The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict Clement Dodd

The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict Clement Dodd Research Associate, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK

© Clement Dodd 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN-13: 978–0–230–24211–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dodd, C. H. (Clement Henry) The history and politics of the Cyprus conflict / Clement Dodd. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-230-24211-1 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Cyprus–History–Cyprus Crisis, 1963. 2. Cyprus–History–Cyprus Crisis, 1974– 3. Cyprus–Politics and government–1960– 4. Cyprus– Foreign relations–Turkey. 5. Turkey–Foreign relations–Cyprus. 6. United Nations–History–20th century. 7. United Nations–History– 21st century. I. Title. DS54.9.D64 2010 956.9304–dc22 2009047528 10 19

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Happy the country that has no history

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Contents Map of Cyprus

ii

Preface and Acknowledgments

viii

1 Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954

1

2 Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960

20

3 Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964

41

4 Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967

67

5 Negotiations and the Greek Junta 1968–1974

91

6 Turkish Intervention and the Geneva Conferences 1974

110

7 From Guide Lines to the First UN Plan 1975–1987

131

8 The Set of Ideas and Confidence-Building 1988–1994

160

9 The EU Catalyst and the UN 1995–2002

188

10 The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004

223

11 After the Referenda

255

12 Conclusion

268

Notes

278

Bibliography

297

Index

308

vii

Preface and Acknowledgements My serious interest in the history and politics of the Cyprus conflict began some fifteen years ago when a small grant by the Leverhulme Trust enabled me to carry out research into some aspects of the Cyprus problem with a view to examining Turkish approaches to it. This resulted in a number of articles and a book (The Cyprus Imbroglio). However, to know a little is to want to know more. So this present book arises from a desire to know and understand better the Cyprus problem as it has developed since its beginnings by combining information and understanding from Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sources with that of different provenance obtained and used by others working in the same field. A book of this sort must, then, rely greatly on the work of others, notable among whom are those historians who have examined the national archives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Republic of Cyprus. Without their work a book like this that seeks to present an overall account of the history and politics of the problem since 1875 would not be possible. To one of these historians, Dr Salahi Sonyel, I am grateful for the use of British documents on the Geneva Conferences in 1974. A problem that arises in trying to analyse a sensitive problem of this sort is that of bias, often apparent more in acts of omission than commission. It is clearly often difficult for a writer not to be sympathetic to the side from which he or she approaches so emotional a topic as the Cyprus conflict, but academic detachment is vital. One has to consider sympathetically the experiences and studies of others of different provenance, and hope to achieve a degree of academic impartiality. As for which persons, institutions, or governments are to be considered as mainly responsible for the emergence and continuation of the tragic Cyprus conflict, that must be left to the reader to decide. It is a good subject for graduate dissertations for all students of politics and international relations, not just for those studying the Cyprus conflict. For much understanding of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot approaches to the Cyprus problem I am much indebted to the very many Turkish and Turkish Cypriot politicians, diplomats, officials and academics with whom over the years I have been able to discuss the problem. Among diplomats Ambassador Özdem Sanberk, and Ambassador Korkmaz Haktanır deserve particular mention for their interest in the Cyprus question and its peaceful resolution. It has also been of very great help to have been able to discuss the issue with Greeks and Greek Cypriots. In this regard the meetings in London of the Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs, of which Dr Zenon Stavranides is the General Secretary, have been valuable viii

Preface and Acknowledgements ix

in bringing together in meetings over the years those interested in, and knowledgeable about, Greece, Turkey and, especially, Cyprus. To my colleagues in the School of Oriental and African Studies, Professor William Hale and Dr Andrew Mango, I am grateful for much discussion of Turkish and kindred matters. In Ankara I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Professor Dr Metin Heper of Bilkent University for his generous hospitality and practical help, and to members of the international relations department for much intellectual stimulus. Members of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University also generously co-operated in replying to questions on the Cyprus issue. I am also very grateful to Professor Haluk ˘lu for generous hospitality in Istanbul and for much intellectual Kabaaliog stimulation. To Dr Aylin Güney, a member of Bilkent University, when I was there, I am indebted for obtaining copies of the proceedings of the Turkish parliament, for arranging interviews with a number of politicians, officials and officers of the Turkish military, and for assembling a collection of articles on the Cyprus question in the Turkish press. To my colleague in the Turkish Area Study Group, its Chairman, John Martin, I am deeply grateful for reading large sections of the manuscript and for making many valuable suggestions. All academics, especially when in ‘retirement’ they continue to work, must owe a great deal to the forbearance of their spouses or partners. I am no exception. Clement Dodd

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1 Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954

Introduction Cyprus was first peopled around 1400 BC by Greeks from Asia Minor and the Aegean. By the ninth century BC the island was Greek speaking, though Phoenician and Persian conquests a few centuries later must also have affected to some extent the ethnic make-up of the population. Cyprus came under Roman rule in 58 BC. Since the island later formed part of the East Roman Empire, the Greek Cypriots were, and are to this day, called ‘Rum’ by the Turks. Under Roman rule the Cypriots became Christian. Under the later East Roman, Byzantine, Empire their ‘orthodox’ Christian church was granted independence, being accorded self-governing (autocephalous) status by the Council of Ephesus, AD 431. Church and state became closely combined. For many centuries, it was Greek speaking, Greek Orthodox in belief, and generally under Byzantine rule, though subject to many disastrous Arab raids between the seventh and tenth centuries. The Byzantine connection was rudely destroyed by the advent of the Crusaders. In 1192 the island came under the rule of the Roman Catholic Lusignan dynasty of French lineage, a rule that lasted almost 300 years. The Orthodox Church hardly survived this calamity and the population suffered great hardship under Latin rule. Lusignan rule was followed by brief periods under first the Genoese and then the Venetians. It was not until 1571 that it became Ottoman, when the Ottomans defeated the Venetians, who were then ruling the island. Immediately after the Ottoman victory, and for some years thereafter, the Ottomans established their hold by colonizing the island. Turks were sent from Anatolia, care being taken that relevant skills and trades were included. Estimates vary as to their number, but it seems that they were around 20,000. To these must be added those members of the Ottoman soldiery who stayed on in the island. By 1640 the population probably numbered 120–140,000, with the Turks constituting about quarter of the island’s population.1 1

2 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

After the conquest the Greek Orthodox Church was freer than under the Latins, the Orthodox Archbishopric being restored. The burdens of serfdom were also lifted from the general population who, under the Ottoman system of religious grouping, the ‘millet’ system, though subject to a special tax, were placed under the delegated authority of their religious leaders, a system of self-government that created a new, and large, degree of autonomy for the Greek Cypriots. The Ottomans did not seek either to establish a Turkish majority, or to set up a dominant Turkish economic class. For the most part they were in a minority. Ottoman rule, sometimes venal in its later years, was loosely authoritarian within its circumscribed sphere, though in times of crisis could be arbitrary in its dealings with all its subjects. For instance, at the time of the successful Greek war of independence in 1821, on what seems to have been slender evidence of collusion, the Greek Orthodox Archbishop in Cyprus, other religious dignitaries, and many other Greek Cypriots were summarily executed. The Ottomans treated their Christian subjects well as long as they did not rebel. During the early part of the nineteenth century Ottoman rule was generally corrupt and inefficient. Governors were changed frequently and sought to satisfy their own and the Sultan’s financial needs at the often ruinous expense of the populace, Greek and Turkish Cypriot alike. However, government became, in fits and starts, rather less venal and onerous, mainly in response to pressures by European powers for better treatment of Christians in the Empire generally. In fact the Ottoman Government had not treated Christians badly, whilst according them an assured, if inferior, status. It was when they began to be infected with nationalist ambitions that, becoming a threat, they began to be harshly treated. In Cyprus the nineteenth century began badly, but ‘taking everything into consideration, there seems to be no doubt that the condition of the island improved sensibly towards the end of the Turkish regime’.2 Neither in Ottoman, nor British, times did the two major communities constitute a Cypriot people, though they mingled freely enough, tolerant of religious differences, and they often joined together in minor commercial transactions and social functions. They lived in separate villages or town quarters, though they sometimes lived side by side in the same villages, and had much in common, especially their suffering under late Ottoman rule, often inefficient and corrupt. They rarely intermarried, religiously based legal, and other, restrictions making this difficult. One legacy of this history is that the Greek Cypriots came easily to regard themselves as the rightful, because original, rulers of Cyprus, looking back essentially to the long centuries when they in Cyprus were part of the Byzantine world, sharing in its culture and religion. They were conscious of the fact that they were not only a majority, but even in Ottoman times a partly self-ruling majority. This led readily enough to their adoption of Hellenism in the nineteenth century, even though it is diluted now. One

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 3

result is that all foreign rulers of the island since Byzantine times have come to be regarded as temporary. In 1878, in return for diplomatic aid against Russia, and as a base for the provision of material assistance, should that be necessary to meet Russian aggression, the Ottoman government reluctantly allowed the United Kingdom to administer Cyprus temporarily on its behalf. Under what came to be known as The Cyprus Convention in July 1878 the United Kingdom agreed to help the Sultan militarily if Batoum, Ardahan and Kars should be retained by Russia and if there should be further Russian aggression against Ottoman territories in Asia. Apart, however, from being a base from which to counter Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus was considered to be an important British strategic acquisition for the defence of the Mediterranean route through the Suez Canal to India and the Far East. However, it was soon obvious that it lacked the capacity to be developed into a naval base. Opposition to the acquisition of Cyprus was therefore more than justified when, four years later, Egypt fulfilled that role.

The two communities The Greek Cypriots Before the British had established control in Cyprus, they were faced with Greek Cypriot demands for self-rule and enosis. On his arrival on the island on 22 July 1878 the first British Governor, Sir Garnet Wolseley, was greeted by the Bishop of Kition with the following words: We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected.3 The Greek Cypriots were well prepared to make such a demand. They had ‘a well-developed system of political representation through the church and a marked degree of national consciousness within their leading groups’.4 They seemed to believe that the British, noted for their liberalism, would allow them to realize their long ambition to rule the island and deliver it to Greece. By this time the Greek Cypriot elite, including the influential church leaders, had absorbed both Greek nationalism and the Megali (Great) Idea, the reunification of all Greeks in the Near East in a single state whose capital would be Constantinople. Inspired by Gladstonian liberalism, after 1882 the British made some judicious haste to establish a consultative body, which led to the establishment of a partly elected Legislative Council, dubbed the ‘toy parliament’ by the Greek Cypriots. This resulted in a majority of Greek Cypriot members, but this, and the enlarged 1925 version, were so organized that together

4 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

the Turkish minority’s members and British officials could prevent the Greek Cypriots from dominating it. In 1911, in response to Greek Cypriot demands for political control, and the union with Greece that would ensue, the British Government was cautious, and for the time being, with good reason. Until 1914, when they annexed the island, the British could be required to return Cyprus to the Ottoman Government, so Greek Cypriot demands had necessarily to be rejected. There was also the Turkish minority (the ‘Muslims’) to consider. They were not quiescent. Pointing to their loyal acceptance of the change of government, they demanded equality of representation in the Legislative Council established in 1882 claiming that in Anatolia the minority Greeks were given equality in administrative councils.5 They also protested against union with Greece. British control was certainly welcomed by the Greek Cypriots, but only as a step towards their control of the island and union with Greece. They were not intent on creating a purely Cypriot nationalism. Greek Cypriot ambitions had been prompted by the successful Greek War of Independence in 1821, and reinforced by later mutual OttomanGreek hostility and Greek victories. Nor in Cyprus were demands for selfdetermination and enosis restricted to the educated classes. The visit of a Greek naval vessel to Limassol in 1900 was accompanied by fervent popular pro-enosis demonstrations. In 1907 the Greek Cypriots saw some support developing for their ambitions when Winston Churchill (Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) wrote that enosis was ‘an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly and feverishly cherished’, though he also stated that the views of the Muslims would also have to be taken into account. At this time some half promises of enosis were also prized out of some British statesmen, suggesting that times were changing. Whilst the original British impulse to acquire Cyprus had been mainly prompted by the danger Russia constituted for the Porte, during the first decade of the new century British interests began to move westwards towards the central Mediterranean. This was a response to the new growing threat from the central European Powers. The United Kingdom and Greece moved closer together, the naval defence of the Mediterranean having become important. This shift of interest raised Greek Cypriot hopes. ‘In the winter of 1912–13 Enosis was considered on the island to be a foregone conclusion’.6 Then, in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, the British annexed the island, and a major constraint on Greek Cypriot ambitions was lifted. This was surely the time to allow freedom and enosis. Fearing Bulgarian participation in the war the British Government decided it could afford to offer the island in 1915 to Greece, in return for Greek participation in the war. Greek Cypriot expectations were frustrated, however, by the rejection of the offer by the Greek Government, which, influenced by the pro-German

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 5

King Constantine, was neither ready, nor inclined, to wage war. It could have been urged further, or more effectively, it has been argued, if the British Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey had not been influenced against the plan by the High Commissioner in Cyprus, Sir John Clauson, who would have found the cession of Cyprus to Greece difficult to explain to the Turkish minority. ‘The offer failed because a tired Grey … was unwilling to take the appropriate steps to make the proposal harder for Athens to reject’.7 The Greek Cypriot desire for union with Greece gathered further momentum immediately after the war, when the Turkish Government could hardly press any claim for the return of Cyprus to Turkey. With the encouragement of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd-George, who had close relations with the Greek Premier, Venizelos, a Greek army invaded Anatolia: the defeat of the Ottoman Empire suggested the feasibility of reHellenization of large tracts of Asia Minor, where there was a large Greek population. This seemed to be the right time for the Greek Cypriots to press their case, but Venizelos, deemed it politic for the Greek Cypriots ‘not to press their demands lest emphasis on Cyprus jeopardize the prospect of more desirable gains in Asia Minor’.8 He also did not want to upset relations with the United Kingdom where views on Cyprus were divided. The massive exodus of the Greeks from Asia Minor in 1922 after the Turkish military victory dealt a severe blow to, if it did not extinguish, the Hellenic Great Idea.9 It was probably fortunate for the Greek Cypriots that Cyprus was under British occupation. The Greek Cypriots, disappointed in their enotist aims, but as determined as ever, boycotted British attempts to revive the legislative council. In 1923 they themselves established a National Organization that included a National Assembly, and a National Council to promote the union with Greece. They hoped for a more positive response from the new Labour Government of 1924, but were again disappointed. Taking note of Turkish Cypriot opposition, the British Government stated firmly that the Cyprus issue could not be discussed. In 1925, putting a seal on this policy the British Government declared Cyprus a British colony. Disappointed and frustrated though they were, the Greek Cypriots did not give up. Opposition festered. Greek flags flew, imported Greek newspapers added to the tirades in the local press against the British and demanded enosis. It was also a constant and serious cause of friction between the British authorities and the Greek Cypriots that the fixed annual tribute the British Government agreed to pay to the Sultan, apart from being a heavy burden on Cypriots, was deeply resented because it was used to pay off foreign creditors on whose loans the Ottoman Government had defaulted. It was not until 1927, in the face of constant resentment and opposition, that the British Government raised the Grant in Aid to the amount of the tribute.10

6 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

It was, however, only one reason for Greek Cypriot intransigence. In the Greek Cypriot schools, staffed with many Greek teachers, many of the young were recruited to the enotist cause. In response to this agitation the Cyprus Government decided to tread gently, not wishing to stir up more opposition, as long as there was no violence. It was to no avail. In 1929 the Greek Cypriots formally presented proposals for enosis to the new socialist British Government. They were again disappointed, being told that the subject was ‘definitely closed’.11 At this juncture the Cyprus Government saw the need to transfer from Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot educational committees their powers over the careers of schoolteachers in order to limit the enosis agitation in the schools. The Greek Government was also asked to withdraw its consul who, on his own initiative and not prompted by the Greek Government, was active in promoting the Greek Cypriot cause. Despite, or because of, measures like these, by 1931 the situation worsened. Economic depression provided fertile ground for political activists, who were backed by church dignitaries. Younger members of the National Organization now formed the Nationalist Radical Union. At this juncture the enotist Bishop of Kition called for the violent overthrow of the Government. An influential priest unfurling a Greek flag, and calling for its protection, announced ‘I proclaim the revolution’.12 On 21 October, a meeting of the Nationalist Radical Union led to widespread rioting that culminated in the burning down of the Governor’s House. Order was restored, but the next day the house of the Limassol District Commissioner was also razed to the ground, and there were other disturbances. The Cyprus Government immediately clamped down on political activity and among other measures, banned the teaching of Greek and Turkish history in the schools, and any display of national photographs and symbols. Ten Greek Cypriot leaders, including a bishop, were banished (to London!); other participants were imprisoned or fined, 2,606 in all, of whom some 2,000 were fined between £2 and £10, whilst the remainder served prison sentences. There was also a general fine on all Greek Cypriots, save civil servants, of altogether £34,315.13 The Legislative Council was suspended, public meetings were prohibited, with political parties banned. The press was muzzled by the imposition of heavy fines for transgressions. Plans for municipal elections were abandoned. There were no elections until 1943. Police surveillance and control were enhanced. The Turkish Cypriots resented that they were subject to restrictions when they had not been responsible for the trouble. A period of repression ensued, notably under the autocratic Governor, Sir Herbert Palmer (1933–39), with some attention given to economic improvement. This is said to have accorded with the dominant British view that the causes of the disturbances were essentially economic, the depth and intensity of revolutionary fervour not often being appreciated by the British officials, many of whom were experienced in ruling very different colonies from that of Cyprus, often in Africa.

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 7

They saw the enotists as hotheads and not representative of the ordinary peasant-worker who, they rather wishfully believed, welcomed the benefits of British rule. They overlooked the influence of the priests on them in the countryside, the spread of education, and increasing urbanization. In the towns they were reminded of the hostility of the Greek city populace to British rule by the inevitable boycotting of any functions in honour of British royalty. An advisory council for practical participation in government was established to replace the troublesome Legislative Council. Four Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot served on it. The response of the Greek Government to this insurrection in Cyprus was to deplore it for the damage it could do to British-Greek relations. Athens made it clear that it did not want to embrace Cyprus as a political issue. After 1931, in a period of enforced calm, the Church was obliged to restrict its open support for enosis. It was also beginning to face a new rival for influence over the populace in the burgeoning labour unions. A new governor, William Battershill (1939–41) encouraged their formation. Political parties were also now allowed. The emerging labour unions were both left wing and right wing. Then on 14 April 1941 the communist Progressive Party of the Working People, AKEL, was founded. By 1940 legislation was in place to regulate labour disputes and there was a minimum wage. By 1944 there were 90 unions with a membership of some 10,000. AKEL rose to prominence in labour disputes during a period of considerable economic activity during the Second World War. Rivalry between the Church and AKEL became intense. In order to widen its appeal to embrace the national cause AKEL began to combine leftism with some sympathy for enosis, a move that had the effect also of largely alienating the Turkish Cypriot workers.14 The Turkish Cypriots As early as 1892, as mentioned earlier, the Turkish Cypriots took exception to Greek Cypriot demands for enosis. Inspiring Turkish Cypriot resistance to enosis was the dangerous Greek revolt in Ottoman Crete. It became an event of prime importance for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus resembled Crete in terms of its size, continued Ottoman connection, dualism of population and involvement of western powers. ‘It was also a living example of, and inspiration for, the struggle for enosis from the Greek Cypriot perspective, and for the struggle to resist enosis from the Turkish Cypriot perspective’.15 In 1911 3,000 Turkish Cypriots demonstrated against enosis. The following year inter-communal violence in Limassol resulted in the deaths of five persons and 134 injured.16 The fears of the Turkish Cypriots about their own possible fate awakened them to their identity as Ottomans and gradually, as Turks. Young Turkish Cypriot intellectuals became receptive to the more purely Turkish nationalist ideals as these began to develop under the Young Turks in their opposition

8 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

to Ottoman rule. Young Turk organizations were prominent in Cyprus where some Young Turks settled themselves to avoid the attentions of the Ottoman Government.17 They were not much welcomed by the Ottoman elite in Cyprus, but they helped fortify the Turkish Cypriots’ increasingly Turkish identity. These new ideas did not just influence the intelligentsia. They spread ‘first to the literate intelligentsia, and from them to the Turkish masses’.18 As long as the British did not give way to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot or ‘Muslim’ population was loyal to Britain, influenced in this by British respect for the Ottoman elite, which was not displaced for some time. This Turkish Cypriot quiescence was not at first much affected by the advent to power in Turkey after the first world war of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who adopted a narrowly nationalist policy, and mainly renounced claims over Turks living outside the borders of the new Turkish nation state. As the Kemalist regime established itself after the war younger Turkish Cypriots began very quickly to absorb Turkish nationalist sentiments. This was greatly aided by the employment of Turkish teachers in Turkish Cypriot schools. One Turkish nationalist, Necati Özkan, became particularly prominent as a critic of colonial rule in the Legislative Council before it was closed down after the 1931 Greek Cypriot insurrection. He was aided in his promotion of Kemalist political and social ideals by a prominent Turkish Consul in Nicosia, Ali Asaf Güvenir, who was encouraging Kemalist ideas on, it seems, his own initiative. Was it, however, only the Turkish Cypriot educated elite that was affected by these new nationalist, and secularist ideas? Certainly the British colonial authorities in Cyprus were much inclined to believe that this was the case. However, the small size of Cyprus, the development of communications under the British and the relatively high level of urbanization of the Turkish Cypriots, enabled the rapid dissemination of these new ideas, so much so that ‘together the interplay of internal and external historical forces had fostered this novel phenomenon of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus that had become apparent well before the Second World War’.19 The Turkish Cypriots were deeply perturbed by the Greek Cypriot uprising of 1931, which brought home to them the seriousness of the threat of enosis. Their views were reported in the Turkish press, including their belief that the Cyprus Government was too indulgent to the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Government took a serious view of the Greek Cypriot uprising, but made no public comment. Ankara was concerned lest Greece should be proved to be behind the insurrection, but was satisfied that this was not the case despite much sympathy for the Greek Cypriot cause in Greece.20 The Cyprus Government did not distinguish itself in its attitudes towards, and treatment of, the Turkish Cypriots, despite the loyalty of the Ottoman elite in Cyprus. Warned, if erroneously, by the Greek Cypriot

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 9

example, the Cyprus Government, especially, but not only, under the governorship of Palmer, believed that the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots could be maintained by the dignitaries of the Ottoman period, though they were brought under close British control. This ‘loyal’, but enfeebled, Ottoman and religious leadership became decidedly unpopular among the increasingly secularist and nationalist younger generation, who were more and more influenced by the Kemalist regime in Turkey. By its actions the Cyprus Government had, however, reduced the authority of the supportive Ottoman elite. The Cyprus Government became alarmed by the development of Turkish nationalism, and sought to stifle it, oddly fearful that young Turkish Cypriot nationalists would join with their Greek Cypriot counterparts in revolt against British rule. Kemalism showed itself in various ways. Many Turkish Cypriots celebrated Republic Day (29 October) but were not successful in their request for a school holiday on that day. In 1937 there was resentment at the appointment of a British headmaster to a Turkish lycée and the dismissal of four teachers on the grounds that the school had become a centre of anti-British agitation.21 A lively Turkish Cypriot press came into being, with the papers, especially the influential Söz [The Word], published in 1920, becoming a link between Turkish Cypriot and Turkish opinion. Its articles found space in the Turkish press, while news from the new Kemalist Turkey featured in its pages, thus informing and inspiring the younger generation in their struggle against the old elite, developing a national sentiment hostile to British rule, as well as becoming increasingly aware of the dangers of enosis. A very telling event was the visit to Famagusta of the Turkish naval ship, the Hamidiye in 1938. Thousands of Turkish Cypriots from all over the island visited the ship. The popularity of the Kemalist republic was underlined. The Turkish Government approached Cyprus affairs with great circumspection. Ankara could hardly halt the spread of Kemalist attitudes to Cyprus, but made no attempt to undermine British rule, though it believed the British Government was too liberal in its dealings with the Greek Cypriots. Ankara was anxious that Cyprus should not lead to bad relations with Greece, especially since by 1930 a remarkably good rapport had been established with Greece, so short a time after the War of Independence and the massive defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia. Above all, Turkey wanted good relations with the United Kingdom. In this regard it was especially important to Turkey that, aware of the Italian threat in the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom was showing determination to hold on to Cyprus, especially as Malta would be under threat. The Turkish Government did not promote dissent among the Turkish Cypriots. On the contrary it wanted them to live happily under British rule. However, the Turkish Government inadvertently helped the Turkish Cypriot nationalists in various relatively minor ways, by providing schoolteachers,

10 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

and by making it easy for Turkish Cypriot students to enter Turkish universities. Nor did the Turkish Government prohibit the lively cross reporting of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot newspapers, though it did not promote such developments. Good relations with the United Kingdom were the cornerstone of Atatürk’s foreign policy. The period after 1931 saw little possibility for the expression of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, a limitation on all political activity that was a byproduct of the clampdown on enosis. Consequently, during the next decade, the Turkish Cypriots made colonial rule, not enosis, their main target. When the severity of the Government was relaxed and municipal councils could function, it was important for the Turkish Cypriots that they should have separate municipal councils, but they did not obtain them until 1958, when they came into existence de facto, not de jure. However, new leaders now began to emerge from the burgeoning nationalist and secularist new elite, the first major figure being Dr Fazıl Küçük. He was a medical doctor, a graduate of the Turkish lycée in Nicosia, but then educated in France and Switzerland. In 1942 he founded a new newspaper Halkın Sesi [Voice of the People] ‘to give voice to the many complaints of the Turkish Cypriot people against the British colonial authorities’.22 In the following year Küçük helped found the Island of Cyprus Turkish Minority Association (Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıkları Kurumu, KATAK). A younger leader to emerge was Rauf Raif Denktas¸. Educated in the English school in Nicosia, he continued his education in the United Kingdom, being called to the bar in 1947 in Lincoln’s Inn. In Cyprus Denktas¸ became a successful lawyer, but was soon engaged in political struggle. Other groups and parties were later united under Dr Küçük’s leadership to form the Cyprus is Turkish Party.23 Under Dr Küçük the newspaper, Halkın Sesi, although anti-British, now began to emphasize the danger of enosis, which in a freer atmosphere was now able to reassert itself. Large-scale meetings were held and military organizations began to be formed to counter the Greek Cypriot threat. In March 1948 large Turkish Cypriot anti-enosis demonstrations in Nicosia were widely publicized in the Turkish press. The Greek Cypriots labelled this Turkish assertiveness as artificial and unrepresentative. However, Turkish Cypriot fears of enosis were genuine and reflected the expectations of the Greek Cypriots that in the end enosis would be possible under British, as it had not been under Turkish, rule. Under British rule there were opportunities for members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites to work together and to fraternize in other ways, but this did not occur much. It is sometimes argued that the British should have done more to unite the two communities, particularly by promoting a common identity through the establishment of common schools. They did not do so because, it is claimed, ‘a cohesive national consciousness might have been deemed a greater threat to their continued presence’.24 Also the

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 11

British policy of indirect rule through existing elites, it is argued, promoted nationalism. This was intensified because, it is claimed, the British, although working through the religious communities, created resentment by greatly curbing their powers. However, it has to be recognized that enosis had already taken hold in the Greek Cypriot community before 1878, as the demand of the Bishop Kition to Sir Garnet Wolseley showed. There was, and is, nevertheless, a popular belief, especially among Greek Cypriots, that the colonial power actively pursued a policy of divide and rule. However, it has been pointed out that, working with the generally compliant Ottoman elite, the colonial authorities were hostile to Turkish Cypriot nationalist assertiveness. ‘The rise of the Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus, in short, did not occur because it was encouraged by the British, but in fact despite their efforts to obstruct it’.25 Whilst this is the case, the way in which the Legislative Council was formed and operated meant restraining Greek Cypriot ambitions by the use of the Turkish minority, who usually, but not always voted, with the British officials on the Council. The Greek Cypriot majority was certainly frustrated by the British officials and Turkish Cypriot members acting in unison, but this was very different in scale from promoting a Turkish Cypriot separatist movement: it was a way of protecting a minority. Had the British followed the Ottoman system of equal participation of both communities in such councils, a greater degree of reconciliation between the two communities might have been achieved. The British method of indirect rule in what was a politicized society, accompanied as it was with freedom of the press, separate schools, increased mobility, and urbanization, certainly allowed inter-communal hostility to develop, but to conclude that it derived solely or mainly from a deliberate policy of divide and rule strains credibility. A unified opposition would have been easier to manage: enosis made the development of self-government impossible.

Mounting tensions, 1945–1954 During the second world war, when Cyprus was under some threat of invasion, and with Greece defeated, the British Government did not allow the Greek Government in exile to establish itself in Cyprus: it soon would have been assumed that Cyprus was Greek territory. During the war, with the Greek Cypriots under less pressure from the British authorities, enosis began to raise its head again, though its advocates were in conflict in some respects with the communist party, AKEL (the Progressive Party of the Working People). At the same time, taking advantage of new legislation, the Pan-Cyprian Trade Union Committee (PTUC) was formed. By 1943 all unions save those in a small right-wing group, were closely linked through the PTUC with AKEL. Nevertheless, whilst Greek and Turkish Cypriot workers had much in common, ‘the bulk of Turkish workers and farmers

12 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

belonged to Turkish trade unions organized into a single federation in 1943, and these felt it their patriotic duty to oppose the Communist System which, in a period of Cold War, threatened Turkey’.26 AKEL had much achievement to its credit in securing welfare and other benefits, but its ideological stance at that time was firm. It was especially relevant when, before 1949, Greece was in danger of becoming communist. AKEL also had influence in the church: in 1947 its candidate, Leontios, was elected Archbishop.27 The rightists in the church preaching enosis were for a while left in the shadows. However, they began to recover and formed the bulk of a unified delegation to London in 1946 to look for change. They met with no response from the new Labour Government influenced more by the Colonial office and the military than by the Foreign Office. An opportunity for AKEL to regain lost ground occurred in 1946 when the British Labour Government attempted to find a solution to the Cyprus issue by seeking to establish a Consultative Assembly in Cyprus whose task would be to draft a constitution. The new Governor appointed in 1947, Lord Winster, tried to have all groups participate in the 40-member Assembly that he announced. AKEL members attended, as did the Turkish Cypriots, but the 19 Greek Cypriot nationalists boycotted it. Therefore in May 1948 the Government had to provide its own broad proposals for a constitution. These allowed for an elected legislature with a Greek Cypriot majority, an important concession for the Greek Cypriots, though decisions in some crucial areas were to be left to the Governor. The AKEL members called for much more self-government than was proposed, wanting to leave only external relations and defence to the colonial government; AKEL pointed out that other colonies aspiring to freedom, like Malta and Ceylon, were being given a wider measure of self-rule. The Church, and the Cypriot press, would have nothing to do with a constitution that prevented enosis. In accepting the proposed constitution, and not stressing their equal rights as a community, the Turkish Cypriots were conceding an important point. It has been argued that had the British gone along with AKEL, enosis might have been sidetracked.28 However, AKEL was beginning to realize that it had to give some more recognition to enosis and, if in power, would doubtless have been forced to move in that direction. Its espousal of enosis was also encouraged, surprisingly, by the Soviet Union even after the communist defeat in Greece: it was potentially a means of upsetting the unity of the western allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sustaining damage through its co-operation with the British, AKEL’s influence in Cypriot society declined markedly especially after its promotion of large strikes in early 1948. It began to lose ground in the leadership of the enosis movement to the church authorities, and latterly to the new Archbishop, Michael Mouskos, elected as Makarios III in October 1950. In fact Makarios owed a lot to his predecessor, Makarios II, who, with other prelates, engaged in a fierce battle with AKEL for the leadership of the

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 13

struggle for enosis. The initiative in internationalizing the Cyprus conflict came from AKEL, with its stress on the evils of colonialism, a theme of increasing popularity in UN circles. The decision to hold a referendum in Cyprus in 1950 on enosis also probably originated with AKEL, but was promoted and organized by the church.29 A degree of hesitation in British policy at this time was prompted by the British left’s sympathy both for anti-colonialism and for socialism. This made them sympathetic to AKEL, especially after the successful prosecution of senior members of AKEL in 1945 for seditious conspiracy by the repressive colonial government. By contrast, like the British Conservative Party, many in Washington were worried about AKEL’s relations with the Soviet Union and were critical of the sympathy extended to AKEL by the British left. However American attitudes were also anti-colonialist, and there was an active Greek lobby in the United States to promote sympathy for the Greek Cypriots. American policy was therefore ambivalent, but began to favour enosis, especially once the Greek right won power in the Greek civil war (1949–50). In the United Kingdom a conservative British government came to power in 1951 and took note that the failure of Labour government initiatives to promote constitutional reforms in Cyprus was due to the outright hostility of the Greek Cypriots on both left and right, and distrusted the new Archbishop Makarios. Meanwhile in Greece British influence was declining, especially when, with the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, British incapacity to continue to support Greece and Turkey was admitted by the United Kingdom. ‘On 28 March 1947, the Greek National Assembly expressed its confidence that Britain would apply principles of selfdetermination to Cyprus, the first official support for Enosis’.30 It was by no means certain that the British Government would do so however. Still anxious to maintain a position of power and influence in the Middle East, the United Kingdom, having abandoned Palestine, and having serious doubts about Egypt, had come to see Cyprus as its Near East military base. The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey As for the Turkish Cypriots, they were becoming very alarmed at what the future might hold, fearing the communists, but more particularly, the enotists. Under new leadership, they were becoming very aware of the backwardness of the Turkish Cypriot community and were also becoming very alarmed by the dominance of the Greek Cypriots in the municipalities revived in 1941, and operating by 1943. They complained that the Greek Cypriots were changing Turkish street names into Greek, flying Greek flags when they could, acting as if the councils were theirs, and paying scant respect to the Turkish Cypriots. To a degree reorganized under modern and competent leadership the Turkish Cypriots turned to face with new energy and resolve the revived

14 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

threat of enosis, as determined as ever not to allow the Greek Cypriots to dominate the island and declare union with Greece. In 1948 there was a wide range of articles in the Turkish Cypriot press denouncing enosis and calling on Turkey to ensure it never happened. The Turkish Cypriots also made energetic representations to the British Government, to the Prime Minister, Mr Attlee himself. A determined effort was also made through Turkish Cypriots in Turkey to bring home their plight to the Government of Turkey, and to obtain coverage in the Turkish press, a campaign in which they had considerable success. By the late 1940s the Turkish press had begun to take a more active interest in Cyprus. The Turkish Government was urged to play a more positive role by supporters of the Turkish Cypriots in Ankara where demonstrations took place. In Nicosia on 28 November 1948 some 15,000 Turkish Cypriots gathered to condemn the agitation of the Greek Cypriots for enosis and self-government. Of the 28 November meeting it was claimed that history would see it as an exceptional and felicitous day in the political life of the Turkish Cypriots.31 In February 1949, a meeting of Turkish associations in Nicosia decided to send five members to Ankara to explain their concerns. In February 1950 a group of Turkish Cypriot journalists, returning from a visit to Turkey, reported that the Turkish Prime Minister promised help to the Turkish Cypriots and had said ‘the Turkish Cypriots should be assured that the annexation of the island by Greece is not possible’.32 During 1948 and 1949 the Turkish press began to assert with great vigour the Turkish interest in Cyprus, demanding that it should be returned to Turkey should the United Kingdom abandon it.33 Significantly, the government organ, Ulus, proclaimed that the British Government was obliged to maintain the status quo on the island. The matter was raised in parliament, but the Foreign Minister declared that there was no sign that the United Kingdom intended to cede Cyprus to another state, and said that Turkey wanted the maintenance of the status quo.34 This popular Turkish concern was enhanced by the decision by the Church, referred to above, to organize on 15 January 1950 an unofficial referendum on enosis, in which it claimed that of the 224,700 who participated, 215,712 (96%) were in favour.35 It was an important development in the conflict. The Turkish Cypriots’ fears were also increased by the appointment of the young Michael Mouskos, as Archbishop Makarios III. He quickly became leader of the enosis campaign. The massive support in the referendum was followed by the reorganization of the Ethnarchy by Makarios, who gained the support of the powerful Greek Cypriot farmers’ union, and promoted the development of a nationalist youth organization. This was accompanied by vigorous internationalization of the nationalist cause. Even so, the Foreign Minister of the still apparently sanguine Turkish Government said he believed that the United Kingdom had neither the intention, nor the inclination to transfer Cyprus to another state, though

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 15

in the previous December Ankara had told London that its fundamental interests in Cyprus would be engaged if any change of sovereignty in Cyprus was envisaged.36 Also in the nationalist newspaper, Hürriyet, on 21 April 1951 the Turkish Foreign Minister affirmed his country’s rights ‘to participate in any Cyprus settlement’.37 Yet at the same time, he stressed the need for Greece and Turkey to stand together on international issues. Cyprus and Greece After 1950 Makarios made unremitting efforts to engage the full support of Greece for enosis, thus marking the transition of Cyprus from being a colonial, to an international, problem. In frequent visits his attempts to win public support in Greece were impressive and successful. Greece certainly had other concerns apart from Cyprus. It was eager to establish the Balkan pact with Turkey and Yugoslavia as a means to counter further communist incursions into Greek political life and to protect her northern border. Also Greece did not want a head-on collision with the United Kingdom, with whom ties were still strong despite the advent of the United States into the Near and Middle East. Nevertheless, persistent enosis campaigning had its effect, when in parliament in February 1951 opposition fury obliged the Greek Premier, Sophocles Venizelos to declare that the Greek Government demanded the union of Cyprus with its mother country, Greece.38 This over-hasty declaration was not immediately followed up, but it served to alarm the Turkish press. Seeking a way out, at one point the Greek Government tried to persuade the United Kingdom at least to declare that enosis could be realized after a number of years. Despite fierce domestic demands for recourse to the UN, Greece tried with great determination to discuss the issue with the United Kingdom alone. This the British Government refused to accept on the grounds that Cyprus was a purely British concern. With the British Government adamant it would not discuss Cyprus with Greece, and faced with a mounting groundswell of public opinion in Greece fomented by Makarios and his supporters, the Greek Government gradually gave way to popular pressure. It was Greece that first brought the Cyprus question to the attention of the UN, if in a guarded way, in November 1951. It was broached more openly in September 1953, but the Greek delegate made it clear that it was only if bilateral negotiations failed to resolve the problem that it might then formally come before the United Nations. At this point, in September 1953, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, saw fit to say very bluntly to the Greek Premier, Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, that there could be no bilateral discussion of Cyprus. The Greek response was an aide-mémoire to the British Ambassador demanding repeal of the oppressive laws of 1931, a liberal constitution, and a plebiscite within two years, failing which the Greek Government would regard itself as ‘entirely free to seek their own solution’.39 In the face of British obduracy, and the

16 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

overwhelming support organized by Makarios and his supporters in Greece, the Greek Government really had no option but to take the lead and embark on the internationalization of the issue. Wounded by Eden’s brusqueness Papagos gave himself to the campaign. Makarios let it be known that if Greece did not bring the Cyprus issue to the UN, other governments would doubtless do so, Poland for instance, or other states within the communist orbit. This was a significant threat. On 20 August 1954 the Greek Government submitted the Cyprus case to the United Nations. Turkish reactions After the referendum of 1950 in Cyprus the Turkish press had greatly increased its already close attention to Cyprus, stressing the strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey, and the need for it to be returned to Turkey should the British leave, about which there was beginning to be real concern. One newspaper called on the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul to denounce the violence when Turkish Cypriots later began to suffer casualties from EOKA operations. A widespread critique was developing that the Government could not long resist. Moreover, the most serious journal of the time, Forum, in discussing possible futures for Cyprus went so far as to consider the merits, and difficulties of the partition of the island, a solution that eventually became official policy.40 However, the Turkish Government and some of the parliamentary opposition thought at first that there was no great problem, believing the British would remain in control. The Government wanted, above all to continue to be on good terms with Greece. Both countries were new members of NATO. Both also wanted to conclude the Balkan pact with Yugoslavia: it was signed, as an Agreement, on 28 February 1953, and was converted into a Treaty on 9 August 1954. This was only a week before Greece took the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. In late 1953 Ankara had begun to develop closer contact with the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish press also became very alarmed by Greek support of Makarios and more persistently called for the return of Cyprus to Turkish sovereignty. Ankara began to make it clear that there could be no change of regime in Cyprus that was not favourable to Turkey. In Cyprus the colonial government did not welcome the militant Turkish Cypriot ‘Cyprus is Ours’ movement that was getting under way there, and finding a resounding echo in Turkey. It was something ‘that harassed officials in London and Nicosia did not need’.41 On the island the Government concentrated on economic development, with as much repression of enosis as they could manage, hoping their policy would take the edge off enosis and convince the sceptical Turkish Cypriots that British rule benefited them. In Greece, and in Turkey to some extent, the governments were pushed into response to Cyprus by the force of public opinion. In a Government

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 17

White Paper Greece claimed that under the Treaty of Lausanne it had a right to a say in the future of Cyprus.42 Popular pressure was resisted in Turkey rather more than in Greece, but it was an illusion to suppose, as seemed to be the case in Athens, that ‘the Turkish Government did not attach great importance to the Cyprus problem, thinking that invoking Greek Turkish friendship would prevent Turkey from opposing enosis’.43 Ankara certainly wanted to be on good terms with Athens, but this could never go so far as to allow Cyprus to be ruled by Greece, which was now widely accused of nurturing expansionist ambitions. With the development of public pressure in both countries relations between Turkey and Greece deteriorated. Anti-enosis sentiment in Turkey developed apace. The nationalist Hürriyet demanded an end to government inaction and ominously made ‘thinly veiled threats against the Greek minority in Istanbul and its institutions’.44 The Patriarchate had not condemned enosis. ‘While the British later made good use of such Turkish feeling, they did not invent it.’45 Against this background the British Government did not find it too difficult to expect some result from its policy of seeking to mobilize Ankara against Greek Cypriot demands for enosis.

Internationalizing the Cyprus problem Recourse to the UN At this stage the British had no intention of leaving Cyprus. It helped them that despite the unpopularity of colonialism in the United States, for strategic reasons the Americans ceased to encourage enosis, and informed Greece it would be unable to give support in the UN General Assembly debate on Cyprus, which took place in December 1954.46 Consonant with British policy, in July 1954, the British Minister of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson, made his famous, or infamous, speech in the House of Commons in which he declared: ‘It had always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent’. Greece made much use of this statement in the political warfare passionately waged against the United Kingdom before the UN debate. Afraid of publicity of the Cyprus issue the British Government still tried, but unsuccessfully, to prevent Cyprus from being inscribed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Turkish press took some satisfaction from Hopkinson’s ‘never’, which reinforced the Turkish Government’s cautious approach. However, its attitude was beginning to change. The Turkish Government was shocked that, on the threshold of signing the Balkan pact with Turkey and Yugoslavia, Greece should take the troublesome Cyprus issue to the United Nations.47 Nevertheless, the Turkish Government, still insisting on its friendship with Greece, expected from Athens ‘calm and

18 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

moderation’. In response to the Greek recourse to the UN, the influential Turkish National Student Federation, concluded a demonstration with a fiery declaration: ‘We proclaim yet again to the whole world that Cyprus is Turkish and we call the entire Turkish Nation to the defence of our cause’.48 In response to more pressure from youth organizations, from sections of the press and, increasingly, from senior members of the opposition Republican People’s Party, including its respected leader, I˙smet I˙nönü, the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, felt obliged to make some response. He announced, before attending a meeting of the Turkish National Student Federation, that ‘Cyprus would never belong to the Greeks’. This acknowledgement of public sentiment, and other measures to influence public opinion, had some effect in restraining public nationalist fervour. There were also newspapers close to the Government that helped arrest public concern, even initially blaming the Cyprus issue on AKEL and the communists, more than on Greece. They reflected the views of those in influential Turkish circles who believed that Cyprus was not important as long as it did not come under Soviet influence. Fear of the influence and spread of communism in the Near East was very pronounced, especially among the state elites and the rising entrepreneurs. Close liaison in NATO with Greece was an antidote to it. It could be comforting to believe that the Greek Government had been pushed into engagement in the Cyprus issue solely by Greek public opinion and would eventually control it. Yet the Greek Government’s White Paper of November 1954 caused alarm. Its policy for Cyprus seemed all too clear; it was next in line. The present Greek state, ever since its foundation, aspired towards the liberation of all islands whose population was wholly or mainly Greek. These islands were the following: 1. The Ionian Islands 2. Crete 3. The Aegean Islands of the Eastern Mediterranean 4. The Dodecanese and 5 Cyprus.49 The UN’s Political Committee discussed the Cyprus issue on 14 December 1954. The defence of the status quo by the Turkish representative, Selim Sarper, was very robust, aggressive even. This was surprising given the inclination, still, of the Turkish Government to play down the Cyprus question. Sarper implied that the issue was one of attempted territorial expansion by Greece into an island that was, geographically, an extension of Turkey. Cyprus was not a Greek island, he declared, its sovereignty belonged to Great Britain under the Treaty of Lausanne, and the Greek demand was ‘cloaked in a mist of poetic irredentism’.50 British policy was to encourage Turkey to make its interest in Cyprus clear despite Ankara’s desire to continue to have harmonious relations with Greece. Yet, despite Sarper’s robust stand, Ankara preferred to leave it to the United Kingdom to take up the issue. In the UN debate, it was noted, the

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954 19

strong Turkish objections to any change of sovereignty in Cyprus were increasingly highlighted in British arguments. In the absence of other outside help, and reluctant to stage a walk-out from the General Assembly, it has been argued that ‘turning Turkish water into fire at the United Nations became not only desirable for Britain, but imperative’.51 This helped to promote a widespread Greek view that Turkey was not fundamentally interested in Cyprus, and that Sarper’s insistence in the UN debate that no change of status could occur in Cyprus without Turkish consent was a response to British pressure. With belated American help, the General Assembly (17 December) agreed to a resolution that ‘for the time being it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus’. In Turkey the critics of Menderes found some satisfaction in this outcome; their attacks on the Government declined in fervour. The Government itself now tended, and certainly wanted, to believe that with the UN decision not to discuss Cyprus the matter had been closed, despite the resolution having ominously been adopted ‘for the time being’. Other matters were pressing for attention. For the first few months of 1955 the Turkish Government was deeply engaged with the reassertion of Soviet interest in Yugoslavia (which was undermining the Balkan Pact) and with establishing the Baghdad Pact despite general Arab hostility towards it.

2 Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960

Ever since 1951 the use of violence to achieve enosis had been under active consideration by extremists both in Cyprus and Greece. The Papagos government knew of these activities, but did little to stop them.1 Arms were landed in Cyprus. In October and November 1954 the Greek colonel, of Cypriot birth, Georgios Grivas, a rightist and passionate Hellenist, organized and trained resistance fighters in Cyprus. He established EOKA, the Nationalist Organization of Cypriot Fighters. On 11 January 1955 Makarios gave the go ahead for a campaign of violence, but authorized at that time only the sabotage of military installations. The insurrection began with acts of violence on 1 April 1955. They heralded a campaign of violence and terrorism that was to last four years. The EOKA attacks certainly inflamed Turkish public opinion, which was already deeply perturbed by the news of the British seizure in January 1955 of a shipload of armaments from Greece destined for Grivas. The ‘treacherous’ Greek ally, rather than the Greek Cypriots, bore the brunt of Turkish ire in the press. Greece was accused of looking for a military solution, and wanting to create another Crete. Anti-Greek feeling was intensified by the wounding of 14 Turkish Cypriots on 21 June 1955 in the course of an attack on a police station in a Turkish Cypriot part of Nicosia. By the midsummer of 1955, although British personnel and property were the main objectives, the Turkish Cypriots began to be seriously affected, especially as they were coming to form most of the police force. The violence incited Turkey to come to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots and created for the British the additional and dangerous threat of inter-communal warfare. As violence escalated the Turkish Government could not maintain its cool stance, especially as rumours of an alleged planned massacre of Turkish Cypriots began to be believed. It was indicative of what was to come when on 27 July the energetic, aggressive, and by some much disliked, Fatin Rüs¸tü Zorlu began to take over foreign affairs. A turning point, however, was an important speech by Menderes on 24 August 1955, which concluded, ‘this country will absolutely not accept any change in the status 20

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 21

of Cyprus either today or tomorrow that will be against the interests of the [Turkish] state’.2 The pro-government paper, Zafer, elaborated on Turkey’s national mission, declaring that Turkey wanted the continuation of the present situation or, otherwise, the union of Cyprus with Turkey, to which country it was a natural appendage. The ‘otherwise’ became important when, by proposing a Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean on 30 June, the British Government showed that it had now abandoned its previous assertion that there was no Cyprus problem for others to discuss. British resolve had apparently weakened. The turn to violence by the Greek Cypriots, and the pressure of its own public opinion, had at last obliged the Turkish Government to render the diplomatic aid the British sought. In Turkey Menderes’ speech was widely welcomed as indicating that the Government had at last caught up with public opinion, though some declared, including the opposition party’s influential general secretary, Kasım Gülek, that it had come too late. Greece should have been restrained by Turkey making its views clear much earlier.

The 1955 Tripartite Conference Greece and Turkey both attended the conference in August 1955 on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. That the former attended was surprising, since it was admitting Turkey to a voice in Cyprus affairs. Neither Greek nor Turkish Cypriots were invited. Grivas ignored it. Makarios condemned it, and persuaded Greece to submit a motion of self-determination for Cyprus to the next, tenth, session of the UN General Assembly, a tactic that hardly allowed Greece to accept less at the forthcoming Tripartite Conference. The way to solve the Cyprus problem for the then new British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, was not to confront it head on with schemes of self-government, in which the Colonial Office persisted in accordance with its usual pattern. Instead he believed that the cure for the problem ‘lay in bringing international leverage to bear’.3 The conference had for Ankara the important merit of indicating that Turkey had a rightful share in the solution of the conflict, just what Archbishop Makarios did not want. Macmillan believed, ‘The stronger the position the Turks take at the outset [of the conference] the better it will be for us and for them’.4 At the conference the British Government claimed that for strategic reasons British sovereignty over the whole of Cyprus was essential, and underlined the common purpose of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain in the defence through NATO of the Middle East and the West. In the chair, Harold Macmillan called for self-government for the island, but intimated that once it was established and working, one would then hope to be able to see the road ahead. This seemed to offer a chink of light for selfdetermination and enosis, but it was not enough for the Greek delegate, Stefanopoulos. He inevitably called for a commitment to self-determination,

22 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

in due course if not now. Greece accepted progress towards self-government if it did not exclude self-determination in the long term. The Turkish delegate, the Acting Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüs¸tü Zorlu, claimed that, under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, only the United Kingdom and Turkey had the right, as ‘interested parties’ to consider Cyprus.5 At the end of the conference Zorlu, fearing that the road was being opened to self-determination, obliged Macmillan to reassert the permanence of British sovereignty, the vital assurance for Zorlu. He made much of the fact that at the Lausanne Conference (1923), which settled the peace with Turkey, it had been confirmed that sovereignty over Cyprus had been given only to the United Kingdom. He stated that Turkey’s stake in Cyprus rested on the foundations of 400 years of sovereignty, geographical proximity, and strategic importance. The United Kingdom, he continued, could not turn over to Greece a country taken from Turkey. He stressed the vital importance of Cyprus for the protection of Turkey’s southern coast, pointing out that if the power that controlled Cyprus also controlled the Aegean islands (as Greece did) then Turkey would be surrounded. Towards the end of the conference Macmillan produced an outline of a scheme of constitutional government he hoped would be accepted. It provided for an Assembly with an elected majority, with substantial powers, though not over such functions as defence, security, and foreign affairs. There would be an elected first minister, but only appointed with the approval of the Governor. In order to underline the international, not colonial, character of the Cyprus problem Macmillan then introduced a novel idea. This was that the Conference should establish a tripartite committee, based in London, which could consider the detailed provisions of the constitution. This committee would also consider all proposals to strengthen links among the three states in a variety of educational and other fields. Most important was the suggestion that the tripartite committee would be a permanent body whose object would be to monitor the development of self-rule and discuss the problems arising. Involving Greece and Turkey in the destiny of Cyprus was a harbinger of the later Macmillan Plan. Curiously, the condominium idea was one of the possible solutions that had been discussed earlier in the Turkish press. The Greek response noted that the British Government had departed somewhat from its earlier inflexibility, but unfortunately had completely opposed self-determination, and was offering a constitution inadequate for so developed and civilized a people as the Greek Cypriots. The proposed tripartite committee would make self-government inoperable. If Macmillan was inclined to alert Turkey on the subject of Cyprus, thinking it more supine than it was, he certainly did not want to create hostility between the two new NATO members. The problem could not be solved unless Turkey and Greece were in accord. The conference is often dubbed a failure, but in recognizing the now pronounced Turkish interest it

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 23

emphasized the fact that collaboration between Turkey and Greece was the only way forward, as later proved to be the case. The essential cause of the conflict lay in the demand for self-determination and enosis, and particularly its promotion by Greece in response to public opinion. Turkey could not be indifferent to Cyprus becoming a Greek island. It is often argued that Turkey had abandoned ‘all rights and titles of whatever nature’ on Cyprus in the Treaty of Lausanne. This naturally followed with the acceptance of British sovereignty. The conditions to which the Treaty referred would be greatly changed, however, if Greece were to rule Cyprus. Moreover Turkey was not interfering in any way with British government in Cyprus, and was certainly not claiming any rights on the island, whereas Greece was asserting its right to join with it. Hence Turkey accused Greece of territorial aggrandizement. Greece also argued that under Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty Turkey had no right to be concerned any longer with the Cyprus question, whereas Greece had. The Turkish Government refuted this claim.6 During the period of the conference, in response to an escalation of Greek Cypriot violence, there were serious attacks on Greek and Greek Cypriot persons and property in Istanbul and Izmir (6–7 September 1955). During the summer, when violence began in Cyprus, there was criticism in the Turkish press of the lack of its condemnation by the church leadership in Istanbul. Anti-Greek feelings were coming to the fore. The ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ society played a leading role in organizing mass meetings. Student organizations issued dire threats and warnings. The focus of attack was Greece, its Hellenism and territorial aggrandizement. Only a spark was needed to set alight this bonfire. It has since been claimed that the vicious attacks on the Greek communities in Istanbul and Izmir were activated by the Turkish Government, which had arranged for a bomb to be exploded outside Atatürk’s birthplace in Salonika. It has, however, more concretely been reported that it was proved later that the bomb had been set off by Oktay Ergin, a student who had close ties with the Turkish Cypriot ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ political party.7 After these dire events, which resulted in extensive damage to shops, houses and churches, thousands of Greeks fled Turkey. At the time, the Turkish Government hotly denied in parliament any involvement in the tragedy, but could not really answer the charge that it had not taken action early enough to stop the violence. The press deplored the damage to Turkey’s international image. The Government did not apologize to Greece, but softened its new more hostile attitude. The conference was brought to a close. It had become clear at this point that Turkey did not need to be pushed into playing some supportive role: it was centre-stage, and considered that legally it had as much right as Greece to be there. Greece subsequently found that it had less than universal support for its policy of self-determination and was unable to have Cyprus included

24 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

in the UN General Assembly agenda in 1955. Nevertheless, the UN General Committee only narrowly rejected the Greek appeal for a UN debate. Cyprus had now definitely become an international issue. The Tripartite Conference, subsequent discussions at the UN, and above all the violence in Turkey, served to make Turkish views and feelings clearer, but they did not stop the violence on the island. This now called for a new governor with military experience. To this end on 25 September 1955 Field Marshal Sir John Harding was appointed Governor. As attacks on Turkish Cypriots began to develop, the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, declared that Turkey would not stand idly by. In particular, casualties were being suffered by the police, nearly all by now Turkish Cypriot. For a Greek Cypriot to be a policeman was to court assassination. The campaign of violence begun by Grivas in April 1955, and supported by Makarios, was now powerfully adding to the hostility of the Turkish Cypriots, with the first major inter-communal clash occurring in March 1956.

Offers of self-government The normal meaning of self-determination is the right of a people to determine its own polity, and normally results in self-government. If, after attaining independence, the Cyprus Government decided to join with Greece, it would surely have been free to do so. Hence all British offers of self-government were only partial. The restricting factor for the British Government was the Turkish Cypriot minority community (about a fifth). They might have been absorbed into one polity, as has sometimes happened, if the Greek Cypriot majority had shown signs of the necessary magnanimity, and had not been intent on joining Greece, taking the unwilling Turkish Cypriots with them. Another reason for not allowing self-determination was the fact that the United Kingdom, latterly backed by the United States, had real fears that a self-governing Cyprus could become too close to the Soviet Union. Turkey was also worried on this score, not wanting any sort of Greek, let alone Soviet, dominated Cyprus to be in a position to control its important southern shore. It was under such adverse circumstances that the British nevertheless made prolonged attempts to persuade the Greek Cypriots to agree to a scheme of partial self-government. In 1954 a new constitution was proposed, though it was even less liberal than that of 1948. It provided in the legislative assembly for a majority of officials and nominated members. Not unexpectedly the Greek Cypriots rejected it. In 1955, soon after his arrival the new Governor, Sir John Harding, entered into discussions with Makarios on the issue of self-government. They soon clashed over the core issue of self-determination. Harding was authorized to discuss only self-government, but he believed, surprisingly

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 25

perhaps, that some movement in the direction of self-determination had to be made. Otherwise the country would have to be run indefinitely as a police state. He went to London to make his point. As a result Harding obtained from the Government the following statement that, on his return, he gave to Makarios. It was said to respect the principle of selfdetermination, as contained in the UN Charter. It has emerged that the Americans influenced the British somewhat in devising this formula, which owed something to the Potomac Charter. Henry Cabot Lodge, the American UN permanent Representative, was at this time pushing for American involvement in the Cyprus issue, not at all to Anthony Eden’s liking.8 The statement conveyed the attitude of the British Government as follows: It is not their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategical situation and on account of the consequences on the relations between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. They therefore have to satisfy themselves that any final solution safeguards the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and her allies. Her Majesty’s Government have offered a wide measure of selfgovernment now. If the people of Cyprus participate in constitutional development it is the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to work for a solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus within the framework of the treaties and alliances to which the countries concerned in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean are parties. Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with the representatives of the people of Cyprus when selfgovernment has proved itself a workable proposition and capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community.9 The text was shown to Makarios on 21 November 1955. After discussion with the Ethnarchy Council he did not accept this reformulation. Selfdetermination was obviously dependent on the United Kingdom’s strategic interests and those of her allies, a provision that clearly brought in Turkey, and thereby the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The British offer was refused, but in December 1955 there was some apparent hope of progress: surprisingly Makarios now intimated that the question of self-determination could be put aside. Discussion with Harding turned to self-government proper. For Makarios this meant that there should be a Greek Cypriot majority in an elected legislature, a point previously conceded in principle by the United Kingdom, but now not to be decided before the interests of the Turkish Cypriots were taken into account. Sir Anthony Eden turned down majority rule by the Greek

26 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Cypriots, as much out of fear of reaction from his party, it has been argued, as from Turkey.10 However, to judge from his memoirs, Eden seemed personally concerned to keep the Turks onside, and it was clear by now that they could not be ignored. Makarios also called for control of security and for an amnesty for those convicted of EOKA crimes, conditions that could not be met. At these last rather promising negotiations between Harding and Makarios, the Colonial Secretary, Lennox Boyd was present. Negotiations broke down on, essentially, the question of control of security in the new state and the composition of the legislature. On both these issues Makarios wanted agreement in his favour. Of these two issues security was the more vital requirement for the British side, but it would not also have been easy to accept preponderance in the legislature for the Greek Cypriots against insistent demands by the Turkish Cypriots at the time that their interests must not be overlooked. The issues were not made less important by leaving self-determination unresolved in the background. Selfgovernment with a Greek Cypriot majority would have soon been converted, no doubt, into an unacceptable demand for self-determination and enosis. The Radcliffe proposals On 7 March 1956, after the breakdown of the Harding/Lennox-Boyd-Makarios negotiations Makarios was exiled to the Seychelles, to the applause of the Turkish press, and the satisfaction of the Turkish Government. He was implicated in EOKA violence if not in control of it. However, the United States found no evidence of his complicity with terrorism.11 The United States did not want to antagonize the United Kingdom, but its ambassador in Athens made a statement sympathizing with the Greek Government that created uproar in the British press. Sir John Harding now waged the difficult struggle against EOKA with increased vigour and success. The British Government at the same time sought, however, to demonstrate its positive attitude to the problem by appointing as a Constitutional Commissioner Lord Radcliffe, who had been deeply involved in advising on the constitutional issues that beset India on gaining independence in 1947. He was charged with proposing a scheme of constitutional government. Harding never believed that there could be a purely military solution to the Cyprus problem. The Radcliffe proposals, published 19 December 1956, contained no promise of self-determination. During the period of the Constitution Lord Radcliffe proposed the island was to remain under British sovereignty. Yet he tried to soften the blow by indicating a growing change in British policy by the provision, now, of an elected Legislature with a Greek Cypriot majority.12 It would be full master in many fields, its acts not needing the approval of the British Governor, as had really been conceded in the Harding-Makarios negotiations. The system was to be a ‘diarchy’, with the

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 27

Governor being responsible for defence, external affairs and internal security, this last a major bone of contention in the Makarios-Harding negotiations. The remaining functions, with some few exceptions, were left to the elected legislature. The exceptions were important. Principally the Governor’s approval would be required for bills that sought to change the Constitution, that would limit the royal prerogative, and would affect the currency and foreign exchange. As a further limitation, the Crown had ‘the power to alter the order in Council itself which set up the Constitution’. Also a boycott by the Greek Cypriot members would not prevent the legislature from functioning. The system was less liberal and democratic than it claimed. In the matter of a Greek Cypriot majority in the Legislature, Lord Radcliffe justified it on the grounds that the Turkish Cypriots were a minority, so ignoring their increasingly strident claim to be an equal community. They would consequently have minority rights. He could not see any possibility of a federation: for a federation he believed that territorial separateness was necessary. There would be considerable protection for the Turkish Cypriot minority’s rights, through powers given to the Governor, and the need for judicial review was stressed. However, this was not all that the Turkish Cypriot community looked for. It wanted an equal say in major overall policy, not just protection for specifically Turkish Cypriot concerns. Radcliffe believed that communal equality could not produce viable government in a unitary state, and he did not believe in a federation, as has been mentioned, that was not territorially based. The Greek Government turned down the Radcliffe proposals, again because they did not accord recognition to the principle of self-determination. The only competent Greek Cypriot authority to respond to the Radcliffe proposals was the exiled Makarios. ‘Not fit for Zulus’ was a comment that went the rounds among Greek Cypriots.13 It provided a majority in the legislature for the Greek Cypriots, thus giving them the opportunity to show that they could treat the Turkish Cypriots fairly and with more consideration than their numbers suggested. If in this they had been successful, showing real statesmanship, harmony would then only have depended on the abandonment of enosis, an unlikely development. However, to return to realities, there was the Turkish hurdle. Ankara regarded the Radcliffe scheme with misgivings, expressing serious concern about the unequal representation of the Turkish Cypriots and the capacity of the Governor to protect them. Partition as the solution By early 1956 it was becoming feared in Ankara that the United Kingdom was prepared to soften its position somewhat on self-determination, and that both the return of the island to Turkey and the maintenance of the present system were no longer viable solutions, if ever they had been.

28 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

The British Government’s move towards self-determination was attributed to the effects of EOKA violence. Since the dangers involved in selfgovernment were apparent during 1956, Turkish opinion began to turn to the solution of partition, the idea being first seriously considered, as mentioned above, in the most serious journal at the time, Forum. It did not meet with an immediately positive response, and was attacked in the Turkish parliament as impracticable. There was confusion on whether it meant double-enosis or the creation of a Turkish Cypriot state. In either event Greece would have a place in Cyprus. The desirability of geographical consolidation of each community was discussed, Menderes coming in the end to believe it was possible. An alternative was a non-regional federal state, a difficult concept. Of course both partition, and non-geographical federation, implied the right of the Turkish Cypriot community to decide its own future, its own right of self-determination. The result of this debate was that the British Government now began to consider seriously partition and self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless, during the summer of 1956 the partition solution only slowly came to be acceptable by informed Turkish public opinion. It was, after all, a concession, the essential and popular Turkish demand being for the return of the island, or the continuation of British rule. However, the increasing exposure of the Turkish Cypriots to EOKA violence, its obvious support by Greece, and the threat of a Greek-dominated Cyprus raised Turkish temperatures and led to severe attacks on Greece in the press. The Government, long-suffering in its patient support of the Greek alliance, began now regularly to accuse its Greek NATO ‘ally’ of treachery. The Turkish UN Representative, Selim Sarper, made valiant attempts to bring American opinion on to Turkey’s side. Asked in a press conference in August 1956 what Turkey would do if the United Kingdom left the island, Sarper replied that it would have to fill the empty space. ‘Could this lead to war? I would like to reply in the negative, but, as you know, throughout history less important matters than this have been the occasion for wars’.14 With misgivings at first, partition now started to take hold in Turkish Government circles. Nationalist passions began to be enlisted in its support. Aware of the need to meet Turkish concerns, Lennox Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, now showed interest in partition, interpreted in some of the Turkish press as ‘a threat to the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to reconsider the merits of the status quo’.15 It seemed to be the only way now to engage Turkish support, essential if the island was to be policed by a now almost completely Turkish Cypriot police force. Moreover, Turkish participation in the defence of the Middle East was clearly becoming vital, especially after the 1956 Suez debacle. Increasing Turkish enthusiasm for partition led to pressure on the Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd on his visit to Ankara before making a

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 29

statement in Parliament on the Radcliffe proposals. The British Government now took a decided position on partition. Turkey was duly reassured about its fears of Greek Cypriot self-determination and enosis, and about British attitudes, by the important parliamentary statement of 19 December 1956. It may have been mainly intended as a threat to the Greeks, who had rejected the Radcliffe proposals, but that was dangerous: Turkey treated the statement as an enduring commitment. It has not yet been forgotten by the Turkish Cypriots. They deplored the fact that the British Government ignored it when in 1963 the 1960 settlement fell apart. The Lennox-Boyd statement read: When the international and strategic situation permits, and provided self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty’s Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination. This was positive for the Greek Cypriots, if not satisfactory, but what followed was a shock. The minister continued: When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. Her Majesty’s Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options. The dreaded word, ‘partition’, had clearly been accepted by the British Government Moreover, given that on the Greek Cypriot side selfdetermination meant enosis, self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots might well be taken to include union with Turkey. The Turkish Prime Minister welcomed this suggestion of a firm British line. A federal system of government and a Turkish military base also came to be raised in the Turkish press as important parts of a possible solution. It became widely accepted in Greek Cypriot opinion that the British Government encouraged Turkey to adopt partition as its preferred policy.16 Yet informed public opinion in Turkey did not immediately warm to partition, many still tending to see it as an unnecessary concession. The major journal of the political intelligentsia, Forum, was again in favour, deploring the fact that the Government had not pursued it earlier. The general consensus was that the Radcliffe proposals were just acceptable if, in the event of their failure, partition was assured. Many saw that partition would, however, be a major and difficult undertaking.

30 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

In parliament the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, claimed that the United Kingdom was the author of partition, but went on to say that, in the circumstances, it really chose itself, there being no viable alternative. He said that movement into two zones would be voluntary and that the movement of population would prove easier than was imagined. The leader of the major opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, the veteran I˙smet I˙nönü, deemed it politic neither to criticize nor support the policy, whilst deploring the fact that the Government would not discuss it with himself and his party privately. In the UN debate on Cyprus in February 1957, Greece still argued for self-determination and enosis, but now the Indian Representative, Krishna Menon, introduced, and argued for a different solution – for selfdetermination for Cyprus without enosis. An ‘independence’ solution began now to be discussed in UN circles as the way forward, but the General Assembly merely accepted a resolution calling for the resumption of negotiations. For Greece this meant negotiations between Greece and the United Kingdom, not negotiations including Turkey. Concord had not been achieved. In March 1957 EOKA was persuaded by the Greek Government to let it be known that if Makarios were to be released, terrorism would cease, this at a time when EOKA was being hard pressed by the security forces, who had victory in sight. Makarios was released in a new shift in a generally vacillating British policy that seriously disturbed the Turkish Government. That Makarios was released owed something, it appears, to the influence of President Eisenhower on the new British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who replaced Anthony Eden after the 1956 Suez débâcle.17 To justify his release the British Government was prepared to accept a much less than unequivocal call by Makarios for the renunciation of violence. On his release Makarios established himself in Greece, not being allowed to return to Cyprus. His attitudes were as uncompromising as ever. His release angered the Turkish Government. Menderes declared, ‘For us Makarios is no more than a terrorist with a criminal record, condemned for ever to remain branded as such … The British Government was ill advised to free this priest.’18 Had Menderes responded to the mood of public opinion in Turkey he would have said more. The release of Makarios was a very great shock. Faith in the British evaporated; they had given way to terrorism. It was suspected that the British aim was to settle the Cyprus problem with the Greek Cypriots directly. The release of Makarios was seen as appeasement. These fears may have had little justification, but Makarios added fuel to the flames when he condescendingly declared on his release that when selfdetermination had been achieved, the Turkish Cypriots would be looked after as a minority. This is what comes, Forum remarked, of not having demanded partition at the Tripartite Conference. The release of Makarios

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 31

showed that the United Kingdom was now weak, it concluded, and was definitely under American influence. When it was learned that Makarios had been invited to visit the United States by Averell Harriman there was a surge of anti-Americanism that resulted, it was reported, in 40,000 telegrams of protest! The Harriman invitation was withdrawn. The result of this agitation was that whereas in the previous year partition was seen as a possible solution, as an addendum to Radcliffe, now it began to become a Turkish priority in itself.

The revision of British policy The British Government was now convinced that something decisive had to be done about Cyprus. The Defence White Paper of 4 April 1957 showed the way; it led to the acceptance of the view that the United Kingdom could meet its needs by having a base in Cyprus instead of making Cyprus a base. On a visit to Cyprus in late April by the Defence Minister, Duncan Sandys, this new policy became apparent. It created a condition for an important review of Britain’s Cyprus policy in July 1957 when Macmillan, together with other cabinet ministers, the Army and Air Force chiefs, and Harding, met to resurrect the tri-dominium idea that had been advanced by Macmillan in at the 1955 London Conference. It now appeared in a more developed form. There were to be British bases on the island instead of the island forming a British base. A scheme for internal self-government was advanced, but important functions would rest with the Governor and two representatives, one from Turkey and one from Greece. They were to share sovereignty with the Governor who, very surprisingly, was to be a neutral. The Macmillan Plan was in the making. When Harding’s two-year appointment ended in October 1957, he resigned and was replaced by Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon). Harding resigned because he was convinced that only a political solution would, in the long term, end the violence. He was also aware that the measures he otherwise needed to end the violence could not be firmly supported by the British Government. It was also becoming apparent that a future Socialist Government might well call for a drastic change in the United Kingdom’s Cyprus policy, a change to which Harding would find it difficult to adjust, despite his desire for a political solution. During 1957, before he resigned, Harding expressed sympathy for the possible involvement of NATO in helping solve the Cyprus conflict. The new NATO Secretary-General, Paul Henri Spaak, taking his own county Belgium as exemplar, in May 1957 also advocated an ‘independence’ solution for Cyprus. The idea was then actively taken up by Foster Dulles the American Secretary of State.19 It was not favoured by the British Government, aware that it would be unacceptable to the Turkish Government, as

32 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

well as to important members of the Conservative Party still smarting under the humiliation of the Suez disaster of the previous year. In December 1957 Greece took the Cyprus question once more to the UN General Assembly (Eleventh and Twelfth Sessions). The Greek Government predictably called for self-determination for the island as a whole, which would entail enosis. During the debates the important point was made, however, that self-determination could not rightly be used to justify joining another state. The Turkish delegate, whilst not explicitly demanding partition, was insistent that self-government, if implemented, should not lead to enosis. The Turkish view was firm that if it came to selfdetermination, the Turkish side had the right, on the same principle, to demand partition. In the upshot the Greek recourse to the General Assembly had some success. The Greek resolution calling for selfdetermination was passed by a majority, but not by the two-thirds majority required.20 The Foot Plan The new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, liberal and open in manner, unafraid and dispensing with security, persuaded the British government to support, if not with marked enthusiasm, his own plan for a solution. It was not much to the liking of either the officials or the British security forces in Cyprus, since it seemed to be paying inadequate and unrealistic attention to Turkish attitudes. Foot also had to cope with increased violence, some of it now coming from the Turkish Cypriots, notably from the Turkish Defence Organization (Türk Mükavemet Tes¸kilatı), established in 1957 by Burhan Nalbantog˘lu, and Rauf Denktas¸. Foot was soon unpopular in Turkey, where he was regarded as weak, too liberal, and pro-Greek. Foot’s plan was in fact not very novel. It proposed a large measure of self-government for Cyprus for a seven-year period as a prelude to selfdetermination for each community. The possibility of a Turkish base on Cyprus was also broached. Now that Ankara was for immediate partition, and was deeply distrustful of the United Kingdom, to take a plan to Ankara a plan that reverted to self-government was to ask for trouble. The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, and in particular the new Governor, were treated in Ankara with marked discourtesy. It is reported that the Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, threw the new document that was presented ‘contemptuously to one side’.21 In the Turkish view, Britain was reneging on its policy of partition, though Lennox Boyd had made it clear in his statement in 1956 that when the time was ripe to review the question of self-determination, ‘the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options’. Nevertheless, angered by the Foot Plan, and encouraged by Turkey, Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia rioted against the British government. Seven Turkish Cypriots were killed and a number of British soldiers were injured. The

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 33

Greek Government also predictably rejected the Foot Plan because it held out no promise of self-determination for Cyprus as a whole. The preferred Turkish solution had by now come to be an immediate division of the island into two self-governing states, but there were some signs that Zorlu was nevertheless coming to appreciate that agreement among the three major states involved was perhaps the most realistic way forward. Turkey was becoming more and more aware that with the Soviet infiltration into Syria, it needed American support. It was also evident that the United States would find partition difficult to condone without enraging its large domestic Greek lobby. Yet it was difficult for Turkey to abandon partition given the Turkish public was now passionately embracing the call for taksim (partition) the word on everybody’s lips. Its domestic policies were coming under mounting censure from the military and other elements of the former Atatürkist elite critical of the changes accompanying a new less statist style of economic and social development. It therefore served Menderes’ purposes, with elections near, to promote, and to be seen to share, nationalist sentiment. His party won a substantial majority in the 27 October 1957 parliamentary elections. During the early and middle part of 1958 Turkish student organizations held large meetings in which they began stridently to demand immediate partition. They reflected the now very anti-British tone of the press, critical of Foot and of British weakness. It was argued that EOKA violence against the Turkish Cypriots showed that the two communities could not live together. Foot’s visit to Makarios in Greece in February 1958 raised all the underlying suspicions that Britain would do a deal with him. The British Government was seen to be less keen on partition, especially as it was announced that a new British plan was in preparation. The response of the Turkish Government was to promote large pro-partition demonstrations, abandoning former restraint. The demonstrations and meetings attracted large crowds. Hürriyet, claimed that between 8 June and 13 July there were 43 meetings with 790 speakers with an attendance of over two and a half millions. The aim was to bring about the rejection of the expected Macmillan Plan, which was made known 19 June, though rumours about its content had long circulated. ‘Partition or Death’ became the nationwide slogan. Of the many telegrams sent to the British Government, one to Macmillan declared that (1) Cyprus was a vital security concern for Turkey, (2) partition was the last Turkish sacrifice to be made, (3) Cyprus would not be permitted to go communist, (4) no British plan was possible without Turkish approval and (5) the United States must support partition. The Macmillan Plan During 1958 Ankara, promoting its policy of partition, and relying a great deal on the December 1956 statement by Lennox Boyd, was not backward in encouraging the Turkish Cypriot armed organization (TMT) from

34 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

making its presence felt. This it was doing by seeking to demarcate Greek and Turkish Cypriot areas. The TMT was becoming a threat, if not as much a threat to security as EOKA. It was a home-grown organization, sometimes difficult for Turkey to control, and as vicious as EOKA in its treatment of traitors and leftists.22 Greek Cypriot civilians were intimidated and forced to abandon some areas. It was nothing like as well organized or as powerful as EOKA, but when it took violent action it was difficult to contain. In addition to the need not to offend Turkey, the security forces still relied on a police force totally manned by Turkish Cypriots. They could, or would, not take heavy action against fellow Turkish Cypriots. In two major violent demonstrations by Turkish Cypriots the British army had to restore order, with bitterly resented fatal casualties to the Turkish Cypriots. Very difficult, too, for the Cyprus Government was the demand made in 1957 by Turkish Cypriot councillors in the jointly run municipalities for the creation of separate municipalities. The Turkish Cypriot councillors were threatening to set them up themselves. The Greek Cypriots, and the Cyprus Government both saw this as heralding partition. In 1958, the Turkish Cypriots established their own municipalities, but they were de facto, not de jure. The crucial development of 1958 was, however, the Macmillan Plan, said to have been conceived largely by John Reddaway, principal adviser to both Harding and Foot, though it built on the ideas put forward at the 1955 Tripartite Conference and later, as mentioned above.23 It was described as a tri-dominium, though it was hardly that in the end. The Governor in this scheme would be British, the idea of a neutral governor being dropped. In its first form the Plan provided for the Governor to be flanked by a Turkish and a Greek representative appointed by their governments. They would join the Governor in a Council otherwise composed of four Greek Cypriot and two Turkish Cypriot members. These would be provided from two elected Houses of Representatives to be established, one Greek, and the other Turkish, Cypriot. There was no special status for the Greek Cypriots in the Council, beyond having more representatives in it. These two Houses would have final legislative autonomy in communal affairs. The Council, chaired by the Governor would be responsible for all non-communal affairs. However external affairs, defence and internal security were reserved for the Governor himself, acting after consultation with the Greek and Turkish governments’ representatives. They would also have the right to refer legislation they regarded as discriminatory to an impartial tribunal to be established. To give the new system a fair chance to succeed the international status of the island was to remain as it was for seven years. There was no mention of what was intended after that period. It was an attempt at self-government, but many saw the handling of communal affairs by two separate elected assemblies as the harbinger of partition.

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 35

Despite movement in this direction, it was not initially acceptable to Turkey, since it did not provide the immediate partition Ankara was demanding. The British Government still seemed to be toying with the idea of self-government, Turkish attitudes changed, however, when, after further consideration, they believed the plan was not incompatible with partition. Ankara then obtained from the British Government a secret written guarantee that the December 1956 statement on partition would apply under the Macmillan Plan.24 The Macmillan Plan was announced on 19 June 1958, but it was later modified as a result, mainly, of American representation, before being presented to Parliament on 15 August. Washington did not regard the plan with favour, but for the sake of good relations with the United Kingdom did not want to oppose it. In an important amendment, the representatives of Greece and Turkey were not given seats on the Council, but instead remained to be consulted by the Governor on external affairs, defence and security. These were changes made with the likely objections of the Greek side in mind. Some prospect of movement was also held out towards joint institutions of some sort to represent the interests of both communities. Seeing partition as the probable outcome Ankara did not object to the softening of the plan. For their part the Turkish Cypriots were allowed their separate municipalities and a day duly (1 October) was fixed for the arrival of the Turkish Representative. He duly arrived, but in the person of the then Turkish Consul, which rather lessened the blow for the Greek Cypriots. The Macmillan Plan was not accepted by Greece, whose main objections centred on the separate jurisdictions envisaged for each community. This ‘self-government’ formula was worse for Makarios than previous proposals since it clearly denied any possibility of self-determination. The heavy reinforcement of the British garrison at this time, necessary to counter the reorganized EOKA, suggested that this was what was being prepared. The advent of the Macmillan Plan coincided with a decline in Turkish Cypriot support for immediate partition, and a reduction in violence from the Turkish Resistance Organization. It coincided too with marked escalation of violence by EOKA against the British. The murder of a middle-aged Englishwoman and a bomb in the NAAFI in Nicosia airfield were particularly devastating and sullied EOKA’s reputation abroad. However, the United Kingdom now had more troops in Cyprus and, employing more effective tactics, was having considerable success against EOKA even though there were many British casualties from terrorism in what became known as ‘Black October’. The independence formula In the background to the problematic Macmillan Plan attention was being given to the alternative ‘independence’ formula without enosis and

36 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

partition. It did not find favour with the British Government on the grounds that Makarios would be likely to dominate an independent state, which would mean trouble with the Turkish Cypriots, prescience indeed. The British believed that a period of experience with self-government was first necessary. Initially the United States was concerned lest independence should lead to a weak communist state, fearing especially the influence of AKEL, but from about 1957 began to believe it was the solution. The Turkish reaction was that there would be no trustworthy guarantee through the UN for the Turkish Cypriot community. Greece came to support strongly the idea of an independent state, even suggesting that if the Macmillan Plan were put into operation, Greece would have to review its position in NATO. The NATO Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak, conscious of the threat to NATO provided by the Cyprus dispute, played an active part in furthering an independence solution. For a while he was reined in by the United States, anxious not to be in disagreement with the British. However, doubts were eventually laid aside and the idea began to be taken up by Foster Dulles. Turkey feared that the Turkish Cypriots would be overwhelmed. Spaak persisted with the independence solution, despite British coolness. The bare bones of his NATO formula for Cypriot independence provided for its being guaranteed by interested powers, including the United States. There would be a NATO base occupied by British forces, and an international statute guaranteeing the rights of minorities. For its part the British Government declared that it would implement the Macmillan Plan. The proposal that under the Macmillan Plan Turkey should have a role in the governing of the island was particularly obnoxious to Greece, and to Makarios. He now came round to accepting the idea of an independent state under UN protection, rightly believing that he would have more room for manoeuvre with the UN than with Turkey and Greece. He had made his change of heart to an independence formula known to a leading British labour MP, Mrs Barbara Castle. With great difficulty Makarios persuaded Grivas that to resist this new policy would result in their having the Macmillan Plan thrust upon them.

