crisis often provides the momentum for change, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is no exception. The “Orao” crisis forced the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to better understand the civil-military relations in the country. Following SFOR’s inspection of the aircraft company “Orao”, on 12 October 2002, in Bijelina, which resulted in the finding of documents which confirmed the indications that this company had sold motors and reserve parts for aircraft to Iraq, it became clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have to undergo reform of civil-military relations. The arms trade to Iraq took place by way of Jugoimport-SDPR company, which is under state control of Serbia and Montenegro. Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina was involved in breaching sanctions against Iraq, established by UN Security Council Resolution 661. Following the “Orao” affair, the international community requested that an inquiry be conducted into this illegal arms trade and that those responsible for it be brought before justice or the country itself would face sanctions. Republika Srpska tried for a couple of months to calm the effects and minimise the inquiry of “Orao” affair by various quasi-reports. In addition, the international institutions also requested that reform in the defense sector be begun. This inter alia involves the re-definition of civil-military relations. What seemed to be impossible a couple of months ago became a reality after the “Orao” affair. All, Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, agreed about the necessity to have a common command at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to have democratic control over armed forces by the state Parliament. The President of Republika Srpska, Dragan Covic, on behalf of this entity, also expressed his support for the efforts of Bosnia and
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Herzegovina to become a Partnership for Peace (PfP) member, while adding that the two conditions for Bosnia and Herzegovina membership in the PfP are: joint command, civil democratic control, and creation of armed forces which would correspond to the financial possibilities of the country. According to Covic, Republika Srpska shall fulfil its obligations by mid 2004 in respect to the conditions for PfP membership. In the next couple of months we shall see how sincere are the authorities of Republika Srpska in respect to the establishment of civil-military relations at state level. These relations shall without doubt be established, especially if we bear in mind that the international community has made it clear that there can be no returning back to status quo, and that the Defense Committee has been formed. The Defense Committee is tasked with the correction of serious deficiencies in the civil and state control, as well as in the command over the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Committee is to identify the constitutional and legal barriers to state level control and command, and will suggest amendments. It has to complete its work by 1 January 2004. An American, James Loher III chairs the Committee and it includes three Secretary Generals of the SCMM, entity defense ministers, and two other entity representatives. EU, OSCE and SFOR are also represented in the Committee.
4
Armed Forces Formations and State Control over Them
Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995 the defense issue was a particularly sensitive one. The Peace Agreement provides for the existence of two separate armies, one in each entity, within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina – one of these armies is in Republika Srpska (Army of Republika Srpska) while the other is in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The situation is further complicated in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Army is divided into two “components” based on ethnic belonging to Bosnian or Croat people. While the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the authority to act as a Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entities are in control of their components of the armed forces by way of the entity Ministries of Defense. These armies are organized in a way, which provides for the defense of each of the three constituent people – and not for the defense from an aggressor outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constituent armies – jointly referred to as the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the end of
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the war in 1995 have had 46,000 professional soldiers, with sufficient heavy weapons to arm substantially larger armed forces. Given that arms control measures were not imposed in the country, the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina supported voluntary measures in that respect, under the Confidence and Security Building Measures programme. The Armed Forces and their political leaders were prepared to consider some moderate measures in respect to arms control and reduction of soldiers. However, following lengthy negotiations both entity governments took on the obligation in 1998 to demobilize 30 per cent of the soldiers. The total number of demobilized soldiers during 1999 and the first half of 2001 were almost 13,000. At the end of 2001 the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were comprised of some 33,000 professional soldiers. Over time, the established dialogue has contributed to the creation of greater confidence and trust. During 2001, the entity governments agreed that Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised of 20,000 professional soldiers, would be sufficient for legitimate security needs. The entity governments agreed that the armed forces should be reduced to this figure by 2005. However, compared to countries with the same population even this number of professional soldiers is too high. Countries with similar population have armies of around 10,000 soldiers. The OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently working on developing a plan for a further reduction of armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mission has prepared an analysis based on an assumption that the defense budget will remain at the 2002 level and that 60 per cent of the budget will be allocated towards personnel costs, based on the goals of the defense policy. This analysis shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina can at maximum have 12,000 soldiers. Some have argued that the optimal number of soldiers that Bosnia and Herzegovina can finance is 9,500. Should this be the case, 60 per cent of allocated budget for the Armed Forces would go towards the personnel costs, such as is the case, for example, in Slovenia. According to the Joint Military Committee, these forces should be commanded by the Main Command of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two names for this Command have been suggested: Joint Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Main Headquarters of the Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. SFOR Commander, William Ward has suggested that the Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be reorganised, so as to include the following: x x
Command and control at state level, with a single chain of command by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Through the Secretary General of the SCMM,
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To the Committee of Headquarters of the Armed Forces.
As can be noticed, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has neither legal, nor factual basis for conducting control over the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the mentioned reform of the defense sector provides for the intensive inclusion of the state (in the control and command of the armed forces), beginning in 2004, through the mentioned reforms.
5
Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Democratic Control over the Defense and Security Sector
The usage of the term “control by state bodies” presupposes democratic control by the Parliament and the government over the Armed Forces. In reality this control can be further subdivided into parliamentary oversight and control of executive bodies, and judicial control. We shall first look at the control of executive bodies. Supremacy of politics over the Armed Forces is reflected in the oversight of Armed Forces by the government and the Minister of Defense. The significance of the authority of the executive bodies is all the more evident in the case of war when the Parliament is not able to operate as an oversight body. The executive government in Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the entity executive government is composed of the President and the Vice-President of the entity and entity governments. 1) Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina In democratic countries the President (or the Presidency) of the state have the following authority over the armed forces: x x x x x
Chief commander of the armed forces, Chairs the National Security Council, Appoints and promotes officers, Proclaims the state of war, Is authorised to proclaim a state of war on the basis of a parliamentary decision.
In respect to this authority, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be compared to the Queen of Great Britain. Although, according to the
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Constitution, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the civil commander of armed forces, real command is realised at the entity level given that the two armies are entity armies. Furthermore, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not authorise the Presidency to appoint or promote officers, neither does it authorise it to proclaim a state of war. This is done by the entity Presidents. Moves towards the strengthening of the Presidency were made while in Office were the ‘Alliance for Change’. During this period Presidency members were not members of national parties, which contributed to the adoption of two documents. In the first document is expressed the commitment of Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a member of NATO Partnership for Peace programme. According to the second document, ‘Defense Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina considers and determines activities related to the preparedness, mobilization and use of armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an aim of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. Presidency members are also members of the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which according to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina co-ordinates the activities of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2) SCMM in Bosnia and Herzegovina The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina specifies the establishment of the Standing Committee on Military Matters. It was established by way of an agreement of politicians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1995, in Dayton. Given the difficulty of reaching a compromise on defense issues, it was decided that the SCMM would be established as a co-ordinating body within the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role and function of the SCMM was not fully agreed upon. Till mid-2002, the SCMM had no real authority. A decision on the organization and the functioning of the defense institution, adopted by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 August 2002, grants the SCMM an important place. This decision specifies that the SCMM is the highest authority for the co-ordination of defense issues within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in respect to international institutions. Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a Ministry of Defense, the SCMM is a body, which closely resembles a state ministry of defense. SCMM is obliged to:
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x Co-ordinate the work of armed forces for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, x Conduct the re-structuring of armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, x Maintain relations with defense-security organizations abroad (NATO, OSCE, etc.), x Maintain dialogue between the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (announces projects and training), x Secure transparency of budgets and foreign assistance, x Conduct public relations. In the framework of defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is expected that the SCMM shall be transformed into a Ministry of Defense. Currently (and in accordance with the decision of the High Representative), the SCMM Secretary General participates in the sessions of the Council of Minister. He does not however have a right to vote. 3) Entity Ministries of Defense According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the defense of the country is regulated by entity laws. The Constitutions of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Republika Srpska task the entities with the organization and conduct of defense of the entities. It is for this purpose that the two entity Ministries of Defense have been formed. Before we look at the authority and responsibilities of these entity Ministries, it should be mentioned that the entity Presidents are commanders-in-chief of the armies. The Federation Ministry of Defense is responsible for the legal and administrative tasks in the field of defense, as is specified in the Defense Law, and other Federal laws. It is comprised of the Office of the Minister, eleven departments, Verification Centre and the Joint Command of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Defense Law of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted in July 2002. The Law makes reference neither to civil-military relations, nor to the democratic control of the armed forces. If we take into consideration that till 2001 the Ministry of Defense of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina functioned as two different ministries, and that the salaries of the employees are a couple of months late, we can safely say that civil-military relations were at a very low level. The situation is not much different in the other Bosnian entity, i.e., in Republika Srpska. According to the latest information the number of
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employees in the Ministry of Defense of Republika Srpska will have to be reduced to 500 persons. This speaks of the magnitude of the financial difficulties that the Ministries of Defense face. As government members, the Ministers of Defense are responsible for the democratic control of the armed forces. However, in the face of small budgets and large expenditures they are by-and-large preoccupied with existential problems of members of the armed forces, rather than with the development of civil-military relations.
6
Constitutional and Practical Role of the Parliament
In democratic societies Parliament is the body with central role in the state. There is no governmental institution that can be exempted from parliamentary control. The parliamentary control of the security sector also includes control of the armed forces. The essence of parliamentary control is in a just division of authority between the lawmaking and the executive authority. 1) Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina The Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina has two Houses: House of Representatives and the House of Peoples. Although members of Parliament are frequent guests at NATO headquarters in Brussels and are parties in talks with representatives of Euro-Atlantic security organizations, it is impossible to define their role in the civil-military relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The defense policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the security policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, tasks the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina with civil command over the armed forces, while the Parliaments, Council of Ministers and other bodies of government are tasked with political oversight, in accordance with the constitutional and legal provisions. A member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a right to question an entity Minister of Defense, just as the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot discuss elements of the budget of the Army of Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Army of Republika Srpska (RS). In such a state-legal set-up, the only occasion on which the Parliamentary Assembly discussed issues related to armed forces was during the adoption of the Law on Export of Arms and Military Equipment, in December 2002. It is unlikely that this discussion would have taken place even then were it not for the ‘Orao’ affair and threat of sanctions by the international community. It is evident hence, that the Parliamentary
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Assembly does not have any role, or only has a minor role, in the democratic control of armed forces. Of all the elements that the Parliament has at its disposal, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not utilise any one of them. It has not adopted any law related to the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it does not discuss the defense budget, it does not deal with the issue of the size of the armed forces during peace, nor does it appoint or dismiss commanders of the armed forces. Only in the case of sending military forces in international peacekeeping operations does the Parliamentary Assembly approve their participation. Since the election and constitution of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Committee for Defense and Security has not yet been formed. The media, together with security experts have frequently questioned the Parliament about the formation of a Committee for Defense and Security, but the response always amounts to a conclusion that such a Committee is necessary, but that it has not yet been discussed by the Parliamentary Assembly. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament does not have an effective democratic control over the armed forces, which prevents Bosnia and Herzegovina from membership in the EuroAtlantic institutions. Things are improving, however, as the two entities have recently agreed upon the establishment of democratic control at state level. 2) Entity Parliaments Unlike the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entity Parliaments are legally responsible for democratic control of the armed forces. Civil-military relations in the entities are established in accordance with the democratic principles. In this segment the entities posses elements of statehood, for they have their own armed forces, as well as Parliaments, which are responsible for control over them. But the entities are not states, nor are they subjects with which representatives of the Euro-Atlantic structures want to negotiate with. When in question is the democratic control of the armed forces by lawmaking bodies, both the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the National Assembly of RS have two means at their disposal: they adopt laws related to the armies and defense, and they adopt the budget for the defense forces. Both Parliaments have a Committee for Defense and Security, which conduct oversight over the security sector. The Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for giving an agreement for the use of military force, should military use
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be justified by international law. According to the Constitution of RS the National Assembly of RS can proclaim a state of war, in the case of an armed attack on RS.
7
Transparency and Accountability as a Key Factor
Public officials are responsible to the public for their decisions and actions, and they are subject to appropriate control. Also, they must be transparent in making decisions, as well as in their activities. Since the coming of the international institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina a lot of time and funds have been invested in educating government and non-governmental sector about responsibility and transparency. The Office for Human Rights (OHR) produced a document titled ‘7 principles of public functioning’ in which responsibility and transparency are emphasised. In order to achieve transparency, the citizens must be in a position to have access to government information. When talking about the transparency of the Parliaments and governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a key element of democratic control, it must be kept in mind that the country is in the process of learning about transparency. For many years we have lived under the conviction that we are threatened from abroad and that secrecy is a priority, on which security is based. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country in transition, which must learn that many topics should not be kept secret. In a democracy, armed forces need active consensus of public opinion. It is difficult to achieve this in a system such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the very defense structures are possible adversaries. For these reasons, following the end of the war in 1995, the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were keeping secret the assistance received from their ‘political’ friends. The Parliaments were not willing to inform the public about the defense budgets. It was a public secret that the Army of Republika Srpska was receiving assistance from Belgrade, Croatian Defense Council from Zagreb and Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Islamic countries. Transparency did, however, improve during the past year and a half. Since May 2002, Belgrade stopped the practice of non-transparent assistance, while assistance provided by the Republic of Croatia to the Croat component of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, became transparent with the coming into office of President Stipe Mesic. Assistance provided to the Bosniac component of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also transparent today.
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Institutions of the Parliament and the armies have departments for public information, by which the public is informed of their activities. It is unfortunate, however, that these departments conduct selection of information they issue and they do not have regular press conferences. The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still far from transparent and do not adequately inform the public about their activities. For example, it is indicative that Bosnia and Herzegovina as an OSCE participating state, once a year participates in the exchange of military information3, which is published in foreign literature, while the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not provided with this information. The government is not solely responsible for this. The media can also be blamed for inadequately developed transparency. The reasons for this are: insufficiently educated journalists, only partial reporting on security issues, closeness of particular media with a particular political circle, etc. For example, the media today most frequently writes about the need of Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the PfP programme. All political parties agree about the necessity to participate in this programme. Given the dispersion of political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their ideological, programme and all other differences, it is impossible that all are sincere in expressing this view. However, given that journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina support these views, an atmosphere has been created, in which journalists with different ideological perspectives are pushing for PfP membership. At the same time, the media are not critically considering how the country could attain this goal. Moreover, during the past year no daily newspaper critically considered PfP membership, nor did they consider how honest were the claims of politicians about preparedness and the wish for membership in the PfP programme. The weekly magazines are somewhat better in this respect. When in question are the media and security, assistance of the international community is needed. Technical and theoretical assistance, especially by NATO, is needed.
8
Intelligence and Security Agencies
The current organization of security and intelligence agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina symbolises the deep distrust and insecurity of people towards one another. Security and intelligence agencies are organized at 3
This is an obligation from the OSCE Vienna Document from 1999 on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).
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entity level. So we have the Federal Security and Intelligence Agency and the Security and Intelligence Agency of Republika Srpska. These two security and intelligence agencies have no common points and consider one another as adversaries. These Agencies have not been de-politicised and they still have not fully apprehended that they are to serve the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also well known that certain members of security institutions are taking part in criminal activities. Both the former and the current Head of the Federal Security and Intelligence Agency have accused one another of wrongful doing in the media. Also, against the current Head of the Federal Security and intelligence Agency a court procedure has been initiated in respect to the events that took place in Hercegovacka Bank when a conflict broke out between SFOR and Croats. The Security and Intelligence Agency of Republika Srpska is not in any better situation. One representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has accused it of being an organization that is assisting with the hiding of Radovan Karadzic, who has been charged with war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is on the most wanted list by the International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The military inteligence of the Army of Republia Srpska has recently been closed, after it was confirmed that it had spied on the political, diplomatic and military activities of USA, NATO member countries and EU representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Documents confiscated in the 410th Information Centre of the Army of Republika Srpska show the intent of this security organization to spy on NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with an emphasis on the air component and the quick response forces. The documents confiscated by SFOR also indicate that the Army of Republika Srpska spied on the investigation on crime and corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducted by the Office of the Hugh Representative. At the state level there is no democratic control, while at the entity level it is conducted by the Defense and Security Committee. Recently, the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a Committee for oversight of the Federation Security and Intelligence Agency. This Committee is comprised of five members of Parliament. Whereas Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defense Committees have attained a degree of success, the intelligence sector is still rarely discussed. Intelligence agencies still have their ‘political friends’ in the parliamentary committees. While in developed democracies the Chairman of these Committees are always members of the opposition, in Bosnia and Herzegovina this is not the case. An indication of the overall improvement however, is the fact that ongoing are reforms of both the defense and intelligence sector. In early May 2003, the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, announced that a Central
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Intelligence Agency should be formed, which could also contribute to the regional struggle against organised crime. In accordance with that, at the end of May 2003, a Committee on the Reform of Intelligence Agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been established, which is tasked with the introduction of a legal base for a single intelligence agency in the country. A Hungarian diplomat, Kalman Kocis chairs the Committee (he was earlier involved in the reform of the Hungarian intelligence agency). The Committee shall have six members appointed by the Heads of the existing intelligence agencies: Intelligence Agency of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Intelligence Agency of Republika Srpska. The High Representative pointed a deadline of 1 January 2004 to the Parliaments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at which they are to adopt the recommendations of the Committee. Hence, we can expect that in 2004 Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a unified/single de-politicised intelligence agency, over which the state Parliament shall have democratic control. That will provide the state with a mechanism necessary for gathering information for the prevention of crime and will enable it to provide an effective response to new security threats. It is clear that the existing organization of intelligence agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot meet the challenge of new times and that it cannot successfully confront organized crime, terrorism and trans-national crime, unless it is restructured.
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Defense and Security Sector Planning Processes
If the process of planning of activities in the defense and security sector is understood as a path from military doctrine through security policy to security strategy, then we can say that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a process of planning. Till June 2003 there was no discussion at sate level about the process of defense planning and security. At the end of June, SCMM adopted a plan for the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the PfP programme. Only then did the members of the SCMM receive a document titled ‘Military doctrine of armed forces’ which was presented to the Presidency for adoption. In addition to this document, the Presidency was also provided with a document titled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Security Policy’ in mid-June 2003. The Presidency initially adopted this document, as one of the conditions of Bosnian membership in the PfP. The document is to be passed on for Parliamentary procedure. However, much more remains to be done before we can have a Bosnian security strategy. All plans, related to the defense and security, are made at entity level, and by and large are opposed to one another. The doctrine of
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the defense sector in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on NATO standards, while in RS it is based on the principles of the former Yugoslav National Army. Co-operation of military and civil experts in the preparation of defense and security documents is not at a sufficient level. First, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are still remnants of the former Communist system, in which the military was a closed group. However, not much has been discussed on this topic. The consequences of such thinking are still present in the military forces, therefore the ‘military experts’ are not willing to accept civilian expertise and at the same time they do not have adequate knowledge for the development of modern security documents. In addition, they lack knowledge of foreign languages and hence they are not able to follow developments in the security field in the other countries of the EuroAtlantic region. Lately the situation has improved by way of additional education for the military, particularly in the field of democratic control of the military force and civil military relations, such as workshops in the NATO School in Oberamergau in Germany. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina has civil experts for defense and security, but they are acting individually and are not institutionally organized. Currently, there is only one non-governmental body dealing with security issues, the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo.
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Parliamentary personnel have to have adequate knowledge in order to perform oversight over the military force. Military personnel and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) personnel often have a feeling that politicians do not have sufficient knowledge about the topics they are discussing. As a consequence the military and Ministry of Defense personnel are not willing to supply them with additional information. Bosnia and Herzegovina still does not have sufficiently educated parliamentary staff, able to communicate with the military sector. In order to overcome this the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is regularly organizing seminars with the goal of educating military personnel. The Centre for European Security Studies from Groningen, together with the Centre of Security Studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and other partner institutes from other countries of South East Europe carried out a two-year project ‘DEMCON’, with the goal of educating members of Parliaments and parliamentary staff of South East Europe in security issues. The Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) from Switzerland has through the OSCE initiated engagement of security experts in the
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entity Parliaments in order to provide assistance to Parliamentarians in dealing with military topics. In the pre-war system, democratic control, transparency and openness were unknown to members of the Parliament. Today additional efforts are made at educating parliamentary personnel and it is necessary that in the coming period it will be institutionalised at the academic level (at universities).
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Role of Civil Society in Security and Defense Areas
By civil society we primarily think about the media, NGOs and academic institutions. In addition to civilian oversight, the aim of these institutions is to integrate military forces into society. This segment in Bosnia and Herzegovina is underdeveloped. There exists only one non-government organization that deals with security issues – the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo. The Centre for Security Studies has organised many seminars with the purpose of educating Parliamentarians and governmental officials in the security field. Although non-governmental experts so far are not engaged in any advisory capacity by the government, they are supported by international organizations, such as the OSCE, NATO and OHR, and they are effective in providing training in the security sector. The establishment of departments at universities, which deal with this problematic, is at an early stage. When discussing media involvement there are military journals, which address military and security issues. The journals are ‘entity journals’, and there is neither co-operation nor competition between them. The daily newspapers only report on issues without analysing them. The weekly and fortnightly magazines from time to time provide some analysis, primarily about demobilised soldiers, and problems they face, while no newspaper is analysing democratic control of armed forces. The electronic media do not have specialized programme on security, defense or the military. When in question are affairs (such as the ‘Orao’ affair and the ‘smuggling of arms to Kosovo’) then the media report it with sensational titles, but at the same time no media house is reporting about the Bosnian involvement in peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as in Congo. The there are two main reasons for such an attitude: lack of education of journalists and poor funding of media houses in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is reflected on the inadequate reporting on these issues.
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Organisation of National Crisis-Management System
Military operations and crisis systems provide a fertile ground for the creation of animosities between the politicians and the military. The government, i.e., the Defense Minister or the President of the Government (depending on the type of organization of the state) has the right to take on operative command over military operations. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state does not have that problem since there is simply no authority at state level empowered to proclaim a state of war. The entities have the exclusive right in this respect. Entity Parliaments have the power to authorise their armies to use military force, given that the entity Presidents are Commanders-in-Chief of their military.
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Formation of Peacekeeping Contingents and Participation in Multi-National Peacekeeping Formations
So far, Bosnia and Herzegovina has participated in two UN peacekeeping missions: Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Mission in Congo. The decision on participation of Bosnian forces in peacekeeping operations has been taken by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, all other decisions such as decisions related to command, control, including democratic control, even emblems on uniform, have not been fully regulated due to the afore mentioned Constitutional arrangements. Co-operation with EU, NATO, Stability Pact and individual states, influencing the establishment of standards in the defense and security sector and democratic civil oversight of that sector are difficult and dynamic. Due to constitutional arrangements in the security field it is difficult to create a single security space in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The attempts of creating a single security space are not always welcome by different political players in the country. Representatives of the military and the Parliaments have participated in many NATO organised workshops and are familiar with civil-military relations in other countries. OSCE has also been involved in the development of democratic control over the armed forces in the country. The Department for Security and Cooperation of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is developing projects and organizing seminars for the purpose of familiarizing the Parliamentarians with models of democratic control. Also, the Parliamentary Assembly has developed contacts and co-operation with Parliaments of other European countries. This communication channel is also used for
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the transfer of knowledge and best practices in the field of civil-military relations. Bosnia and Herzegovina is, certainly a very complicated state concerning constitutional arrangements, which are clearly reflected in the security field. That is why reforms in the security sector are taking much longer than in other states of South- East Europe. However, a number of positive changes have happened during the recent period and future reforms are promising too. Bosnia and Herzegovina is on its way to joining other South East European countries on the path of integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures.
Bulgaria: Completing Requirements for NATO Membership, Accelerating the Security Sector Reform and Adapting to the Counter-Terrorism Era Plamen I. Pantev, Valeri Ratchev, Todor Tagarev
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Introduction
The evolution of Bulgaria’s civil-military relations towards an effective democratic control of the armed forces and the rest of the security institutions very much reflected the general progress of the country’s society and political institutions’ development. An efficient driving factor continued to be the attraction of NATO and EU membership and the standard requirements of both organisations on civil-military relations. The moral responsibility of being a positive example for other Balkan as well as Black Sea and Caucasian nations in that field additionally influenced progress. The remaining tasks to fulfil before being fully integrated in NATO had also some elements of civil-military relations in addition to other broader requirements of social and institutional evolution in this country. Bulgaria was dynamically re-considering its achievements and deficiencies in the light of the broadening of the concept from democratic control over the armed forces to a needed encompassing security sector reform and good governance of the security sector in general. The task was not an easy one, but accumulated experience in the democratic control of the armed forces and a more vibrant civil society with its expert institutes and centres and international networking on the topic provided opportunities for undertaking the tasks and implementing them in an efficient way. The shock of 9/11 and the need of a total and global fight against the ‘new evil’ of the 21st century necessitated a general review of all achievements in the area of democratic control of the armed forces and the started security sector reform. Everyone had to think about and balance fundamental values and principles with the demands of efficient counterterrorism. The new reality obliged every participant in these relations to deliver new and timely solutions of complex issues. The re-conceptualisation had to reflect the persistent need of furthering the regional stability in a democratic context and the requirements of an effective global fight with terrorism without compromising fundamental democratic
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values and norms. A special aspect was introduced with the launch of the fight to disarm the Iraqi regime from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and/or weapons of mass casualties (WMC) by a ‘coalition of willing states’, part of which was Bulgaria. The perception in Bulgaria was that there is a link between the fight against terrorism and the fight against proliferation of WMD/WMC. This brought Bulgarian society closer to the involvement of the ‘pre-emptive strike’ strategy of the leader of the ‘Coalition for Immediate Disarmament of Iraq’ – the United States – and to its practical implementation. The issue remained for some time contentious within Bulgarian society: it was difficult to fully realise the danger that the dictatorial regime in Baghdad posed to the international community. However, the official decision of the Bulgarian Government and Parliament were in favour of participating in the preventive activity against terrorism. In this situation civil society think-tank representatives provided important expertise and arguments about the evolving crisis, confronting leading-tonowhere pacifist demands. Close to its full and effective membership in NATO, Bulgaria continues to critically approach and treat unfulfilled tasks in the area of civil-military relations and its security sector reform while finding proportionately tailored formulae of carrying its counter-terrorist fight. The following article will consider these tasks and the longer-term balancing of the security sector reform and the effective fight against terrorism. For this reason three inter-connected issues are discussed further on: first, completing the tasks of an effective membership in the Alliance after the country was invited in November 2002 in Prague; second, speeding- security sector reform as a necessary pre-condition for an encompassing evolution of society, economy and the state institutions, and third, adapting to the requirements of a counter-terrorism and counter-WMD proliferation era.
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Completing the Remaining Civil-Military Relations Reform Tasks for Full-Fledged Membership in NATO
Full-fledged membership of Bulgaria in NATO would add guarantees to the stability in South East Europe and a strengthened capacity of the Alliance to implement its new tasks and missions. A list of reform issues, however, ‘hangs’ in the minds of both official and non-governmental institutions in Bulgaria throughout the ratification process and later on, until fully adapted to an effective participation in the Alliance. This task is perceived both for reasons of military effectiveness of the armed forces and of effectiveness of democracy in the country.
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The realisation of the criterion for NATO membership – democratic civil-military relations– means the achievement of a reliable functional inter-relationship between the democratic society, state and its armed forces as well as the other security institutions in such a way that at any stage of this interaction the principles of pluralistic democracy, market economy and the rule of law are implemented while national security is guaranteed. In the last months before being integrated in NATO and soon after joining, the process of establishing democratic control of the armed forces in Bulgaria continues to be a dynamic one with all features of remaining a fundamental task in a future, more mature membership. As a matter of fact there is already a philosophic transition towards the understanding that security and defense are more effectively guaranteed in the conditions of democratic civilian control of the armed forces together with allies who have regulated these relations in a similar way. Bulgarian armed forces preserve their quality of a strong symbol of national pride, but in parallel with political and legal norms, they are neutral servants of democraticallyelected institutions. Bulgaria also underwent a conceptual re-thinking of the role of civil society and its representatives in the field of civil-military relations: together with the official institutions, empowered to take responsibility of the security and defense of the country society itself creates its own sources of expertise and information on these same issues, independently from the constitutionally- and legally-established ones, though this potential is still to evolve and find realisation in the actual process of state governance. For more than four years now Bulgaria has dwelt on “second generation” reforms in the sphere of civil-military relations, accentuating the behavioural aspects of the relationship: the effective activity of alreadyestablished institutions and procedures, on the realisation of shared norms and values for both civilians and military, etc. A deep-rooted motivation of “second generation” reforms is the understanding that with the evolution of democracy, democratic control of the military also develops, and the very concept of the democratic control spills over into the broader security sector. This control is an indispensable prerequisite for transparency, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in the sphere of national security and defense. A dominating motivation in Bulgaria’s “second generation” reforms turned to be not just the belief that fulfilling NATO’s criteria for membership matters, but the interest and perspective to improve the relations of society with the whole security sector. Despite the fact that Bulgaria has matured on these issues and legitimately contends for full-fledged membership, the ‘pending list’ of tasks continues to weigh in the minds of governmental and non-governmental experts. Not strangely for local analysts, the list is topped by two substantial
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requirements of transition to market economy and the rule of law. The ineffective functioning of the judicial system and incomplete control of the country’s arms exports have been signs of an inadequate transition. While Bulgaria is making steps in curbing its corruption practices, the judicial system (investigation, prosecution and courts) continues to create obstacles to the harmonious functioning of the separate powers in the democratic state. The legislative and the executive powers are also far from perfect, but definitely the continuous crisis in the judicial system leads to unsatisfactory guarantees of a presumably adequate system of democratic control of security institutions. The net effect of the harmonious and synchronised functioning of democratic legislative, executive and judicial powers is actually the backbone of an effective democratic oversight of the armed forces and the rest of the security institutions. A critical mass has already accumulated pertaining to this issue and society expects results to be delivered. In a similar way the criminal bypassing of state control of arms exports has fallen in the already-concentrated focus of governmental and social scrutiny. A scandalous illegal deal by a Bulgarian MOD-run weaponsproduction company, ‘Terem’, with a country under UN arms-import sanctions regime a few months before the start of the war on Iraq led to major governmental measures. A severely strict control over the implementation of the Law on Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (1995; amended in 2002) by the government should improve the state of implementation of the law. The applied instruments are increasing penalties in case of violation; reducing bureaucratic obstacles when extending the term of licenses; better regulation for identifying the end-user; improved control of intermediaries; broader powers for counter-intelligence and police services. Though the government produces an Annual Report on arms exports for Parliament, it is not obliged to publish it – a fact that makes the issue less transparent and out of practical reach for control by society. Improving societal insight on arms export will generate adequate NGO and expert control mechanisms of this activity in Bulgaria. It is a key question for inducing confidence with Bulgaria’s NATO and EU partners as well as confidence in the OSCE and the UN context on these issues. The effectiveness of democratic civilian control depends to a great extent on the particular model of defense and force planning. Though Bulgaria has a modern defense planning process in place and it has substantially improved civilian-military cooperation in this area, it continues to face certain challenges. The most important challenges are to improve civil-military interaction in planning and implementation, to improve
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acquisition planning, to introduce risk management and cost-benefit analyses techniques and to build a cadre of defense planners. Currently, civil-military interaction in defense planning decisionmaking is achieved mostly through the work of the Programming Council and the Defense Council. In particular, the establishment of the Programming Council proved to be instrumental in promoting cooperative decision-making, role-sharing and distribution of responsibilities between civilians and the military. Civil-military interaction has been further facilitated by the culture of cooperation among experts in various directorates in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. It is expected that the transition to a fully integrated model of the Ministry of Defense, incorporating a Defense Staff, will advance the efficient and effective interaction of civilian and military defense planners. The second important challenge is to provide for coordinated development of organisational structures and procurement of new weapon systems and equipment. Although acquisition programmes are part of the programming schedule, the Ministry of Defense finds it difficult to elaborate adequate acquisition objectives and priorities, to cost procurement, especially accounting for life-cycle cost of new weapon systems, and to schedule procurements so that there is minimal risk for the whole programme. To meet this challenge the Ministry of Defense works on the elaboration and the implementation of a new NATO-compatible acquisition system and procurement programmes. Key in terms of clarifying roles of civilians and military in the process was the establishment of a modernisation Council in 2001, combined with the introduction of a Defense/Operational Capabilities Council that is still pending. There are a number of additional expert councils and committees, where civilians and military already work together using their specific expertise to prepare adequate acquisition decisions. A particular challenge is related to the introduction of risk assessment methodologies, techniques and tools. Proper assessment of the risk associated with each policy option and the related force structure proved to be crucial in making every important decision in the defense planning process. Debate should be based not only on what a defense planner feels but rather on a rigorous and structured approach to risk assessment, using the respective expertise of civilian and military planners. Similarly, it is very important to introduce a more rigorous approach towards cost benefit analysis both in the Ministry of Defense and outside organisation such as the National Audit Office or non-governmental think tanks. The capability of the Audit Office to perform ‘value for money’ analyses in defense, in a way similar to the UK National Audit Office and the US Government Accounting Office or Congressional Budget Office,
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may be improved through temporary assignments of a few experienced military personnel. Alternatively, non-governmental think tanks with proper expertise may be tasked by Parliament and/or Government to provide independent assessments on specific issues, i.e., proposed defense budgets; major procurement cases; specific plans and programmes, as well as to assess reports for their implementation. Some form of competition among the Ministry of Defense, other governmental or parliamentarian agencies, and NGOs in assessing defense planning options may be quite healthy for the promotion of transparency, accountability and, as a result, more effective defense planning. The final challenge in this analysis relates to education of civilian and military defense planners. Short-term training courses proved to be useful to prepare Ministry of Defense personnel to implement particular procedures and planning requirements, i.e., how to draft a Programme Memorandum. However, a more formal education is required both for the military and the civilians involved in defense planning. As the war over Iraq demonstrated it is not sufficient to be part of the coalition of the willing, but to be a capable one. Key in this respect is the building of a civilian cadre of defense planners. This model of cooperation between civilians and military may serve as an example in elaborating planning procedures throughout the security sector. Another problem of the ‘accession list’ is the quality of parliamentary oversight of the security sector. First, there continues to persist – despite the avalanche of national and international education efforts – a relative lack of interest by members of Parliament in defense and security issues in combination with a lack of expertise among parliamentarians. An inadequate number of MPs are really devoted to oversight. Rather it is political/party considerations that bring them from time to time to the topic of their respective commissions. Second, parliamentary control of the security sector is limited also by inadequate access to information rules and by reluctance on parts of the executive, the bureaucracy and/or the security institutions to provide that information. The government in a democratic country is ‘open’ and the MPs and the public should be informed how the government does its work. This holds true for the activity that precedes and prepares the decision-making, including the general concepts on fundamental issues; for the very decision-making, and for the implementation of the decisions that have been taken. The executive in the democratic society must be fully committed to transparency in the areas of national security, foreign policy and defense. This means that the executive branch of power in a democratic society and state has to acknowledge that MPs, to whom the people have vested their sovereign power, have the right to know everything which is to be known about the work of the administration,
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including in the security sector. MPs are entitled to information and this right is derived from the right of the people to know what has been done in the name of the people. For this reason the executive branch, including in the area of national security, foreign and defense policy actors have the obligation to reveal and explain actions and decisions publically. In a similar way, the obligation of the executive is to declare and justify expenditures for the purposes of defense and security. Though in Bulgaria one can witness communication between the executive and the legislative branches on the issues of defense and security, there is no hard evidence about the effectiveness of these communications save in the cases of satisfied budgetary claims by the Defense or Interior Ministries. Ministers and State Secretaries reveal the contents of the discussions to the public, while Chairmen of the respective parliamentary commissions and their members keep silent. Low expertise and low professional self-confidence are often the reason for such performance that backfires on the authority of the Parliament. For example, the Parliament has not kept its pledge to hear and interrogate nominees for high-ranking officers and for Ambassadors. It is fair to add that Parliament lacks adequate resources to support the oversight function of the legislature. But this is indicative, as well, of inadequate organisational capacity to fulfil its oversight power.
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Speeding-Up Bulgarian Security Sector Reform
The progress in implementing “second generation” reforms in Bulgaria logically imposed new and broader tasks, stemming from the need to link the evolution of the security sector (armed forces, police, gendarme formations, border police, coast guard service, customs service and intelligence/counter-intelligence services) with the development of Bulgarian society and economy. The high standards of membership in NATO and the EU required a comprehensive and as economic as possible approach to the management of the security sector: the continuing need to sustain stability in the Balkans; to maintain the percentage of GDP for military expenses; to participate in the formation of the EU and NATO response forces and to define national “niche capabilities”; to preserve an effective participation in multinational peacekeeping operations; to be an efficient member in the counter-terrorist coalition and in the war on Iraq; to tailor classified information and intelligence services organization to the requirements of NATO membership; to complete the psychological and conceptual integration of the Bulgarian security services in the Euro-Atlantic system and shape new personal characteristics of the servicemen and servicewomen in the sector of national security, including neutralising corruption in this system. All
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these needs called for a broad, perspective and top-state run security sector management and reform. The conceptual formulation of the SSR, the drafting of its political, legal and sub-legal normative basis, and its practical realisation has already turned into a fundamental task of all national security institutions in Bulgaria, including the Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the President. As during the whole period of the transition in Bulgaria, stimulating and absorbing non-governmental expertise remains a key factor for success. Expert NGOs have proved they are actors, partners and correctives factors of official institutions. Such a relationship is a measure of both the democratic functioning of the respective society and of management effectiveness. Two aspects beg discussion in particular. First, the need to reconcile the Bulgarian system of classified information with SSR, and second, the need to reorganise the Bulgarian intelligence service. Bulgarian society and the media discussed for months the preparation, adoption and implementation of The Law for Classified Information (2002). However, the problem of classified information in Bulgaria was narrowed just to the topics of the restricted access to files of the security services of the totalitarian era and of classification procedures. Both these issues are important for the democratisation of Bulgarian society and guarantee the country’s national security. Domestic political debates strongly shifted the discussion from professional to personal influence and manipulation. Part of the old files have been liquidated, copied and taken away or directly stolen from the archives, becoming part of everyday political discourse. This could not do anything else but compromise the national security system. It also turns into a mockery the calls for coming to terms with the past on a real democratic basis and fairness. Actually the most topical aspect of the ‘classified information’ issue has been diminished in the public debate: how will Bulgaria guarantee that officials, dealing with NATO secrets and in NATO institutions, will be cleared adequately for these jobs? This has been a real issue as the experience of the newly accepted countries in the Alliance in 1999 shows that. Bringing in English speaking civilian personnel and officers who are eligible for a security ‘clearance’ test is Bulgaria’s challenge. Imperfect national legislation may also become a problem when secrets have to be protected in the NATO context. Unfortunately, a negative side effect of this aspect of the debate is the opacity of public information on tasks, structure, personnel levels and budgets of security sector organisations. Another intellectual, but also direct political challenge continues to be the reform of the intelligence services and the implementation of adequate democratic civil control over them. A clear reflection of persisting
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problems in this field was the answer of Prime Minister Simeon Saxkoburggotsky to a question from the press on 26 February 2003 after his meeting with the Bulgarian President and the change of the old and new Director of the National Intelligence Service. The answer of the Prime Minister to a question concerning the tasks of the Director of Intelligence was: “Do you think that in a normal country the recommendations given to the country’s intelligence are pronounced openly?” For sure in any normal country no head of government or state will tell the press what particular task and objective has been given to the chief of intelligence, but it is absolutely guaranteed that the general tasks of the national intelligence will be formulated in a law or/and national security strategy or concept. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case with Bulgaria. There exists factors complicating civil democratic control of the intelligence services. First is the mix of problems and changing roles of intelligence with the issue of overcoming the legacies of the past. Second is the persisting presence of contradictory theoretic assumptions about democratic oversight and control over the security sector. Third is lack of consultation with NATO, the EU and other Western partners in comparison to the clear and extensive support by established democracies on the issues of the civil democratic control of the armed forces. Fourth is the complexity of intelligence issue. This complex nature is reflected in the definition of the balance and the borderline of the intelligence activity and the scope of control mechanisms of the respective agencies. Fifth, the “academic body of knowledge” on the topic is very modest in Bulgaria. And, sixth, in the aftermath of the 9/11 events and the new security needs of the global war on terror complicate oversight and control. Bulgarian society needs an educated debate on the issues of intelligence and this debate may include the treatment of the following questions: First, the issue of clandestine collection of information and what should be the subject of democratic civil oversight. Second, the issue of counterintelligence and to what extent a democratic government can target or turn its own citizens or residents into an object of surveillance. Third comes the issue of analysis and estimates and what are the parameters of involving academics, institutes and the media for classified work. Fourth, the issue of covert action and what are the permissible and appropriate limits for the executive power to use its own citizens and private organisations without their knowledge to exert influence abroad. The ‘right to know’ in the democratic society, applied to the intelligence service has an additional aspect, encompassing all four elements of the debate: the right to know if demanding professional criteria of joining the service are observed and implemented. A self-critical and educated public must also ask itself the following question: Are the efforts to control the intelligence services
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improving their performance or not? Are the new legislative proposals, institutions for implementing the oversight, the NGO-controlling ‘eye’ not causing also drawbacks on the creativity and efficiency of the intelligence service, especially in the light of higher requirements in the fight against terrorism? It is no secret that a fundamental problem of any country’s intelligence service is preventing them turning into toys of their political masters – by tradition an effort with doubtful success. Furthermore, the effectiveness of legal and institutional formulae to exercise oversight of the intelligence agencies is largely dependent on the democratic maturity of respective societies and states. The Bulgarian experience shows that in the last 14 years there have been efforts to preserve political neutrality, to use opportunistically the intelligence services for narrow political purposes and to evolve gradually a democratic ethos in the services. Until the spring of 2003 these contending pressures have led to the curious situation that constitutionally, the national intelligence service is linked to the head of state who remains responsible for any single failure of the intelligence institution, while the Prime Minister who bears the responsibility for the country’s domestic and foreign policy is not the master of the national intelligence. At the end of the day, it appeared that the executive cannot be controlled adequately by the Parliament since intelligence is isolated from this control1. That is why a new law on national intelligence should give clear answers to the following demands: first, national intelligence should be transferred to the domain of the Prime Minister; second, the process of planning, programming and budgeting of the intelligence activity should be accountable to the Parliament and transparent enough to society; third, adequate organisation and process should provide the Parliament with the capability to investigate and assess the intelligence service’s activity and effectiveness; fourth, how the national intelligence service can propose draft laws that would facilitate the functioning of the intelligence system. Lastly, the new law should give an answer how Bulgarian intelligence will operate and cooperate internationally during the long-term fight against terrorism.
