The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans: Volume 32 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans

Edited by

Iztok Prezelj Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism in the Western Balkans Ljubljana, Slovenia 20–21 April 2007

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Introduction: Counter-Terrorism and Crisis Management as Challenges for the EU, NATO and Western Balkan States The world of today is unfortunately increasingly developing into a venue for crises and terrorism. Next to organised crime, international terrorism has become the highest priority security threat in Europe. Many terrorist organisations have an active presence in Europe. Some are active against certain European states, while others act against nonEuropean states, using Europe as a logistical base. Terrorist attacks such as the simultaneous bomb attacks in Madrid in 2004, the taking of hostages in a Moscow theatre, the simultaneous bomb attacks in London in 2005, the attempts to do something similar in 2006 etc. are sobering examples of the terrorist threat in Europe. According to EUROPOL, altogether 498 terrorist incidents occurred in EU states in 2006. The vast majority of them merely resulted in limited material damage and were not intended to kill. The key weapon used was the Improvised Explosive Device. In the past few years we have been witness to major arrests of terrorist suspects every month by the security services of various European states. In 2006, a total of 706 individuals were arrested for being suspects involved in terrorism. Half of those arrests were related to Islamist terrorism. In this case, the process of radicalisation (which also includes a growing number of militant converts into Islam) has become an extremely problematic and sensitive topic for Europe. However, most attacks in 2006 were carried out by ethnonationalist and separatist terrorist organisations, whereas a trend analysis shows that left-wing and anarchist terrorism currently remains at a relatively low level. AlQaeda’s declaration of war against all infidels, its increasing propaganda involving video statements in the English language and its quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction do not create a reassuring context. Accordingly, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism have become the key focus of national security policies and international organisations. Countries have been paying ever more attention to the proper criminalisation of terrorist activities in their legislation, implying that not only direct terrorist activities but also many indirect terrorist activities have been criminalised, while improving security preparedness, establishing new organisational units within the relevant ministries, establishing new interministerial and interagency counter-terrorist bodies responsible for related coordination, establishing new information systems, increasing the frequency of counterterrorism exercises, reinforcing the foundations for effective international co-operation as regards the prevention and response to terrorism, expanding budgets for counterterrorism etc. Such changes have been of a functional and system or institutional nature, incorporating new missions, strategies, doctrines, laws, structures etc. Naturally, not all countries share the same threat level. More threatened European countries include the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Italy and Germany. Certain other countries surely do not face such a high threat and yet they are co-operating intensively with the more threatened countries.

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The Western Balkans is historically the least stable region of Europe. The security situation in this region is gradually improving and the potential for armed inter-ethnic or interstate conflict has been reduced. However, the indicators of security threats and risks are still the highest in this part of Europe. Let me point out some of today’s complex problems. •

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•

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•

•

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The future status of Kosovo is uncertain – it seems that any kind of solution could potentially lead to a further escalation of the crisis and even terrorism. Fears exist that, if Kosovo is given complete independence, a bad example will be made for those involved in many similar ethnic situations in Europe (e.g. a domino effect starting from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia through to Spain and Russia). An unchanged status to the “legal limbo” could, on the other hand, spark a wave of violent protests, political instability and chaos. Other negotiated solutions (the partition of Kosovo and controlled independence) also hold crisis potential. Bosnia and Herzegovina has to resolve some important political and structural problems vis-à-vis creating a unified country. The central state institutions are weak and the Republika Srpska and the Bosnian-Croat Federation have been assigned a high degree of self-governance. The ethnically-based division used in resolving many national problems still frequently occurs. A consensus on the central issues is very difficult to achieve without pressure from the international community. Macedonia is, despite the introduction of an innovative national inter-ethnic integration model, still struggling with inter-ethnic dialogue at the political level. The solution of the Kosovo problem will heavily affect Macedonia. Fears of the country breaking up have been not allayed. Corruption and organised crime levels are still unreasonably high in most countries of the region. The situation is even more complex due to the heavily corrupt political and bureaucratic structures with links to the criminal underground found in some countries. The organised smuggling of people, drugs and weapons is a key transnational problem. A network of criminal groups has evolved along the Balkan route that cannot be eradicated despite intensive national and regional co-operative efforts. Smuggling has become one of the most profitable businesses in the region. The economic situation in the region is critical, exemplified by high levels of unemployment, national debt, low GDP per capita etc. In addition, the region faces a negative migration trend. The majority of youth in Kosovo and Bosnia, for example, sees its future abroad and not at home. Political extremism is still present in most of these countries and religious radicalisation in the form of Wahhabism is growing stronger. Local extremism has gradually become enriched by links with global radical Islamist movements.

The combination of all the abovementioned factors has always created fertile ground for all forms of terrorism. Terrorism is of course not new to the Western Balkans region. Weapons have been smuggled out of the region to support terrorist groups, international terrorists have trespassed this region (with illegal documents and identities or as illegal immigrants), and Islamist fighters have arrived from Afghanistan and

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elsewhere to fight in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Some of them were before, during or after their Balkan adventure clearly involved in terrorism. In fact, the wars in the region were exploited by some extreme Islamic terrorist groups to test their battle skills and acquire knowledge of weapons. We are still facing bomb attacks in the region (e.g. the UNMIK office in Kosovo, the Macedonian governmental building etc.) that might also be interpreted as terrorist acts. The region has also been facing several political murders or attempted murders. The killing of Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian Prime Minister, in 2003 was a clear example of the connection between the criminal and terrorist threats in the region. To all of these, we can add that Al-Qaeda understands the Western Balkan as a logistical centre for spreading terrorism into Western Europe (Plan Balkan 2020). Perhaps this does not mean attacks so much as many support activities. In this respect, the region should be very cautious about terrorist support activities such as financing, training and supplying. Terrorism is not the only threat that causes the emergence of crises. The so-called ‘crisification’ of our security environment also seems to be rising due to many other factors. Such an environment is generating many crises related to politico-military conflicts, natural disasters, infectious diseases, information disruptions, ethnic or religious violence and others. Many of these crises are completely or nearly completely unexpected and have a strong effect on the security of individual people, states and the international community. ‘Crisis’ has become the key word instead of ‘war’. The awareness of this is partially driven by the growing role of electronic media, bringing negative news and reports to nearly all homes, and partially by objective technical factors that allow the fast escalation of local crises to the international level. Globalisation therefore has a strong subjective and objective impact on our understanding of security. Crisis management refers to managing and eliminating a surprising threat under significant time pressure and amidst great uncertainty. Crisis management can also be defined as the organisation, arrangements and measures relative to the above goals. The term embraces more or less organised activities for resolving and responding to any kind of crisis at: (a) a specific level; (b) within a specific dimension or field; and (c) in periods before, during or after a crisis. The key focus of crisis management is the response during the crisis; however, the pre-crisis preparation or planning phase and post-crisis phase are also important factors that contribute to the success of the response phase. The ultimate general goal of crisis management is to eliminate the crisis factors, restore the normal situation and regain control over events from the perspective of the affected or responsible actors. Crisis management represents a specific challenge to all states and international organisations (e.g. NATO, EU, UN, OSCE etc.) that demands a specific response. The question is how to efficiently address an unexpected and extraordinary threat, whether we need preventive and response systems in place, if so then what kinds of systems, how much this would cost etc. In this regard, all European states are struggling with the complexities and problems of shaping responsive, robust and flexible national security systems. They are going through difficult security sector reforms involving the restructuring, downsizing and acquiring of new missions by the police, military, civil protection forces, intelligence services, border security services and others. Especially important in this process is how the states develop national crisis management mechanisms. The existing experience of NATO and EU countries in the field of national crisis management is quite mixed; however, some common denominators can be identified. We can observe that countries have started to develop crisis-oriented national security

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systems instead of war-oriented national security systems. The shift in the threat spectrum has caused shifts in national security systems. This implies functional and system or institutional changes such as new missions, strategies, doctrines, laws, structures etc. More significant and radical reforms of existing crisis management mechanisms have started to take place in many cases after bigger crises, terrorist attacks and comprehensive studies carried out by governmental or non-governmental actors. The common finding of many developed European countries was that the existing security mechanisms and institutions did not reflect the changed requirements stemming from the security environment. Reforms in developed European countries have stressed the need for: • • • • • • • • •

a formal definition of crisis and crisis management in strategic documents or even laws; shaping the mechanisms needed for comprehensive threat assessments; rethinking the mechanisms for declaring national crises or emergencies; forming comprehensive multidisciplinary, multi-ministerial and multi-agency crisis planning mechanisms; carrying out multi-ministerial and multi-agency crisis management exercises; reshaping and improving the structure of national interagency crisis decisionmaking bodies (such as National Security Councils and other governmental or inter-ministerial bodies); developing efficient information support mechanisms for crisis management; elaborating mechanisms for crisis communication with publics; and devoting special attention to preventive strategies etc.

Simultaneously with changes at the national level, international organisations (e.g. NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the UN) have also begun to formulate new crisis management policies, procedures, mechanisms and systems, and to test the new types of crisis management operations in practice. The combination of threats and risks in and from the region, along with the need for formulating efficient national and international crisis management and counterterrorism policies, led to the organisation of the Advanced Research Workshop under the title Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism in the Western Balkans which took place in Ljubljana in 2007. Around 50 experts from universities and governments participated in the workshop and the result of it is this book. The primary objective of the book is to assess the existing and past processes, policies, structures, mechanisms, reforms and challenges in the interconnected fields of crisis management and counterterrorism in countries of the Western Balkans and South-east Europe. In creating this overview, experts from many institutions have contributed articles: University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Criminal Justice Sciences, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, University of Prishtina – Faculty of Law, University of Skopje – Faculty of Philosophy, University of Ljubljana – Faculty of Social Sciences, Polytechnic College from Velika Gorica, University of Zagreb – Faculty of Political Science, University of Leiden from the Netherlands, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Police Academy from Macedonia, College University Victory from Kosovo etc. This book is divided into three parts. The first part addresses the concepts, policies and dilemmas arising in the fight against terrorism in a more general way. The important yet difficult roles of the EU and NATO are addressed in depth, national and regional strategies against terrorism are discussed at the conceptual level, several reasons

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why the fight against terrorism is difficult to win are identified, a regional risk assessment in the Balkans is elaborated in relation to former or ongoing conflicts, the roles of public information, education and human resources in fight against terrorism are studied etc. The second part of this book addresses the individual approaches of countries in the fight against terrorism. The authors focus on national policies, mechanisms, dilemmas and perspectives. The specific case of Kosovo is also addressed, the radicalisation process in Bosnia is carefully analysed and elaborated and the Croatian historical experience with terrorism is studied. Part three of the book addresses countries’ particular approaches to crisis management. Some countries in the region are introducing quite deep reforms of their national security systems leading in the direction of crisis management, while others are retaining a relatively unchanged concept of civil protection as a universal and umbrella concept. The case of Kosovo again shows that just managing and running this protectorate represents a unique crisis management endeavour. Readers will by reading this book gain insights into the lively and relatively unstudied mixture of national experiences, approaches, policies and dilemmas in counterterrorism and crisis management in the Western Balkans. This book is recommended reading for all those who want to know the region better as regards the fields of counter-terrorism and crisis management. Iztok Prezelj

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Contents Introduction: Counter-Terrorism and Crisis Management as Challenges for the EU, NATO and Western Balkan States Iztok Prezelj

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I. Concepts, Policies and Dilemmas in the Fight Against Terrorism NATO’s Role in the Struggle Against Transnational Terrorism Anton Bebler

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Role of the European Union in the Fight Against International Terrorism Iztok Prezelj

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The New Anti-Terrorist Strategy as an Answer to Mega Terrorism Vlatko Cvrtila and Anita Perešin

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Counter-Terrorism Strategies in the Balkans: Risk Assessment of the Regional Conflict Potential and Recommendable Counter-Terrorism Policies Lyubov Mincheva

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25 Reasons why Intelligence and Security Agencies Run the Risk of Losing the War on Terror Bob de Graaff

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Informing the Public and Educating About Crisis Management as a Precondition of an Effective Fight Against Terrorism Alen Stranjik and Ivan Toth

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II. Country Approaches in the Fight Against Terrorism: Policies, Mechanisms, Dilemmas and Perspectives The Bosnian Approach to the Fight Against Terrorism Edina Bećirević

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The Serbian Approach to the Struggle Against Terrorism Zoran Dragišić

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The Macedonian Approach to the Fight Against Terrorism Marina Malis Sazdovska

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Terrorism in Kosovo and Measures Against it Haki Demolli

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Terrorism in the Western Balkans – The Croatian Experience and Position Siniša Tatalović and Ružica Jakešević

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III. Country Approaches to Crisis Management: Policies, Mechanisms, Dilemmas and Perspectives Civil Security and Crisis Management: The Concept Development and Experimentation Process in Bulgaria (Role of the US, NATO and the EU in SEE) 147 Velizar Mateev Shalamanov Crisis Management in the Republic of Macedonia Marina Mitrevska

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The Serbian Approach to Shaping National Crisis Management Mechanisms Želimir Kešetović

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Crisis Management Education and Research in Serbia Zoran Kekovic and Sladjana Djuric

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Crisis Management in Kosovo: Challenges and Perspectives Bejtush Gashi and Sedat Burrniku

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The Croatian Approach to Shaping National Crisis Management Mechanisms Željko Dobranović

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Subject Index

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Author Index

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I. Concepts, Policies and Dilemmas in the Fight Against Terrorism

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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NATO’s Role in the Struggle against Transnational Terrorism Anton BEBLER Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

Abstract. For a long time NATO paid no attention to the phenomenon of terrorism. The attacks on 11 September 2001 spurred the Alliance on to speedily adopt a number of remedial measures. Due to its restricted membership, legal limitations, institutional features, mode of decision-making and almost exclusively military capabilities NATO is not well-suited to effectively counter the threat of transnational terrorism. The Alliance’s contribution may, however, be enhanced through internal organisational improvements, enhanced consensus among allies and closer co-operation with other international organisations and regional bodies including UN, EU and OSCE. The effective struggle against terrorism requires a global anti-terrorism coalition, radically different designs for security structures and the use of predominantly non-military instruments. The ‘war on terrorism’ has not been won and its intermediary results look inconclusive at best. The Alliance cannot play a central role but can constructively contribute to this endeavour. Keywords: international organisations, transnational terrorism, UN, NATO, European Union

Introduction Terrorism and related forms of violence were known for centuries before the term la térreur (terror) was coined to describe one of the most notorious features of the Great French Revolution. However, it took almost 180 years before the world community started to collectively deal with one of its varieties, namely transnational terrorism. It was then prompted by a number of spectacular terrorist acts perpetrated in the late 1960s and in 1970s, mostly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine, to rightist terrorism and outbursts of leftist revolutionary activities in Latin America, Japan, Germany and Italy. Among prominent international organisations the Organisation of United Nations (UN) and its specialised agency the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) were the first to react. The UN thus has the longest record in addressing transnational terrorism, followed chronologically by the Council of Europe (CoE) [1] and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE). The most important results of these activities have been 19 international conventions and a score of other documents covering various legal and political aspects of the struggle against terrorism. A conference of interior ministers from 46 country-members of the Council of Europe held in March 2005 called for the adoption of three additional conventions. Yet there is still no single consolidated international anti-terrorism convention. One of the main reasons for this void and the major obstacle to overcoming it is the absence of an agreement on a commonly acceptable definition of terrorism. The most

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recent report by the high-level panel on UN reform contains the following definition: ‘Terrorism is any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’’ [2]. An official US document, on the other hand, defined terrorism as ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’. For the purposes of this paper transnational terrorism is defined as terrorism involving citizens and/or the territory of more than one country [3]. 1 Efforts to collectively combat the scourge of transnational terrorism picked up greatly following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the USA. The unusually strong political impact of these acts elicited almost immediate responses from all major international organisations. On 12 September 2001, the UN Security Council called on all states to redouble their efforts in order to prevent and suppress terrorist acts and authorised punitive financial measures against organisations connected with terrorism. This call was soon followed by similar declarations by the Organisation of American States (OAS), the European Union and by Australia as a party to the ANZUS Treaty. The OSCE soon came out with an Action Plan on Combating Terrorism which was officially adopted at its 2001 summit in Bucharest. This Action Plan was followed by several other documents, including the OSCE Secretariat’s ‘Road Map on Terrorism’. The latter stressed the principal related tools of social prevention, good governance, suppression of money laundering and of financing terrorism. In December 2001 the OSCE established its ‘Action against Terrorism Unit’ (ATU) and in 2002 appointed a Representative for Preventive and Combating Terrorism [4]. In March 2005 at an international conference in Madrid UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a global strategy to fight terrorism which put a particular stress on its social and political prevention [5]. Our attention in this paper will however be centred on NATO. Although in existence for more than five decades it only undertook collective anti-terrorist activities less than four years ago. By mid-2005 the number of NATO member states specifically attacked by transnational terrorists since 2001 had risen to four (USA, Turkey, Spain, UK) while several others were threatened. These attacks, failed actions and explicit threats confirmed the gravity of the problem. Particularly the last suicide bombing in London clearly showed there would be no respite and that far-reaching changes needed to be made internally and internationally.

1. Historical background of the world community’s attitude to terrorism The relationship between the world community and terrorism cannot be described as simple and straightforward. If we take as a starting point the end of the Second World War we could say that for a long time the world community paid no collective attention to the phenomenon of terrorism, including its transnational variety. 1 This definition is debatable on a number of accounts because it excludes state or state-sponsored terrorism and combatant targets of attacks.

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Yet this phenomenon has continued to exist in the West and in the ‘Third World’. It has often been related to and appeared in conjunction with revolutionary movements and nationalism in its various forms such as separatism, secessionism, endeavours for national, cultural and/or religious emancipation and anti-colonialism. Although the grievances of most terrorists were national/regional and thus limited in geographical scope, many terrorist operations were already being conducted across state borders and were in this sense transnational. During the 1949-2001 period the total number of deaths in just the North Atlantic Treaty area caused by armed violence with recognisable elements of terrorism counted in the tens of thousands, many more than the number of victims in the USA on 11 September 2001. The tally included victims of violence in France (in the metropolis and particularly in the Algerian departments up to 1962, as well as on Corsica), in Turkey (related to Kurdish and Armenian questions), in the UK (in and related to Ulster), in Spain (related mostly to Basque separatism), in Germany, Italy and Greece (of rightist, leftist revolutionary and anti-Anglo-Saxon varieties) etc. However, prior to 11 September 2001 NATO had not collectively reacted when terrorist attacks with considerable consequences had occurred in the territory of their member states or when military and civilian personnel of their member states, including peacekeepers, civilian citizens, tourists, diplomats etc. were taken hostage, became targets of terrorist attacks and killed (in the Near East, Africa, the Balkans and elsewhere). The historical circumstances of how NATO was born largely explain the attitudes of its members to terrorism: 1. NATO’s creation was prompted by the fears of possible massive military threats to their members [6]. The geopolitical situation in Europe in the late 1940s strongly influenced this understanding, leading to the formulation of the key Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was assumed that massive threats could be posed exclusively by the armed forces of hostile states. This supposition excluded other hostile actions (e.g. sabotage, terrorist acts etc.) below the level of a massive military attack. It was further assumed that such a massive attack would be launched from the outside, across state borders from the territory of an identifiable state(s). The attacker would be thus clearly marked and could not claim a non-state identity. The practice of using fake quasi-civilian volunteers as proxies was also known then but deemed improbable on a massive scale, at least in Europe and North America. Terrorist actions as a casus belli were discounted probably because their destructive potency was seen as incomparably lower than a massive armed attack by regular military forces, particularly if WMD were to be employed. 2. The governments of even influential Western democratic states have for decades displayed ambivalent attitudes to terrorism, let alone pro-Western authoritarian regimes and civilian and military dictatorships. These attitudes and corresponding policies spanned from tolerating domestic anti-communist, racist and religious extremists who regularly or occasionally used terror (e.g. white supremacists like the Ku-Klux - clan and Christian fundamentalist sects in the USA); silently condoning state or state-sponsored rightist terror in states aligned with Western democracies during the ‘Cold War’ (under dictatorships in Portugal, Greece and Turkey) and in states friendly to the West (in Latin America, Africa, the Near East and Asia) – all the way through to authorising their own security services to occasionally employ methods not dissimilar to terrorist acts (e.g. the French blowing up a Greenpeace vessel in New Zealand,

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illegal arrests, kidnappings, targeted assassinations etc.). Moreover, some Western governments secretly provided funds, logistical support, facilitated arming and probably allowed transfers of potent arms to organisations and movements which were struggling against leftist regimes in Latin America, Africa and Asia even though these movements carried out assassinations and bombing. One of the most notorious recipients of indirect Western assistance was Osama bin Laden and his group of Islamic zealots in Afghanistan. 3. Logically following from its original strategic mission and posture, NATO’s institutional structure, mode of decision-making, nature and distribution of capabilities etc. were not geared from the outset nor adapted in the following decades to effective protection against terrorism, let alone preventing or combating it. This applies to domestic and transnational terrorism both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

2. The West’s posture after the ‘Cold War’ ended and the sudden turnabout in September 2001 The end of the Cold War brought about the need to reform and partly reorient NATO. Its strategic posture had to be adjusted to the increased volatility in the international security environment. The demise of the West’s former chief adversary was accompanied on the other hand by the appearance of new challenges on the world security scene. The end of the East-West military confrontation has unfortunately even contributed to the proliferation of local wars and of dispersed low-scale armed violence. Moreover, some aspects of globalisation such as the greatly increased movements of persons, information and funds, have opened up new possibilities for transnational terrorists. While the credible danger of a global nuclear disaster has apparently faded away, the creeping spread of technologies allowing the relatively cheaply production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has not made the world a safer place. If armed with WMD, even very weak adversaries in conventional military terms could pose a serious threat to the mightiest military power on the globe – the USA. The tectonic geopolitical shift around 1990-91 called for a reduction of the scope of military preparations for a major war and, on the other hand, increasing political and other non-military activities, as well as for developing its role as a regional security organisation in the wider Euro-Atlantic area etc. Transnational terrorism had, however, continued to be absent from NATO’s documents and decisions as an important threat to be dealt with by the Alliance collectively. This attitude was in contrast to the attention paid to this growing international phenomenon since the 1970s by several other international organisations mentioned above. In 1995 NATO Secretary General Willy Claes was the first high Western official to publicly mention ‘Islamic terrorism’ as a major threat to the West. However, he very soon retracted this statement following a diplomatic scandal which then erupted in relations with Arab countries. In April 1999 the NATO Strategic Concept (adopted at the Washington Summit) mentioned terrorism for the first time but omitted the struggle against terrorism from the list of the Alliance’s major tasks [7]. The phenomenon of terrorism was then placed in the subchapter dealing with current security challenges and classified as a secondary risk together with sabotage, organised crime, uncontrolled movements of large numbers of people etc. In preceding and more important paragraphs the Strategic

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Concept treated the proliferation of NBC weapons and the vulnerability of information systems. In these two contexts it also mentioned non-state adversaries but did not link these phenomena to terrorism. Why was the West so slow to recognise a major international security threat to its members and so late to undertake a collective anti-terrorist response? The main reason seemed to lie in the general understanding according to which Article 5 was only applicable if a massive military attack occurred from outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. Consequently, terrorism and anti-terrorist activities were considered internal matters and not subjects for discussion in the North Atlantic Council, let alone matters warranting collective punitive action. Further, the governments of some influential NATO member-states, with the notable exception of Turkey, did not wish and even resisted raising these matters in international fora. Third, non-state terrorism which has since 1949 caused the biggest number of victims in NATO member states has often been closely associated with movements struggling for or at least claiming to struggle for lofty goals such as freedom, justice, national liberation from colonial rule, social emancipation, democracy, human rights etc. Suppressing these movements by force in many cases provoked strong leftist and liberal criticisms and protests as well as loud opposition both internally and internationally. Fourth, public attitudes to these movements varied greatly in NATO member states, with double and even triple standards applied to various brands of domestic and foreign terrorism. Fifth, these differences and the understanding of terrorism as a matter falling outside of NATO’s purview diminished the level of anti-terrorist co-operation and, if it existed at all, channelled it outside the Alliance. It had been asserted that some political organisations and illegal armed groups for decades collected contributions, used hideouts, even trained and equipped small groups of terrorists in the territory of another NATO member state. There were allegations on this score related to IRA, ETA and PKK activities in the USA, France, Germany and Greece. The end result of these factors was the prevailing position that terrorism lay outside the purview of NATO as a collective defence organisation. As a consequence of these attitudes and self-imposed limitations the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 caught NATO unprepared. On 12 September 2001 in an unprecedented move the North Atlantic Council (NAC) – the highest body of the Alliance – invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For NATO the invocation was the first act of this kind in its entire history. However, contrary to its original purpose the invocation called for the defence of the United States of America and not of its European allies. It was also unusual because the invocation of Article 5 was prompted by attacks perpetrated within the territory of a member state by a small group of civilians and not by a massive military invasion across state borders from outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. The uniqueness of the event was strengthened by the fact that the invocation was not followed by a NATO military counterattack against the attackers. Moreover, for the first time in NATO’s institutional history the ‘war on terrorism’ 2 was proclaimed to be a major mission of the Alliance. The Alliance showed its vitality by speedily correcting its strategic posture and adapting itself to the perceived potent threat to its members. NATO has since developed an additional capability and partly adjusted its internal structure and relations with other actors to the

2 ‘The war on terrorism’ has become a widely used but still partly controversial metaphoric expression describing various activities aimed at suppressing and eradicating the phenomenon of terrorism.

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new challenges. The degree of this adaptation has not however measured up to the gravity of the challenge. The sudden change in NATO’s positions in September 2001 was largely due to the unusually strong psychological and political impact of the three unprecedented, brutal and visibly spectacular attacks, which caused horrible instantaneous deaths of several thousand innocent civilian victims. Second, the attacks dealt a very painful blow to the pride of the only remaining global superpower whose territory had not been attacked since 1812. The shift in NATO’s policies could thus be largely explained by the uniqueness of the event. Its psychological impact was greatly magnified by television and by the very special and contradictory position of the USA as the strongest member of the Alliance and at the same time a powerless victim. In unanimously supporting the unprecedented decisions by the North Atlantic Council on 12 September 2001 the other members of the Alliance were motivated by the common feeling of deep compassion with the victims (the victims included many of these members’ citizens) and by solidarity with the USA. It was an extraordinary occasion when the allies were asked and this time could offer assistance to the USA. The dramatic events and ensuing reaction however raised the question of the sound and legally correct interpretation of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty in contemporary circumstances, taking into account their original meaning and the underlying assumptions in 1948-1949. Namely the September 11 acts could not properly be called an ‘armed attack’ in the conventional meaning of the words since the attackers did not use firearms, let alone heavy fire arms. These acts were not massive attacks as the terrorists operated in small groups totalling about two dozen persons only, most of them or all having perished together with the victims. Moreover the attacks were launched from within US metropolitan territory and were not clearly and incontrovertibly linked to any single foreign state or group of states. These circumstances explain to a large extent the hesitation of the US government to demand an invocation of Article 5 and the reason why the invocation was not followed by a NATO military counterattack against the perpetrators.

3. NATO’s anti-terrorism activities since 11 September 2001 and their impact on the Alliance itself The terrorist attacks spurred NATO on to speedily adopt a number of measures aimed at more effectively countering the new threats to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Most notably anti-terrorism activities were added to the numerous already developed functions of the Alliance. A new military concept of defence against terrorism and the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) were adopted [8]. On the military side these activities included: sending NATO’s AWACs to patrol US skies; deploying groups of naval vessels in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Gibraltar Straits with the task of escorting civilian ships, monitoring, stopping and searching suspect vessels on the high seas; training senior officers of the Iraqi security forces; assuring external security at the Olympic games in Athens, at a mass event in Portugal etc. Preventive security measures at NATO Headquarters and at other NATO installations were stepped up and refined. Co-operation between the security services of member states was enhanced and the special Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit set up. The member states’ security co-operation with the PfP countries was also strengthened in accordance with the ‘Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism’. It was related for example to anti-

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terrorism activities in Afghanistan and in the Near East and applied notably to cooperation with the Russian Federation. Two ships of the Russian Navy consequently joined the NATO operation ‘Active Endeavour’ in the Eastern Mediterranean. The most important organisational change to NATO’s military structure specifically geared to fighting terrorism was the creation of the NATO Response Force (‘NRF’) in 2003 [8]. By late 2006 this formation had reached an operational level of about 21,000 personnel. The NRF’s size, posture, mode of operation, rules of engagement etc. are however still in the process of evolution. After considerable internal debate, NATO has assumed the responsibility for the International Security and Assistance Force (‘ISAF’) in Afghanistan. This was NATO’s first military operation outside of Europe. The ISAF has provided the backbone of security protection in the capital city of Kabul which has been threatened by Islamic terrorists. The missions of NATO’s ‘out-of-area’ forces in the Balkans have also been partly related to the struggle against terrorism. The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued operating until December 2004 and was then largely replaced by a more constabulary EU force. NATO has however retained its residual presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, if need be, the capability to intervene in force from a distance. The latter capability has also been geared to the potential need to combat transnational terrorism. The terrorist attacks have had a considerable impact on NATO and on transatlantic relations. They almost instantaneously brought the NATO members together in a moving display of transatlantic solidarity. The undeclared war in Afghanistan which soon followed was justified by the USA as a military response to transnational terrorism. Fourteen NATO member states, notably France and the UK, together with a score of non-members joined the USA in military operations against the Taliban regime and subsequently in efforts to provide security in that country and to stabilise the new regime. However, the military forces of individual NATO members had operated in Afghanistan for almost two years outside of the Alliance framework. This fact indicated NATO’s diminished relevance in the eyes of the Bush Administration and a certain internal disharmony within the Alliance. The other, also undeclared but much more controversial war in Iraq was at the outset declared as a military action to stop the proliferation of WMDs and to wage the ‘war on terrorism’. This very tenuous and, as it turned out, unsubstantiated public justification for the US-led invasion deepened disagreements among the Allies, particularly between the USA, France and Germany. In fact, the Iraq war has complicated the process of gaining and maintaining broad European and international support for counterterrorism actions [9].

4. The world community in the search for an effective strategy and tools in the struggle against terrorism Although many actors – individual states, groups of states and international organisations – have been actively engaged in combating terrorism, the global ‘war on terrorism’ has not been won and its intermediary results look inconclusive at best. Several hundred alleged operatives and other adherents of Al-Qaeda have been reportedly killed, detained or imprisoned. It is however unknown how many new activists have entered the ranks of terrorists and been trained and equipped world-wide. Their total number in the Near East, Middle East, South and South East Asia, North Africa and in the Russian Federation has probably increased, as has the frequency and

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volume of terrorist attacks world-wide since September 2001. The much publicised capture of Sadam Hussein had no effect on the ferocity of terrorist acts in his country. Further, Osama bin-Laden is still at large and openly threatens the USA and its allies. The difficulties of and the requirements for effectively fighting transnational terrorism can be gauged from what is known or alleged about the structure and mode of operation of Al-Qaeda, one of the 82 groups officially listed by the US State Department as foreign terrorist organisations, namely: x the structure of clandestine transnational and loosely connected networks, with concealed, possibly alternate headquarters and an anonymous leadership which uses a wide variety of means of communication – from very crude to highly sophisticated ones; x a secret network of highly motivated members ready to sacrifice their lives, supported in many countries by thousands of sympathisers and providers of funds, shelter, legal covers, food, medical and technical assistance etc. Most sympathisers live or originated in states with majorities of population professing Islam. However, cells of devoted members and supporters have also been discovered in several EU and NATO member states; x the use of surprise, high mobility and unconventional combinations of destructive means in attacks against high-value, symbolic and mostly civilian targets; x the very uneven distribution of targets and wide geographical spread of violent acts with the most numerous and destructive attacks since September 2001 having taken place in countries and regions with significant a Muslim population (in the Near East, North Africa, Middle East, South and South-East Asia and the Russian Federation); and x the exploitation of the mass media, particularly of television, to magnify the psychological and political impact of terrorist acts. Taking into account the characteristics of the most notorious international terrorist organisation – Al-Qaeda – it is obvious that a wide gap persists between the requirements for an effective struggle against terrorism on one hand, and several fundamental features of the North Atlantic Alliance on the other. There is a number of important reasons for this mismatch. One is organisational. As a large and relatively open international organisation, containing close to 300 committees and following time-consuming decision-making procedures NATO is structurally too cumbersome and slow for this purpose. Second, NATO has been hampered by internal political discord stemming from varying perceptions of terrorism and from the historically highly uneven exposure of the Allies to major terrorist attacks [10]. In fact, anti-terrorism still does not command a high priority in a number, if not in the majority of NATO member states, all declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. Most responses to transnational terrorism have so far been national and not an Alliance response. According to a RAND study, NATO has not yet been able to reorient itself from its ‘Cold-War mindset’ to meet the challenge of terrorism [11]. In contrast with good day-to-day practical co-operation between corresponding security services and the armed forces of NATO member states considerable elements of discord in anti-terrorism matters still persist at a high political level. The corresponding strains surfaced in 2004 following the targeted assassinations of two Palestinian HAMAS leaders by the Israeli military. It became obvious that the

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transatlantic Allies held quite different views on the political acceptability of terrorism in all its forms, including state terrorism. It has also been said there were serious disagreements concerning the authorised scope of operations and several proposed deployments of the NATO Response Force, basically for training purposes, during the recent natural disasters in the Mediterranean. The third serious hindrance follows from NATO’s restricted membership and from the legal provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. These features contrast sharply with the global reach of contemporary transnational terrorism which operates across state and regional boundaries. NATO’s out-of-area operations in Asian or African states which do not militarily threaten any NATO member and the use of NATO military forces for fulfilling essentially internal security tasks are also questionable on doctrinal and political grounds. Such activities, have no legal foundation in Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. There are also no standing provisions for any pre-emptive military operations of the Alliance. The fourth and most salient handicap of NATO stems from the limited usefulness of military power in combating terrorism and from the still predominantly reactive nature of the Alliance. Terrorism and anti-terrorism could indeed intertwine within war. Terrorism often represents a ‘continuation of political intercourse by other means’ (Carl von Clausewitz) but in itself it greatly differs from war. It is thus improper and counterproductive to approach and treat anti-terrorism as warfare. Effective antiterrorism only marginally requires the application of military power. For example, even if massively employed all of NATO’s capabilities could not have prevented the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA or the subsequent terrorist acts in Turkey, Spain and the United Kingdom. The two principal operative incarnations of the North Atlantic Council – the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group – deliberate and decide on the employment of NATO military capabilities of which only about one percent can be actively used against transnational terrorists, if detected in time. The largest, deadliest and costliest weapons systems maintained by NATO member states have lost most of their potency vis-à-vis a largely invisible enemy widely scattered among the civilian population in over 60 countries. In this asymmetric confrontation nuclear arms have ceased to deter or dissuade stateless adversaries [12]. From a formidable security asset nuclear arms and their vectors have turned into a valuable target for terrorists and thus into a heavy security liability. This observation applies to nuclear weapons as well as to all nuclear facilities located in the NATO member states and reflects the profound geopolitical turnabout. Although it is hard to measure the real impact of NATO’s military activities against transnational terrorism it seems undeniable that the Alliance has so far played a positive role. Yet its supportive role has remained on the sidelines throughout much of the global endeavour [13]. Most anti-terrorism activities have been conducted outside the Alliance framework, unilaterally or bilaterally. The most agile state – the USA – has had several reasons to circumvent NATO in these activities. With further adaptation NATO’s contribution to containing and reducing the threat of transnational terrorism may well be enhanced. NATO’s internal structure, procedures and capabilities could be better adapted to these needs and made more proactive and effective. The abovementioned ‘Cold-War mindset’ is still reflected in the (excessive) number of and bureaucratic activities of the NAC auxiliary bodies. Many of them could be merged or restructured. On the other hand, a lean structure of bodies dealing with the non-military aspects of international security could be built into the NATO structure. It has already been proposed that a new Assistant Secretary General be

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appointed and charged with co-ordinating NATO’s anti-terrorism efforts [14]. Moreover, all member states should have at NATO’s headquarters permanent representatives for the non-military aspects of international security. These representatives would meet regularly as the permanent military representatives currently do, while the national chiefs for these matters would constitute a body functioning similarly to NATO’s Military Committee. This new body would be organically linked to NATO’s Response Force (NRF), the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre, a research and analysis centre etc. It would be supported on a permanent basis by NATO’s International Staff. On the political side, a consensus among the Allies concerning a proactive strategy (with the option of anticipatory self-defence), WMD counter proliferation as well as on the geographical reach of possible military anti-terrorist actions needs to be greatly enhanced. The Alliance should also accordingly adjust the mode of decision-making on anti-terrorism matters, the division of responsibilities and burden-sharing among its members. Given its current handicaps and limited adaptability NATO cannot play a central role in the protracted global effort to defeat, let alone prevent the phenomenon of transnational terrorism from occurring. It is obvious that in order to counter the threat posed by transnational terrorism a potent combination of instruments is required which fall predominantly or entirely outside of NATO’s purview. An effective anti-terrorism strategy ought to be based on an objective assessment of its main target and contain realistic operational goals. By any objective criteria terrorism in all its forms pales as a threat in comparison with other, far graver sources of insecurity for mankind. The number of premature deaths caused by phenomena such as hunger, malnutrition, lack of safe water, fires, heat, cold weather, contagious diseases (notably HIV, tuberculosis and malaria), poisoning, smoking, drugs, alcohol, traffic accidents, natural disasters (such as floods and earthquakes), industrial disasters, local wars, crime, suicides etc has been estimated at well over ten million a year. A single natural disaster in South-East Asia, lasting just several hours (the tsunami in December 2004) caused a quarter million victims. On the other hand, the number of individuals who died as victims of all forms of terrorism between 1991 and 2002 has been estimated by the US State Department at 6,721 or about 600 annually [15]. All contemporary manifestations of terrorism thus constitute an utterly negligible threat to global security. The effectiveness of the anti-terrorism struggle world-wide can be gauged from a comparison between its total cost and the damage caused by terrorism. So far only the financial burden of the ‘war on terrorism’ and of numerous other measures justified under this heading have easily exceeded the measurable direct damage caused by transnational terrorists themselves. The cost of the »war on terrorism« has included the expenses of military operations (mostly in Asia and the Mediterranean), highly expanded preventive security measures, of a considerably increased number of police and other security personnel, higher transportation and insurance charges etc. The indirect cost has been considerably higher if we include the additional time wasting, particularly in air transport, the additional employment of personnel, modification of aircraft and airport facilities, significantly reduced volume of traffic and huge income and business losses in air transportation and tourism etc. Liberal critics of the ‘war on terrorism’ and human rights activists also point out its social and political cost in the form of infringements of human rights, lower democratic standards and endangered political freedoms. Leftist and anarchist protesters also claim that the ‘war on terrorism’ has been simply (ab)used by the Bush Administration as a mere pretext to

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strengthen US hegemony on the global scale and its control over strategic energy resources, particularly in the Middle East. A really frightening aspect of transnational terrorism could appear in its combination with the use of weapons of mass destruction. A study of several related scenarios was recently carried out by a consortium of 22 research institutes led by the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies. One scenario postulated an explosion of an improvised 10 KT nuclear weapon near the NATO headquarters in Brussels. It was estimated that such an explosion would kill about 40,000 people outright, injure 300,000 and create huge economic and ecological damage. The study also highlighted the potential threats represented by the several hundred nuclear reactors in over 40 countries, by radiological dispersal devices, nuclear smuggling, the spread of WMD expertise and facilities for producing, chemical and biological agents etc [16]. Fortunately, these scenarios remain conjectural. They could however become realistic if terrorist organisations are actively supported and de facto sponsored by a sufficiently strong state which possesses the corresponding capabilities, organisation and motivation and ruled by an irresponsible leadership. No credible evidence has so far been presented to confirm the actual existence of such a combination in operational terms. The dangers of contemporary, more technologically advanced terrorism (particularly its transnational variety) require a strategy very different from the present ones as well as far-reaching adaptation at the global level and a radical alternation in the design of state security structures at the national level. The main brunt of preventive, suppressive and protective activities would have to be borne by civilian agencies (domestic and foreign intelligence gathering, civil defence, rescue and health authorities, law enforcement, customs, diplomacy, private contractors etc.), by general and specialised police forces (including border and financial police), by paramilitary formations (i.e. coast guards, gendarmerie-like forces etc.). An effective anti-terrorist strategy requires much smaller, more flexible and highly mobile multinational expeditionary military forces capable of operating swiftly over great distances. Within the national armed forces a very prominent place ought be given to specialised antiterrorist formations (special commando units of all arms with the attached means of high speed transportation, anti-radiation, medical support, decontamination facilities and personnel etc.), while peace-enforcement and peace-keeping capabilities would have to be greatly enhanced at the expense of traditional territorially-oriented forces. These three segments in the armed forces would cut across traditional arms, executing partly overlapping tasks and rotating in and out of the expeditionary forces. It would be unrealistic to expect that in the foreseeable future the NATO member states will radically modify the design and fully adapt the functioning of their security systems to the new agenda. One can only foresee a gradual and partial adaptation due for instance to institutional inertia and vested bureaucratic interests. Terrorism in all its forms will be never uprooted everywhere and destroyed for good. A ‘war’ with such a radical goal of completely eliminating terrorism is thus an utterly unrealistic undertaking. The systematic prevention, disruption and wherever possible suppression of detected terrorist groups and organisations does however certainly need to be waged. The prosecution and suppression of terrorism necessitates numerous measures, including effective law enforcement. The attempts to eradicate terrorism by predominantly military means cannot have lasting effects. Most varieties of terrorism have deep social, psychological and political roots. Their prevention therefore requires very considerable, long-term and steady efforts in political, social,

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economic, legislative, judicial and other domains. This struggle should not be waged by governments alone but should also include as active participants civil society, nongovernmental organisations, religious communities and their leaders etc. It is inaccurate to present the threat of modern terrorism as being equal in gravity with that which emanated in the past from several great powers led by dictators and totalitarian systems of government. It is also inappropriate and misleading to confound the ‘war on terrorism’ with the efforts to promote democracy world-wide. Contrary to the contention in the US President’s National Security Strategy of 16 March 2006 the democratisation of political systems does not and will not solve the problem of terrorism and could even worsen it. Modern transnational terrorists do not attack democracies as such but threaten various states with very different political systems – from absolute monarchies, theocracies, military dictatorships, other autocracies of various kinds, as well as semi-authoritarian and democratic systems. Contrary to some declarations and expectations, the ‘war on terrorism’ in the way it has been fought in Iraq has not strengthened the liberalising and democratising forces in the Near and Middle East. On the contrary, it has contributed to bringing to power by ballot Islamic extremists in Iran and in Palestine. The struggle against terrorism cannot be effective without co-operation with many non-democratic states. In order to make this struggle effective, a world-wide antiterrorism coalition ought to include as active participants, in addition to NATO and EU members, the Russian Federation, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt etc. A relatively small, specialised, low-profile international organisation but with a wide transcontinental membership could more effective than the currently existing international bodies. It would provide for regular, closer and faster confidential cooperation between national security services in their anti-terrorist activities. The overarching framework of the UN, linking specialised agencies and regional security organisations, holds the best promise in this respect. NATO can and should play a constructive and active role in this global endeavour.

References The Fight against Terrorism. Council of Europe Standards, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2003, 3-187. [2] A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN General Assembly, A/59/565, 2. 12. 2004, 49. [3] Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, US State Department, Washington, 2003. [4] Alexander Lambert, The Contribution of the OSCE to International Fight against Terrorism, in Daniel Warner and Victor – Yves Ghebali, New Security Threats and Challenges within the OSCE Region, PSIO Occasional Paper 1/2003, Geneva, 2003, 111-124. [5] UN Secretary-General Offers Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism. Press Release SG/SM/9757, 10. 3. 2005, http://www.un-org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9757.doc.htm, 18. 3. 2005. [6] Alexander Rendel, Secret explorations, in André de Staercke et al, NATO’s Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1985, 11–18. [7] The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1999, 50–51. [8] The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2003, 29-32. [9] Richard A. Clarke and Barry R. McCaffrey, NATO's Role in Confronting International Terrorism, US Atlantic Council Policy Paper, Washington, 2004, viii. [10] Brian Michael Jenkins, The US response to terrorism and its implications for transatlantic relations in Gustav Lindstrom, Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq, Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, Paris, 2003, 231-250. [1]

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[11] Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Co-operation with Europe, NATO and the European Union, CA:Rand, Santa Monica, 2003, 22. [12] David S. Yost, New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France and the United States, International Affairs, no. I, 2005, 83-114. [13] Colonel Russell D. Howard, Thinking Creatively in the War on Terrorism – Leveraging NATO and the Partnership for Peace Consortium, Connections, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Garmisch, 2005, 2-5. Also Renee de Nevors, NATO´s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era, International Security, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2007, 34-66. [14] C. Richard Nelson, Expanding NATO's counter-terrorism role, NATO Review, Special issue, 2005, 5659. [15] Gustav Lindstrom, Terrorism: European myths and realities in Gustav Lindstrom, Shift or Rift Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq, Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, Paris, 2003, 207-230. [16] Black Dawn Briefing. Strengthening the Global Partnership: Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, http://www.sgpproject.org.

Other references A New Agenda for NATO, Wilton Park Paper, Wilton Park, 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, 6-9. Dr. John L. Clarke, What roles and Missions for Europe's Military and Security Forces in the 21st Century?, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 7, Deutschland 2005. Fighting Terrorism: Financial and Economic Aspects, NATO Defense College, NDC Occasional Paper, No. 3, Rome, 2004. Harald Müller, Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment, Chaillot Papers, No. 58, Paris, 2003. Jean – Francois Mayer, Hizb ut – Tahrir. The next Al – Qaida, really?, PSIO Occasional Paper 4/2004, Geneva, 2004. Jochim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanable, Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum, Peter Lang, Bern, 2003. Mary Laczkovich, Jon Kessmeier and Thomas Molino, The Euro-Atlantic Relationship: Ready for the Global Ara?, Center for European Security, CES Monograph, Wilton Park, 2001. Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law. No. 5, The Marshall Center Papers, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2002. Ray Stafford, ‘Combating Transnational Terrorism: American and European Threat Perceptions and Strategies’ in Transatlantic Relations at a Crossroads, Netherlands Atlantic Association, The Hague, 2003, 31-46. Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Mellennium, Brassey’s, London, 1997. Terese Delepech, Transnational terrorism and Europe, Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, Chaillot Papers, No. 56, Paris, 2002. The War on Terrorism: reorganizing government for effective response, Wilton Park: Wilton Park conference WPS03/10, 2003.

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Role of the European Union in the Fight against International Terrorism Iztok PREZELJ Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

Abstract: The European Union has become one of the most important international actors in the fight against terrorism. After 9-11, it has adopted a broad spectrum of measures that are being implemented in all three pillars and member countries. The article shows the gradual evolution of measures against international terrorism by the EU in relation to the developing threat. It represents an analysis of the understanding of terrorism at the EU level, evolution of the EU Action Plan since 2001, the role of terrorism in the European Security Strategy, the role of the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator and SITCEN, the EU CounterTerrorism Strategy etc. The article shows, that despite all these measures, the threat from terrorism remains one of the key European problems and challenges. It will take time and serious efforts to remove many existing problems and dilemmas. Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, EU, strategy, action plan, radicalisation

Introduction Since 11 September 2001 terrorism has evidently become a prioritised security threat that has also been reflected in the security policies of many countries and international organisations. International organisations such as NATO and the OSCE have established that the key task in the changed security environment is the fight against terrorism. The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 placed the terrorist threat to European security on the top of priorities. This article aims to present and evaluate the EU’s role in the fight against international terrorism. The role has changed over time and has regularly been supplemented; however, it has not yet delivered its optimum level. First, we will delve into the threat from terrorism to European security and establish the context of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities. Not all EU member states are equally threatened by terrorism, as can be clearly demonstrated by a comparative analysis. Some EU member states are confronting a higher terrorist threat on the global scale. This is particularly true of Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy and Germany. Moreover, the capitals of some member states, as the hosts of various events including meetings of political leaders, cultural, business, sporting events and so on, are regarded as specific targets. A look at the EU as a whole reveals a relatively seriously exposed geographical area characterised by: • smouldering or escalating conflicts; • frustrated social groups seeking to solve conflicts through illicit means i.e. by the use of arms (a motive for terrorism); • the increasing radicalisation of individuals and certain social groups;

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the relatively sufficient availability of weapons and explosives or knowledge to fabricate them; and periodical attempts to launch large terrorist attacks (London, Madrid, a series of other attacks) etc.

Every few months one of the EU member states carries out an extensive police operation during which a large number of people are arrested. This certainly indicates the degree of terrorist activity or threat. The EU is confronted with Islamist, ethno-nationalist or separatist, and left-wing or anarchist terrorism. The existing terrorist groups aim at member-state or third-country targets whose facilities or representatives are located in the EU or provide logistical or financial assistance to terrorist operations outside the EU. In 2006, the EU was shaken by 498 terrorist attacks, most of which were of small proportions, resulting in limited material damage and not intended to kill. However, the foiled terrorist plots in Germany and Britain demonstrate that the terrorists also aim at mass casualties. In 2006, 706 individuals suspected of terrorism offences were arrested in 15 member states. Islamist terrorism is presently the biggest threat to the EU as half of the suspects arrested this year come from the Islamic world. The radicalisation processes are becoming increasingly sharper, whereby the so-called converts are particularly dangerous [1]. In addition, the EU directly neighbours the Western Balkans which is historically the least stable area in Europe. The region (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia) is known to be a polygon for the training and military activities of Islamist fighters, with some of them moving further on to Afghanistan and Iraq, some staying in Bosnia and some seeking political asylum in Western Europe. The region is also notorious for several attempted and carried out political assassinations, with these also being a special type of terrorism. The European policy to combat terrorism has developed in line with the development and perception of terrorist threats in the EU. This essentially means that the policy has developed in stages that can best be pinpointed by the major terrorist attacks. Prior to 9-11, the EU lacked a coherent counter-terrorism policy. The EU, although a subject of the international community, did not appear as a relevant international actor in the fight against terrorism. Naturally, the EU member states had much experience with terrorism even before 9-11 but at the time a national approach was essentially more relevant than any of the types of international co-operation within the EU. This was particularly typical of those countries that were more exposed to the threat posed by so-called national terrorism (Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Germany). When these countries sought international co-operation the co-operation was primarily bilateral. Nevertheless, some multilateral types of co-operation existed but were either indirectly related to terrorism or failed to reflect a comprehensive approach. The EU is characterised by the multi-stage evolution of its counter-terrorism policy which will be analysed in the rest of this paper.

1. The EU response to 9-11 On 11 September 2001 a series of simultaneous terrorist attacks was launched on the USA, bringing with them considerable global consequences. The EU’s response demonstrated that the Union was aware of the global tentacles of the terrorist attack.

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The fact that some terrorist cells were preparing the attack from Europe was of particular relevance. Moreover, the EU understood that Al-Qaeda’s target was not only the USA but the entire Western world, along with the EU and its member states. The European Council held an extraordinary meeting on 21 September 2001 to analyse the new situation in the international community. It concluded that terrorism posed a real threat to the world and Europe and that a concerted action in fighting terrorism would become one of the EU’s priorities. In addition, the Council sent out a message of solidarity with the American people and readiness to co-operate with the USA. A strong spirit of solidarity was expressed in spite of some misgivings by certain neutral countries concerned about the connection with potential American unilateralist measures [2]. For this reason, the EU called for a broad-based global coalition against terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations [3]. Of course, the EU was unable to adopt such drastic measures as NATO did when, for the first time in its history, it activated Article 5. From the EU’s perspective, 9-11 actually contributed to the unification of different opinions on international counterterrorism co-operation within this organisation. Out of the package of measures adopted after 9-11 the following deserve particular attention: • the Council Common Position against Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban; • the EU Action Plan to Combat Terrorism; • the definition of terrorist offences; • the CFSP Concept in the Fight against Terrorism; and • the 2003 European Security Strategy. Of great importance is the fact that the Council of the European Union adopted a common position against Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. These people and groups were included on a so-called terrorist list. The common position forbids the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to these entities of arms or related material such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts. The states also undertook to: • prevent any process of the supply of technical advice and military training to these entities; • order the freezing of the funds of these entities and ensure that financial assets are not made available to them; and • prevent these entities’ entry into, or transit through, their territories [4]. 1.1 The EU Action Plan to Combat Terrorism After 9-11 the first Action Plan to Combat Terrorism was adopted. It set out a number of measures, with the most relevant including the following: • to improve police and judicial co-operation (with particular emphasis on the need for a European Arrest Warrant, drawing up a list of terrorists and terrorist organisations, preparing a common definition of terrorism, enhancing the exchange of information and co-operation between the intelligence agencies of member states etc.); • to develop international legal instruments for the fight against terrorism (e.g. a universal declaration on combating terrorism);

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• • •

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to prevent the financing of terrorism (signing of a convention on the prevention of financing terrorism, intensifying of activities etc.); to improve air traffic safety (checking of security standards, limit access to cockpits etc.); and to co-ordinate the EU’s global operations (better consistency and coordination of the EU policies).

The Action Plan was planned to be amended regularly. 1.2 Definition of terrorist offences At this point the importance of the EU's definition of terrorism has to be pointed out. The definition is a basis for the EU’s overall endeavours to combat terrorism. The EU defined terrorist offences as those intentionally committed offences by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country [5]. The Decision of the EU Council on this was aimed to establish a uniform legal basis for the prosecution of terrorists [6]. The EU's definition of terrorist offences is very specific. These offences include: (a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (e) the seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; (f) the manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into and the development of biological and chemical weapons; (g) the release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; and (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h) [7]. According to the EU’s definition, a terrorist group is a structured group of more than two persons established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. A structured group means a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of a terrorist offence and does not need to have a developed structure in the proper meaning of the word, and has continuity of its membership and formally defined roles for its members. The EU member states undertook to ensure the following acts are punishable pursuant to their national legislation: the deliberate directing of a terrorist group or participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way.

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In addition, the EU provided a clear-cut definition of offences linked to terrorist activities. These include theft with a view to committing terrorist offences, extortion with a view to the perpetration of terrorist offences, and falsifying personal and other administrative documents with a view to committing terrorist offences. Also classified as terrorist offences are inciting, supporting and attempting to commit a terrorist offence as well as aiding in the commission of a terrorist offence as referred to in Articles 1, 2 and 3 above [7]. 1.3 The CFSP Concept in the Fight against Terrorism Counter-terrorism in the EU is a multi-pillar activity whereby all pillars are equally important for ensuring a comprehensive approach. After 9-11 the process of establishing the basic guidelines in the framework of the CFSP counter-terrorism concept was launched. Due to the global nature of the fight against terrorism the EU places exceptional importance on the second pillar, even though the bulk of counterterrorism activities are concentrated in the third pillar. The fundamental philosophy is the belief that European security largely depends on security in countries beyond EU boundaries, whereby the CFSP can directly or indirectly contribute to counter-terrorism security. For example, the concept of counter-terrorism was not included in the Petersburg Tasks, however, the operations carried out on their basis can contribute to counter-terrorism. The following elements of this concept deserve particular attention: • the so-called third countries can make an important contribution to improving the functioning of the second pillar in the fight against terrorism; • the development of military capabilities according to the Headline Goal 2010 also takes terrorist scenarios into account; • a database of military capabilities has been established and is used for protecting the civilian population against terrorist attacks (especially NBC attacks); • increasing civil-military interoperability (training, development of capabilities etc.); • strategies for the provision of technical aid to vulnerable third countries to increase their counter-terrorism capabilities as well as the exchange of good practices and doctrines; • the fight against terrorism has become an element of political dialogue at all levels with third countries (inclusion of counter-terrorism provisions in all agreements – e.g. the Euromediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism); • the SITCEN draws up national and thematic threat assessments; • the capabilities for analysing and evaluating counter-terrorism activities and endeavours of third countries have been provided; • the protection of EU citizens in third countries (180 million travels to non-EU destinations a year), including consular protection, evacuation plans etc. The EU has acquired some experience in rescuing and assisting EU citizens (e.g. Hurricane Katrina, the tsunamis in Asia, the terrorist attack in Bali etc.); • protection and evacuation of EU military and civilian staff, material assets in third countries or in areas of operations;

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• • •

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an emphasis on the need for the ratification of all international legal instruments of the UN’s fight against international terrorism; establishment of co-operation methods and mechanisms with the UN (e.g. a joint database of contact persons); and co-operation in the field of protecting critical infrastructure etc.

1.4 The European Security Strategy and Terrorism The Iraqi crisis boosted the EU member states’ readiness to pursue a more active security policy and at the same time the enlarged EU could no longer afford to shirk responsibility for global security. As a result the European Security Strategy was devised [8]. This is a historical document of the EU since for the first time in its history an umbrella security document was drawn up. The significance of this strategy can conditionally be equated with the significance of the national security policies in the EU member states. The strategy itself reaches beyond the pillar structure of the EU and thus identifies responses from several pillars. The first chapter deals with the contemporary security environment and the key threats to European security. The essential conclusion in this chapter is that the EU is increasingly vulnerable and susceptible to global changes. The main threats identified to European security include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. Of particular importance is the conclusion which reflects the spirit of the most recent scientific findings that the combination of the above threats is especially dangerous [9]. It is essential for our discussion that the EU defined terrorism as the primary threat to European security. Terrorism is characterised as global in its scope and linked to violent religious extremism. Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism. The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which was placed second, was also dealt with in the terrorist context. The most frightening scenario is one in which a terrorist group acquires and uses weapons of mass destruction. The second and third chapters of the strategy identify strategic objectives and the principles of the EU’s response to the identified security threats. It is crucial that the EU decided on a more proactive approach to the prevention of crises and conflicts and that each of the identified threats calls for a specific combination of EU instruments (e.g. dealing with terrorism requires a combination of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other EU instruments) [8]. On the same day the European Security Strategy was put into effect the Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was adopted, establishing that some actors (terrorist groups and certain countries) aim to acquire such weapons and use them to indirectly or directly threaten the EU or its interests. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is dangerous because it increases the probability of their use. The strategy places particular focus on the EU’s preventive activities to reduce the possibilities of the proliferation of weapons for mass destruction [10].

2. The EU’s response to the 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid The simultaneous bomb attacks on critical rail infrastructure in Madrid were a wake up call for the EU. These attacks gave rise to a new perception that the EU is vulnerable to

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Islamist terrorism at home as well. As implementation of the counter-terrorism measures was scrutinised in more detail, it was evident that the states had either failed to implement the measures consistently or completely failed to implement them [11]. These drawbacks were also mentioned in the report by a high representative for the CFSP, drafted just three days before the attacks. The most important package of measures was adopted by the European Council in its 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism [12]. The Declaration proclaimed 11 March a memorial day to commemorate the victims of terrorism. Its mainstay is the consolidation of the already identified solutions for combating terrorism and the more efficient implementation of the consensually adopted measures, including: • enforcement of the European Arrest Warrant; • freezing of the financial assets of terrorist groups and individuals; • prevention of money laundering for terrorist purposes; • adoption of a decision to establish EUROJUST; • building up of operational co-operation (exchange of operational information); • tightening of border controls; and • strengthening of document security. It is of particular importance that the Declaration defines the seven following strategic objectives for the revised EU Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism [13]: 1. strengthen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism; 2. reduce the access of terrorists to financial and other economic resources (the EU asset-freezing procedure, build up co-operation between the FIUs etc.); 3. maximise capacity within the EU and in the member states for counterterrorism activity (EUROPOL, EUROJUST, Police Chiefs Task Force, better exchange of intelligence information etc.); 4. improve the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control; 5. enhance the capability of the EU and its member states to deal with the consequences of terrorist acts; 6. address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism; and 7. target actions under the CFSP towards priority third countries where counterterrorism capacity needs to be enhanced. The revised EU Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism was adopted on this basis and with the abovementioned objectives in June 2004. This document intertwines a number of partial approaches within a comprehensive whole, which is a step forward to reducing the duplication of work. It was emphasised that the paper was a 'living document' and would be subject to regular supplements (twice a year). Essentially, the document is a categorisation (expansion) of the abovementioned strategic objectives, encompassing over 150 measures and designating competent institutions for their implementation, along with implementation deadlines. The Action Plan did not provide any essentially new measures but rather concretised the implementation of the existing ones.

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At the time the Declaration and the Action Plan were adopted the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [14] was drawn up. Draft Article 42 thereof contained the so-called solidarity clause, laying down that the EU and its member states would act jointly in the spirit of solidarity if one of them became the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. The EU would thus mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources, to: • prevent a terrorist threat in the territory of member states; • protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; and • assist a member state in its territory and at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack (Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2003). The draft Treaty also envisaged concrete procedures for implementing the solidarity clause. The draft Treaty was not approved by referendum in two member states which thwarted the process of its adoption. However, at this point one can only establish that if the Treaty had been adopted a kind of ‘civilian Article 5’ would have been formulated, following the model of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. With regard to the solidarity issue within the EU, the adoption of the EU Solidarity Programme on the Consequences of Terrorist Threats and Attacks is also very important as it represents a supplement to the already adopted CBRN Programme. The Programme’s key objective is to improve the efficiency of measures at the national and EU levels concerning the prevention and restraint of terrorist attacks. The Programme defines six strategic goals and the methods of their implementation: 1. strengthening the processes of the assessment and analysis of risks related to terrorism (risk assessment and analysis); 2. reducing the vulnerability of potential targets against terrorist threats (preventive measures); 3. strengthening the mechanisms for the detection and identification of actual threats and for alerting professionals and the public (detection, identification and alert); 4. enhancing the capabilities and instruments needed to mitigate the consequences of an attack and to facilitate the return to normal conditions (preparedness and consequence management); 5. strengthening scientific bases through the promotion of scientific and research activities aimed at countering the effects of terrorism (research and development); and 6. co-operating with third countries and international organisations (international co-operation) [15]. The adoption of the Hague Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU in 2004 [16] was also very significant. The Programme reflects in its own way the spirit of solidarity in internal affairs. As regards terrorism, the basic principle of ensuring member states’ national security by taking into account the security needs of the entire EU is of great importance and should also apply to intelligence and security services. The project of strengthening the areas of freedom, security and justice is vital to securing safe communities throughout the Union.

