The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment

2 ^ 2 ^ u^ie Qenesls

^/KANT'S

JOHN

H.

ZAMMITO

T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F C H I C A G O PRESS

Chicago & London

The University of Chicago Press gratefully acknowledges a grant from Rice University in partial support of the costs of publication of this volume. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 1992 by T h e University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 1992 Printed in the United States of America 01 00 99 98 97 96 54 32 ISBN (cloth): 0-226-97854-0 ISBN (paper): 0-226-97855-9

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zammito, John H., 1948The genesis of Kant's critique ofjudgment / John H. Zammito. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-226-97854-0. — ISBN 0-226-97855-9 (pbk.) 1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der Urteilskraft. 2. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804—Aesthetics. 3. Aesthetics. 4. Judgment (Aesthetics) I. Title B2784.Z36 1992 121—dc20 91-32390 CIP

© T h e paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

To Martin

Malia,

mentor and

friend

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction Part One

ix

1

The Genesis of the "Critique

of Aesthetic

1. K a n t a n d t h e Pursuit of A u f k l ä r u n g

Judgment"

17

2. Kant's R e t u r n to Aesthetics: T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A r g u m e n t s a n d t h e "Critique of T a s t e " 4 5 3. Validity a n d Actuality: T o w a r d Kant's P h e n o m e n o l o g y of Subjective Consciousness 64 4. T h e T r a n s c e n d e n t a l G r o u n d i n g of Taste: P u r p o s e a n d Pleasure 89 5. T h e Beautiful a n d t h e Pleasant: Kant's T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n of Taste 106 6. Kant's Philosophy of A r t in the Year 1788 Part Two

The Genesis of the "Critique Judgment"

of

124

Teleological

7. T h e Cognitive T u r n : T h e Discovery of Reflective Judgment 151 8. T h e C o n t e x t u a l O r i g i n s of Kant's Critique of C o n t e m p o r a r y Science 178 9. K a n t against E i g h t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Hylozoism

189

10. T h e P r o b l e m of O r g a n i c F o r m in the "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " 214 11. T h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy a n d the Third Critique

228 vii

12. Kant's Attack o n Spinoza in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " 2 4 8 Part

Three

The Final Form of the Critique

of

Judgment

13. T h e Ethical T u r n in Kant's Critique of Judgment

263

14. T h e Sublime, t h e Symbolic, a n d Man's "Supersensible Destination" 2 6 9 15. Aesthetics As t h e Key to A n t h r o p o l o g y : a n d Geistegefühl 292

Lebensgefühl

16. T h e Unity of M a n : M a n As a n "End-in-Himself"

306

17. T h e Unity of M a n k i n d : T h e H i g h e s t G o o d , History, a n d Religion 323 Conclusion: T h e Ultimate M e a n i n g of t h e Third Critique 342 Notes

347

Bibliography Index

viii

455

Contents

427

£^

Acknowledgments

T h e r e a r e several individuals whose assistance I would like to ac* k n o w l e d g e as this work comes to press. As the dedication suggests, I owe a g r e a t d e b t of g r a t i t u d e to M a r t i n Malia for his confidence a n d solicitude. His careful r e a d i n g of various versions of this study a n d his conviction of its significance h e l p e d k e e p t h e project alive. L a u r e n c e Dickey a n d Dallas C l o u a t r e r e a d earlier versions of my work a n d I benefitted from t h e i r insights. Steven Crowell r e a d t h e ultim a t e draft, a r g u e d o u t s o m e of t h e m o r e technical philosophical issues with m e , a n d p r o v i d e d g e n e r o u s a n d timely counsel. G e r s h o n Shafir h e l p e d m e c o p e with t h e academic p u b l i s h i n g system. I wish to t h a n k T . David B r e n t a n d t h e r e a d e r s a n d editors associated with t h e University of Chicago Press for their consideration a n d professional execution, a n d D e a n Allen Matusow a n d Rice University for a s u b v e n t i o n to s u p p o r t t h e publication of t h e book. Finally, I w a n t to t h a n k my wife, Katie, for a b i d i n g — i n all its senses.

ix

Introduction

I

m m a n u e l Kant's Critique ofJudgment of 1790 m a r k e d a watershed in G e r m a n intellectual life, p r o v i n g a c o n d u i t t h r o u g h which t h e most i m p o r t a n t ideas a n d ideals of t h e G e r m a n e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y passed to t h e g e n e r a t i o n of Idealism a n d Romanticism. So rich is t h e Third Critique, however, t h a t it can t h r e a t e n t o o v e r w h e l m t h e r e a d e r with t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of its philosophical a n d cultural b u r d e n . O n e way to g r a s p this complexity is t h r o u g h a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e text's composition which contextualizes Kant's philosophizing a m i d t h e manifold impulses a n i m a t ing G e r m a n y at t h e time. I n particular, Kant's allegiance to t h e A u f k l ä r u n g in its struggle against the Sturm und Drang for d o m i n a n c e in G e r m a n c u l t u r e proves crucial to t h e evolution of his intentions. K a n t revised t h e work substantially from his e m b a r k a t i o n u p o n a "Critique of T a s t e " in late s u m m e r 1787 to t h e publication of t h e finished Critique ofJudgment at Easter 1790. T h e major t h r u s t of this study is to establish t h e shifts in conceptualization a n d a r g u m e n t t h a t s h a p e d t h e Third Critique, a n d to relate these to Kant's earlier works of p h i l o s o p h y of the 1780s. T h e r e have b e e n m a n y efforts to a p p r o a c h Kant's works in t e r m s of t h e archaeology of t h e i r a r g u m e n t s . T h e so-called " p a t c h w o r k " theory of t h e First Critique is t h e most f a m o u s . A similar effort has b e e n u n d e r t a k e n with r e f e r e n c e to t h e Third Critique by such scholars as Michel Souriau, G e r h a r d L e h m a n n , J a m e s M e r e d i t h , a n d Giorgio Tonelli, a n d my analysis will set o u t from theirs. Weaving t o g e t h e r t h e genetic d e v e l o p m e n t of Kant's versions of t h e Third Critique with considerations of t h e context to which they r e p r e s e n t e d Kant's r e s p o n s e sheds light o n t h e m e a n i n g of textual passages at their m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c j u n c t u r e s . H e n c e it proves worthwhile o n i m m a n e n t g r o u n d s . B u t since 1

1

r e a d e r s j u d g e d Kant's Third Critique against t h e b a c k d r o p of t h a t wider context, this a p p r o a c h also illuminates t h e major i m p a c t of t h e work o n its e p o c h . I n r e c o n s t r u c t i n g this process of g r o w t h a n d c h a n g e certain possibilities c o m e to light which K a n t at o n e point took seriously, t h o u g h after reflection o r c h a n g e of o r i e n t a t i o n eventually a b a n d o n e d . T h e s e left vestigial traces in t h e final p r o d uct which a r o u s e d the speculative interest of his Idealist successors, w h o w o u l d follow o u t t h e trail of these neglected possibilities. T o retrieve this historical sense of t h e o p e n n e s s of K a n t i a n philosophy a n d of vast metaphysical possibilities which s e e m e d latent within it is o n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t tasks this study sets for itself. T h e h e r m e n e u t i c p r o b l e m posed by t h e Third Critique is why K a n t s h o u l d have b r o u g h t his t r e a t m e n t s of aesthetics a n d teleology t o g e t h e r with systematic i n t e n t . Since h e h a d a l o n g s t a n d i n g interest in aesthetics a n d it was o n this project, his "Critique of T a s t e , " t h a t h e e m b a r k e d o n c e h e c o m p l e t e d his Second Critique in S e p t e m b e r 1787, t h e issue is: W h y did teleology i n t r u d e ? K a n t h a d to t h i n k this c o n n e c t i o n in a creative m a n n e r , a n d t h e r e f o r e could n o t simply have p u t these two topics t o g e t h e r casually. T h a t K a n t m i g h t act in a m a n n e r u n d e l i b e r a t e in a n y t h i n g s h o u l d strike those familiar with h i m as m a n or t h i n k e r as suspect from t h e outset. All t h e m o r e so in o n e of his major e n t e r p r i s e s . S o m e effort to g r a s p t h e work as a whole is t h e r e f o r e essential. While t h e Third Critique has b e c o m e t h e object of i n t e n s e study in r e c e n t years, t h e c o n c e r n s of m u c h of this literature lie elsew h e r e . Disdaining teleology a n d even Kant's c o n c e r n with t h e sublime, a g o o d deal of c o n t e m p o r a r y A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n chooses to neglect t h e unity of t h e work for t h e sake of a few currently i n t e r e s t i n g a r g u m e n t s a b o u t b e a u t y . Clearly, o n e can r e a d t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " as a n a r g u m e n t largely cond u c t e d in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" a n d in the " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t s . " It t h e n takes o n a delimited a n d c o h e r e n t character, p o i n t i n g to t h e issue of "intersubjective validity" a n d c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e d e d u c t i o n of asensus communis as t h e g r o u n d for t h e validity of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. T h a t was t h e original a m b i t i o n which led K a n t to u n d e r t a k e a "Critique of T a s t e " a l o n g transcend e n t a l lines. It is also w h a t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n philosophy almost w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n tries to salvage from K a n t . U n d o u b t e d l y t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste is a l a n d m a r k in t h e history of aesthetics, a n d o n e which has ever since served as t h e starting p o i n t for n e w efforts. However, this study is devoted to p r o v i n g t h a t only w h e n we pass b e y o n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c 2

3

2

Introduction

d o n of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste d o we e n t e r t h e t r u e h e a r t of t h e Third Critique. T h e t h r u s t of a good deal of r e c e n t G e r m a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has b e e n to retrieve t h e work as a whole, recognizing t h e r i g o r o u s p r o pensity to closure with which K a n t d e v e l o p e d his p h i l o s o p h y . T h e s e insights p o i n t to a major systematic i m p o r t a n c e for t h e Third Critique. I have d r a w n heavily o n this a p p r o a c h , a n d also o n Germ a n studies of earlier vintage, stressing t h e c o h e r e n c e a n d architectonic relevance of t h e Third Critique in Kant's system, in seeking to establish t h e unity of t h e w o r k . I wish to p u r s u e Kant's effort to e x t e n d his t h e o r y of aesthetics into t h e "metaphysical" d o m a i n s of t h e sublime a n d t h e symbolic, c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e bold claim t h a t "beauty is t h e symbol of morality." By d r a w i n g t h e aesthetic a n d t h e ethical into this analogical relation, K a n t essentially established t h a t aesthetics was only a p r o p a e d e u t i c c o n c e r n leading to a n t h r o p o l o g y , a n d set t h e stage for a transition to reflections o n m a n ' s ethical destiny in the n a t u r a l world, which would form t h e most i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " A considerable interest in this idea of teleology has d e v e l o p e d a m o n g scholars of Kant's ethical, historical, religious, a n d political p h i l o s o p h y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s have c o n s i d e r e d t h e issue of teleology only as p a r t of Kant's methodological writings o n n a t u r a l science. As against this, G e o r g e S c h r ä d e r has offered a view of t h e place of teleology a n d u n i t y in Kant's t h o u g h t which is m o r e in k e e p i n g with t h a t p r e s e n t e d in this study, a n d which has b e e n a very i m p o r t a n t source for i t . For a g o o d sense of t h e different potentials of these two a p p r o a c h e s o n e m i g h t c o m p a r e t h e work of J o h n McFarland with t h a t of Klaus D ü s i n g . O f course, this teleological i n t e r p r e t a tion has m e t with predictable r e s i s t a n c e . Nevertheless, Kant's teleology d i d offer p o t e n t insights into issues of c o m p l e x h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s h a s b e e n e m p h a s i z e d especially by those w h o see K a n t as c o n c e r n e d with "philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y . " T h i s study will u p h o l d t h e validity of that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 4

5

6

7

8

9

1 0

11

12

13

Archaeology of the Text T h e "Critique of T a s t e " was b e g u n in late 1787 o n t h e basis of m a s sive p r e v i o u s writing o n t h e empirical p r o b l e m of aesthetics, b u t with a n e w a n d crucial idea for a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g . W i t h t h a t n e w idea, K a n t could readily m a r s h a l a considerable body of material in r a t h e r s h o r t o r d e r (or t h o u g h t h e could) into a n e w CriIntroduction

3

tique. K a n t claimed in D e c e m b e r 1787 t h a t m u c h of his envisioned "Critique of T a s t e " was "already in writing, b u t n o t quite p r e p a r e d for t h e p r e s s . " H e p r o m i s e d it for Easter 1788. B u t for a d e c a d e K a n t h a d a s s u r e d his c o r r e s p o n d e n t s t h a t t h e First Critique was alr e a d y in writing, b u t n o t q u i t e p r e p a r e d for t h e press. I n d e e d it was, b u t in n u m e r o u s drafts a n d folios of widely varying orientation, which K a n t was only able to pull t o g e t h e r with t h e most grueling difficulty at t h e e n d of a decade's gestation. T h e Third Critique was n o t so l a b o r e d a b i r t h , b u t it, too, went to full t e r m . Yet in t h e a u t u m n of 1787 K a n t did have a burst of writing, based o n a burst of insight, w h e r e b y t h e very idea of t h e possibility of a "Critique of T a s t e " first arose in his m i n d . I n t o t h a t project K a n t t h r e w himself t h e m o m e n t h e c o m p l e t e d t h e Second Critique, a r o u n d S e p t e m b e r 1787, a n d h e was in t h e h i g h tide of this "aesthetic" p h a s e w h e n h e wrote his m e m o r a b l e letter of D e c e m b e r 1787 describing his new w o r k a n d its motivating insight. I n o r d e r to o r g a n i z e o u r archaeological investigation into the genesis of t h e Third Critique, let us consult previous efforts to d e v e l o p a c h r o n o l o g y of its composition a n d revision. T h e scholar w h o i n a u g u r a t e d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n — a n d h a d t h e richest sense for its implications—was Michel Souriau. It was h e w h o first recognized t h e revolutionary implications of Kant's theory of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t for t h e entire t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. T h e editors of t h e Prussian A c a d e m y edition of t h e Third Critique a n d its First Introduction, Wilhelm W i n d e l b a n d a n d G e r h a r d L e h m a n n respectively, m a d e s o m e very useful c o n t r i b u t i o n s as w e l l . J a m e s M e r e d i t h , in his w o r k — f a r m o r e t h a n a m e r e t r a n s l a t i o n — o n t h e Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, offered a r e m a r k a b l e p r o p o s a l for t h e archaeology of t h e original "Critique of T a s t e . " B u t t h e most c o m p e l l i n g analysis of t h e c h r o n o l o g y of t h e composition of t h e text is t h a t of Giorgio T o n e l l i . While I will d r a w o n the o t h e r s to s u p p l e m e n t Tonelli's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it is from his results t h a t any f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the genesis of t h e Third Critique m u s t take t h e i r p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e . 14

15

16

17

Like S o u r i a u , Tonelli finds t h e key to t h e evolution of t h e Third Critique in t h e n o t i o n of reflective j u d g m e n t . Tonelli shows that t h e distinction of d e t e r m i n a n t from reflective j u d g m e n t — a n d t h e r e w i t h a clear sense of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t as s u c h — only a r o s e midway t h r o u g h t h e composition of t h e text. It did n o t i n f o r m t h e original t r e a t m e n t of the a e s t h e t i c — w h a t has c o m e d o w n as t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" ( § § 1 - 2 2 of t h e Third Critique) a n d t h e early a n d p r o p e r l y t e r m e d p a r t ( § § 3 1 - 4 0 ) of t h e 4

Introduction

,

very h o d g e p o d g e " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t s . " T h e s e a r e t h e most likely c o m p o n e n t s of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " in its original f o r m . I n d e e d , Tonelli connects t h e discovery of reflective j u d g m e n t with t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, which h e d a t e s to s o m e t i m e p r i o r to May of 1789. O n l y after working o u t t h e implications of t h e new idea of a faculty of j u d g m e n t could K a n t have u n d e r t a k e n the "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " which Tonelli t h e r e f o r e dates after May 1789. T h a t leaves substantial sections of t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " still to b e a c c o u n t e d for. As to the body of material o n art (§§41—54) a n d the extremely i m p o r t a n t "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " (§§55—60), Tonelli dates t h e m before t h e First Introduction—that is, before t h e clear c o n c e p t i o n of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t . H e n c e h e assigns these sections of t h e work r o u g h l y to t h e year 1 7 8 8 . 1 will suggest some modifications of this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , especially c o n c e r n i n g t h e "Dialectic." Finally, Tonelli c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime" ( § § 2 3 - 3 0 ) was only c o m p o s e d after a n d in t h e light of t h e First Introduction a n d t h e n inserted, with t h e necessary transitional sections, into t h e already c o m p o s e d "Critique of T a s t e . " Kant's "aesthetic" p h a s e of composition, which b e g a n as t h e "Critique of Taste," carried into t h e new year of 1788, as h e d r e w u p o n a massive body of material h e h a d a c c u m u l a t e d o n aesthetic questions over t h e years a n d a r r a y e d these ideas in t e r m s of his new t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p r o a c h . K a n t p r o c e e d e d , in 1788, to b r i n g his manifold reflections o n art a n d his specific grievances against Sturm und Drang n o t i o n s of artistic g e n i u s into formulation in t e r m s of his newly established t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy of taste. As h e did so, h e surveyed a n d revised t h e prevailing critical t h e o r y of t h e late e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d his work can only b e g r a s p e d against t h e context o f t h a t "conventional w i s d o m " h e was correcting. H e n c e in o r d e r to m a k e his work clear, it will be necessary to discuss key issues in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y aesthetics, b o t h in t h e i r English origins a n d in t h e i r G e r m a n a d a p t a t i o n s . Yet this material was, for Kant, very m u c h "old business." W h a t q u i c k e n e d his a t t e n t i o n was r a t h e r a latent implication in his aesthetics (which h e called a n "intellectual interest in t h e b e a u t y of n a t u r e " ) , namely, t h a t n a t u r e itself s e e m e d to show artistic design. T h a t led h i m to t h e consideration of teleology as a cognitive j u d g m e n t , a n d to t h e composition of t h e First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment by May 1789. W i t h t h e idea of "reflective j u d g m e n t , " Kant's work took a d e cidedly cognitive t u r n . T h e time of t h e writing of t h e First Introduction Introduction

5

was t h e h i g h p o i n t of Kant's confidence in t h e systematicity of his whole philosophy, a n d of his n o t i o n that t h e Third Critique s h o u l d articulate this systematicity. I n this context t h e work c h a n g e d n a m e s , b e c o m i n g t h e Critique of Judgment. T h i s t u r n has b e e n t h e object of t h e greatest scholarly a t t e n t i o n , n o t j u s t a m o n g those interested in a genetic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e whole text, or in t h e specific c o n t e n t a n d significance of t h e First Introduction, which is a most r e m a r k a b l e f r a g m e n t in Kant's o p u s , b u t above all a m o n g those interested in t h e very n o t i o n of a "unity of r e a s o n " or systematic totality in Kant's e n tire philosophy. B u t s o m e t h i n g led h i m to r e t r e a t from his synthetic e n t h u s i a s m . S o m e t h i n g led h i m to suspect a n excess of r e a s o n , a n d t h e r e f o r e to perceive t h e n e e d for a "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " T h a t d a n g e r was t h e idea of i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e in n a t u r e : "hylozoism" o r p a n t h e i s m , especially as it was b e i n g p r o p a g a t e d by J o h a n n H e r d e r in t h e late 1780s—which brings us to t h e decisive m a t t e r of t h e Pantheism C o n t r o v e r s y a n d its i m p a c t o n I m m a n u e l Kant. Teleology could b e linked to his two m o s t crucial metaphysical c o m m i t m e n t s : to m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d to theism. T h e renaissance of Benedict Spinoza a n d o u t b u r s t of p a n t h e i s t ontology in t h e late 1780s s e e m e d to c h a l l e n g e t h e s e very convictions fundamentally. T h e ultimate fabric of t h e Third Critique was p r o f o u n d l y s h a p e d by Kant's reaction to t h e t h r e a t of this new " d o g m a t i c metaphysics" in the very midst of t h e assimilation of his a n t i d o g m a t i c "critical philosophy." T h e r e fore, t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d especially Kant's c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m in §§72 a n d 73 expresses the ultimate c o n c e r n s of the Third Critique. 18

Kant's struggle with p a n t h e i s m b r o u g h t o n what I s h o u l d like to call a n ethical t u r n . H e u n d e r t o o k to f o r m u l a t e his theory of t h e " s u p e r s e n s i b l e " as a r e b u t t a l to p a n t h e i s m . T h i s new a n d decisive t u r n in t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique o c c u r r e d in late s u m m e r 1789. I n w o r k i n g o u t t h e full implications of this new, ethical t u r n , K a n t u n d e r t o o k t h e substantial revisions of t h e text which int e r v e n e d b e t w e e n his a n n o u n c e m e n t to his p u b l i s h e r Francois d e la G a r d e in O c t o b e r 1789 that t h e work was finished, a n d his delivery of t h e first installment of t h e m a n u s c r i p t , r u n n i n g r o u g h l y t h r o u g h §50, in J a n u a r y 1 7 9 0 . I n early 1790, as p a r t of this s a m e t u r n , h e r e v a m p e d the c o n c l u d i n g s e g m e n t of the "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " Tonelli n o t e s t h a t K a n t "tripled t h e v o l u m e " of this final s e g m e n t between F e b r u a r y 9 a n d M a r c h 8, 1 7 9 0 . Finally, in M a r c h 1790, K a n t revised t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n in crucial ways a l o n g similar lines. 1 9

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6

Introduction

T h e key to this ethical t u r n was the articulation of t h e idea of the "supersensible," a c o n c e p t o n e can use in a textual analysis a n a l o g o u s to Tonelli's with "reflective j u d g m e n t " to distinguish t h e revisions t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n t i r e text which a t t e n d e d t h e ethical t u r n . T h i s suggests t h a t t h e final form of t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " m u s t b e d a t e d to this final p h a s e . With this ethical t u r n , K a n t recognized f u r t h e r possibilities latent all a l o n g in his idea of b e a u t y a n d of reflective j u d g m e n t m o r e generally. T h e result was a n intense revision of t h e e n t i r e work, now t o w a r d t h e elaboration of t h e n o t i o n of t h e supersensible a n d t h e effort to m a k e over t h e Third Critique into a vindication of Kant's notions of theism, m o r a l f r e e d o m , a n d t h e "highest good." T h i s was a very metaphysical t u r n in Kant, a n d o n e with m o m e n t o u s implications for t h e genesis of Idealism. T h e s e g m e n t o n t h e ethical t u r n will d e m o n s t r a t e h o w t h e analogy of t h e d e d u c t i o n s of t h e j u d g m e n t of beauty a n d of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice b e c a m e a m o r e intimate a n d i m p o r t a n t association, how b e a u t y n o w b e c a m e conceived as a "symbol of morality," a n d how this m a d e relevant t h e consideration of t h e sublime, completely t r a n s f o r m e d t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " a n d , of course, f o u n d c o n s u m m a t e expression in t h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in considerations of t h e historical c u l t u r e a n d religious destiny of m a n k i n d . I n s u m , we m u s t d e m a r c a t e t h r e e phases in the composition of t h e Third Critique. T h e first, which l a u n c h e d t h e v e n t u r e , was t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h to a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of aesthetics, which o c c u r r e d in t h e s u m m e r of 1787, d u r i n g , a n d o n t h e basis of, Kant's w o r k o n t h e Second Critique. T h a t b r e a k t h r o u g h m a d e possible a "Critique of T a s t e , " a n idea which K a n t h a d long considered b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. T h e seco n d p h a s e , t h e most f a m o u s , c a m e with Kant's formulation of t h e idea of reflective j u d g m e n t , a n d it is most aptly c o n s i d e r e d a cognitive t u r n . H e e m b a r k e d u p o n it in early 1789, a n d it occasioned t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " into a full-fledged Critique of Judgment, i.e., a work which c o n s i d e r e d b o t h aesthetics a n d teleology. B u t my most i m p o r t a n t claim is t h a t t h e r e was yet a t h i r d t u r n , o c c u r r i n g in late s u m m e r or early fall 1789, which I d e s i g n a t e t h e ethical t u r n . T h a t ethical t u r n resulted directly from Kant's struggle with p a n t h e i s m , a n d i n t r o d u c e d a m u c h m o r e metaphysical t o n e into t h e whole work, e m p h a s i z i n g t h e idea of t h e supersensible as t h e g r o u n d of b o t h subjective f r e e d o m a n d n a t u r a l o r d e r . It resulted in t h e inclusion of a discussion of t h e Introduction

7

sublime, a c o m p l e t e r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " a n d , in 1790, a n elaboration of t h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d a revision of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e whole book.

The Context of the T h i r d C r i t i q u e : Kant and

Aufklärung

T h e contextual origins of t h e Critique ofJudgment lie in t h e p o l e m ical c o n c e r n of I m m a n u e l K a n t to drive t h e forces of the Sturm und Drang from t h e i r p r o m i n e n c e in G e r m a n intellectual life in the 1780s a n d to establish t h e c o m p l e t e h e g e m o n y of t h e A u f k l ä r u n g , t h e m a n t l e of whose l e a d e r s h i p h a d fallen to h i m with t h e d e a t h s of G o t t h o l d Lessing (1780) a n d t h e n Moses M e n d e l s s o h n ( 1 7 8 6 ) . T h e A u f k l ä r u n g m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d n o t simply as a p e r i o d b u t as a m o v e m e n t , a n d o n e struggling o n several fronts for intellectual e m i n e n c e in G e r m a n y . As its leader, K a n t felt compelled to rebuff t h e "excesses" of t h e rival Sturm und Drang m o v e m e n t . Earlier in his c a r e e r K a n t h a d v e n t u r e d a m o r e literary t h r u s t at t h e rival m o v e m e n t in Träume eines Geistersehers. B u t t h e c u r r e n t h a d n o t a b a t e d . I n d e e d , in t h e 1770s it s e e m e d to have swollen to flood tide, a n d , in t h e g r e a t s t a t u r e a c c o r d e d H e r d e r in G e r m a n literary a n d aesthetic circles d u r i n g t h e 1780s, it still s e e m e d to b e t h e prevailing p o i n t of view. U n d e r H e r d e r ' s l e a d e r s h i p t h e Sturm und Drang par a d e d its claims to privileged insight as t h e inspiration of "genius." T h i s K a n t could abide n e i t h e r personally n o r philosophically. T h e project of e n l i g h t e n m e n t itself a p p e a r e d to b e at stake. 21

2 2

Kant's life has s e e m e d so little e n m e s h e d in the m a t t e r of his t h o u g h t t h a t m a n y of t h e b i o g r a p h i e s which have b e c o m e stand a r d , r a t h e r t h a n seeking to e x p l o r e t h e motivating interests of t h e p e r s o n , r e a d m o r e like s u m m a r i e s , in chronological s e q u e n c e , of his w o r k s . Yet Kant's concerns a n d values, i n d e e d even his weaknesses, played a significant role in his writing, especially in t h e 1 7 8 0 s . T h e years 1 7 8 1 - 9 0 constitute t h e d e c a d e of Kant's struggle for recognition a n d t h e b e g i n n i n g n o t only of his r e n o w n b u t also of his conflicts with religious, philosophical, a n d even political authorities. I n 1781 Kant p u b l i s h e d what h e knew to be o n e of t h e world-historical m o n u m e n t s in philosophy. Yet t h e Critique of Pure Reason largely fell o n d e a f e a r s . T h e only review « of substance, t h e so-called Garve-Feder review of J a n u a r y 1782, t h o r o u g h l y garbled his m e a n i n g . So a n x i o u s was Kant for s o m e wider r e s p o n s e t h a t h e published a m o r e " p o p u l a r " version, t h e Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in t h e s p r i n g of 1783. N o t 23

24

2 5

8

Introduction

only did it fail to achieve its goal, b u t Kant now faced criticism for ostensible inconsistencies between t h e First Critique a n d t h e new Prolegomena. I n t h e 1780s, Kant's letters reveal his sense of time's foreclosure. Acutely aware of his a d v a n c e d years, h e felt pressed to c o m p l e t e his m o n u m e n t a l labor a n d b e g r u d g e d distraction, yet h e also h a d a n u r g e n t a n d certainly u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e n e e d to b e u n d e r s t o o d . I n a letter to M e n d e l s s o h n d a t e d A u g u s t 16, 1783, K a n t e x p r e s s e d r e g r e t t h a t his colleague could n o t g r a s p his a r g u m e n t s , a n d ascribed t h e difficulty to his o w n lack of stylistic elegance. It t r o u b l e d h i m , however, t h a t h e could find n o n e a m o n g t h e first r a n k of G e r m a n y ' s p h i l o s o p h e r s — n e i t h e r M e n d e l s s o h n n o r J o h a n n T e t e n s n o r Christian G a r v e — w h o evinced any sympathetic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of his new work a n d m i g h t aid t h e general public in recognizing its i m p o r t a n c e . It m a t t e r e d so m u c h to h i m t h a t h e considered writing a p o p u l a r course b o o k o n the First Critique. First, however, h e p l a n n e d to work u p his m o r a l philosophy, which h e h o p e d would b e " m o r e p o p u l a r " (mehrer Popularität fähig). O t h e r letters from t h e s a m e p e r i o d e c h o e d this c o n c e r n with the r e c e p t i o n of his works a n d , b e h i n d it, a g r o w i n g f r u s t r a t i o n . T h a t frustration h a d its e l e m e n t of h u m a n weakness. His p u b lisher J o h a n n H a r t k n o c h , w h o h a d the g o o d f o r t u n e also to p u b lish J o h a n n H e r d e r ' s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, p a i d a visit to H e r d e r in W e i m a r late in 1783. At t h a t time h e i n f o r m e d H e r d e r t h a t K a n t believed h e could trace t h e "neglect" (Nichtbeachtung) of his Critique to H e r d e r ' s i n f l u e n c e . Kant's l o n g s t a n d i n g hostility to the whole of the Sturm und Drang, of which H e r d e r was by t h e mid-1780s t h e d o m i n a n t intellectual p r o d u c t , m a d e their situation o n e of rivalry, however little e i t h e r of t h e m wished self-consciously to recognize it. T h a t K a n t was c o n c e r n e d with "rivals" is clear from his sensitivity to reviewers in the 1 7 8 0 s . 26

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T h e origins of the Third Critique lie in Kant's bitter rivalry with H e r d e r . I n his published works, with t h e obvious exception of t h e direct reviews of H e r d e r ' s book, Kant scrupulously refrained from m e n t i o n i n g H e r d e r by n a m e , b u t h e r e f e r r e d to h i m , as I will d e m o n s t r a t e , regularly a n d disparagingly. It is particularly i m p o r t a n t to a t t e n d t h e l a n g u a g e of Kant's c o m m e n t s o n H e r d e r , for t h e r e t u r n s out to be a r e m a r k a b l e consistency in the very words K a n t used w h e n h e t h o u g h t of H e r d e r . T h a t Sturm und Drang, a n d specifically H e r d e r , irked K a n t is evidenced t h r o u g h s o m e w i t h e r i n g Reflections from t h e 1770s, t h e d e c a d e of his laborious silence a n d t h e h e i g h t Introduction

9

of the Stürmers volubility. T h i s hostility can be traced t h r o u g h the original edition of t h e First Critique with its veiled references in t h e preface to " i n d i f f e r e n t i s t s . " T h r o u g h o u t t h e early 1780s critics h a r p e d o n Kant's lack of literary grace in t h e First Critique a n d t h e obstacles to p o p u l a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g it p r e s e n t e d . W i t h exasperation K a n t p r o t e s t e d in his preface to t h e Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics t h a t p h i l o s o p h y m u s t sacrifice such glib accessibility for t h e sake of clarity a n d p e n e t r a t i o n . It is n o t too farfetched to suspect a n implied contrast with H e r d e r a n d even a little Kantian j e a l ousy. T h e Third Critique was almost a c o n t i n u o u s attack o n H e r d e r . At e a c h stage in t h e genealogy of t h e Third Critique we can discern a clear a n d self-conscious aggression o n t h e p a r t of K a n t against t h e positions a d o p t e d by H e r d e r . H e r d e r a n d t h e Sturm und Drang w e r e t h e m a i n targets of Kant's t h e o r y of art a n d genius. I n d e e d , Kant's hostility to t h e Sturm und Drang was o n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m o tives b e h i n d his entire e n t e r p r i s e of a treatise o n aesthetics. Similarly, Kant's differences with H e r d e r o n history w e r e substantial a n d crucial. N o t only did K a n t d e v e l o p his ideas o n history a n d cult u r e in t h e " p o p u l a r essays" of t h e mid-1780s in explicit rivalry with H e r d e r , b u t h e took t h e m u p a g a i n in 1 7 8 9 - 9 0 in t h e context of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " O n e can find fewer m o r e intim a t e c o n n e c t i o n s t h a n t h a t b e t w e e n " I d e a for a Universal History" a n d §83 of t h e Critique of Judgment. At b o t h m o m e n t s K a n t selfconsciously challenged H e r d e r ' s primacy in this field. T h e battle b e t w e e n K a n t a n d H e r d e r over t h e m e a n i n g of history, or m o r e precisely over h u m a n destiny a n d the tension b e t w e e n n a t u r e a n d c u l t u r e , was o n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t literary events of t h e late 1780s in G e r m a n y . T h e controversy h a d e n o r m o u s i m p a c t u p o n s u b s e q u e n t G e r m a n t h o u g h t , especially Friedrich Schiller. 31

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T h e decisive continuity, however, is that of H e r d e r ' s t h o u g h t s o n Naturphilosophie from V o l u m e 1 of his Ideen to his Gott: einige Gespräche of 1787, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d of t h e observations in Kant's reviews of H e r d e r from t h e mid-1780s to his r e m a r k s in t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " of t h e Third Critique of 1790, o n t h e o t h e r . I n d e e d , t h e key provocation for t h e final t u r n in Kant's c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique was H e r d e r ' s Gott: einige Gespräche. H e r d e r proves to be t h e u n n a m e d antagonist of m o s t of , t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " 3 4

At each s t e p of o u r analysis, t h e n , this relationship with H e r d e r will play a crucial role. While it will a p p e a r useful in t r e a t i n g Kant's aesthetics, a n d familiar in t r e a t i n g Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history, t h e 10

Introduction

real p o w e r of this c o n n e c t i o n lies in its illumination of t h e contextual sources of Kant's "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy. For s o m e time, aggressive, secularizing rationalists, c e n t e r e d in Berlin, h a d enjoyed t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h a t erstwhile skeptic in m a t t e r s religious, King Frederick I I . B u t theological innovation was still politically d a n g e r o u s . N o t only t h e established c h u r c h e s , b u t even t h e Pietist m o v e m e n t , which h a d o n c e b e e n a major r e f o r m m o v e m e n t within o r t h o d o x Christianity, h a d by t h e late e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y b e c o m e a l a r m e d at t h e t r e n d of theological rationalism in G e r m a n h i g h c u l t u r e . Earlier in t h e century, this h a d led to t h e n o t o r i o u s p e r s e c u t i o n of Christian Wolff at t h e University of Halle, which was only reversed by t h e succession of Frederick II in 1740. More recently, in t h e 1770s, t h e controversy g e n e r a t e d by Lessing's publication of t h e Wolffenbiittel Fragments of H e r m a n n R e i m a r u s showed t h e seriousness of t h e situation. Lessing h a d t a k e n , by t h e e n d of his life, a very bold a n d provocative stance o n t h e issue of t h e rationalization of religion which t r o u b l e d a n d even offended t h e o r t h o d o x a d h e r e n t s of Protestant C h r i s t i a n i t y . W h e n o r t h o d o x y assailed Lessing, t h e s p o k e s m a n of theological rationalism, t h e e n t i r e A u f k l ä r u n g saw its political a n d intellectual liberty j e o p a r d i z e d . T h e mobilization of t h e forces of repressive o r t h o d o x y proves t h e indispensable b a c k d r o p for Kant's c o n c e r n with A u f k l ä r u n g . Kant's i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy ( 1 7 8 5 - 8 9 ) m u s t be linked to these considerations. T h e P a n t h e i s m C o n t r o versy b r o u g h t a b o u t a revival a n d vindication of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of Spinoza in G e r m a n y in t h e later 1780s, b u t its ideological furor r e volved a r o u n d Lessing a n d his s t a t u r e as t h e leader of the G e r m a n A u f k l ä r u n g . K a n t b e c a m e deeply e m b r o i l e d in t h e controversy because h e saw Spinoza a n d p a n t h e i s m as a g r e a t t h r e a t to t h e security a n d stability of t h e cultural milieu in G e r m a n y . K a n t could sense t h e shift in t h e political-religious a t m o s p h e r e , a n d h e worried for t h e kind of " e n l i g h t e n e d " a t t i t u d e t o w a r d religion which h e advocated. K i n g Frederick II was a p p r o a c h i n g his d e a t h as t h e Pantheism C o n t r o v e r s y b r o k e o u t . H e was succeeded by t h e m o r e o r t h o d o x , i n d e e d reactionary, Frederick William II in t h e midst of t h e a f f a i r . Since t h e c o r o n a t i o n c e r e m o n y traditionally took place in Königsberg, a n d since K a n t h a p p e n e d to b e serving as rector of t h e University of Königsberg at t h e time, h e c a m e into p e r s o n a l contact with t h e n e w king, b u t t h e latter's attentiveness to h i m was n o t a n u n m i x e d blessing. Frederick William II's Minister of Justice, 35

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Introduction

11

J o h a n n von Wöllner, w o u l d confirm by his Edict of 1788 t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e Aufklärung's anxiety over religious backlash. I n d e e d , K a n t himself w o u l d feel the lash, a n d Fichte would b e driven out u n d e r i t . Kant's i m m e d i a t e c o m m e n t o n t h e p a n t h e i s m affair, "Was heißt: sich i m D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " of 1786, m a i n t a i n e d a n almost O l y m p i a n indifference to t h e respective substantive concerns of t h e d i s p u t a n t s , a n d confined itself for t h e m o s t p a r t to calling b o t h sides to o r d e r from t h e v a n t a g e of the critical philosophy. Why did h e i n t e r v e n e at all? A footnote late in t h e essay provides t h e answer. It sets o u t with a protest from K a n t : "It is h a r d to conceive h o w t h o u g h t f u l scholars could find s u p p o r t for Spinozism in t h e Critique of Pure Reason." Only because such a link h a d b e e n intimated did K a n t feel c o m p e l l e d to e n t e r t h e bitter controversy. His p r i m a r y objective was to distance himself from such d a n g e r o u s divagations, to d e f e n d r e a s o n against Schwärmerei, a n d , if possible, to shift attention to his soon to b e reissued First Critique. T h i s was, after all, t h e very t i m e w h e n Kant's "critical p h i l o s o p h y " was struggling p a i n fully for r e c o g n i t i o n . However, K a n t soon discovered t h a t t h e p a n t h e i s t s t r e a m was too s t r o n g to b e so quickly diverted. With t h e a p p e a r a n c e of H e r d e r ' s Gott: einige Gespräche in 1787 t h e whole issue r e o p e n e d in a n e w a n d , for K a n t , still m o r e provocative light. His bete n o i r e , t h e Sturm und Drang, s e e m e d o n c e again to be stealing c e n t e r stage j u s t at t h e t i m e t h a t h e was sensing a g r o u n d swell of interest in his o w n critical philosophy. It was at this point t h a t t h e P a n t h e i s m C o n troversy e x e r t e d its most i m p o r t a n t influence o n Kant—affecting his major critical works, especially t h e Third Critique. 38

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Because his o w n disciples s e e m e d e n a m o r e d of these notions, K a n t could only find the c o n t i n u e d i n d u l g e n c e in p a n t h e i s m p r o foundly d a n g e r o u s , a n d h e n c e h e d e t e r m i n e d to take a p e r s o n a l h a n d in d e b u n k i n g Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m . H e b e g a n that campaign in t h e Second Critique, b u t it was primarily i n t o t h e Third Critique t h a t h e c h a n n e l e d these concerns, decisively shifting its o r i e n t a t i o n in its final stages of composition. Placing Kant's intervention in t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy in t h e context of t h e latest t r e n d s in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science as well as in t h e context of G e r m a n theology, however, it b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t t h a t Kant's Third , Critique only succeeded in p r o v o k i n g his o w n most a d e p t disciples to take u p Spinoza a n d "hylozoism" against h i m a n d t h u s led directly to t h e new metaphysics of n a t u r e which is o n e of t h e corn e r s t o n e s of G e r m a n Idealism. 12

Introduction

While this work focuses o n t h e Third Critique itself, it is w o r t h while briefly to consider its key a u d i e n c e , t h e g e n e r a t i o n of Idealism, a n d w h a t s h a p e d their r e a d i n g . Y o u n g G e r m a n intellectuals of t h e 1790s, in o r d e r to ratify t h e i r e m e r g e n t cultural identity, wished to see theirs as p r e e m i n e n t l y "Das L a n d d e r Dichter u n d D e n k e r . " G e r m a n Idealism a p p e a r s , in this light, as t h e expression of a powerful intellectual m o v e m e n t of cultural nationalism in late e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n y , which G e r m a n h i s t o r i o g r a p h y has t e r m e d t h e " d e u t s c h e B e w e g u n g . " A r i p e n i n g p r i d e in l a n g u a g e a n d in poetic gift, a n d a cultivated attentiveness to t h e u n i q u e a n d o u t s t a n d i n g aspects of t h e c e n t r a l E u r o p e a n setting c o m b i n e d with the aspirations for social a n d political p r o m i n e n c e in a particular g r o u p of e d u c a t e d c o m m o n e r s to create a very p o t e n t nationali s m . G e r m a n intellectuals f o u n d cultural identity in resisting t h e d o m i n a n c e of F r e n c h l a n g u a g e a n d style in G e r m a n courts, especially P o t s d a m . T h e struggle to get free from Latin d o m i n i o n led t h e m to a n e w theory of ethnic u n i q u e n e s s a n d creativity as well as of t h e Greek, as o p p o s e d t o t h e R o m a n , origins of ancient g r a n d e u r . B o t h t h e ethnic a n d t h e G r e e k o r i e n t a t i o n p r o m o t e d t h e idea of " c u l t u r e " in t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l sense, linking l a n g u a g e with ecology, religion, a n d p o l i t i c s . T h i s vastly d e e p e n e d t h e Germ a n sense of history a n d its process, a n d gave G e r m a n y a distinctive m o d e l for its o w n self-invention as a n a t i o n . 41

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T h i s e m e r g e n t G e r m a n c u l t u r e h a d a serious p r o b l e m , however. It s e e m e d to b e divided at t h e very core. O n t h e o n e side, stressing t h e project of assimilating t h e new rationalism of t h e West in questions of religion, politics, a n d history, stood t h e G e r m a n A u f k l ä r u n g , led first by Lessing a n d later by Kant. Kant's " I d e a for a Universal History with C o s m o p o l i t a n I n t e n t " a n d " W h a t Is E n l i g h t e n m e n t ? " (both 1784) f o r m u l a t e d the typical A u f k l ä r u n g stance o n m a n y of t h e key issues of the e p o c h . O n t h e o t h e r side stood t h e Sturm und Drang, stressing linguistic u n i q u e n e s s , literary genius, e t h n i c a n d religious tradition, a n d a s t a u n c h aversion to W e s t e r n rationalism a n d its Latin classicist aesthetic. Its key figures were H e r d e r a n d G o e t h e . If H e r d e r offered a theory, G o e t h e personified t h e spirit of a G e r m a n national literary c u l t u r e . T h u s for Friedrich Schiller, w h o s o u g h t to place his o w n a n d his nation's identity in t h e f r a m e of a g r a n d a n d unified c u l t u r e , t h e project s e e m e d to reconcile t h e two traditions, a n d j o i n G e r m a n y ' s foremost Dichter, G o e t h e , with its foremost Denker, Kant. Schiller himself was, i n t h e 1790s, a s t u d e n t of t h e K a n t i a n philosophy as well as t h e closest to a poetic p e e r a n d ally G o e t h e h a d . I n his effort Introduction

13

to define G e r m a n greatness in t e r m s of a synthesis of t h e s e two figu r e s , Schiller d r e w heavily o n Kant's Third Critique. It was t h e o n e w o r k by K a n t which G o e t h e recognized a n d accepted with e n t h u s i a s m . Schiller's effort to reconcile t h e two c u r r e n t s c u l m i n a t e d in On the Aesthetic Education of Mankind (1795), a decisive anticipation of a n d i n s p i r a t i o n for t h e y o u n g Idealists w h o e m a n a t e d o u t of t h e T ü b i n g e n seminary: H ö l d e r l i n , S e n d l i n g , a n d Hegel. T h e y exp r e s s e d t h e i r initial vision in t h e crucial d o c u m e n t "Earliest SystemP r o g r a m of G e r m a n I d e a l i s m . " If they declared themselves Kantians, it did n o t m e a n they took K a n t as t h e i r only lodestar. Many of t h e disciples K a n t r e c r u i t e d in G e r m a n y simultaneously r e v e r e n c e d Lessing a n d G o e t h e , r e a d H e r d e r with attentiveness a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n , a n d f o u n d Spinoza a n d p a n t h e i s m fascinating. I n d e e d , o n e of t h e crucial facts t h a t m u s t b e retrieved from t h e context is t h e wides p r e a d conviction of t h e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s of t h e K a n t i a n system a n d of t h e a g e n d a for p h i l o s o p h y which t h a t c r e a t e d . K a n t cont r i b u t e d substantially to this sense of t h e o p e n n e s s of his system a n d to t h e idea of its possible completion, a n d only very late, w h e n it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t t h a t w h a t his disciples h a d m a d e did n o t suit h i m , w o u l d h e give public notice t h a t his o w n works constituted a n a l t o g e t h e r c o m p l e t e system, a n d t h a t his heirs h a d utterly m i s u n derstood h i m . W h a t fascinated this new g e n e r a t i o n in t h e Third Critique was t h e metaphysical potential it s e e m e d to suggest. I n Kant's association of beauty with morality, n a t u r e with art, history with t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of a j u s t society, they saw t h e p r o s p e c t for a c o n s u m m a t e vision of t h e o r d e r of t h e world as well as a cultural mission for t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n . S o m e possibility which g l i m m e r e d in t h e Third Critique s e e m e d to t h e m to cry o u t for retrieval. N a t u r e , art, a n d history n e e d e d to b e welded into a g r a n d e r synthesis t h a n K a n t himself h a d d a r e d . T h i s quest for a n "aesthetic solution," in t h e p h r a s e of Schiller a n d H ö l d e r l i n , p r e o c c u p i e d t h e brightest m i n d s of G e r m a n y in t h e 1790s a n d resulted in t h e genesis of G e r m a n I d e a l i s m . T h i s "aesthetic idealism" f o u n d systematic articulation in Schelling's writings of t h e late 1790s, a n d cont r i b u t e d greatly to t h e rise of R o m a n t i c i s m . Yet for all that, this project, u n d e r t a k e n by Schiller, Wilhelm von H u m b o l d t , H ö l d e r l i n , Schelling, a n d H e g e l (as well as o t h e r s like Fichte a n d Novalis) took f o r m u n d e r t h e aegis of t h e Kantianism of t h e Third Critique. 47

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Introduction

S^SF» Part One

T H E GENESIS O F T H E " C R I T I Q U E OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT"

Säf*

One

KANT AND T H E PURSUIT OF AUFKLÄRUNG

A

s a n Aufklärer, K a n t saw himself p a r t of a m o v e m e n t n o t only in his nation b u t in E u r o p e as a whole. Yet t h e Germ a n A u f k l ä r u n g s h o u l d n o t simply be assimilated into t h e Western E n l i g h t e n m e n t a l o n g cosmopolitan-secularist lines. G e r m a n y h a d a very distinctive t r a d i t i o n . G e r m a n cult u r e in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y was still very Christian: Christian piety persisted vigorously in the u r b a n laity, a n d university c u l t u r e r e m a i n e d distinctly Christian in o u t l o o k . T h e G e r m a n Aufk l ä r u n g was inextricably involved in t h e theological controversies of t h e P r o t e s t a n t faith in G e r m a n y . Kant was n o t alone in b e i n g " r o u s e d from his d o g m a t i c s l u m b e r s , " yet if h e a n d o t h e r G e r m a n s s u r r e n d e r e d s o m e of their dogmatism in t h e face of criticism from b e y o n d t h e R h i n e (and t h e c h a n n e l ) , they struggled to preserve as m u c h of t h e dogma as they could. While this m e a n t a strained relation with o r t h o d o x y , it n e v e r a p p r o a c h e d t h e radical hostility to r e ligion of a Voltaire or a H u m e in t h e W e s t . If we a r e to ascertain how K a n t c a m e to identify himself with A u f k l ä r u n g in its distinctive G e r m a n sense, we have to look to Frederick II a n d his effort to ina u g u r a t e a n e w cultural e p o c h for Prussia u p o n his accession to t h e t h r o n e in 1740. His two key innovations were t h e r e i n s t a t e m e n t of Wolff to his chair at t h e University of Halle a n d t h e creation of t h e Berlin A c a d e m y . 1

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T h e conflict between t h e rationalists a r o u n d W o l f f a n d t h e Pietist successors of Christian T h o m a s i u s within t h e G e r m a n university system h a d driven Wolff from his chair in 1 7 2 3 . With t h e rest o r a t i o n of Wolff's chair, t h e old struggle between rationalism a n d Pietism r e s u m e d . Against t h e r e s u r g e n t Wolff, t h e Pietists b r o u g h t forth a n e w c h a m p i o n : Christian A u g u s t Crusius. Crusius raised t h e level of philosophical sophistication in t h e Pietist c a m p a i g n . 6

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Professor of p h i l o s o p h y a n d later of theology at Leipzig starting in 1744, Crusius p u b l i s h e d his m o s t influential work, Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverläßigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis, in 1 7 4 7 . I n t h e 1750s, his disciples w e r e active in t h e circles of t h e Berlin Academy, w h e r e they j o i n e d forces with t h e F r e n c h anti-Wolffians in t h e Newtonian-positivist t r a d i t i o n . Wolff m a i n t a i n e d t h a t all k n o w l e d g e was g r o u n d e d in t h e principle of identity, even Leibniz's f a m o u s principle of sufficient r e a s o n , a n d since it was possible to d e d u c e t h e law of sufficient r e a s o n from t h e principle of identity, formal logic served as a n a d e q u a t e ontology. Actuality, in his view, was n o t nearly so i m p o r t a n t as t h e two forms of possibility, necessary a n d c o n t i n g e n t . Rational a r g u m e n t established necessity a n d this w a r r a n t e d reality. H e n c e Wolff subscribed to t h e ontological a r g u m e n t for t h e existence of G o d . A corollary of this faith in t h e analyticity of all k n o w l e d g e was Wolff's conviction that all forms of h u m a n activity could be g r o u n d e d in a single faculty, which was cognitive. Ethical a n d sensual discriminations could be derived from this single cognitive faculty, even as specific cognitions could ultimately be g r o u n d e d in t h e principle of identity. T h e result was a m e t h o d i c a l b u t indiscriminate rationalism. While Wolff a c k n o w l e d g e d allegiance to Leibniz, h e was by n o m e a n s fully in s y m p a t h y with t h e latter's philosophy. H e a d o p t e d , for e x a m p l e , a firm dualism in his t h e o r y of substance, as between m i n d a n d m a t t e r . H e rejected Leibniz's m o n a d s a n d t h e idea of p r e established h a r m o n y , a n d conceived of t h e material universe in strictly mechanistic t e r m s far closer to Descartes t h a n t o Leibniz. H e a c c e p t e d t h e Cartesian g e o m e t r i c m e t h o d as a p p r o p r i a t e for physical science, a n d f o u n d it completely consistent with t h e m e t h o d u s e d in p h i l o s o p h y a n d metaphysics. T h i s Cartesian elem e n t in his t h o u g h t p r o v o k e d t h e revisionism stirring against Wolff in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n philosophy. 7

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Crusius attacked Wolff o n all these fronts. H e d e n i e d t h a t t h e principle of sufficient r e a s o n could b e derived from t h e principle of identity. T h u s formal logic a n d ontology r e m a i n e d distinct. Ind e e d , Crusius a r g u e d t h a t formal logic was n o t particularly useful in t h e latter, since it dealt m e r e l y with t h e possible, while philosophy's real p r o b l e m s w e r e with t h e actual, with t h e b l u n t a n d intractable existence of things. C o n s e q u e n t l y , m a t h e m a t i c s a n d m e t a physics did n o t o p e r a t e with identical m e t h o d s . By e m p h a s i z i n g t h e disjunction b e t w e e n formal logic a n d t h e p r o b l e m s of existence, C r u s i u s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t metaphysical issues w e r e n o t soluble 18

The "Critique of AestheticJudgment"

t h r o u g h analytic logic. T h e ontological a r g u m e n t could n o t b e u p held in this light, a n d t h a t r e s t o r e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of S c r i p t u r e a n d revelation, a n explosive p r o p o s i t i o n in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n theology. C r u s i u s f u r t h e r m o r e stressed t h e limitations of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e , u s i n g a r g u m e n t s from skepticism to u p h o l d fideist c o m m i t m e n t s in P i e t i s m . H e directed a t t e n t i o n to t h e concrete h u m a n project of m a k i n g sense of e x p e r i e n c e , o u t w a r d a n d inw a r d . I n this light Tonelli observed t h a t Crusius's Pietism "allowed his successors to b e m u c h m o r e receptive to English a n d F r e n c h empiricism, sensationalism, a n d c o m m o n - s e n s e p h i l o s o p h y t h a n were o r t h o d o x Wolffian r a t i o n a l i s t s . " As Lewis Beck has a r g u e d , K a n t was n e v e r a n o r t h o d o x Wolffi a n . Tonelli has elaborated o n this h e t e r o d o x y by linking it to t h e influence of C r u s i u s . T h e issues t h a t Crusius i n t r o d u c e d into G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h y — t h e distinction of logic from actuality, t h e limitations of h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h e distinction of t h e metaphysical from t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d — p r o v e d decisive for Kant. H e b e g a n as a p h i l o s o p h e r of n a t u r a l science, conc e r n e d above all with t h e conflict b e t w e e n N e w t o n a n d Leibniz over t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d metaphysical implications of t h e n a t u r a l universe. I n 1755, w h e n h e b e g a n his lectureship at t h e University of Königsberg, Kant's m a i n interest r e m a i n e d t h e relation "between p h i l o s o p h y a n d n a t u r a l science, a n d especially t h e issues which h a d b e e n i n a u g u r a l for e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n m e t a physics—those of t h e Leibniz-Clarke d e b a t e a n d t h e m e a n i n g of N e w t o n i a n i s m . K a n t p u b l i s h e d Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, his most significant scientific c o n t r i b u t i o n o n this t h e m e , in t h e s a m e year t h a t h e b e g a n his university teaching. T h a t space, existence, a n d t h e distinction of n a t u r a l science a n d m a t h e m a t i c s from p h i l o s o p h y w e r e crucial questions for K a n t in t h e late 1750s a n d early 1760s is c l e a r . W h a t they led h i m to investigate was t h e relation of actuality to sensibility, a n d t h u s t h e role of sensibility in valid k n o w l e d g e . A n d it is in this context that we m u s t place his r e c e p t i o n of t h e very different philosophical project of A l e x a n d e r B a u m g a r t e n a n d G e o r g Friedrich Meier. Alfred B ä u m l e r set t h e study of t h e Third Critique o n a new p a t h by c o n n e c t i n g t h e issue of aesthetics to t h e epistemological conc e r n s of G e r m a n "school p h i l o s o p h y " in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . G e r m a n school philosophy, inspired by Leibniz, s o u g h t a logic a d e q u a t e to i n d u c t i o n , by focusing o n t h e n a t u r e of c o n c e p t form a t i o n at t h e level of individual empirical entities a n d the role of sense in k n o w l e d g e . B a u m g a r t e n revised Wolffian philosophy 9

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Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

19

with a n e w t h e o r y of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h sensibility, which h e called t h e "science of a e s t h e t i c s . " H e a n d his disciple, Meier, investigated beauty a n d t h e fine arts for their cognitive potential. B a u m g a r t e n m a d e t h e claim t h a t b e a u t y o r s e n s u o u s perfection (perfectio phaenomenon) consisted in a perfect clarity even in t h e absence of distinctness. Clarity a n d distinctness h a d b e c o m e p r o m i n e n t in t h e lexicon of m o d e r n philosophy from t h e t i m e of Descartes a n d played a n i m p o r t a n t role in Wolff's system. For Wolff, clarity involved t h e ability to discriminate a n object of att e n t i o n from its b a c k g r o u n d . It was a recognition of specificity. Distinctness involved t h e precise analysis of t h e m a r k s which characterized t h a t object. I n traditional l a n g u a g e , clarity d i s c e r n e d entities, distinctness analyzed their p r o p e r t i e s . T h e process of dist i n g u i s h i n g involved t h e c o m p a r i s o n of p r o p e r t i e s at a m o r e a b stract a n d universal level. T h a t entailed r e a s o n or logic. W h a t B a u m g a r t e n , a m o n g o t h e r s , n o t e d was t h a t this abstracting process lost p u r c h a s e o n t h e unity a n d concreteness of t h e entity as a whole. B a u m g a r t e n p r o p o s e d to revise Wolffianism o n this i m p o r t a n t question, a n d h e i n t r o d u c e d s o m e distinctions which were to p r o v e stimulating to G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r s of t h e second half of t h e eight e e n t h century, a n d to K a n t in particular. B a u m g a r t e n distinguished "extensive" versus "intensive" clarity in conceiving of a n individual entity, i.e., the unity of a manifold in its actuality. N o logical analysis of t h e particular p r o p e r t i e s could a c c o u n t adequately for t h e i r c o m b i n a t i o n in a whole. T h i s unity o r " p e r f e c t i o n " s e e m e d t o r e q u i r e a different a p p r o a c h . B a u m g a r t e n linked "extensive" c o o r d i n a t i o n o r "perfection" in t h e s e n s u o u s r e a l m of actuality with beauty. Beauty t h e r e f o r e took o n a cognitive function. Aesthetic perfection was a n inferior kind of objective k n o w l e d g e , r a t h e r t h a n a n entirely distinct a n d self-sufficient m o d e of e x p e r i e n c e . 18

"Extensive" clarity was to be achieved by finding t h e most complete articulation of t h e p r o p e r t i e s which j o i n e d t o g e t h e r to f o r m t h e individuality of any entity. Beauty r e p r e s e n t e d t h e quantitative m a x i m u m of this extensiveness—"richness." For B a u m g a r t e n t h e essential quality of extensive clarity was its "vivacity." By contrast, B a u m g a r t e n associated "intensive clarity" with " p u r i t y . " But B a u m g a r t e n d i d n o t get very far with t h e idea of "intensive clarity" because h e m e a n t by it t h a t logical unity which Leibniz h a d articulated b u t could n o t specify, a n d which K a n t was to find o n e of t h e m o s t intractable p r o b l e m s of his o w n epistemology, the idea of a singular "intuition." While vivacity o r richness m i g h t express t h e 19

20

20

The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

quantitative c o m p l e t e n e s s of p r o p e r t i e s in any individual entity, this "perfection" gave n o real p u r c h a s e o n t h e logical, o r better ontological, p r o b l e m of its integral o r systematic unity. H e n c e t h e admission t h a t it was "confused." "Confused" m e a n t lacking distinctness, i.e., t h e logical-analytic discrimination of p r o p e r t i e s t h r o u g h which u n d e r s t a n d i n g m i g h t m a k e precise w h a t disting u i s h e d t h a t particular entity from b o t h similar a n d different o b jects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . While B a u m g a r t e n recognized t h e i n a d e q u a c y of Wolffian analytic rationalism, h e could n o t resolve t h e issue of t h e relation of rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n to sensible actuality. K a n t was to take issue with t h e B a u m g a r t e n - M e i e r position precisely t h e r e . K a n t c o n s i d e r e d B a u m g a r t e n t h e foremost Wolffian a n d took h i m as a foil in d e v e l o p i n g his o w n a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m of sensibility a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h a t m e a n t K a n t h a d to follow h i m into the question of b e a u t y a n d its place in philosophy. Kant's c o n c e r n with aesthetics, t h e n , m u s t b e g r o u n d e d in this epistemological interest. W h a t first interested K a n t in t h e B a u m g a r t e n - M e i e r project was strictly this epistemological issue r e g a r d i n g t h e laws of sensible k n o w l e d g e , this p r o b l e m of "confusion" a n d t h e relation of t h e aesthetic a n d t h e logical in t h e cognition of a n actual individual entity. K a n t was primarily a n d professionally e n m e s h e d in t h e Aufklär u n g ' s epistemological project. H e was n o t interested in fine art, in its system, in creativity or artistic taste. I n a Reflection from t h e m i d 1750s, K a n t p u t this quite clearly: " T h e beautiful sciences a r e those which m a k e r e a d y to h a n d the rules for the inferior capacities of k n o w l e d g e , t h a t is, confused k n o w l e d g e [die unteren Erkenntniskräfte, d.i. die verworrene Erkenntnis]." B u t t h e G e r m a n Aufklär u n g m u s t b e seen as m u c h in a n ideological as in a n epistemological light. 21

Frederick II, the Berlin Aufklärung,

and Cosmopolitan Taste

Frederick II's effort to b r i n g Prussia into the cultural m a i n s t r e a m of t h e E u r o p e a n — w h i c h for h i m m e a n t t h e F r e n c h — E n l i g h t e n m e n t stimulated cosmopolitanism in central E u r o p e . T h e official l a n g u a g e of t h e P o t s d a m c o u r t was F r e n c h ; t h e King of Prussia d e clared G e r m a n i n e p t for literary o r cultural expression; a n d F r e n c h l a n g u a g e a n d F r e n c h m e n d o m i n a t e d his new a c a d e m y in Berlin. H e even selected Pierre M a u p e r t u i s as p r e s i d e n t (1746—59) of this academy. M a u p e r t u i s ' s allegiance was to a positivist p r o g r a m of n a t u r a l Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

21

science a l o n g t h e lines of J e a n d'Alembert's Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia. At t h e instigation of t h e king, M a u p e r t u i s e m ployed a series of prize c o m p e t i t i o n s in t h e Berlin A c a d e m y in t h e m i d - 1 7 5 0 s to d e b u n k G e r m a n "school p h i l o s o p h y " (Leibniz a n d Wolff) as well as G e r m a n religion (Pietism). T h e academy's p r o g r a m was quite simply Newton's physics w i t h o u t Newton's G o d . Ironically, such " F r e n c h " t h o u g h t h a d its origins in Britain. I n d e e d , Voltaire himself a c k n o w l e d g e d a "new trinity" for t h e c o n t i n e n t : B a c o n , N e w t o n , a n d L o c k e . T h e British i m p u l s e tow a r d s sensationalism, set off by H o b b e s a n d Locke, h a d p r o gressed by m i d c e n t u r y into t h e writings of Hartley a n d H u m e . T h e latter's works b e c a m e available in G e r m a n y in t h e 1750s t h r o u g h a four-volume translation of his essays, a n d they w e r e widely r e a d . While a cultural-nationalist reaction eventually t h r e w off this t u t e l a g e to foreign t h o u g h t , a n u m b e r of G e r m a n s s o u g h t u r g e n t l y to b r i n g themselves a b r e a s t of t h e m o r e sophisticated c u l t u r e from a b r o a d , t h o u g h in t h e i r o w n l a n g u a g e a n d in t e r m s of their indigen o u s philosophical, religious, a n d literary c o n c e r n s . T h e leaders of this discriminating assimilation of foreign e l e m e n t s into a Germ a n A u f k l ä r u n g were t h e so-called " p o p u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r s " of Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, Lessing, a n d M e n d e l s s o h n . I n t h e 1750s, w i t h o u t a n d p e r h a p s even against Frederick IPs p r o g r a m matic g u i d a n c e , t h e i n d i g e n o u s A u f k l ä r u n g f o u n d its first articulation in t h e j o u r n a l s this trio f o u n d e d for G e r m a n literary life. T h e y distilled a n d b r o a d c a s t t h e E u r o p e a n E n l i g h t e n m e n t to t h e rest of central E u r o p e , i n c l u d i n g Kant's Königsberg. 22

2 3

24

25

T h e Berlin A u f k l ä r u n g b r o u g h t to K a n t a whole new set of interests. K a n t took very seriously his status as a Prussian official obliged to i m p l e m e n t Frederick's p r o g r a m , b u t it was also a m a t t e r of p e r s o n a l cultivation. I n a G e r m a n of t h a t e p o c h , the m a r k of "taste" was A u f k l ä r u n g , a cosmopolitan a c q u a i n t a n c e with t h e best of foreign t h o u g h t a n d discrimination. N o t only was Kant in contact with t h e Berlin A c a d e m y a n d t h e u p p e r echelons of t h e cult u r a l b u r e a u c r a c y in t h e capital, b u t h e was also voracious in his r e a d i n g of t h e l e a r n e d a n d critical j o u r n a l s that e m a n a t e d from t h e r e . T h e publicity of t h e Berlin A u f k l ä r u n g , b o t h t h r o u g h t h e a c a d e m y a n d t h r o u g h t h e " p o p u l a r philosophy," conveyed to K a n t t h e vivacity of intellectual discourse in t h e wider world. 2 6

K a n t was a n utterly u n t r a v e l e d m a n , living in a r e m o t e East Prussian city. Yet from t h e very first h e strove to achieve cosm o p o l i t a n i s m , to w i d e n his intellectual h o r i z o n s if h e could n o t 22

The "Critique ofAesthetic Judgment"

widen his physical ones. Kant wished to b r i n g himself abreast of distant e n v i r o n m e n t s , to feel at h o m e in a wider world t h a n his provincial city. We find evidence of this cosmopolitanism in Kant's a n n o u n c e m e n t t h a t h e would give lectures in physical g e o g r a p h y , starting in 1 7 5 7 . H e a n n o u n c e d t h a t such a course would be a p p r o p r i a t e "for t h e rational taste of o u r e n l i g h t e n e d t i m e s . " T h e w o r d i n g is very i m p o r t a n t . K a n t h a d a very s t r o n g desire, in those early years, to b e a fashionable m a n , to show his "taste." Beck notes that " d u r i n g t h e years t h a t h e was Dozent h e was often called 'the galant m a s t e r ' — a s p r u c e dresser, a p o p u l a r teacher, a n d a welcome guest in t h e best society of his c i t y . " H e r d e r , w h o was Kant's s t u d e n t from 1762 to 1764, has given us a magnificent portrait of this Kant: 27

28

29

Playfulness, wit, a n d h u m o r w e r e at his c o m m a n d . His lectures were t h e most e n t e r t a i n i n g talks. His m i n d , which e x a m ined Leibniz, Wolff, B a u m g a r t e n , Crusius a n d H u m e , a n d investigated t h e laws of n a t u r e of N e w t o n , Kepler, a n d t h e physicists, c o m p r e h e n d e d equally t h e newest works of Rousseau . . . a n d t h e latest discoveries in science. H e weighed t h e m all, a n d always c a m e back to the u n b i a s e d k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e a n d to t h e m o r a l w o r t h of m a n . T h e history of m e n a n d p e o p l e s , n a t u r a l history a n d science, m a t h e m a t i c s a n d observation, were t h e sources from which h e enlivened his lectures a n d conversations. H e was indifferent to n o t h i n g w o r t h k n o w i n g . N o cabal, n o sect, n o prejudice, n o desire for fame, could ever t e m p t h i m in the slightest from b r o a d e n i n g a n d illuminating t h e t r u t h . H e incited a n d gently forced o t h ers to t h i n k for themselves; d e s p o t i s m was foreign to his nature. 3 0

H e m a d e a very s t r o n g effort in t h e case of s t u d e n t s like H e r d e r , a n d also J a k o b Lenz, a n d even with his recalcitrant c o n t e m p o r a r y a n d friend J o h a n n H a m a n n , to m a k e t h e m as a c q u a i n t e d with t h e wider intellectual world as h e could, a n d to take u p from t h e m w h a t e v e r they m i g h t b r i n g to his attention of this wider world as well. 31

Kant c o m p e n s a t e d for his Königsberg provincialism n o t only with a g o o d d a s h of Prussian francophilia, b u t also with a taste for things English. T h e crucial m e d i u m for this fascination in Kant was t h e Berlin A u f k l ä r u n g . A fascination for t h i n g s English was all t h e r a g e a m o n g t h e " p o p u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r s " of Berlin with w h o m Kant e n t e r e d into very lively e x c h a n g e . Moses M e n d e l s s o h n looms as 3 2

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

23

especially influential in m e d i a t i n g t h e foreign E n l i g h t e n m e n t , a n d especially t h e British, for G e r m a n philosophy, fusing t h e n e w E n glish a n d F r e n c h aesthetics with t h e work of B a u m g a r t e n a n d M e i e r . M e n d e l s s o h n h e l p e d naturalize into G e r m a n discourse t h r e e crucial n o t i o n s from a b r o a d : feeling, genius, a n d the sublime. M e n d e l s s o h n enjoyed o n e signal a d v a n t a g e over K a n t : h e could r e a d English. As F r e d e r i c Will has n o t e d , h e devoted a n entire year to t h e study of E d m u n d Burke's Enquiry Into the Original of H e was also conversant Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. with t h e F r e n c h literature, particularly J e a n D u b o s a n d C h a r l e s B a t t e u x . His greatest utility, from Kant's v a n t a g e , was t h a t h e p u t all t h e i r insights directly into t h e context of G e r m a n school philosophy a n d particularly r e l a t e d t h e m to t h e issues raised by B a u m g a r t e n a n d Meier with which K a n t was already wrestling. K a n t c a m e into intellectual contact with M e n d e l s s o h n in t h e Berlin A c a d e m y Prize C o m p e t i t i o n of 1761—63, which M e n d e l s s o h n won a n d in which Kant's submission was accepted for publication by t h e academy. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r they e n t e r e d into a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e which lasted until t h e d e a t h of M e n d e l s s o h n in 1786. T h e i r relat i o n s h i p was from t h e first w a r m a n d sympathetic, despite wide differences in their philosophical o r i e n t a t i o n . T h e y were allies o n a m o r e g e n e r a l level: t h e p r o g r a m of i n d i g e n o u s A u f k l ä r u n g in Germany. 33

34

Mendelssohn's effort to i n t e g r a t e foreign aesthetic theory into t h e G e r m a n a p p r o a c h led h i m , p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t u n i n t e n t i o n ally, to shift t h e discourse in a psychological a n d empirical direction away from B a u m g a r t e n , or at least t h e prevailing view of B a u m g a r t e n ' s project as a cognitive a p p r o a c h to beauty. By incorp o r a t i n g a m o r e psychological a p p r o a c h into his essays, especially t h e later o n e s , M e n d e l s s o h n h e l p e d b r i n g t h e sensationalist a n d naturalistic viewpoint of D u b o s , B a t t e u x , a n d t h e F r e n c h Enlighte n m e n t , a n d t h e related British school of H u m e a n d eventually B u r k e , into fashion in G e r m a n y . O n e of Mendelssohn's goals was to establish a h i e r a r c h y of gratifications. F o r e m o s t h e placed intellectual satisfaction in p u r e ideas. S u c h a delight h a d n o sensual c o n t e n t w h a t e v e r a n d b e l o n g e d to t h e tradition of "intelligible b e a u t y . " I n addition, M e n d e l s s o h n d i s c e r n e d a s e p a r a t e gratification in t h e cognitive perfection of a n empirical object. T h e p l e a s u r e in b e a u t y M e n d e l s s o h n raised from m e r e sensuality by claiming it a r o u s e d n o desire. T h i s n o t i o n of "disinterestedness" w o u l d have a g r e a t i m p a c t o n K a n t . I n t h e 35

3 6

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The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

essays of the 1750s, M e n d e l s s o h n did n o t succeed, however, in distinguishing clearly b e t w e e n t h e g o o d , the beautiful, a n d t h e pleasant. H a v i n g already written o n t h e p r o b l e m of t h e sublime, M e n d e l s s o h n felt obliged to c o m e to t e r m s with Burke's major work in t h e field. T h e result, t h e essay " Ü b e r die M i s c h u n g d e r Schönh e i t e n " (1758), s u m m a r i z e d t h e a r g u m e n t s of B u r k e quite effectively, m a k i n g t h e m accessible to a G e r m a n r e a d i n g a u d i e n c e long before Lessing's translation of t h e work in 1773. B u t M e n d e l s s o h n was n o t c o n t e n t merely to s u m m a r i z e ; h e went o n to m a k e a telling criticism: " H e piles observation u p o n observation, all of t h e m fund a m e n t a l a n d insightful; only every time it comes d o w n to explaini n g these observations in t e r m s of t h e n a t u r e of o u r souls, his weakness b e c o m e s obvious. O n e realizes that h e is u n a w a r e of t h e t h e o r y of t h e soul of G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h y . " I n a r g u i n g t h u s for a m o r e spiritual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e sublime, M e n d e l s s o h n m a d e t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t which i n f o r m e d his r e s p o n s e to t h e foreign t h e o r y of genius. T h e principle of t h e i n n a t e activism of t h e subject is p e r h a p s t h e most distinctive feature of G e r m a n as o p p o s e d to British p h i losophy in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. Its source was L e i b n i z . B u t Leibniz h a d n o t p u b l i s h e d s o m e of his most i m p o r t a n t work, a n d so G e r m a n y ' s school p h i l o s o p h y carried forward only a partial form u l a t i o n of Leibnizian metaphysics, a n d Wolff's Cartesian a n d N e w t o n i a n modifications with respect to t h e material world h a d served f u r t h e r to weaken or r e n d e r p e r p l e x e d these potentialities from Leibniz. M e n d e l s s o h n a n d all t h e other, lesser figures of Germ a n school-philosophy s o u g h t r e i n f o r c e m e n t from a b r o a d for their f u n d a m e n t a l l y Leibnizian intuition that the active powers of t h e subject lay at t h e core of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , a n d t h e r e w i t h transfigured t h e world from m e r e m e c h a n i s m . It was in t h a t context, i.e., before t h e "great light" which t h e publication of Leibniz's Nouveaux essais b r o u g h t to t h e m , t h a t t h e G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r s stood o p e n to t h e ideas of activism in t h e subject o r i g i n a t i n g in Britain a n d F r a n c e associated with " g e n i u s . " 37

38

I n his essay o n t h e sources a n d linkages of t h e fine arts a n d sciences, M e n d e l s s o h n h a d a d h e r e d firmly to B a u m g a r t e n ' s t h e o r y of ingenium as f o r m u l a t e d in §648 of t h e Metaphysica, i.e., t h a t genius was t h e perfect h a r m o n y of the h u m a n faculties, b u t n o s e p a r a t e faculty of its own. B u t in his reviews for Nicolai's j o u r n a l , the Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend, starting in 1759, M e n d e l s s o h n b e g a n to m o v e away from t h e strictly B a u m g a r t i a n theory. T h e first sign Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

25

of this is Mendelssohn's defense, in t h e sixtieth letter, of the " u n schooled" genius against those w h o insisted that genius m u s t always be t u t o r e d by taste a n d r e g i m e n , as J o h a n n Gottsched a n d Christian Geliert h a d m a d e t h e p r e m i s e of G e r m a n c r i t i c i s m . Mendelssohn's revision of his t h e o r y of genius was p a r t of a whole series of reconsiderations taking place within the Berlin Aufk l ä r u n g . His colleague in Berlin, Friedrich Resewitz, h a d delivered a lecture o n t h e subject of genius in 1 7 5 5 . A n d in 1757, J o h a n n Sulzer h a d a d d r e s s e d t h e Berlin A c a d e m y with a very i m p o r t a n t "Analyse d u genie," which h a d t h e n b e e n p u b l i s h e d in t h e a c a d e m y y e a r b o o k . Sulzer was active in the Berlin A c a d e m y starting from the 1750s, a n d his a c a d e m y lecture o n genius m a d e a very i m p o r tant c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e new t r e n d s , as did t h e topics h e p r o p o s e d , as l e a d e r of t h e section for philosophy, for t h e prize essays sponsored by t h e academy. It was Sulzer w h o raised the issue for t h e f a m o u s prize c o m p e t i t i o n of 1761—63 o n t h e relation of m e t a physics a n d morals for which M e n d e l s s o h n a n d K a n t submitted imp o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Sulzer wished to naturalize the G e r m a n ideas a n d b r i n g t h e m into c o o r d i n a t i o n with the Encyclopedist trad i t i o n . M e n d e l s s o h n recognized t h a t Sulzer was trying to achieve the s a m e i n t e g r a t i o n his o w n essays h a d sought, between the foreign, naturalistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of genius a n d t h e i n d i g e n o u s tradition of Leibniz. I n d e e d , t h a t was t h e most i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in Sulzer's e s s a y . T h e idea of t h e " u n s c h o o l e d " as o p p o s e d to the "learned gen i u s " c a m e from J o s e p h Addison's celebrated essay o n genius in t h e Spectator in 1 7 1 1 , which h a d b e e n translated into G e r m a n in 1745. T h e issue h a d c o m e to a h e a d in Britain in t h e revolt of t h e new e m o t i o n a l school against A u g u s t a n taste. I n 1756, J o s e p h W a r t o n h a d p u b l i s h e d his manifesto against A l e x a n d e r P o p e , a n d in 1758 E d w a r d Young's f a m o u s essay o n "original composition" c a m e o u t . M e n d e l s s o h n a n d his colleagues were already quite familiar with Young's view, a n d h a d p u b l i s h e d a n earlier essay by the p o e t in t h e second v o l u m e of t h e i r Sammlung vermischter Schriften zur Beförderung der schönen Wissenschaften und der freien Künste (Berlin, 1 7 5 9 ) . It is i m p o r t a n t to retrieve t h e entire controversy in British aesthetics at t h a t pivotal m o m e n t , for it p r o f o u n d l y s t a m p e d t h e last a n d most decisive sense of A u f k l ä r u n g for I m m a n u e l Kant: t h e struggle of reason against t h e i m p u l s e toward irrationalism h e detected in t h e e m e r g i n g Sturm und Drang m o v e m e n t . 39

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Starting r o u g h l y a r o u n d t h e m i d c e n t u r y in Britain, a new school identified with "sensibility" challenged neoclassicism, offer26

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ing a new a p p r o a c h to taste: t h e assertion of the "sublime" against t h e beautiful a n d of " g e n i u s " against r u l e . Sensibility was shifting all across E u r o p e in the course of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, at differe n t b u t related m o m e n t s in Britain, France, a n d G e r m a n y . T h i s manifested itself in c h a n g e s in attitudes towards g a r d e n i n g , travel, a n d p a i n t i n g ("picturesque" landscapes), as well as in preferences in a r c h i t e c t u r e (the revival of a p p r e c i a t i o n for Gothic) a n d literat u r e (the e n t h u s i a s m for S h a k e s p e a r e a n d " O s s i a n " ) . T h e fascination with t h e sublime was p e r h a p s the s y m p t o m of this new sensibility. As David Morris a r g u e s , t h e impulses b e h i n d the revival of interest in t h e sublime were "scientific, physicotheological, epistemological, a n d l i t e r a r y . " T h e subjective e x p e rience of t h e g r a n d e u r of t h e u n i v e r s e — i n d e e d t h e g r a n d e u r of the very e a r t h , in all its variety a n d p o t e n c y — h a d a b o u t it a r e ligious r e v e r e n c e a n d awe, which c a m e , via literary criticism, to be identified with w h a t L o n g i n u s called t h e sublime. T h e h e a r t of this n o t i o n was t h e aesthetic confrontation with infinity, or with the vastness a n d potency of t h e u n i v e r s e . N o l o n g e r did t h e world a p p e a r b o u n d e d , m a t h e m a t i c a l , simple, a n d static. It now a p p e a r e d b o u n d l e s s , d y n a m i c , complex, c h a n g i n g . T h a t is t h e crucial n o t i o n b e h i n d the " n a t u r a l s u b l i m e . " T h e m e d i a t i o n between n a t u r a l g r a n d e u r a n d t h e literary t r o p e was t h e similar subjective e m o t i o n which they a r o u s e d , which was, for that e p o c h , religious in its f u n d a m e n t a l t e x t u r e . While t h a t religious t e x t u r e may have a b a t e d in the course of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, with t h e rise of E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d Deism, the e m o t i o n a l linkage r e m a i n e d firmly established. T h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y a p p r e c i a t i o n of n a t u r e h a d c h a n g e d ; m e n saw n a t u r e differently, a n d t h o u g h t of themselves differently for having d o n e so. T h e sublime was the decisive t e r m t h r o u g h which to articulate t h e n e w a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e world of n a t u r e as a n aspect of h u m a n consciousness. Scientists were e n t h u siastic a b o u t t h e complexity of n a t u r e , h e r variety a n d d y n a m i s m . N o l o n g e r would t h e m e c h a n i c a l vision of Descartes suffice. Newton's own Opticks h a d created far vaster a n d m o r e intricate possibilities. A n e n e r g i z e d n a t u r e s e e m e d too lively for reductively mechanistic t h i n k i n g o n the lines of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y t h o u g h t . I n d e e d , scientists expressed e n t h u s i a s m c o n c e r n i n g possibilities of a n e x p a n d e d physics which was n o t so mechanistically d e t e r m i n e d , b u t which took u p the mysterious question of "force." N o t only scientists b u t also poets were swept u p in this new physics of "force" a n d its a t t e n d a n t m e t a p h y s i c s . Consequently, after 1740, a n d in 4 7

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t e r m s of this n e w sense for t h e complexity a n d d y n a m i s m of n a t u r e , t h e "sublime" c a m e to b e a p p l i e d directly to n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a . T h e linkage of t h e s t r o n g feeling within the subject with imaginative responsiveness to g r a n d e u r s in the o u t e r world of n a t u r e p r o v i d e d all t h e e l e m e n t s of a t h e o r y of h u m a n creativity. T h e fate of t h e sublime a n d its elevated e m o t i o n s c a m e to b e linked, as a cons e q u e n c e , with t h e issues of spirituality, f r e e d o m , a n d creativity in the crucial n o t i o n of " g e n i u s . " T h e Earl of Shaftesbury (A. C o o p e r ) set this relation in m o t i o n by linking g e n i u s with t h e "principle of p u r e aesthetic intuition," or "the process of p u r e crea t i o n . " H e shifted t h e inquiry into beauty "from t h e world of created things to t h e world of creative p r o c e s s . " Shaftesbury s o u g h t to articulate a n o t i o n of h u m a n creativity a n d spontaneity of a sort which, while i m m a n e n t , was not material or m e c h a n i c a l . T h a t n o t i o n , which h a d s t r o n g parallels with Leibnizian metaphysics, s e e m e d all too metaphysical to t h e British of t h e eight e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n s t e a d they f o u g h t it o u t in t e r m s of the conflict of genius with rule, t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e relation of creative freed o m to conventional neoclassical s t a n d a r d s . Addison's famous essay o n genius in t h e Spectator strove, with a n eye to S h a k e s p e a r e , to use t h e contrast b e t w e e n H o m e r a n d Virgil to m a k e a distinction b e t w e e n t h e n a t u r a l or " u n s c h o o l e d " genius a n d t h e "learned g e n i u s . " While A d d i s o n celebrated t h e n a t u r a l g e n i u s for t h e originality a n d p o w e r of his work, h e also w a r n e d t h a t this was exceedingly r a r e , a n d t h a t it was highly d a n g e r o u s to e m u l a t e such figures. Addison implied that genius could quite comfortably be schooled in taste, learn r u l e a n d r e a s o n , a n d e m e r g e t h e b e t t e r for it. Virgil epitomized such genius a m o n g the ancients, t h e A u g u s t a n s believed, b u t they also ascribed it to P o p e among the moderns. 5 5

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It was against this t h a t W a r t o n rebelled in Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope (1756). H e d e n i e d that P o p e was a genius at all. G e n i u s m e a n t for h i m precisely the mysterious a n d u n schooled "originality" of a S h a k e s p e a r e . A n d h e insisted n o t only t h a t Shakespeare's originality was u n s c h o o l e d , b u t also t h a t schooling destroyed originality. T h e irrational n o t e h a d clearly s o u n d e d . S p o n t a n e i t y h e r e took o n a n o t h e r t o n e . T h e stress o n t h e e m o t i o n a l involved a total rejection of rules, a P r o m e t h e a n reb e l l i o n . T h e very n o t i o n s of craft, t e c h n i q u e , a n d taste went by the b o a r d s . G e n i u s was like n a t u r e . In what was the most famous manifesto in this vein, Conjectures on Original Composition (1758), E d w a r d Y o u n g p u t this quite bluntly: "An Original may be said to 6 2

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b e of a vegetable n a t u r e , it rises spontaneously, from t h e vital r o o t of G e n i u s ; it grows, it is n o t m a d e . " Works of art d e v e l o p e d as a n o r g a n i c c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e genius's s o u l . I n d e e d , the artist exe r t e d n o conscious control at all, it s e e m e d . F i n d i n g a r e s p o n s e to this "enthusiastic" t h e o r y of original genius p r e o c c u p i e d t h e most serious philosophical m i n d s in Britain in t h e late 1750s. I n E d i n b u r g h , t h e prize-winning aesthetic p h i l o s o p h e r A l e x a n d e r G e r a r d delivered a new a n d very i m p o r t a n t series of lectures o n g e n i u s . H u m e ' s essays o n taste a n d t r a g e d y from t h e late 1750s t o u c h o n this topic. H e n r y H o m e , L o r d K a m e s , a d d r e s s e d t h e question as well in w h a t m a n y take to be t h e c u l m i n a t i n g work of this whole p e r i o d , Elements of Criticism (1762). T h e y w o r k e d to d e v e l o p a carefully naturalistic t h e o r y of genius based u p o n t h e p r e m i s e that t h e i m a g i n a t i o n was limited to w h a t t h e senses h a d p r o v i d e d . T h e r e could be n o creation ex nihilo, n o divine analogy in m o r t a l g e n i u s . T h e conflict which r a g e d between these two schools in Britain would be t a k e n u p with equal or g r e a t e r ferocity in G e r m a n y , with t h e Stürmer o n t h e side of t h e irrationalists a n d t h e A u f k l ä r u n g o n the side of r e a s o n . 6 4

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I n light of all this, while Alfred B ä u m l e r ' s a r g u m e n t is crucial to t h e p r o p e r contextualization of t h e Third Critique, it is also inc o m p l e t e . As E r n s t Cassirer p o i n t e d o u t in a long a n d incisive n o t e to his Philosophy of the Enlightenment, B ä u m l e r , p e r h a p s o u t of a misg u i d e d national p r i d e , rejected a l t o g e t h e r t h e influence of British t h o u g h t o n K a n t . T h a t is as unlikely as t h e opposite view, p r o fessed by E d g a r Carritt, t h a t "Kant's philosophy of beauty owes nearly e v e r y t h i n g b u t its systematic f o r m to English w r i t e r s . " T h e issue is n o t even, as a m o r e r e c e n t c o m m e n t a t o r has p u t it, to find the balance of "Kant's shifting d e b t to British a e s t h e t i c s . " T h e question is r a t h e r what K a n t took to be t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n the British m a d e to B a u m g a r t e n ' s question of t h e role of sensibility in valid k n o w l e d g e . As we will see, for a long time Kant believed that t h e British h a d t h e final—negative—word o n that score. 6 9

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K a n t could n o t r e a d English. T h a t makes t h e question of Kant's assimilation of t h e British E n l i g h t e n m e n t problematic o n t h e most basic level. Accordingly, it is i m p o r t a n t to establish w h e n , what, a n d h o w British material r e a c h e d h i m . Few m o d e r n i n t e r p r e t e r s would d i s p u t e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of British thinkers for t h e K a n t of t h e 1760s. Beck goes so far as to write t h a t "in 1763 K a n t was as m u c h a disciple of Shaftesbury a n d H u t c h e s o n as M e n d e l s s o h n w a s — p e r h a p s m o r e s o . " B o t h Mendelssohn's a n d Kant's submissions for t h e Berlin A c a d e m y prize show this s t r o n g British influence, 7 2

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t h o u g h M e n d e l s s o h n r e m a i n e d m o r e conventionally G e r m a n a n d h e n c e w o n t h e p r i z e . K a n t articulated t h e key influence of British t h o u g h t in t h e second p a r t of his essay: " I n these times we have first b e g u n to realize that t h e faculty of conceiving t r u t h is intellection, while t h a t of sensing t h e g o o d is feeling, a n d t h a t they m u s t n o t be interchanged." T h e major theory of m o r a l feeling, articulated by H u t c h e s o n in 1725, b e c a m e available in a G e r m a n translation in 1762. O t h e r works by H u t c h e s o n h a d a p p e a r e d in translation even e a r l i e r . K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d H u t c h e s o n in t h e published version of his Prize Essay as t h e f o u n d e r of t h e school of m o r a l f e e l i n g . N o t only H u t c h e s o n b u t especially H u m e p r o v e d influential in this p e r i o d . H u m e ' s major essays h a d b e e n translated into G e r m a n in a four v o l u m e collection in t h e late 1750s, a n d his s u b s e q u e n t essays came swiftly into G e r m a n . T h e consistency a n d brilliance of H u m e ' s skeptical distinction of m a t t e r s of fact from relations of ideas, of empirical from necessary connections, m a d e a n impression o n all serious p h i l o s o p h e r s in E u r o p e in t h e 1750s a n d 1 7 6 0 s . T o be sure, t h e full scope of H u m e ' s radicalism was n o t a p p a r e n t to many, a n d K a n t would only realize it after 1772, w h e n h e r e a d in the translation of J a m e s Beattie's work a sustained attack o n H u m e which h a d t h e m i s f o r t u n e of p r e s e n t i n g t h e s u p e r i o r a r g u m e n t s of its o p p o n e n t in sufficient detail to refute itself. B u t p e r h a p s equally i m p o r t a n t for K a n t in t h e early 1760s was the Elements of Criticism, by H e n r y H o m e , L o r d K a m e s . It a p p e a r e d in English in 1762, a n d a year later b e c a m e available in G e r m a n . T h e reviewers praised it, a n d it p r o v e d influential in G e r m a n aesthetic t h o u g h t from that p o i n t forward. T h e early essays of H e r d e r , which d a t e from t h e m i d 1760s, consider K a m e s equal in stature to B a u m g a r t e n in the question of a e s t h e t i c s . T h a t parallel, t h e r e is r e a s o n to s u p p o s e , h e l e a r n e d from his teacher, I m m a n u e l Kant. K a m e s served as t h e crucial expositor of t h e principle of the British m e t h o d in aesthetics: criticism. 73

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For t h e K a n t of the 1760s, "science" a n d "criticism" stood j u x taposed as alternative m e t h o d s for aesthetics. K a n t used the two n a m e s , B a u m g a r t e n a n d H o m e (Kames), as personifications of the two m e t h o d s . In his lectures in Logic, for e x a m p l e , h e observed: " T h e p h i l o s o p h e r B a u m g a r t e n in F r a n k f u r t h a d t h e plan to m a k e an aesthetic as science. More correctly, H o m e has n a m e d aesthetics criticism, since it gives n o rules a priori t h a t sufficiently d e t e r m i n e t h e j u d g m e n t , as does logic, but takes its rules a posteriori a n d only makes t h e empirical laws g e n e r a l t h r o u g h c o m p a r i s o n s , by which 30

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we know t h e imperfect a n d t h e perfect ( b e a u t i f u l ) . " T h e distinction of science a n d criticism is linked, h e r e , with t h e distinction of a priori a n d a posteriori ( H u m e ) a n d applied to t h e c o n c e p t of "perfection," which B a u m g a r t e n associated with t h e idea of beauty. T h e lectures which serve as the basis for t h e p u b l i s h e d Logic stem from t h e 1770s, t h o u g h K a n t h a d b e e n giving t h e course since t h e late 1750s. T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of Karnes with B a u m g a r t e n dates, as attested by Reflection 1588, from t h e mid-1760s: "Fine art allows only critique. H o m e . T h e r e f o r e n o science of t h e b e a u t i f u l . " W i t h o u t Karnes's n a m e , b u t with j u s t the same c o n t e n t , are several o t h e r crucial Reflections of t h e 1 7 6 0 s . I n Reflection 626, Kant dist i n g u i s h e d k n o w l e d g e according to t h r e e m e t h o d s : science, discipline (instruction in doctrine), a n d critique. T h e first o p e r a t e d o n a rational, a priori basis. T h e second worked historically, a posteriori, toward principles which could be converted ultimately into scie n c e . T h e t h i r d w o r k e d only with Beurteilung, or j u d g m e n t , a n d it was inevitably a n d incurably subjective. Aesthetics fell u n d e r this last category, a n d , K a n t wrote, "for this reason the school t e r m 'aesthetic' s h o u l d be avoided, since it p e r m i t s n o instruction in s c h o o l s . " K a n t h a d a b a n d o n e d t h e rational a p p r o a c h to b e a u t y altogether. H e wrote tellingly: "We d o a n injustice to a n o t h e r w h o does n o t perceive the worth or t h e beauty of what moves or delights us, if we rejoin t h a t he does not understand it. H e r e it does n o t m a t t e r so m u c h w h a t t h e understanding c o m p r e h e n d s , b u t w h a t t h e feeling senses." 82

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K a n t a d o p t e d t h e British a r g u m e n t t h a t "knowledge of beauty is only criticism . . . [I]ts p r o o f is a p o s t e r i o r i . " T h e British h a d c o m e to t h e conclusion t h a t t h e only plausible s t a n d a r d would be a n empirical c o n s e n s u s a m o n g g e n t l e m e n of b r e e d i n g a n d cultivation. If t h e r e could b e n o a priori proof, n o science, K a n t realized, t h e n t h e s t a n d a r d of taste could b e n o m o r e t h a n "general a g r e e m e n t in a n e p o c h of rational j u d g m e n t [Beurteilung]." T a s t e , as distinct from a p p e t i t e , m a t t e r e d only in society, a n d t h e r e f o r e , while aesthetic p l e a s u r e m i g h t b e felt in all contexts, it would only call for the reflection a n d j u d g m e n t involved in taste in the context of a c o m m u n i t y which valued such discrimination. T h i s n o t i o n of a sensus communis r e m a i n e d o n e of Kant's most i m p o r t a n t borrowings from t h e British discussion of taste even in t h e Third Critique. 88

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After his Prize Essay, Kant b e g a n c h a n g i n g rapidly from t h e " m o r a l sense" a p p r o a c h of H u t c h e s o n t o w a r d s his o w n ultimately rationalist ethics. It would n o t be too farfetched to see his Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) as a kind of Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

31

d a t a - g a t h e r i n g in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e n e w a p p r o a c h to ethical p h i losophy which, in his Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbjahre 1765—1766, K a n t p r o p o s e d to teach: "evalu a t i n g historically a n d philosophically w h a t happens [with m e n ] b e f o r e d e m o n s t r a t i n g w h a t ought to h a p p e n . " T h e r e is, in short, a n a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a n d m o r a l p u r p o s e b e h i n d t h e little essay, far m o r e t h a n a n aesthetic o n e . K a n t realized that feelings involved in aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n h a d significance for his philosophy of morals. T h e question r e m a i n s : W h a t led Kant to c o n c e r n himself p r e cisely with t h e two kinds of feeling called "sublime" a n d "beautiful"? T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n evokes, of course, n o t j u s t t h e g e n e r a l discussion which h a d b e e n t r a n s p i r i n g in Britain since t h e t u r n of t h e century, b u t t h e specific title of E d m u n d Burke's key work, Enquiry into the Original of our Feelings of the Sublime and the Beautiful, which a p p e a r e d in English in 1757. T h e work was only translated in 1773 (by Lessing). K a n t did eventually r e a d it, to b e sure, because h e r e f e r r e d to B u r k e ' s work in t h e Third Critique, b u t t h e r e is a g o o d deal of controversy over w h e t h e r t h e work h a d any influence on his Observations. T h e o d o r e Gracyk has most recently a r g u e d that if t h e r e was any influence, it passed via t h e m e d i a t i o n of Mendelssohn's writings o n B u r k e . T h a t is, I think, almost certain. K a n t knew of Burke's work, a n d probably f o u n d t h e idea of e c h o i n g its title very a p p e a l i n g in t e r m s of t h e p o p u l a r i t y of his o w n work. B u t h e did n o t by any m e a n s i n t e n d to give any serious analysis of Burke's a r g u m e n t s . Significantly, t h e sublime receives clear p r i d e of place in t h e essay. K a n t identifies it with Rührung, e m o t i o n , a n d especially m o v e m e n t of t h e m e n t a l faculties. More importantly, K a n t associates t h e sublime with " t r u e virtue." H e a r g u e s t h a t only "that which rests o n principles" deserves b o t h t h e appellations of g e n u i n e virtue a n d sublimity. "As soon as this feeling has arisen to its p r o p e r universality, it has b e c o m e sublime" because "now, from a h i g h e r standpoint, it has b e e n placed in its t r u e relation to y o u r total d u t y . " H e n c e t h e sublime for K a n t was clearly a feeling with m o r a l a n d spiritual e l e m e n t s . 9 1

9 2

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If K a n t was fascinated with t h e "sublime" in t h e 1760s, h e did n o t show t h e s a m e interest in "genius." I n t h e 1760s, Kant f o u n d genius n e i t h e r provocative n o r p r o b l e m a t i c . H e accepted it as a t e r m a p p r o p r i a t e for t h e conception of t h e distinctive practice in t h e fine arts which c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e t e r m " j u d g m e n t " (beurteilen) in t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n or "criticism" of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e . 94

32

The "Critique of Aesthetic

Judgment"

T h e key link between t h e m , for Kant, was that they could n o t be t a u g h t . T h e y r e q u i r e d a n a t u r a l t a l e n t . B e y o n d that, Kant merely assimilated the foreign theories of genius, a l o n g t h e lines of Mendelssohn's c o m m e n t a r i e s , to the Psychologies empirica of B a u m g a r t e n ' s Metaphysica, which h e b e g a n to use as his text for courses in t h e m i d 1760s. B a u m g a r t e n , in §648 of t h a t work, h a d already defined ingenium as t h a t h a r m o n y of all t h e cognitive faculties which results in a h e i g h t e n i n g a n d enlivening of their funct i o n . T h i s was t h e idea from which K a n t would always start o u t in his a p p r o a c h to "genius." I n d e e d , it would b e c o m e the key to his whole t h e o r y of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e . If t h e issue of " g e n i u s " did n o t b e c o m e philosophically significant for K a n t until t h e 1770s, t h e related issue of "imagination" did, a g o o d deal e a r l i e r . F r o m t h e outset, K a n t conceived of aesthetic i m a g i n a t i o n as a d a n g e r o u s capacity to project the u n r e a l u p o n t h e a c t u a l . I n Reflection 3 1 3 , from t h e mid-1760s, Kant w r o t e : " I m a g i n a t i o n [Einbildung] is actually t h e illusion [Täuschung] in which o n e believes h e sees s o m e t h i n g in t h e object which is actually t h e creation of o u r o w n brains. T h a t is how a n enthusiast [Schwärmer] c o m e s to believe h e can find all his p h a n t o m s [Hirngespinsten], a n d every particular sect its d o g m a s , in the Bible. It is n o t t h a t they learn these things in the Bible so m u c h as t h a t they r e a d t h e m into i t . " T h e s e associations of i m a g i n a t i o n with "enthusiasts" (Schwärmer) a n d " p h a n t o m s " (Hirngespinste) a n d with r e ligious sectarians r e a p p e a r across Kant's work for the n e x t several decades, a n d they form a decisive contextual b a c k d r o p for t h e Third Shaftesbury h a d f o r m u l a t e d t h e issue for E u r o p e as a Critique. whole w h e n h e set forth the case for E n g l a n d in his celebrated a n d widely r e a d Letter on Enthusiasm ( 1 7 0 8 ) . H e recognized in "ent h u s i a s m " n o t only the creative mystery of genius, b u t also t h e d a n gers of frenzy a n d m a d n e s s in religious fanaticism. T h a t set of connections o v e r s h a d o w e d m a n y e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y estimations of genius, a n d later still t h e c o n n e c t i o n of genius with m a d n e s s bec a m e the favorite vein of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y t h i n k e r s . 9 5

96

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T h e d a n g e r s of " e n t h u s i a s m " (Schwärmerei) w e r e n o t merely abstract a n d conjectural for Kant. T h e y were concrete a n d tangible, personified in o n e of t h e most r e m a r k a b l e a n d d i s t u r b i n g of his p e r s o n a l a c q u a i n t a n c e s : H a m a n n . H a m a n n was a n u n m i t i g a t e d "enthusiast," whose powerful religious sensibility m e r g e d with a poetic sensitivity a n d a p e r s o n a l h y p o c h o n d r i a to create a charismatic b u t difficult personality whose influence u p o n the age was

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

33

n o t s m a l l . H a m a n n was able to draw o u t of Kant's powerful orbit o n e of his best s t u d e n t s , J o h a n n H e r d e r , in t h e course of the early 1760s, a n d h e c o m m u n i c a t e d m a n y impulses to H e r d e r which K a n t f o u n d extremely d a n g e r o u s . T h a t the subversion of H e r d e r from A u f k l ä r u n g to Schwärmerei by H a m a n n in t h e early 1760s may have b e e n a c o n t r i b u t i n g factor in Kant's ironic essay, Träume eines Geistersehers (1766), is s o m e t h i n g t h a t has n o t b e e n sufficiently conT o b e sure, t h e essay focuses primarily o n the fascinasidered. tion for t h e occultism of S w e d e n b o r g , b u t t h a t was t h e very stuff H a m a n n f o u n d worthwhile. T o b e sure, t h e b r o a d e r target was metaphysicians without m e t h o d or self-restraint, w h o projected i m a g e s of t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r into t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t . Yet o n c e again, H a m a n n most emphatically believed in t h e continuity of realms, a n d t h e validity of t h e most sensual, even sexual experiences as t e s t a m e n t s of divinity. If Kant universalized t h e a r g u m e n t , as h e always s o u g h t to d o , that does not m e a n that t h e r e m i g h t not have b e e n a very particular goad to m a k e it. T h e irritation H a m a n n a n d H e r d e r caused in Kant's life a n d t h o u g h t proves to be crucial. K a n t w a r n e d H e r d e r , in a letter of 1768, against t h e excesses of " g e n i u s . " T h a t Kant sensed a n excess of "genius" already in t h e late 1760s is significant. For K a n t it was clear e n o u g h already in t h e writings of E d w a r d Y o u n g , in H a m a n n ' s personality a n d writings of the 1760s, a n d in t h e "enthusiastic" poetry of Friedrich K l o p s t o c k . For Kant, t h e "cult of g e n i u s " was already a n issue by t h e late 1760s, before the Sturm und Drang h a d in fact e m e r g e d . H e was already p r e d i s p o s e d to reject it, before it h a d even b e g u n to int r u d e o n his cultural world, as it would in time. 1 0 4

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Kant's empirical skepticism r e a c h e d its h i g h p o i n t with the writing of Träume eines Geistersehers. H e t u r n e d to e x t r e m e skepticism n o t only because of t h e offensiveness of Schwärmerei b u t also because of t h e powerful a r g u m e n t s from H u m e which K a n t received via t h e new work of J o h a n n B a s e d o w . I n the new work, his t o n e as m u c h as his a r g u m e n t a l a r m e d his friends in t h e Berlin A u f k l ä r u n g . M e n d e l s s o h n b e g a n his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with K a n t by e x p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n over this precise issue. M e n d e l s s o h n already b e g a n to fear that K a n t was e m b a r k i n g o n a kind of P y r r h o nism which w o u l d u n d e r m i n e all rational metaphysics. K a n t s o u g h t to r e a s s u r e h i m t h a t this was n o t the case. While h e believed t h a t all earlier metaphysics, a n d especially the selfi n d u l g e n t metaphysics so c o m m o n in their day, was misguided, h e claimed to b e c o m m i t t e d to metaphysics a n d p r o p o s e d to find the correct way to g r o u n d i t . 108

1 0 9

34

The "Critique of Aesthetic

Judgment

Aufklärung

vs. S t u r m u n d D r a n g

T h e ultimate sense of A u f k l ä r u n g for I m m a n u e l K a n t would be t h e defense of r e a s o n against w h a t h e took to be t h e d a n g e r o u s impulses of Sturm und Drang irrationalism, especially as carried forward by J o h a n n H e r d e r . H e r d e r first e n t e r e d Kant's life in 1762 as a p o o r s t u d e n t at t h e University of Königsberg, d i s e n c h a n t e d with m e d i c i n e a n d interested in a clerical career. K a n t allowed h i m to a t t e n d his lecture courses for free, a n d h e took a particular interest in H e r d e r , allowing h i m to r e a d several u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t s of his o w n a n d o p e n i n g u p his library to t h e y o u n g m a n . T h r o u g h Kant, H e r d e r c a m e to learn for t h e first time of such E u r o p e a n eminences as H u m e , M o n t e s q u i e u , a n d Rousseau. O f all this, H e r d e r ' s description of K a n t has given us evidence. B u t t h e y o u n g H e r d e r was d r a w n to a n o t h e r m e n t o r at Königsberg, the "Magus of the N o r t h , " H a m a n n , b o t h by t h e charisma of his personality, with its strange b l e n d of mysticism a n d poetry, a n d by t h e skill h e h a d to offer: k n o w l e d g e of t h e English l a n g u a g e . Studying with H a m a n n , H e r d e r fell u n d e r his spell. H a m a n n himself r e s p o n d e d by p u t t i n g o n p a p e r m a n y of his ideas o n t h e m e s of m u t u a l interest, in particular poetry, l a n g u a g e , genius, a n d t h e i r relations to t h e mysticalmetaphysical g r o u n d of b e i n g . T h e work Aesthetica in nuce, H a m a n n ' s most sustained aesthetic philosophy, was c o m p o s e d while H e r d e r was his s t u d e n t , a n d p r e s u m a b l y with the y o u n g m a n as ideal r e a d e r . For Kant, this influence u p o n t h e y o u n g a n d tale n t e d H e r d e r could only be baleful. I n 1764 H e r d e r left t h e university; t h e n e x t year h e was ord a i n e d a n d took u p t h e ministry in Riga. B u t his intellectual interests r e m a i n e d primarily literary, n o t theological, a n d h e worked u p a first critical effort, Uber die neuere deutsche Literatur: Fragmente, which h e p u b l i s h e d in 1767. T h i s work, which dealt with p r o b l e m s of l a n g u a g e a n d stylistic d e v e l o p m e n t in literature, showed clearly the p r e d o m i n a n c e of H a m a n n over K a n t as inspiration: the t h e m e , the texts, a n d the m e t h o d s all suggested H a m a n n ' s a p p r o a c h a n d interests. Kant, while h e c o n g r a t u l a t e d his f o r m e r s t u d e n t for his first publication a n d praised his style by c o m p a r i n g it to P o p e , his own favorite p o e t (but hardly Herder's!), nevertheless w a r n e d against s o m e t e n d e n c i e s h e saw in t h e work towards a n excessive i n d u l g e n c e of "genius"—i.e., Schwärmerei. B u t H e r d e r went his own way. I n 1769 h e left Riga, sailing to F r a n c e to c o m e to closer grips with t h e philosophy of t h e Enlighte n m e n t . H e swiftly w i t h d r e w to Strassburg, w h e r e h e m e t a y o u n g 1 1 0

111

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

35

law s t u d e n t from F r a n k f u r t , J o h a n n Wolfgang von G o e t h e , in 1770. T o g e t h e r they l a u n c h e d a literary revolution in G e r m a n y , t h e Sturm und Drang. H e r d e r c o m p o s e d t h r e e crucial essays in literary criticism a n d aesthetics in t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h of t h e Strassburg friendship. T h e first dealt with "Ossian" a n d t h e q u e s tion of folk poetry. T h e second dealt with S h a k e s p e a r e a n d his significance for m o d e r n literature. T h e s e two, t o g e t h e r with a n essay by G o e t h e o n t h e Strassburg c a t h e d r a l a n d Gothic architecture, were eventually p u b l i s h e d , in 1773, in a v o l u m e entitled Von deutscher Art und Kunst, t h e g r e a t manifesto of t h e Sturm und Drang. T h e t h i r d essay was s u b m i t t e d to t h e Berlin A c a d e m y in c o m p e t i tion for t h e prize for t h e best essay o n t h e origins of l a n g u a g e . H e r d e r w o n t h e prize. T h e result of all this was that by t h e m i d 1770s H e r d e r a n d G o e t h e , w h o m e a n w h i l e published Götz von Berlichingen a n d t h e e n o r m o u s l y successful Leiden des jungen Werther, h a d b e c o m e t h e n e w lions of G e r m a n letters. T h e incongruity b e t w e e n H e r d e r ' s c a r e e r a n d his publications c o n t i n u e d , however. I n 1771 h e was a p p o i n t e d c o u r t p r e a c h e r in B ü c k e b u r g . H e h e l d this position until 1776, w h e n G o e t h e secured h i m t h e office of Generalsuperintendent of L u t h e r a n clergy in Weimar. T h i s " B ü c k e b u r g p e r i o d " was H e r d e r ' s most intensely religious, a time w h e n h e c a m e closest to t h e mystical, f u n d a m e n t a l i s t " e n t h u s i a s m " of H a m a n n , a n d of a new a n d n o t o r i o u s friend, J o h a n n C a s p a r Lavater, a Swiss mystic a n d s t u d e n t of physiognomy. Lavater h a d occasioned a n e n o r m o u s scandal in 1769 by c h a l l e n g i n g M e n d e l s s o h n e i t h e r to refute t h e a r g u m e n t s of Charles B o n n e t for Christianity o r to c o n v e r t . H a m a n n a n d H e r d e r d e f e n d e d Lavater in this c o n t r o v e r s y . Kant, as m i g h t be expected, sided with M e n d e l s s o h n a n d L e s s i n g . 112

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Religion was, from t h e first, p a r t of t h e constellation of d a n gers involved in Schwärmerei for Kant. All expressed themselves clearly in t h e L a v a t e r - M e n d e l s s o h n affair. H e r d e r , for Kant, took o n all t h e blemishes of his friends Lavater a n d H a m a n n . I n d e e d K a n t f o u n d these blemishes in H e r d e r ' s o w n works, above all in Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts a n d , p e r h a p s less i m m e diately, in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, b o t h published in 1774. K a n t r e a d w h a t H e r d e r wrote. O f t h a t we can be quite confid e n t . We k n o w that h e r e a d H e r d e r ' s first publication, because h e wrote t o H e r d e r a b o u t it. We know for certain t h a t h e r e a d Älteste Urkunde. W e know t h a t h e r e a d Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. We m u s t a s s u m e Kant r e a d almost everything

36

The "Critique of Aesthetic

fudgment"

H e r d e r w r o t e , a n d we may t h e r e f o r e connect specific Reflections from Kant's "silent d e c a d e " with his r e a d i n g of particular essays by H e r d e r . If we d o so, we can weave a story o u t of Kant's Reflections of t h e 1770s with decisive i m p o r t a n c e for t h e contextualization of his Third Critique. T h e earliest Reflection in which we can trace Kant's uneasiness over t h e n e w t e n d e n c i e s in G e r m a n c u l t u r e which were associated with t h e Sturm und Drang, a n d h e n c e with H e r d e r , is 767, which dates from 1772—73. It is i m p o r t a n t for its d i s p a r a g e m e n t of Rührung (emotional agitation) a n d Reiz ( c h a r m ) : "Charms and e m o t i o n s m o v e o n e against one's will; they are always i m p u d e n t because they r o b o t h e r s of their peace. (To storm [stürmen] against my sensibilities is r u d e [unartig]. I m a y want to have my e m o t i o n s stirred, b u t only in a way in which I k e e p these u n d e r my o w n control. W h e n that line is crossed over, t h e n others a r e playing with m e r a t h e r t h a n letting m e into t h e i r g a m e . . . ) . " T h a t this refers to the style of t h e Sturm und Drang is u n q u e s t i o n a b l e . It suggests t h a t K a n t knew a b o u t the new t r e n d s in G e r m a n literature, b u t that, as K a n t claimed t h a t "this we would expect, h e did n o t like t h e m . sort of d i s t u r b a n c e puts m a n y off a n d is t h e r e f o r e n o t likely to be popular." H e was w r o n g . Sturm und Drang s u r g e d into h i g h g e a r in the years 1773—74. H e r d e r p u b l i s h e d two works of e x t r e m e self-indulgence a n d i m p u d e n c e in which h e t r o d o n t h e toes of e m i n e n c e s a n d authorities in m a n y fields. Kant, observing this from afar, a n d himself deeply e n m e s h e d in the most d e m a n d i n g a n d r i g o r o u s philosophical investigations, f o u n d t h e new t r e n d in his f o r m e r s t u d e n t utterly offensive. T h e result was g r e a t irritation. It expressed itself in a series of Reflections a n d in some heavily ironic c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with H a m a n n . T h e c e n t e r of it all was H e r d e r ' s work Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts, the study of Genesis as a historical source for t h e origins of t h e h u m a n race. I n t h e work, H e r d e r s o u g h t to apply t h e new historical m e t h o d o l o g y which h e h a d d e v e l o p e d in his essays of t h e early 1770s, a n d to follow in t h e footsteps of the powerful work by B i s h o p Robert L o w t h of E n g l a n d o n the poetry of t h e Hebrews. B u t h e also p l u n g e d into some highly self-indulgent tirades against o t h e r s a n d glorifications of himself a n d the mystical insight of which h e as a self-proclaimed genius was c a p a b l e . T h i s g r a t e d o n the ears n o t only of those h e attacked, b u t even of those w h o were his f r i e n d s . 1 1 8

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It was all too m u c h for Kant. I n Reflection 771 h e e x p l o d e d :

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

37

W h o e v e r sets any sort of intuitions in t h e place of o r d i n a r y reflection by u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n (puts that sort of t h i n g which is a m a t t e r strictly of concepts a n d of which we have absolutely n o intuition . . . [lined out]), raves [schwärmt]. H e has to set his feelings, his m e n t a l agitations, images, t h e h a l f - d r e a m e d , h a l f - t h o u g h t notions which play a b o u t in his swirling m i n d , before t h e m a t t e r at h a n d [die Sache selbst], for these a p p e a r to h i m a u n i q u e [besonderen] p o w e r in himself. T h e less h e can m a k e himself u n d e r s t o o d , t h e m o r e h e criticizes t h e limitations of l a n g u a g e a n d of r e a s o n a n d is a n e n e m y of all distinctness because h e is e n t e r t a i n e d not by concepts, n o t even by images, b u t by m e n t a l agitation. Even writers of feeling actualize their caprices. T h e y may o n e a n d all have genius, be full of sensibility a n d spirit, even s o m e taste, b u t they a r e without t h e dryness a n d laboriousness a n d cold-bloodedness ofj u d g m e n t . E v e r y t h i n g that is distinct p r e sents itself o n e aspect after a n o t h e r a n d t h e n in a concept of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; they want to b e able to intuit all aspects at o n c e . E v e r y t h i n g mystical is welcome to t h e m ; they see u n h e a r d - o f things in enthusiastic writings or best of all in a n cient texts; the n e w e r writing, j u s t because it is precise a n d sets b o n d s u p o n t h e i r s h r i e k i n g spirits, seems to t h e m shortsighted a n d s h a l l o w . 126

I n this Reflection, K a n t clearly associates genius with Schwärmerei a n d contrasts it with "cold-bloodedness of j u d g m e n t . " T h e f o r m e r is self-indulgent a n d trusts in a mystical-mysterious subjective p o w e r r a t h e r t h a n in t h e orderly discrimination of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e f o r m e r denies t h e p o w e r of l a n g u a g e a n d reason to give clear expressions of t r u t h . It d i s p a r a g e s t h e rationality of t h e Aufkläru n g , a n d opts instead for t h e esoteric wisdom of occult writing, m o d e r n (e.g. S w e d e n b o r g ) or especially ancient. K a n t identifies himself, in this as in o t h e r Reflections, with "dryness a n d laboriousness a n d cold-bloodedness of j u d g m e n t " a n d with t h e logical a p p r o a c h of t h e A u f k l ä r u n g . I n Reflection lib, for e x a m p l e , K a n t despairs of m a k i n g any of t h e Schwärmer ever a t t e n d to a rational a r g u m e n t . " T h e y have to d e l u d e themselves a n d o t h ers in o r d e r to a p p e a r to b e fully e n d o w e d with insight which only shallow pates may d i s e n t a n g l e . T h e y c a n n o t let their genius stiffen a n d grow cold by tarrying. Flashes of wit are t h e gift of genius . . . I f they w e r e to c o n d e s c e n d to j o i n the r a n k s of cold scholars, they w o u l d play a very m e n i a l role. B u t now they can flash like m e 38

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teors." T h e e d g e of r e s e n t m e n t o n Kant's p a r t is even clearer h e r e t h a n in t h e Reflection we cited in full. T h e question is: can we specify exactly w h o m K a n t is describing? We can, a n d it is H e r d e r . H e r d e r ' s Alteste Urkunde e m p h a s i z e d the vividness a n d i m m e diacy of t h e poetic imagery of t h e H e b r e w s in the Old T e s t a m e n t as a g r o u n d for t h e i r g r e a t e r validity t h a n rational a r g u m e n t s could p r o v i d e . We can find several revealing Reflections from t h e early 1770s in which K a n t shows his e x t r e m e displeasure with this idea. I n Reflection 7 6 5 , K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e was a difference b e t w e e n those w h o p r e f e r r e d the particular a n d u n i q u e a n d those w h o p r e ferred the principle of h a r m o n y a n d o r d e r . H e left n o question as to his o w n allegiance in t h a t question, a n d t h e n went o n to m a k e t h e contrast in ethnic t e r m s . N o r t h e r n E u r o p e a n s , h e a r g u e d , p r e ferred a m o r e rational a p p r o a c h , while "Oriental p e o p l e s " t e n d e d to b e m o r e s e n s u a l . It is clear w h o these "Oriental p e o p l e " a r e from Reflection 789: 1 2 7

1 2 8

1 2 9

W o u l d to G o d that we could be s p a r e d this O r i e n t a l wisdom; n o t h i n g can b e l e a r n e d from it; t h e world has received n o instruction from t h e m b u t a kind of mechanical artifice, astrono m y a n d n u m b e r s . O n c e we h a d Occidental e d u c a t i o n from t h e Greeks t h e n we were able to lend some rationality to the O r i e n t a l scriptures, b u t they would never have m a d e t h e m selves u n d e r s t o o d o n their own. T o be sure t h e r e was once a wise m a n , w h o was entirely different from his n a t i o n a n d t a u g h t a healthy, practical religion, which, for the sake of t h e times h e h a d to dress u p in images a n d old parables; b u t his teachings fell swiftly into h a n d s which s p r e a d t h e whole O r i ental n o n s e n s e [den ganzen orientalischen Kram] over t h e m a n d o n c e again set a s t u m b l i n g block for r e a s o n . 1 3 0

T h e editor of Kant's Reflections on Anthropology, Erich Adickes, cites two passages from Kant's lectures o n a n t h r o p o l o g y from t h e early 1770s which s u p p l e m e n t this discussion. I n o n e , K a n t a r g u e d t h a t O r i e n t a l p e o p l e were totally unfit for rational t h o u g h t , a n d t h u s incapable of clarifying morals or law. H e t h e r e f o r e w a r n e d against the effort of " s o m e , w h o wish to i m p r o v e E u r o p e a n style by a richness of imagery." T h e y t h r e a t e n e d t h e c o n c e p t u a l rationalism of E u r o p e , a n d m e a n t to think in images r a t h e r t h a n ideas. I n t h e o t h e r passage, K a n t n o t e d that in G e r m a n y t h e r e were those w h o wished to i n t r o d u c e O r i e n t a l rhetoric, b u t h e rejected this, because O r i e n t a l p e o p l e s i n d u l g e d in "bombastic ideas which went b e y o n d the b o u n d s of r e a s o n . " E u r o p e was too used to "purity" of t h o u g h t , Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklärung

39

too " e n l i g h t e n e d . " K a n t insisted t h a t t h e whole m a n n e r of t h e weste r n p e o p l e s was such t h a t they were m o r e interested in u n d e r s t a n d ing t h a n sensibility. Adickes a d d s : " T h e r e is n o d o u b t [that as t h e G e r m a n advocates of this ' O r i e n t a l style' Kant] m e a n t H a m a n n a n d Herder." T h e confirmation of this connection is to be f o u n d , finally, in t h e letters e x c h a n g e d b e t w e e n K a n t a n d H a m a n n over H e r d e r ' s Älteste Urkunde in April 1774. Kant's first letter e n d e d with a very ironic a p p e a l : 1 3 1

If you, d e a r friend, can find a way to i m p r o v e my g r a s p of the m a i n i n t e n t i o n of t h e a u t h o r I ask that you give m e y o u r opinion in a few lines, b u t if possible in t h e l a n g u a g e of m e n . For I, p o o r son of t h e e a r t h t h a t I a m , find myself utterly u n c o n stituted for t h e godly l a n g u a g e of intuitive r e a s o n . O n the o t h e r h a n d , w h a t o n e spells o u t for m e with c o m m o n concepts a c c o r d i n g to logical rules I can h a n d l e perfectly well. Also, I want m e r e l y to ascertain t h e t h e m e of t h e a u t h o r , for to comp r e h e n d it in its entire w o r t h according to t h e evidence is n o t a m a t t e r I would d a r e to u n d e r t a k e . 1 3 2

H a m a n n a n s w e r e d with e q u a l irony, m o c k i n g s o m e of Kant's p h r a s i n g in a way which m a d e H e r d e r s o u n d m o r e provocative. H a m a n n mystified, r a t h e r t h a n clarified H e r d e r , a n d glorified h i m j u s t for this e l e m e n t of m y s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e result was to e s t r a n g e K a n t still further. I n his rejoinder, Kant m a d e a shrewd a n d telling criticism of t h e a p p r o a c h to t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t that H e r d e r was advocating: 133

If o n c e a religion is placed in t h e position t h a t critical c o m p e tence in a n c i e n t l a n g u a g e s , philology, a n d a n t i q u a r i a n schola r s h i p a r e necessary to set t h e f o u n d a t i o n s u p o n which it m u s t build for all times a n d all peoples, t h e n t h e p e r s o n w h o has familiarized himself best with Greek, H e b r e w , Syrian, Arabic, etc., a n d with t h e archives of antiquity, will b e able to m a n i p u l a t e all o r t h o d o x believers a b o u t like children, n o matter how sourly they r e a c t . 1 3 4

T h i s p o i n t of view evokes r e s o n a n c e s with Lessing's challenge to ort h o d o x y over the R e i m a r u s fragments, which would rip G e r m a n y a p a r t over t h e issue of theology in the later 1770s. T h a t issue will c o n c e r n us in detail at a later j u n c t u r e , b u t it is crucial to n o t e h e r e t h a t for Kant, t h e religion controversy, especially as c o n d u c t e d by these s t r a n g e m y s t a g o g u e - f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s , H a m a n n a n d Lavater 40

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a n d — i n his v i e w — H e r d e r , was p a r t a n d parcel of t h e Sturm und Drang. T h a t c o n n e c t i o n was reinforced in Kant's m i n d at just this m o m e n t , for h e received a typically "enthusiastic" letter from t h e n o t o r i o u s Lavater, d a t e d t h a t very same day, identifying himself as a g o o d friend of H e r d e r . Kant's irritation with Schwärmerei was s h a r e d by o t h e r s of t h e A u f k l ä r u n g . Lessing, for e x a m p l e , was deeply offended by Lavater's t r e a t m e n t of M e n d e l s s o h n a n d devoted t h e last ten years of his life to a sly c a m p a i g n to d e b u n k t h e p r e t e n s i o n s of f u n d a mentalists a n d m y s t a g o g u e s a n d salvage some rational m e a n i n g from t h e t h o u s a n d years of Christian civilization in t h e W e s t . M e n d e l s s o h n , obviously, h a d to deal with t h e issue, a n d h e did in Jerusalem, his g r e a t defense of J u d a i s m a n d E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d plea for civil rights for J e w s . T h e issue of Schwärmerei a n d its association with genius f o u n d massive exposition in the work of a Zürich professor, L e o n h a r d Meister, Uber die Schwärmerei (2 vols.; 1 7 7 5 - 7 7 ) . Meister c o n n e c t e d passion with i m a g i n a t i o n as t h e source of t h e frenzy of visionaries a n d p o e t s . Back in E n g l a n d , w h e r e t h e c o n c e r n a b o u t " e n t h u s i a s m " d a t e d all the way back to t h e m i d - s e v e n t e e n t h century, t h e "cult of g e n i u s " h a d d r a w n similar criticism, a n d a m o r e rational a p p r o a c h to genius developed. P e r h a p s t h e most i m p o r t a n t figure in this effort was A l e x a n d e r G e r a r d . H e s o u g h t to avoid t h e "enthusiastic" theory of genius by offering a m o r e m u n d a n e version. I n his prize-winning Essay on Taste h e h a d already a d d r e s s e d t h e question of genius. B u t in a series of s u p p l e m e n t a r y lectures in 1758—59 h e elaborated o n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . B o t h works m a d e their way into G e r m a n translation, a n d it is highly p r o b a b l e t h a t Kant r e a d t h e m in t h e same years t h a t we are e x a m i n i n g . T h e Essay on Taste was translated in 1766; t h e Essay on Genius a p p e a r e d in G e r m a n translation in 1776 a n d we k n o w with certainty t h a t K a n t r e a d it j u s t a b o u t as soon as it arrived. H e was also r e a d i n g the new translation of Burke's Enquiry, with its n o - n o n s e n s e sensationalist a p p r o a c h to h u m a n e m o tions, for Lessing's translation a p p e a r e d in 1773. A r m e d with this level-headed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , K a n t set a b o u t devising a t h e o r y which could explain t h e excesses of t h e Stürmer, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d give a d e q u a t e recognition to t r u e genius, o n t h e other. T h e result was a t h e o r y of genius which asserted the firm conviction t h a t genius h a d n o place in s c i e n c e . We will take u p t h a t t h e o r y in its final form, as articulated in the Third Critique, later in this work. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t to g r a s p is that t h e exclusion of science from genius was n o t a d i s p a r a g e m e n t of science b u t r a t h e r of 1 3 5

1 3 6

1 3 7

1 3 8

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genius, a n d was g r o u n d e d in Kant's disdain for the Sturm und Drang. T h a t b e c a m e absolute in his m i n d after a second, even m o r e e x t r e m e b o u t of a n g e r at H e r d e r , this time from t h e very late 1770s. W e m u s t recall how strenuously Kant was w o r k i n g across this "silent d e c a d e , " h o w l o n g it was taking for h i m to c o m e u p with his n e w "critique" of metaphysics a n d morals, which h e kept p r o m i s i n g his c o r r e s p o n d e n t s w o u l d soon be at h a n d . We m u s t recall t h e e p ochal n a t u r e of t h e work K a n t was accomplishing, t h e n with a Kantian eye survey t h e literary scene of t h e late 1770s a n d see what G e r m a n y f o u n d exciting. T a k e , for e x a m p l e , Lavater's Physiologische Fragmente (1775—78), with contributions from G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r . Wieland's n e w j o u r n a l , Teutsche Merkur, established in 1773, actually credited such a u t h o r s as G o e t h e a n d Lenz with the r e n o v a t i o n of t r a g e d y a n d c o m e d y in t h e G e r m a n l a n g u a g e . J u s t u s Moser h a d t h e temerity to d e f e n d such literature against t h e criticism of the king of Prussia. P e o p l e flocked to F r a n k f u r t to m e e t the "universal g e n i u s " G o e t h e as t h o u g h h e were M o h a m m e d in Mecca. Closer to h o m e , take t h e questions p o s e d by t h e Berlin A c a d e m y . T h e topic for t h e prize essay in 1775 was: " W h a t is Genius, of w h a t e l e m e n t s is it c o m p o s e d , a n d d o these p e r m i t t h e m selves to b e distinguished within i t ? " Sulzer p o s e d it, after h a v i n g given his o w n schwärmerisch answer in his Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste (2 vols., 1771—74), a n d it was a n obvious o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e Stürmer to advertise themselves. For this prize H e r d e r composed his essay, Von Erkennen und Empfinden, published in Riga in 1778. T h e winner, however, was J o h a n n E b e r h a r d , a n o r t h o d o x Wolffian. Still, t h e year before H e r d e r h a d won his second prize from t h e a c a d e m y in t h e d e c a d e ; t h e t h e m e h a d b e e n o n t h e deca d e n c e of taste in p e o p l e s . T h e Sturm und Drang was, as far as K a n t could tell, c o n t i n u i n g along its m a d c o u r s e . 1 4 0

141

1 4 2

1 4 3

H e r d e r ' s prize essay submission, Von Erkennen und Empfinden, a n d a s u b s e q u e n t essay, " U b e r d e n Einfluß d e r s c h ö n e n in die h ö h e r e n Wissenschaften," which a p p e a r e d in 1779, h a d to d o with philosophy. T h e y a r g u e d against dividing h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e into abstract faculties a n d insisted u p o n t h e wholeness which art a n d poetry above all e v o k e d . I n these essays K a n t could n o t h e l p b u t r e a d a n attack o n his concept of philosophy a n d h e n c e o n himself. I n his Reflections, K a n t d e f e n d e d himself: 1 4 4

H e r d e r is very m u c h against the misuse of r e a s o n t h r o u g h a n utterly abstract kind of thinking, in that o n e t h e r e b y neglects 42

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t h e concrete. T h a t was t h e habit of the ancients in their n a t u r a l philosophy. B u t t h e g e n e r a l is n o t always merely abstract; r a t h e r , t h e r e a r e m a n y things which are i n d e p e n d e n t univers a l . T h a t is t h e n a t u r e of all j u d g m e n t s which even in concreto are n o t d e p e n d e n t o n e x p e r i e n c e , b u t w h e r e such j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e themselves r e q u i r e principles a priori. H e r e t h e r e is n o place for the concrete. 145

In yet a n o t h e r Reflection, K a n t c o n t i n u e d his attack: " H e r d e r corr u p t s m i n d s because h e gives t h e m e n c o u r a g e m e n t to m a k e univers a l j u d g m e n t s u s i n g merely empirical r e a s o n w i t h o u t any t h o r o u g h consideration of p r i n c i p l e s . " T h i s was t h e K a n t of t h e Critique of Pure Reason writing, a n d his disdain was g r o u n d e d in a philosophical sophistication H e r d e r could n e v e r a p p r o a c h . H a v i n g r e b u t t e d t h e criticism of his own position, K a n t u n d e r took a sustained d e b u n k i n g of the weakness of t h e a p p r o a c h fost e r e d by H e r d e r . " T h e a d e p t s of genius, w h o m u s t lay claim to genius a n d can only c o u n t o n t h e a p p r o v a l of p e o p l e of genius, are those w h o c a n n o t c o m m u n i c a t e b u t m u s t c o u n t for c o m p r e h e n s i o n only u p o n a c o m m u n a l , sympathetic inspiration . . . T h e artifice consists of scraps [Brocken] of science a n d l e a r n i n g sewn t o g e t h e r with t h e prestige of a n original spirit, criticism of o t h e r s , a n d a deeply h i d d e n religious sense, to give t h e l a u n d r y [Gewäsche] dignity." K a n t d e n i e d that o n e could have intellectual intuitions, a n d h e d e n i e d t h a t images served better t h a n universal concepts. " T h e r e a r e only two sources of valid insights: rational science or critical clarity. A n d t h e n s o m e o n e comes along with a t h r o w n t o g e t h e r b a g of scraps from b o t h , without m e t h o d a n d science, b u t a n i m a t e d [beseelt] with a spirit of inspiration. All such enthusiasts talk r e l i g i o n . " Reason was t h e only vehicle for t r u e c o m m u n i c a tion, for g e n e r a l validity. It was h u m a n n a t u r e to g r a s p the particular only t h r o u g h the universals of reason. For Kant, t h e p r i d e of A u f k l ä r u n g was its a d v a n c e m e n t of reason, n o t its i n d u l g e n c e in occult s y m b o l i s m . A u t h e n t i c genius s o u g h t universality of access a n d m e a n i n g . T h o s e w h o insisted u p o n mystification, w h o refused to be e x a m i n e d in t h e clear light of reason, were n o t practicing genius b u t i l l u s i o n . 146

147

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K a n t carried this criticism forward into a series of Reflections o n the new literary style. H e a r g u e d t h a t Klopstock, for h i m t h e first of these schwärmerisch a u t h o r s in G e r m a n y , h a d n o t nearly t h e a u t h e n tic g e n i u s of a Milton, a n d could easily be i m i t a t e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e c o n c e d e d t h a t schwärmerisch a u t h o r s could b e of v a l u e — 151

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such a u t h o r s as Rousseau a n d Plato, for e x a m p l e . Even Lavater could be u s e d by a critical m i n d to indicate t h e excesses which m o r e discreet believers m i g h t conceal from scrutiny in their o r t h o d o x y . B u t to be useful, they h a d at least to be wrestling with a n i m p o r t a n t O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h a t did not c o n t r i b u t e to e n t e r t a i n matter. m e n t (fine art), invention (technology), or u n d e r s t a n d i n g (scholarship) s h o u l d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d a m a t t e r of genius, b u t r a t h e r of t h e "fantastical" [Phantasterei]. T h a t style Kant e q u a t e d with the alchemical a n d mystical writings of J a c o b B ö h m e . K a n t linked this criticism with his l o n g e r - s t a n d i n g suspicion of imaginative excess—fantasy—as the p h r a s e Phantasterei suggests. I n several Reflections from t h e late 1770s, h e r e t u r n e d to the question of i m a g i n a t i o n a n d fantasy, stressing this c o n n e c t i o n with Schwärmerei. Above all, h e c a u t i o n e d against t h e loss of self-control which i n d u l g e n c e in fantasy ("ecstasy") could entail. " O n e should n e v e r be beside oneself, b u t r a t h e r in possession of oneself [Man muß niemals außer sich, sondern bei sich selbst sein.]" H e m a d e a set of associations with this excessive fantasy: with h y p o c h o n d r i a c s , with t h e superstitious, with O r i e n t a l peoples. H a m a n n h a d to figure in that set of a s s o c i a t i o n s . For Kant, imagination h a d to b e disciplined if it w e r e to be p r o d u c t i v e . O t h e r w i s e o n e risked losing track of t h e actual by c r e d i t i n g t h e u n r e a l . T h e v o l u m e of observations o n these m a t t e r s , t h e consistency of t h e l a n g u a g e which h e used, a n d t h e v e h e m e n c e of Kant's c o m m e n t a r y suggest t h e seriousness with which Kant r e s p o n d e d to H e r d e r a n d the Sturm und Drang. A n d yet all this was in private. Publicly h e said n o t h i n g across t h e entire d e c a d e of t h e 1770s. H e patiently went o n b u i l d i n g his world-historical m o n u m e n t of reason. B u t w h e n h e p u b l i s h e d it, n o o n e cared. H e r d e r r e m a i n e d t h e d a r l i n g child of t h e age. A n d that was the last straw. K a n t was ready for a public s h o w d o w n . 1 5 2

1 5 3

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KANT'S RETURN T O AESTHETICS TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND T H E "CRITIQUE OF TASTE"

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o situate t h e Third Critique within t h e "critical philosophy," it is necessary to establish how it relates to the First Critique's articulation of t h e limits of philosophical reasoni n g a n d its criteria for valid knowledge. T h e r e a r e those w h o , as Mary G r e g o r has p u t it, suspect t h a t " K a n t sometimes writes, in the t h i r d Critique, as if h e h a d n o t r e a d t h e Critique of Pure Reason." I n t h e light of such observations, it is i m p o r t a n t to consider w h e t h e r t h e Third Critique does flagrantly violate the constraints of t h e First Critique; i.e., are its innovations contradictory or d e v e l o p m e n t a l ? T o be specific, was Kantjustified in conceiving of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle a priori for noncognitive h u m a n experience? T h a t was t h e whole idea b e h i n d t h e a t t e m p t at a "Critique of Taste." A n d , with his s t r o n g e m p h a s i s o n a subjective j u d g m e n t a p a r t from t h e categories, was Kant's very c o n c e p t i o n of a "judgm e n t of taste" in u t t e r violation of his rules for t h e possibility of experience? T h e s e two questions pose the i m m a n e n t philosophical p r o b l e m of Kant's decision to c o m p o s e t h e Third Critique. 1

Moreover, as h e wrote o n it, h e c a m e to conceive a philosophical viewpoint for t h e Third Critique which e x t e n d e d — a n d t h e r e f o r e m o d i f i e d — t h e cognitive t h e o r y of the First Critique: the theory of reflective j u d g m e n t . T h i s was t h e essence of t h e "cognitive t u r n " t h a t r e s h a p e d t h e "Critique of T a s t e " into t h e full-fledged Critique of Judgment. T o g r a s p the evolution of the Third Critique, accordingly, it is inevitable t h a t we m u s t consider it in relation to its p r e decessors. T h i s c h a p t e r will consider t h e p r o b l e m of transcend e n t a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h e n e x t will e x p l o r e t h e p r o b l e m of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness. Later, in p a r t 2, we will take u p t h e "cognitive t u r n " a n d t h e theory of reflective j u d g ment. 2

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Kant's r e t u r n to aesthetics in 1787 h a d b o t h a contextual a n d a n i m m a n e n t origin. T h e c o n t e x t u a l origin lay in Kant's hostility to H e r d e r a n d t h e Sturm und Drang. Kant h a d a score to settle with t h e m o n t h e question of art a n d genius, as we have seen. T h e i m m a n e n t origin lay in a crucial innovation in Kant's theory of transcend e n t a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n . W h e n h e took u p t h e "Critique of T a s t e " in S e p t e m b e r 1787, K a n t r e t u r n e d to a question h e h a d j u d g e d fruitless in t h e Critique of Pure Reason of 1781: could taste b e g r o u n d e d transcendentally? For some time Kant h a d n o t believed taste eligible for inclusion within t h e conspectus of critical philosophy because it s e e m e d inevitably empirical. H e stated this clearly in a footnote to the " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic": T h e G e r m a n s a r e the only p e o p l e w h o c u r r e n t l y m a k e use of t h e w o r d 'aesthetic' in o r d e r to signify w h a t o t h e r s call t h e critique of taste. T h i s usage originated in t h e abortive a t t e m p t m a d e by B a u m g a r t e n , that a d m i r a b l e analytical thinker, to b r i n g the critical t r e a t m e n t of the beautiful u n d e r rational principles, a n d so to raise its rules to t h e r a n k of a science. B u t such e n d e a v o r s are fruitless. T h e said rules or criteria are, as r e g a r d s t h e i r sources, m e r e l y empirical, a n d consequently can n e v e r serve as a priori laws by which o u r j u d g m e n t of taste must be directed. 3

B u t by 1787 K a n t h a d c h a n g e d his m i n d . T h e discovery of a t r a n scendental g r o u n d i n g for aesthetics finally set Kant free from K a m e s a n d British empiricism a n d allowed h i m to i n c o r p o r a t e taste into his critical philosophy. T h a t is reflected in t h e changes h e int r o d u c e d into this footnote in his revision of the First Critique. It is reflected even m o r e clearly in a very f a m o u s letter. I n D e c e m b e r of 1787, I m m a n u e l Kant wrote to the m a n w h o h a d successfully p o p u l a r i z e d his philosophy in G e r m a n y , Karl L e o n h a r d Reinhold, a n n o u n c i n g himself at work o n a new study, a "Critique of Taste." T h a t letter is a crucial d o c u m e n t in t h e history of t h e genesis of t h e Third Critique, a n d it can be used to establish n o t only t h e n a t u r e of t h e original impulse of t h a t work, b u t also t h e novelty of its a r g u m e n t . Even t h e context of t h e letter is of interest, b u t first let us focus u p o n its text. My i n n e r conviction grows, as I discover in working o n differe n t topics t h a t n o t only does my system r e m a i n self-consistent b u t also, w h e n sometimes I c a n n o t see t h e r i g h t way to investigate a certain subject, I find t h a t I n e e d only look back at t h e 46

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g e n e r a l p i c t u r e of t h e e l e m e n t s of k n o w l e d g e , a n d of t h e m e n t a l powers p e r t a i n i n g to t h e m , in o r d e r to discover elucidations I h a d n o t expected. I a m n o w at work o n t h e critique of taste, a n d I have discovered a kind of a priori principle different from those h e r e t o f o r e observed. F o r t h e r e a r e t h r e e faculties of t h e m i n d : t h e faculty of cognition, t h e faculty of feeling p l e a s u r e a n d displeasure, a n d t h e faculty of desire. I n t h e Critique of Pure (theoretical) Reason, I f o u n d a priori principles for t h e first of these, a n d in the Critique of Practical Reason, a priori principles for t h e third. I tried to find t h e m for t h e second as well, a n d t h o u g h I t h o u g h t it impossible to find such principles, t h e systematic n a t u r e of t h e analysis of t h e p r e viously m e n t i o n e d faculties of t h e h u m a n m i n d allowed m e to discover t h e m . . . so that n o w I recognize t h r e e parts of philosophy, each of which h a s its own a priori principles. We can now, t h e r e f o r e , securely d e t e r m i n e t h e compass of knowle d g e , which is possible in this way, as including t h e t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s of theoretical philosophy, teleology, a n d practical philosophy, of which, it is t r u e , t h e second will b e f o u n d t h e p o o r e s t in a priori g r o u n d s of d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I h o p e by Easter to be r e a d y with this p a r t of philosophy, u n d e r t h e n a m e of the Critique of Taste, which is already in writing, b u t n o t quite p r e p a r e d for t h e p r e s s . 4

At t h e outset of t h e Third Critique, t h e n , Kant was seeking a priori principles for t h e "faculty of feeling pleasure a n d d i s p l e a s u r e " even t h o u g h for s o m e time h e h a d " t h o u g h t it impossible to find such principles." K a n t claimed to have n o w f o u n d "a kind of a priori principle different from those h e r e t o f o r e observed." A n d h e c a m e to it, significantly, via " t h e systematic n a t u r e of t h e analysis of t h e . . . faculties of t h e h u m a n m i n d . " Since his system was "selfconsistent," h e could trust it to aid h i m " w h e n sometimes I c a n n o t see t h e r i g h t way to investigate a certain subject." It would p r e s e n t h i m with "elucidations I h a d n o t expected." W h a t aided h i m , specifically, was " t h e general p i c t u r e of t h e e l e m e n t s of knowledge, a n d of t h e m e n t a l powers p e r t a i n i n g to t h e m . " T h e idea of faculties of m i n d a n d t h e idea t h a t t h e r e a r e different kinds of a priori principles, of which t h e sort h e h a d n o w before h i m was u n i q u e , prove crucial to Kant's p r o c e d u r e in late 1787, at t h e genesis of t h e "Critique of T a s t e . " T o g r a s p h o w h e h a d c o m e to this n e w t u r n in his t h i n k i n g , we m u s t consider w h a t Kant m e a n t in t h e First Critique by "transcenKant's Return to Aesthetics

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d e n t a l philosophy." " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t " has b e e n t h e s t o r m c e n t e r of controversy in K a n t scholarship for t h e past thirty y e a r s . T h e r e has n e v e r b e e n a n y t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g consensus o n these issues. Dieter H e n r i c h p o i n t e d this o u t eloquently in o n e of t h e most widely acclaimed efforts to achieve c o h e r e n c e . M a n y years later, Karl A m e r i k s richly d o c u m e n t e d t h e variety of views that still r e m a i n e d . We are n o closer t o closure today. A p a r t of this p r o b l e m is, n o d o u b t , obscurity in Kant's text. A n o t h e r p a r t is t h e i n h e r e n t difficulty of t h e task h e set himself. B u t t h e r e is a t h i r d difficulty, which is t h e disposition to treat K a n t in t e r m s of c o n t e m p o rary philosophical c o n c e r n s a n d s t a n d a r d s , a n d thus to lose any h e r m e n e u t i c a l sense of w h a t K a n t himself s o u g h t to achieve. I n this study t h e philological-historical question takes p r e c e d e n c e over t h e epistemological o n e . Methodologically, we m u s t try to establish w h a t sense Kant h a d of his t e r m s , his project, a n d his result before we begin to assess t h e i r "correctness" by c o n t e m p o r a r y s t a n d a r d s . 5

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Kant's Pre-Critical Notion of "Discursiveness" K a n t b r o k e with B a u m g a r t e n by insisting u p o n a d i c h o t o m y between t h e logical a n d t h e aesthetical, b e t w e e n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sense, b e t w e e n c o n c e p t a n d intuition. As sensibility a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g w e r e his t e r m s for t h e "faculties" constituted in this d u ality, intuition a n d c o n c e p t w e r e his t e r m s for t h e specific c o n t e n t which p e r t a i n e d to each, a n d aesthetics a n d logic were the m o d e s or processes which o b t a i n e d in these faculties in relation to t h e i r specific c o n t e n t s . For Kant, t h e distinction of sensibility from u n d e r s t a n d i n g was n o t o n e of d e g r e e , as in school philosophy, b u t o n e of kind. Sensibility was particular, while u n d e r s t a n d i n g was universal. Sensibility was subjective or private, while u n d e r s t a n d ing was objective a n d generally valid. Finally a n d crucially, sensibility was passive in contrast to t h e activity of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s discrimination was to be t h e f o u n d a t i o n of t h e entire critical philosophy, Kant's principle of "discursiveness." B a u m g a r t e n h a d c o n t e n d e d t h a t a different criterion of objective validity could be a p p l i e d to sensibility: individual wholeness (coordination, "extensive clarity") r a t h e r t h a n logical articulation ( s u b o r d i n a t i o n , "intensive clarity"). W h a t B a u m g a r t e n s o u g h t to i n t e r p r e t as a n objective, if inferior manifestation, K a n t insisted u p o n r e a d i n g merely subjectively. Aesthetics h a d to d o with intuitions as p r e s e n c e in sense. Objectivity (universal validity) b e l o n g e d exclusively to t h e o t h e r side of t h e duality, the side of u n d e r s t a n d 48

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ing, concept, a n d logic, a n d so aesthetics by definition was a subjective m o d e . At first, K a n t h a d tried to o p e r a t e with t h e l a n g u a g e of B a u m g a r t e n , u s i n g "extensive" versus "intensive" c l a r i t y . Yet clarity a n d distinctness did n o t express the aesthetic versus logical distinction sharply e n o u g h . B o t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sensibility could be confused. B o t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sensibility could be distinct. "As to distinctness, it is perfectly compatible with intuition. For distinctness has to d o with t h e differentiation of t h e manifold in a whole r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n so far as these pieces for cognition can be t h o u g h t t h r o u g h universal concepts, distinctness is a conseq u e n c e of r e a s o n ; if it occurs t h r o u g h particular [concepts], t h e n it is a f o r m of sensibility. T h e first occurs t h r o u g h subordination, t h e second t h r o u g h coordination." B a u m g a r t e n ' s distinction between "extensive" a n d "intensive" clarity did n o t h e l p m u c h . K a n t quickly t h r e w off t h e whole l a n g u a g e of clarity a n d distinctness as distracting, t h o u g h h e r e t a i n e d t h e contrast b e t w e e n c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d subordination. Leibniz's Nouveaux essais, which finally a p p e a r e d in p r i n t in 1765, h e l p e d K a n t sort o u t from B a u m g a r t e n ' s a p p r o a c h t h e s o u n d e l e m e n t s in a cognitive a p p r o a c h to sensibility by stimulating Kant's t h o u g h t t o w a r d two new distinctions. Logically a n d ontologically, w h a t m a t t e r e d far m o r e t h a n clarity a n d distinctness was t h e distinction of m a t t e r from f o r m . Epistemologically, w h a t m a t t e r e d most was the distinction b e t w e e n active u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d passive sensibility. Kant took t h e act of form-giving as the essence of u n d e r s t a n d i n g or r e a s o n . T h i s was t h e g r e a t legacy of Leibniz to G e r m a n school philosophy. O n c e Kant h a d a d o p t e d t h e two discriminations of passivity/activity a n d m a t t e r / f o r m , h e was in a position to m a k e a m u c h m o r e c o m p l e t e a n d powerful a c c o u n t of t h e process of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 9

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K a n t a r g u e d that all form resulted from spontaneity, from "the soul's o w n activity." H e distinguished sharply b e t w e e n t h e m e r e givenness of material in sensation a n d t h e active r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n a p p e a r a n c e as a figure [Gestalt] in space a n d time by d e v e l o p i n g the two technical t e r m s Empfindung (sensation) a n d Erscheinung (app e a r a n c e ) . His first i m p u l s e was to discriminate t h e subjectivity of Empfindung from t h e objectivity of Erscheinung. "Sensation" r e ferred strictly to a subjective state, while " a p p e a r a n c e " involved t h e r e f e r e n c e to a n object as t h e putative source of t h e passive i m p r e s s i o n s . B u t this original distinction, which c a m e later a n d m o r e effectively to be f o r m u l a t e d as that between Gefühl a n d Sinn, quickly d e v e l o p e d into o n e b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d f o r m . 14

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Not only were sensations subjective, in that they entailed passive r e s p o n s e s of the subject, b u t they p r o v i d e d merely t h e " m a t t e r " for, a n d w e r e n o t themselves r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of, o b j e c t s . Before they could be t h o u g h t a b o u t , they h a d to b e f o r m e d , s h a p e d . O n l y that process of f o r m i n g t h e m into representations-of-objects resulted in Erscheinungen. A n Erscheinung differed from a n Empfindung n o t only in t h a t it r e f e r r e d to a n object, b u t in t h a t it was f o r m e d into a d e t e r m i n a t e figure [Gestalt]. Kant e q u a t e d t h a t form a l d i m e n s i o n of sensibility with Anschauung, o r intuition. H e w r o t e : "Sensibility can be c o n s i d e r e d in t e r m s of its m a t t e r or its form. T h e m a t t e r in sensibility is sensation, a n d its faculty is sense; t h e form of sensibility is a p p e a r a n c e , a n d its faculty is i n t u i t i o n . " B u t of even g r e a t e r significance to h i m was t h e distinction of activity from passivity in m e n t a l process. Within sensibility itself he tried to discriminate, a l o n g with form a n d matter, passivity a n d activity. T h i s h e did in the contrast b e t w e e n Sinn a n d Einbildung: " O u r sensible faculties are e i t h e r senses or formative powers [Sinne oder bildende Kräfte]." W h a t Kant was g r o p i n g toward was a sense of form-giving in which b e a u t y was a "subjective principle" which c o n f o r m e d to t h e "laws of intuitive knowledge." H e a r g u e d t h a t the form p r o v i d e d by intuition could n o t be r e d u c e d to or derived from the form p r o v i d e d by r e a s o n . T w o equally formal a p p r o a c h e s could be t a k e n to t h e " m a t t e r " p r o v i d e d in a whole r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n object, i.e., a n Erscheinung. O n e could analyze it in t e r m s of its e l e m e n t s in so far as they were universal, i.e., c o m m o n to o t h e r objects, or in t e r m s of t h e specific b o n d a m o n g t h e m in a particular entity. T h e first o p e r a t i o n would b e a logical o n e , involving subordination, t h e second a n aesthetic o n e , involving c o o r d i n a t i o n . Both, however, w o u l d be impositions of "form." T h e so-called "subjective d e d u c t i o n " in the First Critique was the result of a p r o l o n g e d effort to discriminate t h e p r e c o n c e p t u a l synthesis associated with imagination. K a n t was already trying to differentiate t h e subjective process of individual concept formation in Reflections d a t e d a r o u n d 1769, h e n c e prior to any influence by t h e psychology of t h e "three-fold synthesis" of T e t e n s . K a n t identified a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n eligible for j u d g m e n t with several features. First, it h a d to b e synthetic, t h o u g h n o t t h r o u g h reason, h e n c e it h a d to unify a manifold of s e n s e . It c r e a t e d a s h a p e or figure [Gestalt] which involved " n o t only the form of t h e object according to the relations of space in t h e a p p e a r a n c e , b u t also t h e matter, i.e. sensation ( c o l o r ) . " Second, it h a d to be "intuitive." K a n t did n o t define this t e r m . T h i r d , it h a d to be i m m e d i a t e in t e r m s of t h e p r o 18

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portionality of t h e sensations. Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness clearly recognized the p r e s e n c e to consciousness of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s [Vorstellungen] which could n o t yet be considered cognitions [Erkenntnisse]. K a n t b r o k e d o w n t h e process of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n into a series of o p e r a t i o n s : differentiation [Abstechung] of t h e manifold; comp r e h e n s i o n [Begreiflichkeit]; synthesis [Zusammennehmung]; a n d discrimination from o t h e r possibilities [praecisio]. H e a r g u e d that t h e synthesis h e described as Zusammennehmung was n o t yet sufficient to provide " d e t e r m i n a t e f o r m " [bestimmteForm]. Rather, this r e q u i r e d w h a t h e called Zusammenordnung, that is, a "connection by c o o r d i n a t i o n , a n d n o t of s u b o r d i n a t i o n [via r e a s o n ] . " T h i s c o n n e c tion by c o o r d i n a t i o n h a d to take place in t e r m s of t h e form of space in intuition. "All objects can b e k n o w n sensibly or via intuition only in a given figure [Gestalt]. O t h e r a p p e a r a n c e s c a n n o t form a n object, b u t a r e merely [subjective] c h a n g e s [involving succession in t i m e ] . " B u t K a n t h a d yet a f u r t h e r level of synthesis: Zusammenstimmung. It h a d two forms: parts to a whole, or g r o u n d to cons e q u e n c e . T h e second, h e a r g u e d , was a m a t t e r of s u b o r d i n a t i o n . T h e former, while clearly a m a t t e r of coordination, could very well fall u n d e r the logical rubric of disjunctive j u d g m e n t s as well. Alr e a d y in t h e late 1760s, t h e n , K a n t conceived of the b u i l d i n g of a particular representation-of-the-object in t e r m s of t h r e e stages: a material o n e , Zusammennehmung o r t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of a manifold of sensation; a formal o n e , Zusammenordnung or t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of this manifold as a Gestalt o r figure in space (and time); a n d a rational o n e , Zusammenstimmung, which involved conceptions of a cognitive-evaluative n a t u r e . K a n t wished to associate this form-giving in intuition with the objectivity of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i.e., its reference to t h e object a n d h e n c e its validity. H e was m o v i n g toward t h e n o t i o n that objective validity was g r o u n d e d in t h e form which the m i n d , e i t h e r in sensibility t h r o u g h intuition or in u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h concepts, a p p l i e d to t h e merely given in sensation. I n conceiving of intuition strictly as t h e form of sensibility, K a n t was in fact d e t a c h i n g it from its function as t h e source of objective actuality, or reality. T h a t r e m a i n e d inertly given in sensation. We have c o m e u p o n o n e of t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s of Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to "discursiveness." 26

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"Discursiveness" entailed t h r e e difficulties from the outset which would beset K a n t t h r o u g h o u t t h e so-called "critical" p e r i o d of his philosophy. First, K a n t h a d c o m m i t t e d himself to t h e idea t h a t form-giving was a n active process, associated with t h e s p o n Kant's Return to Aesthetics

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taneity of t h e subject, h e n c e associated with t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Yet h e h a d d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r y of intuition as similarly form-giving a n d s p o n t a n e o u s , b u t within sensibility. As formal a n d active, intuition did n o t fit comfortably into t h e passive concept of sensibility. Was it p a r t of t h e passivity of sensibility o r p a r t of the activism of u n d e r standing? Let us call this t h e p r o b l e m of imagination. T h e second difficulty p r e s e n t e d by discursiveness is, if sensibility a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g are different in kind, h o w can u n d e r s t a n d i n g d e t e r m i n e t h e particulars given in sensation with logical a n d especially with ontological necessity? H o w a r e objective actuality, t h a t m e r e , "material" givenness in sensation, a n d objective validity, t h a t formal c o n s t r u c t i o n u n d e r rule by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , to be unified? Could r e a s o n have a "real use"? T h i s is t h e p r o b l e m of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n . I n t h e year 1772, u n d e r the i m p a c t of t h e full radicalism of H u m e ' s skepticism, K a n t recognized the e n o r mity of this p r o b l e m . It w o u l d take h i m a d e c a d e to f o r m u l a t e a position o n it in t h e Critique of Pure Reason. B u t t h e r e is a t h i r d p r o b l e m which has to d o with a certain duplicity in Kant's n o t i o n of subjectivity: passive/active; private/ g e n e r a l ; singular/universal. K a n t h a d a very s t r o n g p e n c h a n t to t h i n k of these t h r e e discriminations as i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . B u t they a r e not. O n c e again, his n o t i o n of intuition evidences this. T h e r e is only o n e space, for everyone, a n d necessarily. It is singular, n o t a composite, b u t it is a n all-encompassing t o t a l i t y . It resides in sensibility, t h e ostensibly subjective a n d private aspect of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , b u t it is n o t subjective or private. T h a t raises the q u e s t i o n : H o w is it that e v e r y t h i n g subjective is not necessarily private? Conversely, w h a t sort of g e n e r a l c o n c e p t can o n e develop to discuss w h a t is utterly p a r t i c u l a r a n d private? Is t h e r e even a subjective access to such m a t t e r s , i.e., can they be t h o u g h t ? Let us call this t h e p r o b l e m of subjectivity. 31

32

T h e s e t h r e e epistemological p r o b l e m s drove K a n t to a continual r e w o r k i n g of his p h e n o m e n o l o g y of consciousness n o t only u p to the First Critique b u t o n w a r d t h r o u g h t h e Third. It would b e a n u t t e r m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n to believe t h a t K a n t c o n s i d e r e d all t h e epistemological—or, m o r e broadly, cognitive—issues in his p h i losophy to have b e e n resolved in the first edition of t h e Critique of Pure Reason in 1 7 8 1 . R a t h e r , h e c o n t i n u e d to reflect a n d to revise over the e n t i r e balance of his philosophical career, a n d some of the revisions p r o v e d major. T h e Third Critique r e p r e s e n t e d a major effort to resolve t h e s e epistemological difficulties. K a n t concentrated, in his "critical" b r e a k t h r o u g h , o n resolving t h e p r o b l e m of 52

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, (

t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , his solution left u n r e s o l v e d several subtle difficulties in his notions of i m a g i n a t i o n a n d intuition a n d o t h e r s , m o r e blatant, in his n o t i o n of subjectivity. The "Critical" Breakthrough:

Transcendental

Philosophy

K a n t e x p l a i n e d what h e m e a n t by " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y " in t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e First Critique: "I entitle transcendental all k n o w l e d g e which is occupied n o t so m u c h with objects as with t h e m o d e of o u r k n o w l e d g e of objects insofar as this m o d e of knowle d g e is to b e possible a priori."' '' A n d in t h e Prolegomena h e elabor a t e d : " t h e w o r d transcendental. . . for m e n e v e r m e a n s a r e f e r e n c e of o u r cognition to things, b u t only to o u r faculty of c o g n i t i o n . " I n b o t h contexts K a n t stresses the procedural, n o t merely the objective c h a r a c t e r of k n o w l e d g e : how, n o t j u s t what we (can) k n o w . T h e question is n o t simply: " W h a t is a n object?" b u t " H o w can o u r e x p e rience of t h e object be valid?" T h a t , Kant insists, can only be a n swered by c o n s i d e r i n g the m i n d ' s active participation in knowledge, t h e noetic, n o t simply the n o e m a t i c d i m e n s i o n : "the mode of o u r k n o w l e d g e . . . insofar as [it] is to be possible a priori." It is this active, p r o c e d u r a l d i m e n s i o n that is the d o m a i n of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy." T h e m i n d takes a n active role in cognition, b u t it does n o t always d o so t h r o u g h a self-conscious choice. T h i s necessity which is prior to volition a n d yet i n h e r e n t in subjectivity is Kant's most distinctive philosophical discovery, which m i g h t b e called t h e "involu n t a r y s p o n t a n e i t y " of t h e subject in e x p e r i e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to Kant, t h e subject is active in cognition, as against t h e viewpoint of empiricism, b u t n o t arbitrary, as against t h e view of skepticism. T o the e x t e n t that a subject necessarily structures p e r c e p t i o n in a m a n n e r b e y o n d conscious control a n d h e n c e a n t e c e d e n t volition, t h e r e is m o r e to subjectivity t h a n o n e is immediately aware o f . Philosophically it is possible to a c c o u n t for t h a t involuntary spontaneity a n d to show its necessary rationality. T h a t is precisely w h a t t r a n scendental a r g u m e n t s seek to d o . 1

6

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T h e subject may p e r f o r m this reconstruction from t h e vantage of a h i g h e r level of self-consciousness. However, o n e will never be in a position voluntarily to e x e c u t e those involuntary acts of spontaneity at t h e g r o u n d of his consciousness, a n d t h u s t h a t aspect of his o w n subjectivity will always r e m a i n objective to h i m , t h o u g h still s p o n t a n e o u s vis-ä-vis t h e object of consciousness. T h i s is what Kant m e a n t by " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a l i s m . " In the B-version of t h e 39

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53

" T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " h e p u t it in p e r h a p s t h e most straightf o r w a r d m a n n e r : " T h i s peculiarity of o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , that it can p r o d u c e a priori unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n solely by m e a n s of t h e categories, a n d only by such a n d so many, is as little capable of furt h e r e x p l a n a t i o n as why we have j u s t these a n d n o o t h e r functions ofj u d g m e n t , o r why space a n d time a r e the only forms of o u r possible i n t u i t i o n . " While t h e subject may c o m p r e h e n d the transcend e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s of his o w n subjectivity, h e is n o t in a position to c h a n g e t h e m or to p r o d u c e t h e m by a n act of will. T h i s p r i m o r d i a l givenness is a d i m e n s i o n of reality which m a n can only recognize, n o t c o m m a n d . It is for the p h i l o s o p h e r to speculate a n d if possible to explain persuasively t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of such activity. T r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y starts from the fact of e x p e r i e n c e , t h e act of empirical j u d g m e n t . Given that t h e r e is e x p e r i e n c e , i.e., t h a t a j u d g m e n t gets m a d e claiming objective reference, what can be d o n e to establish its objective validity in t e r m s of the noetic p r o c e d u r e that it logically m u s t p r e s u p p o s e in light of t h e discursiveness of h u m a n n a t u r e ? K a n t w a n t e d to secure t h e c o h e r e n c e of empirical e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h t h e idea of c o n c e p t u a l d e t e r m i n a tion: t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i m p o s e d categorial " f o r m " t h r o u g h j u d g m e n t u p o n sensory " m a t t e r " a n d constituted e x p e r i e n c e as objectively valid. T h e alternative to be eliminated was s o m e "stream of consciousness" which really offered n o security against disintegration into " b l o o m i n g , b u z z i n g confusion" a n d dissolution of any cognitive identity, i.e., c o h e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e . K a n t h a r d l y m e a n t t h a t every empirical j u d g m e n t h a d to be t r u e . H e merely wished to establish t h a t a j u d g m e n t could m a k e a claim to t r u t h based u p o n criteria that w e r e validating. T h e s e criteria, t h e categories, d e t e r m i n e d with necessity a n d universality the f o r m of all possible j u d g m e n t s a b o u t a n object-in-general (Objekt). T h i s w a r r a n t h a d to b e s h o w n to apply to t h e only actual cont e n t h u m a n s e x p e r i e n c e d — s e n s o r y intuition in space a n d t i m e — a n d h e n c e to actual objects (Gegenstände). H o w categories of p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g could apply with validity to sensory intuition was the question of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h e p r o b l e m lay precisely in t h e s e p a r a t i o n of these two e l e m e n t s (concepts a n d intuitions) in two distinct faculties. T h a t m a d e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e flection" indispensable. 40

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K a n t claimed in his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " that t h e constitution of t h e object-in-general in a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l synthesis," whose spontaneity was distinctly involuntary, p r o v i d e d the necessary f o u n d a t i o n for all voluntary acts of synthesis: empirical 54

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j u d g m e n t s with claims to validity. A " p u r e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l synthesis m u s t be p r e s u p p o s e d as t h e f o u n d a t i o n for any a n d every act of empirical j u d g m e n t . T h i s "original synthesis" is n o t t h e act o r invention of the empirical subject. It is p a r t of subjectivity, to be sure, b u t it is involuntary subjectivity. B u t Kant is interested, b e y o n d t h e establishment of this originary synthesis, in the conscious act of (empirical) j u d g m e n t . T h a t "applies" the categories, in t h e sense of finding instantiations in a "syllogistic" r a t h e r t h a n " j u d g m e n t a l " sense of s u b s u m p t i o n u n d e r r u l e 43

4 4

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H o w can we establish t h a t t h e p u r e concepts of t h e u n d e r s t a n d ing, as categories, have objective validity with reference to sensibility? While this was the particular focus of the c h a p t e r entitled " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n , " t h e whole First Critique is Kant's answer, a n d only the whole Critique could be a n answer, because it alone offered scope to establish t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " o r "critical" c o n s e q u e n c e s of discursiveness for knowledge. Nonetheless, the kernel of t h e "critical" philosophy has always b e e n f o u n d in t h e " d e d u c t i o n . " N o piece of m o d e r n philosophical writing has p r o voked so m u c h study a n d controversy. Many c o n t e m p o r a r y interpreters claim it impossible to find a d e d u c t i o n t h e r e . Part of t h e difficulty, as H e n r i c h a n d o t h e r s have n o t e d , is t h a t Kant's c o n c e p t of d e d u c t i o n is n o t o u r s ; it h a d a definite historical source that colo r e d its u s a g e . 4 6

4 7

C o n t e x t u a l reference also clarifies t h e question of "empirical psychology" a n d its relation to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. T h e r e were, for Kant, two ways of g o i n g at m e n t a l activity a n d the concepts which were its e l e m e n t s . O n e , which h e d e s i g n a t e d "psychological," traced t h e historical evolution of empirical concepts in c o n s c i o u s n e s s . For Kant, Locke was t h e p r i m a r y m o d e l of this. O n e could easily a d d H u m e (and T e t e n s in G e r m a n y ) . T h e o t h e r way s o u g h t n o t t h e origins or d e v e l o p m e n t of a c o n c e p t b u t t h e w a r r a n t or r i g h t to it—its validity. T h a t was the p r o p e r l y "transcendental" project. 48

4 9

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We t h u s n e e d to b e clear a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of "a priori" a n d t h e p u r p o s e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. A priori m e a n s n o t derivative from e x p e r i e n c e . It does n o t m e a n completely a p a r t from it. Consequently, a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t is, as Ameriks argues, necessarily a regressive a r g u m e n t , n o t a "presuppositionless d e d u c t i o n . " It c a n n o t be, n o r did Kant ever i n t e n d to m a k e such a claim, h o w e v e r m u c h some i n t e r p r e t e r s ascribe this intention to " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t s " a n d Kant's in p a r t i c u l a r . A transcendental a r g u m e n t sets o u tfront e x p e r i e n c e , b u t that does n o t — 51

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for K a n t — i n any way r e d u c e its a priori validity to s o m e t h i n g "empirical" o r a posteriori. T o be sure, if t h e philosophical inquiry is to establish a n y t h i n g with necessity a n d universality—which is what K a n t m e a n t by t h e t e r m "a p r i o r i " — t h e n it will have to achieve a purity of articulation which will n o t d e p e n d for its cogency u p o n a n y t h i n g empirical. E v e r y t h i n g hinges o n exactly what is m e a n t by " p u r i t y " a n d t h e "empirical," however. We cann o t even begin to discuss t h e validity of k n o w l e d g e without ack n o w l e d g i n g that empirical e x p e r i e n c e occurs. Philosophy c a n n o t sensibly question t h e o c c u r r e n c e of e x p e r i e n c e , b u t only w h e t h e r it can b e r e c k o n e d valid k n o w l e d g e . K a n t p r o p o s e d to avoid taki n g w h a t any specific empirical e x p e r i e n c e concretely entailed— its " m a t t e r " — i n t o a c c o u n t in explaining h o w it was possible in g e n e r a l for e x p e r i e n c e to occur. T o explain why, or how it is possible that, empirical e x p e r i e n c e can occur, we m u s t look to t h e " f o r m " of t h a t e x p e r i e n c e , to its s t r u c t u r e . A " p u r e " analysis is n o t o n e which has n o c o n n e c t i o n w h a t e v e r with empirical experience. H o w can it b e , w h e n it is s u p p o s e d to g r o u n d the validity of t h a t experience? R a t h e r , it is o n e which is n o t d e p e n d e n t o n t h e c o n t e n t of any particular e x p e r i e n c e for its a r g u m e n t . T h a t this was exactly w h a t h e m e a n t by t h e crucial t e r m " p u r e , " K a n t e x p l a i n e d in a n essay, c o m p o s e d in 1787, which h e sent u n d e r t h e cover of t h e very letter to R e i n h o l d we b e g a n by analyzing. H e offered his e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e t e r m as a s u p p l e m e n t to Reinhold's widely recognized exposition of his philosophy, t h e Briefe über die Kantischen Philosophic I n d e e d , Kant's letter a n d t h e essay enclosed with it were his public a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of Reinhold's c o n t r i b u t i o n in p o p u l a r i z i n g Kant's complicated system. H e n c e t h e observation o n " p u r i t y " in t h e essay s h o u l d be t a k e n as canonical. K a n t w r o t e : 53

54

I would like to take this o p p o r t u n i t y to devote j u s t a little att e n t i o n to t h e c h a r g e that ostensible contradictions have b e e n discovered in a work of considerable l e n g t h [the second edition of t h e First Critique], before [the discoverer] h a d a real g r a s p of the whole . . . [This critic c h a r g e d that] in t h e first place I said those cognitions a priori are pure, with which absolutely n o t h i n g empirical is mixed [denen gar nichts Empirisches beigemischt ist], a n d as a n e x a m p l e of t h e opposite p r e s e n t e d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n : all t h a t c h a n g e s has a cause. By c o n t r a s t . . . [a few pages later] I p r e s e n t this same p r o p o s i t i o n as a n e x a m ple of a p u r e a priori cognition, that is, o n e which is not dependent o n a n y t h i n g empirical [die von nichts Empirisches a b h ä n g i g 56

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ist]—two distinct m e a n i n g s of the t e r m pure, of which, however, in t h e w h o l e work I dealt exclusively with t h e l a t t e r . 55

" P u r e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy was n o t d e p e n d e n t o n t h e e m pirical, b u t it was n o t utterly u n r e l a t e d to it. K a n t claimed t h a t the m e t h o d h e p u r s u e d in t h e Second Critique was in fact identical to t h a t of t h e First: "We c o m e t o k n o w p u r e practical laws in t h e same way we know p u r e theoretical principles, by a t t e n d i n g to the necessity with which r e a s o n prescribes t h e m to us a n d to t h e elimination from t h e m of all empirical conditions, which r e a s o n directs. T h e concept of a p u r e will arises from t h e former, as t h e consciousness of a p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g from t h e l a t t e r . " T h e m a r k of rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n as such is t h e modality of necessity. I n all m e n t a l acts, the p r e s e n c e of this modality is t h e crucial indicator of a n a priori t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r i n c i p l e . K a n t believed t h a t without this p r i m o r d i a l a n d d e t e r m i n i n g modality of necessity, even what we assessed cognitively could n e v e r a d v a n c e b e y o n d H u m e ' s c o n c e p t i o n of c o n t i n g e n t - c u s t o m a r y association, i.e., it would r e m a i n merely assertoric, n e v e r apodictic. I n t h e case of cognitive e x p e r i e n c e , Kant a r g u e d in t h e First Critique, without this modality in fact any possibility of e x p e r i e n c e — e v e n H u m e ' s — b e c a m e i n c o h e r e n t . T h a t was t h e only sense in which K a n t could a n d did "answer" Hume. H e n c e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y h a d to g r a s p t h e capacities of " p u r e r e a s o n . " K a n t wished to i n t r o d u c e as the decisive distinction b e t w e e n his philosophy a n d all o t h e r philosophy t h e claim t h a t his was n o t g r o u n d e d o n m e r e g e n e r a l logic b u t r a t h e r o n what h e called " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic." G e n e r a l logic, K a n t insisted, amplifying a p o i n t first m a d e by Crusius against the rationalist-essentialist tradition in G e r m a n y , could n e v e r p r o c e e d from t h e m e r e f o r m of the j u d g m e n t s to any assertion a b o u t t h e actuality (Wirklichkeit) of t h e t e r m s in those j u d g m e n t s , for g e n e r a l logic was only a set of rules a b o u t t h e forms of j u d g m e n t s , n o t a vehicle for t h e establishm e n t of a c t u a l i t y . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic, h e asserted, dealt with t h e p r o b l e m of synthetic j u d g m e n t s a priori, a n d synthetic j u d g m e n t s a priori h a d as their specific difference from j u d g m e n t s in g e n e r a l logic precisely their e n t a i l m e n t of e x i s t e n c e . G e n e r a l logic could not in any way yield o n t o l o g y . Existence is extra-logical: owtological. T o e n t e r t h a t d o m a i n , philosophy h a d n o t only to r e c k o n with the forms of j u d g m e n t s (the logical use of reason) b u t to discriminate the two kinds of matter (concepts a n d intuitions) i n j u d g m e n t s by tracing t h e m to t h e i r dis56

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p a r a t e sources—i.e., t h e cognitive faculties—in o r d e r to establish t h e possibility of their synthesis in valid knowledge (the real use of reason). K a n t conceived t r a n s c e n d e n t a l reflection to entail n o t simply t h e c o m p a r i s o n of concepts with o t h e r c o n c e p t s — n o t merely t h e logic of j u d g m e n t s — b u t c o m p a r i s o n with t h e faculties which constituted their possibility. Reflection (reflexio) does n o t c o n c e r n itself with objects t h e m selves with a view to deriving concepts from t h e m directly, b u t is t h a t state of m i n d in which we first set ourselves to discover t h e subjective conditions u n d e r which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts. It is t h e consciousness of the relation of given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to o u r different sources of knowledge; a n d only by way of such consciousness can t h e relation of t h e sources of k n o w l e d g e to o n e a n o t h e r be rightly d e t e r m i n e d . Prior to all f u r t h e r t r e a t m e n t of o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , this question m u s t first b e asked: I n which of o u r cognitive faculties a r e o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o n n e c t e d t o g e t h e r ? 62

T h e passage deserves t h e most careful exegesis. "Reflection" is t e r m e d a "state of m i n d " [Zustand des Gemütes]. I n t h a t state, K a n t c o n t i n u e s , "we set ourselves to d i s c o v e r " — h e n c e h e is describing a n intentional act, or, in his o w n l a n g u a g e , a Handlung, which implies conscious (and p r e s u m a b l y rational) c h o i c e — " t h e subjective conditions [subjectiven Bedingungen] u n d e r which [alone] we a r e able to arrive at c o n c e p t s . " K a n t explains t h a t reflection provides t h e "consciousness of t h e relation of given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to o u r different [faculties] of k n o w l e d g e [Erkenntnisvermögen].'" T h a t is, reflection seeks to know w h e n c e a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n arises, by r e f e r e n c e to t h e faculty which is its "source." T h a t process is essential, K a n t c o n t i n u e s , because it is "only by way of such consciousness" t h a t p h i l o s o p h y can t h e n correctly establish t h e essential t r a n s c e n d e n t a l issue of "the relation of t h e [faculties] of k n o w l e d g e to o n e a n o t h e r . " 63

K a n t r e f e r r e d to this process of reflection in his letter to R e i n h o l d w h e n h e w r o t e of "the general picture of the elements of k n o w l e d g e , a n d of t h e m e n t a l powers p e r t a i n i n g to t h e m . " For K a n t these w e r e n o t e l e m e n t s of a "merely empirical" psychology. T h e y were f u n d a m e n t a l structures of m e n t a l activity a p a r t from which it was impossible even to begin to philosophize. T h a t subjective conditions a r e t h e only basis u p o n which we can arrive at philosophical k n o w l e d g e is o n e of the most i m p o r t a n t principles of 6 4

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t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. O n l y o n this basis is it possible to a p praise the validity of k n o w l e d g e , or secure a real use of r e a s o n . I take this discussion to b e a m o n g the most straightforward a n d decisive K a n t ever m a d e r e g a r d i n g the p r o c e d u r e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy, a n d t h e r e f o r e as decisive for t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n n o t only of t h e First Critique b u t also of t h e later ones. O u r s is a determinate noetic s t r u c t u r e , discursiveness; a n d t h a t d e t e r m i n a c y m u s t figure as t h e f o u n d a t i o n of t h e epistemological e n t e r p r i s e . It is discursiveness t h a t m a k e s h u m a n k n o w l e d g e problematic. It is discursiveness, t h e n , that a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t m u s t r e c k o n with if "objective validity" is to b e secured. T h i s project could n o t dispense with reference to faculties of cognition. Discursiveness c a n n o t be articulated except in t e r m s of faculties of m i n d a n d w i t h o u t discursiveness t h e r e can be n e i t h e r a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " p r o b l e m n o r a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l solution. If pure concepts sufficed, t h e "Metaphysical D e d u c t i o n " would have b e e n c o m p l e t e — a n d , m o r e o v e r , t h e whole Kantian project would have b e e n irrelevant: Leibniz, Wolff, o r B a u m g a r t e n could j u s t as well serve. N o r could strict empirical psychology suffice, or H u m e would have b e e n t h e finish of philosophy. T h e best expositions of Kant's " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n , " t h e r e f o r e , recognize t h a t t h e r e are two p r o b l e m s s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n o n e a n o t h e r : first, how the objective validity of t h e categories in cognitive j u d g m e n t s is to be established; b u t second, h o w synthesis between t h e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e faculty of sensibility is to be p o s s i b l e . T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r o c e d u r e that makes sense in t h e light of all t h r e e Critiques is o n e which sees Kant regressing from t h e complexity of empirical e x p e r i e n c e (cognitive, m o r a l , or aesthetic) to a p u r e , rational principle a priori. T h i s establishes t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity. B u t h e m u s t t h e n r e t u r n to t h e c o m p l e x case by offering a constitutive a c c o u n t of t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e p u r e principle with r e f e r e n c e to empirical e x p e r i e n c e (application/subsumption). I n t h e case of t h e First Critique, the analysis set o u t from complex (logical a n d actual) empirical j u d g m e n t s , seeking t h e warr a n t for their claims to validity. Such a claim, K a n t a r g u e d , could only be w a r r a n t e d by a priori categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t these p u r e categories "applied" to " p u r e " i n t u i t i o n — that they did, p r e e m i n e n t l y in §26 of the B-version of t h e " T r a n s c e n dental D e d u c t i o n " ; a n d how they did in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Schem a t i s m " c h a p t e r . T h e "Analysis of Principles" t h e n p r o c e e d e d to explain h o w t h e "original synthesis" could w a r r a n t applications to an empirical object in general in a n objective cognitive j u d g m e n t . 65

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Transcendental

Method in the Later Critiques

T h e First Critique did n o t e n d with the " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic." Kant's p o i n t was n o t simply to d e f e n d t h e c o h e r e n c e of j u d g m e n t a n d t h e possibility of objectivity from a skeptical-solipsist dissolution into s t r e a m s of impressions. H e also wished to limit reason's p u r s u i t s to t h e s p h e r e of actuality, i.e., to d e f e n d against "speculative metaphysics." T h i s was t h e project of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic." T h e r e K a n t discussed, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s : (1) the question of "rational psychology," or the substantive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e self; (2) t h e question of "practical reason," o r ethics; a n d (3) t h e q u e s t i o n of religion, since t h e Critique's p u r p o s e was to " m a k e r o o m for faith." It was n o t t h a t K a n t d i s p u t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of such c o n c e r n s to r e a s o n . T h e s e were p e r e n n i a l interests of r e a s o n because they w e r e c o n c e r n s h u m a n s could n o t a v o i d . Nevertheless, h e d i s p u t e d reason's c o m p e t e n c e cognitively to resolve these concerns. T h e p o i n t to consider is t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles for n o n cognitive d i m e n s i o n s of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e f o u n d little s c o p e — i n d e e d , o n s o m e r e a d i n g s , w e r e d e n i e d any valid s c o p e — i n t e r m s of t h e First Critique. B u t that did n o t r e m a i n t h e case in t h e later Critiques. T h e r e f o r e , K a n t c h a n g e d his conception of t r a n s c e n d e n tal p h i l o s o p h y b e t w e e n 1781 a n d 1789. However, we m u s t r e c k o n with t h e p r o s p e c t that n o t all the c h a n g e s in his t h o u g h t over t h e d e c a d e worked in t h e s a m e direction. T h e r e were at least two crucial motives at work: first, a desire to e x t e n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy into the m o r a l s p h e r e ; a n d second, a n e e d to avoid the c h a r g e of idealism. T h e first c o n c e r n led K a n t to seek t r a n s c e n d e n tal principles for t h e wider h u m a n faculties. T h e second led h i m to a n even m o r e acute suspicion of "psychologism" a n d subjective as o p p o s e d to objective reference. T h e s e two concerns were n o t e n tirely h a r m o n i o u s . While scholars interested above all in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " of t h e B-version of the First Critique (1786) have fastened u p o n Kant's c o n c e r n with the charges of idealism a n d psychologism a n d accordingly stressed t h e " p r o g r e s s " from 1781 to 1786 in t e r m s of his "Refutation of Idealism" a n d his " s u p pression" of t h e "Subjective D e d u c t i o n " a n d with it m u c h "facultytalk," it is by n o m e a n s clear t h a t this was t h e p r e p o n d e r a n t shift of t h e d e c a d e , or even t h a t it was such a p r o n o u n c e d shift as these int e r p r e t e r s wish to b e l i e v e . K a n t felt a c o n c e r n t h a t even within his strictly cognitive p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e r e m a i n e d a certain indeterminacy, a " g a p " in t h e system, which I will t e r m later the p r o b l e m of 66

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empirical e n t a i l m e n t . Even with reference to cognition, d e p e n d ing o n one's r e a d i n g of t h e task (to say n o t h i n g of t h e success) of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic," a g r e a t deal m i g h t well r e m a i n to be d o n e in t h e m a t t e r of constituting a valid empirical concept. K a n t himself p r o m i s e d to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e "metaphysical" application of his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles in t e r m s of a philosophical f o u n d a tion of n a t u r a l science. 68

F r o m t h e s e considerations it is possible to f o r m u l a t e at least four projects t h a t would a n i m a t e t h e later critical p e r i o d : 1. 2. 3. 4.

ethics (practical reason) aesthetics (subjective consciousness) metaphysics (God, t h e soul, a n d immortality) n a t u r a l science (methodology).