The road to a solution Greece now had recourse once more to the UN General Assembly (November 1958) hoping and expecting, not without justification, that the third world, and anti-colonial sentiment in the UN, would support its advocacy of an ‘independence’ solution. Its resolution called on the United Kingdom to help the Cypriots to obtain independence with guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot minority and for their participation in government. There was a good deal of support, especially from India, but the endorsement of independence that, in the British view, would have been a disaster, was

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 37

narrowly avoided.25 Whilst the UN Resolution did not approve the ‘independence’ formula, it did keep open the door to a solution, however, by advocating, after much debate, discussions by Britain, Greece and Turkey, together with the two Cypriot communities. The following day this was hurriedly changed to an anodyne expression of confidence, ‘that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’.26 There was a good reason for this hurried change. It was observed that at the UN the Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, was less aggressive than was usually the case. His action after the debates was even more untypical. He approached the Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, with a friendly suggestion that they might get together to discuss the ‘grande politique’ of the Cyprus issue. This surprising initiative produced a ready response. Averoff and Zorlu, began soon to hold discussions on the Cyprus problem, discussions which led to a conference between the Greek and Turkish governments concluded on 11 February 1959 in Zürich. Averoff knew he was only just carrying Makarios along with him. Dr Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktas¸ told Zorlu that to accept the independence solution they would want a Turkish guarantee of the settlement and a Turkish military presence enough to ensure the existence and security of the Turkish Cypriots.27 At that conference agreement was reached on an independence formula for Cyprus and on the basic articles of a constitution for the new Cypriot state. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not participate in their formulation, but later gave their assent to them. Treaties of guarantee and alliance were also agreed. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots leaders were asked to accept these and the basic articles of the proposed constitution The task that remained after these agreements was to tell London how it was to divest itself of its colony, though London seemingly knew what was afoot.28 The reaction in London to having the fate of its colony apparently decided by two other states was one of bemusement, and some disbelief that any conclusion would be reached. In the meanwhile measures were taken to press forward with the Macmillan Plan, though the hanging of two Greek Cypriots was halted at the very last moment at the urgent joint request of Averoff and Zorlu. The most remarkable feature of the Turkish volte-face was its abandonment of its determination to have the island partitioned. Only weeks earlier there had been massive pro-partition demonstrations in Ankara. The move to an ‘independence’ solution was severely criticized in Turkey, and created much disquiet.29 Why had this happened? Whilst partition was definitely unpopular with the UN, and the Macmillan Plan did not inspire enthusiasm, the latest debates had not resulted in the acceptance of an independence outcome. Comment in the Turkish press made these points, but was yet quite restrained and little insistent on partition as the only solution. The Government kept very quiet about the Zorlu-Averoff talks, and

38 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

provided no opportunity for discussion of Cyprus in parliament. The Government discouraged large student pro-partition demonstrations. Menderes relied on his popularity in the country to bypass not only parliament on the Cyprus issue, but even his own party. The opposition Republican People’s Party complained loudly about this disregard of parliament, but on the issue of a Cyprus solution made only guarded comment. The reasons for the swift Turkish conversion to the independence solution seem largely to have lain outside Turkey. It is usually argued that with the collapse of the Baghdad Pact, and Soviet penetration of the Middle East at a time when the Cold War was warming up, the Turkish Government, needing arms, and American economic aid, felt in a weak position. The Turkish Ambassador in Athens is reported to have said to a Greek Foreign office counterpart that the Turkish volte-face was really not due to the situation in Iraq, or to economic weakness, but to the constant pressures of ‘our great ally’, which, he added ‘I am sure is the same with you’.30 Not without some justification, perhaps, it has been dubbed ‘Pax Americana’.31 When the Turkish parliament did discuss Cyprus, I˙nönü also alluded to American pressure on the Government. However, since partition was practically impossible without very great hardship, and probably violence, and since the Macmillan Plan had been so much altered as to rob it of its real tri-dominium character, there was really no feasible solution left but guaranteed independence with both partition and enosis banned. Even in its truncated form the Macmillan Plan clearly acted a spur to this outcome. The plan might well have been unworkable and would have been a burden for the United Kingdom, but British determination first to defeat EOKA, and then to impose it, served to make it a catalyst for a solution. The London Conference: Lancaster House The Zürich conference produced agreement on a set of principles for the construction of what has usually been described as a functional federal state. It was presumably described as ‘functional’ because it had no basis in geographic separation, but there was no major division of central functions; they were shared equally, which turned out to be the major problem. Turkey did not press for a base in Cyprus, but instead accepted a proposal allowing both Turkey and Greece to maintain a modest military presence on the island. The basic articles of the Constitution were approved. Turkey had crucially obtained agreement for separate community voting on major matters in the proposed House of Representatives, and for significant veto powers for the Turkish Vice-President. Three important treaties were signed. The Treaty of Guarantee gave recognition to the basic and unamendable articles of the Constitution, required the Republic of Cyprus to maintain the state of affairs established

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960 39

by the treaties and also acknowledged the entitlement of three named Guarantor Powers, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, jointly or separately to maintain the state of affairs being established. The Treaty of Establishment included the right of the United Kingdom to retain military base areas under British sovereignty. The Treaty of Alliance was signed by Greece, Turkey and Cyprus; they principally agreed to co-operate in their common defence. Makarios kept the conference in a state of alarm for two days. At first he bade fair to wreck the conference by saying he could not accept what would be its conclusions, despite his earlier assent. He principally objected to the powers of veto in the Constitution, the rights of the Guarantor Powers to intervene in Cypriot affairs, the enforced membership of the Treaty of Alliance and the large percentage of Turkish Cypriots in the new public bureaucracy (30%). He then withdrew to pray and debate with himself and others whether after all to sign the agreements. In the end he was persuaded by the Greek premier and foreign minister to do so. Asked why he had caused such trouble he replied that he had his reasons. He was right to show reluctance to sign up to the agreements if he intended to try to overthrow them later, as turned out to be the case. During the conference the British forces in Cyprus sent a message to the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, claiming that they knew where Grivas was and could seize him, though it is very doubtful indeed that Grivas would ever have been taken alive. At dinner Macmillan asked Averoff what would happen if, by chance, Grivas were captured whilst the conference was in progress. The reply was that the Greek and Greek Cypriot delegations would immediately depart. The military in Cyprus were told not to proceed.32 Menderes, who miraculously escaped from his aircraft when it crashed in fog on landing at Gatwick, had to sign the documents in hospital. A few months later, in May, 1960, he was deposed by a military coup. He, Zorlu, and one other minister,33 were later hanged in 1961 on the grounds that they had altered the Turkish constitution and had sought to silence the National Assembly. A plea by the United Kingdom for mercy for Menderes was not heeded. There was no plea for the unpopular Zorlu, who had played the leading role in bringing Greece and Turkey together, if under American influence. Safe with bases, over whose areas there was to be much dispute with Makarios, the British Government combined chagrin with relief at having at last been divested of its troublesome colony, but not without protests from the conservative right. In Turkey the new Prime Minister, I˙smet I˙nönü, reflecting the views of the military, later severely criticized the Menderes government for not obtaining the partition of the island demanded by public opinion and parliament, though he had said little enough at the time. He foresaw that the

40 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Greek Cypriots would try to overthrow the 1960 agreements and to amend the Constitution in their own interest. ‘As long as both communities are not convinced that enosis is not possible in the long run, we shall have a difficult time to ensure that the other articles of the Constitution are implemented’.34

3 Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964

In the late 1950s Makarios had to accept an ‘independence’ solution once he realized that the Macmillan Plan was going to be imposed, and that it would probably result in partition and thus destroy all hopes of enosis. He signed the 1960 Treaties but with deep misgivings, and under severe pressure from Greece. The Treaty of Establishment defined the territory of the new Republic of Cyprus. This territory did not include two British military base areas, which were to remain under British sovereignty. The Treaty of Guarantee was, and remains, of crucial importance. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom ‘recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution’.1 For its part the Republic of Cyprus undertook to ensure respect for the Constitution and expressed its desire, with the other signatories, to co-operate ‘to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution’. The Basic Articles were contained in a document first drawn up by Greece and Turkey with the aid of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Later a constitutional commission put the finishing touches. It included representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee provided for Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom ‘to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance’ of the provisions of the treaty. In the absence of agreement on concerted action, ‘each of the three Guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty’. This was going to provide for Turkey justification for its military intervention in 1974, though this has never been accepted by the Greek Cypriots. The treaty also prohibited any activity to promote union with any other state, or partition of the island. The Guarantor Powers were to prohibit union with another state or partition ‘so far as concerns them’ (an interesting escape phrase) but the Republic of Cyprus undertook ‘not to participate, in 41

42 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever’. This very significant undertaking was later to be very important in a legal Opinion prepared by Professor Mendelson Q.C. prohibiting the Republic of Cyprus from joining the European Union. The Treaty of Alliance signed by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for their common defence included provision for Greek and Turkish military contingents on the island to be only 950 and 650 strong respectively.

The Constitution The Constitution provided for a presidential system, the President being elected by the Greek Cypriot, and the Vice-President by the Turkish Cypriot communities Each had a veto on decisions relating to foreign affairs, defence and security in the Council of Ministers. The Council was composed of seven Greek and three Turkish Cypriot members. In the elected House of Representatives the Greek Cypriots had 35 and the Turkish Cypriots 15 members. They were elected on separate, communal, electoral rolls. Membership of the civil service was to be similarly divided. Legislation was by simple majority, but laws and decisions on elections, finance and municipalities had to be approved by each community group. The municipalities’ issue was especially important because the Constitution established separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipalities in the five major towns, namely Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, and Paphos. All these important arrangements were included in the ‘basic’ and unamendable articles of the Constitution, alterable, presumably, only if both sides and the Guarantor Powers agreed. The composition of the Supreme Constitutional Court had a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot judge, with a neutral president, whilst the High Court of Justice in addition to a neutral president had two Greek Cypriot judges and one Turkish Cypriot judge. Subordinate courts were staffed either by Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot judges. The Constitution provided for each community to have its own elected Communal Chamber with responsibility for education, religion, culture and kindred matters. These bodies could impose and collect taxes for community purposes. It was a constitution that was essentially federal. There is little point in referring to it as a ‘functional’ federation, as is often the case, since all federations are organized on the basis of functions. Some are exercised by the central organization established, others by the entities forming the federation. In the Cypriot case these entities were communities with elected chambers, not states. As a federation it had to be considered as a communal, not a geographic federation. As in a geographic federation certain powers were left to the local communal chambers forming the federation. Members of the House of Representatives were chosen by the electorates of

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 43

the communities forming the federation, this being a case of ‘entrenched representation being accorded to the regions in the decision-making procedures of the central government’.2 Such a federation could work in theory as a single legislature (as was the Cyprus case) if the constituting entities were sufficient in number to allow for changing majorities. In the 1960 Constitution, however, there were only two entrenched groups in the single legislature, and one much smaller than the other. The solution was, therefore, to provide the minority group with effective means to prevent its being overwhelmed. To this end a majority of each communally elected group of deputies in the House of Representatives had to approve legislation in certain important fields, namely in defence, taxation, and electoral legislation. The system was very likely to be unworkable. It could perhaps have worked if both sides really had the determination to make it work, and if, in particular, the Greek Cypriots had leaned over backwards to more than satisfy the minority community, which they could have done with so small a community to deal with. Convinced the island was, and ought to remain Hellenic, and believing, even in these circumstances, that the majority had a democratic right to rule, the Greek Cypriots could not adopt such a policy. Nor were there powerful crosscutting interests to modify communal political differences. The elected presidency and vicepresidency also did not much help fuse the two communities together: for this a parliamentary system of government would probably have been better. The 1960 Constitution has sometimes been described as a ‘consociational system’.3 It certainly had some of the characteristics of the consociational model as defined by its author, Arend Lijphart. These were proportionality in the allocation of civil service appointments and the like, separate majorities for voting on important issues in the legislature, in effect a veto for each community, and the delegation of as many functions as possible to community institutions. However, ‘the primary characteristic of a consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all segments of the plural society co-operate in a grand coalition to govern the country’.4 The leaders have to believe in the need for agreed union and persuade their followers of its necessity. This clearly does not describe the situation in Cyprus in 1960. It was not essentially a consociational system. It is easy, and right to some extent, to blame the 1960 Constitution for the troubles that followed, but it is very difficult to know what could have been created in its place. The Greek Cypriots really wanted a unitary state with themselves in charge, while the Turkish Cypriots wanted a geographically based two-state, or confederal, solution, which was not feasible. It did not help that the Greek Cypriots painfully realized that ‘their heroic struggle to unite their island with Mother Greece had resulted only in partial victory’.5 Enosis was still for many the real objective. For them the independent republic was a second best settlement, and a great disappointment.

44 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Some felt so unfulfilled, or even betrayed, that ‘they felt uneasy when they saw the flag of the Republic flying over public buildings’.6 They felt they had been deprived of their right to rule the island by the Turkish Cypriots backed by Turkey and perfidious Albion. For their part the Turkish Cypriots felt deeply aggrieved that the possibility of self-determination held out to them by the British had now been abandoned. They wanted partition, and would have preferred the Macmillan Plan. The Turkish Cypriots ‘had fought ferociously against the attempts of the far larger Greek community to incorporate the whole of the island into the Greek state, and the Constitution was the fruit of that struggle’.7 They knew that the Greek Cypriots were too passionate for their cause to accept a constitution they believed had been thrust upon them. So they feared and distrusted them. The Greek Cypriots believed that the Turkish Cypriots would take every opportunity to bring in Turkey to partition the island. Now former EOKA and TMT leaders had to work together, They found that very difficult indeed. Issues soon arose to increase tensions as both sides began life under the new Constitution. ‘The creation of an independent Cypriot state represented the narrow middle ground between mutually exclusive ethnic policies and goals’.8 Applying the constitution One issue that arose concerned the constitutional requirement that the proportion of posts in the bureaucracy had to be 70:30 in favour of the Greek Cypriots. They complained, and with some justification, that there were not enough Turkish Cypriots adequately educated to fill the posts. Moreover, they only constituted 18.5 per cent of the population, so they were, in the Greek Cypriot view, grossly overrepresented. It appears that the Greek Cypriots sometimes considered the Turkish Cypriots as ‘generally lacking in culture, education and intelligence’.9 The Turkish Cypriots claimed, on the other hand, that their well-educated candidates were simply passed over. This may have been true. ‘It must be said that in the years immediately following independence it is known that many Greeks got jobs and promotions in the Civil Service and Police with qualifications little better than an EOKA record or connections.’10 In the higher reaches of diplomatic and representative posts the Vice-President claimed some had been filled without his being consulted by Makarios. Another problem was that of the army of 2000 to be established, as required by the Constitution. The Greek Cypriots wanted it to be divided along the 60:40 ratio prescribed down to the lowest unit level. The Turkish Cypriots believed that for reasons of language, religion and other social differences this would not be workable, and wanted separation only down to, and including, company level. The Vice-President vetoed the Greek Cypriot plan. So no army was formed, to the satisfaction, it has been admitted, of the Greek Cypriots, who considered it ‘a costly and unnecessary luxury’.11

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 45

The Turkish contingent would also have proved, if separately organized, a useful trained force for the small and vulnerable Turkish Cypriot minority, should the need arise. A major problem was how to finance the cost of education in each of the two communities, the responsibility lying with each Communal Chamber. Under the Constitution the Cyprus Government was obliged to provide annually £160,000 to the Greek Cypriot Chamber for education and £400,000 to the Turkish Cypriot Chamber. This was not enough for the Turkish Cypriots: their community was too poor to make up by taxation the needed amount. The Greek Cypriot Chamber also had to impose substantial taxes to meet the educational expenditure. Both communities wanted government support. However, they disagreed on the proportions each should have of government grants. The Greek Cypriots wanted a ratio of 82:18 to match the population ratio. The Turkish Cypriots wanted a 70:30 ratio. After long discussions, mainly between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktas¸, it was agreed that the way forward was for the central government to fund all the educational needs of each community Chamber in return for each Chamber agreeing not to impose any taxes on its community. Although this seemed to deal a blow at local autonomy, the Turkish Cypriots accepted this in principle. They also agreed that the system of majority voting by each side in the House of Representatives might well be abandoned on taxation matters. The separate majorities requirement was stopping a vital income tax law from being passed. The difficulty then arose that the Greek Cypriot side wanted these changes to be inscribed in the Constitution, but the Turkish Cypriot side proposed instead a gentleman’s agreement in the form of a protocol. The Turkish Cypriots believed that any change in the Constitution would open the door to others. Clerides was apparently in favour of accepting Denktas¸’s proposal, but Makarios, and others around him, were not. Clerides believed that if the Greek Cypriots had agreed to making changes by protocol, instead of insisting on constitutional change, the problem of the separate majorities would have been solved. Denktas¸ advocated the acceptance of a protocol, as follows: ‘It may be argued that individual members may wish to resort to this power (of separate majority vote) every now and then, but I can assure you that unless a matter of high policy is involved affecting the very existence of the Turkish Community, Turkish members of the House will not use their power of separate majority in the negative’.12 The Greek Cypriots did not accept Denktas¸’s proposal. Clerides had not been confident of success. He feared that certain hawks would do their best to prevent agreement and insist on pushing Makarios to the view that the Constitution was unworkable, that this had to be demonstrated even at the cost of a constitutional crisis, and that ‘amendments to reduce the excessive Turkish rights were imperative and should be proceeded with without delay’.13

46 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

As indicated above, one of these rights was the need for approval by a majority of the Turkish Cypriot deputies of taxation laws. In December 1961, alleging disregard of Turkish Cypriot interests elsewhere, particularly on the municipalities’ issue, the Turkish Cypriot deputies decided to veto the taxation legislation needed to raise taxes. This obliged the Government to re-apply the by then illegal pre-1960 taxation legislation in order to collect essential revenue. On the content of the legislation itself the Turkish Cypriot deputies had expressed no dissent. Makarios pointed out, with some reason, that they were completely unjustified in using their powers to veto taxation because of grievances over other matters. Another major problem, often considered the most important, was that of the municipalities. As mentioned above, it was laid down in the Constitution that in the five major towns each community should have its own municipality. There were some considerable difficulties in bringing this about. For instance, the boundaries of the existing separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities had Greek Cypriots living within them, which neither side wanted. In the new republic establishing agreed boundaries proved impossible. Also, as the Greek Cypriots pointed out, the separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities in the smaller towns would be too small to provide effective services, and too costly. Ironically before 1960 Makarios had wanted separate Turkish municipalities because they were so poor and would be a burden on the Greek Cypriots. After 1960 persistent attempts by mixed committees to establish satisfactory borders failed for very practical reasons. None of the criteria of communal homogeneity, property ownership or tenancy, suggested a solution. The Greek Cypriot element in the Government wanted to establish joint committees to control local government in each town, membership being based on the balance of the population. In response, the Turkish Cypriots, noting that the President ‘was determined not to agree to a geographical separation’,14 proposed a compromise scheme of mixed co-ordinating bodies in each town to effect liaison between the existing Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot municipalities. This did not appeal to Makarios, apparently on grounds of complexity. It was then modified and a more modest scheme for joint committees was discussed that seemed to be providing a solution, though the earlier Turkish Cypriot requirement that the whole scheme should be reviewed after a year was modified to exclude the possibility of returning to separate municipal councils. The Joint Committees’ scheme, seemed to be gaining assent by the Turkish Cypriots, but after a few days they rejected it, stressing that ‘there was an unbridged gap in the minds of both sides … as to the future of the Greek and Turkish Municipal Councils’.15 Later the Council of Ministers decided to set up ‘Improvement Boards’ for the towns to replace the municipal councils, invoking a British colonial law of 1950 allowing them to be appointed. In due course the Supreme Constitutional Court declared the order illegal and also Turkish

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 47

Cypriot legislation for their municipalities enacted by their Communal Chamber. Makarios declared before the judgement that he would not abide by the judgement of the Court, if it found the Development Boards unconstitutional. After the judgement against the Development Boards the Court’s President, Professor E. Forsthoff and his Assistant, Dr Christian Heinze, resigned marking their serious protest at this disregard of the law and the Constitution. Clerides believed that ‘the course followed by the Greek Cypriot side in refusing to implement the constitutional provisions [for municipalities] was wrong and that it could have been done’.16 Municipalities and partition Some Greek Cypriot and other writers have been inclined to assume that the Turkish Cypriots wanted to retain their municipalities as a basis for partition. ‘The municipal issue came closest to a solution which was denied in the end, not because of the degree of constitutionality, practicality, or even acceptability to most Greek and Turkish Cypriots of the solution offered, but because it did not meet Turkey’s requirements for geographical partition.’17 The author also refers to ‘the separatist policies insisted upon by Ankara’.18 The Turkish Cypriots certainly wanted some geographical separation, lest they should lose their identity, but only for local government functions. Partition could be no more now than a pipe dream. Certainly the Turkish Government did not want it. In fact, the Turkish Government appointed a Turkish ambassador in Nicosia, Emin Dirvana, with firm instructions to make the new republic work. A military man in background he had no patience with Denktas¸ and other outspoken Turkish Community leaders. In a period of confusion after the 1960 revolution the Turkish Government had too much on its hands to want any trouble in Cyprus. Dirvana is reported to have had a very restraining influence. He interfered in the work of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber. ‘He did not act like an ambassador, but like a colonial governor’.19 He was not replaced until June 1963. For two years the events in Cyprus had not been carefully followed by the government in Ankara but had been wrongly represented to it.20 The view that ‘the municipalities … represented a method of maintaining Turkish political control within the island’21 strains credulity. So does the view that ‘Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots succeeded in transforming the municipalities … into the Trojan Horse of separation’.22 At most, through its ambassador in Cyprus Turkey warned Makarios of its concern about advocacy of enosis in the press and the collection of taxes in disregard of the objections of the Turkish Cypriot deputies in the House of Representatives.23 When Makarios visited Ankara in December 1962 he was also strongly advised to live within the Constitution, though this was not the only warning from Ankara. I˙nönü later stated that Turkey had made 14 representations between February and December 1962 on the subject of the Constitution.24 In Ankara Makarios

48 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

was apparently willing to consider practical ways around controversial points and seemed to be flexible on the municipalities’ question. He was at this time under some considerable pressure from the Greek Government to be reasonable, but he knew that government to be weak. He later revealed that he was not impressed with Inönü, nor, it seems, with the Foreign Minister, Feridun Erkin.25 His estimate of the calibre of the leading Turkish politicians probably emboldened him in his future actions. These constitutional controversies alarmed the British Government. Repudiation of the 1960 treaties would throw into question the status of the British bases. Another cause of alarm was that Makarios now began to respond to approaches made by the Soviet Union, though denying their importance. In this Makarios had an uncomfortable ally in AKEL, the communist Working Peoples’ Progressive Party which, through the Pan-Cypriot Federation of Labour, embraced some 60 per cent of the labour force.26 Like AKEL, the Soviet Union was in those days only superficially in favour of enosis, but gave considerable support to Makarios at the United Nations. Soviet spokesmen constantly denounced the NATO powers’ attempts ‘to turn Cyprus into a military bridgehead’.27 In its support of Makarios the Soviet Union concluded trade agreements with the Makarios government and delivered substantial amounts of armaments. Western powers were deeply concerned, especially as this was the high tide of Soviet influence in the Middle East. The West feared an attempt to set up an East Mediterranean Cuba in Cyprus. Constitutional revision Against this background, on 3 November 1963, without consulting VicePresident Küçük, Makarios publicly announced proposals for constitutional reform. The United States, alarmed at the possibility of Soviet entry into Cyprus, was cautiously sympathetic to change that would not mean formal revision of the 1960 Treaties, under which the British bases were established.28 There was hesitant British support for some change that would not mean overturning the treaties. The British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Sir Arthur Clark, had, however, earlier become involved with Makarios and Kyprianou in talks over the need to make changes to the Constitution. He had earlier suggested that the British government should persuade the Turkish Government that compromises were essential over certain of its provisions, a proposal commented on adversely by the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Denis Allen. He wrote, ‘There will be a real crisis of confidence here if the Turkish Government discover (as they well may) that we have been listening to Greek Cypriot ideas of modifying the Treaty of Guarantee’.29 Nevertheless Clark proceeded to play an important part in subsequent events. Responding to a request from Makarios, with whom he was on good terms, he obtained authorization from the Commonwealth Relations Office to go through the draft [Greek Cypriot] proposals with the

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 49

Cypriot Foreign Minister. Before these became known Clark produced his own more modest proposals. They included the unification of the judiciary and envisaged the complete mixing of units in the armed forces. Clark did not recommend the abolition of presidential and vice-presidential vetoes, or the election of the President and Vice-President of the House of Representatives by the whole House of Representatives, instead of by their own community groups in the House. Nor did his proposals recommend the abolition of separate communal group voting in the House of Representatives, only its limitation with regard to voting on taxation matters. His proposals did envisage the abolition of separate municipalities, but with safeguards for special expenditure on Turkish areas, and its control by Turkish Cypriots. The Communal Chambers he thought should be abolished on the grounds that they were propagandist. They should be replaced by a Ministry of Communal Affairs to be headed by a Greek Cypriot with a Turkish Cypriot deputy. There would be separate departments of education, but both would be centrally funded, He thought the ratio of civil service posts should be 75:25 in the Greek Cypriot favour. The proposals might be considered as not too unreasonable. It has been shown above that the Turkish Cypriots had indicated in discussions with Clerides that they would go along with some of the sorts of changes now proposed by Clark. If Clark had first engaged with the Turkish Cypriots, building on what they were prepared to accept, Makarios and his ‘hawkish’ supporters would have been put under pressure. To engage with Makarios only served to tell the Greek Cypriots, and subsequently the world at large, that the United Kingdom was in doubt about the 1960 Accords, despite being one of the Guarantor Powers. The earlier advice from Allen in Ankara ‘that urgent consideration be given to what we are about to say about them to our Turkish allies’30 was not taken. The Makarios proposals went much further than Clark had gone, though Makarios must have been greatly encouraged by his collusion with Clark. Makarios called for the removal of presidential and vice-presidential vetoes and the abolition of separate voting in the House of Representatives and in the Public Service Commission. The Greek president and the Turkish VicePresident of the House of Representatives were also to be elected by the House as a whole, not by each communal group of deputies, but separate electoral rolls would remain for the election of deputies, as for the election of the President and Vice-President. In his proposals the unified municipalities would be abolished. The judiciary would also be unified. The proportion of civil service posts for each community would be that of the overall population ratio. It was his intention to abolish the Communal Chambers, though the Turkish Cypriots would be allowed to retain theirs. These were the really crucial points. What they established was a state in which the Greek Cypriot majority would be able to rule without impediment. It represented an attempt to enforce unity instead of achieving it by persuasion.

50 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Despite his own less provocative proposals, Clark later expressed his view that the Makarios proposals constituted ‘a reasonable basis for discussion’.31 Whatever the extent of Clark’s participation in drafting the Makarios proposals, British policy had come round to accepting that constitutional review was essential if worse trouble was to be avoided and in order to head the Greek Cypriots off unilateral action, which could be violent. According to Clark, ‘In such a situation we would be most unhappily placed’. The ensuing troubles would include difficulties in operating the bases, for which Greek Cypriot co-operation was necessary, and encouragement to communism in Cyprus.32 Makarios’s threats to change the Constitution unilaterally, if necessary, were heeded. Clark was afraid that the Greek Cypriots would ‘cut loose and were prepared, in the last resort, to chance their arm in a trial of strength with the Turks’.33 As a guarantor power should the British Government have taken a much firmer stance? Julian Amery, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1958–1960, had no doubt that the British Government accepted that the action taken by Makarios was in breach of the 1960 Accords. He advised the Cabinet not to let Makarios go ahead with his constitutional proposals but ‘to put their foot down pretty hard now because if Makarios gets away with this, you will not be able to stop him … However, under, I think, American pressure, as far as I can recall, we did not do so’.34 In fact, the Americans had in mind a much firmer plan for dealing with Makarios than that of the British, which was ‘was simply designed to bring the Turks to sanction Makarios’s suggestions to amend the constitution’.35 Yet the Americans soon abandoned their plan, which required commitment by Makarios to the 1960 Accords, in return for some revision of the constitution in the Greek Cypriot interest. It fell through as a result of some collusion between the British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador in Nicosia, and disagreement between the White House and the Department of State. The latter believed that ‘the United States already had enough problems on its agenda without taking on the Cyprus dispute’.36 When he received the Makarios proposals the Turkish Foreign Minister said he was shocked by the Archbishop’s effrontery. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Fazıl Küçük, remarked that enosis might have been better! The Turkish Government rejected them first. In Cyprus the tension between the two communities created by the difficulties in the operation of the constitution, and now by the presentation of Makarios’s proposals, intensified. By mid-December Greek irregulars began asking Turkish Cypriots to show identification papers, a form of harassment that caused deep resentment. Turkish premises were being searched. There were rumours that the Turkish Cypriots would be attacked. Something was afoot, ex-EOKA fighters were being warned to be ready.

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 51

The tactic essentially adopted by Makarios in seeking changes in the Constitution, but not in the 1960 Treaties as a whole was shrewd. It might be said that although the treaties ‘bound the Cypriot government not to amend the Basic Articles of the Constitution the argument that every state must have the right to alter the charter governing its internal affairs is substantially more powerful than contentions seeking unilateral revision of treaties’.37 But to declare this against Turkish Cypriot opposition was altogether another matter. However, the timing of the proposed amendments was also shrewd, or fortunate, in that the Turkish political scene was much disrupted after 1960. The Turkish press did express opposition to constitutional change in Cyprus, but the few editorials during, at least, the first half of 1963 were ‘surprisingly restrained’.38 Turkish reasonableness did not stop Makarios from publicly advancing his 13 points. For him the times seemed propitious. In the summer of 1963 both the Prime Minister (Karamanlis) and the Foreign Minister (Averoff) were out of office in Greece and the Greek political scene was confused. Unimpressed personally by I˙nönü, Makarios discounted the strength of Turkish will in the political turmoil following the 1960 coup that overthrew the Menderes government, and the subsequent trials that resulted in execution of Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan. I˙nönü had the military behind him and could have adopted a more aggressive stance, but he wanted badly to re-establish Turkey’s democratic credentials, which the military intervention had seriously dented. His apparent weakness was, it seems, that he relied too much on the American alliance. In Washington he had recently been assured of the strength of the American-Turkish alliance by the new president, Lyndon Johnson.39 Turkey had much more on its plate than Cyprus.

The outbreak of violence Meanwhile in Cyprus, after Makarios’s constitutional proposals, tension had been building up between the two sides, who had been stockpiling armaments since Zurich. On 21 December 1963, fighting broke out in the Turkish Cypriot part of Nicosia, which quickly led to an all-out attempt by the Greek Cypriots to subdue the Turkish Cypriot community and force them into submission. There was also heavy fighting in Nicosia, and in Larnaca. The violence was sparked off by an incident on 21 December when Greek Cypriot police, official or not, killed two Turkish Cypriots in a quarrel after the police had stopped a car in which they were travelling and asked for identity cards, which the Turkish Cypriots refused to show. There are different versions of what followed. The report on the incident by a close observer of these and subsequent events, Harry Scott Gibbons, states that two cars of Turkish Cypriots returning home late at night were stopped by a group of armed Greek Cypriot civilians who ordered them out of their cars. Then Greek Cypriot armed police quickly appeared, and ‘as

52 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

though on cue’, opened fire with machine guns killing two of the Turkish Cypriots and wounding three bystanders.40 A Greek Cypriot version of the incident reports that a police patrol car manned by Greek Cypriots stopped a car for a routine check, and as a result shots were fired and one of the policemen was wounded. The policemen returned the fire. A young Turk was killed and a Turkish woman was wounded, dying on the way to hospital. Within minutes there was widespread shooting.41 That the Greek Cypriot police created the incident is suggested by a report that the previous day the Turkish Cypriot police had been disarmed ‘as a result of a ruse on the part of the Greek Cypriot Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Georkatzis’.42 The shooting from either side continued with increasing severity. The Turkish Cypriots came very close to defeat in these first days. In a letter to Clerides (22 September 1996) Denktas¸ quoted a report to London by the Acting British High Commissioner, Packard: ‘It was only the Turkish Battalion’s movement, threat of invasion, and over-flight of [Turkish] jet aircraft [which] stopped [the] Greek attack at Christmas’.43 Denktas¸ adds that they were saved from defeat by the Turkish action: they had been warned the night before by the Greek Cypriot police that if they did not surrender, they would be subjected to mortar attacks on the enclave and a large number of civilians would be killed. The Akritas Plan There is no doubt that the violence in December 1963 heralded an onslaught on the Turkish Cypriots in accordance with a plan, not now contested, the Akritas Plan, created by a secret Greek Cypriot organization known to, if not set up by, Makarios. Its objective was to subjugate the Turkish Cypriots before outside help could arrive to save them.44 The tactic was, first, to convince world opinion that the 1960 settlement was unjust and unreasonable, and that the Turkish Cypriots were intractable. Secondly, it was to show that the Treaty of Guarantee was therefore an intrusion into Cypriot affairs and should be annulled. (This would prevent any legitimate Turkish intervention). Thirdly, it was then intended to amend the Constitution without Turkish Cypriot agreement and, finally, to suppress quickly with the necessary force any opposition by the Turkish Cypriots before any international intervention could be organized. It would be a fait accompli difficult for the international community to do anything but accept. The Greek Cypriots have asserted that a captured Turkish Cypriot plan showed their intention to establish a separate state and divide the island with Turkish help, but it was a defensive plan. It could only refer to a response to a Greek Cypriot attack. Turkey had otherwise no legitimate reason to intervene, being bound by the 1960 treaties, and, as mentioned earlier, was eager to have the 1960 Constitution work effectively, as well as wanting to be on good terms with its NATO ally Greece.45 On the alleged Turkish Cypriot plan to promote partition, and an independent Turkish

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 53

Cypriot state, it is difficult to accept that ‘the Akritas Plan was just the one side of the coin’.46 Most Turkish Cypriots wanted geographic separation, but they knew full well that without outright Turkish military support it was unattainable, and that such a level of support would be possible only in the most dire circumstances. The Akritas Plan failed because it underestimated Turkish Cypriot strength. In the climate of distrust and suspicion, they had armed themselves against the possibility of physical attack. The range and bitterness of the fighting that broke out inflamed Turkish public opinion. It also impelled Turkey to make threatening air sorties over Nicosia. The Greek Cypriots feared more direct Turkish military intervention, and there were in Turkey threats to intervene, which for lack of preparedness would have been extremely difficult, well nigh impossible. On 26 December, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Erkin told the Turkish parliament that the armed forces had been instructed not to effect a landing in Cyprus. I˙nönü appealed to the United Kingdom and Greece, the co-guarantor powers, to intervene to halt the conflict. It was eventually agreed by both Makarios and Küçük after the hurried arrival of Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, that British troops would intervene to attempt to contain the violence, with the existing small contingents of Greek and Turkish troops on the island under British command, though they did not in fact, wisely, participate in trying to control the situation. The Turkish contingent would not, in fact, place itself under British control without authority from Ankara. The intervention of British troops, which began on 27 December, led to the establishment of a manned permanent cease-fire line, the Green Line, between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot areas of Nicosia. It was clear by now that the Greek Cypriots were engaged on an all-out attack on the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots vacate their positions in the government In a lull in the fighting Makarios called on the Turkish Cypriot officials to return to their posts, whence they had fled. They decided not to do so, mainly on grounds of safety, and also because it would appear to be acquiescence in Makarios’s plan to change the Constitution. When after the December 1963 violence the Turkish Cypriot deputies and many, but not all, civil servants did not take up their positions in government, many Greek Cypriots believed they did this in order to establish a separate government and to incite Turkey to intervene to force partition on Cyprus. This is often seen as an important point because, it is argued, if they did not return to their posts, the Greek Cypriots could claim, as they did, that it was legitimate for them to continue to rule as the government of Cyprus. It is not easy to establish exactly what happened. One writer claims that Turkish Cypriots did not return to their posts after the first fighting died down a little because there were severe punishments meted

54 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

out by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the enclaves if they did.47 Others claim that the officials did have the chance of returning in the spring of 1964 but they chose to refuse.48 Although they were offered UN protection, they still refused to return, but then how could the UN supply enough men to accompany every civil Turkish Cypriot to his or her office? In practice how effective could this have been? They certainly had a great incentive to return: they badly needed their salaries. Also they were strongly urged by I˙nönü to return; he saw that Makarios would exploit their absence from government for his own ends. He wrote: In accordance with the decision of the Security Council, in the near future an international peace force will be sent to Cyprus. We hope and greatly desire that as a result, security will be totally guaranteed. After security has been achieved, if the Turks [sic] continue not to resume their duties and positions in the institutions of the Cyprus state, and the Greek Cypriots themselves perform all state functions to the detriment of Turkish rights and interests, the complaints and objections made by us will not be considered justified by world opinion … In addition, after the establishment of complete security there would be a great advantage if the Turks, as far as possible, returned to their farming and normal tasks. If they do not do so the Greek Cypriots will take them over … In this regard I must stress that to return to normal occupations after security is established absolutely does not mean that we are abandoning our struggle. On the contrary … it will be a very important factor in winning victory for our just cause.49 The response by Fazıl Küçük to I˙nönü included the following: Makarios has declared the Vice-President and the Turkish ministers to be rebels. To return to Makarios’s government would be to bow their heads to the Greek Cypriot yoke and to walk into danger. Looking at it from the other side it is optimistic beyond reason to believe that the EOKA’ists would agree to the ministers going and taking over the administration and would submit to them. For instance, it is obviously impossible that the now 20,000 or so illegal members of the Cyprus army could come under the administration of a Turkish ministry. Therefore to believe that if the Minister of Defence were to return to his post it would be to the advantage of the Turkish Community is nothing but delusion. As to our civil servants, who for the most part have been, and are still, engaged in the fighting, this presents many difficulties. Others are employed in other duties and the identities of nearly all of them are known to the EOKA’ists. For these civil servants to return to their offices and work under the same roof as the EOKA’ists is to do nothing more

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 55

than to expose them to grave danger. As for the members of the Security Forces, they have all been dubbed ‘rebels’ by Makarios, who has frequently stated that they will be punished. … If it were the case that the Vice-President, the ministers and civil servants were obliged to return to their posts they are determined they would resign.50 The only Turkish Cypriot members of the government who remained in office were the Turkish Cypriot judges. They worked in the Greek Cypriot area for two years. They did so ‘through the efforts of the then neutral president of the High Court, Mr Wilson, on the understanding that the provisions of the constitution would be restored’.51 The Turkish Cypriot contention is that they did not leave their posts because they wanted to do so, but because of the attack on them following mounting tension, and the dangers to which they would be exposed if they tried to return to their offices. It was as well they did, since they did not know then about the Akritas Plan and what it had in store for them. When it was later proposed through the UN that civil servants might return to their posts, the Greek Cypriot response was that the return of Turkish Cypriot officials to their posts and payment of their salaries would be part of a political settlement.52 As the violence escalated Turkish Cypriot casualties began to mount. According to official records, 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots were killed during the 1963–64 crisis. In a vast exodus, upwards of 25,000 Turkish Cypriots fled from their homes … This comprised 18,667 inhabitants from 103 Turkish Cypriot and mixed villages, as well as several thousand who fled from villages which were only partially evacuated.53 Some 60 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot population lived in defended enclaves. Containing violence British help in curbing violence was certainly preferable for Makarios to having Turkey land troops, as was feared after Turkey showed its indignation at what was happening with warning flights over Nicosia with Air Force jets. Also the 650 strong Turkish military contingent allowed under the 1960 Accords now illegally moved, for their own safety it was claimed, from its camp outside Nicosia to new positions astride the road from Kyrenia to Nicosia, a vital strongpoint if Turkish troops were to land. Undaunted, Makarios then announced to the world on 1 January 1964 that the 1960 Treaties were abrogated. This produced a rapid and effective response from the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, who had flown out to Cyprus. He pointed out that this would almost certainly

56 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

lead to the withdrawal of British troops and prompt military intervention by Turkey as a Guarantor Power. Makarios back-pedalled immediately, now informing all the states to which he had written that what he had meant was that he wanted to abrogate the treaties by appropriate means. Meanwhile the United States was leaning heavily on Turkey not to intervene, reminding Ankara that American consent was needed for the use of its American equipment. This threat ‘deeply hurt and upset the Turkish Foreign Minister, Erkin’.54 Appreciating that it could not contain the situation for long, the British Government realized that a political solution was necessary. The Americans feared that if the British did not take the initiative, the matter would go to the UN, which, as the British came to realize, apart from being very disadvantageous for Turkey, might well result in ‘an attempt by a large part of the UN to oust them from their base areas’.55 Meanwhile violence escalated on the island. In the Ormophita suburb of Nicosia Turkish Cypriots houses were razed to the ground and the 6,000 inhabitants fled. The violence soon spread to other parts of the island. There was a ferocious battle in Limassol where 6,000 Turkish Cypriots were surrounded, and attacked, by a much larger Greek Cypriot force. There were also serious disturbances in Famagusta resulting in fatal casualties. The Turkish village of Gaziveren was another Turkish Cypriot village attacked, with much resultant damage and many deaths. Only the Turks in the larger enclaves could defend themselves successfully. They were subjected to blockades that prevented the importation of any construction and similar material, and many of the necessities for the local economy and daily existence.

The London Conference The United Kingdom now proposed a conference of the Guarantor Powers and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to meet in London on 15 January 1964. This membership ‘was stipulated in the official communiqué issued by the British High Commission on 2 January 1964’.56 The British asked for Makarios’s acceptance of the plans for the conference.57 His government not only announced that it had accepted a proposal by the British, Turkish and Greek Governments to take part in the conference in London, but added that ‘after the opening session a committee would be set up of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots under British chairmanship to work on the whole Constitution problem and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance’.58 Despite the invitation to both communities, and not to the Makarios government, Makarios sent the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister and Attorney General to represent the Cyprus Government. Instead of being refused admission, they were allowed to attend. The room allocated to the Greek Cypriots

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 57

was labelled ‘Cyprus Government’, but the door of the room for the Turkish Cypriot delegation was labelled ‘The Turkish Cypriot Community’. After an objection the labels were removed.59 It was also accepted that Makarios’s foreign minister, Spyros Kyprianou would not be allowed to speak.60 Nevertheless he did so. As a member of the recognized Cyprus Government he said, ‘All Cypriots should have the same rights irrespective of race, creed, or religion, and all must feel as citizens of a unitary state.’ To save a Turkish Cypriot walk-out, it was suggested that Osman Örek, a member of the Turkish Cypriot delegation, should speak in his capacity of Minister of Defence of the Cypriot Government. This seemed to make matters even, but he, too, could not make statements of prime political importance like that made by Kyprianou without, at least, presidential and vice-presidential approval. It has nevertheless been reported that some Turkish Cypriots ‘argue that they should have taken up their place in the main delegation representing the central government’.61 This is puzzling. It was only legitimate for the Cyprus Government to be at the conference if they had an agreed policy on the major constitutional issues at stake, which clearly they had not. It is not easy to accept the claim that ‘many Turkish Cypriots now see this failure to participate as having led to the conditions that led the international community to regard the Greek Cypriots as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus’.62 Not as a representative of the Government, but of the Greek Cypriot community, Clerides re-echoed Kyprianou’s remarks by making it absolutely clear that the 1960 Accords had to be amended to give Cyprus complete independence. He also declared that Cyprus had to be governed in accordance with the will of the majority. The essential principles to be respected were Cypriot sovereignty and the geographic unity of the island. He was against communal rights and veto powers. It is relevant to note with regard to this whole issue that the Turkish Cypriot delegates at the beginning of the Conference said, ‘We have come here to speak as a community. With the attacks launched by the Greek Cypriot leadership the Cypriot Government has ceased to exist’.63 In so far as they were prevented from filling their proper places in the government, they had a point. At the conference the Greek Cypriot demand for a unitary state and the treatment of the Turkish Cypriots as a minority was matched by the Turkish Cypriot demands for the creation of a number of separate Turkish Cypriot areas, or even just one area for all the Turkish Cypriots. Whilst Denktas¸ called for a number of areas, the Chairman of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, and a member of the House of Representatives, Halit Ali Riza, proposed one area for all Turkish Cypriots. This was essentially a proposal for two states with a central co-ordinating body, essentially a confederation. For these two Turkish Cypriot solutions there would have to be a movement of populations, estimated in a British paper to the Conference

58 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

to be 35,000 Greek Cypriots and 40,000 Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots rejected it. They wanted a unitary state, and claimed that partition had to be rejected on human rights’ grounds. British compromise proposals, which included some separation of the communities, could make no progress. The conference broke up without agreement, as Makarios clearly hoped, and the British expected. In Turkey there was mounting fury at the continued killings in Cyprus and deep concern at the condition of the Turkish Cypriots, over half of whom had now collected in enclaves for their own protection and who were suffering economically as well as in other ways. By February there were insistent reports that Turkey was preparing for military intervention, a contingency the Greek Cypriots rather discounted, believing it would be stopped by the United Kingdom and the United States. At this time in Turkey, the Prime Minister, I˙smet I˙nönü was faced with considerable military insistence for an intervention in the island. The military were still influential and could not easily be fobbed off, especially when supported by an inflamed public opinion. A major difficulty, however, was that the Turkish military were still not prepared for an assault across the sea, for which landing craft were necessary. For the time being the danger passed. After the December 1963 violence, when there was no longer a jointly manned government, the question arose whether the rump Greek Cypriot government was the legitimate government of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. Internal legal advice submitted to the British Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office was to the effect that the government of the Republic of Cyprus had not ceased to exist, that nothing had so far happened which could be described as destroying the government. This legal advice made no mention of the absence of the Turkish Cypriots; presumably it was assumed that they had left government on their own accord, the Greek Cypriot view of the matter. However, in reply to a question in the House of Commons in February 1964, Duncan Sandys replied, ‘The British Government continues to recognize the Government of Cyprus as established under the Constitution.’64 Did this mean the existing rump government could not be recognized, or that its continuing recognition for all practical purposes implied that it was the government as established under the Constitution?

Creating a peace force Events now conspired, however, to allow the United Kingdom to avoid responsibility for openly recognizing, or not recognizing, the new regime in Nicosia as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus. In early 1964, with violence mounting there was the fear that Turkey would in fact intervene militarily. This possibility would in turn incline the Makarios government to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union. This was a major

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concern for the United States, remembering Cuba, whilst the United Kingdom and Turkey were also anything but indifferent to this threat. To settle the violence on the island, and to ward off the Soviet threat, the United States and the United Kingdom now agreed in principle that a military force, preferably from NATO, should be introduced into the island. In the House of Commons the Labour Opposition leader, Harold Wilson, was opposed to a NATO force. The British Government wanted a peacekeeping force, though preferably NATO, and was determined not to be responsible for the policing of violence and essentially to disengage from Cyprus. However, the first favoured option, a NATO force, was soon seen to be impossible to create. A modification of this idea was to have a force composed of troops from NATO countries. This and similar plans fell through. It was eventually agreed in principle that the UN should be asked to establish a force to maintain the peace in Cyprus. Out of concern for the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey accepted British recourse to the UN Security Council. On 15 February, the United Kingdom managed to beat by a short head Makarios’s request for the issue to be put before the Council. Like the United Kingdom, Turkey also did not want to see the 1960 Accords discounted in any way. The British request was for the Council ‘to consider the urgent problems raised by the deterioration of security in Cyprus’ and ‘to take appropriate steps to ensure that the dangerous situation which now prevails is resolved’. It also significantly asked for a solution that inter alia gave full regard to ‘the Governments that were party to the Treaty of Guarantee’. In this regard it was at one with Turkey. If it had won the race to the Security Council the Greek Cypriot request would have been for a resolution calling on Turkey, or on parties concerned, to abstain from committing any acts of aggression against the Republic of Cyprus. Outmanoeuvred by the United Kingdom the Cyprus UN Representative called, without success, for a prior emergency Council meeting on the grounds that there was an increasing threat of war from the preparations on the coast of Turkey opposite Cyprus ‘which made the danger of the invasion of the island both obvious and imminent’.65 The Greek Representative, Dimitri Bitsios, enthusiastically campaigned for the Greek Cypriot cause. When it was necessary for a request to be made for a UN force, in accordance with its procedures, the UN required authority from the Government of Cyprus. Britain obtained this authority from the Makarios government through an alleged stratagem that has been criticized by Turkish Cypriots.66 As the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Küçük was asked for his consent to a request for a UN force to help keep the peace. He agreed as long as Makarios did the same. Presumably wary of asking Makarios to give his assent as leader of the Greek Cypriot community, London told its High Commissioner ‘to ask the Archbishop to instruct his UN Representative, Zenon Rossides, to inform the UN Secretary-General of the Government’s

60 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

consent’. It was only later that Küçük learned that Makarios had given his consent as President, not as leader of his community. This was an important step in the process of coming to accept the rump Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of Cyprus. It was greatly to Makarios’s advantage to have a UN force in Cyprus, rather than a NATO force; Makarios, as a hero of the non-aligned, postcolonial world, could always expect support in the United Nations. Turkey was persuaded to accept a UN force on the understanding, it has been claimed, that the United States, with the United Kingdom, would ensure that a decision taken by the UN to set up a force would not disadvantage Turkey.67 Trusting the United States, I˙nönü agreed to go along with a UN force. UN Security Council Resolution 186 The United Kingdom had obtained the valuable right to speak first in the Security Council. However, a draft resolution was not proposed. Instead the British Representative, Sir Patrick Dean, said he would await the outcome of talks being conducted by the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, before proposing a resolution, which he never did. However, he called for a peacekeeping force to be supported by all parties, including the Guarantor Powers and for an impartial mediator. Very significantly, he said, ‘I call on all states and authorities concerned, to respect the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee, and as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of the Constitution’. This dependence of the Cyprus Government for its legitimacy on the Constitution was just what the Greek Cypriots did not want. The Greek Cypriot Representative, Spyros Kyprianou, stressed that the Turkish plan was to partition the island, so it was immediately necessary to protect the integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. The Turkish Representative, Turgut Menemenciog˘lu, retorted that Turkey ‘had no other wish but to safeguard the security of the Turkish minority in Cyprus’ [when he should have said ‘community’]. Adlai Stevenson for the United States saw the creation of an international force as ‘critically urgent’, saying that the United States would be prepared to take part in such a force, but ‘only at the request of all the parties’, which would certainly not have been forthcoming. Rauf Denktas¸ was allowed in a personal capacity to address the Council. In a long, perhaps too long, speech on the recent history of the problem he ended by re-emphasizing that the 1960 Constitution was in shreds, that the Makarios government now had no legitimacy. The UN Secretary-General then set about trying to obtain some agreement on the contents of a draft resolution. The first attempt, to some extent reflected British and American views. In this first draft there would be a peacekeeping force with a commander appointed by the Secretary-General

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and reporting to him. There would also be a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of Cyprus and the Guarantor Powers. All states, not just Turkey, would be called upon to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Any scheme ‘had to give full weight to the primary responsibility of the Government of Cyprus and the three other governments principally concerned’. In their criticism of this approach to a resolution by U Thant the Greek Cypriots deplored that there was no reference to the 1960 Treaties as themselves being part of the problem, and that the Resolution did not state that the proposed peace force would be there for the specific purpose of helping the government restore law and order [which would put the force under governmental authority]. Nor did it make it sufficiently clear that the force would also defend the republic from external attack [with Turkey in mind]. At this juncture it was alarming for the Greek Cypriots that on 17 February the New York Times printed a pro-Turkish article. To the Greek Representative, Bitsios, this seemed to stem from reports that the United States would take a pro-Turkish stand and stress that the problem was one of intercommunal conflict, not a Turkish threat to intervene. The validity of the Treaty of Guarantee would thus be stressed. In response to representations by Bitsios, in an official statement, the press reports to the effect that the United States was trying to isolate Makarios and favoured partition were denied. Later however, the Under Secretary of State George Ball, read out a draft resolution that he wished Bitsios to have the Cypriots accept. According to Bitsios the draft, if accepted, would have made the independence of Cyprus dependent upon the 1960 Treaties. It was a draft resolution that he had earlier been shown by the British. It called upon all States and authorities concerned ‘to respect the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the treaty of Guarantee and as established and regulated by the basic articles of the Constitution’.68 This was very different from the plan U Thant was developing, His task was immensely difficult not only on account of this basic constitutional issue, but also because he had also to contend with the Soviet view that there was no need for a force, and that there should be no mention of the Treaties. Turkey also wanted a clause that conveyed the validity of the 1960 treaties and made no reference to the government of Cyprus, but only to the communities. It was becoming clear, however, that the Soviet Union would veto any resolution drafted along American, British or Turkish lines. Strongly supportive of the Greek Cypriots during the debates, and particularly aggressive in his attitude to Turkey, the Russian Representative, Nikolai Fedorenko, was fishing for big fish in the disturbed waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. Gains there would offset their dramatic strategic defeat in the Cuba crisis just two years earlier.

62 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

U Thant had three long meetings with the Greek Cypriot side. According to Bitsios, he suggested to U Thant that he should produce an aide-mémoire. After many revisions, this document became the draft resolution put before the Security Council. The Greek Cypriots objected that the draft for a peacekeeping force did not have as one of its objects ‘assisting the Government to restore law and order’ thus making it subordinate in part to the Makarios government. Nor in their view was it sufficiently clear that the force would protect the republic from external attack – with Turkey in mind! Nor was there mention of ‘the Treaties as forming part of the dispute’. At least the Greek Cypriot response to the aide-mémoire greatly appreciated the lack of reference in it to the ‘Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance’ (sic).69 In New York Denktas¸ was, of course, deeply concerned with the plight of the Turkish Cypriots, not with international politics. He did not want reference in the draft resolution simply to the ‘Government of Cyprus’. He and the Turkish delegation tried to have the word ‘constitutional’ added to it, but without success. ‘No one wanted to listen and understand’.70 ‘In New York the Americans, together with the British, in order to overcome our resistance to the draft resolution, made representations on the subject to I˙nönü. They said that the word “government” in the draft meant the constitutional government representing both Communities and that this was how the Security Council would interpret it. They played about with words saying that it was Turkish blood that was being spilt, that this should be stopped, that they knew how the Cyprus government had to be composed, and that they guaranteed it. It was essential that more time should not be lost. They went to Turkey and influenced those in power there.’71 For the Turkish Cypriots it was a major defeat that the Resolution did not safeguard their legal position in the government. They were dejected. Denktas¸ was in tears, knowing full well the intensity of Greek Cypriot convictions that they had the right to rule all Cyprus. By going along with the United Kingdom and the United States Turkey ‘persuaded Turkish Cypriots to accept the terms of Resolution 186’.72 In fact they were not persuaded: they continued to protest that the Greek Cypriot ‘rump’ government was illegal. They could only desperately hope that reference to the sovereign Republic of Cyprus did not mean the Republic of Cyprus then governed only by the Greek Cypriots. In late February the Americans had not been prepared to deny the Turkish Cypriots’ right to form part of the Cyprus Government, believing Turkey would not accept it. However, Washington succumbed to British arguments that there was no chance of having the present situation considered by the three Guarantor Powers, especially as the new Greek Government had become very pro-Greek Cypriot. When President Johnson heard that I˙nönü was stalling on the draft resolution, he sent him a strong and warm personal message telling him that the resolution was ‘absolutely essential in the interest of world peace’.73

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In its final form the UN Resolution, drafted in consultation with the Council’s non-permanent members, did not concentrate on the 1960 treaties. These were, instead, taken into account in the Preamble. Yet in the Preamble reference was also made, with rather more emphasis, to the provisions of the UN Charter against the threat or use of force against any state. This was important for the Greek Cypriots, who contended that the Treaty of Guarantee did not permit the use of force. All Member States were called upon to refrain from any action or threat of it ‘to worsen the situation in the sovereign (emphasis added) Republic of Cyprus’. Most important, the Resolution asked ‘the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus’. This could certainly be interpreted to mean the ‘constitutional Government of Cyprus’, but from the Turkish Cypriot perspective it was essential to add the word ‘constitutional’ thus respecting the 1960 treaties that established the Constitution. Otherwise the Greek Cypriots could claim to be correct in their view that the Turkish Cypriots had, of their own accord, abandoned their place in government, thus obliging the Greek Cypriot element to govern the island in accordance with the Doctrine of Necessity.74 The ambiguity allowed states to follow the UN in dealing with, and recognizing, the Greek Cypriot government, as having authority over both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. A United Nations Peace Force was established, but in consultation not only with the Guarantor Powers, but also with Cyprus. It did not have the ultimate responsibility for restoring law and order, since that was given to the Government of Cyprus. Also a mediator was to be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Guarantor Powers and Cyprus to recommend a solution for an agreed settlement of the problem. He had to bear in mind ‘the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole’, this denying the Turkish Cypriot (and Turkish) contention that there were two peoples in Cyprus.

Conclusions How far did the UN Security Council meet the needs of those involved? During the negotiations the Greek Cypriots did not have to make much defence of their government’s claim to be the legitimate government of Cyprus, They allowed it just to be quietly assumed, but they celebrated the Security Council Resolution as a substantial victory, as it was to prove. They also valued the fact that any solution had to be in accord with the UN Charter, which they would always claim made the 1960 treaties illegal. Yet they failed, as they knew they would, to have the Treaty of Guarantee abrogated, or referred to the International Court of Justice, but then they could not be certain of victory in that Court. It was a disappointment for them

64 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

that Turkey was not specifically named in the requirement that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus were to be respected. The Turkish response was, somewhat strangely, one of some satisfaction. Nihat Erim, their chief negotiator, naively believed that ‘the Cyprus Government’ meant the constitutional government.75 Also the question of the legitimacy of the Cyprus government did not emerge as a specific concern among Turkish press columnists at the time. Perceptive observers, like Mahmut Dikerdem, a distinguished former ambassador, saw, however, that Cyprus would re-emerge as a factor damaging Turkish-Greek relations and a general distrust of the Greek Cypriots was the dominant theme in other press comments.76 However, they were satisfied that the Greek Cypriots had been obliged to accept an international force in whose composition Turkey had a say. They believed this force would be a check on the violence towards Turkish Cypriots that badly affected Turkish public opinion. Also the 1960 Treaties had not been denied, having been referred to in the preamble to the resolution. This I˙nönü considered very important. The Turks also believed that the Security Council debate and resolution had given valuable publicity to the Turkish Cypriot cause.77 It is nevertheless hard to disagree with those who believed it was a major Turkish diplomatic reverse in that ‘constitutional’ was not prefaced to ‘government’ in the Resolution. The Turkish Government has to be considered as partly responsible for the outcome by not resolutely defending the Turkish Cypriot case. Going further, it has been claimed that Turkey played ‘a significant part in the events that led to the eventual alienation of the Turkish Cypriot community from the apparatus of the Government of Cyprus’.78 Why did the Americans and the British not persist with their draft resolution? At the heart of it, greatly alarming to Bitsios, was the reference to the ‘constitutional’ government of Cyprus. Arguably it would not have been that easy for this to have been rebutted in the Security Council; its rebuttal would have amounted to a denial of a crucial feature of the 1960 treaties, but, as a result of the Clark/Makarios discussions, the British had apparently become convinced that the 1960 Constitution was ‘unworkable’, so was it worth trying to save it? An assertion in the Security Council that the government had to conform to the Constitution might well have brought more moderate Cypriot politicians to the fore. Moreover, as has earlier been stated, the Turkish Cypriots were not averse to some restriction of their rights. Küçük and Denktas¸ had proposed a gentleman’s agreement to this end that Clerides seemed prepared to accept. Unfortunately before the Security Council meeting the United Kingdom had gone some way to accepting in practice the Greek Cypriot government as the Government of Cyprus, for example, referring in February 1964 in the House of Commons to ‘the Cypriot Foreign Minister’ and ‘the Government of Cyprus’.79 The United Kingdom’s position was certainly difficult, though its difficulties stemmed in great part from their High Commissioner first showing sym-

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964 65

pathy for Makarios’s plans to change the Constitution whilst not also consulting with the Turkish Cypriots. The British Government was obviously eager not to invite Greek Cypriot hostility on account of the Sovereign Base Areas and other facilities, and was well aware that a pronounced British role in checking the Greek Cypriots would be held to be a reversion to a desire for colonial domination. Discussion in the Security Council centred on the provision of UN force to keep the peace, not on a solution of the Cyprus problem as such. The prominent participation of the Soviet Union’s Representative prompted much controversy besides on the designs of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was important for Soviet aims to be pro-Greek Cypriot; the Cold War was still being waged.80 It has been suggested that too much can be made of the Security Council’s Resolution, on the grounds that it ‘did not elevate the Greek Cypriot regime to a position which it had not hitherto enjoyed’ and that ever since the Council Resolution, ‘there has been no international disposition (other than in Turkey) to doubt that the Greek Cypriot regime is the legitimate Government of Cyprus’.81 The case is essentially that the British Government, at least, had always treated with Makarios as if his major part of the government was the part that really mattered. That rings true, but the Security Council’s Resolution put an international stamp of approval on the Greek Cypriot government. Anxious to be rid of the increasingly unwelcome burden of policing Cyprus the British Government wanted to have the United States involved. It seems that Washington was encouraged by the United Kingdom to be worried that Cyprus could set Greece and Turkey so much at odds that NATO would be much weakened in the Eastern Mediterranean. ‘In order to bring the United States into the situation as a credible actor, it would have to be presented with a situation serious enough to warrant its involvement. The threat to NATO stability was such a reason’.82 Once involved the United States was therefore concerned about Turkish opposition to a Security Council resolution that ignored the Turkish Cypriot case. Hence the care taken, as related above, to reassure I˙nönü that the reference to the Republic of Cyprus in the Resolution meant the republic as constituted under the 1960 settlement. The British Government perhaps genuinely believed that it was necessary to introduce a peace force to avoid a Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, though in fact, ‘both Greece and Turkey acted with remarkable restraint throughout the crisis’. 83 It is also arguable that the British Government, though deeply worried about the security of its bases in Cyprus, overestimated the Greek Cypriot threat to them. They were not welcome to the Greek Cypriots but, on one view, ‘they were never an overriding issue that soured Anglo-Cypriot relations’.84 Had the British Government been less concerned about its bases and the dangers of a Greek-Turkish conflict, it is conceivable that the United Kingdom would have devoted more effort to

66 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

obtaining a satisfactory deal for the Turkish Cypriots, but shedding responsibility for Cyprus was clearly the vital British concern. The Americans wanted to satisfy Turkish as well as Greek concerns about the Turkish Cypriots, but the Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, believed that the Americans ‘must understand that we saw no, repeat no, alternative compromise to a resolution now under discussion’.85 In the British view, if an issue had been made in the Security Council about the constitutionality of the Greek Cypriot government, the whole question would probably have ended up in the UN General Assembly, where pro-Greek Cypriot sympathy was strong, and which, as the British explained to Washington, ‘was a step which everyone in their senses wished to avoid’.86 One student of the consequences of these intricate negotiations sums them up as follows: Perhaps, above all, the American and the British could passively allow Thant’s plan to go through because the 4 March resolution, unanimously accepted as it eventually was, did not look as if it would really adversely affect whatever plans they themselves had particularly adversely. The servicing of the British Bases in Cyprus depended more on the co-operation of the Greeks than the Turks. Makarios was proving himself to be a figure to be reckoned with in the region – perhaps (provided they were carefully watched) he and his administration were better left in charge. There was some reason to believe that the UN force would prevent further massacring of the Turkish Cypriots. Although this force was not officially a NATO force, it would include contingents from NATO countries and none from the Soviet bloc. A fairly innocuous UN-sponsored mediator could be agreed on. And most importantly … the resolution left the ultimate solution of the Cyprus problem in the hands of the guarantor powers and the two communities. There was not much for the Western Alliance to worry about.87

4 Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967

The extent to which Turkey could rely on the United States as an ally, and the effectiveness of the UN force, were soon to be tested. By June 1964 it was clear that the UN force was unable to do much to stop the violence against the Turkish Cypriots, which continued unabated.1 In their unprotected villages they were still subjected to merciless attacks for the crime only of being Turkish Cypriot. In the enclaves to which most of the population had fled, they barricaded themselves in a makeshift way against the attacks of the well-armed Greek Cypriots, who hemmed them in with defence fortifications and deprived them of all but the barest necessities for their grim and miserable existence. They had armed themselves to an extent against the prospect of violence, and began to receive training from members of the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) and some Turkish army officers from the 650 strong Turkish army unit present under the terms of the 1960 Agreements. The 950 Greek troops allowed under the treaties were soon illegally augmented. In May 1964 the Greek Cypriot government introduced legislation authorizing conscription for the armed forces, without even informing the Turkish Cypriot leader, Küçük. The Turkish National Security Council met in early June and, in view of the continuing violence against the Turkish Cypriots, recommended military intervention. It is reported that even the prudent I˙nönü saw now that there was no option but military intervention if Makarios was to be brought to his senses.2 This was the first time Turkey thought seriously of intervening, and by then it appears that the technical difficulties were at least in part being overcome, and military preparations were on the road to completion.3 However, the cautious I˙nönü saw fit to inform the United States of his intentions the day before the intervention! The intention was to give an opportunity for the United States to exert pressure on Greece and Makarios. However the American response was a great shock to Ankara. In Lyndon Johnson’s notorious letter in reply, couched in very undiplomatic language, he denied that there was a need for Turkey to intervene; he claimed it could result in a war between Greece 67

68 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

and Turkey and could lead to the intervention of the Soviet Union. In addition, the letter pointed out that Turkey’s NATO allies had not yet had a chance to consider whether they had an obligation to protect Turkey in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union.4 The Soviet Union had earlier warned Turkey that it was absolutely against military intervention in Cyprus, repeating a previous Khruschev warning.5 The full story of this rebuff was not immediately made known in Turkey but before long leaks were enough to create deep popular hostility in Turkey to the United States, viewed now as a faithless ally.6 An invitation then from Johnson to I˙nönü to visit the United States did not much help to assuage Turkish pride. In Turkey I˙nönü’s position was far from secure. The Turkish parliament only just passed a vote of confidence in him before he left for the United States. At least in Washington the joint final communiqué obliquely reaffirmed the validity of the London treaties.7

The Acheson and other plans At this juncture the United States turned its attention to other ways of solving the Cyprus problem. Rejecting partition as impracticable, the American Government began to devote its attention to enosis as the solution. Unification with Greece, a NATO ally, would put an end to any Soviet designs on Cyprus. In return for enosis Turkey would have to be compensated. The first step was the difficult one of persuading the Greek Premier, Papandreou, to agree to have some parleying with Ankara. To this end he was invited to Washington. With considerable difficulty he was persuaded that if Greece were to agree to enter into talks with Turkey, Ankara would not refuse. Meetings were arranged between representatives of the two sides in Geneva under UN auspices, but the driving force behind these negotiations was the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Two plans emerged. The first provided for enosis but with a good portion of Cyprus for Turkey large enough for a substantial base and for some of the Turkish Cypriot population. The Karpas peninsula was the obvious area. The remaining Turkish Cypriot population would live in two or three areas with a large measure of local autonomy. An international Commissioner would be appointed to ensure the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, who would also have an administrative entity in Nicosia, though under central authority. It was not double enosis, as often assumed; the Turkish Cypriots were not to form part of the Turkish state. There is some doubt on whether the cession of the Greek island of Kastellorizon was included in the scheme.8 The size of the base area was hotly contested. Greece looked favourably on the plan, but then it appeared in the pro-government newspaper Vima, though Papandreou blamed the Greek Cypriots for the leak. However it was, on 30 July 1964 Makarios seized the opportunity to denounce the plan, its denunciation being all the more

Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967 69

forcible by virtue of the outrage that the plan had been devised behind his back. Papandreou then proposed a conspiracy to declare instant enosis, with the support of the United States and Britain. After a period of some confusion regarding the participation of Grivas, the Americans decided not to proceed further with support for this conspiracy, whose objective, enosis, was apparently not unacceptable to the British. A considerable complication in the situation was the presence of Greek troops in Cyprus; by October 1964 there were reportedly some 20,000 on the island.9 This movement of Greek troops reinforced a growing conviction in Washington and London that the best solution was enosis: the presence of Grivas, who had returned to the island, could mean that the Greek forces might be used to intimidate Makarios into accepting enosis on Greek terms. After Turkey’s rebuff by Lyndon Johnson, and with the importation of troops and arms in large numbers from Greece, the Makarios government was emboldened to intensify the blockade on Turkish Cypriot enclaves and, in August 1964, actually to plan and carry out an attack on villages in the Erenköy (Kokkina) area of Northern Cyprus on the grounds that this was a gateway for the importation of Turkish arms. The situation of the Turkish Cypriot defenders faced with military forces led by Grivas, soon became desperate. Faced with superior military skills, and heavy weaponry the Turkish Cypriot amateurs were forced back into Kokkina. This certain defeat of the Turkish Cypriots produced in retaliation warning flights over the area by Turkish planes. They were followed by powerful and effective Turkish air strikes on the attacking forces made by the Air Force without authorization from I˙nönü. These stopped the Greek/Greek Cypriot attack led by Grivas in its tracks and resulted in heavy Greek and Greek Cypriot casualties, military and civilian. At this point the UN sponsored a cease-fire. The Turkish military were deeply frustrated, especially as the declared aims of forcing the Greeks back to their starting lines and raising the blockade of Turkish Cypriot enclaves were not achieved. They were restrained by I˙nönü. He explained his moderate response to this Greek Cypriot aggression by reference to the need to be wary of international complications and not to get involved in ill-considered adventures. Among his fears was that of the Soviet Union, then a strong supporter of the Makarios government. In fact, Khrushchev now warned I˙nönü against an armed attack, a warning that came after, not before, the air strikes, and made it clear, though after the cease-fire, that in the event of an invasion of Cyprus, the Soviet Union would help Cyprus to defend herself, an intention later modified by more cautious Soviet remarks. The dire events in Cyprus held back discussions in Geneva, but did not stop the development of further plans for intervention that envisaged the removal of Makarios, by the Greek troops on the island, Turkish intervention and the declaration of enosis. Turkey would replace its military contingent

70 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

in Cyprus and might, it was suggested in London, even directly move troops to the Karpas peninsula. The scheme had the support of the British Foreign Office’s Head of the Central Department. It all fell through, mainly because of distrust of Grivas and dispute about what would be left to Turkey.10 In these circumstances in late August 1964 Acheson proposed a second plan. This provided for a smaller Turkish base for a considerable period (50 years) of some 200 square miles. The idea of virtually autonomous Turkish Cypriot regions was abandoned. Instead there would just be in Nicosia a Turkish Cypriot Administrative Office for Turkish Cypriot educational, religious and legal affairs. This would be a effected by a coup d’état. It was accepted at first by Greece, but Turkey made it clear that a temporary base was not acceptable. This was a major setback, but at heart, too, Papandreou did not believe Makarios could be unseated, especially as Grivas was not to be relied upon, and as Cypriot support was important. Despite pressure from President Johnson, the Greeks abandoned the plan. Clerides maintains that the Acheson plan was buried when President Johnson ‘refused to press Turkey to give up the idea of a Turkish base under conditions of sovereignty’.11 The Americans persisted with other plans based on enosis with concessions for Turkey. These at first favoured Greece, but then, finally Turkey. They all came to nothing. At one point in these conspiratorial enterprises the British Government ‘examined sympathetically’ the proposal to make its Dhekelia military base area available to Turkey should that be a decisive contribution to a settlement. The Greek Government supported the idea, but Makarios emphatically rejected it. The enosis with concessions project was taken seriously by the United Kingdom, but the initiative and drive came from the Americans. Basically the British Government did not want to become involved again with Cyprus, especially at a time when the United Kingdom, faced with economic difficulties, was trying to reduce commitments overseas. Essentially, the British Government’s concern was to operate the bases without hindrance from the Greek Cypriot government, but also without antagonizing Turkey, which granted Britain important over-flying rights. They were not as afraid as the Americans of Soviet infiltration into Cyprus, while generally supporting enosis, if that could be achieved. By September 1964 American worries about Cyprus as a second Cuba declined somewhat. The Soviet Union had not followed up the support offered to Makarios. The United States and the United Kingdom were alerted in their fears, however, when at the end of September, a Greek Cypriot delegation headed by the Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, visited Moscow. Yet the tone of the Soviet statement after the lengthy visit was not belligerent. More important was the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Erkin’s, visit to Moscow after the demise of the volatile Khruschev in October 1964. Distrustful now of the United States, Turkey sought to mend relations with

Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967 71

the Soviet Union. There was now, after Khruschev, a more measured response. As a result, the Soviet Union began to talk in terms of the legitimate rights of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and even expressed sympathy for a federal solution. Surprisingly, some support was shown for the validity of treaties. It therefore came as a shock to Turkey, and worrying for the Americans and the British, when, in March 1965, Russian SAM missiles were found to be on the way in a Greek ship from Egypt to Cyprus. They may have been by then outdated weapons, but their presence in Cyprus could provoke Turkey into an unwelcome response. American pressure on NATO ally Greece obliged the consignment to be sent back to Egypt. The UN Mediator’s Report For its own political reasons the Soviet Union was perhaps becoming less critical of the 1960 Accords, but the UN Mediator, Dr Galo Plaza, in his Report on 26 March 1965 showed little sympathy for them. The 1960 Constitution he described as ‘a constitutional oddity’.12 The Report rejected any federal scheme of government and envisaged minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots under the protection of a UN Commissioner. For London, as for Ankara, his view that a settlement ‘had to be consistent with the provisions and principles of the UN Charter’ was worrying.13 Galo Plaza believed that a solution had to be found among the Cypriot people and therefore, ‘as matters stand, between the two main communities’. Yet he then goes on to claim that a new settlement ‘must be capable of satisfying the wishes of the majority of the population, whilst providing for the legitimate rights of all the people’ (para. 126). He asserted that the ‘the Turkish Cypriot community obtained from the Zurich and London Agreements a series of rights greatly superior to those which can realistically be contemplated for it in the future’ (para. 180). Those Turkish Cypriots who did not like this could be assisted to resettle in Turkey. It was the oddest of reports calling, as it did, for the Turkish Cypriots to participate in discussions whose desirable end result, according to Galo Plaza, was their own domination by the Greek Cypriots. Dimitri Bitsios deplored the inaction of the Greek Cypriot government in not appealing to the UN Security Council when Turkey rejected the Report.14 The downgrading of the Turkish Cypriots in the Galo Plaza Report was matched, too, in a decision made against them by the United Kingdom. In March 1965 the British Labour Government was due to pay a final instalment of financial aid to Cyprus of £1.5 m. Despite the vigorous protests of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, it was all paid to the Makarios government. The British Government stated that ‘it attached great importance to maintaining the validity of the 1960 Treaties’, but it was noted that the Makarios government was in de facto control of most of the territory of the Republic. This could be claimed to justify recognition, a political, not a legal act. It is not at all easy, however, to see any justification in the accompanying

72 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

statement: ‘Withdrawal of recognition would almost certainly not advance the Turkish interests and would almost certainly damage them’.15 It was not explained how.