1
The President of Bulgaria is elected in a direct vote and he is not answerable to the legislative body.
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Effective Oversight and Effective Capabilities
The horrendous scenes of crumbling WTC towers and smoking Pentagon on 11 September 2001 left a deep mark on the conscience of the Bulgarians. The threat perception of a new, invisible and ominous enemy added to a sensitive perceptual system already distressed by the long wars and conflicts in the Balkans and the Black Sea region and by a hard social and economic transition in the preceding decade. An inherent understanding of rising dangers helped Bulgarian society grasp that a shadowy enemy was trying to attack, destroy or paralyse the civilised state system of the world while blocking the progressive tendencies towards globalisation. No Bulgarian died in the tragic events of that day, but one year later already three were killed in three separate terrorist ambushes around the world: one on the French tanker “Limburg” in the Eastern Mediterranean by the extremist Muslim organisation Aden-Abyan Army, linked to Al Qaeda; a second in a blast in downtown Tel Aviv by an extremist Palestinian group, also linked to the terrorist network, and the third one – in the October 2002 Moscow theatre hostage taking. The few in Bulgaria who, on 11 September, doubted Bulgaria’s participation in the global anti-terrorist coalition now admit this has been a responsible act by the government. In February 2003 Bulgaria joined the coalition of states to disarm Iraq – a logical continuation of the counter-terrorist fight against terrorism on a global scale. The sound counter-terrorist feeling in Bulgarian society was further moulded by the keen understanding that possession of a nuclear plant makes the country even more vulnerable to terrorist intimidation. Having a big ethnic minority, differing from the majority by its religious confession too – the Bulgarian Turks and Moslems – further focused social attention on the issue of reacting to the threat and preserving the Bulgarian ‘ethnic and religious model’ of the past decade. Pockets of ethno-religious based links with Al Qaeda in Bosnia and Herzegovina additionally alerted Bulgarians to the problem. The high level of organised criminality in South East Europe, including domestic gangs with their international links, the crossroads of drug-trafficking in the region and the knowledge of this illegal trade pressure facilitated Bulgaria’s choice to preserve the state and security. The domestic political, legal and institutional reactions to the terrorist threat were various. An adaptation of the National Security Concept is in a drafting phase. At the end of 2001 the Parliament adopted the Law for the Protection of Personal Data. It provides the opportunity to regulate access to and processing of personal data by special laws for defense, national security and public order as well as to facilitate the effective functioning of executive and judicial institutions in criminal law implementation processes.
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In the autumn of 2002 the Bulgarian Parliament adopted the Law of the Measures Against Financing Terrorism. This legislative step was in response to UN Security Council recommendations to improve the national legal measures against terrorists by providing conditions for freezing bank accounts of suspicious individuals and juridical persons, included in the special list published by the State Gazette. The law also provided the terms to update this list. The domestic reactions to the terrorist threat included as well a stronger cooperation and coordination among the institutional elements of the security sector in the state’s fight against terrorism. The laws that were mentioned extend certain powers to such institutions. The border police and customs service also extended their powers in the direction of law enforcement. A very significant aspect of the adequate reaction to the terrorist threat was the joining of forces with foreign and international partners and allies. UN Security Council resolution 1373 made the fight against terrorism a mandatory obligation for UN member states. UN Security Council resolution 1441 added another element to the effective fight on terrorism. The participation in ISAF in Afghanistan and the support for Anti-Saddam coalition by Bulgaria are major aspects of the country’s counter-terrorist stance. Furthermore, national law enforcement and intelligence institutions significantly increased cooperation with counterparts from other countries. A special accent was put on cooperation with the respective partners from the neighbouring countries and the countries from the broader region, but also with US, UK, German, French and Russian counterparts. The challenges facing Bulgaria as any other democratic country of the counter-terrorist coalition may be shortly formulated in this way: how to protect civil liberties, rights and individual privacy while fighting successfully the terrorist threat. The democratic ‘antidote’ to this challenge was found partly or fully, or is yet in search in Bulgaria in the following directions of improving accountability and transparency: First, an intensive public debate in Bulgarian society. Fighting a shadowy foe such as terrorism requires nothing else but an open and transparent approach. However, winning public support for the long-term fight against terrorism remains a fundamental task of all state institutions. Second, to meet the challenges by legislative instruments predominantly. The adoption of any law in that area, especially those concerning security sector reform, should be accompanied by intensive public discussions. Any temporary limitation by law of liberties and rights must be preceded by this kind of debate too.
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Third, more is expected from two tracks to improve accountability of counter-terrorism fight to the public: how is the ‘internal accountability’ in security sector institutions functioning, and what forms of scrutiny and accountability is provided for international and extra-territorial activities of Bulgarian counter-terrorist missions. Fourth, Parliament is supposed to embark on a comprehensive programme to tackle the issue of oversight of the fight against terrorism so as to preserve it within the confines of democratic society and philosophy. There are legitimate calls for parliamentary commissions, dealing with security, defense, foreign policy and domestic public order to improve their organisation and structure. Parliament is the backbone of the democratic control of the security sector and it is expected to start living according to this demanding standard.
5
Conclusion
Bulgaria finishes its preparations for full NATO membership, but the hard work must continue in the post-accession period too. Society and institutions in Bulgaria are in the phase of implementing security sector reform and a lot of work to improve governance of this sector lies ahead. In addition, the fight against terrorism has called for new standards of efficiency of national security activity while preserving political civil liberties and rights. Bulgaria has gained some experience of its own, but further international cooperation in this area remains crucial for the future of the country’s security and regional stability.
The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: The Case of Croatia Mladen Staniþiü
1
Introduction
When considering civil-military relations in Croatia we approach the issue from a democratic development or democracy building point of view. This kind of relations may not necessarily be built in democratic surroundings, as it was the case during the period of Communism in Croatia. Civilian Communist oversight of armed forces was not democratic at all, which is a lesson that should not be forgotten in liberal democracies. Consequently, when talking about civil-military relations, we are not talking about the mutual balance in this matching. Civilians should be given the right of oversight of the military by sticking to the principles of liberal democracy, but the military should not be in an equal position towards civilians; they should not be given the possibility to control civilians. In general, that is what the reform of security sector is about: the area of security should be a part of democratic development in every given country. It should not be given an exclusive position. The people working in the security sector – whether civilians or the military – should act as ordinary civil servants. They should not be allowed to interfere in the politics and they should not be allowed to be members of any political party. On the other hand, they should be qualified to protect values of liberal democracy, which should be their optimal contribution in exercising soft security. In Croatia, this process is occurring under special circumstances due to the recent armed conflict experience on its territory. Nevertheless, it should not be an excuse for neglecting this process. Some problems will occur along this path and they should be overcome sensitively, paying attention to the unique state of affairs. Some delays might be tolerated, but having always in mind a clear vision of placing the area of security into the whole conglomerate of the community of values compatible with the EU and NATO. According to the Constitution, which legitimises our parliamentary political system, the main agents for implementing legal and institutional democratic oversight of defense and security in Croatia, as a substantial element of civil-military relations, are legislative institutions, which means
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Parliament, and political and executive institutions, which means Office of the President and the Government. Although the role of civil society is not particularly mentioned in the Constitution, it is in the very nature of democracy building that this segment of society should have a relevant role, depending of its ability and capability.
2
Legislative
The Croatian Parliament, being the highest legislative authority of power, enjoys a number of privileges in the field of national defense and security. In accordance with the Constitution, the Croatian Parliament decides on war and peace and adopts the Strategy of National Security and the Strategy of Defense. Other responsibilities which are given to the Parliament are being worked out in detail in acts concerning national security, which are more or less considered within the frame of defense activities. Based on such a classification, the Parliament is authorised to ‘supervise the work of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and other holders of public authority responsible to the Croatian Parliament, in conformity with the Constitution and Law’. This illustrates that the Croatian Parliament has significant authorities in the field of national defense and security. The Committee for Interior Policy and National Security is primarily supposed to deal, within its mandate, with this issue. As this issue also has foreign affairs aspect, the Committee for Foreign Affairs is also to be involved, as well as the Committee for Finance and Budget. The responsibilities of the Croatian Parliament in the field of national defense and security are determined by the two basic documents: the Defense Act and the Security Services Act. According to the Defense Act, the Parliament decides on the main issue of defense and according to the Security Services Act, enjoys the most extensive supervisory authority over security services through the Parliamentary Council. Apart from that, the Committee for Interior Policy and National Security is authorised to hold a hearing of the head and officials of the security services to discuss the legitimacy of financial and material transactions of the security services. This Act regulates civil control over the work of the security services1. While performing its duties, the Council is entitled to have access to reports and other documents of the security services, conduct interviews with the heads and officials of the security services when it is considered 1
V. Cvrtila, The Parliament, paper prepared for ‘Stock-Taking Study of Security Sector Reform in Croatia’, DCAF-IMO, Geneva-Zagreb, 2003.
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necessary in order to establish facts crucial for evaluation of the legitimacy of the services’ performance. The competent parliamentary committee is empowered at any time to demand from the Government and the President of the Republic of Croatia, or certain head of a security service, a report on performance. This Council has not yet been established, although the legal provisions for its establishment have existed for two years already. This is one of the numerous examples of discrepancies between legal provisions and their implementation. This is also a very good example of the fact that, for the time being, the legislative still does not exercise mandated authority to a full extent. The main rationale for such a state of affairs is that members of given committees are currently not very much aware of how to exercise this function. The 4-year mandate is too short for mastering the problem. One of the explanations is Croatia’s very recent and painful legacy of defending its territory against the armed aggression from the neighbouring country. Most citizens still consider the government/state responsible for solving defense and security problems. This particularly refers to the military area because there is still some kind of exclusivity to this sector. That might be explained by the credibility and merit attributed to the Croatian army during the Homeland War by the vast majority of people. In other words, the Croatian army has a special position in Croatian society and state, given the fact that its activities contributed substantially to state independence. That is why the defense community, and consequently MPs, are very reluctant to accept all the implications arising from the need of democratic oversight of the Armed Forces. That is why most Croatian MPs have not gained a chance to enhance their skills on democratic security sector reforms. This inconsistency negatively contributes to the security sector reform as a whole, because it prevents a successful exchange and compatibility between civilians and the military. Therefore, military as well as civilian personnel are required to gain new skills in the political, managerial and international areas. Besides previously mentioned facts, the civil sector and the military need to strengthen their ties of cooperation. Closer and improved working relations between civilians and the military contribute to better integration of the Armed Forces into democratic governmental functions. On the other hand, some of the military are likely to remain opaque in dealing with this issue. There are still a lot of examples of superfluous and very extensive interpretation of confidential and classified information on defense and security issues on the side of MOD, but also of the lack of knowledge and expertise of such sensitive relations and problems, on the side of civilians. Broad interpretation of classified documents is commonplace, which is sometimes due to the ambition of some high-ranking
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military staff member to keep his position at any rate by applying information rent, as a sort of guarantee to maintain position and privileges. The same cannot be said for MPs, but they may be manipulated if they are not prepared or competent enough. In order to prepare them to master this very new and complicated area, the Parliament should use the services of socalled staffers, who are supposed to be specialized in specific problems, such as sensitivity in civil-military relations as a part of the security and defense sector reform. They should be employed as experts in given Parliament’s committees, providing the members with expertise, and their association with MP’s should not be limited to their mandates. They should be non-party experts and their work should be focussed more to the expert and less to the political aspect of the problem.
3
Executive
The Law on Defense (March 2002) enumerates the duties of the Head of State, based upon his constitutional role. This Law recognizes the President of the Republic as the Commander-in-Chief and lists 22 specific tasks of the President of the Republic. This list is very extensive and gives the President many specific duties, for example: submitting proposal for establishing the situation of direct threat and the state of war with the countersignature of the Prime Minister, authorising all relevant documents in the fields of security and defense, as well as structure of command, military units and institutions of the Armed Forces. While executing these tasks, the Supreme Commander, alias the President, issues commands, orders, directives, warrants, decisions, regulations and other acts. The Supreme Commander may confer to the Minister of Defense certain tasks from the range of his competence, with the exception of the deployment of the Armed Forces. As the Law foresees, the Government has also a wide range of competencies. These competencies comprise the proposal of all relevant strategic and planning documents, including the Defense Budget, proposal of the general mobilization to the President of the Republic, as well as the introduction of alert measures and mobilization of Armed Forces and ensures the implementation of state of emergency on the territory of the Republic of Croatia2.
2
D. Grubisa, ‘Security Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe’, Croatian International Relations Review, IMO, Zagreb, No. 28/29, 2002.
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The main problem of the executive is opaque jurisdiction between the Office of the President and the Government, i.e. the Prime Minister. The coalition Government decided to change the system into parliamentary democracy, with more authority and power in the security sector given to the Cabinet, at the same time enforcing the oversight authority of the Parliament. On the other side of the executive branch, the President of the Republic was not willing to give up all of his prerogatives, especially in defense and security sector, and a long and bitter struggle for control ensued. The rivalry between the offices of the Prime Minister and the President, a constant fight for predominance, became evident through some important political decisions. Exercising the power between offices, the first post electoral (after the coalition Government entered the office) conflict emerged as a fight for control over intelligence. The division of labour and competency over military issues is clear; the President of the Republic has final say over the armed forces, and the Government (through the institution of civilian minister) is controlling military institutions – budget, planning etc. So with the two sided and opposite controlling partners there are no possibilities for any misuse of the military as a basis of personal or political power. At the same time, this provokes difficulties because decisions have to be mutual and signed by both of them. If this kind of confusion happens during a national emergency, Croatia’s defense capability would be weakened to an extent which would seriously affect national security. This is additional evidence of a very close affiliation between defense and security in times of war. Nowadays, as Croatia is, although informally, a part of collective security in the sub-region of South Eastern Europe, territorial security is not threatened. Yet, due to the confusion in competencies, the security community, including the intelligence, is not under effective democratic control. The establishment of the Parliamentary Council for control over the work of security services is supposed to foster this oversight, but how it will work and within what mandate, remains to be seen3.
4
Civil Society
Croatia has never had a strong tradition of NGOs and civil society. Citizen’s civil engagement for solving both individual and community problems has not been a common practice among the vast majority of citizens 3
O. Zunec, Sapere Aude: Democratic Oversight and Control over Intelligence and Security Agencies in Croatia, paper prepared for ‘Stock-Taking Study of Security Sector Reform in Croatia’, DCAF-IMO, Geneve-Zagreb, 2003.
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in Croatia. However, prevailing NGO structures were able to pay attention to activities of the intelligence and security structures. Most NGOs have been established after the political shift in the year 1990. It is assumed that Croatia currently maintains about 20,000 NGOs, of which 18,000 operate at a local level. Nonetheless, no statistics have been conducted on the number of active NGOs, but this number is estimated to be significantly lower. According to surveys, the work of NGOs only has a minimal effect in the public policy agenda4. It especially refers to the military area although government representatives have, slowly but surely, begun to emphasise the significance of civil society in their public appearances. In the government’s Strategy for Croatia’s Development, the importance of civil society, the principle of subsidiarity and partnerships with NGOs have been recognised as important hallmarks of modernisation and civil society development in Croatia. In the National Security Strategy, a document prepared by independent experts, the relevance of the involvement of NGOs in civil-military relations has been underlined, but this version of Strategy was not discussed and accepted in Parliament. Instead, the Parliament has accepted a text prepared instantly, by a very small group of people without involvement of any agencies except the Ministry of Defense, without input of independent institutions and analysts and without the knowledge of the media or the general public5. In this document, the role of NGOs is significantly reduced to the proclamation on the need of “synergic functioning of the military and civil component within the national defense doctrine”. Even the term “civil society” evades mention. Only the role of the media has been mentioned in the context of democratic oversight of security and military sector, but very generally. As far as other NGO segments are concerned, there are approximately 30 public institutes in Croatia and none is really specialized for security and military subjects, especially civil-military relations. Because civil and democratic criteria are gaining relevance in the accession process to NATO, which is Croatia’s strategic goal, some scientific institutes dealing with social studies got going to analyse these questions as well. The good example is the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb, which develops and recruits analysts, from aspirants to experts, who are dealing with security and military issues, but mainly within research on various segments of international relations and the role of Croatia in this matter. 4
5
Main information on the NGOs’ activities in Croatia are put forward by CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation), CERANEO (The Center for Development of Non-Profit Organizations), Zagreb and SPAI (Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative). Portfolio of Country Transparency Profiles, draft paper issued by the Center for European Security Studies, Groningen, September 2002.
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IMO develops substantial cooperation in this field with most prominent European institutions, such as the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) from Groningen, George C. Marshall Centre from Garmisch Partenkirchen, the International Institute for Security Studies from London (IISS), etc. This cooperation focuses on carrying out joint projects, organizing conferences, seminars and workshops especially in the field of civilmilitary relations. The Centre for Strategic Studies from time to time organizes conferences on some strategic issues, mainly from the point of view of the position of Croatia and Croatian diaspora in international relations as an informal unit of the Institute for Applied Social Research of the University of Zagreb. Such events are mostly financed with contributions from the Croatian diaspora or Catholic Church. There are some experts dealing with security issues and civil military relations at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Zagreb also. Within the Faculty, some centres were organized that might be considered as component of civil society. These are the Defendological Association, the Croatian Association for International Studies and the Croatian Atlantic Council. Although all these experts and professors belong to the Faculty, they can be regarded as independent experts. In the broader sense, one can also say that the security aspect is analysed within some other Faculties dealing with social sciences. All of that could be considered as part of NGOs, dealing with security and military issues and on criteria and standards of NATO membership. The influence of independent institutions and analysts is, at the moment, being felt more in the informal preparatory phase of the decision-making process, than formally. Although there are some positive signs, one can say that public policy institutes, academicians and independent experts are informally accepted as provisional advisors in security and military issues, but there is no feasible system of permanent consultations. There are no hearings by Parliament or relevant committees, no request for special independent reports. The Government, mostly the Ministry of Science and Technology, gives partial financial support to public institutes on a contract basis. Three-year tenders, which define conditions for applications for all concerned institutes, but for independent experts as well. On the other hand, institutes are allowed to apply for projects and activities, which are offered by business, companies, and foundations within the country and abroad. Other government bodies can also apply. There are no restrictions in applying to foreign foundations or any other international or multilateral organizations. There are no restrictions in cooperating with them by working out joint projects
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or any kind of joint activities. This kind of support, especially financial, is very important and according to some public institutes, it might equate to the half of their total budget. The total activity of some of these institutions might almost entirely depend on this kind of funding. With this kind of support these institutions are enabled to co-organise domestic events or events abroad, e.g. conferences, seminars, they can issue publications, even in foreign languages. Regarding the funding of NGOs, several problems persist. Most Croatian civil society organizations depend on foreign financial support and lack any state donations. Therefore, only bigger organizations tend to receive foreign funding, whereas smaller ones are neglected. In the long run, civil society organizations will have to find financial institutions inside the country in order to remain active over time. Possible financial sources include “donations, subventions and income generated from their own services”. As far as the role of the media is concerned, the Croatian government generally respects the protection of press and media by the Constitution. Further protected are free speech, public expression and the establishment of institutions of public communication. At the beginning of 2003, the new Law on State TV was adopted by the Parliament. From then on, public television is controlled by a Council, which consists of representatives of NGOs, but also of some MPs and is validated by Parliament. As a result, transparency on political control over state television was enhanced and more publicity on the identities of major media shareholders was gained. Though the Croatian media is free, diverse media segments lack adequate experts. This is especially the case in the field of security and defense sectors reform and moreover in the matter of civil-military relations. Generally, each media segment is assigned only one reporter. Further, the media neglects serious and quality research, as well as reports and remains at the tabloid level. An imbalance exists with regard to the dissemination into English and local languages. Information is predominantly disseminated into English rather than local languages. The distribution of information is further limited, especially regarding the electronic press. All this refers a lot to media coverage of civil-military relations as well. Although previous tensions between the media and military seem to decrease slowly, mainly through increased levels of cooperation, the problem of professional treatment, concerning sensitive issues of civil-military relations remains. Improvements have been achieved through press conferences, the attendance of media representatives at seminars, public debates and open discussions organized by the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense has acknowledged the media as a means to emphasize problematic issues related to the security community and has agreed to cooperate
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more intensively to strive for overall satisfaction. The MOD still controls and interprets too huge amounts of classified and confidential information without any counter-interpretation from the civil sector, such as the media. On the other hand, the media lacks knowledge and the number of experts to consider appropriately such sensitive topics. Greater educational effort should be done. This is a fine-tuning problem; journalists who are very competent in analysing military issues are not competent enough to analyse very sensitive civil-military relations especially in terms of democratic oversight of armed forces. Further, the MOD possesses all crucial information but seldom organizes press conferences or individual meetings with journalists to increase the quality and quantity of the information being released. However, the press itself does not always attend meetings offered by the MOD, which puts the blame to the lack of communication and cooperation on both sides. The few press releases tend not to include any information on civilmilitary relations or democratic oversight of armed forces6.
5
Transparency and Accountability
A constitutional and statutory framework for policy accountability is in place in Croatia. The Constitution says that the legislative branch accepts responsibility for national security and defense strategy. The Defense Law says that elected representatives must give approval to the Armed Forces Development Plan. That would mean that there is a procedure in which the lawmakers establish guidelines for the development and execution of key strategic documents, and subsequently discuss and comment on the worked out text. The elaboration of the material itself, as well as the policy implementation, would be the task of all relevant offices of the executive branch. As far as financial accountability is concerned, the defense and security sector is still addressed as a common concept, because the security or intelligence budgets are still a part of the military budget. Legislators must approve the budget and every deputy has the right to propose amendments to it. The military budget receives particular attention from the specialist security sector oversight committee (The Committee for Interior Policy and National Security), which is also authorised to control intelligence. However, due to reasons explained above, the intelligence sector is, 6
There are some improvements recently – there are more frequent press conferences than before and the MOD web site is regularly updated.
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according to some expert’s and civil society’s estimations, out of democratic control. The main instrument of accountability is the State Audit Office, which must report to the legislature at least once a year. It is concerned with the legality and appropriateness of defense spending. According to some analysts, financial accountability is fragile as well, although there are regulations which provide instruments for more substantive democratic oversight7. It is a general perception that the Government, but also elected MPs, fulfil their oversight function mostly in a proforma manner. Many MPs appear either unable or unwilling to subject spending bids to in-depth scrutiny. Overall, the legislative tends to give the impression of using its powers actively and decisively, but the reality is different. Another evidence of their hesitation is in the fact that the legislative does not want to be too much involved in a sector, which they perceive still has an exclusive position in society. Subsequently, this additionally indicates the inability or unwillingness of legislatives to recognize the importance and much broader scope of the new security concept in terms of reform and effective promotion of democratic oversight in this area.
6
The Impact of Good Governance
Croatia is currently a weak state with a weak coalition in power. That badly affects the security and defense sectors reform effort on a general scale, and particularly in implementing a new concept of civil-military relations. For the first time in history Croatia must rely on its own sovereign democratic institutions rather than on some alien constitutional entities, such as was the former Yugoslavia or various age-old kingdoms which controlled its territory. No more can strong leaders, whether local or foreign, arbitrate in the case where decision-making process comes to a halt. By their very nature, democratic institutions, acting in a coalition and context of like-mindedness, are weak and are not likely to be effective enough. Confusion in competency can happen, as in the case of the intelligence oversight and the whole process of democratic oversight and are likely to be based on “trial and error”, frustrating practice. An appreciation that “knowledge is power” clearly prevails over recognition of the people’s “right to know” about security and military “business”. On the other hand, there is no proper legislation covering the protection of state and official data and the limits of secrecy in terms of the 7
The ESCADA Report, CESS, Groningen, 2003.
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national interest. Under the previous government, which encouraged such an approach, given the fact that the army was highly politicised and exclusively under control of the ruling party, this was considered as a kind of natural way of thinking. However, when the coalition gained power there were no big changes in the mindset of politicians. There are some opinions that in the governing coalition each partner calls for more transparency only in those areas where its counterparts are in charge. At the same time, all information considered as potentially useful in political competition are kept secret or confidential. This kind of situation might be attributed to the fact that the governing coalition is facing many problems and a lot of sometimes unfair opposition coming from the MPs who belonged to the previous government and from civil servants and bureaucrats who remained in office even after their party lost power. They are still in position to sabotage any steps taken towards the accomplishment of the new concept of civil-military relations. In other circumstances, perhaps other countries not encumbered with such legacy, or non-governmental interest groups – NGOs or some other institutions of civil society – can provide some mediation support. The assistance of better-educated journalists can also be beneficial. As it was illustrated beforehand, such a possibility is rather meek given the present inappropriate role of civil society in Croatia. A remarkable problem is the economic situation. Although Croatia is much better off compared to other countries in the region, there are many problems which affect badly the reform path in this particular sector. The most difficult problem is unemployment, which is the highest of almost all transition countries. In this context, managing armed forces downsizing in challenging. Therefore, reform in defense and security sector is very often reduced to downsizing, although downsizing in Croatian army and in the security sector community is not, at least officially, the main component of the reform. However, it is the unavoidable first step of reform. In the current congested and overcrowded defense and security sectors, any kind of reform aiming to attain an appropriate level of efficacy, transparency and, particularly, democratic oversight is not likely to be successfully completed. Consequently, such a situation would make any progress impossible along the process of adjustment of the civil-military relations to the NATO democratic standards and criteria. To avoid this trap downsizing should not only mean reducing the force structure, but to restructure it in a transparent way which should be controlled and guided by the civilians and which should fit economic and financial resources.
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7
The Challenge of Downsizing
The general public is not particularly interested in the type of weapons and equipment the military requires, but they do want to be assured that their taxes are being properly spent. This refers also to such actions as the impending force reductions. They can understand the need to adjust and the downward force structure in light of both a reduced threat environment, and the need to decrease defense spending in order to address the demands of a struggling economy. However, there is also apprehension over the way in which these reductions take place. Parents, relatives, and friends of servicemen and women, many of whom fought for national independence, expect the defense and military leaders to have a plan that addresses the transition of military members into the civilian sector8. The credibility of the defense establishment will suffer if ill-considered policies or plans, or poor execution, places those servicemen and women who are released, onto already bulging unemployment roles. In Croatia, there are currently around 360,000 unemployed persons. Out of them 34,500 are demilitarised Croatian soldiers from the recent war. Beyond moral obligations, the MOD and the military hardly need thousands of released service members, scattered across the land, unemployed, and bitterly complaining of a failure of the system to reward their sacrifice. To cope with this immense problem, the Croatian MOD has developed a very detailed and thoughtful Transition Training Program called SPECTRA, that seeks to retrain excess service members in order to prepare them as adequately as possible to find employment, even considering the challenges in the current job market. The program is an interagency process that combines labour, education, veterans, regional governments, and other agencies in an effort to do their best to ensure for the postmilitary future of the personnel. Although the MOD is the main actor in the implementation of the programme, many civilian ministries are involved, which illustrates the amalgamation of civil-military relations in such a sensitive situation. The programme will be very substantially supported, for example, by the Ministries for Labour and Social Care, for Science and Technology, for economy, education and sport, small and medium enterprises and of course of finance. NATO’s Economic Council, as a very important step in the process of accession, authorizes the Programme. The time span of the 8
J. Petri, ‘Harmonizing Security Sector Reform & Defense Agreements Security Sector Reform in Croatia’, Croatian International Relations Review, IMO, Zagreb, No. 25/26, 2001.
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programme will be three years (2002–2004) and its total costs will be more than 221 million Euros. The launching costs alone will exceed 2 million Euros. The main goal of the programme is to cut by half military and civil personnel working currently in defense and security sector. If downsizing proceeds along NATO standards and criteria in due time, then the share of defense and security costs in the total Croatian budget will decline from 2.3% (2002) down to 2.2% in the period up to the year 2010.
8
International Assistance and Conditionality
In the context of the civil-military relations, this segment could be addressed from the political and technical aspects, the first being relevant because of conditionality, and the second important for operational reasons. Defense and security sector reform should be discussed more broadly keeping in mind the international assistance and conditionality of all the kinds of reforms that Croatia is now undertaking, with the aim to become a full-fledged member of the community of values, represented by EuroAtlantic structures. Croatia’s main interest by applying to NATO and EU is to get international assistance for adjustment to standards and criteria of liberal democracies, to become a part of a collective security scheme and to become producer and not only consumer of regional and global security. The Croatian public generally considers NATO as a military organization or alliance, not being very familiar with its civilian or democratic aspect, which requires that each candidate country must meet not only military criteria, but also more and more democratic ones, which are common to the criteria of the EU. The consistencies of these criteria are based on the standards of liberal democracy, which are prerequisites for successful development and transformation from the old systems – first the communist, and then the authoritarian to the democratic one. International assistance including the conditionality and even gentle pressure would facilitate the accomplishment of reforms in various sectors including the security sector as well. Although the adjustment to common standards and values embodied by NATO and the EU is the prerequisite for benefiting international assistance, they should not be considered as commanding conditions, but as a process that is of essential interest to Croatia. Accordingly, the virtual “self-imposed quasi-membership” in Euro-Atlantic structures, which will be reached by meeting these “conditions”, is far more important than formal full-fledged membership. All technical and operational assistance schemes, which will be provided for implementation of security sector reform, should be based on these assumptions.
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Regarding Croatia’s membership in international organizations such as NATO, both the military and the civilian sector are required to improve their knowledge of “international organizations, service in multinational headquarters, interoperability, interagency structures, and multinational civilian-military bureaucratic procedures”. As a consequence, military as well as civilian professionals need to replace current skills with abilities that meet today’s standards and allow them to fulfil their tasks professionally and successfully. Therefore, the educational system of the security and defense environment needs to provide well-educated and trained people with the ability to adapt appropriately to changes and challenges of today’s security environment. Education, training and autonomous will to learn are the main indicators that should help to evaluate the quality of the individuals and create basis to further upgrade their skills. To enhance education and training among high-ranking officers, an inter-disciplinary/multidisciplinary national security study program should be established. Courses and seminars should be open to everyone – including civil servants, journalists, politicians, military commentators, etc. Special attention needs to be paid to the education of military personnel regarding their duties, and to international headquarters, including NATO and SHAPE. The future demand of such personnel will certainly rise requiring a solid investment in this specific sector of education. The system further faces the obligation to educate high-ranking officers at a different level than lower-ranked personnel. High-ranking officers have to be provided with advanced lectures in operational and managerial skills. Overall, the current Croatian military profession is inadequate compared to western standards and begs for major reforms in the years to come. Specific reforms should be directed towards the following areas: intensive education and training, increase the level of expertise in procurement/acquisition of new equipment and weapons, with an aim to better understand relations between the civil society and the armed forces, and the requirements imposed by the civil institutions to their members, including soldiers. The military itself should focus on hard security aspects. In addition to this basic defense mission, the military should also focus on new aspects of security: peacekeeping operations, regional arms control activities, demining, cooperation with neighbours and participation in PfP and MAP exercises9.
9
Z. Mahecic, Croatian Defense Reform: Capability Building – Good Governance in Security and Defense Reform, paper presented at the DCAF-IISS workshop on security sector reform in Croatia and Yugoslavia, London, October 2002.
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Conclusion
An appropriate understanding of the distinction between the concept of defense and the new concept of security has a crucial relevance in implementing civil-military relations along the lines of the war against terrorism. The notion of defense has the meaning of defending something (i.e. territory). In the case of Croatia, given the Serbian aggression, the notion of territorial defense is what the military stands for. This understanding was purposely accentuated during the ten years of HDZ isolationistnationalistic rule, extending the paranoid perception of threat to Croatian sovereignty, which should be encountered at any rate. This perception required a special type of officers who were supposed to respect the ethnic or “blood and soil” type of Croatian development, even in peacetime. This completely neglects the new concept of security, which gives quite a new role and functions to the military and to civil-military relations. These include a desire to train for and participate in peacekeeping operations, in regional arms control verification activities, in de-mining, in cooperating with neighbours and participating in PfP and MAP exercises, and especially in the war against terrorism. The precondition for success in these new roles is a full acceptance of civil leadership which transforms the security and defense community from an exclusive club to a normal component of democratic and civil society. That is what the new concept of civilmilitary relations really is about. All the security issues, like terrorism, illegal traffic of drugs and people, WMDs, organised crime etc., are a very important part of democratic institution-building, or democratic capacitybuilding including an appropriate notion of civil-military relations. This ties together and fosters democracy and security very closely. Accordingly, when we talk about the new concept of civil-military relations, we are very much talking about democracy-building in a given country, therefore in Croatia as well. Indeed, the Croatian military strategy provides some elements for the fight against terrorism, by pointing out “support in the anti-terrorist fight and asymmetric threats as a part of the global activities of suppressing the terrorist activities”. Along these lines, the Croatian government opened its air space for American jet aeroplanes in the Iraqi campaign, providing also some services on the ground. The international relations strategy of Croatia, prepared by independent experts and academicians, has recommended “true and unambiguous support to the USA in the global antiterrorist coalition, along with the active involvement in it (i.e., unconditional opening of its airspace, exchange of information, intelligence co-operation, etc.)”. The Strategy was prepared before the Iraqi crisis, and was accepted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but not yet by the Croatian government. In the
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meantime, the Military Strategy, which was prepared by the military with no involvement of civilian experts, was accepted, providing more or less general proclamations while neglecting concrete details and activities. These proclamations proffer “support in the case of natural, technological and humanitarian emergencies and catastrophes, in de-mining and cleaning of the unexploded military warheads of all kinds, in the case of the nuclear, chemical and biological accidents, search and rescue operations, participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities”. None of the officially-approved strategic documents provide the basis for establishing bilateral or multilateral military units of any kind with neighbouring countries. There were discussions on organising regional cooperation, within the civilian or intelligence framework, for the fight against terrorism, but until now no concrete outcome has taken place. Obviously, the fight against terrorism is still more attached to the military and defense concept of the civil-military relations than to the security concept. Having in mind all these, there are four main features, which label the present stage of civil-military relations in Croatia: x Lack of awareness and understanding of the distinction between the concepts of defense and security, x Discrepancy of legal provisions and their implementations, x Lack of the competence on both sides in exercising the new concept of civil-military relations, x A confused economic situation, which slows down the pace of appropriate implementation of the concept.
The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: The Case of Greece Thanos P. Dokos
1
The Evolution of Greece’s National Security Concept
Given its strategic location in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, Greece throughout the 20th century had been subject to the competing bids for great power penetration1. Its near total exposure by sea, placed the country under the direct influence of whatever Great Power exercised naval control in the Mediterranean (Great Britain before 1947 and the United States after that time). In the area of Greek-Great Power relations, political scientists classified Greece among those states with penetrated (dependent) political systems2. The year 1974 is the gate connecting two different eras in the history of 20th century Greece. In the period 1903–74 the small and strategically located country experienced considerable turbulence in its external and internal relations. Economically, it was classified in the category of poor, agrarian, raw material producing, trade-dependent and externally indebted, in short, underdeveloped. Politically, it was polarized, functioning with personalistic and clientelistic political parties whose main purpose was to distribute the largesse controlled by a hypertrophic state-sector. Deep schisms – pitting Royalists against Republicans and Communists against Nationalists – marked the years from 1915 to 1974, resulting in frequent military interventions in politics. Accordingly, dictatorial rule was imposed in 1925/26, 1936–41 and 1967–74. A bloody, destructive and socially traumatic civil war, in 1946–49, deeply scarred the body politic of the country. Given the instability and fragility of its democratic institutions – constantly challenged by competing models of monarchical authoritarianism and communist totalitarianism – Greece was classified by political scientists in the “praetorian zone” during this long period together with 1
2
See, for example, T. A. Couloumbis, J. A. Petropoulos, H. J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective, New York, Pella Publishing Company, 1976. See, for example, Adamandia Pollis, ‘United States Foreign Policy Toward Authoritarian Regimes in the Mediterranean’, Millenium, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 28–51.
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states such as Spain, Portugal and Turkey as well as countries in Central and South America.3 Upon his return from exile in 1974, Constantinos Karamanlis presided over a remarkably smooth transition process that led to the establishment and consolidation of durable and, with the passage of time, adequately tested democratic institutions. ȉhe handling of “dejuntification” in 1974/75, confined primarily to coup leaders and those responsible for the ordering and the practice of torture, prevented the upsurge of a new schism between the “ins” and the “outs”, thus putting an end to the long cycles of mutual revenge in the Greek political arena, while reducing the opportunities (as well as removing the causes) of patron-client relationships between warring political parties (or coalitions) within Greece and competing for influence through local clients Great Powers.4 In order for Greece to qualify for entry into the Community, she (like France, Germany and others) had to abandon concepts and policies such as ultra-nationalism, irredentism or other forms of territorial revisionism and to accept instead the challenges of functional integration and economic inter-dependence which were at the heart of the grand European experiment. Despite the spirited debate that had preceded Greece’s entry into the EC in the years 1976–79 (PASOK, the Greek Socialist Party, had been at that time heavily opposed to Greek membership), in the fourteen years that have elapsed since formal accession in January of 1981, the EU (European Union) has become nearly universally accepted by the full range of political parties as the centerpiece of Greece’s external relationships. It is well beyond the scope of this article to assess the deep impact of EC membership on nearly every aspect of Greek economic, political and social expression. In the long term, it is safe to assume that the comprehensive impact will probably prove to be of monumental proportions in nearly every walk of Greek life, including civil-military relations.5 Membership in NATO also had a certain “modernizing” impact on the officer corps, especially after 1974. 3 4
5
The literature on “praetorian states” was sparked by the book of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968. On the subject of consolidation of democratic institutions in Greece since 1974, see P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974–1983’, in Guillermo O’ Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Southern Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 138–164; see also Theodore A. Couloumbis and Prodromos M. Yannas, ‘The Stability Quotient of Greece’s Post-1974 Democratic Institutions’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 1983, pp. 359–372. See for example, Panos Kazakos and Panayotis Ioakimidis (eds.), Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, London, Pinter, 1994.
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Simultaneously, the EU has functioned also as a restraining instrument. Membership in an elaborate structure that is highly institutionalized required the abandonment of some of the trappings of undiluted sovereignty and national independence. Both with respect to Turkey (as we suggested above) and also in its relations with its northern neighbors (especially FYROM), Greece has found itself, like Odysseus, tied to a European Union mast permitting it to resist the attraction of atavistic nationalism and irredentism.6
2
Greek Security Policy During the Cold War
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the difference between conservatives and liberals (the communists had been outlawed as a result of the Greek Civil War) on security issues and NATO was one of emphasis. Both groupings basically believed that Greece’s main security threat emanated from its northern borders and that Communism (external and domestic) threatened mutually cherished values. NATO was viewed, therefore, as indispensable for the defense of the country and the United States was treated as Greece’s natural ally and guarantor. Greek governments, given the dependence on the US for their survival, yielded on most issues in the field of national defense. Since the years of the Civil War (1946–49) Greek security arrangements were closely identified with American defense policy. The Greek armed forces were exclusively equipped with American arms and the hundreds of officers who received graduate military training in the US welcomed the continuity of their host country’s influence on the Greek armed forces. The orientation of Greece’s defense until the mid-1960s was based on the U.S. credo that the main security concern was one of internal rather than external nature. The Greek Army (in contrast with the Turkish one) was primarily supplied and organized to face a domestic communist threat. According to NATO planning, Greece was only expected “through certain limited accessories to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces in case of global war”.7 With the relaxation of international tension in the late 1960s, perceptions of a domestic communist threat, supported by Greece’s Communist neighbors (except Yugoslavia) diminished considerably, while a confrontation between the two Balkan NATO allies became more likely 6
7
In this section, the author benefited greatly from the insight of Prof. Theodore Couloumbis, Director-General of ELIAMEP. Thanos Veremis, Greek Security Considerations: A Historical Perspective, Athens, Papazissis Publishers, 1980, p. 79.