Most fundamentally, to k e e p c o h e r e n c e at t h e core of his transcend e n t a l philosophy, K a n t h a d to p u r s u e all these c o n c e r n s u n d e r t h e principle of t h e unity or sytematicity of reason. T h e desire to find a legitimate e x t e n s i o n of his " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y " into n o n cognitive areas of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e led h i m to considerations which complicated or i n d e e d revised his earlier positions in a m o r e m e t a p h y s i c a l — " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l psychological"—direction. T h e First Critique simply set aside vast reaches of philosophical concern (because it set aside essential d i m e n s i o n s of h u m a n experience) in its relentless p u r s u i t of a w a r r a n t for t h e objectivity of e m pirical cognition. K a n t did n o t give a full p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness in t h e First Critique because h e systematically abstracted from all n o n t h e o r e t i c a l e l e m e n t s in that experience in o r d e r to establish w h a t would m a k e objective knowledge possible. Moreover, in 1781 K a n t h a d n o plans for either of t h e later Critiques, because their m a t t e r did n o t a p p e a r to h i m a m e n a b l e to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t . H e only t u r n e d to this p h e n o m e n o l ogy in t h e later Critiques. T o p u t it in t e r m s of t h e p r o b l e m s of discursiveness, K a n t may have a d d r e s s e d t h e n a r r o w issue of t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n , " b u t only to some d e g r e e at the exp e n s e of his resolution of t h e p r o b l e m of i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t h e p r o b lem of subjectivity. T h a t did n o t escape his o w n self-criticism. 6 9

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Above all, K a n t came, over the 1780s, to see t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy n o t simply as a question of epistemology b u t r a t h e r as the system of philosophical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m a n . H e n c e t h e impulse of his work in the later Critiques was to carry forward the same t r a n s c e n d e n t a l quest for a priori principles which g r o u n d e d or w a r r a n t e d c o m p l e x (rational a n d actual) h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e 7 1

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not only narrowly in t h e question of t h e cognitive faculty (Erkenntnisvermögen) b u t m o r e widely in all t h e distinctively—i.e., e s s e n t i a l l y — h u m a n faculties (Gemütsvermögen). H e took such a project to be quite distinct from "empirical psychology" or " h e t e r o n o m o u s (empirical) ethics." H e stressed, in what may be for us u n comfortably a n t i q u a r i a n t e r m s , t h e primacy of reason in h u m a n nature. T h e i m p o r t a n t result to retrieve from this c o m p l e x set of considerations is t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy necessarily entails r e f e r e n c e to t h e faculties of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . Consequently, in the later Critiques K a n t would e x p a n d his " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosop h y " in t e r m s of r e f e r e n c e to the faculties of h u m a n n a t u r e . I n his letter to Reinhold, K a n t very emphatically stated " t h e r e are t h r e e faculties of t h e m i n d : t h e faculty of cognition, t h e faculty of feeling pleasure a n d displeasure, a n d t h e faculty of d e s i r e . " In the later Critiques K a n t clarified h o w t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy a p p r o a c h e d the p r o b l e m of t h e "psychologism" of faculties of the m i n d . By 1787 K a n t believed o n e could p r o m o t e certain concepts from empirical status t h r o u g h e x p l a n a t i o n s "according to transcendental d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , " r e f o r m u l a t i n g t h e m in a way which did n o t p r e s u p p o s e a n y t h i n g empirical, b u t r e f e r r e d only to the e l e m e n t s of t h e transcendentally g r o u n d e d cognitive situation: the subjective faculties a n d their r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t a k e n in general, n o t c o n c r e t e l y . I n a n i m p o r t a n t footnote to t h e preface of the Second Critique K a n t clarified t h e n a t u r e of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l explanat i o n s . " A t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n , h e wrote, "consists only of t e r m s b e l o n g i n g to the p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i.e., categories, which contain n o t h i n g empirical." T h a t is, t h e t e r m s in his definitions were perfectly g e n e r a l a n d logical, having n o specific material content. A n d h e insisted: "I n e e d n o m o r e t h a n this for t h e p u r p o s e s of a critique of concepts b o r r o w e d from psychology; t h e rest is s u p plied by t h e Critique itself." K a n t believed these t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s were entirely legitimate e l e m e n t s in t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy, t h a t they did n o t violate its "purity," a n d , t h e r e f o r e , did not u n d e r m i n e its a priori claim. Moreover, if we take seriously the a r g u m e n t in " A m p h i b o l y of C o n c e p t s of Reflection" in the First Critique, it is precisely t h e s e which e n a b l e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy to take place at a l l . A historically g r o u n d e d characterization of Kant's p r o c e d u r e m u s t take seriously his faculty f r a m e w o r k — n o t as a m e r e empirical psychology but, especially t h r o u g h the device of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n , as t r a n s c e n d e n t a l psychology or, 72

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better, p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Such a methodological p r e m i s e underlies t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which f o l l o w s . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s m a d e possible the extension of the critical e n t e r p r i s e b e y o n d t h e strictly theoretical, p e r m i t t i n g the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g in reflective r e a s o n of those key aspects of h u m a n consciousness which K a n t identified with choice a n d with f e e l i n g . T h a t , in t u r n , considerably w i d e n e d the scope of possible propositions of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic" over against what was p e r m i t t e d u n d e r the far stricter t e r m s of the first edition of t h e First Critique. Kant's c o n c e r n to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t reason constitutes a n d regulates t h e wider h u m a n faculties (Gemütsvermögen) most i m m e diately d e t e r m i n e d his a p p r o a c h to the Third Critique, a n d most tellingly revealed his ultimately rationalist c o m m i t m e n t s in m e t a physics. F o r Kant, only in t h e m e a s u r e that reason governed, even in t h e s p h e r e of feeling, was t h e r e any validity or t r u t h in h u m a n c o m p r e h e n s i o n , or, m o r e broadly, any vestige of dignity a n d value in h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . T h e First Critique h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d reason's self-legislation in t h e s p h e r e of cognition. T h e Second Critique d e m o n s t r a t e d reason's legislation of t h e faculty of desire. T h e I n t r o d u c tion to t h e Third Critique a n n o u n c e d t h a t reason, t h r o u g h t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t , would n o w be s h o w n to provide a n a n a l o g o u s legislation for t h e faculty of feeling. O f course, as K a n t indicated in his letter to Reinhold, the scope of t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l legislation was n a r r o w e s t in t h e s p h e r e of feeling, w h e r e m a n k i n d was at its most " n a t u r a l , " b u t it was for K a n t a t r i u m p h nonetheless t h a t even t h e r e r e a s o n d e m o n s t r a t e d its s o v e r e i g n t y . If, as I infer, t h e object of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n is to t r a n s p o s e into a cognitive key all (or as m u c h as possible) of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , t h e n to find any r e n d e r i n g of p l e a s u r e — f o r K a n t t h e most recalcitrantly irrational c o m p o n e n t of t h a t e x p e r i e n c e — i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l form m u s t have b e e n a n extremely h e a d y a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , a n d o n e t h a t would i n d e e d confirm K a n t in his view of the aptness of his system. T o be in a position to u n d e r s t a n d it, however, we m u s t develop a m o r e r i g o r o u s conception of Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness. T h a t will r e q u i r e us to p l u n g e very deeply into Kant's t h e o r y of m e n t a l activity a n d into a serious p r o b l e m with his n o t i o n of "objectivity." 77

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Three

VALIDITY AND ACTUALITY: TOWARD KANT'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

K

a n t associates objectivity with actuality m a r k e d by " m a t e rial" sensation given involuntarily to subjective consciousness. B u t at t h e s a m e time K a n t claims t h a t objectivity is a question of validity, which can only be secured by u n d e r s t a n d i n g in its constitutive determinacy. T h e result is a p e r p l e x i n g ambiguity a b o u t t h e concept "objectivity" in Kant's epistemology. H o w does h e relate objective validity to objective reality (actuality)? I n t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c instance of a n empirical j u d g m e n t , t h e two conceptions coincide: objective validity simply is objective reality (actuality), i.e., t h e j u d g m e n t is about t h e object. T h e r e a r e , however, i m p o r t a n t instances in which validity a n d actuality d o n o t coincide. T h u s validity without actuality would have to be ascribed to g e n e r a l logic, to b e sure, b u t in a radically different sense also to some propositions of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic. C o n versely, a n d of m o r e i m m e d i a t e c o n c e r n , actuality w i t h o u t validity would have to b e ascribed to subjective states t h a t are n o t fully conceptual (e.g. animal o r infant consciousness). T h e question of subjective states p r i o r to cognition is crucial to the p r o b l e m of aesthetics for K a n t . 1

2

K a n t m o v e d from his relatively u n p r o b l e m a t i c n o t i o n of objective j u d g m e n t in t h e First Critique t h r o u g h the distinction of "judgm e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e " from " j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n " in t h e Prolegomena (1783) to his ultimate discrimination in the Third Critique ( a r o u n d 1789) between " d e t e r m i n a n t " a n d "reflective" j u d g m e n t . T h e p o i n t of this evolution was to distinguish a form of subjective j u d g m e n t , with its o w n references, rules, a n d validity. If, as some specialists in First Critique issues have p e r s u a d e d t h e m selves, K a n t r e v e r t e d to t h e original n o t i o n ofj u d g m e n t in his revisions of t h e First Critique (1786), t h e n these efforts could only have 3

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b e e n senseless. Given t h e historical fact t h a t these efforts did n o t s e e m senseless to Kant, the only o p t i o n is to i n t e r p r e t the B-version of t h e First Critique as consistent with these impulses. T h i s m e a n s t h a t a consistent construal of w h a t K a n t m e a n t in §26 of the B-version of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n , " w h e n h e claimed that all sensory e x p e r i e n c e is subject to t h e categories, even if not yet in a j u d g m e n t , is t h a t s o m e c o n t e n t s of consciousness are p r e c o n c e p tual. 4

Objective Judgment: Toward a Phenomenology of Empirical Concept Formation In his Logic, K a n t a r g u e s t h a t m a k i n g a concept distinct a n d m a k i n g a distinct c o n c e p t a r e by n o m e a n s t h e same. While m a k i n g a conc e p t distinct belongs in the s p h e r e of analytic logic, m a k i n g a distinct c o n c e p t is a synthetic project, a n d o n e which r e q u i r e s t h a t givenness of m a t t e r in intuition which is t h e focus of o u r c o n c e r n . H e t h e n explains t h e process of constituting a n object. T h i s constitution in K a n t i a n epistemology is a n extremely complicated project to d e c i p h e r . For o n e t h i n g , K a n t is far m o r e c o n c e r n e d with establishing that objective j u d g m e n t is possible in general a n d valid in principle t h a n h e is with explicating how it is accomplished concretely. Empirical j u d g m e n t s apply (schematized) categories to actual sensible intuition to g e n e r a t e j u d g m e n t s with claims to "objective validity." T h i s second o r empirical synthesis n e e d s to b e transcendentally analyzed n o less t h a n t h e originary, " t r a n s c e n d e n tal" or p u r e synthesis. All sensible intuition is in space a n d time, a n d space a n d time as p u r e intuition a r e s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e (schematized) categories, b u t t h a t does n o t yet establish t h a t particular regions of space a n d time s h o u l d be vested with particular material predicates, d e s i g n a t e d accordingly as a n instance of some g e n e r a l rule, a n d given a n a m e (empirical concept). 5

Empirical concepts are results, n o t f o u n d a t i o n s . T h e unity in a concept t h a t results from a n e m p i r i c a l j u d g m e n t is made, n o t f o u n d . B u t t h a t p r o c e d u r e of constituting a n empirical c o n c e p t does d r a w o n t h e p r i m o r d i a l , s t r u c t u r i n g categories a n d h e n c e u p o n (schematized) concepts. T h e r e is, accordingly, a crucial ambiguity t h a t m u s t always b e b o r n e in m i n d in considering Kant's discussion of concepts. W h e n K a n t speaks of concepts b e i n g always indispensable for j u d g m e n t , h e m u s t be t a k e n to m e a n t h e categories a n d only the categories. Empirical concepts, t h e p r o d u c t s of j u d g m e n t s , are objects constituted, n o t p r e s u p p o s e d , in these j u d g m e n t s .

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T h e y a r e fashioned in a c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l process Kant calls generally "synthesis." I n t h e Prolegomena a n d in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic" of the First Critique K a n t gives a m o r e detailed a c c o u n t of it. H e writes of a p p e a r a n c e s (Erscheinungen) involving sensation which "does not itself occupy any part of space or of time." I n §vii of t h e Third Critique, K a n t describes "space" as a form of intuition internal to consciousness; consequently, "objects" as we r e p r e s e n t t h e m by d e p l o y m e n t in t h a t space are merely p h e n o m e n a l . Yet h e insists these spatial r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s nevertheless refer to empirically real (external) objects. K a n t t e r m s sensation a similarly subjective e l e m e n t , b u t o n e which provides t h e " m a t t e r " for objective reference. Actuality as givenness-in-intuition r e q u i r e s n o t merely t h e " f o r m " of space b u t existence, or " m a t t e r " p r o v i d e d in "sensation." T h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Critique of Judgment defines sensation in §vii as t h e "subjective side of o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of external things, b u t o n e which is p r o p e r l y their m a t t e r ( t h r o u g h which we m u s t b e given s o m e t h i n g with real e x i s t e n c e ) . " " A p p e a r a n c e " we m i g h t call "figure" (Gestalt), a n d t h e m e n t a l activity which necessarily r e s p o n d s to sense data by projecting such figures in space a n d time, "configuration" (Gestaltung) or "delineation" (Zeichnung). T o configure in space a n d in d u r a t i o n is the first m e n t a l activity associated with the givenness of e x p e r i e n c e in sensibility. It constitutes "extensive m a g n i t u d e " a n d is precisely what we m e a n by t h e word " o u t e r " in its most simple sense, which Descartes would have called "extension." B u t p e r c e p t i o n also contains ("besides intuition") w h a t is "real" in a p p e a r a n c e s : sensat i o n . Sensation, however, occupies n o p a r t of space a n d t i m e . It is entirely a modification of t h e subject. Kant t h u s t e r m s sensation a n "intensive m a g n i t u d e " a n d denies it as a n objective r e p r e s e n t a tion. Nevertheless it "refers" to the reality in a p p e a r a n c e s ; consciousness ascribes this c o n t e n t or " m a t t e r " to these figures based entirely u p o n i n t e r n a l r e s p o n s e . Assigning color, flavor, t e x t u r e , or w a r m t h to these figures (which we necessarily associate with given volumes for given d u r a t i o n s in a unitary field of space a n d time based o n sense data) "fills" t h e a p p e a r a n c e s configured in space. 7

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W h a t K a n t is offering is a n e w twist o n t h e contrast of p r i m a r y a n d secondary q u a l i t i e s . I n Kant's version, t h e e l e m e n t of " a p p e a r a n c e , " t h e disposition of intuitions in space a n d time, is as subjective as t h e qualities of taste, color, a n d so on, a n d even these latter, t h o u g h merely modifications of the subject, nevertheless offer d a t a c o n c e r n i n g , a n d h e n c e "refer" to, objects external to t h e 13

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subject. B u t space a n d time a r e "ideal," w h e r e a s sensation is merely "private." C o n t r a s t the necessary singularity a n d identity of space a n d time, n o t only for o n e subject b u t for all, with t h e u t t e r plurality of sensation, for e x a m p l e , t h e s h a d e of blue or t h e taste of honey. T h e r e is n o g u a r a n t e e t h a t all such sensations are identical intersubjectively. I n d e e d , t h e r e is even evidence o n the o t h e r s i d e . 14

Internality to consciousness, t h e r e f o r e , m u s t not be identified with " m e r e " — i . e . , idiosyncratic or private—subjectivity. T h e distinction of t h e ideal from t h e private is what m a k e s space a n d time empirically real in a way t h a t is m o r e p r i m o r d i a l (they a r e , in t h a t sense, " p r i m a r y qualities") t h a n the simple givenness of a certain, individually m o d u l a t e d d e g r e e of sensation—color, w a r m t h , flavor, a n d so o n (which a r e , h e n c e , secondary qualities). It is j u s t by virtue of this distinction of the necessary universality, i.e., i n t e r s u b jectivity, of t h e ideal s t r u c t u r e of space a n d time, that Kant claims h e is a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , n o t a solipsistic i d e a l i s t . 15

K a n t seems to c o n t e n d t h a t n e i t h e r a p p e a r a n c e n o r sensation suffices for t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e existence or "externality" of a n object. It seems to lie in its i n d e p e n d e n c e of subjectivity, its public character, o r universality, b u t t h a t is n o t sufficiently clarified yet. T h e decisive e l e m e n t for t r u e r e f e r e n c e to t h e object is still missing. K a n t writes: Everything, every r e p r e s e n t a t i o n even, in so far as we are conscious of it, may b e entitled object. B u t it is a question for d e e p e r e n q u i r y w h a t the w o r d "object" o u g h t to signify in respect of a p p e a r a n c e s w h e n these are viewed n o t in so far as they a r e (as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ) objects, but only in so far as they stand for a n object. T h e a p p e a r a n c e s , in so far as they a r e objects of consciousness simply in virtue of b e i n g r e p r e s e n t a tions, a r e n o t in any way distinct from their a p p r e h e n s i o n , that is, from t h e i r r e c e p t i o n in t h e synthesis of i m a g i n a t i o n . 16

What is a t t e n d e d does n o t c h a n g e ; everything hinges o n a c h a n g e in how we a t t e n d it. "Object," in its r i g o r o u s Kantian sense, must, t h e n , be constituted o u t o f — a n d p r o m o t e d f r o m — t h i s m e r e subjectivity of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . We m u s t c o n s t r u e as object w h a t is " n o t h i n g b u t t h e s u m of these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . " T h a t is what it m e a n s to recognize existence, Kant claims. Objective reference requires postulation of t h e existence of such " a p p e a r a n c e s a n d their relation to o n e a n o t h e r in respect of their e x i s t e n c e . " Accordingly, h e reform u l a t e s his n o t i o n of t h e synthesis in a c o g n i t i v e j u d g m e n t in t h r e e levels: "of m e r e intuition (that is, of t h e form of a p p e a r a n c e ) , of 17

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p e r c e p t i o n (that is, of t h e m a t t e r of p e r c e p t i o n ) , a n d of e x p e r i e n c e (that is, of t h e relation of t h e s e p e r c e p t i o n s ) . " N o t e t h e s e q u e n c e form-matter-relation. E x p e r i e n c e is a h i g h e r o r d e r integration t h a n a p p e a r a n c e or sensation, a n d only at that level is t h e object truly constituted as e x t e r n a l existence. T h i s p r o m o t i o n can only result from " r e g a r d i n g t h e formal conditions of empirical t r u t h . " T h a t is: " a p p e a r a n c e , in contradistinction to t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of a p p r e h e n s i o n , can b e r e p r e s e n t e d as a n object distinct from t h e m only if it stands u n d e r a rule which distinguishes i t . . . a n d necessitates s o m e o n e particular m o d e of c o n n e c t i o n of t h e m a n i f o l d . " T h i s formulation is exactly t h a t of a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , which entails s u b s u m i n g t h e m a n ifold u n d e r a definite c o n c e p t or r u l e . A " j u d g m e n t of experie n c e , " in t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e Prolegomena, posits what Kant asserted in t h e "Analogies of E x p e r i e n c e " of t h e First Critique: "I r e n d e r my subjective synthesis of a p p r e h e n s i o n objective only by r e f e r e n c e to a r u l e . " Again, K a n t privileges t h e sense of objectivity as validity ( s u b s u m p t i o n u n d e r a universal rule) as against t h e sense of objectivity as givenness. W h a t is given is still in t h e subject, a n d only conceptualization lifts it to objectivity. C o n s e q u e n t l y it is in o u r appraisal of t h e relation of t h e r e p r e sentation to t h e universal rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e decisive question of objectivity is a d d r e s s e d . N o t e t h a t n o t h i n g is a d d e d to t h e c o n t e n t of t h e concept; only t h e validity is r e a p p r a i s e d . T h a t , precisely, is t h e d o m a i n of t h e modality of j u d g m e n t . It is via t h e modality of j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e distinction is first m a d e b e t w e e n merely possible objects a n d objects to which we ascribe a c t u a l i t y . I n d e e d , it is only because within this modality we have access to a n even h i g h e r criterion, necessity, t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n has any p r o s pect of viability. Because t h e modality of necessity is efficacious in t h e schematization of a n object-in-general, t h e modality of actuality is efficacious in empirical j u d g m e n t s , a n d we have t h e r i g h t to posit existence in a j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e . 19

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All objective j u d g m e n t s e m p l o y empirical concepts a n d g r o u n d their claim in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w a r r a n t of t h e categories, b u t they also n e e d t h a t through which t h e j u d g m e n t can relate immediately to its object: intuition. I n t u i t i o n provides t h e requisite features of singularity ("this o n e specific") a n d immediacy ("actual" or given). B u t w h a t exactly is a n i n t u i t i o n ? K a n t equivocates severely between a receptive a n d a s p o n t a n e o u s — i . e . , passive versus active—interpretation of intuition. As sensibility, intuition is associated with r e c e p tivity a n d passivity. As i m a g i n a t i o n , h o w e v e r — a n d t h e r e is a very 26

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i m p o r t a n t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n imagination a n d intuition—it is s p o n t a n e o u s a n d active. T h e r e is a very significant d e g r e e of overlap b e t w e e n t h e strictly "receptive" conception of intuition (the discussion in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic") a n d t h e "synthetic" sense of it in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic," n o t only in t h e socalled "Subjective D e d u c t i o n , " b u t in the "Schematism" c h a p t e r a n d in t h e "Analytic of Principles." Formal andformative a r e words which K a n t invariably assigns to t h e s p o n t a n e o u s side of his discursive dichotomy, to t h e m i n d or t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g broadly conceived. O n e can simply h o l d K a n t guilty of a n " e r r o r " for t h i n k i n g of intuition o r imagination in this w a y . T h e role of i m a g i n a t i o n in k n o w l e d g e has b e e n controversial especially in t h e light of t h e analytic effort to " u p d a t e " Kant. P e r h a p s o n e of t h e most powerful initiatives in t h a t direction c a m e from Peter S t r a w s o n . Moreover, t h e r e is a serious difference between t h e two versions of t h e First Critique o n t h e question of imagination. While t h e original edition of t h e First Critique assigns to i m a g i n a t i o n n o t only t h e capacity for a synthesis of intuition b u t alm o s t t h e w h o l e responsibility for synthesis as such, t h e B-version seems to w i t h d r a w most such credit from i m a g i n a t i o n a n d assigns synthesis exclusively to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e project to liquid a t e i m a g i n a t i o n a l t o g e t h e r from "acceptable" Kant materials was carried forward by J o n a t h a n B e n n e t t , a n d especially by Eva S c h a p e r . T h e i r resistance to any " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l psychology" or "metaphysics" in Kant's n o t i o n of i m a g i n a t i o n is p e r h a p s the c o u n t e r p a r t of a n excess of e n t h u s i a s m precisely for those aspects by t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n c a m p . 27

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Far m o r e interesting is t h e effort to see in i m a g i n a t i o n / intuition, in this formative sense, a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m o m e n t in the synthesis of a n empirical j u d g m e n t , a n d to b r e a k this m o m e n t o u t for closer e x a m i n a t i o n . I n s t e a d of seeing t h e claims of synthesis as a m a t t e r e i t h e r of narrowly conceived u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( j u d g m e n t involving objective concepts) o r of narrowly conceived i m a g i n a t i o n (without a n y connection with concepts), it m i g h t be wise to see each as e l e m e n t s in Kant's g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h to t h e synthetics p o n t a n e o u s participation of m i n d in k n o w l e d g e . I n d e e d , t h e r e may well be g r o u n d s for a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e first schematizations of t h e categories, those of quantity a n d quality, t e n d in a very substantial m e a s u r e to m e r g e r a t h e r t h a n to differentiate t h e p r o p e r l y intuitive a n d t h e p r o p e r l y c o n c e p t u a l projects. Might it n o t be m o r e fruitful to recognize in these initial m o m e n t s of t h e construction of empirical c o n c e p t s a far m o r e c o m p l e x symbiosis of imagination Validity and Actuality

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a n d conceptualization t h a n r e c e n t analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s find comfortable? K a n t t e n d s to think t h a t o r d i n a r y consciousness simply is j u d g m e n t s , i.e., voluntary synthesis-acts of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Accordingly, t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " is frequently taken to hold t h a t n o t h i n g can b e in consciousness that is not t h e p r o d u c t of a c o n c e p t u a l s y n t h e s i s . All r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s — e v e n those n o t already in a unified intuition—must be d e t e r m i n e d by the categories in o r d e r to b e a m a t t e r of j u d g m e n t , i.e., to b e available for consciousness at a l l . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is n o t only prima facie implausible, it r u n s afoul of very i m p o r t a n t textual e v i d e n c e . T h e scholarship o n K a n t has m o v e d very firmly t o w a r d a n alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . P e r h a p s t h e most powerful influence has b e e n G e r o l d Prauss, with his work, Erscheinung bei Kant. A n o t h e r imp o r t a n t influence was Beck's essay, "Did t h e Sage of Königsberg Have N o D r e a m s ? " A wide r a n g e of scholars have, in a typically d i s p a r a t e m a n n e r , a c k n o w l e d g e d this issue of subjective i m m e diacy. Moltke G r a m a n d G r a h a m Bird b o t h distinguish a " s t r o n g " from a "weak" sense of e x p e r i e n c e o r objectivity for consciousness. G r a m notes: "if objects can a p p e a r to us without s t a n d i n g u n d e r t h e categories, t h e n we can have e x p e r i e n c e of objects without synthesizing intuition according to t h e c a t e g o r i e s . " T h i s p r o b l e m a t i c result m a d e sense given two distinct notions of " e x p e r i e n c e , " only t h e s t r o n g e r of which would m e r i t "objective validity." As Bird sees it, we can have m o r e e x p e r i e n c e t h a n we can recognize. H e makes m u c h of Kant's line t h a t " a p p e a r a n c e s can certainly be given in intuition i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e functions of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h i s weak sense of object, however, still allows t h e subject to recognize t h e object as b e i n g of a d e t e r m i n a t e sort, a n d t h u s achieve t h e "strong" s e n s e . 32

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H e n r i c h a n d Paul G u y e r p u r s u e this p r o b l e m in t e r m s of two senses of t h e t e r m " m i n e , " d r a w i n g o n t h e obvious i m p o r t a n c e for K a n t of t h e "unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n . " As H e n r i c h p u t s it: "Sensibility is distinct from self-consciousness . . . [A]s l o n g as it is only available to be t a k e n u p into consciousness, it is n o t at all 'mine'; b u t only 'in relation to m e . ' " G u y e r finds H e n r i c h ' s formulation u n clear, b u t n o t t h e p o i n t h e is trying to articulate, a n d offers a variant which h e thinks p u t s it better: " T h e r e m i g h t be cases in which o n e is conscious w i t h o u t recognizing i t . . . [Gathers may recognize m e to b e in a state which I d o n o t o r c a n n o t recognize as m i n e . " Even Daniel Kolb, w h o is m u c h closer to t h e old i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , acknowl4 1

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edges t h a t "it is always possible to distinguish between t h e way in which a t h i n g seems in p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h e way t h e t h i n g actually i s . " Guyer, evaluating H e n r i c h ' s most e x t e n d e d effort to m a k e sense of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n , " m a d e w h a t m a n y take to b e t h e most p r o m i s i n g m o v e : "Every transition in consciousness [is] explicable by j u d g m e n t s e m p l o y i n g t h e categories b u t n o t expressible solely in such j u d g m e n t s . " Ameriks, i n d e e d , c o n t e n d s t h a t " K a n t was quite aware of a n d quite c o n c e r n e d with a c c o u n t i n g for items that initially a r e n o t t a k e n explicitly as fully unified a n d d e t e r m i n e d by t h e categor i e s . " H e goes o n to claim t h a t " K a n t was p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l e n o u g h to believe in a difference between a n a p p e a r a n c e in t h e g e n e r a l sense of any kind of idea before t h e m i n d , a n d a n a p p e a r a n c e in t h e specific sense of a self-manifesting given . . . [I]t is t h e latter kind of a p p e a r a n c e t h a t is Kant's m a i n c o n c e r n in §26 . . . [with] its d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t the categories apply 'even' for 'perc e p t i o n ' ( B 1 6 1 ) . " A m e r i k s a c k n o w l e d g e d "the i m p o r t a n c e of Prauss' g e n e r a l i d e a for d e v e l o p i n g a sophisticated K a n t i a n acc o u n t of t h e subjective side of o u r p e r c e p t u a l life . . . [A] K a n t i a n t h e o r y c a n n o t i g n o r e this issue . . . [but] i t . . . m u s t c o n s t r u e t h e realm as also subject, in s o m e kind of derivative way, to j u d g m e n t and the categories." For Prauss, t h e essential n a t u r e of Kant's objective j u d g m e n t is a Deutung—a process of " m e t a m o r p h o s i s " of subjective d a t a of consciousness into objects. T h e r e is in t h a t process n o p a u s e to consider t h e subjective d a t a in themselves. H e notes t h a t such givens a r e not, as such, m a t t e r s of cognitive attention for o r d i n a r y consciousness. T h e y a r e worked through—verwandelt (Kant) o r gedeutet (Prauss)—as t h e letters a n d i n d e e d words of a text a r e w o r k e d t h r o u g h a n d a b a n d o n e d for t h e m e a n i n g they b e t o k e n . Consciousness finds itself always already in t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e . It can p e r f o r m a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis u p o n t h a t l a n g u a g e , however, a n d t h a t will lead it retrospectively to realize t h e necessary existence in consciousness of a p p e a r a n c e s as such. B u t t h e p r o b l e m t h a t faces such a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis is h o w ever to talk a b o u t a p p e a r a n c e s in their o w n right, prior to t h e object into which they have b e e n c o n s t i t u t e d . T o focus o n t h e m is a c o n s e q u e n c e e i t h e r of s o m e p r o b l e m of r e a d i n g (e.g. "decipheri n g " a c o r r u p t text, to stay with t h e m e t a p h o r ) , or of a n interest in t h e process of reading (i.e., h o w is it actually that letters a n d words make a text which can b e r e a d ? ) . 43

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T h i s last q u e s t i o n is p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l . It, too, can be b r o k e n Validity and Actuality

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o u t into two aspects. First, it can b e seen as a regression from fully objective j u d g m e n t s into t h e i r constitutive m o m e n t s for t h e sake of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g o r validating t h a t objective p r o c e d u r e . Second, it can b e conceived as a n inventory of subjective states: a n effort to catalog all t h e possible c o n t e n t s available to consciousness, w h e t h e r or n o t they b e c o m e e l e m e n t s in a cognitive j u d g m e n t . I n t h e first of these inquiries, t h e j u d g m e n t s t h a t a r e g e n e r a t e d a r e p r o p e r l y transcendental, n o t subjective. I n t h e second, t h e j u d g m e n t s seem to be merely psychological. While they a r e a b o u t t h e subject, however, it d o e s n o t follow t h a t all such j u d g m e n t s are themselves subjective (as c o n c e r n s validity). T h u s , to claim t h a t colors a r e subjective qualities—that, e.g., " g r e e n " is a s e n s u o u s c o n t e n t of my p e r c e p tion—says n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e objective validity of t h e j u d g m e n t . G r e e n is a p r o p e r t y , however subjectively registered, t h a t features into objective j u d g m e n t s . W h a t is it, t h e n , t h a t constitutes t h e subjectivity of j u d g m e n t s , a n d h o w can they still he judgments in t h e Kantian sense of t h e t e r m ? Prauss identifies t h r e e decisive features such a n analysis m u s t explicate. First, t h e r e m u s t be a judgment, a n d j u d g m e n t s r e q u i r e t h e categories. Yet it c a n n o t refer to t h e object since that already bypasses t h e a p p e a r a n c e s in t h e i r o w n right. T o qualify as a j u d g m e n t , s o m e categories m u s t obtain, yet o t h e r s , equally essentially, m u s t not, for t h e full application of t h e categories necessarily constitutes a n object, a n d t h e subjective a p p e a r a n c e as such gets a n n u l l e d . Second, this j u d g m e n t m u s t b e of a particular form: it m u s t be a first p e r s o n j u d g m e n t in t h e sense n o t only that it is by b u t also t h a t it is a b o u t t h e subject, a n d as such it m u s t m a k e a claim to validity (Gültigkeit), which while subjective in scope is nevertheless compellingly a c t u a l . Finally, a n d logically in light of t h e genesis of t h e p r o b l e m , a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n m u s t c o r r e s p o n d to each a n d every j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , since its "object" (Objekt) is precisely t h e " a p p e a r a n c e " (Erscheinung) o u t of which t h e "object" (Gegenstand) was constituted by t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e . 5 2

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Prauss takes subjective j u d g m e n t s to signify acts of j u d g m e n t a b o u t — h e n c e conscious attention to—pre-objective d a t a of consciousness (Erscheinungen as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s eligible for constitution into objects). Prauss correctly claims that, as such, ^judgment of p e r c e p tion can b e possible only in light of, i n d e e d parasitically comp o u n d e d from, a p r i o r j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e in a kind of reversal o r s u s p e n s i o n of p a r t of its process. T h e r e b y it borrows the (conceptual) l a n g u a g e of t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , i.e., it applies t h e 72

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c o n c e p t u a l " n a m e s " of objects to w h a t a r e only t h e i r subjective concomitants. M o r e importantly, it borrows t h e form of t h e j u d g m e n t itself, r e n d e r i n g it " p r o b l e m a t i c " a n d subjective by reversing t h e objective r e f e r e n c e t h r o u g h t h e s u s p e n s i o n of t h e categories of relation which alone constituted a n objective o r d e r e x t e r n a l to t h e subject. It follows t h a t j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t literally be t a k e n as constitutive in t h e genesis ofj u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e . It is r a t h e r t h a t t h e e l e m e n t s appraised in a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n a r e t h e e l e m e n t s m e t a m o r p h o s e d (gedeutet) into a n object by t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e . Nevertheless, K a n t d i d u s e l a n g u a g e in t h e Prolegomena t h a t suggested a sequential s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e two j u d g m e n t s . T h a t u s a g e fits into a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Kant's t h e o r y of e m pirical c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n which takes a n empirical j u d g m e n t as a "synthetic act" in t h e u n c o n v e n t i o n a l sense t h a t it is n o t simply a c o m p o u n d of active u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d passive sensibility, b u t r a t h e r t h e o u t c o m e of a n initial intuitive formation (by imagination) "taken u p " into a cognitive j u d g m e n t : i.e., a subjective synthesis c o m p o u n d e d , o r m o r e precisely validated, by c o n c e p t u a l g e n e r a l ization. Richard Aquila h a s a r g u e d for such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n vigorously in a series of works. Setting o u t from t h e serious ambiguity in Kant's n o t i o n of synthesis, h e recognizes t h e i m p u l s e in t h e scholarship to seek to resolve t h e conflict by a r e d u c t i o n of synthesis either to u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r to imagination. N e i t h e r resolution is plausible, however. T h e r e f o r e , Aquila opts for a constructive o r seq u e n t i a l a p p r o a c h to empirical c o n c e p t formation. Citing t h e " V i e n n a Logic," Aquila suggests t h a t t h e issue is, in Kant's o w n words, " h o w it comes a b o u t t h a t repraesentatio singularis b e c o m e s communis." I n his o w n t e r m s , "in s o m e sense o r other, empirical conceptualization is a n o p e r a t i o n by which empirical intuitions a r e themselves converted, if n o t literally into concepts, t h e n i n t o determ i n a t e empirical c o n c e p t i o n s . " T h i s sense of " p r o m o t i o n " is t h e key to his r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Kant. H e writes of "intuition's elevation, t h r o u g h t h e elevation of s o m e material in it, to a specifically conceptualized status." T h e crucial point, however, is t h a t s o m e of t h e synthesis m u s t already have t r a n s p i r e d at t h e level of intuit i o n / i m a g i n a t i o n : "at least p a r t of t h e j o b of imagination is to 'synthesize' t h e m a t e r i a l . . . a n intuition m u s t contain, q u i t e in itself, t h e manifold of all t h e material t h a t is merely 'associated' with i t . " H e n c e Aquila a r g u e s t h a t we m u s t recognize " t h e n e e d t h a t K a n t m i g h t have felt for a g e n u i n e l y p r e c o n c e p t u a l a n d precategorical 55

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f o r m of imaginative r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a p p r o p r i a t e l y 'associated' with any intuition to which concepts a r e s u p p o s e d a p p l i c a b l e . " H e n c e "we m u s t t h i n k of t h e conceptualization of a n intuition in t e r m s of s o m e sort of i n t e r n a l alteration of that very intuition . . . s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a p p e n s to it together with w h a t e v e r intuitional expectations it already c o n t a i n s . " H e concludes: "at least p a r t of w h a t conceptualization a d d s to t h e work of m e r e i m a g i n a t i o n involves elevating t h e level of consciousness involved in t h e imaginative expectations in q u e s t i o n , " h e n c e " a n objective j u d g m e n t involves a n objective relationship among the very same representations that a purely associative ' j u d g m e n t ' connects in a merely subjective m a n n e r . " It is p r e cisely t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n intuitively i n t e g r a t e d 'object' to t h e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a whole, t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures of consciousness, t h a t p r o m o t e s m e r e subjective e x p e r i e n c e to objectivity. H e n r y Allison has m a d e a n a r g u m e n t a l o n g a similar line. H e starts from t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t " a n intuition is itself a r e p r e s e n t a tion of a n individual object, quite a p a r t from any c o n c e p t u a l determ i n a t i o n , " d r a w i n g s u p p o r t from t h e n o t e Kant m a d e u p o n receipt of a letter from J a c o b S i g i s m u n d Beck in 1 7 9 1 : " T o m a k e a concept, by m e a n s of intuition, into a cognition of a n object, is i n d e e d t h e work of j u d g m e n t ; b u t t h e r e f e r e n c e of intuition to a n object in g e n e r a l is n o t . " Allison c o n t i n u e s : "having a set of sensible impressions t h a t are associated with o n e a n o t h e r is not the same as h a v i n g a c o n c e p t . . . [ T h a t ] is p r o d u c e d by a series of 'logical acts' of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t K a n t t e r m s 'comparison,' 'reflection,' and 'abstraction.'" 61

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T h i s a p p r o a c h , which will b e closely paralleled in my o w n acc o u n t , can be linked to Kant's strategy in t h e Prolegomena. While Prauss would n o t find this line of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n acceptable, h e did offer s o m e i m p o r t a n t leads that can b e t a k e n u p into it. First, h e n o t e d t h a t t h e so-called m a t h e m a t i c a l categories in fact a p p e a r e d indifferent as to the question of the e x t e r n a l reference o r objectivity of t h e i r " o b j e c t s . " H e n o t e d , further, t h e very close c o n n e c tion b e t w e e n t h e s e categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e p u r e forms of i n t u i t i o n . H e t h e n c o n c l u d e d that the categories of quantity a n d quality very likely h a d to b e involved in w h a t K a n t called a " j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n , " b u t t h a t t h e " d y n a m i c " categories did n o t . With t h e suspension of t h e categories of relation, however, all claims to objective validity a r e s u s p e n d e d a n d t h e j u d g m e n t is r e n d e r e d problematically subjective. T h a t is to say, such j u d g m e n t s can "only b e m a d e by myself a b o u t my o w n — b y any 68

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subject only a b o u t his o w n — s e n s i b l e a p p e a r a n c e [ErscheinunA similar recognition t h a t j u d g m e n t s involving only t h e gen]." (schematized) categories of quantity a n d quality b u t n o t carried t h r o u g h to t h e categories of relation o r modality m i g h t be at t h e h e a r t of Kant's n o t i o n of subjective j u d g m e n t is to be f o u n d in t h e crucial essays of Lewis Beck, Mary G r e g o r , a n d J. Michael Y o u n g . Beck starts from a clear stance o n t h e p r o b l e m of subjective immediacy: " K a n t does n o t a n y w h e r e say t h a t t h e 'I think' m u s t acc o m p a n y all of my r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ; h e says merely that it m u s t be able to a c c o m p a n y t h e m . . . A p e r c e p t i o n that could not be accomp a n i e d by 'I think' 'would n o t b e l o n g to any e x p e r i e n c e , conseq u e n t l y would b e without a n object, merely a blind play of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , less even t h a n a d r e a m . ' ( A 1 1 2 ) " Beck a r g u e s that w h a t c a n n o t serve in a objective j u d g m e n t m i g h t nevertheless b e relevant for subjective r e c k o n i n g , a n d h e asserts t h a t this is t h e precise s p h e r e of "empirical psychology." In such reckonings, d a t a could be "categorized without b e i n g objectified." Nevertheless, for such r e c k o n i n g s to b e " j u d g m e n t s " in the Kantian sense, certain rules m u s t apply. Some categories prove indispensable. B u t "if all even tacit r e f e r e n c e to objects were e x c l u d e d from t h e j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l categories would still apply to t h e intensive m a g n i t u d e . . . T h e Anticipation of Perception a p p l i e s . " T h e r e f o r e , Beck concludes, "aesthetic j u d g m e n t s d o n o t e m p l o y t h e dynamical categories a n d principles of substance, causality, a n d existence . . . B u t t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l categories a n d principles certainly d o apply . . . T h e concepts which K a n t holds d o not play a role in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of (pure) aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e a r e n o t categorical concepts b u t e m p i r i c a l . " Beck t h e n suggests t h a t "the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment seems to have g r o w n o u t of t h e doctrines of t h e Prolegomena which were rejected in t h e second edition of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. " 1 a g r e e with the first point, b u t n o t t h e second: i n d e e d , because of t h e connection between t h e Critique of Judgment a n d t h e Prolegomena o n this issue, we may n o t take t h e second edition of t h e First Critique as a rejection of these i d e a s . 71

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G r e g o r , too, begins with t h e a p p a r e n t conflict between t h e Prolegomena a n d t h e Third Critique, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e ultimate form of t h e First Critique o n t h e o t h e r : " T h e Prolegomena's t h e o r y a b o u t j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n which d o n o t s u b s u m e sense d a t a u n d e r t h e categories, t o g e t h e r with Kant's insistence t h a t t h e p u r e j u d g m e n t of taste d o e s n o t s u b s u m e u n d e r a concept, m i g h t suggest that t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 'this,' in 'this is beautiful,' escapes t h e c a t e g o r i e s . " G r e g o r a r g u e s t h a t any j u d g m e n t , even the j u d g 78

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m e n t of taste, m u s t , o n t h e most indisputable r e a d i n g of t h e First Critique, involve a relation to t h e unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n possible only via t h e categories. W h a t she t h e n does is d e v e l o p t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e " m a t h e m a t i c a l categories" feature centrally in Kant's n o tion of form in aesthetic j u d g m e n t s . Y o u n g n o t e s t h a t "concepts of a highly empirical s o r t . . . to a large e x t e n t simply m i r r o r t h e functions of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . " A n d later in his essay, in c o n s i d e r i n g t h e crucial p r o b l e m of schematism, h e develops t h e p o i n t even m o r e strikingly: "I take K a n t to h o l d t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of q u a n t i t y — w h e t h e r of quantity in g e n e r a l , o r of a specific, d e t e r m i n a t e q u a n t i t y — i s t h e c o n c e p t of a feature t h a t can be a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d only by m e a n s of i n t u i t i o n . " W h a t I, in t u r n , take Y o u n g to m e a n is t h a t in t h e initial schematization of t h e categories of quantity a n d quality it is n o t at all clear t h a t it is u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d n o t i m a g i n a t i o n (as intuition) which is t h e p r i m a r y formative o r "synthetic" a g e n t . T h e initiation of t h e empirical j u d g m e n t is c o n d u c t e d in i n t u i t i o n — b y imagination. T h e coordination of sensation into a sing u l a r intuition c a n n o t be t h e function of concepts. T h a t work m u s t b e d o n e — t o be s u r e in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g — b y i m a g i n a t i o n . C o n c e p t s a r e rules which apply to several possible instantiations. All concepts, t h e r e f o r e , w h e t h e r p u r e o r empirical, are g e n e r a l . If all j u d g m e n t s involve concepts a n d all concepts a r e g e n e r a l rules, t h e n t h e singular individual, in its u n i q u e d e t e r m i n a c y a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n , becomes problematic. T h e r e f e r e n c e of any c o n c e p t to a particular ("numerically singular") instance is simply i n d e t e r m i n a t e at t h e level of t h e concept itself. Accordingly, K a n t calls concepts without intuitions empty. E m p t y does n o t m e a n false or contradictory. I n formal t e r m s , j u d g m e n t s u s i n g such concepts a r e perfectly lucid. It is w h e n we move from formal to real use of j u d g m e n t t h a t this p r o b l e m arises. 79

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At t h e level of concepts, "this tennis ball" never m a k e s any advance over "tennis ball." T h e modifier is pointless unless it can p o i n t b e y o n d l a n g u a g e — b e y o n d concepts to existence. T o be s u r e , t h e l a n g u a g e can try to offer predicates t h a t differentiate this kind of ball from o t h e r balls (e.g., hollow, elastic) or from o t h e r tennis balls (e.g., white). B u t t h e r e a r e a lot of tennis balls t h a t fit t h e most exhaustive description (there can b e n o lowest level of specification of c o n c e p t s ) . O n e can only specify ultimately in intuition. M o r e over, n o t h i n g in t h e c o n c e p t can fully specify t h e similarly particular version of each of its p r e d i c a t e d p r o p e r t i e s (e.g, which white? h o w elastic?) or, m o r e crucially, t h e coordination of these p r o p e r t i e s 83

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into a n integral whole. A n empirical c o n c e p t names s o m e t h i n g t h a t concepts c a n n o t fully constitute. A n d , of course, t h e concept of a tennis ball, h o w e v e r d e t e r m i n a t e l y specified, can never be played o n a tennis court. O n e n e e d s t h e actual ball. T h i s p r o b l e m can be resolved only by t h e extension of concepts t h r o u g h s c h e m a t a into t h e field of s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l intuition, w h e r e n u m e r i c a l singularity can be constituted as a r e g i o n of extension a n d d u r a t i o n .

Subjective Judgment: States and Another "Kind of Judging"

Appraisals,

If we take it t h a t for K a n t j u d g m e n t is simply t h e form of all conscious a t t e n t i o n , such t h a t t h e r e can literally be n o conscious attention w i t h o u t a n explicit j u d g m e n t , t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e r e c a n n o t b e a g r e a t deal available for conscious a t t e n t i o n t h a t does n o t get a t t e n d e d , that d o e s n o t e n t e r into j u d g m e n t s . O n e would, accordingly, n e e d to distinguish b e t w e e n a n awareness which e n c o m p a s s e d all presence-to-consciousness, a n d a conscious attention p r o p e r , which involved w h a t achieved recognition in j u d g m e n t . T o be even available to consciousness is to b e " m i n e , " b u t m i n e in a far weaker sense t h a n it is w h e n it is a p p r o p r i a t e d into consciousness by a n act ofj u d g m e n t . O n e can still acknowledge t h a t conscious attention r e q u i r e s a n act of empirical j u d g m e n t . T h e p o i n t is, however, t h a t t h e r e can be m o r e t h a n o n e kind of empirical j u d g m e n t : n o t simply t h e objective r e f e r e n c e of cognition, b u t t h e subjective r e f e r e n c e of aesthetics a n d reflection. Kant clearly recognized t h r e e forms of "subjective j u d g m e n t " over t h e course of t h e 1780s: 1. " j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n " 2. " j u d g m e n t s of taste" 3. "(logical) reflective j u d g m e n t s . " H o w it is possible for K a n t to use t h e word " j u d g m e n t " in this c o n t e x t — a n d w h a t t h e implications may b e — p r o v e s essential to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Third Critique. I n d e e d , as a Critique of Judgment, it is d e d i c a t e d to t h e e x a m i n a t i o n of this p r o b l e m . We n e e d to distinguish "subjective objects" (subjektive Gegenstände), to use Prauss's p h r a s e , from subjective judgments. One m i g h t ask w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which can never bec o m e e l e m e n t s in a n objective cognition. T h e question n e e d s to be r e p h r a s e d : w h a t about a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can never b e c o m e a n elem e n t in a n objective cognition? N o t t h e matter in it, b u t t h e specific Validity and Actuality

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reference o f it: n o t t h e Sinn b u t t h e Gefühl—how it was for m e , i.e., a b o u t m e , n o t j u s t in m e . W h a t w o u l d e x a m p l e s of such a j u d g m e n t be? T h e essential p o i n t a b o u t such j u d g m e n t s is t h a t they a r e explicitly restrictive: they assert a private situation,/or me alone. T h u s , Prauss's prefatory-transformational p h r a s e "It seems (to m e ) " works to privatize t h e scope of t h e claim of t h e j u d g m e n t . Subjective j u d g m e n t s a b o u t objects a r e j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e subjective r e s p o n s e to objects: valuations. Such valuations can be of quantity, n o t j u s t quality: e.g., "that ski r u n looks s t e e p to m e . " A b o u t c o n t e n t s of m y consciousness I a m m o r e t h a n cognitively aware. I a m also affectively a n d pragmatically e m b r o i l e d in t h e m . "Subjective objects" a r e simply c o n t e n t s of consciousness (Vorstellungen) t a k e n asfor m e , when they a r e t a k e n t h a t way, i.e., in j u d g m e n t s of that sort. T h e s e s a m e subjective objects r e m a i n simply e l e m e n t s of objects—including myself as o n e — i n j u d g m e n t s of that sort. T h e c o n t e n t d o e s n o t c h a n g e ; all t h a t c h a n g e s is t h e refere n c e of t h e j u d g m e n t . T h e issue t h a t r e m a i n s , of course, is t h e validity claim of j u d g m e n t s t h a t a r e self-referential in this sense. W h a t t h e n d o e s subjective validity m e a n ? Late in t h e First Critique K a n t used "subjective validity" to signify a belief which was n o t yet confirmed as objective k n o w l e d g e . T h a t use of "subjective validity" does n o t q u i t e g e t at t h e interesting sense of t h e conception, however. It m a k e s absolutely n o sense to think of a "subjective principle a p r i o r i " in t h a t l i g h t . N o r d o e s it really illuminate t h e t h r e e essential forms of subjective j u d g m e n t t h a t K a n t d e v e l o p e d over t h e course of his critical p h i l o s o p h y . 84

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Accordingly, it will b e necessary t o e x a m i n e in s o m e detail Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness. K a n t took u p this p r o b l e m in at least t h r e e salient discussions: t h e discussion of i m a g i n a t i o n i n t h e First Critique, t h e distinction of " j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n " from " j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e " in t h e Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, a n d t h e section o n aesthetic j u d g m e n t s in t h e Critique of Judgment. T h e key to Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y lies in t h e n o t i o n of "refe r e n c e " (beziehen). I n §vii of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Critique of Judgment K a n t sets o u t by discriminating t h e "logical validity" of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s from t h e i r "aesthetical c h a r a c t e r " by associating t h e f o r m e r with "reference t o t h e object" a n d t h e latter with "refe r e n c e to t h e subject." I m m e d i a t e l y thereafter, h e notes: " I n t h e cognition of a n object of sense b o t h [references] a r e p r e s e n t e d conjointly [kommen beide Beziehungen zusammen v o r ] . " W h a t does it m e a n t h a t b o t h references occur t o g e t h e r ? T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 86

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of-an-object is itself at o n e a n d t h e s a m e time aesthetical a n d logical, i.e., available for reference e i t h e r to t h e subject or to the obj e c t . W h a t is r e f e r r e d is always j u s t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . A n d as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n — a s presence-to-consciousness—it is always for t h e subject. T h i s is Kant's point in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic" of t h e First Critique: r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s "contain n o t h i n g t h a t can b e l o n g to a n object in itself, b u t merely t h e a p p e a r a n c e of somet h i n g , a n d t h e m o d e in which we are affected by that something." Kant writes in §vii of a representation-of-an-object (Vorstellung eines Objekts). T h a t is a particular kind of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , namely, o n e which r e q u i r e s givenness-of-matter in sensation. R e p r e s e n t a tions are possible without such s e n s u o u s intuition, without m a t e riality, a n d h e n c e without objective reference. E x a m p l e s of such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e ideas of r e a s o n (God, t h e soul, t h e worldwhole), o r abstract universals like t h e idea of virtue, o r transcend e n t a l faculties. Insofar as we can t h i n k of " p u r e " intuition as a r e p resentation in itself, a n d n o t simply as t h e form of sense-derived r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , t h e r e , too, we have r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w i t h o u t objective ("material") reference. T h e s a m e would be t r u e of m a t h e m a t i cal constructions in " p u r e i n t u i t i o n . " B u t the case t h a t c o n c e r n s us is precisely representation-of-an-object, both as a m a t t e r for conscious consideration a n d as this consideration itself—both as a what a n d as a how. I n a f a m o u s passage in t h e First Critique, Kant p r e s e n t s a hierarchy (Stufenleiter) of t e r m s relating to Vorstellung: 8 7

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T h e g e n u s is representation in g e n e r a l (repraesentatio). S u b o r d i n a t e to it stands r e p r e s e n t a t i o n with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to t h e subject as a modification of its state is sensation (sensatio), a n objective p e r c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e (cognitio). T h i s is e i t h e r intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). T h e f o r m e r relates immediately to the object a n d is single, the latter refers to it mediately by m e a n s of a feat u r e which several things may have in c o m m o n . 8 9

It would a p p e a r t h e g e n u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is wider t h a n r e p r e s e n t a tion-with-consciousness. I n his Logic, Kant writes of " p r e s e n t i n g s o m e t h i n g to oneself [sich etwas vorstellen]" in a way t h a t leads his translators to n o t e t h a t "any implication of a conscious act is to be excluded." 90

T h a t s e e m s a b s u r d , for h o w c a n t h e r e be presence-to-consciousness w i t h o u t consciousness? Yet h e r e is precisely w h e r e we Validity and Actuality

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m u s t distinguish b e t w e e n t h a t which is p r e s e n t a n d t h a t which consciousness discriminates o r a t t e n d s . In a letter to M a r c u s H e r z , d a t e d May 26, 1789, t h e very time Kant was c o m p l e t i n g t h e First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment a n d d e v e l o p i n g his most complex c o n c e p t i o n of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t , h e w r o t e : 91

For if we can d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t our knowledge [Erkenntnis] of things, even e x p e r i e n c e [Erfahrung] itself, is only possible u n d e r those conditions [i.e., t h e categories a n d space-time as t h e form of i n t u i t i o n ] , it follows t h a t all o t h e r concepts of things (which a r e n o t t h u s c o n d i t i o n e d ) are for us e m p t y a n d utterly useless for k n o w l e d g e [Erkenntnisse]. B u t n o t only that; all sense d a t a for a possible cognition [Erkenntnis] would never, w i t h o u t those conditions, r e p r e s e n t objects. T h e y would n o t even r e a c h t h a t unity of consciousness t h a t is necessary for k n o w l e d g e [Erkenntnis] of myself (as object of i n n e r sense). I would n o t even be able to know t h a t I have sense data; conseq u e n t l y for m e , as a k n o w i n g b e i n g [als erkennendes Wesen], they w o u l d b e absolutely n o t h i n g . T h e y could still (I i m a g i n e myself to b e a n animal) carry o n their play in a n orderly fashion, as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o n n e c t e d according to empirical laws of association, a n d t h u s even have a n influence o n my feeling a n d desire [auf Gefühl und Begehrungsvermögen], w i t h o u t my b e i n g aware of t h e m (assuming that I a m even conscious of each individual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t n o t of t h e i r relation to t h e unity of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e i r object, by m e a n s of t h e synthetic unity of t h e i r a p p e r c e p t i o n ) . T h i s m i g h t be so w i t h o u t my k n o w i n g t h e slightest t h i n g thereby, n o t even what my o w n condition [Zustand] i s . 92

It is critical to discern t h e strategy of this frequently cited passage. It clearly takes u p t h e issues a d u m b r a t e d in §26 of t h e B-version of t h e First Critique. It reasserts firmly that in a cognitive light (hence t h e f r e q u e n t use of t h e w o r d Erkenntnis), t h e p r e s e n c e to consciousness of data (Kant used t h e Latin word to signal strict givenness) would be utterly m e a n i n g l e s s a p a r t from t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures. B u t it also asserts with e q u a l clarity that such d a t a would still b e ord e r e d ("according to t h e empirical laws of association") a n d even m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y t h a t such d a t a could "have a n influence o n my feeling a n d desire [auf Gefühl und Begehrungsvermögen], w i t h o u t my b e i n g aware of t h e m , " i.e., t h a t we respond to stimuli in m o r e t h a n cognitive ways a n d t h a t these noncognitive r e s p o n s e s would be o p erative even in t h e absence of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures. T h e 80

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issue t h a t t h e passage poses, a n d which is at t h e h e a r t of any sophisticated discussion of subjective immediacy, is n o t w h e t h e r such data can have significance for cognition a p a r t from t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures, b u t w h e t h e r they can even have significance for subjective awareness in these o t h e r d i m e n s i o n s . K a n t concludes his passage with t h e s t a t e m e n t "without my k n o w i n g t h e slightest t h i n g thereby, n o t even w h a t my o w n condition [Zustand] is," yet it is typical of h i m in t h e Critique ofJudgment, as also in t h e Prolegomena, to assign precisely to a n awareness of subjective condition [Zustand des Gemüts] t h e judgmental features associated with p r e s e n c e to consciousness of such data. K a n t is u s i n g " k n o w i n g " in this last p h r a s e in a sense m o r e r i g o r o u s t h a n h e would in m u c h of his consideration of subjective j u d g m e n t . B u t t h e r e a s o n may well be t h a t h e wishes to stress t h a t level of consciousness which is entirely animal, w i t h o u t any possibility of h a r m o n y with rational-transcendental structures. I n t h e Stufenleiter passage we c o m e to representation-withconsciousness with " p e r c e p t i o n " (Wahrnehmung). B u t w h a t exactly does t h a t b e t o k e n ? K a n t places at t h e level of p e r c e p t i o n b o t h w h a t "relates solely to t h e subject as t h e modification of its state"—which h e calls sensation (Empfindung)—and "objective p e r c e p t i o n " — which h e calls cognition (Erkenntnis). H o w is the a t t e n t i o n involved with sensation distinguished from cognition? Does w h a t is a t t e n d e d c h a n g e , o r only h o w we a t t e n d it? K a n t does n o t h e r e provide a n The account of h o w o n e moves from Empfindung to Erkenntnis. issue is precisely to articulate t h e difference b e t w e e n what is given to consciousness in r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d how we c o m e to n o t e it, i.e., develop a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e different m o m e n t s in conscious attention. 93

I n his Logic, K a n t suggests t h a t Wahrnehmen, p e r c e p t i o n as t h e m e r e consciousness of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , is s e p a r a t e d by at least several m e d i a t i o n s from the k i n d of consciousness we normally u n d e r s t a n d h i m to m e a n by "objective knowledge." T h e Stufenleiter does n o t b r e a k t h e m a t t e r o u t in e n o u g h detail. T h e Logic offers m o r e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s . A new step, kennen, is i n t r o d u c e d , which entails a capacity of c o m p a r i s o n , d i s c e r n m e n t of identity a n d difference, yet clearly w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to concepts. I n d e e d , Kant holds animals to be cognizant in this s e n s e . H e j u x t a p o s e s to this t h e idea erkennen—"to be cognizant with consciousness"— as distinctly h u m a n a n d rational, a n d yet h e reserves to a h i g h e r level still, verstehen, c o n c e p t i o n t h r o u g h c o n c e p t s . W h a t are kennen a n d erkennen in this account, as distinct from wahrnehmen o n t h e o n e 94

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h a n d , a n d verstehen o n t h e o t h e r ? Is Kant i n d u l g i n g in idle discriminations? O r is it not, r a t h e r , t h a t b o t h in what we s h a r e with animals (kennen) a n d in what we exceed t h e m by (erkennen), Kant seems to e n d o w h u m a n consciousness with t h e capacity for ajudgment ofperception? I n t h e Prolegomena K a n t writes: "All o u r j u d g m e n t s are at first merely j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n ; they h o l d only for us (i.e. for o u r subject), a n d we d o n o t till afterwards give t h e m a new reference (to an object)." This subsequent j u d g m e n t — o f "experience"—has claim to objectivity. I n o n e sense, this is because it "expresses n o t merely a r e f e r e n c e of t h e p e r c e p t i o n to a subject, b u t a quality of t h e object." O n e m i g h t take this "quality" to be existence or givenness. B u t K a n t privileges a second sense of objectivity: validity g r o u n d e d in t h e logical universality of t h e concepts of u n d e r s t a n d ing. K a n t m e a n s to secure "objective r e f e r e n c e " t h r o u g h "logical validity." O n l y this p r o m o t e s j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e to objectivity. Nevertheless h e conceives of too j u d g m e n t s in a s e q u e n c e (note t h e "at first" a n d t h e "afterwards" in t h e passage). I n d e e d , h e speaks of two different "kinds ofj u d g i n g " : "first, I may merely comp a r e p e r c e p t i o n s a n d c o n n e c t t h e m in a consciousness of my state; o r secondly, I may c o n n e c t t h e m in consciousness in general. T h e f o r m e r j u d g m e n t is merely a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n a n d is of subjective validity only; it is merely a c o n n e c t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n s in my m e n t a l state, without r e f e r e n c e to t h e o b j e c t . " Kant seems to link t h e m o r e primitive kind of j u d g i n g with t h e sorts of processes h e t e r m e d kennen a n d erkennen in t h e Logic. T h a t k i n d of j u d g i n g has t h e p o w e r to unify r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e to "a consciousness in o n e subject o n l y . " T h i s unification is by m e a n s of c o m p a r i s o n , d i s c e r n i n g likeness a n d difference. 97

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T h i s "kind of j u d g i n g " is u n d e r t a k e n by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t it is hardly Kant's s t a n d a r d idea of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g (e.g., his It is r a t h e r a " d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t " in t h e Third Critique). m o d e of j u d g i n g which, like t h e notion " j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n " itself, would n o t s e e m to have b e e n d e v e l o p e d yet in Kant's First Critique—except, p e r h a p s , in Kant's notion of "imagination." In t h e Stufenleiter passage of t h e First Critique, Kant characterizes "intuition" as a n objective p e r c e p t i o n , a cognition, t h o u g h it "refers immediately to t h e object a n d is single." T h a t is extremely p r o b l e m atic, n o t only vis-ä-vis B a u m g a r t e n b u t vis-ä-vis m o d e r n skeptics of his n o t i o n of intuition. Intuition of singular objects, n o t according to universal rules, as a n i m m e d i a t e a n d u n i q u e reference to t h e ob100

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ject, fails to satisfy t h e decisive criterion of a j u d g m e n t of experie n c e . H o w is intuition [Anschauung] as "objective" p e r c e p t i o n to be distinguished from sensation [Empfindung] as merely "subjective"? It is n o t s u b s u m e d u n d e r any universal c o n c e p t . T h e relation between sensation a n d intuition as "objects" of a t t e n t i o n raises all t h e issues entailed in t h e incongruity of validity a n d actuality in Kant's n o t i o n of objectivity. We could, as m a n y r e c e n t i n t e r p r e t e r s have c o n t e n d e d , simply h o l d K a n t to have e r r e d in claiming objective status for this sense of i n t u i t i o n . Yet t h e r e is a crucial sense of e x t e r n a l r e f e r e n c e involved with i n t u i t i o n . We n e e d a clearer p h e n o m e n o l o g y of this p e r c e p t i o n . I m a g i n a t i o n is t h e decisive link in this whole inquiry. Kant's characterization of i m a g i n a t i o n in empirical cognition in the First Critique proves very i m p o r t a n t in r e c o n s t r u c t i n g his p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Different p e r c e p t i o n s "occur in t h e m i n d separately a n d singly" a n d they c a n n o t be c o m b i n e d by sense. Kant characterizes sense as " t h e p o w e r of intuiting w h e n t h e object is p r e s e n t , " w h e r e a s i m a g i n a t i o n is n o t so restricted. Sense is m o m e n t a r y o r imm e d i a t e ; t h e p r e s e n c e has n o d u r a t i o n . Only imagination has t h e p o w e r to h o l d past a n d p r e s e n t p e r c e p t i o n s t o g e t h e r a n d by t h a t synthesis " p r o d u c e a n intuition." T h a t is t h e sense of r e p r o d u c t i o n or " p r e s e n t a t i o n " (Darstellung; exhibitio). T h a t is what i m a g i n a t i o n m u s t d o : " b r i n g t h e manifold of intuition into t h e form of a n image." While i m a g i n a t i o n is a n act of consciousness, a n d clearly p a r t of its spontaneity, it acts by rules a n d p r o c e e d i n g s "of which we a r e scarcely ever c o n s c i o u s . " I m a g i n a t i o n is generally t a k e n by K a n t to be p a r t of t h e spontaneity of consciousness, a n d h e n c e , of " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " as conscious activity o n a m u c h wider r a n g e t h a n his First Critique u s a g e . 101

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I n his Anthropology, K a n t distinguishes between " a t t e n d i n g " a n d "abstracting" as powers of " u n d e r s t a n d i n g (in t h e most g e n e r a l sense of t h e t e r m ) . " H e identifies with attentio " t h e p o w e r of a p p r e h e n d i n g given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to p r o d u c e a n intuition," a n d with abstractio "the p o w e r of abstracting what is c o m m o n to several of these to p r o d u c e a concept." N o t e that b o t h a r e productive activities. K a n t elaborates o n t h e p o w e r of imagination in §31 of t h e Anthropology. H e discriminates t h r e e powers: "forming intuitions in space (imaginatio plastica), associating intuitions in time (imaginatio associans), a n d c o n n e c t i n g o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s because of their affinity for o n e a n o t h e r , in so far as they have a c o m m o n g r o u n d (affinitas)." T h e last of t h e s e powers holds o u r attention. K a n t elaborates 106

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his m e a n i n g : "By affinity I m e a n t h e c o n n e c t i o n of t h e manifold by virtue of its origin from o n e g r o u n d . " W h a t does that signify? H e a t t e m p t s to elucidate by contrast with "a succession of r e p r e s e n t a tions h a v i n g n o objective c o n n e c t i o n " so b e m u s i n g t h a t we " w o n d e r w h e t h e r we have b e e n d r e a m i n g . " T h a t cannot be, t h o u g h we can only clarify why t h a t c a n n o t be, only find t h e necessary transcend e n t a l law for it, w h e n we leave this stage of consciousness a n d rise to t h e h i g h e r p o w e r of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Yet w h a t is crucial to n o t e is t h a t "the play of i m a g i n a t i o n still follows t h e laws of sensibility, which provides t h e material, a n d this is associated without consciousness of t h e r u l e b u t still in k e e p i n g with it. So t h e association is carried o u t in conformity with u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h o u g h it is n o t derived from u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " I m a g i n a t i o n " p r o d u c e s " such a n intuition i n d e p e n d e n t of conc e p t u a l universals, K a n t suggests in t h e Anthropology. H e characterizes t h e k i n d of unification of which i m a g i n a t i o n is capable as constituting a discernible individual by c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e h e t e r o g e n e o u s p r o p e r t i e s t h a t b e l o n g in it. O n e m u s t discriminate from m e r e particulars of sense p e r c e p t i o n , which a r e t h e truly simple things for Kant, t h e object in its singularity, which is a composite, i.e., contains a manifold, b u t is n o n e t h e l e s s individual, i.e., d e t e r m i n a t e e n o u g h to b e distinguished. T h a t d e t e r m i n a c y is constituted n o t by t h e application of universals in a c o n c e p t u a l construction, b u t r a t h e r by contrast (oppositio) which "arouses o u r attention by j u x t a p o s i n g c o n t r a r y sense r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s u n d e r o n e a n d t h e same c o n c e p t . " Obviously, m o r e t h a n m e r e contrast is discriminable. T h e i m a g i n a t i o n m u s t also be able to find similarity. K a n t characterizes these two capacities as " j u d g m e n t " (indicium) a n d "wit" (ingenium). " J u d g m e n t ' s task is to n o t e t h e differences in a manifold t h a t is identical in p a r t ; t h a t of wit is to n o t e t h e identity of a manifold t h a t is different in p a r t . " J u d g m e n t a n d wit a r e t a l e n t s — n a t u r a l gifts. T h e y b e l o n g to u n d e r s t a n d i n g in the b r o a d sense, to be s u r e , b u t they " d e p e n d o n t h e subject's n a t u r a l predisposition" a n d in t h a t measure cannot be taught or l e a r n e d . K a n t a d d s a very i m p o r t a n t characterization of wit: " W h e n wit draws c o m p a r i s o n s , its behavior is like p l a y . " I m a g i n a t i o n , with its percipience of affinities, seems very close to t h e kennen a n d erkennen of t h e j u d g m e n t of perception. 1 0 8

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Y o u n g a r g u e s t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n m u s t b e rescued from a simple association with i m a g i n g a n d seen r a t h e r as involving reconfiguration (umbilden, umgestalten), a t a k i n g as o t h e r or as m o r e t h a n is 84

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given. In this sense, i m a g i n a t i o n is i n h e r e n t l y interpretative, n o t r e c e p t i v e . I n d e e d , Y o u n g goes very far toward identifying imagination with functions t h a t K a n t is conventionally held to assign to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g via concepts. T h e r e is n o question, for Y o u n g , t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n belongs to t h e s p o n t a n e o u s functions of t h e m i n d in K a n t . H e sees it functioning in t e r m s of d i s c e r n i n g in t h e sensibly given configurations which " m i g h t also a p p e a r in o t h e r ways a n d o n o t h e r occasions," which seems to c o m e close to t h e conceptual sense of "falling u n d e r a r u l e . " Y o u n g p u s h e s so h a r d in this direction t h a t h e seems close to Schaper's project of dissolving i m a g i n a t i o n entirely into u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e d u c i n g Kant's epistemology to two faculties, with n o m e d i a t i n g t h i r d . B u t Y o u n g is not ultimately disposed to follow S c h a p e r t h a t far. H e m a k e s a crucial distinction: "to c o n s t r u e or i n t e r p r e t somet h i n g sensibly p r e s e n t as a n F a n d to discriminate it from things of o t h e r types . . . is a function of imagination," b u t "to have t h e discursive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t h i n g of kind F, t h e concept of such a t h i n g , a n d to be able tojudge t h a t w h a t is sensibly p r e s e n t is a n F . . . are functions of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h e first function has to d o with t h a t recognition or n a m i n g associated with kennen a n d erkennen as in a c q u a i n t a n c e , n o t k n o w l e d g e [wissen], while t h e second is involved with w h a t K a n t called verstehen ( u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , o r m o r e generally objective j u d g m e n t . Y o u n g points o u t that s o m e of t h e things i m a g i n a t i o n discerns as F's find n o c o n c e p t u a l correlate, while s o m e of t h e things u n d e r s t a n d i n g conceives as F's find n o sensible c o r r e l a t e . 1 1 4

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Y o u n g m e a n s to d r a w i m a g i n a t i o n very close to t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t (Urteilskraft). B o t h entail " s u b s u m i n g particulars u n d e r rules." However, j u d g m e n t is c o n c e r n e d with validity in a crucial way t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n is not. While i m a g i n a t i o n functions as s u b s u m p t i o n in accordance with a r u l e , j u d g m e n t functions as subs u m p t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e conception of a rule, i.e., with explicit r e f e r e n c e to t h e validity of t h e claimed s u b s u m p t i o n . T h i s distinction is decisive. K a n t writes of imagination acting in accord a n c e with t h e rules of u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t n o t for t h e sake of these rules in a crucial passage of the Anthropology which will p r o v e essential to t h e whole idea of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s . T h a t it is possible for i m a g i n a t i o n to act in a c c o r d a n c e with the rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d ing b u t w i t h o u t explicit a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of t h e m makes t h e freed o m of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n conceivable a n d p e r m i t s of Kant's crucial c o n c e p t of " h a r m o n y " in t h e Third Critique, w h e r e a s in constitutive judgment, i m a g i n a t i o n is n o t free, b u t is precisely determined. 120

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Y o u n g concludes t h a t t h e key is to "distinguish b e t w e e n a merely subjective linking of a p p e a r a n c e s a n d a linking of t h e a p p e a r a n c e s in t r u t h . . . b e t w e e n a merely subjective unity a n d a n objective u n i t y . " W i t h this l a n g u a g e h e comes amazingly close to t h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n , b u t h e m e n t i o n s n e i t h e r t h e Prolegomena itself n o r Prauss's f a m o u s exegesis of it. Nevertheless, his analysis of imagination shows h o w p r o f o u n d l y close imagination a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n a r e , a n d how close b o t h are to t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t . It is that c o h e r e n c e that I wish to p u s h to its ultimate conclusion. K a n t recognizes that existence is a m a t t e r a b o u t which n o t h i n g can b e "anticipated" a priori. If t h e r e a r e rules for p r o m o t i n g actuality via concepts to validity, they m u s t start from a n d r e i n t e r p r e t what m u s t already be given. T h a t raises o n c e again t h e question of t h e r e f e r e n c e involved in intuitive synthesis. Is the " c o m m o n g r o u n d " o r "origin" p r o d u c e d by i m a g i n a t i o n — K a n t at o n e p o i n t calls it "intuition" a n d at a n o t h e r " i m a g e " — n o t a p p r o a c h i n g t h e sense of a n object? K a n t seems driven to c o n c e d e at least a restrictive sense of this: " t h e p o w e r of intuition ( p u r e or empirical) is limited to objects in t h e i r singularity, w h e r e a s t h e p o w e r of concepts contains t h e universal e l e m e n t of [ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ] . " If we exploit fully t h e sense we have b e e n g a r n e r i n g b o t h of t h e core ambiguity in Kant's n o t i o n of objectivity a n d of the peculiar "kind of j u d g i n g " we have discriminated, we can suggest t h a t K a n t could m e a n t h a t objective reference only has a claim to validity w h e n conceptually constituted, b u t t h a t some p r o s p e c t of plausible, m e r e l y subjectively valid, r e f e r e n c e to t h e object m i g h t b e associa t e d with t h e j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n : p e r h a p s a descriptive r a t h e r t h a n a scientific reference. I n t h e imaginative synthesis, t h e n , we could discern (kennen) a unity of the manifold (image) as r e f e r r i n g to s o m e t h i n g existing e x t e r n a l to the subject in the most p r i m o r d i a l sense of givenness: a n i n v o l u n t a r y modification of t h e subjective state, to be s u r e f o u n d in t h e subject, b u t n o t m a d e by it. 1 2 2

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Let us s u m u p t h e capacities we ascribe to this o t h e r "kind of j u d g i n g . " Insofar as it has all those powers of a t t e n d i n g involved in i m a g i n a t i o n , it can form intuitions in space, a n d associate t h e m in t i m e . It can c o m p a r e a n d contrast, a n d t h e r e b y discern identity a n d difference, a g r e e m e n t a n d opposition. T h a t is to say, it can find w h e t h e r a n d which sensations are given as c o n n e c t e d with, or a r e a b o u t , distinct forms as their p r o p e r m a t t e r . A n d it can find t h e affinities of m e r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d ascribe t h e m to a unified g r o u n d . It can constitute a n i m a g e of a n o b j e c t . B u t w h a t imag124

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ination c a n n o t d o , n o r this form of j u d g i n g either, insofar as they are identical, is " b r i n g forth a sense r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t was never given to t h e p o w e r of s e n s e . " Insofar as t h e subject can recognize this involuntary givenness of sensation a n d ascribe it to a n intuition as e x t e r n a l to itself, this kind of j u d g i n g can discriminate " i n n e r " a n d " o u t e r " — e v e n if all t h a t it c o n t e m p l a t e s is p r e s e n t as i n n e r sense. It d o e s this, it m u s t b e stressed, ultimately in accordance with, b u t w i t h o u t explicit r e c o u r s e to, t h e rules of t h e u n d e r standing. It is j u s t h e r e t h a t t h e Third Critique takes u p a n d decisively advances t h e a r g u m e n t . I n w h a t is very likely t h e oldest section of the work, §10, K a n t m a k e s t h e following crucial observation: "Again, we a r e n o t always forced to r e g a r d w h a t we observe (in respect of its possibility) from t h e p o i n t of view of r e a s o n . T h u s we can at least observe a p u r p o s i v e n e s s according to form, w i t h o u t basing it o n a p u r p o s e (as t h e material of t h e nexus finalis), a n d r e m a r k it in objects, a l t h o u g h only by r e f l e c t i o n . " " T h e point of view of r e a s o n " in t h e text s h o u l d b e taken to refer to theoretical o r cognitive o p e r a t i o n in t h e technical sense of s u b s u m i n g r e p r e sentations u n d e r universal c o n c e p t s : " j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e " or " d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t s , " in o t h e r words. T h u s we a r e conc e r n e d in this passage with t h a t " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g . " Twice in t h e passage K a n t calls that activity "observation" (beobachten). I n addition, h e uses " r e m a r k " o r "recognize" (bemerken). B o t h a r e words t h a t a p p e a r in s o m e sense cognitive. T o observe (beobachten) a n d to recognize (bemerken) a r e very likely t h e senses of kennen a n d erkennen in t h e Logic passage. K a n t claims n o w t h a t they a r e possible only "by reflection." W h a t , t h e n , is reflection? 1 2 5

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I n t h e " A m p h i b o l y of C o n c e p t s of Reflection" of t h e First Critique, K a n t defines reflection as " t h a t state of m i n d [Zustand des Gemütes] in which we first set ourselves to discover t h e subjective conditions u n d e r which (alone) we a r e able to arrive at concepts." H e n c e it "does n o t c o n c e r n itself with objects themselves with a view of d e r i v i n g concepts from t h e m directly," b u t r a t h e r considers "the relation of given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to o u r different sources of knowledge." K a n t goes o n to a r g u e t h a t all j u d g m e n t s r e q u i r e this reflection. H e intimates t h a t it is a c o m m o n p l a c e in all acts of consciousness, n o t merely j u d g m e n t s b u t "all c o m p a r i s o n s " (alle Vergleichungen). Every interpretative e n c o u n t e r with e x p e r i e n c e involves reflection, a n d h e characterizes its o p e r a t i o n s in j u s t t h e t e r m s which we have c o n n e c t e d with that o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g : "Now t h e relations in which concepts in a state of m i n d can stand to 127

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o n e a n o t h e r are those of identity a n d difference, of agreement a n d opposition, of t h e inner a n d t h e outer, a n d finally of t h e determinable a n d t h e determination (matter a n d f o r m ) . " I n discussing reflection u n d e r these "four h e a d i n g s of all comparision a n d distinction," K a n t provides t h e seal to t h e a r g u m e n t I have b e e n trying to e l a b o r a t e : " T h e y a r e distinguished from categories by t h e fact t h a t they d o n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e object according to w h a t constitutes its c o n c e p t (quantity, reality), b u t only serve to describe in all its manifoldness t h e c o m p a r i s o n of t h e r e p r e s e n t a tions which is p r i o r to t h e c o n c e p t of t h i n g s . " Reference to t h e object in this " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , " I m a i n t a i n , is t h e essential s t r u c t u r e of t h e "reflective j u d g m e n t " u p o n which t h e entire Third Critique is g r o u n d e d . Kant's association of " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " with this e m e r g e n t n o tion of reflective j u d g m e n t is t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of his a t t u n e m e n t to t h e cognitive potential in this o t h e r k i n d of j u d g i n g , a n d it is in p u r s u i n g this cognitive extension of his l a n g u a g e of purposiveness t h a t K a n t would c o m e to m a k e his b r e a k t h r o u g h to t h e t h e o r y of reflective j u d g m e n t as such, with its a t t e n d a n t discrimination from d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t a n d modification of t h e faculty s c h e m e of rationality. B u t b e f o r e h e could follow o u t that potential, K a n t h a d still to use w h a t h e already g r a s p e d a b o u t purposiveness to solve his p r o b l e m in aesthetics. 1 2 9

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Four

T H E TRANSCENDENTAL GROUNDING OF TASTE: PURPOSE AND PLEASURE

s h e t u r n e d to t h e composition of his "Critique of T a s t e " in late 1787, K a n t believed that some form of transcend e n t a l g r o u n d i n g was possible. H e believed h e h a d f o u n d t h a t elusive a n d u n i q u e a priori principle in which h e could g r o u n d t h e faculty of feeling transcendentally in a critique of taste. B u t how did h e c o m e to t h a t principle? H o w was it distinctive? A n d why, above all, did h e t e r m that d e p a r t m e n t of philosop h y which w o u l d explicate it "teleology?" With those questions we get to t h e h e a r t of t h e specific genesis of t h e "Critique of T a s t e . " Kant f o u n d his key j u s t as h e i n t i m a t e d in t h e letter to Reinhold, namely, by reflecting o n his previous success a l o n g t h e line of a systemic extension of t h e critical philosophy in t e r m s of t h e faculties of m i n d , i.e., t h e Second Critique. T h e genesis of the "Critique of T a s t e " lies in t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e m o d e l of t h e Second Critique for t h e resolution of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r o b l e m of the Third. K a n t b e g a n t h e "Critique of T a s t e " o n t h e p r e m i s e that t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice. B o t h h a d s e n s u o u s o u t c o m e s , b u t b o t h w e r e d e t e r m i n e d entirely by form, a n d t h u s by a universal rational principle, a n d they could b o t h t h e r e f o r e be taken to be a u t o n o m o u s a n d a priori. T o work o u t t h e analogy it is necessary to u n d e r s t a n d what form m e a n t in t h e context of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, h e n c e what the s t r u c t u r e of the j u d g m e n t of taste h a d to be, a n d w h a t purity of such a j u d g m e n t would entail. K a n t n e e d e d to follow the p r o c e d u r e h e outlined for t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of p u r e principles: first, to a t t e n d to t h e modality of necessity t h a t r e a s o n itself i n t r o d u c e d into these propositions, a n d second to eliminate all the particular, empirical c o n t e n t a n d isolate t h e p u r e form of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s . 1

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a priori principle different from those h e r e t o f o r e observed" which would g r o u n d feeling in r e a s o n , a n d this g u i d e d t h e whole flow of his a r g u m e n t a t i o n . His p r o c e d u r e p r o v e d very intricate, a n d I p r o pose to r e c o n s t r u c t it exegeticälly t h r o u g h t h e sections which, o n the basis of Tonelli a n d t h e o t h e r scholars, we can d a t e earliest, a n d h e n c e as t h e original "Critique of T a s t e " of fall 1787: § § 1 - 2 2 , 3 1 4 0 . We m u s t n o t a s s u m e , however, t h a t they were c o m p o s e d — m u c h less conceived—as they now stand. H e r e M e r e d i t h steps forth as a n extremely i n g e n i o u s g u i d e . H e suggests t h a t t h e m a r velous piece of architectonic, w h e r e b y t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" was ultimately s t r u c t u r e d in t e r m s of t h e g e n e r a l characteristics of all l o g i c a l j u d g m e n t s , c a m e s o m e w h a t late a n d was i m p o s e d o n a text that h a d d e v e l o p e d in a n a l t o g e t h e r different m a n n e r . H e f u r t h e r suggests t h a t t h e earliest s e g m e n t s of t h e work were, accordingly, §§ 1 Off. a n d §§3Iff. H e includes §1 as i n t r o d u c t o r y a n d §9 as, in Kant's o w n words, " t h e key to t h e Critique of T a s t e . " It is in t h e s e sections t h a t we m u s t locate t h a t b r e a k t h r o u g h which m a d e possible t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of t h e "Critique of Taste." K a n t b e g a n §10 of t h e Critique ofJudgment, "Of Purposiveness in G e n e r a l , " with n o less t h a n five t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . P u r p o s e , p u r p o s i v e n e s s , pleasure, pain, a n d will all received t r a n scendental e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h a t these e x p l a n a t i o n s are in large m e a s u r e a s s u m e d in t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n of t h e rest of t h e analytic, i n c l u d i n g sections which p r e c e d e it, s u p p o r t s Meredith's conject u r e t h a t this may have b e e n t h e starting point of t h e original "Critique of T a s t e . " C o n n e c t i n g the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c h i e v e m e n t r e p r e s e n t e d by §10 with t h e a c c o u n t K a n t gave in his letter to R e i n h o l d in D e c e m b e r 1787 e n h a n c e s t h e plausibility of Meredith's suggestion. 2

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P u r p o s i v e n e s s — " t e l e o l o g y " — s e r v e d as the vehicle for t h e dev e l o p m e n t of a "Critique of T a s t e . " K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d in his letter to R e i n h o l d t h a t teleology h a d little to offer, t h a t it was the "poorest in a priori g r o u n d s of d e t e r m i n a t i o n . " B u t t h a t t h e r e could be any a priori principles g r o u n d i n g feeling was already a revolutionary insight. T h e link between p l e a s u r e a n d p u r p o s i v e ness is t h e g r o u n d i n g insight of t h e "Critique of Taste." I n §10 Kant takes p l e a s u r e , transcendentally described, to b e t h e causality of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in "maintaining t h e subject in t h e same s t a t e . " K a n t characterizes p u r p o s e a n d purposiveness with crisp e c o n o m y : " P u r p o s e is t h e object of a concept in so far as t h e concept is r e g a r d e d as t h e cause of t h e object (the real g r o u n d of its possibility); a n d t h e causality of a concept in respect of its object is its 4

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p u r p o s i v e n e s s (forma finalis)." P u r p o s e is t h e relation b e t w e e n a c o n c e p t a n d a n object w h e r e b y t h e c o n c e p t acts as cause of the actuality (existence) of t h e object. W h a t is caused is "not merely t h e cognition of a n object b u t t h e object itself (its form a n d existence)." B u t even m o r e i m p o r t a n t is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l y distinctive k i n d of cause: causality t h r o u g h a concept. I n t h e K a n t i a n framework, the relation of p u r p o s e involves intelligent agency, o r "will." T h a t is why K a n t p r e s e n t s a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n of will in §10. H e describes it as " t h e faculty of desire, so far as it is d e t e r m i n a b l e to act only t h r o u g h concepts, i.e. in conformity with t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a p u r p o s e . " Causality t h r o u g h intelligent will is " n o u m e n a l causality"; it constitutes a n event which c a n n o t b e a c c o u n t e d for within t h e strict categorical system of t h e world of p h e n o m e n a . T h e essential idea of this m o d e of causality arises in t h e h u m a n consciousness of m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d responsibility. I n reflecting o n t h e idea of will in t h e context of t h e Second Critique K a n t f o u n d t h e clue to a transcend e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of t h e Third. It r e m a i n s to see exactly h o w K a n t t h o u g h t h e h a d achieved his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of taste. K a n t first analyzed (to "analyze" or " e x p o u n d " is t h e first step in "Critique") t h e essential e l e m e n t s in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste as a type of p r o p o s i t i o n . H e d i s c e r n e d t h a t it was a singular, n o t a universal l o g i c a l j u d g m e n t , i.e., it r e f e r r e d to a single i n s t a n c e . T h e j u d g m e n t " T h i s tulip is beautiful" was a j u d g m e n t of taste, while t h e j u d g m e n t "Tulips a r e beautiful" was a cognitive j u d g m e n t . A j u d g m e n t of taste h a d always to be a n imm e d i a t e , first-hand r e s p o n s e to a n unanticipatably u n i q u e stimulus. 6

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Second, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was g r o u n d e d n o t in any c o n c e p tualization b u t r a t h e r in t h e m e r e feeling elicited by t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e representation-of-an-object. H e r e K a n t f o u n d it necessary to discriminate r e p e a t e d l y b e t w e e n "sensation" (Sinn) a n d "feeling" (Gefühl), t h a t is, objective a n d subjective r e f e r e n c e . More specifically, h e discriminated b e t w e e n cognitive use involving conceptualization, a n d m e r e aesthetic c o n t e m p l a t i o n . H e associated t h e f o r m e r with objectivity a n d t h e latter with subjectivity. T h u s t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was subjective, h a d to d o with feeling, a n d ostensibly h a d n o cognitive use w h a t s o e v e r . 14

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B u t despite these two features, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste claimed o n t h e o n e h a n d universal c o n s e n t a n d o n t h e other, necessity. It claimed, in s h o r t , features which K a n t associated with a priori j u d g m e n t s . K a n t was careful to discriminate t h e sort of universality a n d The Transcendental Grounding of Taste

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the sort of necessity claimed in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste from those claimed in cognitive j u d g m e n t s . T h e universality of consent claimed in a j u d g m e n t of taste, K a n t observed, h a d to d o n o t with t h e t r u e universality which could reside only in logical validity, b u t r a t h e r with t h e intersubjective validity of t h e j u d g m e n t , namely, its claim o n all o b s e r v e r s . Similarly, t h e kind of necessity claimed in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was n o t t h e necessity of a universal logical category b u t r a t h e r t h e " e x e m p l a r y " necessity of a singular ins t a n c e . Yet, for all that, in t h e m e a s u r e t h a t the j u d g m e n t of taste m a d e these claims, it s e e m e d to suggest a rational a priori principle at its f o u n d a t i o n . T h e key p o i n t is t h a t in t h e sorts of propositions involved in aesthetic j u d g m e n t s s o m e modality of necessity s e e m e d involved. T h u s , K a n t w r o t e : " I n this modality of a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t s , n a m e l y their a s s u m e d necessity, lies w h a t is for t h e Critique of Judgment a m o m e n t of capital i m p o r t a n c e . For this is what makes a n a priori principle a p p a r e n t in t h e i r case, a n d lifts t h e m o u t of t h e s p h e r e of empirical p s y c h o l o g y . " T h e s e lines c o m e from o n e of t h e transitional sections a d d e d to t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e " to a c c o m m o d a t e it into t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " a n d t h e use of the p h r a s e "Critique of J u d g m e n t " confirms that it c a n n o t have b e e n written before t h e s p r i n g of 1789. B u t t h e idea h a d to be p r e s e n t to Kant's m i n d before h e could e m b a r k at all o n any t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of a "Critique of T a s t e . " T h u s K a n t felt t h a t establishing t h e g r o u n d w h e r e b y t h e singular j u d g m e n t could be recognized as universal a n d necessary, a priori, in this sense constituted t h e philosophical challenge a n d t h e r e w a r d of a consideration of taste as a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l issue. I n §8, h e n o t e d t h a t while t h e formal category was n o t particularly p r o b l e m a t i c for g e n e r a l logic, it was quite a n o t h e r m a t t e r for t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h e r : "It brings to light a p r o p e r t y of o u r cognitive faculty which, w i t h o u t this analysis, would have r e m a i n e d u n k n o w n . " It was this discovery which e n a b l e d K a n t to write his "Critique of T a s t e , " a n d this which h e identified as t h e a priori principle of a kind unlike any o t h e r discovered. 17

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I n t h e case of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice, the p u r p o s e of t h e action could n o t b e its material o u t c o m e , b u t only t h e internal d y n a m i c of rationality in t h e subject. Similarly, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste h a d to be p u r e of such c o n n e c t i o n . Purity in t h e case of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste m e a n t t h a t p l e a s u r e could n o t b e c o n n e c t e d with t h e materiality of t h e object r e p r e s e n t e d to consciousness. H e n c e K a n t a r g u e d t h a t "every interest vitiates t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a n d robs it of its 92

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impartiality . . . w h e r e instead of, like t h e interest of reason, m a k i n g p u r p o s i v e n e s s take t h e lead in t h e feeling of pleasure, it g r o u n d s it u p o n this f e e l i n g . . . " T o be s u r e , in b o t h m o r a l choice a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, a material p l e a s u r e m i g h t a c c o m p a n y t h e m e n t a l process. " H a p p i n e s s " in t h e case of a p u r e m o r a l choice was n o t e x c l u d e d as a result, only as a cause. Similarly " c h a r m " in the case of a j u d g m e n t of taste was not excluded as a t t e n d i n g t h e e x p e r i e n c e , b u t only as the d e t e r m i n i n g basis. K a n t distinguished, in strict analogy to t h e m o r a l p r o b l e m , b e t w e e n empirical ( h e t e r o n o m o u s ) a n d p u r e ( a u t o n o m o u s ) j u d g m e n t s : "A j u d g m e n t of taste . . . is only p u r e so far as its determ i n i n g g r o u n d is tainted with n o merely empirical delight. B u t such a taint is always p r e s e n t w h e r e c h a r m [Reiz] or e m o t i o n [Rührung] have a s h a r e in t h e j u d g m e n t by which s o m e t h i n g is to b e described as b e a u t i f u l . " Rather, a " p u r e " form of delight was associated with t h e i m m a n e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e m e n t a l process e x p r e s s e d in t h e propositions: in t h e case of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice, "respect," a n d in t h e case of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, beauty. T h e s e two feelings, in their purity, i.e., their abstraction from any determ i n i n g interest in t h e material gratification t h a t m i g h t empirically b e b o u n d u p with t h e m , b e t o k e n e d or " m a r k e d " t h e intrinsic a n d rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e m e n t a l activity which occasioned them. T h u s , as from t h e feeling of respect we can necessarily infer t h e p u r e m o r a l choice as its only possible cause, so from t h e feeling of beauty we s h o u l d be able necessarily to infer a p u r e rational p r o cess as its only possible cause: "an a u t o n o m y of t h e subject passing j u d g m e n t o n t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e (in the given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) . " A u t o n o m y is the decisive idea. Again, in striking analogy to t h e a r g u m e n t of t h e Second Critique, Kant insists t h a t "taste lays claim simply to a u t o n o m y . " It is a free choice. I n d e e d , Kant a r g u e s , it is t h e freest choice possible for m a n , a n d a kind of freed o m which m a n alone enjoys, j u s t by virtue of his complex nature. 21

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I n analyzing t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, j u s t as in analyzing t h e p u r e m o r a l choice, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y is " c o n c e r n e d with t h e a priori principles of p u r e j u d g m e n t . . . those in which it is itself, subjectively, object as well as l a w . " T h e way in which we ascertain w h e t h e r such purity or a u t o n o m y is attained in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste is strikingly parallel to t h e m a n n e r in which any given m a x i m of choice is a p p r a i s e d for its conformity to t h e categorical i m p e r a tive: 26

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w e i g h i n g t h e j u d g m e n t , n o t so m u c h with actual, as r a t h e r with t h e merely possible, j u d g m e n t s of o t h e r s . . . by p u t t i n g ourselves in t h e position of every o n e e l s e , . . . letting go t h e e l e m e n t of m a t t e r , i.e. sensation, in o u r g e n e r a l state of r e p r e sentative activity, a n d confining attention to t h e formal peculiarities of o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r g e n e r a l state of r e p r e s e n tative activity. 27

It is only insofar as t h e subject has n o r e a s o n to suspect t h a t his j u d g m e n t can be merely private t h a t h e is e m b o l d e n e d to speak with a "universal voice" a n d express w h a t h e takes to b e a " c o m m o n sense" (sensus communis). T h i s is t h e basis for his claim to universality a n d necessity. Previous p h i l o s o p h e r s of aesthetics h a d s o u g h t t h e basis for t h e j u d g m e n t of taste in a p r o p e r t y of the object, b u t their search h a d b e e n v a i n . I n s t e a d , K a n t p r o p o s e d that it b e s o u g h t in t h e conformity of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object to o u r j u d g m e n t , i.e., we m u s t find in t h e rules given by t h e j u d g m e n t t h e g r o u n d of t h e b e a u t y ascribed to t h e object. T h i s was, as it were, Kant's " C o p e r n i can revolution" in aesthetics, which m a d e possible a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy of taste. K a n t a r g u e d , in view of all t h e essential feat u r e s of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, t h a t t h e rational a priori principle which g r o u n d e d it could only lie in a relation of t h e faculties t h e m selves. I n §9, which h e called t h e "key to t h e Critique of Taste," h e articulated this as t h e idea of " h a r m o n y of t h e faculties." 28

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A "Critique of T a s t e , " u n d e r t a k e n transcendentally, h a d to b e "an investigation of t h e faculties of cognition a n d t h e i r function in these j u d g m e n t s , a n d t h e illustration, by t h e analysis of e x a m p l e s , of t h e i r m u t u a l subjective purposiveness, t h e form of which in a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . c o n s t i t u t e ^ ] t h e beauty of their o b j e c t . " H e r e , finally, " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " [Zweckmäßigkeit] or "teleology" e n ters into Kant's account, a n d justifies his c o n t e n t i o n a b o u t t h e g r o u n d i n g t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle of this faculty of m i n d . 30

T h e strategy of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " a p p e a r s to have b e e n to s u p e r i m p o s e t h e l a n g u a g e of reflection, as a kind of j u d g i n g indispensable for cognition in g e n e r a l , u p o n h u m a n capacity for feeling, as a "real" aspect of finite-rational subjectivity in g e n e r a l . T h e "Critique of T a s t e " can be c o n s t r u e d as a project of g r o u n d i n g at least some feeling in a rational principle a priori. T h e core a r g u m e n t , w o r k i n g from p l e a s u r e a n d purposiveness to the intersubjective validity of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, f o u n d articulation ultimately in t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " in t h e Third Critique, espe94

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daily in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" a n d in t h e " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t . " K a n t f o r m u l a t e d t h e view t h a t t h e r e was a n intrinsic a p t i t u d e peculiar to h u m a n beings for g r o u n d i n g feeling in r e a s o n t h r o u g h b e a u t y . H e called this a " c o m m o n sense" (sensus communis). W i t h t h a t h e tried to i n c o r p o r a t e n o t only t h e G e r m a n rationalist tradition, b u t also t h e British "critical" a p p r o a c h to aesthetics. N o t objectivity b u t subjective response—specifically " m u t u a l subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s " — i s t h e key to the n a t u r e of b e a u t y a n d of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, "a t h i n g b e i n g called beautiful solely in respect o f t h a t quality in which it a d a p t s itself to o u r m o d e of taking it i n . " T h e crucial locus of Kant's analysis of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e is within consciousness, in its o w n o p e r a t i o n s , a n d for h i m t h e crucial c o n d i t i o n is t h a t "the m e n t a l state in this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m u s t be o n e of a feeling of t h e free play of t h e powers of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for a cognition in g e n e r a l . " K a n t goes o n to e l a b o r a t e t h e m e a n i n g of this "free play." H e writes: " T h e q u i c k e n i n g of b o t h faculties (imagination a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) to a n indefinite, b u t yet, t h a n k s to t h e given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , h a r m o n i o u s activity, such as belongs to cognition generally, is t h e sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by t h e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . " W h y did K a n t call this " m u t u a l subjective purposiveness?" I n § 12, K a n t w r o t e t h a t "this p l e a s u r e is in n o way practical." Yet h e claimed t h a t it "still involves a n i n h e r e n t causality." T h i s h e characterized as "preserving the continuance of t h e state of the r e p r e s e n t a tion itself a n d t h e active e n g a g e m e n t of t h e cognitive powers without ulterior a i m . " T h u s K a n t conjoined his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s of p l e a s u r e a n d p u r p o s e to g e n e r a t e this n o t i o n . 31

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The Language of Purposiveness P u r p o s e has its c o h e r e n t a n d literal sense in t h e willed act. K a n t immediately asserts, however, t h a t we may discriminate t h e form of p u r p o s e from its reality. T h e form of p u r p o s e is design, i.e., t h e r e lation of a n idea as cause of t h e actuality of a n object. T h a t is t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " offered in § 1 0 . B u t if we abstract from this relation a n d t h i n k only of t h e form, t h e n we a t t e n d to t h e appearance of design, which does n o t necessarily entail its actuality. A n d t h u s we derive t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of purposiveness given in §iv a n d anticipate t h e p h r a s e K a n t i n t r o d u c e s in so m a n y words in § 10: " p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h o u t p u r p o s e . " T h e notion of "formal" p u r 3 7

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posiveness invokes similarity o r analogy to p u r p o s e . It is a figurative use of t h e l a n g u a g e . W h y does K a n t t r a n s p o s e t h e l a n g u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s from literal to figurative use? T h e answer lies in t h e peculiar o p p o r t u n i t y it provides for a c c o u n t i n g for events. T h e form of p u r p o s e is a possible cognitive o r d e r . T h i s e m e r g e s clearly in § 10: " B u t a n object, o r a state of m i n d , o r even a n action is called purposive, a l t h o u g h its possibility d o e s n o t necessarily p r e s u p p o s e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a p u r p o s e , merely because its possibility can b e explained a n d conceived by us only in so far as we a s s u m e for its g r o u n d a causality a c c o r d i n g to p u r p o s e s . " S u c h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is patently figurative, a subjective r e c o u r s e to m a k e t h e m a t t e r "intelligible to o u r selves." B u t t h e occasion for this account is n o n e t h e l e s s t h e perplexity of empirical cognition. We a r e struggling to "explain" a n d to "conceive." Purposiveness is a cognitive l a n g u a g e to which we r e s o r t in t h e extremity of empirical anomaly. If we have cognitive r e c o u r s e to this l a n g u a g e , w h a t validity can it claim? P u r p o s e , K a n t emphatically assures us, is n o t a category. It is n o t p a r t of t h e constitutive f r a m e w o r k w h e r e b y t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g d e t e r m i n e s objective k n o w l e d g e . Heuristic " m a x i m s " in general a r e certainly "useful" {zweckmäßig has t h a t sense in G e r m a n ) in investigations, b u t they a r e , a c c o r d i n g to Kant, strictly subjective. T h i s subjective usefulness, t h o u g h cognitive, m i g h t be c o n s t r u e d in t e r m s of h u m a n practical p u r p o s i v e n e s s — i n its "technical" r a t h e r t h a n its " m o r a l " s e n s e — r e a d i n g cognition as a m o d e of h u m a n technical practical purposiveness. T h i s idea c o m e s to articulation in Kant's First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, especially in §i. All of this n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , n o t h i n g a b o u t this sort of usefulness r e n d e r s its cognitive results "objective." T h e I n t r o d u c t i o n discriminates logical from aesthetic reflective j u d g m e n t s , yet K a n t never ascribes objectivity to logical reflective j u d g m e n t . H e restricts his entire discussion to subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s . 39

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K a n t wished to e q u a t e subjective with formal, a n d objective with material p u r p o s i v e n e s s , b u t t h e exigencies of his exposition did n o t p e r m i t t h i s . H a d h e h e l d to a tighter line, K a n t could n o t have conceived of a p u r p o s i v e n e s s which was at o n c e objective a n d formal o r of o n e which was at o n c e subjective a n d material. B u t in fact h e did. I n §62 K a n t gave a n a c c o u n t of the purposiveness of geometrical constructions as objective a n d formal. A n d K a n t acc o u n t e d for t h e a g r e e a b l e or pleasant (das Angenehme) in his First Introduction as subjective b u t material purposiveness. Only by vir41

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t u e of o u r a c c o u n t of t h e d i s j u n c t u r e of Kant's n o t i o n s of validity a n d actuality can we m a k e any sense of this. Objective formal p u r posiveness proves to b e a form of validity without actuality, while subjective material p u r p o s i v e n e s s involves actuality w i t h o u t validity, especially in Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e "animality" of m a n . It r e m a i n s t h a t t h e o t h e r two types of purposivess prove far m o r e significant for Kant: objective material purposiveness a n d , above all, subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s . I n c o n t r a s t i n g t h e formal " p u r p o s i v e n e s s in g e n e r a l " of geometrical figures with "real" o r "material" purposiveness in §62 of the Third Critique, K a n t stressed t h a t t h e latter was to be f o u n d in "things, e x t e r n a l to myself," whose " o r d e r a n d regularity [as] existing things m u s t b e given empirically in o r d e r to b e k n o w n . " H e used as his e x a m p l e a g a r d e n laid o u t in geometric regularity. Enc o u n t e r i n g this empirical g a r d e n , o n e discovered purposiveness. It was given, t h e result of a n empirical cognition, as s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the object. Yet purposiveness could only be given problematically, for it was a n interpretative inference from, n o t a p r o p e r t y i m m e diately in, t h e given. T h u s K a n t w r o t e : " T h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s of a thing, so far as it is r e p r e s e n t e d in p e r c e p t i o n , is n o characteristic of the object itself (for such c a n n o t be perceived) a l t h o u g h it may be inferred from a cognition of t h i n g s . " First the t h i n g h a d to be recognized. T h a t s e e m e d to r e q u i r e a n empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t . T h a t j u d g m e n t , m o r e o v e r , led to t h e conjecture t h a t t h e t h i n g as recognized could not plausibly be taken as a m e r e n a t u r a l h a p p e n s t a n c e ; it stood o u t as a n o m a l o u s in n a t u r e . It a p p e a r e d as a n artifact, as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of s o m e d e s i g n . 4 2

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Recognizing t h e purposiveness of things does n o t a p p e a r p r o b lematic if they result from o u r o w n particular practical activity. It is alien p u r p o s e t h a t poses interpretative difficulty. E n c o u n t e r i n g such a t h i n g , we have to m a k e a n inference a b o u t its genesis, having r e c o u r s e to o u r o w n practical purposiveness as a m o d e l . We are in t h e r e a l m of empirical j u d g m e n t s . T o take t h e e x a m p l e K a n t suggests in §62, we m i g h t find ourselves in yet a n o t h e r kind of g a r d e n , n o t o n e o n t h e m o d e l of Versailles a n d geometry, b u t o n e m o d e l e d in t h e O r i e n t a l fashion to imitate t h e spontaneity of n a t u r e , a n d fail to recognize t h e artifact for o n e . O r we m i g h t recognize it as p u r posive a n d yet still take it to s e e m n a t u r a l , a n d enjoy it as a work of art: a " d e p e n d e n t " beauty, because we shall have h a d to recognize, h e n c e conceptualize, it as a g a r d e n before we can j u d g e it as a r t . B u t t h e converse is also possible: we may take a n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e 46

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as a n artifact because it seems so d e s i g n e d . T h e point is, discernm e n t , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n — i n a word, j u d g m e n t — i s requisite h e r e . It is a cognitive situation in which o n e may easily err. A n d more t h a n cognition is involved. T h e r e is also usefulness, a n d t h e c o n n e c t i o n of usefulness with existence. "Material p u r posiveness" has a s t r o n g sense of a n object available for use. I n §10, in defining p u r p o s e K a n t m a d e a g r e a t deal of distinguishing t h e object itself from its m e r e cognition. H e characterized t h e object itself as "form a n d e x i s t e n c e . " T h e existence of t h e object in this sense seems to go b e y o n d t h e cognition of it. Its form a n d existence m u s t have s o m e additional m e a n i n g . T h e m e a n i n g of t h e actual existence of a n object in t e r m s of its availability for use is e n c o m p a s s e d in Kant's t e r m "[material] i n t e r e s t . " It e x t e n d s t h e relation of t h e subject to t h e object from a cognitive to a practical o n e , a n d entails not only t h e material existence of t h e object, b u t also t h e material existence of t h e subject (as Willkür). A p u r p o s e always entails interest, a c o n c e r n for t h e existence o r actualization of t h e object. T h a t is exactly w h a t "material p u r p o s i v e n e s s " signifies. I n §15 K a n t i n t r o d u c e s t h e n o t i o n of "objective purposiven e s s . " T h e c o n n e c t i o n of "objective" with "material purposiveness" is twofold. It involves, in t h e first r e g a r d , a d e t e r m i n a t e object of cognition to b e a p p r e c i a t e d by t h e subject as a n occasion for m e r e gratification. "Material p u r p o s i v e n e s s " is p r o m o t e d to "objective p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in r e f e r e n c e to a n object constituted by concepts a n d elected by a rational process of will (not m o r a l , in this case, b u t simply p r u d e n t i a l , i.e., pleasure-seeking). As such it would b e useful or, in Kant's words, a "relative" p u r p o s e (or relative good). Objects b e c o m e "relative" p u r p o s e s only via t h e i r utility for a n intrinsic p u r p o s e , a n a g e n t o r " e n d . " T h e y a r e , precisely, " m e a n s . " C o n s e q u e n t l y , p u r p o s i v e n e s s r e m a i n s merely "external," n o t in t h e object itself b u t in its utility to a separate " e n d " o r intrinsic p u r p o s e . 49

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H e n c e t h e essential contrast b e t w e e n "material" a n d "objective" p u r p o s i v e n e s s only c o m e s to full articulation in t e r m s of this n o t i o n of intrinsic (self-determining) p u r p o s e . A n intrinsic purpose is a n a g e n t capable of m e a n s - e n d s choice, or at least a n actual entity whose empirically observed b e h a v i o r c a n n o t be a c c o u n t e d for by h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g otherwise t h a n by analogy with such a n a g e n t . T h u s " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s " have i m p u t e d to t h e m a form of action a n a l o g o u s to that of a t r u e a g e n t . Yet Kant is unequivocal that the effective m e c h a n i s m in t h e case of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s is n o t m e a n s - e n d s choice, n o t rational will, b u t merely instinct. H e n c e " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s , " or o r g a n i c forms, have only a n i m p u t e d "in98

The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

trinsic purposiveness." As a c o n s e q u e n c e they d o n o t m e r i t t h e full status of a n "end-in-itself." K a n t identified t h e n o t i o n of "intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s " with t h e c o n c e p t of "perfection." B a u m g a r t e n h a d used t h e n o t i o n to refer to t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s of a t h i n g in t e r m s of its distinguishing m a r k s . T o b e perfect in t h a t sense was to d e m o n s t r a t e all t h e requisite m a r k s of a p a r t i c u l a r kind of t h i n g . T h i s sense of completeness after its kind K a n t t e r m e d "quantitative perfection." H e a r g u e d against B a u m g a r t e n t h a t it was only possible to use perfection in its "quantitative" sense if o n e already could posit w h a t "kind" a t h i n g was s u p p o s e d to be. B u t t h e idea t h a t a n entity ought to be any kind was n o t a simple j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , not a cognitive j u d g m e n t p r e s i d e d over by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t a j u d g m e n t of (practical) r e a s o n . It p r e s u m e d a c o n c e p t of t h e t h i n g , a n d m o r e specifically, a n idea of w h a t t h e p u r p o s e of t h e t h i n g s h o u l d be. T h i s was the e x p l a n a t i o n of his o w n n o t i o n of "qualitative perfection" which K a n t offered in §15 of t h e Third Critique. W h e r e m o r a l j u d g m e n t s are c o n c e r n e d , t h e faculty at w o r k is r e a s o n , a n d r e a s o n functions not in t h e r e a l m of t h e actual, b u t in t h e realm of "intelligible form." T h e j u d g m e n t of "qualitative perfection," insofar as it is a m o r a l a p praisal, t h a t is, insofar as t h e t e r m s "good" a n d "perfect" c o r r e s p o n d , translates t h e object of such a j u d g m e n t from t h e world of t h e senses into t h e n o u m e n a l o r d e r . Perfection as h e uses it, qualitative perfection, entails i m m a n e n t purposiveness o r e n t e l e c h y . T h e most essential link b e t w e e n Kant's philosophy a n d t h a t of B a u m g a r t e n is t h e p r o b l e m a t i c consideration of this idea of Vollkommenheit, o r perfection. Perfection, in this context, refers to t h e objective quality of a t h i n g . T h e n o t i o n of intrinsic perfection has, for Kant, n o t merely a cognitive b u t a n evaluative aspect. K a n t d e veloped this n o t i o n in t h e 1750s a n d 1760s. "All perfection a p p e a r s to consist in t h e a c c o r d a n c e [Zusammenstimmung] of a t h i n g with freedom, h e n c e in its p u r p o s i v e n e s s , g e n e r a l utility, e t c . " For K a n t t h e objective perfection of a t h i n g h a d to d o with its p u r p o s e . 53

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Kant initially, u n d e r t h e influence of B a u m g a r t e n , s o u g h t to use b e a u t y as a n access to this objective perfection. I n a Reflection from t h e 1750s, K a n t m a d e this clear in e x p l a i n i n g t h e m e a n i n g of judicium. "If o n e n o t e s n o t only t h e similarities a n d differences of things, b u t also h o w a manifold m e r g e s into a unity a n d forms its g r o u n d , t h e n o n e recognizes perfection. T h i s is called j u d g i n g [beurteilen] . . . Such j u d g m e n t is quite certainly possible t h r o u g h t h e lower faculties of k n o w l e d g e . " W h a t K a n t wished to resolve, vis-ä-vis B a u m g a r t e n , is " w h e t h e r b e a u t y a n d perfection, including 56

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t h e i r causes as well as t h e rules for j u d g i n g t h e m , stand in secret c o n n e c t i o n . " K a n t wished to believe t h a t t h e recognition of t h e objective quality of a t h i n g — a cognitive-evaluative j u d g m e n t — h a d a n aesthetic c o n c o m i t a n t . " T h e i n n e r perfection of a t h i n g has a n a t u r a l relation to beauty. For t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n of a manifold to a p u r p o s e r e q u i r e s its c o o r d i n a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to c o m m o n laws. T h e r e f o r e t h e same p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h which a b u i l d i n g is beautiful c o n t r i b u t e s as well to its perfection [bonität]." B u t sometimes, with certain sorts of p h e n o m e n a , K a n t believed it possible t h a t this aesthetic aspect could arise even w h e n t h e r e were difficulties with t h e cognitive-evaluative j u d g m e n t . " I n all p r o d u c t s of n a t u r e a n d of art t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g which relates exclusively to t h e p u r p o s e , a n d s o m e t h i n g t h a t merely has to d o with t h e a g r e e m e n t of t h e a p p e a r a n c e with t h e state of m i n d , i.e. t h e m a n n e r [Manier], t h e w r a p p i n g . T h e latter, even w h e n o n e c a n n o t g r a s p t h e p u r p o s e , is often quite sufficient [for b e a u t y ] , e.g. t h e s h a p e a n d color of flowers." T h e m e r e m a n n e r in which such things affect o u r sensibility suffices for t h e e x p e r i e n c e of aesthetic p l e a s u r e . "We recognize of m a n y things in n a t u r e that they a r e beautiful, b u t we d o n o t know their p u r p o s e ; o n e s h o u l d believe n o t t h a t it was n a t u r e ' s i n t e n t i o n to please u s , b u t t h a t we a r e pleased n a t u r e seems to have intention." 57

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Yet, while t h e feeling of b e a u t y m i g h t b e a r o u s e d merely by t h e Manier, K a n t believed it was tied to t h e objective p u r p o s e . K a n t went q u i t e far a l o n g this line: O n e n o t e s t h a t almost e v e r y t h i n g in n a t u r e which has t h e p r o p erty of s h a p i n g itself distinctly from t h e g e n e r a l c l u m p of matter is beautiful in t h e eyes of m a n . F r o m this o n e can see t h a t beauty m u s t involve a c o n s e q u e n c e [Folge] of perfection, while perfection itself m u s t b e a m a t t e r of concepts. P e r h a p s t h e recognition of perfection comes first in m a n ; recognized sensibly, it is beauty; as a m e r e m a t t e r of sensation, t h e p l e a s a n t . 62

I n s o m e obscure r e m a r k s that follow, K a n t insisted that s o m e t h i n g m u s t b e given in sensation which p e r t a i n e d to t h e "absolute a n d real" in t h e object, even if u n d e r s t a n d i n g could n o t g r a s p this absolute quality perfectly [in der Vollkommenheit]. Kant t h u s i n t r o d u c e d a distinction b e t w e e n a perfection in t h e t h i n g itself, which was intim a t e d only obscurely in sensation, a n d a perfection in comp r e h e n d i n g t h e t h i n g , which was a m a t t e r of cognitive process in which t h e obscurity of sensation i n t e r v e n e d .

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The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

I n all sensibility t h e r e is a perfection which h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g does n o t possess, namely, intuition, a n d a n i m p e r fection: sensation a n d t h e f o r m of a p p e a r a n c e . Reason r e p r e s e n t s only relational concepts [Verhältnis Begriffe]; in intuition, however, what is absolute a n d internal in a n object is t h o u g h t . E x c e p t t h e imperfection is t h a t o u r intuitions concern only t h e relation of things to o u r s e n s e s . 63

In t h e Reflection K a n t a r g u e d that it was in intuition that the "absolute a n d i n t e r n a l " — t h e reality—of a n object was t h o u g h t . T h a t clearly suggested a cognitive-evaluative level of d i s c o u r s e . O v e r against that, K a n t claimed t h a t "the synthesis of a manifold for a d e t e r m i n a t e p u r p o s e is relative perfection." I n Kant's t h i n k i n g of t h e 1760s, "perfection" p o i n t e d in too m a n y directions. H e tried to i n t e g r a t e u n d e r it cognitive, ethical, a n d aesthetic c o m p o n e n t s of j u d g m e n t . T h e load was simply too heavy, a n d t h e e n t e r p r i s e collapsed u n d e r t h e i m p a c t of British e m piricism. K a n t gave u p his n o t i o n of beauty c o n n e c t e d to objective perfection in Reflection 6 7 6 , in which h e recognized two distinct sorts of perfection. O n e involved t h e n a t u r e of t h e object, a n d was cognitive a n d e v a l u a t i v e . T h e o t h e r involved t h e n a t u r e of t h e subject, a n d perfection in this sense was what t h e aesthetic, what beauty, was all a b o u t . It involved "liveliness," i.e., e x p a n d i n g t h e consciousness of l i f e . " T h a t t h e form of a n object facilitates t h e activity of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is what makes s o m e t h i n g beautiful pleasurable a n d this is subjective; what is objective, however, is t h a t this f o r m is universally v a l i d . " K a n t described aesthetic experie n c e as a sort of play, a use of t h e m i n d without specific p u r p o s e merely for t h e sake of e n t e r t a i n m e n t , in which "all t h e powers of t h e m i n d a r e set into h a r m o n i o u s p l a y . " T h i s n o t i o n of h a r m o n y of t h e faculties was directly d r a w n from t h e school-philosophy tradition. 64

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While K a n t believed that beauty was a m a t t e r of subjective perfection a n d involved t h e h e i g h t e n i n g of t h e m i n d , h e h a d to determ i n e w h e t h e r h e could explain b e a u t y entirely by this e n h a n c i n g function or w h e t h e r it r e q u i r e d a s u p p l e m e n t a r y a c c o u n t in t e r m s of merely s e n s u o u s p l e a s u r e . In Reflection 6 3 8 , K a n t f o r m u l a t e d t h e issue in t h e following way: " T h e question is w h e t h e r t h e play of sensations o r t h e form a n d s h a p e of intuition is immediately pleasurable o r only pleases because it provides u n d e r s t a n d i n g with comprehensibility a n d facility in g a t h e r i n g into a whole t h e m a n -

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ifold a n d giving distinctness to t h e whole r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " I n t h e first case, K a n t believed, b e a u t y would be indistinguishable from sensual " c h a r m " [Reiz]. Since K a n t c a m e to reject this identification, his t h e o r y of b e a u t y as subjective perfection h a d to b e o r i e n t e d tow a r d a h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, a n d beauty g r o u n d e d in this utility for u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h a t was t h e m e a n i n g of his most fruitful n o t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s : "subjective formal"—i.e., aesthetic—purposiveness. 69

"Aesthetic"

Purposiveness

I n §vii of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n K a n t w r o t e : "If p l e a s u r e is b o u n d u p with t h e m e r e a p p r e h e n s i o n (apprehensio) of t h e f o r m of a n object of intuition, w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to a c o n c e p t for a definite cognition, t h e n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is t h e r e b y n o t r e f e r r e d to t h e object, b u t simply to t h e subject . . . a n d h e n c e can only express a subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s of t h e o b j e c t . " We have, t h e n , to c o n s t r u e "subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s . " 70

T h e subjective (element) in a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , which cannot be an ingredient in cognition, is t h e pleasure or pain b o u n d u p with it . . . T h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s , t h e r e f o r e , which p r e c e d e s t h e cognition of a n object a n d which, e v e n without o u r wishing to use t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of it for cognition, is at t h e same time immediately b o u n d u p with it, is t h a t subjective (element) which c a n n o t b e a n i n g r e d i e n t in cognition. H e n c e t h e object is only called p u r p o s i v e w h e n its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is a n aesthetical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . 71

T h e r e are few m o r e essential o r m o r e difficult passages t h a n this o n e in t h e Third Critique. C o n s i d e r t h e peculiarities of t h e exposition. It is t h e object which is "called" p u r p o s i v e . T h a t suggests a j u d g m e n t very akin to t h e o n e involved in t h e figurative extension of t h e t e r m in empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . B u t in this new context this signifies only t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object is " i m m e diately c o m b i n e d " with a feeling of pleasure. Does this m e a n they are t h e s a m e o r different? Is t h e " r e f e r e n c e " in (i.e., a n aspect of) o r about (i.e., a n assessment of) t h e representation-of-the-object? T h e issue only gets m u d d i e r w h e n K a n t redefines this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , which as such h a d to have available in it m a t t e r for reference to t h e object, into a n "aesthetic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of purposiveness." Is t h e materiality a n d distinctiveness of t h e object utterly a n n u l l e d ? I n ad72

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dition, is a n aesthetic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s t h e same as or different from p u r p o s i v e n e s s itself? K a n t d o e s well to ask, at this j u n c t u r e , " w h e t h e r t h e r e is, in general, such a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . " At t h e outset of §vii, in d e a l i n g with logical validity as r e f e r e n c e to t h e object, K a n t discriminated b e t w e e n t h e " f o r m " of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d its " m a t t e r " : space a n d sensation respectively. Now it would a p p e a r t h a t form a n d m a t t e r a r e relevant as well in t e r m s of r e f e r e n c e to t h e subject. If we may be p e r m i t t e d t h e p h r a s e s , we m u s t distinguish a n "aesthetic f o r m " a n d a n "aesthetic m a t t e r " as p r o p e r t i e s of t h e representation-of-the-object. T h e s e may n o t simply b e conflated with space a n d sensation. T h e s e aesthetic e l e m e n t s in or " b o u n d u p with" t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n could have no objective reference, K a n t i n s i s t e d . H o w d o e s t h e "aesthetic f o r m " of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n connect with formal purposiveness? Earlier we o p e r a t e d with a fairly secure n o t i o n of w h a t formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s signified in its figurative sense: likeness to p u r p o s e , t h e a p p e a r a n c e of design. Now K a n t seems c o n f o u n d i n g l y close to identifying t h e formality of p u r posiveness with t h e form of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as it refers to t h e subject—"aesthetic f o r m . " B u t t h a t is ostensibly onlyfeeling. T h e e l e m e n t of objective r e f e r e n c e t h a t m a d e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n serviceable for empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n seems n o w to have e v a p o r a t e d utterly. I n t h e empirical cognitive use, t h e whole empirical existence of a t h i n g was occasion for t h e r e c o u r s e to p u r p o s i v e n e s s . I n this new, "aesthetical" instance, w h a t m a t t e r s is t h e m e r e form of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, b u t t h a t in only its subjective refere n c e . It is h e l d to b e n o t merely for t h e subject b u t a b o u t t h e subject. K a n t suggests a very i m p o r t a n t p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l distinction in t h e Anthropology: "We s h o u l d distinguish between i n n e r sense, which is a m e r e p o w e r of p e r c e p t i o n (of empirical intuition), a n d the feeling of p l e a s u r e a n d d i s p l e a s u r e — t h a t is o u r susceptibility to b e d e t e r m i n e d , by certain r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , either to hold o n t o t h e m or to drive t h e m away—which could b e called interior sense Sensation provokes n o t merely attention (con(sensus interior)." sciousness) b u t subjective r e f e r e n c e , "attention to o u r o w n state" o r self-consciousness. Every sensation is in i n n e r sense, or for t h e subj e c t , a n d yet almost all can be i n t e r p r e t e d in t e r m s of o u t e r sense, objective r e f e r e n c e . F r o m t h e latter, j u d g m e n t s b o t h of p e r c e p t i o n a n d of e x p e r i e n c e can b e c o n s t r u e d . B u t t h e r e r e m a i n s that which 73

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is n o t merely for t h e subject b u t also a b o u t o r of t h e subject: t h e "state of m i n d " which K a n t associates with t h e feeling {Gefühl) of p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n . Sensation r e m a i n s t h e occasion, however, even of this reference. Kant gives a fitting illustration in §3, w h e r e t h e g r e e n of a m e a d o w is c o n s i d e r e d b o t h in t e r m s of its objective refere n c e a n d in t e r m s of t h e pleasantness o r satisfaction it occasions in t h e s u b j e c t . T h i s latter is t h e s p h e r e of t h e "aesthetic." K a n t is a d d r e s s i n g himself to t h e subjective r e s p o n s e to e m p i r i cal sensation a n d focusing his a t t e n t i o n exclusively u p o n that refere n c e to t h e subject. T h e r e f o r e h e abstracts from t h e cognitive aspect of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, its objective reference, to clarify t h e aesthetic side, subjective reference. H e recognizes that p l e a s u r e or p a i n can b e involved in empirical cognition, yet h e insists t h a t this p l e a s u r e o r pain has n o cognitive r e l e v a n c e . W h e n h e writes of a " p u r p o s i v e n e s s . . . which p r e c e d e s the cognition of a n object," t h e only sense in which t h a t "cannot be an ingredient of cognition," as h e also insists, is if cognition is taken in t h e r i g o r o u s sense of a " j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , " of a " d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . " B u t w h a t a b o u t a reflective j u d g m e n t ? Is the characterization of t h e subjective purposiveness of a "logical reflective j u d g m e n t " (a teleological j u d g m e n t ) at all different from that of a n "aesthetic reflective j u d g m e n t ? " T h a t is, can t h e r e b e any differe n c e in w h a t is p r e s e n t to consciousness? Is it not really a m a t t e r of h o w we a t t e n d t h a t p r e s e n c e — t h e use, t h e intellectual interest t a k e n in w h a t is given? I n short, does n o t subjective formal p u r p o siveness, as K a n t articulates it in this crucial passage, implicitly contain a r e f e r e n c e to t h e object—not, to be sure, in the sense of t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e a n d its "valid" claim, b u t in t e r m s of t h e j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , " a n d its " r e flective" claim? 77

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B u t in light of this parallelism b e t w e e n t h e d i s c e r n m e n t of p u r p o s i v e n e s s a n d the subjective reference of feeling, t h e full significance of "subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in its formal sense, i.e., " p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h o u t p u r p o s e , " e m e r g e s . T h a t t h e same subjective r e f e r e n c e can serve as t h e essential d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of b e a u t y a n d as t h e basis for a cognitive use of p u r posiveness (teleology) suggests t h e p o w e r in Kant's n o t i o n . H e r e we have a n indication of o u r capacity to " e x p e r i e n c e " prior to a n d separately from cognition. We see t h a t the kind of " j u d g i n g " which we have b e t o k e n e d by kennen a n d erkennen, b y j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n , by t h e synthesis of a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d imagination, by beobachten a n d bemerken, a n d finally by reflection, is identified with the aes104

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thetic sense of purposiveness. It is what Kant would later call " r e flective j u d g m e n t . " B u t at this stage of his a r g u m e n t K a n t was exclusively conc e r n e d with u s i n g his l a n g u a g e of purposiveness to articulate the possibility of a subjective r e s p o n s e which was n o t for the p u r p o s e s of cognition a n d h e n c e n o t explicitly d e t e r m i n e d by t h e rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t which was nevertheless g r o u n d e d in t h e rational s t r u c t u r e s of t h e m i n d a n d consequently eligible for a n a priori d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n short, K a n t h a d only a partial interest in t h e s t r u c t u r e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . H e was c o n c e r n e d with o n e p u r e case within it, j u s t as, in his consideration of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice, h e isolated o n e p u r e case within t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e of purposiveness as willed action in g e n e r a l . T h e r e were two linked strategies to p u r s u e in g e n e r a t i n g t h e p u r e case, in p e r f o r m i n g t h e transcend e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of taste. T h e first was to discriminate between a merely passive affect, material p l e a s u r e , a n d the p l e a s u r e which att e n d e d m e n t a l activity itself. T h e second was to discriminate between two j u d g m e n t s a b o u t p l e a s u r e , o n e claiming t h e object was "pleasant" a n d t h e o t h e r t h a t it was "beautiful." As I will show, b o t h strategies t u r n o n t h e c o m p l e x subjective p h e n o m e n o l o g y we have labored so h a r d to b r i n g into clarity.