Abrogation of the Constitution Galo Plaza’s Report did not mention the laws the Makarios government was enacting that contravened the basic (unamendable) articles of the 1960 Constitution.16 They were all important. Compulsory military service was introduced, the police force became completely Greek Cypriot, the judicial structure was changed, the separate municipalities were not to be allowed, the Public Service Commission (which regulated the Civil Service) was amended to exclude Turkish Cypriots, and the size of the House of Representatives was changed. The electoral law was also to be changed to abolish separate electoral rolls for each community. This abolished separate representation of Turkish Cypriots in parliament, and their election of the Vice-President. The British Government could see that as a Guarantor Power its position would be very difficult if it wanted to remain on good terms with the Makarios government. It was becoming a central issue as elections for the House of Representatives were due in August 1965. Makarios reportedly said that if the Turkish Cypriots did not co-operate, he would leave them to stagnate until, ‘becoming uncomfortable for economic reasons’, they would come to their senses and negotiate.17 The Turkish Foreign Minister, Erkin, declared in the Turkish Senate that the Turkish Cypriots would not participate in the elections to be held under the new electoral arrangements. London decided to persuade the UN and the Greek Government to try to stop Makarios, since, according to a view expressed in the Foreign Office, if the Turks asked the United Kingdom to participate in a joint protest, it would be difficult to refuse. The British Foreign Secretary received no support from Greece. It is interesting to note that London seemed to believe that what mattered to Ankara was, primarily, the safety of the Turkish Cypriots, not their political equality. Greece still preferred enosis and believed that under a Greek government the Turkish Cypriots would be a satisfied minority. Later, in July 1965, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives began debating the proposed electoral law, which allowed no separate representation for the Turkish Cypriots. On 22 July, through the UN SecretaryGeneral’s Representative in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot members signified that they wished to attend the House of Representatives, and asked the UN for an escort to enable them to do so. The President of the House, Glafkos Clerides, told them that there was no objection to their attending, but that there were three conditions. First, they must agree to attend all future meetings, not just this one. Second, the Turkish Cypriot deputies must accept all

Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967 73

legislation, and must apply it to the areas under their control. Third, their participation in the House would be regarded as implying their recognition of the present government, though they would not have to make a statement to that effect. Clerides added that it had to be understood that the provision in Article 78 of the Constitution concerning separate voting majorities had been abolished and every member of the House would have one vote for all decisions. When Clerides met with the delegation of Turkish Cypriot members he stated that the constitutional provisions concerning promulgation of the laws by the President and Vice-President were no longer applicable. In fact, he stated that any extension of office granted to members attending the House would not apply to the Vice-President or to ministers. They would not be allowed to resume their positions in government. The Turkish Cypriots objected that the conditions laid down by Clerides would eliminate the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriot members, and of their community. They decided that they could not resume their places in the House of Representatives under these conditions. There is no mention of these important events in Clerides’ memoirs. The Greek Cypriot contention was that the Turkish Cypriots, by their prolonged absence from the sessions of the House and other actions, had allowed their mandates to lapse. In this regard it has, however, to be mentioned that in January 1965 the Turkish Cypriot members of the House discussed with Clerides the issue of their attendance, but by July the House had not met to consider it. (The meeting arose with regard to the designation of a Cyprus delegation to the Council of Europe).18 International repercussions When the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires in London complained about the proposed legislation, the British Government, on the advice of its High Commissioner in Cyprus, Sir David Hunt, delivered a protest to Makarios. It made no reference to the 1960 Treaties, but instead to the Security Council’s resolutions confirming Resolution 186. The Turkish Chargé d’Affaires had been told that any alteration in the existing treaties could only come about by mutual agreement, and the British Government were therefore opposed to any attempt to alter the existing constitutional position unilaterally.19 Despite British objections very clearly expressed to Makarios, on 23 July 1965 the House of Representatives approved the legislation. Dr Küçük protested strongly to U Thant, and the British Government duly delivered its formal protest. In the British protest there was again no mention of the 1960 Treaties. In its dealings with the Greek Cypriots the British Government was treating the matter of Cyprus as a UN affair, whilst seeming to reassure the Turkish Cypriots in terms of the 1960 Treaties. The British protest was described by Makarios as ‘interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus’, and was therefore rejected, as was a later and stronger Turkish protest. Makarios protested that Resolution 186 had nothing to do with the

74 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

matter of the legislation and was directed to the problem of violence. As for the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, it was simply not valid, since it conflicted with the principles of the United Nations.20 Greece also objected to the Greek Cypriot government’s actions, but its own government was at the time in some considerable disarray, as Makarios was well aware. Makarios asked the British High Commissioner what he was to do. ‘The Constitution is unworkable, and you say we cannot alter it and get on to a proper legal basis because the Turks will stop us.’21 The response of the Turkish Government to the rejection of their protest was to invite Greece and the United Kingdom for consultation under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. The United Kingdom and Greece refused. The British Government was afraid of difficulties with Makarios if it agreed to a meeting of the Guarantor Powers, having been advised by Hunt that to do so would increase tension on the island, more than would be the case if there were a meeting of the Security Council on the matter. The United Kingdom and the United States even asked Turkey not to call for a meeting of the Security Council, a request that ‘infuriated both the Turkish government and the Turkish people’.22 Only fear of direct Turkish intervention modified their attitudes. The fear of the consequences, if Makarios was effectively opposed, was either very great (at a time, however, when the Soviet Union was less of a threat in Cyprus, it has to be noted) or, as Turkish observers normally maintain, the United Kingdom and the United States were simply more pro-Greek than pro-Turkish. The new Labour government in power in Britain was certainly more generally pro-Greek than the previous Conservative government, a factor that may account for its stolid defence of British policy in the House of Commons at the time. In the House of Commons the British Government refused, despite considerable pressure, to take the matter to the Security Council, though Turkey anyway proceeded to do so. The British Government’s tactics in the parliamentary debates, which took place in July 1965, were not to express any view as to whether the British government considered the de facto Cyprus government to be constitutional or not. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, said that it was ‘the view of Her Majesty’s Government that it is desirable, until the Cyprus Treaties can be altered by mutual agreement, that the organs of the Cyprus Government should function constitutionally’. That the government was not functioning constitutionally was, clearly, for the British government, not of crucial significance, not enough certainly, to withhold recognition. In reply to a question about the unconstitutional absence of Turkish Cypriots in the government of Cyprus he said, ‘The [UN] Secretary-General has called on all sides to exercise the utmost restraint. We have joined in those representations and I have nothing further to say’. He also stonewalled when asked why there were 10,000 Greek troops in Cyprus in contravention of the

Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967 75

Treaty of Guarantee. He referred to the need not to increase tension in the island, thus reflecting an assessment made by Sir David Hunt in Nicosia.23 The reality behind all this, it has been suggested, was that ‘instead of approaching the Security Council themselves, as a Guarantor Power, they [the British Government] were hoping to let the matter of the fate of the Turkish Cypriots be “shuffled off” into the less public domain of the discussions going on between the various parties involved in the UN pacification process’.24 Makarios was partly encouraged in his bold and decisive actions by the fact that the Greek government had just collapsed, freeing him from pressure from that quarter. This also made it easier for the United Kingdom to refuse a meeting of the Guarantor Powers, a meeting that Sir David Hunt anyway thought would be most damaging. ‘We are already suffering from the revival of the charge that we form a united front with the Turks’.25 Again, this showed the great sensitiveness towards the Greek Cypriots previously evinced by Sir Alec Douglas Home. An American proposal that Makarios’s action should be referred to the International Court of Justice was not well received in London. The Foreign Office thought this might raise the whole question of the validity of the 1960 treaties. If the treaties were held to be invalid ‘the British position in the retained sites and the general use of defence facilities in Cyprus would be undermined’.26 On 30 July 1965 the Turkish Government took the matter to the Security Council stressing how in its view the legislation was ‘in flagrant violation of solemn international agreements’. The next day the Greek Cypriots asked for a meeting of the Security Council on the grounds of Turkish interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. The Council meetings were held on 3, 5 and 10 August. The Security Council At the meeting on 10 August Turkey pressed the case for the Guarantor Powers to hold consultations to restore the state of affairs that was set up in 1960, but the Makarios government claimed there was no need as it was the internationally recognized government of Cyprus. The British Ambassador had been told on 2 August what the British approach should be. ‘Our tactics in the forthcoming Security Council debate must be to do what we can to meet minimum Turkish expectations while avoiding an open breach with the Cyprus Government.’27 He was also advised a little later as follows: ‘As regards the Turkish request that we should underline the unconstitutional composition of the present Cyprus Government, you should not express any view as to whether HM Government consider the present de facto Cyprus Government to be constitutional or not. But you may say that it has always been the view of HMG that it is desirable until the Cyprus Treaties can be altered by mutual agreement that the organs of the Cyprus Government should function constitutionally.’28 (No penalty

76 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

was suggested, however, for not doing so). The United Kingdom insisted that the recent Greek Cypriot legislation was in conflict with the Security Council resolutions, not with the 1960 Accords, The United States went along with the British view, asking for respect for Article 1 of Resolution 186, which called for no ‘action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus’. Reference was also made to Article 3, which called upon ‘the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint’. The Council opted for a tepid and ineffectual compromise prescription, which reaffirmed Resolution 186 and called upon all parties to avoid any action likely to worsen the situation.29 This could be seen as a mild reproof for the Greek Cypriots, but they were allowed to get away with their unconstitutional legislation, and the Turkish members of the House of Representatives had been prevented from resuming their seats. Again, as in 1964, the Turkish Government found it could do little at the UN Security Council for the Turkish Cypriots. There was one gleam of light, however, for Turkey. At least, the United Kingdom and the United States had still asserted the validity of the 1960 Treaties, and, a new development, the Russian representative had made no attempt to defend the Greek Cypriot position. The Turkish representative at a CENTO meeting in September claimed, rather optimistically perhaps, that ‘the Security Council debate had a deterrent effect on Cyprus’ and had been a salutary exercise.30 More important was a Soviet-Turkish joint communiqué on talks between the Turkish Prime Minister and the Soviet Government held in Moscow. The Soviet Union reiterated its now more pro-Turkish views on Cyprus, emphasizing the presence of two ‘communities’ on the island, much to the chagrin of the Greek Cypriots. The First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Nicosia privately gave as his opinion that ‘when the chips were down, Turkey was more important to Russia for historical and strategic reasons, than Greece and Cyprus put together’.31 There was another meeting of the Security Council in November 1965 to consider the serious incident in Famagusta that had occurred on 2 November. The violence that occurred was the result of the building of fortifications around the Turkish Cypriot enclave by General Grivas. In appealing to the Security Council Turkey hoped that the Greek Cypriots would be obliged to surrender their gains and relinquish their positions to the UN peacekeeping force. After some delay the Council avoided making a resolution, but instead issued a ‘consensus’ that called for the moderation and co-operation of all parties. The Americans, and the UN Special Representative in Cyprus were appalled at this feeble result. The UN General Assembly The changed attitude of the Soviet Union had not helped Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in the Security Council. Nor was it going to help them be

Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967 77

saved from a damaging resolution passed at the twentieth session of the UN General Assembly, which treated the Plaza Report as an authoritative document. The Resolution made on 18 December by the General Assembly after a long debate took cognizance of the fact that ‘in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [the Republic of Cyprus] is entitled to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference’.32 It has been described as ‘an endorsement of the recognition provided by Security Council Resolution 186’.33 Given the large number of abstentions this is open to some doubt. It was significant that the Resolution began by ‘recalling the parts of the Declaration adopted on 10 October 1964 by the Second Conference of the Heads of State of the Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo regarding the question of Cyprus’. The wording of that Declaration was repeated almost verbatim in the UN General Assembly Resolution. In addition, the Resolution noted (presumably with approval) that the Government of Cyprus had declared its commitment to human rights and to minority rights, so providing the Makarios government with support for its policy of regarding the Turkish Cypriots as a minority, not as a partner. It is interesting in this respect that the 1964 Cairo NAM conference, many of whose members had minority problems, ‘considered that one of the causes of international tension lies in the problem of divided nations’. Their policy was generally to repress minorities rather than seek to share power and authority with them. The Cairo conference had urged the elimination of foreign bases, but the British Government was at least spared this in the UN Resolution, in which there was no mention of the 1960 Treaties. At least they were not denied. In the Commonwealth Relations Office one official noted that for the United Kingdom ‘the existing uneasy balance in Cyprus had suited her basic objectives better than any alternative within her reach’.34 The UN response to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot outrage at what they regarded as the abrogation of the 1960 Constitution was regarded in Turkey as a crushing, if unavoidable, defeat for Turkish diplomacy, which was to exaggerate its importance. The virtual denial of Turkey’s rights of intervention was particularly resented. It tended to confirm the observation that by February 1965 the ‘I˙nönü government had come to terms with the fact that Greece informally controlled Cyprus’.35 In February 1965 I˙nönü, now aged 80, resigned as head of a shaky coalition government. Until October of that year, when Süleyman Demirel came to power as head of the centreright Justice Party, Turkey was ruled by a caretaker cabinet under a former diplomat, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü. Turkey thus had to face the Cyprus crisis when its government was at its least decisive since the overthrow of the Menderes government in 1960. The military was still important, but had declined in popularity and political importance by 1965. Moreover, the constitutional developments in Cyprus in l965 were not of the sort to

78 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

call for military, but for political, weight in the management of Turkish affairs. In Turkey the previous I˙nönü Government, and the Ürgüplü coalition government, were blamed for inaction. Why had Turkey not taken a firmer line with Makarios from the beginning? Why was Turkey not really ready to intervene militarily in 1964? What were the contents of the Johnson letter? [Not revealed until 1966]. Hindsight showed, it was claimed, that the 1960 Accords were a disaster. Partition was the only way. The Foreign Office’s diplomatic trio of Sarper, Erim and Erkin were criticized in the press for their lack of firmness in dealing with Makarios. Denktas¸ reports that one of the diplomats accompanying the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Sabri Çag˘layangil, to New York chastized previous Turkish diplomacy for burying its head in the sand, even letting Makarios get Muslim states on his side. Also, Turkey was said to have been mistaken in seeing the Cyprus conflict as one to be settled between Turkey and Greece, since this only invited interference by the West. The Cyprus problem began in Cyprus and should have been finished in Cyprus, but not understanding this Turkey turned to intermediaries. It thus brought the present result upon itself.36 For his part Çag˘layangil criticized the United Kingdom for being not just passive, but pro-Greek Cypriot, thus effectively prohibiting necessary Turkish action to restore the position as required by the 1960 treaties, of which the United Kingdom, too, was a Guarantor Power. Any further aggression against the Turkish Cypriots would be resisted and faits accomplis would not be accepted. He went on to state that only a federal solution was acceptable, and certainly not enosis. However, this did not quite match Demirel’s generally very cautious and flexible approach.37 Moreover, when he gave an interview to Denktas¸ and Osman Örek (25 December) Çag ˘layangil did not give the impression that Turkey’s policy was going to be more dynamic. In Cyprus, although worried by criticism from Greek officers, Makarios was in the ascendant. He was confident of being able to dominate Cypriot politics, and satisfied in the thought that the Turkish Cypriots would eventually succumb. Those in the enclaves were suffering economically under the Greek Cypriot embargoes on essential materials, and could notice that many of those outside under Greek Cypriot control were profiting from the now booming Greek Cypriot economy. If only to stop the Turkish Cypriots from being worn down Ankara badly wanted negotiations for a solution. An aide-mémoire from Çag˘layangil, addressed to the United Kingdom and the United States, called for foreign support to allow the Turkish Cypriots to live as freely and fully as the Greek Cypriots, and to remove the ‘inhuman restrictions’ placed upon them. There was threat in the aide-mémoire that if Makarios did not respond by easing restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey would herself take measures to do so. This was alarming. The Americans believed that conditions were not as bad as claimed, that the

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Turkish Cypriots were in part responsible for their plight, pointing to the refusal of the Turkish Cypriots to return to their offices in government in 1964.38 London and Washington dissuaded Ankara from proceeding further along this dangerous path. Later there was more provocation by Makarios for the Turkish Cypriots. The Makarios government began to make appointments to government departments and to important diplomatic posts that, under the 1960 arrangements, were to be filled by Turkish Cypriots. Of these the Ministry of Defence was the most important, its tenure by a Turkish Cypriot having been established in the Constitution. (Greek Cypriots had temporarily held these posts since 1963.) Vice-President Küçük proposed to veto these appointments, in accordance with his rights under the Constitution. If he did so, the United Kingdom as a Guarantor Power, would be expected to support him. To avoid this difficulty, and probable repercussions on its position in Cyprus, the British Government persuaded Turkey to use its influence over Küçük not to use his veto. Ankara obliged. A British protest was delivered to the Greek Cypriot government, but it was predictably rejected on the grounds that it was an internal Cyprus matter. In July 1966 Greek Cypriot legislation extending the terms of office of the Greek Cypriot government was passed with no comment forthcoming from the British Government. Makarios again rejected in the usual terms a protest made by Turkey that reinforced a protest made by Küçük.

Greek-Turkish relations and the Greek military coup In the summer of 1966 surprisingly Athens and Ankara overcame their tensions to re-engage in a secret dialogue on the Cyprus issue. It appears that discussions yet again centred on enosis with compensation for Turkey in the form of a sovereign or leased base. Two new proposals surfaced during the negotiations. One was that enosis might take the form of a federation, or commonwealth. The second was that the British base at Dhekelia might be transferred, or leased, to Turkey. The King of Greece approached the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, directly about Dhekelia. The British Government was prepared to examine the idea most sympathetically provided all the other parties considered it acceptable. Nothing came of the secret dialogue, which Makarios soon knew about, and detested, and did his best to nullify. His worries about an unfavourable conclusion to the secret dialogue were put in abeyance when, in December 1966, the weak Greek Government collapsed, and Turkey would not, at first, talk with the still weaker caretaker government that took its place. Makarios was also reassured about his own position in Cyprus especially vis-à-vis the powerful Greek forces gathering in the island, when on 30 November he received a consignment of weapons from Czechoslovakia. The Greek Government told Makarios to hand the cases of weapons over to

80 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

the Greek army in Cyprus. They were eventually handed over, but according to Clerides, they had already been opened and their contents distributed to Makarios’s National Guard and other supporters. As for the secret dialogue, it would be seen that it had only come, after all, to a temporary halt. The Turkish Government agreed to its resumption, having heard of continuing Greek and American interest. An important factor was that in Greece in April 1967 there was a very short period of right-wing party rule, followed by a military junta led by Colonel Papadopoulos. This political change in Greece, whilst offending against western democratic principles, was not altogether unwelcome in that it suggested that Greece might now control Makarios, which for the most part it had been unable to do. The new military government was also, allegedly, fully in charge of Grivas, now back in Cyprus. The Greek coup and junta rule was a great encouragement to Greek Cypriots devoted to enosis, on which Makarios, with perhaps even a majority, was now believed to be less than enthusiastic, despite always proclaiming it as the ultimate goal. In June 1967, under mainland pressure, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives unanimously demanded immediate enosis. Even the left, who feared it most, voted for it. There were to be no concessions to Turkey for its realization. In August Papadopoulos visited Makarios. After long discussions with him Papadopoulos declared that enosis was ‘the only just and historically acceptable solution for Cyprus’.39 Doubts he might have, but Makarios was apparently to swallow them in return for recognition that he was the accepted leader of the Greek Cypriots, though he was not to contradict policy laid down in Athens. Underneath lay the unexpressed threat that he might otherwise be overthrown. In response to Papadopoulos’s apparent determination to bring about enosis the Turkish Foreign Minister, Çag˘layangil, declared that Turkey would never accept a solution based on enosis. This was a harsh statement considering that enosis with concessions had at least been discussed, if not accepted, by Turkey in the recent past. It did not take into account that, surprisingly perhaps, the Junta, influenced by King Constantine, on whom they relied for some degree of legitimacy, were prepared to make concessions to Turkey in return for enosis. Moreover, with Greek public opinion firmly under control they were in a position to offer greater concessions than hitherto had been acceptable. Also they could control Makarios to a far greater degree. It was a promising scenario, but it surprisingly ended in failure. On 29 August the Turkish Government agreed that the Greek Prime Minister appointed by the Junta, Constantine Kollias, should meet with the Turkish Prime Minister, Demirel on the Greek-Turkish border at Evros. The meeting (the Kes¸an-Dedeag˘aç Negotiations) has come to be known to the Greek Cypriots as the Evros Fiasco, it being so described by Clerides. ‘It was an embarrassing fiasco; it revealed to Turkey the inexperience, the

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clumsiness and the naiveness of the Greek colonels … Mr Küneralp of the Turkish Foreign Ministry described it as the biggest farce he had ever witnessed’.40 The Greek side seemed to believe that Turkey was really interested in enosis with concessions, and seem not to have paid heed to Çag˘layangil’s recent public rejection of it. According to Çag ˘layangil, ‘Constantine Kallias offered Turkey full sovereignty over the Dhekelia base in exchange for enosis’.41 Demirel rejected it: Turkey could not accept enosis. Turkey wanted to discuss federation, or a cantonal regime in Cyprus, or a Greek-Turkish condominium. Earlier in the year a Turkish Foreign Office spokesman is reported as declaring that Turkey’s approach to the Cyprus issue embraced the following four principles. 1. The island could not unilaterally be joined to another state. 2. The international agreements on Cyprus could not be unilaterally annulled or changed. 3. There is no question of allowing one community to come under the rule of the other. 4. The balance established between Greece and Turkey by the Lausanne Treaty cannot be destroyed in favour of one party.42 In line with these principles the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, explained his views in a press conference after the meeting with his Greek counterpart. He claimed that the problem was that Greece could not see any solution to the Cyprus problem unless it started with enosis. Turkey could not accept any solution that did not satisfy both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. ‘We have always to bear in mind’, he said, ‘when seeking a solution, both historic rights and Turkey’s security concerns. Others have their rights too, but both sides have to take into account the lessons of history, and they must both act with caution, seeking a peaceful road to a solution. Otherwise, we give in to emotion, or passion, and then there is no choice but to turn the issue into a merciless struggle’.43 On his return to Athens the Greek Prime Minister, Kollias, also emphasized the need for a peaceful solution. Greek views, he said, were in accord with international principles and with Hellenism. Both sides were sincere. Neither wanted a war over Cyprus, but the Greek Government could not abandon enosis. Turkey now rejected enosis, but yet had not in the past absolutely ruled it out with a base for Turkey. Why now this negative approach? Çag˘layangil’s recent, and seemingly absolute, rejection of enosis was a new development. Perhaps the best explanation is that Turkey was afraid that its new improved relations with the Soviet Union would be jeopardized by the support of enosis, which was a solution least acceptable to Moscow.44 The only way forward now appeared to be some modification of the Cypriot polity

82 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

to give more freedom to the Turkish Cypriots, if short of partition. In a press conference Demirel said that the security, rights and interests of Turkey’s compatriots in Cyprus would definitely be defended. Others blamed Nihat Erim for having been engaged in the enosis or double enosis talks under Acheson and similar plans. Others argued that Turkey was being pushed into directions that suited foreign powers’ interests, not her own. The dominant view was that what was really needed in Cyprus was a federal system, neither enosis nor partition. There was a new mood abroad in Turkey. Denktas¸’s brief return to Cyprus It was not enough for Rauf Denktas¸. In exile in Ankara he was foremost in deploring the occupation of Cyprus by some 22,000 Greek troops. Why had Turkey allowed this utter disregard of the 1960 treaties? Turkey had surely missed the opportunity to match this incursion by augmenting its own forces in Cyprus. It was good that Turkey’s policy was apparently for a federation, but how could it be achieved? It was at this juncture, with the Turkish Cypriots under great threat from the large numbers of Greek troops, many led by Grivas, that Denktas¸ returned surreptitiously to Cyprus to judge the situation for himself. After his appearance at the important UN Security Council meeting in March 1964 he had been banned from Cyprus on threat of prosecution as a ‘rebel’. He and two companions landed safely, but had the misfortune to be detected and arrested before they could reach the safety of a Turkish Cypriot enclave. With the intervention of Clerides he was allowed to return to Turkey. It was generally agreed that he would have added strength to the leadership of Küçük, though whether this altogether suited the Turkish Government is open to question. He was something of a thorn in the flesh to the government in Ankara, but better in Ankara perhaps than in Cyprus. The Turkish Government denied that it had sent him to Cyprus, which was the truth. Çag˘layangil disapproved of the venture when he heard about it, but did not upbraid Denktas¸ on his return. It would have been difficult to take him to task if only because of the large public demonstrations that accompanied his return. Catching international headlines was all good publicity for the Turkish Cypriot cause. Realizing this, the Greek Cypriot Government did not treat him badly and returned him by plane to Istanbul.45

The 1967 crisis The demonstration of Turkish public opinion was impressive, but if Turkey was to give vent to a more self-interested, and aggressive, policy over Cyprus what was needed was a jolt. It came on 15 November 1967 when Greek Cypriot police tried to ‘inspect’ Ayios Theodoros (Bog˘aziçi) allegedly

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to prevent blocking of the road from Nicosia to Limassol. The incident arising from this was used to justify a serious planned attack on this and another nearby Turkish Cypriot village, Kophinou (Geçitkale). The incident was the largest and most important of a number that had occurred since 1964. It arose from the refusal of the Turkish Cypriot ‘fighters’ to allow Greek Cypriot police patrols through the edge of the Turkish part of the mixed village in order to reach the bridge that crossed the river bed dividing the village into Greek and Turkish Cypriot sectors. According to Clerides, the Greek Cypriot Defence Council was deeply concerned that the very active Turkish Cypriot fighters in the area, who held high ground above Kophinou, were attempting to isolate Ayios Theodoros and encourage its abandonment by its Greek Cypriot inhabitants. The way would then be open for the fighters to create a new enclave. This was dangerous because it would control the major Nicosia to Limassol road. The Turkish Government denied that there was any intention to create a new enclave. On 21 October, the Political Adviser to the UN, Remy Gorgé, advised the Makarios government to write to the UN authorities informing them that police patrols would be recommencing on 2 November, and that ‘we expected the support of the UN, but that in any case we would recommence patrols even without such support’.46 Makarios agreed such a letter should be sent. The Defence Council then met on 30 October and [without any reference to the UN] drew up plans for the forceful resumption of policing, plans that included the use of heavy weapons. Then, again according to Clerides, Grivas was requested to ask for the permission of the Greek Government to the operation, which would be the responsibility of both the Cyprus government and that of Greece. The Greek Government was reported by Grivas to have approved the operation, including the use of artillery and armoured cars.47 The Greek High Command, it is reported, fixed the date for the 12 November, or failing that, two days later. On 27 October U Thant called upon Turkey to co-operate with the UN authorities. This was the crux of the matter. The UN accepted the Greek Cypriot request that UNFICYP should provide protection for the Greek Cypriot police in their projected patrol to Ayios Theodoros and agreed on 4 November as a starting date. In Turkish eyes this UN decision was tantamount to taking sides in the dispute. Yet the Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia, Ercüment Yavuzalp, believed that the issue was relatively unimportant, and should be left alone to be resolved step by step in less troubled times. Yavuzalp called on Ankara not to disturb the status quo and to adopt a more flexible policy. At first Ankara found this approach appropriate, but later at the end of their reply to one of his despatches pointed out, ‘probably on the insistence of the military’, that the position in Larnaca, which had resulted from inaction had first to be restored.48 For the Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, inaction or delay over the policing patrols would result in a fait accompli and would lead to a drastic loss of confidence among the

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Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Ayios Theodhoros, and the feared abandonment of their village. Despite Yavuzalp’s frequent despatches to Ankara Turkish policy remained resolute, if not stubborn, and sought to attach to any concession over these villages retribution for recent setbacks in Larnaca, where the Turkish Cypriots had been obliged to give up some defensive positions.49 Both sides realized the importance of control of the area for the domination of the Nicosia/Limassol road. It is claimed by Brigadier Michael Harbottle, the UN Chief of Staff, and supported by other sources, that late in the day ‘the Turks were prepared to reconsider their stand and to accept the proposed timetable’.50 The Greek Cypriot and the Greek governments were determined to go ahead. Grivas needed no prompting. At the last moment the UN detachment around the villages was asked to escort a police patrol across the bridge into Ayios Theodoros. If they chose not to do so, the National Guard would escort the police patrol. The local UNFICYP commander refused the request. It could only come from the Minister of the Interior, as Harbottle points out, and no such request had been made. The UN’s earlier agreement to escort the police patrols was general in nature, and could hardly be considered authority for a particular patrol at a particular time. The National Guard was well prepared for trouble. The first two patrols passed without incident, but the Turkish Cypriots fired upon a third escorted patrol. This was considered enough by Grivas, with his vastly superior numbers and heavy weapons, to launch an all-out determined attack on the Turkish Cypriot positions. His troops soon occupied Ayios Theodoros, and overwhelmed the Turkish Cypriot positions above Kophinou. Then Grivas decided, on his own initiative, to attack and devastate the village of Kophinou itself, a purely civilian target, which suffered very severe damage. All told the Turkish Cypriot casualties were 27 killed and nine seriously wounded against the death of one National Guard soldier. This tragedy occurred because the Greek Cypriots and Greece were determined to hold on to Ayios Theodoros, and the Turkish Government, influenced, it seems, by the military were equally determined not to give way, and only indicated it might do so a day before the attack. When planning the attack the Greek Cypriots feared there would be air strikes by the Turkish Air Force, but in the event these were called off as the National Guard very soon withdrew from the villages. Instead there were numerous and impressive air sorties over Cyprus. This heartened the Turkish Cypriots while the Greek Cypriots were proclaiming their action as a great military victory in the press. Clerides would have preferred it to have been shown as a minor incident. Turkey prepares to intervene In Turkey the Government did not react immediately and once the fighting had died down did not seem to want to take further action. Air strikes were

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called off, but public opinion, as expressed in the press and by large demonstrations, was outraged. The Turkish President, Cevdet Sunay, said that ‘Turkey would solve the Cyprus problem once and for all, from the roots up’.51 In response to popular protest the Government considered plans for military intervention, though I˙nönü privately warned Demirel against it. Demirel was not unimpressed, but decided to go ahead. I˙nönü loyally announced after this meeting with Demirel that he supported the Government.52 Meanwhile the Demirel Government was being widely criticized for inaction as large crowds in the cities called for military intervention.53 Also the temperature in the Grand National Assembly was reaching boiling point. There was much underlying resentment at having been prevented by the United States from resolute action in 1964. With public opinion aflame, parliament voted to intervene militarily in Cyprus with only two against and one abstention. There were also hawks in Demirel’s cabinet to counteract the strong inclination of Demirel and Çag ˘layangil to find a peaceful road to a solution. Some sections of the military, notably the Air Force were also strongly in favour of military action. The military commanders soon came to realize, nevertheless, that they were short of equipment, particularly landing craft, and even had little knowledge of water depths around the Cyprus coast. They had not properly learned the lessons of 1964, and would have had to use ferry-boats and other craft to land their troops against a very large number, probably some 30,000, of trained and tough Greek and Greek Cypriot troops. Demirel and Çag ˘layangil were deeply worried about the consequences of failure, against which I˙nönü had warned them. Turkey had turned a blind eye to the buildup of Greek troops, not wishing to oppose the Americans, for whom, as has been seen, enosis was the real solution to the Cyprus problem provided Turkish interests were satisfied. Under considerable pressure the Turkish Government ordered preparations for military intervention in Cyprus to go ahead, and presented the Greek Junta with a demarche that was not quite an ultimatum, demanding as follows: 1. The immediate recall to Greece of General Grivas. 2. The withdrawal of an estimated 12,000 troops in excess of the 950 strong detachment provided for under the 1960 Accords. 3. Compensation for the Turkish Cypriot victims of the recent attack on the two villages. 4. Relaxation of restrictions on Turkish Cypriots living in the enclaves. 5. Guarantees against any further assaults on the Turkish Cypriots.54 Five days later the Greek Junta rejected the Turkish note. In the meantime Turkish military preparations for a landing on Cyprus were gathering momentum.

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The United States brokers a deal Worried by these developments the UN Secretary-General sent Jose RolzBennett, his Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, to the region to promote concord, whilst the NATO Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio, also sought to mediate. President Johnson, alarmed at the prospect of a Greek-Turkish war, did not on this occasion warn Turkey against it, as he had in 1964. His letter had had serious repercussions, prompting the new Turkish–Soviet accord. He now appointed Cyrus Vance, a former Deputy Secretary for Defence, as his emissary with instructions to stop the threatened war. There was not much time. The date fixed by Ankara for the military intervention was 25 November. Vance first tackled Ankara, where the American Ambassador, Parker T. Hart was urging restraint and moderation. Ankara agreed not to attack as long as Vance was in the region trying to forge an agreement. His tactic was to obtain agreement on a number of points first from Ankara and Athens and then to present the result to Makarios, who would be isolated and universally condemned if he rejected it. It was agreed that first the UN Secretary-General should make an appeal to both Greece and Turkey to find a way out of the conflict. This appeal would soften the blow for Greece, which would have to satisfy Turkey by removing its troops from Cyprus. Secondly, in his appeal the Secretary-General would ask both sides to take steps immediately to remove any threat to each other and to Cyprus. The third item in the appeal would be for the simultaneous withdrawal by Greece and Turkey of troops in excess of those allowed under the 1960 Accords. With this appeal the Turkish military operation would be stood down. The UN Secretary-General’s appeal was somewhat one-sided. It made a call for the withdrawal of all forces in excess of their contingents, but this essentially referred to the Greek forces, since, as everyone was aware, they numbered some 20,000, whereas there were only at most a few hundred extra Turkish military personnel on the island. Also there was no specific call for Turkey to stand down its forces poised for action. That this dismantling of its forces had to proceed at the same time as the withdrawal of the Greek forces from Cyprus was the crucial point in the negotiations. The face-saver for Greece was that, at its request, the fact that the contingents were authorized by the 1960 treaties was not mentioned. Also, only later was there mention of expanding the UN Forces in Cyprus. The proposal for the withdrawal of Greek troops from Cyprus did turn out to be the major item in the final agreement. However, the National Guard, which under Grivas, had carried out the attacks on the villages, was not disbanded. In sum the agreement was a partial victory for Turkey. For the future it was very important that there would be fewer Greek troops on Cyprus, though still some numbers remained as officers in the National Guard. Any future threat of Turkish military intervention would be more credible than

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in 1967, when the only significant military advantage for Turkey lay in its air power. Turkish reactions From some quarters in Turkey there was sharp criticism of the way the crisis had been handled, and of Turkish policy before the crisis. Amongst those critical of the Government was Rauf Denktas¸, frustrated in his exile in Ankara. It had worried him all along that with an army in Cyprus Greece would be able to declare, with some verisimilitude, that enosis had been achieved. Under pressure from the United States, and fearful of communism and Soviet influence in Cyprus, Turkey had allowed this to happen. What about the 1960 Accords that forbade enosis? The Greek army was in a position to achieve enosis without strife. In Cyprus the Greek military were threatening those Greek Cypriots who were against enosis. They could pursue this course because they believed that Turkey was very hesitant about intervening. If the Greek Government believed that Turkey would intervene, it would not have sent its troops to Cyprus. According to Denktas¸ the situation now, after the return of Greek troops, had reverted to that of 1963. Makarios would now press on with his policy of economic pressure on the Turkish enclaves, hoping to wear them down. It might be added here, that the Turkish Cypriots who were not in the enclaves were prospering from the economic development of the Greek Cypriot state that was now proceeding apace. Also a number of Turkish Cypriots (said to be some 10,000 in 1974) were working outside the enclaves for Greek Cypriot employers. The economic prosperity of the Greek Cypriot state stood out in marked contrast with their own miserable economic and social situation. The £10m. annual grant from the Turkish Government did not go far, especially as a good part of it was in military materials and for the relief of refugees. Those Turkish Cypriots who had fled to the enclaves to escape the violence to which they were subject could no longer till more than a fraction of their land. Yet those Turkish Cypriots outside the enclaves were not seduced into complete acquiescence. In their ambiguous situation, living under the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriot government ‘they also recognized the authority of, and gave allegiance to, those institutions that operated in the Turkish areas; for example all Turkish Cypriot young men, wherever they may have lived, served in the Turkish Cypriot conscript army’.55 To return to Turkish foreign policy, another Turkish critic, Behice Boran, a Socialist Party deputy, accused the Government of not recognizing that the man aim of the United States and of NATO was enosis and that nothing good could be expected by Turkey from either. Another, and more academic, critic, Haluk Ülman, accepted that the Government’s strong stance had paid off internationally, and had shown how weak

88 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Greece really was. Yet to call for the so-called independence of Cyprus, and for the removal of Greek troops, with no guarantee that they would not return, was not enough. The recent show of force had been a last-minute affair. It did not constitute a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem. Nihat Erim pointed out that nothing had been done to relieve the situation of the Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves. Nor had any progress been made towards amending the 1960 Constitution. Yet, as Erim knew only too well, Turkish governments had inevitably accorded primacy to its international policies, having to give first attention to their relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Cyprus had to be made to fit in with the demands of international diplomacy.56 For the most part, however, the Turkish parliament and press were supportive of the government. The withdrawal from Cyprus of the Greek troops was played up as a great achievement, despite the fact that over earlier years Turkey had not objected to their presence. There was of course considerable disquiet that the National Guard had not been disbanded, that there was no compensation for the Turkish Cypriot victims of the violence, and that nothing had been immediately achieved for the strengthening of the UN force. Makarios was considered by some to be the winner, especially as it was realized that he was glad to be rid of Grivas and the Greek troops. Yet most important in Turkish public opinion was that on this occasion the United States had not sent a warning note to Turkey. At least on this occasion the United States had used its influence to stop a Greek-Turkish war without causing offence. Consequences for Cyprus In Cyprus there had been no commitment to ease the burdens on the Turkish Cypriots in their enclaves. Before the crisis some movement had been observed in this regard and after the crisis the Makarios government removed more restrictions, though it was not until the following year that major changes were made for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots. Whilst Makarios was still publicly calling for enosis he did make it clear that Cyprus had to concentrate for the present, and perhaps for the future, on what was possible, namely independence. The Turkish Cypriots were somewhat resentful that Turkey had not achieved more for their position and for the victims of the violence, but they had been encouraged by Turkish determination to intervene militarily, and by the numerous low-level air sorties made by the Turkish Air Force during the crisis. They began to feel that their claims to political equality, and at least some degree of self-government, had been vindicated. They now set about with renewed confidence, and with Turkish help, to establish the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration, ‘provisional’ until the 1960 Constitution was restored. The Secretary-General of the Turkish

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Foreign Ministry, Zeki Küneralp, and Professor Suat Bilge, helped them frame a constitution. For these efforts, and for remarks about the situation, Küneralp was asked to leave by the Makarios government, furious at these developments, which seemed to herald partition. Other diplomats were warned not to visit the new ‘government’ or a similar fate would await them.57 Makarios regarded the establishment of the Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration as ‘flagrantly unlawful’, and insisted that there could only be a unitary, and never a federal, state. Did the 1967 crisis mark a turning point in the history of the Cyprus conflict? For Turkey it had freed itself from American domination of its Cyprus policy. The United States had brokered the deal, but the real immediate gains had been for Turkey. Also Turkey had achieved the removal of a substantial number of Greek troops from Cyprus. This gave more confidence to the Turkish Cypriots, who now were more convinced that Turkey would come to their aid, not perhaps being aware that for many Turks the Cyprus problem was one they could do without in order to concentrate on their own problems. However, it was important for the Turkish Cypriots was that they now had much more formal governmental institutions, which allowed them to engage better in relations with the Turkish Government. Also of considerable importance was the fact that they now had Denktas¸ back in a leadership role. His influence in Ankara, where he had established many connections, and the fact that he had won much popular support whilst in Turkey, were going to be very helpful to the Turkish Cypriots in their struggle. They knew that they still had to fight hard to survive and were disappointed that Turkey had not intervened more decisively. What they did not yet know, but would soon find out, was that the Demirel Government would now try very hard to have them come to some accommodation with Makarios. This, neither partition nor federation, was going to be the way forward for the Demirel government. Greece had not come so badly out of the affair. There was some relief that the expensive burden of the troops in Cyprus no longer had to be borne. Also Greece was not obliged otherwise to abandon Cyprus. Before long Grivas would be back in Cyprus leading anti-Makarios members of the National Guard, which Makarios had refused to disband. The desire for enosis was still strong, if now more so on the Greek than the Greek Cypriot side. As for the Greek Cypriots, Makarios was relieved to be rid of the Greek troops. He had made no progress, however, in having the 1960 treaties disregarded. He still had to put up with the Turkish military contingent, but he avoided an increase in the size and powers of the United Nations Force. The Greek Cypriots had certainly come to realize that they could not rely so completely as before on the United States to stop Turkey ‘invading’ Cyprus. Yet they could take some reassurance from the fact that it had

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been American initiative and effort that had seemingly stopped the Turks. Makarios admitted now that his policy was to seek not enosis but a more feasible solution. According to Clerides, the withdrawal of the Greek forces ‘had a catastrophic effect on the morale of the Greek Cypriots, which sunk to its lowest ebb’.58 The United States had shown that Turkey was more important than Greece.

5 Negotiations and the Greek Junta 1968–1974

By early 1968 conditions for the Turkish Cypriots had markedly improved with the embargoes on their enclaves mostly lifted. They were also allowed to move freely in and out of their enclaves, many to find work among the Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot government officials were not, however, allowed to enter the Greek Cypriot controlled areas. Greek Cypriots would be permitted to enter Turkish Cypriot areas provided they abided by local regulations as the Turkish Cypriots had to do in the Greek Cypriot controlled areas, but they refused to enter. Although many Greek Cypriots were angered and depressed by the recent course of events, on 25 February 1968 they voted almost unanimously for Makarios in a new presidential election. His only rival, Dr Takis Evdokas, who stressed enosis as the antidote to communism, failed miserably winning only 3.71 per cent of the votes. Were the electorate voting for an independent Cyprus, or for the promise of enosis sometime in the future? No doubt, Makarios’s ambiguity on this vital point, together with his insistence on a unitary state, and the wide trust in his personal leadership, ensured his total victory. Solidarity was reaffirmed, but it seemed to be worrying for the Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriots were preparing to hold a parallel election for the vice-presidency, as the 1960 Constitution required. This concern was demonstrated by a revelation in the Greek Cypriot press, ten days after the presidential election was announced, that there would be a Turkish-Cypriot candidate in the Turkish Cypriot vicepresidential election to challenge Fazıl Küçük. He would be a lawyer, Judge Mehmet Zeka, who did not live in an enclave. He had defended Greek Cypriot alleged perpetrators of crimes against the British. He was still a representative of Cyprus in the Council of Europe. There were those in the Turkish Cypriot community prepared to support him, including his son-in-law, a leading figure in the community, S¸emsi Kazım. Since a political competition was considered anything but helpful for the unity of the hard-pressed Turkish Cypriot community at that time, especially as the candidate being advanced was clearly acceptable to the Greek Cypriots, 91

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the Turkish Ambassador, Ercüment Yavuzalp, intervened. He called Zeka to the Embassy and asked him not to contest the election in the interest of the unity of the community. He was by no means easily convinced and went to Ankara, presumably to test out opinion at the top. However, he came to accept the Turkish view, and that of Denktas¸ and his hard-line colleague, Osman Örek that he should not become a candidate at this crucial time. It was an important decision. Fazıl Kuçük stood unopposed.1 Under the agreements of 1967 Greek and Turkish troops in excess of those determined in the 1960 Accords were to be withdrawn from the island. The large issue was that of the presence of the very large number of Greek troops. They were reported as withdrawn on 17 January, their numbers being estimated as 7000–8000. In the changed circumstances of 1968 Makarios clearly had to make some move to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots, which he had never hitherto deigned to do, ‘rebels’ as they were seen to be. In March he therefore advanced some broad constitutional proposals to the UN SecretaryGeneral to form the basis for discussion with the Turkish Cypriot community. He had sought to encourage the Turkish Cypriots by saying that enosis was not at present feasible, but this did not rule it out for ever in the Turkish Cypriot estimate. Makarios drew up a document for discussion, but insisted on a unitary state, in which the fundamental rights for all citizens would be respected. Turkish Cypriots would be treated equally with Greek Cypriots. They would all be citizens with equal individual political rights. A Ministry of Turkish Cypriot Affairs was envisaged. There would be freedom and autonomy for Turkish Cypriots as a community, but this would be in matters relating to their education, culture, religion and suchlike matters. This Greek Cypriot initiative had little or no attraction for the Turkish Cypriots. It was in any event overshadowed by the UN Security Council’s Resolution of 22 December 1967 offering the ‘good offices’ of the SecretaryGeneral, U Thant, to help broker a solution. He pressed for inter-communal negotiations. Makarios accepted his proposal with reluctance, fearful that Turkey and Greece might together try to impose a solution with American backing. Talks were to be held in Cyprus between the two parties under the aegis of U Thant’s Representative in Cyprus, Mr Osorio-Tafall.2

Negotiations for a settlement On 13 April 1968 Rauf Denktas¸ returned to Cyprus from Ankara, the Greek Cypriot threat of prosecution having been lifted. Before Denktas¸ left Ankara the Foreign Minister, Sabri Çag ˘layangil, expressed concern on the sort of reception he might expect on his return to the island, and how, in particular, he might get along with Küçük. Denktas¸ reassured him that Küçük would be among the first to welcome him back, He would

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support Küçük ‘until election time and he would not let any disagreement with Küçük damage the Turkish Cypriot cause’.3 After much delay caused by differing views on where the UN sponsored talks should begin, whether in Greek Cypriot, or Turkish Cypriot, controlled Cyprus, it was decided that the two interlocutors should first meet on neutral ground in Beirut (11 June 1968). There they exchanged views, as a result of which it was decided to continue with talks in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots would have preferred to have the talks in the international spotlight in order to engage the support of their many UN member sympathizers.4 After the preliminary round of informal talks in Beirut there were four sessions, in the first series of talks, which lasted until 1971. The first session lasted from 24 June to 26 August, 1968. Both Denktas¸ and the Turkish Government were anxious to make progress. Denktas¸ was aware of the economic and other difficulties under which the Turkish Cypriots were living: it was a fractious community. The Turkish Government under Demirel was anxious for a solution that would enable Turkey to devote its efforts to its own economic development. The Cyprus problem required that substantial financial help had to be given to the Turkish Cypriots and also raised the chances of conflict with Greece. Demirel was hopeful of solutions through negotiation, always seeking to avoid confrontation and believing that the passage of time solved many problems. His Foreign Minister, Çag ˘layangil, was experienced and cautious. On the Greek Cypriot side Clerides was anxious, within limits, to obtain a solution. Like Denktas¸, he was prepared to make concessions, but had to negotiate often from the uncompromising positions of Makarios, who adamantly believed that the Turkish Cypriots had no right to a separate political status. Certainly at the beginning of the talks the Greek Cypriots thought they had time on their hands. In Makarios’s view, the Turkish Cypriots, deprived in their enclaves from participating much in growing Greek Cypriot prosperity, would in the end give up the struggle. There were certainly difficulties and personal rivalries within the Turkish Cypriot community, of which Küçük was not always a convincing leader and, according to the Turkish Ambassador, Ercüment Yavuzalp, often engaged in personal disputes with leading figures in the community. It was generally acknowledged in the Turkish Cypriot community that partition was not a realistic prospect, short of a major crisis demanding Turkish intervention, but there were hardliners in the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Government. Denktas¸ had learned during his years of exile in Ankara that Cyprus was only one of many foreign policy concerns for the Turkish Government. At the first meeting Denktas¸ lived up to the expectations raised by the preliminary Beirut meeting that he would start by making concessions to the Greek Cypriot side. This he most certainly did. He announced that he was prepared to accept nearly all the proposals for reform advanced by Makarios in 1963. The Turkish Cypriot

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side volunteered to reduce to 20 per cent (from 30 per cent) their representation in the legislature, the civil service and the police, with the proviso that these proportions could always be altered to match the ratio of Turkish to Greek Cypriots in the population. Denktas¸ was agreeable, also, to a unified judiciary. In the legislature the need was dropped for separate majorities of the representatives of each community in voting on taxation legislation. In the Public Service Commission there could be no veto. In return, the costs of education for the Turkish Cypriots would be provided from the general budget. It was suggested, also, that the powers of the VicePresident could be reduced. Later the Turkish Cypriot side would agree to the removal of the Vice-President’s veto powers, but not to the abolition of the post. The Turkish Cypriots would not accept, however, the removal of separate electoral rolls for the elections to the House of Representatives. In return for all these concessions Denktas¸ proposed that it should be possible for a Turkish Cypriot to become president. More important, however, was the demand for autonomy in local government together with representation of the Turkish Cypriot local governmental organization at central level. At local level the proposal was to group villages, or parts of mixed villages) and municipalities into administrative, which would not necessarily be geographic, areas. Clerides deemed these requests worthy of sympathetic consideration, it seems, but this was definitely not the case for Makarios. He believed these administrative areas could form the basis for separation and partition. He insisted on the control of local goverment by the Ministry of the Interior. He was also ‘adamant on the issue of common electoral rolls and on the abolition of the office of VicePresident’.5 The second session lasted from the end of August 1968 to May 1969 and began after meetings of Denktas¸ and other leading figures with the Turkish Government. In Ankara in 1968 Denktas¸ was strongly supported by the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, who reaffirmed that Cyprus was a national question for Turkey and that he would be supported in every way.6 By this time the Greek Junta in power in Athens since 1967 had begun to exert a good deal of influence over the Greek Cypriots. Fortified by support from Ankara, and less conciliatory now in the negotiations, Denktas¸ continued to insist on separate electoral rolls for the elections of deputies to the legislature, for Turkish Cypriot assent to any legislation affecting their community, and for the retention of the vicepresidency. Most important, he claimed it was essential, to have a central governmental institution to co-ordinate Turkish Cypriot local government institutions. In addition Denktas¸ proposed that the Turkish Cypriot areas should be grouped administratively. This rang a warning bell for Makarios. He essentially believed that the main Greek Cypriot aim ‘should be to reduce the Turkish community’s political status to that of a minority, acknowledging autonomy only on such matters as religion, education,

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culture and personal status, but not in local government’.7 Also, he did not think that Turkey really wanted to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, and that time would soften Turkish Cypriot attitudes. Responding to an enquiry by Denktas¸ in April 1969, and no doubt reflecting Makarios’s concerns, Clerides made it clear that the government ‘was not prepared to accept under the guise of local government or administration either a federal or a canton system’.8 Despite these problems, at the end of the second session of talks the two interlocutors believed that a just and workable solution could be found if the existing calm atmosphere continued. This was not going to be the case. By this time, February 1969, it was clear that a National Front organization was coming into being with the sole object of bringing about enosis. The third session of the talks began on 11 August 1969. Denktas¸ began by softening the requirements for an administrative grouping of Turkish Cypriot villages and municipalities, and denied he was seeking to establish a federal or a cantonal system, which would certainly not have been supported by the Turkish Government. He could agree to the abolition only of the veto powers of the Vice-President, but still called for a central governmental authority for the Turkish Cypriots. He also asked that the powers of the Turkish local government should be inscribed in the constitution. Clerides responded by proposing that such powers, long and cumbersome as they would be, should be established, not in the constitution, but by legislation requiring increased majorities of both sides’ representatives. There was still no agreement on a central authority to manage Turkish Cypriot local government. Clerides believed at this stage that in not responding to the demand for a central Turkish Cypriot local government authority, the Greek Cypriots ‘allowed a solution based on a much improved constitution to slip through our hands’.9 Despite some reservations, Clerides would clearly have given way a good deal on local government but for Makarios. In October 1969 the Greek Cypriot and Turkish foreign ministers, Kyprianou and Çag˘layangil, met in New York, but to no avail. Kyprianou rejected Çag˘layangil’s insistence on local autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots.10 The local government functions were of themselves anything but nationally important, but they were the functions the Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves were themselves performing. Understandably, they would not want to see their control of their local lives put at risk by overall Greek Cypriot control. This third session of the talks came to an end on 17 August 1970. The calm of the former sessions had been disrupted by the abortive, but nearly successful, attack on the life of Makarios in March 1970 by Greek and Greek Cypriot enotist factions close to the Junta, but probably not by the Greek Junta itself.11 The fourth session of the talks started on 21 September 1970. Under pressure from Ankara a less than enthusiastic Denktas¸, just returned from Ankara, remained as interlocutor, though against his wishes.

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In a memorandum on 30 November offering a ‘package deal’, Clerides accepted that the legislature could be expanded to 75 members, to allow a reasonably sized Turkish Cypriot component of 15 members under the 20 per cent rule now generally agreed for the civil service. Separate electoral rolls were also accepted, including for the election of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the Republic. There was also to be a Turkish Cypriot VicePresident of the House of Representatives. Moreover it was agreed that Turkish Cypriot villages could be grouped for local government purposes. Denktas¸’s reply to Clerides’ proposals came on 27 April 1971, after he had consulted with the new Turkish government under Nihat Erim that came to power after military intervention had deposed Demirel. Also pressure on Makarios by the Greek Junta was obliging Makarios to reaffirm his belief in enosis, which caused much concern among the Turkish Cypriots. In a speech on 14 March 1971 Makarios declared: Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of her history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have inherited her. Greek and undivided we shall keep her, and Greek and undivided we shall hand her over.12 Instead of replying point by point to Clerides, Denktas¸ reviewed the whole situation afresh, and made it clear that enosis could never be accepted. He went back to basics, asserting that in the relationship between the two communities the partnership principle was vital, as underlined in the 1960 Constitution. On the thorny question of local government Denktas¸ now proposed that Turkish Cypriot local government should be under the control of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber provided for in the 1960 Constitution, or under the President and Vice-President jointly. Neither proposal was acceptable to Makarios. Clerides thought this could have been accepted, but he flatly rejected the partnership concept insisted upon by the Turkish Cypriots. ‘In 1970’ he states, ‘we rejected a solution that would have placed Turkish Cypriot local government under the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. The reason for this was, again, our antipathy to the partnership concept, and our intention to reduce the Turkish (sic) community to a minority in a Greek Cypriot state’.13 By April 1971 it became clear that the Turkish Government would have to consider advising abandonment of the talks if there continued to be rejections by Makarios of the local government proposals. This was not to the liking of the Greek Junta, anxious to be on good terms with Turkey, a major factor in its foreign policy. On 1 June the Turkish Foreign Minister, Osman Olcay and the Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Charalambos Palamas, met in Lisbon where, stressing collaboration, they reportedly discussed some form of partition or double enosis, and even federation as a solution.

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Intervention of the Greek Junta It is not surprising against this background, that on 11 June 1971 the Greek Government presented proposals to Makarios that Clerides thought preserved the ‘unitary’ state and satisfied the requirements of the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios rejected ‘mother’s advice’, as Clerides called it. In consequence, the Greek Premier, and head of the Greek Junta now in power, Colonel Papadopoulos severely warned Makarios that he should reconsider his decision. The Greek Government principally recommended Turkish Cypriot control of local government in the form of a Deputy Minister, the inclusion of local government legislation for the Turkish Cypriots in a special law of the legislature that would be difficult of amendment, and the maintenance of separate electoral rolls for the election of deputies. In response to Papadopoulos Makarios wrote that ‘the fixing of areas of local government on racial criteria breaks the unity of the state at its base, and the separation continues upwards by appointing a Minister’.14 He saw local government as the greatest obstacle in the talks, thinking it worse than a return to the London and Zurich agreements. He could not agree with the Greek Government’s view that the acceptance of a Turkish Cypriot minister would unify the state. For the Turkish Cypriots if not a Turkish Cypriot minister, why not then as previously suggested, give control of local government to the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, which controlled educational, religious and other communal matters under the 1960 Constitution? In their view the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber ought also to be revived. They believed that its abolition, and the consequent management of Greek Cypriot communal affairs by the central government, served to underline the essentially Greek Cypriot character of the partnership government, which was not intended under the 1960 Constitution. It was at this stage that near impasse occurred in the talks. The talks revived with legal experts In September 1971 the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers agreed in a meeting that the talks should continue, but with the addition of two constitutional experts to be appointed by their governments, as first suggested, it appears, by the United Kingdom.15 Makarios was pressed by the Greek Government to accept this proposal, which for tactical reasons was made by the UN Secretary-General. At this point Denktas¸ was not hopeful of positive results, as he explained to Nihat Erim in Ankara in early November 1971.16 Nevertheless, he was encouraged to proceed by the Turkish Government, which had responded favourably to an aide-mémoire from the UN Secretary-General in October. This had proposed a broadening of the talks and the participation in them henceforth of the Secretary-General’s Representative in Cyprus, Osorio Tafall, whose role to this point had been that of observer. In January 1972 U Thant’s successor, Kurt Waldheim,

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reaffirmed this initiative. Then the two constitutional experts were appointed, namely Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı and Judge Michalis Dekleris. The prospects for the expanded talks did not look too good when in October 1971 Grivas ‘escaped’ from Greece to return to Cyprus, where, as to be explained below, he was intent on using violent and other means to promote enosis. In addition Makarios was importing arms for his supporters from Czechoslovakia. On 8 June 1972 Kurt Waldheim opened the new series of talks in Nicosia. This inaugural meeting did not go smoothly, however. In particular, the Turkish Government had the Secretary-General remove from his remarks the words ‘settlement of the long-term problem of Cyprus in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’. Clerides also attacked the opening speech by Denktas¸ which, against the advice of the UN, outlined his side’s view of the problem. The first phase of the new round of talks was completed on 1 September 1972. There were moves by the Turkish Cypriots in the other side’s favour. The local government issue seemed to be settled: the Turkish Communal Chamber would make regulations on local government under laws made by the House of Representatives. The Turkish Cypriot proposal for the administrative grouping of Turkish villages and other predominantly Turkish Cypriot inhabited areas, and their policing by a separate police force were abandoned. As for administrative control of Turkish Cypriot local government, that would be the responsibility of a civil servant. In December 1972 Makarios still rejected this now more favourable scheme. For Clerides this was an error of judgement. He writes: The most important and fatal meeting I had with Makarios occurred on 12 December 1972. Because, had I succeeded in convincing Makarios to accept my point of view, events in Cyprus would have taken an entirely different course. … It is a fact of history, which cannot be denied, that the uncompromising attitude of Makarios on the issue of local government prevented a solution of the Cyprus problem in December 1972.17 Coming now out in the open, as was necessary in these troubled times, Makarios refused to declare, as the Turkish Cypriots naturally required, that enosis was banned. The violence promoted by Grivas and others was escalating. By May 1973 the Turkish Government was becoming perturbed by events in Cyprus. In the worsening unsettled conditions on the island Ankara could see no end to the dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Change of government in Turkey Moreover, a new factor now entered into the situation with the accession to power in Turkey in October 1973 of Bülent Ecevit, in coalition with

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Necmettin Erbakan. The new Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Günes¸, ominously remarked in a speech that the Cyprus state was composed of two communities and that the term ‘federative system’ expressed that fact. The Foreign Minister later noted that ‘while the inter-communal talks were continuing after the death of Grivas (which occurred in 1974) it was evident that the enosis idea had not yet been dismissed from some minds’.18 ‘The Turkish Government’, he continued, ‘will exert every effort to secure a peaceful and lasting solution to the problem within the framework of an independent and federal state.’19 This was a bombshell. Talks began once more, but came to a halt when, on 2 April 1974, Bülent Ecevit, declared that ‘a federal solution of government was the best solution for Cyprus’.20 When Denktas¸ was asked the next day by Clerides to agree that negotiations were based on the concept of ‘a unitary, bi-communal state, not a federal one’, and refused to do so, the Greek side discontinued the talks. They maintained that the talks had always proceeded on the understanding that what was being sought was a unitary state, the solution to which the Secretary-General had referred in the Security Council. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Çag˘layangil, had also earlier made reference, it seems, to ‘an independent and unitary state’, and even Demirel had made mention of ‘a minority status’ for the Turkish Cypriots.21 After much argument it was finally decided that the talks would proceed ‘on the same basis on which they were conducted before 2 April’. Clerides still objected, insisting that there could indeed be no change in the basis of the discussions, namely on the unitary state model, an assumption denied by the Turkish Cypriot side. For them the exercise was one of deciding how the 1960 Constitution could be amended, a constitution they regarded as based on partnership. The Greek Cypriots, they maintained, were applying a special restricted meaning to the use of the term ‘unitary’. Reaching conclusions Despite these difficulties, the talks continued. Moreover, they now entered a phase in which the efforts of legal experts from Greece and Turkey were bearing fruit. A large part towards constructing an agreement was also played by Osorio Tafall. It seems that he suggested a way out of the problem of Turkish Cypriot local government by proposing that its control could be exercised by the legislature. To this end the House of Representatives would be divided into two ‘branches’ composed of each community’s members.22 The control and administration of communal affairs was also to be the responsibility of each ‘branch’ of the legislature, thus abolishing the Communal Chambers provided for in the 1960 Constitution. The powers and functions of local government would not be included in the constitution, but in an organic law that would require a two-thirds’ majority to amend, and with at least one third of the Turkish Cypriot votes. It was accepted that general local government legislation

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setting out common standards would have to be the responsibility of the legislature as a whole, and that there would have to be some state supervision. There would not be a separate Turkish Cypriot police force, but Turkish Cypriot police would police Turkish Cypriot areas. The ‘branches’ would make subsidiary regulations within the framework of functions established in the organic law.23 To a degree this provided for some control of Turkish Cypriot local government and community affairs by Turkish Cypriots at the centre in their ‘branch’ within the legislature, though how it would all have worked out is problematical. However, with agreement in principle achieved by March 1974 on this solution of the thorny problem of local government all seemed set fair for total agreement. The Greek Cypriots had obtained more than had been demanded in Makarios’s 13 proposals of 1963. The participation of Turkish Cypriots in all governmental institutions had been reduced to match their proportion of the total population. They agreed to the removal of the veto powers of the vice-president, though the veto powers of the president were also abandoned. The office of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President was successfully preserved, with reduced responsibilities, and there would also be a Greek Cypriot Vice-President, which would give some recognition to the concept of partnership. The special majority requirement in the legislature for changes in finance and taxation was removed, though it remained in force for the electoral law and changes in the Constitution. The judiciary was unified. Yet the Turkish Cypriots did not have to relinquish separate election of their community’s representatives in the House of Representatives, which Makarios had always opposed. It has been claimed with that ‘if it was not for the coup of July [1974] complete agreement on this seemingly intractable problem would have been reached by August 1974’.24 However, there was still the threat of enosis in the air. The proposed solution came too late for Makarios, to accept or reject, or for the Greek and Turkish governments to consider. It could just have been presented to the Greek Cypriots as a solution that respected their demand for a ‘unitary’ state, and Denktas¸ might have been able to argue that it respected the Turkish Cypriot view that what was emerging was still a partnership state. For the Turkish Cypriots, and for Turkey, any solution had now to be accompanied by a clear rejection by Makarios of enosis, and this he dared not do, even if he really wanted to do so.

Cyprus and Greece A major worry for Makarios was that the Greek Junta that had seized power in April 1967 was clearly discussing with Turkey what should be done about Cyprus. This raised for him the spectre of a solution over his head made by Greece and Turkey backed by the United States. The Greek Junta

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was not as yet deeply involved in Cyprus, but on 13 August 1968 an unsuccessful attempt was made in Greece to assassinate the head of the Junta, Colonel George Papadopoulos, an event that had repercussions in Cyprus. The person, rightly or wrongly, seen to be behind it was the redoubtable EOKA leader, Polykarpos Yiorkadjis, a major architect of the Akritas Plan. Under pressure from Papadopoulos he resigned from government resentful of the lack of support shown by Makarios. Yiorkadjis when Minister of the Interior had filled the police force with his own supporters, often, former EOKA men loyal to Makarios. His resignation consequently meant a loss of material support for the President. The EOKA supporters in the police force were before long overshadowed by a new organization devoted to enosis, the National Front. This organization, which was also anti-communist, engaged in violence against supporters of the communist AKEL party and even against supporters of a new moderate party that was established by Clerides, with Makarios’s support and encouragement. Members of the National Front also raided police stations and copper mines for arms and explosives. They were a constant threat and were perhaps behind the assassination attempt against Makarios in March 1970 that shocked the Greek Cypriot community. After this incident, Makarios agreed that elections should be held in July 1970 for the House of Representatives, where Clerides’ moderate Unified Party, widely believed to be Makarios’s party, gained most seats, but even so this showed a marked decline since the last elections in support for Makarios. The anti-junta communist party, AKEL, came second, and could have done better by fielding more candidates. An enotist party did well: its leader was Nikos Sampson, renowned for his hatred of, and violence towards, Turkish Cypriots. Clearly there were deep divisions in Greek Cypriot society. In a disturbed situation violence continued; Makarios was on a tightrope. If only for his own security, he had to reaffirm enosis, which he had earlier described as not feasible. He did so in the speech on 14 March 1971, quoted above. Naturally this greatly alarmed the Turkish Cypriots, and hardened their approach to the negotiations with Clerides. It also worried the Junta, unwilling to antagonize Turkey. The Greek Deputy Foreign Minister intimated that if there were no solution, Greece and Turkey ‘would consult on how to handle the problem’.25 It was at this stage, as mentioned above, that Papadopoulos advised Makarios to accept the Turkish Cypriot demands on local government and on 18 June 1971 warned him that ‘should you break our common front … the Greek Government would find itself faced with the necessity to take those measures which national interest and the best interests of Cypriot Hellenism demand, irrespective of how bitter these may be’.26 The Greek objective now, it seems, was to force the resignation of Makarios. Athens pointed out to Makarios that independent though Cyprus might be, Athens was the ‘National Centre’. Makarios remained

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defiant and did not submit, but he had later to cope with Grivas, also intent on forcing Makarios’ resignation and fostering enosis. This could be seen as one of ‘the painful steps’ Papadopoulos had threatened and for which he was using Grivas, difficult though he was to control.27 Makarios stoutly declared that in what concerned the national interest Cypriot Hellenism had to have the last word. Opposition to Makarios Returning to the island on 31 August 1971 and establishing EOKA-B, Grivas joined with the National Front in raids to acquire arms, but otherwise remained independent. He was now flexing his muscles. He called upon Clerides to resign, seeing him as an obstacle to enosis. He shared with the Junta the desire to see Makarios removed from office. It seems he also could accept the Junta’s inclination to double enosis and thus the partition of the island.28 In January 1972 Makarios received a large consignment of arms from Czechoslovakia with which to arm his own supporters. There was general alarm, the Turkish Cypriots believing that they would be used against them. Under Turkish, and heavy international pressure, the Junta made Makarios hand over the arms to the UN Peace Force. They also requested him on 11 February to form a government of national unity. Oddly, as an addendum the Junta asked him ‘to resign from the office of President and retire from the political life of Cyprus’.29 In response Makarios prevaricated, but on 14 February he received a lastminute warning from the Cypriot Intelligence Service, aware of the Greek Ambassador’s communications with the Junta, that a coup was imminent. He was greatly alarmed. The American Ambassador, David Popper, was hastily brought in to exert pressure from the highest levels on the Junta. The American Ambassador in Athens told Papadopoulos that the American Government was against any attempt to overthrow Makarios. He received ‘clear and categorical assurances that no move was intended, or would take place by the Greek forces in Cyprus, or by Greek officers serving in Cyprus, against Makarios and his government’.30 He concludes, ‘It is clear that the pressure from the United States, first, and then from other governments, prevented the coup planned by the military government of Greece for 15 March (sic) 1972.’31 It has earlier been noted that Clerides had tried unsuccessfully to persuade a compromise on Turkish Cypriot demands for amending the 1960 Constitution. He was regarded as a moderate by Athens and apparently favoured as the best person to replace Makarios. He was cold-shouldered for a while by Makarios, but by March 1972, when Makarios seemed more secure, Clerides let it be known that ‘he would not agree to run for the presidency’.32 After the aborted coup three strongly enotist bishops, with encouragement from Grivas, called on Makarios to resign from the presidency on the grounds that his ecclesiastical office was not compatible with political

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leadership. Makarios, ignored this pressure hurt though he was by it: he was well aware that he had much support among the populace. However, Makarios made an attempt to seek reconciliation with Grivas, but although the two met, nothing came of the initiative. Grivas also wanted Makarios’s resignation from office and collaboration in a joint campaign for selfdetermination and enosis. Aware of these possible developments, no doubt, and becoming generally alarmed by the presence of Grivas in Cyprus, Ankara now called for his return to Greece, reminding Athens of ‘the gentleman’s agreement of November 1967’.33 Ever resourceful, in February 1973 Makarios tested his popularity by seeking re-election as president in the presidential election then due. This infuriated the hostile bishops and Grivas, who stepped up his campaign and called, though without notable response, for a referendum on enosis. Not surprisingly in the following month, though against the advice of the new Greek Ambassador, the three bishops decided to intensify their efforts to remove Makarios. The went so far as to call a synod, which defrocked Makarios, only to be defrocked in turn when Makarios called together a wider and more powerful synod embracing the Orthodox Church outside Cyprus. With Makarios still successfully holding on to power, and with the moderate leader of the Junta reasserting his authority over its other more enotist members, Athens began to seek some understanding with Makarios rather than his overthrow, as demanded still by Grivas. The Junta abandoned their claim to be the National Centre responsible for Cyprus affairs, and were content with a government reshuffle. Having obtained a new expression of popular support, and with more confidence in the Junta, Makarios began organizing and arming his own supporters against the threat of Grivas, and began to build up his own Tactical Police Reserve. He was surviving despite an attempt on 7 October 1973 to blow up the car in which he was travelling. The attempt was mistimed, Makarios escaping by a few minutes. It had been organized by an enotist breakaway group, not by Grivas. A new Greek Junta By mid-1973 Makarios had established better relations with Athens though still wary of a Greek/Turkish solution. However, his peace was short lived. In November 1973 Papadopoulos was overthrown after serious student and other riots the Junta was not able to quell. The strongly enotist Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides replaced him as leader of the Junta. It was then decided, in early 1974, to overthrow Makarios. The briefing of those to be primarily involved took place on 2 July 1974.34 The instigator of the plot was Ioannides, who discounted the fears of other Junta members that Turkey would intervene, claiming he knew this ‘from all the parties involved, and above all, from the United States’.35 It was strongly rumoured in Athens that there

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was a plot to overthrow Makarios. The plot, coded Hermes, was an open secret.36 Ioannides was aware that he had some hold over the United States since Greek co-operation was essential for the maintenance of the American bases at a time when the Soviet Union had important naval forces in the Mediterranean. The US Department of State was informed on the possibility of a coup against Makarios, but played it down, as did the American Ambassador in Greece, Henry Tasca. It is odd that Ioannides disregarded the danger of Turkish intervention at a time when a serious dispute was raging with Turkey over exploitation of the large oil deposits said to exist in the Aegean. Moreover, on 26 January 1974 Bülent Ecevit came to power in Turkey and greatly hardened the Turkish Government’s attitude to the inter-communal talks. Ioannides was clearly heading for trouble, but was probably encouraged by the crescendo of anti-Turkish sentiment in the Greek press prompted by the Aegean oil dispute. Public opinion in Turkey was similarly inflamed, though in June 1974 Ecevit did propose, without response, the establishment of a joint committee to examine Turkish-Greek disputes.37 In attempting to understand the actions of the junta its pronounced anti-communism has also to be taken into account. It deplored the ‘unacceptable tolerance which, in its view, Makarios was showing to the anti-NATO and anti-Western propaganda emanating from the communist and left-wing forces’.38 It was unfortunate for Makarios that Papadopoulos had not stayed in power, because the implacable Grivas had died suddenly on 27 January 1974. His funeral was a massive demonstration of support for the great EOKA leader. Reinvigorated perhaps by his example, the EOKA-B organization for a while did not halt its violence, but then began to show signs of disintegration. This was not the end of opposition to Makarios. Under the influence of the new Junta the more important Greek commanded and officered National Guard (the Cyprus Army) was dangerous. Its Greek Cypriot officer cadets, under their Greek officers, were much involved with EOKA-B. Makarios then sought to remove this threat by trying to reduce the size of the National Guard and to purge it of its disloyal elements. In pursuit of his objectives in July he took a very bold step by writing a very strong letter to the puppet Greek President under the new Junta, General Phaidon Gizitis. In it he stated that had clear evidence of the financing and supporting of EOKA-B by the National Centre in its stance against his government. Even, he claimed, the ‘great crisis in the church had its source of origin and emanated from Athens’.39 He declared he was going to reform the National Guard and requested the Greek Government to recall all its officers, not just those made redundant by measures he had already taken to reduce the size of the National Guard and the period of service of its personnel. Some of the Greek officers, he said ‘are from head to foot mixed up, and participate, in EOKA-B’.40 He had almost been touched, he said, ‘by an

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invisible hand stretched from Athens, searching in order to destroy my human existence’.41 It was too bold a move, misjudging, as it did, the temper of the new effective ruler, Ioannides. He ended his letter: I do not wish to interrupt my co-operation with the Greek Government. It must, however be kept in mind that I am not an appointed commissioner, nor a locum tenens, of the Greek Government in Cyprus, but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and I demand analogous behaviour towards me from the National Centre.42 It would have been asking a good deal to have the Junta accept the letter as a private document, but certainly too much if it was in the public domain, as it soon was, having been leaked to a pro-Makarios newspaper.43 The Greek plot came to fruition. On 15 July the junta, in control of the National Guard, attacked the presidential palace, but, as is well known, Makarios miraculously escaped and after reaching Akrotiri, was flown by the Royal Air force to Malta and thence to London. It was declared that the object of the coup was to maintain order and that those who resisted it would be immediately executed. Developments on the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side During much of the period from 1968 to 1971 Turkey was led by a government under Süleyman Demirel that wanted the Cyprus problem out of the way in order to be able to concentrate on establishing good relations with Greece and on the economic development of Turkey. Demirel’s government greatly encouraged and supported the Turkish Cypriots in the Clerides/Denktas¸ talks. It was, however, replaced by the Turkish military in early 1971 since unrest and violence were getting out of hand. The temporary replacement government under Nihat Erim rather hardened its attitude and watched and advised on the negotiations step by step, as their ambassador in Nicosia, Yavuzalp, reports in his memoirs. In early 1969, surprisingly perhaps, against the advice of Denktas¸, some of the leading Turkish Cypriot personalities wanted to break off the negotiations. This was going too far for Ankara, even in its now firmer mood. Obtaining concordance on policy was not easy. Küçük was becoming less predictable. Relations between Küçük and Denktas¸ were not always harmonious. It was only after much hesitation, and change of mind, that Küçük decided not to stand for the vice-presidency of the Republic when the Greek Cypriots were electing the president. Denktas¸ was more dynamic, and began to match the rather more assertive attitude to the Cyprus problem gradually developing in Ankara, where the military was becoming increasingly influential over the temporary governments in power until the elections of 1973.

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For the Turkish Cypriot vice-presidency there was also another contender, and from another quarter. In 1970 Ahmet Berberog ˘lu established the Cumhuriyet Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party). Those Turkish Cypriots supported it who had some sympathy for AKEL and believed that a satisfactory union with the Greek Cypriots was possible. It was not insignificant that a number of left-wing Turkish Cypriot students had at this time returned to Cyprus from Turkey. Berberog ˘lu intended to stand for the vice-presidency, but was powerfully persuaded not to do so. According to the American Ambassador he was against what he saw in the enclaves as military rule and the police state, and vowed to solve the Cyprus problem within three months.44 Denktas¸ was elected Vice-President unopposed. The Greek Cypriots ignored this election, but the Turkish Cypriots were making the point to the world outside that the 1960 Constitution was still in existence despite its having been abandoned unilaterally by the Greek Cypriots. Importance of the period 1968 to 1974 An agreement by the negotiators in the talks was clearly in reach in 1974, though the chances that it would have been approved by Makarios had it been presented to him were probably slim. Convinced until the end that he could outwit or outface the Greek Junta, he was unlikely to be accommodating towards the Turkish Cypriots. Had the 1974 talks resulted in agreement would it have been a substantial victory for the Turkish Cypriots? They had abandoned their considerable powers in determining overall policy for the sake merely of what were essentially only regulatory powers in local government under broad local government legislation enacted by the legislature on a majority basis. Certainly they preserved their own municipal institutions of government in areas in which they lived, with their own policemen, though not their own police force. This would have allowed the enclaves to survive and manage local affairs. It was a degree of regional autonomy and would have given them a sense of security, which was very important, but the rapidly developing Cypriot economy under Greek Cypriot control would no doubt have changed the situation drastically. There would have been much movement and interaction guided by legislation for the state and society as a whole that could easily have overshadowed the relatively unimportant local government functions left to the Turkish Cypriot municipalities. The policy of the Papadopoulos government was to obtain Turkish acceptance of a deal, provided that it included double enosis, or partition. This Makarios could not condone, even if Grivas could have done so. In 1973 Clerides, returning from discussions in Athens, asked Makarios if he would agree for Article 185 of the 1960 Constitution, which prohibited enosis and partition, to be included in a presumably new constitution reframed in the light of the Clerides-Denktas¸ negotiations, Makarios replied, ‘You see,

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Glafkos, these hands, they can cut them off, but I will not sign any constitution excluding Enosis unless Greece and Turkey sign first a protocol by which Greece would agree with Turkey not to accept Enosis and Turkey would agree with Greece not to accept Partition’.45

The United States and the coup Was the American Government responsible for not preventing the coup against Makarios? As early as late 1973 the head of the Cyprus Desk at the Department of State knew that a coup was being prepared. On his advice the Greek Government was to be warned against it, but the upper echelons rejected this advice, it is claimed, since ‘nobody from the establishment wanted to upset Athens’.46 In late March 1974 a warning of a coup, this time from Soviet sources, also went unheeded. A third warning, in May, from Greek journalistic sources was also discounted. The fourth warning was the most serious and could not be disregarded. On 3 June Ioannides told a CIA officer in Athens that ‘he would overthrow Makarios with the use of force’ and that ‘Greece is capable of removing Makarios and his main supporters, right from the start, within 24 hours, with little or no bloodshed … The Turks will readily agree to the removal of Makarios, an old enemy’.47 Kissinger did respond to this warning, approving a telegram to the American Ambassador, Tasca, instructing him, ‘personally to convey to Ioannides the opposition of the United States to any adventure in Cyprus’.48 Tasca did not approve of these instructions, despite their repetition, and contacted only President Gizikis on 2 July explaining to Washington that he thought the moment was not opportune to contact Ioannides. The House of Representatives’ committee, examining the issue, confirmed the opinion of the Cyprus Desk Director in the Department of State that ‘the instructions were carried out in a half-hearted manner at best by the Embassy in Athens’.49 Kissinger should probably have gone further in making it clear to Ioannides that Makarios was not to be overthrown. On the other hand, a CIA Report of 3 July to Washington stated that Ioannides had changed his mind and a coup would not take place. Then, on 12 July, there was a further CIA message from Athens that Brigadier Ioannides had assured the CIA Athens office that ‘the Greek Government is not involved, and will not be involved, in any clandestine activity designed to overthrow Archbishop Makarios’.50 It gave credence to these reports that no one really expected Ioannides to attempt a coup without Turkey’s agreement. Ankara might well have earlier welcomed the departure of Makarios in order to remove the stumbling block to the success of the inter-communal negotiations, but enosis was altogether another matter. It would constitute grounds for Turkish military intervention, for which eventuality a division of Turkish (non-NATO) troops was stationed not far away from Cyprus.51

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It is interesting that Makarios was himself not sufficiently alarmed to ask for help, as he had done previously. In an interview Clerides said, ‘Most Greek Cypriots, including Makarios, believed that Athens would not dare stage a coup because it would inevitably trigger a Turkish invasion.’52 However, it has been suggested that this disinclination to believe a coup would take place was due to a disinformation campaign orchestrated by the Junta that included an invitation to Makarios to go to Athens for discussions with the Greek Government. His forces were achieving some success against EOKA-B elements, and he had imported arms for his new Reservist Corps battalion, a consignment of which arrived on 4 July. Nevertheless it has been claimed that the State Department was not just remiss at what was indeed a worrying time in American foreign and domestic (Watergate) affairs. It has been variously alleged that Washington used the CIA reports, which claimed that the Junta did not intend to overthrow Makarios, as deliberate cover for inaction. It has also been claimed that many CIA agents in Greece were Greek Americans sympathetic to the union of Greece and Cyprus. Moreover, and very important if true, one CIA agent is said to have assured Ioannides that ‘if Makarios were to be removed, the United States would keep quiet’.53 ‘Clerides believed they [the Junta] felt that if they ousted Makarios, the Americans would not allow Turkey to intervene. He suggested that the Junta got this idea because their contacts were mainly with the CIA. “Probably [Clerides said] the CIA created that impression and it was not the correct picture. Maybe they deliberately created that impression in order to help the coup and to help the Turkish invasion”. The CIA, he said, may have thought they could kill two sparrows with one shot’.54 That Kissinger and the Department of State were influenced by CIA reports or not, it is very unlikely that Washington, always so concerned to keep the Eastern Mediterranean peaceful, would have encouraged the overthrow of Makarios and a declaration of enosis since it could so easily lead to the nightmare of a Greek-Turkish war. Moreover, by 1974 the United States no longer regarded Makarios as likely to import communism into Cyprus. In his memoirs Kissinger considered him ‘more of a nuisance than a menace. At no time during my period of office did we take any measure to reduce his hold on power … we never for a moment thought that he was the “Castro of the Mediterranean”… and we could have coexisted with him very well’.55 After the coup After the coup the United States did not condemn it, or recognize the new government hastily formed with Nicos Sampson as President. The hesitancy in not denouncing the coup encouraged some to believe that the United States was behind it. Surprisingly the new government did not proclaim enosis. According to Clerides this was because ‘the real objective of

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the conspirators was to oust Makarios and his Government in order to proceed with direct negotiations with Turkey … and with the use of the good offices of the United States, to achieve enosis of the major part of Cyprus with Greece, conceding a smaller part of Cyprus to Turkish sovereignty’.56 Yet there is no evidence the Junta told Ankara that this was their intention when they effected the coup. Nor did the appointment of the notoriously anti-Turkish Sampson as president match this intention: it was the worst possible signal to Turkey. Nor is it feasible to believe that EOKA-B and other enotist elements in Cyprus would have let this happen. One reason why enosis was not immediately declared may be that the United States warned Athens not to declare enosis ‘because this would likely lead to a Turkish invasion’.57 From Kissinger, we learn that on 16 July Ioannides, in an interview with Tasca, ‘affirmed Greece’s commitment to “non-interference in a free, independent, sovereign state of Cyprus” – in other words, he abandoned the quest for enosis’.58 On 16 July, during the Security Council meeting, the Greek delegate claimed that ‘the events in Cyprus were an internal Cypriot affair, and that the National Guard, despite its Greek officers, was under the control of the Cyprus Government’.59 American policy was to have the Junta restore a legitimate government in Cyprus. More pressure might have been brought to bear on Greece, but this could have raised difficulties for the American bases in Greece. As for trying to stop Turkey from intervening militarily, Washington could not again repeat the diplomatic disaster created by the 1964 Johnson letter and the resultant wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey. In the middle of the Watergate affair President Nixon was in no state to play a strong personal role. The United Kingdom was generally pro-Makarios, and very anti-Greek Junta, but not strong enough to be able to make any impression on the Junta, which being pro-NATO, was in fact very unlikely to pose any threat to the British bases, which was not just a British, but also an American concern. The British response to the crisis was first to call for the replacement, and later, the withdrawal, of the Greek officers of the National Guard, which would have left the streets open to dangerous armed irregulars. The British Government was also intent on restoring Makarios to power, whereas Kissinger, distrusting Makarios, wanted a government led if possible by Clerides. It was his ‘pet idea’.60 Both the British and American governments decided to hold back on the question of recognition of the new regime in Cyprus, though this, if unwittingly, could help Turkey decide to intervene.