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From the point of view of the coherence of the EU’s activities in its fight against international terrorism, the introduction of the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator (who was promptly nicknamed by some as ‘Mr. Terrorism’) was particularly significant. The Co-ordinator works under the Secretariat of the EU Council and is appointed by Javier Solana. His tasks include the co-ordination of counter-terrorism activities of the Council (at the EU level, between the EU member states and the Council bodies) and co-ordination between the Council bodies and the European Commission. This is more of a political than an operational function, involving regular reviews of all EU instruments and reporting to the Council on their functioning and on implementation of the Council’s decisions. The Co-ordinator is accountable to the Council and not the European Commission and has no authority to coerce the states into implementing the decisions. The accumulation of problems resulted in resignation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator in the first half of 2007. He had refused to provide an explanation of the difficulties encountered. However, it was obvious that he only had limited powers in interaction with the extremely powerful national interests in the labyrinth of Brussels and national bodies. In one of its reports from the first half of 2007 the European Parliament openly criticised the Co-ordinator for lacking credibility in his work. The key problem lies in the fact that certain countries refuse to be coordinated more than they see as being necessary, which in some cases does not reflect the spirit of the decisions adopted by the same countries at other levels.

3. The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) and its Implementation On 7 July 2005 London was the target of a series of terrorist attacks. The simultaneous suicide terrorist attacks affected the transport sector (railway and bus transport). London had been expecting the attack as many representatives of the city (e.g. Mayor Livingstone) had publicly stated that it was only a matter of time when London would be attacked. We can say that the city of London was exceptionally well prepared for terrorist attacks (particularly its transport sector) due to its many exercises and increased financial investments in counter-terrorism. The key EU measure following the attacks was the adoption of the EU CounterTerrorism Strategy on 30 November 2005 [17]. This is an extremely important document as it determines the method of response after 2005 and comprehensively defines the EU’s counter-terrorism activities. The document opens with the following strategic commitment of the European Union in its counter-terrorism efforts: ‘To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice’. The Strategy declares terrorism a threat to all states and to all peoples. Terrorism poses a serious threat to security, to the values of democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of the EU citizens, especially through the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people. It is criminal and unjustifiable in all circumstances. Moreover, the European Union is an area of increasing openness in which the internal and external aspects of security are intimately linked. It is an area of growing interdependence, allowing for the free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources. This is an

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environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives. In this context, concerted and collective European action in the spirit of solidarity is indispensable to combat terrorism. The Strategy encompasses the following four strands i.e. pillars: • prevention; • protection; • pursuing; and • response. These four pillars of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy constitute a comprehensive and proportionate response to the international terrorist threat. The Strategy requires work at national, European and international levels to reduce the threat from terrorism and vulnerability to attack. The Strategy sets out objectives to prevent new recruits to terrorism; better protect potential targets; pursue and investigate members of existing networks and improve capability to respond to the consequences of terrorist attacks. A horizontal feature across the Strategy’s four pillars is the Union’s role in the world. As set out in the European Security Strategy, through its external action the European Union takes on responsibility for contributing to global security and building a safer world. Acting through and in conjunction with the United Nations and other international or regional organisations, the EU will work to build an international consensus and promote international standards for countering terrorism. The EU will promote the UN’s initiatives to develop a global strategy for combating terrorism. A dialogue with key partner countries, including the USA, will also form a core part of the European approach.

Figure 1. Four pillars of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy [17]

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The main measures in the prevention pillar are aimed against radicalisation, including primarily the identification of radicalisation and propaganda, promotion of inter-cultural dialogue, development of a non-emotive lexicon in the EU vocabulary and continuation of research etc. An important role in the protection pillar is played by measures aimed to reduce the vulnerability of targets, ensuring the biometrical safety of travel documents, establishment of a visa information system, establishment of a programme for protecting critical infrastructure and reducing its vulnerability, the raising of security standards in the protection of transport and borders etc. Key priorities under the ‘Pursue’ pillar are to: • strengthen national capabilities to combat terrorism in light of the recommendations of the peer evaluation of national anti-terrorism arrangements; • make full use of Europol and Eurojust to facilitate police and judicial cooperation, and continue to integrate the Joint Situation Centre's threat assessments in counter-terrorism policy-making; • further develop the mutual recognition of judicial decisions, including by adopting the European Evidence Warrant; • ensure the full implementation and evaluation of existing legislation as well as the ratification of relevant international treaties and conventions; • develop the principle of the availability of law enforcement information; • tackle terrorist access to weapons and explosives, ranging from components for home-made explosives to CBRN material; • tackle terrorist financing, including by implementing agreed legislation, to prevent the abuse of the non-profit sector, and reviewing the EU's overall performance in this area; and • deliver technical assistance to enhance the capability of priority third countries. Key priorities under the ‘Respond’ pillar are to: • agree on the EU’s crisis co-ordination arrangements and the supporting operational procedures; • revise the legislation on the Community Mechanism for civil protection; • develop risk assessment as a tool for building capabilities to respond to an attack; • improve co-ordination with international organisations on managing the response to terrorist attacks and other disasters; and • share best practices and develop approaches to the provision of assistance to victims of terrorism and their families. Member states have the primary responsibility of combating terrorism and the EU can add value in four main ways, including strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European co-operation, developing the collective capability and promoting international partnership. Owing to some negative experience with the implementation of already adopted measures in the period prior to the Madrid and London attacks, special emphasis was put on monitoring the progress of the Strategy, as shown in the figure below.

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Figure 2. Value added of EU measures [17]

Figure 3. Political oversight and regular monitoring of progress of the Strategy [17] The European Council reviews progress on the Strategy once every six months. The Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament convene a high-

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level meeting once per Presidency to consider the progress of the Strategy. An essential role in implementing the Strategy is played by the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism whose third revised version was adopted in February 2006. This is an integral document serving as a basis for implementing all four pillars of the Strategy. The document is regularly complemented and the counter-terrorism Coordinator reports on its implementation every six months. The following are some of the relatively relevant processes and measures carried out in the framework of the Action Plan [18]: • the EU exercise programme is based on an increasing number of new terrorist scenarios serving as a basis for assessing the internal and external aspects of the EU’s response; • development of ARGUS (a secure general rapid alert system) linking all existing specialised rapid alert systems for emergencies that require action at the European level; • development of the Central Crisis Centre (CCC) within the European Commission bringing together representatives of all relevant Commission services; • development of appropriate links between the CCC, ARGUS and the Council bodies (SITCEN, EUROPOL, Council Terrorism WG etc.); • promotion of research in the field of terrorism (6th and 7th Framework Programmes); • development of strategies to improve the capacity of member states to communicate with citizens in the event of a terrorist attack; • peer evaluation of the national counter-terrorism systems, including formulation of a questionnaire, filling in the questionnaire, visits to the member states, making recommendations on the basis of good practices and implementing the recommendations etc.; • more intensive information exchanges between SITCEN, EUROPOL, EUROJUST, European Border Agency – FRONTEX etc.; • regarding the suppression of financing of terrorism, all states have ratified the relevant UN conventions; however, the exchange of financial intelligence information and the FIU network both call for improvement; the financial transparency of legal entities in the non-profit sector (e.g. charity organisations) must be increased and asset-freezing procedures established etc.; • promotion of the European Arrest Warrant which was enforced on 1 January 2004 to simplify the extradition procedures (curtailing them from nine months to about 40 days); and • ensuring the storing of mobile and fixed telephone call logs (one year period) and Internet communications (up to 6 months) pursuant to the Directive on Data Retention. The EU’s operational activities in its fight against international terrorism are underpinned by a list of terrorists and terrorist groups or entities. This is a public list that was first published in December 2001 and which is regularly updated (at least every six months). It presents the common positions of the EU Council specifying names, personal details and details on identity documents as well as names of various terrorist groups or organisations [19]. A topical discussion in 2007 revolved around the

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transparency of the process of classifying individuals and groups on such a list. The problem lies in the fact that the names are included on the list on the basis of confidential i.e. non-transparent evidence. For example, a French group designated as terrorists requested an explanation which was never provided. The Iranian opposition group People’s Mujahedin Organisation of Iran sued the EU for damages resulting from its inclusion on the list [20]. The EU Joint Situation Centre – SITCEN is also a cornerstone of the EU’s operational activities. SITCEN monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide on a 24-hour basis with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. SITCEN co-operates with civilian and military intelligence services and crisis management centres in the EU member states from where it receives continual information input. Of particular importance is the exchange of intelligence data on threats within the EU and outside (in relation to EU interests). An integral group of analysts from intelligence and security services jointly assesses the threats. SITCEN uses a special alert mechanism (in line with the EU Emergency and Crisis Co-ordination Manual). Moreover, SITCEN issues confidential reports (e.g. strategic assessments of terrorist threat etc.). 3.1 Protection of critical infrastructure in light of the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts The critical infrastructure of any EU member state could be seriously damaged by a terrorist attack. The European Council of June 2004 asked the Commission to prepare an overall strategy to protect critical infrastructure. In response, the Commission adopted on 20 October 2004 a Communication ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism’ putting forward clear suggestions on what would enhance European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving critical infrastructures. The Council endorsed the intention of the Commission to propose a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and agreed to the set-up by the Commission of a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). In November 2005 the Commission adopted the Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) setting out the political options for establishing the EPCIP and the CIWIN by the Commission. In the Decisions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of December 2005 the Commission was called upon to draft a European programme for the protection of critical infrastructure. The aim of the European policy in this domain is to ensure a suitable and equal degree of protection for selected critical infrastructure facilities, which is only feasible on the basis of a common European framework for the protection of critical infrastructure. The EU’s concern for the member states’ critical infrastructure stems from the danger that the destruction or disruption of certain critical infrastructure in one member state could immediately affect other member states. In such events the protective measures are only as strong as their weakest link. In this sense the EU defines the so-called European Critical Infrastructure as consisting of those physical resources, services, information technology facilities, networks and infrastructure assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of either: (a) two or more member states; or (b) three or more member states.

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The European Commission identified the following sectors of critical infrastructure: • energy; • information and communication technologies; • water; • food; • health; • financial; • civil administration; • public & legal order and safety; • transport; • chemical and nuclear industry; • space; and • research [21]. The critical infrastructure protection within the EU is an extremely complex issue requiring the EU to take a number of steps in this domain, but first the EU will be confronted with an imposing conceptual and systemic challenge [22].

4. Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism The aim of the Strategy was to set out a comprehensive response to combat radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. While different types of terrorism continue to pose a threat to the EU, the Strategy stresses the importance of terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and extremists inspired by Al-Qaeda. The Union’s response to radicalisation and recruitment focuses on this type of terrorism. It is also underpinned by the idea that it is only possible to combat radicalisation by integrating Muslims from Europe and other parts of the world. The Strategy sets out three objectives: • detect the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism (including the prevention of travel to conflict areas for the purpose of terrorist training etc.); • ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism (justification of violence must be overruled by its condemnation); and • more vigorously promote security, justice, democracy and opportunities for all. The EU member states work individually and in concert to implement this Strategy. Responsibility for implementation of the abovementioned objectives lies primarily with the EU member states, while the EU can provide significant assistance (e.g. by co-ordinating policies, exchanging information on national responses etc.) [23]. A great amount of financial resources has been invested in research of radicalisation processes in the EU. It is only in this way that the EU will apprehend the circumstances that actually lead to radicalisation, and that is a keystone of any kind of effective defeat.

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Figure 4. List of the EU’s critical infrastructure sectors [21]

5. A critical reflection on counter-terrorism measures in the European Union To conclude, it has been established that after 9-11 the EU has made tremendous progress in its efforts to combat terrorism. It has become one of the most relevant

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international actors in the fight against international terrorism. Nevertheless, the threat posed by terrorism (despite better counter-terrorism defences) has not diminished so the challenge remains. As to the future, De Vries [24] believes that the states must work on the basis of common standards, that more must be done to address the international conflicts terrorists seek to exploit (e.g. Afghanistan) and that the terrorist ideology must be countered. The following is a short analysis of some major problems. The key source of many problems is the perception of a terrorist threat which is only seemingly of lesser relevance. There are quite large differences between the USA and Europe in terms of the perception of the degree of a terrorist threat, thus hindering trans-Atlantic co-operation. Similarly, in the EU each member state perceives the threat from terrorism in a quite different way which consequently hampers international cooperation. To put it in a nutshell: some states are riding on a train at a speed of 300 km per hour, while others are moving at 100 km per hour. The problem arises when they all claim to be on the same train. This only aggravates the situation as terrorist groups are increasingly apt at taking advantage of flaws in the international counter-terrorism network. An example may be the establishment of mechanisms against Islamist radicalisation. Some EU member states carried out a broad spectrum of counterradicalisation measures, underpinned by extensive analyses, while others are still getting familiar with the concept of radicalisation. The question arises of just how effective the resultant consensus on common international measures against Islamist radicalisation can be. The co-ordination of counter-terrorism measures is a complex multi-level and multi-organisation activity. At the national level, it requires the inter-linking of a great number of bodies such as police, intelligence services, armed forces, financial intelligence units, customs departments etc. National co-ordination is one of the key national problems in combating terrorism. It has happened too many times that the states advocated uncoordinated positions in different international organisations or even within the same international organisation (e.g. the EU). The situation is improving, although the degree of national co-ordination in the EU member states is still not outstanding. This domain continues to be packed with challenges. Another problem is the sovereignty and the balance of power between the nation states and the EU. The nation states, on one hand, aspire for the better efficiency of the EU in its struggle against international terrorism while, on the other hand, they are reluctant to waive some of their powers to boost the EU’s efficiency. The burning issue is the intelligence co-operation between the EU member states. The apparently great motivation for establishing this type of co-operation, following the Madrid terrorist attack, soon faded away. It is a harsh reality that some intelligence services in the EU share mutual trust, while they find other intelligence services less trustworthy. One European politician once made a relatively realistic statement that it was an illusion to expect his country to exchange delicate information with all EU member states. This, of course, is more of a hindrance to the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts with international intelligence co-operation constituting an acute problem. In this light, the position of the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator is extremely difficult and unrewarding. It is no surprise at all that the Co-ordinator offered his resignation seeing that the co-ordination of countries that refuse to be co-ordinated or allow only minimal co-ordination was a hopeless task. Synergy and co-ordination between the EU member states in counter-terrorism can only be created to the extent actually allowed by the states.

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A closer view of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities shows that the implementation of the adopted EU measures is not always satisfactory. This is especially evidenced by the situation after the Madrid terrorist attack when it was established that certain states had failed to implement many of the measures and tasks set out in the EU Action Plan to Combat Terrorism. In addition, the legislative implementation of adopted measures is constantly delayed. There are no concrete sanctions against those who fail to honour their commitments. The European Security Strategy, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and all Action Plans in combination with the appointment of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator represent an extremely important step towards better co-ordination at the EU level. However, the complex organisational structure of the EU continues to hinder the co-ordination of international counter-terrorism activities within the EU. All three EU pillars play an important role in the fight against international terrorism. The mechanisms of cross-pillar co-operation have been created, but their co-ordination is far from optimum. The problem of cross-pillar co-operation and harmonisation in the EU is to some extent also a consequence of inter-ministerial or interagency cooperation in the member states. Low co-ordination and harmonisation at the national level is being transferred to the EU level. Enhancing national inter-ministerial and inter-agency processes would therefore enhance inter-pillar co-operation in the EU. In addition, the EU multiplies this problem by returning the uncoordinated issues back to the member states, further aggravating the whole picture. Another pressing problem is the fact that Europe has caught itself in a trap caused by the gap between effective counter-terrorism action and the respect of fundamental human rights. The analysis of the current situation shows that human rights and liberties have been systematically curtailed in the name of a higher degree of security. By definition, security and liberties are constituent parts of human rights which means that this is all about the relationship between different human rights. A problem occurs, for example, if a trial against a suspect of a terrorist act is biased, if counter-terrorism measures are illegal, if confessions are made under torture, if personal data are kept too long, if a suspect of a terrorist act is detained too long without initiating court proceedings, if a suspect is extradited to a third country where the fundamental standards of human rights are violated (e.g. prisoners are tortured) etc. Further, it has been established that even relatively specific legal definitions of terrorism are frequently insufficiently precise for an efficient and fair identification of a terrorist act. It is a hypocrisy to condemn the prison in Guantanamo and at the same time send interrogators to the prison or submit questions to be posed by US intelligence services to the prisoners. There are more controversies than we can begin to count. It is also evident that in the mid-term and long-term future terrorism will remain one of the key issues in the EU, along with the basic dilemmas and problems of the counter-terrorism efforts. Only through deliberate and co-ordinated action will it be possible to minimise the first and second problems.

References [1] [2] [3]

EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007. TE-SAT 2007, EUROPOL, The Hague, 2007. Monica den Boer & Jorg Monar, Keynote Article: 11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor. Annual Review, vol. 40. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2002. Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21.9.2001, SN 140/01.

34 [4]

[5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]

[20] [21] [22]

[23] [24]

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Council Common Position Concerning Restrictive Measures against Usama bin Laden, Members of the Al-Qaida Organisation and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with them. Official Journal of the European Communities, Brussels, 29.5.2002. Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 19.11.2001. E. Dumitriu, The EU’s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. German Law Journal, 5 (5), 2004. Council Framework Decision of 13.6.2002 on Combating Terrorism. Official Journal of the European Communities, 22.6.2002. European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12.12.2003. Iztok Prezelj, Skupna evropska varnostna in obrambna politika: dosežki, izzivi in dileme v luči učinkovitega kriznega menedžmenta. V: Haček, Miro (ed.), Zajc, Drago (ed.). Slovenija v EU: zmožnosti in priložnosti, Knjižna zbirka Politični procesi in inštitucije, FDV, Ljubljana, 2005. EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. European Council, Brussels, 12.12.2003. Laurence Thieux, European Security and Global Terrorism: the Strategic Aftermath of the Madrid Bombings, Perspectives, Prague, 2004. Declaration on Combating Terrorism. European Council, March, adopted after the Madrid terrorist attack, 2004. EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism. Council of the EU, 10586/04, Brussels, 15.6.2004. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Adopted by consensus by the European Convention, 13.6. and 10.6.2003. EU Solidarity Programme on the Consequences of Terrorist Threats and Attacks. Council of the EU, Brussels, 1.12.2004. The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU. Presidency Conclusions, 4/5, Brussels, November 2004. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Council of the EU, Brussels, 30.11.2005. EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism. Council of the EU, 5771/1/06, Brussels, 13.2.2006. Council Common Position 2006/931/CFSP of 29 May updating Common position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2006/231/CFSP, Official Journal of the EU, 31.5.2006. Iran Mujahidin to Challenge EU Terror List. http:://euobserver.com, 10.5.2007. Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. COM(2005) 576, Brussels, 17.11.2005. Arjen Boin, Mark Rhinhard, Iztok Prezelj in drugi, Shocks without Frontiers - Transnational Breakdowns and Critical Incidents: What Role for the EU?. European Policy Center Issue paper, no. 42, Brussels, 16.11.2005. EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. Council of the EU, 14781/1/05, Brussels, 24.11.2005. Gijs De Vries, Europe's fight against terrorism, Project Syndicate commentary, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/vries1, 30.5.2007.

Other References EU in boj proti terorizmu, Sekretariat Sveta EU, poročilo, Bruselj, 9.3.2007. Final Report on the Evaluation of National Anti-Terrorist Arrangements: Improving National Machinery and Capability for the Fight Against Terrorism, 12168/05, Brussels, 26.9.2005. Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, Council of the EU, 9666/07, Brussels, 21.5.2007. Interim Report on the Evaluation of National Anti-Terrorist Arrangements, Council of the EU, 14306/3/04, Brussels, 23.11.2004, Predlog Direktive Sveta o ugotavljanju in določanju evropske kritične infrastrukture ter o oceni potrebe za izboljšanje njenega varovanja, osnutek, Bruselj, December, 2006. Iztok Prezelj, Teroristično ogrožanje nacionalne in mednarodne varnosti, Varstvoslovje, vol. 8, no. 1, Ogrožanje nacionalne varnosti (ed. Prezelj Iztok), 2006.

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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The New Anti-terrorist Strategy as an Answer to Mega Terrorism Vlatko CVRTILAa and Anita PEREŠINb Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb b Office of the National Security Council, Republic of Croatia a

Abstract. Contemporary society is confronted by several phenomena which exert a continuous influence on its transformation: globalisation, information revolution, terrorism etc. There is no doubt that terrorism represents a key threat to the world today. Terrorists engage in violence as their main line of action. Contemporary states are developing special strategies for fighting terrorism in their efforts to lessen the impacts of terrorist activity. When formulating anti-terrorist strategies the overall human surroundings together with the processes in the world that affect the transformation not just of society but of the phenomenon of terrorism as well should be taken into account. Since transformation and adjustment are continuously occurring, the approaches to be applied in the fight against terrorism should not rely upon status quo policies. Hence, this paper focuses on an analysis of phenomena which point to the transformation of terrorism and the need to redefine the existing status quo approaches: information revolution, terrorism's communicational potential, and the symbiotic relationship between the mass media and terrorism. A new form of terrorism is coming into existence which could be operatively termed mega terrorism. Keywords: terrorism, violence, transformation of terrorism, anti-terrorist strategies.

Introduction The information revolution which reached its peak in the second half of the 20th century exerts an influence on all spheres of global society and prompts their transformation. Information technology has radically changed people's lifestyles from communication, business activities and leisure time to various other aspects of everyday life. One of the consequences of society thus transformed is its openness and ever faster and greater availability of information. One may conclude that today's social movements are considerably under the influence of information that is taking on new meanings. Another phenomenon transforming today's society is terrorism which also constitutes a major threat to world peace. Only after the information revolution had spurred the development of society in the direction of openness and new communication possibilities could this form of new or mega terrorism have come into existence. It is to be expected that in the days to come activities performed by terrorist organisations as well as the battle against terrorism will become increasingly dependent on information and information and communication technologies. The starting point of the analysis of mega terrorism is the hypothesis that the new paradigm of terrorism is the result of information technology development, which is

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manifested in particular by the recognition by terrorist organisations of the importance of the mass media in achieving their objectives. Thus, contemporary terrorism may be regarded as a special form of communication. The aforementioned hypothesis is based on the following: 1. The development of contemporary information technology has resulted in the creation of new forms of organisational structure and functioning of active terrorist organisations. 2. The terrorist act is a communication process based on communication between terrorists and several target segments of the public affecting not only direct victims but the wider population as well. 3. There is an interactive (symbiotic) relationship between the media and terrorism because trends in the media industry and the principles of media content production are increasingly turning towards the sensationalist type of content. Thus, through their activities terrorist organisations are in a position to ensure their maximum presence in the media. 4. Terrorist organisations are incessantly trying to manipulate and exploit the free media for their own purposes. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the scientific and expert contribution made so far to the study of terrorism should be further developed with a focus on identifying the characteristics of mega terrorism. Also, special attention should be given to the view that terrorism constitutes a particular form of communication as well as to the correlation between the mass media and the new paradigm of terrorism.

1. Characteristics of mega terrorism The terrorism of today has a global reach and influence which it did not have prior to globalisation and the information revolution. When looking at terrorism in contemporary conditions it is important to recognise and examine the process of its adjustment to these changes. Namely, terrorist organisations continually adjust their activities in line with contemporary processes, scientific and technical breakthroughs and especially to the Internet and communication technologies. At the same time, terrorist organisations and groups are becoming increasingly interconnected as a means for facilitating the training, preparation and execution of actions. Changes in the characteristics of terrorism over the course of history testify to the fact that, rather than being a fixed phenomenon, terrorism is very apt at adjusting itself to reflect conditions and changes in society. This is especially noticeable in the case of mega terrorism which functions in conditions of the great openness of contemporary societies and of their enormous interconnectivity, something to which the information revolution has contributed considerably. This revolution favours and reinforces the network forms of organisation by giving them an advantage over the hierarchical forms. The network organisation alters the way in which terrorist organisations function as well as their structure, it prompts changes in the types of objectives they choose and exerts an influence on the choice of arms they use. The paradigm of the new terrorism of the information age includes changes which terrorist organisations achieved at the organisational and technological level, at the level of doctrine and strategy as well as changes in the diversity of their threats and methods of conflict management.

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Therefore, the main characteristics of mega terrorism that might be singled out are as follows: x a shift towards a network form of organisation and network warfare; x communicational, rhetorical and symbolic dimensions of terrorism; and x symbiosis between the mass media and terrorism.

2. Building terrorist networks in the information age Studies of patterns and activity trends in the Middle East have borne out the hypothesis that terrorism is evolving in the direction of network warfare since: 1. an increasing number of terrorist organisations is adopting network forms of organisation combined with the greater use of information technology; 2. the more recent terrorist organisations (those that were formed during the 1980s and 1990s) have built more networks than terrorist organisations having a longer tradition; 3. there is a positive correlation between the degree of activity of a terrorist organisation and the degree to which it has adopted the network form of organisation (examples of this include more recent and less hierarchically organised terrorist organisations such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda that have also become the most active terrorist organisations) [1]; 4. there is an equal probability that information technology will be used both as organisational support and as weapons for attack when engaging in warfare; and 5. there is a greater probability that the newly recruited members of terrorist organisations are more qualified to use information technologies, which implies that in the future terrorist organisations will be more networked and will make greater use of computer technology than they do today [2]. The communicational and informational interconnection of the world provides contemporary terrorism with a global reach and influence that it did not have prior to globalisation and the information revolution. It is precisely the information revolution which favours the creation and strengthening of network forms of organisation to which terrorist organisations have adjusted so easily by adopting the abovementioned changes. The very nature of conflict has also changed since it now increasingly depends on informational and communicational possibilities, while knowledge, in particular the possession of quality information, has become a decisive factor in conflict resolution. The technologies of the information age are of benefit especially to the network forms of organisation whose members/groups are geographically dispersed or are in charge of implementing different but complementary activities. Greater communication speed, lower communication costs combined with the integration of communication and computer technologies are the reasons the new information and communication technologies support, i.e. foster, the creation of network forms of organisation. In addition, the organisational structure that already exists in the world of business is also being increasingly applied among participatory structures in network warfare. The functioning of network terrorist organisations greatly depends on the flow of information, the interruption of which would prevent to a considerable degree the

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functioning and co-ordination of their activities. The Internet as an information network enables two-way communication and the level of information infrastructure usage for attack purposes is proportional to the level of exposure of terrorist organisations to the attacks of counterterrorist forces. It is to be expected that terrorist organisations will frequently be able to gain an advantage thanks to the surprise factor but this tactic may be adjusted and applied in the anti-terrorist strategy as well. Anti-terrorist activities should focus on identifying the network form of terrorist organisation both from the organisational and the technological viewpoint, which comprises both additional personnel education and provision of cutting-edge technology. The anti-terrorist strategy should take into consideration the following recommendations: 1. continuous monitoring of the ways in which terrorist organisations use information technologies and at the same time making it imperative to distinguish between the effects of their organisational and attack capabilities; 2. countermeasures and corresponding anti/counterterrorist activities have to target the information ‘flow’ (disruption, interruption, disinformation etc.); and 3. it is necessary to increase information infrastructure protection since its more effective protection results in a more successful dissuasion from attack. The destructive power of new terrorism, if it directs its activities towards information warfare, will be more forceful than the classical methods used so far and the damage suffered by humankind could surpass that brought about by biological and chemical weapons [3].

3. Terrorism as a communication process with a rhetorical dimension Terrorism should be viewed as a socially constructed communication process possessing rhetorical significance [4]. Terrorism, as an act of violence and destruction, can be comprehended through its symbolic value which is viewed as an integral part of the terrorist act itself and it is primarily because the impact of terrorism stretches beyond its direct victims into a much wider segment of the population that it differs from other forms of violence. These violent acts are considered to be terrorist precisely because they provide additional possibilities for communicating their message and meaning to the wider public. Therefore, every terrorist act should be viewed from a much broader perspective than that focusing on the very victims of a specific terrorist attack since this act is part of a bigger process of communication by messages and of incitement of a desired response. Terrorist attacks in modern communication may be regarded as the ‘language of violence’ [5]. And it is precisely this ‘language of violence’ which imparts real power to terrorism through the creation of an effective propaganda effect upon contemporary society. This results in changes in behaviour and attitudes of the public which was or could become the potential target of the attack since terrorists in fact commit violence against one group in order to send a message to another group, i.e., to everybody else and in this case direct victims may be regarded as a means or instrument of communication. Hence, one should start regarding terrorism as a communication process, independently of how morbid or violent it is, and understanding this process will help us grasp the true essence of terrorism and the way in which it constructs our reality [4].

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Namely, terrorism may be best understood as a communication strategy having a sender – terrorist, i.e., someone who formulates a message and a receiver, i.e., a victim, enemy or the entire public [5]. In line with the old Chinese proverb ‘Kill one in order to hold ten thousand others in fear’, terrorists use a very simple communication strategy that may lead to several consequences: the creation of fear among individuals and groups, the polarisation of public opinion, the transmission of false information and messages in order to deceive the enemy, the promotion of one's own activities, aims and motives etc. Symbols may be detected in the very act of terror, the manner in which it is carried out, as well as in the aims of terrorist attacks, all of which stands to prove that terrorism, understood as violence [4], may denote more than just violence itself and the manner in which the public perceives and interprets the symbolic significance of terror is extremely important. In connection with this, one should bear in mind that each specific terrorist attack conceals a particular symbolic meaning but at the same time this attack should also be considered as a symbol of a possible future threat. It is precisely this rhetorical dimension which points to the need to define terrorism as a communication process between terrorists and a number of target segments of the public. Since there is no unique and generally accepted definition of terrorism, we are of the opinion that this communicological aspect should be taken into account when defining terrorism since, in the absence of an integral definition, it will not be possible to develop a high-quality and efficient strategy for combating terrorism.

4. Symbiosis between the mass media and terrorism Special attention should be paid to the role played by the mass media that with the coming of the information revolution has also gained in momentum and reached the peak of its development. Because terrorists through destruction or violence try to demonstrate the credibility of their threats, the media which reports on this is very often even thought of as being in part responsible for ‘creation’ of terrorism. It cannot be said that the modern mass media has the possibility to ‘create’ terrorism but, when it comes to violent acts of terror, the relationship between terrorists and the media inevitably becomes ‘symbiotic’ and modern media technology, communication satellites and the fast spread of television exert a significant effect on the development of terrorism's publicity potential. The majority of experts justifiably call contemporary terrorism mass-mediaoriented terrorism. Namely, by analysing terrorist activities one may notice that in the majority of cases they were carried out precisely in order to draw the attention of international media. Terrorist activities are oriented to the audience and not to its victims and therefore in an increasing number of cases hostages are taken so as to achieve the additional dramatisation of events. An analysis of terrorist tactics testifies to the fact that terrorist organisations are becoming ever more conscious of the importance of information and information and communication technologies for the functioning of democratic institutions. Further, terrorist organisations, conscious of the importance of the media, use its great power in order to increase their own ability to create an atmosphere of fear in the world as well as to increase propaganda output, make known their ideas or force governments, companies or affluent individuals to make concessions or to pay ransom. Therefore, in order to achieve their basic aims and objectives terrorists are in great need of the media

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of mass communication. On the other hand, it goes without saying that the appearance of terrorists in the media means that their activities are a valuable news item and that they can be used as a means of drawing the attention of the media and, in this way, of the public as well to a certain political idea. This statement leads us once again to the thesis about a ‘symbiotic’ relationship. A trend indicating that terrorists and terrorist organisations have developed, besides methods of violence, modern mass media management systems and have started using the majority of techniques applied by public relations experts has become clearly visible. Various sophisticated communication techniques can also be discerned in terrorist activities. Today terrorists, in addition to starting their own newspapers and television productions, make use of anonymous calls aired on television, anonymous telephone referrals and threats via email, addressing themselves to agencies, television stations and newspapers and video clips shown on television and the Internet. Having in mind all the various manifestations, it is apparent that terrorists have adopted an organised approach to the media and that media experts of various profiles are in charge of organising communication with the media. All this serves to corroborate the thesis that they have recognised the importance and the role of the mass media in contemporary society and that they have included communication models and techniques in their operational strategies in order to exert the greatest possible influence on the effects which mass communication produces in society as a whole. By taking into account the fact that violent extremists have their own media relations experts who are trained in manipulating the opinion of the elite, it is apparent that at the present moment their activities are directed at the planning and carrying out of attacks by all forms of communication. They are aware of the fact that communication eliminates borders and that a single press release can cause as much havoc as a military attack and they also have the possibility to act quickly with few people and modest means as opposed to the huge, expensive and bureaucratised democratic institutions. It is clear that terrorists want to appear in the most-watched shows in order to receive not only mass publicity but also the legitimacy which such media attention spawns in the eyes of their followers and sympathisers. On the other hand, the media ‘needs’ such terrorist activities just as well because they provide it with topical and sensationalist information, which results in an increase in media viewing and reading figures. When seeking ‘the oxygen of publicity’ 1 , an interactive relationship between terrorists and the media forms. Broadcasting developments linked to terrorism, especially long-lasting incidents such as aircraft hijackings and hostage situations, is a rich source of sensationalism and visually appealing news, which can really lead to a rise in media viewing and reading figures. It is evident that, for as long as the mass media exists, terrorists will search for ways of approaching it and, for as long as terrorist activities and violence exist, the mass media will be striving to cover such news in order to increase its viewing and reading figures and satisfy the needs of the public for the latest information. However, despite their apparent dependence on each other, it would be wrong to conclude that the media and terrorists have a ‘friendly relationship’. Terrorists frequently regard media organisations and journalists as enemies to be punished or destroyed and media staff 1

This term was used by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

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has frequently been the targets of terrorist attacks. Thus, one may conclude that terrorists seek first and foremost to manipulate and exploit the media for their own purposes, primarily in order for their activities to be broadcast during prime time, which would earn them massive publicity. Irresponsible media behaviour can be neutralised if one sees to it that an expert link with the media and planned news broadcasting are becoming an indispensable part of security and intelligence services' response to every terrorist campaign as well as of the process of planning and crisis management. In a democratic society a good and efficient public intelligence policy which would limit as much as possible the enormous clout that the mass media wields is a vital element in a successful strategy for combating terrorism. A key blow to the terrorist strategy may be delivered by the power of the media and political leadership to mobilise democratic public opinion and to fortify society's resistance as well as to provoke harsher and more efficient countermeasures that would foil terrorist efforts precisely because the objective of these efforts is to crush their opponent's willpower by fear mongering. There is a series of other important means by which responsible media in a democratic society can thwart terrorists' aims and objectives [6]: x by broadcasting in an objective manner the cruelty of terrorist violence and the killings of the innocent the media can contribute significantly to the destruction of the myth of fighters for justice and freedom as terrorists frequently describe themselves; x responsible and accurate reporting on incidents may increase vigilance among the public (e.g., with respect to unusual parcels, suspicious persons and behaviours); x the media may transmit warnings issued by the police to the public as well as instructions on how to behave in dangerous situations; x the media with international reach may offer valuable data on foreign movements, relations between various persons and terrorists and different terrorist organisations, new types of weapons and possible future threats, such as the planning of an international terrorist spectacle or signs warning of a novel threat; x the media also constitute an absolutely indispensable forum for quality discussions on terrorism's social and political implications as well as for the development of appropriate procedures and countermeasures; and x the media will remind authorities that the response to terrorism should comply with the rule of law, basic rights and requirements for social justice. The media need not become an instrument of terrorism. By adopting a well thought-out approach the media in Western liberal states may become a weapon which could be used as an important means for defeating terrorists and there is no doubt that their positive contributions outweigh the unfavourable outcomes brought about by possibly irresponsible behaviour of one part of journalists and media houses. One may conclude that it is precisely the media which provides terrorism with its global reach, which influence the way in which terrorism and its perils are perceived by the public, which have an effect on political decisions taken in response to terrorism as well as on relations forged by national and international policies.

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5. New anti-terrorist strategies Terrorism is not a novel phenomenon in human history. It frequently used to manifest itself as a special form of violence but it took on its contemporary form during the last 200 years. Terrorism is most frequently used by particular social groups that were organised in order to achieve certain goals. By engaging in violence terrorists have always sought to transmit messages to that particular segment of the public in which they wanted to attain their goals. An organised response by the state on whose territory such violence happened or at which violence was directed would always follow. For the most part, this response relied on force and violence, thus inciting terrorists even more strongly to undertake further acts. Numerous states employ the army and police forces as the main instruments in the fight against terrorism and which clearly voice their view in favour of adopting a hardline stance against every act of violence which terrorists commit or intend to commit. Governments are attempting to send an unequivocal message to terrorists that every violent act committed by them will provoke the same response against them. Threats of using violence as well as its actual use should discourage them from realising their intentions. A question to be asked is how much force we should employ and against whom in order to stop terrorists. Is there a centre of gravity, central headquarters, a key person, some kind of place in the world which could be targeted by appropriate forceful means in order to destroy terrorists and their organisations? Having in mind the contemporary organisation of the terrorist network, one can say that the conditions in which a ‘decisive blow’ could be dealt to terrorists and which would as the end result provoke the complete eradication of terrorism do not exist. A key question to be asked is: why are strategies based on force used when it has been shown that they do not guarantee significant success in the fight against contemporary terrorism? These strategies call for the centralisation and central allocation of all resources, something which shifts political power in a democratic society towards one centre. The reasons for holding on to this strategy should be looked for among the manifold impacts on the ruling class. The use of force against threats such as terrorism presents extraordinary opportunities to establish control over society. Every state agency which has the possibility of using coercion assumes a significant role in using the nation's resources, both the political and the economic ones. If one tried to pinpoint the concrete results of using force in the fight against terrorism, one would encounter serious problems when trying to explain why, even after the overwhelming use of force, terrorist acts in contemporary society still occur. However, if one analysed the concrete effects of using force on the internal political and economic situation in countries which resorted to it one would undoubtedly notice a whole series of restrictions whose purpose is to attempt to control various segments of contemporary society. Such findings would lead us to conclude that terrorists are still free to carry out their activities, while the citizens of the states that are pursuing strategies based on force and violence are progressively becoming less free to enjoy the benefits which a democratic and open society should provide them with. Citizens are double victims: first, with regard to the violence committed by terrorists and, second, with respect to the force employed by their governments in order to discover possible terrorist activities. Activities undertaken by the state in order to discover terrorists' intentions are all-encompassing and cover the entire national territory and all of its citizens. This approach encompasses the great majority of

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citizens who do not have any links with terrorists, it monitors their activities and indirectly limits their freedom and civil rights. The use of an anti-terrorist strategy which exclusively resorts to force implies several direct costs for the state implementing it: 1. Increased budgetary costs. The state must properly equip and prepare its agencies which are allowed to use force in carrying out the new tasks so this results in increased budgetary outlays. 2. Political costs. The use of strategies of violence may create a direct impact on the internal political scene. This impact manifests itself through the strengthening of the state apparatus of force (army, police, and secret services) and through its influence on political decision-making in the field of security policy. 3. Threats to civil freedoms and human rights in the name of national security. 4. Exploitation of security issues in order to remain in power or to rise to power. In both cases the promises given focus on taking prompt action which involves the use of force [7]. Experience has so far shown that terrorists change their tactics and ways of operating very quickly. If a certain target turns out to be risky, they very soon find a new one. The usual reaction to terrorist attacks involves tightening security around precisely those objects that are similar to the one attacked. Terrorists rarely focus their activities on the same or similar objects because they are well aware of the fact that security has been strengthened. Therefore, they very soon turn their attention to new targets which are not as tightly secured or which still have not been accorded the heightened degree of protection. Violent responses to terrorism have still not managed to stop terrorist activities. In some states this strategy has already come under public criticism, followed by demands for the pullout of military forces from operations in Afghanistan and especially Iraq. Despite all the efforts to present it as the only appropriate strategy, the fight against terrorism which is based solely on violence does not produce good results. It has transformed contemporary society in multiple ways and has increased violence which came as a result of the use of force in international relations. It may sometimes seem that the proper and logical response should entail force as a reaction to terrorist violence. This is especially true for the periods directly following terrorist acts. However, contemporary analyses show that terrorism has transformed itself and that gradually less and less can be accomplished by using force in the fight against new terrorism. On one hand, there are the terrorists who are constantly changing their organisational and operational forms and methods and, on the other, the fairly static state structures lacking both initiative and ideas about new ways of fighting terrorism [8]. Is there a way for contemporary states to avoid the trap in which they have found themselves at present and from which they cannot free themselves by applying their status quo approach? In answering this question one should stress the fact that states cannot give up the policy of force in their fight against terrorism. Demonstration of force and its use against enemies (no matter how visible they are in space) is something that is considered appropriate for the state and is always enjoying considerable support among the public. Politicians will more frequently resort to the use of force that achieves a momentary impact rather than systematically and patiently shaping long-term policies that are not based on the use of force. Democratic societies have regular cycles for

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testing confidence in their governments in the elections and every government is always more prone to use instruments that produce instantaneous results (or at least create the impression that results will ensue quickly and that they will be considerable). Very rarely are questions about the real benefit of using force against contemporary terrorism being asked and there are at least three reasons for this: 1. It is very hard to define what success in the fight against terrorism is. Should dropping tonnes of bombs be regarded as success? Should bringing down targeted objects by hitting them from a far-away distance be considered a success? Does the implementation of new measures aimed at controlling citizens' various activities represent an achievement? If it is hard to define success, how then do we measure the results of a strategy? Very often these kinds of questions are not asked and governments demonstrate their success through a clearly professed will to come to grips with terrorism by whatever means possible. 2. The decision to use force very often receives public support. In this case there is no discussion about potential costs since all resources considered to be necessary ought to be earmarked for the purpose of achieving national security. 3. As a rule, the implementation of the aforementioned strategy excludes alternative approaches to the fight against terrorism. The conditions in which the various strategies or at least the various ways of tackling the issue should be compared do not exist. It is probably clear to everyone by now that contemporary terrorists are not insane fanatics but persons who react rationally to obstacles arising from the strategies used by their adversaries. Terrorist organisations possess considerable innovation capacities which are reflected in their novel approaches to committing terrorist acts. At present there is no doubt that terrorists have become more resourceful than the inert state apparatus that pins its hopes on instruments of force: the army, police, and secret services [9]. If we agree that the existing approach does not provide sufficient guarantees for a successful fight against terrorism which would involve not only the physical elimination of terrorists or their training places but, in addition, would include new measures to strengthen social capacities for dealing with terrorism, then we should consider the possible alternatives [10]. Through their activities terrorists are seeking to obtain the greatest possible benefit for the achievement of their goals [11]. There are two types of benefits: total and marginal. Total benefit refers to the impacts of terrorist acts that are considerable, such as those following the attack of September 11. Such acts rarely reoccur. However, they are followed by a series of smaller-scale acts which produce marginal benefits for terrorists. The society which has been attacked adapts its instruments on the basis of experience gained from previous acts, whereby impacts of these acts are reduced. Each new activity represents new costs for terrorists. Even marginal acts incur high costs. These costs increase if the entire society contributes to the strengthening of overall capacities for fighting terrorism. The inclusion of society may be viewed from two perspectives: first, the decentralisation of activities within the framework of crisis management systems; second, the devising of alternatives to policies based on force. Since force is being used in a centralised manner, the alternative line of action should also adopt the decentralised approach. In this way manifold activities within society are secured with

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a view to increasing the level of preparedness for emergency situations and decreasing society's vulnerability during crises [12].

Conclusion Anti-terrorist strategies should focus on decreasing benefits which terrorists can achieve by committing terrorist acts. Therefore, it is not enough to concentrate efforts on ways to punish terrorists by resorting to force. Instead, a series of new procedures aimed at developing society's resistance and reducing benefits for terrorists should be included within the framework of anti-terrorist activities. The new anti-terrorist strategy cannot be pursued unless the entire society gets included in its implementation. Thus the marginal benefits which terrorists seek to achieve by committing numerous terrorist acts of limited scope could be reduced. In order for the fight against terrorism to be successful, anti-terrorist activities at the organisational, strategic and technological levels will have to adapt to the workings of the new or mega terrorism. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the ways in which contemporary society can respond to the emergence of such terrorism as well as the ways in which it could turn to its advantage precisely those effects which the information revolution has produced. In doing so, special attention should be given to the role of the media, as the major channel for transmission and dissemination of information, that has come to represent one of the essential levers of both terrorist and anti-terrorist organisations in contemporary society. The issue of media manipulation by terrorists should be regarded as a major social issue and the ‘symbiotic relationship’ between terrorism and the mass media should clearly occupy the minds of anti-terrorist strategists. Hence, we are highlighting the importance of devising a strategy for the media’s fight against terrorism which should give us the answer to the question regarding what the media can do in the battle against terrorism. Therefore, although the mass media in a democratic society is prone to terrorist manipulation, it can just as well make an invaluable contribution to the battle against terrorism. With regard to how the issue has been defined and described, the anti-terrorist strategy of the fight against mega terrorism should include the following basic elements: x an analysis of using power in the fight against terrorism and alternatives to contemporary strategies; x the decentralisation of anti-terrorist activities; x the contribution of society to strengthening overall capacities for fighting terrorism; x an analysis of the impact of information technology development on the transformation of contemporary mass media; x an analysis of the role played by the mass media in contemporary society; x a depiction of how terrorist activity has been transformed and adjusted itself to the new social conditions; x a depiction of how the new paradigm of terrorism is being transformed; x an analysis of the way in which terrorists take advantage of the mass media in order to disseminate their own activities and propaganda; x the recognition that terrorism is a form of communication;

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x

an analysis of how the mass media has been used so far in the battle against terrorism; x an assessment of how the mass media might possibly be used in the fight against terrorism; and x an assessment of the means by which countries could control communication channels without endangering the openness of society and basic human rights. We believe that this type of approach to contemporary terrorism, which regards terrorism as a form of communication and notes the importance of the symbiosis that contemporary terrorism has developed with the mass media, will contribute to the improvement of existing anti-terrorist strategies.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]

Michele Zanini. & S.J.A. Edwards, The networking of terror in the information age, in: Arquilla, John, Ronfeldt, F. David (ed.): Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND, Washington, 2001. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Michael Jensen, Countering the New Terrorism, RAND, Washington, 1999. W. Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5, 1996, 35. J.S. Tuman, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism, SAGE Publications, London, 2003. A. Schmid, J. de Graaf, Violence as Communication, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, Los Angeles, 1982. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, Routledge, (2nd Ed), London, 2006. Bruno S. Frey, Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK), Northhampton (USA), 2004. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998. Daniel L. Byman, & Matthew C. Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002. Todd Sandler, Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism, World Economy, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2003, 779-802. Mark Pieth, (ed.), Financing Terrorism, Dordrecht (Boston), Kluwer (London), 2003. Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, Cities and Warfare: The Impact of Terrorism on Urban Form, Journal of urban Economics, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2001, 205-224.

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Counter-Terrorism Strategies in the Balkans: Risk Assessment of the Regional Conflict Potential and Recommendable Counter-terrorism Policies Lyubov MINCHEVA Institute for Regional and International Studies, University of Sofia

Abstract: Security and intelligence are alternative approaches to counter-terrorism policies. Which one of them is more appropriate for Balkan counter-terrorism policies? I argue that the selection of a policy strategy should depend on the risk assessment of the overall Balkan conflict potential. This article aims to show that a major threat to the Balkan politics and state are currently local ethno-national conflicts. The latter – although considerably contained – still destabilise the Balkan region by sporadic campaigns of local terrorism and provide incentives for local terrorist groups to seek co-operation with global terrorism and trans-state crime syndicates. Drawing on regional risk assessment, I argue that security studies and intelligence should inform and complement each other in the planning of counter-terrorism strategies in the Balkans. However, security studies should take the lead and counter-terrorism strategies should be discussed in the context of conventional peace-keeping aimed at the rehabilitation of post-conflict societies and states. Keywords: security, peace-keeping, intelligence, ethno-national movements, conflicts, terrorism, crime syndicates, Balkans, Kosovo, Bosnia.

Introduction Two alternative strategies guide counter-terrorism policies globally. Where terrorism is defined as tactics employed in local conflicts, counter-terrorism is part of conventional peace-keeping. Investing money in security studies, training experts in defence planning and sending peace-keeping missions are crucial initiatives. Examples abound in all regions where violent ethnic and secessionist conflicts are ongoing. The alternative counter-terrorism strategy shifts the focus from military-civilian peacekeeping to the narrower gathering and analysis of intelligence information. It is less concerned with the management of the root causes of violence. Instead, studying global terrorist networks and planning an offence on local terrorist branches are seen as crucial to combating terrorism.1 What could be a working counter-terrorism strategy for 1

Both of these strategies have their advantages and deficiencies. The first strategy is good for long-term initiatives. However, it creates a ‘career field’ or what is seen as ‘an industry with vested interests’. It is therefore resource-consuming and frequently produces instructive, yet clumsy, at times even speculative counter-terrorism policy analyses. Moreover, it has attracted criticism for having accomplished little in the contemporary global war on terrorism. The second strategy is, in contrast, flexible, pragmatic and efficient. It

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the Balkans? I argue that the selection of strategy should depend on the risk assessment of the overall Balkan conflict potential. Regional risk assessments indicate that regional peace-keeping and intelligence should go together. Balkan peace-keeping should keep on carrying out its post-conflict activities, including the management of local conflicts, as well as combating local conflict-related terrorist activities. Intelligence should also assist discovering and combating global networks of militant jihadi fighters and their suspected funding agencies. Since the early 1990s the Balkans have been shaken by nationalist conflicts and ethnic strife. Two of the conflicts – Bosnia and Kosovo – have been especially threatening. Both conflicts continue to pose a threat to regional Balkan security. Though considerably contained, these conflicts have transformed into sporadic campaigns of terrorism and/or criminal economic activities. The unstable post-conflict Balkan states contribute to the process by breeding a nexus between crime syndicates and terrorist networks. Thus the loose multi-ethnic Bosnian federation, for example, lacks institutional efficiency which could have helped in implementing efficient counter-terrorism politics. This prevents the process of uprooting the seeds of the global jihadi terrorist movement, which alongside its funding agencies – some MiddleEast Islamic charities – arguably established themselves in Bosnia in the course of the Bosnian war and thereafter. On the other hand, the unresolved status of Kosovo keeps inter-ethnic tension high and occasionally generates terrorist attacks by ad hoc emerging local ethnic Albanian paramilitary units.

1. Security studies. Risk assessment of the Balkans’ ethno-national conflict potential Who are the major actors in this conflict analysis? The actors in the Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts share something in common. Both are a communal identity movement. These are cross-border ethno-territorial separatist movements (‘ETSM’), which emerge out of bisected ethnic diasporas which act as regional actors. They comprise identical ethnic segments populating the adjacent border areas of neighbouring countries. The Serbian and the Croatian ESTMs are movements of that kind. They were activated in 1991 with the outbreak of the war in Croatia, and were also very active at the time of the Bosnian war. A similar actor – although to a lesser extent – was the transborder movement of the Bosnian Muslims. The latter consolidated in 1992-1995 at the time of the Bosnian war. And not least, another such actor was the ethnic Albanian ETSM, which gathered momentum in the early 1990s. These movements articulate mutable territorial objectives. The objectives can range from autonomy to separatism to irredentism. The movements also command wide regional support. Their efficiency is due to the work of their cross-border identity networks. Many regional experts have seen the activisation of these hydra-like cross-border movements as the initial sign of a pending regional war [1].2 Indeed, when politicised, helps find out the enemy. Yet its critics point to the insufficient formal instruction offered to intelligence officers. The critics argue that training and education programmes are crucial for long-term anti-terrorism activities. 2 The war – analysts have argued – would be precipitated by the spread of ethnic conflicts across the republican borders of the former Yugoslav republics and would expand through the involvement of territorially contiguous kindred communities and states.

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these movements can turn local conflicts into regional crises. When militarised, they can also turn local conflicts into regional wars. Specifically, the movements’ militarisation either leads to the establishment of cross-border paramilitary alliances – as was the cross-border paramilitary alliance between the Krajna Serbs of Croatia and the Bosnian Serbs. Or, it ends with the establishment of a paramilitary unit – such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (‘KLA’) – whose multiple offspring continue to destabilise the region with their occasional criminal-terrorist activities on both sides of the state borders. Evidence suggests that the movements have considerably contributed to the exporting of conflicts across borders and to conflict regionalisation. Thus, the Serb ETSMs transmitted in 1992 the ethnic conflict from Croatia to Bosnia. In the course of the war, the Serb and Croatian ETSMs jointly instigated nine trans-border military incidents and 13 transborder military clashes. Of these, one trans-border military clash even dragged in NATO as an international mediator, forcing it to launch in 1994 an air raid on the Serb Ubdina air base in Croatia, and the Serb missile sites in Bosnia. On the other hand, the Albanian ETSM instigated less than a dozen transborder incidents for the entire period of the ethnic rebellion [2]. However, the paramilitary wings of the movement re-activated in early 2000 and were responsible for exporting the Kosovo conflict to southern Serbia and Macedonia [3]. Indeed, the Albanian nationalist movement has evolved considerably since the establishment of Kosovo as a protectorate. Most important is the movement’s radicalisation and fractionalisation. All factions of the ethnic Albanian movement – the newly emerging ones included – are radical in their political objectives. However, not all are extremist in their tactics. The emergence of ethnic Albanian extremism at the turn of the 21st century is a significant change within the movement’s evolution and is the most serious threat to inter-ethnic peace and stability in the Albanian-populated areas of the Balkans. Six years after the end of the Kosovo conflict, the KLA insurgency has evolved into campaigns of terrorism said to be aimed at the speedy attainment of Kosovo’s independence and at the resolution of the all-ethnic Albanian issue. The Kosovars have come to demand at a minimum independence for Kosovo and at a maximum the incorporation of all Albanians within a single political entity. Overall, while most prominent KLA commanders shifted to conventional politics in 1999 parts of the KLA gave birth to new paramilitary organisations. The first paramilitary off-shoot of the ‘mother’ KLA was the Liberation Army of Preshevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (UCPMB), which was activated in 2000. Cadres of the former KLA next moved to western Macedonia where a new paramilitary unit – the National Liberation Army (‘NLA’) – was established. After the signing of the Ohrid Peace Agreement the NLA dissolved and transformed into the Albanian National Army (‘ANA’), blacklisted by the United States in 2003 as a terrorist organisation. Two other terrorist organisations reportedly emerged by late 2005. One is the National Unification Front (‘NUF’), which described the UN mission in Kosovo as an occupier [4]. The Front demands the immediate recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty and the merging of southern Serbia with independent Kosovo [5]. Its counterpart in southern Serbia is another terrorist organisation called the Black Shadow. All of the above organisations have been especially active in the Kosovo postconflict development period. Let us recall some facts. Violence aimed at the ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Jews, Roma and Muslims has been reported since 2000. Most serious were the riots in Mitrovica from 2000 and 2004. In 2004 inter-ethnic tension in Mitrovica, initiated by ethnic Albanians against ethnic Serbs, resulted in 19 fatalities and 900 wounded.

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Cross-border violence from Kosovo to the southern Serbia municipalities of Preshevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja – home to some 70,000 Albanians – was reported in early 2000. The conflict was initiated by the UCPMB, an irredentist splinter group of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The cross-border violence ended in early 2001 with an ethnic Albanian rebellion in southern Serbia [6]. The Albanian political leaders called for an expansion of the NATO buffer zone and for an internationally supervised demilitarisation of the valley which, if accepted, would have resulted in the extension of Kosovo’s protected status to southern Serbia [7]. Next, the spread of conflict across borders by ethnic Albanian paramilitary groups also reached Macedonia. The Macedonian conflict arguably aimed at the revision of the Serb-Macedonian border [8]. The follow-up conflict dynamics were similar to those observed in southern Serbia. Paramilitary units on both sides of the border either staged co-ordinated attacks against their respective host authorities or crossed borders to help their ethnic brethren fight their own state authorities. An example is the simultaneous fighting of the ethnic Albanian insurgents against the Yugoslav police in Lucane, in the Preshevo valley of southern Serbia [9]; and the Macedonian forces in Brest [10]. On other occasions, the south Serbian rebels from the UCPMB were reportedly jointly staging attacks with NLA rebels on Macedonian military patrols [11]. Recently the impact of these movements on Balkan regional politics has significantly decreased. The Bosnian and the Kosovo ethnic conflicts are currently home centred. Boundary adjustment and the unification of territories along ethnic lines do not yet seem to be an issue on the national political agendas. The agenda shift in the movements’ political objectives is to be attributed to the committed activities of international organisations such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the EU. These organisations have contributed significantly to the establishment of viable national democratic institutions in post-conflict Balkan societies. Examples of international activities aimed at the rehabilitation of the conflictridden Balkan societies abound. To be mentioned here is NATO’s sweeping defence reform initiative in Bosnia which aimed at the merging the rival ethnic Bosnian armies into a single Bosnian force. The expected establishment of a single Bosnian army under one chain of command and financed from a unified budget would constitute a radical departure from the terms of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord which had given each ethnic community the right to its own military [12]. A unified Bosnian army would preclude any attempts at the establishment of cross-border paramilitary alliances along ethnic lines. In a similar vein, a recently accepted EU proposed police reform package would reorganise Bosnia’s police and its administrative boundaries along non-ethnic lines. Viewed in comparison, the Kosovo’s cross-border paramilitary units are more durable and persistent. The KLA splinter groups were reportedly active by end of 2005. However, in the course of 2006 no significant activities of this unit were reported. Yet problems remain. While the Balkan ethnic movements have largely confined their political activities within the existing state borders, cross-border ethnic networks are still at work. They provide settings conducive of collaboration between local/global terrorists, and organised crime syndicates. Cross-border identity networks assist deliveries of light weaponry and procurement to ongoing conflicts. They also perform other illicit business activities such as drug smuggling and human trafficking, which benefit criminal elements, erode official state economies and corrupt the postcommunist Balkan societies. The study of networks is mostly intelligence business. I

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now turn to a closer examination of the Balkan cross-border identity networks. I will look in particular at the terrorist and criminal activities of such networks.

2. Intelligence. Risk assessment of the terrorist/criminal potential of Balkan crossborder identity networks Two militant transborder identity networks pose a challenge to the Balkans’ regional system stability. One is the cross-border identity network of the ethnic Albanians operating in the territory of the southern Balkans. The other is the transnational Islamic advocacy network which has established itself in Bosnia. I argue that both networks are conducive of collaboration between terrorists and criminals. Why? Militant trans(cross)border identity networks are activated with the occurrence of armed conflict. Their ‘safe heavens’ are sovereignty-free zones such as the territories of failed states, or ‘criminal enclaves’ and ‘black spots’ existing along or close to state borders.3 The activities of militant transborder identity networks account for the economy of armed conflict. These activities are in turn determined by the interaction of illicit market opportunities and constraints. The militant ethnic Albanian cross-border network is said to be an outgrowth of the interaction between the Kosovar paramilitary unit, the KLA, and the Balkan-wide network of Albanian criminal clans, fares [13].4 And the interaction between the ethnic Albanian terrorist groups and the mafia is an actual fact. Kosovo, Albania and some border areas of Serbia and Macedonia known as ungovernable areas are pointed to as the problematic ‘bandit countries’ where this network is mostly active. The network has been intensively involved in drug trafficking. It is reportedly involved in cocaine trafficking with some South American countries and it is also held responsible for the smuggling of Afghan-cultivated heroin into Central and North Europe. The Albanian cross-border network partly reinvests the drug trafficking proceeds in weapons trade aimed at arming the KLA and its splinter terrorist groups. And as part of the international organised crime network, its illicit business activities are determined by factors such as the illicit market’s demands; the complex transnational exchange of commodities and regular access to suppliers. Are Kosovar local or cross-border insurgencies likely in the future? [Cross]-border [Kosovar] insurgencies – with cross-border terrorism at its heart – could be doubly motivated. The pursuit of ethno-political objectives could be one reason. However, profit-making may be another. Rebellion and terrorism are, among other things, also an

3

One example is the tri-border area of Kosovo-southern Serbia-Macedonia. Some analysts go even further by suggesting that the KLA itself is a child of the Albanian criminal mafia. Analyst Bozinovich suggests: ‘Claims are made that 15 leading family clans in Albania (fis) … during the collapse of the Albanian state into anarchy in 1997 ... established complete control over the criminal activity in Albania including arms smuggling. Motivated by fear of inter-fis blood feuds over limited Balkan criminal turf, the 15 fis allegedly made a deal to accept a common paramilitary enforcement unit, the KLA, in order to incite violence in Kosovo with the dual objectives of making money by financing the war and incorporate Albanian-inhabited areas of the Balkans’. Holding the fis solely responsible for the emergence of the KLA is an overstatement. I tend to accept a more balanced explanation. And it is the KLA that was initially established with funds aimed to help the Kosovo shadow government. 4

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industry [14].5 Insurgencies and terrorism demand regular arms supply. That expands weapons consumer groups and leads to profit maximisation. That also decreases transaction risks as weapons supply occurs among people of the same ethnic group. The transnational Islamic network in Bosnia is a different case. Its successful establishment is to be attributed to the global revival of Islam and the spread of Islamic advocacy networks everywhere where Muslim communities exist. The expansion of the trans-state Islamic network to Bosnia commenced at the time of the 1992-95 Bosnian war when the arms embargo on Yugoslavia placed the initiative for fundraising and illicit arms purchases for the Bosnian Muslims in the hands of militant religious groups from the Persian Gulf and North Africa. Major Arab relief organisations, private Islamic organisations and Middle Eastern arms dealers were reportedly acting on behalf of the Bosnian government. The expansion of trans-state Islamic network then continued in post-war Bosnia when different Islamic charities established themselves in the country to carry out humanitarian activities. Analysts argue the trans-state Islamic networks have failed to penetrate the local social networks. Trans-state networks instead existed at the time of the Bosnian war alongside the Bosniak social networks. How could the local social networks have managed to preserve their autonomous functioning? Analysts argue that Islam was mainly used by the warring Bosniaks for nationalistic rather than religious objectives. Islam – runs the argument – was mainly used in the Bosnian national context [15]. However, the Bosnian nationalist movement has still been used by the transnational Islamic movement as a means to gain a foothold in the Balkans in the post-war period. Some organisations operating in Bosnia – such as the al Haraman Islamic Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation, the Human Appeal International, the International Islamic Relief, the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage, the Organisation Igsa, and the High Saudi Committee for Help to Bosnia – have been suspected of funding terrorists moving between Europe and the Middle East and financing terrorist activities outside the country. These organisations have been strictly controlled since 9/11 and some have been closed down. A process of fusion between local Islamic agencies and global terrorist networks is still at work. Bosnia in these days supposedly hosts trans-state networks which provide financial support for the spread of Wahhabism. The local offices of Islamic charities that promote Salafist doctrines, values and lifestyles include some of the abovementioned organisations, namely the al Haramain Foundation; the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage; and the High Saudi Committee. Their local counterparts are the Active Islamic Youth (AIY), Furqan; the Balkan Center u Zenici, and the Center for the Affirmation of Islamic Science. Analysts warn that a process of radicalisation of Islam has been gathering momentum in Bosnia at least since 9/11. Former mujahedin who remained in Bosnia after the end of the war have reportedly tried to establish Wahhabi cells that are composed of well-trained groups and are directly responsible to bin Laden. The threat of terrorist attacks in 2001 on embassies of the US and the UK by the so-called ‘Algerian group’ is seen as a related activity.

