The Experience of Freedom

TH E EXPERI ENCE OF FREEDOM

Jean-Lue Nancy

Assistance for this translation

was provided by the French Miniscry of'Culture

The Expmm« -fFtWdtJm was originally published in r-rmdt in 1988 under the tide 1. ~t tk I4libml, e 1988 Eciitions Galil«. The Translator's Norc: and endnotcs and t~ Foreword were prepared cspecially for this edition. Stanford University Press Stanford, California

by the Board ofT rust«s of the leland Stanford Junior University

«:I199}

Primed in the United StaIn of America ClP

fl9n2064

l

data are at

I~

end of the book

"For the issue depends on frccJom; anJ it is in the power of frccdnm to pass bcrond any and every s~ificd limit."

- Cririqllt ofPllrt' RMJOn. T r.J !1s<:endcmal Dialectic. book I. 5cc[ion 1

Translator's Note

For this translation of l'Explrirnce d~ '" libml, the order of the first three chapters has been rearranged. In the opinion of the series editors. Chapter 2. of the French edition raises issues that resonate with current Anglo-American philosophical debates on freedom. Chapter 2. has therefore been placed at the beginning of this volume. Nan(.-y's many allu!iions and references to French and German philosophical texts pose some challenges to systematic rranslarion. Wherever appropriate. I ha~ kept his terminology consistent with existing translations of these texts. In other cases. where Nan(.-y attempts to free certain words from their given colllexts. it seemed be$[ 10 render these terms in a more literal manner. I wi~h to thank Mr. Albert Liu for his generous advice and hc:lp in preparing this nanslation. Bridget McDonald

Contents

Foreword: rrom Empiricism to the Experience of freedom, by Peter Fenv~

§

I

Are We Free to SpC'.lk of Freedom?

§

2

Necessity of the Theme of Freedom: MixC'd Premises and Conclusions

XIII

9

§ 3 lmpos.~ibility of the Qucstion of freedum:

Fact and Right Indistinguishable

11

§ 4 The Space Left Free by Heidcggcr § 5 Th(' Free Thinking offrcedorn § 6 Philosophy: I.ogic of Freedom

60

§ 7 Sharing Freedom: Equality, Fraternity. JUMi(;e

66

§ 8 F.xpcricm:e of freedom: And Once Again of Ihe Community. Which It Resists

81

§ 9 Fret.-dom as Thing. ForlC. and Gale

§ 10 Absolute Freedom

§

§

11

l2.

106

Freedom and Destiny: Surprise. Tragedy. Generosity

110

Evil: Decision

III

§ 13 Decision, Desert, Offering § 14 Fragments

Notes Index of Names

17S 20')

Foreword: From Empiricism

to the Experience of Freedom Peter FenVt'S ",hnc mad abandon'd limn" -David Hume

Experience. freedom-these two words are perhaps rhe most porent slogans in the English language, Anglo-American thought has never ceased to draw on them in order to define its grounds. methods. and goals_ Empiricism. as a doctrine of experience. and civil libenies. as the political content of freedom. are united in their efforr to remove unjustified authorities. The championing of empiricism and the defense of civillibc:rries against a vast array of meologi,al and political opponents are the chief occupations of much An~I()-American thought. Theological and political authorities are nor. however. the only ones against which the words "experience" and "freedom" have: been marshaled: as long as philosophy is held to be dogmatic and seen ro insinuate certain obscure: articles of faith. it too has been countered with appeals to experience and freedom, The Occidemal mher of Anglo-American thought. which is often called "the conrinent" and is not infrequently presented as philosophically incontinent-"scdu,cd by language"-nor only renounces empiricism but is also seen to remove rhe foundations on which a stalwart defense of civilliberries can be based, The remoteness of "continental" thought from the philosophy most often prauiced in English-speaking countries lies as much in this renunciation as in the perception of this removal. The champiuning of empiricism and the defense of civilliberties do not simply give a certain consistency to Anglo-American xiii

XIV

ForrworJ

thought. nor do they merely give dircctions for its various theoretical and practical pursuits; thC5c two endeavors arc linked in a liherating imperative: accept no authority other than that of experience. Since experience alone is said to give words their meaning. this imperative also implies: free yourself from nonsense. from bunk and humbug. The appeal to cxperience is at bottom a call for liberation. so much 50 that empiricism can claim to clear away long-held opinions, dogma, doctrines, and, at its inception. the very idea of a priori justifications. In place of innate ideas and pure concepts there are works of experience-essays, inquiries, experimenrs, and laboratories. each of which constitute a labor of liberation wherein the given is made to relea'ie itself. If the five centurics of Anglo-American thought arc succes.'iive elaborations on experience as liberation, the counterpart to these labors would be libeT1llion as l'Xp"imc-~liberation without labor or elaboration. liberation without empirical suppan, libemrion that docs not respect the boundaries of civility established by the protocols for civillibcnies. liberation of experience from its service to the work ofliberation. Such liberation docs not easily harmonize with Anglo-American thought. and yet it is no more in harmony with the motifs of labor and the themarics of the Will that have dominated much of its Occidental, "continental" other. It is possible that the thought of liberation Jean-Luc Nancy pursues in The Experienu ofF"edom has as great a potential to break open and expose Anglo-American tnlditions as the ones explicitly addressed in the text. The distinctive trait of Nancy's thought, like that of certain versions of empiricism. is the relentless quesrioning of necessity. From the outset Nancy removes freedom from its subjection to necessity, determinacy. and incvitability-a removal that does not. however, make freedom into mere indeterminacy, indifference. or arbitrariness, each of which is merely a negative mode of determinacy or necessity. The analysis of "existence" Heidegger 6rst undertook in Being mlt/ 1imt leaves room for such freedom. and NaRl:y makes the dimensions of this room more precise, on the one hand by turning his attention to thc legacy of freedom in Hddegger's subsequent writings, and on the other by returning to the phrase with which

Foreword

xv

Sartre laullched "existentialism": "We arc condemned to he tree."1 Our com.lclllnalion to free\lom expresses une more subjugation of freedom to necessity, and so this slogan, far from recognizing Hcide~er'5 break with his philosophical tradition, repeats the formula common It) dassical metaphysics. Hegelianism, and ~hrxism: freedom is the recognition of ncces.'iiity. Against the still ~harply drawn h.l("kground of these formulas-along with the many a5~iations and repercussions they set off, particularly for a French readership-Nancy writes Tlu E'l:prr;",u of Fr~edom. To the degree .hat Nancy's text undoes (he hold that the ideas of necessity and thoroughgoing determinacy exercise over thinking, it resonates more readily with certain strains of Anglo-American thought (han with the versions of essentialism and existentialism Ihat want nothing more than to secure grounds, goals, and verdicts. If the championing of empiricism and the defense of civilliberties layout the points of reference for Anglo-American thought, dlcn the direction this thought takes cannot escape certain momenu of disorientation and errancy. These two points of reference are not easily reconciled with one another. The locus of their conflict-a contlict with which more than one English-speaking philosopher has uied to come 10 terms--is the philosophical concept of freedom. a concept to wh ich the call for civillibenies ubi",atdy refers .1I1d )'et a concept that resists integradon into the progr.un of empiricism. for the experic:m;e of freedom, as the sole experience that would give significance to the word "freedom," is unrecognizable, or at the very least under ,;ullstam di~pute. At the outset of hi~ tamous treatise 0" Liberty, John Smart Mill makes dcar (hat he will have nothing to say of the philosophical concept of freedom: "The 5ubject of (his es.~y is not the so-called 'liberty of the will,' 50 unfimunatcly opposed to the mi5named doctrine of philosophical necessity; but civil, or social liherty. "1 Although l.ocke tried to show that the phrase "Iiherty of the will" is meaninRlcss-onl)' a person is free. never a will'-the phrase nonetheless has a very tlt·terminate meaning; it designates the concept of freedom with which philosophy ha!; •• gain and again struggled:

XVI

FortU!ord

freedom as exemption from thoroughgoing determinacy. And this concept remains problematic as long as thinking-the occupation of the philosopher-means making indissoluble distinctions and seeking solid grounds. Although the precise experience. of freedom is in dispute, there is still agreement about the nature of philosophical thought: it is at bonom the search for grounds. To think freedom in this context is to undermine it; to think freedom means, if one is permincxl to draw on Hobbes's specious etymology, to suspend liberty in "deliberation ...• Thinking is "de-liberation" as long as thinking means above all seeking grounds. From the perspective of this search. the thought of frecxlom is self-defeating. Coming to grips with the self-defeating thought of philosophical freedom, distinguishing modes of determinacy and necessitation, showing the compatibility of thoroughgoing determinacy with spontaneous self-determination, seeking shelter for civil liberties in the defeat of systematic philosophy, even making ignorance of specific causes into the very guarantor of freedom--each of these strategies characterizes a particular way of handling the problematic concept of freedom. and each one tries to prevent freedom, which cannot be unambiguously experienced, from disap~ring withom a trace. Perhaps the most famous anempt to handle the problematic concept offrcedom under me supposition that thinking means positing grounds-and one of the touchstones for Nancy's exposition-is the Third Antinomy of Kant's CritUjue of Pure RellJon. An antinomy is generated when reason, seeking to complete.the series of conditioning causes and reach an unconditioned one, demands an absolutely free beginning and is at once confronted with the counterclaim that any absolmely free beginning abrogates the rules of succession through which the unity of experience is established in the first place. \ The doctrine of transcendental idealism. which presents space and time as forms of specifically human sensibility, has the virtue of rescuing reason from this conflict, and for Kant it is finite reason's only salvation. Having discovered the saving power of transcendental idealism a.nd its idea of world-constitution, continental philosophy sets itself apart from its British precursors. But-and here is the point at

Fo"wom

XVII

which Nancy hroaches the experiem:c of freedom-Kant's "sollltion" (.iepends on a self-subsistent subject who. having secured its own IInity. constitutes a unified world. which can then assure it of its idemity and locarion in space. But the very unity. identity. and locarion of this ~ubject deny its uniqueness. its singularity. its being-in-rhc-world; freedom. as a result. cannot hut appear as extramundanc. "noumenal" causality. That empiricist challenges to the unity. identity. and efficacy of the subject-most notably. the challenge , 'ume proposes--avoid the Kantian "solution" of an tl priori world-constitution makes their efforts into an invaluable palimpsest against which Nancy's endeavor can be rcad. and upon which the oudines of its thought of freedom come to light. When Aristotle speaks of the modes of "responsibility" (aitia). this word cannot mean "cause" as long as causation is understood as necessitation. The analysis of causation as necessitation, by contrast, dominates modern philosophical synems and is perhaps as decisive a criterion of the modernity of a philosophical discourse as reference to the Cartesian statement" cogito. 111m." which is supposed to be "necessarily true" every time it is spoken. 6 Since the founding gesture of empiricism is the rejection of innate ideas, it could hardly accept causation as an a priori concept applicable to experience. In order to retain the analysis of causation as necessitation. it is therefore necessary to point out an experience of necessitation. But, as Hunte insisted again and again/ there is no such experience; necessitation itself i5 never experienced. as long as experience means having an "impression in the sou!." Talk of causality is from this perspective sheer nonsense. for the attributinn of a necessary connection among impressions always falls short of-or oversteps-experience. Transcendental philosophy makes the justification of this overstep into one of its principal tasks. and it docs so in order to secure the unity of ex.perience. Without this overstep. necessity can have no home in experience, and causality would have to be understood as something other than necessary connection. Since necessity can never be experienced. all experience is a matter of "probability." which means. a 'imi,,~. it becomes a matter of sheer possibility. Experience at the

xviii

F017rl'ord

limit-which designates filliu c:xperiem:e-would then be the experience offrttdom. But possibility is as impossihle ro experience as necessity. Such is the docuine of the modalities of being to which empiricism is bound. Experience means having an "impression" in the soul. and each "impression" is actual; indeed. each one defines aClUality.' And for Hume, the impossibility of experiencing necessity not only does not entail a new defense of the philosophical concept of freedom against the idea of thoroughgoing determinacy; it also gives him the chance to represent freedom as an inexplicable and thoroughly useless theological doctrine: "Liberty, when opposed to necessity, not cQnmaint. is the same thing with chance; which is universallyallowed to have no existence. "9 Once freed from theological dogmas-this plays no small part in every appeal to experience, including the appeal to "religious experience" -the concepts of freedom that philosophy has hitherto developed become moribund; to speak of freedom as opposition (0 necessity is to talk nonsense. since no experience. and certainly no "vivid" one, can be had of something that does not exist. As long as philosophicaJ thought means making indissoluble distin(."tions and seeking solid grounds. it ~n make nothing of this concept and can therefore count it among the discarded items of theology. The defense of civilliberties, if they deserve to be defended,'· will come from other quarters. Freedom is therefore nO( a property of human subjectivity; it ccnainly docs not, for Hume, distinguish human beings from other things. But it does not disappear without a trace. As freedom withdraws from (he discourse of philosophy, the discourse of indissoluble distinctions and solid grounds. it leaves a trace of its retreat. The word "freedom" remains meaningful as long as it is opposed to "constraint." and 50 the retreat of philosophical freedom leaves its trace in a certain unconstrainedness, a certain li~raJity. the principal characteristic of which is an ability to make everything possible. liberality cannot then be found in the mere givenness of impressions. since the givcnness of these "experiences" is not free but. as Hume makes clear from the ~ginning, "arises in

xix the soul originally, from unknown causes. "II Liberality expends it~If, rather. in the "gentle forl,;e" cillied ".he imagination." and the imagination. true to i.~ wonl. makes it possible fOr the soul to perceive anything. It is a name for making-possible. being-able: "The uniting principle among ideas is not to be cOllsider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has be:en already excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude. that without it the: mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty."ll freedom accrues [0 the imagination: a force whose very "gentleness," if not its gentility and urbanity. excuses it from forcing anything to occur; it is thus a force without enforcement, a force withum necessitation, a J"t force. "for nothing is more free than that faculty. " Imagination is as important for Hume's exposition of "human nature" as gravitation is for Newton's elucidation of nature in genera\; but gravitation, which is perhaps gentle at times, could hardly be called "free." The word is therefore surprising, and the surprise is that we can speak of the normal, the everyday, and the nalural; the surprise is that we can speak of something. some Dnt thing, at all. The imagination even lets us speak beyond the confines of our nativity: "We arc only 10 regard it [the imagination] as a gentle: force, which commonly prevails. and is the causc why. among other thing.'l. languages so nearly correspond to C'.teh other. "II Imagination "gently," generously,ji-rt/y lets a world com~ into heing: it gives us-but we "arc" nothing Olitside our imagination-the constancy nf objects and it give~ us the idca of causal connections. [Wo ideas that Ilume shows to be mutually incompatible. Only a free force can le[ incompatibilities persist, and their persistence cunstitutes our exist~nce"i An independent and inlerconnecled worM resides in a gentility, a generusity, a liberality, a freedom-ness that i~ it~lf emancipated from the traditional philosophical concept of freedom as mert' indt'terminacy, indifference. or arl>itrarincss. Just as tht' Iiberalit)· of the imagination is more than mere exemprion from determination or cunstraim ("negative freedom"), 50 too is it less than self-determination or the overcoming of inner compulsions {"positive freedom") .. , Liberality, which

xx

Fo"word

always escapes these alrernatives, takes up residence in the imagination as long as the imagination names a space of sheer p055ibility, a space from which nothing, including the nonexistence of chance, can be excluded. The gentleness of the imagination docs not even exclude a certain violence, for the thought of the imagination wrenches Hume from the human. After lamenting the "despair" and "melancholia" into which his researches have thrown him, he seeks the reason why, at the very moment he wisha to conclude his inquiry into human understanding, he has found no mutual understanding at all and has indeed begun to "fancy [himself] some strange uncouth monster. who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been ex~Il'd all human commerce, and left unerly abandon'd and disconsolate."I& Hume "fancies" himself an inhuman entity-and therefore exempt from a treatise of human nature-because of the fundamental character of his own "fanc;y," that is, because the imagination gives and takes away the s~cificity of the human in the same gesture: "The memory, senses, and understanding are. therefore. all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas. "11 The thought of this abyssal foundation leaves one "abandon'd." without commerce. without relation. monstrous: in short. free. In the thought of the imagination as abyssal "ground" there is freedom. But this thought cannot be distinguished from imagination. for as long as it involves memory. senses, and understanding-and how could it not?-it, too. is "founded" on the imagination and can, without funher violence, be called "experiencc. The thought of the imagination is the experience of freedom. The word "ex~rience." as Nancy reminds us, once had the sense of a perilous traversing (~iriJ) of the limit (~rai): "An experience is an attempt executed without reserve, given over to the p~ri/ of its own lack of foundation and security in the 'object' of which it i5 not the subject but instead the passion, exposed like the pirate (p~;rRtis) who freely tries his luck on the high seas. "" Such is the case with Hume. or at least so he thinks: "Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly cs-

.

FO"WOM

XXI

cap'd ship-wreck in pa.o;sing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leacky wetther-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these di5advantageous circumstances. "19 The experience of thought--or. more prtcisdy, of "merhinks. which is nor the same as the inquiry into the nature of personal identity-docs not consist in "impressions" or in their "rcflc!;:tions" but, rathcr. in a periluus traversing of the limit to thought. Traversing in this way is doubdess "imaginary" bur it is, for that reason, all the more fundamental. In the experience of this peril, thinking can no longer be understood as the making of indissoluble distinctions and the finding of solid grounds. At the limit of rhought-or, in this case, at the condwion to the inquiry intu the nature of human understanding-"uncouth." singular monsters are born. and each of these singularities denaturalizes nature, as it finds itself so thorou~hly "abandon'd," so absolved of rclations-that it cannot even find a self-determining "me" that thinks. II

'When Hume thinks himself an "uncouth monster," he can conceive of no community to which this uncanny entity could hencefurth belong. Every section of Tht Expnimct ofFrHdom-IO say nothing of Nancy's other writingsllD-sets our to expose the community of the uncouth and to show this uniquely complex community to be community s;mplicittr. Unlike Hume, he docs nut rely un nature and its unswerving passions to return the um.'Outh to the comh and rhe uncanny to the comfortable. Nor does he, as one awakened by Hume's devastating skepticism, try to discover a wa}' back to the familiar. 11 Nor, finally. docs Nancy. like Hegel and his sllccessors. anempr to show why the familiar world is upsidedown and how it. having become known, could be set aright. The unc.:lluth never returns tu couth; the unfamiliar never gives way to the tiuniliar: the uncanny always haunts the knuwn. And yet-or for precisely this rca§On-thert is community. Such is the strangeness and the difficulty of the thought of freedom Nancy pursues: the abyssal character of freedom. its withdrawal from all grounds. implies the dissolution of every relation: hut this dissolution-

XXII

For~t.lIol'd

which takes place without the labor of experience, without experiments and laboratories--constitutes community in the first and the last place. It is the free space of "fraternity." the immense site at which "equality" finds its incommensurable measure. Hume. who is not alone in this. conceives of his um;outhness as an expulsion from community for one simple rea~on: he. like the metaphysical tradition he inherits. has determined beforehand that community means partaking of a common substance. taking part in "common life" or. at the very least. sharing in "human nature."!! If. by contrast. the experience of community were nor of a common substance but of the very dissolution of substantiality as well as subjectivity-and what else does radical empiricism tcach?then the "abandonment" of which Hume writes would not mark the endpoint of inquiry into the narure of human undemanding but a free beginning of thought. "Thinking" would no longer mean making indissoluble distinctions and seeking solid grounds; thinking would be the exposure ro dis.c;olution and groundlessness. Attacks on the foundations upon which philosophers have purported to build systems are hardly ncw. Ancient and modern versions of skepticism as well as comemporary "antifoundationalisms" have thrived on such polemical srrategies. and the poim of these attacks. when they do not aim as in the case of Desca"es to discover firmer foundations. is almost invariably the same: to give back the given. the namral. or the everyday. One outcome of Nietzsche's rcIenrless critique of philosophical foundations-a critique that barred the way back to the everyday. if not always to the natural-was a certain irrationalism in which the appeal to and ~Iorification of "lived experience" (Erltbnis. Ie vl04) contribmed [0 its widespread reception. Nothing could be more alien [0 Tht /:'xpuimu of Frudom than this appeal and glorification. Nancy does nor conclude on the basis of subjectivity's inability to ground itself that it must seek a ground "beyond" reason and language in some ineffable "lived experience." Such experience. as Nietzsche taught better than anyone else. is just another. even more insidious ground. The experience of which Nancy writes is not "lived," nor is it. as all experiences of existence are for Hume. "vivid." It is as

Fo",uorri

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little an impressiun as ir is a rt"flecrion; it i~. on rhe contrary. rhe experience of exposure ro groundlessness. the "experience of experiencc. "]) And 110 conclusion is drawn from the inahiliry of subjectivity to give itself a ground and secure its own presence; rather. (his inability. ur desrirurion. is thc unique fact to which Ti" ;':V'l'l7mu ofF,"dom is dedicated. nle immense dimension of this Idcr gi\'cs this text its broad scope. its uneven rhythms. and its con~lal1l alteration of tones and texmres. The unique fiu:t is this: subjectivity-which names the substantial self thar is supposed to have the power to support itsdf and to secure its idelllity-cannnr keep irsclf afloat. The foundering of subjeclivity docs not mean rhat human beings. as weak and poorly equipped vcs.~ds. arc not strong enough tu actuali7..e what they desire. With slich a conceptiun of human fragility Same arrived at the furmula. "Wc arc condemned to be free." For Nancy. by contrast, subjectivity is nor simply impotent; if power implies causal iIy. which it surely docs, then the shipwreck of subjecriviry means it has "O',t. and this marks the end of slIhjecth·ity altogethcr. But in this end there is jin;u freedom. a freedom that docs not affiDunt ro a limited Sp.1l e of action but is. rather. the opening-in Ihought, in expcricnce--onto rhe limit. onto grollndlcssrle!lS. onto "exislence" wilhuut essence. As thc uniquc fact to which The /::~p"i,1lt·t o/rmdom is dedicated, the destitution of self-supporting suhjectivity constitutcs. according tD the tcrms Hcidcgger deI,loys, thc "facticity uf existcnce." When Nancy compares Sartrc's famous dil:tum "existence prccedes e!lSencc" with the statement of Heid~r to which if refers-"the 'essence' Df LJllSti" lies in its existence"!I-hc does nut wish tD castigalc Same filr misunderstanding or distorting the original formulation: the point of this comparisDn is to make the Hcidcggcrian exposition of "existence" as !oharp as pos.~ihle. "Existcncc" here I11C;U1S being unable to give oneself a ground al1llthercupon to secure the unity, identity, and con!Olancy that evcry qucstion of cssence-"What is that~" -presuppuses. hci~H'nce docs not then "preccdc" essence; essence recedes from cxiSIl'I1l:c as long as it is cxplil:ated as nature. idea. form, 10 Ii t'I1 tillll; ("lllat whidl was lU be"), po't'tltia ("power")," or even, ac-

xxiv

Fort'Ul()rd

cording to the phenomenological tradition. as Sinn ("meaning").l Heidegger's replacement of the question of what something, including a human being, may ultimately be with the <Juestion after the "who" of the <Juestioner is the sr3ning point for more than one of Nancy's writings, because this replacement carries out the recession of essence from existence. No common name, no general title, and thus no concept of any son can reply to the question "who?" And this failure of common names spells the end of any in<Juiry into essence; it marks the very destitution of essence, a destitution that Hcidegger at times wished to restitute with appeals to "march" and to ·work." The inability of the subject to procure a ground on which it can support itself does not require further work or deeper labor; it demands the abandonment of the idea of subjectivity in favor of the thought of abandonment, of existence. offrcedom. Of far greater significance to Nancy's endeavor than the confrontation between Hcidegger and Same then is the altercation between Kant and Heidcgger over the fundamental character of the transcendental imagination. The transcendental synthesis of the imagination names. according to Heidegger's well-known "destructive" reading of Th~ CritiqwofPUTt RellSon, the abyssal foundation of subjectivity; it designates. although it does not fully acknowledge, the abandonment of the idea of self-supponing entities and the concomitant retrieval of DlISnn "in" the human being. By opening a free space in which it first becomes possible to encounter things-a space called "rime"-the transcendental imagination shows itself to he not precisely the origin of freedom but. rather, original freedomY This freedom is as impossible to form into an image, and thus to "imagine. n as it is to demonstrate on the basis of an impression or sensation. The unimaginability of original freedom does not, however. derive from its pure intelligibility or its noumenal character; it arises from the complexity or. better, the ~/mJgm~jlJ of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Far from settling the troubles Hume experienced when he discovered to his dismay that human understanding rested on the imagination, the uncovering of the fundamental character of the

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xxv

trans("t'ndental imagination in Heidegger's reading of Kant exasperates these troubles and makes them unavoidable; they become: rhe ineluctable matter of thought. The discovery of the uanscen~kl1tal imagination ,15 the abyssal foundation of self-subsistent subjellivity-as the destitution of essence and the tfesrrucrion of all rradiliunal ba5es on which answers to the question "What is man?" h'1\'C rested-frees /";lIg if1~/ffrom its determination and compreht'nsiull in terms of substantiality. subjectivity. narure, or lawfulness, and this freedom of being communicates itself, each time ulli'1ucly. to existence. The community of existence [;Ikes place in this communication. in this "sharing of voices,")' nowhere else. The discovery of rhe transcendental imagination as the abyssal tOllntiation of subjectivity not only undoes the idea of subjectivity as a self-supporting unity, but it also collapses the distinction betwt:en trall~\:endenral condition and empirical evidence. One mark of this collapse-and rhe one to which Nancy pays the closest attcnrion-is Kant's disclosure of a unique "fact of reason." As a fact. i! "dongs to the domain of empirical evidence: as a fact of reason and a fa("t for n:ason. its exposition can only be carried out in nonempirical terms.)' With the discovery of this fact Kant breaks through the impasse of the Third Antinomy and rebuilds rraditional metaphysics on the basis of cerrain "postulates. n Rut he also opens philosophkal thought to anoth~r empiricism. No longer does the solution ro th~ Third Antinomy 1;",PIy lie in the idea of wurld-constihlfion: the resolution of this antinomy in favor of freedom shows. rather. the very limits of rhe world constituted in subjt"ctivi(y and. f()f rhis reason, sets up an empiricism not of imprcs~i()ns or sensations but of (for want of a better word) liberality. The gift of this unique "fact" has no ascertainable origin: if always remains uncertain whether its "manufacture" is even a !ipecifacally IJlllndll maner.1O uThe fact of reason" is as incapable of demonstrative slIpport as philosophical thought. which, according (0 Kant. can neither base itself on anything earthly nor sllspend itself from a heavenly peg." By resolving rhe Third Antinomy in favor of freedum, this fact not only directs philosophy toward a rehabilitation uf metaphysics but also, pointing in entirely difTerent direuions.

xxvi abandons its erstwhile foundations and opens a space for the thought of "existence." The expo~ition of the "existence" opened in the space of a fol'tl~m ,."t;ol1il demands that this fact be brought to irs limit. The "fact of reason" consists. for Kant. in moral consdousness; in an exposure. more precisely. to altogether necessary. unconditioned, "categorical" imperatives. Since the necessity of these im· peratives does not lie in a "n«essary connexion" among objects. their mtrr possibility-the sheer possibility that one can act on their basis alone. the possibility that pure reason can be practical-activates them and thus makes them actual: attention, n:spect, must be paid to them. The necessity of these imperatives lies in their pos."ibility: this is not simply the rehabilitation of the ontological proof of God's existence but the formula for "existence" without ground and without rational demonstration. a formula for the de· formation of the distinction between transcendental and empirical that is already under way in the phra."e foctum ,.,ionis. The empiricity of this fact cannot be gainsaid; or rather, to do so-and there is, according to Kant, an inclination in this directionamounts 10 excusing onC5elf from the claims of moralil}' and ther~ fore from "the humanity in one's person. "I! To ground morality on empirical claims is. however. to undermine the unconditional char· acrer of its imperatives. So the "fact of reason" marks the point where the separation of transcendental conditions from empirical evidence no longer suffices. Nancy does not replace these terms with other ones, but takes the factidty of this faCt to consist in a certain consciousness and pursues this consciousneSS-lhis famil· iarity with the demand to dissociate oneself from everything familiar-to its limit. Such a consciollsness is. according 10 a word Nancy employs in Th~ Cakgor;cllllmp~raliw, a "haunted" one/ J a consciousness or conscience that denies its familiarity with [he "fad' of which it is conscious; it is a consciousness so driven to drive out the "fact" of which it is conscious. so ready to gain.uy the experience of being implored to act unconditionally that it makes freedom into a mere matter of consciousness, something subjec· dye. Aeeting. epiphenomenal. delusive, a necessary deception.

Foreword

xxvii

"':lkcn to its limit. moral ,on5Ciousne~ denics itself and realizes this d"llial in acting for no other rcason than to deny the uncondilionc:Jne5s and uncanniness ofits imperatives. To deny the uncondirionedness and uncannincss of imperatives ••H honom, to disre(tard the moral law nell for the sake of plea~lIrc or happincss hut out of a profound contempt for the condi(inn of imt·, mity and groundlessness it announces. Insecurity and grnundlt'Ssness manifest themselves in the unascertainabiliry of the "voice" that implofl's unconditional action a~ well a.~ in the very wndition of heing ullconditioned that this voice. each time uniqudy. inaugurates. To act in order to spite-not in spite ofthe condition of being unconditioned reaches deeper than the "radical evil" of which Kant wrote and in which he could see the rums of a purel)' ('thical religion. Acting out of profound contempt tor the unique "fact of rcason." acting in order to wipe away the condition of being unconditioned. acting on the hasis of groundlessness--this is not irrationality. especially if "rea~on" means rendering the grountfs and causes of things; it is not irrationality but ",il'Iuv/nl'JJ. and it can a~~("n itself in appeals to empirical knowledge as readily as in ,alls to transcendence:. "Uncouthness" would perhaps be another name for this action, if it Were no longer conlcived as isolilrion frnm everything hum.. n nature compels us to do hili were, insread. seen as the furious denial of the uncouthness, uncanniness. and ulK~l'tainty of freedom; for wickedness wants nothing more than for freedom to disappt'ar inro nern necessity. and for wmmonaliry ro mean nothing but partaking of a common suhstance, a ~pecifk nature, one plale of nativit),. nne nation. a p;utkular race. The experience of freedom cannot he dissociated from an exposure to wickedness, to a non-Humcan-if nevertheless all-too-human-"uncouthness," which i~ nOI just ,he nansti,rmation nf freedum inlll somethin~ subjective but. above all. rhe ('rct:lion of "fraternities" on the ever tirl11t"r foundations that this uansformation, this d('Scenr into c\·il, promises. The experience of freedom cannot therefore be dis..~ociated frolll an exposure to what Kant had called-although he denied it could ever lake place and. a.o; a result. made it into the limit of ethical

xxviii philosophy-"ahsolute evil."~ Wickedness, which is not simply moral depravity, defies the distinaion between the transcendental condition and empirical evidence even more forcefully than d~ the "faa of reason. The positivity of wickedness drives the thought offrcedom Nancy pursues; it is its singular necessity, its unKjue urgency. So little does Th~ Exp~ri~n{'~ of Frmlom rest content with the free play of a harmless freedom that the very opposite of this assertion-that it feverishly tracks down the harm freedom does to itself-hits doser to the mark. With the acknowledgment of the positivity of wickedness not only is every possible theodicy condemned to failure but so, too, is every other mode of giving grounds for and thereby "justifying" the world. Friedrich Schelling, raking his lead from Kant's last writings. made the positivity of evil into the very starting point of thought. and the strangeness of this thought-which excites ever more insistent appeals to homes and homdands-plays no small part in setting continemal philosophy adrift from its Anglo-American counterpart. Of even greater significance to Nancy's endeavor than Heidcgger's altercation with Kant over the character of the transcendental imagination is merefore Heidegger's reading of Schelling's still too often neglected Philosophkallnvmigationl ;nttJ th~ Ellm{'~ of Human FrwJom. In his reading of Schdling Heidcggcr confronts a ·positivism" of freedom developed from the distinction between "existence" and Hground." In the groundlessness of existence evil posits itself as its own ground. Such is, for Schelling, the positivity of evil. Since Heidegger, by contrast, never fuDy acknowledged this positivity. he can never arrive at the abyssal foundation of Schelling's ueatise, and this failure, which finds its echo in Heidegger's assertion that Schelling's idealism prevented him from coming up with the idea of Dm~;1I, cannot but appear as the rwnblings of a justification, the implicit expounding, to use Nancy's words, of a "secret, imperceptible on tod icy. "n M

The positivity of wickedness-nothing has exercised so mu,h fascination in [he last two centuries than this. "the Rower.; of evil." And nothing has elicited more strenuous attempts to reconstruct

ForrworJ

XXIX

[he libc:rties and communities torn apart in wickedness. German Idealism <:ould see in evil the very labor of spirit; its insight into ,he negativity of evil and of death expressed itself in the affirmation that infinite spirit had to dwell in its own n('gation in order flU it to recognize its freedom, to posit itself in destruction and to seLUre its self-presence in recollection. So persistent is this schema of rcrognirion, reconstruction. and tccollcction that it dominates projects and discourses that have never heard of dialectics and want to know nothing of its operations; but every project and every discourse of reconstruction gives new life to theadicy, even those that set out to defend libc:nies and show how the defense of liberties acc:ords with the plan of God, of natul't, or even of human freedom itself. When Nancy writes that the experience of freedom is not the C'Xperience of "'classical empiricism, nor even that of an 'empiricism without positivity,' ",. it is because (ahhough this "bccawe" anticipates Nancy's own discussion) the experience of freedom finds its urgency in the positivity of wickedness, a positivity that classical versions of empiricism are unable (0 handle. In Nancy's hands empiricism does not shirk positivity. bur the positivity it touches no longer consists of impressions, sensations, or "brute facts." It consists of another species of brutality altogether: the insistence on a foundation at all costs, a furiow insistence on a ground in the face of groundlessness, an insistence that expresses itself in acting so as to spite the condition of groundlessness. an insistence that. to put it bluntly. cannot stand cx-istence. And this positivity so alters empiricism that it could never again ra'ert to its classical vel'!iions, nor tn a new, romantic revision. J7 Nancy may at times call this alteration of empiricism "materialism," but the materialism he pursues docs not propose to reduce psychic phenomena to their physiological hases; the very schema of phenomenon-foundation that materi:1lism has traditionally shared with idealism has no place in his ptc:semations of irreducibility, passivity, simplicity. elementariness. hardness. No longer a doctrine of how words secure their meaning. no longer sure even of its own semantics, ,. empiricism in Nallcy's

Foreword hands becomes an exposition of groundleSlineS!i: an exposition of freedom. which removes every ground from existence. and an exposicion of wickedness. which insists on a ground for-and therefore wipes away--cxistence. Nancy's empiricism does not set out to build a world om of fragmented and disconcerting experiences. It is the posirivity of wickedness, not the given ness of sensations or impressions. that has torn the world apart. and every efTon at rebuilding convert5 wickcdneSli into a mode of a negativity that further work. especially the labor of recognition and recollection, promises (0 overcome. Nancy's empiricism exposes the event that takes place in the space of existence. groundlessness. liberality, generosity: it is the coming up. without ground, and the taking over. withom posse.~ion, which is named in the word sur-prist. And this empiricism can only show the experience of "surprise" that every insistence on grounds, every demand for "necessary connexions." every application of the category ground-consequence, every claim to necessity and to be necessitated. miSSC5. Surprise. however, is experience. and any empiricism without surprise. any empiricism devoted entirely to the cuslOmary and the everyday, fails to do justice to empiriciry. That something-it has been called "the positivity of wickedness"-drives Nancy's empiricism shows how little it, in a vain attempt to maintain its innocence. can excuse itself from an insistence on necessity. This insistence expresses irself with ever greater urgency in the final sections of this great book: decision, Nancy makes dear. cannUl be avoided. The unavoidability of decision doe.c; nor, however. amounr to a "condemnation" to frcOOom; on thc contrary. it is the condition of frcedom. the condition that is mistaken for a ground whenever one wants to secure freedom--or even when one wants merely to defend civillihenies. For frudom cannot bt rrt'Umi and this "cannot" expres..~es rhe unavoidabiliry of decision. Freedom cannot be safeguarded. and so a decision for or against freedom-for or against existence without essence, for or against community with om common substance-is always necessary and is always already taken. Freedom cannot be secured, and so every labor of liberation implies that this labor must at every

Forrll'ord

xxxi

11I00llent he willing to abandon it5e1f in favor ufliheraliry. generos" ,md abandunmellt--to give lip irs sacrificial designs and deslillie:. MiMakin~ the mnliirion oHreooom for its ground may have il~ ronr~ in a desire to guard freedom against ib enemies. bill it can/Jilt rio so. Evcn under the guilie of defending dvilliherries. this mis1.lke takl's away the "surprise" offreooom-its overtaking. without possession. and its coming up, without ground. And it is precisely Ihi~ mistake that Nancy. like every guod empiricist. relentlessly tr.u.:ks down. Fur Nancy i~ precisd~' that: a gooc.i empiricist, so good in fact that he knows how thoroughly the "brute facn" -or the fact of brutality-undermine the exercise in semantic control that first (!.OIVC rise to the doctrine of empiricism ;111(1 that finds expression in its liberating imperative: trust no doctrinal words. give credence to '''pcril'nce alone. But the relinquishing of semantic control docs nnl mean that words somehow lose their meaning in Nancy's writing. nor do dIe)' somehow regain their meaning in the "vivid" preselll:c of the things thcm!IClves. On the contrary, language wirhdr.aws into precisely the same position as fn'edom itself: it cannot he SCClU'ed. Icast of all by impressions. sen~rions. or "Jived" experience. The insecurity of language makes its apcrience-not that of imprt'Ssions or semations-into the "expericnce of experience": into the experience of tbought. when thought no longer means at hlluom ~eeking grounds. and into freedom. when freedom no longer !lames a spel:il" of cau~lir)·. Nancy ha~ a name for the experience of language: he calls it "communication, Nothing is mml1lunicatoo in this ,,-ummunicalion but the "ery ability to communk:nc. and (his ability. which has nothing on which to operate ,111\1 dues nO( therefore name a ~pecific power. is, once again. frcellnlll. anc.1 it freely gives. yet again. cmTIlllunilY.

TH E EXPERI ENCE OF FREEDOM

§ I he We Free to Speak

of Freedom?

If nothing is more common today than demanding or defending freedum in the s~lheres of morality, law, or politics--to sut:h an exrent rhat "equality." "fraternity," and "t:ommunity" have demonstrably and firmly been pushed. if at times regrenably. into the kKkground of preoccupations and imperatives, or have finally ~n heen considered as antonyms of freedom-then nothing i5 less articulated or problematized, in turn, than the namre and stakes of what we call "frcedom." What hilS in fact occurred is a divorce betw<:cn the ethico-juridico-political and the philosophical. Such a separation is nothing new in history. when: it i5 for the most part constant. but in the modern world this separation has reached the point of rupture between what is in principle universally recogni/xli llIuler the name of "freedom. and what elsewhere remains 'Iuestioned, under this ~ame name. by a thinking 5till cummitted in a thousand ways 10 reinitiating it5 emire tradition. We can repeat after H~eI. as a hanal evidence of our world: No illca is so generally recognized as indc=finitc. ambiguous. and open which IhcrdtJrc it a<;luo1l1y falls a \'H':lilll) a5 the idra of Freedom: none in common curren,)' with 5U liule appredalion of its mraning,l

10 Ihe grealr51 mi5conceptions (to

This is why a divorce has taken place between, on the one hand. a \cl of determinations [hat are relarivel)" Iltccisc in their pragmat-

Art'

~ Fr« to

Speak ofFreedom?

ic definitions and that are j7mJoms-a collection of rights and exemprions--the suppression or even suspension of which we know opc'ns directly onto the intolerable itself. which is not intolerable solely from the point of view of moral values. but which is the intolerable. down to the very flesh and course of existences; and on the other hand. an "Idra" of freedom. called for or promised by freedomsyet we hardly know what this idea represents or presents of the "essence" of"human beings." and we request that it not be examined. specified. questioned. or above all implemented. so certain are we that this would result in Chaos or "i'error. In this way. nlil-to the point of wickedness. whida we shall have to speak of further-has for us come to be incarnated in alilhat threatens or destroys the freedoms most frequently described by the epithet "democratic." Meanwhile. the essential "good" of a freedom in which the human existence of human beings would be affirmed. that is. exposed and transcended. has become totally indeterminate. stripped of all divine. heroic. Promethean. or communitarian splendor. and is now bare:ly defined. except negatively. and in relation to evil. Neverrheless we know-by mrans of another knowledge no less incontestable but kept in some way discreet. if not ashamed-that "freedoms" do not grasp the stakes of "freedom: They delimit necessary conditions of contemporary human life without considering existence as such. They sketch the contours of their common concept-"freedom"-as if these were the borders of an empty. vacant space whose vacancy could definitively be taken to he its only pertinent trait. But if fret.odom is to be verified as the CS5entiai fact of existence. and consequently as the fact of the very meaning of existence. then this vacancy would be nothing other than the vacancy of meaning: not only the vacancy of the meanings of existence. whose entire metaphysical program our history has exhausted. but the vacancy of this jrwdom ofmeaning in whose absence existence is only survival. history is only the course of things. and thinking. if there is still room 10 pronounce this word. remains only intellectual agitation. Under these conditions. the philosopher wonders if he can do anything other than "speak of freedom.· in all the ambiguity of this expression: in one sense. he cannot but demand of thinking a think-

Art' WI' Frtt' to Spt'd/t ofFytNiorn?

3

in~ (and therefore a discourse) of freedom. for reasons es.o;ential to philosophy's constitution and destination (as we have already evoked

the preceding pages, and as we will specify later); but in another scme. he can unly "5pcak about freedom." that is. not speak of frttdam as such-he can associate a motif. bur not assemhle a concept or an Idea (or he can renounce freedom by taking refuge in the incO"ahle ). "To 5pcak of freedom" is accordingly lO suspend philusophy's work. And this is in fact me very pos.c;ibiliry of a "philosophi7jng" on freedom that finds itself. today, subjected to two kinds of obstades. The first kind of obstacle consists in the self-evidence of the common notion offreedom-which is always more or less that uf a free will-couplcd with the moral self-evidence of the n«essi[), of preserving the rights of this freedom. Because self-evidence is involved, it is not necessary to question foundations; undertaking this type of questioning. however. risks weakening the self-eviden\;;c. Still. with some diffi\;;ulty it is possible [0 avoid doing this. once cenain rights are no longer simply defined as the free disposal of something (which presupposes its ownership, or its acquired use), but when they imply instead that the thing be pla\;;ed at the disposal of the freedom to use it (for example, the work for a free right to work) and that it necessarily be placed at this disposal hy an apparam ... usually that of the State. whose logic cannot be libertarian. In other words, once the right of all to the usc of common goods-air, I~lr example-requires regulation to enable this usc (i.e .• in the ca.c;e I)f "ollmion). it is no longer merely a question of positing fre~­ (Ioms. It has to ba:ornc possible to think the freedom that un posit an\1 defin~ these freedoms, regulating the conditions of their actu;d de~llo)'menr. In all the ways that we orient ourselves toward the exploitation of the resources of the "Third World" or toward the rnana~em~11t of automatic files and information banks. the rights of fre~.'\I'JIII today do not ccase to complicate indefinitely their I't'lations with the duti~ of the same freedom. In many respects, nothing ha~ hecn displaced of what authorizcU ami demanded the Marxian I ritiquc of the formal freedoms auributed to human beings who were "illla~inary members of an imaginary sovercignry."~ Still, the "self· III

evidence" remains. stubborn and inert. though what remains with this "sclf-evidence" is often. beyond the supposedly transparent imperative of a strict independence of individuals (but what is sdf-cvident about the very concept of "individual"?). only a feeble and pale idea. obscured partly by its own realization. How could we nor identify with these lines of Adorno: Ever since me ~nt<.'Cnth ccnrury. fm:dom had been dc:6ncd as all great philosoph)"s mOon private concern. Philosophy had an unexpressed mandate from the bourgeoisie to find transparent grounds for freedom. But mat concern i~ antagonistic in itself. It goes against the old oppression and promotes tM new one. the one that hides in the prin(;iple of rationality iuclf. One sc:eb a common furmula fur freedom and oppression, ceding freedom 10 Ihe rationality that restricts it. and removing it from empiricism in which one does not even wam to see it realized. The alliance of libertarian docrrine and reprasivc practice removes philosophy farther and farther from genuine insight into the freedom and un freedom of the living. But that frrcdom grows obsolete withom having been realized-thi.~ is not a fatality to be accepted; it is a falality whkh resistance must clarify.] The second kind of obstacle is found in philosophy itself and in (as Adorno's text makes clear) constitutes the theoretical subsumption of rhe first obstacle. Bur what appeared there as self-evidence appears here as aporia. The philosophical thought of fn:cdom has been thoroughly subordinated to the determination of an ontology of subjectivity. In the ontology of subjectivity. being is posited as the lllbj«tllm of represcntation. in which. by this fact. the: appearing of all things is converted. The esscnce of being is to "appear (0 itself' (sapparaitrtl in such a way that nothing is. unless supported in its phenomenality by the sobject, and in such a way that the sobjc:ct itself successfully passes the trial of phenomcnality: "phenumenology of spirit." Freedom has not been considered as anything othcr than the fundamental modality of the act of appearing to oneself-this act in which the subject is always simultaneously ill Ilchl and ill po'mlill. its act the potential for representation. its potential the act of phenomcnality. This actualiZiltion ofpott'nti4t-which is fundamentally the insraurarional gesture of felt[

Art' W? J-i-rt' f(} Speak ofFn't'dom? .. uhjcctivity-thinks itsclf as freedom. which means as the power of .lpl'l:aring to on~...df, or as the power of determining oneself acLording [() repreSt'llIiltion and as (the subjet."f 00 representation. The corollary of this is a potmtia/iwtio" O/I/)t' act-which is nothing ocher than freedom determining itself as free u~i11. if will is defilleu ",cording [U Kam (ami not as we cried to understand it above) "the power to be by m~ns of one's rcp~ntations the cause of the ',llil)' of these sam(" representations." For the ontology of 5ubjecli\'iIY, freedom is the "c:t (which also means the being) of (re)presl'lIling oneself as the pmclllial ti.u (re)presentalion (of oneself and ';"I'rj,," of Ihe world). It is free rcprescmation (where I accede 50Verci~"ly to m)·sclf) of f~ represemation (which depends only on my will). From this point of view. the great classical philosophical notion5 uf freroom all turn out to he. at a c:enain level of analysis. in profilUnd soli,laricy. Although LJescartes distinguishes bt'rwet'n the freedom of indifference and tht' perfection of a free will instructed in rhe good or u~i~ted by ~race. and although Hegel steers between Ihe bad infinity of the r,,~c will given over [0 its comingem satisf." lions and the "aC:lua! and free will" that has "universal detenniIMlioll" for its ob;ect.~ the es.~nCt' of llllhjectivity is at work in each ca~e. It is the self-tietcrmination of the will that i5 dialeuically superseded in the grasp of nccc5Sity~r else it is lhe representation of Ihe n~"(;es.~ity that wills ilSeU: In one OISC it is a qUl'Scion of releasing. I;)r ilself ami in its punc:mality. the "self" ofuapllearing to 01lt'St'/f." and this is what comprises the: singular blend of comingent.)' and nen:ssily in lhe Cartesian dedsiun en douht. In the other case. it is a lJlII.."Slion of showing that this "self" appears to it5c1f as Being. with its prcliicates of universality. necessity. truth. and 'i4l on. Whl'l1 a contra,lil"liun is presented between the infiniteness and ;Ihsullllcness given in the act nf being. and rill' faer that the act of its f rt·t·dnll1 consigns it to a history that must not alread}' be given. Ill'gdian Ilistory supersedes the contJ"Jdictioll. insof.u as becoming i\ there the subjeuivil}' lIf selt~;\ppearing heing: but nothing app(\m In icself exccvr this suhjec:tivity prcortiaineti to itself. in which historicity as such is annulled. Ultimately. the completely dcvel-

6

Art' ~ F1W to Sp~ak ofFrmJom?

oped (and nO( refilred. as Gennan Idealism wished) metaphysical free will will have been the free will of indifferent being, which decides itself in dividing itself. and which in dividing itself appears to itself in the freedom of its necessity. The so-called Buridan's ass will have existed as the animal-subject thar resolves irs problem by cutting itJt'/f in two (KI '" I") and by reconstituting itself, in the same instant and without history. in the representation of it~e1f eating and drinking .•. ' Kantian freedom. to the extent that it is a "keystone." likewise is nothing other than that in which reason can and must appear to itself. confirming the delimitation of theoretical phenomenality, and opening-as [he lineaments of a history. or at any rate of a destination-thc having-ta-be of a moral "second nature" that would be the pr«tical phenomenalizalion of reason: its namred essence, its (re)prcsented subjectivity. The "keystone" is the point of equilibrium on which the forces of a construction founded in reason's (critical) self-(re)prcsentation are buttressed and secured. The ontology of subjectivity is also the ontology in which beingas subject-is foundarion. At me limit of the thoughts of foundation. where existence must be thought of as its own essence, which means as in-essential and un-founded, foedom as conceived by the ph ilosophy of subjectivity is no longer praakabk (but was there ever a different thought of freedom?). This is why the philosopher finds himself. dare we say. caught between the principial self-evidence of a "freedom" and the final aporia of this same freedom as foundation. Accordingly, it could be: that we no longer have the task of thinking what was presented or transmitted to us under the name of frt'edom. Perhaps we mwt free ourselves from this freedom and consequently draw freedom back to itself. or withdraw it from itself. or even withdraw it in itself-not in order to recommit ourselves through a dapcrate about-face to the invention of some new discretionary authority (we would not be changing terrain, for despotism and freedom form a couple: the former figures. in a particular subjectivity, the ontology of the latter, whose benefits it simultaneowly withdraws from other pankular subjectivitics), but in order to relate both the necessary thought of existence as such and an ethic

ATt'

We Fret' to SI"ak ofF"~dom?

7

of freedoms that would no longer he merely negative or defensive. to another concept or anmher motif whose name or idt'a we do not yet have. This should at least mean that we would have the t.l~k of delivering ourselves from the thought of "frc:cdom" as a I,rnperty of the subjective constitution of being. and as the property of an individual "subject." But in fact it is not we who decide whether this will be the task of philosophy. even if it is necessary for us to make a decision. h is not all option otTered to our free will any more than philosophizing fll:l.uom as such or any of its "orientations" was ever a matter of fTeely choosing a "freedom of thought." If philosophy has rcal.:hed the limit of the ontology of subjectivit)', this is bcGlu.c;e it has hem led to this limit. It was led to that point hy Iht' initial decision of philosophy itself. This decision was the decision of freedom-perhaps of the freedom preceding every conl.:Cpt Ill' fieedom (if it is possible to speak thu.~ ... ) which belonged. for ['lam, to the "philosophical natural": thc generous availability and freedom of demeanor rather than self-representation-and it WClli in any case, and is still, the del.:ision of a freedom necessarily prior to every philosophy of freedom. This was not and is not-in [he history in which it never ceases to precede and surprise: us-the decision of philosophy, but rather the decision foT philosophy, the decision that delivers and will ddiver philosophy to its destiny (and we will have HI ~peak further of "destiny"). Philosophy too, as soon as it touches wit hin itself the limit of the thought of foundation. or as soon as it is carried by way of itself to the unfoundable border of this thought, can no longer represcm its own beginning as the originar)' unity of a Subject-of-philosophy appearing to itsdf in its freedom. or of a Subjcct-of-freedom appearing to itself as philosophy. (As Ilcgd represented it: "A higher and freer science [philosophical scicllCel.like our art in its free beaut)·, like our tastc and love of these, h;l'. we know, its roots in the Greek life from which it drew spirit. ")6 ()n the contrary, the diffirmu in the origin and the: difference of thl' origin (as Derrida brings to light in his examination of the pllliosophical concept of origin and simultaneously of the philo\lIphical thinking of the origin of philosoph)·r requires us [0 think dw philosophy ilIld its fi'udom do 11of ftJillCid~ ill II SIIbjl'ctil't' pmmr~.

8

Ar~

W? me to Speak ofFrw"om~

and that every philosophial tk,ision (and consequently the originary decision of philosophy and the origin of this decision)~ery time that a "subject . takes the decision to philosophize:' as Hegel daims,M or every time that philosophy "tries to change the procedure followed until now in metaphysics and to effect a revolution in it." as Kant daim5-is delivered ro itsclfby something that. unknown to it. has already been raised into thinking (and that might well be nothing other than thinki"g iuclf). At the same ti me, it must also be thought that this decision renders beyond itself something that arises, each time. from a freedom still to come from thinking (here again. perhaps: thinking iuclf). In other words, there is decision for philosophy and philosophical decision to the extent that thinking does not appear to itself in a subject, but receives (itself) from a freedom that is not present to it. Thus one could say that "freedom," in philosophy, was brought to us at the hean of an aporia that overcame itself as soon a~ it was formed (in Kant. Schelling. or Hegel). but that the theme of freedom brings us to a liberation with regard to its (rc}presentation. in such a WolY that the resources of this liberation arc not yet available to us. The thinking of fm:dom can only be seized. surprised, and taken from elsewhere by the very thing it think.o;. If there were not something like "freedom." we would not speak of it. For even when it is deprived of a referent or empty of all assignable signification. this word still carries. even to the point of indecision. or rather in the impasse of its meanings. the very mmning of logos in which philosophy recogni;o.es itself: the opening of a free space of meaning. Thus philosophy has always already given itself over to the thinking of what it can neither master nor examine: and this is also what we understand. simply. by "being-free." We are therefore not free to think freedom or not to think it, but thinking (that is. the human being) is free for freedom: it is given over [0 and delivered for what from the beginning exceeded it. outran it. and overflowed it. But it is in this way that thinking definitively keeps irs place in the world of our most concrete and living relations. of our most urgent and serious decisions.

§ 2 Necessity of the Theme of Freedom: Mixed Premises and Conclusions

Once existem:e is no lon~r produced or deduced, but simply posited (thi~ simpliciry arrests all our thought), and once existence is ;lhandnncd to this positing at the same time that it is abandoned hy ir, we must rhink the freedom of thi~ ahandonment. In other words. once cxilitence, instead of "preceding," "following." or even "following from" essrnce (symmetrical 'mnubs of exis rcntial isms and cssenrialisms. captives-che one as much as the othcr-of a differ1"IlrC of essence: between essence and existence). once existence itsdf cnnsritutcs CSlicnc.:e ("Vas 'W~sm' tin lMs~;,1S Ij~ ill u;lIrr Exisl~" "The: 'essence' of Dascin lies in irs cxistem;e, &i1lK anti 1im~. §9), ,lIld consequently once these two concepts and their opposition Me no longer relevant to anything hllt the history of metaphysics. (Iiell we must think. at rhe limit of this history, the st~ of dtis other C(lI1(cpr: "freedom." Freedom can no lonl!tOr be eithcr "cssential" or Kcsi~tcntial," but is implicatetf in the chiasmus of these con~e:pu: we have: to consider what makes existence, whkh is in its eS~cr1<.:e: abandoned to a freedom, free for this abandonment. ofterctllo it and available in it. Pcrhaps it will not he possible to pre'nw the \'cry name ami c.:OlllCr' of freedom. We will return to tillS. But if the Cliscnc.:e that is otlrred to existence docs not in some wa~' "rr~" existence in its most proper essence. then thought has IIllrhing Ide to "think" anll existence: has nothing lett to "live": the 1I1l\: antI rhe other arc strippetf of all experience. 9

10

N«nsity ofthe Theme ofFreedom

In still other words: once existence clearly offers itself (this c1ariry dazzles us) no longer as an empiri!;ity that would need to be related to its !;onditions of possibility, or sublated [re~ri in a trans!;endence beyond itself, but instead offers itself as a factualiry that contains in itself and as such. hk et ,,"nt", the reason for its presen!;C and the presence: of its reason, we must-whatever (he modes of this "presence" and of this "reason"-think its "'fact" as a "freedom." This means that we must think what gives existence back to itself and only to itself, or what makes it available as an txisttnC"e that is neither an essence: nor a sheer given. (The ques£ion is no longer exactly "Why is there something?" nor is it any more exactly this other question to which freedom seems to be linked in a more visible manner, namely, "Why is there evil?," but it becomes "Why these very questions by which existence affirms itself and abandons itsclf in a single gesture?") Indeed, if the factuality of being-exinence as such-or even if its haeccity, the being-the-there, the being-that-is-this-there, the da-srin in the local intensity and temporal extension of its singu1arity, cannot in itself and as such be freed from (or be: the freeing 00 the steady, ahistorial, unlocalizable, self-positioning immobility of Being signified as principle, substance, and subject of what is (in shon: ifin fact being. or if the fact of being, cannot be the freeing of being itself. in all of the senses of this genitive). then thought is condemned (Wt'are condemned) to the pressing thickness of [he nigtu in which not only are all cows black. bur their very rumination. down to their death. vanishes--and we with them-into a foldless immanence. which is not even unthinkable, sino: it is (l priDri Ollt of reach of all thought. even a thought of the unthinkable. If we do not think being itself. the being of abandoned existence. or even the being of being-in-me-world. as a "freedom" {or perhaps as a liberality or generosity more original than any freedom}. we are condemned to think of freedom as a pure "Idea" or "right," and being-in-the-world, in return. as a forever blind and obtwe necessity. Since Kant. philosophy and our world have heen relentlessly placed before this tear. This is why jdeology today demands freedom, but does not think it.