6 Turkish Intervention and the Geneva Conferences 1974

In Turkey the Government was taken by surprise by the Greek coup, but soon realized that something had to be done. There was scope for action that would be seen as legitimate since there was a clear threat of enosis. Under the terms of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee each guarantor power, after consultation, reserved the right ‘to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty’. Ecevit, adventurous and decisive by nature, had strong support within his own party for decisive action, including military intervention, if necessary, but others were less convinced. His coalition partner, Necmettin Erbakan, head of the religious National Salvation Party, was overwhelmingly supportive of Ecevit’s policy, indeed eventually urging, that Cyprus should be occupied and then partitioned. The recently replaced, Nihat Erim, long experienced in Cyprus affairs, was against it, suspecting that the United States was behind the Greek coup and would stop Turkey in its tracks. Of the smaller parties, the leader of the Democratic Party, Ferruh Bozbeyli, believed that the Zurich and London Agreements had been ‘flagrantly violated’. Surprisingly, Turhan Feyziog˘lu of the Republican Reliance Party, and the closest to Ecevit’s party, stressed the importance of diplomatic pressure. Demirel opposed military intervention, which, he believed, ‘could only lead to war with Greece’.1 He was also afraid that an attack on the Junta would result in bringing back Makarios. Nor, incidentally, did the cautious Demirel approve of Ecevit’s aggressive policy in the Aegean continental shelf dispute. However, once the military intervention began Demirel supported it. Not to do so would have flown in the face of popular enthusiasm for the operation. Ecevit was strongly supported by his Finance Minister, Deniz Baykal, who argued that a diplomatic solution would not work, and that if nothing effective was done, Greece would soon be Turkey’s southern neighbour. He also believed that the super-powers preferred appeasement to action in these sorts of disputes. The belief that the United States would not interfere to stop Turkish action was crucial. There was also the risk of war with 110

Turkish Intervention and the Geneva Conferences 1974 111

Greece, but this was accepted.2 The military said that they were ready to take military action in Cyprus. A consideration that also had to be taken into account was the possibility that the United States might well, in the end, decide to condone the Greek coup, so any action by Turkey had to be immediate. Moreover, Ecevit was emboldened by his recent assertive and successful policy over oil prospecting disputes in the Aegean. Also, ‘The chief of the Greek Desk of the Foreign Ministry, Ecmel Barutçu, played a significant part in convincing the Government that a landing was necessary.’3 ‘Had he wavered [in Ecevit’s absence at the beginning of the crisis] the decision to intervene might never have been made.’4 Ecevit’s coalition partner, Erbakan, was persuaded to modify his views and support a geographical federation, which was urged by Denktas¸, and which replaced Ecevit’s policy before the Greek coup, of a non-geographical federation.5 Consultation with the United Kingdom Ecevit was clearly determined to take action over Cyprus. Keeping within the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee he first tried to have the United Kingdom join Turkey in restoring the state of affairs established by the 1960 Constitution. To this end, on 17 and 18 July, he had a meeting in London with the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, and the Defence Secretary, Roy Mason, with others in attendance. Ecevit was accompanied principally by his Foreign and Defence Minister, Hasan I˙s¸ık and his special adviser, Haluk Bayülken. The second meeting on 18 July was between Callaghan and I˙s¸ık, with Roy Hattersley and the Turkish Ambassador, Turgut Menemenciog˘lu, in attendance. Callaghan suggested to Ecevit that whilst in London he might meet with Makarios. Ecevit expressed a vapid willingness to do so. Makarios, in response, said that there were so many Cypriots in London to talk to that he had no time for talking to others.6 In the first meeting Ecevit began by calling for the old administration to be restored, and for a return to the previous state of affairs or, failing that, and Makarios could not return, to the constitutional provisions [of 1960]. He did not just call for the return of Greek officers from Cyprus. He also stated that it was important that the Turkish Cypriots had access to the sea ‘somewhere near Turkey, which would enable his Government to prevent Turks from dying from starvation as had occurred in the past’.7 He stated that Turkey wanted a peaceful solution. There should also be a more effective Turkish presence on the island. The Turkish Government did not wish to act alone. The way to avoid bloodshed, Ecevit continued, was for the United Kingdom to allow Turkey to send her forces to Cyprus through the British bases. After listing the virtues of this operation Ecevit stated that ‘the alternative was unilateral action by Turkey, which he thought would be inevitable later if not sooner – later would be worse and bloodier’.8 Later

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on, in the Geneva conferences, it became clear that Ankara did not, in fact, want Makarios back, and regarded return to the constitutional provisions as return to some form of constitutional order, not to the 1960 Constitution itself, which Clerides proposed in the second Geneva Conference. When in London Ecevit called for the return of Makarios he was chiming in with the British attitude, which was hostile to the Junta and very supportive of Makarios. In response to Ecevit’s request for the movement of Turkish troops into Cyprus through the British bases, in order to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, Callaghan replied that they were not meant for that purpose. It has been suggested that in not allowing Turkish troops to enter the island through the bases the British missed an opportunity to control Turkish actions. ‘In retrospect, the British Government missed this positive opportunity.’9 The British House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus (1975–76) believed ‘Britain could have intervened either alone or in conjunction with Turkey, a fellow guarantor power, to have overthrown the Sampson regime.’10 The Committee concluded, ‘Britain had a legal right, a moral obligation and the military capacity to intervene in Cyprus during July and August 1974. She did not intervene for reasons the Government refuses to give’.11 However, unless the Junta agreed to Turkish intervention, which was hardly possible, the Turkish forces would certainly have been opposed by the Greek and Greek Cypriot troops, with the United Kingdom thus being dragged into the dispute. In a review of the United Kingdom’s Cyprus policy at the time, incorporating the views of the Secretary of State, it is stated: The Greeks are now inclined to say that the British Government could have done more to prevent a Turkish invasion; they forget that the Greek government of the time refused even to come to London for talks about the crisis. As to the British refusal to take action, there were insufficient troops, British military action might have led to serious reprisals against British subjects in Cyprus and Greece, and there would be no American support.12 Ecevit was aware of the probable negative British response, but he had to go through the process of consultation. Yet later Hasan I˙s¸ık pressed the British Government by posing four very pertinent and penetrating questions. One was particularly difficult. ‘Is the British Government prepared to agree that Turkey must have the same “rights and possibilities” in the island as Greece did?’ Callaghan stalled on this question. He also refused to make a joint declaration blaming the Greek Government and asking them to restore the situation. To other questions he had made rather positive responses, but he warned I˙s¸ık that his reactions ‘were based on the hope and expectation that the Turkish Government were not contemplating

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resort to unilateral action of a military character’.13 In reply the Turkish Foreign Minister said that Turkey did not wish to resort to such action, but that the decision to intervene might be forced upon the Turkish Government. Time, he said was very short. There was no doubt that the Turks meant business and were not going to be deterred. The British Government’s view was, ‘We would sooner see him [Makarios] back in Nicosia than resort to the constitutional alternative’ Turkey had in mind [i.e. revision of the 1960 Constitution].14 The British suggestion that the three Guarantor Powers should meet was firmly rejected by Ecevit. He could not consider Greece, an aggressor nation, as a guarantor. At this point Kissinger despatched Sisco to London, Athens and Ankara to try to prevent Turkish military intervention, but Sisco had no real power to his elbow. There were no threats or warnings. Ecevit had made up his mind to achieve a definite and favourable result from the Junta’s deposition of Makarios. Of hastier disposition than Demirel, he was inclined towards an active policy, success in which would enhance his popularity in Turkey, which was not overwhelming. His strong inclination to intervene was supported fully by the National Security Council, but Demirel pointed out that without a clear political goal military intervention was an adventure. Kissinger told Sisco to try to have the Junta agree that Clerides should be president for a six-month period, during which time a constitutional agreement could be negotiated without the presence of Makarios. He did not want, however, openly to author such an initiative: he did not want ‘to proceed with the Clerides suggestion until we make the interested parties recognize by themselves that a compromise solution suits their own interests’.15 Ankara wanted more than that. Ecevit explained Turkey’s demands to Sisco on 18 July, the day after Ecevit’s meeting with Wilson and Callaghan, in a meeting in the Turkish Embassy in London before Sisco made his first visit to Athens. Sisco could only warn that Turkish military action could lead to a Greek-Turkish war. Ecevit’s demands of Greece were (1) the immediate replacement of Sampson and the withdrawal of the Greek officers from Cyprus, (2) the admission of Turkish troops, which the security of the Turkish Cypriots demands, (3) the equality of rights for the two communities, and (4) an outlet to the sea [the north coast] for the Turkish Cypriots.16 The Turkish demands to the Junta conveyed by Sisco did not meet with a positive response in Athens. After much delay Sisco was able to see Ioannides, only to get the response that Greece would agree only to replace the Greek officers who had been engaged in the coup. This did not, of course, make any impact on Ecevit, even though Sisco passed on a warning from Kissinger that ‘the US would take the gravest view of Turkish military moves before all diplomatic processes are exhausted’.17 At the last minute, just before the military operation began, Sisco arrived back in Ankara from

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another visit to Athens. He conveyed a message from the Junta that Sampson would be removed from the presidency, that elections would be held, and that the Turkish Cypriots were not in danger. This was not enough since it did not meet the Turkish demands conveyed to Athens by Sisco. Ecevit was not prepared to miss out on a chance that fate had delivered into his hands to do something really effective about Cyprus. It was not to become a Hellenic island dominating Turkey’s southern coast. Nor were the Turkish Cypriots to be left without access to the north coast, which Kissinger believed was to ask for too much. Ecevit realized the importance of Turkey’s NATO role in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey’s great increase in strength since 1964. The opportunity was too good to be missed. Turkish troops landed very early on 20 July. The American Government was clearly disappointed that their pleas for restraint had fallen on deaf ears. The restoration of peace and stability was vital. Washington now tried to stop Greece from going to war, urging on Athens the need for a constitutional solution. In response the Greek Government under Ioannides delivered an ultimatum to the Turkish Ambassador that required an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of Turkish forces. Failing this Greece would declare enosis and war on Turkey. Washington told them that if they did so all military aid to Greece would be withdrawn. Despite having ordered a general mobilization Greece backed down after some dissension in the Greek Government. Turkey simply ignored the ultimatum.18 Turkey had suggested that the United Kingdom should assist Turkish intervention. Writers expressing a Greek Cypriot point of view have complained that the United Kingdom should, instead, have intervened on their side by threatening to use their substantial fleet in the Mediterranean to stop the Turkish action. The British Government seems to have taken this seriously, but became alarmed at the possibility of having to sink Turkish ships and thus start a war with Turkey. Callaghan was aware that he could only act with American support, which was not forthcoming.19 The United States, through Sisco, told the Turkish Government that military intervention was against Turkey’s long-term interests, but made a point of not threatening or demanding. Kissinger did not want to be committed to either side.20

Turkish military intervention After landing east of Kyrenia, not as expected in the Karpas panhandle, Turkish troops expanded their bridgehead in both directions along the coast, but had to repel serious Greek counterattacks, even though the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were in some disarray and were taken by surprise. Paratroops were also dropped in order to secure a link between the Turkish forces and the large Turkish-Cypriot enclave to the south of Nicosia.

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The response of the UN Security Council was on the same day to call for a cease-fire. The Resolution (353) also called for respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, an immediate end to foreign intervention, the withdrawal without delay of foreign military personnel apart from those there under international agreements [i.e. under the authority of the 1960 treaties], and for Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom ‘to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional Government in Cyprus’. This led to the convening of the first Geneva Conference. Kissinger had severely criticized Ecevit for not heeding his warning not to employ military force. When he urged a cease-fire on Ecevit the latter replied: We have followed the policy recommended by America in Cyprus for ten years, and where have we ended? We have different ideas about it … But until now we have not been given a chance … All the time we tried to do something about this. Now we took the initiative … We want to make good use of it.21 Establishing a cease-fire was not easy. Neither side would comply until on 21 July, the efforts of Kissinger and Callaghan, with help from the French Foreign Minister acting on behalf of the European Community, at last came to fruition for a cease-fire from 14.00 hours the following day. Kissinger again threatened Greece with removal of all military aid, and let it be known in Ankara, as a purely private opinion expressed by the American Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Arthur Hartman, that this might even be extended to Turkey. Ecevit was urged to agree to enter into negotiations with Greece and the United Kingdom to restore peace and constitutional government in Cyprus, as required by Security Council Resolution 353. The Greek Government was at this stage in a very parlous state. On 22 July the Junta gave place to a new government under the last democratically elected Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, who was living in Paris. It could not be anything but a weak government with the military still on the scene.

The first Geneva Conference 25–30 July The next development was for the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey to enter into negotiations to restore peace in the area and to restore constitutional government in Cyprus, as required by Security Council Resolution 353. The Turkish Government and the new Greek Government agreed to meet with the United Kingdom in Geneva, in the first of what came to be known as the Geneva Conferences, beginning on the 25 July 1974.

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Callaghan represented the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Turan Günes¸ Turkey, and Greece’s Foreign Minister, George Mavros, Greece. There was no chairman, but Callaghan, frequently in contact with Kissinger, began to assume that role. On the sidelines the American Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Arthur Hartmann was present, as too was William Buffum, Kissinger’s personal representative, also from the Department of State. The UN Secretary-General also had a representative present. Ankara only grudgingly accepted his presence as a silent witness, its policy being to emphasize not the role of the UN but of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The Turkish UN Representative, Osman Olcay, was instructed to delay matters at the UN as far as he could in order ‘to free ourselves from the hands of those member nations of the Council that would try to degenerate the issue’.22 Now the Junta was no longer in power Callaghan began to be perturbed at the extent of the Turkish operation, and strove to prevent the Turkish army from brushing aside the UN Force and occupying Nicosia airport. The UN troops defending the airport were mainly British and partly Canadian. British troops were ordered to resist if the Turks advanced further. Phantom bombers were sent to Akrotiri to provide air cover for the UN forces and more troops were sent to Cyprus. The Turkish troops stayed their hand, but plans to bomb the airport, avoiding British personnel resulted in more threats from the British Government. Ecevit backed down. The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, believed that there could otherwise have been war.23 It was a wholly unnecessary confrontation. The Turkish army appears to have been acting without its government’s authority since Turkey had declared it would not take the airport. However, the UN ought not to have taken over the airport, as Ecevit pointed out. The Turkish army did not need the airport since there was no chance that Greek forces could use it for reinforcements, Turkey having control of the air. The United Kingdom’s defence rights at the airport were not important given the facilities at the bases. Callaghan later wanted to stop any more major Turkish military activity by moving in reinforcements to strengthen a static defence against further Turkish advance out of their bridgehead. He believed that the show of force at the airport had halted the Turks and would do so again. He soon realized, however, that without American support such a move was not possible. Kissinger made it clear that such support was not forthcoming and that he did not approve of any British military action. ‘He did not consider threats of military action either helpful or appropriate.’24 Callaghan backed down, though he insisted to Kissinger that the correct policy was to tackle Turkey ‘on parallel lines, namely to convince them that we were in earnest on both the diplomatic and military level’.25 Kissinger told President Ford of the British threat of military action against the Turks, which, he said, ‘is one of the stupidest things I have heard’.26 The United Kingdom’s strong

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ties with Greece clashed with the United States’ ‘strong strategic preference for Turkey’.27 The United States believed that it had more influence over Turkey than later turned out to be the case. The work of the first Geneva conference was guided by UN Security Council Resolution 353. The first task was consequently to monitor the cease-fire already agreed, and then, secondly, to obtain an immediate end to foreign intervention, and to bring about without delay the withdrawal of all military personnel not authorized under the 1960 settlement. In this regard, during the conference the Turkish Foreign Minister ‘flabbergasted’ the British and Greek sides by the assertion that the demand for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel, otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, ‘did not apply to the Turkish armed forces since they were in Cyprus under the authority of the Treaty of Guarantee’.28 Flabbergasted they may have been, but it was a valid point: Resolution 353 should have been drafted more carefully. The third major task was to negotiate without delay to restore peace in the area, and constitutional government in Cyprus. As noted above, the cease-fire came into effect on 22 July before the conference convened. There now began, however, the difficult task of keeping the Turkish forces within the area occupied in and around Kyrenia and extending to the Turkish Cypriot enclave in, and to, the south of Nicosia. The Turks, much constrained by the limited area they occupied, kept making small advances, often claiming that they were under attack by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces. Also they were landing more troops and equipment, which suggested they intended further action. Ankara hotly rejected suggestions by the Greek side to put a UN Peace Force ring fence of troops around the Turkish positions. Eventually, it was with great difficulty agreed to establish a buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek/Greek Cypriot forces. The Turkish side constantly complained of the occupation by the Greek militia of Turkish enclaves unable to defend themselves and of undefended villages. The evacuation of these areas by the Greeks and the restoration of responsibility to the local Turkish Cypriot security forces was a major Turkish demand that was only very partly satisfied. Clerides, who had just assumed power, in fact openly states, ‘I refused to give the order for the evacuation of the Turkish enclaves in the south by our forces’ pointing out that ‘Turkish forces should evacuate Greek villages in the north and the town of Kyrenia’.29 The two cases were not strictly comparable and it was extremely dangerous not to comply as fully as possible with the Turkish demand if Turkey was to be deprived of justification for extended military action. The Conference did demand, as recorded in the Geneva Declaration embodying its conclusions, that ‘all the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately evacuated’, but Clerides continues, ‘Despite the pressure which was mounting every day, I refused to give

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the order for the evacuation of the Turkish enclaves in the south by our forces both before the second Geneva Conference and during the Conference, insisting on a simultaneous evacuation.’30 On the important issue of the withdrawal of foreign forces mentioned above, taken by the British and the Greeks to include the Turkish troops just landed, the Turkish side proved very difficult. In Ankara, to which Günes¸ referred the issue after a stormy session with Callaghan, Ecevit could not accept ‘withdrawal’. The demand for withdrawal had already been modified by Günes¸ and accepted by Greece, by the vital addition of ‘consistent with finding a just and equitable solution to the Cyprus problem’.31 The word withdrawal in Resolution 353 also had to be abandoned. Over the phone Kissinger tried to find with Ecevit a suitable wording. Decision was urgent as the following day Cyprus was being brought again before the UN Security Council by the Soviet Union. None of the negotiators, nor Kissinger, wanted the Soviet Union, its satellites, and the non-aligned world to be let into the problem and cause havoc among NATO partners. Kissinger, and the Conference, had to accept in place of ‘withdrawal’, ‘the timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces and the amounts of armaments, munitions and all other war material in the Republic of Cyprus’.32 In the context of the Security Council’s call for the restoration of peace and constitutional government discussion in the Conference brought agreement on two issues important for the Turkish side. One was that the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President should be allowed to perform his functions. This the Greek side did not challenge since it implied continuing recognition of the 1960 Constitution. The Turkish side did not want a return to the 1960 Constitution, but to constitutional legitimacy, a wording that also appeared in the Declaration made at the end of the conference. Günes¸ also asked the Conference for ‘the restoration in Cyprus of the two autonomous administrations’, adding that these ‘must be directed respectively by the heads of the two communities’.33 After much argument the Conference made the declaration that included the following: 1. Recognition of the need to set in train as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to regularize, within a reasonable period of time, the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis. 2. No further extension of the areas controlled by the Turkish forces. 3. The establishment of a security zone at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish forces. 4. The evacuation of all Turkish (sic) enclaves occupied by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, and the continuation of their protection by UNFICYP. 5. The release of military personnel detained by either side. 6. The elaboration of measures leading to the timely and phased reduction of the numbers of armed forces and of war material, ‘within the frame-

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work of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all the parties concerned’ [emphasis added]. 7. The participation of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the further talks beginning in Geneva on 8 August. 8. The discussion at the forthcoming talks of, inter alia, the immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President to resume his functions as under the 1960 Constitution. The linking of the timely and phased reduction of armed forces and war material with finding a solution was a very important Turkish achievement. One further point has been treasured ever since by the Turkish Cypriots. ‘The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Without any prejudice to the conclusions to be drawn from this situation, the Ministers agreed to consider at their next meeting the problems raised by their existence.’

The Second Geneva Conference The second Geneva Conference began on 8 August. The same representatives attended, with the addition on 10 August of the leaders of the two communities, Clerides and Denktas¸, the former filling Makarios’s role in his absence. He was in London, but, since he would at some point return to reassume his office, could not be ignored by Clerides, whose position in Cyprus was anything but firmly established. Denktas¸ had his own clear views about a solution, but he had to be guided by Turkey. The problematic issues that the Geneva Declaration addressed were debated intensely at the second conference. Two immediate, and linked, issues that caused considerable friction and ill-feeling were the requirements in the Declaration that (1) the areas controlled by opposing forces should not be extended and (2) all Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately evacuated. The first problem, then, was that the standfast cease-fire was not holding. The Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, claimed that since the 22 July cease-fire the Turkish forces had extended their area of control from 300 to 430 square kilometres by 8 August and that the area controlled contained 11,000 Greek Cypriots. To this the Turkish Foreign Minister, Günes¸, responded that the Turkish area only amounted to one twenty-fifth of the island. This Turkish expansion preoccupied the mind of Mavros, whilst, on the Turkish side, Günes¸ stressed the urgent need to ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and their evacuation by Greek troops. Günes¸ claimed that two-thirds (some 81,000) of the Turkish Cypriot population were defenceless. Callaghan remarked, with more prescience than perhaps intended, that the Turks would be unable to protect the Turkish Cypriot

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community unless they occupied the whole island. Since they denied they intended to advance further, he could not see why they needed 25,000 troops. Günes¸ was insisting on the implementation of Article 3(b) of the Geneva Declaration, the evacuation of all enclaves occupied by Greek, or Greek Cypriot, forces. It was suggested that there was some exaggeration in these Turkish complaints. Mr Weckmann-Munoz of the UN asserted that the Turkish Cypriot villages were not short of food and water, and were not under attack. The situation, he reported, had been restored in most areas; the problem areas were limited to Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca, but the Turkish side claimed that the Turkish Cypriots in Famagusta were in serious danger.34 Agreement on Turkish advances and Greek evacuation of the enclaves could not easily be obtained, All involved realized that if this and other matters, like ‘the timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces’ could not be settled soon, the whole problem would soon be taken up in the UN Security Council, which would give the Soviet Union a chance to fish in troubled waters, to the detriment of NATO unity. The major worry for Callaghan was not how to restrain minor advances by Turkish troops, but how to prevent them doing what he most feared, launching an attack to capture a large part of the island. Fearing this would happen, he told Günes¸ that the British Government ‘would take a very serious view of such action’.35 British-American differences Callaghan thought that Kissinger was not pressing hard enough on Ecevit to dissuade the Turks from the further large-scale action he feared they would take. He reverted to his earlier view, as proved, he believed, by his earlier firm opposition to Turkish occupation of Nicosia Airport, that the Turks could be held back by a show of force. On 10 August, speaking to British journalists, Callaghan said he had suggested that UN troops should be so situated as to prevent any further Turkish advance and said that ‘if a single British soldier of the U.N. Force is fired upon, our troops and planes will go into action to protect British lives’.36 He said that he had asked the Minister of Defence not to withdraw the Phantom aircraft and the troops recently sent to Cyprus. He added that Gurkha troops could be brought to the island. In this aggressive attitude he was strongly supported by the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, who believed that a strongly reinforced UNFICYP force that stood fast would deter the Turks from further advance. He thought the project could be carried through and would have the support of the Soviet Union and China in the Security Council. Callaghan asked for Kissinger’s reaction to his proposal ‘to attempt to deter Turkish activities by reinforcing British troops under UN auspices in Cyprus’.37 The next day the American Deputy Secretary for European Affairs in Geneva, Hartman, told Callaghan that Kissinger was ‘not happy’ with this

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approach, which was, at least, a polite response. Kissinger said he was content with assurances from Ecevit, to whom he had sent a message to continue the talks and to refrain from military action. Kissinger thought ‘there was a real possibility of moving the Turks off their idea of a single Turkish zone in Cyprus’.38 He had in mind the cantonal approach he favoured, under which there would be a number of large Turkish Cypriot areas, not just one. He believed negotiations had to continue in order to find a diplomatic solution. Callaghan’s proposals would bring domestic pressure on Ecevit and force him to take a firmer line. Hartman told Callaghan ‘Dr Kissinger would react very strongly against another public announcement of British military activities. It would have an adverse effect on his tactics with Ecevit’.39 In response Callaghan, no doubt stung by this rebuke, thought ‘Dr Kissinger was not facing up to the real problem on the military side’.40 He believed the Americans were not yet handling the Turks in a way that would have effect. ‘The tougher you are with the Turks, the more they will listen to you.’41 According to Hartman Kissinger believed ‘that if they focused on the military intentions of the Turks, it would affect the whole tone of the political discussions’.42 Callaghan wanted contingency plans against a large Turkish military expansion, but a military threat without American participation would anyway have been impossible. Another way to stop a further Turkish advance would have been to allow Greek troops to be brought in under Anglo-American protection, but this could easily have resulted in a Greek-Turkish war. Economic or other sanctions on Turkey would be dangerous and would take time. Nevertheless Callaghan was persistent in believing that the Turks could be stopped by a show of force. He was in consequence not at all popular in Turkey. He was also frustrated and upset that in talks with Ecevit Kissinger had mentioned without consulting him, the possibility of a cantonal, instead of a single area, solution for the Turkish Cypriots. Callaghan remarked that ‘he was not prepared to be a dummy in the middle’.43 He had hinted earlier in the day (11 August); ‘From a short-sighted point of view it might be the best thing … to withdraw from the SBA’s [the Sovereign Base Areas].’44 This would be a measure to which the Americans were very opposed, but it was being mooted in British Government circles on account of the expense in maintaining them. They were clearly of no value in stopping the Turks. Callaghan was clearly frustrated. Constitutional matters Callaghan invited both sides to express their views on constitutional issues. Before reaching this point, at the beginning of the conference, the Greek and Greek Cypriot side early realized that ‘the Turks were bound to insist on a declaration of principles that recognized, and provided for, a federation organized along geographical lines’.45 Clerides said that he would never sign such a declaration. Although he thought the gap between the

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two sides was unbridgeable, he could see the conference serving a useful purpose. Time could be saved during which ‘some success in other fronts might be achieved … Nor was it likely that the Turkish Government really wanted to negotiate’.46 Günes¸, meanwhile, lost no time in explaining to Callaghan that ‘Turkey wants only one thing, acceptance of the principle of regional autonomy. If this is agreed on, we should at least be able to outline the two regions before we leave Geneva’.47 In response Callaghan said he would discuss regionalization with Clerides, but not advocate it. He added, that if what was wanted was a quick result, Günes¸ ‘must make a concrete move concerning withdrawal of forces; he would not get acceptance of his principle in return for vague assurances’.48 This overlooked the fact that Turkey would never leave a Turkish Cypriot region defenceless. With each side apparently determined to insist on its demands a discussion of the constitutional problem began. On basic constitutional issues Günes¸ pointed out that the Geneva Declaration on which they had recently agreed called for a return to constitutional legitimacy, not for the revival of the 1960 Constitution, whose basic articles ‘had lapsed, or been abrogated, through the will of the Greek community’.49 It was legitimacy, not legality, that had to be concentrated upon, though Günes¸ might have pointed out that in fact, the Geneva Declaration had called for the re-establishment of constitutional government, the assumption in that being that the 1960 Constitution was not in operation. Clerides attacked Günes¸ by arguing that if, as he insisted, there was no Cyprus Constitution then there should clearly be a return to the 1960 Constitution. This, he asserted, was what the Geneva Declaration meant when it called for ‘an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy’. ‘According to the Turks they had invaded the Island under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee … if this had any purpose other than the restoration of the 1960 Constitution, it was contrary both to the Treaty and the Geneva Declaration.’50 This thesis was underlined by the addition, ‘the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution’. In fact, however, Clerides said, changing tack, that Cyprus still had a constitution, that of 1960, which was still valid, neither side having abrogated it. It was just that some features of it were not being implemented, some being unworkable. [If pressed he would doubtless have claimed that this was the fault of the Turkish Cypriots.] He and Denktas¸ could revise the constitution, as they had been doing until recently. ‘A return to the 1960 Constitution would solve Mr Denktas¸’s worries about the security of his community.’51 The Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, drew attention to the positive role played by the Greek and Turkish advisers at the inter-communal talks saying that this was the way forward that would not impair the sovereignty of the Republic. This underlined the Greek Cypriots’ worry that a federation undermined its sovereignty. Clerides thought it was possible to find a solution ‘whereby the Turks would be self-

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administered in a number of villages connected together in various areas under Turkish autonomous administration’.52 This was as far as Clerides went towards any degree of geographical separation. It has also to be recalled that by ‘autonomous administration’ Clerides had in mind the relatively low-level functions ascribed to the Turkish Cypriots in the recent communal negotiations. Mavros supported Clerides pointing out that under the Treaty of Guarantee the guarantor powers ‘have the right, and even the duty, to concern themselves only with the re-establishment of the constitutional order of Cyprus, and that could only be the 1960 Constitution’.53 In fact the Treaty of Guarantee, guaranteeing inter alia the provisions of the basic article of the Constitution, did not direct the Guarantor Powers to the Constitution itself; it gave Guarantor Powers ‘the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs (emphasis added) established by the present Treaty’. The Turkish Cypriots argued that the Constitution essentially created a partnership. This was the state of affairs intended, they claimed, but it was destroyed by the actions of the Greek Cypriots. Denktas¸ did not argue the case in these words, but logically essential to Denktas¸’s view was that it was the partnership that should be restored. Moreover, the attitudes shown, and the conditions created, by the Greek Cypriots since 1960, meant that for the Turkish Cypriots any agreement had to be set in concrete. Denktas¸ argued that the 1960 Constitution had not protected them. In other words, it had not, in effect, produced the ‘state of affairs’ intended. In the greatly changed situation that had unfortunately developed since 1960, it could not again be expected to do so. For their own security, to feel safe not just from Greek adventurers, but from the Makarios government itself, the Turkish Cypriots, Denktas¸ insisted, had to have their own separate area. ‘If the only thing that the conference could do was the restoration of the 1960 Constitution, nothing would be accomplished.’54 The Turkish determination to have autonomous regions in Cyprus was made clear to Callaghan on 9 August by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Günes¸.55 The principle of autonomous regions, he said, must be agreed by the Conference. Callaghan, in reply, said that he would discuss regionalization with Clerides that evening. When he said to the Greek Ambassador, John Tzouniz, that now they knew what the Turks were after, he replied that it was much as they had expected. Attempts at a solution Callaghan realized that the only way forward was to try to have Clerides and Denktas¸ agree on a wording of a statement indicating the way forward to solve the issue. The British delegation produced a first draft for both community leaders to consider. This draft statement envisaged ‘a system based on the existence of two autonomous administrations within

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boundaries, united under a central Government’.56 A Turkish Cypriot draft, in response, postulated, ‘two federated states autonomous within their respective geographical boundaries’.57 Clerides, predictably, rejected it though Callaghan believed, if optimistically, that he might be persuaded if the solution was cantonal. Denktas¸ urged flexibility on Clerides and hoped he would avoid Makarios’s influence. Some resolution of the problem was becoming urgent. Tension was building: the Turkish forces were increasingly feeling hemmed in. Also the British and Turkish delegations were becoming increasingly alarmed that world opinion would soon be mobilized in the UN against Turkey. On 13 August Clerides said that ‘neither he nor Archbishop Makarios could accept federation on a geographical basis’.58 He said that the proposed Turkish zone would require the movement of about 90,000 Greek Cypriots to the South. Mavros was disposed to ask the Security Council to intervene. He thought the Günes¸ cantonal plans were worse than the Denktas¸ plan for a single area. Callaghan nevertheless advised the Greek Cypriots to look again at the options, including those involving large transfers of population. With a remarkable change of emphasis, the British delegation now proposed another draft statement, as follows: The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent, sovereign and integral State, comprising within a federal system, which accords with its bi-communal nature, two autonomous Administrations operating in appropriately defined geographical areas.59 There was then mention of competencies to be allotted to the Federal Government, but since each Administration was autonomous, it would clearly be able to decide what, if anything, to allocate to the federal government. Later Clerides told Callaghan that ‘there was no question of any Greek Cypriot being able to agree to such a draft in 15 days, or even 15 years’.60 He later gave Callaghan the text of the counter-proposals that he had just given to Denktas¸. The Greek side did not want autonomous administrations, but a grouping of villages and municipalities to form Communal Administrations. They would not have competence over state affairs, though there would be autonomy in communal and local matters. Clerides emphasized that this ‘grouping’ was devoid of any geographical division. He realized, however, that there was no possibility the Turkish side would accept these proposals. Clearly, he said, ‘The line between state and communal matters would be carefully delineated so as not to lead to any fragmentation of the state and the disintegration of the central authority.’61 Callaghan’s response was that the Greek Cypriot proposals were not enough to save the conference. He and Kissinger believed that there had to be geographical separation, but should that come about, they would strongly urge the Turks that the sep-

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arate Turkish Cypriot area or areas should not amount to more than 20 per cent of the island. Callaghan’s preference was for a single area; Kissinger favoured a cantonal solution. Responding to the cantonal idea Turkey then produced an alternative plan allowing for one large autonomous Turkish Cypriot zone plus five other Turkish Cypriot districts, all to be under a unified administration separate from that of the Greek Cypriots. For either a single area, or for the cantonal solution, 34 per cent of the island was said to be needed, but this was open to negotiation. The cantonal system would have reduced considerably the numbers of Greek Cypriot refugees, but could have led to friction and perhaps to violence. On the morning of 13 August Callaghan discussed with the Greeks and Greek Cypriots the Turkish proposals for a geographical federation. Mavros said that neither he nor Makarios could accept it, however framed. Mavros said at this point that the conference would break up forthwith if the Turkish Government did not allow a 36 hour recess for delegates to consult with their governments. On the same day Ecevit, on the telephone to Kissinger, made two important points. First, he said he could not keep the military waiting any longer. Secondly, he said he would give the Greek side not just 36 hours, but 36 days, if they accepted in principle his proposal for a geographical solution, cantonal or bi-regional. He also proposed a buffer zone around the Turkish troops, who would not be reinforced.62 Matters now moved fast. Ecevit decided on the morning of 13 August that the time limit for consideration of broad principles of an agreement would expire at 2200 hours that day. Callaghan was immediately in touch with Kissinger, who said he would press Ecevit to raise the deadline. There was no result. The final session This began in the early evening of 13 August, and after a break resumed at 11.15. Denktas¸ made an earnest appeal to the Greek Cypriots to join with the Turkish Cypriots to create a new Cyprus, an appeal that moved Callaghan to say, ‘There was a common humanity which bound them all and Mr Denktas¸ had made a more powerful case than any of them’.63 They had been reminded that both communities were staring in the face of ruin. Shortly before midnight the Conference received the following message from Kissinger: The US position is as follows: we recognize that the position of the Turkish community in Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them. The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted and therefore the

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United States would consider a resort to military action unjustified. We have made this clear to all parties.64 The Turks were not deterred by Kissinger’s last minute statement on 13 August, but, rather, were encouraged by it. According to Birand, Ços¸kun Kırca, of the Turkish delegation, told Mavros that Turkey interpreted Kissinger’s message to mean that ‘the Turkish Cypriots must be granted more rights and greater autonomy … but if these principles are not accepted, Turkey reserves the right to march’.65 Whilst the statement was both an encouragement to the Turkish side and also a warning, Nicolet believes Kissinger ‘should have realized himself that the first two sentences were likely to confirm to Ecevit that the American Secretary of State would endorse his authorization of military action’.66 After a very brief recess the final session continued at 1.40 a.m. 14 August. Günes¸ said he would repeat his proposals once more and ask his colleagues whether they could accept them: (a) Did they agree that the Island should be given a constitutional sector based on regionalism? (b) Did they agree to a region extending from the Turkish sector of Famagusta to the Turkish sector of Nicosia continuing westwards on a line to be determined later, on the basis that the total area under Turkish Cypriot Administration in the form of zones and cantons was to cover about 34 per cent of the area of Cyprus?67 Günes¸ continued by saying that ‘for this evening he would set aside the rest of his proposals and ask Mr Mavros and Mr Clerides whether they could accept those which he had just outlined’.68 No doubt on instructions from Ankara Günes¸ required that the Greek side should that night agree that there should be an independent area, or areas, for the Turkish Cypriots. Mehmet Ali Birand strangely argues that the Greeks wanted to have the conference break down as much as the Turks did. Otherwise, he continues, they could have tied up the Turkish completely by saying, ‘We agree in principle, but we have some counter proposals to make let us begin to discuss them right away.’69 However, agreeing in principle was just not what they were prepared to do without consultation in Nicosia, Athens, and with Makarios in London. Clerides pointed out that such a broad declaration as given by Günes¸ did not give any clue as to the powers to be retained by the Central Government, which was not very relevant since he was being asked to declare himself on geographical area, not on division of functions. He said that could not accept or reject the proposals, but must insist on 48 hours to consider them. He said in response to a question by Callaghan that he would be able to give a definite answer to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot

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proposals after such an adjournment. He would consider the proposals with ‘an open mind’, a promise that did not make any impact on Günes¸. According to Polyviou, Clerides refused to sign a statement drawn up by Callaghan, with the approval of Kissinger, that he would go back to Cyprus for the purpose of ‘favourably considering’ the concept of geographical separation.70 Mavros, and even Callaghan, also wanted a short recess in order to consult colleagues in their capitals, but Günes¸ would not give way. He reminded the meeting that the Greek side had long known the Turkish position on geographical federation and that they had had ample time to consider it. He considered the replies to his appeal for the Greek side to recognize a geographical area, or areas, for the Turkish Cypriots had already been given. There would be no adjournment. ‘He had begun to be convinced in Geneva that the threat of diplomatic delaying tactics was looming up, and he did not want the Cyprus drama to drag on as before.’71 Callaghan thought that to deny the request for an adjournment was unreasonable, as did the United States and the European Common Market member states. It was all to no avail. The conference broke up at 2.25 a.m. on 14 August, a few hours before the Turkish forces began their second operation, which soon resulted in Turkish control of 37 per cent of the island. Were the Turks unreasonable? Their answer is that they thought, with some reason, they had no option because they saw that the spirit of Makarios dominated the Greek side in Geneva. Clerides was in constant touch with him. Clerides’ rejection of the geographical area solution formally advanced by Günes¸ on 9 August had been total and unchanging throughout the conference. It had to be. If anyone, it was only Makarios who could attempt to get the divided Greek Cypriot people agree to what would be a huge change in the 1960 Constitution. Even if he supported the idea, which he did not, he probably could not have done it. Clerides could certainly not do it and keep his head. Kissinger, and even Callaghan, favoured some form of geographical separation and a federal solution. They saw it as the reasonable way forward, but the Greek Cypriots did not. Within the two days’ delay suggested Makarios could hardly have been persuaded to accept the Turkish proposals. In fact Turkish impatience, it has been shrewdly noted, ‘provided the Greek side with the chance not to be in a position where they had to reject them’.72 If there had been any delay the Cyprus issue would have gone straight away to the UN Security Council. They would almost certainly have supported Makarios. The UN had long accepted that the 1960 Constitution was still in existence, as Clerides claimed was the legal position. The UN would probably have called on the two leaders to continue to meet to amend the Constitution, as they had been doing not long before. The Constitution could not be changed, they would argue, just because Turkey wanted it so. The Turkish position would be untenable. Its army would be told to evacuate Cyprus. Ecevit’s policy would be in ruins. Turkey would be humiliated.

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Turkey believed that delay would provide a real opportunity for Greece to turn the world against Turkey. This is what Clerides, on his own admission, would have tried to do if the adjournment had been agreed. He intended to sound out Karamanlis, Makarios and other Greek Cypriot leaders, but in addition, he later wrote, ‘I had also in mind that gaining 48 hours would have given us the time needed to request a meeting of the UN Security Council before the Turkish forces could move’.73 He would also have tried, he wrote, to convince the Greek Government to despatch troops to Cyprus by low flying transport planes. Greece would not have agreed to provide military support, not being strong enough to do so, but the UN Security Council might well have demanded a military halt, which Turkey would have found difficult to ignore in the turning tide of critical international public opinion. Postscript and conclusions In 1984 Bulent Ecevit gave a talk in North Cyprus, in which he said: At one stage of the Second Geneva Conference the Greeks said they wanted to go back to Greece and Cyprus for consultations. We were prepared for that on one condition: that security should be provided for the Turkish troops encircled in a very small area, and the safety, at least, of the Turks entrapped in the Chatos and Famagusta areas be ensured. We suggested that the region between the Turkishcontrolled Nicosia-Kyrenia triangle and the Turkish part of Famagusta be demilitarized and turned over to Turkish Cypriot administration, together with a narrow strip of land to serve as a buffer zone to the west of the triangle. This interim arrangement would include the heavily Turkish populated Chatos area, to the east of the triangle, but excluding the Karpasian peninsula in the northeast, and cover approximately 17 per cent of the Island altogether. But they would not listen.74 Ecevit supported this statement with a map. It appears to be the same map that is included in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office document and outlined the proposed extent of the main, but not the only, Turkish Cypriot canton.75 It ran from a short distance west of Kyrenia to Nicosia and Famagusta, but excluded most of the Karpas peninsula. However, at the last session of the Conference Günes¸ did not ask for acceptance of just this map to save the conference, but for a total area ‘in the form of zones and cantons to cover about 34 per cent of the area of Cyprus’, though he had earlier said that the 34 per cent was negotiable. Clerides would not, however, accept any form of geographical separation, though reportedly during the Conference he had remarkably said, in an aside, that if his people accepted a framework of two autonomous administrations in appropriately defined geographical areas ‘it would be conditional on all Turkish forces withdrawing from Cyprus’.76

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Ecevit in 1984 was apparently claiming that if the Greek/Greek Cypriot side had agreed to the 17 per cent map there would not have been a further Turkish advance, but it has to be noted that it was only, as he said, an interim measure, not a final solution. If the Greeks and Greek Cypriots had accepted it, they would have been giving way on the principle of geographical separation. The solution hinted at by Clerides, a geographical federation in return for the removal of all Turkish forces, was not developed. There could perhaps have been some mileage in it since the presence of Turkish troops was, and still is, felt as a real threat by Greek Cypriots. In retrospect, and with the gift of hindsight, it was a mistake for the Greek side to turn down in principle a geographically based federation. Since states making federations remain autonomous only in certain agreed areas, the principle governing discussions in Geneva of ‘two autonomous administrations’ would have had to be modified once a federation was agreed, a development that would have been welcomed by the Greek Cypriots. Three years later Makarios was to agree to a federal solution under much less favourable circumstances. The Greek Cypriots were deeply dismayed by the Turkish action, and almost all believed that the United States was responsible for the dire events of 1974. The general public feeling was that the CIA was behind the coup that ousted Makarios, and that the US Government was aware that after the coup a Turkish invasion would follow and did nothing to prevent it. It was also believed that an American objective was to get Makarios out of the way, and to divide Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, thus extending NATO and American air bases to the island. If partition could not be achieved, the American aim was to control Cyprus through a puppet government, and bring the island firmly within the NATO alliance, establishing at the same time American air and military bases on it.77 This view is not confined to Greek Cypriots. The events of 1974, it has been asserted, reveal ‘an astonishing international plot, developed from a blueprint evolved first under British rule, then by the U.S. President Johnson’s officials, the goals of which were finally realized in 1974’.78 The authors of these studies insist that the major American concern with Cyprus was to maintain the British bases and British and American listening posts in Cyprus with the object of keeping the Eastern Mediterranean free from Soviet intervention. In this major enterprise the support of Turkey, as a more important NATO member than Greece, was vital. In fact the facilities enjoyed in Turkey itself were much more important than those in Cyprus. The British believed that Kissinger ‘was reluctant to put the US bases in Turkey at risk’.79 In these international manoeuvrings, the Cypriots, Greek or Turkish, could not be anything but pawns too weak to ensure that their own rights were respected, however differently they conceived them. Was the United States really responsible for the Turkish military intervention and its consequences? By 1974 Makarios, as has been noted, was

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regarded by Kissinger as more of a nuisance than a threat. Encouragement of enosis would inevitably trigger a Turkish reaction, especially as Turkey was still smarting after the Johnson rebuff of 1964. Turkish reaction could not be guaranteed not to lead to a Turkish-Greek war, the last result the United States wanted. Ecevit, nationalist and socialist, was much more difficult to influence than Demirel even though Kissinger had known him as a student. The British bases and their, and the American, listening posts were not under threat as long as the status quo remained, and the United States and the United Kingdom had avoided challenging the dominant position in Cyprus obtained by the Greek Cypriots in 1963–64. From his study of American documentary sources Nicolet obviously does not see enough evidence to conclude that the events of 1974 were an American plot. He tackles the accusations that Washington did nothing to prevent either the coup or the invasion, a much lesser charge, describing them as ‘wrong and unfair’.80 He concludes that ‘the United States did too little and too late’.81 The British Government could certainly not be a satisfactory partner in purported American designs. Apart from eventually expressing support for a geographical federation, as Callaghan had shown, it was generally proGreek Cypriot, pro-Commonwealth, and always concerned about vulnerability of the British base areas, and the need they engendered for good relations with the Greek Cypriots. Callaghan was an uncertain ally, and a danger to American policy as developed by Kissinger, who primarily wanted to stay neutral and prevent war between Turkey and Greece. Callaghan, with his attempts to halt the Turkish military advance in Cyprus, was dangerously taking sides. The United Kingdom, like the United States, wanted an agreed settlement on Cyprus if the status quo could not be maintained. Supporting the return of Makarios was not, however, likely to bring this about, since he had little or no sympathy for the Turkish Cypriots. Kissinger’s preference for Clerides was much sounder. He also had a point in urging a cantonal solution as a way to reduce the refugee problem. Among the Greek Cypriots the United States took the blame for not stopping the Turkish ‘invasion and occupation’. The United Kingdom had, at least, tried to halt it, if hopelessly and to no effect, save to make itself immensely unpopular in Turkey. Kissinger did not want any share in that. In his more subtle way he tried to restrain Turkey, but he too failed. The considerable consolation, however, was that Turkey was hugely more important than Cyprus. Sadly Greek Cypriot anger and frustration broke out in a demonstration outside the American Embassy in Nicosia. Shots were fired at the building. The new (and very senior) Ambassador, Roger Davies and his Greek Cypriot secretary were killed. Despite the danger Clerides rushed to the scene where he had the Ambassador placed on a stretcher and conveyed to hospital, but he was by then already dead.

7 From Guide Lines to the First UN Plan 1975–1987

The renewal of military action by the Turkish forces on 14–15 August 1974 resulted in a flurry of UN Resolutions calling for a halt to the fighting and ‘for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government’.1 Two days later the Security Council recorded ‘its formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus.2 By the end of August the Council was becoming concerned about the plight of refugees. In March 1975 the Council, endorsed the General Assembly’s Resolution of 1 November 1974, which considered that ‘all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end’.3 The Security Council Resolution also regretted the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 that declared that part of the Republic of Cyprus would become ‘a Federal’ Turkish State and, curiously, saw this development as ‘inter alia, tending to compromise the continuation of negotiations on an equal footing’.4 In the eyes of the Turkish Cypriots the establishment of their state in the North, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, put them on an equal footing with what was to them a purely Greek Cypriot state. The new state had a liberal and democratic constitution of a parliamentary type, unlike that of the Republic of Cyprus, though there was an elected President with modest powers. There was fierce debate on this issue: those opposed to Rauf Denktas¸, the likely choice, were determined to curtail his powers. The name of the new state implied that it could become part of a federal republic of Cyprus.5 International response was deeply critical. Security Council resolutions called on all states ‘to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus’. The Greek Cypriot case enjoyed increasing international support when Turkish forces occupied some 37 per cent of the island, and as Greek Cypriots either fled, or were forced from, their homes in the North. The numbers of Greek Cypriot refugees is disputed. The Greek Cypriots have claimed as many as 200,000, though the figure of 180,000 has come to be generally accepted. It has, however, been pointed out that the Greek Cypriot 131

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population of the area taken over by the Turkish Cypriots was only 138,823 according to the 1960 census.6 Were the Greek Cypriots forced out of the Turkish occupied area, or did they flee of their own accord? From enquiries subsequently made (by this writer) of British residents present in 1974 they appeared mainly to have fled out of fear, and who could blame them? In many places they were in real danger. An American Senate investigating team concluded, ‘People moved the instant they saw, or thought, the Turkish army was advancing towards their town or village’.7 However in certain instances they seem to have been moved and taken to the border developing with the South. One such case was Bellapais, according to one reliable observer present. There a Turkish officer, politely but firmly, told the inhabitants to collect together their personal possessions and then had them, and their possessions, taken by lorry to the South. The international press deplored the plight of the Greek Cypriot refugees. The treatment of innocent Greek and Turkish Cypriot villagers by the forces of the other side was barbaric. World opinion was particularly outraged by the atrocities committed out of rage and frustration on Turkish Cypriots by the other side before the Turkish troops could reach and rescue them. Massacres of innocent people on both sides ran into the hundreds; in some villages all the men were taken out and shot. Others were imprisoned for long periods under appalling conditions. Not surprisingly the Turkish Cypriots left under Greek Cypriot control made every effort to escape to the North.8 The Greek Cypriot position was militarily desperate. They could not fight back effectively, but still put up a stiff resistance. The troops they had were not in position to resist the attack, having just recently been involved in the events leading up to the deposition of Makarios. Nor could Greek forces be brought in to help since it would have led Greece into war with Turkey, which the Greek Government, aware of Turkish military strength, could not contemplate.

The Vienna Talks Fortified by UN resolutions in their favour, the Greek Cypriots agreed to enter into negotiation with the Turkish Cypriots in a series of negotiations under UN auspices extending to six rounds from April 1975 to the middle of 1976 that became known as the Vienna Talks. The interlocutors were Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktas¸. Clerides was no longer Acting-President as Makarios had returned to Cyprus on 7 December 1974 to a tumultuous welcome. The UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, presided over the talks, in which only Clerides and Denktas¸ participated, though there were other UN officials present. Apart from brief opening public sessions the talks were private, though press briefings by the two interlocutors gave some information on the progress of the talks.

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Clerides urgently wanted negotiations to begin with the return of refugees and the delimitation of the Turkish area. However, confident, it seems, in his side’s new position, Denktas¸ had come to the talks little prepared to discuss these topics and preferred to begin with the constitutional issue, which was always to be his approach. To Clerides he gave the impression, with time so clearly on his side, of merely going through the motions of negotiating. In this regard he benefited from the fact that government in Ankara was in disarray. In September 1974 Ecevit resigned from, and brought to an end, his troublesome coalition government with the Islamist leader Erbakan, who had wanted to occupy all Cyprus. Believing that with Cyprus to his credit he would easily win a new election. Ecevit was then however let down by another party with the result that he was not able to force an election. In consequence a caretaker government ruled under Senator Sadi I˙rmak until 28 March 1975 when Süleyman Demirel managed to put together a moderate rightist coalition government with a bare majority that included the Nationalist Action Party led by the chauvinist Turkish Cypriot Alparslan Türkes¸. Popular with the military, a force then in Turkish politics, Denktas¸ was in the early stages to play his own hand without much control by Ankara. Not only did Demirel have a very shaky coalition government, he also had Ecevit breathing down his neck anxious to regain power, and supportive of Denktas¸. During 1975 there was certainly increasing international pressure on Turkey, the international community having largely become sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot case. In 1975 pressure by the Greek lobby on Congress in the United States resulted in an arms embargo on Turkey, which the American Administration did not like at all but could not remove. The embargo was greatly resented in Turkey. It obliged Turkey to pay heavily for armaments from other sources at a time when the Turkish Government could barely afford to do so. Yet the Americans suffered more when in response Turkey closed down the important American intelligence-gathering stations. Clerides called on the United Kingdom to exert pressure on the Turkish side, but to no discernible effect. In fact, to the considerable ire of the Greek Cypriots, the British Government had arranged for some 9,000 Turkish Cypriots who had taken refuge in the British base areas to be flown to Turkey, whence they moved to the new Turkish Cypriot state. In the Cabinet Barbara Castle had argued against it, but humanitarian considerations were important. To return the Turkish Cypriots to the dangers they might suffer under Greek Cypriot rule, with recent atrocities so much in mind, was really unthinkable. They certainly did not wish to return. The argument against allowing them to go to Turkey, and then to North Cyprus, was that it greatly promoted the separation of the two communities, which the Greek Cypriot government certainly did not want. In Nicosia there were hostile demonstrations, and incidents, outside the British High Commission and the British Council Office.

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In Vienna little was achieved despite Greek pressure on the Greek Cypriots, who constantly argued for a strong federal state with no borders between the two communities. If there was to be a predominantly Turkish Cypriot area it would have to be restricted to about 20 per cent of the island. They would also not agree to a joint provisional government lest it undermined the authority of the Republic of Cyprus. By contrast the Turkish Cypriots argued for a weak federation, something very close to a confederation, and were clearly unwilling to surrender most of the territory they had acquired. The Greek Cypriots objected strongly to the Turkish Cypriots’ intention to have approved by referendum the state they had established, The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. This did not stop the referendum in which 99.4 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour on a 87.2 per cent turnout. At the third round of talks in Vienna the two sides came to an agreement on population exchange that the Turkish Cypriots regard as significant, but which the Greek Cypriots have always dismissed as a limited and unavoidable arrangement. Essentially it was agreed that the Greek Cypriots in the Karpas Peninsula could stay there or move to the South, as most eventually did, if the Turkish Cypriots remaining in the South were allowed to proceed unmolested to the North. In the Vienna Talks Clerides was often suspected of being too open to compromise. The Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, had earlier dubbed Clerides as ‘the Greek-speaking mouthpiece of the Turks’.9 As in the early 1960s, hardline Greek Cypriot opinion, as expressed in the National Council and elsewhere, clearly could not accept any approach to compromise. Makarios wanted ‘a long struggle’. Clerides was not trusted. Clerides was replaced by Tassos Papadopoulos as the interlocutor for the remainder of this fifth session of the Vienna Talks. For some time Denktas¸ refused to accept him as interlocutor on account of his EOKA background, though he eventually relented. Nevertheless, he appointed Ümit Süleyman Onan as the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor instead of attending himself.

The 1977 high-level agreement After the Vienna Talks had petered out, there seemed little hope of progress, but then an initiative, it seems, by the UN Secretary-General’s Representative in Cyprus Perez de Cuellar, led to Denktas¸ writing to Makarios asking him to meet to discuss the Cyprus problem. Makarios agreed, The first meeting took place on 27 January 1977. At the meeting Makarios plied Denktas¸ with questions on his approach to issues that were of prime concern to the Greek Cypriots. Makarios briefed the National Council on the same evening on how his discussion had gone.10 The meeting began promisingly for the Turkish Cypriots when Makarios said that he accepted a federal solution, though under conditions that safeguarded the independence and unity of the Cyprus State. He did not

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mention sovereignty. However, he asserted that the freedoms of movement, settlement, and the right to property were the basic ‘prerequisites’ of a federation. It is hard to see how a federation must necessarily include these features before all else, but Denktas¸ did not immediately object. Makarios said he favoured a package deal. In his view the extent of territory to be administered by each community, and the powers of the Federal Government, would be important parts of this package. Pressed by Makarios. Denktas¸ reassured him that his side’s aim was a federation, not a confederation. The quest for assurance on this point marked a tendency in Greek Cypriot attitudes to believe that a federation with less than complete control of each state’s functions (save in religious, cultural, or purely local matters) was a confederation, whereas in a federation there is no theoretical objection if major functions are exercised by the constituent states. Federal centres have authority over an agreed number of functions, whatever they may be. In a confederation the centre ‘holds its authority at pleasure from the constituent units of the confederation’.11 On territory Makarios thought the Turkish Cypriot area should be limited to 20–25 per cent, as against Denktas¸’s 32.8 per cent, which he said was negotiable. Makarios returned to the three freedoms. He received assurance on freedom of movement, the right to work and a right to own property, but only on freedom of settlement if it did not negate federation, this presumably indicating that the federation would have to be geographical. The return of refugees would be open to discussion, though Denktas¸ stated that it would not be possible for all refugees to return. Again a geographical separation was no doubt what he intended. Shortly after the meeting Makarios gave a briefing to a meeting of the National Council and the Council of Ministers during which Tassos Papadopoulos shrewdly noted that Denktas¸ ‘avoided very carefully to accept without reservations those principles and freedoms which would be incompatible with the concept of two states whilst accepting without reservation principles and freedoms … which are not incompatible with two separate states’.12 At a later joint meeting many members insisted that, before talks started, the other side must accept without reservation the essential Greek Cypriot principles, namely freedom of settlement, the removal of all foreign troops, freedom of movement, and freedom to allow Greek Cypriots to visit their homes in the North. Interestingly, Makarios did not agree that these principles should be pre-conditions. A second meeting was duly held between Makarios and Denktas¸ on 12 February with the UN Secretary-General himself present. After long discussions the following, now historic, guidelines for negotiations were agreed: 1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Republic. 2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of the economic viability, or productivity and land ownership.

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3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property, and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. 4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the state. What did these ‘historic’ guidelines achieve? First, it may be noted, there was no mention of bi-zonality, which was crucial for the Turkish Cypriots and would later be insisted upon. The Turkish Cypriot side claimed that it had been agreed verbally in the presence of the UN Secretary-General. This was soon to become a point of sharp disagreement. So, too, was the concept of federation. To agree on the word was not to agree on its meaning and content. Also for the Greek Cypriots the guidelines contained no real undertakings for the return of refugees to their homes, or of the withdrawal of Turkish troops. This last issue was passed over in silence. Other matters of importance were certainly considered, but nothing concrete emerged. The ‘three freedoms’ of movement, right to own property and live anywhere, all so important for the Greek Cypriots, were not accepted outright. They were only ‘open to discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal, federal system [as if it somewhere existed] and the practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community’, a very open-ended commitment. Endless dispute would also clearly be in prospect on the area of Turkish Cypriot territory. How would land productivity and economic viability be decided? Where, too, was the line to be drawn between the ‘unity of the country’ and ‘the bi-communal character of the state’? The guidelines provided no clear guidance, but the tacit admission by both sides that the principles at stake would have to be considered in relation to the realities of the situation was salutary. It has been claimed that the Greek Cypriots made major concessions in agreeing to the guidelines.13 In reality, they had very little left about which to make material concessions. They had lost the north of the island, and Turkey was too strong and important for any other powers to have it restored to them, even in part. Their only weapon was the fact of their political recognition as sovereign over all Cyprus. They were not going to give it away. It entailed the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, the non-recognition of their state and, in consequence, the crippling economic embargoes soon to be imposed upon them at the behest of the Greek Cypriot Government of Cyprus. This was the weapon of the ‘long struggle’. Turkey was now obliged to support Northern Cyprus economically as well as militarily.

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With hindsight we can perhaps see that in reality there was only one positive way forward. The Turkish Cypriot side could have proposed a Turkish Cypriot area of some 25–30 per cent, in a way to allow large numbers of Greek refugees to resume occupation of their homes (some in the Turkish Cypriot state) in return for a two-state, or confederal, solution, with an internationally guaranteed border. Turkish troops could then probably have been withdrawn. This was probably the best way forward since the Greek Cypriots could not be propelled in the direction of a two-state solution against their will and without attractive recompense. A two-state solution was certainly in the air: it was being toyed with in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, having been suggested as a possibility by Sir Horace Phillips, the British Ambassador in Ankara. The idea did not make much progress. ‘HMG cannot threaten to denounce the 1960 Treaties … it would be out of keeping with HMG’s policy of respecting its international legal undertakings.’14 This was not the point, The Greek Cypriots had to be made a generous offer they would find difficult to refuse. If Turkey had taken an initiative of this sort at that time, even if rejected, it would have stood greatly to Turkey’s credit and lessened international antagonism to its action. However, instead, a federation of some sort became the troublesome intended solution. It could be a weak federation. Article 4 of the 1977 agreement did not say that the powers and functions of the government had to be strong powers; they had only ‘such as to safeguard the unity of the country’. At the beginning federal control of foreign policy and the economy might have sufficed. A confederal, or two-state, solution was really what the Turkish Cypriots wanted. As Denktas¸ later explained, a federation was ‘a compromise solution for the good of Cyprus, and which we can expect reasonable Greeks to accept’.15 Also, he said, ‘There is no policy, no decision, no desire to reunite the northern part of Cyprus with Turkey’.16 Whatever the outcome, for the British Government the bases, and other military facilities in the South, were not to be endangered in any way. A ‘Summary of Interests’ noted a decrease in the importance of the British bases, but also that the United Kingdom could not withdraw from them because the United States believed they had a stabilizing influence. The main danger to British interests [and, therefore, American] in Cyprus was seen as the growth of Greek Cypriot opposition to the bases. Greek Cypriot extremism ‘would make retention of the bases difficult, would endanger the lives and property of British subjects and threaten Cyprus’ western alignment’.17 Against this background, the two sides were now to discuss again, with attitudes little changed, the same issues that had led to deadlock in the closing stages of the fifth round of the Vienna Talks. The sixth round of the Vienna Talks took place between 31 March and 7 April 1977. It was hoped that agreement on the four guidelines would encourage further compromise. Could a substantial reduction of territory

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held by the Turkish Cypriots be bargained against Greek Cypriot acceptance of the well-nigh confederal solution the Turkish Cypriots really wanted? Denktas¸ would certainly have gone along that road, though he was faced with opposition at home from left-wing groups led by Alpay Durduran, and later, Özker Ozgür who had close links with AKEL. They wanted close co-operation with their fellow socialists in the South in a federation. In the background Turkey wanted some solution of the Cyprus issue in order to re-establish good relations with the United States, the damaging arms embargo still being in place. The broad lines of Turkish policy towards Cyprus were summed up 14 June 1976 by I˙lter Türkmen, its Permanent Representative at the UN Security Council, as follows: Turkey has no interest in Cyprus beyond the independence of the island, its non-involvement in any strategic arrangement or power politics, and the well-being and strategic security of the Turkish community. Therefore any solution acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community will unquestionably be acceptable to Turkey as well.18 It was all to no avail. There was no agreement at the end of the Vienna Talks. There was continuing disagreement on the nature of a federation, on territory, and on the alleged commitment by Makarios in the course of the negotiations to a bi-zonal solution, which to the Greek Cypriots signified a border and suggested partition. On 3 August 1977 Archbishop Makarios died. The hard-liner Spyros Kyprianou became president. It is arguable that the chances for a compromise solution now became less promising. It has been suggested that Makarios having ‘put his entire reputation behind this new policy [the “concessions” made in the Guidelines] could … have carried public opinion with him’.19 It has, however, to be remembered that Makarios at this time was insisting on the ‘long struggle’ in strict opposition to the more realistic approach of Clerides, who was now out of favour. Makarios realized that he had to negotiate and therefore seemed flexible, but willingness in the past to negotiate had not meant that in the process he was prepared to make any significant concessions. Clerides’ view that Makarios died ‘shortly after he became a realist’ perhaps merits some reconsideration. For many Greek Cypriots the Four Guidelines’ initiative had failed because Denktas¸ did not want a solution, but the Turkish Cypriot offer of ‘federation by evolution’ as a way forward was rejected out of hand by the Greek Cypriots when Makarios was in office. Acceptance would have put much pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to come to an agreement. The indefatigable Kurt Waldheim did not easily give up his UN mission in these adverse circumstances. In January 1978 Denktas¸ and Kyprianou met at a luncheon given by the UN Secretary-General. After this meeting,

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further and lengthy discussions took place between the two sides, largely over old ground, and produced no result. In May and June 1978 both Kyprianou and Denktas¸ were in New York, where both addressed the UN Assembly’s Political Committee and the Security Council. Not being part of a recognized government Denktas¸ was not allowed to address the General Assembly, the important debating forum. Kyprianou chiefly called for the total demilitarization and disarmament of Cyprus, with law and order to be the responsibility of a mixed Greek and Turkish Cypriot police force under UN guidance and control, the majority element being Greek Cypriot. He would not meet with Denktas¸ in New York, not even socially. In the General Assembly the Greek Cypriots made a determined effort to engage world sympathy for their plight and thus to bring the UN to their aid. In mid-July 1978 under the influence of the Turkish Government, then headed by Bülent Ecevit, Denktas¸ advanced proposals that allegedly would allow some 35,000 Greek Cypriots to return to Varosha, under an administration to be established under the aegis of the United Nations. This proposal was doubtless made to persuade the United States that the arms embargo imposed on Turkey after 1974 was unreasonable. By contrast the Greek Cypriots wished to convince the United States that the Turkish side did not want a settlement. In their view the maintenance of the arms embargo would lead Turkey to oblige the Turkish Cypriots to make serious concessions. The Varosha proposal was not quite as generous as it seemed. The Turkish Cypriots would still manage most municipal services, and some hotels. The territory would remain under Turkish/Turkish Cypriot control. In response, the Greek Cypriots called for the total cession of Varosha and the port of Famagusta. On 9 November the Greek Cypriots successfully persuaded the UN General Assembly to ‘deplore the continuing presence of foreign armed forces in Cyprus and all unilateral actions that changed the demographic structure of the island’.20 The Resolution demanded ‘the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces’ and ‘the institution of urgent measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety’. The Resolution passed by 110 votes to 4, with 22 abstentions. The General Assembly also asked the Security Council to examine the question of implementation of its relevant resolutions, and measures to secure their implementation. This was really putting pressure on the Security Council to do something effective. On this the voting was less overwhelming, the majority for this measure being reduced to 80, and now with 48 abstentions. The Security Council deigned not to respond fully to these recommendations. In its Resolution (440) of 27 November 1978 it did nevertheless call upon the parties concerned ‘to comply with and co-operate in the implementation’ of its earlier resolutions ‘within a specific time-frame’, but no time frame was suggested. The UN Secretary-General was also requested to

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report ‘on the progress towards the implementation of its resolutions’. These were weak responses. Greek Cypriot obduracy in New York and Denktas¸’s effective presentation of the Turkish Cypriot case to the Security Council did not help the Greek Cypriot cause. Most important at this point was the beginning of rapprochement between Washington and Ankara over the arms embargo, which was not serving the real interests of either side. At the beginning of 1978, after Ecevit had returned to power in Turkey, the Turkish reaction to the arms ban became more hostile. Ecevit made a sharp attack on the United States in the Turkish parliament in March 1978.21 In the summer of 1978 Congress began a process of lifting the ban that culminated in its effective final removal by President Carter on 26 September. The Greek Cypriots had failed to persuade the major powers to oblige Turkey to abandon Cyprus. Both the United States and Turkey had other more important concerns. Particularly at that time there was the danger of the likely collapse of government of the Shah in Iran. The relations between the two sides in Cyprus had, of course, worsened with the Greek Cypriot recourse to the United Nations. Also the Greek Cypriots were tightening their embargo on all other states’ contacts, and commerce, with the Federated State. The Turkish Cypriots continued to be excluded from all sporting and other international organizations. Most important for their economy was the suffocation of any hopes of developing a tourist industry. Nor did they receive much of the international financial aid that was being offered to the Government of Cyprus. After the rejection of the 1978 Turkish Cypriot proposals for a settlement, on 10 November 1978 a new, allegedly British-Canadian, plan was advanced for consideration, The plan was mainly drafted, it is widely accepted, by the American State Department Counsellor, Matthew Nimetz. It advocated a presidential federal system of government, with the president and vice-president coming from, and elected separately by, the two communities. An innovation was the proposal for a bi-cameral legislature. The upper house would be constituted of an equal number of members elected by each community whilst the lower house would be elected in accordance with the general population ratio. The upper house would act as a brake on the Greek Cypriot dominated lower house of the legislature, which had a wide range of powers. It was the forerunner of later UN proposals for a settlement. Neither side accepted it. The four guidelines, it turned out, had not helped much. The Turkish Cypriots had accepted federation, though they really wanted a very weak federation first, and were unresponsive to demands to give up territory. By the Greek Cypriots ‘it was quite generally accepted’, writes a Greek Cypriot analyst ‘that the Makarios-Denktash agreement was yet another grievous (and ill-judged) concession on the part of the Greek Cypriot side, all the more remarkable because no corresponding concession or even a reciprocal

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gesture of goodwill on the part of the Turkish Government was at the same time either exacted or secured’.22 The Greek Cypriots regarded it as a considerable concession that they had agreed to a bi-regional federation. Yet in reality they were not in a strong position. Who could oblige Turkey to abandon Cyprus? The United States had not come to the aid of the Greek Cypriots in 1974. Turkey was a large and powerful state, a bulwark for NATO in the Near East. The Greek Cypriots certainly had to be placated by the United Kingdom and the United States out of regard for the bases and other valuable facilities they possessed on the island, but this was not enough when considered in the balance to force concessions from Turkey, even although it was not in Turkey’s interest, as a member of NATO, to have the bases and listening posts rendered ineffective whilst the Cold War was still in progress. Turkish governments certainly wanted a settlement, especially before the arms embargo was lifted in 1978, but as a result of the 1974 operation there was now in Turkey wide popular support for the Turkish Cypriots that no Turkish government could ignore.

The Ten-Point Agreement After rejection of the Anglo-Canadian (essentially American) proposals, discussions between the UN Secretary-General and the Cyprus Foreign Minister, Nicos Rolandis, led to the advancement of proposals for a resumption of negotiations. On 11 April 1979 both sides agreed to a high-level meeting between Kyprianou and Denktas¸, to be held in UNFICYP Headquarters in Nicosia in the presence of the Secretary-General. A year earlier Kyprianou had refused to meet with Denktas¸, even at social gatherings. The Ten-Point Agreement 1. It was agreed to resume the inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979. 2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktas¸ guidelines of 17 February 1977 and the United Nations’ resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question. 3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic. 4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects. 5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations’ auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem. 6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks and special importance will be given to initial

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7. 8.

9. 10.

practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession. The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay. The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia.

It will be observed that not only were the 1977 Guidelines to be the basis of the talks, so also were the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question. This raised problems since a number of them were inconsistent with the 1977 Guidelines. Also it may be observed that Varosha was to be given priority in reaching agreement, though it was not to be discussed before constitutional and territorial matters, but simultaneously with them. There was also no undertaking that agreement would be reached on Varosha before discussion of other matters was concluded. Only if discussion on Varosha was completed before the ending of consideration of other matters would the conclusions on Varosha be implemented. This is an important point to make since it is sometimes claimed by Greek Cypriot writers that the 1979 agreement ‘gave priority to the return of Greek Cypriot displaced persons to Varosha’, but this was ‘not honoured or implemented by Turkey’.23 After the conclusion of the Ten-Point talks the two sides met briefly on 15 June 1979, but soon fell into disagreement on the question of priority being given to Varosha. The Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, (Ümit Onan) wanted first a discussion of Paragraph 2, which referred to the 1977 Guidelines. He wanted the Greek Cypriot side to acknowledge that it was verbally agreed, if not included in the text, that at that meeting the concept of ‘bi-zonality’ had been accepted. If by bi-zonality it was meant that there was to be a border between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ‘regions’, it was not acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. In their view a federation did not allow of boundaries, which spoke to them of partition. The talks collapsed. Internationalizing the dispute: UN General Assembly In a letter to the UN Secretary-General Denktas¸ argued that the Greek Cypriots were not accepting the 1977 Guidelines. More tellingly he pointed out that the Greek Cypriots had not abstained from actions jeopardizing the talks, notably by maintaining an economic embargo on the Turkish Cypriots and by determined efforts to internationalize the problem after making the Ten-Point Agreement. Before the meetings beginning on

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15 June the Greek Cypriots had promoted their case in a non-aligned conference in Colombo (4–6 June), It was promoted again in Havana in September, and then in September/October at the Universal Postal Union Congress, where the Greek Cypriots had the validity of Turkish Cypriot postal stamps denied. At other international meetings the Greek Cypriots pressed on with publicizing their case. On 21 August 1979 Kyprianou announced that the campaign of international ‘enlightenment’ would be intensified. This campaign achieved considerable success in the nonaligned world, as shown by the very one-sided Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of 20 November 1979.24 The Resolution affirmed the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and called on all governments to help the Government of Cyprus to exercise these rights. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and the implementation of previous resolutions of the Assembly and the Security Council, and called for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes. It also went so far as to recommend, if there was no progress towards a solution, the appointment of an ad hoc committee to help the Secretary-General in his task. Significantly, with the talk of a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence that was now in the air, and aware of the influx of Turks into Northern Cyprus, the resolution deplored any unilateral action that changed the demographic structure and promoted faits accomplis. In North Cyprus outrage at this one-sided resolution met with support in Turkey. With the raising of the American arms embargo on Turkey in 1978 there was less pressure on Turkey to try to influence the Turkish Cypriots to make concessions. This pressure was anyway subject to extreme political instability in Ankara between 1978 and 1980, a period during which a Demirel government was back in power at the end of 1979, though only until September 1980 when it was overthrown by the military. During Ecevit’s government (1978–79) attempts were made in March 1979 to engage in negotiation with the Greek Government headed by Karamanlis, in a Montreux summit meeting in March 1979. Ecevit was moderate, but firm, in his views on Cyprus, and indicated that he was not in favour of a declaration of independence by the Turkish Federated State. In November 1979 the new government under Demirel, which might have been expected to be more conciliatory, especially as economic aid from international sources was much needed, strongly condemned the UN General Assembly Resolution 34/30 of 20 November 1979. The official Turkish Foreign Office spokesman stated that there would be ‘no concessions’ as a result of the Resolution. The recommendation made in the Resolution for the appointment of the proposed ad hoc committee to advise the Secretary-General and in consultation with him to recommend and promote the implementation of all relevant General Assembly resolutions on Cyprus was greatly resented in the Turkish press. However, it did not help the Greek Cypriot case in the

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West, that on a visit to major world capitals, Kyprianou took the Soviet line over the invasion of Afghanistan, a development which underlined the importance to NATO of the Turkish bulwark in the Middle East. International press response to the General Assembly Resolution and the Cyprus problem was mixed, but generally showed sympathy to the Greek Cypriot case. The Times, could declare, ‘The president of this “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” continues to spin out, postpone and elude any negotiations with the Greek Cypriot leaders by a series of more or less ingenious pretexts.’25 The new military rulers in Turkey after September 1980 were moderate in their views on Cyprus, despite their close involvement in its affairs and the presence of Turkish troops there. President General Evren expressed the hope that ‘a solution to this problem will be found within the framework of the agreements reached between the leaders of the two communities and through the process of inter-communal talks’.26 The Foreign Minister denied rumours of a reduction of Turkish troops in North Cyprus as a good will gesture, but later, in January 1981, Turkey and the Federated State worked closely together on a plan to allow Greek Cypriot resettlement of Varosha in return for the lifting of the UN supported Greek Cypriot economic and other embargoes on the North. It was not unrelated to the Cyprus issue that the military government in Turkey was concerned lest the political ferment promoted by the rise of leftism in Turkey in the 1970s should spread to Northern Cyprus. In fact the influence of the left in North Cyprus had increased by the end of the decade. It was partly inspired by some Turkish left-wing intelligentsia seeking an environment more congenial after 1980 than Turkey, as well as by returning Turkish Cypriot students of similar persuasion. This was important because these influences helped incline the leftist political parties in Northern Cyprus to maintain and develop their links with AKEL. The left could envisage the emergence of a socialist federal state. Negotiations renewed When the effects of Resolution 34/30 began to wear off the UN SecretaryGeneral renewed efforts to bring the two sides together again. They agreed to resume talks on 9 August 1980, with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Hugo Gobbi, in attendance. On 5 August 1981 the Turkish Cypriot side presented its long-awaited comprehensive proposals, including a map showing the territory they could surrender, together with a map showing its proposals for Varosha. Overall the amount of territory to be given up amounted to no more than 6 per cent of the area of the island, which included the buffer zone. This fell far short of Greek Cypriot demands. The constitutional proposals postulated two separate states, but also a bi-communal federal parliament composed of a Senate and House of Representatives. This was a move, but a very modest one, towards the

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Anglo-Canadian proposal, but it was still essentially confederal in spirit. These rather strange proposals were soon dismissed by the Greek Cypriots. They still adhered to a proportion of territory of some 20 per cent for the Turkish Cypriots, though with some suggestion for minor improvement. They also first wanted the settlement of Varosha, under their sovereignty. This was not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. To try to overcome the impasse in negotiations the UN SecretaryGeneral, advanced interesting compromise proposals, but they could not bridge the gap between the two sides. The discussions centred on ‘points of coincidence’ and ‘points of equidistance’. In April 1982 the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, George Ioannides resigned, dissatisfied with an alleged lack of seriousness of the Greek Cypriot side. The talks continued without notable result until 1983. Having agreed not to have recourse to the UN General Assembly in 1981 and 1982 the Greek Cypriots decided to do so in 1983. In 1982 their internationalization campaign developed a new momentum with the election of Mr Andreas Papandreou to power in Greece, and his important visit to Cyprus in the next year. The inter-communal talks were declared a failure. The Greek Cypriot version of the problem was now widely broadcast abroad. In particular, on 3 March 1983, at the seventh non-aligned summit Conference in New Delhi the Greek Cypriots obtained a favourable declaration in support of their cause. It called for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the return of refugees to their homes, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus. Papandreou and Kyprianou were clearly determined to bring all possible pressure on the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey for what to them would be a satisfactory resolution of the Cyprus problem. Denktas¸ pointed out that in 1981 he had refrained from advancing the Turkish Cypriot cause at the conference of the Organization of Islamic States. The UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253 The Cyprus issue was duly debated on 13 May 1983, in the General Assembly, not in the Political Committee where the Turkish Cypriots might be heard. A resolution in favour of the Greek Cypriots was duly made, supported by 105 votes to 5 against, and with 20 abstentions, which included most of the member states of NATO and four Arab states. France, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and even Australia voted for the motion. Cyprus could claim some result from its campaign of ‘enlightenment’. This Resolution was in some respects stronger in its support of the Republic of Cyprus than Resolution 34/30 of 1979. Whilst repeating much of that resolution it now included a call for respect for the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property for all Cypriots, a demand that was going to be increasingly heard. The Resolution also recommended that the

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Security Council should examine the question of the implementation, within a specified time-frame, its resolutions on Cyprus ‘and consider and adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations for ensuring the speedy and effective implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus’ (Article 15). The demand for an ad hoc committee contained in the previous Resolution was dropped, however. As in 1979 the Security Council did not take action on the implementation of its resolutions. Denktas¸ remarked that the General Assembly wrote the cheque, but the Security Council did not pay it. The General Assembly Resolution was badly received both in North Cyprus and in Turkey. Denktas¸ now let it be known that a declaration of independence was on the cards, a development that worried Kyprianou enough for him to make representations about it to the five permanent members of the Security Council. In North Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot parliament affirmed the Turkish Cypriots’ right to self-determination, a move that allegedly led to Kyprianou’s rejection of a proposal by Denktas¸ to hold a high-level meeting. Influenced by the left, in its Resolution the Turkish Cypriot parliament stated, however, that ‘the exercise of the right of selfdetermination would not constitute an obstacle for the establishment of an independent, bi-zonal, non-aligned Republic’.27 The next development was an important initiative by the UN SecretaryGeneral who on 8 August 1983 submitted an aide-mémoire to the two sides. It made proposals (‘indicators’) some of which were alternatives, around which new negotiations might commence. His proposals took a firmer step in the direction of a stronger federal structure than the Turkish Cypriots had in mind in their 1981 proposals. In particular, the Secretary-General’s ideas allowed for the expression of a powerful general voice in the lower house, where they would have been in a minority. The Turkish Cypriots had so far wanted equal representation in federal institutions. On the territorial issue a maximum of 30 per cent and a minimum of 23 per cent was proposed. The prudent Turkish Cypriot response was that negotiations should proceed instead on the existing guidelines. The Greek Cypriots were deeply and vehemently divided. AKEL and Clerides’s party wanted a positive approach to these proposals, but vacillation by Kyprianou brought about the resignation of the Foreign Minister, Nicos Rolandis, who welcomed the Secretary-General’s initiative. Just before Rolandis’s resignation Kyprianou had given a cautious welcome to the new initiative, but it was clearly not positive enough for the Foreign Minister. Kyprianou was influenced by his own party, EDEK, and by the Greek Premier, Andreas Papandreou. At this stage Denktas¸ proposed another high-level meeting, but at first Kyprianou said it should be between himself and the Turkish president, General Evren. Nevertheless the UN Secretary-General went ahead with making arrange-

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ments for a properly prepared meeting between Kyprianou and Denktas¸, though the latter really just wanted a brief understanding from a meeting that the Greek Cypriots recognized their equal partnership status. Kyprianou, however, wanted a well-prepared meeting, as the SecretaryGeneral also envisaged. To this end the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Hugo Gobbi, returned to Cyprus on 14 November to deliver Perez de Cuellar’s proposals.28 He was too late. The Turkish Cypriots’ declaration of independence was under way, and was endorsed by the Turkish Cypriot parliament the next day. By the end of 1983 the Turkish Cypriots were convinced that the Greek Cypriots would not treat their community as equal. Above all, they were exasperated that there was no sign of any respect, let alone recognition of the Turkish Federated State. They were incensed by the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 37/253.

The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence Would Ankara approve a declaration of independence? Almost certainly not. Earlier, on a visit to Ankara, Denktas¸ had encountered much opposition in Ecevit’s government to the ‘folly’ of such a move.29 By 1983 the military had been three years in power in Turkey and were about to hand over to a civilian government. Denktas¸ realized, as he explained, that he had to act during the very brief period of interregnum, or he would almost certainly be prevented from proceeding to declare independence. Turkey wanted to see a federation established, and would not at all relish a move that might well make it more, rather than less, difficult. That Denktas¸ wanted a more independent state had been obvious for some time. This gave the political opposition in the North ample time to consider its position. The opposition was mainly centred in two left-wing parties, the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtulus¸ Partisi) and the smaller, but further left, Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi), In the 1976 parliamentary elections the rightist, pro-Turkish nationalist party, the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi) founded by Denktas¸ had won 30 out of the 40 seats in parliament. Denktas¸ contested the 1976 presidential election, which he won with 77.6 per cent of the vote, and then resigned from the party. During the following five years before the parliamentary and presidential elections due in 1981 the National Unity Party government was riven by internal dissension and in the 1981 elections obtained only 18 of the 40 seats in parliament. In the presidential election in that year Denktas¸ won only 51.8 per cent of the vote on a low turnout. The left-wing parties were by now eager to have a solution with the Greek Cypriots, especially if in the South AKEL was to the fore. A federal union dominated by the left was not unattractive. The increased popularity of the left in the North

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owed much, and perhaps most, to the economic problems that soon arose for the Turkish Cypriot state, suffering as it was under embargoes and with an inexperienced government to cope with large governmental problems. In 1981 there was a very real chance that a left-wing government would assume office. In parliament only one more vote was needed, that of one deputy Nejat Konuk, who led the two-man Democratic People’s Party. He was almost certainly persuaded by the Turkish Government not to join in with the opposition parties to form a government.30 With independence in the air the leaders of the two left-wing parties gave loud voice to their objections, both believing it would negate the federal settlement they wanted. However, the larger Communal Liberation Party, which had 13 seats in parliament to the Republican Turkish Party’s 6, was becoming divided, with a number of its leading members resigning, including Mustafa Akıncı, later to become a leading light on his return to the party. Many in the party were becoming disillusioned with the Greek Cypriots’ tactics, including their internationalization of the problem. One prominent member who resigned from the party was Fuat Vezirog˘lu who now supported independence, and advised Denktas¸ to proceed to declare it by changing the constitution in preference to going straight to a referendum. To alter the constitution needed a two-thirds’ majority that, but for defections by some Communal Liberation Party deputies, could not be obtained. The votes of 6 of the 13 CLP deputies were needed to change the constitution. Denktas¸ could not be certain of the result, so pressure of some sort had to be exerted. On the evening of 14 November, having cut all possible means of communication with Ankara, he invited all 40 members of parliament to dinner. He there informed the deputies that a motion declaring the state to be independent would be moved the next day in parliament. Despite their premonitions it was a shock to the deputies on the left. Denktas¸ was aware, he said, that some would want to vote for, and others against, the motion, However, ‘naturally’, he said, ‘those who vote against the Republic will perhaps find that they will not be able to take their places within it’.31 It was a bombshell. What did it mean? Was it a threat? Some could see that as opponents of the new state they might well by that act automatically exclude themselves from participation, or be formally excluded by a new parliament. However, the immediate problem for the opposition was that they were not united. With the CLP divided they could lose the vote. United they could have defeated the motion, but even so, they would almost certainly have had public opinion against them, as public demonstrations showed. Moreover, although the leader of the Republican Turkish Party, Özker Özgür, claimed they had been forced to vote for independence, it should be noted that independence did not mean abandoning federation. Also whilst he and his party strongly believed in a settlement, they were not prepared to accept that all Turkish troops should be

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withdrawn as part of a settlement, or that there should be immediate application of the ‘three freedoms’ of movement, residence, and property ownership, so important for the Greek Cypriots. After the dinner with Denktas¸ the opposition party deputies withdrew to hold emergency party meetings to discuss their response. In the critically important Communal Liberation Party meeting, Ismail Bozkurt, who on 8 August had replaced as leader the more determined opponent of Denktas¸, Alpay Durduran, could do nothing but allow a free vote in parliament. Early on 15 November the two party leaders visited the Turkish Government’s representative in Lefkos¸a to ask for support in preventing the declaration of independence. It did not go without notice that they were appealing for help to the state they had constantly accused of interfering in Turkish Cypriot affairs. Their visit had no result: Turkey was not able, or prepared, to intervene. On 15 November parliament declared by a unanimous vote, ‘before the world and before history the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state’. On 18 November, on a motion proposed by the United Kingdom, the UN Security Council condemned the Declaration of Independence. It deplored the declaration of ‘the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus’ which it considered legally invalid, and called for its withdrawal. It also called on all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. The sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus were reaffirmed. Only Pakistan voted against the resolution, and Jordan abstained. Why did the United Kingdom play a leading role in this complete denunciation of the Declaration of Independence? Whilst in the British view the action of the Turkish Cypriots was ‘deplorable’, the British Representative at the UN sought to sugar the pill by remarking that ‘the present action by the Turkish Cypriot authorities is not the only wrong of one kind or another that has been done since the Treaties were signed in 1960’.32 He went on to say, however, that ‘the Turkish (sic) action is incompatible with the state of affairs brought about by the Treaties governing the establishment of the Government of Cyprus. My Government has treaty obligations in this respect’ but, he continued, ‘we are also concerned because of our long historical role with Cyprus continuing into the present with our mutual membership of the Commonwealth and with the settlement in Britain of many Cypriots from both communities’.33 The membership of the Commonwealth was clearly important for a number of reasons. For one, the Commonwealth contained many members of the non-aligned movement and, for another some of them had minorities that they did not wish to see encouraged by the Turkish Cypriot example. Also, and as important as ever, it would not be unreasonable to assume, though not mentioned, was the presence in Cyprus of the British bases and intelligence listening facilities, which could hardly function without Greek Cypriot co-operation. The

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Turkish Cypriots, as always, noted that the United Kingdom had not been so aware of its responsibilities in 1963, 1964, and 1965 when it condoned the assumption of power by the Greek Cypriots in defiance of the 1960 treaties. In the House of Commons Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the British Government had made it clear to Mr Denktas¸ personally, and at a high level in Ankara, that the British Government would strongly disapprove of a declaration of independence. The Turkish Government wished that negotiations could have shown more promise. The Turkish Foreign Minister, I˙lter Türkmen would have ‘undoubtedly preferred it if a just and lasting solution could have been reached through inter-communal negotiations, without arriving at the present state of affairs’.34 Nevertheless Ankara stood by the Turkish Cypriot decision, and recognized the new state. Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriot claim to the right of self-determination, and argued that approval of negotiations by the international community indicated de facto recognition of this right. Predictably the Greek Cypriots and Greece were deeply opposed to the Declaration of Independence. The Commonwealth Conference held on 29 November also endorsed the Security Council’s condemnation of the declaration. The Council of Europe took a more sympathetic line, reserving, and keeping empty, one Cypriot seat for a member of the Turkish Cypriot community. Was the proclamation of the TRNC legally invalid? The following extract from an Opinion by Professor E. Lauterpacht CBE, QC, 9 March 1990, for the TRNC denied that claim. The fact that States have been prepared to recognize and to accord a place in the United nations to the constitutionally unlawful Greek Cypriot regime is comparable to recognition, many times repeated in the history of international relations, of de facto governments that have assumed power after a successful insurrection and repudiation of constitutional forms. But that de facto acceptance by the international community could not, and did not, in any way expunge the international illegality or, even more to the point, deprive the Turkish Cypriot community of its entitlement, possessed in common with the Greek Cypriot community, to the enjoyment of its right of self-determination. The subsequent condemnation in Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) of the exercise of this right by the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a statal entity in Northern Cyprus responding to the factual division of the country and parallel to the one existing in Southern Cyprus is legally bewildering. The repercussions of the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence lasted well into 1984. Interestingly, the Turkish Cypriot’s declaration, it has been observed, ‘was striking in its timidity, as though they were tiptoeing

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out of the door leaving it carefully ajar so that they could quickly and easily come back in again’.35 The constitution of the new state had not yet been submitted to the electorate for approval, so it was possible to abandon the declaration, which was shrewdly timed. Occurring in an interregnum in Turkey it could not be said to have been a Turkish initiative. It was also achieved when the Turkish Cypriot political opposition had become deeply divided by the Greek Cypriots’ internationalization of the dispute and their scant regard for Turkish Cypriot views.36 Perhaps it was this apparent Turkish Cypriot ‘timidity’ that encouraged opposition abroad. In March 1984 the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to withhold military aid to Turkey to the tune of $215m. In other ways international opposition to the new state took some time to decline, if not to disappear. There was a new surge in international protest when on 17 April Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus exchanged ambassadors. The Greek Cypriots had recourse to the UN Security Council, declaring that this signified the end to negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots unless the Declaration of Independence was withdrawn. President Denktas¸ addressed the Security Council (necessarily in a personal capacity) on three occasions, the last address being on the evening of 11 May just after the Security Council had reiterated its call to all states ‘not to recognize the purported state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus set up by secessionist acts’,37 and called upon them ‘not to facilitate, or in any way, assist the aforesaid secessionist entity’.38 In his response Denktas¸ bitterly thanked the Council: ‘It has decided that my people, because they are fighting for their liberty, and do not accept colonization by the Greek Cypriots, should be isolated in this world like lepers.’39 He continued, ‘Now on their behalf you are asking them [the Greek Cypriots] to squeeze us out economically. We have lived on bread, on onions, on beans for twenty years. We shall continue to do so, if necessary, but we shall not accept those who occupy by force the seat of Government as the Government of Cyprus.’40 Resolution 550 also requested the Secretary-General ‘to promote the urgent implementation of Security Council Resolution 541 (1983)’, which called for the withdrawal of the Declaration of Independence, described as null and legally invalid. It was not clear what power the Secretary-General had to achieve this. Perhaps the Churchillian oratory had some effect. The British Representative, whose country had taken the lead in condemning the declaration, said that he had voted for Resolution 550 despite its drawbacks.41 Before the Security Council meeting the Secretary-General had tried to have the Turkish Cypriots transfer Varosha to the UN, to be re-inhabited by Greek Cypriots at the discretion of the UN, but not under Greek Cypriot control. In return it was expected that there would be no further Greek Cypriot attempts to internationalize the Cyprus dispute [if the Greek Cypriots agreed], but the Turkish Cypriots would also be expected to abandon the Declaration of Independence. As Denktas¸ showed by his speech, the

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Turkish Cypriots were not so overwhelmed by their condemnation as to acquiesce. In return for their agreement over Varosha they called for agreement on the re-opening of Nicosia Airport, and the lifting of other restrictions imposed on them by the international community at the behest of the Greek Cypriots. Gradually the reality of the Declaration of Independence and its likely permanence began to be recognized, the UN Secretary-General trying again to get the two sides together. This was not a problem for the Turkish Cypriots, who had declared their continuing readiness to discuss a solution leading to federation, and believed that as an independent state they would have more status. In fact, they did offer conditionally to put on hold the referendum on the new constitution, the act that would set their declaration of independence in concrete. The Greek Cypriots did not at first respond to the Secretary-General’s overtures, but talking in Vienna with Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives, he persuaded the Greek Cypriots to participate in proximity talks. He produced ‘working points’ for both sides to consider. They reportedly included as items of discussion the problem of Varosha, but more fundamentally, possible federal structures and territorial adjustment. Both sides agreed to participate further, but the Greek Cypriots only after Kyprianou had consulted with the Greek premier, Andreas Papandreou, a move criticized by AKEL who believed the proper relationship was that ‘Cyprus decides and Greece supports’.42 The Greek Cypriots now began to place much more emphasis on the complete removal of Turkish troops from the island, taking inspiration in this, it was said, from Papandreou. Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General managed to get proximity talks under way with the two leaders in New York. By now the Greek Cypriot side was no longer maintaining that there could be no negotiations unless the Declaration of Independence was withdrawn. The subjects to be discussed in the proximity talks included the question of Varosha, but were mainly concerned with exploring the possibility of establishing a federal system and obtaining agreement on territory. During these allegedly confidential talks, which were partly leaked, the opening up of Nicosia Airport under UN control was also considered. It was, of course, very important for the Turkish Cypriots, whose airport at nearby Ercan (Tymbou) could not receive direct flights, save from Turkey; permission for others unsurprisingly was not forthcoming from the recognized Republic of Cyprus.