5

Collier and Hoeffler posit that rebellion is ‘an industry that generates profits from looting… Such rebellions are motivated by greed …’

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3. Counter-terrorism policy recommendations The above discussion has shown that the Balkans are currently experiencing multiple conflict-related problems. On one hand, ethno-national conflicts generate problems related to the politics and economics of rebellion. They also generate problems related to the economics of local terrorism. On the other hand, global terrorism generates problems related to the politics and economics of Islamic jihad. I have argued that the ethno-national conflicts are of primary significance to Balkan politics. I have also argued that terrorist activities in the Balkans ensue from and are entwined with indigenous conflicts. Policy recommendations should address each of these problems. And counter-terrorism strategies should be discussed as embedded in conventional peace-keeping aimed at the rehabilitation of post-conflict societies and states. How do we manage ethno-national crises and carry out post-conflict development? The Balkans – perhaps more than any other world region – have become a test-case for efficient post-conflict development. The region has ‘contributed’ to the profound change seen in the character of the post-Cold war peace-keeping operations, transforming the latter into being multi-dimensional and dynamic. The missions sent to the region on behalf of the international organisations belong to the so-called ‘third’ and ‘fourth’ generation peace-keeping operations. They are known to be robust and multi-dimensional. They have set aims going well beyond conventional peace-keeping. Three out of the five ‘new generation’ UN peace-keeping operations held in the Balkans: UNTAES – the United Nation mission in East Slavonia; the OHR/UNMIBH – the Office of the High Representative and the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the UNMIK in Kosovo have been complex and ambitious. These operations not only included conventional containment and the signing of peace accords, but they also sought to ensure basic public security and the rule of law, the establishment of efficient administration, the securing of emergency aid, as well as the securing of funds for structural development. More importantly, international organisations have worked in areas in the absence of local authority such as Bosnia and earlier also in East Slavonia. International organisations have thereby undertaken executive mandates and exercised executive law enforcement and administrative authority. These missions only compare to the UNTAET – the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, and UNTAC – the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia. Last but not least, international peacekeeping and security organisations have thus far made parallel progress in conflict management and combating terrorism. The NATO-led missions in Bosnia and Kosovo of SFOR and KFOR have made it possible to expand UN peace-keeping to also include issues of combating local and global terrorism [16].6 International post-conflict peace-building has been successful in Bosnian regional crisis management. Much has been accomplished in Bosnia for the prevention of regional spillover crises. Further effort will have to address issues of the centralisation of state power and the bridging of the ethnic division within Bosnian society. Kosovo is, however, a different issue. It is still a conflict-prone area. The arrangement of Kosovo’s status is currently a key priority in Balkan post-conflict peace-building. It is likely that the future crisis management effort in Kosovo will deal with ‘home centred’ conflicts alone. As mentioned earlier, the Kosovo movement has recently 6

In his speech of June 2002, Lord Robertson explicitly pointed to cross-border terrorism and criminal networks as NATO’s new security challenge in the Balkans and beyond.

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confined its political objectives to the attainment of independence from Serbia having abandoned previous ambitions for unification with ethnic groups across borders. However, it is not impossible that we will again witness a low-intensity regionalised spillover crisis transmitting the Kosovo conflict to the nearby cross-border areas of southern Serbia or Macedonia. The factor making such a scenario possible is the economics of rebellion. International peace-keeping cannot afford to overlook the economics of violence, nor the dynamic interplay of violence and illicit business in post-conflict areas. Evidence from the Middle East for instance suggests that 1/9th of the identity-based organisations in the region use violence, operate across borders and are engaged in criminal activities at the same time. Indicatively, the frequencies of crime-related rebel activities amount to 1/3 within all countries examined in the past 25-year period [17]. 7 Where cross-border terrorism and insurgencies are staged for economic reasons, the most likely regional politics scenarios are long-term regional crises. The regional crisis actors – terrorist groups – can justify their ongoing illicit business activities by escalating the ETSM’s regional political objectives. Perpetrators of terrorist acts in post-conflict situations are frequently criminal clans or political entrepreneurs who have attained relative independence from their mother organisation and come to pursue ad hoc objectives. Terrorism activities perpetrated by criminal and terrorist gangs encourage criminal aggression. Worse still, they can also subvert the process of peacebuilding by re-instigating ethno-political violence. Cross-border terrorism is what sustains low-intensity regional crises in the long run with their inherent potential for future escalation. How dangerous is the co-operation of local identity movements with global terrorism and criminal networks? Nationalist movements are interested in the establishment of collaborative relations with global terrorist networks. Our analysis has indicated that their networks extend hospitality to terrorist cells. Movements are likely to provide sanctuaries to individual terrorists, as well as recruits for trans-state terrorist activities. However, our analysis has also indicated that nationalist movements are mainly economically driven when interacting with global terrorism. Their alliances with outer players are ad hoc established. And successful identity movements are persistent in the pursuit of their initial national- or other identity-related objectives. The Bosnian Muslims initially sought co-operation with Arab states and militants for military and economic reasons. They sought to defend the Bosnian government against Serb aggression. And after the Dayton Accord ended the civil war, the Bosnian government sought to deport the mujahedin and establish state control over terrorist and criminal networks. The Kosovo Albanians have reportedly received weapons from Iran and transported drugs from Afghanistan. However, the sources of illicit funding for their ethno-nationalist project have not yet changed their ultimate objectives [18]. 8 So viewed from an all-European perspective global terrorism currently seems to be a threat to Western Europe rather than the Balkans. Assumptions about functioning 7 Quantitative data on the criminal activities of identity-based Middle East organisations is being gathered and analysed for the Minorities at Risk Organisational Behaviour – a project housed at the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. 8 A comparative terrorism analysis provides supporting examples from other regions. A cross-regional example from the Caucasus is Chechnya. Indicatively, fiercely independent Chechens, concerned about outside influence have reportedly sought collaboration with Middle Eastern fighters primarily as a source of material support for their nationalist war with Russia, not because of shared Islamist objectives.

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terrorist networks arose in the Balkans with the threat of terrorist attacks against the embassies of the United States and the United Kingdom in Bosnia on 17 October 2002. Assumptions were made in view of the facts. Concretely, among the five North African suspects detained in follow-up operations was Bensayah Belcacem – an Algerian of Bosnian citizenship who was a high ranking figure in the Al-Qaeda network. A hypothetical connection might be suspected as existing between the arrested Algerian(s) and the Algerian Salafist network existing in Europe. The latter is said to have been established by Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching Combat (GSPC) – the largest, most cohesive and dangerous terrorist organisation in the Al-Qaeda orbit – which is engaged in terrorism operations in Algeria but is also emphasising ‘out of Algeria’ terrorist operations.

Conclusion The above discussion of the regional Balkan conflict’s potential has aimed to show that security studies and intelligence should inform and complement each other in the planning of counter-terrorism strategies. Tracking local conflicts’ dynamics over time thus provides reliable guidance about dormant terrorist cells. It also indicates where could be the most likely areas of terrorist operation. Not the least, it also guides our efforts to anticipate the likely periods of increasing terrorist activity. Intelligence can then build on this information to proceed with more specific investigations. Who are the terrorist actors? How do they fund their terrorist activities? What are their international connections and networks? The above discussion has been Balkancentred. However, relevant evidence – qualitative, as well as quantitative – has also been suggested from the nearby regions of Western Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The cross-regional comparison has confirmed the major Balkan finding pointing out identity movements and/or identity diasporas as the key settings of conflict, terrorism and criminal activities. The major policy recommendation thus should lay an emphasis on the increasing efforts for the mitigation, management and transformation of identity-related communal conflicts.

References RFE/RLVol. 1, N 14, 3.4.1992. See also RFE/RLVol 2, N 44, 5.11.1993. See also RFL/RL Vol. 3, N 4, 28.1.1994. [2] Lyubov Mincheva, Ethnoterritorial Separatist Movements and Spillover Crises: The Balkans in the 1990s. Doctoral Dissertation. College Park, The University of Maryland, 2000. [3] Lyubov Mincheva, Spillover Crisis: Major Challenge to the Regional Stabilization Processes in the Western Balkans. Razum, Vol. 1.11.2007. [4] BBC, 8.9.2005. [5] Nebojsa Malic, Toward the Kosovo ‘Negotiations’. Once More, With Feelings. 2.11.2005. [6] The Scotsman, 18.2.2001. [7] The Daily Telegraph, 6.3.2001. [8] The Financial Times, 2.3.2001. [9] St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10.3.2001. [10] The Washington Post, 10.3.2001. [11] The Scotsman, 19.2.2001. [12] Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Balkan Report, NATO Aims to Merge Rival Armies into a Single Bosnian Force. Vol. 9, N 24, 26.8.2005. [1]

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[13] M. Bozinovich, ‘The New Islamic Mafia’. 10.9.2004. www.serbianna.com/columns/mb/028.shtml, 2004. [14] Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions. Washington, DC, World Bank, 2005. [15] Velko Attanassoff, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina – Islamic Revival, International Advocacy Networks and Islamic Terrorism’. Strategic Insight,. Vol. 4, N 5, 2005. [16] Dick A. Leurdijk, NATO’s Shifting Priorities: From Peace Support Operations to Counter-Terrorism., Thierry Tardy. (ed.) Peace Operations after 11 September 2001. London and New York: FRANK CASS, 2004, 73. [17] www.cidcm.umd.edu [18] ‘The Rise and the Fall of Foreign Fighters in Chechnya.’ In Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 26.1.2006.

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25 Reasons Why Intelligence and Security Agencies Run the Risk of Losing the War on Terror Bob de GRAAFF The Hague Campus of Leiden University and Utrecht University

Abstract: In his contribution Bob de Graaff underlines the biggest difficulties intelligence and security agencies experience in their struggle against the current types of terrorism. He discerns 25 factors that make it hard for these agencies to score a victory in the so-called 'war on terror', such as bureaucratic behaviour and turf battles, impossible demands from the public domain, the effects of globalisation, the inheritance of working methods from the Cold War and insufficient knowledge of the workings and objectives of present-day terrorist groups which operate much more flexibly than the intelligence agencies. He reaches the pessimistic conclusion that this struggle, whose final objectives are stated in relatively unclear terms by leading politicians, will last for decades and that time does not necessarily favour those trying to counter terrorism, especially since such a long-lasting fight may sap the morale of the public at large. Keywords: intelligence, security, terrorism, counterterrorism, 9/11, intelligence, failures, intelligence reform

Introduction On one hand, a lot has been written about the question of whether the type of terrorism that has manifested itself since the 1990s is really different from earlier variants of terrorism [1]. On the other hand, there is extensive literature on the intelligence or policy failures leading up to the attacks on the Twin Towers [2]. Further, there has been an abundance of publications on the need to reform the intelligence community, especially in the United States, in light of the events of 9/11 [3]. This article will try to connect the various issues at a more general level, indicating 25 factors that make it extremely difficult for intelligence organisations to score major successes in the fight against terrorism under the existing circumstances.

1. The difficulties of new manifestations of an old phenomenon 1. x x x

It is hard to define the nature of terrorism in a singular way. Terrorism can be defined as: a problem of state security or a threat to the democratic order and process; a judicial problem; a type of warfare;

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x x

a societal problem; or a problem of safety and security. This means that the fight against terrorism is located at the intersection of intelligence and security agencies, law enforcement, the armed forces and several other government agencies. At best this complicates a problem of coordination, at worst it creates competition and stovepiping between the different government organisations involved [4]. What constitutes a victory along one line does not necessarily imply a victory along other lines. For instance, a judicial condemnation may lead to putting one terrorist behind the bars but at the same time may induce 20 others to turn into terrorists. Further, the combination of these different elements can exacerbate problems of overload. Thus the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan absorbed a lot of capacity and energy from the secret services that would otherwise have been invested in other activities such as those regarding Iran and North Korea [5]. At first instance wars have a destabilising effect and can nurture terrorism and create new training grounds (cf. Iraq) [6]. Further, intelligence and security agencies are becoming burdened by activities directed at the judicial condemnation or detention of terrorists.

2.

Another problem is the magnitude of the current terrorist problem. Terrorist organisations in the 1970s and 1980s mostly had only tens or hundreds of members. Groups affiliated with or inspired by Al-Qaeda number in the thousands, while their members might total tens of thousands on the global scale.

3.

This brings in the law of large numbers. Terrorist organisations and intelligence agencies are playing a kind of cat-and-mouse game. One tries to organise an attack, the other tries to prevent it by tightening security [7]. However, the larger the number of terrorists, the greater the risk that one day they will succeed.

4.

The extent to which Al-Qaeda-oriented terrorist groups have become globalised is another difficulty. At a certain moment in time there were about 43 nationalities represented among the then almost 600 prisoners at Guantanamo Bay [8]. This globalisation is leading to a so-called ‘language gap’ among security services worldwide and creating a bottleneck in the processing of information [9]. Secret services have to recruit speakers of the languages of the so-called terrorism belt (from East Africa to Southeast Asia). Such recruitment is hampered when at the same time potential recruits feel frustrated by an ‘us vs. them’ divide [10]. Loyalty conflicts among such boundary riders may produce so-called moles in secret services or at least create doubts about the loyalty of the services’ employees [11]. 1 If, on the other hand, such services decide for reasons of security not to recruit people who are already familiar with the languages, culture, religions and customs of potential intelligence targets, but instead decide to train new agents and staff themselves, this would take many years at a time of pressing

1 E.g. the case of Special Agent Bassem Youssef, one of the FBI’s highest ranking Arabic speakers, who was cut out of terrorism cases after 9/11;

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5.

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demand. They thereby risk training people for targets that have become obsolete by the time the new personnel is ready for action. By way of illustration: it was only in 1996 that the CIA created a separate unit for the fight against Al-Qaeda, five years before the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. One may wonder which surprises await the world five years from now and how (un)prepared the intelligence services will be for them at that time. Scenarios for the development of terrorism, radicalisation and extremist forms of Islam are quite scarce [12]. It took a while before Western intelligence agencies realised that there was not so much recruiting top-down occurring, as was the case during the Cold War with espionage, but that the radicalisation process among youths with an Islamic or Arab background was often a grass-roots event [13]. It makes quite a difference whether you can sit at your observation post opposite the Soviet embassy and watch the car of the second embassy secretary come out and then follow him to his next rendezvous or that you have to find out which youths in a certain district of, let us say, Amsterdam have been radicalised during their home meetings to such an extent that they may plan a terrorist attack. Besides, profiles of potential terrorists keep changing at an amazing speed [14]. Finally, unlike most of the time during the Cold War this time real-time intelligence is needed. Sometimes no more than a few hours remain before someone can be stopped from causing a (suicide) attack.

2. What are the terrorists after?

2

6.

Globalisation enhances the number of triggers for radicalisation and terrorism, e.g. the commotion caused by the Danish cartoons or the radicalising effects on Western youths of the war in Iraq. For the first time in history people around the world have become contemporaries in a real sense, i.e. that events in Teheran or Kabul may have significant and almost immediate relevance for, for instance, people in Copenhagen or London and the other way round.

7.

The ultimate objectives and strategies of terrorists are insufficiently known. Is terrorism a rational strategy aiming at specific goals? Is it only a public relations strategy or a way of agenda-setting? Or is it a form of self-expression [15]? Are the present-day terrorist fanatics with whom it is impossible to negotiate? Or if, conversely, negotiations could become a reality, what are the objectives of the terrorists: no Western presence in Islamic territories, an end to the state of Israel, the establishment of a caliphate, the replacement of corrupt regimes by theocracies or clerocracies [16]? 2

8.

Not only have the number of adherents and the global reach of the terror movement been expanded in recent years, but so too have the number of potential targets. In the 1970s and 1980s diplomats, consular officers, diplomatic buildings and army objects were at risk. Today soft targets have to be included, such as mass meetings (railway stations, sports events, amusements parks and so on) and targets with a highly symbolic value such as

For the different objectives of Al-Qaeda.

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the Twin Towers and Las Vegas casinos or even individual politicians, writers, philosophers and so on [17] This makes near 100 percent security absolutely impossible.

3. New demands on intelligence agencies 9.

Globalisation and the increased complexity of terrorism demand more international co-operation from intelligence agencies than they were ever used to and were ever prepared to commit themselves to. Exchange between different EU member states on a relatively small scale is possible but any substantial information exchange between all 27 member states is an illusion. Apart from that, there is no shared threat assessment in the West: the US hardly has any home-grown radicalisation and terrorism, unlike Western Europe. For the US a war against terrorists is therefore an easier solution than for Western European nations that have to take into account the existence of large groups of Muslims among their own citizens. In addition, in different Western European nations different radicalising ethnic minorities are involved: especially Pakistani in the UK, Moroccans in the Netherlands and Algerians in France. Further, the anti-terrorist powers between the different states are diverse. What, for instance, are the implications of the fact that the German Constitutional Court forbids the shooting of a hijacked plane from the air by the Dutch government? Could this mean that a German request to do so could reach the Dutch authorities? The nature of current terrorism also leads to international co-operation that transcends the traditional boundaries that many states established between (internal) security and (external) intelligence activities. This has been a major issue in the United States, where under normal circumstances the CIA and the intelligence services of the Pentagon were not allowed to operate internally and where many have advocated the establishment of an internal security organisation similar to the British MI5 [18]. If international co-operation between Western secret services is already a problem, this is even more the case when it comes to co-operation with intelligence organisations in the Middle East where questions of opportunity and ethics present themselves more pressingly.

10. The increased public and political interest in the exploits of intelligence agencies in their fight against terrorism threatens to turn these organisations into re-active, post hoc rather than pro-active organisations, which such earlywarning systems should be [19]. Politics has a tendency to demand from these services that they will be able to prevent the latest attack. Many policy measures are advocated just because they score well with the larger public, not because they are necessarily efficient. These kinds of symbolic measures detract services from their real tasks, which are already demanding enough. Many policy-makers think that ‘better’ means ‘more’: more latitude for intelligence services, more personnel (after all, fighting terrorism has so far been the growth industry of the present century) and more opportunities to

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collect ever more information. Less attention is paid to quality and to the capacity to analyse the collected information in time. 11. This short-windedness that the public debate inculcates in the intelligence agencies is in sharp contrast with the ability of at least part of the violent Islamic movement to execute long-term policies. The latter is shown for instance by the exercises in patience given in Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, their use of moles and sleepers, the preparation of some attacks over a period of years and the long-term objective of the Islamic Caliphate [20]. 12. Security agencies, especially when they operate within constitutional boundaries, have a tendency to show bureaucratic behaviour [21]. This tendency is aggravated by growth of their staff or ill-conceived efforts at centralisation or co-ordination, such as the US Department for Homeland Security [22]. Al-Qaeda affiliates and adherents, on the other hand, are extremely flexible when it comes to their organisations and networks and therefore act potentially faster than their opponents [23].

4. Flexibility of terrorists 13. It is not very well known which roles the different members of these terrorist networks play. They are not organised in a military hierarchical way as some of the earlier terrorist organisations used to be. This leads to wrong evaluations among authorities as to what is to be expected from different members of the networks. 14. Another problem for the secret services is that these groups have the ability to use a wide range of methods, from the ultra modern to the traditional and primitive. For instance, they may use codes on the Internet but they also use human couriers; they may use global finance systems to transfer money faster than lightning, but they may also use the tradition hwala financial systems of the Middle East. The attacks of 9/11 are another example, where Boeing 747s were directed like guided missiles into the modern variants of the Tower of Babel through the use of simple box-cutters. Some Western secret services, especially the American ones, have a tendency of mirror-imaging, thinking that when the most advanced techniques are available they will necessarily be favoured over traditional ones. 15. Another problem is the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. Some intelligence services that previously had little to do with these weapons ought now to be able to detect them. So far, starting with the al-Shifa factory in Sudan, they can hardly be said to have a faultless record in this respect. The case of the (non)existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is another example.

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5. Inflexibility of intelligence agencies 16. Moving from the Cold War towards an era in which terrorism has become the dominant strategic problem, knowledge of intentions have become as important as knowledge of capabilities. Thus human intelligence has become important once again, but especially the Americans neglected this form of intelligence gathering during recent decades [24]. The CIA had become a riskaverse and not very creative organisation in this respect [25]. As far as the CIA still operated in the field of daredevil work, this was mainly through covert operations, not by means of having agents in place. 17. How far can secret services go with the use of human agents, e.g. in their efforts to detect grass-roots manifestations of radicalisation? Is it ethical to make use of the services of educators or neighbourhood workers? 18. The burden, tradition or, if one likes, the original sin of the Cold War still adheres to the intelligence services. Their dominant trait remains their secrecy, ‘the 900-pound gorilla’ [26]. There is, for example, too little collaboration with scholars and journalists (who are knowledgeable about foreign countries, cultures and organisations) or too little collaboration with the entertainment industry (which can describe potential targets). The intelligence services have to make a U-turn from secret investigations towards public information about nature and scope of threatening developments and towards the mobilisation of potential defences within society itself [27]. This calls for communicative talents which are not always the most prominent ones within the intelligence community. 19. Politicians often blame intelligence failures on organisational structures instead of on their cultures, which are often more to blame. This leads to the adoption of programmes of reorganisation in the heat of battle. One should never change a winning team, but continuously changing a team that once lost is hardly helpful either. In the US one reorganisation follows another, without knowing the effects of the former. This leads to a fixation on one’s own organisation, which detracts from the real job to be done and hampers both national and international collaboration.

6. And how does politics come in? 20. The fact that the intelligence services of the UK and the US were politicised during the prelude to the invasion of Iraq hampers the acceptance of new information from these services by other nations’ agencies [28]. 21. A major handicap of the intelligence community is the lack of vision as to the long-term-development of both the current terrorist movement and the fight against it. Thus it is becoming unclear what would constitute the best approach: negation as far as possible, isolation, mild reactions or severe repression. It is unclear, for instance, whether youths of Arabic origin in Western countries radicalise by adopting the Islamic religion as a lifelong

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commitment or as a lifestyle, which will whither within a decade. Too little is known about the exit strategies of both terrorist groups and individual terrorists. However, because of its global spread and its constitution of many loosely connected or even independently operating networks it is to be expected that this kind of terrorism will have a relatively strong resilience and an equally strong sustainability. It will not easily suffer from intergenerational changes in leadership as some smaller terrorist organisations have in the past. Some say that the war on terror may last 30 years, but even smaller terrorist groups like the Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany, the IRA or the Spanish ETA lasted as long as that or even longer. So, 30 years may still be too optimistic a point of view of those who combat terror [29]. So far, it is completely unknown how, why and when we can call it a final victory in the battle against terrorism and many counter-terrorists do not know any more than former US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s remark that ‘When the mission is completed, it will be over [30]’. President Bush assured that the war on terror had begun with Al-Qaeda, but would ‘not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated [31]’. Even more subtle objectives like the official British goal ‘to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence’ [32] are stated in relatively unclear terms. 22. The longer the fight against terrorism lasts the greater the likelihood that it will lose legitimacy among the public because of its duration, unclear victories and inevitable mistakes. This problem is enhanced by the fact that among nonterrorists a central narrative to counter the terrorists’ narrative of humiliation is lacking [33]. During the Cold War intelligence and security agencies contributed to psychological warfare and public diplomacy by providing elements for either the West’s or East’s propaganda. Nowadays such a guiding story seems to be absent. 23. Time is also of importance because the longer the terrorists are able to pursue their goals the greater the likelihood that they will one day use weapons of mass destruction. 24. The fight against terror is a battle for the hearts and minds of both the people who may potentially rally to the cause of terrorists and those who are considered to be in the camp of the terror fighters. In many respects the Americans are presently leaving the moral high ground. I just mention Guantanamo Bay where people are held for years in a row without trial; I mention the people who were detained without due process in the United States themselves; the torture applied in the Abu Ghraib prison and other places; the renditions and hijackings of people to countries known for their gross violations of human rights or as some call it ‘torture by proxy’ or ‘outsourcing torture’. Quite often the methods one uses against one’s adversaries have consequences for the atmosphere and climate within one’s own organisation. Some members of the US intelligence community have already complained about the almost Stalinist practices within their own branches. Together with the multitude of reorganisations this produces low morale among their staff [34]. While on one

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hand intelligence services are recruiting at an unprecedented scale, a major outflow of personnel is underway on the other. 25. There is too little recognition of the unintended side-effects of the fight against terror. E.g. the USA Patriot Act hampered recruitment of agents among Arab and Islamic circles in the USA [35]. Recent British research has demonstrated that the current British policies are exacerbating the process of radicalisation among Muslim youth [36]. However, there are also some positive side-effects. The fact that Samir A., one of the Dutch home-grown terrorists, was acquitted twice has probably done more to stem radicalisation than his final condemnation. I hope that through this short overview I have given an idea about the long and winding road that still lies ahead of the intelligence services as they try to fight the current terrorist movement and also about the major improvements still needed in order to ultimately win the battle.

References [1]

[2]

[3] [4]

[5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

[10] [11]

E.g. W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, London, 2001; No End to War. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, New York, 2003; Ch.W. Kegley (ed.), The New Global Terrorism. Characteristics, Causes, Controls, Upper saddle River, NJ, 2003; G.E. Schweitzer and C.D. Schweitzer, A Faceless Enemy. The Origins of Modern terrorism, Cambridge, MA, 2002; J. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Cambridge, MA, 1999. B. Gertz, Breakdown. The Failure of American Intelligence to Defeat Global Terror, New York, 2003; D.N. Bosse, Intelligence Failure. How Clinton’s National Security Policy Set the Stage for 9/11, Nashville, Tennessee, 2004; R. Miniter, Losing Bin Laden; How Bill Clinton’s Failures Unleashed Global Terror, Washington D.C., 2003; D.R. Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor. Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11, Gloucestershire, 2004; The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York/London, s.a.; S. Strasser (ed), The 9/11 Investigations, New York, 2004; G. Posner, Why America Slept. The Failure to Prevent 9/11, New York, 2003; O. Schröm and D. Laabs, Tödliche Fehler. Das Versagen von Politik und Gehimdiesnten im Umfeld des 11. September, Berlin, 2003. E.g. R.A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks. Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11, Stanford, CA, 2005; R.D. Steele, ‘Crafting intelligence in the aftermath of a disaster’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 15 no. 2, 2002, 161-178. E.g. L.S. Strickland, ‘Analytic Myopia, Data Disintegration and Homeland Insecurity’, Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 30, 6 (August/September 2004); B.B. Tussing, ‘Sharing Information for Homeland Security: Overcoming Obstacles of Technology, Process and Culture’, Center for Unconventional Security Affairs Occasional Paper no. 3, January 2004. J. Fallow, ‘Bush’s Lost Year’, Atlantic Monthly, October 2004. D. Priest, ‘Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground. War Created Haven, CIA Advisers Report’, Washington Post, 14.1.2005. B. Hoffman, Inside terrorism, New York, 1998, 180-181. B. de Graaff, ‘Wie wint de “war on terror”?’, Justitiële verkenningen, vol. 30 no. 3, May 2004, 62. E.g. N. Grimm, ‘Intelligence agencies’ officers lacking in foreign language skills’, ABC Online, 23 July 2004; T. Frieden, ‘Report: FBI getting lost in translations. Half-million hours of intelligence material not yet in English’, CNN.com, 27.9.2004; D. Eggen, ‘FBI Agents Still Lacking Arabic Skills. 33 of 12,000 Have Some Proficiency’, Washington Post, 11.10.2006; J. Meeus and J. Schoorl, ‘AIVD slordig met bewijs terrorisme’, de Volkskrant, 8/9 January 2005; ‘Word Warriors. Translators fill gap in war on terrorism’, The Billings Gazette, 8.5.2005. J. Parachini, P. Wilson and D. Aaron, ‘Defeating the Global Jihadist Movement’, in: D. Aaron (ed.), Three Years After. Next Steps in the War on Terror, Santa Monica, CA, 2005. D. Jehl, ‘CIA ponders shortage of Arabic experts’, International Herald Tribune, 8.6.2005; J. Meeus and J. Schoorl, ‘AIVD slordig met bewijs terrorisme’, de Volkskrant, 8/9 January 2005.

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[12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27]

[28] [29]

[30] [31] [32] [33] [34]

[35] [36]

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U.E. Kemmesies (ed.), Terrorismus und Extremismus – der Zukunft auf der Spur, München, 2006. M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia, 2004. ‘Europe’s Changing Terrorist Profile’, Washington Post, 12.3.2007. A. Borowitz, Terrorism for self-glorification. The Herostratos Syndrome, Kent/London, 2005. e.g. G. Kepel and J.-P. Milelli (eds.), Al-Qaida dans le texte, Paris, 2005; Anonymous, Through our Enemies’ Eyes, Washington DC, 2003. B. Hoffman, ‘Defending America Against Suicide Terrorism’, in: D. Aaron (ed.) Three Years After, pp. 21-22. G.F. Treverton, ‘Use history to reshape intelligence gathering’, SFGate.com, 4.7.2004. L. Davis a.o., ‘Terrorism and Intelligence Reform’, in: Aaron (ed), Years, pp. 29 and 32; B. de Graaff, ‘Kabinet vraagt en verwacht te veel van AIVD’, NRC Handelsblad, 16.2.2005. P. Wolfowitz, ‘A Strategic Approach to the Challenge of Terrorism’ in: Aaron (ed.), Years, p. 54. L. Lustgarten and I. Leigh, In from the Cold. National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, Oxford, 1994, 411; M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge, 1997, 336. E.g. K. DeYoung, ‘A Fight Against Terrorism – and Disorganization’, Washington Post, 9.8.2006. L. Davis a.o., ‘Terrorism and Intelligence Reform’, in: Aaron (ed), Years, p. 30. ‘America needs more spies’, The Economist, 10.7.2003; M. Moran, ‘Wanted: Spies who speak Arabic’, MSNBC Special Report, 26.8.2003. J. North, ‘Spooks and ladders: critics say the CIA produces risk-averse careerists’, Washington Monthly, September 2004. L. Davis a.o., ‘Terrorism and Intelligence Reform’, in: Aaron (ed), Years, p. 32. L. Davis a.o., ‘Terrorism and Intelligence Reform’, in: Aaron (ed), Years, p. 29. Examples of such collaboration: G. Wright, ‘Game creator join war against terrorism’, Game zone, 12.4.2001; J. Wagge, ‘A Captive Audience. The Portrayal of terrorism and Terrorists in Large-Scale Fictional Hollywood Media’, http://www1.appstate.edu/~stefanov/proceedings/wagge.htm. B. de Graaff, ‘VS gooien nationale veiligheid te grabbel’, NRC Handelsblad, 4.6.2004. ‘Terrorism Expert Says War on Terrorism May Take Years’, http://cryptome.org/rand081303.htm; A. Rathmell, ‘Building Counterterrorism Strategies and Institutions: The Iraqi Experience’, in: Aaron (ed.), Years, p. 52 . The US National Security Strategy called the war on terror a ‘global enterprise of uncertain duration’, quoted in S. Power, ‘Our War on Terror’, The New York Times, 29.7.2007. Quoted in Chr. Coker, ‘The Long War. The Transatlantic Rift’, in: D. Hansen and M. Ranstorp (eds.), ‘Cooperating against Terrorism. EU-US Relations Post September 11, Stockholm, 2007. Quoted in S. Power, ‘Our War on Terror’, The New York Times, 29.7.2007. T. Garton Ash, ‘Faced with the Tragedy of Iraq, the US must rethink its whole foreign policy’, The Guardian, 14.6.2007. T.S. Thomas and W.D. Casebeer, Violent Systems: Defeating Terrorists, Insurgents and Other NonState Adversaries, March 2004, 84. W. Pincus and D. Priest, ‘Goss Told to Build Up Other Staffs, Too’, Washington Post, 24.11.2004; D. Jehl, ‘2 Top Officials Are Reported to Quit C.I.A.’, New York Times, 25.11.2004; D. Priest, ‘CIA Officials Let Critic Publish’, Washington Post, 25.11.2004. Recently the British intelligence community has been experiencing similar problems, ‘Officers Quitting British Intelligence’, 14.8.2007, http://www.thetrumpet.com/print.php?id=3566. N.J. Henderson a.o., Law Enforcement and Arab American Community Relations after September 11, 2001. Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty, New York, 2006. Policy Exchange, Living apart together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism, London, 2007.

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Informing the Public and Educating about Crisis Management as a Precondition of an Effective Fight against Terrorism Alen STRANJIK and Ivan TOTH Velika Gorica School of Polytechnics, Velika Gorica Abstract: With its devastating effects on and threats to civilians, modern terrorism has the basic characteristics of a crisis and a catastrophe. Success in the fight against terrorism greatly depends on the knowledge of people who organise and implement protection, rescue and security tasks, as well as their readiness to react to terrorist attacks and their knowledge of the methods and mechanisms used in those attacks. For these reasons, the competencies of those managing protection and rescue tasks need to be at a high level of development, which can be accomplished by continuing training and education. The paper points to the importance and ways of the continued informing of public and providing education in the area of crisis management as the foundations for an effective fight against terrorism. Keywords: terrorism, public information, education, civil defence, crisis, catastrophe.

Introduction Today, we are living in a time of contrasts where on one hand we are striving to completely fulfil civil rights and freedoms in the circumstances of greater security while, on the other hand, there are threats to civil communities from terrorism in order to achieve the separatist narrow interests of certain groups. Terrorism as a phenomenon has existed before. However, the threat of terrorism is not about what has already taken place but about what could happen. This is because the means terrorists employ to achieve their goals are constantly changing along with the development of technology; to that effect, along with classical means of destruction, today terrorists also have available to them modern chemical, biological and nuclear means of mass destruction. Given that the motto of terrorist organisations is ‘the goal justifies the means’, there is a great fear around the world that such sophisticated means could be used in terrorist attacks which would cause much greater human casualties and difficulties than those caused by natural catastrophes. For these reasons and the devastating consequences it brings, terrorism is becoming a subject of not only public interest but also a problem that civil defence needs to deal with and offer appropriate solutions. The consequences of modern terrorism can be viewed as a catastrophe caused deliberately, directly and with premeditation by a human being. The enormous human losses, direct and indirect material damage and harm to the environment that take place as a consequence of modern terrorism speak to that effect.

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From the standpoint of the elementary tasks of civil defence, informing the public and educating in the area of crisis management play an important role in attempts to prevent terrorist attacks, ensure more effective reactions and save citizens in the case of terrorist attacks and eventually in dealing more quickly with the consequences. A lack of information and an unprepared population along with a lack of education of competent protection and rescue services increases the risk of a terrorist act turning into a catastrophe with immense consequences. A public that is not informed or receives inadequate information as a rule reacts outside of standard norms of behaviour and such panic reactions and behaviour of individuals or groups leads to the reduced effectiveness of local and wider community defence and protection systems while carrying out the protection and rescue of people. When decision-makers and other players competent for protection and rescue are not prepared and the overall protection and rescue system is also unprepared to react to a terrorist attack this could lead to a catastrophe in the sense of the loss of human lives, health and living conditions. Finally, there could be an economic crisis which over a longer period of time could cause civil society to stop functioning. Having in mind the phenomenon of the ever wider spectrum of methods and goals used in terrorist activities and the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological), it is necessary to take different preparatory and preventive measures primarily by elaborating programmes and projects to educate the population about possible forms of terrorist attacks, consequences and protection measures that could be undertaken with the goal to mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks and the continuing education of competent services involved in protection and rescue systems in the sense of the public information and procedures that come into play in case of a terrorist attack.

1. Terrorism and Civil Defence Sources of threats are part of the human environment and have both general and specific characteristics. These are phenomena and processes that pose threats to human beings, social systems and material goods as well as ecological systems. In terms of threats we differentiate between fatalities, accidents and catastrophes. The classification of an event that has occurred holds a practical meaning for the purposes of making decisions and taking appropriate protection and rescue measures and measures for the removal of the consequences, which in their scope match the level of threat. The same goes for the occurrence of a catastrophe characterised by a large number of casualties, huge material damage and a break in the normal functioning of the community; it is necessary to activate the entire protection and rescue system and introduce special measures that would secure at least minimum living conditions and conditions for the functioning of the community where the catastrophe took place (Figure 1) [1]. Terrorism should be viewed in the same context. Terrorism had previously not been subject to studies due to the fact that they were incidents of a limited character. Those incidents, i.e. terrorism acts, were mainly dealt with by the police. Only recently, when one of the main goals of terrorists has become the mass destruction of civil populations and causing large-scale material damage in order to attract public attention, protection against and rescue from terrorism have become the subject of civil defence activities.

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The characteristics of modern terrorist threats are no longer significantly different from general characteristics of threats, like: • the increased power of threats (nuclear, chemical and biological etc.); • the globalisation of goals and threats; and • the constant appearance of new sources/methods, types and goals for posing threats (nuclear and other facilities, plane crashes into the WTC etc.) . Terrorism is becoming one of the biggest problems of modern society. It is embraced as a means and method for achieving the specific goals of different extremist groups, organisations and countries, appearing as a direct consequence of the interests of individuals, forces and structures wishing to change the balance of power in a community or to influence the global level. In plain words, terrorism means ‘terror’, an act of violence employed to achieve certain, primarily political goals to change existing social relations. Starting from this very simple definition and the fact that the methods terrorists use are illegal, ‘terrorism’ can be defined as the illegal application of threat, force or violence against persons or property in order to intimidate or force a legally elected government, civil population or any part of society to do something and to promote own political or social goals [2]. By observing terrorism from the standpoint of civil defence activities, e.g. from the perspective of protection against and rescue of the population under a threat, we can link it to the consequences that this violence can cause to the civil population, material, cultural and other important civil facilities and critical infrastructure. Although the application of force is sometimes used as legitimate way of rebelling against a dictatorship or to fight for national liberation or liberation from occupation, such an application of force should not (always) be affiliated with terrorism, but according to international conventions in those circumstances such actions that could lead to the harm of the civil population and its property are not permitted.

2. The Importance of International Co-operation and Public Information With regard to its characteristics, terrorism is becoming ever more of a global threat and thereby a global problem. Terrorism, much like a catastrophe, knows no administrative borders in its consequences and can appear in any part of the world if there is the interest of certain forces and structures; thus, the entire international community should join hands against it. This includes wide and harmonised activities of international actors in fighting terrorism and disabling the activities of terrorist organisations in the international and national environment. One of the elementary conditions, certainly not the only one, is the need to strengthen the exchange of information about terrorist activities, including an exchange of information and knowledge about every use of chemical, biological and nuclear materials in order to decrease the possibility of terrorist organisations’ activities and thus possible threats to the civil population and its property. At the state level, with regard to protection against and prevention of terrorism, the state should adopt appropriate legislation and an action plan in the fight against terrorism and provide well-organised, educated and trained implementation forces (police, anti-terrorist police, customs, private security services and, in extreme cases,

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the military). It is clear that it is necessary to secure inter-agency co-operation and well-trained management for such crises. Further, in relation to the protection and rescue systems of states the informing of citizens and their self-protection should be developed and stimulated along with further development and progress in protection and security systems in companies that use or produce flammable, explosive or toxic materials (transport, warehousing). The aforementioned includes a detailed and comprehensive elaboration of methods for informing the public about the possible forms, ways of implementation and possible consequences and protection against terrorism as a process that lasts a longer period of time and includes permanent education of the public about possible and ever more present threats of terrorism and terrorist actions. By informing the public about all forms of today’s terrorism and its consequences, better efficiency in the fight against it is achieved for this is the way to develop awareness that a systematic and global fight against terrorism is necessary. It should also be stressed that the timely provision of useful information by civilians on potential preparations for terrorist attacks could reduce the potential to organise terrorist actions. In line with the aforementioned, it could be stated that terrorism – in the part that refers to civil defence – represents every violent and illegally generated damaging event that can or does cause threats to people’s lives and health, that harms the environment and property and requires the introduction of special measures and execution of special tasks and activities that include activating not only regular rescue forces but overall resources of the community for the purposes of: • rescuing and providing first aid and organising the transport of a large number of lightly and heavily injured people; • directly or indirectly involving a large number of trained and well-equipped rescuers from rescue services; • co-ordinating activities of overall community resources in removing consequences; • providing care for the endangered population by providing temporary accommodation, food and necessary medical and other care; and • preparing for timely and correct informing of the public and media about special events that have occurred.

3. Informing the Public about Terrorism Informing the public about terrorism and terrorist actions is a complex problem and thus standard informing methods cannot be used because of danger they could cause effects opposite to what is desired. As an example, we consider a situation where a terrorist organisation announces a public threat to a state in revenge for arrests of the organisation’s members. Further, it is assumed that this terrorist organisation has means of mass destruction available to it. In evaluating the way and place the terrorist organisation is going to strike, taking into consideration the goal the terrorist organisation is trying to achieve with its terrorist act, the state that is subject to the threat faces a very difficult decision on the method to use to inform the public about the possible danger. In this case, the goal of informing would be timely information and preparing the population to reduce the consequences of the terrorist act. However, where this information is provided to the population via public media for the first time

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in such a situation, the information will not be accepted ‘automatically’ and ‘without reservation’ and it is hard to believe that the population would behave exactly as instructed. Further, informing citizens about a certain danger only once it has occurred provides no results except it creates fear that almost always causes panic and panic reactions. This is caused by the population not being prepared for such a special situation. Because of this, the desired behaviour of citizens in the case of potential danger or a terrorist attack can only be achieved by informing and educating the public over a long-term process that includes making the public aware of possible types of danger, ways of protection against the threat etc. Informing the public in the case of terrorist threats and/or attacks can be divided into several groups: • exchange of information between states, organisations, agencies and services that deal with anti-terrorist activities with the goal to disable and prevent terrorist organisations from carrying out their intentions. This form of informing is almost always secretive and not open to the citizens. This segment of informing also includes guidelines for organisations and companies of special interest (water supply companies, chemical facilities, nuclear plants, refineries etc.) to take the safety measures to a higher level; • informing citizens in the sense of increasing the level of preparedness to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist act. This form of informing often includes educational contents on the means and procedures for the protection and is often implemented through regular drills of specialised state services (civil defence, fire brigade etc.), the goal of which is to present the level of training, readiness and equipment of the community protection and rescue system in order to help citizens trust those services; and • informing citizens of a special event (of a terrorist act that took place), whose goal is to decrease and prevent cumulative actions concerning the endangered population and which could take place as a result of fear and panic. This form of informing is implemented by issuing orders, guidelines and notices on how to proceed in the crisis area, as well as in the other neighbouring areas in order to avoid chaos and panic; by doing so optimum conditions for the removal of consequences and conditions for normal life are created. When informing the public, the right sequence of activities and procedures should be established in order to achieve the goal – informing the public – that includes the community’s participation in planning and strengthening direct co-operation between the population and authorities, which can be accomplished through: • a realistic estimate and evaluation of the potential threat to which reference needs to be made in preparing and developing a potential plan for informing the citizens; • developing a plan of informing that estimates the possibility of the occurrence of a special event or threat, evaluates potential consequences and own potential to address the consequences; • the achieved level of informing the citizens and activities to educate citizens on the possibility of the occurrence of a threat or special event; • the promotion and becoming familiar with the existing system for alarming citizens and with the unique emergency call number (112); • making citizens aware of measures that need to be taken in the case of the occurrence of a threat or special event;

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•

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making citizens aware of the possibilities but also of the obligation to help others; • becoming familiar with ways and methods to take measures and activities to protect, rescue and remove the consequences of a threat; and • determining and elaborating instructions for citizens regarding procedures in the case of a threat occurring. When developing the plan of informing, the following should be taken into consideration: • the goal and purpose of the plan; • stimulating, strengthening and creating a positive environment when executing the planned tasks and activities to remove the consequences of the threat; • a true and realistic explanation of the threat that has occurred; • the form in which the information is prepared in relation to the type of public media in which the public is being informed: radio, television, cinema, daily newspapers, weekly shopping bags, appropriate banners at various events, schools and other similar premises, social gatherings, volunteer associations, various seminars, workshops, posters, leaflets, postal stamps, car stickers etc.; • planning the time needed to publish such prepared information and/or promotional messages; • the time of year, possible seasonal impacts, the time of day to publish information (during the day); and • possible costs. When preparing the information, a right definition of the topic or message we want to send out to the threatened and affected population is needed, taking into account the achieved level of citizens’ education. Understanding the information is important as is its acceptance, while stressing some messages that include the following: • a special event or natural or other civilisation catastrophe knows no national border, gender, race, religion; • the community’s capacity to deal with the threat and the removal of its consequences; • the obligation of people to help each other; and • the need for overall co-ordination in the community’s protection and rescue system as well as of the executive authorities in executing the tasks to address the consequences. When informing the public, messages will be accepted if they are: • accurate; • reliable; • simple and understandable; • timely; • used by several types of (public) media; and • interesting and entertaining in order to stimulate the interest of children. When preparing to develop the plan of informing in the case of a threat to the population by a terrorist attack, special attention needs to be paid to the basic characteristics and habits of the population that needs to be informed about the occurrence of a threat through research and by studying some characteristics like: • the population’s structure (age, gender, level of education, habits); • possible exposure of a certain structure (group) to a threat;

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• • •

present (achieved) level of information about potential threats; potential flaws or advantages; and an evaluation of possible ways to react to information/messages about a threat and the way to proceed and reduce the consequences of such a reaction [3, 4].

4. Crisis Management Education and the Role of Civil Defence in Protection and Rescue against Terrorism Any special event, like any other accident, results in certain consequences which, aside from with the protection and rescue system not being prepared and organised and the population not being sufficiently informed about the event and its consequences for people and their property, can cause unwanted effects. At the same time, preparatory and preventive measures taken on time, as well as protection and rescue measures that are planned to be taken in the case of the occurrence of a special event, can significantly reduce the consequences for the population. This is exactly why we need to remind ourselves that civil defence is a form of organising, preparing and participating citizens, legal entities, state administration entities and local and regional self-governments in order to protect against and rescue from dangers that can threaten the population and/or its material goods. The aforementioned includes the importance of planning in the case of a special event in order for the civil defence system (which includes overall community resources) to react in an organised and timely manner and to execute tasks and activities to protect and rescue the population and its property in the case of a natural or other civilisation catastrophe, including terrorism. The role of local community leaders and authorised persons for catastrophe management is huge and their main task is to ensure the protection and rescue system at the local level operates effectively when there is a need, when such natural events or those caused by human beings occur in peacetime or wartime. Illustration 1 shows a scheme of the responsibility for dealing with a catastrophe. In order to successfully fulfil all the tasks, many specialised skills are needed which can achieved through training that needs to be provided via specialised training programmes by cities, counties and the state. Besides that, another role of key people who manage catastrophes is the transfer of knowledge to their associates for them to be better prepared when the special situation takes place. For these reasons, their role is twofold: adopting knowledge and transferring such knowledge to others. Education is literally identified as a need that is extremely important. It is generally accepted that, in recent years, all around the world the local community has gained in importance, in fact it holds the key to establishing many elemental human services. According to the scheme of responsibilities for dealing with catastrophes in the European Union, the role of local authorities in the case of a catastrophe is clear. For these reasons, training of local community leaders has to be a priority task for the local community. Education programmes have to include areas of management in crisis conditions, planning and proceeding in crisis situations and removing the consequences of terrorism. Participation in those training programmes should not be limited to the leaders of programmes for crises caused by terrorism, instead it should be intended for

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Figure 1. Scheme of responsibilities for dealing with a catastrophe

all those assigned with responsibility and tasks at the time of special situations and a crisis situation caused by terrorist threats [5]. Education programmes need to be developed so that they facilitate the obtaining of necessary knowledge for team work to solve crises and to facilitate the testing of such knowledge through team exercises to resolve problems and tasks on computersimulated special events and crises. In those exercises participants learn from their own experience. Also, in doing so those parts of the plan that are realistic and those that cannot be implemented will be identified.

Conclusion The fast pace of technological development as well as other scientific achievements have created the possibility to use modern technologies to produce means of mass destruction for various ill-intended organisations and groups that can use them for terrorist purposes. Terrorism is a form of activity by terrorist organisations and groups that to achieve their goals use violent and destructive methods in order to attract public attention to their goals. The possibility to use means of mass destruction in terrorist actions became likely especially after the terrorist attack on the civil population in the United States of America, which had previously been inconceivable. Such a possibility puts an obligation on the community to prepare for any special event that requires the executing of tasks and activities that involve activating the community’s protection and rescue system and which occur as a direct consequence of violence to the civil population and its material goods and other important infrastructural civil facilities. When taking actions and removing the consequences of a

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special event, including terrorism, the civil defence system as part of the overall protection and rescue system will use the same protocols, ways and methods of taking action. A population that is prepared on time in order to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist act includes the true and realistic informing of the public about an event that has occurred, which includes possible terrorist action. By doing so, instructions to the population, announced through public media will facilitate the qualitative and effective informing of public about the special event which will at the same time prevent the occurrence of fear that almost always causes panic and thus greater consequences. Informing the public is a key element of preparedness, which significantly impacts on the success of measures to mitigate consequences, including the community’s participation in the planning process which enhances intervention and strengthens cooperation between the people and the authorities which, putting it briefly, saves lives.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Ivan Toth, Sustav zaštite i spašavanja u Republici Hrvatskoj. – Rad i sigurnost, pp. 91-122. (UDK/UDC 351.78(497.5)/355.58(497.5), 2003. Božidar Javorović, Terorizam.-Zagreb: Policija i sigurnost, no.1-2/97. Dean Škanata, Ivan Toth, Ivan Valčić, Pripravnost u Hrvatskoj za slučaj nuklearne nesreće, Zagreb, EGE, year 9, no. 5, 2001, 135-142. Ivan Toth, Informiranje javnosti u kriznim situacijama.- Zaštita, 2, 5, 2006, 17-19. Ivan Toth, Željko Dobranović, Alen Stranjik, Školovanje na Veleučilištu Velika Gorica kao odraz na opasnosti posebice terorizma, ECDN 2006, 9th European Conference on Non-Destructive Testing, Berlin. 25-29 September.

Other references Ivan Toth, Sustav civilne zaštite. – In: Defendološki godišnjak 2002-2003. Hrvatska i svijet. – Zagreb, DEFIMI, 2003, 116-119. Ivan Toth, Nuklearni akcident i potreba zaštite stanovništva, okoliša i teritorija Republike Hrvatske Zagreb, MUP, 1999, 27. Ivan Toth, Civilna zaštita u Domovinskom ratu, Zagreb, Defimi, 2001. Ivan Toth, Civilna zaštita, skripta, Zagreb, IPROZ, 2001, 99. Ivan Toth, Damir Trut, Damir Čemerin, Petar Vistas, Zakon o zaštiti i spašavanju s komentarom, Velika Gorica, Veleučilište Velika Gorica s pravom javnosti, 2005. Dejan Verčič, i drugi, Odnosi s medijima, Masmedia, Zagreb, 2004.

II. Country Approaches in the Fight Against Terrorism: Policies, Mechanisms, Dilemmas and Perspectives

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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The Bosnian Approach to the Fight against Terrorism Edina BEûIREVIû Faculty of Criminal Justice Science, University of Sarajevo

Abstract. The analysis of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights the complexities of the fight against terrorism. This is a country that in the last 15 years has experienced aggression and genocide. Since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed (1995) its citizens have struggled with post-war devastation, a slow reconciliation process, and economic difficulties. The situation is further complicated by the threat of terrorism. This article addresses the question of how real is the threat of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with possible ways to prevent it. In order to answer this question, the author starts with a wider international picture and within that framework analyses the stereotypes of so-called ‘Islamic terrorism’, the dehumanisation of Muslims in Western media, and the brutalisation of American and British soldiers. Pictures of torture in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons have supported the deterioration of liberal values and supported the argument used by terrorists that Muslims are victims of the West. On the micro level this image has also been reflected negatively on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Apart from a feeling of the general victimisation of Muslims around the world, the injustices done to Bosnian Muslims, particularly the genocide committed by Serbian forces and the denial of it, could lead to further radicalisation. Among all of these complicated circumstances the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has successfully prosecuted the first case of terrorism in the wider region. In analysing the investigation and the judgement in the Bektasevic and others case, the author emphasises the optimal direction of future work on the prevention of terrorism. Apart from secondary sources, this paper draws conclusions based on an analysis of 11 interviews, three of which were conducted with Wahhabi converts in Bosnia, two with former members of the Wahhabi community, while six other interviews were conducted with professionals from law enforcement agencies that work on tasks related to the fight against terrorism. Keywords: Bosnia, genocide, justice, prevention, stereotypes, terrorism, Wahhabism.

Introduction Like in all other world states, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fight against terrorism cannot be assessed without first establishing a link between the local and global perspectives. One could say that this is generally the case with the analysis of terrorism; however, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina this is additionally emphasised. Therefore, in this chapter in a presentation of some of the specific characteristics of the approach Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken in its fight against terrorism I shall continue to refer to reflections the international picture has on this specific country.

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The first problem I shall address is the role of the media and creation of stereotypes which prevent the public from achieving a proper understanding of terrorism. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the threat of terrorism is not exclusively linked with Al-Qaeda or terrorist groups with a so-called ‘Islamic background’. In the years during and after the war, if we follow the logic by which an Islamic declaration is attached to certain groups that commit terrorist violence, we could also use that same logic to claim that violence was committed by Christian warriors in the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-95, as well as in terrorist acts committed on Bosnian Muslim returnees after the war. In that sense, we could say that violence was carried out on behalf of the followers of Christianity – both Orthodox and Catholics. Their acts were directed against the religious identity of Muslims in Bosnia, involving the killing of people and blowing up of mosques, as well as against their national identity [1]. These actions were often blessed by priests [2]. 1 However, after September 11, since Bosnia is a country with a large percentage of Muslim population (according to the CIA world fact book the figure is 48%), the world’s media was only interested in so-called ‘Islamic terrorism’ in this country. Therefore, in this chapter I focus almost exclusively on this issue by attempting to deconstruct media myths surrounding it. Considering that for a long time Bosnia has been a victim of stereotyped perceptions of Islam, and quite often it has unjustly attracted attention because of it, I shall address the role of the media in creating malicious stereotypes which link Islam with terrorism. However, deconstructing myths is not the sole aim of my research. I also attempt to assess whether there is a real danger of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the best ways to prevent it. The Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and its global influence is widely recognised as the ideology of Al-Qaeda. This religious ideology infiltrated Bosnia and Herzegovina during the years of aggression (1992-95). Even though many recognise that Wahhabism is a misinterpretation of Islam, and dangerous as such, it is an official religion of Saudi Arabia and international officials, especially Americans, are hesitant to speak out against it. Apart from political realism, an obstacle to the prevention of Wahhabism is human rights standards according to which the prevention of the spread of Wahhabism would be regarded as an infringement of religious freedoms. I shall address this security-human rights dilemma as regards Bosnia and Herzegovina’s importing of Wahhabism. The correct understanding of the recent genocide of Bosniaks committed by Serbian forces during the 1992-95 war could play a significant role in the prevention of terrorism. The stubborn denial of the genocide by the Serbs, as well as the international community’s ignorance, are further fuelling the frustration and feeling of injustice among Bosniaks – the victims of the genocide – which makes them more vulnerable to radicalisation and susceptible to the Wahhabi ideology. In the shadow of all of these complicated socio-political circumstances, law enforcement agencies that function in an equally complicated state structure have managed to successfully prosecute the first case of terrorism. In the final stage of this chapter I shall analyse the investigation, trial and judgment in the Bajraktarevic and

1 The action of the Serbian special unit 'Skorpion' on its way to participate in genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 was blessed by an Orthodox priest. After a video of the killing appeared in public, the Serbian Orthodox Church kept silent for 10 days and then issued a statement in which it modestly condemned the killing.

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others case. This court case can illustrate the complex points where theory and the practical fight against terrorism meet. Apart from secondary sources, information in this paper is based on 11 interviews, three of which were conducted with Wahhabi converts in Bosnia, two with former members of the Wahhabi community, while six other interviews were conducted with professionals from law enforcement agencies working on tasks related to the fight against terrorism. Therefore, let us first look at the global picture.

1. The function of stereotypes in the fight against terrorism A serious discussion on the causes, consequences and prevention of terrorism is usually confused by one’s decision to succumb to a black-and-white perception of the world when identifying ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’ In the context of the subject discussed in this paper, this stereotype is especially apparent in a widespread belief that the world is divided into two main camps – those who support the terrorist cause and those who are against it. The fight against terrorism has been conducted in the manner of the famous statement made by President Bush in November 2001: ‘You are either with us, or against us’. The war in Iraq is a painful example of how this approach – whereby the fight against terrorism focuses solely on military power within a black-and-white framework – can produce more human tragedy and civilian deaths than terrorism which is not fought against [3]. According to the expert Ruhan Guanaratna, since October 2001 Al-Qaeda has suffered serious losses. He says that in autumn 2001 Western intelligence services had estimated that Al-Qaeda had between 3,000-4,000 members. However, since then ‘around 3,400 of its members were arrested or killed in actions conducted in 102 countries’, says Guanratna [4]. Even though these statistics of dead terrorists is proclaimed as a success in the fight against terrorism, in the ‘war of ideas’ the West seems to be acquiring an inferior position. Liberal values were so highly appreciated during the Cold War that thanks to them the USA and its allies were regarded as superior to the Soviet Union. Now, these same values are in crisis. And they are not only losing appeal for majority Muslim countries. Global citizenship based on liberal and human rights has also recognised that those values are being compromised by Western decision-makers, particularly the American and British military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The hypocritical attitude of decision-makers has been supported by the mainstream media. While rhetorically promoting liberal values, the record of human rights of American and British troops in the ‘war on terror’ is, to say the least, shocking. Yet, should we really be so surprised to see the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay on our television screens, and by the brutality of American and British soldiers with which they treat prisoners of war and civilians? Was that brutality to be expected? Is it possible that media stereotypes are responsible for contributing to the dehumanisation of the Muslim populations in Afghanistan and Iraq? Is it possible that this dehumanisation process has made the ruthlessness of British and American soldiers more likely?

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2. Propaganda models The dehumanisation of Muslims in the British and American media has been widely recorded. It seems that the media has only followed what Bush and Blair created in their speeches, a division of the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’. This approach was described by Lloyd and Potter (2007) as ‘the old psychology of war and peace’, which is closely mirrored by many of the nations or groups declared as the ‘global enemy’. They interpret it as a psychology of ‘us and them’ centred upon a linear path to victory or defeat. The analysis of the Bush-Blair speeches they conducted ‘highlights the polarized either-or and if-then quality of the thinking in the speeches. The relational thinking seems to be: if victory, then freedom and prosperity; either complete victory and justice, or total defeat and evil’ [5]. However, to divide today’s complex world into two camps (good and evil) is not that easy. It would be too simple to blame the media alone for the creation of stereotypes that have helped dehumanise Muslims in the world. Different professions have had to support government policies, as well as civil society in Western countries. Roberts’ analysis of the British propaganda model gives us an insight into the complex links between the media, decision-makers and also of the psychological society. ‘That psychologists have been employed in some capacity to design and orchestrate these psychological operations for the government is more than likely. It should not, of course, be forgotten that the conduct of those who perpetrated war crimes or carry out torture, whether under the guise or acting under orders or delivering them, has been addressed by psychological theory before’ says Roberts, reminding us that Milgram’s classical work on obedience and authority and our propensity to ‘follow orders’ could also be applied to the events in Iraq [6]. David Harper notes that there are many contextual influences that create conditions for torture to take place. He mentions that the brutalisation of soldiers and dehumanisation of the enemy are certainly among the prime conditions. ‘No doubt emotions like fear, anger and frustration and a wish for revenge may also play a role. However, one of the most significant influences in the current development of psychological torture is official government sanction by the Bush administration and ambiguous policies’, writes Harper [7].

3. September 11, the media and ‘ambiguous policies’ However, if we go back to autumn 2001 and assess the initial reporting by Western mainstream media after the September 11 attack, it is possible to analyse how ambiguous reporting supported ‘ambiguous policies’. The media did not state clearly who carried responsibility for the attacks, but introduced a general term of ‘Islamic terrorists’ and a stateless Al-Qaeda. Due to this, Al-Qaeda’s history was not explained clearly, nor were its links with the Saudi royal family and its collaboration with the United States in Afghanistan. Underlining the common characteristic of media reports after September 11 would emphasise that Islam in general carries with it a terrorist threat. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a country with a significant percentage of a Muslim population, was also attached with a label of danger. However, later in this text I shall explain why introducing those stereotypes was more difficult in Bosnia than in other majority Muslim countries.