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(especially after the 1964 and 1967 Cyprus crises). Greek security planning could no longer rely on the dogma of internal danger and NATO defense prescriptions. The restoration of democratic rule in 1974 was, indeed, a major turning point in Greek security policy. Greece now began to place more emphasis on internal balancing (through the strengthening of its Armed Forces) and less on membership in NATO and the bilateral relationship with the United States (mainly as a result of Turkey’s membership to the former and “privileged” relationship with the latter). This new period of Greek political history, lasting from 1974 to the present, has been characterized by the diversification of Greece’s external relationships, including a relative weakening of its ties with the U.S. in favor of closer economic and political integration into Western Europe and improved relations with Eastern Europe. In the last decade or so, Greece placed increased importance on its “European card” (membership to the European Community/Union and the WEU).8 The end of the Cold War, the peaceful (in most instances) East European revolutions and the collapse of the USSR have led, rather paradoxically, to a darkening of Greece’s security horizons. The end of the EastWest confrontation and Yugoslavia’s disintegration and civil war have released a variety of explosive ethnic, political, social and economic tensions with serious destabilizing implications for Greece’s northern neighborhood. The escalation and widening of such conflicts could seriously affect Greece, through refugee flows, regional instability and, under certain rather extreme circumstances, engage the country in open warfare. New and more nationalistic approaches to foreign policy among governments in the Balkans have also resulted in considerable unpredictability and fluidity in political developments. Today global structures are in a state of flux. Analysts and policy makers in small countries are attempting to identify and to predict trends as
8
Greece’s security policy has been a search of a synthesis of “internal” and “external balancing”. These are the two policies that states (especially small ones) can follow in order to effectively deter (balancing against) external threats to their sovereignty and independence: internal balancing and external balancing. The former policy regards the strengthening of a state’s internal front (mobilization of a state’s internal resources, mainly the strengthening of its Armed Forces) and the latter a state’s strengthening of its external front (the expectation of allied reinforcement by its participation in international politico-military alliances and coalitions) [See the classic work of Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics, Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley, 1979, p. 168].
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well as to recommend policies of adjustment to emerging global patterns.9 In the post-Cold War era, Greece is faced with what she considers as a major security threat and a number of risks: the threat is perceived to emanate from her eastern neighbour (Turkey) and the risks are seen as resulting from Balkan and Mediterranean instability, including some of the so-called transnational threats. Indeed, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Greek officials have being re-assessing to a certain extent their security priorities and upgrading the significance of the so-called “new asymmetric threats”. Issues of high concern include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, theater and “national” missile defense, terrorism (both conventional and new forms: NBC and cyber-terrorism) and the resulting need for increased bilateral and multilateral intelligence and police cooperation, transnational organized crime, with special emphasis on drug trafficking religious extremism, pollution of the environment and illegal migration.10
3
The National Defense Establishment
The current system is designed to guarantee the civilian control of the armed forces, an issue of great importance after the 1967 coup d’état and the seven-year military dictatorship that followed. According to the Greek Constitution (which was partially revised in 1985), the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but his powers have a largely symbolic character. Decisions are taken by the Prime Minister and the government. The Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYSEA), which convenes on an ad hoc basis, appoints the Chief of HNDGS and the Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of HNDGS is the Supreme Military Commander of the Armed Forces in times of crisis or war. In 9
10
According to a recent RAND Corporation study, Greek strategic space is wide encompassing Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, as well as transatlantic relations. At the broadest level, Greece will also be affected by the complex of trends described as “globalization”. The contemporary strategic environment is characterized by a series of functional issues that cut across traditional geographic lines, leading to a greater degree of regional interdependence (although this is true more for the Mediterranean than for the Balkans). It is also argued that the strategic environment around Greece is being shaped by the development of new lines of communication for energy, and other non-energy infrastructure projects. (Ian Lesser, ‘Greece’s New Strategic Environment’, in Lesser et al. Greece’s New Geopolitics, RAND-Kokkalis Foundation, Santa Monica 2001, p. 2). Thanos Dokos, ‘Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting’ in T. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis & F. Bellou (eds.), Greece in the 20th Century. Lessons and Challenges, Frank Cass Publishers, London 2003.
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peacetime, the Chiefs of Staff of the three branches report directly to the Minister of Defense. The post of the Chief of Hellenic National Defense General Staff alternates (on an almost regular basis) between officers of the three branches every two years. The Chiefs of Staff of the three branches serve for a two-year term, although this can be extended if deemed necessary.
HELLENIC NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
PRIME MINISTER GOVERNMENT COUNCIL ON FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE (KYSEA) MINISTER OF DEFENSE CHIEF, HELLENIC NATIONAL DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF
CHIEF, HELLENIC ARMY GENERAL STAFF
CHIEF, HELLENIC NAVY GENERAL STAFF
CHIEF, HELLENIC AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF
Fig. 1. Chain of Command
The role and influence of the officer corps had traditionally been quite significant. One could hardly disagree with the conclusions of Peter Kassander that “officers have enjoyed a unique status in Greek society”, to a certain extent forming a separate caste. After the restoration of democracy and the trial and incarceration of the leaders of the 1967 coup d’état, officers have consistently refrained from intervening in political life. It is also accurate to state that the officer corps, especially before 1967, had viewed itself as “embodying the national ideals of Greece and equated the goals of the armed forces with those of the nation”. Furthermore, “the selfperception of the military as an indispensable instrument of progress and modernization stemmed in part from the variety of social programs and
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economic development projects in which the armed forces had been employed since 1945”.11 As a consequence of the suffering of many officers and their families during the Civil War, the political attitude of the armed forces has been strongly anti-Communist and pro-conservative. Time and the process of national reconciliation have altered to a large extent the strong proconservative attitude of the military. Kassander12 argued that “civil control over the military has not advanced at a pace similar to that of the West European democratic states” and that “generally the Greek military tends to reflect a historical development that has more in common with the other Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean states than it does with its West European allies”. It appears that the above conclusions are no longer applicable, especially in reference to the post-1974 period. After the restoration of democratic rule in 1974 and the limited purge in the Hellenic Armed Forces, civil control over the military has never been in question. The role of the military has been scrupulously limited to defense matters and all significant decisions concerning national security issues are made by the government. Today, it would be inaccurate to compare the Hellenic Armed Forces with those of any of their neighbors. By virtue of their organization (based mainly on U.S. standards), strict non-interference in politics and civil control and professionalism they have very much in common with the armed forces of its Western European partners and allies.
4
Civil-Military Relations in 20th Century Greece
The current system is designed to guarantee civilian control over the armed forces, an issue of great significance following the 1967 coup d’état and the ensuing seven-year military dictatorship. After the restoration of democratic rule in 1974 and the limited purge in the Hellenic Armed Forces, civil control over the military has never been in question. The role of the 11
12
For an illuminating analysis of the social and geographical background of the Greek officer corps, see Peter Kassander, ‘National Security’, in Greece: A Country Study, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 1989, pp. 292–293. However, according to Thanos Veremis, “The vital task of modernization – a major source of pride for the military in certain developing societies – was not one for which the Greek military was well suited. Greek officers have more often been identified with political turmoil than with orderly change and social innovation, while their declining position in the social order generated a sense of isolation which before 1967 contributed to their hostility towards the ruling political elite, and reinforced their desire for social acceptance”. (Veremis, p. 169). Kassander, p. 293.
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military has been scrupulously limited to defense matters and all significant decisions concerning national security issues are made by the government.13 However, there still is some distrust of the officer corps by some older politicians. According to Thanos Veremis, “during the years of conservative rule (1974–81) the officer corps was treated with caution by the press while an effort was made by the state to re-educate young officers... Furthermore, ever since 1974, governments have made a conscious effort to extract the military from their institutional isolation and incorporate them in civil society. Because entrance examinations for military academies do not differ from university examinations, some deplore the loss of the ‘heroic’ element in the selection and education of officers. But others point out that the bureaucrat-officer can also improve his skills as a technocrat once he transcends the barrack mentality. Be that as it may, the ‘civilianisation’ of officers, made them more prone to involvement in party politics to improve their career opportunities.”14 According to the Greek Constitution, the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but his powers have a largely symbolic character. The Prime Minister and the government take decisions. The Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYSEA),15 which usually convenes on an ad hoc basis, appoints the Chief of Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) and the Chiefs of Staff and makes important decisions on procurement. The Chief of HNDGS is the Supreme Military Commander of the Armed Forces and the post rotates on a 2-1-1 basis between Army, Navy and Air Force. The Chiefs of Staff of the HNDGS and the three branches
13
14
15
The transformation of civil-military relations in Greece during the last decades cannot be explained wholly by political factors. Since the 1960s the social fabric has changed rapidly. The rise of per capita income, the widening of professional options, the incorporation of the military academies into the system of university entrance examinations and finally the prodigious growth of urban centres have changed the social background and the value system of the officer corps between 1974 and today. (Thanos Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics. From Independence to Democracy, Hurst & Company, London, 1997, p. 185). There was a limited tradition of appointing retired officers to ministerial positions, which is no longer the case. Furthermore, from 34 deputies with military background in the Parliament in 1952, the number had fallen to eight in 1993. (Veremis, p. 179 & 181). Composition of the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYSEA): Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, National Economy, Finance, Interior, Environment, Energy, Public Order and the Chief of the General Staff. Other Ministers may participate on an ad hoc basis.
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serve for a two-year term, although this can be extended for another year.16 Law 660 of August 1977, reshaping the command structure in the armed forces, did away with the experiments of the junta. By this law the government (the civilian authority) was alone responsible for national defense. Eighteen years after the 1977 law, which gave the army, navy and air force latitude in special fields of decision-making and allowed them a measure of autonomy in relation to the HNDGS, the latter resumed some of its old authority. The 1995 law, however, gave the Minister of Defense final say on all military matters. Not only is the entire chain of command accountable to him, but he has also acquired his own civilian advisers on questions that cover the whole spectrum from procurement to strategy (the Minister’s Staff/ EPYETHA).17 The government (and more specifically the Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense-KYSEA) has the ultimate responsibility for preparing the threat assessment and national security policy. On the basis of those, the Ministry of National Defense (mainly through the proposals of the military leadership) prepares the annual defense budget and the fiveyear procurement plan (EMPAE) that are then submitted to KYSEA for approval. Implementation of EMPAE is the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense (General Secretariat for Economic Planning and Armaments and General Staffs for the three Services). The final decision for awarding a major contract to a specific company is made by KYSEA on the basis of the recommendations of technical committees that evaluate the offers of various candidates. The priorities of the government are mainly the cost/limitations on the defense budget and the military capabilities of weapon systems.18 The accountability and transparency in the procurement 16
17
18
Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas, ‘The Formation of Greek Procurement Policy: Problems and Prospects’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), mimeo, 1998. Veremis, p. 180. See also: Nikos Alivizatos, The Constitutional Position of the Armed Forces (2 vols), Athens, 1987 & 1992; Gerassimos Karambelias, The Role of the Armed Forces in the Political Life of Turkey and Greece, Athens, 1998; Theodoros Stathis, National Defense, Athens, 1992. It is worth-mentioning, however, that although consensus exists among major political parties and the Greek people that this “sacrifice” is necessary for national defense, military expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greek economy. Thus, a new problematique currently exists with reference to the fact that defense expenditures contribute to the country’s budget/financial deficits as well as for Greece’s low level of social services. In consequence, there are different views and approaches among the various actors involved in the formation of Greece’s security policy with regard to the so-called “guns-butter dilemma”. The latter refers to Greece’s ability to match the need for immediate and considerable defense expenditures with its medium and long-term foreign policy objectives (i.e. economic development by joining the next phase of the European
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process are also taken into consideration (as demonstrated by public tenders, evaluation committees composed of uniformed and – occasionally – civilian experts, oral briefings and written reports to the Parliament, etc.), but do not weigh as heavily as the former criteria. The military plays a significant role in the procurement process, as it is the agency that heavily influences threat assessment and, on the basis of this assessment, defines national defense needs and requirements while also making suggestions for the acquisition of necessary weapon systems. It is not surprising that the military’s priorities are the military capabilities of weapon systems and the fastest possible delivery. Particular criteria, such as the limited size of the defense budget and the accountability and transparency in the procurement process are also taken into consideration, but do not weigh as heavily as the former issues. Although military officers understand the need for greater accountability and transparency, they consider this a responsibility mainly for politicians. Because of strict political control after 1974, military bureaucracies have had an important role in allocating the budget’s share for each branch of the Armed Forces, but little involvement in political decisions. In democratic regimes, parliamentary oversight of the security and defense sector is quite important in the general context of checks and balances. The role of politicians (opposition parties) is rather limited, mainly because of the relative consensus between major Greek political parties (with the exception of the Communist Party) in defining and assessing the national security threats and the basic directions of national defense policy. In addition, the role and authority of the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense is very limited. Although parliamentary committees generally do not possess any real power, the specific Committee lacks any real authority. Its activities are limited to briefings by the Foreign and Defense Ministers and the holding of hearings on various defense and foreign policy issues. However, it lacks any decision-making authority). The effectiveness of the inquiry, hearings and questions procedures is at best limited and, as already mentioned, highly symbolic. The blame for this monetary union). In other words, how can both deterrence and economic development be achieved? In April 2001, the Greek government announced its decision to reduce defense expenditures by approximately $5 billion over the next 3–4 years. As a result, a number of acquisition programs will be delayed. Greece’s decision was based on the need to maintain its economic indicators and performance at the levels required by the country’s participation to the Euro-zone (and was somewhat facilitated by the economic crisis in Turkey which forced the Turkish government – under the pressure of international financial institutions – to reduce its own defense expenditures, albeit at a smaller scale than declared).
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should be put on the general tendency of the executive branch in Greek politics to “allocate” a “ratifying/legitimizing” – and to a large extent – highly symbolic role to the legislative branch, thus limiting its authority and power.19 Consequently, it is an imperative need to upgrade the role of this Committee – and the Parliament in general, by providing specialized support staff and giving it a more substantial role in the decision-making process on issues of defense and procurement. The democratic oversight and control of the intelligence and security agencies in Greece has been an important issue for Greece during most of the post-World War II era. Greece suffered the catastrophic political, economic and social impact of a civil war in 1946–49. As a result, the police was, for more than three decades, more of a tool for the close surveillance and occasional oppression of rival political ideologies than an institution for maintaining public order. An extensive reform programme was necessary after the restoration of democratic rule in 1974. As a result of its past record, the police’s image in the eyes of Greek public opinion has only recently begun to be restored and its popularity has been slowly increasing. Greece’s intelligence agency played a similar role as that of the police as a result of both the civil war and subsequently the military dictatorship, spending more resources on domestic activities rather than the protection of Greece’s national security from threats originating abroad. The same process of reform for democratic control, transparency and accountability described in previous paragraphs for the Police and the Armed Forces was necessary in this case too. In the 1980s and 1990s, the National Intelligence Agency was an inward-looking, rather inefficient bureaucracy, exposed to partisan interference. It was pretty capable in the collection and assessment of military information, but weak in the “civilian” intelligence sector (terrorism, organized crime, etc.). After the Ocalan “fiasco” of March 1999, the Greek government finally realized that reform was urgently needed in the intelligence sector. An [active duty] Ambassador was appointed as the new Director, breaking a tradition of retired military officers at this post. The Agency’s range of responsibilities has been recently expanded to include financial crime, terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. There will be less emphasis on military information. New Directorates for International Terrorism and Organized Crime and for International Cooperation (with foreign agencies) have been established. There is increased emphasis on training 19
To be approved, security and defense budgets have to be voted by a majority in the Parliament, a rather symbolic process in which all political parties, with the exception of the Greek Communist Party, vote in favour of the defense budget.
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and an ongoing effort to upgrade existing equipment (both hardware and software), although there are serious budgetary constraints (the annual budget is approximately 35 million Euros, 90% of which are personnel expenses). The Agency is reducing the number of military personnel and increasing the number of civilian employees, including the recruitment of highly qualified personnel on various fields, with special emphasis on the knowledge of foreign languages (currently the Agency’s personnel includes 1,200 civilians, 300–350 police officers and 40–50 military officers). An Analysis Centre and Scientific Council are about to be created. It remains to be seen, however, whether the “new spirit” at the top of the agency will manage to overcome the considerable bureaucratic inertia and transform this agency to a much more efficient mechanism to address the security challenges of the 21st century. Another issue that needs to be examined is the role of civil society and the security sector and the relationship of NGO experts as policy advisers to the government and to the Parliament of Greece. Civil society initiatives are increasing in Greece, although the country lacks behind most of its EU partners. Think tanks, other NGOs or independent analysts are neither a sizable, nor an influential pressure group in Greece. The role and influence of analysts (in most cases university professors) and thinktanks (such as the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy/ELIAMEP, the Defense Analysis Institute/IAA, the Institute of International Relations/IDIS, etc.) is usually limited to the publication of monographs or oped articles in various newspapers or appearing on television or radio shows. The role and capability of the media to analyse security and defense issues should also be addressed. The Greek mass media may occasionally play a role in promoting transparency and accountability by “revealing” possible wrongdoing and by criticizing specific procurement decisions. However, such criticisms are seldom based on a sound knowledge of the military capabilities of specific weapon systems. Such analyses can be found in specialized defense journals, which are, however, addressed to a rather small audience. The general public’s role and influence in defense decision-making and procurement is very limited. Because of the relative consensus between major Greek political parties (with the exception of the Communist Party) in defining and assessing the national security threats and the basic directions of national defense policy, the average citizen cannot express his personal views on those issues by voting against the governing party, as the opposition is following more or less the same line in defense issues. As for other professional pressure groups, there are several “middlemen”, representing large foreign defense firms, who are exerting some pressure (on
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occasion using their connections, as well offering bribes to key people) in order to win various tenders. However, their influence should not be overstated. Because the majority of Greek defense firms are state-owned their role as pressure groups is quite limited. The requirements of accountability and transparency only became an issue in Greece in the last few years (roughly from 1987–88, with the procurement of 80 third-generation fighter aircraft, 40 F-16s and 40 Mirage 2000). The actors that have a strong interest in promoting more accountability and transparency are the politicians, the media and, of course, the general public. However, only the former two are playing a more active role in seeking more accountability and transparency in defense procurement. As mentioned above, the general public’s role and influence in defense decision-making and procurement, as well as accountability and transparency, is quite limited. As for the mass media, they may occasionally play a role in promoting transparency and accountability by “revealing” possible wrongdoing and by criticising specific procurement decisions. For the military, accountability and transparency are not insignificant but clearly constitute a lower priority than the military capabilities of weapon systems and the fastest possible delivery. Although it will be argued in this study that there is only room for modest improvements in the field of transparency in the Greek arms procurement system, this is not necessarily the case with accountability. Specific measures for increasing accountability include the annual publication of “The White Book” by the Ministry of Defense (the White Book was first published in May 1996 and again in 1997, 1999 and 2001) which aims at informing both decision makers (especially members of Parliament), the mass media and the general public and the Annual Defense Report to Parliament (prepared annually by the Ministry of Defense since 1996). Another suggestion would be the upgrading of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs – and the Parliament in general – by providing specialized supporting staff and giving it a more substantial role in the decision-making process on issues of defense procurement (and possibly a veto-power on specific decisions).
5
Greece and Regional Security
Challenges for regional security and stability, the role of the EU and NATO and the need for crisis management and peacekeeping constitute important issues for Greek security policy. The view in Athens is that the greatest challenge for Western institutions in the 21st century is to expand the region of stability. More specifically for NATO, the main task for the
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Alliance in various crisis regions (such as the Mediterranean, the Balkans, etc.) is to provide a framework of regional stability by “containing” military conflicts, thus creating a suitable environment for other organisations (mainly the EU) to address economic, social and other problems and challenges. In this context, the West must also deal in a preventive manner with the – not new but newly discovered – problem of failed or failing states, which constitute a black hole in the international security system. Greece perceives the need for increased transparency in the context of regional confidence and security. It seems that when procurement decisions are made by the states of South Eastern Europe, the strengthening of regional confidence is not an issue of great concern. Greece and Turkey (allies in NATO yet arch-rivals), as well as the other states of the region are participants and co-signatories of a series of international organizations and agreements which account for the enhancement of transparency in relations among the states. Undoubtedly, transparency could actually be enhanced through OSCE verification and notification procedures (in the framework of CFE) and UN Register on Conventional Arms. As a consequence, the strict application of such measures in the area of South East Europe would further enhance regional security. So far there are a number of CSBMs agreements signed between certain states of the region.20 They range from high-level treaties which complement existing confidence-building measures agreed in the conxtext of the OSCE, to agreements involving academic exchange between military academies and the sharing of information for training. However, the confidence-building nature of those accords and agreements is seriously undermined by a lack of transparency. Needless to say, the accession of all Southeast European states to the Open Skies Treaty would be an additional confidence-building measure of great importance. Greece would very likely welcome and offer strong support to an expansion of the UN Register on Conventional Arms to include holdings and defense production.
20
For example, Greece and Bulgaria have signed the “Athens Document” which complements the 1992 Vienna Document on CSBMs. There are also agreements on military cooperation between Bulgaria and Turkey (“Sofia Document” & “Adrianople Document”), Albania and Turkey (“Tirana Document”), FYROM and Turkey (“Skopje Document”), Albania and Bulgaria and Bulgaria and Romania (“Veliko Tirnovo Document”).
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Table 1. Greek Participation in Peace-Support Operations (Numbers at peak strength) PSO
SIZE OF CONTRIBUTION
YEAR
UNOSOM (Somalia)
106
1992–95
IFOR/SFOR (BosniaHerzegovina)
100
1996–
ALBA (Albania)
803
1997–99
KFOR (Kosovo)
1,489
1999–
Essential Harvest/Amber Fox (FYROM)
330
2001–
ISAF (Afghanistan)
220
2002–
Members of EU and NATO have a special responsibility in influencing the establishment of standards in the security sector in the region of South East Europe. In the “post-Dayton” era, Greece is attempting to play a stabilising role in the Balkan and Black Sea regions by formulating a comprehensive and cooperative approach to the region’s problems. In this context, Greece could serve as a guide and facilitator for the eventual entry of Serbia, FYROM and Albania to NATO and, especially, the EU. Furthermore, in the context of North-South relations, Greece is slowly becoming more actively involved in the shaping of EU’s Mediterranean policy on the basis of its traditionally good relations with Arab countries and its recently – if belated – improved relations with Israel (and has played a minor role in the peace process by hosting meetings between Israelis and Palestinians). Greece is in a good position to contribute to efforts of SEE countries to reform their security sectors because of its historical experience. In an effort to contribute to regional stabilization efforts, the Hellenic MOD has in the past five years concluded several agreements for military cooperation with countries in Greece’s neighborhood (Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa), including Egypt, Israel, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania, etc. In some cases, cooperation has been rather symbolic and of limited practical value. In other cases (Albania, FYROM, Armenia, Egypt, Israel and Georgia) cooperation included, among other, the exchange of students for military academies, joint exercises, military assistance, etc. Military assistance has been extended to Albania, FYROM, Georgia and Armenia. It should be mentioned that no equipment is being exported to states of concern. Currently Greece is promoting the creation of a satellite link of military hospitals, a system that would eventually connect a significant number of hospitals in South East European countries. The Greek Ministry of
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Foreign Affairs has recently concluded agreements with Serbia, BosniaHerzegovina and, soon, with FYROM for the provision of development aid (approximately $580 million for the next 3–4 years).
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Prospects for the Future
In the 1980s, the perception of many western governments and foreign analysts was that “reactionary” policies, unreliability and unpredictability were the dominant characteristics of Greek foreign policy. Since the mid1990s, as Greece has moved considerably closer to the core of European integration (both politically and economically), its views and positions on a number of foreign policy and security issues have converged considerably with those of its EU partners. Greece has moved towards the “centre” on a number of other issues, fully normalizing relations with Israel, as well as considerably improving its relations with Turkey. In the 1990s and early 21st century there is little doubt that the pattern has been for a more pragmatic, reliable, rational, multidimensional foreign policy, placing emphasis on multilateral diplomacy. As for civil-military relations in Greece, no serious problems of “good governance” of the security and defense sectors appear in Greece. By the end of 1975 the parliamentary regime was safe from military challenges – a state of affairs that persists till today.21 The democratic oversight and control of the armed forces and the security agencies is at a satisfactory level. There is a gradually increasing supervisory role for the Parliament regarding the security and intelligence services, which are also coming under regular scrutiny from independent authorities for the protection of personal information. Of course, there is always room for improvement.22 The most pressing need would be the upgrading of the Parliamentary 21
22
The other side of the re-integration of the military in civil society was the gradual involvement of party politics in promotions and retirements. (Veremis, p. 178). New challenges stem from the fact that security in the 21st century requires the coordination of the ‘external’ ministries [i.e. MOD and MFA] and their agencies [armed forces, intelligence services] with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs; education; finance; overseas development; transport; environment; health; etc., with their agencies [policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, etc.]. Security today takes in social development and it demands the involvement of all elements of society in a way which security in the Cold War days did not. Meeting these new security requirements demands fundamental reform of national structures, patterns of investment, systems of government. Likewise it demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly radical scale. This concept draws heavily on the presentaion delivered by a senior NATO official, Chris Donnelly, in a conference organized by the Western Policy Center and the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Ankara, 26–28 October 2002.
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Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, whose role and authority should be expanded and its support mechanism significantly strengthened. Finally, Greece is no exception to the rule that in democratic societies there is a continuing competition between national security requirements and transparency. Although the former is of extreme importance, a functioning system of checks and balances guarantees that there is a relative balance between national security requirements on the one hand and democratic procedures and civil rights on the other.
Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy Tibor Babos, Linda Royer
“This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning” (Churchill)
1
Introduction
“Hungary has come a long way. The National Assembly has effectively developed oversight of the military through budget, approval of the Basic Principles of National Defense and the Defense Bill, and deployment of the Armed Forces. The Constitutional Court has effectively addressed the problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; and its decisions have been respected. The military has evidenced significant reform; it has been restructured to accommodate NATO, but force modernization continues to be greatly restrained by scarce resources. But Hungary still has a number of tasks to achieve effective civilian oversight…”1. Every country that works to reform its defense and intelligence system must decide on the mechanisms and structure that are best suited for its needs. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of Communism in Europe brought enormous change to Hungary’s society. Its defense and security service system have also gone through a tremendous transformation. Despite the relatively strong success in implementing a democratic system, market economy and civilian control of the military since 1989, the transformation of its intelligence agencies is not yet complete. It holds fast to the heritage of the old concept of the oversized, hyperbureaucratic intelligence system that still lacks the appropriate, Westerntype civil control and oversight. The system itself has been changing but not at the adequate speed and to some extent, it has kept the baggage from its past. The recent events of international terrorism bring with it an 1
Simon Jeffrey, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion, (INSS, Washington D.C., USA, 1995) 104.
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opportunity to examine the Hungarian Intelligence architecture, evaluating it for deficiencies and further develop what is working in the Hungarian Security Services. This analysis describes national intelligence organizations and examines intelligence oversight in the Hungarian constitutional democracy with recommendations for the possible guidelines for a new Hungarian intelligence system. The first section summarizes the current situation concerning democratic control and oversight and will lay down a thorough background that is important for an understanding of the ongoing situation in Hungary. Using the available sources of relevant legal and academic works on political science, the next part of this essay will be an objective overview of the current framework of the Hungarian intelligence system, its oversight, and highlights its remaining obstacles. In particular, it seeks to focus on the interaction between the intelligence establishment and the civil authorities and public. The next part suggests that the current system should be reviewed and adjusted according to the new security challenges and international environment. Finally, since civil-military relations and civilian oversight are a way of testing the genuineness and stability of the strategic re-orientation of Central Europe, it will attempt to prove that even with the new and democratic legal framework, the existing rules and structures are still deeply rooted in its history and need to be transformed and “euroformised” based on the requirements of the collective security and Western doctrines.
2
Metamorphosis of the Oversight and Democratic Control
“The change of system has offered us a unique and irreproducible opportunity to reintegrate once and for all into the community of developed and democratic states which are bound together by their commitment to the basic values typical of all them: democracy, the rule of law – with its institutional frameworks and substance, respect for human rights including minority rights and an economy based on private property and free initiative. Not to miss such a historic opportunity this time must be the task and guiding principle of action of all responsible politicians, political parties and the government.”2
2
J. Martonyi, Zs. Németh, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, in: R. Joó, Hungary: A member of NATO, Budapest 1999, p. 13.
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Yet, despite such political statements democracy and especially democratic oversight of the defense and intelligence establishment is not automatically guaranteed and cannot be changed overnight. In the case of the Western democratic states, the military and security system have been developed parallel to the political and societal institutions for centuries. Where the new and transitional democracies of the former Warsaw Pact countries are concerned, the reorganization of such of institutions is a more complex challenge, since the reforms are being made while the new political structure is also undergoing vast and rapid changes. The Hungarian experience serves as a unique example of the problems encountered when transitioning to democratic control of a nation’s military and a shift in civil-military relations, which emerged right after the collapse of Communism. “Hungary is one of the four central European states (...) in which democracy may be said to have been consolidated. Postcommunist Hungarian politics have been characterized by a level of stability uncommon in the region; indeed, it is the only central or eastern European state where, as of early 1999, each of two freely elected governments has served out its full term without a constitutional crisis.”3 In 1989/90, the new political elite suffered from many handicaps in their effort to establish civilian oversight and re-orient their countries foreign and security policies. They did not possess the necessary specialized knowledge of military and security affairs, neutral and efficient administrative structures, expert advice, etc. The one advantage they did enjoy visa-vis the military was their significantly larger exposure to democratic principles and practices prior to 1989. Knowledge of Western political thinking, practice and connections were important assets in their trying to gain acceptance and some genuine respect in the eyes of the military.4 “The existence of a constitutional and legal framework has resulted from Constitutional Court decisions that have effectively addressed the problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; the Court’s decisions have been respected and been incorporated in the 1993 National Defense Act as subsequent legislation. Continued wrangling over the constitutional draft since 1994 and the delaying of its acceptance is worrisome. Work to re-write the Constitution
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4
Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of Washington Press, 1999, p. 78. Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary: Conference on CivilMilitary Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, Réka Szemerkényi: Western Policies and Civilian Control of the Military in Central Europe, Budapest, 1997, p. 53.
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was initially intended to be completed in 1995, but it is taking much longer.”5 Although the political system is profoundly new and has discarded its previous baggage, the transformation of the defense and security organizations continue to resist more change. “The level of civilian involvement in security and defense policy-making is an important indicator of the stability and democratization in the consolidating democracies.”6 Postcommunist transitions are generally more traumatic for armed forces than for other occupational strata.7 “There will be many obstacles to master, ranging from issues of interoperability to language acquisition. The infusion of considerable NATO resources, know-how, and political support is likely to transform Hungary and its armed forces into a valuable asset for the alliance.”8
3
Historical Background of the Intelligence
Hungary has had its own independent security service since the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. Until the end of the WWII the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff was responsible for military intelligence, which had purely military interests as in the particular political atmosphere was heavily tensioned by military violence. As events unfolded in Europe after WWII, and the Iron Curtain fell, the Communist regime took control. The realm of intelligence was extended. In addition to military intelligence, civilian services, to include foreign and domestic intelligence were established under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. During the Cold War, the Hungarian Security Services worked closely together with their Soviet counterparts (KGB, GRU, STASI or SECURITATE) without laws or oversight to prove a real and clear framework for their activities. “There were many reasons for Western policymakers to be concerned about civil 5
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Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary: Conference on Civilmilitary Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, Jeffrey Simon: New Challenges in Hungarian Civil-military Relations, Budapest, 1997, p. 169. Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary: Conference on Civilmilitary Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, Réka Szemerkényi: Western Policies and Civilian Control of the Military in Central Europe, Budapest, 1997, p. 47. Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of Washington Press, 1999, p. 94. Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of Washington Press, 1999, p. 107.
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military relations in Central Europe after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. Primarily, it was of importance how the Soviet-trained officer corps was going to react to the political changes in Central Europe, and whether they represented any challenge to democratization and to the establishment of new institutions. (…) The survival of the Warsaw Pact-type political and military mentality among officer corps was perceived as a major risk both by the Western and Central European policy-makers.”9 During the political transformation, the former state security system ceased to exist and a new security structure was established. The change of the political system was accompanied and accelerated by several state security scandals such as the case of Belovai, Conrad or Carlos. In addition, in 1990, then-opposition political parties publicized facts revealing illegal political activities of the state security service, which at that time functioned within the structure of the police. As a consequence of the scandals and their investigation, police and the state security service were separated, and intelligence agencies were reorganized into four independent offices under the supervision of civilian Ministers. At the same time, Parliament passed a temporary Act granting approval by the Minister of Justice for the use of intelligence methods by the new security services and the police. Organizational aspects of the service were regulated by governmental decrees. The secret services worked by temporary rules until 1995 when Act no. CXXV was introduced.
4
Structure of the National Security Services
The actual composition, role and function of the intelligence services were the result of much debate among the political parties involved in the new political architecture. The major departure point was Act no. CXXV of 1995 concerning the National Security Services (further as Act). According to it, the general mission of the security services is to protect the national security interests of the Hungarian Republic by performing tasks provided by the law. The services are charged with contributing to the national security by using both open and confidential means of gathering information. More precisely, under the law, the term “national security” refers both to the defense of the sovereignty of the country and also to the protection of the constitutional order. Protection of the national security in Hungary 9
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary: Conference on Civilmilitary Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, Réka Szemerkényi: Western Policies and Civilian Control of the Military in Central Europe, Budapest, 1997, pp. 47.
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involves specifically: the detection of efforts to attack the independence and territorial integrity of the country; the detection and prevention of clandestine efforts which may injure or threaten the political, economic and military or defense interests of the country; the acquisition of information about foreign countries or of foreign origin that are important for governmental decisions; the detection and prevention of clandestine efforts to change or disturb through unlawful means the constitutional order ensuring basic human rights, the multi-party representative democracy and functioning of constitutional institutions; and, finally, detecting and preventing terrorist acts, illegal weapon and drug trafficking, and illegal traffic in internationally controlled goods and technologies.10 According to the Act, five security services exist in Hungary11 (Figure 1): x x x x x
the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the National Security Bureau (NSB), the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB), the Military Security Bureau (MSB), the Special Service for National Security (SSNS).
Three of these agencies – the Intelligence Bureau, the National Security Bureau and the Special Services for National Security – are grouped under the term “civil national security services”. The other two – the Military Intelligence Bureau and the Military Security Bureau – are referred to as the “military national security services”.
10 11
Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, § 3–8. Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, § 1.
Fig. 1. Structure of the National Security Services
PRIME MINISTER
THE NATIONAL SECRET SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
MINISTER IN DIRECTION OF THE CIVILIAN NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES
NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU
CIVILIAN SECURITY SERVICES
NATIONAL SECURITY SPECIAL SERVICE
INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES
EXTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
MILITARY SECURITY BUREAU
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
Hungary
INFORMATION BUREAU
MILITARY SECURITY SERVICES
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5
Supervision, Direction and Oversight
1. Ministerial Control The Act provides that the Government controls the civil national security services through a designated Minister and the military security services through the Minister of Defense. The responsible minister determines the particular tasks of the services, oversees their activities, and regulates their functions and organization. The Ministers are also responsible for the Basic Principles of National Security and are empowered to regulate the execution of such tasks in the form of ministerial decrees. They also have the authority to carry out the direct control of the National Security Services in accordance with the governmental decisions and the National Security plans. Each minister is empowered to issue general and concrete instructions without depriving the heads of the services of their powers and without obstructing the exercise of their competence.12 The Minister has the power to task the security services and to give the services orders. He also supervises the budgetary management of the services as well as their legal operation, and also authorized to make recommendations to the Prime Minister as to the appointment and dismissal of the General Directors and their deputies. Within the framework of the rules of law and other binding guidelines of the government, the Director Generals are independently responsible for the activities of the services.13 2. Parliamentary Oversight The Parliament defines the Basic Principles of National Security and Defense and makes decisions concerning the long-term development of the defense and security organizations. The Parliament also allocates financial resources for carrying out security and defense tasks on an annual basis. The Parliament exercises parliamentary oversight over the national security services through its Committee on National Security. The president of the Committee must be a Member of Parliament (MP) from one of the opposition parties.14 The responsible Minister is required to inform the Committee about the general activities of the national security services regularly but at the minimum twice a year. The Government also must inform the Committee about its decisions regarding matters brought to its attention by the Minister. 12 13 14
Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, § 10. Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §11. Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §19 (2).
Hungary
NATIONAL SECURITY CO MMITTEE O F THE PARLIAMENT
MINIS TE R IN DIRECTIO N O F CIV ILIAN NATIONAL SECRET S ERVICES
CIVILIAN NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE
STATE A UDIT OFFICE, G OVERNMENT S UP ERV ISO RY OFFICE
OMBUDSMAN FOR DATA PROTECTION, O MB UDSMAN FO R CIV IL RIGHTS , OMBUDSMAN FOR NATIONAL AND ETHNIC RIGHTS
Fig. 2. Oversight of the Civilian National Security Services
NATIONAL SECURITY CO MMITTEE O F THE PARLIAMENT
DEFENSE MINISTER
MILITARY NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE
STATE A UDIT OFFICE, G OVERNMENT S UP ERV ISO RY OFFICE
OMBUDSMAN FOR DATA PROTECTION, O MB UDSMAN FO R CIV IL RIGHTS , OMBUDSMAN FOR NATIONAL AND ETHNIC RIGHTS
Fig. 3. Oversight of the Military National Security Services
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The Committee has the right to request information from the Minister and the General Directors of the services about the national security situation of the country and the operation and activities of national security services. It can request information from the Minister of Justice and the Minister supervising civil national security services and inquire the Defense Minister and the General Directors about specific uses of secret technical devices and methods. Also, it examines individual complaints against unlawful activities of the national security services. In cases when the complainant does not accept the results of an investigation carried out by the Minister supervising the national security services, the Committee informs the complainant about its findings. If the Committee feels that one of the security services is carrying out unlawful or improper activities, it can ask the Minister to conduct an investigation into the matter and he will inform the Committee about the findings of the investigation.15 The Committee has many prevailing functions. It gives its opinion on the detailed draft budget of the national security services. It also conducts nomination hearings for those appointed as general directors of the national security services. The Committee has the right to examine any files or information reports prepared for the Government by the national security services. If the NSB launches an investigation and secret collection of information against an MP or against one of his or her family members, the Minister will have to report it to the Committee. The MP in question, in this case, will not be informed about the activity. The Defense Committee (DC) in the Parliament, among other tasks, exercises oversight of military security services. The NSC and DC hold closed sessions when exercising their oversight authorities.16
6
Remaining Obstacles
While the military establishment could intensify its reform by NATO’s guidelines there still remains a few obstacles for the intelligence system. The most significant obstacle to the transition was to establish and create a strong legal, institutional budget and organizational foundation for the civilian control and oversight, while changing personnel and simultaneously maintaining professionalism and “combat readiness”. In other words it is a serious challenge to maintain a credible defense and intelligence system while the entire political, societal and economic system is in the midst of 15 16
Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §14 (4) a–h. Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §16–17.