The Draft Framework Agreement As the proximity talks progressed, the UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, believed progress had been made in the creation of a federal government structure under a presidential system, though there were indications that

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the Turkish Cypriots would have preferred a parliamentary system. A major development towards a more usual federal system was the acceptance of a bi-cameral federal centre, with a 70/30 divide in the lower house and 50/50 in the upper. Sufficient now seemed to be agreed on constitutional and territorial questions for the Secretary-General to believe after three rounds of negotiations that a document containing agreement on important issues could be submitted to a summit meeting of the two presidents. Presidents Kyprianou and Denktas¸ accordingly agreed to meet, for the first time in six years, on 17 January 1985 in New York. ‘If you are determined’, the Secretary-General said, ‘to reach an agreement, a unique chance now exists. If this moment is lost, I am sure you will agree, it may not readily recur’.43 Hopes were high: even Papandreou was reported to have remarked that ‘everything was fine; our side has obtained the best possible conditions’.44 Kyprianou said that he had come with goodwill and a desire for a solution, but then unexpectedly claimed that he had not come to sign up to the Draft Framework Agreement prepared as a consequence of the three rounds of proximity talks that had seemed to result in agreement on major issues. He had come to the summit, he said, to negotiate; He then raised objections to almost very paragraph in the document, a document Denktas¸ was prepared to sign as an ‘integrated whole’. Briefly the Draft Framework Agreement provided for a rather strong federation in terms of the range of functions assigned to the federal government, though residual powers were left to ‘the provinces or federated states’. The federal legislature comprised two houses, the lower with a 70:30 and the upper with a 50:50 membership. Legislation on a wide range of major matters required separate majorities in both houses. The Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President could return laws, or executive council decisions, for reconsideration. It was not clear whether this was a veto. Deadlock-breaking machinery was also provided. The executive Council of Ministers was to have a 7 to 3 ratio in favour of the Greek Cypriots. On territory the Turkish Cypriots were to reduce their 37 per cent to 29 per cent of the island. This was a major concession prompted, it seems certain, by Ankara, the President, General Evren having been influenced to exert pressure on the Turkish Cypriots by President Reagan.45 Denktas¸ had also withdrawn his demand for a rotating presidency. In addition a timetable was drawn up for the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot troops. As regards the three freedoms of movement, residence and ownership of property a working group would be established to discuss their exercise. Varosha and adjacent areas would be placed under UN control, as would, for the time being, Nicosia Airport. Working groups would be set up to work out and agree the details of these arrangements. In turning down the Draft Framework Agreement Kyprianou asserted that he was not aware there would be an agreement for him to accept or reject. He claimed that he had misunderstood the whole exercise.

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In Nicosia the collapse of the summit produced a storm of protest from AKEL and DISY. Kyprianou was censured by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives. He was pressed to accept the Draft Framework Agreement, and eventually, on his refusal to comply, he was called upon to resign. In an open letter to Kyprianou, Nicos Rolandis, former Foreign Minister, devastatingly asked, ‘If it was your wish to debate the basic points in the document, why, on 12 and 13 December have you said, “everything is fine; our side has obtained the best possible conditions?”’46 Kyprianou did not resign and, in the presidential system, could not be forced out of office. He was clearly encouraged in holding fast by the Greek Premier, Papandreou, despite his earlier apparent support for the agreement. Despite this major setback Perez de Cuellar persisted in trying to bring the Greek Cypriots on board. Without consulting the Turkish Cypriots he agreed to include in a new document two significant changes. To this end the locus of residual powers in the federated states or provinces was omitted. So, too, was the requirement that at least 30 per cent of Turkish Cypriot deputies in the upper house had to approve ordinary legislation (i.e. not matters of major federal legislation, which required separate majorities of each side’s representatives). With these amendments, according to the Secretary-General, the Greek Cypriots accepted the Draft Framework Agreement.47 Not only were the Turkish Cypriots affronted by this separate negotiation, with the Greek Cypriots, they also declared they were unable to accept the amendments proposed. Making amends the Secretary-General then consulted with the Turkish Cypriot side. Subsequently he was able to bring about low-level meetings between the two sides, which seemed to be promising. The Secretary-General proposed an amended Draft Framework Agreement, which he presented to both sides on 29 March 1986. The Turkish Cypriot side accepted the 29 March Draft Framework Agreement, though in his letter of acceptance Denktas¸ made it clear that there could be no withdrawal of Turkish troops until all aspects of the Cyprus problem was settled. He also significantly stated: ‘The guarantee of Turkey in both law and practice is the sine qua non condition for the security and survival of the Turkish Cypriot people. But for the guarantee Cyprus would have been annexed to Greece’.48 He was also cautious on the issue of the three freedoms, noting that the security of the TRNC should not be endangered, nor the principles of bi-communality and bi-zonality, which he regarded as the basic characteristics of a federation. On 20 April Kyprianou rejected the amended Draft Framework Agreement, which was certainly now rather less attractive than before, especially with the enhanced rights of veto by the President and Vice-President, denoting a return in part to the 1960 Constitution. In rejecting the draft agreement Kyprianou said that he had done so after wide consultation, the Greek Premier being one person he had also consulted. He regarded the basic

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issues as the withdrawal of the Turkish occupying forces, and the ‘settlers’, effective international guarantees of a settlement, and the application of the three freedoms. For discussion of the whole issue he proposed an international conference. If this should not be possible, then there should be a high-level meeting on all three issues mentioned above.49 Why did the Draft Framework Agreement initiative fail? Firstly, it is pretty much clear that Kyprianou changed his mind, when it came to the crunch, under pressure from the intensely nationalist elements in Cyprus, and in Greece. As it turned out, despite the fury of the leftist and liberal opposition in the South, he read the situation aright. There was too much pent up fury in the South at the perceived injustice of their plight to accept what to many seemed like defeat. Ever resourceful, many Greek Cypriots believed there might be other ways of obtaining what they regarded as their just desserts. The more the refugees were assured by some politicians that they would return to their homes come what may, the more difficult it became to accept any compromise. Well-meaning, and reasonable UN and other peacemakers, not altogether perhaps in tune with the depth of feeling on both sides in Cyprus, may well have overestimated the possibilities of a rational solution. It was all very well debating the finer points of constitution-making, important though they might be should a settlement be in sight, but many Greek Cypriots clearly wanted the Turkish troops and ‘settlers’ out, the three freedoms, large-scale return of their refugees to their homes, no Turkish guarantee for the Turkish Cypriots, and a strong federal government if they could not re-constitute a unitary state. The Draft Framework Agreement left all these issues in the air. Many Turkish Cypriots were by no means unaware of the intensity of Greek Cypriot convictions, and did not trust them even if they appeared to agree with Turkish Cypriot demands. For instance, on the Turkish Cypriot side it has been pointed out that there was a contradiction, no matter how well obscured by verbal foliage, between bi-zonality and completely unfettered freedom of movement, settlement, and property ownership, since these freedoms would allow the Greek Cypriots to flood back into the Turkish zone and take it over.50 Nor could they really accept the demilitarization of the island since they feared they would always be under threat from the Greek Cypriot majority: there had at least to be the rudiments of a Turkish military base in the North that could quickly be reinforced from Turkey. This issue, it has been claimed ‘became the main obstacle to progress on the Greek Cypriot side, and Greece involved itself once again by arguing that there could be no progress without their withdrawal’.51 It has been suggested that as a result of Kyprianou’s rejection of the Draft Framework Agreement ‘Denktas¸ had got out of a very tight corner’.52 It is not made clear to what this refers. He was in full accord with the UN Secretary-General, so there was no difficulty from that quarter. He was certainly under the influence of Ankara, and held back the process of

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completing the Declaration of Independence, which required submitting the new Constitution embracing it to a referendum. Once the other side rejected the Draft Framework Agreement the referendum could go ahead. This was a relief because Denktas¸ was under constant criticism in North Cyprus by the nationalist right for making too many con˘lu, was much more hardcessions. The National Unity Party under Dervis¸ Erog line than Denktas¸.53 This opposition was becoming much more important than that from the socialist left, which, as noted earlier, had become greatly disillusioned and weakened by Greek Cypriot attitudes and tactics. Denktas¸ was certainly relieved that the rejection of the Draft Framework Agreement removed the necessity to set up working groups on the three freedoms and other problems. He believed that the Turkish Cypriot side ‘would have encountered great difficulties in the working groups and no headway would have been made in the direction of a fair and permanent settlement’.54 On this score the Draft Framework Agreement certainly seemed much too sanguine a solution. It left major issues in the air. Consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot state In the absence of agreement the process of consolidating the Declaration of Independence got under way. The Assembly adopted the new Constitution on 12 March 1985, which after publication and public comment, was put to a referendum on 5 May. It was approved by 70 per cent of those voting, a substantial vote of approval, though it has been argued that, with a substantial abstention rate, only 54 per cent of the electorate supported it.55 However, the referendum did not cause much excitement as by then the public had generally accepted that independence had already been declared. Also the new constitution was very similar to the former, but there was no reference in it to the establishment of a federal republic of Cyprus, though a Constituent Assembly decision had previously allowed for such a development. It was a signal of Denktas¸’s popularity that on 9 June he was re-elected president by 70.2 per cent of those voting on a turnout of 87 per cent. The two left-wing candidates, Özgür for the more leftist Republican Turkish Party and Durduran for the Communal Liberation Party won only 18.3 and 9.5 per cent of the votes respectively. However, in the parliamentary elections, which followed on 23 June, the left-wing parties together did slightly better than the National Unity Party. From the voting figures it must be assumed that many who voted for the left-wing parties in the parliamentary elections must have voted for Denktas¸ in the presidential election. That Denktas¸, as a separately elected president, was de facto, if not de jure, in charge of foreign policy allowed the electorate to make a clear distinction between foreign and domestic issues. Although constitutionally foreign policy was a governmental responsibility, his separate election conferred a great deal of legitimacy on Denktas¸. Dervis¸ Erog˘lu as head of the National

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Unity Party, and prime minister, could and did criticize Denktas¸, but Denktas¸ had the force of an expressed public opinion on his foreign policy in the Cyprus dispute solidly behind him. ˘lu had little option but to form a governIn 1985 after the elections Erog ment with the Communal Liberation Party, if only to manage a country beset with economic and social problems, including numerous strikes. Shortly after the elections, in early July 1986, the new Turkish Premier since 1983, Turgut Özal, made his first visit to the new independent state. With international criticism of Turkish Cypriot independence renewed by the recent completion of the process, the American Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs deemed the visit ‘unwise’. He was not alone. Soviet, British and UN spokesmen expressed their regret, to the accompaniment of anti-Turkish demonstrations in the South. Özal defied them all by expressing the hope that the Turkish Cypriots would have their country for eternity, declaring that the TRNC must be respected throughout the world. However, his impact on Turkish Cypriot domestic politics did not meet with much approval, certainly from the left. Deeply influenced by the new free market doctrines embraced by President Reagan and the new British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, Özal went so far as to propose withdrawing the Turkish contribution to the Turkish Cypriot budget, which stood at some 40 per cent. With this prospect in view, though not applied, the coalition government fell apart. Certainly there were too many Turkish Cypriots on the public payroll, but the internationally supported embargoes greatly impeded the development of the economy, mainly through the limitations thus placed on international tourism, the industry of the greatest potential for Cyprus, as the experience of the South was demonstrating. On the international scene the Soviet Union took up and tried to obtain support for the international conference on the Cyprus problem favoured by Kyprianou. The UN Secretary-General made soundings on the feasibility of such a conference among members of the Security Council, but could find no substantial support for the proposal. All was now in abeyance on the Cyprus problem, waiting on the result of the presidential election in the South in February 1988. In the meantime Greek-Turkish relations were in some considerable disarray over the important Aegean issue. In March 1987 in Greece and Turkey there was talk of war when Greece decided to prospect for oil in Aegean waters that Greece regarded as its own and Turkey regarded as international. Conflict was avoided, but in April 1987 Greek Cypriot ships were thenceforth denied access to Turkish ports. This was a blow to Greek Cypriot marine interests.

Thoughts from abroad By 1987 nothing had been solved. It was an appropriate time for external views on the problem. In July 1987 the British House of Commons Foreign

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Affairs Committee tackled the subject. On the situation as it had developed up to 1987 the Committee made some interesting points.56 The Committee saw the problem as bound up with the larger problem of Greco-Turkish relations, which reflected the revived antagonism about the Aegean that had recently resurfaced. Papandreou’s role had also been very prominent. It tended, however, to exaggerate Turkey’s interest in wishing to dominate Cyprus where, since 1960, the Turkish Government had nearly always wanted to see a federal solution. For Turkey partition would create the danger of a Greek military base in the South. The Committee supported federation and deplored partition, this not being allowed under the 1960 treaties, but interestingly the Committee had some regard for confederation as a solution. It would not be the best, but the next best, option. Yet, taking into account experience elsewhere, the Committee was sceptical about the chances of success for a federal solution between two unequal entities. The UN seems never to have taken this into account, abiding by the problematic federal solution agreed by the two sides in 1977 and 1979. The Committee was opposed to recognition of the TRNC on principle, this because in its view of ‘the Turkish military invasion and continued occupation.’ However, the United Kingdom was called upon to do everything practicable to facilitate trade and other contacts between the Turkish Cypriot community and the rest of the world. It was not considered how much could in practice be achieved in this direction without recognition, or without Greek Cypriot agreement. This would certainly not be forthcoming since the Greek Cypriots believed that to allow Turkish Cypriot interaction with the outside world would lead to their recognition. The Committee’s Report is shot through with the conviction that in 1974 Turkish action was illegal. Deeply committed to this view the Committee went so far as to call on the European Community to freeze any further consideration of Turkey’s application for full membership of the Community until significant moves were made towards a settlement in Cyprus. The United Kingdom’s action had to be positive: it was not enough to rely on a Greek veto. In the Committee’s view the ‘Turkish zone’ in Cyprus was ‘about twice the area which might be “justified” by the size of the Turkish Cypriot population’. The Committee did not comment that in the Draft Framework Agreement the Turkish Cypriots accepted a reduction of their territory to 29 per cent, which was not much over the proportion that in 1977 Makarios had seemed to accept. There is no evidence in the Report to suggest that the Committee was aware that Turkish pressure on the Turkish Cypriots had helped bring about this attempt at a settlement. On the most desirable form of solution, the Committee curiously states that Turkey had ‘needlessly wrong-footed itself in the summer of 1974: permanent and legal partition might well have assumed a respectable place on the agenda of negotiations between the Guarantor Powers in August 1974 if the Turks

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had not sought to impose it by force’.57 However, there was no sign either before or during the Geneva Conference in 1974 that the United Kingdom, the United States, or any other power, held out any hope for partition. The Greek Cypriots were adamantly opposed to it, not even agreeing to a geographically based federation. As a compromise among the conflicting views of its members, the Committee decided that the best solution, because it contravened least the 1960 settlement, was a federation. Yet it was also aware, as mentioned above, that a lop-sided federation of just two entities was very unlikely to work, especially in conditions of mutual distrust. The Committee concluded as follows: Permanent partition would be a concession to racial and religious bigotry, and an injustice to the many individuals displaced and deprived by the events since 1963. On the other hand there would be little advantage to anyone involved if a ‘federal’ solution were to be adopted which was expected from the start to be unlikely to last. There needs to be a more creative examination of all elements which might make up a federal solution for the island. But if reunification along the lines of a federal solution proves impossible in the reasonably near future, the next-best option is a ‘confederal’ solution, which will at least keep open the prospect of closer collaboration in the future (paras 135 and 136). After more creative thinking on the constitutional framework, the Committee toyed with the idea of constructing a new constitution on a multi-cantonal basis, but it did not spell out this proposal, which after 1974 was not really feasible. This was an interesting report, which in some important respects is still very relevant today. Its caution on the difficulties of a two-member federation in a situation like that of Cyprus has since largely been ignored.

8 The Set of Ideas and Confidence-Building 1988–1994

In January 1988 a sea change seemed about to occur in Greco-Turkish relations when surprisingly Papandreou agreed to meet with Özal in Davos, Switzerland, where they basically agreed to co-operate in solving GrecoTurkish problems, the Aegean being in the forefront of their minds. In return for the unfreezing of Greek assets in Turkey Papandreou indicated he would not veto Turkey’s association agreement with the European Community. Later in the year Özal visited Athens where it was planned to set up joint committees to explore difficult problems. The ‘spirit of Davos’ was expected to help solve the Cyprus problem, though the issue seems not to have been taken up between the two leaders. It was probably better avoided. The new sense of accord, the ‘no war’ deal, as it was termed, was welcomed in both countries, but not without serious misgivings in some quarters on both sides. It was, at least, expected to help along negotiations on the Cyprus issue, and it did seem to be successful in helping to do so. There was also another development of promise in this regard, the election in February 1988 of George Vassiliou in the presidential election in South Cyprus to succeed Kyprianou. Vassiliou, supported by AKEL, seemed flexible, and like his rival, Clerides, head of the Democratic Rally Party, was prepared to enter into negotiations on the Cyprus issue before the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, on which Kyprianou was insisting. Defeated in the first round by Clerides, he then obtained the support of the socialist, and very nationalist, EDEK Party. This brought him victory but could not help but have some effect on his apparently more liberal stance. His position was not strong. Unlike Clerides he did not have a solid party base. Even if his methods were going to be different he still had to say that he would be utterly determined to achieve Greek Cypriot objectives. It helped that he was a clever and attractive person, and a millionaire to boot. His determination to pursue Greek Cypriot objectives was soon tested. When Denktas¸, after congratulating him on his victory, invited him to a meeting of the presidents of two equal political entities, Vassiliou refused. Instead he asked for a meeting with the Turkish President. Ankara reminded him that Denktas¸ was his proper addressee. 160

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Denktas¸ -Vassiliou negotiations In June 1988 at a press conference in New York Vassiliou said that he was prepared to meet with Denktas¸ for meaningful negotiations. At the time President Evren was engaged in discussions, in which Cyprus no doubt featured, during official visits to the United States and the United Kingdom. During an official visit to Ankara in June Denktas¸ announced that he was prepared to engage in a meeting with Vassiliou under UN auspices on the basis of the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements. This could be seen as a retreat from the Draft Framework Agreement to which the Turkish Cypriots had agreed, but which the Greek Cypriot side rejected and would not accept as the point from which to begin. It did, however, release the Turkish Cypriot side from the concessions made in 1986, including the reduction of their territory to 29 plus per cent. The two leaders met in August in Geneva, and subsequently in Nicosia. The intention was to obtain agreement by June 1989. The discussions inevitably went over old ground. The generally good atmosphere of the talks was upset by an incident on the border when, on 19 March 1989 several hundred Greek Cypriot women had tried to cross over the border to the Turkish Cypriot side asserting that there were no boundaries in Cyprus. The talks proceeded through two sessions, after which it was agreed that the third session would be devoted to producing ‘a draft outline of an overall agreement’. By May 1989 the UN Secretary-General, de Cuellar, was optimistic in his report to the Security Council and was authorized to play an active role in the negotiations. De Cuellar then made efforts to encourage further progress. After a joint meeting with Vassiliou and Denktas¸ on 29 June 1989 he produced the outline of a draft agreement for consideration. It was an attempt at a compromise with nothing laid down in detail. The Greek Cypriots could hardly accept in the draft the lack of mention of ‘settlers’ and Turkish troops. The Turkish Cypriots were worried by the reference to ‘substantial’ numbers of Greek Cypriots allowed to return, and reference to Turkish Cypriot problems in this regard as ‘difficulties’. Most of all was the very worrying suggestion that Turkey’s unilateral guarantee could be removed. It was unfortunate that these suggestions were made at a time of increased tension between the two sides. On 17 July there was another massive demonstration on the border in Nicosia by thousands of women and some men declaring again that there were no borders in Cyprus. They crossed over the Green Line, pushing UN troops aside. The Turkish Cypriot police made several hundred arrests, nearly all of women, but including two clerics of high rank. Those arrested were sentenced to three days’ imprisonment and were fined. The issue was serious enough to be discussed in private session by the UN Security Council, but it was not enough to deter the UN Secretary-General

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from his efforts to secure an agreement. He modified somewhat his suggestions and presented them to both sides as ‘a set of ideas’ called ‘a nonpaper’, a detailed set of proposals that soon got into the hands of the press. These extended the powers of federal organs, whilst on the property issue there was no mention of the strongly held Turkish Cypriot view that much Greek and Turkish property could be exchanged. Most important, it emerged that what was meant by updating the 1960 guarantee system was that Turkey would only be able to exercise its right to intervene in accordance with Article 52 of the UN Charter, a long-standing Greek Cypriot demand that would have made any Turkish intervention subject to the Security Council, and could presumably lead to demands for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. Turkish Cypriot reactions The UN Secretary-General insisted that these were only ideas, but they were not ideas that pleased the Turkish Cypriot side at all. Denktas¸ was deeply worried and referred the matter to the Turkish Cypriot parliament, which ˘lu. He was under the control of the National Unity Party led by Dervis¸ Erog was much more hard-line than Denktas¸, having, inter alia, declared that not one dönüm of land should be returned to the Greek Cypriots. The result was that in a resolution on 25 August the parliament insisted on the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people and the preservation of the Turkish guarantee, certainly not accepting that the 1960 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee should be ‘updated and made to accord with the UN Charter’. Bi-zonality, political equality, and property exchange were also stressed. The fact that such a document had been prepared by the Secretary-General was also criticized. His proper role under his ‘good offices’ mission was to help the disputants, not to make proposals. The British Government considered the rejection of the Secretary-General’s proposals as ‘unhelpful’. The rejection was doubtless encouraged by the demonstration on the border. Nor did it help at the time that Vassiliou referred to the Turkish Cypriots as ‘400 years’ old guests’. The rigorous assertion of their rights was seen to be vital by the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots in general, and Denktas¸ in particular, were deeply worried by the turn of world events. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had led to many assertions in Europe, and repeated in the South, that there should be no borders in Europe. This could be regarded as relevant to Cyprus since an application by the Greek Cypriot government for membership of the European Community was clearly in the offing. More important was the fact that with the Cold War virtually over Turkey was no longer as important to the Western Alliance as it had been.1 In the Security Council the United States and the United Kingdom felt they had more leeway in prescribing a solution for Cyprus. None of this would have been so dangerous to Denktas¸ if he could have been sure of Turkish support for

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his policies. He was certainly supported by the military, the Foreign Office and the National Security Council, and by some leading politicians. Unfortunately for him, however, he was aware he did not have the wholehearted support of Turgut Özal, who, although he ceased to be Prime Minister on becoming President on 31 October 1989, still for a while dominated Turkish politics. He was very anxious to have Turkey become a member of the European Community, with whom an application for membership had been lodged, and whose result was awaited. The Cyprus problem was in the way. Under considerable stress, and not prepared to succumb to what they saw as American and British pressure, Denktas¸ and the Turkish Cypriots were emboldened in their resistance that the collapse of the Soviet Union was resulting in the emergence of a number of new states asserting their right of self-determination; this was of much greater significance for them than the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Now was clearly the time for them also to reassert the right of self-determination that had inspired the Declaration of Independence in 1983. They were by no means devoid of supporters in Turkey, though there were those who were becoming more aware that to help promote Turkish Cypriot independence could encourage Kurdish aspirations in that direction. Nevertheless Denktas¸ took care to invite leading opposition politicians to North Cyprus. It was fortunate that he had the strong support of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, who was to become prime minister for a short period in 1991. Negotiations in New York – self-determination As further progress was not being made, the Secretary-General invited the two leaders to meet in New York in February 1990. However, the invitation to resume negotiations was initially for something new. De Cuellar appealed to the two leaders to come to New York, and as from 12 February to participate in a Camp David marathon summit, an exercise in relentless negotiation until a solution was reached. The Americans were thought to be behind it. Bush was not content with the status quo. The American special Cyprus co-ordinator, Nelson Ledsky suggested the proposed marathon summit could go on beyond the expected 15 days, and reportedly ‘took it upon himself to speak of damage to relations between the USA and Turkey if Denktas¸ turned it down’.2 A British Government minister, Frances Maude, reminded Denktas¸ that blocking a settlement in the hope of eventual recognition would not be successful. De Cuellar’s appeal for a Camp David marathon was made on the eve of President Özal’s visit to Washington. Turkey was bound to be under pressure to agree. The Turkish Foreign Office consulted hurriedly with Denktas¸, perhaps to determine what, if any concession could be made to this new approach. The Turkish press believed that concessions from the Turkish Cypriot side would be made, but Özal’s influence over affairs was

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weakening, and Foreign Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, was supportive of Denktas¸. Özal was not strong enough to undermine Denktas¸, if he had wanted to do so. The Turkish Cypriot president had a great deal of support in important areas in Turkey and was very popular. The Camp David proposal angered Denktas¸ who typically responded with defiance. Assured of international sympathy and support Vassiliou was relatively unperturbed, but a Camp David process might also have been hazardous for the South. At the negotiations between Vassiliou and Denktas¸, which began on 26 February, a paper from the Turkish Cypriot side stressed that they were seeking a new partnership based on the recognition of two separate peoples in Cyprus. Denktas¸ called for a joint declaration of intent to establish ‘a Greek-Turkish partnership based on political equality, power sharing and equal and effective participation’.3 This was not likely to receive a positive response. Greek Cypriot proposals of January 1989 had repeated the usual Greek Cypriot demands for the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces and Turkish ‘settlers’ for multi-national guarantees with no rights of intervention, and a constitution to provide effective government. On the three freedoms while the Greek Cypriot side was ‘ready to discuss various options concerning the practical difficulties … the arrangements made must be such as not to frustrate or negate the principles involved’.4 This could hardly be squared with the Turkish Cypriot view that freedom of settlement, for instance, would have to be subject to a moratorium of 18 years. In New York Vassiliou was adamant that the word ‘people’ could not be used to describe the Turkish Cypriot community. The UN Secretary-General was also not persuaded. He insisted on speaking of ‘communities’. He said that the new terminology could alter the conceptual framework. Denktas¸ insisted that without self-determination there could not be a federation, and that if this was not admitted by Vassiliou, ‘there was no point in continuing the meeting’.5 The Greek Cypriot argument was that if every small ethnic or religious minority was to have the right to self-determination, almost every state in the world would disintegrate, a view certainly shared by many states. In a statement in March 1990, after discussions with both community leaders, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that in the course of discussion ‘Mr Denktas¸ stated that the term “communities” be used in a manner that is synonymous with the term “peoples”, each having the right to “self-determination”. Mr Denktas¸, also proposed certain other terms for the word “communities”. In the context of the inter-communal talks the introduction of terminology that is different from that used by the Security Council has thus posed more than a semantic problem.’6 The disagreement on terminology rumbled on. The Secretary-General reminded the Security Council that in the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements ‘the leaders of the two communities pledged themselves to establish a bicommunal and bi-zonal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard its

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independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country, as well as any form of partition or secession’.7 The Security Council later upheld the Secretary-General’s rejection of ‘peoples’ in place of ‘communities’ in a resolution that repeated the Secretary-General’s words.8 The general reaction to Denktas¸’s insistence on self-determination was negative. To the new Russia, to states formerly under colonial rule, and to some European states (e.g. Spain) and, as mentioned above, even for Turkey with its Kurdish minority, self-determination was a dangerously destabilizing principle. In world opinion Vassiliou came out of deadlock in negotiations better than Denktas¸. In the United Kingdom Mrs Thatcher regarded Vassiliou’s role as ‘constructive’ and stressed that the solution had to be of ‘one state and two communities’.9 Support in the TRNC for Denktas¸: his re-election In tune with general international opinion, President George Bush strongly criticized Denktas¸ in his Report to Congress (April 1990) for his uncompromising attitude. Anxious for agreement with Greece, and for support from the United States, in June 1990 Özal excluded Denktas¸ from participating in a European Democratic Union conference in Antalya, attended by Clerides: the Greek Prime Minister, Mitsotakis, had refused to be under the same roof as Denktas¸. Subsequent public demands by Mitsotakis for Turkish pressure on Denktas¸ had an adverse effect, however, on Turkish public opinion. So, too, did the fact that in July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus was encouraged by Greece to apply for EC membership on behalf of the whole island. This was about to become a major factor in the Cyprus conflict. At this stage, despite some opposition from the left-wing parties, Denktas¸ was generally riding high in the North. He had satisfied the hardliners with his vigorous assertion of the right to self-determination, but he also won ˘lu was altering the support from the left for his opposition to the way Erog electoral system to favour the National Unity Party. The presidential election held on 22 April 1990 would test his popularity. Anything like 70 per cent would be taken as indicating impressive support. On a 93 per cent turnout Denktas¸ came close with 66.7 per cent of the vote. His main rival I˙smail Bozkurt of the Republican Turkish Party won 32.05 per cent, whilst the leftist Alpay Durduran, fervent in favour of liaison with the South, as long as AKEL was powerful there, obtained only 1.25 per cent of the vote. Denktas¸ was satisfied. In the 6 May 1990 parliamentary elections Eroglu’s National Unity Party gained 34 out of the 50 seats. The opposition parties had joined together to fight the election seeking to overcome the deleterious effect of the amended electoral law, but they obtained only 16 seats. The National Unity Party would have won under the former electoral law, if not with so large a majority. Turkish mediation helped resolve the

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electoral law problem. To alter the electoral system in its favour was a bad mistake by the National Unity Party.

The EC and Cyprus With the European Community the new TRNC had got off to an unpromising start in 1983 when the European Commission declared: The Commission deeply regrets and rejects the unilateral declaration of independence of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Government of Cyprus is the sole legitimate representative recognised by the European Community.10 The ten member states similarly rejected the Declaration of Independence. It did not help the North that in 1972 Cyprus had signed an Association Agreement with the EC without notable objection by the Turkish Cypriots. In October 1987 the EC and Cyprus signed a protocol for the much-delayed second stage of the Association Agreement. Shortly afterwards Vassiliou, influenced by the Greek Prime Minister, Papandreou, seriously contemplated applying for EC membership. There was significant encouragement from the European Parliament, which in 1988 made a formal invitation to Cyprus to begin political dialogue with the European Community. This led to the establishment by the Commission in May 1990 of an official representative in Nicosia. These developments took no note of the Turkish Cypriots, who objected strongly on the grounds that the Greek Cypriot government was illegal, and that Cyprus was prevented by Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in which the Republic of Cyprus undertook ‘not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever’. The Turkish Cypriot government stated that it was not against membership of the EC provided Cyprus was a state restored to legality by a settlement freely and equally negotiated. This had no impact on the European Parliament. Opinion there was decidedly pro-Greek Cypriot and anti-Turkish, much influenced by Greek parliamentarians after Greece became a member of the EC in 1981. It was there generally agreed that Turkey had illegally ‘invaded’ Cyprus in 1974 and should not have extended its ‘area of occupation’ to over a third of the island. Also Turkey was seen as authoritarian in many respects, showed little regard for human rights and had a very questionable democracy. These ideas were being developed and were going to become EC membership requirements after the Copenhagen Summit in 1993. During 1990 Turkey’s relations with Greece went through a period of serious unease. It was hoped that the narrow victory of Constantine Mitsotakis over the mercurial Papandreou in early April would have led to better

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relations. This was not to be. Mitsotakis made it clear that better relations depended on a settlement of the Cyprus issue. On 6 July 1990 Mitsotakis and the Turkish premier, Yıldırım Akbulut talked in London on the occasion of a NATO meeting, but the Davos spirit was not in evidence. It was not only Cyprus that was disturbing relations. At the time Turkish public opinion was perturbed by difficulties between the Greek authorities and the large Turkish majority in Thrace, known by the Greeks as Muslims, not Turks. Of most importance, however, was that the Greek Government was encouraging Greek Cypriot ambitions for EC membership. The Greek view that Turkey’s own desires to join the European Community could not be accepted unless the Cyprus problem was solved found a response within the European Community. ‘Several officials of the Community had already implied on numerous occasions that the EC members would not give their consent to Turkish membership unless Turkish-Greek differences were resolved and a political solution was reached in Cyprus’.11 It was for both Turkey and the TRNC a very unwelcome development that, shortly before the Republic of Cyprus applied for EC membership, the European Council in Dublin on 26 June 1990 supported ‘the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus’ and reiterated that ‘the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations’. For the Greek Cypriots the prospect now arose of obliging Turkey to force concessions on the TRNC in order to make her own way into the European Community. In this way Cyprus was on the way to becoming a European problem, and more might be hoped for from the European Community than from the United Nations, where Turkey had a voice. The Dublin decision paved the way for Cyprus’ application for EC membership, which was made on 3 July 1990 during the sympathetic Italian presidency of the European Community. In vain, on 1 July the Turkish Foreign Minister had called together and warned all EC ambassadors that the Dublin summit would encourage the Greek Cypriots in their ambitions. Turkey and the TRNC reacted furiously, pointing to the sheer illegality of the application made for the whole of the island. To underline its opposition the Turkish Government would later invite the Turkish Prime Minister, ˘lu, to Ankara on an official visit. In a Joint Declaration close union in a Erog number of important areas would be announced. It was always hoped that a great show of solidarity and support would be sufficient of a warning as to the future of North Cyprus to stop any further progress of the South’s application, but it did not. The European Council decided to send the application to its Commission for an ‘Opinion’.

Turkey and the United States Another issue adversely affecting Turkish-Greek relations came to the fore in 1990. On 8 July 1990 Greece concluded a Defence Co-operation

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Agreement with the United States. Important, and worrying, for Turkey, despite American assurances, was an article in the Agreement which stated that the United States and Greece would protect each other’s sovereign independence and territorial integrity. In Ankara it was believed that Greece had Turkey in mind in this article of the Agreement, as its foreign minister had implied was the case on numerous occasions. In this strained atmosphere, and in the light of this Agreement, on 15 July President Özal saw fit to remind Athens that any attempt to change the status quo with regard to territorial waters in the Aegean was for Turkey a casus belli, lest Greece thought the United States would henceforth support such a move. Ankara seemed now to be supporting wholeheartedly the self-determination of the TRNC, but in doing so had no sympathy or support from the United States. In Nicosia the American special co-ordinator Nelson Ledsky, was reported as saying that in bringing up self-determination in New York Denktas¸ ‘had thrown a spanner in the works’ and that the United States was against the right of self-determination for either community.12 In these circumstances it was not surprising that the UN SecretaryGeneral, de Cuellar, should turn his attention yet again to the Cyprus problem, despite near despair at the Turkish Cypriot insistence on selfdetermination. In March 1991 his verbal report to the Security Council emphasized the principles of bi-zonality, effective guarantees for a settlement, and the equality of the two communities, which were not to be seen as in a majority-minority relationship. This somewhat positive report for the Turkish side had doubtless been influenced by discussions between UN, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials over previous months. American attitudes were also changing. The importance of Turkey during the Gulf War had underlined the fact that in a troubled Middle East Turkey’s role was likely to be as important for the Western alliance as it had been during the Cold War. Moreover Özal was in good odour in Washington. He met with Bush in March 1991 in Camp David. In March even Denktas¸ was called to meet the American Secretary of State, James Baker. In May 1991 Turgut Özal suggested to President George Bush that there might be a quadripartite meeting of Greece, Turkey, and the two communities in Cyprus to discuss the Cyprus question. For both sides it was better than the suggestion being aired of an enforced Camp David style of conference to hammer out a settlement. If the proposed quadripartite meeting went well, it might aid the recognition of the TRNC, but the issue soon arose of how Denktas¸ was to be addressed. He made it clear that if Vassiliou attended as president of Cyprus, he had to be called the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Nor did it help engender enthusiasm in Denktas¸ when President George Bush failed to mention Denktas¸ together with Vassiliou, Mitsotakis and Özal as outstanding leaders in the Eastern Mediterranean. Özal badly wanted Denktas¸ to attend a quadripartite meeting,

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but the proposed meeting was anyway rejected by the Greek Cypriot National Council. Özal nevertheless expressed his irritation with Denktas¸: The Turkish Cypriots can prefer what they like, but we have made great sacrifices and are continuing to do so. They should appreciate the value of this. More than $200 million is spent on Cyprus every year. As long as Turkey goes on doing this, and to a large extent this will go on, one way or another a solution absolutely must be found. This issue is standing in Turkey’s way; this issue is a major obstacle to Turkey’s growth. I say this without hesitation; I have told Denktas¸ to his face.13 Ecevit responded by saying that Turkey would not go bankrupt for $200 million and that Özal’s words were not worthy of a president. Yet Özal, had added that he was not prepared to concede essential points like political equality, bi-zonality, and the Turkish guarantee, ‘the basic conditions of the Turkish side’.14 Özal certainly lost some credibility in American eyes that he was not able to deliver a Cyprus solution.

The UN’s Set of Ideas As hopes for a quadripartite, or some other international, meeting were fading the UN Secretary-General developed more and more meetings of his officials with both sides in an attempt to find common ground. There was some urgency in these preparations since Özal’s star was fading in Turkey, where new elections were in prospect. A solution of the problem would also have helped Bush, since presidential elections were to be held in 1992. The increasing insistence of the TRNC on its sovereignty and its basis in self-determination, may have alarmed Washington and New York, but had not deterred the Security Council from urging De Cuellar to renew his endeavours for his remaining period in office.15 To broker a new settlement was not to be a task for De Cuellar, whose term of office ended on 31 January 1991. His ‘set of ideas’ initiative was now developed with enthusiasm by his successor Boutros Boutros Ghali, who began a series of talks with both sides and with officials in Ankara and Athens. These discussions bore fruit in a developed Set of Ideas, which the Security Council approved subject to some further study of territory and refugees. This was a new and more forceful approach by the UN Security Council. UN discussions with the two leaders were held in New York, starting in June 1992. The second round took place from 15 July to 14 August, the third round, just between the two leaders and under the chairmanship of Boutros Ghali, between 28 October and 11 November. The two earlier sessions were proximity talks, save for brief meetings with the two leaders together from 11 to 14 August.

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In June 1992, before the talks began, the American Secretary of State, James Baker, wrote to Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Hikmet Çetin, urging that pressure be put on Denktas¸ to accept a solution. Somehow the press learned of this letter. The result was a very robust response to James Baker by Denktas¸ for his being seen as the obstacle to a solution. The issue was about maps. Denktas¸ was always against the premature introduction of maps into discussions. His alleged remarks that that the time had not come to discuss maps had not been to the liking of the US Department of State.16 Before the talks Boutros Ghali presented two reports to the Security Council. The second report of 3 April 1992 included a framework for a solution, detailed in some important respects: for instance the principles of bi-zonality and a single sovereignty were laid down, as was the participation of both sides on an equal footing. Also there was considerable detail on the constitution of the new state to be formed, including the structure of the legislature and the executive. It was claimed that if, in particular, the questions of refugees and territorial adjustment were settled, an agreement would be within reach. These were the really important issues for the Greek Cypriots. The new tactic was to have the main features of the Set of ideas approved by the Security Council before discussions began. The Secretary-General again suggested that if negotiations failed, an alternative course of action would have to be considered. In Resolution 750 of 10 April 1992 the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s ‘set of ideas’ whilst recognizing that a good deal had to be done in particular on displaced persons and territorial adjustments. Unlike the situation in 1983 to 1986, the proposed solution now had the full weight of the Security Council behind it. In its Resolution 774 (26 August) aware that agreement was proving difficult the Security Council alarmingly asked Boutros Ghali ‘to recommend to the Council alternative courses of action to solve the Cyprus problem’. Territory and property The discussions in New York began with territorial adjustments and Greek Cypriot displaced persons. This was a victory for the Greek Cypriot side, since these were among their main concerns. For the Turkish Cypriots the resolution of these issues had always to be linked with the character of the federal state to be formed, and could not be decided separately. Nevertheless, early on in the discussions Boutros Ghali produced a map, which was only looked at by the Turkish Cypriots when it was renamed a ‘nonmap’. It showed a reduction of the Turkish Cypriot zone to some 28.2 per cent of the island. This was not far off the 29 per cent it was still generally supposed that the Turkish Cypriots would be content to retain. The major problem was that the map showed the location of Morphou/Güzelyurt in the Greek Cypriot zone. This was completely unacceptable to the Turkish side since it was the only really productive area in the North

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and relinquishing it would have resulted, it was claimed, in some 37,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees. It was also an important area for water supplies for the North. It offended against the 1977 Guidelines, it was said, by not taking heed of the economic viability of the North if the area were surrendered. Denktas¸ believed that the presentation of a map would encourage the Greek Cypriots to believe they were being promised certain areas.17 The Turkish Cypriot side did, reaffirm, however, that their territory could be reduced to 29 plus per cent of the island. Morphou/Güzelyurt was indeed the major citrus producing area for the Turkish Cypriots. Although before 1974 it was very predominantly Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriots maintained they had abandoned major citrus crop areas in the South in 1963 and 1974 to the Greek Cypriots. So Morphou they regarded as a form of compensation. The Turkish Cypriots would not surrender it, even although the Secretary-General pointed out that citrus growing was in decline, and that the North would be left with 55 per cent of the island’s coastline, a valuable tourist resource. Denktas¸ had Turkey behind him, as he had, too, in this issue both the left-wing and the right-wing opposition in the North. Turkish Cypriot public opinion regarded the cession of Morphou as a sell-out. Denktas¸ sought a meeting with members of the Security Council, and explained his position. His relations with Boutros Ghali were by now becoming very strained. On the issue of the return of Greek Cypriots to former property in the North, the Secretary-General proposed that all displaced persons would have the right to return to their properties, though this would occur over a number of years to be agreed. If they wished, they could opt for compensation instead. Such claims would also be entertained from Turkish Cypriots displaced after 1963. In their response the Turkish Cypriot side said they could only allow return to properties after a moratorium of 18 years. Moreover to be excluded from return were properties inhabited by Turkish Cypriot displaced persons, properties substantially altered, allocated for public use or to religious trusts, owned or inhabited by a war veteran, or his heir or descendants, or situated in areas that were previously scenes of massacre or inter-communal violence. For such properties compensation would have to be given. The Turkish Cypriot side also wanted exchange of properties between refugees of both sides. By contrast the Greek Cypriot side insisted that the right of return should only be subject to practical difficulties. In their view all displaced persons had the right of return, save Turkish Cypriots displaced after the events of 1963, who could only claim compensation. The Turkish Cypriot side could not accept the proposed relocation of Greek Cypriots, which, they said, would result in the uprooting of some 47,000 Turkish Cypriots. Nor would they accept the reduction of their territory to less than 29 per cent of the island. These arrangements for return to, and/or compensation for property were to be worked out in much greater detail in the Annan Plan of 2004.

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The Turkish side hedged around the right of return, which could certainly have been socially disruptive. In Boutros Ghali’s view, in practice the conditions the Turkish Cypriots wanted attached to the property question in effect negated the right to return. The Turkish Cypriot side argued that the more equal they were in the system of government, the more they could control the adverse effects of admitting the three freedoms. Also if they were virtually free to govern their own state in a weak federation, or confederation, the numbers of Greek Cypriots wishing to return to their homes might well be greatly reduced. Whilst ‘all universally recognized rights and freedoms’ were included in the proposed Constitution, they could not be realized. As to other important issues, the Treaty of Guarantee, which was much resented by the Greek Cypriots, was to remain. Demilitarization was to be achieved by gradual reduction of forces, but with an agreed level of Turkish and Greek contingents to be stationed on the island. There was no mention in the Set of Ideas of the repatriation of ‘settlers’. During the discussions the Greek Cypriot side wanted their return to Turkey. Constitutional issues The Set of Ideas recognized that Cyprus was the common home of the two politically equal communities. The framework of agreement envisaged would be approved by both communities in separate referenda. The new partnership was said to be bi-communal as to the constitution and bi-zonal as to territory. It would be a federal union of two politically equal federal states to be established, with one indivisible sovereignty, though this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that each federated state would have ultimate power and authority in certain areas, and residual powers. If, to avoid this difficulty, it is suggested that sovereignty lies in, or emanates from, the constitution, then the question of who makes the constitution has to be asked. In the Set of Ideas the constitution would be approved by the electorate of each state in referenda, which in effect recognized the right of self- determination of the citizens of each state. In federations the concept of indivisible sovereignty does not have any place, but the Greek Cypriots have always insisted on it. As to the functioning of government there would be two houses of the legislature at the federal level. The lower house would be formed on a 70/30 Greek/Turkish Cypriot ratio, but in the upper house there would be equality of representation. On important issues (foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship a majority of each sides representatives in the lower house could require that there should be separate majorities. The system would be presidential, not parliamentary. The executive Council of Ministers would also be formed on a 70:30 basis, but on the important issues given above the President and Vice-President would need to concur. Most important, the President and/or Vice-President

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could veto any decision of the legislature on the important issues mentioned. These veto powers were clearly likely to cause much friction, as they had in the period 1960 to 1963. The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would remain in force, and a timetable for the withdrawal of all forces not authorized under the Treaty of Alliance would be agreed. The Set of Ideas outlined arrangements for the return of displaced persons to their properties, for territorial adjustments and for promoting the economic development in particular of the Turkish Cypriot community, for which there would have to be safeguards. For the most part the Turkish Cypriot side went along with the proposals, but wanted a rotating presidency, not just a Turkish Cypriot vicepresident, equality of representation in the Council of Ministers, rotation in the assignment of ministries, and decision by consensus rather than by counting of votes. On the difficult issue of sovereignty their requirement was that the federal government was sovereign in so far as its sovereignty was not limited by that of the federated states. This was, of course, a denial of the sovereignty of the federal state, and could not be accepted by the Greek Cypriots. They accepted the Set of Ideas as a basis for reaching agreement, but stressed the importance of the functionality of the state, by which they meant that the federal government would be strong enough to govern. They accepted the map produced by the Secretary-General, but stressed that many aspects of the Set of ideas were not in accord with international law and human rights. International reactions By August it was clear that agreement would be difficult. There was now a break in negotiations until October. On 24 August Ghali reported to the Security Council. He ruled out a two-state solution, called for greater political will, and saw Denktas¸’s movement on the issue of the resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees in the North as valuable, but insufficient. Denktas¸ pointed out that Turkish Cypriot side’s reasonableness on displaced persons had apparently been accepted as a unilateral concession, whereas something had to be conceded by the other side in return. In Ankara Denktas¸’s part in the talks was generally supported. A high-level meeting in early September before a visit by Denktas¸ included President Özal, Demirel, now Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence. Despite some anxieties on the impact of a failure of the talks on Turkey’s future European policy, the strength of political party and public opinion in support of Denktas¸ ensured that he would be supported by Ankara, if to some degree guided. In its Resolution (774) of 26 August the Security Council noted that some progress had been achieved in ‘the acceptance by both sides of the right of return and the right to property’, and in ‘a narrowing of the gap by both sides on territorial adjustment’. This overstated the case, but the

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Security Council seemed to be determined to be optimistic. It agreed with the Secretary-General that ‘an integrated whole had now been sufficiently developed to enable the two sides to reach an overall agreement’! Denktas¸ was not persuaded and hesitated about the value of the third meeting planned for October. The Turkish Cypriot side were taking note of the fact that it was they, not the Greek Cypriots, who were being called upon to make concessions whilst Vassiliou looked on. There seemed to be no pressure on Vassiliou to agree, for instance, to the rotating presidency the Turkish Cypriots regarded as very important, and to which it was known Vassiliou was adamantly opposed. The October meeting was delayed by a few days because Denktas¸ objected to Vassiliou being described in a document as the President of Cyprus whilst he was called the leader of the Turkish Community. After much wrangling Denktas¸ had his way, and an apology from Boutros Ghali. He and Vassiliou were to be described as leaders of their communities. Apportioning blame for failure The talks went over old ground without result. The Secretary-General produced a useful document listing the differences between the two sides. Whilst recognizing that the Turkish Cypriots accepted 91 out of the 100 paragraphs of the Set of ideas, he listed their objections. In his Report of 23 November Boutros Ghali concluded that some of the positions of the Turkish Cypriot side ‘were in a fundamental way outside the set of ideas’. He also noted that the Greek Cypriots only accepted them subject to the provisos they had listed, which were substantial. In its Resolution 789 of 25 November the Security Council significantly observed, following Boutros Ghali, that ‘the joint meetings did not achieve their intended goal, in particular because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas’, and called on them ‘to adopt positions that were consistent with those ideas’. It also now urged all concerned to commit themselves to confidence-building measures and called on both sides to propose bi-communal projects. The lack of success in the talks owed something to the fact that after 1990 the Greek Cypriots, whilst paying due regard to the United Nations, had begun to direct their attention to Europe, seeing the European Community as offering another, and perhaps better, chance to realize their ambitions than the United Nations. The European Community was beginning to develop real power. It will be recalled that the EC Summit in Dublin in June 1990 had unanimously agreed that future relations with Turkey had to be linked with Turkey’s attitude on Cyprus. This was in line with the rejection by the EC in February 1990 of the application Turkey made in 1987 to join the European Community. In rejecting the application the EC, in the political context, found Turkey wanting in its disputes with Greece, including that over the Cyprus question.

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Against this background, with increased confidence, the Greek Cypriots avoided making firm commitments to the UN Secretary-General. Facing criticism at home for being too accommodating, Vassiliou was adamant in his view that the Set of Ideas was not a basis for negotiation, only for discussion. Later Clerides was to state that although the Set of Ideas had some positive aspects, it was disadvantageous for Cypriot Hellenism, and argued that it could become acceptable only if it underwent significant revision.18 In truth there was little apparent gain for the Greek Cypriots in the constitutional proposals advanced in the Set of Ideas. They would be agreeing to a form of government not dissimilar to that of 1960, one that they had found unfair to them as a majority on the island. The wisdom of the UN in trying to force two communities into a settlement that might only have revived inter-communal violence could be questioned. A seasoned and impartial observer of the events of 1992 was alarmed that acceptance of the Set of ideas would have led to ‘a kind of Zurich, Mark 2, with constitutional provisions of comparable horrendousness … On the basis of all available evidence, including recent conversations with the top Turks dealing with Cyprus, I am convinced that the Turkish side will never cede any territory until it first secures ironclad guarantees that the TRNC can continue as some kind of separate political, entity’.19

Confidence-building measures On the failure of the Set of Ideas initiative the UN Security Council called for the creation and implementation of confidence-building measures between the two sides. This was a reputable tactic in such situations though there is always the danger that seemingly minor issues develop into deeper issues of principle. It also did not help create a climate for negotiations that on 14 February 1993 Glafkos Clerides narrowly defeated Vassiliou in the South’s presidential elevation. He claimed that Vassiliou was too inclined to compromise on vital issues. Clerides was himself inclined to be moderate, but he owed his presidency to the nationalist parties EDEK and DIKO. Rejecting the Set of Ideas Clerides claimed that they denied human rights and contravened international law. Significantly, he noted that agreement on the Set of Ideas could block the way to EU membership. This was really the crux of the matter. He was well aware that if Cyprus joined the EU before Turkey it would be in a strong position to persuade Turkey to exert a beneficial influence over the Turkish Cypriots. Clerides could not, however, reject the UN’s call for confidence-building measures. Nor could Denktas¸. Talks began in Nicosia, but reached a climax in New York in May 1993 at a meeting attended by members of the Security Council. The principal proposal made by the UN Secretary-General was the cession of Varosha (Maras¸) by the Turkish Cypriot side in return for the joint use of

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Nicosia airport, which would greatly remove the embargo on direct air travel to the North and would greatly encourage its tourist industry. Denktas¸ was not at first persuaded. The Turkish Cypriot government called for the removal of all embargoes imposed by the international community, which respected the South’s claim to sovereignty over the whole island. In New York Denktas¸ was generally persuaded that the deal as proposed was worth pursuing and went so far as to explain to Erdal I˙nönü, the Turkish Prime Minister, the possibilities in the deal. Inönü supported the initiative, but then, on returning to North Cyprus, Denktas¸ met with criticism from experts and opposition from members of the right-wing gov˘lu. It was claimed that in surrendering Varosha ernment in power under Erog they would be losing their best bargaining asset for a mere sharing of Nicosia airport. It was salami tactics. For the cession of Varosha all embargoes should be abolished. Denktas¸ reviewed his position. Impressed by the criticism he hastened to Ankara to explain the new Turkish Cypriot assessment of the proposals to the Turkish Government, and in particular to the Turkish parliament, where he received tumultuous applause. He was able eventually, if with difficulty, to convince the Turkish Government that the Turkish Cypriot stance was correct.

Politics in the North These events took place against a disturbed and changing political background in North Cyprus. It will be recalled that in the 1990 parliamentary ˘lu returned to power. elections the National Unity Party led by Dervis¸ Erog As it had changed the electoral system in its favour, against the opposition of Denktas¸, the opposition parties fought the election as an alliance. How˘lu’s domination ever, they did not succeed. During the ensuing period of Erog of parliament nationalist forces were in the ascendant. The victory of Erog˘lu in the 1990 elections at first found favour with Turkey, partly because the National Unity Party went along with, if it did not very efficiently implement, the market-orientated Turkish economic policy developed by Øzal. Whilst this policy was generally unpopular, the party nevertheless won support in the TRNC for its hard-line policies on the Cyprus issue. The government proclaimed it would not return one piece of land to the Greek Cypriots and began to issue title deeds for commandeered property to Turkish Cypriot refugees and to some immigrants from Turkey. It also maintained a clientilist network of some importance. In office after 1990 its popularity began to wane. The opposition parties had united against it in the 1990 elections and attacked the party for its disregard of democratic principles by altering the electoral law in its favour. They also objected strongly to the effects of the new market-orientated economic policy. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union, and influenced

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by the new and more flexible socialism beginning to find favour with the left almost everywhere, they were looking less of a threat to the developing bourgeoisie in the North, so their voices were listened to more. They also believed in giving some ground in order to have a solution, as did Denktas¸, though not to the same extent. Their objection to the National Unity Party ˘lu over was therefore partly shared by Denktas¸, like them at odds with Erog ˘lu’s position the latter’s hard-line approach to the Cyprus problem. Erog was, of course, difficult. Unlike previous prime ministers of the National Unity Party (which Denktas¸ had founded), he insisted on his rights to form all policy, including foreign policy. In domestic affairs he resented the fact that many supplicants for governmental help went direct to Denktas¸, who seemed to him to be interfering in every branch of the administration. ˘lu believed that Denktas¸ should confine himself to his presidential role Erog as established in the Constitution. However, within the NUP a faction began to be formed that was supportive of Denktas¸. It was led by Hakkı Atun. A leading member was Denktas¸’s son, Serdar Denktas¸. This faction broke away to establish the Democratic Party. The emergence of the Democratic faction in the National Unity Party ˘lu, but his relations between Denktas¸ should have been a warning to Erog deteriorated to such an extent that in early July 1993 Denktas¸ resigned as negotiator for North Cyprus. He claimed he resigned because of lack of ˘lu but at the same time Denktas¸ support in his international role by Erog was being pressed by Ankara to accept the UN Confidence-Building Measures, despite his own worries about them. It helped when Ankara exerted pressure ˘lu that resulted in early new parliamentary elections. on Erog These elections were held on 12 December 1993. The National Unity Party and the new Democratic Party shared almost equally nearly 59 per cent of the vote, which certainly showed the great extent of support for national self-assertion. Nevertheless the only coalition now possible was between the Democratic and the Republican Turkish Party led by Özker Özgür, which won almost a quarter of the vote. The coalition, and the participation of Özgür as Deputy Prime Minister in the new government, was a great surprise to the Greek Cypriots, who often believed that the left in the North was adamantly opposed to Denktas¸. The truth was that the Republican Turkish Party, like the Communal Liberation Party, was very supportive of a federal solution, but both parties realized that they could not trust the Greek Cypriots.20 The Republican Turkish Party had by now come out in support of the Turkish guarantee, favoured bi-zonalism, was less close than hitherto to AKEL, and had given a visual demonstration of its more moderate socialism by changing its flag from red to green. The chance of having power in government could have had something to do with the softening of its ideological stance, but it was generally falling into line with the new form of socialism emerging in the western world. The opposition parties were,

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however, also aware that to join the European Community was a step on the road to a much better standard of living than that in the isolated impoverished North. This was beginning to make a settlement with the Greek Cypriots more than normally attractive. The reaction of the international community to the prospect of a coalition government including the left was very positive. Joe Clark, the UN SecretaryGeneral’s Special Envoy, and a former Canadian prime minister, believed that the Cyprus problem had arrived at a new and very promising juncture. In the new government Özgür wanted to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, which would, no doubt have, led to friction with Denktas¸, but he was steered away from that office to became, instead, Deputy Prime ˘lu was no longer in Minister. It was anyway a relief for Denktas¸ that Erog power.21 He resumed his role as negotiator. In agreement with Ankara he said he would now attend the UN talks on confidence-building measures. Meanwhile the South’s application to join the European Economic Communities was making progress, and this was affecting its attitudes over confidence-building measures. Implementation of the confidence-building measures The original intention on the issue of Nicosia Airport was that it would be available for use only by foreign airlines. Consequently it could then be used by, among others, Turkish Cypriot Airlines, which was registered in Turkey. However, on reflection the Greek Cypriots did not approve of this since it would leave Turkish Cypriot Airlines using the airport as if it was its base. Consequently they exerted pressure on the UN, with the result that in a document of 21 March 1994 the Republic of Cyprus was allowed traffic rights in the airport even though it was not a foreign airline. In response the Turkish Cypriot side wanted to have its airline registered in the TRNC, which was unacceptable, being illegal in Greek Cypriot eyes. The Turkish Cypriots maintained that the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot request by the UN upset the balance in the negotiations. They claimed it had been agreed that the major benefit from the opening of the airport would accrue to the Turkish Cypriots, and that of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots. As to Varosha, it was before 1974 a thriving, if in some respects, unattractive, tourist resort, with many high buildings close to the shore. It was by this time a fenced area some 4 km by 1.5 km and was unoccupied, though under the control of the TRNC Government. It was surrounded on three sides by Turkish Cypriot territory, and by the sea on the fourth. It lay immediately to the south of the port of Famagusta. The UN proposal was for the area to be governed by the UN until there was a final settlement. Greeks and Turks were meanwhile to be allowed into the area. Former owners could reclaim their property. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot businesses would be encouraged to set themselves up there. Since the bulk of the property was previously Greek Cypriot owned, some property for renting

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would be made available for Turkish Cypriots. Basically the area would be re-developed as a tourist and free trade zone. An interesting, and important proposal was that foreign tourists would be allowed to move through the area to and from either side. The negotiations on Varosha soon ran into difficulties. There were in particular problems about access to Varosha by the Greek Cypriots, who were unwilling to permit any control of the access road to Varosha from the South by Turkish Cypriots At a special meeting in Vienna called together by the United States, which included UN officials, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish representatives, but not Greek Cypriots, a solution on this issue was proposed that was eventually accepted by the UN Security Council. However, it was rejected by the Greek Cypriots, who would approve only the UN proposals of 21 March 1994, and who pointed out that they were not bound by the conclusions of a meeting at which they were not present. Nevertheless, in due course the Security Council (Resolution 939, 29 July 1994) noted the acceptance of ‘a substantial measure of agreement on the substance of the confidence-building measures and the modalities for their implementation’. It was not, however, enough for the Greek Cypriots. The issue of recognition lay behind the whole issue. As the negotiations had dragged on, under the influence of the hardliners, Clerides had begun to adopt a negative attitude towards the confidencebuilding measures. He could not ignore the fact that the hard-line political party, DIKO, had secured his election to the presidency in the second round run-off election against Vassiliou.

The European Community In accordance with its usual procedures the EU Council called upon the European Commission to provide an Opinion on the application of the Republic of Cyprus for EU membership. The Opinion included a report on Cyrus made by an official in the Commission, Serge Abou. On the grounds that the application was illegal the Turkish Cypriot authorities did not allow Abou to enter North Cyprus to collect information, though he could have used available published material. Consequently, he made some rather startling statements about the North, including the popular Greek Cypriot view that Denktas¸ was kept in power by the votes of Turkish immigrants, which research has shown to be untrue. They voted in much the same ways as other Turkish Cypriots.22 Abou was also reporting under the influence of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, though he did not openly refer to these criteria in preparing his report: it has been pointed out that they would only have caused major difficulties for Cyprus if the North had been included: Greek Cypriot respect for the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish minorities would be difficult to demonstrate. The ability of Turkish Cypriot entrepreneurs to

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meet competitive pressures could be doubted. There was no way the Turkish lira could be expected to meet the limits on inflation set out in the Treaty of Maastricht.23 The Commission had also to consider in its Opinion the stability of Cypriot institutions: Stability is treated as an institutional question. The international aspect is discussed in terms of the UN agenda without mentioning the five near-wars between Greece and Turkey involving Cyprus before 1993. The Government of Cyprus is entirely absolved from responsibility for the ‘turbulent history’ of the young Republic. The outbreaks of communal violence before 1974 are attributed to ‘the existence of the Greek and Turkish communities side by side’ without raising the question of why this longstanding coexistence had been peaceful and was now confrontational.24 Not properly informed about North Cyprus, and largely disregarding the effects of EC membership on the Turkish Cypriots, the EC believed the Greek Cypriot application was admissible, and like the UN regarded the Greek Cypriot government was legitimate and the Turkish Cypriot government, being unrecognized, as illegitimate. It was assumed that human rights in Cyprus were protected by the 1960 Constitution. In short the Turkish Cypriots were largely ignored, treated as a sort of inconvenience that would somehow have to be overcome. However, the Commission’s Report did rule out immediate accession for Cyprus, on the ground that integration implied a peaceful, balanced and durable solution to the Cyprus problem. However, the Commission felt ‘that a positive signal should be sent to the authorities and the people of Cyprus confirming that the Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership, and that as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession’ (para. 48). However, on 19–20 July 1993 the General Affairs Council took an important step that suggested that the problem was not serious enough to wait upon a settlement: The Council supports the Commission stance which proposes to make use of all the instruments contained in the Accession Agreement in order to contribute, in close co-operation with the Cypriot government, to the economic, social and political transition of Cyprus towards integration with the European Union, without waiting for a peaceful, balanced and durable solution to the Cypriot problem. To this end, the Council invites the Commission to initiate, from now on, substantial discussions with the government of Cyprus to help it prepare, in the best possible

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conditions, for accession negotiations which will later follow, and to regularly inform the Council on the progress achieved (emphasis added).25 The phrase ‘without waiting for a peaceful, balanced and durable solution’ was not contained in the Commission’s Opinion. The Council then went on further to state that if a prospect of a settlement in the foreseeable future was not forthcoming, the Council agreed to ‘examine the situation in view of the positions adopted by each party in the inter-communal talks and to examine in January 1995, the question of Cyprus accession to the European Union in the light of the situation’. The progress of the Cypriot application The General Affairs Council did not make a settlement an essential condition for the admission of Cyprus. To do so would have given the Turkish Cypriots a virtual veto over the South’s application. A new factor had now entered into the situation. In early 1994 Greece occupied the EU Council Presidency and, urging membership for Cyprus, argued that it should take precedence over further enlargement. This was to affect the Corfu decision in June 1994. Greece was now very actively, and effectively, promoting and supporting the ambitions of the Republic of Cyprus. Meanwhile in Cyprus Clerides, now close to Greece and responding to his nationalist support, was intent on developing the South’s military potential, signing with Greece in December 1993 the Joint Defence Doctrine agreement. This led to the construction of a new joint air base in Paphos. As Turkish aggression was unlikely this seemed to be intended to draw sympathetic world attention to the dispute. Subsequently, without any more talks actually taking place between the two sides, on 24 and 25 June 1994 in Corfu the European Council welcomed ‘the significant progress made regarding the application of Cyprus … for accession to the European Union’ and considered that ‘an essential stage in the preparation process could be regarded as completed’. It also noted that ‘the next phase of the enlargement of the Union will involve Cyprus and Malta’.26 The European Council also asked the Council and the Commission to do their utmost to ensure that the negotiations with Malta and Cyprus were ‘brought to a rapid conclusion’, but did not say that a solution was necessary. Instead, it stipulated that ‘any solution of the Cyprus problem must respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and high-level agreements’. It was a major victory for the Greek Cypriots. ‘The conditionality of the Commission’s Opinion was seriously eroded … Greece succeeded primarily because it had threatened to block the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden’.27 The Turkish Cypriot press had a word for it, ‘blackmail’.

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The European Summit in Essen in December 1994 confirmed that the next enlargement of the EU would involve Cyprus and Malta. However, its accompanying instruction to the General Affairs’ Council ‘to consider in January 1995 the Commission’s Reports on the progress of the negotiations between the communities implied that progress was expected before Cypriot accession could be contemplated’.28 The European Council nevertheless reconfirmed the decision on Cyprus and Malta at subsequent meetings in Cannes, Madrid (1995) and Florence (1996). The initial requirement of the prospect of a solution was being sidestepped, though not without some misgivings. For instance the British Prime Minister, Mr John Major, stated in the House of Commons that Cyprus was very far from accession due to a difference between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. In January 1995, after Major and the Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, met with Clerides in London, it was said that before negotiations with Cyprus began, it would be necessary to be clear how far agreement between the two sides had reached, This cautious attitude did not persist. The idea was gaining ground that admission of the divided island would itself be the catalyst that would bring about a solution. The European Commission had been expected to review its decision in January 1995, but cautiously did not do so, pending the Report of its Observer on the progress of the UN sponsored talks, which would include the set of talks arranged between Clerides and Denktas¸ in October 1994, discussed below. By the Greek Cypriots the admission of Cyprus to the EU was certainly regarded as a necessary catalyst for a solution. They believed then that it would force Turkey to persuade the TRNC to make concessions for the sake of Turkey’s own prospects in the European Union. Even if there should be no settlement, the accession of the South as the Republic of Cyprus would in theory make available to the Greek Cypriots the whole battery of rights available to any member state. The claim to the ‘three freedoms’ would be strengthened, if not directly supported, by EU membership.

TRNC exports to EU member states The confidence-building negotiations had shown that the Greek Cypriots would not accept any measures that implied any recognition of the TRNC, and the TRNC any measures that denied it. The TRNC’s pariah status was now almost immediately underlined when on 5 July 1994 the European Court of Justice confirmed the Greek Cypriot inspired embargo on the TRNC by requiring Turkish Cypriot exports to EU states to be certified by the Greek Cypriot authorities. A Greek Cypriot company, Anastasiou Ltd, had applied to a British court to ban the export of Turkish Cypriot citrus fruit and potatoes, and manufactures, to EU member states, among which the United Kingdom was the largest importer. The Greek Cypriots had

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claimed that these Turkish Cypriot products exported to EC states had to be approved by the Republic of Cyprus authorities, a claim that was upheld by the European Court of Justice. The United Kingdom and the European Commission fought the case in the European Court on behalf of the North. For this the British Government earned some credit in North Cyprus, but lost it when it immediately imposed the ban instead of allowing some time for the Turkish Cypriots to adjust to these important new restrictions on their freedom to trade. It was a major blow to the TRNC economy, which had suffered badly with the demise of the company, Polly Peck, founded by the prominent Turkish Cypriot entrepreneur Asil Nadir. It reduced lucrative Turkish Cypriot exports to the EU by more than a half. The EU was now falling in with international support for the Greek Cypriot embargo, which had long had deleterious effects on the Turkish Cypriot economy. It could not help but drive the TRNC closer to Turkey. The European Court decision was deeply resented. Rightly or wrongly, the Court’s ruling was seen as a way of implementing the threats that had been made since 1992 that if the Cyprus problem did not yield to UN efforts to solve it, other measures would have to be taken. In Rome shortly after a meeting with Boutros Ghali, Clerides, speaking to journalists, said, ‘the recent trade ban imposed by the EU on Turkish Cypriot exports was an example of the type of measure that was needed’.29 He went to say that ‘substantive, and not verbal, pressure must be exerted on the Turkish side’.30 The European Court’s ruling essentially gave preference to the 1977 Protocol (which defined ‘originating products and methods of administrative co-operation’) over Article 5 of the 1972 Association Agreement (which states that ‘the rules governing trade between the Contracting Parties may not give rise to any discrimination between nationals or companies of Cyprus’). Critics of the Court’s ruling argued that the Association Agreement was a much more important document than the subsequent Protocol. Also, this was ‘prioritizing the Community’s need for uniform rules of certification’.31 ‘The Court argued that different national practices created “uncertainty of a kind likely to undermine the existence of a common commercial policy”. This statement of principle does seem disproportionate in that the trade concerned was confined to Britain and Ireland via Rotterdam.’32 The Court also believed that the ‘domestic remedy’ had not been exhausted, i.e. that the Turkish Cypriot exporters could have applied to the Greek Cypriots for the necessary certification. This ignored the very nature of the problem and the fact that crossing the dividing borderline by officials was not allowed by, or for, either side. The Court’s observation in this regard was ‘demonstrably absurd’.33 This decision strengthened the EU’s involvement in the Cyprus issue. ‘The lack of impartiality shown by the Court of Justice … fits a general pattern shown by all the European institutions’.34

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The Turkish Cypriot government condemned the Court’s verdict. On 28 August 1994, the Turkish Cypriot parliament passed a Resolution declaring that ‘no good would come out of negotiations on the confidence-building measures while the decision of the European Court of Justice remained in force and the Greek Cypriot administration persistently pursues its efforts for unilateral membership of the European Union’. Also, parliament reaffirmed ‘the separate sovereignty’ of the TRNC and declared that any new negotiations would ‘have to take into account the political equality and sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots’. It also stressed the need for the completion of economic integration with Turkey, and repealed previous resolutions that had envisaged ‘federation as the sole form of settlement in Cyprus’, whilst not excluding it altogether. The voting was not unanimous, however. The Republican Turkish Party led by the Vice-Premier Özker Özgür, voted against it, as did the Communal Liberation Party. Responding to these decisions in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, President Clerides wrote to the UN Secretary-General (7 September 1994) saying that ‘these new developments can no longer be ignored or characterized as non-existing, or of no effect, simply because they were the result of a decision of an illegal and non-recognized organ’. He continued, ‘I firmly hold the view that any preliminary consultations must establish, within a short time, clearly and unequivocally, acceptance of Paragraph 2 of UN Resolution 939 (29 July) by Turkey and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community’. [This stated that ‘a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity guarded, and comprising two politically equal communities’]. Clerides noted that the Secretary-General had expressed doubts that his ‘good offices mission’ might not be ‘an adequate method to deal with a situation in which, for the past several years, one side has consistently flouted the wishes of the international community, as represented in the Security Council’. Clerides thought ‘it would be necessary for the Security Council to be asked to consider coercive measures against the side which is flouting its resolutions, or adopt other and more effective, procedures’. This clearly implied taking further measures to bring the Turkish Cypriots into line. It helped sour what were generally positive attitudes in the TRNC towards the European Union. New penalties seemed to be in prospect. Denktas¸ declared that they would burn their produce rather than accept control by the Greek Cypriots. Large crowds made up principally of farmers and textile workers blocked crossing points to the South in protest, though the principal traffic was UN and diplomatic. It helped ease the pain a little when in Ankara Joe Clark surprisingly said that the Court’s decision on exports was unjust. Clark was also told in Ankara that if the EU embargo continued, then the TRNC could not be expected to participate in new UN sponsored negotiations. There was no necessary connection, but Turkish

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and Turkish Cypriot opinion saw the EU embargo as punishment for the Turkish Cypriots’ refusal to accept the Set of Ideas. As a response to this turn of events, and to the South’s intention to join the European Union, circles in Ankara toyed with the idea of signing an accord with the TRNC that would in some important respects place it under Turkish sovereignty. The areas of foreign affairs and security were chiefly mentioned. Ecevit was mainly linked with the idea, but it was also being entertained by the more cautious Demirel. It was an indication of the seriousness with which Ankara now regarded the Cyprus situation. Threat or bluff, absorption into Turkey was not a popular solution in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot people. There is very little evidence that Denktas¸ believed in it as the solution. Also the Turkish Government was well aware that the absorption of North Cyprus would be a violation of the 1960 Agreements, of which it was a guarantor.

The five talks between Clerides and Denktas¸ In an attempt to close the gap that had opened up between the two sides the UN, through its representative in Nicosia, proposed a series of informal talks be held between the two leaders. In October 1994 five informal meetings were held in the presence of Gustave Feissel, the UN Secretary’s Representative in Nicosia. Denktas¸ had hoped that these talks would focus on the confidence-building measures, which was the immediate concern, still, of the UN Secretariat. Clerides preferred, however, to discuss first problems of a general settlement, beginning with the federal structure, though little progress was apparently made. Then Clerides proposed what looked like an attractive deal. If the Turkish Cypriots would support the Greek Cypriot application to the EU, the Greek Cypriots would accept a Swissstyle federation of the sort the Turkish Cypriot side regarded as needed. In particular, the Greek Cypriots would accept the Turkish Cypriot [problematic] definition of sovereignty, namely that the federated states were sovereign in so far as their sovereignty was not limited by the Federal Constitution. The Greek Cypriot side described this approach as ‘imaginative’, and it found favour abroad. Clerides even offered to delay actual accession to the EU until after the formation of the federation. What could be fairer? The Report by the European Observer on Cyprus (Serge Abou) of 25 January 1995 described the overtures made by Clerides as ‘courageous’.35 He also accepted the Greek Cypriot view on the reasons for the failure of the confidence-building initiative, but interestingly he reported that the Greek Cypriot government was ‘opposed to the implementation of the CBM’s as long as there is no real likelihood for agreement on an overall settlement’ (para. 4). This was in fact Clerides’ position in these talks with Denktas¸.

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The Turkish Cypriot side turned down what to many seemed to be an attractive offer, but Denktas¸ did so for a number of reasons. In the first place, ‘Mr Clerides’ acceptance of the above definition of sovereignty, however, was conditional on the Turkish Cypriot’s side’s acceptance to support as from now, the unilateral application for European Union membership submitted in 1990 by the Greek Cypriot Administration under the title of “the Government of the Republic of Cyprus” with the proviso that if accepted it would be the “Federal Republic of Cyprus” which would enter the EU. This condition unfortunately entails legal, political and economic difficulties.’36 In other words, for the TRNC to support the Greek Cypriot side in their endeavour to join the EU would be tantamount to recognizing the legality of a government they held to be illegal. Secondly, and crucially, there was as yet no agreed federal constitution settling the issue of where sovereignty lay, and how it was to be divided. The Turkish Cypriots thought they should stay with the UN approach to the problem, i.e. to move from confidence-building measures to an overall agreement, to be approved by referenda on both sides. The suggestion by Clerides that the numbers of refugees to return to the North could be restricted in return for generous cession of territory was also rejected. Another offer, that of a rotating presidency in return for total demilitarization, could never be accepted by the North. It would leave them at a grave disadvantage in case of Greek Cypriot aggression, and would mean abandoning the Turkish guarantee. The Turkish Cypriot side had noted with some alarm that between August and October 1944, under the terms of the recent Common Defence Agreement, Greek troops held extensive exercises in Cyprus in co-operation with Greek naval and air force units. Clerides had always favoured obtaining Greek military support, though not Greek domination. These military exercises, which took place just before the Clerides/Denktas¸ talks, did not reassure the Turkish Cypriots of Greek Cypriot intentions to come to an agreement. In the Turkish Cypriot National Assembly the major political parties supported the President, though the Republican Turkish Party had some reservations. Denktas¸ was not unresponsive to opinion in the North and did not want to appear rigid. In November 1944 he wrote to the UN Secretary-General stating his belief in the need for the implementation of the confidence-building measures and the Turkish Cypriot side’s willingness to enter into negotiations with the Greek Cypriots to bring about a lasting solution. Later, on 20 January 1995, Denktas¸ announced a 14 point Peace Offensive. This document called for the completion of the confidence-building measures, followed by substantive talks on a settlement. The President also said, ‘The Turkish side wishes to announce, here and now, that it is prepared to discuss the subject of the EU … within the framework foreseen in the “Set of Ideas” as soon as an agreement is reached on a bi-communal, bi-zonal, federal solution.’37

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The Greek Cypriots did not accept the proposals. President Clerides rejected the view that EU membership should follow a settlement; he thought that Turkish Cypriot support for the EU application would ‘have the positive effect of finding common ground for agreement’.38 It is clear that the major concern for each side during the UN SecretaryGeneral’s attempt to get agreement on confidence-building measures was the fear of thereby being seen to accord legitimacy to the other side. For the same reason, Denktas¸ would not support an application for membership to the EU made by the ‘illegal’ Greek Cypriot government. The question now was whether the EU would provide the catalyst for a solution, as Clerides clearly hoped, and Denktas¸ feared, could be the case.