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The world’s media is instrumental in creating public confusion. The anti-Islamic hysteria which in a way overwhelmed the Western media could have been understandable immediately after September 11. That was a brutal attack which caused enormous public fear of Islam. However, to understand that the media played a key role in creating this general fear of Islam one needs to keep in mind that the global media is based on stereotypes. One could argue that most media establishments exploit and heavily rely on stereotypes in any case, so why would the case of September 11 be any different? This tragic event brings to light many of the absurdities present on the international stage after the end of the Cold War. If we look back at the Cold War period, it is apparent that social scientists did not have too much trouble defining the correct methodological approach to use to analyse how decisions were made at the highest level – by the major world powers. Both Eastern and Western camps claimed loyalty to enlightenment values: liberty, equality, human rights etc., while in essence their decisions were driven by the ambition to establish their dominance in the world. And just to make it clear, I do not think it is possible to compare the values of freedom that countries of liberal democracies provided their citizens with during the Cold War with the terror and tortures to which citizens of the communist bloc were exposed. On the other hand, ruthlessness in wars that competing blocs led far away from their borders does not give space for arguments that one should be appreciated more than the other in terms of respect for the enlightenment cause. Many archives that are nowadays within public reach give more than enough evidence to confirm this claim [8]. In any case, the world was divided ideologically and within this black-and-white framework social scientists had no doubt when making their analysis about friends and enemies on the international stage. The main reason was that friends and enemies were precisely defined and decisions were made within this framework. The media picture reflected the international political arena. It also seems fair to say that, in this respect, there was more honesty in international co-operation than nowadays. For example, from the point of view of a Western journalist countries in the Soviet Union were enemies, while communism was a hostile ideology. In the world of globalisation, the division into friends and enemies is quite blurred. The anti-Islamic hysteria with which Western media was overwhelmed after September 11 and the stereotyped news created an image of Islam as being a religion of evil. American public opinion was offered a picture of Islam as an extremist religion which is hostile towards the West. This view did not take into account the variety of cultures, ideologies and regimes within which Islam lives and exists [9]. However, the image that dominates the Western political and media discourse is a negative image of Islam, with which all countries with significant percentages of a Muslim population are being identified, and Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to this group. In this stereotyped language of Western media, terrorists are often labelled radical Islamists, Islamic fundamentalists etc, but rarely as extreme Wahhabists. Why is this so? Out of the 19 terrorists who participated in the September 11 attack, 15 had a passport from Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is the official religion of Saudi Arabia. If the media were to describe the ideology of the terrorist group as an ‘extreme form of Wahhabism’ it would be difficult to make stereotypes about radical Islam which spreads wherever there are Muslims in the world. As is well known, Saudi Arabia is a strategic friend of the United States and does not belong to the ‘axis of evil’. Also, if the Western media were to insist on a precise identification of Al-Qaeda’s ideological

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background, and on a precise identification of this network and its aims, it would be difficult to link Wahhabism with the attack on Iraq, for example. The fact that the Americans turned ‘a blind eye’ to the creation of Al-Qaeda during the war in Afghanistan is also rarely explored by Western media. The Saudi background and ties of Bin Laden with the Saudi royal family are also difficult to tackle since a proper investigation of these issues could be dangerous for the AmericanSaudi strategic partnership. It is much easier to misuse stereotypes of Islamic fundamentalism in an atmosphere of general ignorance. In that case, it is possible to detach ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ from Saudi Arabia, a country from which the most radical Islamic interpretation of Islam – Wahhabism – is being exported and to attach it to a secular dictatorship such as Iraq was before the US attack [9]. The power of the media in Western democracies is well known, and one of the most famous studies that offers models for analysis is offered by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in the book Manufacturing Consent (1988). According to the findings of that study, the media serves to mobilise support for the interests of the state and private capital. One of the main ways through which news is ‘filtered’ is that journalists depend on government sources for information and the media is influenced by lobbies on the right, infected by anti-communist ideology. This last filter – anticommunist ideology – was according to this study a main reason for the selfcensorship of journalists during the Cold War [10]. Since Western capitalist interests need an enemy to bring people together, after the fall of communism the stereotype of radical Islam was given that role. Therefore, for the analysis of Western media the scheme of the ‘propaganda model’ invented by Herman and Chomsky could apply today, except the key filter anticommunism should be replaced by today’s anti-Islamism. The only problem with anti-Islamism is that radical Islam – Wahhabism – is being spread not from the ‘axis of evil’ but from a country which is on the list of America’s strategic allies. After September 11, in the Western media the image of Islam as a religion of hatred became a regular implicit message. In the news it has been quite normal to hear that Islam is not a religion of peace, and that special measures regarding Muslims crossing the American border should be introduced. The European media and politicians have kept following this model. The call by Geert Wilders, a Dutch parliamentary member, to prohibit the Qur’an including its use in mosques, is the latest example [11]. In line with this stereotype perception in Western academic circles, with little hesitation we can hear that Islam is in contradiction with the basic principles of democracies. However, there are also Western academics who argue against this claim [12]. Those advocating this thesis do not find it necessary to mention that, for example Indonesia, a state with the highest number of Muslims – out of its 234 million inhabitants 86% are Muslims – is a secular democratic state. Or Malaysia, out of its 24 million inhabitants, 60% are Muslims. This is also a democratic state with a developed economy and also, what is more and more a rarity in the Western world, a state with successful social programmes. Malaysia could serve as a model for many other countries that do not have a majority Muslim population [13]. I mention Indonesia and Malaysia to illustrate how much important information about the ‘Muslim world’ gets lost in stereotypes. However, stereotypes are important for the creation of general ignorance. In that atmosphere, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was very easy to detach from Saudi Arabia and to attach it to Iraq, which indeed was a dictatorship, however, quite a secular one. Within this context, the ‘propaganda model’ by Herman and Chomsky,

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which portrays the media as an instrument for homogenising the public in the support of the interests of the state and private capital, could be instructive for the analysis of how Islam is presented in the Western world. The first step would be to investigate the roots of Wahhabism and assess the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

4. Wahhabism and its role in the spread of Al-Qaeda ideology Wahhabism, i.e. Salafism, appeared for first time in the 18th century, at the time of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. In this text I am not going to enter into a theological discussion but it is worth noting that there is more or less a consensus of Islamic authorities that Wahhabism propagates a relatively narrow interpretation of Islam. The founder of this sect is Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The main idea of al-Wahhab was that Islamic societies around the world need to give up on customary law and all other cultural differences in which Islam exists. According to him, it was necessary that states with a majority Muslim population be ruled by the divine rules, i.e. Sharia law. In propagating his views and by calling Muslims around the world to come back to the ‘source of religion’, he was also aggressively inviting the murder of Muslims that reject his call. He called those Muslims infidels. ‘The sect of al-Wahhab was not recognised, nor very influential, until he made the alliance with the ‘house of Sauds’ whose members were basically a criminal gang. Islamic authorities at the time claimed that the only reasons for that alliance was that the gang activities of the ‘house o Sauds’ Ibn Wahhab declared a legitimate action against infidels’, says Steven Schwartz [4]. The American-Saudi partnership dates back to World War II, when the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia became known to the State Department [14]. Over the next half a century the alliance of Saudi Arabia and the United States was strengthening through oil exploitation, the sale of military equipment and build up of a military basis. The importance of Saudi Arabia came to the centre of American national interest in 1979 due to the Islamic revolution in Iran and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan [15]. Through the Cold War, the Saudi Kingdom also played an important role in keeping oil prices at a low level, which worked against the interests of the Soviet Union [15]. However, it seems that the Saudi-American partnership is in crisis. Despite this, due to the history of the alliance, along with military and economic interests, it has been difficult for the United States’ government to break this partnership. The continued support of Saudi Arabia for terrorists in Iraq has made this alliance shaky in the last few months. According to the news, Americans are accusing the Saudis of financing Suni groups as well as sending fighters to Iraq. The accusations are still very discrete but it seems that the official American line, which was to protect Saudi Arabia at any price, is changing [16]. However, the latest media reports which started criticising Saudi Arabia and exposing Wahhabism as the ideology of Al-Qaeda are not proof that the ‘propaganda model’ by Herman and Chomsky mentioned earlier should not be applied to this situation. On the contrary, it actually confirms it. The American mainstream media did not write much against Saudi Arabia until the official US government attitude was that Saudi Arabia should be criticised. In the American media, Saudi Arabia has until recently had a remarkable image. Journalists as well as American politicians were often

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guests on ‘political excursions’ in Saudi Arabia, where they would be hosted in a luxurious manner [17]. 2 The double standard of Saudi politics that promotes ‘Islamic unity’ and at the same time works for the interests of the United States can be seen in the example of the Palestinian question. When the state of Israel was declared Ibn Saud, the Saudi King supported the war against Israel but refused to send soldiers to the front. After the end of the war, Palestinian refugees were not allowed to enter the Saudi Kingdom. Stephen Schwartz explains that by the fear that Palestinians and their different cultural Islamic background would interfere with and bring disturbances to the Wahhabi style of living [18]. However, the public rhetoric of Saudi Arabia is the promotion of ‘Islamic unity’ and helping Muslims around the world. Under that pretence Saudi Arabia also entered Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 war.

5. How did Wahhabism come to Bosnia? According to recently published information, in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone Saudi Arabia invested during and in the years after the war (1992-2002) some 600 million dollars. Apart from that, the Saudis claim that they donated an additional 300 million dollars for weapons for the Bosnian Army [19]. The weapons were not the only donation the Saudis made. Together with money for weapons they funded the arrival of foreign fighters, ‘true believers’ as they called themselves. However, if we go back to the topic of stereotypes, it was difficult for the Western media to employ stereotypes about mujahedin fighters in Bosnia due to the fact that Bosnian Muslims are white Europeans. The usual image of ‘extreme Islamists’, which in stereotype-trained Western eyes are only Arab-looking, could only have been employed for a small number of foreign fighters. It did not take long until the term ‘white Al-Qaeda’ was introduced to cover the gap between Arab-looking and European Muslims. 3 The truth is that a small number of Bosnian Muslims 'converted' to Wahhabism and therefore this term was needed to address that danger as well. 4 Wahhabists in Bosnia will not allow any kind of emblems to be attached to their interpretations of Islam. They call themselves ‘true believers’ and insist that their way of practicing is the ‘right way’ [20]. Short sleeves, long beards, covered faces of their female members with a hijab, as well as a different way of praying in mosques are features that distinguish them so much from the Bosnian Muslims whose appearance is European. Bosnian Muslims are particularly well known for a culture of co-existence. Not even the war – aimed at carving up Bosnian territory from its eastern neighbours, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as from its western neighbour Croatia – was enough to draw Bosnian Muslims towards the extremist Wahhabi interpretation of their Islam. For sure, the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against Bosnian Muslims have caused a revival of Islam since during 1992-1995 Bosnian Muslims 2 The lobby group that supports the image of Saudi Arabia in the United States in called the NCUSAR/National Council on US-Arab relations. 3 A Google search on 'White Al-Qaeda' yields 2,250,000 results (10.8. 2007). 4 The followers of the Wahhabi religious practice, when exported outside Saudi Arabia, are usually called Salafists. Given that their interpretation does not differ from the original Wahhabi teachings, in this chapter I do not make a distinction between them. In addition, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the term Salafist has not entered public discourse.

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attacked by their neighbours and betrayed by the world community could only hope to see justice being done in heaven. The revival of faith was comforting for many, yet radicalisation came with foreign fighters. In an interview with a former member of the Wahhabi movement, I asked why this radical interpretation of Islam was (and still is) attractive to some Bosnian men and women. ‘I was 12 years old when the war started. My intense interest in religion started in 1994, when I was 14. There was a war and I had a feeling that the life of a Muslim was very cheap. I started my teenage years with the knowledge that Europe sacrificed us because we were Muslims. And I was also growing with the knowledge that death is imminent and so close. The only hope and strength I could find was in Islam. I was especially interested in Sufism. And I read all the religious books I could get hold of. I really liked the Sufi philosophy; it gave me serenity in those turbulent days. Yet, when Arab organisations that propagated the Wahhabi philosophy came to Sarajevo, at the end of 1994, I readily joined a circle of 'true believers'. Sufism lacked a political dimension and activism. That is exactly what I needed in those days. And that is what Wahhabism gave me’ [21]. According to our interviewees the mujahedin came to central Bosnia and were mainly stationed in the town of Zenica in 1993. Sarajevo was under siege and therefore the first mujahedin came to Sarajevo a year later. They came together with free books that were printed with Saudi money in 1994, and their task was not to fight but to 'educate'. The people most vulnerable to this kind of ‘education’ were those not recruited by the Bosnian army, those with no jobs, overwhelmed with anger and frustration, and lots of time on their hands. Being in the circle of 'true believers' required time and devotion. 'We did not call ourselves Wehhabists, nor even Salafists, those are the terms outsiders used for us. Only after I left the circle did I become aware that their interpretation of Islam is rather problematic', our source said [21]. However, even during the war and due to the intense ‘education’ that was financed by Saudi sources, a very small number of Bosnian Muslims accepted Wahhabism. Not even betrayed and embittered Bosnian Muslims were a good basis for the development of religious extremism, not to mention terrorism. For something like that it was necessary to import an extreme and aggressive interpretation of Islam, which came with foreign fighters and ideologists. This ‘importing’ of Wahhabism that took place during the years of aggression (1992-1995) was very costly for the image of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also compromised the cause of the Bosnian Army and fed the myth of equal victimisation. The presence of mujahedin fighters in Bosnia was quite often used by those who promoted the idea that what was going on in Bosnia was a civil war and not an aggression from Serbia and Croatia. Also, the crimes that were committed by the mujahedin were the key reason for the prosecution at the ICTY of high-ranking officers of the Bosnian Army, as well as for the indictment of Rasim Delic, commander-inchief of the Bosnian Army, who was charged with crimes that the mujahedin had committed [22]. The mujahedin came to Bosnia during the war despite the fact that the late Alija Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had made it clear to the Islamic world that Bosnia does not need fighters but arms. According to the testimony of Ivica Misic, a former Bosnian diplomat, in a conversation with Izetbegovic he tried to find out how many mujahedin were in Bosnia. Izetbegovic told him: ‘To tell you the truth, I don’t know. They are telling me that there are 300, telling me there are 500… I really cannot tell you precisely, but I wish we had none’ [4].

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The issue of the mujahedin’s activities during the war, the reasons they came and who sent them is a very wide subject that needs to be explored in future research. The fact that they came with the knowledge of both American and British intelligence through the territory of the Republic of Croatia allows space for different speculations. One of them is that both the mujahedin and Wahhabism were planted for the purpose of giving arguments to aggressors in Bosnia from both the East and the West and to justify the genocide and crimes against humanity that were being committed on Bosnian Muslims [4]. However, the war inheritance of the mujahedin is only mentioned to link the present problem Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing with the spread of Wahhabism. Local and international media, including the Associated Press reported on 22 August 2007 that the Bosnian authority had decided to revoke around 500 citizenships after a special commission had found that naturalisation procedures were ignored involving people from several countries. The latest round of reviews reportedly revealed that procedures were ignored in granting citizenship to people from several countries, including Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia and Russia. The media paid most attention to former mujahedin fighters, namely those who stayed in Bosnia after the war and married local women and obtained citizenship. These former fighters have certainly spread the seeds of radical Wahhabism in Bosnia, yet the question is whether their deportation will actually reduce the problems of radicalisation in Bosnia? This question can only be answered if we look at how successful they had been in spreading the Wahhabi ideology in the years following the war.

6. ‘True Brothers’ – Are They a Potential Danger? Wahhabi Muslims in Bosnia, i.e. ‘true brothers’, today seem to be more aggressive in their public discourse vis-à-vis Bosnian Muslims than towards members of Christian religions in the country. There are so many examples showing that Wahhabists have a precise mission in Bosnia, which is a mission to convert as many Bosnian Muslims as possible to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. In order to do that they preach how Bosnian Muslims and their interpretation of Islam is not the ‘right way’. It is a common practice that those who convert to Wahhabism cut ties with their family members who refuse to follow them, and stop communicating with their friends. Their only world becomes a circle of ‘true brothers’. One former Wahhabi member told me: ‘It is difficult to come back to normal again. Only understanding of family and former friends can help. I think that the Islamic community should do more to organise support groups for those who want to give up Wahhabi teaching. My brain was washed, but not completely. I kept asking questions and was not happy with the answers. That was the reason I left. But there are young people inside the circles who are not happy, but they are not brave enough to step out from it’ [23]. It is difficult to assess how many Wahhabists there are in Bosnia today. Recently, the Prizma agency which specialises in researching public opinion conducted a telephone poll and the results show that 3.3% of adult Muslims in Bosnia declared themselves to be Wahhabi, while 12.5% did not feel like that but supported the idea of Wahhabism [24]. Having in mind that most Wahhabies do not even call themselves by that name, these research results are quite questionable. Therefore, we can conclude that no proper research has been done in this respect. However, judging from their appearance in the public, it is obvious that year after year Wahhabies are becoming ever more influential and that their attempts to convert people from the Bosnian way of

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practicing Islam to Wahhabism do have some results. However, it does not seem that Wahhbism is spreading more in Bosnia than in some other European countries. Yet, Bosnia, as a state with a significant percentage of Muslims receives negative media attention. Wahhabism with similar intensity is gaining more followers in other, majority Christian countries of Europe. It is well known that the Wahhabi movement in Bosnia is being financed from Saudi sources via European banks. According to Bosnian intelligence sources, Austria is one of the countries not fighting hard enough against the ‘dirty money’ used to finance Wahhabi propaganda in Bosnia, nor against Wahhabi groups [25]. Recently, Mustafa Ceric, a mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina, publicly appealed to the Austrian authorities to restrain radical groups which are spreading hatred from Austria towards Islamic religious community in Bosnia. Mustafa Ceric said: ‘Some Bosnians have found asylum in Austria, and now they are abusing that hospitality. They have created a network and centres in Vienna and from there they advocate religious interpretations that are unacceptable to us. Today, these people in Vienna’s mosques keep talking against Bosnia, and tomorrow Austria could also be the target of those attacks. I am warning all of you not to use the excuse that these people are of Bosnian origin. That group was formed in your environment and it is in Austria that they became strong. (…) Following the logic that nothing should be done until those groups do not do anything to you gives strength to those groups’ [26]. Ceric also warned that via the Internet and in Austrian mosques those groups send messages that are full of hatred towards Bosnia. In this public appeal Ceric said that those groups consider Bosnian Muslims as infidels because they refuse to follow their logic. Ceric warned that the Islamic community in Bosnia keeps radical Islamic groups under control, but that parallel religious societies that are not under control exist in Austria. He denied that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are dangerous circles of radical Wahhabis like those that exist in Vienna [26]. Even though Ceric’s appeal might seem sincere, those who follow Ceric’s public discourse will see he is trying to put the blame on others for the spread of Wahhabism in Bosnia. Also an analysis of Ceric’s previous statements will show that he is not a critic of Wahhabism and that he, together with the other Islamic religious officials, has done nothing to prevent this dangerous ideology. This is not to say that Austria and other European countries are not responsible for allowing Saudi Arabia to freely finance the Wahhabi movement. According to Bosnian intelligence sources, Ceric’s words are grounded in that part where he accuses the Austrian authorities. The only problem with his statement is that Ceric is not ready to admit that dangerous Wahhabi groups are present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is most likely true that most of these groups come from abroad, however, the radical ideology of Wahhabism is also gaining followers in Bosnia within education programmes authorised by the official Islamic community in Bosnia. A significant number of young people over the last 12 years since the end of the war has received scholarships to study Islam abroad in universities dominated by the Wahhabi ideology. ‘After they come back, their identity has changed’, says a former member of the Wahhabi circle in Bosnia I interviewed. This is what he says: ‘Now looking at it as an outsider and yet with a significant insider’s perspective, I could say that Wahhabism is very dangerous for Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think that those so-called ‘domestic’ Wahhabis who did not go abroad and did not pick up on that ideology at its source are not that dangerous in terms of a possible terrorist attack. Domestic Bosnian Muslims are not, so to say, ‘talented’ when it comes to radical

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ideologies. Also the environment is inclusive and the majority of Bosnian Muslims understand Islam as it is, a peaceful religion that promotes multicultural co-existence. On the other hand, it is important to note that a number of young Bosnian men go to Saudi Arabia or Jordan to study Islam at universities that are dominated by radical interpretations, mostly Wahhabism. When they come back to Bosnia, they feel they do not fit into society, they do not have jobs, they feel abandoned and embittered. And the danger of terrorism lies in such lonely young men. They form their own circles of ‘brothers’ and feel alienated from the rest of society. They are easy to manipulate’ [27]. Our source says there is no centralised structure of the Wahhabi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each student who comes back home makes their own structure; they have their own circle of young people. ‘On the surface you have groups that are not connected, but they are connected by a common conscience. Their image is recognisable and, whether they form the same circle or not, they feel like brothers. They feel deeply connected with each other’, says our source. One more form of communication that connects them well even without a central structure is the Internet. At certain web sites they meet and chat, exchange information’ [27]. How well connected they are even without a central structure could be seen on television screens during the funeral of a former Wahhabi leader in Bosnia, Jusuf Barcic who died in a car accident in April 2007. The funeral showed that the Wahhabi movement should not be ignored in Bosnia any longer. Around 3,000 angry Wahhabists attended the funeral and showed hostility to journalists. The pictures broadcast on the national television broadcaster were scary not because of their appearance – long beards and hostile expressions – but because of the general anger they showed towards all others outside of their own world. They were not only verbally hostile to the journalists, but also physically attacked them. The voiceover of a video that is accessible on the Internet shows a number of things with regard to the Wahhbi movement in Bosnia [28]. Although our sources, both intelligence as well as former Wahhabi members, claim that there is no centralised structure or organisation of Wahhabists in Bosnia, it is obvious that a 'common consciousness' and 'deep connection' is felt by Wahhabi cells when connected through the Internet and some other means of social networking can easily homogenise and mobilise them. Based on the television coverage of this funeral, it is possible to conclude that they are very hostile to the world of ‘others’ who do not belong to their community. For the time being, that hostility is aimed more at Bosnian Muslims who are unwilling to give up their traditional Bosnian interpretation of Islam. In the video that is accessible on the Internet one can hear a voiceover which keeps repeating aggressive messages to 'infidels', and based on the message it is obvious that 'the voice' is sending a warning to Bosnian Muslims who refuse to accept the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. It is obvious from the video that Wahhabists came to the funeral in an organised manner, from all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina – as well as from several European countries – this shows that they are very well connected and that the informal means of communication among the different Wahhabi cells in Europe works very well. The proper question is whether those Wahhabi converts are potentially dangerous and could they be easily manipulated to carry out any terrorist acts. It would definitely be an exaggeration to say that every Wahhabist in Bosnia is a potential terrorist threat, but it is common knowledge that every extreme nationalist or religious interpretation is dangerous especially in multinational and multireligious societies. The aggression and genocide that was committed by the Serbian state and commanded by Slobodan Milosevic (who was helped by those who dreamed of a Greater Serbia) who for those

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purposes awoke in the Serbian people an extreme interpretation of Orthodox Christianity and, in its name, committed genocide of Bosnian Muslims provides a warning of how extremism can be manipulated for political purposes. Similarly, Wahhabists can be manipulated to carry out terrorist acts. The first court case in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of terrorism charges illustrates this point well. All members of the terrorist group were members of the Wahhabi sect.

7. The first judgment on terrorism In spite of the complicated political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the Prosecutor at the newly created State Court (Sud BiH) has managed to prosecute the first case of terrorism. The first-instance judgment was pronounced on 10 January 2007, and the final judgment came on 21 May 2007. The judgment in the case ‘Bektasevic and others’ is very significant since it is the first case to be successfully prosecuted regarding terrorism charges in the whole region. The judgment was in many ways a result of international co-operation, starting from the very first operational information that the Federation’s interior ministry received from the police in Denmark. Apparently, Bektasevic, a Swedish citizen, was in contact with a militant imam from Denmark named Abdul Basid. The court sentenced Bektasevic to prison for eight years and four months, while Abdulkadir Cesur, a Turkish citizen, was sentenced to six years and six months. The Bosnian citizen Bajro Ikanovic, who was also proven guilty on charges of terrorism, was given a four-year sentence. The fourth person indicted, Senad Hasanovic, had cooperated with the prosecution and was charged with the illegal possession of arms and sentenced to six months. This group was arrested as a result of a surveillance operation where the first lead, as mentioned earlier, came from the police in Denmark. During a police raid, the following incriminating evidence was found: a suicide vest, a significant amount of explosive, pistols with silencers, as well as incriminating video tape which contained instructions for bomb making and the following video message: ‘Allahu Ekber. The brothers are preparing for an attack here. They are showing us things which they are going to use for the attack. These brothers are ready to attack and Inshallah they will attack al-Qufar who are killing our brothers and Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and many other countries. This weapon is going to be used against Europe, against those whose forces are in Iraq and Afghanistan. These two brothers sold their lives to please Allah, to help their brothers and sisters. They are Muslims. Their time is coming. They are ready to attack; therefore do not think that we have forgotten about you. We are here, we are planning and we have everything ready’ [29]. Ahmet Halebic, a state prosecutor who led this case is more than satisfied with the international co-operation [30]. Thanks to the first information they received from Denmark, the surveillance of the suspects was short and very successful. Prosecutor Halebic is unsure if this case would have ended up in a judgment with a sentence had there not been help from the police agencies and forensic experts from the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Denmark. The prosecution also prepared around 30 expert reports for this trial. Crucial evidence was the video tape on whose basis the prosecution proved a terrorist intent, and expertise here was offered by the FBI’s forensic experts. Important expertise came from Scotland Yard, and that was a phonetic expertise which had the

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aim of proving that the voice from the tape belonged to the first accused in this case, Mirsad Bektasevic. During the interview, prosecutor Halebic emphasised the importance of international expertise: ‘The international co-operation was a distinguishing feature of this case. The FBI, Scotland Yard and other agencies gave us their expertise for free, and also the exchange of information went smoothly and without any complications’ [30]. According to our interviews, this terrorist group could not be connected to AlQaeda or any other terrorist group. Apart from a connection with the radical imam from Denmark, the investigation did not give any conclusive evidence that this group was connected to a wider international terrorist organisation. Another source in the SIPA agency spoke on the condition of confidentiality and explained why there were no problems with the exchange of information: ‘The first information came from Danish police to the federal ministry of the interior. After that, the state prosecutor took over the investigation and there was no problem with overlapping with other agencies that also investigate terrorism in Bosnia’ [31]. Other intelligence sources interviewed for this paper emphasised that the complicated police structure is a key issue that poses an obstacle to the investigation of terrorism in Bosnia. At the level of the Council of Ministers there is a task force group for the fight against terrorism, however our sources indicated that nobody is very happy to share information about an investigation of terrorism. One key problem is that there is no united police structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that nobody has an obligation to share information with others. The integration of the Bosnian police, our sources emphasised, is the first step which would help in the future successful fight against terrorism. This case also proves that ‘loners’ and Wahhabi converts can be dangerously manipulated to carry out terrorist acts. The terrorist act that was planned by this group was not committed, yet this case shows how little it takes for young people to commit terrorist acts – an extreme ideology, a sense of belonging to a ‘terrorist cell’, and manipulation by radical mentor.

8. The silence of intellectuals So far, Bosnian academic circles have vastly ignored the fact that Wahhabism is a threat not only to the Bosnian Islamic tradition but also a potential threat to a stable security situation. Only professors from the Faculty of Islamic Sciences have warned that Wahhabism could in the long term be a potential security threat to Bosnia. There are a few reasons for this silence of intellectuals. First of all, the threat of terrorism was attached to Bosnian Muslims throughout the war which was a completely unjust and unfounded accusation, heavily used to cover up the genocide committed by Serb forces, as well as the crimes against humanity committed by Croat forces. Second, Bosnian Muslims are traditionally tolerant and respect other religions. That is partly due to the Ottoman tradition of millets which gave space to all monotheistic religions to co-exist in Bosnia. Therefore, the arrival of Wahhabism was tolerated even though it was alien to them. Also, during the first years after the war it was rare and did not pose a threat to their practice and tradition of Islam.

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The third reason Bosnian academia have not engaged in an analysis of Wahhabism is because most intellectuals are worried that they would be entering a sphere of analysis where the border between the freedom of religious expression and guaranteed human rights is not precisely defined, and when the abuse of religious freedom becomes a threat to security. There is also a fourth reason why most intellectuals are reluctant to discuss this issue, and this can be found in the well known notion of intellectual conformity which refuses to engage in discussions that are loaded with the controversy of an unknown and insufficiently investigated field. The fifth reason Bosnian intellectuals refuse to treat Wahhabism as a security issue is certainly connected to the anger that many feel towards the West and its treatment of Muslims around the world. This negative stereotype of Islam in the West is something that the majority of Muslims in Bosnia do recognise. The behaviour of American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq, the torture of prisoners in Guantanamo and horrible scenes from Abu Ghraib have created a negative image of the West in Bosnia and strengthened the argument that Muslims are the key victims of imperialist American policies in the Islamic world. This argument was further supported by the case of an Algerian group, namely naturalised Bosnian citizens who were first indicted and then cleared by the Bosnian court of terrorism charges. According to the judgement of the Bosnian High Court they were cleared of all charges and their release was ordered for 17 January 2002. Despite this, they were handed over to the Americans by the Bosnian police and ended up in the Guantanamo prison. And this brings us to the paradoxical situation where by strongly fighting against a stereotyped negative image and the mistreatment of Muslims in the West Bosnian intellectuals cannot see negative reflections of Wahhabism for the future of Bosnia and for the image of Bosnian Muslims. Security checks and the mistreatment of Muslims who ‘look like Muslims’ in airports and cities around the Western world have given the impression that the security agencies treat every Muslim as a possible terrorist. By unconditionally condemning this unjustified mistreatment of Muslims around the world, Bosniak intellectuals have refused to acknowledge that the spread of the Wahhabi ideology throughout Bosnia poses a security threat to Bosnia.

9. Terrorism and genocide It is also important to note that Bosniak intellectuals as well as the general population reject any thought of possible terrorist danger for Bosnia due to the fact that the genocide process is still ongoing in this country. According to Gregory Stanton, a genocide process has eight stages and its final phase is denial [32]. This is certainly the phase in which Bosnia is now. Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept responsibility for genocide and, as a result, genocide survivors are often subject to mistreatment. In the shadow of the daily opening of mass graves containing bodies of genocide victims, Bosnian Serb politicians often try to distract public discussion by talking about the threat of Islamic terrorism. An illustrative example concerns former police minister Dragomir Andan who worked closely with General Ratko Mladic, who has been indicted for genocide in Bosnia. During a discussion about the police reform in Bosnia, former minister Andan, with the intent to divert the discussion away from integration processes of the police

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structures in Bosnia, held a press conference and warned that the Al-Qaeda network has cells in Bosnia [33]. At the same time, injustices done by the institutions of Republika Srpska and its police are quite inconceivable. The latest example of a genocide survivor Fata Orlovic will illustrate this point. After the war ended, Fata Orlovic returned to her house in Konjevic Polje and found an illegally built church in her courtyard. Fata Orlovic unsuccessfully fought to remove this church from her courtyard and suffered greatly from the provocations of the Orthodox priest and a few extremist Serbs who would occasionally come to mass in Fata’s courtyard. After one of the angry exchanges that Fata Orlovic had with the Orthodox priest who held a service with the intention of provoking her, charges were brought against her on the basis that she ‘spread religious hatred and intolerance’. On 16 April 2007 a first-instance court declared that Fata Orlovic was not guilty [34]. These kinds of injustices that are perpetrated by the Orthodox church – which participated in the mobilisation of Serbs for genocide [35] and nowadays participates in the eighth stage of genocide, which is denial – creates a feeling among the Bosnian Muslim population that justice cannot be achieved via legal institutions. Not to mention the feeling of repressed anger that most Bosniaks have due to the fact that the international community rewarded the Bosnian Serbs for genocide with half of the Bosnian territory and allowed them to keep almost all of their war conquests. Cases like Fata Orlovic and the extreme national rhetoric of Bosnian Serb leaders like Milorad Dodik, the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, are the best way to turn more and more Bosnian Muslims towards extreme interpretations of Islam, whose only available form in Bosnia at present is Wahhabism. Therefore, the Bosnian Serbs’ denial of genocide and the extreme nationalistic rhetoric of some of their leaders show that a successful programme of terrorist prevention cannot be implemented without a programme of preventing genocide. Genocide studies have shown that, as long as there is a denial of genocide, there is also a threat that genocide could happen again. The radicalisation of Bosnian Muslims therefore stems from a feeling of fear and injustice. How the international community is often insensitive to the position of victims is revealed by the reaction of Christian Swartz Shilling, former High Representative to Bosnia, to the judgement of the International Court of Justice in the case Bosnia and Herzegovina versus Serbia for charges of genocide. Victims were dissatisfied with this verdict and, in answer to them, Shilling sounded more like someone whose job is to recruit terrorists. He said the kind of justice the victims want can only be achieved in the ‘other world’ [36].

Conclusion There is no doubt that on the ideological level the 'war against international terrorism' demands more sensitive policies, complex programmes and also a honest approach by decision-makers, the media and civil society. When we talk about specific approaches in individual countries the general socio-political context in which extremist elements find space to develop has to be taken into account. In relation to Bosnia, it is important to turn the eighth stage of genocide – denial – into its final phase – the recognition of genocide. Providing more justice for the victims of genocide will prevent their inclination to aggressive religious expression. In

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addition, investigating the attacks on returnees and punishing those responsible in Republika Srpska would contribute to a balance of justice. The international community should play a more proactive role in this process and press the Republika Srpska officials to acknowledge the genocide that Serbian forces committed in Bosnia. Therefore, a follow up to the judgement of the International Court of Justice which confirmed genocide in Bosnia is of the utmost importance. As far as the international community is concerned, it is also important to publicly acknowledge that Wahhabism is being exported from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has generously donated money to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, that money is conditioned so that the mosques being built in Bosnia have to architecturally resemble mosques in Saudi Arabia; this includes setting up libraries that mainly hold literature that spreads Wahhabi propaganda; as well as educational camps in which Bosnian Muslims are being converted from the Bosnian version of Islam into Wahhabism. In comparison to Saudi Arabia it is interesting to note that, even though Iran was generous with donations after the war in Bosnia, its financial help was not conditioned on similar Shia conversions of Bosnian Muslims. Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia, is not an ally of the United States. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that on the high political level it is possible to influence the Saudi government to take action to stop the export of Wahhabism. When asked why some Bosniaks have accepted this aggressive religious ideology, one of the intelligence sources I spoke to responded: ‘They get paid for it. The key to the prevention of Wehhabism is to cut off its financing’. To promote more tolerant communication representatives of the Islamic community should get involved in the additional education of Muslim believers and open up a dialogue with the Wehhabi community. According to available information, most Bosnian Muslims who have accepted Wehhabism come from a poor socioeconomic background. They are frequently former drug addicts or young people with a history of criminal behaviour. Since Bosnia does not have the capacity to prevent and fight drug addiction it is no surprise that these vulnerable people seek support in alternative networks, some of which are Wahhabi. One of our intelligence sources spoke to the father of a former drug addict who told him: ‘Previous treatments did not help him. Since he became a Wahhabi, he is not on drugs any longer. Honestly, I prefer him being a religious extremist than a drug addict’. In conclusion I would like to emphasise that the idea of this paper was not to advocate the infringement of religious freedoms, nor to say that every Wahhabi Muslim in Bosnia or anywhere else in the world is a potential terrorist. Still we need to bear in mind that every extreme form of religious or national expression can easily be manipulated, especially among a less educated population and especially in a country with fragile national inter-relations. I have already mentioned this, but I need to reiterate that the case of extreme Serbian nationalism, which was fuelled by the Orthodox Church during the aggression in 1992-1995 and led to the genocide of Bosniaks, should be a warning for all as to how far manipulation with extremism can go. We should therefore learn from the past, leave stereotypes about each other behind and try to build an environment that is more tolerant. Right now the best policy for preventing terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to develop a more tolerant society.

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References [1] [2]

Philip J. Cohen, Srpski tajni rat:propaganda i obmana historije, Ljiljan, Sarajevo, 1996. Patric Moore, A video shocks Serbia (RFE/RL), 9.6.2005. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/6/2DF1E167-F27F-46F3-A2B1-0548E86FCE88.html., 4.8.2007. [3] President Declares "Freedom at War with Fear", 20.9.2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/#, 20.7.2007. [4] Vlado Azinovic, Al-Kaida u Bosni I Hercegovini: Mit ili stvarna opasnost?, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Sarajevo, Prag, 2007. [5] Julie and Potter Lloyd, Relational Psychology in the War Speeches of Bush and Blair: Beyond 'Us' and 'Them', in Roberts, Ron (ed.) Just War, Psychology and Terrorism, PCCS Books, Ross-on-Wye, 2007. [6] Ron Roberts, British Psychology's Response in Roberts, Ron (ed.) Just War, Psychology and Terrorism, PCCS Books, Ross-on-Wye, 2007. [7] David Harper, The Complicity of Psychology, in Roberts, Ron (ed.) Just War, Psychology and Terrorism, PCCS Books, Ross-on-Wye, 2007. [8] Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, Verso, 2001. [9] Edina Becirevic, Medijski imagei I visoka politika, Odjek, revija za umjetnost, nauku I drustvena pitanja. Sarajevo, Proljece 2003. http://www.odjek.ba/index.php?broj=02&id=00.,25.7.2007. [10] Edward Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The political economy of the mass media, Vintage, London, 1994. [11] Dnevni Avaz, 9.8.2007, 22. [12] John L. Esposito & John O. Voll, ‘Islam and Democracy’, www.neh.gov/news/humanities/200111/islam.html, 1.8.2007. [13] CIA – The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/my. html, 1.8.2007. [14] Michael T. Klare, The Geopolitics of War, The Nation, 5.11.2001. http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011105/klare, 1.8.2007. [15] Ken Silvestein, Saudis and Americans: friends in need, The Nation, 3.12. 2001. http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011203/silverstein, 1.8.2007. [16] Helene Cooper, US Officials Voice Frustrations With Saudis, Citing Role in Iraq, New York Times, 26.7.2007. http://www.nytimes.com, 1.8.2007. [17] NCUSAR/National Council on US-Arab relations, http://www.ncusar.org/, 10.8.2007. [18] Paul W. Roberts, How the Saudis Betrayed Islam, globebooks.com, 25.1.2003. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/832503/posts, 4.8.2007. [19] Michael Dobbs, Saudis Funded Weapons for Bosnia, Washington Post, 2.2.1996. [20] Interviews with three members of Wahhabi Muslims in Bosnia. Information as at August 2006. [21] Interview with S.S., a former follower of Wahhabism, conducted in Sarajevo on 28.7.2007. [22] Rasim Delic, Indictment, http://www.un.org/icty/bhs/frames/cases.htm, 27.7.2007. [23] Interview with A.C. conducted in Sarajevo on 28.7.2007. [24] http://www.novinar.de/2007/03/20/, 14.4.2007. [25] Interview with an intelligence source conducted in May 2007. [26] Dnevni Avaz, 20.7.2007, 10. [27] Interview with A.C., Sarajevo, 28.7.2007. [28] Video of Jusuf Barcic’s funeral http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5028546878112041268&hl= en 5.8.2007. [29] Judgement of Bektasevic and others. Archive of the BiH Court. Sud Bosne I Hercegovine, broj:X-K06/190, Sarajevo, 10.1.2007. [30] Interview with Ahmed Halebic in Sarajevo, 11.4.2007. [31] Interview with a source from SIPA, Sarajevo, 12.4.2007. [32] Gregory Stanton, ‘Eight stages of genocide’, available on the web page of Human Rights Watch: http://www.genocidewatch.org/eightstages.htm, 29.3.2007. [33] http://www.nezavisne.com/dnevne/stav/st05122005-01.php, 16.4.2007. [34] BHT1 radio news, 16.4.2007. [35] Michael A. Sells, Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, University of California Press, Berkley; Los Angeles, London, 1998. [36] Christian Shilling Swartz, Statement on the TV program dedicated to genocide. FTV in Sarajevo on 9.7.2007.

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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The Serbian Approach to the Struggle against Terrorism Zoran DRAGIŠIĆ Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade

Abstract. Every state’s attitude to fighting terrorism, including that of Serbia, can be viewed on several levels. The first level relates to the actual terrorist threat a state is endangered by, the second level refers to a state’s capacity to oppose terrorism while the third level is the public perception of a terrorist threat along with state organs’ strategic determinations in relation to fighting terrorism. Keywords: security system; counterterrorism; national security.

Introduction: Serbian Threat from Terrorism When talking about the Serbian threat from terrorism, we should bear in mind that in both professional and public circles there is no integral opinion on how high the level of this endangerment is, who are its main carriers, and who are the key actors that the level of this endangerment depends on. To a lesser extent, the main reasons for this discrepancy stem from differences in the theoretical approach to these important issues. These differences primarily reflect the various ways of addressing the problem of defining terrorism and understanding the basic features of this phenomenon. However, the reason for the main disagreement is the political diversity that exists among those who make these assessments. The actual threat to Serbia from terrorism has three sources. The first is the problem of Kosovo; the second relates to the presence of the international terrorist network Al-Qaeda in the region and directly reflects on the security of Serbia; while the third source of terrorist threat is organised criminal groups. The problem of Kosovo is an old security problem and every state whose borders this territory was ever within has had to face it. The strong political antagonism created by Kosovo Albanians’ wish to form their own state in the territory of Kosovo has led to lesser or bigger security problems, with their seriousness depending on the international political situation, and the policy of Belgrade and Pristine regarding this issue. Violence has traditionally been the solution to political problems in Kosovo. Therefore, we have every reason to believe that such a state of affairs will not to change significantly in the future. The process of finding a solution to the permanent status of Kosovo is coming into its final stage, which poses a new security threat since different groups within and outside Kosovo have different and strongly opposed views on this status. The Serbian side wants to keep Kosovo inside Serbian borders, whilst the Albanian side wants to establish a new state. The negotiating process has failed to bring the positions of two parties any closer together. Therefore, it seems that one of the negotiating parties will view at the solution in sight as a defeat. At the same time,

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we cannot be certain that all actors on the other side will construe this solution as a victory. Postponing the final solution to the problem of Kosovo has, in return, produced a large number of dissatisfied Albanians who have displayed their dissatisfaction in recent demonstrations during which, regrettably, a number of people lost their lives while the leader of the Self-Determination movement, Albin Kurti, was arrested. Keeping in mind that there are many members of extreme religious groups in Kosovo and certainly that they will not be satisfied with any solution that is on the table, it is perfectly clear that Kosovo holds a huge crisis potential at this moment. If Kosovo were recognised as an independent state and given the status of a ‘supervised independency’ that would create an enormous problem in Serbia and surely lead to the radicalisation of Serbian society. The possibility of organisations emerging that would resort to violence to keep Kosovo within Serbian borders should not be ignored. Such a solution would also create large-scale dissatisfaction among Albanians since the goals that underpinned the armed insurgency against Serbia in 1997 would not have been fulfilled. In fact, the proposed solution would preserve the existing state and that would make the Albanians feel cheated. The great dissatisfaction with the existing situation in the field, the poor economic and social state, the actions of religious and other extremist groups, the existence of infrastructure for the taking of terrorist actions, and the absence of efficient legal institutions all create an ideal environment for terrorist groups’ actions. If we consider the aspiration that the three Communities in the South of Serbia populated with an Albanian majority be united with Kosovo and the possibility that the potential conflict in Kosovo would expand to the territory of the three Communities, it is quite clear that maintaining security and suppressing terrorism in this area is a very complex job. Including the Albanians who live in this territory in Serbian political life and the fact that they have a representative in the Serbian National Assembly offers good foundations for the peaceful resolution of all open political issues and a good crisisprevention mechanism. The other source of terrorist danger is the Balkans, with Serbia as its constitutional part, is exposed to the presence of Al-Qaeda cells in the region. During the war in former Yugoslavia, a large number of fighters from Islamic countries came to Bosnia and Herzegovina where they organised training camps and participated in combat activities. Along with that, pretending to be members of various humanitarian and religious organisations the international terrorist network organised logistics in order to equip, train and recruit new terrorists1. After the war was over, in 1995 a large number of these fighters remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have been granted Bosnian citizenship and some changed their names, married Bosnian citizens and seemingly lead a peaceful life2. The exceptionally good organisation and global character of this network make it especially dangerous, as well as the role assigned to the Balkan region

1

The terrorist network set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina for logistical support, bringing in Mujahedin from Islamic countries and recruiting and training terrorists from the local Muslim population is known by the name ‘Afghan-Bosnian network’. For more about this network, see Colman, Evan F., AL-QAIDA’S CELLS IN EUROPE, The Afghan-Bosnian Network, D&FA, Washington, 2006. 2 Currently, 367 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted Bosnian citizenship during the war and it is wanted that they leave the country. However, it should be noted that many of them have families that they started after or during the war, and that not all of them are potential terrorists. Such a state of affairs is causing the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina serious problems.

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in Al-Qaeda’s strategy3. The terrorist network considers the entire Balkans as one territory and performs its activities in each particular state. Therefore, Serbia cannot regard the existence of terrorist camps in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Macedonia as a threat only to these neighbouring countries, nor can any state in the region regard the existence of terrorist organisations in Serbia as an exclusively Serbian problem. The international terrorist network conceals its actions with different humanitarian, religious, educational and sports activities. Thus, it is very difficult to detect and prove the true intentions and objectives of these organisations, which are usually connected to serious political problems. The struggle against such organisations which are active in the territory of EU member states, and the USA, is a very big problem even for the security and judicial systems of those countries that are, undoubtedly, much more developed and stronger than the respective systems in the Balkan states. The international terrorist network very skilfully exploits the local security problems that burden the Balkans to realise its own, global objectives. There should be no doubt that Islamists have an influence in Kosovo and that this influence will grow relative to the level of complexity of the political situation. These Islamists have ‘a set of problems’ that they are ready to offer for any kind of solution that could secure sustainable peace and development in the Balkans. The recent discovery of a training camp and a larger number of weapons in Sandzak and the arrest of a group of young men, members of the Wahhabi religious movement, points to the gravity of the situation and the need to address this problem with due attention. The attempts to spread and strengthen religious radicalism in Kosovo, particularly among young Albanians, are actually an attempt of the international terrorist network to create an ideological and social environment favourable to their activities. There is no doubt whatsoever that the current political situation in Kosovo facilitates the actions of this movement and that the Kosovo community will have serious problems regarding these activities in the future. Members of the existing political leadership in Kosovo emphasise their European orientation and desire that Kosovo become part of the EU, and NATO if it is granted independence. The standards this community needs to achieve along this road are the values that the present authorities in Kosovo argue for and, hopefully, the majority of the Kosovo population. On the other hand, these values are in direct opposition to those advocated by the Islamists who influence part of the population and try to spread it further. Even if they gain full independence, the Kosovo community may have to face a serious conflict between religious radicals and proEuropean political forces which will certainly lead to terrorism in Kosovo, but also in the wider region of the Balkans. If this dark scenario comes true, the problem of terrorism in Kosovo will not be only a problem of the people living in Kosovo and Serbia but will inevitably involve all states of the region. The third source of terrorism threatening Serbia is organised criminal groups. In a world of classical theories about terrorism, the activities of organised criminal groups cannot be considered terrorist activities because they lack political motivation, which is a necessary element of the subject-matter of a terrorist criminal offence. However, modern organised crime in the Balkans may be looked at as a specific political project. 3 With reference to the opposing opinions on the authenticity of this document, in the Strategy 2020 which is considered to be Al-Qaeda’s action strategy up to the year 2020 the Balkans is treated as a basis and a springboard for terrorist activities in EU member states and the USA.

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By definition, organised criminal groups are inclined to gain political power in order to protect their business and the illegal profit they make when doing such business. The organised criminal groups that appeared as recidivism, after the breakdown of the socialist system, were formed ‘from above’. In other words, the authority structures entered the illegal business very quickly to maintain their economic and financial power even after the democratic changes had occurred. The genesis of organised crime in post-communist regimes differs substantially from the genesis of mafia which have developed ‘from below’ and, parallel to their increasing financial power, criminal groups try to sustain and become stronger by making political ties, but they never really enter political waters. They only use politics as an instrument to protect their illegal business. Post-communist organised criminal groups stem from the political establishment, which is deeply involved in politics, and they use criminal activities not just to get rich but to preserve their political influence. The international sanctions imposed on Serbia have largely underpinned all forms of organised crime. During the period of sanctions, the political establishment of the time organised different kinds of ‘mafia’ that made enormous fortunes from smuggling petrol, cigarettes and other contraband goods that were controlled by the most prominent political actors. Along with that, paramilitary units were formed and used for the dirtiest jobs in war zones and for carrying out political murders and repressing any opposition within Serbian borders. Criminal groups of this kind use violence as the method of their, essentially parapolitical struggle but they also try to ‘buy’ the state with the money they have, i.e. to fake democracy by way of corruption. The dirty money that penetrates political parties, the media, NGOs, education, religious organisations, sport, culture, and other fields seriously contaminates public life. The possibility that organised criminal groups take control of the political life of the state by way of corruption by ‘buying’ or organising the most important political parties, the media and NGOs appears as a possible beginning of a new totalitarianism, which we might call ‘ohlocracy’4. The international terrorist network is very interested in the existence of feeble states that may be used as a basis for its activities and an area where new terrorists can be recruited so that organised crime may be considered a specific strategy for weakening states. This clearly points to the fact that we may justifiably regard it as a terrorist activity. When talking about organised criminal group terrorist activities, we should have in mind that the assassination of President Zoran Djindjic, which is the most serious terrorist act in Serbia, was undertaken by an organised criminal group. The members of this group had committed a series of political murders prior to this one, to the benefit of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. Organised crime can be looked upon as both a specific political strategy and the way in which terrorist organisations come into the possession of necessary financial and other means to facilitate their activities. In addition, terrorist groups thereby systematically weaken the state. All of this shows we must pay great attention to this problem and that the struggle against organised crime must be treated as a struggle against terrorism. Moreover, in order to fight terrorism intensive international collaboration is needed, while the implementation of all necessary security measures will sustain the state and its basic values.

4

Ohlocracy – the rule of the scum of the Earth.

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1. Capacity of the Republic of Serbia to fight terrorism When talking about the capacity of a state to fight terrorism we must take into consideration its ability to prevent terrorism and, if a terrorist act does occur, to successfully respond to it. Preventive capacity primarily refers to the general political and economic stability of a state, as well as the existence of legal, political and institutional capacity to prevent a crisis. Further, it refers to a state’s international position, i.e. its access to international instruments for resolving crises which may contribute to solving political conflicts that lead to terrorism, as well as its access to international intelligence resources which may timely indicate the preparation of a terrorist act. A state’s capacity to respond to a terrorist act is evaluated on the basis of the adequacy of its legal system and the level to which its institutions are capable of responding to every stage of a terrorist act. A very important aspect of a community’s resistance to terrorism is the determination of its citizens not to relinquish their basic social values despite the terrorist threat. This is confirmed by the ineffectiveness of terrorist acts by which, in this case, political objectives can no longer be achieved via pressure on public opinion. When talking about the preventive capacity of the Republic of Serbia, we must keep in mind that it is a new state which only recently stepped out of the union with Montenegro. In addition, Serbia obtained its Constitution in October 2006, the laws are still not in harmony, there are serious political difficulties in constituting new state organs and so far only parliamentary elections have been held, that Serbia is in a deep political crisis with respect to Kosovo and Metohia, the country’s obligations to the Hague Tribunal have not yet been fulfilled which results in a hold-up of negotiations regarding accession to the EU. This is further compounded by the fact that we have a very difficult time getting rid of the legacy of the former regime, that Serbia was accepted into the Partnership for Peace only a few months ago but the Act of Presentation has not yet been prepared due to difficulties in forming a new government and other problems that presently diminish the state’s capacity to prevent crises, to stop the creation and development of terrorist organisations and thwart the activities of the existing ones by taking political action. On the other hand, Serbia is very firm in its intention to access the Euro-Atlantic integrations. The last elections showed that the majority of citizens support this policy which gives the state administration full legitimacy to keep moving towards the fastest possible accession to NATO and the EU, with them being important mechanisms for further development of the state’s capacity to prevent crises. The Serbian crime legislation defines a criminal act of terrorism and funding terrorism in an adequate way. Along with that, the laws provide for operative and other measures required to bring to justice the perpetrators of such complex criminal acts, and proving the existence of such a criminal act in a court of law. There is a special law in Serbia stipulating the struggle against organised crime, and a special section of the County Court in Belgrade which is in charge of processing criminal acts from the domain of organised crime because without doubt the criminal act of terrorism falls within this domain. After the democratic changes in 2000, great attention was paid to the education of judges and public attorneys and their training to process the most serious offences. Thus, we can say that the Serbian judiciary is capable of processing the cases of criminal offence of terrorism and organised crime. However, the progress of trials involving some of the most serious criminal offences of this kind is very slow,

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the sentences passed are considered inappropriate by a large share of the public and the courts still operate under a lot of pressure. All of this is a consequence of the democratic deficit in the Serbian community. An additional weakness is the system of penology, i.e. inadequate investigative prisons, in which the measure of placing suspects for the most serious offences in custody is taken, as well as poor correctional institutions in which convicted offenders are to serve their sentences. The poor prison system in Serbia is a consequence of the bad financial situation so it is necessary to invest in building an adequate correctional facility in which such convicts serve their time. Further, measures for putting people into custody should be taken because this is a prerequisite of a successful struggle against terrorism and organised crime. A terrorist act takes place in three stages: the stage of preparation; the stage of perpetration; and the stage after the perpetration. Different state organs are in charge of responding to each of these stages so, according to the assessed capability of these state organs to carry out the required activities successfully, we can evaluate the state’s capacity to respond to a terrorist act. Preparations for a terrorist act are carried out in the utmost secrecy, often for a very long time and with very few people knowing about them. Such preparations involve a string of different activities, from the gathering of funds, selection of participants, their recruiting and training, logistical preparations, intelligence and security preparation, preparation for psychological and propaganda activities subsequent to the performed act, and other activities specific to the particular terrorist act. The organs most responsible in any state for discovering these activities are security and intelligence services and, depending on the mode of the national security system’s organisation, certain police structures. The Republic of Serbia has a very complicated intelligence and security system that presently consists of five services whose work is regulated by two laws. This organisation is the result of a set of political circumstances. After the dissolution of the State Community with Montenegro, four services remained in Serbia (two intelligence and two security) that had functioned at the level of the common state under a law enacted in 2002 when FR Yugoslavia still existed. The Serbian Government Security Information Agency exists at the level of the Republic Serbia and functions as a security-intelligence service in compliance with the law enacted in 2003. In order to function in an adequate way, the Serbian intelligencesecurity system should be rationalised and structured in line with Serbian needs. An intelligence-security community should be established in which all services will function in co-ordination with each other and be capable of co-ordinating the work of each of them with other state organs in Serbia, as well as with foreign services of that kind. The nature of modern terrorism and organised crime calls for very close collaboration between different states. Otherwise, the struggle against terrorism will end in failure. Serbia will considerably enlarge its intelligence and security capacity after enactment of the law under which a new system will be established. Until then, we must rely on the capacity that each individual service has and on the international collaboration that is going on within the existing framework. The second stage of a terrorist act refers to the actual committing of an act that may be either a so-called ‘blind act’ or a ‘prolonged terrorist act’. A ‘blind act’ is characteristic of Al-Qaeda and is carried out by setting explosive charges in public places to produce as many human casualties as possible for the purpose of intimidating the public and sending a message to authorities of the state in

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which the terrorist act has been performed, as well as the governments of other countries that share the same values or have a similar foreign political orientation. The stage of committing an act of this kind lasts for a very short time. As a rule, if the intelligence and security services do not find out that preparations for such a terrorist act are under way there is not much that can be done at the stage when it is actually committed. Generally speaking, a ‘prolonged terrorist act’ can be committed in one of two ways: either by taking hostages or by using weapons of mass destruction. Taking hostages is an old terrorist method of extorting some concessions. Special counterterrorist units are in charge of resolving hostage situations and of neutralising terrorist groups once they have been detected by intelligence and security services. Serbia has a special counter-terrorist unit acting within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The gendarmerie also has a special unit specialised in resolving hostage situations. The Serbian Armed Forces also has a special counter-terrorist unit specialised in performing such tasks. The special units of the Serbian Armed Forces, the Police and the Gendarmerie are trained, capable of, and equipped for performing tasks within the framework of anti-terrorist efforts. However, in our opinion it is also necessary to rationalise these forces. This can only be done after a set of new laws has been passed in compliance with which the Serbian system of national security will be established. Along with the special units, the Police and the Service for Acting in a State of Emergency also play a very important role in resolving prolonged terrorist acts, and so does the media. If a terrorist act were committed with weapons of mass destruction, the Service for Acting in a State of Emergency, the Police and the Health Service would play the main roles to eliminate the effects of such an act. The actual role of each of these services would differ depending on the kind of weapon used – nuclear, chemical or biological. The stage of eliminating the effects of a terrorist act is very important because this is the stage where ‘the final score is decided on’, in other words, when the success the terrorist organisation has had is determined. The records show that in the case of a terrorist act of this kind the largest number of casualties is due to secondary effects, that is to say due to untimely first aid, fires that are not extinguished on time, and other reasons that may be attributed to the poor organisation of services that act in a state of emergency. A special problem at this stage is the psychological effects of a terrorist act because they are the basic means terrorists use in order to achieve their political objectives. If the services that act in a state of emergency do a good job, the government addresses the public in due time and with proper information, the media provides an objective account of what happened giving the terrorists as little space as possible, the psychological effects of the terrorist act will substantially diminish. The government must be aware that terrorist acts are possible and share that awareness with the citizens. It is important to inform the public about the terrorists’ true objectives in order to lift the threshold of their resistance to terrorist acts, in other words, their readiness to maintain basic social values, the terrorist threat notwithstanding. In this case, even the most ruthless terrorist act will be unsuccessful. Serbia has a very big problem with how things are organised for acting in a state of emergency, i.e. the civil protection service. The Civil Protection Service currently exists within the Ministry of Defence, with no suitable resources to render it capable of solving large security problems. Discussions on how to restructure this service are under way. According to some people, it should be transferred to the MIA, others think it should continue to exist within the MOD, while others believe it would be best to

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form a special government agency for a state of emergency. In our opinion, this third option is the best solution to the problem. Serbia has resources to make available to this new agency, from a well-developed health care system through scientific institutes in the fields of the natural sciences, meteorology, waterpower engineering and waterworks to a well-developed civil construction sector. If this issue is properly dealt with within the new set of laws regulating national security, we believe that Serbia could acquire a suitable system of acting in a state of emergency within a short time. At this point, such a system is missing. We think the existing one is the weakest link in the chain of anti-terrorist efforts in Serbia.

2. Serbian strategic orientation in the struggle against terrorism By mid-2007 the Republic Serbia had not adopted a single strategic or doctrinal document in the field of national security. The former states of Serbia and Montenegro as well as FR Yugoslavia had only adopted a Defence Strategy, a document that largely relied on the Strategy of National Security which was never adopted because there were no constitutional and institutional bases for that. The Defence Strategy is a document inherited from the state community with Montenegro but, until Serbia’s own strategic documents are adopted, it is being implemented as the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia. This Strategy refers to terrorism as one of the biggest threats to Serbian security and opens the way to developing an adequate anti-terrorist system of the Republic of Serbia. In its response to terrorism and organised crime Serbia opts for a co-operative concept. Terrorism and organised crime are recognised in Serbia as a global problem whose solution cannot be found without intensive international collaboration, which must be primarily established in the region of South-east Europe. To this end, President Boris Tadic initiated a Summit of the Chiefs of States in Southeast Europe held in Karadjordjevo, Serbia, in November, 2006, also involving the participation of Franco Frattini, the European Commissioner. The Declaration adopted at the end of the Summit is understood in Serbia as a document that shows the direction in which the Serbian anti-terrorist capacity should develop. 2.1 The Declaration We, the Heads of State or Government of the countries of South-East Europe, Traian Basescu, Branko Crvenkovski, Stjepan Mesic, Alfred Moisiu, Borislav Paravac, Filip Vujanovic and Boris Tadic, in the presence of Franco Frattini, Vice-President of the European Commission and European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security meeting at the First Summit at Karadjordjevo on 16 October 2006, at a time when democratic development in the world, including the building of democratic institutions and the strengthening of the rule of law, has prevailed, when countries in transition are entering a new phase of their democratic transformation, overcoming on that road the remnants of the recent past and facing the challenges of corruption and organised crime, when the region is entering a phase of ever greater stability, even though it continues to be burdened with open problems and: •

fully aware of the threat posed by organised crime and terrorism and strongly committed to join efforts in combating this scourge;

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• • • •

• • • • •

•

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re-affirming our strong condemnation of organised crime and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as the most serious challenges and threats to the security of the world today; also re-affirming the generally accepted fundamental principles of international law relating to organised crime and terrorism; committed to the full respect of human rights in the fight against organised crime and terrorism; guided by the relevant conventions and protocols of the United Nations and the Council of Europe relating to the fight against organised crime and terrorism, as well as the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council; welcoming the agreement reached by the United Nations General Assembly on a global counter-terrorism strategy; expressing our readiness to contribute to, and actively co-operate in, the fight against terrorism and to counter all forms of organised crime; taking note of the commitments assumed in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes, and the interests expressed by the countries of South-east Europe; underlining the importance of our activities and co-operation to date in the framework of the regional organisations and initiatives that are active in this field, particularly within the Stability Pact for South-east Europe; re-affirming the conclusions adopted by the Regional Table of the Stability Pact (Belgrade, 30 May 2006) as well as the Roadmap Towards a Regionally Owned Co-operation Framework in South-east Europe identifying, inter alia, justice, home affairs and security co-operation as priorities of our regional cooperation in the future; and expressing the will to strengthen the co-operation established within the framework of the Police Co-operation Convention for South-east Europe

have adopted this JOINT DECLARATION on the Fight Against Organised Crime and Terrorism Organised crime and terrorism pose a threat to global security, significantly affecting the countries of South-east Europe in the process of consolidating regional stability. With links to organised crime as one of the main sources of its finance, but also as a means of destabilising countries, terrorism constitutes the gravest threat to peace, stability and the democratic development of our region. Recognising that a concerted action aimed at fighting organised crime and terrorism is a necessary prerequisite for the security of each and every country and the region as a whole, we pledge to work together: 1.

to further build the legislative capacity in the countries of the region to enable them to be successful in fighting organised crime and averting the threat of terrorism through the signing of police co-operation agreements;

2.

to ensure the compatibility of national legislation with the legislation of the European Union in order to enable all countries in the region to successfully

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prevent and counter organised crime and terrorism both in their domestic activities and in the international co-operation between and among their relevant institutions, including judicial bodies, law enforcement agencies, security and intelligence services as well as financial authorities; 3.

to establish and develop all the necessary links and forms of co-operation with the relevant bodies of the European Union as the focal points in efforts against organised crime and terrorism, as well as with NATO;

4.

to develop the capacity of intelligence and security services, police and judicial authorities to detect, monitor and survey, provide evidence and prosecute perpetrators of organised criminal and terrorist activities. In this context, we insist, in particular, on building capacity within these authorities to work together and share in good faith all the necessary information required for the successful struggle against organised crime and terrorism;

5.

to further improve the capability of the border authorities, customs control and immigration services to prevent the movement of organised criminal rings and terrorists and the creation of their safe havens in the region;

6.

to increase the capacity of these services for emergency situations to prepare them for joint action in eliminating the consequences of terrorist acts, particularly acts committed with the use of weapons of mass destruction;

7.

to prevent access to weapons and other materials helpful in the commission of terrorist acts, particularly materials intended for the production of weapons of mass destruction, and to exchange information on new weapons and devices that might be used in acts of terrorism;

8.

to work together, based on the best practices in our region, to establish and develop national capacities for export control, to exchange experience and cooperation in this important area;

9.

to make full use of all the existing mechanisms in developing our regional cooperation in fighting organised crime and terrorism;

10. to establish mechanisms to prevent the financing of organised criminal groups and terrorists; and 11. to share know-how and develop common educational, scientific and research programmes relevant to combating organised crime and terrorism. With a view to achieving the aforementioned objectives, we pledge ourselves to a permanent dialogue conducted at the level of Heads of State (or Government). We declare that regular meetings will be held on an annual basis at the level of ministers of the relevant departments (home affairs and/or justice).