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transition. “Insofar as the Hungarian military is concerned, successful democratic consolidation includes the following: (1) placing the military under the authority and supervision of the elected government; (2) unambiguous constitutional codification of the chains of command and areas of responsibility over armed forces between institutions and within the military establishment; (3) termination and prohibition of the activities and political parties within armed forces as well as an effective ban on partisan political activities by military personnel: (4) establishing the government’s fiscal responsibility over defense expenditures an the executive branch’s accountability to the legislature over military affairs; (5) democratizing the military establishment itself with special attention inculcating military personnel with fundamental democratic values (...) Despite some shortcomings, during the 1990’s Hungary successfully democratized its armed forces and established democratic civil-military relations.”17 Assessing the state of intelligence’s oversight in Hungary has become a more difficult task over the passed decade because issues are now more complex. The progress of intelligence reform in Hungary has been confirmed by the commitment shown by intelligence leaders and political elites to democratic political structures and developments. Many of the constitutional, legal and administrative requests for civil control or supremacy over the intelligence have been implemented while Hungary is still finetuning some specific mechanisms of intelligence management. Examining obstacles to the nature of the Hungarian intelligence and oversight it is also obvious that tensions between the civil bureaucracy and intelligence staff is a natural phenomenon, where the professionalism and issue of expertise are key words. “The relevant question in the transitioning states, then, is not whether the officer corps is professional, but whether it possesses a brand of professionalism, appropriate to the type of state that it serves.”18 Democratic or political supremacy over the intelligence is defined as the subordination of the secret services to the democratically elected civilian leaders of the government. The presence of a welltrained and experienced professional military corps that is respected, funded by a civilian authority and a strong non-governmental component within the defense community is crucial19. 17
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Brigitte Sauerwein, Defense Adequacy: The Hungarian Defense Forces, Jane’s Intelligence Review 6, no. 10 (October 1994), p. 90. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, The University of Michigan Press, 1999, p. 110. Rudolf Joó, The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, The Experience of Hungary, Challiot Paper 23, February 1996, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, p. 6.
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It is also obvious that tensions between the government, civil bureaucracy and intelligence establishment is a natural phenomenon therefore it also must be addressed. “The effect of intelligence (...) depends on its institutional reputation and the personal chemistry between practitioners and users.”20 In the Western system, the security services enjoy a delicate relationship with government officials, where the intelligence is responsible for providing professional (technical) expertise to civilian politicians. The lack of intelligence professionalism may lead to some sectors of the intelligence community to mislead or intervene in politics. Without clear political guidance the intelligence may feel themselves as the servants of the state or the regime rather than the democratically elected government in power, and develop their own not necessarily democratic notions. Furthermore, when intelligence is independent in creation of its own size, structure, organization, recruiting and equipment, they may resist total subordination to the government. No doubt, Hungary has a great deficit in civilian security expertise. Therefore, one of the priorities of the country is to take responsibility for the creation of civilian security communities, which can provide skilled personnel to secret services, Parliament committees, research institutes and other NGOs. This should be a significant objective when they restructure or implement the intelligence system. Another question is that how to match legal, institutional, organizational and personnel changes with the new and still transforming political framework. Although a balance should be kept between the “peaceful” transition of the military and intelligence institutions, and the introduction of necessary oversight and control, the last issue is the priority. Regarding the new democracies such as Hungary, one has to take into account the nation-specific circumstances in which the transition is developing and the nation’s history and heritage. As far as the national conditions are concerned, the actual political character, the economic conditions, the societal framework, the media, and the international environment contribute to the unique character of each nation’s experience. The other key issue is the change in the global the security environment and with it, the change of the priorities and focus of intelligence. “Since 1990, defense officials and politicians have been quick to point out that Hungary has no specific enemy and is under no direct threat. Still there are a number of potential challenges they must take seriously, particularly because of Hungary’s unfavorable geo-strategic position. It has no natural 20
Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 142.
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borders intimidating to land forces; it is relatively easy to overrun, as a number of armies have demonstrated throughout the past millennium; and its military establishment has weakened considerably since 1989.”21 In the past, Hungary’s strategic responsibility was the first line of defense as the most important country of the Warsaw Pact’s south theater. It was responsible for the south German Plain and the Po Plain in Italy. The main target countries therefore, were Western Germany and Italy as well as the UK and USA. With the new internal and international environment the whole previous defense and intelligence strategy collapsed from overnight. The previous doctrines became irrelevant: the target countries, the enemies, the controlling authorities, the driving ideas and methods, the financial resources, external and internal relations, and the goals of these organizations as well. The new security services emerged as a consequence of the new circumstances. Though new services were created, they were still based on the previous system. Most people did not realize that the Hungarian military and intelligence, under the Warsaw Pact had virtually the same doctrine as the USSR, which had no real consideration for Hungarian security and defense. And because of the fundamental nature of the intelligence, and antagonistic relationship of the East-West intelligence services the Hungarian services were interested in keeping maintaining their secrecy, while the Western services did not trust in their Eastern counterparts. The new security environment, in particular the post September 11 era, and the security institutions anticipate the need for various types of alliances, multinational intelligence reaction capabilities to fulfill missions needs for low-intensity (other than war) conflicts, often overseas or out of area. Therefore, the transitional democracies have found their need to develop more technically skilled and more flexible professional intelligence capabilities, which can operate in a variety of challenges and at different levels of intensity. “The cold war quickly shifted from a struggle for predominance in postwar Europe to a global struggle in which virtually any nation or region could be a pawn between the two sides. Although some areas remained more important than others, none could be written off entirely.”22 The trend of declining mass information gathering reveals a transformation in the relationship between secret services and society, that which 21
22
Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of Washington Press, 1999, p. 74. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From Secrets to Policy, A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., pp. 11–12.
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reaches beyond an institutional evolution of intelligence to influence the attitude of society. In the Cold War, the intelligence’s role was traditionally mass espionage. Residual roles in emergency response, aid to civilian power, counter terrorism, and sovereignty protection have now been highlighted. Concomitantly, the global role of intelligence in the more complex international environment and multinational (UN, NATO, OSCE and other) operations has expanded. Such potential deployments are by virtue of their low national significance, more politically sensitive for the domestic public, a phenomenon reinforcing the move towards professional intelligence. The transition process is more complicated for intelligence since NATO has no common intelligence system. Hungary was left without a model to readily copy and therefore had to create a hybrid system combining what they already knew, the old Soviet style, and what they were learning about the new Western system. Due to the sensitive nature of classified information and compartmentalized data that is common to intelligence, information sharing is very cumbersome and more difficult compared with other services. This delicate and complex situation allowed for some in leadership to resist moving forward and make the transition complete to a democratically controlled service. To add to the burden, the post communist politicians chosen to lead the defense establishment were naïve about defense matters and easily duped. The bulwark of the old style senior officers were able to keep them “out of the loop”. The lack of trained civilian experts on military matters who can advise politicians was another factor in preventing a truly complete transition to a full democratization of the Intelligence service and civil-military relations. As described, Hungarian intelligence oversight operates in a democratic environment, where the executive and legislature powers are separated, well established, and the tools of the civil societal control (such as the media) is strong. However, due to the special operating environment of Intelligence, some of the leadership, who can’t lose their former mindset, create obstacles to civilian control and are slowing down the transition between the presented democratic framework and the real practice. Perhaps this just takes some time for the next generation to come in and fill in these gaps. “In sum, while the institutional structure of parliamentary civilian control over the armed forces in Hungary is adequate, the internal control mechanisms of the MOD are in need of further development. In large measure
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the problems have been due to general inexperience and the negligence and oversight of some high-ranking military officers.”23 No doubt that the success or failure in stabilizing and reinforcing effective democratic oversight and downsizing of the Hungarian intelligence, have a direct influence on the outcome of Hungary’s further European integration and prosperity. Failure of developing a new, smaller, more cost effective and more rapid reactive intelligence system, would at least indirectly risk the internal political stability and democratic structure. Consequently, an ‘euroformized’ national intelligence must be the interest of all the Hungarian political and experimental actors.
7
Recommendations
“Experience has shown that without a robust system of independent oversight, the system is wide open to abuse. Security services are unable to resist the temptation to indulge in activities that have no place in a democracy. The cure can be as dangerous as the disease.”24 The creation of new intelligence system offers the opportunity to the Hungarian National Intelligence Agencies to become more effective and rationalized through pragmatic synergies. The proliferation of weapon mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ecological threats, policing the cyber space are not exclusively concerns of a single security service, but serious concern to all of them. Accepting the argument “it is important to consider first the nature of the threats to the state and society rather than starting with some preexisting institutional framework” the creation of a new intelligence system should begin with the threat(s), then take into consideration the current framework and cost effectiveness when organizing its operational structure. Regarding the actual national intelligence community there are two major considerations that must be mastered in the Hungarian Intelligence Community. The first is the different configuration of the five national services in the functional dimension, since two of them are subordinate to the military and three of them are under civil management. The second consideration is the role of the intelligence in government policy, both in foreign affairs and domestic activities. 23
24
Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of Washington Press, 1999, p. 92. Richard Norton-Taylor, In Defense of the Realm, Civil Liberties Trust, London, 1990, p. 129.
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When reviewing the current framework of oversight, the intelligence system of the Hungarian constitutional democracy should be enhanced by implementing the following principles: x x x x x x
Primary authority of the democratic institutions of society, Separation of the intelligence from policy-making, Political neutrality of the intelligence services, Accountability and parliamentary oversight over the services, Subordination of the services to the rule of law in practice, Maintaining a fair balance between the secrecy and transparency.
Since the current intelligence system has still not gone through the major changes, and the new intelligence services are likely to be essentially the same as old ones, it is necessary and high time to develop a program to systemically and courageously replace all the unwanted aspects of the old system with a new apparatus. The driving ideas of that new system should be the following: x Redefine Hungary’s security vision and framework in a new law, x Point out the main elements of the new security dispensation to the civil society, x Deepen parliamentary and Governmental oversight to support implementation of the defined changes through special ad hoc committees, x Providing a clearer and stronger guidance regarding the intelligence priorities by the legislative and executive committees, x Strengthen cooperation between the planning, budgetary and intelligence services in order to maintain the further fluent transition and interdependence, x Comprehensively review internal procedures to be in line with the new legislation and ministerial directives, x Develop and strengthen managerial ability that will enable the services to overcome difficulties of further transformation, x Erase or phase out individuals at managerial levels who are working against the goals or outside the perimeters of the new dispensation. To ensure that the national intelligence capabilities are meeting the up-mentioned challenges, the new system should follow functional oriented principles, which emphasizes clear and strong civilian control via
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intelligence oversight and cost effectiveness.25 Meeting these requirements, the new model also gives a better structure for the flow of information from the collectors through the analysts to the consumers. It eliminates and cuts out the superfluous sub-organizations in the chain of report. To reinforce Hungary’s judicial, executive and legislative oversight as well as to expedite Hungary’s future integration into the European Union, some more aspects of the Western especially the British system should be incorporated. Gill has pointed out: “There are two extreme possibilities with respect to ministerial control, both which pose considerable dangers: either a complete lack of control or ministerial direction in the partisan interests of the governing party.”26 But the U.K. has managed to create a system of ministerial responsibility for security intelligence that “can achieve both goals of effective ministerial direction and adequate oversight of those agencies.”27 As far as the Hungarian case is concerned, ministerial supervision and control should be based primarily on national political specifications. Since the current political parties have not recruited and developed appropriate experts on that field, Hungarian Supervision is rather just theoretical than practical. On the other hand “the question of recruitment to security intelligence agencies is particularly important because, if it merely reflects the political dominance of certain classes of groups, partisan direction by ministers will not be a problem since it will usually be unnecessary.”28 “A central feature of modern states is that recruitment to its administrative apparatuses becomes based on patronage and more on impersonal and competitive educational criteria.”29 Consequently, building up a new generation of professional expertise is a key responsibility both for the political parties and the actual intelligence community. Just as the British ensure Executive Oversight via the position of Director General and the Ministerial Committee on Intelligence Services, the Hungarian system utilizes a Director General who reports to appropriate ministers. As previously stated, Hungary has a Committee on National Security Affairs similar to the UK’s Ministerial Committee. But Hungary can improve its parliamentary oversight by adding another working group, similar to the Permanent Secretaries Committee on Intelligence to assist in reviewing and reporting to the Prime Minister. Also, one must remember 25
26
27 28 29
Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From secrets to Policy, A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., pp. 34–38. Peter Gill, Policing Politics, Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, Frank Cass, 1994, p. 217. Ibid, p. 259. Ibid, p. 230. C. Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity, Cambridge Polity Press, 1990, p. 53.
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that who ever controls the “purse strings” wields control over the entity, so as the UK has Intelligence and Security Committee to examine expenditure of the agencies, so too, should Hungary centralize its monitoring of both civilian and military intelligence expenditure. Based on the new security challenges and more sophisticated technology, a more flexible, “rapid reaction capabilities” and panel system, should be introduced in the fields of HUMINT, SIGINT and Analysis. This combination of functionary and budget conscious scheme would allow for a shift in operational concentration with the constantly changing national security concerns. Shifting the attention to the “combat elements” the new system should also contribute to the decrease of the redundant supply units and better utilize the human resources and properties of these organizations. The proposed structure focuses on three pillars: clear and strong civilian control; efficient professional activity and cost effectiveness. The unified scenario also tries to give a better model for the information flow process from the collectors through the analysts to the consumers, eliminating and cutting out the superfluous sub-organizations in the chain of report. Based on the new security challenges and increased technology a more flexible, “rapid reaction capabilities” and panel system will be introduced in the fields of HUMINT, SIGINT and Analysis. Shifting the attention to the “combat elements” the new system would also eliminate the redundant supply units and better utilize the human resources and equipment of these organizations.
8
Conclusion
Change is never easy, but it is inevitable. In the case of Hungary, since the fall of Communism in Europe, it has done a great deal to fill the void created by the post-Warsaw Pact security vacuum. It has shifted its military doctrine to Western ideology and principles while transitioning its government and economy to a democracy and free trade. But there is still much work to do. It must also address the problem of redirecting a whole intelligence mechanism from a repressive agenda to one upholding new democratic ideals and methods. Hungary could manage the transition of its intelligence without any significant problems. But in the case of such a special and complex system like intelligence, the transition always takes long time. If the old management, methods and structure will be totally replaced by the new generation of professional intelligence officers and civil experts, Hungary can state: The first phase of the creation of an intelligence
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apparatus that is founded on democratic principles is complete. But definitely this “is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning”.29 “The challenges facing the Intelligence Community are formidable. Continual budget and manpower cuts degrade managerial continuity, experience levels, and the technical expertise. Yet the international arena and issues that we monitor are becoming more complex. Learning to work smarter has become imperative.” 30 This is especially true for Hungary.
29
Churchill.
30
William S. Brei, Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure, Occasional Paper Number Two, Joint Military Intelligence College, January 1996, 1.
Macedonian Reform Perspectives Petar Atanasov
1
General View
In 2003, the Republic of Macedonia was still challenged with domestic, as well as regional security threats. The stabilization process after the conflict in 2001 is progressing and the implementation of the ‘Framework Agreement’ is speeding up due to efforts of the new government. Despite many difficulties the situation in the country is stable, including security, and life continues with its normal ups and downs. Macedonia these days does not differ significantly from the other countries in the region. The priorities of the governments in the neighboring countries are economic problems, fighting against organized crime and corruption and struggling with NATO and EU integration challenges. Fighting against regional terrorism is just an additional headache connected to the events of the last few years. Macedonian security issues can be divided in two periods, pre- and postOhrid Agreement. While the general characteristics of the first period (1991–2001) are rather poor concerning security sector reform and democratic control over military, the first three months of 2003 the Macedonian agenda in the area of security was overcrowded. It seems that things are ‘moving’ forward. Expectations for the announced, but not yet channeled ‘National Conception for Security and Defense of the Republic’ and revised ‘Defense Strategy’ are high. The Ministry of Defense is loudly presenting the reforms in the defense sector, and the policing implemented by the Ministry of Interior and the international facilitators in the former crises regions was progressing. At the end of March 2003 the European Union officially started the first military mission in its history, named ‘Concordia’, which replaced the NATO mission in Macedonia. The Macedonian Prime Minister, Branko Crvenkovski, stated that this would be the first military mission for the European Union, but the last for Macedonia. The mission is projected for six months. Concerning the public civil-military sphere, some polls have been showing significant numbers and attitudes. Let me quote two of them. Both were conducted by the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical
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Research in Skopje. The first one is about the confidence in the institutions of the system.1 The Macedonians have the highest score, namely 31% confidence in the Army, but the Albanians have greater confidence in the media, 33%, and 4% confidence in the Army. The general conclusion would be that the Macedonians are interested in more security and Albanians in more information. Of course, this is a very simple conclusion. One cannot say that the Albanians are not interested in more security or the Macedonians in more information. This result also shows the close relation between the ‘nation’ and the Army among the perceptions of the Macedonians. In the second research, on the question ‘would you like Macedonia to become member of NATO’, the general attitude is that 64% of the citizens have responded positively2. The answers of the Albanians are slightly higher than the answers of the Macedonians. These are just to show the differences in perceptions among Macedonians and Albanians concerning important security issues. In these polls, differences among attitudes of the two groups of voters for the largest Macedonian parties, the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM)3 and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRODPMNE)4 are minimal. In this co-relation, the political factions between the two largest Macedonian parties, SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, are more about the question of who will be in power, and not too many differences were recorded for the questions on security sector reform. Both parties have led Macedonia in the last 12 years, and have had majority in the Assembly, but without any substantial results in security reforms and legislative oversight. Currently, the situation in the country about the willingness and the capacity to go through reforms has matured and is moving ahead. Nevertheless, the number one topic, fighting against terrorism, would surely 1
2
3
4
‘The confidence in the Government and the political institutions’, public opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje, Center for security and ethnic issues, February 2003. ‘The defense reform processes and attitude toward NATO’, a survey conducted by the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje sponsored by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, March 2003. SDSM is a left-wing political party that held Government Cabinet 1992–1998, and was re-elected in November 2002, led by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski. Most of the statements made come from successors of the previous Macedonian Communist party. VMRO-DPMNE is a right-wing political party that held Government Cabinet 1998– 2002, led by Ljubcho Georgievski, former Prime Minister. The party was established in 1990, but their founders claim that they are successors of the Ilinden revolutionary organizations that organized the Uprising in 1903 against the Ottoman Empire.
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influence Macedonian reform processes in many respect. If we add that in the northwestern regions in Macedonia there are still some Albanian extremist criminal groups initiating sporadic incidents, the will to contribute to the global fight against terrorism on the local level is even higher. One can say that the country is determined enough to reform its security sector, to strengthen the democratic control over the security sector and to improve civil-military relations.
2
Some Institutional Aspects
The basic pillars of national security in Macedonia should be democratic institutions in a plural political system: the Assembly, the President, the Government and competent ministries have to fulfill their duties in compliance with the Constitution and the laws that determine the manner of leadership and management in the field of security. The national security policy by law should ensure execution of the country’s national interests such as: development of democratic political institutions, a stable environment for development of the economic system based on market economy principles, the organization of appropriate defense systems, the economic and political integration with the European Union and political (military) integration with NATO. Still, after 12 years of independence Macedonia has not prepared the ‘National Conception for Security and Defense of the Republic’, which, according to Article 17 of the Law on Defense, should be adopted by the Assembly. Finally, the Assembly did this in April 2003. What can be said about the current national security policy, including the management and oversight aspects, is that the institutions of the political system in the Republic of Macedonia and their legal and normative setting in relation to the country’s safety exist, but it seems that the national security policy has not been completely rounded up.5 There are some gray zones in the legislation, even in practice, and vertical and horizontal coordination of greater quality should be ensured at all levels. According to the current legal solutions it is difficult to see possibilities for exercising unity of the whole national security system, namely, the vertical setting is less disputable than the horizontal coordination of the system elements. Knowing that many of these elements are new, and that Macedonia started to build its security system from scratch in 1992, one can understand some of the problems, but the progress has been slow and with a 5
P. Lazarevski, P. Atanasov, The setting and exercising of the policy of national security in the Republic of Macedonia (Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research, Skopje 2002) 130.
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lot of disparities. Strategic determinations of the national security should be defined in the ‘National Conception for Security and Defense of the Republic’ and the ‘Defense Strategy’ (signed by the President 1998), as well as the specific documents related to national security such as the diplomatic, political, economic and military strategy, which were never promoted or made public. The security structures in the country are not acting as a unique conceptual system, but as separate sub-systems for national defense and internal security. At the same time, better-structured sub-systems for civil defense, crisis management and more efficient civil protection are missing. Hence, we can conclude that unity of the national security can be established only through the development of more specialized sub-systems and their firm interconnectedness. Some of the deficiencies were corrected with the Amendments of the Law on Defense (2002). Yet, the Republic of Macedonia does not have a crisis management system; only some directions on how one should be established. To overcome this gap, during 2001 conflict Macedonia established two different bodies: the Coordinating Body for Dealing with Crises and the Centre for Crisis Management. The Coordinating Body was established within the Government, while the Centre for Crises Management was established and stationed in the Ministry of Defense. These newly-established structures were an attempt to: establish coordination between the two sub-systems, the system for national defense and the system for internal security; coordinate and cover the absence, or inefficiency of the civil defense sub-system (civil protection); coordinate and provide the material resources necessary for the security forces; and manage the activities to implement the President’s plan for the eradication of the crisis.6 The need for leadership and management during the crisis in 2001 was obvious, as well as the coordination between the elements and structures of the sub-systems. The crisis-management sub-system is necessary in peacetime as well as in state of emergency. Needless to say there are ideas for establishing a regional crisis-management system. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, as a representative body of the citizens and bearer of legislative power, should determine and implement the security and defense policy of the country, execute oversight on Government competencies in defense and review the readiness for defense of the Republic. Within the Assembly, there are different committees, among which the Committee on Defense and Security consisting of 14 MPs, that should take part in the preparation of all legal acts and 6
P. Lazarevski, P. Atanasov, The setting and exercising… 105–106.
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oversee the legality of constitutional provisions for defense, as well as the provisions of the Law on Defense. It must be emphasized that the story of civil-military relations was not one of the country’s priorities while state authorities were establishing the political structures of the country. The theoretical concepts concerning civil-military relations, democratic control over the security sector, parliamentary oversight of security structures and others, were never pointed out as a problem in the past, and this is a feature common to all countries in the region. From today’s perspective, the introduction of the concept of parliamentary oversight on security sector was the biggest novelty.7 The Assembly, after a couple of change of administrations, has started to make efforts about the issue, and the Committee itself is trying to be proactive in matters of defense and security. The specific role of Parliament in civil-military relations is central where issues of democratic control are concerned, since Parliament should provide scrutiny not only of the military, but also of the executive and defense policy as a whole.8 This lesson has not been completely applied yet. In this respect, it must also be said that the biggest problem in the work of the Assembly and the Committee on Defense and Security is the lack of experienced staff in security matters to help them in exercising their constitutional authority. The committees have no staff at all except for one secretary. To overcome this, some efforts have been made to improve cooperation with the domestic and international non-governmental bodies, but this cooperation has still far to go. The general feeling is that the Assembly and especially the Committee on Defense and Security are making steps toward a more efficient control over the security sectors. In early 2003 the Minister of Defense reported twice to the Committee on Defense and Security on the reform process. The MPs were also active on issues connected with the defense budget discussions for 2003. One of the problematic issue was rationalization of the budget. 45 million Denars (1 Euro = 61 Denars) less were allotted than the previous year. The total defense budget for 2003 will be 6.3 billions Denars. During the debate over the defense budget the opposition asked the government whether the reduction of the defense budget would influence the combat readiness of the Army. Another issue of interest was also the question of the Ministry of Interior’s budget increasing by 602 million Denars, for a total amount of 7
8
B. Vankovska, ‘The Academic Community among historical hypothecs and promises of the future’, Contemporary Macedonian Defense, III: 6 (2002) 8. A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, A. Forster, Democratic Control of the Armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil Military Relations, CMR Network Website, A Quarterly Electronic Newsletter, at: http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/TCMR%20Papers (September 1999).
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6 billion Denars. Both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior have increased the salaries for the new employees, namely 890 in Defense and 600 in Interior. The new hirings result from the implementation of the ‘Framework Agreement’ and reflect adequate representation of the nonMacedonian ethnic communities in the security structures. This is an attempt to include more non-Ɇacedonians in the mainstream institutions, especially some security structures that were dominated by Macedonians (officers, intelligence, special forces, etc.).
3
Bad and Good Examples of Democratic Control (Demcon)
Three very indicative events happened in the last couple of months that raise questions over procedures in relation with state institutions and democratic control over the security sector. The first two are in the area of cohabitation between the President and the Government under the current circumstances where both institutions are representatives from different political affiliations. About the first event, the quoted statements are from the beginning of March 2003. The quarrel started with a public confrontation between the advisers of the President and the Ministry of Defense over the competencies and constitutional authority for certain defense provisions. One of the advisers of the President accused the ministers (the Minister of Defense) for taking over the jurisdiction of the President due to some overlapping of authority in the defense legislation. It was said that ‘the cohabitation between the President and the Government is not in crisis but obviously starts to squeak’. Actually, the accusations were about not informing the Cabinet of the President about some solutions and decisions by the Ministry of Defense, regarding the formation of units of the Army, that the Ministry of Defense should not discuss changes in the formation of units without the signature of the President, and that the Ministry of Defense cannot, without the consultations with the President – the Supreme Commander of the armed forces – propose reductions of the defense budget for 2003. And the main point, ‘that the Government cannot behave towards the President as he is one of the agencies of the Government’. To make this clearer, some of the missing links in the legislation between the President and the Government can easily produce tensions and misunderstandings between institutions in the country. And the issues that were the core of the quarrel werethe decreasing the number of officers by 700, intention of donating the T-55 tanks to Afghanistan, decreasing conscripts’ service time from 9 to 6 months, and some other ‘minor’ questions. The situation is now normalized, but the scars remain.
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The second event was again between the President and the Government. Because the ‘National Conception for Security and Defense’ was never prepared and accepted by the Assembly in the last 12 years, the President’s Cabinet held a series of panels and round tables in 2002 in order to move forward on preparing the document. This resulted in benign by the Government. People from the presidential Cabinet stated that the President is feeling threatened in his functions in the sphere of defense where his initiative for producing national strategy has failed. On the contrary, the Government thought that there is no ground that the President should propose such document to the Assembly. Because the Government has enough ‘power’, it decided to establish a team that consists of experts from various ministries, led by the Prime Minister’s counselor for national security, who rapidly made significant progress in preparing the document. After the first draft was ready, it was given to the President’s cabinet for opinion. And as I said, the document was adopted in the Assembly and made public in April 2003. Again, where is the problem? Who is right and who is wrong? The main problem is that the legislation is not clear about the legal procedure for producing the ‘National Conception for Security and Defense’. In this case the ‘stronger’ institution, the Government, is taking over and running the business. If we add that the Government always has a majority in the Assembly, then there are no obstacles about the Government’s supremacy in the parliamentary procedures. There is no easy way out of this. The Committee on Defense and Security has also majority of the government coalition and the MPs belonging to the ruling party do not always feel ‘comfortable’ criticizing the Government’s proposals and decisions. The third event is rather more complicated. It concerns the nowdismantled police unit named the ‘Lions’. This police unit was highly controversial to Albanian leaders and many Macedonians alike. Instead of establishing a new unit in compliance with the provisions of the document for establishing rapid reaction police battalion enacted by a government decision in June 2001,in the wake of the clashes, the Minister of Interior decided to use his executive power to increase the number of existing special police forces. The problem was that most of the new ‘fighters’ were members or sympathizers of the ruling party VMRO-DPMNE, some with criminal records and most unemployed. Actually, the new unit was not clearly under the control of the broader security system structures of the state. It was almost a one-party formation that could be misused in different ways. After the new government took office in January 2003, it decided to transform the unit. The Prime Minister stated that this unit is legally problematic, for the way it was established and its functioning do not match the needs of the country and so must be abolished. The ‘Lions’ blockaded one of the main roads between Skopje and Kosovo, protesting
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against the governmental decision and asking for some concessions. While the Minister of Interior sent the regular and special police to break the blockade, the ‘Lions’ pointed their guns towards their own colleagues. Fortunately nothing happened, but still bitterness remains. The Government decided to transform the unit and to absorb the members of the ‘Lions’ into regular security units, the Army and Police, except for the individuals with thick criminal records. This serves as a good example of why the Macedonian authorities should be very careful in their decisions about establishing security and defense structures under supreme civilian and democratic control. We can also mention some good examples, especially from the conflict of 2001. For instance, the Army was constantly under sound civilian and democratic control during the fight against paramilitary Albanian extremists. Despite the fact that, in compliance with the Constitution, the Macedonian Army has only an external mission (protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity from outside), its involvement in the conflict was very sensitive. Still, the Army did not go over firm orders issued by the President, as the supreme commander and the only institution that can legally order the use of military forces, and the supplementary Government decisions. Most of the time the Army had a supporting role of preventing spillover of the fight to the wider region. The use of force by the military units did not exceed international measure of the so-called ‘proportional use of force’. The conflict was under constant monitoring and casualties were kept to a minimum thanks to the Army’s behavior and respect for the orders of high command. The Army even swallowed some of the ‘losses’ in order to stabilize the situation and avoid a civil war. The important thing is that after the changes in the Law on in 2002, Article 23 states that the Army is ‘organized, prepared and trained for armed conflict, combat and other actions for exercising its constitutional function to defend the Republic’. The legislation thus filled the gap that used to allow the Army to act only in state of war. The ruling parties, at the time of enacting the earlier provisions, were not aware that the state would confront aggressive terrorist paramilitary formations, and now they have eradicated the norms for use of the Army only in state of war.9 Given the likelihood of military involvement to deal with internal threats, new democracies cannot be satisfied with simply identifying external defense as the military’s primary mission. In order not to leave the door open for use of the military on an unregulated basis, civilians, and not the military, should decide when and 9
T. Risteski, ‘The legal status of ARM (Army of the Republic of Macedonia)’, Defense Magazine (Odbrana), XI: 73 (2002), 11.
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how the armed forces will be used, specifying what can and cannot be done, the time frame to begin and cease action, and the allocation of responsibility among civilians and officers in command and control of the mission.10 The theory is clear on this.
4
About Transparency and Accountability
Issues of transparency and accountability came with the transition process and the promotion of the ‘good governance’ paradigm, including a civil society as a factor in the whole network of citizens and interest groups and society as a whole. The control exercised over the military through institutions of civil society represents the ‘other side of the coin’ and is probably the central element of the new type of the civil-military relations in postcommunist societies.11 Yet, the Macedonian public has heard the words transparency and accountability too often. Unfortunately, they have only been heard, and not seen, in general. The lessons learned in Macedonia, and maybe elsewhere, are that transparency and accountability are not a state of mind, or subjective attitude towards respect for the rule of law. This is, as it should be, a sound link with the rule of law and democratic style of governance. An area where there is always room for more progress, especially in the security area. I argue that the supremacy of the executive over the legislative power was a pattern of Macedonian political scene for a decade. Due to a fact that the majority of the Assembly is part of the ruling party, and the Prime Minister’s office is held by their party leader is of big importance for MPs’ behavior. Another problem in the leadership-opposition relation is that there is a high ‘personal’ political division between two largest parties, SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE. And this is a crucial argument as to why there is no proper cooperation between the Assembly plenary sessions and committee’s debates. The majority of MPs are just acting as advocates of the government’s wishes and decisions. The opposition in this context is a ‘weaker side’. In these circumstances obviously we have less accountability and even lesser transparency. High official turnover following electoral defeats is a recurring problem. The results of this are slowing down the reforms, wasting most of the time 10
11
J. K. Giraldo, Democratizing Civil-Military relations: what do countries legislate, CCMR Website, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, at: http://www.ccmr.org/public/library (June 2001). B. Vankovska, ‘Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in Post-communist Balkan States’, Contemporary Macedonian Defense, I: 1 (2001), 66.
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on personnel replacements. This is one of the Macedonian nightmares of civilian-civilian relations and democratic oversight on the security sector. Feeling each other as hard political enemies, VMRO-DPMNE even stated in 1998, after winning the parliamentary elections, that they will produce a new Strategy for Defense and White Paper on Defense even though the first one had just been published in September 1998. However, it never happened. More importantly, both parties made enormous damage in many areas of the society, particularly in the field of security. This antagonism is even more complicated with the ethnic division between Macedonian and Albanian political parties. If we stress that civil society is also divided according to ethnic cleavages, the story gets quite complex. Most of the time, politicians are protecting their party interests, their ethnic leaders’ strategies, and not the ‘real’ interests of the people who voted for them. We must emphasize that this weakness is a serious obstacle in the management of different fields, and mostly in the security sector. In this area many questions can be raised, but the most important one for the Macedonian case seems to be the plan to incorporate ethnic communities in the security structures in a way that is part of the implementation process deriving from the constitutional changes. On this issue, relations between society and the military can be transformed into relations between ethnic communities (ethnic groups or minorities after the Framework Agreement were named ‘ethnic communities’) and the military. A lot has already been done in this area, for instance, police training was held for new members and multiethnic police control was established on the ground. The plans for including officers, non-commissioned officers and professional soldiers in the Army are on their way. The Ministry of Defense has reported since 2002, the amount of Albanian NCOs being trained has increased. Still, there are a lot of differences in perceptions among ethnic communities of what the security situation in the country is, what should be done and how to enhance the stabilization process. The best word to describe the influence of state institutions on civil society is centralization. The Macedonian state is too centralized both politically and in matters of allocation of resources. According to constitutional changes it should be decentralized in many aspects. Local democracy should provide new patterns for resolving peoples’ needs. So, one can speak of centralization as a systematic obstacle more than ‘weakness’ of the state structures. What can be concluded about the weakness of the central state/government institutions and their effectiveness is that levels of control and responsibility among different subjects in the security structures are not clearly separated. It seems that controlling, supervising and inspection functions are not developed enough as important elements to implement laws. What is needed is a more direct cooperation with
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institutions such as Auditors, possibly creating classical auditing bodies (such as those that exist in Western countries) as specialized government inspection bodies, but also independent expert institutions and commissions. Although there are certain possibilities for control by the civil society, it seems that these links and relations are very passive and have little influence.12 There is another ‘weak side’ concerning civil society in the area of security. Prominent experts in the civil society, i.e. research institutes, NGOs and media, are rare. For instance, not even one serious NGO dealing with security issues exclusively has appeared. That is why the outside expertise thus far found has little place in the cooperation process with policy makers. About the media, there are more critiques than positive remarks in the overall society. They are reflective, operating day-to-day, and a little policy advice can be found in their commentaries. What is new in Macedonia is that ‘security’ and ‘defense’ communities are developing relations with representatives of University and research institutes. Attempts to establish some ‘serious’ non-governmental organizations to close the gap between state institutions and civil society are made. It is a promising process and a lot of activities have been undertaken. Things are moving forward and maybe the best would be to create a regional ‘security community’, a challenge of its own.
5
Civilians and the Military
It seems that the new NATO members have entered a ‘second generation’ phase of civil-military reform, in which democratic control of armed forces must be consolidated, and appropriate civil-military balance found within this framework. The civilian sector must strive to better understand and address the needs of the military; the military must further accept that there is a core role for civilians in the formulation of defense policy.13 In Macedonia the process of transforming civil-military relations is stuck in the middle of the two phases, something has been achieved and something remains to be achieved. Civil-military relations in Macedonia have been strongly influenced by the legacy of the Yugoslav federation. Domestic conditions also have a significant impact on civil-military relations ranging from economic disaster to ethnic tensions. Macedonia almost does not 12 13
P. Lazarevski, P. Atanasov, The setting and exercising… 134. T. Edmunds, Civil-Military Relations in NATOs New Member States: Consolidating Reform, CMR Network Website, A Quarterly Electronic Newsletter, at: http://civilmilitary.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/TCMR%20Papers (June 2000).
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have its own experience in establishing civil-military relations, or more precisely, does not have experience with military intervention in internal political relations. In the transformation process the problem of civilmilitary relations was neglected not only as a part of the political reform, but also as a significant factor of national and regional security.14 The Ministry of Defense is currently the core element in democratic civil-military relations. Some of the most important issues in civil-military relations in the contemporary era of democratic consolidation are addressed in the form and functions of the Ministry of Defense.15 In this respect, establishing the new Ministry of Defense in the Republic of Macedonia in 1992 was not an easy job. Even today the military is calling the civilians ‘civil persons’ (graganski lica), which means civilians who just have some duties that are of no crucial importance. During the process of building new relations the civilians conquered management places in the Ministry of Defense. Having Western training and education, many of the civilians are the actors with most weight in the defense decision-making and planning processes. That was a shock for many military. With the replacement of the old cadre of the military, things are now smoothly going back to, if I may say, normal civil-military track. In due time, civilians also accepted the military experts as valued counterparts. The opposite process is under way of ‘allowing’ the military to use their expertise and knowledge in the planning process and drafting documents for the defense reforms. Labour is divided so that the civilians take care of national strategy of security, democratic control, resources for security, personal management, political goals and engaging the forces and the military take care of military doctrine and tactics, training, military goals and operations. Their mutual tasks are defense strategy, management of defense, some legislative acts and military mission. There is still some overlapping but relations are improving. The lesson learned, from a civilian perspective, should be that if one political party wants to run the Ministry of Defense and the security agencies, it should train and educate its people that should run the security and defense system, teach them to be loyal to the security and defense structures of the state and not to the political party itself. Recruitment, selection and promotion for civilians and military differ. The civilians are subject to the Labor Relations Law, Law on Organization and Work of State Agencies and Law of Civil Servants. In mid-July 2002 for the first time after the foundation of the Army, the Assembly passed 14 15
B. Vankovska, ‘Democratization of Civil-Military Relations…’ 59–60. T. C. Bruneau, Ministries of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations, http://www.ccmr.org/public/library (August 2001).
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the Law on Service in the Army, which prescribes numerous rights for members of the Army deriving from the specifics of the military service and is a base for many regulations. But these days more interest surrounds the questions about numbers reduction to accommodate a new reform concept for 2007. The number of the officers should be reduced by 700, that of civilians employed in the Army by 950, conscripts by 1,163, and civilians in the Ministry of Defense by 690. The peace formation of the Army is transformed to 12,858 personnel. The plans are focused on increasing the number of professional soldiers and non-commissioned officers while reducing the number of officers, conscripts and civilians in the Army. The main body of the armed forces will consist of two active brigades, two priority reserve brigades and six territorial reserve brigades. The infantry will consist of rapid reaction forces, reserve strategic forces and supporting forces. There will be special forces, two tanks battalions etc. The reform process will also modernize the equipment by 2007. This is the most important defense reform done so Macedonia could get closer to NATO membership. Also, among the reform tasks are strengthening the democratic control and enhancing plans for training civilian experts for defense.
6
International Influence
Due to the crisis of 2001 the fight against terrorism became one of basic tasks of Macedonian security forces. In this respect the revised Defense Strategy will evaluate new risks related to terrorism, proliferation, organized crime and extremism. The emphasis will be on the domestic terrorism that destabilized Macedonia in 2001 and is still producing incidents by extremist groups that are connected with organized crime, namely illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings. According to estimates there are approximately 500,000 illegal pieces of small arms and light weapons in Macedonia. This is a heavy task for the Macedonian security services and demands a lot of efforts to keep under control. The Law for the Voluntary Collecting of the Weapons entered into force and a assistance is expected from international actors, even from within the region. The issue of organized crime (strategic crime) is so acute that in many areas it is negatively influencing the efficiency of state structures and security. The assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dzindzic is a clear example of this. The Macedonian government has started discussions on changing some constitutional provisions in order to give more mechanisms and resources to security structures for fight against organized crime and terrorism. The first is constitutional Article 17 related to guarantees on freedom and confidentiality of letters and all other means of communication that
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will allow security structures to apply special technical means. The debate rages on. The Republic of Macedonia supported the coalition led by USA in fighting against terrorism in Iraq. The decision of the Macedonian support for anti-terrorist coalition against Iraq was not publicly supported. In a poll of the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje done one month before the attack, 80% of the respondents did not agree with any engagement of Macedonia in the attacks on Iraq. The Macedonian public is against the war in general, but they are also against the terrorism from which they suffered in 2001 and up to date. Macedonia joined the international fight against terrorism knowing how easy it is for some extremist groups to use terrorism and harm national security. The events of 9/11 showed the extent of the range and consequences of the terrorist attacks. Macedonia, in accordance with NATO initiatives, Membership Action Plan and Planning and Review Process, declared the forces and capacities that should be engaged in humanitarian and peace keeping missions. Macedonia has already sent four officers in ISAF-2 in Afghanistan, and ten professional soldiers in ISAF-3. The decisions were legal only after the approval of the Assembly. Macedonian soldiers will also be a part of the post-conflict reconstruction mission in Iraq. International standards greatly influenced the Macedonian reform processes, democratic control standards and civil-military relations. Participating in many training, debates, seminars, education courses, Macedonian experts became a part of a wider ‘security community’. Security sector reform is definitely connected with achieving international standards. These apply to defense policy, resource and personnel management, planning and budgeting processes and interoperability with multinational forces. Macedonia is also participating in Southeast European multinational peace brigade stationed in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, together with other countries in the region. The civilian and democratic control process is progressing. But, civil-military relations are something that are purely domestic. In this regard, there is still ground for many improvements and upgrading.