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Five

T H E BEAUTIFUL AND T H E PLEASANT: KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF TASTE

T

h e p l e a s u r e in beauty is a singular event. It c a n n o t be generalized. It is n o t a p r o p e r t y of the object, b u t a subjective r e s p o n s e w i t h o u t c o n c e p t . Taste is always a subjective j u d g m e n t in t h e essential sense that it m u s t b e m a d e in t h e first p e r s o n , of a specific instance, o n t h e basis of t h a t person's individual r e s p o n s e . K a n t assures us t h a t it c a n n o t b e a prescriptive r u l e , g r o u n d e d in discursive concepts. W h a t is consciousness aware of in t h e e x p e r i e n c e of b e a u t y t h a t it should m a k e t h e j u d g m e n t of taste? A r e we cognizant "aesthetically by sensation a n d o u r m e r e i n t e r n a l sense? O r . . . intellectually by consciousness of o u r intentional activity in b r i n g i n g these p o w e r s into p l a y ? " Kant's answer is unequivocal: " T h e r e is . . . n o way for t h e subjective unity of t h e relation in q u e s t i o n to m a k e itself k n o w n [other] t h a n by sensat i o n . " Since "it is absolutely o u t of t h e question to r e q u i r e that p l e a s u r e in [material] objects s h o u l d be acknowleded by every o n e , " it can only b e the form of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, b u t even this n o t so m u c h in itself as in what it elicits in t h e subject, which is t h e basis of t h e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . T h u s §9 crucially cont e n d s : "If t h e p l e a s u r e in t h e given object p r e c e d e s . . . t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a b o u t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, . . . such p l e a s u r e w o u l d b e n o t h i n g different from t h e m e r e pleasantness in sensation, a n d so . . . could have only private validity." T h e t r u e source of t h e validity of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste c a n n o t rest o n t h e m e r e sensation, b u t can only derive from its d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e m e n t a l function which a t t e n d s it. S o m e t h i n g distinctive a b o u t t h e subjective feeling involved in taste differentiates it from m e r e s e n s u o u s p l e a s u r e . K a n t discriminated m e r e passive affect from t h e delight in m e n t a l activity itself. T h i s led to a distinction of form a n d m a t t e r in t h e aesthetic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n object, t h e discrim1

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ination of t h e beautiful from t h e pleasant in t e r m s of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e i r respective e x p e r i e n c e s . The Phenomenology

of the Pleasant

O n l y in t e r m s of this discrimination d o e s Kant's n o t i o n of aesthetic judgment b e c o m e clear. "Beautiful" a n d " a g r e e a b l e " occur only as predicates in j u d g m e n t s . T h a t is to say, these t e r m s arise in consciousness only in t h e context of t h e observations "X is beautiful" or "X is pleasant." T h e s e observations are inept, because t h e p r e d i cates refer n o t to X b u t to t h e state of t h e subject in t h e p r e s e n c e of X. Insofar, however, as j u d g m e n t s can b e m a d e at all, t h e state of t h e subject m u s t in s o m e sense b e a m e n a b l e to conscious a t t e n t i o n . K a n t is acutely aware of t h e incongruity of t h e p h r a s e "aesthetic j u d g m e n t . " T o take it in any sense cognitively, h e concedes, would be "blatantly c o n t r a d i c t o r y . " If K a n t will n o t have us call it cognition, it r e m a i n s to ask w h a t " r e f e r e n c e " a n d "reflection" t h e n m e a n , a n d why h e s t u b b o r n l y clings to t h e word " j u d g m e n t " in characterizing t h e s e events. K a n t wishes to h o l d o u t for t h e possibility t h a t a n "aesthetic j u d g m e n t of reflection" s h o u l d retain s o m e status as a j u d g m e n t , b u t why s h o u l d h e k e e p t h e t e r m for t h e merely sensual e x p e r i e n c e of t h e agreeable? C a n it have b e e n because j u d g m e n t (Urteil) was a traditional t e r m in G e r m a n t r e a t m e n t of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e — e v e n t h e "merely s e n s u o u s " — i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h cent u r y ? Was K a n t merely following convention? Possibly, b u t we would n o t b e wise to take t h a t as a c o m p l e t e account of a philosophical p r o c e d u r e so self-consciously u n d e r t a k e n by so subtle a m i n d . C a n it have b e e n , t h e n , Kant's n o t o r i o u s h a n k e r i n g after "architectonic"—a violence to t h e sense of t h e l a n g u a g e for t h e sake of system? S o m e have b e e n t e m p t e d to r e a d it s o . Yet t h e r e is a n alternative t h a t would r e n d e r m a t t e r s m o r e c o h e r e n t a n d plausible: to have r e c o u r s e to t h a t o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , Kant's complex sense of "subjective r e f e r e n c e " in t e r m s of the state of m i n d of t h e subject. T h i s is why we labored so long over t h e m e a n i n g of "subjective j u d g m e n t " in Kant. 6

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K a n t characterizes t h e a g r e e a b l e o r pleasant (das Angenehme) in §§2ff. of t h e Third Critique by t h e following essential features: (1) it pleases in sensation, t h a t is, it "rests entirely o n sensation" o r " r e p r e s e n t s t h e object simply in relation to sensation"; (2) in t h e a g r e e a b l e "it is n o t merely t h e object t h a t pleases, b u t also its existence"; a n d , consequently, (3) it is merely " p r i v a t e . " I n the First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment, K a n t characterizes observations 9

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a b o u t t h e a g r e e a b l e as "aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of sense" a n d explains t h a t such j u d g m e n t s are "completely i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e faculty of k n o w l e d g e , b e i n g directly related via sense to t h e feeling of pleas u r e . " By contrast, K a n t ascribes to t h e beautiful t h e following features: (1) it pleases in reflection; (2) it is disinterested; a n d consequently, (3) it is universal. I n t h e First Introduction Kant describes observations a b o u t t h e beautiful ("judgments of taste") as "aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of reflection," a n d claims t h a t they a r e g r o u n d e d in t h e "specific [eigentümlichen] principles of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t . " T h e r e u p o n K a n t m a k e s t h e following discrimination: "Aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of sense express material purposiveness; aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of reflection, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , formal purposiveness." Clearly, t h e significance of e i t h e r t e r m hinges o n t h e j u x t a p o s i tion with its a l t e r n a t e . T h e question t h a t immediately arises is why K a n t uses t h e t e r m j u d g m e n t at all for t h e e x p e r i e n c e of the a g r e e able. It would seem m o r e a m a t t e r of physiological r e s p o n s e to stimulus t h a n a " j u d g m e n t . " Nevertheless, t h e t e r m gets articulated in a n observation that has the form of a j u d g m e n t . It is, however remotely, a n aspect of conscious articulation, of cognitive process, even if only of a physiological o r subjective event. T h a t q u a s i - j u d g m e n t a l feature also helps explain h o w t h e a g r e e a b l e can, as K a n t insists, b e b o u n d u p with "interest," i.e., how it can be " n o t merely t h e object t h a t pleases, b u t also its existence." We are back with o u r familiar t h e m e of usefulness. Yet o u r earlier a c c o u n t of it p r e s u m e d t h e cognition of t h e object p r i o r to its evalu a t i o n as available for use. Now, K a n t implies t h a t such subjective materia] p u r p o s i v e n e s s arises without any c o g n i t i o n . It is necessary to reconsider t h e n o t i o n of interest in t e r m s of w h a t K a n t claims a b o u t the agreeable r e s t i n g entirely o n sensation. T h a t calls for a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t of this e x p e r i e n c e . K a n t holds t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e a g r e e a b l e to be impossible to p r e d i c t a priori. Before t h e first e x p e r i e n c e t h e r e can be n o anticipation a n d t h e r e f o r e n o interest, because the connection of pleas u r e with t h e e x p e r i e n c e can c o m e only a posteriori. At t h e outset of this pristine initial e n c o u n t e r , t h e n , t h e r e is t h e p r e s e n c e to consciousness of X, for e x a m p l e , one's first taste of kiwi. Let us a s s u m e t h a t u p o n tasting kiwi for t h e first time t h e r e is a feeling of pleasure "immediately b o u n d u p with it." T h a t e x p e r i e n c e is n o t yet a j u d g m e n t . It is merely "physiological" o r at best "psychological." B u t the e x p e r i e n c e d o e s n o t t e r m i n a t e t h e r e . Instead, a n inference is 1 0

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d r a w n . T h e r e is reflection of s o m e sort after a n d o n account of t h e p l e a s u r e . T h e first p a r t of this inference is t h e j u d g m e n t "X (in o u r case, t h e kiwi) is agreeable." It m i g h t be h e l d t h a t this initial j u d g m e n t s h o u l d have the m o r e primitive form of "This is a g r e e able." Yet for t h e balance of t h e reflection precisely w h a t is r e q u i r e d is t h a t s o m e h o w w h a t occasioned t h e p l e a s u r e b e "recognized" (erkannt), i.e., n a m e d , tagged, a n d m a r k e d sufficiently for f u r t h e r consideration c u l m i n a t i n g in a n interest. O n o u r first consideration this r e q u i r e d cognition in t h e full sense of r e c o u r s e to concepts. H e r e is w h e r e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e capacities associated with that o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g n o w offers a n alternative. W h a t it permits is precisely t h e kind of recognition (erkennen) r e q u i r e d . I n cons e q u e n c e , however, two senses of "materiality" we e n c o u n t e r e d e a r l i e r — t h e givenness of m a t t e r in sensation ("actuality") a n d t h e availability for use a t t a c h e d to t h e existence of a n object ("interest") — d r a w substantially closer to o n e a n o t h e r , a n d with t h a t t h e plausibility of a n "actuality w i t h o u t validity" as a sense of Kant's t e r m "objectivity" increases. H o w d o e s t h e j u d g m e n t of sense lead to interest? By t h e time I m a k e t h e observation a b o u t t h e agreeable, a n a p p e t i t e has b e e n a r o u s e d . I c a n n o t say I find s o m e t h i n g pleasant without simultaneously confessing a desire for m o r e . I n Kant's o w n words: "Now t h a t a j u d g m e n t a b o u t a n object by which I describe it as pleasant expresses a n interest in it, is plain from t h e fact that by sensation it excites a desire for objects of t h a t kind [dergleichen Gegenständen]; consequently t h e satisfaction p r e s u p p o s e s n o t t h e m e r e j u d g m e n t a b o u t it, b u t t h e relation of its existence to my state, so far as this is N o t e t h a t t h e lanaffected by such a n object [ein solches Objekt]." g u a g e implies a very i m p o r t a n t generalization. T h e j u d g m e n t , "X is a g r e e a b l e , " c h a n g e s into "X's a r e agreeable." B u t this p r o m o t i o n f r o m singularity to generality d o e s not occur, according t o Kant, with t h e b e a u t i f u l . T h e initial j u d g m e n t of sense is "aesthetical a n d singular" in a m a n n e r a n a l o g o u s to t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, b u t t h e s u b s e q u e n t generalization is n o t . K a n t characterizes this g e n e r alization as a "logical" o r "cognitive" j u d g m e n t . 14

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T w o things succeed u p o n t h e original physiological e x p e r i e n c e of p l e a s u r e in t h e p r e s e n c e of X: a cognitive generalization a n d a n a w a k e n i n g desire. T h e cognitive generalization is hasty. ( O n e may t u r n o u t to b e allergic to kiwi.) Yet it is essential to t h e genesis of t h e desire. T h e j u d g m e n t takes t h e practical form: "I w a n t things like X." T h a t , precisely, is what interest m e a n s . I n t e r e s t occasions a n

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"inclination" (Neigung) in t h e faculty of desire; it "pathologically conditions" it. T h i s motivates t h e will. Willkür takes a n interest in, c o n c e r n s itself with t h e availability of, things like X, for t h e p u r p o s e of m a i n t a i n i n g its pleasurable state. As this a c c o u n t indicates, insofar as K a n t wishes to associate t h e a g r e e a b l e with interest h e m u s t a b a n d o n his claim t h a t it has n o t h i n g w h a t e v e r to d o with t h e faculty of k n o w l e d g e . Kant's m o d e l of will completely obviates this, since it involves r e a s o n choosing t h e g o o d — w h e t h e r absolute o r merely relative. I n t e r e s t is c o n n e c t e d strongly to t h e n o t i o n of t h e relative g o o d , t h e useful. " T h e pleasa n t , which, as such, r e p r e s e n t s t h e object simply in relation to sense, m u s t first be b r o u g h t by t h e concept of a p u r p o s e u n d e r principles of r e a s o n , in o r d e r to call it good, as a n object of t h e w i l l . " T h e j u d g m e n t of sense m u s t be "elevated," t h o u g h what is b e i n g j u d g e d has c h a n g e d n o m o r e t h a n t h a t which is t h e "object" of a j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e has c h a n g e d from what was t h e "object" of a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n . K a n t claims b o t h t h e j u d g m e n t of sense a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t interest associated with it a r e "private." T h e y d o n o t a d m i t of any necessary generality, e i t h e r for o t h e r subjects o r even across instances for t h e s a m e subject. ( O n e can grow tired of kiwi.) T h e privacy of t h e j u d g m e n t s has to d o n o t merely with t h e materiality of t h e object, b u t above all with t h a t of t h e subject. O n e ' s empirical singularity, one's particular sensory a p p a r a t u s , one's particular dispositions, create t h e possibility t h a t o n e " d e p e n d s o r can d e p e n d o n t h e existence of t h e t h i n g , " i.e., becomes existentially e n t a n g l e d with i t . O n e develops a craving t h a t colors every s u b s e q u e n t e n c o u n t e r ; p r e f e r e n c e s i n t r u d e t h r o u g h o u t e x p e r i e n c e a n d r u i n impartiality. 17

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N o w we can u n d e r s t a n d subjective material purposiveness. It is subjective n o t m e r e l y in r e f e r e n c e to "interior sense," the subject's r e s p o n s e , b u t also in t h e sense of partiality—limited generality. T h a t , however, is b o u n d u p in t u r n with t h e subject's materiality, a n d h e l p s explain why this p u r p o s i v e n e s s is material. A n o t h e r sense of this materiality lies in t h e fact t h a t t h e agreeable is occasioned n o t by t h e "aesthetic f o r m " (as in t h e beautiful) b u t by t h e "aesthetic m a t t e r " in sensation. T h i s is t h e significance of t h e Kantian t e r m Reiz ( c h a r m ) . In addition, this e x p e r i e n c e creates a n "interest," i.e., a c o n c e r n for t h e availability or material existence of t h e object o r objects of t h a t kind for the use of t h e subject. 19

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The Transcendental

Deduction of the Judgment

of Taste

T h e adventitiousness of t h e delight associated with t h e agreeable led K a n t to try to distinguish t h e beautiful from it. T h e j u d g m e n t of taste s e e m e d too i m p e r i o u s , t h e claim of beauty too g r a n d , to derive from t h e s a m e experiential process t h a t a c c o u n t e d for t h e a g r e e able. T h e j u d g m e n t of taste could n o t b e merely private. T h e j u d g m e n t of taste could n o t b e colored by any interest. T h e j u d g m e n t of taste h a d to claim a universal validity. It could n o t if it were merely s e n s u o u s . T h e project, t h e n , was to find a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d in t h e h i g h e r faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Kant wished to raise t h e j u d g m e n t of taste to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity. T h u s h e d r e w a parallel between t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a n d t h e empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t , the j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e : "like all empirical j u d g m e n t s , it can declare n o objective necessity a n d lay claim to n o a priori validity. B u t t h e j u d g m e n t of taste also claims, as every o t h e r e m p i r i c a l j u d g m e n t does, to b e valid for all m e n . " N e i t h e r aesthetic j u d g m e n t s n o r empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t s a r e in themselves a priori necessary in a logical-universal s e n s e . B u t t h e empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t may claim intersubjective validity a n d objective t r u t h because it is g r o u n d e d in universal rules which a r e themselves a priori valid. Similarly, K a n t wishes to g r o u n d t h e j u d g m e n t of taste in a universal a priori s t r u c t u r e of consciousness. Only, with t h e beautiful, h e is in t h e s p h e r e of feeling, n o t concept, a n d t h e logical rules as such c a n n o t serve h i m . 2 0

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Before i n q u i r i n g into Kant's r e c o u r s e u n d e r these circumstances, a s e c o n d parallel b e t w e e n t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e deserves to b e e x p l o r e d . As we have n o t e d , t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e results from a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , at a h i g h e r level, of a p r i o r j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n . T h e question now to consider is w h e t h e r t h e r e m i g h t b e a similar s e q u e n c e of j u d g m e n t s involved in t h e genesis of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. C a n t h e r e be a p r i m o r d i a l e x p e r i e n c e of p l e a s u r e a n a l o g o u s (or identical) to t h a t of t h e j u d g m e n t of sense in t h e a g r e e a b l e , o u t of which, at a h i g h e r level of authority, t h e final j u d g m e n t of taste is f o r m u l a t e d ? Is it a simple or a c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l event? K a n t seems to d e n y emphatically t h a t such a possibility of sequential j u d g m e n t s could arise in this case: "If t h e p l e a s u r e in t h e given object p r e c e d e s . . . t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a b o u t t h e r e p r e s e n tation of t h e o b j e c t . . . such p l e a s u r e would b e n o t h i n g different

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from t h e m e r e pleasantness [Annehmlichkeit] in s e n s a t i o n . " Kant devotes a very l o n g section, which h e calls t h e "key to t h e critique," to t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e reflection m u s t p r e c e d e a n d occasion t h e p l e a s u r e . O t h e r w i s e , K a n t fears, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste would sink to t h e level of t h e m e r e l y private. Yet is h e wise to conflate t h e m a n ifestly empirical c h a r a c t e r of t h e e x p e r i e n c e with merely private validity? T h e beautiful, n o less t h a n t h e agreeable, is inextricably a posteriori: it c a n n o t be anticipated. I n d e e d , given Kant's insistence u p o n its singularity, t h e beautiful is even less predictable t h a n t h e agreeable. It would s e e m t h a t if t h e beautiful is to have a m o r e august claim, it c a n n o t be by d e n y i n g all this, b u t r a t h e r by t r a n s c e n d i n g it. Still, we m u s t a t t e n d carefully to Kant's claims in §9. H e wishes to suggest t h a t his m o d e l of p l e a s u r e as "immediately b o u n d u p with" t h e representation-of-the-object as its "aesthetical c h a r a c t e r " s h o u l d be revised to include t h e possibility t h a t p l e a s u r e n o t i m m e diately a c c o m p a n y t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r may result from a n i n t e r v e n i n g reflective j u d g m e n t . O n the face of it, t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to believe t h a t p l e a s u r e c a n n o t be occasioned by t h e m i n d ' s o w n activities. J u s t t h a t seems to b e o n e sense of Kant's use of t h e t e r m "spirit" (Geist) in § 4 9 . B u t t h e p r o b l e m is to see h o w this activity is occasioned by specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a n d to account for t h e i r eliciting it. I n addition, it is necessary to describe t h e activity itself a n d explain why it s h o u l d occasion p l e a s u r e . All this calls for a m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e e x p e r i e n c e . Kant's p o s t u r e in §9 s h o u l d be j u x t a p o s e d to that which h e a d o p t s in t h e " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " a n d especially in §37 of t h a t p a r t of t h e Third Critique. T h e r e it would a p p e a r t h a t K a n t favors t h e n o t i o n of a s e q u e n c e of j u d g m e n t s . In §36, Kant begins to b r e a k o u t w h a t in §9 h e tried to r e a d as a single j u d g m e n t . H e writes: " A l t h o u g h t h e p r e d i c a t e (of t h e personal pleasure b o u n d u p with t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) is empirical, nevertheless, as c o n c e r n s t h e r e q u i r e d assent of everyone t h e j u d g m e n t s a r e a priori. " He c o n t i n u e s a l o n g this line in §37, a c k n o w l e d g i n g that it is a "merely empirical j u d g m e n t " t h a t a " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n object is i m m e diately b o u n d u p with p l e a s u r e . " Yet this n o l o n g e r keeps h i m from ascribing g r e a t e r validity to t h e e n s u i n g j u d g m e n t of taste: 22

23

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A n d so it is n o t t h e p l e a s u r e , b u t t h e universal validity of this pleasure, perceived as mentally b o u n d u p with t h e m e r e j u d g m e n t u p o n a n object, which is r e p r e s e n t e d a priori in a j u d g m e n t of taste as a universal r u l e for t h e j u d g m e n t a n d valid for 112

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e v e r y o n e . It is a n empirical j u d g m e n t (to say) t h a t I perceive a n d j u d g e a n object with p l e a s u r e . B u t it is a n a priori^judgm e n t (to say) t h a t I find it beautiful, i.e. I attribute this satisfaction necessarily to e v e r y o n e . 27

K a n t takes t h e s a m e line in t h e crucial exposition of §vii of t h e Int r o d u c t i o n , t h e most meticulous a c c o u n t of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of this e x p e r i e n c e . O f t h e two stances, that of §§37 a n d vii seems t h e m o r e a p t . T o claim j u d g m e n t s of taste have a priori validity would n o t only b e inconsistent with his s t a t e m e n t in §vii, b u t would result in t h e incongruity t h a t aesthetic j u d g m e n t s would enjoy h i g h e r validity t h a n j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e , a result that K a n t can hardly have c o u n t e n a n c e d . Rather, as §vii m o r e soundly holds, they r e m a i n empirical, but, sanctioned by t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d s , have claim nevertheless to "intersubjective" validity. Kant e x p o u n d s t h e difference b e t w e e n objective a n d intersubjective validity in § 8 . O t h e r p r o b l e m s r e m a i n . O n e is that a sequential t h e o r y of t h e genesis of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste m u s t still give a n account of t h e initial e x p e r i e n c e which i n c o r p o r a t e s Kant's distinctive m a r k s of t h e beautiful, i.e., its singularity, a n d its basis in t h e aesthetic form, n o t t h e m a t t e r , of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n so far as t h e a g r e e a b l e d e rives from t h e "aesthetic m a t t e r , " we c a n n o t use it as t h e basis for o u r characterization of t h a t initial e x p e r i e n c e . Moreover, t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g telling in Kant's p r o p o s i t i o n that in t h e case of t h e b e a u tiful t h e r e is a m e d i a t i o n of reflection. T h i s d o e s n o t refute t h e s e q u e n c e theory; it only complicates t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e question, a p p r o p r i a t e l y e n o u g h for t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy, is: H o w passive is t h e subject in t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e beautiful? 28

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3 0

While K a n t stresses t h e d e g r e e to which t h e subject is affected (afficiert) in t h e e x p e r i e n c e , nevertheless it is striking h o w n o t merely t h e object b u t even t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object shifts far into t h e b a c k g r o u n d . Its form serves as t h e occasion, b e c o m e s at most a catalyst, for a c o m p l e x subjective r e s p o n s e . K a n t stresses r e peatedly t h e "act" of reflection, t h e "act" of j u d g i n g , a n d above all, the f r e e d o m of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n : "the imagination m u s t be considered in its f r e e d o m . . . as p r o d u c t i v e a n d s p o n t a n e o u s (as t h e a u t h o r of arbitrary [willkürlichen] forms of possible i n t u i t i o n ) . " O n t h e o n e side, t h e i m a g i n a t i o n seems c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e givenness of t h e object. O n t h e o t h e r , it a p p e a r s c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e laws of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t we recall t h a t t h e givenness of r e p r e s e n tations is primarily in t h e i r " m a t t e r , " n o t their f o r m . A n d we recall 31

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t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n as t h a t " o t h e r k i n d ofj u d g i n g " has t h e capacity to "befree a n d yet of itself conformed to law." K a n t acknowledges t h a t this seems "contradictory" in t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to §22, yet h e insists it is nevertheless t h e c a s e . I n t h e Anthropology h e shows clearly h o w this is not a contradiction, b u t merely a difference in t h e level of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l self-consciousness. T h e i m a g i n a t i o n is o p e r ating in a c c o r d a n c e with law w i t h o u t yet b e i n g aware of it a n d expressly observing it. It r e m a i n s to explain w h a t this free act of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n can m e a n . K a n t offers a very useful characterization in §67 of t h e Anthropology: " I n taste (taste t h a t c h o o s e s ) — t h a t is, in aesthetic j u d g m e n t — w h a t p r o d u c e s o u r p l e a s u r e in t h e object is n o t t h e sensation i m m e d i a t e l y (the material e l e m e n t in o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object). It is r a t h e r t h e way in which free (productive) imagination a r r a n g e s this m a t t e r inventively—that is, t h e form; for only form can lay claim to a universal r u l e for t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e . " If t h e h i g h e r faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g manifests its spontaneity a n d its t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a u t h o r i t y in r e i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e merely given after its o w n rules, h e r e too K a n t seems to indicate a r e i n t e r p r e t a tion, a reconfiguration (Umgestaltung) of t h e merely a p p r e h e n d e d , b e t o k e n i n g o n c e again s p o n t a n e i t y a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l authority. It is precisely t h e refusal to stay with t h e m e r e givenness, t h e willful (willkürlichen) play u p o n it in t h e activity of t h e imagination, which elevates taste above a p p e t i t e . I n § 12 of t h e Anthropology, K a n t writes of "Artificial Play with Sensory S e m b l a n c e [Sinnenschein]" a n d cont e n d s t h a t we k n o w it for illusion, a n d yet we linger over it w i t h o u t rectifying it (objectifying it) t h r o u g h conceptualization. " T h i s play with sensory s e m b l a n c e is very pleasant a n d e n t e r t a i n i n g for t h e m i n d . " I m a g i n a t i o n takes t h e merely given a n d reconfigures it, t a k i n g j o y i n j u s t this reconfigurative play. Obviously i m a g i n a t i o n is in n o position to s u p p l y the m a t t e r in sensation, for that is simply given. W h a t it can a n d d o e s reconfigure is t h e f o r m . 32

33

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T h e m o s t impressive a c c o u n t of this was offered by Rudolf O d e b r e c h t in a work rarely cited, Form und Geist, which a p p e a r e d in 1930. O d e b r e c h t a r g u e s t h a t aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n is a n i n t e r r u p tion of t h e n o r m a l cognitive e x p e r i e n c e . B u t m o r e , h e c o n t e n d s t h a t it is a g e s t u r e of subjective liberation: a "Zurückgewinnung der Gestaltung an sich"—a retrieval of t h e (power of) configuration by t h e subject. O d e b r e c h t elaborates: T h e r e takes place, in t h e context of intense activity of my consciousness, a liberation [Loslösung] from t h e first stage of 114

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c h a r m a n d e m o t i o n , a s h a t t e r i n g of t h e f o r m of a p p e a r a n c e [Scheinform] a n d a spirited [stimmungshaftes] r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e in-itself m e a n i n g l e s s r h y t h m of configuration in t h e m a t e rial. I n this configuration t h e r e awakens for m e symbolically a n e w object [Gegenständlichkeit] which is entirely r e f e r r e d to t h e feeling of self of my ego [Selbstgefühl meines Ich] a n d constitutes i t . 36

T h i s is t h e " e x p e r i e n c e of p u r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " as a n act of consciousness. We r e d e s i g n t h e given in aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , a n d this, O d e b r e c h t c o n t e n d s , is what K a n t m e a n t by t h e cryptic t e r m Zeichnung (delineation) in §14 of t h e Third Critique w h e n h e w r o t e : "the delineation is t h e essential t h i n g ; a n d h e r e it is n o t w h a t gratifies in sensation b u t w h a t pleases by m e a n s of its form t h a t is f u n d a m e n t a l for t a s t e . " W h a t O d e b r e c h t saw is t h a t Zeichnung m u s t b e r e a d as act, n o t object, a n d f o r m , consequently, n o t as f o u n d b u t m a d e , a n d finally t h a t otherwise difficult p h r a s e "how it is possible t h a t a t h i n g c a n please in t h e m e r e act of j u d g i n g it (without sensation o r c o n c e p t ) " as Kant's indication t h a t act is the crucial t h i n g . J u d g i n g is act in t h a t crucially " o t h e r k i n d " of significance b e l o n g i n g to imaginative configuration. It is w i t h o u t sensation in t h e sense t h a t it liberates itself from t h e merely given, t h e c h a r m a n d e m o t i o n t h a t a t t e n d t h e "in-itself m e a n i n g l e s s r h y t h m of configuration in t h e material." It is without c o n c e p t because it d o e s n o t p r o p o s e to know t h e material, b u t only to play with it, to enjoy playing with it, for t h e sake of t h e feeling of self t h a t play, a n d n o t simply matter, offers. Obviously we a r e n o w in a position to characterize w h a t h a p p e n s in t h e contrasti n g e x p e r i e n c e of t h e pleasant o r a g r e e a b l e . We d o n o t liberate ourselves. We d o n o t reconfigure. We d o n o t play. We simply take u p t h e given c h a r m a n d e m o t i o n a n d enjoy that. We e x p e n d n o m e n t a l effort, cognitive o r imaginative. 37

3 8

N o w t h a t we g r a s p t h e first p h a s e of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e b e a u tiful, we m u s t r e t u r n to t h e issue of t h e validity of t h e ultimate j u d g m e n t of taste p r o n o u n c e d u p o n it. T h a t is to seek its t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d , a n d K a n t insists " n o t h i n g can b e universally c o m m u n i cated e x c e p t cognition a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , so far as it belongs to c o g n i t i o n . " T h e task of finding a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d , t h e n , is t o find t h e basis in t h e cognitive faculties for what has a p p e a r e d a m a t t e r of m e r e feeling. B u t in discovering that this p l e a s u r e involves t h e s p o n t a n e o u s play of t h e imagination a n d t h e relish of its f r e e d o m , a n d in recognizing f u r t h e r t h a t this f r e e d o m nevertheless 39

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anticipates a n d accords with t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t a fully selfconscious u n d e r s t a n d i n g would i m p o s e , we have t h e i n g r e d i e n t s for t h e K a n t i a n solution: " h a r m o n y of t h e faculties." T h e p h r a s e s " h a r m o n y " o r "free play" of t h e faculties are m e t a phorical a n d accordingly mysterious in themselves. K a n t falls short of offering a clear discursive r e d e m p t i o n of these p h r a s e s in t h e Third Critique. H e n e v e r sorts o u t clearly t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l from t h e empirical in his f o r m u l a t i o n . H e does n o t carefully e n o u g h distinguish w h a t o r d i n a r y consciousness can t h i n k a n d assert in justifying a claim like "X is beautiful" from what t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h e r c a n a d d u c e to e x p l a i n t h e ultimate basis for such j u d g m e n t s . It is necessary to retrieve Kant's scattered accounts of what o r d i n a r y consciousness m a k e s of its e x p e r i e n c e a n d thinks of its claims in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, a n d see h o w far that goes t o w a r d t h e ultimate t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g . If h a r m o n y of t h e faculties lies at t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l basis of t h e validity ofj u d g m e n t s of taste, surely K a n t c a n n o t have m e a n t o r d i n a r y consciousness to m a k e t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n before u t t e r i n g t h e claim. I n d e e d , h e explicitly asserts t h a t o r d i n a r y consciousess is aware of this h a r m o n y only as a sensation of p l e a s u r e . H o w d o e s o r d i n a r y consciousness c o m e to m a k e a n d justify t h e j u d g m e n t of taste? Q u i t e simply, it starts from t h e recognition t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r p l e a s u r e is different from t h e merely pleasant. T h e subject investigates t h e source of his o w n p l e a s u r e . It is n o t t h a t n o t h i n g a g r e e a b l e m a y have b e e n p r e s e n t . Reiz can, a n d usually does, a c c o m p a n y p l e a s u r e in t h e beautiful. B u t t h e subject recognizes t h a t m o r e t h a n Reiz affects h i m . H e did n o t start from a p petite. H e was n o t swayed by p r e f e r e n c e . H e h a d n o stake, n o interest in t h e case. H e did n o t n e e d to know w h a t the t h i n g was for. H e did n o t n e e d to know w h e t h e r it was right or w r o n g . H e did n o t even n e e d to k n o w w h a t it was. J u s t e n c o u n t e r i n g it set h i m off, "since t h e p e r s o n w h o j u d g e s feels himself q u i t efree as r e g a r d s t h e satisfaction which h e attaches to t h e object [since it does n o t rest o n any inclination of t h e subject, n o r u p o n any o t h e r p r e m e d i t a t e d interest], h e c a n n o t find t h e g r o u n d of this satisfaction in any private conditions c o n n e c t e d with his o w n subject, a n d h e n c e it m u s t be r e g a r d e d as g r o u n d e d o n w h a t h e can p r e s u p p o s e in every o t h e r pers o n . " I n o t h e r words, t h e subject believes t h e way h e r e s p o n d e d is t h e way a n y o n e else could, would, a n d should. If pressed to justify this last belief, t h e subject would have r e c o u r s e to the n o t i o n of a " c o m m o n s e n s e " (sensus communis), t h a t is, t h a t h e is only e x p r e s s i n g w h a t all h u m a n s feel a n d j u d g e , given only t h a t they abstract from 40

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t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s . B e y o n d this conviction of s p e a k i n g with a "universal voice," of claiming only what "we r e g a r d as t h e least to b e e x p e c t e d f r o m a n y o n e claiming t h e n a m e of m a n , " o r d i n a r y consciousness cannot g o . T h e balance of t h e a r g u m e n t falls to t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i losopher. T h e situation is a n a l o g o u s to t h e case of j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e . T h e r e , too, o r d i n a r y consciousness can carry t h e a r g u m e n t for p a r t i c u l a r claims only to such generalities as cause or substance. It r e m a i n s for t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r b i n d i n g universality. So h e r e it is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy's task to d e m o n s t r a t e definitively t h a t t h e claim of taste is g r o u n d e d . O n l y t h e p h i l o s o p h e r can f o r m u l a t e such propositions as: "Now a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by which a n object is given t h a t is to b e c o m e a cognition in g e n e r a l r e q u i r e s imagination for t h e g a t h e r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e manifold of intuition, a n d understanding for t h e unity of t h e concept u n i t i n g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . " T h e interaction of these two faculties is t h e key to Kant's account of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty. W h a t is necessary for k n o w l e d g e in g e n e r a l occurs in t h e case of b e a u t y w i t h o u t i n t e n t . As §vii p u t s it, 42

4 3

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that a p p r e h e n s i o n of forms in t h e imagination can n e v e r take place w i t h o u t t h e reflective j u d g m e n t , t h o u g h u n d e s i g n e d l y [unabsichtlich], at least c o m p a r i n g t h e m with its faculty of r e ferring intuitions to concepts. If, now, in this c o m p a r i s o n t h e i m a g i n a t i o n (as t h e faculty of a priori intuitions) is placed by m e a n s of a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n u n d e s i g n e d l y [unabsichtlich] in a g r e e m e n t with t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as t h e faculty of concepts, a n d t h u s a feeling of p l e a s u r e is a r o u s e d , t h e object m u s t t h e n b e r e g a r d e d as p u r p o s i v e for t h e reflective j u d g ment. 4 5

T h e conformity to law without i n t e n t is related to t h e process of "cognition in g e n e r a l , " a n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d is shifted from t h e a u t h o r i t y of universal rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which in t h e cognitive case p r o m o t e d t h e m e r e a p p r e h e n s i o n of imagination to objective validity, to t h e necessity of these faculties t h e m selves for t h e possibility of any cognition at all: "the subjective formal conditions of a j u d g m e n t in g e n e r a l . " T h e universality a n d necessity of t h e s e faculties themselves g r o u n d t h e validity of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. 46

T h a t i m a g i n a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g work t o g e t h e r — c a n work t o g e t h e r — i s t h e f o u n d a t i o n of t h e validity of t h e j u d g m e n t . " T h e p r o p o r t i o n b e t w e e n these cognitive faculties requisite for The Beautiful and the Pleasant

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taste is also requisite for t h a t o r d i n a r y s o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g which we have to p r e s u p p o s e in e v e r y o n e . " T h e p r o p o r t i o n , the "harm o n y , " t h a t "state of m i n d , which is to be m e t with in the relation of o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e powers to each other, so far as they refer a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to cognition in general," is j u s t as necessary to t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e as a n y of t h e categories taken in i s o l a t i o n . "For w i t h o u t this as t h e subjective condition of cognition, cognition as a n effect c o u l d n o t a r i s e . " T h e r e f o r e , "if cognitions are to admit of communicability, so m u s t also the state of m i n d — i . e . t h e a c c o r d a n c e of t h e cognitive p o w e r s . " T h a t is t h e gist of t h e t r a n scendental d e d u c t i o n . What the transcendental philosopher t h u s discursively establishes, t h e subject experiences as pleasure, o r m o r e precisely: "the m o r e lively play of b o t h m e n t a l powers (the i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) w h e n a n i m a t e d by m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t . " T h e play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n is in itself pleasurable: "We linger over t h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n of t h e beautiful because this cont e m p l a t i o n s t r e n g t h e n s a n d r e p r o d u c e s itself." T h a t is subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s . T h e r e is a paradoxical aspect even in Kant's p u r e solution of t h e p r o b l e m of taste, namely, why only certain r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of-the-object s h o u l d occasion t h e e x p e r i e n c e . N o t every object of sense occasions t h e feeling of b e a u t y . Even if "beauty" refers to subjective r e s p o n s e , it is only the catalytic p r e s e n c e of s o m e given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which m a k e s its possible, a n d it is at least plausible to ask w h e t h e r t h e trait which m a k e s certain objects catalytic can b e identified. If subjective p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y of faculties is constant for all h u m a n s , a n d if, t h e r e f o r e , they o u g h t all to recognize t h e s a m e empirical intuitions as beautiful, t h e n t h e r e should, in principle, be s o m e — e v e n if only empirical—traits which such intuitions m u s t s h a r e , a n d s o m e r e a s o n why those occasion beauty. H e n c e , in that m e a s u r e , t h e n a t u r e of t h e object seems objectively involved. It may be difficult to establish the traits. T h e y m a y only b e empirical, b u t it would s e e m to b e logically possible to find t h e m . 47

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While it is t h e case t h a t some representations-of-objects occasion beauty, K a n t a r g u e s it is n o t possible of anticipation, i.e., n o r u l e can b e m a d e prescriptive for it, a n d a n y generalization descriptive of it, if possible at all, would be empirical, i.e., a n empirical c a n o n in t h a t g e n r e of beauty. Such c a n o n s of b e a u t y a r e n o t to b e f o u n d in discursive generalizations b u t exclusively in e x e m p l a r y instances. T h e p o i n t is j u s t t h a t n o discursive generalization can catch w h a t m a k e s t h e instances e x e m p l a r y . If t h e r e a r e instances to which "all times a n d all p e o p l e s " ascribe beauty, they r e p r e s e n t at m o s t 118

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empirical examples in which t h e r e m a y lie a n implicit c a n o n ("deeplying g e n e r a l g r o u n d s " ) , b u t n o t o n e which can b e f o r m u l a t e d in w o r d s . K a n t usually stressed t h a t references to such a "classical" s t a n d a r d for taste was a n empirical r e c o u r s e , worthy a n d essential, b u t still merely empirical. 5 6

Backsliding:

The Confusion of Aesthetic with Cognitive

Reference

F o r t h e K a n t i a n t h e o r y of b e a u t y t o work, it m u s t b e possible for aesthetic form to arise even from t h e m e r e m a t t e r in sensation. T h e characterization of color a n d t o n e cognitively as "secondary qualities," i.e., m e r e sensation o r "intrinsic m a g n i t u d e , " m u s t n o t d e n y t h e m t h e possibility of occasioning a feeling of b e a u t y a n d a j u d g m e n t of taste, for t h e n , i n d e e d , Bach could n o t b e beautiful, n o r Delacroix. T h e s a m e holds, of course, for color a n d t o n e in n a t u r e — t h e s o n g of a bird, t h e color of a flower. Yet K a n t allowed his c o n c e r n for " p u r i t y " to mislead h i m . Purity for K a n t is exclusively a m a t t e r of form. H e was t r o u b l e d by t h e s e e m i n g i n c o n g r u ity t h a t several artistic m e d i a , especially music a n d p a i n t i n g , evoked beauty via sense e x p e r i e n c e which, o n his theory of objective reference, could only b e c o n s i d e r e d " m e r e s e n s a t i o n " — " m a t t e r , " n o t "form." H o w could m e r e m a t t e r have aesthetic form? "A m e r e color, such as t h e g r e e n of a plot of grass, or a m e r e t o n e (as distinguished from s o u n d o r noise), like t h a t of a violin, is described by most p e o p l e as in itself beautiful, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e fact t h a t b o t h seem to d e p e n d merely o n t h e m a t t e r of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n — i n o t h e r words, simply o n sensation, which only entitles t h e m to b e called a g r e e a b l e . " F o r m was for K a n t almost s y n o n y m o u s with t r a n s c e n d e n t a l potential. H e h a d already exploited fully t h e transcendental potential of sensible form (Sinn) as the s t r u c t u r e of a priori intuition in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic" of t h e First Critique. Such form in representations-of-objects was eligible for cognitive use, for r e f e r e n c e to t h e o b j e c t . I n o r d e r to give a clear a n d compelling a c c o u n t of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, Kant h a d differentiated from t h a t a n o t i o n of "aesthetic form," which r e f e r r e d exclusively to t h e subject, a n d which consequently was not to b e confused with t h e other. It was n o t t h e form of t h e representation-of-the-object in its objective r e f e r e n c e which occasioned beauty, b u t r a t h e r t h e aesthetic formality of t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , its r e f e r e n c e to t h e subject, t h e h a r m o n y of t h e faculties it o c c a s i o n e d . If, as K a n t p e r s u a d e d himself in § 14, only form as objective reference in a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of-an-object could elicit a feeling of beauty, t h e n musical t o n e s a n d 57

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the colors in p a i n t i n g — a n d t h e r e w i t h two of the greatest realms of a r t — w o u l d fall o u t of t h e conspectus of his aesthetic theory: a fatal flaw. In his effort to p r o m o t e t h e m to objective formality, h e h a d r e course to t h e theories of L e o n h a r d Euler, w h o tried to established m a t h e m a t i c a l regularities in t h e s e p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of wave frequencies. T h i s , as m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d formal, struck K a n t as a plausible solution. Color a n d t o n e would b e r e s c u e d from t h e i r m e r e materiality. " T h e m i n d n o t alone perceives by sense t h e i r effect . . . b u t also, by reflection, t h e r e g u l a r play of the i m p r e s sions, ( a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e form in which different r e p r e s e n t a tions a r e united,) . . . T h e y would b e n o t h i n g short of formal d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of t h e unity of t h e manifold of sensations, a n d in that case could even be c o u n t e d beauties in t h e m s e l v e s . " W h a t K a n t believed h e h a d d o n e was to establish the "purity" of these sensations as a kind of form. "[SJensations of color as well as of t o n e a r e only entitled to be immediately r e g a r d e d as beautiful w h e r e , in e i t h e r case, they a r e pure." H a v i n g f o u n d " p u r i t y " in this m a t h e matical s t r u c t u r e b e h i n d color a n d t o n e , h e t h e n c o m p o u n d e d his e r r o r by asserting: "all simple colors are r e g a r d e d as beautiful so far as p u r e . . . C o m p o s i t e colors have n o t this a d v a n t a g e . " T h a t violates Kant's principle t h a t j u d g m e n t s of taste may never b e universal j u d g m e n t s . It is also d u b i o u s experientially, with r e f e r e n c e to p a i n t i n g or, for t h a t m a t t e r , n a t u r a l c o l o r . K a n t was t e m p t e d to identify aesthetic f o r m a n d objective f o r m for two r e a s o n s . First, h e believed t h a t f o r m always carried with it t h e potential for objective validity, a n d h e certainly wished to believe that t h e j u d g m e n t of taste entailed s o m e form of validity. B u t h e also h a d a second motive for this e n t e r p r i s e : his s t r o n g interest in discriminating "aesthetic f o r m " from "aesthetic m a t t e r , " t h e beautiful from t h e pleasant. " C h a r m " [Reiz], o r aesthetic matter, could have n o relevance to beauty, aesthetic form, which fell exclusively to t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. T h e p r e s e n c e of Reiz could only r u i n t h e " p u r i t y " of a j u d g m e n t of taste. All of this is perfectly consistent with t h e t h e o r y of beauty we have already e n c o u n t e r e d . T h e p r o b l e m arises w h e n K a n t p r o c e e d s to confuse "aesthetic m a t t e r " with "cognitive m a t t e r " in t h e representation-of-the-object, a n d asserts t h a t "cognitive m a t t e r " is ineligible for a j u d g m e n t of taste. 60

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If K a n t strove to extract objective form from t h e m e r e m a t t e r of sensation in color a n d s o u n d , h e also tried to identify aesthetic f o r m in g e n e r a l with objective form. Kant's identification of Gestalt (figu r e ) with "regularity" exposes t h e ambiguity of t h e whole p r o c e e d 120

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ing: "Every form of objects of sense (both of e x t e r n a l a n d also, mediately, of i n t e r n a l sense) is e i t h e r / j g w e o r play [entweder Gestalt oder Spiel]. I n the latter case it is e i t h e r play of figures (in space: mimic a n d d a n c e ) , o r m e r e play of sensations (in t i m e ) . " T h e words Gestalt a n d Spiel have e n o r m o u s potential for a theory of beauty a l o n g K a n t i a n lines—if only K a n t would leave t h e m w h e r e they b e l o n g , in t h e realm of aesthetic form, namely, the playful reconfiguration [Umgestaltung] of sense i n p u t according to t h e fancy of the imagination, exclusively for its subjective gratification. T h a t is, we m u s t n e v e r forget, t h e t r u e K a n t i a n theory. W h a t is a n aesthetic whole may b e a f r a g m e n t of s o m e cognitive object, o r s o m e congeries of such distinguishable objects, a n d j u s t in that m e a s u r e aesthetic form a n d its essential Gestalt m u s t n o t b e confused with objective form a n d its d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t o u r . B o u n d e d n e s s c a n n o t be a sufficient criterion for beauty, because all objects are b o u n d e d , b u t n o t all a r e beautiful. 62

K a n t himself recognizes t h e limitations of his sense of the b o u n d e d n e s s , t h e regularity a n d symmetry, of t h e beautiful "thing." I n a crucial p a r a g r a p h in t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to §22, h e states t h e issue a n d d e f e n d s his a u t h e n t i c position against this "objective s u b r e p t i o n " of symmetrical, logical form: N o w geometrically r e g u l a r figures, a circle, a s q u a r e , a cube, a n d t h e like, are c o m m o n l y b r o u g h t forward by critics of taste as t h e most simple a n d u n q u e s t i o n a b l e e x a m p l e s of beauty. A n d yet t h e very r e a s o n why they are called regular, is because t h e only way of r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m is by looking o n t h e m as m e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of a d e t e r m i n a t e concept by which the figure has its r u l e (according to which alone it is possible) prescribed for it. O n e or o t h e r of these two views m u s t , t h e r e fore, b e w r o n g : either t h e verdict of t h e critics t h a t attributes beauty to such figures, or else o u r own, which m a k e s p u r posiveness a p a r t from any c o n c e p t necessary for b e a u t y . 63

I n the G e n e r a l R e m a r k to §22 Kant rescues himself from his o w n confusion o n t h e score of taking objective f o r m — m e r e disposition in space (and t i m e ) — f o r beauty (aesthetic form).

The Scope of the "Critique of Taste" Let us review o u r reconstruction of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " of 1787. It h a d a clear a n d careful "Analytic," in t h e exposition of t h e peculiarities of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. It obviously h a d a very precise The Beautiful and the Pleasant

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" D e d u c t i o n , " in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t a b o u t t h e " h a r m o n y of the faculties" a n d "subjective formal purposiveness." B u t what is a " C r i t i q u e " w i t h o u t a "Dialectic"? If we look to t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " as it stands in t h e finished Critique of Judgment, however, we find ourselves virtually in a different universe from t h e o n e we have b e e n considering. It is very h a r d to believe t h a t this was t h e "Dialectic" that K a n t h a d in m i n d in his original version. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it offers us a clue as to w h a t t h e m o r e prim o r d i a l "Dialectic" m a y have b e e n . C o n s i d e r §56, t h e " R e p r e s e n t a tion of t h e A n t i n o m y of T a s t e . " It p r e s e n t s two positions which w e r e b o t h widely articulated in t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y literature a b o u t taste a n d which s e e m e d m u t u a l l y inconsistent. O n t h e o n e h a n d t h e r e was t h e p r o v e r b , old as t h e R o m a n s , t h a t t h e r e is n o disp u t i n g a b o u t taste, t h a t is, t h a t t h e g r o u n d of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e o r taste is subjective, i n d e e d private. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e very n a t u r e of any j u d g m e n t of taste was t h a t one's claim as to beauty o u g h t to b e a c k n o w l e d g e d as valid, that t h e r e s h o u l d b e universality of c o n c u r r e n c e . B u t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of this claim is obviously controversy, because t h a t c o n c u r r e n c e d o e s n o t arise. Controversy, however, implies t h e possibility of discourse a n d resolution, b u t such discourse, if it were c o n d u c t e d rationally, would b e d i s p u t e . H e n c e t h e r e would a p p e a r to b e a necessary contradiction between two positions, each of which has a rational f o u n d a t i o n . T h a t is the stuff of dialectic. It is also c o m p o s e d entirely of t h e ingredients intrinsic to t h e original "Critique of T a s t e . " A n d t h e p r o o f t h a t such a s t r u c t u r e was p r e s e n t in t h e original "Critique of T a s t e " is to b e f o u n d in §7. T h e o d d t h i n g is, §7 also solves t h e "Dialectic," for t h e key to the a n t i n o m y is t h a t t h e thesis is t r u e of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of sense, while t h e antithesis is t r u e of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of taste. Yet we s h o u l d n o t b e p u t off by t h e simplicity. K a n t originally believed t h a t b o t h t h e " D e d u c t i o n , " which h e expressly acknowledged was "easy," a n d t h e "Dialectic" were simple, because this " d e p a r t m e n t of philosophy," as h e called it in his letter to Reinhold, was so " p o o r " in t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , a n d h e n c e in their p o t e n tial c o n f l i c t s . It was only later, w h e n h e b e c a m e aware of g r e a t p o tential latent in t h e material h e h a d worked u p to g r o u n d t h e faculty of feeling in a n a priori principle, t h a t h e c a m e u p o n a whole n e w idea for t h e "Dialectic." O n t h e conjecture t h a t §56 a n d §7 may have b e e n all t h e "Dialectic" t h e r e was in t h e original "Critique of T a s t e , " let us c o m p a r e t h a t archaeological r e c o n s t r u c t i o n with t h e ultimate "Critique of 64

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Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " for t h e major differences. First, as we have j u s t c o n t e n d e d , t h e actual "Dialectic" of t h e final version was a later addition. Also, as we observed in t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n , t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e " was n o t a p a r t of t h e original "Critique of Taste." B u t n o t e also t h a t t h e material o n art, § § 4 3 - 5 4 , played n o p a r t whatever in o u r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Tonelli dates this material to t h e year 1788, i.e., h e considers t h e t r e a t m e n t of art a n extension of t h e project which h a d b e e n u n d e r t a k e n in t h e "Critique of T a s t e " of 1787. 6 6

Finally, t h e r e a r e certain sections in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" which did n o t have a place in o u r reconstruction of t h e original "Critique of T a s t e , " in particular § § 1 5 - 1 7 a n d p o r t i o n s of t h e G e n eral R e m a r k to §22. M e r e d i t h , in assessing §§15—17, observes t h a t they d o n o t seem to fit naturally into t h e flow of t h e exposition before a n d after t h e m . I n d e e d , they r e p r e s e n t a far m o r e c o m p l e x consideration of t h e p r o b l e m of beauty. N o t all t h e s e considerations were n e w to Kant, b u t all were a d d e d to his text later. 6 7

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Six

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART IN T H E YEAR 1788

K

ant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l m e t h o d was to distill from a complex m e n t a l process a p u r e a priori principle, a n d m a k e t h a t principle t h e w a r r a n t for t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e m o r e c o m p l e x p r o b l e m from which h e initially r e gressed. I n t h e Third Critique, K a n t h a d to establish t h e implications of t h e solution for his " p u r e " j u d g m e n t for the full complexity of aesthetic m a t t e r s . K a n t u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e r e were great c o m p l e x ities in the critique of taste which r e m a i n e d , despite his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of t h e p u r e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . Any "critique of taste" which could a c c o u n t for t h e beauty only of foliage b u t n o t of d a Vinci, of sea shells b u t n o t of S h a k e s p e a r e , would n o t have h a d g r e a t s t a n d i n g in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c u l t u r e . T o prove t h e p o w e r of his new insight, K a n t h a d to be able to clarify t h e questions of criticism t h a t arose in t h e c o n t e x t of works of a r t . 1

2

"Dependent" and "Ideal" Beauty K a n t h a d to acknowledge t h a t t h e " p u r e " j u d g m e n t of taste h e h a d s t r u g g l e d so h a r d to isolate was so restrictive t h a t t h e only p h e n o m e n a which s e e m e d to fall within it w e r e relatively trivial—sea shells a n d flowers, a r a b e s q u e s a n d foliage—things perceived as g r a t u itously e l e g a n t without the least intrinsic m e a n i n g . Most of the things of any substantive i m p o r t a n c e to m a n — h u m a n beauty, t h e b e a u t y of o r g a n i s m s , t h e b e a u t y of artifice—do n o t seem to fall u n d e r t h e rubric of Kant's " p u r e j u d g m e n t of taste." T h e y a r e n o t so simple t h a t t h e i r c o n c e p t n e e d n o t b e involved in their recognition, m a k i n g p r o b l e m a t i c t h e " p u r i t y " of t h e i r aesthetic r e c e p t i o n . A t h e o r y of b e a u t y which could find it in t h e b l o o m of narcissus o r t h e

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swirl of a nautilus, b u t n o t in t h e Sistine ceiling or a s o n n e t of S h a k e s p e a r e , could hardly have satisfied Kant. T h i s explains his distinction of "free" f r o m " d e p e n d e n t " beauty (§16). H e r e q u i r e d a transition from his " p u r e " case to t h e c o m p l e x issues involved in t h e appraisal of beauty in c o m p l e x forms of n a t u r e a n d above all in works of art. In d e v e l o p i n g his " p u r e j u d g m e n t of taste," K a n t d e n i e d t h e idea of "objective p u r posiveness" (intrinsic perfection) any place in his aesthetic theory. " W h a t is formal in t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t h i n g , i.e. t h e a g r e e m e n t of its manifold with a unity (i.e. irrespective of w h a t it is to be) does not, of itself, afford us any cognition whatsoever of objective p u r posiveness. For since [in a j u d g m e n t of taste] abstraction is m a d e from this unity as purpose (what t h e t h i n g is to be) n o t h i n g is left b u t the subjective purposiveness of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in t h e m i n d . " B u t that is entirely a subjective r e f e r e n c e , namely, to a state of m i n d "in which t h e subject feels itself quite at h o m e . " "Free b e a u t y " is t h e e x t r e m e case, from which t h e u n d e r l y i n g principle can m o s t obviously b e d e d u c e d . K a n t explains t h a t " d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y " is called such because it "does p r e s u p p o s e a concept a n d the perfection of t h e object in a c c o r d a n c e therewith." It is t h e r e f o r e a " c o n d i t i o n e d b e a u t y " [bedingte Schönheit], which relies u p o n t h e "concept of a particular p u r p o s e " in its aesthetic assessm e n t . "If now t h e j u d g m e n t of taste in respect of t h e beauty of a t h i n g is m a d e d e p e n d e n t o n t h e p u r p o s e in its manifold, like a j u d g m e n t of r e a s o n , a n d t h u s limited, it is n o l o n g e r a free a n d p u r e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . " Kant is most explicit a b o u t " d e p e n d e n t beauty," or t h e connection of b e a u t y with perfection, in §48, w h e r e h e writes: "It is t r u e t h a t in f o r m i n g a n estimate, especially of anim a t e objects of n a t u r e , e.g. of a m a n or a h o r s e , objective p u r posiveness is also c o m m o n l y t a k e n into account with a view to j u d g m e n t u p o n t h e i r beauty; b u t t h e n t h e j u d g m e n t also ceases to b e purely aesthetic, i.e. a m e r e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . " I n pulchritudo adhaerens, t h e aesthetic j u d g m e n t is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the idea of perfection: it is "a logically c o n d i t i o n e d aesthetic j u d g m e n t [ein logischbedingtes ästhetisches Urtheil]." A n o t h e r kind of "interest" t h r e a t e n s to c o m p r o m i s e t h e disinterestedness of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste: t h e ethical interest in t h e good o r t h e perfect. 3

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T h e idea of perfection, that is, "a c o n c e p t of t h e p u r p o s e which d e t e r m i n e s w h a t t h e t h i n g is to b e , " asserts itself in t h e c o n c e p t of " d e p e n d e n t beauty." B u t it involves a n ethical j u d g m e n t , n o t a n aesthetical o n e . If a n entity is recognized as intrinsically purposive,

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this can occasion d e l i g h t . B u t t h a t delight is in t h e good, n o t in t h e beautiful. B e a u t y can n e v e r b e a necessary, h e n c e prescriptive a n d predictable, delight. It is singular a n d it is unanticipatable. It is, of course, possible that a feeling of b e a u t y m i g h t b e a r o u s e d ; such a n o c c u r r e n c e , however, would of necessity have to free itself from t h e sense of t h e objective p u r p o s i v e n e s s of t h e entity. T h e p r o b l e m is, in w h a t sense is " d e p e n d e n t beauty" (pulchritudo adhaerens) still beauty? T h e j u d g m e n t involved is unequivocally i m p u r e . W h a t m e a s u r e of aesthetic value d o e s it retain? "A j u d g m e n t of taste, t h e n , in respect of a n object with a definite internal p u r p o s e , can only b e p u r e if e i t h e r t h e p e r s o n j u d g i n g has n o conc e p t of this p u r p o s e o r else abstracts from it in his j u d g m e n t . " Kant's solution is t h a t two s e p a r a t e " j u d g m e n t s " can b e discerned. " [ W l h e n we c o m p a r e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by which a n object is given to us with t h e object (as r e g a r d s what it o u g h t to be) by m e a n s of a concept, we c a n n o t avoid c o n s i d e r i n g a l o n g with it t h e sensation in t h e subject [es [kann] nicht vermieden werden, wenn wir die Vorstellung, wodurch uns ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, mit dem Objecte (in Ansehung dessen, was es sein soll) durch einen Begriff vergleichen, sie zugleich mit der Empfindung im Subjecte zusammen zu halten]." T h a t is, t h e representation-of-the-object, i.e., t h e empirical intuition, has in itself b o t h r e f e r e n c e to t h e object a n d r e f e r e n c e to t h e subject. K a n t h e r e considerably widens t h e possibilities of his t h e o r y of taste. It is possible b o t h to m i s u n d e r s t a n d intrinsic p u r p o s e as ina d v e r t e n t p u r p o s i v e n e s s a n d , even m o r e interestingly, to abstract from it a n d j u d g e solely aesthetically. T h i s latter p o w e r to abstract from a cognitive or ethical appraisal in o r d e r to u n d e r t a k e a n aesthetical o n e is a very significant addition to t h e Kantian arsenal. T h e capacity to abstract would s e e m to fit very nicely with a t h e o r y of aesthetic a p p r a i s a l as reflective, a n d especially with t h e r e n d e r i n g of this n o t i o n as o n e which inserts r e f e r e n c e to t h e subjective processes of m i n d p r i o r to t h e appraisal of delight. B u t in t h a t case, t h e pulchritudo in p u r p o s i v e objects is in fact n o different from t h e pulchritudo in r a n d o m p h e n o m e n a , a n d t h e distinction of vaga from adhaerens h a s n o t h i n g to d o with aesthetics at all. W h a t K a n t illust r a t e d with r e f e r e n c e to foliage s h o u l d h o l d w i t h o u t a m e n d m e n t for a Bach sonata. T h e n why did K a n t u n d e r t a k e t h e whole distinction? A n d can we b e satisfied with t h e result? I n m y view, §17 is a n effort to reconsider t h e issues a n d perplexities of §§ 15— 16 in a n e w light, in t e r m s of t h e "ideal of beauty." K a n t distinguishes two e l e m e n t s in his "ideal of beauty," a n aesthetic normal idea a n d a rational idea. T h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea," a n "in8

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dividual intuition (of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ) , " would a p p e a r to be t h e aesthetic side of t h e complex, while t h e "rational idea" would enc o m p a s s t h e "perfection" involved in a c o m p l e x ( " d e p e n d e n t " ) case of b e a u t y . K a n t explains t h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" in t h e following terms: 10

T h e n o r m a l idea m u s t d r a w from e x p e r i e n c e t h e constituents which it r e q u i r e s for t h e f o r m of a n animal of a particular kind. B u t t h e greatest p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e construction of this f o r m — t h a t which would serve as a universal n o r m for f o r m i n g a n estimate of each individual of t h e species in q u e s t i o n — t h e i m a g e that, as it were, forms a n intentional basis u n d e r l y i n g t h e technic of n a t u r e , to which n o s e p a r a t e individual, b u t only t h e race as a whole, is a d e q u a t e , has its seat merely in t h e idea of t h e j u d g i n g subject. Yet it is, with all its p r o p o r t i o n s , a n aesthetic idea, a n d , as such, capable of b e i n g fully p r e s e n t e d in concreto in a m o d e l i m a g e . 1 1

T h e n o r m is p r i o r to t h e instances, a n d c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n a t e l y f o r m u l a t e d from t h e m . R a t h e r it is by virtue of t h e n o r m t h a t they can be recognized as instances: " T h i s normal idea is n o t derived from p r o p o r t i o n s t a k e n from e x p e r i e n c e as definite rules: r a t h e r is it a c c o r d i n g to this idea t h a t rules for f o r m i n g estimates first bec o m e p o s s i b l e . " K a n t spells o u t t h e idea: "It is a n i n t e r m e d i a t e between all singular intuitions of individuals, with their manifold variations—a floating i m a g e for t h e whole g e n u s . " T h a t is p r e cisely w h a t a s c h e m a is. T h i s p r i m o r d i a l "idea" in the j u d g i n g subject, a s c h e m a of beauty, seems a n a l o g o u s to t h e i m p u t e d p u r p o s e in n a t u r e w h e r e b y she designs individuals according to a principle of t h e species as a whole, so t h a t they each instantiate it, while rem a i n i n g nevertheless distinguishable individuals. T h e difference b e t w e e n this s c h e m a a n d o n e which serves d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t is t h a t t h e latter is constituted a n d fixed by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h e r e a s t h e o n e which serves t h e reflective aesthetic j u d g m e n t is indefinite. 12

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B e a u t y has to d o with t h a t which p r e c e e d s conceptualization, i.e., t h a t singular instance which incites i m a g i n a t i o n to playful reconfiguration. I n t h a t sense, b e a u t y resides only in "what c a n n o t be r e p r e s e n t e d by concepts b u t only in a n individual p r e s e n t a t i o n [in einzelner Darstellung]." T h e "faculty of p r e s e n t a t i o n " is imagination. H e n c e b e a u t y can only b e a n ideal of t h e imagination. I m a g i n a t i o n , K a n t suggests, has t h e empirical capacity to g e n e r a t e w h a t o n e Kant's Philosphy of Art

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m i g h t t e r m a n "ideal t y p e . " T h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" distills from a series of e x p e r i e n c e s a s t a n d a r d for any particular instantiation (note t h a t t h e issue has shifted to p r o d u c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n recognition) of a species. K a n t offers a "psychological e x p l a n a t i o n " of this process which in fact t u r n s o u t to b e a m o r e e x t e n d e d description. " T h e i m a g i n a t i o n , in a m a n n e r q u i t e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e to us," is able to form a n i m a g e , "a m e a n c o n t o u r which serves as a c o m m o n s t a n d a r d for all [ein Mittleres [Bild] . . . , welches allen zum gemeinschaftlichen Maße dient]." T h i s " m e a n c o n t o u r " is like a statistical average of all t h e empirical instances, which we m i g h t construct mechanically, b u t t h a t is n o t h o w i m a g i n a t i o n does it. It "does all this by m e a n s of a dynamical effect u p o n t h e o r g a n of internal sense, arising from t h e f r e q u e n t a p p r e h e n s i o n of such forms [durch einen dynamischen Effect, der aus der vielfältigen Auffassung solcher Gestalten auf das Organ des innern Sinnes entspringt]." T h i s is very s t r a n g e l a n g u a g e from Kant. Is t h e " o r g a n of internal sense" t h e intuition of time as form for "objective r e f e r e n c e " or t h e receptivity of aesthetic form, namely, the "state of m i n d " o r feeling of t h e subject? W h a t exactly is a " d y n a m i c effect?" T h e m o r e K a n t develops t h e ideas, t h e m o r e questions arise, a n d t h e less clarity r e m a i n s . Insofar as any ideal of b e a u t y as latent criterion for j u d g m e n t s of taste can b e ascribed to t h e j u d g i n g subject, it can only b e t h e schematic a n a l o g o f t h a t condition of h a r m o n y b e t w e e n t h e free play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t h e lawfulness of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g as they relate to any empirical intuition, or, in Kant's words, to "cognition in g e n e r a l . " T h u s t h e "ideal of b e a u t y " as t h e "highest m o d e l " would b e t h e implicit schema to which j u d g m e n t c o m p a r e s a n y singular instance to discern w h e t h e r it is beautiful o r not. Phenomenologically t h a t c o m p a r i s o n is via pleasure, t r a n s c e n dentally it is via h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, empirically it is t h e implicit unity in all t h e previous instances in which b e a u t y has b e e n discerned. B u t finding a tulip beautiful s h o u l d b e j u s t as relevant to t h a t implicit unity of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty, a n d h e n c e of any "ideal of beauty," as finding Beethoven's Pastoral S y m p h o n y b e a u tiful. T h e idea of a n aesthetic n o r m a l idea, while interesting, only offers a different l a n g u a g e to f o r m u l a t e w h a t K a n t h a d explicated m o r e clearly in relating t h e j u d g m e n t of taste to t h e h a r m o n y of t h e faculties. It does n o t at all a d v a n c e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w t h e j u d g m e n t of taste m a y b e e x t e n d e d to m o r e c o m p l e x objects, p a r ticularly those which s e e m to entail intrinsic p u r p o s e , a n d t h e r e fore it d o e s n o t a d v a n c e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of pulchritudo adhaerens 1 5

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as a n aesthetic matter. I n fact K a n t could n o t resolve t h e issue at this p o i n t of his t h i n k i n g . It would take what I call t h e "ethical t u r n " to lead h i m to a t h e o r y of symbolism which would clarify t h e issues. Kant's f u r t h e r observations o n t h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" in § 17 try to offer a m o r e fruitful sense of t h e t e r m as related to art. H e suggests t h a t this n o t i o n r e p r e s e n t s t h e m i n i m u m aptness of a p r e sentation: " t h e form that constitutes t h e indispensable condition of all beauty, a n d , consequently, only correctness in t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e g e n u s . " T h u s h e illustrates with two classical s t a n d a r d s — t h e Doryphorus of Polycletus a n d Myron's Cow. H e n c e t h e aesthetic normal idea, instead of b e i n g a g r o u n d for beauty, is only a limiting condition, g u a r a n t e e i n g "the p r e s e n t a t i o n is merely academically correct." E v e r y t h i n g u n i q u e a n d distinctive, which characterizes a t r u e singular instance, r e m a i n s u n d e t e r m i n e d by this aesthetic normal i d e a . K a n t has d e m o t e d t h e whole notion to the "mechanical" c h a r a c t e r of art. I n t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h of §17, Kant's discourse implicitly shifts from t h e q u e s t i o n of finding beautiful things in n a t u r e to m a k i n g beautiful objects (art). I n discussing t h e "exemplary," Kant writes of " p r o d u c t s of taste," a n d t h e n proceeds to a very i m p o r t a n t assertion: " H e w h o imitates [nachahmt] a m o d e l [Muster] shows, n o d o u b t , in so far as h e attains to it, skill [Geschicklichkeit]; b u t only shows taste in so far as h e can j u d g e of this m o d e l himself [sofern als er dieses Muster selbst beurtheilen kann]." Taste h e r e for t h e first time involves t h a t which p r o d u c e s , n o t merely appreciates, beauty. H e n c e , art for t h e first time e n t e r s consideration in a serious m a n ner. I n d e e d , t h e notions of imitation (Nachahmung), of m o d e l (Muster), a n d of skill (Geschicklichkeit) all play a crucial role in Kant's t h e o r y of art. T h u s , § 17 r e p r e s e n t s t h e transition to t h e consideration of art. 1 8

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The Philosophy of Art W h a t is art? K a n t p r e s e n t e d a very orderly, precise, even brilliant exposition of it in t h e Third Critique. T h e r e is n o t the least hint of casualness o r indifference in t h e analysis. Yet o n e c a n n o t h e l p b u t recognize h o w structurally negligent h e was in t h e p l a c e m e n t of his whole exposition of t h e topic within the work. T h e t r e a t m e n t of art (§§43—54) is r u n into the " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t s " via two transitional sections ( § § 4 1 - 4 2 ) , t h o u g h t h e r e is n o a p p a r e n t reason why it belongs t h e r e . T o m a k e m a t t e r s even worse, t h e whole of t h e " D e d u c t i o n " is left u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of "Book T w o " Kant's Philosphy of Art

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of the "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " which is called the "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e . " J o h a n n Gottfried Kiesewetter, Kant's proofr e a d e r , suggested t h a t K a n t i n t r o d u c e a new division of t h e b o o k at t h a t p o i n t to give d u e weight to t h e shift in a t t e n t i o n . H e suggested a " B o o k T h r e e " to i n c l u d e t h e " D e d u c t i o n " a n d t h e t r e a t m e n t of a r t . B u t even t h a t d o e s n o t really a d d r e s s t h e discontinuity between t h e actual " D e d u c t i o n " (§§31—40) a n d t h e exposition of art. T h e structural neglect is puzzling, especially in a p h i l o s o p h e r so architectonic. It raises t h e question: W h a t function was t h e exposition of art to serve? C o u l d it in s o m e sense b e p a r t of t h e d e d u c tion of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s ? W o u l d it p e r h a p s m a k e sense to say t h a t t h e p o i n t of this exposition was to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e d e d u c tion which w o r k e d for t h e " p u r e " j u d g m e n t of taste also h e l d in t h e case of works of art? Possibly. C o u l d o n e t h e n m a k e a n even m o r e e x t r a v a g a n t leap a n d s u p p o s e t h a t t h e whole m a t t e r b e l o n g e d to t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e " in some sense? T h e r e is a very strained sense in which t h e whole t h e o r y of symbolism, which is t h e c u l m i n a t i o n of t h e exposition of art a n d t h e basis for t h e final form of t h e "Dialectic," can b e considered in t e r m s of t h e most p r o f o u n d m e a n i n g of t h e sublime, namely, t h e aesthetic consciousness of subjective m o r a l w o r t h . Yet all of this is so t e n u o u s t h a t it seems m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e to find K a n t unjustifiably lax in the organization of his book. 2 1

S u s p e n d i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of its p o o r p l a c e m e n t , let us consider t h e exposition of art starting in §43. W h a t is immediately obvious is t h a t this exposition has every aspect of a fresh b e g i n n i n g . It p r e s u m e s n o t h i n g of t h e previous analysis. It defines each of its concepts as it p r o c e e d s , a n d it develops rigorously a l o n g t h e lines it itself sets u p . While it is clearly related to t h e p r i o r "Analytic of t h e Beautiful," especially to §§15—17, it stands a u t o n o m o u s l y . T h e elegance a n d conciseness of this exposition is very noteworthy, especially in view of t h e m o n u m e n t a l i t y of t h e issues u n d e r consideration a n d t h e vast literature which Kant h a d to digest in m a k i n g his discriminations. T h i s last p o i n t n e e d s to b e u n d e r s c o r e d : t h e exposition of art is a n analysis which takes for g r a n t e d a massive b o d y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a "conventional wisdom," a n d is offered as a clarification a n d elevation o f t h a t discourse. K a n t sets a b o u t clarifying t h e c o n c e p t of art in t e r m s of t h r e e discriminations. H e distinguishes b e t w e e n artifice a n d n a t u r e . H e distinguishes b e t w e e n art a n d artifice. A n d h e distinguishes b e tween art a n d science. T h e p o w e r a n d implication of these discrimin a t i o n s a r e impressive. At t h e h e a r t of t h e exposition of t h e first 130

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discrimination is what I will call t h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art: its o d d parallelism with n a t u r e . T h e r e has l o n g b e e n controversy over Kant's a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e relative beauty in n a t u r e a n d in art. S o m e c o n t e n d t h a t K a n t substantially u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of artistic beauty, a n d that his t r e a t m e n t of it in t h e Critique of Judgment was s u b o r d i n a t e d to considerations deriving from his a p preciation for n a t u r a l beauty, a n d from his ulterior philosophical interests in n a t u r a l beauty, i.e., its cognitive a n d ethical implicat i o n s . Kant's t h e o r y of aesthetics in g e n e r a l set o u t from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n o r r e c e p t i o n of beauty, a n d n o t its creation. Even w h e n h e assessed t h e creative d i m e n s i o n of aesthetics, as h e h a d to in c o n s i d e r i n g art, h e did so, as it were, from outside, d i s e n g a g e d from t h e i m m a n e n t artistic process, a n d assessing it with "cold-blooded" d e t a c h m e n t . 22

2 3

All this may well b e t r u e , b u t before we a d o p t it as o u r herm e n e u t i c v a n t a g e , it behooves us to consider a n o t h e r alternative, namely, t h a t K a n t may have c o m e to treat art, as a c o m p l e x issue in aesthetics, after h e c o n s i d e r e d n a t u r a l beauty, merely because in t h e latter h e could m o r e easily isolate t h e essential e l e m e n t s of a " p u r e " j u d g m e n t of taste, a n d consequently t h a t h e always int e n d e d to b r i n g his findings to b e a r u p o n t h e c o m p l e x p r o b l e m of art. T h a t is, in m y view, a very worthwhile consideration. B u t t h e r e is a n o t h e r , m o r e subtle a n d m o r e r e w a r d i n g . While t h e r e is u n d o u b t e d l y s o m e g r o u n d for suspicion of Kant's a t t i t u d e toward art, o n e can e n t e r a n i m m e d i a t e corrective whose implications m i g h t in fact be capable of reversing t h e whole line of criticism against Kant. T h e corrective is simply t h a t n a t u r a l beauty a p p e a r s to b e artifice, or, t h e idea of art is implicit in t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of n a t u r a l beauty. Kant's aesthetic e m p h a s i z e s t h e active role of t h e m i n d in every aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , n o t simply those of creation b u t those of r e c e p t i o n as well. I n d e e d , o n e could go so far as to say t h a t t h e r e can be n o aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e at all which is n o t creative, in t h a t every o n e involves h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, a n d h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, in its t u r n , t h e free play of t h e imagination which is, simply, creativity. P e r h a p s o n e of t h e most f a m o u s lines in t h e Third Critique, a n d deservedly so, is from §45: " N a t u r e p r o v e d beautiful w h e n it wore t h e a p p e a r a n c e of art; a n d art can only b e t e r m e d beautiful, w h e n we a r e conscious of its b e i n g art, while yet it has t h e a p p e a r a n c e of n a t u r e . " T h i s p r o f o u n d p a r a d o x is p r e g n a n t with t h e whole Idealist-Romantic vision. It is from this p a r a d o x t h a t we m u s t gene r a t e t h e e n t i r e t h e o r y of a r t which K a n t p r e s e n t s in t h e Third Cri2 4

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tique. B u t first, let u s dwell a m o m e n t o n t h e n a t u r a l side of this p a r a d o x . N a t u r e is c o n s i d e r e d beautiful w h e n it looks like art, b u t we know it is not. It is i n a d v e r t e n t artifice: what seems to b e designed, yet c a n n o t b e ascribed to any worldly artist. H e n c e K a n t treats n a t u r a l beauty "as if" it w e r e art, a n d h e calls this, frequently, t h e "technic of n a t u r e . " T h e r e is n o question t h a t this is a m e t a p h o r , yet it raises two m a t t e r s for theoretical reflection. First, is w h a t we a p p r e c i a t e as d e sign in t h e object o r only in o u r response? T h e whole question of "objective s u b r e p t i o n " comes back into consideration, with this s u b r e p t i o n n o w f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of t h e problematic c o n c e p t i o n "intrinsic objective purposiveness." B u t second, r e g a r d i n g n a t u r e as t h e s p h e r e of relentless mechanical laws a n d efficient causality, h o w can any p h e n o m e n o n in n a t u r e , n o m a t t e r how a p p a r e n t l y d e signed, possess intrinsic p u r p o s e ("perfection")? Must n o t these works of n a t u r e which a p p r o x i m a t e art be ascribed literally to a n A r t i f i c e r ? I n short, t h e i m p u t a t i o n of beauty to objects in n a t u r e raises questions which a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y ontological a n d theological a n d find t h e i r expression precisely in a n investigation of teleology. T h u s , o n e side of Kant's aesthetic p a r a d o x p u s h e s his t h o u g h t decisively in t h e direction of t h e "cognitive t u r n . " B u t w h a t of t h e o t h e r side? W h a t d o e s it m e a n t h a t art m u s t have t h e a p p e a r a n c e of n a t u r e while still b e i n g recognized as art? K a n t takes Kunst to signify, like t h e a n c i e n t G r e e k techne, all h u m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r , all artifice. H e distinguishes between t h e verb tun, which h e associates with t h e Latinfacere, a n d t h e verbs wirken a n d ( m o r e problematically) handeln, which h e associates with t h e Latin agere. Tun m e a n s to d o , a n d it invariably refers to intentional action, to a " d e e d . " Facere, in addition, has t h e sense of " m a k i n g . " Wirken, which M e r e d i t h translates lamely as " o p e r a t i n g " a n d B e r n a r d as "working," involves, in t h e G e r m a n , t h e sense of causing o r effecting, a n d it is this sense t h a t K a n t wishes to evoke. K a n t calls t h e result of art (Kunst, tun) a "work" (Werke; opus), a n d t h e result of n a t u r e a n "effect" (Wirkung; effectus). T h e sense of t h e whole is n o w clear. N a t u r e refers to t h a t construction of m a t t e r s which involves cause a n d effect (in t h e efficient, mechanisticdeterministic sense) a n d art refers to t h a t construction of m a t t e r s which involves t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of p u r p o s e . 25

I n t h a t sense, Kunst is only a p p r o x i m a t e l y r e n d e r e d by "art" a n d w o u l d b e best conceived as "artifice," as in t h e adjectival contrast "artificial/natural." Artifice stands for t h e whole r e a l m of h u m a n action in g e n e r a l , i.e., techne. It is t h e whole of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e 132

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u n d e r t h e r u b r i c of m a n ' s active stance in t h e world, w h a t H e i d e g g e r called a t t e n d i n g to t h e " r e a d y - t o - h a n d , " as c o n t r a s t e d with t h e p u r e l y c o n t e m p l a t i v e o r cognitive stance toward t h e " p r e s e n t - t o h a n d . " Moreover, it is i m p o r t a n t to recognize t h a t in §43 K a n t still considers t h e "technical" as p a r t of t h e "practical" s p h e r e , i.e., to b e u n d e r s t o o d within t h e f r a m e w o r k of rational will. After h e takes t h e "cognitive t u r n , " h e will correct himself a n d assign all "technical practical p u r p o s i v e n e s s " to t h e theoretical o r cognitive d o m a i n , as a m a t t e r , to b e s u r e , of rationality, b u t of merely efficient rationality— w h a t M a x W e b e r would call Zweckrationalität—as c o n t r a s t e d with authentically practical action, which h a d to be g r o u n d e d in value, i.e., m o r a l c h o i c e — w h i c h , b o r r o w i n g from Weber, we m i g h t t e r m T h a t r e a s s i g n m e n t of Technik, with f u n d a m e n t a l Wertrationalität. r e p e r c u s s i o n s for t h e n o t i o n "Technik der Natur," belongs to t h e p e r i o d of t h e composition of t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. Insofar as all h u m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n is Kunst, o r artifice, t h e contrast of this with n a t u r e , o r t h e a u t o n o m o u s flow of n a t u r a l events, is clear. I n d e e d , K a n t m a d e a g r e a t deal of t h e distinction between a n action (Handlung) a n d a n e v e n t (Wirkung) in his Second Critique. While it was always possible, h e wrote, for t h e subject to p r e s e n t a cognitive a c c o u n t of his actions retrospectively as t h e result of a causal c h a i n , a n d h e n c e as a n event, this belied t h e prospective c h a r a c t e r of each a n d every act u n d e r t a k e n by that subject as a free agent, i n c l u d i n g t h e decision to view p r i o r acts as d e t e r m i n e d . As artifice o r Technik, Kunst implied p u r p o s e , i.e., t h e causality of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e actual existence of a n object o r state of affairs. B u t m o r e , it entailed a consideration o f t h a t causality as effective, i.e., actually in t h e world of sense, h e n c e a m a t t e r n o t only of i n t e n t i o n (Absicht o r Zweckvorstellung) b u t of actualization, a n d h e n c e entailed t h e whole m a t t e r of skill a n d efficiency (Geschicklichkeit) which w e r e irrelevant in t h e case of p u r e m o r a l choice. Artifice is simply too wide a category to h e l p us with a n aesthetic clarification of art. H e n c e K a n t h a d to p r o c e e d to a distinction of a r t as such from artifice in g e n e r a l . T h a t was his second distinction. It will c o m e as n o s u r p r i s e that w h a t K a n t u n d e r t o o k was a n o t h e r search for "purity," a n d that t h e key to such a search would b e t h e isolation of "form." T h u s K a n t m a d e t h r e e discriminations in isolating t h e " p u r e " case of a r t within t h e c o m p l e x field of artifice in g e n e r a l . T h e first is t h e discrimination of a r t from labor. T h e key to this distinction is t h a t t h e motive of t h e latter is t h e r e t u r n to b e derived from t h e action, t h e p a y m e n t . H e n c e , like a 26

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practical choice based o n a material principle, o r like a simple j u d g m e n t of sense, t h e interest in t h e satisfaction ultimately to be exp e c t e d is t h e basis for t h e action. T h e implication, further, is t h a t t h e m e a n s — a n d labor is clearly for K a n t merely a m e a n s — i s u n pleasant d r u d g e r y , a n d consequently t h e only r e a s o n o n e w o u l d subject oneself to it is for t h e p a y m e n t . T h a t c a n n o t b e t h e case for art. It can only b e " p u r p o s i v e as play, i.e., as o c c u p a t i o n t h a t is pleasant in itself [nur als Spiel, d. i. Beschäftigung, diefür sich selbst angenehm ist, zweckmäßig ausfallen (gelingen)]." T h e word "pleasant" is a bit disconcerting in this s e n t e n c e , b u t t h e idea of "play" is t h e m a i n harvest: K a n t identifies art with a n activity which is t h e source of delight in itself, which n e e d s n o e x t e r n a l r e c o m p e n s e . H e salvages t h e distinction of t h e beautiful from t h e pleasant in his n e x t discrimination, which is between "fine [schöne] a r t " a n d "agreeable art." K a n t develops t h a t distinction in §44. T h e pleasant is, as we w o u l d expect, eliminated from t h e " p u r e " consideration of beauty. T h a t leaves o n e final distinction in t h e "purification" of art as such f r o m artifice in g e n e r a l . It is t h e most p r o b l e m a t i c a n d t h e most i m p o r t a n t : t h e distinction b e t w e e n "aesthetical a r t " a n d " m e chanical art." T h e idea of t h e mechanical first arose in consideration of t h e role of t h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" in t h e "ideal of beauty." T h e r e , K a n t associated t h e mechanical with "academic correctness," t h o u g h h e implied t h a t t r u e art h a d s o m e t h i n g m o r e a b o u t it. H e explains this idea in § § 4 3 - 4 4 . I n §43 h e m a k e s t h e following observation: " I n all free arts, s o m e t h i n g of a c o m p u l s o r y c h a r a c t e r is still r e q u i r e d , or, as it is called, a mechanism." I n §44, K a n t explains t h a t "mechanical arts" a r e those which are based o n a clear a n d d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t of what is to be p r o d u c e d , i.e., they follow a r u l e . T h u s "mechanical a r t s " signfies, precisely, artifice in g e n e r a l , as p u r p o s i v e action. B u t with respect to fine art it has a furt h e r implication, namely, t h a t a r u l e m u s t b e followed. B u t we know t h a t n o prescriptive r u l e can be claimed for t h e appreciation of beauty. C a n it b e t h a t o n e could apply in its creation? K a n t clearly recognizes this c a n n o t be. O n c e again, we m u s t b e attentive to his n o t i o n of "play" in this context: t h e action is u n d e r t a k e n for t h e intrinsic satisfaction—i.e., t h e d e l i g h t — i t provides. S o m e h o w , t h e recognition that a r t falls within artifice, i.e., p u r p o s e f u l action, seems n o w to t h r e a t e n its f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e , namely, f r e e d o m . Rules a r e rational, cognitive, a n d d e t e r m i n a n t . Artifice in g e n e r a l falls u n d e r rules. Fine a r t falls u n d e r artifice in general, yet it m u s t not s u b o r d i n a t e itself to a prescriptive r u l e . K a n t has l a n d e d h i m self squarely in a p a r a d o x . It is, i n d e e d , t h e second half of his 27

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g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art: t h a t art m u s t a p p e a r like n a t u r e (that which suffers n o h u m a n intervention), a n d yet m u s t b e recognized as art (namely, a h u m a n act). T h e r e a r e two sides t o this issue. First, w h a t can it m e a n t h a t fine art a p p e a r like n a t u r e ? A n d second, what sort of h u m a n act is fine art? Let us take each of t h e m u p in t u r n . W h e n K a n t writes t h a t art m u s t look like n a t u r e , w h a t h e m e a n s is t h a t it s h o u l d a p p e a r "as free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a p r o d u c t of m e r e n a t u r e [von allem Zwange willkürlicher Regeln sofrei scheinen, ah ob es ein Product der bloßen Natur sei]." B u t since w h e n is n a t u r e "free"? Kant's definition of n a t u r e is precisely t h e e n s e m b l e of laws, o r t h e existence of p h e n o m e n a u n d e r t h e constraint of those laws. Even in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , w h e n we t h i n k of n a t u r e as " u n c o n strained," w h a t sorts of events d o we have in m i n d ? Certainly n o t t h e "starry h e a v e n s . " Even a " m e a n d e r i n g b r o o k " o r a " v a g r a n t b r e e z e " follow, in fact, utterly fixed physical laws. If we r e s p o n d to a spontaneity, a d y n a m i s m in n a t u r e , a n effortlessness of o r d e r , we also know t h a t t h a t o r d e r is real, b i n d i n g , a n d fixed. P e r h a p s it is in t h e p h e n o m e n a of life in n a t u r e t h a t we a r e most struck by its "freed o m , " in t h e l u x u r i a n t creativity which m a k e s each leaf of a n oak tree distinct, each instance of a species u n i q u e . P e r h a p s it is t h e lushness, this s p e n d t h r i f t vitality of n a t u r e , that we m e a n by t h a t sense of " f r e e d o m " from t h e c o n s t r a i n t of arbitrary rules. Certainly if m a n w e r e to m a k e a n oak tree, each leaf would b e p r o d u c e d to identical specifications of t h e most mechanical sort. Individuality is s o m e t h i n g o u r rational constructions seem to consider t h o r o u g h l y dispensable. 29

T h e r e is a f u r t h e r point, however. I n the sense t h a t rules a r e arbitrary (willkürlich), they a r e artificial. T h e y are p r o d u c t s of p u r pose or rational will. Reason is t h e only source of r u l e in t h e world. T o b e r u l e - b o u n d e d is to b e subject to r e a s o n . B u t K a n t locates t h e e n t i r e aesthetic s p h e r e n o t in s u b o r d i n a t i o n to r e a s o n b u t in t h e free play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , in sensibility, t h e r e a l m of t h e merely given, t h e d o m a i n of objective actuality, n o t validity. H e n c e what art m u s t entail is a p u r p o s i v e n e s s without a p u r p o s e : as h u m a n act it falls u n d e r t h e r u b r i c of artifice, of p u r p o s e , a n d h e n c e of rule, b u t as free act it falls u n d e r t h e dispensation of t h e m e r e formality of p u r p o s e , Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck. Yet the formality of p u r p o s e is still a n a l o g o u s to r u l e , to design. S o m e e l e m e n t of r u l e m u s t remain. If, t h e n , t h e r e is a sense t o t h e idea t h a t art s h o u l d b e like n a t u r e in its f r e e d o m from t h e c o n s t r a i n t of arbitrary rules, t h e stress m u s t Kant's Philosphy of Art

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b e o n t h e two words "constraint" a n d "arbitrary," a n d not o n t h e w o r d "rules." T h i s is t h e way in which K a n t elaborates his p o i n t in §45: B u t t h e way in which a p r o d u c t of art seems like n a t u r e , is by t h e p r e s e n c e of perfect exactness [Piincktlichkeit] in t h e a g r e e m e n t with rules prescribing h o w alone t h e p r o d u c t can b e w h a t it is i n t e n d e d to be, b u t with a n absence of labored effect [Peinlichkeit], (without academic form betraying itself,) i.e. w i t h o u t a trace a p p e a r i n g of t h e artist having always h a d t h e r u l e p r e s e n t to h i m a n d of its h a v i n g fettered his m e n t a l powers. 3 0

T h e r e a r e two key points to b e extracted. First, t h e r e is a necessary place for r u l e in free or fine art, h e n c e Kant's insistence o n t h e m e chanical as "academic f o r m " or correctness. B u t t h e d e e p e r p o i n t is t h a t this "correctness" m u s t b e of a h i g h e r sort. T h e "exactness" K a n t prescribes for art is n o t that of its conformity to mechanical c a n o n s of correctness, b u t r a t h e r t h e parallel it shows to t h e inevitability a n d ease of n a t u r a l o r d e r , its a p t n e s s in a m u c h g r a n d e r sense. T h a t is t h e o t h e r side of t h e analogy of art a n d n a t u r e : it is n o t j u s t in its lack of constraint b u t in its precision, i n d e e d , effortless precision, t h a t art m u s t s e e m n a t u r a l . T h e distinction h e r e is between ease a n d clumsiness, b u t even m o r e is at stake, s o m e p r i m o r dial sense of Tightness which is n o t only aesthetic b u t cognitive a n d ethical. A n d t h e r e is o n e final, R o m a n t i c fillip to t h e a r g u m e n t , which K a n t deftly a n d ironically takes u p : m a n is after all also a c r e a t u r e of n a t u r e . N a t u r e , in its effortless creativity, can t h e n be t a k e n to act through m a n to g e n e r a t e works of fine art. A n d t h a t is exactly w h a t K a n t takes " g e n i u s " to m e a n . W i t h " g e n i u s " all t h e c o n t e x t u a l issues c o m e to a h e a d . T h e conflict b e t w e e n r u l e a n d genius was t h e essential issue between Neoclassicism a n d Romanticism. It was also t h e self-professed mission of t h e Sturm und Drang in G e r m a n y to free its c u l t u r e from t h e constraint of arbitrary classical rules (Latin a n d F r e n c h in derivation) by t h e articulation, t h e celebration, a n d t h e u n t r a m m e l e d p u r s u i t of " g e n i u s . " A n d all this was r e p u g n a n t to I m m a n u e l K a n t . T h a t explains t h e t h i r d key discrimination K a n t i n t r o d u c e d in his exposition of t h e c o n c e p t of art: t h e distinction of art from science. L o o k i n g at t h e p r o b l e m of genius in this light first will h e l p contextualize t h e whole issue a n d serve us mightily at a later j u n c t u r e .

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Art versus Science: The Ironic Approach to Genius Kant's hostility to t h e Sturm und Drang is t h e decisive context in which o n e m u s t r e a d n o t only his distinction of art from science in §43, b u t also his whole t r e a t m e n t of g e n i u s in § § 4 6 - 4 7 . K a n t has a very definite t a r g e t in m i n d , even within t h e Sturm und Drang: J o h a n n H e r d e r . His j u x t a p o s i t i o n of science a n d art can be r e a d — s h o u l d be r e a d — a s a j u x t a p o s i t i o n , as well, of his o w n method with Let us first e x a m i n e Kant's exposition, t h e n H e r d e r ' s manner. t u r n o u r sights to t h e context to which it u n q u e s t i o n a b l y refers. T h e c a m p a i g n begins in §43. K a n t insists t h a t t h e r e is a n e l e m e n t of rule, of a c a d e m i c r e g i m e n , i.e., of m e c h a n i s m , even in "free art." It is a p p r o p r i a t e to m a k e this point, h e asseverates, because " n o t a few leaders of a n e w e r school believe t h a t t h e best way to p r o m o t e a free art is to sweep away all restraint, a n d convert it from labor into m e r e play [manche neuere Erzieher eine freie Kunst am besten zu befördern glauben, wenn sie allen Zwang von ihr wegnehmen und sie aus Arbeit in bloßes Spiel verwandeln]." T h e result of such a p o s t u r e , however, is t h a t t h o u g h t h e "spirit" [Geist], which "alone gives life to t h e work [allein das Werk belebt]," would be free, it would be all-too-free, namely, " b e c o m e bodyless a n d evanescent [gar keinen Körper haben und gänzlich verdunsten würde]." T h e r e is n o question t h a t t h e reference h e r e is to t h e Sturm und Drang t h e o r y of genius a n d its rebellion against Neoclassical c a n o n s of taste. T h e question is r a t h e r w h e t h e r we can be m o r e precise in d e t e r m i n i n g w h o t h e target of Kant's criticism m i g h t have b e e n . W i t h o u t question, in t h e 1780s, a n d certainly by 1788, t h e l e a d e r of t h e Sturm und Drang a n d t h e most i m p o r t a n t theorist of aesthetic genius in G e r m a n y was H e r d e r . A l t h o u g h K a n t h a d h a d r u n - i n s also with t h e i r m u t u a l associate, H a m a n n , the latter d i e d in 1788, a n d while it is highly likely t h a t h e was to b e t a r r e d with t h e s a m e b r u s h , h e could hardly pose a f u r t h e r t h r e a t to t h e direction of Germ a n c u l t u r e . O n t h e s t r e n g t h of this alone, H e r d e r seems t h e most obvious c a n d i d a t e . T h a t conjecture receives great r e i n f o r c e m e n t in Kant's n e x t section. 31

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K a n t a r g u e s at t h e outset of §44 t h a t t h e r e can be n o such t h i n g as a "beautiful science," any m o r e t h a n t h e r e can be a "science of t h e beautiful." It is clear t h a t by t h e latter h e m e a n t a logically p r e scriptive r u l e which d e t e r m i n e d t h e concept of the beautiful. W h a t is interesting is t h e m e a n i n g of t h e o t h e r notion, a "beautiful scie n c e . " "As for a beautiful science—a science which, as such, is to be

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beautiful, is a n o n e n t i t y . F o r if, t r e a t i n g it as a science, we were to ask for r e a s o n s a n d proofs, we would be p u t off with e l e g a n t p h r a s e s (bons mots). " K a n t is saying t h a t in such a n instance, s o m e t h i n g p u r p o r t i n g to b e science, h e n c e a m a t t e r of logical discourse, would, w h e n c h a l l e n g e d , reply t h a t it was justified in its p r o p o s i tions n o t by proofs b u t by elegance o r beauty. Beauty was a n i n e p t g r o u n d for t r u t h , for Kant, a n d n o t h i n g irked h i m m o r e t h a n to raise a rational q u e r y of s o m e o n e ' s ostensible science a n d b e rep r o a c h e d for insensitivity to his target's lyrical sensibility. H e h a d g o n e t h r o u g h j u s t such a n e p i s o d e — i n his review of H e r d e r ' s Ideen. 3 3

T h e a r g u m e n t t h r u s t s m o r e deeply t h a n this personal d i m e n sion, for K a n t is q u e s t i o n i n g t h e justice in u s i n g t h e w o r d "science" in t h e w h o l e r e a l m of t h e h u m a n i t i e s as such. I n o t h e r words, K a n t is l a u n c h i n g t h e c a m p a i g n for t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e so-called "two c u l t u r e s " by t h e d e m o t i o n of t h e h u m a n i t i e s from t h e r a n k of Wissenschaft. H e writes that these "elegant sciences" [schönen Wissenschaften] constitute merely t h e p r e p a r a t i o n in scholarship requisite for t h e cultivation of taste: for fine art, in t h e fulness of its perfection, a large store of scie n c e [Wissenschaft—though it would b e better, a n d catch t h e n a t u r e of Kant's distinction, w e r e it translated as "scholarship"] is r e q u i r e d , as, for e x a m p l e , knowledge of ancient l a n g u a g e s , a c q u a i n t a n c e with classical a u t h o r s , history, antiq u a r i a n l e a r n i n g , etc. H e n c e these historical sciences [historischen Wissenschaften], o w i n g to t h e fact that they form t h e necessary p r e p a r a t i o n a n d g r o u n d w o r k for fine art, a n d partly also o w i n g to t h e fact t h a t they a r e t a k e n to c o m p r i s e even t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e p r o d u c t s of fine art (rhetoric a n d poetry), have by a confusion of words, actually got t h e n a m e of e l e g a n t s c i e n c e s . 34

T h e studia humanitatis a r e all h e r e carefully a d u m b r a t e d , a n d all l u m p e d t o g e t h e r as failing of t h e full s t a t u r e of science. While they are, to b e s u r e , worthy studies, they d o n o t have t h e same theoretical status, t h e s a m e objective validity. T h i s stance m u s t b e placed in context. Romanticism is often t a k e n , in g e n e r a l , as t h e rebellion against t h e primacy of theoretical r e a s o n a n d of science in t h e d i s c e r n m e n t of t h e essential m e a n i n g s of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . It was t h e effort to replace t h e n a t u r a l scientist o r n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h e r — t h e t e r m s a n d often t h e figures were, in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , s y n o n y m o u s — w i t h t h e artist as t h e t r u e seer, t h e vates. T h e suggestion of r i c h e r potentials of m e a n i n g to 138

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which aesthetic sensibility o p e n e d t h e artist u p , a n d of t h e actual inspiration of artists by these u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g s , is w h a t lent such p o w e r to t h e idea of genius in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d surr o u n d e d it with a n i m b u s of mystery a n d even mysticism. As a good son of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t , K a n t f o u n d such n o t i o n s revolting. Scie n c e s h o u l d n o t e n d u r e such indignity. " G e n i u s " h a d to be p u t in its place. A n d t h a t was exactly w h a t K a n t p r o c e e d e d to d o . T h e only possible reconciliation of t h e p a r a d o x of art as at o n c e "free" a n d limited by " m e c h a n i s m , " as at o n c e " n a t u r a l " a n d as "purposive/artificial," was to r e a d t h e actual a g e n t in artistic creativity n o t as t h e subject in his self-possession, b u t r a t h e r as n a t u r e w o r k i n g t h r o u g h t h e subject. H e n c e , all "free," all "beautiful" o r "fine" art h a d to b e t h e p r o d u c t of g e n i u s . B u t g e n i u s — a n d this is t h e ironic p o i n t — h a d to b e conceived as s o m e t h i n g which t h e artist n e i t h e r controlled n o r u n d e r s t o o d . Kant's exposition of g e n i u s takes its t e r m s from t h e "conventional w i s d o m . " K a n t started with the n o t i o n of " g e n i u s " as "the talent (natural e n d o w m e n t ) which gives t h e rule to art." B u t that only m e a n t , K a n t elaborated, t h a t g e n i u s was "the i n n a t e m e n t a l a p t i t u d e (ingenium) through which n a t u r e gives t h e rule to art." T h i s was n o t yet his analysis, merely his r e a d i n g of w h a t o t h e r s h a d said, b u t it gave h i m a very useful v a n t a g e o n t h e whole issue. T h e point was that "fine art c a n n o t of its o w n self excogitate t h e r u l e according to which it is to effectuate its p r o d u c t [Also kann die schöne Kunst sich selbst nicht die Regel ausdenken, nach der sie ihr Product zu Stande With this construction Kant could n o w explicate, bringen soll]." from t h e v a n t a g e of his o w n aesthetic theory, why g e n i u s h a d to be t a k e n to b e "original," as t h e conventional wisdom h a d it, a n d why it also could p r o d u c e only " e x e m p l a r y " instantiations which could n e i t h e r b e p r e s r i b e d in logical rules n o r described in discursive e m pirical c a n o n s , b u t which stood in themselves as t h e o n e source n o t only for t h e cultivation of taste as a p p r e c i a t i o n b u t for f u r t h e r exemplification of b e a u t y t h r o u g h art. B u t t h e ironic p o i n t is reserved for last: 3 5

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It c a n n o t indicate scientifically h o w it brings a b o u t its p r o d uct, b u t r a t h e r gives the r u l e as nature. H e n c e , w h e r e a n aut h o r owes a p r o d u c t to his genius, h e does n o t himself know how t h e ideas for it have e n t e r e d into his h e a d , n o r has h e it in his p o w e r to invent t h e like at p l e a s u r e , or methodically, a n d c o m m u n i c a t e t h e s a m e to o t h e r s in such p r e c e p t s as would p u t t h e m in a position to p r o d u c e similar p r o d u c t s . 38

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T h e artistic g e n i u s c a n n o t explain his o w n achievement, c a n n o t r e p r o d u c e it at will, a n d c a n n o t teach it to o t h e r s . F r o m t h e vantage p o i n t of rationality, h e is i m p o t e n t . H o w ironic t h e n is t h e p h r a s e "leaders of a n e w e r school" [neuere Erzieher] in r e f e r e n c e to t h e Stürmer, for in t h e m e a s u r e t h a t they were i n d e e d geniuses, they could n o t teach their g e n i u s . T h e y were merely t h e vehicles of a natu r a l revelation. T h e r e has rarely b e e n so ironic a r e a d i n g of poetic inspiration as this, a n d K a n t i n t e n d s to use it for all it is w o r t h . If this is w h a t genius m e a n s , t h e n obviously the word genius has n o t h i n g to d o with science. AH of Kant's t h r e a d s c o m e t o g e t h e r in a tight knot, i n d e e d , a noose, a n d in it h e has H e r d e r . I n §47, K a n t explicitly e x e m p t s science from t h e s p h e r e of genius. It all lies in t h e n a t u r a l p a t h of investigation a n d reflection acc o r d i n g to rules, a n d so is n o t specifically distinguishable from w h a t m a y be a c q u i r e d as t h e result of industry backed u p by imitation. So all that Newton has set forth in his i m m o r t a l work . . . m a y well b e l e a r n e d , h o w e v e r g r e a t a m i n d it took to find it all o u t . . . [because] all t h e steps t h a t N e w t o n h a d to take from t h e first e l e m e n t s of g e o m e t r y to his greatest a n d most p r o f o u n d discoveries were such as h e could m a k e intuitively evid e n t a n d plain to follow [ganz anschaulich und zur Nachfolge bestimmt vormachen könnte], n o t only for himself b u t for everyone else. 39

Science, K a n t asseverates, is merely prosaic, unlike t h e inimitable flights of poetic fancy of a H o m e r . " I n m a t t e r s of science, t h e r e f o r e , t h e greatest i n v e n t o r differs only in d e g r e e from t h e most laborious imitator a n d a p p r e n t i c e . " N o t only is science prosaic, it is egalitarian. Art, however, is a l t o g e t h e r different: "we c a n n o t learn to write in a poetic vein." Poeta nascitur nonfit. Poets are b o r n , n o t m a d e . T h e h i g h e s t distinction to which the genius lays claim, t h e inspiration of his g u a r d i a n " d a i m o n , " Kant, by acknowledging, d e m e a n s . T o be s u r e they a r e "the elect of n a t u r e [die Günstlinge der Natur]," b u t w h e n K a n t writes " N o d i s p a r a g e m e n t . . . of those g r e a t m e n , to w h o m t h e h u m a n race is so deeply i n d e b t e d , [i.e., t h e m e n of science] is involved in this c o m p a r i s o n " with n a t u r e ' s darlings, w h o e n t e r t a i n s any serious d o u b t w h e r e his loyalties lie? Science p r o m i s e s " c o n t i n u e d a d v a n c e s of g r e a t e r perfection in k n o w l e d g e , with all its d e p e n d e n t practical a d v a n t a g e s . " It is progressive a n d it can also b e t a u g h t . It is t h e very stuff of e d u c a tion. T h e r e f o r e , K a n t bluntly states, it possesses a " g r o u n d of considerable s u p e r i o r i t y " over art. I n d e e d — a n d h e r e K a n t m a k e s a 140

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s t a g g e r i n g p o i n t which anticipates t h e H e g e l i a n t h e o r y of a r t — " a r t m u s t m a k e a halt [at s o m e p o i n t ] , as t h e r e is a limit i m p o s e d u p o n it which it c a n n o t t r a n s c e n d . T h i s limit has in all probability b e e n l o n g since a t t a i n e d . " H o w is a r t t h e n carried forward? H o w is taste cultivated? T h e a n s w e r is: t h r o u g h t h e e x e m p l a r y instantiation of p r i o r works of g e n i u s , o n which s u b s e q u e n t artists m u s t practice t h e i r taste, a n d from which they m u s t derive n o t a r u l e to imitate, b u t a n e x a m p l e to follow: n o t t h e result b u t t h e activity which p r o d u c e d it is w h a t t h e artistic g e n i u s m u s t g a t h e r from a n o t h e r ' s m a s t e r p i e c e . It is to retrieve t h e Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck whose o u t c o m e was a n artistic m a s t e r p i e c e t h a t o n e artist studies a n o t h e r ' s work. A n d to disc e r n it, while vital to t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n , is n o t h i n g if it does n o t elicit in t h e artist a latent capacity in himself to e m u l a t e that process, to m a k e a work of art of his own. T h e r e f o r e , t h e only way t h e potential g e n i u s can be cultivated is to subject h i m o r h e r to t h a t r i g o r o u s exp o s u r e to e x e m p l a r y instances of artistic g e n i u s which is j u s t w h a t is m e a n t by " a c a d e m i c t r a i n i n g . " A n d h e n c e t h a t very " m e c h a n i c a l " e l e m e n t c a n n o t b e e v a d e d in t h e cultivation of t h e artist. B u t K a n t wishes to assert e v e n m o r e : t h e mechanical is n o t only indispensable in t h e cultivation of t h e artist, it is also indispensable in t h e artist's creation of a work. T h a t is why t h e Sturm und Drang version of g e n i u s is incoh e r e n t , K a n t a r g u e s . "Originality" is n o t e n o u g h . Realization of a work r e q u i r e s t e c h n i q u e , skill, discipline: rule. 40

[S]hallow m i n d s fancy t h a t t h e best evidence they can give of their b e i n g full-blown geniuses is by e m a n c i p a t i n g themselves from all academic constraint of rules, in t h e belief t h a t o n e cuts a finer figure o n t h e back of a n ill-tempered t h a n of a t r a i n e d h o r s e . G e n i u s can d o n o m o r e t h a n furnish rich material for p r o d u c t s of fine art; its elaboration a n d itsform r e q u i r e a talent academically t r a i n e d , so t h a t it may be e m p l o y e d in such a way as to s t a n d t h e test of j u d g m e n t . 4 1

H e n c e K a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a work of a r t is a c o m p l e x process, in which g e n i u s supplies t h e " m a t t e r " b u t j u d g m e n t (taste) provides t h e "form." K n o w i n g Kant, m u c h of w h a t follows is p r e dictable. W h a t is n o t predictable is t h e interjection t h a t K a n t places at j u s t this p o i n t : B u t , for a p e r s o n to hold forth a n d pass sentence like a g e n i u s in m a t t e r s t h a t fall to t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e most p a t i e n t rational Kant's Philosphy of Art

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investigations, is ridiculous in the e x t r e m e . O n e is at a loss to k n o w w h e t h e r to l a u g h m o r e at t h e i m p o s t o r w h o envelops himself in such a c l o u d — i n which we a r e given fuller scope to o u r i m a g i n a t i o n at t h e e x p e n s e of all use of o u r critical faculty,—or at t h e s i m p l e - m i n d e d public which imagines t h a t its inability clearly to cognize a n d c o m p r e h e n d this masterpiece of p e n e t r a t i o n is d u e to its b e i n g i n v a d e d by new t r u t h s en masse, in c o m p a r i s o n with which, detail, d u e to carefully w e i g h e d exposition a n d a n academic e x a m i n a t i o n of rootprinciples, seems to it only t h e work of a t y r o . 4 2

K a n t is in fact back in his polemic of §44, r e g a r d i n g "beautiful scie n c e . " It was a r g u e d in c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t section t h a t Kant was referr i n g to H e r d e r . Now, with this passage, t h e evidence is overw h e l m i n g . T h e l a n g u a g e of this passage has only to b e c o m p a r e d to t h a t in which t h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e is to H e r d e r , Kant's letter to Friedrich Jacobi of A u g u s t 30, 1 7 8 9 . A n d t h a t m e a n s t h a t H e r d e r is t h e t a r g e t n o t only of t h e d i s p a r a g e m e n t of "beautiful science" b u t of t h e u n t r a m m e l e d t h e o r y of genius as well. I n d e e d , t h e whole ironic t r e a t m e n t of genius is a result of Kant's hostility to H e r d e r . It is in this sense t h a t we m u s t see t h a t K a n t n e v e r e n t e r s into t h e perspective of t h e artist in creation, b u t always j u d g e s h i m from outside, from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of—science. T h e result is often very p e n e t r a t i n g , as we will see, b u t the d e t a t c h m e n t also has a n ironic, i n d e e d , p a t r o n i z i n g e l e m e n t which we m u s t n o t m i s s . T h e artistic genius d o e s n o t know w h a t h e is d o i n g . T h e r e is s u d d e n l y a n o d d a p t n e s s to o u r i m p u t a t i o n of a work of art to t h e bees, t h o u g h they accomplish it only by i n s t i n c t . Is t h e m a t t e r so different with a n artistic genius? As genius, t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e "material" t h a t is b r o u g h t into t h e synthesis, n o . It is taste, it is j u d g m e n t t h a t p r o vides "form," t h a t provides "rule," t h a t brings with it t h e dignity of reason. 43

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Kant's Architectonic Redemption of Art K a n t h a d a n ironic i n t e n t i o n in his t r e a t m e n t of genius: h e int e n d e d to rebuff t h e Sturm und Drang a n d in particular J o h a n n H e r d e r for t h e o u t l a n d i s h p r e t e n s e s they h a d i n t r o d u c e d into t h e G e r m a n cultural scene, n o t only within t h e n a r r o w b o u n d s of p o etry, b u t also in aesthetic criticism, in history, a n d even, most outrageously, in science a n d philosophy. T h a t i m p u l s e is very s t r o n g in 142

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t h e exposition of art a n d genius in t h e Third Critique, a n d if it is n o t a t t e n d e d , t h e complexity of t h e intentions of t h e work seems to suggest a very h i g h level of confusion. T h e r e was n o confusion at all, j u s t a variety of scores to settle. W h e n Kant felt satisfied t h a t his l o n g - s t a n d i n g g r u d g e against t h e Sturm und Drang h a d b e e n a d e quately articulated, h e could r e t u r n to his systematic task of analyzing t h e p r o b l e m s of aesthetics. Accordingly, his architectonic i n t e n t i o n rescued his theory of art from serving a merely polemical function in t h e work. T h e architectonic i n t e n t i o n was to r e a d t h e p r o d u c t i o n of beauty in art as structurally h o m o l o g o u s with t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of beauty. B e a u t y always involved Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck, i.e., subjective formal purposiveness, which, transcendentally analyzed, m e a n t h a r m o n y of t h e faculties. N o t only was this h a r m o n y of t h e faculties to be d i s c e r n e d transcendentally as t h e basis of t h e a p p r e ciation of b e a u t y in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, it was n o w to b e s h o w n as t h e basis for t h e p r o d u c t i o n of b e a u t y in the work of art. C o n s e quently, w h a t K a n t n o w t u r n e d to accomplish was t h e elucidation of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e work of art in t e r m s of t h e relations of t h e faculties of t h e m i n d . H e already set forth t h e major c o n t e n t i o n of t h a t analysis w h e n h e a r g u e d t h a t " g e n i u s " could only p r o v i d e t h e "material" for beautiful art, b u t t h a t it was taste, mechanically achieved t h r o u g h discipline a n d academic training, which s u p p l i e d the "form." It is t h e relation of genius to taste t h a t b e c o m e s t h e c e n t e r of Kant's a t t e n t i o n now t h a t his polemical e n e r g i e s have dissipated. Kant's claim t h a t g e n i u s only supplies the "material" in a work of art would suggest t h a t genius c a n n o t stand in very h i g h stead in his t h e o r y of t h e b e a u t y of art, since for K a n t beauty, like r e a s o n , is always exclusively linked with "form." T h a t would, however, r e p r e sent such a radical b r e a k with t h e conventional wisdom a n d such a r e p u d i a t i o n of t h e new sensibility as to leave K a n t utterly isolated from his c u l t u r e . Certainly K a n t was a brave thinker, b u t h e did n o t e x p o s e himself needlessly to such e s t r a n g e m e n t , a n d h e felt t h a t h e h a d f o u n d a way b o t h to p u t g e n i u s in its place a n d , to mix t h e m e t a p h o r , to give t h e devil his d u e . Let us begin with t h e tension between g e n i u s a n d taste. 4 6

K a n t r e t u r n s to t h e issue of t h e title at t h e close of §48. H e cont e n d s t h a t t h e b e a u t y in a work of art is t h e result of taste, since taste alone gives it form. K a n t d e f e n d s this claim with a very p e n e t r a t i n g analysis of t h e labor of artistic p r o d u c t i o n , relevant n o t only for his o w n a p p r o a c h , b u t also as evidence of a m o r e a p t a p p r e c i a t i o n of Kant's Philosphy of Art

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creative activity t h a n t h e rival Sturm und Drang notion of effortless genius: T o give this form . . . to t h e p r o d u c t of fine art, taste merely is r e q u i r e d . By this t h e artist, h a v i n g practised a n d corrected his taste by a variety of e x a m p l e s from n a t u r e or art, controls his work a n d , after m a n y , a n d often laborious, a t t e m p t s to satisfy taste, finds t h e form which c o m m e n d s itself to h i m . H e n c e this f o r m is not, as it were, a m a t t e r of inspiration, o r of a free swing of t h e m e n t a l powers, but r a t h e r of a slow a n d even painful process of i m p r o v e m e n t , directed to m a k i n g t h e form a d e q u a t e to his t h o u g h t w i t h o u t prejudice to t h e f r e e d o m in t h e play of those p o w e r s . 47

In this passage K a n t goes very far toward r e i n t e g r a t i n g art within t h e g e n e r a l s p h e r e of artifice, a n d raises t h e self-conscious p u r s u i t of technique to p r o m i n e n c e in t h e t h e o r y of a r t . H e clearly articulates s o m e of t h e g r o u n d i n g principles u p o n which aesthetic m o d e r n i s m w o u l d b r e a k radically with t h e Romantic, a n d i n d e e d even t h e classical t r a d i t i o n . B u t n o t only does Kant, by e m p h a s i z i n g t e c h n i q u e , b l u r t h e distinction b e t w e e n art a n d artifice a n d h e n c e d r a w it closer to "mechanical art," h e also, by e m p h a s i z i n g t h e laboriousness a n d p a i n of t h e process, draws it m u c h closer to labor, to "industrial art." Yet, to b e s u r e , t h e labor is i n t e n d e d a n d experie n c e d as play. 4 8

49

I n p u t t i n g so m u c h e m p h a s i s o n taste, however, Kant begins to fear t h a t h e t h r e a t e n s his whole a p p r o a c h to genius, a n d t h a t leads h i m to take back in t h e very n e x t p a r a g r a p h almost everything h e j u s t ascribed to taste. "Taste is, however, m e r e l y a critical, n o t a p r o ductive faculty; a n d w h a t c o n f o r m s to it is not, merely o n that acc o u n t , a work of fine art." K a n t t h e n reasserts in all t h e i r rigor t h e distinctions between "fine" a n d "mechanical" art. Mere l e a r n i n g , academicism, does n o t suffice for beauty. It may be correct, K a n t a r g u e s , b u t it is "spiritless [ohne Geist]." Let us look back to t h e closing p a r a g r a p h of §43, w h e r e t h e tension between " m e c h a n i s m " a n d "spirit" [Geist] was first i n t r o d u c e d , a n d t h e f o r m e r associated with "body" a n d the latter with "life" o r liveliness. T h e polarities a r e skewed. Spirit a n d life, in t h e n o r m a l Kantian o r d e r of things, s h o u l d b e l o n g with form. M e c h a n i s m a n d "body" should, in t h e n o r m a l K a n t i a n o r d e r of t h i n g s , b e l o n g with "matter." B u t m e c h a nism h a s b e e n associated with taste, a n d taste with "form," while g e n i u s has b e e n associated with "matter." Yet "spirit" a n d "life" 50

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clearly fall to t h e side of genius. H o w are we to m a k e sense of all this? T h a t K a n t can view taste as " p r o d u c t i v e " is evidenced in § 1 7 . T h a t h e views it as n o t p r o d u c t i v e is clear from §48. T h a t genius provides only t h e "material" is stated bluntly in §47. T h a t it nevertheless supplies t h e "spirit" a n d t h e "life," t h a t it is t h e productive e l e m e n t in t h e work of art, is t h e stress of t h e e n t i r e exposition of art. T h e r e is obviously a p r o b l e m with consistency h e r e . Kant's considered view, as expressed in §50, is t h a t it is only t h e synthesis of t h e two which can p r o d u c e fine art. T h e r e f o r e , taking taste in isolation, it can only p r o d u c e a "mechanical," academically correct b u t "lifeless" p r o d u c t . Conversely, by taking genius in isolation—and h e r e we get at t h e essential p o i n t — w h a t is p r o d u c e d r u n s t h e risk of being "nonsense." It is in t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of "spiritless academic correctness" o n the o n e h a n d a n d "original n o n s e n s e " o n the o t h e r t h a t we g r a s p what K a n t is trying to articulate in §48. A r t c a n n o t b e achieved w i t h o u t t h e discipline of a r u l e , even if only in t h e very indefinite form of e x e m p l a r y instances critically a t t e n d e d t h r o u g h academic training. B u t it derives its impulse from n a t u r e , from a g r a t u i t o u s givenness in t h e subject, a n "actuality without validity," which expresses itself in t h e play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n as freely productive. Genius is g r o u n d e d in this. Since t h e s p h e r e in which all this takes place is sensibility in t h e sense in which it is most r e m o t e from cognitive legitimacy, o r "objective validity" in t h e K a n t i a n sense, K a n t assigns it to " n a t u r e . " G e n i u s is c o n s t r u e d as a n a t u r a l kind of freed o m . Yet h e r e a g a i n all t h e p r o b l e m s of what " n a t u r e " m e a n s in such a context, all t h e force of t h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x , i n t e r v e n e . C a n n a t u r e b e t h e strict mechanical realm of p h e n o m e n a l law in this context? We m u s t ask w h a t sort of f r e e d o m t h e aesthetic s p h e r e possesses, a n d w h a t d a n g e r s l u r k in t h a t sort of f r e e d o m . W h y does it have this d a n g e r o u s p r o p e n s i t y to n o n s e n s e , to m e r e caprice, in t h e e x t r e m e to s h e e r lunacy? T h a t is t h e question. Aesthetic f r e e d o m is the "free play of t h e imagination," b u t what t h a t m e a n s is t h a t it is not necessarily subject to any rule. W h e n successful it behaves in a way which is consistent with r u l e . B u t what if it is unsuccessful? T h e n w h a t we have is that " b l o o m i n g , buzzing confusion" which K a n t discussed in t h e cognitive context of t h e First Critique a n d in t h e decisive exposition of i m a g i n a t i o n in t h e Anthropology. Ind e e d , t h a t is m a d n e s s in the precise sense of t h e loss of r e a s o n . Ge5 2

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nius, in its liberty, in its caprice, in its play, flirts with m a d n e s s . If in aesthetic f r e e d o m m a n is at his most free, free even from obligation to r e a s o n , j u s t in this m e a s u r e h e is most in peril for his ultimate dignity, which for K a n t is exclusively g r o u n d e d in r e a s o n . I n t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to §29, with which K a n t surveys his e n tire exposition of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s , h e m a k e s a very telling analysis of t h e f r e e d o m involved in morality a n d the f r e e d o m involved in aesthetics. 55

[ T j h o u g h . . . t h e i m m e d i a t e pleasure in t h e beautiful in nat u r e p r e s u p p o s e s a n d cultivates a certain liberality [Liberalität] of t h o u g h t , i.e. m a k e s o u r delight i n d e p e n d e n t of any m e r e e n j o y m e n t of sense, still it r e p r e s e n t s f r e e d o m r a t h e r as inplay t h a n as exercising a law-ordained function, which is t h e genu i n e characteristic of h u m a n morality, w h e r e reason has to i m p o s e its d o m i n i o n u p o n sensibility. 56

Accordingly, Kant's description of b e a u t y in §5 m u s t b e r e a d with a n e w skepticism. W h e n K a n t writes that "taste in t h e b e a u t i f u l . . . [is] t h e o n e a n d only disinterested a n d free delight," t h a t "favor [Gunst] is t h e only free liking," h e is r e c k o n i n g in m a n a sort of freed o m which is d a n g e r o u s l y a u t o n o m o u s , close to caprice, a n d can only b e rescued, ultimately, by t h e s u p e r v e n t i o n of t h e m o r e a u thentic sort of h u m a n f r e e d o m , which is ethical. H e n c e t h e drive within K a n t i a n aesthetics to establish a b o n d with t h e ethical, via " d e p e n d e n t beauty," "perfection," a n d t h e "ideal of beauty." T h e t h e o r y of art has b r o u g h t us to t h e b r i n k of metaphysics. T h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art o p e n s o u t o n m a n y metaphysical possibilities. A m i d this wealth, Kant's t h o u g h t first hits u p o n o n e : t h e idea of "perfection." It was, as we have n o t e d , a n idea with a history in aesthetics d a t i n g at least from B a u m g a r t e n . B u t B a u m g a r t e n h a d wished to use t h e idea in a cognitive vein. Kant's n o t i o n of perfection, by contrast, was practical. O r so it s e e m e d . I n §48, K a n t r e t u r n e d to his idea of " d e p e n d e n t beauty" a n d his t h i n k i n g t h e r e carried h i m back still f u r t h e r t o w a r d "objective s u b r e p t i o n " a n d t h e question, involved in t h e n a t u r e side of t h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art, w h e t h e r n a t u r a l b e a u t y was real, r a t h e r t h a n i m p u t e d . H e set off t h e issue with a n excruciatingly contradictory assertion: "A b e a u t y of n a t u r e is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a t h i n g . " First of all, to call t h e beauty of n a t u r e a beautiful thing is to c o m m i t objective s u b r e p t i o n . B u t second, to call t h e b e a u t y of art a beautiful r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung) is to use t h e latter t e r m in a n extraordinarily awkward s e n s e . 57

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It usually refers to t h a t which is merely p r e s e n t to consciousness, i.e., i n t e r n a l to consciousness. B u t t h a t is precisely w h a t art c a n n o t be. A r t m u s t be a realization, a n objectification. It m u s t have a sensuous givenness s e p a r a t e from t h e particular subjective consciousness of its creator. It m u s t exist. It m u s t b e a thing. H o w can Kant have so t h o r o u g h l y m u d d l e d things? While, clearly, t h e r e is a difference between t h e b e a u t y of art a n d t h e b e a u t y of n a t u r e , it is n o t simple, as the g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art clearly d e m o n s t r a t e s . Let us a t t e m p t first to salvage Kant's n o t i o n of art. Clearly h e is using " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " in a drastically different sense from t h a t typical of his t h o u g h t . I n what sense, t h e n ? We can rescue t h e sense of his a r g u m e n t if we r e a d Vorstellung as Darstellung, o r p r e s e n t a t i o n . At t h e e n d of his discussion of t h e m u d d l i n g p h r a s e , K a n t writes: "So m u c h for t h e beautiful r e p r e sentation of a n object, which is p r o p e r l y only t h e form of t h e p r e sentation [Darstellung] of a c o n c e p t . " " R e p r e s e n t a t i o n " in this o n e instance merely signifies t h a t which is artificially m a d e to serve as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a physical sign, of s o m e t h i n g . By his association of t h e t e r m Vorstellung with Darstellung, I believe K a n t saves himself from hopeless obscurity or folly in his construction of art. It r e m a i n s to be seen w h a t K a n t i n t e n d e d by t h e c o n t e n t i o n that a n a t u r a l b e a u t y was a beautiful t h i n g . Kant immediately went o n to claim t h a t t h e r e was n o n e e d in a p u r e aesthetic j u d g m e n t to have r e c o u r s e to t h e idea of a n i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e , or to the idea of perfection. Insofar as this was t h e case, t h e n a n a t u r a l b e a u t y was, aesthetically c o n s i d e r e d , merely a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d a n utterly subjective o n e at that, of t h e p l e a s u r e e x p e r i e n c e d t h r o u g h harm o n y of t h e faculties, a n d K a n t h a d n o business calling it a " t h i n g . " Yet b o t h art a n d " d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y " in n a t u r e , a c c o r d i n g to Kant, r e q u i r e s o m e n o t i o n of i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e , of perfection. At his clearest, K a n t insists t h a t beauty, i.e., t h e authentically aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , is n o t a m a t t e r of t h e p r o p e r t i e s of a n object, b u t r a t h e r of t h e m e n t a l activity of t h e subject, a n d h e n c e , for beauty, n o "objective p u r p o s i v e n e s s " is requisite. I n his idea of " d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y " a n d in his discrimination of t h e beauty of n a t u r e from t h e b e a u t y of art, however, Kant discovered a very i m p o r t a n t "intellectual interest in n a t u r a l beauty," a n d its first i m p u l s e was toward a "cognitive t u r n " in his whole a p p r o a c h to reflection: t h e idea of a teleological j u d g m e n t . 59

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Part Two

T H E GENESIS O F T H E " C R I T I Q U E OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT"

SSffc

Seven

T H E COGNITIVE TURN: T H E DISCOVERY OF REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT

T

h a t K a n t s h o u l d p r o d u c e a Critique of biological a n d cosmological speculation makes sense in view of t h e salience of these issues in t h e e p o c h , especially in G e r m a n y . B u t why a n d h o w did this project insinuate itself into Kant's o n g o i n g project in aesthetics? W h a t was it a b o u t his w o r k o n t h e "Critique of T a s t e " which s u d d e n l y led K a n t to consider it a p p r o priate to take u p all those o t h e r questions which h e clearly h a d in m i n d , b u t which o n e would t h i n k deserved separate articulation? T h e most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t for t h e unity of the Third Critique is to show h o w t h e p r o b l e m of teleological j u d g m e n t arises i m m a n e n t l y o u t of t h e p r o b l e m of aesthetic j u d g m e n t , i.e., o u t of the "objective s u b r e p t i o n " which particularly a t t e n d s t h e d i s c e r n m e n t of b e a u t y in n a t u r e . 1

"Objective s u b r e p t i o n " is t h e t e n d e n c y to ascribe to t h e object itself t h e p r o p e r t y which entailed beauty, even t h o u g h according to K a n t b e a u t y resides in t h e r e s p o n s e of the subject, i.e., in subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s . T h e t e n d e n c y to "objective s u b r e p t i o n " is a n a t u r a l e r r o r of j u d g m e n t , yet K a n t believed it m i g h t — n o t within t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e as such, b u t subsequently, as a m a t t e r for reflection—be t h e source of " p r o f o u n d i n q u i r i e s . " T h e " p u r posiveness of n a t u r e " a r o u s e d a n "intellectual interest" after, a n d o n a c c o u n t of, a purely aesthetic d i s c e r n m e n t of beauty in n a t u r e . 2

3

I n §29, K a n t wrote t h a t t h e r e w e r e " n u m b e r l e s s beautiful things in n a t u r e , " whose beauty m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g specific to t h e m , p a r t of t h e givenness of their r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . N a t u r a l beauty was "indep e n d e n t , " Kant claimed in several places, e.g. §23, w h e r e h e expressed t h e view t h a t "we m u s t seek a g r o u n d external to ourselves for t h e beautiful of n a t u r e . " I n §30, Kant wrote t h a t "purposiveness has its g r o u n d in t h e object a n d in its figure [Gestalt]" a n d h e n c e was 151

a "speciesfinalis data, non accepta." While clearly falling into "objective s u b r e p t i o n , " this line of t h o u g h t b r o u g h t K a n t to a key t u r n i n g point. H a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e d it, o n e was d r a w n to w o n d e r why it s h o u l d have h a p p e n e d , K a n t w r o t e in §30: "With r e g a r d to t h e beautiful in n a t u r e . . . we may start a n u m b e r of questions t o u c h i n g t h e cause of this p u r p o s i v e n e s s of t h e i r forms: e.g. H o w a r e we to e x p l a i n why n a t u r e has scattered b e a u t y a b r o a d with so lavish a h a n d , even in t h e d e p t h s of t h e o c e a n w h e r e it can b u t seldom be r e a c h e d by t h e eye of m a n — f o r which alone it is p u r p o s i v e . " In §23 h e w r o t e : 4

Self-subsisting n a t u r a l b e a u t y reveals to us a technic of n a t u r e which shows it in t h e light of a system o r d e r e d in a c c o r d a n c e with laws t h e principle of which is n o t to b e f o u n d within t h e r a n g e of o u r e n t i r e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s principle is t h a t of a p u r p o s i v e n e s s relative to the e m p l o y m e n t of j u d g m e n t in respect of p h e n o m e n a which have t h u s to be assigned, n o t merely to n a t u r e r e g a r d e d as aimless m e c h a n i s m , b u t also to n a t u r e r e g a r d e d after t h e analogy of art. H e n c e it gives a veritable extension, not, of course, to o u r k n o w l e d g e of objects of n a t u r e , b u t to o u r c o n c e p t i o n of n a t u r e itself— n a t u r e as m e r e m e c h a n i s m b e i n g e n l a r g e d to t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n a t u r e as a r t — a n e x t e n s i o n inviting p r o f o u n d inquiries as to t h e possibility of such a f o r m . 5

T h i s passage makes the crucial transition between t h e aesthetics a n d t h e teleology by suggesting that, insofar as we reflect u p o n t h e b e a u t y in n a t u r e as given ("objective"), we i m p u t e to n a t u r e a form of o r d e r i n g utterly distinct from t h a t of mechanistic causality. W h e n n a t u r e m a n i f e s t e d orderliness in t h e empirical s p h e r e , as it were, gratuitously, it a p p e a r e d as if it were a n artist. T h a t is, its result a p p e a r e d p u r p o s i v e . K a n t suggested in t h e aesthetics t h a t w h e n we c a m e u p o n a n object of n a t u r a l beauty, we were p r o n e to m a k e this inference. B u t it was simply a subjective fancy, n o t valid j u d g m e n t . Yet t h e very subjective formal purposiveness with which t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was c o n c e r n e d " p r o v o k e d inquiries." I n g a r n e r i n g t h e full significance of this "technic of n a t u r e , " w h e r e b y n a t u r e is i n t e r p r e t e d "after t h e analogy of art," Kant beg a n t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment a n d m a d e his "cognitive t u r n . " His key was precisely t h e n o t i o n of reflection, t h a t " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g " which we have b e e n at such g r e a t pains to disclose in Kant's t h i n k i n g . I n his "cognitive t u r n , " K a n t c o n s i d e r e d t h e possibility of revising t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t h e o r y of cognition a n d 152

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of metaphysics which h e h a d c o n s t r u c t e d in t h e First Critique. T h e locus classicus of t h a t r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n was the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. T h e ultimate o u t c o m e was the "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " as we n o w have it.

The "Technic of Nature" T h e p h r a s e "Technik der Natur" d e v e l o p e d in Kant's aesthetics, in t h e c o n t e x t of objects of n a t u r a l beauty. I n t h e First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment, this n o t i o n u n d e r w e n t closer cognitive scrutiny. A c c o r d i n g to Kant, consciousness d i s c e r n e d in n a t u r e gratuitous d e s i g n , t h a t is, works of n a t u r e [Wirkungen] which a p p e a r e d like works of artifice [Werke]. N a t u r e could hardly be t a k e n for a n artist, a n d w h a t was really at play in t h e n o t i o n of a Technik der Natur was simply analogy. It was not n a t u r e t o which, in fact, "technic" b e l o n g e d , b u t t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t . T h e First Introduction stressed t h e parallel b e t w e e n "reflection" as a cognitive e n t e r p r i s e a n d "art." K a n t w r o t e : " T h e reflective j u d g m e n t t h u s w o r k s . . . n o t schematically, b u t technically, n o t j u s t mechanically, like a tool controlled by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e senses, b u t artistically, according to t h e universal b u t at t h e same time u n d e f i n e d principle of a p u r p o s i v e , systematic o r d e r i n g of n a t u r e . " It is j u d g m e n t which "posits a priori t h e technic of nature as t h e principle of its reflection." "We will in t h e future also use t h e t e r m 'technic' w h e r e n a t u r a l o b jects a r e only judged [beurtheilt] as if t h e i r possibility rested o n a r t . . . [ N ] a t u r e is j u d g e d [beurtheilt] . . . only by analogy with a n art a n d , m o r e particularly, only in a subjective relation t o o u r faculty of k n o w l e d g e a n d n o t in a n objective relation to t h e o b j e c t s . " T h a t , to be s u r e , is only a m a t t e r of " t h i n k i n g , " n o t "knowing," after t h e r i g o r o u s K a n t i a n distinction, b u t t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " sets o u t from j u s t this t h o u g h t that n a t u r a l b e a u t y acted as a stimulus to scientific i n q u i r y . J u s t by virtue of t h a t gratifying d i s c e r n m e n t of g r a t u i t o u s o r d e r , reflective j u d g m e n t was in a position to generalize a principle for n a t u r e as a whole: the p u r p o s i v e ness of n a t u r e in its empirical variety for h u m a n c o m p r e h e n s i o n in empirical concepts. T h i s was t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle of reflective j u d g m e n t . 6

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T h e key cognitive strategy of reflective j u d g m e n t was t h e idea of artifice projected from t h e subject o n t o empirical n a t u r e : n a t u r e as art. Since it could find instances of a Technik der Natur it felt e n titled to generalize to t h e idea t h a t n a t u r e in all its empirical m a n ifestations w o u l d so c o n f o r m to t h e logical r e q u i r e m e n t s of h u m a n The Cognitive Turn

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awareness. It a t t r i b u t e d to n a t u r e t h e same design it e m p l o y e d in its own functioning. T h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art e m e r g e s as crucial yet again, b u t in t h e obverse direction: it is not art's conformity to n a t u r e , b u t n a t u r e ' s to art which n o w c o n c e r n s us. We a r e n o l o n g e r d e a l i n g with t h e exclusively formal a n d h e n c e completely s p o n t a n e o u s j u d g m e n t of beauty. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t it was n o t h u m a n "favor" that n a t u r e a p p e a r e d so o r d e r e d . M a n h a d to p r e s u m e u p o n n a t u r e ' s favor. N a t u r e could n o t be objectively compelled to show such o r d e r . While it was t r u e t h a t in g e n e r a l n a t u r a l law was i m p o s e d by t h e necessary s t r u c t u r e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l consciousness, it was j u s t as t r u e t h a t empirically what law t h e r e m i g h t b e h a d to b e f o u n d , n o t m a d e , by m a n . It was, indeed, n a t u r e ' s favor to m a n w h e n a n d if such o r d e r showed itself. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t it was impossible for m a n to deal with his empirical e x p e r i e n c e except on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t n a t u r e did so favor h i m , t h a t it did o p e r a t e in conformity with t h e processes which alone g u a r a n t e e d efficacy to his logical o p e r a t i o n s . W h a t t h a t m e a n t , in practice, was that h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e empirical world could only find uniformities o r h o m o g e n e i t y — i . e . , it could only classify—if n a t u r e h a d already actually specified in a logical o r d e r , i.e., in hierarchical structure. T h e issue at h a n d is t h e cognitive status of t h e analogy of nat u r e a n d art, t h e Technik der Natur or t h e "purposiveness of n a t u r e in its empirical variety." We m u s t ascertain the limitations of its cognitive validity. W h a t did K a n t m e a n it to signify? Why s h o u l d t h e oretical r e a s o n tolerate it? I n d e e d , is such a n "objective s u b r e p t i o n " any m o r e consistent with p u r e theoretical reason t h a n with p u r e aesthetic j u d g m e n t ? H a s Kant's c o m p l e x case of beauty not simply r e n d e r e d t h e viability of his p u r e forms of b o t h cognition a n d aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n i n c o h e r e n t ? Unless t h e gravity of this a n o m aly is recognized as essential to Kant's philosophizing in the Third Critique, t h e i n t e r n a l d y n a m i s m of its evolution a n d t h e ultimately revolutionary implications of t h e work will n e v e r be g r a s p e d . As K a n t e l a b o r a t e d his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "subjective formal p u r posiveness" specifically with r e f e r e n c e to n a t u r a l beauty, h e c a m e to realize at last t h e latent cognitive significance of Zweckmäßigkeit a n d of t h e process associated with it, reflection. Not only did "subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s " have a n aesthetical d i m e n s i o n — b e a u t y — b u t it also h a d a cognitive d i m e n s i o n , that "figurative u s e " in t h e " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g . " N o t only did t h e idea of purposiveness offer cognitive possibilities, b u t so did t h e process of reflection; they were m u t u a l l y constitutive. T h i s is hardly p a r t of the constitutive o p e r a 1 2

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tion of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . "Since this kind of classification is not o r d i n a r y experiential k n o w l e d g e , b u t is r a t h e r a n artistic knowle d g e , insofar as n a t u r e is t h o u g h t in such a way that it can be r e n d e r e d specific by this kind of principle, it [ n a t u r e ] is r e g a r d e d as art." A n d Kant reiterates t h e point in §7: " T h u s it is t h e faculty of judgment t h a t is essentially technical; n a t u r e is r e p r e s e n t e d as technical only to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it agrees with this p r o c e d u r e a n d m a k e s it n e c e s s a r y . " T h u s a "teleological j u d g m e n t " has a very peculiar cognitive status, a n d so, too, does t h e idea of t h e "purposiveness of n a t u r e " u p o n which it is f o u n d e d . " E x p e r i e n c e d o e s exhibit e n d s [Zwecke], b u t n o t h i n g can prove t h a t these are also intents [Absichten]." T o take t h e purposiveness of n a t u r e literally as p u r p o s e was to i m p u t e to it such (rational) intents, a n d this could only b e "sophistic." 13

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[W]e have n o empirical k n o w l e d g e of such a relationship. For only in works of art can we b e c o m e conscious of reason as t h e cause of objects, which a r e t h e r e f o r e called p u r p o s i v e or e n d s , a n d in t h a t case calling r e a s o n 'technical' conforms to o u r exp e r i e n c e of t h e causality of o u r o w n powers. But n a t u r e r e p r e s e n t e d as technical analogously with reason (thus i m p u t i n g p u r p o s i v e n e s s a n d m o r e o v e r p u r p o s e to nature) is a special c o n c e p t which is never m e t with in e x p e r i e n c e , a n d which is only posited by t h e j u d g m e n t in reflecting o n things in o r d e r to organize e x p e r i e n c e . 16

T h e first sense to be d r a w n from this, of course, is t h a t the usage involved in t h e n o t i o n of n a t u r e - a s - a r t is merely heuristic or "regulative" in Kant's l a n g u a g e . B u t t h e r e is a d e e p e r point, which becomes very significant later, namely, that o u r discursive form of t h o u g h t can only function with t h e sort of e x p e r i e n c e r e p r e s e n t e d by n a t u r a l art or "technic," i.e., g r a t u i t o u s o r d e r , by i m p u t i n g to it a n intentional artifice m o d e l e d after o u r o w n p u r p o s i v e action. It is only by this projection of o u r purposive activity, o u r art, u p o n such instances t h a t they b e c o m e in any way accessible to o u r c o m p r e h e n sion, yet even so they r e m a i n outside the d e t e r m i n a t e b o u n d a r i e s of empirical k n o w l e d g e . T h i s suggests that t h e r e is a n ultimate inc o n g r u i t y b e t w e e n t h e cognitive system Kant d e v e l o p e d in t h e First Critique a n d t h e intractable fact of t h e existence of "objective p u r posiveness." H e would only draw t h e full implications of this dil e m m a w h e n h e h a d fully w o r k e d t h r o u g h his "cognitive t u r n " in t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " The Cognitive Turn

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The Cognitive Turn: Kant's Discovery of Reflective

Judgment

It is historically useful to consider t h e whole issue of Kant's later cognitive p h i l o s o p h y in t e r m s of his revision of the Critique of Pure Reason. K a n t u n d e r t o o k t h a t revision starting in April 1786, w h e n h e received w o r d from his publisher, H a r t k n o c h , that t h e first p r i n t i n g of t h e Critique of Pure Reason h a d b e e n sold out. I n view b o t h of t h e g e n e r a l neglect a n d of t h e specific m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g which h a d p l a g u e d t h a t first version, K a n t was intent u p o n revising his g r e a t work to m a k e m o r e obvious j u s t w h a t h e h a d b e e n trying to say. N o t t h a t t h e substance would c h a n g e : K a n t felt certain t h a t h e h a d achieved t h e correct solution in 1781 a n d n e e d never v a r y . B u t t h e r h e t o r i c of p r e s e n t a t i o n certainly could stand i m p r o v e m e n t , as his critics h a d n o t hesitated to advise h i m , a n d as h e himself recognized, with r e s e r v a t i o n s . T h u s , the revisions h e u n d e r t o o k in t h e s e c o n d edition of t h e Critique of Pure Reason can, very roughly, b e linked with two intentions: first, to answer specific misi n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , especially t h e c h a r g e of "idealism," a n d second, to i m p r o v e t h e r h e t o r i c of exposition a n d r e n d e r as accessible as possible a work which K a n t knew well e n o u g h could never b e " p o p ular." Kant's revisions w e r e h a m p e r e d by t h e responsibilities of u n i versity r e c t o r s h i p in 1786, a n d h e only c o m p l e t e d t h e m in April 1787, w h e n h e c o m p o s e d t h e preface to t h e second edition. Actually, it would be m o r e accurate to say t h a t Kant s t o p p e d revising, r a t h e r t h a n c o m p l e t e d his revisions, for h e m a d e n o c h a n g e s in t h e work after t h e first c h a p t e r of book 2 of t h e "Dialectic." In t h e preface h e gave two g r o u n d s for leaving t h e bulk of t h e "Dialectic" u n c h a n g e d . First, h e a r g u e d t h a t his critics h a d not h a d any serious p r o b l e m s in g r a s p i n g w h a t h e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e . T h a t a r g u m e n t is specious, for t h e r e w e r e few m a t t e r s which d r e w such u n i f o r m question as Kant's resolution of t h e T h i r d A n t i n o m y a n d his whole distinction of p h e n o m e n a a n d n o u m e n a u p o n which it rested. Seco n d , K a n t a r g u e d , m o r e realistically, t h a t t h e t i m e was too short, i.e., t h a t h e could delay n o l o n g e r t h e issuance of t h e second edition. 17

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T h e r e is a t h i r d possibility, a d v a n c e d h e r e merely as a w o r k i n g hypothesis, b u t o n e which h a s intrinsic interest a n d would b e very significant if confirmed, namely, t h a t K a n t b r o k e off his revisions of t h e First Critique at t h a t p o i n t because crucial issues in t h e balance of t h e "Dialectic" r e q u i r e d such substantial revisions that h e could not carry t h e m off yet. If we reflect t h a t t h e balance of t h e "Dialectic" 156

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considers, first, t h e p r o b l e m s of cosmology a n d specifically the transition from t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles to a n empirical physical science; second, t h e p r o b l e m s of practical philosophy a n d theology; a n d , third, t h e p r o b l e m s of i m m a n e n t rational process in inductive synthesis, leading, in t h e section o n m e t h o d , to a consideration of t h e unity of p u r e r e a s o n as a system, we can take most of t h e w o r k K a n t p u b l i s h e d after 1787 to have b e e n , almost literally, a sustained revision of t h e balance of t h e First Critique. N o c o n c e p t played a b i g g e r role in all these revisions t h a n Zweckmäßigkeit. It was a n idea which only a p p e a r e d in t h e First Critique in t h e u n r e v i s e d s e g m e n t , which fits o u r h y p o t h e s i s . It p r o v e d crucial in t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of Kant's ethical philosophy, b o t h in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals a n d in t h e Critique of Practical Reason. Purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) f e a t u r e d in all of Kant's r u m i n a t i o n s not only a b o u t ethics, but also a b o u t aesthetics a n d e v e n a b o u t systematic theoretical r e a s o n . It is a n idea which would m u s h r o o m in Kant's m i n d over t h e years 1 7 8 1 - 9 0 until it b e c a m e t h e most i m p o r t a n t symbol a n d concept for t h e unity of r e a s o n . It b e c a m e , as we have seen, t h e central idea in the Third Critique. B u t t h e issue goes far d e e p e r t h a n we have yet h a d o p p o r tunity to p u r s u e it, for Zweckmäßigkeit has h i t h e r t o only received consideration in its practical a n d in its aesthetic significances. T h e key p o i n t is that, h a v i n g e m p l o y e d t h e c o n c e p t extensively in these areas, K a n t c a m e at last to c o n s i d e r its cognitive implications. Zweckmäßigkeit in its cognitive sense K a n t calls " t e l e o l o g y . " T h e a d v a n c e K a n t m a d e between t h e First Critique of 1781 a n d the First Introduction of 1789 lay precisely in his discovery a n d elabo r a t i o n of t h e subjective f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e m i n d which only the aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e h a d m a d e accessible to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. T h r o u g h t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, K a n t was b r o u g h t finally to recognize t h e m a n y impulses within his t h o u g h t t o w a r d a t h e o r y of "reflection" as in s o m e m e a s u r e cognitive. T h e result was t h e fusion of t h r e e distinct notions, each with powerful r a n g e s of implication: j u d g m e n t , reflection, a n d purposiveness. O n c e K a n t p u t these t h r e e ideas t o g e t h e r , w h a t o p e n e d u p was t h e t r e m e n d o u s role which this faculty of j u d g m e n t could play in the cognitive sphere. 21

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T h e key to reflective j u d g m e n t is its connection with beauty, both in its subjective g r o u n d — p u r p o s i v e n e s s without p u r p o s e — a n d in its "application" to objects of n a t u r e . K a n t c o n t e n d e d that, subjectively, it was t h e state of m i n d in which imagination a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g freely h a r m o n i z e d , a n d t h e attentiveness to t h a t The Cognitive Turn

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h a r m o n y , "reflection." B u t as "application," it was a n active p r i n ciple. As reflection, t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t h a d t h e whole arsenal of t h e idea of p u r p o s i v e n e s s to work with: purposiveness n o t only in its literal sense of h u m a n action (artifice), b u t also its figurative sense of recognition of design a n d its aesthetic sense of p l e a s u r e in t h e m e r e l y formal a c c o m m o d a t i o n of n a t u r a l forms with t h e struct u r e of m e n t a l action. It could find in n a t u r e objects which gratified it because they a p p e a r e d , by virtue of t h e i r form, as if they w e r e d e s i g n e d to accord with h u m a n consciousness. Purposiveness in n a t u r e , like t h e very b e a u t y which raised it to Kant's a t t e n t i o n , could only b e subjective a n d formal, yet it offered a r e m a r k a b l e cognitive potential which K a n t could well utilize to resolve t h e n a g g i n g difficulty in his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y c o n c e r n i n g e m p i r i cal e n t a i l m e n t .