N~msity oftht T"t1n~ oIF~~",

II

Freedom is everything except an "Idea" (in a ~ense. Kant himself kncw ,his). Freedom is a fact: in this essay. we will not cease dis(us-,ing lhis fact. Out it is the fact of existence as the essence of itself. The factuality of this fact docs not belong to a transhistorically pcrct'pri\'e self-evidence: it maka itself. and makes itself known to experience. through a history. Not through the History of Freedom. Ihe: teleological and eschatological age of the revelation and re-ollilarinn of an Idea (by which a Freedom :wured of its ~e1f-repre­ scnrarion can necessarily only aim at being reabsorbed into N«e:ssity), but by the freedom of history. which means by the eftectivity of a becoming in which something happens. where "time is out of joint." as Hamler says. and by the generativity or generosiry of the new. which gives and gives itself to thinking: for all exi5lC:nce is new. in its birth and in its death to the world. Existence as its own esscm;e-the singularity ofbeing-presentcd iuelf when history set a limit to thoughts concerning being as foundation. In such thoughts, freedom could not be given unles,.', founded; yet as freedom. it had to be founded in freedom itself; this exigency determined the incarnation, or at least the figuration. of freedom in a supreme being. a (1I1Utl sui whose existence and fren\ol1l were meanwhile. in the name of being in general. to be fllunded in necessity .... Once God is no longer the gratuitousncs~ of his own existence and the love of his creation (to which a taith, nor a thought. could respond). and once he becoma accountahle to all existences for their foundation. "God" becomes Ihc name of a necessary freedom whose sdf-nccrssiration actually derl'rminc::s the metaphysical concept of tfeedom (as the freedom of necessity. no less). In this way, being's free ncccssity appears to itself as the supreme being [Itllllt). the Idea of which performs what we could call being's metaphysical mrning away: broken off from irs own from i15 da-~in, it nevertheless ~stttbliJIm this fa~t. but it elitilhlidlcs it on a foundation and as its own foundation-b~ing. hn'dum of necessity is the dialectical predicate of being's subjecthcill~. Along with all existences. being therefore finds itself sub-

'alt.

k\.ll'tl.

12

N~msity oftlJ~ T"~m~ ofFIT~dom

But freedom. if it is something. is the very thing that prevents itself from being founded. The existence of God was to be free in the sense that the freedom that sustained his existence could not become one of its prcditates or properties. Theology and philosophy had certainly recogni7.ed this limit. or this dilemma. Conceived of as freedom's necessary being, God risked (if one did not elaborate subtle lUI hoc arguments) ruining both himself and freedom. ("Is not freedom the power God lacks. or which he only has verbally. since he cannot disobey the command that In is. the command of which he is the guarantor?" Georges Bataille. Litm,tu" lind Evil) The freedom of the gods (if one must speak of gods ... ). like every freedom. makes them susceptible to existence or nonexistence (they can die): it is not their attribute. but their destiny. In return. a being taken for btingas such. founding the freedom on which it is itself founded. designates the internal border of the limit of onto-theology: ahsolute subjectivity as the eS5ence of essence. and of existence. This limit is reached as soon a.~ the logic and signification of fo"nJAtio" in general. that is to say. philosophy, is achieved. The end of philosophy deprives w of a foundation offreedom as much as it deprives us offrc:edom as foundation: bur this "deprivation" was already inscribed in the philosophical aporia consubstantial with the thought of a foundation of freedom andlor with the thought of freedom as foundation. In philosophy itself. this aporia was perhaps already announced and denounced at the same time that Spin01.a attributed freedom exclusively to a God who was not a foundation, but pure existence. and of whom Hegelian Spirit and then Marxian Man were perhaps also the inheritors, raising the question-still unperceived a!l such--of an existing and unfounded freedom. or of a freeing of existence down 10 its fclUndation (or down to its essence). Thus. [he end of philosophy would be tkliv~rllnc~ from foundation in that it would withdraw existence from the necessity of foundation, but also in that it would be sct free from foundation, and given over to unfounded "freedom." At the limit of philosophy. there where we arc, nor having made our way. but having happened and still happening, there is only-

Nrmjity oftilt rlltmt ofFrudom ,"<:1

13

,b","" ;$ (whidl is no longer an affidavit. but a sci~ure)-rhe free

~Ii~~e'rnination of existence. 'Ibis free disscmination (whosc formu101 l11i~ht

well he only a tautology) is not rhe diffmctilln of a principle, nur dIe' multiple effcct of a cause, but is the an-archy-thc: origin rcJIlO"cd from every logic of origin. from every an:haeology-of a singular and rlllI~ in essence plural arising whose being lIS bnng is nci(h~'r ~rolln(i. nor dement. nor reason. but truth, which would '1I11O~nt to saying. under rhe circumstances. freedom. The qucstiun of hcing. the quesrion of the meaning ()f being-as a qucstion conccrning the meaning of what arises inro existence when flO entity can found rhat existence-perhaps has no other definitive meaning than the following. which, properly SI"'4:'1king. is no longer the meaning of a "question": the recognition of rhe freedom of being in its singularity. ThLis it is no longer a qUf'Stinrl of winning or defending the freedom uf man, or human frt'Cdoms. as if these were goods tha[ one could secure a~ possession or property, and whose essential virtue w(mld he to allow human beings to be what they are (as if human bci ngs and freedom drcularly returned to each other in the hean of J simple immanence). rrutcad, it is a question of offering human be-illgs ro a freedom of being, it is a quesrion of presenting the humanity of the human being (his "essence") ro a freedom lIS b~ing by which existent.'C ahmlmcly and resolutely "'IIIUcrlUIs. that is, DC-isrs. In all movements ofliberation. as in all vested insri rutions of freedom. it i~ precisely this transcendence which still has ro he freed, In atHl through ethical. juridical, material. and civil libertics.' one mll~t rree that through which alone these liberties are, on the one hanJ. ultimately possible and thinkable. and on the other, capahie of receiving a dadnatiun mher rhan that of their immanent ~df-(omul11pti()n: a rranscendencc of existence slich that existence. a~ exislcncc-in-the-world. which has nothing [n do with any other World. transcends (i.e .• cOIuinues 1lI 3ccompli~h) the "es.~encc" that if i, in the finitude in which it in-sis[s. Only a finite being can be free (alld it finite being is an existent), for the infinite being encloses lilt' nC~l~sity of its freedom. which it 5Cals [() its being. Ir is rherefOre 'Miml of nothing other than lihcrating human ~om from the

N«nsity ofthe Theme ofFrtedom immanence of an infinite foundation or finality, and liberating it therefore from iu own infinite projection to infinity, where transcendence (existence) itself is transcended and thereby annulled. It is a question of letting freedom exist for itself. Freedom perhaps designates nothing more and nothing less than existence itself. And ex-istmct does not 50 much signify what can at least be connoted by a vocabulary of the "ccsusy" of being. tom from ioelf. it signifies simply the freedom of being. that is. tilt infinite inenmtia/ity ofits kingwhi~h Jel;vrrs

illO the singularity whert;n it is "itself." That existence presents itself in this way. and that it offers itself for

finite.

this type of thought and task. is attested by the event and experience of our time: the closure of the order of significations, the dosure of the very regime of signification as the assignation of meaning into the beyond (translinguistic or metalinguistic. trans- or metaworldly, trans- or meta-existential) of a presence that consequently would be devoted to its own representation. According 10 this regime. freedom ends--or begins-by being understood as the unrepresentable (invisible) "in vi~" of which one would have to arrange rcpresemation, whether political (ddcgation of freedom ... ) or aesthetic (frcc giving of form). This presence-beyond. or this esscntial presence beyond all (re)presentable presence-with regard to which it is important that Freedom should have furnished its supreme Idea. or radter the Idea of the Idea itself (isn't the intdligible form of every Idea in the freedom with which it torms and presents itsclf?)Z-is henceforth. undoubtedly since Hegel bur with an exemplary insistence sin!';e Heidegger, !,;onfrontc:d with the exigency of what could be called. for symmetry's sake, the hither-side [1m Jrra] of a difference: a difference ofheing i" itstlf. which would not simply convert being into difTerence and difference into being (since precisely this type of conversion between pure substances would become impossible). but which would be the difference of iu existmce, and in mis existence, inasmuch as it is its own essence, the difference and the division of its singularity. With the existence of the singular being. an entirely other possibility of Mmeaning" would be offered-frero-before us, on the edges of an epoch which has barely begun to hatch.

NueSfity oft/~ Thm,e olFrmJom There is in fact a hatching IlciosionJ correlative ro closure. even liJ(lllgh we perceive nothing of it and find ourselves delivered to tkrdiction. and even though ~ lack the words and thought for I};!t(hing (an image too organk and "natural" for what is also an irruptiun): there is a hatching bn:ause the event of closure itself lJl;.lkc~ history. and becausc what it brings to an end on the internal border of the limit it touches corresponds equally 011 its external border to an inauguration. "To inscribe the epoch ill ilS essential outline." Granel writes of Derrida. and uf Heidegger behind him, is to inscribe it "such that it is visible from the monster of the future. which gathers itself in that epoch and which no one can see.'" This rClro-spec.;tion anticipated without fore-sight is not a divinatory magic: it has its possibility insofar as history precedes itself as much as it succeeds itselfin the present time, which thuught experiences
16

Nrussity Of,hr Thmlr ofFreedom

there is nothing else to think (to preserve, not foresee; to test. not guide) besides the fact that being ha5 a hi~tory or that being is history (or hi.~tories in the plural), which means at least the coming and the surprise of a renewed hatching of existence. This is the point we have reached: being. in its history. has delivered the historicity or the hislOriality of being. This means the end of a relacion of foundation-whichever one--be[ween being and history. and the opening of existence to its own essenliality as well as to this scansion. or singular rhythm. according to which the existent precedes and succeeds itself in a time (0 which it is nor "prcsenr." bur in which its freedom surprises it-like the spacing (which is also a rhythm. perhaps at the he-cut of the former rhythm) in which the existenl is singulari7.ed. that is to say. exists. according to the free and mmmon space of its inessentiality. What one could call. in some sense. the axiomatic of the spatiatemporal effectivity of existence-that which requires existence to exist hie n mine and at every moment to put at stake its very possibility of existing. at every moment delivering itself as its own essence (which is by this very fact "in-"essential)-does nO( signify the axiological equivalence of what is produced according to the places and moments of history. Evil and good are correlative possibilities here. not in the sense that one or the other would first be offered to the choice of freedom-dlere is not first evil and good. and thm freedom with its choice-bur in the sense that the possibility of evil (which proves to be. in the last instance. the devastation of freedom) is correlative (0 {he illlroduction of freedom. This means that freedom cannot present itself without presenting the possibility. inscribed in its essence. of a fWe rtmmcilltion offt«dom. This very renunciation directly mak~ itsclfknown as wlckrdnru. in a moment in some way precrhical in which ethics irself would nevertheless already surprise itself. Inscrihing freedom in being does not amount to conferring on being. as a singular existent, an indifference of will (resurreclaJ from classical thought) whose ontological tenor would strike indifferently the moral tenor of dt..'Ci.~ions (as some have occasionally gratified themselves to think. in a pmterity

N~utt;ty of,J)~ TIJ~m~

ofFrrrdom

17

,kl'plic,ll of Niet7.sche). On the conrrary. inscribing freedom in bei(\~ alllO unlS to raising to the level of ontology the positive possihilit\.-and not through defidency-of evil as much as of good. not (/; lI~diU(relll. but i1lSofor as (11iI th~re ",,,Im iN~/fknor"n liS stich. lktorc hcing able tn establish what is anticipated here. it is impon,lIlt to posit the fOllowing: in a '"~tain way. nothing is more const;trnly auoleO by the history of (he modern world, and as one of its I1lU~t properly historical marks. than rhe free and resolute renunciation of freedom. We know that this can go as far as the absolute horror of a "humanity~ (willing itself"superhuman") exemplarily ex· ecuting a whole other pan of humanity (dedared to ~ ·subhuman") in order to de6ne ito;clf as the ~~mplfll1l ofhumaniIY." This is ALischwitz. But fH.-edom is also renoum:cd everywhere that existelKe. as existence (which does nm alwa}'s mean lift. pure and simple. Inn which implies it). is subjected anti ruined by a form of C~~CI\CC. :m Idea. a ~rrll(:ture. the erection of an (ir)rationality: in Marx's Manchester. in our "Third" and "fourth" worlds, in all the (,;alllJ». all the apartheids. and all the fanaticism!. Bur also and very simply. if we dare liay if. it is renollnced where the esscnce. concenmltcd in itself. of a process. of an institution (technical. social. ad1L1 ..... t. political) prevents existence from existing. thar is to say from a(,;l.l-ding to its proper essence. Freedom is renounced in the exdlilllgC of this eS'il'nce for the identification with rhe other (with the Ill!.'".. ). and renounced freedom combats the frcc:dulll of the same and the frce,lom of the other. (Which does not mean that existing would take place without identification. but that identification is sUII\(;'ching other than a substitution of essence.) That thi~ happens. and even that this seems to oudine itsdfin a l1lanner indicted more and more often as evidencing the general harrcnlless of tOt1:iy'5 wmld. is what demands of thinking the great"~I tirnllmp«tion and an extreme vigit.H1ce. especially if it nies 10 111.1kc frceJom its rheme. But that this. instead of forbidding us 10 think. llemands prrc i~c1y to be thought, which is to say finally to Ill' rdatl'll to and measured against the: ullapproadlahle freedom It. 'Ill which thought it.~clf proceeds. also telllinti'i us that with the entlllr;mce of thinking (if we mtL"r also understand b)· this the strength

18

N«nsity 0/tht Thtmt 0/Frudom

hold its ground, in the face of the evil that defies thought, from the deepest point of its freedom), there must also be iu hope:: this is not the hope that things "finally turn out well." and even less that they "turn into good." but it is that which, in thinking and of thinking. must, limply in orrin to think, tend in spite of everything toward a liberation as well as toward the very reality of the existenu: that is to be thought of. WithoUl this, thinking would have no meaning. All thought. even when skeptical, negative. dark. and disabused. if it is thought, frees the o:isting of o:istencc-because in fact thought proceeds from it. But hope, as the virtus of thought, absolutely docs not deny that today more than ever, at the hean of a world overwhelmed by harshness and violence, thought is confronted with its own powerlessness. Thought cannot think ofitsclf as an "acting" (as Heidegger asks it to be and as we cannot not require it to be. unless we give up thinking) unless it undcl'5tands this "acting" as at the same time a "suffering." Free thought thinking freedom must know iuclf to be astray, lost, and. from the point of view of "action." undone by the obstinacy of intolerable evil. It must know irself to be pushed in this way onto its limit, which is that of the unsparing material powerlessness of all discourse, but which is also the limit at which thinking. in order [0 be itself. divorces itself from all disrou~ and exposes itself as passion. In this passion and through it. already before all "actionn-but also ready for any engagement-freedom acts. [0

It is always too soon to say what hatches. but it is always time to say that it hatches. Being's difference-in-itself, or existence's (at least as soon as we give back to this word a weight that no foundation could suppon). does not make meaning available a~ lignification. but is the opening of a new space for meaning. of a spacing, or. we could say, of a "spaciosity": of the spacious dement that alone can receive meaning. This means the spacing of a time. (he time that opens at this moment, in (he passage from one epoch ro another or from one instant to .he next. that is, in the passage or transfer [pmsat;o"l of existence, which succeeds itself and differs in its essence. opening and reopening the spacious temporality in accordance with

19 whid. it exi!Ots: the opening of time. tbr first scbmlll, rhe first drawin~ wilhoUl figure of rhe: very rhyrhm of elCisting.~ tk tWl1l!('mrimI"I./i.·f,t'matism ;~If no longer as a "!Ourprise artack" [" (Ollp-de-ma;,(] on rhe secret dissimulated in a "nature." bill tIS II}e freedom with whid. the exisrent surprises the world and irself prior to every detl'fluin:uion of cxistcm:e. And this means thar rime in tum is opene:d unto a m.'w spariality. onto a foe Spit" ar the heart of whkh freedom ~Jn exist. at rhe heart of which freedom can be freed or renounced. (he: free space of the dearing of meaning in general (bur rhere is no "meaning in general." its generality is its singularity). as well as the free space of communication. or that of the public place. or that in which embracing bodies play. or thaI of war and peace. 'Illal whi\:h aim. insofar as it exists. in itself, cannot be except for Ihis ~pace-time of freedom, and the freedom of its space-time. This is why the question of freedom (the question we a.~k in regard to frcedom-Whar is it?-and the qucstion thaI freedom asks-What is (0 be dond) henceforth begins neither with man. nor with God. at the hC
""d

;f """'1 ht'.fo" bt'illg alld lime. "/\ '111.11 there is no existence. that nothing exillts, or at least that

110

one exisls. excepr in freedom. i~ the very simple proposition

tll.lr philosophy not only will always have indicated or fnretold. hilt will always have more or less dearly recognilcd as its own most Ill. It if and motivation. Ihe prinmm mol't'1I1 of its enterprise. That on-

2.0

tology must become an "deutherology" does not constitute, in this sen5C. a discovery. But what reveals itself-what hatches for us in the history of thought-is that the e1eutherology always presupposed by philn~ophy. both as the theme of its logic and as ~t"OJ or hnds of its practice. must itself be elaborated. less as a themc than as the "thing itself" of thinking. In this sense. the "treatise on freedom" that philosophy has nO[ ceased to articulate will perhaps have to be abandoned, since it has never really elevated its object to the status of ,he "thing itself" of thought. Finally, the theme, thc concept or concepts, and the name of freedom will perhaps have to give way-let us say, for the momen' and provisionally-to another ontological "generosity... Regardless of what happens in this regard, it will be a question of hringing an n..p"im« of "freedom" to light as a ,heme and puuing it at stake as a prllXiJ of thought. An experience is first of all the encounter with an actual given. or rather. in a less simply positive v0cabulary, it is the testing of something real (in any case, it is the act of a thought which does not conceive, or interrogate, or conSlCua what it thinks except by being already takcn up and cast as thought, by its thought). Also, according to the origin of the word "experience" in peirii and in ex-periri. an experience is an attempt executed withom reserve, given over to the I"ri/ of its own lack of foundation and sccurity in this "object" of which it is nor the subject but im;tead the passion. exposcd like the pirate (peir"us) who freely tries his luck on the high seas. In a sense, which here might be the first and la~t sense, frcl'tiom. [(J rhl' cxtcm that it i~ the thing itself of thinking, cannot be appropriated, but only "pirated": its "seizure" will always be illegitimate.

§ 3 Impossibility of the Question

ofFreedonl: Fact and Right

Indistinguishable

When freedol11 w.ts prescntl.'C.i in philosophy as the: "keystone: of tht' whole architecture of the system of pure: rcaon" (thereby leading to a mmpletion-a Pf(x:c:dure: undoubtedly en~ in all of philosupl1y). dc:spill' ,the ,beOlrt;cal detenninatinn of this presentation. whidl set aside a positive exhibition of frttdom. or rather. in other term~. which set a~ide the possibility of af"blisl,i''Kfrccdom as a prinrip'~, what was in question was in fact. and at first. an osrension of Ihe existc.-n("c of freedom. or more exactly an osten.~ion of its prc:scnc::e at the heart of existence (and rhus maybe the first definilive: oslensinn of existence ali such. III lett" wc might say-unless Spilln7a is to be countcd here). For Kant. freedom docs not arise as a (I"miml bu t instC'ad ali a Iralit) or as a j;'(I. Ff'I.'cdul11 is not a pRlpcrty of which we must demonstrate our pus~rlisiun. nor is it a faculty whose legilimacy we must. in the Kamian sen~c. lhluce. 1 It is a foCI of rea~on. mlly the only one of irs kind, whil"h alsu amollnts to s:l}'ing that it is rea~n's own factuality. or realion .1li f:10U31 rea~on. ThC' "ke~tonC''' is rca~n in ilS fact, reason fx111.llI y IJrincipial and prindpially factual. The factuality of pheIlO1l1enai cxpericm:l' ncaied to be justified, since the authorization of knllwleJge was at stake (we will nor ask up to what point this kUllwk·dge. as the knowlctige of pure: reason, plants in turn the ~"11I of its legitimacy into the fau offrecdom •. ). Bur here what I~ il1\'olvCtI is lhe experien~e that reao;on prodlu'es V;'i~ (another va-

,,,,"1It

11

2.2.

Impossibility oftk Qtmrio" ofFrwdom

len{;C of fact: not only its positivity. but its active and/or pas.'iive effectivity) from itself. and which consists in the experience of the obligation of free will or free action (which. under the circumstances. and as [ will show. amount to the same thing). or even in the obligation of will or action ttJ be free. Ir is the rational experience of reason IIJ "practical reason." Commentators have: often hexn 5urpriscd by the tcxt of §91 of the Third Criliqur. which posits the Idea of freedom as "presentable in experience." This surprise has been underlined and prohlematizcd by Hddegger, whose analysis we will recall later. It would have been less aC{;Cntuated if Kant's permanent insi5tence on this motif had been remembered. "The Canon of Pure Reason" already states: "Practical freedom can be demonstrated by experience," which also has as a correlate that "pure reason, then. contains ... in rhat practical employment which is also moral. principles of the po!!ibillty ~ txpn'irna. namely. of such actions as mightbe met with in the history of mankind."2 [n fact. the Second Critiqur opens ORlO this alone: it is indeed, writes Kant, a critique "of practical reason" and not "of pure pral:tical reason" because it is concemed solely with esrablishing .. that tlmr h II PU" p,"~ti~11 "tlSO"," and that. once established, pure practical rcason has no need of any critique that would come to limit its contingent/eventual presumption: practical reason would not be able to ·surpass irself," as theoretical reason can and irresistibly tends to do. If th", is a practical reason, "its reality" is proven "by the fact itself." We are not dealing with the presumptions of a power but with the given fact of an actual existence. And this given fact is irs own legitimation. hecause it is not a given object (in which case one would have to ask whether or not it is correctly produced), but rather the given fact of the ellistence of a Iegi.'ilation as the legislation of existence: reason aim as--or under-this law offreedom. That which exists (for example. reason as the given fact of existence. and not as the power ofknowk-dge) is this self-legislation, and that which legislates is this existence. (One could say that with Kant begins the sdf-legitimation of existence, and existence as the abyss of this self-legitimation.) Thus freedom is a "keystone" "to the extent that reality is proven

Imponibi!ity oft~ Question ofFtwdom

lJ

lw ;U1 apodictic law of praaical rcason."111c logi~ modality of apoJ'idicilY corresponds to the calegorial modality of n~essity. The rc;llilY of freedom is a necessity. and necessarily gives itself as such. And if i, ircl:dom itself. as the praxis of reason that is lim of all praxis of i!~ own legislating tacrualiry. which states this net:essity. We will not depart from this apodictidty. No matter how con~iJc:rahle the displaccmcms of concepts and contexts to whic.:h a hiMoriL:al elaboration of the motif of freedom (its effective destiny in Ihoughl) will lead. up until us, we will not depart from an apodictidry according to which freedom would be ill qllnlio". (Here again. let us note in pa....~ing. Spinoza no doubt already preceded this apmliLlicity; but did it not always precede itselfin all of philosophy?) The proof of frttdom-which will reveal itsc:lf to be more on rhe order of the rcst (or of aJ'"imt'~) than of dcmonstration-is in its c:xistence. More exactly, for this is assuredly not "freedom" as sudl. or 35 its concept. which docs exist, this proof is found in existence as the existence of free being. and this proof or this experience finally proposes norhing other than the following; ExiSTENCE AS

ns

OWN ESSENCE IS NOTHING OTHER THAN TilE FREEDOM OF

On the subjca offrccdom. one can propose no other task of Ihuught than to attempt to bring to light that which has already brought itself. in reason. before fealion. Accordingly. in other terms: fi'f~tlom canllOI be tJ~ obj«t oftt fJ"~S­ lioll. Ilm is "only" the p"II;'Ig inlo queslion ofttr, 4firmttt;o1l; and it cannot he the object of a question posed "ahout something," but ()nl~· the putting into question of an affirmation of itselj(of the "self" of free being. and likewise of the "self" of the thought on whidl the reaffirmation of this affirmation rests). (Reciproca1ly. is not allirmation itself eS5emially free. and questioning essentially constrained?) In its most devdopcd Kantian form. this affirmation is mat of §91 of the Thirtf Criliq"e. BEING.

"I1U, what i~ very remarkable. there is one rational idea (which is susH'P1ible in itself of no presentation in intuition. and conorqllenrly of no Ih(,llrctk.lI proof ofits pos.ubiliIY) which abo wmes under things of fact. I hi ~ is Ihe idea of fiwdom, whose reality. regarded as that of a partieIII.U

kind of causality (of which the concept. IheoreliClily comidcml to

24

Impossibility oft"~ Qltmion ofFrr~om

be uanscendenr). may be exhibited by means of pracricallaws of pure relM)n. and conformably to this, in actual aclions. ami consequendy. in experience. This is me only one of aIIlhc ideas of pwc reason wh~ objcct is a thing of fa~t and to be reckoned under the scibi/ill. ~

It is thus perfectly dear that the presentation of freedom. in experient:e. is not that of an object of knowing. Indeed the contrary is [rue-and it would appear to be ncas..w-y [0 alter the formula in order to speak of the presenration of a "subject of action." In properly JUmian logic (but that also means in the general logic of the metaphysics of subjectivity) i[ would still be necessary to specify, if one wanted to sustain this new formula, that iffrecdom is not "in itself" presentable. its particular causality does not present it5df any [he Ies.~ to empirical perception as a "real action" in the course of the causality of phenomena. It is indeed possible that, in the passage quoted from the Third CTit;qu~. Kant is underhandedly alluding to the famous example of the thesis of the Third Antinomy: "If I at this moment arise from my chair. in complete freedom ... " One would then have to say that the presented reality is the reality of the act of a subject. and not that of a signification of an object. But one would immediately have to add that this "subjective" (and "sovereign") reality only allows itself to he presentoo because it is objecrivizcd-and that Kant thus gives himself room for a double violation of the most rigid uitical principles: on the one hand the action of "arising." as a "completely free" action. would be liubreptively withdrawn from the dialectical ~tatus that. from the interior of the "thesis" to which it belongs. it ~ never escape; and. on the other hand (this explaining thad, the "pankular G1.u.~ity" of freedom (whose lla[Ure can in no war be deducM from that of phenomenal causality) would also find itself subreptivcly slipping into the place of the ~neral category of causal iry. thereby making possible. through its conjunction with the intuition of the gCSnlre of arising. the quasi constirution of an object of experience: the free subject Now, in all thi~, it can only be a matter of precisely a quasi I:onstitulioll; in other words. this entire operation would corne back to the SchlUiirmerei. It would definitively suppose this schmit' of freedom (permitring frcc causality to be united with an empirical acr), all possibility of which is rigorously ex-

Impo~sillililJ oft,"

q"mio" ofn"«tlom

1S

(hIJ~'\!

h)' the Second Critiqlle. This is. however. the only possible rein Kantian tenn.~. of the enigmatic logic of this passage ,.lIul we have been ahle to see how this reconstitution. in spite of ('\'l."r~1hing. is & ..crectly namoo in Kant's text by the words "in itsclf." whidl ~m to indicate that if the Idea is not "in itself" susceptible to allY pr~t'l1Iation, it would however be SIL'iceptible to presentation where it is 1101 simply an "Idea in itself," where it overflows itself as Ilk.l in an experience). We have adhered to this analysis without conclusion in order to ~hllw that the Kantian /(IC'/of freedom cannot receive, in a rigorous Kandan logic. it~ status as fact. (And. in a more general way, it 1,;21lllot receive thi< litatus in a meraph)'!iicallogic if the means of the JCl1lol1Stration un never he supplied except through a union of rhe intelligihle anti rhe sensible where these: are in principle posired as irreconcilable.) Strictly speaking. another analysis would be pos... ihle. one that would no longer place on the side of intuition empirical action. hili rather the sentiment of respect for the law-which. inddenrally, prnpcrly constitutes the "intuitive," or at least receptive. clement of r('a,~n in its bc:ing-praClial. Later on we will perhaps encounter the ~ignif1cance of [his respect. 8m here it is not helpful, because Kam i~ H:fc.·rring to fredom's "particular type of c;msality," and respect does nut rrlatc to freedom's causality but to il5 lawfulness. (Or rather, in\ufar a~ it i~ itself the sensible effect of the law. respect can only ~lImmon an aporia comparable lel the preceding one.) Thus the r(,'~ours(' to causality, "particular" or not. hinders the elaboration of the' ~pccif1c factuality of the faCl of the experience of freedom; or rarlwr. and thi!> .IIIlOUIlt§ to rhe sa~ thing. the "particularity" offrcc l3u\.llity conceals the' following: freedom is not a type of causality. '1 his last proposition was the essential result of rhe course given hI' Hcir.lcgger in 1930, "On the Essence of Human Freedom." The 'Ill·gorial subordination of frc('(lnm to causality in the Kantian 1'llIblcmatic appeared to him as the limit of his e\cmherological ~nr~·rl)risc. and he was able to say:

"lll~tilUtion.

(.illl,r"lity. in lhe sense of the traditional comprchen.~ion (If the hdng of hl"n~s, in ordinary undemanding as well as in trJoirional mc:raphysics.

16

ImpossibiLity oflh, {)flmion ofFrudom is precisely tht fimela",tntlll (llugory of ,"ing liS prntnrt-at-httntl. If causality is a problnn offrtNIJJm. and not the inverse. then tht problmt ofbting. tIIltm absoiMItiy. is in itself II probkm offrndtJm. 4

Accordingly, by the same movement, the relation of freedom to causaliry had to be reversed. and the problem of freedom found itself promoted to the rank of the problem of ontology par excellence. In order to invcrt the relation betwecn freedom and causality. it was necessary to engage in a determination of the foct of freedom other than the determination to which Kant seemed to deliver us. Heidegger had from the outset situated his inquiry into the reality of freedom-as such entirely taking up and reaffirming Kant's position-in the perspective of a specific "mode of reality" of prllXis. Insofar as it is practical. reason is nothing other than will. Accordingly, pUrt practical reason is pure will. Pure will is the will that wills absolutely. which means the will that determines itself from nothing other than itsdf (or rather, if it is possible to paraphrase in this way. the will that simply wiUs and that thus does not will lUI]'" thing except will, or except willing). Now "the law of pure will ••• is the law determined for the existence of the will, which is to say that the will is willing itself." Therefore: "The fonJamtntal law of P"" wil4 of pUrt praelklll rtason, is nothing other than the form of kgisl4tion." Pure will is rhus the will of obligation that sprin~ from the law (or that the law encloscs by essence in its being-&Om-the-law. or in its bcing-the-Iaw, which is identical to making-the-Iaw), and from this form of the law that is thc law of pure will. "The essence of willing _. requires being willed." just as .. ht who wills rtaU,

wiUs nothing ot~r than tJx duty ofhis be;ng-t~ [Jas Solkn snnes Dast';'u] ... (Thus, the "will to will," in which Hcidcgger will later lin fact only slightly later) recognize the essence of metaphysic:al subjectivity, was first prfsented here in a very different manner: in accordance with the formally subjective structure of a "willing [for] oneself," certainly, but brought at once to an extremity where the "sclf" of "willing onN/f" is immediately and only a "duty of being-there," which i~ to say immediately the abandonment of existcnce to an obligation.

Imp(JlJibility oftJ~ Q"estion ofPIWdom ,til ,I

27

.he assignation of the injunction of this obligation into the h.l\illg-to-exist. We will not attempt here to analyze the evolution 'lntl implications of Heidegger's thought on the wililbut funher un • ,hall see that it is implied by the analysis of the swpension of the llIorif of freedom in Heidegger]. We must I.:omem ourselves with noting how often. in this seminar of 1930, what is exposed in the name of "'illillg teods mure to represem the "sclf" or the identity of an irreducible !lKtr,tllity [we could also say: the "selr of a fact rather than the "fad' of a self], which is the factuality of the existence of the existent as being-given-over-to-thc-law-of-being-free, and not the self-pn.-sence of a will whil.:h wills rhis very presence. Such a will, as sdf-prc.-sell<:e. would instead lose the grr"md. and (he grrJlI1lds, of its suhjective consistency and propriety, whereas the "selr of beingfree in its fact would offer itself as the un-grounding IJt-fontkIIIml) of a self founded in itsdfby its desire-for-self [the will presenting itself here according to the element of a decision rather than according to the movement of a desire], This also means that the text of this seminar could be annotated by saying that factuality uneltpectedly happens to the "seW' of the existent. and does not "f(mnd" it any more than factuality is fur its part founded by the self or in the sd( And this is why, as we will later come to see, this factuality is a specific factuality.) In this way we reach the proper factuality of praxis:. this factuality ~annot he exterior to the will's relation of obligation toward itself. which is equally the obligation's relation of will toward itsel( This factuality cannol be that of an action (understood as empirical behavior). nor of anything consequent on willing (understood as represemation and desire preliminary to action)-and this mean5 that in the last ill.~ta.m;e nmhing less than the essences of (free) action and of (Iree) willing arc at stake in this factuality. which would no longer permil these essences to communicate with the determinations that ~lll'taplaysics has given them, Neither can this factuality be that of an Intuitive presentation of willing.~ It is a factuality that does nOI de(lend on any insertion into a referential order of fa~t5. nor on any lOI1\titlltinn of an object, On the cuntrary. it is a self-referential dlld ,df-l'Onstitutive factuality (whi,h does not necessarily mean a

Impossibility oftk Q,mtimf ofFIWdom subjective factuality or the factuality of a suhjectivity). Heidegger says. "Th~ "aliI] ofwil/illg is on(y in tlu willing ofthat ~al;ty... This reality itself does not depend on a positive decision being made in favor of obligation. We can "decide for pure obligated willing. that is. effectively willing, or against it. that is, not willing. or we can mix willing and nonwilling in turmoil and indecision": we are nonetheless always drawn into the fundamentalstrucrure according to which willing wills its reality of willing-cven as indecision. Willing wills its own effectivity. and this. as we know. does not mean that it desires or decides it. but that it molws [st" dldb], or even-at least in keeping with our queSlioning of Heidegger here-that the will of will presents noming other than ¢fiaillity insofar as it "so/lIt"J to k tjfoctiv~. More precisely, it is the effectivity of existence that here ~lves to be effective. or to exist, and this decision does not amount to effecting in ac/U what should have been there in pottntia. any more than it refers to a preexisting power of representation or to the energy of a power of realization. bur it is the ex- istenee of the effectivity that existenee is of itself. It is the existence of the existent, its "essence" therefore, or: that me existent exists as the existent that it is. This is the sense in which we must understand that the will is a will to obligate itself to irs own eftectivity. Obligation is the fact proceeding from the nonavailability. for the existent. of an essence (and/or power) of self that oould be represented and intended. Bur if the essence of existence is existence itself. it is not available for representation or intentionality (nor. consequently, for the "will" in the sense of a voluntaristic will). and it obligtft~s its~1f. in its nmtmre, only to mst. that is, to ~ apos~d /0 thr rffoctivity that it is. because it "is" not in any mode of a property of existen(."C. Here. "[0 will willing" therefore means to be effectively cxpmed to existing effectivity (which, moreover. is nothing other than exposing effectivity). This willing-this willing of willing that is the willing of its own duty-thus constitutes the very fim ofaprrinz~ of practical reason, or its practidty as the fact of experience. It ill the fact of freedom .

.. Pr~edom is, only insofar 1lS;1 is tlJ~ df«tiw willing Ofp,," obligation [tit'. ~in Gnol/tm. of the pure ought]."

Impossibility o[tIN Qrtmim, ofFr«dom II i~ the practical fact of ",von. bur Ihis docs not mean that it ""HIIlI he a "fact of reason" in the same sense that one says "a rational h~'illg": thlL'i. it is nor a theoretical "fa~t." ideal or unreal, ineffective anJ incxistent. b On the contrary. if one were to make explicit what Hc:idcggcr's text contains a~ indices. thi .. fact is not only an existent t:Kt-il is (35 we have already se<.'n) the fa~t of existence as such. It is the facr by which the existent hill' Dt,gj,,) relatl'S (to) itself as that which wants to he I obligate itself to he what it is. The existent is thl' hcing that in its being obligates itself I wants to be. and that 00li~ate~ itself to I wants being. Or further: it is the ~ing that is d~­ (id(((/ol' ,";ng. In this way it transcentls. that is, it ex-ists. The fact offrccdom is the "right" of existence, or rather. the "fact" of existence is [he rig'" of freedom. This freedom ili not ,he freedom ofthis or that componment i" existence: it is the freedom of existence to cl(ist, to be "decided for being." that is. to come to itself according to in own transcendence (since. having no essence "to itsclf." it (.m only b~ "esscnrially" Ihis transccndem:e "toward its being"). This freedom is. according 10 the formula employed in &i"g lind 7imf (§40) ... tI,~ b~ing-fi"e~ for the freedom of choosing-oneselfan(i-gmping-onc!iCl( .. The freedom of existence to exist is cxisrel1l.:e itselfin its "essence," insofar as existence is itself essence_ This "essence" consists in being hmugln direcd)' to this limit where the existent is only what it is in i!~ lr.lnsccndence. "Transcendence" itselfis nothing other than the pot~~a~c LO the limit. not its attainmc:nt: it is the bcing~posed at. on, and as the limit. Here. the limit does not signify the arrested cirullmcription of a domain or figure. but signifies rather that th~ t'Srt'l/ff of f'Xillm("~ ('om;lls in l/;is b~illg-ttrke1l-to-th~-~dg~ rrmiJing frO/II /I·lrat 1,.lS "0 "~sstm'~" Ihttl is ~ndo.!N' a"d "s~'r·rd ill lilly im""IIIt'''''~ prrsml 10 t"~ i"mi", oflltt' bOJrln Th;ll cxi~tenc;e is its own l"iSCIKe mean~ that it ha, no "interiority," without, however. be"cl1lircly in exterioricy" (for example. in the way thai Hegel's inor~.lI1il" thing is). £"ist~"'? kl'~ps it1~1f. ·through;ts fSSt'll('~." on t'lt unrl.wl.,/JI(' lim;t ofil$ ou", tkrisio" to o:;sl. In this way. frmlom belongs 1" l')d~ICI\C:t' nor as a property. but as its filL·l. its fitrmm ration;s \\ hidl l311 al~Cl be understoud as "the fan of its reamn for exist-

Impossibility oft," Qunlion ofFrrtJom ing," which is similarly "the rcason for the fact of its existence.· Freedom is the transcendence of the self toward the self, or from the sdf to thc self-whi~h in no way cxcludcs, but on the contrary requires, as we can henceforth dearly see, that the "self" not be understood as subjectivity, if subjectivity designates the relation oftI mbslanct to itself; and which requires at the same time, as we wiU show later, that this "self" only takes place ac(."Ording [0 a being-incommon of singularities. The fa(t of the existent's freedom consists in that, as soon as the existent exists. the very fact of this existence is indistinguishable from irs transcendence, which means from the finite being's nonpresence to itself or from its exposure on its limit-this infinite limit on which it must receivc itself as II lAw of existing, that is, of willing its existence or resolving for it, a law it givn to itst/f aNl whi(h it is not. In giving itself law, it gives itself over to the will to obey the law, but since it is not this law-yet, if we like, it cx-ists in it-it is to mc same cxtent what can disobey, as well as obey, the law. (We could also say: "cxistcnce is law," but iflaw, in general, essentially traces a limit, the law of existence does not impose a limit on existcm:c: it traces existence as the limit that it is and on which it resolves. Thus existence as "essence" withdraws into the law, but the law itself withdraws into the fact of existing. It is no longer a law that could be respected or transgressed: in a sense, it is impossible to transgrcss; in another seme, it is nothing other than the inscription of the transgressive/uanscendem possibility of existence. Existence can only rransgress itself.) The existent's ex-istence giws it 0"" (/imo] to the possibility of gi~ ing i~/fovtr lU' LivrtrJ to its law. precisely because the law has neither essence nor law. but it its own essence and own law. When there is an existent. there is neither essence nor law. and it is in this an-archy that cxisten~c resolves. It renders itself [St Ih'n) to itself, it de-livers lJl-liv"l itself for itself or delivers itself from it-

self. lind

Th~ fan

offrudom i1 thil tk-Liwrttn~~ of~is~nu from every IIlw

ftom itst/fliS lAw: freedom there delivers itself as will. which is

itself only thc existent's being-ddivered-and-decided.

Impossihility oftJJ~ Q"m;o" ofFrmlom

31

Thu\ Ihe fact of freedom is indistinguishable from Ihe reality of 'si~r('nu: inasmu~h as this reality, tin Kam, "signifies the sctting illlll rc,~ilion of the thing in itself. "7 Existence in its rt"a1icy is the thing

in ilsdf Int" being), Freedom is thc prope:r fa,twlity of the "setting inlll po~ilion," of the: S~tZll1lg uf existence. (Thus, a.~ we will bettcr undcr~[;lIld from what fullows, fTeedom is thc factuality of its birth .llltl of its death,) Existence's thing in itself is not simply positeel-alI'l'.ldy ro~ed. pmitioned, gntlZl. as arc all thinp that are nonexisting Jnt! ~'I'Ilc:d t"lt/~r laW5, It is, its reality is. in the Set~tmg, in the aer. in the gc:smre or movemem thar puts it in the position of existence. Ih;\[ r(,lItlers its heing-or that, in il, rc:nc.le:rs being itself-to the dll IIf jJ,t-sr;n. in such a way that this "rendering" or "deliverance" deli\'ers it for possibilities that are not posited. The fact of frc:c:dom is mainr.tincd in this movement, in this d)'namic proper to the ~tzlmg. whidt posits and is never positrtJ...-and m:iprocally. the ~lZlmgof existe"t:C: as the "thing in it5e1f:' whose Min itsdr is only a bringinginw-thc:-world. produces [!dill the reality offrc:c:dom. R Cnnsequently. the very factuality offrc:c:dom is the: very faclualil)' of Fl·""t is rIot dont [filitl. but which will be done-not in the sense of a projeCi or ~'Ian thaI remains to be executed. hut in the: sense Clf thaI which in its very reality does not ret have the presence of it\ rrality. and which must-but infinitcly-ddiver itsclffor reali,,', In ,his way cxistence is aoually in the world. What remain!> "to he tlllnc" is not sitwtcd ()It the register of poiNir, like a work whose ~l"hcma would be given. but on the register of praxis. which "prolluces" 11111)' irs own agent or aoor and whidt would therefore more dll'i('ly resemble: the action of a schelllatiz
Imp0J$ibiJiry oflh~ Qlt~Jtion ofF"~dom law of an inesscnlialiry. Human beings are not born free in the same way that they arc born with a brain; yet they are born, infinitely, to freedom. Thus Heidegger could say: The qu~tion: How is freedom possible? is absurd. From this, however, it does nOI follow that 10 a ,enain exu:m a problem of the irrational fc:mains here. Ralher, because freedom is nOI an objel:t of theoretical apprehending bul i~ instead an object of philowphiling, lhi.~ can mean nothing other than the faa that freedom only is and can only ~ in the setting-free. The wle, adequate relation to freedom in man is the self-freeing of freedom in man. 11

§ 4 The Space Left Free by Heidcgger

Since licidegger. philosophy ha.~ no longer viewed freedom themafically-at least not as irs guiding theme. acept in historkal stlICJic~.1 8ut in fact it was with Hcideger that an imerruption occurml. Freedom was no longer thematized by him. att~r having been thematizc:d on a par or with a rank 1~4!' comparable to that which Spintl7.a. Kant. Schdling. or Hegel conferred upon itIMmdy, a~ "t"£' fimtlammtal qll~Jt;o" ofp"ilosophy. ill u,"ich nltn Ibr 1ursl;o" ofbri11g iJllJ its mot."! W~ a~ the inherirnrs of this interruptillll. It oners [IivI?] us something. and it delivers [Jllivrr) u~ lilr something else, or to something clse. I" onlcr for thC'se: assc:nions not to be gratuitous or merely fonnal. d I~ngthy work woul"l obviou!oly have (0 be undertaken here. devtKed exdusivcly to the question of freedom and it~ interruption or withdrawal in the ('Illme of Heideggcr's thought.' In a sense. this is [he talk that should now be pc:rk)rmed. I will not undertake this for \e\·c ....11 reasons. In the /lr.;t place. for rc.'3.50ns of competence: I am far frolll bdng what (lne would call a HcidCf,Fr "specialist" (but. as can lll' '1..'I.·n, I do not refuse Ihe fn:cdoms tllat are given. nm by a lack of llllnpl'tl'11CC as sLlch. bm h\' a certain distance. with irs inevitablr ri'k~). Sewnd. for reason; of misrrmt: it i~ nnr certain that the \ork IIf recnnstituring Hcidcgger's course: could do anything more lh.lll ~ll1lply lead us back 10 the suspension or illlcrruJltion from w),idl, nn lhe contrary. wc nCt-'l1 to be ahle IC1 deJlarr. Finally. for rea-

a'

ca..

B

TIM SpllU ~fi F"~ by Heidegg" sons of decision: the decision to attempt, at least for the space of a brief programmatic essay, to take up the word "freedom" today, despite the Hcideggerian interruption-in fact, because of it, and in the space of thought it opens. There are some motivations for this decision. If the sense of the word "freedom" remains indeterminate, and if its philosophical concept is caught in the closure of the ontology of subjectivity, the word nonethdcss preserves a burden of history, and a tradition-the transmission of an impulse: that has never stopped throwing itself recklessly against necessity, or the transmission of a voke that has never stopped saying that it is neces.ury to assist Ilnanlu or even that destiny confronts nothing other than freedom-the tradition, therefore, of a force of appeal and joy that is difficult to ignore. even though it has been incessantly misused or abused. This has nothing (0 do with facile appeals to the self-sufficiency and selfsatisfaction of a liberal. or even libertarian, individualism. It involves an appeal to existence, and consequently also an appeal to the finitude in which existence transcends-and by virtue of which existence also comports in itself, in its being, the structure and tonality of a call: the free call to freedom.· If metaphysical freedom, reduced to its simplest expression, has designated the infinite transcendence of the Subject's absolute self-presence, then the hismry of [his freedom, and its tradition, which is also that of the problems forever PUt at stake by its thought, as well as of the struggles waged in its name, are e'lulllly the history and tradition of the transcendence that is henceforth recogni7.able as the exposure to its own limit, that is, as the finite exposure to the infinite separation of essence as existence. l.et us recall brieRy some testimonies (which speak for themselves) of what could be called the tradition of fr~ dom's liberation with mpeet to its subjective appropriation: Ycr this extemalizalion lof the concept) is still incomplete; ir exprcs5es the connecuon of its sclf-<:crtolinty with the object which. just bcclusc it is lhus connccled. has not ycr won its complete freedom. The sdfknowing Spirit knows nor only itself but also the neg;uive of ilself. or its limit: [0 know one's limit is to know how to !OIcrilicc oneself. The

TlJe Space Left Free by Heidegger s,Krilil."c i~ the ~temalir.ation in which Spirit di!IJIla)'$ the pnx:css of its t.l"\.ull1ing Spirit in the form of fire comi"Krlll ""Pl'milll. Thl' uuly frC'e spirit will also think freely reg.1rding spirit itself, and

will

1101

dim:mble over cenain dreadful elements in its origin and ten-

til·1l9'·

rntu!;c an? No. Out go with the art in your own most narrowness. And !OCt yuurself frC'c. ~

I kide~r so liull' attended to the proper force of the word "f'rccdum" -whidl is, in sum, the: force of a resistance to the Com:ept or

or

Idea Frl!edom-that he used it until the end withom retaining any of .hi .. tiucl', or at least without any longer articulating any real notion of it. But if-on the other hand and in spite of everything, a.~ it is legitimate to 5UpIJ05C sim.:e it is abo true, as Adorno said, that freedom has "aged"-ifit is a question ofleaving a place for something nther than "freedom" (let's say, once again, for a "generosity" that would be more "originary"), doesn't this transition have to be madc: \'isible as sucM Isn't it therefore necessary [0 engage "freedom" it!tClf. thematically, in order to be able finally to f"t the place of freedom?

,---

Without treating the question offrecdom in Heidegger in a systcmatic manner, one can fix in outline the stages of its history, in order to try to discern the space left free by his thought. Aller the freedom of DIIS~i" "for its proper po5..'iibililY" had furnished a repeated motif. though hardly developed for its own sake. IIf the an~ll)'ses of B~i"g (JIltl Ti",~ (917), the course of 1918, Mttt1I'I~.'siSC"he AIIJilllflgnlllde rk, Logik {volume 16 of the complete edition l. propused a circumstantial examination of the proposition ;1ll"nrJing to which "the transcendence of Das~;11 and freedom are lurlllKal," and beginning in 1919, The Essn,,:e ofRrllJolIJ themalically ar(OlllH" for freedom as the "freedom to found." Freedom is then lJ.u.1Iifil·J ;\S "[oltlldat;on olfo,md(llio,," and thus "because it is preCl\d~· this GI'IIIU/, freedom is the Abgr,md of human reality."" In

1930. the course dlal we have alrc:ady cited above systematically analyzes the Kandan determination of freedom. bolh to atablish the question of freedom in the positing of [he foundation of the ontological question itself, by means of a conversion of the ontological dignity of calL'ialilY, and (0 indicate in conclusion the necessity of freeing freedom from its Kantian (but in fcu:t more generally mClaphysical) subordination to the category of causality. From this point on, a program of work seemed to be s~ OUt: on the one hand in the direction of freedom as "archi-foundation," and on the other, through a repetition of the philosophy of freedom destined (0 displace freedom's relation to causality, in the direction of a freeing of the resources of "foundation" at the core of the philosophical tradition itselF The course of 1936, which was devoted to Schelling's treatise "On the Essence of Human Freedom," was to constitute the completion of the intended raearch. In a sense. this course offered nothing other than a kind of continuous harmonic composition, where Heidegger's own discourse would create an incessant counterpoint to Schelling's, without making the matter explicit on its own, and without the lauer's discourse being given a clear interpretation by that of the former (as was the case with Kant or Leibniz), There would be here a singular interlacing of the concerns of metaphysics and those of the thinking of being (up to the point, of course, where they end up separating) analogous to what took place dsewhere with regan! to Hegel and "experience." There would have been a period in which it seemed possible to Heidegger to rethink freedom at thc surface of its philosophical tradition, or to replay its concept-since it seemed to him impossible to proceed otherwise. In direct line with the course of 1930, Heidegger finds in Schelling a grasp of the proper factuality of the fact of freedom. and this factuality refcrs to the theme. central for Schelling. of freedom as the necessity of the essence of man. In "seeking to formulatc in a morc originary way" this view of freedom. Heidegger ends up at [his: "The: neccssity by which or as which freedom is determined is that of its own essc:m:c" (p. ISS'). This essence will be more precisely determined as "the overcoming of self as grasping of self" in the oCdc:,idedness" and in the "rcsolureness"

37

"dIe nrenn('~~ of the rnuh of history" by which man can feel the .' 's~ity (II' "his own being" (p, 15~). However. having accompanied 1"IlC:;I(cd Schelling up to this very advanced if not ulrimate point (a rerelition completed by the subsequent analysis of the conjoined pll~'ihility of good and evil), and having at the same time brought him (0 a "more originary" thought. J-Icid~er ahandons him. This .I(,;tndUllll1ent is esscntially due to the f.'1ct that Schelling docs not III,Huge 10 mdically think the originary t1l1ity from which proceed 1m..Jllm a~ n~ity a~ well a~ the correlative possibilities of ~ and C'·il. lIe docs not think this origin as "nothing." and he thus fdils to think fhat "the l'Ssence of all Being is finitude" (p. (62). Schelling thus doc5 not ovcrcome Kant and the "incomprehensible" character of frec\\olll (p. 161). It must be: understood that freedom remains inCCJIllprehemible as long a., it expoSCli its necessity to the core of a thnu~llt (Iiat order.; it to an infinite neccssity of being. and not as a finitude tor which being is not the fOundation. (It is not so much that frccJom would become "comprehensible" in the "more origirw)" thinking," but the questioll of freedom would cenainly no lunger be posed in these rerms--unless it were necessary, in order to gain distancc froll, a problematic of "comprehcnsibility," also to gain distance from "freedom" itself.} Ii" we interpret corrt~cdy the last pagl."S of this course, two things ;arc ~ignified at oncc: Thc c:oiscntial character of freedom has becn attained in the nl'CC~sity for man to assume his proper essence as that of a dedsion rdative to "essence and deformation of es.'iencc" (p. 156). which means [0 good and evil a.~ the realization of this couple of esscnces a "hiMory" (ibid.) that involvcs "encountcring a destiny" (p. 161). 1I1\of:lr as ,IClitiny COll5islS precisely in man's CXllOSUI'C to his own nell'~~il ~'.

Bur this thought has not yet penetrared to the "nothin~" of the 'gin of this necC55ity; it has therefore nm thought the: c:sscntial finillldl' of essence itself (of eKistence) in the essence of freedom'\'hkh t:unse'l"l'lltly. in irs decision and in iu pcrdurance, docs nor In,"~h III' with the necenity of an essentiality (that of "'Itn, whence rhl' di~r.ltlcc Hci\leggcr takes i" ji"r from Schelling's "anthropo-

The Space Lift me by H~itkgg" morphism"), but matches up with what we would call. condensing the terms and tone of these pages, th~ pain oft~ histori,,/iry of~ nothing, in which flnite freedom heroically maintains itself. Up to this point, but just shon of it. and abo in the seminars between 1941 and 1943. Schelling will have taken the relay from Kant as Heidegger's essential reference on freedom, and he will have played, on this register, a role parallel to the Kant of the KAntbuC'h: a "repetition of the foundation of metaphysics" will have almost been performed on his doctrine of freedom. But the parallel stops there-for jf the Kantian resource offered itself expressly for a repetition. and if it was destined to come back. in other ways. to Heidegger (and even later. for example with Kant's U"sis on Being in (963), evcn ifit had nothing to do with the same repetition (and one could say the same. mutatis mutandis. of the Hegdian resource), the mtirt'entcrprisc of accompanying and reproducing Schellingian freedom according ro a more authenric origin will, for its part. ar a cenain moment be abandoned without return. And this abandonment will give way to very little explanation. A note from the seminar of 1943. in the context of which the reference {o Schelling is prescnt, declares the following: Freedom: metaphysically as the name for capacity by itself (spontane-ity. cause). As soon as it mov~s metaphysically into the eenter (into true metaphysics) it intrinsically unifies the determinations of cause [U,.. sndlti and sclfhood (of the ground as what underlies and of the a>ward-itself, for-itself). that is. of mbjmillity. Thus ultimately we have fredom as ,he resolve: to the inevitable (affirmation of "time"!). as essential self-deception. Frrtdom forftiud its roft uriginnlly ill th~ history &ing. for Brillg i5 more original than beingneSli and 5ubjet:tivity.1

of

In this note (which we will eventually have (0 comment on again in several ways. directly or indirectly), ,he principal argument is clear: metaphysical freedom designares ,he capacity to be a cause by and of onesd£ Now causality belongs to bcingness [Iranhtll, not w existence, as does subjectivity insofar as it is the for-itself of the foundation. The rwo concepts are reunited in the ide-a of a foundation-being lfondation-Itttntl, which causes. Bm being [hre] has

39 1I(,thil1~ to do with hcings [1I"1IIs]. Ifbcing is foundation. it cannor bl! ~(l in the mode: of this freooom. Yet no other kind of freedom is prClpo~l·.d. The concept and the wor~ arc ahando~ed to ~meta­

p!wsiLS 10 rhe proper sense of the word (though Heldcgger 5 reading WilS nllt oblivious to the role played by 5uhj«tivity in Schelling's rext. cWIl while it appearl.od to constitute itself as a "repetition"). We n1l1~( rherdore conclude that what could have been. in 1936, "a ",ore originary thinking" of freedom becomes six years later the !elting go of this motif. If Hc:idcgge:r firmly demotes freedom to nOIl-"originary" thought. this is because at every point metaphysics prc:scnt5 him definitively (hut this is nothing new since !king Tilll,.) with the closure of a beingness of being (corollary to the suhjrui\'c closure of the will that he recognized at that time, after having used up, as we've indicated, a motif of free will). In this closure. freedom can only appear as the ClllIsa SII; et Mundi of a suprc:me heing (or of a subject being. which amounts to the same (hing) who then binds up the totality of beings into the "inevitable," and frcedom into ·self-deception. n Would not Hcidegger then have recognized both his own cour5C of J930 and his own reading of Schelling in §27 of Hegel's Philosophy

""d

ofR~f."I?