9 The EU Catalyst and the UN 1995–2002

The confidence-building initiative was by now dead. The Greek Cypriots were happy that they were progressing to EU membership. Particularly encouraging was that Greece had warned that it would veto a Turkey-EU Customs Agreement unless a date was fixed for accession negotiations for Cyprus. Afraid that the TRNC would be sacrificed, Denktas¸ asked Mrs Çiller, who had became the Turkish prime minister on 25 June 1993, to declare openly what she wanted of Cyprus. That she appeared to be deliberately letting the Turkish Cypriot economy stagnate, or even run down, alarmed the Turkish Cypriots some of whom thought that this was intended to make the Turkish Cypriots more willing to agree to a settlement. In fact in January 1995 the financial aid to the TRNC was just over half the amount requested, despite the negative impact of the European Union’s virtual ban on imports from the North. The United States was always concerned about the regional implications of the Cyprus dispute, but especially now Cyprus was making progress to EU membership without a solution. Consequently President Clinton despatched a lawyer, Richard Beattie to Cyprus, as he had Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State, to see what could be done. The latter had succeeded in Bosnia where the EU had failed. After success in Bosnia he might be able to wield ‘the plain speaking authority’ enjoyed by Harry Hopkins in the Second World War.1 Meanwhile, there were clear signs of it being generally feared in government circles in Turkey that Ankara would have to accept Greek Cypriot progress towards accession negotiations if Greece was going to agree to a customs union with the European Union. It was evident that this could raise serious issues for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but many in the business sector, and the secularist intelligentsia who believed that Turkey was essentially a European state, found it difficult to place Turkish Cypriot interests before those of Turkey. 188

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The EU-Turkey customs union and Cyprus In 1990 the European Union had rejected Turkey’s application for membership. Nevertheless, though unacceptable for mainly economic and cultural reasons, Turkey was a large and important country that needed to be kept close to the West, a view strongly urged by the United States and the United Kingdom. Also, in order to mitigate the effects of its rejection of Turkey’s EU bid for membership the EU proposed the development of an EU/Turkey customs union, an important step towards EU membership. There were some doubts in Turkey about its impact on the still partly protected Turkish economy, though major industrial figures welcomed it. A major problem, however, now emerged. Greece, hostile to Turkey on account of the Cyprus and Aegean problems, was opposed to an EU/Turkey customs union. On the other hand Greece was supporting very strongly the Cypriot application for EU membership. Since both decisions required unanimous decisions by the EU a deal seemed to be in the making, a deal that to many Turks began to look like blackmail. Before Athens would consider agreeing to a EU-Turkey Customs Union it wanted a reduction in the proposed generous promises of financial aid to Turkey and more for Greece. More important, however, Athens, seizing the opportunity, was determined to link a promise of accession negotiations for Cyprus to the customs union. Moreover, Greece did not want just a general commitment to accession negotiations for Cyprus. but an undertaking that they would ‘take a structured form similar to arrangements for Eastern and Central European countries’. On 16 February the European Parliament rejected the idea of a customs union on the grounds of Turkey’s bad human rights’ record. However, to link a customs union with the application of the Republic of Cyprus for EU membership would help overcome this opposition since the European Parliament was very sympathetic to the Republic of Cyprus. In the upshot, on 5 March the EU-Turkey Association Council approved a customs union agreement with Turkey. The following day the Council of Ministers agreed to accession talks between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus, to start, on the basis of the Commission’s proposals, six months after the EU’s intergovernmental conference that was to be held in 1996 to review the Maastricht Treaty, though ‘taking into account the results of the Conference’. A Greek demand that Turkey drop its legal objection to Cyprus joining the EU without first resolving its dispute with the Turkish Cypriots was not accepted.2 There was no mention of the need for a prior political solution of the Cyprus problem, nor was it said that a solution was unnecessary. The EU-Turkey Association Council agreed to the Customs Union on 6 March 1995. On the same day the General Affairs Council stressed the need for the Turkish Cypriots to perceive more clearly the advantages of EU membership.

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In Turkey the Government was much criticized for making a damaging concession on the Cyprus issue for the sake of the Customs Union, which came into effect in January 1996. In the Government’s defence Mrs Çiller argued that if the EU chose to make a agreement with Greece not to veto the Customs Union agreement in return for a date for the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus, that was nothing to do with Turkey, but was the business of the European Union. In other words, it was not a package deal. It is certainly arguable that the Cypriot application for membership had already made so much progress that it could have gone ahead irrespective of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. On the other hand, the Customs Union could not have been achieved at that time, or perhaps for a very long time, since Greek approval was necessary. Yet some argued that it was precipitate of Turkey to press on with the Customs Union. Apart from hastening the accession of Cyprus to the European Union, it was regarded as having sent a message to the world that in its own interest Turkey was probably prepared in the future to make concessions on Cyprus, or oblige the Turkish Cypriots to do so. The Customs Union was generally recognized as important for Turkey, but that it was essential in order to underline Turkey’s intent to join the European Union was a moot point. After a shaky start it did turn out to be very beneficial for the Turkish economy. Mesut Yılmaz, leader of the Motherland Party, argued that Turkey should have protested from the outset against any attempt to allow EU/Cyprus discussions to be inscribed in the EU calendar. He argued, as legal experts have also since done that Article 8 of the London and Zürich Agreements written into the Constitution, stated that the Republic of Cyprus could only participate in international organizations and pacts of alliance of which both Turkey and Greece were members. Otherwise, the use of the veto by either community would be in order. Turkey could, therefore, support a Turkish Cypriot veto, in its capacity as a Guarantor Power under the Treaties, to disallow the acceptance of Cyprus into the EU if Turkey was not also a member. The Government should have insisted on this right from the beginning. It was too anxious to enter into a customs union. In parliament and the press Yılmaz had considerable support. There were many who deplored the government’s lack of solid support for the Turkish Cypriots. Why was Greek Cypriot shipping still using Turkish ports? Why had the government not objected when the Turkish National Handball Team was not allowed to cross from North to South Cyprus to play a match there, but had to travel via Israel? Also why were Greek Cypriots allowed to participate in international sporting events in Turkey when Turkish Cypriots were sometimes excluded? On 12 July 1995 the European Parliament made a Resolution endorsing Cyprus’s prospective membership of the European Union: after Maastricht parliamentary approval had become necessary. Parliament’s approval was not a foregone conclusion, but, as mentioned earlier, its members were

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mostly anti-Turkish, and pro-Greek Cypriot in sentiment. It went so far as to call on the Commission to ensure that the ‘democratic forces in the northern part of the island are kept abreast of progress in the ongoing process of accession’, which seemed to exclude the democratically elected government in the North.

Political developments in the North and the South It was expected in North Cyprus after the March 1995 EU deal, and the growing importance of the EU in Cyprus affairs, that in the April 1995 presidential election in the TRNC Denktas¸ might be unseated. In the press it was conjectured at the time that London greatly hoped for the victory of the leader of the Republican Turkish Party, Özker Özgur. He had gained some stature as Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government formed with the Democratic Party. The Communal Liberation Party tried hard to persuade the Republican Turkish party to agree to a joint candidate, but to no avail. Had they agreed on this they would have come second and would have challenged Denktas¸ ˘lu would doubtless have in the second round, though the votes for Erog gone to Denktas¸, who won with 62.5 per cent of the vote. After his election, sensing the strength of the opposition, Denktas¸ declared that 1996 must be the year for a settlement. There was no response from Clerides, who did not want to return to confidence-building measures, which Denktas¸ had in mind. He wanted instead to keep the EU in his sights. Denktas¸ tried to have the EU understand the Cyprus problem better, and see the sense of not admitting the Greek Cypriots to the EU before a solution, but to no avail. Worrying for the Turkish Cypriots at this time was a new determination evident in Ankara to put the Turkish Cypriot economy in better order. Responding to proposed economies the well-organized labour unions, very strong in the large public sector, including the over-staffed bureaucracy, threatened a nation-wide strike. There was certainly much waste in the system that Turkey, in dire economic trouble itself, did not want to continue to finance. To turn to Turkish politics, although the United Kingdom and the United States were anxious to move on the Cyprus problem, the instability of Turkish politics during the whole of the 1990s was a limiting factor. After the death of Özal in June 1993, his rival, the more circumspect Demirel became President. From the True Path Party he had led now emerged Mrs Tansu Çiller, an economist by profession, who established a shaky coalition government with the left-of-centre party. This lasted until the elections of December 1995, in which the relatively new Islamic Welfare Party did well under its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, becoming the largest party in parliament. There was no effective government until March 1996 when

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Mrs Çiller formed a government with the rival Motherland Party leader, Mesut Yılmaz. It lasted just one month. Then in June 1996 Mrs Çiller entered into coalition with Erbakan, he becoming Prime Minister. This lasted one year, until Erbakan, threatened by the Ataturkist and secularist military, resigned. Then Mesut Yılmaz joined in coalition with the socialist Ecevit and Deniz Baykal’s somewhat Atatürkist People’s Party. This last change was good news for Denktas¸, since both Yılmaz and, of course, Ecevit, were strong supporters of North Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side was solidly supported by Greece during the 1990s. Although the fervently pro-Greek Cypriot Papandreou died in 1996, his more moderate successor, Kostas Simitis continued firm in support, even more so his confrontational Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos. In the South there was also considerable unanimity on the handling of the Cyprus question. Despite a gain of 2.3 per cent of the vote by AKEL in 1996, Greek Cypriot politics showed a marked continuity and fixation of purpose. Later, in 1998, Clerides narrowly defeated the rival AKEL supported candidate for the presidency, George Iacovou, who had not, however, espoused markedly different policies. In Turkish Cypriot politics the coalition established after the 1993 elections between the Democratic Party and the left-wing Republican Turkish Party broke down in 1995 after much dissension on domestic issues. There was dissatisfaction within the RTP with its leader, Özker Özgür, whose dedication to socialism was becoming suspect. He was replaced by Mehmet Ali Talat. The two right-wing parties then formed an uneasy coalition. It lasted until December 1998, when new elections resulted in a coalition of ˘lu and the Communal Liberation Party the National Unity Party under Erog led by Mustafa Akıncı, who was resentful over Turkish influence in the North, and was not for this, and other reasons, a comfortable partner for ˘lu. When this coalition predictably broke down in 2001 a new, if again Erog uneasy, coalition was formed under the leadership of Dervis¸ Erog˘lu, with Serdar Denktas¸, head of the Democratic Party, as Deputy Prime Minister. This political instability had its value. It showed that democracy did exist in the North. Denktas¸ certainly did not dominate the scene, much as he was believed so to do by the outside world. The emergence of right/left coalitions also revealed that there was more agreement on the Cyprus question and domestic policies than outside observers imagined to be the case. Moreover, the political parties disagreed as much, if not more, on the latter than on the former issue.

International developments Whilst in 1995 there was much talk of peace initiatives by the United States and the United Kingdom, nothing was attempted. If they hoped that the left in the North would become strong enough to force a solution they

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were disappointed. Not only had Denktas¸ won the 1995 presidential election, there was the seriously debilitating strife referred to above within the Republican Turkish Party. It was not until the end of 1995 that President Clinton began to co-ordinate the architecture of a solution with his special envoys, Richard Beattie and Richard Holbrooke. The Americans also believed that they might solve the Cyprus issue now that they had just been successful in bringing the Arabs and Israelis to meet together. Settling Cyprus might well help solve the more dangerous Aegean problem and prevent discord in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the South it was often declared that not only did the Turkish Cypriots not want a federation, they were also opposed to joining the European Union. The Turkish Cypriot position was that they rejected the right of the Greek Cypriots to enter the EU recognized as having sovereignty over the whole island. They also did not intend to join with the Greek Cypriots in its bid for membership until there was an agreement on a federation They could not, however, just sit back and ignore EU affairs. The EU-Turkey Customs Union could be regarded as having an important and limiting effect on commercial relations between the TRNC and Turkey, The EU might decide not to allow the projected free trade agreement between Turkey and the TRNC if that were concluded after the Customs Union came into being. Denktas¸ had been asking Mrs Çiller to enact legislation for free trade over a number of months, but she was dragging her feet. In December 1995 Denktas¸ appealed to President Demirel for help. He immediately brought the issue to the very influential National Security Council, on which the military were heavily represented. The result was a Joint Declaration of Solidarity by Turkey and the TRNC (28 December 1995) that, agreeing there could be no question of acceptance of EU membership for Cyprus before a bi-zonal federal settlement, asserted that the Customs Union ‘does not include any provision that hinders commercial and economic relations between Turkey and the TRNC’ (Article 7). Denktas¸ described the Declaration as the best new-year present he had ever had. Mrs Çiller was anything but happy with the making of the Declaration, denying that she would ever sell out the TRNC, but it was thought that there could have been trouble for Turkey over Turkish-Turkish Cypriot commercial relations. Political disarray in Turkey made progress on the Cyprus issue difficult. To add to the problems, in January 1996 a dangerous dispute occurred over the sovereignty of the uninhabited rocky islands of Kardak/Imia off the Turkish coast. It showed every sign of blowing up into a dangerous armed conflict. When Greek troops occupied the islet, Turkish troops occupied one adjacent. There was talk of war. President Clinton asked Richard Holbrooke to use his skills to persuade both sides to stand down. Since he was considered in Greece to have favoured the Turks, he became very unpopular both in Greece and Cyprus. The Greeks saw the incident as a national humiliation.3 In November 1996 Greece decided on an expensive

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ten-year modernization of its armed forces. The Kardak incident prompted Demirel to query the Greek claim to sovereignty over all the Aegean islands on the grounds that some were in a grey area with regard to who had sovereignty over them. Tensions in Cyprus rose to a peak when in August 1996 Greek Cypriots, and some Greek ‘bikers’, tried to force a way across the Green Line on the grounds that Cyprus was one country. In the violent incidents that occurred one Greek Cypriot was clubbed to death by Turkish Cypriots, and a second shot and killed by Turkish forces as he climbed a flagpole in an attempt to remove a Turkish flag. Later one Turkish soldier was killed, and one seriously injured, in what appeared to be a reprisal attack. Mrs Çiller reflected in her remarks the intense nationalist feeling these incidents aroused in Turkey. The Greek Cypriot authorities had done little or nothing to hold back the demonstrators, but shooting an unarmed man whilst he was climbing a pole to remove a Turkish flag made a bad impression on world opinion. Later when the two Turkish soldiers were shot elsewhere on the border, there was little international response. A British initiative Shortly after these disturbing events in December 1996 the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, visited the island. He insisted on a meeting with President Denktas¸, despite protests from the Greek Cypriots. Rifkind had been criticized earlier for saying that a settlement on the island should come before the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. He presented ten points for consideration by both sides. They repeated much that was in the Set of Ideas, but urged agreement by mid-1997 with, clearly, joint agreement on EU membership in mind. It worried the Turkish Cypriots that one article appeared to downgrade the international guarantees agreed in 1960. They welcomed, however, a reference to ‘both countries’ in Article 9. Article 10 also could be taken to imply that without a settlement, there could be no accession negotiations, but it was not clearly stated. In response the Turkish Foreign Office pointed out that both sides had already agreed on some of the points that Rifkind considered fundamental. So in some respects the Rifkind mission fell rather flat. It was not a decisive intervention, but it helped enhance the status of the Turkish Cypriots. Party leaders and the press in the South were highly critical. They objected to the omission of any reference to a single sovereignty (save in passing in point 10) and to a single citizenship. Also, there was no mention of the return of the Greek Cypriot refugees. There was some reference to boundary changes, but this could hardly mean that all refugees could return to their homes. In addition, there was no mention of the ‘settlers’. The reference to EU accession negotiations after a settlement (point 10) was rejected as meaning that without a settlement there could be no EU accession.

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The Greek Cypriot arms build-up: the S-300 missiles In early 1997 as part of its military build-up the Greek Cypriot government ordered S-300 ground-to-air missiles from Russia. Having a 150 kilometre range the missiles could attack Turkish planes in Turkish air space as well as over Cyprus. They would defend Cyprus for a while, but only for as long as Turkey did not find and destroy the radar stations needed for their deployment. The announcement that the missiles were on their way provoked much sabre rattling in Turkey, but this declined as the limited scope of the threat became clear. An authority on the subject summed up their importance as follows: To some degree the S-300s will deny Turkey unquestioned air superiority, for at least as long as their guidance radars are operational. The S-300 radars will be one of the most sought after targets at the outbreak of any conflict on Cyprus. However, once they are destroyed, Turkey will quickly regain air superiority.4 The development of the Paphos air base had also been completed. Greek fighter planes could now be stationed there, whether permanently or temporarily. The Greek Cypriots presented the whole programme as no more than a deterrent against Turkish aggressiveness, which they said has been increasing, particularly in the air, with frequent violations of Cypriot air space. The aim was, perhaps, to make the point that the Cyprus conflict could result in a Greek-Turkish war that would rock NATO. Or perhaps the Greek Cypriots believed that their re-armament would lead to demands for the demilitarization of the island, which would include the removal of the Turkish troops, whose presence was hated and feared. The Russians laconically claimed that the sale of missiles was just an ordinary commercial transaction and important for their arms industry. For the West it was important to deny entry of the missiles: they would have given the Russians training facilities in the South that, with the use of radar, could have revealed much on NATO activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In due course, under international pressure, the Greek Cypriots agreed to the location of the missiles in Crete. They had gone a step too far. The Turkish political response to the missile threat was to strengthen links with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. On 20 January 1997 a Turkey-TRNC Declaration of Solidarity was signed. Important in this Declaration, apart from the formal undertaking to provide military support (never really in doubt), was the statement that the sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots must be recognized. The Turkish Grand National Assembly that supported the Declaration unanimously and enthusiastically and endorsed a statement that EU accession negotiations with the South would

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accelerate Turkish/Turkish Cypriot integration. President Clerides described the threat of integration as a bluff. Meanwhile the progress of the EU Cyprus application was giving new confidence to the Greek Cypriots. Also the EU’s Agenda 2000 indicated that Cyprus would form part of the new Eastern European enlargement.

Troutbeck and Glion negotiations In a less than propitious atmosphere, in 1997 the UN tried once more to bring the two sides together. Meetings were held in Troutbeck (New York) in July and in Glion (Switzerland) in August. The approach adopted by the UN Special Adviser, Diego Cordovez, differed from that in 1984–86 and in 1992. Instead of proposing a constitution, Cordovez tried to persuade both sides to agree on a broad set of principles that would provide the basis for a constitution. This was a brave attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. There were difficulties from the outset, especially over EU membership and where sovereignty would be located in the new state to be established. The Greek Cypriot side objected strongly to the UN suggestion that sovereignty ‘emanates equally from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities’. There was a storm of protest in the Greek Cypriot press, all the major party leaders condemning the idea. Also, how could it be said that sovereignty was ‘indivisible’ if in the last resort it rested in each community? Other similar bones of contention arose. At the second meeting in Glion the UN altered its proposed Draft Joint Declaration in favour of the Greek Cypriot side, dropping, inter alia, the shared sovereignty idea. These substantial amendments in the Greek Cypriot interest allowed Clerides then blandly to declare that he would sign up to the amended draft document if Denktas¸ would also do so! However, any hope of agreement had meanwhile been dashed by the announcement made by the European Union, under its Agenda 2000, towards the end of the Troutbeck meeting, that the EU would go ahead with accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots. This prompted Denktas¸ to say that he was only going to Glion to make the point that he could not under these circumstances participate in any meaningful way with the illegal Greek Cypriot government. Clerides responded that he would discontinue the talks if any heed was paid to Turkish Cypriot objections to EU membership for Cyprus. There was no result from Glion. The British President of the UN Security Council blamed the Turkish Cypriots for the failure. There was a sense that commendation was due to President Clerides for the flexibility and co-operation he had shown … [and] there was some concern and disappointment that further substantive progress at

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this time was impeded by the attempt to bring preconditions to the table by the other party, and here I mean, of course, the Turkish Cypriots. This precondition was, of course, non-acceptance of the government of the Republic of Cyprus as the rightful government of all Cyprus. As ever, the Turkish Cypriots’ riposte was that the UN’s acceptance of the legality of the government of the South as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus was the real precondition. Aftermath Not all Turkish Cypriots accepted fully the approach adopted by their own government. In particular, the former Deputy Prime Minister, and leader of the major left-wing party, the Republican Turkish Party, Mehmet Ali Talat, claimed that there was another Turkish Cypriot voice besides that of the President and the government. His views carried some weight, though not too much, since his opposition party had only 13 of the 50 seats in the Turkish Cypriot parliament, with another five seats being occupied by the more moderate Communal Liberation Party under Mustafa Akıncı. The parties together claimed, if dubiously, to represent, or to be in accord with, the majority of the labour unions, which were composed of public service or public enterprise employees for the most part.5 The TRNC was fully supported by the Turkish Government. Ankara had learned by then that it was very unlikely to be included as a candidate for the next EU enlargement. Between Troutbeck and Glion, Turkey and the TRNC, in a Joint Statement, announced that the two states would pursue a policy of integration in the spheres of economy, finance, defence and foreign affairs, with a Joint Council to implement the agreement. Clerides described this development as ‘irresponsible’. Turkey’s support was greatly enhanced by the EU’s December 1997 European Council decision not to include Turkey among even the slow track aspirants to EU membership. Turkey’s aspirations were recognized generally, but were said to depend inter alia on support for a Cyprus solution based on Security Council resolutions. That Turkey was held responsible for good relations with Greece and for progress on Cyprus was much resented in Turkey. Turkish-Turkish Cypriot integration was widely bruited abroad. ‘Symbolically, the first meeting of the Association Council between Turkey and the TRNC took place on March 31, 1998, the day accession negotiations began with Republic of Cyprus’.6

The Holbrooke mission This mounting danger in the Eastern Mediterranean from Greek Cypriot re-armament and the firm, sometimes belligerent, Turkish response was

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undoubtedly important in persuading the American Government to become much more closely involved in the issue and in June 1997 to appoint Richard Holbrooke as the President’s Special Envoy to Cyprus. He did not rush in, but played the game slowly. It was not until 1998 that he began to make his presence felt. Holbrooke proposed a tri-partite solution. This meant that between the two communities there would be a shared zone where the joint federal government would be located. More important, he tried very hard to persuade Denktas¸ to participate in the Cyprus-EU accession negotiations without there first being a solution. The idea behind this proposal, alarming for the Turkish Cypriots, was that in the course of negotiation, as obstacles arose, both sides would see that they had a great deal in common. The very process of collaboration would enhance understanding. They would see, for instance, that in adopting the EU acquis much legislation for the new state would already be in place. They would also come to appreciate that in the EU compromise was of the essence. For the Greek and Turkish Cypriots it would be a new world, a lesson in politics. They would also come to appreciate that they were both part of one European world. Moreover, accord with the Greek Cypriots would enhance Turkey’s opportunities to join the European Union and would promote stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. These last concerns were uppermost in Holbrooke’s mind. Denktas¸ would do nothing without recognition of the TRNC, which both the United States and the United Kingdom adamantly opposed. The Turkish Cypriots would not accept an American compromise formula that the two sides should sit down together at the table as equal representatives of the future federal republic. The Greek Cypriots always claimed that if the TRNC was recognized it would then simply walk away from all negotiations. The third string to Holbrooke’s bow was the creation of opportunities for leading persons from both sides, particularly from the business world, to meet and come thus to understand that future prosperity lay in creating profitable economic, commercial and social connections of Turkish and Greek Cypriots and Turks and Greeks. He spent much effort, and money, in this enterprise establishing meetings, sometimes with Norwegian help, one in Brussels being particularly noteworthy. With regard to attempts like that of Holbrooke to solve the problem through the interaction of business elites, it has, however, been observed: It would be burying one’s head in the sand to assume the two Cypriot sides could be brought amiably together primarily, or largely, through the supposedly universal solvent of ‘trade’. Americans especially may be so wedded to the idea of the businessman as hero that it is natural for them to believe his domain is the only truly efficacious one. This is a

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form of economic reductionism every bit as unconvincing as that of the much reviled and repudiated Marxists.7 Holbrooke said that Denktas¸ was the main obstacle to progress. However, the Turkish Cypriot government was deeply concerned about the dangers of entering into EU negotiations before an agreement on the structure of the proposed federal government, which, after all, was only commonsense. They were also becoming aware that the application of EU norms would greatly benefit the Greek Cypriot majority in a federal state. The leaders of the principal opposition parties in the North nevertheless argued strongly for participation in the EU talks before recognition. By mid-1998 it was apparent that Holbrooke’s mission was unsuccessful, but it did have an impact on some sections of Turkish Cypriot society, particularly on the business community. Also it helped foster a general belief in the North at that time that membership of the EU would make the North more prosperous and, mistakenly, that through membership of the EU they would be protected from Greek Cypriot domination. Others were more cautious, especially as the Luxembourg EU Summit confirmed Turkey’s exclusion from the next stage of enlargement. This had infuriated the Turkish Prime Minister, Yılmaz, and stiffened resistance to any participation in the EU-Cyprus accession negotiations. It heightened the concern in the North about their position in the EU if Turkey was not also there. Would they not just be overwhelmed? Ankara declared that it would not enter into any discussions with the EU on the subject of Cyprus. Meanwhile Cyprus was making progress to eventual membership of the European Union without encountering much opposition. The accession negotiations began in 1998, with France in particular, still querying the wisdom of admitting a divided state. France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, in a joint declaration, pointed to the need for a solution to ease the process of accession, not expecting the negotiations themselves to bring about a solution. When the Turkish Cypriots declined the offer to join in the negotiations it became clear that much would depend on Greece at the December 2002 Copenhagen Council. Greece wanted the eastern enlargement in order to stabilize its own immediate neighbourhood, but gambled that the general demand for the eastern enlargement was so strong that it could afford to threaten to veto it if Cyprus was not admitted, even though still divided.8 Political developments in North Cyprus In the North the opposition was beginning to claim in the 1990s that Turkey was too dominant in the TRNC, and that changes in the Turkish Cypriot population, through Turkish Cypriot emigration and unrestricted immigration of Turks, was turning the North into a Turkish province. This underlined the fact that many Turkish Cypriots considered themselves

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quite different from the Turks, claiming often to be less nationalist and more European. Also the immigrants were from the poorer and less welleducated sections of Turkish society, and sometimes more religious than the quite secularist Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots were always producing figures to show that the Turkish Cypriots were in the minority in the North, a view often promoted by the political opposition in the North. However, a reasonably sound census in the North held on 15 December 1996 revealed that out of a total population of 200,587 68.5 per cent were born in Cyprus. Of those born in Turkey (some 40,000) only 42 per cent (some 17,000) had become citizens of the TRNC, many of the non-citizens being some 10,000 students, Turkish military families, and workers who had not applied for, or had not been granted, citizenship. Those who were not citizens could not vote in elections, so the assertion frequently made in the South that the National Unity Party and President Denktas¸ were kept in power by the ‘settler vote’ was not sustainable. After Holbrooke’s lack of success as a peacemaker, on 29 June 1998 the Security Council regretted that the Turkish side had suspended intercommunal talks. In response, and to underline the close connections between Turkey and the TRNC, on 29 July a Joint Statement was made by the two states announcing a special relationship between them, including an economic and financial union. It was a strengthening and deepening of the co-operation envisaged in the 20 January 1997 Joint Declaration. It was in part intended as a further warning that if Cyprus were to become part of the EU then the TRNC would come much closer to Turkey. The measures to be taken would be implemented, it was said, step by step, and in parallel with the full membership process between the Greek Cypriot Administration of South Cyprus and the European Union. Reflecting Turkish defiance at its rejection by Europe, at a joint press conference in the North in early September 1998 the Turkish Foreign Minister, I˙smail Cem and President Denktas¸ outlined a confederal system for Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots routinely dismissed it as constituting partition, especially as the proposal said that ‘by participating in these negotiations, the parties will acknowledge that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides are two sovereign and equal states’. The Cyprus Confederation might also, it was said, pursue a policy of accession to the European Union. Also accepted was the possibility of Cyprus’ membership of the EU before that of Turkey. It was not altogether clear that the EU could accept a confederation.9 There was a concession in the proposals in that ‘acknowledgement’ might the place of ‘recognition’, but it would be difficult to have that accepted by the Greek Cypriots in their now confident mood. There was also some suspicion during this period that some Turkish Cypriots, believing more and more that EU membership would greatly improve their relatively impoverished state, were beginning to lose faith in their leadership. The results of the December 1998 parliamentary elections were, therefore, something of a

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surprise. The National Unity Party, with over 40 per cent of the vote, increased its number of seats in the 50 member Assembly from 17 to 24, the Democratic Party led by Serdar Denktas¸ losing only one of its 14 seats. The Republican Turkish Party led by Talat lost half of its 12 seats, winning only just over 13 per cent of the votes. The more moderate Communal Liberation Party led by Mustafa Akıncı increased its seats by 2, gaining 15.2 per cent of the vote. The results suggested a new NUP/DP coalition, but in the previous coalition government of these two parties there had been a great deal of discord, reflecting the rivalry of Denktas¸ and Erog˘lu. Consequently, as mentioned above, the NUP formed a coalition with the Communal Liberation Party. Clearly at the time there was considerable support for the nationalist policy of Erog˘lu and Denktas¸, and little for the left’s rather more conciliatory approach. There was still much anger at Turkey’s rebuff by the European Union. Also there was considerable hostility to the Greek Cypriots on account of the S300 missile threat. This was an important factor in encouraging both the Turkish and the Greek military to engage in provocative and dangerous military exercises over and around the island. National animosities were aroused and doubtless affected the election results in the North. The dangers of military conflict sparked by some incident became acute enough for Holbrooke to remind both sides that the Aegean was not an amusement park and fighter jets were not bumper cars. Fortunately the Greek and Turkish premiers Simitis and Yılmaz met in Crete at this time in a friendly atmosphere: problems were not solved, but tensions were somewhat reduced.

The UN calls for negotiations Despite the failure of the Holbrooke mission the Americans were determined to bring about a solution of the Cyprus problem in order to establish harmony in the Eastern Mediterranean. The UN now proposed a series of talks starting in December 1999, responding to a call for renewed negotiations that had been made by the G8 group of seven industrialized countries plus Russia. It was welcomed by the Greek Cypriots always eager to raise international concern over Cyprus. On 29 June 1999 the UN Secretary-General called for negotiations with no preconditions [to stop the North demanding recognition] and with all issues on the table [to make it clear to the South that confederation might, at least, be discussed]. The two sides were to negotiate through the Secretary-General until a settlement was achieved and with full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties [presumably the 1960 treaties of Alliance and Guarantee]. Denktas¸ was opposed to the initiative, demanding that there should be political equality from the start. He first wanted the TRNC to be recognized. He also strongly objected to the ‘no-precondition’ rule, maintaining, as

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ever, that the real precondition was acceptance of the Greek Cypriot government as the government of the North. After he addressed the Turkish parliament on the subject, it made a declaration on Cyprus. This included the statement, ‘No solution is possible without acknowledging the reality of the two states, and treating them equally’.10 On 20 July when in the TRNC Ecevit said that talks had to be on the basis of two separate states, leading to a confederation. However, Turkey was under pressure to have Denktas¸ participate in talks on the terms prescribed by the Security Council. The Turkish economy, in dire straits, needed financial aid from the United States, and its influence in the World Bank. Severe Turkish economic problems were augmented by the disastrous earthquake in Istanbul on 17 August 1999 in which over 15,000 lives were lost. The sympathy of the Greek people and its government greatly improved relations between the two countries, though the tide of good feeling only lapped on the shores of the Cyprus problem. It was on the Cyprus problem that Turkey also needed help badly. Turkey knew it could not expect to make much progress towards EU membership if that problem was not resolved, since many EU states continued to regard Turkey as the culprit in Cyprus. The major problem was how to find a compromise that would allow Denktas¸ to say that the talks so badly needed by Washington, and increasingly now by Ankara, would be between states, not communities. American diplomats, in particular, were trying hard to find a formula Denktas¸ could accept. He agreed, it seems, not to demand explicit recognition, but wanted Clerides to repeat publicly what he had said to Denktas¸ in Glion – that he was not the President of the Turkish Cypriots. To this there was no response. The UN Secretary-General, now Kofi Annan, had the unenviable task of finding a compromise formula that would allow both sides to start to negotiate. Under much pressure from Ankara, Denktas¸ was persuaded to accept that the invitation to negotiations to take place in New York would be to two ‘parties’, but then the UN Secretariat made the mistake of referring in this context to ‘President Clerides’ and to ‘Mr Denktas¸’, who was furious. ‘Is this’ he said to the Americans behind the invitation, ‘how you live up to your commitments? Is this how you abide by your agreements? If so, I am not coming’. He withdrew his agreement to attend the talks. Under American pressure the offending reference to Clerides as president was withdrawn. The wording was restored simply to ‘two parties’, which for Denktas¸ was much better than ‘communities’.11 Denktas¸ went to New York in December 1999. He was not openly insisting on recognition. He had gone thus far in order to help Turkey in its bid to gain acceptance as a candidate for EU membership. The Helsinki Summit 1999 Finally, in Helsinki, in December 1999, the European Council formally accepted Turkey as a candidate for membership, though not quite on a par

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with the other 12 applicants, who could proceed immediately to negotiations without further screening. The need was also indicated for an enhanced political dialogue with Turkey with particular reference to border disputes, and other related issues, and to the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the Cyprus proximity talks to a successful conclusion. After much hesitation, these terms were declared acceptable by Ankara, though Turkey was apparently still held responsible to some degree for a settlement. Greece supported this new stance by the EU, perhaps aware that this was more likely than hostility to weaken Turkish resolve to support the Turkish Cypriots. The statement reassured the Greek Cypriots that whilst a settlement would facilitate the accession of Cyprus, it was not a precondition. They were less reassured by the Council’s intention to ‘take account of all relevant factors’ in coming to its decision Every EU member state had eventually to approve the Cyprus application for membership, and some of them continued to express deep misgivings about its accession without a prior settlement. That Cyprus could well enter the EU without a prior settlement was clear pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to make every effort to reach an agreement. Only if the Greek Cypriots acted in some stubborn or negative way, it seemed to be suggested, could Cyprus be denied accession. The Turkish Cypriots believed there should be no accession until the Greek Cypriots surrendered their recognition as sovereign over the whole island. This could hardly be accepted by the EU or the United Nations. If the Greek Cypriots were now to insist on a unitary state, it would, doubtless, have constituted a ‘relevant factor’ to be taken into consideration, but the Greek Cypriots had no need to change their stance. Another consequence of the Helsinki decisions was that Turkey could no longer continue to declare that the application made by Cyprus was not allowable on legal grounds. Now a candidate for membership, Turkey was not permitted to try to prevent the accession of another candidate country.

Negotiations 1999–2000 The first round of the negotiations (proximity talks) began in December 1999 in New York before the Helsinki Summit on 10 December. The second round was held in Geneva from 30 January to 8 February 2000, the third round in Geneva in July and August, the fourth round in New York in from 10 to 26 September and the fifth round in Geneva 31 October to 10 November. A sixth round was scheduled for January 2001 in Geneva, but after consultation with Ankara Denktas¸ decided not to attend. The proximity talks were designed to be exploratory, intending to find common ground. Direct talks could have been more profitable, but Denktas¸ would not agree to that form unless he was recognized as equal in status to Clerides.

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The talks were subject to a news blackout, but in response to some provocative comments made by Denktas¸, Clerides took the opportunity to state that for him the object of the talks was not to create a new state, but to amend the 1960 Constitution, to make it federal rather than unitary. He ruled out confederation as not providing the necessary single sovereignty and common citizenship, as if these were necessary features of a federation. Denktas¸ considered the 1960 Constitution ‘dead and buried’. For him the negotiations were also now between two ‘parties’, not between two communities. On the Greek Cypriot side there was a hiccup when Clerides took offence at the wording of Security Council Resolution 1283, which did not repeat that a solution had to be based on a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship. Nothing much was achieved at the first round since all eyes were on Helsinki. After Helsinki some worry was evident among the Greek Cypriots that if they seemed obstructive in the negotiations, the EU future of Cyprus could be in doubt. There was therefore some discussion in the Greek Cypriot press of the possibility of a loose federation, even of using a parliamentary instead of a presidential system. In the North, for his part, Denktas¸ was insistent on recognition, or at least acknowledgement, of the Turkish Cypriot state from the start. Confederation was his first aim, but whatever was agreed, the starting point had to be from two states. Despite the blackout on news coverage, it was reported that at the second round Denktas¸, as always, was insistent that the constitutional position had to be clarified before the discussion of territory and property, always high on the Greek Cypriot agenda. Nothing much could be achieved at the second round mainly because in April the presidential election would take place in the North. Denktas¸ could not commit himself before that was over. Presidential election in the North In the presidential election on 15 April 2000 it was expected the contest would essentially be between Denktas¸ and Erog˘lu. There was a reasonably ˘lu nearly high turn out at 80.2 per cent. Denktas¸ won almost 44 and Erog 30 per cent of the vote. Akıncı won only some 12 per cent and Talat just ten per cent, a poor showing for the opposition. ˘lu withdrew, without explanation. There was no run-off election. Erog Many believed he had been told to do so by Ankara, but Erog˘lu said that the Party Council had made the decision, afraid that a major defeat at the second round would undermine the party’s strength. The proximity negotiations proceeded along predictable lines. Clerides had his sine qua non’s: some Greek Cypriots must be allowed to return to their homes: the problem could not be solved simply by exchange and compensation. Nor would he accept any form of federation that did not allow for a single sovereignty, or provided veto powers to the Turkish Cypriots over major legislation. However, he accepted a federal solution with residual

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powers remaining with each entity. This all seemed reasonable to the representatives of the UN, the United States and the United Kingdom. Conscious of the large imbalance between the two components of a Cypriot federation, and deeply suspicious that the Greek Cypriots would be able to dominate it, especially within the European Union. Denktas¸ was not convinced. Confederation would be much safer, and would reunite the island more peacefully. It seems that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom took any serious steps to persuade the Greek Cypriots to follow that route. Continuing negotiations At the third round in July and August 2000 the UN Secretary-General’s Special envoy, Alvaro de Soto, provided suggestions as ‘food for thought’. Denktas¸ made proposals for a confederal solution, which de Soto took seriously. Both documents were leaked, despite the news blackout. The Greek Cypriot side was annoyed that under the rubric ‘all issues were on the table’ confederation could be discussed. Intervening, the Greek Foreign Minister, Dimitris Reppas, said that the Denktas¸ proposals were unacceptable, as they would lead to a division of the island.12 Annoyed by the talk on confederation Clerides wanted the talks to be face to face, and was reported in the press as threatening not to attend the next round. The proposals made by de Soto were an early forerunner of what was to develop into the Annan plan. He proposed a ‘common state consisting of an indissoluble partnership of politically equal, self-governing component states’. There would be political equality, but in the common government there would be ‘effective’, it might be noticed, not ‘equal’ participation. There would be ‘maximum security and institutional protection for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to ensure neither can dominate the other’, a condition by no means easy to achieve in political reality when one entity is much larger than the other.13 It seemed to be presumed that these two very unequal, and mainly antagonistic, entities would be able to operate the give and take so necessary in federal systems. De Soto also pointed to the need to make territorial adjustments and to honour property rights. He greatly annoyed the Greek Cypriots by saying that confederation was still on the table, but Michalis Papapetrou, the Greek Cypriot spokesman, made it clear that the South would only accept a federal solution. Meanwhile all was not well in North Cyprus. Consequent upon Turkey’s economic troubles there was a banking crisis with six banks collapsing. The Turkish Cypriot government reimbursed half of depositors’ losses, but was neither able to pay a second instalment nor, indeed, to meet its civil service ˘lu’s government for sheer economic salary bill. Although critical of Erog mismanagement, Ankara eventually helped resolve the problem, but obliged the North to undertake some drastic economic reforms, imposing economies and extra taxation. This reinforced the belief of many Turkish Cypriots that

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they needed a solution of the Cyprus problem and, above all EU membership, to cure their economic ailments with less pain to themselves. These economic misfortunes, and governmental incapacity, did nothing for the standing of the TRNC in the eyes of the outside world. When the leftist editor of the newspaper, Avrupa, was accused of spying and, with some others, was jailed for a short while, there was a public demonstration of thousands proclaiming ‘Cyprus is Ours’ or, in other words, that the North ˘lu, but did not belong to Turkey. Most of the criticism was directed at Erog there were also calls for Denktas¸ to resign. The left called for peace and a settlement on the basis of UN resolutions. This unrest at home did not make Denktas¸’s task any easier. It was some consolation that all was not well in the South either. The stock market had taken a sharp downturn and there was spate of bomb attacks on financial institutions. The fourth round Against this background the two leaders went to the fourth round of talks equipped with authority from the National Assembly in the case of Denktas¸, and the National Council in the case of Clerides. One was for, and the other against confederation, but Denktas¸ would have been prepared, it seems, to have considered a loose federation provided the North was first recognized or acknowledged. It was this, rather than confederation, that was becoming the real blockage on the road to a solution. Ankara was still supportive of international recognition for the TRNC, but saw that the UN, the United States and the United Kingdom were against it, and was beginning to believe it could not be achieved.14 The fourth round of talks, beginning on 10 September, got off to an interesting start when Kofi Annan made a statement that stressed the political equality of both sides, but which Clerides saw as so dangerous that he refused to attend meetings for three days. He believed it was a step towards the recognition of the TRNC, a subject on which he was as adamant as Denktas¸. The statement of 12 September was as follows: The Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot parties have been participating, since December 1999, in proximity talks to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement. I believe the time has now come to move ahead. In the course of these talks I have ascertained that the parties share a common desire to bring about through negotiations in which each represents its side – and no-one else – as the political equal of the other, a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership on which to build a better future in peace and prosperity on a united island. In this spirit, and with the purpose of expediting negotiations in good faith and without preconditions on all issues before them, I have concluded that the equal status of the parties must and should be recog-

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nized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement, which will embody the results of the detailed negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions. This was a document that could be interpreted as conceding important points to the Turkish Cypriot side. First it mentioned a ‘new partnership’, a term the Greek Cypriots certainly did not favour, and which had been used in the 1992 Set of Ideas. The real problem arose out of the treatment of political equality. Each party, it was suggested, shared a common desire to bring about a settlement as the political equal of the other, which was quite an assumption to make. This political equality was to be brought about ‘through negotiations in which each side represents itself … as the political equal of the other’. On one interpretation this meant only that each side recognized the other as politically equal ‘within the negotiations’.15 However, the Turkish Cypriots argued that in the negotiations each side was representing itself as politically equal in the world outside (emphasis added). In the process of negotiation they were obviously and naturally equal, as negotiators are. The Turkish Cypriot interpreted the term ‘parties’ to indicate that they were equal outside. They would otherwise not have attended. They could claim they were present because they had been addressed as equals before the negotiations, though, in reality, they had to be there for Turkey’s sake. Clerides was deeply worried by the Secretary-General’s Statement. His immediate reaction was ‘sulphurous’.16 The Greek Cypriot National Council denounced the Statement. The UN, and other, representatives tried to convince Clerides that the Secretary-General’s Statement was not harmful. Nevertheless Clerides would not resume negotiations until on 14 September de Soto in a ‘three noes’ statement said that (1) ‘the Secretary-General’s Statement did not imply recognition of the TRNC’, (2) ‘it was not a step in that direction’, and (3) ‘it did not imply de-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus’.17 Arguably, it was a step in that direction. The Greek Cypriot House of Representatives discussed the SecretaryGeneral’s statement in an extraordinary session and declared it rejected ‘any proposals and ideas containing the seeds of confederation or the establishment of two states, and calls upon the President of the Republic to repeat clearly in all directions that he will neither accept, nor discuss, a framework for the solution of the Cyprus problem containing confederal elements’. The House reiterated ‘its firm insistence on a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the UN resolutions and decisions, and the 1977 and 1999 high-level agreements. A bi-communal, bi-zonal federation constitutes our ultimate and painful concession, and not a starting point for negotiations aimed at finding a “middle of the road” settlement’. Alfred Moses, President Clinton’s personal representative, reportedly described the opening of Annan’s statement ‘as “deliberate ambiguity” intended to bring

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the Turkish Cypriots to the conference table’. He also admitted that the Secretary-General’s opening statement had been made ‘with Washington’s knowledge and consent.’18 It is interesting that before the fourth round of the negotiations Denktas¸ provided a document entitled ‘Objectives and Basic Elements of a Cyprus Settlement’, dated 28 August 2000.19 Surprisingly, it went some way to suggesting that it was not only a confederation that Denktas¸ now had in mind. There was to be ‘equal participation and rotation in all institutions of the new structure’ (emphasis added). Then again, ‘the new partnership structure shall be competent in all matters which are explicitly assigned to it’. These points seemed to suggest a federation rather than a confederation. If so, it showed some movement, if slight, towards the direction being indicated by the UN Secretary-General’s proposals, as later contained in his Oral Remarks. At the fifth round the Secretary-General added to his earlier statement by outlining his thoughts on procedure and on some substantive aspects of a possible comprehensive settlement. He was working to a single negotiating text. These ideas were in the form of Oral Remarks, but presented in writing to both sides. He built on the ideas earlier advanced by de Soto. He pictured a common state and two equal self-governing states, but the common state was to be sovereign and indissoluble. It was envisaged that the powers of the two component states would be quite large and that the common state should not be dominated by either side, a condition very difficult to ensure in practice given the large discrepancy in the size and wealth of the Turkish Cypriot community. There would also have to be territorial adjustments, and there were considerations of international law to be taken into account with regard to properties, which might well undermine the Turkish Cypriot insistence on exchange and compensation. Some of these points were represented in the press on both sides when, as was inevitable, they were somehow leaked. The Turkish Cypriot press reaction, often hasty, was that they could be subjected to a strong federal state dominated by the Greek Cypriots as contained in the Greek Cypriot 1989 Constitutional Proposals. It was not clear in the Oral Remarks whether the ‘component’ states would together actually establish the federal government. As the Annan Plan emerged from these foundations, it became clear that, as in the Set of Ideas, the existing states would be asked to agree to a framework of government for approval in separate referenda, which was, in fact, to recognize the sovereignty of each side, Curiously, however, the Turkish Cypriot electorate was not considered to have provided sovereignty for the TRNC! Aftermath The Oral Remarks were presented at the end of the fifth session of talks and were not discussed. Denktas¸ decided that he would not attend further talks

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until he had consulted with the Turkish Government. In Ankara, after a meeting of top political and military figures, he was supported in his view that it was not profitable to persist in the talks, though there was disquiet in those areas of Turkish public opinion for whom EU membership was greatly more important than Cyprus. The Turkish Government was smarting about the reference to the need for its ‘strong support’ for a Cyprus solution in the 8 November EU/Turkey Accession Partnership Document. It was noticed that it coincided with Kofi Annan’s Oral Remarks; a link between the two was assumed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its reply to the Accession Document, stated that Turkey had never accepted a tie between EU membership and a solution on Cyprus. However, the writing was on the wall. If Ankara did not accept a UN solution for Cyprus supported by the EU, Turkey would find accession to the EU difficult, perhaps impossible. The United Kingdom, above all, tried to drive home the point. However, Ankara did manage to have the EU’s wording on Cyprus altered in its favour. From a Cyprus settlement seeming to be a condition, on 4 December 2000 the EU placed both the Cyprus issue and the Turkish/ Greek problem (the Aegean) under ‘political criteria and strengthened political dialogue’. It saved face, but it did not remove the issue. The UN and the EU wanted Turkey to help along a UN solution for Cyprus. After the collapse of the 2000 proximity negotiations the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom exerted pressure on Ankara to oblige Denktas¸ to resume negotiations. In Ankara they encountered divided opinion. The Government was outwardly determined to support Denktas¸ and the Turkish Cypriot cause. Active steps were being taken to put into effect the closer relationship with the TRNC envisaged in the Association Council established in 1997. A $350m. aid package was announced to help develop, and control, the Turkish Cypriot economy, and to link the TRNC more closely with Turkey. Connections were to be greatly expanded in education, tourism, communications, sport and law. Turkish passports would also be made readily available to Turkish Cypriots, many of whom were now beginning to acquire Greek Cypriot passports despite a Turkish Cypriot ban. Despite the green light shown at Helsinki in December 1999, the 2000 EU Nice Summit’s exclusion of Turkey from the 2000 enlargement strategy was not pleasing. Nor was the EU’s refusal to allow Turkey full rights within its European Security and Defence Policy. These events encouraged Ankara in its measures to weld Turkey and the TRNC closer together. In the North Talat described the new measures as turning the TRNC into a Turkish province. Civil servants protested vigorously as new policies inspired by Turkey aimed at depriving them of their extra ‘thirteenth’ month’s salary. Nor did they like being limited to one state pension and the raising of the retirement age to sixty-five. Talat’s party was raking in support. The wisdom of an economy drive in the TRNC has to be questioned at a time when for economic and other reasons numbers

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˘lu, and were very of Turkish Cypriots were losing faith in Denktas¸ and Erog attracted by the prospect of EU membership. In Turkey there was considerable discomfiture also as the reforms demanded by the EU were tackled. Nationalist reaction against EU measures found another outlet when the Turkish Government refused to accept before the European Court of Human Rights that it was responsible for alleged miscarriages of justice in the TRNC. The Court could not accept that Turkey did not control the TRNC and could deny responsibility. That it did exert control in some areas, and a wide influence in others, could not easily be denied, but it could hardly be blamed for helping an impoverished state subject to crippling international embargoes at the behest of the Greek Cypriot government. However Turkey could not afford to fall out with the Council of Europe as it had ambitions for EU membership. It was a repository of European standards that could not easily be ignored. Turkey’s action seemed bold and decisive, but against a disturbed background of severe economic discomfiture involving reliance on the World Bank, and American intercession, this boldness looked like brinkmanship. Resentment at EU interference in Turkish affairs was confronted by the insistence of many intellectual circles, and most notably by the business community, that come what may Turkey had to be in the European Union. Opinion was also becoming more divided in the TRNC. There were signs ˘lu’s National of some disintegration when the coalition government of Erog Unity Party and Akıncı’s Communal Liberation Party broke down. Akıncı could not accept the growth of Turkish influence, but was reportedly ˘lu, understandably, would not let him have responsannoyed that Erog ibility for economic affairs. Akıncı claimed that it was Turkish intervention that brought about the collapse of the coalition, but he could hardly have expected to be allowed to supervise the economy programme initiated by Turkey. The Democratic Party became the junior member of a new coalition with the National Unity Party. Significantly a poll in September 2001 suggested that support for the NUP had dropped since the 1998 elections from 40.3 to 34.1 per cent, and for the DP from 22.6 to 18.2 per cent. The Communal Liberation Party lost 2 per cent whilst the more left Republican Turkish Party under Talat advanced significantly from 8.3 to 14.9 per cent. In May 2001 there were parliamentary elections in the South. It was hoped in the North that these elections might reveal a more conciliatory mood over the Cyprus issue. This could mostly be expected from AKEL, which was liaising with the Republican Turkish Party in the North. AKEL did make small gains, becoming marginally the largest party, which was enough for its leader, Demetris Christofias, to become President of the House of Representatives. That the two most moderate parties, DISY and AKEL, had 69 per cent of the votes more or less equally divided between them would seen to be a good portent for a solution. Their rhetoric in the election campaigning was not reassuring, however. Christofias could not

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refrain, for instance, from declaring that the road to a settlement led through Kyrenia. Anti-imperialism also came to the fore in his denunciation of the continuance of the British bases in Cyprus. The usual promises were made that the refugees from 1974 would return to their houses, and that there would eventually be victory for Hellenism over the ‘Turkish occupation’. And AKEL was considered the most moderate party on the Cyprus issue.

The European Parliament During 2001 the European Union Parliament continued to show a lack of sympathy for the Turkish Cypriot position. In its Resolution of 5 September it typically asserted that ‘Mr Denktash, with Turkey’s backing, withdrew unilaterally from the fifth round of the UN-sponsored proximity negotiations, plunging the negotiations into impasse’. More alarmingly, the Parliament stressed that ‘if Turkey were to carry out its threat of annexing the north of Cyprus in response to Cypriot accession to the European Union, in breach of international law, it would put an end to its own ambitions of European Union membership’. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, I˙smail Cem, criticized the Report, which had been presented by the European Parliament’s Rapporteur, M. Jacques Poos. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press statement referred inter alia to ‘his one-sided attitude towards the Cyprus issue’. This Turkish criticism brought a strong rejoinder from the Parliament’s President, Mme Nicole Fontaine, who found it ‘unacceptable to question the good faith’ of the EU Rapporteur and held that the Turkish Foreign Minister ‘had deliberately contributed to the worsening of relations between Turkey and Europe’. In November 2001 Ismail Cem was still putting on a bold front. He warned that if the EU persisted in bringing about Greek Cypriot membership of the European Union, Turkey would be prepared to pay the price whatever that might be. Later, the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, reaffirmed this position. In response to a question what would happen if ‘Cyprus’ were admitted into the European Union, he stated as follows: First I would like to say that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not surrender, or be surrendered to South Cyprus (by us). The admission of ‘Cyprus’ to the European Union will mean that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be surrendered to Southern Cyprus. In such an event, the TRNC may opt to integrate with Turkey. By opting for an autonomous status, on the other hand, the TRNC will remain independent in its domestic affairs, but will be attached to Turkey in its foreign affairs and defence.20

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The United Nations Despite this brittle Turkish show of resolution, a little earlier (26 September 2001) the UN President of the UN Security Council reported that Council members had ‘expressed disappointment at the unjustified decision by the Turkish side to decline’ the invitation to resume the proximity negotiations. The Security Council’s statement was less severe than that of the UK’s Permanent Representative at the UN, who reportedly said in reply to questions: The Secretary-General and his Special Adviser have made it clear [that] the principles set by Resolution 1250, which include the provision; there should be no preconditions to those talks … have not been met by the Turkish side and by Mr Denktash … There is no reason not to talk about everything, but there must be no preconditions, because if one side sets preconditions, the other will. [Resolution] 1250 is the Council’s text, is the Secretary-General’s text, and in the view of the Council, Mr Denktash has not lived up to it. There was much diplomatic pressure on politicians and officials in an unsettled Ankara to think again. American and British diplomats, acting in their capacity as special representatives on the Cyprus issue, argued determinedly that for Denktas¸ to leave the negotiating table was damaging Turkey’s interests and ‘was propelling into the European Union a divided Cyprus’.21 The Turkish Government was particularly susceptible to American representations on the subject since Turkey’s ailing economy still needed American and IMF support. In December 2001 the influential Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSI˙AD) emphatically declared that the Government should stop supporting the intransigent Denktas¸. He was blocking the path to Europe, membership of which for sound economic reasons was vital for Turkish economic development. The opinion polls were also showing that the government parties were not popular, not least because of the economic situation. From abroad the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, added his piece. ‘Turkey has already made too many sacrifices for too long for Mr Denktash. I believe Turkey has enough common sense, and in the end will abandon Denktash’.22 If it was necessary to get talks started again, it could hardly be on an initiative from the UN Secretary-General. A way out of the difficulty was found by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side when, in November 2001, Denktas¸ invited Clerides, to enter into personal face-to-face talks. After some hesitation, and with the condition that the UN Secretary’s Special Adviser should be present at the talks, though not to make proposals, it was accepted that such talks could begin. In order to help create the right

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atmosphere, Clerides was invited to dinner by Denktas¸, an invitation that was accepted and reciprocated. This was seen as a major breakthrough in personal relations, though in fact Clerides and Denktas¸ were never on bad personal terms. They were sparring partners, rather than enemies. Those interested in Cyprus looked on with mixed emotions of hope, wonder and expectation, and with euphoria in the air.

Face-to-face talks The talks proper started on 16 January. They progressed at the rate of three sessions each week, but with longer sessions of two a week beginning from 1 March. They were expected to continue until June, when it was expected that it would finally emerge whether there could, or could not, be a solution. Time was pressing. A decision on the entry of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ was expected in 2003. The two presidents and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, were accompanied by small delegations. Alvaro de Soto, said that it was not the UN’s intention to bring forward any proposals. He made the following statement: At a meeting held today, 4 December 2001, between H.E. Mr Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader and H.E. Mr Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, at the residence of the UN Chief of Mission and in the presence of Mr Alvaro de Soto, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, the two leaders agreed the following: 1. That the Secretary-General, in the exercise of his mission of good offices, would invite the two leaders to direct talks; 2. That these talks will be held in Cyprus starting in mid-January 2002 on UN premises; 3. That there will be no preconditions; 4. That all issues will be on the table; 5. That they will continue to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement is achieved; 6. That nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed. This agreed document restored the place of the UN in the talks. President Denktas¸’s initiative was responsible for a return to negotiations, but he had not gained the prior recognition of his state. Pressure from Ankara was evident. Also points 3, 4, 5, and 6 in the Special Adviser’s Statement repeated parts of Security Council Resolution 1250, which formed the basis of the failed proximity negotiations. A significant omission from the statement, however, was that there should be ‘full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties’. This was an improvement for the Turkish

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Cypriot side: UN resolutions have nearly all been adverse for the Turkish Cypriots. An opening statement by President Denktas¸ that emphasized the need for a settlement based on political equality, but supported membership of a ‘Cyprus partnership in the European Union’, was not accepted by the other side. Denktas¸ believed that the EU would be able to be flexible about the constitutional form of a settlement on Cyprus, a moot point. However, it was becoming clear that provided the political equality of the two sides was respected before entering into negotiations, there could be some progress towards a federation by the Turkish Cypriot side. As the accepted legal government of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots did not feel under pressure to define their position, and at the onset of the talks they called for a drastic change in Turkish Cypriot attitudes. Their Foreign Minister, Ioannis Cassoulides, said, ‘The unchanging Turkish [sic] aim is partition. So any agreement, if it breaks down, must not lead to partition. Foreigners should understand’, he continued, ‘that legally North Cyprus does not belong to the Turks, nor South Cyprus to the Greek Cypriots. Geographically, it cannot be divided’. The DIKO chairman, Tassos Papadopoulos, however, went further. He believed that acceptance of a new ‘partnership state’ amounted to recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state. For him settling the Cyprus problem between two ‘states’ was completely unacceptable. It was a warning of what Greek Cypriot policy would be should he come to power. The leader of the major party, AKEL, and President of the House of Representatives, Dimitris Christofias, strongly believed that there should be no departure from agreed principles, declaring that the Cyprus people should have human rights and basic freedoms ‘as a whole’. There should be no deviation. The government Spokesman, Michalis Papapetrou, denied that the two leaders had agreed to establish a new state. The position of the Greek side, he said, was seeking ‘to transform the Republic of Cyprus from a unified state to a federal one, and not create a new state’. He further called for the Turkish side ‘to make spectacular movements and adopt new positions in substantive issues’. After the commencement of the talks, he stated that the Greek Cypriot position was essentially that as given in the 1989 Proposals approved by the Greek Cypriot National Council. If this is the case, then Denktas¸ was correct in believing that behind Clerides there was a good deal of Greek Cypriot opposition to agreement to be overcome. Aware of the strength of feeling in the South, he said that he would not like to be in Clerides’ shoes. On the Turkish Cypriot side, as he noted, all sections of society were pressing him to obtain a settlement, the two leftwing parties now going so far as to deny the need for prior recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus! This was a vital concession. When it came to the subject of return to former property the situation was complicated by the Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights

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in May 2001, that former Greek Cypriot owners of property in Northern Cyprus ‘are being denied access to, and control, use and enjoyment of their property, as well as any compensation for the interference with their property rights’. The Court considered Turkey was the Respondent. Sweepingly, it was stated: ‘It is obvious that her army exercises effective control [which] entails her responsibility for the actions and policies of the “TRNC”’. Later, in June 2003 Ankara decided to accept the judgement of the ECHR, accepting payment of compensation of nearly $900,000 to a Mrs Loizidou, who had lost her property in the North. It was a drastic change in policy, but not to recognize the authority of the ECHR would not help Turkey’s application for EU membership. By the end of March 2002 the two leaders and their teams had talked for some 30 hours since 12 January, with the third phase due to begin on 9 April. In reply to questions Denktas¸ stated that there were still ‘fundamental difficulties’. ‘Essentially the Greek Cypriots still will not recognize that we are a state’, he said. By early April there had been 25 meetings with little or no result. In Turkey Ecevit argued for the solution of the Czech-Slovak ‘velvet divorce’, but many Greek Cypriots believed that once recognized, Denktas¸ would not engage in further negotiations. To begin with a confederal solution would also logically require the prior recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state. This was also unacceptable to the Western powers who lambasted Denktas¸ and the Turkish Cypriots for their obstinacy and refusal to recognize that they were heading for economic and political isolation. They reminded them that a divided Cyprus would not be banned from EU membership. They had to realize that Greece would not let that happen. At the end of the third round of talks in late April the Turkish Cypriot side produced a document entitled Draft Outline of the Founding Document for the new Partnership State of Cyprus. The Founding Document would ‘rest on the consent and free will of the two peoples of the island’. This was hardly acceptable to the Greek Cypriot side with its mention of ‘peoples’, but the first paragraph of the Basic Elements and Guiding Principles could not possibly be. It read: The Partnership State of Cyprus is established freely under this Founding Document (Constitutional Agreement) by the Turkish Cypriot Partner State and the Greek Cypriot Partner State, each with its own people, territory, functioning democratic institutions and jurisdiction under its respective constitutional order. It followed from this that prior to the signing of the Foundation Document ‘the three Guarantor Powers shall make declarations for the acknowledgement and recognition of the equal status of the two partner states’ (Article 114). The elaboration of the partnership state showed that it was mainly

216 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

confederal, but for the Turkish Cypriots the existing states were the real ‘constituent’ states of a federation, not just of a confederation. Behind the Turkish Cypriot proposals was an utter sense of outrage that a federation could be constructed without their agreement as a state. It was to count their historic struggle for nothing. They were also aware that a two-state federation, with one much weaker than the other, invited domination by the larger, and in this case by Greek Cypriots, whom they did not trust at all. Studies of two unit federations, even when equally balanced, show them to be inherently unstable.23 However, under pressure, and without conviction, the Turkish Cypriot side had now to consider seriously a federal solution based on two communities, the UN approach. This was a fiction: the communities were embodied politically in the two existing states. This could only be circumvented by a dangerous reliance on referenda. Without admitting it the UN could not help but be aware that under the rubric of ‘communities’ they were in practice helping negotiations between the leaders of two states, but they could not openly admit that the two states existed. In the absence of progress Annan visited the island in May 2002, but he had little impact. When at this time under pressure Mesut Yılmaz surprisingly called for more flexibility on the Turkish Cypriot side he was attacked in some newspaper headlines in Turkey. Opinion in Turkey was not, however, all supportive of Denktas¸, far from it. In some parts of the Turkish press Denktas¸ was being portrayed as the major obstacle to agreement. The EU Ambassador in Turkey, Karen Fogg, was accused of sharing such views.24 For many Turkish Cypriots it was proof enough that the EU was actively conspiring against them in alliance with certain Turkish journalists, with whom Ms Fogg was allegedly in close touch. By June 2002 the Turkish Cypriots, with encouragement from Turkey, were beginning to see some point in the Belgian and Swiss systems. The Belgium/EU experience was advanced as relevant to the Turkish Cypriot position. Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci had examined this experience, and the opportunities for fruitful separate Turkish Cypriot relations with the EU if there was a solution.25 The Turkish Cypriot side found these ideas interesting and valuable, but doubted that the gradually developing complex sets of relationships between the Belgian communities and the EU could be instantly applied in such a different environment as Cyprus. Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General’s plan, as it began gradually to emerge, did foresee ‘extensive co-operation between the federal government and the constituent states based on co-operation agreements inspired by the Belgian model’.26 This was a somewhat puzzling description of the Belgian case. The important feature of Belgian experience has been the increasing detachment of the Flemish and Walloon provinces from the federal centre. For instance, they now have responsibility for foreign trade and have treaty-making

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rights with foreign governments. The federal government is left with control in the fiscal area, with defence, diplomacy and social security. The UN (Annan) Plan sought to adopt this Belgian pattern, which is maintained by the balance created by the two major, and more or less equal, provinces. The Greek Cypriot spokesman said that the Greek Cypriot side was willing to discuss the constitution of federal Belgium. He added, however, that ‘any such discussions should be of the Belgian model in its entirety and not the “fragmentary and selective” approach desired by Mr Denktash “in order to promote his secessionist plans”’.27 Such a study would have revealed that recent movement in Belgian politics had been to weaken the federal government, hardly a development the Greek Cypriots were likely to applaud. In Belgium ‘the regions are the bedrock of the federal system’.28 A little later, in July 2002, it seemed that the Belgian model was having some impact when in a televised interview with the Turkish journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, the British Special Representative, Sir David Hannay, outlined his views on the way to solve the Cyprus problem. Recommending this sort of scheme for Cyprus he said that in a settlement there would be ‘a new state, something different from the old one – a new name probably. It would not be called the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. This, he inferred, would be symbolic of ‘a new partnership’. ‘What Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have been saying [is that] it must be a new partnership. Now it is very clear that the overall structure of this will be a central state, which will have rather limited responsibilities’. He continued, ‘I think we are going to have a central state and two component states. That is what the United Nations calls it. I would call it also two constituent states responsible effectively for everything that is not explicitly given to the centres (sic).’ In the new and different sort of Cyprus ‘the two peoples would be masters in their own house’. He did not agree, however, that the two states in Cyprus could be independent. ‘I really don’t believe that would solve anything’, but he did not make it clear why he thought that was so. He also expressed the view that the Greek Cypriots had been flexible, but this was not demonstrated. The views expressed by Hannay raised a storm of protest in the South, especially his references to the demise of the Republic of Cyprus, to a ‘partnership’ state, to ‘constituent’ states, and to two ‘peoples’. Meanwhile, I˙smail Cem, was attempting to persuade other leaders of the need for a solution that recognized the reality of the Turkish Cypriot state and argued for confederal solution. He could make no headway. For their own political and strategic reasons the United States and the United Kingdom could not take on the issue with the Greek Cypriots. The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, replying to Cem, strangely argued that negotiations for a confederation between the two states would end up in deadlock and, that, a valid point, they would not be able to speak with one voice in the EU or the United Nations.29 A Turkish Cypriot response was that if that should be the case, and it would not necessarily be so, there

218 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

could be a two-state instead of a confederal solution. Of more practical importance was Denktas¸’s repeated assertion that if the TRNC was recognized ab initio anything was possible, presumably including a federation! It was ignored: he was not trusted. Some headway was made during the summer on other issues, including that of security, but agreement on this issue broke down, probably because the Turkish military in the background had reservations on the subject.30 At this stage Denktas¸ also began again to express worries about surrender of territory, the influx of Greek Cypriots into the North and the danger of violence arising, especially with the dislocation of Turkish Cypriots from properties for which they had long had Turkish Cypriot title deeds. By July the UN was blaming Denktas¸ for the lack of progress in the talks. A second meeting of the two interlocutors with Annan in September did not produce any result. A further meeting in October in New York, this time with de Soto, still showed Denktas¸ in defiant mood. He was reported as saying: ‘If the EU takes Cyprus as a member, the talks are ended, and Cyprus is divided for ever’.31 During the talks Denktas¸ criticized the EU for recognizing the Republic of Cyprus as sovereign over the North, and he resented its interference in the TRNC, seducing its citizens with grants and promises of a better future. According to the Secretary-General on 4 December 2002 Denktas¸ had, however, said that the Turkish Cypriot side ‘would support membership of the “Cyprus Partnership” in the EU within the terms of a settlement’.32 The persistence of the UN in trying to broker a deal, backed principally by the United States and the United Kingdom, was demanded by the forthcoming well nigh inevitable acceptance of Cyprus into the European Union at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. Cyprus could not be left on one side because Greece was openly threatening to veto the Eastern Enlargement if Cyprus was not admitted, and a Greek Cypriot Cyprus as an EU member state could cause trouble for Turkey in its ambitions to join the Union, which the United States and the United Kingdom wholly supported. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots were not giving any cause for complaint. They accepted the UN’s ruling that there should be a federation. Unlike Denktas¸ they had not abandoned the 2000 talks. Ankara wanted the 2002 talks to be successful. Even the Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkok, declared that this opportunity for a solution and the establishment of a new partnership formed by two sovereign states was the only way to avoid a crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. He was, of course, out of step with the UN in portraying the TRNC as a sovereign state. In the late 1990s there was an escalation of attacks in the Turkish press on the TRNC Government in general and on President Denktas¸ in particular. This was the beginning of a serious campaign to undermine the confidence of the TRNC populace in its government and president. The

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government and the president were being attacked for their alleged authoritarian rule at a time of severe economic downturn that reflected the crisis in the Turkish economy. In these depressed conditions some of the intelligentsia in the TRNC supportive of Talat, were being influenced by the postmodern vision of politics and society in a globalized world, and saw the European Union as both saviour and exemplar. In these adverse conditions the Erog˘lu government was weakened by the results of local elections in the North held on 30 June. The Republican Turkish Party under Talat registered major gains, especially in the cities. Talat was becoming very critical of Denktas¸ and wanted a settlement on UN terms.

Political change in Turkey In July, there was a major blow for the National Unity Party and for Denktas¸, when resignations rocked the government in Ankara. Only with considerable difficulty had the government been able to make some of the reforms demanded by the Copenhagen Criteria. Also Turkey was still in the middle of an economic crisis. In addition Ecevit’s health was declining. Nor did the EU Commission’s 2002 Progress Report on Candidate Countries help the Turkish Government with Cyprus. ‘The EU, in line with statements made by the UN Secretary-General, emphasized the need for Turkey to take further steps to encourage the Turkish Cypriot leadership to work towards reaching a settlement before the end of accession negotiations’. The EU timetable was forcing a decision. In the absence of positive results from the face-to-face negotiations, and despite Denktas¸’s insistence that the UN should not make the running, the UN, having heard opposite points of view, began putting together the plan that had been long in the making. There otherwise seemed to be no way forward, and time was pressing. The outlines of a plan could have been presented to both sides in early autumn 2002, but events in Turkey required some delay. There the collapse of the government resulted in a caretaker government headed still by Ecevit, whose health was deteriorating badly, with S¸ükrü Gürel, very hard-line on Cyprus, as Foreign Minister. All was hanging on the early elections to be held in November. The polls were indicating almost complete lack of support for the coalition parties lately in government. The new Justice and Development Party was looking the likely winner, but it was not at all clear where it would stand on the European Union, or on Cyprus. In the elections, as expected, the JDP won a very large majority in parliament. None of the previous coalition parties obtained seats, not winning, as was necessary, over 10 per cent of the vote. The only other party with seats was the secularist left Republican People’s Party. It won 178 seats against the 363 won by the Justice and Development Party in this landslide victory. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the change in

220 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

government with mixed feelings. The new prime minister in waiting, Tayyip Erdog˘an, had mentioned the Belgian modal as a good model for Cyprus. The new government, which claimed to be conservative, not Islamic, soon showed it was pro-EU, and responded to feeling in many areas of society that Cyprus was standing in Turkey’s way. The secularist, and what one might call the Atatürkist, elites were divided between support for Europe and responsibility for the plight of the Turkish Cypriots, a responsibility felt most in the armed forces. However, the generals, too, strongly Ataturkist and secularist, believed, like Atatürk, that Turkey had to be part of European civilization. Turkey was still very divided on the Cyprus problem. With the European Council meeting in Copenhagen getting close there was hope, if not everywhere expectation, that the EU would give Turkey a date for its accession negotiations to begin. It was clear that Cyprus was a major obstacle, though realistic opinion knew it was not the only difficulty: there were the Copenhagen Criteria to satisfy. Moreover, the new government had to be careful not to create an indissoluble link between its EU ambitions and the Cyprus issue. As for the Cyprus negotiations both Clerides and Denktas¸ were under continuing pressure. Denktas¸ was clearly still dissatisfied with the idea that only after an agreement would the two component or constituent states have sovereignty in certain areas. He was also increasingly worried about territory, the influx of Greek Cypriots to the North, the dislocation of Turkish Cypriots, and the possibility of violence. Against him it was often urged that Greek and Turkish Cypriots got along very well together, as, say, in London, so what was the worry? This tended to overlook the fact, as apparent from other crises in multi-cultural societies, in the Balkans and Africa, that small incidents can soon develop into violence between, and among, people who have lived harmoniously together, attended the same schools even. One thoughtful Turkish Cypriot journalist resident in Turkey, a frequent and balanced commentator on Turkish affairs, believed that having a strong minority of Greek Cypriots in the North was not acceptable. It ‘would not be different from placing a time bomb at the roots of the settlement’.33

The Copenhagen European Council The purpose of the Council was to decide on the applications for EU membership of the ten states, including Cyprus, that had completed accession negotiations. It was clear that if approved, Cyprus would become a member with or without a Cyprus settlement. There was no chance of holding it back against the Greek threat to veto the Eastern Enlargement. A major Turkish objective at Copenhagen was to obtain a date in 2003 for the commencement of its own EU accession negotiations. Some Turkish political commentators believed that if Ankara persuaded Denktas¸ to sign

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up to the new UN plan announced on 11 November 2002, it would help get a much earlier date than the 1 July 2005 being proposed by France and Germany. With little enough time to spare, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, presented on 11 November his draft UN plan for Cyprus. Briefly it was a plan for a federal system that differed radically from the 1960 Constitution, the draft framework agreements and the UN’s 1992 Set of Ideas. It was a presidential, system, with some parliamentary features and made to look Swiss. The powers of veto for each community were very much reduced, which was of course particularly important for the much smaller Turkish Cypriot community. The central federal institutions possessed a wide range of powers, as is usually the case, though much federal legislation would in many areas be provided by the European Union. The intention was to have both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots accept in Copenhagen the fundamental constitutional structure, a map and some fairly complex arrangements on residence and restitution of property. Negotiations to finalize these provisions, and some necessary legal annexes, would have to be completed by 28 February 2003 for submission to referenda on both sides on 30 March. In response both sides said that they were willing to negotiate on the plan. Clerides wanted clarifications whilst Denktas¸ replied on 27 November that there were nevertheless ‘serious areas of concern’. After having both sides’ responses to his first draft, the Secretary-General produced an amended version of the plan on 10 December, on the eve of the meeting of the Council. The procedure was complicated by the fact that Denktas¸ had been admitted into hospital in New York in October for serious heart surgery and was not well enough thereafter to participate fully in the process. He did not anyway approve of having to sign up at short notice to a scheme that he believed needed a good deal of discussion, In late November the new Turkish Government sent its new foreign minister, Yas¸ar Yakıs¸, to New York to try to persuade Denktas¸, still not well, to agree to the plan, though without result. In the South the UN Plan was much criticized. A very alarming feature of the Plan was the retention of the 1960 Guarantees. Another concern was the extent of Turkish Cypriot veto powers over legislation, though they were much weaker than in the Set of ideas. Also a large number of ‘settlers’ would be able to remain, and the political concessions made to the Turkish Cypriots would only encourage, it was said, demands for secession. The proposed restrictions on the return of Greek Cypriots to their property in the North were ‘unacceptable’ for 79 per cent of respondents in a poll conducted by the newspaper Politis. Over 60 per cent were against the Plan. The Church was very opposed to the Plan. Clerides felt obliged to take the major political party leaders with him to Copenhagen.

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On 7 December Denktas¸ returned to Turkey and later had discussions with de Soto, who also discussed the plan with Clerides. There was considerable popular support for the plan in the North, membership of the EU being the lure, even among those Turkish Cypriots who would be displaced from their former Greek Cypriot homes. Before the summit the new Turkish Government still harboured the belief that some movement on the Cyprus issue would help it obtain from the EU an early date for the beginning of its own EU negotiations. Some of the Turkish media believed this to be the case. The anti-Denktas¸ newspaper, Sabah, declared, ‘Either a signature on Cyprus, or farewell to the EU’.34 Even Abdullah Gül, the new Prime Minister, said, ‘If a concrete date is given to Turkey, this will definitely create a positive environment which will also ˘an, touring facilitate the settlement of the Cyprus issue’.35 Tayyip Erdog Europe after his landslide victory, even suggested that the issues of the European Security and Defence Policy, the beginning of Turkey’s accession negotiations and the Cyprus issue ‘might be taken together as a package’.36 All this was going too far. The EU was not going to allow a Cyprus settlement to render the Copenhagen Criteria irrelevant. Denktas¸ did not go to Copenhagen. The Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister, ˘rulog ˘lu, went in his stead to deliver the coup de grace. Denktas¸ Tahsin Ertug said that he wanted more time to negotiate the plan. He had a point. It was hardly acceptable to produce a complex plan so late in the day. It was suspected that the aim was to hustle it through whilst Denktas¸ was largely hors de combat and the new Turkish Government was finding its feet. Most important, however, was the rigid EU timetable. Ankara did not get the early date it wanted for its own accession nego˘rulog ˘lu arrived, to offer accession tiations, but it was decided, before Ertug negotiations with Turkey at the December 2004 Council provided that by then the Copenhagen criteria had been satisfied. Thanks to the efforts of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and the German Chancellor, the Council decided to add after December 2004 ‘without delay’.37 The Turkish delegation in Copenhagen eventually swallowed their disappointment, we are told, and declared it a victory, not a conclusion that met with universal agreement back in Turkey. As for Cyprus there was at least time for more negotiation until the end of February, though that would have to be on more fundamental topics than had been envisaged. An important deadline now was the Treaty of Accession for all ten new member states to be signed on 21 April. It would be a time for more pressure on Denktas¸ who did not want, as he saw it, to give away his country for the sake of Anglo-American plans, for their own purposes, to make Turkey a member of the European Union, The rub, however, as he realized, was that most Turks wanted to join the EU, and this number increasingly included the Kemalist Turkish military, a major bastion of support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

10 The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004

After the disappointment at the Copenhagen Summit the UN did not give up. It believed that its plan contained the necessary ingredients for a solution of the problem. The major obstacle was the intransigence of President Rauf Denktas¸ and a National Unity Party government that supported, and guided, his foreign policy. In response to suggestions from various quarters the plan was revised and was reissued as Annan III on 26 February 2003. This formed the text for renewed negotiations, though there was not much time for them since the EU timetable required that Cyprus, united or not, should sign the EU Accession Treaty on 21 April. The decision to admit Cyprus into the EU was taken in Copenhagen by the European Council. Given the tightness of the timetable negotiations for a settlement had to be concluded by the end of February, or in March at the latest, in order to allow time for referenda on each side. After some further discussion the UN Secretary-General asked the two sides to meet with him, when they would be asked to put the plan to referenda on each side.

Annan III The first point to make about the UN Plan is that it was very different from previous UN plans. The Draft framework Agreement and the Set of Ideas essentially sought to modify the 1960 Constitution. The two sides restated, if with some modification, their interpretations of that constitution, the Turkish Cypriots claiming that the Greek Cypriots had destroyed it, against the Greek Cypriots’ assertions that the Turkish Cypriots had wilfully abandoned it. Annan III moved from an attempt to modify the 1960 Constitution chiefly by locating a solution within the framework of the European Union. The importance of this change cannot be overstated. It was important at a theoretical level absorbing as it did the new post-modernist conceptions currently popular political analysis and exemplified to a marked degree in the European union. In the new globalized world nationalism 223

224 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

was rightly considered to be both dangerous and unnecessary. To avoid international conflict states should be encouraged to participate democratically and responsibly in a unifying centre for major decisions and for the enactment of major legislation. In the case of a divided society like that of Cyprus it meant that a solution needed to find means of toning down national animosities. As a consequence of this way of thinking in Annan III the emphasis was on co-operation and consensus and veto powers were much reduced. Also the presidential system was significantly modified. A single person presidency, whether accorded to the major partner, or rotating, emphasized the separateness of the two communities and hindered cooperation. There was now to be a presidential council whose members fulfilled the roles of president and vice-president in turn. The consolidation of particular political personages as heads of their communities was to be avoided. These changes were significant, but even more important the new federal state to be established was to be part of the European Union. This would mean that much legislation would be made not in Cyprus but in Brussels, which could be expected to reduce areas of friction between the two sides. Also, and most important, under EU norms it is possible for citizens of the EU to live and work anywhere within the European Union. No matter how these natural rights might be restricted in the Annan Plan it would only be a temporary restraint. The EU involvement in the Annan Plan would in the long run serve to undermine the autonomy very many Turkish Cypriots treasured. And autonomy does imply participating significantly in major political decisions in one’s state, not just in those of secondary, or local, importance. Annan III claimed that ‘the status and relationship of the [new] United Cyprus Republic is modelled on the structure and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government and cantons’. This was quite a claim considering that Switzerland has twenty-six very independent cantons and major linguistic, religious and other groups all of which form a multifaceted parliament and federal council. Moreover Switzerland is not a member of the European Union. It was a form of window-dressing, but seen by the Secretary-General to be justified in the circumstances. ‘The Greek Cypriot side could take comfort in the fact that Switzerland was deemed to be a sovereign state and its Cantons did not enjoy a right to secede. The Turkish Cypriot side could take comfort in the fact that the Swiss model, which they had regularly, if unwisely, cited as their inspiration, was the model to be applied’.1 Nevertheless the Secretary-General did add in a footnote that he did not intend the Swiss model in general as the solution for Cyprus, which he said required a solution sui generis. The Belgian system was also much discussed in the negotiations. It evoked some considerable interest on the Turkish Cypriot side, but, as in the case of Switzerland, the differences between Cyprus and a highly developed

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 225

European state like Belgium are too great to admit of much useful comparison. Moreover, the Flamands and Walloons have of late been moving away, not towards, each other.2 Structure of the Plan The Annan Plan provided for a constituent state for each community, and a common state, later renamed the federal state in response to Greek Cypriot representation on the subject. The federal state was composed of two elected legislatures, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. They were separately elected by the electorate in each constituent state and each house had 48 members. In the lower house at least 12 seats had to be filled by those elected by each community. The Senate was equally divided. In both chambers voting was by simple majority, though votes in the Senate would have to include a quarter of each side’s senators present. In important areas, like finance, foreign affairs and election of the Presidential Council the proportion was raised to two-fifths. The Presidential Council, the executive, was to have membership proportional to the numbers of citizens in each state, provided that at least two senators of the total of six came from each community. They would be elected from a single list by majorities in both houses. The offices of President and Vice-president of the Council were to rotate every ten calendar months, with no more than two consecutive presidents hailing from the same constituent state. Each member of the Council would head a government department. Decisions in the Council would be by majority voting if not arrived at by consensus, but would then require at least one vote by a member from each constituent state. The Presidency Council was now part of a less divisive presidential system. The two constituent states played no part in constituting, in the sense of forming, the federation. They exercised their functions ‘sovereignly’ so their decisions in these respects were not subject to ratification by the federal government. Their functions were important, but of a somewhat secondary nature, including for instance tourism, fisheries and agriculture, industry and commerce, and planning and health. The federal government was responsible for foreign affairs, central bank functions, federal finances, natural resources and communications. There would be a federal civil service but police functions would be the responsibility of each constituent state as well as of the federation. The federal government would have the responsibility of ensuring that EU legislation was applied. It is not easy to imagine how it would all have worked out, but the fact that the federal government was responsible to the EU enhanced its importance. However, the constituent states could represent their own interests in Brussels under certain circumstances and within their areas of jurisdiction. There would be a Supreme Court, which would include some foreign judges, to help, inter alia, to resolve conflicts.