The Problem of Empirical

Entailment

Kant's First Critique did n o t completely constitute a n d validate e m pirical science or, i n d e e d , any p a r t i c u l a r empirical cognition in its particularity, b u t only t h e possibility of a cognition in general, acc o r d i n g to his First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment. W h a t h a d b e e n accomplished in t h e First Critique was to g u a r a n t e e t h e unity of e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l by g r o u n d i n g it in t h e necessary unity of consciousness itself, i.e., in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n . Kant w o r k e d strictly with t h e idea of a n object in general, a n d with " p u r e i n t u i t i o n " — s p a c e a n d time w i t h o u t any particular c o n t e n t . H e n c e what h e p r o v e d was that t h e categories could apply to all objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . B u t j u s t in t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h a t p r o o f t h e p r o b l e m manifests itself: what can h o l d for all objects c a n n o t completely d e t e r m i n e any o n e in particular. T h u s in a very i m p o r t a n t footnote to §2 of t h e First Introduction, K a n t distinguished "analytic unity" from "synthetic unity" o n precisely this line: what all objects of possible e x p e rience possessed in c o m m o n could n o t serve in t h e specification of any p a r t i c u l a r object, i.e., could n o t c o m p l e t e t h e synthetic construction of its empirical concept, since it only p r o v i d e d t h e w h e r e withal for a n y empirical c o n c e p t . Since cognition is n o t a d e quately served by a blanket g u a r a n t e e , b u t m u s t b e able to p r o c e e d to specifics, t h e p r o b l e m of t h e e n t a i l m e n t of t h e empirical, which r e m a i n e d o p e n in t h e First Critique, l o o m e d as a major p r o b l e m for t h e critical p h i l o s o p h y . Kant's cognitive p h i l o s o p h y stands o r falls 24

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u p o n t h e principle of discursiveness a n d t h e clear articulation of t h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e aesthetical a n d t h e logical, b e t w e e n intuition a n d concept, i m a g i n a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Yet even as K a n t insisted u p o n discursiveness, h e recognized t h a t t h e only g r o u n d for a possible p h i l o s o p h y as, i n d e e d , for a possible experie n c e , lay in t h e synthesis which b r i d g e d t h e g a p between intuition a n d concept, i m a g i n a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . N o t only was t h a t t h e crucial issue of t h e First Critique, b u t it also b e c a m e t h e crucial cognitive issue of t h e Third Critique. While K a n t a r g u e d against H u m e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of causality was necessary at t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level, h e acknowledged at t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t H u m e h a d every r i g h t to consider any empirical a p plication of t h a t principle to b e c o n t i n g e n t . T h e p r o b l e m , t h e n , was how to m a k e t h e transition from t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l certainty to t h e empirical application. F r o m t h e outset, K a n t felt confident t h a t such a transition was possible. H e frequently observed, in t h e First Critique, that c o n s e q u e n c e s could b e d r a w n analytically from t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles h e was u n e a r t h i n g . T h u s , in t h e discussion of t h e categories, Kant declined to offer definitions o r follow o u t all their implications, reserving t h a t for t h e "systematic" articulation of d o c t r i n e which could follow, in his view quite easily, from t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f o u n d a t i o n s . H e p r o m i s e d his r e a d e r s a speedy exe c u t i o n of his Metaphysics of Nature a n d his Metaphysics of Morals, which would p e r f o r m this l a b o r . I n d e e d , t h a t is t h e essential positive m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m "metaphysics" for Kant after 1 7 8 1 : t h e analytic ( h e n c e a priori) derivation of principles from t r a n s c e n d e n tal t r u t h s , t o w a r d t h e specification of empirical k n o w l e d g e b o t h cognitive a n d practical. Kant's definition of a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l exposition" was precisely t h e elaboration of a principle which could serve as t h e basis for f u r t h e r a priori k n o w l e d g e . T h i s project of a metaphysical f o u n d a t i o n for t h e d o m a i n s of n a t u r e a n d morals based o n his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles absorbed t h e bulk of Kant's philosophical e n e r g y from 1781 t o his d e a t h . 26

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I n t h e p r e s e n t instance, it is n o t with t h e metaphysics of n a t u r e t h a t we m u s t c o n c e r n ourselves, b u t with s o m e t h i n g still m o r e prim o r d i a l , i n d e e d , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . I n t h e First Critique t h e possibility of a metaphysical f o u n d a t i o n of empirical science h a d n o t in fact b e e n s e c u r e d . I n his work entitled Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (written in the s u m m e r of 1785), Kant set a b o u t t h e transition to empirical science via " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s " of m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n in o r d e r to g r o u n d a N e w t o n i a n , m a t h e m a t i c a l

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p h y s i c s . Yet that was in a very i m p o r t a n t sense p r e m a t u r e , for t h e whole question of t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of empirical n a t u r e with rational concepts of l a w — e v e n in m a t h e m a t i c a l p h y s i c s — h a d n o t b e e n g u a r a n t e e d . It was this realization which m o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g led K a n t to r e c o n s i d e r his cognitive t h e o r y a n d i n t r o d u c e major r e visions. K a n t m a d e t h e situation quite plain in his First Introduction. While, a c c o r d i n g to t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of t h e First Critique, "we a r e to r e g a r d e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l as a system u n d e r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l laws of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d n o t as a m e r e a g g r e g a t e , " K a n t wrote, "it d o e s n o t follow from this t h a t n a t u r e is a syst e m comprehensible by h u m a n cognition t h r o u g h empirical laws also . . . For t h e variety a n d diversity of t h e empirical laws m i g h t b e so g r e a t that, while it w o u l d b e in p a r t possible to unify p e r c e p t i o n s into a n e x p e r i e n c e by particular l a w s , . . . it would never be possible to unify these laws themselves u n d e r a c o m m o n principle." I n d e e d , e a c h e x p e r i e n c e could be such t h a t it showed n o similarity to a n y other, so t h a t each would s t a n d in total isolation a n d consciousness w o u l d b e " c o n f r o n t e d by a c r u d e , chaotic a g g r e g a t e totally devoid of system . . . " U n d e r such conditions, consciousness, t h o u g h a formal unity, would b e faced with a n i g h t m a r e of particulars, of individual intuitions for which n o classificatory empirical concepts could b e f o u n d . T h e r e a r e t h r e e levels to this empirical e m b a r r a s s m e n t . First, t h e r e is t h e p r o b l e m of t h e individual entity. T h i s is t h e p r o b l e m of t h e "synthesis of r e c o g n i t i o n " t h r o u g h empirical concepts. So far as empirical concepts r e m a i n , as concepts, universal, they c a n n o t entail t h e full individuality of the i n t u i t i o n . T h a t is a very i m p o r t a n t sense of t h e n o t i o n "contingency" [Zufälligkeit] in t h e Third Critique. It is precisely in this a r e a that o u r a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g "actuality without validity" a n d t h e " o t h e r kind ofj u d g i n g " b o u n d u p in "aesthetic" reflection proves so i m p o r t a n t . Kant's t h e o r y of e m pirical cognition involves a p r o b l e m of individual intuition from which h e abstracted in his p u r e case of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a priori k n o w l e d g e . O n c e again, t h e c o m p l e x case is far t h o r n i e r t h a n t h e p u r e case, as t h e Third Critique m a i n t a i n e d . 28

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T h e level at which K a n t is most comfortable f o r m u l a t i n g t h e issue is n o t at t h e level of t h e individual intuition. O n t h e o n e h a n d , h e chooses at times to believe that t h e p a r t i c u l a r object is s e c u r e d by his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n , while, o n t h e o t h e r , h e recognizes t h a t even s e c u r i n g t h e c o h e r e n c e of any particular intuition as a n

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object of consciousness will n o t avail if s o m e h i g h e r o r d e r classifications a r e n o t possible. H e n c e t h e idea of g e n e r a l empirical concepts is m o r e crucial to h u m a n k n o w l e d g e t h a n g r a s p i n g a n individual intuition. O n l y in so far as we can classify similarities a n d differences a m o n g e x p e r i e n c e s is t h e r e any h o p e for o r d e r in o u r consciousness, h o w e v e r full each of o u r intuitions m i g h t be. T h u s t h e second level of c o n c e r n is with t h e possibility of laws, i.e., concepts which e x p r e s s uniformities a m o n g e x p e r i e n c e s a n d t h e r e b y organize empirical k n o w l e d g e . Yet these laws themselves would be capricious a n d unavailing if t h e r e w e r e n o t s o m e p r o s p e c t of c o h e r e n c e a m o n g t h e m , s o m e g u a r a n t e e of "system" a n a l o g o u s to t h a t p r o v i d e d transcendentally by t h e unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h e categories. T h a t , in its t u r n , m e a n t that n a t u r e as a n empirical whole h a d to b e a unity, i n d e e d , a system of laws in strict conformity with t h e systematic s t r u c t u r e of h u m a n r e a s o n , such t h a t t h e unity was accessible t o h u m a n consciousness. T h e only way that t h e r e could be a h o p e for system in empirical laws was if it were possible for consciousness to p r e s u m e in empirical n a t u r e a p r o p e n s i t y to organize itself a c c o r d i n g to t h e principles of logical articulation to which h u m a n beings were necessitated by discursive consciousness. T h e claim t h a t categorial u n d e r s t a n d i n g did n o t d e t e r m i n e empirical j u d g m e n t s , t h e view t h a t only the g e n e r a l concept of n a t u r e h a d b e e n secured for certainty a n d t h a t t h e empirical h a d n o a priori c o h e r e n c e , resulted in a substantial circumscription of what h a d s e e m e d t h e established r e a l m of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d cleared a very large space for t h e e x p a n d e d notion of j u d g m e n t as a theoretical o r cognitive i n s t r u m e n t of h u m a n r e a s o n . W h e r e the First Critique h a d recognized p r o b l e m s of empirical e n t a i l m e n t , K a n t h a d resorted to t h e regulative faculty of reason a n d its " h y p o thetical" uses. Now, it s e e m e d , t h e First Introduction t r a n s f e r r e d this function of r e a s o n to j u d g m e n t (or at least m a d e the two virtually i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ) . T h u s j u d g m e n t ' s d o m a i n was e n l a r g e d at t h e e x p e n s e of b o t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n . If we a r e to u n d e r s t a n d how K a n t c a m e to resolve t h e p r o b l e m of empirical e n t a i l m e n t t h r o u g h t h e idea of a faculty of j u d g m e n t , we m u s t go back to t h e First Critique a n d a p p r e c i a t e his theory of t h e logical process of t h o u g h t a n d t h e specific role played in it by "regulative ideas of reason," o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e "faculty ofj u d g m e n t , " o n the o t h e r , a n d trace h o w these ideas evolved, a n d i n d e e d m e r g e d , into t h e idea of "reflective j u d g m e n t . " 32

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The Regulative

Use of Reason and the Faculty of Judgment

In §2 of t h e First Introduction, K a n t reviewed briefly his n o t i o n of t h e faculties of cognition as articulated in t h e First Critique H e identified t h r e e such " f a c u l t i e s " — u n d e r s t a n d i n g , r e a s o n , a n d j u d g m e n t . U n d e r s t a n d i n g , as h e h a d it t h e r e , r e p r e s e n t e d " k n o w l e d g e of t h e universal (of rules)," a n d reason "the capacity for t h e determination of t h e particular t h r o u g h t h e universal (deduction f r o m p r i n c i p l e s ) . " J u d g m e n t , in this s c h e m e , served as t h e m e d i a t i o n . W h e r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g p r o v i d e d t h e major p r e m i s e , or r u l e , j u d g m e n t s u p p l i e d t h e p a r t i c u l a r case to b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r it, or t h e m i n o r p r e m i s e , a n d reason was t h e capacity to draw t h e conclusion with logical necessity. T h e s e definitions derive from t h e formal logical t h e o r y of t h e syllogism as it was t a u g h t in t h e late e i g h t e e n t h century, by Kant a m o n g o t h e r s . T h i s formal definition of t h e "logical u s e " of t h e various faculties is a very i m p o r t a n t starting point, a n d n o t to b e dismissed as " t h o r o u g h l y architectonic a n d riddled with facultyt a l k . " It m u s t r a t h e r be g r a s p e d as Kant's effort to p r e s e n t a clear a n d d e t e r m i n a t e a c c o u n t of t h e process of m i n d . A c c o r d i n g to t h e t h e o r y of logical syllogisms, r e a s o n i n g functioned i m m a n e n t l y by recognizing concepts of g r e a t e r generality (scope) as hierarchically " h i g h e r " a n d placing concepts of g r e a t e r specificity (content) " u n d e r " these. T h u s r e a s o n i n g p r o c e e d e d e i t h e r u p t h e c h a i n of concepts (abstraction) t o w a r d m o r e a n d m o r e universal concepts ( g e n e r a ) , each e m b r a c i n g wider classes of s u b o r d i n a t e concepts b u t itself with less a n d less c o n t e n t , o r d o w n t h e chain of concepts (concretion) t o w a r d m o r e a n d m o r e particular concepts (species), each richer in c o n t e n t but n a r r o w e r in scope. T h i s m o v e m e n t of reason h a d to b e c o n t i n u o u s : t h e r e could b e n o gaps in t h e r e a s o n i n g o r t h e whole s t r u c t u r e would fail of its essential unity. 34

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T h e s e i m m a n e n t principles of rational process were articulated in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of the First Critique in a very i m p o r t a n t methodological a p p e n d i x entitled " T h e Regulative E m p l o y m e n t of t h e Ideas of P u r e R e a s o n . " K a n t called t h e m homogeneity, specification, a n d continuity. In the First Introduction, h e r e t u r n e d to this idea, claiming that it was absolutely necessary for m a n ' s empirical k n o w l e d g e t h a t these logical processes be accomm o d a t e d by n a t u r e in its empirical v a r i e t y . As formal logic this system of a s c e n d i n g (regressive) r e a s o n i n g a n d d e s c e n d i n g (specifying) r e a s o n i n g h a d l o n g since b e e n established by logicians. W h a t K a n t wished to a r g u e was that this whole p a t t e r n of t h i n k i n g 38

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could, a n d h a d to, apply to empirical e x p e r i e n c e . H e n c e it h a d to b e l o n g to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic, a n d have a "real" use. B u t t h a t req u i r e d a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle. Kant equivocated a b o u t a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of such a principle for t h e faculty of reason in t h e First Critique. Eventually, t h e First Introduction assigned that principle to t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t . In t h e First Critique Kant considered t h e o p e r a t i o n u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l r u b r i c of the "regulative use of t h e ideas of r e a s o n , " a n d w h e n t h e p r o b l e m involved synthetic i n d u c t i o n , t h e "hypothetical u s e " of r e a s o n . W h a t we m u s t n o w establish is h o w a n d why K a n t c a m e to transfer this o p e r a t i o n from t h e faculty of r e a s o n to t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t in t h e Third Critique. T h e faculty of reason has a peculiar status in t h e First Critique. O n t h e o n e h a n d , it would a p p e a r to be t h e most i m p o r t a n t p a r t of cognition, a n d yet o n t h e o t h e r , K a n t seems to view it as t h e s p h e r e primarily of "dialectical illusion." Certainly t h e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g enjoys a h i g h e r e s t e e m in t h e bulk of t h e work t h a n does r e a s o n . Yet K a n t e n d e a v o r s to find a positive as well as a critical place for r e a s o n in h u m a n consciousness. It is this problematic struggle which i n f o r m s t h e bulk of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic." T h e issue of r e a s o n has two sides, t h e methodological a n d t h e ontological. T h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l aspect c o n c e r n s t h e " u s e " of reason. T h e ontological aspect c o n c e r n s t h e objectivity of reason, a n d in that c o n n e c t i o n we m u s t always b e a r in m i n d t h e ambiguity of t h e K a n t i a n c o n c e p t of objectivity, its conflicting senses of validity a n d of actuality. I n t h e First Critique K a n t is primarily c o n c e r n e d to d e b u n k t h e ontological idea of r e a s o n . It is only in a n " A p p e n d i x " that h e directly addresses its methodological role. Yet a n attentive r e a d i n g of t h e entire " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" shows that Kant has a n extraordinarily h i g h estimation of t h e p o w e r of r e a s o n in its reflexivity. n o issue within it can r e m a i n obscure. Reason is t h e c o m p l e t e j u d g e of its o w n power. It is reason which submits itself to critique. It is reason which recognizes its o w n limits. Reason: n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Only r e a s o n can supply t h e rules for its o w n i m m a n e n t process. H e n c e t h e r e are two methodological d i m e n s i o n s to r e a s o n : first, a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o n e , g o v e r n i n g t h e i m m a n e n t o p e r a t i o n of r e a s o n i n g itself, a n d second, a n empirical o n e , g o v e r n i n g t h e specific application of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g to empirical s c i e n c e . T h e f o r m e r u n d e r t a k e s t h e laborious task n o t only of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n tal d e d u c t i o n to g r o u n d t h e possibility of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s g r a s p of sensible intuition within its r u l e , b u t also of t h e a n t i n o m i e s , testing 40

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its o w n limits by t h e e m p l o y m e n t of t h e principle of contradiction against its o w n i m m a n e n t process. K a n t a r g u e s that r e a s o n is always m o v e m e n t , process, act, r a t h e r t h a n fixity, c o n c e p t , o r object. Reason creates, r a t h e r , i d e a s . Ideas a r e m e t a c o n c e p t s , in t h e sense of p r o v i d i n g rules for t h e organization of concepts into systems of t h o u g h t . U n d e r s t a n d i n g h o l d s exclusive sway within any given j u d g m e n t . It is precisely t h e set of rules w h e r e b y any given assertion (categorical proposition) can b e formulated—especially any empirical j u d g m e n t via t h e s c h e m a tism, i.e., o n e which has a n object of sensible intuition as its possible subject a n d t h e categories as predicate. S u c h synthetic j u d g m e n t s have t h e i r w a r r a n t exclusively in t h e principles of t h e u n d e r s t a n d ing. B u t t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of these categorical propositions into syst e m s of t h o u g h t , t h e b u i l d i n g of syllogisms, falls u n d e r the purview of r e a s o n . At t h e s a m e time, two of t h e j u d g m e n t s of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g involve t h e relation of propositions (hypothetical a n d disjunctive j u d g m e n t s ) , a n d all t h e m o d a l j u d g m e n t s refer to a h i g h e r o r d e r criterion of validity over a n d above t h e specific proposition. H e n c e certain of t h e categories have a n a m b i v a l e n t status: they fall b o t h u n d e r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d u n d e r r e a s o n . T h e s e categories a r e t h e categories of relation a n d t h e categories of modality. K a n t calls t h e m "dynamical" as o p p o s e d to " m a t h e m a t i c a l , " a n d h e also t e r m s t h e m "regulative." T h o s e two t e r m s , dynamical a n d regulative, lie at t h e h e a r t of t h e n o t i o n of reason in Kant, a n d create ambiguities in his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic. K a n t explains why h e distinguishes between dynamical a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l categories in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic." T h e m a t h e m a t i c a l categories a r e purely constitutive, in that they c o n c e r n t h e a p p e a r a n c e itself; "alike as r e g a r d s t h e i r intuition a n d t h e real in t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n , they can b e g e n e r a t e d a c c o r d i n g to rules of m a t h e m a t i c a l s y n t h e s i s . " T h e d y n a m i cal categories, however, "are n o t c o n c e r n e d with a p p e a r a n c e s a n d t h e synthesis of t h e i r empirical intuition, b u t only with t h e existence of such a p p e a r a n c e s a n d t h e i r relation to o n e a n o t h e r in respect of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . " B u t "since existence c a n n o t b e constructed, t h e principles can apply only t o t h e relations of existence, a n d can yield only regulative p r i n c i p l e s . " H e n c e , t h e "analogies of e x p e r i e n c e " a r e n o t "constitutive of t h e objects, t h a t is, of t h e a p p e a r a n c e s , b u t only regulative. T h e s a m e can b e asserted of the postulates of e m pirical t h o u g h t in g e n e r a l . " T h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e m a t h e matical a n d t h e dynamical categories has to d o n o t with t h e i r " c e r t a i n t y — b o t h have certainty a priori"—but r a t h e r "as r e g a r d s 41

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t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e intuitive ( a n d consequently of t h e d e m o n s t r a tive) f a c t o r s . " K a n t related this distinction of "constitutive" a n d "regulative" to t h e m o r e familiar o n e w h e r e b y h e distinguished t h e empirical role of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n as e n t i r e faculties in t h e " T r a n scendental D i a l e c t i c . " H e writes t h e r e : 47

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T h e principle of r e a s o n i s . . . p r o p e r l y only a rule, prescribing a regress in t h e series of t h e conditions of given a p p e a r a n c e s . . . It is n o t a principle of t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e . . . [i.e.] a principle of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . N o r is it a constitutive principle of r e a s o n , e n a b l i n g us to e x t e n d o u r c o n c e p t of t h e sensible world b e y o n d all possible e x p e r i e n c e . . . Accordingly I entitle it a regulative principle of r e a s o n . . . I n o r d e r p r o p e r l y to d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n i n g of this r u l e of p u r e reason, we m u s t observe . . . t h a t it c a n n o t tell us what the object is, b u t only how the empirical regress is to be carried out so as to arrive at t h e c o m p l e t e c o n c e p t of t h e o b j e c t . 49

R e a s o n functions to o r d e r concepts (in a series o r a s y s t e m ) . T o create or constitute concepts is t h e function of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t r e a s o n does have a use in relation to empirical p r o b l e m s . It is t h e r u l e for t h e "empirical r e g r e s s " m e n t i o n e d in t h e citation above. K a n t calls this t h e "regulative e m p l o y m e n t [Gebrauch, u s e ] " of r e a s o n , a n d defines it as "directing t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o w a r d s a certain goal u p o n which t h e r o u t e s m a r k e d o u t by all its rules conv e r g e . . . t o give to these concepts the greatest [possible] unity comb i n e d with t h e greatest [possible] e x t e n s i o n . " 50

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K a n t addresses himself directly to t h e relation between t h e "regulative" principles of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d the "regulative" function of reason later in t h e s a m e section. T h e principles of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , K a n t claims, a r e "constitutive in respect of experience, since they r e n d e r t h e concepts, without which t h e r e can be n o e x p e r i e n c e , possible apriori." T h a t is, these principles a r e necessary in t h e process of p r o m o t i o n of m e r e p e r c e p t i o n into e x p e r i e n c e , in t h e m o v e m e n t from a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n to a j u d g m e n t of exp e r i e n c e , so that they a r e i n s t r u m e n t a l in t h e c o n c e p t u a l definition of sensible intuition, a n d have a "schematic" function. T h e "regulative" principles of p u r e reason c a n n o t , because " n o s c h e m a of sensibility c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e m can ever b e given, [and] they can n e v e r have a n object in concreto. " Accordingly, t h e principles of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g can have "objective validity" in t h e sense of "objective r e f e r e n c e , " w h e r e a s t h e principles of p u r e r e a s o n (in its cog5 2

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nitive sense) c a n n o t . O n c e again, it is n o t t h e "certainty" b u t t h e relation to intuition, to "actuality," t h a t distinguishes "constitutive" from "regulative." Yet this a r g u m e n t leaves s o m e questions u n a n s w e r e d . For o n e t h i n g , o n c e we have a d v a n c e d b e y o n d t h e " m a t h e m a t i c a l " constitutive categories, t h e e n t i r e process of t h i n k i n g has to d o with rationally i m m a n e n t rules, a n d these, surely, b e l o n g to reason as s u c h . T o d e n y t h e m "validity" is a b s u r d ; to d e n y t h e m "reality" is typical of t h e K a n t i a n ambiguity c o n c e r n i n g "objectivity." Kant's suspicion of reason's dialectical p r o p e n s i t y comes to t h e forefront. O n l y what c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e can sanction does K a n t feel secure in t e r m i n g "real." B u t t h e whole q u e s t i o n of t h e validity a n d even t h e reality of r e a s o n as such c a n n o t be left at that. 5 3

I n any event, it is n o t merely t h e g e n e r a l "regulative" function of p u r e r e a s o n which is h e r e in question, b u t m o r e specifically its " h y p o t h e t i c a l " e m p l o y m e n t . I n m a k i n g t h e distinction between t h e "apodictic" a n d t h e "hypothetical" use of r e a s o n in j u d g m e n t s , K a n t c a m e closest to anticipating t h e key distinction of reflective from d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t which h e e n u n c i a t e d in t h e First Introduction. K a n t w r o t e : If r e a s o n is a faculty of d e d u c i n g t h e particular from t h e u n i versal, a n d if t h e universal is already certain of itself a n d given, only judgment is r e q u i r e d to e x e c u t e t h e process of s u b s u m p tion, a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r is t h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d in a necessary m a n n e r . T h i s I shall entitle t h e apodeictic use of r e a s o n . If, however, t h e universal is a d m i t t e d as problematic only, a n d is a m e r e idea, t h e particular is certain, b u t t h e universality of t h e rule of which it is a c o n s e q u e n c e is still a p r o b l e m . Several particular instances, which are o n e a n d all certain, are scrutinized in view of t h e r u l e , to see w h e t h e r they follow from it. If it t h e n a p p e a r s that all particular instances which can be cited follow from t h e r u l e , we a r g u e to its universality, a n d from this again to all p a r t i c u l a r instances, even to those which are n o t t h e m selves given. T h i s I shall entitle t h e hypothetical e m p l o y m e n t of r e a s o n . 5 4

T h i s is Kant's most explicit consideration of t h e p r o b l e m of i n d u c tion in t h e whole First Critique. W h a t n e e d s to b e recognized in this g e r m of a theory, which is e l a b o r a t e d u p o n in t h e First Introduction a n d t h e n t r e a t e d definitively in t h e Third Critique, is t h e relation between t h e inductive p r o cess a n d t h e ultimate basis of validity. Proof is always deductive. I n 166

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Kant's l a n g u a g e , we can have k n o w l e d g e only t h r o u g h " d e t e r m i n a n t " j u d g m e n t s . T h e r e is a radical incongruity between t h e reasoning involved in discovery (or invention) a n d t h e r e a s o n i n g involved in proof. O n c e we have m a d e t h e i n d u c t i o n successfully, we t h e n t u r n a r o u n d a n d p r e s e n t t h e p r o o f deductively. K a n t did n o t work o u t t h e principles of i n d u c t i o n ; h e a s s u m e d t h e m . H e did not explain the incongruity; h e simply asserted i t . B u t m i g h t this n o t h e l p explain his r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e whole issue of i n d u c t i o n in t e r m s of " j u d g m e n t , " n o t reason? J u d g m e n t as a faculty has n o n e of t h e prestige a n d dignity which Kant c a n n o t h e l p b u t invest in r e a s o n . I n d e e d , h e finds t h e occasion to lay t h e b l a m e for all e r r o r squarely at t h e d o o r of the faculty of j u d g m e n t : "All e r r o r s of s u b r e p t i o n a r e to b e ascribed to a defect of j u d g m e n t [Urtheilskrafl], never to u n d e r s t a n d i n g or to r e a s o n . " H o w did K a n t conceive of the "faculty of j u d g m e n t " in t h e First Critique, a n d how did t h a t conception c h a n g e over t h e 1780s? T h e full-fledged l a n g u a g e of j u d g m e n t was a late innovation in Kant's critical philosophy. I n particular, t h e notion of "reflective j u d g m e n t " was n o t worked o u t in t h e First Critique of 1 7 8 1 , or even i n t e g r a t e d into t h e revised version of 1 7 8 7 . It was only in t h e mid-1780s that K a n t b e g a n to write a g r e a t deal m o r e a b o u t t h e "faculty of j u d g m e n t . " Crucially, o n e of t h e first explicit articulations of t h e n e w l a n g u a g e c a m e in his r e m a r k s c o n c e r n i n g t h e socalled " P a n t h e i s m Controversy" in 1786, in his essay "Was heißt: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " B u t even t h a t essay, since it h a d o t h e r tasks, failed to d e v e l o p t h e idea sufficiently. T h a t developm e n t fell to t h e Third Critique, a n d especially to its First Introduction. While in its "logical use," K a n t assigned the "faculty of j u d g m e n t " merely a m e d i a t i n g role between u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n in t h e First Critique, w h e n h e c a m e to treat of its t r a n s c e n d e n t a l or "real" use, h e spoke of t h e faculty ofj u d g m e n t as t h e faculty of cognition in g e n e r a l , i.e., as t h e process of r e a s o n i n g or m a k i n g j u d g m e n t s , of which t h e m o r e elaborate syllogistic s t r u c t u r e of reason a n d also t h e specific categorical p r o c e d u r e of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g were simply i n s t a n c e s . T h i s g r a n d n o t i o n ofj u d g m e n t in the First Critique was, at t h e s a m e time, c o m p l e m e n t e d by two n a r r o w e r ones. T h e first characterized j u d g m e n t as a virtually mechanical s u b s u m p t i o n u n d e r t h e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e second took j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r n o t of universal a n d necessary reason b u t r a t h e r of n a t u r a l skill, a n e n d o w m e n t o r talent for discrimin a t i n g w h e n t h e rule could h o l d in a given instance a n d w h e n it could n o t . 55

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K a n t claimed t h a t j u d g m e n t as a faculty was distinct from t h e o t h e r faculties of cognition in t h a t it was strictly a m a t t e r of (subjective) m e n t a l process. W h i l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g h a d objectivity b o t h in t h e sense of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity of its universal categories a n d in t h e sense of application t o "objects of e x p e r i e n c e " in t h e full Kantian sense of t h e " j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , " a n d reason similarly h a d objectivity b o t h in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l purity of t h e m o r a l law a n d in t h e application of its imperative c o m m a n d s to acts of t h e will, j u d g m e n t h a d n o objectivity of application. T h e r e was n o o b jective r e f e r e n c e , in t h e r i g o r o u s Kantian sense, which b e l o n g e d to j u d g m e n t ( t h o u g h , as we have a r g u e d , t h e r e is a quasi-objective refe r e n c e in "reflection"). H e n c e j u d g m e n t could p r o d u c e n o " m e t a physical principles" a n d g r o u n d n o "science" or " d o c t r i n e . " I n d e e d , t h e r e is question w h e t h e r in t h e First Critique t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t h a d any specific t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d . Only u n d e r s t a n d i n g possessed this g r o u n d , i.e., a legitimate t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n . It could b e ascribed, in t h e First Critique, n e i t h e r to r e a s o n , because it t r a n s c e n d e d e x p e r i e n c e a n d could n o t have o b jects in sensible intuition, n o r t o j u d g m e n t , because, o n t h e basis of t h e " n a r r o w " definition j u s t given, j u d g m e n t was invariably e i t h e r a n i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ("schematism") o r it was a natu r a l , h e n c e empirical, e n d o w m e n t . While K a n t f o u n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w a r r a n t for r e a s o n in t h e Second Critique, t h e question of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t r e m a i n e d o p e n . It was t h e Third Critique which settled t h e issue. 62

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A t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle did g u a r a n t e e t h e validity of j u d g m e n t (and h e n c e its "subjective" universality a n d necessity), since w i t h o u t o n e , it could not stand as a faculty of cognition at all. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w a r r a n t for t h e whole faculty of j u d g m e n t lay in t h e h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, o r m o r e precisely, in t h e efficacious funct i o n i n g of rationality in its empirical extension, i.e., in t h e conformity of t h e intuition p r o d u c e d by t h e i m a g i n a t i o n with t h e rules legislated by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Kant h a d worked o u t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d a l r e a d y — i n his d e d u c t i o n o f t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. W h e n h e s e c u r e d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity of subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s as aesthetic, h e simultaneously did so for t h e cognitive faculty of j u d g m e n t , because they a r e o n e a n d t h e s a m e . I n o t h e r words, t h e c o m p l e x notion of a faculty of j u d g m e n t c a m e to be i n t e g r a t e d with t h e equally c o m p l e x sense of "reflection" which we u n e a r t h e d in o u r earlier a n a l y s i s . T o g e t h e r they constituted t h e r e m a r k a b l e idea of "reflective j u d g m e n t , " t h e m o s t synthetic c o n c e p t K a n t ever achieved c o n c e r n i n g t h e process of 64

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h u m a n m e n t a l activity, especially in its creative—i.e., inductive o r s y n t h e t i c — m o d e . Reflective j u d g m e n t was t h e m e n t a l p r o c e d u r e of i n d u c t i o n , of finding s o m e c o n c e p t which unified particulars acc o r d i n g to a n empirical principle of o r d e r o r design. System, Organic Form, and the Unity of Reason T h e discovery of "reflective j u d g m e n t , " as Giorgio Tonelli a n d o t h e r s have a r g u e d , was t h e decisive t u r n which e n g e n d e r e d t h e Critique of Judgment as t h e whole we k n o w . K a n t f o u n d t h a t his c o n c e r n h a d b e c o m e m o r e g e n e r a l t h a n h e initially believed. H e was n o t simply investigating taste, b u t a whole a n d very complicated "faculty" of m i n d : j u d g m e n t . F r o m t h e aesthetic j u d g m e n t of beauty in n a t u r e , via "objective s u b r e p t i o n , " K a n t c a m e to t h e p r o s pect of a teleological j u d g m e n t , a n d in t h e c o h e r e n c e of t h e two h e discovered a new m e n t a l process, "reflective j u d g m e n t , " which t r a n s f o r m e d his cognitive theory. T h a t b r e a k t h r o u g h c a m e s o m e t i m e before May 1789, w h e n h e sent a letter to R e i n h o l d a n n o u n c ing his involvement in a larger project t h a n h e h a d h i t h e r t o ack n o w l e d g e d : a "Critique of the Faculty of J u d g m e n t " of which t h e "Critique of T a s t e " constituted only a p a r t . K a n t worked o u t t h e new idea of a "faculty of j u d g m e n t " in t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. It was only t h r o u g h t h e articulation of t h e "system" w h e r e i n j u d g m e n t was constituted as a faculty t h a t it could be raised to full critical e x a m i n a t i o n , K a n t wrote in §iii of t h e final version of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n . T h a t entailed t h e discrimination of o t h e r faculties (cognitive a n d h u m a n ) a n d t h e delimitation of their function such that t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t was left with a possible a n d a necessary function of its o w n within the system. As h e labored over his newf o u n d faculty of j u d g m e n t , h e c a m e to express a bolder n o t i o n of systematicity t h a n h e generally felt possible, a n d t h a n h e would eventually p e r m i t to b e p r e s e n t e d to t h e public u n d e r t h e prestigious r u b r i c of "critique." T h i s is why t h e First Introduction is such a r e m a r k a b l e d o c u m e n t . It offers a tantalizing glimpse into t h e possibilities K a n t allowed himself speculatively at o n e time, only later to r e p r e s s . 6 5

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T h e idea of "system" played a major role in Kant's initial breakt h r o u g h to t h e Third Critique a n d again at t h e crucial "cognitive t u r n " in early 1789. T h e "Critique of T a s t e " originated from Kant's belief t h a t h e h a d d e t e r m i n e d t h e entire scope of t h e system of h u m a n faculties, b o t h at t h e level of p u r e cognition a n d at t h e level The Cognitive Turn

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of g e n e r a l h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s led h i m to believe that t h e p r o b l e m which inevitably a t t e n d e d such discriminations, namely, t h e q u e s t i o n of a n u n d e r l y i n g systematic unity of r e a s o n , was also a m e n a b l e to solution. T h e conviction of a p p r o a c h i n g a solution to t h a t p r o b l e m h a d b e e n g r o w i n g in K a n t in t h e course of his ethical writings, a n d it carried t h r o u g h t h e p h a s e of t h e "Critique of T a s t e , " as attested in t h e letter to R e i n h o l d of D e c e m b e r 1787. It p e a k e d in t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. T h a t work a t t e m p t e d a unified a n d systematic articulation of Kant's whole p h i l o s o p h y ; t h a t is, it s o u g h t to express t h e "unity of r e a s o n . " H e took t h e e l e m e n t s b o t h of t h e cognitive faculties a n d of the g e n e r a l h u m a n capacities which h e articulated t h e r e to be definitive. His project was to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r systematicity in t h e two senses of completeness and interdependency. 69

T h a t K a n t i n t e n d e d this e m e r g e s from a passage late in t h e First Introduction which distinguished a n "encyclopedic" i n t r o d u c tion from o r d i n a r y " p r o p a e d e u t i c " o n e s . Encyclopedic i n t r o d u c tions set t h e work t h a t followed within a systematic o r d e r , a n d b r o u g h t t h a t systematic o r d e r t h e r e w i t h to a close. A n "encyclopedic" i n t r o d u c t i o n is possible only w h e n o n e is in a position to p r e s e n t exhaustively, t h r o u g h t h e formal c o n c e p t of a whole which at t h e same t i m e contains in itself a priori t h e principle of a c o m p l e t e articulation into parts, t h e subjective a n d objective sources of a certain k i n d of c o g n i t i o n s . 70

K a n t claimed his First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment was a n instance of a n "encyclopedic" i n t r o d u c t i o n . T h e t e r m "system" a p p e a r e d e v e r y w h e r e in t h e First Introduction; its first four sections h a d "system" in t h e i r t i t l e s . I n d e e d , K a n t described a p l e t h o r a of "systems," m a n y of which r e m a i n e d , t h o u g h less obtrusively, in t h e final version. T h e r e was t h e "system" of cognitive-logical p o w e r s — t h e Erkenntniskräfte. T h e r e was t h e "syst e m " of h u m a n capacities in g e n e r a l — t h e Gemütsvermögen. T h e r e was t h e "system" of k n o w l e d g e from a priori principles—philoso p h y . T h e r e was t h e "system" of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l possibilities of knowledge—Kritik. S o m e scholars find t h e First Introduction suspect j u s t for this i m p u l s e in t h e work, dismissing it as " t h o r o u g h l y architectonic a n d r i d d l e d with faculty-talk." Conversely, t h e r e a r e those w h o find this a v a n t a g e from which to i n t e g r a t e t h e entire Kantian p h i l o s o p h y . My objective will b e to link t h e idea of "system" with t h e idea of t h e "unity of r e a s o n . " 71

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Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of systematic r e a s o n , as h e d e v e l o p e d it even in t h e First Critique, suggested that h e recognized, however hesitantly, a kind of causal d e t e r m i n a t i o n which was n o t serial, not t r a n s e u n t , b u t s i m u l t a n e o u s a n d i m m a n e n t , a n d t h a t h e recognized this "entelechy" n o t only in t h e r e g i m e n of r e a s o n itself b u t in o r g a n i s m s as well. Such a m o d e escaped his categorical d e t e r m i n a tion of e x p e r i e n c e in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic of t h e First Critique, b u t it p r o v e d ineluctable b o t h in any t r a n s c e n d e n t a l account of t h e i m m a n e n t functioning of r e a s o n a n d in any empirical-scientific acc o u n t of o r g a n i s m s . K a n t i m p u t e d to r e a s o n an i m m a n e n t d y n a mism, t h e capacity to set its o w n goals a n d to p u r s u e t h e m . H e also i m p u t e d to r e a s o n a c o n c e r n with its o w n self-realization. K a n t m e a n t by r e a s o n a process of systematization. " T h e unity of r e a s o n is t h e unity of s y s t e m . " 7 5

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T h i s unity of r e a s o n always p r e s u p p o s e s an idea, n a m e l y t h a t of t h e form of a whole of k n o w l e d g e — a whole which is p r i o r to t h e d e t e r m i n a t e k n o w l e d g e of t h e parts a n d which contains t h e conditions that d e t e r m i n e a priori for every p a r t its position a n d relation to the o t h e r parts. T h i s idea accordingly postulates a c o m p l e t e unity . . . n o t a m e r e c o n t i n g e n t a g g r e g a t e , b u t a system c o n n e c t e d a c c o r d i n g to necessary l a w s . 78

In t h e A p p e n d i x to t h e "Regulative Use of t h e Ideas of P u r e Reason," K a n t disclaimed a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n a formal-logical sense for his t h e o r y of t h e systematicity of r e a s o n . " T h e systematic unity (as a m e r e idea) is, however, only a projected unity, to be r e g a r d e d not as given in itself, b u t as a p r o b l e m o n l y . " T h i s e n d r e m a i n e d a m e r e "postulation," K a n t claimed. While it could serve as "the criterion of the truth" of its o p e r a t i o n s , it could n o t be taken as actual. It was, K a n t a r g u e d , "a logical p r i n c i p l e . " Yet t h e r e is a g o o d deal to t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e idea of systematicity a n d unity of r e a s o n which seems to go b e y o n d such diffid e n c e . I n d r a w i n g t h e whole discussion of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" to a conclusion, Kant r e t u r n e d to t h e question of p u r e reason a n d its unity. 79

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[S]ince t h e systematic c o n n e c t i o n which r e a s o n can give to t h e empirical e m p l o y m e n t of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g n o t only furt h e r s its extension, b u t also g u a r a n t e e s its correctness, t h e principle of such systematic unity is so far also objective, b u t in a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e m a n n e r (principium vagum) . . . B u t r e a s o n c a n n o t t h i n k this systematic unity otherwise The Cognitive Turn

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t h a n by giving to t h e idea of this u n i t y a n object; a n d since e x p e r i e n c e can n e v e r give a n e x a m p l e of c o m p l e t e systematic unity, t h e object which we have to assign t o t h e idea is n o t such as e x p e r i e n c e c a n ever supply. T h i s object, as t h u s e n t e r t a i n e d by r e a s o n (ens rationis ratiocinatae), is a m e r e idea; it is n o t ass u m e d as a s o m e t h i n g t h a t is real absolutely a n d in itself, b u t is p o s t u l a t e d only p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y . 81

T o u p h o l d t h e principle of system in r e a s o n as "objective" even if i n d e t e r m i n a t e was already to m a k e a very i m p o r t a n t assertion a b o u t objective validity w i t h o u t actuality. Moreover, in u p h o l d i n g t h e n o t i o n of a n ens rationis ratiocinatae, K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t s o m e sort of g r o u n d i n g entity was r e q u i r e d by reason in its selfc o n c e p t i o n , even if only "problematically." H e could still claim t h a t any d o g m a t i c assertion of its "existence" was a " s u b r e p t i o n . " Yet t h e issue is really w h a t ontological status to ascribe to "objective validity w i t h o u t actuality." T h e q u e s t i o n m i g h t be p u t otherwise: Is t h e e m pirical subject a n a d e q u a t e "substance" to g r o u n d t h e sort of r e a s o n t h a t K a n t is describing? K a n t frequently writes of t h e logical a n d t h e real " u s e " of reason. T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t arises, of course, is: U s e by w h o m ? C o m m o n sense answers: t h e empirical subject. However, Kant, in his most precise articulation, c a n ascribe " u s e " n e i t h e r to t h e empirical subj e c t n o r to a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e n o u m e n a l subject, a n d h e n c e resorts simply to ascribing it to r e a s o n itself. Reason as s u b j e c t — n o t simply as f o r m — i s what is h e r e at stake. If we a s s u m e , for t h e sake of a r g u m e n t , t h a t r e a s o n "uses" itself logically b u t also in a real m a n ner, what this use r e q u i r e s is that r e a s o n itself possess a n intrinsic d y n a m i s m , a self-determination which is at o n c e s p o n t a n e o u s a n d autonomous. K a n t distinguished system from a g g r e g a t e in t e r m s of t h e idea of "totality," which p r o v i d e d an "exact classification" of e l e m e n t s a n d explicated " t h e i r interconnection in a system." K a n t t h e n went o n to give a very i m p o r t a n t characterization of system as "a unity selfsubsistent, self-sufficient, a n d n o t to be increased by a n y additions from w i t h o u t . . . c o m p r e h e n d e d a n d d e t e r m i n e d by o n e idea. T h e c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d articulation of this system can at t h e s a m e time yield a criterion of t h e correctness a n d g e n u i n e n e s s of all its c o m p o n e n t s . " T h e e l e m e n t s of this definition, strictly logical in formulation, a r e illuminating b o t h as r e g a r d s Kant's idea of t h e d y n a m i s m of r e a s o n , a n d as r e g a r d s t h e self-legislation of science. Kant's idea of systematicity entails t h e n o t i o n s of articulation (architectonic) 8 2

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a n d closure ( u n i t y ) . T h e principle of t h e priority of t h e whole over t h e p a r t s (totality) is clear in all his versions, a n d t h e r e is m o r e over the implication t h a t this whole is a ground, n o t j u s t a b o n d . Finally, system entails a d y n a m i c p r o p e n s i t y t o w a r d b o t h t h e complete d e t e r m i n a t i o n of its p a r t s a n d t h e equally exhaustive exposition of t h e i r interrelation. K a n t r e t u r n e d to his c o n c e p t of system n e a r t h e very e n d of t h e First Critique in t h e section of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Doctrine of M e t h o d " entitled t h e "Architectonic of P u r e Reason." T h e r e h e d e fined system (cognitively) as " t h e unity of t h e manifold m o d e s of k n o w l e d g e u n d e r o n e idea." H e went o n to identify this o n e i d e a — totality, 84

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t h e form of a w h o l e — i n so far as t h e c o n c e p t d e t e r m i n e s a priori n o t only t h e scope of its manifold c o n t e n t , b u t also the positions which t h e p a r t s occupy relatively to o n e a n o t h e r . . . T h e unity of t h e e n d to which all t h e parts relate a n d in t h e idea of which they all s t a n d in relation to o n e a n o t h e r , m a k e s it possible for us to d e t e r m i n e from o u r k n o w l e d g e of t h e o t h e r p a r t s w h e t h e r any p a r t b e missing, a n d to p r e v e n t any arbitrary addition . . . T h e whole is t h u s a n organised unity (articulatio), a n d n o t a n a g g r e g a t e (coacervatio). It may grow from within (per intussusceptionem), b u t n o t by external a d d i tion (per appositionem). It is t h u s like a n animal b o d y . 8 6

In d e v e l o p i n g his most e x t e n d e d characterization of t h e system of reason, K a n t e n d e d u p d r a w i n g a n analogy to o r g a n i c f o r m . T h e key e l e m e n t in Kant's c o n c e p t of r e a s o n is system, b u t his most fruitful insight is t h a t t h e systematicity of reason d e m o n strates a p r o f o u n d a n d persistent analogy with t h e idea of o r g a n i c form. Kant's parallelism between t h e s t r u c t u r e of o r g a n i s m s a n d t h e n a t u r e of r e a s o n is widely recognized. McFarland, for e x a m p l e , observes t h a t K a n t h a d a n "evident conviction t h a t t h e h i g h e s t form of systematic unity to which k n o w l e d g e can b e b r o u g h t is organic in type. I n fact his c o n c e p t i o n of a system of k n o w l e d g e is such t h a t it can be i n t e r p r e t e d in e i t h e r logical o r o r g a n i c t e r m s . " A n d T h o m a s W e l d o n a r g u e d t h a t "what [Kant] really u n d e r s t a n d s by 'idea' is t h e c o n c e p t of any kind of o r g a n i c whole as contrasted with a m e r e a g g r e g a t e o r m e c h a n i s m . " D ü s i n g also points o u t t h e significant i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n between o r g a n i s m a n d system, a n d between r e a s o n a n d o r g a n i s m by virtue of their systematicity. 8 7

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K a n t m o s t definitively articulated this analogy of r e a s o n to org a n i s m via "system" in t h e revised version of t h e First Critique. I n The Cognitive Tum

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t h e preface to t h e B-version K a n t w r o t e : "[P]ure reason, so far as t h e principles of its k n o w l e d g e a r e c o n c e r n e d , is a quite s e p a r a t e self-subsistent unity, in which, as in a n o r g a n i z e d body, every m e m b e r exists for every o t h e r , a n d all for t h e sake of each, so t h a t n o principle can safely b e t a k e n in any one relation, unless it has b e e n investigated in t h e entirety of its relations to t h e whole e m p l o y m e n t of p u r e r e a s o n . " I n d e e d , K a n t pressed t h e analogy m u c h further, d r a w i n g u p o n t h e c o m p e t i n g biological theories of the day to illustrate t h e alternative possibilities of a t h e o r y of m i n d , a n d design a t i n g his o w n as t h e "epigenesis of p u r e r e a s o n . " I n t h a t c o n n e c t i o n , Kant w r o t e : " p u r e speculative r e a s o n has a s t r u c t u r e w h e r e i n e v e r y t h i n g is a n organ, t h e whole b e i n g for t h e sake of every p a r t , a n d every p a r t for t h e sake of all t h e o t h e r s . " W h a t is so significant a b o u t this c o n n e c t i o n with o r g a n i c f o r m is t h e n a t u r e of causality that applies in such forms: i m m a n e n t , holistic, a n d sim u l t a n e o u s . Kant called such d e t e r m i n a t i o n "intrinsic purposiveness" in t h e Third Critique. It is this critical n o t i o n t h a t is, I wish to establish, t h e key to t h e idea of t h e "unity of r e a s o n . " 90

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Kant's crucial c o n c e r n in the later Critiques was with t h e "unity of r e a s o n . " System a n d architectonic a r e t h e talismans of t h a t unity. F r o m t h e inception of his "critical p e r i o d " at t h e very latest, K a n t clearly laid stress u p o n t h e systematicity a n d t h e architectonic of r e a s o n . I n t h e First Critique, w h e n K a n t first articulated his idea of a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic," h e p u t forward a startlingly Idealist formulation: 93

W h e n a science is a n a g g r e g a t e b r o u g h t into existence in a m e r e l y e x p e r i m e n t a l m a n n e r , such c o m p l e t e n e s s can n e v e r b e g u a r a n t e e d by any kind of m e r e estimate. It is possible only by m e a n s of an idea of the totality of t h e a priori k n o w l e d g e yielded by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; such a n idea can furnish a n exact classification of t h e concepts which c o m p o s e t h a t totality, exhibiting t h e i r interconnection in a system. 94

T h e issue of system b e c a m e particularly a c u t e w h e n Kant realized t h a t t h e critical project of t h e First Critique, which h e h a d initially s u p p o s e d to have g r o u n d e d all t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy, only covered theoretical o r "speculative" r e a s o n a n d in fact left o u t imp o r t a n t issues involved in practical r e a s o n . T h i s sense, as it grew o n h i m after 1 7 8 1 , can b e t a k e n to b e t h e decisive stimulus to his f u r t h e r s p e c u l a t i o n s . B u t n o t only did Kant n e e d to distinguish t h e a r g u m e n t s , a n d with t h e m t h e c o n c e p t of t h e a priori principles g r o u n d i n g practical r e a s o n , h e was also left with t h e inevitable sys9 5

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tematic task of reconciling t h e two aspects u n d e r t h e o n e c o n c e p t of r e a s o n . H e n c e system entailed t h e c o n c e r n for t h e "unity of reason." T h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, c o m p o s e d b e t w e e n 1783 a n d 1785 a n d published in t h e latter year, a r g u e d that any extension of t h e critical p h i l o s o p h y t o w a r d t h e inclusion of a p u r e a priori principle for practical r e a s o n would necessarily entail t h e establishment of a p r o o f of t h e unity of reason. "[I]f a critical e x a m ination of p u r e practical reason is to be c o m p l e t e , t h e n t h e r e m u s t , in my view, be t h e possibility at t h e same t i m e of s h o w i n g t h e unity of practical a n d speculative r e a s o n in a c o m m o n principle; for in the final analysis t h e r e can b e only o n e a n d t h e s a m e reason, which is to b e differentiated solely in its a p p l i c a t i o n . " I n the Second Critique, Kant's c o n c e r n for t h e unity of r e a s o n h a d b e c o m e t h e linchpin in his philosophical e n t e r p r i s e : 97

W h o e v e r has b e e n able to convince himself of t h e t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s in t h e Analytic will get a certain e n j o y m e n t . . . for they correctly occasion t h e expectation of b r i n g i n g s o m e day into o n e view the unity of t h e entire p u r e rational faculty (both theoretical a n d practical) a n d of b e i n g able to derive e v e r y t h i n g from o n e principle. T h e latter is an unavoidable n e e d of h u m a n r e a s o n , as it finds c o m p l e t e satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its c o g n i t i o n s . 98

N o t e , first, Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e idea of a unity of r e a s o n ; seco n d , his conviction that it was philosophically attainable; a n d finally, his a c k n o w l e d g m e n t t h a t t h e Second Critique h a d n o t yet accomplished this task of establishing it incontrovertibly, t h o u g h it s u p p l i e d t h e material for such a g r o u n d i n g . H e r e was t h e g r e a t stimulus to Fichte a n d all t h e o t h e r Idealists, a n d h e r e , too, the ack n o w l e d g e m e n t of i n c o m p l e t e n e s s which Kant would later d e n y in his r e p u d i a t i o n of Fichte's a p p r o a c h . T h e possibility r e m a i n s that precisely in t h e Third Critique Kant did c o m p l e t e t h a t system of t h e unity of r e a s o n . His letter to R e i n h o l d in D e c e m b e r 1787 describing his new project of a t h i r d critique has a t o n e of confidence in t h e definitive totality of his syst e m . T h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Third Critique, a n d especially the first version of t h a t I n t r o d u c t i o n , t h o u g h c o m p o s e d s o m e w h a t later t h a n t h e letter, r e p r e s e n t s p e r h a p s the high p o i n t in Kant's confidence in t h e closure of his system. T h i s closure is n o t merely epistemological. It is unequivocally metaphysical. T h e r e is a discernible if g r a d u a l propensity in Kant's 9 9

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writings over t h e 1780s t o w a r d t h e articulation of d e t e r m i n a t e beliefs a b o u t t h e reality a n d n a t u r e of n o u m e n a — G o d , soul, a n d world. T h e architectonic of his critical p h i l o s o p h y c a m e m o r e a n d m o r e to rest o n its t a n g e n c y with a "supersensible substrate" until, in t h e Third Critique, t h a t n o t i o n of a t r a n s c e n d e n t g r o u n d f e a t u r e d decisively in r o u n d i n g his system to a close. K a n t r e s c u e d all this from "dialectical" d o g m a t i s m only by r e p e a t e d a d m o n i t i o n s t h a t such speculations h a d strictly "practical" validity, a n d , t a k e n in a strict, cognitive-epistemological light, r e p r e s e n t e d " m e r e thinki n g . " Yet t h e r e can b e n o real d o u b t a b o u t t h e seriousness of his convictions o n t h e score of theism o r o n t h e related issue of h u m a n moral freedom. H o w e v e r s c r u p u l o u s K a n t may have b e e n a b o u t t h e i n a d e quacy of speculative proofs, h e was a "theist" in t h e precise sense of A his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. large p a r t of his "critical" p h i l o s o p h y can b e i n t e r p r e t e d as a n effort to b a l a n c e his recognition of t h e limitations of speculative rationalism o r " d o g m a t i c metaphysics" with his recognition of t h e essential h u m a n interest in metaphysics. I n t h e Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics h e w r o t e t h a t t h e d e m a n d for metaphysics would n e v e r d i s a p p e a r , "since t h e interests of h u m a n r e a s o n in g e n e r a l a r e intimately interwoven with i t . " I n his I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e First Critique h e w e n t even f u r t h e r : " I n d e e d , we p r e f e r to r u n every risk of e r r o r r a t h e r t h a n desist from such u r g e n t inquiries, o n t h e g r o u n d of t h e i r d u b i o u s character, or from disdain a n d indifference. T h e s e u n a v o i d a b l e p r o b l e m s set by p u r e r e a s o n itself a r e G o d , f r e e d o m a n d i m m o r t a l i t y . " T h e decisive ideas of r e a s o n h a d their g r o u n d in its immanent interests, w h a t K a n t t e r m e d t h e "requirements (Bedürfnisse) of r e a s o n " in t h e essay "Was heißt: sich im D e n k e n orientieren?" I n t h a t essay, as well, K a n t recognized a n a t u r a l p r o p e n s i t y to ontology ("physico-theology") as b o t h t h e "dialectical" d a n g e r a n d t h e metaphysical c h a r m of teleology. I n t h e Third Critique K a n t m a d e explicit w h a t h e h a d i n t i m a t e d in t h e essay of 1786: " T h e r e is, t h e n , i n d e e d a certain p r e s e n t i m e n t of o u r r e a s o n o r a h i n t , as it w e r e , given us by n a t u r e , t h a t , by m e a n s of this conc e p t of final cause, we g o b e y o n d n a t u r e a n d could u n i t e it to t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t in a series of c a u s e s . " A n d again: " t h e n a t u r a l things t h a t we find possible only as p u r p o s e s supply t h e best p r o o f of t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e world-whole." I n d e e d , Kant's p e r s o n a l metaphysical p r e f e r e n c e s c o m e to clear expression immediately after this s t a t e m e n t : "to t h e c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d to t h e p h i l o s o p h e r alike they a r e t h e only valid g r o u n d of p r o o f for its 100

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d e p e n d e n c e o n a n d origin from a B e i n g existing outside t h e w o r l d — a B e i n g w h o m u s t also b e intelligent o n a c c o u n t of its p u r posive f o r m . Teleology, t h e n , finds t h e c o n s u m m a t i o n of its investigations only in t h e o l o g y . " It was this "physico-theology," a n d n o t t h e scientific issue, which m a d e o r g a n i c f o r m s as " n a t u r a l p u r poses" so philosophically i m p o r t a n t for Kant. 105

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T H E CONTEXTUAL ORIGINS OF KANT'S CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE

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h e n we a t t e m p t e d to r e c o n s t r u c t t h e c o n c e r n s which b r o u g h t K a n t to t h e specific cognitive t u r n leading to t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " it p r o v e d useful to c o n s t r u e t h e m heuristically as revisions of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. We can best g r a s p the i n t e n t i o n s b e h i n d Kant's cognitive revisions of t h e late 1780s if we clearly a p p r e c i a t e his p u r p o s e s in t h e original a n d t h e revised versions of that First Critique, as h e articulated t h e m especially in t h e second preface to t h a t work (April 1787). First, we can establish q u i t e clearly t h a t K a n t s o u g h t to secure the validity of science n o t only against t h e skepticism of H u m e , b u t also against t h e speculation of t h e "aesthetic" sorts of scientists. Second, we can establish t h a t K a n t s o u g h t to set severe limits o n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t o r "metaphysical" flights of school rationalism, b u t also o n t h e "mystical" d r e a m s of t h e Schwärmer, t h e religious a n d poetic "geniuses" of t h e Sturm und Drang. 1

T h e r e were m a n y critics of K a n t in t h e s e years, b o t h empiricists a n d rationalists. While they irritated Kant, h e did n o t feel t h e n e e d to r e s p o n d to t h e m . B u t K a n t h a d o t h e r foes, the "aestheticists" of science a n d t h e "mystics" of metaphysics. T h e y h a d b e e n active to a fault, from Kant's v a n t a g e . I n d e e d , t h e i r c a m p a i g n s were u p p e r most in Kant's m i n d in his epistemological a n d methodological considerations of t h e m i d to late 1780s. N o t t h a t t h e Schwärmer directly challenged K a n t . T h e y carried o n in blissful oblivion of t h e stern Königsberger, a n d it was this i m p e r t i n e n c e which p r o v o k e d h i m to assert t h e rights a n d rigors of t r u e science a n d p h i l o s o p h y against t h e i r sophistries. T h e w a r b e g a n in e a r n e s t with Kant's flurry of " p o p u l a r essays" in t h e m i d - 1 7 8 0 s , o n c o n t e m p o r a r y topics in history a n d especially 2

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science, all of which a i m e d at t h e p r e t e n s i o n s of t h e "aestheticists" of science a n d H e r d e r in p a r t i c u l a r . T h e first s h o w d o w n c a m e in Kant's reviews of H e r d e r ' s Ideen in 1785. T h e n m a t t e r s b e c a m e even m o r e controversial with t h e o u t b r e a k of t h e " P a n t h e i s m C o n troversy." It h a d two provocative o u t c o m e s from Kant's point of view: first, t h e intimation (by Jacobi) t h a t Kant's Critique lent s u p p o r t to t h e materialist d e t e r m i n i s m of Spinoza; a n d , second, t h e overt claim by M e n d e l s s o h n , in Morgenstunden, t h a t Kant's Critique h a d destroyed e v e r y t h i n g in metaphysics, b u t most particularly, all rational g r o u n d s for c r e d e n c e in G o d . T h e s e w e r e p r o f o u n d l y d a n g e r o u s c h a r g e s which could easily b r i n g t h e authorities d o w n u p o n Kant. H e n c e K a n t b e c a m e m o r e belligerent in t h e late 1780s, t h o u g h t h a t polemical e d g e rarely rose directly to t h e surface in his philosophical works. T h e prefaces to each of his major works give indication of t h e c a m p a i g n h e saw h i m self waging, n o t only for t h e t r i u m p h of his o w n philosophy, b u t m o r e broadly for t h e t r i u m p h of A u f k l ä r u n g against t h e forces of r e p r e s s i o n a n d of irrationalism. All these impulses fueled Kant's r e considerations of epistemology a n d science at t h e close of t h e decade, a n d gave s h a p e to t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " Kant's decision in 1784 to review H e r d e r ' s Ideen only m a k e s sense within a contextual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Kant's v e n t u r e into p o p u lar essay writing o n t h e subject of history starting in late 1784 s h o u l d occasion s o m e w o n d e r , for h e otherwise steadfastly refused to be distracted from t h e p r e s s i n g urgency of his systematic project. T o be s u r e , K a n t h a d p r o f o u n d observations to m a k e in such fields as history, a n t h r o p o l o g y , a n d g e o g r a p h y , a b o u t which h e h a d b e e n teaching courses for m a n y years. T o b e s u r e , such m a t t e r s were n o t u n r e l a t e d to his critical system. Nevertheless, t h e t i m i n g is striking. H o w m a n y reviews did K a n t ever write? H o w m a n y after 1781? Why of t h e Ideen, a n d why at t h a t particular m o m e n t ? N o t only t h e reviews of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, b u t also t h e essays in t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift, starting with " I d e a for a Universal History" in N o v e m b e r 1784 a n d c u l m i n a t i n g with " M u t h m a ß l i c h e r A n f a n g d e r Mens c h e n g e s c h i c h t e " in J a n u a r y 1786, r e p r e s e n t e d a n o p e n attack u p o n H e r d e r . H e r d e r ' s success was a n offense to Kant in t h e 1780s. T h e p o p u l a r e n t h u s i a s m for H e r d e r ' s Ideen s e e m e d a n implicit insult in view of t h e neglect of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. 3

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W h e n we e x a m i n e t h e circumstances s u r r o u n d i n g Kant's r e views of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, we find a n intimate c o n n e c t i o n with Kant's c o n c e r n s over t h e p o p u l a r r e c e p t i o n of his philosophy. T h e key figu r e in this case is Christian Gottfried Schütz, professor of Rhetoric Kant's Critique of Science

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at t h e University of J e n a , t h e p r i m e locus for t h e future of G e r m a n Idealism. As m a n a g i n g e d i t o r of a new intellectual j o u r n a l , t h e Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Schütz was seeking t h e collaboration of as m a n y distinguished G e r m a n a u t h o r s as h e could find. Naturally, h e t h o u g h t of Kant, whose w o r k h e r e s p e c t e d p r o f o u n d l y a n d w h o h a d n o t yet received t h e recognition t h a t h e rightfully deserved. W h o b e t t e r t h a n Kant, Schütz t h o u g h t , to review t h a t o t h e r most p r o m i n e n t figure in t h e " p h i l o s o p h y " of t h e day, H e r d e r ? With that p r o p o s a l , Schütz o p e n e d his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with Kant in J u l y 1784. I n his lost reply, K a n t a p p a r e n t l y w a x e d e l o q u e n t over Schütz's kindness in taking such a n active interest in his work a n d comp l a i n e d of t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t s e e m e d to h a u n t it. Schütz's r e s p o n s e of A u g u s t 2 3 , 1784, set o u t with sympathetic r e m a r k s which b e t o k e n e d such a c o n t e n t : "It s a d d e n e d m e t h a t t h e coldness with which y o u r sublime efforts have b e e n m e t from several sides a n d t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of s o m e of y o u r most i m p o r t a n t p r i n ciples s h o u l d really have c a u s e d you to d o u b t w h e t h e r o u r e p o c h is w o r t h y of you a n d t h e o u t s t a n d i n g work of y o u r spirit." T h e n c e forth Schütz saw to it t h a t his letters to K a n t carried news of t h e p r o g r e s s in t h e r e c e p t i o n of K a n t i a n philosophy, a n d , i n d e e d , h e was strategically placed to tell a vital p a r t of t h a t tale. T h e letter of A u g u s t also revealed t h a t K a n t h a d accepted Schütz's invitation to review H e r d e r . K a n t suggested t h a t his review b e c o n s i d e r e d a n e x p e r i m e n t a l participation in t h e n e w j o u r n a l , a n d h e d e c l a r e d himself p r e p a r e d to r e n o u c e his h o n o r a r i u m , especially s h o u l d t h e editorial b o a r d b e displeased with his comm e n t s . T h a t suggests a certain bellicosity t o w a r d t h e subject of t h e envisioned review. I n a c c e p t i n g t h e a s s i g n m e n t to review H e r d e r ' s Ideen, K a n t l a u n c h e d his o p e n c a m p a i g n of rivalry against H e r d e r . T h e issue is: W h a t led K a n t to this o p e n attack? T h e answer is "aestheticism in s c i e n c e " — p a n t h e i s t Naturphilosophie. T o u n d e r s t a n d this, we m u s t e x a m i n e H e r d e r ' s work a n d t h e a p p r o a c h b e h i n d it. 5

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Herder's I d e e n z u r Philosophie d e r Geschichte d e r M e n s c h h e i t As a historian as well as a p h i l o s o p h e r of history, H e r d e r wished to i n t e g r a t e into his Ideen as m u c h empirical evidence as was t h e n available r e g a r d i n g n o t merely r e c o r d e d history b u t also w h a t we w o u l d call t h e ecology a n d t h e physical a n t h r o p o l o g y of t h e h u m a n s p e c i e s . H e n c e t h e first v o l u m e of t h e Ideen was a n effort to harvest 7

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from t h e n a t u r a l sciences of t h e day all t h e insight they could p r o vide into t h e f o r m a t i o n of m a n k i n d . T o b e s u r e , science was in its u t t e r infancy in those fields, a n d H e r d e r s o u g h t p r e m a t u r e l y to speculate, j u s t as Descartes, at t h e a n a l o g o u s infancy of t h e m a t h e matical science of physics, h a d speculated a p r e m a t u r e a n d disast r o u s synthesis. A n d , certainly, H e r d e r did i n d u l g e in a lyrical b e n t in his l a n g u a g e . Yet h e also s t e e p e d himself in t h e best scientific t h o u g h t available to h i m , a n d these scientists r e a d his work with n o t e w o r t h y a p p r o v a l . Kant's c o n t e m p t a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t develo p m e n t s in t h e n a t u r a l sciences m u s t n o t mislead us r e g a r d i n g t h e historical integrity of H e r d e r ' s project. H e r d e r ' s g r a n d project in t h e Ideen was to find h o w m a n as a c r e a t u r e of n a t u r e figured in m a n as a n artifice of c u l t u r e , to r e a d these two d i m e n s i o n s of m a n in continuity. Kant, by contrast, wished to dissociate t h e m to t h e highest d e g r e e possible w i t h o u t contradiction. Accordingly, H a m a n n was correct w h e n h e p o i n t e d o u t to H e r d e r , irate at Kant's u n p r o v o k e d attack, t h a t "in y o u r Ideen t h e r e a r e m a n y places which a p p e a r to b e like arrows a i m e d at h i m a n d his system, even if you may n o t have b e e n t h i n k i n g of h i m . " It seems, t o o , t h a t H a m a n n was correct in his sense t h a t H e r d e r ' s provocation of K a n t was u n i n t e n d e d , or at least n o t self-conscious. H e r d e r ' s alienation from K a n t i a n philosophy by 1783 is well d o c u m e n t e d . B u t so is his belief that h e h a d n o t publicly u t t e r e d his o p position. T h a t h e sincerely believed this to b e the case is indicated by t h e e x t e n t of his shock a n d sense of betrayal over Kant's reviews of his w o r k . H e r d e r ' s c o n c r e t e p r o c e d u r e in v o l u m e 1 of the Ideen was to situ a t e m a n , i.e., to c o n s t r u e his e m e r g e n c e in t e r m s of his geophysical p l a c e m e n t . H e n c e , famously, H e r d e r b e g a n his g r a n d work with t h e line, " O u r e a r t h is a star a m o n g s t a r s . " H e r d e r built from this astronomical situation a characterization of t h e geographical a n d climatic conditions of h u m a n e m e r g e n c e . D r a w i n g extensively from t h e e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e analogy of botanical a n d zoological forms with those of h u m a n i t y , H e r d e r w o r k e d t o w a r d t h e c o n c e p tion of m a n as a " m i d d l i n g c r e a t u r e a m o n g animals," t h a t is, as t h e instance in which all t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s f o u n d t h e c o n s u m m a t e integ r a t i o n a n d e x p r e s s i o n . F r o m this physical c h a r a c t e r of m a n as t h e "concrete universal" (to b o r r o w a Hegelianism) of t h e a n i m a l world, H e r d e r t h e n m o v e d o n to m a n ' s decisive physiological difference from t h e rest: erect p o s t u r e . I n w h a t was t h e most i m a g i n a t i v e — a n d for K a n t m o s t suspect as lyrical-speculative— 8

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s e g m e n t of t h e work, H e r d e r s o u g h t to correlate all m a n ' s distinctive cultural attributes with this essential physical attribute of erect posture. T u r n i n g at last to those aspects of h u m a n i t y which w e r e most authentically spiritual, H e r d e r s o u g h t a c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e of transition. H e s o u g h t a m o d e l of t h e f o r m a t i o n of this s p h e r e in m a n which went b e y o n d what h e h a d articulated in his earlier t h e ory of t h e origin of l a n g u a g e , o n e which, in accordance with his larger c o n c e p t , d e v e l o p e d a continuity between t h e forces of n a t u r e a n d t h e forces of s p i r i t . H e f o u n d it precisely in that n o t i o n of "forces" (Kräfte) which they b o t h s h a r e d . I n this H e r d e r d r e w explicitly u p o n Leibniz a n d R u g g e r o G u i s e p p e Boscovich, a n d t h e r e a r e indications t h a t h e was aware, as well, of t h e i m p o r t a n t m e t a physical conclusions which J o s e p h Priestley h a d d r a w n from these scientific n o t i o n s . T h e result was a t h e o r y of t h e world as c o m p o s e d primarily of forces o r g a n i z e d hierarchically. T h i s n o t i o n , especially tied to a sense of t h e conservation of force in t h e world ( t h o u g h hardly in its m o d e r n acceptance), led to a c o n n e c t i o n l o n g since d e a r to H e r d e r : m e t e m p s y c h o s i s as t h e only c o h e r e n t d o c t r i n e of t h e immortality of the soul. H e r e t h e influence of Lessing's Education of the Human Race figured p r o m i n e n t l y . H e r d e r ' s theological d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e 1770s, which m o v e d away from t h e pietistic fideism of his B ü c k e b u r g years a n d his association with Lavater a n d H a m a n n t o w a r d a clear r e p u d i a t i o n of essential tenets of o r t h o d o x Christianity, o c c u r r e d u n d e r t h e aegis of L e s s i n g . I n articulating such ideas, H e r d e r was i n d u l g i n g in those "metaphysical" speculations in n a t u r a l science which t h e G e r m a n s called Naturphilosophie. H e r d e r ' s works of t h e 1780s r e p r e s e n t t h e central effort to t r a n s f o r m t h e m o o d of t h e Sturm und Drang into a position, to take a raw intuition a n d raise it into a conscious a r g u m e n t . H e r m a n n Korff's magisterial Geist der Goethezeit identifies this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in t h e work of H e r d e r (and G o e t h e ) in t h e 1780s as t h e essence of w h a t t h e G e r m a n s call die Klassik, namely, t h e m a t u r e artistic p e r i o d of t h e Goethezeit w h e n o r d e r , balance, a n d c o h e r e n c e displace t h e wild o u t b u r s t s of t h e early formative y e a r s . Korff a r g u e s t h a t it was n o t t h e c o n t e n t of t h e Sturm und Drang mentality b u t r a t h e r its articulation which u n d e r w e n t t h e major t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . H e writes elegantly of t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e g r o u n d i n g intuition of t h e Sturm und Drang: 1 4

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p e a r e d as a living unity a n d a n o r g a n i c b e i n g , which realized itself in a n e t e r n a l b e c o m i n g a n d passing away, in ceaseless creation a n d m e t a m o r p h o s i s . Living N a t u r e ! T h a t was t h e g r a n d idea which divided [their] new h u m a n i t y as m u c h from t h e soulless materialism of t h e F r e n c h E n l i g h t e n m e n t as from t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l i s m of C h r i s t i a n i t y . 20

T h e a u t h o r s of t h e Sturm und Drang r e a d n a t u r e in t h e figure of their o w n creativity a n d restless freedom, i.e., in analogy to genius. T h e y felt in n a t u r e a n irrepressible d y n a m i s m , process, d e v e l o p m e n t — l i f e . A n d they gave themselves over to a celebration of this Dionysian vitality as they gave themselves over to t h e u n t r a m m e l e d articulation of t h e i r own. W i t h i n a n d e m e r g e n t from t h e Sturm und Drang e n t h u s i a s m for n a t u r e was a sense for c o h e r e n c e , for a m o r e d y n a m i c vision of o r d e r . I n a beautiful piece from 1782, his " F r a g m e n t o n N a t u r e , " G o e t h e articulated this e m e r g e n t s e n s e . T h e t o n e was still r h a p sodic a n d t h e intuition of s t r u c t u r e r e m a i n e d inchoate, as G o e t h e felt n o hesitancy to proclaim from a later, m o r e m a t u r e v a n t a g e . Yet within the e x t r e m e variety of n a t u r e ' s " p l a y " — a n d n a t u r e was for G o e t h e a Spielerin, i n d e e d , a Schauspielerin (actress) w h o p u t o n r o l e s — G o e t h e sensed t h e m a r v e l o u s simplicity of l a w . T o c a p t u r e clearly this e m e r g e n t sense of law: this was t h e project of G o e t h e a n d of H e r d e r in t h e years of their most intimate a n d p r o d u c t i v e association, t h e 1780s. T h e y strove to find for t h e i r sense of n a t u r e a philosophical-conceptual s t r u c t u r e . H a r d l y p h i losophers, they n o n e t h e l e s s t u r n e d to philosophy for inspiration. T h u s H e r d e r , w h o in this t u r n to philosophy vastly o u t p a c e d his m o r e diffident friend, f o u n d by t h e late 1770s t h e triad from w h o m to forge his o w n vision: Spinoza, Shaftesbury a n d L e i b n i z . While we will have occasion to dwell o n Spinoza at l e n g t h later in this work, a n d Leibniz m u s t r e m a i n a n o m n i p r e s e n t b a c k d r o p too vast ever to b r i n g into t h e f o r e g r o u n d , Shaftesbury m u s t be b r o u g h t immediately into c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I n his i m p o r t a n t article o n t h e Germ a n r e c e p t i o n of Shaftesbury, O s k a r Walzel m a d e t h e crucial a r g u m e n t : Shaftesbury saw n a t u r e " n o t as a d e a d mass of a t o m s b u t a unified, spiritualized w h o l e . . . [an] organic unity [which was] a n i m a t e d by o n e unifying [spiritual] p r i n c i p l e . " In this new n o t i o n of n a t u r e , Shaftesbury p r o v e d t h e decisive stimulus to t h e later p a n t h e i s m of G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r . T h a t c o n n e c t i o n has b e e n n o t e d , as well, by E r n e s t T u v e s o n . Shaftesbury welded a crucial a r g u m e n t linking this sense for n a t u r e as a living whole with a view of h u m a n n a t u r e as possessing i n n a t e a t t u n e m e n t or "sensibility" 21

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which was n o t simply cognitive b u t simultaneously ethical, e m o tional, a n d a e s t h e t i c . Walzel e m p h a s i z e s t h e concept of " i n n e r h a r m o n y " as t h e key to Shaftesbury's Weltanschauung. H e notes t h a t " i n n e r h a r m o n y is for [Shaftesbury] t h e c o u n t e r p a r t of t h e universal c o h e r e n c e o f n a t u r e ; i n n e r h a r m o n y is also t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n for t h e recognition of this c o h e r e n c e in n a t u r e . " J e r o m e Stolnitz has d i s c e r n e d a very similar configuration in Shaftesbury's c o n c e p tion of t h e " P r o m e t h e a n " virtuoso: " [ T ] h e i n n e r h a r m o n y of his life [is] a n 'imitation of n a t u r e . ' " As T u v e s o n p u t it, Shaftesbury a d vanced t h e "proposition that m a n ' s n a t u r e is a n integral p a r t of t h e h a r m o n y of t h e u n i v e r s e . " His great idea was that t h e r e existed a " u n i q u e h u m a n sense of value as resulting from t h e uniquely h u m a n ability to a p p r e c i a t e t h e aesthetic wholeness of t h e u n i verse." 29

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Shaftesbury's u n i t a r y responsiveness h a d t h e capacity to disc e r n beauty, b u t this beauty was a form of Tightness a b o u t the world which h a d its cognitive a n d ethical c o n c o m m i t a n t s . His f a m o u s declaration t h a t b e a u t y a n d t r u t h a r e o n e m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d in this light. " H e does n o t m e a n by t r u t h a s u m total of theoretical k n o w l e d g e , of p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s . . . T o h i m ' t r u t h ' signifies r a t h e r t h e i n n e r intellectual s t r u c t u r e of t h e universe . . . which can only b e immediately e x p e r i e n c e d a n d intuitively u n d e r s t o o d . " Shaftesbury believed we h a d such a capacity. Ernst Cassirer t e r m e d it " a n intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g (intellectus archetypus)" a n d associated it with Plotinus's d o c t r i n e of intelligible b e a u t y . Shaftesb u r y h a d a p r o f o u n d i m p a c t u p o n i m p o r t a n t poetic m i n d s of e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n y , a m o n g t h e m C h r i s t o p h Wieland, G o e t h e , a n d especially H e r d e r . T h e s e w e r e the ideas which anim a t e d t h e Sturm und Drang a n d which H e r d e r i n t r o d u c e d into his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. But t h e r e was o n e G e r m a n whose taste p r o v e d distinctly m o r e British t h a n G e r m a n o n t h e score of " p a n t h e i s m , " a n d w h o was quick to blast it as Schwärmerei: I m m a n u e l K a n t . 34

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Kant's Disparagement of Herder from the Reviews of I d e e n to the T h i r d Critique Kant's review of volume 1 of H e r d e r ' s Ideen a p p e a r e d in the Allegemeine Literatur-Zeitung in February 1785—anonymously. It was an o p e n secret, however, as Schütz reported to him in a letter dated F e b r u a r y 18, 1785. Schütz was d e l i g h t e d with t h e stir t h e review h a d c r e a t e d , a n d felt it did w o n d e r s for t h e new j o u r n a l . H e also 38

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t h o u g h t t h e review a "masterpiece of precision" a n d felt any a u t h o r s h o u l d b e h a p p i e r to have Kant's criticisms t h a n t h e praise of t h e m u l t i t u d e . Alas, h e r e p o r t e d , H e r r H e r d e r d i d n o t s h a r e his view. H e r d e r h a d p r o v e n very sensitive a b o u t it, a n d o n e of his s u p p o r t ers p l a n n e d a r e b u t t a l of t h e review, to a p p e a r in t h e Teutsche Merkur. It is n o t h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d H e r d e r ' s reaction. While e m p h a sizing H e r d e r ' s literary grace a n d imaginative boldness, K a n t constantly f o u n d fault with his philosophical clarity a n d c o n c e p t u a l p e n e t r a t i o n . H e r d e r claimed in his m e t h o d o l o g y to have set all metaphysics aside a n d to have d e v o t e d himself to physiology a n d e x p e rience. Obviously, h e h a d n o t followed t h a t principle, a n d it was h e r e t h a t K a n t d r o v e t h e first a n d most telling t h r u s t of his review: 39

[H]ow s h o u l d we r e g a r d t h e design which aims to explain that which o n e d o e s not c o m p r e h e n d by that which o n e comp r e h e n d s even less? . . . W h a t can t h e p h i l o s o p h e r n o w invoke h e r e to justify his allegations except simple despair of finding clarification in s o m e kind of k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e a n d t h e a t t e n d e n t necessity to seek it in t h e fertile field of t h e p o etic i m a g i n a t i o n ? B u t this is still metaphysics, a n d w h a t is m o r e , very d o g m a t i c metaphysics, even t h o u g h o u r a u t h o r r e n o u n c e s it, as fashion d e m a n d s . 4 0

Certainly K a n t lavished praise o n H e r d e r ' s lyrical inventiveness, b u t m u c h in t h e way A n t o n y lavished praise o n Caesar's assassins. Kant's review begins: "His is n o t a logical precision in t h e definition of concepts o r careful a d h e r e n c e to principles, b u t r a t h e r a fleeting, sweeping view, a n adroitness in u n e a r t h i n g analogies in the wieldi n g of which h e shows bold imagination. T h i s is c o m b i n e d with cleverness in soliciting s y m p a t h y for his subject—kept in increasingly hazy r e m o t e n e s s — b y m e a n s of s e n t i m e n t a n d s e n s a t i o n . " U n d e r t h e guise of c o m p l i m e n t , Kant's review i n d u l g e d in d e n i g r a tion. It is h a r d to credit t h e view t h a t this was u n i n t e n d e d . O f c o u r s e , K a n t was "correct," b u t in t h a t punctilious sense which by u p h o l d i n g t h e letter d o o m s a g r e a t deal of t h e spirit to d e a t h . T h a t spirit, t h o u g h w o u n d e d in H e r d e r , would s p r i n g alive again a n d t r i u m p h over K a n t in t h e works of his o w n finest disciples, t h e Idealists. 41

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4 3

K a n t was t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h his o w n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of n a t u r a l science even as h e was r e a d i n g a n d critically dissecting t h e early volumes of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, o n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t sources of later G e r m a n Naturphilosophie. Kant's criticism of 44

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H e r d e r forcefully articulated his discrimination of r i g o r o u s science (philosophy) from speculative empiricism, however imaginative o r lyrical. Even as h e p u r s u e d his project of c u t t i n g H e r d e r d o w n to size, K a n t worked b r e a k n e c k at his o w n systematic writings. T h a t project initially f o u n d expression in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (written 1785, published 1786), b u t it c o n t i n u e d in several essays o n t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of science in t h e late 1780s which c u l m i n a t e d in t h e Third Critique. T h e r e is a direct connection between Kant's critical reviews of H e r d e r ' s Naturphilosophie in 1785 a n d t h e a r g u m e n t in t h e " A n a lytic" a n d "Dialectic" of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " of t h e Third Critique. H e r d e r ' s views o n t h e p h i l o s o p h y of n a t u r e , as they f o u n d expression n o t only in v o l u m e 1 of his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784) b u t above all in his Gott: einige Gespräche (1787), served as t h e decisive formulation of t h a t "hylozoism" a n d " p a n t h e i s m " which K a n t d i s p a r a g e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " T h a t constitutes t h e cem e n t t h a t b i n d s Kant's so-called p o p u l a r excursions to his critical a n d systematic c o n c e r n s . H e r d e r h a d t h e temerity to r e s p o n d to Kant's criticism in subseq u e n t volumes of t h e Ideen with s h a r p a n d ad h o m i n e m attacks o n Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history a n d o n Kant's critical rigor. T h e i r hostility was n o w public, a c c e n t u a t i n g t h e polarization within G e r m a n intellectual c u l t u r e between t h e Sturm und Drang a n d t h e Aufklär u n g a n d occasioning in y o u n g e r intellectuals a major p r o b l e m in r e i n t e g r a t i n g t h e i r cultural heritage. T h a t Kant's hostility t o w a r d H e r d e r persisted even after his two reviews of H e r d e r ' s g r e a t work is clear from belligerent if veiled references K a n t i n t r o d u c e d into each of his major works of the late 1780s. I n 1785, Kant p u b l i s h e d his Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, o n a topic s o m e w h a t r e m o v e d from those over which h e h a d publicly d i s p u t e d with H e r d e r , b u t h e gave almost i m m e d i a t e vent to his p i q u e with Herder: W h e t h e r o r n o t p u r e philosophy in all its parts requires its o w n special m a n m i g h t well be in itself a subject worthy of consideration. W o u l d n o t the whole of this l e a r n e d industry b e b e t t e r off if those w h o a r e a c c u s t o m e d , as t h e public taste d e m a n d s , to p u r v e y a m i x t u r e of t h e empirical with t h e rational in all sorts of p r o p o r t i o n s u n k n o w n even to themselves a n d w h o style themselves i n d e p e n d e n t thinkers, while giving t h e n a m e of hair-splitters to those w h o apply themselves to / 86

The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

t h e purely rational p a r t , w e r e to b e given w a r n i n g a b o u t p u r s u i n g simultaneously two j o b s which a r e q u i t e different in t h e i r t e c h n i q u e , a n d each of which p e r h a p s r e q u i r e s a special talent that w h e n c o m b i n e d with t h e o t h e r talent p r o d u c e s nothing but bungling? 4 5

K a n t saw himself as t h e b e l e a g u e r e d d e f e n d e r of rigor a n d m e t h o d . T h i s was stated in all clarity in a Reflection from t h e late 1780s: T o h a n d l e p r o f o u n d l y complicated questions of philosophy in t h e m a n n e r of a g e n i u s : I decline t h e h o n o r altogether. 1 try only to c o n d u c t my inquiry in a n academic m a n n e r . W h e n t h e labor, t h e consistent application a n d caution which this requires has succeeded, t h e r e r e m a i n s for t h e t r u e genius (not t h e sort w h o try to m a k e e v e r y t h i n g o u t of n o t h i n g ) to provide it with a sublime t u r n of spirit a n d so to set in m o t i o n t h e use of t h e dry p r i n c i p l e s . 46

T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of driness a n d t h o r o u g h n e s s to " g e n i u s " a n d c h a r l a t a n r y f o u n d reiteration in the preface to the B-version of t h e First Critique, c o m p o s e d in April 1787. H e celebrated the "spirit of t h o r o u g h n e s s " of Wolff a n d t h e school philosophy as t h e only p r o s pect of a "secure progress of t h e science [of metaphysics, because it] is to b e a t t a i n e d only t h r o u g h orderly establishment of principles, clear d e t e r m i n a t i o n of concepts, insistence u p o n strictness of proof, a n d avoidance of v e n t u r e s o m e , non-consecutive steps in o u r i n f e r e n c e s . " T h i s "spirit of t h o r o u g h n e s s , " K a n t went o n slightly later in t h e preface, "is n o t extinct in G e r m a n y , b u t has only b e e n t e m p o r a r i l y o v e r s h a d o w e d by the prevalence of a pretentiously free m a n n e r of t h i n k i n g . " T h e pretentiously free m a n n e r of t h i n k i n g , with its v e n t u r e s o m e speculations, raised t h e d a n g e r of "materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, a n d superstition," from whose universal injuriousness only criticism could p r o t e c t c u l t u r e . T h e context, by 1787, of Spinozism a n d p a n theism, with H e r d e r as their p r i m e e x p o n e n t , raised p r o f o u n d d a n gers for t h e A u f k l ä r u n g , in Kant's view. T h a t c o n c e r n would s t a m p all his o t h e r projects. 47

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I n t h e Second Critique, K a n t r e t u r n e d to t h e attack against H e r d e r . "Consistency," h e wrote, "is t h e highest obligation of a p h i losopher." B u t it was hardly to be f o u n d "in o u r syncretistic age, w h e n a certain shallow a n d dishonest system of coalition b e t w e e n contradictory principles is devised because it is m o r e acceptable to a public which is satisfied to know a little a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g a n d at botKant's Critique of Science

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torn n o t h i n g , t h u s playing t h e j a c k - o f - a l l - t r a d e s . " T h e discussion shortly t h e r e a f t e r of "syncretism" a n d "Spinozism" betrays t h e target of Kant's disdain: o n c e a g a i n it is H e r d e r . H e r d e r , t o o , m u s t b e t h e t a r g e t of d i s p a r a g e m e n t in Kant's imp o r t a n t essay from late 1787, " Ü b e r d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer Principien in d e r P h i l o s o p h i c " T h e r e K a n t attacked "hasty sophists" (rasche Vernünftler) w h o "are so lacking in foresight as to carry t h e i r o w n ideas over into t h e i r observations." T h e y were particularly to be f o u n d a m o n g those i n t e r e s t e d in the "origins of plants a n d animals," which, however, K a n t claimed was a "science for gods, . . . n o t for m e n . " Such " h y p e r m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , " h e wrote, "are i g n o r a n t of e l e m e n t a r y concepts a n d also profess to disd a i n t h e m , a n d nevertheless v e n t u r e forth heroically to m a k e new c o n q u e s t s . " T h e essay c u l m i n a t e d in a n attack o n t h e idea of a single f u n d a m e n t a l force i n t e g r a t i n g n a t u r e a n d m a n , t h e very idea which H e r d e r h a d speculatively e m b r a c e d in his Ideen a n d reitera t e d in Gott, a n d which J o s e p h Priestley h a d also articulated, m u c h to Kant's d i s p l e a s u r e . T h u s t h e r e is a c o n t i n u o u s trail of hostile r e m a r k s a b o u t H e r d e r u p to t h e b e g i n n i n g of Kant's c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique. W i t h i n each p h a s e of its composition, as well, K a n t w a g e d a direct a n d i m p o r t a n t polemic against H e r d e r . I n t h e "Critique of T a s t e , " h e attacked H e r d e r ' s theory of genius a n d m a d e a very h a r s h distinction b e t w e e n t h e " m a n n e r " of H e r d e r ' s lyrical speculation a n d t h e " m e t h o d " of science. In t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " h e attacked H e r d e r ' s theories of biological force a n d d e v e l o p m e n t as a n "aestheticism of science" i n c o n g r u o u s with its t r u e rigor. A n d in t h e final f o r m of t h e Critique ofJudgment, h e attacked t h e "Spinozism" a n d "syncretism" of H e r d e r ' s m o r a l religious views. T h e rivalry with H e r d e r is t h e most i m p o r t a n t contextual b a c k g r o u n d to Kant's Critique of Judgment. 49

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KANT AGAINST EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY HYLOZOISM

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e v e l o p m e n t s in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y n a t u r a l science p r o vide t h e essential b a c k d r o p b o t h for Kant's i n t e n t i o n s in t h e 1780s, c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e Third Critique, a n d for t h e r e c e p t i o n of t h a t work by t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e 1790s w h o c r e a t e d G e r m a n Idealism a r o u n d a p h i l o s o p h y of n a t u r e . T h e strategy of o u r investigation will b e first to set t h e context of late e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientific t h o u g h t , t h e n to trace Kant's o w n r e flections o n biology u p to t h e decisive consideration of t h e p r o b l e m of o r g a n i c f o r m in t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " O n t h a t basis we can p r o c e e d to t h e metaphysical issues t h a t lay b e h i n d Kant's m e t h o d o l o g i c a l conflict with "hylozoism." I n a d d i t i o n to N e w t o n i a n physics, K a n t took a significant interest in biology. I n d e e d , G e r m a n s of t h e late n i n e t e e n t h a n d early twentieth c e n t u r y c o n s i d e r e d h i m o n e of t h e f o r e r u n n e r s of Darwin—a dubious idea. T h o u g h hardly a proto-Darwinian, Kant did c o n c e r n himself with issues in t h e Darwinian purview: geology, paleontology, ecology, a n d " n a t u r a l history." Most of his w o r k o n biology investigated t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of " n a t u r a l history" in t e r m s of two o v e r r i d i n g c o n c e r n s . First, h e wished to secure t h e distinction of life from t h e i n o r g a n i c , affirming t h e u n i q u e n e s s a n d mystery of o r g a n i s m s as p h e n o m e n a of empirical n a t u r e , a n d u p h o l d i n g t h e u t t e r inexplicability of t h e origins of life. Second, K a n t insisted u p o n a distinction of m a n from t h e rest of o r g a n i c life. 1

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T h e r e w e r e few ideas K a n t struggled to k e e p divided m o r e t h a n life a n d matter. H e r e p e a t e d l y claimed t h a t t h e r e could n e v e r be a N e w t o n of t h e blade of g r a s s . T h e radical r e m o v a l of life from m a t t e r defined it into impossibility. O r g a n i s m s , as empirically given forms of n a t u r e , b e c a m e simply i m p e n e t r a b l e o n c e t h e concept of life was r e m o v e d . K a n t d e f e n d e d a n idea which Descartes 3

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first p r o p o s e d for physics a n d which N e w t o n ostensibly m a i n tained in his g r e a t works, namely, inert m a t t e r . I n fact, however, e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science, i n s p i r e d by N e w t o n , h a d a d v a n c e d far b e y o n d this n o t i o n , as m a n y o t h e r intellectuals in G e r m a n y knew well, certainly by 1786. Kant's attitudes i m p e d e d his recognition of these r e c e n t develo p m e n t s in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science a n d left h i m sharply est r a n g e d from its most creative a n d effective c u r r e n t s . His refusal to consider these possibilities c a n n o t be ascribed to a lack of intellectual capacity, o r to a lack of study. It m u s t b e associated squarely with his views a b o u t method a n d a b o u t metaphysics. Kant's " p a r a d i g m " for science h a d b e e n set by t h e Leibniz-Clarke controversy. T h e issues with which h e was comfortable, a n d t o w a r d which h e a p plied himself assiduously, w e r e those which arose between the N e w t o n i a n s a n d t h e Leibnizians of t h e early e i g h t e e n t h century. T h u s K a n t r e p e a t e d l y investigated t h e objective status of space, disp u t i n g b o t h t h e N e w t o n i a n view of "absolute" space a n d t h e Leibnizian view of a n interstitial o r "relative" space, to d e v e l o p his o w n d o c t r i n e ultimately in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A e s t h e t i c . " Similarly, K a n t attacked t h e atomist theory, a r g u i n g for t h e infinite divisibility of m a t t e r a n d t h e completely n o m i n a l concept of a fundam e n t a l p a r t i c l e . H e u p h e l d t h e Leibnizian a r g u m e n t that action at a distance involved a n "occult quality" r e p u g n a n t to science, a n d h e tried to work o u t a t h e o r y of empirical physics which would incorp o r a t e Leibniz's t h e o r y of d y n a m i s m a n d f o r c e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e u p h e l d Newton's t h e o r y of causality as mechanical, Newton's rules for t h e scientific m e t h o d , above all t h e r e p u d i a t i o n of " h y p o t h e s e s , " a n d Newton's m a t h e m a t i c a l a p p r o a c h to science. Ind e e d , K a n t m a d e m a t h e m a t i c a l formulation t h e criterion of the efficacy of a s c i e n c e . 5

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T h e s e w e r e all worthy a n d f u n d a m e n t a l issues, b u t they were t h e issues of t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e first half of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. T h e history of science has recognized a very i m p o r t a n t generational b r e a k in this p e r i o d which substantially c h a n g e d t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of science a r o u n d t h e m i d d l e of t h e c e n t u r y . It started in Britain in t h e 1740s a n d r e a c h e d F r a n c e in t h e 1750s, w h e r e it s p u r r e d b o t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of F r e n c h materialism in J u l i e n d e La Mettrie a n d E t i e n n e d e Condillac, a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e m o r e eclectic a p p r o a c h of t h e Encyclopedists, J e a n D ' A l e m b e r t a n d Denis Diderot. D'Alembert's Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia is a particularly useful source for this, since it shows a n a c u t e a w a r e n e s s of t h e g e n e r a t i o n a l shift a n d its scientific a n d p h i l o s o p h 12

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ical i s s u e s . Diderot, w h o figured p r o m i n e n t l y in b o t h t h e m a t e rialist a n d t h e Encyclopedist a p p r o a c h e s (they were by n o m e a n s mutually exclusive), gave literary expression to t h e impact of these ideas in his D'Alembert's Dream. B u t p e r h a p s t h e most i m p o r t a n t figures in this scientific f e r m e n t in F r a n c e at m i d - c e n t u r y were t h e b i o l o g i s t s — m e n like Pierre M a u p e r t u i s , G e o r g e s Buffon, Theophile Bordeu, and Charles B o n n e t . T h a t s a m e g e n e r a t i o n a l shift in science c a m e to G e r m a n y a bit later in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. It simply arrived too late for Kant. His m i n d was set in t h e t h o u g h t p a t t e r n s , t h e p a r a d i g m , of t h e earlier p e r i o d , a n d h e n e v e r achieved any s y m p a t h y for t h e p r o b l e m s or t h e insights of t h e n e w a p p r o a c h . I n d e e d , his c o n c e r n to correct t h e i r deviations from t h e a u t h e n t i c scientific a p p r o a c h led h i m to take u p t h e question of m e t h o d o l o g y in t h e nascent biological sciences, first in a series of p o p u l a r essays, t h e n m o r e formally in his o w n systematic version of N e w t o n i a n physical science, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, a n d finally in t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " Even as h e in fact redefined Newton's atomic t h e o r y in t e r m s of t h e decisive n o t i o n of "force," K a n t wished to u p h o l d t h e letter of t h e N e w t o n i a n law, to k e e p t h e m a x i m against "feigning h y p o t h e s e s " at t h e h e a r t of all t r u e s c i e n c e . K a n t chose to a d h e r e to a relentless sense of mechanical causality in t h e explication of physical p h e n o m e n a , even t h o u g h h e realized it would not work in t h e case of o r g a n i c l i f e . B u t this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t c a n n o t account alone, or even primarily, for Kant's p o s t u r e . K a n t h a d not only scientific b u t also metaphysical positions to d e f e n d : t h e traditional n o t i o n of a t r a n s c e n d e n t , intelligent Deity w h o c r e a t e d t h e world, a n d t h e notion of individual m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d responsibility. As h e saw it, t h e t r e n d s in science a n d cosmology, "materialist" a n d " p a n t h e ist," t h r e a t e n e d these positions. Above all, t h e renaissance of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of Spinoza in G e r m a n y s e e m e d to K a n t to p o r t e n d atheism in t h e form of materialistic d e t e r m i n i s m . H e n c e h e vent u r e d into t h e field of biology in the 1780s in a c a m p a i g n against what h e could only see as metaphysical sophistry within t h e new science. 13

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T h i s d r e a d of a t h e i s m a n d d e t e r m i n i s m a c c o u n t e d for Kant's second g u i d i n g principle in a p p r o a c h i n g t h e biological sciences: to u p h o l d t h e distinction of m a n from t h e balance of organic life. His insistence u p o n t h e u n i q u e n e s s of r e a s o n a n d f r e e d o m necessitated t h e categorial separation of m a n from o t h e r animals. K a n t h a d c o m e to biology because of its role in t h e empirical a n t h r o p o l o g y Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism

191

evolving o u t of travelers' narratives of faraway places a n d " p r i m i tive" races. K a n t d e t e r m i n e d to deliver lectures o n this subject, which h e associated with "Physical G e o g r a p h y , " starting in 1 7 5 7 . F r o m t h e outset h e s h o w e d his resolute opposition to any effort to d e v e l o p a physiological a c c o u n t of h u m a n evolution, since it would in fact b e a n a r g u m e n t for m a n ' s continuity with o t h e r o r g a n i s m s . T h e mid-1780s a p p e a r to b e t h e p e r i o d of Kant's m o s t i n t e n s e c o n c e r n with biology. Since t h e issue of t h e differentiation of life from m a t t e r is central to Kant's biological considerations, t h e Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science figures as p a r t of this project. I n d e e d , t h e r e is evidence t h a t Kant's biological p r e o c c u p a t i o n s e v e n i n t r u d e d into t h e celebrated revisions of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " of t h e Critique of Pure Reason in 1 7 8 6 . 1 9

20

Natural Science in the Eighteenth Century: Some

Soundings

N e w e l e m e n t s in metaphysics w e r e astir in t h e scientific discoveries a n d theories of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, especially in t h e nascent sciences of "electricity," chemistry, a n d biology. W i t h o u t p r e t e n d i n g to offer original r e s e a r c h b u t only to synthesize from t h e c u r r e n t literature, this section will suggest, first, t h a t t h e " N e w t o n i a n i s m " which prevailed in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y did n o t carry t h e scientific revolution forward a c c o r d i n g to t h e conventional m o d e l of t h e " m e c h a n i z a t i o n of t h e world p i c t u r e . " R a t h e r , it p u r s u e d t h e m o s t speculative h y p o t h e s e s N e w t o n felt p r e p a r e d to interject into later editions of his g r e a t w o r k s . Second, it will articulate t h e "hyp o t h e s e s " of t h e n e w N e w t o n i a n i s m of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y in t e r m s of its n e w l a n g u a g e of "force," s h o w i n g t h a t this e x p a n d e d physical l a n g u a g e h a d clear a n d crucial metaphysical c o n c o m m i t a n t s . Finally, a n d crucially, it will a r g u e t h a t t h e shift in t h e sense of n a t u r e which took place in t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h century, in which m a t t e r a n d spirit collapsed t o w a r d unity, could be, a n d was, r e a d in two radically different ways: as t h e materialization of spirit, a n d as t h e spiritualization of m a t t e r . A retrieval a n d historical vindication of t h e latter possibility ("hylozoism") is essential to a p r o p e r historical a p p r e c i a t i o n of G e r m a n Naturphilosophie. 21

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T h e n o t i o n of a " m e c h a n i z a t i o n of t h e world p i c t u r e " is a p p r o p r i a t e for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s in physical a s t r o n o m y a n d in terrestrial m e c h a n i c s over t h e c o u r s e of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Descartes a n d N e w t o n , d e s p i t e their serious differences, s h a r e d a theoretical c o m m i t m e n t to m e c h a n i c a l cause a n d a n o t i o n of t h e i n e r t n e s s of m a t t e r . Newton's n o t i o n of t h a t inertness—i.e., his 24

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principle of inertia—was m o r e subtle t h a n Descartes's a n d , as a r e sult, e v a d e d t h e p r o b l e m of e x p l a i n i n g t h e sources of u n i f o r m rectilinear m o t i o n . Nevertheless, while N e w t o n c o n s i d e r e d inertial velocity a n i n h e r e n t p r o p e r t y of bodies, h e did n o t feel p r e p a r e d to recognize a n y o t h e r forces, like attraction o r r e p u l s i o n , as i n h e r e n t . H e n c e his sense of m a t t e r r e t a i n e d a g o o d p a r t of t h e Cartesian n o tion of i n e r t mass. N e w t o n did displace t h e p l e n u m t h e o r y of m a t t e r of Descartes with a t o m i s m ; consequently, space (extension) a n d m a t t e r h a d to be distinguished, a n d e v e n seemingly solid bodies h a d to b e cons t r u e d as p o r o u s . All bodies could b e analyzed into a series of fund a m e n t a l particles u n i f o r m in t h e i r essential p r o p e r t i e s . T h e o n e difficulty in t h e t r i u m p h of Newton's atomist t h e o r y over t h e C a r t e sian p l e n u m was t h e n o t o r i o u s p r o b l e m of "action at a distance." Mechanical cause in terrestrial mechanics worked o n t h e n o t i o n of t h e direct transmission of force t h r o u g h impact. It r e q u i r e d contiguity, as in t h e instance of billiard balls colliding. Terrestrial m e chanics p o s e d few difficulties for t h e atomists. B u t t h e r e were o t h e r actions in t h e physical universe, as N e w t o n was all too aware, which failed to establish t h e transmission of force t h r o u g h impact. T h e most i m p o r t a n t of these was gravity itself. T h e plausibility of t h e p l e n u m t h e o r y of m a t t e r lay n o t insignificantly in its ability to acc o u n t for t h e transmission of such forces t h r o u g h t h e material m e d i u m it claimed filled t h e space b e t w e e n ostensibly s e p a r a t e objects. It was o n this very p o i n t t h a t Leibniz m a d e s o m e of his most telling physical objections to N e w t o n i a n physics, a n d such objections k e p t Cartesian physics alive o n t h e c o n t i n e n t until t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h century. Action at a distance a n d t h e distinction of space from m a t t e r were n o t simply physical theories, b u t expressed metaphysical comm i t m e n t s in N e w t o n i a n n a t u r a l philosophy. N e w t o n was a m a n o b sessed with theological a n d metaphysical c o n c e r n s . H e could n o t have b e e n otherwise, living in t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century. T h e p o i n t is n o t simply to n o t e t h e " q u a i n t " ideas h e cultivated "alongside" his "valid" physical theories, b u t to recognize t h a t metaphysics a n d physics i n t e r p e n e t r a t e d utterly in that a g e , a n d that t h e o n e inspired a n d i n f o r m e d t h e o t h e r . Newton's theory of action at a dist a n c e h a d starkly theological e l e m e n t s . 25

26

N e w t o n e x p l a i n e d action at a distance by conceiving of G o d as t h e requisite "etherial m e d i u m " for t h e transmission of f o r c e . Ind e e d , N e w t o n believed space was divine, a n o t i o n which h e inherited from decidedly metaphysical speculations d e v e l o p e d by t h e 27

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C a m b r i d g e Piatonist H e n r y M o r e a n d c o n t i n u e d by t h a t Christian virtuoso R o b e r t B o y l e . T h a t such metaphysical notions w e r e n o t lost o n his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s is evidenced in t h e decidedly theological cast of t h e Leibniz-Clarke c o n t r o v e r s y . At stake already in t h a t d e bate was t h e suggestion t h a t G o d a n d t h e world m i g h t b e one, a n idea r e p u g n a n t to o r t h o d o x Christianity, a n d associated with " d a n g e r o u s " a n d "atheistic" i d e a s — t h o s e of H o b b e s a n d Spinoza. T h e possibilities for a "materialist" r e a d i n g w e r e obviously t h e r e , as certain t r e n d s in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d later d e m o n s t r a t e d . B u t t h e r e w e r e alternative possibilities for w h a t we m i g h t call a "spiritual" r e a d i n g , which m u s t n o t b e lost from s i g h t . " N e w t o n i a n i s m " n o t only involved t h e large notion of G o d as space o r as etherial force m a i n t a i n i n g t h e world a n d i m p a r t i n g its accelerations, b u t also t h e m o r e concrete physical n o t i o n of a f u n d a m e n t a l a n d u n i f o r m a t o m of particulate matter. Newton's a t o m i s m led to e x t r e m e l y fruitful speculations ("queries" or, in fact, hypotheses) a b o u t t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e physical world which u n d e r cut t h e n o t i o n of inert matter. T h e series of speculations N e w t o n inserted into later editions of his widely studied Opticks c e n t e r e d a r o u n d t h e p r o p e r t i e s which could legitimately be c o n s i d e r e d inh e r e n t in particulate matter. N e w t o n recognized t h e existence of forces, a n d t h e i r vital i m p o r t a n c e to physical science, b u t h e f o u n d it impossible to recognize t h e m as i m m a n e n t p r o p e r t i e s of particulate matter. I n s t e a d h e simply t e r m e d t h e m "etherial" o r "imp o n d e r a b l e principles" of physical action. Obviously, t h e t e r m " p r i n c i p l e " is extremely v a g u e as to t h e exact n a t u r e of these p h e n o m e n a , i.e., as to t h e i r substantive reality a n d metaphysical implications. His successors w o u l d wrestle with this question intensely in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. Newton's speculations a b o u t t h e ultimate n a t u r e of t h e particulate m a t t e r in t h e universe also raised t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t t h e actual mass of t h e universe m i g h t , in t e r m s of its physical extension, constitute a vanishingly small v o l u m e as c o m p a r e d to t h e vast interstices of " i m p o n d e r a b l e " o r "etherial" s p a c e . I n t h a t m e a s u r e t h e b r u t e massiveness of t h e world could b e theoretically transfigured into t h e play of e n e r g i e s u p o n a n airy immaterial field, a n d t h e g a p which t h e Cartesian a n d t h e Christian models set between n a t u r e a n d spirit (as " a n i m a t i n g " o r "energizing" principle) closed. N e w t o n i n t r o d u c e d a n e w a n d powerful i m p e t u s into b o t h m e t a physics a n d t h e physical sciences with t h e s e notions. 28

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T h e N e w t o n i a n scientists of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y p u r s u e d t h e leads N e w t o n h a d offered in his queries in t h e Opticks by study194

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ing t h e n u m e r o u s physical p h e n o m e n a which did n o t fit neatly into a n i m p a c t m o d e l of force. T h e y dwelled u p o n attraction a n d r e p u l sion, u p o n chemical a n d electrical p h e n o m e n a , a n d as they did so, they b e g a n to redefine t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h e physical world in such a way t h a t t h e Cartesian n o t i o n of inert matter, a n d with it t h e C a r t e sian n o t i o n of mechanical cause as t h e i m p a c t m o d e l of force, c a m e to s e e m entirely i n a d e q u a t e . I n central E u r o p e , Leibniz, a n d , following h i m , Boscovich p u r s u e d these lines aggressively, b o t h in t h e metaphysical a n d in t h e physical vein, articulating a theory of physical " d y n a m i s m " which, in Boscovich, completely eliminated t h e idea of particulate m a t t e r ( e x t e n d e d mass) a n d replaced it with a p o i n t c e n t e r of force. Such d e v e l o p m e n t s in particle theory p r o v e d central to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e e m e r g e n t science of chemistry, a n d of t h e related physics of electricity a n d m a g n e t i s m . T h e result was a recognition of t h e necessity of t h e physical postulation of such forces as real elem e n t s in t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a , a n d t h e conseq u e n t a b a n d o n m e n t of any e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e world exclusively in t e r m s of i n e r t m a t t e r a n d t h e i m p a c t m o d e l of force, which tog e t h e r c o m p r i s e d t h e " m e c h a n i z a t i o n of t h e world p i c t u r e . " T h i s was particularly t h e case in t h e even less d e v e l o p e d field of biological science, w h e r e t h e mechanical theory of science h a d b o t h given a fruitful i m p e t u s to revisions of scientific i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d also r u n u p against its clearest limitations in c o n s t r u i n g t h e empirical data. Let u s consider these d e v e l o p m e n t s in science as R o b e r t Schofield chronicled t h e m in his widely cited work, Mechanism and Materialism. While Schofield's g e n e r a l categories a p p e a r confusing, h e nevertheless recognized a definite shift in scientific o r i e n t a t i o n a r o u n d m i d - c e n t u r y in B r i t a i n . T h e n e w — a n d for Schofield o b viously problematic—"speculative influence of N e w t o n i a n m a t t e r theory was felt in chemistry a n d p h y s i o l o g y . " W h a t t r a n s p i r e d was a substantialization of t h e problematic forces which experim e n t h a d u n e a r t h e d as operative in the physical world: light, heat, electricity, a n d m a g n e t i s m . Schofield characterized these new forces in t h e following t e r m s : " T h e materialized, substantial causes are almost all i m p o n d e r a b l e , highly t e n u o u s fluids, a n d most of these a r e partially characterized by their possession of varying forces of attraction a n d r e p u l s i o n . " Schofield f o u n d in his scientists a shift from logical, m a t h e m a t i c a l , abstract rationalism t o w a r d a m o r e c o m p l e x qualitative a n d metaphysical orientation. H e claimed t h e s e new scientists s h a r e d Bacon's c r u d e empiricism 32

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a l o n g with L i n n a e u s ' s "Aristotelian c o n t e n t m e n t with t h e creation a n d categorizing of different q u a l i t i e s . " Schofield b l a m e d this m o r e naturalistic a n d metaphysical a p p r o a c h o n continental influences a n d "religious m y s t i c i s m . " I n t e r m s of scientific influence, h e e m p h a s i z e d L i n n a e u s in particular, b u t o n e m i g h t also include Leibniz a n d Boscovich. Schofield associated t h e m o r e abstract a n d mechanistic a p p r o a c h of t h e earlier g e n e r a t i o n with " A u g u s t a n rationality" a n d with d e i s m . H e l a m e n t e d t h a t in t h e new g e n e r a tion "that peculiar c o m b i n a t i o n of classics, logic a n d m a t h e m a t i c s which h a d t e m p e r e d t h e m i n d to abstract studies was missing." 35

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While Schofield chose to see metaphysics inspiring this shift in o r i e n t a t i o n , h e did a d m i t t h a t t h e r e w e r e s o m e difficulties in carryi n g o n scientifically in t h e mechanistic m o d e o n c e t h e physical imp o r t a n c e of forces h a d to b e a c k n o w l e d g e d . T h e mechanists could n o t "assign m a g n i t u d e o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of form to any of t h e various forces of attraction a n d repulsion which they u s e d with such i n g e n u i t y in t h e i r s p e c u l a t i o n s . " It h a d b e c o m e impossible, scientifically o r philosophically, to enforce a categorial distinction b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d force, between "inert m a s s " a n d "active p r i n ciples." A n d n o satisfactory mechanistic a c c o u n t could b e given for t h e origins o r t h e n a t u r e of "force" as such. 38

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It is n o t because I s h a r e Schofield's o p i n i o n s a b o u t t h e relative w o r t h of t h e s e two orientations, b u t r a t h e r precisely because I d o n o t t h a t I find his testimony so fruitful. T h e distinction b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d spirit which h a d b e e n t h e key to Cartesian t h o u g h t a n d t h e i n t e r m i n a b l e w r a n g l e of p h i l o s o p h y in his wake (the so-called " m i n d - b o d y " p r o b l e m ) c a m e in t h e light of t h e new science to collapse t o w a r d a unity. Yet it was a collapse to unity which could b e r e a d in two lights. It could b e r e a d , as t h e deists a n d pantheists of t h e Radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t r e a d it, as t h e confirmation of materialism, t e n d i n g in its e x t r e m e to a t h e i s m (as in H u m e , Voltaire, a n d t h e F r e n c h Materialists). B u t it could also b e r e a d , as t h e p o e t s of sensibility in m i d - e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y Britain; t h e i r G e r m a n c o u n t e r p a r t s , t h e Empfindsamkeit a n d later t h e Sturm und Drang; a n d , most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientists of chemistry a n d biology across E u r o p e w o u l d r e a d it, asaspiritualization of matter. T h e N e w t o n i a n i s m of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y h a d a rich m e t a physical c o n t e n t . I n d e e d , theology r e m a i n e d very close t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s in n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d while a t t h e e x t r e m e s t h e n o t e of a t h e i s m a n d materialism c a m e to b e h e a r d clearly, for t h e bulk of t h e century's scientific t h i n k e r s , such radicalism s e e m e d clearly unattractive, a n d i n d e e d even in196

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consistent with t h e i r o w n physical results. C o n s e q u e n t l y , they s o u g h t to suggest s o m e t h i n g quite different. T h e y b e g a n to r e c o n ceive n a t u r e as a living whole. Let u s p u r s u e this q u e s t i o n a bit m o r e concretely in t e r m s of t h e biological sciences, in o r d e r to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e peculiar complexity b u t also c o h e r e n c e of t h e n e w mentality a n d its g r o u n d i n g n o t in "mystical excess" b u t in p r o b l e m s of c o n c r e t e empirical science. T h e crisis of the so-called "iatromechanical" a p p r o a c h in t h e biological sciences, i.e., t h e a p p r o a c h which s o u g h t to explain all biological p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of t h e inert-matter, impact-theoryof-force a p p r o a c h of m e c h a n i c a l cause, is crucial n o t only for its intrinsic i m p o r t a n c e in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science b u t because it is t h e field directly a d d r e s s e d in Kant's "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d , n o t coincidentally, in H e r d e r ' s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menshheit. T h e n e w scientific rationalism, with its e p o c h - m a k i n g success in m a t h e m a t i c a l physics, h a d p r o f o u n d l y influenced t h e sciences of m e d i c i n e a n d biology in t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century. T h e effort to revise these sciences to accord with t h e new m e t h o d o l o g y of scientific rationalism led to a systematic p u r s u i t of " i a t r o m e c h a n i c a l " e x p l a n a t i o n s for biological p h e n o m e n a . T h a t e n t h u s i a s m led m a n y medical scientists, most p r o m i n e n t l y figures like H e r m a n n B o e r h a a v e , to b e c o m e p i o n e e r i n g advocates of Newt o n i a n i s m . B u t while such a p o s t u r e was all t h e r a g e at t h e close of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century, its i m p u l s e h a d e x h a u s t e d itself by t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d a n e w orientation b e c a m e increasingly i m p o r t a n t — o n e which, forced by t h e materials u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n , r e a c h e d o u t for m o r e c o m p l e x causal-explanatory theories. I n this search for n e w theories, a n t i q u a t e d t e r m s frequently served to describe t h e most novel e x p e r i m e n t s , a n d scientists, e m barrassed at the metaphysical b a g g a g e their b o r r o w e d t e r m s carried with t h e m , s o u g h t to find a clearer a n d m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t sacrificing t h e richness a n d d e t e r m i n a c y of t h e i r e x p e r i m e n t a l a n d theoretical results. W h e n K a n t wrote in t h e Third Critique t h a t t h e r e could n e v e r b e a N e w t o n of t h e blade of grass, h e m e a n t a n u m b e r of t h i n g s , n o t all of which t h e biologists of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y would have a g r e e d with. B u t o n e t h i n g they most assuredly did: namely, t h a t n o m o d e l of i n e r t m a t t e r a n d m e chanical cause would serve to a c c o u n t for t h e p r o b l e m s of biology. K a n t wished to t u r n this result to a theological point, n o u m e n a l causality by a t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d . T h e scientists, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w a n t e d to complicate t h e i r physical m o d e l of n a t u r e to Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism

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i n c o r p o r a t e those c o m p l e x forces which they hypothesized to acc o u n t for physical p h e n o m e n a . W h e r e K a n t wished to build a wall b e t w e e n spirit a n d m a t t e r , the scientists were finding "vitalism" a necessary e l e m e n t in t h e i r physical theorizing. K a n t segregated "life" from o r g a n i s m s . A biologist could not, at t h e peril of losing his field of inquiry. T w o central E u r o p e a n scientists figured p r o m i n e n t l y in the biologists' d e v e l o p m e n t of a n alternative stance: G e o r g Ernst Stahl a n d Albert von Haller. It was Stahl w h o p r o p o s e d t h e a n t i q u a t e d l a n g u a g e of " a n i m i s m " to h e l p characterize t h e e l e m e n t s in experim e n t a l p h e n o m e n a for which the "iatromechanical" a p p r o a c h h a d n o lexicon. U n q u e s t i o n a b l y Stahl w a n t e d with this l a n g u a g e to rei n t r o d u c e into n a t u r a l science a considerable a m o u n t of traditional metaphysics, which few of his y o u n g e r c o n t e m p o r a r i e s in t h e biological sciences felt enthusiastic a b o u t . Yet they took u p his lang u a g e , faute de mieux. Similarly, t h e new g e n e r a t i o n of biologists l e a r n e d a g r e a t deal from t h e p i o n e e r i n g work in c o m p a r a t i v e physiology d o n e by von Haller, a n d in particular his characterization of "irritability." A g r e a t deal of controversy arose over t h e distinction of this p r o p e r t y of organic life from "sensitivity." B u t t h e whole m o v e m e n t was t o w a r d "vitalism." I n t h e medical school of Montpellier these issues c a m e to a theoretical crisis, a n d in t h e t h o u g h t of B o r d e u achieved as m u c h clarification as t h e prelimin a r y state of t h e science a l l o w e d . I n a brilliant essay, Sergio Moravia has d o c u m e n t e d t h e shift from t h e "iatromechanical" to t h e "vitalist" orientation. By focusing o n B o r d e u , Moravia d e m o n strated t h e perplexity a n d t h e resolution t h r o u g h which t h e school of Montpellier, a n d with it m o d e r n biology, passed d u r i n g t h e course of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . 4 0

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M o r e generally, Moravia s t r u c t u r e d his conceptualization a r o u n d a very f e c u n d pair of t e r m s : I'homme machine, d r a w n , of course, from La Mettrie's provocative work o f t h a t title, a n d I'homme sensible, which, alas, has n o such singular text to which to trace its p a r e n t a g e , b u t is by far t h e m o r e interesting of t h e two. L'homme sensible gestures as a p h r a s e to all those issues of spirituality t h a t m e c h a n i s m would d e n y . By placing man at t h e c e n t e r of his treatm e n t , Moravia stressed t h e direct a n d crucial sense in which t h e implications of biology b o r e u p o n t h e possibilities for a n t h r o p o l ogy. M a n was at stake in all t h e e x p e r i m e n t s with r e g e n e r a t i n g h y d r a . M a n was at issue in all t h e theories of animal a n d vegetable "spirits." W i t h o u t t h a t sense, t h e whole d r a m a of e i g h t e e n t h -

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c e n t u r y science is lost. A n d so, too, t h e motives b e h i n d I m m a n u e l Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of science of t h e 1780s.

Kant's Writings on Biology Kant's publications in biology b e g a n with his review, in 1 7 7 1 , of Peter Moscati's a r g u m e n t claiming t h a t erect p o s t u r e was n o t p h y s iologically a d v a n t a g e o u s to m a n , b u t instead caused t h e species difficulties, h e n c e , it could n o t b e seen as a strictly biological a d a p t a t i o n . Moscati's claim that "the erect p o s t u r e of m a n was forced a n d u n n a t u r a l " sustained Kant's own conviction of a decisive difference between m a n a n d the a n i m a l k i n g d o m : t h e intervention of r e a s o n . Kant c o n c l u d e d t h a t m a n " h a d b e e n led by r e a s o n a n d imitation to diverge from t h e original, a n i m a l a r r a n g e m e n t . " Since h e could walk erect, r e a s o n enforced this shift in post u r e , despite all physiological h a r d s h i p , for reasons of its o w n : "[In m a n ] a g e r m of reason also lay, t h r o u g h which, if it was to develop, h e was d e t e r m i n e d for society. Accordingly h e a s s u m e d p e r m a n e n t l y t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e p o s t u r e [for such society], n a m e l y t h a t of a b i p e d . O n t h e o n e h a n d , h e gained infinitely m u c h over t h e animals, b u t h e also h a d to accept t h e c o n s e q u e n t adversities of so p r o u d l y h o l d i n g his h e a d h i g h e r t h a n his old c o m r a d e s . " T h e issue of erect p o s t u r e , a n d of a physiological transition from o t h e r animal forms to m a n , would arise again, in Kant's controversy with H e r d e r in t h e 1780s. For K a n t , any effort to t h i n k m a n in continuity with t h e rest of t h e animal k i n g d o m t h r e a t e n e d t h e dignity of t h e species, which rested in reason a n d freedom, e l e m e n t s which could have n o physical g r o u n d . 44

Kant's n e x t essay in t h e field of biology c a m e f o u r years later, a p p e a r i n g initially as a n a d v e r t i s e m e n t for his lectures in physical g e o g r a p h y d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r t e r m of 1775, t h e n in a slightly r e vised form in a p o p u l a r science j o u r n a l in 1777. Many of t h e ideas K a n t would u p h o l d t h r o u g h t h e 1780s h e first articulated in this essay, a n d it t h e r e f o r e merits close e x a m i n a t i o n . T h e t h e m e , t h e variety of h u m a n races, was central to t h e e m e r g e n t field of physical a n d cultural a n t h r o p o l o g y in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d h a d m o m e n t o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for social a n d political r e l a t i o n s . K a n t wished to clarify some methodological principles a n d offer s o m e substantive h y p o t h e s e s r e g a r d i n g race. Moreover, t h e topic d r e w K a n t to larger questions in t h e p h i l o s o p h y of science. 45

46

First, h e took sides with Buffon against L i n n a e u s in a r g u i n g

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t h a t t h e principle of n a t u r a l science h a d to d o n o t with n o m i n a l classes b u t with real relations. " T h e divisions of t h e schools have to d o with classes based o n similarities, t h e divisions of n a t u r e , however, c o n c e r n lineages [Stämme] which discriminate animals in t e r m s of consanguinity [Verwandtschaften] in t e r m s of t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n . " T h i s distinction of " n o m i n a l " a n d "real" types would have n o t only a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l b u t also a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l significance for K a n t in t h e 1780s a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y w o u l d play a major role in his d i s p u t a tions. 47

S e c o n d , K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e distinction between Schulgattungen a n d Naturgattungen could only b e sustained if it were possible to establish t h e latter. T h a t could only be d o n e if o n e could discover, b e y o n d t h e artificial typologies (Linnaeus), n a t u r a l laws (Buffon). T o find such laws r e q u i r e d a new sense of t h e p h r a s e " n a t u r a l history," which in practice h a d only b e e n a " n a t u r a l d e scription," a n d even t h e n only in t h e sense of n o m i n a l typologies. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t a science h a d to take t h e idea of history seriously, i.e., recognize t h a t even t h e best description of h o w t h e forms of n a t u r e stood at p r e s e n t did n o t explain h o w they got t h a t way. H e n c e K a n t p r o p o s e d a new c o n c e p t i o n of " n a t u r a l history" which would teach us a b o u t t h e c h a n g e s in t h e form of t h e e a r t h a n d at t h e s a m e time a b o u t t h e [changes which] the c r e a t u r e s of t h e e a r t h (plants a n d animals) suffered in t h e course of their n a t u r a l w a n d e r i n g s , a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t variations [Abartungen] from t h e original f o r m of t h e i r ancestral line [Stammgattung]. It would in all likelihood r e i n t e r p r e t a large n u m b e r of a p p a r e n t l y distinct types [Arten] into races of the same species [Gattung] a n d t r a n s f o r m t h e c u r r e n t l y so diffuse system of a c a d e m i c n a t u r a l description into a physical system for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g [i.e, a s c i e n c e ] . 48

Given Buffon's definition of species as t h a t real consanguinity s h o w n by o r g a n i s m s which w h e n crossed p r o d u c e d offspring capable of r e p r o d u c t i o n , K a n t asked h o w from any original form of t h e species o n e could derive " t h r o u g h a chain of alterations" t h e varieties o r races e n c o u n t e r e d in p r e s e n t n a t u r a l descriptions. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e potential for variation was built into t h e o r g a n i s m as p a r t of its species-heritage. " T h e g r o u n d s of a particular d e v e l o p m e n t [Auswickelung] which lie in t h e n a t u r e of a n o r g a n i c b o d y (of a p l a n t o r a n animal) a r e called germs [Keime] if t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s affect p a r t i c u l a r parts, b u t if they affect only t h e size o r t h e interrelation of t h e p a r t s , t h e n I t e r m t h e m natural 200

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endowments [natürliche Anlagen]." Variation was p a r t of t h e original g e r m - p l a s m , a n d it manifested itself w h e n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t placed t h e species u n d e r specific ecological constraints for a sust a i n e d p e r i o d of t i m e . H e n c e K a n t m a i n t a i n e d simultaneously t h e doctrines of t h e fixity of species a n d of t h e a d a p t a t i o n of varieties within species to ecological constraints. K a n t h e l d to these d o c t r i n e s because t h e alternative would be to allow t h a t e n v i r o n m e n t a l factors could cause t h e strictly genetic n a t u r e of t h e species to alter, a n d K a n t disbelieved utterly in such a possibility. " C h a n c e o r g e n e r a l mechanical laws can n e v e r b r i n g a b o u t such a d a p t a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e we m u s t see such d e v e l o p m e n t s , which a p p e a r accidental according to t h e m , as predetermined [vorgebildet]." E x t e r n a l factors could b e occasions, b u t n o t direct causes of c h a n g e s which could b e i n h e r i t e d t h r o u g h g e n e r a t i o n . "As little as c h a n c e o r physical-mechanical causes can g e n e r a t e [hervorbringen] a n organic body, so little will they be able to effect in t h e m a modification of their r e p r o d u c t i v e powers which can be inherited." H e r e K a n t i n t r o d u c e d t h e p h r a s e Zweckmäßigkeit. T h e r e h a d to b e p u r p o s i v e g r o u n d s for t h e modification or variation of o r g a n isms, a n d t h e r e f o r e it h a d to b e possible to establish a n a c c o u n t of their variation, a " n a t u r a l history," which would indicate t h e original n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t of t h e species a n d explain its actualization in variety over t i m e in different e n v i r o n m e n t s . H e n c e t h e m e t h o d of " n a t u r a l history" would b e "to b r i n g forward p u r p o s i v e causes [zweckmäßige Ursachen] w h e r e n a t u r a l o n e s a r e n o t easily discerned, a n d n a t u r a l o n e s w h e r e we c a n n o t observe p u r p o s e s . " Hence teleology a n d m e c h a n i s m w e r e c o m p l e m e n t a r y m o d e s of i n t e r p r e tation. T h i s n o t i o n would receive m i n u t e a t t e n t i o n in t h e Third Critique. K a n t a t t e m p t e d to follow this m e t h o d o l o g y in a c c o u n t i n g for t h e divergences of races within t h e single h u m a n species in t e r m s of a d a p t a t i o n to different e n v i r o n m e n t s over long stretches of t i m e . 49

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A r t h u r Lovejoy has offered s o m e useful historical indications of t h e sources of Kant's ideas in this essay. F r o m t h e text itself it was obvious t h a t K a n t was familiar with t h e works of L i n n a e u s , Buffon, a n d M a u p e r t u i s , a n d Lovejoy a r g u e s t h a t " K a n t derived n o t only most of his zoological facts, b u t also s o m e of his ideas of scientific m e t h o d , from B u f f o n . " B u t m o r e , Lovejoy p o i n t e d to t h e influe n c e of a c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n a u t h o r w h o m K a n t m e n t i o n e d by n a m e in t h e Third Critique a n d later praised publicly: J o h a n n Friedrich B l u m e n b a c h . I n 1775, t h e s a m e year as Kant's essay, B l u m e n b a c h p u b l i s h e d a m a j o r study o n similar t h e m e s : De generis 52

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humani variatione nativa. B l u m e n b a c h derived his data from Buffon b u t his c o n c e p t s from Leibniz. His two objectives in t h e work w e r e to differentiate b e t w e e n m a n a n d animals a n d to explain t h e different races of m a n . A n o t h e r key conception which d r e w B l u m e n b a c h a n d K a n t t o g e t h e r was t h e Leibnizian n o t i o n of " p r e f o r m a t i o n . " Clearly, K a n t got t h e material for his reflections from this c o m p a n y — L i n n a e u s a n d Leibniz, Buffon a n d B l u m e n b a c h , a n d h e knew, in addition, of Maupertuis's ideas of selective b r e e d i n g . T h e r e was very little in t h e Critique of Pure Reason in its first version which related directly to biology. T h e r e a r e , however, a few points which deserve a t t e n t i o n — a l l of t h e m , incidentally, in t h e "Dialectic." K a n t m a d e r e f e r e n c e to t h e u n i q u e n e s s of o r g a n i c f o r m at several j u n c t u r e s . H e also m a d e a very i m p o r t a n t distinction b e t w e e n t h e r a t i o n a l - m a t h e m a t i c a l principle of continuity a n d t h e fact t h a t a n object in n a t u r e was empirically always a quantum discretum. I n t h a t context h e a d d r e s s e d himself directly to "the widely discussed law of the continuous gradation of c r e a t e d beings, which was p r o p o u n d e d by Leibniz, a n d admirably s u p p o r t e d by B o n n e t . " K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e m a x i m of continuity could n o t be t a k e n as a n objective principle of empirical n a t u r e : 53

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For observation a n d insight into t h e constitution of n a t u r e could n e v e r justify us in t h e objective assertion of t h e law. T h e steps of this ladder, as they a r e p r e s e n t e d to us in e x p e r i e n c e , stand m u c h too far a p a r t ; a n d w h a t may seem to us small differences a r e usually in n a t u r e itself such wide gaps, that from any such observations we can c o m e to n o decision in r e g a r d to n a t u r e ' s ultimate design—especially if we b e a r in m i n d t h a t in so g r e a t a multiplicity of things t h e r e can n e v e r b e m u c h difficulty in finding similarities a n d a p p r o x i m a t i o n s . 58

T h i s a r g u m e n t , which a i m e d directly against any t h e o r y of continuity ( a n d m u t a t i o n ) across species, figured p r o m i n e n t l y in Kant's later writings, a n d was f u n d a m e n t a l to his resistance to "transform a t i o n i s m " a n d "hylozoism." K a n t felt t h a t his First Critique h a d established t h e necessary p a r a m e t e r s for t h e p u r s u i t n o t only of p h i l o s o p h y b u t also of science. While, to b e s u r e , t h e exposition of his "metaphysics of n a t u r e " was n o t c o m p l e t e , it could be derived virtually by analysis of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles h e h a d established in the Critique. H e h a d n o t only clarified certain perplexities of r e a s o n b u t established t h e a p p r o p r i a t e principles of scientific investigation into n a t u r e . Above 202

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all h e believed h e h a d p r o n o u n c e d a n interdict against "speculation" in science, a n d especially against two particular e r r o r s — "materialism" a n d "spiritualism" in c o s m o l o g y . B u t in G e r m a n y , t h e 1780s p r o v e d to b e n o t a d e c a d e of "critical" restraint, b u t r a t h e r t h e s e e d t i m e of Naturphilosophie, t h a t highly speculative a n d distinctive " R o m a n t i c i s m " in science. Its source was the Sturm und Drang, a n d its p r o p h e t was H e r d e r . 59

H e n c e , w h e n H e r d e r p r o c e e d e d in his Ideen to overstep all t h e limits t h a t K a n t h a d so laboriously p o s t u l a t e d for philosophy a n d n a t u r a l science, K a n t felt called u p o n to set his f o r m e r pupil straight. While we have already c o n s i d e r e d t h e t o n e of t h e reviews of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, h e r e we will e x a m i n e t h e concrete issues in science which w e r e raised t h e r e . K a n t took t h e thesis of t h e first volu m e of H e r d e r ' s work to b e as follows: " T h e spiritual n a t u r e of t h e h u m a n soul, its persistence a n d p r o g r e s s to perfection, w e r e to b e p r o v e n t h r o u g h analogy with t h e n a t u r a l formations of m a t t e r primarily in its o r g a n i c f o r m , avoiding all metaphysical investigat i o n s . " K a n t cited two e x t e n d e d passages from H e r d e r which expressed this thesis. T h e first deserves citation h e r e , since it would e c h o r e p e a t e d l y in later writings: 60

Before it was possible for o u r air, o u r water, o u r e a r t h to b e b r o u g h t forth, m a n y m u t u a l l y displacing a n d d e s t r o y i n g lineages [Stamina] w e r e necessary; a n d t h e manifold species [Gattungen] of e a r t h , of minerals, of crystalizations, even of t h e organization of mollusks, plants, animals, finally in m a n — how m a n y dissolutions a n d revolutions of t h e o n e into t h e o t h e r w e r e n o t p r e s u p p o s e d ? H e , t h e son of all t h e e l e m e n t s a n d beings, their choicest totalization [auserlesenster Inbegriff] a n d at t h e s a m e time t h e flower of earthly creation, could be n o t h i n g b u t t h e ultimate child of n a t u r e ' s w o m b [letze Schooßkind der Natur], t o w a r d whose cultivation a n d r e c e p t i o n m a n y d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d revolutions m u s t have served as p r e c e dents. 61

H e r d e r t h u s s e e m e d p r e p a r e d to see n o t only m a n in continuity with o r g a n i c form, b u t o r g a n i c form itself in continuity with t h e inorganic, i.e., in his o w n words, " p e r h a p s even in so-called dead things o n e a n d t h e same e n d o w m e n t [Anlage] for organization, only infinitely c r u d e r a n d m o r e m u d d l e d , m i g h t preside." I n d e e d , this idea of o n e all-pervasive force [Kraft] was t h e essential idea which H e r d e r e n t e r t a i n e d in his work, according to Kant. H e cited yet a n o t h e r passage from H e r d e r which a d v a n c e d Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism

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this speculation: " F r o m rock to crystal, from these to metals, from these to plantlife, from t h e r e to a n i m a l , ultimately to m a n we have seen t h e form of organization ascend [steigen], a n d with it also t h e powers a n d drives of t h e c r e a t u r e s g r o w n m o r e various, until ultimately e v e r y t h i n g c a m e to unity in t h e figure of m a n , so far as this could e n c o m p a s s t h e m . " I n t h e c o u r s e of this speculation, H e r d e r d e n i e d t h e theory of p r e f o r m a t i o n a n d epigenesis, advocated t h e thesis of erect p o s t u r e as t h e physiological distinction of m a n , a n d tried to derive from it t h e rational a n d volitional aspects of his behavior, i.e., h e claimed t h a t t h e h u m a n soul e m e r g e d gradually out of t h e all-pervasive force of n a t u r e itself. H e r d e r wrote: " T h e oretically a n d practically reason is n o t h i n g b u t a derivative [Vernommenes], a p r o p o r t i o n a n d direction of ideas a n d p o w e r s [Kräfte] which is l e a r n e d a n d for which m a n was cultivated by his o r g a n i c form a n d way of living." Moreover, H e r d e r tried to use t h e d o c t r i n e of t h e "conservation of force" as t h e g r o u n d for a belief in t h e immortality of t h e soul, since t h e latter was simply t h e all-pervasive force of t h e world in its h u m a n instance. All of these n o t i o n s were a n a t h e m a to Kant. H e p r o c e e d e d to reject each o n e . First, as to t h e continuity of species, h e raised t h e issue of quanta discreta. As r e g a r d s t h e h i e r a r c h y of o r g a n i s m s , . . . its use with refere n c e to the r e a l m of n a t u r e h e r e o n e a r t h leads n o w h e r e . . . T h e m i n u t e n e s s of differences w h e n o n e c o m p a r e s species a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r similarity is, in view of such a g r e a t multiplicity [of species], a necessary c o n s e q u e n c e of that multiplicity. B u t a consanguinity [Verwandtschaft] a m o n g t h e m , a c c o r d i n g to which e i t h e r o n e species springs from a n o t h e r a n d all of t h e m o u t of o n e original species o r as it were they originate from o n e single generative m o t h e r - w o m b , would lead to ideas which a r e so m o n s t r o u s that reason shrinks back. 62

Even m o r e emphatically did Kant reject t h e idea of a single allpervasive form of force as t h e principle of t h e organization of nat u r e . " T h e unity of o r g a n i c f o r c e . . . is a n idea which is entirely outside t h e field of empirical n a t u r a l science a n d belongs to merely speculative p h i l o s o p h y . " Moreover, in ascribing this as t h e basis of h u m a n r e a s o n a n d f r e e d o m , as a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e h u m a n soul, Kant i n t i m a t e d , H e r d e r "took t h e spiritual powers of m a n in a q u i t e different sense from that of t h e h u m a n soul, a n d did n o t consider it a p a r t i c u l a r substance b u t merely a n effect of g e n e r a l n a t u r e 63

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w o r k i n g u p o n m a t t e r in a n invisible a n d a n i m a t i n g m a n n e r " — i . e . , H e r d e r was very close to a d o c t r i n e of p a n t h e i s m o r " h y l o z o i s m . " K a n t also reviewed t h e second v o l u m e of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, in which H e r d e r discussed t h e issues of physical g e o g r a p h y a n d t h e different races of m a n , issues which, as we have n o t e d , were t h e subject of Kant's r e g u l a r lectures at Königsberg a n d also of o n e of his essays. I n o t h e r words, H e r d e r was writing o n m a t t e r s a b o u t which K a n t c o n s i d e r e d himself s o m e w h a t e x p e r t . Moreover, H e r d e r took t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of this second volume to r e s p o n d to Kant's hostile criticism with s o m e hostile criticism of his o w n , specifically of Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history in " I d e a for a Universal History with C o s m o p o l i t a n I n t e n t . " T h o s e historical issues b e l o n g in a s e p a r a t e context, b u t t h e issue of race figures directly in o u r c u r r e n t considerations. After setting t h e context of t h e dispersal of t h e h u m a n race across t h e physical g e o g r a p h y of t h e planet in book 6, H e r d e r d e v o t e d himself to the specific issue of race a n d t h e explanation of its variations in b o o k 7. H e r d e r d e n i e d t h e t h e o r y of individual p r e f o r m a t i o n [das Evolutionssystem—"transformationism"] a n d t h e t h e o r y of merely m e c h a n i c a l , external factors as sufficient e x p l a n a t i o n s , a n d a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e h a d to be a n i m m a n e n t force b e h i n d such variation. H e r d e r called it a "genetic force" which modified itself a c c o r d i n g to e n v i r o n m e n t a l constraints. K a n t h a d n o q u a r r e l with that, b u t insisted t h a t this "genetic force" was not unlimited, a n d could n o t lead to a m u t a t i o n of species, a n d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t e r m s for it s h o u l d b e " g e r m s " [Keime] o r "original e n d o w m e n t s . " Such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Kant a d d e d , s h o u l d n o t resort to the speculative t h e o r y of m e c h a n i s m s a n d a r c h e t y p e s [Knospen] which w e r e p r e f o r m e d a n d succeeded o n e a n o t h e r u n d e r certain circumstances, as in t h e "transformationist" system, b u t s h o u l d simply accept this capacity for variation as a given incapable of further determinate elucidation. 64

65

Kant's review of t h e second v o l u m e of H e r d e r ' s Ideen a p p e a r e d in t h e N o v e m b e r 15, 1785 issue of Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. In that s a m e m o n t h , in t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift, a p p e a r e d a n o t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n by K a n t to this very topic of t h e a n t h r o p o l o g y of race. T h a t can hardly b e a coincidence. I n t h e new essay o n race, K a n t r e i t e r a t e d his f u n d a m e n t a l principles, m a k i n g even m o r e explicit his c o m m i t m e n t to t h e fixity of species. " T h r o u g h o u t o r g a n i c nat u r e , a m i d all c h a n g e s of individual creatures, the species m a i n t a i n themselves u n a l t e r e d [die Species derselben sich unverändert erhalten]." Kant w e n t o n to a r g u e that this was a n essential principle of scientific investigation, without which every c o n c e p t would dissolve: Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism

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[I]f s o m e magical p o w e r of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . . . were capable of m o d i f y i n g . . . t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e faculty itself, of t r a n s f o r m i n g N a t u r e ' s original m o d e l o r of m a k i n g additions to it, . . . we s h o u l d n o l o n g e r know from what original N a t u r e h a d b e g u n , n o r how far t h e alteration of t h a t original may p r o ceed, n o r . . . into what g r o t e s q u e r i e s of form species m i g h t eventually b e transmogrified [in welche Fratzengestalt die Gattungen und Arten zuletzt noch verwildern dürften] . . . I for my p a r t a d o p t it as a f u n d a m e n t a l principle to recognize n o p o w e r . . . to m e d d l e with t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e work of N a t u r e . . . [to] effect c h a n g e s in t h e ancient original of a species in a n y such way as to i m p l a n t those c h a n g e s in t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e process a n d m a k e t h e m h e r e d i t a r y . 66

T h e reiteration of t h e principles of t h e essay of 1775 a d e c a d e later can only be g r a s p e d as a direct c o m m e n t u p o n t h e d i s r e g a r d for t h e s e ideas by H e r d e r in t h e Ideen. W h y s h o u l d Kant have f o u n d t h e idea of t h e m u t a t i o n of species so u n b e a r a b l e ? T h a t empirical science did not d r a w back from it is clear from t h e work of t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y biologists we have c o n s i d e r e d . Why, t h e n , did Kant balk? T h e answer lies in his philosophical c o m m i t m e n t s , not his scientific i n s i g h t . Kant f e a r e d for t h e dissolution of the two essential b o u n d a r i e s u p o n which his p h i l o s o p h y rested: that between m a t t e r a n d life, a n d that b e t w e e n o r g a n i s m s a n d m a n . T h a t n a t u r a l science s h o u l d v e n t u r e into such h y p o t h e s e s was horrifying to Kant, a n d h e felt driven to confirm t h e legal limits of scientific investigation a c c o r d i n g to t h e s o u n d principles of " N e w t o n i a n i s m . " T h e s u m m e r of 1785 was t h e t i m e of t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, a n d two of its essential objectives were to prove b e y o n d d o u b t t h e distinction of life from m a t t e r a n d to give a m o r e rational a n d critical theory of force [Kraft], as against t h e wildly speculative notions which, taking off from Leibniz a n d Boscovich, were inu n d a t i n g t h e n e w sciences of chemistry a n d biology. 67

T h e Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is a work which has n o t received a g r e a t deal of attention in t h e Kant literature. T h i s is s t r a n g e in view of Kant's p r o m i s e s in t h e First Critique. It is also u n f o r t u n a t e , because it leaves t h e i m p o r t a n t question of t h e metaphysical elaboration of Kant's system in that m e a s u r e o u t of consideration. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t point a b o u t t h e work, from o u r c u r r e n t v a n t a g e , is Kant's insistence u p o n g r o u n d i n g physical scie n c e u p o n m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n , i.e., o n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y 206

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principles of physics, even as he revised t h a t theory in crucial Leibnizian ways t o w a r d a theory of m a t t e r as force. T h i s , c o m b i n e d with his unequivocal s t a t e m e n t t h a t "in every special doctrine of n a t u r e only so m u c h science p r o p e r can b e f o u n d as t h e r e is m a t h e m a t i c s in it," t e n d e d to b e extremely hostile to all of t h e recent work in chemistry a n d b i o l o g y . I n d e e d , in accordance with this criterion, Kant claimed t h a t chemistry failed to qualify as a science a n d s h o u l d b e r e g a r d e d merely as a "systematic art of analysis." T h a t notion of a "systematic a r t " can b e related r a t h e r directly to t h e "technic" of reflective j u d g m e n t , especially as t h e latter w o u l d apply to biology in t h e Third Critique. It follows t h a t biology could p r e t e n d even less t h a n chemistry to science in Kant's sense of t h e word. Still worse was t h e situation for any "science" of empirical psychology, which could not even be a "systematic a r t . " T h e point is, Kant m a d e his criterion for science so restrictive that almost all the new sciences were ineligible. T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g p r o f o u n d l y reactionary a b o u t such a s t a n c e . But it was p a r t a n d parcel of t h e c o m m i t m e n t s to which Kant felt b o u n d by the mid-1780s. Kant's biological p r e o c c u p a t i o n s manifested themselves in t h e revisions of t h e First Critique in 1786, t h r o u g h his use of biological illustrations a n d m e t a p h o r s for his cognitive t h e o r y . B u t t h e next significant piece of writing really devoted to t h e questions of biology was a n essay c o m p o s e d in t h e fall of 1 7 8 7 — t h e essay entitled " Ü b e r d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer Principien in d e r Philosop h i e . " It is widely recognized to have b e e n of crucial relevance to the genesis of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " T h e occasion for t h e composition of this essay is o n the surface quite straightforward, b u t the implications t u r n o u t to be m o r e intricate. Kant not only published his reviews of H e r d e r a n d his second essay o n race in 1785, but h e also published a n essay entitled " M u t h maßlicher A n f a n g d e r M e n s c h e n g e s c h i c h t e " in t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift in J a n u a r y , 1786. It, too, was c o m p o s e d in t h a t busy year of 1785 in which Kant's central p r e o c c u p a t i o n a p p e a r s to have b e e n t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of science. In O c t o b e r a n d N o v e m b e r of 1786, in t h e Teutsche Merkur, the j o u r n a l which h a d carried Reinhold's spirited defense of H e r d e r ' s Ideen against Kant's review a n d which R e i n h o l d coedited with his distinguished father-in-law, Wieland, t h e r e a p p e a r e d a two-part critique of Kant's writings o n t h e a n t h r o p o l o g y of race a n d of h u m a n origins by a n i m p o r t a n t G e r m a n scientist, G e o r g Forster, later to b e c o m e famous for his involvement in t h e F r e n c h Revolution. Kant, ever sensitive to criticism a n d viewing this particular criticism as yet a f u r t h e r rejoinder 68

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from t h e c a m p of H e r d e r a n d t h e "aestheticists" of science, felt a n e e d to r e p l y . T h e m a t t e r c a m e even m o r e forcefully to a h e a d w h e n H e r d e r himself reasserted all those ideas which K a n t f o u n d so i r r e s p o n sible in a n even m o r e o u t r a g e o u s form, t h e unequivocally pantheist tract Gott: einige Gespräche in early s u m m e r 1787. Kant was furious a b o u t t h e "syncretist" a n d " p a n t h e i s t " sophistries e m a n a t i n g from t h a t q u a r t e r a n d a n x i o u s to d e b u n k t h e m . At t h e same time, R e i n h o l d , a n d with h i m t h e j o u r n a l Teutsche Merkur, h a d converted to K a n t i a n i s m , a n d since A u g u s t of 1786 Reinhold h a d b e e n p u b lishing serially his crucial Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, which did so m u c h to p o p u l a r i z e Kantian t h o u g h t in G e r m a n y . I n Octob e r 1787, R e i n h o l d w r o t e to Kant asking for a public acknowledgm e n t of t h e accuracy of his r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e latter's work, a n d K a n t saw t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to use t h e very Teutsche Merkur to r e b u t t his critics. T h e result was t h e essay o n teleology. Forster h a d p u b l i s h e d o n t h e question of race theory himself, a n d his o w n views differed from Kant's, b u t they were respectably scientific for t h e most part, a n d Kant wished not so m u c h to d i s p u t e Forster's scientific s t a n d i n g as to d e f e n d his own. Forster h a d imp u g n e d Kant's scientific objectivity a n d his m e t h o d o l o g y , n o t merely his h y p o t h e s e s , a n d so Kant h a d a n u m b e r of points to address in his essay. It is, i n d e e d , a most c o m p l e x a n d i m p o r t a n t piece of writing. T h e title has often b e e n t e r m e d a bit misleading, for m u c h of t h e essay c o n c e r n s t h e same old issues of race with which we have b e c o m e familiar. B u t that is to m i s a p p r e h e n d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y a n d c o n c l u d i n g sections of t h e essay, which o p e r a t e o n a m u c h h i g h e r level of generality a n d in fact r e p resent s o m e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t writing K a n t ever did o n t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of science a n d also o n questions of his o w n philosophy. T h e r e f o r e it behooves us to a d d r e s s t h e issues of t h e essay in t e r m s of their increasing scope, starting with t h e most concrete a n d familiar, t h e p r o b l e m of race, a n d p r o c e e d i n g to t h e larger conside r a t i o n s in t h a t context. 74

Forster h a d c h a r g e d , with a n eye as m u c h to Kant's " M u t h m a ßlicher A n f a n g d e r M e n s c h e n g e s c h i c h t e " as to his essays o n the a n t h r o p o l o g y of race, that K a n t i n t r o d u c e d theological considerations into m a t t e r s of empirical science. Not only did Kant s e e m to ascribe to Providence a role in n a t u r e (teleology), b u t his a c c o u n t of t h e origins of t h e h u m a n species derived m u c h from t h e scriptural a c c o u n t . A particular instance of this, Forster claimed, was Kant's d o g m a t i c assertion t h a t t h e e n t i r e h u m a n race s p r a n g from o n e set 75

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of p a r e n t s , which Forster believed Kant took literally from Script u r e . K a n t d e n i e d t h e c h a r g e , a n d a r g u e d t h a t it was not biblical literalism b u t r a t h e r t h e facts of t h e case which led h i m to believe that t h e only way to a d v a n c e t h e science of race was to work from a t h e o r y of consanguinity r a t h e r t h a n m e r e similarity, a n d consanguinity simply m e a n t c o m m o n p a r e n t a g e . W h e t h e r t h e r e was only o n e p a i r at the outset, o r m a n y pairs with identical genetic e n d o w m e n t s , did n o t really matter, for it was t h e principle alone which K a n t was trying t o establish. Forster q u e s t i o n e d t h e whole distinction between n a t u r a l description a n d n a t u r a l history, a r g u i n g that Kant's a p p r o a c h to science was too metaphysical in t h a t h e b e g a n with principles, definitions, etc., instead of w o r k i n g empirically. H e r e K a n t r e s p o n d e d that science could n o t p r o c e e d without any o r i e n t i n g h y p o t h e s e s . Kant's c o n c e p t s were n o t metaphysical, but simply hypothetical, d e s i g n e d to clarify t h e p r o b l e m . Forster accused h i m f u r t h e r of advocating teleological e x p l a n a t i o n , w h e r e a s science o u g h t to work only with n a t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n . K a n t c o n c e d e d t h a t of course scie n c e always p r e f e r r e d efficient causes, w h e n it could find t h e m , b u t h e insisted t h a t in their absence, science was fully entitled to resort to t e l e o l o g y . T h i s was n o t capricious, it was necessary for t h e investigation itself. K a n t a r g u e d that it was simply impossible to conceive of o r g a n isms a n d above all of t h e process of g e n e r a t i o n a n d variation in heredity except in t e r m s of purposiveness. Mechanical accounts simply w e r e n o t a d e q u a t e . In his preliminary draft for t h e essay, Kant wrote very clearly o n this line: " T h e principle of p u r p o s i v e ness in t h e construction of o r g a n i c a n d especially living c r e a t u r e s is as m u c h b o u n d u p with reason as t h e principle of efficient causes in r e g a r d to all c h a n g e s in t h e world. T o take any p a r t of a c r e a t u r e for useless [zwecklos] which is a p e r m a n e n t fixture of its species is t h e s a m e t h i n g as to take a n o c c u r r e n c e in the world to have arisen witho u t a c a u s e . " Blind n a t u r a l m e c h a n i s m simply could n o t explain the complexity of t h e reciprocal relations of a n o r g a n i s m . 7 6

7 7

78

79

80

Kant m a d e t h e s a m e point at t h e conclusion of t h e essay, in his most exacting definition of " o r g a n i s m " p r i o r to t h e Third Critique. H e wrote: Because t h e concept of a n o r g a n i z e d b e i n g already implies t h a t it is a material t h i n g in which e v e r y t h i n g stands in relation to e v e r y t h i n g else reciprocally as e n d a n d m e a n s [Zweck und Mittel], a n d this can only b e conceived as a system of final Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism

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causes, a n d h e n c e human reason at least is left certainly not with a physical-mechanical, b u t only with a teleological way to explain its possibility: for this r e a s o n o n e c a n n o t ask of physics w h e n c e all such organization originally springs. T h e answer to this question would, if it were accessible at all, obviously lie outside n a t u r a l science in metaphysics. 81

A n d this was t h e p o i n t Kant wished most to stress to Forster: that the real dividing line was not between t h e two of t h e m as scientists, b u t r a t h e r between a u t h e n t i c scientists a n d a r r a n t speculators. K a n t struck out at such a r r a n t speculators several times in t h e essay. T h e first such blast c a m e early o n , w h e n h e w a r n e d against overhasty inferences from empirical observations to general p r i n ciples. H e claimed t h a t L i n n a e u s h a d fallen prey to e r r o r by taking t h e similarity of certain instances for a p r o o f of the similarity of their f u n d a m e n t a l principles. Such hasty generalization was not s o m e t h i n g a careful scientist p e r m i t t e d himself, but t h e r e were those "so indiscriminate as to r e a d t h e i r ideas into their observations." K a n t called such individuals "rash sophists [rasche Vernünftler]." H e went o n a few pages later to castigate "the c o m m o n , shallow way of t h i n k i n g which takes all the differences in o u r species o n t h e s a m e footing, namely, that of m e r e c h a n c e , a n d sees t h e m e m e r g i n g a n d fading as e x t e r n a l circumstances direct, a n d h e n c e which considers all [scientific] inquiries superfluous a n d even t h e preservation of species in t h e s a m e purposive form pointless." 82

83

T o w h o m Kant was r e f e r r i n g m i g h t b e unclear, o u t of context, b u t t h e r e can b e little d o u b t after all we have considered, a n d t h e r e is m o r e evidence to be b r o u g h t to bear. K a n t r e n e w e d his imprecation against sophistical science at t h e close of the essay, before his crucial definition of o r g a n i s m s , a n d t h e r e h e explicitly attacked the t h e o r y of force which h a d b e e n so widely b a n d i e d a b o u t . Such a theory, Kant c h a r g e d , could n e v e r be p r o v e n by e x p e r i e n c e . But " w h e r e t h e latter stops a n d o n e m u s t carry o n with self-invented forces of m a t t e r [selbst erdachten Kräften der Materie] in a c c o r d a n c e with u n h e a r d - o f laws incapable of proof, o n e has passed b e y o n d n a t u r a l s c i e n c e . " T h a t was w h a t H e r d e r h a d d o n e . 84

Forster h a d u s e d Kant's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e u t t e r fluidity of species from t h e review of H e r d e r as a n instance of Kant's m e t a physical a p p r o a c h to science, b u t K a n t insisted t h a t h e was hardly u p h o l d i n g such a p r e p o s t e r o u s notion as the "relatedness [Verwandtschaft] of e v e r y t h i n g in a n imperceptible g r a d i e n t from m a n 210

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to t h e whale a n d o n d o w n w a r d (conjecturally even to t h e lichens a n d m o s s e s ) — a n d not simply in a system of c o m p a r i s o n s b u t in t e r m s of a system of g e n e r a t i o n from c o m m o n lineages [Stämme] in a n a t u r a l chain of o r g a n i c beings." It was n o t h e w h o held that all life " s p r a n g from t h e m o t h e r w o m b of e a r t h fertilized by the seas l i m e " — t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e plenty w h o did, a n d K a n t gave t h e exa m p l e of B o n n e t . Kant withdrew his o w n c h a r g e t h a t such ideas were m o n s t r o u s a n d that reason was horrified by t h e m ( t h o u g h h e only did so as if these were F ö r s t e r s p h r a s e s , not his own). Rather, h e said, any s o u n d scholar would r e p u d i a t e t h e m because they a b a n d o n e d " t h e fruitful soil of n a t u r a l science" for t h e "wastelands of metaphysics." H e a c k n o w l e d g e d a "not u n m a n l y fear" of whatever "led r e a s o n away from its first principles a n d m a d e it p e r m i s sible to rove a b o u t in b o u n d l e s s imaginations." Not Forster, b u t Herder was t h e target of all this. At t h e core of H e r d e r ' s sophistries, in Kant's view, was his u n justifiable n o t i o n of f u n d a m e n t a l forces [Grundkräfte]. H e n c e Kant b r o u g h t his essay to a close with a n exposition of t h e p r o b l e m of any conception of f u n d a m e n t a l forces from the vantage of transcend e n t a l philosophy. Such a f u n d a m e n t a l force by definition could not b e d i s c e r n e d in any empirical e x p e r i e n c e . H e n c e it could only b e a m a t t e r of k n o w l e d g e if o n e could offer a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l acc o u n t for it. But, Kant was a d a m a n t , h u m a n reason "absolutely c a n n o t conceive such fundamental forces a p r i o r i . " W h a t were the implications for t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy of such a stark assertion? We m u s t reflect t h a t " p o w e r s " [Kräfte] was a t e r m which Kant h a d used to characterize t h e faculties of m i n d . W h a t was t h e status of such concepts in light of Kant's claim? H e a d d r e s s e d himself explicitly to this question in t h e same p a r a g r a p h . It was not, n e a r g u e d , as t h o u g h reason should n o t deal with the p r o b l e m posed by the question of f u n d a m e n t a l forces. But t h e r e was a p r o p e r m e t h o d which a l o n e offered any prospect of results. First, in t h e bewildering variety of such forces, reason should, as always, aim to r e d u c e t h e m to the least possible n u m b e r , t h o u g h it was implausible to believe they could ever b e r e d u c e d to unity. T h e only evidence of the existence of such forces was t h r o u g h t h e relation of cause a n d effect, a n d the only k n o w l e d g e we h a d of t h e m was in t h e effect, so that o u r conception could only draw from that evidence, a n d only express this causal relation. In a footnote, K a n t gave as his e x a m p l e t h e faculty of imagination [Einbildungskraft]. H e a r g u e d that we recognized it by its effects, a n d that we were in n o position to explain it by s o m e o t h e r force. 8 5

86

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T h i s led h i m to a m u c h m o r e g e n e r a l p o i n t , still in t h e footnote, with r e g a r d to t h e relation of substance t o force. H e r e Kant addressed himself to o n e of t h e core doctrines of Wolffian philosophy, t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e soul was a substance with a single f u n d a m e n t a l power, t h e p o w e r of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Wolff's e r r o r lay in t h e confusion of a nominal universal for a real o n e , Kant a r g u e d , d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e philosophical potential implicit in all his thinki n g a b o u t t h e p r o b l e m of r a c e . K a n t illustrated his p o i n t with a r e f e r e n c e to t h e t h e o r y of physical science. T o say all t h e forces of material n a t u r e were forces of m o v e m e n t was t r u e b u t useless, because from this we could not derive t h e specific forces of attraction a n d r e p u l s i o n which were alone constitutive of material dynamics. T h e m o r e abstract c o n c e p t was certainly higher, b u t it did n o t contain t h e lower concepts, since the latter were richer in c o n t e n t a n d h a d m a n y e l e m e n t s which fell outside of what was s h a r e d u n d e r t h e higher concept. B u t K a n t h a d a n even m o r e r e m a r k a b l e point to m a k e . T h e t h r u s t of t h e new ontologies of science was to try to identify t h e concept of s u b s t a n c e with t h e concept of f u n d a m e n t a l force, i.e., to dissolve m a t t e r into force. B u t that was a m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m s , Kant claimed. Force did n o t constitute t h e g r o u n d of t h e reality of p r o p e r t i e s . T h a t was what substance signified. Force was merely the relation of substance to its p r o p e r t i e s insofar as it (substance) g r o u n d e d their actuality. A n d substance could have as m a n y relations as it has p r o p e r t i e s . T h e r e f o r e t h e r e could be n o h o m o l o g y of substance with f u n d a m e n t a l force. T h e relevance of this a r g u m e n t will only e m e r g e fully w h e n we a r e dealing with t h e u l t i m a t e issues of ontology b e t w e e n Kant a n d t h e new metaphysics. K a n t b r o u g h t t h e s e notions of s u b s t a n c e a n d force at last to b e a r o n t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r g a n i s m , a n d c a m e directly to t h e t h r e s h o l d of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " H e w r o t e : 8 7

Now, t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r g a n i z e d b e i n g is this: that it is a material t h i n g which is only possible t h r o u g h t h e interrelation of all t h a t it contains reciprocally as e n d a n d m e a n s (in fact every anatomist a n d physiologist has p r e s u m e d such a concept). A f u n d a m e n t a l force t h r o u g h which o r g a n i c form is achieved m u s t consequently be t h o u g h t as a causality working accordi n g to p u r p o s e s , a n d i n d e e d in such a m a n n e r that these p u r poses m u s t b e a s s u m e d as the basis for t h e very possibilty of its efficacy. We, however, a r e a c q u a i n t e d with such forces, in 212

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t e r m s of t h e i r basis of determination, only in ourselves, i.e. in o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d will, as cause of t h e possibility of certain p r o d u c t s which a r e totally c o n s t r u c t e d according to p u r p o s e s , t h a t is, works of a r t . 8 8

T o try to conceive of a f o r m of causality which, without intellect a n d will, could nevertheless o r g a n i z e itself, was s o m e t h i n g for which we h a d n o m o d e l in ourselves a n d n o basis in e x p e r i e n c e . It was, K a n t c o n c l u d e d , "completely fanciful [erdichtet] a n d e m p t y , " a n d t h e r e was n o t t h e slightest r e a s o n to believe that any evidence could b e f o u n d for it. T h e r e f o r e , s h o u l d o r g a n i c form exist in the world, s o m e intelligent cause for it would have to be conceived, e i t h e r in t h e world o r outside it. Kant's writings o n biology t h r o u g h " U b e r d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer Principien in d e r Philosophie" have b r o u g h t us to t h e p r o b l e m of o r g a n i s m s . Kant's manifold considerations of t h e d e c a d e fuse into this o n e crucial consideration.