7
Final Word
The national security system of the Republic of Macedonia was established from the top. What does that mean? That means that if we imagine the national security system as a body which is producing light from some high point, then there is a risk that the light will not cover all the spots in the society, but there is also a risk that that light will not cover even the bigger parts of the society. In that case the system is not fulfilling its
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function entirely.16 If we stress that the conflict of 2001 suffered from this perspective then the reforms in the security sector should overcome this approach establishing bottom up security and producing a stable and integrated society. This can also be done through democratic style of civilmilitary relations. A bottom-up approach is needed for better human security, for reducing ethnic tensions and eliminating rampant organized crime. All of this together will open the door for more security and prosperity.
16
P. Atanasov, ‘The setting of the National Security System’, Defense Magazine (Odbrana), XI: 75 (2002).
Romania’s Participation in the Fight Against International Terrorism: Implications for CivilMilitary Relations and the Security Sector Reform Claudiu Degeratu
1
Immediate Reactions
As many states in the world, Romania became aware of the imperative to better articulate national institutions’ responsibilities in terrorism prevention and countering. This realization is meant to sustain Romania’s own security objectives and its international cooperation démarche. Romania’s “National Security Strategy”, a fundamental document, also sets one of the main lines of action, the consolidation of the institutional system to ensure national security, in order to respond efficiently to a whole range of risks and threats, including terrorism1. Romania’s fundamental interests2 imposed an integrated approach in order to attain a superior organizational stage: designing an inter-institutional mechanism meant to prevent and counter terrorism, that could respond to the specific challenges of the current security context, by national procedures and international cooperation. This integrated approach covers the following: x Interests and necessities for Romania’s internal security, which call for the strengthening of its self-protection mechanisms against transborder threats, terrorism included, x Enacting the principle of solidarity and engaging Romania in a political attitude against international terrorism by means of concrete measures meant to ensure the increase of the Romanian national contribution to the fight against international terrorism within biand multi-lateral cooperation. Taking into consideration the fundamental interests and objectives of Romania, the Supreme Council for National Defense appointed the Romanian 1 2
National Security Strategy, Bucharest, 2001, p. 19. Op. cit., p. 8–9.
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Intelligence Service as “national authority” in the area of preventing and countering terrorism (Decision 00140/ October 2001). According to this decision, a “National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism” was to be drawn by the representatives of the 24 institutions that form the “National Antiterrorist System”3. This document was presented to the Supreme Council for National Defense, which approved it in April 2001, and it refers to legal regulations and the implementation framework; aspects concerning an integrated approach to the terrorist phenomenon; objectives, organizational structure, principles and directions for preventing and combating terrorism and implementation of the national system for preventing and combating terrorism.
2
Romania’s Participation in the International Coalition Against Terrorism
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States, Romania has been firmly combating terrorism, fully aware of its responsibilities. The Romanian government and Parliament swiftly defined their stand and decided on concrete contributions Romania could pledge as a strategic partner of the United States and as a de facto NATO ally. Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the President of Romania convened the Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND) in emergency session4. During the meeting, the SCND adopted the Resolution on Romania’s participation alongside NATO member states aimed at combating international terrorism. On 13 September 2001, Romania presented its offer to make available a Search-and-Rescue Team to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Center. On 27 September 2001, the Romanian Prime Minister decided to set up the Inter-ministerial Committee for Crises Situations in order to identify and implement UN Security Council Resolution no. 1333/2000 regarding the situation in Afghanistan. Working groups have been set up within the ministries concerned in order to address topical issues related to their specific areas. The working groups co-operate with experts from the Romanian intelligence services5. 3
4
5
See also www.sri.ro for the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism and related aspects. Message of the Presidential Administration in Jeffrey Simon and Mihail Ionescu, eds., Combating Terrorism – NATO and Transatlantic Dimension, Bucharest, 2002, Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, p. 22. See also www.guv.ro.
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On 19 September 2001, the Romanian Parliament, at NATO’s request, would provide the Alliance all facilities related to its air, ground or maritime space as support for possible counter-terrorism operations. Parliament also approved the increase of the Romanian contribution to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) for the entire duration of these missions’ mandates or until competent international organizations will formulate a different request. This proved to be a very practical contribution, having in mind the NAC decision of 4 October 2001 to backfill Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility required to directly support operations against terrorism. Starting with 1 October 2001, the Ministry of National Defense implemented a set of urgent measures aiming at providing appropriate support for the United States and NATO member states within the Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle operations. In this respect, the Ministry of National Defense issued authorization for national air space use, providing approval for the transit flight of US aircraft in medical evacuation and support missions, including troops and dangerous materials transportation6. Romania properly adjusted its National Annual Program to prepare its integration into NATO. The documents contain specific goals and a package of domestic measures against terrorism. Romania expressed full support and associated itself with the North-Atlantic Council Decisions of 4 October on the implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty7. Accordingly, Romania has aligned itself according to the EU Plan of Action of 21 September. Romania is also a party to the Declaration and the Plan of Action of the Warsaw Summit of countries from Central and Eastern Europe of 6 November 2001. Romania participates in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) with a military police platoon (25 military), a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and three liaison officers8. The Romanian contribution in ISAF and Enduring Freedom Operation in Afghanistan represents the application of the political and military engagements assumed by Romania in support of the international coalition against terrorism. This participation also stands as a confirmation of the determination and willingness of Romania to act as a strategic partner of the United States, member of the Partnership for Peace and de facto ally of NATO in the combating of terrorism “by all means necessary, including
6 7 8
George Cristian Maior in Jeffrey Simon and Mihail Ionescu (2002), op.cit., p. 13–14. Ibidem, p. 14. See also, www.mapn.ro; www.mae.ro.
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military”, in accordance to the Decision no. 19/09.19.2001 of the Parliament of Romania. On 21 December 2001, the Parliament of Romania has approved the participation in the International Force of Assistance for Security Afghanistan, created on the grounds of the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1386. The Romanian offer consisted in the immediate entrance in the Operation’s Theatre of 15 Military MDs including their transportation: x Sending within 10 days, when needed, an NBC company consisting of 70 troops, x Sending, within a month, of a Military Police platoon (25 troops, with an option to increase the number to 30), including transportation with a Romanian Air-Forces C-130 Hercules into theatre, x Sending a mountain troops company, consisting of 170 troops.
3
Romania’s Package of Legislative Measures
Alongside with the other 18 states that take part in the ISAF, Romania contributes, starting on 3 February 2002 with: one platoon of Military Police (25 troops), one C-130 transport aircraft with two flight crews and maintenance personnel (20 troops), three liaison officers, of whom one is in Afghanistan and the other two serve with the ISAF strategic command unit. Furthermore, 9 General Staff officers serve with the ISAF command unit in Kabul, in accordance with the approval issued by the Parliament of Romania on 20 March 2002. Among the tasks assigned to the Romanian military personnel are: patrol and traffic control missions, protection for officials and civil objectives, inquiries, anti-terrorist control, special cargo. The C-130 aircraft lies at the disposal of the ISAF command for missions of personnel, military material and equipment transport, as well as for humanitarian actions9. Within the program of assistance to train the Afghan National Guard, Romania contributes with training material and ammunition. The Romanian offer also includes instructing officers for special troops, training ammunition and auxiliary equipment as well as light machine-guns. On 30 April 2002, the Romanian Parliament has approved the participation in the Enduring Freedom Operation, by means of the Decision no. 15/2002. Participating in Enduring Freedom, Romania joins the 19 states that effectively contribute to the force numbering over 16,000 troops 9
ISAF Operation in www.mapn.ro.
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deployed in the area of responsibility of the Command Centre of the Operation in Tampa, Florida, USA. In firm and prompt response to the imperative to fight terrorism, and in correlation with political initiatives, Romania adopted a package of legislative measures aimed at preventing and combating acts of terrorism and the use of the financial-banking systems to finance such acts: x On 25 October 2001 the Romanian Government adopted an Emergency Ordnance drastically criminalizing terrorist acts and their perpetrators or sponsors, x On 15 November the Romanian Government adopted an Emergency Ordinance to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts. According to the provisions of the ordinance, financial and banking transactions between Romanian citizens and/or foreign residents and entities for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts are prohibited. The willful provision or collection, directly or indirectly, of funds with the intent or knowledge to carry out terrorist acts, is criminally prosecuted and sanctioned with 5 to 20 years of jail and revocation of some civil rights. On 19 November, the National Defense Supreme Council approved the organizational structure of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) and of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) in order to restore and strengthen the capabilities of the two institutions. The new SRI and SIE strategies refer to combating terrorism and relations with other foreign intelligence agencies10. In addition to these measures, Romania took the following steps: x Setting-up an inter-institutional working group in charge of analysis and review of the legislation in force to ensure Romania’s legal participation in fighting terrorism, x Promoting the law on the National System for Emergency and Crisis Situation Management. The new law will provide the framework for setting-up a unified risk monitoring system and will establish the authorities in charge with monitoring the evolution of emergency and crisis situation,
10
Gheorghe Fulga, ‘The Contribution of the Romania Intelligence Services to the National Demarche for Euro-Atlantic Integration’ in Năstase, Adrian, ed., Romania-NATO 2002, Monitorul Oficial, Bucharest, 2002, p. 113–119.
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x Implementing a set of measures to prevent and combat trans-border organized crime. On 21 November 2001, the Romanian Parliament adopted the Law on Preventing and Combating the Trafficking of Human Beings.
4
Policy Decisions and Actions at the Regional and Multilateral Levels
At the regional level, Romania proposed concrete measures to enlarge the scope of the Bucharest-based Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime of the South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to cover terrorism, which is closely related to organized crime11. Within the follow-up process of SEECAP, Romania promotes initiatives regarding the cooperation of the South East European countries in fighting terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Romania initiated in SEEGROUP the drafting of an inventory of anti-terrorism measures in South East Europe12. As Chairman-in-Office of the SEDM, Romania initiated a project on WMD non-proliferation, border security and counter-terrorism, endorsed by the Defense Ministers of the SEDM states, in Turkey, on 18–20 December 200113. Romania cooperates at the regional level to combat arms and drug trafficking, as well as to eradicate illegal activities such as smuggling, money laundering and fiscal evasion, all of which contribute to the financing of terrorist networks. As Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in 2001, Romania strongly advocated the need for a comprehensive initiative to set common priorities and an Action Plan within the OSCE framework. As a result, on 4 December 2001 the Ministerial Council of the OSCE adopted The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism14. Romania is party to numerous conventions regarding terrorism and organized crime, such as15:
11 12 13 14 15
Annual Report, 2002 at www.secicenter.ro. George Cristian Maior in op.cit., p.14. See also www.sedm.mapn.ro and for SEEBRIG, www.seebrig.pims.org. See also www.OSCE.org. See also www.mae.ro.
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At the multilateral level: x Convention on Narcotic Drugs (New York, 1961), x Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963), x Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague, 1970), x Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1971), x Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 1971), x Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (New York, 1973), x International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 1979), x Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, 1980), x Protocol of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of the Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1988), x Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platform Located on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 1988), x UN Convention on Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 1988), x Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Montreal, 1991). At the regional level: x x
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Strasbourg, 1977), Cooperation Agreement between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey on Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Money Laundering, Arms and Human Trafficking and other Major Crimes (Antalya, 1998),
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x x x x
Protocol on the Cooperation between Bulgaria, Greece and Romania for Combating Crime, especially Trans-border crime (Sofia, 1998), Cooperation Agreement between participating states in BSEC on Combating Crime, especially Organized Crime (Kerkyra, 1998), Treaty between Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine on Cooperation for Combating Crime (Kiev, 1999), Agreement on Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Trans-border Crime – SECI Agreement (Bucharest, 1999).
Romania signed 17 bilateral treaties in connection with the fight against terrorism and organized crime. Preparations are under way to ratify the following treaties signed by Romania: At the multilateral level: x UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb Attacks (New York, 1997), x International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 1999), x UN Convention against Trans-border Organized Crime and Adjacent Protocols (New York, 2000). At the regional level: x European Convention on Money Laundering, Search, Impounding and Confiscation of Assets as a Result of Criminal Activity (Strasbourg, 1990), x European Agreement on Illicit Trafficking by Sea, in applying art. 17 of the UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Strasbourg, 1995), x Penal Convention against Corruption (Strasbourg, 1999), x Civil Convention against Corruption (Strasbourg, 1999). Internal procedures have been initiated in order to speed up the ratification of 7 more bilateral treaties. At the same time, Romania is currently negotiating other 21 agreements with countries all over the world, covering different aspects of the fight against terrorism and organized crime.
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Romanian Civil-Military Relations in the Post-September 11 Context
After September 11 the main forces behind the reform and restructuring process of the armed forces have been both civil and military. The main lesson of September 11 proved that the “wait and see” policy is no longer suitable for the country and society. This kind of policy has an intrinsic defensive nature, focused on domestic protection. Debates around a new preventive policy were firmly oriented toward an accelerated reforming process in terms of norms, rules and decision-making process. I will assess these three levels in order to emphasize what kind of implications for civil-military relations we can identify in this context. The Romanian strategic leadership has experience in such complex international crises. We have to remember that starting with the first Gulf War our political elite has been involved, internally and externally, in a very complicated process of consultation. These consultations were based on norms and laws, which reflect checks and balances among the main forces. After the terrorist attacks in the USA we observe better dynamics between them. First of all, most of the preeminent leaders paid attention to coordination with the main institutions of the Presidency, Parliament and Government. In fact it was obvious for the entire public that both decisionmakers and experts were involved in the same process. One of the priorities during the first several days was to set up a national strategy which would be integrative and multidimensional. This framework will be supported by the military and that was another good signal to the society that the strategic leadership has achieved a new qualitative level in the last years. It is important to mention that starting in the early 1990s the debate about Romanian strategic culture focused more on national security strategy and less on civil-military relations. The issue has been recognized as being part of the reform process and gradually became more important. Taking into consideration the communication process between the leadership and the military, it is important to mention the mutual exchange of information in order to generate consensus about the post-September 11 events. We can assess that the core of the Romania’ s strategy was to collect as many as possible points of view and positions in order to have a real collective process. This comprehensive approach included political parties, national agencies, unions, mass media and other bodies of Romanian society. Acting in common was the key word for political forces and civil society. Both President Iliescu and Prime Minister Nastase declared that it is fundamental to build an internal solidarity based on the existing political consensus on the main national interests: “We must turn to good account
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the developments generated by the 11 September 2001 terror attacks by developing an efficient response to the new security challenges. This response means a new model of security, one based on cooperation to which all nations should contribute”, Adrian Nastase declared. Another common position has been on the Romania’s strategy for NATO integration. As Romanian officials underlined, the 11 September 2001 attacks triggered fundamental changes but did not invalidate the NATO enlargement agenda. In fact this agenda has been developed better in accordance with the Prague Summit decisions. In this sense Romanian military expertise was fruitful in its efforts to identify the new trends in the Alliance and to advise the civil decision-makers in order to do the necessary changes in our strategy. For instance the adoption of the new National Security Strategy in December 2001 was smooth and rapid due to the fact that our parliamentarian steering committees and National Supreme Council for Defense benefited from a new military assessment on non-military risks. Based on this new view, the drafting process for a new Military Strategy has been started, which will include a new approach on the fight against terrorism. Another important test for Romanian civil-military relations was the participation in the international coalition operations in Afghanistan. The Parliament has played an important role in supporting the Executive proposals. Parliament’s role is manifested in a large spectrum: the role of the military body in the fight against international terrorism, the budget and its structure related with the new programs from security sectors, the National Security Strategy adopted in December 2002, ratification of agreements related with the international cooperation in this issue, preparing the population and improving the communication with the civil sphere of the society, new law on economy and preparation of the territory for defense, the conditions of the state of siege or emergency, other legal documents that have impact on armed forces activity. Other important forms of parliamentarian control were: accounts, reports concerning the terrorists’ activities and evolution, information and documentation visits in the entire security sector. Parliament’s Steering Commissions on Defense, Public Order and Intelligence Services was in charge for the thorough analysis of all draft laws, emergency ordinances and other legislative proposals submitted that refer to matters of interest to the security sector reform after 11 September. At the Executive level, as has been underline above, the Prime Minister was one of the promoters of the idea that our strategy toward NATO has to be adapted in accordance with NATO transformation process. First of all, the idea of new risk assessment methods, an idea very often mentioned inside NATO, was also a priority for the Romanian leadership,
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for many reasons. Our location on the Southern flank, our close relations with Middle East countries and our location on strategic routes linking the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia beg new risk assessment methods. That is why from fall 2001 the Romanian official position was in favor of a common risk assessment for South East Europe and the establishment of a more institutionalized framework for cooperation among the civil-military and intelligence sectors from NATO candidate countries, PfP countries and others from the region. A second important issue internalized in Romanian civil-military relations is the importance and necessary management of transnational risks, which make the socio-economic and security sectors vulnerable. For instance, on 4 April 2002, the Romanian government adopted a comprehensive Reform Agenda, addressing critical changes Romania is committed to make after the Prague Summit. The agenda includes broad initiatives against corruption, measures for speeding-up economic reform and privatization, reform of the military and intelligence services to fight against terrorism, protection of classified information, preventive measures against illegal trafficking activities. Civil society was involved to a larger extent than ever before in debating the implications on NATO enlargement of 11 September on the reform of the Alliance, on the Euro-Atlantic security context, and on the role of Romania in the international coalitions against terrorism. Cooperation between governmental and non-governmental institutions on these issues has been extensively developed since September 2001. Civil society-driven events related with this topic were very broad and included round tables, national and international seminars and presence in written and electronic media. It is important to mention the role of the Romanian Euro-Atlantic Council (a consortium of four NGOs comprised of the Manfred Wörner Euro-Atlantic Association , the NATO House Association, the George C. Marshall-Romania Association and the EURISC Foundation) in this debate. These NGOs generated a big number of public events in which civil and military experts were invited to contribute to the dialogue with representatives from the Executive and Parliament. From the military point of view the entire debate was an important starting point for the building of a new vision on military affairs after 11 September. Most of the military leaders and experts recognized the importance of this issue and started presenting their thoughts. Some of their conclusions are important for the next draft of the Military Strategy and could be summarized as follows. Firstly, the reach of the terrorists’ networks is the most important feature of this asymmetric threat. Secondly, the security context is vulnerable at the national, regional and international levels. That is why combating
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terrorism is not anymore just a matter of the security services; more efficient would be a close cooperation among intelligence, Special Forces, and police (including border police). For most Romanian military experts, terrorism belong more and more to the conflict spectrum so that the Romanian armed forces have to develop new missions such as identification of terrorist threats, preparation for crisis and complex emergencies management, preventive measures to protect military bases and missions against terrorist attacks and post-attack recovery missions at the national and international levels. All these missions are carefully developed in the new draft of the Military Strategy. The development of Special Forces, highly trained rapid reaction forces ready to cope with conventional or asymmetric threats is an important priority. A new Plan for the Preparation of Military personnel for Prevention and Combating of Terrorist Attacks and last but not least, the NBC System Concept are also priorities of the Romanian Armed Forces.
6
Conclusions
The invitation of Romania to enter NATO will speed up the process of reforming the security culture including the preventive antiterrorist strategy. Immediately after 11 September 2001 it has been proved that security sector reform helps the process of better integration in the international coalition against terrorism. Thanks to NATO Prague Summit decisions and the farsighted measures taken by Romanian leadership the contribution for combating terrorism was more effective than in other crisis situations. An important strategic option for Romania is the promotion of new educational programs in security studies, is the most effective long-term policy. Together with the educational programs of the National Defense College, the recent program “NATO Senior Executive Master” run by the NATO Study Center16 and the “Security and Defense Studies Master Program” of the University of Bucharest are important assets in order educate more experts in security sector. Finally, two other options in Romania’s antiterrorist policy are ready to meet the expectations of the Euro-Atlantic community. The first is to increase inter-agency cooperation and, secondly, to use all Romania’s regional policies and other regional arrangements available in South East Europe, in the Black Sea Region and in the Caucasus. 16
See also www.snspa.ro.
The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in FRY/the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro Dragan Simiü
1
Introduction
Theoretical speculations and researches on the relations between the civil and the military sectors of society, as well as, between the political and military decision-makers, in a narrow sense, almost regularly appeared as a consequence of the demand of ‘real reality’. Actually, there are few examples of such stipulation of theoretic thinking with concrete reality. On the other hand, there are few subjects of research overlapping to such an extent with other phenomenon, relations, processes and situations, as is the case of the military factor: the army represents, almost without exception, the concise expression of one society’s condition and relations. Therefore, elaboration of this topic, which assumes prior “sociologically broad” information about society, whose civil-military relations reached a level of democratic civil control over the army and the police, as well as a reform pattern of the security sector are taken under consideration. The “case” of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is sui generis in full meaning of this term; starting from the middle of the 20th century, the former “second Yugoslavia” created very unusual social relations, till civil wars in 1990s, which delayed the so-called transition processes that were already taking place in East and Southeast Europe for more than a decade. Therefore, for a thorough comprehension of the evolution of civil-military relations in Serbia and Montenegro, is especially important to research roots and reasons, which apparently have an influence on today’s situation. Using this approach, with respect to concrete particularities it would be possible to evaluate the actual condition, in order to integrate our society into existing broader security and economic structures through necessary and inevitable changes. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the almost fully isolated evolution of civil-military relations in the past decade must be pointed out in relation to changes which in Western liberal democratic societies led to a redefinition of system and functions of modern security. To be clearer, it is related to a way of thinking and to the overall security
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culture connected to the pre-modern, partially modern, versus the forthcoming postmodern approach. This naturally should not question the necessity of homogenization and adjustment of Southeast European countries’ existing national security systems in order torespond successfully to new security challenges and threats for practical rather than theoretical needs. On the contrary! The rise of so called complex terrorism1 – a serious enough threat, along with all the old and the new security challenges and threats, with its effects on national, collective and global levels made the issue even more deserving of a special research focus.
2
Historical-Traditional Fulcrum: Position and Role of the Army in the Social Life of Serbia and Montenegro
One peculiarity is related to background influences of this sensitive and complex field. The present situation has significantly deeper historical and traditional roots, which is the case with the majority of other nations in Southeast Europe. The point is that during history, and even at present, there exists a purposeful mythology of the army, whose proportion makes it an almost untouchable social/national institution.2 In the mind of the people and also normatively-institutionally, the army, along with the Church made a crucial contribution in creating and maintaining the national state – and not only in the narrow sense – but more precisely in the biological and political survival of the nation on this geo-politically troubled territory. Such real or imagined roles have piled layers of irrational mythological attitude towards the army, which was considered an unmistakable interpreter and defender of national interests. An “ontological entity”3, the army has become, and very much remains, the unquestionable factor of identification of Serbian national entity. Aware of the position and role of the army as part of social organization, there are grounds on which could be questioned the possible misuses of such an eminent and privileged position – this is especially true of military elites – which often claimed or fully identified with the given role of sub social rectifier of national, political and social processes. Maybe because
1
2
3
Homer-Dixon, Thomas, The Rise of Complex Terrorism, Foreign Policy, January/ February, 2002. Hadzic, Miroslav, Manjak pretpostavki za demokratsku kontrolu Vojske Jugoslavije, u Demokratska kontrola vojske i policije, CCVO, Beograd, 2001, pp. 63–69. Ibidem, p. 63.
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of that it is not hard to understand why in our case the Platonic question “who guards the guardians?” has never been seriously posed. Even though communist power-holders did everything to destroy previous institutions and relations, the army’s role and place in the national ethos did not change significantly. Using the classical defense function, acting within traditional security patterns which considered only military deterrence and military responses, this institution was also given considerable space in the Constitutions and can interfere in internal social relations using the right and duty to “spread social and political order”. During the second Yugoslavia the ‘exceptional’ social position of the party army manifested itself in its ‘exception’ from democratic civil control. The normative organization of the army’s position and role in society, which is very important for this review, is a case of continuity and relative stability of the initial relations. For example, article 134 of the Constitution from 1946 prescribes for the Yugoslav army, along with other functions to “serve to maintain peace and security”. Furthermore, by constitutional law from 1953, the Federation and consequently its army were given a duty to “protect social and political order” along with the defense of the country. In the article no. 114 of the Constitution from 1963, such an order was defined also as “the sociological, social and political system” which unequivocally shows to which extent the military was an instrument in purpose of defending socialist ideology. This study is made to show that there was no aberration from the principle of ideological assortment of the army de iure and even more de facto, until the proclamation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro Union, in February 2003. If we continue to follow constitutional and legal development of second Yugoslavia, we will realize that with article 3.XLI of the amendment on the Constitution from 1971, the armed forces consisted of JNA and TO, along with other tasks had a task to defend the constitutional order. Finally, the article 240 from the last Constitution of Tito’s Yugoslavia obligates the armed forces to “protect social order of SFRY established by this Constitution”4. Protection of the constitutional order as a value, whose threatening is being defended by the army cannot be problematic in principle. The problem arises from an inadmissible imprecision in defining the content and factors of the concept of constitutional order which is being defended. In order to use the army in the interest of the political community, it is important to specify in detail the possible forms in which the constitutional order can be endangered as well as to determine, unequivocally the procedures 4
Hadzic, Miroslav, Manjak pretpostavki… op. cit., p. 64.
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and means to be undertaken to defend it. Since there have not been such precise explanation, Communist power-holders were left enough space to misuse the army for personal benefit, often against the interest of the citizens. In the absence of democratic civil control, under a “facade democracy”, the army had a client status in relation to arbitrary and unlimited political will.
3
Civil-Military Relations in FRY (1992–2000)
While the other Central and Eastern European countries managed a successful transition to democratic leadership of the armed forces, police and secret services in a redefined security context, the former Yugoslavia sank in civil war. The JNA was divided according to national pattern, guided by narrow-minded interests and ideological blindness of the top generals and its parts were subordinated to the nationalist republican political elites. The ideology of socialism, prevailing till then, was replaced by the ideology of nationalism – long standing social discontent was changed into discontent because of the position of the nation, using “alchemical propaganda”. All these peoples saw the possibility for social improvement in creating independent, if possible, mono-ethnic state. Paying no attention to the environment and the changes that occurred in that framework, the elite of the former Yugoslav republics were occupied only with the national security, which they reduced to the level of their own existence in power as the highest national goal. Defense of interests of the national collectivity by the creation of independent states was just a wider framework to cover special goals. Without exception all these societies kept the inherited civil-military relations model of second Yugoslavia: an undemocratic civil control over military and police services. Conceptually, systemically and functionally, security which in the last decades of the 20th century broadened in its numerous non-military forms5 was reduced to national territorial defense. The object and subject of security were seen in this state in a narrow sense while the threats and responses were considered and practiced almost exclusively in a military aspect.
5
See in: Gartner, Heinz, Hyde-Price, Adrian, and Reiter, Erich (eds.), Europe’s New Security Challenges, London, Boulder, CO., 2001; Buzan, Barry, Weaver, Ole, and de Wilde, Jaap, A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publisher, London, 1998; Simic, Dragan, Nauka o bezbednosti – savremeni pristupi bezbednosti, Sluzbeni List SRJ/FPN, Beograd, 2002.
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The case of former Yugoslavia convincingly backs previous statements. Moreover, the absence of democratic and civil control over the army and police here is a direct consequence of the nature of the political system and form of governance in the newly created state, and also of the way the state was created. If the influences of the ideological and traditionally mythological factors are to be added, we get a situation in which democratic institutions and processes are not possible. Even before the new state was proclaimed, Milosevic had achieved complete personal control over the army. “Democratic” procedure and feigned pluralism were just a cover for unlimited power. Actually, the decisions previously taken by one man were legalized afterwards just in such a system. When everything said is taken under consideration then normative solutions are not of great importance for sociological-political analysis. However, even that new state was created in a non-constitutional way. For example, the Constitutions of Serbia and FRY are not in concordance, which has led to the interaction of two opposite legal orders from which numerous unpunished violations of the Serbian Constitution were derived. Furthermore, the adoption of unconstitutional laws fully derogated the rule of law opening the door for mass violations of human, minority and civil rights. Former Yugoslavia in ten years of existence, a transitory and unstable creation, had only the army as a federal institution which operated on the territory of both republics, if we exclude the territory of Kosovo and Metohija that became in 1999 an international protectorate. Civil non-democratic control over the army and police as Milosevic’s regime had, additionally came from the gaps in the Constitution of FRY6. The Yugoslav army was also given the role of “defender of the constitutional order” by the Constitution (article 133, paragraph 1), but narrowing the definition, allowing for misuse. Along with the lack of clarity and overlapping of certain rights and obligations on issues of defense and security between the federal state and the republics7, our attention is especially deserved in connection with the organization of the leadership of the army. In article 135 of the Constitution it is written that: “The Yugoslav army in war and peace is led by President of the Republic, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Council of Defense”, which consisted of “the President of the Republic and Presidents of the member Republics”, while the President of the Republic is “the President of Supreme Council of Defense”. The President of FRY explicitly and personally was given the right to independently “place, promote and release officers of the Yugoslav 6 7
Hadzic, Miroslav, Manjak pretpostavki… op. cit., p. 76. Ibidem, p. 76–79.
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army determined by federal law, to place and release presidents, judges and court juries of the military courts and military prosecutors”. Even this lack of clarity is not visible at first glance, because the relations between the President of FRY and the Council respect the principle of unity of command and subordination of the decisions of the Council was a responsibility of the President of FRY, by which was avoided simultaneously non-harmonized command. Despite that, the concept of collective command of the army was not consistently and fully carried out. Considering that the Constitution does not determine the decisionmaking procedure in the Supreme Council for Defense (VSO), it is uncertain whether decisions are taken by consensus or by majority vote. Nor does it specify whether quorum needs to be achieved to reach decisions. All that can produce serious consequences in practice: to endanger the principle of equality of the member republics and/or to make possible the misuse of the army. There was also neither a procedure to coordinate between the command of the President of FRY and the VSO decisions, nor of the ability to verify the legality of his undertakings and their possible recall. On the other hand there were provided no procedures whereby responsibility of the Council and its members would be set, though in the broader interpretation of the Constitution the Assembly could control this body. To this are added teh opaque requirements for imposing a state of emergency, leaving a strong political will with the door wide open to potentially use the army outside the constitutional framework. Particular dangers are hidden in insufficiently defined legal possibilities. The one who imposes state of emergency may limit the rights and liberties of the citizens. Therefore, in cases of extreme danger for state and society, when restrictive measures are inevitable to defend democratic institutions and processes, political powers have too great a space for abuse. When the relation between the Ministry of Defense and Headquarters of Yugoslav army is at stake, their wartime and peacetime responsibilities are not detached and also the supervision of the Ministry of Defense over the Headquarters is not consistently determined, which is one of the main premises of democratic civil control over the military sector. The fact that a civilian occasionally acted as Minister of Defense, in the situation where the Ministry of Defense is mainly composed of military persons, is not sufficient enough to set “the chain of command” properly in a democratic order. It is hard to talk about the existence of civil control over the army when the main inspection, security service, and intelligence service are in the composition of the Headquarters and not in the Ministry of Defense. Until the changes in October 2000, in spite of its unfinished ideological as well as moral formation under the burden of the heritage of defeat in the
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secessionist wars the Yugoslav army showed indisputable proficiency – though it was actually misused on the behalf of the regime at that time. The security sector was non-systemic, mainly on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, reacting post factum and ad hoc against certain security challenges and threats in that period. It is a collection rather than a system of institutions devoid of national security strategy, defense doctrine and legal elaboration which met the new millennium. Directly confronted with terrorist acts lasting several years in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as correctly foreseeing similar possible security endangerments, at the beginning of the 1990s, the state formed the “Cobras” special elite unit precisely with such this intention.
4
Civil-Military Relations in Serbia and Montenegro (2000–2003)
The period marks the beginning of the security sector reforms and the establishment of democratic civil control over the army and the police. Two phases should be distinguished; from October 2000 till the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003; and immediately after that following the murder of Prime Minister Djindjic and the state of emergency in Serbia. The democratic opposition of Serbia, composed of parties which until recently were mainly giving legitimacy and legality to extortion policies, came to power on the wave of unprecedented and magnificent civil protest in October 2000. Confrontations within the political coalition in power, mainly because of short-term considerations of being in power through repressing coalition partners, the conflict of two leading parties, but also objective and non-conceptual big challenges of reconstruction, almost destroyed the social, and above all economic tissue, obstructed DOS decision-makers in involving in the reforms of inherited institutions and relations. Consequently, many wrong moves were made, which is hard to be explained and justified. All these failures culminated in the murder of Prime Minister Djindjic and the imposition of emergency measures. Apparently, the ruling coalition did not prepare a plan for security sector reform which they could start realizing immediately after they came to power. Furthermore, the leaders of this coalition left an impression that they did not realize that the reform of this sector is a precondition for suc-
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cessful reform of all social institutions and relations.8 This is of specific importance for the societies which are from top to bottom enveloped in organized crime. Instead of starting the security sector reform in conditions most favourable for such a thing, immediately after taking power using radical personnel changes, almost all from the old regime got the required time to consolidate and continue of their activities in accordance with old patterns of behaviour. The process of starting radical security sector reforms has been replaced by mixed and unusual individual compromises by some leaders of the ruling coalition with eminent military and police persons, trying to influence these centers of power. Apparently considering that they should be grateful to the army and police generals, especially to the commanders of the special units for not provoking violent incidents, and in that way made possible a velvet revolution, political leaders of DOS naïvely thought that these forces could be placed in client relation, in order to achieve personal party, collective, even individual interests, just as it was done during decades until the crash of the Milosevic regime. Therefore, it was possible that the new authority did not comprehend seriously enough the rebellion of the special unit “Red Berets”, as well as almost daily killings on the streets of Serbian cities, including the assassination of police general Bosko Buha. Still without the necessary systemic and normative prerequisites, security sector reform and democratic civil control over the army and the police has been delayed even though occasional statements by ruling coalition officials hinted at Serbian integration in Euro-Atlantic security and economic institutions. This is an objective obstacle that led to the “imitation of security sector reform” from the very start. It is hard, if not impossible, to reform something that actually does not exist. To be more precise, reform of the, security system could not be adequately discussed in a situation of parallel existence of two authorities, while legally elected Montenegro authority does not recognize the federal state and does not respect its regulations, and part of territory of the Republic of Serbia, province Kosovo and Metohija is under the protectorate of the international community. Maybe the beginning of desirable profound changes in the security sector occurred after the successful resolution of the national conflict in Southeast Serbia (2000/01), when in cooperation and crucial assistance of the international community, the crisis was overcome in the interest of peace and stability not only in our country but also in region as a whole. 8
Edmunds, Timothy, Reforma sektora bezbednosti: koncepcije i realizacija, Vojno delo, 1/2003, Beograd, p. 37.
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For example, the Federal government’s decision to rename the Ministry of Defense into the Ministry of the Yugoslav army (October 2000–January 2001) gives evidence about the ignorance of what is actually going on in this field. Not only did this move contradict the real needs of our society concerning defense and security, but also it led to a redefinition of the security concept, which was reduced only to its military factor and territorial defense, not to mention economic, political, cultural, social and ecological security dimensions and international, global and above all, individual security levels. It has neglected an important distinction of collective defense and collective security, the importance of cooperation in achieving, maintaining and improving security; it was in conflict with overcoming the security dilemma model.9 In such an environment, the so-called non-governmental sector and civil society had their influence on political processes disabled. With the exception of some specialized non-governmental organizations10, the “third sector” barely interfered in the security domain. In addition, the civil nongovernmental experts had a very weak effect on the security discussion. The modified security concept, new ideas and theoretical approaches, simply the new security thinking are at stake here above all. Educational institutions and institutes, which recently had exclusive right to study and teach security issues, are at the same time deeply influenced by the old, traditional – realistic – pattern of national territory defense, with emphasis on the place and the role of military factor. Recently expert training in the field of global and national security in its wider sense, started at Belgrade University. In civil scientific institutions it is understood that training of new approaches in the field of security, with the purpose of achieving a higher security culture, are necessary preconditions for the successful reform of the security sector and of achieving democratic and civil control over the army and police. Only in that way can military and civil experts be engaged competently in the processes of planning in the field of security and defense, in a common concern of preparing a national security strategy, and concept for defense policy. For the time being this kind of cooperation is still insufficient. Some normative moves and political steps, however, were achieved and undertaken, before the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. Among others, according to their significance, the following should be pointed out: 9
10
Cohen, Richard, and Mihalka, Michael, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, European Center for Security Studies – George C. Marshall, 2001. This is field of Research of The Center for Civil – Military relations, CCMO, Beograd.
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x The Federal Government launched the procedure for joining the Partnership for Peace of NATO, x The Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, in the spring of 2002 announced the reduction of the number of soldiers and officers in two phases up to 65,000, x At the end of 2000 and 2001 the Federal Assembly adopted reduced military budgets, x The Federal Assembly adopted the Law on Security Services of FRY, by which military security service, military intelligence, documentation service of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs its security service were put under the control of the Federal Assembly and Federal Government, x Separate commands of the army, navy, air force and air defense were canceled by decision of the Supreme Council of Defense. Instead nine corps were formed under the command of Headquarters of Yugoslav Army, x Military service was reduced to nine months, and civil service to thirteen months, x Army inspection was put under the command of Supreme Council of Defense, and was renamed into inspection of defense, x A number of generals were sent into retirement while others were promoted, gradually changing the personnel composition of command and management. The Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro was finally adopted under the decisive pressure of the international community in February 2003. The Charter does not provide the necessary normative framework for security sector reform and realization of democratic civil control over the army and the police. The status of the army regulated in chapter VIII of the Constitutional Charter reflects a compromise hence the text is too general and legally weak. This indicates that it would be very difficult to turn them into particular laws and practice. In spite of that, some substantial moves in relation to previous normative solutions were completed. This specifically refers to article 54 of the Constitutional Charter, which defines that “Serbia and Montenegro has army under democratic and civil control”. The Charter doesn’t include the necessary instruments to realize democratic and civil control, because it doesn’t contain legally guaranteed executive power authorization to carry out such a procedure developed in detail. The Federal Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, for example proclaims the defense strategy, but not the
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national security strategy; we have already discussed how security reduced to its narrow sense is dangerous. Especially alarming is the normative assurance of key individual security and inherent human dignity premises are being neglected11. Therefore such an opinion is underestimating the security in the Euro-Atlantic region in which we aspire to integrate. It is also important to say that the original power relations between the two members of the Union are being rated in this way and it is not possible to form a common security system which would provide unity of action in the army, the Republics’ police forces, and of the military and civil secret services. Article 53 of the Constitutional Charter is maybe the best example of the solutions reached by the Constitution drafters, following, above all, the particular interests of the political representatives of the two state community members. Defining “the task of the army is defense of Serbia and Montenegro, in accordance with this Constitutional Charter and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”. But without specifying the common values defended (territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence) the Constitution drafters have succeeded in validating every doubt that our state community resembles a state, and in that way they have opened the space for additional interpretation of this article according to the will, interests and needs of the power-holders. At the end, if by introducing consensus as a decision-making rule in the work of SCD as a supreme commander of the army is removed the possibility of over-voting power the question of a group command of the institution and not the unity of command leaves the issue unsolved. Concerning the question of command, some vagueness remains in the Charter between command and leadership, that is between the Supreme Council of Defense and Ministry of Defense that provide the possibility for dual command of the army. In the Constitutional Charter, according to our opinion, some regulations on the external use of the army are missing, especially when engagement in the international struggle against terrorism and in participation in UN and NATO peace operations is at stake. The Charter doesn’t contain precise enough provisions on relations between the Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro, the Supreme Council of Defense and the Ministry of Defense, so that different interpretations are possible in practice. It especially refers to division of responsibilities in defense and security matters among these bodies. The Charter doesn’t even provide the explicit right of control and supervision over the army and the police to responsible chambers of the Assembly, but such a right can be 11
‘Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity’, President George Bush, West Point Military Academy, New York, NY, June 1, 2002.
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derived from other authorizations of this highest legal body of our state community. Since the adoption of Constitutional Charter, some encouraging steps have been undertaken. Above all this refers to the Headquarters of the Serbian/ Montenegrin Army, which was put under the subordination of the Ministry of Defense, as well as the relocation of the military intelligence and military security service in the domain of the Ministry of Defense. In this way conditions for operational supervision were created. Furthermore, cooperation with The Hague International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was intensified. Lastly, a meeting recently of the Minister of Defense in Brussels confirmed the determination of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to continue approaching and later joining PfP and NATO.