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Continued co-operation on the expert level will be developed, both in the framework of the existing regional co-operation and bilaterally, as well as within the new forms of co-operation to be agreed in accordance with our common interests.

Conclusion The Serbian approach to fighting terrorism is characterised by the serious attitude of all government organs with respect to this important issue. This attitude is expressed through the acknowledgment of terrorism as the most serious threat to Serbian security. The Serbian theory of security, but also the practice, understands terrorism as a form of organised crime and emphasises the very close connection between these two phenomena. The Serbian crime legislation stipulates a number of criminal offences that directly relate to terrorism and there is a special court section for processing people suspected of offences involving elements of organised crime so that we may justifiably conclude that Serbia has adequate legal capacity to oppose terrorism and organised crime. The main weakness of Serbia in the struggle against terrorism lies in its institutional underdevelopment and the fact that the state is in the process of constituting new state organs after Montenegro left the common state. The Serbian National Security System is in the stage of finding new, optimal, organisational solutions and its adaptation to the standards that must be achieved within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. As laws must sanction the organisational solutions of the national security system, most probably these laws will be enacted after the new government has been formed. The development of a serious anti-terrorist system that will form part of the regional mechanism of responding to terrorism and organised crime may be discussed once Serbia has established its institutional framework.

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The Macedonian Approach to the Fight against Terrorism Marina MALIS SAZDOVSKA Police Academy Skopje

Abstract: Today the world is characterised by certain changes that bring with them unpredictable risks and dangers for the safety of countries. Besides political, economic and cultural globalisation, the trend of globalisation has also brought threats such as international terrorism and organised crime. The Republic of Macedonia is also not exempted from the world’s global threats, especially the threat of terrorism. Terrorism poses a threat in the world framework and no society is safe regarding this type of criminal activity. In order to prevent terrorism and undertake activities in which more countries are included i.e. society in general, it is necessary to act in the framework of certain international organisations such as the NATO Alliance. In that direction every country in the context of its possibilities should contribute to the fight against today’s evil – terrorism. In this text the measures undertaken by the Republic of Macedonia are described, as are the challenges it is facing and the measures and activities that should be taken in the future. Keywords: terrorism, strategy, safety

Introduction: The situation in the Republic of Macedonia Terrorism represents a threat in the world framework and no society is safe when this type of criminal activity is in question. The Republic of Macedonia with its geostrategic location holds a central place in the Balkans. The location of the Balkans as an European crossroads, especially the location of the Republic of Macedonia as a strategic centre, attracts the attention of foreign conquerors to divide and take parts of its territory [1]. On the other side, interests and ambitions have clashed not only of the neighbouring countries but also of great forces from Europe and the world. The construction of the East-West transversal and the connection of the Republic of Macedonia through Bulgarian railways to Western and Eastern Europe, and from there to the Near and Middle East through Albania through Adriatic and South-west Europe, makes Macedonia of key economic and strategic importance. Macedonia holds security significance for the whole Balkans and hence the big European and world forces, especially the USA, are interested in preserving peace and stability in the Republic of Macedonia. Besides problems with its neighbouring countries, the Republic of Macedonia also faces internal problems which can be regarded as a reason for the undertaking of terrorist activities in its territory. A problem that has existed for many years is the behaviour of the Albanian minority in the Republic of Macedonia. Although, this national minority has with the assistance of the international community mostly been

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integrated with political, territorial and cultural autonomy, certain radical Albanian organisations advocate and strive to prepare and carry out terrorist activities in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia with the aim to obtain certain political concessions [2]. Today, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia distinguishes six criminal acts which have an expressed terrorist character: x terrorism (Article 313) x international terrorism (Article 419) x endangering of persons under international protection (Article 420) x hostage taking (Article 421) x hijacking of a plane or abduction of a ship (Article 302) x endangering of the safety of air traffic (Article 303) [3]. In recent times in the Republic of Macedonia we can unfortunately state that there have been numerous terrorist acts, while numerous planned terrorist activities have also been thwarted in time. So we can emphasise the following examples: the assassination attempt on the then President of the Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, in 2005; the armed and missile attacks on several police stations in Skopje, Tetovo, Kicevo; the planting of explosive devices in front of courts, barracks and other facilities. In terrorist attacks in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia during the conflict in 2001, 24 police officers and 45 soldiers lost their lives, 174 police officers and 211 soldiers were severely or slightly injured. Also, 16 civilians lost their lives and 61 citizens were injured, there were kidnappings and physical molestations of about 167 people, against who terrorists in most cases took measures of terror, using various methods of torment and humiliation with which serious disorders of physical and mental health were caused to these people. To date, the fate of 12 people from the Tetovo region is still unknown and they are considered as missing. The subject of attacks by illegal terrorist groups or individuals in the Republic of Macedonia are state authorities, that is institutions of the system. But, besides these subjects targets of attack also include civilian targets like, for example, the planting of an explosive device in front of a school in Kumanovo. So, from a victims’ point of view the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks in certain cases make a selection of victims (attacks on courts, barracks, police stations). But in some cases they attack civilian targets during which the victims are not selected according to any religious, racial, ethnical or other elements. Terrorist acts usually represent the activity of organised illegal groups, first of all organisations and groups with state, regional and world plans which as a basis for organising have extreme ideological-political, nationalistic or religious motives and goals. In addition, every individual terrorist act should be observed in the framework of the global aim declared by certain illegal groups using terrorist methods [4]. ,Before starting to carry out terrorist attacks in the Republic of Macedonia the following phases are first required: x the organised selection, recruitment and directing of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia for diversionary-terrorist training in the Republic of Albania; x an attempt to establish a system of illegal groups in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia and their training to carry out terrorist activities; x the organised illegal smuggling of weapons and explosives in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia; and

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x

the terrorist training of previously selected persons in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. During the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia many activities have been performed that could be characterised as terrorist activities such as assassinations of soldiers, policemen, civilians, the destruction of cultural heritage etc. Besides the abovementioned victims, foreign representatives have also been attacked in the Republic of Macedonia such as members of the NATO Alliance. In 1999 alone, for example, the following attacks were carried out: x On 29 April 1999 a bomb was thrown in front of the NATO facility in Kumanovo. x On 26 April 1999, again in Kumanovo, where French units of NATO forces have been stationed, a shoveler bomb was thrown that exploded albeit only minor material damage was done. The perpetrators were discovered and convicted. x On 27 April 1999 two hand grenades exploded at the entrance of barracks in Kumanovo where members of NATO forces were stationed. The perpetrators were discovered and convicted. x On 29 April 1999, a military vehicle belonging to NATO French forces was attacked, near Mlado Nagorichane, Kumanovo, with a ‘zolja’ rocket thrower. The perpetrators were discovered, with two of them being citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and three of them of the FR Yugoslavia. x On 11 May 1999 a projectile was fired on the French forces of KFOR stationed near Kumanovo. The perpetrators were discovered. x On 18 June 1999 in the ‘Gazela’ factory a larger quantity of explosives was planted on a German truck in the possession of NATO. The truck, a terrain vehicle with British registration plates, along with other civilian vehicles was destroyed by the explosion. These examples show that even the representatives of foreign missions in the Republic of Macedonia are very often the subject of terrorist attacks performed by illegal terrorist organisations or groups or individuals.

1. What is the state doing about the plan to fight terrorism? 1.

x x x

The Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia on 11 June 2003 introduced the NATIONAL CONCEPT FOR SAFETY AND DEFENCE in which, besides other things, interests considered as being vital to the state are: the protection and improvement of peace and safety; politically-defendable integration into NATO, political, economic and safety integration in the European Union, as well as in other systems for collective security; and participation in building peace and stability in the region, Europe and the world as well as the prevention and development of instruments for early warnings of tensions and crises in order to settle them on time and efficiently in a peaceful manner. The Republic of Macedonia as part of South-east Europe has achieved progress regarding the security situation, although together with countries in the region it still represents a region where threats to safety exist. This

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3.

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includes threats whose roots lie in political extremism, extreme nationalism, religious and racial impatience which together with the existing weak state institutions and non-existence of relevant governing laws represent a danger and the foundation for a high level of risks and dangers [5]. A special threat and source of instability is the presence of huge quantities of illegal weapons in the Republic of Macedonia. In the past an action was organised for the surrendering of illegal weapons but still a large number of those weapons were not surrendered. This poses a threat to the security of the state, and this is proven by the actions in which the security institutions discover and take such illegal weapons away. Within the framework of politics for national security, the Republic of Macedonia has to conduct the continuous education of experts who with their competence will contribute towards the more effective achievement of politics for the security of nationals. In that manner a reform was undertaken of the army and police forces regarding security of the state border. Namely, integrated border security is today part of the authorities of police forces. In that way an agency has been established that efficiently controls the border and border zone and prevents all kinds of illegal trafficking and illegal trespassing of the border. In the Republic of Macedonia this system of integrated border security is functioning successfully which in co-operation with other agencies in the past has realised several successful actions to discover channels for illegal human trafficking, that has lately posed a global problem. The Republic of Macedonia is conducting preparations and reforms based on the Membership Action Plan for NATO. These processes include the individual programme for partnership, and especially the process for planning and reviewing partnership (PARP) through which the partnership aims are achieved and which, parallel to the acceptance and implementation of the planned and organised standards will bring the country towards complete compatibility and interoperability with NATO. The NATO Membership Action Plan consists of five chapters that include political, economic, security, defence and legal issues. For Macedonia the first priority is the country’s internal stabilisation and democratisation. Our priority remains the completion of implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Implementation of the detailed plan for the transfer of competencies and resources in the decentralisation process started on 1 July 2006. We are also implementing comprehensive judicial reforms and measures aimed at eradicating corruption and organised crime, the Crisis Management Centre has been established and reforms of the Police are well underway [6]. Even in 2001, countries from the region including NATO members, aspirants and partner countries adopted a basic document entitled the Southeast Europe Common Assessment Paper (‘SEECAP’) in which we agreed on potential security threats in our region. A joint brigade of SEE, the so-called SEEBRIG was then established. In May 2003, the Charter on a Partnership between Macedonia, Albania and Croatia was established known as the Adriatic Charter.

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4.

5.

As a result of this co-operation, today the Republic of Macedonia has its representatives in joint NATO forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia & Herzegovina. In the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia terrorism is regulated as a felony crime. This means that the legislative authority predicted punishing behaviour that refers to the performing of terrorist acts and which is punished by certain punishment. In the Republic of Macedonia there are initiatives to solve the inter-ethnic conflicts in a peaceful manner. So, in the Republic of Macedonia a regional conference took place on 5 November 2006 called Macedonia and the Region towards EU and NATO-Needs, Experiences and Lessons Learned, at which the achievements in the past period were reviewed and conclusions and recommendations made regarding future activities. Conflict prevention refers to the prevention of violence, turning the focus of action from intervention at an early stage and preventing conflicts from moving in a violent direction.

2. The problems we face 1.

2. 3.

4.

In the Republic of Macedonia there is an initiative to adopt a law on the fight against terrorism, but it has still not been passed. This unrealised project significantly influences the concept of the fight against terrorism. Namely, by passing this law the rights of the competent institutions and their authorisations regarding the fight against terrorism would be regulated. The Republic of Macedonia does not have a national strategy for the fight against terrorism in the national security strategy for managing risks. In the hierarchy of competent institutions there is no single body that manages the institutions included in the fight against terrorism. Namely, the current organisational structure of the relevant departments and agencies (intelligence, counterintelligence and other security services) under the leadership of different authorities like the President of the State, the Prime Minister, the government i.e. the field minister, are not co-ordinated and directed to interagency co-operation. So authorities here duplicated and the competencies are mixed, which ultimately influences the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism. In the Republic of Macedonia, in the framework of the ATA programme education is being given to competent cadre as regards the fight against terrorism. Namely, some members of the security structures are sent for training abroad or are trained by the best experts in our country. But what really poses a serious problem is the use of those professional and trained personnel in practice. Our state is facing the problem of the personnel in security structures belonging to particular parties and during each change of the ruling party serious horizontal and vertical transfers are happening. During those changes, people who are neither experts nor competent to perform certain sensitive tasks are appointed, while the personnel in which the state had previously invested time and money are moved to inadequate positions where they cannot make suitable contributions to the fight against terrorism.

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6.

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The enhanced political influence on the state and security systems can lead to the disruption of the work of the security services because frequent changes to managerial teams lead to a change of personnel that works in the field. In this manner it seriously decreases work motivation [7]. A general problem in the Balkans has been that the immediate need to solve conflicts has often been addressed at the expense of creating ethnic enclaves or of fudging sovereignty: a weakening of the state; whereas the long-term reform challenges of European integration often require the opposite: a strengthening of the state [8]. The militarised units of the Albanian ETSM are a challenge to Macedonia’s inter-ethnic peace and stability. Their activation and cross-border activities – if overlooked – may lead to invalidation of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement. How should this challenge be responded to? And is the strategy aimed at the prevention of conflict spillovers through Macedonia’s association and integration within the structures of the European Union and NATO? [9]. Solving the problem of the status of Kosovo could have negative implications for the security situation in the Republic of Macedonia. Depending on the solution to Kosovo’s status, protests could again spread across the territory of our state, as was the case in 2001.

3. Suggestions for overcoming the problems x x x x

x x

x

Complete participation and integration in Euro-Atlantic security structures, in the spread of stability and security expressed through processes and activities of preparing for NATO and EU membership [9]. In the following period the Government of the Republic of Macedonia should bring in an integrated strategy for the national security of the Republic of Macedonia. The development of the Police should be targeted at the maximum police decentralisation at the local level according European norms and standards so as to make the Police a service of the citizens. Passing a national strategy in the fight against terrorism and the law on the fight against terrorism, the establishment of a single management body that would collect information from different competent departments and agencies and manage activities regarding the operational plan. Carrying out complete disarmament whereby illegal weapons would be taken away from the owners and thereby reducing the risk for a big number of criminal activities, including terrorist acts. In order to study the sociological, political and security problems in certain areas, including the problem of terrorism, the development of strategic analyses is needed in order to establish social regularities of certain occurrences and to efficiently combat negative tendencies. An efficient fight against terrorism is impossible without European safety and defensive politics. ‘The prospect of unification from the viewpoint of 5 to 10 years to have joined the defence, in other words collective defence, at the moment is a type of commitment for providing assistance in the case of an attack is well regulated by the Agreement of ZEU. For the European security

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and defence policy it is very important in the near future to develop and adopt a strategic-security-political concept that provides guidelines concerning what, when and how the reaction of the EU should look like in an international crisis. The European security and defence policies, in spite of the isolated bodies of the Council, needs broader legitimacy and control which despite the traditional role of the national parliament can only be achieved on the spot in Brussels with the significant participation of the European parliament’ [10].

Conclusion The Republic of Macedonia is an example of a positive transformation and is at the same time sending positive signals to its neighbours and beyond. Today, the Republic of Macedonia is a functional multiethnic democracy that is impatiently knocking on the doors of NATO and the EU for membership. The best prevention in modern Balkan conditions is the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Integration with the EU and NATO along with regional co-operation are crucial components of the general prevention of conflict situations and their neutralisation. In order to bring Macedonia closer to full membership in NATO, on 27 and 28 June 2007 Ohrid hosted the NATO Security Forum – an event gathered in the one place 600 participants from 45 different countries to discuss three issues: Kosovo and the future of the Balkans, energetic security and the crisis in Afghanistan. A final document emerged from the Forum, but the conclusions will be discussed at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels. The Security forum in Ohrid clearly located the positions of the Euro-Atlantic partnership council in relation to the global security issues. NATO considers that the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans is key to the security of the region. Speaking at the NATO Forum and members of the partnership for peace in Ohrid, Secretary General Jaap De Hop Shefer added that in order to achieve this the final status of Kosovo should be resolved. Country-members of the Adriatic group, Macedonia, Croatia and Albania, will not receive a common invitation for membership next year in Bucharest. Each country must individually earn its invitation entitlement by the successful fulfilment of NATO’s standards and reforms. Kosovo as an open and at the moment the most sensitive issue in the region surfaced during the Forum. According to the Secretary General, the final solution for Kosovo will not impact on the invitation for membership, but he emphasised that the territory of Kosovo is the missing link in the region’s stability. By adopting and implementing NATO standards in the region it would become possible to successfully fight terrorism yet intensive international co-operation on a bilateral and a multilateral plan is needed in order to neutralise the radical terrorist groups that threaten to carry out terrorist acts in the region.

References [1] [2] [3]

Mitko Kotovcevski, Magazine Denes, 7.5.1998, 43. Marjan Nikolovski, Master’s thesis Criminolistic-criminological and criminal-law aspects of the ciminal act-terrorism in the period 1991/2001. Zlatko Dimovski, Comparative preview of the European criminal-law solutions for terrorism, Police Academy Yearbook, Skopje, 2001.

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[4]

113

Tome Batkovski, Criminal aspects of detection, solving and stopping the terrorism in the phase of preparing of the act, Proceedings-criminology in theory and practice, Banja Luka, 2005. [5] National concept for security and defence, Official Bulletin of R of M nos.42/2001 and 5/2003. [6] Shpresa Jusufi, Macedonia and the Region towards EU and NATO-Needs, Experiences and Lessons Learned. [7] Marina Malis Sazdovska, Manual for intelligence cycle, Skopje, 2005. [8] Erwan Fouere, Macedonia and the Region towards EU and NATO-Needs, Experiences and Lessons Learned. [9] Lyubov Mincheva, Spillover crisis: Major challenge to the regional stabilization processes in the Western Balkans. [10] Vorner Volfgang Vesels, Europe from A-Z, Manual for European integration, BPB: Federal central for political education, Conrad Adenayer, Sector for European integration, Skopje, 2004.

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Terrorism in Kosovo and Measures against it Haki DEMOLLI Law Faculty of Prishtina

Abstract: This study is an attempt to assess the political situation in post-war Kosovo, with an accent on the extent and dynamics of terrorist acts committed in the 2000-2006 period. The study also describes some of the characteristics of explosions that occurred in post-war Kosovo. The findings of a survey of UNMIK Police statistics on criminal acts committed for terrorism purposes during the 2000-2006 period show that 1,204 explosions occurred in Kosovo. For the needs of this paper 48 of these explosions were analysed. The study of these explosions shows that most of them only caused material damage; that for a large percentage of cases no one has claimed responsibility for carrying them out; that usually perpetrators used exploding devices, grenades and bombs with a small quantity of explosives and that in the majority of cases the motives for planting the explosions was the general political situation, namely the unresolved political status of Kosovo and inter-ethnic disagreements between Albanians and Serbs regarding the political status of Kosovo.The findings suggest the risk of terrorist threats in Kosovo after the resolution of its final status may be expected. Therefore, the paper examines some factors which might help reduce the number of those acts and some other factors which might directly influence the occurrence of terrorism in Kosovo. Keywords: terrorism, Kosovo, explosions, threat, political status, UNMIK, KFOR

Introduction Terrorism as a form of politically motivated violence is found in almost all states of the world regardless of the form of their socio-political organisation. Thus, terrorism is present in Western democracies as well as post-communist countries in transition. Kosovo is a territory currently undergoing a period of transition under the supervision and administration of the UNMIK Mission. Here it may be freely pointed out that it is enlisted in a coalition of countries for which the phenomenon of terrorism is not a serious problem. However, given the trends of development of terrorism in this region and beyond Kosovo should be prepared for its own undertakings and for cooperation with other states in the fight against not just local but also international terrorism. In order to provide a clearer picture of the problem of terrorism, this presentation unfolds in the following manner: 1. The political situation and overall security in Kosovo; 2. Legal infrastructure regarding terrorism in Kosovo; 3. Extent and dynamics of terrorist acts in the 2000-2006 period; 4. Characteristics of explosions carried out in post-war Kosovo; and 5. Risk from terrorist threats in Kosovo after the resolution of its political status.

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1. The political situation and overall security in Kosovo Kosovo is a country in which the traces of the 1998-1999 war are still present, during which its population has experienced great suffering, murders, missing persons, the devastation of property and other forms of tragic events. Currently, the people and institutions of Kosovo, supported by the international community, are in a phase of revival and possible recuperation from the consequences of these events, including attempts to create a society in which all communities might hope for a normal life and a better future. Based on the results of various researches, the overall security situation in Kosovo has significantly improved and is quite stabile thanks in large part to the presence of the KFOR and the UNMIK [1]. In post-war Kosovo, the responsibility for securing peace and order underwent three phases. In the first phase, responsibility belonged to the KFOR in co-operation with international police which facilitated security efforts in an advisory role. In the second phase, responsible for the security of citizens and the prevention of crime was UNMIK Pillar One; respectively, the pillar on Police and Justice whose main objective was to strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo. This objective has been achieved through the co-ordinated administration of the Department of Justice and the UNMIK Police. The UNMIK Police refers to the closely integrated structures of international civilian police and local police – the Kosovo Police Service (‘KPS’). During the third and final phase there will be the transfer of authority from the international police to the local police. During this period, the international police will withdraw from their direct activities in the field and undertake and accomplish the advisory and supervisory tasks. As shown above, the main actors responsible for the general security in Kosovo are KFOR, the UNMIK Police and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo. The international community has determined the legal framework of governance in Kosovo through UN Security Council Resolution 1244, according to which the representatives of the international community are vested with the power to apply the law in all spheres of life, including general security. Concretely, the most powerful political mechanism is the UNMIK and, in particular, the Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (‘SRSG’). The first legislative act of the UNMIK [2] established that all legislative and executive power in Kosovo, including jurisdiction, is exerted by the UNMIK under the SRSG [3]. According to the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government Institutions, the SRSG holds exclusive power over all institutions in the application of law including local staff. Despite the fact that the UNMIK is continuing to conduct the transfer of considerable competencies to Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo, the UNMIK is and will remain the main decision-making entity in Kosovo until the end of the process of determining the final status of Kosovo. The UNMIK will continue to exercise a supervisory role in those areas where competencies are transferred to local institutions. The UNMIK Police is composed of international police officers and members of the Kosovo Police Service. The UNMIK Police in Kosovo has two main goals. The first is to guarantee order, security and the application of law in Kosovo. The second is to build a trusted, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service.

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In 2000 within the UNMIK Police 4,718 international police officers from nearly 50 states of the world were serving in Kosovo. A significant difference was seen in this police structure in 2003 as the numbers of international police officers dropped from nearly 4,450 at the beginning of the year to about 3,700 by year’s end. This trend continued throughout 2004 and subsequently, even though the decrease in the international police force was temporarily interrupted in 2004 due to the March 2004 events in Kosovo. According to authorised sources, in June 2004 there were 3,363 international police officers in Kosovo. The UNMIK Police in co-operation with the OSCE have trained 8,830 members of the KPS, 7,021 of whom currently serve in the KPS. The general duty of the KFOR is to ensure the peace and preservation of order visà-vis any external risks, as well as to support the police forces when they cannot respond adequately to internal security challenges. KFOR’s troops are answerable directly to NATO, and not the UNMIK, regarding their overall efficiency as well as their successes and possible failures of operations undertaken in Kosovo. For some issues they are answerable to certain national ministries [3]. In July 1999, the KFOR forces were composed of nearly 50,000 soldiers, while in 2003 this number had dropped considerably to 17,000 soldiers. Second, the governing structures are composed of Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment of Kosovo which are the result of free elections that were held four times from 2000 to 2004. These actors are responsible for security in Kosovo, whose overall population is estimated at between 1.8 million and 2.1 million, and which extends over a territory of 10,887 km² with a density of 193 inhabitants per square kilometre. The dispersion is 30% urban and 70% rural [4].

2. Legal infrastructure regarding terrorism in Kosovo The criminal-legal regulation of terrorism (terrorist activity) in post-war Kosovo has undergone three phases: a) First phase (June 1999 - June 2001); b) Second phase (June 2001- April 2004); and c) Third phase (after April 2004). a) During the first phase, in Kosovo the occurrence of terrorism was regulated by the 1977 Yugoslav Criminal Law. Application of this Law in post-war Kosovo was in compliance with UNMIK Regulation on Authorisations of Provisional Administration in Kosovo no. 1/99, which in Article 3 decisively states: ‘Laws in Kosovo which were in force in its territory before 24 March 1999 will continue to apply in Kosovo if they are not in contradiction with the fulfilment of the mandate given to the UNMIK by Resolution 1244 (1999) of the Security Council of the United Nations, or with this Regulation or any other Regulation issued by UNMIK’. Article 125 of the Law describes terrorism as a criminal offence which might be committed: i. by hostile motives against the state; ii. by causing explosions, fires or other offences of general danger or acts of violence; or

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iii. which might create a feeling of personal insecurity of citizens or groups of citizens. The criminal offence itself is entitled ‘terrorism’. b) During the second phase in Kosovo, the occurrence of terrorism was regulated by the ‘Regulation on Prohibition of Terrorism and other similar offences’[5]. Articles 1-6 are amongst the most important articles of Regulation 2001/12. The first article of UNMIK Regulation no. 2001/12 gave definitions of the main terms related to the occurrence of terrorism such as, for example, ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist organisation’, ‘support to terrorist organisation’, ‘funds and material basis’ etc. According to this Regulation, the expression ‘terrorism’ meant: • the commission of one or more criminal offences (of murder, grave bodily injury, hostage-taking, kidnapping, illegal detention, water poisoning, causing general danger, causing or damaging public services, production or insurance of weapons, illegal possession of weapons and exploding devices, endangering of internationally protected persons, hijacking, endangering the security of flights, unauthorised taking or use of nuclear material and endangering of security through nuclear material); • with intention to seriously threat public order; • to force a government or international organisation to act or not act; or • to frighten or endanger the civilian population. To define the co-operation of persons as a ‘terrorist organisation’, the Regulation required the fulfilment of two conditions: • the existence of a group of two or more persons including paramilitary groups; and • whose goal or activity is directed at the commission of terrorism. According to the Regulation, the support of a terrorist organisation might be committed: • through recruitment of members of a terrorist organisation; • concealment of a terrorist organisation or its members; • obstruction of the discovery of a terrorist organisation or its members; and • providing or collecting financial means or materials for the needs of a terrorist organisation. Articles 2 and 3 of the Regulation governed the preparation, incitement, assistance and commission of criminal acts of ordinary and aggravated forms, alternatively acts which have as a consequence the death of people, and provide criminal sanctions for each type of activity, respectively a terrorist act, separately. For those committing terrorist offences which result in the death of a person the maximum penalty of imprisonment (10 to 40 years) was foreseen, while a lighter penalty of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment was set out for preparation of the commission of a terrorist act. Article 4 described the forms of support for terrorist activities and the related criminal sanctions:

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• support in the form of funds and material means; • the recruitment of one or more persons for terrorist goals; and • instruction, training including the preparation of ammunition or explosives. For these forms of support, the Regulation provides punishment of 5 to 15 years. For support in the form of the delivery or transfer of armed groups, equipment, explosives, weapons, ammunition or other substances inside or outside of Kosovo, punishment of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment was laid down. Article 5 of the Regulation covered the establishment, support and participation in a terrorist organisation. For activities of such a nature punishments of 1 to 15 years’ imprisonment were provided. This Regulation was applied to all terrorist acts committed in Kosovo as well as acts committed outside of Kosovo but only when the accused or the victim was a resident of Kosovo, alternatively where the act posed a threat to the security of Kosovo or its residents. The Regulation clearly stipulated that upon its entry into force the application of Article 125 of the Criminal Law of Yugoslavia of 1977, which foresaw the criminal offence of terrorism, ceased. c) The third phase started on 6 April 2004, when the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (‘PCCK’) entered into force and which remains applicable today. In principle, Chapter XIII (Articles 109-113) of the PCCK incorporates UNMIK Regulation no. 2001/12, with some small changes. Therefore, here I will only point out the differences between the provisions of these two acts. Concretely, in the PCCK in the definition of ‘terrorism’ instead of the expression ‘serious threat to public order’ the more general expression ‘destabilisation or destruction of basic political, economic or social structures of Kosovo, of a country or international organisation’ is used. Such a definition of terrorism means that terrorist acts include not only a breach of the public order but also the basic political, economic and social structures of Kosovo and the broader region. The commission of terrorism has remained completely the same as regards the types of offences involved, and only some formulations and linguistic expressions have been changed. Regarding the definition of expressions that involve terrorism, it should be emphasised that the PCCK, in contrast with UNMIK Regulation no. 2001/12, uses instead of the expression ‘terrorist organisation’ the expression ‘terrorist group’ whose existence the ‘structure of more than two persons’ is required and not a ‘structure of two or more than two persons’ as foreseen by the abovementioned Regulation. Except for the abovementioned differences, the PCCK also brings a few novel developments: i. the provision of a terrorist act which results in grave bodily injuries of a person, for which punishment by imprisonment of not less than 15 years is foreseen; ii. the commission by negligence of the collection, insurance, search or concealment of funds to be used for terrorist goals, for which activity punishment of imprisonment from three to ten years is foreseen; and iii. in the organisation of a terrorist group for someone who organises and leads a terrorist group, a punishment by fine of up to EUR 500,000 is foreseen, while the most punishment by imprisonment foreseen in the Regulation ranges from

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7 to 20 years. Previously, the punishment set for such activities was imprisonment of 5 to 15 years.

3. Extent and dynamics of terrorist acts in Kosovo in the 2000-2006 period Before providing some data on terrorist activity in post-war Kosovo, it should be emphasised that in preparing the materials for this article, I faced various difficulties. a) Undoubtedly one of the main difficulties was the nature of police evidence provided by the UNMIK Police because their statistical evidence does not indicate what constitutes a criminal offence of terrorism as foreseen by the PCCK. b) The second difficulty stems from the nature of the definition of ‘terrorism’ itself because, according to the PCCK, someone commits a terrorist act if they have committed any of the 18 criminal offences enumerated if done for certain political goals. Indeed, the UNMIK Police evidence does contain data on some of these criminal offences (for example, murder, injuries, hostage-taking, kidnapping etc), but does not specify their motives and goals, without which it is impossible to classify them as terrorist criminal offences. Bearing in mind the abovementioned difficulties, data will be presented and analysis provided only for those explosions committed in Kosovo in the 2000-2006 period. This is because explosions represent one of the most frequent forms of terrorist acts committed not only in Kosovo but also internationally [6].1 Further, data will be provided on the total number of criminal cases (criminal offences and minor offences), presented and evidenced by the UNMIK Police as well as other criminal offences which are terrorist in nature.

Table 1. Extent and dynamics of cases that are criminal in nature that occurred in Kosovo in the 2000-2006 period, according to statistics from the UNMIK Police

Attempted Offence Complete offence Total offence

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Year 2003

Year 2004

Year 2005

Year 2006

Total

1320

1984

1611

1761

2262

2066

1835

12839

49518

79715

85679

66069

64775

66015

64165

475936

50838

81699

87290

67830

67037

68081

66000

488775

Table 1 shows that in Kosovo during the seven-year period a total of 488,775 cases were criminal in nature, or an annual average of 69,825 cases. When breaking these figures down by year, it might be concluded that the biggest number of cases came in 2001 and especially 2002, with more than 80,000 cases annually, while since 2003 there have been less than 70,000 cases annually.

1

In 1997 a total of 123 terrorist acts with an international character was committed against the USA, with 87.8% being in the form of explosions.

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The UNMIK Police provide evidence of criminal offences that include, among others: (1) murders; (2) kidnappings; (3) explosions; and (4) possession of illegal weapons. But in the evidence of the UNMIK Police there is no special column for criminal offences which mostly committed for terrorism purposes and which are also foreseen by Article 109 of the PCCK, such as: (1) hostage-taking; (2) illegal deprivation of freedom; (3) causing general danger; 4) destruction, damaging or removal of public installations; (5) endangering of persons internationally protected and UN personnel; (6) hijacking of planes; (7) endangering the security of civil aviation; (8) endangering the security of sea sail and fixed platforms at the continental threshold; and (9) the unauthorised appropriation, use and transfer of nuclear materials and the threat of the theft of nuclear materials. One reason for the non-existence of special columns in the data of the UNMIK Police for the mentioned criminal offences is that a large number of criminal offences are not presented in such a form in Kosovo legal practice. From the concluded facts, the question can logically be raised of what was the true extent of terrorist acts committed in Kosovo in the 2000-2006 period. And the answer is that, on the basis of the UNMIK Police evidence, the exact number of terrorist acts is unknown. Instead, we might only present the exact number of explosions, murders, kidnappings and possessions of illegal weapons, without specifying how many were committed for terrorist purposes and how many were of an ordinary nature, alternatively not politically motivated.

Table 2. Extent and dynamics of cases which, among others, might also be committed for terrorism purposes that occurred in Kosovo during the 2000-2006 period, according to statistics from the UNMIK Police

Explosive Attack Mine/Grenade Murder Kidnapping Illegal Weapon Possession Disturbing Public Order Other Criminal Offence

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Year 2003

Year 2004

Year 2005

Year 2006

Attempt

Total

414 405 351

258 366 351

134 241 178

117 213 126

88 247 116

107 314 108

86 236 71

25 1253 407

1204 2022 1301

66

1666

1383

1261

1250

1433

1371

13

8430

15

481

489

934

1521

5

3440

7254

8392

894

1401

1305

119

19246

A certain number of criminal offences committed during the 2000-2006 period in Kosovo, as presented in Table 2, and especially explosions, sincerely observed, are committed for terrorist purposes. Also, a considerable number of murders is believed to have been committed for political motives. For the criminal offence of illegal weapons possession (in total 8,430), it might be said that in very rare cases they were connected with various political activities and with terrorism in general, while the vast majority of them have to do with the mere possession of weapons committed by certain persons for either personal needs or interests of material gain. On the other side, most kidnappings

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were committed for material interests or personal motives. In Kosovo practice, there is almost no case of kidnapping with political motives, which might be treated as a terrorist act.

4. Some characteristics of explosions carried out in post-war Kosovo Table 2 reveals that in Kosovo for the seven-year period 1,204 cases of explosions occurred, 25 of which were merely attempts. The number of explosions as a percentage of committed offences in Kosovo (488,775), during the 2000-2006 period is 0.2%. According to yearly observations, the majority of cases involving explosions occurred in 2000 (in total 414), while from 2001 to 2006 there was a continuous decrease of such cases with 2006, the last year of the research period, seeing the smallest number, namely a total of 86 cases. In my opinion, the main factors behind the continuous drop in the number of explosions in Kosovo are: a) the increase in the security level in general in Kosovo, either as a result of the extension of the number of local police members, or in their training and professional advancement, the creation of special units for the fight against serious crimes and terrorism as well as strengthening co-operation with citizens; and b) the progress achieved during the development of political processes in the direction of the resolution of the final political status of Kosovo in such a manner that has impacted on the awareness of Kosovo citizens for avoiding the use of force with political motives, resulting in a decrease in the number of explosions in Kosovo. The awareness of citizens has also been impacted by the hard work of diplomatic representations from different countries of the world and local political leaders and the UNMIK representatives who through appeals, communications, various media presentations and debates with citizens have requested that they continue to refrain from the use of any form of political violence as such violence would damage the political process related to Kosovo’s development and would prolong the final resolution of Kosovo’s status; an age-old dream of its population. While preparing for this article, it was impossible to study and analyse all the cases of explosions (1,204) that occurred in Kosovo. The main obstacles to this were: a) the lack of systemised and specialised resources concerning the problematic explosions; and b) the short time available to prepare this article. However, for the needs of this article I studied 48 (approximately 4% of the total number of explosions) cases of explosions that occurred in the 1999-2005 period in Kosovo. Based on a study and analysis of those 48 explosions, I came to several conclusions related to their consequences, including, victims, offenders, places, motives and their other general characteristics. I will continue by presenting the results of the study and analysis together with the corresponding conclusions.

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4.1 Consequences of the explosions in Kosovo After analysing 48 cases of explosions in Kosovo it became evident that, in 10 cases, explosive mechanisms were detected before they were activated and these were dismantled in advance. In one case, there were no material losses or human casualties. In the 37 other cases, the activated explosives caused certain damage to people and material goods.

Table 3. Picture of the consequences of explosions in Kosovo in the 2000-2006 period Cases with material damages 21

Cases with human casualties 04

Cases with material damages, murdered and injured 02

Cases with material damages and injured 12

Of the 37 cases of explosions which caused consequences, 21 cases only caused material damage while in 16 cases, apart from material damages, human casualties and injury was caused. Only four cases resulted in human casualties with a total of seven killed, while in 12 cases there were injuries to a total of 60 people. The biggest number of injuries was caused by the explosion on 13 December 2002 in Prishtina, committed just two days before the visit of a high UN delegation to Kosovo. This explosion occurred in the commercial zone of Prishtina at 8 p.m. in an area which was then highly frequented by ordinary citizens. Since Kosovo is a multi-ethnic place, it is logical to review the ethnic background of the murdered and injured persons according to this type of criminal activity.

Table 4. National structure of people murdered and injured by explosions in Kosovo in the 2000-2006 period Nationality of victims Albanians Serbs International Total

Murdered by explosions 03 04 / 07

Injured by explosions 44 07 09 60

Total 47 11 09 67

Table 4 shows that those murdered by the explosions were of Serb ethnicity (04) and Albanian ethnicity (03). Those injured by the explosions included Albanians (44), Serbs (7) and nine members of the international community who were at the mission in Kosovo. Material goods damaged by the explosions were the property of the Kosovo Government, public property, property of members of the Albanian community, the Serb community and the UNMIK and other international organisations operating in Kosovo.

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Table 5. Structure according to affinity to property materially damaged by explosions in Kosovo in the 2000-2006 period Kind of Property

Private property of Albanians Property of Albanian political parties Public property (bridges, routes etc) Private property of Serbs Property of Kosovar institutions Property of Serbian political parties Serb religious sites and historical monuments Buildings and vehicles of the UNMIK and OSCE Total

Property of Kosovo Governmen t

Public Property

Property of Albanian community

Property of Serb community

Property of International community

07 05

04 02 06

02 05

06

04

12

09

04 04

Table 5 reveals that in 12 cases the property damaged by explosions was the property of the Albanian community. Private property had the form of houses, business premises and cars, while the damaged property of political parties included official premises and cars. In this period, such attacks were directed at the property of the LDK (three cases), PDK and ORA in one case. The property of Kosovo institutions and public property had the form of official buildings, vehicles, bridges and roads. As far as the property of the international community as a target of explosions was concerned there were only official buildings and vehicles of the UNMIK and the OSCE. The KFOR’s buildings and vehicles were never the target of explosions in Kosovo, which shows that their perpetrators, being aware of the capabilities of the anti-terrorist forces of KFOR, did not have the courage to attack the property of this international subject. The property of members of the Serb community in two cases belonged to Serb citizens, in two cases to Serb political parties and in five cases Serb religious sites and historical monuments were damaged. 4.2 Perpetrators of the explosions in Kosovo For only two of the 48 researched cases of explosions did an identified group claim responsibility. A group called the Albanian National Army (ANA) claimed responsibility for the explosion committed on 12 April 2003 in the neighbourhood of Mitrovica. The object of the attack was the bridge which connects Mitrovica with the

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cities of Rashka and Kraljevo, alternatively Kosovo with Serbia. During the commission of the act, two offenders negligently activated the exploding mechanism prior to the assigned time leading to their deaths. After this case, the UN SRSG for Kosovo issued on 17 April 2003 Administrative Directive no. 2003/9 for implementation of UNMIK Regulation no. 2001/12, the first article of which proclaims the Albanian National Army (ANA) as a terrorist organisation. The second case occurred on 15 March 2005 when in the vicinity of the Kosovo President’s (Ibrahim Rugova) vehicle, which was moving at the time, a grenade exploded. The explosion damaged the President’s vehicle and injured two people. Responsibility for this act was claimed by the ANA through a communiqué which threatened the International Mission in Kosovo not to play with the fate of Albanians. It should also be pointed out that the explosion of 2 July 2005, involving an attack on UNMIK vehicles in Prishtina, was followed by an unidentified group claiming responsibility through an anonymous phone call. No one has claimed responsibility for the 45 other cases of explosions. At the same time, no information has been received to reveal and apprehend the actors and we therefore cannot speak of the characteristics of these offenders with any real reliability. The only things that can be inferred are some presumptions grounded on indications and assumptions based on the attacked objects and the circumstances of their commission. On the basis of these indications it may be assumed that the possible offenders of these acts might be included in three wider categories. a) The first possible category is composed of frustrated groups of Albanian youngsters who targeted the property and objects of Kosovo institutions (for example, ministries, courts, police etc), and then objects of the international community (offices, UNMIK and OSCE vehicles), as well as the property of Kosovo Serbs and religious sites and historical monuments of Serbs. In this category one might also include the activists and affiliates of Albanian political parties which have committed attacks against the targets of other political parties. In this category one might also include those individuals who are not organised in groups who, due to a breach of any of their personal rights, committed such acts of revenge against either governmental institutions (for example, the Ministry of Transport, or the courts) or against other individuals (for example, members of the Kosovo Protection Service (‘KPC’)). These individuals suggest that such activity might be attributed to politically motivated actors and thus their own intentions would remain hidden given the circumstances in Kosovo at the time. b) The second possible category contains frustrated groups of Serb youngsters who, unsatisfied with political developments in Kosovo, set off explosions against Kosovo and international institutions and against Serb political parties which have shown a readiness to co-operate with Kosovo and international institutions and, finally, against the property of Albanian and Bosnian citizens in Northern Kosovo. It is well known that the buildings and property of

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international institutions, except in Kosovo, were also attacked by Serb youth organisations in Macedonia [7].2 c) The third possible category of offenders of explosions might be professionals, alternatively collaborators of the secret services of various states which have been operating in Kosovo since 1999. It is believed that currently in Kosovo more than 30 secret services are operating [8].3 It is also suspected that this form of criminal activity might be conducted primarily by the network of secret services in neighbouring countries, and by other countries that see their economic-political interests in the destabilisation of security in Kosovo. 4.3 Devices used for carrying out explosions in Kosovo One of the distinctive characteristics of explosions in Kosovo involves the devices employed to detonate them. Offenders have usually used exploding devices, grenades and bombs with a small quantity of explosives. The quantity of explosive used for such acts was approximately 200-300 grams to 5-6 kilograms. Only in one case was a bigger quantity of explosive used. That was connected to the explosion on 5 November 1999 when a railway bridge in vicinity of Mitrovica was badly damaged. The offenders prepared an explosive device which contained 40-50 kg of TNT. 4.4 Prior warning information about the placement of explosives Members of the KFOR and the UNMIK Police in ten cases successfully dismantled the explosive devices. In four of these cases, authorities responsible for security in Kosovo were informed by anonymous phone calls. Clearly, this information was provided by people with knowledge of or who were connected in one railway or another to their placement. The existence of explosive mechanisms in six other cases was discovered by ordinary citizens or through the tactic-operative activity of the police and the KFOR.

2

‘The explosion that took place in front of NATO's headquarters in the Macedonian capital on 23 June 1999 was organised and carried out by Serbs who were assisted by Serb Secret Service agents’, the Macedonian Interior Minister reported. The names of the accused have not been provided by the Ministry but it is understood they are all Serbs. Minister Trajanov said that the arms used were made in Yugoslavia and were taken from Serbia to Macedonia as has often been the case in the past such as the recently discovered cache of two anti-tank mines, two ‘Zola’ 4 automatic guns, detonators, and explosives that all point to the Serb secret services as regards their make. It is known that Serb agents in Macedonia received training to use these weapons. The activities of this terrorist group include distributing arms and explosives to others inside Macedonia in order to conduct attacks against NATO forces in Macedonia. The latest attack, said the Minister, did not have any connection to the anonymous phone calls made by a woman who had claimed to be a member of the ‘Makedonaska Zora’ organization. 3 According to the ‘Bota Sot’ newspaper, at this moment in Kosovo there are at least 30 secret services in an active and organised form which have direct or indirect interests in Kosovo. One of the most aggressive secret services that acts in Kosovo is the Serb one, which has not stopped creating difficult situations and chaos as a way of realising its goals. The actions of the Serb secret service that now has been accepted even by its own Serb activists defined the manner of attempts on life and other terrorist acts in Kosovo as a way of destabilising the situation. The actions of the Serb secret services in Kosovo right now have at least 176 active informative centres, which function continuously for the needs of the Serb secret services. Even their action does not only cover the space controlled by ‘Serb advisors’, but even all other spaces in Kosovo. An aggressive action in Kosovo is even involving the Greek secret service, the Macedonian one etc., which through Kosovo want to realise not only political and geo-strategic interests, but even economic ones.

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Unfortunately, in two cases involving the placement of explosives KFOR members were in vicinity of endangered objects when the explosive mechanism was activated, which injured 7 KFOR members. Five French KFOR soldiers were injured in the Mitrovica case, while two American KFOR soldiers were injured in the Kllokot case. 4.5 Circumstances and concrete motives of the explosions in Kosovo The most common circumstances and motives behind the explosions in Kosovo are: a) The general political situation, alternatively the unresolved political status of Kosovo and inter-ethnic disagreements between Albanians and Serbs regarding the political status of Kosovo. This is assumed to be the direct cause of a significant number of explosions in Kosovo. This is because the attacked targets were at the International Mission in Kosovo, institutions governing Kosovo, and included the life and property of both Albanians and Serbs religious sites and historical Serb monuments etc. b) Visits of various delegations and eminent international personalities in Kosovo and gatherings of an international character for Kosovo were in several cases followed by explosions and other incidents of a terrorist nature. For example, such acts happened prior to the visit of ex-President of the USA, Bill Clinton, on 22 November 1999 and then the visit of a high UN delegation on 13 December 2002, followed by the visit of Mr. Javier Solana on 19 July 2005, the visit to Kosovo by the OSCE's chairman-in-office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos on 25 February 2007 [9]4 and the hand-over of Ahtisari’s proposal for Kosovo’s status to the Security Council in March 2007 etc. c) The imprisonment of four KLA members (the Llapi group) on 20 July 2003 was followed by several attacks against the District Court and Supreme Court, as well as police stations and vehicles of the Kosovo police. d) The departure of Kosovo’s former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj to the Hague Tribunal on 8 March 2005 was followed by such attacks against the UNMIK and other targets [10].5 e) Conflicts and disagreements of various types between Albanian political parties have led to several attacks against the party buildings of the LDK, PDK and ORA [11].6

4 ‘An explosion west of Kosovo's capital damaged several vehicles belonging to an international security organization early Monday. No one was hurt. Monday's explosion came on the eve of a visit to Serbia and Kosovo by the OSCE's chairman-in-office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos.’ 5 ‘During March 2005 extremist elements attempted to destabilise the situation. On 5 March empty UN cars were blown up or strafed in western towns of Gjakova and Peja. Two grenades were thrown opposite the UNMIK headquarters in the evening of 11 March, wounding a passing teenager and destroying a car. Bomb scares disrupted the central Prishtina street which houses the police headquarters and the main building of the public broadcaster, RTK on 7 and 8 March and the centre of Peja on 17 March. Two explosions at Albanianowned houses in Serb-dominated North Mitrovica over the weekend of 12-13 March jangled local nerves.’ 6 ‘An explosion and fire destroyed the offices of Kosovo's two main political parties in a southern town on 16 October 2001 in the first major outbreak of violence ahead of elections. No one was injured. The earlymorning blast in Suva Reka appeared to have been an attack aimed at the local headquarters of the leading contender in the Nov. 17 ballot, the Democratic League of Kosovo, or LDK’, said Andrea Angeli, a spokesman for the UN mission in Kosovo.

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f)

Also disagreements between Kosovo Serb political parties were followed by explosions against their party buildings in Northern Kosovo, for example in Zveqan and Zubin Potok on 4 July 2005 [12].7 g) The dissatisfaction of ordinary citizens regarding the politics and developments of governmental institutions in Kosovo. Such attacks were directed against the Ministry of Transport, Kosovo Radio Television etc.

4.6 Place of the explosions according to cities/ regions of Kosovo After analysing this component, it is noted that the biggest number of cases of explosions occurred in the Prishtina region (26), then the Mitrovica region (11), the Peja region (5), Gjilan (2), whilst in Gjakova, Theranda, Lipjan and Skenderaj there was one case each. Logically, it was found as expected that the biggest number of explosions occurred in the Prishtina region due to the concentration of various local and international structures and in the Mitrovica region due to the emphasised inter-ethnic problems. If one examines the reason behind the occurrence of explosions in the Prishtina region then it can be seen that they were used as a pretext for opposing the politics of local and international institutions instead of the inter-ethnic disagreements, inter-party contradictions between Albanian political parties etc. Yet in the Mitrovica region the explosions mainly occurred due to inter-ethnic disagreements between Albanians and Serbs and due to party conflicts between Serb political parties. In the Peja, Gjilan and Lipjan regions the motives underlying the explosions were mainly inter-ethnic in nature. Cases involving explosions in Gjakova, Theranda and Skenderaj had nothing to do with inter-ethnic problems in Kosovo.

5. Risk from terrorist threats in Kosovo after resolution of its final status It is believed that the political process of resolving the final political status of Kosovo will be finalised within a short period of time. General political developments at the international and local level are leading towards the creation of an independent state of Kosovo. This new European state will be supervised by different international mechanisms for a certain period of time. Bearing in mind the new circumstances which will occur in Kosovo, the question might be raised of whether the occurrence of terrorism will be more emphasised or marked by a certain decrease in comparison with the current situation. In reality, it can be expected that in the years to come in Kosovo there will be a decrease in incidents that are terrorist in nature. Factors which suggest a decrease in terrorist incidents in Kosovo are:

7

‘A hand grenade exploded in the town of Zubin Potok, near Mitrovica, around 2 a.m. on 4 July 2005, damaging the premises shared by the Kosovo Ministry for Return and the Serb Democratic Party. No one was injured in the explosion, which caused serious damage to the facility’.

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a) the determination of the final political status of Kosovo, alternatively the creation of an independent state of Kosovo by which the political aspirations of nearly 90% of the Kosovo population would be satisfied; b) a continuation of the presence of KFOR troops in Kosovo as protectors and guarantors of security in Kosovo against any attacks from the outside; c) the development and professional advancement of the Kosovo Police Service and continuation of the supervision and observation of its work by police services of other countries of the European Union; d) the establishment and training of special Kosovo units in the fight against terrorism; e) the stronger co-operation between the citizens and Kosovo security forces fighting terrorism. This co-operation will be created on principled and healthy bases according to which ‘those citizens who treat the police as a guarantee of security and co-operate with them will be seen as carrying out a patriotic act and not a betrayal’; and f) the completion and harmonisation of the legal infrastructure which will regulate acts of terrorism in accordance with international normative principles. The main burden of the prevention of and fight against terrorism in Kosovo will be carried by the Kosovo Police Service within whose structures there will be specialised units for combating serious crimes. To date, within the UNMIK Police an Anti-terrorist Unit has been created which operates as a special unit of the Directorate of Organised Crime. The Anti-terrorist Unit mainly involves international police officers who have significant experience in the discovery of and fight against terrorism in different countries of the world, and local police officers who during their training and education will obtain knowledge from their international colleagues. At the same time, members of this unit are on the priority list for attendance at international courses and training in order to be professionally specialised in certain areas of the fight against terrorism. This unit is directly answerable to the UNMIK Police Commissar for its work, training and activity. The Police Directorate of Organised Crimes in Kosovo was established in 2002 and is currently composed of approximately 150 police officers, 110 of whom are local police officers, while 40 are international police officers. This section of the Kosovo police, among others, deals with the discovery and revelation of criminal offences which in one way or another are linked with terrorist activities, for example, the falsification of documents and money, money-laundering, corruption of high political officials, various forms of smuggling etc. In addition to these units there will also be international police officers and members of the KFOR who will face terrorist activities and play an important role in the discovery and apprehension of terrorist offenders. These formations will undoubtedly be assisted by their secret services [13]8 which will use contemporary methods and technologies to combat this evil which could 8

‘We need far more forceful tactics to be employed with special operations featured as the preferred way of handling the relevant problems. Intelligence collection, analyses, interpretation, and dissemination should serve as a prelude to vigorous intervention into international events fraught with dangers of new terrorist attacks. The time-tested covert actions to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, including subversion, sabotage, operational deception, disinformation, massive sophisticated propaganda

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otherwise seriously violate the development and strength of Kosovo as a new international state. In their struggle against terrorism in Kosovo, these police and military forces will clearly be supported and assisted by a large number of countries which have supplied police officers and soldiers to the Peace-keeping Mission in Kosovo. This co-operation will be realised in the form of the exchange of information, the training and professional advancement of police forces, material-technical assistance in the discovery and revelation of specific terrorist cases and in the fight against terrorism in general. These counter-terrorist forces will also profit considerably from their co-operation with various international police organisations. Concretely, the UNMIK Police has intensive co-operation with Interpol and Europol in combating criminality in general and terrorism in particular. The fight against terrorism in Kosovo also helps international judges and prosecutors who are currently competent in training and decision-making against those crimes that are terrorist in nature. Nevertheless, the factors which might directly influence the occurrence of terrorism in Kosovo should not be ignored. Such negative factors are: a) the dissatisfaction of members of the Kosovo Serb population with the resolution of the final political status of Kosovo, alternatively, the creation of an independent state of Kosovo [14];9 b) the presence and activities of the many secret networks and intelligence services in Kosovo; c) the indoctrination of the Kosovo population, especially of younger age groups, with various radical standpoints: neofascist, neocommunist, fundamentalist, oriental etc.; d) the ‘importing’ of international terrorism from different regions of the world and especially from the near east and Middle East. According to Steven Woehrel, a specialist in European Affairs, ‘Radical Islamic organizations, some with links to terrorism, have attempted to recruit followers among Kosovo Albanian Muslims but these attempts have met with limited success. Ethnic Albanian nationalists have committed terrorist attacks on Serbian civilians in Kosovo, but there is little evidence so far that they are working with Al-Qaeda or other radical Islamic groups’ [15].

efforts to confuse and manipulate the targeted contingents should become the core of the intelligence community’s response to terrorists, wherever they may be. No country nurturing or harbouring terrorists should be exempted from special operations going beyond diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions. To this end, human penetration, the recruitment of agents within or the infiltration of agents into the vital structures of institutions, groupings and cells of potential adversaries must be the key to all intelligence efforts. 9 ‘Regional stability has also been undermined through the surreptitious funnelling of support from Belgrade to the army of the Republika Srpska and to paramilitary vigilantes in Mitrovica in northern Kosovo called ‘bridgewatchers.’ At least until January 2002 the bridgewatchers were funded from the budget of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, but they also finance themselves through extortion and organised crime. Adept at orchestrating unruly demonstrations, the bridgewatchers have been responsible for the worst acts of violence that have been perpetrated against the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including a grenade and sniper assault in April 2002 that injured 26 international police. They also use strong-arm tactics to intimidate Kosovo Serbs who co-operate with the UNMIK and to resist the deployment of Serb members of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) in northern Mitrovica. The bridgewatchers are the primary reason that the UNMIK had been unable to extend its writ north of the Ibar River in the predominantly Serb portion of Mitrovica.’

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Some conclusions regarding terrorism in Kosovo After studying and analysing various aspects of terrorism in Kosovo, the results of which are pointed out above, it might be concluded that: • Kosovo society is not endangered to a disturbing extent by the occurrence of terrorism; • in post-war Kosovo, of all the possible forms of terrorism only two of them appeared: explosions and politically motivated murders; • in Kosovo there was no case of hijacking, ship hijacking, use of weapons of mass destruction and hostage-taking, namely extraordinarily common forms of contemporary terrorism; • terrorist acts committed in Kosovo are mainly directed against the institutions of the Kosovo government, UN Mission targets in Kosovo and ethnic targets; • the devices most used often for terrorist purposes in Kosovo are firearms, bombs, grenades and various explosive mechanisms which usually contain a small amount of explosive; and • usually no one claims responsibility for terrorist acts committed in Kosovo because they have mainly been committed by unidentified individuals and groups. To date, the only group known is the Albanian National Army which has admitted responsibility for two explosions [16].

References: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

[10] [11] [12] [13]

[14]

[15]

KIPRED, 'Review of the Internal Security Sector in Kosovo', Prishtina, March 2006. UNMIK/REG/1999/1, On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, 25.7.1999. Paola Marusich-Blancarte, Kosovo juridical status: critical analysis to three claims to independence, Occasional Short Paper No 2, Institute for Strategic Studies, Ljubljana, 2005, 15. Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 'Thematic Report on National Policies for Education in Kosovo', 2001, available on www.see-educop.net/education_ in/, 27.3.2007. UNMIK Regulation no. 2001/12, On the Prohibition of Terrorism and other similar offences, promulgated and enacted on 14.6.2001. US Department of State, 'Patterns of Global Terrorism-1997', USA, April 1998. Serb Secret Service agency behind explosions in Skopje, http://www.alb-net.com/kcc/062599e.htm, 24.5.2007. UNMIK 'Which foreign secret services operate in Kosovo?' http://www.unmikonline.org/press/mon/ lmm160800.html, last visited 20.6.2007. International Herald Tribune, 'Explosion in Kosovo damages vehicles of international security organization', http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/26/europe/EU-GEN-Kosovo-Explosion.php, 26.3.2007. International Crisis Group, 'Kosovo after Haradinaj',, Europe Report No. 163, 26.5.2005. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 'Explosion, fire wreck party offices in Kosovo', 17.10.2001, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4196/is_20011017/ai_n10732154, 28.4.2007. Another explosion rocks Kosovo, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2005/July_06/2.html, 27.4.2007,_06/2.html, 27.4.2007. Kalugin. D. Oleg, Terrorism and Human Intelligence, Centre for Counterterrorism Studies/Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, 2004, http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread. php?t = 21585, 22.5.2007. Research Institute for European and American Studies, 'Special Report on Organized Crime and Political Extremism in the Balkans', 2003, available at http://www.borrull.org/e/noticia.php?id=14123, 16.6.2007. Woehrel, Steven, Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,2005, http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/islamic_terrorism.htm, 15.6.2007.

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[16] Classic Balkanalysis, 'Occupation by Bad Example', 10/3/2004, http://www.balkanalysis.com/?p=434, 27.5.2007.

Other References Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (PCCK) promulgated in July 2003 and enacted on 6 April 2004.

