CENTRE FOR ASIA MINOR STUDIES FOUNDERS: MELPO AND OCTAVE MERLIER
ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS
THE GREEK MINORITY OF ISTANBUL AND GREEK -TURKISH RELATIONS 1918-1974
ATHENS 1992
tSTANBUL BtLOt UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
To Louise and Nicholas
First Edition: 1983 Second Edition: 1992
ISBN 960-85021-4-4 ©
Centre for Asia Minor Studies and Alexis Alexandris, 1992.
FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION Since its foundation by Melpo and Octave MerZier in 1930 the Centre for Asia Minor Studies has concentrated its research on the collection ofmaterialon the Greek communities ofAsia Minor in an effort to build an archive of basic information on the heritage, culture, language and mode of life in the ancestral hearths of h ellen ism in the peninsula through the exodus oj 19221924. The publications of the Centre until now reflect this general research orientation and have been intended as contributions to the knowledge ofan important section ofhellenic civilization and of the Greek tradition that came to an abrupt and tragic end amidst the upheavals of historical change and world conflict. One of the permanent objectives of the Centre is to continue this line ofresearch and to utilize its rich archive oforal history with the publication of scholarly studies dealing with Greek tradition and communallife in particular regions and communities of Asia Minor. With the publication of Dr. Alexis Alexandris's book on the history of the Greek community of Istanbul from 1918 to 1974, the Centre for Asia Minor Studies is inaugurating a new series ofmonographs which while contributing essentially to the promotion of the subject of the Centre's specialised research, appeal at the same time to a wider academic public as case studies of more general issues. It is our hope that in this manner the Centre will have its own distinct contribution to make as a living research organization to scholarship on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The present study is of direct interest to the research subject matter of the Centre in that it examines the political behaviour and choices of the leadership of hellenism in the dying Ottoman Empire during the critical period 1918-1922 which sealed the fate of hellenism in Turkey. It is therefore an essential contribution to the understanding of the historical destinies ofAsia Minor hellenism of which Constantinople had always been the capital. Furthermore it is ofinterest to our research programmes for another substantive reason: it considers the historical sequel to the centuries-old Greek presence on the eastern shores of the Aegean and in the hinterland of Asia Minor, after the extinction of the Christian Orthodox communities in the rest of Turkey with the exchange of minority populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923-1924. 7
In the urban environment of the ancient imperial city of the Byzantines and the Ottomans survived to our own days the forms of communal alld social organization, the' varieties of cultural experience and economic activity, the special premium on education and the intimate involvement of the Church in the life of the community that constituted the essence of the historical experience of Asia Minor hellenism under Ottoman rule. From this point of view Dr. Alexandris's book by studying a still living sequel to an older tradition. contributes to a fuller understanding of a whole cultural configuration and of a mode of historical existence. The consideration of these concrete historical problems however has another aspect to it as well. It examines them as the experience of an ethnic minority in a highly nationalist society. As a case study in minority behaviour and minority treatment it is of interest to those concerned with this important problem in contemporary international relations and it constitutes a can .. tribution to the comparative social history of the Near East where the role and fortunes of minorities and the coexistence of diverse ethnic elements under often explosive conditions has been a dynamic factor in political and social change. The whole history ofAsia Minor hellenism under Ottoman rule constitutes an aspect of this broader feature of Middle Eastern society. The present study, by examining this problem in depth, places the historical destiny of hellenism in Turkey in its appropriate political perspective. PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES Director Centre for Asia Minor Studies
TABLE OF CONTENTS Some Place Name Variants Abbreviations Preface
13 15 17
Chapter I: The position of the Greeks, in istanbul before 1918 1. The,Millet System. 2. Ottoman Reform and the Greeks. 3. The Economic Position of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. 4. The Question of the Millet Privileges. 5. The Megali Idea and the Constantinopolitan Greeks. 6. Greek educational and cultural institutions in istanbul. 7. The Constantinopolitan Greek population.
21 25 31 32 36 45 49
Chapter II: The Constantinopolitan Greek factor during the Anatolian war 1918-1922 The Debate on the Future of istanbul. The Patriarchate: Spokesman of Unredeemed Greeks. The Growth of Turkish Nationalist Movement. 4. The Patriarchal Mission to London and the Death of Dorotheos. 5. Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis.
52 54 63 66 69
Chapter III: The Lausanne negotiations, 1922-1923 1. The Mudanya Armistice and the Refet Bele Mission to istanbul. 77 2. The First Exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks, OctoberDecember 1922. 79 3. The Lausanne negotiations and the future of the Greeks in istanbul. 83 4. The Question of the Patriarchate at Lausanne. 87 5. The Work of the Subcommission on the protection of minorities. 95 6. The Questions of the Military Service and Amnesty. 98 7. The Signing of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Return of 103 istanbul to Full Turkish Control. Chapter IV: The new legal position of the Greek Orthodox community in republican Turkey, 1923-1929 1. Turkish Economic Nationalism and the Greeks. 9
105
2. The Campaign Against Professional Greeks. 3. The Question of the Etablis. 4. The Dispute over the Non~exchangeable Greeks Absent from istanbul. 5. Turkish Grievances About the Treatment of Muslims in Western Thrace. 6. Greek-Turkish Negotiations and the Agreements of 1925-1926. 7. Prolonged Greek-Turkish Negotiations. 8. Turkey and Greek Educational and Cultural Institutions. 9. The Civil Code and the Greek Reaction. 10. Various Anti-Greek Measures and the Decline of istanbul. Chapter V' The Resumption of relations between the Turkish Government and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1923-1929 1. Patriarch Meletios and the Anti-Phanar Riot of 1 June 1923. 2. The Turkish Orthodox Challenge. 3. The Election of Patriarch Gregory VII. 4. The Exchangeability of the Archbishops and the Expulsion of Patriarch Constantine VI. 5. The Reign of Basil III. 6. Restrictions on the Ecumenical Role of the Patriarchate. Chapter VI: The Greek minority during the Greco-Turkish rapproch'ement, 193~1940 1. The Greco-Turkish Agreements of 1930. 2. Persistence of Greek Grievances. 3. Greek Foreign Policy on the Minority Question. The Position of the Constantinopolitan Greek Minority.
108 112 117 120 124 129 131 135 139
144 149 154 159 167 170
174 181 185 190
Chapter VII: Relations between secular Turkey and the Patriarchate, the establishment of a modus vivendi, 1930-1946 I. The Official Recognition of the Patriarch and the Visit of Venizelos to the Phanar. 194 2. Attempts to reinforce the Ecumenical Character of the Patriarchate and Turkish Secular Reform. 196 3. Patriarch Benjamin I. 203 Chapter VIII: The Varlrk Tax and its impact on the Greek community 1. The Position of Turkey During, 1939-1942. ~ The Enactment of the Varllk Tax. Discriminatory Traits of the Varllk Tax.
o
10
@ The Effect of the Varl'lk Episode on the Greco-Turkish ~
Friendship. The abolition of the tax on wealth.
Chapter IX: Cordial Greco-Turkish relations and the revival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1944-1954 1. The Strengthening of Greco-Turkish Relations. 2. Rapprochement and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 3" The Election of Patriarch Athenagoras I. 4. Improvernent in the Position of the Greek Minority. Chapter(p. The effects of the Cyprus dispute on the Greeks in istanbul 1954-1964. 1. The Emergence of the Cyprus Dispute and the Greek Minority. 2. The Anti-Greek Riots of 1955 and the Yasslada Trials. 3. The Minority Question and the Greco-Turkish Crisis, 1956-59. 4. The Patriarchate During the Settlement of the Cyprus Question, 1959-64. Chapter XI." The final exodus of the Constantinopolitan Greek community, 1964-1974. Expulsions of the Hellenes of istanbul. The Patriarchate During the Final Years of Athenagoras and the Election of his Successor Dimitrios. 3. The Muslim Minority of Greece.
Summary and Conclusions. Appendices A. The Minority Clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne" B. Greek parishes and associations in istanbul. C. Constantinopolitan Greek Schools. D. Patriarchs and members of the Holy Synod. Bibliography. Index.
207 211 215 II
225 229
234 237 244 248
252 256 266 274
280 298 307 316 320 324 326 332 337 368
SOME PLACE NAME VARIANTS
The same place often has a different name in Turkish and Greek. The following table may help those readers who are used to the one version and find another in the text. The first column gives the Turkish version, while the second gives the Anglicized Greek version. Throughout this work, the modem Turkish version has been adopted for place names. However, in cases where these cities constitute a diocese or a bishopric the Greek has been preferred. The Turkish words follow the official Turkish orthography. Ala~ehir
Ankara Aydin Balat BalikIi Beyoglu Bursa Biiyiikada <;anakkale <;atalca <;orlu Edime Enoz Erdek Eregii Fener Galata/Karakoy Galatasaray Heybeliada lskenderun lstanbul lzmir lzmit lznik
Philadelphia Angora Thyateira Xyloporta Valoukii Pera Broussa Prinkipos Dardanelles Metra/Chataldja Tyroloi Adrianople Enos Cyzicus HeracIea Phanar Galata Stavrodromi Chalki Alexandretta Constantinople Smyrna Nicomedia Nicaea I3
Chalcedon Caesarea Tatavla Xyrokrini Vlaga Rodopolis N eocaesarea Panteichi Ipsomatheion Sigrni Silivria Therapeia Dercos Trebizond Vyzia Eptapyrgos
Kadlkoy Kayseri Kurtulu~ Kurwre~me
Langa Mac;ka Niksar Pendik Samatya Sigi Silivri Tarabya Terkoz Trabzon Vize Yedikule
ABBREVIATIONS AT: BMAEV: BMAIP: BS: BTTD: CR: D.B.F.P: DP: E.A.: ECR: FO: GOThR: HFD: IJMES:
iy: JEH: JMH: LCNEA: LNOJ: LNTS: LPA/DvP: LPA/DgP: MEA: MEJ: MES: OM: RPP: RyP: SBFD:
SIA: TBMM: TL UNSC: 14
AYln Tarihi Benaki Museum, Archive of Eleftherios Venizelos Benaki Museum, Archive of Ioannis Politis Balkan Studies Belgelerle Turk Tarih Dergisi (Journal of Documented Turkish History) Contemporary Review Documents on British Foreign Policy Democrat Party 'EKKATlcrtacrnKTt 'AAiJgeta (Ecclesiastical Truth) Eastern Churches Review Foreign Office Greek Orthodox Theological ~view Hukuk Faciiltesi Dergisi/Ankara Universitesl (Journal of the Faculty of Law of Ankara University) International Journal of Middle East Studies istatistik Ylmgl (Annual Statistics) Journal of Economic History Journal of Modern History Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs League of Nations, Official Journal League of Nations, Treaty Series Lambeth Palace Library, Davison Papers Lambeth Palace Library, Douglas Papers Middle Eastern Affairs Middle Eastern Journal Middle Eastem Studies Oriente Moderno Republican Peoples Party Ryan Papers Siyasal Bilgiler FakuItesi Dergisi, Ankara Universitesl (Joumal of the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University) Survey of International Affairs Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly) Turkish lira/Turkish pound United Nations Security Council
15
PREFACE This book, originally a doctoral thesis, traces the changing fortunes of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. Throughout the Tourkokratia (Ottoman rule), this community, with the Ecumenical Patriarchate at its head, provided leadership for Asiatic Hellenism. But as the Ottoman capital was transformed from age-old, cosmopolitan «Constantinople» into present day «istanbul» during the last sixty years, the traditional status of the Greeks underwent remarkable changes. Together with the Cypriot Greeks, the dwindling communities of istanbul and Egypt, have, since 1923, provided the last chapter in the history of the classical Greek diaspora. Faithful to the belief that they descended directly from the citizens of Romano-Byzantine Constantinople, the istanbul Greeks considered themselves as Romioi. The Turks, too, acknowledged this fact by addressing the Greek Orthodox community as Rum Milleti. Since 1821 the term Rum was used as an ingenious device to distinguish a Greek of the Ottoman empire from one of the independent Greek state, whose citizens are known to the Turks as Yunanll. Since the Ecumenical Patriarchate acted as a focal point of the Constantinopolitan Greek community, special attention is paid to the position of this institution within the nationalist and secular political structure of modern Turkey. Further, in the process of this study it became clear that the destiny of the Greek minority, as well as that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, were greatly influenced by the political relations between Greece and Turkey. Conversely, these relations were, to some extent, shaped by the treatment accorded to the respective minorities (Greeks of Turkey and Muslims of Western Thrace). In view of this interaction, an assessment of Greco-Turkish relations and their impact on the Greek minority was deemed essential. Again passing reference has been made to the Muslim minority of Greece, which like the Constantinopolitan Greeks survived the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1922 -1923. On the other hand I have omitted from this study the Greek island communities of Imbros and Tenedos, which like the Constantinopolitan Greeks, survived the compulsory Greek -Turkish population exchange in 1922 -23. Although these islanders experienced similar political and social changes, nevertheless due to their geographical position, they form a separate unit 17
with their own particular problems. I have dealt with this question in an article, «Imbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes Toward Two Ethnic Greek Island Communities Since 1923», published in Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. VII, no. 1, 1980, pp. 5-3l. For the term Rum used by the Turks to denote the Greek Orthodox minority in the Ottoman empire and later in modem Turkey, I have adopted the English equivalent of Ottoman Greek or simply Greek; while for the term Yunan applied by the Turks to Greeks of Greece, as well as the Constantinopolitan Greeks with Greek nationality, I have utilized the terms Hellene, Hellenic Greek, Constantinopolitan Hellene etc. For place names I have adopted the modern Turkish version and have given in a separate table the Greek equivalents. But, in cases where Anatolian or Thracian cities constitute a diocese or a bishopric the Greek name has been preferred. For the names ending with oglu two forms have been adopted: oglll for the Turkish names as in Orhan Eyliboglu and OglOli for the Greek names as in Alexander Siniosoglou. While working on this study I received the welcome support of numerous individuals. Mr Richard Clogg, of London University, provided guidance through his unparalleled knowledge of modern Greek history. Miss Julian Chrysostomides, of London University, was unstinting in her encouragement and judicious in her criticism as the manuscript first took shape. The manuscript was read by Professor George K. Tenekides, Dr. John Cambell, and benefitted from their careful comments. I would like to thank in particular Dr. William Hale, of Durham University whose intimate knowledge of Turkey sensitized me tojmp,prtant considerations that had escaped my attention. My special thanks are due to Dr. PaschalL<; Kitromilides, Mr Donald Sedwick, Dr. Paul Hidiroglou and Mrs Valentini Tselika for their valuable assistance. This book is largely based on the British Public Record Office archives and the archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry. My thanks are due to the staff of these archives. I am indebted also to Miss Iphigenie Anastasiadou, director of the archive at the Benaki Museum, Athens, who alerted me to the rich archives of Eleftherios Venizelos and John Politis. Her recent untimely death was a serious blow to Greek scholarship. My thanks are also due to the custodian and staff ofthe archive at Lambeth Palace, London. Likewise, I am grateful to the librarians at the British Museum, BUITOWS Library, King's College, the School of Oriental and African Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford, the Islamic Library at McGill, Montreal, the Gennadius, Vouli and National libraries of Athens. I welcome this opportunity to thank a great number of Constantinopolitan Greeks who furnished me with documents , rare books and information. The publication of this book has been made 18
possible thanks to a decision of the governing board of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies to include my work in the distinguished publication series of their institution. I wish to express my appreciation to them for honouring me with this decision. Finally, I reserve for special mention and thanks my parents who provided me with ample moral and material support. But. ultimately, lowe my greatest debt of gratitude to my wife, who not only translated a large number of documents. but also tolerated. encouraged and helped me during my five year long courtship with the book. The faults of the book burden only the author. ALEXIS P. ALEXANDRIS Montreal 1982
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CHAPTER I THE POSITION OF THE GREEKS IN ISTANBUL BEFORE 1918 I. The Millet System.
The Greeks have been one of the leading ethnic groups to have inhabited istanbul. They alone can justifiably claim kinship with the original founders of the city who colonized it in 658 B.c. Similarly. members of this community are considered as Romioi, the direct descendants of the citizens of classical Constantinople (or New Rome). the capital of the Byzantine empire. With the appearance of the Turkish element. after the Ottoman capture of istanbul in 1453. one of history's most intensive cultural symbioses was inaugurated. Under Ottoman rule istanbul became the centre of Muslim-Christian coexistence which lasted for over five hundred years. This was mainly the outcome of a remarkable system of government. the millet system. adopted by the Ottoman state machinery. Faced with the administration of a large cosmopolitan empire, the Islamic Ottoman ruling class granted a substantial degree of self-government to the non-Muslim religious minorities. Perhaps the most striking feature of the millet structure was its formation on ~~ictly religious. rather than racial or linguistic affiliations. Thus. there were no Turkish. Kurdish or Arab millets but a single Muslim nation which embraced all adherents to the Islamic religion in the empire. On the other hand, despite their ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, the Ottoman Armenians were divided along religious lines into Gregorian and Catholic nations. Likewise all the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans. Asia Minor and the Arab provinces of the empire were deemed to belong to the Greek Orthodox community (Millet-i Rum or Rum Milleti). Other nonIslamic millets were those of the Jews. and later on, the Frankish and «Lutheran» nations. 1 The concept of national entities transcending religious distinctions was not established until a comperatively late date. The influence of the Western idea ofnati~na!ism amongst the Ottoman Christians began to
1 By 1914. there were seventeen separate /Ilillets For a general treatment of this system of government see. K H Karpal..-\n /11
21
gain ground during the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this phenomenon was the struggle of the Bulgarians to establish an independent Orthodox church. Although the Ottoman government officially recognized the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople strenously resisted the secession of the Bulgarians, whose demand for ecclesiastical autonomy it regarded as political and therefore schismatic. 2 It was only in 1945 that the Patriarchate agreed to grantautocephality to the church of Bulgaria. The traditional jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch of Constantinople over the Bulgarians, as well as the other Orthodox of the empire, derived from the !n!llet system, which remained in force from 1454 until 1923. Accordingly, the leader of each millet was the highest ecclesiastical office-holder of the respective community and was directly accountable to the head of the Ottoman government for the management of the internal affairs concerning his particular «flock» (reaya). Throughout the Ottoman period, the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople bore the title of the spiritual and ethnic leader of the Greek Orthodox nation (Milletbas)/,EevapX1lC.J This title was originally bestowed upon Gennadios_II Scholarim;, the first post~Byzantine patriarch, by Sultan Mehmet II in 1454. By a charter,3 formalizing relations between state and church, the Greek patriarch became a recognized inember of the sultan's bureaucracy enjoying extensive rights over his flock. Through the religious privileges (imtiyazat-i mezhebiye !nPOVOj1la) , inserted in this charter, the Greek patriarch, in addition to his traditional spiritual powers, assumed a fairly extensive civil authority over matters of internal millet administration. As the chief of the millet-i Rum, therefore, he controlled not only the ecclesiastical, educational and charitable institutions of the Ottoman Orthodox, but also the regulation of matters relating to personal status, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. The Phanar clergy had jurisdiction over all legal cases involving members of the millet except in criminal matters, which the Ottoman government reserved for its own courts. The ethnarch imposed taxes on his people for the maintenance of his vast millet organization. To fulfil his extensive responsibilities, the ethnarch was assisted not only by the holy synod but also by a number of lay officers with high-sounding 2. See M. I. Gedeon, X;vYl'parpa [JaTpzaPXIKo. Ka! L'VVO&Ko. rou BovJ.yapiKou ~'luff.lUroC;, 1852·1873, Constantinople 1908. 3. This charter has been lost, though the text of the document has been recorded by George Phrantzis and other writers. The earliest surviving charter is that of Patriarch Dionysos III Vardalis (1662). See M. I. Gedeon, 'EniO"'lf.1a Tprif.1f.1ara TOVPKIKri, dvarpepof.1el'a de; TO. eKK).J7O"zaO"TlKd ~f.1WV (jiKaIa. Constantinople 1910. pp. 9-14.
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titles, recalling the splendour of the Byzantine court. These were the grand logothete (M kya(,; A oyoeerrr;) , grand treasurer (Meyae; I Keuorpv).a!;) , grand orator (Merar;; Ptjrwp) and grand archivist (Meyae; Xaprorpv).a!;). Each millet was granted the privilege of electing its own religious head. Such election, however, had to be confirmed by a government decree, the berat (deeret d'investiture), authorizing religious leaders to exercise their functions. Patriarch Germanos V (1913-18) was the last Greek Orthodox patriarch to receive such a berat. Paradoxically, the sultan, though non-Christian, acted in some ways like a Byzantine emperor. Thus, after the election of a patriarch, he would personally install the newly elected religious leader to his throne, although in the years 1657-1834 the patriarchs appeared before the grand vezir (sadrazQm) rather than the sultan. Even the priVilege of using Greek as the official language in its relations with the Sublime Porte was granted to the Patriarchate. 4 These rights and privileges conferred upon the Orthodox, as well as the other non-Muslim communities of the empire, became synonymous with the existence of the millet system. But from the Greek patriarch's point of view, the most far-reaching aspect of his position was probably the extension of his authority to the non-Greek Orthodox Ottoman subjects, thus spreading his jurisdiction over many different races. For the first time since the heyday of the Byzantine empire, the Orthodox Christians of the Near East were actually brought together under a single religious authority. As a result the traditional ecumenical character of the Patriarchate was considerably enhanced. Under these circumstances, the patriarch co-operated with the civil authority, with whom his interests were usually allied. The official seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been in the Fener district of istanbul since 1599. Throughout the Ottoman history, the Patriarchate was also referred to by the Greek name of this district, Phanar (rJ>avaplov). There, amid a group of modest buildings - mainly constructed by Patriarch Joachim III5 at the turn of the century- stands the patriarchal cathedral of St. George. Another residence of the patriarch was in 4. M . 1. Gedeon, I'd (jiKaza Ka! npovof.1za .-au OiKOVf.1eviKOU TlarpzaPXelOV, (memorandum prepared for Patriarch Joachim III), Constantinople 1909. part I. pp. 7-64; C. G. Papadopoulos, Les Privileges du Patriarchat oecunu?nique dans I'Empire ottoman, Paris 1924. 5. Joachim Devetzis (1834-1912). Born in the Bosphorus suburb of Boyaclkoy (Vaphaiochorion). Studied in Bucharest and Vienna. After serving as metropolitan of Thessaloniki. he was elected patriarch in 1878. He resigned in 1884 over a disagreement with the Porte on the question of millet privileges. He was returned to patriarchal throne in 1901. He reigned until his death in 1912. One of the most celebrated patriarchs. Joachim was noted for his strong leadership ana dynamic personality"
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tSTANBUL BtLOl UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
Kuruc;e~me by the Bosphorus. while at present his summer residence is in the theological school of Chalki (Heybeli). Between 1453 and 1600 the patriarchal residence followed the wanderings of the patriarchal cathedral churches of the Holy Apostoles (1453-55), Pammakaristos (1455-87), Panagia Paramythias at Wallach Saray (1587-97), and St. Dimitrios Kanavi at Xyloporta/Balat (1597-99).6 The immediate results of the millet structure were advantageous to both parties. For. while the Ottoman sultans assumed the responsibility of protecting the life and property of their subject races. the heads of the millets, in return. ensured the fidelity and obedience of their «flocks» to the Sublime Porte. All the same there were two fundamental long-term flaws in this system. First. as the general quality of government in the Ottoman empire deteriorated. particularly after the humiliating treaty of Karlowitz (1699). the millet system fell prey to increasing abuse. The Ottoman rulers and senior officials, as well as a great number of unscrupulous Greek Orthodox clerics and lay members. indulged in undignified acts of corruption. The device. for instance. of putting ecclesiastical positions up for auction was traditionally a convenient way of increasing the sovereign's revenues. On the other hand. the acquisition of berats led to acute competition among rival factions within the non-Muslim communities leading to frequent instances of abuse. The Greek Orthodox millet was particularly susceptible to such scrambles for power since. because of its vast wealth. key ecclesiastical positions offered an abundance of lucrative possibilities. Nor did the arbitrary manner with which various sultans. as well as government officials. deal with the politically inferior non- Muslim citizens assisted in reinforcing the Ottoman system of government. 7 Second, the wide authority on internal affairs granted to the millets ultimately proved fatal to the effective incorporation of the non-Muslims into the Ottoman body politic. Further, the continued existence of these distinct religious communities offered a convenient opportunity to the Great Powers of Europe for intervention and intrigue among the minorities. Significantly. the concept of secular Ottoman citizenship never gained whole-hearted support. despite a number of attempts by notable Ottoman reformers during the second half of the nineteenth century. Dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule and 6. See A. Pasadaios. '0 fJa7pIaPX1KO:; O1Ko:; rou O1KovpEl'lKOU epOI'OIJ. Thessaloniki 1976. pp. 83-104: Germanos (Sardis). <<'0 'Ev
avapicp narptapXlK()<; 011(0<; roD 'Ayiou lc:copyiou».
the maintenance of a strong ethnic-religious consciousness by the nonMuslim millets precipitated the genesis of the spirit of Balkan nationalism during the nineteenth century. The modern doctrine of nationalism which began to seize the imagination of the minorities proved disastrous for the preservation of the Ottoman empire. s 2. Ottoman Reform and the Greeks.
Meanwhile, as the declining Ottoman empire became the bone of contention among the Great Powers, the Ottoman Christian factor was utilized by such nations as a pretext for intervention in the internal affairs of the empire. The increasing European interest in the fortunes of the Ottoman Christians was illustrated by the inclusion in the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (KiiC;iik Kaynarca. 1774) of an Ottoman commitment to protect «the Christian religion and the churches of that religion» (article 7). In addition, thanks to this treaty Russia was granted the right to build an Orthodox church in Istanbul, and to make representations on behalf of «those who served it».1 This article had far-reaching effects for it provided the basis for a Russian right of intervention in the Near East and gradually growing into a virtual protectorate over Ottoman Orthodox Christians. This right of intervention was often abused by Russia, who on many occasions incited the Orthodox to rebellion in order to use such outbreaks as a pretext for attacking and for annexing portions of the sultan's territory. At other times, however, when anxious to placate the Turks, the czar cynically neglected his proteges abandoning them to the visitations of Ottoman wrath. More significant, from the non-Muslim point of view, was the establishment of the doctrine of equality as official Ottoman policy. Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) declared that in his view all his subjects, of whatever creed, were equal. But it was during the Tanzimat (Reorganization) period of 1839 to 1876, an era of unprecedented internal structural change, that the doctrine of equality of Muslims and non-Muslims was solemnly proclaimed. The driving force behind this age of great reforming edicts was a number of western educated liberal Ottoman politicians and Sultan Abdiilmecid (1839-1861). Seeking to modernize and westernize the political and administrative institutions of the empire, the reformers espoused a new concept of Ottomanism (OsmaniUik), the concept of a common Ottoman citizenship and loyalty, irrespective of religion or origin. The reformers' commitment to egalitarian principles was manifested by the enactment of a reform rescript on 3
·Op(}060~ia.
16 (1941) 19. 7. It has been estimated that 101 patriarchs served 162 Patriarchates (one of them, Cyril I Loukaris was elected six times to the patriarchal throne). See Germanos (Sardis). LVJlfJoi.l; d:; TlJlj; Karai.oi·oV:; KWl'ural'T/\'ovnoi.Ew; dna Hi:; ·Ai.wuEW:; Kai ;;~li:; istanbul 1935-38.2 vols.
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8. R. H Davison. Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876. Princeton 1963. pp. 13-19 . I M. S. Anderson. The Eal"lern Quellioll 1774-1923. London 1968. p. xL
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November 1839 (Hatt-i Serif of Giilhane). While the Hatt-i Serifpromised the protection of «life, liberty and property», its most novel aspect was its official declaration of equality. Quite unequivocally the hatt affirmed that the imperial concessions would be «extended to all our subjects, of whatever religious sect they may be».2 The new policy was confirmed in a more extensive reform edict, the Hatt-i Hiimayun (islahat, Ferman/), which granted equal treatment for adherents of all creeds in such matters as educational opportunity, appointment to government posts, and the administration of justice, as well as in taxation and military service. This edict - prepared under strong pressure from the British, French and Austrian ambassadors- was promulgated by Sultan Abdiilmecid on 18 February, 1856.3 These efforts at modernization were carried on by the succeeding sultan, Abdiilaziz (1861- 1876), who on many occasions stated his willingness to respect the privileges of the non-Muslim communities and to regard all his subject as «children of the same fatherland». Even more significant was the promulgation of the first written Ottoman constitution in December, 1876, establishing a limited constitutional monarchy (mes,rutiyet) whose subjects were considered «Ottoman, whatever religion or creed they hold». Further, article 17 of the constitution affirmed that «all Ottomans are equal before the law ... without distinction as to religion» .4 These far-reaching changes in the Ottoman empire were closely watched by the Great Powers and in particular the Hatt-i Hiimayun of 1856 assumed international character by its inclusion in the treaty of Paris (1856), as article 9 of this treaty expressed European approval of this crucial hat!. Further, progress on the question of Ottoman minority rights was achieved during the Berlin Congress in 1878, the most significant of all international bodies prior to 1919 attempting to deal with the question of minorities in the Ottoman empire. While the Armenian millet sent an official delegation to Berlin, a long memorandum drawn up by the patriarchal authorities on the question of the Orthodox privileges was read at the conference. Articles 61 and 62 of the treaty of Berlin dealt with the principle of religious toleration. Accordingly, paragraph four of article 62 stipulated: «The freedoms and outward exercise of all forms of worship are assured to all, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical 2. For a full copy of the original decree published in the official gazette see Stefanos . Yerasimos, Azge/is,mililik Siirecinde Turkiye. istanbul 1977, ii/pp. 1116-26. 3. Ibid" pp. 1127-36. 4, R. H. Davison, «Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century». American Historical Review. 59 (1954) 847 ff.
26
organization of the various Communities or to their relations with the various spiritual chiefs». 5 Notwithstanding the inclusion of assurances for the protection of Ottoman minorities, the treaty of Berlin lacked the necessary mechanisms to ensure the implementation of these clauses. Although genuine equality was never attained in the Ottoman empire, the reforms of 1839 to 1876 undoubtedly served well the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan. Members of the Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities started to be assigned to administrative ,judiciary ,economic and educational posts of the government immediately after the reform act of 1856. An important aspect oflocal administrative councils (idare meclisleri) set up in 1840 was the considerable representation ofthe non-Muslim communities. Christians and Muslims were accepted together as students in the newly established imperial lyeee of Galatasaray in 1867, while a number of prominent non-Muslims, mainly residents in the capital, reached influential positions in the Ottoman government. Thus, eminent minority members were appointed to such high offices of state as the Council of the Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Viilii-Yl Ahkiim-l Adliye) in 1856,6 and later on the Council of State (Sllray-l Devlet) founded in 1868.7 Similarly out of a total of twenty-eight experts in the constitutional drafting committee two were Greeks,8 and from the fifty-one senators who served during the constitutional period (1877 - 78) six were Greeks. 9 But the most visible non-Muslim presence was at the diplomatic missions of the Ottoman empire in such key European capitals as London, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Berlin and St. Petersburg. By the late 1860s members of the minorities formed tht> bulk of the diplomatic corps who handled Ottoman missions abroad. The position of the Greeks, therefore, though profoundly shaken by the outbreak of the Greek revolt in 1821, was to a considerable extent restored by 5. On the Armenian delegation see M. K. Krikorian, Armenians in the Sen'ice of the Ottoman Empire 1860-1908. London 1978, pp. 7-8. 6. Greek member Stephen Vogoridis (1773-1859). Vogoridis, a hellenized Bulgarian from Kotek, received his training at the Phanariot circles in Bucharest and between 1812-1819 served as assistant to the Phanariot ruler of Moldavia, Skarlatos Kallimachis. In 1832 he was appointed prince of the autonomous island of Sam os, a position he hold until 1850. He was a close friend of the liberal Ottoman vezir Mustafa Re§id and was favoured by Sultan Abdiilaziz. 7. Greek members: Constantine Karatheodoris (1802-79), Constantine Mousouros (1807-91) and Stavros Aristarchis (1834-1925). 8. Alexander Karatheodoris and John Savas, the director of the Galatasaray lycee. 9. Markos Pasha, Stavros Aristarchis, Constantine Mousouros. Constantine Anthopoulos, Spyridon Mavroyenis and Co~tantine Karatheodoris, a full list in R. Deveneux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. Baltimore 1963, pp. 276-82.
27
the middle of the nineteenth century. Together with a few surviving members of the Phanariot noblesse de robe, 10 a new class of Ottoman senior civil servants and diplomats established themselves in positions of power and influence. The most well-known istanbul Greek families of the late nineteenth century were those of the Mousouros, Aristarchis, Karatheodoris and Vogoridis. Thus, despite the execution of their father, Stavros Aristarchis (1770-1822), the last Greek dragoman of the Porte, during the anti-Greek reprisals in the 1820s, Nicholas (1799-1866), Miltiadis (l80~93) and John (1811-97) succeeded in gaining access to government office. NIcholas became the private tutor of sultans Abdiilmecid and Abdiilaziz, whi~e Milti.adis served as governor of Samos from 1861 to 1866. But itwas John Anstarchls who af~er a service of over fifty years, mainly as the Ottoman ambassador to Berlm, distinguished himself as a senior diplomat of the Porte. The son of Nicholas, Stavros Aristarchis (1834-1925) was appointed to the senate on 17 March 1877 and was one of the three surviving members to be brought back to the senate when it was reopened in 1908. Another member of the family, Gregory Aristarchis headed the Ottoman mission in Washington and was the author of a monUI~ental work, Legislation Ottomane, which appeared in seven volumes (Constantinople 1873 - 88). In token of his appreciation for the services of this family, Sultan Abdiilmecid received in audience the distinguished Greek lady, Sophia Aristarchi and gave her his portrait in diamonds. It was the first decoration ever given by an Ottoman sovereign to a lady. 11 Perhaps the most well-known Ottoman Greek diplomat of the nineteenth century was Alexander Karatheodoris (1833 -1906).J2 A close friend of reformer Mithat Pasha, he acquired prominence as Sultan Abdiilhamid II'advisor on foreign affairs. In 1874 Karatheodoris was appointed ambassador to Rome and in 1876 he became undersecretary at the ministry of foreign affairs. But his international reputation stems from his outstanding performance, as a leading Ottoman delegate, during the congress of Berlin (1878). Because of his considerable diplomatic abilities, he was promoted to minister of foreign affairs (1878), but he soon resigned from this post, when the sultan rejected the reform proposals recommended by the liberal Vezir 10. For a comprehensive list of the Phanariots who ruled the princely thrones of Walla chi a and Moldavia (l711-1821) see E.Z. Karal, Osmanll Tarihi, Ankara 1959, iv/pp. 42-77. After the death of Sultan Mahmud II (1839) few Phanariots, such as Kallimachis and Karatzas, returned to the Ottoman capital from abroad where they had found refuge after t~e Greek revolt: 1L See C. Hamlin, Among the Tlaks, New York, p. 372. For a list of non-Muslim Ottoman officials, ibid, pp. 371~75. 12. A career diplomat. A very cultivated man well-acquainted with ancient Greek, Persian and Arabic literature
28
Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha. After serving as governor of Samos (1885 - 95), he became the first Christian governor of Crete (1895 - 96) and for a short while, he also served as minister of public works. Alexander was the son of StephanKaratheodoris, the personal physician of Mahmud II and Abdiilmecid: Beside his long services to the royal family (1827-61), Stephen Karatheodoris was also instrumental in the foundation of the first medical school in 1828, where he taught for nearly forty years. 13 Other members of this family were employed in various depmtments of government throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 14 Notwithstanding their ethnic origin, these technocrat Greeks were members of the Ottoman establishment and were closely tied to Tanzimat spirit. They were working for Ottoman goals and strongly defended the empire against European encroachments and minority separatism. Aware of their political stand, the Sublime Porte was even prepared to appoint Ottoman Greeks to the Ottoman Embassy in Athens. Thus. Co~tantine Mousouros strongly defended Ottoman positions during his eight year term as the Porte's ambassador to the Greek kingdom (1840-1848) and did not even hesitate to break off relations with Greece in 1847, when he felt that the interests of the empire were threatened. Another Constantinopolitan Greek diplomat, John Photiadis served as the Ottoman ambassador in Athens throughout the Cretan crisis-and on 17 December 1868, he departed from Athens in protest against the Greek position on Crete. Another important post which was held by Constantinopolitan Greeks for most of the later part of the nineteenth century was the Ottoman ambassadorship to Great Britain. The distinguished diplomat, Constantine Mousouros served as ambassador to London for thirty-five years (1856-91)15 and was succeeded by Constantine Anthopoulos (1891-1902)16 and Stephen Mousouros (1902-07)Y But Ottoman Greeks 13. 1789-1867. Born in a village near Edirne (Adrianople). Studied medicine in the university of Pisa and settled in the Ottoman capital in 1826. A distinguished polyglot he was noted to have been able to communicate in sixteen languages. One of the founders of the Constantinopolitan Greek Literary Society (1861), he served for many years in the patriarchal council. 14. For details on the Constantinopolitan Greeks who served the Porte see my own, «Oi "EA.A.llVE~ cr'tl'lv lJ1tllPEcria 'ii~ 'OeOlJlavtlcii~ AuroKparopia~, 1850-1922», Lle).riol' rii:; '/awPlla7:; Kai 'E'Ol'o}.O"/II<.7;:; 'Era/peia;; Iii:; 'E}.I.6.r5o:;, 23 (1980) 365-404. 15. 1807-91.. A Constantinopolitan Greek, he began his career as Ottoman commissioner to the principality of Samos. He served in Athens, Vienna, Turin and London and representated the empire in the conferences of Paris (1869) and London (1871). For more details see S. Kuneralp, «Bir Osmanll Diplomatl: Kostaki Musurus Pa~a, 1807-1891", Belletell, 34 (1970) 427-30. 16. 1835-1902. A Constantinopolitan Greek served as senator and member of the court of justice. 17. 1841-1907. Son of Constantine Mousoums . He also served as ambassador to Rome and governor of Sam os (1896-97).
29
also filled top positions at a number of other embassies in Europe. IS As members of a class closely linked to the state service, these Ottoman Greeks behaved as loyal subjects of the sultan and did not act as formal or informal spokesmen of the Greek millet. Notwithstanding their identification with Ottoman elite, however, almost all of them paid considerable attention to the internal affairs of their community, particularly on such matters as education and reform in the millet structure. Meanwhile many of these notables enjoyed close relationships with the Ottoman sovereigns during the second half of the nineteenth century. These ties were amply demonstrated when Sultan AbdiiImecid took the unprecedented step of attending the Greek Orthodox wedding of Stephen Vogoridis' younger daughter to John Photiadis in 1851. 19 A close relationship also existed between Abdiilhamid II and his chief physician the Phanariot Spyridon Mavroyenis, whose son Alexander, also acted as the sultan's private secretary. 20 A visible growth in the number of non-Muslim employees during the Hamidian era suggests that the palace service became increasingly more accessible to members of the minorities who sometimes functioned as senior palace administrators. Thus, while Abdiilhamid II employed a number of Armenian experts in the administration of the Privy Council, he maintained a large body of Greek physicians at his palace. In fact these Greeks, as well as a number of notable families from the Armenian and Jewish millets, were the nearest that the Ottoman government got in developing a concept of OsmanlUlk (Ottomanism) among the various elements in the empire. A nationality law of 1869 was intended to encourage the Ottoman subjects to develop primarily an alIegiance to the state and only secondarily to their specific millets. Yet the concept of secular Ottoman citizenship never gained whole-hearted support from non-Muslims and Muslims alike, and the great majority of the people preferred to exist as separately defined communities.
18. For details on some other eminent Constantinopolitan Greeks see Alexandris. op. cit .. pp. 368-75. 19. The three distinguished Constantinopolitan Greek families - Vogoridis, Mousouros and Photiadis- had in fact close family ties through intermarriages, see Kuneralp. op. cit .. p. 425. 20, Spyridon Mavroyenis (1816-1902). A distinguished Constantinopolitan Greek doctor. He exerted considerable influence on Abdiilhamid. He served as a senator in 1878 and was also a founder of the Constantinopolitan Greek Literary Society (1861). His son Alexander was a career diplomat. He served in Washington and Vienna as well as in the island of Samos. From 1908-22, he was a senator in the Young Turk parliament. He donated his extensive library to the Greek Literary Society. He died in lstanbul in 1925.
3.. The economic position of the COflstantinopolitan Greeks.
The increasing importance of the Ottoman Greeks was largely due to the marked economic. social and demographic upsurge of the Greek element in the empire d~~ingthesecond half of the nineteenth century. A cohesive class of Greek - and Armenian- enterpreneurial bourgeoisie oftLf!ders.qrokers, moneyI~nders and commissioners appeared in istanbul. as well as the other ~ban centres of the empire. This was particularly so after the Anglo'Ottoman commercialtrealYih J838which ushered in a large influx offoreign qlpital in the Ottoman empire."iOttoman Christians participated actively in those sectors of the economy that expanded most rapidly in the post-1838 era: foreign trade with Europe, the various branches of finance;'mecharlized trasport. export-orientated agriculture and modern industries. 2 The Christian presence ~as most pronounced in finance. The famous Galata bankers (sarrafs) were predominantly Greeks and Armenians. The bigsarrafs of the capital wielded great power as lenders to the Sublime Porte and various other ministries. particularly during the Hamidian periocf(f876-1909). Thus, in an attempt to bailout the government. which through improvident measures and extravagant palace_spending -~as brought to near bankruptcy. the Galata bankers. in cooperation with a number of European businessmen, fumisned the-Porte with 8.725.000 Ottoman liras in 1879. 3 But even the financial adVisors of-many sultans belonged to fhe minorities. Sultan Abdtilhamid: II regularly consulted the Greek banker Zariphis and the Armenian broker Assan! on his business transactions. -1 Another Greek financier. Christaki Zographos. was the banker of Sultan Murad V. S Christian minority members soon became local agents of foreign capital (mainly British and French). Along with this commercial middle class. Greeks and Armenians staffed the liberal professions, namely physicians, pharmacists. engineers, lawyers. bank managers. and teachers. They also formed an important sector of the salaried middle class employed mainly by the large European enterprises such as banks. railways, public utilities and industries. But even a greater part of the skilled urban working class in I D. Avclogiu. Tlirk(lenin Dii:eni. Ankara. 1979. i p, 202 f. 2 V. Eidem OSIIl{[lillllllpal"{[lm/II/;lIlilllilklisadi ~artlllli HaH/Iii/a hir Telkik, Ankara 1970. chapter ix 3. Yerasimos., "p . cil, ii p, 894 . The Istanbul Greek financiers who participated in this enterprise were: Zariphis. Evgenidis. Stephanovik-Skylitzis. Th Mavrokordatos. A Vlastos. Koronaios. Negrepontis ·t Avcloglu. op. (il. i p . 212, .5 On the SUltan's friendship with Zographos see M.e Kuntay. Nalllik I\elll{[r Istanbul 1944-56, ii (part I) p 738 .
31
30 3
istanbul was in fact made up of Greeks. 6 The powerful economic position of the Greeks is illustrated by the actual capital investment in the Ottoman ~mpire in 1914.7 '!-- Nationality
Greek Armenian Turkish Foreign nationals Jewish
Percentage of capital investment 50 20 15 10 5
Evidently, the Christians had been quite successful in absorbing a large' share of the fruits of economic progress. The matter was put succinctly by a British diplomat and scholar in 1900: «One may criticize the Turkish character, but given their idiosyncrasies, one must admit that they derive little profit from such blessings of civilization as are introduced into their country. Foreign syndicates profit most, and after them native Christians, but not the Osmanli, except insofar as he can make them disgorge their gains».8 Paradoxically, therefore, economic growth was not only responsible for stimulating . the Ottoman economy, but also for intensifying social differentiation among the various ethnic elements in the empire. This economic imbalance helped divide Muslims and non-Muslims into increasingly hostile groups, and ultimately undermined the multi-ethnic and multi-religious foundations of the Ottoman empire. The control of commercial activity by the Ottoman Christian groups stimulated to a large extent the economic nationalism of Young Turks. 4. The Question of the Millet Privileges (Ilpov0f.1.zaKo ZftT1Jf.1.a).
This growing influence of the Greek element in the empire in general and in istanbul in particular jeopardized the power and authority traditionally exerted by the Orthodox clergy over the Greek mille t. Soon the economic and political aspirations of the secular intelligentsia and the enterpreneurial elites in istanbul came into conflict with the traditionalist ideological position of the Orthodox Patriarchate and the organization of the mille t. Joining forces wi th . Muslim reformers, the Greek middle class pressed for the democratization of 6. This work deals exclusively with the Constantinopolitan Greek community and thus not adequate attention has been paid to the other important non-Muslim minorities in Istanbul. For those millets see Abraham Galante. Role Economique des luifs d'/stanbul, Istanbul 1942, p. 4 f.; Edward C. Clark, «The Ottoman Industrial Revolution», IJMES 5 (1974) 65-76. 7. Yerasimos, op. cit., ii/po 929. 8. Sir Charles Eliot. Turkey in Europe, New York 1965. p. 153.
32
the oligarchic millet structure. 1 The Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy, however, resisted changes which were intended to increase lay participation in the communal administration. Nor did they appear enthusiastic about the whole reform movement in the Ottoman empire. 2 Likewise they tacitly opposed the principle of Ottomanism which they correctly feared would have ultimately undermined clerical authority over the millet. Instead they advised Greeks to continue with their support for the established system of gerondismos, which assured an overwhelming clerical dominance on all affairs regarding the millet. This system took its name from the gerondes, (metropolitans of high rank) and remained in operation from mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century. Gerondes with neighbouring sees to istanbul were able to be present continuously in the holy synod, to elect their candidates to the patriarchal and other sees, to act as delegates of other metropolitans, and thus to assume a greater power. Gerondes were the archbishops of Caesarea, Ephesos, Heraclea, Cyzicus, Nicaea, Nicomedia, Chalcedon and Dercos. Notwithstanding the apprehensions of the gerondes, reform became inevitable with the enactment of the Hatt-i Humayun in 1856. As a result, conforming to the wishes of the government, an assembly composed of seven metropolitans and twenty-one lay members (ten from the capital and eleven from the provinces) met in istanbul in April 1857. 3 Reacting to the recommendations of this assembly, five senior archbishops resigned in July 1859. A year later Patriarch Cyril VII also resigned. Nor was his successor Joachim II (1860-63) favourably disposed to the reform movement. 4 Finally, a reformed constitution was provided by the Greek millet and was presented to the Porte in 1862. The Ottoman government ratified the «general/national ordinances» (r8VIK'oij'Ef)vIK'oi KaVOVl(jf.1.0i) , the following year. 5 From 1863 onwards, the patriarch wa.s assisted by the permanent mixed national council (To LlzapKec; 'Ef)vIKOV MIK'TOV LVf.1.(30U}.lOV) consisting of four senior bishops and eight lay members elected by and from the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Together with L The Armenian community demanded reforms in the millet structure with even greater vigour, see for details in Vartan Artinian, «A Study of the Historical Development of the Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1863», unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Brandeis University 1969. 2. Davison, Turkish Attitudes, p. 854. 3. This assembly was also entitled «national» (iOVlKOV) council, see Young. Corps, ii/po \3. 4. He too, resigned over this question see M. I. Gedeon, IlarpzaPXlKoi IlivaKl'x;;, Constantinople 1885-90, pp. 669-70. 5. Also known as Ko.TaaTarzKoe; xdpnle; (statutory charter). See reVlKOi Kal'OVla/loi Ilepi riie; dlWOerljaewc; rwv iKKi.lJalaOrIKWI' Kai 'E()VlKWI' IlpaY/ldrwl' rwv uno rou OiKOVJleVlKOU 6Jpovov ,Jzarei.ouvrWl' 'OpOor5o~WI' XjJlorzavwv 'YnlJKoWv Tlic; AVTOU Me;'ai.elOTlJro;;; TOU Eovi.rdvov, Constantinople 1862. For a French translation see Young. Corps, ii/pp. 21-34.
33
the twelve senior archbishops of the holy synod ('!epa L'vvoboc;) , these two patriarchal councils formed the «two bodies of the Church» (TO. Avo L'wf.1ara vje,; 'EKKhw{aeJ The mixed national council assumed responsibility over different philanthropic and educational establishments, parish church fi~ nances, and matters relating to wills, deeds of consecration and donation. In contrast with the reformed constitution of the Armenian millet, which introduced a lay dominated general assembly. the Greek «General Ordinances» were not wide-ranging. The representation, for instaD:ce, of the provinces at the Phanar remained pitifully inadequate even after 1863. The constitutional issue did not only cause a relative diminution of the clerical power but also provoked a deep rift within the Constantinopolitan Greek community. This was to last until 1923 . While the great majority of the senior clerics remained firmly attached to the status quo, an articulate lay group (l.ai"Koi rcapayovTu,;) , assisted by a small number of «progressive» bishops, pressed for a more modern approach towards community affairs, particularly in education. A decisive change soon took place at the Phanar when the charismatic and able archbishop of Thessaloniki, Joachim, decided to side with the advocates of reform. With the assista~ce~f a niimber of influential notables, such as Zariphis, Zographos and Evgenidis, Joachim was elected to the patriarchal throne in 1878. He immediately ushered in a remarkable programme for the modernization of the community institutions in Istanbul and the provinces. His first reign, however, was short-lived and in 1884 he was forced to resign over a serious disagreement with the Porte on the issue of millet privileges. 6 Taking advantage of his resignation, the ecclesiastical party succeeded in maintaining power at the Phanar until 190 1. The most aynamic personality amongst the anti-Joachimites was the archbishop of Chalcedon, GeI~f!1anos,7 who enjoyed the friendship of some powerful personalities as the financier Paul Stephanovik-Skylitzis and the prominent journalist Stavros Voutyras. 8 Notwithstanding these endeavours, Joachim
III succeeded in regaining the patriarchal throne in 1901, and remained in power until his death in 1912. In essence, these factional squabbles heralded the day when the patriarchal leadership would have to make the crucial choice of either conforming to the nascent outlook and aspirations of the community or fighting to preserve the status quo that implied association with the Ottoman government. Traditionally, the Patriarchate strongly adhered to this association and readily espoused voluntary submission to the Ottoman rulers. This passive attitude of the gerondismos tradition was described by critics as ethelodouleia. But this submissiveness to the Porte became the subject of mounting criticism and a contemporary British observer went so far as to describe the Patriarchate as
6. K. Spanoudis, '[OroPIKi:; Lei.i&:;, '[waKeIp a r, Constantinople 1902, pp. 2 ff. 7. Germanos Kavakopoulos (1835-1920). A native oflstanbul, he entered the Patriarchate after completing his theological education in Jerusalem. Athens and Chalki. He was appointed bishop of Kos in 1866 and was subsequently translated to Rodos and Heraclea (1888). In 1897 he was promoted to the see of Chalcedon. Finally, in 1913 he was elected patriarch but had to resign from this post in 1918. He was a bitter opponent of Joachim III and staunchly supported thegerOlldismos tradition. 8. Stavros Voutyras (1841-1923). A Constantinopolitan Greek and a distinguished journalisL He was one of the founders of the Neologos in 1866. He gained prominence with his articles concerning the Bulgarian schism. He championed the rights of the Ottoman Greeks and was
expelled from Turkey during the Greek- Turkish war of 1897. Returning to his native city carried on with his pro-Greek activities. He was instrumental in the foundation of a number of educational institutions (5yl/ogoi) in Istanbul A supporter of the puristic Greek language (katharf\·Ollsianos). he campaigned for the dismissal of all teachers who taught in the demotic language See also ch . II::! . 9. G . Young. Nationalism and the War in the Near East. Oxford 1915. pp. '26-7. 10 . c.. Paparrigopoulos. '/owpia wi! 'Eii'll'IKOli "EOl'ov:; (History of the Greek Nation), Athens 1932. viip 409. II D. Mavropoulos. llaTplapI.IKi;; '::ci.i&:;, Athens 1960. pp . 14-22 . 12 . For the text of this document see Ch . Karykopoulou. To LilcOl'i:; KaOf.rrniJ:; TOI)
34
3S
«an instrument of Turkish Imperialism and an obstacle to all nationalism, including even that of the Greeks» . 9 With similar vehemence the eminent Greek historian of the nineteenth century, Constantine Papanigopoulos judged the determination of the Patriarchate to maintain a low political profile. He was particularly critical of the Phanar's inability to hellenize the non-Greek peoples of the Orthodox millet, despite the innumerable opportunities afforded under the Ottoman rule. 10 The position of the adherents to the status quo became even less tenable when the Porte attempted to curtail the traditional privileges of the millets. If the government was to bring about a more uniform state, it had to limit the jurisdiction of the clergy to strictly religious affairs. Thus when the government took steps to standardize education and to restrict the powers of religious courts, Patriarch Joachim III resigned in protest (1884). Despite this resignation, the question of the millet privileges escalated and soon degenerated into a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians culminating in 1890, when the Patriarchate resorted to the extreme measure of closing the Greek churches in Istanbul. 11 This demonstration of protest attracted international attention and as a result Sultan Abdiilhamid II was obliged to issue a proclamation restoring the traditional privileges of the Greek millet. 12 Not-
withstanding this notable success, the millet privileges were attacked even more vigorously by the Young Turks. Embarking upon a policy which reflected the cultural and religious aspirations of the Muslim majority, the Young Turks challenged once again the authority of the Patriarchate. From June 1909 onwards the Young Turks began to introduce legislation whose aim was to curb the political and cultural autonomy of the millets. By taking over these activities, the Young Turks believed, the state would be able to create a common Ottoman culture, mainly through a common educational system. By means of two educational laws (1908/1915), the ministry of education was made responsible for the supervision of all school curricula in the empire. The teaching of Ottoman Turkish (Osman/lca), as well as a common history designed to encourage unity, was stipulated by the law of 1909. While on 16 February 1912 a law regulating the evkaf (pious foundations) was promulgated,13 another government decree abolished the collective and national representation of the different ethnic/religious communities of the empire (1916). The term millet was now replaced by the word cemaat (community). Continuing with their determination to secularize the empire, the Young Turks passed a legislation establishing civil marriage as the only legal binding ceremony for all Ottoman subjects, regardless of religious affiliations (1 January 1918). Religious marriage was to remain optional. 14 At first the ageing patriarch Germanos V (1913-18) tried to combat the a.~ icalism of the Young Turk administration but with little success, He soon, however, resigned to the progressive weakening of the Patriarchate's influence in the empire. 5. The Megali Idea and the Constantinopolitan Greeks. The biggest challenge to the clerical authority came from the Ottoman Orthodox intelligentsia. which became increasingly disenchanted with the Phanar's submissive approach in its dealings with the Porte. The misgivings of the Ecumenical Patriarchate towards the timing of the Greek revolt of 1821 is well-known. Patriarch Gregory V (1818-21. his third patriarchate) was an ecumenist and an opponent of secular nationalism. I Likewise the Phanar Ofh"OUWl'I/ioij flarpwPlf.iolJ, Athens 1979. pro 73-77. On government encroachments upon the
past mil/I'I privileges see Kallinikos Delikanis. TO. iJih'aw h'ai fl pOl'Opla TOV Oih"OIJ!le\'lh"OU flarpwp-
reacted unfavourably to the unilateral emancipation of the church of Greece, which it only recognized in 1850. True to its Byzantine tradition, the Ecumenical Patriarchate appealed to the universalist religious loyalties of the Orthodox Christians rejecting the parochial, ethnic tendencies embodied in the various Balkan nationalist movements. Suspicious of the secular and rationalist currents originating in Western Europe, the Patriarchate opposed their infiltration in the Ottoman empire as best as it could. 2 More significantly, the existence of an independent Greek state produced a cleavage in the fabric of the Orthodox Christian millet since it gave to ethnicity and language higher priority than religion. Hitherto the Orthodox of the Balkans regarded the Greek language as a non-national medium of religious communication. Inevitably, the Ottoman Slavs would follow the Greek example and initiate their own secular nationalist movements, thus putting in grave jeopardy the Phanar's leading position in the Orthodox millet. Already during the 1850s a Bulgarian ethnic renaissance was under way and by 1860 the Bulgarian Exarch ate was established - though it was not officially recognized before the publication of an imperial decree in 1870. 3 This inability of the communal leaders and the clergy to control their dissatisfied flock had, to a large extent, prompted the reform era of 1839-76 in the Ottoman empire. Unable to face the challenge of Balkan nationalism by force, the Ottoman government tried to appease the non-Muslim communities through socio-political reform. It was clear that the contract made between the conquering Sultan Mehmed II and Patriarch Gennadios II was antiquated by the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, the Patriarchate never recovered from the events of 1821, although officially it remained a leading Ottoman institution until 1923. Faced with the challenge of secular nationalism, the clerics and community leaders of the Phanar adhered to the status quo, while at the same time they kept alive the wish to restore the Byzantine empire. Encouraged by the decline of the Islamic Ottoman state, the hope of achieving a Greek/Christian take-over of the empire, a long cherished Greek dream, was revived. The Phanar clerics shared the view, widely held in the Greek world, that a general historical tendency was at work in favour of Greece. The anticipated «regeneration of the nation» it was to materialize gradually, though it was only a question of time and patience. Despite their confidence in the future of the «nation», the goals of the Greek clerics remained fundamentally vague and obscure. There are indications
If.iolJ. Constantinople 1909, p. 98.
13. H. Giineri. «Azlnllk Vaklflarlnln Incelenmesi». Vaklj/ar Dergisi, 10 (1970) 88. 14. Avcloglu. up. cil .. i;pp. 277-78: B. Stavridis. '[aTOpia roil Oih"OVpet'Ih"OV flarpwPldov. Athens 1967. p. 14. I D. Dakin, The Ufl(ficali()fl{~fGr('ece /770-/923. London 1973, p. 38: Karpat.lnqllir\,. p. 74.
~. On the response of the Patriarchate to the ideas of Enlightment see R. Clogg. «The Didaskalia Patriki (1798): An Orthodox Reaction to the French Revolutionary Propaganda». \1£5 5 (1969) 102·08. 3. On the Bulgarian schism see H . lnalclk. Twdmal I'e BII/gar Mese/esi, Ankara 1943. pp . 17 f
36
37
that they would have, on the whole, welcomed the evolution of a Christian and preferably Orthodox - dominated, multinational and theocratic regime, in which the Ecumenical Patriarchate would assume a leading role, But no member of the Phanar hierarchy ever succeeded in giving any concrete ideas as to how this new order would be established or operate. The Patriarchate, it appears. while cautiously awaiting a gradual transfer of power in istanbul, chose to remain loyal to its traditional policy of low political profile and sought to maintain cordial relations with the Porte. At the tum of the century, some Greek intellectuals, mainly from the Greek Kingdom, went some way in articulating and expanding this «gradualist» approach. They closely identified the future of Hellenism with the promotion of a Turkish-Hellenic understanding, which was to be followed by an agreement among the various nationalities in the Ottoman empire. They envisioned the ultimate formation of an «Eastem Empire» embracing all the Ottoman nationalities. By progressive erosion and by the assumption of co.ntrol of the empire, the Greeks would gradually succeed in fulfilling their national idea (megali idea) which, according to this group, amounted to the ressurection of Hellenic civilization in the Balkans and Asia Minor. The most distinguished exponents of this ideal were Ion Dragoumis (1878-1920) and Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis (1878-1945), both mainland Greeks, who during their stay in istanbul for·medthe~~O;·ganization of Constantinople» in 1908. The major aim of this organization was to promote the concept of Greek-Ottoman cooperation.4 Although they did not deny a leading role to the Turkish element, both Dragoumis and Nikolaidis were confident that, given the dynamism of the Ottoman Greeks, Hellenism would become the dominant factor in their envisaged empire. According to Dragoumis, Souliotis believed that: ,
4. On the 'Op;-avw(i/:; KwvaTavTlvOvno).Ew;;, D. Xanalatos, «The Greeks and the Turks on the Eve of the Balkan Wars: A Frustrated Plan», BS 2 (1962) 277-96: D.H. Chamoudopoulos. 'H Nwripa
38
the Smyrniot Greek deputy, ~ul Karplidi~ declared that the national idea of the Greeks consisted of an effort «to contribute with all the moral and material capital of our Nation to the Civilization of the East; and to protect and cultivate our resources for the interests and Civilization of the East (11 ohnoj.[(x;; tv 'A varo)Jj). 6 The «gradualist» solution gained some credibility among the Greeks with the Greek defeat in the Greek-Ottoman war of 18.97. The Greek reverse had demonstrated the inability of the Greeks to capture the Ottoman empire by force. As it was impossible to conquer the Ottoman empire from without, many Greeks were attracted by the «gradualist» approach which offerred the hgpe to conquer it from within. Meanwhile, an alliance - and eventually a federation- between istanbul and Athens would prevent, the Greeks hoped, the partition of the empire among the various Slavic nations. Greece was particularly alarmed by the Bulgarian ambitions in Macedonia and Thrace and as a result Helleno-Bulgarian rivalry was intensified during the 1890s and 1900. 7 A sincere Greco-Turkish rapprochement, the «gradualists» suggested, would not only preserve the empire but also would prevent the irrevocable loss of Macedonia and Thrace to Hellenism. In this light one may view the positive reaction of the majority of the Ottoman Greeks to the Young Turk revolution in 1908. While putting an end to Hamidian despotism, the Young Turks restored the constitution of 1876 and called for an election in which the Christian population was to take part. From the very first, however, the Young Turks were divided between two tendencies. The more powerful section of the movement, consisting mostly of patriotic officers, formed the Committee of Union and Progress (ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), whose primary aim was to restore full sovereignty to the Ottoman state. To achieve this end, they came out more and more clearly for the central authority and Turkish dominion. This group seems to have enjoyed the support of the Turkish urban petty bourgeoisie, composed of minor officials, school teachers, artisans, and tradesmen, who as aclass, to a certain extent, formed a politically conscious class. Resenting the strong economic 6. Karolidis (1849- 1930) A distinguished Ottoman Greek intellectuaL He had been professor of history in the university of Athens. He served in the Ottoman parliament from 1908-13. Because of his wide knowledge and genuine desire for a Greek-Turkish understanding. he was invited to stand as a candidate of Union and Progress in the election of 1912. His deep understanding of and sympathy for the Turks won him a number of enemies in the Greek nationalist circles of Athens and Istanbul. He represented izmir at the parliament. see P. Karolidis. AOi'ol Kai . Yno;.mi;,wTa , Athens 1913. p. I I I. 7. On the Macedonian issue see D . Dakin. The Greek struggle in Macedonia. 1897-1913, Thessaloniki 1966. passim.
39
position of the minorities, this class supported the Unionists' call for an assault against the privileges of both foreigners and their non-Muslim intermediaries. 8 In contrast to the Unionists, the liberals espoused the ideas of Prince Sabahattin, their unofficial leader, who advocated a decentralized state in which people of various creeds and races were to find freedom in equality of citizenship.9 The liberal proposals went counter to the secular ideas of the Unionists. Nor did the liberals' adherence to a laissez-faire economic system - which by guaranteeing the status quo was to perpetuate the economic superiority of the non-Muslim elements - endear them to the Unionists. Quite diverse elements, whose only rallying point seems to have been their intense dissatisfaction with Unionist policies, flocked to the ranks of the liberal opposition. Members of the nobility, remnants of the pre-Hamidian era of Ottoman liberalism, wealthy Muslim landlords, leading politicians of the old regime who out of necessity joined the Young Turks in 1908, conservative religious leaders and members of the ethnic minorities were all united in a loose association. Lacking, however, any cohesion the liberals did not accomplish much and were only able to form various ephemeral parties most notable of which were the Osmanl'i Ahrar Flrkas'f (the Ottoman Liberal Union) in 1908 and the Hiirriyet ve itila! Ftrkas'f (Entente Liberale) in 1911. The liberal proposals for «administrative decentralization and personal initiative» were welcomed by the majority of the Ottoman Greeks. The main exponent of these views Prince Sabahattin was particularly popular with the Greeks as well as the other ethnic communities. A nephew of Sultan Abdiilhamit II, Sabahattin closely co-operated with a number of eminent Greeks. such as Vasilaki Mousouros-Gkikis J () and George Skalieris, J J who helped him formulate his ideas. Mousouros-Gkikis followed Sabahattin into 8.. For a general account see E. Ahmad. The YOllllg TllrkL The Committee of Ullioll alld Pmgress ill Tllrkish Politics 1908-191-1. Oxford 1969 . On the aims and programme of the party, T.Z . Tunaya. Tiirkiye'de Siyasi Partilf'!" 1859-1952. Istanbul 1952. pp. 174-232. 9 . On Sabahattin (1877·1948) see C Kutay. Prell.l Saha/llIttill Bf'\'. Istanbul I 964passim and S. Mardin. Jiin Tiirklf'!"in Siyasi Fikirleri. Ankara 1964. pp. 215 ft. 10 . Vasilaki Mousouros-Gkikis. A member of the distinguished Mousouros family. He started his career as a government employee and by the time he left Istanbul for Paris he was a member of the Council of State . His return to Istanbul. however. was short-lived. Disillusioned with the failure of the Liberals to prevail during the 1912 election. he once again left for Paris. Lateron he joined forces with various Greek irredentist societies (1917-22) see below. II. Son of Kleanthis Skalieris. he was a member of the Ahrar party and the author of an influential study (Georges C Scalieri. La decentralisation etla refimlleadministratil·e. Constantinople 1911. On his father's political career see LH. Uzun<;ar~lIL "v Murad'! Tekrar Padi~ah Yapmak Isteyen K. Skaliyeri ve Aziz Bey Komitesi». Belleten. no 30 (1944) 245-328.
40
exile (1899) and had been the leader of the Greek delegation at the first Young Turk congress in Paris (February 4/9, 1902). Recommended by his close friend Prince Sabahattin. Mousouros-Gkikis was appointed by the Young Turks to the newly formed senate immediately after the revolution of 1908. During the administration of Kamil Pasha (1908-1909), he became minister of the posts and telegrams. The tacit alliance which soon developed in the parliament between Ottoman liberals and the majority of the Greek deputies should be seen against this background of long-established relations. Many of the twenty-six Greek deputies elected in the 1908 parliament had previously collaborated with liberal organizations. Following the example of other ethnic minorities, sixteen Greek deputies formed a «Greek party» during the 1909-1910 parliamentary session. These deputies voted collectively on all issues and supported the opposition between 1909-1912. The remaining ten, who were either Unionist members or independents, refused to take part in such a grouping. 12 But the anti-Unionist alliance culminated with the electoral pact of 1911 when conservative and liberal Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Armenians and Greeks harnessed their energies in order to defeat the government in the elections of 1912. In return for their support, the newly formed Entente Liberale promised to make important concessions to the Greeks. The traditional privileges of the Patriarchate were to be restored and administrative decentralization was to be granted to the provinces of the empire. Inevitably, the electoral pact of 1912 had disastrous effects on the relations between the Unionists (the principal political organization in the country) and the Greek community. In vain did some of the more far-sighted Greek deputies, such as Paul Karolidis (izmir) and Emmanuel Emmanouilidis (AydIn), strive to dissuade their colleagues from an all-out confrontation with the ruling Unionists. Thus, while pointing out that the opposition lacked any homogeneity of principles, Karolidis advised an understanding with the Unionists. This act would have probably mitigated the increasing alienation of the Greek community from the Turkish leadership. Further, there were some visible signs that the Unionists sought an agreement with the Greek community. This desire to accomodate the minorities first became apparent during the Turco-Italian war which broke out in September 1911. Responding to a co-ordinated demand of the non-Muslim communities, the government officially recognized once again the privileges of the religious heads. In fact, 12. Similar Bulgarian. Armenian and Albanian parties were also in existence. For a list of the Ottoman deputies see E Ahmad & D,A, Rustow. «Ikinci Me~rutiyet Doneminde Mec[isler 1908-1918» in Giilley-Dol?1I AI'I'lIpa Araytlrmalarf Dergisi. 415 (1976) 250-83
41
with a government order of 4 November 1911, the status of the nonMuslim millets was restored to what it had been in 1908.13 As they prepared for an early election during the spring of 1912. the Unionists took some further steps to placate the Greeks. Thus after appointing Senator Alexander Mavroyenis ambassador to Vienna, the Unionists expressed their desire to come to a comprehensive electoral pact with the Patriarchate. According to the Smymiot deputy Karolidis, during these negotiations the Unionists went so far as to promise an increase in the number of Greek deputies to forty-five and the appointment of Senator Aristeidis Georgantzoglou to the ministry of justice and religions, an unprecedented step in Ottoman history. In return, the Unionists demanded the patriarch's support in the forthcoming elections. I.! Under the pressure of the Greek party,IS which was then in the process of concluding a separate electoral pact with the Entente Liberate, Patriarch Joachim remained politically aloof. But this Greek unresponsiveness to Li nionist proposals backfired after the abysmal electoral pelformance of the Liberals in the 1912 elections. Ever since 1908 the Unionists had expected that the subject peoples of the empire would willingly accept their leadership and cooperate in the task of making Ottomanism viable. Instead they found themselves confronted with parties aiming at local autonomies. Fearing that the drive for Ottomanism would ultimately undermine the jealously guarded millet privileges, the heads of the non-Muslim communities adopted a negative attitude towards Unionist policies. Thus, in order to implement their centralist programme, the Young Turk government had to resort to the introduction of legislation whose aim was to curb the political and cui tural autonomy of the Greek, as well as the other ethnic communities. Meanwhile, the number of the Greek deputies in the new parliament (1912-14) was reduced to fifteen and almost all of these were elected on the Unionist ticket. 16 Communal tensions increased further with the outbreak of the Balkan wars in 1912. The isolation of the Turkish element in the empire and the humiliating reverses in the Balkan wars coincided with the growing awareness of Turkish nationalism. The embittered Turks were steadily trans\3. Y.H . Bayur. Tiirk ink/hibi Tarihi. Ankara 1943. ii:1 pp . 245-47.
14 Karolidis. op . cil .. pp . 334-35 . 15 It was formed by sixteen Ottoman Greek deputies . They. in turn. took directions from the Political League / [/oi./w:o; ~-,il(j';(JpO;) which was closely identified with the Hellenic embassy in [stanbul and Dragoumis' «Organization of Constantinople» The leaders of the League.were the Ottoman deputies Chonaios. Bousios. Vamvakas and Kosmidis. On their views see G. Eousios. To [/Oi.lrlh() [/po;'I'!l!l11ll TOii "Ei.i.l)I/(JllOli it T(J/)/wifl Constantinople 1912. 16 . Karolidis. up . cit.. PI' 368-71: Ahmad & Rustow. up. cll. Pl'. 250-83
42
formed from Ottoman patriots into ardent Turkish nationalists. Greek fortunes in the Ottoman empire deteriorated rapidly during World War I when the istanbul government joined the Central Powers. Not only did the Unionists refuse to negotiate with such groups as the Political League or the Organization of Constantinople, but, suspecting them of being instruments of the Hellenic government. took steps to drive them out of Istanbul. Young Turk suspicions were intensified when Greece, under the leadership of the irredentist Cretan Eleftherios Venizelos, threw in its lot with the Entente Powers (1917). Regarding the Ottoman Greeks as being sympathetic to the Entente Powers. the Istanbul government took draconian measures against them. Large scale deportations of Greeks from strategically sensitive areas, such as Thrace, western Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, took place. while the privileges of the Patriarchate were once again severely curtailed (1914-18).17 By the end of the First Balkan war the Ottoman Greek administrative and diplomatic appointments were also terminated and in October 1912 the ambassador to Vienna. Alexander Mavroyenis, was recalled to Istanbul. Similarly, from January 1913 no Greek served in the cabinet. The practice of appointing a Greek to the cabinet was established when the Young Turks took power in 1908 and a Greek usually occupied such posts as public works. forests. mines and agriculture or posts and telegrams. IS Probably the greatest resentment was aroused by the Unionist economic policies. From the very beginning the Unionists demonstrated a determination to bring their own social class, the Turkish petty bourgeoisie, at the helm of economic affairs. They resented the Greek and Armenian refusal to participate in Ottoman regeneration and, therefore, sought to destroy the virtual monopoly of commerce, industry and urban professions exercised by these elements. The traditional «ethnic division of labour» 19 had, according to the Unionists, undermined Ottoman sovereignty and to remedy this theformation ofa «national economy» and a Turkish bourgeoisie was essential. These Unionists ambitions, however. were not fulfilled before the outbreak of World War I. It was after they sided with the Germans that the Young Turks were at liberty to take measures against the established Otto[7. E. Emmanouilidis. TO. Tci.cvTai!lEn) vi:; 'OOwpal'lr:li:; Avwr:pawpfa:;. Athens [924. pp. 285-337. 18. The Greek senators between 1908-13 were: Mousouros-Gkikis. Aristeidis Georgantzoglou. D. Mavrokordatos. Georgiadis. Vayiannis and Alexander Mavroyenis. 19. This is the appropriate formula used by Sussnitzki to describe the allocation of economic activity among different ethnic groups. This article was first published in 1917 see AJ. Sussnitzki. «Ethnic Division of Labour» in Ch. Issawi (ed.). The Eeonolllie HislDlY oflhe Middle Ea.1I /800-19/4. (/ book (dreadings. Chicago 1966. pp. 114-125.
43
6. Greek educational and cultural institutions in istanbul.
man Christian bourgeoisie which was closely associated with Anglo-French capital. The four war years exhibit a frantic pace of economic activity by Turkish - and] ewish - capital. which gained new advantages through the encouragement of the government. and government-sponsered banks. At the same time the Unionists assisted Turkish entrepreneurs by adopting measures, such as the anti-Greek economic boycotts and expulsions directed against the Greek and Armenian elements. It appears that the basis of antagonism waS rooted primarily in class conflict in so far as the Unionist scheme to transform Ottoman society undermined the position of the privileged classes. Thus the elevation of the petty bourgeoisie to the centre of political and economic affairs engendered as much hostility among the upper class Muslims as among the Greeks. Despite the hostile climate after 1913, the Ottoman Greek community was still too powerful to be disrupted by Unionist pressures. Far from being demoralized by the general state of affairs, Ottoman Hellenism received a new impetus with the successful issue of the Greek-Ottoman hostilities in 1912. While between 1908-1912 the advocates of Greek-Turkish rapprochement, who at best hoped for a long-term prevalence of the Greek element in the empire, commanded considerable support, by 1913 sympathy with Venizelos and his irredentist policies at the expense of Turkey began to gain ground. As relations between the istanbul government and the Ottoman Greeks deteriorated beyond repair, dissatisfied middle class Greeks espoused the vision of a Greater Greece (Megali Ellada) embracing all the Greek populations of Thrace, Anatolia and Northern Epirus. Thus, the national idea (megali idea) of the Greeks came to be identified with the aspiration to unite the entire Greek race under a single Hellenic government. Adherents of the megali idea soon gained influence at the Phanar and began to challenge the authority of Patriarch Germanos V Kavakopoulos. An aged and sick man, the patriarch had failed to exhibit effective resistance when the traditional millet privileges came under serious threat in 1913-1918. Nor did the Phanar protest against the Istanbul government when Anatolian and Thracian Greeks were deported in great numbers during World War I. Finally in October 1918, revolting against the traditional subservience of the Phanar gerondes, a dynamic and predominantly lay faction engineered the fall of patriarch Germanos. Encouraged by the victory of the Entente Powers, these mainly middle class Constantinopolitan Greeks backed Venizelos in his diplomatic efforts to achieve the vision of megali idea in the years 1918-20.
44
The ranks of Ottoman Greek irredentists were bolstered by an immensely successful educational system developed by the Greek millet. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, Greek schools in the Ottoman empire strove to improve the cultural level of the community. At the same time, unhampered by any serious government interference, these schools disseminated Hellenic influences. Numerous edu~a_t~()~nal, litera!L and cultural societies( syllogoi) were founded in AnatoiTa-and Thrace. In the capital alone there appears to have been some twenty-six such syllogoi in the early 1870s. 1 By far the most important of those was the Greek Literary Society ('0 'Ev KWl'uTavT/l'ovrroi.cl 'Ei.i.111'IKO;· cfJli.oi.o"1 KO;' Lui).Oi'O:;) , established in 1861 by a number of eminent Constantinopolitan Greeks (of i.o/abc;· roil fj(}vov::;j2 Amongst its founders were Spyridon and Alexander Mavroyenis, Constantine Kalliadis (director of the press bureau at the Sublime Porte) and A. Palaiologos, the Greek ambassador in istanbul. But it was primarily Dr Iroklis Vasiadis (1821· 90), who played a major role in the expansion of a ~rk ~f syllog~s associations in the city as well as in other Ottoman domains. Because of his remarkable cultural and educational activities, Vasiadis soon acquired, within Ottoman Hellenism. the title of «the permanent minister of education of the unredeemed Greeks» ('/uOfJIO:; 'Yrrovpi'o;' Tif:; II a/(5da;' roil 'A i.vrpuJrov 'E)J'lV1uJlOV). Another key figure in the expansion of the syl/ogos institutions was Stav~~Youtyras_~(l841- 1923), the editor of Neologos. This sophisticated educational system reflected the highly-developed corporate life of the Greek millet. During and after the Hamidian regime, the network of Greek schools spread rapidly and as early as the 1870s the Constantino~it~I1_Q~eeks__ al()ne tla(:l105 _schools withJ5,OOO p!lpjl§,3 }3Y I9J2.~t:he number of schools grew_~CLill} To these_JL~ize;:'lhk~number of private lycees should also b~~de.>, BS 16/1 (1975) 103·12; H. Belia, «Le Syllogue pour la propagation des lettres grecques et les ecoles de Thrace», Actes du lIe COllgres International des ttl/des dusud-est Europeell (Athenes 7- I3 Mai 1970). tome IV, pp. 369-76. 2. See P. Moraux, Bibliotheqlle de la Societe TlLrqlle d'Histoire, Catalogue de Manuscrits Grecs (Fonds du Syllogos) , Ankara 1964; T. Stavrou. '0 'EI' KWl'aral'T/l'oVTiOi.el 'Ei.iJll'lKO:;
45
families in the capitaL As early as the 1860s and 1870s, a boom in the number of these schools was experienced. s But communal Greek education was generally supported by the endowments and subscriptions, and administered by committees representing benefactors and beneficiaries. Each local community managed its own Greek school while the central agency was located at the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In most of the Greek schools the motivating ideal was the Helleno-Christian tradition. In the curriculum and in the values sought. the Greeks aimed at transmitting their Hellenic heritage and instilling the Orthodox faith. Little. if any. Turkish was taught in the Greek schools until 1895, when the Ottoman government made Turkish a required subject. In fact. during the second half of the nineteenth century Ottoman Greek education relied heavily upon Greece. Those Ottoman Greeks who studied in Athens returned horne eager to spread the ideas of Greek nationalism and Hellenic culture. 6 The growth of Greek activism amongst the intelligentsia was indissolubly linked to the effectiveness of the educational system in inculcating Hellenism. As early as the 1850s, the acute observer of the Ottoman empire. Abdolonyme Ubicini, noted the existence of a small circle of Greeks who desired the expansion of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman empire. Although narrow, he went on to acknowledge, this circle comprised «the most enlightened and liberal class of the nation; namely the members of the medical, legal and literary professions»,7 However, while in the 1850s the great majority of the Greeks were inclined to favour Ottoman rule, by the 1910s Ottoman Greek self-assertion had become one of the most visible aspects of life in the empire. With their overwhelming emphasis on Hellenic studies, Ottoman Greek schools overlooked the ideas of liberal Ottoman modernizers who envisaged a multiracial and cohesive Pan-Ottomanic state. By far the oldest of the Greek educational establishments in istanbul is the Patriarchallycee at the Phanar. claiming to have been in continuous operation since the Byzantine era. This linkage with the Byzantine patriarchal academy. however, has been questioned and the {ycee was certainly in abeyance during 1664- 1668. With the support of its powerful protectors, the Phanariot Greek aristocracy, the school was transferred to the Bosphorus 5. fli\,wa;; EmTllJT1Iwi nih' iI' KW\'Gml'T/I'Ovnoi.el Kai KarrL Hi npoaGTela Gxoi.ciw\' reV\' ·OpOoSo·
sWA' Constantinople 1870. pp. 56-6L ( 6. For additional information see the impressions of the British traveller. Stanley Lane Poole. i'fli/People (d7I/rkey. TH'enty Years' Residence Among Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanian5, Tllrks and Armenians, London 1878. i/pp. 187. See also A .A. Bryer. "The Pontic Revival and the New Greece» in Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830;: Call1inl/ity lind Change, eds N. Diamandouros et al. Thessaloniki 1976. pp. 185-88. 7 A. Ubicini. Leiters Oil Turke\, tr Lady Easthope. London 1856, ii/pp. 237-38,
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suburb of KurU(;:e~me (EI1POKpliwl) in 1803 where the school soon acquired great celebrity. Yet. like the other Greek schools in the empire, it suffered greatly from the Greek insurrection of 182 I. With the disappearance of the Phanariot nobility, the school was deprived of funds and steadily declined until 1850/52 when it was once again transferred to the Phanar. It was annexed to the Patriarchate under the name of «great school of the nation» ([J arpIap 11/\7) M 8;'0.1.11 rou nl'OU:,; Llol.lf). The building curTently in use was constructed in 1881 with the donations of wealthy Constantinopolitan Greeks such as Zariphis. Zapheiropoulos and Evgenidis. s The largest Greek {ycee for girls was founded in 1857 with the generous contributions of Constantine Zappas. who wished to construct an educational institution in istanbul comparable to the 'Apoo.K81Ol' of Athens. The school was named after him as the ZaTCTwOI' 'EO\'lKOl' [Jap08\'ai'wi'eiol' (Zapyofl Rum Kl~ Lisesi).9 In 1890. with the donations of banker Christaki Zographos another {ycee for boys, the ZWi'parp8101' (Zo/~raf\'on Rum Erkek Lisesi) was opened at Beyoglu (Pem). The energetic Patriarch Joachim III played a pivotal role in the foundation of a great number of Greek educational establishments in istanbul. He was. for instance, instrumental in setting up a multiracial school. largely for Europeans, which taught French, Greek. Turkish. English and German. In requesting permission from the sultan. he argued that such a school would train officials who would take up positions in the government and business enterprises especially those connected with European transactions. The school,. [JarpIaPllKII 2101.17 Tl.w(J(J(Vl' Kai 'E;17ropiou, was opened at Beyoglu (1909) and was used both as a language school and a commercial {yete. It continued to function until the republican regime, when it was replaced by a Turkish elementary school. 10 Earlier, in an attempt to turn the mainly Greek inhabited island of Heybeli (Chalki) into a
fs:\rhe transfer of the patriarchal academy to Kurm;e§me where many of the Phanariots indicates the desire to move this historic educational establishment away from the restrictive atmosphere of the Phanar. Many Phanariots, the initiators of this move, had been educated in the West and were strongly affected by rationalism. They were also instrumental ill the introduction of modernist ideas in the academy in the post-1803 period, On the general history of the school see, 'LA Gritsopoulos, flarpIapxlKli Mei'ai.1/ roB rivOl!:; Lxoi.~, Athens 1971. It is worthwhile noting the background of the students enrolled in 1882, From the 673 students enrolled 271 came from Istanbul, 155 from Thrace and Macedonia, 135 from Anatolia, 59 Hellenic nationals and 53 from the Aegean island see EA 2 (1882) 560-62, M. 10 Gedeon, Tpafllwm IlarpIapX1Ka flepi vj:;; Mci'ai.l/:;; roli rivol!:; LXoi.1j:;;, Constantinople 1903. 9. The title «national» (i8vlh'Olj was dropped in 1923. See A.S. Karanikolas. Td flap8sl'ai'W' ;'da nj:; KW\'GTaI'rll'o!Jnoi.e(V;, Athens 1975. pp, 1~I3. 10. For additional information see O. Ergin, Tlirki\'e ,\Ia{/rifTarihi, istanbul 1939-43. iii/pp. 841-5 L
iede'd
47
centre of learning, important educational institutions were constructed. These were: a college furnishing the Phanar with well-educated clerics, the Theological academy ('Jepa eeo),OYIK~ .Exo).~ X6)X17C,) founded in 1844, and the Commercial college ('Ef1nOpZK~ LXO),~ Xa}x1JC;) built in 1892. Both buildings were occupied by the Young Turks during World War I, but while the Theological school was later returned to the Greek community, the commercial college was transformed into a Turkish naval academy. 11 Graduates of these better known secondary schools could enter any European or Greek university without entrance examinations. Because of their competence, many Greeks (and Armenians) were invited to participate in the Ottoman attempt to create a westernized and secular system of education during the Tanzimat era. At various times, Greeks presided at the famous Galatasaray Iycee, a multiracial Ottoman school founded in 1868. 12 Probably the most outstanding Greek director of this French-inspired Iycee. was John Savas, who later on served as minister offoreign affairs (1879-80) and governor of Samos and Crete. A considerable number of Greeks, such as John Aristoklis (1828-99) and Minas Chamoudopoulos (1851-1908), served in the ministry of public instruction. The private donations of wealthy Constantinopolitan Greeks did not only finance the establishment of a wide educational network in the capital. Benefactors generously contributed to the foundation and maintenance of a sizeable number of churches and philanthropic organizations in the city. The single most important community concern was (and still is) the Ballkll hospital at Yedikule ('E()vzKa
developed corporate life with its capacity for teamwork, may be illustrated by the Greek parish organizations in the Kurtulu~ (Tatavla) suburb. In this almost exclusively Greek district the community maintained three churches and two schools. An athletic and musical club was attached to a philanthropic society (
I L For details M. Theotokas. Nopllai ,wi "JawplKa Mei.ETlittara. Athens 1947. pp. 135-46. 12. L Sungu, «Galatasaray Lisesi'nin Kurulu~u», Belletell 7 (1943) 315-47 . 13. See 'EOI'II,a rpli.al'OpWTI:lKa KaraaTllpara iiI' KWl'aral'TlI'Ovn:oi.el 'Hpepoi.Oi'IOI' WU cwv:; /905, Constantinople 1904, i/pp. 82 f. 14. In 1921 there were four Greek orphanages with 1,548 children, see C.R. Johnson (ed.), COll5talllinople Today, New York 1922, pp. 246, 256. See also '/awplKo AeiiKwpa /853·/95816n' 'Oprpal'orporpsiwl' pa:;. Istanbul 1958.
L K.H. KarpaL «Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893», IJMES 9 (1978) 254. 2" According to the account of A. W. Kinglake, Eothen or Traces o/Travel brought Home/rom the East, London 1844, p. 74, there are indications that such a migratory movement was already taking place as early as 1835, Similarly, the existence of a number of syl/ogoi in lstanbul formed and maintained by Greeks natives ofPelopennese, Thessaly, continental Greece and the Aegean
48
49
Owing to a lack of trustworthy statistics an attempt to estimate accurately the population of istanbul is almost impossible. Notwithstanding the notable Ottoman effort of 1881/82- 1893 and that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1910- 1912. nothing approaching a scientific census had been conducted prior to 1927. Likewise the overwhelming majority of ethnographic studies on the Ottoman empire undertaken by Western observers demonstrate a distinctive bias and sometimes an appalling lack of information. As a result contemporary statistical accounts are amusing in their variety.3 But according to the official Ottoman population records. six censuses were conducted in the capital between 1844 and 1914. These were:-l NOIl-
Year
Muslims
Muslims
1844 1857 1882 (incomplete) 1885 1896 1914
102.532 112.162 118.535 384.410 520.190 520.434
111.160 124.162 101,410 488.655 510,040 389,553
Total 213.692 (males only) 236.092 (males only) 381.376 873,565 1,030,234 909,987
There was also a large group of Hellene Greeks living in the city whose numbers. according to patriarchal statistics reached 65,000 in 1912.5 A more concise evaluation of the actual size of the Constantinopolitan Greek community is given by another Turkish writer who divides the popUlation on religious lines. Thus from 1.052,000 residents. there were 236.000 Greek Orthodox in the city (the Muslim community: 581.000).6 Although Grosvenor seems to agree with the above figure quoted for the Greek community (he gives it as 225.000). he states that the overall popUlation in 1895 was little less than a million of whom 450.000 were Muslims. 7 Another estimate put the number of the Greeks in the capital at 230.000. 8 thus making it highly probable and Ionian islands. points to the existence of such a movement from the Greek Kingdom to the major Ottoman ports. see K. Mamoni. «Les associations pour la propagation de I'instruction grecque it Constantinople (1861-192:2)>>. BS 16:1 (1975) 107. 3. FOI' varying estimaIes throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century see Johnson . lip eil. pp . 14-19 4. Karpat. op. cit .. p . 267. 5. Polybius. Greece Befi"'e the COllfere/1( e. London 1919. pp. 44-5 . See also Appendix E. 6. Eidem. Ollllllllil. p. 55. A copy of the entire census of 1882 can be found in the Istanbul University library. The figure given for the Istanbul Greeks is 182.847. see Dar lIS Saw/aile Biltid-i Sele.\e Nidils Say/mi. p. 2 7. E. Grosvenor. COl1.lIl1lllillople. London 1895. iipp 8-9. R. Synvet. np . (il p. 1
50
that the Constantinopolitan Greeks between the 1870s and 1890s ranged between 180.000 and 230.000. h is perhaps fortunate that the estimates of the Constantinopolitan Greek population in the Turkish return of 1910 and the Greek Patriarchate figures for 1912 are not greatly at variance. The Turkish statistics give a total figure of 330.906 Greeks (260 in the European and 70,906 in the Asiatic shore of the city). while patriarchal estimates for both shores amount to 309.657 Greeks. In addition there were 65.000 Hellene Greeks classified in the category of foreign nationals in the city. 9 On the basis of these two statistical accounts it is probably safe to assume that on the eve of the Balkan wars. the Greek population of greater Istanbul was about 330.000 to 350.000. A comparison of this figure with that of the 1844 census. quoted by A. Ubicini as 132.000. would illustrate the dramatic increase in the Constantinopolitan Greek population during the post-Tanzi mat era. IU One of the characteristic features of Ottoman istanbul at the turn of the century was that while it had become a principal Turkish centre it had also retained its Greek complexion. As Clar~ ence R Johnson observed in 1921 « . .if the visitor goes from one school to another. if he visits their churches. their clubs, their banks and business houses. their steamship offices and hotels. if he makes the acquaintance of Greek editors. artists, clergymen. educators. literary. and professional men. he will gain a truer impression of the Greek community in the city». I I While the Turks remained the predominant element. the Greeks preserved their position as the second most important ethnic group in the cosmopolitan mosaic that made up the Ottoman capital. As Turks and Greeks continued to co-exist. each perfectly distinct and each perfectly at home. there was remarkably little assimilation of one element by the other. This extraordinary symbiosis had. in fact. lasted for ~nore than five hundred years.
9. D. Pentzopoulos. The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece. The Hague 1962. pp. 29-32. In a recent article Dr Justin McCarthy (<
51
CHARTER II THE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN GREEK FACTOR DURING THE ANATOLIAN WAR 1918-1922 1. The Debate on the future of istanbul.
The signing of the Mudros armistice on 30 October 1918 heralded the partition of the Ottoman empire among the victorious Entente nations.! Seeking to benefit from the virtual paralysis of the Ottoman military and political machine, the subject nationalities, particularly the Arrnenians, the Greeks, and the Kurds, put forward lavish territorial claims at the expense of the Ottoman empire. Coupled with this, the encouraging statements of various Allied leaders during and immediately after the war stimulated Ottoman Christian political activities. Among these Ottoman Christian ethnic groups, the Greeks were in a particularly favourable position, for the Hellenic kingdom had been a minor member of the Entente alliance during the latter stages of the war but had contributed substantially to the final Allied victory on the Balkan front. As a result, the highly esteemed Greek prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, was invited to the Paris peace conference (1919-20) to put forward the territorial claims of his country. It was common knowledge, moreover, that Venizelos' ultimate vision was the unification of Hellenism in a powerful Greater Greece. Despite the city's historic Byzantine associations and its large Greek population, Venizelos refrained from extending his demands to istanbul. In his famous memorandum, «Greece at the Peace Conference», dated 30 December 1918, Venizelos laid claims to Northern Epirus, the Aegean islands, Izmir and its hinterland and the whole of Thrace. In this memorandum and later on when he personally appeared before the Supreme Council of the Conference on 3-4 February 1919, the Greek prime minister confined himself to expressing the view that istanbul and the Straits should be
L On the Armistice see G. Dyer, «The Turkish Armistice of 1918», ME'S 8,2(1972) 143-78 and 8,3 (1972) 313-48; A. Tiirkgeldi, Mondros ve Mudanya Miitarekelerinin Tarihi, Ankara 1948, pp. 23 ff.
52
internationalized. 2 Interviewed by a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, the Greek leader went on to propose that istanbul should be declared the capital of the League of Nations. 3 In fact, as early as June 1918, he informed Lord Granville, the British ambassador in Athens, that the best solution for istanbul was its internationalization. The Powers, he urged, should «appoint jointly a Governor for a certain term of years; that system to be continued until possibly in the course of time the country had developed to such an extent as to make it capable of self-government as an independent State».4 Evidently, Venizelos did not believe that the time was ripe for the Greek acquisition of istanbul. He was certain, however, that once the Thracian hinterland was translated to Greece, the huge Greek minority within Konstantinoupolis would dominate that city. Expressing his conviction that the Ottoman capital would be conquered from within once Greece acquired Thrace and Western Anatolia, Venizelos reassured King Alexander that: «I do not forget the promise I have made you. We shall take the City». 5 In the long run the Venizelist foreign policy hoped to achieve a relatively homogenous Greek population in Western Anatolia and Thrace through voluntary intermigration of populations. The accomplishment of such a plan, Venizelos believed, would bring about the fulfilment of megali idea and the creation of Greater Greece. The practicality of such an ambitious scheme was not only questioned by European observers but also by such eminent Greek figures as General John Metaxas. 6 Such criticism gains further credibility when it is remembered that the British reflected upon offering to Greece the whole of European Turkey, including Istanbul. 7 Thus, on 14 April 1919, the British experts Toynbee and Nicolson proposed that istanbul and the European shores of the Straits, 2. For an excellent treatment on the Greek territorial claims see N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919, Thessaloniki 1978, pp. 67 ff. 3. The Manchester Guardian, 25 Jan. 1919. 4. Granville to Balfour, Athens, 9 June 1918, FO 371/3156/109933. 5. D. Kitsikis, Propagande et Pressions en Politique Intemationale, Paris 1963, p. 28 n. 3. 6. For the difficulties that Venizelos' scheme was bound to face see M. Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, London 1973, pp. 4 f. Also FO 608/88/4604, «Greek Irredentism in Anatolia and the Case against Partition» by Professor Calder, 17 March 1919. 7. H. Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919, London 1964, p. 322. On Curzon's determination to eject the Turks from Europe, CAB 29/2/P/85, «The Future of Constantinople», memorandum by Curzon, 2 Jan. 1918. It was circulated to the British Cabinet in January 1919.
53
instead ofizmir, should be given to Greece. 8 Similar views were expressed by Crowe, the British undersecretary of foreign affairs. 9 This alternative was apparently supported by Lloyd George, who on 5 May 1919 informed Venizelos that if the United States refused to take the mandate, the only solution acceptable to Britain would be for istanbul to go to Greece. 10 But the Greek prime minister went ahead with the Anatolian venture without giving a serious thought to «the Constantinople alternative». If conceded, a sea frontier would have separated Greece and Turkey and would have secured the whole of Thrace, including European istanbul, for Greece.!l But in the euphoric days of 1919 Venizelos was determined to bring about a Greater Greece whose frontiers extended over two continents and five seas. Meanwhile, most of the Greeks, and particularly the Greeks of the Ottoman empire, shared Venizelos'dream. 2. The Patriarchate: spokesman for unredeemed Greeks. Despite their admiration for Venizelos, it was to the Ecumenical Patriarchate that the Ottoman Greeks traditionally turned for religious as well as political guidance. The Patriarchate was the national centre around which the spiritual, political and social life of the Ottoman Greeks converged. But by 1918 the dual responsibilities of the Phanar as a high-ranking functionary of the Ottoman administration and the supreme ecclesiastico-political institution of the Rum Milleti came into serious conflict. The traditional universalist position of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople was inevitably incompatible with the basically secular nationalist principles, whose impact on the Ottoman society was dramatic at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ideally the Patriarchate ought to have continued to approach the rise of nationalism among ethnic groups in the Empire with great caution. During the crucial years of 1918 to 1922, however, the Phanar was unable to carryon its responsibilities as a senior member of the Ottoman administrative apparatus. This was mainly the outcome of the traumatic experiences during World War I. The Young Turk experiment in forging a uniform Ottoman identity among the various ethnic groups of the empire after the 1908 revolution had 8. Memorandum prepared by Toynbee and Nicolson, «Peace with Turkey», 14 April 1919, FO 608/110/7335. 9. Minute by Crowe, 16 April 1919, Fo 608/110/7335. to. Venizelos' Diary, 9 May 1919, TaXuapo/lOr;. no. 79,23 May 1969. II. For more details on «the Constantinople altemative» see N. Petsalis-Diomidis, «1919: Tit L!!UPVll il ,itv ITOA.ll; MUI eVaA.A.alCnK1'! A.uOi] ltOl> 6 BEvt~EA.o<; O:ltEppt,!,E !!UI..A.OV ~E~tacr!!EVa», Me).e7:1/-tam rvpw alto TOV BevICO.o Kai !7/v bcox1 TOU. Athens 1980, pp. 101-18.