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31* Ten

T H E PROBLEM OF ORGANIC FORM IN T H E CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

hile t h e First Introduction e x a m i n e d the purposiveness of n a t u r e as a whole, t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " which Kant worked o n in t h e s p r i n g a n d s u m m e r of 1789, c o n c e r n e d itself with t h e issue of m o r e specific o r g a n i c f o r m s . I n d e e d , t h e "Critique" s h o u l d b e r e a d as t h e c u l m i n a t i o n of Kant's biological reflections. Yet all t h a t we h a v e d e t e r m i n e d c o n c e r n i n g the whole Third Critique—its p r o b lem f o r m u l a t i o n , its d e v e l o p m e n t , its languages—raises the disc o u r s e to a different p l a n e , a n d t h u s , while t h e familiar issues arise in t h e "Critique," they take o n a whole new significance a n d figure in a m u c h g r a n d e r philosophical project. T h e strategy of i n t e r p r e tation will begin with p r o b l e m s of biological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n familiar from Kant's earlier writings, p r o c e e d to his formulation of a theory of o r g a n i c form, a n d c u l m i n a t e in the "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " w h e r e Kant addressed t h e metaphysical p r o b l e m s his a p p r o a c h entailed. 1

C e r t a i n sections of the "Critique" directly restate t h e m e s in t h e teleology essay. T h u s , §68 seems to be a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the m e t h odological self-defense Kant offered against the criticisms of G e o r g Forster. A n d §80 can b e seen as Kant's reiteration of his q u a r r e l with t h e theorists of t h e mutability of species a n d t h e unity of force. Similarly, §81 can be seen as Kant's clearest position s t a t e m e n t o n late e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y biological theories of r e p r o d u c t i o n a n d "evolution," a n d h e n c e his definitive stance o n issues in biological science. Similarly, § § 6 4 - 6 6 r e p r e s e n t a m o r e deliberate a n d sustained effort to f o r m u l a t e a definition of organic form, but d e p a r t in n o significant m a n n e r from t h e c o n c e p t i o n offered at t h e close of t h e teleology essay. Let us take u p these familiar issues briefly in turn. 214

T h e gist of Forster's criticism was that Kant h a d n o t c o n d u c t e d himself p r o p e r l y as a scientist, i.e., t h a t Kant betrayed the m e t h o d o l ogy of science. I n §68, Kant again d e f e n d e d his m e t h o d o l o g y . H e e m p h a s i z e d its "systematic" c h a r a c t e r a n d also its use of c o n c e p t u a l h y p o t h e s e s , t h o u g h only heuristically, as guides for investigation. H e a r g u e d t h a t t h e very m e t a p h o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r of his l a n g u a g e s h o u l d have signaled the metaphysical diffidence of t h e a p p r o a c h . "Design is ascribed to n a t u r e , i.e. to m a t t e r . . . [But] n o design in the p r o p e r m e a n i n g of the w o r d can possibly be ascribed to inanim a t e m a t t e r . . . H e n c e we speak quite correctly in teleology . . . w i t h o u t e i t h e r m a k i n g a n intelligent b e i n g of [ n a t u r e ] , for that would be p r e p o s t e r o u s , o r even without p r e s u m i n g to place a n o t h e r intelligent B e i n g above it as its Architect." Kant was n o t advocating a theological a p p r o a c h to n a t u r a l science. Physicoteleology simply p o i n t e d to t h e inescapable logical p r o b l e m of s o m e o r i g i n a t i n g rational cause. Still, from that to a full-fledged n o t i o n of G o d was a considerable distance, a n d in any event, t h e o r i g i n a t i n g cause was a regulative, i.e., heuristic notion, n o t a n o b jective p r i n c i p l e . K a n t insisted that mechanical accounts failed to m a k e sense of o r g a n i c f o r m , a n d t h a t consequently, at some p o i n t in t h e most m e chanical e x p l a n a t i o n of o r g a n i c life some originating a n d n o n m e c h a n i c a l cause would n e e d to be invoked. Kant wished to b r i n g this to b e a r even o n t h e most e x t r a v a g a n t h y p o t h e s e s of g e n e r a t i o n offered in t h e biological sciences of his day, in §80. T h i s was t h e section in which Kant a p p e a r e d , especially to late n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n s t u d e n t s of his work, whose h e a d s were full of Darwinism, to have anticipated m u c h of t h e teaching of evolution. A careful consideration of t h e text shows that n o t h i n g could be f u r t h e r from the t r u t h . Kant was n o t e m b r a c i n g t h e d o c t r i n e h e articulated in §80 b u t r a t h e r h o l d i n g it forward as t h e most e x t r e m e sort of h y p o t h e s i s — o n e which, o n any s o u n d r e a d i n g e i t h e r of the clarifying footnote to t h a t section or of § 8 1 , h e t h e n expressly r e p u d i ated. 2

3

4

"If t h e naturalist would not waste his labor, h e must, in j u d g i n g of things t h e c o n c e p t of any of which is indubitably established as a n a t u r a l p u r p o s e (organized beings), always lay d o w n as basis a n original o r g a n i z a t i o n . " T h i s is t h e starting point for t h e celebrated discussion of t h e fluidity of species in which Kant takes u p t h e results of c o m p a r a t i v e a n a t o m y as a possibility for a mechanical exp l a n a t i o n of o r g a n i c modification: " T h e a g r e e m e n t of so m a n y g e n e r a of a n i m a l s in a certain c o m m o n schema, which a p p e a r s to 5

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be f u n d a m e n t a l not only in t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e i r bones b u t also in t h e disposition of t h e i r r e m a i n i n g p a r t s . . . allows a ray of h o p e , h o w e v e r f a i n t , . . . t h a t h e r e s o m e t h i n g m a y b e accomplished by t h e aid of the principle of t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e (without which t h e r e can b e n o n a t u r a l science in g e n e r a l ) . " Note that for Kant such a theory would b e a t h e o r y of mechanism. A n y i m m a n e n t acc o u n t of biological variation would b e mechanistic in his view, a n d t h a t is why for h i m t h e r e is n o real difference b e t w e e n a strict m e c h anistic materialist a n d a hylozoist. T h e y only differ in t h e p r o p e r ties they ascribe to matter, yet wish m a t t e r to suffice for t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of o r g a n i c p h e n o m e n a . K a n t struck immediately against t h e n o t i o n that any such insights yet qualified as objective k n o w l e d g e . T h e y were hints a n d h o p e s , n o t established facts, in his v i e w — t h o u g h n o t in that of t h e scientists of his day! At best, what they h a d was a fruitful analogy, K a n t went o n . " T h i s analogy of forms, which with all t h e i r differences seem to have b e e n p r o d u c e d according to a c o m m o n original type, s t r e n g t h e n s o u r suspicions of a n actual relationship between t h e m in their p r o d u c t i o n from a c o m m o n p a r e n t , t h r o u g h t h e g r a d u a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n of o n e animal g e n u s to a n o t h e r . " T h e relat i o n s h i p biologists h a d u n c o v e r e d was only analogy, only n o m i n a l . T h e y h a d raised t h e question of a n actual relationship, based o n Verwandtschaft, b u t hardly confirmed it by t h e i r results, K a n t insisted. T h e r e was, to be s u r e , a " g r a d u a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n " of g e n u s to g e n u s , b u t they r e m a i n e d quanta discreta. H e n c e it was a n extrava g a n t hypothesis i n d e e d to try to link t h e m all in a n actual relationship which would e x t e n d "from m a n , d o w n to t h e polyp, a n d again from this d o w n to mosses a n d lichens, a n d finally to t h e lowest stage of n a t u r e noticeable by us, viz. to c r u d e matter." Such a bold archaeologist of n a t u r e , reflecting o n t h e "surviving traces of its oldest revolutions," m i g h t conjecture o n e "great family of creatures." 6

7

H e can s u p p o s e t h e b o s o m of m o t h e r e a r t h , as she passed o u t of h e r chaotic state (like a g r e a t animal), to have given birth in t h e b e g i n n i n g to c r e a t u r e s of less p u r p o s i v e form, t h a t these again gave birth to o t h e r s which f o r m e d themselves with g r e a t e r a d a p t a t i o n to t h e i r place of birth a n d their relations to each o t h e r , until this w o m b b e c o m i n g t o r p i d a n d ossified, limited its births to definite species not f u r t h e r modifiable. 8

Yet Kant's point a b o u t this " d a r i n g v e n t u r e of r e a s o n " which " t h e m o s t a c u t e naturalists" m i g h t p e r m i t themselves was t h a t such a n 216

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k

archaeologist " m u s t still in the e n d ascribe to this universal m o t h e r a n o r g a n i z a t i o n p u r p o s i v e in respect of all these c r e a t u r e s . " T h a t is, at t h e origin, t h e r e m u s t be s o m e form of causality which is not material a n d which t h e n persists a n d governs t h e whole process of r e p r o d u c t i o n a n d variation across time. "It would always r e m a i n generatio univoca in t h e most universal sense of t h e word, for it only considers o n e o r g a n i c b e i n g as derived from a n o t h e r organic being, a l t h o u g h from o n e which is specifically different." Moreover, K a n t w e n t o n in t h e footnote, while such a h y p o t h esis was n o t c o n t r a r y to r e a s o n , a n d this distinguished it from t h e n o t i o n of s p o n t a n e o u s g e n e r a t i o n (generatio aequivoca), it was nevertheless n o t to be f o u n d in e x p e r i e n c e that such fluidity between species (generatio heteronyma) h a d ever taken place. " E x p e r i e n c e gives n o e x a m p l e of it; a c c o r d i n g to e x p e r i e n c e , all g e n e r a t i o n t h a t we k n o w is generatio homonyma. T h i s is n o t merely univoca in contrast to t h e g e n e r a t i o n o u t of u n o r g a n i z e d material, b u t in t h e organization of the p r o d u c t s is of like kind to t h a t which p r o d u c e d i t . " H e n c e K a n t clearly d e n i e d t h e empirical plausibility of t h e " d a r i n g v e n t u r e " of m u t a t i o n of species. I n §81 h e took his o w n stand based o n t h e necessity of a teleological principle in organic forms at s o m e point. E i t h e r such rational ( n o u m e n a l ) causality int r u d e d at every instance of such organic form, which was t h e m e t a physical d o c t r i n e of "occasionalism," o r it i n t r u d e d only at t h e origin, which was t h e metaphysical doctrine of "preestablished harmony," or " p r e f o r m a t i o n . " T h e f o r m e r was t h e u t t e r a b a n d o n m e n t of science, for it f o u n d miracle at every t u r n . "If we a s s u m e t h e occasionalism of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of organized beings, all n a t u r e is quite l o s t . " T h a t left " p r e f o r m a t i o n . " Kant distinguished two versions of t h e latter doctrine. O n e , "individual p r e f o r m a t i o n , " which K a n t associated with t h e t h e o r y of emboitement o r "transformationism," c o m m o n l y called the "evolution" theory in the e i g h t e e n t h century, h a d serious drawbacks. First, in r e q u i r i n g a special provid e n c e in t h e creation of each specific o r g a n i s m , it m a d e n o great a d v a n c e over "occasionalism," especially since p l a c e m e n t at the origin (in time) was really n o t a significant difference w h e n r e f e r r i n g to n o u m e n a l (timeless) causality. B u t t h e r e were even empirical p r o b l e m s with the theory. It h a d great difficulty dealing with such p r o b l e m s as a b o r t i o n a n d hybridization. 9

10

11

T h a t left only the t h e o r y of "generic p r e f o r m a t i o n " o r "epigenesis." A c c o r d i n g to this theory, "the productive faculty of t h e g e n e r a t o r , a n d consequently t h e specific form, would be virtually p r e f o r m e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e i n n e r purposive capacities [Anlagen] The Problem of Organic Form

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which a r e p a r t of its lineage [Stamm]." While the species were f o r m e d at t h e origin, t h e individuals within t h e m varied, within t h e limits of t h e i r original e n d o w m e n t s , a c c o r d i n g to t h e pressures of their e n v i r o n m e n t . T h i s was j u s t t h e t h e o r y which Kant h a d advocated in his t r e a t m e n t of race. T h e a d v a n t a g e of such a theory was t h a t it " r e g a r d s n a t u r e as self-producing, n o t merely as self-evolving, a n d so with t h e least e x p e n d i t u r e of the s u p e r n a t u r a l leaves to n a t u r e all t h a t follows after t h e first b e g i n n i n g . " T h e m a i n advocate of such a t h e o r y of epigenesis, K a n t wrote, was B l u m e n b a c h . It was h e w h o d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e validity a n d t h e limitations of t h e hypothesis by refuting t h e excesses of its materialist a n d hylozoist rivals. I n all physical e x p l a n a t i o n s of these formations h e starts from o r g a n i s e d m a t t e r . T h a t c r u d e m a t t e r s h o u l d have originally f o r m e d itself a c c o r d i n g to mechanical laws, that life s h o u l d have s p r u n g from t h e n a t u r e of what is lifeless, that m a t t e r s h o u l d have b e e n able to dispose itself into t h e form of a selfm a i n t a i n i n g p u r p o s i v e n e s s — t h i s h e rightly declares to be contradictory to r e a s o n . 12

T h e u l t i m a t e e n e m i e s in t h e whole controversy over t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e a n i m a t e a n d t h e i n a n i m a t e stand revealed: those w h o advocated a n i m m a n e n t a c c o u n t of o r g a n i s m s . Kant n a m e d t h e m in t h e last s e g m e n t of §80: H u m e , t h e pantheists, a n d t h e Spinozi s t s . T h e y w e r e n o t scientific rivals; they were rivals in metaphysics. Before we t u r n to t h a t metaphysical rivalry, a n d t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in which it was f o u g h t o u t , let us review briefly Kant's definition of organic form as h e developed it in §§64— 6 6 . T h e essential definition Kant offered of such o r g a n i c form, as we have seen from t h e essay " Ü b e r d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer Principien i n d e r Philosophie," was that of t h e reciprocal interrelation of p a r t s as m e a n s a n d e n d s , a n d consequently, of t h e priority of t h e w h o l e over t h e p a r t s in t h e constitution of t h e entity. Structurally, t h a t is, o r g a n i s m s a p p e a r e d to be b o t h cause a n d effect of themselves. T h e i r p a r t s were possible only t h r o u g h their r e f e r e n c e to t h e whole. T h e y w e r e self-organizing beings. Kant m a d e a m u c h m o r e p a i n s t a k i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n of these same points in t h e "Analytic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " I n §64 Kant a r g u e d t h a t such o r g a n i c forms a p p e a r e d " c o n t i n g e n t " relative to all empirical laws, i.e., they could n o t be a c c o u n t e d for in j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e based o n mechanical causality. A n o r g a n i s m was "cause a n d effect of itself." K a n t p o i n t e d to t h r e e distinct processes which showed this trait: r e p r o d u c t i o n , internal g r o w t h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d r e 13

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ciprocal i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of parts. H e n c e , in §65 h e associated with o r g a n i s m s a "formative p o w e r of a self-propagating k i n d . " In §66 h e went o n to characterize this reciprocal i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as that of e n d s a n d m e a n s a n d to a r g u e that it was as inconceivable t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be parts in a n o r g a n i s m which h a d n o p u r p o s e as t h a t t h e r e could be events in n a t u r e without a c a u s e . B u t t h e really interesting question was not how Kant described o r g a n i c forms. T h e question was how h e reconciled their empirical actuality with his system of cognition a n d his philosophy as a whole. It is t h e metaphysical question which d e m a n d s a h e a r i n g . 14

15

The Epistemological Problem of Empirical

Organisms

Reflective j u d g m e n t i m p u t e d purposiveness to n a t u r e as a whole merely heuristically, as a methodological recourse necessary for scientific insight into the empirical diversity of n a t u r e . Its objective was to create a system of empirical science. O n e of the marks of a system is closure, i.e., t h e resolution of all t h e events that fall within its scope. T h e N e w t o n i a n physics in whose system K a n t wished to set empirical science involved efficient mechanical cause. B u t within t h e empirical diversity it s o u g h t to organize, s o m e objects p r e s e n t e d anomalies which t h e mechanical framework could n o t explicate. O n e m i g h t ask h o w it was even possible, according to Kant's m o d e l , to e x p e r i e n c e such entities, since e x p e r i e n c e was necessarily s t r u c t u r e d in t e r m s of the categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d h e n c e in a m o d e l which was already mechanical. Kant a d d r e s s e d himself to this question in t h e First Introduction in §7. As h e p u t it, "the first q u e s t i o n at this p o i n t is, how is t h e technic of n a t u r e perceived in its p r o d u c t s ? " T o explain h o w o r g a n i s m s could b e recognized, K a n t h a d to deploy his " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , " that involving "reflection" a n d "purposiveness," because t h e d e t e r m i n a n t form of j u d g m e n t simply did n o t suffice. T h e j u d g m e n t of exp e r i e n c e p r e s e n t e d consciousness with d a t a which simply did n o t accord with t h e premises of t h a t v e r y j u d g m e n t — i t was a n o m a l o u s , or, in his t e r m s , " c o n t i n g e n t " — a n d some crucial s u p p l e m e n t bec a m e necessary to r e n d e r t h e e x p e r i e n c e c o h e r e n t . Purposiveness is n e v e r s o m e t h i n g we perceive directly in a n e x p e r i e n c e . It is, r a t h e r , a n inference, a n i m p u t a t i o n , which we m a k e . K a n t p u t it well in a m a r g i n a l n o t e to his o w n copy of the First Introduction: "we r e a d final causes into things a n d d o not, so to speak, abstract t h e m from p e r c e p t i o n s . " 16

1 7

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Yet we d o so for g o o d reasons. K a n t m a d e a very i m p o r t a n t o b servation in the Second Critique which is g e r m a n e h e r e : "all events in time a c c o r d i n g to n a t u r a l law can be called t h e ' m e c h a n i s m of nat u r e , ' even t h o u g h it is n o t s u p p o s e d that things which a r e subject to it m u s t really b e material m a c h i n e s . " T h i s is t h e converse of t h e p o i n t h e m a d e so strenuously at t h e level of n a t u r e as a whole: j u s t because n a t u r e a p p e a r e d d e s i g n e d , that did n o t m e a n it could n o t have achieved this mechanically. H e r e t h e proposition is: j u s t because n a t u r e a p p e a r s u n d e r t h e categorical rules of mechanical law, t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h e real g r o u n d of its p h e n o m e n a l a p p e a r a n c e s m i g h t n o t follow s o m e o t h e r principle. We can perceive, i.e., f o r m a " j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n " of, such entities. B u t how can we conceive of t h e m ? Is it possible to acc o m m o d a t e this a n o m a l y w i t h o u t destroying the causal s t r u c t u r e of the First Critique? H o w is it possible to explain d e t e r m i n a t e l y objects of e x p e r i e n c e which fall outside the s t r u c t u r e of c a t e g o r i e s ? It m u s t b e r e m e m b e r e d t h a t while t h e reflective j u d g m e n t served a l t o g e t h e r well for t h e i n d u c t i o n of new principles of scientific ord e r in t h e empirical world, these principles could only be established as valid science t h r o u g h a p r o o f s t r u c t u r e which would work deductively in t e r m s of t h e causal categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h u s , to illustrate, it was a n act of imagination, of reflective j u d g m e n t , which led Kepler to conceive of t h e orbits of the planets as elipses, b u t h e only p e r s u a d e d t h e scientific c o m m u n i t y of his insight w h e n h e was able to p r o v e his claim mathematically a n d have it c o n f i r m e d by empirical m e a s u r e m e n t s . T h a t is, h e h a d to take his insight, his i n d u c t i o n , a n d r e f o r m u l a t e it as a " d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , " in Kant's terminology. Only " j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e , " sanctioned by t h e rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , constituted valid k n o w l e d g e in his view. 19

20

T h e d i l e m m a which organic forms p r e s e n t e d was t h a t such a m e c h a n i c a l m o d e of e x p l a n a t i o n did not, a n d as far as could b e d e t e r m i n e d w o u l d n o t ever b e able to, account for t h e p h e n o m e n a to be c o n s t r u e d , K a n t a r g u e d . W h a t were t h e characteristics of these empirical a n o m a l i e s which r e n d e r e d t h e m so difficult to explicate mechanically? F r o m t h e vantage of scientific explanation, t h e real p r o b l e m with o r g a n i s m s was t h a t their behavior was inconsistent with t h e h u m a n m o d e of causal e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e intrinsic o r d e r of a n o r g a n i s m was such t h a t it was, in t h e full sense, systematic. H e n c e it was impossible to apply a serial m o d e l of causal construction to it. It fell n o t u n d e r t h e serial form of j u d g m e n t ( g r o u n d to 21

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c o n s e q u e n c e , cause to effect) b u t r a t h e r u n d e r t h e disjunctive form of j u d g m e n t (whole to p a r t ) . At t h e level of p e r c e p t i o n itself, however, it intractably r e m a i n e d t h a t we e n c o u n t e r e d p h e n o m e n a of which it was h u m a n l y impossible to m a k e any sense a p a r t from t h e ascription to t h e seq u e n c e of t h e i r behavior of a principle which was n o t mechanical. A n o r g a n i s m was a self-constituting whole which t r a n s f o r m e d itself within its o w n systemic c o n t o u r s literally before o u r eyes in a m a n n e r which defied all o u r constitutive e x p l a n a t o r y m o d e l s . T h e only alternative principle we h a d at o u r rational disposal was t h e concept of p u r p o s e which we ourselves used to s u p e r i m p o s e o u r will u p o n m e c h a n i c a l process, a n d so we h a d r e c o u r s e to this in o u r conception of these empirical anomalies. W h a t was t h e usefulness of t h e analogy of p u r p o s e in t h e context of o r g a n i c forms? P u r p o s e signified that a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the m i n d served as t h e original cause of t h e existence of a n entity or a state of affairs. M a n could m a k e sense of his o w n purposive activity as rational (even if n o u m e n a l ) causality in t e r m s of t h e temporal a n d logical p r e c e d e n c e of a n idea a n d willed act to t h e actuality h e p r o d u c e d as a n objective p u r p o s e , b u t h o w could such a self-determination be projected u p o n noncognitive entities? T h e r e was n o g r o u n d to ascribe a m i n d capable of such willed action to t h e o r g a n i c forms m a n observed in n a t u r e , Kant insisted. T h e y a p p e a r e d to be intrinsically self-regulating, b u t according to K a n t it r e m a i n e d i m p r o p e r to ascribe to t h e m , as p h e n o m e n a l objects, a n intelligent will. T o view m e r e material p h e n o m e n a in t h a t m a n n e r was to fall into t h e contradiction of h y l o z o i s m . T o ascribe to the p h e n o m e n a of organic form the principle of p u r p o s i v e n e s s was n o t even very fruitful as analogy, because these objects e x c e e d e d utterly t h e m o s t elaborate form of intrinsic p u r posiveness h u m a n beings could design, t h a t is, works of art. K a n t realized t h a t t h e analogy h a d a g a p i n g flaw. W h a t a n o r g a n i s m could d o was "infinitely b e y o n d t h e reach of art," h e wrote in §64. A n d h e d e v e l o p e d this realization m o r e extensively in §65. "We say of n a t u r e a n d its faculty in o r g a n i z e d p r o d u c t s far too little if we describe it as a n analogon of art, for this suggests a n artificer (a rational being) e x t e r n a l to it." K a n t recognized t h a t o r g a n i s m s organized themselves. S u c h "internal natural perfection . . . is not even thinkable o r explicable by m e a n s of any exactly fitting analogy to h u m a n art." K a n t c o n c l u d e d : " T o speak strictly, t h e n , t h e organization of n a t u r e has in it n o t h i n g analogous to any causality we know." 2 2

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H e r e K a n t b o t h a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e limitation of his a p p r o a c h a n d set forth t h e intense philosophical difficulty of a n alternative. It was t h e search for a n alternative which led to the speculative rec o u r s e of hylozoism. O n this score, K a n t w r o t e : We p e r h a p s a p p r o a c h n e a r e r to this inscrutable p r o p e r t y if we describe it as a n analogem of life, b u t t h e n we m u s t either e n d o w m a t t e r , as m e r e matter, with a p r o p e r t y which contradicts its very b e i n g (hylozoism) o r associate therewith a n alien principle standing in communion with it (a soul). B u t in the latter case we m u s t , if such a p r o d u c t is to be a n a t u r a l p r o d uct, e i t h e r p r e s u p p o s e o r g a n i z e d m a t t e r as t h e i n s t r u m e n t of t h a t soul, which d o e s not m a k e the soul a whit m o r e comp r e h e n s i b l e , o r r e g a r d t h e soul as artificer of this s t r u c t u r e , a n d so r e m o v e t h e p r o d u c t from (corporeal) n a t u r e . 2 4

K a n t did n o t believe e i t h e r of t h e two versions of hylozoism could s t a n d u p to r i g o r o u s analysis. H e subjected t h e m to it in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " B u t if all these alternatives failed, was t h e r e any resolution of t h e d i l e m m a ? K a n t believed t h e r e was o n e last o u t : " T h e c o n c e p t of a t h i n g as in itself a n a t u r a l p u r p o s e is . . . n o constitutive c o n c e p t of u n d e r s t a n d i n g or of reason, b u t it can serve as a regulative c o n c e p t for t h e reflective j u d g m e n t , to g u i d e o u r investigation a b o u t objects of this kind by a distant analogy with o u r o w n c a u s a l i t y . " Driven to a d m i t that it was impossible for m a n to see o r g a n i s m s o t h e r t h a n as n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s , K a n t h e l d t h a t this necessity lay in our projection, n o t their n a t u r e . 25

2 6

The "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment":

The Methodological

Portion

T h e "Dialectic" t u r n s o n two distinctions, t h a t between a subjective m a x i m a n d a n objective principle, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h a t between a reflective a n d a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , o n t h e other. A r e flective j u d g m e n t is only a subjective r e c o u r s e , a n d its w a r r a n t is c o n s e q u e n t l y only a subjective m a x i m . A d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , a " j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e " in Kant's earlier l a n g u a g e , has t h e full w a r r a n t of a n objective principle. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t r e a s o n fell into dialectical e r r o r w h e n it took a subjective m a x i m as a n objective principle, o r a reflective j u d g m e n t for a d e t e r m i n a n t o n e . B u t t h e m a t t e r is n o t so simple. T h e resolution of Kant's "Dialectic" h i n g e d o n conceiving of t h e mechanistic e x p l a n a t i o n of empirical events as j u s t as m u c h a 2 7

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subjective m a x i m as t h e teleological e x p l a n a t i o n , a n d this is a very p r o b l e m a t i c idea in light of t h e "Second Analogy" of t h e First Critique. H o w a r e we to u n d e r s t a n d this move? I n his study of Kant's c o n c e p t of teleology, M c F a r l a n d offers a n i n g e n i o u s h y p o t h e s i s . H e suggests t h a t while m e c h a n i s m has t h e full w a r r a n t of validity in its transcendental e m p l o y m e n t , constituting t h e object of possible e x p e r i e n c e o r n a t u r e in g e n e r a l , its status alters w h e n it is b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n p r o b l e m s in empirical n a t u r e , a n d it t h e n stands merely as o n e possible m a x i m of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a m o n g o t h e r s . While it is constitutive at t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level, it is only regulative at t h e empirical level. Yet this i n g e n i o u s t h e o r y r u n s into difficulty as to t h e m e a n i n g of a determinant j u d g m e n t at t h e empirical level. E i t h e r McFarland m u s t d e n y it occurs at this level, which goes against Kant's text, as M c F a r l a n d realizes, o r h e faces t h e prospect t h a t such a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t c a n n o t in fact be discriminated from a reflective j u d g m e n t in t e r m s e i t h e r of i n d u c t i o n versus specification o r of objective cognitive validity. K a n t could n o t have m e a n t this. H e never s u r r e n d e r e d t h e belief that even in t h e empirical, a mechanistic exp l a n a t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e categories resulted in valid knowle d g e , a n d h e n c e it was n o t merely a subjective m a x i m . It h a d a claim to objectivity which was n e v e r accorded to reflection. It p r o d u c e d "real," n o t " n o m i n a l " concepts, t h o u g h assertorically not apodictically. 28

At several j u n c t u r e s in t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " K a n t insisted that, in t e r m s of empirical knowledge, only t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , i.e., only t h e e x p l a n a t i o n according to m e chanical causality, could p r o d u c e valid science. T h u s in §70, K a n t w r o t e : "unless this lies at t h e basis of investigation, t h e r e can b e n o p r o p e r k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e at a l l . " In §78, h e m a d e t h e same point: "It is infinitely i m p o r t a n t for r e a s o n n o t to let slip t h e m e c h a nism of n a t u r e in its p r o d u c t s , a n d in t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n n o t to pass it by, because w i t h o u t it n o insight into t h e n a t u r e of things can b e a t t a i n e d . " A n d in §80, Kant, almost as a n aside, observed t h a t w i t h o u t t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e " t h e r e can b e n o n a t u r a l science in g e n e r a l . " H e c o n c l u d e d t h e e n t i r e "Dialectic" o n this n o t e : "We s h o u l d explain all p r o d u c t s a n d occurrences in n a t u r e , even t h e most p u r p o s i v e , by m e c h a n i s m as far as is in o u r p o w e r (the limits of which we c a n n o t give a n account of in this kind of investigat i o n ) . " T h i s was t h e "privilege" which t h e principle of m e c h a n i s m enjoyed in t h e study of n a t u r e . 29

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N o t only did Kant t h u s privilege empirical d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t s as truly scientific, b u t h e also consistently d e n i e d to empirical reflective j u d g m e n t s any such title. T h i s is most explicit in §79. I n that section, K a n t asked a b o u t t h e cognitive status of teleology: "Does it b e l o n g to n a t u r a l science (properly so c a l l e d ) . . , ?" H e replied: " n a t u r a l science . . . n e e d s d e t e r m i n a n t a n d not merely reflective principles in o r d e r to supply objective g r o u n d s for n a t u r a l effects. I n fact, n o t h i n g is g a i n e d for the t h e o r y of n a t u r e or t h e m e c h a n i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of its p h e n o m e n a by m e a n s of its effective causes by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m as c o n n e c t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e relation of p u r p o s e s . . . Teleology, t h e r e f o r e , as science, belongs to n o d o c t r i n e b u t only to c r i t i q u e . " T h a t is, it is purely subjective. Since it was impossible to t h i n k of o r g a n i s m s in any m a n n e r b u t as n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s , K a n t claimed, "the question . . . can only be w h e t h e r this f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n is m e r e l y subjectively valid, i.e. is a m e r e m a x i m of o u r j u d g m e n t , or w h e t h e r it is a n objective principle of n a t u r e . " K a n t clearly believed that to h o l d t h e latter was to "confuse a f u n d a m e n t a l proposition of the reflective with o n e of t h e d e terminant judgment." Kant's "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " considered m e t h odologically, e n d s in precisely t h e same p o s t u r e for n a t u r e as a whole as h e e n d e d t h e "Analytic" in t h e consideration of particular o r g a n i c forms: with a "regulative" or "subjective" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of reflective j u d g m e n t in its cognitive application (teleology). T h e question t h a t m u s t b e raised seriously is w h e t h e r this suffices. C a n Kant's cognitive system e n d u r e t h e actuality of t h e a n o m a l y of o r g a n i c forms within a p r e s u m a b l y systematic empirical "science" a n d m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y within a p r e s u m a b l y systematic "trans c e n d e n t a l logic"? Kant's p r e s e n t a t i o n d o e s n o t resolve t h e dil e m m a it uncovers, b u t only offers t h e u n p l e a s a n t b u t ostensibly ineluctable e x p e d i e n t of " t h i n k i n g " a b o u t actual p r o b l e m s of nat u r e in t e r m s which violate f u n d a m e n t a l l y t h e principle of his o w n science a n d epistemology. If, as h e c o n t e n d e d , t h e analogy with p u r p o s e was a weak projection, c o n t i n g e n t u p o n o u r discursiveness, a n d o n e , m o r e o v e r , which did n o t fully fit t h e case, a n d if, further, h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e with reason suggested a capacity for intrinsic self-determination as a n actual force in the world, however " n o u m e n a l " its origins, t h e force of Kant's o w n a r g u m e n t t h r u s t s us, willy-nilly, into considerations which m u s t revise his notions of science a n d of epistemology toward a m o r e inclusive frame of reference. 33

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The Intrusion of Metaphysics K a n t wished to k e e p o p e n t h e possibility of teleological j u d g m e n t s a b o u t n a t u r e in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " n o t merely because t h e p r o b l e m of o r g a n i c form could find n o o t h e r c o h e r e n t r e s o l u t i o n — s i n c e in fact even his o w n p r o p o s a l offered only a l a m e resolution which e x p o s e d all t h e weaknesses of discursive r e a s o n i n g — b u t because it offered, over a n d above its empirical assistance, a very i m p o r t a n t set of metaphysical c o n c o m m i t a n t s . "[I]t is at least possible to consider t h e material world as m e r e p h e n o m e n o n a n d to think as its substrate s o m e t h i n g like a t h i n g in itself (which is n o t p h e n o m e n o n ) , a n d to attach to this a corres p o n d i n g intellectual intuition (even t h o u g h it is not ours). T h u s t h e r e would b e , a l t h o u g h incognizable by us, a supersensible real g r o u n d for n a t u r e , to which we ourselves b e l o n g . " T h a t was t h e real p o i n t of t h e "Dialectic." K a n t a i m e d not at the "conflict" of e m pirical research m a x i m s b u t r a t h e r at t h e issue of plausible m e t a physics of n a t u r e as a whole. T h e issue of o r g a n i c form r e n e w e d in a n even m o r e intense form t h e question of t h e objectivity of purposiveness in n a t u r e which reflective j u d g m e n t h a d e n c o u n t e r e d in the idea of the technic of n a t u r e as a whole. T h e m e r e existence of one n a t u r a l p u r p o s e , K a n t a r g u e d , r e q u i r e d a reconsideration of the entirety of n a t u r e as a system of laws: "if we o n c e refer action of this sort on the whole to a n y supersensible g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a t i o n b e y o n d t h e blind m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e , we m u s t j u d g e it a l t o g e t h e r according to this principle," Kant w r o t e . " B u t this concept leads necessarily to the idea of collective n a t u r e as a system in accordance with t h e r u l e of p u r p o s e s , to which idea all t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e m u s t b e s u b o r d i n a t e d . " Such a system would have its g r o u n d b e y o n d nat u r e , for only this would p e r m i t b o t h a mechanical a n d a teleological principle of j u d g m e n t to be viable in the conception of n a t u r a l objects: " T h e principle which should r e n d e r possible t h e compatibility of b o t h in j u d g i n g of n a t u r e m u s t be placed in that which lies outside b o t h (and consequently outside t h e possible empirical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of n a t u r e ) , b u t yet contains their g r o u n d , i.e. in the supersensible." 36

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W i t h these a r g u m e n t s a b o u t t h e supersensible, t h e ultimate consideration b e h i n d Kant's interest in biological science a n d in teleology at last comes to t h e forefront: his c o n c e r n with theology, with t h e c o n c e p t i o n of a n intelligent creator. " T h e n a t u r a l things

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t h a t we find possible only as p u r p o s e s supply t h e best p r o o f of the c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e w o r l d - w h o l e . " H e r e is t h e g r a n d t e m p t a t i o n to metaphysics. " T h e r e is, t h e n , i n d e e d a certain p r e s e n t i m e n t of o u r r e a s o n o r a hint, as it were, given u s by n a t u r e , that, by m e a n s of this c o n c e p t of final causes, we g o b e y o n d n a t u r e a n d could u n i t e it to t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t in t h e series of c a u s e s . " I n a word, "teleology. . . finds t h e c o n s u m m a t i o n of its investigations only in t h e o l o g y . " O f course this is "dialectical"—a n a t u r a l e r r o r of r e a s o n which carries it b e y o n d t h e b o u n d s of its legitimate authority. A n d yet, as t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " reveals, it is for K a n t a n inescapable speculative u r g e w h o s e very frustration should serve as a useful p r o p a e d e u t i c to m a n ' s reflection o n his own being-in-thew o r l d — m o r a l considerations t h a t lead o n c e again, but, in Kant's view, with legitimacy, b e y o n d t h e p h e n o m e n a l world (i.e., "ethicotheology"). K a n t d e n i e d t h e n o t i o n of n a t u r e as living, as an active subject "in-and-for-itself," a d a m a n t l y . First, h e refused to believe we could know n a t u r e as a whole. Second, h e a r g u e d we could barely "think" of n a t u r e as a whole as a p u r p o s e . If we did so, we could not t h i n k it an intrinsic o r real p u r p o s e , i.e., h e d e n i e d that we could even t h i n k of n a t u r e as alive: "the possibility of living m a t t e r c a n n o t even be t h o u g h t ; its c o n c e p t involves a contradiction, because lifelessness, inertia, constitutes t h e essential c h a r a c t e r of m a t t e r . " K a n t insisted that "life m e a n s t h e capacity of a substance to d e t e r m i n e itself to act from a n i n t e r n a l principle, of a finite substance to d e t e r m i n e itself to c h a n g e , a n d of a material substance to d e t e r m i n e itself to m o t i o n o r rest as c h a n g e of its s t a t e . " T h e only p o w e r capable of such self-determination, K a n t went on, was intelligent will. Intelligent will could n e v e r b e f o u n d in p h e n o m e n a ; it did n o t exist in n a t u r e . It b e l o n g e d to n o u m e n a . Even m a n , a being of t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r , only h a d "life" by virtue of his o t h e r , n o u m e n a l a s p e c t . 40

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T h e philosophical p r o b l e m of this "purposiveness of n a t u r e , " K a n t insisted, allowed only o n e solution: a t r a n s c e n d e n t creator. T h e r e w e r e only two alternatives. Either consciousness h a d to a d mit t h a t n a t u r e was capable of intrinsic purposiveness, o r o n e h a d to a s s u m e a s u p e r n a t u r a l creator. Consequently, K a n t believed m a n could only c o m p r e h e n d t h e purposiveness of n a t u r e t h r o u g h a projection of actual p u r p o s e b e y o n d n a t u r e o n t o a t r a n s c e n d e n t a n d considerably s u p e r i o r intelligence. I n §iv of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Third Critique, h e w r o t e : "particular empirical laws, in respect of w h a t is in t h e m left u n d e t e r m i n e d by these universal laws, m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d in a c c o r d a n c e with such a unity as they would have if 226

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a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( a l t h o u g h not o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) h a d furn i s h e d t h e m to o u r cognitive faculties, so as to m a k e possible a syst e m of e x p e r i e n c e a c c o r d i n g to particular laws of n a t u r e . " T o deal with the p a r a d o x e s which organic form posed for consciousness, K a n t f o u n d p r o f o u n d l y attractive, even if merely conjectural, a notion we m i g h t t e r m "nature-for-God." I n Kant's words, "Nat u r e is n o l o n g e r estimated as it a p p e a r s like art, b u t r a t h e r in so far as it actually is art, t h o u g h s u p e r h u m a n a r t . " Such "physicotheology" was inevitable for m a n ' s discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g , Kant claimed. T h i s conjecture of a Nature-for-God c a m e to formulation via t h e analogy of purposiveness. " O u r reason has in its p o w e r for t h e j u d g m e n t n o o t h e r principle of t h e possibility of t h e object, which it inevitably j u d g e s teleologically, t h a n t h a t of s u b o r d i n a t i n g t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e to t h e architectonic of a n intelligent A u t h o r of t h e w o r l d . " Kant's willingness to articulate these speculative notions cann o t b e e x p l a i n e d entirely in t e r m s of t h e scientific o r epistemological q u a n d a r y into which the p r o b l e m of o r g a n i c form p l u n g e d discursive r e a s o n . Rather, it is crucial to b r i n g into consideration s o m e powerful c o n t e x t u a l forces which were driving h i m toward t h e articulation a n d defense of a series of theological a n d m o r a l c o m m i t m e n t s of a definitely metaphysical n a t u r e . T h e key to Kant's metaphysical a d v e n t u r e in t h e Critique of Judgment is t h e n e e d to r e s p o n d to a powerful new metaphysical vision which was catching the i m a g i n a t i o n of G e r m a n y in t h e second half of t h e 1780s: Spinozist p a n t h e i s m . T h e issue t h a t m u s t b e carried forward into t h a t context is w h e t h e r K a n t h a d compellingly refuted hylozoism a n d w h e t h e r his o w n position was c o h e r e n t , either e p i s t e m o logically o r scientifically, i.e., in t e r m s of t h e exhaustiveness of his concept of causality in t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic, o r in t e r m s of t h e possibility of empirical-scientific accounts of organisms. 4 7

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T H E PANTHEISM CONTROVERSY AND T H E THIRD CRITIQUE

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h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy arose in A u g u s t 1785, w h e n Friedrich Jacobi published a slender volume i n t e n d e d to create a scandal over Lessing's alleged Spinozism a n d a t h e i s m . At t h e e n d of S e p t e m b e r , Mendelssohn p u b lished Morgenstunden, with c h a p t e r s d e v o t e d to t h e question of Lessing's a t t i t u d e t o w a r d S p i n o z a . T h e resulting controversy p r o v e d to b e o n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t events in G e r m a n intellectual life. It is only n o w b e g i n n i n g to receive t h e recognition it d e serves. Frederick Beiser's r e c e n t history of G e r m a n philosophy in t h e d e c a d e after t h e First Critique is a notable effort to d o justice to t h e c o n t r o v e r s y . Beiser conceives it as h a v i n g t h r e e levels of signific a n c e . T h e surface issue concerns Lessing's religious loyalties in t h e context of t h e rationalism of the A u f k l ä r u n g . B e n e a t h t h a t is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e p r o p e r exegesis of Spinoza's philosophy. B u t Beiser a r g u e s correctly t h a t t h e " i n n e r c o r e " of t h e controversy is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e "authority of reason," i.e., w h e t h e r philosophy was capable of salvaging a m e a n i n g f u l c o s m o s . 1

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As a major m o m e n t in t h e struggle of A u f k l ä r u n g against Sturm und Drang, the P a n t h e i s m Controversy inevitably affected I m m a n u e l Kant. "Spinozism" was a symbol for two crucial issues of t h e a g e : " m o d e r n scientific n a t u r a l i s m " as " u n c o m p r o m i s i n g m e c h a n i s m , " a n d criticism of traditional authority, b o t h religious a n d civil, t h r o u g h " e n l i g h t e n e d " e x a m i n a t i o n of its bases. Spinozism a p p e a l e d to e l e m e n t s in G e r m a n y i n s u r g e n t against o r t h o d o x y in religion a n d also against t h e ancien r e g i m e in politics. T h a t n o t only Spinoza's biblical a n d political criticism but also the " o r t h o d o x " r e a d i n g of his metaphysics certainly h a d this "radical" p o t e n tial has b e e n established in a wider e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E u r o p e a n c o n t e x t by M a r g a r e t J a c o b . Lessing's Spinozism a p p e a r e d to e m 7

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brace b o t h of these aspects, a n d t h a t was why it p r o v o k e d so m a n y : "Spinozism" was so radical t h a t it t h r e a t e n e d to isolate t h e Aufklär u n g from t h e s u p p o r t of t h e establishment a n d b r i n g d o w n u p o n it t h e reprisals of o r t h o d o x religion. For Mendelssohn, Spinozism was a d a n g e r o u s a n d e x t r e m e philosophical e n t e r p r i s e which comp r o m i s e d t h e security of t h e Aufklärung's progress, b u t for Jacobi A u f k l ä r u n g progress itself was t h e d a n g e r , a n d Mendelssohn's version in p a r t i c u l a r n e e d e d to b e o v e r t h r o w n . J a c o b i insisted that it was not merely t h e "radical" form of Spinozism b u t t h e entire e n t e r p r i s e of A u f k l ä r u n g itself which h a d to b e r e p u d i a t e d to rescue t h e Christian c u l t u r e of G e r m a n y . In his challenge to t h e a u t h o r i t y of r e a s o n a n d his a r g u m e n t for a "leap of faith" (salto mortale), J a c o b i used Spinozism as t h e e x e m p l a r of all consistent philosophy, which, in his view, h a d to drive its practitioners to a t h o r o u g h g o i n g n i h i l i s m . T h a t such nihilism discredited t h e a u t h o r i t y of r e a s o n b o t h Jacobi a n d M e n d e l s s o h n , bitter rivals t h o u g h they were, a g r e e d . T h e public d i s p u t e s e e m e d o n all sides deeply antipathetic to "Spinozism." M e n d e l s s o h n , a n d later Kant, accepted Jacobi's claim a b o u t Spinoza a n d a r g u e d only t h a t while Spinozism did m e r i t t h e criticism, o t h e r rational philosop h y did not. M e n d e l s s o h n equivocated even a b o u t t h i s . Only K a n t clearly d e f e n d e d t h e "authority of reason," b u t o n the basis of his o w n peculiar system. While J a c o b i a n d M e n d e l s s o h n — a n d t h e r e f o r e K a n t — s a w Spinozism as a force (symbolic o r actual) driving philosophy toward nihilism, H e r d e r , G o e t h e a n d the g e n e r a t i o n of Idealism saw Spinozism as a decisive r e s o u r c e , o n c e properly r e f o r m u l a t e d , for t h e rescue of p h i l o s o p h y from that debacle. W h a t was it in Spinoza t h a t t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e Goethezeit f o u n d so promising? Certainly n o t " u n c o m p r o m i s i n g m e c h a n i s m " or "atheism a n d fatalism." Instead, they saw in his idea of "intrinsic infinity" a kind of holism which p r o v i d e d a resolution to t h e c o n u n d r u m of m o d e r n epistemology (in b o t h its m i n d - b o d y as well as its o n e - m a n y f o r m s ) . T h e most spectacular o u t c o m e of t h e controversy was this formulation of a heterodox i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S p i n o z a — a p a n t h e i s m of a n entirely different sort. W h a t set it off was Lessing's notion of hen kaipan. The idea c a u g h t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n of such figures as G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r a n d was passed o n as t h e decisive metaphysical impulse in t h e Idealist g e n e r a t i o n . O f course, they believed Spinozism could only work w h e n enlivened with t h e new ideas a b o u t n a t u r e which t h e p o e t r y a n d also t h e science of t h e later e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y h a d created. 9

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U p o n first l e a r n i n g of Jacobi's disclosures a b o u t Lessing, H e r d e r h a d w a x e d ecstatic over t h e slogan hen kai pan. H e wrote to J a c o b i t h a t h e felt n o o n e h a d yet d e v e l o p e d t h a t e l e m e n t in Spinoza's philosophy, a n d l a m e n t e d t h a t Lessing h a d n o t lived long e n o u g h to d o s o . I n t h a t s a m e letter, H e r d e r disclosed a longs t a n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t to d r a w o u t t h e parallels a m o n g Spinoza, Shaftesbury, a n d L e i b n i z — a project which, provoked by this very controversy, resulted in his Gott: einige Gespräche of 1787. T h e n h e p u t forth his m a i n d i s a g r e e m e n t with Jacobi's view of Spinoza. T h e y differed deeply, h e wrote, over t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e original B e i n g , t h e ens entium. While J a c o b i r e a d it as e m p t y , a propertyless g r o u n d , H e r d e r r e a d it as full, a positive infinity. Next, H e r d e r q u e s t i o n e d t h e sense of claiming t h e u t t e r t r a n s c e n d e n c e of G o d . G o d h a d to act in a n d t h r o u g h things to g r a n t t h e m force (Kraft) a n d o r d e r . While h e h a d difficulties with t h e idea of a "world soul" as Jacobi ascribed it to Lessing, because it s e e m e d to imply t h a t the world was God's body, h e claimed that seen properly, i.e., sub specie aeternitatis, t h e material world t u r n e d simply into the realized reason of G o d . W h a t is of interest for t h e genesis of t h e Third Critique (and also for t h e genesis of G e r m a n Idealism) is h o w Kant followed o u t Jacobi's r e a d i n g of Spinoza, a n d t h e r e f o r e struggled to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t while Spinoza did lead philosophy into t h e abyss of atheism a n d fatalism, his o w n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l idealism would not. H e m a d e t h a t effort n o t only in his i m m e d i a t e c o m m e n t o n t h e P a n t h e i s m C o n t r o v e r s y — " W a s heißt: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " — b u t also in t h e Second a n d p r e e m i n e n t l y in t h e Third Critique. For t h e same r e a s o n s , it is j u s t as i m p o r t a n t to see h o w H e r d e r followed o u t Lessing's r e a d i n g of Spinoza a n d struggled to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t Spinoza did n o t lead to a t h e i s m a n d fatalism, but r a t h e r to a new metaphysics of i m m a n e n t reason, p a n t h e i s m . H e r d e r m a d e this case in Gott: einige Gespräche. Kant, l e a r n i n g of this d e v e l o p m e n t , a p p l i e d himself in t h e Third Critique v e h e m e n t l y to t h e rejection of H e r d e r ' s vitalist p a n t h e i s m as well as to t h e refutation of Spinozist "fatalism." T h a t was the ontological d i s p u t e which Kant u n d e r t o o k in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " 1 4

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E m b a r k e d o n a major controversy, Jacobi t u r n e d to his wider circle of intellectual contacts for confirmation a n d s u p p o r t . Jacobi, H e r d e r , a n d G o e t h e m e t for a c o n f e r e n c e o n Spinoza in W e i m a r in 230

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S e p t e m b e r 1784, b u t they failed to c o m e to a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . C o n f r o n t e d with this refusal to see things his way, Jacobi t u r n e d elsewhere. I n W e i m a r h e , G o e t h e , a n d H e r d e r h a d r e a d with d e light H a m a n n ' s Golgotha und Scheblimini, a polemic directed against Mendelssohn's Jerusalem a n d , m o r e generally, against t h e secularizi n g c u l t u r e of Berlin (and Berlin J e w s ) . Jacobi h a d already m a d e contact with H a m a n n , with w h o m h e s h a r e d a passionate, fideistic Christian p i e t i s m . I n N o v e m b e r 1784 h e sent t h e materials of t h e controversy to H a m a n n , a n d t h e Königsberger p r o v e d to b e t h e stout s u p p o r t h e h a d s o u g h t in vain in G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r . I n d e e d , H a m a n n h a d l o n g since b e e n w a g i n g a private war with t h e Berliners. I n J a c o b i h e saw a welcome ally for his o w n c a u s e . H a m a n n a n d K a n t e n c o u n t e r e d o n e a n o t h e r in Königsberg society from time to time a n d e x c h a n g e d o p i n i o n s o n the c o n t e m p o r a r y cultural s c e n e . H a m a n n saw to it t h a t a copy of Jacobi's b o o k passed t h r o u g h Kant's h a n d s . K a n t held t h e Büchlein very briefly, b u t did r e a d i t . W h e n Jacobi pressed H a m a n n for details o n Kant's r e s p o n s e to t h e work, H a m a n n replied: " K a n t was very pleased with y o u r p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e whole edition. H e h a d never b e e n able to m a k e sense of Spinoza's system, a n d h e h a d a l o n g a n d w i d e - r a n g i n g conversation a b o u t it with [Christian] K r a u s [a f u t u r e ally in t h e controversy], w h o h a d n o t yet r e a d y o u r piece, h o w e v e r . " If K a n t f o u n d t h e little book of interest, o n e suspects it was because it dealt with Lessing. Certainly t h e r e is n o indication, a p a r t from this a d h o c conversation r e p o r t e d by H a m a n n , t h a t K a n t f o u n d it i m p o r t a n t o r that h e felt called u p o n to take u p a careful philosophical study of S p i n o z a . Jacobi's revelations p r o v o k e d radically different r e s p o n s e s from o t h e r major G e r m a n intellectuals of t h e period. H a m a n n himself t u r n e d to a t h o r o u g h e x a m ination of Spinoza's philosophy in the winter of 1784—85. A few m o n t h s earlier, G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r did as well. All of these figures, a n d with t h e m M e n d e l s s o h n a n d Jacobi themselves, gave w a r r a n t of a r d u o u s effort at the study of Spinoza's work. We find t h e s a m e a r d o r a m o n g t h e Idealists later. We d o n o t find it in Kant. T h e r e is n o evidence of any effort o n Kant's p a r t to study S p i n o z a . 15

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T h e specific circumstance t h a t d r a g g e d K a n t into t h e bitter disp u t e lies, most plausibly, in a line of a r g u m e n t which M e n d e l s s o h n first a d v a n c e d against Jacobi, only to have h i m take it u p in his t u r n : t h a t Spinoza's metaphysics could be formulated in Kantian t e r m s . M e n d e l s s o h n suggested t h a t Jacobi's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was "directly o p p o s e d to t h e system of Spinoza" as h e u n d e r s t o o d it. " W h e n you The Pantheism Controversy

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say t h e infinite u n i q u e substance of Spinoza h a s for itself alone a n d o u t s i d e t h e p a r t i c u l a r things n o d e t e r m i n a t e c o m p l e t e existence, you o v e r t h r o w for m e a l t o g e t h e r t h e c o n c e p t I h a d of Spinozi s m . " H e went o n : 25

If I u n d e r s t a n d you correctly, only t h e determinately particular entities a r e actually existent things [so sind bloß die bestimmten einzelnen Wesen wirklich existierende Dinge]; t h e infinite, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , as t h e principle of actuality, arises only in t h e aggregate, in t h e totality of all these particulars [in dem Zusamm e n , indem Inbegriffe aller dieser Einzelheiten]. I t i s t h u s a m e r e collective entity which has n o o t h e r substantiality t h a n that of t h e p a r t s of which it is c o m p o s e d . 2 6

T h a t view was i n c o h e r e n t , h e c h a r g e d . W h e r e was the unity of the manifold? It could n o t be in t h e particular p a r t s , which existed only in themselves. H e n c e it could n o t arise by their m e r e s u m m a t i o n . T h e r e h a d to be a prior whole, "a truly t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity." T h e n o t i o n of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l whole as a p r i o r unity has a clearly Kantian ring. By this point, M e n d e l s s o h n h a d e n c o u n t e r e d ( t h o u g h , by his o w n admission, n o t m a s t e r e d ) Kant's First Critique. T a k i n g u p Mendelssohn's hint, J a c o b i linked Kant with Spinoza. For h i m all p h i l o s o p h y r e q u i r e d t a r r i n g with the s a m e b r u s h . Jacobi's Büchlein claimed in a footnote t h a t passages in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason " a r e completely in t h e spirit of S p i n o z a . " Such a claim d r e w d o w n o n J a c o b i a bee s w a r m of protest from t h e K a n t i a n s . Eventually it even forced K a n t to take u p t h e whole matter. 27

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O n O c t o b e r 16, 1785, M e n d e l s s o h n sent K a n t a copy of Morgenstunden with a cover letter explaining his position in t h e controversy. M e n d e l s s o h n a p p e a l e d to Kant as a s u p p o r t e r of the Aufk l ä r u n g : "I fear t h a t philosophy has its fanatics [Schwärmer] w h o p e r s e c u t e j u s t as v e h e m e n t l y a n d seem even m o r e intent u p o n proselytizing t h a n the fanatics of positive r e l i g i o n . " WhileMendelssohn's letter m a d e a n impression o n Kant, t h e book with which it arrived m a d e a n even s t r o n g e r o n e . Morgenstunden, as a major philosophical effort to restate the rationalist a r g u m e n t s in theology which Kant h a d refuted in t h e First Critique, did concern K a n t directly in a way t h a t Jacobi's Spinoza-Büchlein did n o t yet seem to d o . H e f o u n d t h e work, especially with its n o t o r i o u s prefatory r e m a r k s labeling h i m alles-zermalmende—"all-destroying"—a direct challenge, a n d for a time h e e n t e r t a i n e d the notion of writing a res p o n s e . Kant's new disciples, including the energetic Christian Schütz, p r o t e s t e d that s o m e p e o p l e c o n s i d e r e d Morgenstunden a re29

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buttal to Kant's First Critique, a n d asked Kant to take M e n d e l s s o h n to task for his failure to c o m p r e h e n d t h e critical p h i l o s o p h y . I n t h e a u t u m n of 1785 it a p p e a r e d that K a n t would d o j u s t that. H a m a n n was delighted with this prospect a n d s p r e a d t h e news vigo r o u s l y . H e felt it could only h e l p Jacobi's cause. B u t instead, at t h e e n d of N o v e m b e r , K a n t wrote a letter back to Schütz in which h e p r e s e n t e d a very gracious r e a d i n g of Mendelssohn's work, u r g i n g t h e disciples of t h e critical philosophy to apply constructive criticism to it as "the last t e s t a m e n t of d o g m a t i c metaphysics a n d at t h e s a m e time its most perfect p r o d u c t . " Schütz published Kant's letter a l o n g with his o w n review of Morgenstunden a l o n g the lines Kant h a d indicated. J a c o b i was d i s a p p o i n t e d to h e a r this, b u t his p r i m a r y c o n c e r n was still to ascertain Kant's r e s p o n s e to his o w n work, to his interp r e t a t i o n of Spinoza. Writing to H a m a n n o n N o v e m b e r 18, Jacobi n o t e d t h a t t h e latter h a d n e v e r elaborated o n Kant's impressions of t h e Spinoza-Büchlein. Jacobi w a n t e d to know m o r e a b o u t Kant's p o s i t i o n . H a m a n n a n s w e r e d o n N o v e m b e r 30: "Kant has admitted to m e t h a t h e has n e v e r studied Spinoza a n d , b e i n g so t a k e n u p with his own system, that h e has n e i t h e r desire n o r time to get involved with a n y o n e e l s e ' s . " H a m a n n r e a s s u r e d Jacobi t h a t K a n t liked his work, a n d left it at that. Kant simply h a d n o t h i n g m o r e to say a b o u t it in 1785. 30

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T h i n g s b e g a n to c h a n g e in J a n u a r y 1786, w h e n word of Mendelssohn's s u d d e n d e a t h r e a c h e d Königsberg. Simultaneously, t h e latter's last literary endeavor, To the Friends of Lessing, a brief b u t passionate r e p u d i a t i o n of Jacobi's book, was published by his literary e x e c u t o r s . T h e controversy took o n a far m o r e p e r s o n a l a n d bitter t o n e as c h a r g e s were aired that Jacobi's e x p o s e h a d h a s t e n e d t h e d e a t h of M e n d e l s s o h n . T h e Berlin circle took u p Mendelssohn's cause with v e h e m e n c e : Nicolai at the Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, J o h a n n Erich Biester at t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift, a n d t h e literary executors of the late philosopher, a m o n g t h e m M a r c u s H e r z , Kant's f o r m e r s t u d e n t a n d g o o d friend. Biester, too, was a close friend a n d the publisher of most of Kant's p o p u l a r e s s a y s . B o t h Biester a n d H e r z t u r n e d to K a n t asking h i m , as a n ally of t h e Berlin A u f k l ä r u n g , to take u p Mendelssohn's cause against J a c o b i . I n r e p o n s e to Herz's plea for his intervention, K a n t gave vent to his maximal p i q u e with Jacobi o n April 7, 1785: " T h e J a c o b i a n farce is n o serious matter, b u t only affected geniuscultism [Genieschwärmerei], d e s i g n e d to m a k e a n a m e for himself a n d t h e r e f o r e hardly worthy of a n e a r n e s t refutation. Maybe I 35

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m i g h t d o s o m e t h i n g for t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift to expose this h o c u s - p o c u s [Gaukelwerk]." S t r o n g l a n g u a g e : the Berliners s e e m e d a b o u t to win h i m to t h e i r side. H a m a n n a n d Jacobi recognized t h e shift in t h e wind, a n d Jacobi b e g a n to press H a m a n n for i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Kant's attitude, fearing t h a t h e would now bec o m e t h e target of Kant's i r e . O n F e b r u a r y 11, t h e J e n a Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung had carried a n a n n o u n c e m e n t of Jacobi's work, probably by Schütz, furious over Jacobi's cavalier association of K a n t with Spinozism. Schütz directed a letter to K a n t to t h e same effect in t h a t month. J a c o b i realized h e h a d e r r e d badly, e x p l a i n i n g to H a m a n n in a letter d a t e d M a r c h 24 that h e h a d referred to Kant in t h e Büchlein w i t h o u t sufficient discretion. B u t his anxiety took o n t o n e s of belligerence as well: "I would b e very sorry if Kant j o i n e d t h e p a r t y of t h e Berlin m o n g r e l - d o g s [Lumpenhunde], a n d h e would r e g r e t it p r e t t y m u c h in t h e e n d , for s u r e . " Jacobi worried a b o u t Kant's a t t i t u d e n o t only to t h e work already published b u t also to t h e work h e was a b o u t to publish: Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen (April 1786). " I n any case," J a c o b i wrote, "this time h e s h o u l d n o t have any cause to c o m p l a i n a b o u t m e . " I n d e e d , n o l o n g e r did Jacobi associate K a n t with Spinozism o r a t h e i s m ; his new book invoked Kant's philosophy for its d e m o n stration of t h e p r o p e r limits of speculative p h i l o s o p h y a n d its reco g n i t i o n of t h e rightful s p h e r e of belief. H e sent H a m a n n a copy for K a n t "if you think it good." O n May 5, J a c o b i a d d e d : "If K a n t is n o t entirely h a p p y with o n e o r two places, p o i n t o u t to him t h a t h e s h o u l d k e e p his disciples in J e n a a n d G o t h a in line. T h e s e epigoni really d o n o t d o h i m m u c h c r e d i t . " Jacobi h a d a s h a r p eye for Kant's o n g o i n g efforts to build u p a following, c o m p l a i n i n g in a n earlier letter, "his relations with t h e Berliners a n d t h e J e n a p e o p l e a p p e a r to m e to betray s o m e t h i n g (wanting) petty in his character." 38

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H a m a n n passed o n Jacobi's second p a m p h l e t to Kant as h e h a d b e e n asked, a n d , o n May 2 8 , r e p o r t e d to Jacobi a conversation h e h a d h a d with K a n t a b o u t t h e book. H a m a n n h a d asked K a n t if h e was irked at Jacobi's references to h i m in t h e new work. " H e assured m e t h e o p p o s i t e was t h e case a n d a p p e a r e d to b e perfectly content with y o u r b o o k . " H a m a n n c o n c l u d e d t h a t Jacobi h a d n o t h i n g to fear; K a n t would r e m a i n n e u t r a l . Certainly H a m a n n ' s assessment of K a n t was correct. H e did n o t want to e n t e r into polemics o n eit h e r side. H e did n o t w a n t to be involved at all. T h e question t h e n 46

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arises: Why, in view of this, did Kant feel c o m p e l l e d to write "Was heißt: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " T h e answer is, simply, to d e fend his o w n philosophy. Letters from his closest s u p p o r t e r s a n d friends convinced h i m over t h e late s p r i n g a n d s u m m e r of 1786 t h a t n o t only J a c o b i b u t also M e n d e l s s o h n w e r e misleading t h e public a b o u t t h e critical philosophy. Christian Schütz b e c a m e agitated at t h e liberties t a k e n with Kantianism by Jacobi's latest d e fender, t h e still-anonymous a u t h o r of Resultate der Jacobischen und Mendelssohnschen Philosophie, T h o m a s W i z e n m a n n . Schütz wrote a h a r s h review of t h e w o r k . At t h e same time, L u d w i g H e i n r i c h J a k o b a l a r m e d K a n t over t h e impact of Mendelssohn's work: "in s o m e reviews t h e impression is quite clearly c r e a t e d t h a t t h r o u g h this text [i.e., Morgenstunden] t h e K a n t i a n Critique has received n o slight blow, which in my o p i n i o n proves clearly t h a t t h e Critique is still only b e i n g s k i m m e d over, n o t studied t h o r o u g h l y . " B u t n e i t h e r Schütz n o r J a k o b knew h o w to trigger Kant's fears t h e way his l o n g t i m e associate a n d editor Biester did. It is Biester's letter of J u n e 11, 1786 which p r o v e d the precipitating cause of Kant's i n t e r v e n t i o n . F r o m Biester's letter it is clear that h e h a d studied Kant's reply to M a r c u s H e r z of April 1786. It is also fairly clear t h a t Biester gave considerable t h o u g h t to t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of his case. H e knew what would seem vital to Kant, a n d w h e r e his ultim a t e solidarity with t h e Berlin point of view lay. T h u s Biester dist i n g u i s h e d two issues in t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy: t h e first conc e r n e d Lessing's alleged atheism a n d Mendelssohn's culpability in covering it u p ; t h e second c o n c e r n e d the relation of reason to r e ligion (i.e., w h a t Beiser has t e r m e d t h e "authority of reason"). O n t h e first issue Biester was p r e p a r e d to m a k e wholesale concessions. "I m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e , " h e wrote, "that after what H e r r J a c o b i has p r e s e n t e d in his latest piece o n Lessing, it seems to m e very p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e latter did incline t o w a r d a t h e i s m . " As for M e n d e l s s o h n , to j u d g e his intentions was m o r e complex, a n d Biester claimed t h a t Jacobi very likely withheld information a b o u t t h e precise u n f o l d i n g of their discussions. B u t Biester was even willing to a d m i t t h a t M e n d e l s s o h n m i g h t have s h o w n some personal weakness. M e n d e l s s o h n was not above flaws. O n e of t h e most o u t r a g e o u s claims of Jacobi a n d his ilk was that Berliners h a d t u r n e d M e n d e l s s o h n into a n "idol." T h i s was u n t r u e ; t h e very m e n w h o rose to his defense against the slurs of J a c o b i h a d a r g u e d vigorously with h i m over his philosophy. Berlin was a context of free d i s a g r e e m e n t a n d d e b a t e , a n d all the talk of a "Berlin way of think47

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i n g " which implied t h e c o n t r a r y was slander. Yet even this Biester, t h o u g h n o w personally involved, declared himself p r e p a r e d to set aside. W h a t h e could n o t set aside, what led h i m to t u r n to Kant to fulfill w h a t t h e latter h a d p r o m i s e d , was a c o n c e r n for t h e p r o p e r e s t e e m of philosophy a n d t r u t h . F o r Biester, Jacobi a n d his clique r e p r e s e n t e d at o n e a n d t h e s a m e t i m e t h e two g r e a t delusions of the e p o c h : religious fanaticism a n d atheism. It was, Biester claimed, "a miraculously s t r a n g e o c c u r r e n c e t h a t b o t h confusions of t h e h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g s h o u l d b e so unified in these new sophists Biester h e l p s m a k e clear t h e confusion Jacobi [Schwindelköpfen]." c r e a t e d by his s i m u l t a n e o u s e n t h u s i a s m for Spinoza as philosophy a n d c o n d e m n a t i o n of that philosophy for t h e sake of religious faith. W h a t Jacobi r e p r e s e n t e d , a c c o r d i n g to Biester, was "the u n d e r m i n i n g a n d m o c k e r y of every rational theory of G o d , t h e celebration a n d virtual idolatry of Spinoza's i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e c h i m e r a s , a n d t h e i n t o l e r a n t directive to take u p a positive religion as t h e only necessary a n d at t h e same t i m e t h e only available way o u t for any rational m a n . " For Biester, this a m o u n t e d to "affected genius-cultism." J a c o b i was o u t "to m a k e himself i m p o r t a n t . " T h e p h r a s e s a r e K a n t ' s — f r o m t h e H e r z l e t t e r . W i t h those p h r a s e s e c h o i n g a b o u t , Biester b e c a m e effusive a b o u t t h e salutary result of Kant's prospective intervention: "I wish that m e n w h o have h i t h e r t o held t h e h e l m in philosophy a n d to w h o m t h e entire public t u r n s in grateful recognition as d e p e n d a b l e a n d experie n c e d leaders w o u l d publicly declare themselves against all this, so that r e a d e r s will not b e led astray by ungifted a n d unqualified navigators a n d d a s h e d u p o n t h e reefs." T h a t m i g h t have sufficed, but Biester h a d m o r e . Now h e t u r n e d to t h e scandalous use Jacobi h a d m a d e of Kantian philosophy, which m a d e it imperative "on principle a n d for t h e r e a s s u r a n c e of y o u r c o n t e m p o r a r i e s " for Kant to disassociate himself from Jacobi. 51

5 2

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W h e n r e a d e r s find t h a t a writer in every s p h e r e defiant of t r u t h a n d i n n o c e n c e has taken you as a s u p p o r t i n g witness, they d o n ' t know what to think, a n d in the e n d c o m e to believe his claims. I can assure you t h a t this is already the case with m a n y very respectable p e o p l e , w h o have b e e n misled in this m a n n e r . T h e r e is n o m o r e odious accusation that a n e n l i g h t e n e d p h i l o s o p h e r can e n d u r e t h a n t h a t his principles foster overt dogmatic atheism, a n d t h e r e b y [religious] fanaticism [Schwärmerei]. Fanaticism via atheism! T h a t is Jacobi's doctrine, 236

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a n d h e is n o t d a u n t e d from trying to d e l u d e t h e world into t h i n k i n g J>OM a g r e e with h i m . 5 4

Biester called u p o n his old friend a n d e s t e e m e d colleague to follow t h r o u g h o n his p l e d g e to a d d r e s s the matter, above all for t h e sake of t h e public, a n d to state firmly that h e "has never b e e n a m e m b e r of t h e Christian society for t h e a d v a n c e m e n t of atheism a n d fanaticism." H e recognized t h a t K a n t h a t e d polemics, b u t insisted t h a t this m a t t e r h a d to override such scruples. T h e last t h i n g K a n t would want, h e a d d e d as a final t o u c h , well aware of t h e c h a n g e in t o n e t o w a r d K a n t in Jacobi's latest work, was for t h e public to surmise t h a t h e withheld criticism because J a c o b i h a d publicly praised h i m . As a g o a d to Kant, that letter h a d to b e a m i n o r masterpiece. Kant felt himself c o n s t r a i n e d to address the issue. B u t in fact, h e had b e e n s o m e w h a t mollified by Jacobi's praise. A n d h e did h a t e p o lemics. A n d M e n d e l s s o h n , too, s e e m e d to be confusing the public a b o u t t h e t r u e merits of t h e critical philosophy. W h e n , in J u l y 1786, K a n t sat d o w n to write "Was heißt: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " all these considerations i n t e r v e n e d . Above all, Kant saw his p u r p o s e as t h e clarification of his o w n philosophy in contrast to b o t h of t h e d i s p u t a n t s . I n t h a t p u r p o s e t h e r e lay virtually n o interest in t h e substantive issues of Spinoza's philosophy itself o r of Lessing's religious stance. H e was exclusively interested in t h e question of t h e " a u t h o r i t y of r e a s o n . " 55

Kant's "Was heißt: sich im Denken

orientieren?"

K a n t set o u t in "Was heißt" from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e discursive c h a r a c t e r of h u m a n consciousness, in which concepts w i t h o u t sense intuition could g e n e r a t e n o objective validity. T o be s u r e , even abstracted from sense intuition, they could still have formal usefulness, K a n t a r g u e d . H e p o i n t e d n o t only to logic, whose p r e e m i n e n t d o m a i n this was, b u t also to m a x i m s of m e t h o d o l o g y in i n t e r p r e t a tive science (i.e., "regulative" ideas of reason). At issue, h e went on, was w h e t h e r b e y o n d these formal a n d heuristic uses, concepts abstracted from e x p e r i e n c e could yield valid insight. T r a d i t i o n a l d o g m a t i c metaphysics h a d u p h e l d t h e view that they could, a n d Moses M e n d e l s s o h n h a d long aligned himself with this stance. Ind e e d , his o w n rational theology d e p e n d e d o n it. B u t in his controversy with Jacobi, Kant n o t e d , Mendelssohn h a d c o m e to believe that this speculative r e a s o n n e e d e d t h e g u i d a n c e of c o m m o n sense 56

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to h e l p "orient" i t . Alas, t h a t move n o t only u n d e r c u t t h e a u t h o r ity of speculative r e a s o n , b u t it also o p e n e d t h e way to "enthusiasm a n d t h e total d e t h r o n i n g of reason." T o b e sure, t h a t was not M e n d e l s s o h n ' s i n t e n t , a n d K a n t a g r e e d with him in resisting t h e claim t h a t r e a s o n s h o u l d b e a b a n d o n e d in favor of i m m e d i a t e belief g r o u n d e d in tradition o r revelation. Reason r e m a i n e d the only r e c o u r s e in j u d g m e n t . Yet K a n t a d d e d t h a t r e a s o n h a d to be cognizant of its o w n limits. T h a t was t h e sense of "orientation" t h a t h e himself wished to advocate. T h i s rational p r o b l e m of o r i e n t a t i o n in t h e utterly obscure r e a l m of t h e supersensible, w h e r e concepts h a d n o e x p e r i e n c e to rely u p o n to establish objective validity, could only be resolved by a subjective r e c o u r s e . B u t far from implying a salto mortale in this, K a n t c o n n e c t e d it r a t h e r to t h e "feeling of reason's own r e q u i r e m e n t [das Gefühl des der Vernunft eigenen Bedürfnisses]." H e characterized this process as o n e in which r e a s o n b r o u g h t its j u d g m e n t s u n d e r d e t e r m i n a t e m a x i m s "solely a c c o r d i n g to a subjective g r o u n d of discrimination of its own faculty ofj u d g m e n t [lediglich nach einem subjektiven Unterscheidungsgrunde in der Bestimmung ihres eigenen Urteilsvermögens]." T h e s e two passages a r e of decisive i m p o r t a n c e in d i s c e r n i n g t h e distance K a n t h a d c o m e in his stance o n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l faculties a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n s since t h e First Critique. In describing this d o m a i n , which in the First Critique f o u n d articulation in t h e l a n g u a g e of r e a s o n a n d its "regulative" function, K a n t n o w w r o t e of " j u d g m e n t " a n d a "faculty of j u d g m e n t , " anticipating t h e v a n t a g e a d o p t e d in t h e Third Critique. T h e anticipatory relation looms even m o r e strongly w h e n we e x a m i n e t h e two crucial t e r m s "feeling" (Gefühl) a n d " r e q u i r e m e n t " (Bedürfnis) which K a n t i n t r o d u c e d in the article. 57

58

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K a n t clarified his formulation in a footnote s o m e w h a t later in t h e essay in t h e following t e r m s : "Reason does not feel; it recognizes its s h o r t c o m i n g [Mangel] a n d incites [wirkt] via t h e drive for knowledge [Erkenntnistrieb] t h e feeling of a n e e d [Bedürfnis—better r e n d e r e d as requirement]." Kant went o n in t h e footnote to comp a r e this to his n o t i o n of the " m o r a l feeling" in the crucial sense that the feeling is t h e c o n s e q u e n c e , not t h e instigator, of r e a s o n . We find ourselves in t h e i n n e r m o s t r e a c h e s of Kantian p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness: t h e relation a m o n g t h e subjective faculties. Reason e n g e n d e r s a feeling, b u t it does so for r e a s o n s of its o w n : that is why Bedürfnis m u s t n o t be r e a d too literally as itself a feeling o r n e e d . Reason has a n i m m a n e n t , transcendentally p r i o r p r o p e n s i t y to systematicity, to totality, to logical 60

61

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closure. T h i s i m m a n e n t principle regulates t h e e n t i r e function of t h e m i n d — f e e l i n g , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d r e a s o n itself. It is this which m a k e s k n o w l e d g e a "drive." It is this which s p u r s imagination to visions of c o h e r e n c e in t h e world a n d in t h e self. T h e connection of this relentless law of r e a s o n with t h e p r o c e e d i n g s of t h e o t h e r faculties, I submit, forms t h e systematic f o u n d a t i o n for Kant's Third Critique. I n t h e absence of any objective reference, r e a s o n tries to find t h e next closest a p p r o x i m a t i o n . If it c a n n o t form a d e t e r m i n a t e insight into its supersensible object, it tries to reason a b o u t the relation of this object to t h e objects of e x p e r i e n c e , a n d to b r i n g this relation u n d e r logical rules. H e n c e analogy is t h e rational form of orientation in t h e r e a l m of t h e supersensible. Analogy c a n n o t establish existence; only sense intuition can provide this. Nevertheless, t h e r e a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in t h e m i n d to which n o sense intuition c o r r e s p o n d s . O n e such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n without c o r r e s p o n d e n c e in sense intuition m u s t d r a w o u r a t t e n t i o n : "the c o n c e p t of a n original b e i n g , as t h e highest intelligence a n d at t h e s a m e time t h e highest g o o d . " T h i s n o t i o n of a n ens realissimum o r ens perfectissimum, K a n t a r g u e s , is a necessary idea for o u r rational process. We can only g r a s p particulars in t h e i r concreteness within t h e conspectus of s o m e t h i n g all-encompassing. B u t w h a t Kant insists is that this idea is "regulative," i.e., heuristic, n o t ontological. T h e e r r o r of all d o g matic metaphysics lay in m o v i n g from logical necessity to ontological necessity. Kant's p o i n t is j u s t t h a t t h e r e can be n o analytic d e d u c t i o n of existence. N e i t h e r Descartes n o r Mendelssohn could m a k e t h e ontological p r o o f of t h e existence of G o d work. Moreover, to believe reason capable of such feats was to t h r o w o p e n t h e gates to u n r e s t r i c t e d speculation, the source of all kinds of schwärmerisch c h i m e r a s . 62

6 3

W h a t sort of status does such a n idea t h e n have? It is cognitively indispensable a n d objectively i n d e t e r m i n a t e . For such a notion K a n t offered t h e a p t t e r m Vernunftglaube, rational belief. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t we h a d , for reason's sake, to believe in a n original, rational creator. O n l y this a s s u m p t i o n m a d e sense of t h e p u r posiveness of n a t u r e . "Even if we c a n n o t prove t h e impossibility of such p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h o u t a n intelligent first cause," t h e p r o b l e m s of m a k i n g sense of p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e world were so pressing t h a t we would b e justified in p r e s u m i n g i t . T h i s is a n anticipation of t h e a r g u m e n t of physico-theology as a p r o p a e d e u t i c to theism which played such a central role in t h e "Methodology" section of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in t h e Third Critique. More64

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over, h a v i n g established t h e theoretical plausibility of such a n ass u m p t i o n , Kant went o n to t h e question of its practical necessity in a n anticipation of t h e ethico-theological a r g u m e n t for t h e exist e n c e of G o d which w o u l d find expression in t h e Second Critique (1788) a n d , again, feature i m p o r t a n t l y in t h e c o n c l u d i n g sections of t h e Third Critique. K a n t d e v o t e d t h e balance of his essay to discriminating his n o tion of "rational belief" from Mendelssohn's n o t i o n that speculative r e a s o n could achieve real insight o r objective knowledge, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d from Jacobi's n o t i o n t h a t r e a s o n s h o u l d be t h r o w n over entirely, o n t h e o t h e r . Against t h e latter p o s t u r e Kant d e v o t e d t h e c o n c l u d i n g a r g u m e n t s of his text. T h e concept of G o d , h e insisted, was a rational idea. It could b e f o u n d in n o intuition first. I n d e e d , all evidence of G o d h a d to b e c o m p a r e d to this p r i o r idea of G o d — n o t , to be s u r e , for adequacy, which would b e i m p o s sible in view of t h e infinity of G o d a n d t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e finit u d e of all possible e x p e r i e n c e , b u t for contradiction. T o s u s p e n d this rational criterion in considerations of t h e divine, Kant a r g u e d , was t h e essence of Schwärmerei, a n d its c o n s e q u e n c e s were superstition a n d atheism. At t h a t j u n c t u r e , Kant a p o s t r o p h i z e d t h e fideists directly, calli n g u p o n t h e m to recognize t h e d a n g e r i n h e r e n t in their cult of genius, in t h e i r e x t r e m e claims for f r e e d o m . T h e y d e m a n d e d t h e f r e e d o m to believe w h a t e v e r they wanted, f r e e d o m even from t h e constraints of r e a s o n . T h u s t h e genius claimed to have richer insight t h a n logic could p r o v i d e . " T h e c o n s e q u e n t a s s u m p t i o n of t h e m a x i m t h a t r e a s o n is n o t valid as the s u p r e m e arbiter we o r d i n a r y m e n call Schwärmerei, b u t those darlings of benevolent n a t u r e call it illumination." H o w e v e r prepossessed by this "illumination" t h e g e n i u s m i g h t b e personally, K a n t p o i n t e d out, h e still h a d to convince o t h e r s , a n d for this h e h a d to have r e c o u r s e to m e r e historical facts, to tradition, l e g e n d — f o u n d a t i o n s which could never b e a r t h e weight a n d which, in t h e e n d , boiled d o w n to superstition, since r e a s o n could n o t i n t e r p o s e its criteria. 66

W h e n geniuses took this recourse, they discredited themselves in t h e eyes of o r d i n a r y m e n , b u t worse, they provoked a m o r e general skepticism a b o u t any k i n d of faith, even "rational belief," a n d e n c o u r a g e d a n equally one-sided insistence t h a t reason h a d n o r e q u i r e m e n t s for belief. T h a t was "unbelief," t h e view t h a t all faith was s u p e r s t i t i o n — t h e stance of the radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t , of H u m e a n d of Voltaire. T h a t "atheism" in its t u r n , Kant went on, h a d d e l e t e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s b e y o n d its intentions as well, for with 240

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t h e dissolution of t h e belief in G o d , t h e claims of morality u p o n t h e h u m a n h e a r t were loosened a n d a "libertinism" (Freigeisterei) of conduct followed a free-thinking in m a t t e r s t h e o l o g i c a l . T h a t in its t u r n could only p r o v o k e t h e state to intervene to secure o r d e r in society. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e ultimate o u t c o m e of such radical claims of f r e e d o m against the legislation of reason could only be t h e ironic t h r o t t l i n g of any f r e e d o m w h a t e v e r u n d e r t h e tutelage of t h e state. T h a t was why K a n t a r g u e d so strenuously for r e a s o n as m a n ' s ultim a t e r e c o u r s e in j u d g m e n t . Reason as arbiter left m a n to his o w n self-determination; such rational f r e e d o m was the essence of "enl i g h t e n m e n t . " T o forsake it was to r u n t h e risk of a repression which would affect n o t merely t h e extremists b u t everyone. 67

The Theological-Political

Context of the Pantheism

Controversy

O n e c a n n o t stress too strongly Kant's attentiveness to t h e political context of religious disputes as it was expressed in this closing a r g u m e n t . I n it o n e can find t h e key to Kant's frame of m i n d for t h e n e x t n i n e years, u p t h r o u g h the controversy s u r r o u n d i n g his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Moreover, o n e can hardly find a clearer c o n n e c t i o n between this very lively contextual sensitivity a n d Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of " e n l i g h t e n m e n t " as b o t h t h e principle a n d t h e project of his e p o c h . K a n t m a d e perfectly clear in these lines t h e decisive c o n n e c t i o n between security a n d liberty offered by his n o t i o n of rational belief or e n l i g h t e n m e n t . 6 8

69

After t h e publication of Karl L e o n h a r d Reinhold's Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie starting in 1786, Kantianism h a d b e c o m e all t h e r a g e in G e r m a n y . I n April of that year, t h e original p r i n t i n g of t h e First Critique h a d sold o u t . T h i s allowed K a n t to m a k e i m p o r t a n t clarifying revisions a n d issue a second edition of t h e Critique of Pure Reason in 1787. It a p p e a r e d that h e h a d succeeded at last in t a k i n g c o m m a n d of the G e r m a n philosophical scene, a n d h e could afford n o w to devote himself entirely to t h e c o m p l e t i o n of his m o n u m e n t a l systematic edifice. H a m a n n characterized Kant aptly in May 1787: h e "carried o n his work o n his own system w i t h o u t c a r i n g m u c h a b o u t a n y t h i n g else in the world, caring n e i t h e r w h a t takes place t h e r e n o r what it thinks of h i m . " Kant n o l o n g e r w o r r i e d a b o u t t h e victory of his system. I n d e e d , h e r e a d Jacobi's p r e o c c u p a t i o n with his First Critique as yet a n o t h e r sign of t h e pervasive p e n e t r a t i o n of his critical philosophy. O f course h e claimed t h a t J a c o b i h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d h i m , b u t h e claimed that a b o u t everyone. 7 0

7 1

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T h e r e were still political p r o b l e m s , however. T h e authorities h a d d e v e l o p e d suspicions as to Kant's religious o r t h o d o x y starting with t h e First Critique. Since it systematically d e m o l i s h e d all rational a r g u m e n t s in theology, it was received by m a n y in the theological c o m m u n i t y with dismay. Kant's Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) did little to ease this suspicion in o r t h o d o x circles, a n d i n d e e d c o n t a i n e d material which m i g h t be c o n s t r u e d as even m o r e d a m a g i n g to religious o r t h o d o x y . W h e n Moses Mendelssohn called K a n t t h e "all-destroyer" in his widely r e a d preface to Morgenstunden (1785), h e was r e f e r r i n g to this theological impact. W h a t M e n d e l s s o h n , Kant's friend, l a m e n t e d w i t h o u t ire, o t h e r s , less kindly disposed, w e r e c o n d e m n i n g in t h e halls of power. At M a r b u r g , a cabinet o r d e r h a d b e e n issued b a n n i n g t h e t e a c h i n g of Kantian philosophy starting in t h e winter t e r m of 1 7 8 6 . T h e g r o u n d s were t h a t Kant's t h o u g h t led to total skepticism a n d j e o p a r d i z e d public morals! T h e source of such n o n s e n s e was Kant's old a n t a g o n i s t F e d e r at G ö t t i n g e n . B u t o t h e r s , like Christoff Meiners, in t h e preface to his Psychology, p r o p a g a t e d t h e s e d i s t o r t i o n s . I n d e e d , as Kantianism b e c a m e m o r e p o p u l a r , official scrutiny increased. T h e d e a t h of Frederick II in 1787 a n d t h e succession of t h e far m o r e conservative Frederick William II b o d e d f u r t h e r state interventions in m a t t e r s of faith a n d morals, a n d K a n t , as t h e sequel showed, was far from e x e m p t from suspicion. W h e t h e r K a n t himself wished to b e so t h r e a t e n i n g to o r t h o d o x religion m a y b e seriously q u e s t i o n e d , b u t t h a t his t h o u g h t did inspire in o t h e r s a radicalism in m a t t e r s religious which could only occasion c o n s t e r n a t i o n a m o n g o r t h o d o x authorities can be p r o v e n easily. W i t h Schadenfreude H a m a n n r e p o r t e d o n e particularly juicy instance of this to H e r d e r as early as 1785. S o m e fifty theology stud e n t s w h o d e c l a r e d themselves Kantians a n d disdainers of religion (Religionsspöttern) h a d risen u p , a r g u i n g , in H a m a n n ' s words, t h a t " t h e r e could b e n o m o r a l philosophy [Sittenlehre] n o r s o u n d r e a s o n , n o r public h a p p i n e s s u n d e r Christianity. W h e t h e r Kant has b e e n i n f o r m e d a b o u t this equally o u t r a g e o u s a n d pathetic o c c u r r e n c e I don't know." 73

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W h a t e v e r K a n t may have m e a n t , t h e r e were Kantians w h o viewed his a c h i e v e m e n t as radically hostile to o r t h o d o x y . Official d i s p l e a s u r e over K a n t i a n e x t r e m i s m at T ü b i n g e n was c o m m u n i cated from S t u t t g a r t to Berlin in t h e late 1780s, a n d t h e incident at M a r b u r g was still fresh in Kant's m e m o r y . U n d e r t h e circumstances it is n o t h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d why h e s h o u l d have felt it neces77

7 8

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sary to stress t h e compatibility of his "theism" with religious o r t h o d o x y a n d to distance it as m u c h as possible from any form of "deism," in particular t h e S p i n o z a n - H e r d e r i a n sort. I n t o this c h a r g e d context in m i d - 1 7 8 7 , H e r d e r threw his new work, Gott: einige Gespräche, raising o n c e again all t h e issues of Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m . T h i s time things were even m o r e a p p a l l i n g from Kant's vantage, for H e r d e r was a n unequivocal advocate of these n e w notions, celebrating Lessing, glorifying Spinoza, a n d p e r p e t r a t i n g a n u n a b a s h e d p a n t h e i s m with all t h e considerable p o w e r of his literary style a n d intellectual r e p u t a t i o n . B u t t h e r e was also a p e r s o n a l e l e m e n t . H e r d e r a n d Kant h a d b e c o m e public a n tagonists over Kant's reviews of H e r d e r ' s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (vol. 1, 1784), a n d Kantians could n o t h e l p b u t see in H e r d e r ' s new publication evidence of his bitterness tow a r d t h e i r m a s t e r . I n t o his serenity K a n t f o u n d o n c e again t h a t his rival h a d i n t r u d e d . 79

Herder's Gott: einige G e s p r ä c h e W h a t exactly did H e r d e r a r g u e in Gott: einige Gespräche? Q u i t e simply, h e e l a b o r a t e d o n t h a t c o h e r e n c e of t h e positions of Spinoza, Shaftesbury, a n d Leibniz which h a d already i n f o r m e d the Ideen a n d his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with J a c o b i of 1784—85. T h e publication of Gott in 1787 n o t only fulfilled H e r d e r ' s p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t to write a n essay o n that t h e m e , b u t it h a d t h r e e m o r e i m m e d i a t e "ind u c e m e n t s which t h e times themselves o f f e r e d . " First, h e wished to d e f e n d Spinoza from Jacobi's m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H e n c e it was a work i n t e n d e d as p a r t of t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy. Second, h e wished to revise Spinoza in t h e light of t h e new science, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d of his o w n theological notions, o n t h e other. I n this light, it was p a r t of those stirrings t o w a r d metaphysics that originated in the Sturm und Drang intuition of n a t u r e . B u t finally, h e wished t o attack K a n t i a n philosophy a n d its i n r o a d s into theology. T h a t this was a p e r s o n a l a n d bitter motive goes without saying. T h e complexity of these intentions resulted in a m e a s u r e of obscurity in t h e work. 80

T h e first of t h e five dialogues of Gott: einige Gespräche s o u g h t to refute all t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of Spinoza p r o p a g a t e d by Pierre Bayle. T h i s d i a l o g u e was the most effective in its a r g u m e n t . No less a critic t h a n Schiller a p p r e c i a t e d it, t h o u g h the balance of t h e work left h i m c o l d . T h e second dialogue located t h e core of Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y in t h e notion of intrinsic infinity, in contrast to t h e 81

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243

merely indefinite extensiveness of a s u m of finites. H e r d e r recognized "that few will u n d e r s t a n d this distinction between t h e infinite-in-itself a n d t h e endless conceived in t h e imagination in t e r m s of t i m e a n d space, a distinction which is yet t r u e a n d necess a r y . " A correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this n o t i o n would dismiss t h e c h a r g e "of enclosing G o d within the world a n d identifying H i m with it." H e r d e r insisted t h a t t h e n o t i o n of intrinsic infinity req u i r e d a greatness of t h e whole b e y o n d any m e r e s u m of its parts, even as it r e q u i r e d its logical priority. H e n c e , H e r d e r i n t e r p r e t e d Spinoza as p a n m t h e i s m , n o t p a n t h e i s m , t h o u g h h e lacked t h e terminology. T h e d i l e m m a in Spinoza, H e r d e r went o n , lay n o t in this n o t i o n , b u t r a t h e r in his all-too-Cartesian identification of extension with matter. Spinoza identified G o d with e x t e n d e d matter. H e r d e r acc o u n t e d for this n o t simply by "pernicious Cartesian e x p l a n a t i o n s " b u t also by "the c h i l d h o o d of n a t u r a l science" in Spinoza's times, c o n t e n d i n g that m o r e recent science offered t h e resolution of Spinoza's d i l e m m a of finding a t r u e unity b e t w e e n t h e disparate attributes of t h o u g h t a n d m a t t e r in original B e i n g . T h e solution lay in t h e idea of "substantial forces," a t h e o r y of the d y n a m i s m of n a t u r e which h a d b e e n articulated by Leibniz a n d e x t e n d e d by Boscovich. I n t h a t l a n g u a g e it was possible to restate Spinoza's doctrine of t h e o n e substance as "absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal a n d infinite essentiality" in a m o r e plausible form: "That the Deity reveals Himself in an infinite number offorces in an infinite number of ways." 82

83

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85

m

H e r d e r believed t h e innovations in the theory of the physical sciences h a d a direct b e a r i n g o n the thorniest of metaphysical issues, claiming t h a t his r e w o r k i n g of Spinozism a l o n g these lines p r o v i d e d a c o h e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which would b r i n g a n e n d to all t h e objectionable expressions of how God, acc o r d i n g to this o r that system, may work o n a n d t h r o u g h d e a d m a t t e r . It is n o t d e a d b u t lives. For in it a n d c o n f o r m i n g to its o u t e r a n d i n n e r o r g a n s , a t h o u s a n d living, manifold forces a r e at work. T h e m o r e we learn a b o u t matter, the m o r e forces we discover in it, so t h a t t h e e m p t y conception of a d e a d extension completely d i s a p p e a r s . J u s t in r e c e n t times, w h a t n u m e r o u s a n d different forces have b e e n discovered in the a t m o s p h e r e ! H o w m a n y different forces of attraction, u n i o n , dissolution a n d r e p u l s i o n , has n o t m o d e r n chemistry already f o u n d in b o d i e s ? 87

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H e r d e r ' s " d y n a m i c p a n t h e i s m " t h u s invoked t h e most i m p o r t a n t r e c e n t i n n o v a t i o n s in t h e theories of t h e n a t u r a l sciences, especially in t h e fields of electricity, chemistry, a n d b i o l o g y . H e r d e r used t h e f o u r t h d i a l o g u e to express his distance from J a c o b i in t h e strongest form: " I . . . took u p Mendelssohn's Morgenstunden, a n d saw t h a t we w e r e m o r e o r less in a g r e e m e n t o n t h e historical fact of what Spinoza's system really w a s . " H e r d e r publicly sided with M e n d e l s s o h n , a n d e v e n m o r e with Lessing, against J a c o b i . All t h e m o r e a s t o u n d i n g , t h e n , t h e t u r n which H e r d e r took w h e n h e c a m e to Jacobi's d o c t r i n e of belief, t o w a r d which h e h a d always b e e n so cool. In Gott H e r d e r picked u p t h e idea a n d t u r n e d it against K a n t . A c c o r d i n g to H e r d e r , t h e t r u t h of Jacobi's d o c t r i n e of belief lay in its insistence o n t h e existential situatedness of t h o u g h t . 88

89

W i t h o u t existence, a n d a series of existences, m a n would not t h i n k as h e does. T h e r e f o r e , t h e p u r p o s e of his t h o u g h t cann o t b e to d r e a m fantasies a n d to play with illusory ideas a n d words as if with a self-made reality, b u t r a t h e r , as h e says, "to disclose Existence" . . . Such k n o w l e d g e , in u n i o n with the i n n e r feeling for t r u t h , is alone t r u e . It alone illumines the spirit, n u r t u r e s t h e heart, brings o r d e r a n d regularity into all t h e s p h e r e s of o u r l i f e . 90

Against this holistic m o d e of c o m i n g to grips with reality, H e r d e r f o u n d w a n t i n g all "over-subtle r e a s o n i n g , " all "metaphysical hairsplitting." G r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s , h e went on, d r a w i n g u p a list c o n s p i c u o u s for t h e absence of Kant, "loved precise ideas" b u t as "philosophers] d e s e r v i n g of t h e n a m e , " did n o t i n d u l g e " e m p t y p h a n t o m s of a n idly speculating i m a g i n a t i o n . " 91

H e r d e r a s s e r t e d — h a r d l y argued—the validity of rational t h e ology a l o n g t h e lines of Spinoza's ontological a r g u m e n t against " t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h e r , that is, o n e w h o overreaches h i m self." Irony, alas, h e r e showed its i m p o t e n c e against discursive logic. H e r d e r w e n t o n as if a t u r n of p h r a s e h a d settled the acc o u n t s . His character, T h e o p h r o n , protested: " I , at least,. . . f e e l s o e n e r v a t e d by every p h i l o s o p h y which plays with that type of symbolical words w i t h o u t ideas a n d without objects, t h a t I c a n n o t soon e n o u g h r e t u r n to n a t u r e , to existence, j u s t to b e c o m e aware again t h a t I a m a l i v e . " T h e n h e went o n far too long a n d far too o b scurely to articulate a metaphysics of his own, trying to identify Spinoza's a u s t e r e Divinity with Christian Providence a n d — o f c o u r s e — m e t e m p s y c h o s i s . While H e r d e r recognized t h a t Spinoza h a d a n a u t h e n t i c n o t i o n of G o d as t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e — " I com92

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pletely d e n y t h a t Spinoza t u r n e d G o d into a n u n t h i n k i n g b e i n g " — h e could n o t articulate t h a t recognition without falling back toward s o m e of t h e a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c projections which Spinoza strove to eliminate, a n d which H e r d e r knew s h o u l d n o t be c o u n t e n a n c e d , as h e indicated in his critical r e m a r k s a b o u t L e i b n i z . Persisting n o n e t h e l e s s , H e r d e r laid himself wide o p e n to t h e attack for "syncretism" which J a c o b i a n d K a n t immediately a n d effectively launched. 94

9 5

The Kantians'

Response

H e r d e r ' s work stirred a g r e a t deal of concern a m o n g the new Kantians at J e n a by its o p e n hostility t o w a r d Kant. Friedrich Schiller, a r e c e n t convert, wrote to his friend, Körner, a m o r e a d e p t Kantian, of his impressions of t h e new work, a n d K ö r n e r supplied h i m with a detailed critique from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of o r t h o d o x K a n t i a n i s m . I n a d d i t i o n it is very likely t h a t Schiller discussed t h e work with t h e two most p r o m i n e n t K a n t i a n s in J e n a , Schütz a n d Reinhold. W i t h all that, it is impossible t h a t K a n t would n o t have h e a r d of H e r d e r ' s work very shortly after its publication, a n d indeed, if we c o n s i d e r t h e text of t h e Second Critique, c o m p o s e d over that s u m m e r , we can find clear evidence of Kant's irritation with H e r d e r a n d his p r e o c c u p a t i o n with Spinozism. Certainly we know that K a n t h a d r e a d t h e work by A u g u s t of 1789, for h e wrote a letter to Jacobi which indicated his r e a d i n g . B u t we can establish that the circle a r o u n d K a n t was already very h o t a b o u t H e r d e r ' s Gott in 1787, from t h e letter of o n e of Kant's Königsberg cronies, Christian K r a u s , to Christian Schütz, d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1787. K r a u s w r o t e : "It is a p p r o p r i a t e to e x p o s e t h e pantheistic Schwärmerei which d o m i n a t e s so many, particularly y o u n g m i n d s , a n d t h e aestheticmetaphysical b o m b a s t with which H e r d e r as a clever r o g u e calculatedly n u r t u r e s his p u b l i c . " T h e most a l a r m i n g t h i n g was that m a n y of these y o u n g enthusiasts for p a n t h e i s m were at the s a m e t i m e e n t h u s i a s t s for Kantianism! T h a t , Kant's circle believed, could only result in political mischief. T h u s , K r a u s b e g a n working u p o n a refutation of p a n t h e i s m . 96

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Mindful of Kant's hostility to H e r d e r , J a c o b i sent h i m a copy of t h e n e w edition of his work o n Spinoza, full of criticisms of H e r d e r a n d praise for Kant. Kant's r e s p o n s e was e v e r y t h i n g h e could have desired. I n his letter to J a c o b i of A u g u s t 30, 1789, acknowledging t h e gift, K a n t praised t h e work for its " d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e difficulties t h a t beset t h e teleological p a t h to t h e o l o g y . " It h a d b e e n 99

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this, K a n t suggested, that h a d set Spinoza o n his m i s g u i d e d c o u r s e of d e n y i n g teleology altogether. Kant went o n to claim that it was merely a s e c o n d a r y m a t t e r (Nebensache) w h e t h e r o n e c a m e to a c o m m i t m e n t to theism from r e a s o n or from revelation, for t h e point was to d e f e n d it, a n d f r e e d o m with it, against t h e "syncretism of S p i n o z a " a n d the "deism of H e r d e r ' s Gott." 100

W h a t characterizes all forms of syncretism generally is t h e i r f o u n d a t i o n in a lack, of u p r i g h t n e s s [Mangel an Aufrichtigkeit]: a trait of m i n d which is particularly typical of this great artist in illusions (which, as t h r o u g h a magic l a n t e r n , m a k e miracu l o u s t h i n g s m o m e n t a r i l y manifest, only thereafter swiftly to vanish, leaving b e h i n d still a m o n g t h e naive a sense of wond e r m e n t a n d t h e impression that s o m e t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y m u s t b e b e h i n d it all, which t h e y j u s t d i d n ' t c a t c h ) . 101

W i t h this e x t r e m e l y caustic characterization of H e r d e r , Kant d e clared J a c o b i his ally, a n d e x p l a i n e d that h e m e a n t h i m n o h a r m in t h e essay "Was heißt," which h e h a d written only u n d e r e x t r e m e p r e s s u r e to dissociate himself from Spinozism. It behooves us to step back a n d j u x t a p o s e for a m o m e n t this letter of A u g u s t 1789 to J a c o b i with t h e letter of April 1786 about Jacobi. H o w things have c h a n g e d ! I n 1786 Jacobi was t h e Schwärmer, b u t in 1789 h e is s h o u l d e r to s h o u l d e r with K a n t against t h e Schwärmer. I n 1786 J a c o b i was p a r t of the genius-cult, r a n g e d alongside H e r d e r . In 1789, all this is forgotten. Herder is Kant's o v e r w e e n i n g c o n c e r n . I n d e e d , K a n t a n d his circle h a d b e e n agitated over H e r d e r a n d p a n t h e i s m from t h e m o m e n t of his publication of Gott in m i d - 1 7 8 7 . Kant's worries a b o u t political backlash h a d c o m e too t r u e with Wöllner's Edict of 1788. W i t h s o m e of his o w n followers lured tow a r d p a n t h e i s m , K a n t decided to d e b u n k it himself in t h e Third Critique. Kant's attacks o n t h e " a n a l o g o n of life" a n d o n "hylozoism" in t h e Third Critique r e s o n a t e in t h e i r very l a n g u a g e with the attacks o n H e r d e r of five years e a r l i e r . W h a t p r o v o k e d their reassertion was H e r d e r ' s Gott. Kant's project in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " was to refute such d a n g e r o u s "syncretism." 102

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Twelve

KANT'S ATTACK ON SPINOZA IN T H E "DIALECTIC OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT''

H

aving e x p l o r e d t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy in detail from t h e Kantian vantage, it has b e c o m e clear why t h e issue of Spinozism s h o u l d have b e c o m e so central to the "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " Kant's struggle with Spinoza, as Allison has n o t e d , was "central, n o t p e r i p h e r a l , to t h e overall a r g u m e n t of t h e Critique ofJudgment.Indeed, I wish to a r g u e t h a t it is precisely as h e c o m p o s e d these sections in late s u m m e r 1789 t h a t K a n t m a d e his "ethical t u r n . " T h e r e f o r e , § § 7 2 - 7 7 of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " r e p r e s e n t t h e h e a r t of t h e whole work. T h e i r c o n c e r n is explicitly with (dogmatic) systems of ontology a n d t h e i r plausibility in a c c o u n t i n g for t h e complexities of objective p u r p o s i v e n e s s within a lawfully c o h e r e n t n a t u r e . I n §72 of the Third Critique Kant laid o u t a typology of "dogmatic metaphysical" ontologies. At t h e outset of §73 K a n t asked: " W h a t d o all t h e s e systems desire? T h e y desire to explain o u r teleological j u d g m e n t s a b o u t n a t u r e . " K a n t f o r m u l a t e d all the ontologies in t e r m s of his c o n c e p t of "objective purposiveness." H e discriminated b e t w e e n "realism" a n d "idealism" of this purposiveness a n d between "physical" a n d "hyperphysical" accounts of causality. T h i s occasioned a fourfold schema, which h e set o u t in §72: 2

1. idealist-physical: "lifeless matter," t h e mechanistic m a t e rialism of causality, which K a n t associated with E p i c u r u s a n d D e m o c r i t u s a m o n g t h e ancients; 2. idealist-hyperphysical: a "lifeless G o d , " o r fatality, which K a n t associated with Spinoza a m o n g t h e m o d e r n s ; 3. realist-physical: "living matter," the d o c t r i n e of hylozoism, which K a n t did n o t explicitly link to any t h i n k e r or school; and 248

4. realist-hyper physical: a "living G o d , " t h e d o c t r i n e of theism, which "certainly is s u p e r i o r to all o t h e r g r o u n d s of explan a t i o n " because it ascribed intelligent will to a t r a n s c e n d e n t C r e a t o r a n d t h e r e b y "rescues in t h e best way t h e purposiveness of n a t u r e . " 3

By t h e realism a n d idealism of objective purposiveness Kant m e a n t t h e validity a n d illusion of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e . H e n c e all "idealist" o n tologies rejected teleology. Kant's setting of all metaphysics in a teleological f r a m e w o r k seems for t h a t r e a s o n forced. T h e s e m e t a physics a d d r e s s themselves with equal plausibility to the ancient q u e s t i o n of t h e O n e a n d t h e Many, or, in a m o r e r e c e n t b u t apposite f o r m u l a t i o n , of t h e relation of B e i n g (Sein) to entities (Seienden), in t e r m s of t h e classical l a n g u a g e of s u b s t a n c e . By t h r u s t i n g discourse o n ontology which rejected teleology into that alien lang u a g e , K a n t did it f u n d a m e n t a l violence. By setting t h e p r o b l e m of entities in t e r m s of t h e l a n g u a g e of purposiveness, h e g e n e r a t e d a n absurdity: "If all things m u s t b e t h o u g h t of as p u r p o s e s , t h e n to be a t h i n g is t h e s a m e as to b e a p u r p o s e . " T h a t was, as h e claimed, p r e p o s t e r o u s . B u t h e was w r o n g to castigate Spinoza or t h e "schoolm e n " for this folly: it was his o w n shift of l a n g u a g e which h a d precipitated i t . 4

5

6

T h e s e s c h o o l m e n h a d s o m e t h i n g else in m i n d : what K a n t t e r m e d t h e i r d o c t r i n e of t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l perfection of things (in r e f e r e n c e to their p r o p e r being), according to which e v e r y t h i n g has in itself t h a t which is requisite to m a k e it o n e t h i n g a n d n o t a n o t h e r . " T h i s was simply w h a t t h e s c h o o l m e n m e a n t by the c o n c e p t substance. I n t h e i r l a n g u a g e system, substance signified entity, i.e., a d e t e r m i n a t e grammatical-logical subject which was eligible for predications. A substance was simply t h a t a b o u t which s o m e t h i n g could b e said. Discourse could illuminate sufficient of its p r o p erties—achieve a d e g r e e of completeness ("perfection") in their listing—that its individuality b e c a m e clear a n d distinct. B u t t h e question of entities as substances b e c a m e c l o u d e d w h e n t h e concept of "perfection" was lifted o u t of its scholastic sense of quantitative c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d t r a n s p o s e d into Kant's l a n g u a g e system as qualitative perfection o r p u r p o s e . Such a n o t i o n of perfection entailed intrinsic self-determination, K a n t a r g u e d . While this m a d e sense of s o m e entities—organic forms a n d intelligent life—it a d d e d to t h e o r d i n a r y sense of entity a complexity too heavy for it to sustain. N o t all things were p u r p o s e s . Kant's tactic makes sense only in t h e context of a n e w u r g e n c y a b o u t the p r o s p e c t of a metaphysic 7

8

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g r o u n d e d in teleology which could claim validity. T h a t was exactly what t h e p a n t h e i s t r e a d i n g of Spinozism s e e m e d to e n t a i l . Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l criticism entitled h i m , o n t h e most favorable r e a d i n g , to reject all metaphysics, n o t to privilege s o m e . T h e m o m e n t h e moved from t h e level of epistemological scruple to a d i s p u t a t i o n of particular conceptions, h e b e c a m e b u t o n e m e t a physician m o r e . T h a t K a n t p r e f e r r e d t h e f o u r t h of the d o g m a t i c o p t i o n s h e described is perfectly clear, even t h o u g h h e acknowle d g e d t h a t it could n o t b e p r o v e n theoretically. H e criticized the o t h e r s n o t merely for t h e i r d o g m a t i s m b u t for their d o g m a . A n d the two which d r e w t h e most sustained criticism were "fatality" a n d "hylozoism," or in o t h e r t e r m s , Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m . 9

1 0

I n §73 K a n t offered m o r e extensive criticism of each of the metaphysical views h e h a d schematized in §72. Conspicuously, his a r g u m e n t against Spinozism was by far t h e most p r o t r a c t e d . In that section, K a n t gave his m o s t elaborate characterization of Spinoza's d o c t r i n e of original B e i n g : to this B e i n g , as substrate of those n a t u r a l things, h e ascribes in r e g a r d to t h e m , n o t causality, b u t m e r e subsistence. O n acc o u n t of its u n c o n d i t i o n e d necessity, a n d also that of all n a t u ral things as accidents i n h e r i n g in it, h e secures, it is t r u e , to t h e forms of n a t u r e t h a t unity of g r o u n d which is requisite for all p u r p o s i v e n e s s , b u t at t h e same time h e tears away their c o n t i n g e n c e , w i t h o u t which n o unity ofpurpose can be t h o u g h t , a n d with it all design, i n a s m u c h as h e takes away all intellig e n c e from the original g r o u n d of n a t u r a l t h i n g s . 11

K a n t distinguished "causality" from "subsistence," a n d t h o u g h h e c o n c e d e d that Spinoza established t h e "unity of g r o u n d " (Einheit des Grundes) which was necessary for a c o m p r e h e n s i o n of t h e "forms of n a t u r e " (Naturformen), h e a r g u e d t h a t Spinoza's view r o b b e d t h e m of " c o n t i n g e n c e " (Zufälligkeit), a n d h e n c e of "unity of p u r pose." Spinoza's original B e i n g (Urwesen), in which "accidents inh e r e , " constituted a m e r e "substrate of things in n a t u r e . " T h i s in t u r n m e a n t that Spinoza d e n i e d all design (alles Absichtliche) a n d even u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstand) to the "original g r o u n d . " Kant's whole sense of Spinoza c e n t e r e d a r o u n d t h e doctrine of a "lifeless G o d . " "So m u c h is clear," h e wrote, "that o n this theory t h e p u r p o s i v e c o m b i n a t i o n in t h e world m u s t be taken as u n d e s i g n e d ; for a l t h o u g h derived from a n original Being, it is not d e rived from His u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r from any design of His, b u t r a t h e r from t h e necessity of His n a t u r e a n d of t h e world unity which e m a 250

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nates from H i m . " Kant elaborated o n t h e m e a n i n g of "fatality" in §73 by offering t h e following characterization of Spinozism: "as it a p p e a l s to s o m e t h i n g supersensible to which o u r insight d o e s n o t e x t e n d , [it] is n o t so easy to controvert, b u t that is because its concept of t h e original B e i n g is n o t possible to u n d e r s t a n d . " K a n t was n o t merely claiming "dialectical excess" in Spinoza's n o t i o n of G o d ; h e was claiming it was d e t e r m i n a t e l y wrong. W h e n h e a r g u e d t h a t it was n o t possible to u n d e r s t a n d Spinoza's c o n c e p t of t h e original B e i n g h e m e a n t that t h e notion was logically inc o h e r e n t . T h a t was a m u c h m o r e radical claim, a n d o n e that K a n t could n o t sustain. In essence, what Kant, following Jacobi, claimed was t h a t Spinoza d e n i e d intellect or t h o u g h t to t h e original B e i n g . Yet this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Spinoza's original B e i n g as "lifeless" is m o r e t h a n a little p r o b l e m a t i c . T o s u m m a r i z e Kant's key charges against Spinoza's notion of original B e i n g (Sem), K a n t believed Spinoza's G o d was lifeless since: 1 2

13

1 4

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1. 2. 3. 4.

Spinoza Spinoza Spinoza Spinoza

denied denied denied denied

G o d intelligence; G o d purposiveness; G o dfreedom; a n d G o d causality.

C o n s e q u e n t l y , Spinoza m a d e G o d over into a m e r e Urstoff— p r i m o r d i a l m a t t e r , "blind necessity"—i.e., his c o n c e p t of G o d as substance was "lifeless." As I will show, however, Kant's own conjectures a b o u t t h e intellectus archetypus in §§76—77 of t h e Third Critique d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i n t e r n a l c o h e r e n c e of a m o d e l of intellect very close to what Spinoza ascribed to his original B e i n g . 1. The Question of God's Intelligence. Kant claimed t h a t Spinoza "takes away all intelligence from t h e original g r o u n d of n a t u r a l t h i n g s " for t h e things of t h e world a r e "not derived from His u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r from any design of His . . ." B u t t h a t is widely at varia n c e with w h a t Spinoza actually claimed in t h e Ethics. T h e r e is a profuse a n d p r o f o u n d ascription of intelligence to G o d in t h a t w o r k . O n e is at a loss to see h o w K a n t can have m a d e his assertion. C a n it b e t h a t Spinoza s h o u l d have used t h e t e r m s " t h o u g h t " a n d "intellect" b u t n o t u n d e r s t o o d t h e m , o r n o t m e a n t t h e m ? Is it that e l s e w h e r e Spinoza m a d e a r g u m e n t s o r assertions which contradicted these—consciously o r unwittingly? T h a t seems a m o r e likely alternative. Yet we m u s t at t h e very least recognize t h a t Spinoza affirmed t h e consciousness, t h e self-consciousness a n d i n d e e d t h e infinite consciousness of G o d , for which all possibility is actual. H o w e v e r contradictory his p h i l o s o p h y m i g h t ultimately be p r o v e n 1 6

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to b e , Spinoza c a n n o t b e c h a r g e d with having altogether d e n i e d these t h i n g s , a n d in this m e a s u r e K a n t was j u s t plain w r o n g . B u t t h e point n e e d s to b e s h a r p e n e d . Was Spinoza contradictory? T h e r e is a n o t o r i o u s passage, t h e " N o t e to Proposition 17" of book 1 of t h e Ethics, in which Spinoza p r o p o s e d to show "that neit h e r intellect n o r will a p p e r t a i n to God's n a t u r e . " T h e r e stands o u r contradiction, a p p a r e n t l y . It is shocking, b u t it was m e a n t to be. A serious i n t e r p r e t e r , b e a r i n g all t h e o t h e r passages in m i n d , would seek to reconcile t h e a p p a r e n t discord. A hostile reader, seeking to be scandalized by offense to his religious sensibilities, would latch o n t o t h e s e words with a v e n g e a n c e . K a n t was certainly not that kind of a r e a d e r , b u t Jacobi was. 1 9

W h a t did Spinoza m e a n by his shocking line? For Spinoza t h e t e r m s "intellect" a n d "will" were distinctly h u m a n attributes a n d h e envisioned those of m o r e conventional piety saying "they know of n o t h i n g m o r e perfect, which they can attribute to God, t h a n t h a t which is t h e highest perfection in o u r s e l v e s . " T h e h u b r i s of that projection p r o v o k e d Spinoza's assertion, as h e m a d e vividly clear in a r e m a r k a b l e a n d conclusive passage: 20

if intellect a n d will a p p e r t a i n to t h e e t e r n a l essence of G o d , we m u s t take these words in s o m e signification quite different from those they usually bear. For intellect a n d will, which s h o u l d constitute t h e essence of God, would perforce be as far a p a r t as t h e poles from the h u m a n intellect a n d will, in fact, would have n o t h i n g in c o m m o n with t h e m b u t the n a m e ; t h e r e would b e a b o u t as m u c h c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between t h e two as t h e r e is b e t w e e n t h e Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that b a r k s . 21

Spinoza h a r d l y d e n i e d intellect to G o d ; h e wished to alert his r e a d e r to t h e idea that divine intellect was not simply s o m e multiple a n a l o g u e of o u r s . Let Spinoza m a k e his o w n point: "Now the intellect of G o d is the cause of b o t h t h e essence a n d t h e existence of o u r intellect; t h e r e f o r e , t h e intellect of G o d so far as it is conceived to constitute t h e divine essence, differs from o u r intellect b o t h in respect to essence a n d in respect to existence, n o r can it in anywise a g r e e t h e r e w i t h save in n a m e , as we have said b e f o r e . " T o believe t h a t b e c a u s e Spinoza d e n i e d God's intellect c o r r e s p o n d e d to o u r s , Spinoza d e n i e d h i m intellect altogether is to believe t h e r e can only be o n e kind of intellect, with differences of d e g r e e . J a c o b i m i g h t h o l d such a view. K a n t could not. O n e of his crucial philosophical strategies was to distinguish o u r discursive intellect from a 22

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conjectural alternative form: t h e intuitive intellect. T h i s intellectus archetypus, I c o n t e n d , tallies a l t o g e t h e r well with t h e intellect of Spinoza's G o d . 2. The Question of God's Purposiveness. K a n t c o n t e n d e d that Spinoza's original B e i n g d i d n o t act by design, intention, o r p u r pose; t h e r e was in it n o causality t h r o u g h ideas. T o evaluate t h e significance of this claim, we m u s t recall t h a t Kant m e a n t by p u r p o s e t h e relation w h e r e b y a n "idea" (technically, a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , or Vorstellung) served as t h e g r o u n d o r cause of t h e "existence" of a n o b j e c t . Now, in m a n , merely t h i n k i n g , even k n o w i n g t h e r e p r e sentation does not g e n e r a t e t h e t h i n g . W h a t is r e q u i r e d is a n int e r v e n i n g praxis, actualization. M e n labor to b r i n g forth, a n d they have projected this back u p o n their "creator." I n religious lang u a g e , G o d " l a b o r e d " seven days to create the world. Kant's m o d e l , too, r e a d divine causality o n t h e m o d e l of h u m a n practical p u r posiveness. T h i s a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m was pervasive a n d basic to t h e e n t i r e K a n t i a n system. T h e kind of G o d K a n t r e q u i r e d in his ethico-theology was the "living" G o d of the Christian tradition, with a providential a n d p e r s o n a l character, w h o "created" t h e world. Yet this whole distinction of m e n t a l from material, i n t e n d e d from actual, only m a k e s sense in the context of h u m a n discursive n a t u r e . T o project these q u a n d a r i e s of m o r t a l m a n back u p o n t h e original B e i n g is problematic. Spinoza could n o t accept this: "this d o c t r i n e d o e s away with t h e perfection of God: for, if G o d acts for a n object, h e necessarily desires s o m e t h i n g which h e lacks." T h e n o t i o n of final cause, t h e l a n g u a g e of purposiveness, w h e n applied to G o d , " m a k e s that which is by n a t u r e first to b e last, a n d t h a t which is h i g h e s t a n d most perfect to be most i m p e r f e c t . " T h e n o tion of G o d as a p u r p o s i v e creator, a c r e a t o r from i n t e n t i o n a n d d e sign w h o h a d to realize t h e world in a n act, was p r o f o u n d l y foreign to Spinoza. 23

2 4

25

H e n c e K a n t was correct in his claim t h a t Spinoza d e n i e d p u r posiveness to his original Being. W h a t is incorrect is the implication K a n t drew, namely, that G o d could n o t any l o n g e r b e r e g a r d e d as a cause. Spinoza still felt entitled to view the intellect of G o d as t h e cause of all entities. T h a t causality was not t r a n s e u n t a n d s e q u e n tial, however, b u t i m m a n e n t a n d eternal. Nevertheless, as cause, it r e m a i n e d logically prior. If intellect belongs to t h e Divine n a t u r e , it c a n n o t be in nat u r e , as o u r s is generally t h o u g h t to be, posterior to, or simulKant's Attack on Spinoza

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t a n e o u s with t h e things u n d e r s t o o d , i n a s m u c h as G o d is prior to all things by r e a s o n of his causality. O n t h e contrary, t h e t r u t h a n d formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as such in t h e intellect of G o d . W h e r e f o r e t h e intellect of G o d , in so far as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is, in reality, t h e cause of t h i n g s , b o t h of their essence a n d of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . 26

T h i s n o t i o n of causation, a n d especially of divine causation, will c o n c e r n us f u r t h e r below. 3. The Question of God's Freedom. W i t h t h e rubric of "fatality" a n d with his f r e q u e n t suggestion t h a t it was " m e r e necessity" a n d "blind necessity" t h a t was operative in t h e relation b e t w e e n Spinoza's original B e i n g a n d t h e world, K a n t m a d e t h e claim t h a t Spinoza's G o d h a d n o f r e e d o m . Spinoza h a d a very clear n o t i o n of what freedom signified within his system: " T h a t t h i n g is called free, which exists solely by t h e necessity of its o w n n a t u r e , a n d of which t h e action is d e t e r m i n e d by itself a l o n e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , that t h i n g is necessary, o r r a t h e r c o n s t r a i n e d , which is d e t e r m i n e d by s o m e t h i n g ext e r n a l to itself to a fixed a n d definite m e t h o d of existence o r a c t i o n . " T h e implications for G o d were d r a w n quite clearly: " G o d acts solely by t h e laws of his o w n n a t u r e , a n d is n o t constrained by a n y o n e . " H e n c e , " G o d is t h e sole free cause. F o r G o d alone exists by t h e sole necessity of his n a t u r e , a n d acts by t h e sole necessity of his n a t u r e . " Spinoza's d o c t r i n e q u i t e unequivocally asserted t h e freed o m of G o d — a n d equally d e n i e d it to every o t h e r entity. It was p r e cisely Spinoza's d o c t r i n e of a substance t h a t its existence s h o u l d b e d e t e r m i n e d solely by its own essence. By t h a t very definition h e could conceive of only a single substance, G o d , as existent. G o d as this o n e substance possessed a n intrinsic, self-determining necessity which was f r e e d o m . Entities, which owed b o t h their essence a n d t h e i r existence to t h e original substance, necessarily could n o t enjoy such f r e e d o m . 27

2 8

W h a t d i d f r e e d o m m e a n to Kant, t h e n , t h a t h e s h o u l d have f o u n d it d e n i e d in Spinoza? Manifestly h e d i d n o t m e a n caprice. F r e e d o m for K a n t was precisely t h e capacity to c o n f o r m to a selflegislated principle. Rationality was t h e g r o u n d of freedom. Only because t h a t rationality was t h e intrinsic essence of m a n as n o u m e n o n d i d h e have f r e e d o m . So m u c h m o r e , t h e n , should this reas o n i n g a p p l y to Kant's n o t i o n of G o d . B u t t h e n it would a p p e a r difficult, a p a r t from t h e imagistic w r a p p i n g s , to see what was so diff e r e n t a b o u t t h e two stances. I n d e e d , I s u b m i t Kant's d o c t r i n e of 254

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"life" a n d of f r e e d o m at t h e level of a n original B e i n g d o not significantly differ from Spinoza, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d . T h e real locus of conflict b e t w e e n K a n t a n d Spinoza o n t h e question of f r e e d o m lay n o t at t h e level of t h e original B e i n g o r G o d , b u t r a t h e r at t h e level of t h e individual existent h u m a n being. K a n t insisted u p o n , a n d Spinoza rejected utterly, t h e f r e e d o m of existent m a n . T h i s situation is at t h e h e a r t of t h e conflict between t h e two g r e a t philosop h e r s . Kant's e n t i r e philosophical e n e r g y radiates from his c o n c e r n for t h e efficacious practical f r e e d o m of m a n , i.e., his m o r a l d u t y in t h e world of things. T h a t was t h e origin of his l a n g u a g e of p u r posiveness. It was t h e h e a r t of Kantianism. B u t Spinoza utterly d e nied i t . 4. The Question of God's Causality. Kant a r g u e d t h a t Spinoza confused causality with i n h e r e n c e o r s u b s i s t e n c e . K a n t a g r e e d with his c o n t e m p o r a r y , Crusius, in m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e logical relation of g r o u n d to c o n s e q u e n c e was n o t t h e same as, a n d could n o t serve as t h e basis for, t h e actual relation of cause to effect. Logical relations w e r e "analytic"; actual relations were " s y n t h e t i c . " Precisely w h a t t h e latter entailed was t h e separateness of t h e relata. T h a t sepa r a t e n e s s , for Kant, was only conceivable in t e r m s of existential— i.e., m a t e r i a l — s e p a r a t e n e s s . All causality, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e d materiality a n d was t r a n s e u n t . Such a p o s t u r e creates e n o r m o u s difficulties for purposiveness as a m o d e of causality, for purposiveness posits a n immaterial ( n o u m e n a l ) cause as materially ( p h e n o m enally) efficacious. T h i s K a n t a d m i t t e d to b e flagrantly i n c o n g r u e n t with categorial u n d e r s t a n d i n g of causality, b u t h e h e l d o u t that it was n o t in itself c o n t r a d i c t o r y . 2 9

30

31

32

T h e essential issue lies elsewhere, however. Kant has f o r m u lated t h e e n t i r e p r o b l e m in t e r m s of a discursive rational being, b u t Spinoza was conceiving of s o m e t h i n g quite other. W h a t may b e t r u e of t h e cognitive p r o b l e m of m a n in view of his discursive situation, a n d of t h e practical p r o b l e m of m a n , in view of t h e difference b e t w e e n a n i n t e n t i o n a n d a n object, between o u g h t a n d is, simply may n o t b e projected back u p o n t h e original Being. As a conseq u e n c e , Kant's distinction of g r o u n d a n d c o n s e q u e n c e from cause a n d effect, of logical from actual, simply does n o t apply. T o d e m o n strate this we have only to consider Kant's o w n brilliant j u x t a p o s i tion of discursive a n d intuitive intelligence in §§76—77 of t h e Third Critique. I n those sections, Kant's p u r p o s e was to explain the p r o b l e m of h u m a n consciousness in t e r m s of t h e conflict b e t w e e n reason's aspiration to totality a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s r e q u i r e m e n t s for validity— Kant's Attack on Spinoza

255

in short, t h e discursive d i l e m m a t h a t objective knowledge r e q u i r e d , in h u m a n s , sensible intuition in addition to p u r e reason. T o m a k e clear t h e implications of discursiveness in m a n , Kant a r g u e d , " t h e idea of a possible u n d e r s t a n d i n g different from t h e h u m a n m u s t be f u n d a m e n t a l . " T h a t idea was t h e n o t i o n of a n "intuitive" u n d e r s t a n d i n g . K a n t u s e d this t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t t h r o u g h o u t his critical p e r i o d , a n d in the Third Critique h e spelled o u t the essential e l e m e n t s of the j u x t a p o s i t i o n . For t h e discursive intellect, t h e distinction of t h e possible from t h e actual was decisive. H u m a n beings w e r e c a u g h t in t h e disjunction of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung) a n d object, of intention a n d realization, of o u g h t a n d is. Cognitively this expressed itself in t h e e m p t y liberty of t h o u g h t , which could t h i n k possible all that was n o n c o n t r a d i c t o r y , b u t could not entail its actuality. But "if o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g w e r e intuitive, it would have n o objects b u t those which a r e actual. C o n c e p t s (which merely e x t e n d to t h e possibility of a n object) a n d sensible intuitions (which give us s o m e t h i n g without allowing us to cognize it t h u s as a n object) would b o t h d i s a p p e a r . " C o n c e p t s , as designations of t h e merely possible, would d i s a p p e a r because all possibility in a n intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g would entail actuality. Similarly t h e d i l e m m a of t h e discursive intellect over o u g h t a n d is w o u l d fall away "were r e a s o n considered as in its causality i n d e p e n d e n t of sensibility . . . a n d so as cause in a n intelligible world entirely in a g r e e m e n t with the m o r a l law . . . [I]n such a world t h e r e would be n o distinction b e t w e e n ' o u g h t to d o ' a n d 'does,' b e t w e e n a practical law o f t h a t which is possible t h r o u g h us a n d t h e theoretical law of that which is actual t h r o u g h u s . " Most p e r t i n e n t to t h e question of theism versus deism a n d of t h e place of teleology in t h e i r conflict, K a n t wrote t h a t for t h e discursive intellect t h e whole could only b e achieved by t h e m e c h a n i cal s u m m a t i o n of its parts. Discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g h a d to p r o c e e d from analytic-universals to particulars in t h e construction of any c o n c e p t of a n object. B u t Kant claimed we could " t h i n k a n intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which d o e s not p r o c e e d from t h e universal to the particular, a n d so to the individual ( t h r o u g h concepts)" but would instead p r o c e e d "from t h e synthetic-universal (the intuition of a w h o l e as such), to t h e particular, i.e. from t h e whole to t h e parts." 33

34

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T h e closest a p p r o x i m a t i o n discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g could m a k e to t h e notion of a systemic whole, a n organic entity, was via t h e l a n g u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . I n t h a t l a n g u a g e , a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e whole stood p r i o r to t h e existence o f t h a t whole, a n d f o r m e d , 256

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as it w e r e , t h e causal security t h a t s u b o r d i n a t e d t h e parts p e n d i n g its c o n s t i t u t i o n . Manifestly this l a n g u a g e did not really c a p t u r e t h e relation of whole to parts which Kant characterized as accessible to t h e hypothetical intuitive intellect a n d as a l o n e a d e q u a t e to the n o t i o n of a t r u e whole p r i o r to a n d h i g h e r t h a n its p a r t s . H e n c e p u r p o s i v e n e s s as a m o d e l was a discursive a p p r o x i m a t i o n , a n d a weak o n e . It was hardly consistent with a n intuitive intellect. For t h a t intellect, to think was to actualize. F u r t h e r m o r e , the whole n o tion of t h e contingency of particulars, as in the p r o b l e m of e m p i r i cal n a t u r e ' s lawfulness for a discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b e c o m e s irrelevant for t h e intuitive intellect. Kant's strictures against Spinoza's characterization of t h e causal relation of his original B e i n g to n a t u r a l things are palpably out of place. O n e final point: K a n t explicitly stated that t h e idea of such a n intellectus archetypus "contains n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " With that h e destroyed his o w n claim t h a t t h e r e was a logical i n c o h e r e n c e in Spinoza's n o t i o n of t h e original Being. I n s u m , Kant's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Spinoza's original B e i n g as a "lifeless G o d " fails utterly. Still, if t e r m i n g Spinoza's God "lifeless" in Kant's technical sense of t h e t e r m has b e e n shown i n a p p r o p r i a t e , that does not signify t h a t it was a n y t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g t h e o r t h o d o x theistic version of a personal G o d . H a v i n g devoted so m u c h e n e r g y to revindicating G o d in his a t t r i b u t e of " t h i n k i n g t h i n g " o r t h o u g h t in Spinoza, we r u n t h e risk of u n d e r s t a t i n g t h e inevitably scandalous c o n c o m m i tant position of t h a t philosophy, namely, that G o d was also a n "ext e n d e d t h i n g " o r matter. W h a t e v e r may have b e e n the merits of t h e first position, t h e m e r e claim t h a t G o d was m a t t e r r e m a i n e d outr a g e o u s b e y o n d r e d e m p t i o n to o r t h o d o x religious sensibility. G o d as s u b s t a n c e in Spinoza's sense b l u r r e d with G o d as substance in t h e vulgar sense, a n d t h e result s e e m e d indiscernible from atheistic materialism. J u s t by that m e a s u r e h a d t h e doctrine of p a n t h e i s m served t h e radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y against o r t h o d o x religion, a n d it was n o coincidence t h a t Spinoza was d e a r to t h e h e a r t s of these deist f r e e - t h i n k e r s . T h i s association with m a t t e r was t h e source of t h a t suspicion of t h e inertness of Spinoza's original B e i n g which so possessed Jacobi a n d p r o v o k e d Kant. It would lead t h e Idealists to believe t h a t they h a d to show t h a t B e i n g as Spinoza conceived it n e e d e d to be reconceived in a m o r e spiritualized f o r m . Yet, if my reconstruction has any merit, t h e r e was already a lot of this in Spinoza himself, awaiting Idealist discovery. 37

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First a n d most importantly, as a g o o d essentialist, Spinoza insisted u p o n t h e reality of intellectual intuition a n d o n its episteKant's Attack on Spinoza

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mological p r e e m i n e n c e . A n o t h e r powerful implication of his t h o u g h t was t h a t "the t r u e is t h e w h o l e " — t h a t o n e h a d to start from the idea of t h e intrinsic infinite a n d t h i n k in t e r m s of perfection sub specie aeternitatis. A n o t h e r essential principle h e e n d o w e d t h e m with was t h a t all n e g a t i o n was limitation. T h i s c r e a t e d the logical p r o s pect t h a t within t h e infinite whole t h e r e m i g h t b e a n i m m a n e n t articulation to particularity. T h e e l e m e n t s of dialectics as a logical process of differentiation a n d limitation compatible with ontological u n i t y g l i m m e r e d in his formulations. I n o n e way, K a n t w o r k e d sharply to divide Spinoza from t h e " p a n t h e i s t " s t a n d p o i n t of t h e radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t . H e insisted u p o n r e a d i n g Spinoza's original B e i n g as "hyperphysical," as supersensible o r t r a n s c e n d e n t . T h i s , too, was a n i n a d e q u a t e g r a s p of Spinoza's stance; j u s t as Spinoza's idea of the original B e i n g did n o t fit comfortably with t h e o r t h o d o x notion of a p e r s o n a l divinity, it did n o t fit t h e o r t h o d o x n o t i o n of a t r a n s c e n d e n t o n e either. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' s materialist r e a d i n g did n o t really g r a s p his position either, for Spinoza's affirmation of i m m a n e n c e , as against conventional t r a n s c e n d e n c e , signified t h e imm a n e n c e of entities in Being, of t h e world in God, a n d not t h e converse. Spinoza offered a t h i r d possibility, which would be t a k e n u p a n d d e v e l o p e d brilliantly in G e r m a n Idealism. Spinoza created t h e possibility of a " p a n e n t h e i s m , " t h o u g h only t h e full developm e n t of G e r m a n Idealist t h o u g h t would b r i n g sufficient clarity to these issues t h a t t h e t e r m itself would b e i n v e n t e d . Lessing h a d built his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Spinoza o n a p a n e n t h e ist r e a d i n g . H e r d e r d e v e l o p e d t h e same line of t h o u g h t in his Gott: einige Gespräche. T h e y o u n g Idealists would take u p a n d transfigure t h e s e b e g i n n i n g s by b r i n g i n g Spinoza's idea of t h e original B e i n g into a m u c h m o r e intimate p e n e t r a t i o n of t h e world of entities, fusing a far from "lifeless" Absolute with a n equally animated N a t u r e . T h e y s o u g h t a way to r e n e w Spinoza's metaphysical synthesis via w h a t Lessing d u b b e d t h e hen kaipan. 4 2

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Lessing's p h r a s e c a p t u r e d t h e essential magic of Spinozism for t h e Idealists. W h a t it b e t o k e n e d was synthesis, totality, h o l i s m — t h a t closure lusted after by r e a s o n a n d by feeling: t h e bridge of subj e c t to object, sign to signified, o u g h t to is, desire to fulfillment, m a n to n a t u r e . It is in those most famous p h r a s e s from Spinoza—Deus sive Natura a n d Natura naturans—that we pick u p a n additional a n d crucial e l e m e n t in t h e a p p e a l of Spinozism, in t h e affinity between w h a t K a n t d i s p a r a g e d as "fatalism" a n d "hylozoism." Spinoza's idea allowed t h e G e r m a n Idealists to give way to t h e i r o v e r w e e n i n g intu258

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ition of n a t u r e as d y n a m i c , active, creative—alive. T h a t s e e m e d to resolve t h e i m m a n e n c e - t r a n s c e n d e n c e p r o b l e m . N a t u r e as a living force was b o t h in t h e world a n d its h i g h e r principle. It was immanent Reason. N a t u r e was more t h a n matter, a n d it was Nature that lived. T h e very p r o t e s t K a n t m a d e o n behalf of G o d , his objection to "lifelessness," t h e Idealists would m a k e o n behalf of t h e world. A n d , p a r a doxically in t h e spirit of Kant, for t h e sake of t h e f r e e d o m of t h a t most inextricably worldly spirit, m a n himself. With his a r g u m e n t s in t h e Third Critique, K a n t set t h e issues of the metaphysical vision which would i n f o r m G e r m a n Idealism. K a n t failed in his mission to reverse t h e tide of Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m in G e r m a n y . T h e t r e a t m e n t h e gave these topics in t h e Third Critique served to rally j u s t those w h o w e r e most a d e p t a n d interested in his philosophy to t h e defense of Spinoza a n d p a n t h e i s m , a n d t h u s p r o v o k e d t h e new metaphysics of G e r m a n Idealism. T h e latter could n o m o r e abide t h e denial of life to t h e Absolute t h a n it could to t h e existent, a n d as a result m a d e Life, p r o p e r l y c o n s t r u e d , o u t to b e t h e hen kaipan. If o n e a c c e p t e d b o t h Spinoza's claim t h a t utterly disparate substances could n o t interact a n d Kant's claim that empirical m a n m u s t be seen as free, t h e only possible recourse was to r e a d w h a t Kant t e r m e d t h e n o u m e n a l , t r a n s c e n d e n t , o r intelligible o r d e r as in fact t h e i m m a n e n t principle of t h e real, n a t u r a l , existential o r d e r . Spinoza's B e i n g , indwelling in N a t u r e a n d in m a n , b e c a m e Reason a n d F r e e d o m in o n e : t h e distinctive metaphysical principle of Germ a n Idealism, Geist.

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We have c o m e a vast distance in o u r consideration of Kant's "cognitive t u r n , " a n d it may be well to s u m u p , provisionally, t h e key points of o u r itinerary. T h e cognitive t u r n took place in t h e s p r i n g of 1789, as a result of Kant's discovery of t h e cognitive potential in "subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s " or t h e "technic of n a t u r e . " I n t h e wake of this, h e c a m e to f o r m u l a t e his t h e o r y of "reflective j u d g m e n t " a n d to reconceive his n o t i o n of t h e "faculty of j u d g m e n t . " Accordingly, h e envisioned his work t h e n c e f o r t h n o l o n g e r as a "Critique of T a s t e " b u t as t h e Critique of Judgment. Kant's works of 1787—90 may plausibly be r e a d as a sustained revision of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e First Critique of 1 7 8 1 . F r o m at least 1785 forward, K a n t h a d felt obliged to offer a t h e o r y of t h e "unity of r e a s o n " which went b e y o n d his restrictive Kant's Attack on Spinoza

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considerations in t h e First Critique's " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic." As h e m a d e t h e "cognitive t u r n " in 1789, h e c a m e as close to offering t h a t unified vision of h u m a n consciousness as h e was ever to c o m e , a n d w h a t h e a t t e m p t e d , despite his reservations, inspired his followers to even g r a n d e r a d v e n t u r e s in synthesis. If that p e r h a p s e x c e e d e d Kant's avowed project, it was certainly t h e case that elem e n t s e m e r g e d in t h e Third Critique which s e e m e d to offer s u p p o r t for such a systematic revision, especially o n t h e vexed questions of t h e "unity of r e a s o n " a n d t h e possibility of valid self-awareness. His confidence in t h e closure of his cognitive system with t h e discovery of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle g r o u n d i n g taste, a n d t h e n with his discovery of t h e cognitive p o w e r of this s a m e principle, r e a c h e d a m a x i m u m , p e r h a p s for his whole philosophical career. I n particular, h e believed h e could now resolve t h e n a g g i n g p r o b l e m of his epistemology, the failure in t h e First Critique to entail t h e objective validity of empirical j u d g m e n t s . T o flesh o u t these notions, h e p l u n g e d into t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. B u t K a n t also h a d a n eye toward t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y context, especially in n a t u r a l science. T h e r e were those w h o wished to p u s h s o m e of t h e ideas with which Kant was working too far, w h o fell into "dialectical" excess a n d p e r p e t r a t e d "aestheticism of science." Against t h e m h e h a d already b e e n c o n d u c t i n g a n e x t e n d e d campaign d u r i n g t h e late 1780s, a n d h e saw t h a t it would n e e d to be b u t t r e s s e d in t h e new Critique ofJudgment. H e directed himself to t h a t task in t h e "Analytic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in the late s p r i n g a n d early s u m m e r of 1789. In t h e process, h e saw that t h e "aestheticists of science" could all too frequently be identified with t h e p a n t h e i s t s a n d materialists w h o t h r e a t e n e d the o r t h o d o x theistic p e a c e of G e r m a n religious c u l t u r e . T h e receipt of Jacobi's second edition of t h e Spinoza-Büchlein in late s u m m e r of 1789 t r i g g e r e d a far m o r e polemical t u r n in his a r g u m e n t against hylozoism b o t h in t h e "Analytic" a n d above all in the "Dialectic." His c a m p a i g n s o u g h t n o t only to rectify t h e methodological excess of "speculation" in t h e new science of biology, b u t at t h e same time to demolish t h e m e t a physical excess of Spinozism a n d hylozoism. T h e result was t h e climactic a r g u m e n t with Spinoza in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " over t h e question of plausible o n t o l o g i e s — n o t only of n a t u r e b u t of self. Kant m a d e his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t against metaphysical speculation, b u t h e went o n to insinuate clearly his o w n metaphysical position, identified with theism a n d the free will of individual h u m a n actors. T h a t is what I call t h e "ethical t u r n . "

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T H E ETHICAL TURN IN KANT'S CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

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n §12 of t h e First Introduction K a n t p r e s e n t e d a plan for t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of his newly conceived Critique ofJudgment which s h e d s a g r e a t deal of light u p o n t h e c o h e r e n c e of t h e ultimate work. I n k e e p i n g with his n o t i o n of a n "encyclopedic i n t r o d u c t i o n , " K a n t p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e b o d y of his b o o k provide a systematic articulation of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t , i.e., o n e which would b e c o m p l e t e a n d internally consistent. H e p r o c e e d e d to lay d o w n a f r a m e w o r k for this t h r o u g h t h r e e distinctions. First h e dist i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n d e t e r m i n a n t a n d reflective j u d g m e n t s . Determ i n a n t j u d g m e n t n e e d e d n o consideration within t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t itself since it was completely g o v e r n e d by the faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e r e f o r e t h e systematic articulation of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t in t e r m s of its o w n intrinsic principle would focus exclusively u p o n reflective j u d g m e n t . Kant p r o c e e d e d t h e n to a seco n d discrimination, b e t w e e n aesthetic a n d logical reflective j u d g m e n t s . T h i s r e q u i r e d t h a t a critique of j u d g m e n t s h o u l d have two parts, o n e c o n s i d e r i n g aesthetic j u d g m e n t s ( j u d g m e n t s of taste), a n d o n e c o n s i d e r i n g l o g i c a l j u d g m e n t s (teleology). 1

At first glance, these w o u l d s e e m to be sufficient divisions. B u t in fact K a n t w e n t o n to a third, decisive distinction, between intrinsic a n d relative p u r p o s i v e n e s s . Accordingly, t h e simple twofold division t u r n e d into a fourfold division. I n t h e s p h e r e of t h e aesthetic reflective j u d g m e n t , K a n t identified the consideration of intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s with beauty, a n d t h e n h e linked t h e consideration of relative p u r p o s i v e n e s s with the sublime. I n t h e s p h e r e of t h e logical r e f l e c t i v e j u d g m e n t , h e discriminated t h e consideration of intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s , i.e., n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s or o r g a n i c forms, from consideration of relative purposiveness, i.e., the p u r p o s e of n a t u r e (as a whole) in its relation to m a n . 2

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T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , while n o t acknowledged in t h e final struct u r e of t h e work, nevertheless i n f o r m e d its ultimate design. T h e whole "ethical t u r n " would b e a n elaboration of t h e p r o b l e m s entailed by t h e t h i r d discrimination. It is t h e basis for the consideration of t h e sublime in t h e Third Critique, a n d it helps clarify t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e e l a b o r a t e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " which is really t h e consideration of t h e final p r o b l e m . S t a r t i n g in late s u m m e r of 1789, Kant's Critique of Judgment went t h r o u g h a third, major m e t a m o r p h o s i s c e n t e r e d above all in t h r e e places in t h e Third Critique: t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime," a n d §49 (the analysis of gen i u s ) . H e c o n t i n u e d a l o n g this line in early 1790, elaborating his " M e t h o d o l o g y of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d t h e n revising substantially t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e whole work in t h e last m o n t h s before delivering his m a n u s c r i p t to the publisher. It is this final t u r n in t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of his w o r k that I will call Kant's "ethical t u r n . " H e m a d e it for c o n t e x t u a l as well as for i m m a n e n t reasons. T h e n e w "practical-metaphysical" e m p h a s i s of t h e final version can be e x p l a i n e d contextually in t e r m s of Kant's struggle against Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m . Kant's "ethical t u r n " m u s t be seen as p a r t of a strategy to d e f e n d his crucial metaphysical c o m m i t m e n t s : to the free will a n d m o r a l d u t y of individual h u m a n beings, a n d to t h e idea of a t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l Divinity o n Christian lines. T h e i m m a n e n t r e a s o n h a d to d o with his desire to reconcile his p h e n o m e n a - n o u m e n a t h e o r y of f r e e d o m with t h e p r o b l e m of actualizing t h e m o r a l good. H e n e e d e d , or felt h e n e e d e d , to r e f o r m u late a n d s t r e n g t h e n t h e a n a l o g u e to schematism which h e h a d d e v e l o p e d in t h e Second Critique. T h a t was t h e t h r u s t of t h e crucial §ii of the I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Critique ofJudgment, entitled "Of t h e Realm of Philosophy in G e n eral." K a n t a r g u e d t h e r e t h a t 4

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n exercise . . . two distinct legislations o n o n e a n d t h e same territory of e x p e r i e n c e , without prejudice to each o t h e r . . . T h a t they d o n o t constitute one r e a l m arises from this that the n a t u r a l c o n c e p t r e p r e s e n t s its objects in intuition, n o t as things in themselves, b u t as m e r e p h e n o m e n a ; t h e c o n c e p t of freedom, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e p r e s e n t s in its object a t h i n g in itself, b u t n o t in i n t u i t i o n . 5

I n t e r m s of his p h e n o m e n a - n o u m e n a distinction, this s e e m e d perfectly a d e q u a t e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h o u g h these two different realms 264

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" d o n o t limit each o t h e r in t h e i r legislation . . . they perpetually d o so in t h e world of sense." T h i s is because even if philosophy may b e divided into theoretical a n d practical, "the territory to which its r e a l m e x t e n d s a n d in which its legislation is exercised is always only t h e c o m p l e x of objects of all possible e x p e r i e n c e , so long as they a r e t a k e n for n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n m e r e p h e n o m e n a . " Reason in its m o r a l legislation m u s t legislate to p h e n o m e n a as t h o u g h they w e r e n o u m e n a . B u t t h a t m e a n t t h a t b o t h laws m u s t obtain simultaneously. T h e r e f o r e , practical laws did a n d h a d to infringe u p o n n a t u ral o r d e r . T h e q u e s t i o n was how they could d o so without violating t h e legislation of cognitive laws. T h e answer, for Kant, was of c o u r s e t h e resort to teleology. B u t the force b e h i n d the whole strategy was his c o m m i t t e d belief in t h e reality of n o u m e n a . T h e best way to illuminate t h e n a t u r e of t h e "ethical t u r n " is to contrast t h e final version of the I n t r o d u c t i o n , c o m p o s e d in March 1790, with t h e First Introduction, c o m p o s e d by May 1789. Kant's interest in t h e heuristic utility of teleological j u d g m e n t s for cognition a p p e a r s to have fallen off substantially between t h e composition of t h e two versions. It is n o t so m u c h t h a t Kant a b a n d o n e d t h e position of t h e First Introduction as that it simply did n o t seem so i m p o r t a n t to h i m . R a t h e r , h e felt a s t r o n g n e e d to u n d e r s c o r e t h e merely subjective c h a r a c t e r of teleological t h i n k i n g a b o u t objects of nat u r e . His d i s p a r a g e m e n t of " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e " c e n t e r e d o n his r e j e c t i o n of any possible i m m a n e n c e in n a t u r e in connection with his struggle against Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m . 6

By far t h e most i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n t h e two versions c o m e s at t h e i r very outset: t h e m e n t i o n of will as a " n a t u r a l cause" in § 1 of t h e final version is new. T h a t novelty b e c o m e s salient in §ii of t h e final version, a section which h a d n o p r e c e d e n t in t h e First Introduction a n d which e x p l o r e d in detail the p r o b l e m of will as a n a t u r a l cause raised at t h e conclusion of §i. K a n t stated t h e definitive c o n c e r n of t h e Third Critique in t h e final p a r a g r a p h of the section. It may well b e o n e of t h e clearest s t a t e m e n t s Kant ever m a d e r e g a r d i n g t h e p o i n t of his e n t i r e philosophical e n t e r p r i s e . K a n t s o u g h t to reconcile n a t u r e a n d freedom, t h e laws of causality with t h e law of morality, within his system. H e w r o t e : N o w even if a n i m m e a s u r a b l e gulf is fixed between t h e sensible realm of the concept of n a t u r e a n d t h e supersensible r e a l m of t h e concept of f r e e d o m , so that n o transition is possible from t h e first to t h e second (by m e a n s of t h e theoretical use of reason), j u s t as if they were two different worlds of The Ethical Turn

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which t h e first could have n o influence u p o n t h e second, yet t h e s e c o n d is meant to h a v e a n influence u p o n t h e first. 7

Man's free will h a d to try to actualize its p u r p o s e s in the world of sense, h e n c e this h a d to be at least possible. Kant's m o r a l philosop h y r e q u i r e d n o t success, b u t a n a t t e m p t to actualize the individual's m o r a l will in t h e world. T h a t r e q u i r e d t h e translation of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e will into a n actual, efficacious act: free will as a " n a t u r a l cause." K a n t chose to resolve t h e d i l e m m a in t h e following m a n n e r : " n a t u r e m u s t b e so t h o u g h t t h a t t h e conformity to law of its form at least h a r m o n i z e s with t h e possibility of t h e p u r p o s e s to b e effected in it a c c o r d i n g to laws of f r e e d o m . " Kant went o n to explicate this s e n t e n c e with o n e even m o r e problematic: " T h e r e m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , be a g r o u n d of t h e unity of t h e supersensible, which lies at the basis of n a t u r e , with t h a t which t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m practically cont a i n s . " K a n t recognized t h a t " t h e concept of this g r o u n d " could yield n o k n o w l e d g e ; t h e "supersensible" was obviously b e y o n d sense, a n d h e n c e ineligible for categorial d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Nevertheless K a n t m a i n t a i n e d it m a d e possible t h e "transition" from t h e principles of f r e e d o m to t h e principles of n a t u r e . W h a t Kant a p p e a r s to have m e a n t is t h a t t h e reconciliation of t h e laws of nat u r e a n d t h e law of f r e e d o m could be t h o u g h t only in t e r m s of t h e idea of a "supersensible g r o u n d , " t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t unity of n a t u r e a n d m a n : a metaphysical idea if ever t h e r e was o n e ! 8

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T h e w h o l e t e n o r of t h e consideration was metaphysical in t h a t Kant a d d r e s s e d himself to t h e intervention of t h e supersensible in t h e world of sense. K a n t u p h e l d his distinction of p h e n o m e n a a n d n o u m e n a b u t h e validated t h e latter not only as indispensable to h u m a n thought (theoretical r e a s o n as "regulative"), b u t m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y as essential to h u m a n action (practical reason as a u t o n omous freedom). Since Kant's critical p h i l o s o p h y did n o t p e r m i t any cognitive ascription of objective reality to n o u m e n a , h e h a d to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of a unifying supersensible " g r o u n d " was a t r a n scendentally necessary s t r u c t u r e for consciousness in general. T h e c o n c e p t h e r e q u i r e d h a d to recognize t h e lawfulness of n a t u r e in t e r m s a n a l o g o u s to t h e lawfulness of will. It could be n e i t h e r t h e oretical, i.e., constitutive of t h e objects of cognition, n o r practical, i.e., legislative of m o r a l imperatives, b u t only a m a n n e r of t h i n k i n g : subjective, b u t nevertheless indispensable. W h a t fit t h e bill was t h e c o n c e p t of " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " (Zweckmäßigkeit). K a n t h a d seen in tele266

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ology t h e key to his a priori principle d e t e r m i n i n g t h e faculty of feeling in his original b r e a k t h r o u g h to t h e "Critique of T a s t e " in late 1787. Purposiveness p r o v i d e d t h e link in aesthetics between j u d g m e n t a n d feeling, t h o u g h only in its formal, n o t actual significance. Similarly, purposiveness f o u n d its way into Kant's cognitive p h i l o s o p h y as a way to resolve t h e p r o b l e m of i n d u c t i o n a n d to sec u r e t h e possibility of empirical science. At t h e final stage of his c o m p o s i t i o n , this vastly e x p a n d e d n o t i o n p r o v e d decisive for his metaphysical a d v e n t u r e with t h e "supersensible substrate." Purposiveness, by virtue of its multiple linguistic links, p r o v i d e d the int e g u m e n t b i n d i n g t h e supersensible substrate of n a t u r e with t h e supersensible f r e e d o m of t h e m o r a l subject. T h e l a n g u a g e of p u r posiveness set t h e t o n e o n which all t h e h a r m o n i c s of t h e Third Critique w e r e built. It h a d its original a n d literal place, however, in t h e t h e o r y of h u m a n action, especially practical o r m o r a l action. T h i s m o r a l dim e n s i o n of teleology reasserted itself as K a n t worked o u t his position in t h e Third Critique. T h i s new c o n c e r n i n t r u d e d powerfully into t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d t h e revised I n t r o d u c t i o n . J u s t as teleology h a d f o u n d its way into t h e p r o b l e m of cognition in t e r m s of empirical investigations, so now teleology f o u n d its way into p r o b l e m s of morality in t e r m s of the n a t u r a l , m a terial aspect of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . It was essential for m a n to find a solution w h e r e b y h e could b o t h recognize t h e o r d e r (lawfulness) of n a t u r e a n d yet confirm his o w n freedom not merely n o u m e n a l l y b u t practically. As t h e " T h i r d A n t i n o m y " of t h e First Critique h a d it, f r e e d o m a n d necessity w e r e compatible, b u t only so long as each r e m a i n e d in its o w n realm. Nevertheless, Kant was quite aware t h a t h u m a n m o r a l obligation entailed t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of m o r a l choices into t h e world of things. B u t was t h e r e any place for t h e m t h e r e ? While m a n took himself for a real p u r p o s e , h e was a n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n nevertheless. M a n f o u n d himself a m e r e object of nature's processes: " n a t u r e has n o t in the least e x c e p t e d h i m from its destructive o r its productive powers, but has subjected everything to a m e c h a n i s m of its o w n without any p u r p o s e . " 1 0

M a n as p u r p o s i v e h a d b e e n at stake all a l o n g in t h e Third Critique. F o r K a n t t h e o n e ultimate a n d persistent p r o b l e m for m a n was h o w to reconcile his self-conception as n o u m e n a l l y free with his k n o w l e d g e of his own n a t u r a l materiality. T h e cognitive conc e p t i o n of n a t u r e o p e r a t e d within a framework of relentless causal necessity. As p h e n o m e n o n , m a n was "always only a link in t h e chain of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s . " K a n t h a m m e r e d away at this point. A n d 11

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yet, h e insisted, only in m a n himself could a final p u r p o s e be f o u n d in n a t u r e . " H e is t h e ultimate p u r p o s e of creation h e r e o n e a r t h , because h e is t h e only b e i n g u p o n it w h o can form a concept of p u r poses a n d w h o can, by his r e a s o n , m a k e o u t of a n a g g r e g a t e of p u r posively f o r m e d things a system of p u r p o s e s . " H e was u n i q u e in t h e world for having n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m "to d e t e r m i n e p u r p o s e s . . . as u n c o n d i t i o n e d a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s . " Man's task, a c c o r d i n g to Kant, was to realize his stature as a free a g e n t . " T h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m is m e a n t to actualize in t h e world of sense t h e p u r p o s e p r o p o s e d by its laws, a n d consequently n a t u r e m u s t b e so t h o u g h t t h a t t h e conformity to law of its form at least h a r m o n i z e s with t h e possibility of the p u r p o s e s to be effected in it a c c o r d i n g to laws of f r e e d o m . " M a n h a d to evaluate his own p u r p o s e u n d e r t h e d o u b l e tension between his material d e t e r m i n a c y a n d t h e ultimate t r a n s c e n d e n c e of his freedom (the p r o b l e m of t h e unity of man as a finite-rational subject), a n d b e t w e e n his individual subjectivity a n d the u l t i m a t e destiny of his kind (the p r o b l e m of t h e unity of mankind as a spiritual force transfiguring n a t u r e into history). It is this metaphysical question of h u m a n p u r p o s e that the Critique ofJudgment ultimately takes u p : t h e crucial relation b e t w e e n m a n ' s d u t y a n d his destiny in t h e world. T h e ethical t u r n entailed the effort to c o m e to grips with m a n ' s being-in-the-world. It h a d b o t h a n aesthetic a n d a practical d i m e n sion. I n t h e aesthetic s p h e r e , t h e ethical t u r n invoked beauty as t h e symbol of morality. I n t h e practical s p h e r e , it h a d to d o with d u t y a n d destiny, i.e., history, religion a n d t h e c o n c e p t of the "highest g o o d . " T h e t h e o r y of t h e sublime a n d t h e symbolic only clarified t h e aesthetic d i m e n s i o n of t h e relation of t h e sensible to t h e s u p e r sensible, a n d K a n t t u r n e d to t h e final question of its practical dim e n s i o n , t h e p r o b l e m of t h e "highest g o o d , " in t h e very last stages of t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e text. I n d e e d , h e elaborated it substantially in t h e first m o n t h s of 1790 after h e h a d already i n f o r m e d his p u b l i s h e r t h a t the work was finished. T h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " as we now have it, m u s t b e d a t e d to this last It i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e metaphysical progress Kant h a d period. m a d e via his t h e o r y of t h e sublime a n d t h e symbolic a n d e x t e n d e d it i n t o a g e n e r a l t h e o r y of m a n ' s being-in-the-world. 12

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Fourteen

T H E SUBLIME, T H E SYMBOLIC, AND MAN'S "SUPERSENSIBLE DESTINATION"

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n t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e , " a n d §49 (the analysis of genius) K a n t developed a new t h e o r y of symbolism. A l o n g with a r e n e w e d interest in t h e sublime, two o t h e r t e r m s a s s u m e d salience in his work: t h e " s u p e r s e n s i b l e " a n d " i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts." T h e intimate relation of these t h r e e notions constitutes t h e t h e o r y of symbolism. T h i s n e w interest in symbolism originated in Kant's elaboration of his t h e o r y of n o u m e n a l h u m a n f r e e d o m in t h e c o m p l e x case of h u m a n being-in-the-world. T h e key to t h e t h e o r y of symbolism lies in Kant's revision of t h e a n t i n o m y in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment." I n revising a n d d e e p e n i n g t h e "simple" a n t i n o m y of his "Critique of T a s t e , " K a n t m o v e d from a negative to a positive n o t i o n of the a n t i n o m y : from "discipline" (critique) to speculation (metaphysics). T h e positive sense u r g e s us to "think" t h e unity of r e a s o n t h e g r o u n d of o u r o w n subjectivity. T o b e s u r e , as in t h e First Critique, K a n t c o n t i n u e d to d e n y strict "objective reality" (i.e., cognitive validity) to such t h o u g h t . B u t h e also, a n d m u c h m o r e emphatically t h a n in t h e First Critique, e m p h a s i z e d t h e m e a n i n g f ulness of t h e a n t i n o m y in g r o u n d i n g n o u m e n a for reason. Such a g r o u n d i n g was of course n o t theoretically objective. It was only "practical." B u t in R e m a r k II to §57, K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e p o i n t of all t h e a n t i n o m i e s was to "force" u s to recognize "an intelligible substrate ( s o m e t h i n g supersensible of which t h e c o n c e p t is only a n idea a n d supplies n o p r o p e r k n o w l e d g e ) . " T h i s h e articulated with even m o r e eloq u e n c e a n d i m p o r t a n c e in §57 itself: " A n d t h u s h e r e , as also in t h e Critique of Practical Reason, t h e a n t i n o m i e s force us against o u r will to look b e y o n d t h e sensible a n d to seek in t h e supersensible t h e 1

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p o i n t of u n i o n for all o u r a priori faculties, because n o o t h e r e x p e d i e n t is left to m a k e o u r r e a s o n h a r m o n i o u s with itself." T h a t K a n t used t h e w o r d "force" in b o t h contexts is striking. H e suggested with it t h a t t h e m i n d resisted t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e is a supersensible r e a l m over a n d above t h e sensible o n e . Such resistance derived from two q u a r t e r s : t h e n a t u r a l dialectical i m p e t u s to s u b r e p t i o n , r e g a r d i n g t h e sensible world as t h e only world ( c o m m o n sense), a n d t h e sophisticated philosophical suspicion of such a transcend e n t world (skepticism). K a n t claimed t h a t t h e first resistance could b e o v e r c o m e o n c e it was d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t n o t h i n g f u n d a m e n t a l to t h e actual n e e d s of o r d i n a r y m e n was lost by such a distinction, b u t r a t h e r a g r e a t deal g a i n e d for their ultimate m e a n i n g . Against t h e s e c o n d resistance, K a n t a r g u e d that r e a s o n , u p o n which skeptics rely for critical efficacy, could n o t itself r e m a i n c o h e r e n t witho u t resort to such a distinction. If a n a n t i n o m y exists, t h e r e m u s t be a conflict at the level of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle, i.e., some question of necessary validity m u s t be at stake, a n d this inevitably implies that p u r e reason (the faculty of cognition in general) m u s t exercise its critical function. T h e faculty of r e a s o n (in general) o p e r a t e s exclusively with t h o u g h t s , i.e., via t h e function of concepts. H e n c e any a n t i n o m y m u s t involve concepts. T h e p r o b l e m in t h e specific case of the faculty of j u d g m e n t is t h a t a p p a r e n t l y reflective j u d g m e n t , at least in its aesthetic e m p l o y m e n t , d o e s n o t involve concepts. K a n t t h e r e fore a r g u e s t h a t e i t h e r j u d g m e n t has n o claim to necessary validity, which destroys t h e legitimacy of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, or else j u d g m e n t m u s t have s o m e c o n n e c t i o n with concepts after all. 4

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T h i s was t h e n e w f o r m of t h e a n t i n o m y in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " which K a n t i n t r o d u c e d in t h e late s u m m e r o r fall of 1789. I n this a n t i n o m y , only t h e second possibility was acceptable for Kant. His solution was to associate t h e sorts of concepts exc l u d e d from j u d g m e n t s of taste with " d e t e r m i n a t e " concepts (of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , a n d to conceive of a n o t h e r sort of " c o n c e p t " — namely, o n e which did n o t b e l o n g to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d which was c o n s e q u e n t l y n o t d e t e r m i n a t e : ideas of reason now described as " i n d e t e r m i n a t e " or " u n d e t e r m i n a b l e " c o n c e p t s . C o n c e p t s of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w e r e d e t e r m i n a t e because they could b e applied concretely, via t h e schematism, to objects of sensible intuition. Ideas of r e a s o n were i n d e t e r m i n a t e because they could never b e p r e s e n t e d completely by a n object of sensible intuition. H e n c e , K a n t n o w a r g u e d t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t of taste possessed a n a priori 7

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w a r r a n t for its claim to universal c o n s e n t by virtue of its r e f e r e n c e n o t to any d e t e r m i n a t e concept, b u t r a t h e r to i n d e t e r m i n a t e ideas of r e a s o n . K a n t w e n t o n to articulate in g e n e r a l w h a t such rational concepts c o n t a i n e d . H e a r g u e d t h a t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e concept of reason r e f e r r e d to t h e supersensible "which lies at t h e basis of all sensible intuition." In a reflective j u d g m e n t , " t h e m e r e p u r e rational c o n c e p t of t h e supersensible which u n d e r l i e s t h e object (and also t h e subject j u d g i n g it) [is] r e g a r d e d as a n object of sense a n d t h u s p h e n o m e n a l . " K a n t suggested, t h e n , t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t of taste ultimately entailed the assertion of t h e reality of "the c o n c e p t of t h e g e n e r a l g r o u n d of t h e subjective purposiveness of n a t u r e for t h e j u d g m e n t " as a " d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d " a n d as t h e " s u p e r s e n s ible substrate of h u m a n i t y . " T h a t is clearly "dialectical" s u b r e p t i o n in t e r m s of t h e First Critique. As d e t e r m i n i n g , r a t h e r t h a n determ i n e d , t h e "supersensible" could n e v e r b e a t r u e object of cognit i o n . K a n t n o w stressed, however, that it could be t h o u g h t , a n d it could also be a t t e n d e d via reflection, i.e., aesthetically. W h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g could n o t p r o v e , r e a s o n could think, reflection could feel. W h a t they b o t h p o i n t e d to was t h e supersensible, conceived of n o t only as t h e "substrate of p h e n o m e n a " b u t also as a "subjective p r i n ciple," i.e., "the indefinite idea of t h e supersensible in u s . " K a n t articulated t h r e e aspects of this idea in his R e m a r k II to §57. T h e r e was t h e idea of t h e supersensible in general, as t h e substrate of n a t u r e , which c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e idea of t h e t h i n g in-itself o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l object in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic," a n d also, p e r h a p s , to the idea of n a t u r e as a whole in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e First Critique. T h e r e was t h e principle of subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s of n a t u r e for o u r cognition, or t h e imp u t e d "technic of n a t u r e " involved in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle of logical reflectivejudgment. A n d finally t h e r e was t h e principle of t h e p u r p o s e s of f r e e d o m a n d its conformity to m o r a l law, o r t h e idea of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l or n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m as d e v e l o p e d in t h e Second Critique. H e n c e each of t h e t h r e e Critiques e x p l o r e d a n idea of t h e supersensible. T h e question implied by this articulation was w h e t h e r t h e r e was s o m e unity to t h e idea of t h e supersensible which was m o r e t h a n n o m i n a l , a n d which could t h e n stand as a universal g r o u n d for b o t h n a t u r e a n d f r e e d o m . K a n t asserted in the First Critique t h a t unity was methodologically indispensable for t h e function of r e a s o n , b u t r e m a i n e d merely a formal o r heuristic principle, h e n c e objectively n o m i n a l . T h e new a n t i n o m y s e e m e d to raise 8

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a g a i n t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e r e w e r e g r o u n d s for considering t h e supersensible objectively real. Unless reflective j u d g m e n t could refer to this i n d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t of t h e supersensible, K a n t decided, it could not lay claim to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g a n d would fall o u t of t h e realm of t h e faculty of cognition into t h a t of m e r e s e n s e . B u t if it did m a k e such a r e f e r e n c e , a n d d r e w u p o n it as its ultimate g r o u n d , t h e n w h a t a p p e a r e d to be a m e r e l y aesthetic j u d g m e n t from the vantage o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g could be c o n s t r u e d as a "disguised j u d g m e n t of r e a s o n . " T h i s "disguised j u d g m e n t of r e a s o n " would c o n c e r n " t h e perfection discovered in a t h i n g a n d t h e reference of the m a n ifold in it to a p u r p o s e . " Accordingly, it w o u l d b e a "confusion" to c o n s i d e r it a n aesthetic reflection, since "it is at b o t t o m teleological." K a n t h a d systematically rejected such a n a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m of b e a u t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t . " H e sustained t h a t rejection in t h e R e m a r k to §57. Yet h e formulated it as t h e possibility t h a t would obtain were we e n d o w e d with intellectual intuition of n o u m e n a , i.e., were it possible to "know," n o t m e r e l y "think" t h e supersensible. While such overt metaphysics r e m a i n e d proscribed in t h e "critical philosophy," Kant was now worki n g t o w a r d a new access to these crucial ideas. T h e n a t u r a l c o n t i n u a t i o n of the a r g u m e n t c a m e in §59. It is i m p o r t a n t to d r a w a t t e n t i o n first, however, to a strange passage in §22, at the conclusion of the exposition of the "Analytic of t h e Beautiful," w h e r e K a n t discussed his n o t i o n of a sensus communis. H e w r o t e : 10

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T h i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e n o r m of a c o m m o n sense is actually p r e s u p p o s e d by us, as is shown by o u r claim to lay d o w n j u d g m e n t s of taste. W h e t h e r t h e r e is in fact such a c o m m o n sense, as a constitutive principle of t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e , o r w h e t h e r a yet h i g h e r principle of reason makes it only into a regulative principle for p r o d u c i n g in us a c o m m o n sense for h i g h e r p u r p o s e s ; w h e t h e r , therefore, taste is an original a n d n a t u r a l faculty o r only t h e idea of a n artificial o n e yet to b e a c q u i r e d , so that a j u d g m e n t of taste with its a s s u m p t i o n of a universal assent in fact is only a r e q u i r e m e n t of reason for p r o d u c i n g such h a r m o n y of s e n t i m e n t ; w h e t h e r the o u g h t , i.e. the objective necessity of the confluence of the feeling of any o n e m a n with t h a t of every other, only signifies t h e possibility of arriving at this accord, a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of taste only

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affords a n e x a m p l e of t h e application of this p r i n c i p l e — t h e s e questions we have n e i t h e r t h e wish n o r t h e p o w e r to investigate as y e t . 12

T h e p l a c e m e n t of this passage is extremely awkward in t h e context of t h e a r g u m e n t which was b e i n g developed at t h a t point in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful." T h e reference to a n " i n d e t e r m i n a t e " n o r m is evidence of this, for t h e distinction is n o t at all e m p l o y e d in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" u p to that point. Since the passage involves considerations to which n o t h i n g in the p r e c e d i n g sections would point, it a p p e a r s to be a later addition. T h e n o t i o n that t h e j u d g m e n t of taste m i g h t be a "disguised j u d g m e n t of reason," which was clearly i n t i m a t e d as a possibility in t h e passage, h a d b e e n rejected o u t of h a n d in t e r m s of t h e idea of perfection in § 15, a n d would h a r d l y m e r i t reassertion. Yet Kant h e r e i n t r u d e d s o m e intim a t i o n s t h a t t h e n o t i o n of " c o m m o n sense" a n d t h e claim to universality a n d necessity in the j u d g m e n t of taste b e t o k e n e d s o m e far vaster a n d m o r e metaphysical possibilities t h a n his straightforward articulation w o u l d s e e m to r e q u i r e . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , we s h o u l d n o t b e too hasty to c o n c l u d e in R e m a r k II of §57 t h a t Kant wished a l t o g e t h e r to dismiss t h e p r o s p e c t that t h e j u d g m e n t of taste m i g h t be a disguised j u d g m e n t of reason. I n d e e d , if we t u r n to §59, we discover h e asserted r a t h e r t h a n d e n i e d this prospect, t h o u g h in a new a n d r e m a r k a b l e form: the theory of symbolism. P e r h a p s t h e most striking p h r a s e in t h e Third Critique occurs in t h e title of §59: "Of B e a u t y as t h e Symbol of Morality." E i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y aesthetics f u n d a m e n t a l l y s o u g h t to liberate the realm of aesthetics from its submission to ethics, or, in a n o t h e r formulation, to distinguish a kind of feeling in which n o desire was implicated, b u t with this p h r a s e K a n t dramatically r e i n t r o d u c e d t h e b o n d between the aesthetic a n d the ethical. Yet h e wished to restore t h e linkage n o t discursively, not cognitively, b u t only symbolically. §59 b e g i n s n o t with a n exposition of its d r a m a t i c title b u t r a t h e r with t h e clearest articulation of Kant's n o t i o n of " p r e s e n t a t i o n " [Darstellung] of concepts in general, hypotyposis. Presentation m e a n s simply "sensible illustration." Empirically, it is a n e x a m p l e . It is w h a t a m a t h e m a t i c i a n or a scientist m e a n s by a " d e m o n s t r a t i o n . " S o m e concepts can be d e m o n s t r a t e d determinately, either t h r o u g h c o n s t r u c t i o n in p u r e intuition (as in geometry, a n d m a t h e m a t i c s generally), o r t h r o u g h schematism. Schematism is that p r o c e d u r e of p r e s e n t a t i o n in which for a p u r e concept of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g 13

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a n intuitive d e t e r m i n a t i o n is constituted directly a n d adequately. Schematism is d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . B u t t h e r e are concepts available to c o n s c i o u s n e s s — i n d e t e r m i n a t e ideas of r e a s o n — " t o which n o sensible intuition can b e a d e q u a t e . " K a n t d e v e l o p e d his t h e o r y of symbolism with reference to these i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts. K a n t described t h e p r o c e d u r e of symbolism as follows: "an intuition is s u p p l i e d with which accords a p r o c e d u r e of t h e j u d g m e n t a n a l o g o u s to w h a t it observes in schem a t i s m , i.e. merely a n a l o g o u s to t h e r u l e of this p r o c e d u r e , n o t to t h e intuition itself, c o n s e q u e n t l y to t h e form of reflection merely a n d n o t to its c o n t e n t . " First, it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that s o m e intuitive c o r r e l a t i v e — h o w e v e r i n a d e q u a t e — i s s o u g h t or supplied by t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . We will have to ask why. Second, t h e principle of t h e p r o c e d u r e is analogy. Symbolism works by analogy to t h e p r o c e d u r e of schematism in d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , t h e constitution of sensible intuition by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s principle of analogy K a n t m a d e t h e basis for " o r i e n t a t i o n of t h i n k i n g " in r e f e r e n c e to t h e supersensible in his crucial article o n t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy, "Was heißt: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " Let us retrieve two points from that discussion: w h a t t h e principle of analogy can achieve, a n d why it is invoked. T h e latter idea deserves first consideration, for t h a t article linked it unequivocally with t h e " r e q u i r e m e n t s of r e a s o n . " Reason must t h i n k a b o u t t h e supersensible. Given this, t h e only q u e s tion it will consider is h o w most contructively to d o so. T h e answer is: by analogy. K a n t e x p l a i n e d what philosophical analogy could achieve in t h e First Critique in discussing his "Analogies of Experie n c e . " T h a t n o t i o n of analogy was r e i t e r a t e d in t h e article "Was h e i ß t " a n d again in t h e Third Critique. T h e principle of analogy allows t h e rational confirmation of a relation, b u t n o t of its d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t e n t . T h e analogy of symbol to s c h e m a allows t h e rational validity of a relation b e t w e e n an i n d e t e r m i n a t e idea of reason a n d a sensible intuition, even t h o u g h t h a t relation c a n n o t establish t h e identity of t h e c o n t e n t . T h u s , while schematism achieves a direct p r e s e n t a t i o n of concepts, symbolism achieves a n indirect p r e s e n t a tion. 14

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T h a t b r i n g s us to t h e t h i r d key p o i n t to take from the cited passage, namely, t h a t in symbolism the m i n d is set in m o t i o n in a p r o c e d u r e which is strictly a n a l o g o u s to that of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in its d e t e r m i n a n t o r constitutive p r o c e d u r e . T h a t is, a t h o u g h t seeks p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e form of intuition. T h e m o v e m e n t of the m i n d is from t h o u g h t to sensibility. T h e source of t h e i m p u l s e lies in rea274

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son, n o t sense. It is "expressionist," n o t "impressionist." T h a t is to say, t h e p r o b l e m is n o t o n e of recognition b u t of creation. T h e symbol is i n v e n t e d , not discovered, t h o u g h , of course, o n c e t h e p r o c e d u r e has b e e n established, it is easy to see how it becomes possible t h a t a n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e m i g h t be taken for a symbol: we are in the familiar g r i p of the g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art o n c e m o r e . Let u s s u m u p w h a t we have established. First, symbolism is a n e n t e r p r i s e a i m e d at finding intuitive expression for a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e , i.e., supersensible idea of reason. It involves a p r o c e d u r e of analogy, which is able only to secure t h e relation between the supersensible a n d t h e intuitive object, but not t h e identity of their contents. H e n c e t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n is with this relation, with t h e sense of affinity, with t h e evocation of t h e supersensible in r e a s o n by t h e sensible object. A n d precisely what the symbol is to evoke is t h a t supersensible subjectivity which for Kant is distinctly m o r a l . All of t h e s e e l e m e n t s c o n v e r g e in a single concept: Geistesgefühl. Geistesgefühl was w h a t K a n t "provisionally t e r m f e d ] the faculty of r e p r e s e n t i n g a sublimity in o b j e c t s . " H e n c e o u r e x a m i n a t i o n of Kant's t h e o r y of symbolism leads us directly to t h e sublime. It is only by c o n s i d e r i n g the idea of t h e sublime t h a t we can m a k e sense of t h e relation of "aesthetic ideas" to "rational ideas" in such a way as to d o full justice to Kant's claim t h a t "beauty is t h e symbol of t h e morally g o o d . " 19

The Analytic of the Sublime T h e p l a c e m e n t of the "Analytic of t h e Sublime" ( § § 2 3 - 3 0 ) in t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique is problematic. M e r e d i t h , at o n e e x t r e m e , c o n s i d e r e d t h e material o n t h e sublime to b e a m o n g the oldest writing in t h e Third Critique, a n d h e n c e "almost certainly i n c l u d e d " in t h e original version of t h e "Critique of T a s t e . " S o u r i a u , at t h e o t h e r e x t r e m e , claimed t h a t t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e sublime was " t h e very latest exposition of Kant's aesthetic t h o u g h t , " a n d d a t e d it to t h e very last days p r i o r to publication of the book in s p r i n g 1 7 9 0 . Tonelli a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e sublime, as it stands in t h e Third Critique, is i n f o r m e d by t h e full conception of reflective j u d g m e n t , h e n c e h a d to follow t h e "cognitive t u r n " of s p r i n g 1 7 8 9 . His case is persuasive. B u t Meredith's observation is n o t w i t h o u t point, nor, despite its obvious chronological i m p o s sibility, can we dismiss Souriau's claim, for it contains a very i m p o r t a n t , t h o u g h still unclarified insight.