The allsolute goal, or, ifyoulikc. the absolute imput.c, offrec Spirit is In make its freedom its object. i.e. to make freedom ohjccti~ as much in the ~cnsc that fredom shall be the rational s)'Stem of Spirit. as in the 54:n~e that this system shall be the world of immediate actuality. In m~king freedum its object. Spirit's purpose is to be explicitly, as Idea, what Ihe will is implicitly. The definition of the concept of'the will in ab~lr;tcrion from Ihe Idea of the will is -the frc:c will which wills the free will. -·1 Thus in Hegel roo, or in relation to Hegd. Heideggcr would h;t\·c illll:ndcd to separate him5Clf from the metaphysics of free-

dom. But if the gcsture of repetition in which he had prc:vioulily cng"l!ed no doubt remained insufficiently arriculated for him. was ~()I Ihi~ gl'Mure of separation in turn too easily cxecuted~ This qUC5IlIll1. O( (his suspicion, forms at least the first motivation for an cs-

T"e Space Left Fr~e by Heid~er say of repetition, after Heidcgger. of the theme of freedom. For the moment. we will simply add the following remark: the note of 1943 abo shows very dearly that the abandonment of this "frccdom," which Heidegger himself takes care to name between quotation marks, is here made in the name of an other and more authenric "freedom." We could say that the freedom of man, and of the subject, is ahandoned in favor of a &ec:dom ofbcing. Doubde$S this will perhaps have to be no longer named "frccdom," but it still retains me possibility. if not the necessity, of "caring this name differently. from this momenr until the end of his work, Hcidegger will have stopped seeking thematically an essence of frccdom, and he will make no more than an episodic use of this worn, which can now appear as accidental (at tellSt in view of the immediate contexts in which it most often appears) and stripped of any specific problematic. IO Succeeding it, however (if one can call it a succession-and in what sense? Here the analysis would have to be C'Xtrcmdy long and delicate), is the use of the theme of the "frce" (d4s Frtie) and of "free space. of which we will again have to speak. The situation is thus quite strange: a concept is rejected, a word loses the privileges of questioning that it seemed until then to enjoy, and yet a semantic root is kept, it is even, dare we say, concentrated, and it is used for ends that, as we will sec, arc essential ends of thought. In a ccrtain sense, something of "freedom" will never haw ceased to be found at the heart of the thinking of being: bur in this heart. this "something. exempted in principle from identification, has been submitted to transformations that have not been posited or made explicit as such. Conremporaneous with the note of 1943 (but its first version already dates from J9JO), the text 0" liN Essenct DfTrut" presents at least the principle of this transformation. There Heidegger relates truth-understood as the conformity of the utterance-to freedom as to its essence. Freedom then designates the "resistance" thanks to which beings are allowed to be what they are. Acconlingly, freedom is neither the "C1price of free will nor the mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow a bC'ing)." The step taken by Schelling (and by idealism in general. including transcendental idealism) out of free will and loward a necessity of WI

c~~t'nc(" i~

thus given a merely ontic cast. even if this is not the inIcntillil of the text. On the contrary. freedom henceforth affirms its ontological character or stake in what is c-•.&Ile~i "the exposure to lhe di~d().~{'d Iles.~ of beings." It is this exposure. Ihis possibility of openncs.~ rothe open in which beings are offered as such. which makes the cnulll:iarion of rrmh possible. Rill the hicrarl'hy thus posited is in turn inverted. For freedom lOre(l,j\·cs its own csscm.:e from the more original essence of uniquely es~enti'll Inllh."'1 Ontological primacy then amollnts. in the final analysis. to mlth. This is so because truth carries in its essence and as its essence concealment and errancy. In effect. the concealment of bdn~s-"myslery"-precedes every exposure [0 disclosedness: letting heings t1i5c1ose themselves indicates and preserves a more originall:oncealment or mystery of hcings as such. The errancy that is correlative of this mystery is lhe -free space" to which cx-isrencc is ron~tinllively exposed. and which founds the po.~sibility of error. Thu5 the question of the essence of truth is itself revealed to be the (lllcstion "of the truth of essence." If essence must in fact designatc being, then the "meaning" ofl>eing can be discerned as the errani exposure of existence [0 the mystery of the concealment of Ihe ht'ing ofhcings. In this way. history takes place. beginning with its "conceolled uniqueness." The reversal of ontological preceuel\(;C: between freedom and truth amlllllllS. at the same time. to burying freeuom more deeply in ht-ing, whkh. as being. is revealed to be abstracted from every necessity ('ndowed with presence and signification. Being is the "freedom" of the withdrawal of presence and meaning that accompanies ~\'('ry di~t Insure, or more exactly. that permits disclosure as such. in I~~ principi;ll relation to con~:ealment and erram:y. This interpretalion wOllld allow us to understand thaI Heideggc:rian ontology remain~ hll
T," Spll'~ ufo Frn by H~jJ~" In sum. it is only a question of a difference of ~mphasis. But up to what point can-or must-this difference of emphasis be understood as a sort of recoil of the "practic::al" into the "thcoretical"~ More precisely. how can it be undemood as the 111IlintroAna of a d. tinction (if not of a certain opposition) between freedom and truth, which the text tends to undo, but which would invincibly reconstitute itself, as if it reconstituted with it at least one part of the traditional philosophical preval~nc~ of the "theoretical" over the "practical"? (This prevalence. however, would not be simply reeognizabl~ at all points of the philosophical tradition: not with Aristotle. for exampl~, or Spino7.a, or Kant, or even Hegel.) Up [0 what point does the specific factuality offreedom not risk dropping out of sight (which does not mean suppressed)? Such is the question that ~ are h~re led to ask. Or further: alit of a more profound 6ddity to at least one of the directions of Heidegger's though t, would it not be necessary to try [0 preserve and expos~. trJg~r and in tIN stt",t originarity. the withdrawal of freedom's being and its singular factuality? Obviously this is not a simple question. and. as we can sec, it is one that can only be posed on th~ basis of Heidegger himself. But the important thing for us is that it seems necessary to pose it, and this question, under these conditions. ought to provide the regulative indication of the relation with Heidegger's thought that we are here undertaking.

.---

This question is much less simple than the one posed in Tht Prin'ip/~ of RtllJon (1956)-one of Hcidegger's most important works at the time-which in spite of everything opened a new space of play for freedom. The examination of the "principle of reason" in effect leads thought to a "leap." This lrap allows one to pass from the interrogation of being as ground or as reason (Grund) to the thinking of being as "without reason" in the "groundlessness" of its play. Heidegger writes: The leap remains a free: and open po5sibiliry of thinking: [his so deQsively so that in fact the essential province of freedom and opennCS5 firsr opens up with [he realm of the leap.l~

TIN Spact Ltft Frtt by Htid"Kl:"

43

It I~ douhtless necessary to have the leap. which is the leap of thinkin~ in its "thcoretical" consideration of being. in ordtr for thinking It) pilI itself in the state of perceiving the region of freedom. Yet the k.lp is nothing other than the leap of thcoretical consideration outsidr of or heyond itself; the leap is transcendence and transgressioll of theoretical rcason in its examination of "reason" as Grmrd Therefore. the leap may /lot accede to a "visinn" of freedom except III ,ht: extent that it has "leapt" outside of or away from theoretical "\'i~illn" in general. Yet this is precisely what is not made explicit. In ~lIIy case. the "region" in question designates nothing Olher than what the "Lener on Humanism" (1946) already designated. with no other real explication. as "the free: dimension in which freedom conserves its essem:c. "lIOn the subject of the "frcc dimension" or Mthe free." other texts will provide us with funher examples. For the moment. let lIS simply remark that it is no longer a question hcre of/Trf'dom as a propc:rty or as a power in whatever sensc, but of a spcciii, demcnt. "thc frec," which appears as a quality auributed to a slIbmalUm, "the dimension," only through a banal constrainr oHmgil age. hut which in reality is indistinguishable from this "dimension." What will also be. in &ing and Timr. the: "frcc space of time" is dctt'rmined through this proper spatiality that holds in reserve the eS!iCIl~C of a freedom henceforth only na.med. The quality proper ro this space. irs li~,.tAJ, will not otherwise be determined. and above: ali not through a new analysis of thc notion of freedom. Therefore. it must also be concluded that Hcidegger intended to set aside a ~pa(e Ii)r frt.'Cdom-by keeping the semantic ke:rnel, or index. of the \\(Jrt\ "free"-but a space in which "freedom." in ca~h of its philomphical determinations. appeared to him as an obstruction or oh\Iadr.:. rather than as an opening a.nd release into the open air. I\cl'ping a 5pace free for freedom: docs this frec (and if so, how?) \\ kif trut" see:med to withhold from us? Does it let [his call (0 frceUllin h.lp pell with its proper '(Jrce. this call that-in one way or .1111l1IH:r-the thinking of being (or the thoughts that follow it) ~k.nly cannot refuse?

§ 5 The Free Thinking of Freedom

Keeping a space free for freedom might amount to keeping oneself from wanting to understand freedom. in order to kccp oneself from destroying it by grasping it in the unavoidable determinations of an understanding. Thus the thought of freedom's incomprehensibiliry. or its unpresentability. might seem to heed not only (he constraint of a limitation of the power of thought but also, positively. a respect for and a prcservarion of the frcc domain of freedom. This consideration is doubtless imposed from the very interior of the metaphysics of freedom. to the extent that this metaphysi«;s often 6nds itself exposed to the danger of having 5urrepdriously "comprehended" freedom-somehow even before it has "'t~hNi it-by having assigned freedom a residence in knowledge and. above all, in the self-knowledge of a subjectively determined freedom. Rousseau's Socill/ COlllractoffers unquestionably [he dearest matrix of the schema according to whi!;h freedom, as it becomes conscious of itself (and becomes in fact sdf-consdousness) in the contract. simuhaneou51y produces objective self-knowledge in the sovereign, thereby constituting the sovereignty of the sovereign both in absolute comprehension of his own freedom and in absolute consuaint over himself and over every member of the 50vereign body ("We will force him to be free "). The transcendental treauncDt of this matrix produces. in Kant. the identity offrcedom and law. or

71't F,.u Thil,/rillg ofFmdom

45

ex.lcd)'. the identity of freedom and rationallcgislation. This k!!i~I.Hilln is as.mred~y nothing other lha~ a legislation of frccdo~: hut (hi~ mcans that ti-eeJom ha.~ (0 be ProICC[l,'tI and proposed to It.df as the lawttllm,'S.~ of a moral nafllre. neces.~ary in it~f in the same • 'J\' Ih.1t (he lawfulness of a physical nature is necessary in itself. j:I't'edoll1 is thus undcrstood not only as a particular type of (.\lI~'lliIY in dle proJunion of its cfleet!;: it i~ also understond. on the mudd of rh~'sicill causality. a~ lawn.1 sLJcc~sion. The specific mode of freedom's causality remains incomprehensible. or rather. it is Ihe iIlIYJIfI,>rr/1t'mib/f (\vhich is why there can be no "schema" of moral law. but nnl~" "type." that is. an analogical schema. and this "type" is provided by nattJrt' in the lawfulness of its phenomena). In conna.,I, howC'\'er. the id~"1 of the legislation of a "nature" or "second naturc" regulated by treedom is perfccrly comprehensible by means of the I)'/Ir. which provides. in the mode of the physical world. the gener.tl model of a lawful necessity or necessitation. Now if chis idl'a is {juitc easily understood (despite the idcnl character of a world ruled by morality), that is il«ausc it can be analY7.ed definitively in the tilllowing term~ (which Kam certainly would not have acceptrd, d"~ritc the conformity of their logic to his own. particularly in the ~OIHex[ of (he idea of a creating God): ultimately. fo'rdom m11111 rc

.-Iosrs ,I,t' Jmrl o[cmlJd/ity br('atlj~ it;l in ;tl~If(tmkomprrhmdHi tIS th~ ,"'/ POll"/' o/liIU1afion. Freedom is a particular kind of lJusaiity in thoU it holds and l>rescnts (at It".lst in Ideal the pO/i)~r o/4J~clUa­ tllm ,h.lt Iheurcti~al causality lacks. The principle of theoretical laLJ~;llil\, srare~ in eflect thnt stich is the law of the succession of ph\:lwll~ena f(,r our unJerstanding. hut it cannot present what enahk-s Ihe pruduction. one after another. of th(' sllccessi\'e linka~ of t~Il'S(' phenomena. Freedom holcl~ the secret of c;ll\sality since it is defilled ,l~ Ihe power 0I,"i"g by itsr/fIt CItItJ~. or 35 the power of causII\~ •• d',nlutdy. hmdamelllally. freedom is causality that has achil'\'l'll ~clf.knowledge. In this respect. the "incomprehensible" l'ndll":~ ill it~c1f the sdf-mmprehcnsion of being as Suhiect. , A "'"rld in freedom \Yould be a world of clIIsality transparent to Ilwlf. 'Ih" secret is contained in the formula of the will: "the powl:t III Ill' I~I' II/MIlS a/ollls Irp'Y'st'llftltioIU the callsc of the reality of

these same representations." This is the power of the (pre)formativ.: Idea of reality. Philosophical undemanding of freedom culminates in the "intomprchemible" 5df-tomprehension of me sdf-produaive self-knowledge of the Idea. Henceforth. law is the representation of the necessity of the Idea. Now, the Idea is through itself a (re)presentation of netessity; the law of freedom represents the necessity of netcss I ty. From Kant to Hegel. certainly to Nictzsche, and probably even to the Hcideggcr of "the will to will as the will of its own duty," the thouglu of freedom is fulfilled as if irresistibly. at least through one of its aspeas, in a comprehension of thc necessity of necessity. The point of incomprehensibility is the ultimate point of the comprehemion that gra.5pS that netessity netc5Sitates itself. Beawc of this. human freedom is always susceptible to being understood as the repetition and appropriation of this subjeaive structure. To be &cc is to assume necessity. The "assumption of necessity." or the "liberation through law," or ~n the "inner freedom" that "takes ~ of' external constraint~ become from this point on the formulas of a world that perceives itself to be overburdened with irreversible and ~ighty processes, with coercions of all kinds (naturally, this dom of 5ubjeaive assumption has as its symmetrK:al counterpart the acceptance of pure libenarian anarchy, of freedom reduced to arbitrariness). These formulas represent what we could call the major philosophical ideology of freedom that has developed from the phil050phy of the Idea and of subjectivity. I Yet it is entirely dear that they constinne just so many admissions of a theoretical and practical ~r1essncss, and that this comprehension offrccdom is equivalent to the resignation that Hcidegger designated as the iIIu50ry "resolve" toward the "inevitable." (In this sense, Heidegger's abandonment of the theme of freedom signifies primarily the refusal of this resignation.) lhus it would be possible to say: if me Idea offic:edom-and consequently a determination of its necessity. since the idea of Idea contains in principle necessity and self-necessitation-precedes freedom and in sum envelops it beforehand in its intellection, its intdletuon will remain negative with respea to the "nature" of free ne-

me..

TI" Fru 71,i"killg ofFrr:edom

47

...,~it .v. so rhar freedom is notiCC'ably absent. Ir is absenr here because it i, ill principle ~lIbiccted to a thinking 1Ita( fund.'lmenrally thinks b,il1~ as nc~cssity and as the causality of self-ncces.~itation. This rhou~hr dues not even think of itself as free; it considers itself [0 be the ~df-(lIn)comprehension of this being. Freedom is absent became in Ihis thinking it is IIss"n' in advance (founded. gl.laranteee!' ,111\.1 M:lf-a.~surcd): "the Idea fiwly rrk.ws itself in irs absolute selfa~surance and inner poise."~ If rhe !actuality of f'rttdom is the factuality of "what is not yet done If;,;r]. or made into a fact." as we have claimed, ir must also and perhap~ abuve all be understood as the factuality of what has no Ideo. nor C\,l.'n an idea determined to be "incomprehensible" or "unpresCl1uhlc," This must mean, in one way or another, that this factuality escapes philosophy and even thought if, in whatever way we take the word "thought," it is oriented toward a "thought of freedom. ilnd not primarily (or e~n exdusively) toward a freedom or lihcrarion of thinking. We gain a sharper perception of the way Hcillcgger, at Da\'us, was driven to withdraw freedom from the jurisJiuinn of "theory" in order to restore it to the practice of "philosoph iling." a practice designated a "liberation." or a[ least as corresponding to the Iiber.ltion offrecdom. But this in no way allows us to fclrgo interrogating the exact narure and stakes of this "phiInsophiling" (which Heidegger, at a later date, would replace with "rhinking"). Su~h "philosophizing" can auually be presentetl as the deeonstrulIiv(' penetration that reaches the hea" of metaphysical idealism al thr poil\[ where the Idea binds rt'1IC'bll;m'] freedom, in order to shO\\ that at this same point something different "unleashes itself" Ifr"dld1,tilli'li for example (and this underlies Hcidcggcr's tcxt), a pr;lxil"al ra~tualilY irreducible to the theoretical. Another example \:uuld be the structure that obliges the jurisdiction of rcason to lall. lilerally. over its own ClSC. the case of the instauration or enun~i;llillll nfl.tw. as over Ihat which, contrary to the logic of the "case" III, gl'l1l'ral. ~anllot bm escape lawantt thereb)· rc"\'c:-.d that the: c:ssc:nu: (~f illri~dillinn is to pronounCC' "the right of what is by rigbt without rl~lm, ~ \\ 't' Cln also state that. in tbe imperative. "law is separated ~,.

T," Free Thinking ofFrndom from itself as faCl."l This links lip in a nllmber of ways with a mode that would no longer be that of the "necessity of nec~ity," but which would be precisely the mode of its liberation. Here we rejoin [he Kantian inconceivability of freedom and its commentary by Heidegger: The only thing that we comprehend is irs incomprehensibility. And fTccdom'5 incomprehensibility consists in the bct that it rc:sists com-prehension since it i~ freedom that transpos~ us into the realization of Being, not in the mere rcprC5entation of ir.~

Bur what does "comprehending incomprehensibiliry" mean, and, consequently, what is meant by the "philosophizing" ~r whatever it will be ~-that manages to reach the funhest border of its own possibility in order there to designate and free, through this very designation. precisely what it does not comprehend? Or, ~rhaps more exactly, what does this gesture or activity which is neither ..theoretical" nor "practical" represent. a gcsmre that brings to light the division of these (wo concepts limiting metaphysics. and that would accordingly reserve for freedom a space that is truly free? Comprehending that something is incomprehensible cannot signify simply that comprehension would come to a hah with the discovery of one of its limits. For the limit, once it is recognized as such, is not only "comprehended" as an obstnaction or screen: the PU"Cflcountering of an obstacle is impossible if we undemand by this that we would therefore have no knowledge mher man knowledge of the ob~tacle (or this is death-perhaps). Yet the ob~tacle-by virtue of this law of presentation to which Heidegger was so at· tentive-necessarily presents with itself. as if through itself, the free passage to which it is an oh~tacle. Such is the logic of the limit in general: the limit has (wo borders, whose duality can neither be dissociated nor reabsorbed. such that touching the internal border amounts dlso to touching the external border ("from the interior," one could add-which would render the description of the operation infinite and vertiginous). Comprehending that something is incomprehensible is certainly not comprehending the incomprchen· sible as such, bur ndther is it, if one can say this. purely and simply

Thr FIYr TIJi"ki1lg ofI-i-rrdom

49

~tli11prd1t"ndillg n01hing aOOm ir. We comprehend that there is the il1("nmpn:hcn~ihlc bc-came we comprehend. in the presem exam-

rll', rha[ "[he rdil.ation ofbei.ng" escape~.its "re!,resent~~on" (don't rhc~c lorl11ulas r('(all somedllng of the .heona/praxls couplc?).

\~'c [hereforc comprehend the ;,r-comprehen5ibility of the incom-

prchcmihlc. With this privative "in." we comprehend thai the in(1"llprchcnsible-.frecdom-is not, properly s~aking, "beyond" our clparity of comprehension. hilt it do('5 nO[ simply arise from this capacity. 1:(('('(lom is nor exactly out of comprehension's reach; tOr exilnlpk. it is not located higher up on a ladder ofimelligihility. on a rung accl~sihle. for instance. only to an inrelligence other than our own. Even Ic"5 is freedom opposed to comprehending: it makes it!>elf unJcrstood, at the limit of comprehension. as what does not originate in comprehension. The "reali1.ation of heing" (or pYdXi.i?) hit~ no f1bjrct, or diemI'. except itselt: in irs independence with rc~(t to oh;ectality and thcmaticity. Thus, incomprehensible freedom milkc~ itself understood tit tile limit [a Itl limite]. in a very precise scme uf this expression. as a self-comprehension indl'prndent of the wmprt·hemion of understanding [to1lrr"di'mmtV What we comrrdl(·nd. at rhe limit. is that there is this autonomous comprrhemion, which is the realizing [accomplissolllti cumprehension of rl';lliz.uiol1. We cumprehend that realization (omprt'hmtb itll'/f [Sl' (Oil/p'ma] (e"en ifir d<X's not rmdt'Ntanditsdf[stntl'1ld] and even if \\e do not understand it), in its ~cci6c mode. Yet we sec that this ~pc(itic mode strangely resembles that of the- self-com prehensionand of the sel f-rcalizatiun-()f "reason." "thinking," or "theory" as ~lJ[h .••

Our comprehl'n~ion. then. is not meaningless. and it even forms Olle IIf the summits of philosophical comprehension: for it has also (Olll(' to Ill' Ii.mnulated. not accidentally. as the comprehension of the pitilo\opltical ncces~ity of superseding philosophy in the realizatl('1l of philosophy (in the realization of being). Hegel oOers a for1!l1I!.1 t;lr this. and its displaced or transformed meaning could hold tor .leide~er as well:

hhi,." lite is the Idea of frt'edom in ,hiu on ,he one hand it is ,he ~""d h("cume al;'lt'-rhe good ",dot/wl in ~If-consciollsnt'~s with

so

TIN Fr~~ ThinlringofFrmlom

knowing and willing and artuttliud self-conscious action-while on the other hand self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its absolute foundation and the: end which actuates its effort. Thus ethical lite is the concept of frc:edom dllltillptd into tiN fXisting world mullht 1IIltuIT ofs4f~o1lKioumns. 6

Thus, at the self-realizing end of this ethical life: The: state: is the actuality of the ethic:llldc:a. It is ethical spirit ljll4 the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it. 7

What above all must not be underestimated is the power of thi, philosophical comprehension of me overstepping of the theoretical limit and. on the reverse side of this limit. of the expansion of praxical self-comprehension. We must not even stop at Hegel's exterior and banal comprehension that would have us admit that philosophy here perf~t1y comprehends a concept of practice which philosophy itself elaborated, and from which it does not escape. For the demand of Hegelian Spirit i.~ precisely the demand to be actualized in an accualit}' that ftm it from its simple being-in-itself. and for Hegel it is indeed only practically and outside of itself that Spirit can comprehend itself in its freedom and as freedom. What discourse (un)comprehends-such is the entire theme of the dialectical sublation of predicative judgment in speculative thinking-is that practit:al at:tuality constitutes the ITal (material. historical. etc.) self-realization and self-comprehension of what discursive comprehension comprehends without. however. being able to penetrate the sphere of authentic self-comprehension. This is also why philosophy. with Hegel, having reached the limit where it i~ actualized, no longer "comprehends," hut "contemplates"-it t:ontemplates, for example. the majesty of the monarch in whose individuali[), of body and spirit the actuality of the State is t:ont:en(fated. This contemplation is the comprehension that surmounu. surpasses. and sublatcs itself in the act of its finally ckployed freedom. Clearly. we must conclude nothing less than that (un)comprehension is in rca1i[)' me supreme stage of the wmprehension mat attains knowledge of self-comprehension as self-realizarion. Not only

51 is fllmrrt·hension gras~, at its limit. outside of itK'lf as in its inllerl1l11 l>t truth, but more profoundly. it grasps itself in this apprehension cnlirdy srrcu:hed out of itself. a... it!! own ptuldg~ into ad;on: it "lll11prehcnds itself as it... own becoming-practical. It it/lOWS that sLU.h is it.. truth, and moreover, it ptlts its~lfto ttsf. at il5limit. as 'llready actualizing. before it is al.:tual. this free act ,hat it would nnt he ,Ihle rigorously to comprehend. There is thus a sclf-comprl'hension ofthe comprehension of incomprehensibility. In this )t'lf.mmprehension, "theory" comprehends "praxis" as il5 truth. It/If( it comprehends itself as practical, which also means that in it pr.1([iu~ is theoretically comprehended as the reali7..ation of the freedom (1I11)comprehendcd by theory. Freedom is therefore, despite cverylhing, comprehended. Yet once again necessity is com prehend".J as freedom. and freedom has been earmarked as necessity. This may take many forms. from Rousseau's or Kant's enthusiasm In M,lrx'S reversal of the dialectic's reversals,· to the weight conferred by Heidegger on the word "thinking" (thinking heing itself thought uf as an "acting"): it should he said, always. that fimJom will Illkr w,(f"p in ,ht n«nsity oliN practiettl "/j;comp"lJmsio,,. ,--.. ()f course. ,his is not all. This is not ,he totality of what there is to dC'Cipher in this K'ries of gestures made by philosophical [octs. Yet we canllot avoid going by way of the preceding analysis if we are unWilling to reserve for freedom a space that risks being revealed as alreally cnclost'd hy nccessity-cven if this should be by ,he neccssiry I)f this very reserving. Must an)'rhing he m~rwd for fr«dom? Must its space be It~PI free? We should ask instead if this is even possihle. h not freedom the only thing that can "reserve" its own space? Would not what is at stake in freedom he the fact that, according to ,I logil.: resolutely separate from every dialectic of (in)comprehcn~ihility, freedom in any caK' precedes the thinking that can or ~annllt mmprchcnd il? Freedum precedes thinking. becauK' thinkIn~ prnl'ceds frol11 freedom and because it is freedom that gives thinking.

,I"

TIll' thinking whose thollghr~ not only do nut l;alculatc but arc ab,.. I\IIdy determined by what i~ "other" than beings might be called

52

J"Iw Pm Thinking ofrn«iom e:sscntialthinking. Instead of calculating beings by means of beings, it npcnds itsdfin Being for the truth of Being. This thinking answers to the demands of Being in that man surrenders his historical essence to the simple reality of the loole necessity whose: constraints do not SO much neceSl;itale as create the: ne:ed (No/] which is realized in the fra:dam of sacrifice: .... Frcc:d from all comtraint. because born of the abyss of frc:c:dom, Ihis sacrifice is the C'Xpenditure of the essence of the human being for the pmt"rvation of the truth of Being in respect ofbeing5.'

In a sense, this declaration is perhaps less novel than it seems. It gathers something that undoubtedly traverses, more or less visibly. the entire tradition in which philmophy has always considered freedom to be the source. clement, and even ultimate c;ontent of thinking. "Philosophy is an immanent, contemporary. and presenr thought and contains in its subjects the presence of&eedom. Whar is thought and rccogni7.ed comes from human freedom. ".0 But how is the co-belonging of freedom and thinking determined when, in Heidcgger's tcrms, thinking is "born of the abyss of fTrcdom" and thus engages "sac;rifice" or engages itself as "the sacrifice of the essence of the human being"? Let us leave aside the implication of sacrifice. which is certainly not insignificant from the point of view of a consideration of the whole of Hcideggerian philosophy (thi~ sacrifice at the altar of (ruth, in which one could easily detect, as Bataille might have, the comedy of the simulacrum where nothing essential is 10lit, or the model of dialectical tragedy that would destroy human beings only in order to find them again elevated to the posrure of the contemplators and celebrators of truth. of philosophers as theoreticians). In spite of all this, there is an· other tacet of sacrifice (one through which. after all, there is perhaps no longer "sacrifice" in any sense): prodigality. Thinking expends what it thinks, free of "calculation," in such a way that in spite of aU the benefits that cannot help bur rerurn, whether to the thinking subject or to the economy of ilS discourse, what is truly thought can only be what is expended (which also means: that of which "thinking" is or ha... "cxperience," and not that of whic;h it elaborates a conception or theory). Thinking ex~nds, since it comes from

Thr F"f Thillking ofr;'t'fdom "the: .lh~~s of frcCt.tom. Above all. free
thinking. TIllS simply means that there mi~ht nm be thinking. This also OlC'.lm lhat there might not be human beings. Which means in tUln

Ih.1(

there might not be t'Xlstmrt'-anJ it is in this that existence

can he recn~ni7ed: in that its singularity migln or might not be given. in that its thing-in-itself might or might not be posited. PhenClmena arc nccessary. the very existence of the thing is frcc. That theft' is existence (human beings, thought). that there is that whkh is its own e!i.~ence, cannot derive frnm a necessity for essence, and C\ll only be given, freely given (which is a tautology). Reciprolally: if there were no existence (but this hypothe~is is absurJ-~illl:e we are speaking here of"cxi~tcIKe" and since this very fact, "speaking of something," implies existence-and yet never entirely deniable, if existence. existents, speech, and thought are also always susceptible to renouncing themselves, to becoming euen\;es .) .. jf [here were no existcnce. then there would not ~ nothing and ret there would not be "sUlnt·thing": for the "thing," anJ the indetermination of the "some" that ilSSCmbles each of irs pos,ibl r singularities as presences in or of the wlHld, already completes lhe pr0l-!ram. so to speak. of a thuught. If [here is "something." this i~ hecame it is possible to keep "the thing" and its "heing some (thill~~ in sight. If this were lJ~usStlry. there would be no "there is," "some, and no "thing." There wuuiJ be only-and this would nOt 11(, "there is"-.. rhe repletion. always already re-alizeU and drawn hJ~'k to "'cit: of the general and immanent being of what, even on It I~ till. Clnnot be som~/f,i"g, We would only have: "it is" and no thow·llt ' . .arises · as slie h ~ , If'"It IS POSSl'11 ) C t h at t h" e tI lerc'15 sometIling

:;)~ thinking. ;IS <"Xisrence). this is because this arising is the gift of a tcrdl llll or a freedom that is given.

Every thinking is therefore a thinking about freedom at the same time that it thinks by freedom and thinks in freedom. It L~ no longer exacdy a question here of the limit between the comprehensible and the incomprehensible. Or rather, what happens here. in the free arising of thought, happens precisely on this limit, as the play or very operation of this limit. Thinking is always thinking on the limit. The limit of comprehending defines thinking. Thus thinking is always thinking aoout the incomprehensible-about this incomprehensible that "belongs" to every comprehending. a~ its own limit.1I Yet this does not mean that thought is a kind of usupra_ comprehension" (regardless of how we would like to see it, the mystics' impasse-including what remains of the mystical in Hcidegger-is always presented in this way) and this also docs not mean that it is a SchwiJrmere; (the entirely rationalist definition of this notion produces in Kant an impasse symmetrical to that of the mystics). Thinking docs not push comprehension beyond what it comprehends. and neither does it prophesy. Thinking thinks the limit. which means there is no thought unless it is carried to the limit of thought. I nsofar as it "comprehends." it docs not comprehend its own limit. and it comprehends nothing insofar as it does nor comprehend; neither is it mediated in a "comprehension of incomprehensibility." Yet it is no longer a question of comprehensibility and incomprehensibility. Both emerge from necessity. and thinking is delivered to freedom. It is not subjected to comprehension and its opposite. If we must say that thinking is subjected to a necessity. this will be in such a way that the necessity of freedom would not br the freedom of necessity. The freedom of necessity is realized in the Hegelian concept to the extent that the Hegelian concept is itself realized. The necessity of freedom is "necessary" only in the sense ,hat it unleashes itself in its abyss and from its abyss. Now. lhe uabyss" (whatever Heideggcr. for his part. means by this) docs nor "open" under the pressure of some necessity in order to give or deliver something. The abyss is not th(' essential reserve from which would be produced-by some necessity of trial. ex· traction. or engendering-what comC5 into thought. The "abyss" (of freedom) ;$ that there is something. and it is nothing clse. It "is"

TI~ F"t TlJilikillg ofFrttdom

lh..-rdi.Jrc. a.~ abyss. only the unleashing that emerges "OUt of it. more exactly and because there is no substantiality or interiority (0 lhl' ab)'ss. the "ab)'5S" itsclf-a term still too evocative of depths-i~ (I.,ly the unleashing. prodigality. or generosity of the being-in-the\\'(lrlJ of ~omething. It is what gives thinking. in the sense that thinking is nothing other than the being-delivered to this generositv. Freedom is not the vertiginous ground of the abyss. opened al~J rt""ealed ro comprehension. Freedom arises.from nothing. with thinking and like thinking. which is W'itence delivered to the "there is" (If a world. It is from the outset rhe limit of thinking-thinking as limir. which is not the limit of comprehension, but which, ac(;orliillg to the logic of the limit. is the iI-limitation of the prodigality of being. Thinking is ollht sur/act o[this ii-limitation of the "there i~. it is in itself the unleashed freedom in accordance with which thin~s in general are given and happen. This is why thinking does not have freedom as :50mething to be comprehended or to be renounceo from comprehension: yet freedom ofTers itself in thinking as what is more intimate and originary to it than every object of rhought and every faculty of thinking. li, be sure. here there is no longer even "freedom," as a deflned subMance. There is, so to speak, only the "freely" or the "generously" with which thing.'! in general arc given and give themselves to be thought ahout. No doubt "freedom itself" unleashes "itself" both in the sense that it would be the subject of this act and in the M'n~e that it wOldd expend its own substance. Ycr what unleashes -it5C1£" wa!> not previoudy attached to a substantial unity; 011 the contwy. the subject follows only from freeoom. or is born in her. What is expended was not previously reserved in a pregnant end()~urc. nor even contained in itself like an abyss. Generosity pre((xit"li the possibility of any kind of possession. The secret of this genrru~ir~· i~ that it docs not have to do with giving what one has (one h'h Ilothing. freedom has nothing of its own), but with giving one\clf-and that the 1~1fof this reflected form is nothing other than gl·"crusity. or the generousnc.'iS of generosity. The generousness of !:L·nl·rnsity is neither its subject nor its essence. Rather, it remains its \llIgularil),. whidt is at the same time its evenlY gellermity hal'llC'm.

of

n

;6

Tk Fm UJinking 0/FrruJom

it gives and is given in giving. always singular and never held back in the generality of its own quality-and its unKjue manner of not "taking place" in the sense of a simple positing. but of always p~_ ceding itself by always succeeding itself. II unleashes itself. without "being unleashed," before being. but also well after it-already hurled, sent, expended, without having had the time to know that it i.~ "generous," without having been subjected to the time of such a qualification. What i:s generow abandons irself to generosity, which is not its "own," without having or mastering what it does. It is like hitting one's head (thinking as hining one's head. ), it is having heen delivered or abandoned not only withom calculation and without having been able to calculate. but even withour an idea of generosity. This is not an unconscious. but on the contrary-if these terms can be used-the most pure and simple consciousness: that of expended existence. Thought that is given in this way is the most simple thought: the thought of the freedom of being, the thought of the possibility of the "there is," that is. thought i~1f, or the thought of thought. It does not have to "comprehendor "comprehend itsdf"-or uncomprchend.lt is expended to itself. in existence and as the ex-istcnce of the existent. as its own inessential essence, well before the conditions and operalioll5 of all intellection and (re)presentation: it is expended as the very freedom of eventually being able to comprehend or not comprehend something. This freedom is not a question or problem for thinking: in thinking. freedom remains its own opening. -..... "Freedom" cannot avoid combining, in a unity that ha.'1 only its own generosity as an index, the values of impulse, chance, luck. the unfOreseen. the m,'\:ided, the: game, the discovery, conclusion. dazuemellt. syncope, courage. reRection, rupture. terror, suture. abandonment. hope. caprice, rigor. rhe arbirrary.L' Also: laughter. tears, scream. word. rapture, chill. shock. energy. sweemess .•.. Freedom is also wild freedom. the freedom of indifference. the freedom of dloice, availability. the free game. freedom of comportment. of air, of love. or of a free time where time begins again. It frcc:s each of

.

Th~

Fru n,;,tlting ofFmdom

S7

lhl"se p(ls~ihilities. l'3ch of thelir notions of freedom, like so many freedoms of freedom-and it is freed from thelir. In dlcet. it i~ not a dialectical montage-and even less an eclecrit; I'l'capilulation; it is a heterogenl'Ous dis.r;emination of states, con(l"pu. motivations. or affects. which could compose. so to speak, an inlinil)' of figures or modes of a unique freedom. but which in reality arc ntlcrcd as a prodigality of burslS whose "freedom" is not their lOmmon SlIhsttlllft but rather . their bursting. Nor is freedom lheir transcendent condition. and they are not its transcendentals. In sum. these bursts arc all the possible determinants of freedom to lhe cXlem that freedom expends itself in the withdrawal from every delermination. Each of them, or the figures that can be composed from them, would no doubt call its own elaboration phenumenologkal. but above all, their long list-unfinished and unfinishahll"--signifies its own proliferation (and we do not want to be misunderstood as secin~ an anthropological bricol. here), which iudf definitively means that freedom ~sselltinU, bunts. Nonetheless. it is not necessarily "(he Bacchanalia in which every member is drunk." hut there is no freedom without some drunkenness or dizziness. however slight, Therefore it is dle "abyss" of freedom in the sense that ftmJom does not br/ong to ;IS~1f. In this way. the frenlom of being is not a fundal11elllal pn'I,,'rry rhat would be above aU else posited a~ an essence, but is immediately being in fr«dom. or the b~;"g-f"~ ofb~;ng, where its being is expended. It is its very life. iflife is undcntood as originary aUlo-affection. lJut being is nor a living being and is not .1fTcx(cd" hy its freedom: being is only what il i~ insofar as it is in freedom anJ as freedom. the being of a bursting of being that deli\'er~ being to existence. " 'X'1l.lt IS in (his way is never at first on the order of action, nor is II on the order of volition or representation. It is a bursting or a singu!." ily of cxistene~. whieh means existence as deprived of essence ~Ild ddivcrcd to this in~ssentiality. to its own surpris~ as well as to 11\ 11\\"11 dcdsinn, ro irs own indecision as well u to its own gen"", Bur this "own" of frcc:dom is nothing subjective: it is the in-

Tk Fret Thinking ofFreedom appropriable burst from which the very existence of the subject comes to the subject, with no support in existence, and even without a relation to it, being "itself" more singularly than any ipseity, "itself" in the burst of a "there exists" that nothing founds or necessitates, that happens unexpectedly and only surprises, vcnigi_ nous [0 the poim chat it is no longer even a question of assigning an "abyss" to its vertigo: this vc.-ry vertigo. its existence and irs thought are the vertigo of the prodigality that makes it exist without a""tting it any nsmu and that is therefore not an essence, but rather the free burst of being. Freedom. in me existent. thw also immediately forms its immanence (we could say. in terms raken from a regisrer that is no longer applicable: the necessity of its chance, of its contingency, the legitimacy of its caprice) as well as its transcendence. That the existent transcends means: it has no immanence in the freedom with which it exists. But its freedom, with which it is more intimate than any property of essence. is in this very intimacy only the "strikeW or "cut" of its existence: the archi-originary bursting of pure being. This transcendence therefore should nOl be understood as an "opening to" or as a "passage out of "-in a sense. it is not ek-static. and existent freedom is not ek-sistent, but it is the insistence of a bum; transcendence takes place on the spot. here and now, as a prcsen~ that would be the singular presence of a strike, of a spring. of a free leap in existence and of existence. Thus it is freedom mat definitively "leaps." or rather it is fttedom that is the "leap," whereas Heidegger would have the leap provide ~­ cess to freedom. The leap is therefore not a free decision of thinking. It is freedom and freedom gives thinking. because thinking is what "holds itself" in the leap. Freedom is the leap into existence in which ocistence is discovered as stich. and this discovery is thinking. Well before being or seeking to be "the thought of freedom," think~ ing is thus in freedom. Thinking is in this leap, from Pascal's "chance which gives thoughts and tak~ them away" to this other extremity where thinking can no longer even have "[houghts" (ideas, con~ cepts. representations). not because it would be limited with re-

l1J~ F"~

Tbinkil1g ofF"~dom

59

a Illl!;hti~r power of (rc)presentation. but because it touchIftry fr~~dom. On this limit. thinking neither comprehends nor uncomprehends. It is supported hr mulling, and it is not thrown into the Kantian dove's empty SllJtl'- it leaps into and over nothing. It is but the leap of a nan. a hurst of \,\istcm;e. an unleashing that ulll~.lShes Ilolhing more Ihan rhe ucmhlin~ of the existent at the border of ils existence. Thinking trt'rnbles with freedom: fear and impatience. luck. the experience that (hcrt' is no thinking that would not always be given in freedom an\lto freedom. A~ soon as it thinks. thinking knows ilSdf to be free as thinking. and not onlY-
es. in ;tnd of itself. tbis limit Illal is ils

§ 6 Philosophy: Logic of Freedom

Who is in charge of this other thinking? No one is its operator. official, or "specialist." This orner rninking thinks in all thoughtand it thinks this thought, which means that it weigh5 it, trics it, and puts it to the: tcst of freedom. It thinks "in all thought": it might be at stake in a thinking of mathematics, of politics, of technology. of everyday life, and so on. This might be when one is thinking about somebody, when one "isn't thinking about anything," when one is concerned about making a decision, or is under the prosurcs of suffering, or even under the hardship or insipidity of necessities, as well as when one forms concepts. meditatcs, or organius a discourse. We have said before that this other thinking, which frees all thought as such, is not restricted to any definite form of thought-it is perhaps the form-Iessness of all thought-and is accordingly not restricted by that which goes by the name of "phi· losophy." Moreover. it should be said that we are done wirn "phi. losophy" because it has encloscd freedom in the empire of its necessity and thus stripped itself of this orner thinking. of the freedom in thinking. In this way, philosophy has constituted freedom as a probkm. whereas frecdom is, of course, anything but a "problem: In thought, that which addresses itself to thought and addresses thought to itself cannot constirute a "problem": it ili a "fact," or a ··gift," or a "task." Why then philosophy, or whatcvcr one chooses to call it?

60

Philosophy: Logic oj'Fl'udom

61

II ki,lq~gcr trial to substitute "thinking" for this word-for excelrC;I~(HlS lhat hen' guide even my own discourse-nevertheless, h,'(1." he remains a plJilosopIJtr who determines ,he necessity and sl.lkl." lIf [his suhstitlllion on the b35is of philosophy. and "philosophy" .\IW;l~'S makcs rderence. at least technically or praClkaUy. and. ti.)r c ·ample. institutionally, to the possibility of putting at stake ,hI." mllst unapproachable freedom uf thinking. and freedom as ,hill king.) Should there be a philosoph)' of frt'edom? It has already rakl'lI place: it has raken place in all of philosophy and liS all of philosorh)" One could say that "freedom" apreareti in philosophy-and rc:mail1al a pri50ner of it:ri closure-as philosophy's very !lira t~,IJL:ll back onto its own id~lity, even where philosophy wanted til g() IX')'Ond itself or rt'alize itself. This is why. whenever there has not heen the ahandonment of philosophy. there has been. in philosophy. the ahandonmenr of frCftlom-to the point that today the unti('rtaking (If a philo<;llphical diKOurse on freedom ha'i somethin~ (If rhe ridiculous or indecent abom it. Indeed. "philosophY"'alters liule if it has nOlhing to do with frrcdom. or rather "philosophy" mauers little ifit is not rhe inscriprion ofthejirctoffreeJOIll. instead ofhc.·ing the (in)comprehension ofi" Idea. Frcroom·~he" m.l (tC'fS to us. Not because she would be a good that we desire an,1 have the right to enjoy. but because we ha\'e always been defined and dcstinl-d in her. Alwavs: since the fc>undatinn of the Occident. whilh also ",,-,an5 sinc~ the foundation of philosophy. Our Occidental-philosophical foundation is also our fOundation in free~(lIl'--e\'Cn if (and perhaps pred~e1y because) the foundation of Ireetiulll anti freedom .u foundation ~Iip away from philosophical ~ra~p. Nnw philo50ph~' ha~ always meant-Of at lea~t always indi~atl'\l- -l1\nre ami somerhing mher than "philosophy." other than. as It \\:l'rC:" rhe I'llre discipline of concepts that is by itself the discipline of Ie 'II IIdatiol1 in general. (Even the privileged "thinking of hc.-ing" Jl'~i~nat{'~ fi/'sl the study of a cnnct'pt and th(' s)'Sfcmatic intcrro~alilln of it~ rdation In foundation). Indeed. there is an idea of ,nll.ll·lhing 01\ .1 pur(' ,tiscipline of concepts ollb' bc:cilUse there is--by ;J kllld IIf
61

Philosophy; Logic ofFrmlom

that the order of the concept itself pcnains, in origin and csscnce, to the dement of freedom. The com;ept it5df all ea5ily appear as a representational abstraction: bm the concept of the concept, if we can say this. annot be anything other than the freedom through which the access to representation occurs-and me access to the representation of foundation, as well 35 to the foundation of repm;cn. tation: that is, the mode of being according to exiJtmu, or even thinking as the free pos.~ibiliry of having a world, or as the availability to a world (even if this is. as it comes into philosophy, only a world of representation). The faclUaliry of freedom is also the fact of thinking. It is thus also prescnt in the fact-which opens philosophy, and hence also precedes it-m.ll we define "man" by thought: we do not define him 35 a pat[ of a universal order. or as a creature of God, or as the inheritor and transmitter of his own lineage, but as zOo" logon elthon. Thought is specified as logtls, and logos. before designating any arrangement of concepts and any foundalion of represeRlalion. ~cnlially designates-within this order of the "mncept of concept" and "foundation of foundation" to which its dialogic and dialectic are devoted-tht- jTreJom oflhe access 10 its OWII essence. Logos is not first the production, reception. or assignation J a -reason," but is before all the freedom in which is presented or by which is offered the "reason" of every "reason": for this freedom only depends on the logos. which irsdf depends not on any "order 01 reasons" but on an "order of matters" whose first maner is nothina other than freedom, or the liberation of thought fur a world. The r.gOl would never, for lack of this freedom. pose any question of the concept as concept, of the foundation as foundation, or of representation 35 representation (or any question of the Iog01 as /o~. Thus the Iogo/, before any "logic," but in the very inauguration of its own logic. freely accedes to its own cssencc-cven if this is in the mode of not properly acceding to any essence. This access, which also produces its source, never stops being pur at stake. as much when the logol attempts to master "freedom" in a "logic" as when it renounces assigning any "reason" to this frc:alom. BUI whether it masters (itsdO or renounces (itself), the logos is already seiud by freedom, which undoes on tk surfoce oflhe logol its ma5tcry or its a(,.

Philosophy: lAgir ofFrmJo", This amounts [0 saying that freedom offers or casu r!1l'ugl ll • in philosophy. always beyond "philosophy" ro"u;wd tiS rhe: (:om:ept or Foundation of the logos. That is why there is no philus(,phical co",:~usi(}n or do~.ur~ that do~ not unce again .require: .lIld provoke, If not exactly philosophy, then at least a phtloslIphilal freedom always more ancient and always more recent than every philo~{)phy. We arc therefore not saying that philosophy ;s thinking in its freedom; we are, however. saying that for the enrire Iradition of the Occident, to which the idea of fr~dom inevil'lhl,. belongs, since it founds this tradition (or since it is [unJ(omprehended as its foundation), it is only on 111, surfou of philo~()phy (if not in it as a doctrine, a body of thought, or a constrlluion of concepts) that the logk of freedom passes, for it answer~ 10 nothing other than the existing opening of thought. Tholl~ht and freedom are correlatively determined and destined in philosophy. Even if we have to free ourselves from this derermin.llillll, we cannot do so, by de6nition. in any simplc "outsidc" of philosophy (which does not mean that outside of philosophy there is neither thought nor freedom, but that there is in effect neither me one nor the other in the sense of their reciprocal determination in th(' If/go.<). There is thus no pure discipline of concepts in the sense that there would be a discipline of unverifiable ideas. of great ideas freely pmducl'd outside the constraints of objecrivity and practice, or of visiems elf the world whose free market would occupy the poverty Wne of our knowledge-this is how we [00 often undcr5tand philo"uphy anti philosophical freedom (the ic.ica of freedom itself being Olle: of the: very fitst products put into circulation in this philo~lphkal free-exchange. But "truth," "obicuivity:' and "knowlcdgc" 111 I',t l1\:rill. being (un)fllundloU in the logos. are (un)foundcd in freedlli ll. Philosophy is tbe thought that guides [he discipline of roncel't.'i ba\.k III Ihe cxpct'ic:nce of this fOundation, or rather, it is only the filrg'llil1~ or ubliteration of its 01L'1I constitution. I'hiioltlJl'hy is not a[ all a founding discipline (there precisely lan h~. flll 'urh thing), hut is the vcry folding. in discourse, of the frec\10111 11t.1I deflnesthc logos in its acces.~ to its own essence. Philosophy dll.1I11l1l .

Philosophy: Logic ofFrtteJom the: fact that thinking. in its eS5cncc. should be thc liberation of existence for a world, and that lht'.frudom ofthis li~ration cannot '" appropriaud tV dn "objt'ct of thought. .. btlt that this jrudom marlt, with an indJ'auablt' fold tIJt' t'xt'rciu of thi"king. This is the fold along which thought touches itself, tests itself, or accedes to its own essence following the experience of freedom. without which it would not be "thought" and even les~ logos as free access to its own CS5ence. Thus philosophy does not produce or construct any "freedom: it does nO[ guarantee any freedom, and it would not as such be able to defend any freedom (regardless of the mediating role it can play, like every other discipline, in actual struggles). But it ~'PS opm tiN dems to fbi' mmCt' oftiN 10g01 through its history and all its avatars. In this way it must henceforth keep the access open--frce.. dom-beyond the philosophical or metaphysical closure of freedom. Philo~ophy is inccssanrly beyond itself-it now has a thematic knowledge of this from the interrogarion of the very concept of philosophy-not because it is the Phoenix of knowledgc:s, but ha"ause "philosophi7jng" consists in keeping open the vertiginous atcess to the essence of the iJJgos, without which we would not have any idea of even the slightC"St "logic" (discursive. narrative. mathematical, metaphysical, etc.). But this maintcnance is not an operation of force or even one of preservation: it consists in testing in thought (which means: inscribing in language) this fold of freedom that articulates thought itself (which me-ans: inscribing in language the freedom chat arriculates it and that never appropriates it). Accordingly. when it is said that true philosophy is where -in such knowledge the whole of existence is seized by the root after which philosophy searches-in and by fimJq",." I or even that philosophy is "rigorous conceptual knowledge of heing. It is this. hoWever. only if this conceptual grasp (&g"iftll) is in itself the philosophical apprehension (J:.rgrrifm) of iJast'in in freedom," it is not said that the philosophical concept wOllld comprehend existence in irs freedom. but rather that it is freedom which grasps the concept itselfin its "conceiving." This is not a "conception of existence" and stillles.~. if that is possible, a '\;onception of freedom." but it is ex:0

Plli/osop"y: Logic ofFl'udom

65

.I.~tl'n\.1: in the c'"xerci!;t' of the freedom of the concept, it is existence •~ thinking, which is not a thinking Ilbollt anything lInles.o; il is a rhinkingjPrlhe freedom ofbc:ing-in-the-world. In short, it is the rm.\;uof the I~:.(or "practi~ reasc.~n"). which is nor.so ~u~h a "Ihe:orclil;ll pracnce as that which hrangs the logos to Its Iamn, on the vcrY limit of ("xi",'nce. which the logos "grasps" not by absorbing or sul~stlming. but instc:ad by assuming tlte foct that the freedom of existcnce is whal gives it-and strips il of-irs own essence of logos. I'hilo~oph)' is nor Ihe fTee sphere of thinking in general, nor is il rhl' theoretical relay between moral. political. or aesthetic pracliccs of fn·oool1l. ami it does not supplement Ihe material deprivations of freedom by way of an independence of spirit. In philosophy the logic of freedom merely rejoins incessantly the practical axiom rhat inaugurates it: thinking receives it.~elf from Ihe freedom of existence.

§ 7 Sharing Freedom: Equality, Fraternity, Justice

Freedom cannot be presented as the autonomy of a subjectivity in charge of itself and of irs decisions. evolving freely and in per-f«t independence from every obstacle. What would such an independence mcan. if not the impossibility in principle of entering into slightest relation-and thcrefore of exerdsing the slightest freedom? The linking or interlacing of relations doubdcss does noc precede freedom, but is contemporaneous and coextensive with it.. in the same way that being-in-common is contemporaneous wid! singular existence and coextensive with its own spatiality. The. gulllr being is in relation. or according to rclation. to the same exccat that its singularity can consist (and in a sense always consists) in exempting irself or in cutting it5df off from every relation. Singularil}' consists in the "just once, this time" [unl!' sl!'Uk foist ,~lIe-,i), whose merc enunciation-similar to the infant's cry at birth, and it is necessarily ~a,h tim~ a qucstion of birth---<stablishes a relation at the same time that it infinitely hollows out the lime and spa.:;c that arc supposed to be "common" around the point of enunciation. At this point. it is each time freedom that is singularly born. (And it is birth that ftm.) Ontology has only two formal possibilidcs (but these are equally material possibilities: it is always a question of the body ••. ,. Eimer Being is singular (there is only Being, it is unique and absorbs all the common substance of the beingness lllant;I/) ofbc:ings-but

me

66

SIJllrillg F,.mlo",

ti'llll1 ,Iur mornent it is clear that it is not singuhu: if there is i'llt o"~ till1 l ', there is never "once"); or. t~ is ItO being "/N'rt ftom singuI.nil)": cadl time just this oncc. and thcre would be nothing gener-

,11 or ((}mnHln exccpl the "each limc just this once" [chaqrlr fois tt'tu s{'tllt' foil). This is how we must undcrstand Heidegger's J(II1I·III~t,ktjt. DIINi,,'s "each time as my own," which docs not define the ~ubj~tivity of a substantial p~sc:nce of the t'go to ;tsr/f(and ",hkh is therefore nO[ comparable to the "empty form" of the K.U11ian "I" that accompanies representations}, hut which on the contrary defines "mineness" on the basis of the "each time." Each timl" there is the singularity of a "time." in this German jr- which so str.tIlgdy mimes the French jr, at t!Very srrike of existence. leap of fll'CJmll. or leap into freedom. at every birth-into-the-world. there is "minellcss," which does not imply the substantial permanence. iderHily, or autonomy of the "ego." but rather implies the withdrawal of all substance. in which is hollowed out the infinity of the: rd;uion 3,coroing to which "mineness" ;tImt;,,"/" mell'lS tiN nomdmtilJ' of "yourness" and "hislher/its-ness." The "each time" is an intt'rval structure and defines a spacing of space and rime. There is nothing ,"tw«" each timc: thcre being withdraws. Moreover. being is 1I0t a continuum-being of beings. This is why. in all rigor. it i; I/ot, and has no being except in the discreteness of singularities. The continuum would be the absence of relation. or rather it would he the relation dis....olved in the continuity of suhstance. The ~inglliarity. on the other hand, is immediately in rdation. that is. in the dis,rc:tencss of the "each time just this once": each timc. it cuts itself uff from everything. hur each ti",r [foilJ as a ti",r [fois] (the strike and CUt [co"p tt "OIt~J of existencc) opens itsdf as a relation 10 nther limes, to the extent that continuous relation is withdrawn from them. Thus Mitfri". heing-with. is rigorously contemporaneou~ with D.ur;" and inscribed in it. because rhe esscncc of Dtun" is til exi~t "each time just this oncc" as "minc." One could say: the Sill~lIl.lr of "minc" is by itsc:lf a plural. Each limr is. as such. 111IOt"~,. time, lit mret' other than the other occurrences of "mincness" (whidl l11ake~ the relation also a di~rete relation of"mc" to "me." . time and "my" spacc). and other than the occurrences of

68

Sbaring Frmiom

"minencssa" other than "mine." Singularity-for this reason distinct from individuality-takes place according to this double alterity of the "one time,'" which installs relation as the withdrawal of identity, and communication as the withdrawal of communion. Singularities have no common bdng. but they com-pear [com-paraisJt'n~ each time in common in the face of the withdrawal of thdr common being. spaced apart hy the infinity of this withdrawal-in this sense. without any relation. and therefore thrown into relation. 1 The existence of the existent only takes place singularly. in this sharing of singularity, and freedom is ead) time at stake. for freedom is what is at stake in the "each dme," There would be no "each time" if there were not birth each rime. unpredictably arising and as such unassignable. the surprise of the freedom of an existence. On the one hand, in effect. the originary setting into rela.tion is contemporancous and coextensive with fTecdom insofar as freedom is the discrete play of the interval. offering the space of play wherein the "each time" takes place: the possibility of an irreducible singularity occurring. one that is nor free in the sense of being endowed with a power of auronomy (it is immediately at once in the heteronomy of the rdatio~r rather. it happens on this side of autonomy and heteronomy). but that is already free in the sense that it occurs in the free space and spacing of time where only the singular one time is possible. Bur on the other hand. and consequendy. freedom pm;cdcs singularity. though it does not found or contain it (singularity is unfoundable. unholdablel. Freedom is that which spaces and singuI~r which singularizes itself- because: it is the freedom ofbeing in its withdrawal. Freedom ·precedes" in the sense that being cetks before every birth to existence: it withdraws. Freedom is the withdrawal of being. but the withdrawal of being is the nothingness of this being, which is the being of freedom. This is why freedom is nOI. but ;t frm ~ing and frm from b~i"g. all of which can be rewritten here as: freedom withdraws bring lind gi/IN ,-rldtion. This does not mean that my freedom is measured in relation to others in the sense of rwo courses of action or legitimacy whose circles must remain tangential in order not to encroach upon one an-

olher (.\.~ wc haY(' said, the ~pacing of singtllarities is infinite: and can-

int! ude tangcncr-which dues not prevent it from being at rh( ~;\I11l' time infinitely intimate). Insle-.ul. this means that free,hUll i~ relation. or at lea~t in the relation. or like the rdation: it is, or dtcct~. the singular step [pas] of my existence in the free space of cxi~tl'nle:. the step of my com-pe-.nance which is o",wm-pearance. Freedom iU"!!operJy the mode of the discrete and insistenr existtl'I~(C of mhers in my existence. as originary for my existence. z But at Ihe wne time, it i~ ;11~o the mode of the other existence inSisting] in Illy identity and constilU(ing (or dt:constituting) it as this idemity: I~lr relation is also. as I have said. relation to "me," and it is also in rdation to "me" that "(" am free, or that I "is" fitt. Furthermore. this OlI:".UlS. s}:mmetrically. that rdation is freedom: relalion happens only in [he withdrawal of what would unite or necessarily communicate me to others and [0 myself: in the withdrawal of the continuity of rhe being of existence, without which dlere would be no singul.lrity but unly LlCing's immanence lO itself. (In Ihis case, we could /lor even say that "there is" immanence, and there would not cven he anyone to say that we could not say it .... Being would immediately be its own thought, language, and frccdum. It would be its own other. a pure essence that would indeed be the essence o/existencc:. blll whiLh for [his very reason would exist in no other way.) Being-in-common means that being is nothing that we would have as common property. even though we Ilrt, or evcn though being is not common to us except in the mode of b~i.!.'g s.bl'rrd Not thar a COllllllon and general substance wuuld be distriburcd to lIS, but rarh~·r. being is 0,,1, shared brtu~m existents and ill existents (or hctwcen heings in general and in beings-wmparc note 2. abovehili it is always according to existence as such thai being is at stake a\ heing). C:ullsequ('nrly, on the one hand. there is no being beIWetll exi5tentSo-the spal'e uf existcnces is their spacing and is not a li,sul' or .1 support bdunging to everyone and no one amI which w~.uld liJl:ldore belung to itself--and on the other hand. the being 01 l';llh cxiMl'llce. that which it shares of being and hy which it is. is l10dlillg mher-which is not "a thing"-(han this very sharing. 1"1 111 , what di\·idc:s llS is ~hafl.J out to us: the withdrawal of being. Ill"

70

Sharing Frwdom

which is the withdrawal of the properness of self and the opening of existence as existence. This is why. if it is true in some sense that solirude is total. as our entire tradition keeps claiming. and if it is also true in some sense that freedom is the capricious. unapproachable independence of a singular being unbound to anything. it is also true, in an equally reducible fashion. that in solitude and even in solipsism-at least understood as a sola ipsil of singularity-ipseity is constituted by and as sharing. This means that t/w ;PS~;IJ ofsill. gularity hds as itt fflm~~ tIN withdmWdl oftIN aJfity oflHing. Also. the being of its "self' is what remains of "self' when nothing comes bade to itselP If existence transcends, if it is the bcing-outsidc-of-itself of the heing-shared. it is therefore wlJllt it is by being outside of itself: which amounts to saying that it has its essence in the mSlmc~ it is. c:ssentially in-essential. This fundamental srructure (or: this opening with no return. .) docs not answer to a dialectic ofimmcdiatizing mediation (which m:uperatC5 the: essence beyond its negation), nor to an "ec-stasy" sublimated in reappropriation. Outside: of itself. it is freedom. not property: neither the freedom of representation. nor of will. nor of the possessed object. Fmdom as tk .~lf' oftIN ,. ;ng-(Jutside-of;ts~1f diNs nOI "turn to or IHlong to its,/f Generally speaking. fr«dom can in no way take the form of a property. since it is only from freedom that there can be appropriation of anything-even of "oneself," if this has any meaning. Freedom is here precisely what must be substituted for every dialectic (and for every "ecstatic," understood in the sense suggested above). since it is not the struggle for recognition and self-mastery of a subjectivity. It is. from birth until dcath-the last birth of singularity-what throws the subject into the spaa of the sharing ofbeing. Freedom is the speci6c logic of th~ access to the self outside of imlfin a spacing. each time singular. ofbcing. It is in !ogoJ: "reason: "speech." and "sharing." Freedom is logos. not alogical, but open at the hean of logos itself. of shared being. Ontological sharing. or the singularity ofbcing, opens the space thar only freedom is abJe, \ not to "fill," but properly to space. "Spacing space" would mean

l

r

Sharing Fr~~dom

71

keeping it as space and as the sharing of being. in onln ;ndeftnit~­ /y (II '''I,r~ tIN shari"g of singularities . . This is also why, as this logos of sharing, freedom is immediately ) linked to equality, or. beucr still. it is immediately ~qua' to ~q"al;ty. flJtI.1Iil)· does nm consist in a commensurability of subjects in reI.Hillll to some unit of measure. It is rhe equality of singularirics in Iht' illl.mnmensurable offreedom (which docs not impede the ne,es~itr of having a technical measure of equality. and consequently al>o of jus rice. which actually makes possil>le. under given conditions. aCH"SS to the incommensurahle). For its pan. rhis incommen.~urability doe~ not mean that each individual possesses an unlimited right [0 exercise his will (moreovcr, if "each" designates the individual. how could such a right be constructed in relation to the singularities thill divide the individual himself and in accordance with which he exim? One would first need to Ie-Mn how to think the "cac;h" on the ha..~is of the series or networks of singular "each times"). Nor does thi~ ilH.:ommel15urability mean that freedom is measured only against itself. as if"it" could provide a measure. a standard of free-, dorn. Rather. it means that freedom m~asum its~/ftlgaimlllothi1lg: it "measures" itself against existence's transcending in nothing and "for nothing." Freedom: to measure oneself against the nothing. Me,lsuring oneself against the nothing docs nOl mean heroically aO"rtJIuing or ecstatically confronting an abyss which is conceived of as the /,Jm;tlld~ of the nothingness and which would seal itself around the sinking of the subject of heroism or of ecstasy. MCJ.suring oneself against the nothing is I1lfasllri1lg ollt'St'/fabsolutdy. or measuring oneself against the very "mea~llren of "measuring one~I.f": placing the "sclf" in the position of taking the mea.~llre of its \ CXlstCIKe. This is perhaps. and even cenainly, an excess [dimmlrrJ. In 110 way and on no register of analysis will one avoid the excess of frl'l·Jnm-for whkh heroism and ecstasy are in fact also figures anJ nJlIles. hut these must not obscure other examples, such as ~t'll'IIily, grace, forgiveness. or the surprises of hlllguage, and others

I\

" ill. !',\s('1Hiall}" this excess of freedom, as the vel)' measure of existence.