54
failed abysmally. As the regime's ideals of «equality» and «brotherhood» deteriorated into outright persecution - especially during the war- the Ottoman Greek leadership came to believe that Muslim-Christian coexistence, based on equal political and civil rights, was impossible under Turkish rule.! By 1919, moreover, like the majority of the Hellene and Ottoman Greeks, the Phanar was convinced that the cherished vision of the megali idea was about to become a reality. As a result, the Phanar felt that it had to fulfil its «historic role» by providing leadership to the «unredeemed Greeks»(,AAlYrpO:)'t'm "EnllVE~). Immediately after the signing of the Mudros armistice, the patriarchal authorities decided to elect a more energetic and politicized leadership. The ageing incumbent of the patriarchal throne, Germanos V (Kavakopoulos) was accused of having compromised with the Young Turks on such matters as education and marriage. In addition a number of scandals concerning financial laxity were ventilated to discredit the ailing patriarch. 2 This campaign resulted in the resignation of Patriarch Germanos and his entire patriarchal mixed council on 25 October 1918. 3 The fall of the fundamentalist Germanos put an end to the gerondismos tradition and to the Phanar policy of voluntary submission to the Turkish masters. After agreeing to the postponement of a new patriarchal election until a definite peace settlement was concluded, the Phanar elected the archbishop of Brussa Dorotheos Mammelis, locum tenens (Tonory/py/T1/C;) of the Patriarchate on 28 October rg~-Avery able and dynamic man, the acting patriarch was determined to playa vigorous role and so were the new members of the patriarchal mixed council. 5 Immediately after its election the patriarchal council espoused wholeL At the Paris Peace Conference, Venizelos maintained that over 380,000 Ottoman Greeks had fallen victims to the Young Turk outrages, see Neo).oyor;. 18/31 January 1919. 2. «Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate», Andew Ryan, Cons., 26 December 1922, FO 371/4156/E516. For a biographical account of Germanos see EA 40-41 (1920) 472-73. 3. For the anti-Germanos campaign of the powerful Venizelist Grecophone press of lstanbul see IIpooaor:; 18 N ovember/l December 1918. For a text of the patriarch's letter of resignation see Mavropoulos, op.cit .• pp. 95-96. 4. Dorotheos Mammelis (1851-1921). An Anatolian Greek, he was first appointed archbishop of Grevena in 1897 and was translated to the see of Nikopolis four years later. During this period became a staunch supporter of Greek rights in Macedonia. In 1903 he was transferred to Anatolia as archbishop of Brussa. 5. Details on the election in «Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate», Andrew Ryan, Cons., FO 371/4156/ESI6 . See also Mavropoulos, op. cit .• p. 97. The lay members of patriarchal council were: Charalambidis, Pappas, Karatheodoris, Kioseoglou, Spatharis, Adosidis, Kasanovas and Chatzopoulos.
55
heartedly the cause of Greek irredentism, providing leadership to an umbrella organization, the national committee (,EevllOl 'Enrrponefa). This committee sought primarily to articulate and promote the aspirations of the nationalist Ottoman Greeks. At first it succeeded in making a considerable impact and on :2 December 19 I8, a delegation of the national committee met with the British high commissioner, admiral Arthur Calthorpe. During this interview the British admiral expressed his personal sympathy with Ottoman Christian aspirations. (, Soon, the national committee established official branches in most of the major European centres and in the cities of the Ottoman empire. A prominent Anglo-Greek banker, Sir John Stavridi, headed the London branch, while in Paris the irredentist movement was represented by a number of eminent Constantinopolitan and Smyrniot Greeks. 71t has already been shown that the central committee of the umedeemed Greeks worked closely with the Greek Foreign Ministry, even though Athens endeavoured to belittle its direct links with the whole movement. 8 Meanwhile, the Patriarchate, arguing that the Sublime Porte was not able to administer the country satisfactorily, refused to communicate directly with the Ottoman government. While under the physical protection of a GreekCretan regiment since November 1918, the Phanar proceeded to abolish the teaching of Turkish in Greek schools on 21 January 1919. 9 But the activities of the patriarchal council culminated on Sunday 16 March 1919, when the resolution for «Union with Greece» was taken in Constantinopolitan Greek churches. The official declaration stated: «The Greeks of Constantinople and the neighbourhood assembled today in their churches ... and proclaimed their unshakeable wish to obtain complete national re-establishment. They regard Union with the mother-country Greece as the only firm basis for natural development in the future ... and entrust the Ecumenical Patriarchate, their supreme national authoritY,with the task of transmitting the present resolution to
the representatives of England, France, the United States, Italy and Greece at the Peace Conference». 10 Thus, the Ottoman Greeks were released from their civic responsibilities as Ottoman citizens and the Patriarchate assumed unilaterally complete sovereignty over the community. From March 1919 onwards the Phanar refused to communicate directly with the Sublime Porte and the Greeks were urged to abstain from municipal, communal or general elections.!! The Greek decision to refrain from participation in the general elections of November/December 19 19 coupled with the March proclamation releasing the Ottoman Greeks from their Ottoman civil responsibilities, mark perhaps the formal demise of the Rum Mil/eli. For all practical purposes the status accorded to the patriarchal leadership under the millet system, which had survived for almost a century after the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, was dead. The Phanar's new policy coincided with the popular mood of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. The majority of the members of the community missed no opportunity to manifest their adherence to Venizelism. 12 The sentiments of the Greeks in the city were reflected in the panegyric welcome which they accorded to the Allied fleet when it entered the Bosphorus on 13 November 1918. The non-Muslim sectors of the city were bedecked with flags and a feu de joie flashed in every street. 13 The Greek battleship Averaf!. a member of the Allied fleet, provoked the unbounded enthusiasm of the Greek and Armenian population. Five thousand such Constantinopolitans were estimated to have visited A veraff during its first fortnight in istanbul harbour.!4 The Greek representative in istanbul John Alexandropoulos and naval commander Kakoulidis, as well as the Greek sailors, who started patrolling sections of the city, were treated as liberators by the Ottoman Christians in generaLIs Meanwhile, Greek-Armenian co-operation had acquired a mass basis among the Constantinopolitan Christians immediately after World War I. Joint conferences, like the one held in the Imperial Hotel on the island of Buyukada (Prinkipo) in January 19 I9, were organized in order to co-ordinate
6. Also known as the central committee of the unredeemed Greeks ('H KeVrpl1l.7! 'Emrpomi rwv 'A).vrpwrwv '£)).JjI'WI').
7. Stavridi controlled the Ionian Bank Ltd. whose central branch was in London. He was closely connected with the British Establishment and was a personal friend of Lloyd George. The most active members of the Paris committee were Spanoudis, TriandaphyJIidis and Sepheriadis, see npoooor;. 19 November/2 December 1918 and 'AOiivGI. 20 November/3 December 1918. 8. Kitsikis, Propagande, p. 398. 9. Information on the attitude of the Patriarchate in Kanellopoulos to Diomidis, Cons., 19 January and 19 February, both in YE/A/5VL
56
10. Despatches by Admiral Calthorpe, Cons., FO 371/4165/55059, 55144, 88756,96959. 1L General Staff Intelligence report, Cons., 23 October 1919, FO 371/4160/EI49600. 12. For a vivid description see H.E. Adivar, The Turkish Ordeal. London 1928, ch. I. 13. Nw).ol'o;. 31 OcL/13 Nov. 1918; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece arrhe Peace Conference. p. 95. 14. 'A OijVaI. 22 Nov./5 Dec. 1918. 15. Nw).ol'o;. 21 Nov./4 Dec. 1918. Similar jubilant welcome was given to Greek Commanderin-Chief Leonidas Paraskevopoulos when he visited istanbul on March 30, 1919.
57
the activities of these two groupsY' The existence of a Greek-Armenian Committee in London also illustrates the extent of the co-operation achieved bv the two communities. 17 . But the Constantinopolitan Christians reserved the most enthusiastic welcome for the French General Franchet d' Esperey, the supreme commander of the Allied forces. On 8 February 1919, like the Ottoman conqueror Sultan Mehmet II over four centuries ago, he rode into the city on a white horse, the gift of a local Greek. ls Again. when two weeks later, the French general visited Biiyiikada (Prinkipo), he was greeted by a most cordial Greek crowd. A large Persian carpet was spread over the main road and the Greek school children were assembled holding French and Greek flags. 19 Evidently, the Ottoman Christians did not miss any possible occasion to express their gratitude towards the Allies who, it was widely believed. were at least partly in istanbul to protect them and promote their ultimate political emancipation. Euphoric. if not over-optimistic, editorials appeared frequently in the local non-Muslim press. The Greek language newspapers. and particularly the pro-Allied Nwi.6;'o:;, went so far as to urge the Entente to proceed as swiftly as possible with the emancipation of the Constantinopolitan Christians who, Nwi.6;'o:; asserted. «had no confidence in either the Young or the Old Turks».2() Incidents. like the temporary closure of Nwi.6;'o:; and the harassment of its editor Stavros Voutyras, were publicized in the Greek press in an attempt to vindicate the assertion that the Turks were incapable of justly administering a multi-ethnic social structure. 21 As a remedy they proposed a fundamentally «radical» solution for the future of Istanbul which. in effect, amounted to the ousting of the Turkish administration from the city. The Greeks expressed their views not only in press campaigns, but also in massive public meetings, As the acting British high commissioner, Admiral Richard Webb observed during the customary Greek feast of Tatavla (IIal'tll'Vpl reVl' Taravi.(JJI'):22 «the streets of the capital have for the past fortnight or more seen scenes of constant processions consisting of musical instruments, followed by dancers in all kinds offantastic costumes and these dancers, 16. Neoi.oi'o;;, 14/27 Dec. 1918 and 19 Jan./l Feb. 1919. For a Turkish doc. see TJ. TK ar~ivi 10/2694, 18 Nov. 1919, in Atatiirk'iin Tamim, Telegrafve Beyannameleri, 1917-1938, Ankara 1964, vip. 126. 17. Kitsikis, Propagande, pp . 339-346. 18. Neoi.oyo;;, 28 January/lO February 1919. 19. Ibid., 10/23 February 1919. 20 . Ibid., 12/25 November 1918. 21. The Manchester Guardian, 3 January 1919. 22. Webb to Balfour, Cons., 1 March 1919, FO 371/4164/E42765 .
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no doubt out of pure exuberance of spirits, have constantly molested passers-by navaL military and civilian, myself among the numbers». Noisv demonstrations continued to take place culminating on Sunday, 16 Mar~h 1919, when in almost all the Greek Orthodox churches of the capital tributes of allegiance to Greece were paid. While a Hellenic flag was hoisted in the Patriarchate. a great picture of Venizelos was set up at the Taksim square.23 Greek flags flew everywhere and inscriptions praising Venizelos were displayed in various Greek quarters of the city. Immediately after the March incidents representatives of the patriarchal council met with Admiral Webb and insisted that: 2 -1 «this demonstration had been spontaneous and had not been organized by the Patriarchate. It had got about amqng the Greeks that interested parties were saying in Paris (Peace Conference) that the Greeks of Constantinople were passive and had no aspirations. It was in order to give the lie to this aspersion that the Greek popUlation had. of their own motion. decided to give expression to their desires. They had met in the churches rather that in any public place and there had been no disorder». Indeed, at the Paris peace conference there was a general feeling that the Constantinopolitan Greeks were content with the s{a {us quo. 25 This view was mainly derived by the absence of any large scale Greek uprising in istanbuL At first such a rising was considered a strong possibility for ever since November 1918 the Greeks showed their will with great animation. 26 Further. their subjection to Turkish rule for more than four centuries coupled with the spectacular defeat of the Ottomans during World War I offered all the historic and psychological prerequisites for such a revolt. Yet the Constantinopolitan simply sought their emancipation from Turkish rule. This. it was hoped, would come about through peaceful means as soon as the Allies took up their cause. It was certainly not a coincidence that this increasing Greek activity took place while the Entente Powers were debating the future of the Ottoman dominions in Paris. A patriarchal delegation ( II arpzaPllr:1 'A TCOaWJJj) , consisting of acting Patriarch Dorotheos. Chysanthos Philippidis (archbishop of Trebizond) and Patriarchal Counsellor Alexander Pappas. arrived in Paris 23. Turkish press cuttings on the incident given in Calthorpe to Balfour. Cons., 9 April and 29 May 1919. FO 371/4165/55144 and /88756 respectively. 24. Webb to Balfour, Cons .. 21 March 1919, FO 371/4164/E55111 25. Venizelos to Repoulis, Paris, 3 March 1919, YE/A/5. 26. Alexandropoulos to Diomidis, Cons., 27 December 1918 and Kanellopoulos to Diomidis, Cons, 10 and 16 March 1919. both in YE/A/5VL
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early in March 1919. While at the French capital, these principal exponents of Hellenic irredentism held regular meetings with the French, British, American and Greek representatives at the conference. On 20 March 1919, they submitted a memorandum outlining their demands. 27 Declaring the purpose of his visit to the French press, Dorotheos stated that he wished «to draw the attention of the Peace Conference to the sufferings inflicted by the Turks on the Greek populations in the Turkish Empire». After giving an account of these atrocities he explained that «the main object of his mission ... was to ask the Peace Conference to assign Constantinople to the 450,000 Greek inhabitants and to set up as independent states the large Greek settlements which were at a considerable distance from Constantinople». 28 The endeavour of the Patriarchate to influence public opinion abroad continued throughout this period. With the revision of the status quo in the Near East after World War I, the Phanar contended, there was nothing illegitimate or treacherous in the struggle of Ottoman Greeks to emerge from their second class citizenship. It was the inability of the Ottoman govemments to fulfil their raison d' etre of guaranteeing the safety of their citizens rather than «Christian treachery» which had brought destruction to the Ottoman empire. 29 It was as a result of this contention that the Patriarchate chose to encourage the development of Greek separatist organization in Anatolia, particularly in the periphery of the Black Sea. 30 Again disregarding Turkish reaction the Patriarchate addressed an official communique on 24 May 1919 expressing its gratitude for the Greek landing in Anatolia. 31 Nor did Dorotheos hesitate to voice publicly his conviction that the only future for Hellenism in Turkey rested with the materialization of the «Byzantine solution». Despite his disillusion with the Allied dilatoriness in coming to a decision on the Turkish question, Dorotheos tirelessly fumished
27. Memoire Soumis ala Conterence par Ie Patriarchat Oecllmeniqlle: Les Grecs de ['Empire Ottoman, Paris 1919. 28. Interview quoted in L'Echo de Paris, 13 March 1919. 29. Dorotheos to Venizelos, Cons., 14 February 1920, YE/B/3S. See also E.A. 40-41 (1920) 473-74 and 41 (1921) 2S-26. 30. See A. Alexandris, «'H 'Ava1t"tu~T] "toG 'E9vtlcoG IIvEu!!aTo~ "t&V 'EAt.:flvrov "toG II6v"tou 1918-1922: 'EnT]VlKTt 'E~rotEPlKTt IIoAlTlKTt Kai ToupKlKTt ' Av"tiopacrrp>, M e}.eT/lliara TUpw dno ,OV &vl,iAo Kai nlv 'EnoX'; rov, Athens 1980, pp. 427-74. 31. Full copy of the letter sent by Kanellopoulos to Politis, Cons., 2S May 1919, BMAEV/18; Dorotheos to the British High Commission, Cons., 24 May 1919, FO 371//4218/E8S639.
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the peace conference with memoranda and appeals. 32 By far the most illuminating piece of evidence on the prelate's views concerning the future of istanbul was a letter addressed to Lloyd George on 14 February 1920. Claiming that neither in origin, culture or population istanbul was a Turkish centre, Dorotheos asselted that to the Greeks it had remained the most sacred city. He then went on to explain that: «The idea of a Greek nation will not be realised so long as Constantinople is not united to Greece by a strong tie ... We, therefore, ask for the union of Constantinople with the Mother Country, and we propose this argument, together with the internationalization of the Straits, as the best solution, because it guarantees the right of self-determination and the interests of the Powers concerned. If for reasons which we can appreciate, this solution appears to be of too radical a nature we should propose that Greece should receive a mandate to govern the state of Constantinople».33 This document was followed by many other ones. 34 Meanwhile, Dorotheos' claims were endorsed by many influential Greek organizations. In February 1919, the prestigious Greek Literary Society terminated its long-standing non-political character by addressing a memorandum to the peace conference. It once again reiterated the wish to incorporate istanbul into an enlarged Greece. 35 Expressing the same desire, the influential body of the Ottoman Greek deputies submitted an appeal to the Allied representatives in Paris on 30 April 1919. 36 A year later a petition signed by no less than 154 Greek associations, parish councils and other community organizations in the capital demanded a «radical solution» for the future of istanbul. 37 Besides his correspondence with the Allied political leaders Dorotheos sought the support of the Anglican church, with whom the Patriarchate had already developed good relations. From 1919, Dorotheos showed keen in-
32. De Robeck to Curzon, Cons., 19 October 1919, FO 371/41S9/EI43405. See also OM 1 (1921-22) 136. . 33. Dorotheos to Lloyd George, Cons., 14 February 1920, FO 370/5190/EI990 (partly printed D.B.F.P.(7) no. 19). 34. Dorotheos· to Lloyd George, Cons., FO 371/SI90/ES50 (18 February 1920), FO 371/S190/EI883 (7 March 1920), FO 371/5190/EI698 (1S March 1920). 35. Memorandum by the «Syllogos Litteraire Grec de Constantinople» to the Peace Conference, signed by M. Afthentopoulos and E. Mavridis, tstanbul, Feb. 1919, given in M. Afthentopoulos, Aoyot5oaim M'll'u AliBel'ronov).ov JIpoet5pov 1"06 BV Kwvaravrlvovno}.81 'E)).'lVIKOU
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terest in promoting the union of the churches and he went so far as to issue an encyclical on the fellowship of churches. 38 Besides purely religious considerations. Dorotheos may have also had in mind the political benefits that the Patriarchate would reap from such a union with the Anglican church. He certainly endeavoured to make the most of his ecclesiastical connections to further Greek political aspirations. From 1918 to 1921, an extensive correspondence took place between the Phanar and Lambeth Palace. As early as May 28, 1919, Dorotheos was drawing the attention of the archbishop of Canterbury to the possibility of « ... leaving the Sultan at Constantinople». Such an act, he claimed, would be «a crime before God and before Mankind».39 In a characteristic appeal the Orthodox leader requested from the Anglican church: «We pray you to fortify in energetic fashion the Government of Britain ... in their efforts to drive out the Turks (i.e. from istanbul). By this complete and final expulsion, though by no other means can the ressurection of Christianity in the Near East and the restoration of the Church of St. Sophia be secured». 40 A year later, on 26 January 1921, Dorotheos again reminded Davison that the Ottoman capital was indubitably Christian. 41 This intense diplomatic activity on the part of the acting patriarch may well be attributed to the gradual change of the Entente policy on the issue of istanbul and the Straits. While in 1918-19, there was an overall agreement among the Allies that an international regime should be installed in istanbul, by 1920 the Entente, and particularly the French, appeared willing to allow the Turks to rule istanbul. Thus, by exerting all the influence that he could have possibly mastered, Dorotheos strove to prevent any change of the initial Entente policy on the Turkish question.
38. He even envisaged the creation ofa «League of Churches» on the model of the League of Nations, LPA(DvP(65(3. 39. Dorotheos to Davison, Paris, 28 May 1919, LPA(DvP(98 (Greece). The Phanarenjoyed the support of the archbishop of Canterbury, R T. Davison, and that of the Anglican church in general. With the encouragement of the archbishop of Canterbury «the St Sophia redemption committee» was formed in London. This committee urged that St Sophia should be reverted to the Orthodox church. 40. Dorotheos to Davison, Cons., 24 February 1920, FO 371(5190(E690. 41. Dorotheos to Davison, Cons., 21 January 1921, LPA(DvP(32(2. A number of similar documents can be found in LPA(DvP(65(3.
3. The growth (~l the Tlirkish nationalist l7Io\'('l7Ient
The acting patriarch's misgivings were well justified. At first, the- Turkish population of Istanbul appeared rather depressed, tired and reserved. The post-armistice palace government of Tevfik Pasha (11 November 19183 March 1919) even tried to placate the Ottoman Greeks. The portofolio of the ministry of commerce and agriculture was offered to the former governor of Samos and senator. Kostaki Vayianis while by December 1918 a number of Greeks were appointed to senior government positions. 1 In accordance with this policy of conciliation. the Porte sent the president of the senate, Ahmet Rlza. to the Phanar to communicate his government's good-will towards the Ottoman Greeks. 2 Again. in October 1918. when the newly elected acting patriarch. Dorotheos. paid a visit to the palace, Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin welcomed him cordially and affirmed his intention to treat all Ottoman citizens as equal. regardless of religion or race. 3 To the Greeks. however. these gestures were simply window dressing. In the Ottoman parliament the Greek deputies demanded action and in particular the punishment of the members of the Young Turk government which committed atrocities against the Armenians and Greeks during World War I:~ In January 1919. moreover. the patriarchal council requested from the Greek ministers. senators. deputies and civil servants to resign from their position. Thus. when Vayianis resigned from his ministerial position. another Greek. Aristeidis Georgantzoglou refused the offer to replace him.5 As the atmosphere became increasingly polarized. the Turkish press in istanbul complained bitterly aboLlt the «recent ostentatious display of the city's Greek character». 6 The manifes.tations of national independence over-
L Constantine Vayianis (1846-1919) Member of the court of appeals. He was appointed undersecretary of the ministry of justice and religion immediately after the Young Turk revolution. Between 1898·1900 he served as governor of Samos . For details on the other appointments see S. Ak~in. istanbul Hlikiimeti I'e Milli ,'¥flicadele. Istanbul 1976. pp. 78. 139-42. 161. 2. [JpOO()o:; 18 November: I December 1918. 3.. Mavropoulos. op.cit .. p. 98. 4 . For the speeches of the Ottoman Greek deputies. Emmanuilidis and Charalambidis in the parliam-ont see Emmanuilidis. op . cit.. pp . 376-91 5. Kanellopoulos to Diomidis. Cons .. 30 January 1919. YEA; 5VL See also Ak~in. op . cil.. p . 163 6 . Turkish press articles quoted in [JpOO()o;, 13.26 November 1918 and 'A OliVa!, 13.26 January 1919.
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62 5
tly displayed by the Patriarchate on behalf of the Ottoman Greek community were strongly resented by the Turks~ 7 It has been argued that the Turkish reproaches were unfounded since, with the Mudros armistice, the Ottoman empire had entered upon an intelTegnum. In the resulting political vacuum, the argument asserts, no appropriate authority, apart from the Allied military forces, was in position to enforce its dictates. s This view coincided with the Phanar's interpretation of the state of affairs in the N ear East after October 1918. Yet. the clauses of the armistice were vague, containing little which foresaw or prejudiced the eventual peace settlement. Despite their sympathetic disposition towards the Christians, the Allies were not prepared to alter radically the Turkish status quo. for such an action would have inevitably entailed commitment of a large Allied military force. Unwilling to face an all-out military confrontation with the Turkish people, the Entente, at least in principle, held fast to the continuity of the sultan's government. Thus, although the Allied troops disembarked in istanbul, the Allies carefully avoided using the word «occupation» ~ Even when on 20 March 1920, istanbul was placed under an official military occupation, the Allies stressed the temporary character of this operation. Similarly, despite their serious encroachments on the sultan's authority, the Entente continued to pay him lip-service. Authoritative observers like Andrew Ryan, a senior official of the British High Commission in Istanbul, tried in vain to persuade Dorotheos to refrain from committing himself in the Greco-Turkish antagonism. 9 On 21 March 1919, the acting British high commissioner Webb drew the attention of a patriarchal delegation to the dangers of «over-enthusiastic» Greek demonstrations in Istanbul. He advised them «to trust their leaders (Greek delegates in Paris) and avoid manifestations which would not effect the ultimate issue». 10 Self-restraint was also recommended to the patriarchal counsellor, Ch. Charalambidis by General Franchet d'Esperey. II But even the Greek commissioner in Istanbul, Efthymios Kanellopoulos cautioned on numerous occasions the Constantinopolitan Greek leadership against provocative acts
7. In his meeting with the British high commissioner Damad Ferid Pasha complained of «the conduct of the Greeks». in Cal thorpe to Balfour, Cons" 19 March 1919, FO 371/4165/E45479~ 8. F.W. Fernau, Patriarch en am Goldenen Horn: GeMenll'art und Tradition des Ort/lOdaxell Orients, Opladen 1%7, p. 112. 9. A. Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, London 1951. pp~ 153-54. 10. Webb to Balfour, Cons., 21 March 1919, FO 371/4165/E55111. II. Mavropoulos, op.cit . , p. 115.
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which «exceeded the limits ofprudence».'2 Nor did Venizelos approve of the despatch of a patriarchal delegation to the Paris peace conference in March 1919. 13 But, the Ottoman Greek leadership, aware that the future of Hellenism was being debated in Paris, declined to moderate its stance. The position of the Constantinopolitan Greeks became more uncertain after the establishment of Greek rule in the Smyrna periphery on 15 May 1919. The Greek landing in Anatolia provided the impetus for the emergence of a vigorous and cohesive Turkish nationalist movement. l-l With the congresses of Erzurum (7 August 1919) and Sivas (9 September 1919), the Turkish nationalists laid down the foundations of a well-organized resistance movement. 15 In the Ottoman capital, too, reaction to the Greek landing in Izmir was vigorous. Mass meetings and demonstrations took place in Istanbul. 16 The Constantinopolitan Christians were terrified. Their fears were further intensified when the anti-nationalist government of Damad Ferit Pasha was forced out of office on 1 October 1919. The new government of Ali Riza adopted a tougher line towards Constantinopolitan Christians. Describing this new attitude, the Istanbul press pointed out that the Turkish police had pulled down «Greek flags flying over various institutions in Constantinople». 17 Meanwhile, the British intelligence staff in Istanbul reported that impelled by the Turkish nationalist, «Moslem religious functionaries... urge the population to resist any attempt to occupy the country». 18 Increasingly the resurgence of Turkish self-confidence in Istanbul expressed itself in a lethal bitterness towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the non-Muslim popUlation. Clandestinely distributed nationalist pamphlets became extremely popular in the Turkish quarters of the city. Unhampered by Allied censorship, these pamphlets criticized in the most vigorous manner the activities of the Constantinopolitan Christians. They repeatedly urged the
12. A. Pallis, Eel''1Tef1iI'OI·Ei.i.l/l'e:;, Athens 1953, p. 173. 11. Mavropoulos, op.cit., pp . 107-08. 14. For a treatment of the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia see Llewellyn Smith, ap . cit . , pp. 86-101; M.L. Rodas, 'H :Di.d6a arr,1 MII..pd 'Aaia 1918·1922. Athens 1950. 15. On the Turkish nationalist movement see, M. K. Atatiirk, A Speech Delil'ered b\~ IHustafa Kemal Atatiirk; S.R. Sonyel. Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923. London 1975. 16. On the great demonstration of 23 May 1919 in Sultan Ahmet see K. Arlburnu. Milli Miicadele'de istanbul mitingleri. Istanbul 1951. p. 212 f. Also Cal thorpe to Balfour, Cons., 31 May 1919, FO 371j4227/E82458 17. Turkish press cuttings in FO 37Ij4159!EI44747, I October 1919~ Report by Webb to Curzon on the dramatic events in the city, 10 October 1919, FO 406/41/251-56. 18.. General Staff Intelligence report, Cons., 23 October 1919, FO 371/4160/149600.
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Muslim population to boycott commercial exchanges with Greeks and Armenians. 19 By October 1919, the Constantinopolitan Christians became increasingly apprehensive about the future. A strong proof of the anxiety which the situation inspired in the heads of the Christian communities was given when on 17 October 1919, the Greek and Armenian religious leaders, «in an unparalleled instance of fraternity in the history of their churches», called jointly upon the British high commissioner, J .M. de Robeck. After expressing their «profound disillusionment» with the indecisive treatment of the Eastern Question at the Paris peace conference, they warned that: «The situation was so grave that the Patriarchs might have no alternative but to resign their functions and leave it to the Entente to look after the interests of their flocks». 20 4. The patriarchal mission to London and the death of Dorotheos.
After a long delay, the Allies managed to produce a peace formula which was duly signed at Sevres on 10 August 1920. Despite its harsh terms for Turkey, the treaty of Sevres acknowledged the sovereignty of the sultan over his capital. Article 36 of this treaty, which was never ratified by the Turks, stipulated that: «Subject to the Provisions of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that the rights and title of the Turkish Government over Constantinople shall not be affected, and that the said Government and His Majesty the Sultan shall be entitled to reside there and maintain there the capital of the Turkish State. Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the present Treaty or of any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, particularly as regards the protection of the rights of racial, religious or linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey thereby agrees to accept any dispositions which may be taken in this connection». I
19. The text of such a pamphlet is given in T. Duran. «Milli Miicadele YllIarlnda Yunan ve Rum Katliamlarl Karslslnda Anadolu' dan IstanbUl" daki Tiirklere bir 9agrl». BITD 79-SI (1974) 12-16. 20. See D.B.FP. (4) no. 522 and for more detailed reports De Robeck to Curzon, Cons .• 19 October 1919, FO 371/41 59/EI43405; Webb to Curzon. Cons., IS October 1919. FO 371/4160/EI46634. I. The whole text of the Treaty ofSevres, which was never ratified by the Turks, can be found in British and Foreign State Papers. Treaty Series no. II (1920), cmd. 964.
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Notwithstanding the retention of istanbul by the Turks, the treaty of Sevres marked a formidable triumph for Greek diplomacy. Yet to make Greater Hellas effective, the Greek army would have had to impose the peace terms upon the Turkish nationalists by force of arms. In this they were not successful, for the Anatolian resistance movement had by now developed into a formidable force. Greek military inability to prevail in Anatolia led to an Allied conference which met in London in February-March 1921 to debate the modification of the treaty of Sevres. The increasing political and military muscle of the Turkish nationalist movement was clearly visible when the conference recognized Bekir Sami, the foreign minister of the Ankara government, as the sole effective spokesman of all the Turkish parties, including the sultan and his ministers. This was a major diplomatic success marking yet another significant step towards the complete international recognition of the Ankara regime. 2 In these changing circumstances, the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not remain idle. In an appeal to Lloyd George the acting patriarch requested that the Ottoman Greeks should be given the opportunity of placing their views before the London conference. 3 Despite the adamant refusal of the Entente of any official or semi-official Ottoman Greek representation in the peace negotiations, a patriarchal delegation did arrive in London on 1 March 1921. It was headed by acting Patriarch Dorotheos who was accompanied by the patriarchal counsellors Angelos loannidis and Paul Karatheodoris, as well his secretary Germanos Athanasiadis. 4 During his stay in London, Dorotheos endeavoured to elicit the support ofleading British personalities, in particular the influential archbishop of Canterbury. 5 Thanks to the mediation of the Anglican church, the patriarchal delegation had even succeeded in obtaining an interview with the king of England on 11 March 1921.6 Dorotheos had also a private talk with Lord Curzon to whom he appealed against any modification of the treaty of Sevres. 7 The intense diplomatic activity by the patriarchal delegation produced
2. On the London negotiations see Sonye!. op.cit" pp. 91-112. 3.. Dorotheos to Lloyd George, Cons., 31 January 1921, FO 371/6565/EI492 See an Ottoman Greek appeal to the Entente against any modification of the treaty of Sevres. The Times. 30 December 1920 . 4. Rumbold to Curzon. Cons., 16 February 192!. FO 371/6565/E2191. See also Mavropoulos, Op.ciL. pp. 133-34. 5. Minutes of Dorotheos'interview with the archbishop of Canterbury on 2 March 1921 in LPAjDvP/32!2. 6. E.A. 41 (l92!) 73-76. 7. Dorotheos to Curzon. London, 7 March 192!. FO SOO/CurzP.
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no practical results. Furthermore, the mission received a further blow when on 18 March 1921, acting Patriarch Dorotheos Mammelis died in Londo~ from a heart failure. 8 The prelate's death did not only put an end to the Phanar mission in London but also deprived the inedentist Greek cause of one of its principal exponents. After championing the Greek rights in Macedonia, Dorotheos Mammelis devoted all his energies for the realization of megali idea. A wholehearted supporterofVenizelos, this prelate was instrumental in reversing the established Phanar policy of neutrality. 9 Thus, by his unequivocal opposition to Turkish rule, the acting patriarch committed the Patriarchate to the political antagonisms between Turkey and Greece. His policy of involving the Patriarchate in politics came under fierce criticism not only by the Tu~ks but also by those Constantinopolitan Greeks who advocated a policy of neutrality for the Phanar. Since no definite mandate over istanbul was officially given to any Power or Greece, Dorotheos propounded a very precarious course. His policy exposed not only the Ecumenical Patriarchate (as an institution) but also the large Constantinopolitan Greek community to Turkish hostility as soon as the Allies decided to withdraw from the city. But in the heady days that followed the Mudros armistice. Dorotheos' irTedentist policy was quite popular with the Ottoman Greeks: The possibilities for expansion in 1918 had captured the imagination of most of the Greeks and enabled them to consider the extension of the Greek frontier to the Bosphorus and beyond as feasible. Their optimism was quite premature. As racial relations deteriorated in istanbul, it was the policy of low political profile and compromise (gerondismos), upheld by the deposed patriarch Germanos, which began to reveal its wisdom. Although a minority, some extremely influential Cons tantinopolitan Greeks adhered to this policy of seeking an lJnderstanding with the Sublime Porte. Prominent Ottoman Greeks with long political and administrative experience, such as senators Aristeidis Georgantzoglou Pasha and Mavrokordatos Pasha, istanbul deputy Basil Orphanidis and senior officials Zdiros Pasha, Lambikis Pasha, Christidis, and Aristeidis Skouros were included in this group. An eminent ecclesiastic, the archbishop of Chalcedon, Gregory Zervoudakis, headed these advocates of moderation. Refusing to endorse the decision of the patriarchal council to sever relations with the Porte, Gregory resigned his senior position in the holy synod in 8. Letters by the new acting patriarch, Nicholas, the archbishop of Caesarea, to Canterbury and another by the chaplain of the British embassy in lstanbul both dated on 23 March 1921, LPA/DgP/32/2. 9. Rumbold to Curzon. Cons., 13 April 1921, Fo 371/6566/E4611; Borough to Douglas, Cons .. nd., LPAjDgP/17/14-16.
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March 1919. 10 After the Greek defeat in Anatolia and the signing of the Lausanne treaty in 1923, it was these distinguished Constantinopolitan Greeks who took up the difficult task of rehabilitating the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Turkish republic. Characteristically, the repUblican Turkish government approved the election of Archbishop Gregory to the Patriarchal throne on 6 December 1923. 11 5. Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis
In the meantime crucial political changes had taken place in Greece. In an historic election on 14 November 1920. Venizelos and his Liberal party suffered a stunning defeat. The ascendency of the royalists was further manifested when, in a national referendum, the Greek people voted overwhelmingly for the recall of King Constantine on 5 December 1920. 1 The pro-royalist mood in Greece, however, was not shared by the Ottoman Greeks, who continued to regard Venizelos as the «leader of the nation» (0 apxr!"!(X; riir;; rpv),iicJ With the exception of the Ilarpic;, the Constantinopolitan Greek press continued to support Venizelos whole-heartedly. So did most of the influential professional and commercial middle class. 2 Among the leading business figures of the Greek community, only the two wealthy banking families of Zariphis and Evgenidis were credited with royalist leanings. 3 Yet political affiliations among the prelates at the Phanar were more divided. There was a growing dissatisfaction among the ecclesiastics with the deep involvement of the church in politics. Hoping that the royalists would adopt a more conciliatory policy in Anatolia, a number of prelates sympathized with the political changes in Athens. Others, like the archbishop of Cyzicus, Constantine Araboglou, had strong royalist leanings. Immediately after the defeat of the Liberal party, Venizelist circles in istanbul formed the 'E()V1Kit "AJlUm Kwvamvrzvovn6}.ewc; (Constantinopolitan National Defence League). In its first meeting, which «attracted large crowds», the organization declared its «fidelity to the person ofVenizelos, to the Allies and to the cause of Hellenism». 4 In an expression of their support, mass celebrations were held by Constantinopolitan Greeks on the nameday of Venizelos on 28 December 1920. 5 10. Mavropoulos, op.cit .. p. 127. I L See below, chapter V:3. L OniOI'IKo:; r51XaO'jlo:; see D. Dakin. The Unification ofGreece. 1770-1923. London 1972, pp. 205 ff. 2. Inten'iew with Palll Palaiologos, Athens 1979. Palaiologos was one of the owners of JIarpi:; until 1922. 3. Rumbold to Curzon, Cons., I3 December 1920, FO 371/4685/CI4290. 4. Ibid. 5. That is the day of SL Eleftherios. see 'Ei.£uOspOl; Tuno:;, 16/29 December 1920.
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L
Irredentist Ottoman Greek circles strongly believed that Venizelos was the only Greek politician able to pursue the case of Greater Greece at the diplomatic bargaining table with success. Not without justification. they feared that the political changes in Athens would lead to a European demand for the modification of the treaty of Sevres at the expense of Greece. 1i For it was widely acknowledged that King Constantine and his close associate Dimitrios Gounaris were antipathetic to the Entente leaders.7 The Greek claims in Anatolia and Thrace, the Constantinopolitan and SmyrniotAmyna groups stressed, were dependent on the goodwill and support of the Entente. As a result the indignation of the irredentist Greeks against their compatriots for «jeopardizing the realization of the megali idea» and for «betraying» the Venizelist foreign policy was immense. 8 The anti-royalist activities of the Amynites were encouraged by a group of Venizelist officers who had found refuge in istanbul after November 1920. These officers had either refused to serve in the Constantinist armies or were dismissed by the new regime. Most prominent among them were the generals E.Zimbrakakis, D.Ioannou, A.Mazarakis, G.Katechakis and Colonel G.Kondylis. Many generals, as well as the Venizelist politician Pericles Argyropoulos, established their quarters at the luxurious Pha Pa/as hotel of Bodosakis-Athanasiadis, a prosperous Ottoman Greek businessman. 9 Amongst these officers, Colonel Kondylis was the most active and outspoken opponent of the royalist regime and through the Constantinopolitan daily, JIpwfa, he launched a systematic campaign against Athens. With the support of Venizelos, the Amyna movement attempted to obtain international recognition and financial assistance from Britain. For this purpose and through his intermediary in London Sir John Stavridi, Venizelos put in touch a delegation of the ConstantinopolitanAmyna with Lloyd George. 10 On 10 January 1921, this delegation met Philip Kerr, the prime minister's secretary. While requesting British financial assistance, the Amynites elaborated a number of ambitious plans. They even envisaged the formation of a 6. Thus, in the London conference (26 Nov./6 Dec. 1920) the French representatives demanded such a revision of the treaty see D.B.F.P. (8) no. 95 to 98. 7. A memorandum prepared by the Constantinopolitan Amyna 14 Jan. 1921 in Stavridi P./file 6. 8. For an appraisal of the international implications of the political changes in Greece see LL Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 162 If. On the various Amyna organizations and the Mikrasiatic movement see Rodas, op.cit., pp. 270 If. 9. See Th. Veremis, Of 'Emi/l{Jdael:;; TOU Irpawu ani\' 'Ei.i.l/vlIai IJoi.lwai, 1916-1936, Athens 1977, pp. 71-96; D.B.F.P., (12) no. 472. 10. Venizelos to Stavridi, Nice, 29 December 1920, Stavridi P./file 5. The delegates were: Constantine Spanoudis, T. K. Stavridis and Leonidas Iasonidis.
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purely Ottoman Greek army which would consist of 45,000 men. Once British approval for the establishment of an autonomous Ionian (or Mikrasiatic) regime was assured, the delegation pointed out, the Ottoman Greeks would be in a position to defend themselves. l l The British government not only refused to commit itself to such a basically divisive force but it also adopted a tough line against the Amyna. Thus in March 1921, the British discouraged the representation of the Ottoman Greeks at the London conference by a separate patriarchal delegation. In fact virtually nothing came out of Amyna's grandiose plans. Further, despite their apprehensions about the ability of the royalist Greek government to protect the Anatolian Greeks against the Turks, the Amynites themselves fell victim to the domestic schism of the Greek nation (,E()V1KOs i111.aop.oc;). As a result, the concept of an autonomous Ionian state had a serious divisive effect on the overall Greek political and military effort during the crucial years of 1921-22. By undermining the legitimate Hellenic government, they naively aided the demise of the Greek military enterprise in Anatolia. 12 The first official demonstration against Constantine on the part of the Venizelist leadership of the Phanarwas an appeal to the king, who was then in Switzerland, on 5 November 1920. By that appeal Constantine was exhorted to resign his rights over the Greek throne for the sake of the Hellenic nation. 13 Soon relations between Athens and the Phanar were at such a low ebb that the holy synod even considered the excommunication of King Constantine. 14 Prelates with royalist leanings were recalled from their provincial sees in Anatolia and Thrace and were compelled to remain at the Phanar. 15 Athens retaliated by discontinuing all financial assistance. Faced with acute money difficulties, the Patriarchate was in fact maintained through the private contributions of wealthy businessmen, such as Bodosakis-Athanasiadis and John Kehayioglou. 16 This financial backing was yet another illustration of the close ties which existed between Venizelism and the Ottoman Greek middle class. II. Details on the ideological stand of the movement in a memorandum prepared by Amyna dated on 14 Jan. 1921, Stavridi P./file 6; LL Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 185-89. 12. D.B.F.P., (17) no. 601, n. 3. It has also been pointed out that some of the Venizelist officers in istanbul, particularly George Kondylis, were motivated by pure fanaticism, see S. Markezinis, IJO).lTlIO'! 'Iaropfa riir; L"Vi'XP0I'OV 'Ei.i.(u50:;; 1920-22, Athens 1973, i/p. 290. 13. It was signed by acting Patriarch Dorotheos. For the text see E.A., 40-41 (1920) 437-38. 14. Rumbold to Curzon, Cons., 23 February 1921, FO 371/6565/E2733. 15. Ibid. 16. '£'i.eu8epo:;; Tuno:;. 1/13 and 7/20 December 1920: Markezinis. op.cit., p. 253.
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With the death of the acting Patriarch Venizelism was deprived of one of its most prestigious exponents. His successor Nicholas, the archbishop of Caesarea, who assumed the responsibilities of the patriarchal office on 19 March 1921, was less enthusiastic in pursuing the Phanar's established Venizelist line. Nor did he possess Dorotheos' dynamismY As a result, with the initiative of a number of prelates whose dioceses were situated within the Greek-held zone, the policy of hostility towards the Constantinist government was gradually modified. Thus, in May 1921 the grand vicar of the Patriarchate, Athenagoras, prayed publicly for the king at a service. The apparent pro-Amynite unity of the holy synod sustained a severe blow when senior prelates, such as the archbishops Constantine (Cyzicus) and Joachim (Enos), openly declared their pro-royalist sentiments. IS Together with the newly-arrived royalist Greek high commissioner, Nicholas Votsis, these prelates were striving for the establishment of a Constantinist movement in istanbul. Faced with this challenge, the Venizelists at the Phanar tried to stave off opposition by electing a sympathetic patriarch. Thus, after being in abeyance for almost three years, the issue of a patriarchal election was brought up in September 1921. The local agitation for an election was launched by the overwhelmingly Venizelist Constantinopolitan Greek press. Notwithstanding the bitter opposition of the Athens government, the patriarchal authorities went ahead with the election on 6 December 1921.1 9 The election was transformed into a power struggle between the two factions and after two days of intense deliberations Meletios Metaxakis, a Cretan in origin, Venizelist in politics, liberal and progressive in church affairs, was elected patriarch.20 With good reason Athens viewed the whole affair as a political manoeuvre designed to undermine the authority of the Greek government. Meanwhile, the majority of the senior eccleciastics condemned the predominance of the lay element in the election. Seven out of the twelve members of the holy
17. Rumbold to Cur-zon, Cons., 28 March 1921, FO 371/6566/E4063. 18. Votsis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 23 November 1921, YE/B/35; Rumbold toCunon, Cons., 3 June 1921, FO 371/6566/E6774. 19. Votsis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 7 and 8 December 1921, both in YE/B/35; Rumbold to Curzon, Cons., 10 December 1921, FO 371/6566/EI3900. 20. Meletios Metaxakis (1871" 1935). After holding the see of Kitium in Cyprus, he succeeded the deposed Theoclitos as archbishop of Athens and was himself deposed in tum when the royalists returned to power in November 1921. After his dismissal, he went to the United States to uphold the Venizelist cause among the Greek communities there. While the leader of the Venizelist faction in the Orthodox church, in ecclesiastical matters he promoted the ecumenical movement, showing keen interest in Anglicanism.
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synod resigned in a protest against the irregularities which had apparently taken place during the election. 21 On 12 December 1921, after hearing the testimonies of two dissenting archbishops, Joachim (Enos) and Eirinaios (Dardanelles), a council of ministers in Athens declared the election null and void in view of the irregularities which had taken place during the proceedings. 22 Unable to come to terms with Meletios' return to prominence, Athens employed every available means to undermine the authority of the Patriarchate, particularly in the newly acquired territories of Thrace and western Anatolia. The whole affair was yet another reminder of the Greek obsession with personal feuds and party politics. Embroiled in their feuds, both Constantinists and Venizelists exhibited a disregard for the fundamental needs of the Patriarchate. Above all, by bringing domestic Greek politics into what after all was a supranational institution. beyond the jurisdiction of the Hellenic government, Greek political leaders undermined the prestigious position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an international religious centre. Norwas the new patriarch in a conciliatory mood. To Meletios, his election to the patriarchal throne would usher in a change in political attitudes. A swing back to Venizelism which was to culminate with the return of the Liberal leader to the centre of Greek politics. Thus as soon as he arrived in istanbul, he allied himself with the Amynites placing the moral force of the Patriarchate behind Amyna' s efforts the support of eminent political figures. 23 Although the project for a Mikrasiatic state never materialized, with the arrival of Meletios in the Phanar the Amyna movement gathered considerable momentum among the Constantinopolitan and Smyrniot Greeks. 24 It is evident therefore that the election of an intensely political figure to the patriarchal throne and the maintenance of the Phanar as a stronghold of Venizelism frustrated any possibility of a national reconciliation. 21. The dissenting prelates were: Constantine (Cyzicus). Joachim (Enos), Eirinaios (Dardanelles), Chrysostomos (Tyroloi), Evgenios (Silyvria), Anthimos (Vyzia) and Gerassimos (Pisidia). Votsis to Foreign Ministry, Cons, 14 December 1921, YE/B/35. Also a detained memorandum on the election in Stavridi P./file 6, nd. 22. Copy of the letter sent by the seven dissenting prelates to Meletios in Votsis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 14 December 1921, YE/B/35. 23. He played an active role in the task of enlisting the support of the governor of tzmir, Aristeidis Stergiadis, and the commander-in-chief of the Greek forces in Anatolia, Anastasios Papoulas, see LD. Passas. 'H 'Ai'wvia Eva.; "EOvQv:;. Athens 1925, pp. 151 ff; LL Smith, op.cit .• pp. 248 f. 24. Venizelos was delighted with the election of Meletios. In a letter to the new Patriarch Venizelos wrote: «I need not tell you how glad I was to hear of your election as Oecumenical Patriarch», Stavridi P./file 6,26 Dec. 1921
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Despite his opposition to the Athens regime. Meletios continued to stand firmly for Greek irredentism. Soon Patriarch Meletios proved to be a more articulate protagonist of the Greek cause than even his dynamic predecessor Dorotheos Mammelis. On his way from America to take up his new post at the Phanar. the new patriarch visited London and Paris where he discussed political and ecclesiastical issues with European leaders. On 17 January 1922. he was received by Lloyd George and a week later he proceeded to Paris for talks with French leaders.15 Addressing 100 senators and a delegation of the French Foreign Ministry on 25 January 1922. the patriarch affirmed his adherence to the creation of a Mikrasiatic state. In this speech the Greek prelate even hinted at the inclusion of Istanbul in the proposed Ottoman Greek state.1h Meletios did not conceal his elaborate scheme of recruiting GreekAmerican volunteers.17 After his enthronement. the patriarch visited regularly the Greek parishes in the city appealing for volunteers and financial help to resist the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia. But. while substantial financial assistance appears to have been forthcoming. the Constantinopolitan Greeks were extremely reluctant to join the Hellenic forces in Anatolia. 18 Between March 1921 and March 1922. a mere 2.850 Constantinopolitan volunteers had passed through the recruitment bureau at the Hellenic military mission in Istanbul. Addressing a delegation of prominent Constantinopolitan Greeks at Bursa. King Constantine bitterly complained of «the very limited number of recruits» obtained from istanbul. Efforts to recruit Greek-American volunteers were equally disappointing. By contrast. it was in the diplomatic field that the irredentist Constantinopolitan Greeks chose to play an active role. When. therefore. the Greek evacuation of the Smyrna enclave was debated at the Paris negotiations (22 to 26 March 1922). the Ottoman Greek leadership exercised once again moral pressure on the Entente. In his interview with Andrew Ryan on 17 April 1922. the patriarch. after striking a very grim picture of the future of Ottoman Hellenism. asserted that the Turks would never respect the rights of the
minorities. He then went on to express his firm opposition to the Greek evacuation of Anatolia. 29 By 1922, however, the Allies made major readjustments in their policy towards the Christian minorities in Turkey. They had established a clear distinction between the issue of minority safeguards and the question of Ottoman Greek aspirations. Thus, during the Paris conference, in March 1922, the Entente delegates were ready to propose a series of provisions for the full security of the minorities. The appointment of a special League of Nations commissioner to supervise the execution of these provisions was also debated. But declining to discuss Greek irredentist aspirations, the conference flatly refused the representantion of the Ottoman Greeks by Venizelos or any other personality. 30 But Patriarch Meletios did not give up. On 7 August 1922, he forwarded yet another letter to Lloyd George appealing for help on behalf of Ottoman Hellenism. However, the British found the content of this letter embarrassing, for the patriarch treated as one the issue of minority safeguards and Ottoman Greek emancipation. These two points had been firmly separated at the Paris conference of March 1922 and the British were not prepared to change their position on this matteL 31 Unable to obtain any Allied commitment, Meletios turned to the archbishop of Canterbury. But even he could offer little practical help.32 In despair, Meletios admitted to Venizelos that his people had been abandoned to the wrath of the nationalist Turks. He bitterly accused the Entente of exploiting the aspirations of the «subjected» Ottoman Christians to suit their own interests and aggrandizement. 33 Yet it should have been a basic precept of the Ottoman Greeks not to rely entirely on the Allies. Further, the discontinuation of relations with the Porte may well be described as suicidal. The election of Meletios Metaxakis, for instance, contravened the rules laid down by the Ottoman charters of 1454 and 1856. These regulations stipulated that the Sublime Porte had the right to remove any names displeasing to it from the preliminary list of patriarchal candidates. Once this formality was fulfilled the elected patriarch assumed officially his administrative functions. But most significantly, the regulations
25. Rangavis to Foreign Ministry. London. 18 January 1922 and Votsis to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 22 January 1922. both in YE.B.35 26. His interview with Lloyd George was published by 'Ei.{;/j1Jopo:; Tuna:; 2; 15 February 1922. On 30 January he met in Paris the French leaders Poincare and Clemenceau. Minutes kept by the patriarch's secretary can be found in Stavridi P. file 7. Kallimachos to Stavridi. Paris. 26 January 1922. See also Markezinis. op.cit.. pp. 426-30. 27. Lindley to Curzon. Athens. II March 1922. FO 371 7882/E2722 28 . Details on the patriarchal fund raising organization. K{;I rplh'lj 'Ennpomj 'Epa I CUI see E..A .., 41 (1921) 420-21.
29. Rumbold to Curzon. Cons .• 3 May 1922. FO 371/7882/E4705. 30. The idea of entrusting Venizelos to represent Ottoman Hellenism at the international conferences was suggested to Ryan by the political advisor of the Patriarchate. MousourosGkikis. FO 371/7882/E7830, Ryan interview with Mousouros-Gkikis. Cons .• 29 July 1922. Later on Venizelos denied any prior knowledge of such an idea. 3 J. Meletios to Lloyd George. Phanar. 7 August 1922. FO 371/7870/E8287. 32 . Meletios to Davison. Phanar. 28 July/7 August 1922. LPA/DvP/148/7. 33. Meletios to Venizelos. Phanar, 6 May 1922. text can be found in Markezinis. op.cit .. p. 435.
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of the 1856 charter for the patriarchal nominations (art. 3, ch. 2) stated unequivocally that eligible candidates had to be Ottoman nationals. The former archbishop of Athens, Meletios, was a Hellenic national. Immediately before the patriarchal election in December 1921, however, the Phanar declared that all regulations and agreements were not only forced on their ancestors by the Muslim conquerors, but had also bet';,;'. repeatedly violated in the past by the very Ottoman rulers themselves. This in itself, according to the Phanar, had rendered the laws invalid. Infuriated by this spirit of independence, the Turks contested the validity of Meletios' electi.on from the very start. As a Hellenic subject, the Turks asserted, MeletIOs Metaxakis could not qualify for the pOSt. 34 At the same time, the Porte issued a circular instructing all official departments to consider the patriarchal election as null and void. 35 But if the Porte refused to recognize the new patriarch the Turkish nationalists looked upon him as their arc~enemy. Notwithstanding this strong Turkish reaction, Meletios enjoyed consIderable popularity among the Constantinopolitan Greek community which seemed to be proud of having such a distinguished personality as patriarch. 36 As the Anatolian confrontation was reaching a climax, neither the Greeks nor the Turks in istanbul were in a mood for compromise. Between 1918-22, the Allied-occupied Ottoman capital became as much a theatre of Greek as of Turkish political activity.
CHAPTER III THE LAUSANNE NEGOTIATIONS (1922-23) 1. The Mudanya armistice and the Relet Bele mission in istanbul
The Greco-Turkish military confrontation was brought to an abrupt end when the Turkish forces began a general offensive on all fronts on 26 August 1922. Deserted by their allies and deprived of the vital financial and military assistance, without which the Asia Minor campaign could not have been contemplated, the Greeks met with utter defeat. The conclusive Turkish victory in Anatolia produced a new situation in the Near East. Not only did the new state of affairs generated far-reaching political and military changes but it also ushered in an unprecedented demographic upheaval. Believing non-Muslims to represent trouble and disloyalty Ankara forcefully expelled them from Turkey. Thus, the mass uprooting of Greeks and Armenians from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace in September/October 1922 was the outcome of the racial hostilities which plagued Near East during 1918-1922.1 Anxious to complete the liberation of the territories envisaged by the Misak-i Millf (National Pact), the triumphant Turks threatened to invade the Allied-held zone of the Straits and occupy istanbul and <;;anakkale. This precipitated the well-known Chanak crisis, which almost caused an AngloTurkish war during late September and early October 1922.2 By making a stand against the Turks, the British succeeded in maintaining the Allied military presence in istanbul, thus avoiding a probable repetition of the Smyrna massacre of September 1922. At the same time, they averted hostilities by persuading the Turks to attend a conference at Mudanya. These negotiations between the Entente and the Ankara government were successfully concluded with the signing of the Mudanya armistice on 11 October 1922.3
34. Copy of a letter transmitted to Rumbold by the Ottoman foreign minister, 19 December 1921, FO 371/6566/EI3956, 35. Meletios was never furnished with an official berat without which no Olthodox prelate could be declared lawfully patriarch. 36. On his popularity see reports of the Constantinopolitan press, Taxv~pollOr;, 6 February 1922 and Neo).oyor;, 7 February 1922.
I. Foreign Office memorandum on Smymaevents, 10 October 1922, FO 371/7955/E I 1040. See also M. Housepian, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City, Berkeley 1967, passim. 2. D.B.F.P. (I 8) chap. I deals with the crisis. See also D. Walder, The Chanak Affair, London 1969, pp. 198-280. 3. For the text of Mudanya Convention see Turkey no.l (1922), cmd. 1570 and a copy of the
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To the nationalist Turks the Mudanya armistice represented a spectacular diplomatic victory marking the end to European attempts to carve up their homeland. At Mudanya, Ankara, now the only official government of Turkey, forced the Entente to make significant territorial concessions, particularly in Eastern Thrace. Anxious to maintain the momentum gained at Mudanya the Turkish government focused its attention to the early reestablishment of Turkish sovereignty in istanbul and Eastern Thrace. To achieve this, General Refet Bele was despatched to istanbul on 19 October 1922. He was assigned to negotiate the full details of the Greek evacuation and the transfer of European Turkey to the Ankara government. In reality, however, the Refet mission aimed at pushing the Allies out ofIstanbul before the opening of peace negotiations at Lausanne. In fact, Refet and his 126 gendarmes were to form the nucleus of the future nationalist administration in istanbul ..~ The old Ottoman capital provided a favourable ground for nationalist activity. As a Greek diplomat pointed out by that stage about seventy per cent of the Turkish population in istanbul supported the nationalist cause. 5 With the arrival of the Refet delegation various nationalist organizations, which had hitherto languished underground, came out into the open. While for the first time since 1918 the cosmopolitan element appeared subdued. the Turkish section of the population took great pains to emphasize the Turkishness of the city and by giving «a tremendous reception» to Refet, they proclaimed their adherence to the nationalist cause. n Without delay Refet brought about the overthrow of the discredited palace government. On 5 November, the vezir Tevfik Pasha offered his resignation and handed over his seal of office to Refet. The resignation of the istanbul government was followed by the flight of Sultan Mehmet Vahidettin on 17 November.7 With the old palace government out of the way, Refet took over the administration of the city now degraded to the status of an ordinary province (vilc(vet). Meanwhile. Refet established official relations with the Allied authorities. He was quick to sense the reluctance of the British. now that the Mudanya armistice was signed. to maintain their former firm control over the city. Taking full advantage of this disposition. he brought about the gradual
weakening of the once-powerful occupation machinery. The Allied authorities, on the other hand, satisfied most of Refet's demands short of a request for the complete Allied military and naval withdrawal. 8 By November 1922, therefore, a «dual de Jacto regime» - the Allied military and the Turkish civilian - emerged in istanbul. 9 The division of the city's population for policing purposes into Ottoman and European was the inevitable sequel of this dual administration. On 25 November, the thorny question of maintenance of law and order was settled by a compromise. Under this agreement all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and Christian, were placed under the care of Turkish police, while foreign nationals, including the Hellenic subjects, continued to enjoy Allied protection. 10 In fact, the 25 November agreement constituted a further step in Refer's determination to undermine Allied authority over the Christian population of istanbul. Finally, on 5 December, by allowing the Turks to take over passport control, the Allied authorities relinquished all rights over Constantinopolitan Christians. The Turks demanded that every Ottoman subject who wished to leave Turkey had to obtain a Turkish passport. 11 Up to that date passport control had remained solely in the hands of the Allied authorities, who had by that means been able to send out of the country all those who for various reasons were considered well-advised to leave. But by December 1922, as the acting British High Commissioner Nevile Henderson remarked, «all claims on the part of the Allies to protect the native Christians were abandoned except as a moderating influence against the grosser forms of excesses» .12 2. fJhe first exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks, October-December
/1922. Throughout the Chanak crisis communal relations in istanbul were extremely tense. A large number of what Lieut. Gen. Charles Harington, the commanding officer of the Allied forces in the East, described as «very
Greek declaration to the Mudanya conference on 1O/l1 OcL 1922 in FO 371 '7905/E 11487. See also A. Tiirkgeldi, Mondr05 l'e Mudanya Miitarekeleri Tarihi. Ankara 1951. pp . 158-92. 4. Henderson to Curzon. Cons. 7 December 1922. FO 371j7918/EI4185. 5. Mavridis to General Staff, Cons., ~ November 1922. YE/A/5. 6. Harington to War Office. Cons .. 20 October 1922, FO 371j7905/EI138L 7. Rumbold to Foreign Office. Cons .. 5 November 1922. FO 371/7908/EI2097.
8. Two notes addressed by the Ankara representative in Istanbul Hamit Hasancan to the Allied high commissioners, 5 November 1922, FO 371j7908/EI4185. 9. Henderson to Crowe, Cons., 28 November 1922, FO 371j7916/E13334 . 10. Text of agreement in FO 371j7917/E13634; Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 25 November 1922, YE/A/5. II. Helm to Ryan, Cons., 4 December 1922, FO 800/RyP; Henderson to Foreign Office, Cons., 5 December 1922, FO 371/7919/EI3664; Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 5 December 1922, YE/A/5. 12. Henderson to Curzon. Cons, 7 December 1922. FO 371j7918/EI4185.
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dangerous ~Iements» had managed to infiltrate istanbul. 1 About 20.000 Turks and. a co~slder~ble number of Christians were reckoned to have been armed dun~g this penod. 2 Well aware of the Smyrna events, which had taken place despite t~e presen~: of Alli~d consuls in the town and numerous European con:m~rcIaI and mI!~tary shlp~ anchored at the port, the Constantinopolitan Chn~t~ans were terrified. Their alarm was further aggravated by the pitiable condItI?n.of the Thracian and Pontian Greeks, who had found tem orar p Y refuge III Istanbul. 3 These fears were not misplaced. Unable to tolerate the attitude of the minorities, who for three years made no secret of their delight in the Allied occupation of Ot!oman territory, the Turks demanded the expulsion of the Christians from Istanbul. The Turkish mob became increasingly bold and u?ruly. ~eiled threats of an approaching massacre were freely aired by Turkish bulhes. On 7 November, the Armenian Patriarch Zaven protested to the Allied high commissioners against the tactics applied by nationalist Turks to the Christians in order to force them to leave Turkey.4 Turkish officials accord!n g. t~ the lo~al Greeks and Armenians, exacted large sums of mone; from ChnstIan buslIlessmen under the pretext of gathering subscription for the reconstruction of territories returned to Turkish rule in Thrace. 5 The presence of the Allied forces in istanbul at this crucial juncture prevented a very probable mass exodus of Constantinopolitan Christians, whose numbers were estimated to have been around 500,QQQ in 1912. While the overriding Allied consideration was the preservation of Allied prestige, the. prote~tion of the minorities was linked to this prestige factor. Again the Allies believed that the question of the min .. ir bargaining position at th . tions. 6 As a result the Allied authorities did their best to prevent a repetition of the Smyrna massacre. The tense sit~ation in istanbul relaxed somewhat with the signing of the Mudanya ConventIOn on 11 October. The armistice pre-empted, at least temporarily, a march of the Turkish armi~s into istanbul. On the other hand, at Mudanya the eventual orderly evacuatIOn of Istanbul by the Allied forces was ratified. Constantinopolitan Christians were aware that, given the fervent anti-Greek L Harington to War Office, Cons., 18 September 1922, FO 371/7892/E9679. 2. Ibid. 3. About 30,000 starving and disease-infested refugees from Pontus were stranded in lstanbul between January and August 1923. 4. The text of partriarch's /lote verbale in FO 371j7959/EI2924. 5. Liatis to Politis, Cons., 29 October 1922, YE/A/5. 6. Reports by Harington to War Office, Cons., FO 371/7913/EI2670 (11 Nov. 1922) and FO 371/7916/E13201 (23 Nov. 1922); Minute by Rendel, 13 November 1922, FO 371/7958/EI2667
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and anti-Armenian sentiments of the Turks, the decline of the cosmopolitan character of the city was inevitable. This decline was only too visible. After the Smyrna debacle and the political changes in Athens,? the Constantinopolitan Greek political and community organizations, so active during 1920-22, had simply disappeared. The confusion within the community was compounded by the ineffectiveness ofthe Greek High Commission in istanbul. Capt. K. Mavridis, Greek liaison officer to the British forces in istanbul, sent a thorough but disquieting report to the Greek General Staff on 2 November 1922. He bitterly complained about «the lack of any organized defence by the 400,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks». In a state of panic they appeared totally paralyzed. He had harsh words for the Amyna, which did so much to alienate the Greek community from the Turks. TheAmyna officers had all escaped to Greece and left behind the Greek population leaderless and defenseless. Despite his courage Patriarch Meletios was also unable to organize effectively the defence of the local Greeks. 8 On 9 November, Capt. D. Meletopoulos, who commanded one of the Greek battleships stationed in istanbul, advised the recall of acting Greek High Commissioner S. Liatis, and his replacement by a competent diplomat with the necessary qualifications to evaluate the situation in istanbul. 9 By late November 1922, Athens despatched to istanbul Efthymios Kanellopoulos who was well acquainted with Turkish affairs. Meanwhile, the Turks did not remain idle. Arrests of Christians who supported overtly the Allied and Greek administrations started with the establishment of the Refet mission in istanbul. As early as July 1922 Harington expressed concern over the ultimate fate of the so-called «compromised Ottoman subjects» estimated then to be 700 Christian employees in his administration. 10 This contingent was increased during and after the Chanak crisis to no less than 2,500 Christians, all employed in non-combative capacities. In the meantime, the Turks had declared that they would not recognize a post-war protection of Ottoman subjects. I I Nor was the future of the Turkish followers of the Entente Liberale, who worked with the occupation forces and who desired the establishment of a multi-national state under the government of the sultan, any less precarious. 7. On the overthrow of the government by young officers with Venizelist and antidynastic loyalties on 26 September 1922 see Llewellyn Smith, op. cit., pp. 313·16. 8. Mavridis to General Staff, Cons., 2 November 1922, YE/A/5. 9. Meletopoulos to Ministry of Marine, Cons., 9 November 1922, YE/A/5. 10. Harington to War Office, Cons., 13 July 1922, FO 371j7949/EI0997. 11. In September 1922 there were 1,500 Ottoman Greek employees serving in the occupation forces, Harington to War Office, Cons., 5 September 1922, FO 371/9161/E8986; D.E-F.P. (18) no. 308 fn. 2.
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Thus, in November 1922, Ali Kemal, an outspoken antinationalist and a former high-ranking minister in the sultan's government, was arrested by the Turkish police and sent to izmit where he was lynched by a nationalist crowd. l :! With the conclusion ofthe police agreement on 25 November the number of such anests increased considerably. After reporting that anests «at the first advent of the nationalist administration were numerous», Harington singled out the Ottoman Greeks «who are being tried and condemned of high treason» .13 Systematic aITests of Constantinopolitan Greeks were also reported by the acting Greek high commissioner, S. Liatis,14 Earlier, on 10 November, the Greek representative in London, Dimitrios Kaklamanos requested that the British government give protection to all those who had served in the Allied and Greek ranks or at least facilitate their departure from istanbul. Otherwise they would «certainly be condemned to death by the Kemalist authorities once they have control of the town» .15 His assessment of the situation may have had some foundation for Refet Bele, in a conversation with Henderson, «anathematized the Greeks who lived in palaces while the Turks lived in huts». The Turkish notable went on to point out that the Greeks would be well-advised to leave istanbul, for in the future Turkish state there would be no room for them in the city. The Turks themselves had every intention of taking commerce into their own hands and they no longer needed the services of foreigners. 16 A large number of Greeks followed his advice. Dreading a nationalist attack against the city or even a possible Turkish coup from within, many Greeks decided to leave temporarily, at least until order was restored. Between October and December 1922, Gsome 50,000 non-Muslims, comprising the wealthiest section of the population, fled Istanbul. The British high commissioner, Harold Rumbold, reported that native Greeks were departing at the rate of no less than 3,000 a day. Some 15,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks left the city during October alone. 17 In vain did the Patriarchate try to restrain the wealthier and influential Greeks from leaving. Patriarch Meletios resorted even to moral arguments claiming that their flight might create a wholesale panic among the
mass of the Greek population in Istanbul. I8 But to no avail. Nor did Harington's assurances abate this exodus. 19 Carrying special interallied visas on laissez-passer passports, almost all these 50,000 fugatives headed for Greece. Constantinopolitan Greeks with Hellenic nationality became equally vulnerable when on 12 December the Greek High Commission in Istanbul was shut down. From then on the interests of the estimated 80,000 to 90,000 Hellene Greeks were entrusted to SpaiD. 20 The closure of the Hellenic High Commission was yet another demonstration of the Turkish determination to eject all Greek and foreign influence from istanbul. To the nationalist Turks, the continued occupation of the Straits zone and the Allied pretention to protect the minorities was a clear indication that the Great Powers still interfered in Turkish internal matters. To terminate this state of affairs the Turks demanded the expUlsion of the non-Muslim minorities who had readily rendered themselves as «instruments» to the anti- Turkish designs of foreign nations. One of Refet's main missions in istanbul was to turkify the city as soon as possible. 21 Meanwhile, Turkish public opinion urged the removal of the Greeks, together with the Patriarchate, from Turkish soil. For otherwise, the Turks warned, they would continue to constitute a grave source of political danger to the Turkish nation. 22 •
,,,,",
1
. i
3. The Lausanne negotiations and the future of the Greeks in Istanbul. The issue of the Patriarchate and the Constantinopolitan Greek community, however, had international implications and could not therefore be solved in the same manner as that of the Anatolian Greeks. The mere fact that the old Ottoman capital was still under Allied military occupation made it physically impossible for the Turks to oust the Greek population en masse. 1
12. Sonyel, op. cit .. p . 30. 13. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 28 November 1922, FO 371/7919/EI3642. 14. Liatis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 13 November 1922, YE/A/SVI. 15. Kaklamanos to Curzon, London, IO November 1922, FO 371/79II/EI2S22. 16. Henderson to Curzon. Cons., 28 November 1922, FO 371/7917/EI3642. 17. Reports by Rumbold. Cons., FO 371/7959/EI2845 (17 Nov.), FO 371/79S9/EI3044 (20 Nov.); Meletios to Henderson, Phanar, I December 1922, FO 371/7960/EI3850; Liatis to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 13 November 1922. YE/AISVL
18. Liatis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 13 November 1922, YE/A/5VI. Patriarchal proclamation of 30 September 1922, prot. no. 5666 in EA., 42 (1922) 373-75. 19. Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 19 November 1922, YE/A/5VI; KaneIIopoulos to Venizelos, Cons., 7 December 1922, YE/A/SVI. 20. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 14 December 1922, FO 371/7919/EI4492; Meletopoulos to General Staff, Cons., 9 December 1922, YE/A/5; Anninos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 21 December 1922, YE/A/SVI. 21. KanelIopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 7 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. 22. Translation of editorial article by Ahmet Emin Yalman in Vakil, 2 December 1922 in FO 371/7966/EI3859; Liatis to Politis, Cons., 29 October 1922, YE/A/5. 1. KanelIopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons, 22 November 1922 and Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 7 December 1922, both in YE/A/5VL
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Quite wisely therefore Ankara decided to find a solution to this thorny question at the negotiating table at Lausanne. 2 Immediately after the Greek defeat in Anatolia in September 1922, the League of Nations entrusted Dr Fridtj Nansen with the question of relieffor the refugees from the Greek-Turkish war. 3 After visiting istanbul and Athens, Nansen proposed the adoption of a separate convention for the excha~ge of Greek and Turkish populations. Meanwhile, through its diplomatIc representative in Istanbul Hamit Hasancan, the Turkish government informed Nansen on 31 October that the entire Constantinopolitan Greek population must be included in the proposed exchange ofpopulations.4 The reply of the Greek government to Hamil's communication was «clearly unfavourable». Athens declared that it «could not contemplate taking into Greece the enormous Greek population of Constantinople or admit the principle that the Turks should expel it».5 Alarmed by these developments, the Greek foreign minister, Nicholas Politis, asked Venizelos to stress at Lausanne the inability of the Greek state to absorb yet another group of urban refugees. Lacking shelter and food the huge Greek community from istanbul would be exposed to great misery and even famine. Further, such a social cleavage, Politis feared, would provide excellent ammunition for the communist organizations in Greece. He then suggested that the Great Powers might consider providing accomodation, at least temporarily, to these refugees in Egypt, Cyprus or Tunisia. 6 Following Politis' suggestion Venizelos made privately a «powerful appeal» to the Allies on behalf of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. 7 The Allies, however, were reluctant to commit themselves. s Having little faith in the
2 . The peace conference at Lausanne opened on 20 November 1922 . Many months of diwrangling followed until the final treaty was signed on 24 July 1923. For a general analYSIS of the Lausanne negotiations see KH. Davison. «The Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne» in The Diplomats, G . A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.). Princeton 1953. pp. 277-92; Sonyel. op. cit. pp. 190-226 . 3. LNO]. (November 1922) 1140-41. 4. Two reports by Dr Nansen. with annexes. to the council of the League of Nations. 16 October and 15 November 1922. LN/C. 729 M. 441. 1922. LNOI. (January 1923) 126-32. 5. 2 November 1922. Ibid. 6. Politis to Venizelos. Athens. 22 November 1922, BMAEV/3L 7. Curzon to Crowe. Lausanne. 25 November 1922, FO 371j7960/EI3190. 8. Cyprus High Commission to Colonial Office. 27 November 1922, FO 371j7960(EI3448; Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 7 December 1922. YE(A(5VL ploma~ic
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Allies Patriarch Meletios proposed that Greece should provide facilities in the island of Limnos in the event that the Greek community was suddenly compelled to evacuate istanbul. Y The question of the future of the Constantinopolitan Greeks was first raised on 1 December 1922 when the British chief delegate and president of the territorial and military commission of the conference. Curzon. read a statement prepared by Nansen. suggesting a mutual exchange of Greek and Turkish populations under the supervision of the League of Nations. In the ensuing debate, Venizelos declared that while «he was ready to consider an exchange of populations either obligatory or voluntary», he was opposed to the departure of Greeks from istanbul. Raising objections to this view, ismet inonii, president of the Turkish delegation, demanded the expUlsion of the Greeks as «a painful necessity, but logicaj".10 In response, the chief Greek delegate, Eleftherios Venizelos. reiterated the «unprecedented political. economic and social catastrophe» that such an expUlsion would bring to Greece. 11 On his part. Curzon, the chief British delegate, pointed out that the large Greek popUlation «was vital to the existence of Constantinople as a great city of commerce and industry, and that without it Constantinople would be in danger of losing its authority. wealth and trade». 12 Notwithstanding the sound economic imperatives, the Turks insisted on the complete expulsion of the Greeks from istanbul. On 29 November. ismet inonO had privately told to Richard Washburne Child, a member of the American delegation. that «we will not have Armenians and Greeks remaining as the means of importing corruption and disloyalty into our country». J3 As this issue proved controversial from the very start, it was referred to the subcommission on the exchange of populations for a detailed examination. The Turkish delegation, basing their claim on statistics. maintained that it was impossible to retain a Greek population in istanbul since it was necessary to establish in its place apart of the Muslim population coming from Greece. The Greek delegation advanced counter-statistics demonstrating that Greece. already invaded by rather more than 1.000,000 refugees from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. was not in a position to receive in addition the 9. Lialis
10
Foreign Ministry. Cons. 13 November 1922. YEiA i 5VI
10. L(NEA. p 207 .
II Ihid. p. 121 12 . Ihid .. p . 122. 13. R.. WashhourneChild. A Diplomat Looky at Europe. New York 1925. p 97
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Greeks from istanbul. Taking the Turkish statistics as a basis, the Allied delegations were able to prove mathematically that it was not necessary for Turkey to remove the Constantinopolitan Greek community in order to establish the exchangeable Hellenic Muslims on its territory. 14 Explaining that the expulsion of the Constantinopolitan Greek community would add up to a «major catastrophe», the president of the exchange of populations subcommission, G.M. Montagna cautioned the Turks of their grave responsibilities if they went ahead with their demand. Both the British and French delegates declared that «the Turkish pretentions were inadmissible»,15 Evidently, the Allies were also aware that with the final expulsion of the Greeks the extensive Anglo/French commercial interests in istanbul would suffer severely. For the overwhelming majoIity of managerial and administrative positions in the major concessionary foreign companies were occupied by Constantinopolitan Greeks,16 But, on 10 December, the subcommission appeared to have come to a standstill as the Turkish delegate Rlza Nur demanded not only the expulsion of the istanbul Greeks but also the exemption from the exchange of the Muslims established in Greek Thrace. 17 Finally faced with the united opposition of the Allied and Balkan delegations, the Turks were forced to end this controversy. Thus, at the meeting of the main (territorial and military) commission, on 13 December, ismet inonii accepted in principle to allow both Constantinopolitan Greeks and Thracian Turks to remain in situ. 18 Notwithstanding this major concession, the Turks raised an issue of proportionality of the two non-exchangeable minOIities. Demanding the maintenance of approximately an equal number of minority populations ismet inonii proposed a limitation in the size of the Constantinopolitan Greek community to match the numerically smaller Muslim minority of Thrace. To achieve this, the Turks laid down the following exceptions and conditions: «(a) The removal from Constantinople of all Greeks who are not Turkish subjects. (b) The removal from Constantinople of all Greeks who are Turkish subjects but not natives of Constantinople. 14. LCNEA" p. 331. 15. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 8 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. 16. Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 22 November 1922, YE/A/5VI. 17. SeeD.B.FP. (18) no. 268. This subcommission was appointed on 2 December to draft an agreement on the exchange of popUlations. For details see «Report addressed to Lord Curzon, President of the First Commission, by M. Montagna, President of the Subcommission on the Exchange of Populations», 8 January 1923, LCNEA., pp. 328-37. 18. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 14 December 1922, YE/A/5VI; LCNEA., pp. 207, 211; The Times. I3 December 1922.
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(c) The removal from Constantinople of all societies or associations which had adopted an attitude hostile to Turkey during the last three years. (d) The exemption in favour of the Greeks of Constantinople to apply only to the Greek inhabitants in Pera, Stamboul and Scoutari. (e) The removal from Constantinople of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with all its organisations and constituent bodies. 19 The question of proportionality, which caused the decrease of the Constantinopolitan Greek community from over 300,000 in 1922 to about 100,000 in 1927, has been raised once again in the recent years. This resulted from the dramatic decrease of the Greeks in istanbul during the last three decades. 20 4. The question of the Patriarchate at Lausanne.
As the negotiations progressed the Turks consented to the modification of some of the initial conditions. I Yet they adamantly refused to discuss their demand for the removal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate from istanbul. Speaking before the exchange of populations subcommission on 16 December, Rlza Nur declared that the Turkish government intended to grant non-Muslims in Turkey «rights identical with those which had been granted to the minorities in the States enlarged or newly constituted as a result of the Great Waf». 2 He reiterated the Turkish determination not to yield on the question of the Patriarchate. His government, he explained. desired to get rid of it, for the Phanar was an antithesis to the policy of turkification and secularization. He asserted that: « ... by separating the Caliphate and the State and by establishing a democratic regime, the government had suppressed the privileges which had been granted in the Ottoman Empire to the non-Muslim communities. The relations between the charitable, educational and philanthropic institutions of the minorities and the State must henceforth be carried on directly; the clergy and its hierarchical chiefs must not in the future concern themselves with any but purely spiritual matters. The Patriarchate, which had hitherto been a political institution, ought to be removed outside Turkey; for its past activities will prevent it from adapting itself to the new situation which, by eliminat19. LCNEA .. p. 331. 20. See chapter IX: I. I. Kaklamanos to Meletios. Lausanne, 17 December 1922, YE/A/SVI. 2. LCNEA .. p. 333.
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ing the political privileges of the Patriarchate and of the organisations dependent on it, will remove all grounds for its continued existence. These conditions show that the necessity of abolishing the temporal privileges of the clergy and transferring the Ecumenical Patriarchate outside the country is just as inevitable for Turkey as it is salutary for the community concerned». 3 This view was repeated by Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk who on 25 December declared to Le J oumal that by abolishing the Caliphate and by expelling the Patriarchate his government sought to reinforce the secular character of the new Turkish republic. 4 On 4 January 1923, at a meeting of the subcommission, Rlza Nur demanded once again the removal, of the Patriarchate from Turkish soil and its transfer to Mt. Athos. The hostile attitude adopted by the Phanar and Patriarch Meletios towards the regime in Ankara had intensified this Turkish desire to get rid of the Patriarchate. Finally, he stressed that the Turks had laid down the removal of the Patriarchate as the principal condition for their consenting to the retention of Greeks in istanbul. If, however, the conference continued to persist with their opposition on the question of the Patriarchate, the Turks threatened to respond by expelling the entire Constantinopolitan Greek community. 5 - At the meeting on 26 Decemb~r, the Greek delegation presented to the subcommission a written declaration in which they refuted the claims made by the Turks. They maintained that the recent change of regime in Turkey could not affect the rights which had been recognized from the earliest times as belonging to the Christian minorities in the Ottoman empire. Nor could it justify the removal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The recognition of the rights granted to the Greeks arose solely from the difference of religion which existed between the Islamic conquerors and the conquered Christian nation. Family law being governed exclusively in the Ottoman state by the Serial (religious law), it was impossible to apply Islamic canons to Christians. For these reasons the sultans had recognized the right of the Christians to preserve the use of their ancient canonical law , which could only be applied to them by their legitimate spiritual authority, the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This religious institution, whose historic seat was in istanbul, had been set up by the decrees of the 2nd and 4th Ecumenical councils, which formed the 30 Ibid., po 3330 See also H.JoPsomiades, The Eastern Questiono' The Last Phase, Thessaloniki 1968, pp. 87-80 4. Interview quoted in Atatiirk'iin Soylev ve Demer;leri, Ankara 1954, po 68. 50 Cemil, Lozan, Ankara 1933, ii/po 296; LCNEA., po 336'0
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basis of the canonical law of all churches. It was immovable, and only a new council could give a decision on its maintenance or removal. The decisions of a political conference in such a matter could have no legal effect. As a result, the Greek delegation considered themselves unable to take part in a discussion concerning the removal from istanbul of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Even if he was forced to leave the city, the patriarch would retain his title. 6 Meanwhile, the Greek government appeared equally determined to resist the expUlsion of the Patriarchate. On numerous occasions Greek leaders declared their intention of going to war over this issue. 7 After being compelled to cede Eastern Thrace, Imbros and Tenedos, as well as thefail accompli of a compulsory exchange of populations, the Greek government could not afford to make yet another major concession to the Turks. Apart from their concern with the reaction of Greek public opinion, they feared that the expUlsion of the Patriarchate would trigger off a major panic resulting in a large-scale exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks. While struggling to accomodate some 1,000,000 refugees from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, Athens dreaded the expUlsion of another 300,000 urban Greeks from istanbul. Thus, on 17 December, the Council of State informed Venizelos that Greece could not sign a treaty which did not provide ample safeguards for the maintenance of the Patriarchate and the Greek community in istanbu1. 8 In a second telegram to the Greek delegation at Lausanne on 21 December, Foreign Minister Apostolos Alexandris expressed his government's readiness to accept some restrictions on the non-ecclesiastical privileges of the Patriarchate. Yet Greek resolution to preserve the Patriarchate in its historical seat remained intact. Alexandris asserted that world opinion was favourable to the Greek point of view on this issue. Further, Greek public opinion felt strongly about the fate of the Patriarchate arid the regrouped Greek forces in Thrace could reach the <;atalca (Chatalja) lines if hostilities were resumed. Unable, therefore, to put up with any further humiliations, Athens would be forced to respond to Turkish intransigence by declaring war. 9 On 5 January 1923, Venizelos reiterated his government's detemlination on the question of the Patriarchate. 10 6. LCNEA., p. 333-34; Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 27 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. 70 For the declarations of the leaders of the Greek government, Plastiras and Gonatas, in Bentinck to Curzon, Athens, FO 371/9123/E363 (28 December 1922) and FO 371/9099/E79 (1 January 1923). 8. Alexandris to Venizelos, Athens, 4/17 December 1922, YE/A/5. 9. A1exandris to Greek delegation at Lausanne, Athens, 8/21 December 1922, YE/A/50 100 Venizelos to Foreign Ministry. Lausanne. 5 January 1923. BMAEV/35.
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Yet the diplomatic skills exhibited by the Greek delegates at Lausanne on the question of the Patriarchate were not always beyond criticism. Thus, in an attempt to emphasize Turkey's responsibilities towards the Phanar, Venizelos argued that Greece had no direct say on the matter since the Patriarchate was not a Greek but a Turkish institution. 11 Venizelos did not observe the awkward corollary of this argument, that if the Patriarchate did eventually remain in istanbul, the Turks would have grounds in the future for undermining the international character of that institution. Sensing the implications ofVenizelos' line of argument, Curzon expressed privately his dissatisfaction with the way the Greeks were handling the issue. The British delegation had from the first maintained that this ancient institution was a symbol of Orthodox religion, and that the removal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate from istanbul would offend the religious sentiments not only of the Orthodox, but of the whole Christian world. 12 The American delegation, too, adopted the same view while the French, somewhat less energetically, spoke against the removal of the Patriarchate. 13 Given these diametrically opposed views the president of the subcommission on the exchange of populations, Montagna, was unable to find a solution to the Impasse. Nor was his attitude on the issue of the Patriarchate absolutely impartial. Thus, according to Rlza Nur, who had developed «a special relationship» with Montagna during the Lausanne negotiations, the Italian diplomat strongly disliked the Greeks. 14 Regarding the fate of the Patriarchate, Montagna considered the Greek position as unreasonable and thought that «the removal of the Patriarchate would not be too high a price to pay for the conclusion of an agreement in other respects satisfactory to both sides».15 Turkey, he publicly declared, had the right to abolish the Patriarchate while the Greek delegation had no authority to oppose Turkish action on this matter. 16 During a private meeting, he was noted to have even encouraged ismet in6nii to carryon with the expulsionY
Montagna, it appears, regarded this, a «matter of interest to the Italian policy as such that the Patriarchate should leave Constantinople».18 Nor did the Vatican take an altogether disinterested attitude towards the fate of the Phanar. As the archbishop of Canterbury pointed out to Curzon, the paralysis of the Patriarchate might have been «welcomed rather than deplored by the Vatican». Finally, the archbishop of Canterbury concluded his letter by claiming that the share of the Catholic Church «in these far-reaching controversies ... is a sad one».19 The same view was voiced by l.A. Douglas, a high-ranking member of the Anglican church and advisor of the archbishop of Canterbury on the Near Eastern questions, when he wrote: «no one with the slightest knowledge of the Near East can doubt that Rome is bitterly hostile to the Phanar, and reckons that a disaster to it as an institution to be a great thing». 20 Montagna must have been influenced to a considerable degree by the Vatican's ambitions in the Near East while shaping his attitude on this question. But it is also possible that the Turks had privately given the impression that in return for the expUlsion of the Patriarchate, Ankara would be prepared to allow a greater number of Greeks to remain in istanbul. Montagna appears to have hoped that the Turkish delegation would agree to the return of some 30,000 Ottoman Greeks who had fled istanbul during the upheavals in September and October 1921. Again, he felt that if the Turkish demands on the issue of the Patriarchate were satisfied, the Turks might be willing to allow the 15,000 Greek residents of Pendik Cllav!eixt) to stay behind. While being outside the actual boundaries of the prefecture of istanbul. this Greek populated suburb was inseparable from the socioeconomic life of the city.21 Whatever his reasons Montagna showed a noticeable impatience with the Greek point of view on the question of the Patriarchate. Finally, on 26 December, in an effort to finding a conciliatory formula, the French delegation proposed that the Patriarchate should renounce all nonreligious privileges and concentrate on its purely religious functions in its historical seat at the Phanar. The Patriarchate would also maintain its pos-
II. Meeting of 16 December 1922, see LCNEA, p. 333. 12. LCNEA., p. 333. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 2/15 December 1922, YE/A/5VL 13. LCNEA., pp. 333-34. 14. R. Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, 1stanbul 1%7·68, iii/po 1047. IS. «Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate», Andrew Ryan, Lausanne, 26 December 1922, FO 371/7923/EI4576. 16. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 6/19 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. 17. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, London, 9 January 1925, YE/A/35.
18. «Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate». Andrew Ryan. Lausanne. 26 December 1922. FO 371/7923/EI4576 . 19. Davison to Curzon. London. 30 October 1922. LPA/DvPj32/3 . 20. Douglas to Bell. London. 1 January 1923. LPAjDvP/l48j4 . 21. Eventually these Greek were included in the exchange for details see S.H. Meray. Lo;:al/ Barli KOl/feral/51: TllflIllaklar, Belgeler, Ankara 1969-70. i:iijpp. 314 fL
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ition as the spiritual head of Orthodoxy. Both British and Greeks went along with this proposal only to be rejected by the Turks.22 With the Turkish persistence on their point of view negotiations were deadlocked at the subcommission and the matter had to be refen'ed to the main commission of the conference. The question of the Patriarchate was taken up once again on 10January 1923. It was during that meeting of the main commission that the Turkish delegates faced a united Allied opposition. In addition, an Orthodox/Balkan bloc appeared on so important an issue. Thus, Rumanian delegate Diamandy reminded the Turks that the Rumanian Church, being independent and autocephalous, was connected with the Ecumenical Patriarchate by spiritual bonds. He then added that the religious conscience of his people would be wounded if summary methods were employed against the Patriarchate, which had been establishedin istanbul for centuries. 23 The Yugoslavian delegate, Rakitch, too, employed similar arguments against the removal of the Patriarchate from its traditional seat. 24 Finally, Curzon warned that if «the seat of the Patriarchate was removed from Constantinople, a shock would be delivered to the conscience of the whole civilized world». 25 At the end of the meeting, the Turkish delegation had to withdraw their original demand. ismet inonii gave a verbal undertaking to allow the Patriarchate to remain at the Phanar. In return it would be shorn of all political and non-ecclesiastic attributes. 26 Thus, the question, which according to Rlza Nur «became the single most emotional issue at Lausanne» was finally solved. 27 Sharing this view Montagna claimed that the fate of the Patriarchate gave rise to the greatest amount of difficulty to the subcommission on the exchange of populations, monopolizing the discussions of no fewer than twenty out of twenty-six sessions. 28 This was mainly the result of Turkish bargaining tactics at Lausanne. Thus, ismet inonii even when authorized to compromise, bargained until the last moment. Having told the conference at 10: 30 in the morning of 10 January that the Phanar could under no circumstances remain in Turkey, quite unexpectedly half an hour later he backed down stating to Curzon that he would 22. Kaklamanos to Meletios, Lausanne, 14/27 December 1922, YE/A/5VI; LCNEA., pp. 334-37; The Times, 27 December 1922. 23. LCNEA., pp. 320-21. 24. Ibid., p. 32 L 25. Ibid., p. 319. 26. Ibid., pp. 326-27; Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 10 January 1923, YE/A/5VI; Nicolson to Foreign Office, Lausanne, 10 January 1923, FO 371/10191/E1l529; Curzon to Crowe, Lausanne, 10 January 1923, FO 371/9058/E462. 27. Nur, op.cit., iii/po 1076. 28. The Times, II January 1923.
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after all withdraw his demand for the removal of the Patriarchate.29 This declaration also throws interesting light on the practical results of the whole affair. Although the preservation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was achieved, the stipulations necessary to secure the relative success of the Greek side were not ensured. Owing to their weak bargaining position, the Greek delegates refrained from pressing for a written Turkish commitment on the future status of the Phanar. 30 Nor did they press for the precise conditions under which this institution was to continue its existence in modem Turkey. As Riza Nul' points out in his memoirs, the Turks, by demanding from the very start the expUlsion of the Patriarchate, had managed to appear conciliatory by simply withdrawing their initial demand at the later stages of the negotiations. By that stage, the Turkish negotiator claims, the Greeks were so worried lest they might suffer a further diplomatic humiliation that they even contented themselves with a purely verbal Turkish undertaking. 3 ! Thus, by keeping the form of this undertaking general the Turks succeeded in retaining the freedom of interpreting their «pledge» in its narrowest possible sense. In retrospect the oral Turkish assurance as to the immovability of the Patriarchate proved inadequate for the preservation of the privileges of that institution. The eventual enfeeblement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was brought about by the ommission of any direct reference to it in the final treaty of Lausanne. Notwithstanding their firm stand on the question of the Patriarchate, it appears that the British delegates, too, did not entirely escape criticism. Doubts about Andrew Ryan's loyalties, for instance, were raised when he recommended the disestablishment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the restriction of its functions to purely ecclesiastic and spiritual matters. In fact, British policy on the Patriarchate derived largely from two reports drawn up by Ryan, an expert on Turkish affairs. 32 The Anglican church, on the other hand, strongly opposed the Ryan proposals. In a detailed memorandum forwarded to the Foreign Office on 10 November 1922, Lambeth Palace even elaborated the idea of granting extra-territorial status to the Phanar. 33 Resenting the influence exerted by Andrew Ryan, a Roman Catholic, on the question of the Patriarchate, Rev. J.A. Douglas, the advisor of the archbishop of Canterbury on the Near East, predicted that since
29. 30. 31. 32. 33.
See Davison, «Turkish Diplomacy», p. 202. Kaklamanos to Meletios, Lausanne, 4/17 December 1922, YE/A/5VL Nur, op. cit., iii/pp. 1076-77, 11I3. FO 371/4156/E516, 17 December 1922 and FO 371f7923/EI4576, 26 December 1922. Lambeth Palace to Foreign Office, London, 10 November 1922, LPA/DvP/32/3.
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«Lord Curzon only sees through Mr Ryan's eyes, I think there will be a surrender (on the question of the Patriarchate) with a certain amount of paper guarantees which will be valueless»" 34 This assessment coincided with the viewpoint of Patriarch Meletios, who, through his representative in Great Britain, archbishop of Thyateira, Germanos Strinopoulos, communicated his views to Lambeth Palace. Further, Germanos was present at Lausanne throughout the negotiations, advising the Greek delegation on the question of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 35 It is clear that Meletios not only wished to maintain the Patriarchate in the Phanar with all its traditional privileges but also wanted to shield its position through the inclusion of stringent safeguards at the Lausanne treaty.36 As the Greek delegate at Lausanne, Dimitrios Kaklamanos pointed out, Greece, the loser of the Anatolian war, could not impose on victorious Turkey a Patriarchate with wide temporal powers. Such untenable demands would only intensify Turkish determination to expel the Patriarchate. 37 Curzon, on the other hand, appeared to have been willing to make concessions on such questions as the Christian minorities in Turkey and the Patriarchate provided a face saving formula was agreed upon. He reserved exercising tangible pressure on the Turks for bargaining on the «big questions», vital to British interests such as MosuL French support for the Patriarchate was at best lukewarm. While making a firm stand on matters concerning French interests, such as the Ottoman Public Debt, the French appeared accomodating on issues they regarded secondary" Given the Allied position and wishing to avoid another Greco-Turkish confrontation, the Greeks contented themselves with ismet Inonu's verbal undertaking. Turkish public opinion was dissatisfied with the arrangement of 10 January. The Tevhid-i Ejkar expressed surprise at the Turkish delegation's action. Asserting its confidence that the Turkish government would soon reverse this decision, it went on to add that «"". neither the Lausanne Conference nor the Anglican Church nor any other power can prevent its (the Patriarchate) being sent away or save the Greeks from the punishment 'they deserve». 38 34, Douglas to Bell. London, I January 1923. LPAjDvPjl48j4, 35 An assessment of Germanos' career in LPA/DgP/33/37-38 . 36, Meletios to Venizelos. Cons., IS December 1922. BMAEV/34; Meletios to Germanos, Cons" 6 January 19D. BMAEV/35; Meletios to Germanos, Cons" 13 January 1923, BMAEV/35; Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople, Const, 2 January 1923, BMAEV/35 37. Kaklamanos to Meletios, Lausanne, 17 December 1922, YEjA/5VL 38. Tevhid-i Ejka,.. 13 Jan 1923 quoted in FO 371!9123/E7603
Tanin provided the only exception as it viewed the prospect of maintaining the Patriarchate with more or less satisfaction. 39 But it was the Greekspeaking press of istanbul which rejoiced at the Lausanne undertaking. In common with the rest of the Greek press, the organ of the Patriarchate, the 'EKKbwzaaTlKYt 'AbjBeza, approved wholeheartedly of the «just decision» (,1 iKaza arcorpaazc,;) 40 Yet so great was the indignation of the Turkish public opinion that ismet inonu felt obliged to make a reference to the settlement of the Patriarchate during a press conference given in istanbul on 16 February 1923. He justified his action by pointing out that Turkey had reserved the right to expel the Phanar should that institution continued to engage itself in political activities. 41 5. The work of the subcommission on the protection of minorities. With the settlement of the question of the Patriarchate and of the nonexchangeable minorities the way was paved for a bilateral Greek-Turkish agreement on the thorny issue of the exchange of populations. On 30 January 1923 the «Convention between Greece and Turkey concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations» was signed by Eleftherios Venizelos and ismet inonli.1 Article 2 of the exchange convention stipulated that: «The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1: (a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople (b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. All Greeks who were already established before October 1918, within the areas under the prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace». Further, article 16 authorized that: « ... No obstacle shall be placed in the way of the inhabitants of the districts exempted from the exchange under Article 2 exercising freely their right to remain in or return to those districts and to enjoy to the full their liberties and rights of property in Turkey and Greece». 2 With these stipulations the future of the Greek community in istanbul, as 39. Ibid. 40. E.A., 43 (1923) 1·2.