5
Conclusions
The evolution of civil-military relations in the past decade has shown among other things numerous peculiarities and some similarities of the case of FRY/State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in relation to other Southeast European countries. In our case, for example, not until the events in October 2000 were the necessary preconditions for democratic and social changes provided. With regard to the security sector, old patterns of thinking and acting remained until the adoption of the Constitutional Charter and the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. To be more precise, the Constitutional Charter has proclaimed an important, but still insufficient normative framework changes for security sector reform. With regard to the security conditions in our country in the period in question what has changed are the challenges and threats, but not the degree of security endangerment. The most troubling are organized crime, corruption and the violence of the terrorist acts of the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja in the period after October 2000. The country cannot be a regional pillar of security because of normative deficiencies such as the recent ineffective jurisdiction in Montenegro, and international protection of Kosovo and Metohija. This prevents comprehensive security sector reform. Beside these objective obstacles, the leaders of DOS, guided by short-term personal and party interests, neglected security sector reform, which is typical to societies in transition and a precondition for a complete reform of society. The biggest speaker in favor of
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reforms in Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, paid with his life precisely because of these mistakes. One encouraging example of national conflict resolution with terrorist elements in Southeast Europe should be pointed out, when with crucial assistance of international community (NATO, the EU and UNMIK) tensions which could have spilled over to neighboring countries and the region were successfully overcome. It is not possible to conduct security sector reforms and to achieve democratic civil control over the army and the police, without the adoption of a national security strategy from which should derive defense and military doctrines, and adequate laws and regulation. The Constitutional Charter Serbia and Montenegro doesn’t provide the necessary normative premises for such an inevitable and complex undertaking. Ignorance towards a redefined security concept as well as the new global challenges and threats complicates and delays security sector reform. For Serbia and Montenegro, it is essential to change the way of thinking on security and to urgently abandon focusing on national territorial defense and embark on a broader security paradigm. This can be achieved only through cooperation and integration into mainstream security communities (PfP, NATO, EU). This is at the same time important for politicians, members of the army and police but also to the media, experts and the public. Such a strategic turn was initiated at the Faculty of Political Sciences at Belgrade University by founding a Department for Global and National Security Studies. Although valid normative and institutional premises are yet unfulfilled, there is a growing awareness by politicians, experts and the public that our country should take part in an indivisible European and global security. Our participation is strengthened through cooperation in common security undertakings, peace operations, crisis management and above all in the struggle against global terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs and organized crime.
Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia Marjan Malešiþ, Ljubica Jelušiþ
1
Introduction
Slovenia, like the rest of the central-European formerly communist countries, has made enormous progress in the sphere of the democratisation of civilmilitary relations after the end of the Cold War, i.e. in the period, which was, in Slovenia’s case, marked also by newly established state sovereignty in 1991. Therefore, it was not only the end of the historic period, influencing the way of introducing new patterns of behaviour in the security sector1 of Slovenia, but also the fact that a newly independent state had to establish nearly all institutions of political life and governance from scratch. The political elite tried to enforce those features of defense policy, which would clearly show democratic relations within the security sector to the citizens of the state. It was needed to regain legitimacy of defense system, which lost most of its prestige in disputes between former Yugoslav army and Slovenian civil society in the 1980s. There was also a new phraseology deployed in order to label the processes. For example, there were broad public discussions on depoliticisation and ‘de-partisanisation’ of the armed forces, on the appreciation of the human rights within the military sphere, civilian/democratic control of the military, and on the transparency of defense policy and defense budget. All these, and many other issues have shown tendency towards civilian supremacy in all crucial defense policy questions. However, the introduction of a multiparty system, reformed or new political institutions, and modern phraseology, did not eo ipso result in democratic civil-military relations, neither in democratic relations between the security sector and the civil society.
1
The term “security sector” is used to approach the security more holistically, and not to narrow it to questions of military involvement in politics, or civilian control over the armed forces. The first usage of the term security sector is concerned with militarised formations authorised by the state to utilise force to protect the state itself and its citizens. The second approach defines security sector as organisations and activities concerned with provision of security. See: T. Edmunds, ‘Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation’, in W. Germann, T. Edmunds, Towards security sector reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment (Bonn: BICC, DCAF, in print).
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There are certain complications of a constitutional, legislative and political nature within the civil-military relations sphere which underline civil-military relations as a sophisticated phenomenon and emphasise the need for tolerance as they are taking shape on the one hand, and on the other hand, the civilmilitary relations in society that is being democratised are presented as extremely fragile. And it is within this context that the strengthening of civil society and the part played by the public in general can be understood as the conditio sine qua non for the development of civil-military relations. Some analyses of Slovenian civil-military relations show deviations from the normal pattern, as established in a developed democratic society. Interestingly, there are no deviations originating in an interventionist posture of the military, but in the other, civilian side of the military-civil spectrum. Slovenia shares the non-interventionist posture of its military2 with other Central and Eastern European post-communist states. However, civilian political elites have a tendency to abuse the military to fight their own political disputes.3 Civilian control over the armed forces is in many cases narrowed to the clashes between civilian elites on who is going to guard the guards. The understanding of control over the armed forces as fights within the political elite for the predominance and influence on the armed forces is very near to Huntington’s notion of subjective civilian control of the military.4 In other words, the armed forces were the victim of politicisation, i.e., an instrument for political clashes. Civil society (and the public with it) was merely cast in the role of a badly informed onlooker, and a puppet manipulated by the fighting political elite. The rationalising of civilmilitary relations has often taken place at the level of affiliation to the parties of “the Slovenian national awakening” as opposed to the parties of the excommunist provenance.
2
3
4
C. Danopoulos, D. Zirker, ‘Civil-Military Relations Theory in the Post-Communist World: The Role of Religion’, in H. Born et al., Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional States (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002) 117–140. In 1993, a dispute between the President of the Republic, the supreme commander of the armed forces, and the defense minister occurred. The dispute had constitutional and legal basis, however, it was primarily politically and ideologically motivated. Although it was a struggle between two civilians, the dispute had some impact on civil-military relations due to the fact that the officer corps were taking sides in the dispute and became very politicised despite the fact that the military is requested by the law to refrain from political struggle (see M. Malešiþ, ‘Problems in democratic control of the armed forces (two Slovenian cases)’, in K. Haltiner, M. Caparini, H. Born and J. Kuhlmann (eds), Democratic control of the armed forces – How it really works (in print). S. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1995).
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The general survey of the Slovenian case of civil-military relations has brought us to the assumption that Slovenia is to build its civil-military relations in line with its own tradition, political culture and needs, taking into consideration general standards belonging to the model of civil-military relations of the liberal-democratic states.
2
Democratic Oversight of Defense and Security – Legal and Constitutional Issues
Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster argued that forming core institutions for the political control of armed forces belongs to the first-generation problems of civil-military relations.5 The second-generation problems of establishing effective structures for the democratic governance of the defence and security sector are becoming more important when the institutions are formed according to legal prescriptions but they lack substance. Various countries establish civil-military relations and democratic political control over armed forces according to their historical experience, cultural traditions and political culture. However, there are some less common denominators, which could be summarized as follows: x a solid constitutional and legal framework, x accountability of the armed forces to the Government through a civilian defence minister, x co-operation of military representatives with qualified civilians in the process of defining defence requirements, policy and budget; x division of professional responsibility between the civilian and the military sphere, x supremacy and scrutiny of the Parliament over armed forces and defence matters in general and x internal and external (international) transparency of security and defence matters. In Slovenia, the key legal solutions of civilian oversight over the defence and security sector are embodied in the Constitution, Defence Act and other acts of the Republic of Slovenia.6 The legal framework is important 5
6
A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, and A. Forster, ‘The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations’, Armed Forces and Society, 29:1 (Fall 2002) 31–56. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia of December 1991 and The Defense Act of January 1995.
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for understanding the way in which the country establishes civil-military relations according to its own legal and historic tradition. Previously mentioned common denominators of democratic control over the armed forces are embodied in the Slovenian legal framework of civil-military relations. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia provides a general legal framework regulating: x the adoption of multi-party parliamentary democracy, x the division of power between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, x the adoption of national security policy by the National Assembly and x the embodiment of all executive defence activities in a single body – a Ministry of Defence led by a civilian. The Constitution, Defence Act and other acts provide a sound legal basis for the development of democratic civil-military relations with the following characteristics: x the division between civil and military power, the latter being subordinated to the former, x the leadership of the armed forces is with the President of the Republic, x all crucial national security related decisions are made by the National Assembly, x The role of the military in the decision-making process is professional only and not political and x the military is strictly depoliticised and limited to professional military roles.7 According to the Constitution, the citizens have the right to conscientious objection (Article 46), for religious, philosophical and humanitarian reasons (Article 123). If they are not ready to co-operate in military activities, they should be enabled to co-operate in the defence of the country in some other way. Any encouraging of national, racial, religious or other inequality and inflaming national, racial, religious or other hatred and intolerance in
7
We could designate this phenomenon as ‘total political sterility of the military’.
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contrary to the Constitution. Any encouraging of violence and war is also anti-constitutional (Article 63). A state of emergency is declared when major and general danger threatens the existence of the state. The National Assembly, upon the proposal of the Government takes the decision to declare war or a state of emergency, the introduction of precautions and their abolishment. The National Assembly decides on the use of defence forces. In case the National Assembly cannot meet the President of the Republic performs the abovementioned obligations and is obliged to seek the confirmation of the National Assembly as soon as the latter is able to act (Article 92). The President of the Republic represents the Republic of Slovenia, and he/she is a Supreme Commander of the defence forces (Article 102). The sort, scope and organization of defence, intangibility and integrity of state territory are defined by the Defence Act, which is adopted by a two third majority in the National Assembly. The National Assembly exercises control over defence. While assuring its security, the state emanates above all from a pacifist policy and a culture of peace and non-violence (Article 124). The Defence Act forbids the use of armed forces for any kind of political and party activity, and does not allow professional officers to be members of political parties. The armed forces are apolitical and their tasks are purely professional. Military courts were abolished and the members of armed forces are subjected to civil legislation and courts. The Slovenian army could be referred to as apolitical, and as such hardly exerts an influence upon political decisions, even when the issue in question is of military corporate interests8. Or, according to Segal and Huntington9, the relation between the army and society could be said to be professional; however, in Slovenia, the harmony between the two is sometimes relatively low. The National Assembly, as the highest legislative body, defines the national security policy of the state and exercises the control over the armed forces, especially through committees on Defence, on Budget and Finance, Control of the Intelligence Services and on Control of the Realisation of National Security Resolution. Through the allocation of defence funds, the National Assembly supervises the development and equipping of the armed forces. 8
9
One case of that kind was the passing of law regulating the length of service for officers; the latter are expected to sign ten-year collaboration contracts that may be extended for 5 years. The officers hardly said anything for their own benefit: they were forced to accept what the Government decided. S. Huntington, The soldier and the State … 746.
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The Government has the executive role in the defence sphere, and it is accountable for keeping unity and concordance of the defence forces in line with the national security and defence policy. The Government is also responsible for putting defence measures in place, on the basis of the decisions made by the National Assembly. The President of the Republic, as outlined earlier, is Supreme Commander of the defence forces, i.e. of the Slovenian Army.
3
Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector
The National Assembly exercises its control over the security sector by passing laws, adopting the budget and through many other financial channels. The Defence Committee is supposed to be the most powerful and professional body of parliamentary oversight. However, it is comprised of deputies with very modest defence expertise and knowledge, and many of them have no direct experience with the Slovenian military. If they experienced any military training, it was due to their military service in the former Yugoslav People’s Army and not in the Slovenian Army. Therefore, many judge Slovenian military according to their experience in the former Yugoslav military, and they are not aware of the fact that the Slovenian military is very different, smaller in size, with shorter compulsory military service and with a growing number of all-volunteer units for international cooperation. The Defence Committee is mostly engaged in occasional incidents provoked by the Defence Ministry and not so much in the regular difficulties and problems in the development of the Slovenian military. It sometimes happened between 1990–1995, that the Defence Minister effectively deprived the President of the Republic and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of relevant confidential information on the preparedness of the armed forces. The Constitution made it possible, because when it was introduced, there was no detailed legislation on the control of the armed forces. Besides that, some Defence Ministers were the source of political tensions and sometimes scandals. Although they were civilians, they stimulated party politics within the army, contributed to the lowering professionalism of the Slovenian military establishment, and reflected the insufficiently developed democratic political culture in the area of defence. The National Assembly would need more defence knowledge to decide on defence issues, and even more urgently, to exercise professional control over the armed forces. In such a situation, the National Assembly benefits from the low professionalism of the military establishment. The latter is unable to fight for its professional interests and is no serious partner in control issues. As a consequence, professional autonomy is in many cases
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a subject of control (politicians deal with professional military issues), instead of executing effective control over issues that are supposed to be civilian-controlled, for example – defence policy, decision-making process, military and defence budget, the balance of defence budget, etc. In 1997, the Slovenian Armed Forces and the Slovenian Police began to cooperate in international peacekeeping. This fact brought many new aspects and issues of democratic control. Who would guard the professional all-volunteer units in their foreign missions? If the answer is clear, adding this task to the National Assembly and to the Government, the more sophisticated question on “how” to exercise the control remains open.
4
Transparency and Division of Power
According to Slovenia’s Constitution, the President of the Republic does not have a very powerful position. He (or she) is non-executive president and titular Commander-in-Chief. Although the Prime Minister chairs the National Security Council, he (or she) has no specific power in the defence area. Even more, the National Security Council has only an advisory function. In practice, the key defence official in peacetime is the Defence Minister, who is a civilian politician from one of the parties that constitute the current ruling coalition. The Prime Minister can overrule the Defence Minister’s actions. The General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces is part of the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief is not directly subordinated to the President of the Republic. Once a year, the Commander-in-Chief reports directly to the President, in the presence of the Defence Minister.10 The defence sector was from the very beginning of Slovenian independence an extremely difficult governmental sector. There were some powerful 10
There were significant legal consequences of the above-mentioned dispute between the President and Defense Minister to prevent further misunderstanding and misuse of a constitutional and legal basis that regulate the relationship between the President of the Republic, Government and Defense Minister. The Defense Act of January 1995 reiterates after the Constitution that the Supreme Commander of the Slovenian Army is the President of the Republic. Military command with subordinated commands, units and institutions is the authority of the Chief of Staff and other commanders. With the consent of the President of the Republic, the Defense Minister determines in detail the conditions and procedures of informing the Supreme Commander about the combat readiness of the army and about other matters important for the defense of the country, the provision of accommodation, protection, protocol matters, sentry and other conditions for exercising the role of supreme commander in peace and war. It is also important to stress that the Chief of General Staff is thereafter appointed by the Government upon the proposal submitted by the Defense Minister (Defense Act of January 1995).
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personalities as Defence Ministers between 1990 (first multiparty elections and government) and 2003, but many were replaced or were forced to resign due to incidents at the Ministry. In this period, seven different ministers held the post, coming from three different political parties. The last one, currently holding the post, began his career as non-partisan, and he, later on during the job, joined the strongest political party, expecting more political support from the ruling coalition for his professional decisions, by being member of one of them. The Defence Minister’s actions are exposed to the scrutiny and pressure from the Defence Committee of the National Assembly or from the National Assembly as a whole. The Defence Committee is always chaired by a member of the Parliament from the opposition party, usually from more powerful parties. Actions of the Defence Minister and the activities of the Defence Ministry are exposed to the public scrutiny as well. Public criticism on defence issues has been openly expressed and published in printed and electronic media, which in several occasions served as the basic information for the Defence Committee from the National Assembly to begin its parliamentary procedure of the critical oversight. It happened that the media were in many cases better informed, or informed in greater detail on issues that should be subjected to the parliamentary, i.e. political civilian control, sector.
5
Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Agencies
Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies was established as a part of the newly defined parliamentary control over the security sector after 1990. Although the constitutional and legal framework has set more or less clear channels of control, it happened that these agencies did not work very professionally. In some cases, they were under the strong influence of one of the ministers, be it Defence Minister or Minister of Interior, and they used their data to support the ambitions of these personalities. In other cases, they have given their information to the powerful personalities of the Slovenian Independence Movement from 1991. It happened also that the data from the Secret Archives of the State were copied and stored in unknown places (also in foreign countries) in order to put the Government or leading personalities under pressure. In 2003, the secret data of the Police Archives from Former Yugoslavia were put on the Web site of the private company owner from Australia, Dušan Lajovic. He is of Slovenian origin and served as Honorary Consul of Slovenia to Australia and New Zealand. The secret data on thousands of Slovenian citizens were made public, despite the fact that they should be protected as confidential.
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Ipso facto, the incident has shown how fragile is the human right to expect from the government to store personal data in a safe place, and especially, how quickly destroyed is governmental ability to impartially care for its citizens. The case shows that the oversight of intelligence services must include expectations and imperatives for the professional work of these services.
6
Civilians and the Military in Defence Planning
The Slovenian Defence Ministry is predominantly staffed by civilians. This is in contrast to the practices at the federal defence level of the former Yugoslavia, whose structures were criticised over the years, and clearly neglected in the basic structure of the newly independent state of Slovenia. Many practices, although good, were abolished and forbidden, just because they emerged from the system of former Yugoslavia, now unacceptable. The way in which the professional military was placed under firm and several layers of overwhelming civilian control was the result of criticism towards former Yugoslavia’s defence sector instruments. Bebler argues that one of the most important reasons for the exceedingly high degree of civilian domination in defence sector of Slovenia lies in the numerical and intellectual weakness of military professionals.11 Prior to independence in 1991, Slovenia had military professionals in the former Yugoslav army, and many of them returned from their posts in the Yugoslav military to Slovenia immediately after the war for independence in June–July 1991. These were predominantly officers of lower ranks and non-commissioned officers, very few among them were senior officers or of the rank of general. The officers from lower ranks were commissioned in the Slovenian military. The nationality of the officer was not important, if he had or obtained Slovenian citizenship, left the Yugoslav military during the armed conflicts or after them in a very limited period of time. It happened that many non-Slovenian officers who previously worked in the Yugoslav units within Slovenia, knew the procedure of changing the sides and accepted it, whereas many Slovenian officers working in other parts of former Yugoslavia, stayed in their regions, within the former Yugoslav military until its total disintegration in 1992. Thereafter, they were not accepted into Slovenian military anymore, no matter how professional they would be. Many of them are still looking for jobs in 11
A. Bebler, ‘Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia’, in: A. Cottey et al., Democratic Control of the Military in Post-communist Europe: Guarding the Guards. (Hampshire: Palgrave 2002), 159–173.
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Slovenia with very low chances to get something that corresponds to the level of their education. Their degrees from Yugoslav military academies gave them the Bachelor of Military Science, and an occupation as “officer of Yugoslav Army”. With such degree they are fully uncompetitive on the Slovenian labour market. The only Slovenian general who previously worked for the Yugoslav military, and who found work after independence was general Milovan Zorc. He was the only general of the former military, who was in some way commissioned for the Slovenian defence needs after 1991. He advised the President of the Republic of Slovenia on military issues. He asked for demobilization and retirement from the Yugoslav military before the clashes between Slovenian defence forces and Yugoslav army units in 1991 began. He realised very soon in 1990 that the aggressive Serbian policy, empowered by the appetites of the Yugoslav army, being put under control of the Serbian politicians, would cause the disintegration and bloody destabilisation of the federal state. But, as already said, he was the only general, and he worked for the President of Slovenia. Other military professionals were placed in different ranks within the Territorial Defence Units of Slovenia, but for some years they were under the constant scrutiny of other Slovenian military professionals, coming from reserve units and from the newly-established system of officer training. Military professionals from the former Yugoslav Army were frequently controlled and stopped in promotion, and they were not very influential on issues of professional military activities. Instead of educated military officers, the reserve officers and other civilians hastily filled in the officers’ ranks to develop the Slovenian military. They often had neither proper military qualification (if they had it, it has been gained in short officers’ courses), nor professional experience, except the experience gained from the ten-day Slovenian War for Independence. Slovenian officers were numerous, but professionally very weak, with an underdeveloped corporate identity and low political profile, therefore they were not influential in military decision-making. Distrust and discrimination against former officers of the Federal army were overruled in the last three years, when many of them took the highest places in the General Staff. A very high degree of civilian domination over the Slovenian military stems from the rejection of the militarist and praetorian tendencies of the autonomous military experienced in former Yugoslavia. The parliamentary system of civilian oversight over the small military establishment gave this civilian domination its Constitutional and legal foundation. A political culture without elaborate military traditions and with a high degree of public interest in defence matters add another dimension to the civilian
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supremacy: over-civilianisation of the defence sector and especially of the military establishment. The reduced level of military professionalism and over-civilianisation of the defence sector have radically changed the substance of usual civilmilitary relations. In many areas of defence policy the civil-military interface has been supplanted by de facto civil-civil relations.12 Most defencerelated issues are decided by the civilian officials or by people who entered the military as civilian workers, losing job opportunities elsewhere, but holding their civilian corporate identity instead of getting a new military identity and culture. The professional military can only partly influence the formulation of Slovenia’s defence policy. The strategic areas of defence planning are out of their purview.
7
Good Governance Case
The Slovenian Government decided in 2002 to abolish conscription and to introduce all-volunteer force. The general data in 2001 revealed that the institution of conscription was in deep crisis: demographic trends in Slovenia were unfavourable, the level of conscientious objection was very high and increasing, and the number of conscripts who were not medically fit was increasing, as well. We should also mention the functional dimension of the issue: new missions of the armed forces carried out mainly abroad, more complex and demanding military tasks, a rather short military term of service, and modest training and equipping of reserve units. From a broader perspective, one should not ignore the importance of the social and vocational characteristics of post-industrial societies, such as pluralism and individualization, specialization and professionalism, when discussing the need to reform the Slovenian Armed Forces. At this point we are not in a position to explore the specific factors that influenced the decision on the shift in manning the armed forces13, rather, we are interested in the procedure itself, which seems to be a good governance case in the security sector. Namely, there were some sporadic incentives coming from political parties to introduce an all-volunteer force. The Government wanted to explore thoroughly all factors that influence such an important decision, estimating that there was a lack of scientific and professional expertise required for the discussion, which was often politically motivated. As a consequence, the first comprehensive survey on the 12 13
Bebler, ‘Democratic Control…’ 168. See M. Malešiþ (ed). Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2003, in print).
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matter was completed at the end of 2001. It consisted of two parts; the first one was carried out by a research team of the Defence Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, entitled “Conscript Army or All-Volunteer Force: The Case of Slovenia”. The second study was done by an international research team, and was entitled “Comparative Analysis of Manning the Armed Forces in Europe.” Concurrently, there was an internal survey accomplished by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the Ministry of Defence. The empirical results of both surveys were a basis for a discussion in the Government, National Security Council, the political parties and in mass media. Finally, the Government brought about a decision that Slovenia should abolish conscription and introduce all volunteer force by mid-2004. Although professional suggestions were not fully accepted by the Government (especially as far as the time needed to accomplish the reform was concerned), we could say that the cooperation between different security sector actors and civil society was rather good in this particular case. No doubt, the introduction of all-volunteer force will bring new challenges to civil-military relations: modern ways of democratic control of the armed forces, the question of its legitimacy, socialization role and cooperation with civilian surroundings.
8
The Role of Civil Society in the Security Sector Reform
8.1
The Civil Society
In times of the former Yugoslavia, and particularly in the second half of the 1980s, Slovenian civil society showed an explicit sensitivity to the interference of the armed forces in the civil sphere, and to attempts to militarise society. Yet, one can notice a certain public yielding to the army in the civil society, now that the armed forces are considered ‘ours’. A part of the intelligentsia has grown quite non-critical of the armed forces as an institution within the independent state, though in former times used to be extremely critical of the former Yugoslav army. It has to be reiterated that the Slovenian armed forces had none of the ‘praetorian’ ambitions of the former Yugoslav armed forces and its relationship with society is from a legal point of view of an entirely different nature. Standards and criteria to assess the role of the army within civil society are fundamentally more sophisticated. Civil society should preserve its criticism of the army as an institutional body on the one
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hand, and it should never forget that the army, too, has a state-forming role, on the other hand. A substantial part of the members of the civil society associations who opposed the former Yugoslav military incentives to militarise society, strong and influential when Slovenia was developing the pluralistic political system and becoming independent, ‘went over’ to the governmental and parliamentary authoritative bodies (accordingly, former political dissidents were in power) of the political system of Slovenia. We labelled this process as ‘etatisation’ of civil society. It shows that even the most ambitious members of civil society have to gain the state power in order to put their ideas into being. Usually, they alone turn into routine governmental officials and provoke new waves of public criticism, and new civil society associations as well. It happened in Slovenia, where many old peace activists from the 1980s, being in the forefront of the clashes with former Yugoslav army, became high officials in the new independent political system, where they were expected to form the new defence sector of Slovenia. They had realised that a lot of their peace activism had to remain outdoor when state interests had to be protected by all means. 8.2
Public Opinion
It goes without saying that the military elite in Slovenia is interested in public appreciation, acceptance and support, which means a certain degree of legitimacy necessary for its normal existence and operating.14 The last public opinion poll15 showed that the public expects the armed forces to carry out its functional and societal imperative.16 The former is the public’s expectation of the army to effectively deter aggression, and should that occur, to successfully defend the state. The societal imperative is about the public’s expectation of the army to appreciate the fundamental social values, norms and rules of behaviour. In short, the army is not to form its own subculture alienated from society. Furthermore, the army is expected to participate in various “social programmes”. With regard to functional and societal imperatives, the 14 15
16
See also J. Burk, ‘The Public and the Military’, The Public 1:4 (1994) 13–25. The research was carried out by the Defense Research Centre, University of Ljubljana, in November 2001, on a representative sample of grown-up citizens of Slovenia (N=1095). See S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1957) 2; ‘Civil-Military Relations II’, in: J. Reichart and S. Sturm, American Defense Policy (Fifth Edition), (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1982) 738; M. Edmonds, Armed Services and Society, (Leicester: Leicester University Press 1988) 79.
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Slovenian public’s expectations, as to the armed forces’ tasks, are quite unique in terms of giving priority to help during natural disasters before the defence of the homeland! Indications are that the Slovenian public attributes a rather high level of socialisation and socio-economic role to the armed forces, yet strongly disapproves of its interference with political affairs. Concerning the process of political decision-making, the armed forces are supposed to participate only in military-defence related decisions. Furthermore, the majority of the public is in favour of the reduction of armed forces as well as of the military budget; the armed forces should be mostly professional, and the officers should not be partisans of any political party. According to the public, the Slovenian army should participate in peace support operations abroad, especially with its professional forces, mainly in humanitarian operations rather than in combat ones, and should be engaged not too far away from home.17 8.3 The Role of (Security) Studies Sociological and security studies play a particularly important role in controlling the armed forces, and accordingly in the development of a suitable model for civil-military relations. In Slovenia, there is one educational and one security studies research institution. They are part of the University of Ljubljana. The Defence Studies Division is an educational branch placed within the Political Science Department of the Faculty of Social Sciences. The Defence Research Centre is a research branch, placed within the Institute of Social Sciences. They both are an important segment of civil society (some might say a segment of the ‘security community or strategic community’), and taken from the sociological and political science aspects. They research and analyse national and international security issues, and especially the defence system. Since Slovenia has become independent, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the development of the defence establishment on the one hand and the security studies on the other. The defence establishment has in the last decade grown in quality and size, but the size of the staff has not kept up with the research and analysis requirements. The institutional needs for expertise, surveys and other academic activities have grown enormously. Other academic disciplines do not take a sufficient part in studies concerning 17
As opposed to the majority of European and North American publics, the Slovenian public does not perceive terrorism as a serious threat to the security of the country. Out of nineteen different threats, terrorism appears to be one of the least important (seventeenth). In this respect, the phenomenon of terrorism hardly influences security sector reform in Slovenia.
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national security. If they did, they would complement the security studies theory covering specific areas, such as political economy of the national security, international war and humanitarian law, crisis management, psychological and social aspects of disasters, etc. When defence institutions, especially the higher echelons of the Ministry of Defence, were first formed, technical aspects and professionalism were neglected and recruitment was carried out on the principle ‘it is not important what and how much a candidate knows, as long as he is ours’. Consequently, people were employed, if certain criteria were met, such as the right political affiliation, or an absolute loyalty to Defence Ministry leadership (other ministries followed the same pattern). Still it has to be emphasised that the relevance and consideration of the security studies have lately become quite noticeable. Some time ago, everybody seemed “to become an authority for whatever the problem”; also, complex questions of national security turned to be somewhat simple, not in themselves, of course, but merely due to being simplified by some people out of ignorance. The present day situation can be said to have changed; security studies have been gaining ground. And if some time ago the discussion about questions on (national) security was quite general, since the concept, doctrine and the security system were to change, today the discussion deals with specialities and individual cases.
9
Issues of Security Sector Reform: Crisis Management, Peacekeeping, Regional Security
Since 1997, Slovenia contributes its military units and civilian policemen to the peacekeeping operations in the turbulent neighbourhood of South East Europe. The civilian policemen are taking part in UN led mission UNMIK in Kosovo and in Macedonia, as also in EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The soldiers are part of the KFOR mission in Kosovo and SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some 200 soldiers are currently deployed in operations abroad. In the past six years, the deployment of soldiers and policemen was predominantly part of the foreign policy, and to a lower extent also part of the security policy. The deployment of troops abroad was one of the prerequisites of the rapprochement policy towards the EU and NATO. Therefore, Slovenian political elite sometimes decided to send units into peacekeeping to fulfil its promises regarding EU and NATO membership. Many of these promises were not in concordance with Slovenian security policy and sometimes they overestimated the capacities of Slovenian army to train, send and maintain numerous peacekeepers abroad.
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10
NATO, EU and the Stability Pact in the Process of Standardization in the Security Sector Reform
In the process of achieving solid solutions in civil-military relations, international security co-operation plays an important role as well. The desired compliance with EU and NATO countries’ standards in that field and the co-operation within OSCE increase transparency in defence matters. Transparency in the field of security and military affairs becomes a crucial element of co-operation and partnership between states, and an important link in democratic parliamentary control of the armed forces that fosters constitutionality and legality in the security field. The fact that Slovenia wanted to join NATO and EU had a significant impact on the development of civil-military relations and security sector reform. This impact was exercised through the accession criteria that needed to be fulfilled in the process. Establishing conditions for a pluralistic political system, market economy, the rule of law, freedom of the press and media became a ‘must’ for democratic control of the armed forces. More specific criteria referring to the development of the armed forces had a tremendous impact on raising the quality and efficiency of the Slovenian Army. Bilateral cooperation in different military-related programmes and the active participation of Slovenian military in peace support operations abroad was very influential in this process. However, these general benefits of international cooperation could not prevent some peculiar and specific difficulties, nor could they prevent problems within the political elite to comprehend the role of the military in a democratic society. Some of these difficulties and problems were addressed in this paper. As far as the Stability Pact and its influence in security sector reform are concerned, one should stress that Slovenia was not very keen to join it. All initiatives that wanted to ‘integrate’ the South East European countries were at the very beginning rejected by part of the political elite and the public. Slovenia joined the Stability Pact, but emphasized at the same time that the country should be observed as ‘a part of the solution and not part of the problem’. Slovenia finally joined the project and was very active in running three different round tables: on small and mid-size enterprises, on national minorities and on de-mining the region of Kosovo through the International Fund run by Slovenia. In such circumstances, the Stability Pact could not have a significant impact on security sector reform in Slovenia.
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Conclusion
Slovenian civil-military relations originate from the last few years of former Yugoslavia’s existence. In the period between 1988 and 1991 the military dominated public issues and coloured the political debates. High political and civil society interest in defence issues was diminished after the successful armed victory of the Slovenian Defence Forces in the ten-day War for Independence in 1991. After independence, the social prestige of defence matters and military occupation has decreased significantly. The indifference among the general public and especially among the young population towards the military and defence issues in general resulted in decreasing willingness of young men to enter the military service, increasing number of draftees asking for the status of conscientious objector, and in an increasing refusal of the compulsory military service in public. The Government and the National Assembly recognised public feelings in the regulations that led to the abolishment of the obligatory military service in 2004. It alone will bring new challenges of the civilian oversight of the armed forces, since after 2004 the Slovenian Parliament and public will have to exercise democratic control over all-volunteer armed forces only. In addition, the armed forces will be more and more involved in international missions abroad where the possibility of direct democratic control of the military is rather limited. For this challenge to be successfully fulfilled, civilian controllers will have to learn a lot about security, defence and military issues.
Civil-Military Relations in Turkey1 Nilüfer Narli
1
Introduction
Democratization and the role of the military in Turkish politics have received much attention in the literature and in international forums. Since the early 1990s European Union member states, whose military and civil authorities are legally separated, have required Turkey to reform its legal system and political institutions in line with democratic standards in Western Europe. Turkey’s integration into the European Union, a process that would not be smooth and swift2, also requires an abated role of the military in politics. The peculiarities of civil-military relations in Turkey are very important when studying a Turkey that would be a European partner and a regional power in the 21st century. What is the nature of civil-military relations in Turkey? Which theory best explains civil-military relations? Why and how does the military have a political influence? How do civil-military relations affect Turkey’s allocation of resources for the reform of the armed forces? Two factors regarding Turkey’s historical and political conditions are essential to answer these questions: the role of the army as the defender of Kemalism and the Ottoman legacy of a vertically organized society. From imperial collapse, partition, and occupation in 1920, the republic of Turkey 1
2
An earlier version of this paper had been first presented at International Conference “Balkan Security and Reform of the Armed Forces-Economic Aspects”, University of National and World Economy, in Sofia (29–30 October 1998). Then an edited version was published in Journal for Turkish Studies. See Nilufer Narli: “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, Journal for Turkish Studies. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 107– 127. London. This updated version of the paper was presented at the International Conference, “Taking Stock of Civil-Military Relations”, Co-organised by the Centre for European Security Studies, The Netherlands, the Centre for Security and Defense, Canada, and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland. 10– 12 May 2001, The Hague, The Netherlands. Eric Rouleau thinks that the negotiations between ‘Ankara and Brussels will be difficult, painful, and most likely last for many years to come’ due to Ankara’s misconception that, owing to Turkey’s strategic and economic importance, the EU will let Turkey into the union after cosmetic reforms. See Eric Rouleau: ‘Turkey’s dream of Democracy’ Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, p. 113.
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emerged three years later as an internationally recognized, independent, nation-state. Modern Turkey, therefore, began its existence stripped of an empire, but conscious of imperial greatness and defined by a strong national identity. Unlike western European states, where society developed along functional, horizontal lines with socioeconomic classes developing common identities and mores, Ottoman society was hierarchical. The sharp cleavage between the Ottoman elite and subject peoples prevented the masses from organizing themselves to seek power when the elite was weak.3 Ottoman society was divided into two categories: the sultan, the military, and the ulema at the top, and subjects (reaya), comprising a large proportion of peasants, at the bottom. The civil and military bureaucracies acted as intermediaries between the two classes. This political organization and culture survived under the Republic, and the position of the bureaucratic-military elite at the higher echelon remained very important.4 Despite introducing a law early on decreeing the equality of all citizens regardless of ethnicity, religion or region, the government did not narrow the gap between the elite and the masses during the Republic’s first three decades. Consequently, the elite – military officers, senior bureaucrats, notables, and industrialists – geared its policies to maintain this gap. The conflict between the elite and the rest of the population emerged as a result of the state-endorsed efforts to create a local business class, and played a role in the organization of the Islamist and separatist movements that gained momentum in the 1970s and peaked in the 1980s. The Ottoman tradition of close military-state ties5 continued into the Republican era, giving the armed forces a preeminent role in society extending into the civil sphere. The military became not only the republic’s defenders, but also the guardians of secularism and the six principles of Kemalism: nationalism (synonymous with the narrow definition of Turkism, rejecting both irredentist Ottoman inclinations and expansionists panTuranist ambitions), secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and 3
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5
For the center-periphery conflict, see Serif Mardin. 1973. ‘Center-Periphery Conflict: A Key to Turkish Politics’ Deadalus, Vol. 102, pp. 169–190. Metin Heper. 1985. The State Tradition in Turkey. Hul: Eothen Press, p. 64. Heper gives insight into the enduring nature of the division between state and politics in Turkey and the unique position of the Turkish military in the political process and democratization. The military had a prominent role during the Ottoman period. For example, the Yeni Ceri had a dominant position at the pinnacle of the imperial system. It was not broken until 1826, and it was only after this that Sultan Mahmut II was able to pursue his modernization program, which included military reforms.
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reformism. The army’s heroic status as guardian, the perception of external military threats from the region, the Sèvres6 syndrome that feeds a fear of losing territorial integrity, and favorable portrayals in the media and in schools have facilitated the army’s strong presence in society. The army has played a prominent role in Turkey’s political modernization7 leading the country “along a western path“8, by endorsing the dynamic transformation of the Turkish state and society, in line with Ataturk’s ideological commitment to the West. It also intervened politically to counter forces blocking this transformation and to preserve democracy, secularism, and national unity in the face of Islamist, separatist, and sectarian challenges. Its privileged position has guaranteed it a generous budget9 earmarked for reforms, modernization10, and technological 6
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The Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which, though never ratified and subsequently superseded by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, foresaw the allocation of large tracts of modern Turkey to Greece, Armenia, Italy and France (the latter two in the form of mandates), and the eventual creation of an independent Kurdish state, has had a traumatic impact in the minds of the Turks. Many still believe that the Westerners are willing to revive the Sèvres Treaty. See Lucian Pye. 1962. ‘Armies in the Process of Political modernization’, in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, J. J. Johnson (ed.): New Haven: Princeton University Press, pp. 69–89; Morris Janowitz. 1964. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and Samuel Huntington. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. For the role of the army in Turkey’s modernization, see Daniel Lerner and Richard O. Robinson. 1960–1961. ‘Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force’ World Politics, p. 13. Umit Cizre Sakallioglu. 1997. ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’, Comparative Politics. Vol. 29, No. 2, p.154. Broadly speaking, the Turkish General Staff always received the budget allocation they requested. In the 1990s, according to official figures, defense normally accounted for 12 percent of the national budget, 2 percent of GNP, and 4.5 percent of GDP. Taken from a draft copy of the 1995 Turkish Defense Statement, pp. 83–86. This information is quoted in Simon. V. Mayall. 1997. Turkey: Thwarted Ambition. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies. MacNair Paper 56, p. 87. However, according to Senesen, Turkey’s military expenditures constituted approximately 5 percent of its gross domestic product in the mid-1990s. This ratio did not include all of the expenditures incurred due to military and paramilitary operations in the southeastern regions. See Gulay Gunluk Senesen. 1995. ‘Some Economic Aspects of Turkish Armaments Spending’, New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 13, fall: 75–91, p. 75. According to the figures given by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the defense budget for 1997 was US $ 6.8 billion. See IISS. 1996–97. The Military Balance. London, p. 70. In the period 1985–1990 modernization costs were nearly US $ 15 billion, of which about US $ 5 billion came from the United States and Germany, as reported in Simon. V. Mayall. 1997, p. 78. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) demanded further modernization in the army as a response to the performance of the coalition forces in the Gulf
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advancement. Indeed, governmental opposition to funds requested by the armed forces, particularly when there is a perceived threat either from outside or from “anti-state” domestic forces, is met with consternation not only in military circles but also in public opinion.11
2
Theories of Civil-Military Relations
2.1
The Concordance Model
The current civil-military theory12 that prevails in Western Europe and the United States highlights the separation of civil and military institutions and the authority of the civil sphere over the military to prevent domestic military intervention. Turkey operates under a different system. The concordance model, as it is called, envisions a civil-military partnership that accomplishes two goals. “First, it explains which institutional and cultural conditions – involving separation, integration, or some alternative – prevent or promote domestic military intervention. Second, it predicts that when agreement prevails among the three partners (the military, the political elite and the society), domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. The central argument, therefore, is that if the military, the political elite, and the society achieve concordance on four indicators (explained below) then domestic intervention is less probable.” (Parentheses from the author)13. Co-operation and agreement on these four indicators – the composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style – may result in a range of civilmilitary patterns, including separation, the removal of civil-military boundaries, and other variations.
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War. The threat from the southeastern neighbors and combating the PKK terrorism motivated the TGS to be more insistent on the modernization of the armed forces. The recent example of this was the Welfare Party-True Path Party (RP-DYP) coalition’s withholding the funds demanded by the military for the operation against the PKK in May 1997. On 14 May 1997, the Turkish military launched its largest evercross-border operation against the suspected PKK bases in northern Iraq. On June 6, the day after a highly emotional mass funeral for 11 soldiers killed by the PKK, the TGS publicly accused the RP-DYP coalition of withholding the funds. The government immediately denied the allegations and promised to provide whatever funds needed. For the current civil-military theory see, Rebecca L. Schiff. 1995. ‘Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance’. Armed Forces and Society. Vol. 22 (Fall). No. 1, p. 7–24. ibid. p. 12.