72

Sharing F~uJnm

is common. h is of the e;..o;ence of a measure-and therefore of an ctcess-to be common. The community shares freedom's exc.ess._ Because: this excess consists in nothing other than the faa or gesture of measuring itself against nothing, against the nothing. the cornmunity's sharing is itself the common excessive mc:ouure «Ji)mt'suPr] offrc:cdom. Thus. it has a common measure. but not in the sense of a given measure to which everything is referred: it is common in the sense that it is the ~cess of the sharin~f existence. It is the~ of equality and relati()!'\... It is also f~ternilY. if (raternity, it must be said. asTcfc: from every sentimental connotation (bur not aside trom the possibilities of passion it conceals. from hatred to glory by way of honor, love. competition for excellence. erc.). is not the ~ lalion of those who unify a common family, but the relation of those whose Pamu. or common subsrance, has distt,,~ dd~rins them to their freedom and equality. Such are. in Freud. the sons of the inhuman Father of the horde: becoming brothers in the sharing of his dism~mb~nJ body. Fraternity is equality in the sharing of the incommensurable. \VItat we have as our own, each one of "us" (but there is only a singular "us," there again. in the "each time, only this rime" [.a chtIIfIII foist UN s~ fois) of a singular voice. unique/mulriple. which can say "us"). is what we have in common: we share hein.!. It gives itself. such in the very possihility of saying c~s:" th~1 is. ~f pronouncing the plural of singularity, and the singularity of plurals, themselves mul,. tiple. 'Ibe "us" is anterior to the "I." not as a first suhject, but as the I sharing or partition that permits one 10 inscribe "I." It is because Descancs CU1 say ~ know, each and every one of us. thar wt'cxistas each on~ of us-chat he can pronounce tgo sum. (This does nor, however, imply that the "we, at this level. fum;tions simply as the "shifte:r" r~b~TI ofrhe enunciation over its enunciating subject. "We" makes a blocked shifter, distanced from itself, function. One cannot say who enunciates "we:." What would have to be said is this: "one" evidently knows one exists. 4 and it is thus that Wl'eDst, sharing the possibility that I say it at every moment.) If being is sharing. our sharing. thc:n "to be" (to exist) is to share. This is relation: nO( a t("ndenrial relation, need. or drive of por-

SI1ttring FrmltJm

73

!ions of being that are oriented toward their own re-union (this w"uld not he relation. bur a sdf-presence mediated by desire or ",j\Il. but existence delivered to the incommensurability ofbeing-in(oI11I1WII. What measurcs itself against the incommensurable is fn:edom . We could even say that to be in relation is to measure tlnc:~c1f with being as sharing, that is. with the birth or de-liveram.c uf existence as such (as what lhroll~h essence de-livers itself), and it is here that we have already recognized freedom. If it is indcc(t true that freedom bdongs in this way to the ·~5cnce" of hum.1Il beings. it dlles so to the extent that this essence "fhuman heings itselfhelongs to being-in-common. Now, being-incommon arises from sllaring. which is the sharing of being. On the archi-originary re~ister of sharing. which is also that of singularity's "at every moment." there arc no "human beings." This mcam that the relation is 1I0t one between human beings, as we might ~peak of a relation established between two subjects constituted as subject~ and as "securing," secondarily. this relation. In thi~ relation. "human beings" are not given-bur it is relation alone that (an give them "humanity." It is frccdom that gives relation by withdrawing being. It is then freedom that gives humanity, and nm Ihe: inverse. But the gift mat freedom gives is never. insoF.tr a41 it i~ the gift of fir~dom. a quality. property. or essence on the order of "'1I",III1/;",S." Even though freedom gives its gift under the form of;1 as it has done in modern times. in f.Kt it gives a trano;ccndmce: a gift which. :1~ gift. transcentl~ the giving. which docs not e~t;lbli~h itself as a giving. but which hefore all gives ;1S~1fas ~ift. Jlld a~ a gift of freedom which ~ives essentially and gives itself. In the withdr.lwal of being. This is why "man" is ,1150. as we know, a r.~lIrc th.\( is s1l5ct'rriblc to being effaced. F,.utltJ", givn-fi~t­ '/'1111. It only (l('rtains to the "cssence of mall" ill50far as it withJfi\\\S thi, 4.:~~cl\(,:e away from itselt: illlo (·)(istence. And in existCI1~l·. freedom gives itself as the possibililY for the existent of a d"ir,,( ur "ttllilll.dittlJ." ali much :I~ of a "",mulIl;tt's" or ",~j/(u." 1\111 ,lho\'c all. hd
""''''''''';1111,''

74

Sharing F"~om

we will discuss further). freedom shares OUt existence in accordan~ with relation. and is shared therein: it is freedom (and therefore. in this sense, nothing other than a "'ibmal') 0,,1y in the singular/com_ mon occurrence of singularities. Freedom is therefore singular/common before being in any way individual or collective. Existence in accordance with relation would then be the ontological determination of what Hannah Arendt tried to represent as the Olnteriority of public freedom to private or interior freedom. an antcriority which. fur her, allowed one to think the true origin and nature of the very idea of freedom. ~ Before it became an attribute of thought or a qualiry of the wiD, freedom was understood to be the free man's status. which enabled him to move: .. and meet orner people in dud and word.

It matters little that the historical accuracy of the representation of an ancient city with a spontaneous sense of free public spacz would have been degraded or lost in later history. We simply want to note that it is possible, perhaps even necessary, from the interior of our tradition, to represent the originary form of freedom as I free space of movements and meetings: freedom as the external composition of trajectories and outwanl aspects. before being an internal disposition. No doubt something like an individual auronomy seems to be implied in an identical way in both cases. However. the "automobility" of the first case docs not precisely designate the autolegislation of the second. The first "autonomy" depends on the opening of a space in which only the closing of the second can take place. Now. by definition. free space cannot be opened through any subjective freedom. Free space is opened. freed. by the very fact that it is consrirured or insritured as space by the trajectories and outward aspects of singularities that are thrown into existence. There is no space previOlWY provided for displacement (whkh is why the images of the agortt or forum could be misleading), but there is a sharing and partitioning of origin in which singularities space apart and space their being-in-common (points and vectors of the "at every moment," shocks and encounters. an entire link without link. an entire link of unlinking. a fabric without weave or weaver,

Sharing Frrrdom

75

elllllrar), 10 rtl;no's conception). Freedom docs not appear here as an illll:rnal rule of community. nor as an external condilion imposed on fh~' LlU11Inuni[)'. bUI it appears as precisely the internal exteriority of [he LlImmunir}': exisrence as the sharing of being. Pnwided the assets or rcanicularions of these notions outweigh thdr liabililies. we will call this space the public or polilical space, ;IS Jncs Hannah Arendl. though ours may nor be exacrly in aeeord.lIl(C wilh her perspecrive. Thai the political space is rhe origin,lry 'pace offrcedom docs not lhercfore mean that the political is dcsrined primarily to guarantee "fr~dom" or "freedoms" (in lhis reg.UlI it is nor space rhar must be spoken of, bur only me apparatus) bUI [har the political is the "spaciosity" (itsclf spatiotemporal) of freedom. It gives place and time to what we have called "measuring onesrlf wilh sharing." It gives space and rime ro rhe raking m~sure of Ihi~ "mea~uring oneself' in its various fonns. an archi-politics from whi~h it i~ possible to consider polilics as well as to distinguish politi,al orders from other orders of existence. The jllSt;ce necessarily in question here-becausc ir is a quesrion of sharing and of measure-is not that of a just mean, which presupposes a given measure, but concerns a just measure of the incommemurable. (:or this reason-regardless of the negotiadolls that ott lhe same time must he conducted with the expecrations and rea~onahle hopc§ for a just mean-jlls,;~t' can only reside in lhe rt'ncwed decision to challenge the validity of an established or prev:liling "just measure" i" tilt Illlmr oftilt i"commrnsllmbk. The polilical ~pa,e. or ,he politkal as s(Yclcing. is given from the outset in the form--always paradoxical and crucial for what is neither the politkal nor the community, but the management of society--of the 1. 0 11111\011 (absence of) measure of an incommensurable. Such is. \\it' l-lluid sa v, the 6m rhrust of freedom. It i~ in this sense that propositions such as this one from LaCOllCLlh,trrhC'_all diflcrences and disputn aside-should be taken:

I h(' nlntours of [he pditkal arc uau.d or rClraced emly on aile measure ..I till" withdrawal. in the poliliCll and from the politil;a1. uf iu eSKIKc." l)r from Lyotard:

Shan'ng medom Politics ... bears witness to the nothingness which opens lip wiili each occurring phase and on the occasion of which the differcnd be~n

genres of discourse is born.

Or from Badiou: The event , through its porenda! for inrcrnlprion. amounts to supposing that what is admissible ceases to have value. The inadmissible is the major referent of any politio; worthy of it~ name. 8

I Jowever, while these propositions-like: the: formula of a "just of the incommensurable." which I am freely taking t:bc right to impose on them as a kind of common factor-rightfuUy open. so it seems, dir~tly onto another proposition that could be reprcsenred. at least for the moment, by this one from Badiou-mea.~ure

Jkvoiurionary politics, if we want to keep this adjecti~, is essentially interminable.

-they still do nm indicate. or at least not explicitly enough. wI1tII is properly Kimcrminable" in a "revolutionary politics" (whose appellation would accordingly refer [0 the relation of the political to its own spacing, the opening and reopening of its own space as such). This is not the infinite readjustment of the aim of a correctness [iwtt'JIr] or justice which, posited as regulative Idea. is interminable. This aim would be that of a "bad infinity" in the Hegelian sense (and whatever the 3(;tual services it has rendered since itS Kantian im:cprion, it can equally accompany the resignations familiar to us today in the: thinking of the left, up to the point of resignation where one no longer knows what "left" and "right" mean). What is bad in this regulating infinity is that freedom in iu fact-the reality constituting the space of sharing. which we are designating here as the politic:al--and. consequently, along with this freedom. equality. not to mention fraternity. are guaranteed beforehand in the Idea and at the same rime delivered to the infinite distance of a representation (or of the representation of an impossibility of representation) in whose dement [he right to these Ideas is by definition contained. By interminably invalidating history's re:cords in the

Sb",.i"g n"t~tloll1

77

,I
illu~i(}l1mem

[lut

iffrcedol1l i!! on the order oHact. not tight. or ifit is on lIle

Ilnkr in which fact and right art' indistinguishable, tim is. if it is tnt-

h' ,-,i·;(cl1l.:<: as its own essence. it must be understood differently. It ,;II,o;t be understood Ihat what is intt'rminahle is not the end. but the be~inning. In mht'r wonk the political act offrcedol11 is fr«dom (cljllalirr. fraternity. justice) in action. and not the aim of a reguladw ideal of frc:cdom. That such an aim could or should belong to (hi~ or that pragmatic of political discourse (it remains less and less .ertain that this would he a pr;'gmati,ally desirahle and efficient mediation or ncgntiation with the ,iiscourses of Ideas) docs not impl'lle the political act-a~ wdl as the act that would decide to have a discourse of this ~rt-from being tllllw Oll"tt fn:edom's singular ari~ing or re-arising. or its unleashing. Perhaps the political should be mea.'Iuted against the fact that freedom dlles not wair for it (if ever rrcnfom waits, anywhere . ). It is initial and must be so in order to be freedom. Kant wrotc: I ~ral1t that I cannot really recom;ile mysdf (0 ,he fullowing cxprrssions m.lde U'it' ofhy de~r men: "A cerlain people (engaged in a muggl!! for li"il freedom) i~ not yet ripe for frttdom": "The bondmen of a landed

pruprietor are nm yel ready for freedom." and hrnce. likewise: in general is nOI yet riJX for freedom ofbdief," For according 10 slKh a pr~upposilion. freedom will nl'ver arise. siner we canIIlI! Il/'mlO Ihi~ frC'c:dom if we art' not fir.;1 of all placed rhe~in (we must I.\: fret' in order 10 be able 10 make purposive use of our powers in frel"<1om).'1 ··~f.lIlk.il\d

hc:cJnm cannot be awarded, granted. or conceded according to a. lkgr('(' nf malurit), or some prior aptitude that would receive it. hl"cdom can only be Ink"r. this is what the ml(}/utio"tlry tradition ~('prl·\eIltS. Yet raking freMom means that freedom f,,('('S it!iClf, that '~ ha~ .Ilrt·;1t1 r received it~df. from itself. No one begins 101M free, but Irl'l'dulll ;.f the beginning ami endlosly remains [he beginning.

Sharing F,utlom (The beginning;u the beginning of history is found only where there is freedom. that is, whe~ a human group comports iuelf resolutely toward beings and thdr truth.)lfI

lfit is not possible here to attempt to go fu"her in this determi_ nation of the political, we will at least posit that the political docs IlOf primarily con!Oist in the compo5ition and dynamic of powers (with which it ha5 been identified in the modern age to the poilll of slipping to a pure mechanics of forces that would be alien even to power as such, or to the point of a ·political technology," atc'ording to Foucauh's expression).11 but in the opening of a space. This \ space is opened by freedom-inirial. inaugural. arising-and fn:e.. dom there presents itself in action. Freedom docs not come to pr0duce anything. but only comes to produce itself there (it is DOt poinis. bur praxis). in the sense that an actor. in order to be the actor he is, produces himself on stage. U Freedom (equality, fraternhy, justice) thus produces it5e1f as existence in accordance with relation. The opening of this 5Cene (and the di5-tension of this .dation) supposes a breaking open. a strike. a decision: it is also as the political that fTecdom is the leap. It supposes the strike. the cur, the decision, and the leap onto the scene (but the leap itself is what opens the scene) of thal which cannot be received from elsewhere or reproduced from any model. since it is always beginning. "each rime.· Or more exactly. if this is the reproduction of a model-which is at any rate not a model of producrion-it is simply the model of the beginning or of initiality. The beginning is not the origin. C..orrecting the general use of this term that we have made up until now, we will say that the origin is the origin of a production. or al any rate. in the PlalOnic scme of poi~sis. it is the principle of a coming into being. Power has an origin. freedom is a beginning. Freedom does not cause coming-to-being, it is an ;nitiality ofbtiRf freedom is what is initially. Dr (singularly) se!finitiating being. Freedom is the existence of the existent as such. which means that it is the initialiry of irs "serring inro position."" It "postures" existence. according to sharing, in the space of rdarion. Freedom: event ( and advent of existence a5 the being-in-common of singularity. It is , the simultaneous breaking into the interior of the individual and of

Slldring Frwdom

l

79

Ih~ (ommunity. which opens the specific space-rime of initialiry. \'fh;lt is lacking today, and lacking up until now in the philosoph~' of democracy, is the thought of this initiality, before or be"(Jnt! the safeguarding of freedoms considned to be established ir~d()rns (frum nature or by righr). h is possible that fi)r this reason it 111.1)' no longer even ~ possihle, in the furore. to think in terms of ·\kl1lo~ra,y." and it is possible that this also signi6es a general displ.lll'mCI1l of "the political." a word we have provisionally mobilized here:: perhaps a liberation of the political ic;elf. All thing.o; con'iidered, wh;1t i~ lacking is a thinking of the freedom that is not estahlished. hili that lakes iffe/fin the act of its beginning and its recommencem('nt. "I his remaino; fi,r us to consider, perhaps heyund our entire political Iradition-and yet in some ways the direction of this imperative has already been thought by at least one part of the re\'ohllionary tradition. In at least one of its aspects, revolutionary thinking hao; always acceded-and not without risks that cannot ~ m'crlnokcd-not so much to the overturning of power relations as 10 the arising of a freedom untainted by any power. though all pmwrs cOllceal it, What lIlust also be understood along these lines is thl' radical demand in Marx for a freedom that would not gl.laranrl'C political, religious, and other freedoms. but an i"tfllgumllib",,,ioll with respeu to these freedoms. insofar as they would nothing other than the f~oms of <:hoi<:e at the interior of a dosed an~1 precomrrained space. It is nor a question of substituting for the framework of these cmhlishel1 rights the coercion of a "liberation" whose principle and t'IIU would themselves be eSlablished (whkh is not necessarily the laSl' in Marx). We know what this means: the malerial deStrllnion of all freedom. Rather. it is a question of permitting the reopening of the framework and the liberation from every atablishIllCIlI, lIr irs overflowing. by freedom in its ~tfC" rim~ irredUdblc( fn:)i.l·ginning: Ihi~ is the task of politics as the liberation offree
be(

80 itself still remains to bc thought. let us citc Saint-Just: "Although France has established judges and armies. it must see to it that the public is just and courageous. "1~ This meant that France was to free itself for its own being-free and not merely to prcscrve its institmed freedoms. But "seeing to it" should not he an operation. nor should the "public" be a work, its "justice" and "couragc" a production. A politia-if it slill is one-of initial freedom would be: a politics putting freedom at thc surface of beginning. of allowing to arise. in the sense of allowing to be realizcd-since it is realized in arising and in its breaking open-what cannot be finis,"eI. Like sharing. freedom cannor be finished.

§ 8 Experience of Freedom: And Once Again of the Community, Which It Resists

In its highest form of explication nothingness would be: jiwJo",. But this highest form is negativity insofar a~ it inwardly deepens itself to its highc:~t intensity; and in this way it is itself afflrmarion-iruked absolute aJlirmation. '

Thus, in Hegel himself, at least at the literal level of this text. freedom is not primilivel)' Ihe dialectical reversal of negativity and its sublation into the positivity of a being. It is, rather. in a kind of predialcrtical hurst, the deepening and intensih..:ation of negativity up to the point of affirmation. Freedom = [he self-deepening nothin~ncss.

In thi~ way. there may be a beginning. arising. and breaking open of an opening. Not only i~ there nothing btfo1"r. hut there is nothin~ III tht tIIOl11mt of freedom. There is nothing on which it depends, nothing Ihal conditions it or renders it possihlc-or neces~ry. neither is there "frmlom itself." Freedom is even frc:c:from frct:{iorn: thu.~ it is free for freedom (through its wlU.litional---comp,lrr note I-Hegel's text in some sense presents the freedom that ll)flln before freedom. or the very hirth of frcroom). With freeJOIn, the dialectical linkages are interrupted or have not yet taken pl,lq:~'en if their possibility has already been oflered in its emiret)'. NlI I,kntity preserves itself in negadon in order [0 reappear affirmed (IIndl'r~t;lI1dahly. since [h(' n()[hingnes~ is here none other than the lIothilJgn~ ofheing as such in its initial abmaction). This is so be-

nut

81

Ex/Nrimc~ ofFreuJom

cause freedom is not itself negated during the course of its own trial (as would be the case on the funher register of a dialectic of slavery): freedom is itself nothingness. which docs not "'Kat~ ilJ~1f properly speaking, but which. in a pre- or paradialectical figure of the negation of negation, affirms itself by making iL'ielf int~nJ~. The inrensification of the nothingness docs not negate its notbing-,mi' ["Iantitl]: it concentrates it, accumulates the tension of the nothingness as nothingness (hollowing out the abyss, we could say. if we were to keep the image of the abyss). and carries it to the point of incandescence where it rakes on the burst of an affirmation. With the burst-lightning and bursting. the burst of Iightning-it is the strike of one lim~, the existing irnJption of existence. In this black fulguration. freedom ;s not and does not Imow ;Is~lfto be fr« ftom anything; nor is it or docs it know itself to be free for anything determined. It is only free from all freedom (determined in this or that relation. for example. the relation with a necessiry), and it is only free for t:Vt:ry freedom. In this way, freedom is neither in independence nor in necessity. neither spontaneous nor commanded. It does not apprehend itself [silpprend], but takes itself [. prmdJ. and this means that it always surprises itself [Sl!' surpmrJJ. Freedom = the nothingness surprised by its fulguration. Despite its having been foreseen. the free act surprises itself. beyond foreseeability. Foreseeability could only concern its ronrents. not ita modality. This is also why the will foresees-in fact it does only rhis-but it docs not fon:sce itself (it is by confusing the two that we make the will into its own subject). Freedom defies intention. as wei as representation. It does not answer to any concept of itself IlI1 more than it presents itself in an intuition (and it doubtless thmfore bdongs neither under the term "freedom" nor in any image or semiment that could be associated with freedom). because it is the beginning of itself at the same time that it is itself the heginningwhich is to say. the maximum intensity of the nothingness and no origin. "No "otion ()!btgi"nings." writes a poct. l Heidegger imerpreted freedom's nothingness (even ifhe was not formally interpreting Hegel's text) in the following way:

E-.:p"itnct ofFruJom ,.-,.(t'dolll is lIN fimWI;tm offomuWI;(m . ... The breaking-fonh of Ihe in founding transa:ndence is lhe primoroial movement which freell(~m makes with U5.' .11l\'~~

The Iranscendcnce [hat makes freedom is the transcendence of finimde. since the essence of finilUde is to not contain in itself its own essence. and consequently to he, "in its essence" or in its inessence, the existing of existence. It is a fill itt flrtdom which is the "foundation of foundation." This absolutely does not mean that thi~ freedom would be a limited freedom having no space of play except between certain borders or fronticf5 (which is how freedom is almost always understood in every elilial. political. and even aesthetic conception of freedom). Finitt freedom. on the contrary, designates freedom itrt/f, or the ((blo/llu freedom of bcing whose essence essentially withdraws; from existence. Thus, freedom here COIlle'S to characterize tht finmdatirm u,J,irh by ;Ut/[dOts not Jmm ;tst/f,u jotmdation (call~. !'rason, principle. origin. or authority), bur which refers through its essence (or through its withdrawal of cs.~ncc) to a foundation of itself. This lauer foundation w()uld be the securing of every foundation-but it cannot be precisely this on Ihe modd of any other foundation. since no other foundation fimd.llllt'l1tdlly secures itself as such. The foundation of foundation cono;equently founds in a mode which is also that of a nonsecuring. hilt whidl this lime refers dearly to the withdrawal of its own e5.~II\.:C anu to what we could call the definitive in-dcpendence of its own independence. The foundation of foundation therefore founds. in Hci
Exp~rimc~ ofFrudam

tensificauon: roo much jigurt'. in spite of everything (the COntours of the abyss). and too little inumity. But the truth of the abyss and of intensification, as the truth of the Ilo-tbillgllm. can be named as txp"imu. (This does not mean thar we would be naming it properly. We will play the game of impropriety with every other term. But we will attempt to experiment here with precisely tills impropriety as the very foundation of freedom. and to experiment with what it teSlS in thought and language: the finimde of their infinite freedom. the infinitude of their finite freedom.) The foundation of foundation that is freedom is rhe very experience of founding. and the experience of founding is nothing other than rhe essence of experience in general. The act of founding is indeed the act par excellence of aptriTi, of the attempt [0 reach the limit. to keep to the limit. Is nO( the model of all foundation the founding of the ancient city-the marking of the outline of the city limits? (By the same token. this is also the model of polirlgl foundation. even if. as we have seen. the outline of me model of p0litical foundation should be understood as a nerwork of paths and direcrions rather than as a circumference already in place.) It is not a foundation in the architectonic sense of the excavation ~d preparation of a ground that will support a building. In order [0 construCt an architectonic foundation. one must first have founded in the sense of having topographically surveyed (or having founded W survey itself. ), which means having delimited the space of the foundation. This delimitation. in itself. is not anything; it is the nothingness of productive conslruction. In this sense. it maIm nomina (and is not poiesis). and th~" is nothing. nothing given or preesrablished (not even the idea of a plan of the city or building). There is nothing but the indeterminable chora (not an undetermined place. but the possibility of places. or rather pure matter-for-places) whnt the foundation takes place. This foundation is more or less [he Ilolhi"g itself, this ungraspablc ,hora. carried to the incandCKCnt intensity of a decision. Here. now. where there is nothing. here and now which are anywhere and anytime. existence is decided for-for example. the existence of a city. This is not the production of the city. but that without which there would be neither plan nor operation

III

pnxlll(c it, The dt.'Cision oUllines a limit by bringing itself to

Ihe lil11il that owe~ irs exisrence only to this founding gesture,

It ir is therefore, despire everything. a poirsi!. this time in the ~t'n~c of whit( "brings into being." it is a poirJi! that brings neither to

;hc bcing of essence (the plan. one could say), nor to the being of 511h~rance (stone', morrar), bur only to the being of existence, One

mll sr r"'llk here of a poirJis which is in irsclf a pmx;j, Whar is founded exi'irs insofar as it has emerged. by a free decision, from the inir~dl: from the abstract night and depth of immanenu:. but it has not cmer~l'J therefrom in rhe sense of something having been extract~J: iI has nO[ yet emerged except in the sense of a frcc: decision, which at the same time makes the inaugural incision into the surface of Ihe: in-itself-and the in-itself withdraws. This is experience itself, beClllse it ncither gathers nor produces anything: it decides a limit, an,1 rhus at the same time--at one timt'--it decides its l1w and its transgres~i()n, having in sum already transgressed the law before setting it. making it exist without essence, transcendent without a tramt.cllded immanence, (\X:'e ha"l' related. through com:epts and languages. "experience" til "piracy." RU[ foundation always has something of piracy in it. it pir'1r<'~ the im-propriety and formlessness of a .!lord-and piracy always has sumething of foundation. unrightfully disposing rights
86

Experience ofFrmiom

existence, at the same time that it is the foundation of its existen~ What makes experience: here is the carrying (0 this extremity where there is nothing except through the decision of foundarion, and lIS this decision. It is decision that produces, one could say, the founder (freedom) as much as the thing founded (existence). But the founding gesture. the experience of the limit. does not belong to a founding subject, nor does it support a toundcd object. And the founding gestll re cllrrin itself-Ill once anterior and posterior to the tracing of the limit it tracc:s-ro the contour. path, and outward aspect of a singularity whose freedom and existence it makes arise simultaneously, the freedom of existence and the existence of freedom: the . . . r;enu of having nothing given. nothing founded. the experienc:c of owning no capital of experience, the inaugural experience of experience itself. The "foundation of foundation" supporu itself alone. having nothing to support it. not even "itself," since "itself" comes to light, or to the world. in a founding gesrure, sustaining itlielf only on iu existence. which is swtained only by its own freedom. And this freedom is only swtained by the free decision of being-free, whic;b is in turn only sustained by an infinite withdrawal of being and a non-being intensification of the nothingness, pushed all way to an affirmation of existence as existence, that is. as its own csscncc-<>[ in-essence. Here (and now). existence tries itself ("... penn) before and beyond itself. it traces and crosses the limit oria being-thrown-into-the-world, it tCSts its every chance of existCJKC: it founds itself and pirates itself at the same time, which amounlS, furthermore. (0 saying that exislmce makes itself its own chanct If} Ulhirh, at tht samt timt, it ,,,ts itstlf ht glum owr. This is why the "foundation offoundation" is experience itself. experience does noC experien<::e anything. but it experiences the nOI"ingas the real that it tests and as the stroke of luck it offers. There is no freedom and there cannot be the slightest act of freedom without this cxperien<::e. despite whatever calculations we could or would want to make of the possibilities of choice. of the powers of [he wiu, and of the physical and social laws that constrain or emancipate. The experience of freedom is therefOre the experience that freedom

me

·xperi("nce. It is the experience of rxpcrience. Rut the experience of t·xpcric.·nce is nothing other than experience itself: trying the self at the ~drs border, the immcOiate testing of the limit whkh consists t'4\1'1I1y in the te-aring apan of immediacy by the limit, the pa~o;age of the limit. which passes nothing and which does not surpass itself. hili w!Ji, h II,,/'PfflS (st' Jld.trci. in the sense that";1 /;llp~'U" Ifa an-iwj anJ in the: sense that "mall ;,rfillile/ymrptusn ",an." Experience is the c:xrl'ri~n~c of experience's difference in iLo;elf. Or rather: t'."qNrimct;s ~'I"'rii'll('ri diDnr"ct, it is the ptril of the crossed limit that is nothing other than the limit of essence (;and therefore existence). the I singular outline of shared being. Experience is thus also its own Jill"cr,mce: experience does not helong to itself, nor docs it constilUte." an appropriation of"cxpcrienccs" (in the: sense of knowledge obtained through experimentation). but it is returned to what it is not-nnd this widening of the gap of difference is its very movement" Thill gap into which being withdraws is a gap or withdrawal of a self-presence. a gap or withdrawal of a self-knowledge. hl'\.'dom is not "inconceivable": f~om is nor com:ei~. and this is why it is freedom. Irs self-evidence beyond all evidence. its factuality more undeniahle than that of any fact. depends on this nonknuwledge of self. more buried and exposed than any consdousncss or unconscious. For l)cscancs. all lhal can be said of freedom is "tlw each individual should encounter it and experiment with it for him~df.""· Like the tgo mm anti the IlIttlm '1"id of the union of the s01l1 .md bod)"-antlno doubt in direct conncction. which should he: dmlOmmated. with these two instances-freedom proves irselfby ,~ it~elt: This docs not refer to any intrmpcction. nor to any int1l113h: sentiment. klr frc:cdom is anterior to every empirical certitude. without being. properly speaking. on the order of the transcenlIl"llIa!. Or rather-and this is what consrirutcs the difficulrv. bur also rhl' II r~ncr and the liberating force of this Ibougbt for philosophil,1I discoursc:-fn:cdum is II trtlllSc"mdml,rI r....pai~"u or tile Imll"",(,.,,'111 /J/t'Xp~ri~1/{~. the transcendentallhal is expericm:c. What "Il."xpl·rirnenr with tin my~lr' is in no way a pow("r I could withhold. or a capacity I could get in touch with in myself. Instead. I e)lPl"lIl11ctU Illtlll a", in the cxpcriclII.:e of mYlodf-lhis intensity of

88

Expmmu of furdom

(un)founded no-thingness-I experiment that the withdrawal of C5sence is an affirmation of my existence and that it is only on the "foundation" of this affirmation that I can know myself ro be the subject of my I'Cpresentation.~, and give flesh to my singular being in the world. All there is to think of freedom is this affirmation of its experience. But affirmation in general cannot be thought of simply as the neption of negation. Affirmation can only be thought through the intensity of affirmation. A thought affirmative of this affirmation. a thought that would be neither the product of a dialectic nor the arbitrary prophecy of a suhjectivity is what a logic of the experience of freedom must propose. In a sense, Hegel's "science of the experience of consciousness" proposes nothing else: it guides the concept of experience to the necessity for experience to be its own subject. At every instant of this trial, the constitution-iota-subject, given over to its own experience, is carried (0 its limit. But the Heideggerian DIlS~in's "dtcownncss" also says nothing else: it guides this neccssity for experience EO be its own subject to the necessity for the subject to be, in its {un)foundation, abandoned to experience. which means abandoned (0 the freedom (0 exist. This freedom [0 exist is not a choice that could be made by a suhject, but is that existence decides itself as existence, that is, as being which is shared outside of itself and which has in this sharing not its "n~"'t(' nsmu (dialccticallogic), but",. ciseiy ;IS n:istrncf IlS ilS OWII (;n)eSSellt"f. Heidegger did nor keep the word "experience" here. Yet he did judge that Hegd had "retreated" from what was fundamentally implied by [he usc of [his word in the (ide of the Phmommo/orf Indeed, Hcidegger had already indicated rhe nature of (his implication or "resonance": more profoundly than "the appearing in its own present being to itsclf,"~ which for him tran51ates "experience: of wnsciou.me;s," experience should open onto the exact reverse (not the opposire-and hence more "profound." without depth, the foundation of foundation ) of this self-presentation. which means onto the other side of this same: limit on which the "sclf' is lucated: "Undergoing an experience in the sense ofletting the mac-

rer im:lf demonstrate: its~1J and so be verified as it is in lruth."C, fxp"ricm:e: letting the thing ~ anti the thing's letting-bc. and the thin~-in-itself, as we have said, is cxistcnce (the existence of Das~;n ;and the cxistencc ofheings in gencral in their common reciprocal IIp'·lllle!.~). The experienc.:e we have is existence-rather than the c:xpcril'IKc ofexistence. Experience of the thing itst/fand experiell\,e as rhc thing ir!iL'lf. samene!lS of the thing and thingness of the \;unc:. I.cuing the thing of existence give itself over into truth. to its rruth-\\ hich is abo\'c all the freedom with whic:h. each tim~. it ,·,ins. We have this experience which makes lfiti~ the fot'toffreedom, ret we do not "have" or "make" it (in the sense of poiesis). NcidlC:r would we say that it "makes liS." 1..('t LIS say. rather: experience's sdf·withOlu-subjectivity-which experience singularizesis attained in full force by its freedom. This is not empiricism's experience. though ir i~ lIot an experience that a subject could teach. h is not the experience of classical emI,iridlilll. nor even that of an "empiricism without positivity" as Livinao;s is reputed to ~.7 It is not these because it is tile experience of e"peril-nce. in the sense that has been mentioned. and because it i.; thl'l,·tl)f( always the experience of thinking. BlIt if, by this very fact, it i~ aI,,, a question of a thought of experience. it is ncvc:rthcless in no WOI)' a (ll1e~ti()n of an "experience in thought." which would de~ignatc nothing but an imaginary cxperience. h is a question of th()lI~ht as expericnce: this is as much empirical as transcendental. Morcover, [he transcendental is here the empirical. It is this empirkity of thought itself that is attached to "conditions of produc- \ tiOIl. for example. history, soc.:iety, institutions, hut also language. the hod}" and always chance, risk. the "stri~" of a "thought." /" tix ""'('tligtlliOl' Ibnt brblfJ to Ngbt its Oll'n condition ofpossibility asfortdIJIII. t"hlking mmlot "Ibi"k"(whc:ther in the sense of the constructinll of thc COIKept. or in the sense of self-reflexi\'ity) u,;thott, lit the' .',iIIlt' 11II1t' mdurial(Vlolichillg on tbis I~ry c(",dir;oll ofpossibility. II :~ nJ.lIcrialiry i~ 11 .. 1 that of a simple physical extcriority (it is 11 .. [ ;t pincal gland . ). and yet it is no less the body or flesh of ~h~I~I~IIf-tl1.,ught not "incarnated" b)' some afterdTccr. but more 111I1I.dly delivcred to itself in the fold and refoMing of what ()csartC'i n

I

Expmence ofFree/10m had fO resort to calling a "substantial union.'" If freedom gives thought to thought-even more than it simply gives it something to think about-this happens in the materially transcendental ex. perience of a mouth at whose opening-neither substance nor fig. ure, a nonplacc at the limit of which thought passes into thought_ thought tempts chance and takes the risk (expt'riri) of thinkins. with the inaugural intensity of a cry.

.---

One will perhaps argue that this logic does not strive to escape from self-presence except in order continually to rerum to it and c0nfirm it. Ultimately, in spite of everything, freedom has experience. "itself," and one could even go so far as to affirm that it has expe.rience of the purest ipseity: the "foundation of foundation" is nothing other than the foundation that is rigorously no longer founded on anything bur itself. With good reason, one will recaU that ia the certitude of the cogito. in Descarres's own terms. necessil)' and frc:cdom are each as powerful as the other. or rather are converted into one another. One might then be tempted to conclude freedom does nothing but RCOgIlize its own proper l1CCC5Sity, and ~ cessil)' is then recognized as the freedom of what is absolutely proper and self-present. Nothing of the above is incorrect, and all of it can be summarized by the following pronouncement: freedom frce5 itself. Philosophy" certainly never said anything else. Bur this still does not mean that freedom. in freeing itself. appears to itsell[lappamltre]. That whidt. in making itself. does not appear to itself (that which. consequelHIy, does not "make" itself according to the mode of producing its lidos). docs not have the property of subjectivity. Nevertheless. it should not be understood that "self-appearing" would be a patticular arrribure which. in the subject. would come to be added to "making oneself," whereas it would be absent in the case of fn:cdom. The two things are indissociable. and it follows that ftwdom /UtII4/ly has t~ exact structure oft~ SUbj~"I: in a sense. it appears to irsdfbf making itself, and it makes itself by appearing to itself. present-tOitselfin the absolute unity of its autooriginarity. But what appears (0 it (icself ... ) is that it does not make irsclf, and what it makes (it-

m.

Experimce ofF,.mJom

91

) is its nor appearing to itself. In other words. frredo11l grasps t/...·frill ,t mode of"kas;ng. It is not a pirouelte-and not a dialectic. frc:cdmn gra.~PlI itself released; it is a releasing of the grasp a[ [he Ilea" II till' very gesture of grasping. It is the no-thingncss of the mastering of its own mastering. I:or lhere would be no frcc thing or person if Wh.ll wa~ free commanded itself frum a position of certitude and rrC'~cm;e that would not he put at 'lake by free acrion. Thus freedom is not the negative of the subject. It is, on the contr;uy. the affirmalion of self-presence plUhed to the very e11dor rather j"itiaUy cllIT;ed to ,he ;mmsiry of ;Jlcandncmc~[O this exrremity at which. simultaneously, the self disappears into a pure prest'nee widlout any relation-to-self (but. at the same time. with an infinite relation (0 others) and presence vanishes into a sdf purdy \ given over to itself (to the sharing of singularity). None of these MpurC" l'MCnCeS is presentable as such. because none subsists as such in any region where thc unpresentablc in being would be concealed. Rur their absolute mixture. as well as their infinitc distension. produce the "strike," syncope. and pulsing in which freedom i.~ decided. and was always decided, before any free subject appears to itsell: which means. finally. before any "freedom" presents itself as such. fjY'~do", I'mtkr! t/~ selfto the ~IfoUlJide ofall prmnu. hcctiom operates here as the anci~nt condition of free human being~. at least in the way that we think we understand this condition or in Ihe: war that philusophy nceded to represent it to itself (and with il. all the originari(y of the political), Being free "by birth" signifit'~ being free since before birth, before there was Ihe being of being free. This mc:;l.llS that the possible place, in a particular lineage Or parlimlar city. for a new future individual is the place for a free hUlllan hcing-a free ~)Iace for a free human being-who receives the mndition of freedom when he comes to he concci,'cd, just as infallihly as a slave's sun recci,·c:s his wlldition. (In the same wa)', morl:clVcr. the contingem.:y of a war or of a de{';ision for emancipatio ll tall suddenly deliver each individual to his inverse cundition, ~I:J rhi, possihility is also p3rt of the scheme.} There i.~ no other (ask 01 thought. on dIe subje{,;t of fn:edom, than that which consists in tr.lI1\furming its sense of a property held by a subject into the sense 5C 1f

I

91

r

of a condition or space in which alone something like a "subject" CUt eventually come to be born. and thw to be born (or to die) tD frtedom (was this not already in some sense the effort of Spinola's thought on fTccdom?). What makes [hi~ [ask so difficult and perhaps even impossible to accomplish as a task of philosophical discoune is that the ontological condition required here is not a statwJ, as was that of the free human heings of Antiquity (who were in this sense from the stan the owners of their freedom). but consists in a releasing of being. We tt" born~ not in the sense that a law of natUR: or of the city guarantees fOr us in advance the enjoymenr of . . dom. but in the sense that every birth is a releasing of being. abaadoned to a singularity or t~ a trajectory of singularities. Now. being does not have frmlom as a property it could distribute. by releasing from itself. to every existent-nor is being the necessity whose discovery across the movement of existence would produce itself'lI freedom. Rather. freedom is the foundation that is discovered in? faa that being is essentially abandoncd-or that it ailts. Freedom i~ the withdrawal of being. whose existence founds itscl£ This "foundation" is nothing other than an exposure. Freedom C'Xposes existen<:e. or rather. freedom is the fttct that existence is exposed. Ek-si~ence. rooted in trurh as freedom. is exposure to the disclosedncs of beings as such."

Exposure: procecd5 from "truth as freedom" becawe truth. before being the adequation of a verifiable utterance. resides in the very p0ssibility of such an adequation (or in the: foundation of this f0undation), This adequation supposes that there is a coming. a cominsinro-presence-of. ., Coming-into-presence is nO[ simple and pure presence: it is not the given, but the gift of the given. The gift, the coming-into-presence, or, one could say, the presentation. tears presence itself from the depth of the presence immersed in ilSdf (immersed to the point ofhcing able to be con\'ertcd only into abscnce, as is regularly done by the supreme presence of every negati-lc ontology. [hcoiogy, or e1eu[herology). At this poillt, whert diAltdiaJ thought sm ;'UO opmltion the POW" ofthe ntgatiw in order to rn;ttIl the pr('U"~t lit the "tttrt ofits tth!tIl« (which presupposes subjectiv-

Exptrirnct ofFrttdOIll

93

iI'" in~(lfar a'i subjectivity is itlidf what hollows out negation oIl11dwhat '~Ill~'rs on it. mIl an intensity of the 1l00hingncss. but a f'Otential for C:(lIl\c.:r~inn:

the suhje\.'1

hilS

always already slIpponrd the ah!IiCnce of

prl'~cnCl". it has alwa)'s already founded its freedom in this necessi-

at this point tIlt' ,IJill!r;,'g of ,bt ",il"tI"""oII/ of btillg rtquirts ti'i"~';II.f!, ,hllll"t" ;1 not lin opt,II,ioll, bll'" /ibtmt;on.

1\'

Thi~ means that before every process of a spirit appearing to itself as the becoming of being in irs phenomenon and in the (self-) knowledge of the phenomenon, being as being makes itself available liJr e\'ery subsequent proces.'i, of this kind or of another, and being is til is "01 ;lk ing itself availahle." But "making itself available" dots 1101 ,1PPI'I'" to i'~1f. it docs not represent. objectify. engender. or present itself It) itself. lO (And if we can somdlOw think and say Ihis, it is not ix-c311S(, we make usc of rhe concepr of such an "a-presentation"; on the C(llmar~'. it is because thinking and saying are themselves given ami madc available by this setting into availability: they are and ha\'c experience of it.) Similarly. "making itself available" does not imply an)' conversion of cs.~nce that would mooiate itself. That which n1akcs itself a\'"ilable remains unchanged in what it is, But what it is. it frees for. . I;or example. for a subjectivity-not. hO\\'('Vcr. in the sense that a liberation would be onlered tc)r this subjc~ti\'i[)' as it would he for irs foundation (in consciousness. intentionaliry, will. in the freedom conceivC'd of as thC' freedom of aim or lI~e ofhdng). but in the sense that the ad\'C'1Il of su\;h a subj«tivity remains itself free. existing. and able to take place or not to take place (;md. as WC' will say later. exposed to good as well as to evil), Iking frees it~cM for existence and in existence in such a way that Iht' (')(i~tel1cc ollhe existent tim'S not cnlllprehend i~lfin its origin alld finally never comprehends itu/f, but is I1t tl1f o"tSfl grlUptd 11M P"""~I'~rd hy this fredng which "founc.is" it {or "pirates" it}, Mlllt'O\'l'r, elli~tcn\;e is to being not as a predicate i~ ttl a subj«t Il\.uII wa~ till,' first to know this) hUlas the improbable is to neces. gi \"l'n rh:u there is hd ng. whal is the chance of ils withdrawal Ircl'illf: an ('Xi~tencc? The existence of being is improbable for the I:'Jo;i\tl:'lII_.1I1d is what fret'S thought in it: .. W1JY ;1 ,"r,r JOmrllJillg I;ul,,., tll'lII lIol"i"f.?~ In [his way there is a wming-imo-pre5Cnce: in

94

Exp'rjmc-~ ofFrreriom

the t'Omingto presc:nce of that whose pn:sence in itsclfhas no "*on or foundation for coming to presence. (This is exactly what the entire ontothcological tradition has relentlessly sought to P~ent. even resolve. as the problem of freedom or of the necessity of I "creator" and its "creation. ") To use the terms that haunt all of Kant's thought. there is no realiOn that there should not be chaos and no reason that anything should appear. If something appears, it is therefore not thrOUgh "reason." but through its freely coming. And if existence. somewhere. appear.; to itself as subje<::tivity. which also means as "reason." this is also through its freely coming. TIle "disclosc:dness of beings as such" (= "there is something1 does not refer [0 a deep-seated constitution of being in being_ closed (here no doubt is where the possibilities for a general phenomenology end), but refers to the improbable. to the unexpec:ted. [0 the surprise of a discl05ure. Without this surprise:. there would be no disclosure 3.0; such (and there would be no experience). then: would be "revelation" in the ontotheological sense of the terM, whose formula comes from Hegel: "What is revealed is precitely that God is the revealable." With respect to disclosure. one would have to say instead: "What is disclosed is precisely that the diJ. closed is not in itliClf disclosable--it is being-and that its disdoswe exceeds and surprises it instead of coming back to it: it is Mill 'founded' in freedom. it is existence." For this reason. disclosure also offers itself-this is the logic of altt~ia in Heidegger-as the renewed concealment of the very being that discloses itself. and of the being of disclosure itself: in other words. as the con<::ealmenr cl the being ofbc:ing, and of the being of freedom. of the freedom tl being. and of being as freedom. Freedom: what is concealed in disclosure. if we can understand this not as a remainder that stays concealed in disclosure. but as the very movement of disclosure. or as irs aspect or tone (its inrensity): what is "veiled" in a voice:. for example:. In this way e:xistcn<::c is exposed: Dmem is exposed to the surprise of the disclosure of beings. because mis surprise happens in the JA of Yin and as this tld-as "being's being-the-thef(~" -whereas the

Expn'imrr of FIYt'dom

95

b{'il1~-thcre of lJa~in does

110( belong to it as its own before this surThe tbe" of existence is definirively nor a position, neither S~-Y.l­ ~I'IIIl(lr tcmporal, rhough it involves sp:lce and time. but it is a surpri,c. "is;~ 1N;"g~t/~1Y that m~es its surprise. its being-there in the \\'(lrld of hemgs dlsdosed as bemgs. -Ii, b(' exposed means to he surpri~ed hy the freedom of existing. This also means to he given over to the risk of existing, to the ri~k uf never appropriating for oneself this surprise, of never 1l'3pI"",pri;uing for oneself one's foundation. I will never appear ro mysdl .1~ my own surprise. as my own hirrh, as my own death. as my own freedom. This "tl'tr contains :It once all the finitude and infinirude of finite transcendence. It contains m)' pure presence in its own difference of being, exposed to its unlikely coming. Once again we touch on the question of rc:btion (actually, we never Il·ft it). Being-ill-common is what presents 10 me this nt'wr. my birth and my death are present to me and are my own only through the hirrhs and deaths of others. for whom in turn their births and deaths arc neither present nor their own. We share what divides us: the fn:c:dom of an incalculable and improbable rom;ngto presence of being, which only brings us into presence as the onn of the othm. This is the coming to presence of our freedom. the (';ommon experience of the exposure in which the communil)' is founded. hut founded only through and for an infinite resistance to every appropriation of the essence, collective or individual. of ils sharing, or uf irs l;l\Indation.

1fi<;(".

I

§ 9 Freedom as Thing, Force, and Gaze

One will ask whether we are still free when we are free to the point that Being is what is free in us, before w. and ultimately for lL~. This vcry question could not hdp posing itsdf to Hcidc:gger. who finally answerc:d-during the period in whi<:h he still themarized 6. dam. although this was a decisive step toward the abandonment of the theme-that frro:iom con~idcred a.~ the "root" ofbcing in no way agreed with freedom represented as the property of man: But if ek-5istent Da-;rlll. which lets beings be. sets man free for ilk "frcedom by first olTering to hi~ choice something possible (a bciog) and by impcKing on him something necessary (a bcing). human capri« do~ not then have freedom at it~ disposal. Man docs not "possess" freedom as a property. At be.~t the conver~ holds: freedom. c:k-si.stcm. di!;Closive /)a-seill. posses~s man. .. I M

In what sense. however. is man "posscs.d by frecdom~ Sante interpreted this thought in his celebrated formulation: "We are condemned 10 freedom. "1 Now this is certainly not the sense in which freedom should be understood. unless we confuse a thinking of the existence of being with an "existentialism." For Sarrrc:. this "condemnation" means that Illy freedom. "which is the foundation," intervenes in order to found-which means. according to Sanre. [() engage in a "project" of existence-in a situation of "detcrminism" hy virtlle of which I am nOl free: M

Frrtdom III Thing. Foret. and Gnu

97

'I hils mr liTcljnm is ~ondemnalion because I am not free to be or not to he ill and iIIne" comes from without: it is not from myself. it has Ilothing to do with me and is not my fault, Bur since I am free. I am ;lined hy my freedom to make it mine. to make it myhorilon. 111y ,-jeW. my morality. etc. I am perpetually cOIl\!emned to will what I h.I\'(." nut willed. no longer to will what I have willed. to construct my5c1f in the unit), of a life in the presence of destructions externally in~i'rl'd on me, , I am obliged to assume this determinism in order to pl;J\.c the ends of my freedom beyond il. to make of this determinism one more tllgf1gtmtnt. Thus the condemnation to freedom is itself the con!let1u~nce of a condemnation to necessity. Because I cannot avoid illness. I also cannor. in order to be a human being. whose cssenu: lies not in an object hut in a project. exempt myself from the necessity of making this accident the means. opportunity. and stepping-stone of a new overstepping of my accidental and a(;cident-prone being in the projt·(t of "the unity of a life." I must "assume" my nonfrccdom: nlOre exactly. I mwt assume one of the "aspects of th~ situation." namely. the "pa.uivity" surrounded by "the totality of the world." by means of the mher aspect. which i5 the freedom to make a life projell our of every condition. This anal)'si5 fundamentally refers to a lack a.~ well as to an excess in the apprehc:nsion of existence. It refers to a lack insofar as the freedom that is posited here as the taking charge of what it cannot (hoost' or decide is itself ddinirivcly considered a power (or perhaps onl)' an obligation ..• ) commanded by its own deficiency, which lllrrnponJs to a deficiency in the essence of human beinw;: freedom k,is tbe lilllndarion" in human bcing.c; who" lAek. . being their own IOlllld.uicm." freedom here is not "the foundation of foundation." as We have analyzed it. but is the: foundation ill #lIIlt of foundation. It i~ aiM) nor experience as the experience of the limit at which experil'lI(c ir..c1f docs not belong to itself or !'eturn to itself-which is wh.H ~i\'cs it its freedom-but it is the proof that there is something Illlwr than freedom. a default of the autonomy and autar(;hy of a f rl'(',lorn that rcmaim in itself a full power of self-determination. It 1\ 11.) II mgt'r a question of the foreignness of frc('(lom to irse1f. but of

F"~dom

as Thing.