41. A.N. Karacan, LOZGn Konferansl ve ismet Pasa, istanbul 1943, pp. 218-20. 1. Ratified by Turkey, Aug. 23, 1923, by Greece, Aug. 25, 1923. 2. LeTS., pp. 175-85.
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well as the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, was officially guaranteed. Nonetheless, in order to reduce the size of the large Constantinopolitan Greek community and thus satisfy the Turkish demand for proportionality between the two ethnic minorities, the exemption clause was made retroactive. It excluded from the benefits of article 2 a substantial number of Greeks who had settled in istanbul after the date of 30 October 1918. A conservative estimate put the Greeks in this category to 38,000. 3 As it has been pointed out, the Greek numerical presence in istanbul reached a peak during the Allied occupation of the city. According to British estimates, the Constantinopolitan Greek population amounted to about 300,000 in 1914 and had risen to almost 400,000 by 1922.4 Since the Turks refused to tolerate the presence of such a large minority, the right to exemption was extended to only certain categories of Constantinopolitan Greeks. After agreeing on the principle of excluding the Thracian Muslims and certain categories of istanbul Greeks, the subcommission for the protection of minorities took up the difficult task of defining the status of these minorities. Because of their significance for the future of the Greek minority in Turkey, the Greek delegates - Venizelos, Kaklamanos, Theotokas 5 and Dendramis- paid particular attention to the issues debated at this subcommission. On the other hand, aware that public opinion throughout the western world had not forgotten the Armenian massacres, the Turkish delegates felt themselves called upon to defend past Ottoman attitudes towards Christian minorities. This they thoroughly resented. They felt that the Allies were using the emotive issue of the Christian minorities in order to embarrass and ultimately weaken Turkish determination on more important questions such as the abolition of the capitulatory system in Turkey, reparations, the Straits and Mosu1. 6 Early in the proceedings, the Turkish delegates declared that, in accordance with article five of the Misak-f Millf (National Pact), Turkey was ready to guarantee full protection of life and libeIty of worship to every citizens of the country without distinction of language, race or religion. They were also 3. By December 1924 these Greeks were transferred to Greece, LN/C'.775.273. 1924. II, Lara to the League of Nations, 8 Dec. 1924. 4. LCNEA., p. 122. Also in FO 371/7959/E13044, memorandum prepared by FO, 20 November 1922. 5. Michail Theotokas (1872-1951). Constantinopolitan lawyer before 1922. He acted as the judicial expert of the Greek delegation at Lausanne. His contribution on the issue of the Patriarchate and on the question of the minorities was particularly noteworthy. Another Constantinopolitan, Angelos Ioannidis, too, acted as advisor. 6. Karacan, op. cit., p. 127. The Turkish representatives at this subcommission were: Riza Nul', Miinir Ertegiin, Mustafa ~eref Ozkan and ~iikrii Kaya.
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prepared to extend equal rights and treatment to all religious minoIities. 7 Both ismet inonii and Rlza N ur claimed that Christians had rewarded Muslim toleration by lending themselves as instruments to the «predatory designs» of the enemies of the Turkish nation. It was this disloyalty rather than the religion they professed that caused their sufferings. They both advised the non-Muslim minorities that their best hope lay in their compliance with the «liberal and democratic laws» of the Turkish republic. They, however, strongly objected to further discussion on the issue of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. This they considered it to be an excuse for interference in the internal affairs of Turkey.s Faced with such an attitude, the Greek and Allied delegations were soon forced to make a number of concessions as regards to the protection of minorities. 9 One such concession concerned the appointment of a representative of the League of Nations in Turkey to ensure the application of the minority clauses. It was regarded essential by the circles close to the Patriarchate that such a representative should «see that there was no interference with holding of Synod and Canonical elections, public and private worship, instructions, the access of bishops to their people and so forth».1 0 Rlza Nur, however, stressed that Turkey was only prepared to accept similar clauses to those signed by European states. Thus, only when other nations were prepared to allow in their midst a League representative would his government consider to follow suiLl1 Another important question debated at the subcommission concerned the freedom of movement (liberte de circulation} of non-Muslims in Turkey. On 20 December, Venizelos demanded that the Turkish delegate «declarer que la Turquie ne mettra aucune entrave aux ceremonies religieuses des orthodoxes de Noel et de Paques qui ont lieu la nuit, sous pretexte qu' il y aurait menace de l'ordre public».12 After some initial reluctance to discuss the issue on the grounds that it was a purely internal Turkish matter, Rlza Nur gave a verbal assurance with regard to the freedom of movement during the religious processions at Christmas 7. For details see chapter II. 8. On Turkish views about the minority question see LCNEA., pp. 190-204; Cemil, op. cit., ii/pp.2n74. 9. Nicolson to Foreign Office, Lausanne, 27 December 1922, FO 371/9085/E2. 10. Lambeth Palace to Foreign Office, London, 10 November 1922, LPA/DvP/32/3. 11. Meetings of 22, 23 and 26 December 1922, minutes kept YE/A/5. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 22 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. See also Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 186-91,200 f. 12. Minutes of the meeting held on 20 December 1922 kept in YE/A/5VI.
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and Easter .13 This paved the way for the discussion on the legal position of non-Muslims vis-a-vis the state (statut personnel et statut familial). Once again, the Turkish side informed the subcommission that like other secular western states, Turkey had accepted civil marriage, and although it did not object to religious mamage as such, all marriage had to be registered with the civil authorities. 14 What the state wished, according to Rlza Nur, was to prevent the ecclesiastical authorities from assuming any administrative functions. For with the disestablishment of the churches in Turkey, he concluded, the state had taken over all civil powers from the religious heads (milletba!)Jarl). Yet, as Rlza Nur points out in his memoirs, the Turks had also taken into consideration a rather more intricate factor while shaping their policy on this issue. A total secularization would inevitably allow mixed marriages between Muslims and Christians. This practice would be ultimately beneficial to Turkey, for the children of such marriages were bound to have a stronger Turkish national conscience. Another additional benefit was that conservative Greek-Orthodox would rather move to Greece than face the possibility of marrying their children to Muslim Turks. 1s After tough negotiations, a compromise was reached on the issue of statut personnel on 2 January 1923. Accordingly, a commission consisting of equal numbers of Muslims and representatives of the minorities should be created to consider the incorporation of the clauses concerning personal status in the Turkish civil code. In case of failure to agree, an arbitrator chosen from among European jurists was to be jointly nominated by the Turkish government and the League of Nations. 16 6. The questions of the military service and amnesty.
By far the most intractible issues concerning the minorities proved to be the exemption of Christians from compulsory military service in return for the payment of an equitable tax (taxe d' exoneration) and the agreement on a reciprocal amnesty declaration. They were first raised by Curzon on 12 December when he invited both the Turkish and Greek governments to
13. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 22 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. See also Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 176-79. 14. Miinir Ertegiin's speech at the subcommission on 30 December 1922, minutes kept in YE/A/5VI. See also Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 227-33. 15. Nur, op. cit., iii/pp. 1056-58. 16. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry. Lausanne, 3 January 1923, and the minutes of the meeting in YE/A/5VL See also The Times, 3 January 1923.
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proclaim a general amnesty, and suggested that the Christians in Turkey and the Muslims in Greek Thrace should have the right of opting out from military service by the payment of a reasonable fixed tax. 1 On the exemption of Christians from military service the Allied delegations proposed the following formula: «La Turquie s'engage a inserer dans sa legislation une disposition permettant aux ressortissants turcs non-musulmans d'etre exemptes du service militaire moyennant Ie paiement d'une taxe. Cette taxe d' exoneration devra etre moderee et sera la meme pour les musulmans comme pour les non-musulmans, au cas OU la Turquie accorderait la meme exemption a tous ses ressortissants».2 The Turks vetoed this proposal. Since all Turkish subjects were to be equal before the law, Rlza N ur reasoned, the responsibility of protecting the democratic order of new Turkey fell equally upon every Turkish citizen regardless of his religion. He then maintained that Turkey could not be induced to create special classes enjoying particular privileges. If, however, the Turkish government in the future decided to exempt any Turkish national in return for a given amount of payment (bedel), then non-Muslims, like Muslims, would benefit from this law.3 While accepting in principle the Turkish arguments, Venizelos stressed that he found them of a very broad nature. He specifically pointed out that the Turkish government had already practised widely the bedel system. Greece, too, followed the same system for the benefit of the Hellene Muslims. He therefore urged the Turks to follow this precedent. The Greek leader even went so far as to suggest that non-Muslims might be exempted from military service in return for the limitation of their political rights. 4 Andrew Ryan said that when discussing this question, the attitude of the Turkish people towards the minorities, rather than fine general principles, should be examined. The Turks, he assessed, had never trusted their minorities, and as a result of this mistrust the «infamous» labour battalions (amele taburlar'l) for non-Muslims, in which the death toll was extremely high, had been formed. s Speaking before the main commission, Curzon 1. Venizelos to KaneUopoulos, Lausanne, 12 December 1922, BMAEV/34. 2. D.B.F.P. (18) no. 290.
3. Minutes of the meeting held on IS December in YE/A/5VI and Meray, op. cit., i:ii/p. 157. The issue was also debated on 22 December, Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 22 December 1922, YE/A/5VL 4. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 22 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. See also Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 156-57. 5. Meray, op.cit .. i:ii/p. 157.
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stated that Ankara had already passed a law in February 1922 exempting non-Muslims from military service upon payment of a tax varying from 300 TL to 1,000 TL. As a result, he asserted, the Turkish government had already recognized that these people could not be usefully incorporated into the armed forces in time of war. On the other hand, a tax on exemption would provide the state with a substantial revenue. After stating that this law was simply a temporary measure, ismet inonii went on to elaborate yet another argument. A privilege of this kind, he explained, might increase the economic and numerical strength of the minorities in Turkey to the detriment of the rest of the population. Venizelos retaliated indignantly by reminding that the Turkish arguments of equal treatment pronounced so often at the conference were inaccurate, for non-Muslims were not even permitted to become officers or non-commissioned officers. 6 Finally, on 9 January 1923, the issue of military service, together with the question of the amnesty declaration, the only other unresolved point, were referred to the territorial and military commission. Three days later a compromise was reached whereby in return for the ommission of the article about military service the Turks accepted in principle the amnesty clauses proposed by the Allies. 7 Content with the compromise, Andrew Ryan wrote that at least a large number of Ottoman Christians were to be protected by the amnesty clauses. 8 This compromise constituted a clear diplomatic victory for the Turks. Thus, in a self-congratulatory spirit, Rlza Nur mentions that the «successes on the questions of military service and the Patriarchate had destroyed the Ottoman Greek identity (Rllmiligu oldiirdii)>>.9 Aware that Christians still associated the excesses of the labour battalions with military service, the Turks knew that non-Muslim conscription would serve as a useful tool in their compaign for the reduction of the Christian element in Turkey. Riza Nur makes it abundantly clear that his principal reason for resisting Allied pressure on this issue was his belief that through compulsory military service Turkey would be able to get rid of most of the young Greeks who had been . exempted from the exchange of populations. 10 It seems that Ryan, too, was apprehensive of such an eventuality. He noted that an exemption from the military service «would have been one of the best things we could have done
for the non-Muslims». 11 In vain bib Meletios and the representatives of the Patriarchate in Switzerland, Michael Kepetzis, implore the Greek government to press further with the exemption of Christians from military service. 12 On the question of the amnesty there were also serious difficulties. Article 1 of the amnesty declaration stipulated that: «No person who inhabits or who had inhabited Turkey, and reciprocally no person who inhabits or who had inhabited Greece, shall be disturbed or molested in Turkey and reciprocally in Greece, under any pretext whatsoever, on account of any military or political action taken by him, or of any assistance of any kind given by him to a foreign Power signatory of the Treaty of Peace signed this day, or to the nationals of such Power, between 1st August 1914 and 20th November 1922».13 Notwithstanding the acceptance of the amnesty clauses by the Turkish delegation on 11 January, the issue was debated once again during the later part of the Lausanne negotiations. On 19 May, the Allied delegations referred to the difficulties produced by the Turkish authorities in connection with the return to istanbul of non-exchangeable Christians. These people had left istanbul temporarily during the critical period of October-December 1922. Since they could not have procured regular Turkish passports in the then prevailing circumstances, these Constantinopolitan Greeks and Armenians had left the country with Allied traveling documents. 14 The head of the British delegation, Horace Rumbold pointed out that according to a recent decree passed by Ankara no Turkish subject who had left Turkey without a proper Turkish passport was to be allowed to return. Many influential and wealthy Greeks and Armenians were included in this category. Their property, Rumbold went on, was being treated as abandoned owing to the inability of the owners to return. 15 Venizelos and Montagna drew attention to articles 2 and 16 of the exchange convention of 30 January 1923, which fully provided for the right of all non-exchangeable Greeks to return to istanbul. United on this issue the Allies strongly urged the Turks «to repair this injustice and interpret the amnesty in the widest possible sense». ismet inonii reassured the conference that Tur-
6. LCNEA., pp. 291-93; D.B.F.P. (IS) no. 315. 7. Curzon to Henderson, Lausanne, 12 January 1923, FO 371/9095/E5S7; Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 10 January 1923, YE/A/5VI. S. Ryan to Henderson, Lausanne, 15 January 1923, FO SOO/RyP. 9. Nur, op. cit., iii/pp. 1114-15. 10. Ibid., pp. 1049-50.
11. Ryan to Henderson, Lausanne, 15 January 1923, FO SOO/RyP. 12. Kepetzis to Venizelos, Lausanne, 12 and IS January 1923, BMAEV/320; Meletios to the Greek delegation at Lausanne, Cons., 12 March 1923, YE/A/5VI. 13. LCTS., pp. 111-14. 14. Details in reports by the British delegation at Lausanne, FO 371/907S/E5119 (16 May 1923) and FO 371/9078/E5128 (IS May 1923). 15. D.B.F.P. (IS) no. 533.
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10l
key intended to interpret the amnesty «dans un bon sens d'apaisement general». 16 In the meantime at the drafting committee the Turkish delegation obstructed any concrete discussion on the insertion of a clause in the amnesty declaration concerning those Turkish nationals who had left istanbul without regular passports. This attitude gave rise to a long debate during the conference meeting on 4 June 1923. After declaring that the Turkish government reserved the right to prevent the return to Turkey of all suspects, spied and evil-doers, Rlza Nur added that peaceful citizens without a political record would be allowed to return. He did not, however, elaborate as to how that large category of non-Muslims, now living abroad, would be given the opportunity of proving their innocence before the Turkish courts. Finally, the Turks argued that the amnesty referred only to persons resident in Turkey and this in no way affected Ankara's right to prevent those minority members who had fled the country from returning. l7 Public opinion in Turkey demanded the punishment of all those elements who opposed the Turkish national struggle. To avoid offending the susceptibilities of the public, the Turkish government not only barred the return of absent non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Christians but also began to arrest local Greeks. In July 1923, nine prominent Greeks from Istanbul, who had been accused of sending funds to the Greek military mission at Bursa in 1919-20, were imprisoned. ArTests of ordinary Constantinopolitan Greeks, charged with aiding the Greek forces in istanbul, followed. IS Meanwhile, the Turkish representative in istanbul, Adnan Adivar, informed Henderson that all Turkish subjects who had served in the British occupation force were to be expelled. 19 In a last effort, during the final meeting at Lausanne on 17 July, Rumbold raised once again the case of Christians who had served the British in non-combative capacities. Their arrests, he remarked, were contrary to the spirit of the negotiated general amnesty.20 Finally, realizing that the Turks would not compromise on this issue, the British were forced to facilitate the departure of 1,500 Greeks and 500 Armenians, as well as their dependents. 16. Ibid.; The Times. 21 May 1923. 17. For the declaration of tsmet inonii made on 4 June 1923 D.B.F.P. (18) no. 590. 18. The names of Greek political prisoners who. according to Athens, had been executed by the Turks were furnished by Kaklamanos to the Foreign Office on 21 September 1923, FO 371/9161/E9467. See also The Times. 23 July 1923. 19. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 10 July 1923, Fo 371/9160/E7148 20. Rumbold to Foreign Office, Lausanne, 17 July 1923, FO 371/9088/E7479. Sir Horace Rumbold had replaced Curzon as the president of the British delegation during the second phase of the talk (April to July 1923).
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7. The signing of the treaty of Lausanne and the return of Istanbul to full Turkish control. The treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 and was ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly a month later. This treaty was generally acclaimed as the greatest diplomatic victory of nationalist Turkey. Throughout the negotiations the Turkish delegation manifested a rigid determination to abolish all foreign controls over the finance, economy, judicial system, minorities and territory of Turkey. Almost all the Turkish objectives were attained and as a result a sovereign, republican, secular and homogenous Turkish state was acknowledged by the international community. The Turkish determination to preserve absolute sovereignty over domestic matters was amply demonstrated during the debate on the minorities. At Lausanne Turkey agreed to grant equal treatment for all religious and racial minorities mainly because it regarded such an undertaking to be in accordance with its political philosophy. As a result the minority clauses concerning the future position of non-Muslims in Turkey and Muslims in Greek Thrace were inserted in the final text of the Lausanne treaty. These clauses, together with article 16 of the exchange of populations convention, constituted the «Magna Carta» of non- Muslims in Turkey. 1 By virtue of these clauses the inherent right of the indigenous Greeks to exist in istanbul, separate from strictly political considerations and arra.ngements, was recognized. Although the Ecumenical Patriarchate was also allowed to remain in Turkey, the Greek minority had to seek a separate rationale from the Orthodox church for its continued existence. For the political status and duties of the members of this community as Turkish citizens placed them under a different set of imperatives than the internationally based Ecumenical Patriarchate. The latter was stripped of all its non-religious attributes while its exact position vis-a-vis the state was never defined at Lausanne. Concurrently, with the exchange of populations and the disestablishment of the Patriarchate, the Turkish government succeeded in putting an end to the millet system. On 2 October 1923, as it was agreed in the Mudanya convention and confirmed during the Lausanne negotiations, the Allied forces left istanbul and the rest of the neutral zone. This caused the exodus of yet another substantial group of Constantinople Christians who decided to leave with the Allies. With the entry of the «Iron Division» into the city on 6 October 1923, amid the enthusiastic Muslim population of istanbul, the Turkishness of the old Constantinople was consolidated. Not without justification the press described the event as «the second conquest» of istanbul. The once selfI. See appendix A.
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assertive and demonstrative Greeks and Armenians of Pera (Beyoglu) now recognized that if they wished to remain citizens of the Turkish republic they had to adapt themselves to the rise of Turkish nationalism. To enjoy their livelihood and property, the prosperous Christian middle and lower middle class in istanbul not only had to act discreetly in such a way as not to give offense to Turkish sensibilities but also to pledge loyalty to the Ankara regime. For the Greeks in particular this meant the surrender of the cherished dream of megali idea and the ultimate recovery of Konstantjnoupolis by a Greater Greece. Yet, aware that Christians were the «undesirable» citizens of modern Turkey, a large group of Constantinopolitan Greeks chose to move voluntarily to Greece. Significantly, emigration was widespread among the members of the professional middle class who formed the cultural and intellectual backbone of the community. According to rough Patriarchal estimates in March 1923, there were «250,000 Greeks in Constantinople and about 150,000 Greeks are going».2 Certainly, some 60,000 Hellene Greeks, about 40,000 non-exchangeable Greeks, 38,000 Greeks established in the city after 1918 and about 20,000 Greeks from the suburbs left istanbul during the period 1922-24.
2. Germanos to Davison, London, 9 March 1923, LPA(DvP(32(3,
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CHAPTER IV THE NEW LEGAL POSITION OF THE GREEK ORTHODOX COMMUNITY IN REPUBLICAN TURKEY, 1923-29 1. Turkish economic nationalism and the Greeks.
The exchange of populations solved the grave problems involved in the presence of a powerful and numerically strong Greek ethnoreligious group, whose business acumen placed it in a very influential position in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. With the elimination of the Greek population, Turkey had managed to form a nationally homogenous state. This in turn constituted the most effective way of robbing any solid basis for remounting a future Greek irredentist programme at Turkish expense. In effect, at Lausanne the idea of a Greater Greece became an anachronism. I With the exemption of Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox and Thracian Muslims from the exchange, a last"remnant of mixed populations was maintained in both Turkey and Greece. Given the strained Greek-Turkish relations in the aftermath of the Anatolian war, these minorities, inspite of their relatively insignificant numbers, continued to constitute a source of conflict and suspicion. Thus, the insistence of the Turks to retain a minority in Greece was interpreted in Athens as a long-term Turkish covert design over Greek Thrace. Likewise, the Turks suspected that, with the Patriarchate and a sizeable minority remaining in situ, the Greek urge towards the city might once again become irresistable. As a result, during the post-Lausanne period, Turkey strove to consolidate its position in cosmopolitan Constantinople. While tolerating the existence of a Greek minority, the Turks :vere determined to reduce the pronounced non-Turkish presence in Istanbul. Nowhere did this presence manifest itself more vividly than in the economic life of the city. As previously remarked, during the Ottoman rule, local Christian businessmen accumulated large fortunes by acting as inter-
I. For details on the exchange of popUlations see D. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece, The Hague 1962; C.B. Eddy, Greece and the Greek Refugees, London 1931; J.A. Petropoulos, «The Compulsory Exchange of Populations: Greek~Turkish peacemaking, 1922-1930", Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 2 (1976) 135-60.
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mediaries of foreign capital. After Lausanne, however, the republican government was determined to develop a «national» (milll) economy through a rapid progress of embourgeoisement of Muslim Turks. With the help of a loyal Turkish bourgeoisie Ankara hoped to drive towards economic selfsufficiency. One of the chief components of economic nationalism was the eradication of the European capitulations and the foreign debt accumulated during the Ottoman era. Towards the turn of the twentieth century, the feeling was that the capitulations and the debts were instruments used by foreign powers to infringe upon Ottoman sovereignty.2 Turkish nationalists intended to change this state of affairs. As a result, a sustained assault against local Christian business interests and commercial institutions was inaugurated with the reestablishment of Turkish authority in istanbul. The first step towards the turkification of the economy was the foundation of the National Turkish Commercial Union (Millf Turk Tiearet Birligi) in 1923. Enjoying the backing of the government, the Union aided the gradual take over of the finance and banking business by a number of Turkish businessmen. It also played a major role in the purchase of commercial establishments and shops owned by the outgoing Christians, particularly Greeks. 3 Eager to fill the gap produced by the departing Greeks, Turkish merchants made use of their newly acquired political muscle to improve their economic position at the expense of local Christian businessmen. Thus, according to N.S. Roberts, the acting commercial secretary of the British High Commission in istanbul, «in some cases, deliberate attempts are made to frighten Greek merchants into leaving the country and disposing of their property for whatever price they may be able to obtain». 4 The president of the Commercial Union was ibrahim Pa~azade Kavalall Hiiseyin who, like many of its members, was of donme origin. By providing them with ample business opportunities, Ankara hoped to win over the support of the powerful donme Turks, who had played an important role during the Young Turk revolution. s In fact, the links between the government and the Commercial 2. O. Okyar, «Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 1923-73»,lJMES 10 (1979) 330. 3. D. Avcioglu, Tiirkiye'nin Diizeni, istanbul 1979, i/pp. 340-44. 4. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade, Cons., 11 December 1922. FO 371/9113/E280. 5. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 13 January 1923, FO 371/9113/E824. Donmes were descendants of the Jewish followers of Sabbatai Zevi (1632-75), who ostensibly became converts to Islam with him in 1666. They long maintained their identity as a sect but in recent years they have done their outmost to be assimilated into the Turkish society.
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Union were quite apparent. The Union was financed by Ankara and a number of deputies were personally involved in the enterprise. 6 By March 1923, the active participation of Turkish deputies in the economic life of the country increased substantially. They initiated and financed a number of companies, such as the Turkish National Import and Export company (Turkiye Millf ithalat ve ihracat Anonim Sirketi) which was founded by 50 deputies and high bureaucrats. 7 Indeed, there were gigantic opportunities for Turkish merchants not only in Anatolia but also in istanbul. According to information compiled by the commercial secretary of the British High Commission, H. Woods, 110 important Greek firms and 21 Armenian commercial houses had been closed in the city between November 1922 and March 1923. In addition, hundreds of smaller businesses ceased to operate owing to the flight of their owners.8 Based on a report by the ministry of the interior, the Eeonomiste d'Orient gave some revealing figures on the flight of Constantinopolitan Christians since the introduction of the nationalist regime in the city. According to the same report, 188,681 Greeks from the city (together with another 61 ,094 from the suburbs) and 150,076 other non-Muslims had abandoned istanbul. The property, left behind by these 399,856 non-Muslims amounted to 143 million TL.9 At the same time, constant official harassment involving threats of instant seizure of goods undermined confidence amongst those Greeks who were determined to stay in the city. Often Greek traders, like the wealthy tobacco merchant Nicholas Sepheroglou, were charged with malpractice. 10 Particularly susceptible to official interference were those Greek companies involved in business transactions with the Allied administration of 1918-23. 11 To retain their competitiveness and avoid official interference many such companies went into partnership with Muslims and foreign nationals. It has been demonstrated by a recent study that foreign investment in Istanbul during 1923-30 was considerable. 12 It largely concentrated on purchasing a 6. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade. Cons., 11 December 1922, FO 371/9113/E280. 7. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade, Cons., 28 March 1923, FO 371/9114/E3460. For the emergence of a new Turkish «economic class» see S. Mardin, «Historical Determinants of Stratification: Social Class Consciousness in Turkey», SBFD 22/4 (1967) 142. 8. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade. Cons., 28 March 1923, FO 371/9114/E3460. 9. Ibid. 10. KwvaraVrlVOv110J.u;:, 14 February and 14 March 1926. II. The Kendros brother case and that of Emmanouilidis-Bekakis cit. in FO 371/9159/E5809 (4 June 1923) and FO 371/9159/EI2250 (23 December 1923). Also another letter by the British Chamber of Commerce in istanbul to Henderson, Cons., 9 February 1924. 12. See A.G . Okc;:iin, 1920-1930 Ylllarl araslnda kuru/an Tiirk Anonim !}irket/erinde Yaband Sermaye. Ankara 1971. pp. 117-18.
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major share of the lucrative businesses abandoned by the departing Greeks. For example, the Fabriques Unies de Ciment Arslan et Eski-Hissar, founded by the Siniosoglou brothers and Alexander Kioseoglou in 1921 (capital 367,500 TL) was taken over by foreign nationals and Muslim Turks. Another two Siniosoglou-Kioseoglou concerns, the Bazar du Levant and Minoterie d'Orient suffered a similar fate. I3 Meanwhile, Constantinopolitan Greeks with foreign nationality, like George Rallis who had acquired Italian citizenship, also benefited from the Greek exodus. I4 Nor was the increasing government intervention in business and the emergence of state monopolies welcomed by local non-Muslim entrepreneurs. Greek interests were particularly affected by the establishment of alcohol monopoly in March 1926. Although the government allowed some private companies to manufacture and distribute wine, few Greek concerns, which had hitherto dominated the market, survived. IS The policy of economic nationalism coupled with bureaucratic restrictions persuaded many Greeks to pack their bags and head for Greece. 2. The campaign against professional Greeks.
The sustained effort to achieve a «national» economy in istanbul did not limit itself to the commercial field. Soon the government sought to bring about greater Muslim participation in the lucrative foreign concessionary companies. Until 1923, ninety per cent of all managerial and clerical positions in such companies were occupied by non-Muslims and foreigners. Soon all European firms operating in the city were urged to employ, whenever possible, Muslim Turks (,en disponibilite ».1 Such pressures on foreign companies 13. Ibid, pp. 28-29. 14. Ibid., pp. ISS-S6. IS. In 1921 out of 2S7 restaurants in Istanbul 171 were owned by Greeks and out of 4'l1 beerhalls 444 were again Greek-owned. Similarly out of6S4 wholesale concerns S28 were Greek, see C. Johnson, Constantinople today, New York 1922, p. 263. L Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 24 April 1923, FO 371/91 14/E4314. The precentage of Greek employees in the major commercial establishment in 1923 was as follows: Registered foreign concessionary companies
Names of companies
Proportion of Greek employees
Commercial Bank of Near East ............................................ . Orosdi Bank ............................................................. . Deutsche Orientbank Credit Lyonnais .. .. ................ ..... .................. . .... .. ......... Compagnie d'Assurances Generales. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
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90%
60% SO% SO% 99%
continued throughout 1924 and were renewed with vigour in 1926-27 under the stewardship of ~iikrii Kaya, minister offinance, and Ali Cenani, minister of commerce. Unwilling to displease Ankara, the foreign firms complied with the wishes Proportion of Greek employees SO% Banco di Roma Banca Commerciale Italiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SO% Banque hollandaise pour la Mediterranee .................................... SO% Banque Fran9aise des Pays d'Orient ........................................ SO% Ionian Bank .............................................................. SO% The Adriatic Petroleum ............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SO% Assicurazioni Generale .................................................... SO% Union de Paris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20% Helvetia (insurance) ....................................................... 20% Bank and Manson Insurance Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2S% Halcyon Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25% Khedivial Mail Steam Ship ................................................. 25% Messageries Maritimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2S% Paquet................................................................... 2S% Gelchrist Walker and Co ........... ,....................................... 2S% Lloyd Triestino ........................................................... 2S% Walter Seager Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20% 10% «Orienta» Societe des Tabacs Names of companies
Registered Turkish companies
Societe cooperative des marchands de fromage de Constantinople... .. ..... .. .. Minoterie d'Orient ........................................................ Minoteries Unies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Compagnie d' Assurances Generales de Constantinople ........................ Banque de Salonique ...................................................... Industrie Chimique et OliIere .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Balia-Karaidin ............................................................ Banque Nationale de Turquie.................... ........................... Societe de Glace de Constantinople ......................................... Fabriques Unies de Ciment Arslan et Eski-Hissar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fabriques Unies de Conserves Hermes et Confiance Cartal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Societe Nationale d'Assurance Turque ...................................... Mines d'HeracIee ......................................................... Cine-Magic ............................................................. . . Docks et Chantiers de Stenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
100% 60% 60% 60% SO% 40%
40% 2S% 25% 25% 25% 20% 20% 20% 20%
These statistics were given in a letter of the Turkish government addressed to the League of Nations on 6 March 1925, LN/C. 135. 1925. VII.
109
of the government. Thus, according to Douglas Watson, the manager of the Constantinople Telephone company, his fIrm replaced Christian telephonists with Muslims whenever possible and since 1923 it had not engaged a single Christian girl. In many cases preference was given to non-French speaking Muslims rather than to French speaking Christian girls with Turkish nationality, despite the fact that up to then a foreign language was a necessary qualifIcation for the job. 2 Asked by the manager of the Ionian Bank, Wyatt, whether the authorities demanded the engagement of Muslims at the expense of Christian employees with Turkish nationality, the inspector gave him a choice of either substituting his non-Muslim staff or employing a fIxed number of Muslims in addition to the Christians already employed. Identical options, the Turkish inspector claimed, were offered to most of the other foreign companies and had been already accepted. 3 As the obligatory employment of Muslims was uneconomical, it inevitably led to the gradual dismissal of Christian employees. Thus, by 1929, the Foreign Office considered that «the local Christian employees have already to a very large extent been replaced by Muslims». 4 But the dismissal of Constantino politan Hellene Greeks was even more rapid. As early as April 1923, both the Ottoman Bank and the Regie des Tabacs were obliged to replace all their Hellenic employees with the exception of a very few who were regarded as indispensible. 5 According to Greek estimates by 1926 over 5,000 Hellenes were dismissed from such European companies operating in istanbul alone. 6 Meanwhile, the disposition of the government to lump together nonMuslim Turkish citizens with foreign nationals was quite apparent. Notwithstanding their legal right to Turkish citizenship, non-Muslims were still considered by the majority of Muslim Turks as an alien element. Such feelings were even publicly expressed by senior members of the Turkish Cabinet. Thus, on 19 October 1923, during a press conference, the minister of public works, Fevzi Bey, declared that 7
2. Lindsay to Chamberlain, Cons., 18 November 1924, FO 371(10207(EI0203. 3. Ionian Bank to Undersecretary of State, London, 5 March 1926, FO 371(Il540(EI540; Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons., 4 March 1924, FO 37I(Il540(EI512. 4. Knight to Chamberlain. Ankara. 21 May 1929, FO 371(138Il(E2514. 5. Kollias to Oliphant, London, 21 March 1923, FO 371(9114(E3133; Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 24 April 1923, FO 371(9144(E4314. While there were 500 Greek employees in the Regie des Tabacs in 1922 there were only 2 or 3 left five years later, in «Comparative examination of the application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty in Greece and Turkey», memorandum prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry for Venizalos, 1930, BMAEV(58. 6. Kwva!avrlvovno).z;;, 7 February 1926. 7. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 23 October 1923. FO 371(911 6(EI 0547.
«According to the arrangements concluded with the foreign companies, the latter must engage Turkish employees only. This does not mean that they can employ all subjects of the GrandNational Assembly of Turkey indiscriminately. They must employ Moslem Turks only. If the foreign companies do not shortly dismiss their Greek, Armenian and Jewish servants, I shall be compelled to cancel the privileges under which they are authorized to function in Turkey. This decision is irrevocable» . Such a decision, however, went counter to article 39 of the Lausanne treaty which extended to non-Muslim minorities equal treatment and opportunities. As the British representative in istanbul pointed out,8 «the persistent unofficial pressure brought to bear on foreign com· panies and institutions to employ Muslims at the expense of nonMuslim Turkish nationals is in flagrant contradiction with the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty». Replying to a demarche by the Allied high commissioners, the Turkish authorities in istanbul asserted that: 9 «Les dispositions des articles 37 et 39 ne derogent en rien ,11 droit, ni diminuent Ie devoir du Gouvernement turc de veiller sericli 'llllcnt a ce que les elements appartenant ala majorite de la population ne soient pas prives de la possibilite de participer aun domaine important de travail dans Ie pays. Par consequent, les mesures prises a regard devraient etre envisagees non pas comme une tendance hostile a regard des minorites, mais bien comme des moyens legitimes de contrecan'er la pratique d'exclure systematiquement les majorites de toute cooperation aux activites economiques». In a similar tone a Turkish memorandum addressed to the League of Nations dismissed claims that Turkey was violating the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty. 10 Similar official interference also affected members of the liberal professions. Thus. a government commission investigating the morality of istanbul barristers disqualified 350 out of 960 members of the bar in September 1924. They were prohibited from practising law either on moral grounds or for engaging in business incompatible with the profession of the barrister, such as 8. Ibid. 9. Notes exchanged between Henderson and Adnan Adlvar. 16 February and 17 March 1924. FO 37LI0207/E3317 10. Turkish memorandum on the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey. LN/C.135.1925 . VII.
III
110 8
commerce. As this decision affected two-thirds of the Greek members of the bar, the Greek government protested to the League of Nations. 11 Dismissing charges of discrimination against Greek lawyers the Turkish government outlined that: 12 «Cette mesure n'a jamais vise une categorie detenninee.Il y a aujourd'hui quarante-deux avocats grecs inscrits au barreau de Constantinople et exer9ant leur profession. Quant a ceux a qui cet exercice a ete interdit, comme les Turcs musulmans qui sont dans Ie meme cas, c'est qu'ils ne remplissaient pas les conditions premieres determinees par les lois necessaires a leur metier. Chaque expulse a Ie moyen d'en appeler a la justice de son pays, et de faire reviser son cas». Notwithstanding such Turkish assertions, the disproportionately high number of disqualified Greeks, as well as anti-Kemalist Turks, threw some doubt on the motives of the Ankara government. Following the example of numerous businessmen and employees of foreign companies, many Greek members of the liberal professions chose to practice their skills in more congenial atmosphere in other countries. Dismissals of Christians were by no means confined to these better paid professions. Members of the working class were as severely hit. Thus, when the postal services were nationalized non-Muslims and foreigners were prevented from carrying on their professions, such as pilotage, ship chandling and diving. Further, the general anti-left drive in Turkey also affected the active Greek trade unions in the city. Non-Muslim labour leaders like Serafim Maximos, Nicholas Asimakopoulos, !lias Zacharias and Ronald Gensberg fled to Greece and the United States. Thus, the Constantinopolitan Greek trade union (J]avBpyaTlK~ 'Evwalc,;), founded by Maximos and his associates in 1920, was doomed to oblivion.13 3. The question of the etablis.
Meanwhile, the inability of Greece and Turkey to solve all outstanding issues arising from the exchange of populations prolonged the strained relations between the two governments. Amongst these unresolved matters the interpretation of article 2 of the exchange of population convention, signed in I!. LN/C. 13 L 1925. VII, 6 March 1925. 12. LN/C.135. 1925. VII, 6 March 1925. 13. In !925 an end was put to all socialist and trade union activities in Turkey. On the non:Mushm,Part~cip~tion in the.Otto.man working-class movement see G.S. Harris, The Origins of COllllllUfllsm III Turkey, CalIfornia 1967, pp. 105, 118-19, 125; M. Tuncay, Turkiye'de Sol Aklmlar 1908-1925. Ankara 1967. pp, 155 f.
112
Lausanne on 30 January 1923, provided a potent source of conflict. Article 2 defined the categories of Greeks who were recognized as «established in Constantinople».l As Greek and Turkish interpretations of this article differed widely a sharp divergence of views between Athens and Ankara developed leading to prolonged negotiations lasting until 1930. There is little doubt that those who drafted the clauses of the treaty intended to exclude from the exchange all Greek residents settled in the city before 30 October 1918. From the statement made by the chief Turkish mediator ismet inonii during the Lausanne negotiations, it is quite clear that the Turks also agreed with that position. The formula, however, employed in the final draft of the treaty quoted the categories of Constantinopolitan Greeks who were entitled to remain in Turkey, rather than, as it was originally intended, to specify the groups of Greeks who would have to depart. This inverted formula created ambiguity. 2 Wishing to reduce to a minimum the number of non-exchangeable Greeks, the Turks reopened the issue as soon as the mixed commission was convened in October 1923. 3 In a memorandum forwarded to this commission in August 1924 the Turks maintained that the term «established» (in the French .text etablis) could only apply to Greeks registered as citizens of Stamboul with the civil authorities, under the Ottoman law of domicile of 1914.4 In this way the Turks attempted to define the term etablis as being equivalent to «domicile». As registration was not an essential condition for residence in the pre-1923 period and only a small minority of Greeks had taken the trouble to register, this interpretation would have added another large group of Constantinopolitan Greeks to the category of exchangeables. Seeking to maintain the largest possible number of Constantinopolitan Greeks, the Greek side contested vigorously the Turkish definition. In a memorandum to the neutral members of the mixed commission, the Greek delegation observed that, according to the stipUlations of the exchange convention, the term etablis referred to any Greek inhabitant registered on the record books of the municipality before 1918. Again Greeks who had a fixed residence or exercised any trade or industry in L See chapter III:3. 2. Cf. S. Seferiades, "L'echange des populations», Academie de Droit International, ReclIeil des Cow·s, 4 (1928) 388-89, 3, Article 11 of the exchange of popUlations convention provided for the creation of a mixed commission for the supervision of the exchange of populations and the liquidation of properties of the exchanged. The commission consisted of four Turkish, four Greek and three neutral members appointed by the League of Nations, for details see S. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York 1932, pp. 353-76. 4. Copies of Turkish and Greek memoranda to neutral members of the commission, Cons., 4 September 1924, FO 371/I0184/E7886,
113
the area prior to the signing of the Mudros armistice were to be considered as etablis. S Initially, the neutral members of the mixed commission appeared to have favoured the Greek thesis. Soon, however, the Spanish member, General Manrique de Lara shifted his position claiming that some new evidence, a law on census, brought up by the Turks threw new light on the question. The inconsistency of General de Lara on this and on several other issues not only impeded the Greco-Turkish dialogue, but it also demonstrated the inability of the neutral members to act decisively when there was a serious divergence of opinion between the two interested sides. Criticizing the inconsistent and at times biased approach of General de Lara, the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir George Clerk stated that the «Spanish general's patent incapacity would delay the solution of the simplest problem». 6 Both the Turkish and Greek delegations were not slow at taking advantage of such a weakness. Thus, the Turkish delegate Tevfik Rii~tii Aras declared during a press conference that he regarded the commission incompetent to interpret the term eta b lis . He then went on to threaten that the Turkish government was determined to exchange all non-etablis Greeks regardless of the outcome of the discussions at the commission. 7 By September 1924 negotiations at the mixed commission were deadlocked. s In an attempt to find a way out of this impasse, the question of the etablis was referred to the judicial subcommittee. On 1 October 1924, the subcommittee advised that the registration under the law of domicile of 1914 should not constitute the only criterion of the intention to remain established in istanbu1. 9 This pronouncement coincided largely with the Greek interpretation. Dissatisfied with these developments Tevfik Rii~tii Aras tendered his resignation on 3 October, only to announce a week later that he was to resume his duties as head of the Turkish delegation at the commission. 10 Meanwhile, taking advantage of this state of affairs, the Turkish government proceeded to arrest 4,452 Greeks whom it considered exchangeables and interned them prior to deportation. This action was contrary to the terms of the exchange convention, which specifically provided for the mixed commission to make all the arrangements for the exchange of populations. The Turks justified their action by pointing to the delay in the departure of a number of Greeks, 5. Ibid" Kaklamanos to Foreign Office, London, 24 October 1924, FO 371(10184(E869L 6. Turkey: Annual Report, 1927, FO 371(13096(E1149. See also Ladas, op. cit., pp. 360-63. 7. The Orient News, 6 September 1924. 8. The Orient News, 9 September 1924. 9. Text in LNO] (November 1924) 1676-78. 10. Ibid., pp. 167'2-73: Lindsay to MacDonald, Cons .. 16 October 1924, FO 371(10184(E9538.
114
whose exchangeability was unquestionably stipulated by the exchange convention. 765 of those detained were clearly non-exchange abies having established themselves in istanbul before 30 October 1918. The rest were exchangeable Greeks to whom the competent subcommittee had not yet delivered the necessary passports. 11 The whole affair and the hardships endured by those interned in the monastery of Ballkll (Ba}.oVldit) «caused panic among the Greeks in Constantinople» .12 The Greek government appealed immediately to the League of N ations. 13 This appeal prompted the Turks to refrain from further arbitrary action. On 24 October, the Turkish delegation agreed to free all non-exchangeables and to await the decision of the commission before it took measures against persons whose exchange was in dispute. When the Council of the League of Nations met to debate the developments in istanbul on 31 October the Greek representative, Nicholas Politis, stated that although the immediate tension between Greece and Turkey had been alleviated, a sharp divergence of opinion continued to exist on the issue of the etablis. 14 The president of the mixed commission, General de Lara, expressed surprise at the Greek action of appealing directly to the League. Although a settlement over this question was not as yet reached, he had no reason to believe that the Turkish government had encroached upon the duties of the mixed commission. IS Given the tensions and the sharp disagreement on the question of the etablis, M. de Lara's contention was a gross underestimation of the serious deadlock faced by the mixed commission. Encouraged by M. de Lara's declaration, Fethi Okyar, the Turkish representative, responded by expressing Ankara's anxiety over the «wretched position» of the Muslims in Greek Thrace. He added that the Turks would «welcome with lively satisfaction an enquiry on the position of the Turks in Western Thrace as well as that of the Greeks in Constantinople» .16 Unwilling to commit itself, the Council communicated its hope that the outstanding points would be settled by the commission. In the event of another deadlock, the Council suggested the possibility of an appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. 17 1L 18-22 October 1924. LNO] (November 1924) 1673. 12. Henderson to MacDonald, Cons., 18 October 1924, FO 371(10185(E9538. 13. Dendramis to League of Nations, LN(C. 614. 1924. VII, 22 October 1924 in LNO] (November 1924) 1678; Politis to League of Nations, LN(C.645.1924. VII, 29 October 1924 in LNO] (November 1924) 1672·73. 14. LNO] (November 1924) 1663. 15. Ibid" pp. 1666-67. 16. Ibid., pp. 1665-66. 17. Ibid., pp. 1669-70. According to a minute by Osborne, a member of the Eastern Dept. of the
115
But the mixed commission proved once again unable to tackle the thorny issue of the erablis and on 16 November 1924, had no choice but to ask the Court at the Hague for an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the term erablis .18 Meanwhile, the Turkish authorities promised to refrain from taking measures against the Constantinopolitan Greeks. On 13 December 1924, the Council of the League of Nations, at the request of the mixed commission, decided to ask the Permanent Court to pronounce an advisory opinion on the question of the erab/is 19 On 21 February 1925, the Permanent Court of International Justice announced its opinion regarding this issue: 2o «1. That the purpose of the word «established» in Article 2 of the Convention of Lausanne of January 30th, 1923, regarding the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, is to indicate the condition in point of time and place on which depends the liability to exchange Greek and Moslem who respectively inhabit Constantinople and Western Thrace; that this refers to a situation of fact constituted, in the case of the persons in question be residence of a lasting nature; 2. That, in order that the persons referred to in Article 2 of the Convention of Lausanne as «Greek inhabitants of Constantinople» under the terms of the Convention and exempted from the compulsory exchange, they must reside within the boundaries of the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912; have arrived there, no matter whence they came, at some date previous to October 30, 1918, and have had, prior to that date the intention of residing there for an extended period». The Court had favoured the Greek view, for it opined that the whole matter was one of international law and that questions of national legislation had no bearing on the interpretation of the exchange convention of30 January 1923. It did not, however, attempt to give an exact definition of the «stability of residence» which determined establishment. Finally, it reassured the Tur>
i
!
Foreign Office, the Council «did not directly advance a settlement, since they only passed the buck back to the Commission». 31 October 1924, FO 371/10185/E9489. IK Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons>, 16 November 1924, FO 371/10185/E11277; LN/C.694> 1924>1, 16 November 1924. 19. Greek memoranda on the Muslim minority of Thrace (5 December 1924) and on that of Constantinople (10 December 1924). Also a Turkish document dealing mainly with the Turks in Thrace, LN/C .774.1924.1 in LNGJ (February 1925) 155-56, 283> 20. Publication a/the Permanent Court a/International Justice, Series B, 21 February 1925> Collection of Advisory Opinions no. 10, «Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations», pp> 25-26.
116
kish government that the mixed commission derived its authority from an international agreement and in no way constituted an infringement on Turkish sovereignty.21 In order to avoid upsetting Turkish susceptibilities, the Court did not also give an opinion on the exchangeability of the senior clerics of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 22 Since the opinion of the Court was acceptable to both parties, negotiations at the mixed commission proceeded with greater smoothness. The immediate reaction to the Court ruling in Athens and in the Greek circles in istanbul was one of relief. The dispute had intensified Greek suspicions that the Turks simply employed the erablis question as a pretext to achieve the complete exchange of Constantinopolitan Greeks and Thracian Muslims. 23 Such a prospect was an anathema to Greece for the Greek mainland, saturated with Ottoman Greeks, was unable to absorb more urban refugees. 4. The dispute over the non-exchangeable Greeks absent from istanbul>
While the Turks agreed to resolve the question oftheerablis at the negotiating table and to refrain from unilateral action at the expense of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, the controversy over the status of the Greek population continued down to the year of 1930. Another knotty problem confronting Greek and Turkish mediators was the future of about 30-40,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks and their property. Although they fulfilled the conditions of article 2 of the exchange convention, these Greeks had fled istanbul during the panic of September/October 1922. After the establishment of political stability in Turkey these absent non-exchangeable Greeks wished to return to istanbul and regain their abandoned property. Further, by the provisions of article 16 of the exchange convention Greeks established in the city in October 1918, but who departed thereafter, were free to return. Nonexchangeable absent Constantinopolitan Greeks could also benefit from the provisions of the amnesty convention signed at Lausanne. 1 The Turkish government, however, was at no time willing to consent to the return of absent Greeks unless they were in possession of passports issued by the Turkish republic (proclaimed on 29 October 1923). These Greeks, the Turkish government maintained, were «undesirables» for they had demonstrated their antipathy towards the new regime by fleeing rather than welcoming the nationalist order of modem Turkey. As a result, they were considered 2L Ibid., pp. 20-22. 22. See chapter V:4> 23. Cheetham to Foreign Office, Athens, 29 October 1924, FO 371/10185/E9739. L See chapter IlI:4.
117
as having forfeited their right to Turkish citizenship. In addition, they comprised the wealthier and more articulate section of the Greek population in istanbul. By obstructing their return, the Turks not only freed themselves of many prominent members of the community but they also delivered a severe blow to the economic power of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. The property of the absent Greeks, estimated at between £200,000 and £400,000 sterling, were at first simply registered by the authorities. 2 But after the enforcement of the abandoned property law of 20 April 1922 in istanbul, the Turks began to confiscate it. The seizure of such abandoned properties alarmed the Constantinopolitan Greek community and Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis addressed protest letters to the Allied high commissioners. After expressing his indignation Meletios compared the law to the acts of the «Bolchevico-Communisme de Moscou».3 The confiscations were intensified when Ankara passed a more detailed law on 23 April 1923. The new legislation hit particularly hard the absent Greeks, for it provided for the confiscation of property transferTed by owners immediately before their departure.-l Before leaving their homes the absent Greeks had invariably authorized a relative or a friend to take care of their possessions. By the end of 1924 the more valuable properties of the absent and Hellene Greek~ had been largely distributed amongst «ministers and notables of whom Ismet Pasha is one». 5 More modest accomodation was used for housing the incoming exchangeable Muslims from Greece. It appears that 50 out of approximately 250 properties belonging to nonexchangeable absent Greeks were of considerable value. These were: 6 a. The Leonidas Zariphis property next to the British Embassy at Galatasaray (ITaVpoJp0J11r b. The Chatzopoulo commercial house (han) in Stamboul (MahmutI I
"
"
pa~a).
c. The Siniosoglou property; a block of newly built apartments at Grand Rue de Pera (istiklc11 Caddesi), including the Kallivrousi commercial house initially valued at 207,856 TL. d. Shares of Alexander Siniosoglou in six large business concerns. He also owned the stadium of Taksim . 2, Anninos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 28 December 1922 and 4 January 1923, YE/A/5VI. 3. Meletios to Henderson, Cons., 7 January 1923, FO 371/9128/E630; Meletios to Venizelos, Cons., 8 January 1923, YE/A/5VL 4. Text of the law in FO 371/9128/E4676. Also Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 30 April 1923, FO 371/9128/E4313. 5. Lindsay to MacDonald, Cons., 8 October 1924, FO 371/10172/E8863. 6. Sakellaropoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons" 28 October 1928, YE/A/5VI.
118
e. A block of flats at Pera which was bought by Hamit Kadirzade for 252,203 TL in February 1926. f. Property of the Iliaskou family, particularly a private house in the island of Chalki (Heybeli) which was donated to ismet inonii. g. A block of flats at Grand Rue de Pera (istiklc11 Caddesi) owned by Tsaousoglou. h. The Sismanoglou property. j. Pera Palas hotel, the most luxurious hotel in istanbul. k. The Olivo Pasaj with all its offices and shops as well as the Stamboul han at Sultanhamam, both owned by Xanthopoulos. 1. Property of the Portokaloglou family. m. Company shares and property of Alexander Kioseoglou. In Greece, the condition of the majority of the non-exchangeable absent Greeks became intolerable. For instance, the eminent publisher of the oldest newspaper in istanbul, Neo},oyoC; (founded in 1866), Stavros Voutyras died penniless in Athens in 1923. Unable to receive any revenue from their property in istanbul, the absent Greeks found inadequate accomodation in the refugee districts of Athens. Because the Greek government treated them as temporary political exiles rather than permanent immigrants, they were unable to even benefit from the various resettlement schemes. Meanwhile, realising that Greece might be forced to sign away their rights for the sake of an .overall agreement with Turkey, they organized themselves into a relatively powerful pressure group. They then strove to publicize their cause. Accordingly, in a meeting held at the Athenian theatre Kvpt}'lJ on 12 April 1925, the absent Greeks reiterated their desire to return to istanbul and urged the Greek government to refrain from signing away their legitimate rights. The meeting made a considerable impact for it was attended by 1,200 absent Greeks. Calling itself the «Commission Executive chargee de la defense des Grecs, sujets turcs, etablis aConstantinople et sejournant provisoirement en Grece», it addressed lengthy memoranda to the League of Nations and the mixed commission requesting assistance for their claims.7 In an attempt to convey the wishes of the committee to the League of Nations, Paul Karatheodoris, former patriarchal counsellor and now a leading absent Greek, was despatched to Switzerland in October 1925. 8 Yet, the Turkish determination to prevent the return of the non-exchangeable Greeks absent 7, Copies of four such memoranda addressed to the League and dated on I June, 14 July, 20 August 1925 and 18 March 1926 in FO 371/10865jE4857, FO 371/10860/E6294 and LN/CA02.1926.I. 8, Letter of Karatheodoris to Foreign Office forwarded by Cambell, 23 October 1925, FO 371/10860/E6385.
119
from istanbul did not waver. In addition on 23 May 1927 the Turkish assembly authorized that: 9 «those Ottoman subjects who did not take part in the national struggle and remained outside Turkey during the War of Independence and have not returned to Turkish territory during the period between July 24, 1923 and the promulgation of the present law, be deprived of Turkish nationality». 5. Turkish grievances about the treatment of Muslims in Greek Thrace. The Turks, too, accused the Greeks of violating article 16 of the exchange convention. As noted earlier, on 31 October 1924, Fethi Okyar took the opportunity to draw the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to the non-exchangeable Muslims in Greek Thrace. «More than 50,000 Turks in Western Thrace», the Turkish representative asserted, «whose property has been confiscated by the Greek Government, are not able to resume possession of their property and are in a state of lamentable destitution».1 This was followed up by demands of the Turkish press that retaliatory action be taken against Constantinopolitan Greeks for the illegal behaviour of the Greeks in Greek Thrace. In this the Turkish side had a legitimate grievance. Destitute and homeless refugees from Eastern Thrace had crossed the Maritza river in the autumn of 1922 and found refuge in Greek Thrace. While freely seizing property and livestock, the refugees set up villages on lands owned by Thracian Muslims.2 Although local Greek homes and property were also requisitioned for the same purpose, the impact of these intrusions on the Muslim community was far greater. Forced sharing of habitations was particularly resented by the Thracian Muslims, a deeply religious community. Because oftheir religious and family traditions, the Muslim home was quite unsuitable for the dwelling together of people of different religions. Further, given the national hatred and animosities aroused by the war and by the personal misfortunes of the refugees, no friendly and peaceful cohabitation could have existed between the local Muslims and the dispossessed refugees from Turkey. Forced cohabitation, therefore, was such a serious inconvenience that there was a disposition among the Thracian Muslims to leave their region and go to Turkey. There was also a basic psychological factor at work. With the arrival
9. See CA. Macartney, National States and National Minorities. London 1934, p. 392. L LNO] (November 1924) 1666. 2. Memorandum of the president of the Thrace subcommittee, Tchazman (Komotini) to the president of the mixed commission (Cons . ). 5 November 1924. YEjA.
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of tens of thousands of Greek refugees in the region, the hitherto dominant Muslim element of Greek Thrace was now reduced to a mere minority.3 While admitting that the situation was far from satisfactory, the Greek government pointed out that Greek Thrace was the first region on the way of the refugees coming by land Turkey. Since Macedonia was filled with refugees from Anatolia, the refugees coming by land were retained in Greek Thrace until Macedonia was cleared. The measures taken in Greek Thrace, Athens reassured. affected all natives. Greeks and Muslims alike. Finally, the Greek government promised to pay indemnity for the requisitions and seizures of Muslim property. Accordingly. the evacuation of Muslim property began in 1924. In a telegram dated 10 February 1924, Greek Prime Minister George Kaphandaris communicated to the governor ofThrace the decision of the government to transfer gradually 40,000 out of the 100,000 refugees of Greek Thrace to other parts of Greece. Concurrently with this gradual evacuation, the government intended to purchase large Muslim properties for the settlement of the remaining refugees.'; As George Roussos, the Greek foreign minister, revealed on 29 November 1924, 16,000 refugees were removed from Greek Thrace. 5 Likewise. the government began to return seized properties to their Thracian Muslim owners.1> Conditions had somewhat improved by April 1925. when the neutral members of the mixed commission carried out a thorough investigation in Greek Thrace. Thus, out of 13.833 rooms seized in 1922 only 5,927 were still under the occupation of the refugees. From the 127 requisitioned schools and mosques 85 were returned to the Muslim community, while the occupied area of land was reduced from 100,153 stremmata to 22.159. 7 This improvement was brought about by the construction of new dwellings for the refugees, erected on land expropriated from the natives of Greek Thrace, including Muslims. According to the findings of this inquiry a total of 6,506 houses were either constructed or were in the process of construction, on land of which 1896 stremmata had been expropriated for this purpose from Muslims. The payment of indemnities on these expropriations was in progress. Large rural 3. The results of an extensive inquiry carried out in Western Thrace (MarchjApriI1925) by the neutral members of the mixed commission were outlined in a memorandum by M. de Lara entitled «Minorite Turque en Thrace Occidentale», 28 May 1925, YEjA. 4. Kaphandaris to Kourtidis, Athens, 10 February 1925, YEjA 5. Roussos to Greek Consulate in Cons., 29 November 1924, YEjA. 6. Kourtidis (Komotini) to Greek delegation at the mixed commission (Cons.), 19 November 1924, YEjA; Report by the department of colonisation, Komotini, no. 128212, nd., and memorandum entitled «Assistance to the Muslims», Didymoteichon, 16 October 1924, YEjA 7. A stremma is equivalent to about a quarter of an acre. Only lands of small rural properties included in this figure. Large estates are excluded.
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estates (~'ijliks), comprising land of an area above 300 stremmata, and abandoned properties were also occupied by the government. An area of 204,331 streml7lata from a total of 467, 191 (or about 11/25) classified as large rural estates were occupied. Moreover, an area of 82,392 stremmata of small properties was also seized as abandoned property.8 Another report drawn by a similar team of investigation in November 1928 indicated a decisive improvement of the lot of the Thracian Muslims. Gradually permanent settlement was provided for 17,000 refugees families in 208 villages. Of these only 53 villages were constructed on land partially evacuated by its Muslim farmers. Y If the occupation of houses and small properties had come almost to an end, Turkish discontent with the treatment of their minority in Greek Thrace continued. The Turkish press launched an intensive campaign against the Greek treatment of the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace. lo Relations between Greece and Turkey reached a low ebb when, during the enquiry carried on by the mixed commission in Greek Thrace in November 1928, the Turkish member. Cemal Hiisnii, claimed to have discovered grave irTegularities in the treatment of Muslims. He informed journalists attending the commission on its tour that he heard of a «Turkish boy» who was refused schooling by the Muslim school committee because he wore a hat instead of the traditional fez. From this, the Turkish representative deduced that the Greek authorities favoured the conservative element in the community, which was opposed to the secular ['efomls introduced by the Ankara regime. 11 The Greek side strongly objected to the attitude of the Turkish delegate accusing him of deliberately trying to prejudice relations between the two countries. His indignation, the Greeks assessed, was not due to the maltreatment of this minority but rather to the marked indifference of Thracian Muslims to the innovations introduced by the nationalists in Turkey. Their favouring of the fez and their ignorance of the new Latin alphabet was, according to the Greeks, the result of the inherent religious conservatism of the Thracian Muslim community.12 8. «Minorite Turque en Thrace Occidentale» drawn by M. de Lara on behalf of the neutral members of the mixed commission, 28 May 1925, YE/A. 9. Special report by Holstad to the mixed commission, 17 November 1928, YE/A. By May 1927, only for the purchase of 47 large estates the Greek government paid to Muslim owners 45,042,915 drachmas, see Ladas, op. cit., p. 520. 10. Cumhuriyet, 5 July 1928; Milliyet, 19 January and 13 November 1928, press cuttings in YE/B/37. 1L Clerk to Chamberlain, Ankara, 29 November 1928, FO 371/I3097/E5859; Ladas, op. cit., pp.494-95. 12. Loraine to Chamberlain, Athens, 27 November 1928, FO 371/13085/E5868.
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Nor did the neutral members of the inquiry share the misgivings of the Turkish delegate,13 Indeed, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the Greek government tried to destabilize its Muslim minority. Such an action would have clearly been against Greek interests, for Greece was quite vulnerable on the issue of minorities. If Greece attempted to use its Muslim minority as a bargaining tool, the Turks might have retaliated by expelling the prosperous Constantinopolitan Greek community en masse. Nor the reciprocal expUlsion of the Muslim farmers of Greece would have remedied the situation. Turkey had all along welcomed the exchange of the entire Greek minority in return for the Muslim farmers of Thrace. Such a population would have been absorbed easily in sparsely populated Anatolia. In Greece, however. the arrival of about 120,000 urban refugees from istanbul would have meant chaos. As a result, the Greek government tried to appease its Muslim minority. Three fl1lijlis (Xanthi, Komotini and Didymoteichon) continued to be responsible for the administration of the community and govern it through the Islamic law. These were nominated by the leadership of the Muslim community and were paid a salary by the Greek government. Three Muslim deputies were elected to the Greek parliament and in 1927. there were 15 Muslim mayors ((jllpaplol). 5 assistant-mayors (nap8(jpol) and 175 local councillors. By 1928. the National Bank of Greece had advanced large sums of money as loans to the Muslim farmers. 14 Similar assistance was made available in the educational field. Thus, in 1929- 30, the Greek government forwarded 4,489.000 drachmas for the maintenance of Muslim religious, educational. and cultural institutions. ls Nor did the authorities interfere in the administration of the Muslim/Turkish schools. From 305 such schools in Thrace only 28 included Greek language courses in their curriculum during the academic year of 1928-29. Cultural organizations with strong Kemalist leanings. as the Turkish Youth Hearth (Tiirk Genr;lik YlIrdll) , were also tolerated. I (, While the anti- Kemalist Muslim Thracians were on the whole satisfied with the Greek administration a small but vociferous group of Panturkists pressed for the turkification of the ethnologically heterogeneous minority. Perhaps the most tangible proof of an improvement in conditions was the actual increase of the Muslim population of Thrace during the 1920s.
13. Special report by Holstad to the Mixed commission. 17 November 1928. YE/A. 14. «Comparative examination of the application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty in Greece and Turkey», memorandum produced by the Greek Foreign Ministry for Venizelos, 1930, BMAEVj58. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid.
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Thus, while there were 86,793 Muslim during an interallied census of 30 March 1920,17 this had reached to 126,017 at the official Greek census of 1928. 18 To the Turks, however, such measures were inadequate. Responding to the expropriations of 1922-23 in Greek Thrace, the Turkish government retaliated by seizing Hellenic and abandoned property in istanbul. Such requisitions and counter-requisitions were frequent in the post-Lausanne period. As a result the position of both minorities was made precarious by the persistently strained Greek-Turkish relations. Difficulties over the treatment of the minorities were of such a serious nature as to cause both parties to appeal repeatedly to the League of Nations. 19 In turn, by debating the minority question in an inernational forum and by undertaking inquiries in istanbul and Greek Thrace, the League provided a safety-valve for the growing ill-feeling in both countries. 6. Greek-Turkish negotiations and the agreements of 1925-26. The strained relations between Greece and Turkey during 1924- 25 were in part due to the instability of both governments concerned. A series of somewhat ineffective republican governments in Athens were unable to corne to an
17. This was the first scientific census of the area taken by the interallied authorities who governed Thrace in 1919-20, The division of the population was as follows: Turks (Muslims) , , , .. , 0, , 0, , . , ' , . Bulgarians 0' .. "., .... , .. 0, , , , , . Greeks "" .... " ...... ,'," 0... , Pomaks (Muslims) . 0..... '" 00.. 0' Jews ",000.' 00, , . , 0, , .. , . 0, , . 0, Armenians, . , ..... ". 0... "', 0" Gypsies (Muslims) , " , , , , , '0,00",
73,220 69,154 51,706 11,739 3,000 1,969 1,834
212.622 Total 0, ,. ,0" "'00,0 '0'0."" ", For details about this census see D. Mitrany, The Effects of the War in South Eastern Europe, Yale 1936. pp. 224-26. 18. This figure includes the whole Muslim population of Greece. But since the exchange of populations the overwhelming majority of the Hellenic Muslims (with the exception of some 25.000 Albanian Muslims in Epirus) lived in Thrace. For the 1928 census see Statistical results of the population census of Greece conducted in 15116 May 1928, Athens 1935. table II, p. 246 ff. 19. Memorandum by the Greek government to the General-Secretary of the League ofN ations on the situation of the minority of Turkish race in Western Thrace 5 March 1925, LN/C.130, 1925. VII, and on the situation of the Greek minority at Constantinople, 6 March 1925, LN IC. 131, 1925. VII Two corresponding memoranda communicated by the Turkish government to the League of Nations on6 March 1925, LN/C.134.1925.VII and LN/C, 135, 19250 VII. On the expulsion of Patriarch Constantine and the Greek appeal to the League see chapter V:4.
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agreement with Ankara on the sensitive outstanding Greek-Turkish questions. In Ankara, on the other hand, the government of liberal Fethi Okyar, supported by the newly formed Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver ClIInlzuriyet Firkasi), faced strong Kemalist pressure. To strengthen his position in the assembly, Fethi Okyar took a number of anti-foreign ~easures. The suppression of the Orient News, an anglophone newspaper of Istanbul, was one instance; another and more important one was the expulsion of the patriarch from Turkey on 30 January 1925. 1 But both the Fethi Okyar government and the opposition party were short-lived and on 3 March 1925, ismet inonu returned to power. The new Turkish government adopted a less instransigent attitude towards Greece. The end of political isolation, the Kurdish revolts, the problem of internal reform, and the general sentiment that the western world and the League were hostile to Turkish interests especially in Mosul and iskenderun (Alexandretta) were factors which con~ tributed to this new attitude;:! Faced with constitutional and economic difficulties, the government of Andreas Michalakopoulos welcomed the new Turkish attitude. An improvement in political relations was reported by the Greek charge d'affaires in Ankara, John Politis in late March 1925.3 By early April 1925 negotiations were resumed and were successfully concluded on 21 June 1925, when George Exindaris and Hamdi, presidents of the Greek and Turkish delegations to the mixed commission respectively, signed the Ankara accord. This agreement attempted to solve the intractable financial and legal questions arising from the exchange of more than 1.500,000 people.~ The second section of the agreement dealt specifically witl) the interpretation of articles 2 and 16 of the exchange convention. It dealt with the status and property of non-exchangeable Greeks with Turkish nationality and Muslims of Greek Thrace with Hellenic nationality. Under the terms of the agreement the Turks recognized as etablis «all the Greeks present in Constantinople prior to October 30, 1918 and now present there», without any examination into «the intention of permanence of residence». E.'tablis both Greeks and Turks should b: free to return to their homes in istanbul and Greek Thrace respectively, WIth the exception of those who left these localities without regular passports. Such persons had the right to dispose freely of their property. Where actual restitution was impossible, fair compensation was to be paid by the I. For a detailed analysis see chapter V. 2. See Psomiades, Eastern Question, pp. 102-103. 3. Lindsay to Chamberlain, Cons., 23 March 1925, FO 371/10868/E1927. 4. For a detailed analysis of the financial stipUlations of the Exindaris-Hamdi agreement see Ladas, op.cit., pp. 506-07.
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government in whole territory the properties were situated. Greece, therefore. was not required to evacuate Greek refugees settled on Muslim property in Thrace. so long as the «recognized minority rights» of Muslims there were upheld. These provisions of the agreement were advantageous to the Greek side. In return, however, Greece had to make a major concession over the issue of non-exchangeable absent Greeks. Article 4 of the Ankara accord stated that: 5 «the Greek and Turkish governments have the power respectively to refuse the right of return to absent persons who had left the country without a regular passport, respectively Greek or Turkish». Despite the reciprocal character of the clause, it was intended to restrict the return of 30-40,000 non-exchangeable Greeks who had left istanbul without regular Turkish passports, Persons in this category, however, were permitted to liquidate their estates in istanbul through agents within a fixed period of four years. Quite clearly the major beneficiary of the accord were the Constantinopolitan Greeks with Turkish nationality and Thracian Muslims with Hellenic nationality, who were allowed to remain undisturbed in their respective districts with full property rights, The Ankara accord was hailed as the beginning of a new era of close political co-operation between Ankara and Athens. In the following month Greece and Turkey exchanged ministers, establishing normal relations for the first time since the Balkan wars of 1912-13. Despite the willingness ofthe two governments to establish cordial relations, the Ankara accord was never put into effect. At first the neutral members of the mixed commission refused to endorse the draft agreement signed at Ankara. This was because the new provisions, and especially the restrictions imposed on the rights ofthe absent non-exchangeable Greeks, were in disagreement with the exchange convention. The attitude of the mixed commission was to a large extent the result of pressure exerted by the commission executive chargee de la defense des Crees, slIjets tllres, etablis d Constantinople et sejollrnant provisoirement en Crece, More significantly. despite their willingness to establish full diplomatic relations, both governments had some misgivings about the stipulations of the agreement. In the hope of achieving better terms, they appeared ready to renegotiate. 6 In addition, the fall of the democratically elected Michalakopoulos government and the establishment of a military dictatorship put an end to the diplomatic work done during March-June 1925. Greek dictator, General Pangalos came to power on 25 June 1925, four days after the 5.lbid .. pp, 507-08.517. 6 . Politis to Rentis, Cons .. 24 September 1925 and Politis to Roufos, Cons .. 16 March 1926. both in BMAIP/228/14. 1~6
signing of the Ankara accord. He refused to take positive action and practically ignored Turkey, failing to send instructions to Pericles Argyropoulos, the Greek representative in Turkey, He prolonged the ratification of the Ankara accord to such an extent that the Turks asked for renegotiations. 7 The spirit of conciliation achieved during the Michalakopoulos government was further undermined by the revanchist and undiplomatic speeches of Pangalos. Aspiring to occupy Eastern Thrace and istanbul, he strove to find ways of allying himself with Britain and Italy, who both had outstanding questions with Turkey at that time. s His ill-conceived overtures, however, produced no benefit to Greece. With the settlement of the Mosul question, the British sought stability in the Near and Middle East. 9 Considering that the foreign policy objectives of Pangalos would have a destabilizing effect in the area, the Foreign Office now frowned at Pangalos. Nor did the Greek dictator score a lasting understanding with Rome. 10 Consequently, the ensuing Greek political isolation turned his outworn objectives into embarrassing phantoms that stalked the brief remainder of his term in office. Hardly equipped to deal with questions of diplomacy, Pangalos, a man of small political and moral stature, managed to antagonize most of Greece' s Balkan neighbours, giving the impression of pursuing a revisionist policy. The dictator's public provocations created new psychological barriers against any meaningful dialogue with Turkey. In the light of decades of territorial wranglings between the two countries, a prompt Turkish reaction was inevitable. Accusing Pangalos of harbouring revisionist designs against Turkey. Ankara moved troops to the Thracian frontier. Similarly, at the negotiating table, the Turks shattered the glassy cordiality achieved in June 1925 by making new and intractable demands, At the same time, the Turks launched a new wave of confiscations of abandoned Greek property in istanbul. On 12 March 1926, the Turkish assembly passed a law stipUlating that immovable property of non-exchangeable persons, seized by the authorities as abandoned, should pass to the full ownership of refugees housed in them since 1923. Incidently, it was during this period that the authorities seized and removed to Ankara the famous library of the Greek literary society (E)i.lll'IKO:;;
7, H.I. Psomiades, "The diplomacy of Theodoros Pangalos, 1925-1926», BS 13 (1972) 7. 8, Ibid., pp, 11-29. The Council of the League of Nations decided to attach the disputed Mosul to Iraq on 16 December 1925, This persuaded the Turks to conclude a treaty with Great Britain and Iraq on 5 June 1926 accepting the League's decision, 10. A Kyrou, 'Owpa Kai npaj'f.1aTlKoT'lre:;. Athens 1972, pp. 73-74,
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collections of manuscripts. archives and books. Thus, Pangalos' irrational approach to Greek-Turkish problems not only proved an obstacle to a fruitful dialogue between the two countries but also harmed considerably the Greek financial interests in Turkey.11 Meaningful negotiations between the two governments began only after the fall of the Pangalos dictatorship in August 1926. Finally, on 1 December 1926, an agreement was signed in Athens by Pericles Argyropoulos and ~iikrii Sara<;:oglu for Greece and Turkey respectively. It was ratified in February 1927 and ratifications were exchanged in Athens on 23 June 1927. 12 The first part of the Athens accord dealt with the thorny question of properties in Greece owned by Muslims who were not subject to the terms of the exchange convention, and who had left Greece before 12 October 1912, or who had always resided outside Greece. By signing the «Declaration Relating to Moslem Properties in Greece» at Lausanne on 24 July 1923, the Greeks accorded to these Muslims complete freedom as regards the disposition of their property.13 Now with the Argyropoulos-Sara<;:oglu agreement, the terms of the 1923 declaration were redefined and expanded. It included as beneficiaries not only the Muslims and Greeks who had left Greek and Turkish territory before 18 October 1912, or who had resided all the time outside of the two states, but also Greek and Turkish subjects owning property in Turkey and Greece whose nationality was not changed as a result of the exchange convention. Such properties were to be purchased by each government on agreed conditions of valuation and then balance accounts. The Greek government conceded to earmark £500,000 to cover at least part of its anticipated debit. All Muslim properties in Greek Thrace and urban properties in the rest of Greece, and all Hellenic and non-exchangea~le properties in istanbul were exempted from the new arrangement. PropertIes included in such categories were to be restored to their owners within a month of the enforcement of the Athens agreement. Undoubtedly, the Athens accord was less favourable to Greece th~n the one concluded a year earlier in Ankara. In contrast, Turkey emerged WIth the lion's share, since it was almost inconceivable that the property of some 400,000 Hellene Muslims should be worth £500,000 more than the property of about 1,500,000 prosperous Anatolian and Thracian Greeks. Greece seemed on the whole prepared to accept these rather unfavourable terms in 11. P. Argyropoulos, 'ArrojJ.I''ljJ.ovevjJ.ara, Athens 1970, pp. 359-60. 12. Original text in LNTS lxviii/pp. 12-34; Ladas, op.cit .. pp. 799-S16. 13. It was also known as Declaration IX, for details see Psomiades, Eastern Question, pp. TJ.SL
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return for the settlement of the emotive issue of the etablis. As a result, article 2 of the Athens agreement confirmed the definition of the term etablis agreed upon in the unratified Ankara accord of June 1925. Summerizing the Greek considerations, the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir George Clerk, explained that «the Greek delegation made special sacrifices to secure the maintenance of the protocol of 1925». He then went on to disclosed that according to his calculations 35,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks were to benefit from the settlement of the etablis problem. 14 7. Prolonged Greek-Turkish negotiations. Despite the initial goodwill of both governments which followed the overthrow of Pangalos, the property question was so hopelessly entangled that there was little progress in the execution of the Athens accord throughout 1927 and 1928. The evaluation of properties which were to be acquired by the two governments proved a matter of immense complication. The Greek government contended that the value of land in Greece, where land was scarce and labour plentiful, was greater than in Turkey, where land was plentiful and labour scarce. l Recriminations over the appraisal, liquidation and restoration of properties blocked any meaningful progress in the execution of the Athens agreement. Pressured by powerful refugee organizations. the democratically-elected coalition government of Athens refused to restore the properties of 119 Turkish claimants who were recognized as non-exchangeables by the mixed commission.2 As it might have been expected, the Turkish government retaliated with further confiscations of Greek property in istanbul. Nor did the Turks show any genuine interest in restoring Hellenic and abandoned non-exchangeable Greek property in istanbul. the mixed commission reopened the whole issue of the etablis. This was brought about, when M. de Lara tried to disregard the text agreed upon in the Ankara accord of 21 June 1925. As previously remarked, the definition given to the term etablis in the Ankara accord was later on confirmed by the Athens agreement. A decision taken by the mixed commission on 19 March 1927 stipulated that all Greeks present in the city were to be considered as etablis within the meaning of article 2 of the exchange convention, provided that they 14. Clerk to Chamberlain, Cons., IS February 1927, FO 371/12318/E988. See also Ladas, op. cit., pp. 4OS-IL 1. Clerk to Chamberlain, Cons., IO May and 21 June 1925 in FO 371/13085/E2547 and FO 371/13096/E3223 respectively. 2. Ibid. This intransigence was later char'acterized by Venizelos as «a serious political mistake». see Le Messager d'Athelles. IS and 19 June 1930.
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were there before 30 October 1918. Their establishment there prior to that date can be proven by any means of evidence. Thus, with this decision, the mixed commission endorsed the broad definition of the term etablis bestowed by the Ankara accord. 3 Despite these explicit provisions, General de Lara on 16 June 1927. continued to claim that Greek presence in istanbul before October 1918 could at best be regarded as a presumption in favour of their intention to establish themselves in that city and not necessarily as a proof of their right to be included in the etablis category.4 Taking advantage of the confusion aroused by the Spanish General's statements, the Turks hinted that they might expel 20.000 Constantinopolitan Greeks because they could not prove their «intention of establishment». The Greek government immediately warned the Turks against the <
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1928 hinted that an exchange of populations between Constantinopolitan
and Thracian minorities would ease Greek-Turkish differences. Such an exchange, it went on to conclude, could be completed within six months and the Patriarchate would then be removed to a Greek town, such as Thessaloniki. According to the former Greek minister in Ankara Pericles Argyropoulos similar views were expressed by the Foreign Minister Tevfik Ri.i~tU Aras. who on several occasions proposed an exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey.l 0 Although eager to reduce the size of the Constantinopolitan Greek community, there is no conclusive evidence to support the belief that Turkey aimed at an immediate and complete exchange of minorities. Instead, the Turks used the threat of expulsion as a lever in their negotiations with Greece. For Ankara was convinced that Greece, in order to maintain its minority and the Patriarchate in istanbul, would ultimately be more accomodating on such outstanding questions as Muslim properties in Greece.!! The Greek government, on the other hand, was clearly unable to counterbalance these tactics by retaliatory measures against the Muslim minority in Greece. This might have prompted an expUlsion of Greeks from istanbul, an eventuality which was repugnant to all Greek leaders.12 Ever since 1922, Athens had repeatedly intimated that such an expUlsion of the Constantinopolitan Greeks would trigger off a Greek-Turkish war. Indeed, by 1929 relations reached such a low point that Foreign Minister Andreas Michalakopoulos did not conceal from Sir Percy Loraine, the British ambassador in Athens, that a «crash» between Greece and Turkey was not impossible. 13 Sharing the same view the Cumhuriyet of 5 March 1929 predicted that a Greek- Turkish war was «unavoidable». 8. Till'key and Greek educational and cultural institutions.
The inability of both governments to resolve their differences exposed the Greek minority in Turkey to considerable harassment and inconvenience. In their drive for the turkification of istanbul, the Turkish authorities managed to impair irrevocably the once flourishing cultural and educational establish-
10. Harvey to Henderson. Athens, 1 August 1929. FO 371/13811/E3902. 11. As Argyropoulos indicated «because of the superior wealth and numbers of the Greek community in istanbul. the Greek card will always be trumped (at the Greek-Turkish negotiations»>. ibid. 12. Loraine to Chamberlain. Athens, 4 February 1929, FO 371/13810/E812. 13. Loraine to Chamberlain. Athens, 17 May 1929, FO 371/13811/E2514.
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ments of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. A notable example in this context was the seizure of the building and the contents of the Greek literary society ( '£)).rj VlK(X; cfJlJ.oi.oI'IKO;· Lvi.i.ol'o:; Kwvara\'T/\'ovn:oi.cw:;). At first, the Turkish authorities ordered its closure under the law concerning societies in Turkey. In 1925, however, the Turks seized officially the actual premises of the society and confiscated its movable property. In vain did the Greek delegates of the mixed commission point out that this action was contrary to the exchange convention of 1923. This agreement provided that movable property should either be taken by the exchangeables to Greece (article 8) or retained by the non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greek community (article 16).1 But the Turks were not prepared to let the rich archives and library of the Syllogos go. Instead, they transferTed part of the material to the newly founded cultural and literary associations in Ankara, while the rest was distributed amongst the Turkish libraries in istanbuL2 The impressive building of the Syllogos was at first transformed into party headquarters of the RPP, then it was used as a Turkish orphanage and finally as a court of justice. 3 Other famous Constantinopolitan Greek associations, such as the society of Greek lawyers and doctors, suffered similar fate. 4 At the same time, the creation of new minority non-political associations was strictly discouraged. Nor were the Greek schools immune from such government restrictions. Further. restrictive laws enacted by Ankara often went counter to the educational freedom guaranteed by article 40 of the minority clauses of the treaty of Lausanne. As previously remarked. non-Muslims enjoyed wide educational autonomy under the Ottoman millet system, but this system was first challenged by the Young Turk administration which aimed at the establishment of a more uniform educational order. Thus, thanks to the laws of 1908 and 1915, I. Article 8 stipulated that «the members of each community (including the personnel of mosques, tekkes, medresses, churches, convents. schools, hospitals, societies, associations and juridical persons, or other foundations of any nature whatever) which is to leave the territory of one of the Contracting States under the present Convention, shall have the right to take away freely or to arrange for the transport of the movable property belonging to their communities . The fullest facilities for transport shall be provided by the authorities of the two countries.» 2. Societies which are currently in possession of material belonging to the Syl/ogos are the Turkish Historical Association ITiirk Tarih Kurt/mu), the Turkish Language Society (Tiirk Dil KlIrumll) , the Public Library of Ankara, the Siileymaniye library in istanbul and various other literary associations, see P. Moraux. Bibliotheqlle de la Societe TlIrqlle d'Histoire. Catalogue de Manuscrits Grecs (Fonds du Syl/ogos). Ankara 1964, pp. 3-24. 3. By 1941 this building fell in disuse and was bought by a Greek, Nicholas Tsitouris, in an attempt to save it from total destruction. But Turkish public opinion reacted unfavourably to this transaction and the state rebought it a year later . By September 1955, Syl/ogos was entirely abandoned and vandalized. It was subsequently demolished. 4. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 4 July 1923. YE/A/5 .
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the ministry of public instruction became responsible for the supervision of all, Muslim and non-Muslim, school curricula in the country. Concurrently, the teaching of the Turkish language and Ottoman history were made compulsory by an educational law in 1909. Such regulations were somewhat relaxed during the Allied occupation ofistanbul, but were renewed in a more vigorous manner after the reestablishment of Turkish rule in istanbul in 1923. Not only the Turkish language and history, but also geography, patriotic studies and lessons of physical fitness were now taught in Turkish. 5 To obtain a teaching certificate all Greek teachers had to pass a Turkish language examination. 6 An investigation on the past political activities of Constantinopolitan Greek teachers was undertaken by Salih Zeki, general-secretary of the ministry of public instruction. Together with the Hellene Greeks, a substantial number of experienced teachers were found «unfit to teach in the schools of the Turkish Republic». 7 Not only did the Ankara government appoint Turkish teachers in the Greek minority schools, but it also regulated their salaries. Thus, the monthly salary for Turkish teachers in minority schools were fixed at 40 to 60 TL. Non compliance with these regulations, the authorities cautioned, would result in the closure of schools. 8 By 1926 salaries of Turkish teachers alone accounted for 2/5 of the entire community school budget. 9 With limited resources and unable to obtain any government subsidies, the community schools tried to meet their grave financial difficulties through donations from parishioners. Such contributions however proved insufficient, and in 1925 the authorities shut down four Greek primary schools at Yenimahale, Altlmermer, Hask6y and Salmatombruk on the pretext that the Turkish teachers were not paid regularly. I 0 The parish school of Tatavla (Kurtulu§) followed suit a year later. As early as 10 November 1922, Patriarch Meletios warned E. Kanellopoulos, the Greek representative in istanbul, that without the «moral and material assistance» of the Greek government, the community schools were doomed to vanish. 11 The Greek consul-general in the city, K. Diamandopoulos, 5. Diamandopoulos to Roussos, Cons., 18 November 1924, YE/B/33. 6. Turkish government encyclical, no. 3109/2110, Politis to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 30 April and 8 May 1925, both in YE/B/33. 7. By 1924, 156 teachers (104 with Turkish and 52 with Greek nationality) were dismissed. A detailed memorandum by Stylianopoulos, Cons., 2 February 1924, YE/B/33. 8. Government encyclical to the minority schools, printed in Tevhit. 23 December 1923. 9. Vryzas to Foreign Ministry, Cons .. 30 October 1926, YE/B/33. 10. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., I December 1925, YE/B/33. Cf. LN/C.!31.1925.VII, 6 March 1925. II. Meletios to Kanellopoulos, Cons., 10 November 1922, YE/B/33: Parish council of Dercos (fiVe signatures) to Foreign Minister, Therapeia. 7 December 1922.
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shared this dim view. In an appraisal of the situation in 1925, he reported that the Greek exodus, uncertainty about the future, Turkish restrictions and financial difficulties posed a grave threat to the future of the minority schools. Without Greek government assistance, he predicted, the Greek schools in istanbul would be soon turkified. 12 Faced with little choice, Athens increased its annual subsidy to Constantinopolitan Greek community institutions to 100,000 TL. 13 Turkish pressures against Greek schools were manyfold. The chief Greek high-school for girls, Zappeion was closed for the academic year 1925-26, because of a statue in the building presenting the founder in the classical Greek cheiton. Reporting to Ankara that the founder was depicted in the Hellenic national costume, the local Turkish inspector recommended the closure of the school. 14 The patriarchal college of languages and commerce and the commercial school in Chalki (Heybeli) were also shut when technical education became a state monopoly. The Apostolidis lycee suffered a similar fate in 1926 because it received subsidies from the French government. 15 Of all these high-schools only Zappeion survives today. The closure of such schools that provided the best specialized training in foreign languages and commerce, had a detrimental effect on the education of Constantinopolitan Greek students. According to Samuel Hoare, the British representative in istanbul, «the real motive (of these closures) doubtlessly was to deprive Greek children of a very good education» .16 Measures against Greek schools and the falling standards of education contributed significantly to the flight of the Greeks from the city. Thus, while there were 24,296 students in the 166 Greek schools in istanbul, in 1920-21 their number was down to 15,766 during the academic year of 1923 - 24. J7 The number of students continued to diminish even after the panic of 1922- 23 and according to official estimates, there were 8.515 students in the Greek schools of Istanbul in 1925. Three years later this number was down to 5.923.'~ 12. Diamandopoulos to Roufos. Cons .• 23 December 1925. YE/B/33 . 13.. Vryzakis to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 30 October 1926. YE/B/33. 14. It remained closed for 18 months. Sakellaropoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons", 3 October 1928. YEiBj33; Hoare to Chamberlain. Cons. 24 March 1926. FO 371/11541/E2055 15 «Comparative examination of the application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty in Greece and Turkey». memorandum prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry for Venizelos. 1930. BMAEV/58. 16. Hoare to Chamberlain. Cons .. 24 October 1926. FO 371/11541/E2055. 17. «Statistical table of Greek minority schools in Constantinople». memorandum prepared by Stylianopoulos. YE/B/33; Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 20 February and 18 November 1924. both in YE/B/33. 18. «Statistical table of the minority schools in Constantinople». memorandum by Sake 1-
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To the charges that Turkey violated article 40 ofthe minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty, Ankara responded by pointing out that the Orthodox could still receive an excellent education in the numerous Greek educational establishments. By contrast. the Turks claimed, Greece impeded the dissemination of modern Turkish education in Greek Thrace, by encouraging religious conservatism among members of the Muslim minority. It is true that a number of anti-Kemalist Turks. headed by the former S,eyhiilislam Mustafa Sabri, found refuge in Komotini after the Anatolian war. But they appear to have been well-received by the deeply religious Muslim community of Greek Thrace. An overwhelmingly agricultural community, the Thracian Muslims concentrated on the cultivation of their estates and generally shied away from the secular revolution which was taking place, at the time, in Turkey. They also lacked the considerable equcational facilities erUoyed by the Constantinopolitan Greek community. though the Greek government allocated funds to Muslim schools in Thrace and paid the salaries of Greek language teachers in such schools. During the academic year of 1928- 29, responding to the provisions of article 41 of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty, the Turkish government. too, made available to the Greek minority schools in istanbul a small grant of 4,050 TL. This token subsidy was finally shared between 28 of the 50 Greek minority schools in the city. 1 9
9. The Civil Code and the Greek reaction. Another controversy concerning the religious minOritIes arose during 1925 -26 when the Turkish government went ahead with the adoption of the Swiss civil code. The wholesale abandonment of the sacred Islamic law in favour of this western code was in accordance with the Kemalist program of secular reform. Already by 192'6, thanks to the well-reported Atatiirk reforms, many of the outward signs of Islam in Turkey had been done away with. Within a span of three years the Turkish assembly had abolished the Caliphate (1924), dissolved the religious colleges and religious courts, enforced the adoption of western headgear (1925), outlawed the wearing of the veil and adopted the Gregorian calender for all purposes. 1 To accelarate the laropoulos. 1928 YE/Bj33; Diamandopoulos to Roufos. Cons., 23 December 1925, YE/B/33. See appendix C. 19 . «Comparative examination of the application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty in Greece and Turkey». memorandum prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry for Venizelos. 1930. BMAEV/58. L D.A. Rustow. "Politics and Islam in Turkey. 1920-1935» in R.N. Frye (ed.), Islam and the West. The Hague 1957, pp. 69-107.
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pace of westernization Ankara abolished the old Ottoman M ecelle (code) and replaced it with the Swiss civil code on 17 February 1926. This code, together with a new penal code, based chiefly on that of Italy, came into effect on 4 October 1926. These reforms, however, were not universally welcomed by the Turkish people. The hacas (Muslim teachers) were bitterly antagonistic to the government's laicist policies and many prominent Turks were irredeemably opposed to such a radical break with the past. To deal with Islamic conservatism, the «independence tribunals» - the vanguards of Kemalism- went into action with ruthless efficiency executing a large, and as yet undefined, number of adversaries. 2 Unlike most of the other anti-clerical legislation, the new civil code af·· fected the religious minorities of Turkey. It aimed at the adoption of a universal secular system as regards personal and family status. As had been said, under the millet system non-Muslim Ottoman citizens involved in disputes over such matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance applied to their separate religious courts for settlement. The continuance of this state of affairs for the minOIlties was to some extent guaranteed by the provisions of article 42 of the Lausanne treaty, which regulated the personal and family status of non-Muslim citizens in Turkey. By this article, Turkey had undertaken to permit the settlement concerning family law and personal status in accordance with the customs of non-Muslim minorities. 3 This provision, however, was in direct conflict with the new code on family and personal status for it made civil marriage compulsory. To overcome this difficulty the authorities urged the religious heads of the communities to renounce fOImally the first paragraph of article 42 of the Lausanne treaty in favour of the new civil code. The reaction of non-Muslim religious leaders paralleled that of Muslim clerics. At first, the religious leaders tried to avoid commitment by offering alternatives and the Jewish grand rabbi suggested a plebiscite, hoping that the impracticality of such a measure would deter the authorities from further action. Instead, Ankara continued to press the communities. In May 1925, the government appointed three mixed committees, each with a Turkish chairman, two other Turkish members and two non-Muslims belonging respectively to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities. This was an attempt to comply with the second paragraph of article 42 of the Lausanne treaty; though contrary to the stipulations the minority representatives were not appointed by the communities but by the government itself. The Jewish
committee first met on 23 May 1925 and signed a declaration complying with the wishes of the government on 10 September. The Armenians soon followed suit and endorsed a similar renunciation of article 42.~ With the Greek community, which was by far the most numerous, the Turks faced serious problems. The Greeks felt that the Lausanne provisions about personal and family status were the most important part of the minority clauses. It was not so much a privileged position that they sought as something to differentiate them individually and collectively from the Turks. This, they felt, was crucial at a time when the Turks endeavoured to turkify every trace of Greek influence in Turkey. Sensing resistance in the Greek community, the committee of two Turkish' officials and two Greek representatives decided to appoint a new body, composed of some half-dozen Greeks. This so-called camite d'initiative was asked to draw up a petition for the renunciation of the minority privileges stipulated by article 42 and then present it to the community. When the camite showed a tendency to resist the Turkish demand, the authorities brought its members up to twenty-two by adding a number of Greeks whose interests in Turkey made them particularly susceptible to official pressure. This committee was considerably influenced by a speech of Avrilios Spatharis, during a meeting at the Greek lycee of Zographeion. Despite the presence of the police, this Greek lawyer subtly denounced the proposal as an attempt to bring into disrepute so sacred an instrument as the National Pact (Misak-i MillO whose fifth article guaranteed the rights of the minorities. He also argued that the recommendation to renounce article 42 would place Turkey in the embarrassing position of violating an article which had become law through the ratification of the Lausanne treaty by the Ankara assembly. 5 Instructed by the government, the camite added to itself twenty-six more members who were reluctantly elected by the various parishes and as reluctantly came to the discussions. The Turkish police, moreover, arrested three delegates who had manifested opposition to the Ankara recommendation a day before the crucial vote. This action had the desired effect and at the meeting of 27 November 1925 the camite, complying with the wishes of the government, renounced article 42 of the Lausanne treaty in view ofthe forthcoming introduction of the civil code. From the total of 72 members of the camite and parish representatives 55 signed the petition for the renunciation and the three arrested notables were 4. Official declarations of the Armenian and Jewish committee are given in the letter of Tevfik Aras to the League of Nations, 9 March 1927, LN/C. 185. 1927J. 5. Lindsay to Chamberlain, Cons., 8 December 1926. FO 371/1 0866/E7712; two memoranda on the Turkish attitude towards article 42 of the Lausanne treaty, prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry, 5 and 30 November 1925. YE/A/24; OM 6 (1926) 22-23.' Rii~tli
2. G.L Lewis, Modern Turkey, London 1974. pp. 104-07. 3. For the complete text see appendix A.
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only released after the meeting of 27 N ovember:6 Two days later the initial mixed committee, composed of two Turks and two Greeks, approved unanimously the Ankara recommendation concerning the renunciation of the Lausanne guarantees of minority family and personal status. 7 The realization that with the new civil code they no longer had a separate legal standing caused considerable apprehension amongst members of the religious minorities. The crux of the problem centred on the question of the civil marriage for the Greek Orthodox. According to the new law, civil marriage was established as the only legally binding ceremony, while religiousmarTiage was to remain optional. 8 The Greeks, however, explained that their canon law recognized only religious marTiage and therefore they requested the government to regard as legal both civil and religious marTiage. Articles in the Greek press voiced the anxiety and fears of the community. The implementation of the new code, it was argued, would undermine the ethnic traditions of the minority. 9 At first the Greek government reacted by making friendly representations to Ankara, mainly on the imprisonment of the three delegates at the eve of the voting day. But by September 1926, Athens decided to approach the League of Nations. In two consecutive memoranda, the Greeks outlined the Turkish violations of articles 42 and 44 of the Lausanne treaty. 10 On 9 March 1927, the Turkish government replied by asserting that: 11 «Le Gouvernement n'avait nullement en vue les minorites, et leur statut familial ou personnel n'etait point en cause, son unique souci ayant ete celui de doter Ie pays d'une des legislations democratiques les plus parfaites». With the enforcement of the new code there was no need to maintain article 42 of the treaty of Lausanne. The minorities, it was claimed, were satisfied by
6. A copy of the petition and 55 signatures in Tevfik Rii~tii Aras to the League of Nations, 9 March 1927. LN(CI85. 1927. LN(C.185.1927.I. and a copy of the Greek petition to the minister of justice Mahmut Esat, YE(A/24. 7. The Greeks members were Dr Aristeidis Pasha Skouros, professor at the faculty of medicine at the university of Istanbul, and Vasilakis Orphanidis, a former deputy of Istanbul. 8. Article 110 decreed that religious marriage may take place after the celebration of the civil ceremony, see La Legislation Turque: Code Civil Ture, Istanbul 1926. 9.. See the analysis of the effects of the civil code on the Greek minority by the former legal advisor of the Greek delegation at Lausanne, Michael Theotokas in KWVI7TaVTIVolm;o;.IC;, 16 and 23 May 1926. 10. Argyropoulos to the League of Nations. II September 1926, LN/C.566.1926.I; Dendramis to the League of Nations, 10 October 1926, LN(CS88.1926.L II. Tevfik Rii~tii Aras to the League of Nations. 9 March 1927, LN/CI85.1927.L
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the Turkish assurances about the universal and indiscriminate application of the new code for the benefit of all Turkish citizens. 12 This view was reiterated by $iikrii Saras;oglu 13 Despite these reassurances. both Muslim and nonMuslim religious conservatives viewed with dismay the intermarriage of persons of different creeds which was made possible by the civil code. But, on the whole, traditional religious divisions were maintained even after the enactment of the code. Thus. after 1926, the Greeks celebrated their religious marriage after fulfilling their legal obligations at the state registration office. 10. Various anti-Greek measures and the decline of Istanbul. The adoption of the civil code. however. did not bring about a sudden change in the attitudes of Muslim Turks towards the religious minorities. Already the new republican constitution. adopted on 20 April 1924. recog-~+· nized all the inhabitants of the country as Turkish citizens (Turk vatandas)). More specifically, under article 88 of the constitution. all former religious minorities were guaranteed full rights as Turkish citizens. 1 Yet ~v_~I1_t!19-':lgh an article inserted in the constitution in 1928 abolished the concept of «state religion» in Turkey. Islam as a factor in Turkish society survived. None but Muslims could aspire to office in government, the defence forces, the civil service or other posts at the disposal of the state. Thus, despite written international and Turkish guarantees. the participation of non-Muslims in the public life of Turkey decreased dramatically after the establishment of the Turkish republic. The deep-seated perception that Muslim equals Turk and non-Muslim equals non-Turk persisted. 2 Notwithstanding the constitution'S specific interpretation of the term «Turk» (Ttirkiyeli) to embrace all the children of the fatherland. non-Muslims continued to be regarded as untrustworthy subjects. Because of this mistrust discrimination against the religious minorities continued unabated throughout the 1920s. While non-Muslims were called up for l"T!ilitary service. they did not bear arms and were not commissioned. For the Greeks in particular the political and social climate in Turkey appeared to
12. Ibid. 13. Declarations by Siikrii Sara.;oglu. Greek Legation Cons.. YE/A/24. 1925; Th. Athanasiadis-Novas. Luil' TOlJph"ia pi: 6'7Jwl7w;'paqJlh",j rpaJ,,j, 19::5 ·19::6, Athens 1967. pp. 21-66. 224-25. 1 Text given in the Ti:tnit{ of 17 to 23 February 1924 . See also AS G6ziibiiyiik and Z. Sezgin. 1924 Ana\'asasl Hakklndaki ,'>feclis Goni!jmeleri. Ankara 1957. pp . 437-39: E..C Smith «Debates on the Turkish Constitution of 1924» SBFD 13 (1958) 103 :: B. Lewis. The Emer/?ence (~f tvlodern Turkey, London 1968. pp. 356-57..