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siderable body of material, l o n g since dissected a n d formulated, inc l u d i n g n o t merely t h e view published in his Observations of 1 7 6 4 — of which at least o n e significant idea, the m o r a l relevance of t h e sublime, p r o v e d essential for t h e Third Critique—but his u n p u b lished Reflections, his lecture formulations, his critical a n n o t a t i o n s from Burke's treatise, a n d so o n . Meredith is correct, for t h e most p a r t , a b o u t t h e vintage of t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime." B u t h e misses t h e crucial difference between the bulk of the exposition ( § § 2 5 - 2 9 ) a n d t h e sections which, o n Tonelli's r e a d i n g , were inserted to ease t h e transitions into a n d o u t of this new s e g m e n t of t h e "Analytic." Precisely t h e r e — i n § § 2 3 - 2 4 , 30, a n d above all in t h e first p a r t of t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to § 2 9 — t h e m o r e sophisticated idea of reflective j u d g m e n t i n t r u d e s . T h a t suggests—as Souriau a n d T o n e l l i b o t h believe—that t h e sublime was not "almost certainly i n c l u d e d " in t h e original "Critique of Taste," c o n t r a Meredith. W h y did Kant i n t r o d u c e it, a n d why, in spite of the new sophistication of his t h e o r y of j u d g m e n t , did h e find his older formulations of t h e sublime a p p r o p r i a t e ? H e r e is w h e r e Souriau's sense t h a t t h e sublime r e p r e s e n t e d s o m e t h i n g m o r e m a t u r e in Kant's t h o u g h t in t h e Third Critique can be rescued. While Tonelli is correct that it was not possible t h a t t h e "Analytic of the Sublime" could b e d a t e d as late as 1790, as S o u r i a u wished, h e does not recognize, as S o u r i a u did, t h e p r o f o u n d affinity between t h e changes which w i t h o u t question K a n t did i n t r o d u c e in 1790 a n d t h e point b e h i n d t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e . " B o t h of these reflect a n o t h e r t u r n in Kant's t h i n k i n g , b e y o n d t h e "cognitive t u r n " of s p r i n g 1789. T h e new t u r n was a n ethical t u r n . T h a t m a d e the sublime relevant for inclusion in t h e Third Critique, because it h a d b e e n c o n n e c t e d with Kant's ethical t h o u g h t from as early as 1764. Since t h e ethical t u r n c a m e after t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e First Introduction, Tonelli is correct in d a t i n g t h e insertion of t h e sublime after s p r i n g 1789, b u t it was old material (as M e r e d i t h claimed) used for the most m a t u r e p u r p o s e s of t h e work as a whole (as Souriau claimed). 2 3

T h e sublime did not figure at all in t h e original "Critique of T a s t e . " It was a d d e d only late in t h e composition of t h e Critique of Judgment as a result of Kant's elaboration of t h e theory of reflective j u d g m e n t , a n d even m o r e as a result of his "ethical t u r n . " In t h e text as we n o w have it, the c o n c e p t first a p p e a r s in § 14 in what is clearly a t a c k e d - o n final p a r a g r a p h inserted, long after t h e composition of t h e original section, to p r e p a r e t h e r e a d e r for t h e new s e g m e n t o n

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t h e sublime that K a n t decided to a p p e n d to his t r e a t m e n t of t h e beautiful. K a n t took u p t h e idea of t h e sublime, as h e took u p so m a n y of t h e t e r m s in t h e Critique of Judgment, from his context, redefining a n d elevating such notions by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e m within his system of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. In the Third Critique, Kant d r e w certain features a n d illustrations from t h e conventional wisdom. H e accepted t h e association, starting with L o n g i n u s , of t h e sublime with t h e g r a n d — i n d e e d , even t h e infinite—and within that framework, with such ideas as formlessness a n d u n b o u n d e d n e s s . H e also accepted t h e c o m p l e x psychological account of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of the sublime which h a d b e e n articulated first for t h e e i g h t e e n t h century by A d d i s o n , t h e n taken u p a n d refined in s u b s e q u e n t accounts to achieve its definitive form in B u r k e , i.e., t h a t t h e sublime comm e n c e d in a feeling of sensual discomfort or pain, only later succ e e d e d by a feeling of gratification. B u t Kant, in t r a n s f e r r i n g these n o t i o n s into his own aesthetic philosophy, a n d especially in linking t h e sublime with t h e m o r a l a n d rational, completely transfigured t h e significance of these conventional connections. I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e significance of t h e idea of t h e sublime in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y aesthetics in general a n d in t h e genesis of t h e G e r m a n Sturm und Drang, we n o t e d t h a t Kant h a d t r a n s f o r m e d that g e n e r a l n o t i o n already in his essay of 1764 by a d v a n c i n g t h e conception of t h e sublime as g r o u n d e d in t h e n o t i o n of h u m a n m o r a l w o r t h . T h a t was not a line p u r s u e d by the British aestheticians, n o r a tack t a k e n by t h e G e r m a n s of t h e Sturm und Drang. While they stressed w o n d e r a n d awe, a n d even developed complex psychological accounts of t h e e x p e r i e n c e , they first of all f o u n d t h e g r o u n d for such a n e x p e r i e n c e in t h e objects of n a t u r e , a n d second, if they related it to subjectivity, f o u n d t h e relation n o t in h u m a n m o r a l g r a n d e u r b u t r a t h e r in h u m a n genius a n d creativity. I n d e e d , o n e m i g h t call theirs a p o s t u r e of the primacy of t h e aesthetic. T h a t was a n a t h e m a to K a n t . H e e n d e a v o r e d , consequently, to assert t h e primacy of t h e practical (ethical). His first move was to c a p t u r e t h e sublime for his p u r p o s e . His next, as we shall see, was to c a p t u r e the n o t i o n of genius. W i t h those two bastions fallen, h e could advance in triu m p h to claim beauty itself as a symbol, i n d e e d " p e n d a n t , " of m o rality. 24

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T h e first serious articulation of the p r o b l e m of the sublime in t e r m s of t h e genesis of t h e Third Critique c a m e in the final section of t h e First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment, h e n c e in early s p r i n g

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1789. K a n t conceived of t h e sublime t h e r e as t h e issue of "relative p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in t h e aesthetic reflective j u d g m e n t . T h a t formulation already signals t h e ultimate significance of Kant's theory. B e a u t y b e t o k e n e d t h e recognition of a purposiveness in t h e f o r m of t h e object as given, Kant a r g u e d , a n d h e n c e t h e i m p u t a t i o n of t h a t p u r p o s i v e n e s s to t h e object of n a t u r e , a n d h e n c e to n a t u r e , in itself. W i t h t h e sublime, however, t h e p h e n o m e n a were n o t p u r p o s i v e in themselves, a n d j u s t that fact occasioned their significance. S u c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e "formless," t h e "boundless," t h e u n p u r p o s i v e , a r o u s e d "a feeling of purposiveness lying a priori in t h e subject ( p e r h a p s t h e supersensible d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e subject's m e n t a l p o w e r s ) . " I n t h e sublime a p h e n o m e n a l e x p e r i e n c e occasioned a reflection in t h e subject n o t r e g a r d i n g t h e object b u t r e g a r d i n g itself. H e n c e n o "intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in t h e object n e e d be involved in this e x p e r i e n c e , "because it d e p e n d s only o n t h e c o n t i n g e n t [zufälligen] u s e of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . [for] a different feeling, namely, t h a t of t h e i n n e r p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e constitution of t h e powers of t h e m i n d . " In short, t h e sublime is a n e x p e r i e n c e which occasions self-consciousness t h r o u g h aesthetic reflection. A correct estimation of t h e role of t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime" in t h e Third Critique m u s t find its function n o t simply in c o m p l e t i n g t h e architectonic articulation of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s b u t m u c h m o r e in d e m o n s t r a t i n g a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l a n d t h e ultimate n a t u r e of t h e self. K a n t confirmed this p o i n t by t e r m i n g his consideration of t h e sublime a Kritik des Geistesgefühls, a critique of spiritual f e e l i n g . W h a t will e m e r g e from a n exposition of t h e c o n c e p t of t h e sublime is that t h e aspect of t h e subject to which t h e e x p e r i e n c e points is precisely t h e m o r a l d i m e n s i o n of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l freedom, a n d h e n c e t h e supersensible g r o u n d of subjectivity. 26

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In § 2 3 , w h e r e K a n t c o m m e n c e d t h e "Analytic of the Sublime," his objective was to c o m p a r e a n d contrast t h e sublime with t h e beautiful, which h a d h i t h e r t o b e e n t h e exclusive focus of his consideration. I n t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to §29, at t h e e n d of t h a t discussion, Kant c o m p a r e d t h e sublime n o t only with t h e beautiful b u t with t h e pleasant a n d t h e g o o d , m a k i n g all t h e m o r e palpable its absence from t h e detailed e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e s e experiences in § § 1 - 5 of t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful." T h e sublime was a d d e d late, a n d it was a d d e d precisely to establish a m u c h m o r e substantive relation b e t w e e n t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h e ethical o n e . While t h e analogy of t h e form of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste with t h e 278

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m o r a l j u d g m e n t p r o v i d e d t h e original insight leading to the trans c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, K a n t did n o t initially feel p r e p a r e d to press t h e analogy from form to substance. H e h a d n o t yet seen t h e full potential of the idea of symbol. B u t with his elaboration of t h e theory of symbolism, t h e sublime c a m e to play a crucial m e d i a t i n g role in c o n n e c t i n g t h e aesthetic with t h e ethical. T h e sublime was t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e which p a r excellence symbolized t h e m o r a l d i m e n s i o n of h u m a n existence. T h e discussion of t h e sublime in §23 begins with a discussion of " i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts." I n t h a t section, i n d e e d , Kant suggested t h a t t h e r e w e r e i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts n o t only of reason b u t also of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h a t while t h e sublime h a d to d o with t h e former, b e a u t y involved the l a t t e r . W h a t it can m e a n t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g will be a question which can only be clarified in the context of the notion of "aesthetic ideas," a n d we will have a better p u r c h a s e o n t h a t w h e n we u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h e p r o c e d u r e works in t h e r e a l m of t h e sublime, for which all o u r previous discussion p r e p a r e s us. T h e question is: why d o e s t h e e x p e r i e n c e of the sublime arise? W h a t is the place of this aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e in h u m a n life? 30

I n t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to §29, in w h a t a p p e a r s to be a classic instance of his p e n c h a n t for architectonic, Kant p r o c e e d e d to associate each of t h e four sorts of feeling h e h a d identified—the pleasant, t h e beautiful, t h e sublime, a n d t h e g o o d — w i t h o n e of t h e four m o m e n t s of logical j u d g m e n t — q u a n t i t y , quality, relation, a n d m o d a l i t y . T h e exercise m i g h t a p p e a r trivial, b u t some very imp o r t a n t implications derive from it. By associating t h e pleasant with quantity, K a n t reasserted that strictly sensual gratification was h o m o g e n e o u s a n d could b e conceived only in t e r m s of its quantity (eit h e r positive o r negative). T h e association of beauty with quality can be c o n n e c t e d with the unanticipatable u n i q u e n e s s of each event, c o m p a r a b l e to t h e u n a n t i c i p a t a b l e qualities of empirical j u d g m e n t . T h e association of t h e g o o d with modality h a d to d o with Kant's view t h a t t h e only feeling which could be established a priori was t h e m o r a l feeling which a t t e n d e d the imperative necessity of m o r a l law. T h i s idea of "respect" will preoccupy us shortly, b u t for t h e m o m e n t we m u s t focus o n t h e association of the sublime with relation. 31

I n §12 of t h e First Introduction, K a n t a r g u e d that, as distinct from t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty, which ascribed "intrinsic" p u r p o s iveness to its object, t h e sublime involved only a "relative" p u r posiveness in t h e sense of serving as t h e occasion for a subjective The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination

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reflection. Kant's whole t h e o r y of t h e sublime revolved a r o u n d " s u b r e p t i o n " — v i e w i n g a n object of n a t u r e as t h o u g h it were t h e g r o u n d of a feeling which in fact h a d its source in t h e self. As K a n t p u t it, "We m u s t seek a g r o u n d external to ourselves for t h e beautiful of n a t u r e , b u t seek it for t h e sublime merely in ourselves a n d in o u r a t t i t u d e of t h o u g h t , which i n t r o d u c e s sublimity into the r e p r e sentation of n a t u r e . " M o r e concretely, K a n t w r o t e : "the feeling of t h e sublime in n a t u r e is respect for o u r own destination, which, by a certain s u b r e p t i o n , we a t t r i b u t e to a n object of n a t u r e (conversion of respect for t h e idea of h u m a n i t y in o u r o w n subject into respect for t h e o b j e c t ) . " As a n e x p e r i e n c e of n a t u r e , t h e sublime was a n e r r o n e o u s projection, K a n t believed, a n d h e n c e h e f o u n d t h e sublime g e n e r ally fruitless for o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of n a t u r e , as c o m p a r e d with the rich stimulation t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty p r o v i d e d for o u r study a n d g r a s p of n a t u r e . W h a t t h e sublime illuminated r a t h e r was metaphysics. It m i g h t a p p e a r that such metaphysics should entail only a subjective reference, a n d consequently at most, a subjective idealism. B u t t h a t is precisely w h e r e t h e idea of relation b e c o m e s m o s t interesting. H a v i n g this e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime with a n o b j e c t of intuition in fact d e m o n s t r a t e d o u r capacity to symbolize, i.e., to take a n actual object, however i n a d e q u a t e , as a n illustration, a m e t a p h o r , for a supersensible idea. T h e sublime is, in t h a t m e a s u r e , t h e w a r r a n t for t h e possibility of art. B u t in j u s t t h a t m e a s u r e it b r i n g s t h e supersensible subjectivity of o u r m o r a l sense t o g e t h e r with t h e ostensibly merely sensible e x p e r i e n c e of beauty, a n d d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t aesthetic feeling in g e n e r a l is g r o u n d e d far m o r e d e e p l y t h a n a n y m e r e l y sensual e x p e r i e n c e . T h u s Kant could offer a w h o l e n e w t h e o r y of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of beauty a n d of g e n i u s , a whole new, far m o r e metaphysical theory of taste, o n c e h e h a d w o r k e d o u t the idea of the sublime. 3 2

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Kant's idea of t h e sublime is that it constitutes the h a r m o n y of i m a g i n a t i o n with r e a s o n , as contrasted with beauty's h a r m o n i z i n g of i m a g i n a t i o n with u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t t h e n o t i o n of h a r m o n y , as we have n o t e d earlier, is itself a m e t a p h o r , a n d we are now far advanced t o w a r d a m o r e discursive formulation of t h e unity of reason. S t a r t i n g from t h e relation of i m a g i n a t i o n a n d reason via t h e sublime, we can p r o c e d e to t h e relation between aesthetical ideas a n d rational ideas (symbolism), a n d o n to t h e ultimate o u t c o m e w h e r e b y beauty b e c o m e s t h e symbol of morality. A c c o r d i n g to Kant, t h e sublime could be divided into two m o m e n t s , t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d t h e dynamical, because it r e f e r r e d 280

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i m a g i n a t i o n to t h e faculty of reason in its two aspects: theoretical reason, t h e principle of "totality," i.e., finding the u n c o n d i t i o n e d for every given condition; a n d practical reason, t h e principle of " a u t o n o m y , " i.e., t h e categorical imperative s u p e r v e n i n g over every interest of sense. I n t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l m o m e n t , t h e sublime e x p e r i e n c e arises w h e n i m a g i n a t i o n a t t e m p t s to offer a n intuitive whole for a n idea of r e a s o n so g r a n d that it defeats imagination's effort. I m a g i n a t i o n , K a n t informs us, involves two projects, " a p p r e h e n s i o n " a n d " c o m p r e h e n s i o n . " It is able to a p p r e h e n d ad infinitum, t h a t is, it meets n o b o u n d or limit, since the forms of intuition, space a n d time, a r e mathematically indefinite or "extensively infinite," as K a n t h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d in t h e first a n t i n o m y of t h e First Critique. B u t it is n o t able to achieve the s a m e in its comp r e h e n s i o n . A c c o r d i n g to K a n t "in c o m p r e h e n s i o n t h e r e is a maxi m u m b e y o n d which it [the imagination] c a n n o t g o . " As h e p u t s it, s o m e of t h e "partial r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of s e n s u o u s intuition" which it tries to hold t o g e t h e r a r e lost as new o n e s a r e a d d e d . It is o n this g r o u n d t h a t we can have, for instance, n o intuition of n a t u r e as a whole, t h o u g h conceptually we can carry t h e limits of t h e sensible world b e y o n d t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n of i m a g i n a t i o n . " T h e logical estimation of m a g n i t u d e goes o n without h i n d r a n c e to infinity." T h e easiest illustrations of this are mathematical. While it is possible to form a n i m a g e of t h r e e a n d p e r h a p s four d i m e n s i o n s , it is impossible to carry forward into additional d i m e n s i o n s in images, b u t it is n o p r o b l e m at all to d o so in algebraic formulas. 36

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K a n t c o n t e n d e d t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n tried to k e e p pace with t h e d e m a n d s of r e a s o n , tried to e n c o m p a s s in o n e individual intuition s o m e t h i n g "absolutely g r e a t " a c c o r d i n g to reason's r e q u i r e m e n t , a n d by its failure b o t h humiliated the subject a n d filled h i m with respect. K a n t f o r m u l a t e d it as follows: " B u t because t h e r e is in o u r i m a g i n a t i o n a striving t o w a r d infinite progress a n d in o u r reason a claim for absolute totality, r e g a r d e d as a real idea, t h e r e f o r e this very i n a d e q u a t e n e s s for that idea in o u r faculty for estimating t h e m a g n i t u d e of things of sense excites in us t h e feeling of a s u p e r s e n sible faculty." T h a t reason can think of such absolute greatness as a whole, t h a t it " r e n d e r s it unavoidable to think t h e infinite (in t h e j u d g m e n t of c o m m o n reason) as entirely given (according to its totality)" establishes that this faculty is itself b e y o n d sensibility, i.e., "surpasses every s t a n d a r d of sensibility," o r is, itself, n o u m e n a l . "The bare capability of thinking this infinite without contradiction requires in t h e h u m a n m i n d a faculty itself s u p e r s e n s i b l e . " It is capable, in o t h e r w o r d s , of w h a t we have called t h e idea of "intrinsic infinity," 41

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t h e infinite "completely c o m p r e h e n d e d under o n e concept." T h i s c o m p l e t e n e s s o r closure was n o t possible in t h e extensive infinitity involved in "the m a t h e m a t i c a l estimation of m a g n i t u d e by m e a n s ofconcepts of number. " T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n with t h e p r o b l e m of infinity, t h e n , forms t h e basis of t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l sublime. I m a g i n a t i o n is o v e r w h e l m e d , a n d in awe of reason's capacity for such synthesis, t h e subject feels respect, which is a feeling of satisfaction. T h a t is to say, in relation to theoretical reason, i m a g i n a t i o n finds itself faced with a task, t h e initial imposition of which is u n p l e a s a n t , b u t t h e ultimate conseq u e n c e of which is a feeling of satisfaction. H e n c e the sublime is a c o m p l e x e x p e r i e n c e , o n e which involves m e n t a l " m o v e m e n t , " shifting feeling: Rührung or e m o t i o n . Kant claims that t h e sublime can b e c o n t r a s t e d with t h e beautiful in this r e g a r d , for t h e latter is, h e claims, "restful." T h i s is h a r d to reconcile with his notion of t h e enlivening play associated with beauty, a n d it can p e r h a p s b e exp l a i n e d by his effort to a p p r o x i m a t e his psychological accounts to those of B u r k e , w h o m h e took as t h e e x e m p l a r y psychologist of aesthetic s t a t e s . Kant would have b e e n better off discriminating t h e simplicity of t h e l i n g e r i n g play of the m i n d involved in t h e experie n c e of beauty, its m e r e pleasure, from t h e complexity of t h e c h a n g i n g state of t h e m i n d in the e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime, which begins in p a i n a n d only eventually achieves satisfaction. I n any event, t h e sublime is g r o u n d e d in the initial d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , frustration, o r even humiliation of t h e imagination, followed by a realization of h i g h e r p u r p o s e a n d a feeling of pleasure. T h e r e is to it, consequently, n o t h i n g of play, n o t h i n g of c h a r m , b u t r a t h e r t h e e a r n e s t n e s s of labor a n d t h e strain of d e p r i v a t i o n . 4 3

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T h e whole d r a m a takes place within a n d between t h e faculties. T h e p a r t i c u l a r objects of n a t u r e — i n d e e d , even n a t u r e itself as a n o b j e c t — a r e really n o t intrinsically relevant. " A n d it is not t h e object of sense, b u t the use which t h e j u d g m e n t naturally makes of certain objects o n behalf of this latter feeling that is absolutely g r e a t . . . C o n s e q u e n t l y it is t h e state of m i n d p r o d u c e d by a certain r e p r e s e n tation with which the reflective j u d g m e n t is occupied, a n d not t h e object, t h a t is to be called s u b l i m e . " Yet objects in n a t u r e which press i m a g i n a t i o n b e y o n d its capacity for c o m p r e h e n s i o n instill this idea of infinity, create t h e situation in which we discover "the i n a d e quacy of t h e greatest effort of o u r imagination." 45

T h e feeling which a t t e n d s this discovery is "respect," because r e a s o n set d o w n a law for i m a g i n a t i o n which it c a n n o t fulfill. K a n t

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defines respect precisely as " t h e feeling of o u r incapacity to attain to an idea which is a law for us." T h e m o r a l r e s o n a n c e of that definition is u n m i s t a k a b l e . B u t reason imposes laws, "regulates" the faculties of t h e m i n d , a n d imposes " r e q u i r e m e n t s " n o t simply in its practical f o r m , b u t also in its theoretical form. I n t h e humiliation of failing to achieve w h a t r e a s o n c o m m a n d e d , t h e subject experiences a p a i n , b u t by t h e realization t h a t it is its o w n r e a s o n which not only c o m m a n d e d b u t c o m p r e h e n d e d that which sensible intuition via i m a g i n a t i o n could not achieve, satisfaction overcomes t h e pain. T h e e x p e r i e n c e "arouses in us t h e feeling of this supersensible destination" i n h e r e n t in o u r rationality. " T h u s t h a t very violence which is d o n e to t h e subject t h r o u g h t h e i m a g i n a t i o n is j u d g e d as p u r p o s i v e in reference to the whole determination of t h e m i n d . " T h e evidence for t h e supersensible destination of t h e subject, it m u s t be r e e m p h a s i z e d , takes the form of a feeling. Reflection can attain t h e sense of t h e supersensible destination of the subject t h r o u g h the e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime. T h e t r e a t m e n t of the "dynamical sublime" simply carries the s a m e line of a r g u m e n t forward in reference directly to t h e practical laws of r e a s o n , i.e., t h e superiority of m o r a l law to all considerations of material gratification, even t h a t of life itself. T h i s recognition of o u r m o r a l g r a n d e u r is most vivid in confrontation with material forces of such m i g h t as to d w a r f o u r n a t u r a l s t r e n g t h a n d imperil ( t h o u g h only by implication, n o t immediately) o u r n a t u r a l satisfactions "(goods, health, a n d l i f e ) . " T h e e x p e r i e n c e of such aweinspiring p h e n o m e n a in n a t u r e — a n d Kant can list t h e m as readily as t h e most r o m a n t i c a u t h o r of his day—evokes in t h e m i n d of m a n a sense of t h e superiority of his m o r a l destiny. "Reason exerts a d o m i n i o n over sensibility in o r d e r to e x t e n d it in conformity with its p r o p e r r e a l m (the practical) a n d to m a k e it look o u t into the infin i t e . " T h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime is inherently o n e which points to t h e m o r a l g r o u n d of m a n , " t h e feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to w h a t is m o r a l . " 46

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Now we can fully a p p r e c i a t e h o w p r o f o u n d l y Kant i n t e n d e d his claim that t h e essence of t h e sublime was its aspect of "relation," i.e., t h e relation of t h e sensible to t h e supersensible. T h i s theory of t h e sublime explains Kant's metaphysical theory of genius, i.e., t h e n o tion of Geist as t h e faculty for "aesthetic ideas," a n d explains how

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t h e full-fledged t h e o r y of symbolism can at last i n c o r p o r a t e n o t only t h e idea of genius b u t also of beauty into Kant's notion of expressive r e a s o n . I n §49, K a n t reevaluates t h e faculty of imagination, recognizing w h a t h a d l o n g b e e n latent in his t h o u g h t a n d which we have b r o u g h t o u t in o u r consideration of t h a t " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , " namely, t h a t it belongs o n t h e side of spontaneity a n d has a n intim a t e a n d crucial c o n n e c t i o n with r e a s o n . " T h e imagination (as a p r o d u c t i v e faculty of cognition) is a powerful a g e n t for creating, as it were, a second n a t u r e o u t of t h e material s u p p l i e d to it by actual n a t u r e , " K a n t w r i t e s . N o t only d o e s it e n t e r t a i n us w h e n experie n c e is b o r i n g , b u t "we even use it to r e m o d e l e x p e r i e n c e [wir . . . bilden diese [die Erfahrung] auch wohl um]"—i.e., we reconfigure [umgestalten], in O d e b r e c h t ' s decisive sense. T o b e sure, r e p r o d u c t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n functions a c c o r d i n g to t h e "laws of association," i.e., in a "psychological" m a n n e r , as B u r k e a n d Hartley a r g u e d . B u t K a n t now articulates clearly that " p r o d u c t i v e " i m a g i n a t i o n is n o t restricted, n o t limited to such a merely sensationalist p a t t e r n , a n d instead can b e seen as "also following principles which have a h i g h e r seat in r e a s o n (and which a r e every whit as n a t u r a l to us as those followed by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in laying h o l d of empirical nature)." H e r e K a n t has said it: t h e r e a r e principles of reason which are " n a t u r a l " to us. W h a t " n a t u r e " is that? N o t t h e sensible o n e . "By this m e a n s we get a sense of o u r f r e e d o m from t h e law of association (which attaches to t h e empirical e m p l o y m e n t of t h e imagination), with t h e result t h a t t h e material can be b o r r o w e d by us from n a t u r e in a c c o r d a n c e with that law, b u t be worked u p by us into s o m e t h i n g e l s e — n a m e l y , w h a t surpasses n a t u r e . " K a n t is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y talking a b o u t t h e n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m of the subject in this passage. T h a t is, h e presses a metaphysical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of genius, instead of t h e n a t u r a l o n e . Spirit [Geist], as t h e " a n i m a t i n g principle of t h e m i n d , . . . is n o o t h e r t h a n t h e faculty of p r e s e n t i n g aesthetical ideas." G e n i u s p r e s e n t s "aesthetic ideas," i.e., imaginative r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h r o u g h which ideas of r e a s o n find symbolic expression a n d t h e r e with cultural articulation ("universal c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y " ) . 5 0

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T h e c o n c e p t of aesthetical ideas was first b r o a c h e d in § 17, b u t it only achieved real clarity in t h e exposition of §49. I n t h e earlier section, K a n t was still e n t a n g l e d in s o m e distinctions from the First Critique which r e q u i r e d modification to a c c o m m o d a t e his new t h e o r y of symbolism. K a n t distinguished a n idea of r e a s o n from a n ideal: " P r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , a n idea signifies a c o n c e p t of reason, a n d a n 284

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ideal t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n individual entity [eines einzelnen . . . Wesens] as a d e q u a t e to a n idea." H e distinguished f u r t h e r between two kinds of ideals: those of r e a s o n a n d those of imagination. T h e a r c h e t y p e of taste was "merely a n ideal of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n [bloß ein Ideal der Einbildungskraft] ." I n the First Critique Kant h a d g o n e to s o m e l e n g t h to distinguish a n "ideal of r e a s o n " from a n "ideal of imagination." Ideals of reason, c o n c e p t u a l totalities which served as regulative goals for reason's process of seeking the u n c o n d i t i o n e d for every condition, " m u s t always rest o n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts a n d serve as a rule a n d a r c h e t y p e , alike in o u r actions a n d in o u r critical j u d g m e n t s . " Such i d e a l s — G o d , h u m a n i t y , o r virtue, for e x a m p l e — t h o u g h "we cann o t c o n c e d e to [them] objective reality (existence), . . . a r e n o t t h e r e f o r e to be r e g a r d e d as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a s t a n d a r d which is indispensable to i t . " As contrasted with these rational ideals, K a n t wrote, 55

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t h e p r o d u c t s of i m a g i n a t i o n a r e of a n entirely different nat u r e ; n o o n e can explain o r give a n intelligible concept of t h e m ; e a c h is a kind of monogram, a m e r e set of particular qualities, d e t e r m i n e d by n o assignable rule, a n d f o r m i n g r a t h e r a b l u r r e d sketch d r a w n from diverse experiences t h a n a d e t e r m i n a t e i m a g e — a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n such as p a i n t e r s a n d physiognomists profess to carry in their h e a d s a n d which they treat as b e i n g a n i n c o m m u n i c a b l e image [Schattenbild] of their creations o r even of t h e i r critical j u d g m e n t s . . . Such r e p r e sentations . . . furnish n o rules t h a t allow of b e i n g explained and examined. 5 7

N o t only was t h e r e n o c o n c e p t u a l r e d e m p t i o n of a n "ideal of imagination," because n o d e t e r m i n a t e r u l e could ever b e f o u n d for it, b u t similarly t h e r e was n o way t h a t a n ideal of r e a s o n could find suitable illustration in e x p e r i e n c e , K a n t claimed in t h e same a r g u m e n t . " T o a t t e m p t to realize t h e ideal in a n e x a m p l e , t h a t is, in t h e [field of] a p p e a r a n c e , as, for instance, to depict t h e [character of t h e perfectly] wise m a n in a r o m a n c e , is impracticable . . . a b s u r d a n d far from edifying . . . in as m u c h as the n a t u r a l limitations . . . a r e constantly d o i n g violence to t h e completeness of t h e idea . . . a n d so cast suspicion o n t h e g o o d itself . . . by giving it t h e air of b e i n g a m e r e fiction." 58

T h i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d symbolic a n d artistic expression of rational ideas h a d c h a n g e d dramatically by t h e fall of 1789. Kant h a d The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination

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achieved a far m o r e m e a n i n g f u l theory of art a n d symbolism. Accordingly, in §49, K a n t gave a new definition of aesthetical ideas: by a n aesthetical idea I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n which occasions m u c h t h o u g h t , without however any definite t h o u g h t , i.e. any concept, b e i n g capable of being a d e q u a t e to it; it consequently c a n n o t be completely compassed a n d m a d e intelligible by l a n g u a g e . We easily see that it is the c o u n t e r p a r t ( p e n d a n t ) of a rational idea, which conversely is a c o n c e p t to which n o intuition (or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e imagination) can be a d e q u a t e . 5 9

T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is a whole, a n individual which, t h o u g h perh a p s d e t e r m i n a t e as a n empirical object of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g , stands metaphorically (symbolically) for m u c h m o r e t h a n that d e terminacy. For e x a m p l e , N a p o l e o n o r M a c b e t h — o n e actual, a n d o n e fictive—constitute intuitive wholes for which we also have e m pirical concepts. We can explicate t h e m in t e r m s of d e t e r m i n a t e concepts. N a p o l e o n lived for so m a n y years a n d did such a n d such; Macbeth was a figure in Shakespeare's play of t h e same n a m e ; a n d so o n . B u t t h e p o i n t a b o u t these two empirical individuals is t h a t they occasion t h o u g h t s which vastly exceed their m e r e d e t e r m i n a t e objectivity. T h e y symbolize a g r e a t field of conflict between p o w e r a n d right, talent a n d virtue, a n d occasion meditations which can scarcely r e a c h a simple resolution. W h a t they involve is t h e "enl a r g e m e n t " of t h e d e t e r m i n a t e concept into i n d e t e r m i n a c y . 60

T h e aesthetic idea initiates a m o v e m e n t of t h e m i n d ; it "occasions in itself m o r e t h o u g h t t h a n can ever be c o m p r e h e n d e d in a definite c o n c e p t a n d which consequently aesthetically enlarges t h e c o n c e p t itself in a n u n b o u n d e d f a s h i o n . " T h a t is to say, u n d e r s t a n d i n g strives to offer a d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t for such a n intuition. It seeks a "discursive r e d e m p t i o n , " in the l a n g u a g e of m o d e r n criticism. B u t it fails. Such a n aesthetic whole " c a n n o t b e completely c o m p a s s e d a n d m a d e intelligible by l a n g u a g e . " We c a n n o t e x p l a i n all t h e significances which flow o u t of such a s y m b o l . I n F r e u d ' s t e r m s it is " o v e r d e t e r m i n e d . " By e x h a u s t i n g u n d e r s t a n d ing's capacity to d e t e r m i n e t h e concept, t h e imagination p r e s e n t s a reflective j u d g m e n t which c a n n o t be converted into a d e t e r m i n a n t o n e , which c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d definitively, i.e., cognitively, b u t only reflected u p o n at a h i g h e r level, a n d h e n c e what occurs is t h a t reason, t h e faculty of intellectual ideas, intervenes. Such an aesthetic idea "brings the faculty of intellectual ideas (the reason) into movement." 61

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At this p o i n t we m u s t r e c o n s i d e r t h e relation between aesthetic ideas a n d rational ideas. K a n t called t h e aesthetic idea "the c o u n t e r p a r t ( p e n d a n t ) of a rational idea." H e claimed it was easy to recognize this, because such a rational idea was conversely a concept to which n o intuition was a d e q u a t e . Now, it is i n d e e d easy to see t h e formal s y m m e t r y of these two notions, their converse relation. B u t it is q u i t e a n o t h e r m a t t e r w h e n o n e presses the idea further, a n d it is pressed f u r t h e r by Kant's parenthetical insertion of t h e word " p e n d a n t . " " C o u n t e r p a r t , " t a k e n as " p e n d a n t , " suggests t h a t K a n t does n o t wish to d e v e l o p simply t h e formal symmetry of converse p r o p o sitions, b u t a substantive relation between t h e two. T h i s entire discussion is n o t c o u c h e d in t e r m s of the passivity of the subject in aesthetic c o n t e m p l a t i o n , b u t in t e r m s of a n articulation of t h e elem e n t s in t h e subject which m a k e genius, t h a t is, artistic creativity, possible. C o u n t e r p a r t as p e n d a n t signifies precisely a n expressive potential, i.e., a symbolical relation between aesthetic ideas a n d rational ideas. N o t only is t h e faculty of reason mobilized by t h e ina d e q u a c y of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , it was in fact t h e origin of t h e very e n t e r p r i s e , a n d t h e aesthetic idea is its own symbolic project. If we wish to view this p r o c e e d i n g merely from t h e vantage of aesthetic r e c e p t i o n , however, t h e point only t u r n s o u t to be t h e same, for w h a t we will b e describing is simply t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime. K a n t d e v e l o p e d t h e c o n c e p t i o n of aesthetic ideas directly o u t of t h e n o t i o n of i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts in R e m a r k I to §57 of t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t . " H e worked o u t m a n y of t h e implications of §49 explicitly in t h a t R e m a r k , especially t h e idea of a symbolical, n o t simply formal c o n n e c t i o n between rational ideas a n d aesthetical ideas, a n d t h e a s s i g n m e n t of the origins of such a c o n n e c t i o n to t h e d y n a m i s m of r e a s o n itself. I n t h a t light Kant r e defined genius. T h e " n a t u r e " with which genius h a d b e e n identified in t h e original i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a r t (§§46ff.) h a d b e e n t h e material, sensual, " n a t u r a l " e l e m e n t in h u m a n subjectivity. B u t now Kant seized this n o t i o n from such "irrational" g r o u n d s a n d transferred g e n i u s to a radically different " n a t u r e " in m a n : "It can only be that in t h e subject which is n a t u r e a n d c a n n o t be b r o u g h t u n d e r rules of concepts, i.e. t h e supersensible substrate of all his faculties (to which n o c o n c e p t of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g extends), a n d consequently t h a t with respect to which it is t h e final p u r p o s e given by the intelligible [part] of o u r n a t u r e to h a r m o n i z e all o u r cognitive facu l t i e s . " T h e d y n a m i c r e q u i r e m e n t of reason as t h e supersensible unity of t h e subject n o w e m e r g e s as t h e real g r o u n d of genius, as t h e source of its quest for m e t a p h o r i c a l expressions of its o w n 64

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i m m e d i a t e b u t i n d e t e r m i n a t e essence. T h e drive toward "harm o n y " of t h e faculties is n o w to b e recognized as the i m m a n e n t r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e unity of r e a s o n . B u t its g r o u n d i n g is n o t merely m e t h o d o l o g i c a l ; it is t r a n s c e n d e n t ("supersensible"). A n d because this t r a n s c e n d e n t g r o u n d i n g is b e y o n d t h e e x t e n t of u n d e r s t a n d ing, i.e., b e y o n d d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t a n d its schematism, t h e only r e c o u r s e available to it is symbolical expression. I n this light, all t h e efforts t o w a r d a c o n n e c t i o n of aesthetics with e t h i c s — " p e r f e c t i o n " a n d " d e p e n d e n t beauty," t h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" a n d t h e "ideal of b e a u t y " — w h i c h s e e m e d so p r o b lematic from t h e v a n t a g e of a merely aesthetic i n t e p r e t a t i o n , m a k e perfect sense within a b r e a t h t a k i n g l y metaphysical revision of t h e w h o l e project: art offers symbolic access to the ultimate. B u t t h e r e is a f u r t h e r point, which K a n t articulates as t h e essence of this n o tion of "aesthetic ideas," namely, that t h e r e would b e n o r e c o u r s e to metaphor unless t h e r e was a n ineluctable incapacity of discursive r e a s o n i n g to secure metaphysics. A r t t h e r e w i t h assumes a central place in c u l t u r e . Art is t h e vehicle t h r o u g h which t h e supersensible gives t o k e n of its real p r e s e n c e . A n d it is j u s t for this reason that t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e is transcendentally g r o u n d e d . N o w I say t h e beautiful is t h e symbol of t h e morally good, a n d t h a t it is only in this respect (a reference which is n a t u r a l to every m a n a n d which every m a n postulates in o t h e r s as a duty) t h a t it gives p l e a s u r e with a claim for t h e a g r e e m e n t of everyo n e else. By this t h e m i n d is m a d e conscious of a certain enn o b l e m e n t a n d elevation above t h e m e r e sensibility to pleasure received t h r o u g h sense, a n d t h e worth of o t h e r s is estimated in a c c o r d a n c e with a like m a x i m of theirj u d g m e n t . T h a t is t h e intelligible to which . . . taste looks, with which o u r h i g h e r cognitive faculties a r e in accord, a n d w i t h o u t which a d o w n r i g h t c o n t r a d i c t i o n would arise between their n a t u r e a n d the claims m a d e by t a s t e . 67

K a n t p u t it m u c h m o r e simply in §60: "Taste is at b o t t o m a faculty f o r j u d g i n g t h e sensible illustration of m o r a l i d e a s . " I n t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , i.e., via feeling, reflection is p o i n t e d t o w a r d t h e ultimate m e a n i n g of subjectivity which n o exertion of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t s could ever attain, a n insight into t h e unity n o t only of r e a s o n , b u t of being, in t h e supersensible g r o u n d . K a n t w r o t e : 68

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H e n c e , b o t h o n account of this i n n e r possibility in t h e subject a n d of t h e e x t e r n a l possibility of a n a t u r e t h a t agrees with it, it finds itself to be r e f e r r e d to s o m e t h i n g within t h e subject as well as w i t h o u t h i m , s o m e t h i n g which is n e i t h e r n a t u r e n o r f r e e d o m , b u t which is yet c o n n e c t e d with t h e supersensible g r o u n d of t h e latter. I n this supersensible g r o u n d , therefore, t h e theoretical faculty is b o u n d t o g e t h e r in unity with t h e practical in a way which, t h o u g h c o m m o n , is yet u n k n o w n . 6 9

T h e unity of r e a s o n in the supersensible substrate: this was t h e p o i n t to which all t h e a n t i n o m i e s "forced" us, in Kant's view. It was t h e peculiar a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e a n t i n o m y of aesthetic j u d g m e n t , of t h e whole faculty of reflective j u d g m e n t , to t h r o w o p e n to o u r att e n t i o n , a n d to m a k e accessible to o u r consciousness, t h a t which was at o n e a n d t h e s a m e t i m e n o t d e t e r m i n e d by concepts or directly objectified in a specific intuition.

Beauty as the Symbol of Morality K a n t insisted u p o n t h e reservation of objectivity to t h a t coincidence of actuality a n d validity which occurs in a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . B u t t h a t obviously m a d e inadmissible what h e took to b e the essential aspect of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e : t h e primacy of t h e practical a n d its o p e n n e s s t o w a r d t h e supersensible. H e n c e , to m a k e these latter c o n c e r n s accessible to o r d i n a r y consciousness h e t u r n e d to symbolism. T h r o u g h m e t a p h o r K a n t could p e r m i t t h e articulation of t h e metaphysical c o n c e r n s which h e p r o h i t e d within t h e s p h e r e of cognition p r o p e r . N o t only h a d h e limited reason to m a k e r o o m for faith, b u t h e also h a d elevated art to t h e m e d i u m of the expression of reason's interests a n d insights in t h e supersensible realm. I m a g ination functioned n o t only a c c o r d i n g to the (mechanically) n a t u r a l laws of association b u t also "in a c c o r d a n c e with principles which occ u p y a h i g h e r place in reason (laws, too, which a r e j u s t as n a t u r a l to us as those by which u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o m p r e h e n d s empirical nat u r e ) . " T h i s c o n n e c t i o n with reason gave art, via genius, t h e p o w e r to work u p " t h e material supplied to us by n a t u r e . . . into s o m e t h i n g different which surpasses n a t u r e . " 7 0

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C o n s e q u e n t l y , for K a n t art could n o t be simply mimetic. Its prim a r y p u r p o s e was to express t h e supersensible. Art was a vehicle for t h e e x p r e s s i o n of religious a n d rational ideas. Philosophy itself h a d n e e d of s u c h rhetorical recourses to illustrate its metaphysical a r g u -

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m e n t s . K a n t several times a c k n o w l e d g e d this in his p r e s e n t a t i o n of his t h e o r y of e t h i c s . Accordingly, formalism a n d play are insufficient to explain Kant's t h e o r y of art. T h e r e is a seriousness, a n "earnest" a b o u t it, which suggests a discipline: taste, precisely, r e q u i r i n g s o m e h i g h e r significance in t h e work. T h i s p o i n t bears directly u p o n t h e aesthetics of m o d e r n i s m . If K a n t was p r o f o u n d l y suspicious of m e r e "inspiration," it would b e w r o n g to take h i m to advocate t h e d o m i n i o n of m e r e t e c h n i q u e . O n e of Kant's most p o t e n t insights into t h e p r o b l e m of formalism is his recognition that aesthetic f r e e d o m can g e n e r a t e m e r e nonsense. Once one abandons a mimetic aesthetic, it b e c o m e s necessary to find some g r o u n d for a n expressive o n e . T h e p o i n t of a symbol is to m e a n . W i t h o u t refere n c e , e x p r e s s i o n is e m p t y . I n o n e of the most p e n e t r a t i n g essays ever written o n t h e p a r a d o x a n d p r e t e n s i o n of aesthetic m o d e r n ism, J o s e O r t e g a y Gasset p u t this with characteristic precision: " T h e r e is n o difficulty in p a i n t i n g or saying things which m a k e n o sense whatever, which a r e unintelligible a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t h i n g . O n e only n e e d s to assemble u n c o n n e c t e d words o r to draw r a n d o m lines. B u t to construct s o m e t h i n g that is n o t a copy of ' n a t u r e ' a n d yet possesses substance of its o w n is a feat which p r e s u p p o s e s n o t h i n g less t h a n g e n i u s . " As K a n t p u t the same t h o u g h t , the p o e t "tries . . . to g o b e y o n d t h e limits of e x p e r i e n c e a n d to p r e s e n t [ideas] to sense with a c o m p l e t e n e s s of which t h e r e is n o e x a m p l e in n a t u r e . " A n expressionist t h e o r y of art, t h e n , involves m o r e t h a n t e c h n i q u e , m o r e t h a n form. T h e message is m o r e t h a n the m e d i u m , a n d a strictly formalist " a u t o n o m y of art" can only be p u r chased at t h e cost of its u t t e r triviality. 73

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B e a u t y was t h e symbol of m o r a l i t y . W h a t K a n t would not permit theoretical r e a s o n to assert, h e now d e m o n s t r a t e d to be essential to m o r a l c o n d u c t a n d accessible b o t h in t h e p u r e thought of r e a s o n , a n d even m o r e tangibly in t h e rich symbolism of aesthetic exp e r i e n c e , b o t h in its receptive a n d in its creative d i m e n s i o n s . A n d that, at last, resolves t h e n a g g i n g p r o b l e m of t h e idea of " d e p e n d e n t beauty." As K a n t f o r m u l a t e d the m a t t e r in §§ 1 6 - 1 7 , it was impossible to u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h e p u r e j u d g m e n t of taste could b e complicated into a j u d g m e n t of d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y without losing e v e r y t h i n g aesthetic a b o u t it. Kant's t r e a t m e n t of perfection in t h a t c o n t e x t s e e m e d in fact to p r e e m p t t h e aesthetic. Now we a r e in a position to a p p r a i s e t h e situation m o r e judiciously. Let us consider t h e crucial p a r a g r a p h of § 16 in t h e light of t h e t h e o r y of beauty as t h e symbol of morality. Kant's text reads: 78

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It is t r u e t h a t taste gains n o t h i n g by this c o m b i n a t i o n of aesthetical with intellectual satisfaction, i n a s m u c h as it becomes fixed; a n d t h o u g h it is not universal, yet in respect to certain purposively d e t e r m i n e d objects it becomes possible to p r e scribe rules for it. T h e s e , however, a r e not rules of taste, b u t merely rules for t h e unification of taste with r e a s o n , i.e. of t h e beautiful with t h e good, by which t h e f o r m e r b e c o m e s available as a n i n s t r u m e n t of design of the latter. T h u s t h e t o n e of m i n d which is self-maintaining a n d of subjective universal validity is s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e way of t h i n k i n g which can be m a i n t a i n e d only by painful resolve, b u t is of objective universal v a l i d i t y . 79

O n a strictly formalist r e a d i n g of art, t h e loss of a u t o n o m y involved in this p r o c e e d i n g is u n d e n i a b l e . Beauty "becomes available as a n i n s t r u m e n t , " it is " s u b o r d i n a t e d , " rules are "prescribed for it." T h e liveliness a n d play which are essential to it a r e n o w h a r n e s s e d to t h e "painful resolve" of duty. K a n t is clear that " p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , . . . perfection gains n o t h i n g from beauty, or beauty by perfection . . ." Morality's claim is valid w i t h o u t t h e sweetening of beauty. Beauty in its p u r e formality can function without reference to perfection ( t h o u g h only with pulchritudo vaga). It only achieves it t r u e p u r pose, h o w e v e r — w h i c h is n o t p l e a s u r e b u t t h e " h a r m o n y of t h e faculties"—when it d o e s in fact serve for the expression of perfection. " A n d t h u s w h e n b o t h states of m i n d are in h a r m o n y o u r whole faculty of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p o w e r g a i n s . " T h e "whole faculty" is reason in its unity—its supersensible unity, which is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m . T h e philosophical significance of beauty, t h e n , is t h a t it symbolizes morality. Kant's whole discourse r e g a r d i n g aesthetics culminates in t h e primacy of practical reason. 80

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AESTHETICS AS T H E KEY T O ANTHROPOLOGY: LEBENSGEFÜHL AND GEISTESGEFÜHL

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h e s p o n t a n e o u s conformity to t h e rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g by t h e i m a g i n a t i o n in its free play reveals the intrinsic o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d orientation of h u m a n consciousness. T h a t is, t h e h u m a n m i n d has certain e n d s or p u r p o s e s in its functioning, which a n event like t h e experience of b e a u t y exposes to conscious scrutiny, m u c h as a n empirical j u d g m e n t e x p o s e s to conscious scrutiny t h e p r o b l e m of cognitive validity. B u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e beautiful involves a good deal m o r e complexity t h a n t h e empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t , because all the aspects of h u m a n responsiveness t u r n o u t to be involved—even t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h o u g h n o t for its o w n p u r p o s e s . T h u s , the beautiful c a n serve as a peculiarly illuminating field for t h e consideration of h u m a n life as a whole. T h i s was articulated in §5 of the Third Critique, w h e n t h e beautiful was identified as a distinctively human exp e r i e n c e , because it involved m a n both as rational a n d as a n i m a l . T h i s s i m u l t a n e o u s animality a n d rationality is t h e core b o t h of t h e t h e o r y of feeling a n d of t h e t h e o r y of morality which Kant develo p e d in his p h i l o s o p h y generally a n d in t h e Third Critique specifically. B e a u t y allowed K a n t a scope in which to work o u t t h e full complexities of the mixed f o r m which was m a n . Aesthetics was t h e key to a n t h r o p o l o g y . 1

Kant's position is t h a t aesthetics can only b e placed p r o p e r l y within a s c h e m e of philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y which stresses t h e primacy of t h e practical a n d t h e g r o u n d e d n e s s of h u m a n m e a n i n g in a supersensible o r d e r of value. A r t can serve, in t h a t context, as a vehicle for m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . K a n t developed this idea, via the m e d i ation of t h e sublime, as t h e basis of his c o n n e c t i o n of beauty with morality in t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to §29. B o t h aesthetic feelings, t h e beautiful a n d t h e sublime, insofar as they h a d their origins n o t in 292

m e r e sense b u t in reflection, w e r e "purposive in reference to t h e m o r a l feeling." T h a t is, they c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e awareness a n d acc e p t a n c e of t h e m o r a l principle in c o m p l e x h u m a n beings (animal as well as spiritual). K a n t d r e w a parallel b e t w e e n t h e purity of t h e form of these aesthetic j u d g m e n t s a n d t h e purity of the form of m o r a l j u d g m e n t in t e r m s of t h e resultant feeling. I n each case, t h e feeling derived from a p u r e l y i m m a n e n t rational process. As a result, Kant wrote, " t h e m o r a l feeling . . . is . . . so far c o g n a t e to t h e aesthetical j u d g m e n t a n d its formal conditions t h a t it can serve to r e p r e s e n t t h e conformity to law of action from d u t y as aesthetical, i.e. as sublime o r even as beautiful, w i t h o u t losing p u r i t y . " T h a t is to say, o n e can symbolize m o r a l considerations via t h e aesthetic feelings, because t h e feeling evoked by m o r a l law in the subject is "cognate" with these feelings. T h e sublime showed a m u c h closer fit t h a n t h e beautiful, h e n c e Kant's qualifier "even." Kant m a d e t h e point a b o u t t h e closer p r o x imity of t h e sublime to t h e m o r a l feeling a bit later in t h e G e n e r a l Remark: 2

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T h e object of a p u r e a n d u n c o n d i t i o n e d intellectual satisfaction is t h e m o r a l law in t h a t m i g h t which it exercises in us over all m e n t a l motives that precede it. T h i s m i g h t m a k e s itself aesthetically k n o w n to us t h r o u g h sacrifices (which causing a feeling of deprivation, t h o u g h o n behalf of internal freedom, in r e t u r n discloses in us a n u n f a t h o m a b l e d e p t h of this supersensible faculty, with c o n s e q u e n c e s e x t e n d i n g b e y o n d o u r k e n ) . . . H e n c e it follows t h a t t h e intellectual, in itself p u r p o s ive, (moral) g o o d , aesthetically j u d g e d , m u s t b e p r e s e n t e d as sublime r a t h e r t h a n beautiful, so that it r a t h e r awakens t h e feeling of respect (which disdains c h a r m ) t h a n t h a t of love a n d familiar inclination; for h u m a n n a t u r e does n o t attach itself to this g o o d spontaneously, b u t only by t h e a u t h o r i t y which reason exercises over sensibility. 4

As c o m p l e x , a n i m a l a n d spirit, m a n e x p e r i e n c e s this supersensible n o t as play b u t as obligation. While t h e essence of m a n ' s s u p e r s e n s ible g r o u n d is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m , t h e n a t u r e of that f r e e d o m as e x p e r i e n c e d concretely is duty. Consequently, o n c e again, t h e r e is a closer a p p r o x i m a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime a n d t h e m o r a l t h a n between t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e beautiful a n d t h e moral: Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology

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a l t h o u g h t h e i m m e d i a t e p l e a s u r e in the beautiful of n a t u r e likewise p r e s u p p o s e s a n d cultivates a certain liberality in o u r m e n t a l a t t i t u d e , i.e. a satisfaction i n d e p e n d e n t of m e r e sensible e n j o y m e n t , yet f r e e d o m is t h u s r e p r e s e n t e d as in play r a t h e r t h a n in law-directed occupation which is the g e n u i n e characteristic of h u m a n morality, in which reason m u s t exercise d o m i n i o n over sensibility. B u t in aesthetical j u d g m e n t s u p o n t h e sublime this d o m i n i o n is r e p r e s e n t e d as exercised by t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , r e g a r d e d as a n i n s t r u m e n t of r e a s o n . 5

Yet d e s p i t e t h e closer proximity of t h e sublime to t h e m o r a l , by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e fittingness of aesthetic feeling in general for t h e e x p e r i e n c e (and the expression) of o u r rational g r o u n d in m o r a l obligation, t h e sublime also m a k e s the relation b e t w e e n t h e beautiful a n d t h e m o r a l accessible. W h a t makes t h e beautiful in itself purposive for morality is t h a t it " p r e p a r e s us to love disinterestedly s o m e t h i n g , even n a t u r e itself." M o r e generally, "it cultivates us, in t h a t it teaches us to a t t e n d to t h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e . " In t h e reflection a b o u t beauty, t h e subject n o t only recognizes p l e a s u r e b u t reflects u p o n its sources a n d its w o r t h . It is this capacity to rise above a p petite which is precisely taste, o r cultivation. Consequently, as K a n t a r g u e d in §59: "taste makes possible the transition, without any violent leap, from t h e c h a r m of sense to habitual m o r a l interest." 6

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The Transcendental

Relevance of Feeling

For K a n t t h e r e is a very i m p o r t a n t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l relation between feeling a n d r e a s o n . Feelings t u r n o u t to have great value in t h e subjective r e c k o n i n g of consciousness r e g a r d i n g its states a n d its p u r p o s e s . In a d d i t i o n to t h e p u r e rational self-appraisal called " a p p e r c e p t i o n , " t h e r e is a n o t h e r d i m e n s i o n of self-awareness u p o n which we can c o u n t for evidence of m e n t a l states a n d m e n t a l functions: the s p h e r e of feelings a n d t h e reflective j u d g m e n t a b o u t t h e m . Reflection arrives at t h e s a m e result t h a t p u r e rational a p p e r c e p t i o n achieves. Feeling can b e t h e m a r k of the existence of a relation of r e a s o n . As a m a r k of existence, it is empirical. B u t it refers, subjectively to be s u r e , to a n a priori rational principle. Feeling is possible because m a n is sensible, b u t n o t all feelings a r e caused by sense. T h e peculiar feeling of respect is the crucial instance of this. "Sens u o u s feeling . . . is t h e condition of the particular feeling we call respect, b u t t h e cause t h a t d e t e r m i n e s this feeling lies in t h e p u r e 8

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practical r e a s o n . " T h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l potential of feeling is most striking in t h e later Critiques. T h e relation between imagination a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g is m a r k e d by t h e distinctive feeling of beauty. T h e relation b e t w e e n imagination a n d reason is m a r k e d by t h e distinctive feeling of t h e sublime. A n d the relation between will a n d reason is m a r k e d by t h e distinctive feeling of respect. H o w is self-consciousness, immediately via t h e feelings of one's i n t e r n a l state, possible? In § 1 of t h e Third Critique Kant wrote of "a quite s e p a r a t e faculty of distinction a n d j u d g m e n t . . . c o m p a r i n g t h e given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e subject with t h e whole faculty of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , of which t h e m i n d is conscious in the feeling of its state [das ganze Vermögen der Vorstellungen . . . , dessen sich das Gemüt im Gefühl seines Zustandes bewußt wird]. . . H e r e t h e r e p r e s e n tation is a l t o g e t h e r r e f e r r e d to t h e subject a n d its feeling of life [Lebensgefühl], u n d e r t h e n a m e of t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e or p a i n . " Kant a r g u e s t h a t we can infer from a feeling to the rational struct u r e which d e t e r m i n e s it by reflection. W h e n t h e m i n d a t t e n d s its "feeling," it a t t e n d s its subjective processes. Pleasure a n d pain are not t h e final t e r m s o f t h a t consciousness, but only the data, the matter for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , for j u d g m e n t . Lebensgefühl is g r o u n d e d in Kant's t h e o r y of subjective self-consciousness u n d e r the rubric of reflection, o r w h a t we have identified with that " o t h e r kind of j u d g ing." K a n t is loath to call this cognition, yet it is self-consciousness of t h e subject n o t as merely passive b u t as active. T h e m i n d has t h e p o w e r to r e s p o n d to its appraisals of its states, a n d to alter t h e m . A n d it has at least o n e criterion by which this d a t a — p l e a s u r e o r p a i n — i s to b e evaluated: the feeling of life. W h a t does Lebensgefühl point to, what does it m a r k by its d a t a of pleasure? Life, for Kant, is t h e p r o p e r t y of a n intelligent will, t h e capacity to choose, to a c t . " It is freedom of will in its actuality: Willkür, in Kant's precise sense. T h e feeling of life, t h e r e f o r e , is t h e awareness of o u r empirical freedom, o u r status as practically p u r posive in t h e world of sense. Pleasure, in that context, is either what fosters o u r consciousness of this freedom, or what accompanies a n d u n d e r s c o r e s its efficaciousness. I n either case, pleasure is b o u n d u p with t h e materiality of m a n , his capacity to sense, his bodily existence. Kant referred to E p i c u r u s in this connection: 9

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[A]s E p i c u r u s m a i n t a i n e d , all gratification or grief may ultimately b e c o r p o r e a l . . . because life without a feeling of bodily o r g a n s would b e merely a consciousness of existence, w i t h o u t a n y feeling of well-being or the reverse . . . For the Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology

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m i n d is by itself a l o n e life (the principle of life), a n d hind r a n c e s o r f u r t h e r a n c e s m u s t b e s o u g h t outside it a n d yet in t h e m a n , consequently in u n i o n with his b o d y . 1 2

Similarly, in §54, Kant connects gratification with a "feeling of the f u r t h e r a n c e of the whole life of t h e m a n , a n d consequently also of his bodily well-being, i.e. his h e a l t h . " T h u s Lebensgefühl, like Willkür, is involved in t h a t c o m p l e x dualism of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e as b e t w e e n p u r e r e a s o n a n d m e r e matter. It can be r e a d simply physiologically, a n d t h e n assuredly we are in t h e realm of e m p i r i cal psychology, not only with Lebensgefühl, b u t also with Willkür. B u t it can also b e r e a d mentally, in accordance with t h e technical sense of Kant's t e r m life. I n t h e latter sense, b o t h Lebensgefühl a n d Willkür offer t h e possibility of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l significance: they p o i n t to a p u r e rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n . While t r a n s c e n d e n t a l selfconsciousness ("apperception") a t t e n d s principles of p u r e reason a priori in " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l reflection," reflective self-consciousness (Lebensgefühl) a t t e n d s feelings as keys to its state (Gemütszustand), a n d t h u s u n d e r t a k e s aesthetic r e f l e c t i o n . K a n t believed t h a t t h e r e is (or o u g h t to be) a difference between " s e n s u o u s " a n d "intellectual" pleasure, n o t so m u c h in t e r m s of psycho-physical r e s p o n s e as in t e r m s of rational significance. " S e n s u o u s " p l e a s u r e is occasioned by t h e senses o r t h e imagination; "intellectual" p l e a s u r e by concepts or ideas. For K a n t n o t all feelings w e r e h o m o g e n e o u s quantities (such that, o p p o s e d , they would cancel o n e a n o t h e r ) , for b o t h in t h e Anthropology a n d in t h e Third Critique h e identified circumstances in which it makes sense to find p a i n justified a n d j o y bitter. As Kant p u t it in t h e Anthropology, "a higher satisfaction o r dissatisfaction with ourselves (namely, a m o r a l one) [serves to] j u d g e e n j o y m e n t a n d p a i n . " I n t h e Third Critique K a n t e x p l a i n e d : " T h e satisfaction or dissatisfaction h e r e d e p e n d s o n r e a s o n a n d is t h e s a m e as approbation or disapprobation; b u t gratification a n d grief can only rest o n the feeling o r prospect of a possible . . .well-being o r its o p p o s i t e . " 13

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If all t h a t m a t t e r e d w e r e quantitative gratification, Kant a r g u e d in §3 of t h e Third Critique, " t h e impressions of sense which determ i n e t h e inclination, f u n d a m e n t a l propositions of reason which d e t e r m i n e t h e will, m e r e reflective forms of intuition which determ i n e t h e j u d g m e n t , a r e q u i t e t h e same as r e g a r d s t h e effect u p o n t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e . " If o u r goal were simply h a p p i n e s s , we would n o t scruple over t h e source of pleasure, b u t simply maximize it; i n d e e d , t h e r e would b e n o m o r a l issue at all, only a question of 18

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efficiency. B u t obviously for K a n t t h e r e was a m o r a l issue h e r e . A n d t h a t p r o f o u n d l y colored his view of m e r e gratification. T h u s K a n t i n t r o d u c e d a crucial complication: t h e r e were conflicting criteria for t h e evaluation of states of m i n d a n d for actions taken to alter t h e m . H e discriminated b e t w e e n a feeling of life (Lebensgefühl) a n d a feeling of a u t o n o m o u s spirituality (Geistesgefühl). 19

"'Spirit [Geist]' in a n aesthetical sense, signifies t h e a n i m a t i n g principle [das belebende Princip] in t h e m i n d , " K a n t writes in § 4 9 . " A n i m a t i n g , " "enlivening," "life"—a whole series of words which previously a r o s e in c o n n e c t i o n with Kant's characterization of t h e " h a r m o n y of t h e faculties"—here achieve r e n e w e d p r o m i n e n c e . K a n t elaborates in t h e following t e r m s : 2 0

B u t t h a t w h e r e b y this principle a n i m a t e s t h e s o u l — t h e m a t e rial which it employs for t h a t p u r p o s e — i s t h a t which sets t h e m e n t a l p o w e r s into a swing t h a t is purposive, i.e. into a play which is self-maintaining a n d which s t r e n g t h e n s those powers for such activity [Dasjenige aber, wodurch dieses Princip die Seele belebt, der Stoff, den es dazu anwendet, ist das, was die Gemüthskräfte zweckmäßig in Schwung versetzt, d.i. in ein solches Spiel, welches sich von selbst erhält und selbst die Kräfte dazu stärkt]. 21

While b e a u t y o p e r a t e s in t h e r e a l m primarily of Lebensgefühl, it has within it, as its only source of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l value, a reference as well to Geistesgefühl. T h e h a r m o n y a n d conflict b e t w e e n these two subjective states parallels t h e relation of subjective a n d objective will-determinations. I n §54 K a n t c o n n e c t e d gratification with a "feeling of t h e f u r t h e r a n c e of t h e whole life of the m a n , a n d conseq u e n t l y also of his bodily well-being, i.e. his h e a l t h . " B u t h e t h e n m a d e w h a t was for h i m t h e key distinction: b e t w e e n gratification which was merely "animal [animalische], i.e. bodily sensation," a n d t h a t which was a "spiritual feeling [geistigen Gefühl] of respect for moral ideas." 22

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For K a n t , h e a l t h (physical well-being) was a particularly indicative aspect of t h e feeling of life, b u t d u t y was t h e ultimate g r o u n d of t h e feeling of spirituality. W i t h health (as a physiological as well as psychical quality) h e associated t h e general idea of h u m a n h a p p i ness. W i t h t h e feeling of spirituality (as a satisfaction, respect, which involved s u b o r d i n a t i o n of physical desires) h e c o n n e c t e d t h e majesty of m o r a l law. While Lebensgefühl o p e r a t e d o n the n a t u r a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t health a n d well-being were good, Geistesgefühl int r o d u c e d t h e question of w o r t h , of value in a n ultimate sense, which t h r e w this n a t u r a l a s s u m p t i o n into suspicion. Kant's ethical rigorAesthetics as the Key to Anthropology

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ism t h r u s t at t h e very h e a r t of subjective purposiveness as e n h a n c e m e n t of liveliness by asking: W h a t is t h e p u r p o s e of life itself, a n d is e n j o y m e n t m a n ' s p u r p o s e ? I n §4 h e m a d e his position clear: Even in t h e j u d g i n g of health we may notice this distinction. It is i m m e d i a t e l y pleasant to everyone possessing it . . . But in o r d e r to say t h a t it is g o o d , it m u s t b e considered by reason with r e f e r e n c e to p u r p o s e , viz. that it is a state that makes us fit for all o u r business . . . r e a s o n can never b e p e r s u a d e d that t h e existence of a m a n w h o merely lives for enjoyment (however busy h e may b e in this p o i n t of view) has a worth in itself. . . O n l y what h e does, w i t h o u t reference to enjoyment, in full f r e e d o m a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of what n a t u r e c a n p r o c u r e for h i m passively, gives a n (absolute) worth to his p r e s e n c e (in t h e world) as t h e existence of a p e r s o n . 2 4

M a n m u s t evaluate all in t e r m s of his spiritual estate, his m o r a l p u r pose, a n d consequently life itself, empirical freedom, a n d t h e capacity to enjoy it m u s t c o m e u n d e r a s t e r n e r criterion. I n t h a t light, "life as such . . . has n o intrinsic value at all . . . it has value only as r e g a r d s t h e use to which we p u t it, t h e e n d s to which we direct i t . " " T h e value of life for us, if it is estimated by that which we enjoy, . . . sinks to zero . . . T h e r e r e m a i n s t h e n n o t h i n g b u t t h e value which we ourselves give o u r l i f e . " T h e full significance of t h e tension b e t w e e n Lebensgefühl a n d Geistesgefühl lies in m a n ' s recognition of his supersensible destiny. I n t h e s p h e r e of feeling, t h a t recognition is called "respect." T h e distinctiveness of respect lies n o t only in its necessity a n d a priori derivation, b u t also in t h e difference it manifests as feeling from o t h e r f e e l i n g s . K a n t writes of it as "a positive feeling n o t of e m pirical origin . . . which c a n be k n o w n a priori . . . a feeling p r o d u c e d by a n intellectual c a u s e . " "Respect is p r o p e r l y t h e r e p r e sentation of a worth that thwarts my self-love," b u t o n e which as a feeling is " n o t received t h r o u g h any outside influence . . . h e n c e it is specifically different from all feelings of t h e first k i n d . " It is n o t a feeling of sense, t h o u g h it is sensible. It is a feeling which refers to t h e supersensible. It is n o t Lebensgefühl b u t Geistesgefühl. 25

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T h e p r i m a r y practical role of sensibility, of course, is in g e n e r a t i n g "inclinations" o r i e n t e d t o w a r d " h a p p i n e s s " o r "self-love." C o n s e q u e n t l y , "whatever checks all inclination of self-love necessarily has, by t h a t fact, a n influence o n f e e l i n g . " F r o m t h e side of r e a s o n , it can b e established a priori from t h e n a t u r e of m o r a l law, 30

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a n d from t h e actual condition of m a n as a natural-material subject, a finite rational b e i n g necessarily d e t e r m i n e d by t h e m o r a l law, t h a t h e m u s t e x p e r i e n c e this d e t e r m i n a t i o n subjectively in feeling as c o m p u l s i o n a n d p a i n : "[W]e can see a priori that t h e m o r a l law as a g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e will, by t h w a r t i n g all o u r inclinations, m u s t p r o d u c e a feeling which can be called pain. H e r e we have t h e first a n d p e r h a p s t h e only case w h e r e i n we can d e t e r m i n e from a priori concepts t h e relation of a cognition (here a cognition of p u r e practical reason) to t h e feeling of pleasure o r disp l e a s u r e . " Since "respect" is for law, for t h e necessity of duty, it is a necessary, n o t a voluntary feeling: "a tribute we c a n n o t refuse to pay to merit w h e t h e r we will o r n o t . " It is also a n ultimately affirmative o n e , d e s p i t e t h e initial displeasure. T h e subject experiences a p a i n , b u t reflection u p o n this p a i n , i.e., j u d g m e n t a b o u t t h e state of m i n d via Lebensgefühl, leads to the recognition that the rejection of desire was c o m m a n d e d by r e a s o n within t h e subject. Reflection, t h r o u g h Lebensgefühl, becomes aware of a relation to its o w n i m m a n e n t rationality, a n d of t h e authority of t h a t rationality in t h e subject. B u t this p r o d u c e s a feeling of "intellectual p l e a s u r e , " or, m o r e precisely, a p p r o b a t i o n . T h a t is Geistesgefühl. 31

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T h e c o n c e p t of Geistesgefühl has already arisen in o u r consideration of t h e feeling of t h e sublime, a n d t h e parallelisms between the feeling of respect a n d the feeling of the sublime are obvious. T h e first parallel is in t h e psychology of t h e e x p e r i e n c e . Both respect a n d sublimity a r e "mixed feelings" or c o m p l e x states of m i n d involving c h a n g e . B o t h start o u t with a feeling of displeasure or p a i n . B u t this feeling in t h e sensible subject is discerned to b e caused by t h e subject's o w n rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d this induces a new feeling of a p p r o b a t i o n , which is pleasant b u t in a different m a n n e r . T h u s t h e subjective e x p e r i e n c e of b o t h respect a n d sublimity is a m o v e m e n t in m e n t a l states, a Rührung, a stirring of e m o t i o n s . B u t the c o n n e c t i o n is n o t merely o n e of similar subjective process. I n b o t h cases, t h e e x p e r i e n c e is n o l o n g e r merely a feeling of life [Lebensgefühl], i.e., t h e actual efficacy of the will. It is a feeling of spirit [Geistesgefühl], i.e., t h e rational authority in t h e will. Kant a r g u e s t h a t in t h e e x p e r i e n c e of respect for the law, "cont e m p l a t i n g t h e majesty of this l a w , . . . the soul believes itself to b e elevated in p r o p o r t i o n as it sees t h e holy law as elevated over it a n d its frail n a t u r e [die Seele sich in dem Maße zu erheben glaubt, als sie das heilige Gesetz über sich und ihre gebrechliche Natur erhaben sieht]. " T h e v e r b K a n t u s e d is in its n o m i n a l f o r m t h e t e r m for t h e sublime. 3 3

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Again, in describing duty, K a n t writes t h a t it is " s o m e t h i n g which elevates m a n above himself as p a r t of t h e world of sense, s o m e t h i n g which connects h i m with a n o r d e r of things which only t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g can t h i n k [was den Menschen über sich selbst (als einen Theil der Sinnenwelt) erhebt, was ihn an eine Ordnung der Dinge knüpft, die nur der Verstand denken kann]." A n d K a n t uses t h e n o m i n a l form of sublimity as well: "the sublimity of o u r o w n s u p e r s e n s u o u s exist e n c e . . . subjectively effects respect for their h i g h e r vocation in m e n . " T h u s t h e c o n n e c t i o n is extremely close between t h e feeling of respect a n d t h e feeling of t h e sublime. Yet they can a n d s h o u l d be distinguished. K a n t writes t h a t respect "applies to p e r s o n s only, n e v e r to t h i n g s . " A bit later h e clarifies himself still further: " r e spect c a n n e v e r have o t h e r t h a n a m o r a l g r o u n d . " T h i s accords with t h e a r g u m e n t h e m a d e in t h e Grounding: "All respect for a person is p r o p e r l y only respect for t h e law. . . of which the p e r s o n p r o vides a n e x a m p l e . " T h u s K a n t comes back to his basic assertion: "only t h e law itself can b e a n object of r e s p e c t . " I n o t h e r s a n d in oneself, w h a t causes respect is t h e law. Subjectively it is duty. Objectively it is t h e m o r a l law a n d , b e h i n d it, t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e will in rational f r e e d o m . 34

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Precisely w h a t distinguishes t h e m o r a l feeling from t h e sublime is t h a t t h e m o r a l feeling a t t e n d s t h e subjective supersensible directly, while t h e sublime involves a " s u b r e p t i o n , " whereby it seeks it in a n object of n a t u r e . Yet the sublime is the e x p e r i e n c e w h e r e b y t h a t s u b r e p t i o n reveals t h e limitations of t h e merely p h e n o m e n a l p r e s e n c e of n a t u r e . T h u s K a n t defined the feeling of t h e sublime as " a n object (of n a t u r e ) the representation of which determines the mind to think the unattainability of nature regarded as a presentation of ideas." T h e e x p e r i e n c e of seeking such a n "objective correlative," such a "sensible illustration" in n a t u r e d e m o n s t r a t e s not p e r h a p s t h e idea, b u t t h e process of r e a s o n itself, "as t h e faculty expressing t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of absolute totality [als Vermögen der Independenz der absoluten Totalität]," t h a t is, w h a t really gets p r e s e n t e d is " t h e subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s of o u r m i n d in t h e e m p l o y m e n t of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n for its supersensible d e s t i n a t i o n . " While Kant is merely restating t h e t h e o r y of t h e sublime in this passage, it is even m o r e clear h o w decisively t h e n o t i o n of aesthetic ideas, t h e t h e o r y of symbolism, r e p r e s e n t s t h e culmination of his whole vision of aesthetics, a n d h o w t h a t fits p r o f o u n d l y into his c o n c e p t i o n of m a n as a b e i n g g r o u n d e d in t h e supersensible. 4 0

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projected u p o n n a t u r e was a " s u b r e p t i o n , " a m i s p l a c e m e n t of t h e actual g r o u n d of t h e feeling, which authentically b e t o k e n e d t h e supersensible destination in t h e subject. T h i s " s u b r e p t i o n " disting u i s h e d t h e feeling of t h e sublime from t h e feeling of respect. Respect was inevitably aware of its p r o p e r a n d t r u e g r o u n d , while t h e sublime feeling was characteristically m i s g u i d e d a b o u t its source. Yet this s u b r e p t i o n was fruitful precisely for t h e m e t a p h y s i cal o p e n n e s s it occasioned, namely, for t h e h a r m o n y of n a t u r e with Geist, a n d h e n c e t h e possible ontological unity of t h e supersensible g r o u n d of n a t u r e with t h e supersensible g r o u n d of m a n .

Kant's Speculations about Geist Kant's discussion of Geist in §49 is o n e of t h e most difficult a n d r e w a r d i n g sections in the whole Third Critique. For t h e intellectual historian, t h e t r e a t m e n t of Geist is fascinating simply for its relation to t h e articulation o f t h a t crucial c o n c e p t in s u b s e q u e n t Idealism. B u t even w h e n o u r a t t e n t i o n r e m a i n s strictly with Kant, this section o p e n s u p a s t o n i s h i n g d e p t h s of Kantian metaphysics. All of Kant's metaphysical intimations c u l m i n a t e d in t h e idea of Geist. B u t Kant p r o v e d e x t r e m e l y reticent a b o u t acknowledging t h e metaphysical potential latent in t h a t concept. I n his criticism of rational psychology in t h e First Critique, h e h a d i n t i m a t e d (negatively) t h e potential in t h e n o t i o n . H e o b served: " N e i t h e r t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l object which u n d e r l i e s o u t e r a p p e a r a n c e s n o r that which u n d e r l i e s i n n e r intuition, is in itself eit h e r m a t t e r o r a t h i n k i n g b e i n g , b u t a g r o u n d (to us u n k n o w n ) of t h e a p p e a r a n c e s which supply to us t h e empirical concept of t h e f o r m e r as well as of t h e latter m o d e of e x i s t e n c e . " T h e inaccessibility of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject a n d t h e universality of its impositions u p o n t h e empirical ego's e x p e r i e n c e of i n n e r sense a r e such t h a t it can in n o way be established w h e t h e r it is s o m e t h i n g specific to each individual o r s o m e t h i n g which in fact e n c o m p a s s e s all such empirical i n d i v i d u a l s — i n d e e d , all reality, i.e., not merely t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject b u t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l object as well— within t h e totality of its o w n n o u m e n a l n a t u r e . " I f . . . we c o m p a r e t h e t h i n k i n g T n o t with m a t t e r b u t with t h e intelligible t h a t lies at t h e basis of t h e o u t e r a p p e a r a n c e which we call matter, we have n o k n o w l e d g e whatsoever of t h e intelligible, a n d t h e r e f o r e a r e in n o position to say t h a t t h e soul is in any inward respect different from i t . " T h u s t h e e n t e r t a i n m e n t of such speculations as t h e g r o u n d 43

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for a subjective idealism could n o t p r e c l u d e t h e i r extension to a n even vaster objective idealism. While K a n t used such a r g u m e n t s in t h e "Paralogisms" in a negative m o d e , to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e e m p t i n e s s of these speculations, h e was nevertheless conceiving possibilities which h a d doctrinal significance in b o t h t h e school-rationalist tradition a n d the religious tradition in G e r m a n y , a n d possibilities which h e would himself take u p , in t h e context of t h e Third Critique, in defense of these o r t h o d o x i e s against t h e t h r e a t of a n alternative, p a n t h e i s t ontology. W h a t rational psychology tried to establish from the t r a n scendental subjectivity of t h e "I think" was quite g r a n d i o s e : T h e substance, merely as object of i n n e r sense, gives t h e concept of immateriality; as simple substance, t h a t of incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, personality; all these t h r e e t o g e t h e r , spirituality; while t h e relation to objects in space gives commercium with bodies, a n d so leads us to r e p r e s e n t t h e t h i n k i n g substance as t h e principle of life in matter, t h a t is, as soul (anima), a n d as t h e g r o u n d of animality. T h i s last, in t u r n , as limited by spirituality, gives t h e concept of immortality.^ K a n t p r o c e e d e d in his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" to d e n y that rational psychology could attain any of these crucial conceptions t h r o u g h a cognitive p r o c e d u r e , a n d yet, via "practical r e a s o n " a n d "rational faith" (Vernunftglaube) K a n t rescued e a c h a n d every o n e of t h e c o n c e p t i o n s for his o w n philosophy. T h e ideas of "life" a n d "animality" play a c r u c i a l — t h o u g h heuristic—role in his theory of organic f o r m . T h e idea of "spirituality" figured n o t only in his m o r a l a n d religious teaching, b u t also in his analysis of the subjective f o u n d a t i o n s of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e . A n d of course, t h e notions of "personality" a n d "immortality" were essential to his specific m o r a l teachings. Yet Kant, despite his belief in each a n d every o n e of these notions, d e n i e d their cognitive certainty. T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t r e m a i n s is how m u c h of a t u r n Kant m a d e in his a t t i t u d e t o w a r d Geist, as t h e n o u m e n a l g r o u n d o r substrate of h u m a n f r e e d o m , by t h e time of t h e Third Critique. T h e whole t h r u s t of his r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e a n t i n o m y in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " was to "force" us to consider t h e "supersensible substrate" of h u m a n n a t u r e a n d r e a s o n as a " u n i t y . " B u t this line of speculation carried b e y o n d a subjective to a n objective idealism. I n 46

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§ii of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n , Kant w r o t e : " T h e r e must, therefore, b e a g r o u n d of t h e unity of t h e supersensible, which lies at t h e basis of n a t u r e , with t h a t which t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m practically cont a i n s . " I n R e m a r k II to §57, K a n t m a d e t h e same metaphysical a r g u m e n t , a n d h e took it u p again in t h e c u l m i n a t i n g section of t h a t whole "Dialectic," §59, in t h e following t e r m s : 47

H e n c e , b o t h o n a c c o u n t of this i n n e r possibility in t h e subject a n d of t h e e x t e r n a l possibility of a n a t u r e t h a t agrees with it, it finds itself to be r e f e r r e d to s o m e t h i n g within the subject as well as w i t h o u t h i m , s o m e t h i n g which is n e i t h e r n a t u r e n o r f r e e d o m , b u t which yet is c o n n e c t e d with the supersensible g r o u n d of t h e latter. In this supersensible g r o u n d , therefore, t h e theoretical faculty is b o u n d t o g e t h e r in unity with t h e practical in a way which, t h o u g h c o m m o n , is yet u n k n o w n . 4 8

Despite his epistemological scruples, Kant insisted o n the legitimacy of rational belief in this unity of t h e supersensible. "We have t h e r e f o r e in us a principle capable of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e idea of t h e supersensible within us, a n d t h u s also that of the supersensible without us, for knowledge, a l t h o u g h only in a practical point of view . . . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e concept of f r e e d o m (as f u n d a m e n t a l concept of all u n c o n d i t i o n e d practical laws) can e x t e n d reason bey o n d those b o u n d s within which every n a t u r a l (theoretical) c o n c e p t m u s t r e m a i n hopelessly l i m i t e d . " In this context it would a p p e a r t h a t Kant's n o t i o n of practical reason did entail a " k n o w l e d g e " which e x t e n d e d r e a s o n b e y o n d t h e theoretical p a r a m e t e r s of " u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h i s was a kind of " k n o w l e d g e " which h a d a h i g h e r validity t h a n m e r e "belief," a n d which also h a d clearly metaphysical implications. As we t u r n to Kant's ethics, we will press this point tow a r d a teleological a n d metaphysical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his notion of m a n a n d of his relation to t h e o r d e r of t h e world. T h o s e notions would be t a k e n u p by his successors u n d e r t h e r u b r i c Geist a l o n g t h e very lines which Kant was implying. 49

T h e richest insight into t h e metaphysical potential in Kant's c o n c e p t of Geist is to be f o u n d in his Reflections of the late 1770s. T h e s e private speculations, which p r o v e d m o r e d a r i n g t h a n his p u b l i s h e d writings, set o u t from t h e definition of Geist which Kant would e n u n c i a t e in §49 of t h e Third Critique, namely, t h e "animating principle of the m i n d . " H e h a d f o r m u l a t e d this definition already in 1 7 7 1 . Yet in t h e Reflections Kant was m o r e c a n d i d a b o u t 5 0

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the latent metaphysical potential of t h e n o t i o n . In Reflection 782 K a n t w r o t e of t h e geistige Gefühl as a sense of "participation in a n ideal w h o l e . " H e identified this ideal whole with t h e " f u n d a m e n t a l idea of r e a s o n . " In a n o t h e r Reflection h e w r o t e : "the feeling of spiritual life [das Gefühl des geistigen Lebens] has to d o with u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d f r e e d o m , for m a n has within himself t h e bases of k n o w l e d g e a n d w e l l - b e i n g . " For Kant, Geist was this "secret s p r i n g of life." It was n o t subject to volition, b u t arose s p o n t a n e ously, "from n a t u r e . " T h a t was w h a t it m e a n t to say t h a t what arises from spirit is "original" [ursprünglich]. Geist, Kant wrote, was t h e " i n n e r principle of activity." It r e q u i r e d t h e "sustained exertion of the m i n d . " 52

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I n s o m e linked Reflections from t h e late 1770s, Kant d e v e l o p e d t h e idea in its most r e m a r k a b l e form. H e first n o t e d that t h e t e r m itself was novel, a n d t h a t "a n e w t e r m does n o t find i m m e d i a t e acc e p t a n c e if it is n o t very apt." I n us t h e r e a r e delightful a n d compelling, b u t also enlivening causes of m e n t a l power; this last principle has its o w n quite u n i q u e n a t u r e a n d laws. N o t h i n g is enlivened b u t a certain universality which t h e m i n d fastens u p o n p r i o r to all particulars, a n d f r o m which it fashions its viewpoint a n d its p r o d u c t s . T h a t is why g e n i u s resides in this capacity to create t h e universal a n d t h e i d e a l . 56

Geist is t h e "generative g r o u n d [Erzeugungsgrund] of i d e a s . " T h e "expression of t h e idea t h r o u g h manifold a n d unified sensibility is p r o o f of spirit." It is t h e source of "system" as contrasted with m e r e a g g r e g a t i o n . It is n o particular talent, b u t t h e " a n i m a t i n g principle of all t a l e n t s . " Geist is t h e active principle; "soul" is what is anim a t e d . Geist is t h e source of all a n i m a t i o n , a n d can be derived from n o t h i n g p r i o r . T h i s line of t h o u g h t b r o u g h t K a n t to his ultimate c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e concept: 57

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Because spirit involves t h e universal, it is so to speak divinae particula aurae [a particular e m a n a t i o n of t h e divine] a n d it is c r e a t e d o u t of t h e universal spirit. T h a t is why spirit has n o specific p r o p e r t i e s ; r a t h e r , according to t h e different talents a n d sensibilities it affects, it a n i m a t e s in varying ways, a n d , because t h e s e a r e so manifold, every spirit has s o m e t h i n g u n i q u e . O n e o u g h t to say n o t that it belongs to t h e genius. It is t h e unity of t h e world s o u l . 60

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T h e metaphysical potential of the Idealist concept of Geist was already fully latent in t h e r e p r e s s e d speculations of I m m a n u e l Kant, a n d it filtered t h r o u g h , above all in t h e Third Critique, to stimulate his successors to its o u t r i g h t a r t i c u l a t i o n . 61

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a n t b e g a n his critical philosophy by acknowledging nat u r e as causal necessity, but conceiving of morality as free will a d h e r i n g only to its o w n law. His p r o b l e m was to reconcile these two c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e First Critique develo p e d t h e a n t i n o m i a n a r g u m e n t t h a t f r e e d o m a n d necessity n e e d n o t be logically contradictory, b u t it could only succeed in this by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p h e n o m e n a from n o u m e n a , a n d assigning f r e e d o m to t h e n o u m e n a l . T h i s p r o d u c e d , in the Second Critique, a new antin o m y which asserted t h e "practical necessity" of r e g a r d i n g oneself as morally responsible a n d h e n c e free. But, o n c e again, f r e e d o m h a d its locus exclusively in t h e n o u m e n a l . T o b e m o r a l was a m a t t e r of motive, n o t efficacy. Acting from d u t y sufficed b o t h to evidence t h e f r e e d o m of t h e will a n d to satisfy m o r a l obligation. Yet m o r a l d u t y a n d free will, while they w e r e strictly n o u m e n a l in their origin, exercised a u t h o r i t y over a n actual being. C o n c e r n for t h e efficaciousness of morality in t h e world of sense motivated Kant's "ethical t u r n " in t h e Third Critique. T h e practical, as t h e active c h a r a c t e r of t h e whole p e r s o n , inevitably raised two distinct b u t related issues for Kant: t h e p r o b l e m of t h e real "unity of r e a s o n , " since h e identified r e a s o n b o t h with its theoretical a n d with its practical uses; a n d also the p r o b l e m of t h e unity of t h e person, for t h e practical entailed n o t merely a disemb o d i e d ratiocination b u t a h u m a n act in t h e world of sense. Metaphysically, K a n t r e q u i r e d a n intrinsic (self-determining) d y n a m i s m of r e a s o n , f r e e d o m as a u t o n o m y , m a n as a n "end-in-himself," for his n o t i o n of morality to b e possible. T h e p r o b l e m h e faced was t h a t it was epistemologically impossible to prove such a t h i n g . Yet h e insisted it was m o r e t h a n merely a "belief," even a rational belief (Vernunftglaube). It was a "fact of p u r e r e a s o n . " Even vaster m e t a 1

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physical ideas i n t r u d e in t h e second line, for K a n t h a d to establish transcendentally how it was possible that n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m could b e a n efficacious cause in t h e p h e n o m e n a l world. I n a decisive passage in t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Third Critique, K a n t a r g u e d that it was a "metaphysical principle a priori" that t h e empirical elective will (Willkür) was free a n d efficacious as " n a t u r a l c a u s e . " Ultimately, Kant's ethical t u r n involved two issues of "metaphysics"— first, t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e "objective reality" of freedom, a n d second, t h e question of t h e efficacy of n o u m e n a l causality in t h e world of sense. K a n t c o m m i t t e d himself to a d e t e r m i n a t e claim a b o u t each of these. T h e first involved his idea of m a n as a n "end-in-himself" in a " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " T h e second involved his idea of the "highest g o o d . " T h e historical K a n t was in fact c o m m i t t e d to each of these n o t i o n s : t h e "primacy of practical r e a s o n " within t h e "unity of r e a s o n , " t h e idea of m a n as a n "end-in-himself" in a " k i n g d o m of e n d s , " a n d t h e "highest g o o d " as t h e "ideal" p u r s u e d by efficacious h u m a n f r e e d o m in t h e actual world. T h i s c h a p t e r traces t h e a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g free will from t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals t h r o u g h t h e Second a n d Third Critiques, to d e m o n s t r a t e h o w t h e "primacy of practical r e a s o n " in the "unity of r e a s o n " culmin a t e d in t h e idea of " a u t o n o m y , " t h e notion of m a n as a n "end-inhimself." T h e n e x t c h a p t e r will c o n c e r n itself with t h e "highest good." 2

The Unity of Reason Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy explains t h e involuntary s p o n taneity of consciousness by recognizing it as the act n o t of t h e empirical, b u t of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject. Kant's a t t e m p t to conceive h u m a n consciousness in t e r m s of two subjects—one empirical and one transcendental, one phenomenal and one noumenal— while at t h e s a m e time insisting u p o n t h e identity of the h u m a n p e r s o n a n d t h e unity of reason, t h r e a t e n e d a grave i n c o h e r e n c e . O n t h e o n e side, K a n t was so a d a m a n t a b o u t t h e p u r e formalism of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject t h a t it b e c a m e very difficult to recognize it as a " b e i n g " [Wesen]. O n t h e o t h e r side, K a n t was so a d a m a n t a b o u t t h e m e r e p h e n o m e n a l i t y of t h e empirical e g o that it b e c a m e very difficult to recognize it as a subject. 3

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If it was impossible, a c c o r d i n g to Kant's teachings in t h e "Paralogisms," a n d m o r e generally according to his doctrine of " i n n e r sense," to m o v e b e y o n d t h e m e r e formality of t h e " I " of transcend e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n , it was j u s t as impossible to d e m o n s t r a t e any The Unity of Man

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f o u n d a t i o n for ascribing s p o n t a n e i t y to t h e empirical ego. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject could n e v e r b e k n o w n objectively because t h e process o r act which constituted consciousness could never be a n object of c o g n i t i o n . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject did have knowle d g e that it existed, b u t n o t how, in what d e t e r m i n a t e form it did s o . T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of e x p e r i e n c e which it could discern were n o t p r o p e r t i e s of p r i m o r d i a l active intelligence, b u t merely its effects u p o n a passive sensible i n t u i t i o n — " i n n e r sense." T h a t u p o n which it acted was a "passive subject." It was at best a " m e . " K a n t claimed t h a t empirical consciousness could n e v e r achieve t h e kind of unity which h e posited for t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n d also for t h e practical subject. H e w r o t e : " t h e empirical consciousness, which accompanies different r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , is in itself diverse a n d without r e lation to t h e identity of t h e subject." Kant assigned empirical e x p e r i e n c e of t h e self merely to t h e s p h e r e of t h e "analytic unity of consciousness" which derived from a n d d e p e n d e d u p o n a p r i o r "synthetic unity of consciousness" in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject. " T h e empirical unity of consciousness, t h r o u g h association of r e p resentations, itself c o n c e r n s a n a p p e a r a n c e , a n d is wholly contingent." K a n t insisted that these two notions of subject, active a n d passive, could n o t b e collapsed into o n e , a n d yet at t h e same time h e c o n s i d e r e d b o t h to b e e l e m e n t s in a n identical h u m a n p e r s o n . K a n t i n d e e d strove to k e e p t h e two subjects distinct, insisting "the least object of p e r c e p t i o n (for e x a m p l e , even p l e a s u r e o r displeasure), if a d d e d to t h e universal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of self-consciousness, would at o n c e t r a n s f o r m rational psychology into empirical psycholo g y . " B u t empirical psychology, which e n c o m p a s s e d e v e r y t h i n g a b o u t t h e e g o except t h e e m p t y formality of t h e "I think," could in its o w n right achieve virtually n o t h i n g in t h e way of concrete k n o w l e d g e of t h e self. C o n s e q u e n t l y h e cast t h e notion of selfconsciousness into considerable o b s c u r i t y . 5

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W h i l e K a n t d e n i e d valid cognition of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, it is clear h e also ascribed s o m e form of p r e s e n c e o r reality to it. It is t h e "intellectual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of spontaneity," t h e consciousness of self as intelligence a n d act. A m o d e of awareness (not "cognition" in t h e strict sense) a n d a m o d e of existence (not "intuit i o n " in t h e strict sense) a r e indicated. Obviously they d o n o t fall clearly within t h e f r a m e w o r k of Kant's synthetic j u d g m e n t s , e m pirical o r a p r i o r i . K a n t refused to a d m i t t h a t any ontological j u d g m e n t was possible h e r e , despite a n o v e r w h e l m i n g " n a t u r a l dialectical" p r o p e n s i t y to m a k e j u s t such a j u d g m e n t . " [ T ] h e r e is n o t h 14

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i n g m o r e n a t u r a l a n d m o r e misleading t h a n t h e illusion which leads us to r e g a r d t h e unity in t h e synthesis of t h o u g h t s as a perceived unity in t h e subject of these t h o u g h t s . We m i g h t call it t h e s u b r e p tion of t h e hypostatised consciousness (apperceptionissubstantiae)." K a n t insists u p o n t h e irreducible mystery of t h e origins of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t . Space a n d time, t h e n u m b e r a n d n a t u r e of t h e categories, i n d e e d , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n itself: all of t h e s e a r e given. W i t h o u t t h e m , e x p e r i e n c e as we know it w o u l d n o t b e possible at all. T h i s givenness c a n n o t b e explained empirically because it is logically p r i o r t o e x p e r i e n c e . It exerts n e cessity n o t only u p o n t h e subject b u t u p o n t h e a p p e a r a n c e , such t h a t this a p p e a r a n c e can be conceived of as a n object. It is this givenness which is t h e "synthetic" unity u p o n which all s u b s e q u e n t analysis a n d exposition a r e g r o u n d e d . H e n c e it is unconditionally valid. If it is b o t h universal a n d necessary, if it is a priori valid, it is objective. It would seem to follow, t h e n , t h a t it is real. Yet K a n t wished to reserve t h e n o t i o n of reality exclusively to empirical refe r e n c e , to possible e x p e r i e n c e o r "actuality." I n themselves, a p a r t from such e x p e r i e n c e , space, time, a n d t h e categories r e m a i n e d merely "formal." Kant's restriction of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n to i m p o t e n c e in self-consciousness derived from his hostility to t h e n o t i o n of "intellectual intuition" a n d t h e dialectical license which traditional rationalism allowed itself o n t h e p r e m i s e of t h e c a n d o r of selfawareness. K a n t was certainly correct in c h a l l e n g i n g t h e view, typical of Descartes a m o n g t h e m o d e r n s , that everything subjective was t r a n s p a r e n t to self-consciousness. T h a t was perniciously false, b o t h cognitively a n d morally. Cognitively, it gave license to all sorts of dialectical fantasies. Morally, it d e l u d e d t h e subject as to his g r a s p of his o w n motives. Kant's p r o b l e m was to articulate this insight, a n d to discriminate b e t w e e n two sources of t h a t internal obscurity— the i n v o l u n t a r y s p o n t a n e i t y of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures of consciousness a n d t h e involuntary passivity of m a n ' s physical actuality—yet to d o so in a way t h a t d i d n o t a n n u l utterly what cognitive insight a n d m o r a l conscience did in fact exist in m a n ' s complex e x p e r i e n c e . 15

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It is n o t a l t o g e t h e r clear t h a t h e could d o t h e latter w i t h o u t s o m e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e objective reality of reason, at t h e very least as practical. C o n s e q u e n t l y , it is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o n s i d e r Kant's o b j e c t i o n s to t h e idea of a n "intellectual intuition." T h e best account of w h a t K a n t m e a n t by intellectual intuition c a m e , as we have seen, in §§76—77 of t h e Third Critique. B u t t h e idea was used extensively The Unity of Man

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in t h e First Critique, precisely in o r d e r to establish t h e discursiveness of h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n t h a t context, K a n t associated his n o tion of intuition in g e n e r a l with u n q u e s t i o n a b l e givenness, with immediacy, a n d with wholeness. K a n t held "intellectual intuition" inaccessible t o m a n in that, first, only t h e sensible is indubitably actual for consciousness a n d second, t h a t t h e principles of the activity of t h e h u m a n subject can only be logically d i s e m b e d d e d t h r o u g h a n analysis of consciousness, h e n c e t h a t act is n o t cognitively i m m e d i ate in itself. Finally, t h e unity of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, while logically indispensable, can n e v e r b e k n o w n — a t least not in t e r m s of a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . Yet K a n t s e e m e d to wish to distinguish "intellectual intuition" not merely negatively as against these limitations of t h e discursive (sensible) intuition of m a n , b u t positively in t e r m s of its originary or creative capacity to t r a n s c e n d the distinction of actuality a n d possibility so t h a t a n y t h i n g conceived by t h e intellectual intuition is m a d e actual by that very c o n c e p t i o n . Most assuredly that is a capacity b e y o n d t h e h u m a n m i n d . Yet if this capacity, which Kant p r u d e n t l y restricts to a p r i m o r d i a l Creator, is only a most extravag a n t form of intellectual intuition, a n d if, considering the o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s , a n a r g u m e n t m i g h t b e m a d e t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e to consciousness of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject does in fact have t h e e l e m e n t s of individuality, givenness a n d immediacy which characterize intuition, t h e n it m i g h t be possible to claim t h a t a n inferior but crucial sense of intellectual intuition can b e ascribed to h u m a n s , a n d m o s t vividly so in t h e self-consciousness of t h e subject as morally active. T h a t p r e s e n c e to consciousness would b e precisely t h e "fact of p u r e r e a s o n . " Against Kant, b u t in strict conformity with his o w n definitions, t h e "fact of p u r e r e a s o n " would signify non-sensible intuition. Moreover, t h e involuntary spontaneity which organizes a n d s t r u c t u r e s consciouness with transcendentally necessary validity m i g h t be r e g a r d e d as yet a n o t h e r instance of this "fact of p u r e r e a s o n . " T h e p h r a s e "fact of p u r e r e a s o n " in t h e Second Critique signified inescapable a n d ubiquitous necessity, p r i o r to a n d constitutive of h u m a n consciousness of m o r a l obligation. Such compelling force was real for Kant. If we conjecture a theoretical "fact of p u r e r e a s o n " it is because it exerts a similarly c o m p e l l i n g force u p o n h u m a n consciousness. B o t h "facts of p u r e r e a s o n " are g r o u n d e d within t h e subject, a n d yet c o m m a n d also in reference to objects. B o t h g e s t u r e to t h e ontological p r e s e n c e of s o m e t h i n g without which t h e empirical e x p e r i e n c e would be impossible. 1 7

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K a n t did occasionally, even in the First Critique, acknowledge t h e p r o s p e c t of a n a p p e r c e p t i o n of t h e rational subject. M a n , . . . w h o knows all the rest of n a t u r e solely t h r o u g h the senses, knows himself also t h r o u g h p u r e [bloße] a p p e r c e p t i o n ; a n d this, i n d e e d , in acts a n d i n n e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n s which h e c a n n o t r e g a r d as impressions of t h e senses. H e is t h u s to himself . . . in respect of certain faculties the action of which cann o t b e ascribed to t h e receptivity of sensibility, a purely [bloß] intelligible object. We entitle these faculties u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n . T h e latter, in particular, . . . views its objects exclusively [bloß] in t h e light of i d e a s . 18

K a n t h e r e seems to a r g u e that t h e r e is real knowledge of the n o u m e n a l self n o t only practically (as t h e faculty of reason) b u t also cognitively (as t h e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) . T h i s passage lends s u p p o r t to t h e notions of spontaneity as the i m m a n e n t principle of r e a s o n a n d of r e a s o n as a n objective r e a l i t y . T h e h e a r t of K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y is t h e idea of consciousness— of r e a s o n — a s act. K a n t defined "spontaneity" as t h e p o w e r to p r o d u c e concepts o r to t h i n k w h e n h e first i n t r o d u c e d it at t h e outset of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Logic," in contradistinction to t h e receptivity of i n t u i t i o n . S p o n t a n e i t y is t h e decisive characteristic of reason as such. It is identified with a n " a c t . " Spontaneity is responsible for all acts of c o m b i n a t i o n , of s y n t h e s i s . It is, as act, p u r e a p p e r c e p t i o n . Moreover, it is identifed as "the g r o u n d of t h e threefold synthesis which m u s t necessarily be f o u n d in all k n o w l e d g e . " I n t h e " T h i r d A n t i n o m y , " Kant d e v e l o p e d the conception of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m " a n d e q u a t e d it with "absolute spontaneity." H e r e t u r n e d to this notion in explicating t h e cosmological a n t i n o m y : " r e a s o n creates for itself t h e idea of a spontaneity which can begin to act of itself, without r e q u i r i n g to b e d e t e r m i n e d to action by a n a n t e c e d e n t c a u s e . " Kant was only able fully to explicate t h e m e a n i n g of spontaneity a n d of reason, insofar as it h a d as its essence this i m m a n e n t d y n a m i s m , by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e notion of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m . Kant suggested that r e a s o n could n o t b e r e a d simply in t h e light of t h e cognitive aspect of h u m a n experie n c e , b u t t h a t it h a d its g r o u n d r a t h e r in the practical. 19

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Practical reason, K a n t believed, offered the best prospect of a "correct e m p l o y m e n t of p u r e reason," i.e., a positive or "real" use. I n t h e "Paralogisms" of t h e B-version, K a n t allowed t h e possibility t h a t reason's s p o n t a n e i t y m i g h t b e determinately k n o w n — b y practical r e a s o n . H e w r o t e : The Unity of Man

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S h o u l d it b e g r a n t e d t h a t we may in d u e c o u r s e discover not in e x p e r i e n c e b u t in certain laws of t h e p u r e e m p l o y m e n t of r e a s o n — l a w s which a r e n o t merely logical rules, b u t which while h o l d i n g a priori also c o n c e r n o u r e x i s t e n c e — g r o u n d for r e g a r d i n g ourselves as legislating completely a priori in r e g a r d to o u r o w n existence, a n d as d e t e r m i n i n g this existence, t h e r e would t h e r e b y b e revealed a s p o n t a n e i t y t h r o u g h which o u r reality would b e d e t e r m i n a b l e , i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the conditions of empirical intuition. A n d we s h o u l d also b e c o m e aware t h a t in t h e consciousness of o u r existence t h e r e is contained a s o m e t h i n g a priori, which can serve to d e t e r m i n e o u r e x i s t e n c e — t h e c o m p l e t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of which is possible only in sensible t e r m s — a s b e i n g related, in respect of a certain i n n e r faculty, to a non-sensible intelligible w o r l d . 27

I n t h e crucial section of t h e First Critique called t h e " C a n o n of P u r e Reason," K a n t w r o t e : "Reason is impelled by a t e n d e n c y of its nat u r e to g o o u t b e y o n d t h e field of its empirical e m p l o y m e n t , a n d to v e n t u r e in a p u r e e m p l o y m e n t , by m e a n s of ideas alone, to t h e utm o s t limits of all k n o w l e d g e , a n d n o t to be satisfied save t h r o u g h t h e c o m p l e t i o n of its course in a self-subsistent systematic w h o l e . " I n all his p h r a s e s r e g a r d i n g t h e i m m a n e n t propensities of r e a s o n — " n e e d s , " "interests," "vocations," " e n d s " — K a n t implied, w h e t h e r h e wished to d e f e n d it or not, a conception of r e a s o n n o t as a m e r e "logical" form for empirical agents, b u t as a real force d e t e r m i n i n g t h e m as it d e t e r m i n e d t h e " n a t u r e " of their subjective e x p e r i e n c e . 28

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H u m a n consciousness is n o t exclusively, i n d e e d n o t even primarily cognitive. It is active or p r a c t i c a l . In Kant's own words, "in t h e e n d all t h e o p e r a t i o n s of o u r faculties m u s t issue in t h e practical a n d u n i t e in it as t h e i r g o a l . " T h i s principle K a n t t e r m e d the "primacy of practical r e a s o n . " By " p r i m a c y " h e m e a n t " t h e p r e r o g r a t i v e of o n e [thing] by virtue of which it is the p r i m e g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a tion of t h e c o m b i n a t i o n with t h e o t h e r s . " It was in t e r m s of t h e unity of r e a s o n t h a t t h e practical h a d primacy. "It is only o n e a n d t h e s a m e r e a s o n which j u d g e s a priori by principles, w h e t h e r for theoretical o r for practical p u r p o s e s . " K a n t a r g u e d that r e a s o n h a d its o w n "interests," a n d t h a t within r e a s o n each of its p r e e m i n e n t u s e s — c o g n i t i o n a n d volition—had interests. T h e question of primacy h a d to d o with t h e relation of those interests. T h e very con30

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cept of interest, K a n t realized, was practical in its ultimate sense, a n d t h e r e f o r e "every interest is ultimately practical, even that of speculative r e a s o n . " T h e p r o b l e m was w h e t h e r theoretical reason s h o u l d tolerate t h e postulation of t h e reality of ideas of reason which practical reason r e q u i r e d for t h e p u r s u i t of its interests. If reason could n o t recognize a n y t h i n g b e y o n d what cognition could establish as valid k n o w l e d g e , t h e n crucial interests of practical r e a s o n would be t h w a r t e d . B u t K a n t h a d already d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t theoretical reason was free to think a n y t h i n g n o n c o n t r a d i c t o r y , a n d t h e r e f o r e could recognize t h e possibility of t h e ideas which practical reason r e q u i r e d . F u r t h e r , t h e a n t i n o m i e s h a d s h o w n that t h e positing of these ideas, h o w e v e r i n d e t e r m i n a t e for cognition, was absolutely necessary for t h e internal functioning of cognitive r e a s o n itself. T h u s , subjectively, these ideas were necessary. Practical reason claimed a n objective, i.e., ontological status for o n e of these ideas, that of f r e e d o m , a n d a postulated reality of o t h e r s for t h e sake of this f r e e d o m . T h e "primacy of practical reason," for Kant, m e a n t t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e interest of practical r e a s o n in d e m a n d i n g t h a t theoretical r e a s o n abide by this in their unity. T h i s idea of t h e primacy of practical reason is controversial. Its critics a r e certainly correct in p o i n t i n g o u t that K a n t could n o t m e a n by it t h a t cognitive r e a s o n s h o u l d accept s o m e t h i n g clearly i n c o n g r u o u s with its o w n p r i n c i p l e s . Practical r e a s o n could n o t r e q u i r e cognition to accept t h e validity of two contradictory assertions, for e x a m p l e . T h e "methodological" primacy of practical reason is a m y t h . But, as Beck points o u t , practical reason does n o t m a k e such d e m a n d s . It p r o p o s e s to take possession of a r e a l m for which cognitive r e a s o n has already established itself incapable of prescribing constitutive rules, b u t which it has also d e s i g n a t e d as a territory of vital interest to its o w n intrinsic f u n c t i o n i n g . 34

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T h i s discreet formulation is n o t yet clear e n o u g h . W h a t t h e primacy of practical r e a s o n m e a n s is t h e claim to objective reality, i.e., to ontological status, for r e a s o n itself. Reason's ultimate concept for itself is f r e e d o m , which is t h e metaphysical principle which integrates s p o n t a n e i t y a n d a u t o n o m y . It was only w h e n Kant advanced from t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m as s p o n t a n e i t y — w h a t Beck t e r m s "negative f r e e d o m " a n d K a n t " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m " — t o t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m as a u t o n o m y , a step h e took a r o u n d 1785, that K a n t could m a k e a n y a d v a n c e o n t h e metaphysical c o n u n d r u m of t h e reality of r e a s o n from t h e v a n t a g e of a finite rational b e i n g . K a n t c a m e to recognize that in o n e crucial s p h e r e t h e subject 39

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participated voluntarily in his spontaneity a n d was t h u s raised into the s p h e r e of p u r e r e a s o n : a u t o n o m y , "practical self-legislation." With a u t o n o m y Kant h a d a c o n c e p t of freedom a d e q u a t e to t h e dignity of a rational subject. While t h e finite rational subject particip a t e d in p u r e r e a s o n , at t h e constitutive level t h a t participation h a d s e e m e d to K a n t p u r e l y a u t o m a t i c a n d mechanical, h e n c e from t h e individual-empirical v a n t a g e , passive. Cognitively, p u r e reason acted as a n involuntary spontaneity constituting sensible intuition into empirical k n o w l e d g e . Morally, p u r e reason acted as compulsory obligation m a k i n g constitutive rules for practical action in t h e world of sense. Insofar as spontaneity was involuntary, it could n e v e r be t h e empirical subject's own. B u t K a n t recognized that m e r e passivity was n e i t h e r an accurate depiction of empirical m a n ' s m o r a l (or e v e n cognitive) e x p e r i e n c e n o r — f a r m o r e crucially— consistent with t h e m o d e l of reason's actualization. H e n c e h e stressed m a n ' s cognitive capacity to l e a r n — t o discover a n d to i n v e n t — b u t even m o r e , m a n ' s practical self-legislation: a u t o n o m y . T h e r e w e r e two sides to this innovation in his t h o u g h t . O n t h e o n e h a n d , K a n t h a d to loosen t h e d e t e r m i n a c y of t h e u n d e r s t a n d ing in cognition of t h e empirical to m a k e possible t h e active p u r s u i t of k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h j u d g m e n t . O n t h e other, Kant h a d to ack n o w l e d g e t h e m o r a l f r e e d o m of the empirical will in o r d e r to vindicate t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e rational will as accessible even to a finite rational b e i n g . As rational, h u m a n n a t u r e could ascribe to itself a f r e e d o m of self-determination a n d a capacity to modify reality in a c c o r d a n c e with t h a t f r e e d o m . T h u s concrete m a n could particip a t e in t h e r e a s o n which d e t e r m i n e d t h e laws of his action a n d in t h e constitution of those laws. K a n t ultimately f o u n d a way to assert t h e "objective reality" of f r e e d o m t h r o u g h his ethical philosophy, his "metaphysics of morals." K a n t claimed that m a n was a n "end-in-himself." A u t o n o m y posited q u i t e unequivocally a rational being. K a n t r e q u i r e d a concept t h r o u g h which to articulate this problematic ontological c h a r a c t e r of r e a s o n . H e f o u n d it in the idea of "objective e n d [ p u r p o s e ] . " T h e essential c o n n e c t i o n was between practical reason a n d "intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s . " All a l o n g this study has a r g u e d for t h e centrality of t h e l a n g u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . While t h e l a n g u a g e of system is reason's l a n g u a g e of self-consciousness as formal or logical, reason's self-consciousness as effective o r real finds articulation in the lang u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . T h e s e notions w e r e at t h e o u t e r m o s t e x t r e m e of Kant's consideration in the First Critique, but, as o u r whole study has established, they b e c a m e central for t h e Third 314

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Critique. Objective purposiveness b e t o k e n e d t h e single most crucial metaphysical idea of I m m a n u e l Kant: reason as a u t o n o m y , as freedom. P u r p o s e is a l a n g u a g e of r e a s o n . It is in fact a l a n g u a g e exclusively a n d natively rational: n o t for t h e d e t e r m i n a t e j u d g m e n t of p h e n o m e n a , b u t for reason's internal process, most importantly its practical r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h u s the decisive e l e m e n t K a n t i n t r o d u c e d into his discussion of t h e "unity of reason" was the idea of p u r posiveness. " T h i s highest formal unity, which rests solely o n concepts of r e a s o n , is t h e purposive unity of t h i n g s . " A few pages later K a n t a d d e d : " C o m p l e t e p u r p o s i v e unity constitutes what is, in t h e absolute sense, p e r f e c t i o n . " Absicht, or intention, is a m a t t e r exclusively of rational beings. Objects of desire, however, are actual for all a n i m a l life forms. T h i s desire can be i m p u t e d to t h e m as a necessary trait or drive [Trieb], b u t its o p e r a t i o n is merely instinctual, not rational, i.e., n o t p u r p o s e f u l but purposive. T h a t was t h e whole t h r u s t of Kant's a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g so-called " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s . " T h e i r "intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s " was i m p u t e d to t h e m o n analogy to rational p u r p o s e . B u t with m a n himself we a r e n o l o n g e r in t h e d o m a i n of analogy. M a n is intentional (absichtlich). H e is p u r p o s e f u l , i.e., a n intelligent c a u s e . H e is a n end-in-himself. 40

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K a n t believed t h a t the involuntary spontaneity b e h i n d cognition a n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m b e h i n d choice were identical: they were t h e n o u m e n a l h u m a n soul. But h e q u e s t i o n e d w h e t h e r it was possible to p r o v e this, a n d h e also questioned w h e t h e r it was wise to d o s o . T h e first scruple was epistemological. T h e second was religious. T o d i s r e g a r d the first scruple would t h r e a t e n t h e principle of t h e discursiveness of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T o disregard t h e second scruple would t h r e a t e n t h e idea of m o r a l freedom. O n l y t h e preservation of his distinction between t h e p h e n o m e n a l a n d t h e n o u m e n a l could avoid t h e s e t h r e a t s , h e a r g u e d . 4 3

4 4

T h i s t e n s i o n between belief a n d p r o o f was of t h e essence of his n o t i o n of Vernunftglaube, rational belief. H e held that by limiting t h e scope of r e a s o n h e m a d e r o o m for faith, a n d in that m e a s u r e took n o t h i n g away from c o m m o n h u m a n i t y b u t only d e m o l i s h e d t h e m o n o p o l y of t h e s c h o o l s . At t h e same time, h e was anxious to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t belief in G o d , f r e e d o m , a n d immortality could be s h o w n to be rational according to t h e critical philosophy. Religion within t h e limits of reason is b u t o n e half of Kant's g u i d i n g principle, for it would a p p e a r t h a t p r u d e n c e r e q u i r e d r e a s o n within the limits of religion as w e l l . T h e idealism of p u r p o s i v e n e s s in n a t u r e as a whole tallied well 45

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with Kant's critical project of clearing a space for faith by d e n y i n g d e t e r m i n a t e capacities to r e a s o n in t h e s p h e r e of t h e supersensible. K a n t wished only to establish t h e possibility of i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e , t h e subjective necessity of its p r e s u m p t i o n , b u t n o m o r e . If it were possible to p r o m o t e this subjective possibility into a n objective actuality, t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s would b e very serious for his whole system. T h e possibility of p u r p o s e in t h e world of n a t u r e was necessary to a c c o m m o d a t e h u m a n ethical action, b u t it was n o t necessary to sec u r e t h e validity of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e . Conversely, t h e actuality of p u r p o s e in n a t u r e would destroy aesthetic f r e e d o m , a n d h e n c e t h e whole possibility of beauty, by m a k i n g it c o n t i n g e n t u p o n nat u r e . Even m o r e profoundly, it w o u l d t h r e a t e n h u m a n m o r a l freed o m , by m a k i n g n a t u r e as a n o u m e n a l force immediately real to o u r consciousness. Such immediacy before the m i g h t of God, K a n t believed, would destroy the i n d e p e n d e n c e h u m a n beings n e e d e d to b e authentically m o r a l . T h u s , crucially, t h e metaphysical survival of b o t h b e a u t y a n d morality h i n g e d u p o n t h e denial of t h e objectivity of p u r p o s i v e n e s s in n a t u r e . 4 7

Man As an

End-in-Himself

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l principle of Kant's metaphysics of morals is t h e idea of m a n as a n end-in-himself, i.e., t h e objective reality of freed o m . B u t K a n t r e m a i n s epistemologically s c r u p u l o u s to claim t h a t we c a n n o t know such a reality, because it is n o u m e n a l . We c a n — i n d e e d we m u s t — t h i n k it, a n d practically we can infer its objective reality from o u r e x p e r i e n c e of necessary law. Still, Kant w a r n s against t h e "mysticism of practical r e a s o n " which "makes into a s c h e m a t h a t which s h o u l d serve only as a s y m b o l . " Kant's o w n u s a g e of "objective reality" for practical reason, however, is n o t too far r e m o v e d from t h e very practice h e chastises, b u t for a bit m o r e discretion, a n d it is clear t h a t h e is n o t too hostile to such "mysticism." Still, h e cloaks himself in t h e full rigor of "criticism" a n d consequently, in his m o s t extensive discussion of m a n as a n end-in-himself, in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant i n t r o d u c e s t h e n o t i o n r a t h e r circumspectly, in a hypothetical vein: " S u p p o s e t h a t t h e r e were s o m e t h i n g whose existence has in itself a n absolute w o r t h , s o m e t h i n g which as a n e n d in itself could be a g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a t e l a w . " T h i s sentence r e q u i r e s the most careful analysis. F o r K a n t t h e only t h i n g whose existence can have a n absolute w o r t h is a n end-in-itself. T h a t is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n 4 8

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ciple of t h e a p p o s i t i o n . Each clause contributes distinctive e l e m e n t s to Kant's c o n c e p t i o n which only c o m e clear o n t h e basis of subsequent comments. O n l y a n intrinsic p u r p o s e can g r o u n d all e x t e r n a l p u r p o s e s , a n d t h e r e f o r e all purposiveness is g r o u n d e d in this capacity a n d d e rives its possibility a n d value from it. A n end-in-itself, Kant tells us, is a n "objective e n d [ p u r p o s e ] " — t h a t is, it exists as the capacity to assign w o r t h , a n d , as t h e only such capacity in t h e world, it possesses "absolute" w o r t h . T h e capacity to assign worth is t h e capacity to h a v e intentions, Absichten. T h a t capacity is autonomy: t h e power, which is exclusively reason's, of legislating for itself ( " g r o u n d i n g d e t e r m i n a t e law"). A " p e r s o n " (an objective e n d in t h e m o r a l context) has "dignity" (absolute worth in t h e m o r a l context) by virtue strictly of the rationality which is the g r o u n d a n d also t h e principle of one's capacity for choice, one's n a t u r e as a p u r p o s e m a k e r , a n end-in-itself. Reason alone has absolute w o r t h . Reason a l o n e provides t h e " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of law" according to which p u r pose is possible. B u t most importantly, r e a s o n alone is t h e real g r o u n d for w o r t h , p u r p o s e , a n d principle. " T h e g r o u n d of all practical legislation lies objectively in t h e rules a n d in t h e form of universality, which . . . makes t h e rule capable of b e i n g a law . . . Subjectively, however, t h e g r o u n d of all practical legislation lies in the e n d [ p u r p o s e ] ; b u t . . . t h e subject of all e n d s [purposes] is every rational b e i n g as a n e n d in h i m s e l f . " K a n t is m a k i n g t h e usual moves with t h e t e r m s "objective" a n d "subjective" h e r e . By "objective" h e refers to validity a n d form, b u t t h e issue is w h e t h e r K a n t is entitled to call t h e reality in this situation m e r e l y subjective. It is n o t t h e sensible subject which is at stake h e r e b u t "every rational b e i n g as a n e n d in himself." 51

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Kant's metaphysics of morals r e q u i r e s that t h e r e be rational, essential being. "Rational n a t u r e is distinguished from t h e rest of nat u r e by t h e fact that it sets itself a n e n d . . . t h e e n d m u s t h e r e b e conceived, n o t as a n e n d to be effected, b u t as a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y existing e n d . " T h a t is, it is possible for rationality to d e t e r m i n e t h e will as a formal principle only if it is real as a prior g r o u n d . A u t o n o m y g r o u n d s rational choice. Reason is at o n e a n d t h e s a m e time real a n d legislative. "Rational n a t u r e exists as a n e n d in itself." Moreover, t h e r e a s o n which g r o u n d s a n d d e t e r m i n e s legislatively t h e p u r p o s i v e action of any rational being is t h e same for every rational being. Self-recognition of t h e "objective principle of t h e will" o r t h e " m o r a l law" m u s t lead o n e to recognize at the s a m e time 5 4

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"what is necessarily a n e n d for everyone," t h e " g r o u n d of such a principle," i.e., s h a r e d r e a s o n . If t h e r e are rational beings, a n d my o w n self-conception as an end-in-myself could have n o o t h e r basis, t h e n n o t only I b u t every rational being, simply by virtue of rationality, m u s t also b e a n e n d in itself. T h a t is why t h e recognition of oneself as a n end-in-itself, i.e., t h e recognition of one's o w n capacity to have intentions, in a n d of itself b i n d s o n e to t h e c o m m u n i t y of all ends-in-themselves. Man, as a finite rational being, recognizes t h e capacity to choose in himself, i.e., recognizes his own rationality "as legislating for itself a n d only o n this a c c o u n t as b e i n g subject to t h e l a w . " B u t t h a t immediately entails his recognition that s h o u l d any o t h e r rational beings exist, they too w o u l d necessarily enjoy t h e same status. H e n c e Kant's n o tion of "a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a k i n g d o m of e n d s " — i . e . , a c o m m u n i t y n o t of objects of will but of wills: "a systematic u n i o n of rational beings t h r o u g h c o m m o n objective l a w s . " T h e law is c o m m o n n o t only "because [it is] legislation bel o n g i n g to all p e r s o n s as m e m b e r s " b u t also because o n e a n d the s a m e r e a s o n is involved, as g r o u n d a n d as p r i n c i p l e . T h e m e m b e r s h i p in a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " which derives from s h a r e d rationality is the key point we m u s t harvest at once. "A rational being m u s t always r e g a r d himself as legislator in a k i n g d o m of e n d s r e n d e r e d possible by f r e e d o m of t h e w i l l . " A u t o n o m y a n d spontaneity, as t h e essential e l e m e n t s of r e a s o n , constitute f r e e d o m of the will. 5 5

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In t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " Kant went at length into t h e hypothetical c h a r a c t e r of a n intellectus archetypus as a cognitive m o d e l of p u r e rationality. I n the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant d e v e l o p e d t h e n o t i o n of a "holy will" to characterize a practical m o d e l of p u r e rationality. I n a holy will, t h e i m m a n e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s of r e a s o n are automatically, s p o n t a n e ously a c t u a l i z e d . T h e r e is n o g a p between is a n d o u g h t , n o labor to b e u n d e r t a k e n , n o external p u r p o s e as m e a n s or as e n d (result) to b e distinguished from t h e i m m a n e n t self-sufficiency of t h e holy will itself. S u c h a holy will K a n t also t e r m e d a "sovereign" in t h e "kingd o m of e n d s . " N o w this sovereignty could not involve t h e d o m i n a tion over a n y o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e k i n g d o m , for to treat t h e m as m e a n s a n d n o t e n d s is forbidden even to a holy will, t h o u g h it would n e v e r be t e m p t e d to violate this principle. H e n c e t h e idea of sovereignty suggests a new c o n c e p t i o n of t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " Sovereignty lies n o t in t h e relation of t h e holy will to o t h e r rational wills, w h o m it may n o t c o m m a n d , b u t in relation to the objects of all 61

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wills. A "sovereign" will immediately actualizes all its objects. All nonintuitive, n o n h o l y intelligences n e e d to labor to realize or actualize t h e specific e n d s (results) they have chosen according to their intentions (motives). T h i s set of results, w h e n i n c l u d e d with the "ind e p e n d e n t l y existing e n d s , " results in a second, e x p a n d e d notion of t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " Kant wrote that it was "possible to think of a whole of all e n d s in systematic connection (a whole of both rational beings as e n d s in themselves a n d also of the particular e n d s which each may set for h i m s e l f ) . " Let us be clear a b o u t o u r result so far. M a n as a rational b e i n g possesses autonomy, t h e capacity to legislate his o w n freedom. As such h e belongs to the c o m m u n i t y of all such legislators, the "kingd o m of e n d s " in its first, clear a n d unequivocal sense of a comm u n i t y of wills, in which all, by virtue of their c o m m o n reason, stand as ends-in-themselves in relation to o n e a n o t h e r . B u t since n o t all rational wills are pure rational wills, i.e., not every intelligence is a n intellectus archetypus a n d n o t every will is a holy will, t h e intentions which these imperfect, finite legislators r e q u i r e m u s t be actualized by exertion in t h e world of sense. T h a t occasions uncertainty. Moreover, as finite, these legislators also find themselves s a d d l e d — " b u r d e n e d " is Kant's p r e f e r e d t e r m — w i t h actual needs. Since m e m b e r s h i p in the k i n g d o m of e n d s p r e c l u d e s exploiting o t h e r s as m e a n s merely a n d since t h e prospect of actualizing one's legislations m u s t be c o n t i n g e n t u p o n their toleration a n d may be c o n t i n g e n t o n their assistance, t h a t occasions some risk. B u t if any goal can b e actualized, any result achieved within these b i n d i n g constraints, t h a t result belongs, as well, within t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " T h e latter now becomes a n e x p a n d e d concept: n o t merely a c o m m u n i t y of wills b u t this c o m m u n i t y t o g e t h e r with all its legitimate achievements. 62

T h i s e x p a n d e d c o n c e p t of a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " was a n "intelligible world," a " m o r a l world" which Kant called t h e "highest g o o d . " As such, K a n t m a i n t a i n e d in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, it was "certainly only a n i d e a l . " T h e point is, this would be t h e world were t h e rational agents in t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s " capable of the powers of actualization of a n intellectus archetypus. T h e issue t h a t r e m a i n s is: given t h e limitations of h u m a n nat u r e ("finitude"), what becomes of t h e notion of this e x p a n d e d " k i n g d o m of ends"? B u t t h a t is n o l o n g e r a question of p u r e rationality. T h a t is a question of m a n in his full complexity as sensual as well as rational. T h a t is a q u e s t i o n of being-in-the-world. 6 3

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The "Kingdom of Ends" As the "Ectypal World" T h e crucial question for a finite rational b e i n g is how to conceive it possible to act as a legislator in t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s , " which is its rational right, w h e n it finds itself, as its n a t u r a l condition, in a world of sense g o v e r n e d by n a t u r a l laws. T h e p r o b l e m is o n e of t h e t r a n scendental applicability of t h e p u r e law of practical r e a s o n in t h e c o n c r e t e case of a finite rational being. "A k i n g d o m of e n d s is possible only o n t h e analogy of a k i n g d o m of n a t u r e , " K a n t w r o t e . T h a t is t h e p r o b l e m of "practical j u d g m e n t . " I n analogy to the First Critique, we may t e r m it t h e p r o b l e m of " s c h e m a t i s m " — K a n t ' s discussion of t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s " in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals b e c o m e s a discussion of t h e "typic of practical j u d g m e n t " in t h e Critique of Practical Reason. T h a t transition is m a d e m o r e intelligible by his discussion of "ectypal n a t u r e " earlier in t h e "Analytic." Kant i n t r o d u c e d t h e n o tion of "ectypal n a t u r e " in a discussion of t h e possibility of a t r a n scendental d e d u c t i o n of p u r e practical r e a s o n . T h e question, in analogy to t h a t of t h e First Critique, is w h a t w a r r a n t p u r e reason may have to legislate over given actuality. B u t t h e situation is by n o m e a n s so strained as in t h e First Critique, for while t h e r e t h e radical alienness of m a t t e r given in sensation ("actuality without validity") c o n f r o n t e d p u r e r e a s o n , h e r e it is instead " n a t u r e " as p h e n o m e n a o r d e r e d a n d constituted by r e a s o n cognitively according to law. While a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " r e q u i r e s the law of f r e e d o m , t h e kingd o m of n a t u r e is b o u n d by mechanical laws of causality; n e v e r t h e less, t h e feature they s h a r e is precisely lawfulness, t h e authority of r e a s o n . It is, t h e n , simply a m a t t e r of finding a m o d e of r e a d i n g t h e lawfulness of o n e sort into t h e lawfulness of t h e o t h e r . 65

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Already in t h e Grounding, K a n t recognized t h e striking conv e r g e n c e of m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d teleological j u d g m e n t in this context: "Teleology considers n a t u r e as a k i n g d o m of e n d s ; morals r e g a r d s a possible k i n g d o m of e n d s as a k i n g d o m of n a t u r e . In t h e f o r m e r t h e k i n g d o m of e n d s is a theoretical idea for e x p l a i n i n g w h a t exists. I n t h e latter it is a practical idea for b r i n g i n g a b o u t w h a t d o e s n o t exist b u t can b e m a d e actual by o u r c o n d u c t , i.e., what can b e actualized in a c c o r d a n c e with this very i d e a . " We have considered t h e q u e s t i o n of teleology as a n e x a m i n a t i o n of n a t u r a l p u r pose. W h a t we m u s t n o w see is h o w it serves as a vehicle for c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t h e c o m p l e x "schematization" of practical reason. 67

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t h e laws of t h e possible o n e . " T h i s [moral] law gives to t h e sensible world, as s e n s u o u s n a t u r e (as this concerns rational beings), the form of a n intelligible world, i.e., t h e form of s u p e r s e n s u o u s n a t u r e , w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r i n g with t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e f o r m e r . " T h e p r e s u m p t i o n is t h a t t h e n a t u r a l world can a c c o m m o d a t e this at least in s o m e m e a s u r e . T h a t is j u s t w h a t is at stake in t h e discussion of "ectypal n a t u r e . " T h e idea of a " s u p e r s e n s u o u s n a t u r e " refers back to t h e mundus intelligibilis of t h e First Critique a n d to the "moral world" as a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " in t h e e x p a n d e d sense in t h e Grounding. It is t h e world as n o u m e n a l , which is not accessible to h u m a n cognition. B u t it is also conceivable in t e r m s of a shift in optics from w h a t is to w h a t o u g h t to be. Reason, even finite h u m a n reason, can readily e n o u g h conceive of a j u s t world, even in its absence. For Kant, such a j u s t world would d r a w its material from t h e n a t u r a l world, b u t it would be f o r m e d by t h e ideal, m o r a l world: " s u p e r s e n suous n a t u r e , so far as we can form a concept of it, is n o t h i n g else t h a n n a t u r e u n d e r the a u t o n o m y of p u r e practical reason. T h e law of this a u t o n o m y is t h e m o r a l law, a n d it, t h e r e f o r e , is t h e fundam e n t a l law of supersensible n a t u r e a n d of a p u r e world of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h i s is natura archetypa, t h e world we can know only by r e a s o n , a n intelligible world. B u t its " c o u n t e r p a r t m u s t exist in t h e world of sense without interfering with the laws of t h e l a t t e r . . . [this] could b e called t h e ectypal world (natura ectypa), because it contains t h e possible effects of t h e idea of t h e f o r m e r [natural archetypa] as t h e d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d of t h e w i l l . " I n t h e "Typic," K a n t picks u p this very a r g u m e n t : "we a r e t h e r e f o r e allowed to use t h e n a t u r e of t h e s e n s u o u s world as t h e type of a n intelligible n a t u r e . " I n t h e "Typic" Kant offered a careful t r a n s c e n d e n t a l justification of this p r o c e e d i n g . T h e p r o b l e m of t h e "Typic" was p a r t of t h e g e n e r a l p r o b l e m of "hypotyposis"—of finding in t h e world of sensible intuition correlates for t h e concepts of r e a s o n . I n t h e s p h e r e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sensible intuition, t h e hypotyposis o c c u r r e d t h r o u g h s c h e m a t i s m in a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , a n d t h e result was n a t u r a l law a n d n a t u r e as existence (actuality) u n d e r this law. In the case of t h e p u r e ideas of reason, t h e p r o b l e m of t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung) was e x t r e m e , a n d K a n t clarified it only in his theory of symbolism in t h e Third Critique. B u t in t h e case of applied ideas of r e a s o n , i.e., m o r a l j u d g m e n t s as imperatives, t h e hypotyposis was a c c o m p l i s h e d by t h e m e d i a t i o n of a postulated law of n a t u r e . As K a n t p u t it, " n a t u r a l law serves only as the type of a law of freed o m . " Because n a t u r e is lawful cognitively (for t h e u n d e r s t a n d ing), " r e a s o n has a right, a n d is e v e n compelled, to use n a t u r e (in its 68

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p u r e intellible form) as t h e type of j u d g m e n t . " T h e w a r r a n t or right lies in lawfulness as such, t h e m a r k of r e a s o n in general: "laws as such a r e all equivalent [as rational], regardless of w h e n c e [which faculty] they derive their d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d s . " B u t having established how it was possible did not of itself establish that it was completely actual or even t h a t it would be completely actualized. T o the e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e was a n obligation to actualize this ideal world, s o m e serious p r o b l e m s arose, in Kant's view. Kant's " k i n g d o m of e n d s , " in its e x p a n d e d sense, entailed t h e actualization of t h e "highest g o o d . " "For, in fact, t h e m o r a l law ideally transfers us into a n a t u r e in which reason would b r i n g forth the highest g o o d w e r e it a c c o m p a n i e d by sufficient physical capacities; a n d it d e t e r m i n e s o u r will to i m p a r t to t h e s e n s u o u s world the form of a system of rational b e i n g s . " We m u s t p l u n g e , at last, into the controversy over t h e n a t u r e a n d necessity of Kant's n o t i o n of the "highest good." 7 4

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T H E UNITY OF MANKIND: T H E HIGHEST GOOD, HISTORY, AND RELIGION

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h e viability of m a n ' s m o r a l p u r p o s e in t h e world of sense is, as I have a r g u e d , t h e most salient t h e m e of Kant's Third Critique in its final form. H e e n u n c i a t e d this t h e m e in §ii of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n . H e closed the work with it in t h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in t h e discussion of "moral teleology." T h e issue for " m o r a l teleology" is t h e reconciliation of n a t u r e as it is with n a t u r e as it o u g h t to be if we a r e to be effective free a g e n t s : "[M]oral teleology concerns us as beings of t h e world, a n d t h e r e f o r e as beings b o u n d u p with o t h e r things in the w o r l d . . . [and] has to d o with the r e f e r e n c e of o u r o w n causality to p u r poses a n d even to a final p u r p o s e t h a t we m u s t aim at in t h e world . . . a n d t h e e x t e r n a l possibility of its a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . " T h e m o r a l law which is t h e g r o u n d of o u r f r e e d o m c o m m a n d s t h a t f r e e d o m act in t h e world to realize justice. "Moral teleology" involves the p r o b l e m of t h a t realization, t h e highly controversial idea of the "highest g o o d " in Kant's e t h i c s . I n t h e preface to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone h e stated it with great clarity: 1

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It c a n n o t b e a m a t t e r of u n c o n c e r n to morality as to w h e t h e r o r n o t it forms for itself the c o n c e p t of a final e n d of all things ( h a r m o n y with which, while not multiplying m e n ' s duties, yet provides t h e m with a special point of focus for the unification of all e n d s ) ; for only t h e r e b y can objective, practical reality b e given to t h e u n i o n of t h e purposiveness arising from f r e e d o m with t h e purposiveness of n a t u r e , a u n i o n with which we cann o t possibly d i s p e n s e . 4

As J o h n Silber notes, Kant claimed reason's task was to achieve t h e unity of t h e g o o d . T o d o so K a n t n e e d e d to e x t e n d his analysis of ethics from m a n as a merely rational b e i n g to m a n as a rational a n d 5

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a sensible b e i n g at o n c e . G r a n t e d t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e good, i.e., two forms of t h e g o o d which m a n m u s t recognize a n d integrate into his practice as a finite rational being, t h e n t h e idea of t h e "highest g o o d " as " i m m a n e n t " b e c o m e s intelligible within Kant's m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h e "schematization" of t h e m o r a l law in actuality can b e rationally r e c o g n i z e d by t h e subject as t h e project of p r o m o t i n g t h e highest g o o d in t h e w o r l d . I n this way Kant in Religion, for exa m p l e , writes of " t h e synthetic e n l a r g e m e n t of t h e concept of t h e law t a k i n g place t h r o u g h [reference to] t h e n a t u r a l character of m a n as a b e i n g of n e e d s w h o c a n n o t be indifferent to t h e results of his a c t i o n s . " O n a c o h e r e n t r e a d i n g , K a n t never i n t e n d e d to claim that t h e h i g h e s t g o o d constituted t h e d u t y i m p o s e d by t h e m o r a l law, b u t only t h a t it specified it in actuality, a n d t h a t as a m o r a l ideal it could b e k n o w n a priori. K a n t r e q u i r e s t h e "schematization," i.e., actual a p plication of p u r e m o r a l law in t h e world of sense by a finite rational b e i n g with objective n e e d s . T h e r e f o r e h e conceives of " e n d s (results) which a r e duties," a n d f u r t h e r of t h e entire set of such e n d s — for each individual a n d for m a n k i n d as a w h o l e — a s a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " a n d as a "highest g o o d . " Beck writes t h a t "the m o r a l will m u s t have a n object as well as a form, a n d , because of t h e finite a n d sensible n a t u r e of m a n , t h e c o n c e p t of t h e possiblity of t h e highest g o o d is necessary to the m o r a l disposition, b u t n o t to t h e definition of d u t y . " Still, Beck rejects this a r g u m e n t as " h e t e r o n o m y , " the sullying of p u r e m o r a l will with "all-too-human" e n d s . It is h a r d to see how Beck can u p h o l d his position without a r r o g a t i n g t h e good e n tirely to t h e p u r e will. T h a t r e d u c e s K a n t to Stoicism, which h e could n e v e r have accepted. Moreover, t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e g o o d is g r o u n d e d in t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of h u m a n n a t u r e . Man's m i x e d n a t u r e i n t r u d e s equally in t h e discursiveness of cognition. Beck d o e s n o t by that t o k e n d e n y t h e efficacy of p u r e reason in actual h u m a n cognition. T h a t m a n is n o t a n intellectus archetypus is ind e e d a pity, b u t it d o e s n o t p r e v e n t h i m from m a k i n g actual cognitive j u d g m e n t s in which p u r e r e a s o n constitutes (legislatively d e t e r m i n e s ) n a t u r e without losing any of its rational character. S c h e m a t i s m is certainly involved in this synthetic (ampliative) j u d g m e n t . T h a t m a n is n o t a holy will is also a pity, for such a holy will, p r e s u m a b l y because it is a n intellectus archetypus, would a u t o matically actualize all its m o r a l intentions a n d t h e r e would arise for it n o g a p b e t w e e n is a n d o u g h t . B u t t h a t does n o t entail t h a t t h e s a m e p u r e m o r a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n could n o t be a p p l i e d to actuality, 6

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t h a t this application by its very n a t u r e would be synthetic (or ampliative), o r t h a t it would constitute t h e r e b y a morally legitimate object r a t h e r t h a n sully p u r e m o r a l will itself. Beck's " p u r i s m , " while it has s o m e w a r r a n t in Kant's texts, has serious limitations. Mary Zeldin devotes a careful article to t h e defense of Kant's n o t i o n of t h e h i g h e s t g o o d against Beck's c r i t i c i s m s . S h e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e h i g h e s t g o o d is m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n t h e categorical i m p e r a tive, since it is a n ampliative synthetic j u d g m e n t which applies t h a t i m p e r a t i v e to t h e concrete conditions of actuality. "Just as t h e schematized categories c o n t a i n m o r e t h a n t h e ' e m p t y ' p u r e categories," she writes, so d o e s t h e highest g o o d as a synthetic practical j u d g m e n t c o n t a i n m o r e t h a n t h e p u r e m o r a l law as stated in t h e categorical imperative. T h e highest good, she claims, is in fact a " m o r a l ideal" o r goal of p u r p o s i v e action in t h e world of sense. It conceives t h e synthetic totality of all t h e achievements in t h e actual world which a r e compatible with t h e m o r a l law a n d conducive to t h e welfare of m a n k i n d . It r e p r e s e n t s t h a t ampliative, second sense of t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s " which includes n o t only all rational wills b u t all t h e i r legitimate a c h i e v e m e n t s . Allen W o o d m a k e s t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t in Kant's Moral Religion. H e a r g u e s t h a t " t h e r e m u s t b e a systematic unity in which n a t u r a l e n d s , t h e e n d s given by m a n ' s finite n e e d s , can be i n c l u d e d within t h e e n d s of morality, t h e objects of p u r e practical r e a s o n . " I n his a r g u m e n t , W o o d distinguishes between t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d (pure) g o o d a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n e d (schematized) good, associating t h e first with t h e m o r a l law a n d t h e categorical imperative a n d t h e second with t h e c o m p l e t e d actualization of that imperative in t h e world of sense. W o o d a r g u e s t h a t Kant's m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y aims at m o r e t h a n a n analysis of particular m o r a l choices. It carries forward to larger totalities: a c o n c e r n for t h e p e r s o n a n d his virtue, n o t j u s t r i g h t action in a given instance. A p e r s o n is a c o h e r e n t rational b e i n g with a c h a r a c t e r a n d disposition, a b e i n g of intrinsic worth. T h e d e g r e e of t h a t w o r t h is virtue. Virtue is n o t a single right action b u t a whole p a t t e r n of choice a n d t h e g r o u n d i n g disposition b e h i n d it. Finally, W o o d a r g u e s , morality involves n o t simply motives b u t c o n s e q u e n c e s . M e n have actual obligations in t h e world. T h e r e a r e , as K a n t would insist in Metaphysics of Morals (1797), " e n d s which a r e duties." Even to oneself as a n a t u r a l b e i n g such duties obtained, W o o d points o u t , a n d K a n t accepted t h a t position as t h e key to his rejection of S t o i c i s m . 10

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p r e t a t i o n of t h e idea of t h e h i g h e s t g o o d is to be f o u n d in T h o m a s A u x t e r ' s works o n "ectypal n a t u r e . " Particularly fruitful is the distinction A u x t e r i n t r o d u c e s b e t w e e n a n ethic of inclusive e n d s a n d a n ethic of ultimate e n d . While a formalist r e a d i n g (and a fortiori a rigorist one) would take K a n t to u p h o l d a n ethic of ultimate e n d , i.e., t h e e x e c u t i o n of d u t y for duty's sake, t h e r e is sufficient textual evidence, in Auxter's view, to suggest t h a t Kant also wished to u p h o l d t h e idea of a n ethic of inclusive e n d s , a n ethic which h a d as its s u p r e m e principle t h e idea of a m a x i m a l i n t e g r a t i o n of all the specific p u r p o s e s of rational a g e n t s into wholes. Within the individual this signified unity of personality, character, disposition, virtue. B u t this " h a r m o n i o u s o r d e r of h u m a n p u r p o s e s " e x t e n d e d b e y o n d a n y single individual a n d involved a social a n d historical, a species d i m e n s i o n . T h e highest g o o d was, A u x t e r a r g u e s , a "regulative p r i n c i p l e " for t h e expression of this idea of m o r a l p r o g r e s s : " T h e final g o o d is a n inclusive e n d — a life in which we h a r m o n i z e t h e exercise of all n a t u r a l abilities t h r o u g h t h e influence of r e a s o n . " A u x t e r tries to develop a t h e o r y of Kant's "highest g o o d " in this sense a c c o r d i n g to t h e idea of a "teleological c o n v e r g e n c e " in which a "progressive h a r m o n i z a t i o n a n d realization of h u m a n values" (morality as a n inclusive e n d ) substantiates o r actualizes the p u r e m o r a l law (morality as a n ultimate e n d ) . T h e objectification of t h e m o r a l law in t h e world of sense involves t h e actualization of m a n ' s latent capacities, a n d above all t h e q u e s t i o n of m a n ' s effort to achieve a j u s t world. T h i s is a m a t t e r n o t so m u c h of individual c o n d u c t as of interaction a m o n g m o r a l a g e n t s . It is a universal, not a particular m a n d a t e , to be s o u g h t not simply individually b u t collectively. T h e r e f o r e it raises t h e issues of t h e m e a n i n g of history a n d of political-religious c o m m u n i t y , as w e l l . K a n t p u t this in t e r m s of the " k i n g d o m of e n d s " in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals a n d in t e r m s of a "just civil c o m m u n i t y " in " I d e a for a Universal History with C o s m o p o l i t a n I n t e n t , " t h e n r e f o r m u l a t e d it in t e r m s of "ectypal n a t u r e " in t h e Second Critique a n d " m a n u n d e r m o r a l laws" as t h e "final p u r p o s e of c r e a t i o n " in t h e Third Critique. W h a t is most exciting for m o d e r n t h i n k e r s is t h e strictly m o r a l r e a d i n g of t h e "highest g o o d " as t h e e x t e n s i o n of n o u m e n a l l y g r o u n d e d m o r a l law into t h e actual world b e y o n d t h e subject: justice, c o m m u n i t y , history, cosmology, a n d r e ligion. T h e s e issues c a m e to formulation in t h e very last p h a s e of c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique, in early 1790, above all in t h e " M e t h o d o l o g y of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " 1 4

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I n t e r m s of t h e architectonic of t h e work, t h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t " set o u t to e x p l o r e t h e p r o b l e m of relative p u r p o s i v e n e s s in theoretical reflective j u d g m e n t . A "relative" p u r p o s e is t h a t which serves s o m e other, active a n d h e n c e "intrinsic" p u r p o s e . It is t h e r e f o r e "external"; its purposiveness is n o t s o m e t h i n g i n h e r e n t in its o w n essential principle, b u t only serves t h e i n t e n t i o n of s o m e o t h e r entity. It is n o t i n h e r e n t in t h e n a t u r e of cork bark, for instance, t h a t it stop wine bottles. It takes t h e external i n t e r v e n t i o n of m a n to m a k e t h e cork bark purposive in this way. It is t h e n relative to m a n ' s p u r p o s e . It is n o t the p u r p o s e of m a n to p r o v i d e b l o o d for mosquitos. B u t they use h i m anyway. M a n is a relative p u r p o s e for t h e m . Purposiveness in this e x t e r n a l a n d relative sense is n a t u r a l in a world which is p o p u l a t e d by organic forms, i.e., intrinsic p u r p o s e s . M o r e problematic, of course, is t h e n a t u r e of a n intrinsic p u r p o s e itself, a n d w i t h o u t this, relative purposiveness b e c o m e s impossible. A n intrinsic p u r p o s e , o n Kant's r e a d i n g , sets its o w n p u r p o s e s , o r is self-organizing. W h a t e v e r t h e difficulties this n o t i o n poses for t h e categorial d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n a t u r e , K a n t finds it necessary in o r d e r to m a k e sense of certain things in t h e world. 2 0

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All of this is q u i t e familiar. T h e new issue K a n t raises is t h e relative p u r p o s i v e n e s s n o t of particular things in n a t u r e to o t h e r s , b u t of n a t u r e as a whole. If n a t u r e as a whole is to b e a relative p u r p o s e , w h a t intrinsic p u r p o s e is it serving? I n o r d e r to be "ultimate," i.e., serve as t h e p u r p o s e for n a t u r e as a whole, such a n intrinsic p u r pose would n e e d to b e "final," n o t only " o r g a n i z e d " b u t of value in itself (i.e., capable of m o r a l f r e e d o m ) . T h e r e a r e two logical candidates for this status. T h e first is m a n , taken n o t as n a t u r a l b u t as n o u m e n a l . T h e second is G o d , t a k e n n o t as i m m a n e n t b u t as t r a n s c e n d e n t . I n short, to think of n a t u r e in t e r m s of its "ultimate p u r p o s e " we m u s t t h i n k of m a n or of G o d as "final p u r p o s e s , " i.e., as ends-in-themselves, a u t o n o m o u s rational wills. T h e y a r e , as such, u n q u e s t i o n a b l y n o u m e n a l . T h e y are b e y o n d categorial d e t e r m i n a tion. B u t they a r e n o t b e y o n d t h o u g h t . K a n t p r o p o s e s t h a t they b e t h o u g h t t h r o u g h q u i t e rigorously. 22

If we seek within n a t u r e itself for a n "ultimate p u r p o s e , " t h e only c a n d i d a t e is m a n . T o see m a n as n a t u r e ' s ultimate p u r p o s e is to t h i n k h i m "privileged" by n a t u r e . While h e is intrinsically p u r p o sive even as a n a t u r a l o r g a n i c form, h e is by n o m e a n s " n a t u r e ' s dar-

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ling," for h e is as m u c h t h e victim of n a t u r e as h e r b e n e f i c i a r y . While t h e r e a r e certainly occasions in which it a p p e a r s to h i m as t h o u g h t h e e n t i r e world is t h e r e for his sake, t h e r e a r e o t h e r s in which, as with t h e m o s q u i t o s , it seems t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d . As n a t u r a l p u r p o s e , m a n seeks to maximize his " h a p p i n e s s . " U n f o r t u nately for h i m , " h a p p i n e s s " is a c h i m e r a . It is a n o m i n a l , not a real universal. It c a n n o t b e specified concretely, because it is i n d e t e r m i n a t e , shifting n o t only b e t w e e n h u m a n subjects b u t even for each h u m a n subject. It is nevertheless a n inevitable result of o u r m a t e rial subjectivity. N o t only will it necessarily exist; it will necessarily exact practical a c k n o w l e d g m e n t . T h e claim of " h a p p i n e s s " cann o t b e e x t i r p a t e d a n y m o r e t h a n it can b e satiated. B u t if t h a t w e r e n o t b a d e n o u g h , n a t u r e h a r d l y seems driven to a c c o m m o d a t e h i m anyway. W h a t d o e s n a t u r e d o for m a n , t h e n , if n o t p r o v i d e h i m " h a p p i ness"? K a n t answers this q u e s t i o n in t h r e e distinct veins. First, most notoriously, n a t u r e challenges his skill, a n d t h e r e w i t h forces h i m to d e v e l o p his talents in o r d e r to survive a n d p r o s p e r in t h e w o r l d . N a t u r e proves p u r p o s i v e for m a n in j u s t t h e m e a s u r e t h a t she r e sists his ease a n d comfort, forcing h i m to exert himself to d o m i n a t e h e r a n d extract from h e r t h a t q u o t i e n t of " h a p p i n e s s " h e restlessly a n d vainly p u r s u e s . T h i s is p u t most bluntly in Kant's essay of 1784, " I d e a for a Universal History with C o s m o p o l i t a n I n t e n t " : 23

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T h a n k s a r e d u e to n a t u r e for [man's] q u a r r e l s o m e n e s s , his enviously competitive vanity, a n d for his insatiable desire to possess o r to rule, for w i t h o u t t h e m all t h e excellent n a t u r a l faculties of m a n k i n d w o u l d forever r e m a i n u n d e v e l o p e d . M a n wants c o n c o r d b u t n a t u r e knows better w h a t is g o o d for his kind; n a t u r e wants discord. M a n wants to live comfortably a n d pleasurably b u t n a t u r e i n t e n d s t h a t h e s h o u l d raise himself o u t of lethargy a n d inactive c o n t e n t m e n t into work a n d t r o u b l e a n d t h e n h e s h o u l d find m e a n s of extricating himself adroitly from these l a t t e r . 27

T h i s is t h e f o u n d a t i o n of Kant's philosophy of history a n d politics— a very stark, H o b b e s i a n f o u n d a t i o n , however Rousseauist t h e solution h e believes will eventually s u p e r v e n e . T h e s e c o n d provision of n a t u r e is to cultivate his taste. In this disciplining of taste, schooling m a n ' s gratification away from coarse a p p e t i t e a n d elevating it to m o r e u r b a n e a n d dispassionate d e lights, K a n t finds t h e c o n n e c t i o n between b e a u t y a n d morality, t h e principle of "aesthetic e d u c a t i o n , " as Schiller would soon p u t i t . 28

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O n c e again, however, this strictly n a t u r a l cultivation, while it is less s t r e n u o u s a n d privative t h a n t h e first, does n o t satisfy m a n ' s n a t u r a l craving for h a p p i n e s s . It merely sublimates it a bit. Desire is d e flected from its original o b j e c t s . T h a t is p r o g r e s s , to b e s u r e , b u t n o t o n t h e s t a n d a r d of m a n ' s n a t u r a l i m p u l s e . N a t u r e is inadvertently at t h e service of s o m e t h i n g u n n a t u r a l . It is satisfying to m a n ' s rationality, b o t h cognitive a n d practical. T h e beautiful a n d t h e sublime reinforce m a n ' s awareness of these " n o u m e n a l " e l e m e n t s in his " n a t u r e . " A n d t h a t awareness, o r r a t h e r t h e stimulation to such reflection, is t h e t h i r d distinct a n d i m p o r t a n t p u r p o s e n a t u r e serves for m a n . N a t u r e occasions reflection, t h r o u g h its o r d e r , a b o u t its ultim a t e p u r p o s e a n d h e n c e m a n ' s o w n intrinsic p u r p o s e , a n d helps b r i n g m a n to t h e crucial recognition of his f r e e d o m . A n ultimate p u r p o s e w o u l d have to be a final (intrinsic) p u r p o s e . B u t m a n is a final p u r p o s e , a c c o r d i n g to Kant, n o t as n a t u r a l , b u t as m o r a l . T h u s n a t u r e is p u r p o s i v e for m a n precisely in m a k i n g m a n ask after his o w n final p u r p o s e . I n all t h r e e of t h e s e services, n a t u r e m a k e s m a n b e t t e r able to b e w h a t h e already is: a free w i l l . T h e discussion in §83 of t h e Third Critique reformulates t h e p h i l o s o p h y of history which K a n t h a d first sketched in " I d e a for a Universal H i s t o r y . " K a n t raised t h e issue t h e r e : Did history m a k e sense? W h a t a historian h a d to d o , h e asserted, was " a t t e m p t to discover a n e n d of n a t u r e in this senseless m a r c h of h u m a n e v e n t s . " Accordingly, t h e p h i l o s o p h e r of history h a d to posit "teleology" in n a t u r e , since conjectures a b o u t historical c o h e r e n c e r e q u i r e d a d e t e r m i n a t e " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e of m a n . " K a n t asserted as his first p r i n ciple: "All n a t u r a l faculties of a c r e a t u r e a r e destined to unfold completely a n d a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r e n d [Zweck]." 29

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T h e i n c o n g r u o u s a n d d o g m a t i c c h a r a c t e r of Kant's use of "nat u r e " in this work has occasioned a g r e a t deal of c o m m e n t . N a t u r e in t h e s e p h r a s e s can only have signified God's providential design for t h e world. T h a t K a n t did n o t write " P r o v i d e n c e " may be simply a q u e s t i o n of stylistic grace a n d c o m m o n usage. T h i s was a p o p u l a r essay. B u t t h e r e a r e two o t h e r possibilities. First, K a n t may n o t have felt comfortable p u b l i s h i n g his w o r k o n history "with cosmopolitan i n t e n t " in s u c h unequivocally religious garb, especially as it was to a p p e a r in t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift, o n e of t h e most aggressive of t h e secularizing-rationalist j o u r n a l s of t h e period. B u t second, a n d m o r e plausibly, Kant m a y have m e a n t his r e a d e r s to b e struck by t h e e x t r a v a g a n c e of t h e personification of n a t u r e . A d e e p e r literary t r o p e m a y h a v e u n d e r l a i n t h e m o r e obvious o n e : irony directed at 3 4

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p r o p o n e n t s of a n i m m a n e n t n a t u r a l destiny of m a n — a view very p o p u l a r in intellectual circles in G e r m a n y associated with H e r d e r , t h e first v o l u m e of w h o s e Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit was a p p e a r i n g almost simultaneously with the essay, a n d w h o m K a n t was a b o u t to attack in a series of h a r s h r e v i e w s . In short, h e r e again t h e controversy with H e r d e r proves essential to t h e Third Critique. T h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n Kant a n d H e r d e r over t h e m e a n i n g of history a n d t h e p r o p e r relation between nat u r e a n d c u l t u r e was o n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t events in t h e literary life of G e r m a n y in t h e last years of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. It b r o u g h t to a climax t h e whole extensive discussion of the philo s o p h y of history which was o n e of t h e most lively aspects of A u f k l ä r u n g . It would b r i n g forward even m o r e i m p o r t a n t speculation a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of history, that of t h e G e r m a n Idealists a n d Karl M a r x . Yet t h e r e is interesting evidence that as h e comp o s e d t h e Third Critique, K a n t b e g a n a shift in his historical thinking, p e r h a p s influenced by t h e events taking place simultaneously in F r a n c e , which m o v e d h i m away from his harshly Hobbesian orie n t a t i o n a n d closer, if n o t to H e r d e r , t h e n to t h a t g e n e r a t i o n which inherited Herder's a g e n d a . I n any event, with t h e p r e m i s e of Providence in h a n d , t h e essay of 1784 p r o c e e d e d to claim a crucial second principle: t h e n a t u r a l p u r p o s e of m a n could n o t b e realized by t h e individual b u t only by t h e species. "Every m a n w o u l d have to live excessively l o n g in o r d e r to l e a r n h o w to m a k e full use of all his faculties." T h i s was because those faculties w e r e g r o u n d e d in reason, which h a d to progress by l e a r n i n g — t h r o u g h "trials, e x p e r i e n c e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n " — a n d which recognized n o b o u n d a r y o r limit in its "capacity to e n l a r g e t h e rules a n d p u r p o s e s of t h e use of his resources." Not only did this result in t h e discomfiture of particular individuals, b u t all those transitional g e n e r a t i o n s which slowly wove t h e rich fabric of h u m a n realization would themselves be d e n i e d t h e full fruits of t h e i r labor. K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t "it r e m a i n s p e r p l e x i n g that earlier g e n e r a t i o n s s e e m to d o t h e i r laborious work for t h e sake of later g e n e r a t i o n s . . . [but, h e c o n c l u d e d ] however mysterious this may b e , it is nevertheless n e c e s s a r y . " K a n t c o n c e d e d t h a t at t h e level of t h e i n d i v i d u a l — a n d p e r h a p s even for t h e whole of t h e transition— "Rousseau was n o t so very w r o n g w h e n h e p r e f e r r e d t h e condition of s a v a g e s . " B u t K a n t insisted that Rousseau was nevertheless w r o n g , for it was n o t t h e individual b u t t h e species, a n d i n d e e d , t h e u l t i m a t e destiny of t h e species, t h a t h a d to serve as c r i t e r i o n . 35

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Kant's t h i r d principle replied t h a t it was by t h r o w i n g m a n u p o n his o w n devices: " N a t u r e seems to have delighted in t h e greatest parsimony; s h e seems to have barely p r o v i d e d m a n ' s a n i m a l e q u i p m e n t a n d limited it to t h e most u r g e n t n e e d s of a b e g i n n i n g existence, as if n a t u r e i n t e n d e d t h a t m a n s h o u l d owe all to himself." By d e n y i n g h i m a d e t e r m i n a t e physical a d v a n t a g e in t h e struggle for survival, n a t u r e c o n s i g n e d m a n to his latent faculties— r e a s o n a n d free will. T h i s deviousness of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e , this "invisible h a n d " o r " c u n n i n g of n a t u r e , " d i d n o t halt at t h e physical e n d o w m e n t s of m a n . Kant's f o u r t h principle took u p Rousseau's gravest strictures a n d r e a d t h e m in a n ironically constructive light. K a n t saw in Rousseau's amour propre n o t merely m o r a l viciousness b u t social productivity. N a t u r e used " t h e a n t a g o n i s m of m e n in society," t h e i r "asocial sociability," as t h e device for species progress. M a n , "impelled by vainglory, ambition a n d avarice, . . . seeks to achieve a s t a n d i n g a m o n g his f e l l o w s . " "Private vice c o n d u c e s to public virtue." H e r e was t h e g r e a t r e lief t h a t political e c o n o m y offered t h e anxious moralists of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. C o m p e t i t i o n , with its e n f o r c e m e n t n o t only of labor b u t of p r u d e n c e u n d e r t h e rubric of "interest," offered n o t only a n o r d e r , b u t a p r o s p e c t of " i m p r o v e m e n t . " T o be sure, n o a p p e a l was m a d e to virtue, which seemed, in a n y event, too weak to weld society together. It was i n a p p r o p r i a t e in a h a r d h e a d e d , n a t u ralistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h u m a n b e h a v i o r . I n t h e 1780s, Kant r e a d t h e history at least of t h e past o n such a strictly mechanistic, naturalistic, i n d e e d H o b b e s i a n l i n e . K a n t was willing to c o u n t e n a n c e n o t m e r e l y t h e loss of h a p p i n e s s , b u t even t h a t a m o r a l — i n d e e d i m m o r a l — a g g r e s s i o n , for t h e sake of t h e p r o g r e s s it h a d achieved. T h r o u g h competition, relentless p u r s u i t of p e r s o n a l interest, "all m a n ' s talents a r e gradually u n f o l d e d , taste is developed . . . t h e basis is laid for a f r a m e of m i n d which, in t h e course of time, t r a n s f o r m s t h e raw n a t u r a l faculty of m o r a l discrimination into definite practical principles." K a n t f o u n d t h e justification for these "unlovely" m e a n s in t h e e n d : "a pathologically enforced coordination of society finally t r a n s f o r m s it into a moral w h o l e . " T h e difficulty of such a project was n o t lost o n h i m . " M a n is a n animal w h o , if h e lives a m o n g o t h e r s of his kind, needs a master, for m a n certainly misuses his f r e e d o m in r e g a r d to o t h e r s of his k i n d . . . M a n t h e r e fore needs a m a s t e r w h o can b r e a k m a n ' s will a n d c o m p e l h i m to obey a g e n e r a l will u n d e r which every m a n could be f r e e . " T h e final t e r m s a r e Rousseau's, b u t w i t h o u t Rousseau's h u m a n s with a n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t of g o o d . I n d e e d , K a n t articulates far m o r e 42

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clearly t h e s t a u n c h L u t h e r a n conviction of m a n ' s baser n a t u r e a n d t h e n e e d for a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n state to control i t . Kant's dim view of " b r u t e n a t u r e " in m a n lies at t h e c o r e of his philosophy of history. A n i m a l s i n d e e d , m e n w e r e schooled by their very "asocial sociability" to a n a t t i t u d e a l t o g e t h e r inconsistent with a "moral w h o l e . " K a n t c o m m e n t e d : " T h e task involved is t h e r e f o r e most difficult; i n d e e d , a c o m p l e t e solution is impossible. O n e c a n n o t fashion s o m e t h i n g absolutely straight from wood which is as crooked as t h a t of which m a n is m a d e . " N o , a n d still less if one's whole conc e p t i o n of " p r o g r e s s " is a w a r p i n g of t h a t wood o n a n a l t o g e t h e r different line! K a n t characterized m a n ' s "final p u r p o s e " (Endzweck), "the h i g h e s t task n a t u r e has set m a n k i n d , " as a " m o r a l whole," "a completely just civic constitution." T h i s was t h e most difficult p r o b l e m m a n k i n d h a d to solve; nevertheless K a n t believed it was also t h e c u r r e n t p r o b l e m , or, in short, t h a t " t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of a civil society which administers law generally" was t h e task to which t h e "age of e n l i g h t e n m e n t " h a d t u r n e d . Yet it is n o t at all to be seen h o w a "pathologically enforced c o o r d i n a t i o n of society finally t r a n s forms it into a moral w h o l e . " K a n t wrote: "great experience in m a n y activities a n d a. good will which is p r e p a r e d to accept such a constitution a r e all r e q u i r e d . " W h e n c e would they have come? H o w should they prevail? It was to e v a d e t h e e m b a r r a s s m e n t of this p r o b l e m that K a n t r e f o r m u l a t e d t h e q u e s t i o n in §83 of t h e Third Critique. K a n t shifted from a view of history as p r o g r e s s i n g according to s o m e mechanical n a t u r a l law, to o n e of history as a voluntary project of h u m a n m o r a l realization. N a t u r e still h a d a tutelary role to play, b u t Kant, in t h e context of his pervasive purposiveness in t h e Third Critique, clearly assigned to voluntarism a n d p u r p o s e a g o o d deal m o r e responsibility in t h e fabric of history. T h e r e were still e n o r m o u s p r o b l e m s of transition a n d m e d i a t i o n , b u t K a n t p r o p o s e d a whole new principle for history with this shift. History b e c a m e a r e a l m between n a t u r e a n d f r e e d o m : t h e r e c o r d of t h e interventions of f r e e d o m in t h e world of m e c h a n i c a l causality a n d t h e string of t h e i r consequences ( i n t e n d e d a n d u n i n t e n d e d ) . Moreover, reason's intervention d i d n o t c o m e only at t h e e n d (or at t h e p r e s e n t , " E n l i g h t e n e d " t u r n i n g point, t h o u g h t h a t c o n t i n u e d to have a decisive role to play in Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history). Reason i n t e r v e n e d from t h e origin of t h e species. I n " M u t h m a ß l i c h e r A n f a n g d e r Menschengeschichte," K a n t h a d t a k e n u p this issue, d r a w i n g o n Rousseau (and d i s p u t i n g H e r d e r ' s use of Genesis). H e traced t h e n a t u r a l ("pragmatic" o r 5 0

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"technical") interventions of r e a s o n in h u m a n fate p r i o r t o t h e moral i n t e r v e n t i o n . At t h e s a m e t i m e h e e l a b o r a t e d o n n a t u r e ' s int e r v e n t i o n in h u m a n affairs, t h w a r t i n g , t e m p t i n g , cajoling, struct u r i n g . T h e dialectic of history, in this new formulation, p r o v e d far m o r e intricate. Kant's m o d e l of history started from t h e p r e m i s e t h a t n a t u r e was n o t s p o n t a n e o u s l y m o r a l b u t could b e c h a n g e d by h u m a n praxis. At t h e s a m e time, n a t u r e did act in ways t h a t stimulated t h e e m e r g e n c e of h u m a n praxis as this m o r a l transfiguration. It T h r o u g h discipline a n d schooled m a n in his o w n f r e e d o m . cultivation, n a t u r e p r i m e d m a n ' s n a t u r a l capacities a n d evoked rational reflection a n d t h e realization of m a n ' s f u n d a m e n t a l p o w e r to seize control of his o w n fate. T h i s decisive t u r n i n g p o i n t in universal history K a n t identified with E n l i g h t e n m e n t . T h a t was t h e m o m e n t w h e n n a t u r e s u r r e n d e r e d control of t h e h u m a n project a n d left t h e b a l a n c e of history in the h a n d s of f r e e d o m . Prospective history would, in a Kantian frame, p r o c e e d u n d e r t h e self-conscious a n d voluntary ideal of a perfection of the world a c c o r d i n g to m o r a l laws: t h e p u r s u i t of t h e "highest g o o d . " T h e vehicles for this p u r s u i t in history would be t h e political c o m m u n i t y o r state o n t h e level of legality—the "civil c o m m u n i t y " to which K a n t devoted a great deal of a t t e n t i o n in his writings o n history a n d especially o n t h e philosop h y of r i g h t — a n d t h e "ethical c o m m u n i t y " which f o u n d its institutional e m b o d i m e n t in religion, b u t its philosophical essence in the " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " 54

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T h e s e ideas, i n t i m a t e d in §83 of the Third Critique, b e c a m e t h e major focus of Kant's a t t e n t i o n in t h e s u b s e q u e n t d e c a d e , stimulated n o d o u b t by t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . H u m a n action t r a n s figuring t h e world from t h e d e t e r m i n i s m which characterized t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r into a n o r d e r of f r e e d o m , Y i r m i a h u Yovel a r g u e s , is Kant's richest sense of t h e h i g h e s t good. It is n o t h i n g less t h a n " t h e regulative idea of history," a c c o r d i n g to Y o v e l . For h i m , Kant's c o n c e p t of t h e highest g o o d only comes fully into its o w n at this communal-collective level. It is as a species interest t h a t t h e highest good m a k e s sense in Kant's system of philosophy. It is t h e ideal acc o r d i n g to which rational, i.e., voluntary history as a work of h u m a n f r e e d o m , p r o c e e d s . " T h e work of m o r a l history is to o v e r c o m e t h e alienness of n a t u r e by i m p r i n t i n g h u m a n p a t t e r n s a n d e n d s u p o n i t . " T h e l a n g u a g e Yovel uses is strikingly—and a p p r o p r i a t e l y — H e g e l o - M a r x i a n . B u t it is also K a n t i a n : "we have to create a 'second n a t u r e ' which exhibits m o r a l i d e a s . " T h e task of m o r a l history is t o t r a n s f o r m t h e empirically given into a h u m a n p u r p o s e , to objec58

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tify morality. " K a n t m a k e s this idea of s u b d u i n g n a t u r e a n d r e s h a p i n g it in a c c o r d a n c e with h u m a n r e a s o n t h e principle of critical h i s t o r y . " T h i s "can only b e c r e a t e d by a cumulative a n d c o o p e r a tive effort of h u m a n i t y . " I n religious l a n g u a g e , what K a n t saw as t h e project of m o r a l history was t h e creation of the " k i n g d o m of God on earth." K a n t wished to use this d i m e n s i o n of t h e c o n c e p t also as a t r a n sition to theology. G. E. Michaelson notes that t h e r e was a shift, in t h e Religion, from a political to a religious conception of the "ethical c o m m u n i t y " to be associated with t h e "highest g o o d " in t h e w o r l d . W o o d , t o o , a r g u e s t h a t t h e ultimate sense of Kant's " k i n g d o m of e n d s " m u s t be t h a t of t h e " K i n g d o m of G o d o n e a r t h . " T h i s position is reinforced by Michel D e s p l a n d , w h o a r g u e s for t h e centrality of a Christian eschatology in Kant's philosophy of h i s t o r y . Yet Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history e n d e d in failure, even his most careful expositors t e n d to c o n c l u d e . Rather, his t h o u g h t has s e e m e d to be m o r e c o h e r e n t as political theory, because essentially it is t h r o u g h his timeless m o r a l t h e o r y that h e most richly a n d powerfully e n dows social t h e o r y with a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e . T h u s , critics of his a p p r o a c h to history a n d teleology nevertheless find in his theory of political r i g h t s t r o n g stimulus to t h o u g h t . Still, in essaying t h e integ r a t i o n of morality with teleology in historical time, K a n t c a m e to grips with g r e a t questions of t h e h u m a n state, a n d accorded t h e m dignity as p a r t of t h e r e a l m of philosophy. T h e Third Critique is recognized as t h e crucial text for t h e found a t i o n of this historical, political, a n d religious philosophy in Kant, yet h e offers t h e r e a r e m a r k a b l y c o m p r e s s e d account of these areas, with t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e theological aspect of religion. It is m o r e t h e case t h a t t h e Third Critique clears t h e g r o u n d for t h e work in these fields which would occupy Kant extensively in t h e 1790s t h a n t h a t it actually accomplishes m u c h of that work. It is the vehicle for accessing such questions, a t h r e s h o l d before t h e rich fields of social a n d cultural philosophy. T h e s i m u l t a n e o u s i m p a c t of t h e F r e n c h Revolution could only have a c c e n t u a t e d this r e o r i e n t a t i o n . Yet t h e very fact of this massive contextual impact, to say n o t h i n g of t h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e rival Idealist school within G e r m a n y in t h a t same d e c a d e , suggests t h a t a c o n t e x t u a l r e a d i n g of Kant's t h o u g h t o n history a n d politics in t h e light of t h e Third Critique would n e e d to b e q u i t e a m b i t i o u s a n d extensive. T h a t is clearly b e y o n d t h e scope of this study. 62

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T h e r e is, however, a contextual point t h a t is g e r m a n e , namely, t h e s t r o n g religious interest t h a t a n i m a t e s t h e Third Critique, grow334

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ing o u t of Kant's struggle with Spinozism, p a n t h e i s m , a n d m a t e rialism. T h e insistence u p o n theism which is so central to t h e "ethical t u r n " of t h e Third Critique, a n d i n d e e d , a n even m o r e determ i n a t e ^ Christian r e a d i n g of t h a t theism, finds s t r o n g expression in t h e final pages of the work. K a n t elaborated extensively u p o n t h e religious d i m e n s i o n of the "highest g o o d " in t h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in o r d e r to buttress his case against the Spinozists. While t h e extraordinarily i m p o r t a n t discussion of history o c c u p i e d only §83, t h e discussion of ethico-theology took u p almost t h e e n t i r e s e g m e n t , § § 8 4 - 9 1 .