Fon:~.

lind Gnu

a hindrancc or constraint that limits it from the exterior. ml'OUgh "determinism." Thus freedom finds itself again endowed with an cssence (the project) and with an aseity (the decision to assume itself) which operates, within its own limits, as a foundation whOSe foundation (which is apparently to be found in subjectivity) We would not question, And we doubdess undetSmnd the distraacd desire that compelled Sartre to restore a consistency to a traditional power of homo mttAphysil'us, who had been made so anemic by the modern awareness of the world's implacable "inveslmelll." But lhia simply amounts to an artempt to provide a compromise solution for the most classical freedom of subjectivity in a space henceforth conceived and lived as foreign and hostile (0 this subjecdviry (~ as this space is precisely the deployment of this subjectivity. as could be shown. for example. by a detailed analysis of the idea of "iUness" that governs the text's example). In this sense. the Saurian freedom that "assumcs" objectivity without any of the means of objectivity is desperately in need of itself. As for exccss. the case is of course symmetrical. What is at stab for me. as I act on my "condemnation" to freedom by assumiIJs the situation and overstepping it. is that "the world must appear to me as issuing in its being from a frc:cdom which is my freedom." 11Ir goal and obligation is nothing less than to find a way of relatins an absolute subjectivity to the very order of the world whose reality denies the absoluteness of subjectivity. (Furthermore. it is perhap only a question of acting as if "the world must IIppM" to mt IIJ ••••; at the limit. the self-deception of freedom is dearly what is being daimed). If this goal has any meaning (and for Sartre it is "meanins· itselO. it would have to be based. as in Hegel, on the presupposition of an infinite Spirit-which, however, could not be admitted heJc. If the subject is finite. the goal has no meaning. Sartre will of course be able to say: uF.ach person must ~ali7.e the goal. and it must still remain to be realized afterwards. The finit~ pursuit of each person in the infinite pursuit of humanity." The finit~ and [he infinite are juxtaposed here in such a way thar no ontological community could be found for them, except in a mode of foreclosure: Sartre's "finite" is a pure and simp/' IJindran'~ to being infinite (compensating

99 tilr ,his anguish by vaguely projecting an infinite humanity-which b only a bad infinity..• ), and his "infinite" is (l Pll" "nd limplt' .ll'flitI,mt't of the condition of the finite. One could not accomplish with greater consciousness, with a ICIKllilY m..!e more striking by its insistence. the unhappiness of con~d()lIs"ess that HcSei recognized in order to sublate it into the selfknowledge of actualization. Deprived of this sublation (or only pfllposing it in rhe mode of a deliberate "as if"), Sartrian freedom-in some ways the: last "philosophical freedom," already prepared [() cede its ground to the juriltical defense of ~doms-is the finJI name of this unhappiness of consciollsness: condemned to heing, in the infinitc form of the projc\'"l (whkh would ultimately be the wi Irs unhappiness). the infinite consciousness of the finite and the finite consciousness of the infinite. SJrlre's man is not "posscssed" by freedom: hc is forced by it inw the "frc:c:" knowledge of his infinite deprivation of frc:c:dom. But here again, definitively, freedom has b~n measured against the neccssity of causality: the freedom of the Sartrian "projc:ct" is the will to be the calise of that for which causes are lacking or contfar)· in given reality. lbe project is a wishful causality launched in dcliance of experiencrd caIL'kIliry: the heroLCim of despair. nni~ has marked lip until now, we should not forget. a large collection of discnurses. not always directly existentialist. on freedom conceived of a~ the a~sumption, the overstepping, or in some sense the redemption. uf harsh necessity.) As lung as the concept of freedom remains caught in the space of (;1\15.11 ity-and of will as causality through representation-it does 11m permit LIS to think of anything other than a spontaneous causality whose reality will always remain at least doubtful (measured by rhe measuring instruments of causality as such, which means ac(urding lu the anthropology of ,he "human sciences") and whose selll'1 ,,,ill he kept. in every case, in the princi(lle of causality itself. Now, the principle of causality, in Kantian terms,l is thar of the Jll'rlll'lIll'nce of substance, to whidl the concepts of necessary force alld anion lead ba,k in order for the problem of change in phe'11;1 tu he considered. This principle is formulated in the tol-

100

F,,"tiom liS Thing. Fort'f. anti Gitu

lowing way: "ali changt (suct"t!s;on) ofapptarancts is IM"/y tll,"_ ation. Coming into ~ing and passing away of substance are not aI. terations of it, since the concept of alteration presupposes one and the same subject as existing with two opposite determinations and therefore as abiding."4 Thus the only possible logic of freedom a. causality would require that I be the cause of my birth and death. l can certainly be this cause, if not entirely explicitly for Kant, then at least according to a coherent explicitation of his thinking, to the a:tent rhat I can be, as an intelligible being and outside of the succession of time, the subject of a specific causality that is itself of the order of the intelligible, that is, "free." But this new causalil}' must be able to be considered as reunited with sensible or natunl causality. To think the permanence of the substance of the world united with the spontaneity of a subject of action is to think the unconditioned causality of the totality (as it is represcnted in the Ida by the subject of the imperative in view of the realization of a moral nature). However, the idea of the unconditioned causality of totality is nothing other than the idea of being itsdf. Thus "the po. sibility of a unification of two quite different kinds of causalil}'••• lies in the supersensible substrate of nature. of which we can determine nothing positively, except that it is the being (daJ Wesm) if' itself of which we merely know the phenomenon."~ But to attribute to being (or to essence, which is here precisely the same thi"', considered as cause, the character of the unconditioned and spoil"' tanCOlL' i.~ to withdraw this ~ing as such from beings in their toaIic); for whom alone the category of causality has validity. Furthermore. it is to withdraw causality from itself or into itsclf. (This is why Kant's logic could lead one to claim that freedom is and is only causality itself. or that freedom is its fundamental 4fi~lIdty whose means remain hidden in the law of phenomenal succession. This could also lead one to wonder whether it is schematism-and specifically the first schema, the "( generate time"-that opens suc, cessivity. whose "hidden art" would finally harbor the secret of ~ dum .... But could this secret be mluced to anything that is not aI50 secret? . Unless the thinking of fi-eedom must be thai of something like tht m,tnifnt faN 0/" m·"t. ... )

F,rrdom "1 77Jing.

"orr~.

"nti (~

101

The illca of a "unification of two hClerogeneou5 causalities" can ollh' ~ignify a brumgrnNil of cau~aliry: a c",,~ WilhoUI causality, or;~ ~lIhstam;e withmu perm.lnence. Rut the ''''I!rwithoUl causal'. th;1I is to say exempted a5 much from determination byanothrr ,.IIISC as from the determinalion to produce an effect. i~ the thi"g itsdf~ the: thing ill itst'{f.'The thing kbo1t') of the phenomenon is nOI its c.llI~e ,,""'lSe) (even if. as everyone knows. it is rhe same word): it is its cxistence. E-mlnlft is II;, Ivi,IMin",,,,lofbti"g ItS ca"le """ lIS ,,""Mill'''' SIIbUnttt', or, further. it is ri,e willJti1flU',,/oft1w c"use in tlw tl.i".v,. The face of the exiseence of the thing (irs St'lZlmg) makes all the slIct:<."SSh'e changes of its essence C'Xise at ehe same time, but this f.lu. in conformity with lhe Kantian principle, ha5 nothing to do wilh its changes as such. The idea of "camality by freedom" represenrs nothing other than this Snz''''g. or the bilt" (and death) of the thin~. rxtYpt tiklt its t'ttllndation [o,."etl thaI the cause in questionfrc:cllo/ll -;S p,.t'ci1t'~'f tilt tiling witl10ttt c",tSd/ity. In this sense, one w()ulc.l he justified in saying lhat metaphysics is exacrl}' me furgetting of frec,iom (resuhin~ in Same), and that this forgetting is prodUCl't1 at rhl' precise moment thaI it c",-ria m'tT tlw d~term;"tttion of lilt NSt'IICt' ofCllltldlil) onto tlw Pll" d~re,.",illation ofthe ex;st~nCl of jTmlom, whereas existence exists only :liS the wirhdrawal of essence and lCIIlseclucndy lhe IhillgC'Xists only as the withdrawal of c"u~. It is rhcrdorl' not '"heing frcc" in the metaphysical sense of this conn'pl a~ much as it ili heing free where the thing. al Ihe moment it i~ valued as the very "cause," withdraws finm all causaliry. and consequt'l1Il \', ~ ie "t'('ms. from l'very force and action necessary for the prodll\.li'm of the eflccti\'iry l'lIpeered of a free au. This is not actually "heing fret: in the sense of being ahlc 10 Cltuse "freely," hilI it is clIistel1ce's heing-free. In this sense, the existent is "pos5r~~l'J" h~' trl'cdorn: it is "posSC'ssed" by it nOI in the: privative mode of till' Ilclcssit)' of mitigating (more or Ic!iS imaginarily) ils inabilit~ 10 p():.it ilself and think iesclf a5 unconditioned causaliry. bur in till' .llIirmativc.' mnde in which freedom measures itself precisdy .1~;JIII~t rhe facl that its Idea (lIncnnditionl'tl camality) is finally the Idl'.l (which is I,rc:ciscly no longer an Idca. bill a fact) of the thing \\ Ilhntlt c;ll\sality. This is the Idea of existence, in which and as M

102.

F"«iom I1J Thing. Foru. and (;au

which the "Idea" is immooiately given as foct and this fact is given as txptrimu. 6 Yet what is given in this way as fact and experience is Ihe~by also given. without changing ontological registers, as force and as action. Being free is not given as a "property" that it would be POSSi. ble ro make use of on condition of disposing elsewhere of the forca necessary for this wage. which also supposes that when all fo~ art lacking for action (and usually almost all are lacking in this regard . ) freedom withdraws into the interiority from which it never ceases to shine. superb and powerless, until a last fatal forte comes to extinguish iLti mocking Harne. On the contrary, even though it is effectively powerless, freedom is given as force and as action. The reality of the freedom of him who finds himself deprived of the power to act is not a "pUfC interior disposition," it is not a simple protestation of the spirit against the chaining up of the body. It is. it should be said. the wry rxistnuu/ this body. The existence of a body is a free force which does not disappear even when the body is destroyed and which does nor disappear a.~ such except when the relation of this existence ro an 0cher and destructive existence is itself dcstroyed as a relation of cDtences, becoming a relation of CisencCi in a causality: such is the ~ f"ercna: of relation between the murderer and his victim. and the elfrerence of non relation between the exterminator and his mass grave. This force is neither of the "spirit" nor of the "body"; it is exittenee itself. impossible to confuse with a subjectivity (since it QIl be deprived of consciou.~ncss and will) or with an objectivity (since it can be deprived of power). Freedom as the flrr, oftb, tIling as 5u,h. or as the force of the act of existing, does not designate a force opposed ro or combined with other forces of namre.] Rather, it designates that from which [here can rise relations of force as such. between human beings and nature and between human being5 among themselves. It is the force of force in general, or Ihe very resistance of rhe thing's existence-iLti resistance to being absorbed into immanent being or into the SUC' cession of changes. Accordingly, it is a tran5cendental force, bur one that is a material actuality. Because ~xjstm" as such has its be-

Frutfom ttl Thillg. FOIU, mId Gt,u ing (Ilr its thing) in the acc. or if we like, in the praxu uf exi&ring, it is imrossihle not to grant it the actual chara,,,:r uf a force. the thought of which implies tile thought of a transcendenral materiality. "r if we prefer. an ontolugical materiality: thc withdrawal of being as .1 ImHcrial Srtzlmgof singularity, and the difference of singularitil:S as a diHerence of forces. Prior to every dc:tcmlination of maner. thi~ Ill.ltc:riality of c:xistcnce, which sets down the fact of freedom, i~ no I('...~ endowed wilh the material properries of exteriority and resi~ t.1II re. 8 Udng free as being "possessed" by freedom is being free with the actuality of a materiality irreducible to any "pure spirituality" of frc('llorn (and yct, "spirit" il this material dilference in which the exiSlent comes to expose itself as such). Though we cannUl represent this materiality without making it drift into the order of forces burh reprl'Sented and linked in causality, and though, because of this fact, we cannot avoid falling back into an (optimistic or pessimistic) arprcci;l!ion of the possibilities of action available to freedom. whil.h. hc,ause of this fact. is reduced to a causal property ofuspirit" (hUl who would dare simply to appreciate in this way the free ~orce of the cadaver before its murderer?), this docs not testify against the ontological status of the force of freedom. This indicates. i" ,J,t 1'1"1 m;sllmu IIJ II" conetpl. t," impt'nen7lbility Il.ilhoulrvhich ji-tf·do", Il'oliid "01 k frttdom. (One should not forget that what resists in this way is found constantly lodged at the heart of causality itsdt: as the efficacity of its successivity. It is not in the "spirit" a1l1ne that the fora of fl'CCdom resides and resists, blll it is in the exisrl'n~c of every lhingas such. One could say: "wi' are the freedom of _wry thing.) IJerr thinking appears to be rno!;t dearly removec.l from both comprdu,'nsion and incomprehension:" thinking docs not comprdlcnd freec.lom's torce, hut also does not regard it as incomprchl',H,hlt:'-actually. it is colliding. as thinking. wilh the han! matter of ficcdtlOl itsclf, lhis foreign body whit-h is its ou'n and by virtuc of wlll l h al'lIIe it can he what it is: thinking. It;s first in ilsrlj." alld IV its o~.·'llttllt'l/ mtutrilll illlt>mity. mat thillkillg IoIlC/'t1 tIN impmrtrablr Yrfm",,1"l' ofiTt'ttfnm (and it touches it. more precisely, as the resis-

10

4

FruJom us Thillg. Force. IIlld Gau

tance of Idn~t1g~. as the resistance of the sillgularity of thinkers and thoughts. but also as this other resistance. again singular. of the body that thinks. with muscles tensed. strong flashes in the mind. and the silent density of a flesh that delivers and withdraws at will what we call "thoughts" ). So the:n. freedom is far from being able to be only "a thought" and it is also not a freedom "in thinking. to It corresponds instead to the: following: the fact that the existent thinks does not constitute one: property among othe:rs in the existent. but sets up rather the very structure of its existence, bcatuse in thought--or as thought-it is removed from the immanence of being. This absolutely does not mean that the: e:xistent exists only in the dimension of ·pure thought"; the:re is precisely no "pure thought" if thinking is cxistax:e according to me transcendence that delivers it to the world and 10 the finitude of shared being. Rather. this means that the 'iftofthe exi.~tent is identic:ally its thought (and for this reason. moreover. a philosophy of "life" does not suit it any more than does a philosophy 01 "spirit"). Before or beyond every dete:rminate thought. in partiwlar every deduction of its "frcxdom" or "nonfre:edom." as well as every intuition of one or the other of these. thinking is the act for which its essence of a<;t (its fon:e. and therefore the "substance" that should be endowed with this force) is no more: prescnt in immanence than it is conceived in representation. Thinking is tIw lid ufan in-actlltllit]: this is why it cannot appear to itself in order 10 master itself. in the: mode of a subjectivity. but is for itself-as that which it thinks and as that which think... it. always other than itself and always iairial--the experience: of the impenetrable force of its freedom. This force: atn be considerable or minute in its calculable effecu depending on the linking of causes (assuming we can calculate the efleets of thinking and of freedom), but is in itself. as thing and not as cause. always the same. It always has the same intensity. which is not a relative but an absolute intensity. This is the absolute intensity that through and through ~-unds the play of differenas by which we: exist in the relation of singularities. Freedorn is the: absolute tewion of the relation. ,his ontologica1ly material tcft" sion whose impenetrability is the absolute price of existence (-dig-

Frudom as U,;ng. Fort't. "lUI C,tU

lOS

l,il\", ill Ihe: Kanlian lexicon. which means what is no longer a 'i~III("")' This tension is visihle as soon a~ two galCS cross (it is not C\'~n n'rt
§ 10 Absolute Freedom

If freedom were not this being.free. this freedom of being (ill own) and the f'rccdom of existence in relation to being (which is the same freedom. the generosity of the withdrawal), we would nol be free at all. We would be returned to the antinomy of caprice and fiR, which could easily form the basis. and instantly the impasse. 01 Kant's third Antinomy-revealing that transcendental illusion is properly found neither in the thesis nor in the antithesis. but ia the very antinomy purponing to give them their dialectical SWI. (which thus exposes the general dialectic. in every sense of die word. of freedom for metaphysics). All philosophy prior to KanE knew, as he did, that caprice can depend on fate. just as fate can be understood as a caprice (perhaps this is where the philosopbic:al interpretation of tragedy begins, or ends, unmindful of a "trape freedom" which we will have to discws further). By imagining the difference in nalllre of two causalities. Kant made possible bom the exposition of the antinomy and irs transcendental solution. But once this difference in nature is shown to be fallacious, since 011 bOlh sides it is still finally a question of causality, we find ourselves relegated [0 the perpetual and derisory displacement at the interior of the antinomy, a displacement that condemns to inanity evert interrogation offrmlom. including finally even the concept offj¢dom, which engages one or anomer of the following pcssibilitics: the subjective assumprion of necessity. the relative freedom at the heart t06

10

7

J.l tktcrmined group. spiritual and nonmaterial freroom. ethiwpillilil.al tT~oms ~n~~ahle of und('rstandi~g rhemSC'lves. and so on. J'rl'eduJ11 IS not If It IS not absolute, and It can only be absolute by ncil1~ a pos.~ibility of causalit)" or e\'en only by being finally (as cn·rrthing in Kant would lead us [0 reac.t it) the very imelligibility of l;llIs;llity-for it is the thing. nor rhe cause, thar can be absolute; it i~ presence, not essence; it is existence, nor being. The thought of litis ,thsoluteness i5 the categorical imperative of every thought of frc:edom. and perhaps of all thought in general. even and exactly if thi~ (a~k of thou~t can never present itself as the program of a dcdlluion or demol15tration. even an infinite one. and if on the wntrar), ir always offers itself 3li thought's testing of its own limit (but also of its own mattl'l1. If (he categorical imperative only has meaning insofar as it is addressed 10 a freedom. its meaning is (hat frealom. fur its part. only has meaning in receiving such an imperative (whether thi5 is literal'" the Kantian imperative, or whether it is an enrirdy different pm). In other nouncement: filr example, ~a1ways think freedom'" words, freedom is mmtillily. not accidentally. the speaker of the injuncrinn. 1 and is perhap.~ therefore essentially only the a1locutor of a categorical injunction on the subject of freedom. and the allocutor, wnscquently. of its own injunction: be free! Or: frc:c: yourself! (Or, P111re elaborately: be what you are. that is. freedom. and for thi5, frl:c yuurself from an essence and/or concept of freedom!) Perhaps (het~ has never been anything else at the extremity or inauguration of every thought of freedom. whether the necessary free condition of th~ philmopher for Plato. dle Cartaian free dnision to be ol1l"'>elf, Spin07..3's exclusive freedom of God. or even the Hegelian Stall' a~ I he total and singular actualization of freedom. ,.1l/ro-lI(m~y. whidl has always reprcscntal the vcr)' regime offreedo l11 , must he unllerstnod on this b3liis: 3li a legislation by the s~{rill \\'hi~h the .vlfdoes not preexist. since its very t'xisrmce is what i5 pre~lrlhrd hy the law, and this law itself is not hased on any right. ~llIlI' it f()und.~ with its own juris-diction the possihility of a "right" III ~l"l\eral. Freedom is not a right. it is the right of what is "by rlght~" withom right: with this radicaliry it must be understood as

108

Absoluu Frmiom

fact, as initial and revolutionary. 10e law here is law itself, in its pu~ essence (what it prescrihes is suhordinated ro nothing prior. "01 nJm to jom, ntm-frmlom from which it would IJt1vt to fr« ibdf: frtc.. dom cannot but precede it.'ic1f in its own command). and is. by the same fact. the law that never ceao;es bm~hing the limit of law, ~ law that docs not cease freeing i[~e1f from law. Freedom: singulari. ty of the law and law of singularity. It prescribes a single law, but this single law prescribes that there be only cases, that there be only singular instances, singularly impenetrable and unapproachable by this prescription. At the same time, freedom is prceminendy approachable and penetrable: it is the law without which there would be neither hint nor expectation of the slightest law. "Be frcc!" {perhaps, by way of an improbable verbal use of the substantive or adjective. one would have to be able simply (0 write "flu!" l/ibrd}-unless this sounds, yet why not, like a training command ). "Be free!" therefore commands the impossible: there is no freedom that is available or designatable bifo" this injunction or outsitit of it-and the same command commands impossibly. since there is no subject of authority here. Once again we touch the limit of comprehension. But we do so in order to find ourselves once again before the necessary anteriority offrcedom,2 w~ is no longer iUuminated here only in regard to thinking but also in regard to freedom itself (if we are still permitted to make this distinction). Freedom must p"",dt ity/f in its auro-nomy in order to be freedom. It cannot be ordered. its advent can be prescribed only ifit has alrea4yfreed rhe space in which this prescription can take place without being an absurdity, or rather without being anterior to the slightest possibility of mttming in general (and yet. is it nO( a qUC!ition of this? ). We cannot say Nbc free!~ except to someone who knows whar this phrase means, and we can nor know whar it means without having already been free. without having al~dy been set free. In the imperative in which freedom differs in irsdf. it must also haw prr(,t'd,d it,ft'!f. "Be free!" must occur unexpectedly as one of freedom's orders. Freedom must have already freed irself, not only so rhat rhe imperative can be pronounced. but so that i~ pronouncemcm can be an act endowed with [he force offrc:cdom·

Absoll,lt Frwlom

109

Ihi~ sense, if it ill lOrrect to claim that the imperative, in generI~ 11Owerles.~ IWl'r the execmion uf what it orders-it is nor the ,;1u~c-i[ would 11111 he correct to claim that it is without force. lhi~ tim:c is what mak~ intondtion (a form of intensity) a remark-

(In

;11.

able: dcment in linguistic descriptions of the imperative mode.· Thi~ fim:c forces nothing amI no one. In a cerlain wa)'. it is a force widlOllt hmction. or is only the intensity of a singularity of existcnce, insot:u as it ~xist1.) In Ihis way, autonomy as Ihe auto-nomy offrccdmn is absolute. This docs not rnl"'dll. as it could he understood on IIle most obvious rc.'!!istcr of Hegdian logic, that the Ab~lllte i~ free. This means-the t'lCaCI reverse ufHegd-that freedom is a~lute, which is to say that frccllom is the absolmiZiltion oflIN absolute itself. To be absolule is to be: detached from everything. Thc absolute of the absolute, the absoluu: essence of the absolute, is to be detached from every relatinn ,md e"cry presence, including from itself. The absolute is being that is no Innger located sumewhere, away from or beyond beings, with whum it would again have this rdation of "beyond" (which H('gd knew well" and it is not an entity-being, but is being withdrawn into itself short of itsdf. in the ab-solution ofits own essence and taking place only as this ah-solution. The absolute is the being ofht-in~~, which is in no way their cssrnce but only the withdrawal of ('~sence, its ab-solurion, its dis-solution. anti CVC'n, absolutely, irs Wllliioll. in the of existence. in its sinfllk,rity. in the mll/~ri­ til imcnsity of its coming and in the tone of the autonomous Law whose autonomy, autofoundation. and aurhorit)' depend only on the experience of being the law extended to the edge of the law like the throw of an c"istcnce. If &uch i~ indeed heing's absolute exrremiry. to which we must absoll1tl'I)· grant existence. the very thing of thinking, then "jWMomh r"r p/,iloJop!Jical ndme oftiJis absollllmess. or is nothing. Freedom I~ the detachment-and unleashing-of being insofar as being is IlIl! retaincc.i in being and is absolved of its being in the sharing of ·xj'lrllce.

Ji"-'

§ II Freedom and Destiny: Surprise, Tragedy, Generosity

Because: of this absoluteness. freedom must be though t of in a way that distinguishes it from every concept of freedom opposcd-and therefore relative-to something like fatality. The idea of fatality. whether it takes on the resonance of a Desdny controlled from beyond the world, or of a necessity of rhe immanenr development of a History, presupposes an ontological consistency proper to the course of events as such. either in its origin or in its linking process. This course of events must ~ (and it must be as a course) in accordance with succes.~ion and direction. On account of this, there can only be freedom in relation to this course of events; that is, there can only be freedom from the point of view of a non-finite transcendence that permits it to occupy a position outside of time. In this position, freedom can be identified with ity, whether on the model of an ecstasy in God (or in the: Subject of History) or on the model of the: "resolve to the inevitable as essential self-deception." The consistency proper to the course: of events is the being of time: not being as time. but time as being; time as substance: and as subjectivity. The question of. or obsession with. finality is constantly present in the Occident (and without it. the thought of freedom falters, or else: thought and freedom become dialccticize
faw-

110

Frudom find DNtjllY

III

the ~n( i rc rradirion-rhat [emporaliry is recognized as presenting an Llbsla,1c to substanriviuuion in general, and in pankular to its own <;uhO,I;lIllivil.3tion. 1 the pcrspcc:tivc shifts. The fou~of events should ~('t he denied. but rather broUGIll (0 light as the course of ttJt'ntJ and .1S the evenrfulness of [he very "course" as such. We will not addrN the Hcidcggerian analyses of temporality here. nor the persi~(cnt if unobtrusive thread of tradition that was to lead to them (hi~lory) and that was simultaneously freed by them from irs course (CVC/lI). We will bring oursdves immediardy [0 thi~ extremity at whidl the very concept of tjmt. and almost even its name, is found su~r('nded:l to this point at which the temporality of rime proves ro be nothing remporal (or where the remporality of rime is temporal to thc extent that it gives the time of rime, in some sense its rhythm rather than its course-if we can risk forgetting that this rhythm (X;cu~ only in the very course itself). This means that tfcrtJJl time itself. so to speak. rather than in the depth of a temporal essence of time. what can finally be discerned is what we could call the origination (prownanctl of time. or more exalt I)" the coming-forth [pro-l'manul of time's pmtnt. Indeed. time as such, however fluid and even fugitive its flowing. is held fau for all of philosophy in the dimension and grasp of presence (the havin~-hcen-presc:nt, the being-pra;ent. the bcing-present-to-(,;ome). Thus lime as such was for Kam the only thing that does not flow in time: it i~ thc permanence of the present rhat succeeds itself. Jusr as beings, which arc to the extent that they are beings-present, disdose themselves by concealing being in its withdrawal. likewise (!hi~ "likewise" actually responds [0 thc intimatc inrerlacing of both qu\:stions) time's present cannot present itself without signaling kOIlLl·.llill~ is also and above aU signaling. without signifying} toward lhl' lOlllill~-int()-presence of this present (or. if one likes. IOWan! prescnlC:\ heing-presented). The present can nor originarc from another prl'~l'nt; each present as such holds itself back from an abJolutt (Pi\~'. pn:selll, or future) presenu: lhat, as 5uch, is detached from all ~\Inl"~i\'ity. In Kant's terms for causality: each prcsctl[ of a presence 1\ ;t I'mll (or a death) to existence. it is not a modification of a perIll;IIIl'llt ~ubslancc (which as such would never have come to pres-

112.

Frrniom IIna Deslin,

cncc). Or further. the phenomenon in its phenomenaliry involvc:s the couple of permanence/succession. which itself involves the couple of substance/accident. whereas the phenomenon considered as the etistmu of the thing involves. if we may say so. simply (but in fact it is simpliciry itself, so dose and so distant.. ) dte "setting into p0sition" of the thing, the Setzungof the exi~tent inro existence. This Snztmg escapes permanence as well as succession and escapes substantiality as well as successiviry. It is the origination, in time, of piesenee insofar as presence, as the: present of its presence, depends on nothing that founds or produces it. This .Ytzung come:s neither from time nor from anything in time. nor from anything outside of time. It is in some sense the coming-fonh of time in time. In this. ir proceeds from a "coming" dtat is itself not temporal, neither in me sense that it would come in time, nor in the sense that the: duraEion of its procedure would there present itself (in this sense. it is not evm a "coming"-it does not properly come, bur it perhaps comes forth, comes up. comes back). It is a coming-forth that does not p~ the present. but gives it as present, gives it its prese:nce of presenr. or gives it to presence (and in this it way giW1lime--the origination (provmanct! and obligingness [prevnranct! of being for existence). Hcidc:gger rwnc:d this Ereignis. He says: "The giving of pmma is the property of Ertignen. Being vanishes in Errignis." Under the term i:."rrignis. whose current sense is "event," Heidegger merefore tries to think not temporal and preliCnt punctuality, which is what we no(mally understand by "event." but rather the advent of the event, the origination of a present and thus of the appropriation (Eignung) of being as being, of time: as time:. and of being and time in the opening of a presence (which also implies space). Heidegger left the explication or exploration of Ereignis partially suspended. J will not attempt to take: it up and prolong it: mis would require an entirely different work. I will content myself with frc:c:ly wing what this motif seems necessarily to indicate in the di· rection of freedom. or in the direction of what we persist in calling here "freedom." It is thus a question of the coming-forth of time. If time is considered as originating from itself. it is considered to be the subje:c;tivity of a necessity: an ineluctable course: of events, with

Frmlnm and DminJ

113

whiLh freedom would have (0 reduce itself to practicing imaginary ru~C~' Blit what aOOm the event or advent of the couru as such? \X:h,1I about the advent of time itself, as the course of presents and .1~ lhe present of the course? (Wh:iIIt then. ultimatc:ly. about the: first I\antian schema and the
F"MOm and DtStiny perhaps, would come up at thc originary ori6ce of the mouth, and not come from it), is surprise. Surprise as surprise docs not COOk up in order to add itself to the course of events and [0 modii}r it. It of. fers another course, or, more decisively, it ofTers in the ·course" itself ,he withdrawal of the course of time, the withdrawal of all its presence. In tact, we could say that surprise is already inscribed in the heart of all philosophical analyses of temporality and. in a singular manner. in the analyses of the presem instant: on the limit betwem the already-having-been and the not-yet-being, the present has al. ways also proved to be the limit of presence-the already-havingpassed of what has-not-Yd-wme. This is the structure of the surpria: (and it will form the exact reverse of the structure of the prescnt): it takes place without having happened; it will therefore not haw taken place, but will have opened time. through a schematism of thr surprise whose "I" would surprise itself. Open time could be the time of astonishment and upheaval, or that of interrogation and expJa. nation. For example, the time of the question: Why is there 50m~ thing?--or even of this (other?) question: Why pose the preceding question? We can always take the time to respond to the qu& tion. and we must, even if only to respond that there is no "rt:UtJIlfor this "why?" Yet this time that we will take will have been op-ud only by the surprise that did not take time, the surprise for whidt there was no longer time-or not yet time-to take one's time. The surprise will not even have taken the time to come, it win have come-up at every coming and will have been the event of a lim~, of a free opening of time so that time could present itself. The time of the response will be the time of necessity---QS indeed the time of the question already was, since the "why?" presupposes the regime of necessity. But no necessity opens by surprise, which means that time as such will always be that of neccui£yo For time is always the course of the presentation of events, as weD as the course of questions, doubts, responses, or silenccs--the rime of"lifc· as the time of "philosophy" and as the time of the "philosophy of time." Yet the time of time. or this syncope of time that makes presence present itself by surprise (an empiricist's qurstion: Will the sun rise tomorrow? In this sense. there is no response to enl -

fiw

Fretdom and iRslillY pirid~m. except in the expr,.imcr of surprise. which docs not respond. hur which says only that tomorrow's sun. if there is one. will not be the same sun)-this can only he called "freCtiom." \'fhen it is 110 umgrr tin/( to live an
,\nd 111C: ~slure was made before she even realized it, so much had ~hc: thought about it. Or: ~h('

Ihmws herxlfheneath th(' train without h:l\'ing made the decision Rather, it was the deci~ion that took Anna. Which surpri5ed and over-took (a sm'-prist] her.\ 111,10 ~Il.

I'rn'dnm always surprises when there is no longer or not yet lilllt', That is, when there is no longer or not yet time for timt'. and li'r Ihe upp()liition of a "freedom" and a "fatality." Not that freedom i~ re:'olVl'd only to he "resignation [0 the inevitable" (which douhtIt \\ ~hapes the result of the metaph)·sical concept of freedom, hut llllh at the same time has ncvcr formed the es.~ntiallhollglu of any gr~'.l1 philo1iophy; exemplary and even of primary importance in tI'i, rcspl'Ct. the Stoic's will to will the order of the world cannot be

u6

Frt~dom

anti Dnliny

analyzed as resignation).' Yet neither does it lend itself (and this again is 5[Ok) to the illusion of a revolt that would in reality be subjected to the binding power of destiny. Freedom Scpar8tes itself from resignation and revolt not in order to do nothing, hue in order to open up this separate place. which is that of the free aa in its proper and revolutionary force. 7 (Undoubtedly, neither me attitude of rrvolt nor that of n:signation is excluded: but it is freedom that decides, fn:edom makes them free or nOl.) When it is no longer or not yet time for the opposition of a will and a destiny, this is because it is no longer or not yet time for time. In fn:edom, it is not time for time. It is "time" for a cutting of time. for a coming-up that surprises time by presenting what has DOt come. withdrawing presence from what has been presented. The IRe act ignores the present of the past and does not ensure the praent of the future; yet it also does not keep itself within its own presem: it is not the event, bur it happens to the ~nt and appropriaca ("~ip~t) it as the opening or closing of time, as a gift or refusal of coming-into-prcscnce. In a sense, Kam is correct: if right now I get up from my chair. mere is no other causality that comes to ill· terfere without interfering in the mechanical causality of the world; bur there is inevitably in this event a coming-up of what docs not come there and of what docs not appear there. of what delivers Ihc time of this gesture [0 existence. which means to the (usually improbable) possibility of a syncope of time and presence wh~ that which WS "ot pmmt itselftiS pmmt pmmts its~1f. namdy, the withdrawal of essence in which existence exists. Freedom "presents itself' ahead ot1behind itself, in excess of and in renear from whar could assign or institute it within a presence. whether the presence of a will or of a destiny. It is free for will and lor destiny, but it does not mingle with their subjectivity or substamiality: it is the possibility of having to make oneself the subject of a free will andlor the possibility ofbcing taken by the of a destiny, but it will be neither free will nor destiny; in them it will be existence exposed in an arbiuary and/or destinal mode. !nit this nrpoSll" i~1frvilJ be nfiml'r Ilrbitrary nor dntinll~ it will be what C'(poses itself without foundation. what is exposed by the releasing of

rorce

Frudom and Dmbry

117

il~ f"('llOdation to the chance of the will. to the risk of destiny. It will

he the event of a choice or of a transport. it will he what comesur in sIKh an event: an expmed existence. In this way freedom is absolute: detached even from its own ('\'cn!. unassignahle in any allvent, it is the CUI within time and the k.lp inrn the rime of an e'xistcoce. It enters time and in this sense we (Ilulu say it "chooses" time, but it docs not enter time except by way 01 the excess and withdrawal where time as :;uch-which could be Ihc pr('q'nt3ti()n and the present of a freedom. of an aa, and of a free suhie(l-i~ surprised, since freedom there surprises itself. opening time 11\1 the :;urface of time. through the course of time. on time or at the wrong time. In this !i('me, we could not even say that freedom "dwmcs it~('If" or that it "chooses" time. s It is a question neither of choil-c 110r ()f constraint. The is.~ue is that existence as sllch is pureIv oOered [0 time' -which means [0 its finitude-and that this off('rin~. this prescnration that comes hefore any presence, this coming.t~mh that only comes up uncxpccte(t1y. is existence in withdrawal from essl'I1ce or from heing. Its surprise does not let it "dlOose," Nevertheless. surprise does not (ietermine existence: it exposc~ existence a~ an infinite genermity to time's finitude (as an infinirc" unexpected coming-up in finite presence). ()I1I\ lllUs call time !le~ot:ne "filled" or "fulfilled," according to Benjamin's model: (1111

Ili\wriGllril1ll" i~ infinite in every dircction anti at every mommr nor fillnl the determining force of the historical form of rime is never ptlllll~' (Iiscernihle through any empirical event nor can it be reduced I .. any eVCII!. An event, a~ it would be fulfilled in a historkal sense. is Illlldl 1lI000C something entirely undetermined empiric.1I1y. an idea.' This fuifillllll"nt apflCal's to me as analog()lIs to what I have named Ihc 1I11~'xpe((l-d coming-up of and tel [he event. The "idea" susceptlhl e III mming-up unexpectedly and gra~ping rhe "force of the 111"'11)1 iell f()fm of timc" (which means, in fact, the force of its very tullill rncnt ) Gill only be freedom-in thi, (;!!ie, the frecdom of the tragic lim) exposed to his "Oaw," which, as Benjamin explains. is lIot"ill~ other .han the filling tip of his "rime proper." This freedom

118

Frudom and DNtiny

fills time, withdraws it from infinity as well as from its empty form. and finisks it because it {'ompkt~j it: a finished finirude, infinitely finished. we could say. and exposed as such in tragedy. This OCCUrs in an instant (as Benjamin notes eLiewhere. (he unity of tragedy's time is a figure of the instant). which means not within an instant, in (he present time of an instant. but by a cut in the middle of the instant: the cut of freedom that unexpectedly com~ up in (his tUne and fills it. Yet. "in tragedy, the hero dies because nobody is capable ofliving in filled time. He dies of immorrality." We will transcribe this: his freedom withdraws his presence and essence in the very gesture by which it completes the existing finimde of time. It is also surprising. Death comes to surprise the tragic hero: For it is not rare that it is in moments offull repose-in. 50 to 5peak. the hero's sleep-that his timc's decree is fulfilled; and likewise, in tragic destiny. the meaning of filled time comes to light in great a. menu of passivity: in the tragic dcci~ion. in the moment of delay, in catanrophe. We see how this surprise of finite immortality-if it can be rhus litde or nothing to do with this vision of the tragic. which is concluded by being made into the metaphysical paradigm of the conAict between a Ufrecdom" and a "destiny." Tragic destiny is here nothing other than freedom's d~tiny, or the fot tkstiny of""'" brings tim~ to 1M S4luraud intmJity ofa "tim~ prop"," the finite/infinite burst of existence, which withdraws from being and rime. The tragic, which knows nothing of sadncss, ~ Benjamin has aIJo noted, is the surprise of a time filled with freedom: unpresemable surprise, unsustainable and yet ~rfectly prescnt, oflered at the surtace of the unimpeachable fact of its very surprise. If one docs not die from each act of freedom (but if there is no freedom that does nO{ involve death. a~ Hegel knew), free existence nonetheless is never contained in the time filled with irs freedom. It is never contained in a "free time," or in a fulfilled time, but in a necessary time from which freedom withdraws. Yet this withdrawal is precisely what renders existence to the absolute surprise of the experience of freedom'~ unexpected occurrence. expr~scd-has

F"tdom Imd Dm;1',

119

Finally. one does not die from cat;h au of freedom. but one dies. Si(l1ibrly. each lime freedom exposes us to the possibiliry of death • •ic.llh in turn expOsc."S us to the surprise of freooom-as birth docs abo. l\irth and death actually have the same structure. which does 11(11 simply join the two extremities of a lifetime::. but whidt happens III the emire course of this life's events and whkh is none other Ih.1I1 the unexpectedly occurring structure of tx;SIl'na as such: the nile through which it is never present except in being freely offered 10 presence-to its own presence as wdl as to the presence of a wClrld. Binh ami death: what we can think of only as the appropriatioll of a pK'Sencx (El'rit',;s) unexp«tcdly coming-up without origin llJ presem:e and to time's present. Birth and death arc caught in time br a f.1tality-itself without origin or end-but are at the same time withdrawn from time. in a finite eternity that is itself only a free existing exposure. For fiwdom, which is initial. is to thr Stllnt' vetrlll};lItll. not. howcver. in the scnsc of a goal or rcsult but in thc scnse Ihat it. always fulfilled. does not cease exposing existent.-c to the fulfillment that is its own: being its own essence. that is. withJrawing from every essence. presence. substance. causalit),. prolllllliull. and work. or being nothing othcr than (to use Blanchot's term) the worklcs.~ inoperation ldtsoruvrt11lt'1ll] of existing. "'10 be burn free" and "to die freely" are not merely ~ormulas coined for the determinations of right or for ethical exigencies. They say something "holll being as such. about the being of time and about the:: singular being of existence. to They say that we are not "free" to be born and tn dic--in the sense of a free choice we could make a~ subjl'Ct-but that we are born and we: die 10 "otbillg otlltr ,ha" jT«dom. where "dying to freedum" shuuld be understood as "being born to fr('cliom": we do not lose it. we accede to it infinitely. in an "imlIJun:llity" of freedom which is not a supernatural lite, hut which fr('(·~ in death itself the unprecedentcd offering of exi)tC!llI;c. ('nhal)!; Heidcgger tried to think somcthing similar by the term df'.l/illfTt;{m. 1I Destination would be the very mO'Jemem of E,.riK"i5, Or Ilf the appropriating coming-up: not destiny-the dnminariun of till' JlH."!>cnt-but the "donation of p,.t5e11fl'." This presence ili given. hcld Ollt. offered from irs withdrawal and in its widldr:lwal. and

110

"',,"dam Imd Dt'$tiny

this means the liberation of presence and for presence in the with_ drawal of present rime: a presence which proves to br not prrsmt, but destination. sending, liberation of itself as the infinite sharing 0( existence. Yet "destination" and "liberation" still risk saying too little, as long as these words continue to mark conscious and willed action. In order to try to fTec in words another designation of let us say: a mrprisi1Ig gmerosity ofbeing.

freedom.

§ 12 Evil: Decision

What if thought tlnmd itself harshly summoned to modesty and reduced to powerlessness by evil? More serious still. whar ifir found

itself confronted by evil with its own

worthlcssnes.~?

Au~d\wi'l

dt'mnnmared irrcfurahly that CUlrufl' had failt'd. That this could happen in rhe miJ~t of the traditions of philluophy. of Irt. and of the enli~t('nin~ sc~nc('$ says more than that the5e traditions and their ~I'lit la\.-ked the: poMr to take hold of men and work a change in Ihem. 'l1lC:re is untruth in those field!; tht'mselvt'S. in the autarchy (we would add: fl~ thoughts, thoughts freed. always joined to an essential fl"Ct"'dom llf humanity's thotJWtt) that ~ emphatically claimed for them. All po5t-Auschwirz cuhul"('. including its urgenr critique, is garbage. In 1'C:~lOring itself alit'r the things that happened without resimnce in its own ~()umry5iue. culture has turnN e:ntirely inln ,he iueology it had hn- n 11()te:mi"lIy·- ·hau betn ever sino: it pl'tSlimed. in opposition to rnaf('rial existence. to inspire that existence: with (he: light denied it by lhr ~cpar;ation of the mind from manual labor. Whoever pleads for lhe maintt'nanc(' of Ihi~ radically culpable and shabby culture bccomt's It\ a(fOmplice. while the man who sal's no to culture is directly furlh~'rillg the barbarism which our culture showed it5C'lf tn he.'

A, a I.:on§equcnce of his las[ proposition. Adurnu adds: I:\'en silence gen m out of the circle. In silence we simply usc the col l)hjcctive mllh tn ralionalize our suhjcclive im:ap;K;it)" once more dC~I.ldillg muh into a lie.

\Jilt

~t.lIl·

111

122

Therefore we cannot remain silent. We cannot remain silent be. fore what has blocked "freedom" that was our culture's main thought and before what has almost made us renounce all thOUght of freedom (Heidegger undoubtedly thought he was recognizing this, among other things. when he acknowledged "the greatest fol. Iy of my life";2 however, he: did ke:ep silem.) and this silence, as we have claimed. was also a silence concerning "frttdom"; in the: mean.. time, he never ceased trying to think the "free space" of /;"rrignis: this too meant recognizing the worthlessness and futility of the "cuiture" of freedom. without. however. giving way to . freedom.) If every thought of freedom must be renounced in order to make room for the hastily acquired consensus of a moral and polirical Iibe,clIism, the:n thinking as such must be renounced. This would DOt be a serious maner if thinking were only "some: thought"; on the contrary, it would be to renounce that which can be evil and do evil in thought: illusion, facility, irresponsibility. and intellectuality, which only considers iL~df free and easily affirms freedom as Ion811 freedom does not put it to the test. However, thinking is not inrcllecruality, but the cxperience ofits limits. This experience, as the aperience of freedom, materially and in an unapproachable mrporeality. is nothing other than binh and death. Indeed, to say of birth and death that "we can only think them" means that we an only think in them, and that freedom is at stake in them. Ausdlwiu signified the death of birth and death. their conversion into an infinite abstraction, the negation of existence: this is perhaps above all what "culture" made possible. We cannot remain silent and we do not have to choose. The cx· perience of freedom is not ltd libitum. It constitutes existence and must therefore be grasped at this cxtremity of the negation of existence. Hem:eforth. there is an experience of l'Vil that thought can no longer ignore. In fact. this is perhaps the major experience of all contemporary thought as the thought of freedom, which means precisely as the thought that no longer knows if and how "freedom" could be its "theme," since the negation of exisrt:nce was systematically undertaken freely at the heart of the culture of freedom. Thought thinks nothing ifit is not tested against declarations such as this ope:

me:

Evil: lkcisioll

IlJ

In" 'J 'homas Mann from 19J9: "Yes. we know once again what gou<.! ~~lJ c\·il arc,"· Yet the first requirement is not to understand by (hi~ thc return to a "well-known" good and evil. It is on the contrary til lake the measure of a new "knowledge of good and evil" and of a knowledge that cannot avoid the inscription of C\.jJ. in one way or another, ill freedom. Cuncerning evil. the lesson we must heed con..~ists of three puints: I. Ihe dosure of all thcodicy or logodky, and the affirmation thar cvil i~ strictly unjustifiable; Ihe closure of every thought of evil as the defecl or perversion of a particular being. and its inscriprion in the being of exislence: evil is positive wickedness; ~. the actual incarnalion of evil in the exterminating horror of the 111m grave: evil is unbearable and unpardonable.~ Under this triple determination is constituted what we could call-not without a somber irony-the modern knowledge of evil. different in nature and intensity from every prior knowledge. though it still harbors cerrain of its trair.~ (essentially. in sum. the evil (hal was "nothing" has become "something" that thought cannot reJUl:c).

(In addition, this knowledge also indudes the history of the modern /ascilldlioll with evil. for whidl il will suffice to rc:call. all diftercnces aside. the names of Sade. Baudelaire, Nietzsche. l..auUCamont, Bloy. Proust, Bataille. Bernanos. Katka, aline. withOUt lorgl'uing the ITm14l1l noir. in the V".uiow senses that two ccnrurics have given this term. or the "horror" film. including private produnions of films showing actual murders of prostitutes.)(' This knowledge is above alllhe knowledge that there is a proper ~p()sirivity" of evil. not in the sense [hat it would come to contnhule in one way or anorher [0 some rOnlJersio in bollum (whidl aJwa\'S n:sts on its negativity and on the negation of this negativiIJUt in the sense dIal evil, ill its r'ery Ilegfrtil!iry. witbollt di"/~cti­ (',I! JIIM,IIiol1, fonm it positiw possibility of existence. This is the I'lls,ihiliry of what has lately been called the diabolical or satanic and fll r whidl we no lunger have e,'en these designations. whidl arc '\Iill mlled from the sublimity of "an appalling black slln from

12 4

Er,il· Dtdsio"

which the night radiates."? For us the night can no longer radiate; on the contrary. it plunges into the dissolution of a fog mat thkkens it all the more: Nacht und Ntbtl This positivity of evil-as a kind of hard block that philosophy rejected or threw out before iudf in the fulfillment of subjectivity, ig_ nored or denied by a subject (God. Man. or History) who by rights could only rediscover and recover his "good"-represcnts preQ,dy what Kant would not and could not think with regard to what he brought to light as the "radical evil" in human beings. 8 We are not. then. to call the depraviry of human nature wicltnJNa laking the word in its strict sense as a disposition (the subje~ pm... dple of the maxims to adopt evil as t/);/ into our maxim as our incativC$ (for that is diabolical); we should rather term it the pnvtrr#J~'" heart. which. then. ~UK of what follows from il. is also called an tfIil htart. However. despite everything. it is in diabolical wickednas dw Kant will recognize. scver.u pages later. the biblical representation an incomprehensible origin of evil in human bein~. In other words, for there to be relative evil (which is called "radical" evil and Cor which there is always the hope of a "return to the good 8 ) , must be in the origin the absolute evil of the determination toward evil. Yet all that we can picture of it is its incomprehensibili~ which is the incomprehensibility of a "discord in our free will-: our free will is "primitively disposed toward the good." and yet. ifir is possible for our wcak.nen to pervert our maxims. evil itself must first have been introduced as a motivation for maxims in gcnaaL This is what is figured by the devil, inasmuch as he is incomprehensible: "for whence comes the evil in this spiri[~"-this spirit whose original destiny. Kant speci fies. was "sublime." The wickednes.~ of Lucifer/Satan figures an incomprehensible. absolute c:viI at the root of the root of human evil. Accordingly. [he incomprehensibility of evil is lodged-since Kam's time and almost without his knowing it. or at the limit of his thought-at the heart of the incomprehensibility of freedom. Yet in the final analysis nothing else is inr.:omprehcnsible abom freedom ex-

m

mCK

F.,·il, D«isio"

lZS

the possibility of wickedness-and this tn the extem that this "pllssibility" is a reality efTectivd)' present in freedom's facmality. l)l1~e ;'ltain, our world presents us with this reality every day in ,',lrinus ways, ever since it entered imo the age of exterminating fuf", Nnthing else is incomprehensible about freedom except this wiLkc(lnes.~, once one recognizes the net:essity of exempting the thinking of freedom from its dependence on the thinking of causalit\', The mystery of freedom is no longer that of a spontaneous ·,~lIsc. it is thar of a spontaneity of wickedness. (But wasn't this issue at on<:e prl.'Jl.lroo and concealed in Kant's thought. as well as prior to him. by the tollowing: that authentic freedom was the freedom of the good. whereas evil was the fact of non freedom letting itself be dragged along b)' the mechanics of the sensible? Isn't this more dC';lrI)' illuminate..1 by the passage. in Kant. from theoretical freedom to prauical freedom. as well as in the pa!lsage from Kant himself to Schelling and Hcgel-a pas!lage to the necessity of evil which Hl'itlcgger sought to repeat and to which we will return?) The causing of evil docs not pose a problem of causality but a prublem of maxims, Freedom spontaneously admits. of itself, a rn'lxim of wickedness. This d()('5 not exactly mean the dC5ign to '\:allse evil for tbt sa/u ofevil," if we wish to objcct to [his formula rh:u implies [hat there always subsists a good that is subjectively represented as the finality of an act, or at lean as the triumph of a for~-c or as the pleasure of [he subject. However, lhis "good" can no longer he represented as one in which an evil da:d would be a moIllcnr or nl(:diation. ror this "good" is carried our or gratified by the perpctrarion of evil as evil. In evil, a.~ evil, it is goodthal is ruined absollllclr, That evil and good are relative [0 each other docs not signit}, (rather, no lunger signifies as soon a.o; "the Good" can no longer he lbignated in a transcendent esscnce. 10 whosc absolutc only l'\'il would he relative) that evil is the privation of a good. insofar as 'hi~ privation leavcs the C5Scnce or ideal of the good unscathed (we will neglt'cl for the momelll the fact that the good. at another levd lit philosophy. is perhaps thought of entirely ditlcrently once it is :hollgIH-including and !'ince Plato--to be situated bc)'Ond esscnce lI~df, ('prk~;"d I~s O'U;llJi we will return to this). Nor is good relative (l:I'[

116

£"il: D~~isioll

be the cosation of an evil (in this minirnaJ version, cynical or pragmatist, evil is barely evil: i( is (he inconvenience and hardship of living). But evil is, if we can say it thllS. "absolutely relative" to good in that it is the ruin of the good as such, nor its privarion, but its crushing in a night where nothing any longer gives one the slightest right to say that it would still be the gloomy evening preceding a dawn. Neither good nor evil precedes. Freedom alone precedes and succeeds and surprises itself in a decision that can be for the one or me other, but only insofar as the one and the other exist by the decision that is also, fully and positiwly. for evil as much as for good. Deciding for evil is not therefore deciding "not to do" good, it is deciding to ruin in the very decision the possibility of the good. Evil does not impair the good (it could not be impaired). nor does it disregard it (for evil knows and wills itself' as evil and is rhcrcfore knowledge of the good), but it refUses its coming to life. Wickedness causes evil by withdrawing from the good ill possibility in statu nascmdi. It does not consist in an auack againsr the good (the polemological metaphysics of the combat berwem powers of good and evil loses all relevance here;" besides. here th~ is no power of good "" S~, and it is with power as such that evil ultimately identifies). Wickedness consisrs in surprising the good where it has not even occurred: wickedness is stillborn good. Wickedness is the infinite tenacity that tears apart the mere pronUsc of the good. again without signi6cation or consistency. In this way, wickedness is freedom unleashing itself in the destruction of its own promise--just as Lucifer was promised to a sublime destiny. Yet because there can be no pure "promiseD of freedom, and because freedom is entirely there. given in its surprise. ;t iJ fre~dom that unleashes its~/fagainst ils~1f. Freedom knows this as a "good" and it is this good rhat freedom devastate,: as it exercises itself as freedom. Freedom destroys itself in every freedom as if with an initial self-hatred. FTPedom's s~lfhatred is perhaps rhe only formula (this gives a strange sense of vertigo and an oppressive threat) that can render what 6nally bardy maoOW' to be .said in terms of "evil" and "good" and what nevertheless constitutes the absolute evil of resolute wickedness. The wkked being's tenacitY to evil insofar as it would

me

Evil: iNcision Jocs not wait for the victory of a freedom: it wails only for its own UIII~,.lshing (drclJainrmrm]. to which it was previously and fredy hound. to If this binding (nlrIJainnntmJ is the tact offrcooom, this i~ 11C.:~;llIse freedom. insofar as it essentially fiusor unleasha itself, is through itself the being-wicked as much as the being-good, or even, r~lht'r, lx.'Cause being-wicked is the first discernible posirivity of ti~"C:Jom.

The thought of identity infinitely identical with and dissociated fmm "e\'il" and -good" (from thi.5 point on oaasionally nmed with quotation marks, as in Hegel) in freedom was imposed on philosophy after Kant by way of Schelling, I Iegcl. Nietzsche, and Hcid~-ggcr. Heidegger writes: Tht" essence of evil does not consist in the mere baseness of human ac-

lion but rather in the malice of fur)·, AnJ:

Tn ht'Olling (king fil"!il grants ascent into grace; to fury its compubion to ruin,ll If fury is predisposed in being as the equal of grace, this equality is nlmwiatdy shanered in the very principle (the principle shatteB the prim:iple of equality), because fury "tins: it ruins "healing," but healing docs nor repair ruin, it "docs" nothing: its only possibiliry S~I11S to be 'to "rise lip" in the middle of mins, ThcrdOre we can say nothing about it unless we already know what fury is, This fury can tiouhrless be unticr~[ood in greater precision (Hritlcggcr gives none; but perhaps the mere date elf this text. 1946. n('cd he contemplated) with the help of the one from which it deri\"~... : the "fury" that the Hegel of 71/f .~)'Slmr olErbica/ Lif~'~ made the "!lrst 1C\·d" of evil or of the negative a§ ·crime," This i~ the fury C11 h.lrharic "oc:vastatiun" or of the "purposeless destruction" that an'\\'c.·r~ (() the "absulute urge" "at the exueme of absuhllc abstr;\~­ lio ll , of "the absolute concept in its complete indeterminacy, the r"'dl'~~nC!is of the ahsolute concept's infiniry." Anti this annihilating rl."'dn~nC5s of abstract infinity is also "pure freedom" which aims at lloThing uthcr than its uwn unmediatoo passage into objcctivity.

128

Evil' D«ision

or into "the real being of absolute subjc:ctiviry." which in "pure ob. jectiviry" can only produce itself as annihilation of the determi_ natc and as "formles.~ness." Thus fury annihilates itself. but it only annihilates itJ~lf by annihilating with it the freedom that it is. In passing from Hegel to Hcidcgger and to the experience of our world. which presents itself to itself as universal barbarism, ~ should say the following: fury annihilates itself. but it does not thereby suppress itself as fury: it institutcs total devastation. This is not the self-suppression of abstract subjectivity. but it is (l ~ In... dSlatioll tlJlltleavt:s ftudom d~vastllll'd: this constitutes a relation ro the "self" only [0 the extent that the "self' of freedom is the absolute detachment from self. Fury. however. does nm suppress this detachment: it is its unleashing and its tenacity. Fury. in Hcidqpr'I terms, has its possibility in Being because Being "conceals" in it "the e$.~ential source of nihilation." Yet it conceals this origin in freedom. whkh is the freedom of its withdrawal. In the freedom of the withdrawal. freedom can be essenrially withdrawn. that is CO say devastated by the fury of the nihilation that it is. The fury of wickedness docs not seek to preserve or mediate its freedom. It simply and directly executes-this is why it is furious-the infinite possibiliry of detachment that freedom ir. the abyss ofbcinB in which singularity is equal to the withdrawal of all presence, in such a way that the ruining of all singularity of prc:scnce and all prc:scac.c (coming-up) of singularity is the very liberation of freedom. Wickedness does not hate this or that singularity: it hates singularity as such and the singular relation of singularities. h hates dom, equality, and fraternity; it halcs sharing. This hatred is free. dom's own (it is therefure also the hatred that belongs to equality and fraternity; sharing hates itself and is devoted to ruin). It is nor a hatred ofif1t/f, as if frttdom were already ,here and l:()uld end up detesting itself, and yet it remains hatred of the singular "self" that is the existence of freedom. and the freedom of existence. Evil is tht JJ.tred ofndjlm~~ dJ such. It is a possibility of the existent only in rhe sense that in evil the existent withdraws existence into the abyss of being-pure immaneJu:e or pure transcendence II-instead oflcttinS being withdraw inro the existcntiality of existence. III this s(1lSt.

mc-

Er.jf·

ikrisioll

119

INlll'rl'rr. tvi! is in tk existmt as its illnmmut possibility ofnfllsing exi'/I'I/(·(·

Ikrc are the unjustifiable and Ihe intolerable: in freedom's point of .lIumlmcllt where its own unleashing devastates it, where its own in(.1ndescence devllurs it. The fascination of modern thought and ;\U with evil origin3te~ here: it is a fascination with the furious ex;t~perati(ln of the prop"I.1 itself. which i5 never more properly what it i5 dtan in the ruin of existence. since exi!itence, which is 51i11 its appropriation (l:""i~,iJ), comes-up in it, whereas ruin comes back to iI, a~ Ihe profit and pleasure ofbcing appropriated up to the point of appropriation it5df. Evil: reappropriated coming-up, existence taken 1I1' ag.lin in essence, identified singularity, the rdation taken as a mass-and the mass in a mass ~rave. No one doubts that a justificalion nccd not be attempted. no one douhts (this is the greatest d:1I1grr) that evil need not he imputed to the few in order to spare the others: evil belongs to the essence or structure of freedom such as it ha~ been freed and surprised in our history. as our history. This justifies nothing, since it is on the comrar), what exposes w to the unlea.~hing of wickedness. Bur this does justify that a thought of freedom mllst kC<'p its C)'Cs fixed on the hatred that delivers itself at the hcart of freedom. In II1C:se conditions. what remains of a freooom for the gooc!? em we even pose the qu('stion? Does not the en
Evil' INcision istence (of God as his proper po5sibilil)' of existence revealed in humanity), and if it is man who. acceding in his autonomy to UQ_ derstanding and language. lays claim to existence itself as the ground. which means to the "tendency to return to oneself" or to "ego-centrism." then evil occurs when ",he ground elevates iraelf to existence and puts itself in ,he place of existence" and when man wants to be "as separated selfhood the ground of the whole. "16 8u& ,he separation of "ground" and "existence" that is the proper p0ssibility of humanity is also, thanks to it, the most proper possibility of divine existence itself (in tenns we have used: the hatRd of ez. istence is also the mo~t proper possibility of freedom). Thus the possibility of divine revelation as human existence. and thereby the possibility of the unity of beings-and thus the possibility of the good-here have their primary resource in the freeing of freedom u the freeing of evil. For evil is uuly in man's essence as the most extreme: opposirion and rewit of the: spirit against the Absolute: hearing oneself 3Woly from the uaiversal will. being against it, the: will replacing it in this "against', EYiI .. is" as frmJom. the most extreme freedom "Kains' the Absolute within the whole of I>einp. For ~om "is" the capacity for good and evil. The good "is" the evil and the evil "is" the good. But why is evil spoken of :n all? Because it produces the inncrmOlt and broadest discord in beings. But why discord? Evil is thought . . . . in this most extreme and real discord as dis-jointure (Un-fog) the -'Jof the jointure ofbcings as a whole must appear moSl decidcdly. tbc same time.