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be rather claustrophobic" On 26 February 1925, the government announced restrictions on the movement of Greeks beyond the prefecture limits of istanbul. 3 In an attempt to justify this restriction, Ankara maintained that Greeks with Turkish nationality would be able to visit the interior of the country after obtaining permission for each journey. But as the issue of such documents was subject to long bureaucratic delays, it affected seriously those Greek enterpreneurs with commercial establishments and property outside istanbul. Even more devastating to the Greek business community were the effects of the unresolved etabUs question. Because of the uncertainty about their status, Greek merchants could not obtain credits or loans. N or were they allowed to sell their property. As about 80 per cent of the Constantinopolitan Greeks were engaged in commerce, the effects of these restrictions were far-reaching" 4 Concurrently, fear of persecution under the law against «insulting Turkism» (Turkliige hakaret) forced severe constraints upon the Grecophone press of istanbul. Most of the pro-Allied and pro-Greek press of the armistice period had disappeared by 1923, leaving behind several Greek newspapers which adopted a non-committal line" Notwithstanding their moderate tone, Greekjournalists in the city continued to suffer harassment and persecution. Thus, Eugenopoulos was condemned to death and subsequently hanged in 1926,5 while three years later XPOVIIUJ., one of the grecophone newspapers in istanbul was closed after being charged with insulting Turkism. Encouraged by the imprisonment of the owner of this paper, nationalist Turkish students wrecked the printing office of XPOVIKG. on 10 July 1929. 6 Incidents were also created by the «Citizens Speak Turkish» (vatanda!f. Turkfe konu!f.) movement. This movement was founded by the nationalist organizafion~the Turkish Hearth (Turk Ofag/) with the purpose of applying pressure on the ethnic minorities to adoptthe-Turkish language. 7 Nor did the Greek minority have 3. Text of the law entitled «Les Deplacements des non-Musulmans dans la Banlieu de Constantinople» in FO 371/1 0866/EI388" For earlier application of this law to Armenians see Le Journal d'Orient, 29 March 1924" 4" Politis to Rentis, Cons", 14 October 1925 and Politis to Roufos, Cons., 19 March 1926, both
in BMAIP/228/14" 5" «Expose sur la situation actuelle de la minorite Grecque de Constantinople», memorandum prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry, Athens, 1930, YE/B/37" 6. This was the so-called «MIle Eleni» affair (the imprisoned proprietress of the XpovIKa), Clerk to Chamberlain, Ankara, 18 July 1929, FO 371/13818/E3656; Clerk to Chamberlain, Ankara, 21 November 1929, FO 371/13818/E6101; OM 9 (1929) 116" 7. The observations of the British consuls in tzmir and Edirne in FO 371 /i3096/EI581 (9 March 1928) and FO 371/13096/E2120 (II April 1928); Annual Report on Turkey by Loraine, 1935, Ankara, FO 371/20091/E933.
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a~y n:~ans
available to protest against such harassment. The religious mmontIes were barred from electing their own representatives to the central and local government Even on the Princes islands (K'lz'll adalar) where the overwhelming majority of the popUlation was Christian the local governor was a Muslim Turk. On their part, the Constantinopolitan Greeks desired to remain in the country of their birth as subjects of an alien state while preserving their racial and r.eligious individuality. Yet, the drawbacks of such a system, from the TurkIsh point of view, were considerable. It ran counter to the nationalist ideals and aims of turkification. Notwithstanding their verbal manifestations of lo~alty to Ankara, the majority of the Greeks, as well as the other non~u~hm communities, could hardly conceal their nostalgia for the ancien regIme of the sultans. The nationalist Turks considered this attitude as pro~ocative; a tangible proof of Greek resistance to the creation of a strong and mdependent Turkey. As a result they introduced measures which eroded the traditional Greek influence in istanbul. Further, the position of the Con.stantinoP?Iitan Greek community became even more precarious by the stramed relatIOn between Ankara and Athens during 1922-30. Given these conditions the size of the Greek minority in Turkey dwindled !hroughout the 1920s. The deliberate attack on the wealth and trade of Is~a~bul undermined Greek confidence in the new republican order. Discnml~atory taxation and the creation of state monopolies forced many oldest~bhsh Greek firms to bankrupty and prompted discontented Greek busmessmen to depart. Likewise, faIling standards to Greek education forced many Greeks to move to Greece while youths left the country rather than face the prospect of military service in the Turkish army. It was because of this exodus that the Greek community seriously contemplated shutting down most <;>fthe Greeklycees in istanbul and maintaining only one such school for bo.ys and another for girls.s Areas inhabited almost exclusively by Greeks pnor to 1923 were gradually taken over by Anatolian and Balkan immigrants. The most notable example of this marked demographic transformation took place in Ph~Ilar (Fener), the traditionally Greek quarter of the city. Another overwhelminglY Greek quarter of the city, Tatavla, experienced a similar ch~nge in its ethnic composition as a result o(thegreat fire of January 1929. ThIS devastating fire bumt down 400- 500 houses dispossessing 2,000 to 3,000 Greeks .. The fire ushered in a period of decline for Tatavla reducing its po~ulatIon to 7,000. Although the Athenian press claimed that the fire was dehberately set by the Turks in order to destroy one of the surviving Greek 8" Tsamados to Foreign Ministry, Cons", 19 August 1927, YE/B/33"
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districts of istanbul, we have no conclusive evidence to this effect. 9 However, the Turkish press showed remarkably little sympathy for the victims of the devastating fire and the authorities rushed to change the official name of the district from Tatavla to Kurtulu~ (liberation) immediately after this event. I 0 All the same, despite the considerable decrease in the number of Greeks in istanbul, the community as a whole managed to survive the adverse years of 1922- 29. This was partly because of their great capacity for and experience in business. Together with the other non-Muslim minorities, they were able to continue controlling a substantial portion of the trade in istanbul, thus making it harder to uproot them en masse. Again, notwithstanding official pressure, a sizeable section of the minority genuinely desired to remain in the city of their birth. With their roots, families, properties and connections in the city, these Greeks were determined to stay behind. Nor was Turkey prepared to abrogate the Lausanne agreement by expelling the Greek minority in toto. Rather they aimed at the gradual turkification of the religious minorities in Turkey. The continued presence of the Greek community in istanbul throughout the 1920s is borne out by the Turkish statistical data. According to the official statistics compiled in June 1924, istanbul had 1,065,866 inhabitants of whom 656,281 were Muslims, 279,788 Greeks, 73,407 Armenians, 56,390 Jews. l l This figure, however, drops dramatically at the general census of October 1927. The population of the vilayet of istanbul was calculated at 806,993 (the city proper was only 699,602). Of these 100,214 inhabitants informed the authorities that they professed the Greek Orthodox faith while 91,902 were Greek-speaking. 12 There were also 26,419 Greeks with Hellenic nationality.13 These figures roughly coincide with the statistics of the four
Greek Orthodox parishes ofistanbul, according to which there were 110,000 Greeks with Turkish nationality in the city,14 Finally, a report drawn by the neutral members of the mixed commission in 1934 estimated the number of Greeks in Turkey as 111,200. Of these 73,000 were Greeks with Turkish nationality residing in istanbul. Another 30,000 were non-exchangeables Greeks with Hellenic nationality and 8,200 were the Greek inhabitants of Imbros (Gokgeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) who were also exempted from the exchange of populations in 1923. 15
9. Clerk to Camberlain, Cons., 31 January 1929, FO 371/13824/E627; The Times, 23 January 1929. 10. Thus, when some practical assistance was offered to the victims by the wife of the British ambassador, Lady Clerk. a «tremendous campaign» was launched in the press against the British embassy for interfering in the internal matters of Turkey. The campaign was initiated by Necmettin Sadik oftheAk~am on 25 January. Clerk to Chamberlain. Ankara, 3 March 1929, FO 371/13833/EI259; Turkey: Annual Report (1929). Clerk, Ankara, FO 371/14578/E729. II. Direction de l'Etat Civil du Vildyet de Constantinople, quoted also in E. Mamboury, Constantinople, Cons. 1926. p. 19. 12. 8.312 Greek-Orthodox who did not declare Greek as their mother tongue were karaman!ides and Orthodox of Albanian origin. Thekaraman!ides (karaman/1) were Orthodox who spoke Turkish which they wrote in Greek characters. The bulk of these Orthodox arrived in the city from central Anatolia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In istanbul they attended Greek schools and by 1923 they had been largely hellenized. 13. iY, 4 (1930-31) 61-64.
14. «Memorandum on the Greek community of Constantinople» prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry, 1930, YE/B/37. IS. On those Greeks see my article «Imbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes Toward Two Ethnic Greek Island Communities since 1923» ,Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 7/1 (1980) 5·31
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143 10
CHAPTER V THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE. 1923-29. I. Patriarch Meletios and the anti-Phanal' riot of 1 June 1923.
Even before the defeat of the Greek armies in Anatolia, Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis was considered as an enemy of Turkey. But after the Smyrna deb[lcle anti-Greek resentment in Turkey focused on the patriarch. Soon after his arrival in the city the nationalist governor, Refet Bele. made a vitriolic speech against Meletios and the Turkish press followed suit. 1 His safety was only assured by the Allied presence in the city. Because of the widespread international concern about the patriarch's safety. 2 Curzon made General Charles Harington personally responsible for the life of Meletios. 3 Following Curzon's instructions, Harington obtained a personal guarantee from Refet Bele regarding the safety of the patriarch ..~ On his part, Meletios tried to placate Turkish public opinion as best as he could. In an interview with the press. he appealed to the Turks «to forgive and forget», quoting the «magnanimit:, ~hown to his predecessors in office by the Caliph Omar and Sultan Mohammed the Conqueror». 5 At the same time. Meletios displayed a 'ipirit of independence and courage. Disregarding the dangers, he remained at his post and continued to provide leadership to the dispirited Cons tantinopolitan Greek community and did not hesitate to protest to the Allied high commissioners when the rights of the community were threatened. 6 Notwithstanding these qualities, the continued presence of Meletios at the Phanar weakened the position of the Patriarchate. Not only was he hated by
1. Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 29 December 1922, BMAEV(34. 2. Archbishop of Canterbury to Curzon, 23 October 1922 and to Bonar Law, 24 October 1922, LPA(DvP(32 . Also Patriarch of Jerusalem Damianos to the Colonial Office, Jerusalem, 27 November 1922, Fo 371(9109(EI7. 3. D.E.F.P. (18) no. 252. 4. Harington to War Office, Cons., 2 December 1922, FO 371(7917(E3623. 5. Interview published in Journal d' Orient and Stamboul, 2 December 1922. 6. Meletios to Henderson, Cons., 7 January 1923, FO 371(9128(E630.
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the Turks, but also since they never acknowledged his as patriarch negotiations between the Turkish authorities and the Phanar could not take place. Given the irregular position of the Patriarchate vis-a-vis the Turkish government such negotiations were crucial for its rehabilitation in modern Turkey. More significantly, at Lausanne ismet inonii demanded a firm commitment from Venizelos as to Meletios' withdrawal from the Phanar, before consenting to the maintenance of the Patriarchate in Turkey. Venizelos agreed to such an arrangement and advised the patriarch to tender his resignation. 7 He even gave an interview to the JIarpir;; on 20 January asserting that since Meletios found himself in such an opposition to the Turkish government he should relinguish the patriarchal throne. The resignation of the patriarch, Venizelos underlined, would placate the Turks and improve the position of the Patriarchate, whose maintenance in the Phanar was «of major importance to the Hellenic race and to the Orthodox world».B Although he consented to his eventual resignation, Meletios cautioned that his immediate departure was untimely for it would trigger off a major exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks. He therefore suggested to postpone his departure until the conclusion of a peace agreement. The patriarch's position was further exacerbated by dissention within the Constantinopolitan Greek community. After the Greek defeat in Anatolia, the more extreme elements of the anti-Meletios faction intensified their campaign for the removal of the patriarch. Aware of the changing political climate in the city, they hoped that such a campaign against an avowed enemy of Turkey would enjoy the encouragement, if not the cooperation, of the Turkish authorities. The most outspoken members of this group was Damianos Damianidis, a trustee (brirpo'TCoc;) of the Galata district and the general-secretary of the church Panagia Kaphatiani. 9 Since 1921, Damianidis had staunchly opposed the election of Meletios. In a display of his antiVenizelism, he had invited the representatives of the royalist Greek government in istanbul to a reception at Kaphatiani during the early months of 1922.10 In May 1923, however, the opponents of Meletios suffered a severe setback when Damianidis, together with his associate, bishop of Myra Philaretos, were implicated in the embezzlement of church funds. The bishop
7. Venizelos to Arthur Crosfield. Lausanne. 2 July 19~3. LPAjDvPjI48;4. 8 The text of this interview is also given in Ollef ~ (192~-~3) 5~6-~7. 9 . This church was founded in 1462 by Greek immigrants from Kefe/Kaffa in the Crimean. for more details see 'Opllo()o:;ia, ~3 (1948) 111-12. 10. Mavropoulos. Op . cil, p. 187 .
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was duly removed from Galata to the monastery of BaIlkIl and Damianidis was dismissed from his post. 11 His dismissal, however, did not put an end to his activities. Regarding Meletios as the main obstacle to a dialogue between the authorities and the Patriarchate, a number of dissatisfied prelates at the Phanar encouraged Damianidis to carryon with his anti-Meletios campaign.12 Thus, on 1 June 1923. in an attempt to force the abdication of Meletios. a crowd of about 100 demonstrators, headed by Damianidis, gathered outside the Phanar. At the time the patriarch was presiding over a Pan-Orthodox conference which was then sitting at the Phanar. This conference was abruptly intenupted when the demonstrators invaded the Patriarchate. Despite the protests of the representatives of the Serbian and Rumanian churches, the invaders entered the private chambers of the patriarch and demanded his immediate abdication. On his refusal to abdicate, Meletios was dragged down the stairs and was badly maltreated only to be rescued by an Allied police force which an'ived at the Phanar and dispersed the agiratorsP It is clear that the riot took place with the full knowledge of the Turkish authorities since Damianidis had notified the chief of police Vehbi of his intention to invade the PhanarY Further, the Turkish police was present throughout the incident. Yet, claiming that the dispute concerned only the Orthodox community, the police did not attempt to protect the Patriarchate. Similarly, since the government had not recognized Meletios as a legitimate patriarch, the Turkish police did not consider him or his entourage as the lawful occupants of the patriarchal premises. 15 According to th~ patriarc? '.s own account, however, members of the Turkish police force actIvely partIcIpated in the demonstration. Ultimately, Meletios claimed, the Turks planned to hurry him to Izmit (Nicomedia) or Thrace where he would have been executed by the nationalist authorities. 16 Commenting on the role of the Turkish police, the acting British high commissioner, Nevile Henderson, noted that 17 II . Borough to Douglas. Cons", 19 May 1913. LPA/DgPjI 7!lOS: Henderson to Curzon. Cons ... 29 Mav 1923. FO 371;9123!E6067 12. Anninos to Alexandris. Cons .. 7 June 1923. YE/Bi35. Mavropoulos. op.ci!., p. 188. 13. Rapport .1111' les edllelllen!s dll I 111ill 1923. Meletios to Henderson. Phanar. FO 371:9123 E6309; Holy Synod to Venizelos. Phanar. 4 June 1923. YEIB/35: Helm to Ryan. Cons .. 6 June 1923. FO 800jRyP. 14. This was publicly admitted by Vehbi. Henderson to Curzon. Cons", 6 June 1923. FO 37Ii9123!E6967. 15. Declaration of Vehbi published in the Allrore of IS June 1923. press cutting in FO 800jRyP/l79 .
16. Major J .A.Codrington·s interview with Meletios. 6 June 1923. LPA/DgP/ISjl99, 17. Henderson to Curzon. Cons. 2 June 1923. FO 37Ij9123/E5721
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«it was not unlikely that they were cognisant of, if not responsible for the demonstration which was carTied out by the worst Greek elements» . The agitators, he went on to inform, were in fact hired by the Turks in order to achieve the replacement of «obnoxious» Meletios with «a more agreeable Patriarch». 18 The first reaction of the Patriarchate was to pronounce sentences of excommunication against three leaders of the demonstrators, Damianos Damianidis, John Tsirigotis and Stergios Polykritos, on 9 June. 19 Concurrently, the patriarch addressed a telegram to Venizelos requesting the reopening of the question of the Patriarchate at Lausanne. Pointing to the campaign waged by Damianidis, he asked for the insertion of a clause in the Lausanne treaty which defined the status of the Patriarchate in an unequivocal manner. Without strong safeguards his resignation would cause irreparable damage to the prestige of the Patriarchate. He strongly doubted that his abdication would pave the way for the rehabilitation of the Patriarchate in Turkey.20 Similar views were expressed in a note by the holy synod to Venizelos on 4 June 1923. 21 In a rather abrupt response, Venizelos explained that he was unable to demand the inviolability of the Patriarchate at Lausanne. He also cautioned the patriarch against jeopardizing vital Greek interests by postponing his decision to resign. Reminding him of the Greek promise to Ismet inonii at Lausanne in January 1923, Venizelos strongly urged Meletios to abdicate as soon as possible. 22 He also warned the members of the holy synod that they would have to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Only by acting in a pragmatic manner could the Greek community and the Patriarchate hope to survive in Turkey.23 In a discussion with Sir Horace Rumbold, the British chief delegate at Lausanne, Venizelos intimated his desire to bring the issue of the Patriarchate at a head while the Allies were still in the city. In this way the Greek government would be able to ascertain the intentions of Ankara concerning the recognition of the Patriarchate as a spiritual institution. 24 IS. Henderson to Curzon. Cons", 5 June 1923. FO 371/9123/E5906, 19. E.A .. 43 (1923) 109-10. Tsirigotis and Polykritos were soon pardoned when they asked
forgiveness from the Phanar. 20, Meletios to Venizelos. Phanar. 4 and 7 June 1923. YE/B/35. 21. Holy Synod to Venizelos. Phanar. 4 June 1923. YE/B/35. 22. Venizelos to Meletios. Lausanne. 6 and 10 June 1923. YE/B/35, 13. Venizelos to Holy Synod. Lausanne. 10 June 1923. YEjBj35 A resume of the correspondence between Venizelos and Meletios is given in Anninos to Alexandris. Cons,. 16 June 1923. YE/B/35. 14,19 June 1923, Rumbold to Curzon. Lausanne. FO 371/9113/E6524,
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At this conjuncture the patriarch's views were in sharp divergence with the objectives of Greek foreign policy. Viewing the whole issue in a long-term manner, Meletios was reluctant to abdicate. Because of the exchange of populations and the national reorganization in Turkey, he reasoned, the Patriarchate would gradually decline and take the shape of an ordinary archbishopric representing 200,000 people. Given the nationalist and secularist tendencies in modem Turkey, he remarked, the position of the Patriarchate would be intolerable.25 This state of affairs would undermine its standing as the centre of Orthodoxy. As a remedy, Meletios strongly advocated the transfer of the Patriarchate to Thessaloniki or to Mount Athos. The majority of the Greeks took a different view. The Greek government did not seem prepared to accept any change in the patriarchal seat so long as there was a Greek community in istanbul. Nor did the holy synod endorse the removal of the Patriarchate. Most of them opposed the radical proposal of Meletios and favoured an international role for the Patriarchate. A fresh Pan-Orthodox and non-national image, it was hoped, might be less objectionable to the Turks. They further maintained that the transfer of the Patriarchate to Greece would inevitably bring it under Greek national influence and thus result in the loss of its ecumenical character. Already by February 1923, the synod had made notable steps towards enhancing the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate by appointing representatives to many major European centres.26 Likewise in June 1923, a Pan-Orthodox conference was held at the Phanar. Finally, the debate about additional rights for the Patriarchate or its transfer to Greece ceased when Meletios announced his departure from the Phanar on 27 June. He did not, however, resign. Instead, he declared his wish to go abroad for reasons of health and asked leave of absence from the mixed council of the Patriarchate. He then appointed Nicholas, the archbishop of Caesarea, as his loculll tenens and instructed ~im to seek negotiations with the Turkish authorities.27 His decision to leave Istanbul was partly prompted by two strongly worded letters by Venizelos.28 Likewise his ~eparture was hastened by a Turkish court order charging him with entering Istanbul without a regular passport.29 Through Alexander Pallis, the director ofthe Greek 25 . Details on his interview with Meletios. Anninos to Alexandris. Cons ... 13 June 1923.
YE B 35 ~6 The Tillles. 8 February 1923. 27. Henderson to Foreign Office, Cons .. 27 June 1923. FO 371;9113/E6665; Henderson to Ryan. Cons .. 3 July 1923. FO 800. RyP 185. 28. Telegrams of 6 and 10 June 1923. in YE B.35 29 Helm to Ryan. Cons. 27 June 19~3. FO SOO RyP 176.
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Red Cross in Turkey, he informed the British high commission of his decision to retire from istanbul.30 Finally, on 10 July ,Meletios Metaxakis left Turkey aboard a British steamship «Famaka» and withdrew to a monastery on Mount Athos.3J Yet, in Greece he continued to campaign for the transfer of the Patriarchate to Greek soiL It is also interesting that before his departure, Meletios gave a long interview to a correspondent of Tan in , Ali Zeki, on 2 July. After claiming that he had never been an enemy of Turkey, he hinted that. if the Turkish government did neit object to his continued patriarchate, he would be prepared to return to istanbul when his leave of absence was over.32 Although his concern for the Orthodox church was real, his ambition to retain the patriarchal throne often marred Meletios'good judgement. 2. The Turkish Orthodox challenge.
Notwithstanding his personal aspirations, uppermost in the patriarch's mind was the interests of the church when he 4ecided to depart without abdicating. He had all along maintained that he would resign as soon as the legal position of the Patriarchate in Turkey was defined.! By withdrawing from istanbul, Meletios hoped to enable the holy synod to open negotiations with the authorities. He also stressed that he would resign as soon as the Patriarchate was allowed to elect a successor in accordance with the declaration made by Rlza Nur on 16 December 1922 at Lausanne.2 If, however, Ankara proved intractable, it would still be possible for the holy synod, rather than submitting to unjustified interference by the Turks, to join Meletios at Mount Athos and continue to recognize him as patriarch.3 In the meantime the departure of the patriarch refueled the debate on the issue of the Patriarchate. Several local Turkish newspapers expressed approval ofthe attitude taken by the holy synod. Significantly, there were also some indications that the government, too, was prepared to modify its attitude towards the Phanar. Determined to take advantage of the momentum generated with the departure of Meletios, the holy synod tried to approach the authorities in istanbul. Employing Vasilaki Orphanidis, a former Otto30. Henderson to Foreign Office. Cons .. 27 June 1923. FO 371/9113/E6658 . 31. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. IOJuly 1923. YE/B/35; Borough to Douglas. Cons .. II July 1923. LPAjDgP/17;121. 32 . 7ll/lin. :. July 1923. The next day. he gave another interview to the Vatan and expressed his hope that his departure would enable the Patriarchate to negotiate with the authorities. press cuttings in YE/B/35. I. Anninos to Alexandris. Cons .. 13 June 1923. YE/B/35. 2 See chapter III:4. 1 Henderson to Ryan. Cons,. 3 July 1923. FO 80OjRyP/185.
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man deputy, the Patriarchate contacted the viili of istanbul, Ali Haydar. 4 Meanwhile, with the occasion of the bayram (Muslim religious holiday) a patriarchal delegation, headed by locum tenens Nicholas, paid visits to Turkish military and civil dignitaries in istanbul. These highly placed officials assured the delegation that the rights of minorities would be respected in modern Turkey.s Again Germanos Athanasiadis, the secretary of the holy synod, together with the patriarchal counsellor on political affairs, D. Phytos, went to welcome Ismet inonii on his arrival to istanbul from Lausanne on 10 August.o Ankara also responded to a congratulatory letter addressed by the Phanar to the Turkish assembly on the ratification of the Lausanne treaty. 7 Anxious to placate the Turkish authorities and to proceed with a new patriarchal election, the Phanar issued a statement setting out the principles on which relations between the Patriarchate and the authorities might be conducted. In this statement the Patriarchate declared its readiness to abandon all former political and administrative privileges and to remain a purely religious institution of Pan-Orthodox character. In accordance with the statement of Rlza Nur at Lausanne, the relations between the Turkish government and the Patriarchate would be similar to those existing between state and church in England, France and the USA. While communal educational and charitable institutions were to be administered by popularly elected representatives, marTiage and cognate questions would fall within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Finally, the election of the patriarch would take place according to canon law. Locum tenens Nicholas, who made this statement to the press, concluded by stressing that the Greek minority desired nothing better than to live on friendly terms with the Turks.s Likewise in an article in the official organ of the Phanar', 'EKKbwzaawol 'AbjOeza, the bishop of Skopelos, Gennadios Arabatzoglou, emphasized that the Patriarchate would be «a major moral factor in the reconstruction and transformation of modern Turkey».9 While welcoming such expressions of goodwill, the Turkish goverrunent chose to ignore such statements. Nor did the viili of istanbul, Ali Haydar, consent to discussing the question of a new patriarchal election with the representatives of the Phanar.! 0 In addition, the central government would 4. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 6 July 1923. YEjB;35. 5. E.A .. 43 (19:23) :272-73. 6. Ibid., p . 294 . 7. This was signed by Prime Minister Fethi Okyar. dated 20 August 1923. E.A .. 43 (1923) 314 . 8. Henderson to Curzon, Cons .. 17 July 19:23. FO 371/9123/E7603; The Time5, 13 July .1923. 9. E.A .. 43 (1923) 267-68. 10. Anninos to the Greek delegation at Lausanne. Cons .• 23 and 24 July 1923; Anninos to
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not negotiate so long as Meletios remained the official head of the church. Making use of the government's ambivalent attitude towar'ds the Patriarchate, Damianidis continued his campaign against the Phanar. After reestablishing himself at the church of Kaphatiani with the assistance of the authorities, he published a long address to the Orthodox community in the Vatan of 14 June 1923. Characterizing all the prominent Constantinopolitan Greeks of the armistice period as traitors, he concluded:!! «Oh you ignoramuses ... if you desire to continue living in Turkey you must abandon those who imbued you in errors and repent for your mistakes ... It is only thus that you can win the favour of your Turkish fellow-countrymen» . Notwithstanding such patriotic utterances, there is conclusive evidence casting serious doubts on the sincerity of his motives. His signature, for instance, is clearly visible in a document sent by the Constantinopolitan Greek parishes to the British Foreign Office and dated 29 January 1920, demanding the union of Istanbul «with the mother country» Greece.!2 His name was also implicated in the feud between Constantinists and Venizelists in the city during 1920- 22. Darnianidis had been an active adherent of the former clique and his conversion to a Turkish patriot appears to have taken place after the collapse of the Greek forces in Anatolia. The anti-Phanar activities of Damianidis were fervently supported by Papa Eftim (Efthymios Karahissaridis), an Anatolian priest of Keskin. Papa Eftim was a Karamanll Greek Orthodox from Akdagmadeni, nearYozgat. He was ordained in 1915 and when Gervasios Sarisitis, the archbishop of Angora, moved to the Phanar in March 1918, he assumed the title of locum tenens for the parish of Keskin. 13 During the Anatolian war he appears to have been in close contact with many Turkish nationalist figures. Relying on his Kemalist connections, Papa Eftim managed to coerce three Greek Orthodox prelates, who were stranded in the nationalist-held zone, into convening a congress at the monastery of St. John at Zincirdere, Kayseri (Caesarea). This congress proclaimed the foundation of a Turkish Orthodox church in Anatolia on 15 Foreign Ministry, Cons., 3 August 1923; Nicholas to Gonatas, Cons., 15 September 1923, all these documents in YE/B/35. II. Statement is also given in The Orient News, 14 June 1923. 12. Damianidis signed the petition as the president of the central parish community of Galata (llpofx5por; vir; /(evrpllc'iir; emrporcfir; Fai.arii) , in FO 371/5190/E2785. 13. On the background of Papa Eftim (1884-1968) see G. Jaschke, «Die Ttirkisch-Orthodoxe Kirche», De,. Islam 39 (1964) 95-129; T. Ergene, lstikliil Harbinde Tiirk Ortodokslarl, istanbul 1951. pp. 1-6.
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Septemper 1922. While declaring its hostility towards the Phanar, the Turkish Orthodox church proposed working for the establishment of harmonious relations between the Muslims and the Orthodox of Anatolia. 14 It was also tolerated by the Turkish nationalists for it was compatible with the Kemalist desire to turkify the Anatolian Christians. The basis of this church, however, was destroyed when the karamanl'l Greeks were included in the exchange of populations. Although Eftim should have also been included in the exchange of popUlations, he was able to secure his exemption on the grounds of his pro-Turkish activities during the Anatolian war. 15 Papa Eftim, who remained the main champion of a nationalist church, appeared to have been in close contact with Damianidis. In fact, the whole movement of Damiani dis, who was also ofkaramanll origin, can be seen as an attempt to publicize in Istanbul the concept ofa nationalist Turkish Orthodox church. Initially, the followers of Eftim tried to establish links with the ka/'{fJ1l11nll communities residing in the city particularly in the quarter of Samatya CY\Vwlla9tfa) and Kumkapl (KOV'WO'KUA.lOV). But the karamanl'l Orthodox had been largely integrated into the mainstream of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they became increasingly susceptible to Hellenic influences channelled through the ecclesiastic, educational and even commercial institutions. They married into socially established Constantinopolitan Greek families and adopted the Greek language. Not only were they totally integrated within the Greek community at large, but the karamanl'i Orthodox felt intensely attached to Patriarchate and the Phanar tradition. A very substantial number of karamanll Greeks, such as Siniosoglou, Sismanoglou and Kehayioglou, achieved eminence for their commercial, philanthropic and community activities. Given these circumstances both Eftim and Damianidis were aware that their movement could have little impact on the karamanl'i Constantinopolitan Greeks. Instead they attempted to take advantage of the vacuum generated by the withdrawal of Meletios. As speculation for a new patriarchal election instensified, Eftim, accompanied by Saffet Arlkan, an inspector of the department of public order, and Hilmi Fehmi, a Turkish officer, arrived in istanbul and took up residence in the Tokatllyan hotel at Pera. 16 He im14. Memorandum on the Turkish Orthodox church, 24 December 1922 and another 10 January 1923, in YE/B/35. A British report on this movement, 10 May 1922, FO 371/7923/EI2002. IS. Eftim also secured the exemption of his associate lstamat Zihni Ozdamar (Stamatis Pulloglou), an karamallil lawyer. 16. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 26 September 1923, FO 371/9123/E9775; The Times, 3 October 1923.
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mediately got in touch with the Phanar through the mediation of CyriL archbishop of Rodopolis. During his meeting with theioclim tenens Nicholas on 26 September, Papa Eftim claimed that he solely intended to restore the Orthodox church to its former place of honour with the assistance of its priests. As a panacea he advocated the election of a turcophone patriarch who had a «Turkish heart». The new patriarch should have neither shown «treacherous sympathy for the British» nor spoken «rebelliously» against the Turkish state. Above all, he demanded the immediate official abdication of Meletios as well as the dismissal of six members of the holy synod with dioceses outside Turkey.17 Offended by his patronizing attitude and particular'Jy by the insulting statements to the press against the Patriarchate, the holy synod decided to sever all links with Papa Eftim on 28 September. 18 Anxious to put across his views, the determined Anatolian priest soon resorted to violence. On 2 October, an hour before the Allied evacuation of Istanbul, Eftim and his Turkish associates invaded the Phanar. Under duress, the ten'ified synod deposed Meletios and satisfied the demands of the invaders. Eftim than expelled six members of the holy synod along with the locum tenens Nicholas, who was replaced by Kallinikos Delikanis, the archbishop of Cyzicus (Erdek). At first, Eftim declared that he would remain in the Phanar until a patriarch and seven new members of the synod were appointed. But he soon changed his mind and after appointing himself the representative of the Patriarchate in Ankara, he proceeded to the capital to present his letter of credence to the minister of Justice on 8 October. 19 He did not leave, however, before extorting from the financially plagued Phanar 3,500 TL ostensibly fOf the relief of the karamanil community in Anatolia. In addition, he took care to have his salary fixed at the rate of 500 TL monthly .20 There is little doubt that the Turkish authorities fully supported Eftim's ~lctivities, while the press gave him a very sympathetic hearing. Some newspapers went so far as to demand the appointment of Papa Eftim as patriarch. 11 At first. Papa Eftirn claimed that his visit to istanbul had an official
17. Memorandum presented by Eftim to the holy synod, 26 September 1923, YE/B/35. 18. Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the holy synod on 28 September 1923, YE/B/35., 19. Minutes of the meetingofthe holy synod on2 October 1923, YE/B/35; Memorandum on the invasion of the Patriarchate by Papa Eftim. 6 October 1923, YE/B/35; Henderson to Curzon, Cons., I3 November 1923. Fo 371/9123/EII126. 20. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 10 October 1923. YE/B/35; 'Hpep,juza ma. 9 October 1923. 21. Articles in the Vakil. Tel'hid and Tallill of 4 October 1923 given in YE/B/35.
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character.22 Nonetheless, when the authorities urged him against involving the government in intercommunal matters of the Orthodox, he disclosed that he had simply acted in a private capacity. It should be remembered that one of his associates, Saffet, was the brother of Dilaver Arlkan, the police commander in AnkaraP A leading Kemalist, Saffet Arlkan became the general secretary of the Republican People's party during the late 1920s. There is also evidence to suggest that Eftim' s trip to istanbul was initiated by Rlza N ur, the prominent Turkish delegate at Lausanne.24 Evidently, any challenge to the power of the Phanar was congenial to the Turkish government. But the violent methods of Eftim and his arrogant declarations offended Ankara. Turkey undertook certain obligations towards the religious minorities and Eftim's excesses were bound to make an unfavourable impression on world opinion. Consequently, the authorities publicly dissociated themselves from Eftim's actions. On 12 October, the semi-official press bureau (Anadolu ajans/) reported that the government refused to accept Eftim as an official representative of the Phanar since the Patriarchate, a purely religious institution, had no right of formal representation in Ankara.25 Likewise, the Turkish press became less enthusiastic about Papa Eftim. Tanin, moreover, went so far as to describe Eftim's actions as «the product of a komitac'f mind» and summarized the whole affair as «theatrical» and «incompatible with the dignity of the government» .26 3. The election of Patriarch Gregory VII. After these setbacks suffered by Eftim, the «provisional» holy synod at the Phanar was able to free itself from external control and pressure. Meanwhile, the Greek government renewed its pressure on Meletios to declare publicly his resignation. 1 This he eventually did and on 12 October the Greek government reported to the press that it was desirous of reestablishing friendly relations with Turkey. When, moreover, Athens announced that it would recognize a new patriarch in istanbul provided his election was carried out in
12. He introduced himself as such to the Patriarchate. see minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the holy synod. 26 September 1923. YE/B/35. 23. liischke. «Die Tiirkisch-Orthodoxe Kirche», p. 119. 24. Memorandum on the invasion of the Patriarchate by Papa Eftim, 6 Octwer' 1923, YE/B/35. 25 . Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 13 November 1923, FO 37119123/E1I126. A;1icles in the Ak!jalll of 12 and Va kit of 13 October 1923. in YE/B/35. 26. hillin, 5 October 1923. Full text in YE/B/35.
accordance with Orthodox rules, Ankara adopted a relatively lenient attitude towards the Patriarchate. As a result, on 6 December 1923, the authorities instructed the synod to make ready for an election. Concurrently, they furnished the Phanar with an official document outlining the regulations for the patriarchal election. Signed by assistant governor, Fahrettin, it decreed that: 2 «Aux elections a des fonctions spirituelles et religieuses, ayant lieu en Turquie, il faut que les electeurs soient des sujets Turcs et exercent lars de i'election leurs fonctions spirituelles en Turquie, et que la personne elue reunisse les memes qualites». Heartened by these developments, the synod proceeded with the election on 6 December and elected Gregory Zervoudakis, the archbishop of Chalcedon (Kadlkoy) to the patriarchal throne. 3 The new patriarch had a reputation of caution and moderation. A staunch adherent of the gerolldismos tradition he was closely identified with Patriarch Germanos V during 1913-18. After Germanos' abdication and the ascendancy of pro-Allied faction at the Phanar, Gregory lost all influence. He was opposed to the rupture of relations between the Phanar and the Sublime Porte, and he carried his objection to the point of resignation from the holy synod. Retiring in his diocese at Chalcedon, he shied away from befriending the Allies. 4 Because he had refrained from displaying any anti-Turkish sentiments during the armistice, Gregory was reckoned to be persona grata at least with the liberal Turks. Immediately after his election the patriarch praised the president of the Turkish republic and declared to the press that he felt «sincere loyalty» towards the Turkish government. 5 The election of Gregory caused a great deal of joy in the Greek community and the patIiarch retired to his see at Chalcedon to await his official enthronement a week later. Meanwhile, Papa Eftim, who had supported the candidacy of Cyril, the archbishop of Rodopolis (Ma9ka), declared that he would not abide by the result of the election. Encouraged by press reports, which alleged that Gregory served Hellenic (Yullan) interests, Papa Eftim and forty armed Turks once again invaded the Phanar on 7 December. 6 During the take-over a number of prelates, notably the archbishops of Nicaea (iznik) and Cyzicus
L Lambros to the Prime Minister. Thessaloniki. 12 October 1923: Archbishop Kallinikos to Alexandris. 22 November 1923. forwards an official copy of the letter of resignation. both in YE/B/35
2. Tezkere no. 1092, istanbul vi/dyeti, 6 December 1923. 3. Gregory Zervoudakis (1855-1924). He served as archbishop of Serres and Cyzicus before his appointment to the seat of Chalcedon in 1909. 4. See chapters 1 and 2. 5. Akram, 6 December 1923. the text was reproduced in The Orient News, 7 December 1923 as well as the local Greek newspapers. 6. Ergene. op.cit., pp. 87-96; Ak!ja/1l, 7 December 1923.
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(Erdek), were seriously maltreated by the invader. 7 Immediately after establishing himself at the Phanar, he announced to the press that he ascribed the defeat of his protege Cyril to «Hellenic intrigue orchestrated by John Politis (the newly appointed Greek representative in Turkey»>. Since the government would not accept the new patriarch, Eftim asserted, he occupied the Patriarchate «in the name of the nation». He then hinted that he would remain in the Phanar until the government declared the election invalid. s At the same time, he addressed a letter to the patriarch ascribing himself as «the general representative of all the Orthodox communities» (Biitiin Ortodoks Cemalitlari Vekil Ulllllllllllisi). Once again the government thwarted Eftim' s plan to establish himself permanently at the Phanar. On 9 December, the authorities ousted Eftim and his associates from the patriarchal premises. 9 Evidently, while it was prepared to tolerate Papa Eftirn's harassment of the Phanar, the Turkis.hgovernrnent could not allow him to stamp out the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. Not only would it have been against the Turkish pledge at Lausanne to maintain it as a religious institution in its historical seat, but also it would have violated article 38 of the Lausanne treaty which guaranteed freedom of religious practice to the non-Muslim minorities. Thus, on 17 December, Seyyid, the minister of justice, declared before the Turkish assembly that the election of Gregory was in order and that Eftim was not acting with the authorization of the Turkish government. IO Further, on 25 December, President Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk sent a personal telegram to the patriarch thanking him for his favourable expressions towards the republic. II This note by the president of the republic was interpreted as a recognition of Gregory by the Turkish government. Ankara once again reiterated its intention to allow the operation of the Patriarchate so long as it refrained from meJdling in politics. Meanwhile, the actual enthronement of Patriarch Gregory took place on 13 December without any serious incident. 12 Using this relative improvement in its relations with the Turkish government, the Phanar endeavoured to stern the tide of the Eftimite challenge.
But, Eftim reacted with equal vehemence. By now he was completely alienated from the Greeks and there was no hope of rehabilitating him in the Patriarchate. Thus, on 12 December, he laid charges of high treason against certain members of the synod and in particular against the patriarch. 13 Once again, however, the tribunal of independence (Istiklal Mahkemesi) , the highest court in the country, refused to take action against the Phanar. 14 Realizing, therefore, that the government would not tolerate a take over of the Patriarchate, Papa Eftim now campaigned for the transfer of «the provisional centre of the Turkish Orthodox church of the east» from Kayseri to Istanbul. After a coup on 12 February 1924, Pap~ Eftim established himself as the priest of the church of Kaphatiani at Galata. 15 On 6 June 1924, in a congress held at Galata, Eftim and his associates took a resolution to sever all relations with the Patriarchate. A month later the foundation statutes of the Turkish Orthodox movement were adopted. 16 To these provocations, the Phanar reacted by defrocking Eftim on 19 February. Then in direct appeals to President Atatiirk and Prime Minister Ismet tnonu, they requested the intervention of the authorities. 17 But the Patriarchate was officially informed that the authorities would not interfere in the Kaphatiani affair for they considered it a matter concerning only the Orthodox. IS Again when a patriarchal delegation expressed the Phanar's intention to send a bishop to Kaphatiani to hold a service on 15 August, the governor (l'{IIi) of Istanbul rebuked the delegates for this decision and added: 19 «l see that you want to disturb the public order; your people must not set foot in the church unless they want to face machine guns».
Encouraged by the government's tacit acquiescence to the Kaphatiani coup, Eftim renewed his attack against the Patriarchate. In a long statement to the press on 3 March he claimed that the Phanar continued to be a «hotbed of
7. Borough to Douglas. Consn 8 December 1923. LPA)DgP; 17/127. For an unconvincing attempt to justify the violence used by Eftim. see Ergene. o{J.ciL, pp . 98-100 . X. Text of the announcement in The Orielll Nl'Il'I, 8 December 1923: 0:1,[ 4 (1924) 29-30. '! Henderson to Curzon. Consn II December 1923, FO 371/9124/E9124, HI. Politis to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 19 December 1923. YE;Bj35: Henderson to Curzon. COllSn 19 December 1923. FO 371/9124/EI2138, 11 Borough to Douglas. Cons .. '27 December 1923. LPA/DgP;l7(137; OM 4 (]924) 31 12. Borough to Douglas. Cons ... 14 December 1923. LPA/DgP/17/135; The Times. 14 December 1923,
11. Politis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 19 December 1923, YE/B/35; The Orient News, 13 and 14 December 1923. 14. Henderson to Foreign Office, Cons., 2 January 1924, FO 371/10191/EI85. 15 . Diamandopoulos (Cons.) to Politis (Ankara), J3 February 1924, YE/B/35; Ergene, op.cit, , pp. 105-13. 16. Ergene, op.cit., pp. 185-89. 17. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 15 February 1924, YE/B/35; Politis to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 14 March 1924, YE/B/35. 18. Borough to Douglas, Cons., 21 July 1924, LPAjDgP/17/203; Jiischke, «Die TiirkischOrthodoxe Kirche», pp . 122-23. 19. Borough to Douglas, Conso, 20 August 1924. LPA/DgP/17/213.
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intrigue» and reiterated his determination to fight against the treacherous Greek priests. 2o He then brought suit against Gregory and the synod claiming 30,000 TL compensation for the patriarchal sentence of excommunication. 21 Finally, Eftim won his case and was awarded 500 TL compensation. The prestige of the Patriarchate was further undermined when the authorities proceeded with the seizure of Phanar property in execution of the court's decision. 22 The second major crisis during the reign of Gregory came about when the Turkish government abolished the Caliphate on 2 March 1924. 23 The Turkish press demanded that the non-Muslim religious establishments must also ·follow suit and be suppressed as a sequel to the establishment of secularism in Turkey. 24 The local Greek press rebutted this claim by arguing that there was no analogy between the Patriarchate, a minority religious institution, and the caliph who held the most influential position in the Ottoman government. 25 In this the grecophone press was supported by the Tanill which stressed that such an act would be contrary to the Lausanne undertaking.26 At first, it appeared that the government might be also favourably disposed towards the abolition of the religious heads of the minorities. Further, on 23 March, the New York Herald published an interview with the president of Turkey who allegedly stated that Turkish public opinion could no longer tolerate the existence of non-Muslim patriarchates,27 Throughout this debate the position of Patriarch Gregory as the head of the Ecumenical Patriarchate remained precarious. Anxious to rally support against the suppression of the Patriarchate, the Greek government sounded its disquiet about these developments. 28 Finally, the Turkish government announced that it had not wavered its stand on the non-Muslim patriarchates. Further, on 6 May, the semi-official Anatolian press agency (Anadolu Ajans/) circulated a categori20. See Ergene, op.cit., pp. 144-85. 21. Ibid., p. 111: The Orient News, 14 March 1924. 22 . Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons., 7 May 1924. FO 371/10191/E4101; Borough to Douglas, Cons" 7 April 1924. LPA/DgP/17/178 23. Law 431/1924, see Lewis. Emergence, pp. 262-71. 24. Particularly vocal were the istanbul papers Vatan, Tevhid-i EftaI' and Aks,am see The Orient News, 12 March 1924. 25. c[Jw; and 'H/1£P1(J/a Nia, 12 March 1924: The Orient News 12 and 13 March 1924. 26. Psomiades, The Eastern Question, p. 97. 27. Full text of the interview in Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons., 7 May 1924, FO 371/10191/E410L 28. Melas to Roussos, Paris, 24 April and 3 May 1924. Kaklamanos to Roussos, London, 30 April 1924, Tsamados to Roussos, Washington, 8 May 1924. For the action taken by the Serbian government on behalf of the Patriarchate. 3 April 1924, all documents in YE/B/35.
cal dementi announcing that the alleged New York Herald interview had not taken place. Another government organ. the Cumhuriyet. disclosed that Ankara had not as yet come to a final decision regarding the patriarchates. 29 At the same time, the government conducted an investigation on the past activities of the Phanar prelates. ~() While this investigation was carried out, the authorities adopted an ambivalent attitude towards the Phanar. Not only was Gregory never officially recognized as patriarch, but also it was with the connivance of the authorities that Eftim managed to transfer successfully his Turkish Orthodox church to the city. After establishing himself illegally at the wealthy Greek Orthodox parish of Galata, Eftim remained a constant irritant to the Patriarchate. Despite these setbacks, Gregory succeeded in enjoying a relatively peaceful but short reign. After a reign of over eleven months, Gregory died on 16 November 1924. As Arnold Toynbee remarked, by dying in harness, Gregory «achieved the feat equalled by few of his predecessors».31
4. The c.\c!lilngc{[hilit\· (~r thc archhishop, alld thc exPlllsion of Patriarch COllstalltillc \/1. By late 1924, the dispute over the status of the Phanar clerics had profoundly unsettling effects on the Patriarchate and at one moment threatened to lead to Greek-Turkish hostilities. As early as June 1924, Patriarch Gregory expressed his anxiety about the status of the archbishops who had come to the city later than 1918 and were therefore technically exchangeable under the terms of the exchange convention. I He then asked the Greek consul in Istanbul. Kimon Diamandopoulos, to inquire as to the Turkish intentions on the matter." While at first the Turkish authorities adopted an evasive attitude, by October 1924 they began to register all the archbishops at the Phanar," On 16 December. the Turkish authorities requested the mixed commission for the exchange of populations to issue passports for three prelates on the grounds that they were exchangeable, The archbishops were then escorted to the police station and were not released until a Greek 29. Text of this statement of 6 May in Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons .. 14 May 1924, FO 371/l0191/E437L 30. Stylianopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 12 January 1924, YE/B/35 . 31. SIA, 2 (1925) 269. L Gregory to Roussos. Cons .. II June 1924, YE/B/35. 2. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 9 June 1924. YE/B/35. 3. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 16 October 1924. YE/B/35. A list on the status of the Phanar prelates compiled by Minister of the Interior Recep Peker on I October 1924. Y'EjB/35
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member of the commission, Antony Siotis, and the proprietors of the local Greek papers, 'HpepfWza Nia and <1>(0:; made strong protests.4 One of the three detained archbishops was Constantine Araboglou, the strongest contender to the patriarchal throne after the death of Gregory. Meanwhile, the Turks, both officially and through the press, cautioned the prelates against electing a patriarch who was considered to be exchangeable. 5 Notwithstanding these explicit warnings, the holy synod proceeded with the election of Constantine on 17 December. In doing so the Phanar probably wished to clarify once and for all the ambiguity arising out of the exchange convention which did not specifically define the position of the prelates of the Patriarchate, Not only did the Turks refuse to recognize the new patriarch, but they also pressed the mixed commission to speed up Constantine's exchange procedures. 6 It appears that the new patriarch was rather antipathetic to the Turks, A religious conservative, Constantine had been the leader of the anti-Meletios group and had close ties with the royalist Greek government during 1920-22, A native of Slgl (Sigrni) near Bursa (Brussa), Constantine arrived in the city in 1921 as archbishop of Cyzicus (Erdek), He was then translated to Brussa and in 1924 he became archbishop of Dercos (Terkoz). But Turkish indignation was mainly due to the election of a patriarch who was clearly objectionable to them. By electing an exchangeable patriarch, the authorities felt, the Phanar tried to force upon the government the view that members of the synod should be. exempted from the exchange because of their position, When the Turks requested once again the expulsion of Constantine, the Greek member at the commission asserted that despite the fact that the prelate had come to Istanbul after 1918, he, like all the other archbishops forming the holy synod, was not exchangeable,7 After many private discussions, the mixed commission adopted on 28 January 1925 a resolution in the following terms: 8 «The mixed commission, while noting the facts contained in the report
of the sixth subcommission, no. 2360, dated December 17, 1924, in regard to the possibility of exchanging Mgr. Constantine Araboglou, former metropolitan of Dercos, according to which Mgr. Constantine having been born in Asia Minor and having gone to Constantinople after October 30, 1918, fulfilled in his person all the conditions necessary for the purpose of the exchange, holds that it is beyond its competence to take decision in regard to the case of this prelate in view of his status as a metropolitan». This resolution implied, as it was expressly stated, that the mixed commission or its agencies were to take no subsequent action. The decision satisfied the Greek circles in the city and the local Grecophone press expressed its approval of the resolution. 9 Evidently, with their non-committal pronouncement the neutral members of the commission hoped to prevent the expUlsion of the patriarch since, according to the exchange convention, no individual could be exchanged without a passport issued by the mixed commission. At the same time with their evasive pronouncement, the commission tried to satisfy Turkish sensibilities by admitting the exchangeability of Constantine under the terms of the exchange convention and by refraining from even addressing the prelate as patriarch. Equally, the commission shunned its duty of interpreting the Turkish undertaking given at Lausanne to maintain the Patriarchate in relation with the exchangeability of the prelates who formed the holy synod. This, however, was precisely what the Greeks urged them to do. The Greeks stressed that it was «inconceivable that the Patriarchate could continue to exist and function without its organs, namely the individuals of which it was composed». The Turkish delegation at Lausanne, the Greeks underlined, had on 10 January 1923 consented to the retention of the Patriarchate «with all its organizations and constituent bodies» in Turkey. Since only two members of the synod were established according to the Turkish requirements, the extention of the exchange clause to the Phanar archbishops would be tantamount to the abolition of the Patriarchate. 10 Concurrently, the Greeks asserted that under the canon law all the clerical members of the Patriarchate were also members of the monastery ofSt. George at the Phanar. This was acknowledged by the official berats issued by the Ottoman government to the Phanar archbishops. Thus, such prelates were subject to the
4. Mavropoulos, op.cit., p. 207. 5. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 27 November 1924, YE/B/35; Memorandum on the events at the Patriarchate proceeding the election, 24 December 1924, FO 371/10859/E55. 6. Copy of the letter addressed by the vlili oflstanbul, Siileyman Sami, to the president of the mixed commission, 16 December 1924 and another letter from the local authorities to the subcommission, 3 January 1925, both in YE/B/35; Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 18 December 1924. YE/B/35. 7. Souidas to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 9 January 1925, YE/B/35. 8. LNO] (April, 1925) 483; Ladas, op.cit., p. 414.
9. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 29 January 1925, YE/B/35 . 10. See the 'E}.evBepov Bfjf.1a of28 December andLe Messagerd'Athenes, 29 and 30 December 1924 for the views of Michael Theotokas, a legal expert on the Patriarchate. Alexander Pallis, too, elaborated the Greek viewpoint in The Times, 3 February 1925.
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jurisdiction of the courts in Istanbul irTespective of their place of origin. As a result, the archbishops staying in the Phanar were known as ev6rtllOUVTEX; _ residing in the community - while the prelates who were sent by the Patriarchate to administer the ecclesiastical districts outside Istanbul were called anoollllOUVTEX;;, or those residing outside the community. From this the Greek thesis concluded that the Phanar archbishops were in fact domiciled in the city even when they were despatched to the Anatolian dioceses. l1 The Turks dismissed emphatically such arguments. While acknowledging the Lausanne engagement, the Turks insisted that this had only been embodied in the proceedings and not in the actual treaty, precisely because of the domestic nature of the Patriarchate. Because of that, the Turks underlined, Turkey did not undertake any treaty obligations with regard to the Patriarchate and thus no foreign power could interfere in such an internal matter. Since the Turks considered the Patriarchate a purely Turkish institution, they felt that it was within their jurisdiction to refuse as one of its officials a person who, according to their criteria, was ineligible for the patriarchal position. 12 In speeches at the assembly as well as in memoranda to the mixed commission, the Turks reiterated this thesisP On 30 January 1925, moreover, the Turks brought matters to a head by abruptly expelling Constantine Araboglou from Turkey without even awaiting the settlement of the issue of a passport by the mixed commission: The discourteous manner with which the patriarch was removed at 6.30 tn the morning, without even being given sufficient time to pack his belongings, had an adverse effect throughout Europe. 14 The reaction in Greece was vigorous. The patriarch was received by thousands of people in Thessaloniki who demanded vengeance upon the Turks. While similar demonstrations took place in Athens, the Anglo-Hellenic society and other philhellene associ~ tions in Europe staged protest meetings. IS The Greek press adopted a belhI L :'.Iemorandum by Constantine VI to the League of Nations. 23 February 1925. LN:C.
1~9 . 1925VII The Greek thesis on this issue was supported by a prominent European legal
cose attitude and the organ of General George Kondylis, the '£0)'11(17 <Jj(l)l'lj, was in favour of the resumption of hostilities. 16 The m;:uor European newspapers condemned the expUlsion and even the hitherto turcophil Le Temps strongly criticized the Turkish behaviour. 17 Aft.er addressing a strongly worded letter to the mixed commission, George Exindaris, the Greek member at the commission, tendered his resignation on 1 February. 18 The treatment of the patriarch by the TllIkish authorities. Exindaris protested, was worse than that accorded to the /wmal.., (porters) of Istanbu\.19 Faced with the expUlsion of the patriarch, the Michalakopoulos government found itself in a very awkward position. Acceptance of this Turkishf{Lit accompli would have weakened considerably the Greek bargaining position on the other outstanding questions. For the Turks might be encouraged to act unilaterally whenever a difference of opinion arose between the two countries. 20 In addition. the issue of the Patriarchate threatened seriously the stability of the Greek government. Many Greek military leaders felt that Greece had to respond to the humiliating treatment of the Patriarchate by declaring war on Turkey, Most outspoken in his statements was General Theodore Pangalos. who referring to the execution of the six ministers in 1922. warned that the government would suffer the same fate if it compromised vital Greek interests. As the Greek premier disclosed to Sir Milne Cheetham. the British ambassador in Athens. popular excitement might offer the opportunity to the more extreme element in the military to stage a coup c/' drat and proclaim a dictatorship.21 While expressing its profound indignation against the Turkish action. Athen" sought to exhaust all peaceful means before resorting to hostilities over the patriarchal question. 22 Finally. in an attempt to placate the refugee section of the population and to reconcile the «militarist» group. the Greek government decided to internationalize the issue. When. therefore. attempts at mediation by France and England failed to bear results. the Greek government requested. under the provisions of paragraph 2. article II of the Covenant. that the League of Nations consider
expert. Dr Karl Strupp. A copy of his expose Le difRrelld greco-llIrc slir /' eloigllell1ellt dll Patriarche de COlIStalltiJlopie (I March 1925) in YE;B;35. 12 It is. however. interesting that although they argued that the patriarch was a Turkish officiaL the Turks not only continued to be extremely hostile to the head of the Orthodox church but they also did not pay him any salary . ~ 13. Copy ofa memorandum addressed by the Turkish minister of For~ign Affairs to the Greek legation in Ankara. 5 February 1925: text of the speech of Premier Fethl Okyar (4 February) and
16. The Times, 2 and 3 February 1925: The Dail" Telegraph, 4 February 1925.
expulsion . 15. Michalakopoulos to Venizelos. Athens. 6 February 1925. YEB!35: Cheetham to Chamberlain. Annual Report on Greece. 1925. FO 371 '11357'C5755
17. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera. 14 February 1925. YE/B/35. 18. Exindruis to De Lru'a, Cons., 30 January 1925: Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 31 January 1925, YE/B/35 19. OM 5 (1925) 94-95. 122-23. 20. Politis to Foreign Ministry. Ankara, 9 and 12 February 1925, both in YE/B/35. 21 Cheetham to Chamberlain, Annual Report on Greece, 1925. FO 371/11357/C5755. 22. Cheetham to Chamberlain, Athens, 30 January 1925. FO 371/10859/E560. See also D. Gatopoulos. 'Al'Jpia:; MI1.a).ar:071ov).O; 1875-1938, Athens 1947, p. 228.
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F~reign Minister Sukrli Kaya (10 February). in YErBj35
14.-Diamandop~ulos to Foreign Ministry. Pera. 30 January 1925. YE/Bj35, for details on the
the question of the Patriarchate. 23 On 23 February, the expelled patriarch addressed his own memorandum to the League. 24 At first, the Turkish press demonstrated a «naive surprise» at the Greek indignation over the question of the Patriarchate, but soon adopted a threatening tone accusing the Patriarchate of being an instrument for foreign interference in Turkish domestic affairs. 25 Thus, the Cumhuriyet of 4 February went so far as to propose that a complete exchange of the Constantinopolitan Greeks and the Thracian Turks would ipso facto abolish the raison d' erre of the Phanar. Speaking before the assembly on 4 February, Premier Fethi Okyar reiterated the Turkish stand. The expulsion of Constantine was brought about because the government was unable to give «preferential treatment» to any specific categories of exchangeable Greeks. He underlined that his government would honour the pledge given at Lausanne and advised the Orthodox to proceed with the election of a new patriarch from among those prelates who were not liable to exchange. He also begged Greece to adopt a reasonable attitude and refrain from menacing Turkey. Ifnot, he warned, the Turkish people «would know how to defend themselves».26 On numerous occasions, Foreign Minister ~iikrii Kaya repeated this warning. The campaign, moreover, against the Patriarchate was intensified and many deputies accused the Phanar of being a political rather than a spiritual institution. 27 Strained relations between the two governments were also accentuated by the attitude of the Fethi Okyar government which adopted an uncompromising stand on both the Patriarchate and etablis questions. As Arnold Toynbee pointed out the expUlsion of Constantine was «another example of the autocratic manner of the (Fethi Okyar) government» .28 Ankara also dealt summarily with the two grecophone papers, 'H/18p1la/a N ia and II o}.zrda, who had been unduly critical of the treatment accorded to the patriarch. 29 Unlike his predecessor lsmet inonii, who always handled Greek-Turkish differences with studied restraint, Fethi Okyar brought the two countries to the brink of yet another war. 30 Nor did the Turks consent to appear before the council of the League of Nations. Instead, a communique, signed by Turkish Foreign Minister ~iikrii Kaya, was addressed to the League on 1 March. In it the Turkish government 23. II February. See document LNjC57.M30.1925. VII given in LNO] (April, 1925) 579. 24. LNjC 129.1925. VII. 25. See Mahmut Esafs articles in Hakimiyet-i Milliye 2, 4, 5 and 10 February 1925. 26. See Psomiades, The Eastern Question, p. 61. 27.. Text of speeches in the Turkish assembly on 10, 11 and 19 February 1925 in YEjBj35. 28. A.J. Toynbee and K.P. Kirkwood, Turkey, London 1926, pp. 190-91. 29. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons .. 10 June 1925, YEjBj35. 30. Politis to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 4 February 1925, YEjBj35. For details on the etablis question see chapter IV.
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req~ested the council not to consider the Greek government's application. It demed having failed to respect the powers conferTed upon the mixed commission by the convention of Lausanne. Again, it asserted that it had not failed to conform to the declarations made in Lausanne by its representative ismet Inonii, when he withdrew his demand that the Patriarchate be removed from Turkey. It reiterated that the Patriarchate was a domestic Turkish institution its constitution and administration being subject to Turkish laws and regula~ tions: Ther~ was, moreover, no clause giving one or several foreign powers the nght to rotervene on behalf of this in~titution. The same letter accused the Greek government of trying to present the Patriarchate as an international institution and thus interfere in Turkish domestic affairs.31 Notwithstanding the Turkish attempt to challenge the council's competence, on 14 March the question of the Patriarchate came before the League of Nations. Dimitrios Kaklamanos, the Greek representative, argued before the council that the maintenance of the Patriarchate was by no means a Turkish domestic question. He reminded the council that the question of the Patriarchate had not only given rise to long discussions at Lausanne, but that Turkey itself had placed the question of the Patriarchate on the agenda of the Lausanne conference. By SUbmitting the question of the Patriarchate to an international conference, he argued, Turkey had in fact acknowledged the international character of that institution. Kaklamanos further explained that Greece did not want to deny the fact that the Patriarchate was an institution of an internal character. The maintenance of the Patriarchate in Turkey had, however, been the subject of the provisions of international agreements. Any departure from what had been decreed was a matter of interest to Greece, one of the states signatory to the treaty of Lausanne, and at the same time an Orthodox state. Greece would no longer have any reason to concern itself with the affairs of the Patriarchate once the principles laid down at Lausanne were confirrned. 32 Because of the Turkish objections, however, the council declined to proceed with the question. Instead, by a resolution of 14 March, and after a report by Viscount Ishii, the secretary-general of the council, it decided to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion on the following question: 33
«Do the objections of the competence of the Council raised by the 31. Full text of the letter, LNjC. 160. 1925. VII is given in LNO] (April, 1925) 579.81. 32. LNO] (April, 1925) 482-84. For a memorandum by the Greek government in reply to the Turkish communique of I March 1925, 3ubmitted to the council on 14 March 1925, LNjC 21 L M.70.1925.VII in ibid., pp. 637-39. 33.. Ibid., pp. 578-79.
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Turkish Government in its letter of March 1st, which is communicated to the Court, preclude the Council from being competent in the matter brought before it by the Greek Government by its letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations dated February I I,
1925?». At the same time. the council expressed the hope that it would be possible for the question at issue to be settled by private negotiations between the two governments. To this end. the council suggested, they might use the good offices of the neutral members of the mixed commission.).! Earlier. the Permanent Court of International Justice had declined to make a pronouncement on the exemption of the Phanar prelates from the exchange when it gave its advisory opinion on the issue of erablis on 21 February.35 Notwithstanding its indignation with the abrupt expUlsion of the patriarch. Athens realized that it would reap few concrete benefits by internationalizing the issue. Thus. the Greek government agreed to follow the advice of the League and enter into direct negotiations with the Turks. A similar desire for a satisfactory settlement was also expressed by the Turks. particularly after the resumption of premiership by Ismet inonu on 4 March. On II April. the Turkish delegate at the mixed commission withdrew the demand for the expUlsion of the rest of the Phanar prelates. 36 Concurrently. the nili of Istanbul offered a qllid pro qllo to the holy synod, according to which the government would arrange a non-exchangeable status for the archbishops provided that they proceeded immediately with the election of a new patriarch.J7 On the government level. too, the Exindaris-Aras negotiations were resumed and achieved «satisfactory» results on the question of the Patriarchate. 38 As previously remarked. these negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Ankara accord of 21 June 1925. Meanwhile. the pro-government press in Athens urged the election of a new patriarch. The 'EI.cIJ(}r;pol' B1lpa even went so far as to suggest that the whole affair was brought about by the «monkish pig-headedness» of the ,:. nod. which persisted in electing Constantine in spite of a waming by the
Turkish governmenLJ9 Eleftherios Venizelos, too, was highly critical of the way the holy synod handled the whole question of the patriarchal election.40 Finally, on n May, Constantine, who initially opposed abdication, forwarded his resignation to the Phanar from Thessaloniki. 41 This conciliatory move eased the way for a solution to the question of the Patriarchate. On 29 May, the Turks assured George Exindaris that the election of a new patriarch would be orderly and that the eight exchangeable archbishops could stay at the Phanar. In return, the Greek side agreed to recognize that the new patriarch had to be a persol/a grata with the Turkish government. 42 With the positive outcome of these negotiations, Greece withdrew its appeal to the League of Nations on I June. In a letter to the League, it stated that, since the question of the Patriarchate had been successfully concluded, there was no need for an advisory opinion on the subject by the Permanent Court of International Justice. 43 Notwithstanding the immediate advantage of fhis agreement, the withdrawal of the Greek appeal to the League had far-reaching implications. During the Constantine affair the Turks successfully portrayed the Patriarchate as a purely Turkish institution without being seriously contradicted by any of the western powers. By not awaiting the pronouncement of the international court on the question of the competence of the League to discuss the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greece, too, implicitly undermined the international character of the Phanar.
5. The reign of Basil III. Instructed by the government to go ahead with a new election, the holy synod proceeded with great caution to choose a successor to Constantine. During a formal meeting with the archbishops of the Phanar at the beginning of June 1925, the viili oflstanbul, Slileyman Sami, advised them to proceed in accordance with the precedent of the 1923 patriarchal election. He also informed them that the election of the archbishop of Chalcedon, Joachim, would be viewed with displeasure in Ankara. I Conforming with the government's wishes, Joachim, the most prominent figure at the Phanar, withdrew
34. Ibid. 35. Publication ofthe Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, Series B, No. 10,21 February 1925, Collection of Advisory opinions, «Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations», p. 28. 36. Souidas to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 1l April 1925; Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 12 April 1925, both in YE/B/35. 37. Such meetings between the wlli and members of the synod started in February 1925, Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 24 February and 2 June 1925, both in YE/B/35. 38. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 4 March 1925, YE/B/35.
39. Cheetham to Chamberlain, Athens, 8 February 1925, FO 371/10859/E932 40. Venizelos to Foreign Office 12 and 26 February 1925, both from Paris, YE/B/35 . 41. Once again, Nicholas, the arcbishop of Caesarea (Kayseri) was appointed locum tenens of the Patriarchate, Keeling to Chamberlain, Athens, 27 June 1925. 42. Politis to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 7 June 1925, YE/B/35. See also Psomiades, The Eastern Question, pp. 102-3. 43. LNOJ. (July, 1925) 895. L Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 2 June 1925. YE/B/35; Borough to Douglas, Cons., 3 June 1925, LPAjDgP/321209.
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his candidature. 2 The election took place on 13 July and the archbishop of Nicaea, Basil Georgiadis was duly declared patriarch. The election was conducted in a free atmosphere and when Damianidis and few of his followers attempted to create an incident the Turkish police intervened and dispersed the intruders. 3 Basil III, a man of very old age, was a distinguished doctor of canon law and an eminent liturgist caring more for scholarly pursuits than politics. He came from an eminent Constantinopolitan family which apparently traced its descent back to the days of the Komninoi. Before being appointed archbishop of Nicaea (iznik), Basil served at the metropolitan of the trouble striken episcopy of Anchialus between 1894 and 1909. Born in the Asiatic suburb of istanbul, Oskildar (Scoutari) in 1846, the new patriarch was regarded as acceptable by the Turkish authorities. 4 Soon after the election, George Exindaris and Tevfik Ril~til Aras agreed on a formula which recognized as non-exchangeables eleven senior clerics of the Phanar. This new arrangement was immediately communicated to the authorities in istanbul. 5 Notwithstanding the recent orderly election of a new patriarch, relations between the authorities and the Phanar could at best be described as tolerable. Although proud of its laicism, repUblican Turkey considered it unwise to ignore the political record of the archbishops. Endemic suspicion of the Phanar impeded all attempts to mitigate hardened attitudes. The press contirmed to remind the Turkish people of the past «treacherous» activities of the Greek Orthodox and warned them to beware of the Phanar's present activities. As a result, intercommunal relations, though modified, remained tense. Under these circumstances, Basil's tenure of office (1925-29) coincided with one of the most crucial periods in the history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. During this time, Papa Eftim, assisted by his prominent friends in the government, continued to antagonize the Patriarchate. Above all he capitalized on the Turkish suspicions of the Phanar. Thus, he inaugurated a new press campaign against Basil whose election, he alleged, was only brought about by an intense propaganda financed by the Greek government. As with previous patriarchs, he accused Basil of publishing anti-Turkish articles during the armistice. 6 In order to extend his influence in istanbul, the 2. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera 29 June 1925; YE/B/35; The Times, 9 July 1925. 3. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 13 July 1925; YE/B/35; Hoare to Chamberlain, Cons., 15 July 1925, FO 371/10860/E3450. 4. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 22 July 1925, YE/B/35. 5. Mavropoulos, op.cit., pp. 214-15. 6. Ergene, op.cit., pp. 201-2.
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power thirsty Anatolian priest made use of existing rivalries amongst various groups within the Greek community. Likewise some local Greeks. including fe~ Phanar dignitaries. sought to advance their careers -by fraternizing with EftlrTL The timely invasions of the Phanar in October and December 1923 could not have been staged without the assistance of a couple of opportunist prelates - Cyril Chatzidimitriou. the archbishop of Rodopolis (Maqka) and Ambrosios Stavrianos. the archbishop of Neocaesarea (Niksar). Nor could he have taken over the Galata church of Kaphatiani without the active participation of a number of local parish trustees. such as Damianos Damianidis. By using the same means. Papa Eftim managed to occupy Christ Church of Galata, on 2 April 1926. 7 Another attempt to prevail upon the church of St Nicholas in May 1926 proved unsuccessful. mainly because of the vigorous reaction of the parish trustees. The reaction of the local Greek press was equally vehement. Indignant members of the community accused Eftim of seeking to erode the distinct ethnic identity of the Greek minority. 8 At the same time. the Patriarchate retaliated by suing Eftim for his arbitrary occupation of Orthodox churches. During the court hearings. which went on until 1928. the Greeks rallied to express their profound aversion to the tactics of Eftim. Anti-Eftim feeling reached such a high pitch that the authorities were forced to move the court hearings to the Anatolian town of Izmit (Nicomedia).9 The divisive tactics of Eftim surfaced once again in April 1928 during the communal election of the Pera ephori, the richest of all the Greek Orthodox parishes. The administration of the Greek communal property was somewhat regulated in 1927 when a committee of Turks and a Greek Orthodox (Avrilios Spatharis) drew up a statutory charter (KaraaTaTlKo:,; Xapryt:;). In accordance with the Lausanne agreement, this charter handed over the administration of parish property to the lay members of the community (miitevveli heyetleri). These lay administrative councils were elected by the members of the community for periods of four years. IO When therefore the stipulated period elapsed, the authorities instructed the election of a new ephori at Beyoglu (Pera). whose membership was made up of forty-four local and six central trustees. 7. This church was built in 1760 by a group of Greek immigrants from Cephalonia Details on Ef"tim's attempts against the Galata churches in Borough to Douglas. Cons., 4 April and 5 May 1926. in LPA;DgP/17/271 and LPAiDgP/17/279 respectively. " 8. Ergene, op.cit. pp. 208-9 9. Ergene, op.cit .. pp. 208 f. 10. For the treatment of the administration of non-Muslim communal property see Giineri. op.ci!, pp 79-108. See also Kw\'ara\,r1\'olJ7wi.I;. 10 April 1927.
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The smooth execution of the elections was disrupted when two associates of Papa Eftim, Kotsos Papadopoulos and Michael Ioannidis, were named members of the central committee. Their election was only made possible by the interference of the authorities who supervised the parish voting. The election of two unpopular figures coupled with the unwarrented interference of the Turkish authorities caused new excitement among the Greeks. A deputation appealed directly to the viili explaining that both Papadopoulos and loannidis did not enjoy the confidence of the community. When, however, their request was refused, the forty-eight remaining members resigned in protest against the irregularities which had taken place during the election. 11 Unmoved by this reaction, the two Eftimite trustees, accompanied by the police, entered the central church of Panagia at Pera on 6 May and placed seals on the safe. 11 By June 1928, however, tensions were somewhat relieved when the forty-eight trustees withdrew their resignations. Consequently, they assumed their duties and, together with Papadopoulos and loannidis, took up the administration of the Pera ephori. 13 Evidently, the interference of the police during the election, and particularly the removal of the ballot boxes to the local police station, was contrary to the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty. The Greek community viewed the whole affair as an attempt to erode their separate identity. The fact that the government used strong anti-Phanar figures as Papadopoulos and loannidis intensified this gloom. A Greek of Pontic origins and an exchangeable, Papadopoulos managed to remain in Turkey thanks to the intervention of Papa Eftim. Again, with the assistance of the latter, he published the daily newspaper, McrappUe/llGl:;;, which adopted a strong anti-Phanar stance. 14 By favouring dubious elements, the Greeks feared, the government would endeavour to undermine the authority of the elected parish councils. Impotent councils, the Greek leaders opined, would have neither the power to represent effectively the community nor the strength to administer the immensely valuable properties of the parishes. b. Restrictions on the eCl/menical role (~f the Patriarchate.
Unable to intervene on behalf of the Greek minority, the Patriarchate remained an impotent observer throughout the Pera ephori affair. But the II
impotence of the Phanar was even more visible in the international sphere. Since 1923. the Turkish government remained consistent in its determination to play down the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate. Thus the head of the Patriarchate was simply addressed as the archpriest (h(qpapa::). as opposed to patriarch. of the Orthodox that happened to live within the boundaries of Turkey. Contacts viith the rest of the Orthodoxy were frowned upon and any such initiative was described as detrimental to Turkish sovereignty. Extremely sensitive on the activities of the Patriarchate, Turkish public opinion labelled as treacherous any dealings of the Phanar with foreign Orthodox religious heads. Consequently the authorities assumed an obstructive attitude towards the visits of the Rumanian and Polish patriarchs in 1927. I Official sensitivity was best manifested when on 10 December 1925, the Patriarchate initiated the convening of an Orthodox ecumenical council. The government flatly refused permission for such an undertaking and when the Phanar suggested the convocation of a pro-synod on Mt Athos to deal with pressing ecclesiastical questions, such as the calender reform, the press accused the Patriarchate of intrigue and political activities. 2 Under these adverse circumstances a certain inevitable stagnation permeated the Phanar. This was strongly felt among the communities which came under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Thus after an attempt to placate the Soviet Living church in 1925. the representatives of the White Russian church in exile (established in Karlowitz. Yugoslavia). denounced the Patriarchate for bargainino with the enemies of Orthodoxy. There were repercussions in the ~hurch~s of Serbia and Rumania, which were bitterly hostile to the anti-clericalism of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, thE' Greek Orthodox patriarchs of Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch prepared themselves to act on their own account and convened an ecumenical council in Jerusalem in May 1925. 1 Encouraged by such reactions. Turkish efforts to weaken the international prestige of the Patriarchate went on unabated. Thus the police seized the archives of the Phanar and documents of cardinal importance. such as the decree recognizing the autonomy of the Serbian church. were leaked to the press. This in~turn 'iparked off a campaign against the Patriarchate accusing the patriarch of anti-Turkish activities. 4 Faced with the visible enfeeblement of the Phanar,
Sakellaropoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons. 22 April 1928. YE;Bj37: Memorandum b,
R. H Hadow . 28 May 1928: FO ~71 13096/E2845 12. DalielOs 10 Foreign Ministry . Cons .. 10 May 1928 and Dalietos 10 Michalakopoulos. Cons .... 15 \Ia) 1928 both in YE B 37 I~
Clerk 10 Chamberlain. Ankara. 27 June 1928. FO 371 13097'E3314; Sakellaropoulos to J-:alapanos~ Cons .. 16 July 1928. YEo B.37 14. Ifl:ra/,/,,;(Ijllm; 10 June 1925
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I See CUllliIuriyu, 15 April 1927: !\W\(7T!1\lIln/i;roil; 17 April and 29 May 1927 . 2 Patriarchal encyclical. no . 2957 inOpOo()o:;ill 1 (1926) 24 3 OA/' 5 (1925) 80-81 4 Archbishop Germanos Strinopoulos to the archbishop ofCanterbury~ London . 10 lanum,
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the Albanian church demanded autonomy. Following this example the tiny Albanian Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul asked for a separate church in 1927. 5 International isolation. however. was not the only consequence of having to operate from within a secular, nationalist and ~ostile T~rke~. Equ~lly important was the Patriarchate's moral and financIal detenoratlOn durmg 1922-29. Patriarchs. like Meletios Metaxakis and Constantine Araboglou, who possessed the ability to steer an independent line, were declared undesirable and forced to leave Turkey. Likewise. forceful personalities, like the archbishop of Chalcedon (Kadik6y). Joachim were kept away from the patriarchal throne. 6 The patriarchs who were allowed to reign (Gregory Zervoudakis and Basil Georgiadis) were of advanced age and not equipped to deal with the extremely sensitive conditions of the post-Lausanne period. Furthermore. the Phanar's fortunes were greatly affected by the political relations between Athens and Ankara. The latter was not slow in realizing that the Phanar could prove an invaluable bargaining tool in their deals with the Greek government. Given these conditions, many prominent Greeks propagated the removal of the Patriarchate to another country. Taking into account the susceptibilities of the other Orthodox churches, some proposed the island of Cyprus as a possible future location of the Patriarchate. 7 Others, headed by the former patriarch Meletios Metaxakis, favoured its transfer to Mt Athos.8 To overcome the canonical objections, the precedent of the Patriarchate's temporary transfer to N icaea in the thirteenth century and that of the Vatican in the fourteenth were cited. Furthermore. conditions in the Phanar seemed to have justified such a transfeL The expulsion of the Anatolian and Thracian Greeks deprived the Orthodox Patriarchate in Turkey of its traditional recruitment ground. Already the Patriarchate began to face difficulties in filling vacant sees with prelates of the required calibre. 9 The Ecumenical Patriarchate faced an imminent danger of being reduced to an ordinary parochial church. In addi·, 1925: Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons,. 17, ~O. 22 and 23 December 1924 all in YEiB;35, 5 Hoare to Chamberlain. Cons .. I December 1927. FO 371/12318/E5193. 6. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera 23 June 1925. YE/B/35. 7, The British government. for reasons of its own. strongly discouraged any such proposals. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, London. 20 February 1925. FO 371' I 0859/El 059 8, Lindsay to Chamberlain. Cons" 3 February and II March 1925 in FO 371;10859(E777 and FO 371.10859jE1616 respectively. See also 'HJlCf)]im(1 Nia, 31 January 1925. 9" Thus. «one of the ablest metropolitans of the Patriarchate» Jacob of Durrazzo was translated to Mitylene and left the Phanar. Borough to Douglas. Cons" 17 February 1925. LPA DgP!I7i246
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tion, the Turkish government sought to establish in the patriarchal throne a sympathetic patriarch. Thus they pressed for the election of Cyril Chat. zidimitriou, the archbishop of Rod opolis, who had apparently given substantial proof of his Turkish patriotism during World War I. There is evidence to suggest that this prelate was also sympathetic to the ideas of Papa Eftim.lO Yet during 1923-29, the patriarchal authorities succeeded in upholding the separate identity of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. Despite a considerable loss of international and domestic prestige, the Phanar proved resilient enough to survive the adverse post-Lausanne period.
10 Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Pem. 2 and 9 July 1925. both in YE/B;35,
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CHAPTER VI
THE GREEK MINORITY DURING THE GRECO-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT, 1930-40 1. The Greco-Turkish agreements of 1930.
Ever since the Lausanne negotiations the Turks had suspected that Athens was opposed to the exchange of the Constantinopolitan Greeks because such a move would have severed their last link with the legacy of the Byzantine empire. Likewise, the Greeks were inclined to view with suspicion the Turkish insistence to maintain a minority in Greek Thrace. Both governments reproached each other not only for desiring to perpetuate a rival tradition in their respective territories but also for being influenced by a political arriere pel/See. In the aftermath of the Lausanne treaty, a period of intense distrust and acrimonious dispute, the minorities suffered substantially. The steady deterioration of relations brought Greece and Turkey to the edge of yet another armed conflict during the late 1920s. These melancholy prospects, however, were obviated by a number offactors, among which the most significant was the outstanding statesmanship of the Greek and Turkish leaders, particularly that of Eleftherios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. Decisive political changes took place in Greece when the Liberal party received an overwhelming vote of support in the parliamentary and senatorial elections of 1928 and 1929. 1 As a result Greece, for the first time since 1922, acquired a strong government able to shoulder the responsibility of taking far-reaching decisions. An additional asset of the new government was Venizelos himself - a politician of national repute and international standing who was literally idolized by the Asia Minor refugees. The experiences of the Anatolian war and the Lausanne settlement had radically transformed Venizelos' irredentist aspirations. By 1928 the Greek leader came to symbolize the idea of peaceful Greek-Turkish co-existence. As soon as he returned to
I H.J. Psomiades. «The Diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos. 1928-1930" in Essays ill the \I(,lIIory ofBasii Laollrdas, Thessaloniki 1975. pp. 556-57.
office, Venizelos, by emphasizing repeatedly that the notion of megali idea was dead and buried, strove to proclaim his peaceful intentions. «We desire», he characteristically declared during his first major speech on foreign policy, «to establish with Republican Turkey .. , as friendly relations as possible». 2 ?n 30 August 1928, only ten days after his stunning electoral victory, Venlzelos addressed a personal letter to Isme~ lnonii, with whom he had de .. vel oped a rapport during the Lausanne negotiation in 1922-23. He explained to the Turkish prime minister that: 3 «Au moment ou Ie peuple heIlene vient de me confier, par une forte majorite. la direction de son gouvernement pour une periode de quatre ans, je tiens a vous affirmer mon vif desir de contribuer a un reglement des rapports de nos deux pays qui leur assurerait une amitie etroite que viendrait consacrer un pacte d'amitie, de non agr~ssion et d' arbitrage, d' une etendue aussi large que possible. rai pleinement conscience du fait que la Turquie n 'a point de vi sees sur nos territoires, et il m 'a ete donne maintes fois au cours de la periode electorale de declarer pUbliquement que la Grece n 'a aucune visee sur les territoires turcs et qu' elle accepte les traites de paix sincerement et sans reserve. Je ne puis donc douter que Ie reglement de nos relations, tel que je r entends, corresponde aussi au desir de Votre Excellence. A la realisation de ce desir commun ne s'oppose aucun obstacle si ce n' est les questions en suspens entre les deux pays du fait de la convention d'echange des populations et des accords qui I'ont suivie». He elaborated the same view in another letter to Tevfik Rii~tti Aras, the Turkish foreign minister. 4 The response of the Turkish premier was very positive indeed. He wrote that: 5 «("est avec un vif plaisir que j'ai pris connaissance ... du contenu de cette lettre repondant entierement ames propres vues et marquant dans I'histoire des rapports helleno-turcs I'ouverture d'une nouvelle ere de tendance franchement et loyalement amicale». After expressing his strong wish for an improvement in Greco-Turkish relations, the Turkish foreign minister, too, concentrated on making practical 2 . Le MessaRer d'Athelle.\, 23 July 1928. For the full text ofVenizelos' speech in Thessaloniki lin 22 July 1928 see BMAEV/173 3.. Venizelos (Athens) to Ismet Pacha (Ankara). 30 August 1928. BMAEV;50 See D . Kitsikis. «Les Projets d'Entente Balkanique. 1930-1934" in Reme Historiqlle, 241 (1969) 118. 4 . Venizelos (Athens) to Tewfik Ruschdy Bey (Ankara). 30 August 1928. BMAEV/50. 5. Ismet (Ankara) to Venizelos (Athens). 27 September 1928. BMAEV;50.
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174 12
suggestions as to how a detente between the two countries could be achieved. 6 Speaking before the national assembly on 14 September, ismet tnonil stressed that «there was no obstacle in the way of a Turco-Greek understanding».7 Given the sober approach of the two governments, Greek-Turkish negotiations were resumed in December 1928. In July 1929, a new Greek representative, Spyridon Polychroniadis, was accredited to Ankara, with personal instructions from Venizelos to intensify the peace efforts.s Likewise, President Atatlirk directed the Turkish foreign office to eliminate all obstacles hindering a treaty with Greece. 9 The attendance, for the first time in history, of the Turkish minister in Greece, Mehmet Enis Akaygen, at the official Te Deul11 on the anniversary of the Greek independence was a sign of Turkey's new conciliatory mood. I 0 The positive Turkish response to the Greek premier's peace initiative was largely facilitated by the spectacular transformation that had taken place in Turkey during the 1920s. After an initial period of inward, anti-European and ultra-nationalistic stance, Turkey steadily evolved into a state with a western approach ready to stay outside the Soviet sphere of influence. Turkey now wished to resolve its differences with the West and especially with its Balkan neighbours. 11 Given the revisionist designs of Bulgaria, Turkey, like Greece, welcomed an alliance between states that adhered to thestatlls quo. Again, a Greek- Turkish rapprochement was bound to have a favourable impact in Western Europe, and particularly in Britain. l .:! This in turn would help Turkey decrease its dependence on the Soviet Union. Clearly, the Greek - Turkish endeavour for a rapprochement was purely political and was primarily dictated by common defense considerations. The breakthrough in the Greek-Turkish talks was largely influenced by the major foreign policy speech delivered by Venizelos before the Greek parliament on 10 February 1930. Having accepted in good faith all the treaties that had followed the World War, Venizelos declared, Greece was attached to 6 . Dr Ruschdy (Ankara) to Venizelos (Athens). 27 September 1928. BMAEVj50. 7. See SIA 6 (1928) 221: K.D. Svolopoulos. H Ti.i'II'IKI; 'Ec,oJ!EplIa; 17oi.lTlKli IIW] nil' EVl'OljK1l (Ii; ;lw(d\'l'1/;, 'H KpiaIllO; Kajlm; 'lovi.lO;-dEKSjlfJpW; 1928, Thessaloniki 1977, pp. 141-52. 8. On the talks. Po1ychroniadis to Foreign Ministry. Ankara. 2 March 1930: Polychroniadis to Venizelos, Ankara, 3 June 1930, both in BMAEV/57 . 9 . Psomiades. «The Diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos», p. 564. 10. Ibid. and for more details in Ramsey to Henderson. Athens. 26 March 1930. FO 371 IJ4575jEI 570 . I L A.H. Ulman and 0_ Sander. «TUrk Dl~ Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenler 0923-1968) II» in SBFD, 27: 1 (1972) 3-4. 12. [IIOIII/'lIiill Soy/e!' I'e Deme~'/eri, Istanbul 1946. pp. 198-99,.
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peace with the world at large and particularly with Turkey. He predicted that the exchange of population negotiations would soon be brought to a successful conclusion. This, he opined, would be foIIowed by a treaty offriendship between Greece and Turkey and as a result a naval understanding regarding the balance of power in the Aegean would be possible.1 3 Such an agreement was first signed on 10 June 1930 by Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Ril~til Aras and Spyridon Polychroniadis, the Greek minister in Ankara. Consisting of twelve chapters, this convention was divided into thirty-four articles. It dealt almost exclusively with the liquidation of questions arising from the application of the Lausanne treaty and of the agreement on the exchange of populations. On the thorny issue of property belonging to exchangeables. both governments came to the conclusion that it was impos'iible to arrive at a just and accurate estimate on its value. Consequently, they agreed to consider both Greek and Turkish claims as balancing one another. While the property of the exchangeables was transferred without compensation to the Greek and Turkish governments, each party undertook to compensate its own refugees. A notable exception to this rule was property seized in Istanbul and Greek Thrace. Such properties were to be restored to their rightful owners within two months. Further, the Greek government agreed.to place at the disposal of the mixed commission the sum of £ 425,000 to be used for the compensation of three categories. Firstly, £ 150,000 was to be paid to those Muslims of Greek Thrace whose properties were requisitioned by the Greek governmenL Another £ 150,000 was allocated for the Constantinopolitan Greek etablis who were to lose their properties in Turkey outside the vitayet ofistanbul. FinaIIy, £ 125,000 was to be paid to the Turkish government, one half immediately and unconditionally and the other half (in two instalments) on Ankara's fulfilment of its obligations under the convention. The first half of this sum was to be paid to those former Turkish owners of property in Greece who were now living in Turkey and whose property was confiscated by the Greek governmenL The second half was to be made available. if necessary, for the compensation of the Constantinopolitan etab/is and Hellenic nationals in cases where the Turkish authorities were able to satisfy the mixed commission that restitution was impossible. 14 Initially the sum agreed upon was £ 150,000 but Turkey agreed to diminish it by £ 25,000 in order to compensate part of the estimated value of 13.. P Pipinelis. 'luTOpia vi:; 'E:;'WrcPIKlj; 170i.lTlh7j; ni; ·Eii.d6o; 1923·1941, Athens 1948. pp 51-53.. 14 . The official text of the Ankara convention of 10 June 1930 appears in French in Ladas. op.cil., appendix VIII, pp_ 817-30. For an analysis and evaluation of its terms. see idem .. pp 567-n
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properties left behind by the non-exchangeable absent Greeks of istanbul. 15 It is beyond doubt that Greece considered such payments unjust. Athens felt that the properties of some 1.,200,000 thriving Ottoman Greeks were much greater in value than the properties left behind by about 400,000 Hellene Muslims. Thus in view of its financial terms, the Ankara convention was regarded as yet another Turkish triumph and yet another major Greek concession for the sake of stabilizing Greco- Turkish relations. The Greek government was also anxious to mitigate the precarious position of the Greek minority whose numbers steadily decreased because of the adverse political climate during the 1920s. Financial sacrifice, as Venizelos pointed out on numerous occasions, was the price Greece had to pay in order to safeguard the future of the Greek minority in Turkey. «The treatment», he emphasized during a speech in the Greek chamber, «that the Greeks of Turkey will get is directly analogous to the state of Greco- Turkish relations» .16 The interests of that minority were also championed by five influential former Constantinopolitan Greeks (Alexander Pappas, Alexander Voutyras, Basil Vardopoulos, Anastasios Misiriglou and Frankiskos Sarantis) who since 1928 had been members of the Venizelist government. Indeed, with the Ankara convention the vexed question of the etablis was finally settled in a way which proved satisfactory to the Greek side. Under the agreement, Turkey recognized all Greek Orthodox who were actually present in istanbul as Turkish citizens (Turk vatanda:{l) regardless of the date of their arrival in the city or the place of their birth. In principle, this provision was more comprehensive than that contained in the earlier agreement of 1 December 1926, since it did away with the additional requirement of proof of their presence in istanbul prior to 30 October 1918,17 Overall, the major beneficiaries from this provision were the Phanar archbishops and on 23 September 1931, the patriarch received a certificate, signed by the mixed commission, acknowledging his etablis status.1 8 According to the official Turkish census of 1935, there were 125,046 etablis Greek Orthodox of whom 17,642 were Hellenic nationals .19 15 . Clerk to Henderson. Ankara. 16 January 1930. FO 37I/I4575/E463; Ladas. op.cil., pp. 582-81. 16 . Text of this speech in Ramsey to Henderson. Athens. 18 June 1930, FO 371/14576/E3403; Le MessageI' d'Atl!i:Jles, I7 June 1930. 17. The first paragraph of article ten (chapter V) of the convention stipulated that: «La Turquie reconnalt la qualite d'etablis a tous les grecs orthodoxes ressortissants lUrcs, actuellement presents dans la zone d'Istanbul et Ie lieu de leur naissance . »
18. 'Op80oo¢ia, 6 (1931) 547. 19. IY 9 (1936/37) 41-43
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The thorny question of the non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks who fled the city without regular Turkish passports in 1922 was also dealt with by the Ankara convention. Greece renounced their claim to nonexchangeable status and their properties in Turkey were officially recognized as state property. In return Turkey consented to give up £ 25,000, to which an equal amount was added by the Greek government, for the compensation of the non-exchangeable absent Greeks. 20 The latter strongly opposed these clauses and they even staged a protest demonstration on the eve of the signing of the agreement. 21 With the settlement of questions arising from the exchange of popUlations the way for a closer understanding between the two countries was paved. On 26 October 1930, the Greek premier, accompanied by his foreign minister, Andreas Michalakopoulos, arrived in Turkey for a five day official visit. During this visit Greek and Turkish leaders signed a comprehensive treaty of friendship whose aim was to lay the cornerstone for a lasting Greco- Turkish detente. Thus on 30 October a treaty of neutrality, conciliation and arbitration, a protocol of parity and naval armaments and a commercial convention were signed. 22 The October pact was hailed throughout the world as a major contribution to the cause of peace, comparable to the Locarno agreement signed by the western European nations. The GrecoTurkish Entente Cordiale was, in fact, to prove one of the most durable diplomatic engagements concluded during the interwar period. Not only did the diplomatic relations between the two countries enter a more propitious phase but also the attitudes of both Greeks and Turks towards one another gradually began to mollify. Thus while in 1930 a considerable section of the Greek opposition, and particularly the refugee organizations, were hostile to the June 1930 agreement, a year later there was a unanimous approval of the policy of reconciliation. This was reflected in the cordial reception accorded to the Turkish leaders, ismet inonii and Rii~tii Aras, who visited Athens in October 1931. Interestingly, the enthusiastic crowds which welcomed the Turkish leaders were largely made up of Anatolian refugees. Turkish public opinion, too, welcomed the new spirit of conciliation. Thus, in August 193 I, 300 Greeks from Crete visited Istanbul and were received 20. Article 28 of chapter X, see Ladas, op.cit .. p . 828. 21 Ramsey to Henderson. Athens. 26 May 1930. FO 371/14575/E2869. 22 . For the text of the pact. see '£IfJI/Jl£pi::; ni:; K/Jp£pl'1aew:;, IS April 1931. p . 655 ff. After its approval by the Turkish assembly the pact became law (no. 1758;1931), see Resl/li Gll::ele, 15 March 1931, The best analysis of the Greco- Turkish agreement is given in I. Anastasiadou. «'0 BgVl;i:t,O~ Kat TO 'Et,l,llvOTOUPK1KO LUJ.!CjlWVO IAia~ TOU 1930», .I{c;.cniJlara rlJjJw c17l{) TOI' &1/(,1;)0 h'lli nil '£7101'; TO/J, Athens 1980. pp. 309-426.