Abbreviations ANA - Albanian National Army KFOR - Kosovo Forces KIPRED - Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army KPS - Kosovo Police Service LDK - Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës ( Democratic League of Kosovo) NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ORA - Partia Reformiste ORA (Reformist Party ORA) OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PDK - Partia Demokratike e Kosovës ( Democratic Party of Kosovo) PCCK - Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo RIEAS - Research Institute for European and American Studies SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary General UNMIK - United Nations Mission in Kosovo UN - United Nations

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Terrorism in the Western Balkans – the Croatian Experience and Position1 Siniša TATALOVIĆ and Ružica JAKEŠEVIĆ Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

Abstract: Terrorism is a multilayered phenomenon which, if to be viewed in its entirety, implies an interdisciplinary approach and parallel research in a number of areas. The reason it is difficult to deal with this social phenomenon is that there is a whole series of different subjective and objective factors that slow down the resolution of the complex problem of terrorism. Croatia is a state that was burdened by intense terrorist activities in the period from 1992 to 2001. The war in Croatia exerted a primary influence on it since it provided favourable conditions for the spread of terrorism. The basic sources of terrorism in Croatia in the past period were accumulated economic, ethnic, social, religious, political etc. contradictions, undesirable social conditions and unrealised ambitions of certain social groups. This article deals with terrorism in Croatia in the mentioned period in terms of: (a) international; (b) insurgent; and (c) domestic terrorism. Keywords: national security, conflict, terrorism, types of terrorism, legislation, Croatia, war, post-war period

Introduction Terrorism can be defined differently and there is no final and universally accepted definition of terrorism. Still, what is common to all definitions is that terrorism basically means the application of terror or violence. For the American FBI 2 terrorism is the ‘illegal application of force or violence against persons or property in order to intimidate or coerce the government, civilian population or any part of the society and to promote one's own political or social goals’ [1]. The concept of terrorism and its definition have changed somewhat through history but the interpretation that comes closest to the present-day understanding of terrorism defines terrorism as violence aimed at provoking fear or breaking resistance for the sake of the achievement of a certain, primarily political goal. What is understood by this concept is a systematic application of violence or, rather, a system of violent government [2]. The chief instruments of terrorism in the pursuit of its goals are the most brutal forms of violence, assassinations and serious crimes tending towards extensive demolition and mass destruction. In a nutshell: a terrorist act can be defined as an attack on employees of state authorities, civilians, facilities and other material assets for the sake of attaining a political objective. Still, there is very frequently confusion as to who is a terrorist and 1 This article was completed within the scientific-research project ‘The Republic of Croatia in the European Security Architecture’. 2 The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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who is a freedom fighter and a human rights fighter. If the definition of terrorist activities is indisputable, why is it then that all those who perpetrate such acts are not terrorists? Who decides that, on the basis of what criteria and what is the difference between them? This dilemma about who is a terrorist and who is a human rights fighter arose over the past 15 years just as a result of the impact of major powers on the international public. Terrorism is a multilayered phenomenon which, if to be viewed in its entirety, implies an interdisciplinary approach and parallel research in a number of areas. The reason it is difficult to deal with this social phenomenon is that there is a whole series of different subjective and objective factors that slow down the resolution of the complex problem of terrorism. The most frequent objective factors are social relations and conflicts of interest as well as the deficient legal regulation of this phenomenon, while the subjective factors arise from the politically motivated conduct of states on the international scene which often, due to their own interests, avoid or violate their international commitments whose implementation should help combat terrorism. Although terrorism motivated by ethno-nationalist and separatist aspirations arose within the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires, it was only after 1945 that that phenomenon became a more penetrating global force. Anti-colonial terrorism is crucial to understanding the evolution and development of modern terrorism. The ability of terrorist groups to win over sympathy and support beyond the borders of the actual scene of action represented a lesson to other peoples who started to view terrorism as an efficient instrument for turning what had been until then local conflicts into international issues. Thus, in the late 1960s groundwork was laid for transforming terrorism from a primarily local phenomenon into a security issue on a global scale. Since the appearance of terrorism up to the present, terrorism has been so imbued with meaning and theoretically shaped that a corresponding doctrine with many rules, procedures and practices was formulated so it is possible to discuss terrorism as a doctrine of violent actions and terrorism as a practice of systematic violence in the struggle to achieving a certain (political) goal. In the early 21st century and in particular following the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, interest in terrorism has been increasing. A growing number of books and articles on the phenomenon of terrorism bear witness to the global concern. Their contents reflect the fact that terrorism is viewed today as a major threat to values of liberal democracy, with significant consequences for the welfare of the entire international community. There can be no moral justification for terrorist acts no matter what the proclaimed goals of their perpetrators may be. The main feature of terrorist attacks is the wilful killing of civilians. When small groups, state agents or broader insurgent movements strive to attain their political and military objectives which are, in their assessment, unattainable at regular political fora or on the battlefield against an entire army, they use terrorism which has today become a familiar trait of global politics and conflicts. Terrorism is always political, even when it depicts other motives such as religious, economic or social [3]. Years of an obvious lack of interest on the part of the United Nations – which has still not defined the concept of terrorism – and relativistic mottos such as ‘One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter’ have undermined the natural human aversion to terrorist methods and enabled terrorist propaganda to gain much more credibility than it deserves. Terrorism is more than a constant threat to the international community and national interests of specific countries. It represents a moral challenge to legal political and social life. It requires a well-balanced, continuous and sometimes violent response of all states that need to pursue the policy of ‘no

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concessions to terrorism’. There is no magic formula for combating terrorism since each conflict has its own unique character, which necessitates a unique set of procedures and measures for an efficient response to terrorist threats. It is wrong to assume that democracies are helpless in the conflict with ever growing terrorist threats. Even relatively small and unstable democracies can display a surprising measure of force and resilience based on their public legitimacy, electoral mandate and legal constitutional powers. Because they enjoy constitutional legitimacy in the eyes of majority of their citizens, liberal democracies have shown remarkable resistance to the terrorist campaigns of extremist political movements. However, they have not been immune to terrorist attacks: quite the opposite, intrinsic freedoms of a democratic society can make terrorist propaganda, the recruitment of terrorists, as well as the planning and execution of terrorist operations a relatively easy task [4]. The chief fallacy is that it is possible to fight terrorism exclusively by law enforcement methods, without an actual study of its social and political roots and causes [5].

1. The Study of Terrorism in Croatia Croatia is a state that was burdened by intense terrorist activities in the period from 1992 to 2001. The war in Croatia exerted a primary influence on it since it provided favourable conditions for the spread of terrorism. The rebellion of some Serbs in Croatia and the Croatian police and military response gave rise to a situation that was favourable to terrorist operations in Croatia. This situation made possible terrorist activities that were inspired and organised by Serb rebels as well as by the Croatian side, in particular by groups and individuals who acted of their own initiative. Counterterrorist activities in Croatia, when state authorities are in question, were directed mainly against Serb rebels during the war and against all the masterminds and executors of terrorist acts. The actions of thwarting and sanctioning terrorist activities were very modest and insufficient, in particular at the end of the war in 1995 when a large number of terrorist attacks on civilians and their property took place. Vague legal provisions and indistinct actions of the competent state authorities, which followed a relatively narrowed spectrum of terrorist activities, were not advantageous in an effective fight against all forms of contemporary terrorism. For the sake of all this, the study of terrorism in Croatia is very complex and what makes it even more difficult is the absence of a clear classification and quantification of terrorist activities in the 10 years being analysed. To cover this subject, it is necessary to classify terrorist activities on the basis of a media analysis of terrorism in Croatia, quantify them and review their consequences. This should make it possible to propose certain measures in the legislative and organisational fields. Terrorism is becoming one of the main security problems of the contemporary world. It is accepted by different, primarily political groups, organisations and even some states that are guided by the motto ‘the ends justify the means’ as a means and method for attaining their goals. Terrorism is a trans-national phenomenon – it can emerge in any part of the world should it be of interest to certain forces and structures. For this reason, it is not only a challenge to certain individual states but to the entire world and hence the whole international community has to fight it.

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2. Sources and Types of Terrorism in Croatia The basic sources of terrorism in Croatia in the past period were accumulated (economic, ethnic, social, religious, political...) contradictions, undesirable social conditions and the unrealised ambitions of certain social groups. Particularly prominent are: 1. economic and social disparities within society; 2. frustrated national feelings or extreme nationalism; 3. national subjugation – a lack of freedom, unresolved ethnic problems; 4. unresolved border disputes, questionable solutions in respect to the status of some areas and the states they belong to; 5. religious deviation – fundamentalism; 6. a desire for power – unfulfilled political ambitions; 7. a desire for expansion and hegemony (national, territorial, economic, social, religious and cultural domination); 8. the existence and interests of structures of large-scale national and international crime (narcotic production and trafficking, illegal arms trade...); and 9. revenge. Exponents of terrorism in Croatia were certain political, para-political and similar organisations and groupings, which chose violence (violent methods) as a road to fulfil their goals in line with their ideology, objectives and some general considerations, instead of democratic action, in other words political methods. Certain state institutions also appeared under certain conditions as exponents of terrorism in failing to punish certain organisations and groups that used terrorism. Some mafia organisations, in particular large-scale narco-mafia can also be added to exponents of terrorism. Individuals with different motives, in particular revenge, also resorted to the use of terrorism. In terms of its orientation, terrorism in Croatia can be divided into three types: (a) international; (b) insurgent; and (c) domestic. International terrorism has not represented a more serious security problem for Croatia so far, although there were some predictions along these lines in public opinion at home and abroad in the early 1990s that primarily took into consideration developments in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the first place MuslimCroatian conflicts and the presence of several hundred mujahedin as part of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina with their experience in terrorist actions). The only classic terrorist action of that type was a terrorist attack on the building of the PrimorskoGoranska Police Department in Rijeka in 1995. Insurgent terrorism was linked to the 1990-1995 period and in particular to 19901991 when, on the eve of the culmination of an armed rebellion, terrorist attacks on police officers of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, servicemen of the National Guard Corps and civilians represented the chief means used by Serb rebel forces. Attacks perpetrated by extremist parts of the SDS3 and members and structures of the Yugoslav People’s Army close to them were labelled as terrorist attacks not only by the public but also by state authorities, in particular by the police and judiciary. Domestic terrorism, or rather terrorism in the territory beyond the regions affected by armed rebellion, can roughly be divided into several categories. One group includes acts with certain features of terrorism (planting bombs in vehicles, facilities, 3

SDS – Srpska demokratska stranka [Serb Democratic Party]; translator's note.

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establishments etc.) against citizens of Serb nationality, mostly in crisis areas, but also in Zagreb and in places outside the regions directly affected by the war. The second category comprises acts that can be subsumed under organised crime, namely acts with a clear criminal background. There are also acts perpetrated by means similar to those of terrorism but whose motives are personal (settling accounts within the family, settling debts etc.). Terrorist activities were included in the war strategies of the warring sides in Croatia. For this reason, the war period was marked by a large number of terrorist attacks on both belligerents. The goals of the masterminds and perpetrators of terrorist attacks on both sides were similar. They were: sending a message to members of another ethnic group that they had to leave a certain place (the murder of the Serb family Zec in Zagreb or the massacre of Croatian civilians in the Dalmatian village of Škabrnja) or sending a message to members of one's own people that there was no room for co-existence (the murder of Dmitar Obradović, head of the Gvozd Municipality, or the murder of Josip Reichl-Kir, head of the Police Department in Osijek).

3. Legislation on Combating Terrorism Since 1990 there have been significant changes in legislation dealing with terrorism, international terrorism and similar criminal acts in Croatia [6]. The Penal Code (Article 141) defines an act of anti-state terrorism: ‘Whoever, with an aim to endanger the constitutional order or the security of the Republic of Croatia, causes an explosion, fire or by a generally dangerous act or device imperils the lives of people or endangers property or kidnaps a person, or commits some other act of violence within the territory of the Republic of Croatia or against its citizens, thus creating a feeling of personal insecurity in citizens, shall be imprisoned for a period of not less than five years’ [7]. Article 169 defines international terrorism as: (1) Whoever aims to cause major fear among the population, to force foreign states or international organisations to do or not do something or suffer, or who aims to seriously jeopardise the fundamental constitutional, political or economic values of a foreign state or an international organisation, commits a criminal offence referred to in Articles 170 through 172, and Articles 179 and 181 of this Code, or who causes an explosion or fire, or by a generally perilous act or means creates a dangerous situation for people or property, or kidnaps a person or commits another violent act which can seriously harm a foreign state or an international organisation shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years. (2) Whoever seriously threatens to commit a criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by imprisonment for one to five years. (3) If, by the criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the death of one or more persons is caused, the perpetrator shall be punished by

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imprisonment for not less than ten years or by long-term imprisonment. (4) If, by the criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the death of one or more persons or large-scale destruction is caused, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten years. (5) In order to initiate criminal proceedings for the criminal offence referred to in this Article, an approval from the State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia is required.’ The Act on Liability for Damages Arising from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations [8] governs the liability for damages arising from acts of terror and other acts of violence perpetrated with a view to the serious infringement of public order through intimidation and creating the feeling of insecurity among citizens and arising from demonstrations or other forms of publicly displayed mood in public places. As defined in this Act, an act of terror is especially considered to be an act of violence perpetrated as a rule for political motives with the aim of causing fear, horror and a feeling of personal insecurity of citizens. According to this Act, the Republic of Croatia is liable for damages arising from terrorist acts and public demonstrations on the basis of the principle of social solidarity, the even distribution of a public burden and equitable and fast indemnification. According to this Act, the obligation to compensate for damage exists independently of the fact whether the individual who caused damage was identified, prosecuted or found guilty. The damaged parties are considered to be individuals who have sustained damage or individuals who have sustained damage as a result of an action to prevent harmful acts or to help the victims.

4. Manifestations of Terrorism and Basic Quantitative Indicators In the 1992-2001 period manifestations of terrorism in Croatia appeared in the conditions of war and the post-war period. The war period was marked by extraordinarily strong and numerous terrorist acts perpetrated in the areas in the immediate vicinity of the front. This implied killing innocent civilians, mining private homes or social facilities that could be used by the other side, as well as planting bombs in vehicles for intimidatory purposes. In the post-war period, terrorist activities substantially decreased and were marked by mafia showdowns and the planting of bombs under ideologically coloured monuments. In the territory of the Republic of Croatia, a total of 2,279 offences with features of terrorism were registered in the period from 17 August 1990 to 2002. With reference to those offences, criminal charges were laid against 356 individuals because of a reasonable suspicion that they had perpetrated acts of terrorism. In relation to the aforementioned number of registered acts of terrorism it should be highlighted that the figure in the first place refers to the period 1991/92 and to acts perpetrated until the end of 1995, or that most of those offences were perpetrated in an armed rebellion or armed conflicts linked to the war in Croatia, which subsequently fell within the scope of the Act on General Amnesty of 20 September 1996 (official gazette Narodne Novine no. 80/96). When it comes to dealing with offences that have features of terrorism, there lacked a unified approach by the relevant authorities and thus some offences with objective features of terrorism were classified as acts of ‘jeopardising life and property through a universally dangerous act’. This fact significantly lessens the actual dimension of terrorist activities in the past ten years in the territory of Croatia.

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5. Terrorism in the Occupied Part of the Republic of Croatia Terrorist acts perpetrated against facilities and police officers, through the use of explosives and open fire on police officers in the course of 1990/1991 prior to the start of the war conflict were mostly dealt with as an offence of terrorism in the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia. One can single out an example of classical terrorism: planting explosive devices in the area of Plaški when railway tracks on the line Zagreb-Split and overhead transmission lines were mined. Also many attacks on police check-points in spring/summer 1991 can also be qualified as such (Budačka Rijeka, Žuta Lokva etc.). With respect to offences with features of terrorism perpetrated in the occupied part of the Republic of Croatia since the end of 1991, one can state that such acts were mostly dealt with by applying other articles of the Penal Code4. For instance, Mile Martić was charged by the court of jurisdiction with the offence of a war crime for ordering a rocket attack on Zagreb even though it can be stated that it was beyond any doubt an act with features of terrorism. A group of high-ranking JNA officers was charged and sentenced in absentia by a court in Karlovac for the offence of ‘joining forces for the sake of performing a hostile activity’, although most of the acts they were charged with were, objectively, acts of terror5. Only the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia pressed more than 20,000 charges against persons under the suspicion of having participated in an armed rebellion or some other offences related to this. Competent state authorities qualified individual acts directed against the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the state for the most part as an armed rebellion and very seldom as terrorist activities.

6. Terrorism in the Free Part of the Republic of Croatia A number of significant offences with features of terrorism were registered in the free territory of the Republic of Croatia at the start of the war conflict. Offences perpetrated in 1991/92 that can be singled out from that group refer to planting explosive devices in front of the building of the Jewish Community and in the Jewish cemetery in Zagreb (on 19 August 1991), in front of the Museum of the Serb Orthodox Church in Zagreb (on 11 April 1992) and in front of the building of the American Embassy at Zrinjevac Square No. 14 in Zagreb (on 1 May 1992). In reviewing the problem area pertaining to terrorism in Croatia (presently qualified in the Penal Code as anti-state terrorism) in the period from 1990 to 2002, it is observable that this qualification of the offence was applied proportionately seldom and terrorist acts were for the most part qualified otherwise as ‘generally dangerous acts’. Planting bombs in houses and other buildings has some features of terrorism. However, due to the specific nature of perpetrated acts, their number and lack of 4 Those offences were mostly qualified as acts of armed rebellion and subsequently of war crimes i.e. offences quoted in Chapter 19 of the then Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia and Chapters 14 and 15 of the then Basic Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia. 5 Due to armed rebellion and a threat of terrorism the Croatian Parliament enacted the Act on Offences of Subversive and Terrorist Activities against State Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of the Republic of Croatia as early as 4 November 1992. Article 5 of the Act read: ‘Whoever threatens the peace and safety of citizens or the state stability of the Republic of Croatia through terrorist activities shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years or imprisonment of twenty years.’

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interconnection in the sense of the penal law, such acts were for the most part treated as offences under Article 146 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia or as the already referred to ‘jeopardising life and property through a universally dangerous act’. Subsequent police investigations into individual cases of planting bombs ascertained that a significant majority of these offences were perpetrated in connection with offences of general crime and organised crime. Still, planting bombs in a large number of houses and other buildings was meant to spread fear and to send certain political messages, which means these acts had features of terrorism.

7. Post-War Criminal Offences with Features of Terrorism Post-war manifestations of terrorism in Croatia were especially pronounced at the beginning of this decade. In the course of 2000/01 offences including the use of explosives were perpetrated in Croatia, specifically in Zagreb, which considerably upset the public. Those were: • Milan Levar, a protected witness of the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, was murdered on 28 August 2000. He died after activating a handgrenade that was planted below a car tyre in his yard. Although the police suspected that one of the perpetrators might have been arrested together with the Gospić Group, an indictment for Levar's murder has still not been issued. • An explosive device was planted and exploded in a metal refuse container in Zagreb at the Dolac city market, in front of house number 9 on 23 November 2000. There were no victims and the terrorist act was, in police circles, linked to the Zagreb Summit which was held in late November in Zagreb and assembled a large number of statesmen from 24 European countries. • An explosive device was planted in front of the building of the Serb Orthodox Church in Zagreb on 15 January 2001. It was discovered by the building’s caretaker who, unaware of its nature, threw it into a nearby refuse container. The device exploded only several hours later in a lorry owned by the city waste utility. There were no official reports on that attack which has so far remained unknown to the general public. • An explosive device was planted and activated at the monument and tomb of the National Heroes of the People's Anti-Fascist Struggle at the Mirogoj Cemetery in Zagreb on 1 February 2001. The explosion took place in the evening after more than five kilograms of explosives were activated by a slow-burning fuse. The explosion provoked a fierce public response. • An explosive device was planted and exploded in a refuse container at a car park next to the Zagreb City Government building in Zagreb, Stjepan Radić Square No. 1, on 15 March 2001. The explosion caused substantial damage, five nearby parked cars were burnt and the public was seriously troubled. In addition to the aforementioned offences committed by the planting of explosives, other offences of the same type were also perpetrated. Most of them were tied to other forms of offences linked to criminal activities. It has recently been pointed out that planting anti-personnel mines in the area of the city of Vojnić that were activated on three occasions in 2001 (on 10 August, 2 October and 20 October 2001) are a criminal offence with features of terrorism. Planting anti-personnel mines, as surprise mines, was especially typical in the aftermath of the war and can be linked to

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the activities of individuals and groups who oppose the return of Serb refugees to Croatia. The Croatian Helsinki Committee registered 24 cases of planting mines that killed 10 people and injured another 21. The injured are permanently seriously disabled persons. All cases were reported to the police, yet none of them had been clarified by the end of 1999. Only after the change in government on 3 January 2000 did the police start clarifying individual cases of surprise mines6. A characteristic terrorist attack using surprise mines, which especially alarmed the public, happened on 2 February 1999 in the village of Brlog next to Otočac. When Nikola Karleuša (77) pulled out hay from a hay-stack with a fork for his cows, he activated a deliberately planted hand-grenade that exploded7. In the following day, during an examination of the scene of the death of Nikola Karleuša another lethal device exploded at the same spot. This time, the victim was an officer of the Anti-Explosive Device Department of the Lika-Senj Police Department Zvonko Delač (35) from Perušić. While he was examining the hay-stack with some hand tools along with his colleague, an explosives specialist, an explosive device exploded. Although his injuries were critical, he survived thanks to speedy medical intervention.

8. International Terrorism in the Territory of Croatia With regard to offences with features of international terrorism, three offences have been qualified as such by Croatian state authorities since 1990: • the shooting down of an EU helicopter by JNA aircraft in 1991; • the activating of a car bomb in front of the Primorsko-Goranska Police Department building on 20 October 1995. The Egyptian terrorist organisation ‘Al-gam'a al-islamiya’ claimed responsibility for the attack through the London-based Reuters news-agency; and • cutting off the chain of IRA dissident factions for the supply of arms and explosives from the territory of the Republic of Croatia. The shooting down of the EU helicopter can be qualified as a classical act of state terrorism. The terrorist action in Rijeka, according to all its essential features, fits into the typical operations of radical Arab (Islamic) terrorist organisations (collaboration of several such organisations, suicide attacks etc.). The chain of supply of arms and explosives of dissident IRA factions from the territory of Croatia was cut off by authorities of the Republic of Croatia in charge of such actions in co-operation with law enforcement and intelligence services of the United Kingdom. During the police investigation arms and explosives were discovered that were intended for IRA dissident groups. Criminal charges were filed against two nationals of the Republic of Croatia for the reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offence of international terrorism according to Article 169 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia and in connection with Article 38 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia – Aiding and Abetting. The court of jurisdiction, however, rejected such incrimination and criminal proceedings against the parties in question were conducted for the unauthorised 6 Šime Lučin, Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, told the Croatian weekly Globus on 23 March 2001 that the police ‘have recently resolved 13 cases of planting explosive devices in the territory of the Lika-Senj County, which happened from 1996 to 1998, in which six persons lost their lives’. 7 According to reports of the Croatian daily Novi list of 4 February 1999, death was instantaneous.

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possession of arms and explosives. With the exception of the car bomb and cutting off the IRA supply chain there have been no cases of international terrorism recorded in the Republic of Croatia since 1995.

Conclusion When reviewing the problem of terrorism and its appearances in the broadest sense, it is necessary to emphasise that one of the gravest consequences of the war in Croatia is the fact that huge quantities of explosives, arms and mines and explosive devices of military origin were not appropriately controlled. Thus, individuals and groups came into possession of arms and explosives of military origin and used them to perpetrate different offences falling within the scope of general and organised crime. Offences perpetrated in such a way do not possess the features of classical terrorism. However, as a rule, they cause grave consequences whether to persons or to property, significantly disturb the public and substantially aggravate police work and criminal investigations. Also, it should be stressed that some offences with the features of terrorism indisputably fall into the category of organised crime or, in other words, crime that resorts to classical terrorist methods (such as planting explosive devices under private vehicles), but is motivated not by political but by criminal motives. What contributed to the existence and development of terrorism during the war and in the post-war period was as follows: 1. the political regime that hindered democratic relations, processes and institutions, being slow to resolve the issues of national minorities, in particular of the Serb community in Croatia; 2. actions by the state in supporting or leaving in impunity the masterminds and executors of terrorist attacks for the sake of satisfying self-interests; 3. engineering and technological development, in particular arms development, which increases to undreamed-of levels the lethal power of individuals and small groups, in particular in circumstances where large numbers of citizens possess arms; and 4. communication and information interconnectedness which makes it possible for the general public to be informed about a terrorist attack or demands of terrorists almost instantaneously. The goals of terrorism are specially shaped and express the political or parapolitical goals of organisations, groups or movements that are also ready to resort to terrorist methods. The goals of terrorism in Croatia that could and still can be identified are as follows: 1. changes in government with which the instigators of terrorist activities are not satisfied; 2. the seizure of power implying a violent overthrow of the existing government and taking over state authority; 3. the internationalisation of a conflict, in particular if the other side is supported by somebody and if the engagement of the international community is deemed desirable;

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4. 5. 6.

fomenting a rebellion against the government8; challenging the authorities and forcing them to take actions that would be condemned by the domestic and international public; and causing economic and other damage to certain regions or communities.

Risk assessment is one of the fundamental conditions of a successful fight against terrorism. The assessment of the risk from terrorism in Croatia basically comprises: 1. the identification and analysis of the source of terrorism; 2. the existence of conditions and factors favouring terrorism; 3. understanding the goals of terrorism; 4. identification of the exponents and perpetrators of terrorism; 5. an evaluation of possible/probable targets; 6. the identification of conditions that may lead to terrorist attacks; 7. possible consequences of the attacks; 8. possibilities for combating/preventing attacks; 9. measures of preventive and operational protection; 10. modus operandi in case of attacks, alternatives for alleviating the risk and for providing assistance; and 11. the optimisation of risks, in other words solutions that meet security requirements with minimum costs, or how to achieve maximum security with existing resources. The assessment of the threat of terrorism in Croatia is also based on the experience acquired so far characterised by the following acts of terrorism: 1. assassinations and attacks on persons that represented some symbol; 2. planting bombs in or burning houses or catering establishments; 3. planting car bombs; 4. planting bombs under monuments, in particular those commemorating events from the People's Liberation Struggle; 5. blocking communication; and 6. attacks on state and public institutions. Intensified transnational threats in the region and beyond – global terrorism, organised crime, refugee crises – will have a direct or indirect impact on the national security of the Republic of Croatia. These phenomena, no matter whether their source is in the immediate neighbourhood or beyond, are its real security risk. Global terrorism represents a threat to international peace and security, thus jeopardising the interests of the Republic of Croatia too. The activities of organised crime and their consequences (destabilisation of state institutions, damaging the legal order, economic crime and corruption) represent the Croatian reality and are a major security challenge. The problem of arms and narcotic drugs trafficking as well as illegal migration should be stressed as a major security risk. Due to its location in the region crossed by trafficking routes from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe bound for Western Europe, the Republic of Croatia is especially sensitive to these types of security threats.

8

According to a survey conducted by the Croatian weekly Globus on 23 March 2001 as many as 51.4% of the respondents answered the question of whether the explosions in Zagreb were terrorist actions aimed at toppling the government of the time with ‘yes’, 23.0% responded with ‘no’, while 25.6% of the respondents replied they ‘did not know’.

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State protection from terrorism in the Croatian case should imply operations of the instruments of the state and its bodies and services in: (a) preventing terrorism; (b) eliminating conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorist organisations and their activities; (c) combating terrorism; (d) protecting citizens, state institutions and the constitutional order; and (e) protecting the system, as well as the level and quality of national security. In that respect, the Republic of Croatia has taken great strides at the national level but also in co-operation with other countries, in particular in the region of South-east Europe.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

[7]

[8]

B. Hoffman, Unutrašnji terorizam [Inside Terrorism], Narodna knjiga, Beograd, 2000. B. Klaić, Rječnik stranih riječi, MH Zagreb, 1986, 1345; Policijska sigurnost, Zagreb, 1997, no 1-2. Christopher C. Harmon, Terorizam danas [Terrorism Today], Golden marketing, Zagreb, 2002. P. Wilkinson, Terorizam protiv demokracije – odgovor liberalne države, [Terrorism Versus Democracy: the Liberal State Response], Golden marketing, Zagreb, 2002. S. Tatalović, Nacionalna i međunarodna sigurnost [National and International Security], Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2006. Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia [Osnovni krivični zakon Republike Hrvatske] (published in the official gazette Narodne novine No. 31/93, 39/93, 108/95, 16/96 and 28/96) and Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia [Krivični zakon Republike Hrvatske] (published in the official gazette Narodne novine No. 32/93, 38/93, 16/96 and 28/96), and Act on Offences of Subversive and Terrorist Activities against State Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of the Republic of Croatia (official gazette Narodne novine, No. 74/92) ceased to be valid with the entry into force of the Penal Code [Kazneni zakon] on 1 January 1998 (published in the official gazette Narodne novine No. 110/97). Penal Code [Kazneni zakon] (official gazette Narodne novine No. 110/97, 27/98, 50/00 – Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, 129/00, 51/06, 111/03, 190/03 – Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, 105/04 and 71/06). Act on Liability for Damages Arising from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (Narodne novine No. 117/03).

_______ Note: For the purposes of this article the authors used: the materials of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (CHC); newspaper articles published in: Vjesnik, Večernji list, Jutarnji list and Novi list; articles published in the weekly reviews: Globus, Nacional and Feral Tribune; discussions with a certain number of non-governmental organisations’ representatives, research institutions as well as governmental institutions’ representatives.

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III. Country Approaches to Crisis Management: Policies, Mechanisms, Dilemmas and Perspectives

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The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Civil Security and Crisis Management: The Concept Development and Experimentation Process in Bulgaria (Role of the US, NATO and the EU in SEE)1 Velizar Mateev SHALAMANOV Head of C4I Department at the Institute for Parallel Processing, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Abstract: The paper reviews the experience gained through a series of studies and exercises focused on developing the concept of the Civil Security and Integrated Security Sector in Bulgaria. The main focus is on Command and Control in order to achieve horizontal and vertical integration in crisis management operations. The concept of the development and experimentation process, supported by computerassisted exercises, is an instrument that has been proposed to achieve better regional co-operation and the building of modern and interoperable systems in SEE. Keywords: crisis management, emergency management, security sector, command and control, computer-assisted exercises, change management

Introduction: Civil Security and an Integrated Security Sector The real challenge in the security area is the transition to a comprehensive approach with the citizen in the centre of the concept and the efforts of the security sector. Having in mind this idea of Civil Security [1], the next challenge is to have a common space for the same level of security for citizens for the whole Euro-Atlantic community. This even more complex concept requires many elements to be explored, such as: 1. an Integrated Security Sector as an answer to the Civil Security challenge; 2. the Command and Control Dilemma and C4ISR Architecture for Crisis Management; 3. operational procedures for integrated incident, emergency and crisis management;

1

Work on this topic was supported by NATO’s Scientific Division in the framework of the Science for Peace Programme - Project SFP-981149 (2005-2007) CoE in Operational Analyses (http://www.gcmarshall.bg/sfp981149/).

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the Governance Model of the integrated system for incident, emergency and crisis management, incl. financing of the system development and life cycle support; 5. computer-assisted exercises (CAX) as a tool for change management in the area; 6. building a common space for security and safety in the EuroAtlantic/Transatlantic area; and 7. special attention to the democratic control of the integrated security sector as a key requirement for global security to be harmonised with democracy. The current structure of the security sector that includes different institutions with a monopoly over the use of force or information operations in support of the use of force is mirroring the structure of well-defined and separate operations of the use of force/information support to the use of force [2], [3], [4]. At the same time, nowadays the security environment defines the need for complex crisis management operations where interagency, international, joint, private-public co-operation is essential [5]. This reason is driving integration in the security sector where different institutions keep their identity together with the opportunity to form combined interagency joint forces for specific complex operations with a change in the mix of forces in different stages of operation or when moving from one operation to another in the same region. An integrated security sector is not an organisation but a concept of the organisation of institutions participating in this network in order to be able to work together, to support each other, reinforce each other when for each particular operation one institution takes the lead according to the operation’s legal status [6]. Figure 1 schematically presents this transition from a set of organisations responsible for specific operations to an integrated security sector able to implement complex incident, emergency, crisis management operations.

Mo I

Mo EM

MoI

Mo D

MoD

Mo FA

MoFA

Special Services

4.

MoEM Integrated Security Sector Special Serv ices

One Ministry ’s Operation: •Def ense •Public order •Emergency management •Diplomacy •Inf ormation

Complex Crisis Management Operations of the Integrated Security Sector

Figure 1. Third-Generation SSR for an Integrated Security Sector The ultimate goal of the security sector is the security/safety of the citizen – meaning Civil Security – the roof of the Security Temple presented in Figure 2. This is the central point in the planning of the security system. In the past there were,

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especially in the defence area, different concepts – enemy-/threat-oriented planning, capabilities-oriented planning, operations (effect-based operations) oriented planning, but the key even for operations is the security of the citizen.

Civil Security Operations D O C M E N T S

ORGANIZATIONS

S Y S T E M S

RESOURCES

International co-operation / integration Democratic Control Change management

Figure 2. Temple of security

In order to achieve Civil Security through effective operations the security sector needs its four main pillars – documents (starting from the Constitution of the country or international agreements through strategies, doctrines and laws down to annual reports and white papers), organisations (from combat units through command structures up to management and oversight organisations), systems (from lethal weapon systems, through support/logistic elements up to C4ISR systems) and, of course, resources (financial, material, human, informational and even time). In order for the pillars to be able to support Civil Security through operations, there is a need to rely on three fundaments – international co-operation and especially higher level – integration in security alliances; democratic control based on transparency and accountability; and, of course, the most serious requirement in the global world – a strong capacity for change management in order to adapt all the above elements to the new situation.

1. The Command and Control Dilemma and the C4ISR Architecture for Crisis Management A key element of the integrated security sector is its command and control (C2) system. This is a key element of horizontal and vertical integration on the service, national, regional and Euro-Atlantic levels where interoperability is only one dimension to consider. Even democratic control of the security sector is part of the command and control/governance system at large.

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Info attack

Info attack Decision Orientation

Planning

Understanding Knowledge Info assurance Information

Info assurance

Data

Observation

Action

Figure 3. The key role of decision-making in the C4ISR systems In the security sector the key role is the decision-making and effectiveness [7] of the Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance System (C4ISRS) [8]. Success in this area is based on the speed of Observation, Orientation, Decision, Planning and Action (OODPA) cycle based on a cognitive pyramid (data, information, knowledge, understanding, decision and down again). This cycle, together with cognitive pyramid of decision-making, is presented in Figure 3. Non Emergency Communications (for example “311”) Emergency Communications (for example “911”, “112”, …) Emergency Management to include Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS), Integrated Early Warning System (IEWS), Integrated Alert and Notification System (IANS) Defense-Crisis Management / Expeditionary Operations to include NMCC

Total Defense / Total War

Figure 4. Levels of the C4ISR At the same time, we have to recognise that there will be permanent information attacks to ruin this process and we need to have the capacity to assure information in this environment of permanent C2 warfare/information operations. This concept defines the requirements of the C2 systems for providing Civil Security through an Integrated Security Sector. In Civil Security we have to consider C4ISR on at least five vertical levels and to try to integrate the elements of the C4ISR on different levels in one system for the seamless C2 of security operations, as presented in Figure 4. This integration is not only a challenge for interoperability on the

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technical and even operational levels, but a serious issue on the System Governance Level (SGL) at which input and decisions are made for the principles of building/operating these systems, on the architecture of the C4ISR, the development of infrastructure strategies, the implementation of ‘business applications’, and of course investment in the C4ISR systems/components.

2. Operational procedures for integrated incident, emergency and crisis management Practically on every level there are interagency and even international dimensions to consider, but clearly when going down from a non-emergency response to a total war the requirements are getting higher and higher. At the same time, most probably most of the time we will need for providing the security and safety of the person to use nonemergency and emergency communications systems (they are closer to the citizens in everyday life) [9]. Most critical are emergency, crisis management and wartime systems and they will most probably attract most of the investments. This means another governance challenge is to manage resources so as to have an optimal level of functionality for all levels of the integrated system. Citizen / caller Unified Emergency Call Taking Incident

Specialized Dispatching (CAD)

Police

Fire

Medical Emergency

Large Emergency Situation Emergency Support Functions

Early Warning System

Civil Protection Alert and Notification System

Rescue Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Mobile EOC

Defense Related Emergency Support Functions

Crisis Management Center (CMC) Defense Related Crisis Response Functions

Crisis Situation

Figure 5. Integration between Incident, Emergency and Crisis Management Systems

Figure 5 presents the concept of providing citizens’ security on at least three levels [10]: 1. Through an Incident Management System that receives calls from the citizens or another source and reacts with the capabilities of first responders – Police, Fire teams, Civil Protection (CP) teams, Medical Emergency (ME) teams. 2. If there are too many calls or calls for a series of incidents as well as information from the Early Warning (EW) System (part of the Integrated Emergency Management System – IEMS), or information from the Crisis Management System (CMS) for a large emergency the IEMS is activated

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through the network of Emergency Operations Centres (EOC) and the deployment of the mobile EOC and, in addition to Police, Fire, ME and CP other capabilities are activated from emergency support function areas (transport, utilities, others). In certain cases through the CMS elements of the defence forces (defence-related EM support functions from engineers, NBC, medical, transport, even special forces and CIMIC) are activated in support of civil authorities. In this case, the Incident Management System (IMS) is ‘subordinated’ to a certain extent to the higher priority emergency management operation. 3. If there is any kind of intentional external threat or any kind of threat to Bulgarian citizens outside the country the crisis management system is activated and emergency management and incident management systems are ‘subordinated’ to the highest priority crisis management operation. Critical for IMS is Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) linked with the Geographic Information System (GIS) and related Automated Vehicle Location (AVL), databases (including with access to Automatic Number Identification – ANI and Automatic Location Identification – ALI databases) as well as the sharing of this information between different centres – call taking, dispatch, operations.

National Centers

Other Int. Centers

EU, NATO, UN Centers

Regional Centers

District centers

Municipalities Centers

Object Centers

Mobile Centers

Figure 6. Network of EM/CM Centers

On the level of the EOC a new system for emergency management is required with capability to manage resources and messages to be linked with the Early Warning System, Alert and Notification System, Decision Making Support System and enhanced Office Management System. This EMS is linked with the CAD and GIS/databases of the IMS. On the level of the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) as the next level – a modern C2 system for intensive military involvement is required, but linked with the IEMS and IMS. The CMC should have access to the Alert and Notification System and the EOC. In certain cases – especially on the district and municipal levels – the EOC and CMC could be one and the same facility with certain specifics and there is a need for redundancy – so to have one main and alternate centre. When the city is a District/Region centre one centre (main) could be run by the Governor’s administration

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and an alternative one by the Mayor’s administration, but to have the two of them available for both the Governor and the Mayor in order to save resources. The simplest architecture for the emergency/crisis management system is presented in Figure 6. We need to have all these types of centres and connectivity between them. In addition, especially for the emergency call system (and nonemergency call system with lower requirements for reaction time) we need in parallel (but integrated with emergency management) the system of centres presented in Figure 7. This architecture has to be adapted to the administrative structure of the state and the legal base defining the responsibilities and other meaningful relations in the system of incident, emergency and crisis management as well as defence/public order and security arrangements in the state.

Figure 7. Network of Call / Dispatch Centres In Figure 7 in addition to the EM/CM centres a system of call/dispatch centres is added to co-ordinate incident management operations together with an on-site FR (first responder) C2 (co-ordination centre) as a separate vehicle (or a system could use one of the FR radio/computer systems). The key elements for IEMS (Figure 8) are: 1. An Integrated Early Warning System (IEWS) – this is critical for receiving information on possible critical events/processes. 2. A Fusion Centre (FC) – this is focused on the integration of all incoming and internal information in order to develop and present a Common Operating Picture (COP) for assessment, orientation and decision-making support as well as to be used for information sharing. The Fusion Centre is part of the IEWS and IEMS, but considered a specific critical element to be mentioned separately. 3. The Decision Support System (DSS) – this is part of the IEWS and IEMS but considered a specific critical element to be mentioned separately. It is a set of mathematical models for analysis and synthetic decisions based on information from the FC and directly contributes to improving the understanding of the COP and to develop alternatives to human decisions.

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Figure 8. Conceptual End-State Configuration of the IEMS for Bulgaria 4.

The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) – this is the most complex element to include the Alert and Notification System (ANS) as well as capabilities for communications with different command/operations centres, mobile units, a system for resource management, message handling, recording, tracking of events etc. It is an integrating element providing the environment for dealing with a critical situation by interagency and even international teams. 5. The Training Centre (TC) – this is an element of great importance to support change management in the system by training specialists and teams to work with new procedures and technologies as well as to be used for experimentation. There are at least two levels of training – for the command and control teams and for the first responders/reaction teams. 6. The System Development Laboratory (SDL) – this is an element to support the technology part of the change management process in the life cycle of the emergency management system. The SDL is used for Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD), the development of new technology solutions and most of all for the support of testing, integration and technical training. 7. The Regional EOC (REOC) – this is an element of the system with all aspects of IEWS, ANS, IEMS, FC, DSS and others, but on the local level. 8. The 112 Emergency Communications Centre (112 ECS) – this is an element of the national 112 ECS on the local level to process 112 emergency calls, transfer them to dispatch centres and through them to control the first responders’ reaction. 9. Mobile Command and Control Units (MC2U) – these are units with limited IEMS capabilities, but deployable and connected (reach back capability) with REOC or NEOC to use all the available resources there for the in-the-field C2 of the response operations. The implementation of such a complex system involves great governance challenges. To overcome this, there are some instruments such as feasibility studies for concept development, advanced technology demonstrations (ATD) for experimentation

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.

Emergency Support Functions: Rescue Transport Infrastructure Utilities …….

Video screen

Video Tele conference

LDC monitors

Integrated Emergency Management System

Crisis/Emergency Operations RoomW Early Warning System

I N D O W

Non emergency calls “111” ( in US 311)

Additional working places

GIS/Maps IEWS

Alert / Notification System

Window

Confidential meeting room

Duty Officer

Watch Room A/N S

Mobile and other communications

IEMS

GIS

Ком. усл.

CAD

Connectivity with 112 ECS

7

Figure 9. Municipality/District Emergency/Crisis Management Centre of the key technologies and Computer-Assisted Exercises (CAX) for testing the procedures and the human acceptance of the technologies and concepts, followed by pilot projects of the key elements of the total concept. The pilot project is a challenge for the integration of organisations and technologies on a smaller scale at the regional level in order to verify and improve the concept. Figure 9 presents in more detail the conceptual design of Winbourne and Costas Inc. for the typical Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) at the municipal/district (national) level for emergency/crisis management. The EOC is connected with ‘112’ ECS and ‘311’ non-emergency response system (NERS) to provide an integrated approach to civil security. The implementation of a network of such centres in the main municipalities and district centres (with a main and alternative one – could be between the municipal and district centre in one city serving each other as alternative centres) is a key component of providing a mature civil security system. For the ‘112’ ECS there are several key operational and as a result technology requirements as presented in Figure 10 to be addressed in order to have an effective system to serve the citizens and to be integrated in the EM/CM System. For the ‘311’ NERS there are lower requirements, but they still need a detailed design for very welldefined operational and technological requirements in order to implement an effective system.

3. Governance Model Critical for implementation is the governance model – we can accept that the requirements are the most difficult to be met in the ‘112’ ECS. The governance structure is not only for building the system, but for its effective operation and change management process during the life cycle. Such systems

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Figure 10. Technologies for 112 ECS: Located at Regional Call Centres and District Dispatch Centres

Figure 11. Example: Plovdiv Pilot … Edirne Pilot (Incident, Emergency, Crisis Management) have a long life cycle of 20-30 years and their governance/management is a generational issue. Figure 11 shows the structure for a pilot project to include the network of 2 EOCs (with 311 centres) and the related 112 ECS is presented as an example of the integration of all the ideas presented above. To proceed further a real governance model is required.

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Figure 12. Governance model for the National ‘112 ECS’ In Figure 12 the central role is given to the ‘112’ Council to work out all conceptual and normative aspects of the system, to define the key principles of the 112 ECS, operational requirements and performance standards (including a definition of the services and applications requirements). This means developing the National ‘112’ programme and to oversight its implementation from an operational point of view. When it comes to financing, the key role is given to the MoF that runs the ‘112’ trust fund for the development and operation of the 112 ECS. This trust fund is based on surcharges collected from telecom operators for every telephone set under the regulations of the Commission for Regulating Communications (CRC). In addition, other contributions could be made to the fund – from the national budget, foreign donations and grants etc. Having this trust fund under the MoF (represented in the ‘112’ Council) guarantees transparency and accountability at the highest possible level outside the operational organisations of the 112 ECS. Another key element of the system of governance is the Implementing Agency (in the case of Bulgaria – the State Agency for IT and Communications /SA ITC/), responsible for architecture decisions, infrastructure development, technology issues as well as the programme management, training and maintenance of the 112 ECS. Operating agencies are the MoI, MoH and MoSPDA (the Ministry of State Policy for Disasters and Accidents in the Bulgarian case) that dispatch real first responders and provide C2 in the field. Call taking is performed by unified call-taking centres operated by one of the operating agencies and transferring calls to all relevant dispatch centres. All of this in the 112 ECS is actually the Incident Management System (IMS), but as was discussed above the IMS could be considered an element of the Integrated Emergency and Crisis Management System, where the IEMS could be activated by the IEWS, when the Crisis Management System could be activated by the MoD’s early warning system. In both cases, in addition to call and dispatch centres specialised operational and communication and information centres (O and CIC) for

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Figure 13. Proposed organisation for implementation of the 112 ECS emergency/crisis management will be activated to provide full- scale C2 capability for the responsible institutions. This means that the IMS cannot be governed without a relationship with the IEMS/CMS and, respectively, the Security Council of the Government is the highest governance body for all these systems. In the governance model one of the most important elements is providing financing and managing the multi-vendor implementation of the system. The scheme on Figure 13 describes the complex organisation of a project to develop a business case for the 112 ECS for the Government, providing financing from the investor and the willingness of the prime contractor to work with the implementing agency and multi-vendor team to implement the system as well as to later develop the Programme Management Office in the Government to build and support the operation of the system. In the case of Bulgaria, an initial team between Winbourne and Costas and TMIS was set up to implement the approach. The division of work is between the Governance, Architecture, Infrastructure, Operations, Management aspects and the Financing/Regulation aspect of the case.

4. Change management in integrated security sector When it comes to the Governance, Architecture, Infrastructure, Operations and even Management aspects of the 112 ECS (as well as other higher-level systems such as IEMS, CMS) there is a need for the Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) process presented in Figure 14. This is why the team of WCI developed a White Paper

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Figure 14. CAX-based Model for Concept Development and Experimentation for the 112 ECS/IEMS and initiated a set of seminars, exercises, technology demonstrations to experiment the conceptual design and to ‘teach’ all the participants (stakeholders) about this serious change management effort in the area of the safety and security of the citizens. The Joint Training Simulation and Analysis Centre in Civil Security (JTSAC-CS) that was used to support the change management process is based on a specially developed model for concept development and experimentation in the area of civil security through CAX [11]. This model is a basis for the change management process – the transformation of the security sector into an integrated network enabled the organisation as a goal of the third generation of the security sector reform to address the challenges of civil security. JTSAC is an instrument for research, including M&S in crisis management to support CAX in this area. Especially in the context of the exercise EU TACOM SEE2006 (EU terrorist attack consequence management in the SEE exercise), in particular its CAX part, the JTSAC supported: • a strategic review of the civil protection system in Bulgaria and its EU/NATO/regional context; • the development of the Civil Security Concept for Bulgaria; • the development of the General Scenario, Operational Architecture and Message Flow for EU TACOM SEE-2006; • the establishing of a model environment for implementation of the Operational Architecture and Message Flow for EU TACOM SEE-2006; • the individual and pre-exercise training of the participants in the exercise; • the CAX’s implementation itself; and • currently undergoing the process of analysis, assessment and lessons learned drafting from the exercise with plans to update the White Paper on Civil Protection and the Concept for Civil Security. The CAX has a key role in this process of CDE because it provides the integration of different organisations and technologies as well as involves people in the loop of experimentation [12]. In a certain sense the CAX itself is a motivation and a tool for joint work and well-documented experimentation, providing objective material for the analysis and adaptation of the concepts.

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Figure 15. FEOC – DEOC – NEOC – MEOC – IEOC configuration for CAX EU TACOM SEE – 2006 The simplistic architecture of EU TACOM SEE-2006 CAX, as presented in Figure 15, is to stress the scope and diversity of the EOC involved and related EM/CM systems. This was a high visibility exercise with the participation of six countries plus the EU and NATO and observers from 17 countries. On the Bulgarian side it was led by VPM Etem, MoH Gaydarski, MoEW Chakarov and included the participation of the MoI, MoH, MoD, MoFA, MoAF, State Agency ‘State reserve’, the districts of Plovdiv and Vratsa, more than 10 institutes of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, two universities and about five SMEs. A similar exercises focused on IMS with the involvement of call and dispatch centres, while first responders are of critical importance to verify the proposed architecture and operational procedures. In order to receive feedback, special questionnaires were developed and used during the exercise and 49 of them were received, including 14 from international participants. In the questionnaires five groups of questions – with four being ‘closed’ and the fifth – ‘open’ were included with a six-level scale of assessment in these areas: • Organisation of the exercise – 4 • Scenario – 3 • Exercise setup – 5 • Technique – 6 A separate questionnaire for the developers was prepared. The assessment and analysis (lessons learned) are an integral part of the CAX life cycle (included in initial planning) and for the EU TACOM SEE – 2006 a special balance scorecard system for the assessment and strategic management of the exercises and emergency management system at large was developed. Some general observations from the feedback papers are: • no difficulties with the CAX, a very positive attitude, readiness to participate in future CAX; • the CAX are very useful for improving the co-ordination capacity between ministries and local authorities; • more CAX are needed (cost analysis for feasibility); • the scenario is an area of required improvement with great value; and

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specialised questionnaires are needed for different categories: DISTAFF, participants, support and journalists. Specific observations and recommendations on operational issues were connected with: • long-term co-operation between the users and analytical model developers is recommended; • better co-ordination between state institutions and private companies in the area of information and forecasts; • more focus on the scenario development and pre-exercise training of the participants; • in the information flow to focus on events – not a description of the situation; • public information analysis and the population’s understanding of the situation was positive and needs further investigation; • better co-ordination with the MoSPDA on providing data for the analytical models is required; • integration – the fusion of information and periodic briefing to participants is needed; • better co-ordination between the simulation centre and the participants will improve the performance; • an advance definition of the functions and tasks of the participants is required; • an improved synchronisation of the display of messages – reports from different ministries – is required • a focus in the scenario on the strategic level according to the legislation is preferable; • a specific database from all of the institutions involved is needed during preparation of the CAX, along with the documenting of all the comms during the exercise and distribution of these data to all the institutions after the exercise; • the introduction of the standard EU/NATO cycle of work in the NCMC; • it is better to combine the practical field exercise with CAX (Sofia – Montana); • the synchronisation of information from ministries and scenario script is important; • a clearer role of the authorities is required; • the scenario should have more of an educational focus and alternatives; • preserving the defined schedule for messages during the exercise in order to keep a more stable environment for the participants; • a better balance between the ‘speed’ of events and the speed of emergency management reactions is needed; • ‘unexpected elements’ are needed for the better use of CAX – in the best case unexpected events coming from the field; and • more analytical data are needed together with precise reports from the field. Specific observations and recommendations on technical issues were mostly connected with: • a more diverse comms system; • a special focus on comms – the Internet – is not enough; • comms with LEMA to be improved;

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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

TV sets to be used to follow an info flow on different TV programmes; a special focus on information assurance and other aspects of security; real NCMC with working places (comp. and comms) for every ministry is required; the acquisition of a Google Earth license and improvement of the MHS and generation of messages; establishing of a permanent training centre for CM by the MoSPDA and other ministries; better computers are needed; an improvement of the communications and working environment is needed; real modelling and simulation is required with a presentation in GIS on the main screen; VTC is not at the required level of quality; in every ministry a CM team is required to work in real time with real VTC with NCMC; to use the opportunity to test the latest technologies; conditioners are needed and better ventilation in the work environment; more space for this number of people and equipment is needed; general observations from the development team; a more detailed specification of the tasks for the team is needed; a more detailed specification for the structure of the network and software is required; a precise system for control of the contracts in support of the CAX environment is required; and more co-operation between the operational and technical staff in planning/running/assessment of the exercise is needed.

Conclusion: Building a Common Space for Security and Safety in the Transatlantic Area There are many important lessons learned in the process of implementing the presented approach in Bulgaria and the region [13]. Below some of the conclusions are set out: 1. the Euro-Atlantic vision for security and safety is required to be developed with the participation of all interested – in this case civil society at large; 2. NATO, EU, US, regional programmes’ (BSEC, SEEDM) harmonisation have to be achieved in order to be able to move forward; 3. the bottom-up approach in key areas of security and safety with a focus on the citizen is the only possible way to achieve visible results for the people in a short time; 4. the role of the 112/IEMS project as an integration and modernisation tool is critical to include feasibility studies, technology demonstrations, pilot projects; 5. the role of CAX as an integration and change management tool was proven successfully during EU TACOM SEE-2006 and the series of SEESIM exercises; 6. transparency, accountability, effectiveness/efficiency as good governance measures for the safety and security system are key to involve the citizens,

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society and to provide even financial resources; and democratic control and the citizens’ involvement for changing security/safety perceptions is the real link between global security and democracy.

This paper has stressed the importance of co-operation between the administration, NGOs, academic institutions, consultancy and vendor companies in the development of the new concepts of safety and security, their experimentation and implementation using effective governance and management models to provide the highest possible level of safety and security for the citizen in today’s changing world. The goal to achieve a common space for security and safety in the Transatlantic Area calls for a common vision, strategy and programmes. We can agree on the importance of integrated Incident/Emergency/Crisis Management Systems but, based on the current experience and studies, we have to stress the important role of CAX for the human and societal aspects of the issue as well as the critical aspect of democratic/civil control over the security system/activities. Another aspect of a common space is of course technology – we need to have interoperability in the system as well as unified services for the citizens in all countries of the Euro-Atlantic space. This means a common methodology for the design, implementation and life cycle management of the safety and security systems that will provide the highest possible standards of service at the lowest possible cost for the system. Through IEMS (integrated 112 ECS) the goal of the integrated security sector could be achieved step by step and at the same time the level of transparency, accountability and effectiveness/efficiency could be improved – a key challenge for global security and democracy. The role of the US, NATO, the EU in SEE could lie in the following areas: • the US: feasibility studies, training (incl. GMC – Garmisch), pilot projects funded by the USTDA, DoD/DoS FMF programme and access to technologies and the Homeland Security concept development; • NATO: CMX, EADRCC, EAPC programmes; and • the EU: CME, MIC, Phare and Operational Programmes/EU NP. The bottom line for the Bulgarian experience in crisis/emergency management could be synthesised as: • harmonisation of the concepts; • co-operation between the structures; • the interoperability of technologies; • integration of the Incident, Emergency and Crisis Management systems; • the critical role of education, training and continuous research; • the great contribution of exercises, incl. CAX; and • change management and the Governance Model challenge.

References [1] V. Shalamanov, St. Hadjitodorov, T. Tagarev, S. Avramov, V. Stoyanov, P. Geneshki, N. Pavlov, Civil Security: Architectural Approach in Emergency Management Transformation, Information & Security: An International Journal vol. 17, 2005, 75-104, http://www.isn.ethz.ch. [2] N. Nikolov, The Role of IT in Emergency Management: Integrated Information Infrastructure of the State Agency for Civil Protection, Information & Security: An International Journal, vol. 16, 2005, 2228, .

164 [3] [4] [5] [6]

[7]

[8] [9]

[10] [11]

[12]

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Zh. Zhivkov, Information technologies in the C2 System of the Gendarmerie, Information & Security: An International Journal, vol. 16, 2005, 13-21, . Pl. Torlakov, Special Operations Forces in the Fight against Terrorism on National Territory, Information & Security: An International Journal, vol. 19, 2006, 85-101, . V. Shalamanov, New Challenges for Crisis Management (pp. 41-46), In: Crisis Management in the Republic of Macedonia, MoD of Macedonia, Skopje, 2005, 130. Philipp H. Fluri and Velizar Shalamanov, eds., Security Sector Reform – Does It Work?: Problems of Civil-Military and Interagency Co-operation in the Security Sector, DCAF and GCMA, Geneva/Sofia, 2003, 240. O. Kountchev, R. Willems, V. Shalamanov, Ts. Tsachev (eds.), Scientific Support for the Decision Making in the Security Sector, IOS Press, NATO Science for Peace Series, 2007, 342, ISSN 18746268. V. Shalamanov, The Role of the C4ISR Projects in Modernization of the Security Sector in Bulgaria and SEE region, Information & Security: An International Journal, vol. 6, 2001, 7-22. G. Handy, J. Kimball, J. Winbourne, Building a Sound and Flexible Emergency response System: Hard Won Lessons in Disaster Management, Information & Security: An International Journal, vol. 19, 2006, 31-38, . Jeffrey Winbourne, Velizar Shalamanov, Emergency Management Pillar of the Civil Security: Practical approach, Security Issues, No 3, Tirana, Albania, 2007, 60-79. Analysis and Adaptation of Models from NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and European Community and NATO Countries for Analysis, Assessment, Decision-making, Planning, Crisis Management and System Ensuring for Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX) on National and Regional Level (South-East Europe (SEE) and Black Sea Region Countries), Scientific Project №9 to Working Program of year 2005 of the Science Co-ordination Committee with the Standing Committee for the Protection of the Population against Natural Disasters, Emergencies and Catastrophes, 20.10.2005. V. Shalamanov, Integration of C2 and M&S Elements in CAX for Crisis Management (pp. 50-61), In O. Kountchev, R. Willems, V. Shalamanov, Ts. Tsachev (eds.), Scientific Support for the Decision Making in the Security Sector, IOS Press, NATO Science for Peace Series, 2007, 342, ISSN 18746268. V. Shalamanov, Knowledge based, Network Centric Approach in Strengthening Transatlantic Link with the New NATO Members in SEE, Connections Int. Journal, vol. II, No. 3, 2003, 10-20.

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Crisis Management in the Republic of Macedonia Marina MITREVSKA Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Defence and Peace Studies, Skopje

Abstract: Crisis management as an instrument of governments for enforcing security in transitional democracies has become a genuine issue for analysis. The managing of crises has encountered threats that demand a faster and more coordinated response and management strategy that surpasses the capacities of exclusively military crisis management. In those circumstances, as a legitimate issue and precondition for the successful execution of security, crisis management has become part of the agenda of post-conflict Macedonia. The experience with the crisis of 2001, and even before that, implies the need for a crisis management system. Thus, finding an appropriate solution where the acquired shortcomings will be avoided and prevention will have its own place was resolved by the establishment of the Crisis Management Centre. Therefore, the offered concept for structuring the Crisis Management Centre expresses a high applied value. Modelling is based on the predetermined compatibility as the initial foundation of the necessary explicit functionality with both an intra and inter character. Keywords: crisis, management, managing, system.

Creating a crisis management system that could timely and efficiently manage the risks and threats of the modern world assumes the building of a security system simultaneously capable of protecting the interests of the citizens, creating conditions for sustainable development and the implementation of economic, social and other government policies as well boosting the foreign-political credibility of our country. The establishment of this mechanism would provide a central overview and assessment of threats, risks and data analysis, efficient civil control of the security system in crises at the highest political level as well as co-ordination of the system institutions and security services activities. The structuring of the crisis management system at the same time represents one of the key steps in the process of co-ordinating home legislation in the area of security and the security system of the Republic of Macedonia with the standards of NATO members. The improvement of interdepartmental coordination is a crucial issue not only for countries seeking NATO membership, but it is also a crucial challenge for current members of the Alliance. The building of a synchronised security system in Macedonia integrated with collective security systems is a strategic investment not only for our security and stability but also for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. That is in the interests of our partners in NATO and the EU, but also Macedonia’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic collective security [1]. Namely, today, five years after the outbreak of the armed conflict and signing the Framework Agreement, the Republic of Macedonia is in a phase of post-conflict peacebuilding. This is one reason the success of this phase will provide not only for the repairing the consequences of the conflict but also the prevention of its repetition. For

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these reasons, ending the armed phase of the conflict should and must be perceived as the beginning of a new phase in the prevention of a new wave of hostility through active social peace-building. Post-conflict peace-building faces a number of challenges and problems and, as such, it is the subject of many analyses. Certainly, one of them is the analysis of crisis management. In that sense, the analysis should provide an answer to these questions: first, whether creating a national system for crisis management will help prevent timely and efficiently the risks and threats that emerge in post-conflict peace-building in Macedonia. Second, whether effective implementation of this system means building a security system that will be able to protect the interests of its citizens, and at the same time to create conditions for the development and execution of economic, social and other policies that will enable the stabilisation of Macedonia. Generally speaking, in the last period crisis management has been a priority issue on the security agendas of international, governmental and non-governmental organisations. In addition, this time it is a challenge to the new security environment full of unconventional security threats and challenges [2]. Engagement in prevention, management and post-conflict peace-building has opened up a series of questions and there are very few lessons being learned [3]. Therefore, for the Republic of Macedonia in the framework of this difficult and complex process of post-conflict peace-building the concept of crisis management can provide a positive contribution. Namely, its inauguration can assist in building security and the creation of the state as a producer of security. There are serious indicators that point to the challenges and need for the serious treatment of the crisis management concept in the frame of the process of post-conflict peace-building and security in Macedonia. That is why one should welcome the consensus of all factors, in addition to the political ones, for the organisational establishment of a crisis management system not only as a precondition, that is, a standard for our integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures, but also and above all as our real necessity. Consequently, one of our priorities is the creation of a crisis management system that will be able to tackle risks and threats, which unfortunately in Macedonia are not addressed in a timely and efficient manner. It means that we should be able to deal with problems on our own and in the spirit of the democratic times we are living in. Moreover, one should recognise and admit that different needs and security threats cannot be put in a universal systemic agreement for crisis management and as such be introduced into the national civilian crisis management. However, the basic principles of democratic control of the security sector should also comprise a part of crisis management. Thus, the general determination is justified. Macedonia needs a crisis management system and. of course, a related law. They will help in the permanent monitoring of the condition and in the post-conflict period it will prove to be a very important stage of the ultimate stabilisation of the state. It presents a great positive opportunity for Macedonia which can only further stimulate us in the process of stabilisation and integration with Euro-Atlantic security institutions. The analysis has proven that the need for a national system for crisis management has emerged as a conceptual response with several dimensions. The first is the different social context where crises emerge and influence the unique characteristics and dimensions of the crisis itself. In the Republic of Macedonia, the reasons for a future crisis, that is whether its structural roots will involve political, economic, social or security challenges are due to the condition in the post-conflict period when peace and a green light for stabilisation, development and integration attach a specific character to the

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crisis and entail the need for an appropriate mechanism for its management. Postconflict peace-building requires a rapid diagnosis, that is, the anticipation of crises in different social contexts. Thus, one should always take its specifics into consideration. They should always lead us to the answer about when, who and how the crisis is managed. Whether it is better to build on time a crisis management system or a system that will ‘only cure and not prevent’. Second, to open up the issue of crisis in the context of post-conflict Macedonia, which will depend on successful diagnosing and elimination of the reasons for the crisis. Third, for security challenges in post-conflict Macedonia one of the key issues is how to respond to the requirements for security sector reforms. Fourth, the new security environment and challenges for security. In the last period, the Republic of Macedonia has had a first-hand opportunity to perceive the nature of asymmetric threats and face the consequences of the lack of co-ordination of state institutions and security services. Experience shows that contemporary risks and threats work between sector authorities, surpass resources and capabilities for certain governmental institutions and exceed the borders of separate states. These threats do not only concern security and defence policy but also the policies of other sectors: foreign, economic and social policies, health and environment policies. Creating a security system capable of tackling these challenges and giving support to the overall policy of the government means the efficient co-ordination of these sectors at the highest level [1]. Fifth, abandoning traditional defence and resorting to crisis prevention. Namely, today, security in Europe is mainly characterised by increasingly intensified relations of co-operation and mutual co-operation, which is one of the indicators that slowly but surely the possibilities of a major conventional war have been eliminated. On the other hand, however, in certain regions such as South-east Europe many crises and crisis situations have emerged exactly as a consequence of the crumbling of the bipolar world and big socialist states (such as the Republic of Macedonia). Moreover, the future strategic realities after the terrorist attacks in the USA, Spain and Russia underline the fact that the danger of non-military and asymmetric threats emerge in unexpected shapes and devastating intensity. To the current point of civilisation development, that is, lately, as a consequence of technical-technological development, globalisation and climate change, there have been more frequent natural and technical-technological disasters and other large scale emergencies which very often exceed the overall potential of a state. Therefore, states are required to be organised so as to be able to tackle these crises. Namely, the states must find solutions for managing the crises starting by their prevention and finishing with their resolution. In that sense, the latest National Security and Defence Concept of the Republic of Macedonia contains a separate part entitled Crisis Management where the directions and basis for the organisation and development of this system are given. Accordingly, the establishment of a crisis management system is an imperative for Macedonia. Sixth, creating a crisis management system that can tackle the risks and threats of the contemporary world timely and efficiently means establishing a security system able at the same time to protect the interests of citizens, to create conditions for sustainable development and the implementation of economic, social and other government policies and to reward the foreign political credibility of our state. Establishing these mechanisms will enable the central monitoring and assessment of

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threats, risks and data analysis, efficient civil control of the security system in emergencies at the highest political level and the co-ordination of activities of institutions of the system and security services [1]. Seventh, endorsing the Law on Crisis Management will help in the efficient coordination of assessing the crisis. Therefore, in the upcoming period the following issues will have to be considered: x to establish the aims of the management process; x to plan basic activities; and x to determine common principles and the structural frame that is expected to affect the crisis. In conditions when the main threats are surpassed, they have been replaced by a much larger number of less predictable risks that are present and direct, difficult for analysis and inconsistent. All of this implies there is a continuous need for a controlled response, organised crisis management, measures and communications that could be included, separately or collectively, in controlling crises and shaping the future directions and gratification of political doers and crisis managers. The categorisation of the aims of the crisis management system has been of great importance. Namely, to contribute to the reduction of tensions and their prevention which directly influences state security; efficient crisis management, which will prevent their escalation and growth into warfare; to ensure civil and military preparations. Complexity of conditions for acting stipulates a qualitatively different way in prevention through controlled response and readiness for action at all levels of the crisis. In its details, this approach reflects the utilisation of political, economic and social instruments as well as the military, with a greater emphasis on conflict prevention, peace-keeping and crisis management [4]. The need to promote the crisis management system, that is, crisis management in the Republic of Macedonia recognizes organisation, order and measures aimed at putting the crises under control and enabling conditions for shaping the future direction of the crisis. Further, in the process of co-ordinating the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia one will have to determine the main activities for crisis management, accompanied by every state of crisis that suggest a unique matrix through the whole process of crisis management. The practice of co-ordinating the crisis assessment is necessary because the activities of managing crises are complex and encompass monitoring, the detection of a crisis, a decrease in the intensity of the crisis, negotiations and peace-building. The formal list of tasks should include the implementation of all planning activities accompanied by formal decisions, taking into consideration the specific actions that have been undertaken with strategic optional elaboration through obligatory coordination across all levels during the crisis. The formation of the institution for preventing and tackling crises should enable the avoiding of situations such as those before and during the conflict of 2001. At that time, our state reacted ad hoc and in the middle of the crisis organised a Co-ordination Body to address the crisis, in whose framework a crisis management centre was formed. This was a good solution. However, a priority for us has been creating a crisis management system that will be able timely and efficiently to deal with crises, which unfortunately have also not left Macedonia out. Thus, a number of elements are required to realise the crisis management concept, with the most important being:

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development of an efficiently organised crisis management system, that is a system for managing crises; the state providing legal and other conditions so as to establish a crisis management system compatible with world standards; and the permanent and obligatory training of the personnel who will work in this system [4].