226 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

It was an unusual arrangement since the two existing states did not form it. Sovereignty was said to reside in the separately expressed common will of the two communities: the possibility of their not being a common will seems not to have been considered. Matters of great concern to both sides and difficult to reconcile were the issues of residence and property ownership, this relating to property abandoned by both communities in 1963–4 and 1974. The Annan Plan provided opportunities for compensation of property lost, for exchange as well as encouragement for their sale. If former owners did not avail themselves of these opportunities they could be reinstated in their properties under certain conditions. New possessors of property who had significantly improved it, could apply to receive title if they paid for the value of the property in its original state. This was altogether a political solution, later modified in Annan V, and was intended to replace legal claims to former property. In order to prevent mass movement of population, with Greek Cypriot movement to the North in mind, the Plan laid down that after 15 years the Greek Cypriots could constitute only 21 per cent of the North’s population. It was estimated by the UN that the relinquishment of territory by the Turkish Cypriots would result in the displacement of between 62,000 and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot government thought the figure would be much higher, about 100,000. To ensure that these elaborate rules on residence would be adhered to, especially as there might well be second homes and temporary residence, would not have been easy. Also there were to be no restrictions on those over 65 years of age. It might well all have been an administrative nightmare with much friction to boot. The Turkish Cypriots were afraid that under the Plan the more prosperous and numerous Greek Cypriots would overpower them, especially as their own economy had been crippled by the embargoes. They were aware that any restrictions imposed on the Greek Cypriots would necessarily have to be temporary. It was to become a unified EU state. For their part the Greek Cypriots believed that the Turkish Constituent State would make every effort to become autonomous. They did not really approve of its legal status, fearing its functions might be expanded. They also greatly feared the continued presence for Turkish troops until such time as Turkey joined the European Union. Nor did they want the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, fearing more Turkish military intervention, as in 1974. Whether the constitution makers of the UN and the EU fully felt and understood all these deeply held feelings of both sides is not at all certain. They were intent on bringing about a settlement for the sake, mainly, of concord in the Near East, which was important for their own international political interests. They were not impartial arbiters. Whilst taking care to

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protect their own concerns, they advanced what seemed a fair compromise to them, but compromise on these deeply felt issues was not uppermost in the minds and hearts of the two communities, especially among their leaders.

From Copenhagen to the Hague March 2003 Denktas¸ had been able to refuse to sign up to the Annan Plan at Copenhagen in December 2002 because he had the support of the government in Lefkos¸a and of the state institutions in Turkey. He had felt strong enough to ignore pressure from the new Turkish political leader, Tayyip ˘an, who was yet not a member of parliament, and was prime minister Erdog in waiting.3 ˘an criticized Denktas¸ for a negative attitude to After Copenhagen Erdog any solution. In January 2003 he said that Cyprus ‘was not a personal matter for Denktas¸. It was no-one’s personal problem. Denktas¸ says he does not trust the other side, but let us put on one side whether we trust them’.4 A little later Denktas¸ said that if he were pressed by Turkey to make an unacceptable agreement, he would resign. In response Erdogan remarked that political skill lay in creating solutions, not problems. Denktas¸ replied that ‘to tell the people that the Cyprus problem is Denktas¸’s problem is a great mistake’.5 There was much in the same vein. It did not blow up into an open row, but disagreement lay under the surface and it did not bode ˘an would be in office. well for the future when Erdog On 18 December 2002 President Sezer saw it appropriate to arrange a meeting attended by the Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, the Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkok, the Foreign Minister, Yas¸ar Yakıs¸, the Per˘ur Ziyal, the Turkish manent Secretary (Müstes¸ar) at the Foreign office, Ug ˘rulog ˘lu and the Permanent Secretary Cypriot Foreign Minister Tahsin Ertug to the Turkish Cypriot Presidency, Ergün Olgun. This was an important meeting after which the Head of the President’s Office, in an official statement, said that there had been support for Denktas¸’s decision to continue with the negotiations. ‘Hoping, for a well-intentioned and constructive approach from the Greek Cypriot side’, he continued, ‘Turkey will continue to support the TRNC and its people under the leadership of Denktas¸’.6 Gül made a similar statement. Reassured by this support Denktas¸ and the Turkish Cypriot government ˘an’s comments too seriously, and to declare that felt able not to take Erdog Cyprus was a national question for Turkey. All his major actions, Denktas¸ repeatedly said, were taken with the approval of both the Turkish Cypriot Government and Turkey. For his remarks about Denktas¸ Erdog˘an came in for a good deal of criticism in the Turkish press. The major opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, the only opposition party with seats in parliament, came out strongly in support of Denktas¸, as indeed did

228 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

many deputies of the Justice and Development Party. Former President Süleyman Demirel declared that Denktas¸ was a hero. He was not a hero to everybody when he returned to the TRNC. There had been demonstrations in Lefkos¸a whilst Denktas¸ was away in New York calling on him to resign, or sign up to the Plan. There was a large demonstration on 27 November 2002, another on the day of the Copenhagen Summit, on 26 December and others on 14 January and 27 February after his return to Cyprus. These demonstrations were organized by the opposition political parties and some labour unions, and with much help from a large number of other non-governmental organizations, including the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, whose Chairman, Ali Erel, was greatly in favour of the Annan Plan. The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce had received significant grants from the European Union, and was in close touch with TÜSI˙AD, the influential pro-EU Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association. It was also unfortunate for the Turkish Cypriot government that the largest circulation newspaper, Kıbrıs, owned by Asil Nadir, suddenly turned to support the opposition parties and other groups. The demonstrations in the North were given much publicity in the Greek Cypriot press. The estimated numbers of demonstrators as they appeared in the press had to be taken with some caution. The UN Secretary-General believed that the government should take particular note of these demonstrations of support for the Plan, but should a fairly elected government concede to popular demonstrations? The demonstrators believed that the Turkish Government was on their side. This was not altogether the case. On 14 January the influential Speaker of the ˘lu with a Turkish parliament, Bülent Arınç, came to visit Denktas¸ and Erog group of deputies. They were faced with a pro-Plan demonstration, but nevertheless expressed firm support for the Turkish Cypriot government. At this time the opposition parties in the Turkish Cypriot parliament tried unsuccessfully to have Denktas¸ replaced as interlocutor in the UN talks. The National Unity party was solidly behind him, but there was some wavering in the coalition Democratic Party. During the early months of 2003 it was vital for Denktas¸ to maintain and develop his support in Turkey. He was under great pressure from the UN, the USA and the UK through their representatives in Lefkos¸a to sign up to a deal. They were also exerting pressure in visits to Ankara, which Kofi Annan also visited. The main leverage was the need for Turkey to have the Cyprus dispute out of the way in order to remove at least one obstacle on the road to Turkey’s EU membership. It was not, however, a good time to engage the Turkish Government on Cyprus since it had its hands full with the decision on whether to allow American forces to enter Iraq through Turkey. That the Turkish parliament decided against this did not help the Government’s relations with the Turkish military, who were quietly in favour.

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In early March Denktas¸ was again in Ankara seeking Turkish governmental support for his marked disinclination to accept the Annan Plan. He first ˘an, who did not become a member of parliament until a met with Erdog by-election on 9 March 2003. It was a meeting fraught with danger since almost a polemic had developed between them on the subject of the Annan Plan and the need for a solution. In the Turkish press some thought the meeting might be disastrous, but it did not turn out to be so. Without rancour, it seems, they discussed the Annan Plan. Reportedly Denktas¸ told ˘an that in making his decision on 10 March he could only do so with Erdog ˘an was not in a strong position since he had the support of Turkey. Erdog yet to become a member of parliament and to establish his government, and develop his influence over the institutions of the state. He was also still not well informed on the Cyprus issue. His remarks on the subject had been criticized in the press as lacking in an understanding of the history of the conflict. His remarks on the Annan Plan had also shown that he was not well informed on its content. It was at this point becoming clear that ˘an was moderating his views, and was now more sympathetic to the Erdog shortcomings in the Plan, as the Turkish Government perceived them at the time. At least he would go along with the rejection of it by Denktas¸. ‘Since he was just about to establish his own government he could not risk facing opposition from the military and from those domestic forces critical of the Annan Plan.’7 In late February he spoke to a parliamentary group of his own party in favour of the Plan, but had misgivings about the increased numbers of Greek Cypriots who under Annan III could be resettled in North Cyprus. The increase from 65,000 to 85,000 he found unacceptable.8 He also asserted that there were two sovereign sates in Cyprus, but he did not logically conclude, as Denktas¸ did, that negotiations had to begin from that point. ˘an, Denktas¸ and the Prime Minister, Dervis¸ After meeting with Erdog Erog˘lu, met on 6 March in a Summit at the presidency in Çankaya with President Sezer, the Prime Minster Abdullah Gül, the Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Ozkok, the Foreign Minister Yas¸ar Yakıs¸, and officials. At this summit it was decided that at The Hague Denktas¸ would not sign up to the Annan Plan because it did not meet the Turkish side’s concerns and expectations. However, it was noted that Annan had said that changes could be made to the Plan up to 25 March.9 In addition to this support Denktas¸ received tumultuous applause when he had the opportunity to explain to the Turkish parliament his objections to the Annan Plan. At the Çankaya summit he said he had put forward his view that the Annan Plan in its present form could not be accepted At the summit there was agreement, he said, that the Plan must be changed; they did not want the peace on the island to be endangered. ‘The Turkish army must not have to come to rescue us again. There must be no need for that. We want a sound and durable agreement. We do not want an agreement

230 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

that can be torn up and thrown aside, an agreement that says “you are a minority” … In the South there is a state made up of Greek Cypriots; in the North you would see a mixed state. This is unjust, unbalanced, and abolishes bi-zonality.’10 The main points in the Parliament’s Declaration were as follows: 1. In this national question the Grand National Assembly makes it known again to the whole world that Turkey and the TRNC are in complete unity and accord. 2. In the TRNC’s search for a just and lasting solution it has the support of the Grand National Assembly. 3. The solution must recognize the equal status and complete equality of the two sides. 4. Turkey’s rights as a guarantor of the 1960 treaties must continue. 5. In Cyprus the balance established between Greece and Turkey can in no way be disturbed. 6. Any attempts to make a Cyprus solution a condition affecting Turkey’s accession to the European Union are rejected. 7. Proposals and decisions that damage bi-zonality, and thus endanger security, will again lead to violence. It is vital that this should never be accepted. News of the Ankara Summit and the Grand National Assembly’s Declaration led on 7 March to a large demonstration in Lefkos¸a on Denktas¸’s return in support of the government. Addressing it Denktas¸ said, ‘The Turkish Cypriot struggle to survive will continue. Ankara has decided that the Annan Plan in its present form cannot be accepted. Do you have faith in Ankara or in those who want the Plan to be accepted immediately?’11 He went on to say that ˘lu declared at Turkey wanted the TRNC to continue, not to be destroyed. Erog the same meeting, ‘Today, in this square, the referendum is finished.’12 Denktas¸ also later pointed out that he did not have the authority to agree to a referendum: that lay in the realm of the government’s authority in the TRNC’s parliamentary system. Moreover, the government had stated that it did not accept the Plan. In addition, Denktas¸ said that the whole subject of the guarantee by Turkey (and Greece and the United Kingdom) was not for him to decide and that, as far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned; it was primarily an issue for Turkey to pursue. After returning from New York Denktas¸ had made every effort to persuade Ankara that he should not sign up to the Annan Plan. The responses of the Ankara summit and the Grand National Assembly were the culmination of efforts over the crucial three-month period between the Copenhagen Summit ˘an and The Hague. It was fortunate for Denktas¸ that during this period Erdog was sidelined through not having yet become a member of parliament and prime minister. Had he been present at the Çankaya Summit the result might

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 231

have been different, but the Government led by Gül was new and inexperienced, and had yet to exert a powerful influence over the state institutions it had inherited. Denktas¸ was also supported by a good number of the new Justice and Development Party deputies, and was very popular with the public at large. The Turkish Cypriot opposition did not get support from the large Atatürkist/socialist Republican People’s Party in Turkey led by Deniz Baykal. Also Erdog˘an’s criticisms of Denktas¸ won the latter some sympathy. However Denktas¸ did have ranged against him sections of the Turkish press, reflecting the strong desire of business and other sections of society not to have Cyprus stand in the way of EU membership. Some of the Turkish press also made much of the alleged authoritarianism of the ˘lu government and of Denktas¸, a campaign encouraged, it was claimed, Erog by the then EU Ambassador Karen Fogg, against whom Denktas¸ constantly railed. In this connection a major factor in the North was the continuing intrusion of the EU into Turkish Cypriot society, and the hopes thus raised of a much better standard of living. Above all many Turkish Cypriots wanted the freedoms they had been denied by the embargoes and which the EU seemed to promise. Meanwhile, a real harbinger for the future, the Greek Cypriot public continued to show its dislike of the Annan Plan in a number of opinion polls. Many did not believe that the Turkish Cypriots should be as politically independent and equal as the Plan proposed. They also feared that the proposed Turkish Cypriot constituent state would become too powerful. Nor should the Turkish immigrants be allowed to stay, and there should be no limitations on the rights of Greek Cypriots to resume occupation of their properties, or live where they liked on the island. It was not, therefore, surprising that in the presidential election in the South due on 15 February 2003, the hard-line candidate Mr Tassos Papadopoulos was elected president in a first and final round victory over the incumbent Gl⁄ afkos Clerides. He won 51.5 per cent of the vote and was supported by the largest party, the leftist AKEL and by the nationalist Democratic Party, DIKO. This shift in electoral support in favour of hardline leadership was ominous for the success of the Plan. AKEL’s support was surprising, and significant.

The demise of the Annan Plan in 2003 After the election of Papadopoulos no further face-to-face meetings were held. In the meantime the Turkish National Security Council expressed strong support for the stand being taken by the Turkish Cypriot Government. However, a poll in early February 2003 in the TRNC showed that a majority of Turkish Cypriots would vote in a referendum for the Plan. The 28 February 2003 deadline set by the UN Secretary-General for agreement was extended to 7 March. This took account of the Greek Cypriot

232 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

presidential elections and of the tardy submission of the third version of the Plan. The 7 March was clearly too early a deadline to allow for significant discussion, but the UN Secretary-General would not extend it. He declared that the Plan was finely balanced and could only be fine-tuned. The leaders of the two sides were asked to meet the Secretary-General in The Hague on 10 March to agree to hold a referendum on the revised Plan on each side on 30 March. The British and American governments urged both sides not to let slip this historic opportunity to resolve the Cyprus problem. ˘an about Important for Denktas¸, however, was the indecisiveness of Erdog the Annan Plan. He wanted a solution, but was advised by President Sezer and the Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkok, that any EU derogations for the Turkish Cypriots in the Annan Plan would not be permanent. Erdog˘an expressed his doubts in a television interview.13 He was clearly undecided on the best approach to the Cyprus issue. It is reported that on ˘an suddenly expressed concern the day of the meeting at The Hague Erdog that an attempt was being made to link the Cyprus issue with Turkey’s application to join the European Union. ‘This swift change in his remarks determined the course of the meeting in The Hague.’14 Before going to The Hague, as mentioned above, President Denktas¸ and the Turkish Cypriot Government obtained support for its rejection before the large rally of supporters in Lefkos¸a, alleged in some reports to equal in numbers the huge pro-Plan demonstrations of the previous December and January. On the same day, 7 March, the National Assembly was to meet to decide whether to support a referendum. The President asked the party leaders not to proceed to a vote as it could weaken his position in The Hague: there was some doubt on how some of the Democratic Party members would vote at the crunch, especially as outside the parliament building crowds had assembled in favour of a vote for a referendum. Also the National Unity Party deputies also did not want to vote under pressure from a demonstration outside the building. There was no vote on the issue. The Hague At The Hague for the Turkish Cypriot side Denktas¸ said that the Plan could not be put to a referendum since it had fundamental objections to the Plan on basic points. He rejected it. The Greek Cypriot side also had a number of objections to a referendum. They wanted legislation to be put in place ‘to avoid the possibility that the only states that would be functioning would be the constituent states’. It seems they wanted to ensure that the ‘federal government’, which they could dominate, would be presented as the successor to the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots also demanded that Turkey, through the Turkish Grand National Assembly, should back the Plan’s security provisions, which would have been a lengthy and problematical process. Naturally that was

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unacceptable. Papadopoulos also looked for time to inform the electorate properly about the Plan before it was submitted to a referendum. He wished ‘to be sure that the gaps regarding federal legislation, as well as the constituent states’ constitutions, would be filled’.15 On both issues agreement could well have been difficult. In the end, however, he agreed to withdraw his demand for changes if the Turkish side would do the same. Predictably the Turkish Cypriot side could not agree: its required changes were much more fundamental, as the Greek Cypriots well knew. The Turkish Cypriot side nevertheless offered to discuss all changes required by both sides until 28 March, after which, if there was agreement, they would go to a referendum. The Turkish Government now pointed out, however, that the outcome, including, in particular, changes in the 1960 treaties would have to be approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. It could not accept amendments to these treaties on the strength of affirmative referenda. For this purpose it was regarded as insufficient that a draft treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom that approved the Foundation Agreement was appended to the Plan. The Turkish stance provided an opportunity for the Greek Cypriot side to object that it ‘could not be expected to go into the referendums uncertain whether or not Turkey would endorse the outcome’.16 Essentially both the Turkish and Greek Governments should have assured themselves that they had adequate authority to agree to the results of referenda on the Annan Plan. In the Turkish case it could be argued that there was simply not enough time. A new government had just come into power when the Annan Plan appeared, and the EU timetable was pressing. Could time not have been extended to 28 March? The Turkish Cypriot view was that the talks were closed down precipitately, but the differences were very great and the Greek Cypriots could afford to do nothing and rely on the advantage that EU membership would offer after signing the Accession Treaty in April. President Denktas¸ earned the opprobrium of turning down the Plan, which, he said, would have made the Turkish Cypriots prisoners forever. Papadopoulos safely sheltered behind the Turkish Cypriot rejection of the Plan. Had Denktas¸ accepted Papadopoulos’s offer and gone along with the Plan as it then was, the new state might well have entered united into the European Union. It would have been very difficult for Papadopoulos in 1963 to campaign against the Annan Plan, as he did later in 2004, since at The Hague both leaders would have been required not to do so. However, very surprisingly it is reported that a few days after The Hague ‘he denied he would have agreed to sign the Annan Plan at The Hague even if Denktash had agreed’.17 In his concluding statement at The Hague the UN Secretary-General noted that the Turkish Cypriot side had fundamental objections to the Plan on basic points. In his view President Denktas¸ did not accept ‘that has been a sea change from the confrontational atmosphere of the 1960s to

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the Europe that Cyprus is joining at the outset of the new millennium’.18 The UN’s Plan was carefully drafted for two communities whose leaders would be expected to compromise, but this the two leaders were not prepared to do. The attempt to reconcile the Turkish Cypriot demand for an agreement between ‘two peoples’ with the Greek Cypriot conviction that there was only one people on the island failed again. Rational foreign diplomats seemed not to appreciate the intensity of the feeling on both sides. Issues of international politics were uppermost in their minds, and there was very little time to hammer out a solution because of the EU’s timetable for the admission of new member states, including Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots really wanted in any agreement with the Greek Cypriots to be absolutely equal from the start. Uneasy with what was being proposed, Denktas¸ voiced this demand time and time again during the Annan Plan negotiations. He was not prepared to accept a ‘constituent’ state that, in fact, had no say in constituting the new federal state proposed. ‘If it is recorded’, he said ‘that a new partnership will be formed between the two sovereign sides, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot nations, then we are saying that the rest is easy’.19 Was this the fundamental objection to the Annan Plan? Would the Turkish Cypriot government have signed up to the Annan Plan if the TRNC had first been recognized? Possibly not is the answer.20 This is because after 1974, the Turkish Cypriot government had argued persistently for a very loose federation not far removed from a confederation. They did not want to be involved in complex and binding federal institutions with the Greek Cypriots because they mostly did not trust them. That the new federal state would sooner or later have to apply EU norms with regard to residence, property ownership and economic freedoms was a new and substantial worry. The Turkish Cypriot opposition, it should be said, however, did not generally believe that they could not make an agreement with the Greek Cypriots. Some were convinced, as socialists, that with AKEL they could overcome the nationalist divide that they believed was in part the offspring of capitalism and imperialism. They deplored the rejection of the Plan. Talat said that the Turkish Cypriots wanted to join the EU not for economic reasons, but because they badly wanted to be saved from their isolation, and become united with the South and with the world. They rejected outdated nationalism. A good deal of opposition to the government also arose from some of the left’s dislike and fear of big brother Turkey. ‘Cyprus is ours’, was a popular cry. Many believed that if they did not establish an accord with the Greek Cypriots, they would forever be under the Turkish yoke. Significantly, as polls showed, very few Turkish Cypriots wanted to be part of Turkey. ‘And would independence not in the end mean little more than that?’ they asked. The Turkish presence was so close and overwhelming that it could push the Greek Cypriot danger into second place. On the other side,

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Denktas¸ said, ‘You have to know the Greek Cypriots. If the basic intention is to uproot us, [he later said it was] then they would settle in the North out of stubbornness.’21

After The Hague Not surprisingly, the UN Security Council (14 April 2003) regretted it was not possible to reach agreement at The Hague on submission of the Plan to referenda ‘due to the negative approach of the Turkish Cypriot leader’. The Security Council also declared its full support for the ‘carefully balanced’ latest version of the UN Plan, but would not accept the Anglo-American proposal that it would be the basis of a solution. Instead, China, France and Russia, sympathetic to the Greek Cypriots and reflecting their views, would only agree to its being described as ‘a unique basis for further negotiations’. At The Hague Turkey had supported the TRNC. The new government was aware that in Turkey there was much support across society for the TRNC, and not just within the military. One institution on which the military could exert its influence was the National Security Council, where it was powerfully represented. An important change was now taking place, however, that would weaken its hold in that important body. The role of the military in the Council was under fire from the EU, which regarded it as undemocratic and outside EU norms. Politicians in the United States had also in the past expressed concern about the military’s influence, even if the Administration had not been inclined to do so. The military were not in a strong position to resist reform of the National Security Council since, as ardent Ataturkists, they believed Turkey’s place in the world was to be part of Europe. Also they believed that EU membership would help restrain the development of Islam in Turkey, which they feared and opposed. Henceforth only the Chief of the General Staff would be a member of the National Security Council, other commanders being asked to attend if and when necessary. The President would chair the Council, of which the Prime Minister, and other ministers were to be members. The powers of the Council were also much reduced. It helped bring about this important change that the Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkok, was a moderate, In August 2003 President Sezer endorsed the substantial reform of the National Security Council in the Seventh EU Harmonization Package adopted by Parliament that removed military domination of the Council. The draconian State Security courts were also to be abolished. In Turkey after The Hague there were opposing views on the wisdom of the Turkish Cypriot rejection of the Plan. A former Turkish Foreign Minister, I˙lter Türkmen argued strongly that in the Plan the Turkish Cypriots had after all achieved the recognition of their constituent state, and blamed Denktas¸ for letting the Republic of Cyprus become a member of the European

236 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Union against Turkey’s interests. He also stressed that in the Plan Turkey’s role as a guarantor power was also restated. By contrast a former Turkish ambassador to Japan, and a columnist, warned that a solution based on EU principles would inevitably lead to the domination by the island of the much more numerous and powerful Greek Cypriot community just as Denktas¸ feared. It was widely accepted that it was dangerous for the TRNC to join the EU as part of a federation unless Turkey was also a member. On 16 April 2003, together with nine other candidate countries, the Greek Cypriot Government signed the accession treaty with the European Union. The Turkish Foreign Minister excused himself from attending the signing ceremony, but later attended the ceremonial dinner. Denktas¸ criticized him for doing so. The accession of Cyprus to the EU was not regarded as the end of the road for a settlement. There was still, it was said, a ‘window of opportunity’ until 1 May 2004 when, with the others, Cyprus would formally join the European Union. On 17 March, Verheugen, addressing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, said, ‘If by the end of 2004 there was still no settlement on Cyprus, it would be very difficult to recommend starting accession negotiations with Turkey’. The response from some commentators was cautious and doubting. Why should Turkey exert pressure on the TRNC government in order to facilitate Turkey’s road to EU membership when, for other reasons, that may never come about?

Initiatives after The Hague In early April with Turkish approval the Turkish Cypriot government offered a peace plan to the South that principally provided for the return of Varosha in return for the lifting of embargoes on the North. To this Erdog˘an added a proposal for a five-power conference. It would be composed of representatives of the Guarantor powers, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots rejected both proposals, Papadopoulos pointing out that the conference would provide recognition of the Turkish Cypriots. He said that the negotiating through the UN was the proper way forward. This Turkish/Turkish Cypriot initiative was followed by the breathtaking announcement on 21 April, five days after the signing of the EU Accession treaty by Cyprus, that the TRNC would allow freedom of movement across the North/South divide. The proposal, which had been considered for some time, was said to have been made by the president’s son, Serdar Denktas¸, head of the Democratic Party in the coalition government. It utterly surprised and confused the Greek Cypriot government. They at first considered it illegal, and intended to impress and mislead the international community. However, against the government’s wishes, the Greek Cypriots

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flooded across the border, closed since 1974. They had to show their passports or identity cards to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, much to the chagrin of the Greek Cypriot government. The desire to go to see the North was so strong nothing could really be done to stop the visits. Cars were queuing for miles at the border delayed by having to buy vehicle insurance when entering the North. The Turkish Cypriots were also eager to cross over and were impressed by the relatively high level of development by comparison with their own less developed economy. The Greek Cypriots were surprised that, despite obviously being less prosperous than the South, the North was not poverty stricken and disease ridden, as their propaganda often implied. They also saw very few Turkish soldiers. The Greek Cypriots were remarkably well received for the most part by the present possessors of their former property, confident for the most part that they would never have to relinquish the homes they had lived in for so many years. Some Greek Cypriots seemed to realize that if they returned to their former properties they would be living in a predominantly Turkish Cypriot community. The North was no longer the North from which their families had fled in 1974. Yet one elderly Greek Cypriot lady, noting the rundown state of the exterior of her former home, the next day sent a painter from the South to paint it. Some of the Greek Cypriots declared that they were going to take a every possible step to get their property back and were going to take legal action. The European Court of Human Rights would have more cases before it to add to the thousands already awaiting jurisdiction.22 The UN and the EU welcomed the opening of the border, though it was pointed out that it was not a solution. In response to the Turkish Cypriot move, it seems, though claimed to have been long under discussion, on 30 April the Greek Cypriots announced a series of measures ‘to give Turkish Cypriots living in the occupied areas the opportunity to enjoy, to the extent possible, the rights and benefits that the Republic of Cyprus extends to its citizens’. Wherever they lived the Turkish Cypriots were, of course, to them citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. What was on offer was important for the Turkish Cypriots, who had lived long under the embargoes. They would be offered identity cards and passports, the latter now so very important since the Republic of Cyprus was virtually a member of the European Union. Medical care was also available, and was, understandably, of a higher standard in the richer South than in the North. Where appropriate, qualifications obtained in the universities in the North could be recognized in the South, thus encouraging not only manual workers and artisans to work in the South, which some already did. It was described as a ‘charm package’ by the Turkish Cypriot government, and was interpreted as a means of promoting osmosis. President Talat was later to criticize this attempt to absorb the Turkish Cypriots into the Greek Cypriot state.

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In late May there was a development of very considerable importance. Seeing that Cyprus was now most certainly an EU problem the European Union announced a €12 million aid package for North Cyprus. Three quarters of the grant was for economic development, with €6 million allocated to municipalities and €3 million to the encouragement of small and medium economic enterprises. Most controversial was the grant of €3 million designed to bring the North closer to the EU, of which one million was for EU propaganda. The Turkish Cypriot government saw all this as little more than bribery, especially as large grants were given to the large municipalities, which were mostly left-wing. The Turkish Cypriot government did not accept that North Cyprus was part of the European Union. Eventually it accepted some of the aid. An attempt by Turkey to match this EU aid with its own special aid programme, including a customs union, fell through when regarded as illegal for a country now accepted as candidate for EU accession. Later, in July, the Turkish Cypriot government, with Turkish support, tried again to break the mould. The Turkish Cypriot government now proposed, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, to return to the confidencebuilding measures of 1993. Nicosia Airport would be used by both sides, the Turkish Cypriot airport, Ercan, could be used by the Greek Cypriots, and Varosha would be opened up for use by both sides. In addition Turkey offered to open up Turkish ports to Greek Cypriot shipping, which Greek Cypriot shipping interests certainly wanted. The offer was spoilt by the threat that without some such agreement Varosha might be opened up just for the Turkish Cypriots. The UN Secretary-General, with the agreement of the Security Council would not countenance the proposal save as a precursor to acceptance of the Annan Plan, an attitude adopted also by the European Union. Papadopoulos called for the renewal of negotiations, claiming that Denktas¸ had rejected the 1993 confidence-building measures.

Parliamentary elections in the North With all these developments the situation was much disturbed. Much would clearly depend on the outcome of the parliamentary elections due in the North in December 2003. Polls suggested caution. The electoral campaign concentrated on acceptance or rejection of the Annan Plan, and on the issue of international recognition of the TRNC before signing up to any agreement. It soon became very clear that the international players in the Cyprus drama wanted a victory for Talat. The American Ambassador in Cyprus was accused of urging support for the opposition in a speech in Cyprus, as was the American representative, Thomas West speaking in Ankara. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, in a speech to the Belgian Senate on 2 December, though anxious not to show that the Turkish Cypriot elections had any legitimacy,

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 239

could not refrain from saying that ‘the elections could possibly have some value if the Turkish Cypriot opposition won, as they wanted a solution based on the Annan Plan and EU accession’.23 The Turkish Cypriot government protested in vain. Important in Turkey was the statement by Hilmi Özkok, the Chief of the General Staff, that he saw possibilities in the Annan Plan. In North Cyprus the opposition parties claimed that the government was rigging the elections by granting citizenship to Turkish immigrants, thus allowing them to vote. There had certainly been a marked increase in the number of citizenships so granted. This was because many Turkish immigrants who had lived in North Cyprus for the required number of years now suddenly wanted to register as citizens for the sake of the EU benefits that might be available in the future. This development did not, in fact, help the government. It had long been the case that immigrants had never solidly voted for the National Unity Party. The immigrants’ leader explained in a television interview that they would be voting for Talat’s party.24 It was claimed that the government influenced the vote by promoting its case through the national radio and television authority (Bayrak Radio and Television). This influence was more than negated, however, by the popular pro-opposition Genç TV and Kıbıs TV stations, the latter owned by Asil Nadir. His newspaper, Kıbrıs, had the largest circulation in the North, and also sided with the opposition. Aware that there would be claims that the government had influenced the elections the government called for foreign observers, but there was no response, on the grounds that it would amount to recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Present at the time, the author witnessed no intimidation of electors at polling stations, no falsification of voting returns, or other indications of wrong-doing. The elections were conducted carefully by the officials and proceeded calmly.25 As polls had suggested, the government and opposition parties divided the votes and seats equally. It was not a walkover for the opposition as the demonstrations in January 2003 might have indicated would be the case. However, the Republican Turkish Party led by Talat did increase its proportion of the votes from 13.35 per cent in 1998 to 35.17 per cent, the National Unity Party’s vote dropping from 40.33 to 32.91 per cent. The government’s coalition partner, the Democratic Party, had its share of the vote cut from 22.1 to 12.94 of the vote. On the left the Peace and Democracy Movement won 13.19 per cent of the vote overall. Although the opposition parties had a small majority over the government parties, this translated into 25 seats each in the 50-strong legislature. In fact, the government parties could have done better had two small progovernment nationalist parties, who wanted a change of leadership in the government, not put forward their own candidates. But for these squandered votes the government would have won the election.

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It was difficult to know how a government would be formed, but in due course President Denktas¸ asked Talat to form a government, which he did with the participation of the Democratic Party led by Serdar Denktas¸. This party had members not so solidly against the Annan Plan as the members of the National Unity Party.

A surprising Turkish initiative The elections were regarded in Ankara as support for the Annan Plan. This was a relief since the Turkish Government was under considerable pressure to have the Annan Plan reactivated. In its Progress report on Turkey’s EU membership process that appeared on 5 November 2003 the EU made it plain that Turkey had to make a determined effort to solve the Cyprus problem. Turkey was reminded that the Cyprus problem could be an obstacle on the path of achieving Turkey’s aspirations. Ankara protested that Cyprus was not included among the Copenhagen Criteria and should not be taken into account, but had to realize that the EU now had no option ˘an now but to do so. Encouraged by the elections’ result in the TRNC Erdog began to have the Turkish Cypriots sign up to the Annan Plan. He began to show his irritation against Denktas¸, advising him to find some new advisers, since those he had did not bring forward any new views. Commenting on the UN Security Council’s statement urging resumption of negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan, he said, ‘That is what we want too’.26 Yet it was not clear how far all the major players in Turkey were in accord with him. The Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer was a determined protector of the Atatürkist secular state, popular with the military, and sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot position in Cyprus. In his 2004 New Year message he said, ‘We think that a compromise and a comprehensive solution in Cyprus could be achieved on the basis of the existing realities on the island, and also by benefiting from the steps taken by the Turkish Cypriot side.’27 ‘Basic realities’ was a phrase originating with Denktas¸ and was generally accepted as meaning that a solution had to be based on the recognition of two sep˘an denied reports arate states. A second major player was the military. Erdog in the press of discord between the Government and the military on the subject of the Annan Plan which, it was widely believed, found no more favour with the military than it did with Denktas¸. ‘Our Foreign Ministry’, ˘an said ‘has conducted the work (on changes Turkey wanted to see in Erdog the Annan Plan) in consensus with the office of the Chief of the General Staff’.28 This was on the same day, 8 January 2004, that a meeting was held under the chairmanship of President Sezer, and attended by the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül together with high-level civilian and military officials. In a brief statement after the meeting it was announced that Turkey backed the good offices’ mission of the UN and confirmed its political

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determination to reach a rapid result through negotiations, which should acknowledge the realities on the island. There was no mention of the Annan Plan, but negotiations could hardly proceed without it. The Government was anxious to play down any differences with the military, but the newspaper, Cumhuriyet, printed copies of papers by the military in which the Foreign Ministry was criticized for surrendering Cyprus.29 Yet a Cyprus solution was clearly a major concern for the Government. The President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, on a timely visit to Ankara, when he judiciously praised Turkish efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria, stressed that a solution of the Cyprus problem would greatly help Turkey in its EU ambitions. The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer on a visit to Ankara, delivered the same message. It was repeated by Thomas Weston, whilst Günther Verheugen was also expressing optimism over Turkey’s eventual destiny to join the European Union if the Cyprus obstacle was removed. The next important meeting in Ankara was that of the National Security Council held on 23 January 2004. The President chaired this meeting, which was attended by the Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkok, but also, and this was important, by other military commanders. Unlike Özkok, they were very hawkish on Cyprus, representing a dominant trend in the Turkish military. Also the military were suspicious of the Justice and Development Party fearing the outcome of its Islamic origins. However, an ˘an was that in order to approach demoimportant development for Erdog cratic norms parliamentary legislation had made the National Security Council merely advisory. After the meeting the written statement was as follows: Turkey continues its support for the good offices’ of the UN SecretaryGeneral, and continues its commitment for a rapid achievement of a settlement through negotiations based on the realities of the island taking also the Annan Plan as a reference.30 The Annan Plan was now mentioned, if only as a reference, whereas it had not been in the 8 January meeting. The ‘realities on the island’ were included, so there was still seemingly some acknowledgement of what for Denktas¸ was a prime condition, the recognition of two states on the island before negotiations. Before the meeting Denktas¸ was briefed in Ankara on developments, but he clearly did not know what was going to be decided ˘an was to meet Annan in Davos on the occasion when on 26 January Erdog of the World Economic Forum. At that meeting, Denktas¸ afterwards said, ‘Everything was decided, but they hid it from me.’31 The ‘realities on the island’ phrase was included, but they were soon quietly to be forgotten, and the ‘Annan Plan as a reference’ turned out to be the Annan Plan as the basis of discussion.

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Erdog˘an duly met Annan in Davos. What happened there was crucial. Annan said he would be prepared to offer his good offices provided that, if there should be no agreement on his plan, he would be given the authority by both sides to fill in any gaps for it then to be submitted to referenda on both sides. It was, of course, important to achieve a result before 1 May when Cyprus would fully become a member of the European Union. After ˘an went to the United States to the Davos bombshell, and just before Erdog see President Bush, Denktas¸ met both Sezer and Erdog˘an in Ankara, and ˘an knew before going to later met with Özkok. According to Talat, Erdog Davos and Washington that Talat’s government would support the Annan Plan. The Secretary-General also believed that the Greek Cypriots would go along with new discussions on the basis of the Plan since they had ˘an had Bush’s accepted it as it was in The Hague. In Washington Erdog support, as did Annan. On Erdog˘an’s return to Ankara he called together a meeting attended by Denktas¸, Talat and Serdar Denktas¸, a meeting at which Sezer was not present. It was expected to last half a day, but lasted two days. Denktas¸ objected strongly to giving Kofi Annan the right to complete the Plan where there was disagreement between the two sides. He was also strongly disinclined to accept the Secretary-General’s expected invitation to go to New York to consult with him, along with the Greek Cypriot side, on the Secretary-General’s procedural plan. Attempts were made to soothe him down, particularly, it seems, by Talat, but Serdar Denktas¸, now in political alliance with Talat was playing an important role. In the end it became obvious that Erdog˘an was not going to be deterred from his agreement with Kofi Annan. The basic argument was that this was in Turkey’s interest because of its ambitions to join Europe. Forever insisting that he was always at one with Turkey Denktas¸ had to agree to go to New York. He was hoist with his own petard.32 He later said, it was a case of ‘Either go, and if you go accept what is on offer, or if you don’t go take the blame’.33

New York, February 2004 Annan duly extended his invitation to both sides to New York for negotiations on the implicit understanding that negotiations could continue until the Plan took its final form on 31 March, after which both sides would submit it to referenda. If, however, there was no agreement he would, albeit reluctantly, have to fill in any blanks. Why did the Greek Cypriots accept Annan’s invitation? The brief answer would be that they could not afford to be regarded as not wanting a solution. They had always said that they wanted a solution, but equally the Greek Cypriot public had always been told by nearly all political leaders in the South that the Annan Plan was unacceptable. After Papadopoulos agreed in New York to the procedure proposed by Annan, the Greek Cypriot

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 243

press, and many politicians, expressed dismay and anger at what had been accepted. There was wide opposition to the Annan Plan: it was not regarded as a just solution, and now it looked as though it might be forced upon them, obliging them to veto it in a referendum. In their disinclination to accept the UN initiative the Greek Cypriots were at first supported by the Greek Government, which was at first unwilling to accept the procedure, but eventually agreed to it.34 The meetings began in New York on 10 February. The opposition in Turkey, aware that the understanding was that the UN Secretary-General would, if necessary, complete the plan, declared that it was going to be a sell out. It was tantamount to accepting the UN Plan without negotiations. Former Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, declared that no Turkish Cypriot government had the right to relinquish its sovereignty without first changing the constitution. On the way to New York Denktas¸ and Talat reportedly discussed the problem at length. Talat tried hard to offer solace, but Denktas¸’s morale, he said, was very low.35 At the conference Ug˘ur Ziyal, Head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, was instructed to warn Denktas¸ that the side to walk out of the conference would not be theirs.36 At the first session Papadopoulos said that he did not accept that the UN Secretary-General could fill in the blanks in the Plan. On hearing this Denktas¸ said, ‘I agree’. At this Talat reportedly said to him, ‘What are you doing?’ To this Denktas¸ replied that the man spoke rightly. But, said Talat, ‘Let it rest, let him reject it, why did you do so?’ To this rejection Annan responded by reminding them that they had responded to his letter of invitation, and that since they had come to New York, he assumed they had accepted what he said in it. From the account reportedly given by Talat Turkish Cypriot opposition to allowing Annan to be the final arbiter does not seem to have been very pronounced. However, an unidentified diplomat close to the talks is reported to have said ‘Denktash is very critical of the whole thing and no-one seems to be reining him in, while Papadopoulos doesn’t seem too interested in making progress’.37 That Denktas¸ strongly disapproved of it all is suggested by the strength of the warnings he received about his response to the situ˘ur Ziyal was told to remind Denktas¸ very firmly that it was Turkey ation. Ug ˘an who, on his that was at the table.38 There was also a warning from Erdog way back to Turkey from Korea, told journalists that he had given Denktas¸ a road map to be followed and that if he was not faithful to it, North Cyprus would pay the price. Affronted by this, it seems Denktas¸ almost left ˘an was perthe conference, but the matter was hurriedly settled when Erdog suaded to make immediate amends with Denktas¸ by telephone. After the negative response he received Annan asked both sides to think again and meet him the following day. The Greek Cypriots seemed to believe that Denktas¸ would be as intractable as ever, especially as he had at least murmured agreement with Papadopoulos

244 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

when the latter had said he could not accept that the Secretary-General could fill in any blanks in the Plan. They were therefore greatly surprised when, the following day, Denktas¸ proposed that the Secretary-General could complete the Plan, if necessary, though before that there should be an intermediate stage when Greece and Turkey, with the two Cypriot sides, should try to find a solution. This was accepted. The Greek Cypriots were in a quandary, but had no option but to agree. They then tried hard to have the EU added into the penultimate stage, but without success. The EU, when consulted, did not wish to be directly involved, save over technical issues. The Turkish side objected strongly to the presence of the EU in the negotiations on the grounds, chiefly, that Turkey was not a member of the European Union.39 Vain hope though it was, it was thought that the intervention of Greece and Turkey and, if then necessary, the finalizing of the Plan by Annan might be avoided by further discussion between Papadopoulos and Denktas¸ to be completed by 21 March. With the threat, now, that the Plan might be completed without their agreement Papadopoulos and Denktas¸ would perhaps make much greater efforts to agree than had hitherto been the case. It seemed a reasonable supposition, but in the absence of agreement both presidents could use their influence over the voters in the referenda, and in the Greek Cypriot case that influence could be expected to be crucial given that opinion polls showed that most Greek Cypriots were against the Plan.

Negotiations in Nicosia The meetings to be held by Papadopoulos and Denktas¸ in Cyprus in an attempt to find a solution began on 19 February 2004 and ended on 22 March without agreement. A large team accompanied each president, though the two presidents took the lead in the discussions. The UN’s Special Adviser, Alvaro de Soto, also had his team. Included in the Turkish Cypriot group were Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktas¸, the new coalition government partners. Invariably the Turkish Cypriot team included the Secretary (Müstes¸ar) to the presidency, Ergün Olgun. De Soto headed the UN team.40 At the end of the talks Denktas¸ announced that he would not be going to the final session to be held in Bürgenstock. He said that he had done enough for Turkey’s sake and he did not want his presence in Bürgenstock to give Turkish Cypriots the impression that he approved the Plan. Ergün Olgun, went along, but only in order to make efforts hopefully to improve matters, and was successful in some important respects. The twelve meetings resulted in no agreement, but the crucial topics of dissent were explored, often in considerable depth to judge from a verbatim account of the talks published later in the North in book form by President Denktas¸.41 Also after every meeting Denktas¸ gave a verbal account

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 245

to journalists of the day’s negotiations. This was not liked at all by Ankara, but Denktas¸ asserted his right to let the people know what the Annan Plan was about, since they would have to vote on it. There was much leakage, and weekly official accounts, of the proceedings on the Greek Cypriot side. Towards the end of the negotiations the two sides agreed to proximity meetings to replace the face-to-face negotiations that took place for the most part. It did not help produce a result that the two presidents just did not want the Annan Plan.42 Whilst the talks were in progress opinion polls showed that the Greek Cypriot public would not vote for the Plan in the planned referendum, whilst over half of the Turkish Cypriots indicated they would vote positively despite Denktas¸’s warnings about the likely consequences. Denktas¸ had to be as restrained as he could manage: Ankara was watching him closely. It was a strange series of discussions. It served to be seen as giving the two sides a very last chance to agree before agreement was forced upon them. Denktas¸ had his hands tied. Papadopoulos knew the Annan Plan could, and most probably would, be rejected in the proposed referendum, and as a member of the EU could wait for the better opportunities that membership would produce for obtaining Greek Cypriot ends. The whole exercise has been described as ‘a pure charade’.43 This was confirmed when, according to Denktas¸, he was asked by Papadopoulos towards the end of the negotiations if he could have a few private words, and said to him: This process is not working and will not work. You have saved yourself by not going to Switzerland. I have not done anything, nor can I. But we are faced with great difficulties. Let us not find a solution in Switzerland. When we return let us continue to talk. Our colleagues have been discussing the problem together. Let us continue the process.44 Denktas¸ said he would respond after talking with his colleagues, but nothing more emerged. Save on subjects like that of the flag for the new state and provisional plans for accommodation of the various office of state, nothing of any substance was achieved in the Nicosia talks. The technical committees did however work hard, and successfully, on legal texts and other practical matters. They produced 131 laws and other agreements in a number of fields running to 9,000 pages. It was a considerable joint effort supported by some fifty UN experts. The Turkish Cypriot side brought up a large number of points. Chief of these was a longer transition period in order to allow the Turkish Cypriot economy to reach the level of that of the South. They also strongly resisted a Greek Cypriot demand that the Turkish Cypriot territory to be surrendered should be placed immediately under the control of the UN, and

246 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

not kept under Turkish Cypriot control for three years. The Greek Cypriots were afraid that in the end the Turkish Cypriots would not leave the territory. Denktas¸ expressed concern about the violence that might well occur when the tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots to be rehabilitated had to hand over their homes to Greek Cypriots. And where were they to be rehabilitated? No funds had as yet been procured to help bring about this massive operation. Deprived of their land what sort of work would they have? The old issue of bi-zonality also raised its head again. The Turkish Cypriot side maintained that there would be a boundary between the two constituent states. This was not how the Greek Cypriots saw it. We are not here, said Papadopoulos, to talk state to state. In this regard, the Turkish Cypriot side also wanted members of the Senate who were to be elected in the Turkish Cypriot state to be native Turkish speakers, since there could be many Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state able both to vote and stand as candidates for the Turkish Cypriot part of the Senate. This was strongly contested by the Greek Cypriot side: they wanted to minimize communal separateness. The Turkish Cypriots wanted the restrictions on Greek property ownership and residence written into EU primary law to prevent appeals against the Plan’s provisions to the European Court of Justice on the grounds that EU principles were being contravened. This later proved impossible, though the Turkish Cypriot side claimed that it had earlier been intimated that this requirement would be met. Derogations of the sort needed to protect the Turkish Cypriots were intended essentially for one state in exceptional circumstances to defer, or annul, the application of the body of EU law (the acquis) in its relations with one or more states. To obtain derogations for Cyprus was virtually impossible. The internal arrangements of Cyprus, as a member of the EU, did not much concern the EU as long as they did not conflict with individual rights or freedoms.45 The issue was to arise later in Bürgenstock. Many of the matters raised by the Turkish Cypriot side were claimed by the Greek Cypriot side to be outside the parameters of the Plan, a view the UN Secretary-General supported to an extent in his Report, though not to the extent indicated by Claire Palley: As to the substance of these [Turkish Cypriot] proposals, the Turkish side sought recognition of the ‘TRNC’ in devious ways, demanded massive EU derogations and transitional arrangements, insisted on the right of all settlers to remain, and sought to diminish the scope of any UN peace-keeping forces’ mandate.46 The author of this passage avers that, ‘Apart from suggestions in a couple of paragraphs, the changes to the Plan demanded by the Turkish Cypriot side

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were demonstrated by the Greek Cypriot side to be well beyond the Plan’s parameters’.47 De Soto was criticized for not ruling the Turkish Cypriot proposals out of order, he reportedly replying that he had no responsibility to judge the parties’ proposals. In his account of the February–March negotiations the UN Secretary-General did confirm the Greek Cypriot view, stating that the Turkish Cypriot side’s concise package of demands of 24 February did propose far-reaching changes, a number of which would have substantially altered key parameters of the Plan. ‘My Special Adviser explained this to the Turkish Cypriot side and to Turkey, and informed the Greek Cypriot side that he had done so … and left aside Turkish Cypriot demands which were clearly outside the parameters of the plan.’48 According to the Secretary-General, the Greek Cypriot side asserted that its own proposed changes were within the Plan, and did not therefore affect Turkish Cypriot rights. They did not see the need to engage in a process of give and take with regard to Turkish Cypriot demands because in their view they were outside the parameters of the Plan. Moreover, the Greek Cypriots pointed out that the Turkish Cypriots had failed to produce territorial proposals, a failure which left them in the dark. The Greek Cypriot side did not accept that what they regarded as uncontentious proposals were contentious for the other side. So the Greek Cypriots believed that few, if any of its amendments should require trade-offs. ‘By contrast, the Turkish Cypriot side was generally prepared to engage on Greek Cypriot proposals and to discuss matters on a realistic basis and sought to make counteroffers and compromise proposals.’49 The Secretary-General concluded, ‘While the discussions in February and March were less fruitful than they might have been, at least, by mid-March, the vast bulk of the material was on the table.’50

Bürgenstock In the absence of agreement the scene now shifted to the Swiss resort of Bürgenstock, where the Swiss Government had generously provided facilities for the occasion. Having decided not to attend, President Denktas¸ appointed Talat and Serdar Denktas¸ in his stead. The intention in February in New York was that, in the absence of prior agreement, there would be a meeting of the two Cypriot sides together with Turkey and Greece. A formal meeting of this ‘quartet’ as it came to be known proved, however, to be impossible. This was because Papadopoulos would not have official connections with officials of unrecognized Northern Cyprus. He could sit down with President Denktas¸ because they were both leaders of their communities, which neither Talat nor Serdar Denktas¸ could, in his view, rightly claim to be despite being authorized by Denktas¸ senior. ‘They might have the authority to talk’, said Papadopoulos, ‘but not to make decisions.’51 Greece adopted the same attitude. According to

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de Soto, who headed the UN team, the February Agreement did not necessarily require a meeting of the quartet, so de Soto tried to bring the sides together informally at social occasions, and those representing the two sides did casually meet and converse. Each side was also in constant discussion with members of the UN team, and with visiting officials like the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Verheugen and Thomas Weston. The British High Commissioner in Nicosia was also present. It was a hothouse atmosphere in a hotel into which no journalists were allowed. They mostly stayed in a hotel some distance away, and without telephone connection to the scene of the action. There was some time for what were in effect proximity negotiations to be pursued in order to help the UN team assemble more information, and further test opinion and feeling, before the arrival late in the day of the Greek and Turkish prime ministers and foreign ministers, and lastly, the UN Secretary-General himself, Kofi Annan. In informal discussion with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül and others Papadopoulos reportedly said that while the Turkish Cypriots wanted two states, he took his stand on the fact that there was one state, and while this difference of view continued it would not be possible to achieve a compromise. To this Gül responded that it was one federal state made up of two states. Papadopoulos replied that it was clear that the Turkish side’s conception rested on two states from its demand for two central banks. He continued that behind all the demands for equality there were other objectives. That was why the Greek Cypriot side, by bringing some of its anxieties on to the agenda, hoped it could remove them.52 After much effort devoted to sounding out the parties’ views on a number of problematic issues, de Soto made a number of bridging proposals for comment. To these both the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish delegations made comments, offering agreement on certain points. However, the Greek Cypriot side was dissatisfied with these bridging proposals, which converted Annan III into Annan IV. To judge from the Secretary-General’s Report, de Soto had not been pleased with the way the Greek Cypriot side had proceeded by not having provided a comprehensive set of textual amendments until midway through the Bürgenstock negotiations, and by not prioritizing their demands. They had, in fact, produced a full paper on their demands on 24 February in Nicosia, but this appears not to have been shortened into more manageable form until 30 March.53 The Greek Cypriot side objected inter alia to disguised permanent derogations on the rights to property and residence, any assumption that the Treaty of Guarantee empowered military intervention, election to, and representation in, the Senate on a communal (ethnic) basis, reductions on the caps placed on Greek Cypriot residence in the Turkish Cypriot state, voting by ‘settlers’ in the referenda to be held, the numbers of ‘settlers’ to remain and acquire Cypriot citizenship (which should be reduced from 45,000 to 30,000), the limits placed on restricting residence of the citizens of one state in the

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 249

other, and the lack of hierarchy, necessary in certain circumstances, between federal and constituent state legal rules. The Greek Cypriot side also wanted the Greek and Turkish military contingents on the island each not to exceed 2,500 in number after 29 months, with all troops out by 1 June 2015, or earlier if Turkey joined the European Union. There were other detailed criticisms of financial and other aspects of the proposed property regime and related matters. The proposed arrangements regarding the federal executive were also unsatisfactory. The Greek Cypriot side claimed that they obtained less than they asked for, by comparison with the Turkish Cypriots. ˘an and KaraThe promised quartet did meet, if unofficially, when Erdog manlis arrived, if late, in Bürgenstock. However, issues were still unresolved. Subsequently, the UN Secretary-General completed the document and presented it to both sides as the document to be submitted to referenda. He maintained that improvements were made in respect of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot views, but the Greek Cypriot side believed the Turkish Cypriots had been favoured.54 The Secretary-General roundly rejected this view. He went on to say in his Report, ‘It might have been possible to accommodate other Greek Cypriot concerns had the Greek Cypriot side been more willing to engage in give and take at Bürgenstock and before, and to prioritize its objectives.’55 Against this it has been argued as follows: To have given priorities would have opened Pandora’s box. It would necessarily have implied that if some Greek Cypriot priorities, or even parts thereof, were inserted in the final text by the Secretary-General, there would have been an agreement by the Greek Cypriot side to his ‘balancing’ such insertions with other insertions satisfying Turkish demands – whereas these demands were nearly all beyond the Plan’s parameters.56 It is also claimed that the issues the Secretary-General was choosing to balance ‘were unrelated, and he had failed to concentrate on substance or to have regard to the principles of the UN Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law’.57 ‘Turkey’s requests were all ulti˘an … that mately to be met, with the Secretary-General telling Mr Erdog 9 of his 11 requirements had been completely agreed by the UN team, and that the other two were virtually met.’58 Two important problems certainly arise. First, what were the parameters of the Plan and who could decide whether they had been ignored? It seems that the UN Secretary-General decided, but in that case it was then a UN Plan imposed on the two sides. As to the criteria for determining parameters none were laid down in any specific way. It seemed to be generally agreed that the TRNC could in no way be seen to be recognized: confederation could not be accepted, but there was to be political equality. The application of this last principle could, nevertheless, vary. In the 1992 Set of Ideas the clear veto powers

250 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

accorded to the Turkish Cypriots in legislation in certain areas were not outside the parameters, but in 2004 veto rights of this sort were said by the Secretary-General to be so. In 1992 a rotating presidency was outside the parameters, but this was what was in effect proposed in 2004. The second problem was the UN Secretary-General’s insistence on trade-offs. This was an emphasis on bargaining, which it was very difficult to achieve since deeply felt matters of principle were at stake. ‘Improvements’ in the plan over Annan III To take, first, the restitution of property to displaced persons, under Annan V most Greek Cypriots, by the removal of ceilings on property reinstatement, would have had some property reinstated in the Turkish Cypriot state.59 This would usually have been their former homes and a third of the land ‘though more (often all) for small landowners, and all returnees to four Karpas villages and the Maronite village of Kormakiti’.60 There were still certain restraints, however. For instance, current users who had greatly improved property could apply for ownership on condition they paid the present value of the property, in its original state. Another change was that there were now to be restrictions on rights to purchase property for 15 years as long as the gross national product of the Turkish Cypriot state did not reach 85 per cent of that of the Greek Cypriot state. The Turkish Cypriots did not regard this as reassuring; the Greek Cypriots thought it would take all of 15 years for the North’s economy to catch up. On the question of the appeals for restitution of property made to the European Court of Human Rights the Plan provided for the United Cyprus Republic to request the Court to strike out all proceedings before it, since the Plan provided the remedies sought. In the new Plan there were new rulings on residence in the other constituent state. Under Annan III the percentage of the population of villages and municipalities rose by stages to constitute 21 per cent of the population; this was an important issue for the Turkish Cypriot state. Before this came into operation there was to be a moratorium of six years. Under Annan V this was reduced to five years, with smaller per cent stages of growth of the Greek Cypriot population in order to reach the lesser maximum of only 18 per cent. However, whereas under Annan III the maximum was maintained until Turkey joined the EU, the new maximum, though lower, existed until Turkey joined the EU, or for 19 years, whichever was the earlier, not for ever as in Annan III if Turkey did not become a member state of the European Union.61 Moreover there was no restriction, after the second year following the settlement, on the return of former inhabitants over the age of 65 accompanied by a spouse or one sibling, or to former inhabitants of specified villages, presumably those in the Karpas and Kormakiti. The restriction on secondary residences was also removed. According to the UN Secretary-General in his Report of 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437) the overall

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 251

amount of property eligible for reinstatement would be roughly doubled as compared with the 2003 version of the UN Plan. Other alleged new gains for the Greek Cypriots related to the Presidential Council, the Central Bank, a Court of Primary Federal Jurisdiction, assurance that the Plan would in fact be implemented, reduction of troop levels, with the object ultimately of demilitarization, and limitation on the flow of Turkish immigrants to the North. Whilst the 1960 treaties were reaffirmed, at the instance of the Greek Cypriots Annan V underlined commitment to international law and the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The Turkish Cypriot side was greatly worried, that the revised property and residence rules could be overthrown by appeal to the European Court of Justice. However, since ‘derogations’ could not apply, as earlier explained, there was a compromise in the form of a Law of Adaptation that, after the referenda, if successful, would be submitted for approval to the European Council. This stated that the EU could accept the restrictions on freedom of ownership and residence contained in the Annan Plan. For the EU this was not an extraordinary accommodation. ‘The main content of any Accession Treaty are the transition periods granted to a new member state. A transition period allows a temporary non-compliance with the acquis on special grounds.’62 After the period of grace granted in this instance normal EU rules would apply. Of particular significance for Cyprus was that in the EU Treaty, in addition to the principles of liberty and democracy, there is respect for human rights and freedoms. These have come to include freedom of internal movement and residence and protection of property rights. The Act of Adaptation would have provided for unusually long, but still temporary, concessions. A change of importance for the Turkish Cypriots was that the Senators elected in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state would have to be Turkish Cypriot, not just citizens of the Turkish Cypriot state, as many Greek Cypriots might be. For the Greek Cypriots there was a valuable change affecting the levels of Turkish troops on the island. Under Annan V they were in stages to be reduced to 650 (950 Greek troops being allowed), but subject to three yearly reviews with the objective of total withdrawal. Under Annan V there was no change affecting the Treaty of Guarantee, a treaty much criticized by the Greek Cypriots, especially as it did not specifically prohibit military intervention. There was no change in the number of Turkish immigrants who could be admitted to Cypriot citizenship (48,000). The Greek Cypriot wanted fewer, the Turkish Cypriots more. On constitutional matters, the executive Presidential Council was enlarged to nine members, with the possibility of further expansion. The presidency and vice-presidency rotated every 20 months, this being inspired by Swiss practice. Whether this new modified presidential system would have worked it is not easy to say. It might have helped to create unity at the top. Assuming the continuation of mutual distrust, however, there could be a real danger

252 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

for the Turkish Cypriots that they had only a modest veto power, and that too only in the Senate, over the establishment of the presidential executive and over federal legislation.63 The referenda After Bürgenstock there was less than a month before the new Plan, and the 9,000 page legal documents, were to be put to simultaneous referenda on 24 April 2004. President Denktas¸ and the National Unity Party under Dervis¸ Erog˘lu opposed it. Talat’s Republican Turkish Party supported it, while Serdar Denktas¸ left his Democratic Party supporters without much guidance, there being some division in the party on the issue. There was much reassurance from Turkey that a positive vote, against the expected rejection in the South, would lead to recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Polls in the North suggested a small majority in favour of the Plan, but in the South there were, indeed, alarming indications for the UN and the EU that the Plan was not popular. There was considerable doubt about the crucial position of AKEL In Bürgenstock Christofias had reportedly told Talat that, although there was a difficult situation, AKEL would vote for the Plan.64 On 7 April President Papadopoulos made an emotional televised appeal to the populace not to support the Plan. He declared that with the Plan the Turkish Cypriot objective of two peoples and two states would be achieved. He called on the people to defend the Republic of Cyprus. His fear and distrust of Turkey were amply stressed. After much heart searching the largest party, AKEL, supported Papadopoulos. The referenda ballot paper did not ask one question but four, to answer, which would have required hours of patient reading and study. The ballot paper also mentioned the European Union as the intended end result, as follows: Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united? It was, of course the case that possessing ‘an inherent constitutive power’, as admitted in the Preamble to the Foundation Agreement, the Turkish Cypriots were freely voting for participation in a new state that would be a member of the European Union, though in the Plan they were said to be voting for a ‘state of affairs’ not a state.65 They were thereby using their right of self-determination. Yet would the Turkish Cypriots have voted for union with the Greek Cypriots if they had a satisfactory standard of living, or had the opportunity to apply for EU membership for their own state? It

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004 253

is therefore arguable that they were in fact voting under some duress: they badly wanted to be free from the economic and social restraints they had been obliged to suffer. On a high turn-out on both sides, 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots approved the Plan whilst 76 per cent of the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Post-referenda reactions After the referenda Günther Verheugen said, ‘I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot Government’.66 The UN Secretary-General described the South’s rejection as a major setback. He believed that what had been rejected was ‘the solution itself, rather than a mere blueprint’. Yet he also believed that after a period of reflection there might emerge a way to re-float the Plan. He called upon the Security Council, in the meantime, to give a lead to all states to help eliminate the unnecessary restrictions and embargoes on the North. Also, despite Greek Cypriot protests, Talat was invited to meet the British Foreign Secretary. He was not received as ‘prime minister’ but it denoted a significant change in attitude. Revealing some anxiety perhaps, the UN Secretary-General also warned that recognition, or assisting secession, of the Turkish Cypriots would be clearly contrary to the Resolutions of the UN Security Council. Nor, he went on to assert, would this represent the will of the Turkish Cypriots! He believed that ‘in opting for a settlement the Turkish Cypriots have broken with the decades old policies of seeking recognition of the “state” they purported to create in 1983’. This implied that the Turkish Cypriots, in establishing their state, did not have the right of self-determination, but were they not exercising just that right in the referendum? Conclusions Papadopoulos is said not to have grasped that a settlement had to be political in nature and would involve gains and losses, the approach adopted by Clerides. ‘His [Papadopoulos’] basic belief in a federal model appeared to be open to question.’67 It is extremely doubtful it ever existed. Also the government made no attempt to educate the people about the Annan Plan on, for instance, the inevitability of only the partial return of refugees, and the gradual, not immediate, withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. Nor did the media help. In fact the press and television stations solidly opposed the Plan. As for the voters, they apparently believed that the Turkish Cypriots would have more influence in the federal structure than their numbers warranted. Also whilst some just did not want to live with alongside Turkish Cypriots, many clearly felt that they would be insecure in a federation. They feared for their safety if the Turkish troops remained. Also they did not trust the Turkish side to implement the agreement fully. They might well find reasons for not evacuating territory, for instance, on the grounds,

254 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

say, that alternative accommodation for displaced Turkish Cypriots was not ready. There was also the alleged cost to them that a federation was said to entail. Many Greek Cypriots were also undeniably affected by the fact that AKEL, allegedly the most understanding of the Turkish Cypriots, came out strongly against the Plan. As a result, too, of heavy outside pressure, the whole atmosphere was ‘introverted and xenophobic’.68 To this could be added a feeling of distinct unease that the Turkish Cypriot government and Turkey strongly favoured the Plan. So it must be advantageous to them. Why not reject the Plan and hope and expect that in the advantageous position of EU membership Cyprus would be able to get a better deal, especially as Turkey so badly wanted to join the European Union? This was almost certainly a consideration in government circles. Was it an opportunity squandered? It is arguable that if Clerides had been able to stay in power, he would have persuaded the electorate to vote for the Plan. Perhaps he believed, like the nationalist opposition in the North, that in the long run the Annan Plan would have worked in favour of the Greek Cypriots. He had always been a shrewd and determined defender of Greek Cypriot interests, whilst able to recognize that by giving a little one may obtain a lot more in return.

11 After the Referenda

The intrusion of the EU into the Cyprus problem, beginning essentially in 1995, was a very successful result of Greek/Greek Cypriot diplomacy. The EU catalyst, carrot and stick, obliged Turkey to reduce the role of the military in Turkish politics and overcame its opposition to a change of leadership in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This was made easier by the prospect of future prosperity for the Turkish Cypriots within the European Union. A solution was in sight but the Greek Cypriot leadership was determined to have control in Cyprus and to use their new EU mem˘lu were reined in, but Papadopoulos bership to obtain it. Denktas¸ and Erog was able to break loose. The diplomats seem to have misjudged the temper of the Greek Cypriots that lay behind the apparent reasonableness of Clerides. As Rauf Denktas¸ once remarked, Papadopoulos was his best friend. Safely ensconced now in the EU, and not without friends there, there was little that could be done about him by those states, principally the United States and the United Kingdom, who were anxious to clear the road for Turkey’s progress towards accession to the European Union. The first task, however, was the need to do something to improve the lot of the Turkish Cypriots, still in their state of near economic, political and social isolation. Obviously very important was to have the embargoes lifted, including freeing for international use the Turkish Cypriot airport, Ercan, vital for the development of tourism, which, as in the South, had to be a major creator of wealth. The United Kingdom took the lead. In July 2004 the European Commission announced a combined package of aid and direct trade measures for the TRNC that would be put before the European Council. The Republic of Cyprus soon pointed out, however, that since this contravened the ruling to suspend the application of the acquis in the North it would require a unanimous decision, to which they would not subscribe. The financial aid had therefore to be considered separately; the attempt to add free trade to it was frustrated. On the international use of the Turkish Cypriots airport that too could not be achieved. Under the Chicago Convention the agreement of the Republic of Cyprus would be required, and that was not forthcoming. 255

256 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

On the issue of financial aid the Greek Cypriot Government tried to attach conditions to it, namely the joint use to Famagusta and the cession of Varosha. Delay resulted in a reduction of the aid offered, but the full amount of €259 million was eventually restored. The EU sidestepped the Greek Cypriot demand to administer the grant by placing its administration under the directorate that dealt with countries negotiating accession, thus excluding the Republic of Cyprus. The EU later established an office in the North. In this and other ways the intrusion of the EU did improve the prosperity of the Turkish Cypriots. There was also some increase in tourism in the North since it was now possible for EU citizens to cross the border without restraint. So some tourists flying to Larnaca crossed the border to holidaying in the North, though the physical effects of the economic development the EU was promoting there was making it less of a tourist haven. Another boost to the Turkish Cypriot economy was the increased flow of Turkish Cypriot workers to the South for higher wages.

The property problem A major motor of the Turkish Cypriot economy after 2004 was the boom in property building and development. This occurred chiefly because the Annan Plan limited the right of Greek Cypriot owners to reoccupy properties abandoned in 1974 if they had been substantially developed. The occupiers could claim title provided they paid for the value of the land and property in its original state. This encouraged not only Turkish Cypriots to develop former Greek Cypriot land and property, but also foreigners, including large numbers of Britons looking for a place, temporary or permanent, in the sun. The demand from abroad encouraged developers, local and British, to build states of tightly packed houses and apartment blocks, often at the expense of the environment, with the result that the Turkish Cypriot paradise began to look like paradise lost. Not many took note that in 1998 the European Court of Human Rights required Turkey to compensate Mrs Titina Loizidou for her loss of property and ordered that she should be allowed to return to it. Other purchasers of property did not take heed of the warnings made by the British Foreign and Commonwealth office. One British couple, Mr and Mrs Orams, ill-advisedly responded to a summons to appear before a Greek Cypriot court in Nicosia which in 2006 ordered them to demolish the property they had built on land owned by Meletios Apostolides. They were also required to pay rent, and to meet his legal expenses. This could simply have been ignored but for the fact that the Republic of Cyprus was now a member of the European Union. Under a EU ruling the case could be referred to an English court, which could seize their assets in England. The English court decided that the Cyprus judgement was enforceable, and did not deny

After the Referenda 257

Mr Apostolides’ legal entitlement to the property, but an appeal by the Orams was allowed and upheld on the grounds that under Protocol 10 of the EU/Cyprus Accession Treaty the corpus of EU law (the acquis) was suspended in the North. This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which then asked the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. In December 2008 Advocate-General Juliane Kokott published an Opinion in favour of Mr Apostolides. The European Court of Justice subsequently decided in his favour. The outcome for the Orams now depends on the English Court. There are technical issues about the trial in Nicosia that may be open to question by the English court. More fundamentally, however, the judgment could be disallowed as ‘manifestly contrary to British policy in the UK’ that being interpreted, however, in a more general sense than it was in Luxembourg. There is also the issue whether the Orams could be considered as having had a fair trial in Nicosia, a matter on which the European Court of Justice did not criticize the court in Nicosia. There is also the case that the human rights of the Orams have been infringed in certain ways. They have appealed on these grounds to the European Court of Human Rights.1 The judgement of the European Court of Justice does not of course just affect citizens of EU states. Very important for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, should there be a federal solution the Nicosia court’s judgement would probably apply to the many Turkish Cypriots who occupy property claimed to be Greek Cypriot. The Turkish Cypriots have claimed that the judgement of the European Court was biased because the President of the Court was Greek, and had visited the Greek Cypriot side of the island not long before the judgment. Also one other judge was a Greek Cypriot. Before the events leading up to the judgement of the European Court many Greek Cypriots had applied for the return of their properties through the European Court of Human Rights, the route followed by Mrs Loizidou, whose judgement in her favour was eventually accepted by Turkey, which was regarded by the Court to be the proper respondent on the grounds that it was occupying North Cyprus. The immediate impetus arose, however, from the later case of Arestis v. Turkey, which related closely with some 1,400 other cases before the Court, which now looked to Turkey to provide effective redress, and advised Turkey to establish in North Cyprus a property commission with authority to provide compensation to owners of property in the North before 1974. The Commission’s remit did not cover restitution of property, and excluded property for which Turkish Cypriot title deeds had been issued. The Court also developed a formula to cover exchange of properties. Some hundreds of Greek Cypriots are reported to have applied successfully to the Commission, but they have been subjected to much criticism in the South for doing so.

258 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Political developments in the North In the TRNC in late April 2004 the coalition government of the Republican Turkish party under Talat and the Democratic Party led by Serdar Denktas¸ began to fall apart. Two Democratic Party members resigned, as did the representative of the Turkish Immigrants Association, Nuri Çevikel, who was not content that Talat was persisting in not seeking recognition for the TRNC, which many Turkish Cypriots felt was more than ever due to them after the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan. Talat decided to resign rather than try to rule with a minority government. The National Unity Party and the Democratic Party could then have formed a coalition, but the Democratic Party was cautious, alive to the swell of support for Talat and EU membership and unwilling to be associated with the NUP, which had condemned the Annan Plan. In consequence there was no alternative to new parliamentary elections, which took place on 20 February 2005. Talat’s party increased its share of the vote (from 35.2 to 44.5 per cent, but at the expense of the small Peace and Democracy Movement led by Mehmet Akıncı and other more minor parties. The vote for the National Unity Party and for the Democratic Party remained stable at 31.7 and 13.5 per cent respectively, by comparison with 2003. With only 24 seats in the National Assembly Talat was obliged to form another, now much more stable, coalition with Serdar Denktas¸. Two months later Talat became a candidate for, and won the election for a new president, obtaining 55.6 per cent of the vote. After having been successful in every presidential election since 1975 Rauf Denktas¸ stood down, a truly historic event ending a truly remarkable political career. The government was now led by Ferdi Sabıt Soyer, who had a difficult task in a country whose citizens had been left in some confusion after the failed 2004 referendum. The new property boom tested government resources to cope with its consequences. Inflation was disturbingly high and new developments made possible by EU funding called for a high-level of administrative competence. There was much criticism of the quality of the administration and concern at the growing number of public servants on the payroll. Within the government Serdar Denktas¸ was increasingly letting it be known that he really wanted a two state solution of the Cyprus problem. The Republican Turkish Party decided to break up the coalition. An opportunity surprisingly presented itself when in September 2006 two deputies and one member of the National Unity Party resigned from their party and with one deputy from the Democratic Party formed a new Freedom and Reform Party (Özgurlük ve Reform Partisi). The chief personality was Turgay Avcı, formerly General-Secretary of the National Unity Party, now led by the rather inexperienced and liberal Hüseyin Özgürgün, and seeking to modernize itself after the retirement of its leader, Dervis¸ ˘lu. Avcı became Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Erog

After the Referenda 259

It was an odd development and widely criticized for being undemocratic. Surely, it was protested, a new election should have been held. It was widely rumoured, and probably believed, that Ankara had been behind the move, anxious to keep the Republican Turkish Party in power. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, denied that there had been any Turkish intervention. When asked if there had been President Talat replied that he did not know. Offended by the move the National Unity Party and the Democratic Party decided to boycott parliament, the NUP soon to be under ˘rulog˘lu. By now it was becoming a new leader the hard-line Tahsin Ertug clear that the government’s policy of seeking agreement with the Greek Cypriots was becoming unpopular. An opinion poll in January 2007 revealed that some 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots would prefer a separate independent state to a federation with the Greek Cypriots. Earlier, in April 2006, a poll showed that only 45 per cent of Greek Cypriots really wanted to live alongside Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless Turkey still seemed inclined to believe, as clearly did the United States and the United Kingdom, that a federal solution was the end to be sought. As this was the policy desired by the Turkish Cypriot Government, its leader was heartened when in July ˘an’s Justice and Development Party won a resounding victory in 2007 Erdog the Turkish parliamentary elections.

Negotiations Turkey was anxious that negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus should be restarted and show some positive result. Talat was eager to begin, but he could obtain no response from Papadopoulos, who said he was prepared to meet Talat only at the conference table and under UN auspices when there seemed some prospect of a solution. Talat believed in an Annan type of solution, but Papadopoulos clearly did not. It was not apparent what Papadopoulos wanted as a solution, but in May 2005 a Greek Cypriot envoy, Tassos Tzionis, visited Kofi Annan to explain the lines along which the Greek Cypriots were thinking. Not surprisingly these somehow appeared in the press. It seems that Papadopoulos wanted the abolition of the rights of intervention by the Guarantor Powers of the 1960 treaties, the removal of all troops, a limit on the numbers of Turkish immigrants allowed to remain, the return of more Greek Cypriots than previously envisaged to their properties in the North than allowed under the Annan Plan, a strong federal government with no Turkish Cypriot powers of veto.2 These issues were more generally mentioned in an informative Report by Sir Kieran Prendergast, formerly UN Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, on his mission to consult with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus on the possible future role of the UN Secretary-General in the Cyprus dispute. He concluded in the Report that ‘launching an intensive new process prematurely would be inadvisable’.3

260 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

However, the government party leaders from each side in Cyprus were meeting from time to time in informal talks, not always totally amicable, in which the possibility of proceeding on technical issues was discussed. Then in February 2006 Papadopoulos arranged to meet Kofi Annan, after which the Secretary-General, noting that both sides wanted to discuss technical matters then went on to say, ‘The Secretary-General and Mr Papadopoulos agreed it would be beneficial … if progress could be achieved on further disengagement of forces and demilitarization of the island … and on the issue of Famagusta.’4 In response the Turkish Cypriot Government made it clear that they had agreed to talks only on technical matters, certainly not on Famagusta or demilitarization. This reaction prompted the Greek Cypriot Government to conclude that ‘their attempt to get the Turkish side to sign up to the idea of new bi-communal talks made little progress as Ankara and its regime in Cyprus sowed confusion about their view of the status of the talks and what they should cover’.5 Nevertheless the UN began to see some possibility of progress and in May 2006 announced that a Special Representative for Cyprus would be appointed. This was Ibrahim Gambari, who duly managed to get the two leaders together for a meeting. They agreed to talk on issues that included, but went rather beyond technical matters. For Turkey the Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, welcomed the beginning of talks, but said that there should be no discussion of the withdrawal of Turkish troops, or of the cession of Varosha. In a speech to the UN General Assembly Papadopoulos said that ethnic diversity should not be at the expense of functionality and efficiency of state institutions. At a meeting on 8 July 2006 both sides accepted that the following five principles should govern discussions. 1. A commitment to the reunification of Cyprus as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation 2. Rejection of the status quo 3. Acceptance that a comprehensive settlement was desirable and possible, and should not be delayed 4. Agreement to discuss issues that affected day-to-day life, and concurrently those that concerned substantive matters, both of which were seen as contributing to a comprehensive settlement and 5. The development of confidence-building measures and the ending of the ‘blame game’ The talks that began in July 2006 achieved very little. In December 2007 the UN Secretary-General reported that ‘mutual recriminations continued to be exchanged throughout the reporting period, undermining trust between the two communities’.6

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Talat and moderates in the South were trying hard at this time to open a Ledra Street (Lokmacı Gate) crossing in the centre of Nicosia, which would greatly have increased movement cross Nicosia. However, there were those on the Greek Cypriot side who objected strongly that Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags would be immediately in view. They also wanted Turkish troops out of the Turkish side of Nicosia. President Talat was worried by remarks made by former Foreign Minister, George Iacovou, in an interview with a journalist. Iacovou believed in a solution unity and governance and economy was vital, not the confederation he saw behind the Annan Plan.7 Social unity he believed was already a fact since many Turkish Cypriots were enjoying social benefits provided by the Republic of Cyprus. Talat believed that this represented a deliberate policy of osmosis and recommended Turkish Cypriots to hand back their passports and take Turkish ones instead. It was generally felt that Papadopoulos had been intent to show that he was not against negotiations, particularly as he might need some of the moderate vote in the forthcoming presidential elections in the South. Talat wanted to push on quickly with negotiations, but this was not to the liking of Papadopoulos, so they were at odds and made no progress. Further negotiations had to await the election of a new president in the South in the elections due in 2008. In the meantime there seemed little that outside powers could do. In fact the United Kingdom became very unpopular with Papadopoulos on account of its support for Turkey’s Action Plan in early 2006 and for its attempt to have the embargoes lifted. In January the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, was treated with marked discourtesy on a visit to the South, being denied an interview with Papadopoulos, and was even told that he should not see Talat in the latter’s office in the North lest, presumably, it looked like recognition. There were also anti-British demonstrations in the South. On return, in the House of Commons, prompted by some supportive remarks by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, a former Foreign Secretary, Straw said: I take it from what he has said that he, and I believe, the House too, also regard it as a matter of regret that the Administration of President Papadopoulos have sought to distance themselves from the Turkish Cypriot community and to cease to have any contact with it. Moreover, because of their unhelpful approach towards the aid proposals for the north from the European Union, they are in my judgment seeking to marginalize the Turkish Cypriot community. In response to another question on whether it was a mistake to have let Cyprus into the EU, Mr Straw replied: The hon. Gentleman is exactly right to say that, as I suspect, the Government of Cyprus are now seeking to use their membership of

262 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

the EU to try unacceptably to seek progress on their United Nationsrelated issues. What I said to those whom I met from the Government of Cyprus was that if they go down that road, they will get exactly what they do not want, because they will make it impossible for Turkey to enter into full negotiations for membership of the European Union and then, over time, there will be a status quo in Cyprus which some countries may start to recognize in practice.8 Furious at these remarks the Greek Cypriot spokesman, George Lillikas, said that Cyprus would in future call for the active involvement of all five permanent members of the UN Security Council in any future negotiations. The British Government also fell foul of Papadopoulos when in October 2007 the United Kingdom and Turkey signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the aim of improving the lot of the Turkish Cypriots. It principally envisaged the promotion of direct commercial, economic, political and cultural contacts between the United Kingdom, the European Union and the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot Government was outraged by this agreement. Seen as a means of trying to de-link the ending of embargoes from the issue of political recognition it was not acceptable. A Taiwan solution would not be tolerated, though the UN SecretaryGeneral, Ban Ki-moon, later stated in his Report to the Security Council (3 December 2007) that ‘the maintenance of economic, social, cultural, sporting, or similar ties, does not amount to recognition’. For the Greek Cypriots the claim that there were embargoes was a myth. There was no objection to trade between the North and any other countries provided it went through the ports of the recognized Republic of Cyprus, not through ports in the ‘occupied areas’.