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cordially by the Cretan Muslims now living in Turkey.23 Given the long and bitter enmities between Muslims and Christians in Crete during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the significance of the new entente may be realized. Throughout the 1930s a stepping up of exchanges between Greeks and Turks was experienced. University students, journalists, football teams, theatrical companies as well as political and military leaders exchanged frequent visits. After the fall of the Venizelos government in 1932, both the Tsaldaris and Metaxas administrations followed the policy of rapprochement. With new political agreements in 1933 and 1938, as well as commercial pacts in 1933, 1934 and 1938, the two countries consolidated the policy of friendship inaugurated by Atatiirk and Venizelos. 24
August 193 J.28 Further, in February 1935, the Turkish government took the unprecedented step of inviting members 9f the minorities to sit the Turkish assembly. The Greek member, Dr Nicholas Taptas was a prominent istanbul throat specialist with European repute. 29 Taptas was nominated as an independent deputy for Ankara and as he himself stressed in an interview with VILIS, «he was not just a representative of an ethnic minority but of the Turkish nation at large».3o Encouraged by this remarkable consolidation of Greco-Turkish relations, many prominent Greeks even envisaged the foundation of a Greek-Turkish confederation. 31
Inevitably, this new approach in Greco-Turkish relations was reflected in the treatment of minorities. Both the Greek and Turkish governments adopted a more broad-minded attitude towards their respective minorities. Indeed, the spirit of reconciliation gave a psychological boost to the Greek business community in Istanbul. Aware that close relations between the two nations would improve their lot, the Constantinopolitan Greeks adhered wholeheartedly to the Greco-Turkish friendship.25 Thus soon after the signing of the Ankara convention, Greeks were allowed to travel freely in the interior of Turkey, a privilege hitherto enjoyed only by the Muslim and Jewish Turkish citizens. Members of the Greek minority would need a special permission from the local authorities only when they wished to remain in Anatolia for more than three months. 26 Again, with the ratification of the Ankara convention, the Turkish government raised the sequestration on property and bank deposits owned by Constantinopolitan GreeksY In accordance with the sllme agreement, the wives, minors and unmarried daughters whose family heads were established in istanbul were allowed to return in the city. Another step reflecting th~ goodwill of the Turkish government was the inspection of conditions by the minister of the interior in the mainly Greek inhabited islands of Imbros (G6kgeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) in
Despite the remarkable change of attitude towards the Greek minority, Turkish public opinion remained consistent with the initial Kemalist principles of nationalism and secularism. Turkish nationalism remained a prominent feature of political life throughout the 1930s and new impetus was given to the attempts of creating a Turkey run by Muslim Turks. Further, Turkish nationalism was still a rather recent phenomenon and, despite changing political circumstances, retained its insecure and volatile characteristics. While, therefore, the basis for a Greco- Turkish symbiosis, was present, there was a tendency for past prejudices and enmities to re-emerge. At the same time, as part of its westernization and modernization program, the Turkish government wished to display a liberal image to the international public opinion. Thus Turkey's decision to join the League of Nations on 18 July 1932.1 Yet this liberal image often went counter to the fundamental Kemalist principle of Muslim Turkish self-sufficiency, particularly in the political and economic fields. Ankara, therefore, had to steer a very delicate course between these two expediencies.
230 The Times, 3 October 1931; Wo Miller, «The Greco-Turkish Friendship», Contemporary Rel'iel\', 140 (1931) 7IS-19. 24. On 9 February 1931 Greece and Turkey granted each other reciprocal treatment of most favoured nation and in October 1935 a new company. Sociere Anonyme Hella-Tlnk was inaugurated in Athens to foster Greco-Turkish trading relations. . 25. In 1929. the Constantinopolitan Greek business community had requested from Venizelos to put an end to Greco-Turkish bickerings, see I. K, Vogiatsidis, To 'Ei.;,'l\'OroVpnll{(J I' LUJUPW\,Ol
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L Persistence of Greek grievances.
28. In these two Turkish-owned islands there is still an indigenous Greek popUlation which survived the exhange of popUlations in 1923, Although these Greeks shared a common destinv with tho,e oflstanbul. due to their geographical position and occupational composition (unlik~ the Constantinopolitan Greeks this was an overwhelmingly agricultural population). they formed a separate unit with their own particular problems. For a treatment of this community, see my own «lmbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes Toward two Ethnic Greek Island Communities since 1923». journal (d' the Hellenic Diaspo/'{/, 7: I (19S0) 5-31. 29, The other three were: the Armenian banker Keresteclyan. the Jewish member Dr Abravaya MarmaraH and the Eftimite Istamat Zihni Ozdamar. ostensibly elected together with Dr Taptas as member of the Orthodox community. 30. Speech quoted in Loraine to Simon. Ankara. 15 February 1935. FO 371/19034/EI20S. 31 Do Kitsikis. 'Ei.i.a:; gai .::c\'o/ 1919,1967, Athens 1977. pp . SO-S5, I For details see M. Giinliibiiyiik. «Atatiirk Devrinde Tiirkiye'nin Dl§ Politikask Turkish Yearbook of International Relation.l, 2 ( 1961) 210; D .E.. Webster. The Turkey ofAwtiirk: Social Proce.ls in the Turkish Reformation, Philadelphia 1939, pp. I17-IS.
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This dilemma was well demonstrated during the municipal elections held in Istanbul in 1930. The newly formed Free Republican party (Serbest Cllmhllriyet Firkas'i), led by Fethi Okyar, courted the suppOIi ofthe religious minorities. The new party, though adhering to the Kemalist principles, made a number of promises such as a reduction in taxation, emphasis in laissezfaire economic policies, freedom of the press and other liberal measures. Such policies were largely attractive to the non-Muslim urban bourgeoisie and many members of the minorities took a prominent part in the municipal elections.2 By inviting the minorities to take an active part in the elections, the moderate Fethi Okyar was in accordance with the policy of westernization, as well as with the new spirit of Greek-Turkish co-existence adhered to by Ankara. Yet Okyar' s attitude was sharply criticized by the organs of the ruling RPP. Attacking the timing of such a collaboration with the non-Muslim minorities, they stressed that only a few years had elapsed since Greeks and Armenians were the mortal enemies of the Turks. The view that the minorities had the right to assume public responsibilities and even be elected as deputies, expounded by the Free Republicans, was strongly opposed by the ruling party. The minorities, too, incurred severe criticism for involving themselves in Turkish politics. Even Premier Ismet Inonil seemed to have disapproved of the line adopted by Fethi Okyar. Commenting on the policies of the opposition he remarked that «the new party is providing a rallying ground for all sorts of discontented and disgruntled politicians and that such a nucleus can not form the basis for a really strong progressive party».3 By discontented elements, Ismet Inonil did not only refer to non-Muslims. Above all it was the widespread anti-Kemalist Muslim support enjoyed by the newly-founded party which worried the government. Through the infiltration of the Free Republican party organization, the government strongly suspected, social and religious reactionaries would once again attempt to challenge the secular principles of the Turkish republic. There were indeed signs to justify these fears. Fethi Okyar's speeches were often followed by distur~ bances and even riots while there were ominous stirrings in the eastern provinces. Faced with the possibility of widespread agitation, the Free RepUblican party was induced to abolish itself and by November 1930 Turkey
2. See interview of Okyar to an Amlenian paper in OM. 10 (1930) 439-40; The Times. II October 1930. 3. The Times. 26 August 1930.
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had returned to one party rule. 4 Despite the marginal importance of the minority issue during this affair, it is interesting that the government was still opposed to any direct non-Muslim involvement in Turkish politics. The urge of Turkish nationalism, perhaps partly influenced by the formidable nationalist movements in Germany and Italy, led on several occasions to expressions of anti-minority and anti-Semitic feeling during the 1930s. Thus in 1934, the authorities had all Jews forcibly deported from the strategically sensitive zones of Edirne (Adrianople) and the Straits.s Again, after the obligatory adoption of surnames by every Turkish citizen in 1935, pressure was brought to bear upon the minorities to adopt Turkish sounding surnames. This applied particularly to the Greeks who were urged to drop from their surnames such endings as dis and pOlllos. 6 Of similar significance were the activities of the «citizens speak Turkish» (I'atallda!'j Turkr;e kOl1l1!'j) movement during the 1930s. In order to compel the minorities to adopt the Turkish language. this organization campaigned for the enactment of stringent measures. Sporadic attempts to enforce such views were made during 1938 and the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir George Clerk, reported that «local Greeks and Jews were fined or blamed for speaking a non- Turkish language». 7 A bill was even put fOIward to compel the Jewish minority to speak only Turkish, but it was defeated at the assembly. It is clear that the government tried to contain these extreme expressions of nationalist zeal. As the British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Percy Loraine remarked in December 1938, there was no widespread anti-Semitism in Turkey «except in so far as discriminations may be made against all the non-Muslim elements - for example, restriction of residence in certain areas, entry into government service and the like». 8 In particular President Atatilrk officially dissociated himself from such attitudes and, mindful of international opinion. was careful to avoid even the slightest taint of anti-minority sentiment. This moderation was greatly appreciated by the minorities and the Turkish president enjoyed an enormous popularity among the non-Muslim Turkish citizens. But the single most serious grievance of the Greek minority was against the so-called Turkish Orthodox movement. Barely a month before the signing of 4. Fora general treatment of the Free Republican party see Tunaya. Tiirkiye'de Si~'asi Partiler. pp. 622 ff. For a reference on the minority involvement in the new party. W.E Weiker, Political Tlltelage alld Democracy ill Turkey: The Free Party al1d its Aftermath. Leiden 1973. p. 113. 5. AT. 8 (1934) 50-54: The Times. 5 July 1934. 6. ·Ei.cliOcpol' Blipa. 30 September & 25 December 1934. 7. Annual Report: Turkey 1938. Clerk to Eden, Ankara, FO 371/23301/EI214. See also OM 17 (1937) 226: The Tillles. 31 March 1937. 8. Loraine to Eden. Ankara. 31 December 1938, FO 371/23290/EI50.
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the Ankara convention, istamat Zihni Ozdamar, a close associate of Papa Eftim and a leading member of the Turkish Orthodox, managed to get himself appointed the chief trustee of the historic Greek hospital of B all kll.9 This notorious Anatolian lawyer enjoyed the close friendship of a large number of eminent Turkish political figures and thanks to his strong connection in the government he was appointed deputy in 1935. He was also instrumental in the promotion of a movement entitled the «association of lay Christian Turks». On 14 July 1935. the association held its inaugural meeting, attended by 35 people. at one of the People's Houses (Halkevleri) in istanbul. In a statement published in the local press. the association declared that their aim was to put an end to the economic and political ostracism suffered by the minorities. «Since it is impossible for us to live as minorities», they argued, «let us declare once and for all our readiness for fusion». Thus the association expressed its readiness to break away from the Greek and Armenian communities. give up their maternal tongues and be assimilated in the mainstream of Turkish society. They intended to begin their program by closing down all minority schools. In this appeal to the Christian minorities, the association expressed its abhorrence for the word «minority» (ekalliyet) and claimed 69 members. 10 The president and the majority of its members appeared to have been Armenians. though the secretary of the association was an Eftimite Greek called Triandaphyllos. Likewise, it was supported by another notorious figure, Kotsos Papadopoulos. the owner of the grecophone daily. ,v!;;wPPV()/-IlUl;'. 11 While it is not clear whether the association acted on its own initiative. there was sufficient evidence to indicate that it enjoyed the encouragement of the ruling RPP. 12 Like all similar movements, however, the association of lay Christian Turks failed to win the support of the religious minorities and soon faded into obscurity. Without access to the Turkish archives it is impossible to estimate the dearee of Government involvement in organizations, such as the Turkish '" '" Orthodox movement. the «citizen speak Turkish» movement and the association oflay Christian Turks. It is. however, clear that although committed to the concept of Greco- Turkish co-existence, the Turkish government did not let detente interfere with crpcial Kemalist policies such as the Turkification of commerce and the seculariza,tion of the state. While, therefore, in accordance with the Greco-Turkish agreement, Ankara renewed the work permits of the Constantinopolitan Hellenic subjects in 1930, it concurrently pursued 9 . For more details see chapter VII:2. 10. Loraine to. Hoare. Cons .. 2 August 1935. FO 37IjI9037/E4806 . II ,IIcrappl'l()p{(n:;, 16 July 1935. 12 . Ibid
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vigorously the policy of Turkish economic self-sufficiency . When, moreover. economic difficulties, provoked mainly by the world-wide general depression, affected Turkish trade, the Ankara assembly reacted by reserving a wide range of professions and trades for Turkish nationals in 1932,13 By a later enactment, the measure was to be enforced gradually, in six periods of three months ~ach, commencing on 1 December 1933. This measure mostly affected the Hellenic nationals who, estimated at 26,431, formed the largest single foreign community in Turkey. In addition, Hellene Greeks specialized mainly in handicrafts and small trades which were actually included in the bill. Likewise, Hellene Greeks were wellrepresented in such professions as chemists, dentists, surgeons, lawyers and engineers, all now reserved to Turkish nationals. 14 Despite some delay the Turkish government proceeded with application of the new law which went into effect on 26 July 1934. Immediately, the first group of 150 Constantinopolitan Hellenes. mainly chauffeurs, tailors and shoem'akers with their families. left Istanbul for Greece. 15 Shortly after, a «marked exodus» of Hellenic subjects followed reaching the figure of 2,000 within a few months from the enforcement of the law. 16 Thus while there were 26,431 Hellenes, according to the official Turkish census of 1927, this figure was down to 17.642 in 1935,17 The calculations of the British embassy, which estimated that some 10.000 Constantinopolitan Hellenes were affected by the act. coincided with the Turkish figures. 18 The expUlsion of such a great number of Constantinopolitan Greeks. almost all of them born and brought up in Istanbul, angered Greek public opinion. A certain amount of resentment was also expressed in the Greek parliament while the Athenian press protested vigorously against the Turkish measure which threw thousands of Hellenes out of work. 19 '. Greekf(Jreign policy on the minority question.
Unable to influence the Turkish government in favour of the Cons tantinopolitan Hellenes, the Greek government was left with no other choice but 'to conceal its indignation and start resettling the thousands of newly arrived
13. Law no. 2007/4 June 1932 . The text can be found in ReslIliGa;:ele, no. 21260f 16June 1932. 14. Clerk to Simon. Ankara. 3 February 1933. FO 37I!16984/E826. 15. The Tillles, 27 July 1934. 16. Waterlow to Simon. Athens. 18 July 1934. F037 I;I 8396/R41 79 . See also OM 14 (1934) 279. 17. IY no. 380 (1959) 84. 18.lbid 19 . Annual Report: Turkey 1954. Loraine to Simon. Ankara, FO 37IjI9037/E854.
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Greek citizens. The whole affair, in fact, illustrates a problem which was first elaborated by the Greek diplomatic corps in Turkey at the height of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement. The Greek envoys in Turkey strongly questioned the accuracy of V enizelos' evaluation that a Greco-Turkish agreement would automatically ensure the improvement of the position of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. Given the Turkish disposition towards the ethnic minorities and the policy of Turkification, they found grave shortcomings in Venizelos' approach. Thus in a series of detailed and informative reports, the Greek vice-consul in istanbul, A. Dalietos drew a realistic picture of the difficulties encountered by the Greek minority in Turkey. He outlined the pressures applied by istamat Zihni Ozdamar on the community institutions and his illegal appointment, with the connivance of the authorities, to the ephori of BallkIl. The Turkish restrictions on the Greek communal and educational institutions, he stressed, went on unabated even after the signing of the Ankara convention. 1 While he did not doubt the beneficial effects of the Greco-Turkish understanding, he urged that Greece should adopt a «friendly but firm policy» on the question of the minorities. Otherwise, he predicted, the Greek community as well as «the Hellenic character of Constantinople» would be «sacrificed on the altar of Greco-Turkish friendship». 2 So concerned was the Greek vice-consul with the future of the Constantinopolitan Greek community that he even ventured to inquire as to whether the Greek premier would contemplate altering Greek foreign policy on the question of the minorities. 3 Similar views were expounded by the Greek representative in Ankara, Spyridon Polychroniadis. In a letter to Venizelos on 28 July, the Greek diplomat stressed that the Constantinopolitan Greek community, together with the Muslims in Thrace, should be a «uniting link» (avvOe"ClI«)C; KpzKor,;) between the two nations. The minorities should be a help, mstead of a hindrance in the development of friendly relations between Athens and Ankara.4 On the eve of the Greek premier's visit to T~rkey in October 193?, Constantine Sakellaropoulos, the consul-general in Istanbul, re~ewed. hIS efforts to impress upon Venizelos the problems of the Constantmopohtan Greeks. First of all he reassured Venizelos that: s
L Dalietos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 1 I June 1930, BMAEVj228jI4. 1 . Dalietos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 13 August 1930, BMAEVj228jI4. See also Anastasiadou. op.cit .. pp. 418-10. 3. Dalietos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 23 August 1930. BMAIPj228jI4. 4. Polychroniadis to Venizelos. Therapeia, 28 June 1930, BMAEVj57. 5.. Sakellaropoulos to Venizelos, Cons .. 16 October 1930. BMAEV/58.
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« I t is certain that no one of those who form our co-national (OIlO;'[;l'Ij:,;) minority in Turkey questions the necessity of absolute loyalty to the sovereign state (i. e. Turkey). Aware of this presupposition, the Greeks in Turkey simply ask the fulfilment of those indispensable conditions under which they will be able to develop as a law-abiding yet self. sufficient element in accordance with their distinctive traditions and customs».
These conditions, he stressed, could be insured through the organization of the forty Greek community parishes and the free election of community representatives and administrators of parish properties. Above all. he emphasized the recognition of minority rights - particularly in the field of education - stipulated by the Lausanne treaty. Comparing the respective minorities in Greece and Turkey, Sakellaropoulos reported that Ankara showed a considerable interest in the fortunes of the Thracian Muslims. As a result. he assumed, Turkey would not hesitate to «sacrifice» Papa Eftim and his associates in return for a Greek undertaking to remove some objectionable elements from Western Thrace. He then advised that Greece must demand that Turkey offset. by mutual action in IstanbuL any Greek concessions to the Thracian Muslims. Otherwise the Greek consul warned «we would be creating a state within a state in the most strategically sensitive province (Thrace) of Greece».6 Venizelos not only did not take heed of these warnings. but during his trip to Turkey he promised the removal of certain anti-Kemalist Muslim religious leaders. After being banished from Turkey in 1923. these prominent adherents of the ancien regime found refuge in Greece. Greek Thrace, with its traditionalist Muslim society, proved to be a fertile ground for their antiKemalist activity. This state of affairs carne to an end in 1930-31, when in accordance with Venizelos' promise, the Greek government deported the core of these «objectionable» Muslims from Greek Thrace. Thus in April 1931, Mustafa Sabri, the last Ottoman se,,!zli{is{am and leader of the traditionalist element. left Greece for Alex~~dria.7 During his negotiations with the Turkish leaders Venizelos got the impression that Turkey would also take reciprocal action and hand back the occupied churches of Galata to their rightful Owners. 8 President Ataturk himself
6 . Ibid . Dalietos. too. sent a detailed memorandum to Venizelos on 12 October 1930 outlining the needs of Constantinopolitan Greek minority. in BMAEVj228/I4 7. Annual Report: Greece 1931. Ramsey to Simon. Athens. FO 371/15970;CI611: Clerk to Henderson. Ankara. 17 December 1930. FO 37IjI4576/E6858. 8. Views of Polychroniadis expounded during an interview with the British ambassador. Clerk
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reassured Venizelos that he would keep Papa Eftim out of the affairs of the Patriarchate. 'i It is quite clear however that Venizelos did not specifically insist on a Turkish guarantee which would keep Papa Eftim out of the affairs of the Greek minority. Again ignoring a memorandum written by Polychroniadis on the eve of the visit of ismet inonii to Athens in which he urged the official recognition of minority right in Greece and Turkey, Venizelos did nor press the issue of the Constantinopolit~n Greeks.1 0 Further, it is evident fro.m the minutes kept during the Venizelos-Inonii talks in October 1931 that, whIle the Turkish side demanded and got further concessions in favour of the Muslims in Thrace, the Greeks hardly mentioned the various problems facing the Greek element in Turkey. Instead, Venizelos expressed his readiness to entrust the Turkish government to respond to the needs of the Constan. ' tinopolitan Greek minority. I I The Turkish government was not inclined to expel Papa EftIm or to restnct the activities of the Turkish Orthodox movement. While remaining cordial towards Greece, the Turks felt themselves in a position to pursue a socioeconomic policy of Muslim Turkish self-sufficiency. In vain did the Greek ambassador in Turkey try to persuade Foreign Minister Rii~tU Aras to alter the policy of favouring disreputable figures such as Papa Eftim and lstamat Zihni. This created, the ambassador asserted, the impression among the law-abiding members of the Greek community that they were persecuted. I Z At the same time, the expUlsion of the Muslim religious leaders from Greek Thrace had far-reaching effects. It marked the beginning of a gradual transformation of the Muslim community in Thrace from a religious to a national minority. In the healthier atmosphere of the Greco-Turkish detente, Thracian turcophones with strong sympathies for the nationalist and s~cular regime in Turkey managed to fill the vacuum created by the .expuls~on. ~f some 150 religious conservatives. Already by October 1931, dunng theIr VISIt to Athens, the Turkish leaders informed Venizelos that «with the removal of the undesirables, 50 per cent of the Muslims in Greek Thrace adopted the Latin characters».13 It appears that by approving a Greco-Turkish rapto Henderson. Ankara. 17 December 1930. FO 371 14576,E6858. Also in Ramsey to Henderson, \lhens. 19 December 1930. FO 371 14576 E6928 . 9, See H ,1. Psomiades. «The Ecumenical Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic: The Fllst 'len Years» in BS II (1961) 68 10, Polychroniadis to Venizelos. Ankara, 16 September 1931. BMAEV/228/14 ,, II Minutes kept at the discussion of the premiers and foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey durin" the meetings of 56 October 1931. BMAEV!61 12"KG Andr;adis. The ,\J(II/elll ,\lillori!.\' ill Western Thrace. Thessaloniki 1956. pp. 48. 67-68: ,·\nastasiadou. opcil.. pp., 370-75 13 '.linutes kept .. during the meetings of 56 October 1931. BMAEV/6\.
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prochement, Venizelos hoped to avert a massive expUlsion of the large Constantinopolitan Greek community which would have perforce come to increase the urban population of Greece. Once he achieved that, Venizelos paid little attention to the minority question. Again, in seeking a friendship with Turkey, uppermost in Venizelos' mind was the wish to put an end to the armed truce of 1920s. A policy of confrontation with Turkey necessitated a ruinous military, and especially naval, expenditure to the detriment of the Greek budget. Likewise, through a rapprochement with Turkey, Venizelos hoped to avert the risk of a Turco-Bulgarian alliance at the expense of Greek territory in Thrace and Macedonia. 14 Even though the Greek archives for the post-1930 period are stilI closed, there is some evidence to support the idea that successive Greek governments based their policy on the minority question along the lines established by Venizelos during 1928-32. Faced by restrictive legislation against the Greek minority, the Athens government reacted with caution and circumscription. While the Athenian press was encouraged to adopt a conciliatory attitude. Again, as with the law 2Q07/1932, which threw several !housands of Hellenic, as well as other foreign, citizens out of work in Istanbul, Turkey would not let Greco-Turkish friendship interfere with its domestic policies. Repeated Greek representations on this and other questions involving the minority bore no fruit. IS While aware of the detrimental effects of a number of legislative and administrative measures in Turkey, Athens was reluctant to allow this issue to cloud in any way the GrecoTurkish understanding. This view coincides with the evaluation of the British Foreign Office which held that: 16 «It has been an axiom in Greek foreign policy that, while recognizing the existence of a minority question between Greece and Turkey, this question should not be allowed to introduce a discordant note into the harmony of Greco-Turkish friendship».
14. Cf. Anastasiadou. up. cil.. pp., 385-93. 15., This question was discussed during the negotiations which resulted in the-Greco-Turkish commercial agreement of May 1933 and in the pact signed on 14 September 1933. Ramsey to Simon. Athens. JO May 1933. FO 371!16985jC4369; Clerk to Simon. Cons .. 17 September 1933. FO 37IjI6775!C8375. For other examples see chapter VII:2. 16. For the Greek foreign policy on the minority question between 1936-39 details can be found in «Brief for the Secretary of State in conversation with the Greek Prime Minister E. Tsouderos». prepared by the Southern Dept. of the Foreign Office, 27 February 1943. in FO .'1 1;37401fR 1552,
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.:t. The position of the ConstGntinopolit£ln Greek minority.
Reacting to the Turkish measures, as well as to the compliant attitude of the C.ireek government, Constantine Spanoudis, a prominent former Constantinopolitan Greek, vigorously protested against the precarious position of the Greeks in Turkey. In a series of articles in the 'EhUBepOl' Biff.1a of 14, 15 and 16 February 1935, Spanoudis claimed that «the disposition of Ankara towards the Greek minority and the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not ceased to be hostile even after 1930".1 He placed particular emphasis on the indirect pressure exerted upon the Greek minority schools in lstanbul. These schools, he intimated, operated under «pitiable» conditions. Not only was the appointment of Turkish co-directors obligatory, but also the finances of such minority schools were scrutinized by Turkish officials. 2 He complained about the imposition of a very large number of Turkish state teachers (230 Greeks as opposed to 190 Turks) who had to be paid by the Greek community itself. The Pera (Beyoglu) parish, he disclosed, had to pay 35,000 TL out of its total budget of75,000 TL to meet the salaries of the Turkish teachers during 1934. By contrast Greek teachers had to content themselves with reduced salaries as the schools found themselves in serious debt. 3 He also referred to 38 Constantinopolitan Greek lawyers graduates of Turkish universities and with impeccable qualifications who nonetheless were not allowed to practise their profession. Nor was the Greek community represented in the Turkish a ... "embly since Nicholas Taptas was appointed specifically deputy for Ankara. a city without any Greek popUlation ...! Spanoudis then contrasted these gloomy conditions with those enjoyed by the Turks in Thrace. The Muslim minority, he maintained. sustained 311 schools, partly subsidized by the Greek state. which were directed by the community leaders. The Thracian \luslims. he went on. possessed 300 mosques and sent four deputies and two senators to the Greek chamber. While the Turcophone press and cultural association operated freely, the Muslim minority of Greece was a thriving community whose numbers were increasing. 5 This gloomy appraisal of condition in lstanbul was shared by a number of neutral observers. In a memorandum prepared for the southern department tl!" the Foreign Office on 6 May 1936, A.E. Lambert listed several instances when the Turkish government failed to observe the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty. «As a result», the author of this report concluded, LEi.cll/cpol' B1iIW, 14 February 1935. 2. fhid", 15 February 1935. J. fhid. 4. fhid", 16 February 1935 . S IIJid.
«non-Moslem minorities in Turkey have suffered considerable hardship». 6 In another memorandum dated in May 1937, Rev. Austin Oakley, the chaplain a~ the ~rimean Memorial church in lstanbul, referred specifically to the dIfficultIes encountered by Greek religious and educational institutions between 1935 and 1937. 7 Describing the continued emigration of Constantinopolitan Greeks, the 'Ei.e150epov Bifpa of 30 September 1934 observed that while the Greek minority schools in Beyoglu (Pera) had 1817 students in the academic year of 1932-33, a year later their number was reduced to 1444. This decrease on the number of students was largely due to the exodus of some Hellenic nationals who were affected by the law 2007 concerning the restnctlon of employment. Likewise, Spanoudis was perhaps painting rath~r too gloomy a picture of conditions in Turkey. For, notwithstanding the d:tnmental effects of Tur~ish legislation on the community, the policy of detente had a favourable Impact on the Greek minority as a whole. This improvement can only be conceived when conditions in the 1930s are com~ared with those of the post-1922 period, when the Constantinopolitan Greeks were regularly subjected to the visitations of Turkish wrath. There were also some tangible improvements in the treatment of the minorities during the 1930s. Thus on his election as the president of the republic in November 1938, Ismet inonii expressed his goodwill towards the minorities. 8 Further, the Turkish record on the treatment of minorities during the 1930s compares admirably with other central and eastern European nations. Thus the Greeks continued to constitute the largest single non-Muslim group in Istanbul. This presence remained fairly stable throughout the interwar period. Accordingly, while there were 125,046 Greek Orthodox - of whom 108,725 were Grecophone- in 1935, during the next Turkish census ten years later the Constantinopolitan adherents of the Greek Orthodox religion were estimated at 103,839. Of these 88,680 declared Greek as their mother tongue. In addition, there were 8,124 Greeks in the islands of Imbros (Gok~~ada) ~nd Tenedos (Bozcaada) as well as 13,598 Constantinopolitan Hell~m~ subJects. 9 The continued Greek presence was partly due to a fairly sophIstIcated community infrastructure which was able to respond to the personal and family needs of its individual members, providing them with a
IO,?O?
6. «Note on Minorities in Turkey and the application to Turkey of the Minorities procedure of the League», by A.E.Lambert. 6 May 1936, FO 371/20093/E251 7. «General conspectus of events during the period January 1935 to May 1937», memorandum prepared by Oakley, Cons., 27 May 1937, LPA/DgP/22/l04-7. 8. Letter by H. ~'amllclyan and Foreign Office minutes, 18 November 1938 in FO 7 1/2 I 927/E7381. 9. Forthe census of 1935 seeiY9(l936/37)41A3 and for that of 1945 idem. no 380(1959) 81-83.
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191 13
satisfying self-identily. During 1933/34, the Greek community at large maintained 6/ycees and 38 schools with 7667 students, 252 Greek and 182 Turkish teachers. These, together with 54 churches, were administered by 48 Greek parishes. 10 Concentrated in the few remaining cosmopolitan quarters of the city, such as Beyoglu (Pera), the Constantinopolitan Greeks were able to remain a cohesive and distinct body. Thus, during the great cultural and institutional metamorphosis of the Turkish majority in the 1920s and 1930s, the Greek minority preserved at least part of its traditional urban culture in istanbul. Yet, while Greek involvement in commerce continued to be worthwhile, the cultural and social participation of the minority in modern Turkish society was minimal. This was partly the outcome of Ottoman/Kemalist ideology which drew a clear line between Muslim Turks and non-Muslim minorities. Traditional Ottoman society classified men essentially into Muslim and Zimmi .- the believer and the subjugated unbeliever- with appropriate codes of conduct for each group. As previously remarked, the very structure of the Ottoman state, in the millet system, institutionalized differences between subjects into a distinctive form of governmental administration. The influence of this Islamic heritage, and the millet system in particular, has been to make «second-class citizens» of the non-Muslim Turkish populace during the interwar period, despite the secularism and formal legal protections of the Turkish republic. 11 This bias has been reflected in such things as the tacit refusal to accept non-Muslim but otherwise qualified girls as Red Crescent nurses or accept non-Muslim boys as military officers. The exclusion of non-Muslims, and particularly the Greek minority, from the body of the Turkish nation can be partly explained by their ignorance of the Turkish language. Constantinopolitan Greeks - with the exception of the karamanl'is- born before the 1910s did not, as a general rule, speak Turkish. With the inclusion of Turkish lessons in the curricula of the minority schools this changed dramatically. But during the interwar years the inadequate knowledge of the Turkish language by many of the Constantinopolitan Greeks acted as a psychological barrier for a better rapport between Turks and Greeks. Nevertheless, as the national self-confidence of the Turkish people increased, the vestiges of discrimination began to diminish in proportion. Thus during the 1930s, a handful of Greeks, like Th. Makridis, the director of the Byzantine museum in Istanbul, were highly esteemed by the Turkish majority. 12 Another distinguished figure was Theologos An-
thomelidis, a linguist and a Turcologue, who was invited on 26 September 1934 to speak on the different phases of the language question and the recent language reforms initiated by President Kemal Atatiirk. 13 Significantly, this lecture was given at one of the city's people's houses (Halkevleri). Founded by the ruling RPP, the purpose of these houses was avowedly to inculcate in the Turkish people the principles of republicanism. nationalism and laicism.
10. S.N. Zervopoulos, 'Ei'n:vn:i.o71a/(511.:!JI' ·HjlEpoi.Oi'IOI', Istanbul 1934, i/p. 233. II 1.H. Psomiades, «Turkey: Progress and Problems» in MEA 8/3 (1957) 94-95. 12. Requested by Venizelos and with the expressed permission of Kemal Atatiirk, Th.
Makridis (1872-1940) was sent to Athens to organize the Benaki museum. For more details on the career see A. Ogan, «Th. Makridi'nin hatlraslna». Bel/eten, 5/17-18 (1941) 163-69. 13.. Zervopoulos, op. cit .. iv/pp. 190-92.
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193
CHAPTER VII RELA nONS BETWEEN SECULAR TURKEY AND THE PATRIARCHATE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MODUS VIVENDI 1930-46
L The official recognition of the patriarch and the visit of Venizelos to
the Phanal".
The Greco-Turkish rapprochement also had a favourable impact on the Ecumenical Patriarchate. By placing no obstacles to a visit to the Phanar by Venizelos, the Turks gave a spectacular example of their newly adopted goodwill towards the Patriarchate. Thus after being informed that such a visit would arouse no misgivings, Venizelos accompanied by a number of Greek and Turkish senior officials paid a formal call to Patriarch Photios II on 1 November 1930. This was an unprecedented event in the history of the Phanar, for never before was a Greek prime minister allowed to visit the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 1 With the prevalence of detente, however, a meeting in the Phanar between the head of the Greek Orthodox church and the leader of the Greek state no longer carried an ominous significance. The Turkish approval of such a meeting not only underlined the success of the Greco-Turkish understanding, but it also demonstrated Ankara's satisfaction with the conduct of the Phanar authorities. Since 1923, the Patriarchate followed strictly the guidelines laid down by the Lausanne agreement. Renouncing all politico-cultural responsibilities, the Phanar concentrated on purely religious functions. It refrained from any political activities which could in any way be interpreted as inimical to Turkish interests. The Greek premier's visit ushered in a healthier atmosphere for the Patriarchate. But this change in Turkish policy can be traced to as early as 29 September 1929, when Patriarch Basil III died. According to Canon Whitehouse, who represented the British Embassy at the patriarch's funeral, the conduct of the Turkish police, responsible for the maintenance of order at the Phanar, was «exemplary from the point of view of courtesy and L Clerk to Henderson, Ankara. 1 November 1930, FO 371/14576/E6088; Ramsey to Henderson, Athens, 5 November 1930, FO 371/14576/E6199
194
o
helpfulness».1 Likewise, the Turkish authorities kept a low profile during the election of a new patriarch on 7 October 1930. Thus after a free and canonical election, the archbishop ofDercos, Photios Maniatis, was declared patriarch. Not only was the new patriarch a native ofIstanbul, but also, having joined the holy synod in 1924, he was largely untainted by the events of the turbulent years of 1919- 1922,3 On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Turkish republic congratulatory telegrams were exchanged between Atatiirk and Photios II. In his response to the Phanar, the Turkish leader addressed Photios as «the patriarch of the Orthodox in the Phanar». 4 This was a major shift from the hitherto official appelation of the Orthodox leader in Turkey as «archpriest» (Bawapaz). Since 1923, the local authorities had refused to service any documents which addressed the Orthodox leader as patriarch. When, . moreover, the authorities in istanbul declined to recognize the title of pat'riar'ch even after the telegram of Atatiirk to the Phanar in November 1930, Spyridon Polychroniadis, the Greek ambassador in Turkey, appealed directly to the Foreign Minister Tevfik Rii~tii Aras. In a detailed memorandum, dated 2 March, the Greek envoy outlined the reasons why the patriarch was entitled to keep his historic title. Since this title, Polychroniadis stressed, did not necessarily involve jurisdiction outside Turkey, the Turkish government should not have any interest in declining to recognize it. 5 With the Greek archives still closed for the post 1930 period, the text of the foreign minister's response is not available. Yet, from a report sent to the Foreign Office by one of the senior members of the British Embassy in Ankara, J. Morgan, we learn that Rii~tii Aras recognized the claim of the Greek ambassador to make friendly representations on behalf of the Patriarchate. He was not, however, prepared to admit that Turkey was bound by any international obligation in this respect. 6 Soon after Yunus Nadi, a leadingjoumalist and a deputy, intervened to put an end to the controversy over the title of the patriarch. In a leading article in the Cumhuriyet of 9 March, he reported that the Turkish government had agreed at Lausanne to maintain the Patriarchate in Turkey, on condition that 2. Clerk to Henderson, Ankara, 8 October 1929, FO 371/13828/E5265. On the election of Photios see Sakelaropoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 9 October 1929, YE/B/35. 3. Born in the island of Prinkipo (Biiyiikada) in 1874, Photios served in Bulgaria during the turbulent years of 1902 to 1914 as vicar at Philippoupolis (Plovdiv). Recalled to lstanbul he was first appointed bishop of Eirinoupolis and was then promoted to archbishop of Philadelphia (1924) and Dercos (1925). 4. The Times, 6 November 1930; Anastasiadou, op.cit., p. 368. 5. Polychroniadis to Tevfik Rii~tii, Ankara, 2 March 1931, BMAEV/59. 6. Morgan to Henderson, Ankara, 25 March 1931, FO 371/15378/EI583.
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the latter would no longer enjoy temporal rights. Provided that this condition was observed, he went on to stress, it would be «unprofitable» on the part of individuals or government departments to raise the question of the patriarchal title. The institution maintained at the .Phanar, the account concluded. was a Patriarchate and no decision was taken at Lausanne to alter the title ofthe patriarch. 7 According to the information given to J. Morgan by the Greek ambassador, the article on the defense of the Patriarchate was written on the instructions of Premier Ismet Inonii who had himself supplied the arguments used. This, Polychroniadis remarked, was a response to his meeting with Rii~tii Aras on 2 March. Throughout the Patriarchate affair, Ambassador Polychroniadis disclosed, his advice was freely and regularly taken by the Turks.s Finally. on 16 March, ClImhllriyet allowed the publication of an anonymous letter, probably written by a member of the Greek community, reiterating the views of the Patriarchate on the issue. 9 Meanwhile, the local authorities received orders to accept all documents forwarded by the Patriarchate. Later on, in September 1931, the patriarch. along with the rest of the members of the holy synod were furnished with a document acknowledging their etabli status (Iliifus ciizdan'l). 10 2. Attempts to reinforce the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate and Tllrkish secular reform.
Venizelos paid another brief visit to the patriarch on 23 August 1931, while on his way back from Rumania. 1 This set a precedent and throughout the 1930s a number of Greek visitors to Turkey, including the prime ministers, Panagis Tsaldaris (1933, 1934) and John Metaxas (1937), paid customary calls to the Phanar. Apart from Greek officials, important European political leaders, such as the premiers of Rumania and Yugoslavia, also visited the Patriarchate. Similar calls were paid by eminent religious personalities like the archbishop of Canterbury Cosmo Long. 2 Meanwhile, a delegation headed by Germanos Athanasiadis, the archbishop. of Sardis, visited Poland on an ecclesiastical mission. 3 Likewise, the Rumanian government invited the Phanar to consecrate a new basilica, while in 1934 a patriarchal delegation, on the request of the Yugoslavian government, held the official requiem mass for 7. Ibid. See also OM II (1931) 177. 8 . Morgan to Henderson. Ankara. 31 March 1931. FO 371/15378/EI725. 9. Ibid. 10. ·Opeo6o~ia. 6 (1931) 547. I Clerk to Reading. Conso> 26 August 1931. FO 371/15232/06712: 'Opeo6o~ia, 7 (1932) 449-52. 2. Oakley (0. Douglas. Cons .. 16 April 1939. LPA/DgP/22/112-2: The Times, 15 April 1939. 3. 'OpOoc5o~ia, 23 (1948) 118-20. gives det~ils of this visit which took place in December 1930.
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the murder of King Alexander. 4 As a result the hitherto isolated Patriarchate was able to enhance considerably its ecumenical image. The new patriarch, moreover, was committed to drawing the various Orthodox churches into a closer spiritual union. Resting on his position as primus inter pares between the heads of the fourteen autocephalous churches that made up the Orthodox communion, Photios did much to reestablish the unshakable dignity of his throne. Thus in 1930, he convened a Pan-Orthodox conference, in which all the churches, save the Russian and Bulgarian, participated. This conference held fifteen meetings at the monastery of Vatopedion on Mt Athos during which a number of purely ecclesiastical questions were discussed. s The Ecumenical Patriarchate was represented by Chrysanthos Philippidis, the archbishop of Trebizond and representative of the Phanar in Greece, and Germanos Athanasiadis, the archbishop of Sardis. The patriarch also sought closer relations with the Anglican church and, together with the archbishop of Canterbury, initiated the two OrthodoxAnglican theological conferences in Lambeth in 1930 and 1931. All Orthodox delegations, present in various international theological conferences, were headed by the far-sighted ecumenist Germanos Strinopoulos, the archbishop of Thyateira. 6 At first the Turkish authorities did not discourage the increasing international activity of the Patriarchate. The Phanar delegate at the Athos conference Germanos Athanasiadis was permitted to travel with a regular Turkish passport. This constituted a marked departure from the previous Turkish stance in 1926, when the authorities warned the Phanar that any archbishop who left Turkey in order to participate in an international conference would not be allowed to return. But soon the Turks realized that the Phanar, despite its considerable loss of power and prestige, still played a crucial role in the Orthodox world. Further, the patriarch's enthusiasm for a union of the Orthodox and Anglican denominations worried the Turks. In an interview with the n pwfa of 21 October 1931, Photios reiterated his support for this movement and on another occasion talked of his wish «to bring about the reunion with the Anglican church during his Patriarchate».7 The Turkish disapproval of such activities was manifested wht!' the authorities turned down a request for the representation of the Phanar in the first Pan-Orthodox congress on theology in Athens (November-December 1936).
4. 5. 6. 7.
Oakley (0 Douglas, Cons .. 6 February 1936. LPA/DgP/22/83-88.. B. Stavridis. «The Ecumenical Patriarchate», GOThR 16 (1969) 210. Ibid, pp. 213-15. Pollard to Douglas. Conso> 12 January 1930, LPA/DgP/22/144-145.
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By seeking to enhance. the prestige of the Patriarchate Photios tried to reverse an eclipse of the historic church. The latter, relying exclusively on some 100,000 Greeks in Turkey, was unable to find competent clerical and academic personnel. This decline was visible in the Theological school of Chalki (Heybeli) which, barred from employing eminent theologians from outside Turkey, was transformed into a basically training college for bishops and priests. This trend was accelerated after the deaths of the distinguished theologians, Pandeleimon Komninos and Basil Andoniadis. With their loss, the college was unable to maintain its traditional standards, thanks to which it had met effectively the needs of the Patriarchate by providing a succession of outstanding prelates between 1884 and 1923. 8 In a letter to Rev. J.A. Douglas, Edward Every, an Anglican priest studying Greek and theology at Chalki, described vividly the declining standards of the Theological school. 9 Between 1932 and 1937, the college had only 65 students with 15 teachers of which three were Turks.IO Equally serious were the severe financial difficulties encountered by the Phanar during the 1930s and 1940s. Deprived of its extensive estates in Anatolia, Macedonia and Thrace, the Phanar became increasingly dependent on the subsidies from abroad. Consequently, in 1934, according to the official patriarchal accounts, the Phanar was 281,397 TL. in debt. II Faced with such a serious lack offunds, Photios took a number of austerity measures including the abolition of the traditional distribution of free meals for the poor students of the Phanar schools (IIa'lpzaPXIKa Iuaairza). N or were the Turks prepared to allow the Greco-Turkish detente to interfere with their wish to regulate the position of religious institutions - both Muslim and Christian - in accordance with the Kemalist program of secularization. Part of this general program was the law forbidding individuals to wear religiously significant clothing. Introducing the new law in the assembly on 3 December 1934, the minister of the interior, .sukrii Kaya, declared that this measure was part of the policy of secular reform. In a private conversation with the British ambassador, .sukrii Kaya explained that since Muslim clerics (hocalar) were forbidden to wearing their religious garb outside the actual place of worship, it would cause «justifiable discontent» if nonMuslims were exempted from such restriction. 12 Commenting on the ban, 8. B. Stavridis, 'loropio. rou OiKOUf./f:l'/KOU flGTPlapl.dou, (Athens 1967) p. 120 f. 9. Every to Douglas, Chalki, 24 September 1933. LPA/DgP/19/291. 10 . Zervopoulos, op.cit., ii/pp. 138-41. II. Mavropoulos. op.cit . , p. 227 . 12. Loraine to Simon, Ankara, 5 December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7432. Law no. 2596/1934 is given in Resmi Gazete no. 2879, 31 December 1934.
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Cllmhllriyet opined that Turkey was simply following the example of other
secular European states such as France. The abolition of the clerical gar'ment, it went on to suggest, would be beneficial to clerics who would be able to do away with their awkward garb and long hair which had caused them unnecessary duress in the past. 13 On 8 December, appealing directly to Greek public opinion, Milliyet explained that the new measure was part and parcel of the general Turkish transformation. It was certainly not directed against the Orthodox clergy in Turkey. The Greek press, Milliyet hinted, might have been provoked by «certain elements residing in Turkey who endeavoured to misinterpret the scope and aims of the law».14 Finally, the Yeni Giin of 20 December reaffirmed the Turkish commitment to peaceful co-existence with its neighbours, and particularly with Greece, and concluded by asserting that modern Turkey treated its minorities fairly. I5 As early as 29 November, the Greek foreign minister, Dimitrios Maximos, in an interview with the Turkish ambassador in Greece, requested the exemption of the Greek Orthodox clergy from the ban. But in a telegram from Geneva. Foreign Minister Ru~tii Arasdeclined to make such a concession. 16 The Turkish rejection of this request wounded Greek susceptibilities and created a widespread feeling of disappointment. The Greek press argued that the law, which was part of a wider plan to create a uniform population, seriously compromised the cultural traditions of the Orthodox community in Turkey. 17 Pointing to the oppressive nature of the law, some papers went so far as to wonder whether the friendship of Turkey was not almost as inconvenient as its hostility. 'E)).llVI/":O\, Me;).ov, a paper closely in touch with the Greek prime minister, declared that «not even the worst enemies of the Greco-Turkish friendship could have dealt it a deadlier blow». 18 The treatment received by the Greeks in Turkey was regularly contrasted with the «privileged position of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace».19 So great was the bitterness against the Turkish government that the president of the Greco-Turkish league in Athens, formed to develop friendly relations bet-
13. ClIm/llIrivet, 6 December 1934. text given in AT 13 (1935) 93. I·t. Ibid .. p. 94. 10. 'EhvOr.pov Blif.lG. 9 December 1934. 17 . Walker to Simon. Athens. I December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7322. 18. Quoted in Walker to Simon, 6 December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7397. 19. Ibid.
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ween the two countries, resigned and the secretary called a meeting to consider whether the league should continue to exist. Among the Constantinopolitan Greeks it was the patriarch who seemed to have resented most this latest attempt of secularization. At first Photios appealed directly to Premier ismet inonii requesting the exemption of the Orthodox from the law, but he did not even receive a reply.:!o With the eventual application of the law in June 1935, he was noted to have cancelled all public audiences save those taking place after liturgy and to have regarded himself in mourning over the ban. 21 Apparently, he even contemplated the transfer of the patriarchal see to Mt Athos.22 His strong feelings on this issue were somewhat balanced by the majority of the members of the holy synod who took a more realistic view and were ready to comply with the new regulations. On the whole, the Greek community, too, adopted a reasonable attitude and disapproved of the intransigent attitude of the conservative body centered around the patriarch.:!3 The almost hysterical reaction of the higher echelons of the Phanar clergy illustrated that the Greek Orthodox church in Turkey was as reluctant as the conservative Muslim Turks to accept the principle of secular nationality pursued by the Kemalist regime. It should be emphasized that the ban on clerical garb was aimed primarily at reducing the prestige of the Muslim clergy. If there were any single conclusion to be drawn from the whole affair it was the enthusiastic anti-clericalism of the Turkish regime, the extent of which could perhaps be compared with that of the Soviet leadership in Moscow. It should be remembered that only few months later, the government converted St Sophia. the most visible symbol of Ottoman Muslim victory over Christian Byzantium, to a museum. On the other hand, by forbidding the wearing of ecclesiastical garb outside the places of worship, Ankara was pushing forward with its avowed aim of bringing about a homogenous population - both culturally and emotionally. This, however, coupled with the interference in the purely spiritual affairs of the religious minorities. engendered by the act of 1934, constituted at least a technical violation of the Lausanne clauses. Alarmed by these developments liberal Greek politicians did not think that Orthodox ecclesiastical susceptiblities should be allowed to influence the
~O .
~1. 2~.
~3.
Mavropoulos. op.ciL, p. ~34. Oakley to Douglas. Cons .. n January 1935, LPA/DgP/22/65. Mavropoulos. op.cit .. p. ~35. Cited in The Times, [8 January [935.
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close friendship between Greece and Turkey.24 Venizelos was particularly critical of the way the Tsaldaris government dealt with the whole affair. He complained that, instead of trying to come to an understanding with the Turks, the Tsaldaris government allowed a highly emotive press campaign whose only impact was to harden attitudes both in Greece and Turkey. The Turkish measure, he insisted, was not introduced in a spirit of hostility towards the Patriarchate. 25 Even Meletios Metaxakis, the patriarch of Alexandria, warned that it was foolish to upset Greco-Turkish friendship on account of such a relatively minor matter. The Greek government, too, had to give priority to wider commercial, military and political considerations and thus come to terms with the new Turkish measure in the same manner as it did a year earlier when some 10,000 Hellene Greeks in Turkey were forced out of their jobs. On its part, the Turkish government agreed to exempt the head of the Orthodox church, together with another seven leaders of other religious orders in Turkey, from the ban. 26 Ankara also consented to the wearing of the clerical garb during the meeting of the holy synod.27 The view that the Turkish government would not desist from its course of secular uniformity was further reinforced when Ankara adjusted the legal position of religious foundations (evkaf or vaklflar) in Turkey. On 5 June . 1935, in accordance with the stipulations of the civil code of 1926, the Turkish t-I government introduced a far-reaching law covering the entire issue of vak/f property. 28 Stating that all religious establishments - Muslim and non-Muslim- were Turkish institutions, the law made all religious foundations accountable to the Turkish government. As a result, the department of Religious Foundations (EvkafGenel Miidurlugu) was instructed to supervise the property owned by religious, cultural and benevolent institutions of all creeds. Such property was divided into two categories. The first, the mazbut property, was administered directly by the state through the department of Evkaf All Muslim property was included in this category. By contrast,
Yn
24. A. Papanastasiou. Ml:i.iTI::;, AOi'Ol, "ApOpa, Athens [957, p. 789. ~5 . Anastasiadou. op.cit .. p. 4[4; 'EhvOl:pol' Blitw, 8 and 9 December [934. Tsaldaris and his Populist party came to power after the elections of March [933. ~6. Annual Report: Greece, [935. Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, FO 371/20392/RI432. 27. The order of the exemption received by the Phanar on ~~ June 1935 (prot. no. 11322) can be found in 'OpOoooi")a, 10 (1935) 211- 13. The other seven leaders who benefitted from the exemption were: Rlfat Bey (Muslim). Mesrup Naroyian (Armenian/Gregorian). Vahan Kocarian U\rmenian!Uniate). Vaton Mighirdich (Armenian/Protestant). Ishaq Shaki (Jewish). Dionysios Varougas (Greek/Uniate) and Eftim Karahissaridis (Turkish/Orthodox). 28. The law no. 276~/l935 is published in the Resmi Gazete, no. 3027. I3 June 1935.
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_!
r[,.1I;t!--
non-Muslim communal foundations were attached to themulhak (dependent) category. Property belonging to this category was to be administered by committees of trustees (miitevelli heyetleri/Koll'OTlKai £rpopeiaz) elected by the members of each parish. The trustees would fulfil their responsibilities under the overall control of the department of Evkaf The non-Muslim minorities viewed the 1935 law with suspicion. In particular they were apprehensive about the wide powers given to the department of E\'kaf Accordingly no transaction of property could take place without the approval of this department and the money acquired from such sales had to be deposited in the Vakljlar Bank. The capital was then frozen and the communal organizations could not get it back. Instead they were allowed a nominal interest on the actual capital. But of more serious nature was the take over by the Evkaf department of eight churches and a hospital belonging to the Uniate Armenian community on the ground that they were not administered in accordance with the new law. 29 The Greek community, though subjected to sporadic official interference, did not suffer any permanent confiscation of property. On 5 August 1929, the Patriarchate furnished the authorities with a list outlining all the estates registered under its name in the Ottoman title deeds (tapular). The rest of the Constantinopolitan Greek parishes followed suit. Yet the Greek community did not receive an official acknowledgement on their'title deeds before April 1949. 30 Thus during an interval of some twenty years, the Greek community had to live with the uncertainty as to whether the government would recognize its property rights. This uncertainty culminated in 1936-37 when the appointment of a single trustee (tek lI1iitevelli) for every communal establishment was made obligatory. Further, the right of the department of Evkaf to appoint directly such trustees deprived the community of all effective participation in the administration of their institutions. Taking advantage of this law, the authorities appointed Istamat Zihni Ozdamar, a man with a notorious reputation and a close associate of Papa Eftim, as the trustee of the Ballkll hospital. The future of the minority institutions looked so bleak that the Phanar appealed, through the chaplain of the British Embassy in Turkey Austin Oakley, to the Foreign Office. The Phanar asked Britain to try to dissuade the Turkish government from carrying through the religious foundations law of 1935. This measure, it was maintained, did not only create tremendous difficulties for the minority but also threatened Greco-Turkish
29. The Times. 26 September 1936. 30. Document no. 2470/978 given in Glineri. op.cit., p. 90.
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relations. 31 Legally, however, there was little that the Patriarchate could do on behalf of the Greek minority. With the Lausanne settlement, the patriarchal authorities were stripped of all administrative functions and the Greek minority had to seek a separate rationale from the church for its dealings with the Turkish government. Under these circumstances, and pending the appointment of a thoroughly objectionable character as the trustee of Zappeion, the Greek government protested to Ankara. This intervention was successful and no other Greek minority establishment received a government appointed trustee. In fact, the Greek parish committees, elected in 1928, remained in office with the tacit consent of the government throughout the 1930s and 1940s. This irregularity was finally settled in 1949, when the system of government appointed trustees was abolished. Instead, community institutios were to be administered by persons elected by the members of the minority.32 Quite clearly, the whole question of seeking an appropriate code for the administration of non-Muslim, as well as Muslim, religious trust property stemmed from the government's wish for centralization. A reduction in the influence of non-secular institutions in Turkey was a major component of the Kemalist policy of secularism (layikllk). Inevitably, the pursuit of such a policy went counter to the freedom of religious minorities to manage their communal affairs without any interference from the Turkish authorities. During the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation had wholeheartedly subscribed to the freedom of minorities in the running of their communal institutions. Further, this right was enshrined in the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty. As a result, throughout the interwar period, Turkey had to compound two mutually exclusive policies - i.e. to create freer conditions for the minorities in accordance with the Lausanne and Greco-Turkish agreements and to persist with the secular reforms.
3. Patriarch Benjamin I. The desire to achieve this delicate balance was reflected in the government's decisions to send the vdli of Istanbul as its official representative to the funeral of Patriarch Photios II. With his moderation and quiet dignity Photios, who died on 29 December 1935, appeared to have gained the sympathy of the Turkish government. Accordingly the presence of a highly placed Turkish official in a patriarchal funeral was indeed an unprecedented 31. Oakley to the archbishop of Canterbury. communicated to the Foreign Office by Dr Don. 0 February 1940. FO 371/25021/R210L 32 . Law no 5404/1949 for details see chapter IX:3.
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event in the history of the Patriarchate and epitomized the healthier atmosphere in which the Phanar was allowed to operate during the 1930s. Expressing satisfaction with the Turkish attitude, the Greek press interpreted this gesture as a sign of Ankara's respect for «this ancient religious institution which is held in veneration by every Greek».1 To find a successor favourable to both Turkey and Greece, however. proved a rather complicated task. From the very beginning Ankara hinted at the suitability of Jacob Papapaisiou, the archbishop ofImbros and Tenedos. In particular, the Turks approved of the prelate's proficiency in Turkish and his lack of enthusiasm for the movement for the union of the Christian churches. 2 The Greeks, on the other hand, favoured the archbishop of Chalcedon, Maximos Vaportzis. Only thirty-eight years old and with outstanding abilities, Chalcedon was popular with the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Having worked closely with Photios, the archbishop of Chalcedon shared the patriarch's concern about the declining international position of the Patriarchate. Just before the new election, the authorities stated that the election of Chalcedon and Dercos - the two most likely contestants - would be unpalatable to the Turkish government. Doubting the administrative capacities of Jacob, the Greek government opposed his election and endorsed the candidature of Maximos Vaportzis.3 On 19 January 1936, unable to elect the energetic Chalcedon, the holy synod compromised by elevating to the Patriarchal throne Benjamin Christodoulou, the aged archbishop of Heraclea. 4 The mixed feelings of the Greek Orthodox about the new patriarch became only too obvious when a demonstration of disapproval took place at the church of the Phanar, while the results of the election were being announced. Subsequently the Turkish police had to intervene in order to prevent a free fight and the new patriarch, visibly shaken and unable to make himself heard, left the church immediately after his election. Equally resentful were the Greeks with the Turkish effort to influence the outcome of the election and the independence exhibited by the patriarchal authorities. The renewed interest of the Turkish government in the internal affairs of the Patriarchate was probably due to the feeling in Ankara that,
L Waterlow to Hoare, Athens. 9 January 1936, FO 371/20087/E227, 2. Oakley to Douglas, Cons .. 6 February 1936. LPA/DgP/22/83-88. See also Mavropoulos. "p.cit .. pp. 241-42. 3. For details on this prelate see chapter IX:3. 4. Loraine to Hoare, Ankara, 3 February 1936. FO 371/20087/E766. See also The Times, 20 January 1936.
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despite a considerable loss of power, the Phanar still played an important role in the Orthodox world. The Turks associated this upsurge of the Phanar's prestige with the ecumenist policies of Patriarch Photios. After his death they appeared determined to step in and discourage the persistence of Photios' policies. But unlike his predecessor, Benjamin was reluctant to pursue an active ecumenist program. Perhaps the most important international step taken during the Benjamin reign was the granting of autonomy to the Albanian (1937) and Bulgarian (1945) churches. s Of some importance was also the visit of the British ambassador, Sir Hughes Knatchbull-Hugessen, to the Phanar on 14 October 1940. This was the first official contact between the British Embassy and the Phanar since 1923. 6 The Patriarchate was quite content with the reestablishment of official relations with Britain for it enhanced the Phanar' s aspiration to remain an international institution. While at first it raised no objection to the ambassador's visit, later on the Turkish government expressed its «annoyance» with the whole affair. 7 Notwithstanding the Turkish displeasure with the visit of the British ambassador to the Phanar, the fact that such a meeting could take place at all indicates the freer conditions under which the Patriarchate was allowed to operate during the 1930s and 1940s. This was also reflected in the success with which the Phanar was able to contain the challenge of Papa Eftim. Ever since 1927 Eftim was unable to make any serious impact. Not only was he boycotted by the Constantinopolitan Greeks, but even Turkish public opinion was increasingly impatient with the behaviour of the Anatolian priest. With sarcastic comments about the pompous titles that he had assumed, the Turkish press ridiculed Eftim' s opportunism and arrogance. The Vakil of 8 April 1926 even questioned the sincerity of his Turkish nationalist sentiments and wondered why a patriot sent his daughter to a Greek school (Zappeion). Under these circumstances Papa Eftim entered a period of obscurity which culminated with the establishment of Greco-Turkish co-existence. Unable to obtain government encouragement after 1930, he adopted a cautious attitude. He thus postponed the occupation of another Galata church, St Nicholas and kept a low profile during the patriarchal elections of 1929, 1936 and 1946.8 As the Eftimite movement faded into obscurity, Eftim faced yet another challenge. During the Greek-Turkish negotiations in 1930-31, the Greek government attached considerable importance to the pacification of Papa 5, 6. 7. 8.
Mavropoulos, op,cit., pp. 245-46: 'Op8or5o~ia, 12 (1937) 111-18. Nicols to Hugessen. London, 19 April 1940, FO 371/25021/R541. Morgan to Halifax, Ankara, 16 October 1940, FO 371/25021/R8626. Ergene, Op.cil., pp . 214-21.
205
Eftim and some other twenty-six militants. As previously remarked, Athens was ready to reciprocate by expelling from Greece the leaders of the antiKemalist core in Greek Thrace. Thus in a gesture of goodwill, in 1931 Athens expelled from Greece the leader of the conservative Muslims in Thrace, Mustafa Sabri. Although prepared to discourage further anti-Phanar activity in istanbul, the Turkish government did not wish to see the total elimination of the Turkish Orthodox movement. Thus as had been said, Papa Eftim was one of the eight religious leaders allowed to wear the ecclesiastical habit in public after the ban of 1934. 9 Evidently, the Ankara government continued to regard the Turkish Orthodox church as one of the major religious orders in Turkey. Further, while Papa Eftim was encouraged to keep a low profile, his one time lieutenant istamat Zihni OZdamar gained considerable prominence during the 1930s. Not only did he enter the Turkish parliament in 1935, but he was also appointed by the government as trustee of the Ballkll hospital. When between 1935- 37, istamat Zihni brought to the administrative council a number of Eftimite partisans, the Patriarchate warned that the hospital would soon fall into the hands of the Turkish Orthodox. These fears, however, did not materialize and by May 1937, the influence of Istamat Zihni on Greek parish affairs was on the wane. I 0 This was mainly due to Greco-Turkish cordial relations which, in turn, obliged Turkey to pay attention to Greek susceptibilities. The Turkish concern with Greek sensibilities was illustrated by Ankara's willingness to take the advice of the Greek Embassy on matters affecting the Patriarchate. I I From 1930, therefore, the Turks allowed the Patriarchate to operate in a freer atmosphere which corresponded to the spirit of Greco- Turkish friendship, while on the other hand they strove to contain any growth in the Phanar's ecumenical character. To achieve this delicate balance, the Turkish government on numerous occasions demonstrated its goodwill towards the Patriarchate and at the same time, in pursuit of its secular policies, it promulgated some far-reaching measures courtailing the powers of the religious institutions in Turkey.
9. Jiischke, «Die Ti.irkische-Orthodoxe Kirche», pp. 126-27. 10. «General conspectus of events during the period January 1935 to May 1937», memorandum prepared by Oakley, Cons., '27 May 1937, LPA/DgP/22/104-7. 11. Minutes by Helm, 25 March 1933. FO 371/16986/1534.
CHAPTER VIn THE V ARLi K TAX AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GREEK COMMUNITY. 1. The position of Turkey during 1939-1942.
During the first months of World War II, Turkey had more to fear from the USSR than Nazi Germany, as Soviet-Turkish relations appeared rather shaken. Turkish apprehensions were further intensified when on 23 August 1939 the Germans signed a pact of non-aggression with the Soviets. Fears of Soviet intentions and the expansionist ambitions of Germany and Italy pushed Turkey into an alliance with the anti-revisionist Anglo-French block. Thus, the successor of Atatiirk, Ismet Inonii entered a mutual assistance agreement with Great Britain and France on 19 October 1939. Yet after the fall of Rumania and the expansion of the Axis influence to the Thracian I border of Turkey in May 1941, Ankara began to reconsider its policy. Declin-;=:;-i ing to participate actively in the war, Turkey embarked upon a policy of. neutrality. 1 Isolated from the Allies, an increasingly nervous Turkey sought to avoid provoking a German invasion. To secure German goodwill, the Turkish government signed on 18 June 1941 an agreement of friendship and commerce with the Nazis. At this early stage of the war the Turkish government seriously questioned the ability of the British to provide them with adequate military assistance. In this Ankara was influenced by the Greek experience. After six months of heroic resistence to the Italians, Greece capitulated to the Axis Powers. Despite its commitments to Greece, Britain did little to prevent the fall of Athens to the German forces on 27 April 1941. Nevertheless, the Turks were able to reconcile their recent agreement with the Nazis, with their continued alliance with Great Britain by exempting from the Turco-German pact any obligations previously assumed. Through this device and by their continued affirmation that they would resist attacks against Turkish territory, Turkey appeased its hard-pressed British ally. By
1. For an excellent treatment of Turkish foreign policy during World War II see F.G. Weber . The El'Gsil"e Neutral, Columbia 1979.
206
207 14
counterbalancing the pressures exerted upon them by both blocks, the Turks successfully maintained a somewhat uneasy position of non-belligerence throughout the war. 2 Given the sensitive strategic position of Turkey, the avoidance of an active commitment to the war was a remarkable achievement of Turkish foreign policy. Although Turkey avoided direct involvement in the war, it was unable to escape the severe economic strains felt throughout Europe during 1939-44. Despite notable efforts at industrialization, the Kemalist vision of economic self-sufficiency was far from being accomplished. On the eve of World War II, Turkey was still dependent on Europe for its basic commodities such as raw materials and spare parts. War activity and blockades in the Mediterranean dramatically curtailed the volume of Turkish imports, and although Turkish export trade retained its vitality, the disruption of commercial exchanges with the Axis had particularly severe consequences. 3 Under these circumstances essential imported commodities, which had long been taken for granted by Turkish consumers, became grossly inadequate. Dissatisfaction in the urban centres was particularly strong among the civil servants with fIxed incomes and the working class. 4 The Turkish peasant, who still made up over 75 per cent of the population, was also discontented. Meanwhile, because of the imminent threat of invasion fIrst by the USSR and then by Germany, the Turkish army had been on a war footing since 1939 and a force of about one million men was mobilized. The mobilization was a tremendous burden on the economy exceeding the sum of 1,000,000 TL per day. Thus, while Turkish national defence expenditure was 163,941,000 TL in 1939, it was increased to 542,516,000 TL by 1943. 5 Only one third of this expenditure could have been covered by the existing taxatiOl,l. Coupled with 2. Ibid. 3. Annual values of foreign trade ($ 1000). Year 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
IlIlporrl 118899.:2 92497,6 50034,6 55348,9 112878,8 155340,2 126230,1
Erport5 115018.7 99647,2 80904,9 91056,3 126115,3 196734,5 177952,4
Difference - 3880,4 + 7149,6 + 30870,3 + 35707,4 + 13236,5 + 41394,3 + 51722,3
VoluJIle of foreign trade 233917,8 192144,8 130939,5 146405,2 238994,1 352074,7 304182,5
M.. Diizgiine~. Tiirkiye'de Toplumsal VI' Ekollomik Geli:Wlenin 50 ym, Ankara 1973, p. 3:26 4. Text of the speech by the Turkish prime minister. Refik Saydam, 2 February 1942, in FO 371/33375/R810; Jordan to Foreign Office, Ankara, I December 194:2. FO 371/33389/R8684. 5. F. Okte, Varllk Vergisi Facias!. istanbul 1951, p. 23 f[
208
this, the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of active men from productive capacities adversely affected the agricultural output and industrial production of the country. The mobilization not only engendered a severe labour shortage but also the huge armed force provided a new source of competition on the market. consuming goods and foodstuffs needed by the civilian population. As supplies were unable to meet demand, severe shortages in such staple articles as wheat, sugar and coal became commonplace. The scarcity of basic commodities in turn resulted in a steep rise in prices. 6 Owing to the upward tendency of the price index hoarding and speCUlation became rampant. Both speculators and consumers indulged extensively in such practices aggravating the market trends. A number of retailers, wholesalers. agents. brokers, middlemen, exporters and importers, known as the «war-rich» (harp zenginleri). in the larger cities were able to dominate a flourishing blackmarket and amass large fortunes in a short space of time. Nor was speculation and hoarding restricted to the urban capitalist and commercial classes. The government policy of offering progressively higher values for wheat and other cereals led a section of the farmers to hold onto their stocks in the hope of benefiting from the ever-increasing prices. Describing the condition of the peasants, the British ambassador, Sir KnatchbullHugessen remarked that «the peasants who are hoarding grain and selling at high prices are virtually as well off as are many numbers of peasants in the North (Black Sea region)>>. 7 6 . The wholesale price index:
Year 1938 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Foodstuffs \·egetable.l 100 123..3 179.8 424.9 8945 539..4
Raw materials industrial 100 1345 1763 26L2 319 355.6
meat 100 12L8 IR8 386 . 6 752.8 520.9
General index 100 126.6 175.3 339 . 6 590.1 458
7. Hugessen to Foreign Office. Ankara, '27 April 1942, FO 371/33388/R2814. An index of agricultural production in Turkey based on the most important crops gives the (1938: 100) 1935 .. "'. 72 1936 ..... 93 1937 . . . ,95 1938 ..... 100 1939 ..... 105 1940 ..... 106
209
He also noted that in the Adana district, the cotton farmers and textile manufacturers were «prosperous», and that «is:el enjoys a local prosperity». 8 At the same time heavy expenditure occasioned by mobilization and the constant rise of the price index resulted to a considerable increase in note circulation. During the month of October 1942 alone note circulation had increased by 35,500 TL. Increased money circulation indicated inflation and all indices affirmed that Turkey was in the midst of a serious economic crisis. 9 1941.. ... 95 1942 ..... 103 1943 ..... 90 1944 ..... 86 1945 ..... 74 1946 ..... 96
2. The enactment of the varl'ik tax.
According to a wheat price index cmpiled by the Turkish statistics department (istatistik Umum Miidur/iigu) prices fluctuated as following 1935 ..... 5.50 1936 .... 5.72 1937 ..... 5.47 1938 ..... 5J6 1939 ... " 508 1940 ...... 6.05 1941 .... JO.58 1942 .... .30.76 1943 .... .47.23 1944 .....28.40
(kg/Kuru:j)
V. Eidem, «Mill! Gelir», jstanbul Univesitesi jktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasl. 9/1-2 (1948) 82-83. 8. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 27 April 1942, FO 371/33389/R2814. 9. Money supply and wholesale prices, 1936-1944. (TL million)
Years 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Bank notes ill circulation (1) 170 180 194 281 404 512 733 802 960
On 24 October 1942, the British ambassador in Turkey expressed his anxiety about the economic situation in Turkey. In a telegram to the Foreign Office, he reported that «he anticipated a more or less complete breakdown in the Turkish economy by the end of the present year (1942)>>.1 0 Turkish leaders were equally alarmed by the gloomy prospects of the economy. This nervousness was expressed by the president, ismet inonii, when on 1 November 1942 he condemned the widespread profiteering and hoarding practices. He accused such unscrupulous traders of «attempting to undermine the national life».l1 The new Turkish prime minister, -5iikrii S~as:oglu shared the views of President inonii. 12
Sight deposits at banks
Total (1 +(2)
jstanbul wholesale price index
133 157 205 201 202 285 399 400 500
303 337 399 482 606 797 1,132 1,202 1,460
101.4 105.5 100.0 100.9 123.1 166.5 325.9 699.4 486.7 (1938: 100)
These estimates are based on the nearest available data. See Anlluaire Statistique. 1935·36, Ankara 1937, p. 275; Annuaire Statistique, 1942-45. Ankara 1945, p. 299.
210
-/ By drawing a deliberately depressing picture of the economy, the president hoped to prepare his countrymen for the drastic legislation against warprofiteering contrived by the Saras:oglu government. As early as 1 January 1940, the government attempted to check the situation through rationing wheat, imposing rent controls and finally by giving extensive emergency powers to the authorities with the promulgation of the National Emergency law. On the whole, these measures proved ineffective and speculators were able to circumvent government controls. 1 Now, on II November 1942, a new emergency tax measure was promulgated in order -to curb the galloping inflation. Claiming that the sole purpose of the new emergency measure was to put some order in the economy, Prime Minister Saras:oglu declared before the Turkish assembly that «we are neither the pupils of Adam Smith nor the apprentices of Karl Marx. We are the children of a political party whose social religion is populism and whose economic doctrine is etatisme». He concluded his account by stressing that an emergency act was necessary for the control of the unabated inflation as well as for the assessment of the. hitherto untaxed wealth. 2 Thus, the varl'ik vergisi (capital tax) was duly approved by 350 out of 429 deputies in the Turkish assembly. Among the 76 who abstained (three seats were vacant), there were the Greek and Jewish deputies, Nicholas Taptas and AbravaYl1 MannaralP 10. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 24 October 1942, FO 371/33389/R7117. 11. AT lOS (1942) 21-24 for the complete text of the speech. 12. Ibid .. pp. 39-41. 1. E. Clark, «The Turkish Varllk Vergisi Reconsidered», MES 8/2 (1972) 206. 2. He called the tax «a revolutionary step», for the text of the 11 November speech seeAT 108 (1942) 25-41. See also TBMM Zablt Ceridesi, 28-29 (1942) 33-35. 3. Official translation Loi de l' Impot sur fa Fortune, no. 4305/1942.
211
This extraordinary levy was mainly designed to tax the abnormally high profits amassed by a number of individuals and companies since the outbreak of the war. Four categories of the population seemed to have been largely affected by the new levy. These were: (a) companies and individuals engaged in business since 1939 (b) middlemen and commissionaires (c) owners of immovable property, and (d) salaried private employees (government employees were ex empted). Through a fiscal measure, the government intended to deflate the economy by providing the treasury with funds. Deflation, it was hoped, by withdrawing surplus purchasing power in circulation would cause a fall in prices. Given the extensive profiteering and tax evasion which had taken place since 1939, the proposed tax was in principle legitimate. It was also desirable for the purposes of both revenue and social justice, for a relatively small section of the population had been able to profit from the economic crisis at the expense of the Turkish people. While, therefore, the necessity of a drastic fiscal measure was indisputable, certain traits of the new bill created apprehension from the very start. Such misgivings were widespread among Turkish citizens who wished to see the establishment of democratic values and civil freedoms in Turkey. Thus, although taxes were to be levied in proportion to wealth and ability to pay, no declarations of resources were sought by the assessment boards. Such committees (mahallf takdir komisyonlarl) were comprised of high-ranking government officials and influential personalities in each district, who conducted their inquiries «in well-guarded secrecy». 4 Equally disconcerting were the almost unlimited powers bestowed upon these committees to estimate the amount of tax imposed upon every individual. Further, a clause forbidding all appeals except through the assembly was also inserted in the tax. The payments were to be deposited within fifteen days of assessment and, although fIfteen days grace was granted, this was subject to high interest payments of one per cent on the value of the original tax during the first week and two per cent during the second. Those who were unable to pay off the tax within the prescribed month were liable to immediate confiscation and public auctioning of their property. If the price obtained was still insufficient, defaulters were liable to forced labour on non-military projects under the direction of the ministry of public works. Aware that a large body of opinion in Turkey associated the prevailing 40 kE, Yalman. Turkey in My Time. Norman 1956, p. 205.
212
economic crisis with their business practices, the non-Muslims were particularly worried by the unlimited powers vested with the assessment committees. They strongly feared that they would be treated less favourably than their Muslim counterparts. The Turkish press had launched an extensive campaign against Christian and Jewish businessmen accusing them of speculation, blackmarketing and stockpiling. In a characteristic article entitled «Yorgi, you will no longer be allowed to do what you wish», the Ulus of 24 Novembei:1942 accused the Yorgis, Salamons,Kyriakos, Artins, in other words, the non-Muslims in general, for bringing about the economic ills which had befallen the country. Finding the liberties enjoyed by the minorities in Turkey too wide, the press demanded restriction. Before long, the campaign took a distinctive anti-Jewish character. 5 Stimulated by the adverse economic conditions, historical prejudice and mistrust of nonMuslims in Turkey surfaced once again. The renewed antipathy towards religious minorities was shared by the Turkish government. Notwithstanding the lip-service paid about the equality of all Turkish citizens, Ankara manifested a willingness to place the responsibility for the economic crisis on the shoulders of the minorities. Thus, in a conversation with the British envoy Sterndale Bennett, the Germanophil Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu claimed that «the minorities were a rich commercial community. They did nothing for the country. They lived extremely sumptuously and well, while the Turkish peasants were half starving and even the Turkish officials lived like the proletariat in comparison with the rich merchants of istanbul and izmir». 6 By portraying Turkey as the victim of a number of unscrupulous entrepreneurs, the government sought to conceal its shortcomings in the economic field. Chanelling discontent to an unpopular target such as the non-Muslim minorities would, the government felt, divert criticism and satisfy emotionally the hard-pressed Turkish masses. Even before the varllk taxation, the Turkish government had shown signs of sympathy with discriminatory attitudes towards the minorities. An early manifestation of this inclination was the decision to mobilize all non-Muslims between the ages of 18 and 45. Just about the time of the signing of the Turco-German agreement in June 1941, these men were sent to special camp~ in Anatolia each containing about 5,000 men. There, the men were instructed 5. For a resume of Turkish press repOIts, Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 29 January 1943, FO 371/37401/RI212. 6. Sterndale Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 10 March 1943, FO 371/37403/R3391.
213
!
to engage themselves in non-combative capacities such as roadbuilding. 7 The concentration of all non-Muslim males in such camps aroused great apprehension in minority circles in Istanbul. 8 Their fears were intensified when reports of harsh conditions and high mortality rate reputed to have prevailed in the camps reached Istanbul. 9 On 8 December 1941, however, those men between the ages of38 and 45 were allowed to return to their homes: The rest spent another six months before they were eventually released. It is reasona. ble to assume that the whole operation was a device engineered to get the minorities out of the strategically sensitive area of istanbul and the Straits. There is also some evidence to suggest that the Turkish government suspected a number of non-Muslims, almost all Armenians, to be involved in «fiftp column» activities against Turkey. 10 The mistrust of the government towards the minorities was best illustrated during the varlik episode. There is no doubt that a section of the non-Muslim businessmen deserved this mistrust. For they did accumulate large fortunes out of the economic difficulties in the years 1939-42. This was particularly so with those who were in a position to exploit both the highly valued Turkish exports and the scarcity of essential imports. Non-Muslim merchants also showed a particular aptitude for transmuting their profits into goods, real estate and gold, thus making full use of the inflationary market conditions. Speculation and hoarding was by no means restricted to non-Muslims. Turkish businessmen were as prone to such activities as their minority counterparts. It was during these inflationary market conditions that a considerable number of Turkish merchants managed to expand substantially their business concerns. Yet both the government and the press chose to direct their frustration with the economic ills against the minorities. Reduced to mere scapegoats, the latter found themselves accused of disloyalty, tax evasion and exploitation. Anticipating the foml of a future tax measure, A. K. Helm, an experienced observer of Turkish affairs and a British diplomat in I Ankara, predicted that «it need not cause surprise if in a few years ... a violent campaign is
7. Cornwallis to Eastern Dept., Bardad, 2j4 Novembe 1941, FO 371j30031jRlOO81. 8. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 19 May 1941, FO 371j30031jR5357. 9. Interviews with twenty Constantinopolitan Greeks who served in such camps. There are, however, no reliable statistics as to the overall mOitality rate in these camps. More information is given in the Ankara Chancery to Southern DepL, 4 June 1941, FO 37Ij30031jR58I3. 10. As pointed out in Foreign Office minute dated 19 May 1941, «the Armenians are extremely fruitful ground for German activity. The non-Muslim elements with their pre-Kemalist mentality are always viewed with mistrust by the Turkish authorities», in FO 371j30031jR5357.
214
directed against the Jews or if the minorities are again mulcted of the profits which they have been buildingup in the recent years of relative tolerance» .11 3. Discriminatory traits of the varl'lk tax.
When the varl'lk assessments were eventually made public the discrimination feared by many was not only established but it even exceeded all expectations. 1 The majority of the assessments levied on non-Muslims was set at confiscatory figures bearing no relation to declared profits or capacity to pay. In the case of firms they amounted from four to seven times the nominal capital of the company or four to five times the declared profits in 1941. Likewise, taxes imposed on property owners often exceeded the total value of their estates as registered with the government department. 2 Influenced by the commonly held view that non-Muslims evaded paying taxes, the assessment boards taxed the minorities over their declared wealth. Defending the wholly Muslim local assessment boards, the director of finance (defterdar) in istanbul, Faik Okte presented evidence indicating that the tax rates were ordered by Ankara. He also attributes the conception of the bill to the prime minister, ~iikrii Sara
II. Memorandum prepared by Helm on the situation in Turkey, Ankara, 11 August 1942, FO 371j33376jR5552. I. Memorandum by Roberts on the Capital Levy, I January 1943, FO 371j37400jR645. See also.
The New York Times, II September 1943. 2. Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 28 December 1942, FO 37Ij33389jR9020. 3. In his book which constitutes the main Turkish source on the tax, Okte displays a marked objectivity and thoroughness, see Varllk Vergisi Faciasl, pp. 73-76.
215
thorities suspended Vatan on 30 September for «not complying with the policy of the government». 4 President Ismet Inonii and his administration had certainly to bear the responsibility for the infamous tax on wealth. The biographer of Inonii, ~evket Siireyya Aydemir, who defends the tax as an «unavoidable need», admits that «even today the tax remains as an accusation against Inonii's career». He also reveals that the president paid particular attention to the implementation of the tax, for he was aware that he would ultimately be accountable for it. 5 Yalman, too, states that, given the strong influence exercised by the president on all public matters during this period, his approval, if not his initiation, of the.tax was indisputable. 6 From the evidence provided by Faik Okte, it has been established that taxpayers were divided into two main categories, the «M» category for those of the Muslim faith and the «G» category, for the non-Muslim Turkish citizens (gayrimiislim). Subsequently, two further categories, the «D» category for the 750llme Turks and the «E» category for the foreign nationals (ecnebi), were instituted. In general those in the «G» list were taxed about ten times the amount levied from Muslims of the same wealth. The «D» category paid twice as much as Muslims. Since international law dictated that a state may not tax foreign subjects more heavily than its own nationals, local assessment boards were instructed to treat foreign residents like the «M» group, except for the Jewish subjects of the Axis powers. In practice, however, owing to the defective system of identification records then in operation many foreign nationals ended up being lumped together with non-Muslim Turkish citizens. 7 This was particularly so in the case of the ethnic Greek and Levantine residents with foreign passports. The largest levies were imposed in the main urban centres of Turkey: Thus, Istanbul was assessed at 344,000,000 TL, Izmir at 27,000,000 and Ankara at 16,000,000. In the case of the capital many assessments were a simple «paper transaction» as the largest amounts were those levied on the Turkish banks, which continued to owe the money or, if they did pay it, borrowed it back again from the Treasury. 8 Considering the overall assessment estimated at 42S,000,000 TL, the share ofIstanbul - 77 per cent ofthe total- was indeed very high. Further, the non-Muslim element was assessed 4. A.E. Yalman. Yaklll Tarilzte Cordi/klerilll \'e Cer;irdikierilll, istanbul nd., pp. 381-83. 5. ~.S Aydemir. Wllci Adam, istanbul, 1975-76. pp. 228-30. 6. Yalman. Yak/II Tarillte, p, 381. 7. Okte. op,cit, , pp. 49. 77-82: G.L. Lewis. Modern Turkey, London 1974. pp. 134-35. 8. Memorandum on the Capital Levy, prepared by the commercial counsellor, N.S. Robert. I January 1943. FO 371j37400jR645.
216
at 233.000.000 TL (or nearly 52 per cent) while the Muslim share was 122.500,000 (or 29 per cent) and that of the foreigners 79,SOO.OOO (or 19 per cent).9 The extent that the Turkish government expected the minorities to contribute to the var/lk tax is better illustrated when Turkish population statistics are considered. From a total population of 16.188,767 in 1935. the non-Muslim population of Turkey did not exceed 300,000 persons. Beside Okte' s account. reports from the British Embassy in Turkey provide further conclusive evidence of the harsh and often prohibitive rates of taxation imposed on the minorities. Thus. a survey conducted by British businessmen of some 100 of the largest profit-making enterprises in Istanbul showed that in the case of the Armenian firms the assessments were 232 per cent of the capital. of the Jewish 184 per cent. of the Greek IS9 per cent and of the Muslim Turkish 4.9 per cent. 10 The ratios are almost identical with the findings of the foreign Chamber of Commerce in Turkey whose survey results are quoted in the Nell' York Times of 11 September 1943. :\ comparative study of some assessments with regards to non-Muslim iTurkish and foreign) citizens and their ethnic Turkish counterparts reveals: faxes fixed on the clients of the British Tucker company. 11 G. Mavroudis (Turkish citizen/Greek origin) Stavropoulos Bros. (Turkish citizens/Greek origin) Anavi Fils (Turkish citizens/Jewish origin) Crespi Fils (Turkish citizens/Jewish origin) Stileyrnan I~akzade (Turkish citizen/Muslim) Lm\'yers:
IOS,OOO 220,000 500,000 95,000 9,000
TL TL TL TL TL
taxed
Gad Franco (Turkish citizen/Jewish) Sekib Adut (Turkish citizen/Jewish) A.A. Mango (British citizen/Chiot Christian) Hlkmet Mekki (President of the Istanbul Bar/Turkish) Rafet Ha~im (Vice-President of the Istanbul Bar/Turk)
377,000 375,000 21,000 2,00S 1,000
TL TL TL TL TL
9. Clark. op.cit" pp. 208-09. 10. British businessmen to the Prime Minister's Office, Cons .. 3 March 1943, FO 371j37402jR2809. II. These businessmen were in the paint and colour trade and were considered to be on the same footing as far as capital was concerned. in Tucker to Mander. Cons .. 10 January 1943. FO 371;37401(R 1163 .
217
estimated capital 65,000 TL 25,000 TL 60,000 TL 60,000 TL
Automobile spare parts Ototlirk (Turkish citizen/Jewish) Christos Amand (Turkish citizen/Greek) Bedri Tok Uvluslim Turk) Nihat Bozkurt (Muslim Turk)
estimated capital 20,900 TL 70,000 TL 229,379 TL 500,000 TL 300,000 TL
Wollen Merchants J. Eskenazi (British citizen/Jewish) J. Eskenazi Fils (British citizens/Jew) S. Souraski (British citizen/Jewish) Hussameddin Eren (Turkish Muslim) Mustafa Yucat (Turkish Muslim)
taxed 150,000 TL 75,000 TL 2,000 TL 10,000 TL
taxed 90,000 TL 120,000 TL 750,000 TL 30,000 TL 20,000 TL
Shipowners Barsilay & Benjamin (Turkish Jewish) tonnage: 19,300 five ships, taxed: 2 million Kalkavanzade (Turkish Muslim) tonnage: 21,550 five ships, taxed: 60,000 TL
General Merchants Isaac Modiano (British citizen/Jewish) Vehbi K09 (Turkish citizen)
estimated capital 97,000 TL 2,000,000 TL
taxed 2 million TL 60,000 TL
Restaurants in Beyoglll (Pera) Kimon Pavlovich (British citizen/Greek origin) owner of the Majestic Restaurant Abdullah Restaurant (Turkish-owned) Narin Restaurant (Turkish-owned)
15,000 TL 5,000 TL 3,000 TL
Commission Agents Leon N. Stelianides (British citizen/Greek) Facil Verdi (Turkish Muslim) Hilmi Nail Barlo (Turkish Muslim)
10,000 TL 4,500 TL 5,000 TL
taxed
Both Turkish agents were involved in a much larger way in bussiness than Stelianides.
218
Real Estate Mary Rizzos (British citizen/Greek) Agopian & heirs (British citizen/ Armenian) Said Karamanoglou (Turkish Muslim)
Appx. value 73,000 TL
taxed 25,000 TL
176,000 TL 1,000,000 TL
100,000 TL 20,000 TLI:!
It was not only the large non-Muslim business concerns that the tax on wealth aimed to cripple. Many other small shopowners and artisans of nonMuslim origin were also taxed at exorbitant rates. Had they been of the Turkish race, such persons would have certainly escaped taxation altogether. Detailed evidence forwarded by the Association of British Women in lstanbul amply demonstrates this point. In a letter dated on 23 December 1942, the association revealed some of the most unjust aspects of the tax. It concentrates on the hardships caused by the tax on the low income non-Muslim families who were assessed sums far beyond their powers to pay. Thus, while members of the minorities working at the lstanbul branch of «His Master's Voice» were taxed at 500 TL, Muslim employees paid nothing. Again out of five women workers at the American Girl's school at Oskiidar (Scoutari) an Armenian with an income of 100 TL was taxed at 750 TL and a Greek earning 28 TL was assessed 500 TL. The three Muslim workers earning 28 TL each were not taxed at all. 13 The practice of taxing non-Muslims of the lower income groups the minimum levy of 500 TL was widespread. 14 The flagrant differentiation shown in the assessments invites the charge that the varllk tax had a dual purpose. Apart from purely fiscal considerations, the tax sought to transfer to Turkish control many of the commercial establishments in lstanbul which had survived the policy of economic nationalism during the 1920s and managed to expand during the relatively tolerant conditions of the 1930s. As Nadir Nadi, the owner of the influential Cumhuriyet, pointed out «according to a more specific explanation which was whispered from earto ear, or even at times voiced out loud, a second objective of the tax was to free the market from the control of the minorities and open it to
12. Documents with such comparative examples. Hugessen to Foreign Office. Ankara. 29 January 1943. FO 371/33389/RI425; Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. '27 December 1942. FO 37 1/33389/R9004. 13. This letter carries 38 signatures and was addressed to Bennett. Cons 23 Decemb,~r 1942. FO 371j37399jR270. 14. The author interviewed many low income Constantinopolitan Greekl;. including a widow with three children and no pension. who were invariably taxed at 500 TL. Victoria Rizas. interview with the author. London. 1978. q
219
the Turks ... Thus, our Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Catholic and Gregorian subjects who were proud of being Turkish citizens had to sell out their property and wealth for nothing». 15 For non-Muslim Turkish citizens the tax became nothing less than a smallscale bloodless financial massacre. Commenting on the bill many observers of Turkish affairs contended that the influence of Nazi ideology in Turkey stimulated considerably the build-up of a general anti-minority feeling in 1941-43 which culminated with the imposition of the infamous tax on wealth. 16 In addition, a recent study has clearly shown that at the early stages of World War II, at least a portion of the Turkish leadership flirted with Berlin.17 The influence of racist ideology in Ankara may be illustrated by the imposition of discriminatory taxes on the DUI/me Turks. Faik Okte reveals that past family records were investigated in ol~der to determine which Turks were of Jewish origin. Encouraged by the government's attitude a bitter anti-Dol1me campaign was inaugurated in the large urban centres. These Muslims of Oriental Jewis origin were bitterly denounced by the press for «being worse than the Jews, because they pretended to be Turks and wanted to have the best of both worlds».18 This campaign presented a radical break with past Turkish attitudes. While playing a prominent part in the Young Turk revolution, the Donme Turks continued to be active in the Kemalist movement. The American educated journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman, a DOl/me Turk, was a leading Turkish publicist. So was the author of Le Kemalisme, Tekin Alp (Moise Cohen). Apart from their contribution in the intellectual and professional spheres of Turkish life. the DOl/me Turks also distinguished themselves in commerce, filling the vacuum created by the departure of Greek and Armenian businessmen in 1922-23. Again the official inclusion of Jews from the Axis countries in the non-Muslim category indicated Turkish desire to curry favour with the Germans by following anti-Semitic policies. 19 In turn the Nazis wholeheartedly approved of the I'arll" episode. 20 If the assessment of the tax rates was discriminatory, the enforcement of the var/ik was equally ruthless. 2,563 members of the minorities forming the «extraordinary non-Muslim class» (jel'kafade gayrimiislim) were charged with the astronomical sum of 189,969,980 TL, or 27 per cent of the whole 15 . N . Nadi. Perde Arkalarlndan, Istanbul 1964. p. 178. 16. Yalman. Yak/n Tari/zle, p. 375: Lewis. Modern Tllrkey, p. 134. 17 . Weber. op . cit., p. 20 f[ 18. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 12 December 1942. FO 371/33376/R8573. For a general treatment see Lewis. Emergence, pp. 295-96. 19 . Okte. op. cil., p. 81. 20. Lewis. Emergence, p. 300. n . 10.
220
currency circulation in Turkey.21 Further, as the law stipulated, they had to produce this large sum in cash on a short notice of fifteen days. In the event of non-payment at the end of thirty days beginning from 17 December 1942, when the list for Istanbul was issued, the entire property of the taxpayers was to be confiscated and publicly auctioned. Tax officials (talIsifat miidiirleri) appeared to have shown great zeal in confiscating merchandise and property, particularly in Beyoglu, a district inhabited mainly by non-Muslims. 22 Altogether 885 immovable property auctions were recorded in Istanbul, reaching a tax value of 2,700,883 TL. Another 73 properties were entrusted to the Treasury.23 Much more property and personal belongings, however, were sold privately. The total magnitude of forced sales has not yet been exactly determined, but there is ample evidence to prove that it was of such a scale as to cause widespread hardship and bitterness. Although Faik Okte argues that the auctioned property fetched reasonable prices, he also hints that details of the sales were in some cases not even published in the press. 24 By concealing such auctions the authorities must have kept many potential buyers in ignorance of these transactions. It is such official behaviour that prompted the Greek ambassador in Turkey, Raphail Raphail to warn the British envoy Sterndale Bennett, that «agreat racket was going on». From reports received from Embassy staff, sent out to observe the property auctions, the Greek ambassador concluded that the police together with tax officials shared the spoils. He went on to assert that «in very many cases the public is excluded and the goods were bought up by the police and the tax officials themselves at extremely low prices and afterwards sold at profit outside».25 Such activities, the Greek ambassador maintained, were particularly common in the auction of goods. Seizures and sales of property forced the closure of many long established non- Muslim enterprises in istanbul despite the fact that such sales produced somewhat less than one per cent of the total tax collection. 26 Closures of businesses in turn resulted in throwing into unemployment several hundreds of employees who had the additional difficulty of
21 Okte.op. cil., p. 102 . IhhL. pp" 105-06. 23. Ibid., pp. 163-66. 233 (list of confiscated property). X Ibid, pp. 166. 25, Details of the intervie\v in SterndaJe Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 18 March 1943. FO y)
37 I ;37403jR3392, 26. Okte. Op.cil., p . 233.
221
finding their own \'{[rl'lk assessments which usually ranged from 500 to 750 TLY Intercommunal bitterness was further intensified when a number of is tanbul and Anatolian Turks took advantage of the harsh varlik measure and bought up minority property and businesses. The tax did not touch the landowners who owned textile factories, commission collectors who did business with the government, and the contractors, though they also had managed to amass large fortunes during 1939-43. These Turks, and particularly prosperous farmers from the Adana district, began to take over the istanbul market as established Constantinopolitan commercial houses faded away because of the varl'lk taxation. 28 As a last resort, a large number of Turkish citizens used their constitutional right and directly petitioned the Turkish parliament. Of the 24,316 appeals against the tax on wealth 16,816 were connected with excessive assessments. thus establishing this tax as causing the greatest number of complaints (ittiraz) in the history of the Turkish republic. 29 But in the absence of a procedure for investigation of such appeals by the assembly, the deportation of those who did not discharge themselves of their liabilities was put into effect. On 7 January 1943 regulations concerning forced labour for nonpayment of the varl'lk tax were approved by the Turkish government. 30 Ostensibly internees were to engage themselves in compulsory labour for public works and were to be paid two TL per day, one of which was to be credited to their tax account. They were supposed to remain in such camps until they had paid off their entire tax debt. Considering the large amounts of their tax, in practice. the decree was equal to life imprisonment. It has been estimated that defaulters would have had to work for more than 250 years in order to pay their entire tax debts. 31 But forced labour camps were primarily to act as a deterrent. By 27 January 1943, thirty-two non-Muslim businessmen with tax debts of over 50,000 were convicted of unwillingness to support their country in its hour of need and were duly arrested. They were first interned in the Asiatic suburbs of istanbul and later sent to a labour camp at A~kale. An inaccessible spot in the mountainous area west of Erzurum, A~kale in the minds of city
dwellers was thought of as the Turkish Siberia. With fair regularity at intervals of ten to fifteen days, other groups of defaulters were deported to labour camps at A~kale and and few other locations in Anatolia. 32 Of the 1,869 persons arrested in istanbul 640 paid their tax (25,908,695 TL) and the rest were deported. Altogether 1,400 persons were interned of whom 1,229 came from istanbul.33 There are conflicting reports as to the conditions in the internment camps. Yalman, who was himself sent to A~kale, described the camp as «a healthful place. The people who were forced to be there had a good time, although most resented their exile deeply».34 This view was adopted by other western observers of Turkish affairs, who compared favourably the treatment of the varl'tk internees with the inhuman punishments then being applied in much of the rest of Europe. Internees, it was argued, lived the life of political exiles rather than political prisoners. Life in the camps was boring rather than intolerable. 35 Yet, there is conclusive evidence to suggest that the varllk victims suffered considerable harassment particularly during their transportation to the internment camps. After visit. ing an internment camp in the middle of February 1943, the British Colonel Binns described the treatment which was meted out to defaulting taxpayers. «This morning I visited the barn at Demirkapl where some forty merchants, lawyers and others have been imprisoned for the last ten days and are being despatched this evening to A~kale to join the 32 already there. The room in which they are imprisoned is some fifteen yards in length by eight yards in width ... There was not a stick of furniture of any kind with the exception of one stove. The room was full of weeping men, women and children who had come to say goodbye and to bring the deportees odd parcels of food and clothing. A most depressing and wretched picture. »36 The original upper age-limit of 55 was not respected as fourteen out of the thirty-two deportees sent to A~kale on 27 January 1943 were over the age of 55. Nor were the sick and ailing spared. Amongst those defaulting taxpayers despatched to the internment camp there was a 70 year old partly paralyzed
27. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 18 March 1943, FO 371/37403/E3392. 28. D.A. Rustow. «Politics and Development Policy» in F. C. Shorter (ed.). FOllr 5tl1dies Oil the Economic Del'e/opment of Tllrkey, London. 1967. p. 12 29. Okte. op. cit., pp. 109-11. 129. 30. Law no. 19288/1943 given in Resmi GlI~ete, no. 5302. 12 January 1943. 31. Okte. op.cit., p. 57.
32. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara, 29 May 1943. FO 371/37404/R5055. 33. Ankara Chancery to Southern Dept.. 6 June 1943. FO 371/37406/R8832: Okte, op.cit., PI157-58. 34 . E. Weisband. 71lrkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945, Princeton 1973, pp. 234-35. 35. Cf. L. V. Thomas & R.N. Frye (eds.l. The United States and 71lrkey and Iran, Cambridge Mass. 1951. pp. 97-98: Clark, op.cit.. p . 208. 36. Memorandum on conditions in the assembly camp of Demirkapl, Colonel Binns to the British Consul-General in istanbul. FO 371/37402/R2416.
222
223 15
Jew, Shaban, while another, Behar, aged 65, was h.andicap~ed,37 According dated 19 May 1943 and based on mformatIon smuggled out to a Gree k report , l' . th periodically by the internees, the level of nutrition and clean lIl~SS m e camps was extremely low, while medical assistance w.as very ~Iffi~ult ~o obtain and had to be paid for. Conditions in these camps, It was mamtamed 1Il the report, were responsible for several deaths among the deportees. T.hus, a Jewish businessman named Romano died on 28 March, after a s?ort Illness suffered lying on some straw in a stable at A~kale. On 1 May BaSIl Konstantinidis a Constantinopolitan Greek, died at Erzurum from a heart attack after his ret~rn from compulsory labour. He, the account concluded, was ~efused any medical attention. 38 Overall, the human casualties ofthis sad affair w~re twenty-one, 0 f WhI'ch eleven were Greeks . 39 Reflecting on the hardshIps caused by the varllk affair, Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen assert~d that «the treatment and handling of the deportees have been charactensed by roughness and inconsiderateness». He then went on to conclude that .. «there is unfortunately every reason to believe that the. condItIOns under which the,se unfortunate people have to pass theIr days and nights are unworthy of a modern civilised country» .40 . . Meanwhile, the application of the wealth tax and its impact on mmonty and foreign business drew the interest of the diplomatic circles in Ankara. Before long the discriminatory character of the varllk taxa~io~ was recognized by the Allied nations. The racist and arbitrary charactenstlcs of the tax were ~er tainly contrary to the Anglo-American principles. Yet they wer~ face.d W.~t~l a dilemma. Any attempt to intervene on behalf of the non-Musl~m mmoIlties would irritate Ankara, since the Turks viewed the varl'lk ,affair as a. purely internal matter. Further as the ambassador of the U ~ited St~tes. Stemhardt . t d out the Axis Powers might well attempt to alienate 1 urkey from the pOUl e , I k'l 41 Tl Allied block by capitalizing on any trouble created by the var I aw.. lUS, the Allies considered it «inadvisable» to make formal representatIOns on behalf of the aggrieved non-Muslim Turkish nationals. As G.L. Clutton of the British Foreign Office remarked, the Allied attitude . «may be cynical and disregard moral rights and wrongs, but I submIt that it is good politics». 42 O
37. Ibid. 38. Raphail to Hugessen, Ankara, 19 May 1943, FO 371/37404/R5055. 39. B. Konstantinidis, C. Iatrou, L Antoniadis, B. Kyriatzis, Z. Doxakis, J. Topaloglou , G" Sismanoglou. G. Tsorbatzoglou, D. Esnafoglou, A, Sakkopoulos, C. Dimakopoulos. 40. Hugessen to Eden, Ankara, 29 May 1943, FO 371/37404/R5055. 41. Bennett to Eden, Ankara, 23 Desember 1942, FO 371/33389/R8885. .. . 42. Minute by Clutton in FO 371/33389/R8837. For another document on the Bntlsh atut~de towards the tax, Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 28 December 1942, FO 371/33389/R90_0.
224
As a result, official action was confined to individual representations by each embassy on behalf of its own nationals. Indeed, such representations were frequent and placed Ankara in an embarrassing position. During a conversation with Foreign Minister Numan MenemenciogIou, the British envoy J.C. Sterndale Bennett, speaking in an unofficial capacity, observed that «the Turkish Republic has taken its stand on justice and equality of treatment of its nationals and on friendly relations with foreign countries, including reasonable treatment of their nationals; that world opinion still counts for a great deal and that great injury may be done to Turkey's good name and her wider interests by carrying through the law on present lines». He then went on to reason that «foreign opinion would regard the manner of levying the tax as akin of Axis methods and misinterpret it accordingly as reflecting Turkey's attitude towards the war». 43 Faced with a sustained clamour against the tax from foreign diplomats, Axis and Allied alike, the Turkish govenunent decided to revise the assessments of foreign nationals and new lists with modified levies were received by the embassies. 44 4. The effects of the varl'lk episode on the Greco-Turkish friendship.
There was, however, a notable exception. As late as 30 August 1943, the Greek ambassador complained bitterly that he was the only foreign representative who did not receive a list of modified levies for the Hellene nationals. 1 Ever since the publication of the tax, it was evident that the harsh treatment accorded the Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals was equally extended to the Hellene Greeks, the largest single foreign group in Turkey. Up to January 1943, there were 3,000 Hellene subjects who had declared to the Greek consular authorities their varl'lk assessments. The total amount of tax assessed for this group reached 8,705,412 TL. Discrimination was particularly visible in the case of employees in banks and other similar institutions. 2 43. Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 23 December 1942, FO 371/33389/R8890. 44. Okte, op.cit., pp. 121-26. 1. Helm to Eden, Ankara, 30 August 1943, FO 371/37406fR8574. 2. The sum of 18,705,412 is divided by professions as follows:
1460 354
Clerks Small artisans
225
896,695 TL 660,225 TL
Hellenes were the only foreign group whose property was confiscated and auctioned extensively. As a result, by August 1943,6,500,000 TL tax debts of Hellene nationals had been collected by the Turkish authorities. 3 Commenting on the stringent measures against the Hellenes, on 23 December 1942, Sterndale Bennett remarked that «all indications go to confirm the victimization of Greek nationals».4 The concern of the Greek Embassy was particularly pronounced in the case of Constantinopolitan Hellene wage earners whose aggregate tax amounted to no less than 500,000 TL.5 According to a comparative list by professions, prepared by the Greek Embassy in January 1943, the difference between the amounts of tax claimed from the Hellenes and Muslim Turkish was tremendous. Accordingiy:6
Professions Importers Exporters Merchants Industrialists Grocers Shopkeepers Agents Merchant tailors Furniture merchants
Hellenes 10,000/75,000 60,000/400,000 15,000/1,000,000 75,000/262,500 6,000/150,000 12,000/160,000 10,000/120,000 15,000/75,000 6,000/140,000
Muslim Turks 1,000/10,000 5,000/25,000 1,500/100,000 500/35,000 500/10,000 500/15,000 1,000/10,000 1,500/17,000 1,200/ 3,000
Such discriminatory evaluations were contrary to the principle of international law which forbade a state to tax its foreign residents more heavily than its own nationals. Greek resentment towards the Turkish action was immense. In a conversation with the British diplomat, Sterndale Bennett on 21 December, Greek Ambassador Raphail expressed the view that the tax was «a savage
708 315 139 15 9
Artisans & small shopkeepers Shopkeepers & small traders Merchants Landlords with no other income Professional men
3,722.885 4.728.800 8,359,807 303.000 34.000
TL TL TL TL TL
Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. 27 January 1943. FO 37Ij37401/RIII0 . Turkish estimates give the tax imposed on the Hellenes as 19.861.350 TL. Okte. op.cit .. p. 125. 3. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 8 August 1943. FO 371/37228/R7387. 4. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 23 December 1942. FO 371/33389/R8890. 5. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 31 December 1942. FO 371/37399/RI2. 6. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. 27 January 1943. FO 371/37401/RIIIO
226
attack on the Greek community as a whole with political rather than fiscal objectives». The taxation demands, he insisted, «meant nothing less than the complete extermination of the Greek community, and represented a preconcerted plan to drive the Greeks out of business and take over their trade». 7 This view was shared by the British commercial counsellor in the Ankara Embassy, who was sent to istanbul to collect information on the tax. After a thorough research, he concluded that in the case of the minorities and the Greek nationals the «taxation is absolutely crushing».8 The Foreign Offic~, too, believed that «The Turks are determined to eliminate the Greeks from Turkish national life, whether they form part of the Greek minority or are Hellene Greeks who played a large part in the commercial and cultural life of istanbul». 9 Although no exact figures on the share of the tax levied on the Greek community itself are available, the Greek consular authorities estimated it to be at least 60,000,000 TL.l 0 The tax imposed on Greek minority institutions alone was calculated at 400,000 TL. Greek Orthodox priests, schools, hospitals and other philanthropic institutions were held liable to pay the so-called tax on ext~'aordinary «war-profits». Concurrently, whereas the American hospital ofIstanbul, a large and flourishing modem establishment charging 10 TL a bed per night, was assessed at 2,000 TL (another account puts it at 1,500 TL), the Ballkll hospital, a much more modest concern, was down for 68,000 TL.ll Together with the Hellenes, the Greek element as a whole was assessed to no less than 80,000,000 TL. In other words, the Constantinopolitan Greeks, although constituting a very small proportion of the total population in Turkey (approximately 0,55 per cent), was called upon to shoulder just under 20 per cent of the total varllk taxation. The Greek charge d'affaires, Kapetanidis, a staunch supporter of GrecoTurkish friendship, described his six month stay in istanbul as consul-general (September 1942 to March 1943) as «a nightmare owing to the tax».12 The deportation of Greeks to Anatolia and the daily auction of Greek property and merchandise shocked the community as a whole. The tax did not only 7. Details of this conversation in Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 21 December 1942, FO 371,33389; R8837. 8 . Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara, 23 December 1942. FO 371/33389/R8928 . 9. Minute by G.L Clutton. 23 December 1942. FO 371/33389/R8837. 10. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. 27 January 1943. FO 371/37401: Rill 0 and information forwarded by the Patriarchate to Lambeth Palace. Archbishop of Canterbury to Eden. London. 18 January 1943. FO 371/37400/R616. II. Archbishop of Canterbury to Eden. London. 28 January 1943. FO 371/37400/R935. 12. For Kapetanakis' views. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 8 April 1943, FO 371/37228/R3658.
227
embitter the Greeks against the Turkish government but also against the evasiveness of the Great Powers. Thus, the varl'ik episode was hushed up in the Anglo-American press. The only exception to this was the New York Times correspondent in Turkey, C.L. Sulzberger, who in three long and detailed articles, drew attention to the punitive tax on wealth. 13 Later on, the New York Times took up the issue editorially and stressed: «America and Britain cannot dictate tax laws to Turkey any more than they can to each other. But they could certainly view with some uneasiness the development in Turkey of a narrow nationalism reminiscent, even in a milder way, of that which Germany has imposed on Europe. We hope that as Turkey turns more and more away from the Nazis in other respects she will turn from them in this respect too» .14 Faced with the refusal of the United Nations block to intervene on behalf of the minorities, the Greek Embassy took upon itself to negotiate a better deal for the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Thus, the Greek ambassador, Raphail Raphail, as well as the consul-general in Istanbul, made frequent representation to members of the Turkish government, but with little practical results. IS A bitter Greek government viewed the varl'ik affair as another Turkish effort to redefine Greek-Turkish relations. Old suspicions were once again revived and the Turkish failure to assist Greece against the Axis Powers in April/May 1941 was now described as «the treachery of an enemy who posed as a friend» . At the same time, the Greeks were painfully aware of their feeble international position. The removal of the Greek government-in-exile to London and then to Cairo, after the German occupation of Greece, decreased Hellenic diplomatic leverage in Ankara. After the German invasion, the Greeks complained bitterly, Turkey found favourable conditions for the elimination of the Constantinopolitan Greek element. Clearly, relations between the two countries showed severe strains, despite Ankara's lip-service to Greek-Turkish friendship" The Greeks feared that the Turks would seek a predominant position in the Aegean by raising their old demands for territorial compensation in the Dodecanese and in the eastern Aegean islands. Thus, in his conversation with the British foreign secretary, Antony Eden, on 1 March, Greek Premier Emmanuel Tsouderos stressed the fact of the comparative weakness of the Greek navy and the need
130 The Nell' York Times. 9 to 12 September 1943. 14. The Nell' York Times. 17 September 1943. 150 Interview with Greek Ambassador Raphail, Bennett to Eden. Ankara, 18 March 1943, FO 371/37403/R3392.
228
for it to be of greater strength than the Turkish. 16 It was mainly because of the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations that the planned visit of Tsouderos to Ankara was cancelled,17 Earlier, on 3 March, in a direct appeal to the Turkish premier, ~iikrii Sara90glu, Tsouderos reaffirmed that he did not question Turkey's right to impose any tax measures on its citizens, including those of Greek origin" However, it appears, Tsouderos remarked, that the new law struck the Greek inhabitants of Turkey with singular vigour causing widespread ruin and misery. He then went on to stress «Le Gouvernement et Ie peuple grecs pourront difficilement comprendre qu'a un moment OU l'hellenisme subit les dures vicissitudes d'une triple occupation ennemie la Turquie amie et alliee n'aura pas a coeur de donner des instructions nettes aux organes administratifs turcs pour que ceux-ci apportent les temperaments necessaires a I'application d'une loi qui sans cela risque de mener a la misere un element dont la loyaute a la cause greco-turque est hoI'S de doute».18 In his answer Sara90glu, after addressing Greece as Turkey's friend and ally, insisted that all taxpayers had been treated equally. 19 Similarly, on 16 May, in a speech at the opening of the Institute ofInternational Law at the University of lstanbul, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu reiterated his government's commitment to Greco-Turkish friendship.20 It appears that the Turks failed to conceive the profound bitterness that the l'(lrllk taxation engendered in official Greek circles. This was made clear by the Turkish prime minister who, while reassuring the British that Greco-Turkish friendship was one of the main pilars of his country's Balkan policy, he disclosed that when the tax was imposed its effects on this friendship were not considered.21 The Greeks, however, were not satisfied with such explanations. Perturbed by the punitive character of the tax, they felt that this reflected a change of policy on the part of the Turkish government. 5. The abolition of the tax on wealth.
From the very beginning, the Turkish government endeavoured to play 16. Details of conversation with Greek Premier Tsouderos, Eden to Palairet. London, I March 1943, FO 371;37228;R 1873 . On fears of Turkish designs in the Aegean see Weber. opo cit .. p. 60. 170 According to Raphail the tax was the immediate cause of this cancellation, Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 22 May 1943. FO 371/37403/R4609. 180 Tsouderos to Sara90glu. 3 March 1943. FO 371/37402/RI957" 19 . Sarac;oglu to Tsouderos. Ankara. 7 March 1943. FO 371/37402/RI957" 20. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 16 May 1943. FO 371/37468/R4362" 2L Memorandum on Greco-Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept." 2 March 1943. FO 371;37228iR2128.
229
down the discriminatory aspects of the tax. If the varllk affected a small proportion of the population, Ankara asserted, it was simply because this particular section of the society had amassed the national wealth. This view was expressed on 15 June by Premier Sara<;:oglu who declared that the minorities should contribute to the state finances in the same manner as did the «loyal» Turks. Ifa large portion of the levies collected so far had been paid by members of the minorities this, he argued, was because they owned all the real estate and had the sources of wealth in their hands. While at pains to point out that it was not the intention of the government to «crush the minorities», his whole attitude and tone, according to Knatchbull-Huggessen, indicated that the government expected from non-Muslims in Turkey «something more than a mere desire for equal sacrifice». 1 Likewise, Presidentlsmet Inonii was noted to have regarded the \'([r/'ik as «a tax on all the Turks».2 Despite the lip-service of equal treatment paid by the Turkish leadership, the tone and actions of the government were probably responsible for a renewed wave of anti-minority feeling during 1941-44. At the same time, the Turkish government attempted to reopen old questions, such as the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Thus, early in January 1943, during a conversation with his Greek colleague A. Agnidis, the Turkish ambassador to London, Rauf Orbay, asked why the Patriarchate was not abolished in the same way as Turkey had done with the Caliphate. 3 In addition, the archbishops of Chalcedon and Imbros were removed from the Phanar and sent to exile in Bursa. This was followed by: the arrest of the mayor of the island of Imbros and another three Greek notables. 4 A few months later, on 5 May, Rauf Orbay cautioned the Greek ambassador in Britain, Agnidis, to refrain from encouraging the Patriarchate to believe that «it has a political mission in favour of Greece and to the prejudice of Turkey». Secondly, he stressed, the Greeks should not seek British intervention in favour of their compatriots in Turkey. Thirdly, Orbay concluded, Greece should not encourage its compatriots in Turkey, who were Turkish subjects, to look towards the Hellenic authorities for protection. s Taken aback by these recommendations, the Greek ambassador insisted that there was no justification for such remarks. With Greece occupied by the Axis Powers, the L Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 21 June 1943. FO 371/37470/R5698. 2. Weisband. op.cit., p. 235. 3. Minutes of Sir A. Cadogan's conversation with Agnidis. London. 15 January 1943. FO 37 1/37224/R52L 4. Arrested in January 1943. the prelates remained in exile for four months. ibid. and British Embassy Chancery to Foreign Office. Ankara. 9 April 1943. FO 371/37228/R3747., 5. Greek aide-III1?lIloire to the British government. Cairo. 7 June 1943. FO 371/37228/R5373.
230
Greek government-in-exile had to consider more pressing issues than interference in the internal affairs of Turkey.6 In an aide-memoire to the British government, the Greeks observed that the Turks chose this conjunction to uproot the Greeks in Turkey becauce they were aware of Greece's inability to exercise its own rights. At any other time the Muslims of Thrace would have constituted in themselves a guarantee against the persecution of Constantinopolitan Greeks. But, with the occupation of Greek Thrace by German and Bulgarian forces, this deterrent was lost and Greece could do very little to reverse the Turkish policy towards the Greek minority.7 Public opinion in Turkey backed the anti-Greek and anti-minority measur:es. One of the things that impressed Ambassador Raphail during a visit in Istanbul in March 1943 was the growth of «an aggressive nationalism». In a conversation with Sterndale Bennett, he disclosed that «he himself had been the subject of insulting epithets for talking in Greek in the street while the wife of the Greek naval attache had been stopped in the street and insulted for the same reason».8 Meanwhile the Turkish press, headed by the pro-Axis Cllmlzllriyet, accused the non-Muslims of being unpatriotic, disloyal and of «alien blood».'! In a speech in June 1943, the former justice minister and deputy, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, warned the minorities that they should «e~ther become Turks or leave the country».l 0 Overnight, Atatiirk's attempts to Incorporate the minorities into Turkey, in so far as such attempts had had some measure of success, were undone. Greek, Armenian and French (the street language of most of Turkey's educated Jews) were suddenly to be heard on lips which had previously spoken Turkish in pUblic. Resentment and discrimination dwelled everywhere. RepUblican istanbul lapsed into Ottoman Constantinople. With the varlfk episode it became clear that despite the republic's principle oflaicism, the Islamic concept of what makes a first-class citizen remained paramount. As a result, the tax undermined the confidence which the minorities had gradually built up towards the Turkish government during the 1930s. Neither did the tax achieve its economic objectives. On the contrary, it resulted in the collapse of the price policy that had inspired it in the first place. While Turkey needed all the expertise and potential available in the country to overcome the economic crisis, thanks to the tax it managed to drive out of trade the most experienced section of the business community. A Ihid. 7.lhid H. Interview with RaphaiL Bennett to Eden. Ankara. 18 March 1943. FO 371j37403;R3392. lJ Lewis. Emergellce, p . 299. I(L
Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 21 June 1943. FO 371/37470;R5698.
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But the diplomatic implications of the act were also considerable. As the mr/'ik. incident deeply offended the sensibilities of Western democracies, the international reputation of Turkey suffered a serious setback. Likewise, by unfairly taxing its foreign residents, Turkey invited foreign interference in its internal affairs. In vain did Premier Sara90glu claim to be impervious to outside influences through such emotive phrases as «I am not an Ottoman \'ezir». 11 After all, under strong diplomatic pressure, the Turkish government was forced to reevaluate the taxes imposed on foreign nationals. Equally significant were the political implications of the varllk. taxation. This act constituted the single most visible violation of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty. Yet none of its signatories was prepared to challenge Turkey to respect them, and as the Foreign Office reasoned «a direct appeal to the Lausanne treaty is to be deprecated because it would certainly offend the Turks and make them more obstinate». 12 But the concluding remarks of the report reveal the reasons behind the British reluctance to intervene. «The tax is probably the most serious breach of the minority provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, since that instrument was signed, but the fact remains that at any rate since 1930, we have accepted the position that these provisions are a dead letter. Strong Allied action undoubtedly represent in Turkish eyes a derogation of their sovereignty analogous to the Capitulations».13
h~en ~~lIected. Of this amount 280,000,000 TL had come from the «wealthy mInOritIes» .16
The inaction of the Great Powers, despite article 44 of the Lausanne treaty, illustrated the vulnerability of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The end of the varl'lk. taxation coincided with the realization that Germany had lost the war. But the repeal of the tax on wealth came in a series of steps. The first concrete step towards its abolition was taken on 17 September 1943, when the government relieved from payment those persons who were assessed at sums not exceeding 2,500 TL.14 It has been estimated that 22,000 non-Muslims benefited from these remissions. Minority communal institutions were also cleared of their debts.ls Eventually, in December 1943, a week before President Inonu was scheduled to meet Churchill and Roosevelt in Cairo. the remaining 1,400 deportees were allowed to return to their homes. When the tax was cancelled on 15 March 1944,315,000,000 TL had
I L Aydemir. op. cit" ii/po 233. 12. «Brief for the Secretary of State in conversation with the Greek Prime Minister E. Tsouderos» prepared by the Southern Dept, 27 February 1943, FO 371/37401/RI552. 13. Ibid, 14. Okte, op.cit",~pp. 222. 231: AT 118 (1943) 7. 15. Bentlett to Eden. Ankara, 20 September 1943, FO 371/37402/R9796.
131
16" Resllli Ga;;,ele. no. 5657. 17 March 1944: Okte. Op.ciL, pp. 127-28.
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CHAPTER IX
CORDIAL GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE, 1944-54. 1. The strengthening of Greek-Turkish relations.
Throughout the 1930s friendship between Greece and Turkey was a mutual and vital interest not only for the security of these two natios but also for that of the entire south-eastern MediterTanean. The conditions necessary for its fulfilment had been provided for by the Lausanne treaty which had radically solved the most intractible questions, such as the terTitorial and minority issues, between the two countries. The same conditions that prevailed in the halcyon days ofVenizelos and Atatiirk still existed in 1945. Moreover, Soviet expansion in the Balkans, prompted Greece and Turkey to act in concert in their external relations during the immediate postwar period. An axis between Ankara and Athens was essential to counter-balance the weight of the other Slav components in the Balkans, more especially as these were now dominated by the Soviet Union. The Communist revolt in Greece (1946-49) had been a cause of serious concern in Turkey, where the spectre of a Soviet-dominated government in Athens aroused great fears. As the revolt gained momentum the award of the Italian-held Dodecanese to Greece caused considerable apprehension in Turkey, particularly in military circles, because of the proximity of several of these islands to the Turkish shores. Despite these Turkish misgivings their transfer to Greek sovereignty was implemented by the treaty of Paris of February 1947; and the decision of the council of foreign ministers that the Dodecanese were to be demilitarized somewhat alleviated Turkish fears. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine, with its implied assumption that Greece and Turkey were the targets of the same international forces, paved the way for the strengthening of ties between the two countries. In May 1947 a committee for Greek-Turkish co-operation was formed in Athens under the then deputy prime minister, Sophocles Venizelos, while in Ankara President tnono spoke of the urgent need for close consultation and unity. In the course of the following months negotiations were held between represen234
tatives of the two General Staffs. By now the Turks appeared to have given up their misgivings about the cession of the Dodecanese to Greece and began to view the Aegean islands as convenient bridges between Greece and Turkey over which exchange of goods and currents of friendly feelings were to flow unhampered. Athens shared these views. The prime minister and foreign minister, Constantine Tsaldaris, in an interview to the Turkish Anatolian agency, declared that he wished to promote Greek-Turkish co-operation not only in the political sphere but also in social, economic and cultural matters. I Accordingly, in September 1948 a commercial treaty was concluded, followed by a number of cultural exchanges. Gradually, the ground was prepared for closer co-operation. In June 1950 the two governments solemnly pledged to promote unity actively and confidence between their two nations. 2 The two governments also worked closely together to present their cases for joining the Atlantic Alliance. Similarly, their applications were viewed as one, and a single protocol, signed in London on 22 October 1951, turned them into NATO's eastern flank. 3 Separate military commands were subsequently established to co-ordinate their armed forces with those of the Alliance. A feeling of cO'mradeship soon developed between Greek and Turkish officers serving in these NATO headquarters. Finally, on 15 February 1952, Turkey and Greece officially became members of NATO.4 Meanwhile, closer political ties were discussed at length when Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos visited Ankara early in February 1952. During his talks with the Turkish leaders it was decided that a permanent mixed Greek-Turkish commission should be established to deal with questions of common interest, such as encouraging trade relations; common marketing abroad of Turkish and Greek tobacco; fishing in territorial waters between the Greek islands and the Anatolian mainland; abolition of visas and the possibility of a customs union. But the main topics of discussion were the;' questions of security and integration to NATO while there was a generC'· agreement that both sides would seek to induce the Yugoslav government to join them in a regional defense agreement. 5 On 26 April 1952, a Turkish delegation headed by Premier Adnan MenI Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 15 July 1946, FO 371/58868/RI0674. 2. J .0. Iatrides, Balkan TJ-iangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological BOllndarie.l. The Hague 1968, pp. 76-78. 3. Ibid. 4. The Times. 18 February 1952. Early in April 1952, the president of the United States, General Eisenhower visited both Ankara and Athens. 5. Iatrides, op.cit .. pp. 78-79; The Times. 26 April 1952.
235
deres, and including Foreign Minister Fuat K6prtilil and Chief of Army Staff General $iikrti Kanatll, arTived in Athens on an official visit. The visit was in return for that paid by Venizelos in February and it aimed at strengthening Greek-Turkish relations after the integration of the two countries into the NATO. The discussions were concluded on 2 May, on which day a communique issued in both capitals stated that the talks embraced «all international problems of interest to the two countries». It was emphasized that there had been complete agreement on all subjects, and that the Greek and Turkish peoples could look to the future with optimism. 6 At a press conference on 2 May, before his departure from Athens, Menderes refeITed to a proposal by the Greek prime minister, General Plastiras, for a union of Greece and Turkey and declared that such a development would benefit the West European nations. He then expressed the hope that Yugoslavia would appreciate the value of such a union. 7 The most formal of a series of Greek-Turkish exchanges came when King Paul of the Hellenes and Queen Frederika paid a s,tate visit to the president of Turkey early in June 1952. This was reciprocated in November 1952 by President Celal Bayar. Significantly, King Paul was the first Greek sovereign to have set foot on Turkish soil since the days of the Byzantine empire. This was also the king's first official visit to a foreign capital since his accession to the Greek throne. Speaking at a banquet given by President Bayar on 9 June, King Paul recalled the centuries of dispute between the two countries and then refeITed to the complete reconciliation which had taken place. He described this friendship as a «useful example of political maturity», citing their common effort in Korea as symbolic of their present feelings towards each other. 8 The secret talks between Greece and Turkey continued during the six-day official visit to Athens of President Ceral Bayar on 27 November. During these talks special consideration was given to the growing rapprochement with Yugoslavia. 9 Negotiations during the winter of 1952-53 resulted in the signing in Ankara, in February 1953, of a treaty offriendship and co-operation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. This was followed by the conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance of the three countries in August 1954 at Bled in Yugoslavia. 10 These developments represented a partial attempt to revive the Balkan Entente of the 1930s and provided for a substantial degree of both 6. The Times. 3 May 1952. 7 . lhid. 8. The Times. 11 June 1952. 9 . Ihid .. 28 November 1952. 10 For the text of the agreement see Iatrides. op.cit.. pp. 187 ff.
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military and political co-operation. Closer relations in the economic and cultural.fields followed. True to the spirit of detente, a prominent Greek economIst, Athanasios Sbarounis, proposed the idea of Turkish-Hellenic customs and economic union. I I 2. Rapprochement and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
In. 1945,just before the high level contacts between Greece and Turkey, the tensIOns engendered by the varl'lk episode were still visible in istanbul. This was attested by the remarks on 13 October 1944 by Turkish Foreign Minister Has~n ~aka to ~ir Mauri~e Peterson, the British ambassador in Turkey. Expr essmg the vIews of hIs government, the foreign minister disclosed that t~e Greek minority in istanbul constituted the only unresolved issue between hIs countr~ and Greece. 1 On another occasion, in a conversation with Peters?n, PremIer $ti~~ Sara90glu admitted that his government seriously consIdered the possIbIlIty of requesting Greece to transfer the Patriarchate.2 As however, Greco-Turkish relations assumed a cordial character, Ankara be~ came more accomodating on the minority question, while the postwar political and ?liIitary liaison between Ankara and Athens had a favourable effect on the Constantinopolitan Greeks and the Patriarchate. A~art fro~ the Turkish desire to get along with the Greeks, in view of the SovIet ambItIOns at the expense of Turkey,3 a new factor had now emerged. ~ware that the Russian Orthodox church offered an admirable vehicle for mflue~cing op!nion th:oughout .t~e Near East, the Stalin government sought to re:lve the mtern~tlonal pOSItIOn of the Russian Patriarchate. Thus, the pres~lge of the Ru~slan church as the largest, wealthiest and strongest of all the Orthodox patnarchates, was deliberately fostered abroad.4 Meanwhile, 11: A. Sbarounis. Project ofa 1llrkish-Hellenic Customs and Economic Union. istanbul 1954, passim. I. J3 October 1944. Chancery to the Southern Department Ankara 3 April 1945, FO 371j48349jR6606.
'
,
2. Ibid. 3. In 1.945. the Soviet Union refused to renew the 1925 treaty offriendship without substantial c?nc:sslOns from Turkey . Before such a treaty could be negotiated, the Soviets stressed, the dIstrIcts of Kars and Ar~ahan. Turkish since i921, would have to be surrendered to the USSR. Also the Montreux StraIts Convention would have to be revised so as to give control over the the Black Sea powers. When Turkey refused to capitulate, Ankara became the waterways tar~et ofa VICIOUS wa:ofnerves which lasted until 1953. For details see G.S. Hams, «The Soviet UnIOn and Turkey». In LV. Lederer and W.S. Vucinich (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Middle East. The Post-World War 11 Era. California 1974, pp. 25·28. 4. H.J. Psomiades, «Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East MEl 2 (1957)
:0.
,71-81.
",
237
the patriarchal throne of Moscow. which had remai~ed vacant ever since 1924 was filled in 1943 when Sergius was elected patnarch. In 1945. he was succ~eded by Patriarch Aleksei. 5 In addition. the Soviets cultivated an interest in the Orthodox communities and institutions in Syria. the Lebanon, Palestine. Egypt and the Balkans. A number of Orthodox patri.archs in the Middle East were encouraged to visit the Soviet Union/' Resummg, to some extent. the traditional Tsarist role of protector of the Orthodo~ Christians in the East. Moscow showed an increasing interest in the affairs of the Orthodoxy outside Russia. Soviet foreign policy did not overlook the Ecumenical Patriarch~te. Between 1945-47. the Patriarchate of Moscow displayed a tendency to dlspar~ge the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. particularly in t~e co~ntnes under the influence of the USSR and in the Middle East. In Isolatmg the Phanar. the Russian patriarch hoped to take over the primacy in the Orthod?x Eastern church. These tendencies were also voiced in the Greek commUnIst press as well as in Bulgaria. The gist of these publications was that since the Phanar had lost its former authority and prestige. the best way to remedy the situation was to elect to the ecumenical throne a patriarch chosen by all the Orthodox churches. Such a patriarch - who might be Russian. Bulgarian or belong to any other nationality - should be assisted by a permanent PanOrthodox holy synod and should reside in a specially selected part of Istanbul enjoying the privileges of extra-territoriality similar to those enjoy~d ~y the Vatican. This. in fact. would have amounted to the gradual subordmatlOn of the Phanar to Moscow. Given the traditional political control of the state over the Russian church. the extension of Soviet influence in the Phanar becomes clearer. The political ambitions of the state. moreover. coincided with the historical objective of the Russian church to acquire the primacy of the Orthodox world. Turkish and Greek circles considered these proposals as a thinly veiled attempt at establishing a Russian «ecclesiastic-dl basis". in Istan.bu~ ~ith the purpose of investing the patriarch of Moscow with the right of junsdlctlon and protection over all the Orthodox peoples of the Middle .and N ear Ea~t: The emergence of the Russian factor. therefore. altered radIcally the pOSItIOn of the P~hanar l'is-ti-l'is the Turkish government. Ever since 1923. the Turks endeavoured to weaken the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. for they regarded it an agent of the Greek government. By 1945. however. the 5. British Embassy to the Southern Dept.. Moscow. 10 August 1945. FO 371/48349/RI4255. See also M. Spinka. The Church ill the SOl'iet Vnion, New York 1956, p. 121. ., 6. British Embassy to the Southern Dept.. Damascus, 18 January 1945. FO 371/48349/R_188: Killearn to the Southern Dept.. Cairo. :2 March 1945. FO 37Ij48349/R50:2:2.
(jreek influence in Istanbul was not a matter of great significance and Greece had repeatedly assured the Turks that it entertained no territorial ambitions at the expense of Turkey. The new danger to Turkey came from the Soviet Union and its Balkan allies. Further, given the strained Turco-Soviet relations in 1945-46, Turkey feared that the Patriarchate might offer Moscow a pretext for intervention in Istanbul as the champion of the Orthodox church. As the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir Maurice Peterson pointed out, at this juncture the Soviets appeared only to be anxious «to find sticks with. which to beat the Turks». 7 As a result, the Turkish government felt that. at this stage, not only would it have to tolerate the presence of the Patriarchate but also prevent it from dying of inanition. On the other hand, to the Turkish mind the Phanar had been associated in the past with the megali idea and the majority of the Turks opposed the revival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. To avoid playing into the hands of either the Russians or the Greeks. therefore, Ankara was prepared to support the Phanar to such an extent as to preclude all pretext for Russian intervention, but without allowing it to become a possible champion of Greek nationalism in the future.8 Aware of the fragile international position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, however, Greek ecclesiastic and political circles demanded a «major revitalization» of the Phanar. Alarmed by the Soviet overtures, they approached the British and American governments alerting them to the seriousness of the new situation. Alexander Pallis, a member of the Greek embassy in London. drew the attention of the British government to: «the plight of the Oecumenical Patriarch now that his province is reduced in practice to the city of Istanbul. .. Even in Istanbul the community has steadily declined until it numbers only about 80.000. No doubt the Patriarchate has lost not only the contributions of the faithful but also the revenues formerly derived from properties all over Turkey. The Holy Synod consists of the Patriarch and twelve members. a far greater number of bishops than the reduced Greek community of Istanbul can hope to produce or support". 9 He went on to underline that the Patriarchate had retained its «canonical importance» as the head of the whole Orthodox church. Its irreversible eclipse. he went on. would act as a catalyst to Communist penetration in the 7. Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara. 25 March 1945. FO 371/48349/R625L 8. Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate prepared by the Research Dept. of the Foreign Office. 6 February 1946. FO 371/58860/R2379. 9 . Text of this interview in Edmonds to McDermott. London. 6 February 1945. FO 371/48349/R3009
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other independent Eastern Orthodox churches. He finally stressed that at this juncture it might be vital to Turkish interests to strengthen the international position of the Phanar. 1o Elaborating this thesis, Germanos Strinopoulos, the archbishop of Thyateira and the ex arch of Central and Western Europe, in a letter to the archbishop of Canterbury, made a number of suggestions as to how the Patriarchate could be «rejuvenated». Seeking ways to avoid Phanar's domination by the Russians, Archbishop Germanos proposed that all secular restrictions, impeding the fulfilment of the Patriarchate's «historic mission» as the supreme authority of the Orthodox churches, should be eliminated. Instead, the Patriarchate should only be amenable to the laws concerning public order. The «Germanos thesis» also envisaged the provision of international safeguards which would have transformed the Phanar into «a powerful bastion against any Soviet penetration».11 An international definition of the religious status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, determined by an international body, would not, according to Germanos, conflict with Turkish interests. To justify this view he maintained that Turkey would «acquire in a strengthened Patriarchate a potent ally against a danger threatening both . l? parties». Likewise, on 20 April 1945, in a conversation with the archbishop of York, Archbishop-Regent Damaskinos put forward another two suggestions on the issue: (a) that a quorum of high ranking Hellenic clerics should be transferred to the Phanar with the view of permanent service and residence there assuming Turkish nationality, and/or (b) that young men should be allowed to come from Greece to study for priesthood at the Theological college ofChalki, thus swelling the ranks of the patriarchal clergy and ultimately the episcopate. 13 Lambeth Palace which had always shown great interest in the fortunes of the Patriarchate communicated these views to the British Foreign Office. 14 While reluctant to support openly the notionof a revitalized Phanar that
was to act as a bulwark against Soviet ecclesiastical policies, the British government approached the Turks informally. Thus, on 2 April 1945, Ambassador Peterson succeeded in impressing on Sara~oglu the value to Turkey of any institution, like the Patriarchate, which commanded worldwide respect. Turkish sovereignty over istanbul and the Straits, Peterson remarked, would be confirmed by the existence of international organizations in that city. Citing the example of Switzerland, he reminded the Turkish prime minister that Swiss neutrality had gained a great deal ever since the establishment of the League of Nations in Geneva. He then suggested that Greece and Turkey should come to an agreement about the future of the Phanar. 1s Likewise, on 27 February 1946, the Foreign Office addressed identical letters to the British ambassadors in Ankara and Athens instructing them to urge informally the Turkish and Greek governments to unite on this question. It warned that Greek- Turkish dissension would lead to the eclipse of the Ecumenical Patriarchate which would result in the ascendancy of a Sovietcontrolled Russian church. 16 By 1946 the Turks were persuaded that it was to their advantage to maintain good relations with the Patriarchate. The death of the aged Patriarch Benjamin I on 17 February 1946 provided the Turkish authorities with an opportunity to express their goodwill towards the Phanar. Special courtesies were shown during the funeral and, for the first time in the history of the republic, the viili of Istanbul personally attended a patriarchal funeral. 17 No names of objectionable archbishops were put forward prior to the patriarchal election and the holy synod was instructed to vote for a new patriarch «with perfect liberty of conscience». As a result, on 21 February 1946, Maximos Vaportzis, the archbishop of Cha1cedon, who had been declared objectionable by the Turkish authorities in the previous election in 1936, was brought to the patriarchal throne. 18 Meanwhile, Greek-Turkish talks, which started soon after the arrival in Ankara of the new Greek ambassador, Pericles Skepheris, in early 1946, began to bear fruit. The issue of the Greek minority and its institutions in istanbul was debated at length during the Greek-Turkish negotiations at the
10. Ibid. II. Archbishop Germanos to the Archbishop of Canterbury, London, 9 December 1945, FO 371/58860/R2589. 12. Ibid. I3. The minutes of this interview in British Chancery to. the Southern Dept., Athens, 13 June 1945, FO 371/48349/RI0615. 14. Hayter's interview with the archbishops of Canterbury and York on 12 February 1946, London, FO 371/58860/R2379.
15. Details of this conversation in British Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara, 3 April 1945, FO 371/48349/R6606. 16. Letters of Sir Orme Sargent of 27 February 1946 are given in the minutes of FO 371/58860/R3886. 17. Peterson to Bevin, Ankara, 2 March 1946 and Peterson (Ankara) to Norton (Athens), 2 April 1946, in FO 371/58860/R3886 and FO 371/58860/R5685 respectively. 18. Memorandum on the election of the new patriarch, Cons., 13 March 1946, LPAfDgP/32/328; 'OpOoboc,ia, 21 (1946) 37-147.
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end of June and early July 1946. During these talks, Skepheris raised four main grievances. First, the elective committees with which the Greeks were accustomed to administer their charitable organizations, had during the 1930s, been arbitrarily replaced by single designated officials (tek miitevelli). 19 During the negotiations in 1946, the Turks promised a new law which would enable the elective committees to function once again. At the same time, the single government appointed representatives were to be replaced provisionally by small approved committees. Secondly, a law imposing a tax on sporting and similar associations had been applied to the churches and non-paying minority hospitals. 20 The Turks agreed to settle this grievance, too. Again, Turkish officials had, some time before, threatened to seize on the island of Heybeli (Chalki), not only the Greek commercial college but also the Theological seminary situated there. Likewise, two old Byzantine chapels in the premises of the commercial college had been threatened with being put to secular use. It was now agreed that the Turks could retain the commercial college (which was deemed too large for the use of the Greek minority) but would leave the Theological seminary to the Patriarchate. Meanwhile, the two historic chapels were to be classed as national monuments. Finally, the Turks agreed to allow the teaching of the Greek language in the Greek schools in the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. 21 Earlier, a delegation of the Patriarchate visited Ankara on 13-15 May 1946, and furnished the government with a list of requests . 22 Soon after this visit the press in istanbul announced that the authorities had decided to hand over the administration of the Ballkll hospi tal to a special committee representing the Greek minority. At the same time, it appears that Prime Minister Sarar;oglu asked Papa Eftim and the administrator of the hospital istamat Zihni Ozdamar to renounce all claims over the Ballkll property. 23 On 17 July, Ankara radio announced that the authorities had already handed the hospital back to the Greek community and hinted that the two occupied churches in Galata might be also returned to the Greeks. 24 A month later, in a conversation with 19 . See chapter VII:L 20. This was the II1l1klltall taxation payable to the Department ofEI'kllf
the prominent journalist Hiiseyin Yal<;ln, the new prime minister, Recep Peker, was noted to have stated that his government would show «extreme tolerance towards the minorities». Moreover, he singled out the Patriarchate which he said he would protect. 25 Contacts between Ankara and the Phanar continued to take place and on 12-16 May 1947 another patriarchal delegation paid a visit to the capital. In a meeting with the new prime minister, they produced yet another list of requests. They primarily asked for the abolition of the vaklflaw of 1935 and the lifting of the l11ukataa taxation on the minority institutions. 26 Soon after by registering the Theological seminary of Chalki as a property owned by the Patriarchate, the authorities satisfied one of the long-standing grievances of the Greek community. On 18 May, the patriarchal authorities formally took over the entire administration of the Ballklp7 Earlier, the Turkish police returned to the Greeks one of the two Galata churches held by Papa Eftim. 28 As a result, a substantial section of the Greek minority showed its appreciation by voting for the RPP during the general elections of 1946. In contrast all the other minority groups had gone solidly to the newly formed liberal Democrat party (DP).29 At first the election of Maximos was welcomed, for the new patriarch was known for his dynamism and administrative abilities. He had also exhibited ample diplomatic skills during the settlement of the Bulgarian schism in 1945. He was, in fact, instrumental in bringing about the repeal of the schism which resulted in the recognition of the Bulgarian church as an autocephalous body under the presidency of the archbishop of Sofia with the title of exarch. 30 As the overriding influence at the Phanar during the reign of the aged Patriarch Benjamin, Maximos had chaired various synodical committees, which dealt not only with internal administrative matters but also with issues concerning relations with other Christian churches. Curiously enough, his diplomatic skills endeared him to both Greeks and Russians, without annoying the Turks. The fifty-two year old patriarch had a reputation of being ambitious and superior to the other archbishops at the Phanar in character and intellect. But, not long after his accession to the throne, Maximos fell victim to
was also received by the prime minister. Details on these talks can be found in Kelly to Bevin. Ankara. 3 July 1946. FO 371/58868/RIOO99; Helm to Bevin. Ankara. 20 May 1946. FO 371/58868/R8004; ·OpOo6of,ia. 21 <1946) 250. 253. A month later another such delegation revisited the capital 23. Ergene. lifci! .. pp. 230-32; Jaschke, op.ci! .. p. 126. 24. Minute by Edmonds in FO 371/58868/RIOO99 .
25. British Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara, 16 August 1946, FO 371/58868jRI2280. 26. 'OpOorJoc,ia, 22 (1947) 156-57. 27. The Patriarchate had already, on 17 September 1946, appointed Gerasimos Kalokairinos, the bishop of Pamphilos, to the monastery of Ballkll, 'OpOorJoc,ia, 21 (1946) 359. 28. This was Christ Church. Kaphatiani however remained under the control of Papa Eftim, ibid., pp. 158-59; Ergene, op.cit., pp. 239-40. 29. Minute by Edmonds, 19 July 1946, FO 371/58868/RlOO99. 30. British Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara, 30 June 1945, .FO 371/48349/RI1782.
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periodical fits of morbid melancholia, which appear to have been due to hereditary causes. 31 With the illness of the patriarch a new period of uncertainty, lasting for almost two years, permeated the Phanar. During this period the Greek and Turkish governments were once again faced with a vulnerable Patriarchate. It was widely held that with Maximos as its head the Patriarchate would not be able to resist the Russian attempt to gain influence on the Greek Orthodox. Alarmingly, such efforts intensified by late 1946. Thus, in January 1947, the archbishop of Leningrad, accompanied by a «politically-minded Archimandrite», made a series of important visits to the patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem. 32 During his tour in the Middle East, the Russian prelate proposed the convocation of a new Pan-Orthodox council. Disregarding the ancient prerogatives of the ecumenical patriarch who alone possessed the right to convoke, with the concurrence of other Orthodox churches, such a council, Moscow addressed an official invitation to all the autocephalous Orthodox churches to attend a Pan-Orthodox conference to be assembled in Moscow. This initiative caused great consternation at the Phanar. It was feared that such a council would enable the Soviet-backed Russian Patriarchate to take over the spiritual supremacy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus, in its reply to the invitation of Patriarch Aleksei, the Phanar declared that it did not consider the present moment as propitious for the convening of a Pan-Orthodox conference. But, if and when a favourable opportunity arose the Ecumenical Patriarchate, exercising its ancient prerogative, would gladly take note of the Moscow proposition and, provided that the other autocephalous churches agreed, would convoke such a council. 33
3. The election of Patriarch Athenagoras [. By this stage many leading personalities in Turkey agreed that a strengthened Ecumenical Patriarchate was compatible with Turkish n~tional interests. 1 As a result, together with Athens, the Turkish government tried to enhance the position of the Phanar. Reluctant to elect a local ecclesiastic, 3 L Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 23 December 1946, FO 371/59330/RI8526. See also Mavropoulos, op.cit., pp. 25()"51. 32. Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 15 January 1947, FO 371/67293/R867. 33. Text of the patriarchal reply is given in the detailed article of the distinguished Cons tan· tinopolitan Greek journalist and correspondent of The Times, Constantine Mavroudis, «The Oecumenical Patriarchate: Religious and Political Cross-Currents, Slavs and Greeks», 23 June 1947. A copy of the text in FO 371/67293/RI1242. L Some of those who had expressed this view to the British ambassador were Hiiseyin Yals:ln, Feridun Erkin, H. S. Tann6ver, Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 15 January 1947, FO 371/67293/R867.
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both governments favoured the patriarch's replacement by a prestigious leader with international repute. 2 The Greek government announced immediately that they favoured the candidature of Chrysanthos Philippidis, a former archbishop of Athens and a strong anticommunist figure. Because of his past anti-Turkish record as archbishop of Trebizond in 1918-22, however. Chrysanthos was a persona non grata in Turkey. There was also little hope of securing Turkish approval for another candidate, Germanos Strinopoulos. the archbishop of Thyateira. Nor was the archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos. acceptable to the Turks on the grounds that as a former Regent of Greece, he was a political figure. and thus unsuitable for the patriarchal posP The Turks favoured the archbishop of North America, Athenagoras Spyrou. This was expressed by a number of Turkish leaders, while the press in Istanbul addressed him as «the loyal friend ofTurkey».4 Athenagoras was indeed a commendable figure combining genuine piety with an appropriate measure of political astuteness. As archbishop of Kerkyra (1924-30), moreover. he was conspicious for his ecclesiastical liberalism. Since his transfer to the United States in 1931, Athenagoras managed to heal the political feuds which had bitterly divided the members of the Orthodox church in North America. While respected in the ecclesiastical circles of New York, he had also earned the friendship of President Roosevelt and was highly regarded by his successor President Truman. Finally, although he had an excellent record as an opponent of Soviet ecclesiastical infiltration. his relations with the Russian church had been correct. S Both London and Washington appeared to uphold his candidature, even though they preferred to keep a low profile throughout the affair. 6 On the other hand, strongly desiring the election ofChrysanthos, the Greek government was at first reluctant to support Athenagoras. 7 Athens also felt that it would be rather difficult to replace Athenagoras in the United States. But soon the Greeks realized that he was the only possible solution to the 2. Ibid.; Mavropoulos, op.cit., pp. 251-52. 3. Eyres to Bevin, Ankara, 7 May 1947, FO 371/67293/R6224. 4. Mavropoulos, op.cit., p. 262. Appraisals of the Turkish positions in Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 15 January 1947, FO 371/67293/R867; Eyres to Bevin, Ankara, 3 June 1947, FO 371/67293/R7415. 5. Inverchapel to Foreign Office, Washington, 6 May 1947, FO 371/67293/R60%. 6. Foreign Office to Athens embassy, London, 18 April 1947, FO 37 1/67293/R5 130; Norton to Bevin, Athens, I May 1947, FO 371/67293/R5982. 7. In an interview with Dimitrios Tsakonas, Panayiotis Pipinelis, the undersecretary at the ministry of foreign affairs, admitted that the Greek government initially did all they could to frustrate the election of Athenagoras, see D. Tsakonas, 'A (Jl/vay6pa; 6 OiKOVJlBV1KO; nvv Newv 'Ic5ewv, Athens 1976, p. 57.
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Phanar question. s Nonetheless the most determined opposition to Athenagoras came from the patriarchal synod itself, whose task it was to elect the new patriarch. They were primarily opposed to Athenagoras because «he was not one of them» and also because of his liberal religious tendencies. The Phanar prelates favoured Joachim Pelekanos, the archbishop of Dercos and appeared committed to oppose the election of an «outsider» to the patriarchal throne. The situation was further complicated by the attitude of Patriar'ch Maximos, who refused to resign unconditionally, despite strong pressure from Athens. The patriarchal crisis lasted until 18 October 1948 when, after a long journey to Athens, he was at last persuaded to step down. 9 Finally, on 1 November 1949, the holy synod too, under strong pressure from Athens and Ankara, consented to elect Athenagoras to the patriarchal throne. 10 On 26 January 1949 the new patriarch arrived from the United States in one of President Truman's private planes. He was accompanied by Colonel Charles Mara and a number of eminent Greek Americans. A very large and enthusiastic crowd of Constantinopolitan Greeks and Turkish journalists welcomed Athenagoras at the Ye~i1koy airport in istanbul. l l A speech of welcome in Greek was delivered by the patriarchal delegation, to which Athenagoras replied in Turkish thereby pleasing and surprising the Turkish officials and journalists present. 12 From the airport he drove straight to the Taksim square where he placed upon the Atatiirk monument (Cllmhllriyet An'idl) a wreath of flowers brought from the garden of the White House. He then proceeded to the Phanar where he was greeted by the holy synod and Greek embassy officials. 13 The symbolic significance of the patriarch's first gestures in istanbul was enormous. From the very start, Athenagoras made his position, as a genuine friend of Turkey, clear. Accordingly, during the patriarchal sermon on his enthronement on 27 January 1949, he expressed his devotion to President ismet inonii and to the Turkish people as a whole. 14 Throughout his tenure of office, Athenagoras manifested' his detachment from the traditional Phanar suspicions towards the Turkish secular authorities which had hitherto
characterized his predecessors ever since 1453. Despite the adverse political climate which was brought about by the emergence of the Cyprus conflict, the patriarch did not diverge from his initial aim of being a loyal Turkish citizen. Thus, soon after his arrival in Turkey, the eminent prelate renounced his United States citizenship and adopted the Turkish nationality. 15 In the days of detente in the early 1950s, the Turkish press had nothing but praise for Athenagoras. This was amply demonstrated when on his arrival, the istanbul papers unanimously stated their «extremely warm expressions, goodwill and friendship on behalf of the Turkish people for the arrival of Athenagoras» .16 A new era of euphoria captured the minds of both Turks and Greeks in istanbul. A month after his arrival in Turkey, the patriarch visited Ankara and called upon President inonii to whom he delivered a personal message from President Truman. He then had private meetings with Premier ~ernsettin Giinaltay and Emin Eri~irgil, the minister of the interiorY This was the first visit of its kind since the foundation of the Turkish republic. The impression created by the charismatic patriarch in the capital was excellent. Soon, he was able to win the sympathy and appreciation not only of the Constantinopolitan Greeks but also of the Turkish public opinion. Meanwhile, he pursued with great eagerness his wish to transform the Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Turkey into promoters of Greco-Turkish coexistence. This was reflected in his insistence that the Greeks should fully integrate in the modern Turkish society.18 He thus ordered that the Ecumenical Patriarchate, like every other official institution in Turkey, be decorated on Sundays by a Turkish flag. While he visited many Ottoman-Turkish holy places and historical monuments he did not hesitate even to pray in a Muslim mosque. He kept in touch with many prominent Turkish political figures and his relationship with the distinguished politician and man of letters Hamdullah Suphi Tanrlover was particularly cordial. I 9 His popularity with the Muslim public was equally considerable. In the streets, Turks frequently stopped to kiss his hand and respectfully addressed him as father-patriarch (Patrik Baba).20
8. A resume of the whole affair in a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office research department, 14 October 1947. FO 37Ij67293jR7578. 9. For an interesting account of the pressures exerted on Maximos to resign see Mavropoulos, op.cit .. pp. 253 f. For the patriarch's visit to Greece, ·OpBooo~ia. 22 (1947) 142-49. 10. For the patriarchal encyclical see ·OpBooo~ia. 23 (1948) 335-36. II. ·OpBooo~ia. 24 (1949) 19-43. 12. Pipper to Douglas, Cons., 26 January 1949, LPAjDgPj32j338. 13. Ibid. See also AT 182 (1949) 9. 14. The Times. 28 January 1949.
15. His loyalty to the Greco-Turkish friendship and to the Turkish state is also apparent in his correspondence with his friend and eminent Greek journalist Paul Palaiologos. See also Tsakonas, op.cit .• pp. 62-65. 16. Quoted in The Times. 18 Februaty 1949. 17. 'OpBooo~ia, 24 (1949) 59-64. 18. This comes out clearly in the correspondence of Athenagoras with Paul Palaiologos. 19. M. Baydat·, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrlover ve AnUarl, lstatlbul 1968, pp. 69 &182. 20. O. Clement, Dialogues avec Ie patriarche Athenagoras, Paris 1969, p. 99.
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4. Improvement ill the position of the Greek minority.
Meanwhile, the patriarch pressed the government to respond to a number of long-standing grievances of his community. Encouraged by the liberal attitude of Athenagoras and by the spirit of Greco-Turkish friendship, Ankara responded by making several concessions to the Greeks in Istanbul. Thus, for the first time since 1923, a patriarch was allowed to visit the Greek minority schools in the city and interest himself directly with the affairs of the community. Ever since the Lausanne treaty, the members of the Greek minority were placed under a different set of imperatives and under a separate rationale from the Patriarchate for its continued existence in Turkey. As a result. the community was administered by lay representatives and the Phanar officials were discouraged from involving themselves in the internal affairs of the Greek minority. This state of affairs, however, was modified when the Greek Orthodox parishes were permitted to select their principal clerical spokesmen, with the approval of the government. The Patriarchate was also allowed' to reestablish its own press bureau and a second weekly theological journal, the 'Anouro).o;' 'A \'()pea;' - in addition to the 'Opeot5o~fa which had first appeared in 1926 - began to be printed in 1951. Two archbishops with Hellenic nationality, Jacob Tsanavaris (lkonionjKonya) and Aimilianos Zacharopoulos (SelevkiajSilifke) entered the patriarchal service after acquiring Turkish citizenship in 1949 and 1951 respectively. Further, the vexed question of ownership of Greek community property was also settled in April 1949 and all the estates of the Ballkll va kif were declared patriarchal property. 1 Thanks to another law, promulgated a month later, the system whereby community (cemaat) property was administered by elected lay council was reinstated. Likewise, the mukatan tax on community concerns was also abolished. 2 According to the Directory of the Evknf (Pious Foundations), the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul maintained 106 communal establishments in 1949 with a yearly revenue of 663,378 TL.3 Again. the Turkish authorities received favourably, Athenagoras' desire to rebuild the sector of the Patriarchate destroyed in the fire of September 1941. Academic and administrative restrictions on the Greek minority schools were also lifted. This was particularly so in the case of the Theological college of Chalki which was once again allowed to receive students from Greece as well as other Christian countries. Thus, in the academic year of 1951, this
L Law no 978/2470 of 9 April 1949, see O.F. Berki & H. Ergiiney, Yabandlar Hukuku ve Kanun ihtilaflarl i1e ilgili Yargltay Kararlarlnln Tilhlil ve hah/arl, Ankara 1963, pp. 29-31. 2. Law no 5404 of 31 May 1949. in Resmi Gazete of 4 June 1949. 3. See A.K Berki. Vaklflar, Ankara 1950. pp. 62-65.
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college had twenty-five teachers - five of them Turkish- and seventy students of whom forty-seven were foreign nationals. 4 Altogether the community maintained 61YCf?es, 7 secondary schools, 1 theological academy, 51 primary schools and 5 nursery schools. Special organizations of «enlightment» (M op((JWTlIwi Lr)).i.Oi'OI) , catering to the educational needs of the Greek schools, were formed. Standards in these schools were further improved with the Greek-Turkish educational agreement in 1954. Under the terms of this pact a fixed number of Hellenic teachers was allowed to teach in Greek minority schools, while the same number of Turkish teachers was despatched to Greek Thrace to meet the educational needs of the Muslim minority. Again, each government was to supply its own minority with school books. Thus, immediately after this agreement an abundant supply of Greek books and magazines was sent to Turkey from Greece in 1955, with the approval of the Turkish Ministry of Education. Similarly, both governments agreed to provide financial help to the minority educational establishments. Patriarch Athenagoras continued to cultivate cordial relations with the Turkish leaders, even after the victory of the DP in the general elections of 1950. He first met the new Turkish president, Celiil Bayar and his prime minister, Adnan Menderes in istanbul on 27 July 1950 and then again two years later in Ankara. 5 On 10 November 1953, he was invited to Ankara to participate in the funeral procession that accompanied the remains of Atatiirk to the monumental mausoleum that had been built on a hill in the outskirts of the capital. A year earlier Premier Menderes paid an official visit to the Phanar, the first of its kind in history.6 Likewise, political and religious figures from Greece and the West invariably paid their respects to Athenagoras when visiting Turkey. Perhaps the most important of such visitors were King Paul and the Queen Frederika of Greece who met the patriarch on 13 June 1952. 7 Reflecting the tolerant attitude adopted by the Turkish authorities towards the Phanar, patriarchal officials were allowed to travel freely and regularly abroad. As a result, between 1949 and 1955, the patriarch not only succeeded in enhancing considerably the prestige of the Ecumenical Patriarchate but also in staving off the Russian challenge to the supremacy of the Orthodox church. 4 . There were 29 Hellenes. 16 Constantinopolitan Greeks with Turkish nationality. 6 Ethiopians. 5 Cypriots. 2 British. 6 Irnbriots and I Tenediot with Turkish nationality. 2 Syrians. 1 Egyptian. I South African. and I Lebanese. see 'OpOo(50~ia. 26 (1951) 396-400. 5. 'OpOo6o~ia. 25 (1950) 282·85, 6. Tsakonas. op.cit .. pp. 68-69. 7.. The Times, 13 June 1952. After attending a thanksgiving service held at the Sr.. George cathedral. the royal visitors had a luncheon with the patriarch.
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As Muslim-Orthodox relations in istanbul reached their highest point since the beginning of the twentieth century, the .Greek community, too, experienced a distinct cultural and commercial revival. From 1950, the DP, not only repudiated the varl'ik ·tax but also made available large credit facilities to independent businessmen. s Further, Greek businessmen were satisfied with the laissez-faire economic policies of the new government. Once again, Greeks together with the Armenians and Jews, established a strong hold over the import-export trade as well as in the chocolate and tanning industries. 9 The spirit of Greco-Turkish symbiosis and the efforts of Athenagoras to promote good intercommunal relations help the Constantinopolitan Greeks to regain confidence about their future in Turkey. The abolition of visas between Greece and Turkey in August 1952, brought an unprecedented number of Greek tourists to istanbul, while cultural exchanges between the two countries intensified. Meanwhile, some political responsibilities were extended to the Greek members of the Turkish parliament. Thus, in April 1951, Achilleas Moschosjoined a parliamentary committee investigating the growth of anti-KemalistpropagandainTurkey.1OIn 1955, another Greek deputy of istanbul, Alexander Chatzopoulos was appointed member of a parliamentary committee despatched to Teheran to promote Turco-Iranian economic ties. The same deputy acted as a liaison between the Turkish and Greek leaders, when Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis and his foreign minister Averoff-Tossitzas paid an official visit to Ankara in May 1959, soon after the settlement of the first phase of the Cyprus problem. 11 As already remarked, during the mid-1930s, two representatives of the Greek minority and one each of the Armenian and Jewish communities, were appointed by the ruling RPP to the parliament as independent deputies. The first two Orthodox to enter the parliament were Nicholas Taptas and istamat Zihni Ozdamar (or Stamatis Poulloglou). The latter, though of Anatolian Greek origin, became a fanatical anti-Phanar figure and was associated closely with Papa Eftim. Dr. Taptas, on the other hand, remained an independent deputy for ten years. He was then replaced, for a short while, by a
Greek lawyer, Michael Kayioglou. In 1945, another Constantinopolitan Greek doctor, Nicholas Fakatchellis, the sole regular member of the Republican party among the non-Muslim deputies, was elected in a by-election and served until 1950. During the 1946 elections, a psychiatrist from istanbul, Basil Konos was also elected to parliament as member of the DP opposition. The sweeping victory of the DP in the elections of 1950 brought two istanbul Greeks to Ankara - Basil Konos and Achilleas Moschos, a lawyer. The former was replaced by Alexander Chatzopoulos in the elections of 1954 and the latter by the lawyer Christos Ioannidis in 1958.
8. Interviews with former Istanbul Greek businessmen, Athens 1976-79. 9. Though after the mrlik experience, non-Muslims severely curtailed their investment in a number of commercial fields. such as the manufacturing industry. see Clark. op.cit., pp. 214-15. 10. K. Arlburnu. Milli Miicadele I'e Inkilaplarlllllgi/i Kanllnlar, Esbabi Mllcibeler l'e Mec/is Gijrij~l1leleri, Ankara 1957. pp. 270-71. 1L Alexander Chatzopoulos (1911-1980), Born in Istanbul. Graduated from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Istanbul. Taught in the Greek minority lycees and became the headmaster of Zappeion (1946-62). Served in the Turkish parliament as a member of the DP government and deputy for Istanbul (1954-60). Interview with A. Chatzopoulos, Athens 1979.
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CHAPTER X ..J.
THE EFFECTS OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE ON THE GREEKS IN iSTANBUL, 1954-1964 1. The emergence of the Cyprus dispute and the Greek minority.
Athenagoras' genuine cordiality towards the Turkish government was part of his strong desire to consolidate Greco-Turkish union and friendship. He strongly upheld the Atatiirk-Venizelos doctrine of rapprochement. It was perhaps partly due to this consideration that he had abandoned the comforts of North America for the Phanar. He envisaged the ultimate transformation of the Patriarchate into a bulwark of Greek-Turkish goodwill and communication~~lI1d the continued existence ofa substantial Greek minority in Turkey as a tangible example of the symbiosis between the two neighbours~ This he championed with immense eagerness. For long periods of time since 1453, the patriarch underlined, the two races had shared a common political and economic destiny. If they had also waged hard and destructive wars against each other, this was mostly over the legacy of Byzantium. Since this legacy was now dead, he reasoned, there was no obstacle to the brotherly existence between Greeks and Turks. Further, as a keen political animal, he was well aware of the postwar political and military polarization, that had rendered a Greek-Turkish entente absolutely essential for the survival of the two national-states. 1 In his enthusiasm for such an alliance, however, the patriarch grossly underestimated the persistence of deep·rooted animosities between the two peoples. Thus, from late 1954 an increasingly bitter antagonism took place as Greek Cypriot national aspirations gathered momentum in Cyprus. 2 While
Greeks and Turks found themselves deeply embroiled in the Cyprus conflict, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek minority in Turkey faced their second major crisis since 1922. As Turkish public opinion assumed that the Constantinopolitan Greek minority would identify with the Greek Cypriot cause, the happy chapter of intercommunal relations in istanbul of the previous decade (1945-55) came to an abrupt end. The first attempt to implicate the Phanar in the Cyprus dispute took place in September 1954, when the Committee for the Defence of Turkish Rights in Cyprus addressed a letter to the patriarch requesting him to take disciplinary measures against Greek prelates under his jurisdiction who had meddled in politics in connection with Cyprut 3 This rather vague request ushered in a Turkish press campaign seeking to involve the Patriarchate in the Cyprus dispute.'L.Thus, on 2 July 1955, Terciiman demanded the direct intervention of the patriarch against the leader of the Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarioi: 4 The patriarch could not have taken such a political stance, for this would have clearly(violated the strictly spiritual, non-political character of the Patriarchate established at Lausanne in 192f Ironically, the Turks, who had initially demanded the restriction of the patriarch's functions to purely ecclesiastical matters, were now inviting Athenagonis to involve himself in a controversial political issue. Further, the archbishop of Cyprus was popu· larly elected by the Greek Cypriots and, as the head of an autocephalous church, he was linked to the Patriarchate of Constantinople with no administrative ties. Unwilling and unable, therefore, to play an active role in the dispute, Athenagoras assumed a neutral stance. Thi~ n?n-wmmittal ~ttitude infuriated the Turk~. Headed by Terciiman and Humyet, the Turkish press attacked the patnarch personally for his failure to «discipline» Archbishop Makarios~5 As this campaign gained momentum, in a leading article in the Terciiman of 24 August, a prominent journalist, ~ihan Baban demanded the expulsion of the Patriarchate from Turkey. Claiming to articulate Turkish public opinion, he accused the patriardl, among other things, of conspiring in the Cyprus conflict and of acting as an agent of the megali idea. A few days later, Cumhuriyet implied that the Nationali.1111 ofa State, Alabama 1978: K.H. Karpat. (ed.), Tllrkey's Foreign Policy ill T/'allSition 1950-1974, Leiden 1975.
L The patriarch's correspondence with Paul Palaiologos. See also Tsakonas, op.cit., p, 64. 2. The vexing question of the Cyprus conflict remains outside the scope of this work. For details see S. Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954·58, Ohio 1967 and CypT'lls:' Reluc-
Republic, The Hague 1973; V. Couphoudakis, (ed.), Essays on the Cyprus Conflict, New York 1976; N. Crawshaw, The Cvprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Vnion with Greece, London 198. For the Turkish viewpoint see H.I. Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse
talll
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3. The Times, 4 September 1954. This committee was formed on the initiative of the National Federation of Turkish Students and was soon renamed as the «Cyprus is Turkish» (Klbris Tiirktiir) society. 4, AT 260 (July 1950) 55. 5 Hiilrivet, 18July 1955 quoted in F.. Armaoglu. Klbrls Meselesi 1954-1959.' Tiirk Hiikiimeti I'e Kall/u 0-"1111/1/1 D(l\'ranl!jlarl, Ankara 1963. p 124.
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Patriarchate harboured «agents of anti-Turkish activities and intrigue». Going even further, the artiClealleged that some archbishops had secretly collected donations from the Greeks in istanbul amounting to «millions of liras» with the objective of assisting financially the EOKA activities in Cyprus. 6 Such reports should be treated circumspectly since none of these newspapers produced any evidence to support their allegations. They did, however, prove ofimmense propagandistic value and managed to revive the hitherto dormant Turkish suspicions and dislike of the Greeks-feelings that had all along moved beneath the surface of outwardly friendly appearances. As reports of anti- Turkish demonstrations in Greece and increase of terrorism in Cyprus were widely circulated in Turkey public discussion of the Cyprus issue became permeated with intense sentiments of anger and frustration. Such emotions were deliberately stimulated by a group of extreme nationalists headed by Hikmet Bil, the president of the «Cyprus in Turkish» society.7 This campaign-was discreetly aided by Ankara, which felt that some pressure on the Patriarchate would make Greece more accomodating over the Cyprus dispute. 8 While at first the Menderes government maintained official silence on the issue, by J955, encouraged by Britain to consider itself as having an interest in the island comparable to that of Greece, it decided to play an active role in the Cyprus affair. Further, with the consolidation of NATO coupled with the death of Stalin, Turkish fears of a Russian attack diminished considerably. A.s a result, Turkey lost interest in placating the Patriarchate. Meanwhile, reacting to the press polemics against the Phanar, the Greek newspapers of istanbul demanded an end to «the anti-Greek hysteria». 9 Andreas Lambikis, the most outspoken Constantinopolitan Greekjournalist, in an editorial in his weekly 'E),c:vBC:P1l wvr, declared that this press campaign was based on «purely imaginative speculation». He concluded by challenging his Turkish colleagues to produce concrete evidence to support these allegations. 10 On 29 August, the daily 'EpTCPOC,; reiterated the frustration of the community in a long article entitled «it is enough» (apKc:ni). 11 Disregarding the delicate position of the Greek minority, the Turkish press replied by demanding that Greek journalists in istanbul should wholeheartedly support the Turkish position on Cyprus. Directing its attacks primarily against Lam-' 6. ClImllllriyet, 28 August 1955. 7. Armaog1u, op.cit., pp. 71·72. 8. See for instance a speech by Menderes on 30 August. quoted in AT 261 (1955) 17()"73. 9 . 'Ei.ev8eplJ (/JWI'I/ (EleJtheri Pholli /Free Voice), 28 August 1955. 10. Ibid. I L Quoted in ClImhllriyet, 30 August 1955.
bikis and his 'E),c:vBC:P1l WVlj, Clll1lhuriyet described his articles as unpatriotic and divisive. 12 Meanwhile, realizing the seriousness of the situation, Alexander Chatzopoulos, one of the two Greek deputies of the ruling DP government, endeavoured to clarify the position of the Greek minority. In an interview on 27 August, he expressed the immense anguish and anxiety of the Greek community. He stressed that the views of the minority on the Cyprus issue coincided with those of the government. In agreement with Ankara, the Constantinopolitan Greeks, Chatzopoulos explained, did not wish to see a change in the status of Cyprus. Finally, commenting on the patriarch's silence over Cyprus, he pointed out that Athenagoras was a religious leader and in that capacity he refrained from indulging in politics. He did,however, ernphasize that the patriarch remained «a friend of Turkey». 13 Athenagoras was indeed disturbed by the turn of events. Like Venizelos in the 1930s, he sensed the potential damage that a disagreement over the future of Cyprus might inflict on the friendship between Greece, Turkey and Britain. He, therefore, appeared in favour of the status quo in Cyprus. He was noted to have commented: «Looking at the Cyprus affair realistically I cannot believe that Greece could possibly overcome the Ottoman, British and American empires. And you know how much I love Greece». 14 On another occasion, speaking again on Cyprus, he stated: «Chypre est sous Ie ventre de la Turquie ... Jamais la Turquie n'aurait pu courir ce risque ... ».15 In retrospect the political far-sightedness of the patriarch can be easily appreciated: though his outspoken statements won him few friends in Greece. Likewise, he was known to be critical of Makarios' attitude and in an interview with Olivier Clement he remarked that «II (Makarios) n'a pas mesure ses responsibilites. II n'aurait pas dujouer ce role politique».16 Yet, anxious not to impair pan-Orthodox cordiality, Athenagoras carefully refrained from public criticism or condemnation. The Constantinopolitan Greeks, too, were apprehensive about the struggle of the Greek Cypriot enosists. Above all, the Greek-Turkish antagonism over
C . For instance. it objected to the motto of the 'Ei.ev8eplJ (/JW1'I7 which was «justice for the ROlllios),lli" (To OiKUlO Ita. rr,v PCOJ.llOmJVTJ), see Cumhllriyet, 29 August and 5 September 1955. 13. Ibid., 27 August 1955. 14. Tsakonas, op . cit., p. 69 . 15. Clement. op.cit., p. 100. 16. Ibid. On the patriarch's views see also B.. Ohse. Der Patriarclz Atlzellagoras I \'011 l\ollstal1til1opeL Ein oikllmenisclzer visionar, G6ttingen 1968, pp. 143-58.
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Cyprus brought back to the fore their schizoid nature of being on the one hand Turkish citizens and on the other a Greek ethnic enti ty. Sooner or later, they would be asked to clarify their position vis-a-vis the Greek-Turkish differences.'Ii:If the Greeks did not endorse the Turkish position by condem~ing Greek Cypriot aspirations, the Turks would label them as disloyal elements and demand their expulsio&. Few prominent Greeks, however, readily volunteered to declare their position. Only one eminent member of the community, Dr Phaidon Skouros, a member of the DP and a local councillor, declared publicly his conviction that Cyprus should be given to Turkey. On the other hand, the great majority of the Constantinopolitan Greeks remained noncommittal and discreetly carried on with their everyday lives. The grecophone press of istanbul, too, avoided comment on controversial political issues and mainly concentrated on publishing the facts as they appeared in the Turkish press. The only exception was 'E).evOep17 rpwvr, which continued to uphold the rights of the minority and protest vehemently against the antiPhanar press campaign.!7
2. The anti-Greek riots of 1955 and the Yasslada trials. As the Cyprus crisis approached a climax during the Tripartite London conference on 6 September."the position of the Greeks in istanbul became unbearable~While this conference was still in session. news of violent antiGreek riots in istanbul and izmir reached London and caused the immediate withdrawal of the Greek representativefrom the talks and a complete breakdown of Greco-Turkish relations. C?l'jensiblY. the 6/7 September riots were a reaction to two widely circulating stories In the Turkish prest. According to the first the Greek Cypriots were preparing to attack the Turkish minority on 28 August While in a speech on 25 August, Premier Menderes gave official credence to this rumour. Hiirriyet threatened that <
L Hiirriyet, 28 August 1955. 2. At 12,: 10 in the morning of 6 September an explosion did occur in the courtyard of the
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This unconfirmed report sparked off peaceful anti-EOKA demonstrations in the major cities of Turkey. Soon, however the demonstration in Istanbul was transformed into widespread riots against the property of the Gree.k el;;nent in the city. The over-enthusiastic students of the «Cyprus IS Turkish» association, who initially organized the demonstrations, were in fact a minor element in the huge crowds that gathered in the city centres on the night of 6 September. Discontented villagers. who had travelled in 100:'ies the previous day (before the announcement about the bomb attack agaInst Atatiirk's birthplace in Thessaloniki) from the nearby Anatolian and Thra~ilIag,es, formed the bulk of the demonstrators. They werej?in~d by the city's lumpenproletariat, the bootblacks, porters, .apartment Jamtors and. mendicants.3 Thanks to these-elements the demonstration was soon transf~~~~dinto a de§tructive riot. Mass hysteria prevailed. There was much looting but mor;deliberate destruction. istikl§J Cad\iesi, the famous Grand Rue de Pera and the city's main shopping street with many Christian-owned shops, was littered with wreckage of furniture , refrigerator§, r~dio.s and other. goods. In the commercial centres of the ci ty, looting and destructIOn was ~ot confined to Greek property but also to that of the other non-MuslIm minorities. 4 The few human casualties and rape cases occurred in the suburbs. The priest of the monastery of Ballkll, Chrysanthos Mantas, who was ~~er.ninety, was burnt alive while the bishop of Pamphilos suffered fatal InJunes. Although no exac~ statistics of casualties were released by the police authorities, it is generally accepted that they were negligible. In the suburbs along the Bosphorus and the coast of Marmara, the real anti-Greek character of the riot was evident. According to Greek evidence, 200 Greek women were raped Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, a building located adjacent to Atatiirk's house. A number ~f windows of both buildings were shattered. There was, however, no other damage. On the ~asls ofthe marks of the explosion and offragments of the fuse, officers of the Greek ~~y determtned that the explosive material could not have been thrown into the courtyard, whIch IS surroun?ed by a high wall, but Iiad in fact been placed on the site of the explosion and,then setoff. At,the t.lme of the explosion. the Consulate'S watchman. a Turk, was InSide the Consulate. A Tnraclan Muslim student attending the University of Thessaloniki was arrested a week later after a fuse similar to the one which had set off the explosion was found at the lodgings of the st~dent. Both suspects were formally charged and provisionally released pending tri;;tL The Th:aclan student, who was believed to have been responsible for the explosion, fled to Turkey, drIven across the border in the official car of the Turkish consul in KomotinL It was subsequently shown that the . photographs which had appeared in the Turkish press had bee~ faked. 3. F. Tachau, «The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected In the Cyprus DIspute», MEl 13 (1959) 270. . 4. Cumhuriyet. 7 September 1955; The New York Times, 17 September 1955.
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in such remote parts of istanbul. Similarly, the greatest destruction was infiLcteciJJpo_n churches and other Greek -- institutions in the outskirts of the city.s -Although the riots received wide publicity, there has not been any earnest effort to determine their actual cause. Turkish writers were inclined to give a socio-economic interpretation to the episode. Thus, in a long article in the Ulus of 14 September, the eminent Turkishjournalist, Hiiseyin Cahit Yal91n, in an article entitled «The Most Dangerous Front» (En Tehlikeli Cephe) observed: 6 «Here the enmity was not directed against the Greeks who threw the bomb into Atatiirk's house, but against a group which they envied and considered gUilty of being rich and living in comfort. Greek or Jew or Armenian or Turk were all the same from this point of view . The enmity was social and not political. It was the upheaval of poverty against richness. This was the birth in our streets of the same enmity and revolt of which we have seen examples throughout the history». No doubt the riots were also a demonstration of serious social and economic grievances. The presence in istanbul of a large, floating, unemployed and dissatisfied male population acted as valuable recruits for a clique of religious and racial fanatics who incited methodically communal violence. Economic distress and inflation - estimated at thirty per cent annually-- partly determined the violent character of the outbreaks. Unlike the salaried classes the business community in Turkey was able to keep up with inflation and enj~y a comfortable living. Minorities traditionally represented the well-to-do section of the population in istanbul and the rioters attacked not only Greek. owned premises but also Jewish, Armenian and foreign-owned commercial establishments. 7 While a limited number of Muslim-owned property was attacked probably by mistake, the rioters deliberately avoided inflicting damage on Turkish premises. Nevertheless, the material destruction caused ~
5. The patriarchal photographer, Dimitrios Kaloumenos went around the city immediately after the riot and photographed in detail the damage inflicted on the Greek Orthodox churches and communal property. He later compiled a photographic account in a book entitled, The Crucifixion of Christianity. Though the accompanying text is written in a highly emotive language, the pictures in the book provide valuable documentary evidence on the exent of the catastrophe. Kaloumenos is also in possession of an invaluable collection of photographs of Byzantine art treasures which were destroyed during the September riots, Kalollmenos interriew. Athens 1977. 6. Trans. quoted in K. Karpat, Tllrkey's Politics:' 11re Transition to a Multi-Party System, Princeton 1959, p. 422, n. 72. 7. The New York Times, 17 September 1955.
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by the rioters did considerable damage to overall Turkish economic interests.8 Although no official figures as to the total destruction were ever given. Greek sources assessed the damages to private property and property owned by religious and charitable institutions as $ 60,000,000 (or 16S,000,000 TL).9 Statistics show that 1004 houses, 4348 shops, 27 pharmacies and laboratories, 21 factories, 110 restaurants, cafes and llOtels were destroyed during the night oIoSeplembef:I3Ui:-O;'eek ~nirproperty sustalne,fthe-greatestdamage. I fie mob of istanbul gutted 73 churches,1O 26 schools and 5 athletic clubs. 11 Likewise, the two principal Greek cemeteries (;;i~li and Kinall) were desecrated. Some damage was also inflicted in izmir (headquarters of the NA TO South-East Command) when on 6 September a mob attacked houses occupied bv Greek officers and wrecked a Greek pavilion at a trade fair. Expressing deep regret for the widespread damage done to Greek property, the Turkish government promptly promised compensation. 12 Within a month 4433 Greeks applied for payment of damages claiming a total ;f69,SiS,74-4TL 13 But soon Greek victims began to complain that the ~ompensations actually paid represented only a tiny fraction of thedarnage. Thus, the Patriarchate initially requested 12,000,000 TL indemnities. But, the Department of Religious Affairs (Vakif GCllcl Miidiirliigii) handed 4,000.000 TL in bonds for the restoration and repair of chUICJ1.~S_. Cln£LQJh~r ~~rlaged communal institutions. 14 According to anin~~~tigation by an independent mission offellowship sponsored by the World Council of Churches which visited istanbul in November 1955, the damage to the Greek Orthodox churches alone stood at $ 150,000.000 (or 412.500,000 TL).IS In April 1957, the Greek government protested that only 3.000,000 TL had in fact been paid to the churches while indemnification to individuals was insignificant. Altogether, the Turkish government appears to have granted indemnities 8. The Turkish press tried to minimize as far as possible the damage inflicted by the riots Thus.Hiirrhet, which thanks to a series of highly emotive anti-Greek articles played a major role in inciting the riots. stated on 17 September that only 862 shops and stores were in fact suffered any damage in Istanbul. quoted in Armaoglu. op.cir.., p. 82. 9. Tire Greek Millority ill Tlldel and the Turkislr l\clilloritl in Greece: How TII'o GOI'ernlllellts Treat Tlreir Minorities, Greek Information Service. Athens 1965. p" 6, 10" 29 completely destroyed. 34 badly damaged and 10 partially damaged. II. Tire Nel\' York Til/WI, 17 September 1955. 12 Cumlrur(I'et, 16 September 1955" 13. fhid", 16 October 1955: AT 264 (]955) 84-85. 14 Cumlruri\'et, 19 January 1957: Armaoglu. op . cit"' pp . 82-83. 15 The Time.l, 7 & 14 November 1955. Estimates of the damages vary considerably. Thus. another authoritative source assesses it at S 300.000.000, Iatrides. op.cit", p. 169.
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amounting to between 50 and 60,000,000 TL, though the Greeks complained that payments were delayed or nullified through various administrative subterfuges. I 6 Refusing any involvement,'-fhe Menderes government, in a statement issued on 7 September, attributed responsibility for the riots to communist agitators and described the disturbances as «a communist plot». The Left, according to this communique, had profited from the existing tense conditions and succeeded in transforming a peaceful demonstration into a largse aJlti~~i£I:l~ with the ultimate aim of undermining the state. The statement went on to conclude by expressing deep regret for the damage done to Greek propertyY On 9 September, Ankara radio announced that ~214 persons suspected of«:lcts()f provocation» had been arrested in Istanbul and Izmir. TI1e~Tu~kish assembly met in an emergency session on 13 September and decided to extend maI!i5lLJaw - which was imposed by President Bayar immediately after th;~lots- in the three main cities for six months. Premier Menderes, in a statement to the assembly, expressed his deepest regret for the widespread damage on Greek property and admitted that the Istanbul police was slow to take action against the rioters. 18 On 15 Seprember, the military police padlocked all Trade Union headquarters in IstanbuI.I9 Since communist organizations had already been rigorously suppressed for many years in Turkey, Ankara suggested that a group based in Beirut could be responsible. 20 The Turkish press widely upheld the government thesis of a communist plot and Milliyet argued that «there can be no connection whatsoever between the Turkish nation and the 6;7 September incidents».ll Meanwhile, the army set up three special military tribunals in Istanbul to try the ringleaders whose numbers by the beginning of 1956 were swollen to 3813. They were accused of destruction of property, looting, spread of communist propaganda, theft, sabotage, rape, murder, attacks against religious and sacred establishments and revolting against the government. 22 All trials took place in camera and the Nelv York Times correspondent drew attention to the rigorous censorship that had been in ope rat on during and in 16. The Greek Millority ill Tllrkey alld the Tilrkish Minoritv ill Greece. p. 6. 17 . AT 262 (1955) 68-69: The Tillles, 8 September 1955. 18. 12 September. AT 262 (1955) 69-72.
19. After the declaration of martial law , Istanbul was placed under the command of General Niirettin Aknoz. ClIlIlhllrivet, 8 September 1955. 20. Ibid., 9 September 1955. 21. AT 262 (1955) 87: Armaoglu, op.cit., pp. 159-61. 22. Similar courts were set up in Izmir and Ankara, see Cllmllllriyet, 8 September 1955..
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the immediate aftermath of the riots. Reporters were warned that anything but «purely objective reports» could lead to trouble.23 Most of the foreign journalists in Turkey were forbidden to report the events to their papers and all telegrams mentioning the riots were confiscated before they could be despatched. Departing correspondents were also' searched for notes and photographs. Noel Barber of theDaily Mail (London) apparently eluded search by hiding his notes in his shoes. 24 It was because of his insistence on reporting the events that the outspoken Constantinopolitan Greekjournalist Andreas Lambikis found himselfin serious trouble with the military authorities. Immediately after the riots, in a highly charged editorial, he described the 6/7 September incidents as the «St Bartholomew's Day» of the Christians in Turkey. Still in a defiant mood, on 14 September he elaborated the feelings of the Greek minority. 25 «The only natural and human request that we make is a guarantee for the security of our children and our homes. We are tired of the historical repetitions of anti-Greek measures and outbursts which take place at regular intervals of every fifteen years». The military authorities did not take kindly Lambikis' articulate protests and on 16 September his newspaper was banned. 26 Subsequently, Lambikis was arrested and was detained at the Harbiye military prison where he was interrogated about his articles. On one occasion, h~ was questioned for three consecutive days as to whether the Patriarchate or the Greek embassy had instructed him to campaign on behalf of the minority,27 Although 'E).evOepYf ct>Wl'll was allowed to resume publication on 21 October, Lambikis was detained in a military prison for three months. Reacting to the manner in which the government dealt with the episode, the Greek deputy of Istanbul, Alexander Chatzopoulos, made an emotional speech at the Turkish assembly on 12 September. He directed his attack primarily against the performance of the police during the night of the riots, giving evidence that demonstrated the refusal of the police to deal with the rioters. Thus. they allowed five boats with about 200-300 rioters to land in the 23. The Nell' York Times. 17 September 1955. By 1957, thirteen fo~n?ing m.embers .of the "Cyprus is Turkish» society were released. The president of the aSSOCIatIOn. Hlkmet BII: ~as even despatched to Beirut as the Turkish press representative to the Lebanon. The aSSOCIatIon itself was back in action by 1957. Cllmllllrivet, 25 January 1957. 24. Quoted in Iatrides, op.cit., p. 170. 25. 'EhveePl/
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island of Biiyiikada (Prinkipo) soon after midnight. According to Chatzopoulos, the rioters appeared to have fraternized with the police just before indulging in outrages. Nor, he stressed, did the police try to detain them when they decided to embark on their boats and return to their villages on the Anatolian coast. Similar toleration, the Greek deputy underlined, was shown ~-,-" to the mob in Beyoglu, which vandalized the Zappeion lycee and the adjacent church of Pera, both situated at the centre of the city. He then described to the assembly the attack against his own house. His parents, Chatzopoulos reported, botl;t overeIg}ltyyear~sord,Wefethrown in to the strests in the middle of the night, while rioters proceeded to ransack his house,)iIis house incidently was next door to a police station, but the gendarmes stoo'didTy by reftIsi1f.[TO~c~cflifi:QLtherioters. 28 Afterthese-exampl es ,-newenton to hint that the-\\Thole incident w~s-carefully planned by «some powerful and efficient body». Otherwise, he reasoned, how would seventy out, of seventy four Greek Orthodox churches, in places as far apart as te two sides of the ~()sphorus, the city and the Princes islands, have been subjected, at precisely tQe same time, to the wrath of the rioters. Concluding his account, Chatzopoulos expressed his hope that the government would punish severely those responsible for the outrages. 29 The leader of the opposition, ismet inonii, too, after describing the riots as «a national disaster», underlined that the Menderes government was responsible for not taking the necessary measures to contain the rioting mob. 30 The circumstances sun'ounding these acts of violence and particularly the speed and precision with which the mob went about its destructive work, convinced many foreign observers that they had been organized and carefully planned in advance. Thus, on the night of6 September, the American consul general in istanbul telegraphed the State Department that the «Extensive destruction and situation appears completely out of hand with no evidence of police or military attempt to control. I personally witnessed the looting of many shops while the police stood idly by or cheered on mob» ..31 '--"-"~A'_"'-"
,~,~~~
A British correspondent who witnessed the 6/7 September episode reported that: 32 «all evidence points to an exact, perfectly co-ordinated attack. The
flame that swept the city was ignited at a hundred different points at precisely the same zero hour». According to the same account, in lzmir the rioters carried lists of names and addresses, including those of the Greek officers serving with the NATO headquarters in that city. 3.3 Today, it is almost universally agreed that a demonstration was initiated by DPIeaders and-local party bosses, as a means of emphasizing the strong TurkIsh interest in the future of Typrus. The demonstration, however, rapIdly got out of hand. This involvement of the DP government in the riots was partly vindicated during the Yasslada trial of 1960-61. This took place soon after the Turkish revolution of 27 May 1960 which resulted in the overthrow of the Menderes government. 34 Although, four years had elapsed from the time of the anti-Greek riots, considerable evidence was produced to implicate at least Adnan Menderes and his foreign minister, Fatin Zorlu. Initially, Bayar, Menderes, Zorlu, Hadlmll (the governor of izmir) and seven other persons were charged with direct responsibility for the September 1955 riots, in which, according to the authorities three people were killed, 30 injured and over 5000 properties were destroyed. 35 The anti-Greek riot trials started on 19 October 1960 and lasted until 5 January 1961. The prosecution alleged that the accused were responsible for a bomb explosion at the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki and the adjoining birthplace of Kemal Atatiirk, which had provoked the riots. Hasan U<;ar, a former employee of the consulate, and Oktay Engin, a university student from Western Thrace, who were among the accused, had been convicted by a Greek court of causing the explosion. But {he accused alleged that they had «framed» by Greek justice. Unable to produce concrete evidence, the prosecution was eventually forced to drop the charges concerning the Thessaloniki bombing. The riots were said to have been organized by the extreme nationalist "Cyprus is Turkish» society, of which Menderes was a patron, although he denied that he had been responsible for its formation. Hikmet Bil, who was
@
28.. Charzopollios inteITieH". Athens 1979. The text of his speech in the assembly can be found in TBMM Zablt Ceridesi (Proceedings 0 the 28th meeting), voL 7. pp. 675-77. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid .. pp. 692-93. 31. Quoted in The Nell' York Times. 17 September 1955. E. The Daily Mail. 14 September 1955.
33. Ibid. 34. For a detailed analysis of the militarry coup and the fall of the DP government, see W.F. Weiker. The nlrkish Rel'ollllion /960-196/: Aspects of Military Politics. Washington 1963, passim. 35. Cllmhllriyet. 20 October 1960. On 14 October, Menderes, his former cabinet and a number of senior officials were placed on trial on the Marmara island of Yasslada (Oxia), charged with violating the constitution, corruption and a variety of other crimes, such as the September 1955 anti-Greek riots. The trials were, on the whole, fairly conducted. but the consequent execution of Menderes and two of his ministers provoked lasting bitterness on the part of millions of ordinary Turks who still supported him.
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the president of the association at the time of the riots stated in evidence that Menderes had told him on the morning of 6 September 1955: «Zorlu's job at London is to push the Turkish case and torpedo the conference. Zorlu wants us to be active in Turkey». Again, c;o~kun Klrca, a former member of the Turkish delegation to NATO in Paris, told the court about a coded telegram which, he claimed, the Turkish foreign minister, Zorlu, sent from London to Ankara stating that «The British seem to be inclining towards self-determination for Cyprus ... It is necessary that the premier takes appropriate steps to support my position»36. Zorlu did not deny sending this telegram, but claimed that «appropriate steps» merely meant demarches with the British and American ambassadors in Ankara. Further, it was stated in the court that the text of this telegram had not been found in the records. A score of witnesses gave evidence that the police had watched the rioters attacking Greek property in Istanbul without making any attempt to intervene: that a policeman had assured a Greek woman that there would be no bloodshed, as «only shops and buildings are to be destroyed»; that the army had intervened only three or four hours after being ordered to do so; and that over 3000 persons arrested at the time of the riots were released soon after. 37 A member of the Istanbul police testified that he had been ordered not to intervene by a superior officer, while another police official revealed that he had been dismissed after arresting a local DP leader who had taken a prominent part in the riots. A retired military judge, Arif Onat, stated that he was «absolutely convinced» that the riots had been deliberately engineered. During a walk through the city on the night of 6 September he had noted that neither the police nor the troops had taken any steps to check the rioters. J8 Refik Turga, a former aide-de-camp to President Bayar and later the military governor of Istanbul, could not state categorically as to whether he himself had heard of any official plan for the riots. He was, however, of the opinion that both Bayar and Menderes had prior knowledge of the plans for a smaller demonstration. 39 A farm owner on the outskirts of Istanbul declared that truckloads of villagers bound for the city were shouting «there will be fun in the city tonight». 40 Major Hayrettin Sumer, who in 1955 was the premier's personal assistant,
described how he heard a minister of state, Mukerrem Sarol, say on the morning of the riots: 41 «We told them to do it, but not to do it in this way. If you tell Turks to smash up property they may easily start killing». On 25 October, Ekrem Allcan, finance minister in the revolutionary government and a former member of the DP, gave evidence that at a meeting of the Democratic parliamentary party, Menderes had done his outmost to prevent discussion on the riots. To achieve this, he went on to point out, Menderes had resorted to completely irregular methods and had finally ordered the termination of the meeting.42 Significantly, £wfessor F'I~t KgpriiJii deputy Rrime minister at the time of the riots and one of the accused, in his testimony on 21 October, stated his conviction that the violent demonstrations had been inspired by Zorlu and organized by Menderes, in whose hands «all power resided». This demonstration, he affirmed, had later degenerated into a riot. Referring to the official theory that the riots were a «communist plot». Koprulii revealed that the idea was originally suggested by Allen Dulles, head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, who was in Istanbul at the time attending a criminology congress. Unable to provide supportive evidence however he was eventually forced to modify his charges and declare simply that «it is possible that the Menderes government did inspire the riots» .43 Even in its modified form, such a statement made by one of the leading members of the Menderes government was of immense significance. On I November, the former DP deputy, Alexander Chatzopoulos stressed that although he could not prove that the government had planned the riots, he was certain that they were pre-arranged and that the police tolerated the excesses. 44 Perhaps the most significant and symbolic testimony on the question of the riots was that of Patriarch Athenagoras. He confirmed that a few hours before the riots he was visited by senior police officials who had informed him about the demonstration, who then went on to reassure him that he should not be worried, for nobody would be hurt. He had also received a telephone call from Fahrettin Gokay, the governor of Istanbul, two hours before the riots, who told him that «there be some trouble, but you are not to
-II. The Times, 10 November 1960.
36. The Nell' York Times, 25 October 1960: The Times, 25 October 1960: Weiker, op.cit., p. 34. 37. The Nell' York Times, 4 November 1960. 38. The Times, 26 October 1960; Cumhllriyet, 26 October 1960. .19. Cllmhw'i),et, 25 October 1960; Weiker, op.ciL, p. 35. -10. The Nell' York Times, 4 November 1960.