Further, our experience indicates the following: x there is a need for comprehensive preparations, equipment, facilitation and planning of all state institutions for the acceptance of the challenges caused by the conflict and the crisis because an escalation of the crisis is hard to predict; x it is necessary to establish a system for overall transparency among all institutions that participate in crisis resolution, putting to work the available infrastructure and national resources; x even in peacetime the status of citizens who, as a consequence of a crisis and due to political, economic, social, demographic, ethnic or religious reasons will become the subject of forceful migrations, should be fully regulated; x a regional approach to overcoming the crises, along with regional contingents and regional co-ordination are key to exiting the crisis zone; and x the co-ordination of the activities and planning of missions of NATO, the EU and OSCE have shown themselves to be crucial for exiting the crisis zone [4]. The endeavours of the Government and the Ministry of Defence are very important in developing the Law on Crisis Management. A positive side of the Law is that it is based on the provisions of the National Security and Defence Concept which, inter alia, provides directions for regulating the whole area related to the security and defence of citizens, their material values and the state. Moreover, some of the contents of the Law have been standardised vis-à-vis some solutions from NATO member states and the European Union. The proposed text of the Law provides for the achievement of several objectives such as: an improvement in the co-ordination of intelligence communities and, consequently, the quality of information that underpins the assessment of security threats of the country. The new Law establishes a crisis management system which should ensure timely, fast and efficient prevention and reaction in the case of an emergency for people, their goods and lives and the security threat of the country, while the Law also determines the co-ordinated, rational and efficient need for resources in the case of an emergency in the country. Further, two novelties have been introduced in the Law, namely: the Parliament will exercise permanent control over state institutions and the Government in the resolution of any crisis situation, and only the President of the state is entitled to decide on the engagement of part of the Army for overcoming a crisis. Therefore, due to the timely preparation of a response to a ‘possible crisis’ or ‘emergency’ that would jeopardise the vital values of the state, the Republic of Macedonia will have to organise crisis management, that is, a system for crisis management. This conclusion has emerged from the overall analysis that offers an answer to both questions posed in the introductory part. Namely, the analysis points out that the Republic of Macedonia needs a crisis management system. One should start from an important determinant of creating the crisis management system, and that is the forming a co-ordination body for dealing with crises and a Crisis Management

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Centre. Namely, in order to be able to operationally, efficiently and professionally perform the activities related to crisis management, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia formed these bodies during the crisis in 2001. The primary tasks of the co-ordination body for dealing with the crisis were to coordinate, direct and unite the activities of state institutions when dealing with a crisis, including the Army and Police and to propose the use of a unit for combating terrorism. Moreover, in the interest of efficient crisis management the Government of the Republic of Macedonia formed a working group for crisis management, that is, a Crisis Management Centre. The Crisis Management Centre consists of: x Head of the Centre; x Deputy Head of the Centre; and x one representative of the Ministry of Defence; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Intelligence Agency; the Army of the Republic of Macedonia and the Police. In terms of dealing with crises, the Crisis Management Centre has the following tasks: x to collect, process, analyse and submit data and information to the coordination body for crisis management and to propose measures and activities for dealing with crisis situations; and x to submit information to the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and the Intelligence Agency. In order to deal with a crisis successfully, the state institutions, the Army, the Police and the Intelligence Agency are required to submit data related to emergencies to the Crisis Management Centre. Further, subgroups are formed within the Crisis Management Centre, as follows: x collecting information; x planning; x analytics; x communications and information; and x common and legal affairs. These are the basis for the organisational establishment of the crisis management system. Namely, in order to ensure the possibility of fast and comprehensive action, that is, to propose decisions and ensure constant consultations, co-ordination, timely reaction, efficiency and the appropriate utilisation of the available resources in the case of emergencies, as well as ensuring the timely, quality and proper assessment of security hazards of the country, the Law suggests the following organisation of the Crisis Management System, namely: A Steering Committee – according to the Law, it is a government body for coordination and governing the crisis management system. The Steering Committee comprises the Ministers for Interior, Health, Transport and Communications, Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Assessment Group. The control mechanism functions by involving one representative of the Parliamentary Committee for Security and Defence of the Republic of Macedonia and one representative of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Macedonia in the work of the Steering Committee. An Assessment Group – this is a Government body that carries out the permanent assessment of security risks and threats to the country and proposes measures and

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activities to prevent them, along with early warnings and dealing with emergencies. The Assessment Group comprises the respective Directors of the Public Security Bureau, Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence, Intelligence Agency, Directors and Deputies of the Crisis Management Centre and the Directorate for Protection and Rescue, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Army as well as the Head of the Section for Security and Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence. A Crisis Management Directorate – this is an independent body of state governance. In performing tasks related to crisis management, the Centre carries out the following activities: ensuring continuity in inter-agency and international cooperation, consultations and co-ordination in crisis management, filling up and updating the unified assessment of security risks and threats in the country, as well as the proposing of measures and activities for resolving emergencies. An important novelty of the Law on Crisis Management is the possibility of the crisis management system organising prevention at the local level. Namely, the Law assumes the organisation and accomplishment of prevention, early warnings and dealing with a crisis that poses a risk to the goods, health and lives of citizens, emerging from dangers which directly jeopardise the constitutional order and security of the Republic of Macedonia or part of it. Further, the crisis management system also encompasses the collection of information, an assessment and analysis of the situation, the establishment of aims and tasks, the development and execution of necessary acts for prevention, early warning and dealing with crises. Thus, in the framework of their authorities the municipalities have an obligation to assess risks and threats at the local level as regards the efficient prevention and early warning of a potential crisis. For prevention at the local level, the crisis management system performs the following duties: x it monitors situations and happenings that could lead to an emerging crisis in the area of a municipality; x it announces the assessment of risks and threats of an emergency arising in the territory of a municipality; x it approves a programme for the revitalisation of the municipalities; x it executes decisions of the government regarding crisis management in the territory of the municipality (which means establishing the co-ordination necessary for successful prevention); x in dealing with a crisis the mayors ensure the co-ordination of participants in the crisis management system at the local level; and x according to the offered solution, the municipalities are obliged in their acts to organise and systematise the establishing of working places for the preparation and performance of working tasks related to prevention and dealing with crises. Therefore, one can conclude that all important aspects of such established organisation and co-ordination of the crisis management system can yield positive effects in terms of accomplishing security and defence in the Republic of Macedonia because the crisis in Macedonia has opened all vulnerable issues of the functioning of the political and security institutions in conditions when a co-ordinated response is required. Further, the crisis has shown that the institutions have been unsuccessful in their efforts to distinguish their authorities, which makes the co-ordination of joint activities very hard. A co-ordinated response lacked as well on the part of the security

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forces – the Police and the Army. The problem appeared to be unclear, that is between the key security institutions, the Army and the Police, and the division of responsibilities between them. These problems have created an impression of a bad simulation of the crisis. The post-conflict period has opened a new page on the list of future problems, namely the possibility of future post-conflict crises. The potential for instability and insecurity or the potential for conflict is not and cannot be entirely eliminated. In that sense, not even theory recognises sterile non-conflict societies. However, what it points out is that structural factors are not a sufficient element to break the rule of democratic accomplishment of interests and needs. Two other components are always required: possibilities and the political will to utilise the structural problems. In the case of postconflict Macedonia, the possibilities/risks are still present: illegal weapons, corruption, foreign support for armed violence, and illegal armed groups [5]. In such conditions, the establishment of a civilian crisis management which will ensure civilian and democratic control over the activities and forces will enable the coordination and efficiency of the system, which is a general aim, along with the first aim to prevent and the second to contain and resolve crises [5]. Therefore, in this period creating a national Crisis Management System represents one of the main challenges to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Vlado Buckovski, Upravuvawe so krizi vo Republika Makedonija, Ministerstvo za odbrana na Republika Makedonija, Skopje, 2005. M.E Brown, The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996. Lidija Georgieva, Krizen menadzment:regionalno iskustvo i dilemi za Makedonija, Sovremena makedonska odbrana, no.10, Skopje, 2006. Marina Mitrevska, Crisis Management System in the Republic of Macedonia: Real Necessity for more Secure Tomorrow, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2005. EU Crisis Response Stability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report No. 2, Brussels, June 2001.

Other references M. Brecher and J. Winkenfi`eld, A Study of Crisis, Michigan Press, 2000. Marina Mitrevska and Trajan Gocevski, Krizen menaxment, Makedonska riznica, Kumanovo, 2001. Marina Mitrevska and Trajan Gocevski, Krizen menaxment, Kiro Dandaro, Bitola, 2002. Marina Mitrevska, Krizen menadzment, Makedonska riznica, Kumanovo, 2005.

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The Serbian Approach to Shaping National Crisis Management Mechanisms Želimir KEŠETOVIĆ Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade

Abstract: In the introduction author points out that crises are omnipresent in the history of human societies. Due to this and their potentially devastating consequences they have to be in the focus of researches, and adequate capacities for crisis management have to be built in the public, state and profit sectors. In that context, the author gives a brief description of the importance of crisis management as a theory and as a practice in the contemporary world. After that, he assesses that the theory and practice of crisis management in Serbia are at the very beginning although this country has in the last few decades been in a stage of very serious and deep crises in the spheres of politics, the economy and security. The author refers to the most important reasons for this situation and the prospects of developing Serbian crisis management in the near future, describing the new draft Law of Protection and Rescue that is waiting to be adopted in the Serbian Parliament. Keywords: crisis, crisis management, transition.

Introduction The observation that crises have always been with us, thereby shaping our societies and cultures, and that their names and dates have marked eras in human history [1] can be fully applied to the region of the Western Balkans in general, and Serbia in particular due to the fact that this country has been the venue of a number of different crises, particularly in the last decades of the 20th century. At the same time, the theory of crisis in this region is at the very beginning, while the practical handling of crisis is not justified and often brings panic similar to instinctive reactions. During the period of building the socialist regime, after WWII a ‘system of social self-protection’ that was ideologically based but relatively functional existed in the countries of former Yugoslavia. Within this system, managing different kinds of crisis at all levels of organising the state and society held an important place. After abandoning the socialist project and taking first steps towards transition in Serbia this system is being dismantled, while a new one has not yet been built so the country is in this regard in a specific vacuum. Practitioners in various areas from politics, economics, environmental protection etc. at all levels (local, regional and national) have responded to the crisis in a solely ad hoc, reactive and hectic manner without any strategic vision or short- or long-term plan. The consequences for the state, nation and the citizens have been disastrous. On the other hand, Serbian scientists, despite the fact that they were practically in a ‘live crisis laboratory’, have not even tackled the crisis phenomenon. In the period of the system of socialist self-management the reality was, in accordance with the official ideology, depicted idealistically so that

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even use of the term crisis was problematic. Later on, with painful attempts at establishing the institutions of democracy (after 1990) Serbian society faced crisis after crisis such that they became in a certain sense a ‘way of living’. In fact, in a country where one finds in the newspapers news that there is electricity for households, there is gas at the petrol stations, and that pensions will be distributed for the previous month, and where everybody is surprised when something is functioning normally, the very concept of crisis as a deviation from normal functioning is senseless. As a result of this situation, there is only one book about crisis – Crisis Management – a textbook for students of the Faculty of Economics (University of Belgrade) focused on different kinds of crises that a company or business enterprise can face (a microeconomic approach). There are few articles dealing with specific aspects of crises from the viewpoint of certain subjects in specialised journals. Leading foreign works in crisis management are not translated nor available in Serbian libraries. Only in 2005 was Crisis Management recognised as a teaching subject and a research and scientific field at the Faculty of Security Studies1 at the University of Belgrade, where it is included as a compulsory subject in the curriculum at the basic level of studies (the Security specialisation) and as a postgraduate course in master’s studies [2].

1. The current situation – normative aspect Crisis management as a system and as a function of local and central government (the state) is not defined. In fact, in a normative sense the actual situation in Serbia is very complex. Crisis management is not regulated with a single and comprehensive law. Different kinds of crises are regulated by particular laws. Besides the general provisions in the Constitution, the most important laws in the crisis management area are: • The Law on Fire Protection; • The Law on Explosive Materials, Inflammable Liquids and Gases; • The Law on the Distribution of Explosive Materials; • The Law on Transporting Dangerous Materials; • The Law on Protection against Natural Disasters and Other Major Accidents; • The Law on Defence; and • The Law on a State of Emergency etc. Having in mind the mandate and responsibility of certain subjects for crisis management, the most important of these laws are: the Law on Fire Protection, the Law on Protection against Natural Disasters and Other Major Accidents and the Law on Defence. Many of these laws are stale and outdated as they were passed 20 or even more than 30 years ago in completely different domestic and foreign social circumstances, a different political system (a party state, not a state based on the rule of law) and state organisation. They have not been harmonised with the constitutions that were adopted in the meantime. This also refers to international conventions. At the same time, sublaws were not adopted. Some provisions of these laws are not practically applicable. Besides that, in the meantime new situations emerged in practice that are completely 1

Up until 2006, the Faculty of Civil Defence.

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unregulated. Finally, due to the lack of a comprehensive law to regulate whole area of crisis management, in practice a collision of mandates and jurisdictions often occurs. Sometimes there are situations in which it is not clear who is in charge or, on the other hand, the responsible agency (organisation) does not have the proper resources and capacities for an adequate response within its mandate. This specially refers to the division of the mandate between the Republic (ministries) and local government. Typical examples of inappropriate institutional reactions were obvious in 2005 during the floods in the Jaša Tomić municipality in Vojvodina, or after a traffic accident when a bus with passengers fell off the Žabalj bridge into the Tisa river. There is also confusion about the mandate and responsibility of state bodies and agencies (the Police, Army etc.). The Serbian Law on Fire Protection [3] gives the central position to the municipality that ‘organises protection against natural and other major accidents and fires, and provides the conditions for their mitigation and limitation of their consequences’. Among other important provisions, it should be noted that the mandate for extinguishing fires is granted to local fire brigades (MoI), professional fire brigades within business enterprises and companies, volunteer fire-fighter associations within companies, e.g. in the municipalities. In the meantime, a reorganisation of the Ministry of Interior occurred and this Ministry became centralised in the sense that in Serbia only one police organisation exists – the Ministry of the Interior, while all the field divisions, including local fire brigades in the municipalities, are its organisational units. The Law on Protection against Natural Disasters and Other Major Accidents [4] is also focused on municipality structures as the municipality is made responsible for organising protection against fires, natural disasters and other major accidents in a way that it prepares the necessary conditions for preventing such events, and for controlling and limiting their consequences and performing other related tasks. This Law does not regulate acting in certain emergency situations such as technical disasters and accidents with dangerous materials. The proclamation of a state of emergency in cases of natural disasters or other major accidents is also not regulated. The Law on Defence (Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) [5] states in Article 20 that the defence of the country is at the same time the right and obligation of each member of the community, while Article 22 refers to the role and importance of the special units designed for rescuing civilians and material resources from destruction in war operations, natural disaster or other calamities and dangers. The text of this law strongly affirms civil protection and defence and its pillars (units of civil defence and units of civil protection) and protection of the civilian population as the highest priority and most important aim. The purpose of the civil protection (‘CP’) and its units is protection and rescue operations of the people, material and other resources from destruction that might be caused by war operations, natural disasters and other dangers in peace and wartime. The plan for acting in emergency situations is not fully operational. The determination of citizens to take part in providing first aid is minimal, while procedures of informing citizens about events are not properly conducted. Besides remarks about the laws and regulations it should be stressed that there is no national strategy of protection in emergency situations. Rescue operations are only successfully performed by some organisation structures such as fire brigades, first medical aid and the Police. Equipment for the operations is not at an adequate level and solutions for financing those activities are inappropriate. The outdated normative regulations, dissipated and non-functional ‘system’ of crisis management, that are altogether an ideological product of one era in which the

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main accent was placed on ideological questions and defence against a number of domestic and foreign enemies, certainly does not suit the needs of modern times nor the Serbian ambitions to join Euro-Atlantic integrations, which implies harmonisation in various fields including capacities and standards for crisis management.

2. Towards a New System Despite these facts, for a number of reasons (mainly in the political sphere) work on a comprehensive crisis management strategy has not yet begun. Some changes have been implemented in the organogram of the MoI [6]. The most important is the forming of a new Protection and Rescue Sector within the Ministry. Based on documents of the OUN (Resolution 2034/65 of the General Assembly) and contemporary documents and terminology used by the EU (first of all the terms: civil protection, civil defence, civil safety, emergency management structures) in 2005 the MoI started to work on preparing a draft Law on Protection and Rescue for the Republic of Serbia. This draft law was finished in autumn 2006 and is now waiting in the assembly of the Parliament to be adopted.2 The new draft Law of Protection and Rescue regulates: • the protection and rescue of people and material and other property in emergency situations; • the way of organising, managing, handling and co-ordinating the activities of protection and rescue; • the rights, obligations, qualifying and advanced training of participants in protection and rescue activities; and • supervision of implementation of this Law. With this Law a new system will be established for acting in emergency situations in the Republic of Serbia. Its main objective is to improve the organisation of protection in emergency situations (disaster management) as occurs in EU countries and according to its directives: 1. joining the activities of all rescue services; 2. merging the Civil Protection; and 3. managing all events in the national territory from one place and their coordination. The basic requirements asked of this system are: • to be prepared for all types of intervention; • to collect information about incidents; • to get quickly to the place of incidents; • to react in the best possible way; • to rescue endangered people first; and • to offer first aid to rescued citizens. 2 The draft law was sent to Parliament on 16 October 2006, but at the time there were many laws waiting to be adopted. In the meantime, new elections were held in December. A new government was to formed in May 2007.

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The emergency situations referred to in this Law are: • natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, mudflows; storms, heavy rains, electricity discharges, hail, bad weather, droughts, avalanche, ice on rivers, landslides and rockslides); • technical and technological accidents (fire, explosions, traffic accidents, accidents in mines and tunnels, electric power plants damages, oil and gas plants damages, telecommunication and information system damages); • situations in which the lives of people and the environment are affected by hazardous materials; epidemics, locusts, plant diseases and all other phenomena occurring in wider proportions which may endanger health and lives of people and also the environment or cause large-scale damage. The main goals of the Law are: • the co-ordination and pooling together of activities which aim to protect the lives and property of citizens and to preserve the conditions necessary for life in an emergency situation; • preparations for overcoming situations which are a result of natural disasters, fire, the effect of hazardous materials and other forms of danger; and • the creation of organisational, material and technical conditions for the participation of citizens, companies, state services and other organisations and professional services involved in activities for protection and rescuing of people, animals and other material goods. When it comes to the organisational aspect, a special organisational unit – the Protection and Rescue Sector within the Ministry of Interior – is to be formed. It is responsible directly to the minister. The Sector consists of a: • Department for Prevention; • Department for Protection and Rescue Units; • Department for Management in an Emergency Situation; • Section for Public Relations and International Co-operation; • Main Training Centre; and • Operative Centre 112. The Sector’s organisational structure is presented in more detail in the organogram: The main tasks of the Sector are: 1. prevention; 2. co-ordination; 3. rescue activities; 4. civil protection; 5. protection management in emergency situations; 6. co-ordination; 7. supervision; 8. international co-operation; 9. averting consequences; 10. preparing citizens for acting in emergency situations;

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Figure 1. Organogram of the Protection and Rescue Sector of the MoI 11. enabling the operative units; and 12. informing about events. In the context of prevention the main tasks are: • to protect and train the citizens and to prepare them for acting in emergency situations; • to assess damage caused by natural disasters, fire and technical-technological accidents; • to assess health and environmental damage caused by chemical, biological and radiological contamination; • to supply plans for protection against natural disasters and technicaltechnological accidents and for protection from contamination; • to supply operational plans (plans of reaction); and • to control the process of conducting measures of prevention which are defined by the Law, technical regulations, as well as national and international standards. Co-ordination refers to: • co-ordinating all active subjects in the case of emergency situations (from state to local level); • co-ordinating the protection plans and the operational plans of regional, municipal and local self-government agencies; and • co-ordinating operational plans with other subjects that act in emergency situations (Red Cross, the Police, paramedics, the military etc).

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The supervision refers to the processes of the production, trade and transportation of combustible and exploding materials, including supervision of the protection of people, goods and the environment from consequences of the unprofessional handling with those materials. This Law defines who, where and for which area it is authorised to declare a natural disaster. For local self-government it is the President of the municipality who can declare a natural disaster on the proposition of the municipal crisis centre, or the Protection and Rescue Sector of the Republic. The Serbian Government can declare a natural disaster for the Republic upon the proposition of the Crisis Centre of the Republic, or the Minister of the Interior. If a natural disaster is declared for local selfgovernment, the municipality manages the protection activities together with the municipal crisis centre for protection against natural disasters. If it is declared for the whole Republic, the Government and republican crisis Centre for Protection against Natural Disasters is in charge. Protection measures have to be implemented according to the plans of protection approved by the Republic, autonomous provinces and municipalities. Measures for protection are defined separately for each natural disaster that has occurred. They are classified having in mind the sequence that must be followed if there is immediate danger that a natural disaster will occur, the measures that have to be taken during a natural disaster, and those that have to be taken after the natural disaster in order to limit the damage. The government is authorised to form a Crisis Centre of the Republic, which is activated in cases of the immediate threat of a natural disaster or major accident, upon the proposition of the Prime Minister. The Government appoints members of this Crisis Centre and its chief. All of them are members of the Government. The Minister of the Interior and the head of the Protection and Rescue Sector are members of the Centre by the nature of their positions. The other members are directors of republican public enterprises in the field of public transportation, forestry and waterpower engineering and other agencies that perform tasks linked to the protection of people and property. This Law also establishes obligations of the mass media, other ministries and government agencies, as well as the rights and obligations of other participants in protection activities, their training and education. While this Law is, among others, waiting in Parliament, the newly formed sector is preparing several projects for the future. The most important of these are: • composing the national strategy for protection in emergency situations, whose purpose is to create the conditions for a quick response and for rescuing people and property and to reduce risks and vulnerability within the context of sustainable development; and • the implementation of a unique telephone number for information about all events (112) that will make communication with all services in charge of acting in every situation easier.

Conclusion At the beginning of the 21st century Serbia is again at the crossroads, trying to establish the rule of law and institutions of democracy and to build a modern and rational state. Tensions between home-grown norms, rules routines and habits and those associated with Europe and ‘the West’ are present like in other transitional countries [7]. Yet an awareness of the importance of crisis preparedness and the fact that a new kind of

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‘modern crisis is on the horizon’ [8] is emerging. In this context, a crucial question is building an adequate crisis management system at both the state (national) and local (municipality) levels and in the profit sector as well. This system should be based on scientific insights and best foreign practices. The authors of the new draft Law on Protection and Rescue had all of this in mind when proposing this comprehensive institutional framework for crisis management in Serbia that will include all the rescue services and civil protection and enable the co-ordination and management of operations from one centre. They were also fully aware that a better and more sustainable solution would be establishing the directorate for emergency and crisis management as an independent state agency linked directly to the Government of Serbia. Nevertheless, they were cognisant that this solution would require considerable funds (estimated at around EUR 40-50 million) that are not available at the moment. 3 It should also be noted that there are certain tendencies and endeavours aimed at keeping the system of civil protection within the military structures. These are the results of the old system of values and views on these problems and, on the other hand, a fear of change and preoccupations with personal positions and interests. In that context, a working group at the Ministry of Defence is preparing its own draft law. Whole spheres of life in post-socialist Serbia are defined and shaped by politics. It is still to be seen what concept of a crisis management system will be implemented. The final decision is to be made by political factors that have so far been more preoccupied with their own personal interests and the interests of political parties than with the vital interests of society and the state.

References: [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

3

A. Boin, C. Kofman-Bos, and W. Overdijk, ‘Crisis simulations: Exploring tomorrow’s vulnerabilities and threats’, Simulation & Gaming: An International Journal of Theory, Practice and Research, 35, 2004. Z. Keković, Ž. Kešetović, (eds), Crisis Management 1 – crisis prevention, Belgrade: Faculty of Security Studies, 2006. Official Gazette RS No. 37/88. Official Gazette RS No. 20/77. Official Gazette FRY No.43/94 - basic text and innovations (amendments) 1995, 1996, 1999 and 2002. www.mup.sr.gov.yu. K. Engelbrekt and M. Förberg (eds.), Managing Political Crises in Bulgaria: Pragmatism and Procrastination, Stockholm: CRISMART, 2005. A. Boin, ‘Crisis Management in Europe: A Discussion of Key Factors in Improving Safety’, paper for The NATO/Russia Advanced Research Workshop, University of Aberdeen, 2.-6.6.2003, Forecasting and Preventing Catastrophes.

This was a problem for some countries in the region.

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Crisis Management Education and Research in Serbia Zoran KEKOVIC and Sladjana DJURIC University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies

Abstract: Facing a wide variety of crises, Serbia, like no other country in the region, can benefit by learning from them. Although the key actors are in a position to generalise their experience, there is no organised effort in the field of systematic education and training for acting in a state of emergency. Intuition, random reacting, common sense, and a reactive approach are the terms with which we can describe the modus operandi for dealing with assessing and resolving crises in Serbia. In this work, a survey of the status and systems of functioning in the field of crisis management in Serbia is given through an analysis of the activities of relevant institutions, and in relevant fields: the Police, the military, the economy, and the non-governmental sector. The efforts made in the field of educational, scientific and research work at the Faculty of Security Studies of the University of Belgrade are also the subject of a special analysis. The programme of a special course of studies, Crisis Management, is presented, as are some activities at the Faculty regarding the projects directed at examining different dimensions of the treat to security. Keywords: crisis, crisis management, security management, terrorism, education, research

Introduction People belonging to business circles, those in the public services and those engaged in public activities in countries all over the world, and in recent years in our country too, show a great interest in crisis management and the education and training of crisis assessment and management experts. Many of these managers lack formal and professional qualifications in the field of risk analysis and crisis management. This especially refers to the field of security. Understanding security as a dynamic process that is a response to contemporary security threats presumes the implementation of analytical methods in the decision-making process in the conditions of uncertainty, risk and certainty. In return, such a state of affairs has induced the recognition of crisis management as a special function of security management and, at the same time, as an integral part of risk management in the public and private sector. Today, crisis managers are required to have not just analytical skills but also explicit abilities of designing prognostic scenarios and reacting accordingly. It seems that the lack of these abilities is the biggest weakness in response to the events that the modern world has been marked by: the terrorist acts in New York, Madrid and London, hurricane ‘Katrina’ in the Gulf of Mexico, citizens’ unrest in France, different natural disasters and catastrophes, technical and technological accidents etc.

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There is a wide spectrum of crises that occur in societies in transition. Particularly serious are economic espionage, strikes and takeover, citizens’ unrest, humanitarian catastrophes, media scandals, criminal and terrorist threats etc. In recent years, many crises in Serbia, from those political and socially conditioned (the crisis in Kosovo, significant demographic changes triggered by the arrival of a large number of refugees and internally displaced people) to accidents of technical and technological origin, explosions at military installations and natural disasters and catastrophes (flood, landslide etc.) leave behind them significant positive and negative experience. Typical risks are floods and landslides that reflect the vulnerability of the endangered population, and traffic and construction infrastructure, coupled with devastated natural resources and inadequate management. Being one of the most serious challenges and threats to global, regional, and national security, and due to its transnational nature, ties with organised crime and violent, interethnic extremism, terrorism is a very important item on the agenda of national security priorities of the Republic of Serbia. Notwithstanding the fact that Serbia has not been a target of international terrorism so far, such a possibility cannot be excluded, nor can a scenario according to which its territory would be used for preparing and carrying out terrorist actions in other countries. In such conditions, the prerequisite of the survival and success of profit and nonprofit organisations, all kinds of business and state organs as well is to make relevant assessments, define strategies and organise and carrying out systematic activities in all stages of the life cycle of actual and potential crises.

1. Political Framework After more than ten years of economic, social and institutional decay, Serbia started its process of reform as late as the beginning of 2001. Since then, the course of economic and political reforms has been steady, although not always in a straight line but the Republic of Serbia is still falling behind its neighbours. Accession to the EU, as one of the key motivational factors of the reform, is in the shadow of the structural weaknesses of the state that came into being primarily due to the influence of the SFRY’s disintegration, ethnic geography, and confronting and other entities. Political instability has left serious consequences regarding the issues of preparedness for accidents and the possibility of reducing risk at all levels. Strategies of prevention do not even exist and as for the capacities to eliminate the effects of accidents, it all comes down to reacting ad hoc with no strategy of co-ordination between military, fire fighting, police, medical, and other public services and activities. The Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA) is in charge of activities relating to protection from fire. They fall within the protection and rescue sector, with territorial branch offices on the local level. Civil protection falls within the authority of the Ministry of Defence, with the organisation being in the shape of a pyramid which is composed of civil protection headquarters at the local level. Organisational and personnel weaknesses that exist on the national level are reflected on the local level. Having accepted the policy of decentralisation, among other fields, in the field of protection and rescue of the civilian population, and material and cultural goods in situations of mass disasters the state of Serbia has not decidedly defined its position relative to instructional and operational instruments of the prevention and elimination of disaster effects (primarily relative to the civil protection

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service). Being in a state of anticipation of adequate legislation, the whole field of planning is subject to improvisation and has been left without the required professional knowledge, scientific methods of assessment and, above all, co-ordination between local community subjects in charge. Effective plans of preparedness for a potential disaster and the defined responsibility of each local community subject do not exist. By doing an analysis of the experience gathered in responding to and eliminating the effects of recent mass disasters in Serbia, it has been established that the main problems arise as a consequence of negligence in crisis management. The reason for this state of affairs should be looked for in the absence of a national body for the coordination of a response to danger, but also in the absence of local educational campaigns and research efforts that should raise the level of collective consciousness of potential risks. To all of this we should add the difficulties existing in establishing a consensus between the relevant actors on collective goals and strategies, the disharmony of educational programmes, shortcomings in the systems of information and their management, and the mechanisms of responsibility. The rapid falling behind of managerial capabilities and protective infrastructure with respect to the needs for protection is accompanied by the existence of a ‘mentality of idleness’ at the lower levels of decision-making, and waiting for matters to be settled ‘from above’.

2. Institutions in Serbia Relevant to the Development of Crisis Management, Status and Perspectives 2.1 The Police Their authority in the realisation of public security as regulated by the law primarily determines the role of the Police in crises. Article 2 of the Law on the Police [1] stipulates that the Police take urgent measures necessary for the elimination of clear and present danger to people and property when such measures cannot be timely taken by other authorised organs. In addition, the Police give assistance to state organs and legal and physical individuals in the case of a general danger caused by a natural disaster, epidemic, and/or other forms of endangerment. With respect to these activities, the Police also take part in performing rescue actions and giving first aid to people. Article 153 of this Law stipulates the duty of members of the Police to educate and perfect themselves professionally in the internal organisational units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, established to this end. Taking into consideration the authority of the Police organisational units, we can talk about the following forms of policing in a crisis: crime suppression in an endangered area, blocking of an endangered area, control of the movement of an endangered population and control of the usage of road communications, the suppression of panic and disorganisation among people, and co-ordination with other state organs and non-state subjects [2]. In doing this police business, criminal police officers, police officers ensuring public order and peace, and traffic police officers are not specially trained and prepared for crises; they modify their course of action with respect to the characteristics of a particular situation. This does not apply to the Sector for Protection and Rescue of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, within which the education of executive officers and field workers employed in the RS MIA fire-fighting and rescue units is done for decision-making jobs, and other jobs relating to fighting fire, rescuing endangered persons and property, and performing in other kinds of

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emergency. Along with this, special courses are organised for handling explosive and hazardous materials, carrying out various kinds of technical interventions and inspections. With the exception of fire protection and direct engagement in the actions of protection and rescue, it may be concluded that the Police in Serbia primarily play the role of an assistant in crises (especially those of large proportions) due to the authority they have. The role of police management, known in the Western world as the Gold, Silver and Bronze Lineup, is somewhat specific in the Serbian Police. The Bronze Level that consists of field police officers providing for a visual presence are represented by police officers in uniforms and their superior officers. Since the firefighting service is integrated with the police, police officers of a higher rank are much more present in the field in order to resume responsibility for numerous risks, including rescue actions in order to alleviate the effects of various kinds of catastrophes (explosions, contamination etc.). As for police activities for creating conditions for other state organs to perform their duties uninterruptedly, depending on the characteristics of situation the silver level and the gold command structure on the level of the local police precinct i.e. the seat of the MIA, provide for a strategic overview of the situation. Further, there are special police units (Gendarmerie, special anti-terrorist units etc.) within the RS MIA. These units are intentionally equipped and trained for fighting terrorism and for taking more complex, high-risk police actions. In this sense, the concept of training Counterterrorist Units (‘CTU’) of the RS MIA, with the intention of eliminating crises, primarily those in which hostage rescuing is involved, is interesting. Namely, the basic concept of the CTU unit’s operations is not a response to a crisis but predicting future events. The recent action carried out in the area of Sjenica, Tutin and Novi Pazar on 3 March 2007, in which a group of religious fanatics suspected of making preparations for terrorist acts were apprehended, proves this. In the strategy of the struggle against terrorism, the CTU’s operations are based on preventive monitoring i.e. predicting occurrences that may have a terrorist act as a consequence. The preventive work involves gathering information, making plans and doing the constant checking of the CTU’s capability to react adequately, which is achieved through a series of drills. The goal of the CTU’s training is a better performance than that of terrorists and criminals in a new environment full of surprises, asymmetry and nonlinearity. Instead of mass forces, mass effects come into focus. In all the drills, the accent is placed on the capability to overpower the adversary both physically and mentally. In effect, this would produce such a mental and physical paralysis of the adversary that it would cause an irregular orientation, preventing them from adjusting to an ever-changing environment, and disabling them from reacting. This is in accordance with Shenehan’s Doctrine that proposes ‘operations based on shock’. Special importance in training the members of these units is given to tactical field exercises performed in real conditions (for example, the tactical drill of liberating hostages from the American Embassy building in Belgrade, in 2006, performed on the premises for the first time in the world). Being aware of the fact that, in time, the training will be increasingly moving to the virtual world, following the accelerated development of information technology, the CTU is trying more and more to utilise simulations of combat activities in its training. A scuba diving squad is also in the formation of this Unit with the task of undertaking rescue actions in water. Experience acquired in some crises in Serbia

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shows the explicit willingness of this Unit to learn from every action of protection and rescue in which they take part.1 Finally, yet importantly, the significance of the RS MIA Negotiation Team in resolving crisis situations should be pointed out. Acting upon the experience from abroad, this Team is engaged in cases of abduction, hostage situations, blackmail, mutiny in a correctional facility, a facility takeover, a street riot, suicide or murder threats, threats to the Police or other people by arms or explosive devices, in the process of police measure preparation and taking, and whenever it is possible to influence the behaviour of those causing a conflict situation. The strategic goal of the Negotiation Team is to perfect the methodology of detecting and resolving conflict situations applying a multidisciplinary approach and using contemporary methods confirmed in practice with a minimal level of exposure to danger of human lives and the security of people and property, by direct negotiations and/or giving suggestions to the authorised MIA Services. Supported by international organisations (OSCE, DFID, CIDA etc.), the Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs has made a certain effort to the end of getting support from the state, civil bodies and citizens, and their partnership in creating a ‘safe community’.2 Relating to that, a series of activities has been initiated for the purpose of security development at the local community level. Various models have been applied in selected local communities of different social, economic, demographic and security characteristics underpinning, at the same time, the capacities for establishing safe communities in other parts of Serbia, too. The planning and realisation of such projects are of great importance because their aim is to improve relations in society, the citizens’ trust and confidence in local authorities, and provide for the much more active participation of all social subjects in the security system, changing their understanding of personal security and the security of the community. 2.2 The Military The issues of citizen protection, of the protection of material goods, and cultural artefacts in a state of emergency of technical and/or technological origin, and of protection against danger that appears in the course of military operations or as an after-effect of those operations form an integral part of the defence policy of our country, with a specific role for the military in performing peacetime tasks of protection and rescue. According to the White Book of Defence [3], within their organisation the military should have forces capable of taking timely and effective action in a state of emergency caused by a terrorist action, but also of responding to non-military challenges and threats by giving assistance to other services and subjects. This presumes their participation in numerous security tasks and actions of survival and rescue by creating and maintaining the conditions for the activation of all available resources. The Office for Civil Protection exists within the Department of Defence, of the Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of Defence (MOD). The basic role of this Office is planning, organising and taking measures of civilian protection and rescue from natural 1

The action of rescuing passengers onboard a bus that plunged into the Tisa River from the Zabalj Bridge in 2005. Prior to this case, the practice of determining priorities in responding to crises had not existed. Priority determining involved the timely identification of the available forces and capacities, but also the key actors in responding to a crisis. 2 Concrete activities started as of 2002/3.

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disasters and catastrophes in peacetime. Being of the opinion that the basic element of the organisation of civil protection is people, the vision of the Ministry of Defence and the expectations of this Department go in the direction of establishing four civil protection centres in the territory of the Republic of Serbia by 2008. The Centres will be training camps for education and training of those people in charge of civil defence. It will be organised for: • professionals doing civil protection jobs; • the COs of civil protection headquarters; • members of civil protection headquarters; • civil protection agents; • civil protection mobile unit reserve (state level); • the COs of territorial and industrial production facility civil protection units (local civil protection); and • critical specialties in territorial and industrial production facility civil protection units. The Centres would serve as campuses for the civilian military service and for training other recruits who will do their civilian military service there, to perform their duties in civil protection such as: rescue man, fire fighter, medic, laboratory technician, radiation meter man etc. the Centres will also provide for the education and training of state mobile civil protection units (emergency service) capable of using cutting-edge technology and equipment. At the same time, local civil protection forces would be established at the local community level, consisting of the following components: 1. Production facilities, institutions and organisations trained to take actions of rescue and protection (public, civil, construction, transporting, waterworks services and/or firms, civil aviation, hotels and restaurants, hospitals, health care centres, veterinary stations, the Red Cross, amateur fire-fighters, diving, nautical, alpinist and amateur SW radio clubs. These firms, institutions and organisations would design their own state of emergency plans, assign the duties and train their employees to perform them. 2. Territorial civil protection units on the local community level that would be trained to act as general purpose units on the local level. 3. Industrial civil protection units set up by factories and plants potentially threatened by different kinds of state of emergency and/or those that themselves are the source of such threats. 4. Personal and mutual protection of the citizens and workers being trained to help themselves and others. Special anti-terrorist units and army teams have been formed to fight terrorism directly. They are trained to be capable of fulfilling their duty according to the newest standards of military special force training. 2.3 Economy Being the symbol and source of the state’s economic power, big economic systems and public enterprises have always been a primary target for terrorists. Private enterprises (domestic and foreign) are also vulnerable to that kind of threat because of the fact that politically- and security-wise unstable areas discourage foreign investment. This is one more form in which terrorism appears as a political weapon and, in this way, it can have a particularly negative effect on societies in transition.

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The rapid falling behind of managerial abilities and protective infrastructure, primarily in the public sector of the economy, is evident in Serbia relative to the development of the economy and the factors accompanying this development (urbanisation, industrial capacity expanding etc.). This in particular refers to the sector of energy supply. Energy supply stability is a synonym for the safety of a nation and, thereby, a critical element of national security. In speculations about a new world energy crisis, Serbia is recognised as being a transit energy power and a hub. But this opportunity is followed by new risks and managing these risks in the sphere of energy capacity security is becoming a key question for the state of Serbia and for the security managers in energy companies of national importance [4].3 Although they are unable to eliminate the threat of such acts of violence, the managers do have at their disposal a wide variety of measures with which they reduce the vulnerability of endangered infrastructure (reduced density of the objects in the area, training of intervention teams).4 Anti-terrorist measures include the responsibility of the managers in increasing the operational reliability and safety of the system of protection that can be achieved, among other things, by strengthening their ability to apply risk-analysis instruments. It is necessary that the instruments for raising the level of public awareness include citizens’ education about possible terrorist threats, early warning signals, and the possibilities of preventing accidents caused by terrorist acts, and alleviating their effects. There are no systematic attempts in Serbia to organise the training of crisis management for workers employed in the economy. In private enterprise, there is a system of in-house security management seminars, the participants of which are primarily security managers. In big economic systems and public enterprises relevant to national security (the Serbian Oil Industry, the Serbian Electro Economy, Belgrade International Airport) a series of lectures and interactive workshops has been organised in recent times about risk management and security crisis management. Together with security managers, other sections of company managerial structure have also taken part in these activities. The latest one in this series of seminars took place at the ‘Nikola Tesla’ International Airport in Belgrade, and was called ‘Crisis Management under ICAO Standards’. 2.4 Non-governmental Sector The significance of the non-governmental sector for the development of civil society stems from the fact that it creates a grid of relationships independent of the state, and they increase the participation of the citizens and their responsibility for themselves and the society in which they live. The non-profit, non-governmental sector is becoming an alternative and a new partner (but not a rival) to the governmental sector in which people rely on their own strength. Apparently, non-governmental organisations (‘NGOs’) participate to a greater extent in the process of satisfying people’s needs in local communities. Therefore, their decision-making structures and their members need to be trained to be able to predict crises, and to know how to respond to them in an effective and timely fashion.

3 The message of Sheykh Abdullah bin Naseer al-Rashid that an economic dzihad nowadays is one of the most powerful means of vengeance to infidels may involve a serious warning. 4 It is estimated that 40% of the total amount of crude oil in the world is in oil pipelines.

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The non-profit sector in Serbia displays an increasing interest in initiating and funding educational programmes for professionals in the field of crisis management. So far, the role of the International Committee of Red Cross in Serbia and the roles of some other international organisations and programmes (OSCE, UNDP) have been recognised in this area. In May 2006, USAID allotted the contract Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) for the purpose of realising the SCOPES Programme (the Programme of Planning and Reacting in Crisis Situations and Strengthening of Economic Safety in Serbia). The SCOPES has two components. The first one is building capacities for preparedness and reaction in the case of a natural disaster at the republic and community level. The other one is an improvement of economic safety in participating communities. Within the framework of the first of these two components, a training programme has been realised in the purpose of building community capacities for managing the situations of natural disaster, and other accidents and catastrophes on the local level. The programme primarily encompasses the members of community crisis headquarters. The course is about how to form a functional and effective community headquarters for managing a state of emergency, as well as about the designing a general plan for managing a crisis situation. At the very beginning, the Programme showed some weaknesses because it was carried out independently of government structures (the Serbian MOD) into which the organisation and function of civil protection has been integrated. The Fund for Open Society funded a project to study the indicators of human security in the Republic of Serbia. In contrast to the group of indicators relating to the work of the Police in a community, the indicators relating to the elements and functioning of the system of civil protection have been chosen because the state and its institutions perceptibly neglected them. The object of empirical research was the realisation of an insight into the status of operative organs and civil protection forces in the communities in the Republic of Serbia. Special attention was paid to the functioning of headquarters in the domain of crisis situation management with the accent on activities performed in the communities during 2005 and 2006. The data were gathered in the ministries in charge: the MOD, MIA, as well as in community organs and services [5]. Having identified the descriptive and quantified indicators, and especially having had an insight into the existing state of affairs in the field, the following conclusions were drawn relevant to this research objective: • The headquarters placed in the defence system are neglected even in the new drafts of new laws regulating the field of protection and rescue. • The citizens have no training, they are not motivated and unready for collaboration during a state of emergency (at the same time, the weakest element of headquarters functioning – the relationship with the citizens). • Preventive activities reduce damage to material goods (i.e. landslides in areas where people had built housing without a building permit). • The profile of an average community headquarters shows a satisfactory age, professional and national structure, i.e. the structure with respect to the members’ experience, but regarding the sex structure of the members an insufficient number of women is noted. Also, there are not enough university graduates, specialists and people who have taken other professional training courses, attended seminars etc. for the purpose of maintaining the level of knowledge and skills regarding the increasing threats and challenges of modern times (natural disasters are expected more and more frequently,

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threats from potential technical and/or technological accidents, chemical accidents, terrorist acts etc.). • Most problems the headquarters has are in their relationship with the citizens, a fact that speaks for itself regarding an inadequate level of communication within the local community and the lack of understanding of citizens’ needs, whose safety must lie at the core of every activity, but it also speaks of an insufficient security awareness and personal culture. The Center for Risk Analysis and Crisis Management in Belgrade is the first nongovernmental organisation in Serbia whose objective is risk analysis and risk management. It is designed as a flexible instrument (not burdened with red tape and official procedure) to compensate for the sluggishness of the state in reacting to security challenges and threats. Its mission is to build the effective, efficient and sustainable capacity of the public, private and civil sectors for the identification and reduction of risk and development of the capacity for preparedness for crisis prevention and management. The Center offers an opportunity to open up dialogue between professionals trained in the field of crisis management and similar associations in the neighbourhood for the purpose of better co-ordinating their activities. One of the strategic objectives of the Center is to raise the level of public awareness of crisis situations and the possibilities of their prevention, or turning them in the desired direction. The Centre organises education, special courses for the present and future risk managers, and crisis managers in the state administration and the economy. They are offered professional knowledge necessary for the implementation of all available instruments for analysis, control, monitoring, the evaluation of security risks, as well as algorithms and procedures of managing the crisis situations by applying analytical methods and skills of assessment, communication, and resolving such situations in concrete case studies. 2.5 Faculty of Security Studies, the Initiator of Education and Research in the Field of Crisis Management The Faculty of Security Studies is a respected scientific and research institution at which various modes and aspects of education and research in the field of crisis management are organised and carried out. For this purpose, there are numerous activities going on at the Faculty and they entail: • permanent perfecting of the teaching process (modernisation of teaching programmes, methods and techniques); • organising scientific research work (projects, networks, official document and strategic framework formulating), and designing professional projects; • trainings, courses and seminars (organised for different target groups: social and humanitarian workers, workers in the judiciary, the MIA, and the military, jurists, and executives on different levels of decision-making in society and the economy); • organising conferences and professional meetings; • publishing periodicals and other publications; • consulting; • organizing domestic and international conferences; and • designing information systems etc.

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In the next chapter, we shall briefly present the most important form of education in the field of crisis management at the Faculty and some of the activities in this field planned for the future. 2.5.1 Education for Crisis Management The first serious attempt to place education for crisis managers within an academic framework was made at the Faculty of Security Studies of the University of Belgrade with the foundation of Special Studies in the Field of Crisis Management in 2006. The intention of this programme of studies is to assess and monitor negative events, competitors’ actions, intelligence, criminal, terrorist and other security threats, political, economic and other risks, natural catastrophes and disasters that lead to organisational crises and produce unwanted humanitarian effects, and to do that in a wide-ranging fashion, in a complex geo-political, security and competitive environment. In an effort to achieve this, an interest was found complementary to the one of international organisations (primarily the OSCE) active in different stages of the conflict cycle, from early warning and conflict prevention to conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Special studies are based on the perception of a certain dose of inexperience on the part of security and crisis managers, as well as special force or team members in making crisis situation assessments, which makes way for the higher probability of making a mistake in doing that. The programme of studies is based on understanding crisis as a process and the courses are structured so as to follow the life cycle of a crisis. The accent is placed on prevention and the instruments for measuring it. In view of the fact that the aim of the studies is the training and education of students to undertake planning, organising and decision-making jobs professionally in the period prior to a crisis, during a crisis, and subsequent to a crisis the students are government employees but also workers from business structures: public and private enterprises, which is particularly important in the context of economic rehabilitation as a prerequisite of political rehabilitation and stabilisation in this area. The heterogeneous structure of the students as representatives of local and wider community subjects is also very important because of their capability to assess a situation and make decisions on the operational level as part of the early warning system, which makes their organisations part of the decision-making process in accordance with the principles of regional international organisations. Besides the basic course of studies of crisis prevention and management, through the programme of options the students are educated and trained to apply the skills of crisis management in different fields of practice. This entails analytical skills, negotiating skills, crisis-communicating skills and cost/benefit analysis-making skills in different fields of the crisis management sphere such as industry, energy production, tourism, hotel and restaurant management, sports, different branches of the public administration, military and police organisations, traffic, human environment protection, and education. These special studies are an opportunity for the Faculty of Security Studies to create a network of specialists in crisis analysis, and to anticipate risks that lead to the occurrence of a crisis in Serbia applying an integrated methodology in the process of creating this network. The scientific and teaching staff at this Faculty have established co-operation with a network of similar institutions of university-level education in the world, in the field

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of risk and crisis management, in their effort to build up a scientific and professional capacity in their midst that would make them equal partners in the field of interuniversity collaboration in Europe and in the world.5 2.5.2 Research Projects in the Field of Crisis Management Currently, at the Faculty of Security Studies a large number of scientific and professional research activities are being carried out and planned on the international, regional and local levels. The research activities gather research workers and scientists with different but complementary interests and theoretical backgrounds in an effort to transform the accomplished theoretical insights into guidelines of policy-making and developing means that should be of help to decision-making subjects in local, national and multinational government and non-governmental organisations as well as to executives at all levels of social and economic management. We shall present only some of the ongoing research projects at the Faculty, those relating to studying concrete fields of a state of crisis and different forms of their manifestation. (a) The Project ‘Model of Human Security Status Assessment and Improvement Measures in the Local Community’ The Faculty of Security Studies has successfully developed an applied research model of the status and programme of human security key indicators in a local community. This longitudinal research model has already been applied in the Communities of Palilula, Prokuplje and Indjija and, currently, the Faculty is negotiating realisation of this project in several Belgrade Communities with the Town Hall. In the next period, this project will be realised in some more Communities in Serbia, which will open up the option of security status comparative analysis making in a considerable part of the state territory. The basic theoretical concept on which this project is based starts from the widely accepted idea of human security that includes the following: human environment security, personal and physical security, economic and social safety, and political stability (non-discriminated groups and individuals). By doing this research, the capacity of the local community is analysed to recognise the risk of threats to the personal and group security of citizens in their everyday life, and to respond adequately. This involves identifying the key factors and critical locations at which the risk of security threats is very big, or unacceptable for normal living, as well as a general insight into the citizens’ opinions and attitudes to the overall political and social ambiance in which they exist. On the grounds of the findings obtained in this way, a map of exposure to risks to the community is made, and a proposition of the measures to improve the existing status is being worked out. (b) Project ‘Security in Serbia’ The five-year long research project ‘Security in Serbia’ (2006-2011) is designed to be a multidisciplinary research of the complex phenomenon of security. • In its first stage, the project focuses on the creation of an adequate theoreticalmethodological framework of security problem research. The existing 5

In the previous period contacts were made with academic and scientific institutions such as the University in Lyden, the Netherlands, and the Institute Crismart in Sweden.

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•

scientific and research studies of this serious problem offer valuable findings in addressing it. However, any further dealing with the complex field of security requires a generalisation of the acquired theoretical and empirical knowledge with which the fragmentary nature of individual studies could be superseded, and the acquired knowledge made systematic and fitted into an adequate theoretical framework. Designing a precise conceptual apparatus and drawing a clear structure of key ideas appear to be a prerequisite of future fruitful scientific and research endeavours. The next stages of the project involve concrete research endeavours as regards examining the separate dimensions and forms of endangering security. The academic and disciplinary variety of the scientific fields studied at the Faculty of Security Studies, and the interdisciplinary nature of its research capacity, offer a chance to examine the problem of security in Serbia from all relevant aspects. This research will entail an analysis of all relevant security status indicators: military threats (aggression, armed insurgency, guerrilla warfare), terrorism, organised crime, crime, social challenges, political instability, ecological challenges, natural catastrophes, and antisocial behaviour.

(c) Project ‘Reconstruction of ‘Serbian Railways’ Security Model’ This year, the Faculty of Security Studies is starting a two-year applied research project in collaboration with the ‘Serbia Railways’ Public Enterprise and the competent ministries. The high security standards the EU has adopted for railroad traffic in its member states are in close connection to the terrorist attacks launched on railroad trains in Great Britain, Spain and Italy, but also in other countries outside the EU. According to the assessments coming from intelligence service circles, international terrorism and other asymmetrical threats have moved from air and sea traffic to railroad traffic. The system of railroads is currently more sensitive and accessible, and less organised and secured by systems of control and surveillance. Therefore, it is more convenient for arousing the feeling of insecurity and fear with the civilian population due to the danger of mass casualties, material damage and ecological catastrophes. The level of security in PE ‘Serbian Railroads’ is much lower than the level of security achieved in the EU. The assessments of relevant services also point to the fact that we may become the target of terrorist attacks due to both internal reasons and orientations in foreign policy and the process of military integration that is underway. Within the framework of Euro-Atlantic integrations, Serbia is under an obligation to provide adequate standards and safe traffic conditions for all passenger and/or freight traffic coming from EU and NATO member states along the corridors running through our country, notwithstanding the kinds of shipments, and for all Serbian and foreign personnel working on the railroads. Being an institution of the largest professional and scientific resources in the field of security, the Faculty of Security Studies at the University of Belgrade has been engaged in the design of a project that should encompass all aspects of this issue and would be realised in stages, i.e. object by object, depending on the priorities and assessment of the level of endangerment. (d) Project ‘Education Management in Crisis Conditions’ The action research project ‘Education Management in Crisis Conditions’ has been organised and started by the Faculty of Security Studies and supported by the Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of Education. By supporting the project, the Ministry has

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recognised the training of education management as a national interest and strategically important component of economic and social development. The reason to start this project is two paradigms of the same process: education management in crisis conditions, and crisis of education management. The objective of the first part of the project is developing the professional competence (knowledge and skills) necessary for education management in the period prior to a crisis, during a crisis, and subsequent to a crisis, i.e. assessing, monitoring and responding to crisis situations (strikes, terrorism, conflicts, destructive cult activities, drug addiction, family violence, and violence in sports). The second part of the project addresses the education management crisis in view of the fact that there is an embryo of a crisis at every level of education management (the crisis of competence, value system, and interpersonal relations) this is a social, professional, and scientific phenomenon whose manifestations are a crisis of the education system, a crisis of institutions, and a crisis of educational programmes. The development of the professional competence of management is especially important in the field of education, which is a pillar of social development in crisis conditions. (e) Project ‘Safe School’ The final objectives of this project are determining an effective strategy for improving the level of security, and creating a safe social climate in school, one that underpins the adequate emotional and social development of children and youth. In collaboration with the Fund for Open Society, the Faculty completed the first stage of the project activities through the subproject ‘Strategies of security risk identification, prevention, and suppression in schools’ in the March 2006-March 2007 period. The aim of the completed subproject was an extensive analysis of foreign academic and practical experience in this field, as well as the creation of guidelines applicable to the school system in Serbia. As an important result of this stage of project activities, we present two publications: • The reader Security Risks in Schools: Models of Detection and Responding, (Editor: Djuric, S.), Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, 2007; and • The reference book Safe School (Djuric, S., Popovic-Citic B.), Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, 2007, distributed in all primary and secondary schools in Serbia. An integral and comprehensive approach to the issues of security demands the continuation of research in the direction of the development of successful models and strategies of prevention and adequate measures applicable to our conditions. The projected research activities for the next period relate to the creation of the Model of Objective Assessment of School Security Status. Without knowing the school’s real needs and actual potential, as well as the level of its preparedness to do something regarding its security, it is impossible to make a choice of appropriate actions. The following stages of the project will include three successive forms of research activities. The first stage would relate to establishing a model of assessment of a school’s preparedness to apply the programme of school security improvement. The second stage would relate to establishing a model of the assessment of a school’s needs, whilst the third stage would pertain to establishing a model of the potential of the school and the local community, and that is very important for improving school security levels.

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Conclusion Interactive relations in the sphere of security oblige all countries, including Serbia, to assume responsibility for internal and external security. Being on the threshold of EuroAtlantic integrations and one of the most important factors of stability in South-east Europe and in the Balkans, Serbia is expected to actively contribute to security in the region. The country will achieve this through collaboration and partnership with other international relationship subjects, assuming responsibility for political, social, economic and other risks and crises which it may influence. In this context, the issue of building an adequate system of crisis management on the level of the state and other forms of political and territorial organisation, but also in the public enterprise and profit sectors, as well as in education, tourism, sport and other fields of human activity is of the utmost importance. It is necessary that this system be scientifically grounded and designed, and a prerequisite of that is to build preventive capacities for risk and crisis management and to thereby accomplish, maintain and improve the overall security of the country and strengthen its political, economic and other ties with the environment. The strategy of education in the field of crisis management must start from the standpoint that the conception of education is impossible to accomplish only through formal education due to the huge acceleration of change. The system of education for responding to a crisis situation must not be detached from the informal one in the environment. Otherwise, its objectives will not be real and a crisis of competence is certain to appear.

References: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Official Gazette of Republic Serbia, No. 101/2005. Z. Kekovic, M. Talijan, Internal Affairs and Preventive Evacuation, Collective Works, Faculty of Defence and Protection, Belgrade, 1999. White Book of Defence of the State Community of Serbia and Montenegro, NIC Vojska, Belgrade, 2004. Al-Qaeda publication, The Laws of Targeting Petroleum Related Interests, June 2004. The 2006 Report on Human Security Indicators in Republic Serbia, Fund for Open Society.

Other References: Eduard Borodzicz, Risk, Crisis & Security Management, John Wiley & Sons, 2005. Slađana Đurić, Model istraživanja bezbednosti u lokalnoj zajednici. Zbornik radova Fakulteta civilne odbrane, 2005, 231-255. Izveštaj o indikatorima ljudske bezbednosti u Republici Srbiji za 2006. godinu, Fond za otvoreno društvo, Beograd, 2007. Zoran Keković, Želimir Kešetović, Krizni nemadžment u Sloveniji, Zbornik radova Fakulteta civilne odbrane, 2005, 305-322. Zoran Keković, Želimir Kešetović, Krizni nemadžment 1 – prevencija krize, Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2006. Zoran Keković, Momčilo Talijan, Unutrašnji poslovi i preventivna evakuacija, Zbornik radova Fakulteta odbrane i zaštite, 1999, 129-153. Službeni glasnik RS, br. 101, 2005. Strategija odbrane državne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore, Ministarstvo odbrane SCG, www.mod.gov.yu.

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Crisis Management in Kosovo: Challenges and Perspectives Bejtush GASHIa and Sedat BURRNIKUb a College University Victory, Kosovo b Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kosovo

Abstract: The low level of efficiency of local and international institutions to face and deal with social problems (unemployment), organised crime, non-settlement of the status of property, corruption, narcotics smuggling, prostitution, Kosovo as an oasis with an unresolved status, the influence of Serbian politics on the governance of the enclaves and others may be factors in the development of a crisis which could move beyond institutional control. These events could then have as a consequence devastating riots with elements of interethnic clashes. The KFOR’s presence in Kosovo is substantial and strategically needed because this force is a guarantee of the region’s peace, security, stability and democratisation. It is also the only force which can guarantee a solution to the inherited problems in the region. Keywords: crisis management, strategy, Kosovo, riots, KFOR

Introduction UN Security Council Resolution 1244 approved on 10 June 1999 and which stems from the Security Council’s ‘Preserve International Peace and Security’ mandate is in almost its entirety connected with security issues. The deployment of KFOR troops and UNMIK Police in Kosovo started the building of a new security environment based on contemporary concepts of the foundation of security services. In the past eight years, due to a lack of competencies by local institutions the security environment in Kosovo did not receive the treatment it has in developed countries. As a consequence of the lack of relevant legislation, the missing quality and efficiency of the response of operational security institutions and the lack of accountability of every branch, the state system was not good. The settlement of Kosovo’s status according to the proposal of United Nations Special Envoy, Marti Ahtisaari, which is expected to happen in the following months, will create preconditions for a better future for Kosovo. But while ever this issue remains open, both ethnicities will continue to see each other as a threat. This endangers the fragile peace in Kosovo and in the Balkans, while many people are losing hope that the international community will leave Kosovo as soon as possible. Implementation of ‘Ahtisaari’s package’ by international and local institutions is seen as a challenge and a possible path leading towards a functional state. NATO and the European Union are expected to play a key role in both the creation of these possibilities and also in facing up to the challenges.