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The three actors in the concordance model are: the military, which encompasses the armed forces and army personnel; the political leadership, which refers to government officials and those with direct influence over the composition and funding of the armed forces. The governmental elite can include the President, Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, party leaders, Parliament members, and royal families; and the citizenry, which is defined by its function in the concordance model (as opposed to other theories that rely on political institutions as the main “civil” components of analysis.) The concordance model examines the function of the citizenry by analyzing the way the government and the citizenry affect the military’s role in a nation. This requires an understanding of the society’s perception of the military that is shaped by political socialization and history. The first of the four indicators in the model is the composition of the officer corps. In societies that feature separate civil and military domains, militaries have an officer corps that is in charge of the broad, institutional day-to-day functioning of the armed forces. These officers are career soldiers (or “professional soldiers” in the political scientist Amos Perlmutter’s classification) who dedicate their lives to developing the military and defining its relationship to the rest of society. In democratic societies, “the officer corps represents the various constituencies of the nation”. Broad representation, however, is not a must for concordance, “since it is conceivable that the society and the military could agree on a less broadly representative corps”14. The second indicator is the political decision-making process, that “involves the institutional organs of society that determine important factors for the military: materials, budget, size, and structure”15. To fulfil its needs, the military generally turns to a governmental channel that weighs both military and societal resources and needs. This channels debates, whether in open Parliaments, closed cabinets, or special committees, estimates the military’s needs, and devises a compromise that often secures the citizens’ support. However, concordance requires an agreement among the political elite, the military, and the citizenry over the political process that best meets the requirements of the armed forces.16
14
15 16
ibid. p. 14. Schiff gives an example to illustrate a particular composition of the army in less modern societies. During the British Indian colonial period the army was drawn from particular castes and classes sets these classes well apart from the ‘mass of Indian peasantry’. Rebecca L. Schiff. 1995, p. 14. Also see Stephen P. Cohen. 1971. The Indian Army. Berkeley: University of California Press. ibid. p. 14. ibid. p. 15.
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Recruitment method, the third indicator in Rebecca L. Schiff’s model is the enlistment of citizens into the armed forces, which can be coercive or persuasive. The former refers to the forcible conscription of men and supplies for military purposes. Persuasive recruitment, however, is based on beliefs and values. The population may believe that “the sacrifice of military service is worthwhile for the sake of security, patriotism, or any other national cause”17, and a military career may be an honourable profession. Persuasive recruitment implies a consensus among the political leadership, military, and citizenry over the requirements and composition of the armed forces. Military style, the final indicator, refers to “the external manifestations of the military and the inner mental constructions associated with it: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it”18. According to Schiff, style is important because it determines social boundaries, or lack thereof. “It is the mode by which members of a particular elite associate with each other as peers and differentiate themselves from the members of other elite and the members of non-elite groups.”19 For the military, it is important because it reflects how something appear; and appearance is a symbol that can, by the nature and force it conveys, connote a type of power or authority. Military style manifests itself among the other variables. It is usually part of the historical development and political culture associated with military traditions and symbols that include uniforms, parades and marches, music, social traditions, and customs.20 Here political culture is defined as a specialized part of a whole culture, referring to the dominant or typical attitudes, values, assumptions, and beliefs that affect the political action and attitudes of individuals composing the society.21
17 18 19 20 21
ibid. p. 15. ibid. p. 15. ibid. p. 15–16. ibid. p. 16. This definition is formulated by getting inspirations from the Macridis’ definition. Roy Macridis, 1987. Modern Political Systems: Europe. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International.
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Civil-Military Continuum
Richard Dekmejian22, who made studies on the civil-military relations in Turkey and Egypt, presents a revised version of Claude E. Welch’s scheme where “civilian rule” and “military rule” are seen as the two opposite ends of the spectrum of civil-military relations. (See: Figure 1 in appendix) In neither case is the power of any one actor “pure”, for there is always some degree of military influence on civilian regimes and vice versa. Hence, moving toward the centre of the continuum, there might be two intermediate categories of civilian-military partnership, where either the civilians or the military might be predominant. Aiming to sharpen conceptually the nature of the military’s roles in Welch’s schema, Dekmejian employs Perlmutter’s23 three-fold classification of military officers based on their different orientations toward civilian authority. Perlmutter’s “professional soldier”, possessing a strong sense of corporatism and clientelism, considers himself subservient to civilian authority, and thereby characterizes civilian-military relations in the left-of-centre categories of the continuum (‘the civilian rule/military influence’ phase in Figure 1). The opposite end is the case with the ‘praetorian soldier’ who seeks to identify the military’s corporate aspirations with the national interest and becomes its own client. Praetorian rule is characteristic of regimes belonging to the right-of-centre sectors of the civilian-military continuum (the ‘military rule/civilian influence’ phase in Figure 1). (Parentheses from the author).24 The Turkish case deviates from this model in that the “professional soldier” is found not merely in the civilian rule/military influence’ phase, but also in other phases depicted in Figure 1. As will be seen below, the increased professionalism of the army associated with greater military influence in the Turkish case deters rather than increases subordination of the military to the civil authority.
22
23
24
Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982. ‘Egypt and Turkey: The Military in the Background’, in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Modernizing Societies. Kolkowitcz, Roman and Andrzej Korbonski (eds.), Boston and Sydney: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., p. 28–51. Amos Perlmutter. 1977. The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Haven, Conn, and London: Yale University Press, p. 11–13. Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982. p. 30. It is worth mentioning that Perlmutter’s third type of military officer, the “revolutionary soldier”, does not fit into Welch’s four categories delineated in Figure 1. Indeed, in revolutionary situations, the civilian and military spheres are tightly integrated into a single vanguard party, whereby the military losses its corporate autonomy and professional integrity. Ibid. p. 30.
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3
The Civil-Military Partnership: Fluctuating and Fragile
3.1
An Uneasy Partnership
Dekmejian examined the dynamics of civil-military interaction in Turkey during the years of 1923–1979 and ended his analysis by predicting a coup in the late 1980s, which took place in September 1980, sooner than expected. Dekmejian argues that Turkey moved from “civilian control and military partnership”, a situation (phase 2 in Figure 1) that characterized the early Ataturk period, to “civilian rule and military influence” (phase 1) in the 1930s. The Ataturk-initiated process of civilianization continued as Turkey evolved toward a multiparty system after 1945. During the Democrat party’s rule (1950–1960) the government took the form of civilian rulemilitary influence. A number of factors,25 however, induced a military coup in May 1960. Subsequently, a purely military body, the National Unity Committee, became a legislative organ, and its chairman, General Cemal Gursel, presided over a Cabinet of civilian technocrats and two officers. Ironically, during this period of military rule, Turkey drafted its most liberal Constitution. At the same time, the Constitution established the National Security Council (NSC), an advisory body through which the military discharges the responsibilities of defending the state and the nature of the regime. Following the October 1961 elections, which resulted in victory for the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the RPP and the Justice Party that replaced the Democratic Party formed a coalition government. Dekmejian characterizes Turkish politics of the mid- and late 1960s as a “silent partnership” in which the military enjoyed full autonomy from the government
25
In contrast to the Republican People’s Party, which ruled Turkey from 1923 until 1950, the Democratic Party of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes lacked strong historical ties to the military and the legitimizing influence of Ataturk’s charisma. More seriously, the Democrats progressively departed from the principles of Ataturkism and started an “Islamic restoration”. Moreover, the government of Adnan Menderes increasingly restricted political freedom by purging judges and university professors, curtailing political parties, confining the press, and using the police to suppress popular protest. See C. H. Dodd. 1969. Politics and Government in Turkey. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. pp. 26–8. For the Democrats’ “Islamic restoration” and their alliance with the Islamic brotherhoods, see Nilufer Narli. ‘The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey’ MERIA Journal. Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1999). www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria.html/
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while keeping a watchful eye over the parameters of civilian political life26 (phase 3 in Figure 1). Military moderates, firmly committed to parliamentary democracy, defended the civilian governments of the 1960s against attempted coups by various radical military officers.27 Relations between the military and the government became tense in the late 1960s when growing student demonstrations, labor union strikes, political discontent caused by deepened cleavages, violent manifestations of anti-Americanism, and parliamentary stalemate over reform measures28 challenged the internally split government of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel (the civilian-military stalemate phase of 1965–1971 in Figure 1). Demirel resigned after an army ultimatum of 12 March 1971 stating a stern warning from the military chiefs to the Grand National Assembly which threatened military intervention if a ‘strong and credible government’ capable of passing reform measures could not deal with the severe domestic instability and “fratricidal strife”. The army, however, refrained from assuming power outright and permitted a succession of non-partisan cabinets to impose martial law,29 suppress the media, outlaw strikes, arrest hundreds of leftist activists, and dissolve the leftist Turkish Workers’ party and the pro-Islamist National Order party. With the 1971 intervention, Turkey moved to a “military control/civilian partnership” (phase 3) situation. Martial law ended by September 1973 and the following October, elections brought victory to the People’s Republican party (RPP) led by Bulent Ecevit who had moved the 26
27
28
29
Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982. p. 43. For the role of the military in the 1960s, see Ergun Ozbudun. 1966. The Role of the Turkish Military in Recent Turkish Politics. Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs. Harvard University. Some middle-ranking “radical” officers had little confidence in competitive party politics, but they believed that rapid developments and reforms are possible only under the strong leadership of the military. Fourteen such radicals were expelled from the ruling junta, the National Unity Committee, after the 1960 coup. See Roger P. Nye. 1977. ‘Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Elections’, International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 8, p. 212. After winning clear majorities in the national elections of 1965 and 1969, the Demirelled Justice Party (JP), with its backing in the peasantry and religiously conservative town people, felt no need to rapidly push the many reform measures that the military moderates considered top priorities. The armed forces became restless when the JP suspended measures dealing with tax, education, land reform, electoral law reform, the exploitation of oil and mineral deposits, welfare legislation, and after 1968, law-and-order measures. The armed forces considered these measures to be essential to create a prosperous, stable and modern country idealized by Ataturk. Roger P. Nye. 1977, p. 212. On 27 April 1997, martial law was declared in the eleven provinces of Adana, Ankara, Eskisehir, Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Zonguldak, Diyarbakır, Hatay, Siirt. Kurdish separatist activities were reported in the last three cities named. The rest contain Turkey’s largest cities and the greatest university students, urban workers, and urban guerrilla population. See Roger P. Nye. 1977, p. 209.
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party to the left to gain support from the electorate of the outlawed Turkish Labor party. The 1973–1980 period was perplexing for Turkish politics (the deadlock phase in Figure 1) as factors promoting instability were manifold. Turkish politics was polarized by the issues of Cyprus and European Community membership, education and economic policies, martial law and corruption. Instability in the form of clashes between ultra-nationalist militants and radical-leftists, urban guerrilla terrorism, sectarian antagonism, union strikes, and a deteriorating economy in the midst of global and domestic economic crises increased political tensions. During this period Turkey was ruled by internally divided coalition governments30 that included ultranationalist and Islamist parties. Throughout the mid-1970s, the military was highly critical of successive civilian governments due to their inability to cope with economic problems and promote stability.31 In the late 1970s, civil-military relations, in Dekmejian’s terms, tended toward uneasy coexistence. According to Dekmejian, both camps were divided along at least three competing ideological lines: Islamism, pan-Turkism, and socialism.32 However, Ataturkist principles were the most prominent army ideals. This explains why the military distanced itself from far right and radical left
30
31
32
First, the People’s Republican Party formed a coalition government with the Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP). The coalition collapsed following Turkey’s July 1974 military operation in Cyprus to protect the Turkish-Cypriot community. Then, on 31 March 1975, the NSP became a coalition partner in the first “National Front” government (1975, 1977) formed under the premiership of the center-of-right Justice Party (JP) led by Suleyman Demirel. This coalition also included the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (NAP) led by Alpaslan Turkes. Then after the June 1977 elections, the second National Front Government formed under the leadership of Demirel. In July 1977 Demirel resigned, but he returned to power in August, at the head of an almost identical coalition including the NSP, NAP and JP. However, Demirel was forced to resign following defections from the JP in December. Ecevit formed a coalition government in January 1978, promising to deal with the economic problems and the political violence that was increasing as a result of the clashes between left wing and right-wing groups as well as between the Sunnis and Alevis (e.g., Corum and Kahraman Maras incidents). But JP’s victory at by-elections in October 1979 deprived Ecevit of his working majority, and he resigned. In November 1979, Demirel formed an all-JP minority government with the backing of the NAP and NSP. For example, in January 1975, Chief of Staff General Semih Sancar warned that “the Army will not stay away from the nation’s problems”. Moreover, General Irfan Ozaydinli sent a “letter of protest” to Prime Minister Demirel and charged the government with “mismanagement”. See Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982, p. 45. Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982, pp. 46–47.
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ideologies after the coup of 12 September 1980. The army declared that the coup’s aim was to “re-establish democracy”33. After the coup, Turkey moved to a “military rule/civilian influence” phase, evidenced by the military government of 1980–1983. During those years, political and military restructuring efforts left the military with a growing influence on Turkey’s political process. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) initiated the REMO (Reorganization-Modernization) project34 in order to help the army recover from the impact of the 1975 U.S. arms embargo imposed in the wake of the Cyprus intervention the previous year. The project, coupled with the impact of internal security concerns, elevated the professional skills of the military, which in turn enlarged its influence in political matters.35 The most important political event of the 1980–1983 period was the drafting of a new Constitution in 1982, restricting formerly granted civil liberties and enhancing the military’s political influence.36 It has enhanced the constitutional guarantees that enable the military to have high influence on parliamentary decisions. For example, according to the 1982 Constitution, Turkey’s Council of Ministers must consider, “with priority, the decisions of the National Security Council concerning necessary measures for the protection and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society” (1982 Constitution, Article 118).37 The Constitution was backed by an overwhelming majority in 33
34 35
36
37
On the morning of the coup the army issued a statement setting out the reasons for intervention: “The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country… to reestablish the existence and authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order.” Quoted in Metin Heper. 1985. The State Tradition in Turkey. Hull: Eothen Press, p. 131. For REMO project, see Simon V. Mayall. 1997, p. 29. On the relationship between the increased professionalism of the military and its growing political influence in Turkey, see Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 152. Sakallioglu notes that similar developments were observed in the Middle East and Latin America. For the role of the military in decision-making in the 1980s, see George Harris. 1988. ‘The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers’ in State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (eds.). Berlin: De Gruyter, p. 177–200. As mentioned above the NSC is a Constitutional body that had been created by the 1961 Constitution and its status was enhanced by the 1982 Constitution. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution establishes the NSC as a body evenly divided between five civilians (the President, Prime Minister, and ministers of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs), and five military officials (the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the army, navy, and air force, and the general commander of the gendarmerie). After making Constitutional changes in the composition and functions of NSC in order to meet Copenhagen criteria, in 2001 and in 2003, this was changed. See the discussion in section, ‘Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and Civil-Military Partnership’.
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a referendum, as was the election of General Kenan Evren as President. Article 118 was given effect by National Security Council Law No 294538 that extended the concept of “national security” on which the NSC could issue “decisions” to include the protection of the state against any foreign or domestic to its interest in the international sphere, including political, social, cultural and economic. The military regime folded in 1983 but the army limited elections that year to three parties. Its favored candidate, the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), led by a retired general, lost to the Motherland Party, which obtained 41 percent of the vote and 53 percent of the seats in Parliament.39 Nonetheless, the military accepted the election results, preventing Turkey from remaining in a long military rule/civilian influence phase. In terms of the civil-military continuum, the post-coup period was a hybrid between civilian rule/military influence and civilian rule/military partnership. During the Turgut Ozal government (1983–1989) civilian dominance was higher, but declined after 1991 (see below). Ozal’s attempt to reorder security policy, to stop relying on territorial security – which maintained the state’s dominance over society – and start relying on economic strength, played a role in enhancing civilian leverage. Ozal’s successful economic reforms, initiated in 1980, enabled him to challenge the military’s primacy in the state, and to broaden the domain of the civilian government. By 1987 Ozal felt confident enough to recommend changes to the 1982 Constitution, in 1990–1991, he talked about the “Kurdish reality”, and in 1991, he took the unprecedented step of rejecting the army’s nominee for Chief of the General Staff and appointed his own candidate.40
38
39
40
“National security means the defense and protection of the state against every kind of external and internal threat to the Constitutional order, national existence, unity, and to all its interests and contractual rights in the international arena including in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres.” (Article 2a, National Security Council Law No 2945, Justice Ministry web site, http://www.adalet.gov.tr). Turgut Sunalp founded the MDP in 1983. The MDP presented a party platform emphasizing security, political stability and traditional social values. While it lost the 1983 elections, it did “the best in eastern Turkey, obtaining 30 per cent of the vote in 15 provinces which rank near the bottom of the Turkish economic scale”. John H. Fadden. 1985. ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Third Republic’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 39 (Winter), No. 1, p. 81. Commenting on his decision to appoint General Necip Toruntay to be the general chief of staff, Ozal said: “Since 1960, no civilian government has appointed the general chief of staff itself. The position has been filled by automatic succession. From now on, this is going to be normalized. Governments should appoint the general chief of staff themselves according to merit” quoted in Sakallioglu. 1997, p. 162.
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Gradually, Ozal took the lead in a growing number of decisions in security and foreign affairs. Soon after the October 1991 elections,41 civilian leverage shrunk when conservative elements in the state consolidated to thwart Ozal’s bold initiatives and gradually restored the higher military control and influence phase. Despite Ozal’s personal charisma and his authority as President, new Prime Minister Demirel and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin allied with the military to dominate the NSC.42 When Demirel assumed the presidency in 1993, new Prime Minister Tansu Ciller joined the politicalmilitary alliance, replacing her initial revolutionary ideas with conservative policies43 strengthening the military’s domestic hand. In the mid-1990s the civilian government’s failure to check the growing influence of Islamists and Kurdish separatists gave the military an opportunity to justify and even expand its dominant role in Turkey’s internal affairs. From the mid-1990s onward, the political influence of the military high command progressively increased as a response to the electoral gains made by the Islamists in local government (after the 1994 local elections) and in Parliament (following the 1995 general elections). The military’s power is best evidenced by its 1997 unseating of Turkey’s first ever Islamist government led by Necmettim Erbakan’s Welfare party. At a 28 February 1997 meeting of the NSC, the military issued an 18-point list of policy recommendations for the True Path-Welfare party coalition government. The list focused on extending compulsory education 41
42
43
In the 1991 general elections Suleyman Demirel led True Path Party won the elections and formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP). For the attitude of the Demirel government towards the military, see Simon V. Mayall. 1997, p. 70–71. According to Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Ciller’s initial reaction to the PKK problem and discussions on the “Kurdish reality” was to seek the means for quick reconciliation. “She floated a number of ideas: The First was a suggestion to create a civilian and parliamentary-based National Security Council that could investigate the Kurdish issue; second, she proposed Kurdish broadcasts on state-owned television as well as optional classes in Kurdish. All of these ideas including the ‘Basque model’ as a potential formula for resolving Turkey’s ethnic problem – a suggestion made following a meeting in Vienna with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales – were shot down. Demirel, by arguing that concessions could not be made while terrorism rampant, and the chief of the general staff, Dogan Gures, by pointing out that the proper place to discuss these issues was the National Security Council, put an end to these discussions … Yet, faced with these criticisms, Ciller rapidly backed off further personal interests in the problem and turned over the conduct of the Kurdish policy to the military.” See Henri J. Barkey and Graham Fuller. 1998. Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p. 137.
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from five to eight years and restricting the activities of religious schools and private Quran courses, which the military believed were fostering antisecular values.44 Erbakan, already under pressure from radical elements within his party for not implementing his election manifesto, refused to carry out the NSC recommendations and was ousted in June 1997. His party was banned shortly thereafter.45 The subsequent coalition government, led by Mesut Yılmaz, formed in July 1997 and implemented a number of the NSC recommendations, passing the education bill, closing the junior sections of the imam-hatip schools, restricting the informally organized Quran courses, and enforcing the ban on head-covering in educational institutions at all levels. Tensions, however, arose between the government and the military after a military poll revealed that the Virtue party, successor to the banned Welfare party, was the most popular political bloc in Turkey.46 Intending to assert the government’s primacy in containing the Islamists, Prime Minister Yilmaz twice accused the army of meddling in party politics and twice was forced to retract his statements as the General Staff declared that the army is the ultimate defender of secular democracy and is above party politics. According to the Chief of the General Staff: “It is an obligation imposed upon us by the law to protect with the same sensitivity the existing 44
45
46
The National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997 formulated a list of 18 measures to curb the Islamist activities and presented them to the cabinet of the then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Then on April 29, officers of the Turkish General Staff gave a media briefing at which, for the first time, the threat of Islamism and separatism within the country was rated by the military as a greater danger to Turkey than any external factors. In May and June 1997 military elaborated on the danger of Islamism by pointing out the infiltration of the Islamists into professional life and public administration, the high percent of imam-hatip graduates at the universities, the proliferation of the Islamist publications, etc. As the Welfare Party (Refah) equivocated, the military began to increase the pressure, holding a series of briefings for the press and judiciary on the dangers of the Islamists, while working to persuade members of the True Path Party to withdraw their support for the government. On 21 May 1997, the Public Prosecutor applied to the Constitutional Court for Refah’s closure on the grounds that it had attempted to incite the violation of the Constitutions’ provisions on secularism. On 18 June 1997, Erbakan’s parliamentary majority steadily eroded by defections from the True Path Party (DYP), Erbakan resigned as Prime Minister. On 16 January 1998, the Constitutional Court announced Refah’s closure. While the military’s role in toppling the Refah’ government created questions about Turkey’s commitment to the democratic process, the move was well received by a much larger proportion of the society. For the results of the poll, see Turkish Daily News, 1 July 1998, A1–A3. Later it was reported that the public opinion poll conducted by a leading government agency revealed that the Virtue Party and the True Path Party share the lead in popularity with 24 percent each. Turkish Daily News, 2 July 1998, A1–A2.
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constitutional system, to which we feel absolutely attached.”47 Soon, relations between the Yilmaz government and the military improved until the government’s demise at the end of 1998. Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left party, formed a minority government on 12 January 1999 that lasted until 18 April when Turkey went to the polls for local and general elections, handing Ecevit’s party a victory. Ecevit formed a coalition government with the Motherland and ultra-nationalist National Action party that won a decisive vote of confidence on 9 June 1999. The Ecevit-led coalition’s policies have been harmonized with those of the NSC, and there has since been broad societal agreement on the military’s influence in the domestic political affairs. Criticism, however, was leveled at the government and the military following the devastating August 1999 earthquake48, which led to a public reassessment of its confidence in the military-civilian balance. A majority of Turks accept the military as the guardian of democracy, secularism, and national unity and approve of the military’s involvement in politics. One explanatory factor for the army’s rising prominence throughout the 1990s is the decline in support for Turkey’s center-oriented parties since the late 1980s49 and its consequent decreased public trust in the
47
48
49
On 4 July 1998 the Chief of the General Staff Karadayı made this statement at a press conference. In response to this, Yilmaz said that he had no disagreement with what the Chief of the General Staff had said and that he would put his signature to it if so asked. For the statements made by Yılmaz, General Cevik Bir and the Chief of the Staff Karadayı and the tension between the military and the government, see Hürriyet, Milliyet, Yeni Yüzyıl (5–8 July 1998). People had confidence in some state institutions, such as the army, and kept it out of any debate. But the confidence in the state seemed to be shattered after the quake when the state was too slow to reach the devastated areas. For two days the rescue and relief teams could not get to the stricken zones, thus causing a public outcry. Added to the public concern was the fact that military units, which usually rush to earthquake zones within a short period of time, according to past experiences, were missing this time. There were claims that the military concentrated too much on the rescue work at its destroyed Golcuk Naval Base and was unable to pay enough attention to the civilian settlements in the area. See Turkish Probe, 29 August 1998, p. 2. The sign of declining confidence in these parties was the progressive decrease in their votes. For the decrease in their votes from 1987 to 1995, see Nilufer Narli and Sinan Dirlik. 1996. ‘Türkiye’nin Siyasi Haritası’ (‘the Political Map of Turkey’), Yeni Turkiye Dergisi, No. 9, May–June, p. 125–151. In the April 1999 general elections the most dramatic loser was the center-of-left People’s Republican Party. With just 8.9% of the vote, it fell below the national 10% threshold. The center-of-right parties were also among the biggest losers. The True Path Party obtained only 12.1% of the votes and the Motherland Party polled 13.3% of the total votes.
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politicians and the Parliament.50 With that decline, votes have shifted to the peripheral Islamist and ultra-nationalist parties, resulting in government instability. For example, Turkey had three coalition governments following the 1995 elections.51 At the same time, the military enjoyed further support from the general population and civil society (i.e., trade unions, women’s groups, and other organizations with liberal tendencies and even those with left-leaning orientation52) to suppress the anti-secularist currents in the rhetoric and activities of the Welfare party and its Islamist supporters during the Welfare-True Path government (July 1996–June 1997).53 Support for the military’s watchdog rule continues today because the military and a larger segment of the society believe that unless the civilians are not strong 50
51
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53
The opinion polls demonstrate a declining public confidence in the politicians, but an overwhelming public trust in the country’s armed forces, which consistently top the lists of most trusted institutions. A December 1996 survey revealed that only 16.6% of those questioned said that they trusted politicians, falling to 14.4% in January 1998 and then rising to 21.6% in June 1999 before sliding to 15.0% in September 1999. The same surveys showed that in December 1996 81.3% of those questioned said that they trusted the armed forces, compared with 78.8% in January 1997 and 78.9% in June 1999. For results of the opinion polls conducted by Piar-Gallup, see Milliyet, 8 November 1999. After the short-lived Motherland-True Path (DYP) government collapsed in 1996, the Welfare Party (RP) formed a coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party. The RP-DYP coalition broke down due to a dispute over the passage of an eight-year compulsory education law recommended by the National Security Council (NSC) on 28 February 1997 meeting. Later in July 1997 the Motherland Party, led by Mesut Yılmaz formed a coalition government with the Democratic Left Party and the Democratic Turkey Party. Along with the big business and liberal groups many former hard-line leftists (members of the Revolutionary Worker’s Union, DISK), who had borne the brunt of military pressure following the 1980 coup, supported the 1997 military-led drive to oust the Islamistled coalition. Along with the dispute over the eight-year compulsory education, the former crisis created by the Welfare Party mayors and deputies, whose anti-secular rhetoric and activities agitated secular public opinion, played a role in provoking the military. These developments exacerbated tension between the military and the Welfare Party. It had been building due to: a disagreement over the expulsion of the Islamist officers from the army in December 1996; the Welfare Party’s attempt to sign a defense co-operation agreement with Iran in 1997; Welfare’s call for lifting the ban on head-covering for female university students and the civil servants; the dispute over building a mosque at Istanbul’s Taksim Square; the Iranian-inspired Jerusalem Night (31 January 1997) in the Welfare-controlled Sincan district of Ankara (where anti-regime slogans were shouted); and Erbakan’s reluctance to sign NSC’s recommendations (formulated at the 28 February 1997 meeting). Moreover, RP’s anti-democratic position on a number of developments disappointed the secular public opinion. The problem came out when Refah’s support for the constitutional arrangements of the state looked ambiguous. Its interest to maintain Turkey as a secular state was not clearly stated. This alarmed the public opinion, which welcomed the military’s involvement to maintain the secular structure in Turkey.
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enough to defend a democratic secular state, the military has the legitimacy to exercise political influence. 54 3.2
Fragile Concordance
The tenacious climate of terrorism created by the ultra-left and the right in the 1970s and the threat posed by the PKK55 since the early 1980s, combined with the unstable environment in the Middle East, have shaped the relationship between the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), political institutions, and society. The TAF’s influence on government, industry, and the ethos of the Turkish people illustrates how integrated the civil and military spheres in Turkey are. However, not every sector of society supports the military’s interventionist role in Turkish politics. Whereas there is broad political and social agreement on the military’s involvement when the nation is threatened from foreign forces or domestic radicals, a sizeable minority including Islamist and pro-Kurdish groups, as well as liberals and leftists, have become increasingly vocal in challenging the armed forces. Thus, concordance among the military, the government,56 and society is fragile and fluctuating. Turkey experienced military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. These interventions largely came in times of crisis when civil-military relations were strained and the army command perceived that the country was in mortal danger due to anti-state activities,
54
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The military’s conviction that the civilians are weak to defend the system is documented. According to one high-ranking officer: “Once the Turkish people begin to use the democratic system, then we won’t want to intervene. Nor would we be able to intervene even if we wanted to.” Quoted by Gareth Jenkins. 2001. Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics, Adelphi Paper 337. Published by Oxford University press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2001, p.19. The PKK (the outlawed Kurdish Worker’s Party) was founded in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan and launched a guerrilla war against the Turkish state in August 1984 and since then the state has mobilized its resources to suppress the PKK terrorism. See Ismet Imset. 1992. The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey 1979–1992. Istanbul: Turkish Daily News Publications; and Nader Enterssar. 1992. Kurdish Ethnonationalism. London. Lynne Reinner Publisher. Ocalan was captured in February 1999. This had ended a period of flight for the PKK chief who began in October 1998, when he had been flushed out of his base in Damascus following heavy Turkish pressure on Syria. On 31 May 1999 Ocalan faced the State security Court and he was given death sentence (on 28 June 1999). The verdict now goes to the High Court of Appeals. Following that, if this court upholds the decision, Parliament must then approve it before the final word goes to the presidency. Other scholars also observed a type of agreement or the harmony between the military and the governments since 1983. See Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 151.
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which government could not control. After each coup, concordance among the three main actors was restored. With regard to the first of Schiff’s four indicators of concordance, the composition of the officer corps, Turkey differs from Western Europe and the United States. The army brass’ professionalism is distinguished by an intimate and informal Turkish culture; the corps is not a separate and exclusionary institution. Rather, it is comprised of a group of elite soldiers who sustain a citizens’ army largely by maintaining the respect and trust of the citizen soldiers. The officer corps does not exclude any group, but it largely consists of urban men from Central Anatolia and the Aegean and Marmara regions.57 These officers are modern and secular, and are committed to Ataturkist ideals.58 Most citizens have not demonstrated any opposition to this composition, nor have they favored expelling antiAtaturkist officers from the army.59 The consensus over the corps’ composition can be explained by analyzing Shiff’s second indicator, recruitment method. In Turkey, the military is not seen as a separate institution within society, despite the highly selective recruitment60 of the officer corps. Rather, it is seen as a home, a “Prophet’s hearth” (Peygamber ocagı) or soldiers’ hearth (asker ocagı). Military service, though compulsory for all Turkish men since 1927, is seen as a national duty and heroic mission because citizens have been socialized with values promoting the army’s role as protector of the state. The army also engages in public relations work by promoting its “national 57
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James Brown’s study on the demographic background of the officer corps (in 1982–84) showed that a large proportion of the War Colleges’ cadets and War Academy officers’ origins were urban areas and they often came from the following regions: Central Anatolia (29.2%), Marmara and Aegean Sea (29.1%), Black Sea (12.7 per cent) and Mediterranean (12.4%). While they were fairly represented, officers from Eastern (10.4 percent) and Southeastern region (6.3%) were relatively under-represented. See James Brown. 1989, p. 394–395, Table 3 and Table 4. The military developed an identity and mission inspired by the achievements of Ataturk and dedicated to their maintenance. Mehmet Ali Birand, 1991. Shirts of Steel, An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, is particularly good at describing the philosophy of the Turkish military. It provides a keen insight into how Turkey’s armed forces, particularly the strong corps, view Ataturk, the state, the military, politics, and civilians. The Supreme Military Council takes the decision of expelling the officers who have Islamist and separatist or extremist tendencies. The military is very selective in the recruitment and education of the officer corps. Candidates for military careers, selected according to strict social, political and intellectual criteria undergo intensive training in special schools that are beyond the jurisdiction of the ministry of national education. Along with military training, they follow universitylevel courses in history, sociology, political science, and economics.
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security concept” to raise citizens’ consciousness about internal and external threats that it identifies. It does not differentiate internal and external treats or between threats to the country’s territorial integrity and to the Ataturkist principles enshrined in the Turkish Constitution.61 Both the soldiers and the citizens firmly believe that it is their duty to protect the motherland and do not let any enemy grasp a piece of it. Conscription has become a major rite of passage for young males and a source of identity construction.62 Typically, young men postpone marriage until after they’ve served their two years in the army and often have a hard time finding jobs before their term of service. The glorification of the military is inculcated through the primary and secondary socialization. The school system teaches: “Every Turkish citizen is a willing, fearless soldier in our army which protects the independence and integrity of the country. Our army is the symbol of our national unity and the guarantee of our future, which fulfils its duty to the letter.”63 Of course, not every conscript shares this glorified perception of the military. Initiation into the army is celebrated, with farewell ceremonies organized by new soldiers’ friends and nationalist groups (ulkucu). While soldiers are motivated by patriotism, officers have additional rewards such as monetary remuneration and quality living conditions. Turkey’s past military successes and its internationally recognized contribution to peacekeeping forces from Somalia to Bosnia have given the armed forces added prestige in Turkish society, as has its modern and secular worldview. The army, and hence recruits, represents and guards the nation’s Ataturkist ideals and soldiers are educated and socialized to internalize these secular values. With respect to political decision-making, a third indicator, Turkey’s history is split between civilian and military rule. Members of Parliament are popularly elected civilians, though in some cases, a legislative decision is a compromise between the military and the civilian government. As mentioned above, the semi-military National Security Council is a constitutional body and its recommendations are given priority in the legislative 61
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For example, see Chief of staff, Gen. Kivrikoglu, TGS Press Office, Announcement No. 30, March 17, 2000. Turkish Armed Forces web site, http://www.tsk.mil.tr; and Chief of Staff Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu’s message on 76th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish republic. Author’s translation. Anadolu Ajans, 29 October 1999. See Ayse Gul Altinay Karayazgan. 1999. ‘Making Citizens and Citizen Soldiers: Military Service and National Education in Turkey’, American Ethnological Society Meetings, March 1998, Portland, OR, USA; Ayse Gul Altinay. 1999. ‘Mehmetin Kitabi: Challenging Narratives of War and Nationalism’, New Perspectives on Turkey, 21 (Fall), p. 125–145. For example, see Ilkogretim Soysal Bilgiler 5 (Istanbul: Turkish Ministry of Education, 1999), p. 16.
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process. Its role in policy-making is very much accepted by a society that largely supports the military’s watchdog role. The influence of the Turkish military on the political decision-making is partly related to its high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis civilian control.64 The Chief of Staff (COS), who acts as Commander in Chief during wartime,65 does not fall under the aegis of the minister of defence66, and he conducts military affairs independent of the cabinet. His office is responsible for drawing up all programs, principles, and priorities related to personnel, operations, intelligence, training, education and logistic services, preparing the armed forces for war, and coordinating among the ground, naval, and air force commands, as well as other institutions attached to the general staff. The office also presents its views on the military aspects of international treaties and agreements, and if necessary, participates in meetings regarding such agreements.67 The armed forces also enjoy autonomy in the judicial domain, having their own laws, courts, and judges to deal with matters concerning military personnel including cases where civilians68 are involved. Considerable economic and financial independence and means (e.g., military owned companies69) reinforce its political and 64 65
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Also see Sakallioglu, 1997 for the autonomy of the military in Turkey. Article 117 of the Constitution stipulates that the office of the Commander-in-Chief is inseparable from the Turkish Grand National Assembly and that the President of the Republic holds it. According to the same article of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers are responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defense of the country. The article says, “The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of war, exercises the duties of the Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the Republic.” See www.mfa.gov.tr/b6.htm. The Turkish General Staff is not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, but to the Prime Ministry as under the current Constitution. Article 117 of the 1982 Constitution, which closely resembles Articles 40 and 110 of the 1924 and 1961 Constitutions respectively, states that the Chief of the General Staff is “appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Council of Ministers” and “responsible to the Prime Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers”. The General Directorate of Press and Information. 1990. Turkey: An Official Handbook, p. 60. Any public criticism of the military found to be “belittling and defaming” (Turkish Penal Code, Article 159) can result in being sentenced up to six years in the prison. Such cases are civil criminal courts. Secondly, under Turkish Penal Code Article 155, a public speech or written text found to be containing an aim of “alienating the people from the military” is a crime and tried in General Staff Criminal Court. Crimes of opinion are often tried in state security courts that were presided over by high-ranking officers until the Ocalan case in 2000. For example, the main one OYAK is a vast composite “comprising some 30 enterprises in sectors as diverse as automobile manufacturing, cement work, food processing,
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judicial autonomy. It is the COS, not the Prime Minister, Cabinet, or Parliament, who overseas arms production and procurement. It is the General Staff that draws up the annual budget of the armed forces that absorbed almost 18%70 of the state budget before the February 21 economic crisis. The crisis, which raised inflation, the rate of unemployment, and the number of small business going bankrupt and made the labor and business sector restless – and required the military to revise its budget and to adopt a policy of transparency at a time when public opinion was more concerned with public expenses. Some groups, ironically including the Islamists71 and a segment of the liberals, opposing the military’s independent power and autonomy advocate amending the Constitution to curtail the military’s influence in the NSC and to subordinate the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense. It is also one of Brussels’ targets72 to reconsider Article 118 that establishes the NSC as a coordinating body shaping the legislation and its implementation. The subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense rather than to the Prime Ministry as under the current Constitution is often cited as one of the main criteria for civilian control of the military. The Turkish military has traditionally resisted such a change, arguing that, “given the way in which the political system operates in Turkey, politicians would then attempt to exercise patronage and interfere in the day-today running of the armed forces.”73
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pesticides, petroleum, tourism, insurance, banking, real estates, supermarkets and high technology.” See Eric Rouleau. 2000, p. 109. The Turkish General Staff declared to the public that it planed to revise its budget with an aim of reducing the expenses. It also planed to adopt a policy of transparency and aims to explain the share some information with the public while considering the importance of confidentiality. The General Secretary of the General Stuff issued a press release explaining that the military expenses were to be reduced and the projects that have “no priority” would be postponed or canceled. It also underlined that the military expenses that had been 18 percent of the total state budget (almost 3.5% of GNP) since 1984 (when the PKK launched guerrilla war against the state) is to be the 10.6% of the budget in 2001. The military decided to postpone 32 projects in order to save US $ 19.5 billion. See Radikal, 12 April 2001. For example, the Islamists and the Welfare Party mentioned this attempt a number of times in 1997. Eric Rouleau argued that Brussels target a change in the Constitution and “transformation of the NSC into an informal and extra-constitutional consultative body with a civilian majority”. Eric Rouleau. 2000, p. 106. For the opinion of the military on this, see Gareth Jenkins. 2001. Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics. Adelphi Paper, 337. Published by Oxford University press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2001, Chapter III, footnotes 10 and 11, p. 44.
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The last indicator, military style, reflects the military’s preeminent role in Turkish society and its function as a modernizing agent in a country that was largely a peasant society just 50 years ago. External appearance is of extreme importance. A military uniform is supposed to be neat and bespeak quality, and an officer in uniform must give the impression that he is prompt, well mannered, a man of authority and a role model. Additionally, an officer’s wife and children are also required to be well dressed and adopt a modern way of life. Officers’ clubs offering all types of sports and social activities are important socializing agents for elite soldiers, who are at once distant from society, yet are perceived to be an organic part of it. 3.3
Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and CivilMilitary Partnership
Constitutionally, the army’s role in politics was profoundly affected by Turkey’s bid to become a full member of the European Union. After becoming a candidate for eventual accession at the EU Summit in Helsinki in 1999, the European Commission added details to the broad principles outlined in the “Copenhagen criteria” by issuing an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey detailing the reforms Turkey would need to implement before the start of accession negotiations. Besides improvements in the human right regime and the treatment of minorities and expanding the civil liberties, they required the government to “align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU member states”.74 The Document did not spell out precisely what the “practice of EU member states” was. However, the Democratic Left Party-led coalition government presumed that the NSC’s functions would need to be reduced to advising rather than acting as a coordinating body influencing legislative-decisionmaking process and that its scope of advising need to be limited to questions affecting national defence and security. In order to change its functions, it was decided to reform the composition of the NSC, so as to give civilian members a majority. Accordingly, after an internal debate, the Parliament altered Article 118 of the Constitution (on 17 October 2001) so as to make the Deputy Prime Minister(s)75 and the Minister of Justice members of the Council. As a result, the civilian members of the NSC are in a majority. More significantly, the mandatory nature of the Council’s 74
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Turkey: 2000 Accession Partnership (Annex to Proposal for a Council Decision, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 8 November 2000): text from website of the EU Commission Representation in Turkey (www.deltur.cec.eu.int). In the current AKP government there are three Deputy Prime Ministers.
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decisions for the government provided for in the previous version of Article 118 (see above) was significantly reduced. According to the new text of the Article: The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that are taken and ensuring the necessary conditions with regard to the formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the state. The Council of Ministers shall evaluate decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society.76 Following the electoral victory of the AKP in the November 2002 general elections, a law giving effect to the new version of Article 118 was passed by Parliament on 15 January 2003. It gave a far more restricted definition of the fields on which the NSC was entitled to make decisions by altering the former National Security Council Law of 1983 (Law No. 2945) that defined national security in such broad terms that it could, if necessary, be interpreted as covering almost every policy area. The new law states that the National Security Council “takes advisory decisions regarding the determination, establishment and execution of the national security policy of the state” and provided that it “informs the Council of Ministers of these views, measures and principles and the advisory decisions which it has determined, and carried out its other duties provided for by law”.77 The AKP government has given priority to the reforms targeting transformation of the functions of the NSC and expansion of civil liberties in order to start accession talks with the EU as soon as possible. This is changing civil-military relations in the direction of increased governmental control and less military influence in political decision-making process. This has created tension between the AKP government and the military that is discussed below.