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-12 . Cumhurivet and The Times, 26 October 1960. 43. Cumhuri;'et, 21 October 1960; The Ne\\' York Times, 22 October 1960. A former Harvard professor and a founding member of the DP. KoprUlU had by 1956 turned critic of Menderes and resigned from the party long before the 1960 revolution . 44. CUlllhllriyet, :! November 1960.
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be worried».4 5 The patriarch reaffirmed that he had addressed a letter to Menderes on 15 November 1955. in which the riots were described as: 40 «clearly organized according to a plan and programme beginning in a number of different places at pre-arranged signals». He refused, however. to uphold the inference drawn by the prosecution that the planned demonstration was only a cover for sinister designs. 47 All the accused denied their guilt and maintained that the riots were the spontaneous result of popular emotion aroused by the Cyprus question. But in his final speech. on 4 December, the prosecution insisted that the DP government had deliberately contrived the anti-Greek riots. Thus, the prosecutor asked for the maximum penalty offour and a half years imprisonment for all the eleven accused. 48 But a month later the Yasslada court found Menderes, Zorlu and Hadlmll (the former governor ofIzmir, who was apparently carried on the shoulders of a mob just before it set fire to the Greek consulate in that city) guilty of inciting the Turkish population against the Greek and other minorities in Turkey at a time when relations between Turkey and Greece were particularly tense on account of the Cyprus dispute. The other accused were. however. acquitted.4Y Finally. the court upheld the view that the Menderes government had organized an anti-Greek demonstration in Istanbul in order to press the Turkish cause on Cyprus. Yet, from the legal point of view, the evidence produced in the court to implicate the DP leadership in the affair had been based on circumstantial evidence and personal accounts. Most of the incriminating evidence was obviously destroyed and after five years the prosecution had no alternative but to base its case on personal testimonies of the events of 617 September 1955.
3. The minority question and the Greek-Turkish crisis, /956-59. Back in 1955, the outbreak of anti-Greek riots in Turkey left the Greek government and public opinion so stunned that the breakdown of the Cyprus conference in London passed almost unnoticed. On 7 September, the inner Greek cabinet met to consider the situation and the deputy prime minister, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos. made a strong verbal protest to the Turkish charge d'affaires. He informed the Turkish representative that Greece would ask for a special meeting of the North Atlantic council to investigate reports of the
45. 46. 47. 48. 49.
Ibid., 26 October 1960: The Times, 26 October 1960. Ibid. Weiker, opcit., p. 35: The Nel\' York Times, 26 October 1960. Cumhuriyet. 5 December 1960. ibid" 6 January 1961.
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ill-treatment of Greek officers attached to NATO headquarters in izmir. A written protest, couched in strongly-worded terms, was despatched to the Turkish government on 9 September. Three days later, the Turkish charge d'affaires called upon Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos and expressed his government's deep regret at the anti-Greek riots, together with assurances that the victims would be compensated. He also reassured that measures had been taken to avert similar outbreaks of violence in the future. 1 It appears that the Greek government was surprised by the strong Turkish r<;,.action to the Greek Cypriot call for enosis. Perhaps for the first time they realized the strong feelings that this issue aroused in Turkey. At first the Greeks felt that Turkey, as in the case of the Dodecanese, would accept the numerical superiority of the Greek element in the island and would, albeit reluctantly, consent to the cession of Cyprus to Greece. Thus, in May 1954, Premier Papagos expressed his belief that the Greek-Turkish friendship «rests on solid foundations and has its roots deep in the hearts of the two peoples so that it is in no way endangered». «We believe», he declared, «that the Greek-Turkish friendship cannot be threatened or disturbed by the CypI'US question».2 The riots in Turkey shattered Greek confidence. While the opposition demanded the resignation of the Papagos government, Athens declared its intention to re-examine the future of Greco- Turkish relations. As relations between the two countries reached their lowest point in the past thirty years, the permanent representatives of NA TO met in a special session on 8 September to consider the situation. On 18 September, the alarmed US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, in identical notes, urged both the Greek and Turkish premiers to refrain from allowing these «unhappy events» destroy the partnership of the two nations. 3 Meanwhile, the events of September 1955 brought for all practical purposes, the Balkan entente between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece to an end. 4 The summer of 1956 saw a further aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations. In August the Greek embassy in Ankara was ransacked and a number of important documents, some bearing on defence matters, were reported missing. s The Greek government blamed the incident on the Turkish authorities and filed several notes of protest. At this juncture,
I. For details see Xydis. Cyprus, p. 620, n. 30. 2. To Br7f.w, 30 May 1954 quoted in Iatrides, op.cir.., p. 165. 3. Full text is given in Documents on international Affairs, 1955, London 1958, pp. 178-79. 4. As early as 9 September. The Times had reported that the entente had suffered a "deathblow». 5. ibid, 28 & 29 August 1956.
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the two countries, as subsequently admitted by the Greek foreign minister, had corne at the brink of war. 6 Nor did the excesses of the September riots put an end to the anti~Phanar campaign in Turkey. By April 1957, the Turkish press renewed its vigorous polemics against the Patriarchate alleging that the patriarch was involved in anti- Turkish activities. While demands for the expulsion of the Patriarchate intensified, Yeni istanbul published a series of statements by Turkish intellectuals and public figures on the Phanar issue. The results of the survey tended to confirm that there was a strong current of opinion against the continued presence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey.7 No newspaper or other agency, however, succeeded in producing evidence proving the Phanar's involvement in politics. There are strong indications, moreover, supporting the view that the anti-Phanar campaign between 1954-59 was based on speculation and was guided by emotion with the ultimate aim of undermining the authority which the Patriarchate had regained during the first years of Athenagoras' tenure of office. The Turkish government, too, altered its attitude towards the Phanar. In a letter addressed to Premier Menderes on 15 November 1955, Patriarch 6. During the Greek elections of October 1961, a campaign pamphlet reliably attributed to Foreign Minister Averoff and reviewing the Cyprus conflict, contained the following passage: «Early in the summer of 1956, Turkey contemplated military operations. threatened Greece with war, and towards the end of the summer prepared another plan - a surprise attack against the large islands of the (Aegean) Archpelago near the Asiatic coast, to be accompanied by a declaration that it (Turkey) does not intend to retain the islands; secondly, it had undertaken the operation so that the Greeks and everyone else may realize how important the Cyprus issue was for Turkey; and. thirdly, that it would evacuate the Archpelago as soon as it had been agreed that the Cyprus issue would be settled «in a way that was acceptable to all three (governments) concerned» .... In response to these threats, whatever form they might actually take, Greece would not have confined itself to proforma political and military actions. our plans were ready, detailed. and justified optimistic expectations . In the political sphere, a 48-hour deadline would have been issued for the enforcement of international law by the evacuation (by Turkey) of the Greek islands. If this were not done within 48 hours, ... the Greek army would have been ordered to attempt to advance to Constantinople. Since a Turkish attack upon us would have in fact severed all bonds of alliance between us, since our allies, through their indifference, would have torn up the NATO pact, since Greece's honour would have been at stake, and as the military undertaking against Constantinople would have been difficult, the Greek government would have sought assistance from any party that might be interested to see Turkey removed from the Straits .... ». Greek text in To Bl1f10, 22 October 1961, trans. in Iatrides, op.cit., pp. 172-73. 7. These articles appeared between 9 and 17 April 1957, quoted in Armaoglu, op.cit., pp. 344~46. Writers, journalists, lawyers and other professional men canvassed by the newspaper did not all assert directly that the Phanar was involved in politics, but all indicated that they suspected this to be the case. They then agreed that if it was so, the Patriarchate should be expelled from Turkey.,
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Athenagoras gave details of the vandalism caused by the Turkish mobs. Art treasures dating back to the Byzantine period, the patriarch stated, were destroyed, the most sacred Orthodox shrines profaned, graves in Greek cemeteries ransacked while a Greek Orthodox priest was murdered. 8 The Turkish prime minister did not answer this letter. His attitude underlined the radical change in the relations between the government and the patriarch. Hitherto, Ankara exhibited enormous respect towards the person of the patriarch. This respect, however, was gradually transformed into relentless hostility. Particularly after the visit of Makarios to Athens in April 1957, the Turkish government went so far as to suggest that Turkey could abrogate the Lausanne agreement and seek the removal of the Patriarchate from Turkish soil. 9 Such attitudes bedevilled Greek-Turkish relations to the extent that a new crisis situation was reached by April 1957. 10 Fearing a repetition of the anti-Greek riots, Athens urged the United States to act as a restraining influence on the Turks,11 On 15 April, the new Greek prime minister, Constantine Karamanlis informed Washington that if the events of 1955 were to recur, or if the Patriarchate were to be expelled, Greece would retaliate. 12 A day earlier, the Greek foreign minister, Averoff Tossitzas warned the Turkish ambassador that the indignation of Greek public opinion had reached such a point that tactics of «tooth for tooth» and «eye for eye» would become unavoidable if the Greek minority and the Patriarchate were harassed again. 13 As the rift between Greeks and Turks deepened, the Greek ambassador in the United Nations, Christos Palamas, drew attention to the «vicious campaign» that had been launched against the Patriarchate and the Gree" minority in Turkey. 14 The Turkish government rebuffed these charges by proclaiming that the Greek minority in Istanbul was a contented and prosperous community .15 It is beyond doubt that the Constantinopolitan Greeks, on the whole, elljoyed a high standard ofliving though their grievances were not economic, but social and political. They complained about their insecure status in Turkey. Point8., This letter was read during the Yassiada trials, see The Times, 26 October 1960.
9. Ibid., 22 April 1957. 10. Xydis, Cyprus, pp. 80-86. II. At this crucial juncture, the American government sent a timely demarche to Ankara helping to avert Turkish action, Tlze Times, 22 April 1957. 12. Xydis, Cyprus, pp. 84-85. 13. Ibid., pp. 83-84. 14. Letter to Hammarskjold, 17 !,>Jay 1957, Xydis, Cyprus, p. 113. 15. AT 265 (1955) 85-90, quoting Zafer, 23 December 1955 and Diinya, 25 December 1955.
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ing to the 1955 riots and the press campaign against the patriarch, who as the archbishop of Constantinople was also their spiritual leader, they expressed their resentment against the deliberate attempts to implicate them in the Cyprus conflict. They repeatedly expressed their strong desire to keep aloof from Greek-Turkish antagonisms. Responding to Turkish accusations the patriarch himself voiced his loyalty to the Turkish government stressing that the Patriarchate was a religious institution «outside political significance». Archbishop Aimilianos, the religious assistant of Athenagoras, in a press conference on 14 April 1957, reiterated the loyalty of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to Turkey. 16 The Turkish side played down the Greek grievances. Expounding his views to an Athenian correspondent, Premier Menderes took pains to emphasize that «no discrimination whatsoever against any minority group took place in Turkey»Y The Turkish press, while occasionally hinting at the possibility of an exchange of populations , 18 paid lip-service to the equality of all Turkish citizens in Turkey. By pressing for the transfer ofthe Patriarchate to Greece the Turks, according to three consecutive articles in Yeni istanbul, wished to strengthen Greek-Turkish relations. The maintenance of such an institution in Turkey, it explained, had a negative effect on the friendship between the two countries. 19 Under these circumstances, the Greek minority, who recalled the disasterous riots of 1955, feared that the build-up of anti-Greek feeling might lead to a renewed wave of attacks against them. From bitter experience, they were also aware that neither Athens nor Ankara, nor any other power for that matter, would be able or willing to protect them from the fury of the Turkish masses. As a result a considerable exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks was engendered. It can be safely argued that the riots of 6/7 September 1955 and the persistence of an anti-Greek campaign marked the beginning of the end of the historic Greek community in Turkey. Nor was this exodus confined to the Constantinopolitan Hellenes. An increasing number of Greeks with Turkish nationality sold their property and moved abroad. Even the former deputy, Dr Nicholas FakatseIlis decided to move to Greece, leaving behind his pension as a member of the Turkish parliament as well as his clientele in istanbul. 20 Although the majority of these people moved to Greece, a substantial section chose to emigrate to Australia, Canada and the United States. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
The New York Times, 15 April 1957. Interview published in To Bij/w, 7 JanUluy 1956. See, for instance, Cumhuriyet, 28 December 1957 and 28 January 1958. Articles of Habib Edib Torehan in the Yeni istanbul of 26, 28 & 29 April 1957. Cumhuriyet, 20 December 1957.
In an attempt to play down this visible exodus, Fuat K6priilii contended that the trend was not a sign of maltreatment but of prosperity enjoyed by the Greeks under Turkish rule. These people, he opined, went abroad in order to expand their businesses and fortunes. 21 Such utterances, however, showed little understanding of the real desires and aspirations of the minority. The Constantinopolitan Greeks, being brought up in Turkey for generations, had their roots, families, businesses and connections in istanbul. Despite the adverse conditions of 1922-30 and 1942-44, they manifested a strong desire to continue their distinctive way of life, along with their traditional language, religion and culture, in Turkey. It was only when the Turks systematically eroded this distinct way of life that the Constantinopolitan Greeks decided reluctantly to abandon the banks of the Bosphorus. Away from istanbul, the Constantinopolitan Greeks exhibited a strong attachment to their native city. Demonstrating many characteristics of displaced people and remaining faithful to their distinctive traditions, the Constantinopolitan Greeks even today, whether in Greece or elsewhere, form closely-knit communities and in general shy away from the host societies. . As bitterness over Cyprus intensified, a renewed outburst of TurkIsh nationalism often found expression against the Greek community. Notices warning all Turkish citizens to speak Turkish and instructing them to urge those who did not, reappeared all over istanbuL In particular, such notices were hung in Greek and Armenian-owned shop-windows in Beyoglu and Galata. 22 This upsurge of nationalism was initiated by the National Turkish Student Federation and was strongly supported by the press. The authorities, too, tacitly encouraged the spread of such feelings. Thus, as late as 27 August 1960, General Refik Tulga explained at a press conference that foreign languages «which grate on the Turkish ear should not be spoken in loud voices in public places».23 Such declarations were not only a blatant violation of the Lausanne treaty but also of the Turkish constitution itself. Meanwhile, the Turkish press rediscovered the notorious Papa Eftim and once again gave wide coverage to his anti-Phanar utterances. In repeated statements he accused Patriarch Athenagoras of anti-Turkish activities. On 15 June 1958, Eftim pledged full material and moral support to the Turkish CypriotsY In 1957 the press dug deep into the past of the Phanar, recalling that the main gate ofthe Patriarchate had never been opened since 1821 when 21. Armaoglu, op.cit., p. 198. 22. Cumhuriyet, 29 August 1957. 23. The Times, 29 August 1960. 24. Papa Eftim' in Klbrls hakklndaki gorii:jleri. (The Views of Papa Eftim Concerning Cyprus), istanbul 1958, p. 3. That he was protected by the government can also be deduced from the fact
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Patriarch Gregory V was hanged on the gate by order of the vezir who held him responsible for the Greek War of Independence. At the same time, the municipal planning committee of the city threatened to tear down the patriarchal buildings and St George cathedral to make room for a new highway. 25 While this did not take place Christ church was demolished in May 1958 to make room for a similar road between Tophane and Karakoy.26 Perhaps the impact of the expulsion of a number of notable Constantinopolitan Greeks with Hellenic nationality on the community was even greater. The majority of those belonged to the professional middle class (journalists, teachers and doctors). They were charged with publishing material injurious to the Greco-Turkish friendship and harmful to Turkish national interests. A number of prominent Hellene businessmen were also expelled after being accused of smuggling foreign cUITency, spying and other anti- Turkish activitiesY No right of appeal was granted to these people and almost all were expelled within a day's notice. Reacting to the deportations, the Greek ambassador in Ankara, George Pesmazoglou, on 6 December 1957, filed a formal protest. 28 The Athenian press, too, strongly disapproved of the Turkish action describing the expulsions as «arbitrary and vindictive». 29 Meanwhile, in April 1958, the authorities shut down the Hellenic Union of Constantinopolitans ('E)).'7v1Kit ·Evwal:'; KwvaravTlvOvno).lTwV) , after a court decided that its activities were detrimental to Turkish national interests. 3o The incident had arisen after the conviction and imprisonment for twelve years of the secretary of the association, Lambros Goulakis (a Cons tanthat during the September 1955 events. his church at Galata suffered no damage whatever., See also CUll/huriyet. I~. 13 and 16 June 1958. 25. The Nell' York Times, 17 April 1957; Clement, op.cit .. pp. 101-102. 26 . ClIIllhurivet. II May 1958. ~7. The deportations started on 9 August 1957 with the expulsion ofa prominent journalist Theodore Markouizos, This was followed by the expulsion of journalists, Stephen Papadopoulos and George Patriarcheas as well as that of the Tsitouris brothers. both Cons tantinopolitan businessmen and publishers. Early in January 1958. the patriarchal photographer and journalist Dimitrios Kalloumenos was also expelled for publishing <
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tinopolitan Hellene). On 6 June 1957, a Turkish court found him guilty of espionage, namely of supplying military information to the Greek military attache in Turkey. 31 At the same time, Turkey threatened to review the whole Greco-Turkish convention of establishment of 1930 which enabled some 12,500 Constantinopolitan Hellenes to remain in istanbul. Bearing in mind the suffocating conditions under which the dwindling Greek community had to live in Turkey, the Greek government considered alternative solutions to the minority question. Thus, Foreign Minister Averoff Tossitzas suggested to the American ambassador in Greece, George Allen the possibility of an exchange of the Cypriot Turks against the Constantinopolitan Greeks. This, he asser1ed, would help to solve both the Cyprus and minority questions. 32 Such a proposition, however, was not palatable to the Turks, since Ankara's main interest in Cyprus was based on strategic rather than demographic criteria. Instead, the Turks were prepared to consider an exchange of populations between the Constantinopolitan Greeks and the Thracian Turks. The Turkish Cypriots, Ankara stressed, had nothing to do with such a bargain. 33 Faced with the exodus of the Greeks, the patriarch strove to slow down this trend by using all means possible. 34 But he had little success. Some Greeks, moreover, were dissatisfied with the conciliatory attitude adopted by the patriarch towards the Turks. Instead of presenting himself as an outspoken champion of Greek minority rights, the patriarch continued to appeal to the better nature of the Turks and, through moderation, he hoped to persuade them to treat his community with greater compassion. He always took pains to emphasize his attachment to «the Turkish Fatherland and his respect for the laws of Turkey», while he absolutely refused to indulge in any kind of political statement. Thus, exhibiting great moderation during the 1960-61 Yasslada trials, Athenagoras told the court that he did not have concrete evidence to state positively that Menderes and his entourage had organized the 1955 riots. Dismissing the argument that he should have used his international reputation to challenge the Turkish behaviour towards the Greek 3 I, The Times, 7 June 1957. It appears that from all the Hellenes expelled ostensibly on charges of spying. Goulakis was perhaps the only one who could legitimately be regarded as having engaged himself in anti-Turkish activities. Goulakis died in a Turkish prison a few years later, Dallltsas illten'iew, Athens 1977. 32, Xydis. Cyprus, pp. 81-82. 33. Cumhuriyet, I December 1957 and 28 January 1958 giving the views of deputy and professor Osman Turan (DP) who strongly advocates such an exchange. 34. Ibid., 24 May 1958. This view was confirmed by Nicholas Damtsas, a senior Greek embassy employee in istanbul.
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minority, the patriarch stressed that such an attitude would have been detrimental to both the Patriarchate and the community. As past experience revealed, he reasoned, such an approach would have only resulted in enraging the Turks even further. An able student and pr;:l~titioner of the art of diplomacy, Athenagoras had acquired a deep understanding of the Turkish mentality. Unlike many Greek leaders in Athens and Nicosia, he was aware that an intemational appeal would most probably result in the expulsion of the Patriarchate; for it would give the Turks the opportunity to consider such an appeal an «example of the Phanar's involvement in politics». Further, such an event would, in turn, have widened the rift between the two countries. As a staunch believer in Greco-Turkish friendship, the patriarch was thoroughly opposed to this state of affairs.35 On the other hand. nationalist circles in Greece resented his moderate stance and the patriarch was frequently criticized by certain Athenian newspapers.36 Taking advantage of this situation. religious conservatives. like Dimitrios Mavropoulos. the editor of 'H i[Jw\'Ij vi:.; 'EKKi.1Wfa:;;. who disliked the patriarch's religious liberalism. encouraged the anti-Athenagoras trend.37
4. The Patriarchate during the settlement of the Cyprus Question, /959-64. The treatment accorded to the Greeks and their institutions in Turkey was directly analogous to the relations between the govemments of Ankara and Athens. To the Turkish govemment the Greek minority and particularly the Patriarchate had a «hostage value»; a tool through which Athens could be forced to adopt a more accomodating line when Greek-Turkish differences arose. This attitude was readily accepted by many prominent Turks on a number of occasions. Dr Fahir Armaoglu, for instance, explained that the Greek government was reluctant to confront Turkey in a «vigorous manner» on the Cyprus conflict because the Turks held «significant trump cards» (kozlar). He went on to categorize as such, the Patriarchate and the Greek minority, including the Orthodox communal institutions in istanbuJ.1 Further, there were some Turkish intellectuals, such as Miimtaz Soysal, who had serious reservations about the need to involve the Patriarchate and the Greeks in Turkey in the Cyprus question. In an article in the Yeni istanbul of 35. Athenagoras correspondence with Paul Palaiologos; Clement, op.cito. p. 101. 36. Tsakonas, op.cir.. pp. 161-63; Cumhurivet. 12 December 1956. 37. Opposing his ecumenical views, Greek O'rthodo~ religious conservatism even accused him of favouring Protestantism, see Greek press reports reproduced in the Cumhuriyet of 12 December 1956. L Cumhuriyet. 8 March 1964.
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2l April 1957, he asserted that the Turkish point of view on the Cyprus question was strong enough on its own merit and did not require the reexamination of bilateral Greco-Turkish issues settled at Lausanne. Greek-Turkish relations improved in 1959 as both parties agreed to the establishment of the republic of Cyprus in which the rights of the Turkish minority would be safeguarded and guaranteed jointly by the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. Thus, after the success of the Zurich and London negotiations, the three governments signed in London the Cyprus agreement in February 1959. 2 Thus, since World War II, Turkey and Greece were allied under three separate pacts: NATO, the Balkan alliance, and the Cyprus accords. In May 1959, in an attempt to repair the damage caused to their relations by the Cyprus affair, the Greek and Turkish governments held high-level talks in Ankara. Thus, on 7 May, Premier Karamanlis, accompanied by his foreign minister, Averoff Tossitzas, arrived in Ankara for a six day visit. It was the first time an explicitly harmonious atmosphere had existed since the visit of Marshall Papagos in 1953. The fact that the Greek prime minister decided to visit Turkey merely four years after the ugly anti·Greek riots in lstanbul illustrates the willingness to forget the unpleasant events of the past. There was goodwill on both sides, and a growing realization that as the two peoples were neighbours, squabbles and quarrels, far from promoting their national interests, were obstacles to peace and prosperity in southestem Europe. In particular they wanted to discuss the outstanding questions concerning the civil, educational and economic status of the minorities in both countries, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and fishing limits. The Greek leaders felt that, despite the Cyprus settlement, the Constantinopolitan Greek minority did not regain that feeling of confidence to which they were entitled under the minority provisions of the Lausanne treaty. There were questions of confiscations, of indemnities, expUlsions and unwarranted press campaigns against the Patriarchate which, in the view of Greek officials, had to be settled before the feeling of trust and security could retum. 3 Despite their initial reluctance to raise the minority question, the Turks did agree to discuss the subject. Thus, the two prime ministers agreed on all main issues and Karamanlis declared that he had «full confidence in the sincerity and spontaneity of Turkey's desire to strengthen friendship and co-operation with Greece». 4 It was also agreed to appoint a senior official to study bilateral 2. Great Britain, Conference on Cyprus. Documents Signed and Initialed at Lancaster House. London 1959, Cmnd 679, no. 4. 3. The Times. 7 & 8 May 19590 4. Ibid .. 11 May 1959.
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issues and recommend solutions to outstanding problems. Talks between Dimitri Bitsios, the Greek representative, and his Turkish counterpart Zeki Kuneralp took place in the summer of 1959 and concentrated on the issue of the minorities and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. 5 It was expected that by the time Menderes would pay his return visit to Athens, the two governments would be ready to sign an accord. Such a visit, however, did not materialize. Faced with serious internal difficulties, Menderes postponed his visit to the Greek capital. Finall y, on 27 May 1960, he was toppled by a military coup d' etat. The far-reaching political changes in Turkey delayed the dialogue between the two governments. But, the willingness of the military government to bring up the issue of the anti-Greek riots during the Yasslada trials was interpreted as a guarantee of the future well-being of the Greek minority in Turkey by Athens. The trials coincided with the visit, in October 1960, of the new Turkish foreign minister, Selim ~arper, to Greece. 6 This was the first high level contact between Turkish and Greek leaders since the military coup in Turkey. On 22 October, a joint statement issued in Athens reaffirmed Greek-Turkish agreement on international questions, as well as on matters concerning the Balkans, Cyprus and the Middle East. 7 A few months later, an agreement, aimed at improving and increasing the flow of reliable news and views between Greece and Turkey, was reached at a meeting of twelve newspaper editors and publishers from both countries in Rhodes. In a statement the participants announced that they had decided to do their utmost to keep any possible misunderstandings out of the press of their countries. 8 This was a significant step in view of the part hitherto played by the press in fanning the old fires of Greco- Turkish antipathy. Earlier. on 25 December 1960, President Giirsel appointed Kaloudis Laskaridis, a Constantinopolitan lawyer, who had fought as an officer during World War I and had lost an arm at Dardanelles, to the newly formed Senate. 9 Beyond ascertaining mutual goodwill, however, little progress had been made in settling outstanding bilateral problems, such as the rights of minorities and the avoidance of border incidents. To discuss such issues, 5. IbicL 29 July and 9 November 1959. According to the information furnished to the author by a member of the Greek embassy in Turkey. the issue of Papa Eftim was also discussed during these negotiations. Damtsas inter1'iew, Athens 1977. 6. CUIIl/zuriyet. 21 October 1960. 7. Ibid., 23 October 1960; The Times, 24 October 1960. 8. Ibid., 14 March 1961. 9 . Laskaridis was the last Constantinopolitan Greek to be appoi~ted or elected to the Turkish parliament. On the appointments to the Senate. Cumhurivet. 25 December 1960.
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Greek Foreign Minister A veroff Tossitzas paid a brief visit to Turkey in August 1962. In Ankara, he met with Premier ismet inonii and his foreign minister, Feridun Erkin and discussed the Cyprus developments, relations between the two countries, questions related to the minorities, the disposal of Greek assets frozen in Turkey, cultural issues, tourism, fisheries and common defence within the framework of NATO. In a joint communique on 5 August, it was announced that the discussions had been conducted «in a spirit of greatest cordiality» and that relations between the two countries were further strengthened. The setting-up of a mixed commission to resolve those minority issues which could not be settled through administrative action was also announced. 10 Before returning to Greece, A veroff stopped briefly in istanbul where he was received by President Giirsel and had talks with representatives of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. Given these cordial relations between 1959-64, the Constantinopolitan Greeks were once again able, at least partially, to recover their position. In particular, during this period the Patriarchate sought to regain its ecclesiastical influence within the Orthodoxy. In this it was able to achieve striking successes. Thus, the visits of the Phanar of Russian Patriarch Aleksei and of Bulgarian Patriarch Cyril ushered in a spirit of co-operation between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and two most influential Orthodox churches. In a sense, moreover, these visits were an acknowledgement of the spiritual supremacy of the Phanar. l l Soon after, the patriarch initiated a PanOrthodox conference representing all the Orthodox churches. As all the patriarchates and autocephalous churches accepted the invitations sent out by Constantinople, the first conference of its kind for more than thirty years was held in Rhodes from 24 September to 1 October 1961. A delegation of six representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, four metropolitans and two professors of theology, left istanbul on 21 September with regular Turkish passports. 12 About 130 delegates were present at the conference, the official languages of which were Greek, Russian, and Arabic, with English, French and German as secondary languages. Presided over by Metropolitan Chrysostomos, the Rhodes conference discussed a wide range of theological issues, including faith and doctrine, consideration of a common Orthodox confession of faith, a possible new translation of the Bible, participation of the laity in the liturgical life of the church, and adaptation of the monastic life of the church to the modern world. In addition, there was discussion of such 10. Ibid .. 6 August 1962. 11. The Times. 5 May 1962. 12. Ibid .. 22 September 1961.
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ethical issues as euthanasia, cremation, birth control and family planning, marriage, fainily life and divorce. Although the patriarch himself did not go to Rhodes, the conference was a result of his visit in 1959 to the Greek Orthodox patriarchates of the Middle East-Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch. 13 The Rhodes conference was the first in a series of inter-Orthodox exchanges aimed at reasserting the spiritual leadership of the Orthodox church in the modern world. It was followed by another two Pan-Orthodox conferences (September 1963, November 1964) that took place again on the island of Rhodes. Apart from the unity of the Orthodox church, these conferences paid a great deal of attention to inter-church relations. A champion of the ecumenist movement, Athenagoras was determined to make use of his prerogative as ecumenical patriarch to represent Orthodoxy in its relation with the heterodox. Traditionally, Orthodox-Anglican relations had been excellent, but during the reign of Athenagoras they were strengthened even further. Of great importance were the visits to the Phanar of the two archbishops of Canterbury, G. Fisher (1960) and M. Ramsey (1962). During these visits and the ensuing correspondence between the two sees an agreement had been reached to appoint a joint doctrinal commission between the two churches. Meanwhile, Anglican delegates were present in Rhodes (1961) and at the festivities on the millennium of Mt Athos (1963).14 Perhaps of greater importance were the efforts of Athenagoras to achieve an ecclesiastical rapprochement with the Vatican. In the Pan-Orthodox conference of 1963, it was decided to start with Rome a «dialogue on equal terms», with the understanding that the ecumenical patriarch take the initiative on the Orthodox side. ls With the election ofa new pope, Paul VI, in 1963, a regular con'espondence started between the two prelates. These common efforts culminated in the historic meeting of Pope Paul and Patriarch Athenagoras in Jerusalem in the first week of 1964. 16 More dramatic was the visit of the pope to the Phanar on 25/26 July 1967. He was the first pontiff of the Roman Catholic church to visit the former Byzantine and Ottoman capital for more than 1250 years. He was met at the Ye~ilk6y airport of istanbul by President Sunay and Prime Minister Demirel. The pope was also greeted at 13. B. Stavridis, «'0 OlKOUlleVIKO<; ilaTpuipXl]<; 'A9l]vay6pa<; A», Ki.t/poI'opla, 4/B (July, 1972) 453-63. 14. The dialogue with the Anglican church continued and in February 1965, a Phanardelegalion, headed by Archbishop Meliton Chatzis, held ecclesiastical talks at the Lambeth Palace. 15. B. Stavridis, «The Ecumenical Patriarchate», GOThR 16 (1969) 211-1216. G. Konidaris, «The Importance of the Meeting Between The Ecumenical Patriarch and the Pope in January 1964», International Relatiolls 7-S (1964-65) IS-24.
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the airport by Patriarch Athenagoras, with whom he exchanged the «kiss of peace». But the main object for this visit was to strengthen the bond between the two churches. A few months iater, Athenagoras returned this visit by travelling to Rome. After three days of discussions, the two ecclesiastical leaders issued, on 28 October, ajoint declaration reiterating their intention to strive for Christian unity. Prior to this historic visit to the Vatican, Athenagoras paid visits to Sofia, Belgrade and Bucharest where he met the leaders of the Orthodox churches in these countries. During the first week of November, the patriarch visited Geneva and met the leaders of the World Council of Churches while from 9 to 13 November he stayed in Britain for talks with the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Ramsey.17 Assisted by his able lieutenant, Archbishop Meliton of Chaicedon,18 the patriarch assumed a leading role in the ecumenist movement. In May 1969, he visited Sofia for the 1lOOth anniversary of the death of St Cyril. I 9
17. The Times. IO November 1967. IS. Meliton Chatzis (1913) was born in Istanbul. In 1934, after completing his postgraduate studies at the Theological seminary of Chalki, he entered a distinguished ecclesiastical career. In 1950, he was appointed archbishop of Imbros and Tenedos, For the next I3 years, Meliton endeavoured to revitalize the educational and cultural life of the islands. Under his strong leadership, the islands, and particularly the largely Greek inhabited Imbros, flourished. In 1963, he was promoted to Archbishop ofHeliopolis, and, in 1966, he occupied the senior position of Chalcedon, Twice, in 1970 and 1972, when the ageing patriarch was too ill to perform his functions, Meliton was put in charge of the Patriarchate. Sharing the patriarch's strong commitment to the union of the churches, Meliton represented the Phanar in a number of international ecclesiastical conferences; see XaplO'rqpza d::; TIll' TzWII' rou M1lrponoi.irov ripol'ro;; X ai.1olr5ol'o;; Mei.irwl'o::;, Thessaloniki 1972 passim. On his outstanding achievements on the islands ofImbros and Tenedos, see Alexandris, «Imbros and Tenedos», pp. 24-25. 19. The theological dialogue between the Phanar and Vatican continues. The successor of Paul VI, Pope John Paul II paid a visit to the Phanar in November 1979. Together with the successor of Athenagoras, Dimitrios I, the pope declared his commitment to the union of the Christian churches.
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CHAPTER XI
THE FINAL EXODUS OF THE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN GREEK MINORITY. 1964-74. I. The expulsions of the Hellenes of Istanbul.
Despite its temporary settlement. the Cyprus problem continued to plague Greek -Turkish relations. In fact the constitution of Cyprus. formulated under the terms of the 1959 agreements. accentuated the antagonism dividing the two ethnic groups by granting to the Turkish Cypriots political powers far exceeding their numerical strength. As the Turks used their constitutional rights. amounting to a veto power over all important legislation. the government of Cyprus was unable to perform its functions. As a result Makarios, stating that the constitution was unworkable. proposed certain amendments. Reactin~ to this. the Turkish government warned against amending the constitution and once again pressed for the partition of the island. When attempts to achieve a compromise failed. fighting broke out across the unhappy island at Christmas 1963. The presence of Turkish and Greek troops on the island. authorized by the 1959 treaties, threatened to involve those two countries in the hostilities. In August 1964. moreover. the Turkish airforce carried out a surprise strike on Greek Cypriot positions at Kokkina. resulting in some loss of life. Meanwhile. Turkey found itself in a diplomatic isolation. for hardly anyone. not even its NATO and CENTO allies. supported the Turkish thesis of partition or was prepared to condemn the Makarios government. I It was at this juncture that Turkey decided to employ once again the Constantinopolitan Greek factor in its diplomatic confrontation with Greece. Amidst reports of Greek Cypriot atrocities against their brethren. the Turkish press demanded anti-Greek measures. 1 Holding Greece responsible for encouraging Makarios in trampling upon the constitution of 1960. the Turks. unilaterally denounced the 1930 Convention of Establishment. Commerce I. For an excellent analysis of the post-1964 crisis. see S . Xydis. C\,prtLL' Reillclant Repllhlic. The Hague 1973. passim 2. OIllII1I1/"(\'el. 27 December 1963.
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and Navigation on 16 March 1964.3 This affected over 10,000 Constantinopolitan Hellenes who were established there under the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty and the 1930 convention. Unlike the majority of the Greeks in Turkey, who held Turkish passports, less than a third of the Constantinopolitan Greek hablis held Greek nationality. Like all the Greek hablis, they were established in istanbul prior to October 1918, and thus they were allowed to remain in Turkey by virtue of the Lausanne exchange of populations convention of 30 January 1923. Likewise in accordance with the Lausanne convention respecting conditions of residence, business and jurisdiction foreign nationals residents in istanbul were permitted to remain in Turkey for a seven years period (article 20).4 Further, in October 1930, the right of the Hellenes to remain in their native city was extended with the signing of a new agreement. Despite this agreement, under a law forbidding foreign residents in Turkey to practise a variety of professions, many Hellenes found themselves out of work during the mid-1930s. Some of them had no choice but to emigrate to Greece while others changed professions. s According to official Turkish estimates, there were 26,431 Hellenes in Istanbul in 1927. Their numbers, however, decreased steadily to 17,672 in 1935, 13,598 in 1945, 11,879 in 1955 and 10,488 in 1960.6 Together with the Greeks of Turkish nationality. the Constantinopolitan Hellenes comprised a single ethnic group in Turkey. Nor were they any less indigenous than those with Turkish nationality. Many had never even been to Greece. They held the Hellenic nationality because their ancestors had come from the provinces of the Ottoman empire that were incorporated in the Greek kingdom in 1830 and later. On 24 March 1964, the list of the first Hellene deportees was announced in the Turkish press. 7 On 29 March, the first five Hellene families left istanbul for Greece. s With the abrogation of the 1930 treaty, the Hellenes were subjected to article 35 of the tapll (title deed) law which prohibited the ownership of immovable property, by foreigners. 9 At first the Turks claimed that the expulsions were «individual measures» aimed at those Hellenes involved in activities «dangerous to the internal and external security of 1. Ibid .. 17 March 1964. The arbitrary measures taken against the Greek popUlations ofImbros and Tenedos have not been included in this study . For a detailed account of the Turkish attempts to de-hellenize these islands see my own «Imbros and Tenedos». pp. 25 ff. 4 . LCIS. pp. 139-41. 5. See above chapter VI:::!. 6. jy .. no. 380 (1959) 84 and no. 460 (1960-61) 78-79. 7. ClIlIIl1l1riyel. 24 March 1964. 8. Ibid. 30 March 1964. 9. Ibid .. 19 March 1964.
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Turkey». 10 Accusations against the expelled ranged from smuggling foreign currency to having sent money «to the Greek terrorists in Cyprus». Soon, however, it became evident that the deportees comprised highly respected individuals, who until that moment had never been involved with the authorities. 11 As a result the Turkish government had to admit to the collective character of the deportations. Accordingly, on 27 April, the director of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the counsellor of the Greek embassy that the measures against the Greeks in istanbul «were the natural consequences of the fact that the Turkish government regarded the question of Cyprus and that of Greco- Turkish relations as forming a single whole, and therefore was unable to continue to grant Greek nationals favoured treatment, at a moment when Greece displayed an attitude of hostility towards Turkey by lining up on the side of Makarios' views».12 Later on, the Turkish government spokesman, Miimtaz Soysal reiterated this view when he rebuffed Greek protests against the expulsions. On 31 July, he declared that: «as the result of the unfriendly policy of the Greek government towards Turkey, the Turkish government was terminating the privileged treatment unilaterally accorded in the past to the Greek nationals». 13 The spokesman added that the measures of expUlsion were in accordance with the convention of 1930. On another occasion the same official warned the Greek representatives in Ankara that: «unless the Greek government changed its attitude in regard to the question of Cyprus, all the Greek nationals in istanbul might be expel- ' led en masse».14 10. Another term used by the Turkish government was «Greek national who was engaged in harmful activities against Turkey», Eralp to the Secretary-General, 29 September 1964, UNSCjSj6728 . II. The claim that those expelled supported the EOKA was discredited when the authorities issued deportation orders for individuals who had been dead for some time. Thus lraklis Pamphilos died in 1963; Dimitrios Avgoustakis and Panayiotis Panayiotou in 1%2; Georges Rossopoulos in 1959 and Constantine Kimoliatis in 1948. Again among those expelled - ostensibly because they were involved in anti- Turkish activities- there were eight paralytics, three blind persons, one deaf-mute, two crippled persons, four insane and nine patients stricken with incurable illness, Photographs of such handicapped Hellenes boarding the airplane in istanbul were widely circulated in the Athenian press. 12. Explanatory memorandum, Dimitrakopoulos to the Secretary-General, 10 September 1964, UNSCjSj595L 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.
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As the expUlsions mUltiplied, Greece asked for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the «mass expulsion of Greek citizens from Turkey» in September 1964. 15 By mid-August. the number of persons mentioned by name as expelled amounted to 1073. In his speech to the Security CounciL the Greek ambassador to the United Nations, Dimitri Bitsios stated that an increasing number of «hostile and provocative acts» by Turkey against Greece had created a state of acute tension in the relations between the two countries. This led to an explosive situation which had forced the Greek government to appeal to the Security Council. Focusing on the expulsions, Ambassador Bitsios stressed that the Turkish authorities had openly stated that the treatment of Greek nationals in Turkey was in retaliation for Greece's support to Makarios. If open hostilities did not break out, the Greek representative concluded. it was due to the Greek government's restraint. I " In reply Orhan Eralp. the Turkish ambassador to the United Nations, alleged that those expelled had been guilty of «criminal subversive activities» against Turkey's security.17 Faced. however. with concrete evidence submitted to the Council by the Greek side. the Turkish representative was forced to admit. that «As for the deceased whose names may have appeared by error on the list of those who were asked to leave, if in fact there were such cases, it could mean that the Greek citizens of Istanbul have been careless in reporting vital statistics to the local authorities». Despite his admission that the lists carried dead persons. Eralp insisted that the expUlsions were not «vindictive measures against Greek nationals in Turkey».18 Neutral members in the Council. including the Soviet member and president of the Council Marazov, condemned <
283
late 1960s. there were only few hundred Hellenes. mainly women married to Greeks with Turkish nationality and persons over sixty-five. left in Istanbul. Public opinion in Greece resented the refusal of the Turkish authorities to allow the orderly departure of the expelled, Further. the expulsions were accompanied by measures aiming at the virtual confiscation of the property of those expelled, The fiscal authorities had already taken a series of measures intended to ensure that Greek nationals were deprived of all possibility of liquidation of their interests. Thus the banks received instructions to refuse all credit to businesses entirely or partly owned by Hellenes. Property belonging to Greek nationals was seized by the fiscal authorities as a precautionary measure against possible default on taxes. the assessments being calculated at several times what would have been required in the past. The amounts so assessed included future fines of the businesses concerned; bank accounts were blocked. goods seized and even furniture and personal effects impounded in order to guarantee the Treasury against any future failure to pay taxes. Meanwhile. instructions were given to the Land Registry department not to register transfers of Hellenic property.21 Indignant with the Turkish treatment meted out to the Hellenic Greeks. the Athenian press compared these measures to the I'arllt; taxation during the war. The expulsions were carried out with extreme harshness. The deportees were allowed to take out with them no more than 200 TL (or $ 22) and one suitcase containing only clothing. Before leaving. they were forced to sign a declaration of the content of which they were not allowed to take cognizance. According to the information obtained by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. by signing this declaration the expelled Hellenes admitted: (a) having committed currency offences; (b) having been a member of the dissolved «Hellenic Union of Istanbul». which had been accused of political activities inimical to Turkey; (c) having sent money to the «Greek terrorists in Cyprus»; (d) finally. that he was leaving Turkey of his own free will. 22 The plight of the Constantinopolitan Hellenes who arrived penniless in Greece moved Greek public opinion, An association. the Society of the Hellenes expelled from Turkey (LwIWrdol' 'Ei.i.ljl'Wl' ·Y7T.IlhOWl' A7[{;i.aOi1'Twl' b;, TOIJphia;' J. was founded in Athens in 1965.
Many of the expelled Hellenes were well-to-do businessmen with longestablished commercial institutions providing employment for many local Greeks and Turks. During 1964-65, about 100 such businesses were reported to have been closed down and Turkish estimates of Constantinopolitan Hellenic wealth had gone as high as $ 500,000,000; though this figure was subsequently reduced to $ 200,000,000. The Greeks, who found ·the latter figure too low, argued that the Turkish authorities reduced their estimates when they realized that some day they might have to settle for properties taken by the expelled Hellenic nationals. 23 Sensitive to public indignation and fearing th~t the Turks were about to abrogate the Lausanne treaty, the Greek foreign minister, Stavros Kostopoulos advised the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Turan Tiiliiy, on 22 April 1965, that diplomatic exchanges between the two countries would be discontinued. For a while, it appeared that relations between Ankara and Athens had reached yet again a crisis point. By mid-May, however tensions somewhat eased when Turkey refrained from pressing any charges of «subversive activities» against the Patriarchate. 24 On 31 May. a goodwill message from Premier Suat Hayd Urgiiplii was presented to his Greek counterpart George Papandreou by Ambassador TiHily.25 Meanwile, the Cyprus question served to obscure internal political and economic problems in Turkey. Throughout 1964 and 1965, Cyprus monopolized attention, enabling weak coalition governments (first by Inanii and then by Urgilplii) to demand from the opposition «national solidarity» in the face of an external problem. In this way the assembly was able to pass a number of fiscal measures. The Cyprus question also exposed Turkish isolation in foreign affairs making the Turks feel particularly bitter against their allies in NATO and the Turkish press attacked the United Nations for the first time. 21i No member-state had supported the Turkish thesis at the United Nations. The Turks expressed their frustration by holding big demonstrations, demanding an end to the «Greek treachery and to the deceitful Makarios». They urged the Turkish army and the Turkish youth to invade CyprusP
21 Explanatory memorandum. Alexander Dimitropoulos to the Secretary-General. IO September 1964. UNSC·S!5951 . These draconian measures were provided forby the law no. 6183 on tax evasion . The example of a Constantinopolitan Hellene businessman. Constantine Vasileiadis illustrates the arbitrary nature of the taxation. A paper manufacturer. Vasileiadis had hitherto paid an annual income tax ranging between 25 and 28.000 TL. But in 1964 he was arbitrarily f<)I"ced to pay 165.000 TL 22. Ihid,
23 . See article by Jay Waltz. entitled «Turks Expelling Istanbul Greeks», in The Nell' York Times. 9 August 1964. According to The Observer (London) of II July 1964, Hellenic immovable property in the city confiscated by the authorities amounted to £ 80,000,000. 24. A threat of an investigation of the Phanar's «political activities» and the immediate expUlsion of the remaining 5000 Hellenes was announced on 19 April, after a cabinet meeting in Ankara. by Interior Minister, Ismail Hakk! Akdogan, see CUl/lhuriyet, 20 May 1965 . 25. Ibid., 1 June 1965. 26. F. Ahmad. The Turkish E\-perimellt ill Democracy. 1950-1975. London 1977, pp, 188 & 221 D. For details on such a demonstration in Istanbul see Cumhuri?et. 16 March 1964.
284
285
Given the intense antagonism between Greece and Turkey, the Greek element of Turkey found itself in an unenviable position. Firstly, the repercussions of the expulsions of the Hellenic subjects on the Greeks with Turkish nationality were decisive. Although they held different passports, the family links which bound them were so close that in practice the expulsion of the Constantinopolitan Hellenes led to the elimination of almost as many members of the Greek minority with Turkish nationality. Sensing their precarious future. the latter too began to leave Istanbul in great numbers. Affirming this trend. the ClImhllriyet of II October 1964 announced: <<30.000 Turkish nationals of Greek descent have left Turkey perrnanently. in addition to the Greek subjects already expelled». A series of restrictive measures newly adopted and immediately put into effect by the Turkish authorities with regard to minority educational and charitable institutions reinforced the apprehensions of the Greek community. Thus, Greek elementary and secondary schools were compelled to accept the appointment of Turkish assistant headmasters recruited by the Ministry of Education in contravention of the educational clauses of the treaty of Lausanne. These assistant headmasters deliberately followed a policy intended to render the task of the Greek headmasters and staff as difficult as possible and to provoke the intervention of the Turkish educational authorities on charges of breaking the regulations and of anti-Turkish conduct. 28 As a result within the months of March-April 1964 alone the Turkish authorities dismissed three headmasters and eleven teachers while in a renewed campaign against Greek minority schools in 1967. thirty-nine teachers were expelled and six primary schools were closed down. In 1983. of the five Greek /ycees, Zographeion (Phrangopoulos) has a Greek headmaster. As the authorities refused to appoint new Greek headmasters. the management of the Greek minority schools fell into the hands of Turkish deputy-headmasters. Likewise. applications for the appointment of new teachers were turned down by the Ministry on the grounds that the applicants did not possess an adequate knowledge of Turkish, although the Greeks argued that this was not the case. 1LJ Official inspectors not only paid frequent 28. This information has been forwarded by a number of retired Greek teachers. including the last Greek headmaster of the historic patriarchalll (~I! at Phanar ([]urpulp/Jhli .'v!c;·rii.l/ roij nl'OlJ; ~:I.oi.li). John Karayiannis. In an interview with the author in 1977. this distinguished Constantinopolitap educationalist stated that he was twice discharged from his duties during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Ironically. the Greek I.n ~e of the Phanar. which traces its origins to the Byzantine period. is today administered by a Turk. a direct contravention of the Lausanne treaty. The appointment of deputy headmasters was enforced in April 1963 (protocol no. 2467). 29 . Such a test for Greek teachers was made compUlsory in October 1964. for details see Ei.D/;lhpl/ C/1(,Jlli 8 May 1965
visits to Greek schools, but also by behaving in a hectoring manner terrorized the staff and pupils.3o While refusing permission for the repair of dilapidated school-buildings, the authorities withdrew recognition of a number of elected school-boards of the Greek community. 31 Earlier, by virtue of law 222 of 1961, the government placed all the minority schools under the department of private schools of the Turkish Ministry of Equcation, which meant that Greek minority schools were no longer recognized as «Communal Schools» entitled to the minority clauses of the treaty of Lausanne. On 27 March 1964, a government encyclical (protocol no. 410/16) prohibited Orthodox clerics from entering the premises of Greek minority schools. Another encyclical (protocol no. 3885), dated on 15 September, banned morning prayer in the Greek schools and Greek textbooks and encyclopedias in the schools were strictly prohibited. 31 The result was that the whole level of education in the Greek minority schools. which were once renowned for their high standards, declined dramatically. The fear that their children would be inadequately educated was, and still is. one of the many reasons compelling the Constantinopolitan Greeks to leave their city. This is reflected in the following official figures. Number Number Number Number
of pupils of secondary schools of elementary schools of kindergardens
1923
1964
1970
1978
19803 3
15,000 8 85 70
5000 6 42 4
3930 6 42
1147 6 22
816 6 20
30. Interview with John Karayiannis, Athens 1977 . 31. Interviews with members of the Kurtulu~ (Tatavla) school board trustees. Naum. Tolaros and Alexandris, who asked permission for the repair of the parish school in 1964. Such permission was never granted. But perhaps the most blatant case of official harassment was the closure of the Prinkipo orphanage in April 1964 on the pretext that there was a danger of fire in the building housing iL At the same time. the school located on those premises was closed and sealed. although the school building was ofa recent constructiorL Thus 165 Greek orphans were deprived of their lodgings and their schooling. The arbitrary character of this measure lies in the fact that for several years the same authorities had stubbomly and without cause refused permission to rebuild. which the administration of the establishment had repeatedly requested. This information was communicated to the author by the trustee and teacher of the school, Christos Mavrophrydis. The author of 'JaroplKo AEUKWJLa rwl' 'Oprpal'orporpdwv Jlar;; 1853-1958. Istanbul 1958. Mavrophrydis is an able Turkish linguist and taught at the Theological seminary of Chalki. at the Prinkipo orphanage and at the school of Galata. He was a member ofthe RPP and he narrowly missed being elected to the parliament in the elections of 1946. Mavrophrydis interl'iew, Athens 1980. 32. 'Ehu8EPI/ C/1wl'lj. 8 May 1965. 33. This information has been fumished by the former deputy and educationalist, Alexander Chatzopoulos. For more analytical information see appendix C.
287 286
19
Reacting to this state of affairs, the outspoken Constantinopolitan journalist Andreas Lambikis, in May 1965, published a long open letter to the minister of education, Cihat Bilgehan, requesting an end to the restrictive legislation which crippled Greek minority schools in istanbul. 34 When, however, his appeal remained unanswered, he tried to publish yet another open letter this time addressed to President GOrsel. Prevented by the authorities from doing so, the 'E},8v()8Pfl f/Jwwl of 19 July 1965 appeared with a blank editorial space, indicating that the main article was censored. Nor were the authorities prepared to put up with Lambikis for very long. On 11 September, he was arrested and hun-ied by the police to the Greek border where he was told to cross over into Greece. It is worth mentioning, moreover, that L~lfll bikis was a Turkish national. Just before his expulsion a court found Lambikis guilty of violating articles 141 and 142 of the penal code and charged him with «making Greek propaganda inimical to the national unity» (Millf birligi bozarak !iekilde Rumluk propagandasl yaplyordu). The premises of 'E).8V08Pfl f/Jwvft were subsequently ransacked and the old issues of the newspaper destroyed. With its suppression, the Greek minority lost the only instrument willing to voice their grievances and champion the minority rights enshrined in the Turkish constitution and in the Lausanne treaty.35 As the Greek popUlation in Turkey diminished, the Constantinopolitan Grecophone press, too, declined dramatically. Today, 'ArcOY8Uj.laTlVft is the only daily Greek newspaper while since 1976 Charalambos Rombopoulos, a former school teacher, has published the weekly 'Hxw (Echo). Linking the Cyprus problem to the minority question and the territorial balance established in Lausanne, the Turkish government continued to put pressure on the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Thus, on 16 October 1965, Premier Suat Hayri Urgiiplii warned: «I cannot guarantee what might happen in istanbul if one Turk was killed in Cyprus. Additional security measures have been taken to prevent riots and possible attacks. Such measures, however, have been taken before, as'during the riots of 6/7 September 1955» .36 Profoundly disturbed by the implications of this statement, the Greek deputy premier and foreign minister, Elias Tsirimokos, in an interview to the press stated 34. Under the title «An Open Letter to the Minister of Education, His Excellency Cihat Bilgehan» ('A l'o/KUI emaroi.i! npo:; Tal' 'Ynoup?ol' ITu/(5eiur;; 'Ec,oxcinurov nl1.dr Mmi.YKexuv). this article appeared in three consecutive issues, I. 8 and 15 May 1965. 35. Settled in Athens, Lambikis publishes the monthly KcvvamvTlvovnol.lr;;. which first appeared in 1975. 36. CIIIII!JlIriyet, 16 October 1965.
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«Greeks are stunned by the declarations of Mr Urgiiplii because we sincerely believed that no Turkish statesman would ever make such a reference to the events of September 1955 which not only provoked the indignation of world public opinion but also the conviction by a Turkish tribunal of those responsible, a fact which we believe Mr Urgiiplii would not have forgotten. His declaration confirms my statement in the General Assembly to the effect that the persecution in Turkey of Greeks and the Ecumenical Patriarchate are not mere police measures nor are they caused by the behaviour of the Greeks in istanbul. but are used in a policy of reprisals and to bring pressure on the Greek people as a whole to make it renounce its national aspirations» .37 Concun-ently, the Greek representative in the United Nations, Dimitri Bitsios, addressed a letter to the secretary-general protesting against the «ominous tone of the head of the Turkish government and his outspokenness which verged on cynicism». Realizing that his prime minister's statement would only have an adverse effect on world public opinion, the Turkish president, Cemal Giirsel, hastened to express his indignation with Urgiiplii. Thus, early in November 1965, he declared: «Such words could only have been uttered by a person labouring under stress. I cannot understand otherwise how the prime minister could have spoken in this way. Turkey is not a tribe but a state: she honours her obligations and takes when necessary forcible action. The mere recollection of the events of 6/7 September 1955 is painful. I reject the prime minister's words. »38 Despite the reassuring statement of the president, the Greek minority continued to be apprehensive about its future in Turkey. Nor did these misgivings disappear after the electoral victory of Siileyman Demirel and his Justice party in October 1965. 39 The Demirel administration, following the
37. Bitsios to the Secretary-General, 18 October 1965, UNSC;S(6820, The quote by Tsirimokos is given in the same document. 38. This quote is given in G. Lewis, op. cit., p. 148. Already in an interview to the Athenian daily To Bfif1u on 19 March, the Turkish premier hinted that if the Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave Cyprus. Turkey would welcome them. "but such a turn of events would compel us to take similar measures», This evidently was a reference to the Greek minority in Turkey. 39. The Constantinopolitan Christians voted en masse for the Justice party, for statistics indicating this trend see M. Sencer, Turkiye'de Slnlfsal Yapl ve Siyasal Davranl:jlar, istanbul 1974, pp . 115-16.
289
policies of his predecessors, continued with the expulsions of Cons tantinopolitan Greeks. Further, through new legislative action, the Demirel govemment sought to curb the rights of the non-Muslim minorities over their communal property. Thus, in the summer of 1967, a new act (no. 903/1967) replaced the earlier vakiflaw of 1949 (no. 5404).40 According to the second paragraph of article 74 of the new law, communal property founded by a group and aiming at «the reinforcement of a certain race or minority» would not be recognized as a vakifby the authorities. Evidently, with this article the govemment made clear its intention to put an end to the formation of new minority-owned communal concems. This view was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court (Yarg'itay) of Turkey, when on 12 January 1971 it decreed that the minorities would no longer possess the right to found new vakif property.41 Commenting on the vak'i/law of 1967, Dr Ahmet i~eri maintained that by imposing restriction on the right of the minorities, with Turkish citizenship. to own communal property, the new legislative act was contrary to the Turkish constitution."!:! The new law did not only go against the fundamental principle of equal treatment stipulated by the Turkish constitutions, but it also violated the minority clauses of the treaty of Lausanne. Paragraph two of article 42 of this treaty decreed that «All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the non-Muslim minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish govemment will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature.» Further, the 1967 law decrees the levy of a five per cent surtax upon the income of communal organizations, which had already paid their proper govemment and municipal taxes. This was the so-called mukataa tax that was abolished by the earlier vakiflaw of 1949. Finally, in another law in 1978 (no. 502/1978), the BallkU hospital was singled out. Accordingly, the Ballkll parish was informed that no donations to the hospital after 1936 would be registered by the govemment, for such a transaction would have «disturbed public order». In this way, the hospital was deprived of the large endowent made by a wealthy Constantinopolitan Greek in 1964. Meanwhile, the central committees of the large BeyogJu (Pera), Galata and Kadlk6y (Chalcedon) 40. 41. 42. 1968,
Resmf Gazete, no. 12655, 24 July 1937. Giineri, op.cit., p. 98. A.l~eri, Iiirk MedenfKanununa Gore Vak/f(Tesis), Ankara University doctoral thesis p. 48.
parishes, which co-ordinated the administration of community concems within each parish, were abolished. These legislative onslaughts convinced many Constantinopolitan Greeks to move out of Turkey. The dramatic decline of the Greek element in Turkey is clearly visible in the following official population statistics: 43 Date 0/ census Greek-speaking Greek Orthodox 1935 108,725 125,046 1945 88,680 103,839 1955 80,000 86,655 1960 65,000 106,611 1965 48,096 76,122 Despite this palpable exodus, the Turkish govemment continued to maintain that the maltreatment of the Greek minority in Turkey was «a myth». As the Turkish ambassador to the United Nations argued, «the Greek minority in Istanbul», according to Ankara, <
290 291
Cyprus issue,45 but they also managed to improve their position on other points of the Greek- Turkish nexus, i.e. the minority question and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The fate ofImbros and Tenedos Greeks was sealed then. The Turkish determination to empty these islands of their Greek majority population became clear during the crisis of 1964-65, when taking advantage of the circumstances Ankara colonized Imbros and Tenedos with convicts from mainland jails. Submitted to ever-growing pressures, the Imbriot and Tenediot Greeks fled the islands. Since the late 1960s, little has been heard of them, except when one reads of a boat coming in from one of those islands carrying a few desparate refugees. 46 After the far-reaching Greek concessions on the Cyprus question during the K.e~an-Alexandroupolis conference, Ankara appeared willing to improve bilateral relations. Thus, on 20 January 1968, Turkey recognized the Greek military regime, the only country to do so besides Congo-Kinshasa. Following earlier rounds of talks in 1959 and 1962, Greece and Turkey agreed, to hold talks on the outstanding minority questions in February 1968. The first stage of these negotiations took place a month later in Athens. The Greek delegation was headed by John Tzounis, chief of the Turkish desk at the Greek Foreign Ministry and the Turkish by Adnan Bulak, director-general of the Greek and Cyprus affairs department in the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The second stage of the talks was held in Ankara in April and the third in Vienna ending on 3 I May. As a result, the two sides succeeded in concluding an educational agreement permitting the Muslim minority in Greece and the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey to have their children taught in their own language without restrictions.-l 7 This agreement was endorsed by the foreign
45. These negotiations can be considered as a cornerstone in the future developments in Cyprus. In November 1967, after bloody collisions in the island which brought threats of Turkish intervention, Cyrus Vance was rushed to Athens, Nicosia and ankara. He was successful in forestalling a Greek-Turkish confrontation and the main outcome of his effOlt was an agreement to withdraw from the island all Greek and Turkish forces other than those allowed by the Zurich and London agreements. As a result, by agreeing to withdraw some twelve thousand soldiers introduced to the island in 1964 by the Papandreou government to defend it against Turkish threats of intervention, the junta deprived Greece of its military foothold on the island. On the other hand, the Turks were able to camouflage the two or three thousand Turkish soldiers whohad been introduced as Turkish Cypriots. With the withdrawal of the Greek troops, the Athens regime lost even the relative freedom it had to conduct its own policy in Cyprus. It became wide open to pressures from Ankara and Washington. For details see A.G. Xydis, «The Military Regime's Foreign Policy» in R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos (eds), Greece Under Military Rule, London 1972, pp. 191-209. 46. See for details Alexandris, «Imbros and Tenedos», pp. 23·31. ., 47. The Greek delegation included Peter Molyviatis and Panayiotis Oikonomou, as well as
292
ministers of the two countries. Panayiotis Pipinelis and ihsan Sabri <:;aglayangil. during a meeting in the Turkish embassy in London on 27 July. In a communique issued on 3 September it was announced that the agreement concerning the educational issues of minorities would be put into effect during the academic year of 1968-69. The formation of a mixed GreekTurkish commission to examine ways of implementing the stillborn cultural agreement of 195 I was also announced. The commission duly met in Ankara (2 I October to 9 November) and then in Athens (IO to 20 December) resulting in the signing of a new instrument on minority education."!! Seeking to improve teaching conditions in the minority schools this agreement affirmed the exchange of teachers and text-books while facilitating the wide use of the minority language in such institutions. As a result a number of Constantinopolitan Greek teachers. including the headmaster of the Ioakeimeion /yeee. Dimitrios Pandelaras. were reinstated. Satisfied with the results of these negotiations. Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis expressed optimism about the future of the Greek minority schools in Turkey. Likewise. in a statement to the istanbul daily Mil/iyet on 30 May 1971. Premier George Papa90poulos quite naively proclaimed his belief in a Greco-Turkish federation. This optimism, however, was rather premature. By August 1971. the Theological seminary of Chalki, still the principal training school for the clergy of the Greek Orthodox world outside Greece itself, was closed down by the authorities following a law against all private institutions of higher learning. 49 Notwithstanding the reappointment of a number of Greek teachers in Istanbul, pressure against Constantinopolitan Greek schools continued while the teaching of the Greek language continued to be prohibited in the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. By May 1973. the two governments exchanged notes complaining about the maltreatment of their respective minorities. A few months later during a conversation with Turkish Premier TaW. the Greek foreign minister. Xanthopoulos Palamas referred to the «gradual disappearance of the Greek element in Turkey». 50
Nicholas Damtsas. a member of the Greek consulate in istanbul with a wide knowledge of Turkish affairs, and Nicholas Kephalidis, an advisor on educational issues. Damtsas interview, thens 1977. 48. Bilgen· Kitsaras agreement. Cllmhllriyet, 21 December 1968. 49. For more details on the closure of the seminary see below. 50. Nairn Talii to George Papadopoulos. 5 May and George Papadopoulos to Nairn Talii, 24 May 1973. quoted in Ch. Sazanidis. Of ·D.i.l/\'OTOVPK/Ki::; Eliael:; au;\' ilenaeria, 1973·1978, Thessaloniki 1979. p. 65 .
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The almost complete disappearance of the Greek element in Turkey was finally brought about by the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974 which brought Greece and Turkey nearest to an armed conflict since 1922. Given the near cold war atmosphere that has characterized relations between Athens and Ankara since 1974 the exodus of the remaining Constantinopoli- • tan Greeks from Turkey is quite understandable. According to a survey conducted by the editor of the grecophone weekly 'HxeO , Charalarhbos Rombopoulos and two IDeal Greek lawyers in October 1978, there were barely 7822 Greeks remaining in istanbul. A large number of those expressed their intention of leaving Turkey soon.51 Preoccupied by the pressing questions of Cyprus, the Aegean continental shelf and the air space, the governments of Greece and Turkey have not forcefully raised the issue of the minorities as yet. However, politicians and the press in both countries often return to this question. Both sides continue to complain about the treatment of these minorities. Greece has also raised the issue of «proportionality» and «reciprocity» of the two minorities, which, according to Athens, is built in the Lausanne treaty. Thus, during the parliamentary session of2 February 1976, fifteen deputies submitted a petition to the government concerning the fate of the Greek minority in Turkey. They argued that article 45 of the Lausanne agreement called for the maintenance over time of approximately an equal number of minority populations in istanbul and Greek Thrace. In view of the mass exodus of the Greek element from Turkey, the petition asked the government to seek ways for the restoration of the minority balance. 52 During the same session deputy Hippocrates Savouras wanted to know the position of the government on the minority question. In response, a government spokesman reported that just in 1975, Greece had made forty-one representations to the Turkish government concerning the Greek minority in Turkey. 53 The opposition, and in particular the Centre Union, raised on several occasions the issue demanding the settlement of the minority question on the basis of the «principle of inter-state reciprocity» (apPl v7,;; JzaKparzKlj:,; a/loz{Ja.z0T11Tar;;).54 On 31 May 1978, the undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry, Andreas Zaimis revealed that the issue of proportionality was raised by the Greeks on four different occasions. 51. 27 October 1973.
Firstly, during the Tzounis-Bulak negotiations in 1968, and then during the exchange of notes, on 31 May 1974, on the unresolved issues between the two countries. Thirdly, in a long memorandum forwarded to the Turkish government on 3 February 1976 by the Greek embassy in Ankara. Finally, the issue of reciprocitY'was raised on 13 January 1977, in a demarche to the Turkish government by the Greek ambassador in Turkey.55 The Turks, however, while bitterly complaining against the treatment of the Muslim minority in Greece, refused to debate the grievances of the Greeks in Turkey. Instead they insisted that the Constantinopolitan Greeks were a privileged minority. With the return of Biilent Ecevit to power in January 1978, there was a renewed interest in resolving differences between the two countries. Thus, before the summit meeting between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers in Montreux on 10-11 March, Ecevit approached the Phanar expressing its wish to reopen a dialogue between the government and the minority. A patriarchal delegation met Ecevit in Ankara on 7 March and was followed a month later by a representation of the Ballkll ephori.56 A sympathetic Ecevit listened to the grievances of the minority and patricularly the difficulties created by the five per cent surcharge on the financially troubled communal institutions. The premier appointed Orhan Eyuboglu, the minister to the prime minister. to investigate the grievances of the Greek minority. But little tangible progress was made. By January 1979 most of the Greek parishes were furnished with their mukataa surcharge. When, moreover, the authorities confiscated some property of the Phanar /ycee for boys and auctioned it, in an attempt to raise the tax, Patriarch Dimitrios addressed a protest note to Premier Ecevit. In it he bitterly complained of the harassment caused by this tax and warned that surtax may force the Greek communal institutions into bankruptcyY In April 1979, the patriarch sent yet another such note. 58 This precipitated some international reaction and the archbishop of North and South America, Jacob Koukouzis, sent letters to President Carter and Cyrus Vance, the US foreign secretary. Earlier, the London based Minority Rights Group took an interest in the condition of the Constantinopolitan Greeks and invited Erica Dai, a legal expert on interna-
53. 18 of those representations protested against the imposition of the five per cent surcharge on the minority establishments, 17 against the plight of the Greeks in Imbros and Tenedos and six against restrictions on Greek education, ibid, pp. 29-31. 54. Ibid., pp. 33-34. The Central Union has shown great deal of sensitivity to the fate of the Greek minority. In this it is assisted by a Constantinopolitan Greek, Neoklis Sarris, a university lecturer.
55. Ibid. 56. The patriarchal delegation consisted of Meliton of ChaIcedon. Chrysostom of Myra and Bartholemew of Philadelphia . The representatives of BalikIl who met Ecevit on 6 April were Miltiadis Tzambazoglou, Miltiadis Kourtesoglou. Dimitrios Karayiannis and the legal advisor Platon Christidis . They were accompanied by the deputy of istanbul. K
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52 . .dei.riov Ksnpou Kwvawl'rIvoun:o}.crwv, Athens 1978, p. 19.
tional relations and former Greek representative in the UN and Council of Europe, to elaborate on the subject. In her speech, Dai referred to the plight of the Greek minority in Turkey and the legal harassment of the minority by the Turkish authorities. 59 Anxious to avoid any adverse publicity, the Ecevit government renewed the dialogue with the Greek communal leaders. Thus, on 29 August, the patriarch, accompanied by Archbishop Meliton of Chalcedon, held a meeting with Eyiiboglu, the vice premier, during which they once again voiced the apprehensions of the minority about the five per cent surcharge. A month later, Eyiiboglu met with the president of the BaIlkU parish, Miltiadis Tzambazoglou. 60 Notwithstanding these meetings, the government did not alter its policy on the mllkataa surcharge with the result that most of the Greek minority establishments have to operate under the constant threat of bankruptcy. The exodus of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, clearly indicates that the Muslim-Orthodox symbiosis in istanbul, that began in 1923 with the Lausanne agreement, has failed. The Turkish mistrust of their Greek fellow citizens was partly due to the persistence of the millet mentality, which continued to determine relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Turkey. Accordingly, Turkish-speaking Muslims remained the only citizens who, in practice, held full political and civil rights. On the other hand, the Greeks, particularly bthe religious Orthodox circles, resented the introduction offar-reaching cultural and institutional changes in Turkey. The majority ofthe Constantinopolitan Greeks appeared perturbed by the Kemalist determination to put the principle of secular nationality into practice. This policy, they feared, would ultimately impair their distinct ethnic and religious character. Their opposition to secular reform, coupled with their nostalgia for the ancien regime did not endear them to the Ankara government. The Greek in republican Turkey lived simultaneously at two levels of experience. On the one hand, he conducted his everyday life as a Turkish citizen and loyally observed the responsibilities that his citizenship entailed. But, there was another level of experience closely connected with his traditional ethnic Greek/Rum identity and customs which he was not prepared to abandon. Often, these two levels of experience, particularly duting the Cyprus crisis, diverged sharply, placing the Greeks in a very awkward position. Aware of this dichotomy, nationalist Turks mistrusted the Greek minority and continued to treat them as aliens. Significantly, the ethnic origin and/or religion still appears on the Turkish identity documents (nilflls be-Igesi) ancfin 59, The text of the speech is given in the KaOTTIlBpmi of II January 1979_ 600 Ilo).iTTTr;. 13 (October 1979)"
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the case of the Greeks the termSRllln Ortodoks is being utilized. In this way it is emphasized that such minority groups, though Turkish citizens, are not pure Turks. The essential basis of Turkish suspicions about the Greeks appears to have been religious-cum-racial prejudice. Further, although there were Turkish misgivings concerning the use of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority as a pretext for an attempt by Greece to incorporate istanbul in the Greek state, given the small number of Greeks in Turkey, this threat had by 1930 become non-existent. Again, the extrusion of the Greek minority from the body ofthe nation can be partly explained by the Greek isolation from the social and cultural world of the Turks. Yet, there has recently been a distinct change in the cultural and linguistic attitudes of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. The post-1950s generation of Greeks spoke Turkish fluently and exhibited signs of integration into the Turkish culture. This change was primarily brought about by the heavy concentration in the curriculum of the minority schools on the Turkish language and culture. This trend was also encouraged by Patriarch Athenagoras, who was influenced by his experience in the United States where the Greek Americans had been able to integrate successfully into the American society. There is evidence to suggest that without constant pressure and discrimination this last generation of Constantinopolitan Greeks might have indeed identified itself with the Turkish nation at large 61 • On the other hand, an increasing number of Turks, particularly in the business circles, developed close ties with members of the Greek minority. Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a visible intensification in the interrelations between the two groups. Thus, many Turks expressed sympathy for the predicament of the Constantinopolitan Hellenes in 1964-65. 62 The Turkish government failed to appreciate this marked change of attitudes. Instead, Ankara continued to view the Greek minority in Turkey as a mere pawn in its deals with Athens_ Further, with the emergence of a new Turkish professional and managerial class after World War II, the Constantinopolitan Greek element acquired a marginal character in the contemporary socio-economic life of istanbul. Unlike the 1920s therefore, the Greeks in Turkey were now a dispensible element. Their mass exodus, Ankara believed, would have little, if any, adverse effects on the performance of the istanbul economy. 610 Today, in areas of Athens, like Palaio Phaliron and Kalamaki, where there is a high concentration of former Constantinopolitan Greeks, it is not uncommon to hear youths conversing among themselves in the Turkish language. 62" See article entitled «Turkey Deports Hundreds of Greek Nationals» by Phillip NoelBarker, in The Christian Science Monitor. 27 July 1964.
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2. The Patriarchate during the final years of Athenagoras and the election of his successor Dimitrios. During the post-1964 period, while exhibiting little sympathy for the needs of the Greek minority, the Turkish government adopted an illiberal attitude towards the Patriarchate. In an attempt to improve its bargaining position in the long-standing Greek-Turkish antagonism, Ankara began to put severe pressure on the Phanar. As most of the Turks continued to regard the Phanar as an unwelcome residue of Greek influence in what had become an overwhelmingly Islamic istanbul, Turkish public opinion stood firmly behind the position of the Ankara government. 1 Thus, on 16 April 1965, a Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that the Turkish government linked the problem of Cyprus with that of the Patriarchate, as part of the same question. The Turkish government accordingly indicated that, if the Greeks did not modify their Cyprus policy, Ankara would not hesitate to reexamine its engagements towards the Greek minority in Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.2 To demonstrate its determination, the Turkish government adopted a number of restrictive measures against the Phanar. Thus, as early as 1962, the Bureau of Political Police in istanbul informed the patriarchal authorities that the government would not tolerate the Phanar's involvement in the affairs of the Greek minority. Likewise, the authorities refused permission for the reconstruction of the section of the Patriarchate burnt in September 1941. Nor did they allow the Greeks to repair several churches, including the cathedral building ofDercos archbishopric at Tarabya (Therapeia), damaged during the September 1955 riots. Instead, the Byzantine church ofSt. George on the banks of the Bosphorus was demolished to make room for the construction of the luxurious Tarabya hoteJ.3 The campaign against the Phanar was intensified as intercommunal hostilities erupted in Cyprus. Thus, from the academic year of 1963-64, only
L In an interview with Spyros Markezinis in 1972, the distinguished soldier and politician tsmet Inonii, who headed the Turkish delegation at Lausanne, expressed his open dislike for the Phanar, see Markezinis, op. cit .• p. 333. 2. The Turkish press urged repeatedly the government to use the Phanar as a trump card (koz) inits deals with Greece, see Cumhuriyet. 8 March 1964. See also another article by the distinguished professor, Ismet Giritli, entitled Patrikhane (Patriarchate), in the Cumhuriyet of 22 April 1964. 3. Anonymous. «01 'ElCKJ~l]oiE<; 1tOV lCU'Eliucpicr9l]lCUV mi)v Kcov(rtuvnvou1toA.l] lCui m1')v '\flPPO flE,a ,1') Luv9i]lCl] Acoscivvl]<; (1923)>> 'E"").'1u1a. 1981, pp. 5-21.
Turkish citizens were permitted to study at the patriarchal seminary of ChaDd, resulting in the expulsion of Hellenic as well as all other foreign theology students. On 10 April 1964, the Bureau of Political Police ordered the closing of the patriarchal printing-house on the grounds that under law 5681 only legal entities and legal persons were allowed to operate a printing press. Since the Patriarchate was apparently not recognized as such, the authorities shut down the patriarchal press which was first established during the patriarchate of Cyril in 1672. This resulted in the discontinuance of two religious publications, 'OpBo6oC:Ja and 'A n60"w},oc,; 'A v6piw;;, through which the Phanar had performed its spiritual activities.4 Even more significant was the expulsion, on 21 April 1964, of two senior members of the holy synod, Aimilianos Zacharopoulos, archbishop of Selefkia and grand vicar of the Patriarchate, and Jacob Tzanavaris, archbishop of Philadelpheia. Accused of engaging «in political, administrative, educational and social activities of a subversive nature», the metropolitans were divested of their Turkish citizenship and asked to leave the country.s Similar action was taken against a number of priests with Hellenic nationality, one of whom , Father Anastasios Xenos, was even sentenced to a prison term for «harmful activities against the Turkish state». A year later, on 8 April, the Patriarchate was accused by President Giirsel of «behaving illegally», hinting that the Phanar had failed to confine itself to purely religious functions. Likewise, Premier UrgiipIi.i. after claiming that the Phanar was engaged in political activities, warned that the government could take several legislative and administrative measures to curb such «anti-Turkish activities». 6 three inspectors, representing the Ministry of Finance, the police and the Department of Religious Foundations (evkaf). During a brief talk with Athenagoras, they demanded an investigation of the accounts and administrative functions of the Phanar, despite the inviolability of the patriarchal premises guaranteed by article 80 of the Turkish civil code. A thorough and well-publicized investigation of the Phanar started on 28 April and resulted in the repeal of the patriarch's right of ownership ofthe cathedral of St. George at the Phanar. The estate, including its movable property (priceless ikons and other religious objects), were thus declared to be without recognized legal
4. Cumhuriyet, II April 1964. 5. Ibid .• 22 April 1964. 6. The Times. 8 April 1965. For more examples of anti-Phallar statements by Turkish leaders see M.S. Sahin, Pener Patrikhanesi ve Tiirkiye, Istanbul 1980, pp. 217-18, 233-35,
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ownership. Later in the same year, the government placed at the doors of the Patriarchate a police contingent, both uniformed and plainclothed, ostensibly to protect the patriarch. On 4 October however a number of visitors, including the bishop of Dafnousia, were not allowed to enter the Phanar premises. Two days later a group of German tourists was discouraged from visiting the Patriarchate and the authorities announced that no foreign diplomatic representations would be allowed to enter the patriarchal grounds. Indignant at this state of affairs, the Greek Consul-General Karandreas expressed to the governor of Istanbul his government's displeasure with «the attempt to isolate the head of Greek Orthodoxy». While restrictions were somewhat relaxed after this demarche, the authorities officially forbade the Phanar archbishops to use the Greek names of their Anatolian and Thracian dioceses. Apprehension in Greece with the renewed Turkish pressure against the Patriarchate was acute. The Greek foreign minister, Stavros Kostopoulos, accused Turkey of violating the provisions of the treaty of Lausanne concerning the rights of the Patriarchate in anote verbale delivered on 20 April 1%4 to the ambassadors of Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Japan (the other signatories of the treaty). After referring to the closing of the patriarchal printing-house and the expulsion of several priests, Kostopoulos maintained that such measures ran counter to the obligations assumed by the Turkish government during the negotiations at Lausanne. In 1923, the Greek foreign minister recalled, the Turks had pledged not only to maintain the Patriarchate but also to allow «the unhindered performance of its lofty religious mission». 7 Likewise the measures were in flagrant contradiction to the guarantee given at Lausanne concerning the free exercise, whether in private or in public, of any creed, religion or belief. Referring specifically to the deportation of two senior Phanar metropolitans, he cautioned that this measure «opens the way for action to decimate the Holy Synod by administrative means and to invalidate a Church institution». In a letter to the Council of the United Nations, date on 21 May, the permanent representative of Greece, Dimitri Bitsios, concentrated on the arbitrary nature of the expulsion of the metropolitans stressing: «It is all too easy to make vague accusations a posteriori of political, administrative, educational and social activities of a subversive nature. An elementary sense of justice demands that such accusations should be made known to the persons concerned and that the latter should have an opportunity to refute them and the right to appeal from them to 7. The text of the note verbale was communicated to the United Nations, see document UNSC/S/5665.
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a higher authority. Yet the two Metropolitans were divested of Turkish nationality and summarily expelled by a simple administrative act; no accusation was made against them and they were not even permitted to exercise any right of appeal. The administrative authority which notified them of the decision even refused them the opportunity to acknowledge, without prejudice of their rights, receipt of the notification.» 8 At the same time, the restrictions imposed on the Phanar, provoked a reaction from the Christian churches all over the world. On 16 April, the World Council of Churches in Geneva called upon the Turkish government to follow «generally accepted principles of religious freedom» in its relationship with the Patriarchate. 9 Another telegram forwarded by the US Protestant leaders expressed «deep concern» about the measures taken against the Patriarchate. It urged Ankara to «preserve the Patriarchate inviolate» and to view the «position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in both its ecclesiastical freedom, and in the light of the generally accepted principles of religious freedom allowing it to perform its functions».1 0 The leades of the Anglican church also sent an appeal to the Turkish government stating that «the injury to the Patriarch himself will give great distress to the Churches in ;:tIl our different countries. I I Similar appeals in this connection were also sent from France, as well as from 54 religious leaders representing six Protestant denominations, who were meeting at Princeton university to discuss Christian unity.12 Finally, on 24 April, the Imbros-born Greek Orthodox archbishop of North and South America, Jacob, addressed a detailed memorandum to the president of the US, Lyndon B. Johnson elaborating on the measures taken by the Turkish government against the PatriarchateP Faced with a concerted outcry against its policies towards the Phanar, the Turkish government chose to make a reassuring statement. Thus, on 20 April, in a telegram transmitted by the Turkish ambassador in Washington,
8. Bitsios to the Secretary-General, 12 May 1964, UNSCfS/5702. 9. Signed by Dr. Franklin Clark Fry, chairman of the World Council of Churches» Policy Committee and the general secretary, Dr. Visser't Hoofe The text of the letter can be found in International Relations, 7-8 (1964-65) 136-37. 10. This telegram, addressed on 15 April and caITying four signatures, can be found in ibid., pp. 133-34. II. It is signed by the archbishops of Canterbury, Uppsala, Philippines, Canada, Melbourne, India and Jerusalem, see ibid., p. 134. 12. Ibid., p. 141 13. Ibid., pp. 138-41.
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Turgut Menemencioglu, to the director of the commission on international affairs of the World Council of Churches, Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin gave an assurance that «both the Patriarchate and the person of the Patriarch shall remain fully inviolate» .14 Justifying the expulsion of the two metropolitans, the permanent representative of Turkey to the United Nations, in a letter to the secretary-general, U Thant, elaborated his government's position: «They (the two metropolitans) have been acting as officials and agents of the Greek Government entrusted with the task of conveying the wishes and orders of that Government to Turkish Orthodox citizens. Furthermore they have interfered with the educational cun"icula of the Greek minority schools and have propagated hellenistic doctrines sapping the loyalty of Turkish citizens of Greek origin. Nor have they failed to indulge in large-scale subversive activities within the Greek minority of a nature to jeopardize the prestige and security of Turkey». 15 He finally accused the two Phanar clerics of «having acted as a fifth column for the expansionist ambitions of the Greek Government» .16 Ambassador Eralp, however, produced no evidence whatsoever to substantiate these accusations. The anti-Phanar measures coincided with a violent campaign against the Patriarchate and Patriarch Athenagoras in the Turkish press. The National Federation of Turkish Students staged mass demonstrations outside the patriarchal premises shouting anti-Greek slogans. Meanwhile, Papa Eftim renewed his campaign against the Phanar. In a press conference as early as September 1963, he alleged that the Phanar «is working in the service of Hellenism» and predicted that the clerics of the Patriarchate would son leave Athenagoras and join his Turkish Orthodox church, which, he claimed, was the only officially recognized Patriarchate. 17 With the worsening of the situation in Cyprus, Papa Eftim regained prominence and when he fell ill his son, Turgut Erenerol, became the defacto leader of the church. Significantly, on 28 Febrary 1964, the Council of Ministers decided to allow Turgut to wear the ecclesiastical dress outside the church. This in fact was an official ack·
14. See Th. Agnidis, The Ecumenical Patriarchate ill the Light a/the Lausanne Treaty, New York 1964, p. 7. 15. Eralp to the Secretary-General, I May 1964, UNSCjS/5677. 16. Ibid. 17. X. Jacob, «An Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Church», Eastern Churches Review, 3 (1970-71) 66-67.
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nowledgement of Turgut as Papa Eftim' s successor and head of the Turkish Orthodox movement. Turgut was determined to oppose the Patriarchate with equal tenacity. In a statement to the press in May 1965, he accused Athenagoras of being a traitor and of working for Hellenic interests. He then went on to propose that all the schools, churches and the hospital of the Greek community ought to be handed over to the Turkish Orthodox Church since this «was necessary for the nati?nal integrity of Turkey» .18 At the beginning of September, he took posseSSIOn of the remaining two Greek-controlled churches of Galata, St. John and St. Nicholas. To justify his action, he alleged that the title-deeds of these churches, together with the adjoining Greek school of Galata, belonged to the Turkish Orthodox Church. Resorting once again to his violent polemics against the Phanar, he declared that according to «the liturgical laws» Papa Eftim had the right to depose the patriarch and to dissolve the holy synod. «We make known to the Christian world», he said, «that henceforth the Eastern Orthodox Church is placed under the protection of the Turkish Orthodox Church». 19 Finally, on 24 September 1965, with the connivance of the authorities, Turgut became the «legal owner» of the Galata churches. While the Constantinopolitan Greek community petitioned the legal authorities, the Patriarchate reacted by taking Turgut Erenerol to court. The Greek government immediately addressed a letter to the United Nations protesting against the activities of the Erenerol family at the expense of the Greek community. 20 In this letter, Athens underlined that although it lacked a congregation outside the immediate Erenerol family, the Turkish Orthodox church enjoyed subsidies and support from the Turkish government. It explained that: «The Orthodox churches of istanbul belong since time immemori~l to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Only in recent years did Turkey introduce a European system of real-estate registration, but the Land Office defeated arbitrarily all the steps of the Patriarchate to register its churches ... There is no such thing as a Turkish Orthodox Church let alone Patriarchate. There is only the notorious Erenerol family, c;eatures and tools of the Turkish Government, to whom the Turkish authorities find it convenient to issue title-deeds to Greek churches, in
IS. Ibid., p. 67. 19. Ibid., For his statements to the Turkish press see Sahin, ap.cit., pp. 222-23. 20. Papa Eftim changed the Greek form of his name, Karaltisaridis, into the Turkish HisarogJu; but finding this to be still too Greek in sound, he officially adopted the surname Erenerol.
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order to despoil the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek community which erected them at its own expense.»21 This appeal brought no success and Premier Urgiiplii warned that his government would not give in to outside pressure, especially since this matter was considered to be an internal question. 22 Finally, in 1973, a high court decreed that the Galata churches were the legal property of the Turkish Orthodox Church and dismissed the appeal of the Patriarchate. 23 Earlier, on 14 March 1968, Papa Eftim I died at the age of eighty-four. Having been excommunicated by the Patriarchate, the Greeks refused to allow his burial at the main Orthodox cemetery. By special order of President Sunay. the authorities forced the patriarch to give his consent to Eftim's burial at the Greek cemetery. The presence of several senators. deputies and other dignitaries. including an official representative of the government. at his funeral illustrated the high respect enjoyed by Papa Eftim in certain influential Turkish circles. Concurrently. his son Turgut. succeeded him with full rights. and with all the titles and privileges enjoyed by his father. The autonomous Turkish Orthodox church still exists. under its new head Turgut Erenerol who also assumed the title of Eftim IJ.2~ The Turks, however, did not show equal tolerance to the Greek Orthodox Church. Fearing that the Phanar's improving relations with the Vatican might enhance the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate, the Turks applied new pressures against the patriarch. Thus, the Turkish press reported that the rapprochement with the Vatican had an «anti-Turkish and political character» and warned the Phanar against such activities. Again, when the patriarch attempted to improve relations with the Bulgarian Exarchate, the press charged him with «Communist intrigue».25 On 27 April 1965, the Turkish ambassador in Paris declared that:
21. Letters by Liatis to Secretary-General. 29 September and 14 October 1965. in UNSCjS/6723 and /6783 respectively. 22, For a Turkish defense of its position on this question see Eralp to Secretary-General. 7 October 1965. UNSC/S/6758. 23, dei:riov Kivrpov KWVO"Wl'TlI'OVlroi.miiv. p, 27. 24. Going even fulther than his father. he gave up his Christian Orthodox name George Karahisaridis, by adopting the name Turgut. Born in Ankara in 1920, he graduated from the medical faculty ofIstanbul university. He went to the America for postgraduate studies, and on his return to Turkey he got married. Despite his marital status and his rudimentary theological knowledge, he claims to be an Orthodox patriarch. Lacking a congregation, Turgut and his brother Selyuk run the Galata churches, including the substantial property of the parish, as a private family business. 25 ~ahin. op . cil. pp. 218-19.
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«The Patriarchate may stay in Turkey as long as it remains a national religious institution whose activities are strictly and modestly confined within the frontiers of the country.» 26 This statement, implying a threat to expel the Patriarchate if it persisted in exercising its ecumenical functions, raised a wave of rebuttal from churches and religious leaders in the West. 27 The Greek government, too, in a letter to the United Nations warned that Ankara was «bent on eroding the position and the ecumenical character of the Christian Orthodox Church». 28 Earlier, on 11 September 1964, the Greek delegate in Geneva, Dimitri Bitsios, in his opening remarks at a meeting ofthe Council of the United Nations referred at length to the harassment of the Patriarchate only to be rebuffed by his Turkish counterpart, Ambassador Orhan Eralp. Turkish legal and administrative measures against the Patriarchate however continued unabated. In July 1971, the Turks shut down the theology department of the Chalki seminary on the grounds that, under the provisions of a new law. higher education became a government reserve. The closure of the theological academy creates new problems for the clergy, for it is now impossible to train locally younger members of the community for the senior posts of the Patriarchate. This restriction coupled with the dramatic dwinlHing of the Greek community places the future of the Patriarchate as a religious institution in jeopardy. Today, with only few thousand Orthodox left in Turkey. any boy who chooses to become a priest is quite likely to reach the rank of archbishop - if, of course , he does not follow the example of most llf his community and emigrate first. Predicting this eventuality, as early as 1964. Archbishop Jacob of America warned: 29 «The Patriarchate is not a collection of buildings, walls and grounds. It is a living spiritual force embodied in an institution that has for centuries been the very core and heart of the Greek Orthodox Christian tradition. Therefore, Turkish assurances that the Patriarchate will not be endangered are meaningless. Just as the Greek Orthodox Christians can not exist in Turkey without the Patriarchate, so too the Ecumenical Patriarchate cannot fulfil its true and inherent function without the communicants who entrust their spiritual life to the Patriarchal See ... The Ecumenical Patriarchate cannot live in a void».
26. Le Monde, 27 April 1965. ~7. See for instance the refutation by the Dominican theologian Father Dumont. in Le Monde, 28 April 1965. 28 . Bitsios to Secretary-General. 27 September 1965. UNSC/S/6723. 29. Quoted in The Hellenic Rel'iell', October 1964.
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The patriarch, too, was noted to be in despair about the future of the Patriarchate. During the last years of his patriarchate, he was compelled to watch helplessly while the size of his flock in istanbul dwindled to a catastrophic degree. As the suggestion of removal of the Patriarchate to Patmos, Mt Athos, Crete, Rhodes and Geneva gained ground in some Orthodox circles, Athenagoras firmly refused to abandon his remaining flock at this critical conjuncture. On the other hand, faced with a renewed Turkish campaign for the expulsion of the Patriarchate from Turkey coupled with veil threats from Ankara, the patriarch took some steps for guaranteeing the uninterrupted continuity of the institution. Thus, in 1966, with the generous donations of Greek shipping magnate, George Laimos, a centre of Orthodoxy, attached to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. was founded in the outskirts of Geneva, Switzerland. 30 Similarly, in 1968, two educational establishments. affiliated to the Patriarchate. an institute of theology (l1arpwpIIKOl' ",[c5PVj.lC1 ilarEplKCUl' lviEi.GTCU1') in Thessaloniki and an Orthodox academy in Crete. were erected.}! At the same time. thanks to the patriarch's energetic leadership and diplomatic skills. the Ecumenical Patriarchate was able to maintain its international prestige. When the aged patriarch Athenagoras died on 7 July 1972. the issue of his succession raised considerable difficulties. The dispute was brought about by the new Turkish regulations concerning the election of a patriarch. communicated to the Patriarchate at the beginning of February 1972. The clergy was particularly apprehensive about the clause stipulating the witnessing of the future patriarchal elections by a public notary. This, the prelates argued. was contrary to the canonical law of the church. Further, the close associate of the patriarch. the dynamic Archbishop Meliton of Chalcedon together with another two prominent members of the Holy Synod were declared objectionable by the Turkish government and were thus disqualified from succeeding Athenagoras. Finally. on 16 July 1972, the holy synod elected Dimitrios. the archbishop of Imbros and Tenedos. patriarch with the title Dimitrios 1.32 Ever since his election the new patriarch has kept a low profile concentrating
30. JEi.rfol' Kil'TPOU KWl'aral'rII'OU7roi.lTwl', p . 56. 31. Stavridis. '0 ObiOUPEVIKO:; [JaTp/(ipX1J:;, p . 458, 32. Born in 1914 in the Bosphorus suburd of Tarabya. Dimitrios Papadopoulos graduated from the Theological seminary of Chalki and followed post-graduate studies in Canada and Athens. He entered the Phanar in 1937 and became the bishop at the parish ofSt. Apostles at Ferik6y. In 1966 he was promoted to archbishop of Imbros and Tenedos Immediately after his enthronement the new patriarch declared his loyalty to Turkey and expressed his wish for the improve-
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on appealing to the government against the vaklf surcharge, which threatens most of the Greek pious foundation in Istanbul with bankruptcy.33 But, the highlight of Dimitrios' patriarchate so far has been the visit of Pope John Paul II to the Phanar on 29 November 1979. In an effort to strengthen further links with the Orthodox church, Pope John Paul went even further than his predecessor Paul VI and attended an Orthodox mass at the Phanar cathedral of St. George. H Apart from its significance to the movement for Christian Unity. the papal visit helped enhance the prestige of the beleaguered Patriar'chate of Constantinople.
3. The Muslim minority a/Greece. On their part the Turks too appeared to have nursed grievances about the treatment accorded to their minority in Greece. Not unlike the Constantinopolitan Greeks, the Thracian Muslims benefited from the Greek- Turkish detente of the 1930s. While enjoying an increasing amount of religious, linguistic and cultural freedom, they were preoccupied with the cultivation of their tobacco-fields. In particular, those tobacco merchants, who acted as middlemen between the growers and the British-American Tobacco company were quite prosperous. In a detailed memorandum on the minorities in Greece, British Ambassador R.A. Leeper. an experienced diplomat on Greek affairs, remarked that the «treatment by the Greeks of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace has been uniformly good».1 The reasons for this, according to Leeper. were not hard to see. During the 1930s, Greece was genuinely attached to its new friendship with Turkey. Both the government and public opinion felt the need for Turkish support, in view of the threats posed by Fascist Italy in the west and Bulgaria in the north. Further, the existence and well-being of the Thracian Muslims may be used as a factor in urging the Turkish government to show goodwill towards the Greeks in Turkey. After stressing that the Muslims of Greek Thrace were «happy and content», Leeper concluded his account by intimating that the Greeks cultivated that community as «a model minority» with a certain «hostage value».2 These favourable conditions were abruptly interrupted by World War II. After Greek capitulation to the Axis Powers in May 1941, Greek Thrace was ment of relations between Greece and Turkey. He concluded his speech by stating «our road is that prescribed by Atatiirk», the text of this speech is given in $ahin, op.cit., p. 210. 33. See above chapter XI: I. 34. The Guardian (London), 28 & 30 November & I December 1979. I. «Minorities in Greece», memorandum prepared by Leeper, Cairo, 29 May 1944, FO 371/43775/RI2193 2. Ibid.