Heidegger finally decided that Schelling failed in his thinking of the articulation or jointure of being. that is. the adjoining of "ground," of "existem;e." and of "their unity." Schelling's failure. he explains. is due to the traditionally mctaphysi011 positing of this unity as absolure (which Heidcgger wants to understand as the absolute rehun to self, rather than as the absolute detat;hment that we: mobiliz.ed earlier). It must be underslOod. and this is doubtless the whole imemion of the commentary. that only the thinking ofbcing as the withdrawal of being in DAS~;" and as DtlS~il1-the thought of Ol;Jtrn~~ (just missed, dare we say. by Schelling. which explains why

13 1 [hi~

commentary is so illt(mud, in the best sense of the word)-<s';llll'S the preliminary and insurmountable designation of the unit" il~clf or of ,he absolute a~ a heiug. Bur the beingness [lttUltit/J of Ii1\' absolute, because it offers th" ahsnlme [0 the grasp of the "tenJCIK~' lO re:turn to itsdf" or because it opens "ego-centrism" to the all~oltJte. is what unl~,shes evil 3., the truth offrcedom. Since: good i~ lonsideroo ro be thc return to self of rhe uni[), of (he being (a re(lIrn to self that would no longcr be that of a separated ipsei[)', bur ont' of nonsepar,uion). evil is in fdct already, in principle, dialccticized as a negative momem or power of good (but this hut consequence no longer belongs, for its part, in any way to what we could Icgitimatd)' understand in Heidegger's laconic conclusions; and this is certJinl)' not b)' chance. as we will see from what follows). The dc:viarions, drift. or tangent that Heideggcr seeks to take in rclarion to &helling would therefore be this: a nonbeing 1"011rwlt] adjoining of being (its withdrawal). 8U[ up to what point would this withdrawal affect the structure of freedom "for good t/1uffor evil"? This is what is not mentioned. In fact. here Heidey,ger is /lot far from abandoning freedom. from devoting himself to being (and the "selt~eception of resignation toward the inevitable:" that he would denounce a few years later. again in relation (0 Schelling. implies a uitilJue of indiffermce to good and evil), Yet in this move1llt"1ll. ill not the sovereign (and quasi-dialectical) indifference of S~hdlingian good and evil preserved? Does this more or less imIlCrC'eptible preservation respect the most pmfllUnd exigencies of the thinking of being itself. or of the thinking of existence. as IlciJcMcr ~cems to have recogni7..cd in rhe anal)'5is ofiiccdom" pur~Ilcd thus far? In other words: is it possible to say that the thinking of being. at le,ht as Hcidegger was able to annoum:e it. has escaped the prof~)u'Hllogic and tonality of rhe idealism of freedom. according to ", hich freedom "for good and for evil" is first established and can onlv be l'Slablished through evil. and must therefore. whether it Wallts tu or not, in one way or another justify evil. which means di;}k~(lici7.e it, as is the case when "diswrd" is Jt best what makes

E"il' lRdsioll "unity appear"? At what point docs the identity of good and evil cease once "fury" and "the criminal" have equally been disposed of in the "nihilarion" of being? At what point does this identity, specifically presented as noc being M one," cease dialecticizing itself and producing a superior identity. the result of which seems to be noEbing other than a deaf return to a theadicy or logodicy, this time in the form of an ontodicy? And yet, why does being need a justification if it is not and docs not cause-unless we must ask ounclva whether it isn't the unjustifiable that, in spite of everything, we want [0 justify? (This clearly means: to what extent, in spite of everything and everyone, did Heidegger silenrly justify Auscbwil71 Yct this also means, above all for us: to whdt ~nt is this si/mtJIGtiJication not a ultaJmns ofth~ wry thinking ofb~i'~g, understood, u we are trying to do here, as the thinking of "freedom" or of the generosity of being?) 17 (We amid pose a similar question to Batailk. considering that "Ibc unleashing of passions is the good, which has always been able to animate hLUtWI beings"'! and that this unleashing occurs, by definition. by way of the violation of the prohibition, which defines cvUhere again there is a sort of fUry. A "life without prohibitions" is impossible, and we cannot, once God is dead, "humanly lift prohibitions without venerating them in fear." Thus. "we rob freedom ~iIs salt, if we do not acknowledge its price. Freedom demands a fear. a vertigo of freedom. "19 To what exten t doesn't unleashing here dialecticize itself? To what extent isn't there here an Matheological" thcodiey of sacred evil which is unleashed passion? '10 what extent didn'r Baraille want, following a certain theological tradition ofthc economy of redemption. to justify sin [~tUlm peccatIJ • •• J, whereas sin, according [0 another less Meconomic" and more "spirirualw tradition. ili never justifiable, though it can be pardoned? Finally, to what extent-in order to relate Bataillc: and Heidegger in a more 0bvious way-do we not yield to a fascination for the "vertigo" or "abyss" of freedom. which leads in rum to a f.!.scination with me evil that engulfs and repulli~ [and at bottom, to a way of being tempted or of attempting to bear the unbearable. which does nOI mean (oJ.. er.uing or defending it. but whkh despite everything implies emc:ring

Evil' Ikrision

1)3

into ;\ mange and somber relation with irs posiriviry]. while the ,.../r,lJil1K of heing-free. and indeed its IJ"(O~, arc so grOlmtilm that ,h,' horror and attraction of the abyss form only one of their possibk fi~ures-1111 dOllh, the one jigllrillg them predsely with the l11ust pre!;cnce and IhickllC5S, ("onferring on them a profound and ,!t,ldl)\\')" ~lIbsran("e. Yer the posirive presence of evil rightly annllllllU:S II1;u it l'Ilmes from an ahyss of the will to presence. from the ~fl'srlel>SnCss of the absolute concept's infinity." What is grolllldins is also to rhe same cKtenr. perhaps more "profoundly," what comes-up fllllll nothing, on nothing, what, instead of climbing alit of the ;lhr~. fn.'d,. riscs up. suspended in free air. the simple pulsating of a rdc... iI) , !II or can .tnd In\.\r the ahsolute of freedom engage it in a nonilutillerence? l'nJ.uuhtcdly. the answer sccms 10 be interw()\'en in the ques. ;lI1d eSJ'l"ci:tll), in the enrire enum:i.uil)11 of the: Ihinking of be1I1~: Iwing heillg he is to ler it withdraw from whal Hegel called "IIl'l'IllI".uion in itself," which he dC'ii~natCtt as the first f()fm of evil

134

hViL' Drcirion

in the PIJenommology (in sum. thc phenomenology of the spirit of fury: the al>soJurc return to self of the consciousn~s that has hot gonc out of itself). In a basically similar way. it is to let withdraw the ego-centrism of Schelling's "ground." The entire tradition has understood evil as ego-ism. and egoism as [he fury that in itself determines [hc undetermined absolute. finitizing the infinite and infinitizing the finite. (Likewise, in Bataille, the freedom of passiOh is in no way egoistical: it is the very place of communication and it is communication. For Bataille. egois[ical freedom annuls itself. BUI at the same time, in ic.~ transgressive unleashing, passion docs notbiDs but unleash itsdf), And yet, if the question of a seem, imperceptible ontodicy is not entirely illegi[imate, it is perhaps also not illegitimate to suspcct, despite everything, a secret cgoity of being:

What properly is, thaI is, what properly dwc:lls in and deploys il1 essence in the Is, i~ uniquely Being. Being alone" is"; only in Being and a.~ Being dOl'S what is called flY "is" appear; what is, is Being on ~ basis of its essence. ll The deploymcnt of Being can cenainly ncver be thought except &om the point of irs withdrawal and irs no-thingncss. But cannot me being-its-self rttIY-propIYF! of being preserving its property always once again withdraw from th~ wilhdrawaJ of bcing, and reappropriate the Errigniswhere it appropriatcs irselfby "vanishing"? One could find the question scandalous in view of the whole logic of this thought, in which being is Ollly the sin!.',lar existence of Dmn", If we must, despite everything, pose this question. this is firsr of all by reason of, if not the logic of this thought, then at lcast its to1l41ily (which also means its tension and intensity, if not its intentions).v With the liberation of the thinking afbnng ar b~;ng as sole exigency, as a kind of paradoxical but inevirable harmonic (at least up to a certain point), this tonality makes possible a certain abandonment of the b~;ng of btings, given over [0 the fate of the deployment of the essence of being, and with it, in an indifferent way, to a fury pr0fH"~Y consubstantial with this essence. This tonaliry docs not arise from a simple criliqU~: rather, one should hear res-onate, like an echo. the tension in the conc",,~d response [0 che

Er,i': /)~dlio" n1.llcrialltransccndental irrllprion of devasrating evil in this epoch of lx,ing, Nor is it a qll('Stion or"rdaxing" this tension: the unbearable .IIIlI lh~ unjustifiable have not ceased. But if we must ask ourselves what cxtelll dtis unjustifiable would risk being justified. this is bcc;1II.'iC the thinking ofbcing offers the demand and resource for this question. as we should have understood from the beginning, '\l1ollu:r tonality is at stake. and we must try to understand it, 111('re is yet another reason to pose the question. whK:h the mt!re logjc uf the thinking of heing (it is a logic. how could it he anything d~c?) will never he ahle to answer: the affirmation of Dm,i11 as the cxistt!l1ce of being will always be answered by the affirmation of bdng's heing-free as the "concealment." no doubt dissymmetrical. bUI always dialecticizable. of good and evil. Tbis is truly why Heidcgger's abandonme11l of the theme of frcc:dom will have been logical: as a power of suhjectivity. freedom will in efi'c(t only have 00'11 the illusion in charge of covering over the profound acceptance of the course of things, And freedom's own factuality will always be disliool\'ed into that of necasity, Freeing oneself from this freedom will have remained a wish suspended at the limit of this logic which itself traced the limb of philosophy,

,II

.---

S/Jorl oftllking II stt'Pforthrr-short of taking a step further. if we \:,111 say this. into the irreducible and singular faC:llIalil)' of freedom. and short of taking a st"" fimher into the very logic of the thinking of treedom. it is one step further to say t"at tI" a"nurr, h,", ;1 ;" tk drfision,

hcoomn is frcooom for good ana evil. Irs decision. ifit is in the ul,,:ision that freedom occurs or happens to itself. is therefore the deci\ioll for good evil. Yet. insofar as it d~'ddes, freedom is this del'i\lOIl, the decision for good or evil. Denying that freedom pre\tllls itself as an arbiter placed before values or norms tranSCCIldell! to its own finite transcendence docs not amount to denying that trl'tUom, in deciding. decides for good 0" evil. Only freedom in .1niun (there is no other). at the limit of thought-where thought i\ in turn finally the act that it is. and consequently. wht!n:' it is also dt:l i\ion-dcddes as it liberates (itself) from good or e\'il. This

""a

136 means that it is necessarily. in its act. or even in the very jllC't in which it ftuly lurpriw itst/f not the united and indifferent unleashing of good and evil. btl( in and through itself good or bad decision. Only unleashing unleashes itsclf, but this docs not mean thai it unleashes indifferently, for it would finally only unleash unleashing itself. "concentrated in itself," and consequently always wickedness. Undoubtedly. this does not mean that it unleashes a little of one and a little of the other. or the one as much as the other. without i.selfbeing implicated in this difference or opposition. In unleashing its~lf-and thereby releasing itself and knowing itself as the possibilicy of evil-it also releases itself and knows it5elf as fury oras liberation. We would at least like to try to show this much. "Decision" does not have merely the irreducibly formal staNs given by its enunciation at .he limit of its cvent (or Errignii Would Ertignis be decision?): we name .he decision. but in so doing we do nor enter it; we describe from without a gesture which can then be interpreted either as the simple passage into action of a considerable potencial freedom for good and evil, or as the decision between a "good" and "cvil" previously furnished by the most classical moralicy, or on the contrary as the arbitrariness. also most classical. of a Me subjectivity d«iding on its "good." Decision does not have merely this formal status because, as it is thought in all the rigor of the thinking of existence, the "concept" of decision itself refers to a tilrilion tjfirtivt/y tttltm in this thought. The thinking of existence cannot think frcc decision without havi ng actUAlly decided for its Dum existence, and not for its ruin-not because of a choice and a moral preference anterior to the development of thought. but in the act of thinking posited at the existing limit of thought. (What then comes to light is not a novelty: there has been no philosophical thought worthy of its name that has not proceeded from chis thinking decision of thought. But henceforrh it has (0 think thought as such.) In Being and Time. the analysis of G~UJiSJm ends up at the thuught of decision altd at a tbcis;on 0/tboughtwhich still remains to be brought to light in this very thought. 24 Gewissm means "conscience" in the moral sense that French sometimes accords to the word cOllscima ['"consciousness" or "conscience"-Trans.] but that

E,·;l· D«is;orr

137

is lIot "morality" in the sense of still having to do with any distincril'lI tit "good" and "evil." In Gtwissrn is attested Daftin's "ownI1l1'~t potf'ntiality-for-Being" insofar as, b«ausc it is unfounded I~lllmtuion, which means "existing as thrown," "it is nt''" in P05sc~~illl1 .. f its ownmost heing," In this "nullity," lw;n is discovered ;1.\ ('~~lIlially "i"dth'ta (schu/d;g, which also medllS uguilty''). The exi~t('nt. 3S existent, is indehted to and guilty for the being-itself whil.:h it i~ nOf and which it does not have:: it is indebted to the withdrawal ofheing. we could say in reassemhling the vocabularies of \'arious periods in Heideggcr. and this debt m,m n,,' IN tlln~/td III //It mode ofII mtitllt;oll ofbring-01lt·s-Stlj. but prrcisrl] in liN m"tlr oj'r.\-isttll('t a"tI of'N dtdJion for mftmcr. Z' Dt:bt is revealed to the existent by the call that is addrcssed to it 11)' the mil:e ofirs own/alien "foreignness," which characterizes its be-

in~ as heing-abandoned-lO-the-world. l6 Wirh originary debt or guilt (wh(l~c connection with Benjamin's tragedy could be pur5ul:d) "being-wicked" is also revealed, "Wickedness" here correspond!'i to heing-indebted. For if. on the one hand, it cannot be a qucstion. at this ontological level. of moral values. which have here nnl~' their "existential condition of possibility." and if. accordingly. the Kantian image of conscience as a "trihunal" cannot be taken up again, 011 the other hand "every experience of conscience begins by experiencing somerhing as a 'debt,''' and this is what. in the "ordinary" experience of conscience. the primacy of "a bad ~on­ scicnce" responds to, In other words, what is ordinarily considered as "bad" io; this heing-guihy of not properly being one's being. or of nm proPl'lly being being, bur (which is not specified but which 111l1~t hecome explicit in order to come to rhe decisive point of this ('mire tllllugln) ofII'" bri1lK bring in tht mod~ ofitt bt'blg. which iJ '''~ ",,,t/l' Oft:
EfJi/~

iHris;on

mined and submitted to ;udgmenr (whose possibility. on the connary, it founds). (However. it is equally possible to claim that Dtun" has always already committed the: wrongful act of not existing ac. cording to existence's ownmost possibility-alwa}'ll already. it has not properly and absolutely rendered inclf to its world. and it has not freed itself-it has always already skined the gener05ity ofbeinBand nOl even vulgar consciousness would be so vulgar in this rc:spca.) The ontological undecidability of moral good and evil thus rests in fact on what should be called an ontological archi-dccision of the existent. attt::ited as wrong by the call sent to it by its own existentiality. If it is not wrong in the sense of a choice made between good and evil. it is wrong (and how would it not then have 111_ "ad" infinitely alrtady. decided on a good and an evil? ... ) in that it is in debt and has to decide. The decision. Ent1chnJ,,"I> hen: is not the choice produced at the end of a ddiberation 21 (the aistent docs not delibcrafe whether it exists or will exist: meanwhile, in another sense. we could say that its existence is in itself esscnrially (}di!Nm«d. in the two valcnc~ of the word), but if it rots [tntndatrl. it don so between an undecided state and a state of decision. It decides for decision and for decidability. This could also come 10 mean that if the existent is not "wrong" in any determinable sense of guilt. it is, meanwhile, wrong (as Hegel knew) in thdt it;s ".,;". noc~"t (literally. not to be in-nocent is to cause harm). It is not innocent. since. as an existent thmwn-into-the-world. it is in the very element of its freedom. it is its flct, and freedom is the freedom 10 decide on good and evil. The non-innocence of freedom consritUtC5 the existential condition of possibility of the decision. which makes the existent exist as "resolute." So: Resoluteness. by its ontological essence. is always the resoluteness of some factual Dascin at a panicular time. The essence of Dascin as an entity is its existence. RC50lurencss "cxisu" only as a decision (E"tJt'~ which understandingly projttts itsc:lf. But on what basis docs Ozein disclose itself in resoluteness? On what i~ it to decide? Dilly the decision itself can give thc answer. 21 That the answer is given only by the decision means thar there is

Evil: Drrisio1l

139

no sensc in deciding. by way of the analysis of the ontological slruc!lift: of t'xislence, on what the singular existent mllst decide. This would be to remove it from its vt'ry decision. (0 fold up its freedom ;Ind suppress the possibility that it rccogni7.c itself as indebted to de,i~i()n by the very fact of its existence-by this fact (pf being its own es.~ence) tlNIt tI~ dfcision presmlJ abOl'r all--and this would thcrt:fore be to have fundamentally missed the originary phenomenon of existence. In proceeding as thinking doe; here, which means in letting be the hcing-free of existing bcing-forthe factual and singular dfCisiollhasn't thinking dedded, in itself and for itsclP. From thf romprt-

"rmitm oftl;, non-innfKmft offrrrdom, "asn~;t decidrd for decision find for itr singulttr j(,cwality? This also means: from the com prehcnsion of the existent's being-itself as tkciJ~ existmcr, h35n't thinking decidl.o for the decision that decides in favor of existence, and nOI f(}f the decision that decide.~ to StllJ indrbud to O;;Slma r(}lI!('qllmt~y to appropriatr itulf ttl tlu mmct outsitk of txisunct? Ha.m't thinking dedded. at the most intimate point of its deci ... ion for decision, in favor of the "grace" of existence, and not of the flll)' of essence? (And mormver. since it is henceforth time to ask the following: can we speak of "graec" and "fury," of "healing" and of "ruin." without having allowed a decision to be made by language. whereas what is at stake is allowing every decision as such. in its fr«dom. to decide for one or the other side of what is equally "conn';lled" in being? For if the existent can dt'cidc on ruin ami Oil its own fuin. and if this possibility is inscribed in the very being of exi~lmce. such a decision is no less what also ruins the decision in its exi\lcntial essence,) This is not written as such in Heideggcr's tt'xt. Here. the stakes are t1l11~e of a decision of reading. less in the sense of a question of inIl.:rpreting the discourse of a thinker more or less correctly and faithflilly. than in the sense of a question ofbcin~ addres..~ed by a frecd'lI11 to freely share his thought. The act of reading is here no doubt III retreat as much from scrupulous review 35 from interpretive vi"knee. It rcads hy sharing the freedom through which thought as (hought is always offiml: held om, pmpmed, III be taken and de-

""d

hi,i': Dl'ris;on cided. at the surfacc of the text. (Now it is in the same context that Heideggcr write;: "It is the authentic Being-onc's-Self of resolutenc:ss that makes leap forth for the first time autheR[ic Being-with. Others"; there is no sharing exccpt of freedom. bur there is abo no freedom except in sharing; the freedom of deciding to be-one's-sc:lf outside of sharing is the freedom, lodged at the heart of freedom. to ruin freedom. We can only come back to this decidability.) Thinking hcre decides for decision. or it decides. if we like. for the in-dccision in which alone decision can occur as such. Decision is singuJar. it is "at every moment that of a factual Das~;n." It is not a decision ofsingularity (since singularity is not a preexisting subject. but is singular "in" the very subject and decides in deciding. g/f), but it is a decision for singularity. which means for freedom itself. if freedom is in the relation of singularities and of decisions. Singularity. as decided and deciding itself. is no longer in the noninnocence of the freedom to decide. Yet neither has it become innoceR[ and "good." It has entered into the decided decidabiliry, so to speak, of existence at each momnrt of its existence. Now decision, as singularly existing and as engaging relation and sharing, engap the withdrawal of being. If decision keeps itself as decision. it also keeps being in its withdrawal, as withdrawn. It "saves· if. as Heideggcr says elsewhere. in the sense that "this means releasing. delivering, liberating. sparing. sheltering. taking into one's protection. guarding."l'} What is thus saved is the finitude ofbcing. It is "the essen rial limitation. the finitude [that) is perhaps the condition of authentic existence. "30 finiTUde is what. in singularity and as singularity. withdraws from the innnite grasp, from the molar expansion and furious devastation. of an ego-icy of being. Being withdraws into finitude; it withdraws from "concentration in itself": it is its very being. yet insofar as the very heing of being is being-free, be-ing cannot be this withdrawal {'Xupt by d~cision. Only decided existence withdraws being from the essential "self" and properly holds back its possibility for devastating fury. Only existence. as the exi~ tence and singular factuality of freedom, offers. if not exactly an ethics. in any case this "shelter" of being which is ill own most tthos tiS fhl' nhos or abodl' of fIJi' human b~i"g UIIIO dwells in Ih~ possibility ofhi! ftl'e d~cijioll.

/:-,,;/: D«ision TIKr"C is therefore an authemk dl"Cision-though it ha5 its audll'nritity in the very decision and without the prior distinl'tion of ;111 in.llHhentic or authentic content of decision. Or there is an aurhenticity of decision. that is to say, an authenticity of freedom. Thl."rc i~ an authentic flftdom. which deddes frcedumforexistence amlli!r the singular relation that ir i!i, and which decides it from the hc.m 01 .111 infinite non-innocence where the in-tiniry of being (which does not have its own essence) can always unleash itself. ami in a sense ha!i always already been unlea.~hed. as fury. There is ,I tree decision that frea flttdom for i~lf, fOr irs flniruM. for its sharing. for equality. fi,r community. fOr fraternity. and for their justicesinttllJ.uly. singularly shawtfdivided. singularly withdrawn from the hat~d of existence.

§ 13 Decision, Desert,

Offering

Would authentic decision then be the good? Then: is no positivity of the "good" and the ~jJtl«iml tis ousiils of Plato's Good must again be understood here. Oec;;ision cannot appear to itself as "good" insofar as it will have truly decided. It cannot. quite simply. appear to itself,1 and it is doubtless less frec= ~ more it wants to appear as such. Nothing therefore can assure it. and even less forewarn it. withow suspending its c:ssc:ncc: of decision. It is delivered to irs freedom as 10 rhat which comes-up to it and surprises it. Every decision surprises itself. Every decision is made. by definition, in the undecidable. In this way. essentially (and it is in this sense that 1 have said "authentic" here. a word taken nom Hcidegger. ill spite of or in defiaac of its moralizing connmation), decision cannot decide without letting being be in its finite singularity. I cannot decide without infinitdy abandoning myself to the finitude of my singularity and thus I cannm. in (he strike and cut of my decision, renounce appearing to myself as the "deciding" subject. This is also why my decision is identically. each rime, a decision for rdation and sharing-to the point that the subjtct of my decision can appear to itself as not being simply "me" (but also a "you" or an "us") without it being any less singularly my own, if it is authentic. Yct it must be repeated the deci~ion docs not appear to ;ts~lf: in this way it rkcUks and is decided. Nothing finishes wirh the decision. but everything begins. It is in-

mat

DfC;sion. Vrsm. (Jjfn'ing drcd only here (hat wickedness C"JIl begin (0 be wicked and it is l1l'fC tllilt rum-innocence can become fury. For fury necrls singularity: \\I~h·dness Il'nntJ to l'njo.y [jollir! the spectacle of its ruin and thus fun Illust maintain its presence. Wickedness too lets existence be, in i't~ own way. in ord\"r to ruin it. Othcrv.'i5e what would it address?! bn't decision also the choice of a line of life. vice or virrue. that it would fix lIpon the existent? Yet decision is the access to letting-be. IXlling-he, which is always the contrary of a "laissez-faire" or "Iettin~-h'lppcn." will ceaselessly have to decide, at ever)' moment. iL~ "ethical" relation to the l'Xistence it lets-be. It will be in rhe dury, or ill the shirking of the duty, in virtlle or in its exhaustion. in malignityor goodnas, in the calculated appreciation of circumstances. or in the srnic mknirin that welcomes the right moment. Yet it cannot avoid acceding to the relation with existence. which means to the rci.uilln in existence: with the: being-singular that alone: txists and that CXi~IS in the withdrawal of being. It can unleash the nothingness of this withdrawal in es..<;ential devastation. or expose itself as if to its vcr", existence. Rut it cannot avoid-and this i1i wherein freedom iii a fact-acceding to the singular disscmination of being. and dividing it. Nor. consequendy. can it avoid rxposing itself as the beingsint!lllar ofit~ own decision. exposed to this coming-lip ofhcing in it, wirhdra\\ .d. which only places us into presence as the ones of the orhcro;: this is properly. in ~-un5titutivc and irrcducihle a1terity. to place frecdom illlo the "presence" of itsdr. \ This does nor arm us with a morality. This does nor dilt3te to us \\l1at it will mean, and when and how, "to respect Olhers." "to respect (llle~c:lr." "to treat hlllllanit)' as an end." or to want equality, fra(emil)', and justice for the human community. This docs nor even dinOlrC' when and how to respect. and nor give. death (my own or that of others) as this singular possibility that "belongs" only to \ingllbrity.4 This gains us neither determined duties nor rights. l 'IIJllIlhtedly. their determination can itself he nothing oillcr than tlw product of infinitely renewed decisions that are r<."disclIssed and rl'I\C~oliated in the general:;pacc of the: decision. But this frees LIS for dilly ;lI1d right. and for the perversion of the one and the other. \X'hat makes liS free. then, is the freedom that exposes us and

lRcision.

D~sm,

Offrring

that is only what it is in this exposure. Neither will nor destiny, but the gift of what Heidcgger calls "disdosedness:"

In the term "Situation" rsituation"-"to be in a situarion") there is an overtone of a signification that is spatial. We shall not try to c:liminate this from the existential conception .... But spatiality of the kind whkh bdongs to iJasnn. and on the: basis of which cxisu:na: always determines its "location." is grounded in the state of Being-in-the-world. for which disdwcdncs.~ is primarily constitutive. JUSt as the spatiality 0( the "there" is grounded in disdosedness. the Situation has its f0undations in resoluteness. 5 Disclosedness louv"turrJ and resoimeness arc correlativc, whic:h means that d~ion a.5 such is essentially "disclosivc" or "spatializingD (a spatiality mat does not return to timc. but which is "at [he same time" the spacing of the space and time of existence). Now, the disclosedness that characterizes the decision in its authenticity iI the disdosedncss to (or of) the "free." Once he had separated freedom as theme from the metaphysics of subjectivity. Heidegger wiD not have ceased to give more and more: scope, if we can say this. to the motif of "the open" as a motif of "free space,"" itself coJUid. ered either as a "prospatiality" of "the free space of time" (we: could say: it is herr that surpri~ is involved), or as a "spacing" that "carries the free, the disclosed. the spacious ...

"Spacing is the seuing fr~ of places" -and places thar have been set free undoubtedly answer to whaI Bonnefoy calls "the true place": The true place: is a fragment of duration consumed by the eternal. at dae truc place linu: is undone within us. .. Perhaps it is infinitely dose; ir is also infinitely distant. Such are the ironic presence and being in our instant. The true place is given by chance, but at the true place chance will lose: it5 enigmatk ,har.lI;ter ..•• There is beauty in this kind of place. but a beauty !IO extreme that I would no longer belong to myself. in being governed and a...,umed by its perfect command. In this place I woulcJ also be profoundly free. for nothing in it would be foreign to , me.

145 Thi~ ~patiality. or spa<:iosity. is the space offl'C'cdom, inasmuch as trl·l.'llom is. at every momelll, the freedom uf a free space. Which ,11t';1I1S that it consritures the spatializing or spacing essence of freethull. Spacing is the gcneral"form"-which precisely has no form. hut ~i\'cs room fur forms and formations. and which is not general, hut which giVl'S room tor singularities-of existence: the spacing. exposure. or I'C'tl'C'nchmcot and (:uuing (c.loci~i()n) of singularity. the 11","irt (whkh is, as we have indicated elsewhere. the charaaer of II;~ of ~inglliarity in its ditTerence which relates it to its limit. to others, and to itself: for l"
that gnaws. and tends to grow. in all dirt'Ctions. The nomads inha"it ,hese places; they remain in them. and Ihey rhenudvC5 make Them ~RJw. for it has been established that the nomad~ make the an 1111 It·" than they arc made by it. They arc vcctou of ckterritorialir.uion. Thry add desert to desert. 5t~ppc: to 5tc:ppe. hy a series oflocal operations wI1l1~C: orientation and direction ~ndl~~~ly vary. there is no line ~1:p.lt;1ting earth and sky; rh~re is no intermediate dislOlnce. no per~Itcuiv~ or contnm; visihility is limited; and yet th~re is an ~xtraordi· naril~' fine topology that relies not on points or ubjects hili rarh~r on h.teen·ides. on ..et~ of" relations (wind5. undulations of snow or sand or l rl'.lking of ice. the lauile: qualities uf horh).~ 'p.l("C

"\I'

,\, this desert which is nul an increase of devastatiun. but (he J! rO Wlil of its own spadng as (he nomad's dwelling phlce. frCt'dom II'Jt:~ lint receive a space rhat would be given to ie, bur it gives it~elf

lkrision, Dtyrt. Ojfrring space and gives space to itself a.'i the incalculable spacing of sinsu_ larities. In other words, freedom itself is not the essence of ~ f_ but the "free" is the existing opening by which freedom takrs plac:r: It is not PU" spacing. it is al50 "habitation"-habitation in the: open-if the nomad does nO[ represent errancy without at the same time repre;enting a dwelling, and thus an tlhoJ. This is not exactly what one would understand as an Kethics of freedom." It is the tthos it.self as the opening of space, the spacious shelter of being in existence, deciding to remain what it is in the _ lancing from self, in this distancing that delivers it (0 its retreat, to its existence. generously. It is a generosity of ethos more than an ethic of generosity. "Freedom" itself. in the spaciosity of being when: freedom is opened rather than engulfed, proves to be: generosity even btfO"be:ing freedom. It gives rise, in the exposure ofbeing,1D its own singularity always newly decidable, always newly surprised by its decision. This generosity does not dominate fury. which is born with it. Yet it gives. without counting-without counriDB anything but fury-it is the in6nite gift of finite freedom. while fury is the finite appropriation of infinite freedom. It gives freedom. or offm it. For the gift is never purely and sim· ply given. It does not vanish in the receipt of the gift-or of cbc Kp~t." The gift is precisely that whose "present" and presentation are not lost in a realiz.ed presence. The gift is what comes-up to the presence of its "presem." It also keeps itself, in this comins-up and surprise of the gift, as gift, as the giving of the gift. In this it is an offering. or withdroiwal, of the gift in the gift itselF. the withdrawal of its being-present and the keeping of irs surprise. It is not a question here of the economy of the gift. where the gift comes back to itself as the benefit and mastery of the giver. On the contrary. it is a question of what makes the gift as such: an offering that may not be returned to anyone, since it remains in itself the frtt offering that it is (this is why. for example, one never gives what one: has received to a third party. lest one annul the gift as gift). One must keep the singular present in which the gift as such is kept. that is, offered! it is presenred. made freely available. but is freely held back at the edge of the receiver's free acceptance. The offering is the inestimable

147 I"in' of the gift. The generosity ofhcing offers nothing other than l'xisrcnce. and the offering. 3S such. is kept in freedom. All of this n1l.',IIH: a !ipace i!i offered whose spacing. C"olch time. only happens by ',1\' uf a c.iecision. But there is nor "a" ,tecision. There is. each time. 111~: own (IT singular minc)-yours, theirs, ours." This is the generosit)' of being. l11rl't U, then. that which should become more and more ur~t'nt tor our thinking, as its theme ,md 3S its decision: this gencro~ity ofbcin~, its !ibmllity, whid, dispenses that IN mmm,;llg and that we exist. This taking place of something offers itsdf in 1111: opening that frees places and the tiee space of time. TIle openin~ dcK.'S not open unless ~ let it open, and we only let it open if we Il'l cmrsclve5 be exposed in exutence. We arc: exposed to our ~om. There is theretore finally rhe ~cnerosity of being dispensed in the ~ll ural singularity of "us": the freedom of the decision, which is always "mine" in the sense that all property of my essence vanishes and [har the entire community of existence is involved. Yet this gift is kept in the oftrring. It is kept there as what is unfOunded in ficedom. as (he in~scnce of existence, as the dcsertlike and nomadic: charac(t'r uf its dwelling. as the risk of its experience or the pirating of its tuundations--and consequently also as lhe threat of a free hatred of freednm. If there is a hope of thinking. without which we would not even think. it docs not consist in the hope of a torallibernrion of freedom that wa~ to occur as the total mastery of freedom. The hisrory of a ~il1lilar wait is over. "(ollay rhe (hreal of a devastation of existence alllnt' has an)' positivity. Yct the hope of thinking signifies that we wuuld not even think if existence were not the surprise of being.

t'""

§ 14 Fragments

How might a discourse offrccdom correspond to its obj«t (supposing this made sense)? How might it ·speak freely" (as one "spcab frankly" or as one "speaks up") in speaking of freedom and in order [0 speak of it, or ro let it speak? I give no particular credit to the form of the fragment. inasmuch as I employ it here (as occasionally elsewhere) and entitle this paragraph with this form, and with no theme or concept. h a form. fragment is exposed to all the ambiguities of which its history since Romanticism. if not since: the moralism' maxims, has made us per. fecdy aware. These are the ambiguities of a freedom represented simultaneouslya.o; disengagement. as a surpassing of all rules and of a1llitcrary genres. and as a concentration of self~nstitution and &elf. sufficiency. Because they are csscntialto the brevity and discontinuity of the fragmentary form. these ambiguities cannot be removed. Nevenhcless, as Blanchot indicates in one of his fragmentary textS, if the fragment is "something strkt." this is "nor because of its brevity (it can prolong itself to the point of agony) but because of a tightening and strangling to the point of rupture. "I In principle the fragment can be, even should be. singuJar and continuous. It shouJd be a single. continuous fragmentation-neither "just onc" fragmem nor dl!t3ched fragments. I would even say: philosophical discourse today is fragmentation itself. Philosophy no longer stops being written at the limit of the rupture of its discourse--which

me

!-i-agmmts

149

111t".111~ philosophy's "cnd," but likcwisc its "Iibcration." Why is it.

"wn. that fact does not make il .;elf the eqllal of right. and why deddt: \0 finish-un finish he~. in the torm of the fragment. an essay asriring 10 be philmophieal~ lkcause of poverty, simply because: of insufficiency. It is too dear III me, too harshly visible. that the skctl.:h bardy outlined in the rn:l.e(ting pages of a frcc thinking of freedom has at this point n1t:rdy begun, that nothing h3.~ been said. and that this discourse ~11l11l'S too soon for something that undouhtedly precedes it from .tt:tr. Ir is too dear to me that every I.:ontinuation of this discourse as ir is (not mine, but our~. this discourse in which the word Mf'rccdom" can in no way approach the liberation of its own meaning. nor of the meaning of ownership in general. of wh,H freQ it and of what frees from it, etc.). evcry use of 5upplementary philosophical resources (whid! are not lacking). is from the start commiuoo to the: continu;!1 fragmematioll that is in question here: the fragmentation of a thinking of freedom. Consequently. fn:edom cannot be signaled CXl'Cpt :u that which comes to thought only through the "agony" of this thought, with the "strangling" of this discourse. '10 condude-illld to begin-it is freedom's own fragmentation lhat in fuct escapes discourse. Philosophy rejoins neither its own "('lid" nor its own "Iiheration." It pettily crumbles. shon of the ·'fr.lgmenr" as well as of"discoufSC."ln speaking offreedom. one has to a~~cpt being confronted h}' this insistent stripping away. If I anemptoo [0 rea(;h the end (as if there were one .. ) of this a~'my, to usc discourse untiringly against this rock (thing. force. gaze) of frc:cdom. until exhaustion. until syncope, until death. I would lilll1btlcss not be wrong, and yet I would he cheating. I would keep Ih" surprise and experience of frc~lom for a beyond 1Il.\t I would pretend to attain in disappearing. But thc cxperience i\ .1lrcady taking place. 3.'i I have continually sai(t. and all philosophy h.1\ said it without ever being ablc to say it (except hy cheating ... ). And I would be cheating no less with thc community, which is the ~ill' of this experience btU which cannot communicate: this expcril'IWe to itself 35 its ,ammon essence, because it is not an essence. but a ''''Iring. Freedom sharcs and shares itself. Philosophical discoursc

150

Fragmmts

cannot think of rep~senring it or of presenting it: in thinking freedom. philosophical discourse mwt think of itself as shared. as at the same time "communicating" something (of the concept. and even of the concept of the limit of the concept). and as apart: separated in its praxis from other praxes where experience takes place. similar and infinitely dissimilar. Freedom places philosophy before irli strangest. most discon_ certing truth. So then-fragments. They run the risk of appearing to bring abom an ambiguous reversion of "philosophical discourse- to a "literary form" and of seeming to give in to another trick. But without this risk. despite everything. no maner what I did I would be betraying yet more certainly the experience of freedom. I would claim to offer it as a concept (even if as a concept of the limit of the c0ncept) or to draw it a.'1 a conclwion from an analysis. or to identify it with the movements of a discourse, and even with irs tightening. its continual fragmentation. But the experience of freedom is already taking place. and it is only a question of this, along with our formidable insufficiency to "know" it. "think" it, or "say" it. So then. tTagments. as vague. uncertain marks of th is insufficiency. 2 The risk of seeming to reappropriate through "literature" what would be lost in "philosophy." At least since Nieu.5che. and up until all of w today-all those who dare philosophize-there has been no philosophical writing exempt from this risk. or from coming to terms with it: Bergson as much as Hcidc:gger. Delellze as much as Derrida. In certain respects, the hisrory of contemporary philosophy is the history of this risk. in all the diversity of its variationtwhich means. in all the diverse ways in which freedom has come to implicate itself as a writing of philosophy (s£yle. genre. character. address. audience. company. proximity. translations. untranslatabiliries. words. metaphors. fictions. pOliitions of enunciation. and so on and on: all that renders the "philosophical genre" hardly recognizable and yet perfectly identifiable in the concept. analysis. demonstration. 5ystematicilY. self-grounding. and self-questioning that were always its own).

.--..

FmgmmtJ

lSI

Concerning the insufficiency I have memional. I would claim neither ,hat it is necessary. nor that the constraint of freedom is [0 IR'IHI us securely to the necessity that freedom should bc seized (rum us. nor that it has "appropriated" u.~ in such a way that there is nn longer any sense. "afterwards. n in wanting to appropriate it to l11lCSelf. Undoubtedly. this is true. It is even trllth it~elf. BlIt ·'insufficiency." and its correlate in the "strangling" of discourse, II'? pr(riltly not yn at ,be 'ePle' o/w/Jar is in ,,,mioll bfTf. It is not a question of an impossible appropriation hecause it is "above our ",cans" or bccaU5C it happens in death and as death. It has to do with a ljllcstion that an appropriation here cannot and must not pose in om}' terms. There is nothing to ask of this gcnre. or to look fur. or 10 inrerrugate positively or nc:gath·eJy. And that it should be so is in no 'ar a deprivarion. but is freedom itself. -Still. I cannot avoid saying. Ihis is freedom p'"Optr. Yet anorher thing (or the same thing. differently) must be at H.lke in this chiaroscuro necessity of the fragment: something. dearly. that touches on thc relation of philosophy and literature. It is not Ihat the fragment would give a literary form to philosophical thought and its un-thought (one knows. from here on, how the thought of the form/ground couple must be deconStfucted. and I might add that the entire question of freedom perhaps finds itself invl'S(cd here. beginning Wilh, for example, classical motifS of the "freedomn or "necessity" of the "form" in relation to the "ground"). Rather. what is at stake in the relation of philosophy and literature i~ what Derrida has named writing. (Perhaps we should say that he has 514rnamedit "writing." recapturing and rewriting words and lflllC:Cpts that the period brought forth on (he basis of Nietzsche. l\cnjamin, I-Ic:idcggcr. Bataille. and Blanchot.) Writing is the moveIllent of meaning in the suspension of signification. which withdraws me.millt; 111 giving it. in onler to give it as its gift. (I would ~y: il\ otTering.) (In a more recent vocabulary. accompanying Blanchot, I lcrrida chooses to say: the step. the past, the pa.'iSage amI pace of truth "which becomes irrcve~iblc in the truth of the ptIS,n, where Ihis IJ~t truth multi he underst(xKl as me la.~t truth of rnt·aning.) In wrir-

Fmgmmts ing. there is nothing philosophical or literary. Rather. writing lI'acti an es.
me

Fmgmmts lens ion of the logic of offering and withdrawal. We communi·.ltc--that is to say. above' all we "arc in common" or we "comrC;lr" [Cllm-ptlraifrtj in the withdrawal of communicated sense and in the withdrawal of the sense of col1ununication-tf"d in the sharing of "genrcs" or systems of discourse. 1 cannot pretend to com'l1~micate a common sense (even though such a "pretension" must abo be what decides to write). But if I decide to write, I am subject inullcdiatdy to the sharing. and to (he incommensurability of the incol11mon (compare above. Chapter 7). If I say "so tllt'n. the fragment ," I am allowing. or trying to allow. ''''l1Nhing of this sharing (0 play "in" "my own" discourse and in "addl\.~sillg" "my" readers. Something, certainly very few things. hut I ("[mllot master the calculation of its effects (readings); I cannot rd,,~c its game or risk. 1 cannot set aside its decision. It is a political and ethical minimum. Freedom is at stake here. without which the most open, communicative, and democratic writing, the writing that is most (:areful of common sense and also most rigorously philowphical. can cover up (he worst lie and accompany the worst pulitics. KWt' must not give ourselves illusions: freedom and reason, these two ethical as well as ethico-aesthetic concepts that me d:usical age of German cosmopolitanism bequeathed to us as distinctive ~i~ns nfhumaniry, have not done very well since the middle of the nineteenth century. t~radually they became 'off-beat,' we no longer knew 'what to du with them: and if we let them get corrupted, Ihi~ i~ less a success of their enemies than of their friends. We muSl Iherefore not give ourselves illusions concerning the: fact that we, or OUr ~u\:«~ssors, will t:ertainly not return to these unt:hanged repreICl)t;]tions. Our task, and the sense of what will put our spirit lO the 11.'\1. will be much morc-and this is the task of pain and hope, so r"rt'l}" understood. that weighs on each generation-lO effect the aJ,ly~ l1t.'Ce~"'i:lry anc.llongl.'d-for transitiun to the new, with as few dis·l\tn~ as possible!" (Rohert Mwil. On Stupidity. '937: must we specif~· that this h1ure, a~ its ririe ought to shuw. un.lmhiguOlL~ly targCl\.-d

b . . ('i~Il\?)

·54

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Freedom can experiment with itself up to the limits of its own experience-where nothing separates it any longer from "necessity:

I have been told: "You offer no semantics of the word ·freedom...• True. lhc senses of this word matter little to me (but its strategic p0sition. much). It does not cease, in tradition as wdl as for us. to ~ proach "necessity." And this is exacdy the question: from such • proximity of the two, something entirely other must inevitably free itself: me truth of experience. We can no longer even say: "Freedom, Diotima, if only we understood this sublime word! " (Holderlin, Hy~rio,,),

Let w give without commentary me elements of an etymological semantics: according to a first derivation, lib~I'tIJ.j. like ~1mthnM, has a base *kudholkudhi signifying "public," attached to *1nuJh: the idea of growth, increase. Another etymology. less cenain. maka libmas come from librr, book: the 1i1N1lus. little book or bookie! of frcc expression, would account for its moral meaning. As for me Anglo-Saxon fr«1jM. its first signification is: beloved, cherished (friend and Frru"d arc from the same family), because in my house there are those (love. and slaves. Libni, children. first designates the children of a free man. But in facr there are rwo categories: .. lilJmlrum hominum alii i"g~nui Junt, alii libmi,,;"' (Gaius, Institutitnltlt I. 10). The i"gmus is born from a free father (and means "distinguished, liberal. generous. sincere. refined"), the libtrtinus is bom from a father who was himself freed (enfranchised), (Of course. these ingenuous or libertine children are not the rejects-proltJ-of me proletariat,) Nrcwllrius, for its part. primarily designates a person with whom one is close. but not consanguineous: hence a friend. someone from whom one cannot separate. What other semantic is there. which would not he the complete program of the philosophy of freedom? Freedom to do. to aa, or

FmgmmlJ

ISS

frc:c\iOIll in view of ...• fn:edom as an esse:nce to be rcaliu:d or as a ciwn Ilc1ture. responsible freedom and rC5ponsibility toward freedom. i-r~I:Jotn as right or power. self-determination, free will. recognirion of common law. individual or collective freedom, civil. ecoIlomic. political, sodal. cultural freedoms. the assumption of ne.:t-~~iry. anarchy. libenine or libertarian freedom. liberality, freedom L1r tnovemenrs, freedom of spirit. the free end of a rope or chainnone of these: should escape our anenrion, yet none of these ex;Kriy Illatcha what is at stake here under the name of "fn:edom." Such an: the stakes of the limit that freedom iJ. or rather that it always surpasses: in touching the outside o/Iht ins;J~. one does not therefore pass the limit. for the exhaustion of thUi touching is unlimited. And this exhaustion is equally what effaces itself before, and in the coming to presence of, the thing itself-a coming to pr<.'!Icnce lhat no pn:selll will ever ClpIUn:. that no pn:sentation will e\·cr secure or saturate. The coming [0 presence of the other of thought exhausts all thought of the other. --... ( )ne could say thai in freedom there is the ontological imperative. or hdng as intimation-hut under lhe condition of adding thai thi~ is without commandment (no commandment/freedom dialectic) or thai lhe commandment is lost in freedom's abandonIlII.'I1l lO ilSdf. alllhc way to caprice and chance.

.

Under the name of freedom. it now seems to me that I have Iricd to ,\iscuss something that would have, in a sense. the structural I'"~ition of Hegelian death (of metaphysical death, therefore-and I~ thi~ not always the site and operation of deliverallce?). Yet this wnuld not be the negative and hence would nO( lend snen~(h to a di.,k~(ic. One negative is the negation offrecdom. of which frCt'dom il'dfi~ alone capahle. It is the fury of evil. But cvillikewisc doC's not txi" ;lS a dialectical moment; it is an ahsolure possibility offrcxdom.) ~lIlllc'hing else: thell. in place of death: purring rhe exi!;[clU illlu 'ltl" wmld. Hirth. which is ,Ioubdess birth to death-nor. however. in lh(" sense that binh would he "~i)r" death (with this doubtful

1~6

Fragments

value of "for," if it is used to translate Heideggds "ztlm Toal'). but in the altogether different sense in which death is that to which. or in which. there is birth: once again. exposure to the limit. Not "freedom or death!" (though I want to erase nothing of the power or nobility of this cry in our history). but: freedom in plAc~ ofdeath. Thought. then. does nm have the relation with freedom that Hegelian spirit has with death. It does not have to "dwell in it fearlessly." In the first place, thought is not a dwelling. not a tomb or an abode. but a nomad spac;;e (and yet it is also a plac;;e to stay. perhaps even a house .. ). Next, thought cannor he exempt from fright in the face of the freedom which precedes it, which always surp~ es it, and toward whim it can n~er turn back (thought is therefo~ not a fear "in the face of," as there is no Hegelian "face-to-facewith the abyss). It cannot but be anxious about freedom to the point of making a mockery of all thought-or to the poim offree.. ing a laugh whose joy is limitless. In freedom, thought encounters nm so much an "unthinkable" as the umhinking (and it does not "cncounter" it: there is no "encounter" here, not even the so-c:allcd encountering of others' freedom. beuuse this freedom is not exterior to me). The unthinking mher weighs thought and gives it weight or withdraws its weight. The transcendental materiality or fie.. tuality of freedom is the unthinking other, whim does not even think thought, but delivers it to itsd£

mis

I would have liked. and it would have been necessary, for work to have been able to go furthcr-I do not mean only in analysis or problematization. but ac;;tually to the poim of withdrawing and puuing under erasure all its discourse into material freedom. I could have been tempted to make you hear music now, or laughter. or cannon shots taken here and there in the world. or moans of famine. shrieks of revoll-or even to present you with a painting. as we find in Hegel when the young girl prescnts the outstanding products of' ancicnt art and the divine places that the gods have lcft.~ Quite dearly, this would be temptation itself. the cunning abdication of thought into the immediate. into rhe "lived." inlo the ineffable.", or inm the praxis and art de~ignated as the others of

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thought. On the contrary. it is a question of refilming praxis [0 thinking. Something from Marx inevitably resonates here with !o41t11l:lhing from fh·idegger. A material thinking of the at:tion of lhought? But it rt'mains equally cenain-and this is an indestructiblt' remainder-that on the limit of thought, thought is exposed to the inlb:ision between di~course and gesture, both of which are of thclllgill. bm thre-.nen at every moment to break out of it. That is, thc~' Ihn.-aten to he only discourse or only ~l·sture. Here again, there i\\IMring. between "the we.1pons of criticism" and the ·critique of . ';ll'lOns," ht!tween the "action of Ihinking" and the "thinking of acIlOilo" Thi~ sharing must he thought orprnniced by deciding each timc the ullJeciJahle. ()Ilt! could also SOlY; thinking in action is always suspended (and "in potential." so to speak) hetween these [WO ultimate possibilities: "lhe words to say it mY'l"ddni' and "the words arc lacking not 18 S4J if. hut to llo it." Only in and through this primary indecision is there any d,,'Cision of thinking (since thinking always engages itself where "\\'ord~ are missing": this is its freedom. for which precisely nodting is missing, except words).

.-.... Note 1. to Chapter 7 (p. 191.) says: "there would be the freedom of /)'lJfill and the freedom of beings in general. one in the other and title throu~h the other. n Thi5 is one of the most difficult points. hl1t doulnless. fInally. one of the most necessary. Heidegger. in the period of /killg alld J"imt'. means to "tistingui~h the factuality of / )tHrill from the factuality ot: li'r example. the "stone" (see §17 of Rt'ilig lind Tinlt'). It seems to me that this cannot he so simple. lhnc GlI1nnt he. al least on what we could l:all a first level (but is it ollly Ihe first? \'\-'hat would this distinction of levels me-.m?), sever.11 bl'llialities. 71rl"Tf;/ the factuality of the world. /\f!.ain. what I in,j'l UI1 calling filaltt"j~}, ami what. lInder thi~ name. gives the !llll~l rl'iiahlt' (ami most problem;nic) glllliing thread of freedom fr"tn 1\;ltlt to the freedom U'f have to think (this thread passes t1"'1I1~h He~c1. Marx. Nietzsche. and Heidegger). iJ the "there is" '\tlh .111 its ftlrCc uf "rc-.. I prcsel1(;e" (withoUl torgetting an)' of the

Frttgmmts

problems related to such a "presen~.. -ftr5[ and above all. that presen~ is in its coming, not in its being-present). Factuality aa factualiry is also (I would almost say "and first of all," were it not preferable not to introduce any order here) the fac[Uaiity of the Slone. the mineraI, a~ well as that of the vegetal. animal. cosmic, and rational. Presence, impenetrability. th~rt' without "ek-stasy." . fonn the material-transcendental condition of a Dtts~in {and with this 1Ulm~ one must rename "man" in the sense (hat (his man is a singular material presence: a man. and not a stone. bur the one and the other there. the one beside the other; in this regard. moreover. we see that we should no longer be able to say in such a context "man" in the generic sense, but only "man" or "woman"). Will I then say that in this unique (which docs not mean "identical in all its modalitiesi factuality a unique (and nonidentical) .... dom must offer ilSdP. Will I say that all thin~ are free? Yes. if Ilmew how to understand this. Bur at least I know that it would have to be understood (even while I know that such an "understanding" would have to be disentangled from the "understanding" of philO$Opbera). We cannot content ourselves with sharing the world between Ihwi" and bein~ that are Vorhantkn and Zuhantkn-not only because these categories do not permit, or permit poorly. malcing space and allowance for the animal and vegetal. other modes that are also undeniably modes of "cx-iSlena:." though in a way that remains ob5curc to our understanding. But alOio. and abow au' because one must be able to affirm. for every thing, the withdrawal of the rarm in it (analyzed above; sec Chapter 9). In the thing without causality (neither caused nor causing) there is beingness (hantitl) as the p0siting (StolZUng, not S~Uung) of the thing. existence as what makes the being-thrown. not only in the world (of DtIJ~;n), but ofthe world. The world is not given. substantial and immobile. in ordn for US to comc Ih~rt. The Ih~rt of the "there is" is not a receptacle or a place arranged in order for a coming to produce itself th~rt'. The thnt is itself the spacing (of space-time) of the coming. because there is ail (and totality is not the fastening. the complction without remainder; it is the "having there" [y avoir) , the taking place [a~r lim). the unlimited "coming there" Iy vmir) of the delimited thing;

Fragments which alst) means that totality is all, except totalitarian, and it is olwiouslya qut'Stion here of freedom). Nur is the world (this is clear in Heidegger) the ,orrdate of an in((·l1l1onality. (Perhaps it should be said. from the very interior of a IllI~~erlian logk. that the "transcendence of the world" cannot work without the fa"ual-material effectivity of a world that no longer arises flom any "naive thesis"; one must perfOrm a "reduction" here that would no longer be "eidctic," hurt if we dare say it. "hylcti,-'.") In no sense is the world "for me": it is tl" mmtial m-Nlonging of (.\:-;tun~~ with tlJ~ ccistillg ofail things. Without that existence would be only ideal. or mystic:al, , , , Hut existence takes pl:K:e on the surface of things. If we thoroughly investigated this essential cobelonging (of the essen,c:-Iess). we would find that no thing can he simply "necessary" and that the world is not "necessary," We could not isolate on one side the causality of phenomena. and on the other noumenal fr«dom (this is what, ~r since Hegd. we have not stopped debating with Kant ). What would we find men? Let us try. provisionally. to say: something like a dinlllMn, which would not be dunce (another necessity). but the free opening of ,he ",here is" in gt:nt:r.tl-whi,h is never precisely general, but always on the order of"cach rime." Clinamen. or declension. indination of the "there is," ofthe "n g;1,t," of the offering, Por it to be. it must bend. it must slant-fiom nuthing toward nothing. Or again, the blink [din], the blinking uf appearance. of the ,oming of all things. a.~ secret as the "wink of an eye" (as the instant). hut JUSt as motivated and just as insistent as it is. Only in this way can there he an opening. a redpro~a1 clearing uf D.lsnn and of beings in totality, without their becoming indis[in~uishahle. but without their being submitted to the exclusive apparatus of subjectivity and representation. (The thought of reprt'sc:ntation inevitably ,ondemns freedom. since the prescnce "beyond" representation is there given as "necessity," and freedom is ,onIl'llt In play wilh representations. in order finally ro dissolve into repIl'~('ntation,)

In this scnse, the Slone is free. Which means that there is in the \llIne-or rather. liS it-this freedom of heing that being is. in

160

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which freedom as a "fa,t of reason" is what is put at slake according to co-belonging. (l do not deny. it should be empha~i7..ed. that in aU of this I am openin~ an enormou.~ question in which one cannot but find provocation, especially since I posit no result.) I have uied to say that "we are the freedom of all things- and perhaps (his expression should not be kept. At least its intention is in no way subjectivist. It docs not mean that we represent the entire world in our freedom. but rather that the freedom of being pUb itself at stake as the fre:e existence of the world and a~ our ex-istcncc: 10 this freedom-which also means that we are responsible for me freedom of the world. And this could not be without consequences for the question of tedmology (and on the at once open and apolUic position of this qUC."ition in Heidcgger). Not that we have to p~ teet nature agail1St teehnical exploitadon (when something of this son has to be done. it is always oncc again a matter of technology); but in technology we liberate. and we liberate ourselves to the freedom of the world. It is no surprise that this can cause anguish and profound ambivalence. But we do not have: free access to what happens here. as long as we think only of freely exploiting the unfree ~ mainder of beings. This is also what makes us accommodate ourselves to entering into this class of beings as workers. The thought of a proletariat. like the thought of ex-istence in which a ~ ciprocalliberation of"naturc" and "history" would be played out. could find something here to reconsider-mediated. it is true. by many kind~ of displacements and transformations. I have absolutely no intention of extrapolating in a confused way the idea of freedom. How could I do [his withoU[ making USC of such an "idea"? Whatever the exrreme difficulty and strangeness of the problem. if the being of beings is the being ofbeinfl. and not a kind of hidden daimoll telling its secrets [0 Das~in. we cannot avoid detouring through the freedom of the world in order to come to our own freedom. This is a necessity of thinking, a political and ethical exigency. KAurhemic decision" (Chapter 12): a difficult thought. a limitthought, at least for the powers of thi.~ essay. How can we affirm char

FmgmmtJ

.6.