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However, regardless of ethnicity the real security threats and challenges Kosovo will face after its status has been resolved are: trafficking (drugs, prostitution, small arms and light weapons, cigarettes etc), corruption, money laundering during the privatisation process, the low level of employment, low economic growth, an army of asylum-seekers ‘at-the-gates’ and various parallel systems – public versus private (healthcare, education – especially superior versions etc), procrastination in system capacity-building (judicial, policy, diplomacy, employment etc), the lack of a genuine intelligence service etc.

1. The strategy for crisis management in Kosovo As in other countries, Kosovar institutions supported by international organisations are in the process of drafting the ‘General security strategy for Kosovo’ 1 as the highest document of the executive institutions in which security issues will be defined. In this document, abilities and skills will be anticipated for the creation, application and coordination of the diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, technological instruments and other parameters for achieving the goal – the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the citizens and institutions of Kosovo. Building of the security management strategy in Kosovo is based on a cooperative model regarding security which emphasises security more than threats, or underlines reaction and not prevention. The KFOR, UNMIK Police and KPS are responsible for the security system, while another important role in the internal security field is playing by professional private security companies. These companies have so far only been functioning according to the UNMIK Regulation but very soon (by the end of the year) their tasks and responsibilities will be institutionalised in the law for private security services which is in the process of being drafted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo. The way of designating dangers and threats is closely connected with the interests of national, regional and global security. The main problem of the security management strategy is the definition of the vital interests of Kosovo that can be survival, life, major or peripheral. If these interests are objectively defined, then the hazards and threats to them will also be designated in the right manner. Based on norms and values accepted in society and defined in ‘Ahtisaari’s package’[1], the basic missions of this strategy will be: the pursuit of Kosovo’s sovereignty; the protection of independence and territorial integrity; the protection of life and property; the development of democracy; economic prosperity (social welfare); the advance (strengthening) of human rights and liberties; a contribution to peace and stability in the region; the development of abilities to promote and implement legitimate interests; and integration in the international security structures. After the new UN Security Council’s Resolution, it is not expected that Kosovar Albanians (‘K-Albanians’) will undertake any actions that will endanger security. Although they have not attained the maximum of their expectations, considering the circumstances they have lived in for centuries, the proposal is being favourably accepted. Therefore, discontent among K-Albanians is relatively low. This is because 1 Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Jessen Petersen, based on an offer from Great Britain in December 2004 invited an advisory team for Development of the Security Sector to review the concepts of internal security in Kosovo.

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the vast majority of Albanians believe that Ahtisaari’s proposal is the best that can be achieved given the current circumstances. All K-Albanians know that any act of violence in Kosovo could jeopardise their interests by turning back the process of Kosovo’s independence – a scenario in which even the greatest extremists and nationalists would find themselves as losers. For societies in transition, international co-operation is not only the way of materialising own abilities and international promotion but it is also a condition for resolving accumulated problems. So, the international co-operation of Kosovo and its institutions will be significant for the general adaptation of society and its institutions in line with the standards and procedures of developed countries. The responsibilities of government institutions of Kosovo within the security system will depend on the distribution of the roles that derive from the principles of three powers or jurisdictions. So, institutions are implementing and developing various responsibilities and tasks as regards the general security system in order to achieve the system’s legal, efficient and accurate functioning. The local institutions relevant to crisis management in Kosovo are: the Prime Minister (Chief Executive Officers), Inter-ministerial Committee for Protection and Rescue (a mixed structure – locals and internationals), the Security Adviser to the PM (a mixed structure – locals and internationals), the Ministry of Internal Affairs established in 2005 but still with limited competencies, the intelligence structure, the Parliament in general and its committees (committee for security issues) and independent non-governmental institutions. Further, the operational elements of the general security system are: the KFOR (armed military force), the Kosovo Protection Corps, the Kosovo Police Service, the UNMIK Police, the Department of Emergency Management, Criminal Intelligence, and private security companies. The level of national security as a result of various activities is a hard to measure category. In assessing the security situation it is necessary to consider various elements that are very difficult, sometimes even impossible, to categorise. These elements are: economic growth, weaknesses of the judicial system, criminality, co-operation with international institutions of punishment, illegal immigration, international road infrastructure, energy supply, social development, system of values, demographical development, safety of the ecological environment, decentralisation, the health system, geopolitical relations, border contests, natural and technological disasters, the geostrategic position, the development of military forces, terrorism, organised crime, drug smuggling, and security and stability in the Western Balkans (South-East Europe). Even after eight years, due to a lack of certain legislation regulating this issue the security environment in Kosovo is still not defined and is characterised by undefined relations between the respective institutions. Also, as regards the work and efficiency of the local and international security services there is an absence of a unique strategic concept of organisation and action. In the operational aspect, security was the responsibility of the international institutions and they did not sufficiently support the transfer of responsibilities and competencies in the way required by local institutions which at the end of 2003 achieved a good level of abilities and capacities for crisis management. This level of management skills was evident in the case of managing the situation after an earthquake on 24 April 2004 in the Gjilani region when local institutions were the main players in management of the crisis. As a consequence of this earthquake thousands of people were displaced.

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Different methods are used to classify dangers and threats. One of the classifications is based on their breadth, nature, intensity and consequences. Based on their breadth, dangers and threats can be global, regional or national. Regional dangers and threats in Kosovo can come as a result of the inherited problems of ethnic cleansing which created an outflow of refugees of illegal immigration, international trafficking by mafias, religious intolerance, large arsenals of weaponry possessed by the states and the people, improper administration of the minority inter-border troubles associated with the use of weapons and violence, the implementation of policies aimed at the creation of large states etc. These dangers could influence the region and have various affects in the most countries in the wider region as well. The issues of ethnic minorities and the current country borders are a potential risk that in recent years has been growing in size. The control of natural sources is among the oldest causes of conflicts. The problem is that no government of countries in the region can solve problems by themselves. The current national politics, whether transparent or hidden, are called the ‘politics of re-nationalisation’. Here we find distinct countries of former Yugoslavia and problems between Kosovo and Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. The framework of the conflicts resulted from threats and dangers in Kosovo, and its complex appearance which can be internal and external. There are many factors combined in complexity that can have an influence, which means that one factor alone cannot explain everything. Realistic analysis shows that the complexity of factors that could transform dangers and threats into a conflict has to be analysed. Factors exerting a key influence on the dangers and threats in Kosovo are: the low level of economic development, the separation of municipalities along ethnic lines, the fragility of democratic institutions, violations of human rights, political pluralism, a market-driven economy etc. For the Kosovar institutions an analysis of dangers and threats is a priority. The main reasons that have influenced improper reactions to dangers and threats of various natures have been: structural (institutional fragility due to the slow process of transferring competencies); increasing economic problems, the high level of unemployment, radical political and non-political groups etc.

2. The experience so far Kosovo as a territory under international supervision in the 1999-2007 period, besides ordinary crimes which other countries of the world are also facing, has mostly dealt with the problem of the freedom of movement for both communities, and with public order. In this contribution we will present two typical cases/examples our country has faced which are typical cases of a crisis or instances that could be transformed into a crisis. In fact, one case is an example of a failure of the management of the security system while the second one is a positive example of the successful management of the situation.

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2.1 Summary – the March 2004 riots Riots started on 17 March when, in the southern part of the divided city of Mitrovica near the Ibri bridge, Albanians gathered to protest about three Albanian children who drowned in the river in the northern part of the city, whereby they were accusing Serbs of the deaths. Shooting with firearms started on both sides and peace-keeping troops intervened but were unable to stop the violence. The violence continued on 18 March as well, with demonstrations in other parts of Kosovo especially in Çagllavica and around other enclaves inhabited by Serbians. The 2004 riots started to weaken the unstable basis of the gradual progress achieved over four and a half years. Within a few hours the whole country was pervaded by a rebellion in which the targets, beside Serbs, also included UN personnel and assets. The violence that happened then had not been seen since 1999. On 18 March the violence escalated and the whole situation started to be exploited by extremists and criminals of both ethnicities, especially Albanians. The demonstrations showed the UN mission (UNMIK) and NATO peacekeepers (KFOR) to be fragile structures and uncoordinated to face such a situation. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (‘PISG’), the media and civil society were also revealed to be incapable in this regard. The entire management of the country’s security system failed and the riots have been transformed into an unstoppable crisis. National institutions (the Government of Kosovo), the UNMIK Civil Administration, the UN Police, the Kosovo Police Service but also the KFOR military forces could not manage to either stop or bring under control the escalation of violence. A consequence of this was: 19 dead people (11 Albanians and 8 Serbs), about 900 injured people, 700 destroyed houses belonging to Serbs, Ashkalia and Roma, 10 destroyed or damaged public buildings, 32 orthodox churches and monasteries damaged or destroyed and some 4,500 displaced people. The riots actually started spontaneously rather than in an organised way, which benefited extremists and criminal groups especially on the second day. The KFOR and NATO lost their image of being invulnerable and elusive. It has been suggested that these demonstrations also involved foreign secret services. Due to the fragile situation in Kosovo, surveys made by international and local organisations had warned about the population’s expression of displeasure through a conflict protest so the claims by UNMIK representatives and local institutions that the demonstrations were a surprise are not credible. Even three years after the riots and general assessments about the reasons for the failure of the security system management, it is a general opinion that this happened due to the: x improper structure of the crisis and security management system that was basically the responsibility of the UNMIK; x the lack of preparedness of the local police structure to deal with wide ranging/country-wide riots and also the lack of decision-making competencies; x the absence of a co-ordination/communication structure per se among the security players (KPS, CIVPOL and KFOR); x the lack of a proper intelligence structure involving locals and the malfunction of the existing intelligence structure led by internationals; and x the absence of courage of local and international political structures to face and deal in practice with the enraged crowd of people.

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2.2 Summary – the funeral of President Rugova Kosovar President Dr. Ibrahim Rugova died on 21 January 2006. There was a general fear in the country that after his death, including the days of mourning, violence could emerge which would be initiated from different sides and with the goal of the internal and external destabilisation of the fragile Kosovo. The whole operation of ensuring public order and the internal security management was almost perfect. The days of homage, the funeral day itself and following days in which thousands of people from Kosovo participated, along with well-known people from Western countries, passed without a single incident. The operation of the situation management that could have potentially become a large crisis for the country and the whole region was mainly successful because all main players of law and security enforcement (KPS, CIVPOL and KFOR) were involved in all its phases. There was a clear line of communication, co-ordination and responsibility between these players, but also between the local and international political and administrative factors. On 26 January, when the funeral took place, KPS and CIVPOL with the KFOR’s help ran a large-scale operation of situation management. About 4,000 members of the Kosovo Police Service of all nationalities were directly involved in the operation, while the operation itself was led by the KPS. The operational command room was manned at the central police level and in all six police regions. The operations went in several directions at the same time: security of the building where respects were being paid; security of the roads from the airport and border-crossing points from where international VIPs were arriving; and the security of the building in which the central ceremony with the participation of local and international VIPs was taking place. Also, at the same time a Kosovo-wide operation for preserving general security was going on.

3. Challenges and threats involving crisis management in Kosovo 3.1 General Possible challenges to security during this period might have come from the Serb community and would in fact have been a consequence of the long-running investment made by Belgrade, not only in political but also scientific-academic and financial terms, in creating negative convictions about K-Albanians and in creating the myth of ‘Kosovo being the heart of Serbia’[2]. If the influence from Belgrade continues to be so strong, 2 it can reasonably be expected that the reaction of the Kosovo-Serb community against Kosovo’s final status will be explicit in already familiar forms such as: organising mass protests in all their habitats, blocking roads and preventing the free movement of people through their areas [3]. All these acts will seek to provoke countermeasures on the side of the Albanian majority or law enforcement agencies, hence slowing or even stopping the implementation of settlement [4]. 3

2

There is still no daily newspaper in the Serbian language that is edited in Kosovo and read nationally, while local radio and TV stations are virtually completely under Belgrade’s influence. 3 Such a scenario is possible according to political analysts.

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Such actions are being promoted, induced, organised and/or executed by extremists, militants and/or government officials from Belgrade 4 and can jeopardise security by means of the Serbian military, police and/or paramilitary incursions and attacks on the border, with the excuse of protecting the Kosovo-Serb minority. On the other hand, in this later phase the main challenges to security could happen on the other side – the K-Albanian majority. Their discontent with the process is due to the absence of an explicit nation-state. If the international community and local government fail to include K-Serbs in Kosovar society, this will pose a threat to security. The deterioration of ‘contentment’ will first show itself among members of other minorities and shortly after that among members of the K-Albanian majority. Attention must be paid to K-Albanians who will continue to live in the artificial ‘ghettos’ created by the decentralisation process. 3.2 Interethnic relations Inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have not seen any progress. In Kosovo a multi-ethnic society i.e. Albanian-Serbian symbiosis, has not existed at any time. These relations are characterised by large-scale polarisation in all aspects of social, political and economic life. Based on an analysis of various survey results, Albanians and Serbs perceive the same things in different ways. What is acceptable for one side is unacceptable for the other. One factor which interferes in the inter-ethnic relations, co-existence and integration in Kosovar society is the issue of missing persons of both ethnicities during the war. According to figures from the International Red Cross Committee, the following are missing: 2,915 Albanians and 1,035 minority members: 646 Serbs, 219 Romas, 103 Bosnians and 67 Gorans. The following is an extract of Ahtisaari’s proposal: ‘All organisations not authorised by law to conduct activities in Kosovo in the security sector shall cease to operate.’ In the North of Kosovo, (in North Mitrovica in particular) and other areas where K-Serbs will be a majority (new municipalities enacted for this purpose), there have been and probably will continue to exist, organised armed groups that have/will operate under various names. According to local media reports [5], a considerable number of MPB (Serbian Ministry of Interior) officials and paramilitary forces have moved towards Kosovo. A few of them have been apprehended by the KPS (Kosovo Police Service). According to Serbian sources (cited), since May 2006 as many as 385 servicemen of the exYugoslav Army have been being paid to organise Serbian ‘forces of civil protection’ in the cities the north of Kosovo [6]. The same source further states that, as soon as the international recognition of Kosovo as a state begins, all Serb officials of the KPS in the north of Kosovo will start to act under the command of the local authorities. Further, when asked whether Serbs in the north of Kosovo planned to declare a breakaway Serbian republic in Kosovo, Dragiša Mijoviü, the mayor of Zveçan/Zveþan, said a declaration was unnecessary. ‘There is no need to declare anything because we are already functioning as part of Serbia,’ [7] he said. It will be a great challenge for the local government in co-operation with the new international presence here to prevent such actions. But, an even greater challenge than 4

For instance, the gathering of ‘refugees’ in tents along the northern border of Kosovo.

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stopping such armed groups will be the process of identifying and selecting which of those must be listed for outlawing since the ‘internationals’ will regard many of them as civil organisations and/or NGOs protecting Serb citizens [7]. 5 The most prominent example of the inefficiency of appropriate institutions in this matter is the case of the ‘Bridge Watchers’ and police officials from MPB that operated and are still operating in the north. In the spirit of Ahtisaari’s proposal, such a practice must be brought to an end and no parallel organisation whatsoever should be allowed to operate, not only within the Serbian community but elsewhere in Kosovo as well. 3.3 Parallel structures of Serbia in Kosovo and the freedom of movement The freedom of movement is a problem for the citizens’ access to essential judicial services, education, social services and employment. In general, human rights in Kosovo are far away from the standards and also a continuous source for inter-ethnic tensions in the country. Due to the lack of the freedom of movement in the whole of Kosovo, the Serbian population continues to live in so-called enclaves and isolated from social and economic developments. In those enclaves parallel structures from Serbia in the fields of education, health and the judicial system continue to function. These structures are financially supported by the Serbian government and are the main obstacle to the integration of the Serbian minority in Kosovar society as well as the PISGs and UNMIK exercising its authority in the whole country. Also, in those parts the KPS is not functioning and public security is only implemented by the KFOR and UNMIK Police. On 7 July 2002 the Steiner-ýoviü agreement was signed so as to eliminate these structures but the Serbian side did not respect it and furthermore came with its own request for the decentralisation of some municipalities and the creation of new ones – the canton of Kosovo and its division. The passive attitude of the UNMIK regarding the activities of these extremists in the enclaves are hindering efforts to improve relations between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority and is being reflected in a deep political crisis. 3.4 The return of refugees and displaced persons Factors which negatively influence the implementation of the Kosovo Government’s Programme for the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons to their Homes are ýoviü’s programme for the return of refugees and the establishment of 24 new locations for the returns and the recently launched proposal of the Serbian government for the recognition of the autonomy of Serbs within the ‘autonomy’ of Kosovo. This Serbian policy is in opposition to the UNMIK policy to return refugees to their homes. It has to be emphasised that the process of returns is also damaged by politicisation of the process itself by the Serbian side. It is producing higher figures than what exist in reality. 3.5 Dissolution of the KPC Parallel to the formation of the KSF, the KPC will be dissolved. A lot has been invested in the KPC both materially and professionally. The KPC has completely 5

They publicly claim, for example, that their force will do nothing more than provide extra firemen for Serbian municipalities.

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fulfilled its assigned duties and is the only institution to have reached the standard preassigned by the international community. In its work and activities, the KPC has provided great management in dealing with emergencies and crises as well as in other fields of its activity [8]. Although initially feared as the greatest challenge coming from ‘Ahtisaari’s package’, dissolution of the KPC could prove to be the best planned and executed process in finalising the status of Kosovo. Throughout the entire process, however, the dignity and historical contribution of KPC members must be borne in mind. Some of the possible and easy ways to do this are: prequalification for new jobs through vocational training, dedicating funds to financially support those who cannot qualify for the KSF or otherwise, inclusion in the pension fund (on reasonable conditions) of those who comply with the criteria. Although members of the KPC who are dissatisfied with the solution could organise themselves in new associations to protect their rights and/or express their discontent, none of this will be through violence. This argument is supported by the fact that, even though the ‘Vetëvendosje’ had urged them to, neither members of the KPC nor the associations arising after the war of the KLA joined their protests or their stance [9]. 3.6 The Orthodox Church One of the main challenges of the Comprehensive Proposal for Settling the Status of Kosovo, for Kosovo after its status has been fixed and especially for security and the freedom of movement (a basic precondition and principal of human rights) will be religious and cultural heritage. Only orthodox religious and cultural heritage are given attention in ‘Ahtisaari’s package’ while all the rest of Kosovo’s heritage is reduced to one paragraph with three lines. Even more, in this paragraph the ethnographic and archaeological fortune taken by the Serbian regime during the war is described as ‘being taken on loan for temporary exhibitions’ 6 . Because they are being put under heavy security measures 7 and put beyond the regular functions of the state, 8 orthodox religious sites in the future could pose a real threat to security. The majority population (K-Albanians) will continue to feel threatened by such installations because the ‘Protective Zones’ will hinder their right to private property and freedom of movement. The presence of the international military force (initially) and later of the KPS will make the K-Albanian population feel uncomfortable in their own habitats while at the same time feeding a sense of insecurity of the K-Serb population and inducing their tendency towards self-isolation, thus making any relaxed and free contact among citizens impossible. As they will be beyond the daily functioning of the state 9 , a permanent threat would be posed that these religious zones would become practically extra-territorial 6 The Republic of Serbia shall return the archaeological and ethnological exhibits which were taken on loan from the museums of Kosovo for temporary exhibitions in Belgrade in 1998-1999 within 120 days of the date of the entering into force of this Settlement. 7 The proposal envisages at least 45 protected zones comprising hundreds of acres. 8 Kosovo shall grant customs duty and tax privileges to the Serbian Orthodox Church in addition to those enjoyed by all religions in Kosovo, for the economic activities of the Church specific to its financial selfsustainability…

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zones within Kosovo and, under the influence of Serbian daily politics, in the near future seek territorial autonomy with the intention to secede. As it is becoming a strong economic and financial entity, the SOC will get more directly involved in the political life of the new municipalities with a K-Serb majority. This will in turn generate other problems by creating psychological and actual barriers between communities and by fragmenting social capital. Such extra-territorial zones could eventually become cells that work against public interests and produce circumstances that afflict the system of individual, group and even general security. Also, they could potentially be used for an expansion of the ‘regional disturbance’ politics that threaten internal security and could easily get out of control. 10 3.7 Social problems One of the biggest problems of Kosovar institutions is the high level of unemployment which is much greater than in all other countries of the region and those in transition – 5 to 10 times higher than the other countries in transition. Since there is no mandatory system in Kosovo for registering the unemployed population, the current number of the unemployed is much higher than the number of employed ones. Based on the comprehensive ‘Assessment of Poverty’ study conducted by the Statistical Office of Kosovo in 2002, 50.5% of Kosovo’s population lives in poverty and more than 12% in extreme poverty. Even this year, the dynamics of employment did not influence a softening of this problem. It is estimated that of the 61.2% of the population that is able to work, only 42.9% are employed so the scale of unemployment is 57.1%. These surveys show the need to draft a strategy to cut poverty in Kosovo. This level of unemployment is a risky source of dissatisfaction with Kosovar institutions and the UNMIK. According to the surveys, the unemployment problem is the second biggest problem which Kosovo faces. 3.8 The transfer of power and competencies Since the beginning of 2002 Kosovo has created its own institutions but without full competencies because a number of those are still reserved for the UNMIK and SRSG. The sharing of power between the UNMIK and local institutions was never quite clear and regulated by agreement. This has inevitably caused tensions between the two administrations, whereby Kosovars have been trying to get more reserved competencies while the UNMIK administration was behaving with disregard even in those fields where the Kosovars have full competencies. Tensions and conflicts have also become aggravated due to the lack of sincere communication and created an environment of mutual accusations for the irresponsible and inefficient governance. An ICG report published in September 2003 critically analyses the relations between the UNMIK and local administrations. This report concluded that ‘rather than being a natural by-product of power-sharing and essential to identifying problems so that they could be corrected, tense relations between the Steiner-led administration and the PISG 9 Kosovo authorities shall have access to sites which constitute the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church only with the consent of the Church, or in the event of a judicial order issued relating to alleged illegal activities or in the event of imminent danger to life or health. 10 Such a use of the SOC by Serbian daily politics is well known in Macedonia.

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often distracted officials from the effort to build democratic institutions and created unnecessary hostility and ill-feeling’. Further, in one of the most important fields for the state, that of internal security and public order, even though it was created in 2005 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo still does not have sufficient competencies in the respective field, nor for its executive agency – the KPS. The International Mission in Kosovo will after the settlement of Kosovo’s status heavily rely on the model existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995. Initially, Kosovar institutions will not have effective governance in the northern parts of Kosovo while the Serbian government will continue to exert its influence through local political parties and the provisions of the ‘Ahtisaari’s package’ regarding decentralisation. The International Civilian Representative (‘ICR’) will have offices in North Mitrovica. It will be very interesting to see if this office will be truly dedicated to quelling Belgrade’s influence or will continue the behaviour of the UNMIK – standing by while this influence becomes greater and greater. The ICR, who will also be the EU’s Special Representative, will have the last say. He will be the final authority in Kosovo to interpret civil aspects of the settlement with the corrective powers (changing bills), sanction and replacement powers (removal of ministers and/or other officials and appointing other individuals to their positions) as well as to ensure investigations of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crime, economic/financial crime etc. as provided for in the special Annex of the ‘Ahtisaari’s package’ for the International Civilian Mission in Kosovo that is to replace the UNMIK. The authorisations of the ICR are necessary as insurance for the K-Serbs, to help Kosovar institutions in the abovementioned fields and to groom Kosovo to become a worthy member of the Euro-Atlantic community. However, these authorisations and the timeframe of this international mission in Kosovo also have, apart from its potential to improve the situation, the intrinsic attribute to ignite grievances among the KAlbanian majority and even the K-Serb minority in the country. The ICR will be appointed by an International Steering Group (‘ISG’) 11 after consultations with the EU. The ISG will acquire the consent of the UN Security Council for such an appointment. This means that the actions of the ICR, even if not welcomed by members of the majority community, will have the approval and support (both political and practical) of all major international institutions and actors. 3.9 Organised crime and corruption For a long time after the end of the last war, there were no clear indications or concrete data about the existence of organised crime. The only exceptions were cases detected by the UNMIK Police of narcotics smuggling and trafficking of females for prostitution. Anyway, even in these cases it was not found that they were cases of crime organised even though it is well known that these occurrences in the Balkans and beyond do form part of organised crime – usually with an international character. After the announcement of the ‘Zero tolerance of crime’ by SRSG Michael Steiner, the police have still not achieved satisfactory results in the fight against organised crime. But the situation is improving and some progress has been made. 11

The ISG will comprise the European Union, European Commission, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, NATO, Russia and the United States.

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The legal infrastructure has been changed according to international standards, including the approval of the Provisional Penal Code, the creation of an AntiCorruption Agency, compilation of an action plan against corruption and trafficking in human beings and the dynamics for their implementation have also been ensured. Meanwhile, within the KPS regional units against organised crime have been established. This unit, among other things, treats the major cases of organised crime as: trafficking in human beings, drug smuggling, corruption and other organised crime. To increase prevention capacities at the border-crossing points, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has prepared the Draft National Strategy of Kosovo for Integrated Border Management which is in the procedure to be approved. In this strategy, the fight against organised crime at border-crossing points is clearly planned, starting from trafficking in human beings, various types of contraband, narcotics smuggling etc. Also, we have started to be active participants with neighbouring and other countries in the process of developing co-operation in the fields of the joint prevention, detection and punishment of organised crime because Kosovo’s geographical position in the Balkans is very sensitive given the level of organised crime in the region. The Directorate of Organised Crime in the KPS has paid special attention to the prevention of and fight against organised crime and the results are good especially in the fight against narcotics smuggling. It has to be underlined that, within this Directorate, following the newly created global circumstances a sector for terrorist issues has been created particular. This sector is established with the aim of preventing terrorist activities and acts in Kosovo. The sector is still in the process of formation and is very soon expected to be functional and to start establishing contacts and co-operation with similar foreign agencies. In order to be more efficient, KPS officers will attend necessary trainings in this field. In the last two years, the KPS has managed to seize large amounts of drugs such as marihuana, cannabis, heroin and others. Another phenomenon or part of organised crime is trafficking in human beings. The KPS’ statistics show an increase in the last two years in the identification of victims of trafficking and an increase in the arrest of criminals involved in such trafficking. This increase does not necessarily mean an increase in trafficking in human beings, on the contrary it shows an increase in police abilities to detect the channels of trafficking and to arrest the people involved in these crimes. In this context, the successful work of the KPS again has to be underlined. In cooperation with the KFOR and UNMIK Police, it has managed to find and confiscate large amounts of weaponry and arrested many individuals and criminal groups. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government still do not have all the competencies to fight organised crime, which would further improve its efficiency here. Also, budget restraints are a negative factor that directly depends on the general economic situation and which is undoubtedly reflected in the success of the fight against organised crime. The use of explosive devices and attacks against institutions and their representatives are usually politically motivated or linked with organised crime. The efficient fight against these serious crimes holds special importance for public and personal safety and security. If these particular crimes remain undetected that will send a message of encouragement for further attacks against the police, judicial and other institutional representatives.

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4. Perspectives on the management Based on an analysis of the dangers and threats, a formulation of the vital interests of Kosovo and basic assessments regarding the security position, the main strategic concept about the general security strategy has to be built around co-operation and integration with international institutions as a instrument to achieve stability in both the country and the region; the general development of all instruments for the action, social resources and professionalism of Kosovar institutions as a path leading towards a more successful society and to increase the general abilities and improve readiness for reactions to unpredicted dangers (events) as a instrument for providing a wider spectrum of security in crises. According to Annex VIII of ‘Ahtisaari’s package’, Kosovo is recognised the right of having competencies in the security sector, in the enforcement of its ‘judicial system, public security, intelligence services, and control of the borders of its territory’ [10]. The security architecture in Kosovo will be established based on international democratic standards and this development will be supervised by the International Civilian Representative and NATO. The following will participate in the security structure: the Kosovo Security Council (local and international structure), the Committee for the Security of the Communities, the Police, the Kosovo Security Force, the Intelligence Service and the private security companies. It is also very important to improve command and control within the UNMIK and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), enhance their co-ordination with the KFOR (especially for gathering intelligence on extremists and parallel structures), provide the police with more training and equipment, and further increase their ability to face challenges like that arising on 17-18 March by boosting their dangerously low morale. On the other side, the Ministry of Internal Affairs must be given sufficient competencies in the field of security and public order but first and foremost in the management of its executive agency, the KPS.

Conclusion Security problems will arise later on if the Kosovar institutions and the international community fail to free the K-Serb community from the influence of Belgrade (and compensate for the losses so incurred) and prevent Belgrade from manipulating it. In such a case, discontentment will arise among other minority communities as well, but the major challenge will come from the discontentment among the majority community. Such discontent could even be materialised through non-institutional actions. The ‘real’ problems of security which have been put on the second plan, namely organised crime (drugs, prostitution etc), corruption, high unemployment, the low level of the economy on one hand and the lack of capacities to face such problems on the other (weak healthcare system, deficient education system, lack of an intelligence service etc), will become the key challenges that will require attention not only of the Kosovar institutions but of the entire society. The regional consequences of the continued drift leading to a destabilised Kosovo are incalculable. The international community has a very brief window in which to learn from its mistakes and regain control of the agenda. Otherwise, Kosovo may

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become ungovernable and dissolve into a vicious cycle of violence that infects all of the Western Balkans. The KFOR’s presence in Kosovo is substantial and strategically needed because this force is a guarantee of the peace, security, stability and democratisation of the region. It is also the only force which can guarantee a solution to the inherited problems of the region. Education in the field of security has to be a political responsibility and follow general developments in our society, while also following contemporary education standards of this field of the Armed Forces and NATO. Education is very important in terms of management, organisation, armament and equipment. Opening a Military University and a Police Academy would be useful and enable the establishment of a complete education system in the field of security. Education and scientific institutions in the field of police and military work would enable the professional preparedness of personnel at all levels for the needs of the KPS and the KSF. The assistance of institutions of the security system in the education of journalists, independent activists, institutions and civil society has to take on an organised form. The intention of the system will not be to ‘buy the thoughts of the critics’, but to establish long-term co-operation and enable access to the public and to hear different opinions about the functionality of the system, and this would be the best investment in the future. The low level of efficiency of local and international institutions to deal with social problems (unemployment), organised crime, non-settlement of the status of property, corruption, narcotics smuggling, prostitution, Kosovo as an oasis with an unresolved status – without nationality – whereby the UNMIK’s documents do not have the validity of a nationality, the influence of Serbian politics on governance of the enclaves and others could be factors of the development of a crisis which could move beyond institutional control. These events could then have as a consequence devastating riots with elements of inter-ethnic clashes.

Recommendations x

x

Kosovar institutions must be very careful not to allow a repetition of the events of 1999 when the UNMIK in its sole discretion determined an ‘amount of power’ for itself. They must ensure that the authorities and powers of the ICR are congruent with the requirements and level of responsibility assigned to it in ‘Ahtisaari’s package’ and make sure that the timeframe for reviewing such powers is honoured properly as set out in Article V of Annex IX of the Settlement. It is necessary to establish a security agency and immediately start analysing and surveying illegal activities in the country and develop comprehensive proactive and reactive strategies to face any situation potentially threatening Kosovo after its status has been resolved. Opportunities must be provided for professionals among minority communities as well as those already working in informal security organisations. Parliamentary and public surveillance over the agency must be established prior to enactment of the agency itself. These are essential preconditions to convince the public that the new intelligence service will truly be in the service of the public instead of a select few in political or other interest groups.

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x

x

x

x

209

Serious measures and steps must be taken to gain the trust of all the communities in the KPC. The Ministry of the Interior must build a police force with professional aptitudes (special units) and a management that is professionally qualified, capable of exercising its power of governance throughout the country and ready to accept both authority over their subordinates and responsibility for their actions. These measures will enable the KPS to transform from a service that is completely under the UNMIK’s authority into a genuine police with complete command and operational independence and the citizens’ confidence. Institutions must start preparations for calm and fair regular elections that will represent the true will of the citizens. In this respect and in conjunction with the previous recommendation, especially the K-Serb community must be given the chance to choose people who truly represent their interests and who will not be under the influence of Belgrade. The Government must sponsor training and educational programmes for journalists from electronic and written media to familiarise them with their responsibility vis-à-vis the security environment. Kosovar institutions must take immediate steps to sever the media influence of Belgrade upon the KSerbs community in Kosovo. This entails creating opportunities for them to have information available in their own language, edited and printed in Kosovo, completely free of influence of any kind. All institutions in Kosovo (both local and international) must become genuinely involved in facilitating the social integration of KPC members left out of the KSF (Kosovo Security Force). In particular, this means making the best use of dedicated funds to create benefits for public and private enterprises and institutions that will employ such individuals. Maximum attention must be paid to their dignity and heritage.

References [1] [2]

Comprehensive proposal for the status of Kosovo, 2.2.2007. Official website of ‘Coordinating Centre for Kosovo and Metohija’: http://www.kc.gov.yu. Official website of the Government of Serbia: http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/. Official website of Radio Television of Serbia: http://www.rts.co.yu. Vasa ýubriloviü, ‘Memorandum for the Expulsion of the Albanians’, 1937. Koha Ditore, Public statements of SOC officials against ‘the package…’ 23.3.2007, 2. [3] Public statements of Serbian politicians can be found in the media: Balkan Investigative Reporting: Mitrovica Serbs hold their breath amid talk of unrest (Balkan Insight, 31.1.2007) http://kosovo.birn.eu.com/ en/1/70/2178/. [4] Patrick Moore of Radio ‘Free Europe’ http://www.europaelire.org/programs/interview/2007/04/2007 0421102242.asp, ‘Lajm’ date 23.4.2007 (p. 4), ‘Koha Ditore’ date 25.4.2007, (p. 5, 11). [5] Dailies ‘Lajm’ 23.03.07, p. 5; ‘Koha Ditore’ 21.04.1007, p. 4; ‘Express’ 4. 5. 2007, p. 5. [6] Balkan Investigative Reporting Network: Diplomats Plan Mission for Independent Kosovo (Balkan Insight, 26.10.2006) http://kosovo.birn.eu.com/en/1/70/1750/. [7] Balkan Investigative Reporting Network: Diplomats Plan Mission for Independent Kosovo (Balkan Insight, 26.10.2006) http://kosovo.birn.eu.com/en/1/70/1750/; Patrick Moore of the Radio ‘Free Europe’, http://www.europaelire.org/programs/interview/2007/04/20070421102242.asp, ‘Lajm’ date 23.4.2007 (p. 4), ‘Koha Ditore’ date 25.4.2007 (p. 5, 11). [8] Dr.sc. Bejtush Gashi ‘FSK-ja-ushtri e Kosovës që rrjedh nga TMK-ja’, Koha Ditore, 2.3.2007. [9] ‘Zëri’, 31.3.2007, p. 4. [10] Comprehensive proposal for the status of Kosovo, article 9, point 1, 2.2.2007.

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Other References The framework constitution for the Interim Government in Kosovo, PSSP, 15.5.2001. Law on Protection against Natural Disasters and Other Disasters, No. 02/L-68, June 2006. Regulation No. 199/1 for United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 25.7.1999 on Authorisation of the Interim Administration in Kosovo. UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/8 on establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK), 14.1.2000. UNMIK Regulation 2000/61 on establishment of the Administrative Department of the Civil Security and the Emergent Readiness, 2.11.2000. UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/61 on the framework and Direct Principles of the Kosovo Police Service, 20.12.2005. Ministry of Defence, Republic of Slovenia, ‘White Paper’, 1996. Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic Government, 1999. Authors Group, The contemporary system of national security, Zagreb University, Zagreb, 1999. W.N Carter, The Disaster Management, The Asiatic Development Bank, 1991. K. Smith, The environment dangers - the risk assessment and the disaster reduction, 1991. Issues on military strategies, The Ministry of Defence, Tirana, 2002. The Military National Strategy of the Republic of Albania, Tirana, 2002. White Book, The Ministry of Defence, Tirana, 2005. The Strategy of the National Security of the Republic of Albania, Tirana, 2005. Wesley K. Clark, To make a modern war, Pristina, 2003. Alexander Yonah, The War against Terrorism, Tirana, 2004.

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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The Croatian Approach to Shaping National Crisis Management Mechanisms Željko DOBRANOVIĆ Crisis Management Course, Velika Gorica School of Polytechnics Abstract: The paper presents the process of shaping crisis management mechanisms in the Republic of Croatia. It includes a short historical overview of organising mechanisms with an emphasis on organisational aspects. It also provides an overview of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate’s structure. The paper analyses contemporary risks and threats and provides an overview of international co-operation and the process of adapting to contemporary crisis management mechanisms. Also presented is the new crisis management mechanism. Keywords: crisis management, protection and rescue, civil protection.

Introduction In order to understand the current situation and the process of shaping crisis management mechanisms in Croatia, it is necessary to indicate factors emerging from previous times that influence the process of shaping crisis management mechanisms. Being familiar with the historical process allows not only an indication of the destination and directions of the development of relevant processes, but it also primarily underpins an explanation of the conditions in which experiences were generated and personnel educated. Even today, all of this affects the developing and designing of more appropriate mechanisms in contemporary conditions. The characteristics that are important for understanding the process of shaping crisis management mechanisms in Croatia are conditioned by internal and external factors. Internal characteristics are expressed through the continued reform of the management of tasks in the public domain in order to modernise the system and adapt it to the needs of citizens, as defined by the Constitution and national security strategic documents. External characteristics are expressed on one hand through the current status of the country’s intensive accession to the European Union which will within a relatively short time result in full EU membership and, on the other hand, through the status of the process of joining NATO which is best seen in the implementation of MAP. 1. Historical development of crisis management mechanisms What is today meant by the term ‘crisis management’ started as a system of protection against fire, flood and other natural disasters supplemented by the systematic protection of civilians against combat activities in times of warfare1. 1 The Civil Defence School in Zagreb has operated since 1938 (the decision on its establishment dates back to 1932).

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When studying the history of this social segment in Croatia, it is necessary to take note of differences in terminology and in the content of notions that emerged during social transitions. The Republic of Croatia, as a member of the complex state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also affected by changes at the federal level2. Under the competence of the Ministry of the Interior, in 1948 an anti-aircraft defence was established (PAZ)3 and in 1955 tasks were expanded to encompass the protection of the population and material goods from natural disasters and other larger accidents, established under the name Civil Protection (CZ) until 1963. The Civil Protection was transferred on 1 January 1963 from the competence of the Ministry of the Interior to the federal Ministry of Defence, under the name Civil Defence (‘CO’). The Law on National Defence of 1969 gave the CO4 a significant position in the Total National Defence system, introduced the new term ‘defence and protection’ while the Territorial Defence (‘TO’) was charged with civil defence tasks in the area of protecting the population and material goods from war destruction. With the system defined in this way, after democratic elections Croatia could not initiate a modernisation of the management system which would be adequate for the social needs of Croatian citizens due to large-scale war destruction and the expulsion of civilian population caused by the military attack of another member of the federal state 5. The Croatian civil defence and civil protection operated up to the end of 1993 as a Directorate for the Country’s Defence Preparations and Civil Protection Department under the Ministry of Defence, when the first preconditions for transformations were met. On 1 January 1994, civil protection was transferred to the competence of the Ministry of the Interior under the name Protection and Rescue Directorate, while civil defence remained within the competence of the Ministry of Defence under the name Directorate for the Country’s Defence Preparations until 1998 and then since 1999 under the name Defence Preparations Department6 [1]. Because of Croatia’s geographical characteristics, the influence of the sea and mountains conditions on search and rescue operations must be considered, leading to the establishing of special services for search and rescue operations for the sea, mountains and caves. Search and rescue at sea7 is very important for Croatia because of the sea environment and the big number of tourists unfamiliar with sea conditions. Based on the provisions of the Hamburg Convention, the Republic of Croatia brought its National Plan of Search and Rescue and Salving the Human Service of Search and Rescue in line with the Law on Certifying the International Convention of Search and Rescue, which was ratified in 1996. In Rijeka the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) was established with a network of regional centres in Pula, Rijeka, Senj, Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Ploče and Dubrovnik [2].

2

The civil defence system that functioned well in the territory of Croatia was terminated in summer 1945. The PAZ has the task of developing citizens' loyalty to the homeland, providing assistance to the armed forces and protecting the population and the economy from an attack by air. 4 The focus of the organisation (funding) is on companies and municipalities, including the citizens' legal obligation to obtain means for protection (1970). 5 As regards the experience of the civil defence in the Homeland War, see: Roundtable – Analysis of Civil Defence Activities during the Homeland War, DEFIMI, 2006. 6 Certain adjustments took place in 2002. 7 The International Convention on Search and Rescue at Sea was adopted by Conference in Hamburg in 1979. The Convention entered into force in 1985. 3

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A mountain rescue service was set up in 1950 as a voluntary service within the Croatian Mountains Association [3] and today it is a public service organised and working in accordance with a special law adopted by parliament on 30 June 2006. The Croatian Mountains Rescue Service is a member of IKAR – CISA. The territory of Croatia is covered by stations of mountains rescue service. These stations are located in Delnice, Dubrovnik, Gospić, Karlovac, Makarska, Ogulin, Požega, Pula, Rijeka, Samobor, Split, Šibenik, Varaždin, Zadar and Zagreb. Practical operational and co-ordination problems required a change in the organisation of all civil protection and rescue systems. A new system was needed with a specialised body with national responsibility for all protection and rescue systems. Based on the Observation and Information Service of the Ministry of Defence and the Protection and Rescue Directorate that operated under the Ministry of the Interior, a reorganisation took place and an independent administrative entity was established at the national level under the name ‘National Protection and Rescue Directorate’. 2. The National Protection and Rescue Directorate The National Protection and Rescue Directorate8 is an independent, professional and administrative organisation tasked with preparing plans and managing operational forces, as well as co-ordinating the activities of all participants in the protection and rescue system [4]. An organisational chart of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate is show in Figure 1. Civil emergency planning in the Republic of Croatia is the responsibility of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate which is divided into the following organisational entities: • Civil Protection Sector; • Fire Fighting Sector; • Sector for the 112 System; • Fire Fighting and Protection and Rescue Training Centre; and • Personnel, Legal and Finance Sector The functionality of the Directorate is ensured through its territorial organisation, i.e. there is a Protection and Rescue Office consisting of a Protection and Rescue Department and a County 112 centre in each county, while along the coast there are also national intervention units operating within the Protection and Rescue Office. 2.1 Civil Protection Sector Civil Protection Sector directly manages civil protection forces during a disaster or larger accident; it conducts mobilisation and co-ordinates other protection and rescue operational forces engaged in disaster-response activities. The Sector also conducts prevention activities, i.e. drafting SOPs, risk assessments and response plans. It monitors the situation and events in the field of civil protection, monitors the construction and methods for utilising shelters, while it also recommends and organises education and training for citizens.

8

Established on 1 January 2005 pursuant to the Law on Protection and Rescue.

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National Level

DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DIRECTORS CABINET

SECTOR FOR 112 SYSTEM

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CIVIL PROTECTION SECTOR

FIREFIGHTING, P&R SCHOOL

PERSONNEL, LEGAL & FINANCE SECTOR

FIREFIGHTING SECTOR

COUNTY PROTECTION AND RESCUE OFFICE HEAD OF OFFICE

COUNTY 112 CENTERE PROTECTION AND RESCUE DEPT. NATIONAL INTERVENTION UNITS (X 4) CITY 112 CENTRES (X 39) County Level

Figure 1. Chart of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate 2.2 Fire Fighting Sector The Fire Fighting Sector at the national level monitors the situation and events in the area of fire protection, drafts strategies and tasks, trains and equips fire brigades as well as other participants in fire-fighting activities. The Sector directly manages the national intervention units and co-ordinates the activities of all participants in fire-fighting operations. When a fire incident spreads across two or more counties – this Sector commands and co-ordinates the response; it also co-ordinates more demanding operations that involve both land and air forces. 2.3 Sector for the 112 System Sector for the 112 System (national and county 112 centres) Operational communication duty services within this Sector operate 24/7 and collect and process information, notifications and data. They are tasked with informing the population, legal entities, national administration, rescue services, civil protection officers as well as others regarding all possible threats and their consequences. This service also keeps logs on the status of events, dangers, accidents and disasters; it prepares the public alert system and co-ordinates the transferral of commands and decisions.

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3. Civil-military co-operation The National Protection and Rescue Directorate can call upon the Ministry of Defence, at the recommendation of the Civil Protection Commander, in the event of a disaster. The Ministry of Defence participates in protection and rescue operations and especially in situations like forest fires, earthquakes and floods which require special means and forces. 4. Legal framework The operations of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate and all protection system in the Republic of Croatia are based on the following items of legislation: • Protection and Rescue Law; • Fire-fighting Law; • the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Interior Affairs consists of a special chapter with 74 articles which regulate the area of civil protection (by defining civil protection; establishing fundamental goal, tasks and the organisational structure of civil protection); • the Law on Protection against Natural Disasters determines the term ‘natural disaster’ and provides for the basic protective measures, rights and duties of protection officers, evaluates damages and defines how to assist damaged areas; • regulations on the organisation, attendance, recruitment and use of units, services and bodies for management and other forms or organising civil protection; and • regulations on the methodology and content of plans relating to protection and rescue9. 5. Contemporary risk and threats The establishment of the National Protection and Rescue Directorate and its activities improved the previous situation yet not all problems were solved, especially in view of today’s security challenges. The problem of security is very often addressed when there is a situation in one's neighbourhood which constitutes a security risk and generates threats: • the first risk we face stems from the previous frame of mind formed by the then ruling ideologies and negative experiences of the past, thus making it more difficult to accept new ideas10; • the second risk to peace and security comes from a policy which resorts to the use of arms in an attempt to impose one's own political views on others, denying the universal right to defence; 9

Plans are being made on the basis of an evaluation of the dangers and consequences of natural, technicaltechnological and ecological accidents and war destruction, as well as on the basis of the human and material forces available for the protection and rescue of subjects which relate to this plan. The plan relating to protection and rescue is being made for municipalities, cities, the city of Zagreb and the state. 10 Totalitarian systems, imperialist policies and threats to human rights have caused many problems in this region that remain to be solved. Constant attempts to retain the old approach are a permanent source of instability and threaten peace and security in the region.

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•

the source of the third risk is an attempt to resolve existing problems by dealing with the consequences only, rather than appraising the underlying causes and eliminating them; • the fourth risk is the immoral accumulation of personal wealth by taking unfair advantage of human weaknesses. Today, this sort of risk comes in the form of drug trafficking and organised prostitution (human slave trafficking); • the fifth risk originates in personal and collective frustrations and results in terrorism; and • the sixth risk stems from the fact that there are obstacles to uniform economic development proportional to the achieved technological levels and needs of the modern citizen of Europe11. A possible crisis threatening peace and security in a region always takes place in those societies where social relations have not reached a sufficient level of democracy and where the policy of the use of force and intolerance is pursued in order to direct processes within a society. As a consequence of their security, today states face new demands to deal with: • regional crises; • ethnic and religious conflicts; • abuses of human rights • the collapse of the state; • nuclear weapons outside of allied countries; • the expansion of NBKR arms; • international terrorism; • threats to the flow of vital resources (energy); and • mass migration. Due to the complexity of threats, as well as the need for a multidisciplinary response to crisis management, a Government Crisis Committee and/or County Crisis Committees have been established. In the case of these kinds of threats, the national security system also operates through other state entities, especially the Civil Defence system. The civil component of the defence system is a group of institutions and activities directed at preparations to defend the state, including defending the state with nonmilitary means. This includes entities of state authority and administration, local self-government, legal entities that implement defence programmes and organisations for the protection and rescue of people and preservation of material goods. With its non-military means and ways, civil defence ensures the functioning of authorities, economic and social activities; supply and protection for a population’s survival and provides support to the military defence of the state. 6. International co-operation in crisis management The Republic of Croatia actively participates in Partnership for Peace initiatives and drills in the areas of crisis management, civil emergency planning and disaster 11

The backbone of economic capability of some European countries has been destroyed by armed conflicts, totalitarian policies and different ideological patterns, thereby weakening the strength of Europe as a whole.

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preparedness and takes an active part in the work of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (‘SCEPC’). In 2006, representatives of all eight task committees were appointed and the systematic co-ordination of the Republic of Croatia’s presentation within the SCEPC and its committees was initiated through regular meetings [5]. The Republic of Croatia reacts on a regular basis to requests for international assistance by countries struck by disasters. Since the last MAP cycle, the Republic of Croatia has achieved progress in developing and modernising its central system for collecting information disasters and catastrophes, as well as in developing a system for management in cases of catastrophes through comprehensive normative solutions. With the goal of establishing a comprehensive approach to resolving the issues of civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, the National Protection and Rescue Directorate started to actively involve the local structure of civil society, as well as citizens’ organisations in the protection and rescue system through various forms of training that will enable all levels of society and the state administration to actively participate in the protection and rescue system based on subsidiary principles. Currently, international standards are being adopted for development programmes, especially training, so as to train intervention teams that can be sent as part of international assistance via NATO’s civil instruments. In line with the request of the UN-ISDR (‘International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’) to implement the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, in August 2006 the Republic of Croatia appointed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integrations and the National Protection and Rescue Directorate to act as the national focal point. In May 2007, the Republic of Croatia was set to host and co-organise an international protection and rescue drilling exercise called IDASSA in the Zadar County, together with NATO and Partnership for Peace civil structures12. 6.1 Priority activities Priority activities in the forthcoming MAP cycle are: • create normative preconditions for developing crisis management, civil emergency planning, military emergency planning and civil-military emergency planning systems; • elaborate a system of integrated crisis management; • intensify participation in NATO activities in the area of crisis management (SCEPC and committees for planning, participation in drills and seminars); and • continue conducting regional courses and seminars in the area of protection and rescue (8th cycle) on management in cases of disasters, as well as on modules on specific and current topics.

12

The exercise is organised and implemented with the goal to advance co-operation and co-ordination between NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries in order to rehearse existing procedures of national civil and military structures and co-operation between countries for preparedness, response and management in the case of larger accidents and disasters.

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7. The new crisis management system The national security strategy and strategic overview of defence [6] clearly define the need to resolve crises. Experience to date shows that the efficiency of the crisis management system directly depends on the quality of organisation, but primarily the quality of personnel operating the system. For these reasons, a process ensuring the higher education of future employees of the system was initiated parallel to the process of restructuring the system13. The Republic of Croatia will continue developing the civil component of the defence system so as to provide adequate response capabilities for a wide spectrum of risks and threats. This includes the development of civil institutions for protection and rescue and reacting to crises in the country, along with developing new capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia for implementing non-traditional tasks. Given that the adjustment of the overall defence system to the new strategic and security circumstances also includes adjustments by the civil component of defence, it will be reformed in a way that facilitates a response to contemporary threats and risks but also incorporates the overall defence system of the Republic of Croatia in the collective security systems of NATO and the EU. The complexity of solutions needed in this area requires close co-operation between several state administrative sectors. Given the nature of modern threats and risks, areas of crisis management deserve special attention and so the future organisational solutions will secure capabilities to respond to crises at the national level, but also beyond. The international role of the Republic of Croatia and its activities in the area of supporting peace, and in particular participation in reconstructing areas affected by crises, require systematic and close civil and military co-operation in order to obtain the necessary capabilities for executing complex tasks when responding to crisis operations abroad. Host-country support capabilities in order to receive assistance in the case of a crisis in the territory of the Republic of Croatia or its close vicinity will be developed within the framework of civil defence, harmonised with the capabilities of Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia in its territory. With the goal to design a future civil defence system harmonised with the threat and risk assessment of the Republic of Croatia and with the collective defence concept, in the next mid-term period the following activities will be implemented: • the overall civil defence concept will be redefined to comply with the national security and defence concept and sub-legal documents will be adopted for the area of civil defence to comply with the existing legislation (including an expansion in terms of crises) which will regulate the system at the national level and create the preconditions for the higher quality execution of international obligations in the area of civil defence; • organisational adjustments to the new concept will be realised: • an adequate information system will be developed which will facilitate the implementation of logistical support by the civil defence to collective military defence, as well as support for peace operations and other activities abroad along with overall co-ordination in the area of crisis management; and • completion of the overall civil and civil-military crisis management system at the national level is expected by the end of 2009. 13

Crisis management study conducted at the Polytechnic College Velika Gorica.

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Due to the complexity of the existing system and the need for an effective reaction to contemporary threats and co-operation between different relevant departments, special groups for inter-departmental co-operation have been founded with the task to define and propose solutions in this area. This then initiated the process of redesigning the crisis management system which will result in strategic, normative, organisational and operational and planning solutions ensuring greater effectiveness as regards the national security of the Republic of Croatia and better links with European Union and NATO systems. The process of shaping the new national crisis management system and the different impacts on that process are shown in Figure 2.

nati

Threats

Inte r

ona l ob liga tion s

EU

Shaping National Crisis Management Mechanisms

NATO –PfP MAP

s ent rem

National security

y National ability

tor hi s

ui req

New Crisis Management System

Figure 2. The process of shaping the new national crisis management system After analysing the situation, determining the goals of the crisis management system and the preconditions for establishing the system, the inter-departmental task subgroup for the area of civil, civil-military crisis planning and other similar areas has proposed the establishment of a ‘System of Integrated Crisis Management in the Republic of Croatia’, which represents the establishment of the National Centre for Crisis Management with the following structural units: • Crisis Prevention Unit (analyses and proposes measures); • Operative Affairs Unit (planning, development, harmonisation, forces leadership, communications); • Public Relations Unit; and • International Co-operation Unit. Conclusion When establishing a new crisis management system adequate to meet new security risks, it has been necessary to preserve the achieved level of security and effectiveness of the protection system along with simultaneous development to achieve a new level

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appropriate for the future needs and obligations of the Republic of Croatia once it becomes a full member of the European Union and NATO. Due to process dynamics and the large number of variables14 in the transitional period and especially due to the war imposed on the country, modifications have taken place in several stages which have logically followed in the process of building the new system in such a way that each stage was a complete modification that lifted the system to a new level and closer to the goals that were set. There were no problems in defining goals; however, there have been problems determining the parameters for achieving the goals. References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

14

Roundtable: Analysis of Civil Defence activities during the Homeland War, DEFIMI, Zagreb, 2006. Služba traganja i spašavanja na moru (Sea Search and Rescue Service), http://www.mmtpr.hr/default.asp?id=876. Hrvatska gorska služba spašavanja (Croatian Mountains Rescue Service), http://www.plsavez.hr/hr/HGSS. National Protection and Rescue Directorate documents, www.duzs.hr. Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents, www.mvpei.rh. Strateški pregled obrane, MORH, Zagreb 2005. http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/spo_hrv.pdf Croatian Ministry of Defence documents, www.morh.rh. Collection of Works: Kako se štitimo od katastrofa, HCK, DUZS and VVG, Zagreb, 2007.

It should be noted that in this period, besides internal development variables, there was also a high degree of uncertainty in the variables that described the dynamic changes that the European Union’s and NATO’s crisis management systems had undergone.

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Subject Index 112

70, 154–157, 159, 162, 177, 179, 213, 214 Action Plan 4, 8, 16, 18, 23, 28, 33, 34, 68, 109, 206 Al-Qaeda v, vii, 9, 10, 18, 37, 55, 58, 59, 61, 63, 78–80, 82–84, 90, 92, 95–97, 100, 129, 194 ANA 49, 123, 124, 131 Anti-terrorism v, 3, 8, 10–12, 14, 26, 48 Anti-terrorist strategy 13, 35, 38, 43, 45 ARGUS 28 Article 5 7, 8, 18, 23, 118, 138 Asymmetric threats 167 Balkans vi, viii, ix, 5, 9, 17, 47, 48, 49, 51–55, 96, 97, 106, 111-113, 130, 132, 173, 194, 195, 197, 205, 206, 208 Bosnia and Herzegovina vi, 9, 17, 53, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84–90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 135, 198, 205 C4ISR 147, 149, 150, 164 CAX 148, 155, 159, 160–164 Center 52, 151, 189 CFSP 18, 20, 22, 34 Civil protection vii, ix, 26, 101, 151, 159, 163, 175–177, 180, 182, 185, 186, 188, 201, 211–214 Civil-military co-operation 215 Cold war 5, 6, 10, 11, 53, 57, 59, 62, 63, 79, 81–83 Communication viii, 10, 29, 35–39, 46, 88, 93, 141, 142, 157, 179, 189, 199, 204, 214 Complexity 60, 97, 168, 198, 216, 218, 219 Counter-Terrorism Strategy 16, 24, 25, 33, 34, 47, 103 Crisis management system(s) 44, 151, 153, 157, 163, 165–172, 180, 218, 219

Critical infrastructure 21, 26, 29, 68 Croatia 35, 48, 49, 84–86, 109, 112, 132, 134–142, 211, 212, 215, 216, 218, 219 Declaration on combating terrorism 18, 22, 34 Definition of terrorism 3, 18, 34, 39, 118, 132 Early warning 60, 151–153, 157, 171, 187, 190 EU Solidarity Programme 23, 34 European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 29, 34 European Security Strategy 15, 16, 18, 21, 25, 33, 34 Explosion(s) 13, 19, 108, 114, 116, 119–127, 130, 136, 139, 177, 182, 184 Extremism vi, 21, 49, 65, 85, 89, 93, 109, 182 Globalisation vii, 6, 35, 36, 37, 57, 58–60, 68, 81, 106, 167 Ibrahim Rugova 124, 200 Indicators vi, 137, 166, 167, 188, 191, 192 Information Technology 29, 35, 37, 45, 184 Intelligence agencies 18, 57, 58–60, 62 Iraq 8, 9, 14, 17, 21, 43, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 79, 80, 82, 83, 89, 91, 110 ISAF 9 Islam v, 10, 52, 59, 78, 80–88, 90–93 KFOR 53, 108, 114–116, 123, 125, 128, 131, 195–197, 199, 202, 206, 207 Kiro Gligorov 107 KLA 49, 50, 51, 126, 131, 203 Kosovo vi, vii, ix, 17, 47–49, 51, 53, 54, 95–97, 99, 111, 112, 114–122, 124–131, 182, 195–202, 204–209 Kumanovo 107, 108, 172

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Macedonia vi–viii, 17, 49–51, 54, 97, 106–112, 125, 165–172, 204 Mass Media 10, 35–37, 39, 40, 45, 94, 179 Mega Terrorism 35–37, 45 Ministry of defence 101, 169–172, 180, 182, 185, 210, 212, 213, 215, 220 Movement 24, 48, 49, 52, 53, 59, 61, 62, 64, 85, 87, 88, 96, 97, 104, 183, 198, 200, 202, 203 NATO Strategic Concept 6 Network vi, 10, 28, 29, 36, 37, 42, 51, 52, 55, 82, 87, 92, 95–98, 125, 148, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159, 162, 190, 212 NLA 49, 50 North Atlantic Council 7, 8, 11 Olympic games 8 Organised crime v, vi, 6, 21, 50, 51, 97–100, 102–106, 109, 128, 129, 136, 139, 141, 142, 182, 192, 195, 197, 205–208 Osama bin Laden 6, 10, 18, 52, 82 OSCE vii, viii, 3, 4, 14, 16, 50, 116, 123, 124, 126, 131, 169, 185, 188, 190 Peace-building 53, 165–168 Peace-keeping 13, 47, 48, 53, 129, 168, 199 Police service 115, 128, 197, 199–201, 207 Political status 114, 121, 126, 127, 129 Protectorate ix, 49 Public information ix, 62, 66–68, 161

Radicalisation v, vi, ix, 16, 26, 32, 34, 49, 52, 59, 60, 62, 64, 77, 78, 85, 86, 92, 96 Recommendations 26, 28, 38, 53, 110, 161, 208 Recruitment 22, 58, 64, 107, 117, 118, 134, 215 Refugees 84, 140, 182, 198, 201, 202 Riots 49, 195, 199, 208 Risk assessment ix, 23, 26, 47, 48, 51, 142, 210, 218 Ruhan Guanaratna 79 Serbia 49, 51, 54, 84, 85, 88, 92, 95–102, 105, 124, 125, 173–176, 179, 181, 182, 184–188, 190–194, 198, 200, 201 SFOR 9, 53 SITCEN 16, 20, 29 Suicide(s) 4, 12, 24, 59, 89, 140, 185 Threat assessment(s) viii, 15, 20, 26, 60 UN (United Nations) vii, viii, 3, 4, 14, 18, 21, 25, 28, 49, 50, 53, 103, 115, 116, 120, 122, 124, 126, 129–131, 133, 195, 196, 199, 205, 210, 217 UNMIK vii, 53, 114–126, 128, 129, 131, 195–197, 199, 202, 204–208, 210 Wahhabism vi, 52, 77, 78, 81–88, 90–93 War on terror 57, 63–65, 79 WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) v, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 21, 29, 61, 63, 67, 101, 104, 130 Zoran Djindjic vii, 98

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans I. Prezelj (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Author Index Bebler, A. Bećirević, E. Burrniku, S. Cvrtila, V. de Graaff, B. Demolli, H. Djuric, S. Dobranović, Ž. Dragišić, Z. Gashi, B. Jakešević, R.

3 77 195 35 57 114 181 211 95 195 132

Kekovic, Z. Kešetović, Ž. Malis Sazdovska, M. Mincheva, L. Mitrevska, M. Perešin, A. Prezelj, I. Shalamanov, V.M. Stranjik, A. Tatalović, S. Toth, I.

181 173 106 47 165 35 v, 16 147 66 132 66

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