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occupied by Bulgaria. During the three-year Bulgarian occupation both Christians and Muslims were subjected to severe maltreatment. To escape Bulgarian persecution many local Muslims found refuge in Turkey. Their position. moreover. continued to be precarious even after the termination of World War II. as Thrace became one of the main theatres of the Greek civil war. Because of their allegiance to the royalist government of Athens. the Muslims were subjected to continuous pressure by communist bands.3 Persecution at the hands of the Bulgarians and Greek communists coupled with severe economic difficulties. forced some 3000 Muslims to emigrate to Turkey ..! By the end of 1946. however. the government forces in Thrace had taken strict measures against communist raids and the flow of Muslims to Turkey stopped. s The end of the civil war coupled with the entrance of both Greece and Turkey in NATO. contributed significantly to the amelioration of conditions in Greek Thrace. In accordance with the spirit of coexistence with Turkey. the Greek government sought ways of responding to the grievances of the Muslim community. Thus. on 24 March 1954. in a statement concerning the Muslim minority. the Greek premier. Marshal Papagos. declared: <<1 follow the question myself as I attach a particular importance to it and I am personally examining the demands and complaints of the Muslim communities. I have given orders that not only the pending problems should be solved immediately in a satisfactory manner and in conformity with the spirit to which I have referred, but all questions must be dealt with effectively to attain a general improvement in the social and spiritual conditions of this minority». 6 Earlier. Athens officially recognized the ethnic rather than religious character of the minority. when. on 28 January 1954. the governor-general of Thrace. G. Phessopoulos instructed the local authorities to substitute the word «Muslim» at the expense of non-Turkish Pomak and Gypsie Muslims.? 3. Ankara Chancery to Foreign Office. 13 September 1946. FO 371/58868/R 13871. An article which appeared in the ·Ei.i.l)I'lhOV Mii.i.Ol' (Thessalonikil of 22 September 1946 stated that «the Greek Communist party caused a panic among the Turcophone residents in Thrace». quoted in FO 37]i58868//RI4657. Peck (Thessaloniki) to Reilly (Athens). 23 September 1946. 4 . Interview with Turkish consul in Komotini. Muzaffer Gordiisu in Peck (Thessaloniki) to Reilly (Athens). 290ctober 1946. FO 371/58868/R 16150. See also The Times. 30 November 1946. 5. Peck (Thessaloniki) to Reilly (Athens). 29 October 1946. FO 371/58868/R 16150 . 6. See Ch. Christidis. Kvnplal(o hoi Ti.i.1)I'orovphIKa 1953·1967, Athens 1967. Lawyer and expert on the minority issue, Christos Christidis was employed by the Greek government to draw up a memorandum on the problems of the Thracian minority. 7. Andreadis. op.cit . , p. 9.
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The term «Muslim of Hellenic nationality» appears in the Lausanne treaty which exempted the Thracian Muslims from the exchange of populations of 1923 on the basis of their religion rather than nationality. This distinction. however. was eroded when at the Greek-Turkish negotiations of 1930-31. Venizelos conceded to Turkish demands for a greater secularization of the Muslim minority in Greece. s As a result. the deportation of leading local conservatives and the introduction of Turkish teachers from Turkey led to the gradual transformation of a basically religious to an ethnic minority in Greek Thrace. 9 Like their counterparts in Turkey. the Muslim minority in Greece benefited from the provisions of a number of educational and cultural agreements concluded by the two countries during the early 1950s. Further. with the initiative of King Paul, the Greek government built a Turkish gymnasium in Komotini for the use of the local Muslim community. The opening of the high-school coincided with the state visit of President CeliU Bayar who attended the inaugural celebrations in Komotini on 1 December 1952. In honour of the Turkish president the new high"school was named after him (eelal Bayar Lisesi). 10 According to the results of the Greek census of 1951. 111.665 (or 14.76 per cent of the popUlation) inhabitants were followers of the Muslim religion. I I Beside the Thracian Muslims this figure included the tiny Turkish population. estimated at 3.500 persons. in the newly incorporated Dodecanese. Being Greek citizens. the Muslims of Greece were represented in parliament by three deputies (sworn in on the Koran). They still have their own schools and four daily newspapers. while the Greek national radio network broadcasts a daily news bulletin in Turkish. Almost 300 mosques are scattered throughout Greek Thrace and are administered by the mufti (head of the Islamic order) and the community leaders. With the emergence of the Cyprus dispute, however, conditions for the Turks in Greece deteriorated. From January 1956, wide coverage to the 8. See above chapter VI:3. 9. See an excellent article by Anastassiadou. op . cit . , pp. 371- n. 10. The Times, 28 November and 3 December 1952. 1L The Greek census of 1940 estimated that there were 141.090 Hellenic Muslims. But this figure included about 22.000 Albanian Muslims in Tsamouria. During the World War II and civil war. these Albanian Muslims moved across the border to Albania. In the census of 1961. there were 105.000 Muslims in Greek Thrace alone. During the census of 1971 the language and religion question was not asked. For details see A. Angelopoulos. «Population Distribution of Greece Today according to Language. National Consciousness and Religion». BS 20 (1979) 123 ff. Today it is generally acknowledged that the Muslim population of Greece is about 125.000 strong.
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«unbearably oppressed» Muslim minority in Thrace was given in the Turkish press. Indignant deputies in the Ankara assembly referred to the «maltreatment» of their brethren in Greece, comparing them unfavourably with the confortable living enjoyed by the Greeks in Istanbul. 12 Indeed, not unlike the Constantinopolitan Greeks, the Muslim minority in Thrace has experienced a deterioration in its relations with the majority group since the mid-1950s. Communal and racial suspicions were revived; though the Istanbul riots of 5/6 September 1955 had not been followed by retaliatory measures of the same nature in Greek Thrace. The Turkish press ch~'ged that the Greek government endeavoured to dichotomize the minority into Turks and Pomaks. The Greek claim that the Pomaks were originally of Hellenic stock was strongly resented by the Turks. According to official statistics there were 11,739 Pomaks in Greek Thrace in March 1920. By 1940 their numbers had increased to 18,086, in 1951 to 18,671 and ten years later to 19,000. Tracing their origins to the ancient race of Thrace, the Achrians, the Pomaks have been both culturally and linguistically influenced by the Slavs, Turks and Greeks. What bound them to the Turks was not language (they speak aconupt Bulgarian with Turkish idioms and a sprinkling of Greek) but principally a common religion with its prescriptions and customs. They are on the whole conservative Muslims and are opposed to the secularization oflife in modem Turkey. There is also evidence that they have a certain feeling of aversion for the Turks which was well illustrated during the Bulgarian occupation of Greek Thrace in 1941-44. Unlike the Turkish-speaking Muslims of the area, who remained loyal to the Greek rule, many Pomaks, headed by the former deputy of Xanthi, Hamdi Fehmi, openly collaborated with the Bulgarian occupation authorities. As a result, during World War II, the Pomaks, unlike the Thracian turcophones, were spared from persecution. 13 Although some of the differences historically dividing the two Muslim communities remain, today there is greater integration and cooperation between the two different racial Muslim groups in Greece. Again Athens was accused of treating favourably the conservative Muslim element which is strongly opposed to secularization. Facilities and government subsidies, the Turks asserted, were given to the religious publications
Peygamber Binasl (The Construction of the Prophet) and MulzaJazakar (The
Conservative). both printed in the old Arabic-Ottoman print. 14 There is evidence to support this in that Hiisnii Yusuf and Hafiz Re~ad, leading members of the traditionalist faction in Thrace, as well as the Union of Muslims in Greece (El'(J)011 Movaovl.wivWI' nie,; 'EVdJoc,;), enjoyed the goodwill of the Greek government even though, the authorities did little to discourage the development of a secularist conscience among the Thracian Muslims. Today, the minority maintains two youth clubs and two teachers' associations with strong secular and nationalist tendencies. ls Further, a number of outspoken newspapers, such as the Trakya, Ak'tn (Attack) and the more recent A z'tn l'tk Pastas't (The Minority Post), adopted a strong line against the Greek authorities,. Thus, the fonner Thracian deputy, Osman Nuri, in his daily Trakya, published in Xanthi, openly argued that «the Turks of Thrace were living under a police state». Referring to the governors of Thrace, Osman Nuri went on to describe them as «dictators» and labelled the local Greek administration as «defective» (sakat).16 Thus, most of the nationalist and secularist turcophone press of Komotini and Xanthi was able to champion the rights of the minority with considerable freedom. Reacting to the hardships encountered by the Constantinopolitan Greek journalists in Turkey, particularly since the imprisonment and expulsion of Andreas Lambikis whose printing-house was ransacked by Turkish youths, the Greek authorities recently adopted a tougher line against publications in Thrace with anti-Greek tendencies. Further, the mere presence of a large Turkish consulate - staffed with high-ranking diplomats- in Komotini disturbed the peace of mind of the Greek authorities. The latter accused a Komotini newspaper, Akin (Attack) of being support.ed by the Turkish consulate. In January 1981, the authorities fined the editor of Akin, Hasan Hatiboglu, 15,000 Drachmas and closed his newspaper fur three months, after a court found him gUilty of «inciting communal tensions between the Orthodox and Muslim population» P The Greek authorities
12. For speeches of DP deputies B. Bilgin, F. Belen and O. Turan, who claimed that «psychological pressures» were exerted on the Thracian Turks, see Armaogiu, op.cit .. p. 196; Cumhuriyet. 28 January 1958. 13. The Pomak leader, Hamdi Fehmi, for instance, was even seen in Bulgarian uniform. More details on the Bulgarian-Pomak relationship during World War II in Knight (Thessaloniki) to Lascalles (Athens), 18 September 1946, FO 371/58868/RI4234.
14. Cumhuriyet. 10 January and I3 May 1958. There was another traditionalist newspaper, the Sebat (Stability) first issued in Komotini in 1957. On the Turkish press see C. Orhonlu «Batl Trakya'da Tiirk Baslnlna Yapllan Bask!», Turk Kulturu. 4 (July 1966) 595-97. 15. The Turkish associations of Thrace are: The Turkish Union (Xanthi), Turkish Youth Club (Komotini), Turkish Teachers' Union, Muslim Union of Greece, Muslim Teachers' Association of Thrace, The Islamic Awakening Club and numerous Turkish agricultural cooperative societies. 16. Article quoted in Cumhuriyet. 21 January 1958. 17. In 1979, Salih Halil of ileri (Forward) demanded the demolition of the Greek hospital of Ballkll in lstanbul as a reprisal to the pressure applied by the Greek authorities in Western
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3I I
strongly suspect that, through some sympathetic local journalists, the Tur~ kish consulate of Komotini is actively attempting to politicize the Hellenic Muslims of Thrace. Recently, the attacks of the turcophone Thracian press intensified causing a strong reaction of the local Greeks. As communal tensions increased, the Greeks formed an association, the «Panthracian Anti-Turkish Defense» (JI avOpaKlIoj 'A vrz-TOUPK1K~ "AJiuva) , determined to combat a Turkish attack and infiltration. I 8 The Greek press, headed by Xp6vo;' (Times) of Komotini, charged that several pro-Turkish and anti-Greek groups have been formed within the Muslim community, chiefly among the better-educated young and the growing ranks of white-collar workers. These groups, it is alleged, have close ties with the association of Western Thrace (Bat't Trakya) , whose headquarters are in istanbul. With strong chauvinistic tendencies, this association seeks the incorporation of both Bulgarian and Greek Thrace to Turkey.19 Alarmed by these.developments Muslim community leaders emphatically deny the existence in Thrace of groups working at the expense of the Greek state. Thus, declaring pride in his Islamic heritage, ,sevket Hilmi, the moderate publisher of MilIiyet in Xanthi, urged his colleagues to refrain from publishing abusive articles. One of the most controversial issues concerning the Muslim minority of Greece is education. Literacy is far below average among the Thracian Muslims, and the Turks claim that the Greek authorities refuse to allow qualified Turkish teachers into their schools. 20 The Greeks deny the charges maintaining that there is no discrimination whatsoever practised against the Muslim community. They instead point out that the Turkish lyceum of Komotini, as well as three other primary schools, were not only built and supported out of Greek public funds, but also that the annual sum contributed out ofthe Greek Treasury to Muslim education in Thrace amounts to 800,000 drachmas. 21 Contrasted with the condition of the Greek educational estabThrace. He concluded his articre by requesting the «protection of the mother country» (Turkey). The Greek courts found Salih Halil guilty of subversion and sentenced him to twenty-three months' imprisonment, 18, The mlljii of Xanthi. Mustafa Hilmi. too. joined forces with the nationalist section of the turcophone press and on 15 February 1979 published a long article in Gerr;ek (The Truth) protecting against the attitude of the Greek authorities towards the minority. 19, This society is also known as the «General Association of Mutual Aid for the Turks of Western Thrace». whose present president is Hikmet Yur:lakul (1982) 20. See U .H. BayiHken, «Turkish Minorities in Greece» in The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations. 4 (1%3) 145-64. 21. The Greek Minority in Turkey and the Turkish Minority in Greece. p. 22. The quoted figure was allocated in 1964 and amounted to $ 27,000, By comparison, during the same year, the
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lishments in istanbul, the Greeks argued, the Turkish school in Thrace enjoy a favourable position, According to official Greek statistics there were 289 Turkish schools with 14,489 students in Thrace in the academic year 1963-64, as against only 86 schools in 1923.22 The Turks continued however to complain of harassment in the schools and a Greek tendency to encourage outmoded fashions and reactionary religious leaders. An extremely conservative community, the Hellenic Muslims tend to adhere faithfully to the traditions of their forefathers, Never subjected to Atatiirk's revolution, they have often been described as the last bastion of the Ottoman empire. Even today, women continue to wear the long black kaftans of the days of the sultans, and rarely leave their houses unescorted. Men still dress in the bloused trousers and high leather boots of the past, and their status in the community is clearly proclaimed by the colour and shape of their traditional head~dress, the fez, Apart from their dress, the use of the Arabic script and the strict observance of religious practices and social customs of a bygone era constitute part of their daily life. Family law is based upon the Koran, and children are given Muslim names. A closed and somewhat suspicious community - 68 per cent of Turkish origin, 22 per cent Pomak-speaking and 10 per cent gypsies- the Muslims of Thrace have neither assimilated nor adopted twentieth-century life. Successfully resisting the introads of modern life, the Hellenic Muslims maintained a distinctly Ottoman-Turkish character and culture. As a result, both local officials and the Greek authorities have repeatedly expressed concern over the question of where the loyalties of the Muslim community members lie. Greek apprehension intensified with the emergence of the Cyprus question and the subsequent invasion of that island. The existence of tensions between Greece and Turkey creates unpleasant difficulties for the Muslim minority. Muslims claim that they are restricted from buying property and that they can only sell their land to Greeks. They also complain that it is very difficult to get agricultural loans and subsidies. In addition they resent the fact that they have not been allowed to elect their own community councils. Pointing to the fact that there was not a mass exodus from Thrace to Turkey, the Greek government persistently refused to take seriously the claims that this minority was ill-treated. Economically, moreover, the Muslim community of Thrace is riding high on the wave of prosperity enjoyed by northern Greece over the past few
municipality ofistanbul made a token payment of 50- I 50 TL to each Greek minority school in the city. 22. Ibid.
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~he ~reek~ fea~' that the Turks. taking advantage of the existence of a large years. Almost 90 per cent of the Muslims are farmers, owning much of the richest land in Thrace. Their 1978 revenue from tobacco cultivation alone surpassed $ 25,000,000 and their per capita income - according to Greek figures- is a staggering 22 per cent higher than that of their Greek neighbours. Anticipating even greater benefits from the entrance of Greece to the European Community, the Muslim farmers of Thrace appear determined to remain in their native land. Thus, unlike the Greek minority in Turkey, the Hellenic Muslim population is on the increase reaching 125,000. Yet, mutual suspicious reflect the growing sensitivity and political awareness of the Muslim community, which views its delicate position as a potential issue in the diplomatic tug~of-war between Greece and Turkey with some trepidation.23 In this diplomatic antagonism, the Turks, with their systematic campaign on behalf of the Muslim minority in Greece, appear to have won some support. Thus, in a report by United States President Carter to the Congress on the issue of human rights, in February 1978, he referred to the «periodic complaints of harassment and maltreatment» of the Muslim minority in Greece on such matters as «buying and selling land, and bureaucratic delays in processing official papers». The report reflected the official Greek view that the Muslims in Greek Thrace enjoy «absolute equality of opportunity», but described it as a claim. Sensitive to suggestions of official discrimination against its minority at a time of strain in relations with Turkey, the Greek government strongly resented these remarks contained in the chapter on Greece. On 13 February 1978, Greek Foreign Minister Panayiotis Papaligouras declared to the press that: «President Carter's report to Congress on the human rights contains, as regards to our area, erroneous evaluations».
.Turklsh mmonty at Greece's northeastern panhandle. might be tempted to mvolve themselves in another adventure on an even wider scale.24 These ap~rehensions are reinforced by Ankara's refusal, since 1960. to issue resldencesh,ips .and working permits to Muslims with Hellenic nationality. The determmatlOn of the Turkish government to maintain a large minority in Greece coupled with the activities of the government-sponsored Association of Mutual Aid for the Turks of Western Thrace, which advocates the «liberation of Western Thrace». added credibility to the Greek fears. Further. recently the Turks installed a high-powered radio transmitter in ~dir~e, on the Turkish side of the border broadcasting into Greek Thrace l~rklsh programs with strong nationalist content. On the other hand, no hard eVidence to substantiate Turkish official designs on Greek territory has as yet surfaced. and the Turkish government has on several occasions reassured Greece that it would continue to respect the Maritza frontier established in 1923, Arguing that the Thracian minority factor may pose a serious problem ifnot a danger, for the national security of Greece. Greek public opinion urged the government to provide a new formula which takes into account the steady growth of the Hellenic Muslim popUlation and the virtual disappearance of the Greek minority in Turkey. Accordingly, the numerical balance of the minorities. was wiped out by the Turkish refusal to honour its commitments un~erta~en at Lausanne. As a result, the argument goes, Greece, under article 4) of the Lausanne minority clauses. has the right to take measures to restore the numerical balance of the respective minorities. which has been under:mined ever since 1955. Faced with the urgent problems of the Aegean and Cyprus: the Greek government, favouring a policy of appeasement and ~nderstandmg towards Turkey. has been reluctant to reopen the minority Issue.
The Greeks were particularly upset by the fact that the report did not even mention the Greek minority in Turkey and the prevailing conditions in istanbul which resulted in the disappearence of that community. Once again, the Greeks characterized this statement as another example of the implicit United States support of Turkish claims at the expense of Greece. At the present moment both Greece and Turkey keep the potentially volatile issue of the minorities at abeyance. But given the Cyprus experience, 23. In October/November 1978, the PASOK deputies Peponis, Atmatzidis and Amalia Fleming charged the Turcophone press in Thrace with publishing abusive and provocative articles. They also warned that Thracian societies were in close contact with the ultra-nationalist «General Association of Mutual Aid for the Turks of Western Thrace». For details see P. Hidiroglou, TOVPKI"7T 'E)).I/voi'parpia, Thessaloniki 1980, pp. 35-38.
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24. In a r~cent strategic study, Faruk Sukan, a Turkish general, argued that, in case of a Greek-TurkIsh war, the Turkish minority of Western Thrace represented a «weak point in the rear of the Greek defences»,
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The story of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority is perhaps the best example of the abortive attempts to assimilate the non-Muslim elements in republican Turkey.1 The Turkish constitution and the law accorded complete equality to all citizens. Yet the republic' s principles of secularism and formal legal protection of all its citizens has only nominally superseded past attitudes and prejudices. Notwithstanding the political status of the Constantinopolitan Greeks as Turkish citizens. both government and public opinion in Turkey looked upon this community as an alien element. As a result, Ankara felt no compunction in using the Greek minority as a lever against Greece whenever relations between the two countries became tense. One important conclusion of the Constantinopolitan Greek experience is that minorities can only exist within neighbouring nationalist states if general relations are friendly. Thus, during such intervals (1930-40,1947-54,1959-64 and 1968 -71) the Greek minority was able to enjoy a certain sense of security and belonging. As soon as relations between the two neighbours began to deteriorate there was an immediate backlash against them. Under these circumstances. and as the Turks applied official and psychological pressure, the fortunes of the Greek minority were adversely affecte~. It is not coincidental that the four principal waves of Greek exodus from Istanbul ( 1922-29. 1955-59. 1964-67 and 1972-75) took place during such periods of strained Greek-Turkish relations. The Constantinopolitan Greeks all along manifested a strong determination to remain in their native city. However, in return for their survival in Turkey, the Turks demanded the renunciation of their distinct ethnic Greek identity and its replacement with modern Turkey's secular and nationalist values. While a few, headed by Papa Eftim and his associates, were all too willing to make this transformation. the great majority of the Constantinopolitan Greeks remained faithful to their religious. ethnic and linguistic traditions. Despite their readines~ to fulfil loyally their duties as Turkish citizens, the Greek minority strongly opposed assimilation and clung to their traditional urban culture. As a result. although they were for all intents and purposes fully bilingual, the Greeks successfully resisted the inroads of Kemalist I. By far the best integrated non-Muslim minority in Turkey is that of the Assyro-Chalde~ns (Sliryaniler). detailed account of the history of this community see A GiineL T/irk Slirvalllier
nationalism and secularism, maintaining a distinctly Greek/cosmopolitan character. In their part, both government and public opinion in Turkey expressed repeatedly their concern over the question of where the loyalties of the members of the Greek community lay. Particularly at times of strained Greek-Turkish relations, Turkish suspicions of their Greek fellow co-citizens reached the levels of mass hysteria. This was best illustrated during the Cyprus conflict when the Turkish press launched an inflammatory campaign against the Greeks resulting in the ugly episode of 5/6 September 1955. Envy of the business acumen and European status of the Greeks, further accentuated this mistrust. This led to the common assumption in Turkey that the Greeks, as well as the other non-Muslim groups, were solely interested in money-making and, given their cosmopolitan affiliations, lacked any patriotic sentiments. The imposition of the punitive and discriminatory varl'lk taxation during the Second World War was perhaps the best illustration of this notion. Again, behind thelaique fa<;:ade of the republic the older Muslim Turkish concept of full and second-class citizenship, inherited from the Ottoman empire, was still vigorously alive. Throughout the history of the republic, non-Muslims in general remained «second class» citizens, excluded from participation in public life. Even today, this fundamental division is reflected in the moral stigma attached to the word gavur (infidel, unbeliever, non-Muslim) in modern Turkey. These religious-cum-racial factors, coupled with the persistence of Greco- Turkish rivalries doomed to failure the experiment of Muslim-Orthodox symbiosis in istanbul. Reluctant to leave their city, the Constantinopolitan Greeks only did so after being SUbjected to prolonged pressure, both on personal and communal levels. Such pressures often went counter to the obligations assumed by the Turkish government at Lausanne. It was during the Lausanne negotiations that the inherent right of at least a remnant of the large Constantinopolitan Greek community to remain in the city, separate from strictly political considerations, was internationally acknowledged. To safeguard this right, the minority clauses were embodied in the treaty of Lausanne. It is because of the systematic violation of these clauses by Turkey, rather than the desire to expand their financial concerns, as was intimated on several occasions by Turkish leaders, that the Constantinopolitan Greeks were ultimately forced to close their lucrative businesses, sell their immovable property and emigrate. Almost all the Lausanne minority provisions have either systematically or periodically been violated by successive Turkish governments. Thus, by weakening the prestige of the Greek Patriarchate and by applying restrictions
TaT'ihi. Diyarbaklr 1970. passim.
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on the functions of the patriarch, who in his capacity as the archbishop of Constantinople was also the religious head of the community, the authorities were in fact interfering with the «free exercise of religion» stipulated by article 38. The occupation of the Greek Orthodox churches of Galata, with the connivance of the local officials, by a renegade priest, Papa Eftim, who incidently was not even a member of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority, was also contrary to this article. Notwithstanding the government's attempt to give a legal character to the seizures by issuing title-deeds to Papa Eftim, these churches were built as early as the seventeenth century by the Constantinopolitan Greek community and were administered by them until their forceful occupation in 1924, 1926 and 1965. The third paragraph of the same article was also violated when between 1922-30, the Greek minority was confined within the limits of the istanbul prefecture and was not allowed to visit any other province of Turkey without special permission. Likewise. the third paragraph of article 39 stating that «differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public life, functions and honours», was systematically ignored. Nor were adequate facilities ever given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the court. The legal restrictions and interference by the authorities in the administration of the Greek minority schools and communal property are also contrary to articles 40 and 41 of the Lausanne treaty. The successful attempt of the Turkish government to coerce the minority notables into renouncing article 42 in 1925 have been described in some detail. In general, moreover, most of the secular reforms, such as the abolition of the clerical garb in 1934, the refusal to establish new religious and charitable institutions and the closure of existing establishments like the Prinkipo orphanage in 1964, were contrary to the Lausanne provisions. Because of its discriminatory character, the varllk taxation of 1942 was also a most serious breach ofthese clauses. So were the anti-Greek riots in istanbul on 5/6 September 1955 which resulted in extensive damage of Constantinopolitan Greek property. In a memorandum prepared by the Southern Department of the British Foreign Office, as early as February 1943, just before a meeting between the British secretary of state and the Greek prime minister, it was pointed out: 2 «Despite the declarations made regarding the perfect equality of treatment that would be accorded to the minorities, since 1930 the minority 2. «Brief for the Secretary of State in cOIlversation with the Greek Prime Minister E. Tsouderos», prepared by the Southern Dept., 27 February 1943, FO 371/37401/RI552.
clauses of the Lausanne treaty have been, for all intents and purposes, a dead letter. The Turkish legislation has definitely been discriminatory on more than one occasion. Petty persecution of Greeks has been endemic». Such «endemic petty persecution» which intensified after the emergence of the Cyprus question led to the almost complete disappearance of the once numerous and prosperous Constantinopolitan Greek community. Yet the Turkish attitude towards the Greek minority was formulated as early as the first two decades of the twentieth century. As ethnic polarization in the Ottoman capital reached a peak in 1918-20, Turkish nationalists vowed to rid themselves of all non-Turkish elements. This view was ably articulated by the chief Turkish delegates at Lausanne, ismet inonii and Dr RIza Nur. Although the Turks fought hard at Lausanne for the complete deportation of the Ottoman Greek element, they finally had to yield to concerted international pressure and consent to the exemption of a small number of Greeks in istanbul (with an approximately equal number of Muslims left in Greek Thrace) from the compulsory Greek-Turkish population exchange. Notwithstanding the humanitarian, economic and political factors which dictated the retention of some 100,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks in Turkey, the Turks never ceased to regard this element as an unwelcome residlle of the Ottoman empire. The subsequent rapprochement of the 1930s and the entrance of Greece and Turkey into NATO simply acted as a postponement in the inevitable process of the dehellenization of Istanbul which was in fact sealed with the defeat of the Greeks in Anatolia and with the emergence of homogeneous national states on the shores of the Aegean. While the Greek minority is still undergoing an irreversible eclipse, the Patriarchate of Constantinople is slowly but steadily dying from inanition. Having to rely for recruits solely on the Greek community of Turkey whose numbers are far too small to produce the required twelve metropolitans of the holy synod, the Ecumenical Patriarchate will sooner or later be faced with an impasse. The closure of the Chalki seminary in 1971, which had hitherto trained the Phanar clergy has been an additional blow to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Hitherto, while tolerating the physical presence of the Patriarchate in Turkey (as agreed at Lausanne), the Turks managed to isolate the Phanar from the rest of Orthodoxy. With the disappearance of the Greek element in Turkey, however, the Turks will be increasingly unable to honour their Lausanne pledge, for lacking the appropriate personnel, the Phanar will not be in a position to respond to its ecclesiastical responsibilities. Under these circumstances, Greece and Turkey will have to find a workable solution to both the Patriarchate and the minority questions.
318 319 21
.;
any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.
APPENDIX A THE MINORITY CLAUSES OF THE TREA 1Y OF LAUSANNE Article 37. Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them. Article 38. The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection oflife and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction ofbirt.h, nationality, language, race or religion.
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on the part. of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order. Article 39. Turkish subjects belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law. Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries. No restrictions shall be imposed on the free us·e by any Turkish national of 320
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts. Article 40. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. Article 41. As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Turkish Govenmlent from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of these sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned. Article 42. The Turkish Government undertakes, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish
321
Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.
Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Pennanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant. Article 45. The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.
Article 43. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order. Article 44. Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out ofthese Articles between the Turkish Government and anyone of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the 322
323
3. Archbishopric of Dercos. Tarabya 0Epanwl Biiyiikdere Yenimahalle
Bakirkoy MmcpoxroplO Y e~ilkoy "Aywe; I>te<pavoc;
APPENDIX B 4. Archbishopric of Prinkiponnisa. Greek Parishes and associations in istanbul
t. Archbishopric of Constantinople. 1) CibaIi Tst~aAio 2) Langa BMYKa 3) Kumkapi KOV'WcrKUAlOv 4) Samatya "AywC; rEropylOC; 5) Samatya "AywC; K(J)vo"'ravtivoe; 6) Kazll 7) BEAtypu8wv 8) AItl Mermer "E~ Mupflapa 9) Egrikapi Kapcria I1UAT] 10) Ayvansaray 3uponopta 11) Balat BaAata.e; 12) Salmatombruk LaAfla'LOfl~pOKW 13) Tekfursaray TEK
21) 22) 23) 24) 25) 26) 27) 28) 29) 30) 31) 32) 33) 34) 35) 36)
Taksim < Ayul T ptu8a I1epa ~i~ll NEKpOta
Burgazada 'AvttyovT] Kinallada I1protT]
Biiyiikada I1piYKT]nOC; HeybeJiada XUAKT]
5. Greek associations and establishments. Archbishopric of Constantinople: 37 philanthropic associations. Archbishopric of Chalcedon: 6 philanthropic associations. 3 cultural (flOP
2. Archbishopric of Chalcedon. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)
Kadikoy XaAKT]86va Yeldegirmeni Kalami~ KaAaflicrta Dskiidar XpucrounOAtC;/LKOUtapt Kuzguncuk KoucrJcoUVtsOuKWV
6) Kandilli Kav8uAAl 7) Pa~abahge 8) Beykoz 9) c;.'engelkoy
324
325
APPENDIX C NUMBERS OF GREEK STUDENTS IN CONSTANTINOPOLITAN GREEK SCHOOLS I)
ARCHBISHOPRIC OF CONSTANTINOPLE
1920/21
1923/24
1927/28
1933/34
1948/49
37
75
70
25
217 264 177
300 364
170 302
83 156
250
183
229 44 68
18
1978/79
HIGHER EDUCATION
1. Theological College of Chalki
9
30 (offering higher theological as well as secondary education)
SECONDARY EDUCATION
2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Patriarchal Lycee for boys at Phanar Zographeion Lycee for boys at Pera Greek-French Lycee at Pera (G. Apostolidis) National College of Language and Commerce Commercial College of Galata (with primary school for boys) National teacher's training school for women (T. Bareidou) Zappeion Lycee for girls at Pera Ioakeimeion Lycee for girls at Phanar Kendrikon Lycee for girls at Pera
7. 8. 9. 10.
243 274 389 454 927
163 195 232 390 575
7 617 457 576
198 345 361 492
245 192 281 442
393 305 366
152 354 107 287
272
188
260
237
61
(operating as primary school)
PRIMARY EDUCATION
11. 12. 13. . 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
Patriarchal Primary school Marasleios at Phanar National Orphanage S. Siniosoglou Orphanage Primary School for boys at Ciban Primary School for girls at Ciban Mixed Primary school at Vefa Mixed Primary school «"AylO~ 0epu7tcoV» Primary School of Mouchlion at Phanar Primary School of Mouchlion at Phanar Primary School for boys at Balata Primary School for Girls at Balata Mixed Primary School at Xyloporta Mixed Primary School at Egrikapt Mixed Primary School at Edirnekapi Mixed Primary School at Tekfursaray Chatzopouleios Mixed Primary School (Salmatombruk) 27. Mixed Primary School at Sarma~ik 28. Mixed Primary School at Topkapi 29. Mixed Primary School at Belgrade Forest 30. Mixed Primary School at Eptapyrgion (Yedikule) 31. Mixed Primary School at St. George Kyparissas 32. Mixed Primary School at Exi Marmara (Altlmermer)
45 230 170 63 208 214 244 106 253 193 78 130
183 33 56 54
214 192
C
40
{ 90
C
103 206 170 166 141 150 60
130 { 115
130
16
{ 102
fll8 t
C2
130 30 73
66
36
74 60
54
78
25
9
63
1920121
1927128
1923124
1933/34
1948/49
1978/79
33. St. Constantine School for boys at Ypsomatheion 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.
(Samatya) St. Constantine School for girls at Ypsomatheion Primary School for boys at Vlanga (Langa) Primary School for girls at Vlanga Primary School for boys at Kondoskali (Kumkap1) Primary School for girls at Kondoskali Mixed Primary School at Pikridion (Haskoy) Primary School for boys at Tatavla (Kurtulu~) Primary School for girls at Tatavla Primary School for boys at Evangelistria (Y eni~ehir) Primary School for girls at Evangelistria Primary School for boys at Ferikoy Primary School for girls at Ferikoy First Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi (Galatasaray) Second Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi Third Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi Fourth Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi Fifth Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi Sixth Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi First Primary School for girls at Stavrodromi Second Primary School for girls at Stavrodromi Third Primary School for girls at Stavrodromi
233 230 296 268 508 483 157 527 413 197 173 295 217 295 292 337 264 170 130 312 303 482
{ 312
{ 203
193 156 495 432 125 378 347
109 101 270 250 198 185
290 200
f 136
{ 150
f65
301 235
200 150
{l.O73
{ 737
{128
{182
4
{ 81
{16
{ 78
72
l
13 53 {205
r
04
{ 3
e e
{41
04
09
t r 3
f
t219 214
52
98 75 65
{ 668
{ 418
{S30
658
506
250
174
166
207 165
167 121
(130
fl7
58. Primary School for boys at Mesochorion (Ortakoy) 59. Primary School for girls at Mesochorion 60. Primary School for boys at Mega Revma
134 124
{ 223
{ 103
{95
(Arnavutkoy) Primary School for girls at Mega Revma Mixed Primary School at Bebek Mixed Primary School at Stenia Mixed Primary School at Vapheochorion (Boyadkoy) 65. Mixed Primary School at Neochorion (Yenikoy)
235 236 158 50
{ 325
{ 228
{205
95
85
163
137
78
50
38
220
226
126
120
55
11.527
7.125
5.844
3.490
865
318 283 62
208 220
250 276
89
49
55. Primary School for girls at Galata 56. Primary School for boys at Diplokionion (Be~ikta~)
57. Primary School for Girls at Diplokionion
61. 62. 63. 64.
{
127
-~
41
1
then amalgamated with boyschool
f 20
l-
{78
{ 18
PRIVATE SCHOOLS
66. Greek-French School for Girls
Efterpi Santorinaiou at Pera 67. Greek-French School N. Melas at Per a 68. Primary School P. Moumtzi at Pera
statistics delayed 81 94 15.806
2) ARCHBISHOPRIC OF CHALCEDON
1. Chalcedon School for boys 2. Chalcedon School for girls 3. Kalaml~
68 5
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. IO.
Yeldegirmeni Mixed Primary School at Scoutari (Uskiidar) <;engelkoy Parish School of Kouskountzoukion Parish School of Kandylli Parish School of Bei'cos (Beykoz) Parish School of Pa~abah~e
1978j79
1923/24
1927/28
1933/34
1948/49
102 195 172 256 45 31 30
155 53 122 35 24 22
141 32 103 35
62 20
1.494
839
837
298
49
181 92 141 460 194
130 109 32 270 112
106 67 32 255 68
29 35 25 88 20
2
19 3
1.068
653
528
197
24
401 275 69 28
212 126 51
214 144 68
202 46 23
12 7
773
389
426
271
19
14.862
9.006
7.635
4.256
957
44
10
3) ARCHBISHOPRIC OF DERCOS
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Parish Parish Parish Parish Parish
School School School School School
of Therapeia of Biiyiikdere of Yenimahalle of Makrochori (Baklrkoy) of St. Stephano (Ye~i1koy)
4) ARCHBISHOPRIC OF PRINKIPONNISA
1. 2. 3. 4.
Primary School of Prinkipos (Biiyiikada) Primary School of Chalki (Heybeliada) Parish School of Antigoni (Burgazada) Parish School of Proti (Klnallada)
Total
1.
* Numbers of Greek Schools in lstanbul:
1920/21 :88 1923/24:73 1927/28:57 1933/34:48 1948/49:50 1958/59:56 1978/79:26
2 * The analytical statistics for 1920/21 are limited to the Archbishopric of Constantinople. The aggregate student numbers for Chalcedon and Dercos are 7233 and 5136 respectively. The great majority of these Greeks was subsequently exchanged in 1922-24 for they were considered to be established outside the municipal boundaries of lstanbul. Sources: E.A. 43 (1923) 40/supplement Statistics forwarded to the Greek Foreign Ministry by the Greek Consul-General in lstanbul, in YE/B/33 0924-1929). Statistics by Zervopoulos, op. cit., I (1934) 233. Official statistics of the Turkish Ministry of Education for the period 1948 to 1960, publications: no. 304; no. 431 and no. 437. Greek parish statistics for 1978/79 given to the author by the Constantinopolitan Greek educationalist and former deputy Alexander Chatzopoulos.
APPENDIXD PATRIARCHS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOLY SYNOD 1918-1921 Brussa and locum tenens Amaseia Caesarea Cyzicus Angyra Pissidia Ainos Vizya Silyvria Saranta Ekklisies Tyroloi Dardanelles
Dorotheos (Mammelis) Germanos (Karavangelis) Nicholas (Sakkopoulos) Constantine (Araboglou) Gervasios (Sarisitis) Gerasimos Joachim (Georgiadis) Anthimos Evgenios (Papathomas) Agathangelos (Konstantinidis) Chrysostomos (Chatzichristou) Eirinaios
1921-1922 Caesarea and locum tenens Amaseia Cyzicus Angyra Pissidia Ainos Vizya Silyvria Saranta Ekklisies Tyroloi Dardanelles
Nicholas (Sakkopoulos) Germanos (Karavangelis) Constantine (Araboglou) Gervasios (Sarisitis) Gerasimos Joachim (Georgiadis) Anthimos Evgenios (Papathomas) Agathangelos (Konstantinidis) Chrysostomos (Chatzichristou) Eirinaios
1922-1923 Meletios (Metaxakis) Patriarch Nicholas (Sakkopoulos) Gregory (Zervoudakis)
Caesarea Chalcedon 332
Basil (Georgiadis) ; Kallinikos (Delikanis) Agathangelos (Konstantinidis) Apostolos (Triphonos) Benjamin (Christodoulou) Joachim (Stroubis) Nikodimos (Komninos) Jacob (Nikolaou) Joachim (Martinianos) Cyril (Chatzidimitriou)
Nicaea Cyzicus N eocaesarea Rhodes Philippopolis Korytza Varna Dyrrachion Belgrade Rodopolis
1923-1924 Gregory (Zervoudakis) Patriarch Nicholas (Sakkopoulos) Caesarea Basil (Georgiadis) Nicaea Joachim (Georgiadis) Chalcedon Kallinikos Dercos Constantine (Araboglou) Brussa Agathangelos (Konstantinidis) N eocaesarea Evgenios (papathomas) Silyvria Cyril (Chatzidimitriou) Rodopolis Thomas (Savvopoulos) Anea Gennanos (Athanasiadis) Sardis Photios (Maniatis) Philadelphia Kallinikos (Delikanis) Cyzicus Changes: Jan. 1924: Agathangelos from Neocaesarea to Prinkiponisa March 1924: Ambrosios Neocaesarea May 1924: Constantine from Brussa to Dercos May 1924: Nikodimos from Varna to Brussa 1924-1925 Constantine (Araboglou) Patriarch Kallinikos (Delikanis) Cyzicus Basil (Georgiadis) Nicaea Joachim (Georgiadis) Chalcedon Photios (Maniatis) Dercos Nikodimos (Komninos) Brussa 333
Ambrosios (Stavrianos) Evgenios (Papathomas) Cyril (Chatzidimitriou) Thomas (Savvopoulos) Germanos (Athanasiadis) Agathangelos (Konstantinidis) Nicholas (Sakkopoulos)
N eocaesarea Silyvria Rodopolis Anea Sardis Prinkiponisa Caesarea 1925-1929
Basil (Georgiadis) Patriarch Kallinikos (Delikanis) Benjamin (Christodoulou) Joachim (Georgiadis) Agathangelos (Konstantinidis) Photios (Maniatis) Ambrosios (Stavrianos) Nikodimos (Komninos) Evgenios (Papathomas) Cyril (Chatzidimitriou) Germanos (Athanasiadis) Nicholas (Sakkopoulos) Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Cyzicus Nicaea ChaIcedon Prinkiponisa Dercos N eocaesarea Brussa Silyvria RodopoIis Sardis Caesarea Anea
Changes: 1927: Death of Joachim; replaced by Nicholas 1927: Death of Nicholas; replaced by Agathangelos 1927: Thomas from Anea to Prinkiponisa 1927: Gennadios (Arabatzoglou) Ilioupolis appointed member of the Holy Synod
Germanos (Athanasiadis) Thomas (Savvopoulos) Evgenios (Papathomas) Gennadios (Arabatzoglou) Jacob (papapaisiou)
Changes: 1932: Agathangelos resigned because of poor health and was replaced by Maximos 1931: Ambrosios died: replaced by Joachim 1934: Deaths of Kallinikos and Evgenios 1935: Deaths of Nikodimos and Agathangelos 1936: Death of Cyril
1936-1946 Benjamin (Christodoulou) Patriarch Joachim (pelekanos) Thomas (Savvopoulos) Maximos (Vaportzis) Gerrnanos (Athanasiadis) Gennadios (Arabatzoglou) Jacob (Papapaisiou) Polykarpos (Dimitriadis) Leondios (Liverios) Meletios (Loukakis) Germanos (Athanasiadis) Constantine (Alatopoulos) Dorotheos (Georgiadis)
Caesarea Dercos Philadelphia ChaIcedon Nicaea Brussa Rodopolis
Dercos Prinkiponisa ChaIcedon Sardis IlioupoIis Imbros Brussa TheodoroupoIis Christopolis Ainos Eirinopolis Laodicaea
1946-1948
1929-1936 Photios (Maniatis) Patriarch Kallinikos (Delikanis) Ambrosios (Stavrianos) Maximos (Vaportzis) Agathangelos (Konstantinidis) Benjamin (Christodoulos) Nikodimos (Komninos) Cyril (Chatzidimitriou)
Sardis Prinkiponisa Silyvria IIioupoIis Imbros
Maximos (Vaportzis) Patriarch Thomas (Savvopoulos) Joachim (pelekanos) Dorotheos (Georgiadis) Polykarpos (Dimitriadis) Maximos (Christopoulos) Gennadios (Arabatzoglou) Jacob (Papapaisiou) Leondios (Liverios)
Chalcedon Dercos Prinkiponisa Brussa Laodicaea IIioupoIis Imbros Theodoroupolis 335
334 22
Maximos (Repanellis) Germanos (Athanasiadis) Constantine (Alatopoulos) Philotheos
Sardis Ainos Eirinopolis Proikonisos BIBLIOGRAPHY
1949-1972
Athenagoras (Spyrou) Patriarch Thomas (Savvopoulos) Joachim (Pelekanos) Polykarpos (Dimitriadis) Dorotheos (Georgiadis) Gennadios (ArabatzogIou) Constantine (Alatopoulos) Germanos (Athanasiadis)
Primary Sources
Chalcedon Dercos Brussa Prinkiponisa IIioupoIis Eirinoupolis Ainos (after his death Adamantios Pergamos) Proikonisos Kydoniai Neocaesarea Laodicaea Sardis
Philotheos Agathangelos (papatheodorou) Chrysostomos (Papachristou) Maximos (Christopoulos) Maximos (Repanellis)
1973Dimitrios (Papadopoulos) Patriarch Meliton (Chatzis) Chalcedon Maximos (Christopoulos) Laodicaea Maximos (RepaneIIis) Sardis Ieronymos (Konstantinidis) Rodopolis Chrysostomos (Konstantinidis) Myra Simeon (AmariIios) Eirinopolis Gabriel (Premetidis) Kolonia Agapios (Kesisoglou) Prinkiponisa Evangelos (Galanis) Perga Kallinikos (Alexandridis) Lystra Constantinos (Charisiadis) Dercos Joachim (NerantzouIis) Melitini
336
A. Unpublished L FOREIGN MINISTRY, Athens. General Correspondence of the A (political) Section, 1919-29. (A/3: Greco-Turkish relations; A/4b: Minutes kept by the subcommissions at the Lausanne conference A/5: Special file on Imbros and Tenedos; A/5: Greek High Commission in istanbul; A/5VI: The Minority Question, Lausanne negotiations, Turkey, Exchange of Populations). General Crrespondence of the B(political) Section, 1919-29. (B/33: Greek Minority Schools in Turkey; B/35: Church Affairs and the Patriarchate; B/28: Imbros and Tenedos; B/37: Comparative observations between the Greek Minority in Turkey and the Turkish Minority in Greece). General Correspondence of the r (political) Section, 1919-29. (rj68, press cuttings from the Grecophone press in Turkey and translations of Turkish articles). Although the classification of documents at the Greek Foreign Ministry archives is as yet rudimentary, there is an abundance of documents with regards to Greco-Turkish relations and the minority question. 2. PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, London. a. Foreign Office Correspondence, 1919-48. Files 371, concerning Greco-Turkish relations, the minorities and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 3396 4165 658 7892 7916 935 7966 9079 9099 9123 9160 105 10860 11541 1329
4156 4218 6565 7905 7917 7949 7967 9081 9106 9124 9161 10191 10865 11548 13085
4158 4685 6566 7908 718 7955 7968 9082 9110 9128 9171 10206 10866 1152 13089
4159 5173 7870 79Il 8919 7958 058 9088 9113 9141 10171 10207 10870 11556 13090
337
4160 5190 7882 7913 7923 7959 9059 9090 9114 9152 10172 1022 11357 12318 13096
4164 5261 7891 7915 7933 7960 9078 9092 916 9159 10184 10859 11540 12321 13097
13811 14578 16984 19037 22360 30091 37224 37403 43775 b. c. d. e.
13818 15232 16985 19040 23290 30110 37228 37404 48349
13824 15376 16986 20087 23301 33375 37399 3406 58860
3828 15378 17962 20093 23777 33376 37400 37469 58868
14575 15970 18396 21143 25021 33388 37401 37470 59330
14576 16775 19034 21927 38031 33389 37402 37473 67106
Turkey a. Atatiirk'iin Tamin, Telegrafve Beyannameleri (Circulars, Telegrams and Proclamations of Atatiirk), 4 vols. Ankara, 1964. b. La Legislation Turque. Code Civil Turc, istanbul, 1926. c. Constitution of the Turkish Republic, eds, Sadlk Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat, Anara, 1961. d. istatistik Umum Miidiirliigii. istatistik nlllfjJ, Ankara. e. Biiyiik Millet Meclisi Zablt Ceridesi (Records of the Grand National Assembly). 67293
67305b
Files 406/40-41 (Confidential Prints, Eastern Affairs). Files 608 (British Delegation, 87 Constantinople). File~ 800 (Private Collections, Balfour, Lord Curzon, Ryan). Cabmet Papers (CAB 29 International Conferences).
3. LAMBETH PALACE LIBRARY, London. a. Private correspondence of Ranall Davison (archbisho of Canterbury), 1918-1948. Box~s 32 (3 files), 65, 98 and 148 (7 files), deal with the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Anglican-Orthodox relations. b. Private Correspondence of Canon J. A. Douglas, 1911-1955. Boxes 17, 18, 19,22,31,32,33,76,78 and 88, deals with the Patriarchate of ConstantinopIe. There are also valuable press cuttings from the press in istanbuL 4. VENIZELOS PAPERS, Benaki Museum, Athens, 1919-1,,3L 5. POLITIS PAPERS, Benaki Museum, Athens, 1925-1931. 6. JOHN STAVRIDI PAPERS, St. Antony's College, Oxford. Ten files. 7. PALAIOLOGOS PAPERS, Athens. Private Correspondence of Patriarch Athenagoras i with Paul Palaiologos, 1949-1971.
B. Published
1. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS. Great Britain a. Command Papers: 964, vol. L, 1920 - Treaty of Sevres. 1814, XXVI, 1923 - Lausanne negotiations. 1929, XXV, Treaty Series 16 - Treaty of Lausanne, 24.7.1923. b. British and Foreign State Papers: V. I 13, 652-776 - Treaty of Sevres. II. 133, 609 _ Greco-Turkish Pact of 1930. c. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, first series, vols. 4, 7, 15, 17 and lK d. Foreign Office, Tilrkey in Europe, 1918. The Rise of the Turks, 1919. The Ethnological Map of Central and South Eastern Europe, 1919. Greece Greek Information Service: The Greek Minority in Turkey and the Turkish Minority in Greece. How Two Governments Treat their Minorities, Athens, 1965.
League of Nations a. Official Journal, especially issues of November, 1924. February, 1925. April, 1925. May, 1925. July, 1925. C.645.1924 (VII) b. Documents: C.614.1924 (VII) C.694.1924 (I) C. 774.1924 (I) C.129.1925 (VII) C.775.M.73 (I) C.130.1925 (VII) C. 131.1925 (VII) C. 134. 1925 (VII) C.135.1925 (VII) C.160.1925 (VII) C.211.M.70.1925 (VII) C.57.M.30.1925 (VII) C .306.1925 (VII) C.402.1926 (I) C.566.1926 (I) C.588.1926 (I) C.185.1927 (I) Permanent Court of International Justice: Series B, 21.2.1925. Collection of Advisory Opinions no. to «Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations»; and no.16 «Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926». United Nations/Security Council: Documents:
S/5665 S/5951 S/6351 S/6758
S/5677 S/5957 S/6718 S/6783
S/5702 S/5968 S/6723 S/6820
S/5844 S/6162 S/6728
S/5946 S/6288 S/6734
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Ulman, Haluk and Sander, Oral, «Tiirk DI~ Politikaslna Yon Veren Etkenler» (Factors which gave Direction to the Turkish Foreign Policy) II, SBFD 27/1 (1972). U1udag, Osman S., «Osmanll tip tarihinde reaya hastahaneleri ve imtiyazlar» (The role of the non-Muslim hospitals and their privileges in the history of Ottoman medicine), Belleten, 1/1 (1937). Unal, Tahsin, «Bat! Trakya Tiirkleri» (The Turks of Western Thrace), Turk Kiilturu, 7/76 (1%9).
365
Urgiiplii, Suat H., «Tiirk-Yunan ili~kileri iizerinde gizli bazl anllar» (Some confidential memoirs on the Greco-Turkish relations), Milliyet, 27 January 1976. U§akllgil, B., «La Turquie et Ie Patriarchat d'istanbul», Cultura 1llrcica 1/2 (1964). Uzuns:ar§lll, ismail H., «V. Murad'i tekrar Padi§ah yapmak isteyen Skalieri-Aziz Bey komitesi» (The Scalieri-Aziz Bey Committee which wanted to reinstate Murad V to the throne of the Sultans), Belleten, 8/30 (1944). Vogiatzidis, LK., «MeyQAT] 'Iota» (The Great Idea) in 'H nevraKOalOa!" brb:elOr; dno ,fir; 'Ai.waewr; VIr; Kwvaravrzvovn6;.ewr;, 1453·1953 (The 500th anniversary of the capture of Cons tantinople, 1453-1953), L'Hellenisme Contemporain, Athens, 1953. Woods, Ch. H., «Turkey under the Nationalists» in CR 128 (1925). Xanalatos, Diogenis, «The Greeks and the Turks on the eve of the Balkan Wars: A Frustrated Plan» BS 2 (1962). Xavier, Jacob, «An Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Church» in ECR 3 (1970/1971). Xydis, A.G., «The Military Regime's Foreign Policy», Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George (eds.) Greece under Military Rule, London, 1972. Xydis, St., «Modem Greek Nationalism» in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Lederer, I. J. (ed.), Washington 1%9. Yalman, Ahmet Emin, «The Struggle for Multi-Party Government in Turkey» inMEJ I (1947).
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Greek 'A9i;vm , A1toyeuj.lanvij (Afternoon/istanbul) 'EKlCAT]01acrnKij , AAijgew (Ecclesiastical Truth/istanbul)
366
367
INDEX A
AbaHoglu, Yunus Nadi, Turkish journalist. 195 Abdiilhamid II. Sultan, 30. 31. 40 Abdiilaziz. Sultan, 26, 28 Abdiilmecid, Sultan, 25, 26, 28. 29. 30 Adana. 210. 222 Adlvar, Adnan, Turkish Politician, 102 Adrianople, see Edirne Aegean. islands, 52. 177, 235. 268n"6, 294, 315, 319 Agnidis, A., Greek ambassador in London, 230 Ahmet Rlza. president of the Ottoman senate, 63 AimiIianos. Zacharopoulos, archbishop of Selevkia. 248. 270, 299 Akaygen, Mehmet Enis, Turkish ambassador in Athens. 176 Akdagmadeni. 151 Ak/n, Turkish daily of Komotini, 311 Aks;am. Turkish daily of istanbul, 158 n.24 Albanian Muslims, 41, 124n.18, 309n. II. Orthodox. 142n.12, 172.205 Aleksei. Russian patriarch, 238, 244, 277 Alexander. king of Greece, 53 Alexander. king of Yugoslavia. 197 Alexandria, Patriarchate of, 171, 184. 201. 244,278 Alexandris, Apostolos, Greek foreign minister, 89 ·Alexandropoulos. John, Greek representative in istanbul. 57 Alexandroupolis. conference of, 291, 292 Alibrantis. brothers. Tatavliot wrestlers. 49 Ali Haydar. governor of istanbul. 150 Ali KemaL anti-Kemalist leader. 82 Allen. George. US ambassador in Greece, 273 Allies, Allied Powers (World War I). 52. 57, 60, 61. 63, 64. 66. 67, 68, 75-86. 92. 94. 96. 97, 99-103, 106. 107. 118.
368
133. 139, 144, 146, 147, 153, 155 Altlmermer. 133 Alp, Tekin, Turkish writer. 220 Ambrosios. Stavrianos. archbishop of Neocaesarea. 169 AmYl/a. 69-73. 81 Anatolia. see Asia Minor Anchialus. episcopy. 168 Andoniadis, Basil. Greek theologian. 198 Anglican Church. 61. 62, 91. 93, 197, 198, 278. 301 Anglo-Hellenic Society. 162 Ankara, accord of (1925), 125-130, 166 Ankara. accord of (Aras-Polychroniadis, 1930), 177-180, 186 Ankara, government of, 77, 78, 88, 100, 101. 104, 107. 108. 109. 115. 118, 122. 125, 127. 131. 132, 134-138, 140. 141, 147-151. 167, 177, 181, 182, 187, 190, 194. 201, 203, 204, 207, 214, 215. 220, 225, 228-230, 235, 239, 241-243, 247, 248, 254, 255, 260, 267. 269, 270. 273. 275. 282, 291. 293-296, 298,301,305,315.316 Ankara. treaty of (1930), 179. 273, 281 Anthimos. archbishop of Vizya. 73n.21 Anthomelidis, Theologos, linguist and turcologue, 192. 193 Anthopoulos, Constantine, Ottoman ambassador to London, 27n"9. 29 Antioch. Patriarchate of. 171. 244, 277 Apostolidis, school of, 134 Arabatzoglou. see Gennadios Araboglou, see Constantine VI Arabs, 21. 43. Arabic. 313 Aras. Tevfik R. Turkish foreign minister, 114, 131. 166, 168, 175. 177. 179, 188, 195, 196. 199 Argyropoulos, Pericles. Greek representative in Ankara, 52, 127. 128, 131 Arlkan. DiIaver. 154 Arlkan. Saffet, 152. 154 Aristarchi, Sophia. prominent Phanariot. 28
Ba/lk/l. hospital of. 48, 115, 146, 184, 186, 202, 207, 227, 242, 243. 257. 290, 295, 296, 3 I In. 17 Balkans. nations of the. 92. 127. 170, 234, 238. 267. 275, 276 Basil III, Georgiadis, patriarch of Constantinople. 168. 172, 194 Bawapaz (archpriest) 171. 195 Bayar, Celal. Turkish president, 236, 249, 260. 263, 264, 309 Bayiilken, U.H. 312n.20 Bedel. 99 Bekir Sami, Turkish foreign minister. 67 Bele. Refet. Kemalist leader, 77-83. 144 Bennett. Sterndale, British envoy in Ankara. 213, 221. 225. 226 Benjamin I, Christodoulou, patriarch of Constantinople. 203-205. 241. 243 Berat, 23. 161 Berlin. congress of. 26. treaty of. 27 Beyoglu.47. 104, 118, II9, 169. 191. 192. 22 I. 262, 27 I. 290. see also Pera Bil. Hikmet. Turkish journalist, 254, 26 I n.23. 263 Bilgehan, Clhat, Turkish minister of education. 288 Binns. British colonel. 223 Bitsios. Dimitri, Greek representative in the United Nations. 276, 283, 289, 300, 305 Bled. treaty of. 236 Bousios. George, Ottoman Greek deputy. 42n.15 Bozcaada. see Tenedos Bozkurt. Mahmut Esat. 130. 164n.25. 23 I Brussa. 55. see also Bursa Bulak, Adnan, 292, 295 Bulgaria, Exarchate of, Bulgaria, 22. 37. 40. 176. 189, 197.205,231,238,243, 304, 307, 308 Bursa, 74. 160. 230 Biiyiikada. 48, 58, 252, see also Prinkipo
Aristarchis. Gregory. Ottoman Greek diplomat. 28 Aristarchis. John. Ottoman Greek ambassador to Berlin. 28 Aristarchis, Miltiadis. Ottoman Greek administrator, 28 Aristarchis, Nicholas. prominent Phanariot. 28 Aristarchis, Stavros. Ottoman Greek senator. 27. 28 Aristoklis, John. Ottoman Greek civil servant. 48 Armaoglu. Fahir. 274 Armenians. Armenian millet, 21, 26. 27, 30-34. 41. 43. 48. 52. 57. 77. 81, 96, 101. 104. 111. 136. 137, 182. 214. 217. 219. 250. 258. 271 Asia Minor. 44. 45, 53. 54. 69-71, 76. 77, 84, 85, 105, 107. 123. 144. 15 H59, 161. 162. 169, 174, 213. 223, 319 Asimakopoulos, Nicholas. Constantinopolitan labour leader, 112 A~kale, 222-224 Assani. Amlenian broker. 31 Atatiirk, Mu~tafa Kemal, 80. 156- 158. 174, 176. 180, HB. 187. 193. 195, 200, 207.231. 234. 252. 256-258. 263, 313 Athanasiadis. Bodosakis, 70, 7 i Athanasiadis. see Germanos • Athenagoras. Spyrou, patriarch of Constantinople, 245-250, 252-255, 265, 268-271, 273-275. 277-279. 297, 299, 302, 303. 306 Athens. agreement of (1926), 128-130 Averoff. Evangelos Tossitzas. 250. 268 n.6. 269, 273. 275. 277 Axis. 207, 208, 216. 224, 225, 228. 230, 307. see also Nazi Germany Aydemir, S.S .. 206 Az/n/lk Pastas/, Turkish daily in Komotini.311 'A7lOi'WIWTll'lj. Greek daily of istanbul, 288 'Arr6uroi.o;; 'A \'(5psa;;, religious journal of the Phanar. 248, 299
C Caesarea, 33, 72. 151, 167nAI <;aglayangil. ihsan S., Turkish politician. 293 Caliphate, 87. 88, 135. 158. 230
B
Baban. Cihan. Turkish journalist, 253 Balat, 4
369
Calthorpe. Arthur. 56 (anakkale. 77 Canterbury. archbishop of. 61. 67. 75. 91. 93. 197. 198. 140. 179 (atalca. 89 Catholics. Catholic Church. 21. 91. 93. see also Vatican Cehi.1 Bayar Lisesi. Turkish lyceum in Komotini. 309 Cenani. Ali. 109 Chalcedon. 33. 155. 167. 172. 204. 230. 141£1018 Chalki. theological academy of. 24. 48. 134. 198. 240. 242. 243. 248. 287 £1031. 293. 299. 305. 306£1032. 319 Charnoudopoulos. Minas. prominent Ottoman Greek. 48 Chanak crisis. 77. 80 Charalambidis. Ch... patriarchal counsellor. 64 Chatzidimitriou. see Cyril Chatzis. see Meliton Chatzopoulos. Alexander. member of the national assembly. 250. 251. 155. 261. 262. 265 Cheetham. Milne. 163 Child. R. Washburne. 85 Chonaios. Ottoman Greek deputy. 42£1015 Christ Church of Galata. see Sotiros Christou Christian Church Association. 184 Christodoulou. see Benjamin I Chrysanthos. Philippidis. archbishop of Trebizond. 59. 197. 245 Chrysostomos. Konstantinidis. archbishop of Myra. 177 Chrysostomos. archbishop of Tyroloi. 73£1021 Churchill. Wo, 232 Clement. Olivier. 255 Clerk George. British ambassador to Turkey. 114. 129. 183 Commercial College of Galata. patriarchaL 47 Committee of Union and Progress. 39. 40 Constantine VI. Araboglou. patriarch of Constantinople. 73£121. 160-167. 172 Constantine. King of Greece. 70. 71. 73. 76
370
Cosmo Long. archbishop of Canterbury. 196 Council of the Judicial Ordinances. 27 Council of State. Ottoman. 27 Crete. Cretan issue. 29. 179. 180. possible haven for the Patriarchate. 306 ClIllllzllriyet. Turkish daily. 131. 164. 195. 196. 199.219.231. 253. 255. 286 Curzon. EarL 85. 89. 91. 92. 94. 98. 99. 102. 144 Cyprus. 85. 172. 247. 250. 252-256. 263. 264. 266. 267. 268. 270. 271. 274-276. 280. 282. 285. 288. 292. 294. 296. 298.299.302.309.315.317 "Cyprus is Turkish» Society. 253£1.3. 254. 260£1023. 263 Cyril 1. Loukaris. patriarch of Constantinople. 24. 299 Cyril VII. patriarch of Constantinople. 34 Cyril. Chatzidimitriou. archbishop of Rodopolis. 153. 155. 156. 169. 173 Cyzicus. 33. 155. 160 D
Dai. Erica. 295. 296 Daliatos. k. Greek vice-consul in istanbuL 180 Damad Ferid Pasha. 64£107. 65 Damaskinos. archbishop-regent. 240. 245 Damianidis. Damianos. eftimite leader. 145-147. 151. 152. 168. 169 Damtsas. Nicholas. 272£1.30. 273£1034. 276n.5 Davison. R.T o. see archbishop of Canterbury «Defence of Turkish Rights in Cyprus» Society. 253 Delikanis. see Kallinikos DemireL SUleyman. Turkish premier. 278. 289. 290 Dendramis. Greek ambassador in Berne. 96 Dercos. 33. 160. 204. 246. 298 Devetzis. see Joachim III Diamandopoulos. Kimon. Greek consu!general in istanbul. 133. 159 Diamandy. Rumanian negotiator. 92 Didymoteichon. 123
Dimitrios I. Papadopoulos. patriarch of Constantinople. 279. 295. 306. 307 Dionysios III. Vardalis. patriarch of Constantinople. 22£1.3 Dodecanese. 228. 234. 235. 267. 309 Donllle, \06. 216. 220 Dorotheos. Mammelis. archbishop of Brussa. 55. 59-63. 68. 71£1 . 13. 72. 74 Douglas. JoAn Anglican religious leader. 91. 93. 198 Dragoumis. Ion. 38. 42£1 . 15 Dulles. Allen. 265 Dulles. John Foster. 267 Durrazzo. 172£109
exchange of populations. 84-88. 92. 95. 103. 105. 112. 177 Exindaris. George. 125. 163. 166-168 Eyuboglu. Orhan. minister to the prime minister. 295. 296 'EOl'll':!) I/JWl'l/, 163 EKXi.IJUIMrIKI) 'A i.ljOela. 95. 150 ·Ei.evOepll l/JoJl'lj. Athenian daily, 162 'Ei.evOep'l I/JWl'l/. Constantinopolitan news-
paper. 254-256. 261. 288 'EhvOepo BliJIa. 166, 190, 191 ·Ei.i.'ll'll{o\' Mii.i.o\'. 199, 308n03 'EJlTipo;, 254
F
E
Fahrettin. assistant governor of istanbuL 155 Fakatchellis. Nicholas. Greek deputy. 250.270 Fehmi. Hamdi. Pomak deputy. 3\0 Fehmi. Hilmi. see Hilmi Fehmi Fevzi Bey. minister of public works. 1 \0 Franks. 21 Free Republican Party. 182. 183n.4 Frederika. Queen. 236. 249
Ecevit. Bulent. Turkish premier. 295. 296 Econollliste d'Orient, 107 Eden. Antony. 228 Edirne. 183. 315 Eftim. see Papa Eftim Egypt. 84 Eirinaios. archbishop of Dardanelles. 73 £1.11 EllIente Liberale, 40. 41. 81 EOKA. 254. 257. 282 Ephesos. 33 Eralp. Orhan. Turkish representative at the United Nations. 283. 302. 305 Erdek. see Cyzicus EreneroL Turgut. son of Papa Eftim. 302-304 Eri§igil. Eo, minister of the interior. 147 Erkin. Feridun CemaL Turkish foreign minister. 244£1.33. 277. 302 Erzurum. congress of. 65. 222 Esperey. general Franchet d'. 58. 64 etablis. 112-117. 125. 129. 130. 140. 164. 166. 177. 178. 281. 337 etlzelodollieia. 35 Eugenopoulos. Greek journalist in istanbuL 140 Every. Edward. Anglican priest. 198 Evgenidis. Constantinopolitan Greek banker. 31£13.34.47.69 Evgenios. Papathomas. archbishop of SiIyvria. 73£1021 el·kq!. see l'aUf 202. directory of the. 242n020. 299
I/Jcv;, 160
G Galata. 145. 146. 151n . 12. 159. 169. 187. 205. 242. 243. 171. 290. 303. 318 Galata bankers. 31 Galatasaray. imperial Iycee of. 27. 48 Gennadios II. Scholarios. patriarch of Constantinople. 22 Gennadios. Arabatzoglou. archbishop of Ilioupolis. 150 Gensberg. Ronald. 112 Georgantzoglou. Aristeidis Pasha. 42. 43 £1.18. 63. 68 Georgiadis. see Basil III Georgiadis. Dimitrios. Ottoman Greek senator. 43no 18 Gerassimos. archbishop of Pisidia, 73n.21 Germanos V. Kavakopoulos. patriarch of Constantinople. 23. 35. 36, 44, 55. 155 Germanos, Athanasiadis. archbishop of Sardis. 67. 150. 196. 197
371
Hellenes. Hellenic Greeks. 71. 83. 118. 124. 128. 129. 133. 142. 178, 185. 189. 191. 201. 225, 226. 227. 240. 248. :270. 272. 273, 281-286. 297. 299 Hellenic Union of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. 272. 284 Helm. kK .. British diplomat. 214 Henderson. Nevile. acting British High Commissioner in istanbul, 79. 82. 102. 146 Heraclea. 33, 204 Heybeli. 134, 242. see also Chalki Hilmi Fehmi. associate of Papa Eftim. 152 Hilmi. Mustafa. mufti of Xanthi, 312n,18 Hilmi. ~evket. Muslim journalist in Thraceo 312 Hoare, Samuel. British representative in Turkey. 134 Hugessen. Sir H. Knatchbull. 205. 209, 224. 230 Hiirriyet. 253. 256. 259n.8 Hiisnii. Cemal. Turkish member at the mixed commission on the exchange of Greek and Turkish popUlations, 122
Germanos. Strinopoulos. archbishop of Thyateira. 94. 197. 240. 245 Gerondes. Gerondis/Ilos. 33. 35. 55. 68. 155 Gervasios. Sarisitis. archbishop of Angyra. 151 Gkikis. Basil Mousouros. Ottoman Greek senator. 40. 41. 43n . 18. 75n.30 Gok<;:eada. see Imbros Goulakis. Lambros. secretary of the Constantinopolitan Hellenic Union. 272. 273n ..31 Gounaris. Dimitrios. Greek premier. 70 Gouras. Oikonomou. 281 Grand archivist. 23 Grand logothete. 23 Grand treasurer. 23 Greek Cypriots. 252. 253. 255. 256. 267. 280 Greek Literary Society of Constantinople. 29n.13. 45. 61. 127. 132 Gregorian Armenians. 21 Gregory VII. Zervoudakis. patriarch of Constantinople. 68. 155-160. 172 Giinaltay. ~ .. Turkish premier. 247 Giirsel. Cemal. Turkish president. 276. 277. 288. 289. 299
i<;:el. 210
H
ileri. Turcopl1one paper in Thrace, 31 I
n.17 Iliaskou. L, 119 Imbros. 142. 180. 181, 230. 242. 264. 279. 281. 291-294. 306 inonii. Ismet, 85, 86, 90. 92. 95, 97, 100102, 113. 118. 125. 145. 147, 150, 157, 164, 166. 175. 176, 179, 188. 191. 196, 200. 207. 211. 216, 230, 232, 246. 247, 262. 277. 285, 298, 319 Institute of Pat ric Studies, Thessaloniki. 306 Ioakeimeion college. 293 Ioannidis. Angelos. prominent Constantinopolitan Greek. 67, 96n.5 Ioannidis. Christos. Greek deputy, 251 Ioannidis, Michael, associate of Papa Eftim. 170 Ioannou. D .. 70 Ionian state. 71
HadlmH. governor of izmir. 263. 266 Hamdi. Turkish delegate at the mixed commission on the exchange of Greek and Turkish popUlations. 125 Hamit. Hasancan. Turkish representative in istanbul. 84 Halil. Salih. Muslim journalist in Thrace. 311n,17 Halkel'ieri (People's Houses) 184. 193 Harington. Sir Charles. commanding officer of the Allied forces in istanbul. 79. 81-83. 144 Hatlboglu. Hasan. Muslim journalist in Thrace. 311 Hatt-i Hiimayun. 26. 33 Hatt-i ~elif. 26 Hayrettin Pasha. Tunuslu. 29 "Hellenes Expelled from Turkey». Society of the. 284
372
KanatlL ~iikrii. chief of army staff. 236 Kanellopoulos. Efthymios. Greek High Commissioner in istanbul. 64. 81. 133 Kanellopoulos. Panayiotis. Greek politician. 266 Kapetanakis. Greek consul-general in istanbul. 227 Kaphandaris. George. Greek politician. 121 Kaphatiani. see Panagia Kaphatiani Karahissaridis. see Papa Eftim Ka/"{//Il{/Illides or Katal1lallll. 142n.12. 151-153. 192. 291n.43 Karamanlis. Constantine. Greek premier. 250. 269. 275 Karandreas. Greek consul-general in istanbul. 300 Karatheodoris. Alexander. prominent Constantinopolitan Greek. 27n,8. 28. 29 Karatheodoris. Constantine. Ottoman Greek Senator. 27n.7 Karatheodoris. Paul. patriarchal counsellor. 67. 119 Karatheodoris. Stephen. prominent Greek physician. 29 Karatzas. Phanariot Greek. 28n.1O Karayannis. John. headmaster of the Patriarchal lycee. 286n.28 Kadowitz. treaty of, 24 Karolidis. Paul. Ottoman Greek deputy. 39. 41. 42 Katechakis. George. Greek officer. 70 Kavakopoulos. see Germanos V Kavalall. ibrahim Pa~azade Hiiseyin. donme Turk businessman. 106 Kaya. ~iikrii. 96. 109. 162n,13. 164. 198 Kayioglou. Michael. istanbul Greek deputy. 251 Kayseri. 151. 157 Kedros brothers. Constantinopolitan Greek businessmen. 107 Kehayioglou. John. 71. 152 Kemalism. 125. 135. 136, 151. 154. 181. 182. 184. 187. 192. 200. 203. 208. 215.220.296.316 Kepetzis. Michael. 101
Ishi. Viscount. secretary-general of the League of Nations. 165 iskenderun. 125 Islamic Awakening Club of Thrace. 311 n,15 istamat Zihni. see Ozdamar istanbul Ekspres. 156
izmir. 52, 56. 65. 213. 256. 258. 259. 263. 266, 267 izmit. 82, 146. 169 iznik. see Nicaea "HpepljGla !Yea. Grecophone daily in istanbul. 160. 164 'H1W. Grecophone daily in istanbul. 288. 294
J Jacob. Nikolaou. archbishop of Durazzo. 172n.9 Jacob, Koukouzis. archbishop of North and South America, 295, 305 Jacob. Papapai'siou. archbishop of Imbros and Tenedos, 204 Jacob. Tsanavaris, archbishop of Ikonio. 248. 299 Jerusalem. Patriarchate of. 171. 244. 277 Jewish, millet. 27. 43. Ill, 136. 180. 183. 213.215-217.224.231. 250. 258 Joachim III. Devetzis. patriarch of Constantinople. 23. 34, 35. 42 Joachim, archbishop of Chalcedon. 167. 172 Joachim. Pelekanos. archbishop of Dercos, 246 John Paul II, Pope. 279. 307 K
Kadlk6y. 290. see also Chalcedon Kaklamanos. Dimitri. Greek politician. 82. 94, 96, 165 Kalliadis. Constantine. prominent Ottoman Greek. 45 Kallimachis. Phanariot Greek. 28n.1O Kallinikos. Delikanis. archbishop of Cyzieus. 153 Kalokairinos. Gerassimos. bishop of Pamphylos. 243n.27. 257 Kaloumenos. Dimitrios. 258n.5. 272n . 27
373
Laskaridis. Kaloudis. Greek Senator. 276 Lausanne. conference of. 78. 84. 90-92. 94.95. 101-103. 106. 111. 113. 116. 145. 147. 149. 150. 154. 161. 162. 164. 165. 187 Lausanne. treaty of. 93. 94. 103. 1I 1. 113. 116. 119. 128. 132. 135-138. 142. 150. 156. 158. 170. 174. 175. 177. 190. 195. 196. 200. 203. 232. 234. 248. 253. 269. 271. 275. 281. 286. 287. 288. 290. 294. 296. 300. 309. 315. 317-319 League of Nations. 84. 85, 97. 98. 112. 113, 115. 120. 124. 138. 163-167. 169. 181. 241 Leeper. KA.. British ambassador to Greece. 307 Liatis. Soo Greek acting High Commissioner in istanbul. 81. 82 Limnos.85 Lloyd George. British premier. 54. 61. 67, 74,75 Locarno, 179 London. tripartite conference of (1955). 256. 266 Loukaris. see Cyril Loraine, P., British ambassador in Athens. 131. 183
Keresteciyan. Armenian community leader. 181n.29 Kerr. Philip. 70 Ke~an. conference of. 291. 292 Keskin. 151 Kinall (Proti). Greek cemetery of. 259 Kiosseoglou. Alexander. Constantinopolitan Greek businessman. 108. 119 Kocarian. Vahan. Armenian religious leader. 201n.27 Kollias. Constantine. 291 Kombodekras. Constantine. Greek journalist. 272n.27 Komninos. Pandeleimon. theologian. 198 Komotini. 123. 135. 308n.4. 309. 3 I I. 312 Kondy1is. George. Greek leader. 70. 162 Konos. Basil. Greek deputy. 25 I Konstantinidis. Basil. 224 Koprulu. Fuad. Turkish foreign minister. 236. 265. 27 I Korea. war in. 236 Kosmidis. Pandelis. Ottoman Greek deputy.42n.15 Kostopoulos. SL. Greek foreign minister. 285. 300 Koukouzis. see Jacob Ku~uk Kaynarca (Kutchuk-I\ainardji). 25 Kumkapl. 152 Kuneralp. Zeki. 276 Kurds. 22. 52. 125 Kurtulu~. 49. 133. 142. 287n.31. see also Tatavla Kuru~e§me. 24. 47 Kymiatzi. headmistress of Zappeion. 286
M
Macedonia. 39. 55n.4. 121. 189 Ma~ka. see Rodopolis Mahmud II. Sultan. 28n.10 Makarios III, archbishop of Cyprus. 253. 255. 269. 280. 282. 283. 285 Ma~ridis. Th,. director of the Byzantine Museum of istanbul. 192 Mammelis. see Dorotheos Mango. A.A" 217 Mantas. Chrysanthos. 257 Mara. General Charles. 246 Maritza. river of (Evros). 120 Markouizos. TL Greek journalist, 272 n.27 Markos Pasha. prominent Greek. 27 Marmarali. Abravaya. Jewish deputy. 181n.29.211 Marx. Karl. 211
L
Laimos. Goo Greek shipowner. 306 Lambert. A.E .. Foreign Office official. 190 Lambeth Palace. 62. 93. 94. 240 Lambikis Andreas. istanbul Greek journalist. 254-256. 261. 288. 31 I Lambikis Pasha. prominent Constantinopolitan Greek. 68 Lara. General Manrique de. president of the mixed commission on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. 114-116. 129. 130
Mavridis, K., 81 Mavrokordatos, D., 43n.18, 68 Mavrokordatos, Th., 31n.3 Mavrophrydis Ch., 287n.31 Mavropoulos, Dimitri, 274 Mavroudis, Constantine, Constantinopolitan Greek journalist, 244n.33 Mavroyenis, Alexander, Ottoman Greek diplomat, 30 Mavroyenis, Spyridon, Greek physician, 27,30 Maximos, Dimitrios, Greek foreign minister, 199 Maximos, Seraphim, Greek socialist, 112 Maximos, Vaportzis, patriarch of Constantinople, 204, 241, 243, 244, 246 Mazarakis, Alexander, 70 Mazbut, 201 Megali idea, 38, 44, 53, 68, 70, 104, 239, 253 Mecelle, 136
Mehmet II, Sultan, 22, 37, 58, 144 Mehmet VI, Vahdettin, Sultan, 63, 78 Meletios, Metaxakis, patriarch of Constantinople, 69, 72-76, 81, 85, 88, 94, 101, 118, 133, 144·149, 151·153, 155, 160, 172, 201 Meletopoulos, D., commander of Greek navy stationed in istanbul, 81 Meliton, Chatzis, archbishop of ChaIcedon, 278n.14, 279, 295n.56, 296, 306 Menderes, Adnan, Turkish premier, 235, 236, 249, 254, 256, 260, 262·266, 268, 270, 273, 276 Menemencioglu, Numan, Turkish foreign minister, 213, 225, 229 Menemencioglu, TUI'gut, 302 Metaxakis, see Meletios Metaxas, John, Greek leader, 180, 196 Michalakopoulos, Andreas, 125-127, 131, 163, 179 Middle East, 238, 244, 276 Mighirdich, Vaton, 201n.27 Mikrasiatic state, 73, 74, see also Ionian state Milletbas,l, 22, 98 Milliyet (istanbul), 199, 260, 293 Milliyet (Xanthi), 312
Misak-i Mill!, 77, 96, 137
Misiroglou, Anastasios, 163 Mithat Pasha, 28 Mitylene, 172n.9 Mixed commiSSIOn on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, 113-117, 122, 126, 129, 130, 132, 143, 159-163, 165, 166, 177 Montagna, G.M., Italian negotiator at Lausanne, 86, 90-92, 94, 101 Morgan, J., Senior member of the British embassy in Ankara, 195,196 Moschos, AchiIleas, Greek deputy, 250, 251 Moscow, 200, 238, 239, 244 Mosul, 94, 96, 125, 127 Mt. Athos, 88, 148, 149, 171, 197, 200, 278, 306 Mousouros, Constantine, Ottoman Greek diplomat, 27-29 Mousouros, Stephen, Ottoman Greek diplomat,30 Mudanya, conference of, 78-80, 103 Mudros, armistice of, 52, 55, 64, 68, 114, 155, 168 Mufti, 123, 309, 312n.21 Muhafazakiir, Thracian newspaper, 311 Mukataa, tax of, 242n.20, 243, 248, 290, 294-296 Miilhak, 202 Murad V, sultan, 31 Muslims of Western Thrace, 85, 86, 95, 96, 114, 116, 117, 120-126, 128, 131, 135, 164, 187, 188, 190, 199, 257n.2, 273, 307-315 Muslim Teachers' Association of Thrace, 311n.15 Miitevelli heyetleri (ephories), 202 Myrivilis, Stratis, 272n.30 Merappv()J1/(nr;. eftimite paper, 170, 184 N
Nadi, Nadir, Turkish journalist, 219 Nansen, Dr Fridtj, 84, 85 Naroyian, Mesrup, Armenian community leader, 201n.27 National Turkish Commercial Union, 106, 107
375
374 24
r'
NATO, 235, 254, 258, 264, 267, 275, 277, 280, 285, 308, 319 Nazi Germany, 207, 208, 220, 231, 232, see also Axis Negrepontis, 21 Neocaesarea, 169 Neologos (Neal.oyor:;) , Constantinopolitan Greek paper, 34n.8, 45, 58, 119
ambassador in the United Nations, 269, 293 Pallis, Alexander, 148, 16In.10, 239 Pammakaristos, church of, 24 Panagia Kaphatiani, church of, 145, 151, 157, 169, 243n.28 Panagia Paramythias, church of, 24 Panagia of Pera, church of, 170 Pandelaras, Dimitris, headmaster of Ioakeimeion, 293 Pangalos, Theodore, 126-129, 163 Panthracian anti-Turkish Defence, 312 Papa Eftim, 151-159, 168-\70, 173, 187, 188, 20In.27, 202, 205, 206, 242, 243, 250, 27\, 302-304, 316, 318 Papadopoulos, see Dimitrios I Papadopoulos, George, Greek dictator, 291-293 Papadopoulos, Kotsos, eftimite journalist, 170, 184 Papadopoulos, Stephen, Greek journalist, 272n.27 Papagos, Alexander, Greek premier, 267, 275, 308 Papaligouras, Panagiotis, Greek foreign minister, 314 Papandreou, George, Greek premier, 285 Papapa'isiou, see Jacob Paparrigopoulos, Constantine, 35 Pappas, Alexander, patriarchal counsellor, 59, 178 Paraskevopoulos, Leonidas, 57n.15 Paris, peace conference of, 52, 55, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66 Paris, peace treaty of (1947), 234 Patriarchal Iycee, 46, 286, 295 Patriarcheas, George, Greek journalist, 272n.27 Paul, King of Greece, 236, 249, 309 Paul, Pope,-.?78, 307 Peker, Recep, minister of the interior, 159n.3, 243 Pelekanos, see Joachim Pendik, 91 Pera, 87, 104, 1/8, 119, 152, 169, 190-192, 257, 262 Pera Palas, Constantinopolitan hotel, 70, ll9
New York Herald, 158 New York Times, 217, 228, 260
Nicaea, 33, 155, 168, 172 Nicholas, Sakkopoulos, archbishop of Caesarea, 72, 148, 150, 153, 167n.41 Nicolson, Sir Harold, British diplomat, 53 Nicomedia, 33 Nicolaidis-Souliotis, A., 38 Niksar, see Neocaesarea Northern Epirus, 44, 52 Nur, Rlza, 86-88, 90, 92, 93, 96-100, 102, 149, 150, 154, 319 Nuri, Osman, Thracian deputy, 3ll
o Oakley, Austin, chaplain at the Crimean Memorial Church, 191, 202 Oikonomou-Gouras, Greek foreign minister, 291 Okte, Faik, 215-217, 220, 221 Okyar, Fethi, Turkish Liberal Leader, ll5, 120, 125, 162n.13, 164, 182 Orbay, Rauf, Turkish ambassador in London, 230 Organization of Constantinople, 38, 42n.15 Orient News, 125
Orphanidis, Basil, Ottoman Greek deputy, 68, 138n.7, 149 Ottomanism (OsmanlUlk), 26, 31, 32, 42 Ozdamar; istamat Zihni, eftimite leader, 152n.15, 18In.29, 184, 186, 188, 202, 206, 242, 250 'OpBol5oc,ia, official journal of the Patriarchate, 248, 299 P
Palaiologos, A., Greek diplomat, 45 Palaiologos, Paul, Greek journalist, 247 n.15 Palamas, Christos Xanthopoulos, Greek
376
Permanent Court of International Justice, 115-117, 165-167 Pesmazoglou, George, Greek ambassador in Ankara, 272 Peterson, Maurice, British ambassador in Ankara, 237, 239, 241 Peygamber Binasl. religious paper in Thrace,311 Phessopoulos, G., governor of Thrace, 308 Philaretos, bishop of Myra, 145 Philippidis, see Chrysanthos Photios II, Maniatis, patriarch of Constantinople, 194-198, 200, 203-205 Photiadis, John, Ottoman Greek diplomat, 29 Phrantzis, George, 22n.3 Phytos, Dr D., patriarchal counsellor on political affairs, 150 Pipinelis, Panayiotis, 245n.7, 292, 293 Plastiras, Nicholas, 89n.7, 236 Poland, 196 Politis, John, Greek charge d'affaires in Ankara, 125, 156 Politis, Nicholas, 84, 115 Polychroniadis, Spyridon, Greek representative in Ankara, 176, 177, 186, 188, 195, 196 Polykarpos, Stergios, anti-Meletios figure, 147 Pomaks, 310, 313 Portokaloglou, 119 Pouloglou, Stamatis, see Ordamar Princes Islands, see Biiyiikada PIinkipo, 141, orphanage of, 287n.31, 318 Progressive RepUblican Party, 125
Re§at, Hafiz, Muslim leader in Thrace, 311 Rhodes, 277, 278, 306 Rlfat Bey, 201n.27 Robeck, J.M. de, British high commissioner in istanbul, 66 Roberts, N.S., \06 Rodopolis, 155, 169, 173 Rombopoulos, Charalambos, istanbul Greek journalist, 288, 294 Roosevelt, Franklin, 232, 245 Roussos, George, Greek foreign minister, 121 Rumania, 92, 196, 207 Rumbold, Sir Harold, British high commissioner in istanbul, 82, 101, 102, 147 Russia, 25, 197 Russian Patriarchate, 197, 244, 245, 249 Ryan, Andrew, 64, 76n.30, 93, 99, \00 S
Sabahattin, Ottoman prince, 40, 41 Sabri, Mustafa, ~eyhiilislam, 135, 187, 206 Saka, Hasan, Turkish foreign minister, 237 Sakellaropoulos, Constantine, consulgeneral in istanbUl, 186, 187 Sakkopoulos, see Nicholas Samatya, 152 Sara<;:oglu, ~iikrii, Turkish premier, 128, 139, 2/1, 215, 229, 230, 232, 237, 241, 242 Sarandis, Frankiskos, 178 Sardis, 197 Sarisitis, see Gervasios Sarper, Selim, Turkish foreign minister, 276 Sarris, Neoklis, 294n.54 Savas, John, 27n.8, 48 Saydam, Dr. Refik, Turkish premier, 208n.4 Sbarounis, Ath., 237 Scoutari, see Dskiidar Sebat. Thracian turcophone paper, 3ll n.14 Sergius, Russian patriarch, 238
[la\'ePi'awai "EvwaI/ KwvaravTlvovno).ewr:;.
112 [lo).Ireia (Politeia), 164 [lpwia (Proia), 197
R
Rakitch, Serbian delegate at Lausanne, 92 Rallis, George, 108 Raphail, Raphail, 221, 226, 231 Refornls, Ottoman, 24 Religious privileges, 22
377
Sepheroglou, Nicholas, Greek tobacco merchant, 107 Seriat, islamic law, 88 Sevres, treaty of, 66, 67 Seyyid, minister of justice, 156 Shaki, Ishaq, Jewish religious head in Turkey, 201n.27 Slgl (Sigrni), 160 Siniosoglou, Alexander, Constantinopolitan Greek entrepreneur, 108, 118, 152 Siotis, Antony, Greek member at the mixed commission on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, 160 Si~li, cemetery of, 259 Sismanoglou, Alexander, Greek businessman, 119, 152 Sivas, congress of, 65 Skalieris, George, eminent Constantinopolitan Greek, 40, 338 Skalieris, Kleanthis, influential politician, 40n.21 Skepheris, Sophocles, Greek ambassador in Ankara, 241, 242 Skouros, Aristeidis Pasha, prominent Constantinopolitan Greek, 68, 138 n.7 Skouros, Phaidon, local councillor, 256 Smith, Adam, 211 Smyrna, Greek rule of, 65, 74, massacre of, 77, 80, 81 Sotiros Christou, Greek Orthodox church of Galata, 243n.28, 272 Soviet Living Church, 171 Soviet Union, the, 176, 200, 207, 234, 237-241, 244, 245 Soysal, Miimtaz, 274, 282 Spanoudis, Constantine, Constantinopolitan Greek journalist, 190, 191 Spatharis, Avrilios, Constantinopolitan Greek lawyer, 137, 169 Spyrou, see Athenagoras Stalin, Joseph, 237, 254 Stavrianos, see Ambrosios Stavridi, Sir John, Anglo-Greek banker, 56 St. Dimitrios Kanavi, church of, 24 Steinhardt, U.S. ambassador in Turkey, 224
Stephanopoulos, St., Greek foreign minister, 267 Stephanovik, Paul Skylitzis, Constantinopolitan Greek philanthropist, 3In.3, 34 Stergiadis, Aristeidis, Greek governor of Smyrna, 73n.23 St. George, patriarchal cathedral of, 24, 161, 249n.7, 272, 299, 307 St. George, Therapeia church of, 298 St. John of Galata, church of, 303 St. Nicholas of Galata, church of, 169, 205, 303 Strinopoulos, see Germanos St. Sophia, Church of, 62n.39, 200 Sublime Porte, 23, 24, 29, 33, 45, 68, 75 Siileyman Sami, governor of istanbul, 160n.6, 167 Sulzberger, c'L., American journalist, 228 Sunay, Cevdet, Turkish president, 278, 304 Syllogoi, 45 T
Taksim, square of, 118, 246 Talii, Nairn, Turkish premier, 293 Tanin, 95, 149, 154, 158 Tanrliiver, H.S., prominent Turk, 244n.l, 247 Tanzimat, 25, 29, 48 Taptas, Dr Nicholas, Greek deputy, 181, 190, 21I, 250 Tatavla, 49, 58, 133, 141, see also Kurtulu~
Temps, Le, 163 Tenedos, 89, 143, 180, 181, 192, 204, 242, 279, 281, 291-293, 306 Terciiman, 253 Terkoz, see Dercos Tevfik Pa~a, Ottoman premier, 63, 78 Tevhid-i Ejkar, 94, 158n.24 Theotokas, Michael, Constantinopolitan Greek lawyer, 96, 138n.9, 161n.1O Thessaloniki, 131, 148, 162, 167, 256, 257, 263 Thrace (eastern and western), 39, 44, 45. 53, 70, 71, 77, 78, 80, 85, 86, 89, western, 96, 99, 103, 105, 120-128, 135.
378
174, 177, 186, 189, 249, 257, 294, 307-315,319 Thyateira, 94, 197, 240, 245 Tokatliyan, hotel of, 152 Toynbee, Arnold, 53, 159, 164 Trakya, Western Thracian paper, 311 Trebizond, 59, 197, 245 Triantaphyllos, eftimite Greek, 184 Truman doctrine, 234, 245-247 Tsakonas, Dimitri, 245n.7 Tsaldaris, Constantine, 235 Tsaldaris, Panayis, Greek premier, 180, 196, 201 Tsanavaris, see Jacob Tsatsos, Dimitri, 272n.30 Tsirigotis, John, anti-Meletios figure, 147 Tsirimokos, Elias, Greek political leader, 288 Tsitouris, N., Constantinopolitan Greek businessman, 132 Tsouderos, Emmanuel, Greek premier, 228, 229 Tulga, Refik, 271 Tiiliiy, Turhan, Turkish ambassador in Athens, 282 Tunisia, 84 Turkish Cypriots, 271, 273, 275, 278, 289 Turkish National Export and Import Company, 107 Turkish Orthodox Church, 149, 151, 157, 159, 183, 184, 188, 206, 302-304 Turkish Teachers' Union of Thrace, 31I n.15 Turkish Union of Xanthi, 311n.15 Turkish Youth Hearth of Thrace, 123 Tzambazoglou, Miltiadis, istanbul Greek community representative, 295n.56, 296 Tzounis, John, Greek diplomat, 292, 295
Varougas, Dionysos, 201n.27 Vasiadis, Iroklis, Greek educationalist, 45 Vatan, 149, 15In.24, 215 Vatican, 91, 238, 278, 279, 304 Vatopedion, 197 Vayianis, Constantine, 43n.18, 63 Vehbi, police commandant in istanbul, 146 Venizelos, Eleftherios, Greek leader, 43, 44, 52-55. 59, 65, 69-73, 75, 84, 85, 89, 90. 95-97, 99, 100, 101, 129, 145, 147. 148, 167, 174-176, 178-180, 186189, 194, 196, 201, 234, 252, 254, 309, 338 Venizelos, Sophocles, 234, 235, 236 Vlastos, A., 31 Vogoridis, Stephen, 27n.6, 28, 30 Votsis, Nicholas, Greek high commissi-" oner in istanbul, 72 Voutyras, Alexander, 178 Voutyras, Stavros, prominent Constantinopolitan Greek journalist, 34, 45, 58, 1I9 X
Xanthi, 123, 310, 31In.18 Xenos, Anastasios, Constantinopolitan priest, 299 Xylopolta, 24 Xyrokrini, see Kuruge~me XPOVIKa., 140 XPOI'OC;, Komotini daily, 312
W
Wallach Saray, 24 Watson, Douglas, manager of the Constantinople telephone company, 1I0 Watt, manager of the Ionian Bank in istanbul, 110 Webb, Richard, acting British high commissioner in istanbul, 58, 59, 64 Whitehouse, Canon, Chaplain of the British Embassy in istanbul, 194 Woods, H., 107
V Vakfj; 201, 243, 248, 290, 306 Vak'lflar Bank, 202 Vakit, 205 Valoukli, see Bal/kll Vaportzis, see Maximos Vardopoulos, Basil, 178 Varllk vergisi, 211, 213-232, 237, 284, 318
U
VIliS, 213, 258
379
Yusuf, Hiisnii, Muslim leader, 311
Union of Muslims in Thrace, 311 Unionists, see Young Turks Unite Armenians, 202 United Nations, 228, 269, 283, 285, 289, 291, 296, 300, 302, 303, 305 United States, 245-247, 269, 270, 297, 301, 314 Urgiiplii, Suat H., Turkish premier, 285, 288, 289, 299, 304 Uskiidar, 87, 168, 219 USSR, 237-239
z Zacharias, !lias, 112 Zacharopoulos, see Aimilianos Zaimis, Andreas, Greek deputy foreign minister, 294 Zakynthinos, D., 272n.30 Zapheiropoulos, Constantinopolitan banker, 47 Zappas, Constantine, Greek benefactor, 47 Zappeion, Greek Iycee for girls, 47, 134, 203, 205, 250n.ll, 262, 286 Zariphis, Leonidas, Greek banker, 31, 34, 47, 69, 118, 130 Zaven, Armenian patriarch, 80 Zeki, Ali, correspondant of Tanin, 149 Zeki, Salih, 133 Zervoudakis, see Gregory VII Zincirdere, 151 Zimbrakakis, E., 70 Zographeion, Greek lycee for boys, 47, 147, 286 Zographos, Chnstaki, Greek financier, 22, 24,47 Zorlu, Fatin, Turkish foreign minister, 263-266
Y
Yal<;:!n, Hiiseyin, Turkish journalist, 243, 244n.l,258 Yalman, Ahmet Emin, Turkish journalist, 215, 216, 220, 223 Yass!ada, 263, 266, 269, 273, 276 Yedikule, 48 Yeni Gazete. 291 Yeni Gun. 199 Yeni istanbul. 268, 270, 274 Yenimahale, 133 Young Turks, 36, 39-44, 58, 63, 106, 132, 220 Yozgat, 151 Ypsilantis, Alexander, 37 Yugoslavia, 171, 196, 235, 236, 267
380
the Constantinopolitan Greek community.
Alexander Zoiros Pasha, prominent Greek doctor employed at the Ottoman palace.
Solon Kazanovas, member of the patriarchal mixed council.
C. Karatheodoris, Constantinopolitan Greek politician.
Marko Pasha. a prominent member of
Alexander Siniosoglou, prominent Greek businessman of karamanll origins.
John Chatzopoulos, prominent Constantinopolitan Greek and member of the patriarchal mixed council.
E. Evgenidis, successful Constant inopolitan Greek businessman and philanthropist.
George Exindaris, Greek negotiator at the Mixed Commission (with the kind permission of his nephew, Ambassador Exindaris).
From the historic meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch in 1967.
Patriarch Dimitrios I.
Fraternity. A Turkish mollah (in the centre) is shown sitting at the voting-table with a Greek priest on his right and an Armenian priest on his left. The wail at the back is the fac;:ade of a Greek church.
The church of St. George and the patriarchal gardens. Premier C Karamanlis with his Turkish counterpart Adnan Menderes. This photograph has been taken during the Greek premier's visit to istanbul in May 1959. On the right hand it is the Greek deputy of istanbul, Alexander Chatzopoulos.
Atatiirk with a group of istanbul Greeks. The picture was taken at the early 1930 at Florya beach.
The offices of the patriarchal mixed council and the library, part of the patriarchal complex.
The historical Patriarchal Throne of Chrysostomos at St. George Church of the Phanar Monastery (offer of Dimitri Kalloumenos).
The Theological Academy of Chalki.
A.
The icon of Panagia Pammakaristos - one of the oldest icons preserved at the Phanar cathedral.
The auditorium of the patriarchal Iycee of Phanar.
The patriarchal lycee and the FenerjPhanari quarter of istanbul. The picture was taken at the turn of thf' century. (I would like to thank Dimitri Kalloumenos for offering me this picture).
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