,hrrr is an "authrntic" decision. which amounts [0 affirming and anIlPlll1c:ing an ethical fi:llIndation without hcing able to present the tllul"tuinn or nature of this "authenticity"? (Keeping this word '·.Iuthenticity" is already more than ambiguous, since it means that (lm' is install('cl in an axiology ... ). Furthermore: how am we do it. JS lung as we rest assured that freedom constrains us to undo or frllUf,lte the logics of"fi:llIlldation"? Ami yet. "w(" knnw what evil is" (compare Chapter 13). We know it all the more since its overwhelming self-evidence has been made C\'cn nmre widc:ipread by our recent anti present history, Bur what we Jim know is [hat moral foundations have not only collapsed unJer this evil. but have lent it a hand. And it is not for nothing mal the scruem:e "Freedom. how many crimes a~ committed in your name!." whose author 1 have forgonen. has become a disabused adage of modern rime5. The undecidahility in which there is decision is not [he equivalcm:c (If all decisions. It is the impossibility [hat the "decider" of the d('t:i~ion (at once its criterion am,l agent) precede the decision itself. which is a very different kind of und«idallility. But the decision that llecides iudf decides for the authentic or nOI. Doubtless, in Hl.'iJel!Ser. this decision remains in at lea.~t one sense too "heroic" and linked-why nor say it thus?-to a "system of value5" that up to il (c([ain point commands and secretly decides tbe very analysis uf the decision. T"i~ also amounts to saying that "authenticity," d('~pite HeiJeggcrs intentions. can only be cut from "inauthenticity." lIf which 3mhcnricity musl be "only a modified grasp."~ l.c[ m leavc the cxaminarion of lhis point in Hc:idcgger for later. It s(.'cms to me that we can also seck to understand lhat there: is a deri\iull fi:>r freedom which is not the dcdsion for the freedom [0 ~Ii'pend fl't'l'dnm. even though in both cases it would be the same frl'ecloll\ thilt decides itself. hcedum is pr«isc:ly what is free for .llld .lgainst itself. It c.mnot be what it is except by remaining, at every I11Olllmt. freedom of "grace" a"eI of "ftl'}·... This chasm is its "foun,l.lIlon • its absence-of-gruuml. But this is also the chasm through whirh the freedom that choo....es itselfand the freedom that destroys it,I/-/rare the same and not the same, And perhaps freedom "is"

Frttgmmts

nothing other than this absolure diffe~nce in ab~olute idenrity. How can one grant that it is an "authentic decision?" The decbion that ~ freedom against itself is the decision to sup. press decision-and consequently to suppress the undecidable that render5 decision possible and necessary. Or rather, it is the suppression of the existentiality of existence itself (a suppression rhat takes a thousand forms. besides murder). The dec~ion for nilwhich remains the possibility essentially conjoined and therefore absolutely proper (0 the decision for good-is a dccision for what leaves nothing more to be decided. Authentic decision is on the contrary a decision for a holdi1lgof decision as such, which is its ~ propriation and reconquest in the indecision that is itself malntained as an opening of the possibility of deciding. And this is why authentic decision dots not know itstJfas such, or as decision for the good. It cannot present itself to itself as "good." It remains in itself different from itself. The decision for evil is what can appear ID itself as "good," as a decision "taken" or "resolved." but not "hdelin the sense indicated above. One has co determine (mznmnj, that io;, one has to derermine!hat we will be able and will always have to determine again. even ifk is only to make this "same" decision every time: because as tkdJint, and not as already decided, decision is at every moment new. Yet qcj. ther dcxs this mean that authentic decision, reopening at every moment in itself the diffcrence of in-decision. never decides except to .. let everything happen rtout laiSJtT foirt!. Letting evert" thing happen is also a way of annulling decision, as much in the 1iberal or anarchist sense that can be given this expression as in the sense oflctting everything be done in the extreme, which completes the whole by exterminating it. The authentic decision is precisely against the possibility of doing "everything," or lerring it be done. But as decision. it chooses not to do "everything." Prescription, obligation. and responsibility remain fastened to it. One will say: now it is without content or ethical norms. No doubt. But did it ever have any of these? Decision i~ the emprr moment of every ethics. regardless of its contents and foundations. Decision. or freedom. is the tlhos at the groundless ground of ever'!

Fnrgmmts ctllks. \'(Ie have to decide on contents and norms. We have to decide I.tws. exceptions. cases. negotiations; but there is neither law 11M e:xn'ption for decision. Its "authenticity" is not on the register of dIe: I.tw. Or rather. it is this law withdrawn from every form of law: dlc cxistentiality of decision, freooom, which is also the decision of cxi~"'nce and fur cxUtence, rc:ccivcd well before every imperative and ever\, law. ',(/e therefore do not have to think in terms of new laws (even though we also have tn make them). and we do not have to invent a "morality" (with hardly any irony, we can say: don't we ha~ all we ne~J in matter?). But above all. what is incumbent on us is an Ilbwl"u determination, an absolutely originary, archi-originary detcm,in;1I iun of ethic:5 and praxis-not a law or an ultimate value, but that hy which there can be a relation to law or to value: decision. freedom. If existence is without essence, this is because existence is entirely in its decision. It is entirely in the free decision to receive and hold itself as decision (a deciding decision. but in the mode of a reeeiving-iuclf. a letting-itself-be-taken by the decision .•• ) IlIlJ/or to tk.'liJe on iudf as such or such essence, Such is the ethos to which we must come. or which we must allow to come to us. This ~thos would not correspond to a "progms of moral conscience." bur would bring to light the archi-originary ethicity without which thcre would be neither Plato's Good. nor Kant's good will. nor Spinulistic joy. nor Marxian revolution, nor Aristotle's mOil poJiljkol~.

011

\Vhy speak of "rc:volution" (for example. in Chapter 7)? In order capridously to oppose the current discredit of this word? Why nO[~ Ideulogy can always benefit from being shaken. But also: don't we lJave the responsibility of thinking the decision that opens onto the very pOS5ibility of deciding? Now which word has carried this tho\ll:\l1[, in a privileged way. through two centuries? Ami which \\'lIld could replace it after two centuries? Enough has been said ahllut how much "revolution" was a tum toward nothing. or even 31l1llhcr tum of the: screw. This is true--but this is also a mOl.:kcry (If hi\tory. Revolution brings to light common freedom. frel't!ulU's

being-in-common. and the fact that this being. as such. is given over to decision. We cannot. d~pite everything. think this word dif. ferenrly. For a long time. the case of reform hat; been heard. and the morc: reform there is. the less anything changes. Revolt is a prisoner of the despair that produces it. Revolution doa not at all adu. sively signify the taking of power by a political faction. It signifies. or at least it signified: the opening uf decision. the community exposed to itself. I know that Fascism and Nazism were also revolutions. as were Leninism and Stalinism. It is therefore a question of revolurionizins revolutions. I understand all [00 well that this "pirouette" might not be appreciated. But what should we: say and do if it becomes 110 less true that we must dtdin. despite everything. decide to brak with the course of things entirely decided? What should be said and done if the intolerable is always present. and if freedom has ro make itself more and more skittish. more and more unbridled? How QJl we think "revolution" without assault divisions or c0mmissars of thc pcople. and even without a revolutionary 11IfJtk/ (but on the contrary. as a reopening of the question of the mood itself)? After all, the word matters little-but we still have not thoroughly thought through all that "revolution" gives to be thought. Above all. people continue to die of hungcr. wars, drugs. boredom. A middle class continues to be generalized with its scruples relating to "technology." masking from ll§ what is in the process [t«hn~ ofbccoming class wcufare. b People die of hunger, drugs. wars, boredom. work. hatred. revolts. revolutions. They die or become mutilated in life. soul. and body. AJiliherations (national. social. moral. §eXuai. aesthetic) ~ ambiguous. and also arise from manipulations-and yet each has its truth. Freedom Manipulated (by powers. by capital): this could be the titlc of our half-ccnrury. Thinking freedom should mean: ~­ ing freedom from manipulations, including. first of aU. those of thinking. This requires something on the order of revolution, and also a revolutiun in thinking. .--...

rragmtlltl

I kOlocracy is less and less exposed to external criticisms or aggr,·~~i(Jns. b~1l more and more preyed l!pon b~ its. internal criti-

li-ms ,111(1 disenchantments. Or rather: forces with makulable effeLtS (nuclear. physical. chemical. genetic) have b«n put into operatinn or unleashed, as we would sa)'. All this leads back to the qllolilln of what "thinking freedom" means today. It means at l~aJI "err dearly that received ideas abom freedom, in all of their syslematic frameworks (opposition to necessity. or assumption of necc~sity, as~i~nation to the free subjeu, reciprocal delimitation and respeLl. rcpartition of the juridical. of the moral and political. of puhlic and private. of the individual and collective. and so on). are themselves either "operative" in thc least liberating practices of this frightening and disem:hamed world. or constantly rendered "ob_ solete" by it. "I:reedoms" are "/10 pieces of "technology." This is whr it is derisory to content oneself with reaffirming. in a Kandan moc.ie. a "regulative ic.ica" of freedom. or, in the mode of a "philosophy of values" (whic.:h we know was also able. morr than othen, to support Na7.ism), an "absolute value" offrecdom ... We alway~ return to this: thinking freedom requires thinking nO! an iliea but a singular fact. just as it requires carrying thought to the limit tlf a fauuality that precedes it. In this essay. I was forced to repeat several times that &ccdom [CI!lld not be "a question." This means that itli thinking must be in srarch of a nonquestioning mode of thinking (hut can we say "scoud,' here? Would if not he too dose to "question"?). Here is a prnfonnd and powerful trait of today'5 thinking: the demand for an atlirmativity (we find it modulated differently from Niet7.sche and l\cuj.unin to Dele!l7-C and Derrida). Yet perhaps nC'ither affirmation nor negation may be substituted 1~lr the ~ucstion. It I.:ould he a qU<.'Mion of another disposition. olle lh.lt 1Ia., no lugical name. ,-,

What I wl'OIe herr concerning Hcidc:gga and Na7.ism is nccc:uarily ill\ufficicllt aftcr a year of commentaries occasioned by the renewoo

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bringing to light of the "affair." Yet J have no intention of adding to these commentarie~. A few words will suffice: that Heidegger nev. er SlOpped thinking. in his most inrimare and decided thoughll, somerhing of "freedom"-by means of the abandonment of its theme or metaphysical question-and that this itselfcould COI1\mand his political gestures. is what gives us something to think about. On the one hand, Heidegger was the first to take the mcaswt of the radical insufficiency of our "freedoms" to think and open existence as freedom. But un the other hand. he still thought of "the free," up to a cerrain point at least. in the terms and in the tones of "destiny" and "sovereignty." In the name of this he was undoubtedly seduced by Hitler and later remained silent on the subject of the camps. Destiny and sovereignty-whatever the names or figures they are given-are the sites where freedom obstinately renounces it~1t: even if freedom is what is destinal and sovereign. In this regard. Heidegger could not mnain the thinker of existence humbly exposed to the world, which also means, but without fuss: free. "Being" just begins to clarify itself when we consider that -freedom" gives it. or that being is in freedom. We are then no longer thinking precisely according to a "thinking of Being," since we are in the process of rocuing this thinking from being "a thinking-t something" (even if being is not). A thinking freed from being a thinking of This essay propo~s a thesi!i on being. in direct line from the one that Heidcgger deciphers in Kant and from this other thesis, posited and withdrawn by Heidegger. on being "founded" in freedom. And what is more, it involves a thesis on theses. a posiling and affirmation on the positing and affirmation of being. as posited and affirmed by freedom. as freedom. To this extent, I run the ril;k of simply and naively reconstituting a metaphysics. in the sense in which this word designates "the forgetting of being" and the forgetting of this forgetting. Which means: the forgetting of the difference between being and beings is from the:

Fmgmtllls s(;Ut lost from sight by metaphy~i~s-this difference permits no flldfmgofbeings to be imposed on being, and no sovereignty over beings to be attributed to being. Bur this difference is no*-not even tIN- "ontico-ontological diffelent·e." It is itself the very effacing of this difference-an effacing ,h.1I has nothing to do with forgetting. If this difference is not, it in etfcL( retreats into its own difference. This retreat is the itkntifJ ofheillg tlIlfl ki"gs: existence. Or more precisely: freedom. freedom: the wiuxlrllfUll1 ofevery positi"g ofking. int'luding it! beposited tU diffrringfrom bnllgs. There is therefore no thesis here 011 being except insofar as there is no longer any possible thesis on being. Irs freedom is in it and more ancient than it. This is its last thesis-or its first aoing lfo;rr] (j'aCt". foctum have the same root as tithemi, thnis, and even ttl" and to do, in German and English). "Doing" can no doubt be interpreted in many ways; I use it here only to ~how a difference within the thesis itself. Philosophers have made theses on being; now the question has to do widl the fact of its freedom.

i""

Where thinking hutts up against what renders it possible, against what ""rim it think (fiti" penseti. The "authentic decision" is made in "the beyond of the decision. "R It does not arise from decisionism. It is much more and much less than what any theory of decision can represent (I am thinking of Carl Schmitt in panirular, for whom the dedsion on the cxc('ption becomes the essence of the political. which is not foreign to Hcidegger's politics.) Why? Because the decision does not tear ihclt· away from the "inauthentic" in order (0 break with it; it happt'ns within it and at its surface. Hddegger comes dose to saying thi~-and docs nor. This is where. in Heidcgger. one must break through "the thin wall by which the 'they' is separated, as it were, frtllll the uncannincss of its Being. "'J The authentic dccision is Ihm'tore also "short of 1m dtflll the decision." [\m this "shon of" 1\ in 110 way the stupid and dismal acceptance of the quotidian anu of .111 that is produced there. The "inauthentic" remains an d prior;

168

Fmgmmn

warped category. marked by a loss even if Heidegger refuses to make a "forfeiture" of it. But this "loss" is the loss of being. ofits im. manence and coming to rhe world. to pr~ence. freedom. The pl~ of being-thrown-irs place or irs very "throw"-is not first of all the KThey." but freedom. The motto "liberty. equality. fraternity" seems to us somewhat ridicuJou.~ and difficult to introduce into philosophical discourse,

be-

cause in France it remains official (:I lie of the State) and because it is said to summarize an obsolete "Rousseau ism ... But for Heidc:r,r,u. does nOl "being-there also with others" (§z6. Bl'ing and nmt) determine itself according to "an equality I GltichlNi~ of being as be· ing-in-the-world?" Such an equality is unbreachable: it belongs precisely to freedom. As for fraternity, which gives one even more to smile about: should it be suspected of coming from a rdation to murdering the Father. and therefore of remaining a prisoner as much of the sharing ofhaued a~ of a communion with an idenrical substancelcssence (in the totemic meal)? This interpretation of the community as "fraternal" must indeed be carefully dismantled. But it is possible. even with Freud. to interpret it Olherwisc: as a sharing of a malernal thing which precisely would not be substance. but sharing--m infinity.'o In this respect, Chapter 7 above has only gone halfway. Perhaps the "mother" must also be abandoned, if we cannot avoid her being "phallic" (but is this certain?). We must also think of the fraternity in abandonment, of abandonment.

.--..

.. Fm~"'ity: we /011(' tI~m. UH cannol do anything for rhtm. ac~1 hi'lp thl'm to rl'arh tlJl' rhmhold." Blanchot's fragment ascribes [0 fraternity a love without effect, without affect. without communion. A strange restraint oflove. yet still named "love." (Regarding fraternity. Hannah Arendt could be invoked in the ~me sense.) What. in these conditions. does "help" mean: not a support, nor a consolation. but the communal exposure of freedom .

......... Pushed to the end of itli experience. freedom would on Iy result in death. It could not meet up with itself except in the unleashing of

Fragmr1lts i1h~olllte. unapproachable principle, where "grace" would be "tilr,." it~lf: The 'Iermr. sacrifice. sav3l!cry. suicide. By reasoning in thi~ way. we ha\'e already lost l'iight of the fau of freedom. As if in dr.tlh this fact became presence, property. self-identity. But the eKpcricnce of freedom remains the experience where these deterrninali(,"~ colla,'~e. Freedom is the inappropriable of death. In decidin~ on death. we think we are deciding on freedom, either to give it (suicide. or the Inquisition), or to kill it (murder). But what re\,sts. resistaOl;e itsclf-which is properly the community's-is the frcl'\tom that tbl'dead ,"non (not abstract "death") never ceases to present. and that breaks loose more than ever from his being-dead. Ili~ death. whatever its cause, gave him back to an inappropriable frecdom, Thus inal'propriable death delivers this frealoJll which gives hirrh to me. h is in this way that being-in-common takes pla~: through this fiee space where we come into muntal presence, where we com-p<'ar. lbe opening (If this space-spacing of time. exposure, evelll. surprise-is all there is of being. inasmuch as it Mis" free. I )e.lth docs not belong to this space, tOr it effaces itself in pure lime as a fi~ure of l'ITacement and as an effacement nf all figures. Yet common space. while it is at every moment new, also bears the mark. ;u this moment ineffaceable. of this effacement. We live with ailihe dead: (his is whal murder denies in vain. The community is cl1Iirelr exposed to il5c1f-induding the community of the co-belonging of the world. (Lei us not be sU5pected here of an eKalted. mystical vbiion of universal life. . . It i5 certainly a question oflife. but finite. hum11k. h:1l\al. and insignificant. in the sense that life exist~, in effect. at Ihe limit sense: whell: the experience of freedom begins and

or

rIlJ,.)

.--... There is no "experience offreedmn": freedom itself is experience .

-.

.

Fighting "Iilr" frl'Cdol1l. equality, fraternity. and justice does not ~llI1sist merely of making other conditions of exim'nce occur, since " i~ nOI simply lIll the ortler of a project. but also consisr~ of im11l,-di.He!y 'ltfirl1ling. hi,' tt ",me. free. (,qual. fraternal. and just ex-

Fragmmts istence. We ought (0 be able to say as much for writing and think_ ing "abom" freedom. "To die freely: an illusion (which is impossible to denounce). For even if we renounce the illusion of believing ourselves to be free with respect to dying, we return to confusing. in words constandy belated, what we call the gratuitousness. the frivolity~ts light will-o'-the-wisp Aame-the inexorable lightness of dying. with the insubordination of what every seizure lacks. Whence the thought: to die freely. not according to our freedom, but from passivity and abandonment (an extremely passive attention), according to tilt freedom to die. "II "Here is an appendix which develops. a spirit without canals or compartmenu. a freedom perhaps ready to be seized. perhaps also to annihilate other freedoms. either to kill them or better to embrace them."12 "Freedom is an t'thicalprinciple of e/mrrmiccssence."I' There is this surprising freedom in which freedom leaves us, relative (0 it, free to let it offer itself. while it has nothing to make itself recognizable. This is all there is. This freedom which asks us, proposes to us. requires us to be

free to the point that we remain free with respect to it, to the poine that we free ourselves from freedom. Given the direction that certain commentaries are presently taking. what I will have tried to say here about a freedom which lays claim to republican and democratic monoes, bm which disengages itself from "democratic freedoms." will be charged with Jacobiniint. even terrorism. if not outright Fascism (or. in another version. nihilism). (Recenriy, this rype of accusation has been eagerly Rung at every effort of thought that a reference to Heidcgger in particUlar is reputed to expose.) Yet.

Frttgmmts

171

.. ir should be known that in the move from a thinking. let us say of hcin~. of es-<;ence, or of principles--it matters little here-to a politics and an ethics. the consequence is never good (why do we systl:ll1;uically forget the massive and enduring adherence of so many dll:(lri~t~ of the "philmophy of values" to the Nazi rcgime?); 2. this consequence is not good because in drawing it we pass wilhom passage from the regime of the interrogation of the "prin(iplc" a!i such. of its nature and "principiality" even. to the regime in which we fix these principles. Thus we remove frttdom from the one and the other. for what is in play from the one to the other is preci~c1y the indetermination. the undt:dudbility of putting freedom at stake and into operation. Or further: the "principle" of freedomlet's say. as foundation or as the sharing ofbeing-predsely "founds" rhe exercise of an incalculable freedom. That Heidegger should have lx-cn a Nazi was an error and a mist.lke:. '111at he could have been one is what bdongs to the archiethical principle of freedom. (Finally. in being a Nazi. in the very parrklilar way we are beginning to be able to distinguish. that he could aIm have willed himself "to conspire with the liberation of the possihlc," according to Grand's expression. 11 is what requires an evalu.Hion. undoubtedly infinitely delicate. which belongs to our tasks of thinking.) ']0 depend on nothing-to give one.~e1f onc's own law-ro be the opening of a beginning: in our discourse we cannot escape this triple dctermination (Jffrecdom. ill which everything is held (and holds for hoth a ll't' and an I). It is thus solely a question of making the following uanscription: having no foundation-accordingly. ha\'ing "one's own" law always this side of or ~yond "oncsclf"-being ;t~ removed from oneself as an opening is. and grasping no Olore of oneself than em a beginning. Everything comes back to this. and the transcription appeal'li simple enough. In reality. however. hcl'.IU\{' transcription is impossible in our discourse. it remains equally impossible in the very de~cription I have recorded here! Ir~l1s(fiption has its freedom this side of or beyond itself (and cannOt be verbal transcription only. or a changing of names or ~yn-

171

Fragments

taxes. or even a "pure and simple" "act" outside of discoune}. It is what is most difficult for thinking: at its limit. putting its limit at stake. Transcription is no doubt unachievable. However. this docs not mean that freedom would be. in Hegelian fashion. the infinite ;u the absolute in its negativity. Ba:ause freedom is the infinitenes..c; ofthe finite mfinite. and is thus itself finite. which means at the same time singular and without es.~ence in itself, it consists in neither having nor being an essence. Freedom consi5ts in not consisting. without any contradiction. This "without COntradiction" makes the foct and secures the prrsnrt'e of freedom-thi5 presence which is the presence of a coming into presence. N~ infinite. ne'Yl!r dialectical negativity. more buried than affirmation and negation. freedom is never this "freedom of the void" which Hegel designates as belonging to "fanaticism" and to "the fury of destruction."I~ Neither "full" nor "empty." freedom comes. it is what of presence comes (0 pre5ence. In this way it is. or is the bnng ofbnng. '6 Thinking. undoubtedly. is for us what is most free. But freedom is this fact which less than any other can be reduced to thinking.

Reference Matter

Notes

Forrwo,J Set p. 96 of thi5 book. John Stuart Mill, 0" Li""ty. Elizabeth Rapapon. ed. and imro. (Indianapolis: Hacken, 1978). p. I . .1. Sec John Locke, An EJs4y Co"rm,ing H""",,, V_nM"'i,,g, Peter II. Niddirch. ed. and intra. (Oxford: Clarendun Press, r97S). p. 244: "The pmprr question is nOI, whether Ihe Will be fret. bUI whether a Man he free .... We call 'Circe: Idl how to imagine any /king freer, than to be able to do what he wins. So Ihat in respect of Actions, with ,he: ce:;Kh of such a power in him. a Man seems as free, as 'tis possible for Fretdom to make him." 4· Set Thomas Hobbes. L~vitlllJn". C. 8. Macpherson. ed. (Harmond5worrh. Eng.: Penguin. 1968). p. 117. ~. Sec Immanuel Kant. Criliqllt of Pu,., R~(lso". Norman Ke:mp Smilh. (rans. (New York: SI. Martin's. 1965), pp. 4°9-11. 6. Sec Renl! Descanes. Mn/it(ltions on Firrt Philosophy. Donald A. Crl"!>~. trans. (lndiallapolis: Hackett, 1979). p. 17. On this momentous .ltCIllCIlI, sec lhe: meticulous prescntarion of Jean-lue Nancy. Ego ""lIll'aris: Flammarion. 1979). - See David Hume. A T,~tlt;s~ of /f1ll1ll11l M,tllrr, l.. A. Sdh)·-8i~. l'll.. I'. H. Nidditeh. rev. cd. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). PI" I.

1.

IH-72:

Rook I, §14.

R. This abo capturC5 ,he: analysis of modalif}' th.\[ KaRl UlldenakC's in rhe 5cuiun of the: Criliql" 0/ Purr Rmson emide:J "The Principles of F mpiri(al Thought: but insof.1r a!i the C,iliqllr iudf sers out to expose 175

the "conditions of possibility" of rhe unity of experience. it also alloWs for-if it does not already pre!icnt-an experience of possibility. and it is this allowance that, according to Nancy. marks the decisive dJaracter of Kant's "revolution in the mode of thinking": "The becoming-world of world means that 'world' is no longer an ohject. nor an idea. but the place existence is given to and exposed to. This ficsr happened in philosophy. and to philosophy. with the Kantian revolution and the 'condition of possible experiencc': world as possibly of (or for) an existent being. possibili,y as world for ~uch a being, Or: Being no longer to be: thought of as an eS!iCnce. but to be given. offered to a world as its own possibility" (Nancy. Introduction. WIlo Comts Afur lilt Sub}",. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Conner, Jean-Luc Nancy. eds. [Routledge: london, 1991). p. I). 9. David Hume, All E"'!,,iry COllctrt/ing !lummI Untkrstanding, Eric Steinberg, cd. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977). p. 64; cf. A Trutiu of Human Nail'", pp. '99-418. Hume's attempr to show the comparability of liberry-or. more precisely. the "lihcrty of sponraneity~-with thoroughgoing determinacy has sct the terms in which numerous analyses of freedom havc been em; see the excellent discussion of dUa is!oue in Barry Stroud, Humt (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1977), PP·14 1-54· 10. Civilliherties were nor. for Hume, an overriding concem, and he certainly did nor conceive of their defense on the basis of "reason- as a legitimate philosophical exercise; in fact. his historical studies set out to demonstrate the need for me continuity of authority and to extol the power of precedent. On ,he sense of Hume's uconservativism," whkh. unlike modern conser".ativism, does 1101 result from rejection of the Frcnch Revolution (although perhaps it took impetus from a revulsion for Rousscau), see the remarks of Donald W Livingston. HMmc~ Philosophy ofCOlli mOil Lift (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). pp. 306-42.. II. Hume. A Trmtilt ofHum"" Natrtrr, p. 7. 12..lhid., p. 10. IJ. Ibid. 14. See. in particular. llume's renunciation of his earlier usolutionto the problem of perwnal identity in the appendix to A TrttltiJ~ Hum,,,, N,II"rr. "'n short rhere arc two principles. which I cannot render con~isrC'nr; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, Ihat 1111 ol/r diJtinct p..,.(tptiO/IS art distinct exist(ll(N, and that tIN mi,,4

4

va.

NOln to PdgrS xi»-.'Ct

177

II'" '1''' "f"ff;'~S ttI~)' 1-r,,1 (ORllt'Xion "mong ,Iislina txistflJI-rL Did Oll r per(rpliuns C'ilhcr inhere in sornelhing ~implc and individual. or did the Olin.1 perceive some real !;onnaion among them. there wou'd be no tiillit'ulry in Ihe case. I:or my f',m. J mu~t plead the privilege of a ~ep­ II~ ••1Od confns. Ihal this difficulty i~ too hard tor my understanding" lA rrfl1tisf of Hl/III.III NfI,,"·r. p. 6J6). On this inconsistency and in rchlliun III rhe pmhlem of personal identity. ~ee the well-known discus,ill II h,. Norman Kemp Smith. 77/, Pbi/osopl" of D""irllIulllr (I.on0011: I\.facmillan. 1941). pp. 556-58. I~. The most celebrated account of the alternative between "negarivc" anti "llOsitive" freedom can be found in haiah Berlin's "Two Cnnccpts of Liheny." Fo",. Essa.ys l.iiJr,." (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1969). PI" 118-71. A more nuanced vt'~ion of this alternative is PUrlilied with surprisingly similar r~1I1r5 by Richard E. Flathman. 71" Ph,l"sopby dlUl Ptllit;n of F"m"'m « :hicago: University of Chicago

0"

Prcss.

1987). 16. Ilume. A Trral;st ofH"mlln Nlmm. p. 164. 17. Ihill .• p. 165. In an earlier chaptcr. Humt' had tried to distinguish

imagination from mt'nlo[), and had further di5ringuis~d two sensa of imagination (5ee pp. 117-18,,). h... t"ach of Ihese rurn out to be "founded" on an originary if nevertheless heterogeneous imagination from whidl Ihe othe~ derive. The most exten\ive survey of Hume on the im ...~inalinn is thai of Jan Wilbanks. H,,,,,es 1"'ttlI] ojl",Agi""titm (The H~gue: Nijh()fT. 1968): the n:lation of Hume's faculty of imagination to DC5cartcs's corpon:al imagination and the medical theories it spawned is Ji"uSo\cd by John 1'. Wright. TIl( S"rptiral R,trlism of D""iJ Hume (klilllll:aJlUlis; University of Minnrsma Press. 1933), pp. t87-146. The dio;colIl'K of lh." imagination in rightccnth-cmtury Brilain wa.~ extraord.. naril)· widespr(";'I,1. Along with Hume, Ihe discussion was pu~ued by ,\it-x:lnlirr Gerard. Ahraham Tucker. Adam Smith. F.dmund Burke. Adam h~r~tI~n. and Dugald SleW'Jrt. to name only a few (and to leave (lUI the docto~ mtirdy). It has been a Irdditional topos-or perhaps ide:ClI(J~y-of scholarship [0 see in Ihe di~couJ5e of the imagination the "';,rcshat!owins" of English Romanticism. especially 5ince Coleridge's prL'~clllation of Ihe imagination has hccn 50 often viewed as irs credo. IR. Sec p. 10. Cf. the explication of [he word "experience" in I'l,ilippc l.acoue-Iabanhe. L" I'ols;t fOmlllt f."(plritllt'f (Paris: Bourgois. I')~(,l. lIP. 30-JI. The German word Elfah"" ("to experience") derivcs. ot" lourse. from FlIlJrtn (WIO travel") and is relaled 111 C,"fjaIJr ("dangcr").

NOln 10 PlIgtJ xxi-xxii ofHUmAn Naturt. p. 264The most importam of Nancy's writings in this context is ~ inopt1'lllivt Community. Peter Connor. ed. P. Connor. L. Garbus. M. Holland, and S. Sawhney. trans. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1991). A complete bibliography of Nancy's writings can be found in a volume of PIlTlltp"llph devoted to Nancy's thought and edited by Peggy Kamuf; sec Pilratp"aph (June 199}). 11. Those whom Hume awoke include. at least on the ·continent.~ not only Kant but at least two other no le$.~ significant sleepel'!l: Johann Georg Hamann and Edmund Husserl. When Hamann went to England in 1757. he encountered "the Attic philosopher." David Hume, who, as he explained to Kant in a lengthy letter, has fastened onto "belier' or "faith" (GlAulHn) and is, to this extem. "a Saul among prophets"; see Hamann's leHer of July 27. 1759. in ~m. PhilosophiuJ Comspo,uknu. Arnulf Zweig. trans. (Chicago: University of ChiaJBO Pr~s. 1967), pp. 41-42. Hamann did not. of course. find "faith" in Hume. but he also experienced morc than simply "frustration humi. cnnc" (Nancy's term, L 'Dub!,. tk Itt philoJophit [Paris: Galilee, 1986]. p. 47); as the rcference to Saul indicates. he discovercd in Hume an unlikely speaker. one in whom the classical forms of argumentation gave way to overjoyed nitpicking and argumentative exuberance. For Hamann's friend and student F. H. Jacobi. Hume's diS(;ouoe on bdid' marks a gulf that neither uaditioaul metaphysiu nor its Kantian transformation could ever hope to overcome; only a "leap of faith" does so. Sec F. II. Jacobi. David Humt ;ibtr ibn Glilubm. otkr Itkalimtus . Rtalirmus, rin GfSpriJch (Breslau: Lowe, 1785). Although in a completdy different sense. Edmund Husserl also conceived of a Hume who AItpassed Kant in the depth and direction of his questioning. Hume was, according [0 Husserl. a decisive if nevertheless misguided predecessor in phenomenological rescarch; sec. in particular, the late: reAectioRS on the alienation from the "life-world" contained in Husserl. Th~ of Eurol"an Sc;mcts. David Carr. trans. and intro. (Evanston, III.: Northwestern Univeoity Pr~. 1970). cspecially pp. 88-97: "the worid-cniSma in the dcepest and most ultimate S("nS(" (not the sense Kant understood). the enigma of a world whose being is being through subjective accomplishment [Ltimmgl, and this with the self-evidem:e that another world cannot be at all com:eivable-thal. and nothing else. is Hltmel probkm" (pp. 96-97). 22. Precisely what substancc Hume understood a community to 19. Hume. A TmtlUf 20.

emu

No/~s 10 Pa~ xxiii

179

,h.m: in. or to partake of. is lhe key qurslion for any inquiry into his 1'"litical philosophy. his conception of historical continuity. amI his Iwillies. To lhe extent that he thought it was nature and not reason. he opposed atrempts to establish communiry on radically new, "rational" f"undations. No doubt his hizarre encnunler with Rousseau. who ;iccuse'd him ofleadin~ a worldwide conspiracy, also contributed to his conr.;eption of the political community. FOI an interpretation of this em;ounrc:r, see Jerome Christensen. Prlleticill: Ellli:l,tmmmt (Madison: Universiry of Wisconsin Press. 1987), pp. 14l-7J. See p. 87. Nancy doa not in this context refer to Walter Benj.lmin·s philosophical writings, but they often impose themsdves on his anaIYSC'5. In an carly text that shows the confluence of Hermann Cohen and Edmund Husserl, entitled "On the Program for the Coming Philosophy." Benjamin. like Nancy. frees experience from everything "lived." from every subjectivism as well as every objectivism. The experience in whose: presence philosophy will come is purely transcendental; it is "an experience of experience." and this experience could very well turn out to be that of pure languagc:. Sec Walter Benjamin, "O~r da~ Programm der kommenden Philosophic: Gn(l"''''tll~ Seh,ijitll. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schwcppc:nhauser. eds. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1980). 11.1. pp. 157-71; "Program for the Coming l'hilosophy," Mark Ritter. nans •• Th~ Philosop/,ieal R",;~w IS (FallWinter. 198)-8-4): pp. 41-SI. Benjamin lurns from this program for philosophy to come. which is anything but a proposal for the n:newal of philosophy, rowud an exposition of the characteristically modern ushock·experience" in which experience (Erfohrun~ breaks up into "lived experience~" (ErMmiss~; sec. in ra"icular. rhe third and fourth ~~tioIlS of "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire" in IIIIImillatitJPIl. cd. and intro. Hannah Arendt, Harry lohn. rrans. (New York: Schocken. 1968), pp. 160-6S. 8audelaire's itf f1n1TS till mal registers "an emancip.ltiun from experience (Erfohn",tY' (p. 161). and this emancipation ~ives rise to a poetr)· of E,/~b"isu, which. precisely because it has d~lmycd whar pa5.~es for the unity of Erfollrun,. may COIUlitute rhe "(")(perience of experience" of which "The Program for the Coming I'hilo~phy" speaks. 24. Ma"in Heidcsger, &i" u"J ait (Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1979). p. ,p, Iftill: Illld Timt, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. nans. (Nc-w York: Harper & Row. 1962.). p. 67. Sc:c: p. 9 of this book. 2S. A spectacular example of the explication of essence as po,,,,,i_

180

NO/~s 10 Pag~s

xxiv-xxv

and one that no doubt marks the beginning of spcl:ulative meta_ physics---can be found in Lcibniz's rMponse to Spinou: "The power of God is his essence itself. because it follows from his essence that he is the cause of himself and of the other things" (Leibniz. PhiIOHJphk., PII~n lind Lrttm. Leroy E. Loemker. ed. and trans. (B05ton: Reidel, t969]. p. 204)· 2.6. One of Nancy's more programmalil: writings, L'Dub'; tk Ia phiJosophi~. is devoted [0 the "position of the "sense" that is "us." See especially the chapter entided "Le sens. c'est nous" (I. 'Oub'; tk Ia phiJosophi~ (Paris: Galilee. 1986). pp. RS-4J9). But this UllJ cannot be I:onfused with the Sinn toward which phenomenology is oriented; the latter is. in Nancy's terrru. "signification" and arises from a desin: (or exercise of the will, or act of labor. or intention) to cancel the distance from oursc:lves that "sense" imposes on us. Nancy's StnJ should not, then. be understood ali the equivalent of Husserl's Sinn. but it nevertheless remains a question whether the term SIns invites such equivocations. 27. See Martin Heidegger. Klint tlnJ thl Probltm of MtlllpbJlia, Richard Taft. trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1990). In -La voix libn: de I'homme" Nancy proposes a reading of freedom in Hcidegger's Kant-book and in his subsequent dispuration with Ernst Cassirer ovcr the legacy of Nco-Kamianism; see L 'lmpbllljf catlgtJru,. Waris: Flammarion. (98). pp. I1~-J7. Nancy hali wrinen of the transcendental imagination and its -arl~ of schematism in many other contexts. See. in particular, Lt D;1{'ourj J,la sJn(opI (Paris: Aubief1ammarion. 1976). pp. 106--9; "La verite imperative" in L '/mpbllli/ mttgoriqut. especially pp. 106-8; "L'Otfrande suhlime" in Du Subliwu. Jean-Fran~ois Courtine et al .• eds. (Paris: Belin. 1988). pp .•0-..6. Reading Kant's chapter on transcendental schematism is. for Nancy. thinking thc crisis it inscribes: "In the crisis. and by it. philosophy is therefore judgcd: it leads it (0 discern itself: (In this sense. there: is a repetition of something of Kantian (riliq''': schematism does not asle to be elucidated; it asks to be brought to light as the limit of the thought of signification. which it reprcscnts)" (Nancy. L 'Oub/i J~ IA phiJosoph;~, p. 79). 1.8. See Nancy. Lt Parltlg~ J~5 voix (paris: Galilee. 1981); "Shanns Voil:es." Gayle L. OrmiSIOIl. trans .. Trllnsforming lhe H~rmtntUlic Conttxt. G. L. Ormiston and A. D. S,hrift. cds. (Albany: State Univer'!iiry of New York PreiS. 1990). PI" 11l-~9.

Noln 10 PagtJ xxv-xxi.r: !CJ. The prolegomenon for the discu55ion of the Ufact of rrasan" in fbf Exl'"im.·(' til F,"tioM. which destribes iudf as "prolegomena" for future thought of freedom (Rt: p. 106). is Nanty's L 1mpblllif ~atl­ ,I:()Tiqll(,: see. in particular. pp. 10-11. N,ml:Y's cx~~osition of "the fact of IC.Hon" be-.m striking CO""llsl to that of Theodor Adorno. who. during .111 amllysis of the Marquis de Sade's moral Ihcorirs. presents il as ·a l1\('re natuul psychological facI" (Max Ilorkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Diakrtir tll/:,,,lixbrtnmtnt. Juhn Cumming. trans. (New York: Continuum. 19711. p. 94: d. Adorno's more extensive analysis in "Freedum: On the Metacritique of )lractkal Reason." N'lativt Di"kctiN. E. 8. Ashton. trans. (New York: Seabury Press. 19731. pp. 111-99). A diKu~sion of rhe relalion of Nancy to Adorno. which is undoubledly warranted in lhi~ context. would have to consider Jacques Lacan's "Kam avCt Sade· (Errils [Paris: Editions du Scuil. 19661. pp. 76S-9o) alung Wilh Nancy and l.acoue-Labarthc·s early text on Lacan. Le Tit" dr 1ft It'IIrr (Paris: Galilk. 1972.). ,0. Sec Kant's admission of uncertainty and of the ·veritative rone" in which this admission rakes place in "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tnne in [Jhilosophy·; sec Rllisi"g tht TOllt 0/ Philo1(Jphy: L.Iltt &"" by K,I1I1. Trn"sfo,matiw C,iliq/lt by Drrrida, P. Fenves, ed. (Baltimore: Juhn~ I fu~)kin5 Univc~ity I'res.•• 199). especially pp. 71. 9j. , .. Sec Kant. FnrllltiatiollJ of tht Mttaph.:YS;~J of Mo,.,,1s. Lewis White Reck. tran~. and intro. (Indianapolis: Bohh,,·Merrill, 1959), pp. ·t}-oM· 3!. For a particularly signific:alll deployment of this often·found phra.\C in Kant's writings. sec Immanuel Kant. Tilt Domi"t ./Virtut. Mary J. Gregor. lrans. (Philadelphia: Uni\'enity of Pennsylvania Press.

196.. ).

p. 1711.

n. Sec: N.mcy. L 1mplrtfti/t'lJtIKD,.iqut, pp. 10-11.

3.', Sc:c:. for example. Kant's remarks on the: e:xecutiun uf Louis XVI in M('fttl"~"liral Elm/mit oJJUJtict. John l.add. lrans. and intro. (Indi,mapllli~: 8CJhh~-Ml'rrill. 19(5), pp. 87-881l; tf. Peter r:envc~. A PmJia,. I·,l/r(lthaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1991). pp. 2.72.-7S. "\~. Sec I" 134· ,6. Sec p. 89. Nancy in Ihis passage rl'fcrs to a phrase Jacques 11~'rri,la 111:I'Ioys in Ihe ~onclusion of his analysis of Ihe writings of I' nlanuel Levinas: "Col1l.:erning death which i~ Ilideed its Ithe other's] itrnhll:iblc: resource. I.evinas spraks of an 'empiricism which is in no ".1,. a posith'i~m'" (Derrida. W'rir;/Ig and Diffi,tnU, Alan 815.•. nans. :hicago: University of Chicago Prcss, 19781. p. IP: Ibinas, Difficult

NOln 10 PllgtJ xxix-4 Frudom. St'an Hand. trans. [Bahimort': Johns Hopkins Universiry Press. 19901. p. 188). This citation. like so many others found in Tilt Expmmct ofFrmJom. implies a multiplicity of conneclions. At stake in Nancy's exposition of freedom is the issue of ~violcnce and metaphysics." and this issue is gready sharpened by the ~ries of questions Derrida poses after he cites Levinas', remarks on Rosenzweig: "But can one speak of an a/'"itnu of rhc other or of difl"cf('flct'? Has not the concept of expt'rit'nce always been dt'termined by the metaphysics of pre~nce? Is not experience always an encountering of an irreducible presence. the perception of a phenomcnality?" (p. 12.6). 1M Exp~ of Fr~dom. which could also perhaps be called "the experience of the other" or "the experience of difference." takes up these questions not precisely to answer them as to show how "experience" has already done 50. And this is not only what Derrida proceeds to d~"nothing can SO profoundly solidI the Greek logos" (p. 126)-bu( also. as Dcrrida noteS, what Schelling had set out to do in his Exposition 0/ PMlosoph;u/ Empiridmr. and finally what characteriZt'~ the mmt important tt'XtS of Emanuel Uvinas as wdl as those of Franz Rosenzweig. J7. Nancy docs not use the word -classical" lightly or loosely; ill shifting meanings arc explored in Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacouc-Labarrhe. Tht Liura" Absolute. P. Barnard and C. Lester. traDl. (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1988). )8. See p. I H.

Chapttrl 1. Encyclopedia. §48z. in Htgel's Philosop"y of Milltl. A. V. Miller. trans. (Oxford: Clarendon l'ren. (971). p. 139. From Hcgel to us, me vanity. ambiguity, and inconsistcncy of an idea of frc:cdom incapabk of 0btaining foundation and rigor for itself. have: been, in discoWSC5 that a~ just as moralizing as emanciparory. as reactionary as progressive. topoi as abundant as thc IOPfJS of irrepressible freedom itsdf. Balaille has expressed this in another way: "The term fr«dom, which supposes a puerile or oratorical enthusiasm. is from rht' ourset fallacious. and there would be: cvt'n less of a misunderstanding in speaking of all that provokes fear." Georges Bataille. Onlvres rompJltts. vol. l (Paris: Le Seuil, 1970). p. 13 1• z. Karl Marx. 011 the J~wish Q,lrSt;on. in Enrly Writings, T B. Bouomore. tram. (New York: McGraw-Hili, 1964). 3. Thcodor Adorno, Nrgntiv~ DiakctiCl, E. B. Ashton. trans. (NeW York: Continuum. 1987), pp. 114-15.

Not~s to Pag~ $-IJ

18)

4. J{~nc! Dacan". Fourth MwJitat;orr, '-h.ogel. !:.;''Y'·/opmia §§478. 4RI Itramlatcd in H~/i PlJilosophy ofMilli/). PP' 2)7-391. We add the follilwing qualification: nothing of this s,heme is fundamentally PUt in 'IUcs[ion when the subject of rcprc~ntation i~ situated in God and when. 'ell man, freedom becom~s more problematic (as is the case, in different ·.Iy~, fOr Leibniz or Spinou). h is no kss tmc that the thought of freedom ;l~ the n~,eS5ity of subnance or of essence (from SpinOla [0 Ni~[zsche hr way of German IdeiJli,m) combines the subject's "sclf-ap~ringM with a mod~ of bringing the subject. at the: limit. to an exposure in which it no 1(1l1g~r appears to itself: This is what Ileidcgger will have tried to gr3lip in S~hclling (we will rerum to [his). 5. lJotos thi~ J1Y3n thinking? -In fact one cannot think for someone cI.'C. illlr more than one can eat or drink for him. . n G. W. F. Hcgd. l:i/fYC"'pd;a, §Z.3 [nanslatc:d in Tilt Encyc!opdia ltJgc. T. f. Geracrs et aI•• trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett. 1991). p. HJ. 6. G. W. F. H~d, L«tllrtS Oil tilt HiJtory ofPhilosophy. E. S. Haldane and Frances S. SimMJn, trans. (New Jersey: Humanitin Press. 1983), vol. , p. 150 [trans. modified). 7. Cf. Jacques Derrida. &im"nti HIISJrr!j Orit;n ofGMmm'J, John 1'. I.eavey. Jr.• trans. (Uncoln: University uf Nebraska Press. 1989). c."p. pp.

115-46. R. G. W. F. Hq;c:I, Ellcycl0!'tJitl. $'7 [translared in TIN Encydopttiitl Logit'. p. 41). 0111p",rz I. We: arc: nor saying "political" here. F.irhc:r whar is unde:rstc.KMI hy "political freedoms" more or less coven the: series of epithets we have u~C'd. or we would have: to consider in the political 3li such the spc:cific plltting ar ~rake of Ihe [ranscc:ndence of C:lCisrence. It is uncertain whether nne could do this today. We must still relhink th~ political as such. or think differently what Hc:gd assigns ro the political as the exiuent cfTectivity "Ill' all the dctcrminatinns of freedom" (EIIC}t'Iopttiia. §,,86. in lIq,rl's 1'IJ;!olOp/~., ofMilld, A. V. Miller, trJns. [Oxford: Clarendun I'ress. 19711). Later, we: will consider the: modd of a frtt politkal space. without king ahle: ro keep it as constituting by iudf ,hc: prop~r space of frce· dllm. At rhe VC'ry least, W~ will be: able to find a politi,"" "analogon" of' wha[ AI;'! in Radiou s«ks in the following interrogalion on rhe suh;('cr of freedom: "What is a radKdl politics. one whkh goes to the root. whkh ehalICI\t!~s lhe administr.uinn of the necessary. which reAcels on clllh. which

Notes to Pagn 14-19 maincains and practices ju§tice and equality. and which all the while assumes the climate of peace. and is not like the em pry anticipation of a cataclysm? What is a radicalism which is at the same time an infinite task?Alain Badiou. Ptul-rm pmsn-ltl polieique? (Paris: Le Scuil. 1985). p. 106. To which we would add: what ~ a common freedom which presents itself .. such without absorbing into its presence the frcc event? cr. Jcan-Luc Nancy... Lll Juridiction du monarqut hlgllitn." in Rtjoutr It politiflw (Paris: Galilee. 1981). 2. "The concept of freedom. insofar as irs reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason. is the IttyslOnt of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason." Immanuel Kant. Critique ofPradical ReIlStl1l, Lc:w~ White Beck. trans. (New York: Macmillan. 1985). p. J. Wasn't this proposition an axiom for all of philosophy up until Man: and includins NietzsdJe? Ifit lost tlW position, ,his Wali not due to a loss of a taSte for freedom. but rather to the dosure of an epoch of history and of tho.!, a closure for which the i<mtian "kc:ysrone" provides a model (even though the Kantian thought of the foetof freedom also constitutes the opening of what we have ro think concerning this topic) . .J. In Traditumis "aditio (Paris: Gallimard. 1972.), p. 17S. 4. "In the concentration camps. it was no longer the individual who died. but a specimen." Theodor Adorno. Negaliw Diakctics. E. B. Ashton. trans. (New York: Continuum. 1987), p. 361 !trans. modified). That is. the specimen of a typt (in this context. "raclan. of an Idea. of a figure of:an essence (in this context, the Jew or the gypsy as the essence of a nonessence or of a human 5uh-es.o;cnce). Cf. on this subject the analyses of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in the "Heidegger" section of his L 1mitation Ms modtrnt! (Paris: Galilee. 1986). On [he quc:stion of evil. cf. Chap. n. 5. "I generate time iudf in the apprehension of the intuition" (CriIUfw ofPllrt Rtttsoll, N. K. Smith. trans. (New York: St. Martin', Press, 196sl. Transcendental Schemat~m. p. 184). and this apprehension is the -synthesis of the manifold -i.e.. the constitution of phenomena-"which sensibility provides in its originary receptivity" by "joining with spontaneity· (Transcendental Oedllcrion). This originary synthesis is nothing other (han ,he principia) structure of finite transcendence (cf. Marrin Heidegger. Kant a"d tilt Probkm OIMtl4physiC"S. Richard Taft. trans. [Bloomington: Indiana University !'ress. 1990). §16). But. in these conditions, the schematism should be: elucidated no longer according to the guidc:linC5 of a production of B;U-a.~ Heidcgger does. at least up to a certain pointbut on the conrraty (even though this is not a contrary ... ) a.~ the jrfflIDm K

NO/~J

to Pttgn 19-29

II~df of 1/" wilMrarm/fmm every figure (cf. ibid .• §'4). lbis would be rhe Ill-jl,,"! IIf another work. t1. Martin HridC'gger. (;tStlmlll'lSgnb, (Frankfurr-am-Main: KJosternl;llll1, 198 2). \'01. jl. p. 134. Ch,tpt~r J

I. -l1lc im'crtC'd Sfrllctllre of the Deduction of rhe Second enti,1« in ,d.lIion 10 that of [he First Cririqllt is indicatcd by KOlnt. enti,", Df ['nldiedl Rmson. I~wis Whire Beck. trans. (N~ York: Macmillan. 1985). Hook I. chap. I. I. p. 17. 1, "The." COlnnn of Pure Reason." I and II, ImmOlnuel Kant. Cntu,wof {'IIP'r RmftJII. Norman Kemp Smith. lIans. (New York: St. Ma"in's Press, 19(,S). p. 637. J. Immanurl K.1nt. C,'ili'l'" ofJlltI~lIt. J. H. Bernard. trans. (New York: Hafner I're:n. 19SI). §91. p. Jl0. 4. Martin He:id~er. GNdmt"us~fI"t. VII\. .tI. p. 300. (We take: E. Manineau's side in tnlllslOlting V"rhn,ttltnsn'" as i'"'UJul,M·n",in. and [hi~ is also an occasion to recallihar Manineau initialed. on the basis of f /('idqr,g('r. the op('ning of a problematic of frc:ccfom that is echMd here. (:f. hi~ prcl'a"e to R. 8ochm. Ln Mtl",./!ysi'l"~ tI'A rillo~. NOI thai lhis in ~l1y way diminishes our greal esterm fOr Ihe rran51ations ofJran·Fran~is (:ounine.) We will proce:ed hy following rhe analyses of §§17 and 18 in n,i1lK alia ~, This coulcJ not be a moral conscience (we will Jiscllss c;,wiJSnt latn according to iu analpis in Bnllf m,tI Timr) ",host' ontological. nonalUhropolo~kal c:hara(;lC'r Hc:illcsger empha~ile:s (G,sIIm'4I1SK"k. vol. 31. r. 19r). Nl"\'enhelC!i5. respect could add a fUrthC'r twist to this determinacion of rhl' facr of pr;u Ikal rca.~on. bur it will nor "ppc:ar here. 6. Nor JUe5 Ihis mean thai it would ht- a lilu of me: "inlerioril}'" of rca· "'n . .Kce....ible to some: k.ind of inrrmpccrion. Tht' 1'~~'l:hological is emI'"iul. bur nol un Ih(' order ..f the trans(%nJe:m;d c)lpcrience: which is rhe '~I~rie:nce offrcc(iom. On :lIInrher level. this also does nor mean Ihat reality here: woulcJ onlr he rhal (Jf I,ossibiliry. as il is. fOr t'Xamplc. in Ficlne:: 'Fre:edom r(';llly and rruly exim. anJ is the: rool ofF.xisrcnce; however. it i~ not imml'(liald)' rcal. for ils reality goe~ only a.~ tar as possibilil}'." J. G. I·il:hlc. 71.,~ Wi" Tu,,·(trtis 1/" Blm,tI l.i/~. William Smith. trans. 'Wa.~hil1gu)JI. c.: University Pllhlicari~1I5. 1977). Fichte's formula 1I1l~ll)uhte:Jly ,,',luteS philmorh~"~ mosr (ollSlam Ihought. at l(';Ist (if tllr !he 11\0melll we leave a~ide SpinOla. who,c pro)limity to whal we are

7,,,,,.

n:

186

No~s to PagN 31-J3

trying to say should be studied, to the extent that for him freedom is identified with the effectivity of beatitude; but Spinoza does not think existen(;e as such)-'Il least up [0 Hegel and to the (;onvcl"liion of freedom into cffcaivity (yet not simply into necc:ssity. for Fit:htC'an "possibilityn is itsclf a nc:(;cssity of thc "independence of the absolute with rC!ipcct to im own intimate being"). Frttdom has been thought as the neces.o;ary cxUtcna of the subject's infinite possibility of relating to itself. but not as the existentialiry of existco(;e. 7. §76. Third (Tili'l'" (New York: Hafner Press. 19~1). p. 150. We choose "seuing into position" for S,lZlwg. in contradistinction to simple POS;,;qn (in the German text) of rcpmcmation. Our use of this motif liberally distan(;es itself-bC:QUSC of this distinction of conccpm in Kant- from He~r's usc of it in IGml S Thnis 0" &ing, where precisely this distin(;tion is ignored. 8. Stwmg therefore fesponds point fOf point ro the dynamic of difforanit' by which Derrida dC!iignates the infinite motion of finire being u such. DifPranlt' thus implies freedom. or is implied by it. Freedom £rea dijJlranit'. while diffirATKt dc:fers freedom. whim docs not mean that difflranet keeps freedom waiting: it is always already there. but by surprise. as we will sce. 9. Aristotle, Book I. Nietlmtle~an Ethics. W. D. Ross. rrans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1975). 10. Translator's not~Nancy plays on the homonymic coupling in French of"iifoilY." ~ro be done." and "Ilffairt." "affair. mailer. conam. transaction, business. lawsuit." and their relation ro "foirr." Mdoing. making. produ(;ing." and "foil,· "faa." II. Ktlnl antI the Prtlbkm of Mttttph.,s;CJ, Richard Taft. trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1990), p. 178.

me

Chllpter 4 I. Same will have merely displaced and misinterpreted (on this point. as on others) Heidegger's thinking. as we will show latcr. Adorno. for his part. left behind in Nrgalivt Dial«tics a thinking in which freedom is (;onfined to its own movemenrs rather than interrogated in irs C!ist'ncr. It should also be recalled that Bergson roo reprcsents. in an entirely difttrent way. a kind of Slopping point of the rhinking of freedom. Theodor Adomo. Nrgativt Diakc,us. E. R. Ashcon. trans. (New York: Continuum. 1987). 2. GtsamtAUJgabt. vol. 31. p. 300. }. Reuben Guilcad's book. Etrt t'l libtrti-unt hudt sur It d"nitr

NOIt.'S 10 Pag~s .J4-}6

/It'idt'.<
I Mdt'f,1lr t'11'rxplrimct' dt' I" /,t'nrlt' (Paris: Gallimard. 1978), wirh whic:h we feci ounc:lve:s to ~ in a~reement in 5eve:ral re:spet:t~, does not consider lhe swpcnsion of rhe theme in Hcide[:lter. I:red R. Oallmayr. while.' he toO docs not consider [his POilU, prc:senu a very suggestive.' synthesis of I kid~er's thought un freedom in Polis "lid Pr,ws (Cambridge.'. Mass.: MIT I'rrss, 1984), ,hap. 4, "Heidqr,ger's Onrology of Freedom. Our work would have to engage in a complex dis,us.~ion with Reiner Schurmann', book, lIt'itlqgt'r tm Bt'inK ""tI AClillg: Fro", Prinrip/nlo AllilrdlJo Christine-Marie Gros. trans. (Bloomington: Indiana Universiry I'ress, 1987). S,hiirmann does not I'ClIly analyze me: frcc:dom which ~ supP'*5 or implies throughout and which would have: to ~ aniculatc:d wirh his theme of "cllming ro preRm:e" (whidl is also an imponanr motif lOr Wi. and to which we have devoted other analyses; cf. "l.(' Rire. la p~nu:" in Oiliql4t' 488-89' Jan.-Feb. 1988). We are less comfortable with hi5 .-nncept of "economy." If there: is a certain communiry be[Wca1 wand these works (induding those of Marrine.'au. cf. note 4 Chap. 3. and .1150 Lt'vinas's -difficult fr«dom"), it consists le55 in a determinate "rhough." (and S[iJIles~ in a "concept") than in the: recognition of a neee~sar}' "liberation" of the thinking that nics to be the thinking "ofB freedom. In other word~. [his is first a liberation with respect to the con(('pu and systems of freedom (among which we still will lint include SpinOla without reservations; but that is anorher program of work). and sccondly a less detcrminable liberation of thinking itsc:Ifin its own pro-

.0

oJ. '111e call of care in !killg anti Timt' provokes and convokes lJngillto in freedom; cf. §§S7 and 58. Martin l-Icid~er. Bri"K alld Tim,. John Mat:quiurie and F.tlward Robinson, tran5. (New York: Harper 8c Row, 1962). We will speak again of the call. s. c,. W. F. Hegel. Pbmolnt'll%gy 0IS,,;,;,. A. V. Miller, nans. (Oxford: Oxford Univenity PrC5s. 1977). p. 492,; friedrich Nict7_~che. IIl1l1ulII A" l"cIo limn"". R. 1. Hollingdale, trans. (Cambridge. Eng.: Cambridge Univeuity Prns. 1987), I. §II. p. 117; Paul Celan, Dtr ;\faith.III, ill Gt'J""""t'lu \Vt',kt'. vol. 3. Bcda Alleman and Stephan Reiche«. ed~. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 1'18}). p. 100. 6. Manin Heidcggcr. 1111' Esst'1lct' (I/RrtlJom. Terren,e Mali~:k. uan~. (E,·anston. III.: Nonhwcstern Uni\lersity Prrss, 1969). pp. 117-18. 7. "cwrding 10 the ~esture who~e model is gi"en b)' /<'~mt ""d ,Ill' Problnll of MrlflP"ysi.·J. Richard Tali. trails. (Bloomington: Indiana

188

Nott! to Pagn 38-48

University Press. 1990). Let us add here. as one document among others, thac scmenccs from the JIUTOd,tCIion to Mtttlphysics (1935; New Ha~n: Yale University Press, 1987). p. 170: "Being-human. as the ned INol} of apprehension and t:ollection. is a being-driven INOligungi imo ,he fredom

of undertaking l«I",t. the sapient embodiment. This is the character of history'- In the paga of ollr tC'Xt immediatdy following, citations re~r to the English translation of Heidegger's &Iull;ng's Tmuist on tht ESltnct'i HU11IIIn Frmiom. Joan Stambaugh, trans. (Athens: Ohio Uni~"ity Prc:a, 1985).