"Ethico-theology" in the "Methodology of Teleological

Judgment"

T h e historical issue distracted us from t h e o n g o i n g a r g u m e n t of t h e " M e t h o d o l o g y " a b o u t t h e relative purposiveness of n a t u r e as a whole, a n d t h e relation b e t w e n "ultimate" a n d "final" p u r p o s e s . K a n t c o n t i n u e s t h a t discussion in §84. Only as a morally intrinsic p u r p o s e is m a n a "final p u r p o s e " — o n e which "needs n o o t h e r as condition of its possibility." Because m a n is certain via t h e "fact of p u r e r e a s o n " of his status as m o r a l a n d h e n c e final p u r p o s e , h e can see himself, as a m o r a l entity ( " u n d e r m o r a l laws"), eligible to be t h e "ultimate p u r p o s e " of n a t u r e . 70

N o w we have in t h e world only o n e kind of beings whose causality is teleological, i.e. is directed to p u r p o s e s , a n d is at t h e s a m e t i m e so constituted t h a t t h e law according to which they have to d e t e r m i n e p u r p o s e s for themselves is r e p r e s e n t e d as u n c o n d i t i o n e d a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of n a t u r a l conditions, a n d yet as in itself necessary. T h e b e i n g of this kind is m a n , b u t m a n considered as n o u m e n o n , t h e only n a t u r a l b e i n g in which we can recognize, o n t h e side of its peculiar constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom) a n d also t h e law of causality, t o g e t h e r with t h e object, which this faculty may p r o p o s e to itself as highest p u r p o s e (the highest good in t h e world). 71

H e n e e d s n o f u r t h e r g r o u n d for his o w n f r e e d o m o r for the possibility of his relation to n a t u r e as ultimate p u r p o s e . T h e p r o b l e m lies n o t with t h e possibility of this relation, b u t with its full actualization. M a n is eligible to b e n a t u r e ' s ultimate p u r p o s e . B u t does nat u r e even have a p u r p o s e ? 7 2

While m a n ' s f r e e d o m is a fact, its efficacy in t h e actual world is entirely c o n t i n g e n t u p o n t h e laws of t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r , a n d those The Unity of Mankind

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laws n e e d n o t necessarily accord with his design, however final. I n t h a t m e a s u r e , n a t u r e may n o t b e a consistent o r even a f r e q u e n t "relative p u r p o s e " for m a n . We m i g h t r e f o r m u l a t e Kant's a r g u m e n t as follows. While m a n " u n d e r m o r a l laws" was indubitably a "final p u r p o s e " a n d h e n c e h e could see himself as a possible "ultim a t e p u r p o s e " for n a t u r e , h e could n o t establish himself as its actual "ultimate p u r p o s e , " m u c h less its necessary o n e . H e r e q u i r e d , t h e r e f o r e , a w a r r a n t which would secure this actuality. T h a t is, h e n e e d e d a g u a r a n t e e t h a t t h e "highest g o o d " was possible, for this w o u l d m a k e m a n " u n d e r m o r a l laws" t h e actual ultimate p u r p o s e of n a t u r e . T h e only way this actuality could be w a r r a n t e d , Kant a r g u e d , was for a n o t h e r "final p u r p o s e " to establish with necessity t h e u l t i m a t e p u r p o s e of n a t u r e as m a n u n d e r m o r a l laws. T h a t o t h e r final p u r p o s e , of course, was God, a n d t h a t ultimate p u r p o s e h e w o u l d have for n a t u r e w o u l d b e Providence, creating t h e possibility for m a n ' s realization of f r e e d o m . T h e existence of G o d would g u a r a n t e e m a n ' s actual c h a n c e to realize t h e "highest good," t h r o u g h t h e transfiguration of t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r into a " k i n g d o m of e n d s , " i.e., " m a n u n d e r m o r a l laws." G o d did not g u a r a n t e e the n e cessity of success, for it was m a n ' s task to see to it. G o d simply m a d e n a t u r e a m e n a b l e to t h e project. By t h e t i m e of t h e Third Critique, t h e highest g o o d for Kant was a step in a n a r g u m e n t which was from t h e outset intentionally t h e o logical, n o t merely m o r a l . If we consider t h e m a n n e r in which K a n t c o n s t r u c t e d his a r g u m e n t from "moral teleology" to t h e "highest g o o d " in t h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " we can see t h a t his interest lies q u i t e unequivocally in justifying belief in t h e existence of a t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d . His classic refutation of all rational proofs of G o d in t h e First Critique h a d included a refutation of t h e so-called "physico-theological" p r o o f . N e v e r t h e less h e e x p r e s s e d respect for this a r g u m e n t . T h e Third Critique a d vanced t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t it was at least subjectively necessary to t h i n k of a n intelligent will as t h e original cause of t h e w o r l d . B u t t h e r e "physico-theology" r e a c h e d its o u t e r limit. It could n o t p r o ceed from this to t h e full n o t i o n of a G o d . T h a t step was possible only in a n d t h r o u g h m o r a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d "ethico-theology." 7 3

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K a n t tried in t h e " M e t h o d o l o g y " to establish a necessary connection b e t w e e n " m o r a l teleology" a n d "theology." T h i s a r g u m e n t m o v e d from t h e practical reality of f r e e d o m t h r o u g h the obligation to realize t h e "highest g o o d , " to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t for a w a r r a n t of t h e possibility of t h a t realization. Kant claimed we n e e d a theology precisely for t h e sake of t h e "highest g o o d " — n o t , to b e sure, for 336

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o u r obligation to p u r s u e it, b u t for t h e h o p e t h a t this obligation is n o t Sisyphean. In seeking a w a r r a n t for t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of justice in this world m a n first conceives t h e rational n e e d for G o d . T h e r e a r e two crucial points which m u s t be clarified in this c o n n e c t i o n . First, m a n ' s m o r a l obligation is n o t g r o u n d e d in t h e existence of G o d . As K a n t a r g u e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e "highest g o o d " itself, t h e exist e n c e of G o d is n o t "necessary for m o r a l s , " b u t r a t h e r "necessitated by m o r a l i t y . " It is because we a r e morally obliged to secure justice in t h e world t h a t we m u s t believe in a G o d to m a k e this possible. I n o t h e r words, it is n o t w h a t o n e knows of G o d t h a t m a k e s h i m m o r a l , b u t w h a t is m o r a l which tells o n e w h a t h e knows a b o u t G o d . T h e idea of G o d is t h e principle necessary to secure t h e possibility of t h e full realization of t h e "highest g o o d . " N o t h i n g m o r e is n e e d e d in t h a t concept, a n d n o t h i n g less. Second, "theology" arises o u t of a n i m m a n e n t practical c o n c e r n , o u t of " m o r a l teleology," a n d h e n c e t h e n a t u r e a n d t h e validity of theology derive from t h a t context. O n e n e e d have n o c o n c e r n with w h a t God may b e as a speculative entity, b u t only with k n o w i n g t h a t G o d provides certain essential r e q u i r e m e n t s for m a n ' s practical destiny in t h e world. W i t h t h a t the w a r r a n t for t h e reality of G o d shifts from a cognitive principle to a practical r e q u i r e m e n t . K a n t wrote extensively in t h e balance of t h e " M e t h o d o l o g y " to s q u a r e t h e circle of his c o m m i t m e n t to d e t e r m i n a t e beliefs a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of G o d with t h e "critical" restrictions of k n o w l e d g e of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t . His p r o t r a c t e d discussion r e affirmed all t h e positions of t h e "critical philosophy," including t h e d o c t r i n e of "rational belief." T h o u g h it was to serve a metaphysical function, t h e h i g h e s t good as a w a r r a n t for postulating G o d could n o t a p p e a l to theoretical r e a s o n , because it originated in practical reason. 79

At t h e level of t h e individual h u m a n being, K a n t a r g u e d , t h e only k i n d of justice which m a n can find consistent with his principle of morality a n d his condition as a n a t u r a l being is o n e in which h a p piness, as t h e inevitable aspiration of his n a t u r a l existence, is legitim a t e d by worthiness. As a n a t u r a l , n o t merely rational being, m a n has objective n e e d s which r e a s o n associates with h a p p i n e s s . As a free b e i n g , m a n can act purely for t h e sake of t h e m o r a l law. Such a n act, a c c o r d i n g to Kant, is v i r t u o u s a n d a d d s to t h e worth of t h e a g e n t w h o p e r f o r m s it. T h i s "merit" should, in a perfect world, find r e c o m p e n s e in a p r o p o r t i o n a t e h a p p i n e s s . For a n individual h u m a n b e i n g , t h e highest g o o d involves t h e relation of his virtue to its r e w a r d . T h e p r o b l e m for m a n is that his empirical e x p e r i e n c e suggests t h a t n e i t h e r in his o w n particular case n o r in t h e universal The Unity of Mankind

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case of his species a r e t h e prospects of such a j u s t world e n c o u r a g ing. It r e m a i n s , however, t h a t it is a l t o g e t h e r h u m a n to ask—over a n d above " W h a t s h o u l d I d o ? " — t h e question " W h a t may I h o p e ? " T h a t question m u s t n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e will, b u t it is certainly a rational q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e subject may ask a b o u t t h e disposition of affairs in the cosmos. K a n t believed t h e question " W h a t may I h o p e ? " was legitimate a n d i n d e e d inevitable in m a n as a finite rational b e i n g . Such a question, however, was at least as speculative as it was p r a c t i c a l . Ultimately, it involved a religious, n o t merely a m o r a l d i m e n s i o n . H e n c e , in t h e highest g o o d as t h e p r o b l e m of individual r e w a r d , t h e link b e t w e e n morality a n d religion is at its most salient. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t "speculative r e a s o n " would n o t find the plausibility of t h e "highest g o o d " confirmed by a n inspection of t h e real world, a n d it w o u l d t h e r e f o r e e i t h e r t h i n k it "an u n g r o u n d e d a n d vain, t h o u g h well-meant, e x p e c t a t i o n " or have to satisfy itself t h a t t h e r e was a G o d to m a k e it right. If it could n o t convince itself of God, "it would r e g a r d t h e m o r a l law itself as t h e m e r e deception of o u r r e a s o n in a practical a s p e c t . " Kant claimed t h a t despair could i n d u c e m a n n o t to strive to live u p to his duty. " [ A l t h o u g h t h e n e cessity of d u t y is very plain for practical r e a s o n , yet t h e a t t a i n m e n t of its final p u r p o s e , so far as it is n o t altogether in o u r power, is only a s s u m e d o n behalf of t h e practical use of reason, a n d t h e r e f o r e is n o t so practically necessary as d u t y itself." K a n t t h e r e f o r e a r g u e d t h a t m a n h a d to expect some success in his e n d e a v o r s o r h e would s u c c u m b to despair. T h e n o t i o n of t h e highest g o o d served as a security t h a t such success would a t t e n d m a n ' s project of m o r a l virtue. K a n t s o u g h t to d e f e n d his view by d e m o n s t r a t i n g the plight of a putative " r i g h t e o u s atheist" (such as Spinoza): 80

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[H]is effort is b o u n d e d ; a n d from n a t u r e , a l t h o u g h h e may e x p e c t h e r e a n d t h e r e a c o n t i n g e n t accordance, h e can never e x p e c t a r e g u l a r h a r m o n y a g r e e i n g according to constant rules . . . with t h e p u r p o s e t h a t h e yet feels himself obliged a n d impelled to accomplish. Deceit, violence, a n d envy will always s u r r o u n d h i m , a l t h o u g h h e himself be honest, peaceable, a n d kindly; a n d t h e r i g h t e o u s m e n with w h o m h e meets will, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g all their worthiness of h a p p i n e s s , b e yet subjected by n a t u r e , which r e g a r d s n o t this, to all t h e evils of want, disease, a n d untimely d e a t h , j u s t like the beasts of the e a r t h . So it will b e until o n e wide grave engulfs t h e m t o g e t h e r (honest o r not, it m a k e s n o difference). . . T h e p u r p o s e , t h e n , 338

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which this well-intentioned p e r s o n h a d a n d o u g h t to have before h i m in his p u r s u i t of m o r a l laws, h e m u s t certainly give u p as i m p o s s i b l e . 83

K a n t believed t h a t without G o d this "tragic" d i l e m m a would occasion cynicism a n d t h e a b a n d o n m e n t of m o r a l righteousness. It n e e d n o t . It s h o u l d n o t . It certainly does n o t abolish t h e d u t y entailed by t h e m o r a l law, for t h a t is a priori a n d i n e l u c t a b l e . B u t Kant's profession of despair of such tragic e n d u r a n c e is consistent with his religious b a c k g r o u n d a n d culture. T h e Christian origin of this whole constellation of considerations is n o t to b e overlooked K a n t clearly relates the ethical life to t h e p r o b l e m of radical evil a n d t h e Christian n o t i o n s of a t o n e m e n t a n d s a l v a t i o n . W h a t is K a n t really c o n c e r n e d a b o u t in this t r e a t m e n t of t h e "highest good"? While it would a p p e a r that h e is c o n c e r n e d with t h e p r o b l e m of psychological despair t h a t results w h e n morality c o m m a n d s things which a r e too h a r d for the n a t u r a l subject, o n e m u s t w o n d e r a b o u t this. K a n t is rigoristic in his m o r a l t h e o r y . At t h e s a m e time, h e clearly has n o s y m p a t h y for m a n ' s n a t u r a l n e e d s . H e barely m a k e s r o o m for t h e m within his s c h e m e of m o rality. T h a t h e s h o u l d nevertheless m a k e such a n issue of psychological discomfort suggest t h a t h e m u s t have a n ulterior motive to secure rational access to two very h i g h desiderata of his c u l t u r e a n d his religion: t h e immortality of t h e soul a n d the existence of a t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d . T h e s e were principles which his t h e oretical p h i l o s o p h y could n o t secure as objectively real. T h e y existed at best as "ideas of r e a s o n " with a regulative a n d subjective value for r e a s o n . T h a t did n o t suffice for Kant or for t h e c u l t u r e to which h e was c o m m i t t e d . H e n c e h e n e e d e d to find a way to provide t h e m objective reality in t h e critical philosophy. K a n t s o u g h t a p a t h to t h a t r e i n t e g r a t i o n via t h e " p r o b l e m of t h e highest good." 8 4

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I n t h e Third Critique, Kant is really c o n c e r n e d with the kind of world which would exist were e v e r y o n e to be fully m o r a l . I n a world of full worthiness, everyone s h o u l d also be p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y h a p p y . W h a t is r e q u i r e d to c o m p e l t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r to m a k e h a p p i n e s s for m a n as a species a real possibility is n o t h i n g less t h a n God. It m i g h t t h e n take all m a n ' s strivings to actualize that possibility, a n d h e n c e his skill a n d his merit would b e entailed, b u t G o d m u s t provide t h e crucial metaphysical security for t h e whole project. T h e realization of t h e "highest g o o d " would accordingly b e c o m e t h e realization of t h e " K i n g d o m of G o d in this world." Kant's philosophy culminates, it would a p p e a r , in t h e affirmation of some crucial tenets of t h e The Unity of Mankind

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Christian religion, t h o u g h ostensibly "within t h e limits of reason a l o n e . " Rational belief in G o d a n d t h e immortality of t h e soul finds justification in t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of practical reason to realize t h e h i g h e s t g o o d . T h e objective reality of these spiritual n o u m e n a is to be "postulated." T h e u l t i m a t e question of t h e "highest g o o d " can be t a k e n to b e t h e c o h e r e n c e of t h e cosmos itself a n d its absolute worth. T h e q u e s tion t h e n b e c o m e s o n e of the unity of n a t u r e a n d freedom, t h a t real u n i t y of t h e supersensible at t h e g r o u n d of n a t u r e with that at t h e g r o u n d of f r e e d o m . T h e ideal of t h e highest good r e p r e s e n t s in this light n o t only t h e idea of a n ultimate wholeness a b o u t the cosmos, b u t of a prior, g r o u n d i n g wholeness at its origin. T h i s wholeness, t h e ens perfectissimum of classical metaphysics a n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d of o r t h o d o x Christianity, was obviously, again, b e y o n d t h e pale of a r i g o r o u s epistemology, o n c e a g a i n " d o g m a t i c m e t a p h y s i c s . " B u t t h a t did n o t keep K a n t from p u r s u i n g these questions, n o t only in t h e Third Critique b u t also in t h e work which took u p w h e r e it left off, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. T h e r e K a n t used t h e idea of t h e "highest g o o d " to articulate a n eschatological sense of t h e c o n s u m m a t e wholeness of t h e cosmos, t h e c o m i n g of Utopia, the " K i n g d o m of G o d o n E a r t h . " In this context, religion m e r g e d with a notion of a freely chosen fut u r e . Secular a n d sacred history c o n v e r g e d . T h e core of Kant's a r g u m e n t is t h e suggestion that m a n n e e d e d Divine P r o v i d e n c e in o r d e r psychologically to motivate t h e actual will to persist in t h e c o u r s e of virtue. T h e obvious objection is, of c o u r s e , t h a t psychological n e e d is n o t a logical a r g u m e n t . T h i s o b j e c t i o n was m a d e by W i z e n m a n n against t h e Kantians in t h e context of t h e P a n t h e i s m C o n t r o v e r s y . Beck is correct to invoke it against this particular form of t h e Kantian a r g u m e n t for t h e highest g o o d . W o o d tries to d e f e n d this a r g u m e n t by u r g i n g that it is n o t psychological b u t m o r a l , a n " a b s u r d u m p r a c t i c u m " which r e sults t h e m o m e n t o n e accepts m o r a l d u t y in t h e context of a recalcitrant w o r l d . B u t t h e ulterior, religious-dogmatic c o m m i t m e n t clearly i n t r u d e s into Kant's m o r a l a r g u m e n t . Beck is quite correct to a r g u e t h a t at t h e very least t h e religious sense of t h e highest g o o d (reward for merit) was not necessary to g r o u n d m o r a l obligation, b u t p a r t of a "practical-dogmatic metaphysics" which s o u g h t to b r i n g theoretical a n d practical reason t o g e t h e r i n t o a unity. F o r Beck, this unity is merely a "dialectical Ideal of r e a s o n . " U p h o l d i n g Beck's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Jeffrie M u r p h y calls it a n "aesthetic i d e a l . " T h a t is, t h e motive b e h i n d t h e idea of t h e highest g o o d was 91

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n o t ethical b u t speculative, a n d t h e sense of " t i g h t n e s s " s o u g h t was n o t m o r a l o r even theoretical b u t " a e s t h e t i c . " Moreover, t h e doctrinal c o m m i t m e n t a n d its contextual motive a r e particularly clear. A c c o r d i n g to A u x t e r , in t h e Second Critique " t h e distinction between the m o r a l ideal of t h e A n a l y t i c ' a n d t h e religious ideal of t h e 'Dialectic' c a n n o t be too strongly insisted u p o n . " While h e denies t h e h i g h e s t g o o d conceived in t h e latter, h e reformulates t h e notion of t h e objectification of m o r a l principle in t e r m s of Kant's idea of "ectypal n a t u r e . " T h e " m o r a l ideal" was indispensable for Kant's " m o r a l teleology," i.e., for t h e actualization of m o r a l p u r p o s e s in t h e world of sense, a n d h e n c e w a r r a n t e d a notion of t h e "highest g o o d " as t h e ideal expressing t h e goal in actuality. B u t t h e "religious ideal" p o i n t e d in directions which were n o t strictly necessary to Kant's m o r a l philosophy a n d h a d , for Auxter, a blatantly d o g matic metaphysical c h a r a c t e r . It is very difficult, in light of all this, to resist t h e view t h a t Kant's Third Critique, a n d above all its "ethical t u r n , " intensely h i g h l i g h t e d all t h e metaphysical issues in t h e "critical philosophy." Kant's contextual struggles a n d his p e r s o n a l comm i t m e n t s to a "theistic" if n o t o u t r i g h t Christian p o s t u r e strongly colored t h e u l t i m a t e s h a p e of t h e work. 97

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Conclusion

T H E ULTIMATE MEANING OF T H E THIRD CRITIQUE

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h e Third Critique finds its decisive c o n c e r n s n e i t h e r in questions of beauty n o r in questions of empirical biology, b u t r a t h e r in t h e ultimate questions of t h e place of m a n in t h e o r d e r of t h e w o r l d — h i s f r e e d o m a n d his destiny. T h e evidence a m a s s e d in t h a t e n d e a v o r r a n g e s from t h e i m p r o m p t u b e a u t y of n a t u r e to t h e intractable purposiveness of organisms to t h e mysterious n a t u r a l gift of genius. Across it all, however, n a t u r e serves only as a m i r r o r : its purposiveness as a sign of o u r p u r p o s e , its b e a u t y as t h e symbol of morality. T h e design of n a t u r e a n d even its very chaos give occasion for reflection u p o n t h e sublime p o w e r of f r e e d o m a n d for a stern consideration of its p r o p e r uses. T h e Third Critique t h u s stands as Kant's m a s t e r work o n m a n ' s c o m p l e x being-in-the-world. If this r e a d i n g of t h e ethical t u r n a n d consequently of t h e ultim a t e p u r p o s e of t h e Critique offudgment is valid, it goes a long way t o w a r d establishing t h a t t h e occasion for Idealism lay within t h e p h i losophy of K a n t himself. Despite c o n t e m p o r a r y inclinations to dist i n g u i s h K a n t from his Idealist successors, t h e continuity from t h e later K a n t to t h e Idealists is very clear. T h e "sage of Königsberg" h a d definite ontological a n d theological preferences, which bec a m e increasingly explicit over t h e 1780s a n d took o n exceptional p r o m i n e n c e in t h e Third Critique (1790). Kant's Third Critique was a work of g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e n o t only in its influence o n t h e s u c c e e d i n g g e n e r a t i o n of G e r m a n Idealism a n d Romanticism b u t also in its revision of t h e K a n t i a n philosophy. T h e r e a r e s t r o n g g r o u n d s for t h e view t h a t Kant's t h i n k i n g evolved b e y o n d t h e p o s t u r e of t h e First Critique, a n d t h a t a historical a p p r e ciation of his philosophizing m u s t take into a c c o u n t a t e n d e n c y in his later t h o u g h t to try to resolve certain d i l e m m a s of dualism 342

which h a u n t e d t h a t first g r e a t effort. T h a t t e n d e n c y , u n d e r t h e aegis of such t e r m s as t h e "unity of reason," t h e "primacy of practical r e a s o n , " a n d "intrinsic purposiveness," d r e w K a n t close to t h e kinds of speculations in metaphysics which his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e First Critique h a d proscribed. It is well to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t K a n t m a i n t a i n e d into t h e Third Critique his distinction of " t h o u g h t " from " k n o w l e d g e , " a n d h e n c e a d h e r e d to t h e essential critical p o s t u r e a b o u t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y of r e a s o n b e y o n d sensible intuition. Nevertheless, t h e d e g r e e of d e t e r m i n a c y to which his t h i n k i n g e d g e d in t h e discussion of t h e " s u p e r s e n s i b l e " — b o t h within m a n a n d as a g r o u n d w i t h o u t which the c o h e r e n c e of knowle d g e even of t h e sensible world would be impossible—suggests t h a t his critical stance h a d to it a n e l e m e n t of transparency, b e n e a t h which a p r o f o u n d l y metaphysical Kantianism lay clear for any w h o wished to see it. T h e r e w e r e two aspects of metaphysics in Kant's philosophy. First, metaphysics was involved in t h e entailment of the empirical: in t h e actualization of reason, w h e t h e r theoretical or practical. T h i s was t h e front o n which K a n t m e t H u m e a n d s o u g h t to rescue t h e possibility of valid k n o w l e d g e . Second, metaphysics involved access to the transcendent: g r a s p i n g those f u n d a m e n t a l ideas indispensable for h u m a n m e a n i n g b u t inaccessible to material m e a s u r e m e n t . H e r e K a n t c o n f r o n t e d t h e d o g m a t i c metaphysicians of "school p h i l o s o p h y " a n d t h e whole h e r i t a g e of traditional Western m e t a physics. I n t h e First Critique h e h a d salvaged t h e first kind of metaphysics a n d scuttled t h e second. Nevertheless, h e acknowle d g e d even in t h e First Critique t h a t h u m a n beings could n o t r e n o u n c e t h e questions raised in t h e second vein, a n d h e m a d e provision t h a t we m i g h t "think" a b o u t these, t h o u g h such t h o u g h t would be vain of all k n o w l e d g e . Such a conclusion, h e assured his r e a d e r s , m a d e r o o m forfaith. T h a t this faith should also b e rational was p e r h a p s a piety even e x c e e d i n g t h e notion t h a t faith could serve at all. T o o m u c h t h a t was vital to h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e h a d b e e n sealed off from rational consideration by t h e First Critique, a n d we can only m a k e sense of t h e n e x t twenty years of Kant's t h i n k i n g w h e n we realize t h a t h e h a d to rebuild rational structures to access t h e s e d o m a i n s a n d t h a t his later works were devoted to this task. 1

2

Epistemologically, grave reservations can be raised against t h e p o s t u r e of t h e First Critique. I n this study, t h r e e such p r o b l e m s have surfaced r e p e a t e d l y : t h e p r o b l e m of a singular intuition, t h e p r o b lem of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n (the u t t e r disjunction of r e a s o n a n d sense), a n d t h e p r o b l e m of self-consciousness (the unity of t h e Conclusion

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subject). K a n t h a d modified his stance o n each of these questions, in my view, by t h e Third Critique. O n t h e first, his theory of reflective j u d g m e n t r e p r e s e n t e d a major effort to revise his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of p e r c e p t i o n . O n the second, his n o t i o n of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s " allowed h i m to take into the critical p h i l o s o p h y crucial new aspects of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e a n d relate t h e m to a m u c h m o r e d y n a m i c a n d integral t h e o r y of r e a s o n in which t h e two key t e r m s w e r e system a n d p u r p o s e . O u t of this e m e r g e d t h e crucial idea of "intrinsic p u r p o s e , " which expressed a view of holism a n d i m m a n e n t causality distinctly i n c o n g r u o u s with his t h e o r y of categorial d e t e r m i n a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e b u t which p r o v e d indispensable b o t h for a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c c o u n t of reason a n d for a n empirical a c c o u n t of o r g a n i s m s . Finally, o n t h e t h i r d issue, K a n t elaborated substantially o n his idea of practical reason over t h e d e c a d e of t h e 1780s, a n d t h e g l i m m e r of belief in "practical a p p e r c e p t i o n " which surfaced in t h e First Critique took o n m o r e intensity a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w a r r a n t in t h e Second. T h e Third Critique s u p p l e m e n t e d this "practical a p p e r c e p t i o n " with a theory of selfconsciousness via reflection o n subjective states (Geistesgefühl), e n r i c h i n g a n d confirming Kant's central conviction of m a n ' s m o r a l essence as a n end-in-himself. With his idea of Geist all these m e t a physical impulses c a m e to t h e i r c o n s u m m a t i o n , for it was the idea of t h e "unity of t h e supersensible g r o u n d " of which h e spoke in t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Third Critique a n d in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " as t h a t to which r e a s o n "forced" t h o u g h t a b o u t t h e fund a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e of k n o w l e d g e a n d being. As Michaelson has p u t it, " F o r K a n t to have posited such a comm o n g r o u n d would have involved h i m in t h e creation of a h i g h e r metaphysical unity m o r e characteristic of H e g e l t h a n of the a u t h o r of t h e Critique of Pure Reason." I n t h e Third Critique K a n t at times did c o m e very close to s o u n d i n g like a H e g e l i a n Idealist. Patrick Riley recognizes, too, t h a t in t h e Third Critique, a n d especially in §57, t h e discussion of t h e supersensible in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " K a n t c a m e closest to H e g e l in recognizing t h e r e ality of r e a s o n . Yovel articulates t h r o u g h o u t his study of Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history t h a t i m p e t u s in his work which f o u n d e x p r e s sion in H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y . With the Third Critique K a n t signaled to his heirs t h e vision they w e r e to try to realize. Kantianism itself m a d e Idealism inevitable. R e a d i n g t h e Third Critique created a n u r g e n t a n d specific philosophical p r o b l e m for Kant's successors. By d e m o n s t r a t i n g at t h e very least t h e intensity a n d u r g e n c y with which K a n t took u p these questions in his work, this study has 3

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s h o w n t h a t K a n t — i n addition to, a n d p e r h a p s even in conscious supersession of, his epistemological scruples—carried within his system t h e g e r m s of t h a t metaphysics which his i m m e d i a t e disciples c r e a t e d largely in his n a m e : G e r m a n Idealism. T h e m o s t p r o f o u n d way to express this from within Kantianism would b e to say t h a t K a n t recognized that t h e most i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r s a b o u t t h e ultimate reality of t h e universe a n d a b o u t m a n himself w e r e b e y o n d t h e limits of m e r e cognitive j u d g m e n t , b u t t h a t n o t only t h e u r g e n c y of practical life b u t t h e most rigorous p u r suit of this strictly cognitive function compelled m a n to recognize his m e m b e r s h i p in t h a t ultimate reality a n d h e n c e to t r a n s c e n d t h e limitations of his u n d e r s t a n d i n g . For K a n t that realization took o n a religious d i m e n s i o n . For his successors it r e m a i n e d a philosophical o n e . W h a t K a n t believed, they s o u g h t rationally to d e f e n d . His successors wished to reestablish those beliefs at t h e c e n t e r of philosophy in t e r m s of reason's o w n reality. W h a t K a n t h a d locked away in a n inaccessible t r a n s c e n d e n c e , they retrieved as a transfiguring i m m a n e n c e . Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e idea of a "unity of r e a s o n " is n o t q u e s t i o n e d even by so epistemologically stringent a n i n t e r p r e t e r as Beck. H e simply says t h a t K a n t could never achieve it. T h a t it was a very serious philosophical a n d "systemic" p r e o c c u p a t i o n of K a n t from at least t h e time of t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals forward is clear. T h e r e K a n t asserted the necessity for t h e critical elucidation of t h e unity of r e a s o n . T h e Second Critique reaffirmed his c o m m i t m e n t . B u t t h e ambition was n o t completely realized t h e r e . Beck believes t h e a m b i t i o n was misguided in t h e first place, a n d h e n c e incapable of realization. Yet in t h e Third Critique Kant m a d e his most s t r e n u o u s effort to achieve t h e unity of r e a s o n . T h o s e very e l e m e n t s of epistemological scruple t h a t Beck praises, t h e g e n e r a t i o n of y o u n g Idealists after 1790 would see as Kant's r e n e g i n g o n his o w n d e e p e s t i n s i g h t s . 7

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" T h e rational is r e a l " — t h a t is o n e half of Hegel's objective idealism, t h e subjective half. K a n t h a d in fact g o n e very far toward g r o u n d i n g t h a t subjective idealism, a n d it is this i m p e t u s in his t h i n k i n g which I have tried to recover in as m u c h systematic detail as Kant allowed to escape his o w n self-censorship. T h e reality of r e a s o n is t h e key issue in t h e p r o b l e m of self-consciousness in Kant. I n d e e d , it is exactly h e r e t h a t t h e most a u t h e n t i c challenge to K a n t m u s t be m a d e : w h a t is the ontological status of p u r e reason itself? K a n t vacillated b e t w e e n a merely logical a n d a n ontological c o n c e p tion of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n . T h a t vacillation Conclusion

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p r o v e d u n a c c e p t a b l e to his successors in Idealism. T h e y o p t e d for t h e ontological c o n c e p t i o n as t h e only o n e capable of sustaining t h e e n t i r e architectonic of systematic philosophy, a n d as the only o n e which recognized t h e full rights of reason. If, as Kant in fact believed, it c o n s t i t u t e d a spiritual b e i n g with t h e p o w e r to c h a n g e t h e world (of e x p e r i e n c e ) , t h e n it was utterly prejudicial to its dignity, its a u t o n o m y , a n d its ultimate significance to d e n y it reality a n d r e c k o n it merely a formal s t r u c t u r e latent in empirical e x p e r i e n c e . K a n t offered r e m a r k a b l e insights into t h e n a t u r e a n d p o w e r of reason, b u t his fear of dialectical hypostasis h e l d h i m back from a full ontological c o m m i t m e n t to t h e reality of reason, at least cognitively. B u t w h a t K a n t believed, a n d t h e vivid formulation of those beliefs in his works, s e e m e d to his followers to cry o u t for a m o r e wholeh e a r t e d articulation a n d defense. I n Kant's own work they believed they could see t h e basis for such a stance. T h e y c a m e to believe t h a t t h e involuntary s p o n t a n e i t y K a n t associated with the active, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d , t o g e t h e r with t h e essential, ontological g r o u n d of h u m a n n a t u r e , as Geist. T h a t is, they identified g e n e r a t i v e ("spontaneous") a n d systemic r e a s o n with t h e metaphysical g r o u n d of being.

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Notes

Abbreviation and Citation Format Sources are cited in abbreviated form in the notes and given with full details in the bibliography. German titles for Kant's works indicate that I am translating from the original; English titles indicate that the reference is to a translation. The following particular conventions are used: Critique ofJudgment, §[no]:[page][GR = General Remark] = Bernard translation Critique of Judgment, §[no]:M[page][GR = General Remark] = Meredith translation. All citations from this translation amend "judgement" to "judgment" for uniformity. A.A. [vol]:[page] = Kants Gesammelte Schriften Herausgegeben von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. (Akademie Ausgabe). Hauptschriften = Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismus Streit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn. Ed. Heinrich Scholz.

Introduction 1. In English, N. Kemp-Smith's Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is the most obvious instance; he derived his approach from German scholars of the close of the nineteenth century like E. Adickes and H. Vaihinger. 2. For example: T. Cohen and P. Guyer, eds., Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, esp. "Introduction," 1—13; P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste; and E. Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics. 3. In addition to the works cited above, see F. Coleman, The Harmony of Reason; D. Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory; K. Rogerson, Kant's Aesthetics; and M. McCloskey, Kant's Aesthetic. 4. See especially K. Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Welthegriff; P. Heintel, Die Bedeutung; W. Bartuschat, Zum Systematischen Ort; H. Mertens, Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung; F. Kaulbach, Ästhetische Welterkenntnis bei Kant; A. Model, Metaphysik und reflektierende Urteilskraft; and the exchange

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between in R. Horstmann and R. Brandt in E. Förster, ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions, 157-190.

5. The Germans have been attentive to this systematic importance of teleology and the Third Critique since the late nineteenth century: see A. Stadler, Kants Teleologie.

6. Among the older German works the following are most important: R. Odebrecht, Form und Geist; K. Marc-Wogau, Vier Studien; and G.

Lehmann, Kants Nachlaßwerk and his collected essays, Beiträge. 7. Writing of the young Friedrich Nietzsche, M. Silk and J. Stern have noted: "'Aesthetics'... is not confined to art, not even to 'art as a whole.' It runs into history, psychology and moral philosophy, into life itself. . . the most significant of German 'aesthetic' enquiries have invariably moved beyond 'aesthetic' in the narrow sense, and often into a quest for the 'whole man.'" M. Silk and J. Stern, Nietzsche on Tragedy, 35. It is just this sense of 'aesthetic' that the young Idealists drew out of Kant, especially out of his Third Critique, to create Idealism. See E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlighten-

ment, 332, for a similar contention. 8. See especially P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy; Y. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History; H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy; W. Booth, Interpreting the World: Kant's Philosophy of History and Politics; A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion; T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology; and M. Despland Kant on History and Religion. 9. J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology.

10. See G. Schräder, "The Status of Teleological Judgment." 11. See, for example, J. McFarland, "The Bogus Unity." 12. A new and very important effort to draw out the implications of Kant's teleology for hermeneutics, based on the Third Critique, is R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant. 13. M. Souriau, Lejugement reflechissant; F. van de Pitte, Kant as Philo-

sophical Anthropologist; F. Williams, "Philosophical Anthropology"; E. Cassirer, "Critical Idealism." 14. Kant, letter to K. L. Reinhold, December 28-31, 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15. 15. Windelband, "Einleitung in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft"; G. Lehmann, "Einleitung zur Ersten Einleitung." 16. J. Meredith, "Last Stages," xxxvii—1. 17. G. Tonelli, "La formazione." 18. See Kant's letters to K. L. Reinhold, May 12,1789 (A.A. 11:39) and M. Herz, May 26, 1789 (A.A. 11:48). 19. Kant was also embroiled in his controversy with Eberhard at this time, which helps to account for the substantial delay, from October 1789 to January 1790, in Kant's dispatch of the manuscript of the Third Critique. 20. Tonelli, "La formazione," 444. 21. E. Schulz, "Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung." On Lessing's role in the Aufklärung, see H. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment. On the whole Aufklärung see H. Wolff, Die Weltanschauung, and J. Schober, Die deutsche Spätaufklärung

(1770-1790).

F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, sees the

period as one in which Aufklärung, despite Kant, suffered defeat, but

348

Notes to Pages

3-8

Kant certainly did not see it that way, and it is certainly arguable that the generation of the Idealists did not either. 22. In his observations about the genesis of the Third Critique, J. Meredith wrote: "an attack on the leaders of the Sturm und Drang movement was almost certainly meditated from the start" ("Last Stages," xli). See R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang. See also H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, vol. 1. 23. See especially K. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant; E. Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought; and W. Ritzel, Kant, eine Biographie. For an overview of Kant

biographies see R. George, "The Lives of Kant." But George, like the biographers themselves, concludes: "Not much can be said about Kant's personal development in [the 1780s] that would aid us in understanding his work; there are no external influences to be recounted and, indeed, devotion to the work itself left little room for other matters" (493). I strongly disagree. 24. For a similar position, see G. Lehmann, "Kants Lebenskrise," in Beiträge, 411—21. Lehmann argues that Kant's biography takes on great relevance after the publication of the First Critique in 1781. 25. The best account of the early reaction to Kant's philosophy is B. Erdmann, Kants Kriticismus, esp. 98—128. See also K. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, 406-30. 26. In addition to Erdmann, see H. de Vleeschauwer, La deduction transcendentale, 497—535. 27. Kant to Mendelssohn, Aug. 16, 1783, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:346. 28. See Kant's correspondence, esp. with Johann Schulz about a popularization of the First Critique, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:348—54.

29. K. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, 317n. Some Kant scholars have minimized the reliability of this report (e.g., A. Tumarkin, Herder und Kant, 23). But there is too much intensity about Kant's preoccupation with Herder. It has a long and important history which we must unearth. 30. See L. Beck, Commentary, 56—57; and esp. F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 165—225, for discussion of Kant's critics and his attitude toward them. 31. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface to A-version, Ax. 32. Kant, Prolegomena, 6 - 8 (A.A. 4:261-62). 33. A brilliant pursuit of that connection is G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 92-178. 34. For a similar conclusion, see Beiser, Fate of Reason, 153-64. 35. On Lessing I have relied upon W. Dilthey, Das Erlebnis unddie Dichtung, 18—123; H. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment; K. Aner, Die The-

ologie der Lessingzeit; and E. Zeller, "Lessing als Theolog." 36. For a recent study of the Spinoza controversy see H. Timm, Gott und die Freiheit, vol. 1, and on its role in the philosophy of the period, Beiser, Fate of Reason. 37. See H. Brunschwig, La crise de l'Etat prussien and R. Koselleck, Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution.

38. SeeT. Greene, "Historical Context." 39. Kant, "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" A.A. 8:143n. 40. The Pantheism Controversy did contribute to Kant's popularity,

Notes to Pages 8-12

349

because K. L. Reinhold used that dispute to highlight the strengths of the Kantian position in his Briefe über die kantische Philosophie. See Beiser, Fate of Reason, 45, 233. 41. By the time Mme. de Stael made her historic survey of Germany, this cultural identity was not only available but prominent. See de Stael's classic account, Of Germany. 42. See W. Dilthey, "Die dichterische und philosophische Bewegung," 11-27; W. Windelband, Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie; E. Troeltsch, "Der deutsche Idealismus"; F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State; E. Cassirer, Freiheit und Form; K. Vorländer, Kant-Schiller-Goethe. 43. For the social context see M. Walker, German Home Towns and W. Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century. For the social character of the intellectuals, see esp. H. Gerth, Die sozialgeschichtliche Lage and H. Holborn, "German Idealism," 1-32; and on Weimar "classicism," see W. Bruford, Culture and Society in Classical Weimar, 1775—1806. 44. E. Aron, Die deutsche Erweckung; J. Taminiaux, La nostalgie de la Grece; and H. Hatfield, Winckelmann and his German Critics. 45. This key term, Bildung, is at the heart of German Idealism. See the classic accounts of its significance: F. Paulsen, "Bildung"; see also E. Troeltsch, Deutsche Bildung, and H. Weil, Die Entstehung des deutschen Bildungsprinzips. For a recent bibliographical essay on this concept, see R. Vierhaus, "Bildung." 46. See part 2 of Meinecke's Entstehung des Historismus, for the most extended statement of this. For a recent and penetrating assessment of these matters, see P. Reill, The German Enlightenment. Unsympathetic is the account by G. Iggers, The German Conception of History. 47. The literature on Schiller and Kant is vast. Some views which have clarified the issues for me are: K. Vorländer, "Ethischer Rigorismus und sittlicher Schönheit"; E. Cassirer, "Die Methodik des Idealismus in Schillers Philosophischen Schriften"; P. Menzer, "Schiller und Kant"; E. Schaper, "Schiller's Kant: A Chapter in the History of Creative Misunderstanding," in Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 99—117; and D. Henrich, "Beauty and Freedom." 48. J. W. von Goethe, "Einwirkung der neueren Philosophic" The historiography of the deutsche Bewegung and of Idealism places enormous stress on the link between Kant's Third Critique and Goethe. A. Bäumler wrote: "The Critique ofJudgment and Goethe—that means the thought and its existential expression. In their division as in their unity with equal significance Kant and Goethe come before us as symbols of our historical existence . . . One could never fathom Kant from the vantage of Goethe. On the other hand it is easy enough to grasp Goethe from Kant's vantage. Kant knew nothing personally or actually about Goethe, but he thought him. Goethe's having been thought by Kant is perhaps the greatest and most significant occurrence of German intellectual history" (Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, vi-vii). Windelband, in his history of philosophy, also made this connection, as E. Cassirer has noted: "Kant's Critique ofJudgment. . . constructs, as it were, a priori the concept of Goethe's poetry, and . . . what the latter presents as achievement and act is founded and demanded in the former by the pure necessity of philosophical thought" (Philosophy of the 350

Notes to Pages 13-14

Enlightenment, 278). See also E. Cassirer, "Goethe and the Kantian Philosophy"; K. Vorländer, "Goethe und Kant"; and F.J. v. Rintelen, "Kant and Goethe." 49. See R. Bubner, ed., Das älteste Systemprogramm. 50. F. Beiser notes: "If one were a Kantian in the early 1790s, the main question was no longer how to defend Kant against his enemies, but how to rebuild the critical philosophy from within upon a new foundation. The center of interest thus shifted from external defense toward inner reform. Reinhold's demand for a new foundation was indeed the starting point for Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Although they disagreed with Reinhold concerning the nature ofthat foundation, they accepted his contention that it was a necessity" (Fate of Reason, 227). 51. See Kant's public letter against Fichte, Aug. 7, 1799, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 12:396-97 (Philosophical Correspondence, 253—54). 52. On the idea of an "aesthetic solution" see G. Rohrmoser, "Zum Problem der ästhetischen Versöhnung"; and F. Strack, Ästhetik und Freiheit. 53. The classic locus is, of course, Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism [ 1800], but perhaps just as crucial and not so well known is his Philosophy ofArt [1802-3]. One: Kant and the Pursuit of

Aufklärung

1. As P. Gay proposed in his important study, The Enlightenment. Gay acknowledged a great debt to E. Cassirer's classic Philosophy of the Enlightenment but dissented from him on this question (see Gay, 1:544). Cassirer's assessments are nevertheless far more apt on this point. 2. See the classic essay by E. Troeltsch, "The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics." See also the important effort to establish a history of specifically German philosophy: L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, upon which I have drawn heavily, though occasionally in dissent. 3. On the Pietist movement, see F. Stoeffler, The Rise ofEvangelical Pietism and German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century. On university culture, see the classic work by F. Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts, and the recent study, C. McClelland, State, Society and University in Germany, 1700— 1914. 4. On the religious orientation of the German Aufklärung see K. Aner, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit; W. Philipp, Das Werden der Aufklärung in theologiegeschichtlicher Sicht; K. Barth, Protestant Thought from Rousseau to Ritsehl; and W. Lütgert, Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende. 5. W. Dilthey, "Friedrich der Große," esp. 134ff. 6. On the conflict between Wolff and Thomasius, see esp. Hans Wolff, Die Weltanschauung, 109-71. 7. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 394-402. 8. Tonelli mentions A. Reinhard in particular in his article "Crusius, Christian August." 9. L. Beck has pointed to Crusius's importance in distinguishing the formal logical relation between ground and consequence from the "synthetic" or ontological relation between cause and effect. Kant would follow out this distinction all the way to the key notion of "synthetic a priori judgment" (Early German Philosophy, 396-99). Notes to Pages 14-19

351

10. See R. Popkin, History of Scepticism, for a penetrating account of the connection between skepticism and fideism in the early modern period. 11. G. Tonelli, "Crusius," 269. 12. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 439. 13. "Kant, educated in the Pietistic, eclectic, and anti-Wolffian milieu of Königsberg University, was mainly trying . . . to counteract Wolffian philosophy . . . [He] appealed both to recent anti-Wolffian trends— Maupertuis and his Berlin circle and through Maupertuis to Newton— and to Crusius, the new leader of Pietist philosophy . . . whose reputation grew tremendously from 1744 on" (G. Tonelli, "Crusius," 270). See also G. Tonelli, "Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant." (Both brief articles present the results of his monograph, Kant, dall' estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica, Memorie delta Academia delle scienze di Torino, series 3, vol. 3, part 2 [1955]. Unfortunately, the Italian text is inaccessible to me.) That Kant should conceive the philosophical battle-line in any measure to lie between Pietism and Wolffianism is very important for our future construction of his works, especially his response to the Pantheism Controversy. It would be misguided to take Kant for a Pietist. On the other hand, he was steeped in the Pietist background; Pietism shaped his character and moral sense, and it was an issue in the public controversies of his day from which he could not remove himself had he even wished to. See P. Schilpp, Kant's PreCritical Ethics, 50ff. for some telling remarks on this score. 14. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 431; see also G. Buchdahl, "Gravity and Intelligibility" and "The Conception of Lawlikeness in Kant's Philosophy of Science." 15. L. Beck makes much of the issue of space as the major concern of the early Kant, Early German Philosophy, 446—51. 16. A. Bäumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft. 17. See also M. Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, and E. Cassirer, Freiheit und Form. 18. On this inauguration of modern aesthetics, see P. Kristeller, "The Modern System in the Arts (II)," 34ff.; on Baumgarten see esp. M. Gregor, "Baumgarten's Aesthetica." 19. A. Bäumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 200. 20. P. Menzer, Kants Ästhetik, 28. 21. Reflection 2387, dated 1755-56 by Menzer, ibid., 26. 22. See Voltaire, Letters on England, 57—86. 23. R. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie." 24. For the importance of cosmopolitanism and cultural nationalism in the German context of the later eighteenth century, F. Meinecke's Cosmopolitanism and the National State is indispensable. R. George, "The Lives of Kant," 490, 495-96, stresses the importance of this in Kant's life especially in the 1760s in his review of the recent biographical literature. 25. See L. Beck, "Philosophers on the Spree," in Early German Philosophy, esp. 324ff. 26. G. Tonelli, "Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy." 27. He wished to assess the wide variety of travelogues and histories dealing with people and places remote in space (and time) which the Euro352

Notes to Pages 19-23

pean Enlightenment was amassing to develop what we would now call cultural anthropology, and through this, evolve a theory of human nature, or philosophical anthropology. For reflections on these questions see F. van Pitte, Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist, 7—29. 28. P. Menzer, Kants Ästhetik, 37. 29. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 431.

30. Herder, Werke 18:324-25, cited in Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, xxii. 31. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 13, 31.

32. On the popularity of English trends, see Bäumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 117,261. 33. L. Goldstein, Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche Ästhetik.

34. F. Will, "Cognition through Beauty," 100. 35. Ibid., 97-105, and the chapter on Mendelssohn in Will's monograph, Intelligible Beauty; E. Cassirer, Freiheit und Form, 9 9 - 2 2 1 .

36. L. Beck, Commentary, 105. 37. Mendelssohn, "Uber die Mischung" (Gesammelte Schriften, 1:254), cited in Menzer, Kants Ästhetik, 44. 38. On this, the German historians of aesthetics are all of one voice. Thus Bäumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 39ff.; Menzer, Kants Ästhetik, 54; and R. Sommer, Grundzüge einer Geschichte, 120.

39. For a mercifully brief summary of their views see E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 331 ff. 40. H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 115.

41. Mendelssohn reviewed each of these works in his Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend, in letters 92—93, reprinted in Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, 4:2,46-54. 42. The wording of the essay competition was as follows: "Whether metaphysical truths generally, and in particular the fundamental principles of natural theology and morals, are not capable of proofs as distinct as those of geometry; and if they are not, what is the true nature of their certainty, to what degree can this certainty be developed, and is this degree sufficient for conviction [of their truth]?" (cited in L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 441-42). 43. His effort, part of the overall strategy of the Berlin Academy, in this particular instance had the good fortune to encounter among the French themselves a new attunement to the spiritual element in genius, particularly in Diderot. See H. Dieckmann, "Diderot's Conception of Genius," esp. 13ff. See also H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 63ff. 44. H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 146; see also P. Menzer, Kants Äs-

thetik, 85. Sulzer's major work only appeared in 1771, when it was too late to have much impact on Kant (though not too late to have some, however ill received, on Goethe and the Sturm und Drang—see R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 297).

45. It made a very big impression in Germany when it was translated, less than a year later, as well. See M. Steinke, Edward Young's "Conjectures on Original Composition " in England and Germany, who tries to minimize this im-

pact, but still documents its importance in the epoch. 46. H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 30n. The title of this collection of Notes to Pages 23-26

353

publications is in itself a marvelous documentation of the project of the Berlin Aufklärung. 47. E. Hooker, "The Discussion of Taste"; W. Bate, From Classic to Romantic; and G. McKenzie, Critical Responsiveness. 48. A. Lovejoy, "'Nature' as Aesthetic Norm," "The First Gothic Revival and the Return to Nature," and "The Chinese Origins of a Romanticism," in Essays in the History of Ideas; C. Thacker, The Wildness Pleases. 49. D. Morris, The Religious Sublime, 4. 50. Hence the subtitle of M. Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development ofthe Aesthetics of the Infinite. The phrase "aesthetics of the infinite" she acknowledges as Ernest Tuveson's creation. 51. Nicolson, Mountain Gloom; E. Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means of Grace, and especially his earlier article, "Space, Deity, and the 'Natural Sublime,"' the basis for chap. 3 of his monograph. 52. "Eighteenth-century man experienced the sublime in two main contexts—literature and nature—but while the context changed, the experience remained much the same. And perhaps the single most important point of continuity is the basic association between sublimity and religion" (Morris, The Religious Sublime, 8). 53. "fT]he scientists and popularizers of science . . . were lyrical on the subject of the fullness and diversity of the universe. Their 'Prefaces' and 'Conclusions' are often paeans of praise to the Infinite God of an infinitely full universe" (M. Nicolson, Mountain Gloom, 142n.). 54. See M. Nicolson, Newton Commands the Muse. 55. F. Staver, "'Sublime' as Applied to Nature." 56. See H. Thüme, Beiträge; H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte; and J. Engell, The Creative Imagination. 57. E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 322-25. 58. Ibid., 316. 59. H. Thüme, Beiträge, 68ff; H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 16ff. 60. "In England,. . . Shaftesbury has been largely ignored," J. Stolnitz has noted, since "among his countrymen . . . his writings seem . . . a mere Schwärmerei." Yet Stolnitz recognizes that Shaftesbury "exercised a profound influence on the continental, particularly the German thinkers of his century" (Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory"). See also H. Thüme, Beiträge, 74—75; W. Alderman, "The Significance of Shaftesbury in English Speculation"; and D. Townsend, "From Shaftesbury to Kant." 61. J. Addison, "Genius"; see H. Thüme, Beiträge, 78ff; H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 26ff; J. Engell, The Creative Imagination, 37. 62. Even earlier, M. Akenside, in Pleasures of Imagination, had insisted upon the element of frenzy and ecstasy, i.e., great emotion, as essential to genius, and had equated genius with divinity in its creative power. These elements did not sit lightly within a neoclassical frame. While Addison, Akenside's avowed mentor, had been clear about the connection between passion and imagination, he had tried to keep it circumscribed by taste and reason. The upshot, as far as the new generation felt, was a body of deadening rule. 63. The Germans have traced the Prometheus motif from Shaftes354

Notes to Pages 2 7-28

bury to Goethe and beyond. See O. Watzel, Das Prometheussymbol, and H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 20ff. 64. E. Young, Conjectures on Original Composition, 45. What is important about Young is the religious and spiritualist element in his celebration of original genius. There was a strong connection between his faith in imaginative creativity and his faith in human spirituality, and indeed, in a transcendent divinity. That was what Tuveson was getting at with his title, "The Imagination as a Means of Grace." And see H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 36, who stresses "the deep religiosity and 'irrationality' in Young's concept of genius." Wolf thinks it very important that Young was a Theist, for in that measure he could not accept fully the Shaftesburian pantheist interpretation of genius. He substituted a version of Milton's divine inspiration. A similar line would be taken up by Klopstock in Germany, defended by such critics as Resewitz and Hamann, and feed into the Sturm und Drang. 65. J. Benziger, "Organic Unity." 66. H. Thüme suggests that these "naturalistic" theorists of genius fell into as one-sided an error as the neoclassicists they rejected. For in their theory there was no place for "conscious artistry" (Beiträge, 94). 67. A. Gerard, An Essay on Genius. 68. M. Nahm makes this the crux of his many disquisitions on genius. He distinguishes, along these lines, between Addison, Kames, Duff (and Herder), who succumb—in Nahm's view—to the "mystagoguery of inspiration" or the "cult of genius," and the sober and rational approach which sees the artist as a mere artisan, remaking the naturally given through his craft, which he associates with Gerard (and Kant) (Nahm, "Imagination as the Productive Faculty for 'Creating Another Nature . . ."'). See also Nahm's other works: Genius and Creativity and "Genius and the Aesthetic Relation of the Arts." 69. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 319n. But see a more recent effort to trace Kant's evolving aesthetic exclusively to Baumgarten: H. Juchem, Die Entwicklung des Begriffs des Schönen bei Kant. 70. E. Carritt, "Sources and Effects in England of Kant's Philosophy of Beauty," 315. 71. T. Gracyk, "Kant's Shifting Debt to British Aesthetics." 72. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 332. 73. L. Beck argues that in terms of elegance and clarity, Mendelssohn's essay was certainly more impressive than Kant's admitted uncertainty. But Kant was on the verge of crucial innovations across the board, while Mendelssohn was telling the German philosophical community only its own conventional wisdom. See L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 332. 74. Cited in ibid., 443n. 75. Lessing, for example, translated Hutcheson's System of Moral Philosophy in 1756. 76. See D. Henrich, "Hutcheson und Kant." 77. B.Erdmann, "Kant und Hume urn 1762 ."One important connection is Johann Hamann. He went to England in 1757, and he returned to Königsberg shortly thereafter with a lively awareness of British intellectual life, in particular with a very enthusiastic if eccentric appreciation for Notes to Pages 29-30

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David Hume. (See his important letter to Kant, July 27, 1759, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:7-16 (Philosophical Correspondence, 35-43.) The experience was undoubtedly complex and Hamann's assimilation partial, but we can be very confident that all of it, in Hamann's inimitable fashion, got communicated to Kant. See P. Merlan, "From Hume to Hamann" and "Kant, Hamann-Jacobi and Sendling on Hume"; I. Berlin, "Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism"; and F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 24ff. 78. His great early work, the Treatise on Human Nature, on the other hand, did not get translated during the period of Kant's decisive philosophical work. See R. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie." 79. In Germany and especially in Kant, this took the form of a distinction between a priori and a posteriori judgments. 80. In addition to Wolff, see W. Piper, "Kant's Contact with British Empiricism." 81. L. Shaw, "Henry Home of Karnes." 82. Kant, Logic, A.A. 9:15, my translation. 83. Kant, Reflection 1588, A.A. 16:27. 84. Most notably 622, 623, 624, and 626: Kant, A.A. 15:269-72. 85. Kant's connection of history with learning, discipline, and discipleship, and science with system, autonomy, and mastery forms much of the argument in such works as Logic, and is not without relevance to the great Critiques. 86. Kant, Reflection 626, A.A. 15:272, and see the equivalent stance in the First Critique, A21. 87. Kant, Observations, 72. 88. Kant, Reflection 622 (1760s), A.A. 15:269. 89. Kant, Reflection 623 (1769 or earlier), A.A. 15:270. 90. Kant, Reflections 648, 653, 686, 721, A.A. 15:284, 289, 306, 319. See P. Guyer, "Pleasure and Society in Kant's Theory of Taste," esp. 41ff. 91. Kant, Nachricht, A.A. 2:311. 92. Gracyk, "Kant's Shifting Debt to British Aesthetics," 207. 93. Kant, Observations, 58. 94. See G. Tonelli, "Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779)." 95. Kant, Reflection 621 (1769 or perhaps the mid- 1760s), A.A. 15:268. 96. Kant, Reflection 622 (1760s), A.A. 15:269. Genius and aesthetic judgment or "taste" could not be learned, but only exercised (geübt). The notion of Übung preceded the use of the specific word. 97. Baumgarten's Psychologia empirica, with Kant's annotations, is reprinted in A.A. 15:3-54; for §648, p. 39. 98. It was with Addison that imagination began its great surge to the throne of human capacities in the course of the eighteenth century (see J. Engell, The Creative Imagination, passim). But behind Addison's enthusiasm were some Lockian reservations, and these came to stark restatement in the philosophical writings of David Hume. Hume's discontent with imagination goes back to Locke, even as his rigorous affirmation of the "association of ideas" goes back to Hobbes. He was also the first to formulate the idea of imagination as the function of synthesizing new images (see M. Kallich, "Association of Ideas and Critical Theory," 303n., 314). In the British tradition a distinction arose accordingly between constructive "imagination" 356

Notes to Pages 30-33

and wild "fancy" (see J. Bullitt and W. Bate, "Distinction of Fancy and Imagination in Eighteenth-Century English Criticism"). 99. Kant's early observations on the negative potential of imagination suggest the influence of foreign thought, most likely Hume. 100. Kant, Reflection 313, A.A. 15:122. 101. In one Reflection he connects it explicitly with the Herrenhuter and Pietists in Germany. In another with Mme. Guyon. 102. Shaftesbury, "A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm to My Lord ***** " 3_39 103. Dieckmann, "Diderot's Concept of Genius," 21. 104. R. Unger, Hamann und die Aufklärung; W. Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann; J. O'Flaherty, Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia; L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 374ff; F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 16ff.; and the proceedings of the last two Hamann colloquia: B. Gajek, ed., Hamann—Kant— Herder and B. Gajek and A. Meier, eds., Johann Georg Hamann und die Krise der Aufklärung. 105. Kant,Träume eines Geistersehers, A.A. 2:315—7 3. The editor's notes suggest that the work was completed in the year 1765, though it only appeared in the subsequent year. That it was provoked by the opinions of friends was stated in the text itself, as the editor noted, A.A. 2:500-1. 106. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:73-74. 107. That Kant was not wrong in seeing there the origins of the Sturm und Drang cult of genius has long been recognized. See J. Ernst, Der Geniebegriff der Stürmer und Dränger und der Frühromantiker, 17ff. See also M. Steinke, Edward Young's 'Conjectures on Original Composition'in England and Germany. Hamann is considered by many to be the real founder of the movement. See F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 34, for a recent statement of this view. 108. G. Tonelli, "Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant." 109. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:6973. 110. J. Hamann, Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten/Aesthetica in nuce; F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 35—37. Contrasting Hamann's approach to Kant's, Beiser underestimates the measure to which even Kant—precisely in the Third Critique—does develop a symbolic theory of art. 111. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:73-74. 112. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 5ff. 113. These essays were accompanied by an essay on local history by the older historian Justus Moser. Moser was sympathetic to their efforts to establish an indigenous literary culture, steeped in locality. Moser had the courage to respond publicly to Frederick IPs denigration of German as a literary language and to celebrate the literary renaissance in Germany. 114. On Lavater, see R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 2. 115. E. Flajole, "Lessing's Attitude in the Lavater-Mendelssohn Controversy," and H. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment, 198. 116. E. Flajole, "Lessing's Attitude"; E. Schoonhoven, "Hamann in der Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn"; and Z. Levy, "Hamanns Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn." 117. Evidence of this can be found in his letter to Mendelssohn of AuNotes to Pages 33-36

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gust 1783, in which Kant praised Mendelssohn's Jerusalem, the ultimate formulation of Mendelssohn's position in the controversy. See E. Schulz, "Kant und die Berlin Aufklärung." 118. In the Observations, Kant had treated both ideas in a rather positive light, particularly Rührung. 119. Kant, Reflection 767 (1772-73), A.A. 15:334. The parenthetical remark was lined out later by Kant, but it is the most revealing passage in the Reflection. 120. See Menzer on this, Kants Ästhetik, 15ff.,esp. 20-21; and L.Beck, Early German Philosophy, 427, who, in the context of sketching Kant's "Weltanschauung" observed that it was hostile to the sort of Schwärmerei that the Stürmer engaged in. 121. Kant, Reflection 767, A.A. 15:334. See also Reflection 762 (177273): "In order to appear a genius, nowadays one abandons rules. It is all well and good to go beyond the rules where they arise out of a constriction of the spirit; but where they merely have to do with the familiar and coincidental, one should have the modesty to accept them, because otherwise, since others will also demand their freedom, in the end everything will become unruly" (A.A. 15:332). 122. R. Pascal, The German Strum und Drang, 95ff. 123. R. Lowth, Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews (Latin, 1753; German tr. 1758). This was a favorite work of Hamann's and the basis of many of his arguments with Kant about the superiority of his approach to that of the Enlightenment. 124. See H. Wolf, "Die Genielehre des jungen Herder." 125. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 18. 126. Kant, Reflection 771 (1774-75), A.A. 15:337. 127. Kant, Reflection 775 (1774-75), A.A. 15:339. 128. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 97, makes this point. 129. Kant, Reflection 765 (1772-73), A.A. 15:333. 130. Kant, Reflection 789 (1774-75), A.A. 15:345. 131. Kant, A.A. 15:344—45n. The anthropology lectures are cited from a manuscript in the Royal Berlin Library (see the bibliographical note, A.A. 15:vii) and from Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie, ed. Fr. Ch. Starke (1838), 152. 132. Kant to Hamann, Apr. 6, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:156. 133. Hamann to Kant, Apr. 7, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:156-58. 134. Kant to Hamann, Apr. 8, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:160. 135. Lavater to Kant, Apr. 8, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:165-66. 136. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment, passim. 137. M. Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or On Religious Powerand Judaism, tr. A. Arkush (University Press of New England, 1983). 138. J. Engell, Creative Imagination, 102—3. 139. P. Menzer noted (Kants Ästhetik, 87) that Kant was unusual in his day for rejecting the idea of genius in science. None of the others who wrote on the subject made such distinctions, and especially those who shared his "cold-blooded" view tended to write about Newton as frequently as about Homer in elaborating their theories of genius. Menzer was mystified by Kant's choice to depart from the others, and pointed out that he 358

Notes to Pages 3 7-41

had not always thought that way. His earliest Reflections accept the idea of genius in science. What Menzer missed was Kant's outrage at the excesses of the Sturm und Drang cult of genius, and hence the polemical slant behind the theory of genius Kant constructed. 140. K. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, 243n. 141. Ibid, and W. Dilthey, "Friedrich der Große," 136. Dilthey dates the prize to the year it was awarded, not the year it was announced. Eberhard would later, in the time Kant was finishing the Third Critique, open the school-philosophical onslaught against Kant's critical philosophy. 142. W. Dilthey, "Friedrich der Große," 137. 143. Ironically, both Goethe and Herder had begun to disengage themselves from the excesses of the Sturm und Drang as soon as they moved to Weimar, and their enterprise was to achieve a classical balance. See R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 31; H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, 2:16. Kant never recognized this, not even in the 1780s when it was apparent to the rest of Germany. 144. R. Pascal, 7Äe German Sturm und Drang, 134ff.; Beiser, Fate of Reason, 127ff., 145-49. 145. Kant,Reflection 911 (late 1770s),A.A. 15:398. 146. Kant,Reflection 912 (late 1770s),A.A. 15:399. 147. Kant, Reflection 896 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:391. 148. Kant, Reflection 897 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:392. 149. Kant, Reflection 898 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:393. 150. Kant, Reflection 899 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:393. 151. Kant, Reflection 914 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:399. 152. Kant,Reflection 921 (late 1770s),A.A. 15:406. 153. Kant, Reflection 92 la (late 1770s),A.A. 15:407. 154. Kant, Reflection 335 (mid to late 1770s), A.A. 15:132. 155. Kant, additions from the late 1770s to Reflection 364, A. A. 15:142. 156. See Kant, Reflections 369 and 499, A.A. 15:144, 217. Two: Kant's Return to Aesthetics 1. M. Gregor, "Aesthetic Form and Sensory Content in the Critique of Judgment," 194n. 2. Although M. Liedtke wished to establish that the idea of reflective judgment was already latent in the First Critique, his work demonstrates the degree to which it is not fully worked out there. See Liedtke, Der Begriff. Similarly, G. Prauss makes the point quite compellingly that Kant had not really conceived clearly of the problem of subjective consciousness in the first edition of the Critique ofPure Reason, and that this led to his revisions in the Prolegomena culminating in the idea of "judgments of perception" (Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 102). This will all be taken up in detail in the next chapter. 3. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A21. 4. Kant to K. L. Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127-28). 5. See K. Ameriks, "Recent Work," for an excellent overview. Notes to Pages 42-48

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6. D. Henrich, "Proof-Structure," 640. 7. K. Ameriks, "Recent Work." 8. This demand to recognize the historical Kant's frame of reference is the strength of J. Hintikka's essay "Transcendental Arguments," esp. 274; this principle may be generalized from an extremely perceptive statement found in H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account'": "[T]he troubles of Anglo-American philosophers with Kant's [philosophy]. . . are due not so much to a lack of solid knowledge of German as to a lack of familiarity with Kant's philosophical environment and, even more so, to our strong absorption in contemporary philosophical discussions" (126). He insists that we must "grasp Kant's explanation in its own historical context first" (123), indeed "entwicklungsgeschichtlich" (115). That is the methodological commitment of this study. 9. See Kant, Logic, 17, 39ff., esp. 40-41 (A.A. 9:15,35ff, esp. 35-37). 10. In a Reflection which is impossible to date precisely, but which seems to fall just at this logical juncture in his thinking, Kant jotted: "Extensive clarity through external characteristics [Merkmale], intensive through inner, the former through coordinated, the latter through subordinated [characteristics]. In the former, a broad, in the latter a deep clarity. The flaw of the one: dryness; of the second, flatness. The advantage of the former: aesthetic; of the latter: logical" (Reflection 2368, cited in P. Menzer, Kants Ästhetik, 29). 11. Kant, Reflection 204, A.A. 15:79. 12. Kant, Reflection 643 (1769-70), A.A. 15:283. 13. Kant, Reflection 179, 182, A.A. 15:67-68. 14. Kant, Reflection 619, A.A. 15:268. 15. Ibid. 16. Kant, Reflections 619, 620, 622; A.A. 15:268-69. 17. "Sensation has in it feeling [Gefühl] and perception [Wahrnehmen]; the first is subjective, the second is objective" (Reflection 279 [1770], A.A. 15:105). 18. Kant, Reflections 177 (1769) and 681 (1769), A.A. 15:65, 303; and, from a later period, 408 (1770s), A.A. 15:165. 19. Ibid., most particularly 408. 20. Kant, Reflection 680 (1769), A.A. 15:302. In another such reflection, Kant writes: "Sensible representations are either sensations and require sense, or appearances and are grounded upon the power of intuition; the former are changes in the condition of the subject through the presence of the object; the latter are representations of the object itself insofar as it is open to the senses" (Reflection 650, A.A. 15:287). 21. Kant,Äe/2«:fc'orc287(1770s),A.A. 15:107. The notion oiEinbildung as a spontaneous power was not entirely clear to Kant in the period 1769— 70. It only emerged over the 1770s. For detailed discussion of Kant's precritical theory of imagination, see R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, 9—25; and H. Mörchen, "Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant," esp. 386ff. (reprint, 76ff.). 22. Kant, Reflection 643 (1769—70), A.A. 15:283. 23. On Tetens, see J. Barnouw, "The Philosophical Achievement and

360

Notes to Pages 48-50

Historical Significance of Johann Nicolas Tetens," 301-35, and L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 412-25. 24. Kant, Reflection 624, A.A. 15:270 25. Kant, Reflection 638, A.A. 15:276. 26. Kant, Reflection 209, A.A. 15:80; and Reflection 681, A.A. 15:303. 27. Kant, Reflection 625, A.A. 15:271. 28. Kant, Reflection 683, A.A. 15:304. 29. Ibid. 30. See Kant's discussion of the "threefold synthesis" in the First Critique, A97. 31. See Reflection 213 (1770), A.A. 15:82, where Kant begins to sense the difficulty. 32. This crucial insight into the holism of space and time constituted Kant's great breakthrough of this period, leading to the theory of pure (sensible) intuition (see Reflection 662, A.A. 15:293). Space is a prior whole, unitary and interpersonally valid, according to Kant. It is the form of sensible intuition. The perfection which sensibility has, compared with reason, is the prior unity of the whole form itself. Such a prior whole is only a conceptual goal ("totality") for rationality. On the other hand, the imperfection of intuition is sensibility itself, namely, dependence upon the matter of sensation, and the limitation of the sensible forms to space and time. Reason is not limited in these ways. 33. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, AI 1/B25. See T. Pinder, "Kants Begriff der transzendentalen Erkenntnis." Pinder stresses the antidogmatic thrust of this phrasing and insists on Kant's departure from his predecessors' usage. See, in this connection, the debate between I. Angelelli and N. Hinske: Angelelli, "On the Origins of Kant's 'Transcendental'"; Hinske, "Kants Begriff des Transcendentalen und die Problematik seiner Begriffsgeschichte." 34. Kant, Prolegomena, 37 (A.A. 4:294). 35. See Critique of Pure Reason A56: "not all cognition a priori must be called transcendental, but instead only that by means of which we recognize that and how certain ideas (perceptions and concepts) are a priori applied and possible." 36. D. Henrich, "Proof-Structure," 646; J. Hintikka, "Transcendental Arguments," 274-76. 37. That the mind works by processes which need not be selfconscious in their functioning is a fundamental and necessary element in the "transcendental" philosophy. That Kant thought along these lines is clear if nowhere else at the very least in the Logic: "The exercise of our own powers also takes place according to certain rules which we first follow without being conscious of them" (13 [A.A. 9:11]). 38. This is why Hegel insisted that a phenomenology of spirit entail a bifurcation of perspective as between the consciousness appropriating its own experience and that of the philosopher already conversant with the essentials of that experience. Hegel argued that consciousness was not, for a substantial segment of its itinerary of self-discovery, aware of what it was or what it was about.

Notes to Pages 50-53

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39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A367-74, A490-97/B518-25. 40. Ibid., B145. 41. The difference between Objekt and Gegenstand is essential. In traditional school philosophy, it was the difference between res and ens, i.e., between a matter of formal judgment and a matter entailing an existent entity. See H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account.'" On the distinction in Kant himself, see esp. H. Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 27—28, 135-36. 42. D. Kolb, "Thought and Intuition in Kant's Critical System." And see H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account'": "in order for the conceptual reality of a thing to be the reality of a possible object of experience, the thing has to be posited also in accordance 'with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with the conditions of intuitions and concepts.' [B265] And in order for it to be the reality of an actual object of experience, it has to be posited as 'bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation,' [B266] as well" (122). 43. I take this to parallel Allison's argument in Transcendental Idealism that the two parts of the proof in the "Transcendental Deduction" involved first the "metaphysical deduction," i.e., the theoretical constitution of a "real use" for the categories, and then the "transcendental synthesis" which established that this "real use" did apply to "pure intuition" and could be articulated as a "transcendental synthesis of the imagination" in the "Schematism" chapter. 44. On this notion of pure or originary synthesis see H. Allison, "Transcendental Schematism"; and R. Aquila, "The Relationship between Pure and Empirical Intuition in Kant" and Matter in Mind, 49ff.; skeptical of this notion is P. Guyer, "Apperception and A Priori Synthesis." 45. See H. Allison, "Transcendental Schematism," 64—65. 46. It was against this that S. Korner protested, albeit too drastically, in "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions." Schaper's response, "Arguing Transcendentally," presupposes the regressive Kantian formulation and so defends Kant's sense of "deduction," but fails to confute Korner's logical point, as Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments," esp. 460n., observed. The point is that Korner and a fortiori P. Strawson (The Bounds of Sense), B. Stroud ("Transcendental Arguments," 54—69), and R. Wolff (Kant's Theory of Mental Activity) are seeking in Kant a kind of deduction he never intended. 47. D. Henrich, "Kant's Notion"; see also J. Rosenberg, "Transcendental Arguments Revisited," 612. 48. J. Rosenberg, "Transcendental Arguments Revisited," 612-13; Stroud, "Transcendental Arguments," 54; and Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments," 461. 49. P. Guyer, "Psychology and the Transcendental Deduction." See also G. Bird, "Logik und Psychologie in der Transzendentalen Deduktion," and W. Walsh, "Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique." 50. D. Henrich, "Kant's Notion," 34-35. 51. K. Ameriks, "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," 273-87, esp. 282n. See also N. Rescher, "Kant and the 'Special Constitution' of Man's Mind." 362

Notes to Pages 53-55

52. Frustration with this phantom form of logical argumentation is the driving impetus of M. Gram's several refutations of transcendental arguments: "Transcendental Arguments" and "Must Transcendental Arguments be Spurious?" See also G. Bird, "Recent Interpretations of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," for a criticism of the antiskeptical concept of transcendental argument in Strawson, Stroud etc. Gram, in his turn, provoked J. Hintikka to protest that the argument had been transposed entirely out of the Kantian key (Hintikka, "Transcendental Arguments," 274—81). He was right. Gram set aside at the very outset of his remarks the only fruitful content for considering transcendental arguments: "his theory of the synthetic a priori and his doctrine of the categories" (15). 53. "That Kant not only sets out from this fact of empirical judgment but actually must and also has a right to do so is immediately apparent. He has to set out from this because otherwise his philosophy as a theory of experience would be literally lacking an object." Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 62. 54. For a thorough consideration of this notion, see R. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, passim and esp. 15. 55. Kant, "Über den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:183-84. 56. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 29 (A.A. 5:30). 57. The modality of necessity in the intentional act in general signaled to Kant the presence of his sought-after pure a priori principle of practical reason: the moral law with its "categorical"—and more essentially apodictic—imperative. See L. Beck, "Apodictic Imperatives." 58. This interpretation I take to be congruent with that of L. Beck in "The Putative Apriority of Judgments of Taste," in Essays on Kant and Hume, 167—70; and also of G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 86. 59. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A56/B81. Beck puts this clearly in terms of analytic versus syntheticjudgments: "the distinction between analytic and syntheticjudgments is not one of formal logic, for formal logic abstracts from the meaning of all terms" ("Can Kant's Syntheticjudgments Be Made Analytic?" 10-11). See also F. Grayeff, "The Relationship of the Transcendental and Formal Logic," and T. Swing, Kant's Transcendental Logic, 28-46. 60. This sense can be expressed in terms of the logical versus the real use of reason, a distinction Kant makes throughout his work. Beck explains: "A real definition not only puts the word in place of others, but the definiens contains a clear mark by which the object can be recognized and by virtue of which the defined concept is shown to have 'objective reality'. . . Kant is saying that in a real definition we do not mainly equate a word with a logical product of arbitrarily chosen logical predicates, but we make at least a problematical existential judgment and state the conditions under which this judgment could be justified" ("Kant's Theory of Definition," 26-27). This line of thought has been developed by H. Allison in his debate with M. S. Gram on syntheticity with specific reference to the KantEberhard controversy, but with direct relevance to the whole "critical philosophy": M. Gram, Kant, Ontology and the A Priori; H. Allison, The KantEberhard Controversy, esp. 54ff.; Gram, "The Crisis of Syntheticity"; and

Notes to Pages 55-57

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Allison, "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments." 61. That was why, among other things, the ontological proof of God fell apart, as Kant argued so forcefully in the Critique of Pure Reason (A592602/B620-31). That was also why Leibniz's great speculative system failed, as Kant argued there as well in a crucial appendix entitled "The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection" (A260-92/B316-49). This appendix is the seedbed of many of Kant's later epistemological and ontological considerations. 62. Ibid., A260/B316. 63. See M. Liedke, "Kants Begriff der Reflektion." 64. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127—28). 65. See, e.g.: D. Henrich, "The Proof-Structure," Identität und Objektivität, and "Kant's Notion of a Deduction." For evaluations of Henrich, see P. Guyer, Review of Identität und Objektivität, and K. Ameriks, "Recent Work," 15-16. 66. This point is all too frequently neglected by contemporary philosophers, but it was essential to Kant. See Critique of Pure Reason A3/B7; Prolegomena, 2 - 3 (A.A. 4:257). It is time to return to a discriminating metaphysical interpretation of his work. (Ameriks suggested this prospect in his review, "Recent Work," 1.) 67. Scholars have maintained that most of the revisions of the B-version worked to eliminate the "psychologism" and to suppress the "faculty-talk." While there can be no doubt that Kant reformulated his argument in the B-version, it did not imply at all a repudiation of what he had written in the A-version, and certainly not of the "subjective deduction." It remained implicit in the B-version, and its elements figured explicitly throughout the unrevised "Analytic of Principles." (See esp. Critique ofPure Reason, A180/B223.) Moreover, a concern for an account of subjective mental process stayed with Kant in his later critical work and played a major role in the genesis of the Third Critique. (See esp. First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, 24 [A.A. 20:220].) 68. On this concern for a "gap" which haunted Kant to the end of his years, see E. Förster, "Is There a 'Gap' in Kant's Critical System?" 69. "[T]hat there should be a second or even a third Critique with an 'Analytic' and a 'Dialectic' was a completely foreign thought for Kant in 1781": Brandt, "The Deductions in the Critique ofJudgment," 183. 70. In the Third Critique he would attempt his most comprehensive characterization not merely of each aspect of consciousness in itself but also of the systematic interrelations among them. See W. Bartuschat, Zum Systematischen Ort, for the most thorough statement of this interpretation. 71. This takes the "critical philosophy" to be essentially a philosophical anthropology, as E. Cassirer has argued in "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture." 72. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127—28). 73. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §10:54. 74. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 9n. (A.A. 5, 9n.). 364

Notes to Pages 57-62

75. Kant gave several examples of such "transcendental explanations" in this footnote: "Life is the faculty of a being by which it acts according to the laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of desire is the faculty such a being has of causing, through its [representations], the reality of the objects of these [representations]. Pleasure is the [representation] of the agreement of an object or an action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty through which [a representation] causes the reality of its object (or the direction of the energies of a subject to such an action as will produce the object)" (ibid.). The analysis of the concrete nature of each of these transcendental explanations will concern us later in this study. 76. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A260-92/B316-49. 77. My historical interest in finding continuities between Kant's Third Critique and the later Idealists will be apparent. On transcendental arguments in the later Critiques I have learned a great deal from R. Benton, Kant's Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendental Arguments, 24 and passim. 78. Originally this allowed the extension of transcendental analysis to volition and feeling, but eventually it would double back on the transcendental analysis of cognition itself, i.e., the categorial determination of objects of experience would come under reexamination in terms of the structure of purpose of a dynamic rationality. This was the "cognitive turn" which led to the highly systematic First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. 79. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127-28). Three: Validity and Actuality 1. R. Meerbote raises this question, but in an entirely different light. See "Kant's Use of the Notions of'Objective Reality' and 'Objective Validity.'" More to the point are H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account,"' and H. Allison, "Objective Validity and Objective Reality," chap. 7 of Transcendental Idealism. 2. Is there a "real use" of reason with reference to its own immanent process? See R. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, 90 and esp. 102: "[A] claim that we possess concepts a priori is a transcendental claim; it is a claim about a kind of knowledge." 3. According to Prauss, Kant only came to recognize a problem in his theory of subjective consciousness after he published the A-version of the First Critique, and his response to that lacuna was the theory of a "judgment of perception" in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of 1783 (Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 102). 4. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B161. In making this interpretation I believe I find myself in the company of Aquila, Matter in Mind, 126; and Young, "Kant's View of Imagination." Also emphatic on this point is G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant: "The theory of judgments of perception which was evolved in the Prolegomena, of which the first edition of the Critique [of Pure Reason] had not even a trace, was not only not surrendered by Kant in the second edition, but only actually introduced into the Critique for Notes to Pages 62-65

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the first time [cf. B139f.]. This [mis]perception fails to take cognizance, further, that also in the Critique ofJudgment the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience serves as a necessary and, for Kant, self-evident presupposition" (14In.). 5. Kant, Logic, 69ff. (A.A. 9:63). The idea of concept formation in relation to empirical judgments and the constitution of objects is richly examined in Bäumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, and deserves more consideration as a link between the projects of Leibniz and Baumgarten before, and Hegel after Kant. See A. Model, Metaphysik und reflektierende Urteilskraft, on these issues. 6. An empirical concept, Kant makes quite clear, differs little from a mere name: "an empirical concept cannot be defined at all, but only made explicit. For since we find in it only a few characteristics of a certain species of sensible object, it is never certain that we are not using the word, in denoting one and the same object, sometimes so as to stand for more, and sometimes so as to stand for fewer characteristics . . . The word, with the few characteristics which attach to it, is more properly to be regarded as merely a designation than as a concept of the thing" (Critique of Pure Reason A727-28/B755-56). See R. Pippin, "The Schematism and Empirical Concepts" and "Kant on Empirical Concepts"; and G. Schräder, "Kant's Theory of Concepts." 7. Synthesis is the crucial concept in Kant's epistemology. This has been recognized by many scholars. See R. Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments," 466; R. Aquila, chap. 3 of Matter in Mind, 49ff; and H. Allison, Transcendental Idealism, passim and esp. 141-44, 159—64. R. Makkreel (Imagination and Interpretation, 25ff.) construes synthesis narrowly in terms of transcendental constitution, but it may well be that the term is Kant's most general for the spontaneous activity of mind in many aspects, including those Makkreel sees as "formative" rather than "syn^ thetic." In any event, it is crucial to reconstruct this constitutive process and to recognize that since it is sequential, in some sense, parts of it can be carried out without always necessarily completing the whole constitutive procedure. That will prove the key to those peculiar sorts of judgment that Kant calls subjective. 8. Kant, Prolegomena, §26:52 (A.A. 4:309). 9. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §vii:29. See R. Aquila, "Is Sensation the Matter of Appearances?" 14. 10. See Kant, Critique ofJudgment, § 14. These are of course synonyms for Bildung, formation, the most important such concept, as we shall see. 11. For this sense of "besides" see Kant, Prolegomena, §26:52 (A.A. 4:309), and Critique of Pure Reason A166/B207. 12. Kant, Prolegomena, §26:52. 13. On primary and secondary qualities see: R.Jackson, "Locke's Distinction"; R. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism"; E. Curley, "Locke, Boyle,"; J. Bennett, "Substance, Reality"; and M. Ayers, "Substance, Reality." 14. See Bennett's discussion of phenol as a secondary quality, "Substance, Reality," 8.

366

Notes to Pages 65-67

15. On Kant's "transcendental idealism" and the continuing controversy over its precise meaning, see Ameriks, "Recent Work," 1-11, for a careful overview. While there are elements of the "two view" approach which seem attractive from the contemporary vantage, it remains that there is probably a good deal to the "two world" view, with its attendant metaphysics, as a historical gloss of Kant's doctrines. That will be considered further at a later point in this study. 16. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A189-90/B234-35. 17. Ibid., A191/B236. 18. Ibid., A178/B220. The centrality of the categories of relation in the establishment of objective reference has become central to the discrimination of "subjective" from "objective" judgments, as will appear below. 19. Ibid., A180/B223. 20. Ibid., A191/B236. 21. Ibid. 22. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §iv: 15. 23. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A195/B240. 24. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §76, makes this point vividly in terms of the discursiveness of human consciousness. 25. I take this interpretation to be roughly congruent with L. Beck's analysis in "The Putative Apriority of Judgments of Taste," in Essays on Kant and Hume, 167ff. 26. Intuition is perhaps the most problematic notion in Kant's epistemology. It has been interpreted in terms of three distinct properties in the scholarly literature: "singularity" or "individuality," in the sense of completeness of a manifold in a whole; "givenness," in the sense of indubitable actuality for consciousness (hence, for Kant, there is no certainty equal to intuitive certainty); and finally, "immediacy" to consciousness, that which needs and can have no rational mediation to assure its presence to consciousness. See J. Hintikka, "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)"; M. Thompson, "Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology"; K. Wilson, "Kant on Intuition"; M. Gram, "The Sense of a Kantian Intuition"; K. Robson, "Kant's Concept of Intuition"; and R. Smyth, Forms of Intuition, 134-69. 27. As E. Schaper does in "Imagination and Knowledge," in Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 1—17. 28. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception." 29. R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, 29, notes Kant's textemendation in his personal copy of the B-version of the First Critique substituting "understanding" for "imagination" as the source of all synthesis; nevertheless Young ("Kant's View of Imagination," 148) claims that the A-version is more authentic to the critical philosophy taken as a whole. I concur. 30. Schaper, "Imagination and Knowledge" and "Kant und das Problem der Einbildungskraft." More moderate is M. Warnock, "Imagination and Perception." 31. M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics; H. Mörchen, "Die Einbildungskraft in Kant." For a criticism of Heidegger's metaphysi-

Notes to Pages 67-69

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cal project with imagination, see D. Henrich, "Über die Einheit der Subjektivität." 32. On some readings of the First Critique, one might question whether "matter," the manifold in sensation, can even be registered by consciousness apart from judgment's synthesis of recognition. One passage where Kant raises the possibility of incoherence, only later to repudiate it, is Critique of Pure Reason A90/B123. See R. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, 156ff; and E. Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 18—75. 33. For a recent statement of this view, see D. Kolb, "Thought and Intuition," 229. 34. Not only will the Third Critique offer this evidence; there is also a letter from Kant, written to Herz during the time of that Critique's composition, which bears decisively on this question. See below. 35. G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, is surely the most important work on the phenomenology of subjective consciousness in Kant in recent times. K. Ameriks ("Recent Work," 18) clearly assigns Prauss this stature; see also W. Marx, Review of Prauss. But Prauss has not been without his critics. See H. Seigfried, "Zum Problem des Wahrnehmungsurteil bei Kant," and R. Pippin, Review of Prauss and Kant's Theory of Form, 180—81. Prauss has rescued the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience from centuries of disdain and neglect and brought it to the center of attention. For other considerations of this distinction see T. Uehling's survey, "Wahrnehmungsurteile and Erfahrungsurteile Reconsidered." 36. L. Beck, "Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams?" in Essays on Kant and Hume, 38—60. 37. See W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, 1—59; R. Aquila, "Is Sensation the Matter of Apearance?" 11-29; and Aquila's other studies: Matter in Mind, "The Relationship between Pure and Empirical Intuition in Kant," and "Matter, Forms, and Imaginative Association in Sensory Intuition." See also J. Baumgartner, "On Kant's 'Matter of the Appearance.'" 38. Gram, "Must Transcendental Arguments Be Spurious?" 311-12. 39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B122. 40. G. Bird, "Recent Work in Kant's Transcendental Deduction," 8-9. 41. D. Henrich, "Proof-Structure," 654. 42. P. Guyer, "Apperception and A Priori Synthesis," 210. 43. D. Kolb, "Thought and Intuition," 229. 44. P. Guyer, Review of Identität und Objektivität, 160. For appreciation of this formulation, see K. Ameriks, "Recent Work," 16. 45. K. Ameriks, "Recent Work," 16. 46. Ibid., 17. 47. Ibid., 18. 48. Prauss generically encompasses with Erscheinung all the other Kantian terms for givenness-in-sensation like Empfindung and Wahrnehmung (Erscheinung bei Kant, 148). My own purpose is to associate Kant's usage of Erscheinung with Vorstellung eines Objekts and to reserve Empfindung or Wahrnehmung for a more primordial—unreferred (unbezogene)— representation in consciousness.

368

Notes to Pages 70-71

49. A very clear formulation of this, without explicit reference to Prauss, is in R. Aquila, "Matter, Forms," 87. 50. Even such terms as "whiffs" and "hues" are in fact conceptualobjective, as R. Pippin points out, Kant's Theory of Form, 33. 51. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, passim. 52. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, 39. 53. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 237. 54. K. Ameriks makes this quite clear in his review: "[T]he realm of subjective objects is thought of as tied not to a peculiar stratum of pre- or suprajudgmental items (such as mere association, dreams or commands) but rather to a kind of consciousness that is present precisely in the most ordinary acts of objective perception; it is the purely subjective side of such acts" ("Recent Work," 17). 55. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 163. 56. Ibid., 145-46. 57. R. Aquila, Matter in Mind, 121 and note (234). 58. Ibid., 54, citing A.A. 24:907. 59. Ibid., 55. 60. Aquila, "Matter, Forms," 74. 61. Ibid., 80. 62. Ibid., 92. 63. Ibid., 94. 64. Aquila, Matter in Mind, 138. 65. Aquila writes: "the 'application' of concepts to objects (or appearances) can in its own turn be nothing other than an 'application' of the very faculty of understanding itself. For nothing else is given to the understanding to 'apply' to objects—not even concepts" (Matter in Mind, 134). 66. H. Allison, "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between Analytic and Syntheticjudgments," 20; Kant, note to J. S. Beck letter of Nov. 11, 1791, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 1 l:298n. (Philosophical Correspondence, 181). 67. Allison, "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between Analytic and Syntheticjudgments," 18. 68. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 105. 69. Ibid., 117. 70. Ibid., 164. 71. Ibid. ,171. All of these insights bear with great consequence upon aesthetic judgments, as I will demonstrate. The crucial connection lies in the concept of imagination. 72. L. Beck, "Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams?" in Essays on Kant and Hume, 45. 73. Ibid., 47-48n. 74. L. Beck acknowledges in a note the influence of Prauss in this realization, ibid., 52n. 75. Ibid., 56. 76. Ibid., 58. 77. R. Aquila, Matter in Mind, 127ff., takes a very strong stance that accords with my own, as does Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 141 n. 78. M. Gregor, "Aesthetic Form," 195.

Notes to Pages 71-75

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79. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 150. 80. Ibid., 158. 81. This qualifier will be elaborated below. 82. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51 /B75. 83. Kant, Logic, §11:103 (A.A. 9:97). 84. Meerbote, '"Objective Validity' and 'Objective Reality,"' 53ff. 85. The notion of a "subjective principle a priori" is, of course, essential to the argument of the Third Critique. 86. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §vii:25. 87. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A44/B61. 88. Mathematical constructions take place in "pure" intuition, according to Kant. Pure intuition is not empirical. The space of mathematical construction is ideal, and therefore any "object" which is "realized" in a mathematical construction is not a real object. It is merely formal, not actual. What it lacks is precisely material existence. In his preface toMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant explained this distinction in terms of a contrast of "nature" with "essence." Nature, he wrote, "signifies the primal, internal principle of everything that belongs to the existence of a thing," whereas "essence is the primal, internal principle of everything that belongs to the possibility of a thing." Kant continued: "Therefore, one can attribute to geometrical figures only an essence and not a nature (since there is thought in their concept nothing which expresses an existence)" (Metaphysical Foundations, 3). The heart of the distinction between nature and essence is the contrast between existence (actuality) and possibility. Kant makes the same distinction in the Third Critique, arguing that the ground of this distinction "lies in the subject and in the nature of our cognitive faculties." He elaborates: "if the understanding thinks . . . a thing (which it may do at pleasure), the thing is merely represented as possible. If it is conscious of it as given in intuition, then it is actual" (Critique of Judgment, §76:249-50). 89. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A320/B376-77. 90. Kant, Logic, 7In. 91. "In man (and so in beasts too) there is an immense field of sensuous intuitions and sensations we are not conscious of, though we can conclude with certainty that we have them. In other words, the field of our obscure [representations] is immeasurable, while our clear [representations] are only the infinitesimally few points on this map that lie open to consciousness: our mind is like an immense map with only a few places illuminated." (Anthropology, §5:16. Here and in all citations from this translation, I replace Gregor's "idea" with the standard "representation" for the German term Vorstellung in order to avoid confusion.) 92. Kant, Letter to Herz, May 26,1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 11:51-52 (Philosophical Correspondence, 153—54). 93. G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 75, notes Kant's revealing use of "metamorphosis (Verwandlung) of [subjective] appearance [Erscheinung] into cognition [Erkenntnis]" in such works as Metaphysical Foundations (A.A. 4:555) and the Prolegomena (A.A. 4:297). 94. Kant, Logic, 71 (A.A. 9:65). 95. J. M. Young holds that his cat is capable of this sort of discrimina3 70

Notes to Pages 76-81

tion: "What the cat has, if my suggestion is correct, is the capacity to interpret his sensible states in accordance with certain rules and to discriminate sensible things of one sort from those of other sorts" ("Kant's View of Imagination," 149-50). Aquila writes: "Kant himself is prepared to grant that, animals are in fact capable of a kind of judgment . . . a kind of 'reflective'judgment . . . the notion of a certain sort of suitability or affinity between the work of the mere imagination and that of an at least potential understanding" (Matter in Mind, 69). 96. Animals can "recognize" in the sense of comparing likeness and difference; they are manifestly acquainted with such things as scents, tracks, salt licks, and water holes without having to subsume these "objects" to conceptual universals. Indeed, they don't articulate an experience like "That is George," but they certainly have it. The animal would not be perplexed by the emptiness of "that" or "this" in these propositions, for it would never have come to propositions. It is humans who articulate, who name. Yet erkennen in this sense would still have the sense of acquaintance (kennen, not wissen). "That is George" remains a matter of attaching arbitrary signs to the signified, not yet a matter of logical understanding. Yet humans worry over sentences and their referents. Having named, they wish to "understand" (verstehen) and therefore have to reflect upon propositions, elevating them to logical scrutiny and universal validation. See Sellars and Gram, cited in notes 37 and 26 above, for divergent notions about the status of "thises" and "thats" in judgments of recognition like "That is George." 97. Kant, Prolegomena §18:41-42 (A.A. 4:298). 98. Ibid., §20:43 (A.A. 4:300). The repeated reference to "consciousness of my state" and "state of my mind" should be connected with the argument in the "Amphiboly" of the First Critique. We will return to this notion. 99. Ibid., §22:48 (A.A. 4:305). 100. See Critique ofJudgment §iv: 15—16. This would apppear to be the predominant sense ofjudgment in the First Critique. See A132-34/B17173. On the implicit distinction from reflective judgment in the First Critique see M. Liedtke, Der Begriff. 101. This issue resurfaces in Kant's own epistemology as the problem of "empirical entailment" in the Third Critique, and especially in its First Introduction. 102. See Kant's note on the letter from Jacob Sigismund Beck, Nov. 11, 1791,A.A. ll:298n. (PhilosophicalCorrespondence, 181). 103. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A120. 104. Ibid., A78/B103. 105. Kant called imagination "a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious" (Critique of Pure Reason, A78/B103). 106. Kant, Anthropology, §6:19: 107. Ibid., §31:50. 108. Ibid., 52. In connection with this see the controversial text in the First Critique, A90/B123. 109. Ibid. Note the symmetry with conduct in the practical sphere that Notes to Pages 81-84

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is "in accordance with" but not done "for the sake of" duty, i.e., in explicit acknowledgement of its rule. 110. Ibid., §25:40. The use of "concept" here may seem a bit misleading, yet by its placement in the text and by the term "attention" associated with it, we must recognize that the only sense of concept here is that of an empirical concept, and Kant is clear that it differs little from a mere name. 111. Ibid., §44:73. 112. Ibid., §54:89. On this see the extensive discussion in A. Bäumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 142ff; O. Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie, 268; and G. Tonelli, "Kant's Early Theory of Genius." See also that remarkable passage about judgment in the First Critique (A132-36/B171-75), which obviously takes judgment in a different sense from the standard determinant judgment under the authority of the categories. See M. Liedtke, Der Begriff, for details. 113. Kant, Anthropology, §55:90. 114. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 141-42. 115. This draws close to Makkreel's project to construe imagination in Kant's Third Critique as a source for hermeneutics as a mode of "interpretation." 116. J. M. Young, Kant's View of Imagination," 147. 117. E. Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 1-17. 118. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 149. 119. Ibid., 151. We will return to these issues in our discussion of hypotyposis ox Darstellung in connection with Kant's theory of symbolism in part 3 of this study. 120. This sense of a faculty ofjudgment with distinctive features parallels closely the remarkable passage concerning judgment in the First Critique: AXM-MI 121. Makkreel conceives of imagination in this determined sense as "synthetic," while he calls undetermined (or indeterminate) imagination "formative." The terms are certainly distinguishable, but what seems to differentiate the so-called "synthetic" from the "formative" is the explicit acknowledgement of rule in the judgment, a distinction Kant formulates most clearly as that between determinant and reflective judgment. 122. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 154. 123. Kant, Anthropology, §40:69. 124. In §26 of the Third Critique, Kant will term this capacity of imagination "comprehension." 125. Kant, Anthropology, §28:45. 126. Kant, Critique ojJudgment, §10:55-56. 127. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A260-61/B316-17. See also M. Liedtke, Der Begriff. 128. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A260-61/B316-17. 129. Ibid., A261/B317. 130. Ibid., A269/B325. Four: The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 1. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason 29 (A.A. 5, 30). 2. See Meredith, "Last Stages," xxxvii—1. 372

Notes to Pages 84-90

3. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §9. 4. Kant to K. L. Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15 {Philosophical Correspondence 127-28). 5. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §10:55. 6. On Kant's language of purpose see esp. K. Marc-Wogau, Vier Studien, part 2: Wesen und Arten der Zweckmäßigkeit. My view is heavily indebted to his work. For other recent contributions, see G. Tonelli, "Von den verschiedenen Bedeutungen"; and W. Pluhar, "How to Render 'Zweckmäßigkeit.'" For the older literature, see, e.g., R. Eisler, Der Zweck. On the superiority of "purpose" and "purposiveness" as renderings of Zweck and Zweckmäßigkeit over Meredith's "end" and "finality," I find myself in complete agreement with Pluhar. 7. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §10:55. 8. Ibid. 9. N. Rescher, "Noumenal Causality"; R. Wolff, "Remarks." 10. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 164 (AA 5:160). 11. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A23/B38. 12. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §31:M135, §33:M140, §8:M53-55. 13. Ibid., §33:M140. A second passage contrasted identical propositions, substituting rose for tulip (ibid., §8:M55). 14. Ibid., §3. 15. Ibid., §12:M63, §35:M142-43, §36:M144, §37:M145. 16. Ibid., §vii:25-26. 17. Ibid., §8. See L. Beck, "On the Putative Apriority ofJudgments of Taste," in .Essays on Kant and Hume, 167-70; E. Schaper, "Epistemological Claims and Judgments of Taste," in Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 18ff.; P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 310—26; K. Ameriks, "Kant and the Objectivity of Taste." 18. Kant defined "exemplary necessity" as "a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment which is regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state." Critique ofJudgment, §18:74. 19. Ibid., §29:M117. 20. Ibid., §8:M53. 21. Ibid., §13:M64. 22. Ibid., §14:M65. 23. Ibid., §31:M135-36. 24. Ibid., §32:124. 25. Ibid., §5. 26. Ibid., §36:M144-45. 27. Ibid., §40:M151. 28. Ibid., §40, §8, §6, §22. 29. Ibid., §34. 30. Ibid., §34:M141. 31. These ideas have been explored extensively in the article literature on Kant's Third Critique. For some important contributions, see T. Greene, "A Reassessment of Kant's Aesthetic Theory"; R. Zimmermann, "Kant: The Aesthetic Judgment"; H. Blocker, "Kant's Theory of the Relation of Imagination and Understanding in Aesthetic Judgments of Taste"; B. Lang, "Kant and the Subjective Objects of Taste"; S. Petock, "Kant, Notes to Pages 90-95

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Beauty, and the Object of Taste"; W. Henckmann, "Das Problem der ästhetischen Wahrnehmung in Kants Ästhetik"; M. Neville, "Kant's Characterization of Aesthetic Experience"; and J. Fisher and J. Maitland, "The Subjectivist Turn in Aesthetics." 32. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §32:M137. 33. Ibid., §9:M58. 34. Ibid., §9:M60. 35. Ibid., §12:M63. 36. Ibid., §10. 37. Ibid., §10:55. 38. Ibid., §iv:l7. 39. Ibid., §10:55. 40. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A686-94/B714-22. 41. See Kant, Critique ofJudgment §15:64, and K. Marc-Wogau, Vier Studien, 70-71. 42. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §62:210. 43. Ibid., §vii:26. 44. We will have to correct this impression ultimately and claim that precisely because of the "animality" in man, his susceptibility to "subjective material purposiveness" operates even prior to any empirical cognitive judgment, through a mere "judgment of sense." 45. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §64:216. See also §43:M163: "if, as sometimes happens, in a search through a bog, we light on a piece of hewn wood, we do not say it is a product of nature but of art [artifice]. Its producing cause had an end in view to which the object owes its form." Though we can ascribe such artifice to nature figuratively, as in the case of bee's work, on analogy to art, it is because it is only conceivable to us "in such a way that its actuality must have been preceded by a representation of the thing in its cause . . . although its effect could not have been thought by the cause." And see, finally, §64:216—17: "If in a seemingly uninhabited country a man perceived a geometrical figure, say a regular hexagon, inscribed on the sand, his reflection busied with such a concept would attribute, although obscurely, the unity in the principle of its genesis to reason, and consequently would not regard as a ground of the possibility of such a shape the sand, or the neighboring sea, or the winds, or beasts with familiar footprints, or any other irrational cause. For the chance against meeting with such a concept, which is only possible through reason, would seem so infinitely great that it would be just as if there were no natural law, no cause in the mere mechanical working of nature capable of producing it. . . This, then, would be regarded as a purpose." 46. Of course, even there we have difficulty with the unintended consequences of our purposes—both in recognizing and in acknowledging them. But that is a Hegelian insight, not a Kantian one. See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 211—52. 47. For a sense of the richness of this particular illustration for the mentality of the age see A. Lovejoy on changes in styles of gardening in the eighteenth century ("The Chinese Origins of a Romanticism" and "The First Gothic Revival and the Return to Nature," in Essays in the History of Ideas). 3 74

Notes to Pages 95-97

48. Kant, Critique of Judgment §45:149, §48:154. A great deal more needs to be said about these notions, but this is not the place. See below. 49. This is Kant's essential point about organisms. 50. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §10:55. 51. See L. Beck, Commentary, 90-108, on the role "interest" plays in Kant's theory of action. See P. Guyer, "Interest, Nature and Art," "Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant's Aesthetics," and Kant and the Claims of Taste, 174ff., for a considered view of the role of this notion in Kant's aesthetics. 52. It is a notion with which the Third Critique will wrestle ever after, and never completely resolve. Kant's notion of "objective purposiveness" is problematic because it fails of both the two senses in which "objective" works in the Kantian philosophy. It cannot be primordially given, because purposiveness is always an inference, not an inherent property of the object (Third Critique, Introduction, §vii:26). And it cannot be objectively valid because it cannot be brought under determinant judgments. 53. Kant, Grounding, 42. There are two key attributes of such an "endin-itself." First, it is a rational agent, an "independently existing end"—a will, not an object of will. Second, as such, it is "final." By "final" Kant meant two things: ultimacy, that which can never be taken as a means for any other purpose; and autonomy, having the capacity independently to determine its own purposes (Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §82:276). It is in the concept of "final purpose" that Kant supplies the crucial clarification of "objective purpose" which specifies it within the general category of "intrinsic purposiveness" and allows the essential claim that man is an end-inhimself. But this clarification was only achieved in the Third Critique. It was the fruit of Kant's "ethical turn." 54. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §15:63. 55. Kant, Reflection 696 (1769-71), A.A. 15:309. 56. Kant, Reflection 403 (1750s), A.A. 15:161. 57. Kant, Reflection^,A.A. 15:269. 58. Kant, Reflection 628 (1769), A.A. 15:273. 59. Ibid., 267. 60. That, and even the example which first comes to his mind, the beauty of flowers, anticipates what became the crux of Kant's theory of "free beauty" in the Third Critique. 61. Kant, Reflection 628 (1769), A.A. 15:267. 62. Kant, Reflection 656 (1769), A.A. 15:290. 63. Kant, Reflection 643 (1769-79), A.A. 15:283. 64. Kant, Reflection 694, A.A. 15:308. Kant added a further comment: "the form of synthesis for any purpose in general [die Form der Zusammenstimmung zum Belieben überhaupt] is absolute perfection." This definition should be related to Kant's later formulations of objective purposiveness as organism and system, i.e., as a self-determining whole. 65. Kant, Reflection 279 (1770), A.A. 15:105. A little later, in 1771, Kant comes even to distinguish between the cognitive and the evaluative approach to the object. A cognitive representation of the object is distinct from the evaluation [Beurteilung] of the object, which has to do with its worth (Reflection 714 [1771], A.A. 15:316). Notes to Pages 97-101

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66. Kant, Reflection 676 (1769), A.A. 15:299-300. 67. Kant, Reflection 630 (1769), A.A. 15:274. 68. Kant, Reflection 618 (mid-1760s), A.A. 15:266. There were the germs of his own later theory. 69. Kant, Reflection 638 (1769), A.A. 15:276. 70. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §vii:26. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid., §10:55. 73. Ibid., §vii:26. 74. It might seem that I have unduly complicated matters by introducing the notion of aesthetic matter, when only form was alluded to in the passage. But the Kantian distinction of the agreeable from the beautiful will be seen to turn on just this discrimination. 75. Compare Guyer's discussion of "form of finality" and "finality of form," Kant and the Claims of Taste, 211 ff. 76. Kant, Anthropology, §15:32. 77. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §3:40. 78. "It is also not to be denied that all representations in us, whether, objectively viewed, they are merely sensible or are quite intellectual, may yet subjectively be united to gratification or grief, however imperceptible either may be, because they all affect the feeling of life, and none of them, so far as it is a modification of the subject, can be indifferent" (Critique of Judgment §29:119). See also §1, where Kant considers it possible that rational representations can have mere subjective reference and be, then, aesthetical. In his discussion of the cognitive use of the language of purposiveness, Kant suggested that satisfaction could accompany even an empirical judgment about nature. He was speaking of the thrill of discovery, as he made clear in §vi of the Introduction. He wrote there: "The discovery that two or more empirical heterogeneous laws of nature may be combined under one principle comprehending them both is the ground of a very marked pleasure" (Critique ofJudgment, §1:24). Nevertheless, Kant did not believe there was any necessary role for pleasure in a logical reflective judgment. See the preface to the Third Critique (5). A determinant judgment, presumably, would be altogether abstracted from any possible "aesthetic character" in the representation. Five: The Beautiful and the Pleasant 1. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §34:127. 2. Ibid., §9:M59. 3. Ibid., §9:M60. 4. Ibid., §39:M149. 5. Ibid., §9:51. 6. Ibid., 26. 7. A. Bäumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 84ff. 8. See, for example, T. Cohen and P. Guyer, introduction to Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, 4; and P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 10—11. 9. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §4:41-42, §5:43, §7:46-47. 10. Kant, First Introduction, 28. 3 76

Notes to Pages 101-8

11. Ibid., 28-29. Translation slightly amended. 12. Ibid., 28. Translation slightly amended. 13. See Kant's letter to M. Herz, May 26,1789, A.A. 11:51-52. 14. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §3:41. 15. Ibid., §8:49-50. 16. Ibid., §8:50, §33:127. 17. Ibid., §4:42. 18. Ibid., §2:38. 19. Ibid., §13:58. 20. Ibid., §vii:27. 21. L. Beck, "On the Putative Apriority ofJudgments of Taste," in Essays on Kant and Hume, 167-70; and E. Schaper, "Epistemological Claims and Judgments of Taste," in Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 18ff. On this question Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, is the most rigorous extended study; see esp. 310-26. 22. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §9:51. 23. Ibid., §9:5Iff. 24. Ibid., §1:38. 25. Ibid., §49:157. 26. Ibid., §36:131. 27. Ibid., §37:131-32. 28. Ibid., §vii:27. 29. The sequential or stage theory is at the heart of Guyer's interpretation in Kant and the Claims of Taste, esp. 11 Off., whose analysis of §§9 and 37 makes a very compelling case for the superiority of the second argument. For an earlier formulation of this view, which Guyer drew upon, see A. Tumarkin, "Zur transscendentalen [sic] Methode der Kantischen Ästhetik." 30. Kant, Critique offudgment, §8:49—50. 31. Ibid., §22GR:77-78. 32. Ibid., §22GR:78. 33. Kant, Anthropology, §31:52. 34. Ibid., §67:108. 35. Ibid., §12:29. 36. R. Odebrecht, Form und Geist, 97. 37. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §14:61. 38. Ibid., §31:122. 39. Ibid., §9:51. 40. Ibid., §9:53. 41. Ibid., §6:46. Note the centrality of disinterestedness in this approach. 42. Ibid., §40:136. 43. Ibid., §8:50-51, §40:135. 44. Ibid., §9:52. 45. Ibid., §vii:26. 46. Ibid., §35:129. 47. Ibid., §39:135. 48. Ibid., §9:52. 49. Ibid., §21:75. Notes to Pages 108-18

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50. Ibid. 51. See Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, passim; A. Tumarkin, "Zur transscendentalen Methode"; and A. Genova, "Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Aesthetical Judgments" for critical examinations of this deduction in detail. 52. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §9:54. 53. Ibid., §12:58. 54. On the face of it, if the process is entirely subjective in its grounding, and presumably the faculties work in harmony freely, it should be entirely at the subject's disposition which representations should occasion beauty. If it isn't, then something about the object must be necessary to the experience. It is not the case that a parallel with empirical cognitive judgment resolves the issue, because all sensible intuition is constituted the moment any ground for the applicability of categories of understanding has been established. That only some empirical intuitions occasion the feeling of beauty, however, poses an altogether different problem. 55. There are some who argue that on Kant's theory, every object should occasion this feeling, and that this decisively weakens Kant's approach. The criticism has been formulated by R. Meerbote, "Reflection on Beauty." An attempt to answer the criticism, by accepting but reinterpreting its key assertion, was made in T. Gracyk, "Sublimity, Ugliness, and Formlessness." Both essays recognize in Kant's aesthetics a notion of a preconceptual ordering with aesthetic value. For a very effective treatment of this issue, see M. Gregor, "Aesthetic Form." 56. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §17:68. 57. Ibid., §14:M66 amended. 58. To say that representations-of-objects are eligible for objective reference is simply to say that they necessarily occur in space and time, i.e., they have the form of sensible intuition. 59. P. Guyer has analyzed this confusion in terms of the convergence of the "finality of form" with the "form of finality." See P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 211 ff. 60. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §14:M66 amended. 61. The distortion finds echoes later in the text. In §42 Kant gave another go at distilling "form" from the Reiz of color and tone. "The charms [Reize] in natural beauty, which are to be found blended, as it were, so frequently with beauty of form, belong either to the modifications of light (in coloring) or of sound (in tones). For these are the only sensations which permit not merely of a feeling of the senses, but also of reflection upon the form of these modifications of sense" (ibid., §42:M161). 62. Ibid., §14:61. 63. Ibid., §22GR:M86-87, substituting "purposiveness" for "finality." 64. See Kant's Reflection 706 (1771-72), A.A. 15:313, for an anticipation of this conception of the dialectic. 65. For the "ease" of the "Deduction," see §38, Remark; for the poverty in transcendental determinations, see the letter to Reinhold, Dec. 2 8 31,1787, in Briefwechsel A. A. 10:513-15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127-

3 78

Notes to Pages 118-22

28); for further reflections on this question, see §55, the introduction to the final version of the "Dialectic." 66. Tonelli, "La formazione," 447. 67. Meredith, "Last Stages," 253-54. Six: Kant's Philosophy of Art in the Year 1788 1. M.Johnson, "Kant's Unified Theory of Beauty." 2. R. Burch, "Kant's Theory of Beauty as Ideal Art." 3. It is useful to look to the Latin for these terms. "Free beauty" is termed pulchritudo vaga. "Dependent beauty" is pulchritudo adhaerens. To render vaga as "free," as Kant did, is indicative of the peculiar character of . the freedom he wished to assign to taste. 4. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §15:M70. 5. Ibid., §16:67. See E. Schaper, "Free and Dependent Beauty," in Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 78—95; and P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 242-52. 6. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §48:M173, substituting "purposiveness" for "finality." 7. Kant goes to great lengths to distinguish among merely sensual pleasure, das Angenehme, beauty, das Schöne, and the good, aas Gute, in §§ 1— 5 of the Third Critique. These ideas had been distinguished in his thinking since the 1760s. 8. Ibid., §15:M70. And see ße/fecfem 656 (1769), A.A. 15:290. 9. Ibid., §16:67. 10. It is, in other words, an "ideal" in the terminology of the First Critique. Why Kant insists on calling it an "aesthetic idea" will only be fully clear after we have incorporated his theory of symbolism. For the moment, let us suspend that question. 11. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §17:M77, with emendations. 12. Ibid., §17:M78-79. 13. Ibid.; Kant discusses the ideal of the imagination along similar lines in the First Critique at B384-85. 14. Or, alternatively, has its source in something less determinately applicable to sensible intuition, namely, ideas of reason. This last possibility is the one Kant will eventually opt for. 15. The phrase, which is so utterly apt, is from Max Weber, who uses it in an entirely different context. Kant's sense accords more with an idea which one of Weber's students developed: Georg Lukäcs's idea of the typical as a Hegelian "concrete universal." See, e.g., Lukacs, Realism in Our Time, 122. 16. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §17:M77. 17. Ibid., §17:M78. 18. Ibid., §17:M79. 19. What could be an image of anyone cannot very well serve as a portrait of someone. A. Malraux makes a very interesting analysis of this idea in juxtaposing a head sculpted in antiquity with one sculpted in the Middle Ages. The Roman head is in just the relevant sense impersonal. The medieval head is utterly personal. See Malraux, Voices of Silence, 218-19. Notes to Pages 123-29

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20. Kant, Critique ojJudgment, §17:68. 21. Kiesewetter to Kant, Jan. 29, 1790, A.A ll:126ff. 22. Hegel was one who criticized Kant along these lines. See Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics, esp. 56ff. 23. Nietzsche has a great deal to say about the difference this introduces into the aesthetic theory one composes. See "The Will to Power as Art" in Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 419-53, and the discussion in M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, 1:107ff. 24. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §45:M167. 25. Ibid., §48:M173. 26. See Kant, First Introduction, § 1. For these two senses of rationality in Weber, see "Politics as a Vocation," 120—22.1 wish only to use his terms to help illuminate Kant. 27. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §43:146. 28. Ibid., §43:M164. 29. Ibid., §45:149. 30. Ibid., §45:M167. 31. Ibid., §49:M181. 32. Ibid., §43:M164. 33. Ibid., §44:M165. 34. Ibid. Kant frequently distinguished merely historical learning from rational or philosophical science. See his First Critique, A836/B864, and his announcement of his lectures, A.A. 2:305-313. 35. In all this one can see the enormous appeal of Kant to the Positivists of the late nineteenth century, whose phrase "back to Kant" was a rebellion largely against all the "Romantic excesses." In their acceptance of Kant's ironic handling of genius, they mislaid the very powerful Romantic stress on creativity, however. It is the great philosophical contribution of Michael Polanyi in all sobriety to reintroduce these questions with explicit reference to the philosophy of Kant, in Personal Knowledge. 36. Meredith cites Alexander Gerard, William Duff and Edward Young as the most likely sources of Kant's theory of genius. O. Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie, offers a host of English sources. G. Tonelli, "Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779)," tries to sort out the early sources. What is clear, in any event, is that Kant had closely read the existing literature, and had taken Gerard, in particular, as the most important theorist before himself, and the one he had therefore to improve upon. 37. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §46:M168. 38. Ibid., 169. 39. Ibid., §47:M 169-70. 40. The notions of the limitation of art, that this limitation in human culture had already been reached, and the consequent demotion of art in terms of its rank among elements in human culture constitute the decisive starting point for Hegel's philosophy of art, and also the basis of his criticism of Romanticism. It is remarkable that Kant should have made these assertions. Yet Kant never pursued or developed them. Indeed, he did not even justify them. They remained bald assertions in his work. All the real labor was left to Hegel. 41. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §47:M171-72. 380

Notes to Pages 129-41

42. Ibid., 172. 43. Kant to F. H. Jacobi, Aug. 30, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. U:73f. 44. What we have here, in short, is yet another chapter in that "ancient quarrel between the philosophers and the poets," as Plato put it long ago. 45. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §43:M163. 46. Indeed, he had an even more profound trick in mind: to steal genius away from the Schwärmer and make it a vehicle for reason. Kant's philosophy of art contains two theories of genius. The first, consistent with all that has gone before, regards genius as "natural" in the sense of belonging to sensibility, givenness, and imagination, and it articulates the phenomenology of genius in terms of the subjective conditions of the faculties of the mind. It is this "naturalistic" theory of genius that concerns us here. But in §49 Kant also articulates for the first time publicly a much more radical possibility, namely, that genius emanates not simply from "nature" in that sense of "actuality," but rather from "nature" in its noumenal sense, i.e., from reason as supersensible but real being. The latter notion, which is the foundation of Kant's theory of symbolism, only came to full articulation, however, in the wake of his "ethical turn," and we will reserve analysis of it for that later context. 47. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §48: Ml 74. 48. Kantian theory of art sees play as a form of abstraction from the binding character of rule through the use of such rules for other purposes, as in setting up rules in a game through which to make play possible, but not out of any earnestness about the rules as such. There is a good deal of literature picking up on Kant's use of play in this context, starting with Schiller and carrying forward to some of the most recent scholarly efforts to make sense of Kant's theory of art. See, e.g., H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 9Iff., and A. Trebels, Einbildungskraft und Spiel. 49. See J. Barzun, Classic, Romantic and Modern, and I. Howe, ed., The Idea of the Modern. 50. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §49:M175. 51. Ibid., §43:M164. 52. Ibid., §17:M75. 53. Kant uses the contrast geistreich andschön in §50 to make his point. A work may be geistreich, full of spirit, when the imaginative genius supplies a good deal of its distinctive "material," but it may not be beautiful. Indeed, like those English gardens, it might verge on the grotesque. Conversely, that which has only taste, but no spark of genius, is, to be sure, in the measure that it conforms to the rules, "correct" and, Kant even seems to suggest, beautiful (schön), yet unequivocally lifeless. 54. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A90/B123; Anthropology, §31,52. 55. See Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §5. 56. Ibid., §29GR:M120. 57. Ibid., §48:M172. 58. Thus Meredith notes, in his commentary: "Of course, 'representation' is not here used in the technical sense with which readers of the Critique of Pure Reason will be familiar. At the same time it is somewhat difficult to fix its meaning . . . Kant's distinction raises more difficulties than it solves" (Kant's Critique of Aesthetical Judgement, editor's note, 285). Notes to Pages 141-46

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59. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §48:M174. 60. In fact, the meaning of this essentially expressive theory of art will only become clear when we address ourselves to Kant's theory of symbolism. Seven: The Cognitive

Turn

1. R. Horstmann recognizes the problem of the process of development: "The two years during which Kant wrote the book must have witnessed a remarkable process of adjusting the initial idea of a Critique of Taste to needs originating from sources not directly related to the theory of taste." Yet he declines to "investigate the details of the historical development of the Critique ofJudgment" ("Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique ofJudgment?" 160—61). 2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §23:M92. 3. In these considerations the cognitive and the practical senses of "intellectual" were peculiarly fused, because the matter which was at issue was the "purposiveness of nature." Insofar as it was "purposive," it referred to a judgment of reason rather than understanding, but insofar as it had to do with "nature," it seemed at least in some sense cognitive. In §42, Kant wrote: "it. . . interests reason that the ideas (for which in the moral feeling it arouses an immediate interest) should have objective reality, i.e that nature should at least show a trace or give an indication that it contains in itself a ground for assuming a regular agreement of its products with our entirely disinterested satisfaction" (143). What Kant is intimating is that, in fact, there are two interests involved in the rational consideration of beauty, first a cognitive one in finding empirical order, but second an ethical one in finding our moral purposes compatible with nature's laws. The first interest would lead him to his "cognitive turn" and the second to his "ethical turn." 4. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §30:M133 (replacing "finality" with "purposiveness"). 5. Ibid., §23:M92 (replacing "finality" with "purposiveness"). In his Remark to §38, Kant elaborated on the "profound inquiries" he meant in the following terms: "But if the question were: How is it possible to assume a priori that nature is a complex of objects of taste? the problem would then have reference to teleology, because it would have to be regarded as an end of nature belonging essentially to its concept that it should exhibit forms that are final for our judgment" (ibid., §38:M148). Kant insists that two considerations be kept clearly in mind: first, this speculation about the intrinsic purposiveness of nature cannot be proven, and hence remains subject to doubt. And second, it is unnecessary to his theory of beauty in nature. 6. Ibid., §43:145. 7. In the First Critique, Kant explained that analogy could not, in philosophy, achieve the specificity of result that it could in mathematics. It could not give the fourth element, when the other three were given in analogical relation, but it could only validate the relation. Yet analogies were extremely important in human cognition. They functioned especially in 382

Notes to Pages 147-53

the sphere where determinate concepts failed, i.e., where understanding was not legislative. In this context, it is worthwhile to point out that Kant used the term "Analogies of Experience" for the crucial categories of relation in the "Transcendental Analytic," and distinguished them as "regulative" and "dynamical" in contrast to the more mathematical categories {Critique of Pure Reason, A179-80/B222). This suggests that the dividing line between analogy and indicative assertion in Kant's theory of knowledge may not be as simple as he would have wished. 8. Kant, First Introduction, §7:24 (A.A. 20:220). 9. Ibid., §5:18 (A.A. 20:213-14). 10. Ibid., §1:8 (A.A. 20:200-1). Beurtheilen is less rigorous than urtheilen; it does not have the same cognitive validity as erklären and seems closer to kennen than to wissen. 11. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §23, paragraphs 4 and 5. This was Kant's point about the beneficial impact of natural beauty upon scientific inquiry. It was also his point about the affective accompaniment of discovery, and the more sustained (transcendental) gratification at the conformity of empirical nature with human reason, which occasioned Kant's memorable apostrophe to the starry heavens. Compare §iv of the Introduction, on the delight associated with discovery in science, which attends the cognition of gratuitous order. 12. See the crucial line in the Transcendental Dialectic, A643/B671: "All errors of subreption are to be ascribed to a defect of judgment [Urtheilskraft], never to understanding or to reason." This is a matter to which we must return. 13. First Introduction, §5:20 (A.A. 20:215). 14. Ibid., §7:24 (A.A. 20:220). 15. Ibid., §9:38 (A.A. 20:234). 16. Ibid., §9:38-39 (A.A. 20:234-35). 17. Kant makes this assertion in his preface to the B-version. It is also implicit in his letter to Reinhold of 1787, of which we have made so much use. 18. The question of "popularity" was a sore point for Kant. He seemed to have had a rather sound attitude about it in the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, but its reception clearly annoyed him, and he was far more irrascible about the issue in his prefaces both to the Prolegomena and to the second edition of the First Critique. 19. For a more detailed analysis of this question, see H. de Vleeschauwer, La deduction, 2:552ff. and vol. 3, passim. See also B. Erdmann, Kants Kriticismus, 163ff.; and M. Washburn, "The Second Edition of the Critique." 20. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface to B-version, Bxl—xli. 21. Kant discusses "purposiveness" in a very important manner in the "Transcendental Dialectic," A625/B653; A686-87/B714-15; A743/B771; A815/B843. We will take this up below. 22. H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 211. 23. Horstmann, "Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique ofJudgment}" 166-69 and 259n., discusses the perplexity of

Notes to Pages 153-57

383

the status of Zweckmäßigkeit in the First Critique in terms of methodological versus transcendental principles of subjective consciousness. 24. Kant, First Introduction, §4 (A.A. 20:203n). See K. Düsing.fli« Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 57, for a very clear exposition of this. 25. The best statement of this insight, and one which has deeply influenced my study, is G. Schräder, "The Status of Teleological Judgment in the Critical Philosophy." But see also H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 211, who argues that the "conformity [of particulars to empirical laws] was not guaranteed by the Transcendental Analytic." And, too, Horstmann, "Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique ofJudgment}" 163: the transcendental principles established in the First Critique "do not account for the contingent or empirical fact that nature consists of very many individual objects [with] . . . special contingent characteristics." 26. See the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant promised a Metaphysics of Nature "not half as large, yet incomparably richer in content than this present Critique" (A:xxi). While the Critique offered an exhaustive synthesis of transcendental principles a priori, Kant argued that the concepts so constituted contained a great deal more, and consequently "there will remain the further work of making their analysis similarly complete" (ibid.). 27. Ibid., "Transcendental Aesthetic," B:40. The contrast of "transcendental" and "metaphysical" expositions was an innovation of the B-version, in which Kant was working toward the conception of a mediating role for metaphysical principles as analytic corrollaries of his transcendental principles which would provide the transition to their empirical employment. 28. Kant's physics was only partly Newtonian, as commentators have noted in evaluating his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. See G. Brittan, Jr., Kant's Theory of Science, 131-40; and M. Jammer, Concepts of Force, 82ff. 29. Kant, First Introduction, §4:14 (A.A. 20:209). 30. G. Schräder, "The Status of Teleological Judgment in the Kantian Philosophy." 31. K. Düsing, Die Teleogie in Kants Weltbegriff, 65; I. BauerDrevermann, "Zufälligkeit in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft"; Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 218: "the concept of contingency is central to the entire Third Critique." 32. One of the important shifts that transpires over the course of the "Critical" decade of Kant's works is that whereas in the First Critique "understanding" clearly dominates over all other faculties and seems to be the driving force of the mind altogether, in the later works, reason and judgment come to the fore. It is particularly important to note that already in the First Critique there were grounds for ascribing dynamism to "reason" within the whole operation of the mind. See the apt arguments for this offered by R. Brandt, "The Deductions in the Critique of Judgment." Most modern, and a fortiori most Anglo-American, philosophers routinely privilege "understanding" in their reading of Kant's theory of mental activity. See G. Buchdahl, "The Relation between 'Understanding' and 'Reason' in 384

Notes to Pages 158-61

the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy." Though Kant began with that posture, by the later critical writings, reason and judgment had become far more important—and they were consistently complementary, one in the "pure," and one in the complex sphere of human rational activity.The parallelism of reason in pure operations with judgment in empirical applications is the striking counterpart of the restriction of the understanding. See the preface to the Third Critique for a very clear statement of this. The close parallel between judgment in its "technical" function (teleological judgment) and judgment in its "practical" function (moral judgment) is a systematic principle which deserves far more philosophical attention than it has hitherto received. 33. See A. Stadler, Kants Teleologie und ihre erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung, for the first sustained analysis of this relation between the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the First Critique and the Third Critique. For more nuanced readings, see W. Bartuschat, Zum systematischen Ort; H. Mertens, Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft; and the exchange between Horstmann and Brandt, in E. Förster, ed.,Kant's Transcendental Deductions. 34. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A304/B360. 35. Kant, First Introduction, §2:8 (A.A. 20:201). 36. See Kant, Logic, 125-30; Critique of Pure Reason A303-5/B35961. 37. See J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 70. 38. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A642-68/B670-96, esp. A 6 5 7 58/B685-86. 39. Kant, First Introduction, §4:14 (A.A. 20:209). 40. See: J. Dister, "Kant's Regulative Ideas and the 'Objectivity' of Reason"; R. Zocher, "Der Doppelsinn der kantischen Ideenlehre"; and J. Evans, "The Empirical Employment of Pure Reason." 41. Kant used the term "idea" in a very specific sense, which he worked out at the outset of the "Transcendental Dialectic," A310— 38/B366—96. He saw fit to make no changes in this section of the "Dialectic" in the B-version. 42. At several junctures, Kant wrote of reason as governing the understanding in a way strictly analogous to understanding's legislation, through the schematism, for experience. On the importance Kant attached to this parallelism, see McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 27. 43. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A178/B221. 44. Ibid., A178/B220. 45. Ibid., A179/B222. 46. Ibid., A180/B222-23. 47. Ibid., A180/B223. Even within the mathematical categories there is a difference between quantity and quality. All that can be "anticipated" as regards the "real" in appearances is that it will have degree, but which properties and what degree—i.e., all that is essential to the specification of an empirical object of experience—cannot be anticipated or "constructed" a priori. 48. See S. French, "Kant's Constitutive-Regulative Distinction." 49. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A508-10/B536-38. Notes to Pages 161-65

385

50. Ibid., A643/B671. 51. Ibid., A644/B672. 52. Ibid., A664/B692. 53. That is the point of Kant's distinction of philosophy from mathematics. Philosophy is the exclusive affair of reason. It works with concepts, not constructions in intuition. See Critique of Pure Reason, A713-27/B741-55. 54. Ibid., A646-47/B674-75. 55. Michael Polanyi has explored these matters in a rigorous and insightful manner from a "post-critical" vantage in Personal Knowledge. 56. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A643/B671. 57. Compare M. Liedtke, Der Begriff. 58. A.A. 8:133-47. 59. See, e.g., Critique of Pure Reason, A69/B94, where the faculty of judgment is the set of "all acts of the understanding," or A81 /B106, where the faculty ofjudgment is held to be "the same as the faculty of thought." 60. See ibid., AI 32/B171, where the faculty ofjudgment is contrasted with understanding: "understanding in general is to be viewed as the faculty of rules, judgment will be the faculty of subsuming under rules" and similarly at A247/B304: "the employment of a concept involves a function of judgment [Urtheilskraft] whereby an object is subsumed under the concept." And especially see A646/B674 of the "Transcendental Dialectic," where Kant comes closest to the sense of a "determinant judgment": "If reason is a faculty of deducing the particular from the universal, and if the universal is already certain in itself and given, only judgment [Urtheilskraft] is required to execute the process of subsumption, and the particular is thereby determined in a necessary manner." 61. This is the most striking, indeed even incongruous usage of Urtheilskraft in the First Critique, and smacks of Kant's style in the Anthropology or in the Third Critique. Kant wrote: "judgment [Urtheilskraft] is a peculiar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good . . . [I]n the absence of such a natural gift no rule that may be prescribed to [a learner] for this purpose can ensure against misuse . . . He may comprehend the universal m abstracto, and yet not be able to distinguish whether a case in concreto comes under it" (A133—34/B172—73). This is, so far as I can establish, the only place in the First Critique where Kant treats the faculty ofjudgment autonomously of understanding in the largest sense. Hence here Kant approached the "other kind ofjudging" which he only came fully to acknowledge in the Third Critique. 62. Kant explains all this in his "architectonic" first section of the First Introduction, §1:3-8 (A.A. 20:195-201). 63. See Horstmann's discussion of the distinction in the First Critique between methodological and transcendental principles, "Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique ofJudgment}" 164-76. Kant did not yet recognize in the First Critique the idea of a subjective transcendental principle a priori, but he was forced to in the Third Critique in terms of the faculty of judgment. 64. Kant, First Introduction, §5:20 (A.A. 20:215).

386

Notes to Pages 165-68

65. See, above all, G. Tonelli, "La formazione," and M. Souriau, Le jugement reflechissant. 66. Kant to Reinhold, May 12, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 11:39. 67. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §iii: 13—14. Kant made the claim of the systematic closure of the faculties in his letter to Reinhold of December 1787 as well. 68. Kant did allow the text to be published, unedited, later, and he also claimed that it was not in any philosophical way different from the final version of the Introduction, only longer. The latter claim is clearly inaccurate, and the significance of the later publication—as a fragment—is unclear. What is clear, however, is that Kant was never before or after so caught up with the idea of system. 69. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 8. 70. Kant, Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft, §11, A.A. 20:241— 42 (my translation). 71. Ibid., 242. 72. It appears in none of the section tides in the final version. In its place, the language of "purpose" increases in prominence. 73. J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 70. 74. See H. Mertens, Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung, and A. Genova, "Kant's Complex Problem of Reflective Judgment." 75. "What is peculiarly distinctive of reason . . . is that it prescribes and seeks to achieve its systematisation, that is, to exhibit the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle" (Critique of Pure Reason, A645/B673). See G. Buchdahl, "The Kantian 'Dynamic of Reason.'" 76. "Pure reason is in fact occupied with nothing but itself. It can have no other vocation" (ibid., A680/B708). 77. Ibid., A680/B708. 78. Ibid., A645/B673. 79. Ibid., A647/B675. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid., A680-81/B708-9. 82. These issues assume ineluctable saliency in the sphere of practical reason, as we shall see when we return to them in the context of the "ethical turn." 83. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A65/B89-90. 84. For this distinction of architectonic from system, see H. Mertens, Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung, 71. 85. In terms of Kant's theory of space, it is not Leibnizian, i.e., merely the result of the interrelation of things, that which is "between" them, linking them, but more Newtonian, i.e., that within which they are deployed. But the fundamental question which obviously arises is whether Kant, like Newton, takes this ground to have objective reality (space as Divine substance) and hence considers reason as being (the soul, in rational psychology), or only takes it to be merely transcendentally ideal, i.e., a necessary structure of consciousness but not by that alone warranted as objectively real. 86. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A832-33/B860-61.

Notes to Pages 169-73

387

87. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 38. 88. Weldon, Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 239. 89. K. Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 89. 90. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxiii. 91. SeeJ. Wubnig, "The Epigenesis of Pure Reason." 92. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxxvii-xxxviii. 93. See K. Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft. 94. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A64-65/B89. 95. Hence Kant's revision of the title of his First Critique in his famous letter to K. L. Reinhold of Dec. 2 8 - 3 1 , 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:51315 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127—28), and in many other texts of this and later periods to read "Critique of Pure Theoretical (or Speculative) Reason." 96. Kant's letter to Reinhold gave clear notice of a change in his position. While he wrote as though the change only made possible a Third critique, the change was involved in creating the possibility of the Second. See R. Benton, Kant's Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendental Arguments, 24 and passim. 97. Kant, Grounding, 4. 98. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 94. 99. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:51315 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127—28). 100. Kant makes an explicit distinction between theism and deism in the First Critique: "Since we are wont to understand by the concept of God not merely an eternal nature that works blindly, as the root-source of all things, but a supreme being who through understanding and freedom is the Author of all things; and since it is in this sense only that the concept interests us, we could, strictly speaking, deny to the deist any belief in God, allowing him only the assertion of an original being or supreme cause. However. . . it is less harsh and more just to say that the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God (summa intelligentia)" (A632—33/B660—61). 101. Kant, Prolegomena, 2 - 3 (A.A. 4:257). 102. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A3/B7. 103. Kant, "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" A.A. 8:136. 104. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §72:237. 105. Ibid., §75:246. Eight: Kant's Critique of Science 1. Thus Kant's remarks about the German spirit of thoroughness and those who had tried to dissolve it, in the second preface, e.g., Bxlii—xliii. 2. See F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 165-225, for a current discussion of Kant and his critics in the early to mid-1780s. He notes that it was only in 1788 that the intensity of criticism from empiricists and Wolffians alike assumed such proportions that Kant felt compelled to defend himself publicly. 3. These were the essays with which Kant assumed leardership of the Aufklärung movement. Most of them appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, one of the flagship journals of the movement. For bold statements of 388

Notes to Pages 173-79

Aufklärung ideology from Kant, see the preface to the A-version of the First Critique, Axi, note; the entire section entitled "The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of its Polemical Employment" in the First Critique, A737-57/B766-86; and the preface to the B-v«-sion, Bxxxii-xxxv. The locus classicus is, of course, his essay "What Is Enlightenment?" (1784). 4. For a similar conclusion, see F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 149—50. 5. C.Schütz to Kant, July 10, 1784, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:371. 6. C. Schütz to Kant, Aug. 23, 1784, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:373. 7. When he took up the project of his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Herder was at the prime of his powers, and in that project he addressed his most important concern. The result, without question, was his greatest work. (For the finest study of Herder to this day see R. Haym, Herder; on this specific point, 2:193.) It remains one of the greatest works of the German 1780s. Yet, because of Kant, Goethe, and Hegel, Herder's bright star is dimmed as by glaring suns. It was his peculiar historical lot to be a grand figure dwarfed by titans. Yet he deserves better than the condescension or even contempt to which he has been so frequently subjected by literary and historical scholars. Even so major an effort as I. Berlin's "Herder and Enlightenment" fails to do him full justice. More just, if briefer, is L. Beck in Early German Philosophy, 382—92. 8. Haym, Herder, makes this important point, 2:262-63. 9. Hamann to Herder, May 8, 1785, in Hamanns Briefwechsel, 5:432. 10. See his remark to Hartknoch in 1783, cited by K. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, 317n.: "Kant's works were certainly not enjoyable for him and against his way of thinking, but at the same time he had neither written nor occasioned to be written anything against them." Of course, Kant would disagree: Von Erkennen und Empfinden ssemed a direct attack on his philosophy11. Those reviews, intervening in the middle of his great synthetic project, adversely affected the balance of Herder's work, and the bitter hostility to Kant they engendered worked like a cancer to corrode his thinking thereafter, until it resulted in those last bilious and futile outbursts—the Metakritik der reinen Vernunft and the Kalligone—of the close of the century. See Haym, Herder, 2:251, for the question of Kant's immediate and destructive impact on the composition of the Ideen. 12. Herder, Atom, vol. 1, 13:13. 13. Ibid., 65. 14. Ibid., 109ff. The issue of erect posture had drawn Kant's attention in an earlier review, "Recension von Moscatis Schrift" (A.A. 2:423—25). 15. See J. Herder, Essay on the Origin of Language. 16. Herder, Ween, book 5. See R. Clarke, "Herder's Concept of 'Kraft.'" 17. Haym, Herder, 2:212ff. 18. H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit 2:22. 19. Ibid., esp. 2:1 Iff. 20. Ibid., 2:14. 21. Goethe, "Natur-Fragment." 22. Goethe, letter to Kanzler von Müller, May 24,1828, cited in Pascal, German Sturm und Drang, 210. 23. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, 2:18-19; but see the very negative asNotes to Pages 179-83

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sessment of Goethe as scientist despite praise for his poetry of nature, illustrated by this fragment, in C. Sherrington, Goethe on Nature and Science. For a monumental rebuttal of this utter severance of poetic from scientific insight, see E. Sewell, The Orphic Voice, esp. part 3, "Erasmus Darwin and Goethe," 169-276. On the impact of Goethe's thinking see J. Hoffmeister, Goethe und der deutsche Idealismus. 24. See Herder's letter to F. Jacobi, Feb. 6, 1784, Herders Briefe, 227, and the preface to God: Some Conversations, 67. 25. See esp. E. Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, chap. 6. Cassirer has throughout his works shown a sound appreciation for the importance of the Earl of Shaftesbury for eighteenth-century thought. 26. O. Walzel developed this idea explicitly: "Shaftesbury prophetically anticipated the later recognition that the cosmos and every particular organism is a system, in which the parts are coordinated into a whole by the unity of purpose" ("Shaftesbury"). On the relation of the idea of organic unity to pantheist metaphysics in the eighteenth century, see J. Benziger, "Organic Unity," esp. 29. 27. W. Dilthey, "Aus der Zeit des Spinozastudien Goethes." See also Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 85. 28. Shaftesbury's "metaphor of the world as a living body anticipates the later conception, held by such Romantics as Diderot and Goethe, that the universe is a complex of active processes rather than a mechanism composed of dead matter" (Tuveson, "Shaftesbury and the Age of Sensibility," 87). 29. A. Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, esp. "The Moralists" (1709), 2:1—156. 30. Walzel, "Shaftesbury," 428. 31. "The highest good for man is to imbue the microcosm, his life, with the 'vital principle' which animates [Nature as a work of God]." J. Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury," 102. 32. E. Tuveson, "Shaftesbury and the Age of Sensibility," 83. 33. Ibid., 82. 34. On the whole notion of aesthetic attunement as implicating cognitive or ethical validity, see the first part of H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 5-90. 35. Cassirer, Philosophy ofthe Enlightenment, 314. And: "Nature itself in its deeper sense is not the sum total of created things but the creative power from which the form and order of the universe are derived" (ibid., 328). "The deeper truth of this world . . . consists in the fact that an operative principle obtains in it, which is embodied in and reflected by all its creatures in varying degrees and force" (ibid., 314). The beautiful "is independent and original, and innate and necessary, in the sense that it is no mere accident but belongs to the substance of the spirit and expresses this substance in an entirely original way" (ibid., 322). 36. Ibid., 317. 37. "Shaftesbury's doctrine of'enthusiasm,' of'disinterested passion,' of genius in man which is akin to and not inferior to the 'Genius of the World,' contain the first seeds of this new fundamental conception whose development and systematic justification took place at the hands of Less390

Notes to Pages 183-84

ing, Herder, and Kant." Cassirer, Philosophy ofthe Englightenment, 319— 20n. See also: O. Walzel, "Shaftesbury"; and W. Bruford, Culture and Society in Classical Weimar 1775—1806, 26—37. See also C. Weiser, Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben; and I. Hatch, Der Einfluß Shaftesburys auf Herder. 38. The text is in A.A. 8:44-55. The scientific substance of the review will be treated in a later chapter. 39. C.Schütz to Kant, Feb. 18,1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:375. Ironically, this defender of Herder, whom Kant demolished in short order in a response printed in the March issue of Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, proved to be none other than K. L. Reinhold, who would, a year later, use the same Teutsche Merkur as the forum for his Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie (1786—90), the decisive popularization of Kantianism in Germany. 40. Kant, "Recension von Herders Ideen," A.A. 8:53-54. 41. Ibid., 27. 42. Haym, Herder, 2:247-48, and K. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, 319, blame Kant. Even L. Beck writes that "Kant deserved all the blame" for the falling out (Early German Philosophy, 384) but he also insists that Kant was correct (ibid., 390-91). 43. Haym wrote aptly: "Kant uncovered with victorious sharpness and clarity the halftruths and confusions of his opponent, but he passed over without recognition the legitimate motives of the latter, indeed, he did him an injustice" (Herder, 2:256). And see Hamann to Herder, Feb. 4, 1785: "Kant is too full of his own system to be able to judge you objectively—and no one is in a position yet to see the whole scope of your project" (Hamanns Briefwechsel, 5:352). 44. The first volume of Herder's Ideen is preponderantly Naturphilosophie. The second volume, which Kant also reviewed, dealt with physical anthropology and race theory, scientific topics of direct relevance to Kant's teleology essay. For background on these questions in the eighteenth century, see C. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, 508ff. 45. Kant, Grounding, 2. 46. Kant, Reflection 990 (later 1780s), A.A. 15:435. 47. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B:xxxvi. 48. Ibid., Bxlii-xliii. 49. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 23. 50. Kant, "Über den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:161. 51. Ibid., 180. 52. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 102. On Priestley's "syncretism" see J. McEvoy and J. McGuire, "God and Nature." Nine: Kant Against Eighteenth-Century

Hylozoism

1. See P. Menzer, Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung. For correction see A. Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," and G. Lehmann, "Kant und der Evolutionismus: Zur Thematik der Kantforschung Paul Menzers," in Lehmann, Beiträge, 219-243. 2. K. Roretz, Zur Analyse von Kants Philosophie des Organischen, 112-50; E. Ungerer, Die Teleologie Kants und ihre Bedeutungfür die Logik der Biologie, 64-132; P. Bommersheim, "Der vierfache Sinn der inneren ZweckmäßigNotes to Pages 184-89

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keit in Kants Philosophie des Organischen"; and H. Lieber, "Kants Philosophie des Organischen und die Biologie seiner Zeit." For a recent study of Kant's theory of organic form see R. Low, Philosophie des Lebendigen, esp. 138ff. 3. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §75:248, §77:254. 4. On Kant's concept of life see Low, Philosophie des Lebendigen, 15367. And see R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, 91 ff. 5. Hence Kant situated himself squarely in the tradition of the new scientific rationalism. For an old but still trenchant assessment of this view seeE. Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations ofModern Physical Science. Forarecent and penetrating analysis, see G. Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. 6. That did not escape younger intellectuals in Germany who did keep abreast of the latest developments in natural science, and who could sense in Kant's work, even of the later 1780s, a position which did not quite incorporate the then current level of scholarship. In the aftermath of the publication of the Third Critique, young philosophers, steeped in the latest science, came to find his posture insupportable. Hence here was one of the impulses which led to German Idealism. 7. For this notion of "paradigm" see T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 8. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A39-40/B56-57. See L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 446—51, for a consideration of this. For more detail, see G. Martin, Kant's Metaphysic and Theory of Science, which stresses the Leibnizian origins, and Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. 9. This is the thrust of the "Second Antinomy" of the Critique of Pure Reason, A434-45/B462-73, A523-27/B551-55. See J. Ellington, "The Unity of Kant's Thought" and "Translator's Introduction," esp. vi-x; 2 0 5 13. 10. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, chap. 2, "Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics," 4 0 - 9 4 (A.A. 4:496-535). 11. Ibid., 60 (A.A. 4:470). 12. See, for example, R. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism. 13. J. D'Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedic; see also Cassirer's use of D'Alembert's work in Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 8ff. 14. See L. Crocker, "Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformationism." 15. See B. Glass, ed., Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859, esp. 51—83. 16. Or perhaps he did, but only in the Opus posthumum, where it was too late to salvage the relationship between the elder Kant and his Idealist heirs. See G. Lehmann, Kants Nachlaßwerk, and K. Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 143. 17. In the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the First Critique Kant made quite clear the extent of his commitment to this principle: "Order and purposiveness in nature must themselves be explained from natural grounds and according to natural laws;. . . the wildest hypotheses, if only they are physical, are here more tolerable than a hyperphysical hypothesis" (A77273/B800-1).