76 77
1982 Constitution, as amended on 17 October 2001. Law regarding the change in the Law of National Security Council and National Security Council Secretariat (‘Milli Guvenlik Kurulu ve Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterligi Kanununda Degisiklik Yapilmasina Dair Kanun’), No. 4789, of 15 January 2002, Article 2: text from website of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar).
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3.4
The AKP Government: A Turning Point in the Partnership?
Before it gained a landslide victory in 2002 November’s parliamentary elections, the Islamic roots of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) prompted suspicion in military circles. And despite repeated AKP insistence that its political approach is moderate, and that it should not be compared to the Islamist government pushed out of power in February 1997, there has been tension in the AKP government-military relations. The tension is related to three main issues. The first issue is the Foreign Ministry circular advising embassies to improve links with Milli Gorus, a conservative Islamic group with a wide following in Europe’s massive Turkish Diaspora and to support Fettullah Gulen Schools.78 Secondly, Turkish military leaders are increasingly concerned by government moves to replace senior bureaucrats with “AKP-loyalists”. The AKP-military tension burst into the open on 23 April when top generals, along with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and opposition politicians, declined to attend a reception hosted by parliamentary speaker Bulent Arinc to celebrate the anniversary of the Parliament’s foundation. The cause of the boycott was an announcement that Arinc’s head-scarfed wife would attend the reception. Those staying away from the reception viewed the announcement as a political challenge to Turkish secularism. Ultimately, Arinc backed down, saying his wife would not attend. Amidst the uneasiness in the government-military relations, the military came under heavy criticism from top US officials for not assuming a “strong leadership role” to support the deployment of the US troops.79 An indicator of the challenges confronting the Turkish military was the length of the April 30 meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), which provides a monthly opportunity for Turkey’s top brass to discuss policy with civilian political leaders. That NSC session lasted seven-and-a-half hours, the longest such meeting in several years. In sharp contrast, the
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On April 20, 2003 Radikal daily reported: ‘On April 16, 2003, Gul sent two circulars to the embassies abroad. Circular No. 3847 states: Milli Gorus is not a harmful organisation. Its activities shall be supported by the embassies. Ambassadors and diplomats should attend its functions organised by Milli Gorus. Its members should be given representation in the official delegations.’ The second one, Circular 3848 orders supporting the Fettullah Gulen schools. Quoted in Radikal, ‘Gul: Milli Gorus Genelgesi Normal’ (National View Circular is Normal). April 20, 2003. In March, one third of the 365 AK Party lawmakers voted against the motion to allow the deployment of foreign troops in Turkey and to send Turkish troops abroad. This created tension in the US-Turkishrelations.
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statement released following the meeting was startlingly brief: one sentence reaffirming that “secularism must be meticulously protected”. The third issue is related to the reform packages prepared by the AKP government to meet the Copenhagen criteria and move forward to the accession talks. Since last November, the government has stepped back from plans to introduce an appeal system to State Security Courts, retracted criticism of the army’s right to expel soldiers suspected of religious extremism, and failed to persuade the bureaucracy of the need to grant greater cultural rights to the Kurdish people. In May, the AKP introduced a new reform package aiming at a change in the anti-terror law; to declare general amnesty to the PKK militants, provided that they surrender; and to expand cultural rights to the Kurds. The tension was further deepened by an article80 which hinted that young officers are unhappy with AKP policies. This became a hot topic of debate in the press. In responding to the debate, on May 25, Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan said: “It is a lie … there is harmony between our military and the government.”81 The next day, on May 26, the Chief of General Staff, General Hilmi Ozkok made a press conference. General Ozkok clarified the situation by saying: “there is no specific group or ranks in the military whose members feel unease with the policies. But there is a shared concern over the appointment of extremist bureaucrats by the government.” On question of the EU membership, Ozkok said: “The military supports Turkey’s membership of the EU, as reaching contemporary civilization envisaged by Ataturk. When we (the military) have concerns, we tell them to the government.”82 It seems that the issues identified above created discordance in the civil-military relations.
4
Conclusions
Cultural and institutional factors, such as Schiff’s four indicators, offer a clear explanation of civil-military relations in Turkey. Despite their formal separation, military and civilian authorities have forged a partnership based on an imperfect concordance among the military, political elites, and the citizenry. This ruling style is the product of Turkey’s specific cultural, social, and institutional context, featuring a stratified society and political 80
Mustafa Balbay: ‘Genç subaylar tedirgin’ in Cumhuriyet Daily, 23 May 2003. For the discussion on the young officers and Erdogan’s reply, see ‘Genc Subaylar Sikintisi Yok’ (‘There is no Unease of Young Officers’) in www.havadis.net/haberdevami.asp?id=10244. 82 See Turkish dailies on 26 and 27 May 2003. 81
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culture as well as historic conflicts with neighboring states and the constant fear of losing territory synonymous with national integrity. Such conditions significantly influence the military’s role in the nation. Ataturk’s victorious army was initially divorced from politics in the name of creating a democratic republic. But, the military has gradually gained a stronger presence in politics, with broad public support. Throughout the period of 1980–95 the military continued to a have a strong influence in Turkish politics. Although the international environment favoured the establishment of democratic systems and the then Prime Minister Ozal tried to curtail the political power of the officer corps, the military was able to sustain its political influence because of the separatist Kurdish insurgency and the inability of the politicians to function as an autonomous socio-political group. The military did not only succeed in maintaining its political influence but even increased its economic and political power in the second half of the 1990s. The military’s political role has entered a new era in the late 1990s and would be carried much into the 21st century. Despite the concordance between the military and the citizenry regarding the army’s involvement in politics, tension has emerged between the military and certain groups which either challenge the secular nature of the state (i.e. the Islamists), or its unitary character (i.e. Kurdish nationalists and separatists). During crises, when the government is incapable of acting effectively, the military has intervened to settle domestic political affairs. Since 1960, the military has staged four coups in order to protect national unity, democracy, and secularism. In each takeover, most citizens accepted the military’s political involvement because of society’s deep confidence in the army and its role as an organic part of the society. Although Turkey’s civilian sector is more prominent, the military has constitutional tools at its disposal and an endorsing political culture, should it choose to play a behind-the-scenes role in the political process. For example, there is an institutionalized, consultative relationship at the very top echelons between the government and the military. When a civilian government is efficient, capable of maintaining political stability, and does not have strong disagreement with the military, the military’s influence on decision-making is lesser. It exercises more authority in circumstances of political instability and when there is a growing unease in the civil/military partnership. Such freedom of action for the army worries some liberals who desire the progress of democratization without military intervention, but most citizens are comfortable with the military’s role as guardian of democracy and secularism. This concordance between the military and the citizenry is key to understanding civil-military relations in Turkey. The concordance model also explains the correlation between the army’s increased professionalism and its enhanced political influence. Po-
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litical scientist Samuel Huntington’s theory,83 which assumes the separation of military and civil authorities, objectives, and activities, suggests that the higher the professionalism of the military, the lower the military’s influence in the political domain. Concordance theory, on the other hand, assumes accommodation and shared objectives among the military, political elite, and the citizenry. Enhanced professionalism has better enabled the military to meet shared objectives in Turkey. Further, its technological advancement and strength demonstrated successfully against PKK terrorism and in international peacekeeping operations, has increased its prestige in the public’s eye at a time when the people have dramatically lost their trust in the political parties and Parliament. Its sophistication has also enabled it to grasp the complexities of social issues and the needs of the citizenry, and hence, to increase the military’s standing in the public domain. Moreover, working toward shared objectives with the citizenry may lead to the erosion of civil-military boundaries, an assumption of the concordance model. This erosion has seemingly been taking place in Turkey since early 1997. Military officers, for example, joined civilians in celebrating the 75th anniversary of the republic. Military officers in uniform held hands with civilians and marched in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir on October 25, 1998, symbolically manifesting the removal of civil-military boundaries. The military’s historic role in building the nation and functioning as an agent of change to realize the goals of Ataturk’s reforms have given it a respected position in society. Therefore, the government often meets the military’s stated requirements for modernization and technological advancement. The public supports such allocations because the army, as guardian of democracy, is Turkey’s most trusted national institution. Is this trust subject to challenges? There are very likely challenges because there is a conflict between the military and radical groups that have a discord with the larger segment of the society also. They are ungratified by the military influence in political process and a small number of leftist liberals endorse their discontent. Among them the Islamists developed an interest in magnifying the people’s disappointment with the late response of the army to the disaster caused by the 17 August 1999 earthquake. The army, however, was quick in responding to the 12 November Duzce quake. This was significant in re-establishing the public confidence in the army.84 83
84
Samuel Huntington. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Soon after the collapse in public confidence during the national trauma of the August 1999 earthquake, in September 1999 the armed forces still headed the list of trusted institutions with 65.1%. See Milliyet, 8 November 1999.
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The high public faith in the army is not only related to its heroic image, but also to the fact that it has remained relatively free of the corruption that has become endemic in both the government and the civil services. Considering the importance of public trust in the military, the army is highly sensitive to the social and political developments that have consequences for its image in the public. For example, the military rapidly responded to the February 21 economic crisis and played down the card of those who were planning to discredit the military by pointing out its huge budget share (18%) since 1984 (when the PKK launched guerrilla war against the state). Efforts to discredit the military would lead to political turmoil rather than pave the way to further democratization at a time of political instability. Most important for Turkey’s future stability is the capacity of the civilian governments to maintain harmonious relations with the military. It depends to what extent a civilian government is capable of resolving two major conflicts: the political tension created by the cleavages and the unease between the military and the AKP government. With increased democratization, higher prospect for the European Union membership and enhanced political stability, the military would reduce its influence in the political arena since the higher echelons of the military has evinced anything other than a strong desire to restore to Turkey a functioning democracy. A conviction on part of the military that there is a strong civilian force to protect the unitary secular state is important to transform the NSC, in all respects, into an advisory organ rather than a coordinating body. This is one of the mid-term changes aimed at meeting the “Copenhagen criteria”, as stated in the Accession Partnership Document issued by the EU Commission and in the National Program85 prepared by the Democratic Left Party-led coalition government that lasted until November 2002. Beginning during the former DSP-led Coalition government (1999– 2002) and stepped up by the AKP government, a number of constitutional reforms and changes in statutes defining the functions and the composition of the National Security Council have increased civilian influence on the political decision-making process since 2001. In 2003, civil-military relations have moved to “the civilian rule/military influence” phase. The AKP government is highly enthusiastic to make far-reaching reforms in the functions of the military and in expanding civil liberties in order to start accession talks with the EU. This enthusiasm is well received by liberal circles, but some circles are worried about a “secret agenda” that targets the emasculation of the military’s influence in Turkish politics in order to Islamize the state. 85
For the national Program, see http://www.abgs.gov.tr/.
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Appendix 1950 – 1960
1925
1923
1960 – 1961
1961 – 1965
1980 – 1963
1984 – 199186 1991 – 1996 July* 1997 Feb*
1971 – 1973 1965 - 1971 1973 - 1980 1996 July - 1997 Feb*
< – 2002 – 2003 Civilian Rule/ Military Influence
Civilian Control/ Military Partnership
Military Control/ Military Partnership
Military Rule/ Civilian Influence
1
2
3
4
Professionalism
Civilian/Military Stalemate (or deadlock)
Praetorianism
Fig. 1. Dekmejian’s Civilian-Military Continuum Note: The following periods are the categorization of the author based on the conceptual scheme developed by Dekmejian: Turkey 1984 – 1991* Turkey 1997 – * Turkey 1991 – 1997* Turkey 1996 July – 1997 February* Turkey 2002 November – 2003. * This is the result of two developments: First, the amendments in the Constitution and the change in National Security Council Law to meet the EU criteria that require reducing the role of NSC to advisory body. Secondly, the urge of the AKP to reduce the military’s control over political affairs.
86
James Brown categories the 1983–1989 period to be civilian/military partnership. See James Brown. 1989. p. 392, Figure 1.
Analysis and Conclusions Plamen I. Pantev
The authors of the national-case studies provide enough arguments that confirm the validity of the six major accents of this book. First, the issue of the evolution of civil-military relations is central for the transition countries of South East Europe, but of priority value to Greece and Turkey, too. The democratic control of the security sector is perceived as one of the pillars of the developing democratic systems in the individual countries of the region. Maturity of democracies is more clearly perceived and assessed in connection with the state of the democratic control over the security sector in the individual countries: a welcome development after the many post-Yugoslav wars in the Western Balkans. Second, though disparities in the levels of evolution of democratic civilmilitary relations still exist in the individual countries of South East Europe, the tendencies and directions of the developing issue indicate a value of homogeneity in that area that has never existed before. This is a solid guarantee that forming a regional security community has passed a philosophic turning point that can be hardly reversed. This does not mean that the security threats and instability are overcome and that stability in the Western Balkans is irreversible. Henriette Riegler gives solid indicators of the real difficulties on the road ahead, especially with the legacies of the post-Yugoslav wars. It is due to these wars, writes the Austrian scholar that “this area was and to a degree without equal still is one of immense insecurity”. The legacy of totalitarian party control in the Balkan countries is also reflected negatively on the state institution building in the region. Third, the national evolution of civil-military relations in South East Europe in the beginning of the 21st century proves the validity of an older tendency towards integration of the region into NATO and the EU. Membership in NATO and the EU, whether close or distant, remains the chief motivator for security sector reform. Maturity on issues of civil-military relations in the individual countries is achieved very much by the inducement stemming from the opportunity and promise of future NATO and EU membership.
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Fourth, third-generation reform of the issues in the area of democratic control of the security sector has been launched in parallel to the ongoing first and/or second-generation reforms. This strange situation stems from the need to fight terrorism and to reach more effective democracy by countering in an international cooperative manner security problems and challenges. The slower pace of evolution of the issues in some of the countries of South East Europe pertain to incomplete or unfinished first and/or second-generation reforms. Fifth, the national case studies reflect a growing awareness by the people of the individual states about the importance of security and stability for the improvement of their standard of living. This is a fundamental prerequisite for the further deepening of the security sector reform and the evolution of democratic control. Understanding the meaning of good governance of the security sector in the individual Balkan countries may become a major vehicle of the broader reform process of the societies in the region, especially of the transition countries. Sixth, the fight on terrorism and the national and regional contribution to that fight is well realized by the people of South East Europe, though the urgency of that issue is not yet reflected well in the opinion polls of some of the countries. There is a link between the stability of the states and the activities of organised crime and terrorism. Some of the West Balkan countries bear that dangerous potential. The author of the chapter on the theoretic preconditions of fighting terrorism notes the need to take adequate measures through democratic procedures to legally narrow the room for manoeuvre of the terrorist groups that would choose the Balkans in their schemes. Protecting democratic liberties and rights of the people, notes Richard Cohen, is another major challenge for the Balkan people. Though the author concentrates on the effects of 9/11 on both the old and new democracies, and on the respective risks for their societies, he points to the specific opportunities for the countries of South East Europe to complete the started changes of their defence establishments despite the pressure of the terrorist threat. At this point he considers the pressure of terrorism on the USA and Western Europe more ominous than on South East Europe. “It would be a grave mistake writes Cohen, if the war on terror is used to tighten constraints on fledgling democratic freedoms. Curtailment of freedoms in the name of security in the new democracies must not be allowed to damage the growing ties between the soldier and the society that he or she is entrusted to protect.” A new perspective of measuring the maturity of civil-military relations is introduced in the regional discourse on the topic by the contribution of Jean-Jacques de Dardel. He studies the legal, political and practical aspects of the operational interrelations of international humanitarian law,
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democratic control of the security sector and the security sector reform in a new strategic environment. The author notes that as more detailed divisions of labour are set in the security sector special attention will have to be given to what rules of humanitarian law, human rights, or other bodies of law will apply. This is most likely to be the case in peacekeeping operations abroad – an activity which is definitely on the rise. South East Europe is likely to be not only the locus of foreign involvement in peace support, but also a net provider of peace support units and personnel for multilateral operations. The question becomes even more important due to the process of expansion of international humanitarian law and its bridgebuilding to human rights law. The author underlines danger of abandoning the rigour of international humanitarian law and its role as a bulwark against barbarity during the period of the security sector reform. A specific warning by the author, concerning the peculiarities of South East Europe is formulated in this way: As security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, just as elsewhere, the performance and lasting validity of international humanitarian law must go on looming large over all temptations to justify, in retrospect, the ghastly violations of the past, as it remains axiomatically true that no amount of wrong makes a right. As for the fight against terrorism and its apparently necessary rule of exception, writes the author, it must be stressed that any crackdown and outright frontal counter-measure will be short lived, if the feeding grounds of terrorism do not subside. Whatever the measures taken, popular support for terrorist organisations is likely to dwindle at a fast pace if serious breaches of humanitarian rules and ideals feed general resentment in those communities, from which the terrorists originate… The benefits of a certain form of restraint and the upholding of higher values will always outweigh those of unruly coercion, especially when it comes to fighting an ideological battle for the soul of the social and political next-of-kin-terrorists. J.-J. de Dardel proposes a set of humanitarian law requirements when defining and operating security sector reform in the effort to meet today’s security challenges. He calls them the initial ‘seven humane pillars of wisdom’ that no democratic society should do without. One can hardly disagree with the conclusion of this author, who prefers to continue thinking not only humanely, but also strategically and with a long-term perspective in dealing with the terrorist threat. The articles on the general prerequisites of fighting terrorism, the security threat situation in South East Europe, continuity and change in the field after the launch of the fight on terrorism and the international humanitarian law/human rights law provide additional background to the national-case studies. Any draft of typology or classification of the countries
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of South East Europe on the basis of “civil-military relations evolution and state of the democratic control and reform of the security sector” is only conditional: the aim is just to highlight peculiarities of a process, which encompasses the whole region and all states without exceptions. All three generations of civil-military relations reforms are present in the region and develop, though at different velocities and levels of maturity, towards a common target: covering the requirements of being NATO, PfP and EU members. This constitutes a great change, compared to the state of affairs some three years ago. The region of South East Europe is becoming more stable thanks to a democratic progress of the individual societies in the area of civil-military relations too. A level of common culture on the issues of democratic control and security sector reform has already been reached by the countries of South East Europe that would caution and deter any more ambitious effort to reverse the evolution or impose standards that would deviate substantially from the generally agreed and accepted Europe-wide and NATO-wide. It is a fact that the third generation of reform in this sector, stemming from the need to fight terrorism and build-up national democracy more effectively is also a part of the current thinking in the countries of South East Europe and an instrument to close the gaps between the states of the regions, concerning the level of realization of the first, the second and the third generations of reform of civil-military relations. Having said that, and realizing the commonality of the objectives in that area, we still need to be fair and objective in pointing the problems and difficulties for each case. They are reasons for the different assessments, what road the countries have passed and what remains to be covered. Greece is a special case of highly developed country that has succeeded to borrow effectively from the experience of its NATO and EU membership and to focus on the most urgent issues of security sector reform that many developed countries faced in the post-Cold War era and after 9/11. According to Thanos Dokos Greece still needs to match the best experience of some other EU members in utilizing civilian expertise and the potential of the media. Coping with the “Ocalan” and “17 November” cases show mature civil-military relations can overcome real hard issues within the confines of democracy. Slovenia is a positive example of a country with progressing civilmilitary relations from another perspective: it is one of the postCommunist and of the post-Yugoslav countries that shows the way for the other ex-Yugoslav states how to achieve maturity in civil-military relations and reach the goals of membership in both NATO and EU. Marijan Malesic and Ljubica Jelusic have provided a fair and balanced picture of the existing problems and negative tendencies. A dubious assessment is given on
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the way terrorism is perceived in an increasingly indifferent Slovenian society – as 17th in importance out of 19 threats. This leaves room for further study of a generally highly successful case. Hungary is very much in the same grouping of successful cases. Tibor Babos and Linda Roger have highlighted in detail the remaining deficiencies in one of the reforming institutions of the security sector – intelligence. This young NATO and EU member, according to the authors still needs to improve its intelligence to match the requirements of fighting terrorism. The Hungarian case study may serve as a useful model in going into more details on the topic of democratic oversight of the intelligence services of the other countries of South East Europe. The Bulgarian and the Romanian cases fall into this same grouping. The self-critical Bulgarian case study presents the problems linked with completing the tasks of adaptation to NATO membership, with the start of the security sector reform and with the adaptation to fighting terrorism (and organised criminality) while staying in the framework of democratic attitudes. The Romanian case gives a detailed picture of the accomplishments in preparing and starting the fight on terrorism. It would be correct to notice that Romania continues to work on an agenda of covering the requirements of the defence reform that did not finish with its formal integration into the Alliance. One of the most interesting and important cases of the evolving South East European democratic societies and regional security community is Turkey. Nilufer Narli’s paper addresses the peculiarities of the relationship between the military and the civilian authorities by explaining the historical role of the army in Turkish politics and society. This paper adds substantially to the richness of individual cases in South East Europe. The author explains the factors that have enabled the military to influence Turkish politics in the name of protecting national unity, democracy and secularism. In order to understand Turkey’s complex civil-military relations at a time when the international actors and pro-EU national circles assess whether its domestic policies comply with the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, one needs to be aware of the composition of the Turkish officer corps, the military conscription method, and military style in conjunction with the way the military influences the political decision-making process. Yet a major perceptual problem remains unsolved: apart from understanding the complex nature of Turkish civil-military by outsiders, Turkey needs to understand the pressing nature of democratic control over the armed forces and the broader security sector in the democratic society. The EU will hardly compromise the fundamental geo-political advantages of having Turkey in the Union. The EU and other democratic nations and friends of Turkey expect Turkish society to evolve and generate the institutions and mechanisms up to a level when the ultimate defender of secular
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democracy will be Turkish society itself, not the country’s military. This is not an easy job, but Turkey has the potential to solve this issue, as well as the understanding by neighbours and friends – NATO, EU and prospective EU members. This study is an important stepping stone on this road. The studies of the Albanian, Croatian and Macedonian national cases allow us to propose another grouping of countries developing their civilmilitary relations and democratic societies. The criteria are the similarities in the positive developments and the persistence of major, though differing in quality and magnitude in the individual cases, deficiencies in Albania, Croatia and FYROM. All three countries have clear perspectives of working to join NATO by implementing their respective MAP programmes. All three states have made the strategic decision to cooperate in their efforts to join the Alliance. All three Western Balkan countries have clarity of purpose: to contribute to regional stability. The perspective of integrating in the EU is of a more short-to-mid term probability for Croatia, of a mid-tolonger term perspective for FYROM, and of a longer-term perspective for Albania. Croatia needs to cope with four distinct problems, according to Mladen Stanicic: lack of awareness and understanding of the differences between the concepts of defence and security; discrepancy of legal provisions and their implementation; lack of competence of both civilian and military in exercising the new concept of civil-military relations, and, the difficult general economic situation that slows down the process of implementation of the concept. Blendi Kajsiu has pointed at the continuing influence of negative factors, pulling the country back in its efforts to build-up modern civilmilitary relations: economic and social deficiencies; state weakness, and the legacy of the past. According to him several features are specific of the inadequacies in that sector: legislative and procedural vacuum in military resources management and defence budget formulation; inadequate exchange between the Executive and the Parliament; inadequate communication among the parliamentary committees; under- and unqualified staff of the parliamentary committees responsible for democratic oversight of the security sector; asymmetry of expertise of the Ministry of Defence and the Parliament disturbingly in favour of the executive branch; inadequate security think-tank activity, and inadequate resources for organising the fight against terrorism. Petar Atanasov is rather optimistic that the state of civil-military relations in Macedonia does not differ significantly from other countries in the region. However, the author soberly adds that despite the efforts of the various state and non-governmental players in the field of security, despite the closer involvement of both the EU and NATO, Macedonia continues to be at a very immature level of its civil-military relations because
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of persisting instability caused by the continuing ethnic conflict and the existence and violence inflicted by armed units of illegal organisations. In this situation Macedonia is bogged down in “first-generation” reforms and is ineffective in the efforts of implementing the “second-generation” reforms. Atanasov further notes the impact of the absence of experienced staff in security matters in Parliament to help it exercise its constitutional authority; the inadequate representation of the non-Macedonian ethnic communities in the security structures; the inter-institutional legal inadequacies, mainly between the President and the government, etc. He writes that the Macedonian public has heard the words transparency and accountability too often, but unfortunately they have not been made manifest. The author argues that the supremacy of the Executive over the Legislative power was a pattern of the Macedonian political scene for a decade. Another negative tendency is the will of the state to centralise civil society. At the same time he underlines that no single serious NGO that would deal exclusively with security issues has yet appeared. Little expertise could be found in the Macedonian media on security affairs too. The nascent ambitions to create an expert non-governmental security and defence community by representatives of universities and research institutes should be encouraged. There are strong indicators that unless the individual countries cope in a decisive way with their specific problems in the area of civil-military relations the tendency to differentiation among them may prevail and each case would be judged according to its own merits on the way to NATO and EU membership. Croatia seems to be closer to attaining this goal, though none of the three countries is excluded from the ‘open doors’ policy of the two institutions. The natural competition of the three countries is developing simultaneously in generally cooperative and positive trilateral context. Furthermore, the positive impact of the other countries from the region and from the Alliance and the Union stimulate the processes of evolution in the area of civil-military relations in the three countries. Two other specific cases of the evolution of civil-military relations in South East Europe deserve special attention: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Both states and societies have registered substantial progress, compared to 1995 (in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and to 2000 (in the case of Serbia and Montenegro). Politically both are applicants for membership in the PfP programme of NATO. They are involved in various development programmes and are prospective EU members in the longer-term. They, however, can be hardly classified into one conditional, separate grouping of states in South East Europe. Yet both bear the characteristic of retardation, though with different potential of getting out of the present status and embarking on new and better prospects of
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development from the point of view of the state of their CMR, DEMCON and SSR. We do not see often national or other analysis of the state of these social sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bisera Turkovic gives an answer to a question asked often by experts: why is that country so retarded in that area compared to other Central, Eastern and South East European transition states, and after the huge post-conflict rehabilitation investments and efforts? First, it is due to the multiplicity of issues that required attention (reconstruction of houses, return of refugees, rebuilding the infrastructure of the country). So CMR were left on the margins and Bosnia and Herzegovina did not keep up with the trends in the other transition countries. Second, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a reflection of peace negotiations and agreement that did not pay a specific attention to CMR. In a similar way the respective institutions which should be tasked with the realisation of CMR and DEMCON were not established. Third, due to the war, the weak economy, the multiplicity of overlapping legal provisions and the non-existence of state military institutions, Bosnia and Herzegovina could not induce civil-military relations that would pay back in the near future. Low salaries of the officers and soldiers were another traumatizing factor of CMR. A fourth factor, hampering the development of CMR was the ethnic tensions within the military and civil aspects of the government. There are three ethnic components within two organisational structures in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with no common command, and functioning on the basis of ‘national key’ and the principle of ‘non-intervention in the affairs of the other’. Therefore Bisera Turkovic doubts the army of Republika Srpska would be ready to defend a mostly Bosnian city as Sarajevo – a really sad and bitter assessment of the present state of CMR in the country. Even more troublesome is, however, another judgement – the situation of ethnic division and exclusivity does not worry much the civil authorities of the country. While she believes some form of control over the unhealthy CMR does exist, she is sure it is not democratic. A specific feature of the CMR in Bosnia and Herzegovina is they are not state-based, but ethnic-based. International pressure more than EU or NATO membership motivates civil-military relations and security sector reforms. Facing the threat of punishment by sanctions for the state and well perceiving the promise of joining the PfP programme the three ethnic components of the country and of the armed forces agreed on the necessity of having democratic control by the Parliament and of having common command at central level. The Defence Committee – a new governmental body with national and foreign participants chaired by an American – was tasked to introduce the needed elements of central command of the armed forces and of democratic CMR. Another aspect of
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retardation is the low level of public awareness about the need for transparency of the Legislative and Executive powers. The traditional stereotype was the expectation of the outside threat and the belief security was based on secrecy. The three entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their military establishments continued to perceive each other after the mid1990s as enemies. Transparency was a logical victim. Support for each of the entities by Serbia, Croatia and Muslim countries further limited the application of the principle of transparency over the security sector. The application of the principle started improving after 2002–2003 when Belgrade stopped its practice of non-transparent assistance, and also after the President of Croatia, Stipe Mesic, ceased the practice of non-transparent Croat support for the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian component of the army also started receiving assistance already in a transparent way. Media are still inadequate to the requirements of transparency in the country. Overcoming the decentralization and ethnically dispersed authority of the democratic control over intelligence is another venue of improvement in the area. The establishment in May 2003 of the Committee on the Reform of the Intelligence Agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the initiative of the High Representative aims at the establishment of a single, unified, depoliticised and legally-based intelligence agency by the end of 2004. In this setting Parliament is expected to have a functioning democratic control over intelligence. A major deficiency that needs to be overcome is in the defence planning sector: the conceptual homogeneity of the defence plans of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one side, and of Republika Srpska, on the other would require getting rid of the principles of the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA). This is already a fact for the Bosnian-Croat part of the country, but awaits realisation in the Serbian one. The author also highlights the need for more and functioning think tanks on security issues as well as more active and educated media. It is a pity that few people know about, for example, the participation of contingents from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the UN peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Congo. Bisera Turkovic correctly points to the significance of the support, provided by NATO, the EU, the Stability Pact for South East Europe and the OSCE for the further evolution of the CMR, DEMCON and the SSR in a country with such a complicated domestic situation. The last of the national cases – that of Serbia and Montenegro – is also of specific character and only conditionally grouped together with the other especially retarded one, of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a critical assessment of the development of civil-military relations in FRY/Serbia and Montenegro Dragan Simic provides evidence that in his country first generation democratisation of civil-military relations has not yet occurred and
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that these reforms have been slowed-down very much because of the weakening of the state, its dependence on organised crime, culminating in the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. At the same time he describes the indicators of the conceptual rethinking of security on the national, regional and global levels. This re-conceptualisation process would inevitably influence institution-building and practical behaviour of this country in the future, giving way to a more effective democratic civil control and security sector reform. Dragan Simic particularly highlights the fact that instead of starting the security sector reform in the conditions most favourable for such a thing immediately after taking power and by using radical personnel changes, almost all personnel of the old regime got the needed time to consolidate and continue their activity in accordance to old patterns of behaviour. The author underlines that apart from objective obstacles, the leaders of DOS (the Democratic Opposition of Serbia), guided by short-term personnel and party interests, neglected security sector reform, which is obligatory for societies in transition, and a major precondition for a complete reform of society. “The biggest speaker in favour of reform in Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, paid with his life precisely because of these mistakes”, writes the author. Dragan Simic formulates the direction of the development of civil-military relations and of the security sector reform in his country: integration into the security communities of PfP, NATO and EU countries. This is the way for Serbia and Montenegro to receive the support needed to make the necessary corrections. It would be correct to add “in cooperation and through the support of neighbouring countries of Serbia and Montenegro, by contributing to the regional stability and progress”. A most effective instrument that Serbia and Montenegro could utilise is a vibrant “third sector” – the NGOs – especially the nonpartisan security expert academic and non-governmental think-tanks. Their effective pressure may accelerate reforms and help in catching-up with the forerunners in the region. The state and society of this country should realise that this is not a contest with adversaries, or a zero-sum game: the success of each of the countries from the region magnifies the successes of the others on their way to integration in NATO and the EU. Lastly, the countries and societies of South East Europe are ‘doomed’ to carry out and complete successfully the reforms of their CMR and the security sector, if they are to progress as vibrant and equal nations of Europe in the 21st century. As Richard Cohen has pointed in his article “now is the window of opportunity for the South East European nations to focus on transition reforms and shape effective democratic system of civil-military relations while terrorism has not concentrated on the countries of this region, but on the developed West”. He is right, but knowing the lessons of the past in the troubled region of the Balkans, those who do not adapt on
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time, including on the issue of effectively fighting terrorism in cooperation with the civilised world, stay behind the others and we, in South East Europe will be again new-comers in the next round of history, rather consumers and not contributors to security. That is why persisting with civilmilitary relations and security sector reforms within a democratic framework while adapting to the fight on terrorism, preserving our democratic values and principles, despite the various pressures on us during this fight, seems the only valid strategic option for the peoples and states of South East Europe. A very important advantage in this situation gives us more assurance these goals can be attained: a mature, versatile and motivated expert security community in South East Europe and on the region. It has the potential to be a meaningful pressure group on the governments in the area, influencing the national and regional developments on CMR, DEMCON and SSR – for the betterment of this part of Europe and of the world. Future common research endeavours would prove again this statement.
List of Abbreviations
AKP ALBA ANA CFE CMR CSBMs CSID DC DCAF DEMCON DOS EC EU EMPAE FRY FYROM GDP HDZ HNDGS HUMINT ICC ICTY IFOR IHL ISAF JNA KFOR KKCMTSH KYSEA MAP MOD/MoD MP NAC NATO NBC NDP
Justice and Development Party (Peacekeeping Operation in) Albania Albanian National Army Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty) Civil-Military Relations Confidence and Security-Building Measures Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy Defence Committee Democratic Control of the Armed Forces Democratic Control Democratic Opposition of Serbia European Community European Union Five-year Procurement Plan (in Greece) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gross Domestic Product Croatian Democratic Union Hellenic National Defence General Staff Human Intelligence International Criminal Court International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia Implementation Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) International Humanitarian Law International Security Assistance Force Yugoslav People’s Army Kosovo Force National Committee for the Liberation and Defence of Albanian Lands Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (in Greece) Membership Action Plan Ministry of Defence Member of Parliament North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (weapons) National Democratic Party
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NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NSC National Security Council OHR Office for Human Rights OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PASOK Greek Socialist Party PfP Partnership for Peace PKK Kurdish Workers’ Party PR Public Relations RPP Republican People’s Party RS Republic of Serbia (Republica Srpska) SCD Supreme Council of Defence SCMM Standing Committee on Military Matters SCND Supreme Council on National Defence SDSM Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia SECI South East European Cooperative Initiative SEDM South East European Defence Ministerial SEE South East Europe SFOR Stabilisation Force SFRY Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia SIGINT Signal Intelligence SIS State Intelligence Service SSR Security Sector Reform TAF Turkish Armed Forces TGS Turkish General Staff UCK Kosovo Liberation Army UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo UNSOM United Nations Mission in Somalia USA United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity WEU Western European Union WMC Weapons of Mass Casualties WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WTC World Trade Centre
Editors and Authors
Petar ATANASOV, Research Fellow, Ph.D. in Sociological Sciences. Expert in ethnic relations, multiculturalism and societal security. Working at the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje, lecturing in Contemporary Sociological Theories. Tibor BABOS, Major is the Deputy Head of the NATO Cooperation Division, Ministry of Defence, Hungary. He earned his M.A. in Intelligence Studies at the National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary and is presently enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Security and Civil-Military Relations Program, Monterey, California. He is also a Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies. His research field is the European Security, particularly European Security Institutions and Integration as well as Civil-Military Relations. Richard COHEN, Colonel, is President of “RSC Strategic Connections”, an independent company, based in Ottawa, Canada, advising on a broad range of security-related issues. From 1994–2002, he was Professor of NATO and European Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center, in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He founded and directed the Senior Executive Seminar programme at the Marshall Center from 1998–2001. Richard Cohen served in both the Canadian and the British Armies as an infantry and parachute officer. He served in many parts of the world, including Germany, Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands, Hong Kong, Borneo, Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada and the United States. He directed NATO’s Military Cooperation Programme with Partner countries from 1991 to 1994. Jean-Jacques de DARDEL, Ambassador, heads the Centre for International Security Policy of the Swiss MFA. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. He functioned as Secretary Jurist at the ICRC and the International Conference on the Development of Humanitarian Law in 1976/77, before joining the Swiss Foreign Service in 1981 and serving in Bern, Vienna, Washington, Canberra and Paris. He authored a number of books, essays and articles on cultural and international affairs.
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Claudiu DEGERATU is currently Program Director for Security Studies at the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, and Lecturer at the University of Bucharest, teaching International Relations. In his previous position Claudiu Degeratu was Deputy Director at the Directorate for Political-Military Analysis of the Romanian Ministry of Defence. Fields of research interest are geopolitics, sociology, and European integration. Thanos DOKOS, Ph.D. has held research posts at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, in Frankfurt and the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University. He served as the Director for Research, Strategic Studies Division, Hellenic Ministry of National Defence. He was also a NATO research fellow for 1996–1998. He is currently the Director for Studies at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He is the author of several books and articles on arms control, international security, Greek-Turkish relations and Mediterranean security. Philipp H. FLURI, Dr. studied Philosophy, History and Social Anthropology at the Universities of Fribourg and Bern (doctorates 1987 and 1990) and East European Studies at the Osteuropa-Institut at Fribourg University. He became a defence analyst with the Swiss General Staff in 1991 with a focus on post-communist societies. He joined the OSCE AG to Chechnya as an Expert on Human Rights and Democratisation in 1995 and was appointed Acting Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the Question dealt with by the Minsk Group (NagornoKarabakh) in 1996. He became the Coordinator for Civil-Military Relations at the Secretariate General of the Swiss MoD in 1998 and as such the project leader on what is now DCAF. Gustav E. GUSTENAU, BG Mag. is Deputy Director of the Directorate General for Security Policy at the Federal Ministry of Defence in Vienna, Austria. In 2002, he was appointed Liasion officer of the Federal Ministry of Defence to the National Security Council. He is advisor to the Austrian Defence minister in matters of Security Politics. Additionally, BG Gustenau has published numerous articles and publications in the field of Austrian and European security policy with a special focus on South East Europe.
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Ljubica JELUŠIý, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and a Head of the Defence Studies Department. Her recent teaching and research areas are civil-military relations, armed conflicts, peace operations, women in armed forces. Her courses include Polemology, Military Sociology, Peace Studies, Theories of Civil-Military Relations. Blendi KAJSIU is a researcher at the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) as well as lecturer at the University of Tirana where he teaches “Introduction to Political Science”. He double majored in Applied Economics and Political Science from the American University in Bulgaria (AUBG) in 2000. In 2001 he received his MA in International Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame, Indiana. Marjan MALEŠIý, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and Head of Defence Research Centre at the Institute of Social Sciences. His recent teaching and research areas are security policy, civil-military relations, crisis management, propaganda and public opinion. Nilüfer NARLI, Prof. Dr. is Chair of the Sociology Department at Marmara University, Istanbul. Her major research interests are comparative studies in Islamic movements in Turkey, the Middle East and Southeast Asia; civil-military relations in Turkey; illegal migration of workforce and human smuggling in South East Europe. Plamen I. PANTEV, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor in International Relations and International Law at the Law School, Department of International Relations and International Law of Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridsky”, Sofia. He is founder and Director of the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia, Bulgaria. Valeri RATCHEV is Colonel in the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Currently he is Deputy Commandant of the “G. S. Rakovski” Defence College in Sofia and Dean of its National Security and Defence Faculty. He is also a Senior Research Associate of the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia, Bulgaria. Henriette RIEGLER, Dr. is a senior research fellow at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna. Her research focus is on South East Europe with a special focus on the Former Yugoslavia. She is a lecturer at the Universities of Vienna and Innsbruck, Austria.
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Linda ROYER, Major, is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the 179th AW, Ohio Air National Guard. She has earned a M.A. in History at Cleveland State University and is presently enrolled in the Naval Post Graduate School’s Civil-Military Relations Program, Monterey, USA. Her research field is transatlantic relations particularly the PfP and State Partnership Program and Intelligence Studies. Dragan R. SIMIû, Ph.D. in Political Science; Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences – Department of International Studies, Belgrade University. He teaches International Relations and Global and National Security. Main areas of research are: security studies, international relations, foreign policy theory and political philosophy. Mladen STANIýIû is Director of the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb, Croatia. He is also Head of Department for Macroeconomic Analysis; editor-in-chief of the journal “Croatian International Relations Review”. He is Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, Croatia at the M.A. study “EU – Political, Economic and Legal Aspects”. Todor TAGAREV, Ph.D. is Director Programmes of the Centre for National Security and Defence Research, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He was the first Director of the Defence Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria (1999–2001) and served as Director of Armaments Policy and National Armaments Director in 2001. He is a Senior Associate of the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia, Bulgaria. Bisera TURKOVIû is Executive Director of the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) in Sarajevo. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and is lecturer at the University of Sarajevo. In 1996–2000 she served as Ambassador of her country to the OSCE and in June 2000 till February 2001 as Minister for European Integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