8. Martin Heidegger, Scht/ling's Tmuist on tht Essrnu of Hu"",,, Frudom. p. 192.. Let us be dear about this: 1936-43, these dares speak volumes on their own, and one will oot have failed to note. in the tone of the "rc:solvc~ to "dcstiny." an echo of the &kloralSmUof 1933. The question of politics in Heidegger is obviously inrerrwillc:d with the question of his debate on the subject of frcedom and with the ida of freedom. One

would have to consider this question with Philippe Lacoue-Labanhe, "Transcendence: Ends in Politics," in T.~pography (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univc"ity Pres.~. 1989). pp. 167-300; and with Gerard GraMl, "Pourquoi nous avon~ publie cela," in Dr L 'UnivmiJi(Mauzrvin: T.E.R, 1985). 9. G. W. F. Hegel. Htgtl's Philosoph) of Right. T. M. Knox. (London: Oxford University Press. 1967), p. 32..

traIlS.

10. Martin He:idcgge:r, "On the: Essence of Truth," in Bmic Writi., David Farrell Krell, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 118. II. Ibid .• p. U7. 12.. This siruating of the theme was prepared by a passage from 1M Qlltstion Conumillg Ttrhllology (1953). of which we will speak further. Martin Heidegger. Tht Prillciplt of Rtaso", Reginald tilly. trans. (Bloomington: Indiana Unh'ersity Press. 1991). 13. Martin Heidegger. "leiter 011 Humanism." in Basic Writings. p. 113·

Chtlpttr 5 I. This al~o date~ to before ROllsseau and Kant (although the Spinolistic rdation to civil law divergc:s. for irs part. from this model; cf. in particular Etienne Balibar, "Jus-PaclUm-l.ex." in Studitt spinOUlltl, vol. I, 1985). 2. G. W. F. Ilegel. SC;tllft of Logic. A. V. Miller. lrans. (Atlantic Ilighiands. N. J.; Humanities Press International. 1989). p. 843. 3. Jcan-I.uc Nancy. T. "mphllliferrfrgoriqllt (Paris; Flammarion, 1981). pro 5R. 134· The: text I refer [0 here is bound up with a network of

Nota to P"~J 48-$2 thoughts woven around rM poinr of "unlealihing" (didJainmrtnl): the in Blallchor. judgment in l.yorard, (in)dt'\;isioll in Oerrida. responsibiliry in I.evinas. Only respomibilil)' is thematically construeit'd as pri(Ir In fh't'tlnl11 and :1!' "dominaring" it. Stt Emmanlld livinas, TtllttUty tIIff! II/Iil/ity. Alphon\(, l.i"gi.~, rrans. (Pimhllr~h: nllqll~ne Universiry Press, 1969), p. 87. An additional remark: for l.t!vinas freedom is mingled, rhrough itself, wirh "rhe arbitrarinC'~s" of an ·C'goisrical ego," and irs "essem;e" lies in "the imperialism ofrhC' Same." Responsibility, by "investing freedom- wirh the "presence of the Uther," "/rttS;t ftom tIN al"bifl"tl'Y" (my empha.~is). This formula alone te'tilia to the fact that freedum cannot fail rn rrccrde itself or to pre«de every attempt to grasp it or to fr~ it from grasp, even irs own grasp. Levinas himself, whose con~ept of fr~tlom-at leasr in this work, since the rest of his work uses the word -f'rredom" in a wider sense-is thus strictly limited 10 dial of free will. nevertheless appeals to "rhe critique in which freedom is capable of being called into question and thus preceding itself" (ibid., p. 89). 4. Manin Hcidegger, .Ylltl/;"g i Trrat;st "n tht /;'sstnC't of H"m"11 F",d"m, Joan Sramhaugh. trans. (Athens: Ohio Universiry Prcu), p. 161 [[rans. slightly modified). The conrcx( gives these lines a remarkablyamhiguous profile: they designate at the same time a limit ofJ
mis

Nom 10 Pages 52-55 Crick, trans., in ExisulltyanJ &illg(Washington, D. c.: Henry Regnery, t949, ~pr. (988), pp. J57-fII [rrans. modified). 10. G. W. F. Hrgd, lLrtMM on lIN History tI!PhiIoJtlp'1J, E. S. Haldane and Frances Simson, trans. (Adantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities PI'eI5, 198,), Introduction. II. Must chis be emphasized? From ,he ·comprehension·' of Dasm. in B~;ng a"d Tim~ to the "chinking" of WlNlI ;s CallnJ TIJinking?, we are only following Heidegger's "path of thought," accenting it dif1"erendy, frc:ely, seeking to liberate what it propoKS. It is understood that we are pracricing a r~tition which itsdf comprises the ~tition of other reperitions: we arc speaking not only of those we most frequendy cite, ~ and elsewhere, several of which have been worked through in the ~peti­ :ion of Heider;ger, but of still Ot:hers, which have sometimes in self-defense repeated something of the same Heidegger (Adorno above all). Ciration is not me entirery of repetition. Actually. an entire epoch was invenred through repetition. and invented its difTerena as repetition. that is, difference as a secondary consequence of che -end of philosophy," as the ~-dc:mand (IT/Wtitio) fur what is at stake in philosophy. But it is Heidcger himself who inaugurated thinking as ~petition (and not as critique: or su~ larion) of what had already heen thought. To repeat is to experience the fact that thinking was c1~ in "metaphysics"-,,"" the fact that this closure frees the possibilities and exigencies of finite thought. that is. of thought that takes up and replays all of its experience as c:xpc:rience of fini· tude:. Frc:edom to rc:pc:at,libc:ration in repetition. In the "prelimirwy remarks" to Wrgma,*~n (1967), Heidcger indicated the "necessity oflarer being understood otherwise chan one understood oneself"; bllt "this tICcnsiry hu its grouncl in the possibiliry thar historical tradition and transmission still prc:sc:rvc a frc:c: space of play for what necessiry demands" Thinking and its tradition free: from themselves me possibility of their free rcpc:rition-and this is why there is thinking. 11. "Singulariry" should here be understood at once according 10 the value Deleuze gives to the "ideal event" or to "cssentially pre-individual, non-personal. a-conceptual" punctualiry, and according to the value that common language givcs to the word when it makes it mean "strangeness, anomaly," as well as according to the value of "surprisc:" which wr will later anal)'7.c in the relation of frc:edom and time. Gilles Ddeuze, Tilt LtlfJl' OfSnlSt, Mark l~ter, trans. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1990), p. 51. For us, existence is above all what is singular. It happens singularly and only singularly. As for the existent, its own c:xislence is

Ntlt~s ttl P"gn 56-68 ahov~

all singular. which means that its existenc~ is not pr«isdy its "uwn" and Ihal its "exi~(il1g" happens an in41ctinitc number uf limes "in" its "ery indi"idualir,' (which is for its pan a singulariIY). Singularity is what Jistinguishes the ~xisrent from the SIIbj«1, for the suhject i, e!IlIcntially what appropri;uC5 itself. au:ordins to its own proximity and law. Yet dx advcnt ()f a subjectivity is itself a singularity. 13. Even free will would have to be ren·aluated. especially ifit is to be undcmvod in its original form. as Vuillemin proposes: "It is ui(1 that l>e:mocritus' systcm suffered from having been transmitted throu~h EpicllfllS' ~tcm. which subordinated throry to practice and introduced the m~taphysical conc'"1't of frc:cdont irno philosophy. Actually, it is this concept of the freedom of indifference:. of balantt. or of will. which inspired the admiration of a Marcus Aurc:lius and which is the kC)'5tone ofEpicurus' philoso~)hr. And this fr«dom is primarily that of refusing the solicirations Ill' opiniun. for example the r~pr~ntation of future evils. in ord~r 10 at.ccpt only the present. i.e. sensadon lUI offfront the active 1I\0Veml'n( of error." Vuillemin. NutsSill 011 r:"nI;"g~"r:~/itpor;t tI~ Di"tlolT tlln IJlttln~S pIJiloSIJphiqrm (Paris: Minuit. 1984). p. 105. An acceptance of Ihe prC5~nt which would be precisely a resignation to destiny (this is what Epicurus wanted) will later charact~rize freNom for us (Chap. II). It is not a question of proposing a new Epicureanism. or an F.pirurc:an ~ivative. II is only a question of smting that at the heart of the philosophical tradition surrounding frftdom Ihere is what could be called a Mmaterialism of the present" -und~rstood as the singularity of ~i5tence and not as appropriated prC5encc---
C'II",," 6 I. Martin Hd(iCf,ger. 71J~ Mnapl1JSi(1l1 FOllndAtion. olLog;c, Michael Ile:im. trans. (Bloomingron: Indiana Unive:nil)' Press. 19R4). p. 18.

Chllpltr 7 This analysis has been underraken ill Je-an-Luc Nancy. Tht t"optrll,iw Comm,mity. Perer Connor. cd. (Minneapolis: University of MinnC'SOta l'rcss. 199t). The law of th~ relouion of singular existenc~ is lormul~llcd in the: following way by rrancis WolfTCwho condudes all anal)'sis of Epicurus and 1.1Icretius in Hcider.gerian terms. cf. nOle: I) 10 Chap s): A being which one !;ould not rdare to any OIher IIKII does not ek-5iu. U

Not~s to Pagn 69-72

it is th~ existenc~ of one rdation to another that determines the possibiliry of their ~k-sistence." Francis Wolff. ~qu~ tU I'llhnmt--
!

r

Not~s

to PaIN 74-78

193

I·Clix Guanari. A rltoustfrltl Ptarmus. Brian Massumi. tram. (Minneapolis: t Jnivcnity of Minnesm3 1)~S5. 1988). ~.

Ct: MWhat is freedom?" in Hannah Arendt. Bmv«n /'1ISt lind Fuht" York: Penguin. 1968). p. 1.. 8. 6. ('hiliJlf1C La(;oue-Labanhe. I. '1mitatimr titS rntldtnln (Pari~: Galilie. 19116). p. 188. (This ~nrence must he unclmtood in rclation ro th~ toil••wing one: "Why. after all. would nO[ the probl~m of ideruifK:ation be. in general. the vet)' problem of the political?" p. 17).) 7. Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard. TI" Oiffimrd. Georges Van Den Abbede, nans. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press. (988), p. 141. R. Alain Badioll. I'ru'-()II I""u" la politilJllt? (Paris: I.e Seuil. 1984). p. (N~w

11)-

9. Immanuel Kam. Rrligi()II \f'il/'in II" l.i",iIJD!RrdSo" Alo"r. T. M. and H. H. Hu,lson, trans. (New York: Harper). p. 176.

(.;r~ne

10. Manin J lcidey,ger. GrJI'mlaH.~ttbt (Frankfun-am-Main: Kl05termann. 1981). vol. fl, p. 16 ("Grundbcgriffe." course of 1941). II. "Omnes ef singulatim" in l.r tltlntt. no. 41, 1986. p. 7. In reality, we have the choice of defining politics between two poles: either the Aristordian de6nitioll of me "political animal" in terms of the disposition of logos insofar as it involves ju\tice. good and evil. ere .• and in renns of the nOllu5t'ful finality of "living well~ (~U uin)i or. at the other pole. Ihe l(:dulOlogy of power. Perhaps the name "politics" should be reservc:d for one of the two; pf'rha~ they should be thought logether. Whatever the choice. it is remarkable mat &~om i\ c:55Cntial at both polcs (and this is what clc:mands thatrhe~' be thoughttogerhc:r). In the same text, Foucaulr (Uuld in fact write: "'Ibe distilKtive trait of power can he found in the fact th.1t some indi\·iduals can mo~ or less entirely determine the conduct of other individuals--but never in an exhaustive or coercive: way. A person who is chained up and beaten is suhjected to the force exerted over him. not to power. YN ifhe can be made to 5~ak. when his last ~son could havc been [0 hold his tongue. I'lcferring death. he has thus b~n forced to hehave in a certain wa~'. Hi, fr~Jllln has been suhjected to )>ower and he has 5uhmined to the government. If an individual can remain &ee. however limited his (r~dom m:ty be. power can subject him to d~ government. There ill no power without the pOIeruial fur refu5al or revult" (p. 34). u. cr. Hannah Arendt. "What is Fref',lom?" in BtlllVm Past alld Fut/ll't (New York: Penguin. 1968). Is there then a mimesis of frttdom. or ,Ioes fr«dom on rhe contrary repudiat~ all mim("!ii~~ This qucstion. briefly

f

Notn tIJ p(lg~s 78-9J

194

skimmed sevcrallines funher on. cannot be treated here. We will simply indicate the principle: cf. note 9 in Chap. 13.

Cf. Chap. 1.

I).

14· Saint-Ju.u. l 'Esprit J~ '" "1101,,';011 (Paris: 10/18. 1'}69), p. 79. C..hapt~r8 I.

G. W. F. Hegel. The Enrycltl/Hdia Logit (Indianapolis: Hackett. The conditional would bl'that teplaco the indicative is

1991), §87. p. 140.

of the first edition indicates. it is true. a slight retreat with respect to this determination offreedom. It is as ifHcgcl were saying, "Freedom wuuIcI be this supreme form of nothingness, if nothingness were not itself alrcacIy annihilated: Nonetheless, the dialectical conversion is not formally iden. rifled as such and is instead reabsorbed into "intensification." 1. Keith Waldrop. Tilt Gllranr tI/ Effort (Providence, R. I.: Bumins Deck. 1975). p. Bo. 3. Martin Heidegger. Tilt Ess~nn o/Rl'asolU. Terrence Malick. trans. (Evam;ton. Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969). p. 119. 4. Rene Descartes. "Author's Rcplies to thc Fifth Set ofObjcctiolU,in Thr Philosophical Writings o/DrKilrtrs, vol. 1.10hn Cottingham. trans. (Cambridge, Eng.: C.ambridge University Press. 1989). p. 141. s. Martin Heidegger. H~di O",ct'pt ofExfHril'llC~ (San Francisco: Harper & Row. (970). p. 110. 6. Marrin Heidegger. Htgl'l's PhmtlmenobJgy o/Spir;t. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. UIRS. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988). p. 10. And funher: "To undcrgo an expericnce with somclhing-bc it a thing. a penon. or a god-mcans that this something bcfaUs us, strikes us, comes ovrr us. overwhelms and transforms us." Heideggcr. "The Narure of language: in On tilt WI1] to liInl"l1gt', Peter D. Hern, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 197r). p. 57. 7. Cf. Derrida's analysis of Uvinas in ·Violence and Metaphysics.· in Writing and DiJform«. Alan Bass. trans. (Chicago: University of Chicaso Press. 1978). pp. 79-153. 8. cr.· Unum quid" in 1ean-luc Nancy. Ego sum (Paris: Flanunarion. (979).

9. Martin Heidcgger, "On the Essence of Truth." in Basic Writings. David Farrell Krell, ed. (New York: Harper & Row. 1967). p. 118. 10. Thus. in Hegel. subjectivity fint graSp$ that pure bring is ·onJy an empty word." which presupposes the mastering of signification and the relation to self given by representation. In this regard we: might also adopt

Jl.loln 10 P"grs ~/02

J9S

Michel Hellf}"s analysis in oMtr to express the trulh of sub;e'livity and its impossibility for frctdom: "The momem of wns,iousncss rc:main~ in fact the: e:nemial momtlU of sdf-consciousllC55. which remains an exterior ,omdousncn. ~ina exteriority is lhe: medium in which consciousness is prcsent to irsdfin self-consciousness. For conscioU5ness, Hegel did not concdve a mode of prcsem:e-to-onesclf other than the mode: of the prrsenl::C of the ohject. bcl::ausc: the presence of the ohjca as such is.. in his view, none orher Ihan lhe: \'ery essence of consciousness. The: e:ssc:ncc of objectivity consrilulC:S the unique fOundation. it is the universal mtdium in which all lhal is manifested is realized." Midtd Henry, L 'EM1lt'~ d~ ill "'dllifoltltion. vol. 2. (Paris: Presses Universitaire:s de: Francc. 196}), p. 901.

Chnp trr 9 I. "On the Essence: of Truth," in Martin Heidegger, &sic Writ;,ItS, David Farrell Krell. edt (New York: Harper & Row. 1977), p. 12.9. 2.. The anal}'5is that follows applies primarily to Sartre's efTans ro e1ucidare and define the meaning of his ronnularion in the posthl1motL~1y publisl,,:d Cnhim ptmr un~ mtlmk (Paris: Gallimard. 198J). beginning at p. 447. 3. cr. the fir~r and second" Analogies of Experience" in the first Critiqut. The rest of our anal}'5is addresses and expands certain clc:me:nts of Hddcgger's anal}'5is in vol. SI of the G~J4mltl'ug4N. Our cunclusions seem 10 be Ihose Ihal Heidcgger rcachtd but did not ,Jt:vclop.
Not~ to Pag~ 102

ignaring as "experience." Still, Hcidcgger's extremely dliptkal anal}'!iis docs not seem rruly to attain the unity it declares bctwcc:n me rel;;eptivity ofimagination and the free impmition oflaw, bc:catL~ it i~ precisely in the unicity of an originary concept of experience that this unity should be found: in the experience of being-in-the-world a~ being-free: cvt'rything in Heidegger leads to this. without formally ending up at it: in IGmt """ Ih~ Probiml ofMtlilpl!JSu this nonanainmem. as well as the restricted pm given to practical reason, sccou commanded by a phenomenologiCLI (eidetic) hyporheric that burdens tlK- directive analysis of the imagination and of schematism; but another work would need to be done in order to ~how thH. Yet if thae is a "sdf-cvidencc~ of respect. it depends on the fol"Ium rationiJ and not on the ~nsibility that accompanies it without truly being at stake in that rdation, since it is exempted from the "pathologic:aJ: which. however. designates nothing other than the regime of the affectability of pure affection (d: Michel Henry's analysi~ in L 'Emn~t tiL '" maniftstlltion [Paris: Presses Universitaires de Frana. 19631, §s8-from whidJ we have strayed in our conclusions). We must therefore be able to think. if not a "pathology." at IC.lSt a pure passion of pure rc;aon, where rea~n is "practical" in all that it is {even when it is "theoretican. But "purity" here will be nothing other than the material effectivity of being-inthe-world. and moral impurity (evil. which we will speak of later). This "passion" is the experience of freedom. The immediacy of this experience must therefore be understood as Ih, aff«tivt ;m-mnluuy offonlom ;" t:cUsOIt? ;'lSOfor as fi-rrt/o", affrcts roS«lIct fom 1111 illfill;« Juran«: from the point of an infinite withdrawal and in traversing existence with this distance-from-itself (its non-essentiality) which ~ts it outside of irsdf only in order to make it mil as the thing in itself. This im-mediacy of experience is the common originary structUre ofhoth sentiment and ~If-evidence. which it withdraws. the one as much as the olher. from subjectivity. 7. II is merefore not a question of [he man who is "immediately natural ... bestowed with natural for~ ~ of whom Marx speaks in his "1844 manuscripts" (Colkcttd Wo,*,o vol. J [New York: International Publishers, J97S)) in order to dininguish him from the man "who aim through himself." Bur it is no Ics.~ significant that Marx wanted to emphasize power in the same way that Hegel had emphasiud conscioUSllCS.'i. The experiem:e of freedom is also the experience of a difference of forces at Make in being-in-the-world. We can recall. moreover. that in an entirdy different but equally symptomatic way Bergson sought to pre~nt free action a~ the "deronation" of a material energy (cf. L 'E"trgi~ spiritu~II~. I).

Not~ to Pdgrs

IOJ-15

197

8. This ontological materiality seems to LIS to meet up with the analyof Didier Franck in H,id'IK'" problfmul, l'nptlrt (Paris: Minuit,

,t1,

5C:S

1986).

9. Cf. Chap. 5,

CI,"pur to I. Cf. Jean-I.uc Nancy. L 'Implratif (atllt',';q'" (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), and cf. Chap, ~. 1. Cf. Chap. s. 3. The general and oonjoincti stnlctllre of order and ~nt: "Come:: how could rhis provoke lhe coming of what comes, Ihe coming of the evw:nt, fOr example, if Ihe '""", itself docs not arrive, docs not arrive at i~If?· Jacques l>crrida, PaMg's (Paris: Galilee, 1986), p. 61. 4. Cf. Emile Benveniste: " ... the bare semanteme employed in its jussivc form, with a sprcific intonation." which docs not ~n constitule "an unerance." P'YJ6Imrs in (,'m,ml Li11fl,;stit"s, Mary Elizabeth Meek, trans. (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1971).

Chapurl1 I. We mu.~t ignore here the anicularion with space, which nevertheless belongs to this pmblt'matic. For rhis another work would be rrquiml. Further on we will find some indications in tht' direction of what would have to he thought not onl)' a~ an originality pmper to ipace (as cion Didier Franck, d. nOle 8 to Chap. 9, above), but as a "spaciosity- of rime around rhe ""Will; which we will discu!oS here. Generally speaking, freedom OfT"B itself as spacious and spacing: I WilllOllch on this in the conclusion (Chap. 13). 2. Cf. Martin Heitiqr,gt'r, On n"" anti &illg, JO;In Stambaugh, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and also Oerrida's analysis of the "thoroughly mt'taphy~ical" character of the ·ccmct'p' of time" in ·Ousia and G,.a",mt': Note on a Note: from "r;lIg alld 1i",," in Margins of PMIDJopl1} (Chicago: University or Chicago Press, 1981). ). Translator's note--" Srt",",,,,," "the u~xpcctc:d occurrence," when empha.'ii7.ed by Nancy a" su,-rlt'I/"" has bttn rranslatcd ali ·coming-up" in order to prt'5erve it~ sense of "coming" [''f'IIHto). 4. Cr. Chap. 6. 1"11t' entire thematic of the prC5t'nt para~ph should he c()m~'<Jred to I.yotard's reading of HrgrbmJ"it in Kantian hislOry, of the cvent'$ "f"ct of gi\'ing itself' as lhe "tract' of freedom in rc:a1it)·." Although I.rotard, who does nOI propose an t'Xaminatioll uf freedom for itself. re-

Not~

to P4g~ 11$

wns the term Mcausality by freedom." the: implicit concept of freedom that his text seems to suppose would perhaps fInd mOle analogies here. However, we would have some reservations with regard to the expression -trace offreedom," which implies both visibility (or sensibility; these arc the stakes of Lyorarc1's Msentim('nt," which should I('ad us back to what is evoked in not(' 6 to Chap. 9) and intermittency; what is undeni. abl(' on (h(' level of the "historical cvent.~" of which Lyorard speaks seems to me to refer. on the level of ontology. to what could be called the non· sensible constitution of the sensible and the non-imerminem wnstitution of ev('nemential intermittence. In a sense. there is constantly an event of freedom that opens existence as such. There is wnstandy a ~coming-up" in time, and it is only from this point that one can accede to the possibility of thinking a "history" and its "signs." Cf. J('an.FuJl4jois Lyotard. L ,£"thous;mm, (Paris: Galilee. 1986), ('specially pp. 54-56, 100, "~. S. Juli('n Grc:tn, Minu;t, cited in G('Or~s Paub, Mnu" d, ''instAnt (Paris: Pion, 1968), p. 376; and Milan Kund('fa, CArt dtl Roman (Paris: Gallimard. 1986), p. 80 (th(' author speaks of Anna Karenina-srructurally speaking. would literature have to do with this surprise. many other literary examples of which could cmainly be produced?). There is something of a syncopt' here-suspt'nsc and rhythm-of a beating at the h('arr o("r('ason," of a h(',utbeat. "A h('arr is alrt'ady an ev('nt, an evt'nr is already a ht'art: wrote Dottn. Freedom, in its event, is pt'rhaps always of the order of the h('arr. But how does one think a ht'arr of being? (We addressed the question in "Shattered Love," Lisa Garbus and Simona Sawhncy, trans., in Tht Imp,rllli", Commum'ty, Petcr Connor, ed. (Minneapolis: Univcrsity of Minnesota Press, 1991].) What occurs in Frtignis is pt'rhaps that occurring OCClll'!i to itsdf aM appropriates itsdf as pres('nce. Bur this can only occur in th(' modt' of an unexpt'Ctt'd comingup. Occurring occurs to irsdfby coming up in the beating of the comingup. It would be this-the heart of being-or its freedom (wouldn't the htart be for us a synonym or metl1phor of freedom in all its states?). Thc opening of a world, as such and absolutdy, is unthinkable outside of freedom of the coming-up. Otherwise. it is not a worIJ. but a IIII;wm. In a somewhat comparable way, Wiug('nsrein links wonder before the "miracle" of existenc(' (which reft'rences H('idqr,gcr. in th(' G('rman edition of th(' text, as Christoph('r Fynsk has shown liS) with "hi(j as the proper order of expressions "whose very es.~nce is to have no meaning," which we would interpret as: to have the "meaning of the freedom of being (d.

m('

D

Noln 10 raUl 1/6-19

199

Wingt:'nsccin. "l.n:tllre on F.thics. in TlJr I'lJiiosopl}iclIl &,,;t", \hhaca: Sage School of Philosophy. 196,). vol. 7 j. PI" 3-(1). 6. Among many analyses, we cite that ofVlIillemin (who. moreover, al'il) analpC'i Spinoza), for the finesse with which it grasps the active abandonmenr of [his will: "What i~. however. the origi n of [he conversiun by which a finite will. in anuming the lirnilarions [h'lI o\'erwhelm it. identifie~ hsd!: 10 ,he extent that this is possible, with its cause: and sub· mnce? h would not be thi~ finite will itself. except fJrec:isd)' in~far as we con~ider it 10 be a given part of Nature and the wise man only comes to wisdom b)' W3)' of a certain etemalnecessity. We are Ihcrcfi.n: necessarily necessiratM to salvation 3nd acquioc.:ence. And again it is the secret of the strength of feeling one's effusion sunained by a source which i[ captured as if involuntarily. whkh i[ doa not connol and which it feels to be inexhall~tihle." Vuillemin. N«tssitt Ott ('OlIri'tgnrrt-I'trpont tit Diodo,,,,, Its SJstcmts I'hilosoplliqrltS (Paris: Minuit. 1984), p. J89. To which we would add only, in order to C5rabli~h a more secure link with mis tor, that "salvarion and acquiescencc" are nothing omer than freedom itself. 7. Cf. ChafJ· 7. ~. The theme of rhe choia of OtlS,;,,'S proper possihilities, in &in: IIlId Tilllt. does nor rd'er to the classical motif of the will's choice. "To choose oneself" i~ not to elect one po55ibility among orhel'S. and it i.s nevertheless not a resignarion to the inc:virable. It is a decision ro be one's own as the rxiumt that one is. whidl means always. as this being whose cxiuence surprists it. 3S existem:e and as irs own. 9. Cf. Walter Ikn;amin. "Trauerspiel uml TragiXIie." in rrtJllmm~/tt Srbl'ijim, vol. 1 (Frankflln·am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1980). pp. 1..... 115. 10. Ilowever. we will not pronouncc the~ without the: following warning from Adorno. from Ntgllt;,~ D;"lt~ti~s, E. B. AshlOn. frans. (New York: ('.onrinulIlll. 1987). p. }69: "The dc:reriorarion of the death of mcrarhysics. whether into adveniscmenrs for heroi~ dying or to rhe triviality of purdy rest;lIing the unmistakahle fact that men must di~all this ideological mischief probably rests on the f3~1 lhal human con~ciousness to rhi~ day is 100 wcolk to su§tain the experience of dcarh. perhaps even too weak to inu:grate death with the self. " But we will add rhat MIO integrate Je:arh with the sdf" is at leaM an ambiguous exprC$Sion and rhat it i.s fn:cdnm irsclf which takes us to lleath and which .mo ,"vIISc:'1l1enrly drI'dt'r< III (J.rtl~I'Y possibility ofIIl'l'ro,orillli"g Ibis dtllll}, ur rhe binh which opcn~ onto it. M

,an

100

Notes 10 Pllgn 119-23

II. Cf. the entire motif of Sd,;clnAL ~hirlml. and bntimtnnl, which clearly communicatcs. as is wcll-known. with that of EIYigni! (cf. 0" TiI1ll anti B';"g, Joan Stambaugh. trans. [New York: Harper &. Row.

1971]).

Chllpttr 12 I. Theodor Adorno. NtKativt Dill/min, E. B. Ashton. trans_ (New York: Cominuum. 1987), p. 366. 1. H. W. Pcact citcs this expression in his preface to Martin Heidcgger/Erharch Kastner, BriifwtC'hid (FrankfurHlm-Main: KloSlcrmann. 1986). J. Cf. Philippe Lacoue-Labanhc. La Pllisi, romm, 'xpimnC'r (Paris: Bourgois. 1986), p. 167: "This is strictly ,mparJonabV-the word relates simuitaneolL~ly to Auschwitz and to HeKk~r's silence. (In addition. and as a prefacc to later remarks. we: should recall that pardon. in irs Judeo-Christian tradition. needs no justification. What remains unjustifiable can, on another register. be pardoned-nccpt when it precisely involves an altitudc that 1c:an5. in one way or another, toward justifying the unjustifiable:. as we: mipt suspect the case would be at a certain level in Heid~r. Yc:r in the same: u:adirion of pardon there rc:mains an enigmatic "sin against the: spirit" which cannot be: pardoned.. . (Let us add that Heidegger's silence was not ahsolutely total; somc sentences were spoken and we: wiJIlarer allude to one of tMsc on the U"hril, the disaster. of Nazism. But apart from this word, nothing broke Heickgger's profound silence:. All the mate:rial on this poim is presented and carefully analyzed by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in La FiC'tion au politiqu, (Paris: Bourgoil. 1988), rranslat~d as HtiJtlX"' Art ana PtllitirJ. Chris Turn~r, trans. (I.ondon: Basil Blackwell. 1990). 4. Thomas Mann, Dtu Probltm dtr Frtihtit (Stockholm. 1939). 5. As indicated earlier (Chaps. I, J), we are thinking of a secret eomplicity. in spite of fundamental differences, between the camps and everything that, by exploitation. abandonment. or tonure. presenls in our time: what could be gadtc:rc:d under dtc: names (both malerial and symbolic) of tenacity (amamrml'm). emaciation (ald.NImtmmt), and ,he mass grave: (rharni",. The analysis of these would have to be: give:n c:Ise:where. It would be: necessary to retrace what circulates between the: exposing of the brutality of the primitive accumulation of capital-the exposing of the "sickne:ss of civiIi7.ation--and the eXp05ing of civilized and technicized

barbarism.

NOln 10 P"KN 123-27

101

6. Onc mi~ht finlJ \uch a confusion of Jifli:rcnccs CKccssivc. It is mc:3ningful only wilh respect to thc cKhibilion of a "posilivity" of evil. which we: will di!IClI~\. Meanwhile: onc should not forget. even as their neeeuary differences are res[Orcd. thc ~adi~tic sc... ne~ in Proust or the R.1taillt'an project ofhulllan sacrifice: for. in ~pite /If everything. this happened-and Bamille himself finall~ recogni7.rd it-oU[side the sacred and outsidc the immanent rcrrihlllion of evil 10 which he laid claim. 7. Victor Hu~n.l." Fill MS"ran. 8. Immanuel Kant. R~/i!.io" Vi';,,,;,, ,11, /'imits o!R,,,son A/ON. pp. )1 (We retain the old... r translation. since it secm~ difficult to renounce the word "wkkedncss" (mlrlMnfl',r]. allcast for our prescnt use. in favor of "mal icc" [m"ligu;rr] even though. in ils previolls si~nificarion. the lancr term gave its name pm:i!icly 10 rhe: E"i/ 011, [M"/in!: but this signification has heen Iml.) 9. In this sense. a simplc lise of Ihc terms "good" and "cvir no doubt loses i" relcvarn.:e:. However. the fundamental-and fc)undationles.diKurd 10 which thC)' testify. without even being charged wilh any other Jererminalillil th:," Ihal of lhe "finy" of evil. CUlnOI he o:pressat in othe:r words. (" Fury" is not "combat." it dcv...\laICS and ruins. nOlhing more.) And this i~ aiM'! why it seems to us difficult to renounce. in spite of everything. the: word "tiecdom." 10. Doubtless. (here is no longer a pure empirical figure for .he "wicked heing" any morc than there is fOr the "sage" or for lhe "!klint" (meanwhile. therc arc: apparatu'l("~. mcchani~ms. instilU[iul1s. and calculations that can prcscnl wickeliness as such ••• ). YC( aparl from the facr thar we can no lon~r easily reamn in sLlch (erms. whcrc expc.·rience itself is transccndental. there is a total dissymmctry hctwccn the prC!irnration of a tortured body on which maliciousncss is inscribed in capirallcners. and that of a hody which we will nOI cven call happy or heautifill. but which suffe:rs from mmethin~ mher than wickedness. Al if evil by essence imprinted its mark. and good. on the contrary. covered up its own trac:cs. Evil must attest to itll own operation. it mun show its devastation. Good neither dcstroys nor c:onsrnlCts. it is not ofslIch an order. Wc wuld therc:fOre also conclude that ~oud alwa~ escapc:!i wicked destruction (as all of idrali5m thought. with greater or Irs'K'r diflkuhy): yet even this h..., nn precise meaning. Good is "Ilt "safC"r.llardcd." Where evil occurs. there i~ no good on reserve. Rut the attcstation (If evil is equal to Ihe att~tion of lhe good that is not there. [0 thc eXlcnt ,hal il is not there: and has no I"c)!Iili\·iry. II. Manin llridcpge:r. "I.rtter on Humanism." in &nc Wril;'IgS. David

a:

101

Notrs fo Pagn 127-29

Farrell Krdl. trans. (New York: Harper 6l Row. 1977). pp. 2}7-}8 [trans. modified). The date of this text (1946) and the use of the word" fury. in the sense whose origin we believe we can It)cate. lead us to believe that Heideggcr at least implKidy also targeted Nazism here. Yet at the same time. and for fundamentally obvious motives. "fury" must also refer [0 an aspect of the analysis of "technology" and of Gnull (where the theme of fury can often be detected and sometimes explicitly read: cf.• for example. 'The Question Concerning Technology." in &nic Writingy. David Farrell Krell. cd. [New York: Harper & Row. 1967». To comprehend. not evil through technology. but the properly technological determination of technology. the one that according to Heideggcr hides its ~nce of "disdosing" ([0 recall quiclcly one of the daims of his text). ro comprehend therefore this determination by way of evil and by its fury is one of Heidegger's comtant directiom. even if it is rardy made explicit. The Unhtil the distress without safeguard. the disaster (a term employed once to designate the worlc of the Nazis--cf. lacoue-Labarthe. whOJC entire analysis should ~ run through here). cha~rir.cs the world of rMtnology. And the motif of freedom. as if in counterpoint. also run., through the entire text on technology. We simply wam [0 poim out these indicadom. without otherwise problematizing them. 11. G. W. F. Hegel. 11~ Systmr of Ethical Lift and First PhilDsop!J.yof Frmlom, H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox. trans. (Albany; State University of New York Press, 1979). p. IH. I}. All figures of fury fiD this abyss wirh the idea of a "pure race" or wirh every other "pure" idea. including that of freedom. even that of a violent God. We could relate them 10 what Lyomrd calls the "absolute wrong" in lk Diffrrtlld, Georges Van Den Abbede. trans. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1988). We could also relate the characlerization of the evil thus attained to what lacan designated as "the jealousy that is born in a subject in its reLation to anomer. inasmuch as this other is thought to participate in a certain form of jouiJSllnct'. of vital superabundance. perceived by the subject as that which he can nor apprehend by way of any affective movement. even the most elementary. [s it noc truly singular. and strange. that a being should admit to envying in another. [0 the point of hatn:d. to the point of needing to destroy. what he is incapable of apprehending in any way. and by no intuitive means? The almost conceptwlloclting of this other may in itsdf suffice to produce this movement of unease .... " Jacques !.acan, Lt'Slmi"",", Book VII. "L'Ethique de la psychanalyse" (Paris: lc Scuil. 1986). p. 178. And ruSIn,,,t'. as such, il -JuprrttbuntLmu." 14. Translator's note-For the remainder of this chapter. the word M

No~s

to Pages 129-J7

2.03

I'rol'rt has heen uanslated as "own- and "proper" irucn;hangeably in ord~r to regiMer Nal1l.:Y's nuancing of this term.

15. Cf. Martin' Icidegger. "l.cner nn Humanism," in 8tuk \f;rit;"gs. Certainl)· anothcr undersranding of H~idcggcr'~ propositions on tlbos is made possible if rhe du't'Jlingwhi,h rlj,O! must he for him is not a dwelling of the proper. and is finally /lot a "dwelling- at all. What we will say next ahout the det.:ision will follow in this direl:tion. 16. Martin Heid~gg~r. Srhtllil,fl,'s Tmllist 011 tilt Esst1lrt of H,,,,rttn f'rtttiom, Joan Stambaugh, [ran.~. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), pp. r41-'43; next citation. pp. 177-78. 17. It should he noted that Hegel's anal~is of good and evil in the PlmlOmmo!ogy. which dialet.:ricizes their identity, nevertheless empha$il~S in a particular rone that the simpl~ affirmarion of their identity mu~t he juxrapm;ed "with an insurmountahle obsrinlk.Y." namely, that of their ditTerem:e. IR. Georges Bataille, .. Conftrmm" in Ontr'm (Amplhts, vol. 7 (Paris:

Le Sa&i1, (976), p.

J7}.

19. Ihid .. vol. 8, p. 495. 20. 21.

Cf. Chap. J. QUNlions IV (}Jar": F1ammarion), p. 150 [trans. of Dit &Im," M

1961 1. 22. Translator's nntc--Errt-proprr rranslates Heidcggcr's "St/~in," rendered in English as "Being·its-Self" or a5 "Bc:ing-one's-Sclf" in Macquarrie and Robinson's tramlation of Bei"g and Timf. 2). "Mood-heing arnmed-to hear the attunement. To be able 10 hear: ((till of the stillneSli of being." Srhtlli"g s Tmllist on '''~ Eum"~ of HItIHt1" Prttdom. p. 189. (This callundoubtcdly communicates with the one we will next dis,uss). [Translator's note-Nancy's di~cussion of tonality follows from the translation of Hcideggc:r's Stimmung"molld"-~ fOIl"Iill.l 2.,. §S7 and following. 25. This call and this voice have been specifically analYlcd by Clu"lOphcr Fynsk in IItidtrgtr- Thought al/d Hiltoridty (\thal:a: Cornell University Press. 1986). chap. I. This 'lnal~is has also given risc 10 an essay by Mikkcl Borch-Jal:ob!;en. "termtr," in PoIs;t .15. Paris. 1<}86. 011 the ({(lIill thc con5titution of Vasti" beyond the subjCi:t, cf. Jean-Luc Marion. -1:lnterloqt.e" in TO/,oi, ill W1~ CO",N Aft" tht Subfrrt? Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor. Jean-l.uc Nancy, cds. (New York: Routledge, 1991). pp. 2}6-45. And on the ",,11 in general in Hcid~cr, con~dcrcd tOr its (d~-phl)" ny and rdated to Hcidcr,gcr's politiu and his thinking on tcchnology. sec

u:

204

Notts to Pagn IJ7-4}

Avital Ronell. TIM l'''kpIJolI~ Book (Lim;oln: Nebraska UniveBity PrCSl. 1989).

16. In this way. ontological analysis yields to the ·pre-ontological" comp~~nsion of the phmomenon of G~rttiMr, in ordinary expel'irnce (cf.

§S9). This experience is therefore only "ordinary" in that it malen the call of conscience succeed a committed act as a lived experience. Ytl;1 is not ordinary in that it giM primACY to bad cansnena. Morwver. the paralld analysis of an ordinary "good" conscience results entirely in Ihe impossibility of this purported phenomenon. The good man will be the last 10 say". am good" and thereby to escape from the possibility of hearing the call. Consequently. we: can add to what Hddcgger says. the good man is good only in receiving rhe "attestation of his being-wicked." 17. lowe this comment on the word to Werner Hamacher. who is p~paring an impo"ant srudy of G~/lJ;ssnr. 18. §60. p. J4S lnans. modified). To remain consistent with the lexicon of "facruality. "we render folttisch as "faerual" and not "faerial. n 19. Q"nlions IV (Paris: Flammarion). p. 148 (trans. of" Die Klhrt." 19611. JO. QutJtions IV(raris: Flammarion). p.1II4. This comes from a seminar protocol. not from one of Heideggcr's texts.

Chapt" IJ I. Cf. Chap. J. Yet decision doubdess always insmbn itself. which means it not only says or writes something. but gives itself as dtcisio" (through speech or writing. or through the body. gesture. or tone). This inscription of decision is cerrainly not unrelated to what Jcan-Claude Milner analyzes as d,d"rlltio". which for him is p~cisely the material inscription of freedom (cf. Libtrtis. Imm. ,,,,,1;;". I..cs con~~ncn du PerroquCl. 3. Paris. June 1985)· 1. Cf. similarly Uvinas: "Violence can only aim at the faer." cired by Derrida. who condnues: "Furrher. wirhour Ihe thought of Being which opens rhe face. rhe~ would be only pure violence or pure nonviolence." Jacques Derrida. "Violence and Metaphysics· in Wriling DiJfortllct. Alan Bass. lrans. (Chicago: University of Chicago rress. 1978). p. 147. We may add: "iolencc also originates from a face. on which wickedness can. occasionally. be read II! rh, d,wtstAl;ol/ ofthis s
."d

fensc a~i"'1 dying. do nor decidc the undecided. do not say: "here is what is donC':' prcsumptuously claillling a right over rhe "not yet." do not act as if .he last word has been spoken. time is fini~hcd. and the Messiah has finally arrived.'" Maurice Blanchot. Pas ",,-/kIll (Paris: Gallimard. 1973). p. 149· ~. Manin Heilll'l~er. Bring lind lImt. John Macquarrie and Edward Rohin~on. trans. (New York: Harper & Row. (961), $60, p. 346. (Translator's nore-Where Nancy appears explicitly to be referring to Hddc~er's text. ·oll,'trt",i· ("EncIJ/omnhtil') hu been transJated as "disclosedm:ss"; otherwise it has heen rendered as "opening" or "open-

u

nc:ss. "J 6. Cf. primarily On Timt tlnd &ir'g, and Art lind Spa"t. 7. YVC'S Bonnefoy. L 'Improbttbk (Paris: 1951), p. lSI, S. Gilles Dd(,lI1.e and Felix Guarrari, A fhtmsn",1 PIaUllfll, Brian Massumi, tran.~. (Minneapolis: UnimsityofMillnc:soca Press, 1987). p. )81. This will also rd'er to.he description of "free action" which "ahsolurdy occupies an unpunctuated space." 9. 15 it therdure inimitahlc:? Ilere we will hold in rescrve .he mimetologkal quelilion offn:C'dom (in a general sen~c and with panicular reference 10 Lacuue-Labanhc). Frcrdom is produced in and as the being-singular of being. The bdng-singular of being is for itself. in existena, ndthcr a general essence. nor a generic substance. nor a formative force. nor an exemplary ideality. There is no reproducible contour. no mood. no scI'm1tt of pmerical reason in its fo("', No non-scnsible image of .he smsihle-bm the finite: tran~endcnce of naked ~nsibiliry. existC'llce materially d~iding it~lf in the world. Freedom doe~ nOi resemble anything and it is not (l' lnC'mble an~'thing. Imitadon has always been considered as unfree. it has even undouhtedly furnished ~rvility's rxt"'pl"m. and free,",om. on the conrrary. would he the tx,mpl,llll of non-imitation--the negative rxnnpl,m, of a negation of mi""S;I. The limit of imitation, never rhe imitation of the limit: always 01/ the limit of existence (would this he .he hi,ldcn "rtof the schemalism?). But this still estahli~hC'5 a mimeric rdation. and freedom has also always bern considered ;l~ t'xempl:uy: C'Xemplary of C'Xcmplality we ,"uuld say. Exemplary of what under ,he name of prll:o$ (excellence. virtue. n:volution) can he thought of a.\ non-poitsil. or as po;tS;S of the 501(' agelH of l'0inis. We know, moreover. that this can also be interpreted as pot", ;n,lf. We could investi~te how freedom has been identified with poetry itsclf and reciprocally. Is it not at bottom for us the txtmp'um, without example, of "creation." it5c1f exem-

106

NOkS to Pagt'S 148-51

plary of the uncxnnplifiable offering of a world and to a world~ Freedom: praxical archi-mimesis and archi-poetry~ If there is something of the revolutionary in art. this i!i because it forcc~ one---since Plato. with and against philosophy-to think freedom. Yet perhaps it demands this more radically offrmlom. It would be in [h~ sense that [he -archi-obligation" present in an for Lacoue-Labanhe should be understood. Sec Philippe Lacouc-I...abarthc, L 7mitlltion tin motkrnn (Paris: Galilee, 1986), p. 184. But if art obligates one to freedom, it is not because it gives an example of it or because there would be an "art of fredom." These determinations have all been aught up in our representation of the Greek ~ple (in our constirution or construction of our beginnings in an exemplary origin). If there is something revolutionary, which we have kept calling "freedom." it i~ something that gesrures toward a liberation from this very example of an an of freedom and of a fr«dom of an. whose chiasm signifie5 tor us a lost Greece as well as a freedom beyond our reach. But here is a liberation for another opening. for another unexpectw occurrence without example or whose only example would be surprise, the ~nerosity of the surprise and the surprise of generosity. A surprising example. Freedom would rrquire thinking-in a region where the demands or hopes of "an," "cthics," and "politics would be replayed-neither an inimitablc model nor a m;mesu withou r model, but the surprise ofthe ex4mp/e as such (why dOf'$ this furnish an example? Why is there an example rather than ... ?), a surpr~e more originary than mim~iis to every poiesi;, therefore a praxis, we could say, but one which would not be the agent's "sclf-production," but rather the vinuc-fhe force and excdl~nce---of nothing other. bur nothing less than, t'Xutmu. An ontology of this surprising example that being gives.

Chaptn14 I. Cf. Maurice Blanchot, Th~ Writing of th~ Disasttr, Ann Smock, trans. (Lincoln: Unive~jty of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 46. 1. These fragments were added several momh~ after this essay was drafted, and were originally given to be read for a thesis defense, and to some friends. 'fhry therdOrc bear traces of questions po.~, of readings and of reRections made afterward. Above all. I do not wan[ them to appeat as wanting to uconclude." Th~ classical rhetorical precaution is here more than justifiw. There is not "a thinking" of freedom. there are only prolegomena to a freeing of thinking. 3. Jacques Derrida, Pllragt1 (Paris: Galilee, 1986), p. 67. ITranslator'~

Not" to Pltg" If6-72

207

pas without overlooking irs meanings in French. which range from irs nominal designations "stt"p. pace. footprinl. [race. stri~. walk. gait. dance. precedence. Ihreshiliti. step of siair. passage (of arms), strait. pass. pitch. Ihread to its adverbial U5C a~ a panide of n~ation signifying "no. not. nOI any. "] 4. cr. IA J~'/I" fillt qlli 110111 prism" lit,." forthcoming. 5. §}8. I will 'OOle back to this in an essay on "opening" in the analytic of D/'I~;n. Moutin Ileidegger. B~i"g ""d T;m~. John Macquarrie and Edward Rohinson. nans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 119. 6. Translator's not~"7«1m;q"t." in French. is open to many English translations, among which are the following: "technique." Ihe specific style or manner in which an activity is conducted; "technics," the technological tooL~. methods. theories. and so fonh used to carry OUI an action: anti "technology." rhe terminological body relating as a whole 10 the: technological. 7. Since these notes, Derrida has explicirly come bad to the: 5tatus of questioning in Heidewr: Jacques Derrida. OfSpirit. HtUkggtr.nd tht QlltSlioll. Geoffrey Bennington and Radlcl Bowlby. trans. (Chicago: Univeniry of Chicago PI'CS5. 1989). B. Blanchot. TIw Writing oflJw Disasltr. 9. §S7. Martin Heideggc:r. Btillt ana T;mt. p. J13. 10. Cf. "Lc: Peuple juif nc rM pas." by Philippe: Lacoue:-Labanhc: and Jean-Luc Nam:y, in La Psyc""nttlys~ m-~/k IIn~ histoi" jlli",? (Paris: Lc: Scuil. 1981); and on Ihe Hrgdian "mother." Jean-Luc Nancy, "Idenrirr et tremblement" in Hyp"(Jw (with M. Barch-Jacobsen and E. Michaud) (Pari.~: Galilee. 198}). n. Maurice: B1anchot. Pas Ilu-drld (Paris: Gallimard. 1975), p. 7J. 12. Robert Amdme.lette:r of June 21, 1945, citrd in Dionys Mascolo. Amour dim 1]Or, tit ml",o;" (Paris: M. Nadeau. 1987). I). E. M. Cioran. Prlris tit dIromptlrititJIl (Paris: Gallimard. 1965). p. n. 140 Cf. (;mnJ Grand. Ala Guerre de Seccssion." Dlb.t, no. 48. Jan.nor~ln English, there is no way 10 render

muhi~'le

M

u

u

Feb.1988. IS. G. W. F. Hegel, Phi/ostJp", ofRigJII (New York: Oxford Universiry Press. 1967), §S. 2.2. 16. Amtlor rhe event of being. I insist h"re on returning to L '£Ir~ tt l'lr,mrmtllt by Alain Dadiou (Pari5: I.e Seuil. 1987). Having appc:arat too

r.

late for me: (0 gram it its due cr"dir. rhis imponam book 5C:C:1II5 (0 me (0 comain. in cenain respect" a rhesl~ close to (he rhais on the fttedom of being.

Index of Nalnes

In ,his index an af' aftrr a num~r indicates a scpararc rt~nce on the nellt page. and an ~fl~ indicates separate referenca on the next two pagCll. A continuous discuuion OV~ nvo or mort pag~ i, indicated by a span of page numbers. e.g.. U - S9• P;willl i~ used for a cluster of rcfcrenas in dose but M

nOl

consrcutiv~ ~qumce.

Adorno. Thcodor.... n. 111. 184n4. 186nl. 190nll. 199nl0 Arrndr. Hannah. 74(, '4S. 168 Ari~IOde:, 41, 16}. 19)nll

Dcrrida. Jacques, 7. I,. Isof. 16,. 186n8. 189n). 194n7. 197n}

(Chap. 10), 197nl (Chap. II). 107n7

Oescarrcs. Ren~. S. 71. 87, 89(, 107

Badiou. Alain. 76. 183nl. 207016 Ral.ille. Gt'orgeo;. 12..52. 12.}. 1}2. IH. lSI. IRlnll. 10ln6

BaudelJire:. Ch;ulc:s-Pic:lle, (1) 8t"njamin. Waller. 117-18. 137. lSI. 165

8c:nveniste. Emile:. 197n4 8t"rg.~m. Henri. ISO. 186m. 196-97 n7

8iraud. Henri. 186-87n) Blandtot. Mau.il:e. 119. 148. lSI. 189n1. 1<)2n4. 204n4 Ronnefo)·. Yves. 144

F.picurus. 19m1} Fichll~. J. G.• IS,-B6nf Foucault. ",tichc:l. 78. t9Jnll Franck. Didier. 197n8 (Chap. 9), 197'nl (Chap. II) Freud. Sigmund. 71. 168 Fynsk. Christopher. 1031115

(;rancl. Grrard. IS. 1"1. l88n8 tiUalt;1ri. Fc.'lix. 193n4 Gl1ilead. Rcubm. la6n)

Uorl.:h-JKubsen. Mikke:1. lOJn!s Dall."a)'r. Frrd R.. IS;n}

De:lcuze. (;iII~. 'So. I(,S. 19On12. 1'}2n4

Ilamachrr. WC'rner. 204n2.1 Ill'gd.li. W. L I. f. 7f. 14. 19. 33. J6. J8f. 41. 46 • 49-S0. H. 7 6 • RIff. 88.94• 107. 10,}. 118. IlS.

.,sr.

109

lndn:

2.]0

117r. IH. 138. I~sff. IS9. 171. 18101. 18301. 18sns. 19401. 194-95nI0. 196n7. 10)n17 H~idcgger. Martin. 14. 18. u. 15-19. )1. )3-43. 46-54 passim. 58. 61. 67. 81r. 88. 94. 96. IIIr. 119. 112..

115. 115-31 fJilHim.

135-44 ptwim, 150r. 156-61 passim. 165-71 plUSim. 183n4. 184nS. 18snn4-S. 186n7. 186-87n3. 187-88n7. 188n8, 188nl1. 189n4. 19Onll. 194n6. 195n3. 195-96n6. l!J8ns. 100n3. 101nll. 103n15. 104n16. 107n7 Henry. Michel. 195nIO. 196n6 HoId~rlin. Fri~drich. 154 Husser!. Edmund. IS9

Kafka.

Franz. 11} Kanr. Immanud. sf. 8. lof. 11-16 passim. 31. 33. }6ff. 39. 41. 44fT. 48. SI. 54. 59. 67. 7 6 f. 9)f. 99 ff. 105ff. Ill. 113, 116. 114-15. 117. 1)7. 157. 159. 16). 165f. Il4n1. 1840"4-5.18501. 186n7. 188m. 189n4

M:m;us Aurdius. 191013 Marion. Jcan-Luc. 10)n25 Manincau. E .• 18sn4. 187n) Marx. Karl. 17. 51.79. 157. 163. 184nl. 189n8. 196n7 Mcrlcau-Ponry. Mauricc. 191nl Miln~r. Jcan-aaud~. 10401 MWiil. Robm. 1S3 NiellSChe. Friedrich. 17.46. 113. 117. ISor. 157. 165. 183n4. 184n1

Pascal. Blaise:. 58 Plato. 7. 75. 78.107.115, 141.163. 205n9 Proust. Marccl. 113. loln6 ROUS5elU. Jean-Jacques. 44. 51. 188nl Sadc, Donaticn-Alphonsc-Fran~is dc, 113

SainI-Just. Louis dc. 80 Sartn:. Jcan-I'aul. 96. 98f. 101, 186m. 19Sn1 ScMlling. Friedrich von. 8. 33.

)6-40 PIUS;m. 115-31 plUSim. 134. ucan. Jacques. 101nl3 l.acou~-l.abanhc. Philippe:. 75. 184"4. 188n8. lOOn). 10lnll. 101-6n 9 Leibniz. Gottfried, 36. 18}n4 Ibinas. Emmanud. 89. 187n). 189n3. 19407. 104nl Lyotard. Jcan-FraDljois. 7S-76. 189n3, 197-98n4. Wl1l13 Mann. Thom:l!i. 113

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MERIDIAN

Crossi,zg Aesthetics

Jcan-Luc Nancy, TIN Ex~riml"t ofFrm/om Jean-Joseph Goux, Chdiplls. Phi/osoplNr Haun Saussy,

Tb~ Prob/~m

offI ChillN Ant/utiC'

Jean-Luc Nam:y, Tlw Birtb to Prtsmu

I.ibrary of Congr05 Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nancy, J~an.Lw:;

[Expc:ritncc de Ia Jibe"c. English! The experience of freedom I

Jean-Luc Nancy ; [ranslalcd by Bridge! McDonald with a foreword b)· Peter femes. p.

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ISIIN 0-8047-2190-4

aile. paper) II. Series

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Liberty. I. Title. Meridian (Stanford, Calif.)

BIOS·4~N)613

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