392

Notes to Pages 189-91

18. Indeed, Kant never relented from his stance that valid scientific knowledge was possible only through mechanical explanations—not even in the "Critique of Teleological Judgment." 19. For a clear statement of his objective in the course, see his Nachricht (A.A. 2:305-13, esp. 312). 20. J. Wubnig, "The Epigenesis of Pure Reason." 21. See, e.g., E. Dijkterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, and J. Heilbron, Elements of Early Modern Physics. 22. H. Guerlac, "Newton's Changing Reputation in the Eighteenth Century"; M. and A. Hall, "Newton's Electric Spirit"; I. Cohen and A. Koyre, "Newton's Electric and Elastic Spirit"; J. McGuire, "Force, Active Principles, and Newton's Invisible Realm," 187—208, "Transmutation and Immutability," "The Origins of Newton's Doctrine of Essential Qualities," and "Atoms and the 'Analogy of Nature'"; M. Jammer, Concepts of Force, 158-87; M. Hesse, Forces and Fields, 157-88. 23. P. Heimann and J. McGuire, "Newtonian Forces and Lockean Powers"; P. Heimann, "Voluntarism and Immanence" and '"Nature is a perpetual worker'"; P. Harman, Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy; A. Thackray, Atoms and Powers; J. Yolton, Thinking Matter; M. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, esp. 1—64. 24. I by no means wish to suggest anything but respect for E. Dijkterhuis's masterful study of these developments, The Mechanization of the World Picture, but only to suggest that the same model on which he so acutely interpreted the seventeenth century does not hold for the eighteenth. 25. See Voltaire's amusing comments in his Letters on England (1734) that upon crossing the channel the language for describing the physical world suddenly underwent a radical transformation. This persistence of Cartesianism in France cannot be written off to any cultural chauvinism, for the same resistance was to be found in the low countries among the eminent disciples of Huygens and in Germany of Leibniz himself. 26. J. Keynes, "Newton, the Man." 27. J. McGuire, "Force, Active Principles, and Newton's Invisible Realm," 187-208. 28. The finest treatment of these questions is without doubt Alexandre Koyre's From the Closed World, esp. 125—235. Koyre's influence upon my interpretation of the history of science in this period has been decisive. 29. On the Leibniz-Clarke controversy, the work of Koyre is again definitive. See not only From the Closed World, 235-76, but also his article with I. Cohen, "Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence." 30. This is my only reservation about the otherwise so powerfully wrought and original work of M. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment. Within the limits she has sketched out, her thesis is compelling and provocative, but it leaves us a bit at a loss to account for figures like Joseph Priestley in the second half of the British eighteenth century. See J. Yolton, Thinking Matter, for a more encompassing perspective. 31. A. Thackray, Atoms and Powers, 56, and "Matter in a Nut-Shell." 32. That Schofield's categories are confusing has been recognized nu-

Notes to Pages 191-95

393

merous times in the literature. See the pointed criticisms in P. Heimann and J. McGuire, "Newtonian Forces and Lockian Powers," 234-35 and passim. 33. R. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism, 68. 34. Ibid., 95. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 99. 37. The parallels between these two positions were worked out long ago by A. Lovejoy: "The Parallels of Deism and Classicism," in Essays in the History of Ideas. 38. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism, 94. 39. Ibid., 100. 40. H. Metzger, Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la Doctrine Chimique; L. King, "Stahl and Hoffmann" and "Basic Concepts of Eighteenth-Century Animism"; L. Rather, "G. E. Stahl's Psychological Physiology"; and L. Rather and J. Frerichs, "The Leibniz-Stahl Controversy." 41. G. Rudolph, "Hallers Lehre von der Irritabilität und Sensibilität"; S. Roe, Matter, Life and Generation; A. Vartanian, "Trembley's Polyp, La Mettrie and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism"; T. Ha\\,IdeasofLife and Matter, 1:351-407 and vol. 2, passim, and "On Biological Analogs of Newtonian Paradigms"; J. Schiller, "Queries, Answers and Unsolved Problems in Eighteenth-century Biology"; and P. Ritterbush, Overtures to Biology. 42. Bordeu appeared in fiction as the attending physician in Diderot's provocative little essay on the perplexities in implication of the new science, D'Alembert's Dream. Diderot represents a remarkable figure in this whole matter, for he seemed at once at home with the utter materialists, and yet attuned to aspects which one would normally associate with the more vitalist currents of the age. His insertion of the redoubtable Dr. Bordeu into his text suggests he was quite aware of the importance of Bordeu's conjectures. See H. Dieckmann, "Theophile Bordeu und Diderots Reve de D'Alembert." 43. S. Moravia, "From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible." 44. Kant, "Recension von Moscatis Schrift," A.A. 2:425. 45. Kant, "Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen," A.A. 2:429-43; editor's note, 518. 46. See C. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, 512ff. 47. Kant, "Von den verschiedenen Racen," A.A. 2:429. 48. Ibid., 434n. 49. Ibid., 434. 50. Ibid., 435. 51. Ibid. 52. A. Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," 179. See also the essay on Buffon in that volume, where Buffon's theory of species and principles of method in natural science are given a sympathetic exposition. 53. J. Larson, "Vital Forces"; T. Lenoir, "Kant, Blumenbach and Vital Materialism in Germany Biology" and "Teleology without Regrets." 54. Kant offered a very interesting observation on Maupertuis's suggestion for selective breeding of men to segregate virtuous and productive 394

Notes to Pages 195-202

people from the less worthy. Kant conceded this might be possible, but it would not be wise. Nature was "wiser" in using the "mingling of the good and the bad" as the great driving force [Triebfeder] which "sets the sleeping powers of humanity into motion and requires it to develop all its talents and thus approach the perfection of their destiny [Bestimmung]" ("Von den verschiedenen Racen," A.A. 2:431). The anticipation of his arguments in "Idea for a Universal History" (1784) is striking. 55. E.g., A317-18/B374, A384, A526-27/B554-55. 56. Ibid., A526/B554, A661/B689. 57. Ibid., A668/B696. Hence Kant was familiar with Bonnet's work at least by 1781, and presumably earlier. 58. Ibid. On the whole theme of the law of continuity, see Lovejoy's classic, The Great Chain of Being. 59. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxxiv—xxxv. 60. Kant, "Recension von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Theil I" (1784), A.A. 8:52. 61. Cited in ibid., 46. 62. Ibid., 54. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid., 53. 65. Kant, "Recension von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Theil II" (1785), A.A. 8:62. 66. Kant, "Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace" (1785), A.A. 8:97; tr. in A. Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," 184. 67. A. Lovejoy has some interesting things to say about this in his essay. According to Lovejoy, Kant "recoils in horror before the idea of admitting that real species are capable of transformation . . . because of certain temperamental peculiarities of his mind—a mind with a deep scholastic strain . . . one that could not quite endure the notion of a nature all fluent and promiscuous and confused, in which series of organisms are to an indefinite degree capable of losing one set of characters and assuming another set. He craved, above all, a universe sharply categorized and classified and tied up in orderly parcels . . . [T]his scholastic side of his mind prevented him from making any thorough application of the principle to biology" (Kant and Evolution, 185). Lovejoy is often intemperate in his criticism of Kant (see L. Beck, "Lovejoy as a Critic of Kant," in Essays on Kant and Hume, 61-79), but there is at least a germ of truth in this passage which we will try to cultivate in the balance of the exposition. 68. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 6 (A.A. 4:470). 69. Ibid., 8 (A.A. 4:471). 70. As A. Lovejoy put it, "Kant was, of course, by no means abreast of the latest chemistry of his time" ("Kant and Evolution," 186n.). But the point is that even if Kant had been perfectly well informed, he would not have able to accept the new ideas. That, and not Kant's familiarity with the literature, is the real consideration. Kant had certainly read much of the pioneering literature in biology, and one suspects that he was also familiar with chemistry from his frequent use of chemical analogies in his writing. But he could not accept the new theories emerging in those fields. 71. J. Wubnig, "The Epigenesis of Pure Reason." These analogies Notes to Pages 202-7

395

work in the inverse direction, as well, toward a conceptualization of human reason. 72. Kant, "Überden Gebrauch" (1787),A.A. 8:159-84, editor's notes, 487—89; and "Vorarbeit zu Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie," A.A. 23:75-76. 73. For example by G. Tonelli, "Von den verschiedenen Bedeutungen," 156; J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 50ff. 74. See M. Riedel, "Historizismus und Kritizismus." 75. Kant certainly used the language of providence liberally in his writings on nature, but he clarified the methodological significance of this language in the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the First Critique, A698— 702/B726—30. That he could be quite extravagant in exploiting this metaphorical license was clear in the essay "Idea for a Universal History," and it was this, with its ironical cut at figures like Herder who did believe in a form of immanent purpose, which roused the ire of the hylozoist camp, and perhaps led to Forster's counterthrust. 76. Forster, "Noch etwas über die Menschenraßen." A. Lovejoy's assessment of "Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte" would seem to support Forster's complaints (see "Kant and Evolution," 196n.). But they are both being too literal-minded. Kant's method in the essay only makes sense as a rejoinder to Herder's work on the same subject, toward which Kant had always been very negative. 77. Kant, "Über den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:163n., 178. 78. Ibid., 161,178. 79. Ibid., 159, 169. 80. Kant, "Vorarbeit zu Über den Gebrauch," A.A. 23:75. 81. Kant, "Über den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:179. 82. Ibid., 161. 83. Ibid., 168. 84. Ibid., 179. 85. Ibid., 179—80; reference to Bonnet in note, 180; Kant also mentioned in this note that Blumenbach had made some very fine criticisms of such a stance in his work on natural history. 86. Ibid., 180. 87. Kant did not believe that all the capacities or powers (Kräfte) of the mind could be reduced to a single, all-comprehensive fundamental force (Grundkraft). Some effort at conceiving such "forces" was necessary, he conceded, and reason did make the effort. It strove "to bring them nearer to a radical, that is, absolutely fundamental power." Though logic is not capable of deciding whether afundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers. The logical principle of reason calls upon us to bring about such unity as completely as possible; and the more the appearances of this or that power are found to be identical with one another, the more probable it becomes that they are simply different manifestations of one and the same power. (First Critique, A649/B677) But, Kant went on, such "relatively fundamental powers" could not them396

Notes to Pages 207-12

selves be brought to unity. "This unity of reason is purely hypothetical" (ibid.). It was only an operating maxim, not an ultimate reality, Kant insisted. Thus the idea of an all-encompassing Vorstellungsvermögen such as Wolff had placed at the foundation of his theory of mind was, in Kant's view, merely nominal, not real. No real concept of a fundamental power, from which all the others could be derived, was possible. See D. Henrich, "Über die Einheit der Subjektivität," for a penetrating discussion of these issues. Henrich disputes the metaphysical attempts of Heidegger (and Hegel) to develop such a unity, and upholds Kant's disclaimer of such a possibility. 88. Kant, "Über den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:181. Ten: The Problem of Organic Form 1. K. Roretz. Zur Analyse, 12—74; E. Ungerer.Dze Teleologie Kants, 64— 119; Bommersheim, "Der Begriff"; H. Driesch, "Kant und das Ganze"; and R. Low, Philosophie des Lebendigen, 138ff. 2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §68:230. 3. Ibid., §75:246-47, esp. §85:286-92. 4. A. Lovejoy puts this correctly: "No contemporary of Kant's, reading this passage in the Critique ofJudgment as a whole, was likely to find in it encouragement to risk that 'bold adventure of the reason' of which it speaks" ("Kant and Evolution," 199). Even so careful a Kantian as Cassirer occasionally succumbs to the temptation to misread Kant, as in "Goethe and the Kantian Philosophy," 71-72. 5. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §80:267. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 267-68. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., 268n. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., §81:272. 12. Ibid., 274. 13. Ibid., §80:269-70. 14. Ibid., §65:221. 15. Ibid., 223. The parallelism with the language of the "Vorarbeit zu Uber den Gebrauch" cited earlier is striking, and confirms the close relationship between that essay and the shape of the final Critique. 16. Kant, First Introduction, 24 (A.A. 20:219). 17. "For since we do not, properly speaking, observe the purposes in nature as designed, but only in our reflection upon its products think this concept as a guiding thread for our judgment, they are not given to us through the object" (Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §75:247). 18. Kant, First Introduction, 24n. 19. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 100 (A.A. 5:97). 20. For other considerations of this particular conundrum see: P. Baumanns, Das Problem der organischen Zweckmäßigkeit, 99-131; E. Heintel, "Naturzweck und Wesenbegriff"; N. Rotenstreich, Experience and Its Systematization, 88—110; M. Kraft, "Kant's Theory of Teleology"; J. Simon, Notes to Pages 213-20

397

"Teleologisches Reflektieren und kausales Bestimmen"; D. Siewert, "Kant's Dialectic of Teleological Judgment"; and F. van de Pitte, "Is Kant's Distinction between Reflective and Determinant Judgement Valid?" 21. See Critique of Judgment, §65:220, §77:255-56. 22. Ibid., §76:251-52. The kind of individual an organism represents as an empirical problem is more intractable of solution than the individual constituted by space, which we can be satisfied to render as the indefinitely vast frame of reference for the vastest set of motions and relations we wish to consider (see ibid., §77:257). 23. Ibid., §65:221-22; §73:242. One wonders how other human beings as phenomenal objects should be construed under this rubric: as phenomena, presumably, lifeless and determined. How does one square that with one's ethical obligation to regard them as ends, i.e., as real purposes? Presumably we infer from their merely phenomenal presence a noumenal being within them. But how is that different from the case with organisms, apart from a religious bias about a human spirit or soul? 24. Ibid., §65:221. 25. Ibid., 222. 26. Ibid., §75:247, and, most vividly, §65:221-22. 27. Ibid., §§69-71,232-36. 28. J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 30-32, 70-74. 29. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §70:234. 30. Ibid., §78:258-59. 31. Ibid., §80:267. 32. Ibid., §78:264. 33. Ibid., §79:265-66. 34. Ibid., §72:237. 35. Ibid., §71:236. K. Marc-Wogau, Vier Studien, 275, observes that Kant's dialectic is resolved in the very course of stating it in §70, and that the remaining sections appear redundant. They do indeed if all that Kant cared to do was resolve the scientific, and not the metaphysical issues at stake. He is willing to allow the speculative inferences to run their course because he has metaphysical concerns. H. Allison notes that the "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment" has two moves—a preliminary (methodological) one—"the assertion of the merely regulative status of the maxims" (which is all that McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 120— 21, finds significant)— and an ultimate, metaphysical one: "an appeal to the supersensible (noumenal) ground of phenomenal nature" ("Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 213). Allison observes: "the second move (the appeal to the supersensible) . . . seems to constitute the actual solution" (ibid., 214). The notion of the "supersensible" is the keyword of the "ethical turn," as I will argue in part 3. Its centrality in the "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment" signals the moment of crisis at which Kant's work would begin its third and final metamorphosis. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 398

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

§77:257. §66:223. §67:225. §78:260. §75:246.

Notes to Pages 220-26

41. Ibid., §72:237. 42. Ibid., §75:246. 43. Even in the context of the First Critique's rigorous assault on the dialectical errors of reason, this physico-theological approach to a proof of God's existence was treated with great respect. See A623-24/B651-52. 44. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §73:242. 45. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 105. 46. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §84:285. 47. Ibid., §iv:16. 48. Ibid., §48:M173. 49. Ibid. While our reason is driven that far, it cannot make the final step and establish "the determinate concept ofthat supreme intelligence." Kant concluded: "the concept of a deity, which would be adequate for our teleological judging of nature, can never be derived according to mere teleological principles of the use of reason (on which physico-theology alone is based)" (ibid., §85:290). The notion of a transcendent, intelligent cause can only be promoted from its heuristic, theoretical use to the full-fledged notion of God through "ethico-theology," Kant argued in the closing segments of the Third Critique. Yet the kind of being physico-theology required to make the world coherent for discursive understanding tallied with the kind of being practical reason required in terms of the indubitability of the moral law and all the consequences it brought in its train. This, in turn, allowed Kant to translate his "theist" notion—merely conjecturally, of course—from the one sphere to the other. The resultant notion of "Providence" tallied well with traditional religion. Eleven: The Pantheism

Controversy

1. Jacobi, Über die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 92-93, 102. [Unless specified, all citations are from the original, 1785 edition.] The best analysis of Jacobi's conversations with Lessing is in A. Altmann, "Lessing und Jacobi." On Jacobi and Spinoza, see: T. van Stockum, Spinoza-Jacobi-Lessing; A. Hebeisen, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi; and H. Nicolai, Goethe und Jacobi, esp. 156-77. 2. Mendelssohn argued that even if Lessing appreciated Spinoza, he remained a conventional theist. Lessing advocated at most a "refined Spinozism" (geläuterte Spinozismus) consistent with orthodox theism. See Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden, in Hauptschriften, 1—44. 3. The vitriolic pamphlets which the two antagonists exchanged thereafter, Mendelssohn's An die Freunde Lessings and Jacobi's Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, are reprinted in Hauptschriften. 4. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 47ff. 5. For a similar conception of the issues in the controversy, see H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 201. 6. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 47. "What is at stake for Jacobi and Mendelssohn is not the specific question whether Spinoza's metaphysics ends in atheism and fatalism, but the more general question of whether all metaphysics ends in it" (80). For Beiser, the essential development of this epoch in philosophy was to discredit the authority of reason. A much more radiNotes to Pages 226-28

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cal skepticism and relativism asserted itself under the sponsorship of such maverick critics as Hamann and Jacobi, but with powerful connections backwards to Hume and forwards to Nietzsche. Beiser goes so far as to argue that, in this sense, the Pantheism Controversy was more important for the history of philosophy in the next century than was Kant's First Critique itself (44). While this long-term view is insightful, and while it raises the historical stature of such figures as Hamann and Jacobi, it nevertheless underestimates the immediate outcome of the controversy, which was not the triumph of skepticism and relativism but rather one of the most remarkable outbursts of metaphysical rationalism in the history of philosophy, German Idealism. As Beiser himself recognizes, Fichte, Sendling, and Hegel were striving to "preserve the authority of reason" (48). In this, they were self-consciously striving to carry out a Kantian project. 7. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 56—60. 8. M.Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, traces Spinozism in the rise of English deism and in the Masonic forms of free-thinking and radical republicanism. This movement read Spinozism and "pantheism" (coined, adjectivally, by the Deist John Toland in 1705 in reference to Spinoza and "Socinianism"), interchangeably to signify materialism. She points to a significant body of literature tracing a similar outcome in France: P. Verniere, Spinoza et la pensee franqaise avant la revolution and H. El Noussy, "Le pantheisme dans les lettres franchises au XHIe siecle." 9. Jacobi, Über die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 81. 10. Thomas Wizenmann made this painfully obvious in his powerful intervention into the dispute. On Wizenmann, see Beiser, Fate of Reason, 109-13. 11. On this, see Spinoza's "Letter on the Infinite" (= Letter to Lewis Meyer, Apr. 20, 1663) in B. Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding, 317—23. The doctrine of intrinsic infinity does not derive the notion from a contrast with or endless expansion of a prior finite magnitude, as in the conventional mathematical notion of infinity, but rather reckons the infinite as a complete whole in itself. Such a concept of infinity has always characterized the religious notion of God as infinite. Spinoza reckoned that the concept should be taken as the first and primordial concept, upon which substance itself could find a metaphysical ground, and a coherent ontology find foundation. One might even claim that Spinoza's philosophical greatness resides precisely in striving to grasp intrinsic infinity first and in itself, sub specie aeternitatis. The centrality of this notion of infinity in Spinoza's metaphysic was recognized by the Wolffian school in Germany, esp. in Wolff's Theologia naturalis (1737), §§671—716, and in M. Mendelssohn's An die Freunde Lessings (1786), though they did not do full justice to Spinoza's position. 12. Lessing used this phrase in his conversation with Jacobi: Über die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 77. Hen kaipan (the one is the all), a Greek slogan of murky origins but unquestionably pantheistic or monistic implications, took on a very prominent role in the evolution of German Idealism. Lessing introduced the phrase hen kai pan—at least for the German audience of the late eighteenth century. See R. Knoll, Johann G. Hamann und Friedrich H. Jacobi, 52—53 on the novelty and impact of the phrase. Jacobi 400

Notes to Pages 228-29

did manage to find an earlier usage—in Giordano Bruno's Of the Cause, Principle and One, which he quoted at some length in an appendix to the second edition of his book. See Hauptschriften, 205-23. For the importance of the phrase to one of the Idealists, see M. Bäumler, "Hölderlin und das Hen Kai Pan." 13. Goethe and Herder were thrilled with the news about Lessing. (Goethe to Herder, mid-Dec. 1784, in F. Düntzer and F. v. Herder, eds., Aus Herders Nachlaß, 1:84.) Lessing's praise for Spinoza galvanized their latent enthusiasm for the Jewish philosopher, and stimulated their own deviations from religious orthodoxy. In his autobiography, Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe made the most perspicacious assessment of the Pantheism Controversy and its disclosure about Lessing's attitudes in religion. He compared the revelation to "an explosion which suddenly uncovered the most hidden conditions of men of the first rank, conditions which, unknown even to themselves, lay dormant in the midst of an otherwise extremely enlightened society." (Cited in H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit 2:23— 24. See also B. Suphan, "Goethe und Spinoza, 1783-86," 164.) Certainly he and others felt a monumental affirmation of their deepest intuitions in what they were surprised to learn their great compatriot had believed. It gave them a courage of conviction which played no small part in the incomparable intellectual boldness of the epoch of German Idealism. The involvement of Goethe and Herder is crucial not only to the history of the Pantheism Controversy itself, but to Kant's response as well, since ultimately it was Herder's views of Lessing and Spinoza which provoked Kant's arguments in the Third Critique. 14. Herder to Jacobi, Feb. 6, 1784, Herders Briefe, 227. 15. B. Suphan, "Goethe und Spinoza, 1783-86," 174-75. 16. Herder to Hamann, end Oct. 1784. in Hamanns Briefwechsel 5:248—49. This was part of the controversy which had been launched by Lavater's attack on Mendelssohn. See E. Schoonhoven, "Hamann in der Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn"; and Z. Levy, "Hamanns Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn." 17. On the mentality which Hamann and Jacobi shared, see I. Berlin, "Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism"; and L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 36 Iff: "The Counter-Enlightenment." For an effort to distinguish Hamann from Jacobi's "irrationalism," see Beiser, Fate of Reason, 29,47. 18. R. KnolfyoAann G. Hamann und Friedrich H. Jacobi, 33ff. The volume of their correspondence swelled to flood proportions from late 1784 to Hamann's death in 1788. See Hamanns Briefwechsel, vols. 5—7. 19. K. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, 90ff, 231ff. 20. Hamann to Jacobi, Sept. 28, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel 6:74. 21. Hamann to Jacobi, Oct. 3, 1785, ibid., 77. Hamann's correspondence, despite its gargantuan self-indulgence, proves to be a most instructive source for the assessment of Kant's connection with the Pantheism Controversy. 22. Indeed, one wonders how closely Kant read the Büchlein. It seems unlikely that Kant would have been pleased if he had read the text closely enough to note certain footnotes linking the First Critique with Spinozism. Notes to Pages 229-31

401

23. See Hamanns Briefwechsel, 5:264, 271, 317, 326. 24. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary, not only inferentially from his writings, but directly in his testimony to Hamann. 25. Mendelssohn, "Erinnerungen an Hrn. Jacobi," in Hauptschriften, 120. 26. Ibid., 119. 27. Jacobi, Über die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 146n. The passages in question are from the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and have to do with the unique and all-inclusive totality of space and time as forms of sensibility. Jacobi cited Kant again in his footnote to point twenty-one, this time refering to A107 of the First Critique, where Kant articulated the notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (156—57n). See H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 203 and n. 28. See the Anzeige of Jacobi's work which appeared in the Jena Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Feb. 11, 1786, in all likelihood by Christian Schütz. The key points of that text are reprinted in Hauptschriften, lxxviii-lxxix. 29. Mendelssohn to Kant, Oct. 16, 1785, in Briefwechsel, AA. 10:390. 30. C. Schütz to Kant, Nov. 13, 1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:400. 31. Hamann to Jacobi, Oct. 28, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:107; Hamann to Jacobi, Nov. 10, 1785, ibid., 127. 32. Kant to Schütz, end of Nov. 1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:406. 33. Jacobi to Hamann, Nov. 18, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:146. 34. Hamann to Jacobi, Nov. 30, 1785,ibid., 161. There is no reason to question this statement's authenticity. As I will argue in detail in the next chapter, there is no evidence that Kant ever thoroughly studied Spinoza. I am not convinced by H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," who offers references in Kant's lectures as evidence of a more careful assessment. Even Allison acknowledges that Kant's conception of Spinoza's philosophy was "not particularly well-informed" (201). Indeed, I will contend that it was based all too heavily on secondary materials—Wolff, Mendelssohn, and above all Jacobi. 35. Reprinted in Hauptschriften, 283-325. 36. On Biester and Kant, see Vorländer, Immanuel Kant 310—11. 37. Biester to Kant, Nov. 8, 1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:394; Biester to Kant, Mar.6,1786, ibid.,410; Herz to Kant, Feb. 27,1786, ibid., 408-9. 38. Kant to Herz, Apr. 7, 1786, ibid., 419. 39. Jacobi to Hamann, Mar. 21, 1786 (323), Mar. 24, 1786 (325), May 12, 1786 (385) in Hamanns Briefwechsel, vol. 6. 40. C. Schütz to Kant, Feb. 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:407. 41. Jacobi to Hamann, Mar. 24,1786, Hamanns Briefwechsel 6:324—25. 42. Ibid. 43. Jacobi, Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, reprinted in Hauptschriften, 327-64. For the reference to Kant see 351-52. 44. Jacobi to Hamann, May 5, 1786, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:384. 45. Jacobi to Hamann, Apr. 9, 1786, ibid., 325. 46. Hamann to Jacobi, May 28, 1786, ibid., 408. 47. It was this review by Schütz which provoked Jacobi's ire at the Jena Kantians.

402

Notes to Pages 231 -35

48. L.Jakob to Kant, Mar. 26, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:413. 49. For a similar assessment of Biester's importance, see Beiser, Fate of Reason, 115. H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," misses this connection. 50. Biester to Kant, June 11, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:430. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Kant to Herz, Apr. 7, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:419. 54. Biester, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:432. 55. Beiser writes that Kant's essay "reveals the motivation and justification behind his allegiance to reason" (Fate of Reason, 115). Kant said nothing in his essay on the question of Lessing, and virtually nothing on the question of the meaning of Spinoza. He had taken Biester's lead very skillfully. While Biester was charmed that Kant had "conquered the hydra" of Genieschwärmerei and expressed his contentment with Kant's essay, Jacobi was not charmed at all. (Biester to Kant, Aug. 8, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:439; Jacobi to Hamann, Oct. 31,1786, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 7:37. Biester read Kant's essay in manuscript, since it was submitted to his journal. Jacobi only saw it once it was in print, in October 1786.) He felt wronged by Kant's characterization of belief. "About Kant's essay I don't know what to tell you," he wrote to Hamann. "The man is trying with all his might to found a sect. I'm going to try to see if I can make clear to people what he is really saying." Accordingly, Jacobi set himself to buttressing his own position regarding belief by a lengthy recourse to David Hume. The result, David Hume über den Glauben, a work if anything even more important for the emergence of German Idealism than his Büchlein, appeared in 1787, together with a short appendix aimed directly at Kant in which his famous and fruitful objection was entered that without the thing-in-itself it was impossible to enter the Kantian system, and with it it became impossible to remain inside (Jacobi, "Zur transcendentalen Idealismus," 289ff.; the famous line is on 304). That objection inspired much of the Idealist reconstruction of Kant's metaphysics, from Reinhold and Fichte to Schelling and Hegel. But for Jacobi the Hume book was a continuation of the Pantheism Controversy at its deepest level, with Kant's philosophy now the target of the charge of nihilism. 56. Kant, "Was heißt," A.A. 8:133. 57. Mendelssohn had expressed sympathy for Jacobi's turn to thesalto mortale in the face of the difficulties encountered in speculative philosophy. It was sometimes necessary, he agreed, to descend out of the speculative clouds and seek orientation by common sense. This was a phrase Kant would seize upon in the article "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" (See Mendelssohn, "Erinnerungen," Hauptschriften, 114.) 58. Kant, "Was heißt," 136. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid., 139n. 61. On Kant's notion of moral feeling see: A. MacBeath, "Kant on Moral Feeling"; A. Broadie and E. Pybus, "Kant's Concept of Respect." 62. It drives him from his conjectures about formal beauty through

Notes to Pages 235-39

403

the perplexities of sublimity and art to his grand metaphysical insight of the link between beauty and morality in term of his conception of aesthetic ideas. See part 3, below. 63. Kant, "Was heißt," 137. 64. The term Vernunftglaube was articulated in the Kanon of the First Critique, A820-30/B848-58. The question that will be explored in the third part of this study is the degree to which Kant's philosophy changed in its orientation toward this concept, and whether, in the later Critiques, more of an effort was made toward establishing the transcendental validity of such beliefs. 65. Kant, "Was heißt," A.A. 8:138. 66. Ibid., 145. 67. This premonitory construction of the consequences of religious extremism is, I think, read too literally as Kant's interpretation of history by M. Despland, Kant on History and Religion, 35ff. 68. See "What Is Enlightenment?" (Berlinische Monatsscrift, Dec. 1784). Kant was acutely aware that his Aufklärung was still in the process of being born and that the existing state could still abort it. For the context, see J. Schober, Die deutsche Spätaufklärung (1770-1790), 241-72; and L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 434—35. 69. That still leaves open the question of the profundity of Kant's own Christian religious feelings. No less hostile a figure than Jacobi reckoned Kant an authentic Christian in his personal life, but he did not believe that carried through to Kant's thought. M. Despland, Kant on History and Religion, has marshalled a very interesting case than even this thought must be grasped from the Christian Pietist vantage. At the very least, Kant was committed theoretically to a "theism" consistent, in his mind, with Christian tradition. 70. See N. Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 8—15; Beiser, Fate of Reason, 226ff. 71. Hamann to Jacobi, May 10, 17'87', Hamanns Briefwechsel, 7:194. 72. There were many challengers, but few he took seriously. Among the latter was, however, Thomas Wizenmann, whose response to Kant's "Was heißt" drew substantial attention in the Second Critique. 73. Kant, Grounding, 47. 74. J. Bering to Kant, Sep. 21, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:442. 75. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 165-92. 76. Hamann to Herder, Aug. 18, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:55. Just this sort of thing was what alarmed the officials at the Tübingen seminary and also provoked the cabinet order at Marburg. 77. R. Maker, "Zeitgenössische Reaktionen auf Kants Religionsphilosophie," 145—67. 78. Tübingen was the seat of one of the most important seminaries in Germany. The fact that Kant felt anxious about criticism emanating from there already in 1786 (see the remarks ascribed to him about criticism in the press of Tübingen and Göttigen in Hamann's letter to Jacobi of May 28, 1786, in Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:409) adds weight to the contextualist interpretation of Kant's philosophy in this period. That orthodox sentiment at Tübingen did become suspicious of Kantianism is now well established. 404

Notes to Pages 239-42

See D. Henrich and J. Döderlein, "Carl Immanuel Diez." That the whole question of Kantianism at Tübingen is of course crucial follows simply from the fact that the great young generation of Idealists, Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel studied there and became exposed to the entire ferment in that context. On the Württemberg context of Hegel and his classmates, see L. Dickey, Hegel. 79. See G. Körner's interpretation of Herder's Gott in his letter to Schiller, Aug. 19, 1787, in Schillers Briefwechsel mit Körner, 92-96. 80. Herder, God, 67. 81. Schiller to Körner, Aug. 8, 1787, Schillers Briefwechsel mit Körner, 84. 82. See note 11 above. 83. Herder, God, 107. 84. H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, 2:28, gets this exactly. 85. Herder, God, 102,119. 86. The first phrase is from Spinoza's Ethics, Book 1, def. 6, p. 45; the second phrase is Herder's, from God, 103. 87. Herder, God, 105. 88. On the notion of Herder's "dynamic pantheism" see F. Schmidt, Herders pantheistische Weltanschauung; E. Hoffart, Herders 'Gott'; W. Vollrath, Die Auseinandersetzung Herders mit Spinoza; J. Dieterle, "Die Grundgedanken in Herders Schrift 'Gott' und ihr Verhältnis zu Spinozas Philosophie." 89. Herder, God, 145. That is, they agreed that Spinoza argued for an intrinsic infinity. Otherwise there were substantial differences in their respective interpretations of Spinoza's metaphysics. Mendelssohn was very critical of such pantheism. See Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden, 38, and Beiser, Fate of Reason, 104—5. 90. Herder, God, 146. < 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid., 147. 94. Ibid., 119 for the statement on Spinoza, and 126 for the comment on Leibniz and anthropomorphism. 95. See Jacobi's Appendices 4 and 5 to the second edition of Über die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 236—47. For Kant, see his letter to Jacobi of Aug. 30, 1787, A.A. 10:73f. and §85 of the Third Critique, 290: "Others who wished to be theologians as well as physicists . . . " 96. See notes 79,81. 97. C. Kraus to C. Schütz, Dec. 11,1787, cited in Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, 323n. 98. See Jacobi's reference to this essay in his notes to the third and final edition of his Spinoza-Büchlein, in Hauptschriften, 176—77n. 99. Kant to Jacobi, Aug. 30, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 11:73f. Jacobi must have been astounded to learn this was what he had been doing. The line shows how deeply enmeshed Kant had become in his own problems and system, and how outside impulses tended to be incorporated into his own project and even his own language. 100. That it was not a Nebensache for either of them (as they each well Notes to Pages 243-46

405

knew) gives us a sign of just how threatened Kant must have felt that he should welcome such an alliance. 101. Kant to Jacobi, Aug. 30, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. ll:73f. 102. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, §65:221. Twelve: Kant's Attack on Spinoza 1. H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 219. 2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §73:239. 3. Ibid., §73:242. 4. This language I take from M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics and What is a Thing? 5. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §73:241. 6. Here I find myself in disagreement with Allison's analysis, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 205-6. 7. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §73:241. 8. Ibid., §15:63, and note the translator's reference there to Kant's elaboration of these notions in the preface to his Metaphysical Elements of Justice. 9. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 13, 15, 128, 147, and esp. 154 recognizes the issue, but does not pursue it. 10. H. Allison writes of a "broad brush [which] covers all pre-critical metaphysics," "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 204. 11. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §73:240. 12. Ibid., §72:239. 13. Ibid. Since Kant makes rather extensive appeals to the supersensible himself throughout the Third Critique, the query that immediately presents itself is what difference Kant saw between his recourse and Spinoza's. To suggest that Spinoza offered determinations of the supersensible object which were "dialectical," i.e., incapable of objective validation, is of course true. But so did Kant in conjecturing theism. 14. Kant associatedjust these traits with his notion oilife. See above all his statement in Metaphysical Foundations, 105. 15. Kant's interpretation strongly suggests his reliance upon Jacobi's gloss of Spinoza. There is reason to doubt whether Kant ever closely studied the Ethics. Spinoza is not mentioned once in the Critique of Pure Reason. (K. Vorländer noted this in Immanuel Kant, 331.) The names of his decisive precessors somehow manage to intrude, however marginally, into his great work. Plato and Aristotle, Galileo and Newton, Locke and Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume, Wolff and Baumgarten—even Lambert and Mendelssohn—find their way to mention in the First Critique. But not Spinoza. Kant regarded Spinozism philosophically as old business. He might never have troubled himself with Spinoza had not the pantheistic revival of his ideas threatened Kant's own rise to philosophical ascendancy in the Germany of the late 1780s. 16. For a different fourfold explication of Kant's quarrel with Spinoza, see Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 204—9. 17. "By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes" (Spinoza, Ethics, book 1, def 6, p. 45); 406

Notes to Pages 247-51

"Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing" (book 2, prop. 1, p. 83); "God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential" (book 1, prop. 33, note 2, p. 73); "God's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action" (book 2, prop. 7, corollary, p. 86); "In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence" (book 2, prop. 7, corollary, p. 86); "God understands himself," (book 2, prop. 3, p. 84; book 22, prop. 3, note, p. 84). 18. This is precisely what the eighteenth-century materialists took him to have meant, and what Jacobi insisted he had to have meant. 19. Spinoza, Ethics, 60. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., 61. 22. Ibid., book 1, prop. 17, note, p. 62. 23. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §10:54-55, §iv:17. 24. See ibid., §10:55: "Where then not merely the cognition of an object but the object itself (its form and existence) is thought as an effect only possible by means of the concept of this latter, there we think a purpose." 25. Spinoza, Ethics, 77. Allison aptly stresses the theocentric commitment of Spinoza's philosophy and its methodological expression: sub specie aeternitatis, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 225—26. 26. Ibid., book 1, prop. 17, note, p. 61. 27. Ibid., book l,def. 7, p. 46. 28. Ibid., book 1, prop. 17, p. 59-60. 29. Spinoza expressed himself very bluntly to this effect: "men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire . . . [M]en do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own" (Ethics, book 1, Appendix, 75). 30. Allison develops this Kantian criticism extensively, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 205-6, 21 Off. 31. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 452. 32. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §ii:12. 33. Ibid., §77:253. 34. Ibid., §76:250. The parenthetical remarks are Kant's. 35. Ibid., 252. 36. Ibid., §77:254-55. 37. Ibid., and also §74:243. 38. Ibid., §65:222. 39. Ibid., §77:256-57. 40. M.Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment. 41. See Schelling's letter to Hegel of Feb. 4, 1795 i n j . Hoffmeister, ed., Briefe von und an Hegel, 20-23. See also Hegel's famous remarks in the Notes to Pages 251-57

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preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 10: "everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject... If the conception of God as the one Substance shocked the age in which it was proclaimed, the reason for this w a s . . . an instinctive awareness that, in this definition, self-consciousness was only submerged and not preserved." 42. On Spinoza's notion of intellectual intuition and his epistemology generally, see G. Floistad, "Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge in the Ethics." 43. The term panentheism was invented by Karl Christian Krause (1781-1832), a disciple of Sendling. Its philosophical meaning had been implicit in many earlier metaphysical speculations. See esp. H. Schwarz, "Die Entwicklung des Pantheismus in der neueren Zeit"; and W. Dilthey, "Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus nach seinem geschichtlichen Zusammenhang mit den älteren pantheistischen Systemen." 44. See K. Rehorn, G. E. Lessings Stellung zur Philosophie des Spinoza and the excellent discussion in A. Altmann, "Lessing und Jacobi," 45—57. Thirteen: The Ethical

Turn

1. Kant, First Introduction, §12:51-55 (A.A. 20:247-51). 2. Ibid., §12:53 (A.A. 20:249); Kant explicated that distinction three times in the body of the Third Critique, in §15, §63, and §82. 3. Ibid., 55 (A.A. 20:251). 4. A related earlier discussion, §§16-17 of the "Analytic of the Beautiful," on "dependent beauty" and the "ideal of the beautiful," was probably revised to accord with the new conception achieved in 1789. 5. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §ii: 11. 6. Ibid., 10. 7. Ibid., 12. 8. Ibid. 9. It should be noted that the term "supersensible" appears already in § 1 of the final version of the Introduction and goes on to quite extensive usage there, whereas it is mentioned only rarely and without obtrusiveness of any kind in the First Introduction. The notion of the "supersensible" in §ii should be compared especially with its usage in the final sections of the main body of the work, the "Dialectic" and the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment." It is discernibly absent in the sections originally belonging to the "Critique of Taste." 10. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §82:277. 11. Ibid., §83:280. 12. Ibid., §82:276. 13. Ibid., §84:285. 14. Ibid., §ii:12. 15. G. Tonelli, "La formazione," 444, notes that it tripled in length in the period from February to March 1790, just before Kant committed the whole work to press. Fourteen: The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's

Destination

1. On the idea of "discipline" as the defense against dogmatists (atheistic and otherwise) see First Critique, A738-94/B766-822. The same point 408

Notes to Pages 258-69

is articulated in the Third Critique (§90:312). On the positive aspect of the antinomy see Critique of Judgment, §57, Remark II. See also G. Schräder, "The Status of Teleological Judgment in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy." 2. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §57, Remark I. 3. Ibid., §57, Remark II, 190. 4. Ibid., §57:186-87. 5. This argument for transcendental idealism was made especially in the Preface to the B-version of the First Critique, and then reiterated in the Third. 6. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §57:184—85. 7. Ibid., §57:186. 8. Ibid., §57, Remark II, 184-85. 9. Ibid. This is parallel to the argument regarding transcendental apperception in the "Paralogisms" of the First Critique. 10. P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 331 ff. argues that Kant need not have drawn this conclusion, and that in doing so he clearly abandoned the transcendental for a "metaphysical" treatment of beauty. Guyer finds this misguided. R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, 79, 8 Iff., also sees a metaphysical drift in these portions of the work, and likewise seeks to minimize it. I would argue, however, that this metaphysical turn is significant and needs to be taken seriously. 11. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §57, Remark II, 191. 12. Ibid., §22:77. 13. Ibid., §57, Remark I, 188. 14. Ibid., §59:197. 15. A.A. 8:137. 16. Note that the phrase "requirement of reason" appears in the passage from §22 cited above. This notion represents Kant's most explicit acknowledgement of the intrinsic dynamism of reason, or as the ontological, not simply methodological, sense of the spontaneity of reason. 17. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A179-80/B222. 18. Kant, "Was heißt," A.A. 8:137; Critique of Judgment, §90:315n. 19. Kant, First Introduction, §12:54 (A.A. 20:250). 20. Meredith, "Last Stages," xli. 21. Souriau, Lejugement reflechissant, 85—86. 22. Tonelli, "La formazione," 442ff. Much of Tonelli's essay focuses on his dispute with Souriau over the placement of this section. 23. Lehmann ("Einleitung") had the most clearminded approach to these questions in recognizing that Kant would hardly have had to start from scratch in composing most of the material that went into the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," especially the "Analytic" and the "Deduction." He had been reading and writing and lecturing about these ideas for thirty years. 24. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §14:62. 25. Kant, Observations (1764). 26. Especially in his distinction of the beautiful from the sublime, Kant indulged in what we have termed "objective subreption." 27. Kant, First Introduction, §12:53-54 (A.A. 20:250-51). The tentaNotes to Pages 269-78

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tiveness of the term "perhaps" and the parenthetical formulation of the whole idea suggest the diffidence with which at the point of composing the First Introduction Kant still regarded discussion of the supersensible. That tentativeness vanished in the full "ethical turn" of late 1789 and early 1790. 28. Ibid., 54 (A.A. 20:250). 29. Ibid. For other conceptions—many starkly disparaging—of Kant's treatment of the sublime in the Third Critique, see: R. Bretall, "Kant's Theory of the Sublime"; M. Nahm, "'Sublimity' and the 'Moral Law' in Kant's Philosophy"; A. Lazaroff, "The Kantian Sublime"; J. Barnouw, "The Morality of the Sublime"; P. Guyer, "Kant's Distinction between the Sublime and the Beautiful"; W. Hund, "The Sublime and God in Kant's Critique of Judgment"; R. Makkreel, "Imagination and Temporality in Kant's Theory of the Sublime"; D. Crawford, "The Place of the Sublime in Kant's Aesthetic Theory"; and T. Gracyk, "Sublimity, Ugliness, and Formlessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory," 49-56. 30. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §23:82. 31. Ibid., §29GR: 106-7. 32. Ibid., §23:84. 33. Ibid., §27:96. 34. Ibid., §23:84. 35. Ibid., §29GR: 115-16. 36. Ibid., §26:90. 37. Kant, First Critique, especially exposition of the first antinomy, A510-23/B538-51. 38. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §26:90. 39. Again, this whole line of thought is grounded in the "First Antinomy" of the Critique of Pure Reason. 40. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §26:93. 41. Ibid., §26:88—89. The phrase "striving toward infinite progress" is redolent with the metaphysics of Fichte and the sensibility of Romanticism. 42. Ibid., §26:93. 43. Ibid. 44. Kant claimed Burke gave the best psychological account of these states (§29GR:118). Yet the idea is still inappropriate except in that qua pleasure, the impetus is to remain in the state rather than to change it. 45. Ibid., §26:88-89. 46. Ibid., §27:96. 47. Ibid., §27:98. 48. Ibid., §28:101. 49. Ibid., §29:105. 50. M. Nahm, "Imagination as the Productive Faculty for 'Creating Another Nature . . ."' and "Productive Imagination, Tragedy and Ugliness"; and M. Zeldin, "The Role of Art and Genius in the 'Vocation of Man'" and "Kant's Theory of Art and Genius." 51. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §49:M176. See also Kant's discussion of imagination in GR§22. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 410

Notes to Pages 278-84

54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., §17:M76. 56. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A569-70/B597-98. 57. Ibid., A570-71/B598-99. This anticipates Kant's formulation of the "aesthetic normal idea" in § 17 as a schema. 58. Ibid., A570/B598. 59. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §49:157. 60. We might make the same point about the Grand Canyon or Van Gogh's Starry Night. That is, the empirical objects need not be intrinsic purposes, and they can be both objects of nature and objects of art. What they require, however, and what distinguishes them from the sorts of things which belong to pulchritudo vaga, is just some higher significance for the subject, which Kant associates with purposiveness, and hence with perfection. 61. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §49:158. 62. This is the only sense to be made of Kant's notion of indeterminate concepts of the understanding associated with beauty. 63. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §49:158. 64. Ibid., §49:157. 65. Ibid., §57, Remark I, 187. 66. Ibid., 189. 67. Ibid., §59:198-99. 68. Ibid., §60:202. 69. Ibid., §59:199. 70. "Nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and representation, so far as it belongs to cognition. For it is only thus that this latter can be objective, and only through this has it a universal point of reference, with which the representative power of everyone is compelled to harmonize" (Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §9:51). 71. Ibid., §49:157. 72. Ibid. 73. See Kant, Grounding, 41. 74. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §50:163. 75. J. Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art, 23. 76. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §49:158. 77. See H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 73—90, for a similar position. 78. For other readings of the notion of beauty as the symbol of morality in Kant, see: J. Glenn, "Kant's Theory of Symbolism"; T. Cohen, "Why Beauty is a Symbol of Morality"; D. White, "On Bridging the Gulf between Nature and Morality in the Critique ofJudgment"; and R. Kuhns, "That Kant Did Not Complete His Argument Concerning the Relation of Art to Morality and How It Might be Completed." 79. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §16:67. 80. Ibid. Fifteen: Aesthetics As the Key to Anthropology 1. It "concerns men, i.e. animal, but still rational, beings—not merely qua rational (e.g. spirits), but qua animal also" (Kant, Critique of fudgment, Notes to Pages 284-92

411

§5:44). See O. Larere, "Sentiment esthetique et unite de la nature humaine," and J. Möller, "Die anthropologische Relevanz der Ästhetik." 2. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §29GR: 108. 3. Ibid., §29GR:107. 4. Ibid., §29GR:111-12. 5. Ibid., 109. 6. Ibid., 107-8. 7. Ibid., §59:200. 8. G. Schräder, "The Status of Feeling in Kant's Philosophy." 9. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 78. 10. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §1:38. 11. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 105. 12. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §29GR:119. 13. Ibid., §54:175. 14. See R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, chap. 5, "The Life of the Imagination," 88— 107, a reworking of his earlier article, "The Feeling of Life: Some Kantian Sources of Life-Philosophy," Dilthey-Jahrbuchfur Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften 3 (1985), 83— 104. 15. Kant, Anthropology, book 2: "Of Pleasure and Pain," opening remarks, 99. And see Critique of Practical Reason, 122. 16. Ibid., §64:105. 17. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §54:175-76. This disjunction expressed Kant's key ethical insight into the "heterogeneity of the good." See J. Silber, "The Moral Good and the Natural Good in Kant's Ethics." 18. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §3:40. 19. Geistesgefühl points to two key elements: first, to the tension between natural inclination and "supersensible destination," i.e., moral selfconsciousness; and, second, to the metaphysical potential in the idea of Geist, especially as Kant articulated it in §49. 20. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §49:157'. 21. Ibid., §49:M175. 22. Ibid., §54:175. 23. Ibid., §54:180. 24. Ibid., §4:42-43. 25. Kant, Anthropology, §66:107. 26. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §83:284n. 27. A. Broadie and E. Pybus, "Kant's Concept of Respect"; A. MacBeath, "Kanton Moral Feeling." 28. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 76. 29. Kant, Grounding, 14n. 30. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 77. 31. Ibid., 75. 32. Ibid., 80. 33. Ibid., 80. 34. Ibid., 89. 35. Ibid., 91. 36. Ibid., 79. 37. Ibid., 84n.

412

Notes to Pages 293-300

38. Kant, Grounding, 14n. 39. Ibid., 13. 40. What Kant is referring to by admiration and astonishment for such things as "lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and distance of the heavenly bodies, the strength and swiftness of many animals, etc." (Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, 79) is what is called the "natural sublime." Kant also discusses admiration, astonishment, awe and their distinctions in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, and in the Third Critique these distinctions are revived in connection with the sublime. That it could move even Kant was betokened not only in the magnificent apostrophe which ended the Second Critique—"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe . . . the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me." (ibid., 166)—but by his earlier writings and concern with natural science. (P. Menzer, Kants Ästhetik in ihrer Entwicklung, 3—7.) 41. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §29GR:108. 42. Ibid. 43. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A379-80. 44. Ibid., A360. 45. Ibid., A345/B403. 46. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §57:187. 47. Ibid., §ii: 12. 48. Ibid., §59:199. 49. Ibid., §91:327. 50. Ibid., §49:157. 51. Kant, Reflection 740 (1771, perhaps earlier), A.A. 15:326. 52. Kant, Reflection 782 (1772-75), ibid., 342. 53. Kant, Reflection 824 (1776-78), ibid., 367. 54. The insistent wordplay with "spring" is certainly not inadvertent. Kant, Reflection 831 (1776-78), ibid., 371. 55. Kant, Reflection 844 (1776-78), ibid., 375. 56. Kant, Reflection 932 (1776-78), ibid., 413. 57. Kant, Reflection 933 (1776-78), ibid., 414. 58. Ibid. 59. Kant, Reflection 934 (1776-78), ibid., 415. 60. Kant, Reflection 938 (1776-78), ibid., 416. The notion of Weltseele is extraordinarily important. Not only does it gesture to pantheism as advocated by Herder in the 1780s, but it obviously found its great articulation also in Schelling's Idealism of the 1790s. See G. di Giovanni, "Kant's Metaphysics of Nature and Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature." That the notion of Weltseele was of profound significance within Kantianism in the 1790s is clear not only from Kant's own opusposthumum, but in the speculations along those lines by that remarkable Kantian Solomon Maimon in the early 1790s, which he published ("Über die Weltseele") and to which he sought to draw Kant's attention. (Maimon to Kant, May 15, 1790, in Briefwechsel, A.A. ll:174ff.). See K. Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 164, 174ff. See also G. Lehmann, Kants Nachlaßwerk, 19-40. 61. H. Dreyer, Der Begriff Geist in der deutschen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel; R. Solomon, "Hegel's Concept of Geist."

Notes to Pages 300-305

413

Sixteen: The Unity of Man 1. More precisely, freedom was an a priori metaphysical corollary of the fact of pure reason, which was itself the apodictic imperative of the moral law. It remains that both had unconditional validity in Kant's view, hence represented something significantly higher than mere belief. 2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §v:18. 3. In the "'Transcendental Aesthetic" of the First Critique, Kant acknowledged the paradoxical nature of his theory of subjectivity (Critique of Pure Reason, B68 and B152-53.) He claimed that the problem of selfconsciousness was inevitably difficult in any philosophical approach: How the "I" that thinks can be distinct from the "I" that intuits itself (for I can represent still other modes of intuition as at least possible), and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter; and how, therefore, I can say: "I, as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as an object that is thought, in so far as I am given to myself [as something other or] beyond that [I] which is [given to myself] in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am to the understanding"—these are questions that raise no greater nor less difficulty than how I can be an object to myself at all, and, more particularly, an object of intuition and of inner perceptions. (Ibid., B155-56.) This is surely one of the most daunting sentences in Kant's entire First Critique. 4. That Kant nevertheless thought of it in such a manner, at least in terms of practical reason, is apparent in the transcendental definitions he offered for the notions of "life," the "faculty of desire," and "pleasure" in the crucial footnote to the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, 9 (A.A. 5,8-9n.). 5. Pure reason is determining (ratiocinans), hence it cannot catch itself as such, but only in its determinations (ratiocinatae). Kant wrote: "since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of determination, . . . I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an intelligence" (Critique of Pure Reason, B156-58n.). In the "Paralogisms," Kant wrote: "this identity of the subject. . . cannot. . . signify the identity of the person, if by that is understood the consciousness of the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all change of its states" (ibid., B408). It was too empty. Hence, "I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the self . . . I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination" (ibid., B158). See K. Ameriks, "Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality" and Kant's Theory of Mind. 6. "In the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of 414

Notes to Pages 306-8

myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am" (Critique of Pure Reason, B157). While the "I think" as transcendental subject was utterly certain, it was not even a concept but rather "a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X" (ibid., A346/B404). Such bare consciousness is merely form and process, not thing. 7. Ibid., B153. 8. Ibid., B133. 9. Kant, First Introduction, 10n. (A.A. 20:204n.); K. Diising, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 57. 10. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B140. 11. Ibid., A343/B401. 12. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 8; T. Mischel, "Kant and the Possibility of a Science of Psychology"; M. Washburn, "Did Kant Have a Theory of Self-Knowledge?" In the First Introduction, Kant argued that there could be no empirical psychology as a science because time "does not furnish enough material for an entire science, unlike the pure theory of space (geometry)" (First Introduction,41 [A.A. 20:237]). 13. P. Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self." 14. In a footnote to the B-version of the "Paralogisms," Kant introduced some new ideas on this subject: The "I think" expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. perception (and thus shows that sensation, which as such belongs to sensibility, lies at the basis of this existential proposition) . . . An indeterminate perception here signifies only something real that is given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance, nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually [in der Tat] exists, and which in the proposition, "I think," is denoted as such. (First Critique, B422-23n.) This language of an "indeterminate perception" seems to suggest the transcendental subject is experienced neither as appearance (phenomenon) nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but rather as a bare "fact." But that "fact" is of the essence of reason. It is not simply empirical. It is grounded in a necessary transcendental structure. It is—or rather, it ought to be—a "metaphysical principle," in Kant's precise sense, namely, that which can be analytically inferred from transcendental principles and thereby form the basis for valid knowledge. Kant suggests this possibility not only in his explanation of transcendental and metaphysical expositions in the B-version of the First Critique (B38-40) but also in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment in a crucial passage concerning our certainty of the freedom of the empirical will (§v: 17). 15. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A402. 16. D. Henrich, "Über die Einheit der Subjektivität." 17. Its "factuality" is an unresolved matter in Kantian epistemology. Beck notes this in passing in a footnote in his Commentary, 273n.; see also P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 56. 18. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A546-47/B574-75. Notes to Pages 308-11

415

19. Heimsoeth stresses the importance of this passage in his classic essay, "Persönlichkeitsbewußtsein und Ding an sich in der Kantischen Philosophic" While D. Henrich adopts a more guarded approach, he too notes a definite cognitive element to at least practical apperception: "Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft" and "Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant und im spekulativen Idealismus." Benton, Kant's Second Critique, 147—48, also Stresses this passage as the strongest evidence of a "practical apperception" in Kant's First Critique. For a critical analytic stand on these questions, see L. Beck, "The Fact of Reason" and "Towards a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason." 20. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A50-51/B74-75. 21. Ibid., A68/B93. See R. Pippin, "Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind." 22. Ibid., B130. And see B152: "[S]ynthesis is an expression of spontaneity." 23. Ibid., B132. 24. Ibid., A97. 25. Ibid., A446/B474. 26. Ibid., A533/B561. 27. Ibid., B430-31. This passage seems to point to Kant's notion of a "fact of pure reason" as it would be developed in the Second Critique, probably only a few months after Kant composed these revisions of the "Paralogisms." For evidence that Kant developed the notion of the "fact of pure reason" while revising theFirst Critique, see preface to B-version, B:xxxviii: "a priori data of reason." 28. Ibid., A797/B825, following Silber in dropping Kemp-Smith's interpolation. See J. Silber, "The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good as the Canon of Pure Reason," 233. 29. Yovel writes, in Kant's Philosophy of History, "the Kantian texts are studded with expressions that amount to a virtual erotic glossary of reason. Reason is not only endowed with 'ends,' 'tasks,' and 'interests'; it also has 'needs,' 'satisfactions,' 'aspirations,' 'strivings,' and 'affection'; it has a 'vocation,' a 'destiny,' a 'calling,' and an 'appellation'; and needless to say, it has 'requirements,' 'claims,' and 'pretenses'—which Kant portrays as concrete attitudes. Many of these expressions should certainly be understood as metaphors; but metaphors for what? For . . . certain aspects of the interest of reason which, in itself, is no longer a metaphor in the same sense, but rather a systematic concept" (16). Nowhere before have I encountered so clear a recognition of the language Kant employs with reference to reason or of its metaphysical, not just metaphorical significance. See his development of these ideas: Yovel, "The Interests of Reason." See also M. Renault, "Le principe d'auto-conservation de la raison est le fondement de la croyance rationelle"; P. Vignola, "'Seele' et 'Gemut' selon Kant"; and M. Westphal, "In Defense of the Thing in Itself." 30. The "practical" itself had two components: there was the praxis of cognitive-technical thinking—"judgment" in its teleological sense—and there was the praxis of moral evaluations—"practical judgments" and "practical purposes"—i.e., concrete projects grounded in a rational choice. 416

Notes to Pages 311-12

Spontaneity expressed these two dimensions of praxis as a freedom to inaugurate cognition or action. While it was subjectively possible to feel these aspects of praxis, Kant also insisted that it was cognitively possible to think them and even barely possible to know that they functioned via direct apperception. In 1789, Kant would shift the notion of technical praxis from the realm of moral philosophy to that of theoretical philosophy. Zweckrationalität was, Kant's First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment now proclaimed, merely theoretical. Spontaneity had its ground exclusively in moral purposiveness: in the "law of freedom." 31. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §3:40. 32. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 124. 33. Ibid., 125. 34. Ibid., 126. 35. See, e.g., N. Rotenstreich, Experience and Its Systematization, 111— 31. 36. Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 288-89; and M. Casula, "Der Mythos des Primats der praktischen Vernunft." 37. L. Beck, Commentary, 249-50. See also N. McKenzie, "The Primacy of Practical Reason in Kant's System." 38. On "realm" and "territory" see Kant, Critique ofJudgment, §ii: 10— 11. 39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B476, B560ff, B830-31; L. Beck, Commentary, 177. 40. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A686/B714. Kant identified the principle of totality in systems with the idea of a purpose also in his crucial discussion in the "Architectonic of Pure Reason," A832-33/B860-61. 41. Ibid., A694/B722. 42. "Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance, I entitle intelligible. If, therefore, that which in the sensible world must be regarded as appearance has in itself a faculty which is not an object of sensible intuition, but through which it can be the cause of appearances, the causality of this being can be regarded from two points of view. Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects" (Critique ofPure Reason, A538/B566). "The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition (we are quite unable to think any such object), but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment, that is, as a corpus mysticum of the rational beings in it" (ibid., A808/B836). 43. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §90:310-12. 44. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 105-6. 45. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface to B-version, B:xxxii-xxxv. 46. The Wöllner Edict of 1788 made the question of censorship and orthodoxy very vivid in Prussia, and Kant suffered from it soon enough. But one might go so far as to argue that Kant had not only a prudent but also a positive ground for his campaign to "limit reason to make room for faith," namely, a genuinely religious commitment. See Despland, Kant on History and Religion, and A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion. Notes to Pages 312-15

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47. J. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," lxxx. 48. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 6. For alternative views, see J. Marshall, "Man as an End in Himself"; and P. Haezrahi, "The Concept of Man as an End-in-Himself," 29Iff. 49. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 73. 50. Kant, Grounding, 35 (A.A. 4:428). 51. Ibid., 3 5 - 3 6 (A.A. 4:428). 52. "Autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature." Ibid., 41 (A.A. 4:436). 53. Ibid., 38 (A.A. 4:431). 54. Ibid., 42 (A.A. 4:437). 55. Ibid., 36 (A.A. 4:428-29). 56. Kant was not very explicit about how we would be certain of the existence of other rational beings. He went to such lengths about the validity of finding reason in oneself that he left undeveloped the problem of the recognition of other rational beings. For him that was so obvious that it did not occasion practical concern. It is, however, neither obvious nor effortless to make these linkages. The point would be worse if we could attain the idea of the validity of the concept of an end-in-itself only via its universality among rational beings. But since it is in fact grounded immanently upon the necessary rationality of any, then it can be unhesitatingly ascribed to all rational beings. That includes even, should they exist, extraterrestrial or supernatural intelligences. Reason, not universality, but as reality, not merely as form, is the key here. Here we must invoke the distinction between intersubjectivity and universality, and even more that between universality and validity. Validity grounds universality, not the converse. The essence of a priori validity is necessity, not universality. (Here I differ sharply with L. Beck, Commentary, 22, 67.) The latter follows inevitably, and may therefore be taken as an indicator, but it is not itself a modality which is apodictic. What is merely imputed to everyone is not as such objectively valid, as Kant made clear in a crucial argument in the Critique ofJudgment, §8:49. Objective validity is a matter of necessary rationality; reason's intrinsic determination is decisive in this context. All rational beings share in taking themselves as ends in themselves, but it is not that they so share which makes them rational, but rather that they are rational which makes it possible for them to share. Reason is primary. It is the ground. 57. Kant, Grounding, 38 (A.A. 4:432). 58. Ibid., 39 (A.A. 4:433). 59. Ibid., 43 (A.A. 4:438). 60. Ibid., 40 (A.A. 4:434). 61. A purely rational being would necessarily actualize all the immanent interests of reason. In the First Critique, Kant wrote: "Now in an intelligible world, that is, in the moral world, in the concept of which we leave out of account all the hindrances to morality (the desires), such a system, in which happiness is bound up with and proportioned to morality, can be conceived as necessary, inasmuch as freedom, partly inspired and partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of general happiness, since rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would them418

Notes to Pages 316-18

selves be the authors of both their own enduring well-being and ofthat of others" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A809/B837). Similarly, Kant wrote extensively in the Grounding of the "holy will" for which there would be no impediments to perfect morality, and hence no need for the compulsion of duty. It was not that such a being would have no moral principle, but rather that this moral principle would not be experienced as constraint. Kant argued in the Second Critique that reason had the capacity to determine the moral intention entirely without reference to any intuition outside reason itself. The pure immanence of reason's autonomous self-determination in the practical domain betokened the objective reality of reason. This was a crucial result, at once the linchpin of the critical philosophy and the stumbling block for all empiricist philosophies. 62. Kant, Grounding, 39 (A.A. 4:433). 63. Kant, First Critique, A809/B837. The use of the concept of the "highest good" in the "Analytic" of the Second Critique hearkens back to the treatment of the term in the "Canon of Pure Reason" of the First Critique and to the discussion of the "kingdom of ends" in the Grounding. The question is: Is it the same concept as the one which Kant develops in the "Dialectic" of the Second Critique and takes up again in the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment" in the Third Critique} Is there only one concept of the "highest good" in Kant? 64. Kant, Grounding (39, A.A. 4:433). 65. Ibid., 43 (A.A. 4:438). 66. See the works of T. Auxter on this idea and its implications: "The Teleology of Kant's Ectypal World," "The Unimportance of the Highest Good," and Kant's Moral Teleology. 67. Kant, Grounding, 42n. (A.A. 4:436n.). 68. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 44. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid., 72. 72. Kant explained the notion of "hypotyposis" in Critique of Judgment, §59:197-98. See chap. 13 above. 73. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 73. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid., 73. 76. Ibid., 45. Seventeen: The Unity of Mankind 1. T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, passim. See also F. van de Pitte, "The Importance of Moral Teleology for Kant's Critical Philosophy." 2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §87:298. 3. Kant entertained more than one notion of the highest good. As Y. Yovel has put it, the "Kantian concept of the highest good is ambiguous; its meaning varies not only from one work to the next, but occasionally even in the same chapter. In fact there is no single text in which Kant discusses it exhaustively, and all his treatments of the notion must be taken as fragmentary and as calling for reciprocal supplementation and illumination" Notes to Pages 319-23

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(Kant's Philosophy of History, 81). The core definition Kant offered of the idea of the "highest good" was a proportionality of happiness to worthiness. This formula, or a close variant, appeared in a very large number of Kant's published works over a considerable span of time. But it frequently did so in the company of other definitions which at the very least amplified and often obscured the core meaning: the "Kingdom of God," Critique of Practical Reason, 128; the "intelligible world," ibid., 132; "natural beings under moral law," Critique ofJudgment, §86; "moral vocation of man," Critique ofPure Reason, A840/B868. See Beck, Commentary, 242, for discussion. The most important distinction to make in approaching the issue of the highest good in Kant is that between the problem of the objectification of moral laws in the actual world and the problem of the reward for worthiness and its transcendent requirements. Kant merged these two ideas together, perhaps for a motive ulterior to the strict question of morality. The result has been a monumental controversy over the meaning and even the legitimacy of this notion in his philosophy. 4. Kant, Religion, 5. 5. J. Silber, "The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," 179ff. 6. J. Silber, "Kant's Concept of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent," 469ff. 7. J. Silber, "Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft," 253ff. 8. Kant, Religion, 6n. 9. Beck, Commentary, 243. 10. M. Zeldin, "The Summum Bonum, the Moral Law, and the Existence of God." See also R. Friedman, "The Importance and Function of Kant's Highest Good"; A. Reath, "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant"; S. Smith, "Worthiness to Be Happy and Kant's Concept of the Highest Good"; M. Packer, "The Highest Good in Kant's Psychology of Motivation"; R. Friedman, "Hypocrisy and the Highest Good"; and W. Brugger, "Kant und das Höchste Gut." l l . J . Atwell argues that if objects of the will derive their value other than from the law, then their achievement cannot be a duty. He denies that "objective ends" as results can be taken up by reason as moral ("Objective Ends in Kant's Ethics," 169—71). Yet the morally responsible agent is a sensual entity with already built-in propensities to seek certain natural goods. While duty could override them, it could not extirpate them entirely, and, more, it should not. The question Atwell's intepretation of Kant can never clarify adequately is the reason behind this "should." 12. A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 55. 13. Ibid., 117n. 14. T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, 60. 15. T. Auxter, "Ectypal Nature," 488. 16. T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, 24. 17. Ibid., 150. 18. G. Barnes, "In Defense of Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good," esp. 453; G. Krämling, "Das höchste Gut als mögliche Welt"; S. AndersonGold, "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth"; and T. Godlove, Jr., "Moral Actions, Moral Lives." 420

Notes to Pages 323-26

19. They would also lead from the Third Critique into Kant's next projects, both his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, which pursued the religious dimension, and his On the Old Saw: That Might Be Right in Theory but It Won't Work in Practice, which carried on the historical-political analysis. See R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, chap. 7, for a discussion of the connection of the Third Critique to this output of the 1790s. 20. Kant, First Introduction, §12:53 {A.A. 20:249). 21. In §82 of the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment" Kant restated the distinction between relative and intrinsic purposiveness which he had formulated earlier in § 15 of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" and §63 of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment." 22. Kant makes this distinction in ibid., §82:276. 23. Ibid., §83:280. 24. Kant discusses the concept of happiness in ibid. §83:280, 284n. and §84:286n. 25. In the Second Critique Kant observed that no one needs to be commanded to pursue happiness. A human being cannot help but do that (Critique of Practical Reason, 38). This is a notion that has not received sufficient attention in some interpretations of Kant's ethics, especially as regards the controversial issue of the "highest good." 26. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §83:281ff. 27. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 121. 28. Ibid., 283-84. See Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. 29. The connection with Freud's theory of sublimation has not escaped some interpreters, e.g., N. Hertz, "The Notion of Blockage in the Literature of the Sublime." 30. This is what Kant means about the propaedeutic function of physical teleology in theology. See Critique ofJudgment, §85. 31. This is Kant's definition of "culture." See ibid., §83:281. 32. The most thorough and in many ways provocative study of this is G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 89—178. 33. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 126. 34. G. Kelly; Idealism, Politics and History, 139—40. 35. Ibid., 100, 121. Also, E. Fackenheim, "Kant's Concept of History"; and K. Weyand, Kants Geschichtsphilosophie, 49—136. 36. On the Kant-Herder dispute in history see H. Irmscher, "Die geschichtsphilosophische Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Herder"; J. Simon, "Herder und Kant"; and M. Sakabe, "Freedom as a Regulative Principle." 37. P. Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, passim. 38. L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 105—6. 39. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 119-20. 40. Ibid. 4L The asceticism of this posture was extreme. It provoked Herder in the 1780s, and later it even roused the Kantian Schiller to protest. Schiller had absorbed enough of the social theory of the Enlightenment to "concede that, litde as individuals might benefit from this fragmentation of their being, there was no other way in which the species as a whole could Notes to Pages 326-30

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have progressed" (On the Aesthetic Education ofMan, 11). Yet Schiller was far more attentive to the loss involved. "Thus, however much the world as a whole may benefit through this fragmentary specialization of human powers, it cannot be denied that the individuals affected by it suffer under the curse of this cosmic purpose" (ibid., 14). Kant could claim that man deserved no more, since in terms of his own "natural dispositions . . . he himself, as far as in him lies, works for the destruction of his own race" (Critique ofJudgment, §83:280). Schiller would not accept this: "But can Man really be destined to miss himself for the sake of any purpose whatsoever? Should Nature, for the sake of her own purposes, be able to rob us of a completeness which Reason, for the sake of hers, enjoins upon us? It must, therefore, be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers involves the sacrifice of wholeness. Or rather, however much the law of Nature tends in that direction, it must be open to us to restore by means of a higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves have destroyed" (On the Aesthetic Education ofMan, 15). That is the essence of the "aesthetic solution" of German Idealism. 42. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 119. 43. Relating Kant's idea of nature to the "invisible hand" suggests the enormous importance that the Scottish Enlightenment idea of a "civil society," as the impersonal order imposed by the market economy, had on German social thought, starting at least with Kant. The idea of a "cunning of nature"—a take-off on Hegel's full "cunning of reason"—was invented by Eric Weil and employed extensively by Y. Yovel to refer to the purely mechanical role nature plays in fostering man's capacity for freedom prior to his rational self-assertion. 44. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 120; Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 120. 45. See A. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, for a full articulation of this essential argument about the culture of the eighteenth century and the modern West, which found expression above all in the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment. 46. On this naturalistic line see Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 120— 21, 135, 143; Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 93-94; and W. Booth, Interpreting the World, 96, 109. 47. In the 1790s he became more critical of such Hobbesianism, e.g., in On the Old Saw (1793), 57-65. See L. Krieger, The German Idea ofFreedom, 93-95; P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 73-80; and Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 139ff, 161. 48. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 120. 49. Ibid., 122. The incongruity between the idea of "general will" and man needing a master is even starker than the well-cited contradictions in Rousseau himself. See, e.g., the tension in Kant's exposition of "constitutional law" in On the Old Saw, 57—74. 50. On Lutheran notions of the inevitability of sin in the world, and consequently of the need for a powerful secular authority, see: C. Trinkaus, "The Religious Foundations of Luther's Social Views," and E. Troeltsch's classic account The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches, esp. 518-31. 422

Notes to Pages 331-32

51. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 123. This reflects Kant's idea of "radical evil." See Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 208ff., for a careful defense of Kant's notion. See also J. Silber, "Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," passim; and E. Fackenheim, "Kant and Radical Evil." 52. This was the thrust of the second key essay of 1784, "What is Enlightenment?" 53. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 95; L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 104. 54. Kant, "Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte," A.A. 8:107-23; E. Fackenheim, Kant's Concept of History, 384-89; Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 125—41, 164—69; and G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 140-70. 55. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §83:281-82. 56. "Kant always emphasizes that the Enlightenment is not just a form of consciousness but a real historical force that can be institutionalized through praxis and become embodied in historical reality" (Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 175). 57. This is the sphere of Kant to which Wood, Despland, Auxter, and Yovel have all devoted such innovative attention. That Kant was interested in the history of the future and in what philosophy could say about it, and that this interest had strong religious and political dimensions which were anchored firmly in his context all suggest the degree of continuity between Kant and his Idealist successors. It is the basis for a possible ultimate unity. "If one stresses reason and reason's ends as the known substrate of morality and as the estimated substrate of nature and art, then a (Godless) synthesis remains possible" (P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 92). Riley uses this argument to refute McFarland's claim in "The Bogus Unity" that the only unity the system could have would be God and Kant cannot be proven to have really believed in a God. 58. L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 112ff.; G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 153f. 59. Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 31. 60. Ibid., 73n. 61. Ibid., 84. 62. Ibid., 135. 63. Ibid., 75. 64. Ibid., 72. 65. G. Michaelson, Jr., The Historical Dimension of a Rational Faith, 133— 83. 66. A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, passim. 67. M. Despland, Kant on History and Religion, 203ff., 263ff. 68. Thus Fackenheim, "Kant's Concept of History," 398; Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 300ff. See also P. Stern, "The Problem of History and Temporality in Kantian Ethics." 69. W. Booth, Interpreting the World, 125ff.; E. Vollrath, "Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Grundlegung einer Theorie des Politischen"; D. Pasini, "Das 'Reich der Zwecke' und der politisch-rechtliche Kantianische Gedanke"; and R. Pippin, "On the Moral Foundations of Kant's Rechts-

Notes to Pages 332-34

423

lehre." The influence of Kant on contemporary political theory, especially in view of the reconstruction ofJ. Rawls, is substantial. 70. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §84:284. 71. Ibid., §84:285. 72. Ibid., §91:320-21. 73. Ibid., §87:299n. 74. K. Düsing, "Das Problem des höchsten Gutes in Kants praktischer Philosophie." 75. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A590-642/B618-70, esp. A 6 2 0 30/B648-58. 76. Ibid., A623/B651. 77. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §85:287. 78. Ibid., 290-91. 79. Ibid., §87:301n. 80. Kant, First Critique, A805-19/B833-47; L. Beck, Commentary, 241. 81. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §91:323n. 82. Ibid., §91:323. 83. Ibid., §87:303. 84. The "tragic worldview" takes this position. See Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, 97ff, 123, 183; A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 179. Kant's treatment of the tragic position is not adequate. But see W. Booth, Interpreting the World, 114ff, for an effort to define Kant's position as "tragic" via the category of the sublime. 85. This is the Stoic position. On Kant's ambivalent relation to the Stoics, see Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 117n., and esp. Booth, Interpreting the World, 43—47, who argues that Kant is ultimately quite close to Stoicism. 86. Kant says so much himself, in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, 4. 87. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 128n., 132ff. There are those who question the sincerity of this belief and its consequence, Kant's "theism." See Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 94ff., 109; and J. McFarland, "The Bogus Unity," 280. That position seems to me irreconcilable with historical evidence. Here, Wood, Despland, and Silber have the stronger case by far. Yet there is a world of difference between the sincerity of this belief and its validity. With that at stake, the stance of Yovel and McFarland takes on a new importance. But see Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 91—93, for a response. 88. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," cxxi—cxxxiii. 89. "Rigorism" is the suspicion of worthiness raised to a principle. Kant's rigorism is at times quite stark. While his defenders protest against the "caricature" of Kant as a rigorist, there is too much textual evidence for this caricature not to have caught (and admittedly exaggerated) some prominent features. The strongest articulation of this rigorism is in the first part of Kant's Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone, where, in keeping with traditional Christian theology, though on the basis of his own critical philosophy, Kant argued for a radical disposition to evil in human nature. In another of his most rigoristic passages Kant argues that "when

424

Notes to Pages 335-39

we pay attention to our experience of the way human beings act, we meet frequent and—as we ourselves admit—justified complaints that there cannot be cited a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty" (Kant, Grounding, 19). This is an anthropological observation, and hence empirical, as Kant certainly recognized, but it makes a very strong negative claim, namely, that every action of a human being can be suspected, and that this suspicion is in itself sufficient warrant to deny worthiness. One can be very severe with oneself on that score. One's worthiness may be easily disproved, even if it is hard to prove. Still, only the most "rigoristic" posture would deny any worthiness. For a rigorist, mankind is guilty until proven innocent, and the proof is impossible. This kind of thinking, the "hermeneutic of suspicion," has its ground in the PaulineChristian notion of sin as a condition, not an act, and finds its later expression in Freudian theories of unconscious (and unsavory) motivation. This idea of the "hermeneutic of suspicion" is developed by P. Ricoeur in reference to Freud and his predeccesors, Marx and Nietzsche. But, as he certainly knows, its origins lie far deeper in the religious tradition of the West. See Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 32—35. 90. That is the ascetic element in Kant. The "rigorism" and the "asceticism" of Kant should be carefully distinguished, though there is an intimate association between them. Kant had a strong personal disposition toward asceticism, and this influenced his writings on ethics. For Kant, it was hard ever to regard "inclinations" of man's sensual nature otherwise than as a "burden." (See Critique ofJudgment, §83:284n.) This dour attitude, which comes to clear expression in his ethics and in his anthropology, provoked sharp opposition from Herder, and later from the Idealists. It was the point over which Schiller publicly quarreled with Kant. Kant admitted philosophically that such asceticism was unjustified, but his personal preferences continued to color his treatment. Kant's ambivalence toward the "natural good" is one of the most pervasive and problematic features of his ethics. 91. For rigorous epistemologists, the only sphere left to consign this kind of thinking to is the aesthetic. It goes without saying that it could claim no objective validity. 92. See Kant's acknowledgement of the argument in Second Critique, 149n. 93. Beck, Commentary, 253f. 94. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 28-29. 95. Beck, Commentary, 245. 96. J. Murphy, "The Highest Good as Content for Kant's Ethical Formalism," 109. 97. For "rigorists" of their school, no more damning conclusion could be reached. But for those seeking to find in Kant's Third Critique the sources of the metaphysics of German Idealism, this result has quite another meaning. This whole realm of thought is decisive for the "aesthetic solution" of the Idealists. 98. Auxter, "Ectypal World," 493. 99. Auxter, "The Unimportance of the Highest Good."

Notes to Pages 339-41

425

Conclusion: The Meaning

of the Third Critique

1. As E. Fackenheim put it, the Third Critique was the effort "to join together what the first two Critiques have put asunder" ("Kant's Concept of History," 389). This same point is made by L. Krieger in The German Idea of Freedom, 106, and by E. Cassirer in Kant's Life and Thought, 360. Kant sought to do so under the rubric of purposiveness or teleology. As G. Michaelson puts it, "Kant turns to teleology when he wants to bridge the gap between the worlds of nature and freedom" (Historical Dimension of a Rational Faith, 141). 2. Hence such titles for Kant's works after 1781 as "Metaphysics of Nature" and "Metaphysics of Morals." Those titles persisted for two decades after he ostensibly "preempted" metaphysics, according to the formalist reading. 3. Michaelson, Historical Dimension of a Rational Faith, 181; see P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 3, for a similar observation. 4. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 71. 5. Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, passim, esp. 302. 6. F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 227. 7. L. Beck, Commentary 54; and see J. McFarland, "The Bogus Unity." 8. "If a critical examination of pure practical reason is to be complete, then there must, in my view, be the possibility at the same time of showing the unity of practical and speculative reason in a common principle; for in the final analysis there can be only one and the same reason, which is to be differentiated solely in its application" (Kant, Grounding, 4). 9. Kant wrote of the "expectation of bringing some day into one view the unity of the entire pure rational faculty (both theoretical and practical) and of being able to derive everything from one principle." This, he went on, was "an unavoidable need of human reason, as it finds complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its cognitions" (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 94). 10. For a similar conclusion, see P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 67— 68. 11. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 92.

426

Notes to Pages 343-45

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453

Index

Act, aesthetic, 114-15, 119 (see also Imagination); cognitive, 49, 54-55, 70, 72, 74, 77, 164, 308, 310, 311 (see also Synthesis); practical, 95, 105, 221, 295 (see also Freedom; Will) Action at a distance, 190, 193 Activism. See Spontaneity Actuality (see also Existence; Validity), 18-21, 72, 77, 91, 95, 212, 219, 232, 309, 315, 325, 336, 341; objective, 51-52, 68; with validity, 60, 64, 86, 163, 166, 289, 316; without validity, 64, 97, 109, 135, 145, 160, 320 Actualizing the moral law (see also Efficaciousness of morality in world of sense), 133, 264-68, 314, 319, 320, 322, 332; and highest good, 323-26, 3 3 3 34, 340-41 Addison, Joseph, 26, 28, 277, 355n.68, 356n.98 Adickes, Erich, 39 Aesthetic and ethical, relation of, 3, 273, 278-79, 288, 291, 292-94 Aesthetic vs. logical, 19-21, 4 8 49, 61, 64, 78-79, 159

Aesthetics, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 131, 273, 292 Aesthetics: (critical theory) of 18th century, 5, 122, 273, 277; Kant's "Copernican Revolution" in, 45, 46, 94; and teleology, 88, 151-52 Aggregate vs. system, 160, 171, 173, 174, 268, 304 Agreeable. See Pleasant Akenside, Mark, 354n.62 Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, 233 Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 180, 184, 205, 234 Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, 19 Allison, Henry, 74, 248, 363n.60, 402n.34 Ameriks, Karl, 48, 55, 71, 369n.54 Analogy, 3, 239, 264, 274-75, 279, 320-21, 324; of judgment of taste and pure moral choice, 7, 89, 93, 278-79, 293; of nature to purpose, 96, 153, 216, 221-22, 315; of reason with organism, 173-74; of symbol to schema, 274, 316 "Analytic of Teleological Judgment," 186, 218, 224, 260 "Analytic of the Beautiful," 2, 4, 455

"Analytic of the Beautiful" (cont'd) 9 0 , 9 5 , 121, 123, 130, 272-73, 278 "Analytic of the Sublime," 5, 92, 123, 130, 264, 269, 275-76, 278 Animal consciousness, 64, 80—81, 370n.91, 371n.95, 371n.96 Animality. See Materiality of man Anomaly of empirical cognition and recourse to teleology, 96, 97, 155, 219-20, 224, 227 Anthropology: cultural, 181, 182, 191-92, 199, 205, 353n.27; philosophical, 3, 32, 39, 61, 179, 292, 303, 334, 353n.27, 364n.71, 425n.90; physical, 180-81, 191-92, 198, 199, 391n.44 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 83-84, 85, 103, 114, 145, 413n.40 Anticipation (prediction) (see also Singularity: of an event or experience), 86, 91, 108, 112, 118, 126, 239, 279, 385n.47 Antinomy, 122, 163, 269-70, 271, 281, 289, 302, 306, 311, 313 Appearance (Erscheinung), 49— 50, 66, 67, 71, 75, 79, 164 Apperception (see also Selfconsciousness): practical, 303, 344, 416n.l9; transcendental, 294, 296, 307, 308, 309, 311, 414n.3, 414n.5, 414n.6, 415n.l4 Appetite, 31, 109, 114, 328 Aquila, Richard, 73-74 Architectonic: as oversystematization, 90, 107, 162, 170, 279; systematic articulation, 3, 130, 142-43, 172, 174, 176, 227, 278, 327, 346 Aristotle, 406n.l5 456

Index

Art, 5, 10, 20, 31, 42, 46, 120, 123, 129-47, 280, 286, 2 8 8 92, 404n.62; the mechanical in, 129, 134, 137, 139, 141, 144—45; parallel with nature, 14, 131-32, 152, 155; philosophy of, 124, 129-47, 286, 320n.40, 381n.46, 381n.48; and rule, 134-36; work of, 29, 97, 100, 124-25, 129-47, 155, 213 Artifice, 97-98, 124, 132, 153, 155, 158; vs. art, 130, 133-36, 144; vs. nature, 130-33 Asocial sociability, 331-32 Association, laws of empirical, 80, 284, 289 Atheism: alleged against Kant, 234; Enlightenment trends toward, 194, 196, 229, 257; Kant's hostility to, 187, 191, 230, 240, 338; Lessing, Spinoza and, 228, 235, 236-37, 399n.6 Aufklärung, 1, 8-14, 17-34, 228-29, 230, 330, 348n.21,. 388n.3; and epistemology, 19-21; and political-religious reaction, 11, 228-29, 241-43; relation to Western Enlightenment, 13, 17, 22; vs. Sturm und Drang, 26, 34, 35-44, 186, 187, 228 Augustan taste (see also Neoclassicism), 26, 28 Authorities, political, and repression, 8, 179, 228, 241-43, 246-47, 332, 404n.78 Authority of reason, 63, 228-29, 235, 237, 238, 283, 293-94, 299, 320, 399n.6; vs. irrationalism of genius, 26, 35, 38-40, 43, 186-87 Autonomy (see also Freedom): aesthetic, 89, 93, 290-91; eth-

ical, 89, 172, 266, 281, 300, 306, 307, 313-19, 321, 327, 346, 419n.61 Auxter, Thomas, 326, 341 Awareness, noncognitive, 81 Awareness: vs. conscious attention, 77 Bacon, Francis, 22, 195 Basedow, Johann, 34 Batteux, Charles, 24 Baumgarten, Alexander, 19-21, 24, 3 0 - 3 1 , 46, 48-49, 59, 82, 406n.l5; and perfection, 20, 21, 30, 99; and "science of aesthetics," 20, 30 Bäumler, Alfred, 19, 29 Bayle, Pierre, 243 Beattie, James, 30 Beauty (beautiful), 2, 20-21, 29, 32, 75, 93, 95, 104, 122, 263, 292, 316, 342; in art, 131, 146-47; dependent (pulchritudo adhaerens), 97, 124-29, 146-47, 288, 2 9 0 91, 379n.3; empirical canon of, 118-19, 139; as enlivening the mind, 94, 101-2, 117, 118, 282; free 'pulchritudo vaga), 125, 291, 379n.3, 411n.60; intelligible, 24, 184; as mark of immanent determination by mental process, 28, 93, 95, 295; of nature, 5, 131-32, 146, 151-52, 280, 294, 342; and objective perfection, 2 0 - 2 1 , 31, 99-101, 184; vs. the pleasant (charm), 101-2, 105-21, 134, 376n.74; as stimulus to scientific inquiry, 151-53, 280, 383n.ll Beauty, ideal of, 124, 126-28, 134, 146, 288 Beauty as symbol of morality, 7, 14, 268, 273, 275, 277, 280,

288, 289, 291, 293, 294, 328, 342, 404n.62 Beck, Jacob Sigismund, 74 Beck, Lewis, 18, 23, 29, 70, 75, 313, 324-25, 340, 345, 351n.9, 363n.59 Being, original, 35, 230, 232, 239, 244, 250-51, 340, 346; as intelligent creator, 191, 215, 225, 226, 227, 239, 249, 310, 336 (see also Theism); Spinoza's theory of, 244, 248, 250-59 Being, rational, 307, 314, 3 1 7 18, 319, 321, 322, 323, 344, 346; finite, 94, 268, 299, 313-14, 318, 320, 321, 324, 338 Being-in-the-world (see also Human nature), 226, 268, 269, 319, 323, 342 Beiser, Frederick, 228, 235, 348n.21, 351n.50, 399n.6, 403n.55 Belief (see also Faith), 78, 234, 238, 240-41, 245, 306, 403n.55 Belief, rational (Vernunftglaube), 239-40, 241, 302, 303, 306, 315, 337, 340, 343, 404n.64 Bennett, Jonathan, 69 Beobachten and bemerken (see also "Judging, other kind of"), 87, 104 Berlin Academy, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36, 42; 1761-63 Prize Competition, 24, 26, 29-30, 31, 353n.42, 355n.73 Berlin Aufklärung, 11, 22-34, 231, 233-34, 235-36, 329 Berlinische Monatsschrift, 179, 205, 207, 233, 234, 329 Biester, Johann Erich, 233, 2 3 5 37, 403n.55 Biology, science of, 151, 174, Index

457

Biology, science of (continued) 181, 188, 191-92, 195-214, 215, 225, 245, 260, 342, 395n.70; Kant's interpretation of, 189, 199-214, 225 Bird, Graham, 70 Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 201-2, 218 Boerhaave, Hermann, 197 Böhme, Jacob, 44 Bonnet, Charles, 36, 191, 202, 211 Bordeu, Theophile, 191, 198, 394n.42 Boscovich, Ruggero Giuseppe, 182, 195, 206, 244 Boyle, Robert, 194 Bridsh aesthetics, 26-29, 3 0 - 3 1 , 95, 184, 277 Buffon, Georges, 191, 199-200, 2 0 1 - 2 , 394n.52 Burke, Edmund, 24-25, 32, 41, 276, 277, 282, 284 Carritt, Edgar, 29 Cartesian. See Descartes Cassirer, Ernst, 29, 184 Categories: and constitutive determination, 65, 72, 75, 76, 88, 168, 220; dynamic, 74, 75, 164, 383n.7; mathematical, 74, 75, 76, 164, 166, 383n.7, 385n.47; as pure concepts of understanding, 82, 273, 292; of quantity and quality, 69, 74, 75, 76, 385n.47; of relation, 67-68, 74, 75, 164, 383n.7; and schematism, 325 (see also Schematism); as transcendental structures, 54-55, 80, 118, 159, 161, 309; and valid knowledge, 59, 68, 158, 219, 362 Causality, 75, 117, 159, 248, 255; immanent vs. transeunt, 253— 458

Index

55, 344; mechanical/efficient, 132, 152, 190-97, 209, 215, 218-25, 332; noumenal, 91, 197, 217, 255, 335, 417n.42; through a concept, 9 0 - 9 1 , 95, 132-33, 212-13, 222, 335 Charm (Reiz), 37, 93, 102, 115, 116, 120, 282, 293, 378n.61 Chemistry, science of, 192, 195, 196, 206, 207, 244, 245, 395n.70 Choice, pure moral, 63, 89, 9 2 93, 105, 133, 315, 317, 325 Christianity, orthodox (see also Pietism; Theism: orthodox Christian): alarm over theological rationalism, 11-12, 17, 19, 40, 194, 228-29, 242-43, 257, 260; doctrinal commitments, 19, 182, 194, 243, 332, 339; Kant's affinity to, 243, 253, 302, 315, 332, 334-41, 345, 404n.69, 4I7n.46, 424n.89 Clarity vs. distinctness, 20, 49,. 249 Cognition (Erkenntnis), 51, 77, 79, 8 0 - 8 1 , 158 Cognitive turn, 45, 133, 151, 152, 155, 156-61, 169, 178, 259-60, 275, 276, 365n.78, 382n.3 Coldbloodedness of judgment (see also Rigor vs. speculation), 38, 131, 358n.l39 Community, ethical (see also Unity of mankind), 319, 326, 332; political vs. religious, 332, 333 Comparison, 74, 82, 87-88 Concept, 58, 62, 106, 111, 270; vs. intuition, 48—49, 51, 54, 57; universality of, 76, 79, 82, 83, 84, 86, 117, 166

Concept, determinate, 121, 2 7 0 71, 2 8 5 - 8 6 Concept, empirical, 61, 65, 68, 76, 77, 160-61, 165, 301, 366n.6; formation of, 19, 50, 65, 69, 73, 158, 286, 366n.5 Concept, indeterminate (indefinite), 76, 127, 171-72, 328, 343; and symbolism, 269-75, 279, 286-87 Condillac, Etienne de, 190 Configuration (Gestaltung), 66, 114 Confused knowledge, 21 Consanguinity (Verwandtschaft), 200, 204, 209, 211, 216 Conscious attention, 72, 77, 81 Constitutive determination, 54, 64-65, 70, 72, 84-86, 96, 154-55,162, 164-65, 2 2 0 21, 266, 274, 313, 314, 327, 344, 366n.7 Constructions, mathematical, 79, 96, 273, 370n.88 Contextual-historical method, 48, 62, 342, 360n.8 Contextualization of Kant's philosophy, 1, 8-14, 178-88, 227, 334, 342, 349n.23, 360n.8, 367n.l5, 404n.78 Contingency (Zufälligkeit), 159, 160, 176,218,219, 226, 250, 257, 278,308, 335 Coordination of an entity into a whole, 2 0 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 0 - 5 1 , 76, 84 Correctness, academic (see also Aesthetic normal idea), 129, 134, 136, 137,141, 144-45 Cosmology, 151, 157, 191, 203, 311,326, 340 Cosmopolitanism, 17,21, 22-23 Creativity, 2 1 , 2 8 , 3 3 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 5 36, 183, 259, 277, 287, 290

Criticism vs. science, 3 0 - 3 1 , 3 2 , 43,46, 137,168, 178 "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," 2 , 4 , 5 , 15, 75,92,94, 122-23, 130,272,408n.23 Critique ofJudgment (Third Critique), 1, 66, 81; archaeology of composition, 1, 3—8, 10,46, 121-23,154,214, 227,230; contextualization of, 37,46, 227, 382n.l; determinant vs. reflective judgment in, 64, 77, 82, 88; epistemological concerns of, 52, 159; final form, 6, 7, 188,259,263-64, 323, 342; impact on epoch, 1,2,13-14; §83 and "Idea for Universal History," 10, 329, 332; systematic import in critical philosophy, 3 , 6 , 4 5 , 6 2 , 75; unity of, 2,3,151,239 Critique of Practical Reason (Second Critique), 4, 7 , 4 7 , 5 7 , 6 2 , 6 3 , 157, 187, 220, 230, 240, 246, 264, 269, 271,307, 320, 326, 344, 345,404n.72,413n.40, 419n.61; as model for Third •Critique, 89, 91,93; "Analytic," 320,420n.63; "Dialectic," 341, 419n.63; "Typic of Practical Judgment," 320-21 Critique of Pure Reason (First Critique), 8, 12,43,45,46,47, 52, 56,57,60,61,63,64,155,202, 342, 344, 383n.l8; archaeology of, 1,4,42; B-version (revisions), 64, 75,156,178,187, 192, 241, 364n.67; and empirical judgments, 59, 64, 158; hierarchy (Stufenleiter) of representations, 79, 81, 82; on imagination, 69, 78, 82-83; and limits of valid knowledge, 4 5 , 1 5 2 - 5 3 , 238, 269,271; linked to Spinozism, 231-32, Index

459

Critique of Pure Reason (continued) 401n.22,402n.27; purposiveness in, 314; reception of, 8—9, 12, 179; and regulative ideas, 161; and subjective judgment, 76, 145, 358n.2; subjective validity in, 78; "Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection," 62, 87, 364n.61, 371n.98; "Analogies of Experience," 68, 164, 274, 383n.7; "Analytic of Principles," 59, 69; "Anticipation of Perception," 75; "Architectonic of Pure Reason," 173; "Canons of Pure Reason," 312, 419n.63; "Introduction," 53, 176; "Metaphysical Deduction," 59, 362n.43; "Paralogisms," 302, 307, 311; "Refutation of Idealism," 60; "Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason," 162, 171; "Second Analogy," 223; "Subjective Deduction," 50, 60,69; "Third Antinomy," 156, 267,311; "Transcendental Aesthetic," 46,69, 79,119, 190; "Transcendental Analytic," 60, 61, 66,69, 164,271,383n.7; "Transcendental Deduction," 53, 55, 7 0 - 7 1 ; "Transcendental Deduction" of B-Version, 53-54, 59,60,65, 80, 192,343; "Transcendental Dialectic," 60, 156, 162,163,165,171, 176, 178,202,259,260,271,302, 396n.75; "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," 173; "Transcendental Logic," 311; "Transcendental Schematism," 59,69, 362n.43 "Critique of Taste," 1,45,46,47, 151, 169,170,259; composition of, 47, 89,90, 92, 121-23, 188; original project, 2, 3 - 4 , 5, 460

Index

7, 121-23, 267, 269, 275-76, 408n.9 "Critique of Teleological Judgment": archaeology of, 3, 5 - 6 , 10-11,152-55,178-79,18688,207,214,267; and biology, 189-91, 197, 214-23; and history, 10—11; and Pantheism Controversy, 11, 186-88, 191; and "Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie," 207,212, 124 Critiques, later, 59, 60, 61, 62, 174, 295, 404n.64 Crusius, Christian August, 17-19, 23,351n.50 Cultivation (education, Bildung), 292-94,328-39,333 Culture, 7, 10, 13, 181,288, 350n.45 Cunning of nature, 331, 442n.43 DAlembert, Jean, 22, 190 De la Garde, Frangois, 6 Deduction, historical sense of, 55 "Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments," 2,5, 7,95, 112, 122, 129-30 Deism, 27, 196, 247, 256, 257, 388n.l00,400n.8 Delineation (Zeichnung), 66, 115 Democritus, 248 Descartes, Rene, 18, 20, 27,66, 181, 192, 239, 244, 309; and mechanistic science, 18, 25, 27, 189, 192-96, 393n.25 Design: appearance of, 95,98, 103, 132, 135, 153, 169; as inference about empirical objects, 97,158,215 Desire, 24, 109,273,299, 315, 328-29; faculty of, 47,62,80, 91,110,365n.75 Despair, 338-39 Despland, Michel, 334

Determinacy. See Individuality Determination. See Constitutive determination Determinism, 179,191, 267, 333 "Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment," 5, 7 - 8 , 1 2 2 - 2 3 , 264, 269,270, 287,302, 303,344 "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment," 6, 186,214,218,222, 223, 224, 225,226, 230, 247, 248, 260,318 Dialectical excess, 6, 163, 166, 176, 222, 226, 251,260, 270, 271,308, 309, 346,406n.l3 Diderot, Denis, 190-91,394n.42 Dignity of reason, 63, 142, 146, 167, 199,314,317,346 Disciples of Kant (Kantians), 12, 14,232-35,242-43,246-47, 344-45, 351n.50,404n.78 Discursiveness, 48—55,61, 159— 61,237,288,310,315, 324, 399n.49; vs. intuitive intellect, 252-57; and recourse to teleology, 219-27 Disinterestedness of pleasure in beauty, 24, 9 2 - 9 3 , 108, 125, 273, 294 Dubos.Jean, 24 Duff, William, 355n.68, 380n.36 Düsing, Klaus, 3, 173 Duty, 32, 255, 264, 268, 291, 297, 299, 300, 306,326,338-39

Eberhard, Johann, 42, 348n.l9, 359n.l41,363n.60 Ectypal nature, 320,321,326, 241 Education. See Cultivation Efficaciousness of morality in world of sense (see also Actualizing the moral law), 265-66, 295, 299, 306-7,314,323, 325 Emotion (Rührung), 27-28, 32, 37,93,115,282,299

Empiricism, 19,46,53,101,178, 195,388n.2,419n.61 Encyclopedist, 26, 190 End-in-itself (see also Purpose: intrinsic), 99, 306-7, 314-19, 327, 344,375n.53,418n.56 Endowments, natural (natürliche Anlagen), 200-201, 217-18 Ends, objective, 324, 325,420n. 11 Enlightenment, 8, 17, 21, 22,24, 27,35, 139, 183, 241,332-33, 421n.41; British, 22,24, 29; French, 13, 2 1 - 2 2 , 23, 24, 183; Radical (materialist), 196, 228, 240, 257, 258; and religious tolerance, 11, 241; Scottish, 422n.43, 422n.45 Enlivening (liveliness) of mind (see also Spirit), 118, 144-45, 274, 286, 291,297-99, 304 Entailment: problem of empirical, 6 0 - 6 1 , 158-61,260, 343, 384n.25 Entelechy (see also Purposiveness: intrinsic), 99, 171 Enthusiasm (Schwärmerei) (see also Fanaticism, religious; Sturm und Drang: and irrationalism), 12,28-29,33-36,38,41,42, 44,178, 184, 232, 233,236, 238-39,240,246,247, 381n.46,403n.55 Epicurus, 248,295 Erect posture, 181-82,199,204 Ethical turn, 6 - 8 , 1 2 9 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 9 6 0 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 , 265,276,306, 307, 335, 341,342, 375n.53, 381n.46,382n.3,398n.35 Ethico-theology, 226,240,253, 335, 336, 399n.49 Euler, Leonhard, 120 Evolution: 18th-century theories of, 205, 214,217 Exemplary instance of beauty, 118-19,128-29, 139,141,145 Index

461

Exemplary necessity, 92,373n.l8 Existence (see also Actuality), 6 7 68, 75, 76,82, 86,164,239, 285, 308 Experience, empirical (Erfahrung), 56, 75, 80, 154, 165,211,309, 310, 346 Explanations, transcendental, 6 2 63,90-91,159,344,365n.75 Expressionism of reason (see also Symbolism), 275, 284,287-88, 289, 290,304, 382n.60 Extensive vs. intensive clarity, 20, 4 8 - 4 9 , 360n.l0 Extensive vs. intensive magnitude, 66 Fact of pure reason, 306, 310, 335,414n.l,416n.27 Faculties: relation of the, 58, 94, 117-18,238,270, 282,294-95 (see also Harmony of the faculties); system of cognitive (Erkenntnisvermögen), 58, 59, 6 2 , 7 9 , 9 4 , 115, 117, 162, 168, 169,170, 227; system of human (mental; Gemütsvermögen), 42,47, 5 9 , 6 0 , 6 2 , 6 3 , 8 9 , 1 6 9 , 170, 211,238,263,278, 2 9 4 95 Faculty: cognitive, 47, 48, 62, 108, 110 "Faculty-talk," 60,162,170, 364n.67 Faith (see also Belief), 60, 236,240, 289,315-16,343 Fanadcism, religious (see also Enthusiasm; Sturm und Drang: and irrationalism), 33, 4 0 - 4 1 , 187,232,236-37 Fantasy (fancy; Phantasterei), 44, 357n.98 Fatality (see also Determinism), 187, 229,230,248, 250-51, 254,258, 399n.6 462

Index

Favor, nature's, 154 Feder, Johann, 242 Feeling (Gefühl), 2 4 , 3 0 , 4 9 , 6 3 , 111, 115, 238,267, 272, 278, 280, 288, 292,295; faculty of, 4 7 , 6 2 - 6 3 , 8 0 , 89,94,267; as mark of relation of human faculties, 294-95 Feeling, moral (see also Respect), 30, 32, 238,279, 293,300 Feeling of life (Lebensgefiihl), 101, 292, 295-99 Fichte, Johann, 12, 14, 175, 400n.6,403n.55 Figure (Gestalt), 49, 50, 51,66, 120-21, 151 First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment: in archaeology of text, 4 - 6 , 80, 152-53,167, 170, 175,214, 260, 276; and beautiful and pleasant, 107-8; contrast with final Introduction, 265,408n.9,410n.27; plan for whole work, 263; and sublime, 265, 277-79; and technic of nature, 133, 219; on technical vs. practical, 96, 4 1 6 17n.30; and theory of judgment, 157-58,161-67,169 Force (Kraft), 27, 182, 193; of attraction and repulsion, 193, 195, 212, 244; fundamental (Grundkraft), 188, 203, 204, 211,212,214, 396n.87; Herder's theory of, 182, 188, 203-4, 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 230, 244; in nature, 27,182, 188, 190,194, 206,207,210,212 Form, aesthetic, 103-4, 106, 110, 113, 119, 120-21, 128, 376n.74; vs. objective form, 120-21 Form, pure, 8 9 , 1 1 9 - 2 1 , 133 Form-giving, act of. See Synthesis Formalism in art, 290—91

Formlessness and sublime, 2 7 7 78 Forster, Georg, 2 0 7 - 1 1 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 , 396n.75 Frederick II (of Prussia), 11, 17, 2 1 - 2 2 , 4 2 , 2 4 2 , 357n.ll3 Frederick William II (of Prussia), 11,242 Free-thinking, 187, 241,257, 400n.8 Freedom (see also Autonomy): actual individual, 255,259, 264, 266-67, 295,298,314,315, 329,342; aesthetic (Liberalität), 93, 116, 135-37, 139, 145-46, 290, 294, 379n.3; non-Kantian ideas of, 28, 183,204, 240, 254; noumenal (transcendental), 254, 266-67,268, 269, 271, 278,284,291,293,300,302, 307,311,315,329, 335; practical, 6-7, 91, 99,176, 191, 266, 315,316, 327,329,418n.61; Spinoza's denial of human, 255,407n.29 French influence. See Enlightenment, French French Revolution, 207, 330, 333, 334 Galileo, 406n.l5 "Gap" in Kant's system (see also Entailment: problem of empirical), 60 Gardens, geometric vs. spontaneous, 97,381n.53 Garve, Christian, 8—9 Garve-Feder review, 8 Geliert, Christian, 26 Genius, 24-25, 28,46, 342; Addison on, 25, 28; Baumgarten's theory of, 25, 33; cult of, 34, 40,41,233,236,240, 247, 355n.68,357n.l07,359n.l39; danger of nonsense and mad-

ness, 145-46, 290, 381n.53; and enthusiasm, 33—34, 35, 38, 233,354n.62, 381n.46; Gerard on, 29, 41; Herder as selfproclaimed, 37; as inspiration, 138-39, 290, 355n.64, 355n.68; Kant and, 10,32-33, 38,43, 46, 187,380n.36, 381n.46; Kant's ironic interpretation of, 136-42, 380n.35; Mendelssohn on, 2 4 - 2 6 , 3 3 ; metaphysical interpretation of, 269, 280, 283-84, 287, 2 8 9 90, 304, 381n.46; naturalistic account of, 16, 29, 136-42, 381n.46; vs. rule, 27, 28, 136, 354n.62, 358n.l21; vs. science, 4 1 - 4 2 , 358n.l39; Shaftesbury on, 28; Sturm und Drang and, 5, 8, 13,46,183, 277; as supplying material for beauty in art, 141, 143—45; unschooled vs. learned, 25, 28; Young and, 28-29, 355n.64 Gerard, Alexander, 29,41, 355n.68, 380n.36 Givenness of material in sensation, 49, 51, 52,66, 86-87, 109,113-15,310,367n.26, 381n.46 God: belief in, 241, 315-16, 340 (see also Deism; Theism); and Providence, 327,329,336, 338, 339, 340 (see also Providence); rational idea of, 61, 79, 176, 179,215,236,240,285; of Spinoza, 193-94, 244, 245-46, 248,250-59 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 13-14, 36,42, 182-84, 229, 230-31, 350n.48, 359n.l43, 389n.7, 390n.23, 390n.28, 401n.l3 Good, beautiful, pleasant, 25, 278-79 Index

463

Good, the, 30,98,99, 110,125, 126, 279,291,298, 323; heterogeneity of, 324, 325, 412n.l7,420n.ll,425n.90 Gottsched, Johann, 26 Gracyk, Theodore, 32 Gram, Moltke, 70 Gregor, Mary, 45, 75—76 Ground and consequence, 51, 220-21,255, 351n.9 Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, 157, 175, 186, 242,300, 307,310,316,318,319,321, 326, 345,419n.61,419n.63 Guyer, Paul, 70-71 Halle, University of: controversy over Wolff, 11, 17 Haller, Albrecht von, 198 Hamann, Johann, 33-35, 36, 40, 44, 137, 181,231-34, 241,242, 355n.64; 355-56n.77, 357n.l07,391n.43,400n.6, 401n.21,402n.34 Happiness, 93, 296, 297, 298,328, 329,331,337,418n.61, 420n.3,421n.25 Harmony, 85, 118 Harmony of the faculties, 25, 33, 85,94, 101-2, 116-18, 119, 122, 128, 131, 143, 287-88, 291,297, 378n.54 Hartknoch, Johann, 9, 156, 389n.l0 Hartley, David, 22, 284 Health (see also Well-being), 296, 297,298 Hegel, G.W.F., 14, 141, 333, 3 4 4 45, 361n.38, 380n.40, 389n.7, 397n.87,400n.6,403n.55, 405n.78,407n.41,422n.43 Heidegger, Martin, 69,397n.87 Hen kaipan, 229-30, 258-59, 400n.l2 Henrich, Dieter, 48, 55,70-71 464

Index

Herder, Johann, 14, 23, 30, 46, 188, 242, 243, 355n.68, 359n.l43, 391n.37,421n.41, 425n.90; and "beautiful science," 42, 141—42; career of, 35—36; disparagement of Kant, 245, 389n. 10, 389n. 11; and Hamann, 34-36; on history, 180-81, 330, 396n.75; Kant's rivalry with, 8-10, 39-44, 178-88, 243, 349n.29; and pantheism, hylozoism, 6, 187— 88, 199, 203-6, 211, 230, 245, 40In. 13; and Spinozism, 2 2 9 31, 243-47; and Sturm und Drang, 8-10, 12, 35-37, 13742; Works: Alteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts, 36, 37, 39— 40; Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, 36; Gott: einige Gespräche, 10, 12, 186, 188, 208, 230, 243-47, 258; Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 9, 10, 36,138, 179, 180-86, 197, 203-6, 207, 243, 330, 332, 389n.7, 389n.8, 391n.44; "Über den Einfluß der schönen in die höheren Wissenschaften," 42; Über die neuere deutsche Literatur: Fragmente, 35; Von Erkennen und Empfinden, 42,389n.l0 Hermeneutic of suspicion, 425n.89 Herz, Marcus, 80, 233,235, 236 Highest good (see also Actualizing the moral law; Community, ethical; Mankind), 7, 239, 268, 307,319, 322,323-26, 333, 419n.63,419n.3,421n.25; as moral ideal, 322,324-25,326 History, 7, 14, 200, 268, 323, 3 2 6 34, 340; German idea of, 13, 330; Kant's philosophy of, 10, 186,205,268,328-29, 344,

423n.57; Kant's rivalry with Herder over, 10, 178-79, 3 3 0 34,396n.75 Hobbes, Thomas, 22,194, 328, 330 Hölderlin, Friedrich, 14, 405n.78 Homer as unschooled genius, 28, 140, 358n.l39 Hope, 337, 338 Human experience, complex, 3, 59,61, 292, 293, 296, 297, 299, 309,319, 323,337 Human nature, animal and rational (unity of man) (see also Being-in-the-world), 42,62,93, 268, 293, 302, 306,41 In. 1 Humanity, idea of (see also Mankind), 63,280, 285 Humbolt, Wilhelm von, 14 Hume, David, 17,22,23,24, 30, 31,34,35, 52,55,59,178,196, 218, 240,343,356n.77, 356n.98,400n.6,403n.55 Hutcheson, Francis, 29-30, 31 Huygens, Christiaan, 393n.25 Hylozoism (see also Matter vs. life; Nature: as living whole; Vitalism), 6, 186,189,192,202, 205,213,216,218, 222,226, 227, 244, 247,248, 250, 258, 260, 396n.75 Hypotyposis (see also Presentation), 273, 321 Iatromechanical approach to biology, 197-98 Idea, aesthetic (see also Symbol), 275, 279, 280,283, 286, 287, 288, 300,404n.62 Idea, aesthetic normal, 126—29, 134,285, 288 Idea of reason (rational idea), 79, 126, 164, 172, 176, 240, 339; vs. ideal, 284-85; and indeterminate concept, 270-71, 274;

and symbolism, 281, 286-89, 304,321 "Idea for a Universal History," 10, 13,179, 205, 326,328,329, 395n.54, 396n.75 Ideal: of imagination vs. reason, 127,284-85,319 Idealism, dogmatic, 60, 131; objective, 302, 345; subjective, 280, 302, 345; transcendental, 53,67, 230,367n.l5; as unreality, 248-49,315 Idealism, German, 1,2, 7, 12-14, 156,174,175,180,185,189, 229-30, 301,305,330, 334, 342, 344-46, 348n.7,350n.45, 350n.48, 392n.6,400n.6, 400n.l2,401n.l3,403n.55, 422n.41, 423n.57, 425n.90, 425n.97; and Spinoza, 14,229, 231, 257-59,407n.41 Imagination (Einbildungskraft), 29, 44, 50, 82-87, 114,185,239, 244, 274, 289, 296,356n.98, 37In. 105, 381n.46; apprehension vs. comprehension, 281^82; danger in, 3 3 - 3 4 , 4 4 ; faculty of, 33, 211, 284; as faculty of presentation (Darstellung), 127; following rules without intention, 83-84, 114,117,145; formative vs. synthetic, 366n.7, 372n. 121; free play of, 28,84, 85,95, 101,113,114-15,116, 118,121,127,128,131,135, 145, 292, 297; harmony with reason in sublime, 280,281— 84; harmony with understanding in beauty, 84-85, 87,95, 117, 157, 280,295; as interpretative, 85; and intuition, 68-69, 76; problem of, 52-53, 61; productive, 114, 284; and reconfiguration (umbilden), 84, 114-15, 121,127; role in Index

465

Imagination (continued) knowledge, 68-69, 76, 83-84, 159, 367n.29; and spontaneity (act), 83, 85, 114-15, 220; synthesis of, 50,67, 68-69, 73-74, 86,104,362n.43, 367n.29 Imitation (Nachahmung), 129 Immediacy, 5 0 , 6 8 , 8 2 , 8 3 , 79, 310, 367n.26; subjective, 70, 81 Immortality, 61, 176,182, 204, 302,315,339,340 Imperative, categorical, 93, 266, 281,321,325,363n.57 Inclination (Neigung) (see also Interest, material), 110, 116, 296, 298, 299,412n.l9,425n.90 Indeterminacy. See Concept, indeterminate Individuality as determinate singularity (see also Intuition; Singularity: of an intuition), 19, 20, 21, 52, 84, 126-27, 160, 239, 249,310, 367n.26 Infinity, intrinsic, 229, 243-44, 258, 281-82,400n.l 1, 405n.89 Inner sense, 80, 87, 103, 301,302, 307 Intelligible (noumenal) form, 99, 269, 287, 288,301,311,312, 322,417n.42 Intelligible world (see also Kingdom of ends), 256,319, 321, 417n.42,418n.61 Intention (Absicht), 132-33, 155, 315,317,318,319,327 Interest, ethical, 125, 294 Interest, intellectual, 104, 176, 289; in the beauty of nature, 5, 131, 151,382n.3 Interest, material (see also Inclination), 92,93,98, 108-11, 116, 134, 281,315,331 Interest of reason, 60,176, 312, 382n.3,416n.29,418n.61 Interest: as practical idea, 312 466

Index

Interior sense, 103, 110 Introduction to Third Critique, final version, 6, 8,63,66, 78,96, 175, 226, 264-67, 303, 307, 323, 344,408n.9 Introductions: encyclopedic vs. propaedeutic, 170,263 Intuition (Anschauung): and attentio, 83; and cognition, 82-83; as faculty of form-giving in sensibility, 50—52; vs. concept, 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 4 , 5 7 , 79; and imagination, 6 8 - 6 9 ; as immediate and singular representation, 20,68, 74, 79, 8 2 , 1 6 0 - 6 1 , 286, 343, 367n.26 (see also Individuality; Singularity: of an intuition); pure, 65, 74,76, 79,158, 272, 3 0 9 - 1 0 , 3 1 8 - 1 9 , 3 2 4 ; as receptive, 68-69; sensible, 65,274, 281, 310; specification in, 76-77, 83; synthesis of, 67, 83,86,281 Intuition, intellectual (intellectus archetypus), 43, 184, 225, 251, 253, 255-57,272, 309-10, 318-19,324 Jacob, Margaret, 228, 393n.30, 400n.8 Jacobi, Friedrich, 142,404n.69; alliance with Kant, 246-47, 260, 405-6n.l00; and belief (leap of faith), 229, 245, 403n.55,403n.57; influence on Kant's view of Spinoza, 2 5 1 52, 257,402n.34,406n.l5; and nihilism, 229, 399n.6,403n.55; and Spinozism, 179, 228-37, 243,402n.27 Jakob, Ludwig Heinrich, 235 Jena: and Kant's disciples, 234, 246; University of, 180 "Judging, other kind of," 82,85, 86-88,94,104,107,109,113,

114,115,152,154,160,219, 284 Judgment, 74,157; as natural talent to differentiate (Beurteilung: iudkium), 31, 32, 84,99, 167-68,386n.61 Judgment, aesthetic (see also Judgment of taste), 75, 76, 78, 85, 92,107, 1 1 1 - 1 5 , 1 2 6 - 2 7 , 1 4 6 47, 151, 154, 169, 272, 278, 289, 293; of sense, 108-10, 111, 122, 134,374n.44 Judgment, determinant (as objective), 68, 82,87, 104,127,167, 220, 222-24, 274,310,315, 321, 376n.78, 386n.60; and anomaly, 219, 286, 288; vs. reflective, 4,64, 88, 166, 222-24, 263, 372n.l21 Judgment, empirical cognitive, 5 9 , 6 4 - 7 0 , 83, 85,91,92,126, 161, 164, 279, 345; and judgment of taste, 97,99, 109, 111, 113, 292; vs. subjective, 7 1 77 Judgment, faculty of (Urteilskraft), 4,63, 80, 85-86, 108, 238, 259, 263, 270, 384n.32; discovery of, 151-70 Judgment, moral (practical), 99, 109,125-26,272-73,320-21, 385n.32 Judgment of experience, 64,68, 71-73, 8 2 - 8 3 , 8 6 - 8 7 , 9 9 , 103-4, 110-13, 165, 168,218, 220,222,223 Judgment of perception, 64, 7 2 86, 1 0 3 - 4 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 6 5 , 2 2 0 , 359n.2,366n.4, 368n.35 Judgment of taste (see also Judgment, aesthetic), 2,45,46, 128, 143,152,157,263,278-79; metaphysical theory of, 270— 75; original theory of, 89-95, 106—22; pure vs. conditioned,

75-77,91,92,93,124-25, 130-31,290 Judgment, reflective: aesthetic, 96, 1 0 4 , 1 0 7 - 8 , 1 2 6 , 2 0 7 , 2 2 0 25,259,263,271; in archaeology of text, 4 - 5 , 7,45,64, 275-76; vs. determinant, 4—5, 45,64, 166-69, 263, 344, 359n.2, 372n.l21; and indeterminate concepts, 271-75, 286, 289; logical, 77,96, 104, 263, 271, 327 (see also Judgment, teleological); and "other kind ofjudging," 88; and subjective states, 112, 117, 151-58, 270, 282, 289 Judgment, subjective, 43, 72, 7 4 75, 77-88, 106, 107, 366n.7 Judgment, synthetic a priori, 57, 164, 308, 324-25, 363n.59 Judgment, teleological, 104, 151, 155, 169,225,248, 265, 272, 320, 385n.32 Just society, 14, 321, 326, 332, 337-38

Karnes, Lord (Henry Home), 29, 30-31,46 Kennen anderkennen, 81—82, 84, 85,86, 87,104,109 Kepler, Johannes, 23, 220 Kiesewetter, Johann Gottfried, 130 Kingdom of ends (mundus intelligibilis), 307, 318-19, 320,321, 417n.42, 419n.63; expanded sense, 319, 322, 324-26, 333, 336 Kingdom of God on earth, 334, 339, 340 Klopstock, Friedrich, 34,43, 355n.64 Königsberg, 11, 22, 23, 231, 233, 246,342,355n.77 Index

467

Königsberg, University of, 11, 19, 35,156, 205, 352n.l3 Korff, Hermann, 182-83 Körner, Gottfried, 246 Kraus, Christian, 231, 246 La Mettrie, Julien, 190, 198 Lambert, Johann, 406n. 15 Lavater, Johann Caspar, 26, 36, 40-41,182 Law, moral, 168, 256, 265-68, 271,279, 283,314,317, 418n.61; compatibility with law of nature, 320-25, 335-36, 338; and spiritual feeling (Geistesgefühl), 293-99 Law, natural, 154, 265-66, 268, 320, 321,332,335 Law: empirical vs. transcendental, 160-61,218 Lawfulness: as mark of reason, 128, 135-36, 160, 266, 267, 320,321-22 Lehmann, Gerhard, 1, 4 Leibniz, 17-18, 19,20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 49, 59, 182, 183, 193, 195, 202, 206, 230, 243, 244, 246, 364n.61,387n.85, 393n.25, 406n.l5;and Nouveaux Essais, 25, 49; and spontaneity of the subject, 25, 26, 28 Leibniz-Clarke debate, 19, 190, 194 Lenz, Jakob, 23,43 Lessing, Gotthold, 8, 11, 13, 14, 182, 390-91n.37; and Berlin Aufklärung, 22; and hen kai pan, 400n.l2; and LavaterMendelssohn controversy, 36, 37; and Pantheism Controversy, 228-31,233, 235, 243, 245,400n.l3,403n.55; as translator of Burke, 25, 32, 41; and Wolffenbüttel Fragments, 11,40 468

Index

Letter to Reinhold, December 1787,4,46-47, 56, 5 8 , 6 2 - 6 3 , 89,90, 122,170,175 Life (intelligent will) (see also Matter vs. life), 249, 255, 259, 296, 298, 302, 304,365n.75 Life, feeling of. See Feeling of life Limits of reason, 234, 238, 289, 302,315-16,345 Linnaeus, 196, 199-200, 201-2, 210 Locke, John, 22, 55,406n.l5 Logic, formal, 18,92, 162,171, 237, 279, 363n.59; moments of judgment, 9 0 - 9 2 , 164, 2 2 0 21, 279; vs. transcendental, 57, 64,92 Logic, transcendental, 57, 63, 163, 164, 174, 224,227 Logic, 3 0 - 3 1 , 7 9 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 7 Longinus, 27,277 Lovejoy, Arthur, 201, 395n.67, 395.70 Lowth, Robert (Bishop), 37, 358n.70 McFarland, John, 3,183, 223 Maimon, Solomon, 413n.60 Makkreel, Rudolf, 366n.7, 367n.29, 372n.l21 Man, distinguished from other life-forms, 181, 189, 191-92, 199, 202, 203,204, 206 Mankind: historical and religious destiny of, 3, 7,268,280, 324, 330, 337, 342; unity of, 258, 323, 324, 326, 330,332, 333 (see also Community, ethical) Manner (Manier): and "free beauty," 100; vs. method, 137, 178, 183 Mark of rational determination: feeling as, 9 3 , 2 9 4 - 9 5 Marx, Karl, 330,333 Materialism, 179,183, 187, 191,

194,216,218,248,257, 258, 260, 335,400n.8; French, 183, 190, 196 Materiality of man, 97, 98, 110, 116, 267-68, 295,302, 309, 328, 331-32, 374n.44 Materiality of object (see also Usefulness), 79,92, 102, 109, 110, 120 Materialization of spirit (see also Determinism; Materialism), 192 Matter, aesthetic, 103, 106, 110, 113, 120-21,376n.74 Matter and form, 49—51, 54, 56, 57,66 Matter given in a representation (see also Sensation), 64,65, 77, 79,94, 113,119, 368n.32 Matter, physical, 159, 189, 190, 192, 193-94, 259; fundamental atoms of, 190, 191,194; inertness of, 190-91, 192-93, 194, 196, 215; properties inherent in, 193, 194-96 Matter vs. life, 186, 189, 192, 198, 203,206,218, 222,226,244, 248 Matter vs. spirit in cosmology, 192, 194,196,198, 203,257 Maupertuis, Pierre, 21-22, 191, 201-2, 352n.l3, 394n.54 Maxim, 96, 215, 219, 222, 224, 237,239, 265,271,302 Mechanism (see also Teleology vs. mechanism), 18, 25, 27, 196, 2 2 0 - 2 9 , 2 6 7 , 3 2 1 , 3 3 1 ; as only valid science, 216, 223-24, 392n.l7, 393n.l8 Meier, Georg Friedrich, 19, 20, 21,24 Meiners, Christoff, 242 Meister, Leonhard, 41 Mendelssohn, Moses, 8, 9, 179, 406n. 15; and aesthetic theory,

24-34; and Berlin Academy Prize, 29-30, 355n.73; and Berlin Aufklärung, 22-34; controversy with Lavater, 3 6 41; on Kant's destruction of rational theology, 232, 242; and Pantheism Controversy, 228, 229, 231-41,245, 399n.6,402n.34,403n.57, 405n.89 Meredith, James, 1, 4, 90,123, 275-76, 349n.22, 380n.36 Metaphor and metaphysics, 280, 287-88,289 Metaphysical commitment of Kant, 6, 63, 176, 206, 227, 247, 264-65,301,315-16,343, 398n.35 Metaphysical potentiality of Third Critique, 2, 3, 14, 146, 176, 225, 278,303, 305 Metaphysical turn in Third Critique, 3,7, 175-76,214, 268, 288, 343-44,409n. 10 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 159, 186, 191, 192, 206, 370n.88,384n.28 Metaphysics, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 6 , 6 1 , 6 9 , 153,176, 179,185,215,218, 225, 249-50,426n.2; dogmatic (traditional), 6,28, 34-35,176, 178,185,217,233,237,239, 248, 250, 340,343; and science, 189-90, 192-96; speculative, 60, 182, 245, 260, 269,343,403n.57 Metaphysics of morals, Kant's, 159,314,316-17 Metaphysics of Morals, 325 Metempsychosis, 182, 245 Methodology of natural science, 3, 61, 178, 185-86, 188, 189-90, 191,207,215 "Methodology of Teleological Judgment," 7-8, 230, 264, Index

469

"Methodology" (continued) 268, 323, 326-41,335, 336, 337,408n.9,419n.63 Michaelson, G. E., 334,344 Milton, John, 43 Modality ofjudgment, 57,68, 75, 164 Modality of necessity, 57,68,89, 92, 279, 363n.57 Modernism, aesthetic, 144, 290 Moravia, Sergio, 198 More, Henry, 194 Morris, David, 27,354n.52 Moscati, Peter, 199 Moser, Justus, 42,357n.l 13 Motive, 306, 309,319, 325 Murphy, Jeffrie, 340 "Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte," 179, 207, 208, 332 Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen... 1765-1766, 32 Nahm, Milton, 355n.68 Nationalism, cultural (deutsche Bewegung), 13, 22, 350n.48, 357n.ll3 Natural history, 23, 189, 200-201, 209 Nature and freedom, reconciliation of, 91, 135, 155, 220, 2 6 5 66,267, 271,289,327,332, 340,426n.l Nature, empirical: as artistic, 5, 152—55, 183 (see also Technic of nature); and conformity to human reason, 161; dynamism of, 27, 28,97, 135,183,190, 244, 259; as existence of phenomena under laws, 135, 145, 220,223,320,321,370n.88; as living whole, 182-83, 197, 226, 258, 259, 390n.88; Kant's metaphysical principles of, 159, 202, 225; shift in 18th470

Index

century attitude toward, 27, 192,229; as system of empirical laws, 91, 135,155, 161,220, 225,248, 267,320, 327 Nature vs. culture, 1 0 , 1 8 1 , 3 3 0 34 Naturphilosophie, 10, 12, 180, 182, 185-86,192, 202, 203, 243, 391n.44 Necessity, 18, 53, 54, 5 6 , 6 8 , 9 1 92,162, 240,254,267,272, 306, 418n.56; and universality in a priori, 67,92,94, 110 Neoclassicism (see also Augustan taste), 26, 27, 136-37 Newton, Isaac: and difference of science from genius, 140, 358n.l39; Kant and, 206, 384n.28, 387n.85,406n.l5; and Newtonianism in German Aufklärung, 18-27; theory of physical matter, 157-58, 18997 Nicolai, Friedrich, 22,25,233 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 400n.6 Nominal vs. real classes (Schulgattungen vs. Naturgattungen), 200, 212-13,216, 223,271,328, 397n.87 Noncognitive experience, transcendental grounding for, 45, 4 7 , 6 0 , 6 3 , 9 4 , 267 Noumena, 99, 176, 224, 226, 259, 269,272,281,301,315,316, 321,327, 329,398n.35; vs. phenomena, 156, 226, 264—65, 266, 267, 306, 307, 315, 398n.23 Novalis, 14 Object-in-general (Objekt), 67, 68, 72; vs. actual object (Gegenstand), 54,72,158,362n.41 Objectivity (see also Actuality; Reality, objective; Validity,

objective), 60,63, 70, 74, 82; ambiguity of validity vs. actuality, 64,68,83,163,166, 289 Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime, 31, 276 Odebrecht, Rudolf, 114-15,284 Ontological argument for God, 18-19, 239,245,364n.61 Ontology: dialectical sense of, 163, 176; and existence claims, 49, 57, 172,212, 239, 308,310, 3 1 3 - 1 4 , 3 4 5 - 4 6 ; Kant's rivalry with other, 6,18,21,212,230, 248-51,260, 302,342, 390n.26 Openness of Kandan system (see also System [systematicity]: in Kant's philosophy as a whole), 14,175, 351n.50 Opus postumum, 413 n. 60 Organic form (organism): analogy to reason (purpose), 173-74, 222, 249, 256; analogy to work of art, 221; definition of, 2 0 9 10, 212-19; as empirical fact, 189,219-20, 221,224, 342, 398n.22; and entelechy, 171, 344; ineptness of mechanical account of, 202, 215-16,218, 220-21, 225; vs. life, 198,222, 226; and metaphysical implications, 225-27; as natural purpose, 98,215, 221,222, 224, 263, 327; variation and inherited characteristics, 2 0 0 201,209,215-17,218, 395n.67 Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 290 Ossian, 27, 36 Panentheism, 229-30, 244,258, 413n.60 Pantheism (see also Panentheism): and Herder's Naturphilosophie,

180,103, 187,205,208, 230, 243-46; Kant's opposition to, 6 - 7 , 1 8 6 , 191,208,218,246, 259, 260, 264-65, 302, 335; and materialism (Radical Enlightenment), 196,257-58, 400n.8; and Spinozism, 14, 187,218,227,229,243,250, 257-58,264-65,405n.89 Pantheism Controversy, 6, 10—12, 179, 228-48,274,340, 349n.40, 352n.l3, 400n.6, 401n.l3,401n.21,403n.55 Paradox of art, grounding, 131— 36,145,146, 154, 275 Partiality (see also Inclination), 110 Passivity vs. acdvism in consciousness (see also Spontaneity; Synthesis), 4 8 - 5 0 , 5 2 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 1 1 3 - 1 5 , 2 8 7 , 3 0 7 - 8 , 309,311, 314 Perception (Wahrnehmung), 66,68, 72,75, 7 9 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 1 6 5 , 2 1 9 , 221,308 Perfection (Vollkommenheit), 20— 21,99-102,125-27,146-47, 221, 252, 2 7 2 - 7 3 , 2 8 8 , 2 9 0 91; qualitative, 99, 249; quantitative, 99,249; subjecdve, 101 Person (personality), 298, 300, 302, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 - 8 , 3 1 7 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 Phenomenology of subjective consciousness, 45, 51, 5 2 , 6 1 - 8 8 , 238, 344, 365n.3,368n.35 Philosophy, cognitive (theoretical), 47,60,265,339 Philosophy, critical (transcendental), 4,6, 7,45,46, 48,53, 54, 55,57, 5 9 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 2 , 78,89, 93,113, 157,158,167,175, 176,211,233,234,241,272, 277, 306, 307, 315, 337,339, 341, 344,351n.37,363n.60, 364n. 71,419n.61,424n.89 Philosophy, political, 3, 328, 334 Index

471

Philosophy, practical (moral; ethical), 3, 9, 3 2 , 4 7 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 1 5 7 , 242, 265, 276, 2 9 0 , 2 9 2 , 3 2 3 26, 341 Physico-theology, 27, 176-77, 215, 227, 239, 336, 399n.43, 399n.49 Physics: mathematical, 159-60, 181, 192, 197, 207; Newtonian, 189-97,219 Pietism, 11, 17-19, 22, 182, 352n.l3,404n.69 Plato, 44,406n.l5 P l a y ( S ^ ) . 84, 101, 121, 134,144, 183,282,290,291,293, 297, 381n.48 Pleasant (agreeable; Angenehme), 9 2 - 9 3 , 96, 100, 105-11, 120, 134, 279, 376n.74 Pleasure and pain, feeling of, 63, 89-95,100,102-16,128,29499, 308, 365n.75 Pleasure, intellectual (moral satisfaction), 293, 296-97, 298, 299 Plotinus and intelligible beauty, 184 Pope, Alexander, 26, 28,35 "Popular essays," 10, 178-79, 186, 191,233 Popular philosophers (see also Berlin Aufklärung), 22,23 Popularization of Kantian philosophy, 8-9, 56, 156, 179-80, 208,234,241,349n.40, 383n.l8, 391n.39 Possible vs. actual (see also Discursiveness), 68, 251, 256, 310, 316, 322, 335-36, 362n.42, 370n.88 Prauss, Gerold, 7 0 - 7 3 , 74, 77, 78, 86,359n.2, 365n.3, 365n.4, 368n.35 Preference. See Inclination Presence-to-consciousness (see also 472

Index

Subjective objects), 51, 79, 108, 310; without conscious attention, 5 1 , 6 5 , 7 0 - 7 1 , 7 2 - 7 4 , 7 7 , 79-80 Presentation (Darstellung), 83, 127, 147,273,274,285, 300, 321 Priestley, Joseph, 182, 188, 393n.30 Primary vs. secondary qualities, 66-67, 119 Principle: metaphysical, 61, 155, 159, 168, 206, 307,312, 384n.27, 415n.l4; subjective, 78,92, 122,263,266, 271; transcendental, 59, 61, 89, 124, 157, 159, 163, 164-65, 202, 270,294,415n.l4 Private, 52, 67, 78, 106, 108-11, 112,116, 122 Prolegomena, 8-10, 53, 66, 68, 73, 74, 75,81,86, 176, 383n.l8; and judgment of perception, 64, 73, 78, 82,359n.2,365n.3, 365n.4 Providence, 227, 245, 329-30, 336, 340, 396n.75 Prussia, 17,21,22,23,42 Psychologism, 60,62, 364n.67 Psychology: empirical, 55,62, 75, 92, 207, 284, 296, 308, 410n.44,415n.l2; rational, 60, 3 0 1 - 2 , 308, 387n.85; transcendental, 61,62,69, 72, 128 Purity, 62, 89, 92, 93, 293 Purpose, 87, 8 9 , 9 0 - 9 1 , 9 5 - 1 0 5 , 221,249,267,272,294,298, 315, 317, 344; as causality of a concept, 9 0 - 9 1 , 9 5 , 110,13233, 221, 253; final (Endzweck), 268,287,323,326, 329,332, 335, 338, 375n.53; immanent in nature, 6,396n.75 (see also Hylozoism); intrinsic (imma-

nent), 98,128, 316,317, 327, 329, 335, 344,41 ln.60; natural, 98,100,127,215,221,222, 224,225,249,263,265,315, 320, 328 (see also Organic form); ultimate, (letzte Zweck) of nature as a whole, 263, 264, 268, 327-29,331,333, 335-36 Purposiveness, 87, 88, 90, 91,95, 157, 158,219, 266-67,314, 317; as discursive approximation, 88, 96,97, 154, 158,219, 256-57,315, 376n.78; human technical, 96, 132-33, 155, 332-33, 385n.32,416n.30; intrinsic, 98-99, 125, 132,147, 174,218,221,226,263,278, 273, 279,314,315,327, 343, 375n.53, 382n.5; language of, 88,95-97, 105,249,253,255, 256, 267, 314, 376n.78; of nature as a whole, 151, 153—55, 158,214,219, 225,226, 239, 249, 271,315-16, 323, 327, 335, 382.3, 382n.5; objective, 97,98,125-26,155,221,225, 248, 249,314,315,316, 375n.52,375n.53, 375n.54 (see also End-in-itself); objective formal, 96-97; practical, 97, 253,293,295, 333,416n.30 (see also Will); relative, 98, 263, 278, 279, 327,335, 336 (see also Usefulness); subjective formal, 8 7 , 9 1 , 9 4 - 9 6 , 9 7 , 102-5,108, 118, 122, 143,152, 158, 168, 259, 278 (see also Beauty); subjective material, 96, 108-10, 134, 374n.44 (see also Charm); of variation in organisms, 201, 208; without purpose, 95, 126, 135, 141, 143,157,315, 342 Quantum discretum vs. continuity, 202, 204,210-11,216

Race, anthropology of, 192, 199, 200, 2 0 5 - 7 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 8 , 391n.444 Reality, objective (see also Ontology), 266, 272,285,307, 308, 309-14, 316, 317, 339, 340, 345-46, 363n.60, 387n.85, 417n.42 Realm vs. territory, 264—65, 313 Reason, 50, 381n.46; dynamism of, 92,164, 171,172, 238, 287, 306,311,384n.32,409n.l6, 416n.29; faculty of, 99, 270, 281,286, 287,311; immanent principles of, 50,93, 108, 124, 157,162-64,168,238-39, 293,296, 299,311,315, 364n.67, 418n.56; methodological vs. ontological view of, 163; practical, 6 0 - 6 1 , 1 7 4 75,266, 281,294-95,299, 302-3, 306, 309, 311, 320-21, 337-40, 344, 399n.49; primacy of practical, 277, 278, 291, 292, 307, 312-16, 343; reality of, 163, 166, 172,311-13,317, 345-46,419n.61; requirement of (Bedürfnis der Vernunft), 175— 76, 238, 272, 274, 283, 2 8 7 88,312,315,318,340, 409n.l6; systematicity of, 157, 170-71, 173, 174, 238; theoretical, 138, 154, 157, 174, 265,266, 281, 282, 290,306, 312,337 Receptivity. See Passivity Reciprocal determination and organic form, 209-10, 212, 218-19 Reconfiguration (umbilden), 84— 85, 114-15, 121,284 Reference (beziehen), 60, 66, 78, 107, 119; intuitive external, 83, 86, 168; objective (outer sense; Sinn), 49, 51,66,67, 74, 77, Index

473

Reference (continued) 78-79, 8 2 , 8 6 , 9 1 , 1 0 3 - 4 , 1 1 9 , 126,165,168,239,309; subjective (Gefühl), 49,61,64, 77, 7 8 7 9 , 8 2 , 9 1 , 102, 107,114-15, 119,125-26,294 Reflection, 31, 74, 87-88, 104, 107-8, 151, 152, 154,157,158, 168,219,271,274; aesthetic, 271, 272, 274, 278, 288, 2 9 3 94, 296; subjective, 58,103, 279-80, 293, 295, 299, 329, 333, 342 (see also State of mind, subjective); transcendental, 54, 58, 296 Reflections, 9, 31, 33, 3 7 - 4 0 , 4 2 44, 50, 9 9 - 1 0 1 , 187, 276, 303, 304 Regulative vs. constitutive, 155, 161-62,164-66,215,222, 223,224,237,239,272,284, 326, 333,383n.7 Reimarus, Hermann, 11,40 Reinhold, Karl Leonhard, 46, 169,207,208,246,403n.55; and Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, 56,208,241,350n.40, 391n.39,403n.55 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, 241, 323-24, 334, 340 Representatio singularis (see also Intuition), 73 Representation (Vorstellung), 50, 51, 67; hierarchy (Stufenleiter) of, 79; of an object (Vorstellung eines Objekts), 5 0 - 5 1 , 7 8 - 7 9 , 91, 102; of an object and aesthetic reference, 91, 102,106, 112,118, 119,126; process of, 49, 5 0 - 5 1 , 6 6 , 7 1 , 9 4 Resewitz, Friedrich, 26, 355n.64 Respect (see also Feeling, moral), 93, 279, 282, 293,294-95, 298-99 474

Index

Reward linked to virtue, 337-38, 420n.3 Rigor vs. speculation, 178,186— 88,210-11 Rigorism, ethical, 297-98, 339, 424n.89 Riley, Patrick, 344 Romanticism, 1, 14,131,136,138, 144,203, 342,280n.35, 280n.40, 390n.28 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 23, 35, 44, 328, 330-31,332,422n.49 Rule (see also Categories; Lawfulness), 28; subsumption under, 52, 54, 55, 59, 68,83, 84-85, 86, 87, 166, 167 (see also Constitutive determination)

Schaper, Eva, 69, 85 Sendling, Friedrich, 14,400n.6, 403n.55, 405n.78, 408n.43, 413n.60 Schema, 127-28, 165,215, 285 Schematism, 65,68, 69, 75, 76, 164, 165, 1 6 8 , 2 6 4 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 3 74, 288,320, 321,324,325 Schiller, Friedrich, 10, 13-14, 243, 246, 328, 381n.48,42122n.41,425n.90 Schofield, Robert, 195-96 School philosophy, German (see also Wolffianism, orthodox), 19-21, 22, 24-25, 3 1 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 95,101,107,178,187,249, 302, 343 Schräder, George, 3 Schütz, Christian Gottfried, 1798 0 , 1 8 4 - 8 5 , 232-33,234,235, 246, 391n.39 Science, natural empirical, 61, 157,158, 159, 181,208,216, 224,260, 267; aestheticism in, 178-79, 180, 188, 208, 260; vs. art, 136-42; vs. criticism, 3 0 -

31,46, 137,168, 178; vs. genius, 4 1 - 4 2 ; Kant's philosophy of, 19, 23, 185,194,415n.l2; mathematical essence of, 190, 207; metaphysical concomitants of, 191-92, 193-94, 244; new ideas in 18th century, 12, 27, 189-90,192-99, 229, 243; and philosophy, 19 Sciences, beautiful (humanities: schöne Wissenschaften), 21, 42, 137-38,141-42 Secularism, 11, 17,329 Seigfried, Hans, 360n.8 Self-consciousness, 70, 103, 116, 278, 2 9 4 - 9 5 , 3 0 8 - 1 0 , 3 1 4 , 343, 345,412n.I9,414n.3, 415n. 14; rational (see also Apperception), 294, 296, 344, 414n.5, 414n.6; reflective, 294-95,344 Self-determination (selfconstitution) (see also End-initself; Purposiveness: objective), 218, 219, 221,224, 226, 249,254,297,306,313,327, 375n.64,419n.61 Sensation (Empfindung), 49—50, 64,65,66,67,76,79,81,106, 107, 311; as matter for objective reference, 66,103; as subjective state, 49, 106 Sensationalism, 19, 22, 24, 284 Sense (Sinn) (see also Reference: objective), 49, 50,91, 119,294 Sensibility, faculty of, 19, 50,51, 274,281,381n.46;in knowledge, 19, 20, 21, 29,48-49, 52, 54,59,311 Sensibility (emotive attunement to world), 183; British school of, 2 6 , 2 8 - 3 2 ; shift in, towards Romanticism, 27,143 Sensus communis (common sense), 2 , 3 1 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 116,272-73

Shaftesbury, Earl of (Anthony Ashley Cooper), 28, 29,33, 183-84, 230, 243,354n.60, 355n.64, 390n.26, 390n.27, 390n.37 Shakespeare, 27, 28, 36, 124-25 Silber, John, 323 Silent decade, 3 7 , 4 2 , 4 4 , 5 2 Singularity: of an event or experience, 106, 108,109, 112, 118, 127-29, 279; of an intuition, 52,68, 7 6 - 7 7 , 7 9 , 8 2 , 8 4 , 8 6 , 367n.26 Skepticism, 52,53,60, 240,270 Skill (Geschicklichkeit), 129, 133, 141,328, 339 Soul, 2 5 , 4 9 , 6 1 , 79,176,182,204, 222,297,301,302,304,315, 387n.85 Souriau, Michel, 1,4, 275-76 Space and time as form of sensible intuition, 49, 5 1 , 5 2 , 5 4 , 6 5 - 6 7 , 77,80, 103,158, 281,309, 361n.32,387n.85 Species, fixity vs. mutation of, 200-201, 202,204,205,210, 214,215,216-17, 395n.67 Specification vs. abstraction, 76, 162 Spinoza, Benedict, 6,12,14,194, 228,229-32,236,243,24559, 260,400n.ll,405n.89, 406n.l7; Kant's interpretation of, 230,231,233,237,246, 248-59, 338,402n.34, 403n.55,406n.l3,406n.l5; and Pantheism Controversy, 6, 11, 12, 179,183,191,401n.l3 Spinozism, 6,12, 187-88, 218, 227,228,229,234,243,244, 246, 247, 248, 250-51,258, 260, 264, 265, 335, 399n.6, 400n.8,406n.l5 Spirit (Geist), 38, 112, 137,14445, 182, 187,192, 204,259, Index

475

Spirit (continued) 283, 284,297, 3 0 1 - 3 , 304, 344, 346, 381n.53,412n.l9 Spiritual feeling (Geistesgefühl), 275, 278, 281,292,297, 298, 299, 304, 344,412n.l9 Spirituality, 28,32, 182, 198, 298, 302, 355n.64 Spontaneity (innate activism of subject), 25,28,49, 5 1 - 5 4 , 8 3 , 113-15, 154, 172, 284, 304, 311,313,318, 346,366n.7, 408n.l6, 417n.30; involuntary, 53, 55, 307, 309, 310,314, 315, 346, 361n.37, 361n.38 Stahl, Georg Ernst, 198 State of mind, subjective (Zustand des Gemütes): as awareness, 58, 64, 75, 87, 107, 125,157,282, 294-304, 344, 371n.98; as content, 49, 72,96, 100, 104, 118, 128, 291; pleasure in maintaining, 90, 105,106,109,110, 112, 114-15,116 Stoicism, 324-25 Stolnitz, Jerome, 184, 354n.60 Strawson, Peter, 69 Sturm und Drang: and genius, 5, 34, 136-42, 144, 357n.l07; and irrationalism, 26, 29, 34, 35,178 (see also Enthusiasm; Fanaticism, religious): Kant's hostility to, 5, 8-14, 3 5 - 4 4 , 4 6 , 136-44, 349n.22; as movement, 1, 8-14, 3 4 , 3 5 - 4 4 , 1 3 6 , 277, 359n.l43; and vitalism, 182-84, 196, 203, 243 Subject: empirical (sensible), 55, 172, 299, 301, 3 0 7 - 8 , 3 1 2 - 1 3 , 314, 317, 339; noumenal (transcendental), 172, 267,301, 307, 308, 309,311,327, 335, 346,414n.3,414n.5,414n.6, 415n.l4 Subjective (noncognitive) re476

Index

sponse, 78, 80, 105, 106, 110, 113, 118, 128,151,294 Subjective conditions (subjektive Bedingungen) of knowledge, 58, 87,117,381n.46 Subjective objects (subjektive Gegenstände), 71-72, 77-78, 369n.54 Subjectivity, problem of (see also Apperception; Selfconsciousness), 5 2 - 5 3 , 6 1 , 359n.2 Sublime: as aesthetic confrontation with infinity, 27, 277, 2 8 1 82; in archaeology of text, 7-8, 263-64,275-77,403-4n.62; vs. the beautiful, 2, 27, 32, 263, 277-80, 282,292-94, 328, 409n.26; dynamical, 280, 283; 18th-century views of, 24—25, 27-28, 277, 354n.52; as mark of harmony of imagination and reason, 280,294, 295; mathematical, 280-82; and metaphysics, 280, 301; and moral worth, 32,130, 276, 277, 279, 280, 283, 293-94,342; as movement of emotion (Rührung), 187, 277, 282-83; natural, 27-28,413n.40; related to respect, 299-301 Subordination (see also Constitutive determination; Rule: subsumption under), 48-49, 50-51 Subreption, objective, 121, 132, 146,151, 154,167,169,172, 270,271,280,300,301,309, 409n.26 Substance, 18, 75, 117, 172, 212, 232, 245, 249,254, 279,302 Sulzer, Johann, 26,42,353n.44 Supersensible: in archaeology of text, 7, 267-68,408n.9, 410n.27; artistic (symbolic) ac-

cess to, 287-90; as necessary metaphysical thought, 176, 225,267, 269,271,274,289, 343,406n.l3; unity of, 271, 288-89,303, 340, 344, 423n.57 Supersensible destination, 269, 275, 278, 280, 283, 298, 412n.l9 Supersensible faculty, 281, 291, 293, 335,381n.46 Supersensible ground of empirical nature, 268, 270, 283, 398n.35 Supersensible ground of subjectivity (freedom), 271, 275, 278, 287, 289, 292, 300-302 Supersensible realm as undeterminable, 238-39, 251, 258, 265-66,271,272, 275,280, 288,316 Swedenborg, Emanuel, 34, 38 Syllogism, 162,164,167 Symbol, 273, 275, 277, 279,286, 290; vs. schema, 274,316 Symbolism, 274, 275, 280, 2 8 4 90, 293; as sensible illustration of moral ideas, 288, 300, 321; and sublime, 3,268,269,280; theory of, 129, 130, 269-75, 284-86, 300, 321,381n.46, 382n.60 Symmetry (regularity) and beauty, 120-21 Syncretism, 187-88,208,246,247 Synthesis (act of form-giving), 6, 14,49, 5 0 - 5 2 , 5 4 - 5 5 , 58, 59, 66, 67,69, 157, 163,169, 309, 310,311, 366n.7; empirical (of recognition), 65,69, 70, 368n.32; of imagination, 50, 6 7 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 73-74,104, 362n.43; transcendental (original), 54-55, 59,65,362n.43, 362n.44

System (systematicity), 107,157, 169-75,238,304,344, : 375n.64; in empirical laws, 161,219,224 {seealso Nature: as system of empirical laws); in Kant's philosophy as whole, 3, 6, 1 4 , 4 6 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 6 3 , 1 7 5 , 1 7 9 , 186,219, 265,277,316,333, 403n.55 Talent, natural, 33, 84, 139, 167, 328, 331 Taste, 38, 42, 118, 122, 126, 272, 288, 290, 294, 328, 331, 382n.5; and academic correctness, 141, 144-45; vs. appetite, 31; and Aufklärung cosmopolitanism, 2 2 - 2 3 ; as free choice, 93; and judgment, 31, 106, 129; as providing form for art, 141-45; and rule, 26, 28; only in society, 31 Technic of nature, 127, 132-33, 152-55,219, 259,271 Teleology, 2, 3, 7,47, 104, 1767 7 , 2 0 8 - 9 , 223,224,249,250, 264, 266-67, 320, 329, 382n.5, 426n. 1; as cognitive judgment, 5, 157; and "Critique of Taste," 89,90,94; vs. mechanism, 98, 173,201,209-10,215,217, 220-29, 390n.28; moral, 323, 336-37, 341,348n.5 Tetens, Johann, 9, 50, 55 Teutsche Merkur, 42,185,207, 208 Theism (seealso Being, original: as intelligent creator): Kant's metaphysical commitment to, 6-7, 176, 191, 197,243, 249, 253, 256, 257,260, 335, 336, 339,341, 388n.l00, 399n.49, 404n.69; orthodox Christian, 253, 257, 258,260,264, 335, 339-40,404n.69 Index

477

Theological rationalism, 11, 17, 19, 329 Theology (religious philosophy), 3,157,177,196,225,226,237, 246,335-41,342 Thinking vs. knowing, 153, 176, 224,226,265,269,271,272, 274,290,327,343 Thomasius, Christian, 17 Tonelli, Giorgio, 1,4-7, 19, 90, 123, 169,275-76, 352n.I3, 380n.36 Totality (systematic whole) (see also Whole vs. parts), 52, 170-74, 229, 232, 238,255,256, 258, 281,285, 300, 301,304,312, 325 Transcendental, 52; argument, 45,46,48, 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 9 , 6 0 , 61,71, 122,260, 362n.46, 363n.52; deduction, 5 2 - 5 3 , 59,61,68, 89, 114, 160, 163, 168, 238; deduction of practical reason, 168,174-75, 320; deduction of taste, 2 - 3 , 5, 7, 46,90-95, 105-6,111-19, 124,168, 260,270-72,279, 280, 316; object (thing-initself),27l,301 Träume eines Geistersehers, 8, 34 Tübingen, 242,404n.76,404n.78 Tuveson, Ernest, 183-84, 355n.64 "Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie," 188, 207-13, 214,218 Understanding, faculty of, 31,40, 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 4 , 57,59, 74, 81-82, 85, 111, 114, 117, 152,159, 162, 163, 167,263,311, 367n.29,384n.32 Unity: analytic vs. synthetic, 158— 59, 308, 309; of an intuitive 478

Index

manifold, 48, 50, 51, 86,120, 232,281,310 Unity of apperception, transcendental, 54, 70, 76,80,158, 161, 232,309,310, 345 Unity of reason, 6,60, 157, 17075,259, 260, 269, 280, 2 8 7 88, 289, 291,300-316, 340, 343-46, 397n.87, 426n.8, 426n.9 Universality: and communicability,95,115,284; of concepts, 76, 7 9 , 8 2 - 8 4 , 86, 117, 166; of consent, 91-92, 112, 116—17; and intersubjective validity, 92, 112-13, 117, 418n.56; and necessity in a priori, 54, 5 6 , 9 2 - 9 4 , 117,273, 309,418n.56; vs. particularity, 48,50, 52, 108; subjective, and necessity, 168 Use of reason: empirical, 163, 271; hypothetical, 161, 163, 166; logical, 57, 162, 172; real, 52,58, 76, 163,172, 311; real vs. logical, 5 7 - 5 8 , 1 0 4 , 162, 167, 362n.43, 363n.60; regulative, 162-66,171,238,339 Usefulness (see also Purposiveness: material), 96,98,108,110 Validity vs. actuality, 64,97, 163, 172, 289 Validity, cognitive (objective knowledge), 58, 59, 61,65, 74, 85, 154,216, 223,240,269, 292, 302,313 Validity, intersubjective, 2,94, 111 Validity, objective, 64,138,145, 255, 260; as logical-universal, 4 8 - 4 9 , 52, 54,59, 70, 74, 82, 86, 117, 120,164-66,418n.56; and objective reference, 51,54, 59,72,82,86,165,237,238, 289

Validity, private, 106,112 Validity, subjective, 72, 78, 82, 96, 176,224,291,316,339 Validity, transcendental, 56, 59, 111, 168, 270,310,404n.64 "Vienna Logic" of Kant, 73 Virgil as learned genius, 28 Vitalism (see also Hylozoism; Matter vs. life; Nature: as living whole), 135,198, 230 Voltaire, 17, 22, 196, 240, 393n.25 Von deutscher Art und Kunst, 36 Walzel, Oskar, 183-84,390n.26 Warton, Joseph, 26, 28 "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" 12,167,176, 230,235, 237-41,247,274,403n.57, 404n.72 Weldon, Thomas, 173 Well-being, feeling of (see also Health), 295-96,297 "What is Enlightenment?" 13 Whole vs. parts (see also Totality), 51,218, 220-21,244, 256-57 Wieland, Christoph, 42, 184, 207 Will: actual (Willkür), 98,133, 265-66, 295, 296, 299, 307 (see also Desire, faculty of); determinations, objective vs. subjective, 297,299,317,321; free, 260, 264, 295, 299-300, 306,318,329,331 (seealso Freedom, practical); holy, 3 1 8 19, 324, 419n.61; rational (in-

telligent) (Wille), 133,221,226, 295, 319, 325,327; transcendental explanation of, 90-91 Will, Frederic, 24 Windelband, Wilhelm, 4 Wit (Ingenium) as natural talent for similarities, 84 Wizenmann, Thomas, 235, 404n.72 Wolff, Christian, 11, 17-19, 23, 25,59, 187,212,397n.87, 402n.34,406n.l5 Wolffianism, orthodox (see also School philosophy, German), 18-21,42, 352n.l3, 388n.2, 400n.ll Wöllner, Johann V., and Edict of 1788, 11-12, 247,417n.ll Wood, Allen, 325, 334, 340 World-soul (Weltseele), 183-84, 230,304,413n.60 World-whole, idea of nature as a, 79, 176,184, 226, 271,281 Worth, moral, 277, 283, 294, 297, 298,316,317,325,337 Worthiness commensurate with happiness, 338,339,424n.89 Young, Edward, 26, 2 8 - 2 9 , 3 4 , 355n.64, 380n.36 Young, J. Michael, 75, 76, 84-86 Yovel, Yimiahu, 333, 344,416n.29 Zeldin, Mary, 325

Index

479