Elections in the South Unpopular though Papadopoulos was in some quarters abroad in May 2006 parliamentary elections in the South showed a fair amount still of support for him, though the promised ‘European solution’ forecast after the South’s admission to the EU was not in sight: they were still not united with the North on satisfactory terms. Democratic Rally (DISY) supporters were also openly regretting the rejection of the Annan Plan, and were hoping for success in the forthcoming presidential election in February 2008. Papadopoulos had become a shade less popular, and it was not at all certain that he would be re-elected when AKEL’s leader, Demetris Christofias, decided to stand against him, thus breaking the alliance that had brought about the rejection of the Annan Plan. There was now going to be a threeman election, the other candidate being the MEP, Ioannis Cassoulides, whom DISY could be expected to support. In the first round on 17 February Papadopoulos was eliminated, having come third by a small margin. In the

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second round a week later Christofias won 53.37 per cent of the vote thanks probably to the support of DIKO and EDEK, the parties behind Papadopoulos. The result was greatly welcomed by the United States and the United Kingdom. Optimists now saw a new window of opportunity, but would Christofias and Talat be able to open it? The signs were good: they both declared they wanted an early solution.

New negotiations Welcoming the new opportunity for negotiations Talat declared that he was prepared to renegotiate the Annan Plan. There could not have been a worse start as far as the South was concerned. It was quickly pointed out that the South was not going to return to the Annan Plan. Christofias had, after all, united with Papadopoulos in rejecting it. Talks began on 28 April 2008 with the intention first to discuss the major constitutional issues. It soon emerged that the Greek Cypriots wanted the negotiations to be self-generating, not a response to any UN proposals, as had been the case with the Annan Plan. The starting point was to be the July 2006 agreement. On 23 May the two leaders committed themselves in future talks to ‘a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality as defined in relevant UN Security Council resolutions’. This was dangerous for the Turkish Cypriots because, as understood by the Security Council, political equality did not mean that at the outset of negotiations the TRNC had equal status with the Republic of Cyprus. Before the meetings really got under way the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and President Christofias signed in London a Memorandum of Understanding ‘to develop a stronger relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus’. They committed themselves to working together to reunify the island, their aim being a settlement based on ‘a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and political equality as defined by the relevant UN resolutions, and the principles on which the EU is founded’, a significant addition. ‘The United Kingdom’, it was further declared, ‘will not support any moves towards the partition of the island, or the upgrading of any separate political entity on the island’. Also, ‘The United Kingdom commends the measures taken and proposed by the Republic of Cyprus for the benefit of the Turkish community.’ Since a twostate solution was beginning to be the popular demand in the North, the condemnation of any upgrading of ‘any separate political entity’ on the island was very unwelcome. More immediately important was the apparent approval the Turkish Cypriots saw in the Agreement of the Greek Cypriot policy of osmosis. President Talat denounced the Memorandum of Understanding as completely unacceptable. Some political commentators believed that it was primarily designed to strengthen the position of Christofias in

264 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

the South, where he was under pressure from DIKO and EDEK members of his government, but also revealed concern about the trend of political opinion in the North. A group of prominent Turkish Cypriots and some British expatriates sent a letter of protest to the British Government and to both Houses of Parliament. Since the negotiations had come about as a consequence of UN prompting in 2006 it was appropriate for the UN Chief of Mission in Cyprus, TayeBrook Zerihoun to keep close to the negotiations. On behalf of the two parties, after a meeting on 1 July 2008 he read out a joint statement, as follows: The two leaders discussed the issues of single sovereignty and citizenship. Agreement was reached ‘in principle’ that a settlement would be based on a unified state with single citizenship and single sovereignty, in which the Greek Cypriots had sought reassurance. At the meeting it was decided that the details of the implementation of single sovereignty and single citizenship would be discussed during the negotiations. ˘lu, immediately accused The leader of the National Unity Party, Ertug˘rulog Talat of weakness, reminding him that he was president of a state whose sovereignty was not to be surrendered. Others pointed out that it was meaningless to discuss federations in terms of sovereignty, which could only be applied to unitary states. Talat claimed that he had not conceded sovereignty. ‘It was an equal partnership in sovereignty.’ In order to assist in the negotiations, but not in any way to direct them the UN now appointed as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser in Cyprus the former Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer. It was not certain how Turkey was regarding the new negotiations, but later there was some indication of Turkish attitudes when the Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdog˘an, visited the North on 20 July, the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Turkish military intervention of 1974. In the course of a speech he stressed that any agreement emerging from the negotiations had to be based on two states equal in status. Also he later said that Güzelyurt (Morphou) could not now be returned to the Greek Cypriots despite its having been surrendered to them under the terms of the Annan Plan. The reference to two states seems to have inspired a statement made by Christofias two days later, in a televised interview as follows: 1. There would be a presidential system with a rotating presidency and vice-presidency, but the Greek Cypriot president would hold office for a longer period.

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2. The central state would have one sovereignty, one citizenship, one economy and one international personality. 3. The two communities [sic] would have political equality. In the Annan Plan, by contrast, the system, it will be recalled, was almost more parliamentarian than presidential, the communities had their states, and there was dual citizenship. Talks continued, but as no reports of any substance were issued on progress, it was not clear whether agreement was reached on constitutional matters before the two leaders turned to the difficult subjects of territory and property. The latter problem has now been rendered more difficult by the judgment of the European Court of Justice on the Orams case. What will be needed, as was the case with the Annan Plan, is a political solution of the property problem. In 2004 it was agreed that the Court of Human Rights would set aside cases brought to it by Greek Cypriots in favour of settlement by means of the arrangements to be agreed in the Annan Plan. Whether the judgment of the European Court of Justice could similarly be laid aside is a difficult question. Whilst the negotiations proceeded a number of other problems were creating ill-feeling between the two sides, including, of course, the maintenance of embargoes by the Greek Cypriots on the political, social, and economic intercourse of the TRNC with the outside world. One development of particular significance was the decision by the Greek Cypriots to search for oil and gas in areas to the south of the island that they regard as within their economic zone. Turkey has protested that the Turkish Cypriots have an equal right to these possible resources, and has even stopped foreign vessels from searching for oil and gas some 30 miles south of Cyprus. It has the makings of a major dispute. To add to difficulties, it was becoming clearer as the negotiations progressed that opinion in the North was turning quite pronouncedly against a federation. Polls showed that the Turkish Cypriots were largely very disappointed with the EU for its lack of success in lifting the embargoes, and were realizing that in the EU they would not easily, if at all, find means to stop the Greek Cypriots from reoccupying their former property and, indeed, from eventually dominating the island politically, socially, and economically. There was also growing dissatisfaction with the quality of government of the Republican Turkish Party. With parliamentary elections due in 2010 the National Unity Party was beginning to see itself once again in the seat of government. It was partly with this prospect in mind that a faction developed in the party that ˘lu, now in retirement, in favoured the return to leadership of Dervis¸ Erog place of Ertugrulog˘lu. He had fought well for the party, and had wisely abandoned the boycott of parliament maintained by his party and the Democratic Party, which maintained the boycott.

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˘lu was voted to power by the party on 30 November 2008, but surErog prisingly did not have much time to prepare for the election due in 2010 because the ruling party suddenly announced that there would be an early election on 19 April 2009. It was conjectured that the government, well aware that the Talat/Christofias negotiations might well fail, hoped to be re-elected before that came about, when its chances of success would be much less. In the election held in April 2009 the National Unity Party won 44.07 per cent of the vote against the 29.25 per cent of the Republican Turkish Party. Erog˘lu was able to form a government, having 26 seats without the cooperation of the Democratic Party, which won five seats. The result could, of course, create a rift between President Talat and Erog˘lu, who was essentially in favour of a two-state solution. It was not, therefore, surprising that ˘lu that Turkey the Turkish Prime Minister, saw fit to make it clear to Erog wanted the current negotiations to be an aid to a solution, not an obstacle. Erog˘lu duly declared he supported Talat, but wanted to be represented in the negotiations. For his part Talat, who had been distancing himself from the Republican Turkish Party, announced that if the negotiations failed, he would not stand again for the presidency in 2010.

Cyprus and Turkey The outcome of the negotiations on the island is, of course, of very great importance to Turkey, still eager to join the European Union. The major concern after the failure of the Annan Plan was whether Cyprus would use its veto to block Turkey’s route to Europe. Whatever the Republic of Cyprus decided to do, eventually, in the absence of an agreed solution, Turkey would eventually have to recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over all the island. However, in the immediate future it was necessary for Turkey, under its Customs Agreement with the EU to open up its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots. In July 2005 Turkey duly signed an additional protocol, (the Ankara Protocol) extending its customs union agreement to the ten new EU members, but stated in a separate Declaration that this did not amount to recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. The Declaration said that ‘the signing, ratification and implementation of the protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus … nor prejudice Turkey’s rights and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960’. Moreover, it continued, ‘the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the protocol is not the original partnership state established in 1960’. So even if the protocol was ratified and implemented, Turkey would still not consider it as recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Against this the EU adopted a counter-declaration, which stated that Turkey’s declaration was unilateral, formed no part of the Protocol, and had no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol.

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Could the Customs Union nevertheless be applied to the republic of Cyprus? Ankara decided that it could not do this, and on January 2006 announced an Action Plan. It provided for opening up Turkey to Greek Cypriot ships and planes, and to commerce generally, but only if the Turkish Cypriot ports were freed for trade with the EU, and international airlines were allowed to use the Turkish Cypriot airport. The Greek Cypriot government rejected the proposal, describing it as ‘reheated food’. They would see it as a step towards recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Recognizing the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus over all Cyprus, in 2006 the European Union decided not to consider opening new chapters in Turkey’s EU accession process until Turkey applied the Ankara Protocol. Of the 35 chapters eight are currently blocked on this account. Unwilling to have Turkey in the European Union, France has blocked a further five chapters. The European Council decided to review the position in December 2009, which it did. Against hopes, if not expectations, little changed. It was noted ‘with deep regret’ that Turkey had not fulfilled its obligations, and Ankara was pointedly reminded that its commitment and contribution to a solution of the problem were critical. Turkey was allowed to open just one new chapter in its accession process, that of the environment. It was a severe reprimand, but it did not alter the situation. For its part the Republic of Cyprus insisted on reserving its right to close more chapters if Turkey still refused to comply with the terms of the Customs Union. On whether they scored a victory, or suffered a defeat in the European Council, the Greek Cypriots were divided in their opinions. The Council was clearly waiting to see if there would be a successful outcome to the present negotiations. Turkey would greatly welcome, and is helping to promote, a federal settlement of the Cyprus problem but Talat’s presidency ends in April 2010, and a candidate supported by the opposition nationalist government party, the National Unity Party, may well be elected. And that party wants a two-state solution. Even if Turkey could exert greater influence to bring about a federal solution before April, it would be no guarantee of further progress towards EU membership since France, Austria, and Germany even, do not want that to happen. So the uncomfortable status quo looks set to continue, unless new ways of solving the Cyprus problem are devised.

12 Conclusion

The Cyprus problem began to reveal itself in its essential features in the nineteenth century with the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece. To go further back in history this was a product of Greek nationalist rebellion against the Ottoman Empire had expressed itself first in the Greek War of Liberation which, with European help, secured them independence from the Ottoman Empire. Nationalism was later to be reinforced with the Megali Idea, the movement to reunite all Greeks in the Near East and which envisaged Constantinople as its capital, to be rescued from the control of the Ottoman Turks who had destroyed the Byzantine Empire. In Cyprus the Greek Cypriots could hardly help but be sympathetic to this new national movement especially as it seemed possible to achieve it with the Ottoman Empire clearly in rapid decline. Union with Greece, enosis, began to be seen as distinctly possible once Cyprus was occupied by liberal and often pro-Greek British Government, though this view tended to overlook the fact that the British were not only a liberal, but also a colonial, power. Naturally, and typically, they used, and had to rule through, the Ottoman ruling elite, especially as until after the First World War Cyprus was still under Turkish sovereignty. Used by the British, if deprived of real power, the Ottoman Turks in Cyprus were not going to accept allegiance to either the Greeks or the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, the example of Crete, wrested from Ottoman control with Western help, was ever before their eyes. Gradually the disquiet of the Ottoman elite was reinforced by the advent of the Young Turks to power in Turkey, leaders whose new Turkish nationalism found willing ears among the younger Turks in Cyprus. Relations with Istanbul were close. One leading Ottoman statesman, Kamil Pasha, was a Turkish Cypriot. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), a new and more coherent nationalism developed among the young Turkish intelligentsia in Cyprus, who were often in conflict with the older Turks, still Ottoman in their ways. The fact that the British were at war with the Ottoman Empire encouraged the Greek Cypriots in their desire for enosis, a union that might easily 268

Conclusion 269

have come about when the United Kingdom offered Cyprus to Greece if it would join in the war. Thereafter the British would not promote enosis for strategic reasons, and because of the need to maintain good relations with post-war Turkey. Ironically the Greek Cypriots were probably saved by the British occupation from the sad fate of the Greeks in Asia Minor after the Turkish defeat of the invading Greek army, when so many had no option but to abandon their homes and flee to Greece. The popular notion that the United Kingdom divided the two major communities on the island by a deliberate ‘divide and rule’ policy carries little conviction. The two communities were already divided. The view that the colonial government did little to unite them is true, but that was a formidable task. A university for all Cypriots would doubtless have helped create a joint elite, but unfortunately an enterprise to achieve it came to nothing despite welcome approval by the colonial government. Attempts to unite the workers from both communities in labour unions had some success, the effects of which have somewhat persisted, but was overcome by the emotional lure of enosis for the Greek Cypriots as masterminded by the church in general, and later by Archbishop Makarios in particular. In their turn the Turkish Cypriots inspired by the Atatürk revolution, were becoming more nationalist. The 1951 plebiscite on enosis underlined the division. Attempts by the British to establish partly self-governing forms of government came to nothing. Makarios and the Greek Cypriots could not accept self-government unless it carried with it the right to selfdetermination for the island as a whole. This was anathema to the Turkish Cypriots, and increasingly to Turkey. By the 1950s Turkey was fully engaged in the Cyprus dispute fearing that British weakness would allow this strategically important island to become Greek, thus potentially limiting Turkey’s freedom of action along its southern coast. They were already suffering from the feeling of being hemmed in the Adriatic. The intrusion of Turkey into the dispute could not now be prevented. When in 1957 the United Kingdom declared that its interest was not in ruling Cyprus, but in having a base in the island Ankara’s determination to prevent enosis and to save the Turkish Cypriots was set in concrete. Saving the Turkish Cypriots from the EOKA war of liberation incited thousands of Turks, mainly students, to demand ‘partition or death’. Partition was now virtually promised by the British Government, which aware of Turkey’s increasing importance, decided that self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots was not ruled out if it was to be conceded to the Greek Cypriots. Whatever prompted this declaration it has not been forgotten by the Turkish Cypriots: it fortified all future demands for independence. With these developments the problem became more difficult to resolve. If in Cyprus the problem had rested with just the Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites the problem might have found some solution. The British, busy decolonizing after the Second World War, could have retired to their bases in comparative peace, but on the island

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the growth of education and communications allowed the elites to marshal much of the population behind them. They also both called on their motherlands for support, thus dragging Greece and Turkey into the dispute, which initially neither wanted to do. The 1960 settlement was a brave but forlorn attempt to reconcile the aims and ambitions of both communities. A close association of the two communal elites that a joint university might have earlier helped to create was absent: it was not a consociational settlement. Enosis was banned, but still lived on powerfully in both Cyprus and Greece, where Makarios had earlier preached it with marked effect. In their heart of hearts many Turkish Cypriots wanted partition, but knew that it could only occur with Turkish intervention, which would not happen unless there was a major conflagration on the island, in which they would anyway suffer terribly as the minority. Moreover Turkey did not want to intervene. As for the Greek Cypriots, four-fifths of the population, they found it grossly unfair to have to treat the Turkish Cypriots as partners in government. They had fought the British for freedom to rule the island but discovered that their real protagonist was Turkey. Aware, however, that Turkey was in a somewhat parlous state after the revolution there in 1960 they believed that they could successfully exert pressure on the Turkish Cypriots, as in the case of denying them their separate, constitutionally protected, municipalities, which became a major problem and source of conflict, though one that Clerides believed could have been settled. Independent municipalities were by some Greek Cypriots as regarded as a Trojan horse, and would result in the partition they dreaded. Clerides and Denktas¸ tried hard, but in vain, to achieve harmony in government. In government the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President Fazıl Küçük complained to Makarios that the Greek Cypriots were paying little respect to their Turkish Cypriot partners, deciding much without bothering to consult them.1 In 1963, a moment of weakness in both Ankara and Athens, Makarios embarked on a course of action that solidified the inter-communal conflict. With some very unwise British collusion, which could hardly be regarded as anything but support, Makarios published proposals for constitutional reform that, going beyond the British High Commissioner’s views, converted the Turkish Cypriot’s place in government to that of a minority. When both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected them, Turkey significantly responding first, Makarios, unheeding, then gave the lead to those who wanted forcibly, if necessary, to oblige the Turkish Cypriots to accept a minority place in government. It was a huge mistake, and set the Cyprus conflict in its present mould. With violence mounting the Turkish Cypriot ministers and civil servants fled from their offices and half the Turkish Cypriot population formed self-defended enclaves where, with the support of some Turkish officers, they defended themselves. The ensuing violence now added fear and hatred to the inter-communal divide. It was an object

Conclusion 271

lesson in how not to deal with a minority. The Turkish Cypriots could easily have been given in government not less, but more, than they wanted. There was at the time no danger from Ankara provided the Turkish Cypriots were treated carefully. The nationalist passions that had been created by EOKA against British rule now sought outlet in suppressing the Turkish Cypriots. The next development that deepened the conflict was the decision by the United Kingdom, as a Guarantor Power, not to try effectively to curb Makarios. Weary of the debilitating and expensive Cyprus problem, and eager only to procure the safety of its newly acquired sovereign base areas, for the operation of which Greek Cypriot co-operation was important, the United Kingdom more or less vacated the field. This was partly because the United States, in its desire to protect the Near East, was now seriously concerned that the Cyprus problem should not disrupt relations between Greece and Turkey. The Cold War was in full swing, and there was the danger that Cyprus might become another Cuba, and seriously affect the British bases. Against this background, and with the Cyprus conflict becoming a problem for the UN to solve, matters took a serious turn for the worse for the Turkish Cypriots. When in 1964 the UN took on the responsibility for providing a peace force for Cyprus the UN Security Council took a decision in Resolution 186 that had the effect of recognizing the, by then, purely Greek Cypriot-manned government as the Government of Cyprus. It could only be justified by accepting the Greek Cypriot assertion that the Turkish Cypriots had deliberately abandoned their places in government. However much the British and Americans might later claim, as some did, that the references in Resolution 186 to the Government of Cyprus were to be interpreted as the Government of Cyprus as established under the 1960 Constitution, they with the UN treated with the rump Greek Cypriot government as the Government of Cyprus. Unfortunately, at the time Turkey did not seem to appreciate the importance of Resolution 186; it was the last chance to oblige the Greek Cypriots belatedly to accord the Turkish Cypriots their constitutional place in government. Later protests in 1965 by the United Kingdom and Turkey, as the Greek Cypriots consolidated their hold on government, were of no avail. The Greek Cypriots told the Turkish Cypriots that they could only rejoin government with their status reduced to that of a minority. The problem was now established on rock-solid foundations. The world did not worry much: there were many unhappy minorities in the new, former colonial, states with many representatives now in the United Nations. As a leading member of the non-aligned movement Makarios was well supported in the United Nations. The next, and very serious, development in the Cyprus conflict was the very active interest Greece, under military rule after 1967, began to take in Cyprus. In 1967 the Greek Junta was obliged to withdraw some of its many

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troops in Cyprus together with Grivas, but the Greek Junta was still influential, in Cyprus, and more enotist than Makarios. He saw his chickens coming home to roost since he had been foremost in promoting the cause of enosis in Greece in the 1950s. Moreover the Junta seemed to have more regard for the Turkish Cypriots than Makarios, who turned down schemes of reconciliation hammered out by Clerides and Denktas¸. Also the Junta was not averse to a deal on enosis with Turkey, the last thing that Makarios could accept. Ironically it was not Makarios who brought about the next and dramatic development in the Cyprus problem, but the Greek Junta, when they overthrew Makarios. The danger perceived by Turkey was that with enosis Cyprus would now become Greek, which they could not tolerate. Hence they intervened militarily, and the Cyprus problem as a result became even more difficult to resolve. In the Geneva negotiations after the 1974 intervention there could have been a federal solution if only the Greek Cypriots had accepted the federal formula on offer. The claim that they needed more time to consider it is not very convincing; they had had plenty of time to realize that this was the solution Ankara would insist upon. As an alternative, Turkey could later have offered a two-state peace plan that could have restricted the Turkish Cypriot area to about a quarter of the island, and thus would have allowed the return to their homes of many of the Greek refugees. It was a missed opportunity, not even apparently considered by the Turkish Government, which was soon politically in some disarray. Instead of a two-state solution Turkey stayed with a federal solution, which was always likely to be very difficult to bring about, if only because of the discrepancy in size of the two Cypriot communities. It is arguable, too, that Turkey occupied too much of Cyprus, nearly 37 per cent of the island, which effectively prevented the return of many of the 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees. For the most part the 45,000 Turkish refugees were only too glad to escape to the North, a move the Greek Cypriot authorities tried to prevent. In 1977 Makarios belatedly came around to accepting that a federal solution was the way forward. The guidelines that emerged from the talks between Denktas¸ and Makarios unfortunately did not, however, provide much guidance. How, for instance were problems of economic viability, productivity and land ownership to be decided? Freedom of movement, settlement and the right to own property were simply to be discussed. Then what precisely was to be made of the statement that the powers of the central government were to be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal nature of the state? Endless negotiations both on matters of principle and of detail were in prospect. To add to the confusion bi-zonality, said by the Turkish Cypriot side, to have been accepted during the negotiations, was not mentioned. The Turkish Cypriot

Conclusion 273

side was influenced by Turkey in going along with federation, instead of the confederation they really desired. Confederation, or a two-state solution would, of course have taken the problem outside the contours of, and dangerously challenge, the 1960 settlement, but by 1964 that settlement had clearly broken down. Could Turkish policy not have been more positive? The 1977, and the renewed 1979, guidelines served to usher in a long period of frustrating negotiations led by the UN during which the Turkish Cypriots argued for a near confederal, and the Greek Cypriots for a near unified state. The crucial issues of property ownership, settlement and territory were largely left aside. There was nearly an agreement on constitutional issues in 1989, but it was rejected at the last minute by the Greek Cypriots under the influence, it appears, of Greece. This UN sponsored attempt at an agreement had the Turkish Cypriots agreeing to limit their territory to 29 per cent, but the three freedoms, and economic issues, were still to be decided later, which Denktas¸ rightly saw would be very troublesome. It did not help negotiations that during this period the Greek Cypriots were imposing embargoes on the North and was spending much time and effort in educating the world on the real nature of the Cyprus problem, all of which encouraged Denktas¸ in 1983 to press ahead with his objective of declaring the Turkish Cypriot state to be an independent state no longer necessarily wedded to reunification with the South, whilst still trying to achieve it. The Draft framework Agreement of 1989 did not really address the problems of property ownership, and settlement, and only settled the proportion of territory the Turkish Cypriots would accept. The later Set of ideas did tackle these problems, the UN even proposing a map as well as essaying means of settling restitution of property, and conditions governing the numbers of Greek Cypriots who would be able to return to the North. The terms suggested were not at all acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. Most of the constitutional proposals were acceptable to them, but not to the Greek Cypriots. The difficulty on constitutional matters was that the UN’s proposals really re-echoed the spirit of the 1960 Constitution, providing strong veto powers for the Turkish Cypriots, The negotiations failed, with the Turkish Cypriots being mostly blamed for the failure. Shortly afterwards, however, a change began to occur that drastically affected the Cyprus problem and how it might be settled. This was the introduction of the EU into the problem, a process inaugurated by Greece in collaboration with the Greek Cypriots. Greece was now going to play a major, and questionable, role in the development of the Cyprus conflict to the advantage of the Greek Cypriots. The EU became involved in the problem in two ways. First came the very successful move by Greece to gain entry into the EU for the Republic of Cyprus, which theoretically meant for the whole island. This subsequently

274 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

resulted in great international pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to join the EU train, many arguing that on the EU train with the Greek Cypriots the Turkish Cypriots would soon see the great advantages that would ensue from membership. On this journey all the problems about the political relationship with their compatriots would somehow cease to be relevant. The Turkish Cypriots did not accept it, believing that the Greek Cypriots, if members of the EU, would be in a very advantageous position. They would also be recognizing the Greek Cypriot state as Republic of Cyprus. The other way in which the EU became involved was through the desire of Turkey to become a member of the EU. In order to do so Turkey had not only to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, but also to do something effective about the Cyprus problem. Turkish recognition of the TRNC was irrelevant; the EU recognized the Greek Cypriot Government as responsible for all Cyprus. Turkey was now under pressure to persuade the Turkish Cypriots to agree to a solution. This was the importance of bringing the EU into play. Greece achieved this by promoting the entry of Cyprus into the European Union. Athens threatened to block EU enlargement of Cyprus was not admitted. This made a solution more, not less difficult. Late in the day the UN produced a new plan for a settlement in Cyprus, the Annan Plan. This in some important respects differed from former plans, and essentially in that the new state envisaged would be a member of the European Union. It advanced an elaborate scheme for solving the property problem and another to limit for a number of years the numbers of Greek Cypriots who could live in the North. It also provided some restraint on the likely economic domination of the North by the South, but, and it was a big but for the Turkish Cypriots, these exceptions to EU rules were only temporary. Also in the Annan Plan the Turkish Cypriots’ veto powers were much reduced, and there would no longer be a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president: national symbols of identity were not in vogue in the new EU post-modern mode. The EU’s impact on the course of events was considerable, especially its provision of substantial grants to the North, some inspiring much needed modernization and development at a time of severe economic depression consequent on Turkey’s economic troubles. Other grants worked to the benefit of opposition groups, and the EU devoted resources to propaganda explaining the benefits of EU membership to the populace generally. Ankara was meanwhile under considerable pressure by agents of the United States, the United Kingdom, the UN and the EU to make strenuous efforts to help solve the Cyprus problem. The United States and the United Kingdom wanted Turkey in the EU for their own political and strategic reasons. They warned Ankara that without a Cyprus solution Turkish accession to the EU would not happen. Ankara responded by reducing the power of the military arm in government, by agreeing to completion, if necessary of the unresolved gaps in the Annan Plan by the Secretary-General and by

Conclusion 275

reining in Denktas¸, though in fact Denktas¸, in a predicament, said he would not want Cyprus to stand in the way of Turkey’s future. The diplomatic pressure exerted was very successful: the EU catalyst was seen to be working. The diplomats involved, often acting in unison, were unsurprisingly more concerned with their own international issues than with the internal wrangling of the Cypriots, who seemed to be baulking at what, to the outside world, was in the Annan Plan a fair compromise of the two sides’ aims and ambitions. Both sides came under criticism, but the real obstacle to a solution was seen to be the ‘intransigent Denktas¸’. Whether the main international players felt the depth of feeling on either side of the Cyprus divide can only be conjectured. They certainly underestimated important features of the conflict in the case of the South. They were greatly surprised when the Greek Cypriots, not all as seemingly reasonable as Clerides, turned down the Annan Plan, responding emotionally as well as rationally to the pleas of the hard-line Papadopoulos not to overthrow the republic for which they had struggled for so long. The Cyprus problem is still weighing heavily on Turkey in its desire to proceed with its EU accession negotiations. The Republic of Cyprus is in a strong position to hinder, and even stop, Turkey’s progress to EU membership. So what are the apparent options for the future? At present the preferred solution for Ankara, and probably for the powers interested and involved in the Cyprus dispute would be a successful outcome of the present negotiations between Presidents Christofias and Talat, with the problems created by the judgement of the European Court of Justice somehow set aside to allow for a political solution of the property problem. There is little information available about these negotiations, and it would be optimistic to believe that they will succeed. Turkey seems determined to have them do so, warning the new National Unity Party Government, which basically prefers a two-state solution, not to hinder progress. But what if the negotiations do not succeed, as many fear? Immediately the status quo would continue. This could leave the British military facilities in Cyprus the bases and the electronic listening posts, valued also by the United States, to continue to function without any problems. However, it could mean that the road to Turkey’s EU membership would continue to be blocked, which the United States, the United Kingdom, and some other, but not all, European states would deplore. It would also leave the Turkish Cypriots in their present unenviable position, with the international embargoes still in force, and obliged to be economically dependent on Turkey, unable to develop their main potential industry, international tourism. Being so dependent on Turkey the North might gradually come to be little more than a Turkish province. The Republic of Cyprus would then have not the TRNC, but Turkey, pure and simple, as its neighbour in the island with its troops permanently there, a future they could hardly welcome.

276 The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict

Perhaps a two-state solution would be the best outcome. It would have to be recognized, however, that it could not be achieved simply by pressurizing the Greek Cypriots. They would presumably respond to any recognition of the TRNC by either the United States or the United Kingdom by making the bases and other facilities difficult to operate. They could also claim that the 1960 treaties were null and void since they had prohibited partition, and that ipso facto the British Sovereign Base Areas had also become illegal. To achieve a two-state solution the Greek Cypriots would have to be convinced that such a solution was in their interest, which would not be easy. A number of initiatives might be suggested. 1. The Greek Cypriots would have to be offered territory more than they could expect under a federal agreement, sufficient to reduce Turkish Cypriot territory to between 25 and 30 per cent of the whole. This would not now, admittedly, be easy, since the area they would particularly want would be Güzelyurt (Morphou), which has now been much developed since 2004, when it formed part of the Annan Plan package. 2. It would have to be made possible, in some way for Greek Cypriots to return to their homes in the Turkish Cypriot state, and vice versa, having arrangements for return to property similar to, or better than, those in the Annan Plan. However, it is not very likely that Greek Cypriots would generally want to return to live in a wholly Turkish Cypriot state, so the numbers returning might well not be a problem. In fact, after so long a period after 1974 the many Greek Cypriots who can claim title to lost property probably have had no connection with it, and might well be prepared to accept compensation if, with international financial help, this were made attractive. 3. There would have to be agreement on the removal by stages over a number of years of all Turkish troops from the North and Greek troops from the South, followed by agreed levels of local Greek and Turkish Cypriot troops. 4. The border between the two states would have to be internationally agreed and recognized, and for some time manned by UN forces. Another possible advantage for the Greek Cypriots would be the possibility of buying much-needed water from Turkey if water is piped across to Cyprus as is currently planned. Shipping interests in the Republic of Cyprus would also benefit from being able again to dock in Turkish ports. The immediate advantage to Turkey of a two-state solution would be that there would be no special reason for the Republic of Cyprus to hinder Turkey’s progress to the European Union. Turkey’s application to join would then be subject to judgement by the normal criteria.

Conclusion 277

A new and independent TRNC would have to decide on the nature of its relationship, if any, with the European Union. A special relationship might be worked out, as in the case, say, of Norway, or the Channel Islands. Freed of embargoes the country would doubtless be able to sustain itself economically. Separation as a solution is not much favoured by those who valuably devote their efforts to bring together divided societies through the processes of integration and consociationalism in which Track 2 diplomacy clearly has an important role to play. Indeed there is much truth in the assertion that the ‘ordinary people’ of Cyprus on both sides are not very different. Consequently it seems possible to bring them together. Yet in order to achieve this, political and economic differences and difficulties have to be taken into account. In Cyprus there are also still living memories of the past with which to contend, and in the South, especially, the history of the conflict has been so taught in the schools as often to create, rather than reduce, hostility between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Sometimes good fences are needed to make good neighbours. In Cyprus the way to a real reunification of the island would perhaps be better served by separation followed by a gradual reconciliation and co-operation, for in so small an island two states would surely soon see the need to co-operate on an equal footing in many areas. A new international effort along different lines may be needed to solve the Cyprus problem.

Notes 1

Inter-Communal Discord and British Rule 1878–1954

1 For population estimates in Ottoman times see L.W. St John-Jones, The Population of Cyprus: Demographic Trends and Socio-economic Influences, pp. 1–31. According to the first British census, in 1881 there were 137,000 Christians and 45,458 Muslims. 2 Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, p. 263. 3 Ibid., p. 297. 4 Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, p. 1. 5 See Hill, vol. IV, p. 420. 6 Diana Markides, ‘Cyprus 1878–1925: Ambiguities and Uncertainties’, in Herbert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis (eds) Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post Colonialism, 1878–2006, p. 29. 7 Andrekos Varnava, ‘Cyprus is No Use to Anybody: The Pawn, 1878–1915’, in Faustmann and Peristianis, Britain in Cyprus, p. 57. See also Hill, History of Cyprus, vol. IV, p. 523 and other references there cited. 8 Markides, ‘Cyprus 1875–1925’, p. 31. 9 For a harrowing account of the exodus of well over a million Greeks (and Armenians, and for later populations exchanges), see Marjorie Housepian, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City. 10 The subject of the tribute is complex, but is clearly explained in Hill, vol. IV, pp. 463–85. 11 Ibid., p. 453. 12 Quoted in Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, p. 35. 13 Figures from Heinz A. Richter, ‘Benevolent Autocracy, 1931–1945’, in Herbert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis (eds) Britain in Cyprus, pp. 136–7. 14 The British Government had little time for either the church, or for AKEL, which could perhaps have been used more to help promote the self-government the British sought to encourage. The markedly secular Turkish Cypriot community regarded the Greek Orthodox Church as ‘archaic and sinister’, Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 22. 15 Altay Nevzat Nationalism Among the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave, p. 144. 16 For details, drawn from a number of sources, about these and other instances of communal conflict promoted by the demand for enosis see James A. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus 1919–1939, pp. 26–31. 17 On Young Turks in Cyprus see M. S¸ükrü Haniog ˘lu, The Young Turks in Opposition. 18 Nevzat, p. 430. 19 Ibid., p. 434. 20 See McHenry, pp. 180 ff. where the author utilizes a published Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ study, The Question of the Cyprus Revolt and Greece (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1931). 21 Reported by Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, p. 53. 22 He so described its aims in a letter to Professor Pierre Oberling. See Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, p. 54. 23 The Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıkları Kurumu [The Organization for Cyprus Turkish Minorities) was followed in 1945 by the Kıbrıs Türk Halk Partisi [The Cyprus 278

Notes 279

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

National Turkish People’s Party]. They together formed the Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi [the Cyprus is Turkish Party]. Nadav Morag, ‘Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Ethnic Politics’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 4 (Winter 2004), 10. Nevzat, p. 437. Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood, 2nd edn, p. 21. Reported by Ioannis D. Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, p. 2. For views on this see François Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, vol. 1, pp. 241–2. See Stefanidis, pp. 233–4. George H. Kelling, ‘British Policy in Cyprus 1945–1955: The Pigeons Come Home to Roost’, in Faustmann and Peristianis, p. 189. Reported by A. Suat Bilge (quoting the newspaper Halkın Sesi), Le Conflit de Chypre et les Cypriotes Turcs, p. 28. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 35. Reported by Crouzet, vol. 1, p. 305. Ibid. The population census of 1946 showed 361,999 Greek Cypriots and 80,548 Turkish Cypriots (17.9 per cent). In 1881 the Turkish element constituted almost a quarter of the population, but by 1931 it was only 18.4 per cent, due mainly to the doubling almost of the Greek Cypriot element between 1881 and 1931. Crouzet, vol. 1, p. 306. Stefanidis, p. 211. Crouzet, vol. 1, p. 363. As reported by G.H. Kelling, ‘British Policy 1945–1955’, in Faustmann and Peristianis, p. 193. An important study of government/public opinion relations is Fahir H. Armaog ˘lu, Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954–1959. G.H. Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, p. 112. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, The Question of Cyprus (Athens: 1954). A rejection of Greek arguments on the Treaty of Lausanne is contained in a survey by the Turkish Embassy, Turkey and Cyprus (London, 1956). Crouzet, vol. 1, p. 390. Stefanidis, p. 215. Crouzet, vol. 1, p. 128. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, pp. 37 ff. Reported in Erol Mütercimler, Satılık Ada, Kıbrıs, p. 88. Quoted in Armaog ˘lu, pp. 61–2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, The Question of Cyprus, p. 28. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 87. Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954–1959, p. 43.

2

Violence and a Settlement 1955–1960

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39 40 41 42

1 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, pp. 244–5, gives an account of these activities. 2 Fahir A. Armaog ˘lu, Kıbrıs Meselesi, 1954–1959, p. 132. 3 Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954–1959, p. 59. 4 Ibid., p. 69.

280 Notes 5 Greece considered it was an interested party because Greece was also a signatory of the Treaty. On a narrower definition of Article 16 only the United Kingdom was the interested party. 6 See William Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History, p. 25, and The Turkish Embassy, London, Turkey and Cyprus, which attacks the Greek contention, and gives the official Turkish view of Article 16. 7 See Makarios Drousiotis, ‘The Greco-Turkish “Para-State” and Cyprus (1947–1960)’, in Herbert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis (eds) Britain in Cyprus, p. 223. 8 Claude Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954–1974, pp. 70–1. 9 Quoted in Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, pp. 157–8. 10 See Holland, p. 113. There remains some confusion on the reasons for denying a majority for the Greek Cypriots in the proposed legislature. Domestic conservative, as well as Turkish, opposition could, it seems, have been expected. 11 See Nicolet, United States Policy, pp. 74–5. 12 There were to be six members elected by the Turkish Cypriots and 24 by the Greek Cypriots. In addition there would be six nominated members to represent the British community and other minorities. A quorum of 12 to pass laws meant that a Greek Cypriot boycott would not hold up the legislative work of the Assembly. 13 Holland, p. 162. 14 Reported in Armaog ˘lu, Kıbrıs Meselesi, p. 271. 15 Ibid., p. 163. 16 Reddaway asserts, however, that Britain ‘consistently sought a compromise between the two extremes of Enosis and partition, and regarded both as undesirable’ (John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, p. 93). 17 See S¸ükrü Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi, p. 128. 18 Quoted in Averoff-Tossiza, Lost Opportunities, p. 129. 19 Holland, p. 193. 20 For a full report on the debate see Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, pp. 266–73. 21 Zorlu had earlier stated (9 January 1958) that ‘the only possible decision to be taken immediately is a decision for partition’. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 276. 22 Turkish Cypriot studies, especially by those unsympathetic to the nationalists, give details. See, for instance, Ahmet An, Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor? 23 For Reddaway’s alleged authorship of the Plan see Holland, p. 237. In Burdened with Cyprus, pp. 114–15, Reddaway certainly shows the extent of his support for the Plan, arguing its merits against the ‘independence’ solution that was soon to emerge. 24 See Holland, p. 285. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed the written guarantee to Mrs Barbara Castle. 25 Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 337. 26 UN Resolution 1287 (XIII). 27 Mütercimler, Satılık Ada, Kıbrıs, p. 110. 28 According to Hugh Foot (Lord Caradon), A Start in Freedom, p. 159, the British Ambassador to the UN arranged a meeting between Averoff and Zorlu. 29 Armaog ˘lu, pp. 515–16. 30 S.G. Xydis, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic, p. 372. 31 Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp. 68–76. 32 For an account of the Lancaster House Conference see Holland, pp. 311–18. 33 Hasan Polatkan. 34 Quoted in Süha Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish American Relations and Cyprus, p. 36.

Notes 281

3

Constitutional Breakdown 1960–1964

1 As concerted action to guarantee the state of affairs might not be possible, each state could take separate action to do so. 2 Preston King, Federalism and Federation, p. 141. 3 For a discussion of this issue see Ahmet Sözen, ‘A Model of Power-sharing in Cyprus: From the London-Zürich Agreements to the Annan Plan’, Turkish Studies, vol. 5, 1 (Spring 2004), 61–77. 4 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, p. 25. 5 Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, 2nd edn, p. 37. 6 Ibid., p. 38. 7 Ibid. 8 Joseph S. Joseph, ‘The Political Context and Consequences of the London and Zürich Agreements’, in Hubert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis (eds) Britain in Cyprus and Post-Colonialism, 1878–2006, p. 465. 9 Ibid., p. 43. 10 Ibid., p. 44. 11 Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, vol. 1, p. 128. 12 Ibid., p. 148. 13 Ibid., p. 134. 14 Ibid., p. 421. 15 Ibid., p. 427. 16 Ibid., p. 122. 17 Diana W. Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis, p. 73. 18 Ibid. 19 Ahmet Gaziog ˘lu, Kıbrısta Cumhuriyet Yılları ve Ortaklıg ˘ ın Sonu, 1960–1964, p. 126. For a full account of Dirvana’s direction of Turkey’s policy see pp. 119–30. This study is very informative on disputes within the Turkish Cypriot community, and on the municipalities’ issue. 20 Ibid., p. 246, where Gaziog ˘lu states that Ankara began to be more active after the appointment in June 1963 of Mazhar Özkol as ambassador in Nicosia. 21 Markides, Cyprus, p. 177. 22 Ibid., p. 178, quoting from P. Kitromilides, ‘From Coexistence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus’, in M. Attalides (ed.) Cyprus Reviewed. 23 Nihat Erim, Bildig ˘im ve Gördüg ˘um Ölçülerinde Kıbrıs, p. 179. 24 Tozun Bahceli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, p. 57. 25 Salahi R. Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic and its Aftermath, p. 35. 26 See T.W. Adams and A.J. Cottrell, Cyprus Between East and West, p. 19, for this and other information on the left in Cyprus at this time. 27 Ibid., p. 35. 28 Süha Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish American Relations and Cyprus, p. 55. 29 Sonyel, Cyprus, p. 46. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 56. On this issue see also K. Kyle, ‘The British and Cyprus in 1963’ Report (Friends of Cyprus) No. 37 (Spring 1994). Kyle considers the Clark and Makarios proposals, whilst not identical ‘sufficiently similar to lead to the inference that the High Commissioner could well have performed, as Clerides and others have claimed, some sort of editorial function’. On my reading, however, on two crucial points the two documents differed, as explained. Close to the Greek Cypriot side, Kyle seems to have been influenced by their views on this issue.

282 Notes 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68

See ibid., p. 51, for the quotation, and other comments. Ibid. Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 March 1987. Claude Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954–1974, p. 182. Quoted ibid., p. 186. Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958–1967, p. 51. George Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Relations in Historical Perspective, 1945–71, p. 106. Light is thrown on I˙nönü’s attitudes and policy by his son-in-law, Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin I˙smet Pas¸a’lı Yılları. I˙nönünün Son Bas¸kanlıg ˘ı, 1961–65, pp. 188–9. At the London Conference (January 1964) Turkey had taken a very firm line, but it was not followed up. Harry Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files, p. 2. This is the account given by Stavros Panteli, A New History of Cyprus, p. 353. Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, pp. 366–7. Quoting from a copy of released British documents, which the President’s Office collected with the help of Dr Sonyel. The existence of the Akritas Plan is not denied. See Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus, vol. 1, pp. 207 ff. An incident, it is said, sparked off the violence and led to the implementation of the plan six months prematurely. For an account of the alleged Turkish-Cypriot plan see Clerides, vol. 1, pp. 225–6. J. Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963–64, p. 39. Farid Mirabagheri, Cyprus and International Peacekeeping, p. 48. Nicolet, United States Policy, p. 225. I˙nönü’s letter is reproduced in Mehmet Arif Demirer, Türkün Onur Sorunu: Küzey Kıbrı Türk Cumhuriyeti, pp. 138–9. Ibid., pp. 140–1. Translations are by the author. Statement by Mr Justice Ülfet Emin, formerly President of the Supreme Court of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, quoted by Zaim Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, p. 62. See Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/5050, 10 September 1964. Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, p. 120. Nicolet, p. 189. Ibid., p. 192. Sonyel, p. 82. Nicolet, p. 193. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1963–64, p. 20113. Rauf Denktas¸, Hatıralar [Memoirs], vol. 1, 56–7. Ibid. Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, p. 46. Ibid. Denktas¸, Hatırları 1, p. 56. Sonyel, p. 74. Keesings Contemporary Archives, p. 20113. For a criticism of the questionable means by which the United Kingdom helped bring this about, to the detriment of the position of the Turkish Cypriot community, see Sonyel, pp. 75 ff. Toker, Demokrasimizin Ismet Pas¸a Yılları; I˙nönünün Son Bas¸kanlıg ˘ı, p. 198. D.S. Bitsios, Cyprus: the Vulnerable Republic, p. 145. This was very different from the plan U Thant was developing, The task was immensely difficult because he had also to contend with the Soviet view that there was no need for a force.

Notes 283 69 The points on which the Greek Cypriots considered the Aide-Mémoire was unsatisfactory are given by Clerides, vol. 2, p. 49. 70 Denktas¸, vol. 1, p. 151. 71 Ibid., p. 155. 72 Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, p. 123. 73 Nicolet, p. 218. 74 For a critical account of the Doctrine of Necessity see Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, pp. 60–5. 75 Nihat Erim, p. 250. 76 Mehmet Arif Demirer, Türkün Onur Sorunu, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti, gives a selection of comments, pp. 125–6. 77 Ibid. 78 Ker-Lindsay, pp. 123–4. 79 John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, p. 158. 80 For a detailed account of the UNSC’s proceedings, in which the Cyprus problem as such, is overshadowed by other concerns, see James Ker-Lindsay, pp. 79–118. 81 Both quotations are from Alan James, Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963–64, pp. 98–9. 82 Ker-Lindsay, p. 124. 83 Ibid., p. 123. 84 Ibid., p. 122. 85 Ibid., p. 103. Derived from Memorandum dated 28 February 1964, FO 371174748. 86 Ibid. 87 Michael Moran, Rauf Denktash at the United Nations: Speeches on Cyprus, pp. 32–3.

4

Holding Back Turkey 1964–1967

1 A detailed first-hand account of Greek Cypriot attacks on the Turkish Cypriots from 1963 to 1967 is given by Harry Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files, pp. 2–272. See also, for an account using this and other sources, Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, pp. 87–121. 2 Metin Toker, Demokratimizin I˙smet Pas¸a’lı Yılları: I˙nönünün So n Bas¸kanlıg ˘ ı, 1961–1965, p. 206. 3 Ibid., p. 205. 4 Text of the correspondence is in The Middle East Journal, vol. XX, no. 3 (1966). There is some confusion about when I˙nönü called off the military operation. He may have done so before receiving the Johnson letter (see W. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000, p. 184). 5 Süha Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, p. 76, his source being Aziz Aysel, ‘1964 Yılında Kıbrıs Buhranı ve Sovyetler Birlıg ˘ı’, Ankara S.B.F. Dergisi, vol. XXIV, no. 3. 6 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Relations in Historical Perspective, 1945–71, p. 115. 7 Ibid., p. 117. 8 See Claude Nicolet, United States’ Policy Towards Cyprus, pp. 259–60. 9 Salahi Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic and its Aftermath, p. 122. 10 For an account of these remarkable events see Nicolet, pp. 274–7. 11 Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, vol. 2, p. 149. 12 The Report was submitted to the UN Secretary-General on 26 March 1965.

284 Notes 13 For a legal discussion of the compatibility of the Treaty of Guarantee with the UN Charter, see Zaim Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, pp. 116–22. 14 Dimitri S. Bitsios, Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic, p. 206. 15 Sonyel, Cyprus, p. 139. 16 They are listed in Necatigil, pp. 57–60. 17 Sonyel, p. 135. A new electoral law was needed to replace the pre-independence Act. Elections were due in August 1965. 18 The wording in this account of the discussions and the responses is taken almost verbatim from the Report of the Secretary-General on Recent Developments in Cyprus (29 July 1965). It is reproduced, with other reports at or about, the same time in Michael Moran (ed.) Rauf Denktash at the United Nations, Speeches on Cyprus, pp. 291–307. 19 Sonyel, p. 156. 20 Ibid., p. 158. Makarios was driving home the logic of Resolution 186. It is hard not to conclude that the British attempt to walk a tight-rope between Resolution 186 and the 1960 Treaties, in response to various pressures, was worsening the situation. 21 Ibid., p. 157. 22 Ibid., p. 158. 23 For these exchanges see Moran, Rauf Denktash at the United Nations, pp. 41–6. 24 Ibid., p. 46. 25 Sonyel, p. 160. The fact that Greece had also criticized the electoral law was said, somewhat curiously, by Hunt to have been ‘kept very quiet in Cyprus’. 26 Ibid. 27 Moran, p. 47, quoting British documents. 28 Ibid. 29 Security Council Resolution No. 207, 10 August 1965. See Moran, pp. 47–8 for a cogent critique of British and American attitudes. He concludes: ‘The Greek Cypriots had effectively got away with their constitutional legislation specifically designed to exclude the Turkish Cypriots from the House of Representatives’. 30 Moran, p. 150. 31 Ibid., p. 152. 32 Resolution 2077, 18 December 1965. It was voted by 47 to 6 against, but there were 51 abstentions, including the Soviet Union and its satellites, and the United Kingdom. Turkey, the major Commonwealth states, and the United States voted against the motion. 33 Oliver P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations, p. 104. 34 Sonyel, Cyprus, p. 170. 35 Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, p. 128. 36 These remarks by an unnamed Turkish diplomat are reported by Denktas¸, Hatıralar, vol. 2, p. 472. 37 Çag˘layan expressed his views to the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Denis Allen, in January 1966, as reported by Sonyel, pp. 178–9. 38 See Nicolet, p. 329, and Sonyel, pp. 189–90. 39 Sonyel, p. 219. 40 Clerides, Cyprus, vol. 2, p. 194. 41 Nicolet, p. 347. 42 Murat Sarıca, Erdog ˘an Teziç and Özer Eskiyurt, Kıbrıs Sorunu, p. 129. 43 Ibid., p. 139.

Notes 285 44 This and other reasons were suggested by the American Ambassador in Ankara. See Nicolet, p. 348. 45 For a full account of Denktas¸’s sojourn in Ankara in 1967, and his attempted return to Cyprus, see his memoirs, Hatırları, vol. 4. He gives an account of his capture, imprisonment and release in pp. 446–81. He was in Ankara from 1964 to 1968. Clerides’ account of Denktas¸’s attempted return to Cyprus is in Cyprus, vol. 2, pp. 200–7. 46 Ibid., p. 198. 47 Ibid., p. 206. 48 See Ercument Yavuzalp, Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik, p. 70. 49 As reported by P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960–1980, p. 47. 50 Michael Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, p. 150. Yavuzalp reported no change, in his full coverage of the affair, but see Nancy Crawshaw, who reports that the UN was told the day before the attack that the Turkish Government was ready to reconsider its position. ‘Cyprus After Kophinou’, World Today (October 1968), 429. 51 Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, p. 58. 52 Erol Mütercimler, Satılılık Ada, Kıbrıs, pp. 162–3. 53 A clear account of the crisis in Turkey is given by Nasuh Uslu, Türk Amerikan I˙lis¸kilerinde Kıbrıs, pp. 206–12. 54 As reported in the Special Report by the Secretary-General on Developments in Cyprus to the UN Security Council, S/8248, 16 November 1967. 55 Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, p. 56. 56 The opinions of Denktas¸, Ülman, Erim et al are taken from press articles, and are discussed by Sarıca et al in Kıbrıs Sorunu, pp. 152–6. For Denktas¸’s views see also his Hatırları, vol. 4, 1967, pp. 485–90. 57 Nancy Crawshaw, ‘Cyprus after Kophinou’, 434. 58 Clerides, vol. 2, p. 212.

5

Negotiations and the Greek Junta 1968–1974

1 The whole affair, and his important part in it, is given by the then Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia, Ercüment Yavuzalp in Kıbrıs Yangınında, Büyükelçilik, pp. 133–43. 2 For American (and Canadian) ideas on the way forward see Claude Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954–1974, pp. 384–7. 3 Rauf Denktas¸, Hatıralar, vol. 5, p. 157. 4 See Oliver. P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus, p. 109. 5 Clerides, My Deposition, vol. 2, p. 247. 6 Denktas¸, Hatırları, vol. 5, p. 880. 7 Ibid., p. 273. 8 P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960–1980, p. 73. 9 Clerides, vol. 2, p. 312. 10 Salahi R. Sonyel, Cyprus, The Destruction of a Republic and its Aftermath, p. 268. 11 See Clerides, vol. 2, pp. 366–9. 12 As quoted from Makarios lll, Complete Works, by Makarios Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974: Greek Coup and Turkish Invasion, p. 36. 13 Clerides, vol. 3, p. 46. 14 Ibid., p. 85. 15 Salahi R. Sonyel, Why did the Inter-communal Talks on Cyprus (1968–71) Fail?, p. 28.

286 Notes 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

Denktas¸, Hatıralar, vol. 8, pp. 205–6. Clerides, vol. 3, p. 204. Reported ibid., p. 294. Text ibid., p. 295, quoted from the Cyprus News Digest, No.70/74, ‘Turkish Press’, 28 March 1974. As reported by Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, p. 82. Süha Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, p. 147. See Polyviou, Cyprus, Conflict and Negotiation, p. 111. The complexities are explained by Polyviou, pp. 112–13. Ibid., p. 115. Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography, p. 213. Clerides, vol. 3, p. 79. As affirmed by Mayes, p. 214. See Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974: Greek Coup and Invasion, pp. 51–2, for suggestions that Turkey and Greece were in agreement that Grivas should topple Makarios and pave the way for double enosis. As reported by Clerides, vol. 3, p. 79. Ibid., p. 134. Ibid., p. 140. Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, p. 95. Ibid. As reported by Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, p. 169. Ibid., p. 159. Stavros Panteli, The History of Modern Cyprus, p. 257. Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, p. 175. Clerides, vol. 3, p. 326. Ibid., p. 322. Ibid., p. 324. Ibid., p. 322. Ibid., p. 325. Mayes, p. 236. Very firm dissuasion of Berberog˘lu’s political ambitions is recounted, on the evidence of the American Ambassador, in Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, pp. 111–12. Reporting from British documents, Sonyel, Cyprus, pp. 294–5, concludes that the party he established ‘did not make much of an impact on the Turkish Cypriot community’. He notes that the Turkish Government was reported in British documents to have sat upon previous attempts to set up an opposition party. Clerides, vol. 3, p. 270. Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, p. 158. Quotations from Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, p. 165. Ibid., p. 166. Nicolet, p. 417. Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, p. 177. See also Nicolet, p. 420. As reported by Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, p. 160, on evidence provided to a Greek Parliamentary Investigating Committee. Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, p. 168. Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish American Relations and Cyprus, p. 185. His source is Taki Theadoracopulos, The Greek Upheaval (New York: Caratzas Bros, 1978), p. 36. O’Malley and Craig. p. 168, quoted from an interview with Clerides. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 199.

Notes 287 56 57 58 59

Clerides, vol. 3, p. 343. As reported by Nicolet, p. 428, from a range of documentary evidence. Kissinger, p. 215. Jan Asmussen, Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis, p. 43. 60 Ibid., p. 57.

6

Turkish Intervention and the Geneva Conferences 1974

1 M.A. Birand, 30 Hot Days, p. 5. 2 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000, p. 156, states that a senior member of the Turkish Foreign Ministry at the time informed him on this point. 3 Suha Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, p. 187. 4 Birand, p. 2. 5 See Hale, p. 156. 6 Jan Asmussen, Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis, p. 61. 7 FCO 9/1922, Visit to London of the Turkish Prime Minister, the Acting Turkish Foreign Minister and the Turkish Minister of the Interior, 17–18 July 1974. 8 Ibid. 9 Asmussen, p. 61. 10 Report from the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus, 1975–76, para 18. 11 Ibid., Summary of Conclusions, para. 3. 12 ‘British Policy on Cyprus, July to September’, 1974, FCO 9/237/288271/1976. 13 FCO 9/122, The Geneva Conferences on Cyprus, p. 19. 14 Ibid., p. 12. 15 Makarios Drousiotis, Cyprus 1974, p. 201. 16 As given by Birand, pp. 11–12. Bolükbas¸ı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, p. 192, lists immediate negotiations to create a federal system of government in place of equality of rights for each community. 17 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 219. 18 For these events see Asmussen, pp. 97ff. 19 Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, provide this information, p. 183, based on interviews with Tom McNally, political adviser to James Callaghan. 20 See Asmussen, pp. 84–5. 21 Ibid., p. 218. 22 As reported by Oliver P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus, pp. 115–16, quoting from a Greek Cypriot PIO translation of articles in the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet by the Head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Cyprus Desk. 23 The story is told by Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, pp. 197–8. 24 James Callaghan, Time and Chance, p. 353. 25 Ibid. 26 Reported by Nicolet, p. 440. 27 Ibid. 28 FCO 9/1922, The Geneva Conferences on Cyprus, July–August 1974, p. 49. 29 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, vol. 4, p. 37. 30 Ibid. 31 FCO 9/1922, p. 72. 32 Ibid., p. 87. 33 Ibid. (Turkish Proposed Guidelines), p. 53.

288 Notes 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

FCO 9/1922, pp. 99–104 recounts these exchanges. Ibid., p. 106. As reported by Birand, p. 89. Ibid., p. 129. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 130. FCO 9/1922, p. 131. Ibid. Ibid., p. 133. Ibid., p. 131. P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960–1980, p. 326. Ibid. Birand, p. 87. FCO 9/1922, p. 106. Polyviou, p. 334. FCO 9/1922, p. 123. Ibid., p. 124. Ibid., p. 128. Quoted by Polyviou, p. 336. Polyviou, p. 331. FCO 9/1922, p. 105. Ibid., p. 140. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 154. Ibid., p. 156. Ibid., p. 142. Polyviou, p. 353. Reported by Birand, p. 104. FCO 9/1922, p. 165. Nicolet, p. 440, reproduced from official sources. Birand, p. 111. Ibid. Ibid., p. 174. Ibid. Birand, p. 109, also claims in effect that Kissinger accepted Ecevit’s demand for a cantonal or bi-regional system, but that this received no support from Callaghan who, ‘on the plea of wishing to remain neutral, hoped to exert pressure on Turkey to abandon a further operation. According to the Americans, it was this unwillingness that eventually led to the second Turkish operation’ (p. 104). This would seem to ascribe the blame for the Greek side’s rejection of the Turkish proposal to Callaghan. Polyviou, p. 365. Ibid., p. 179. Asmussen, p. 296. As recounted by Clerides, Cyprus, vol. 4, pp. 69–70. Bülent Ecevit, The Cyprus Question (Translation of a speech in Nicosia, 9 February 1984. The map was subsequently added by the speaker). For this, rather unclear, version of the map see Asmussen, p. 203. FCO 9/122, p. 155. Ibid., p. 106.

Notes 289 78 O’Malley and Craig, pp. vii and viii. See also Perry Anderson, ‘The Divisions of Cyprus’, London Review of Books, vol. 30, 8 (24 April 2008), pp. 7–16. 79 ‘British Policy on Cyprus’, FCO 9/237/288271, p. 7. 80 Nicolet, p. 443. 81 Ibid., p. 444.

7

From Guide Lines to the First UN Plan 1975–1987

1 UN Security Council Resolution 357, 14 August 1974. 2 Resolution 360, 16 August 1974. 3 General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX), 1 November 1974. There were 117 votes in favour, none against, and no abstentions. 4 Security Council Resolution 367, 12 March 1975. 5 For an account of this formative period in the North see C.H. Dodd, ‘From Federated State to Republic 1975–84’, in C.H. Dodd (ed.) The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, pp. 103–35. 6 By Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, p. 191. Moreover, Mr Tornaritis, the Greek Cypriot Attorney General has reportedly written that the Greek population in the North did not exceed 129,000 before the events of 1974 (as reported by Necati Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute, p. 271. According to Ertekün 65,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced in 1974, and 25,000 between 1963 and 1974. 7 US Senate’s Team of Investigation, Report, 1975 (http:/www.cyprus-conflict.net) 8 Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, pp. 164–5 and pp. 184–6. 9 FCO 9/2375: Vereker (Nicosia) to Wood, 7 July 1976. 10 The record of the Briefing is given by Clerides Cyprus: My Deposition, vol. 4, pp. 409–14). Perez de Cuellar was present at the Makarios/Denktas¸ meeting. 11 Preston King, Federalism and Federation, p. 133. 12 Clerides, vol. 4, p. 414. 13 By Keith Kyle, http://www.cyprusconflict.net, p. 29. 14 FCO 9/2380 ‘Options Paper’, 2 December 1976, prepared for the Secretary of State. 15 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 18 November 1986, para. 2. 16 Ibid., para. 4. 17 FCO, ‘Options Paper’. 18 Yüksel Söylemez (ed.) Foreign Policy of Turkey at the United Nations, 1972–1978, p. 549. 19 Keith Kyle, The Cyprus Conflict, http:/www.cyprus-conflict.net. 20 UN General Assembly Resolution 33/15 (XXIX), 9 November 1974. 21 Briefing, 29 March 1978. Ecevit consulted the National Security Council closely at this time in order to obtain the military’s views, and support, on the Cyprus question. 22 P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960–1980, p. 206. 23 Van Coufoudakis, Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective, p. 93. 24 General Assembly Resolution 34/40, 20 November 1979. 25 The Times, 31 March 1980. 26 Briefing, 22 September 1980. 27 As translated by Necati Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute, p. 501.

290 Notes 28 Gobbi’s own views differed from those advanced by the Secretary-General. He advocated a confederal solution. See his Rethinking Cyprus, and Michael Moran, Sovereignty Divided, pp. 90–103, for a discussion of Gobbi’s ideas. 29 As stated by Denktas¸, The Cyprus Triangle, p. 121. 30 C.H. Dodd, ‘From Federated State to Republic’, in C.H. Dodd (ed.) The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, pp. 103–32. See also Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 41–6. 31 As reported by Fuat Vezirog ˘lu, Dizleri Titreyenler, p. 45. 32 Quoted by Zaim Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, quoting as source S/PV 2500, 18 November 1983. 33 Ibid., p. 241, citing S/PV 2500. 34 As reported in Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1984, p. 32,638. 35 A.J.R. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, in J.T.A. Koumoulidies (ed.) Cyprus in Transition 1960–1985, p. 127. 36 On the occasion of the meeting of the UN General Assembly in May 1983 ‘fructuous’ informal meetings of members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot delegations, according to the Turkish Cypriots, ‘were broken off by the Greek Cypriots at the instigation of the Greek Government, and public polemics resumed’, Ibid., p. 137. 37 Resolution 550 (1984). 38 Ibid. 39 Michael Moran (ed.) Rauf Denktash at the United Nations, p. 241. 40 Ibid. 41 The United States abstained from voting. Only Pakistan voted against the motion. 42 Necatigil, p. 268. 43 As quoted by Necatigil, p. 287. 44 A.J.R. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Democracy’, p. 127. 45 Groom, ‘Cyprus: Back in the Doldrums’, The Round Table, vol. 75, 300 (1986), p. 380. 46 R.R. Denktas¸, The Cyprus Triangle, p. 380. 47 As related by Necatigil, p. 332, who states that it later appeared that the preparation and acceptance of the revised document was a tactical move to bring pressure on the Turkish side. 48 Letter to Perez de Cuellar, 21 April 1986, in Denktas¸, The Cyprus Triangle, p. 408. It was annexed to the Secretary-General’s later Report to the UN Security Council. 49 For the attitudes of the two sides see the UN Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, 12 June 1986, S/18102. 50 As expressed by Necatigil, p. 292. 51 Oliver P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus, p. 186. This is reported from the New York Times, but the original source is not given. 52 Farid Mirabagheri, Cyprus and International Peacemaking, p. 135. 53 For an account of the rise of the nationalist right in Turkish Cypriot politics see. C.H. Dodd, ‘The Ascendancy of the Right, 1985–1993’, in C.H. Dodd (ed.) The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, pp. 136–66. 54 Denktas¸ , Cyprus Triangle, p. 143. 55 Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, p. 43. 56 It was a much more comprehensive report than its later Report of 22 February 2005, for which see C.H. Dodd, ‘Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on Cyprus’, The Round Table, vol. 95, 383 (January 2006), 65–78. 57 Foreign Affairs Committee, Report, 1987, para. 100.

Notes 291

8

The Set of Ideas and Confidence-Building 1988–1994

1 For a succinct account of Turkish policy after the Cold War see William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000, pp. 191–5. 2 Briefing, 771, 22 January 1990. 3 Pierre Oberling, Negotiating for Survival, p. 52. 4 The Greek Proposals, 30 January 1989’, Section III. The proposals are given in Clement Dodd, Storm Clouds over Cyprus, pp. 102–10. 5 Oberling, Negotiating for Survival, p. 40. 6 Statement of 2 March 1990. Text in Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, pp. 465–6. 7 Statement of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 8 March 1990 (S/21183), para. 13. 8 UN Security Council Resolution 649, 12 March 1990. 9 Reported in Briefing, 778, 12 March 1990. 10 Quoted in Christopher Brewin, The European Union and Cyprus, p. 65. 11 S¸ükrü S, Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece: a Difficult Aegean Relationship’, in C. Balkır and A.M. Williams (eds) Turkey and Europe, p. 181. 12 Reported in Briefing, 791, 14 June 1990. 13 Reported in Briefing, 856, 30 September 1991. 14 Ibid. 15 See A.J.R. Groom, ‘Process of Negotiation’, in C.H. Dodd (ed.) The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus. 16 Reported in Briefing, 896, 13 July 1992. 17 Reported by Suha Bölükbas¸ı, ‘The Cyprus Dispute in the Cold War Era’, The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, vol. 18, 1 (1994), 9. 18 According to Suha Bölükbas¸ı, ‘Boutros-Ghali’s Cyprus Initiative in 1992: Why Did It Fail?’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 31, 3 (1995), 476. His information is from Cypriot broadcasts. 19 Kenneth Mackenzie, The Economist correspondent in Turkey, Cyprus Mail, 4 November 1992. 20 For a useful, if rather pro-Greek Cypriot, account of the December 1993 elections see Kevin Watkins, ‘All Change in Turkish Cypriot Politics?’, Friends of Cyprus: Report 36 (Spring 1994), 5–7. 21 For these developments in Turkish Cypriot politics see C.H. Dodd, ‘Politics in the TRNC’, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, XXII (1992), 37–49. 22 See the valuable work by Jonathan Warner, ‘Importing Voters. Does it Work?’, New Cyprus [Lefkos¸a,] September/October 1990), 34–5. Subsequent work on the December 1993 elections confirms that the immigrants’ votes make no appreciable difference to overall results. These results are contained in C.H. Dodd, ‘Politics in the TRNC’, 37–49. 23 Brewin, The European Union and Cyprus, p. 76. 24 Ibid., p. 77. 25 Quoted ibid., p. 82. 26 European Council at Corfu, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 24–5 June 1994. 27 Susanna Baier-Allen, Exploring the Linkage between EU Accession and Conflict Resolution: The Cyprus Case, p. 154. 28 Brewin, p. 17. 29 Cyprus News, no. 63, 1–30 November 1994. 30 Brewin, p. 85. 31 Ibid., p. 86.

292 Notes 32 Ibid., p. 87. 33 Ibid. 34 For a trenchant critique of Clerides’ position see Michael Moran, Sovereignty Divided, pp. 129–39. 35 This letter is reproduced in C.H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio, pp. 165–71. 36 Kıbrıs (North Cyprus monthly) vol. 3, 1 (January 1995), where the text is given. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.

9 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

The EU Catalyst and the UN 1995–2002 Christopher Brewin, The European Union and Cyprus, p. 214. Reported by Brewin, The European Union and Cyprus, p. 24. Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 2nd edn, p. 220. Dan Lindley, ‘The Military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean’, in Clement, H. Dodd (ed.) Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, p. 209. For more information on labour unions see my ‘Political and Administrative Structures’, in C.H. Dodd (ed.) The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, pp. 178–80. Semin Suvarierol, ‘The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership of the European Union’, Turkish Studies vol. 4, 1 (Spring 2003), 59–60. Michael Moran (ed.) Rauf Denktash at the United Nations, p. 114. For Greek options see Lykke Friis, ‘Looming Shadows: the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement and Cyprus’, in Thomas Diez (ed.) The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict, pp. 28–30. See Susanne Baier-Allen, Exploring the Linkage between EU Accession and Conflict Resolution, pp. 129–30. As reproduced, translated into English, in Briefing, 1251, 19 July 1999. As reported in the Cyprus Mail, 19 November 1999. They are conveniently given in David. Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, pp. 125–7. Hannay, Cyprus, ibid., gives the text of de Soto’s ‘preliminary thoughts’. The quotations are from this text. Hannay told the Turkish Foreign Minister, I˙smail Cem, that there was no chance of confederation. Cyprus, p. 127. Hannay, p. 129. Ibid., p. 130. The statement is given ibid., p. 131. Van Coufoudakis, Cyprus: A Contemporary Political Problem in Historical Perspective, p. 29. This document is reproduced in Appendix 8, in Clement Dodd, Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A Briefing, 2nd edn, pp. 100–1. Kıbrıs (North Cyprus Monthly) no. 1, 2001. Hannay, p. 146. Reported in Briefing, 1371, 3 December 2001. The domination of the weaker in a two-state federation was a point made long ago by K.C. Wheare in his classic Federal Government. For the unworkability of dyadic federations see I.D. Duchacek ‘Dyadic Federations and Confederations’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, no. 18 (1987) 5–31.

Notes 293 24 Intercepted e-mails were published (in Turkish) by Dog ˘u Perincek, Karen Fogg’un E-Postalları. See also Hasan Ünal, ‘Roasted Turkey’, The Spectator, March 2002. 25 Cyprus as Lighthouse of the Eastern Mediterranean: Shaping Reunification and EU Accession Together. 26 Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/2003/398, 1 April 2003, p. 21. 27 Cyprus News, no. 154, 1–30 June 2002. 28 Alexander Murphy, ‘Belgium’s Regional Divergence: Along the Road to Federation’, in Graham Smith (ed.) Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge, p. 88. 29 His response is given by Hannay, p. 167. 30 Hannay, p. 165. 31 Briefing, 1414, 7 October 2002. 32 Ibid. 33 Yusuf Kanlı in Turkish Daily News, 23 November 2002. 34 Müge Kınacıog ˘lu and Emel Oktay, ‘The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union’, Turkish Studies, vol. 7, 2 (June 2006), 263. 35 Cyprus Weekly, 29 November 2002, reported in Nathalie Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution, p. 113. 36 Kınacıog ˘lu and Oktay, 263. 37 For a witness, and participant, account of these proceedings see Hannay, pp. 193–4.

10

The Rise and Fall of the Annan Plan 2002–2004

1 Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/2003/398, 1 April 2003, para, 77. 2 As earlier noted, Belgian experience is discussed in Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, Cyprus as Lighthouse in the East Mediterranean, pp. 23–7. 3 He was not allowed to hold political office having been convicted for religious incitement. This ban was subsequently lifted, but he could not become a member of parliament and assume leadership until March 2003. 4 Remarks quoted in Bilal N. S¸ims¸ir, AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs, p. 257. 5 Ibid., p. 258. 6 Ibid., p. 223. 7 Müge Kınacıog ˘lu and Emel Oktay, ‘The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy’, Turkish Studies, vol. 7, 2 (June 2006), 266–7. 8 Reported in Turkish Daily News, 25 February 2003. 9 The statement by President Sezer’s Political Adviser, Ambassador Tacan I˙ldem, is given in S¸ims¸ir, pp. 450–1. 10 Ibid., p. 452. 11 Ibid., p. 455. 12 Ibid., p. 456. 13 Details of the interview are given in the article by Kınacıog˘lu and Oktay, note 24, 273. 14 Ibid., 206. 15 Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 1 April 2003 (S/2003/398). 16 David Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, p. 218. 17 James Ker-Lindsay, EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus, p. 75, quoting the newspaper Politis as his source.

294 Notes 18 Report of the UN Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/2003/ 398, para. 135. 19 Interview with Oya Berberog ˘lu, Aks¸am newspaper, Turkey, 3–4 February 2003. (PIO.gov.cy, 5.03.03) 20 To judge from responses to this question made to the author by President Denktas¸ and others. 21 Aks¸am, 3–4 February 2003. 22 The author was in North Cyprus at the time and talked with a number of Greek Cypriots who were visiting their former properties in the villages of Lapta and Alsancak (Karavas). 23 Reported in Turkish Daily News, 4 December 2003. 24 See Clement Dodd, Update on the Cyprus Conflict, pp. 25–6 for further information. See also Briefing, No. 1468, 3 November 2003, for a television interview conducted by Mehmet Ali Birand with Mehmet Ali Talat and the immigrants’ leader, Nuri Cevikel. 25 The author and Michael Stephen, a former British MP, toured polling stations on election day. 26 PIO.gov.cy, 20 December 2003, reporting from the Anatolian News Agency. 27 Turkish Daily News, 2 January 2004. 28 As reported on Istanbul NTV, 8 January 2004. 29 Briefing, No. 1477, 12 January 2004. 30 The text, translated into English, is in Briefing, No. 1479, 26 January 2004. 31 Bas¸aran Düzgün, Bir Tarihin Tanıdıg ˘ından Pilatus’un Gölgesinde, p. 23. 32 See Ibid., pp. 41–8. 33 Ibid., p. 48. 34 As reported by James Ker-Lindsay, EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus, p. 83. 35 Düzgün, p. 54. 36 Ibid. 37 Jean Christou, reporting in the Cyprus Mail, 12 February 2004. 38 Düzgün, p. 57. 39 This account of the New York conference mainly follows the account given by Düzgün, stemming from his interviews with Denktas¸ and Talat. 40 Other members of the Turkish Cypriot team included, variously, the Permanent Secretary in the TRNC Foreign Office (Müstes¸ar) Aytug˘ Plumer, the Turkish Cypriot Washington Representative, Osman Ertug ˘ and Professor Mümtaz Soysal. Members of the Greek Cypriot team included Ambassador Tassos Tzionis, Ambassador Andreas Mavroyiannis, Ambassador Nicholas Emiliou and Toumazo Tsielepis of AKEL. In the UN team were the Head of UNFICYP Zbigniew Wlosowicz, Didier Pfirter, Robert Dann, Lisa Jones and Jeremy Farall. 41 Rauf R. Denktas¸ , Müzarekeler 11 S¸ubat–22 Mart 2004. 42 This brief account of the proceedings derives mainly from the Report of the Secretary-General S/2004/437, 28 May 2004, the record of meetings given in detail by Denktas¸ in Muzakereler, from Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle, and from a brief account by James Ker-Lindsay, EU Accession ad UN Peacemaking in Cyprus. 43 Hannay, Cyprus, p. 243. 44 Denktas¸, Müzakereler, pp. 183–4, translated from the Turkish. 45 For a lucid explanation of the position see Nathalie Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace and Consolidating Partition in Cyprus, pp. 162–5.

Notes 295 46 Claire Palley, An International Relations Débâcle, p. 114. 47 Ibid. 48 Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/2004/437 (UN Security Council 28 May, 2004), para. 19. 49 Ibid., para. 21. 50 Ibid., para. 22. 51 Düzgün, p. 92. 52 As reported by Talat, interviewed by Düzgün, p. 98. 53 The two documents are given in Palley, appendices 2 and 3. 54 List of improvements prompted by each side is given in the Secretary-General’s Report, S/2004/437, paras. 43–54. There is also a list of provisions not materially changed, including the map and the Treaty of Guarantee. 55 Ibid., para. 66. 56 Palley, p. 125. 57 Ibid., p. 126. 58 Ibid., p. 128. 59 UN Secretary-General’s Report, S/2004/437, para. 48. 60 Ibid. 61 There is a degree of ambiguity in the text, it not being completely clear that the Greek Cypriot population could expand beyond 19 per cent if Turkey did not join the EU. 62 Georg Ziegler, ‘The EU Dimension of a Future Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’, in Ahmet Sözen (ed.) The Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead, p. 113. This is a clear analysis of the situation. 63 For further analysis of the Plan see Clement Dodd, ‘Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its Antecedents’, Turkish Studies, vol. 6, 1 (March, 2005), 39–51 and Ahmet Sözen, ‘A Model of Power-sharing in Cyprus’, Turkish Studies, vol. 5, 1 (Spring 2004). 64 Düzgün, p. 173. 65 For legal analysis see Kudret Özersay, ‘Separate Simultaneous Referenda in Cyprus: Was it a “Fact” or an “Illusion”?’ Turkish Studies, vol. 6, 3 (September 2005), 379–99. 66 As reported in the Cyprus Mail, 22 April 2004. 67 Ker-Lindsay, pp. 126–7. 68 Ibid., p. 131.

11

After the Referenda

1 Information derived from an academic background paper ‘The Orams case; Enforcing the judgement in the United Kingdom’ prepared by Naomi Mehmet and Partners. 2 The list of Greek Cypriot desiderata is given in the Country Report: Cyprus, Malta (London Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2005), pp. 14–15. 3 UN Security Council, Press Release, SC/8422, 22 June 2005. This Report provides a valuable account of the attitudes of both sides, and of Turkey and Greece to the dispute, and their views on possibilities for the future. 4 UN Secretary-General, Office of the Spokesman, ‘Statement issued following the meeting between the Secretary-General and President Tassos Papadopoulos’ (Paris, 28 February 2006). 5 As reported in Cyprus News, no. 199, 1–31 March 2006.

296 Notes 6 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, S/2007/199. 7 He was to become the chief aide to Christofias in the negotiations that later took place. 8 The United Kingdom. House of Commons. Oral Answers to Questions, 7 February 2006. 9 The Action Plan was published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Initiative by Turkey on Cyprus, 24 January 2006.

12

Conclusion

1 In a letter, for instance, to Archbishop Makarios from Küçük (12 September 1961) in which he complains, inter alia, that ‘the Greek Cypriot ministers come to meetings of the Council of Ministers having first taken decisions together, thus giving the Turkish Cypriot Ministers the impression that their presence at the meetings is for the sake of formality only’. Again, certain policy matters, he claims, are dealt with ‘without consulting, or even informing, the Vice-President and Turkish Ministers’ (I am grateful to David Barchard for drawing my attention to this letter). Greek Cypriot writers have complained about Turkish Cypriot attitudes and behaviour at this time. See, for instance, Stella Soulioti, Fettered Independence, Cyprus 1878–1964.

Bibliography Documents The United Kingdom Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other Instruments, Lausanne, 24 July 1923 (HMSO, 1923), Cmd. 1929. Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus. Report submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Right Hon. Lord Radcliffe, CBE, HMSO, 1956, Cmd. 42. Conference on Cyprus, 19 February 1959, Documents (HMSO, 1959), Cmd. 679. Conference on Cyprus, 19 February 1959, Final Statements (HMSO, 1960), Cmd. 680. Cyprus, Joint Committee on the New Constitution, 19 February–1 July 1960, Cmd. 1093. The Constitution of Cyprus, 1960. Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus, 1975–76, HMSO, 1976. Report of the House of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on Cyprus, 1987, HC 23. HMSO, 1987. Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2004–05, HC 113. HMSO, 2005. Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Visit to Cyprus, HC 196. HMSO, 2009. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 9/1922, ‘The Geneva Conferences on Cyprus, July–August 1974.

United Nations and European Community/European Union documents Details of documents consulted and/or quoted are given in the Notes. Among documents of particular significance are: Galo Plaza Report. UN Security Council Official Records Supplement, 26 March 1965, S/6253. United Nations Security Council. Report of the Team of Experts on the Economic Benefits of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport Package, December 1993. Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus. UN Security Council, 1 April 2003, S/2003/398. The UN (Annan) Plan, Version 5, 31 March 2004. Report of the UN Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus. UN Security Council, 24 May 2004, S/2004/47. Faulds, Andrew. Excerpta Cypria for Today: A Source Book on the Cyprus Problem. Lefkos¸a: K. Rustem (for Friends of North Cyprus Parliamentary Group, House of Commons), 1988. Hakkı, Murat Metin. The Cyprus Issue. A Documentary History. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.

Turkey Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi [Records of the Grand National Assembly]. Dıs¸is¸leri Bakanlıg ˘ ı Belleteni [Journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. 297

298 Bibliography Søylemez, Yüksel (ed.) The Question of Cyprus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey at the UN 1966–72. Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. n.d. —— The Foreign Policy of Turkey at the United Nations, 1972–1978. Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987. Turkish Embassy, London. Turkey and Cyprus: A Survey of the Cyprus Question with Official Statements of the Turkish Viewpoint. London: 1956.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Records of the Republican Assembly (Parliament). The Official Gazette (Resmi Cazete). Supreme Electoral Board. ‘Press Conference’, 9 December 2003. Joint Declaration: Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 28 December 1995. Turkey-TRNC Declaration of Solidarity, 20 January 1997. Turkey-TRNC Joint Statement, 20 July 1997.

Periodical publications Briefing. Ankara: EBA Publications (weekly). Country Report: Cyprus. London: Economist Intelligence Unit (quarterly). Cyprus News. London: Republic of Cyprus High Commission (monthly). Kıbrıs. Lefkos¸a; Public Information Office (monthly). News and Views from Northern Cyprus. London: Office of the TRNC Representative (monthly). Report. London: Friends of Cyprus. Turkey Confidential (monthly review by Andrew Mango). London: September 1989–June 1993.

News sources Keesings Contemporary Archives. Cyprus News Agency, Cyprus Mail, Cyprus Weekly. Turkish Daily News, now Hürriyet Daily News, Cumhuriyet, Aktuel, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Turkiye, Zaman. Cyprus Times, Cyprus Today, Halkinsesi, Kıbrıs, Ortam, Volkan, Afrika.

Reports Asmussen, Jan. Cyprus after the Failure of the Annan Plan. ECMI Brief no. 11. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 2004. International Crisis Group. The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next? Europe Report no. 171, Brussels: March, 2006. —— Reversing the Drift to Partition. Europe Report no. 190. Brussels: January, 2008. —— Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet. Europe Report no. 194. Brussels: June, 2008. Kaymak, Erol, Lordos, Alexandros and Tocci, Nathalie. Building Confidence in Peace: Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process. Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2008.

Bibliography 299 Kramer, Heinz. EU-Treaty Negotiations: Still in the ‘Cyprus Impasse’. German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments 1, January 2007. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Cyprus: Background to Enosis. London: Chatham House, 1958. UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Opinion Survey 2006–2007. Cyprus: UNFICYP, 2007.

Memoirs Averoff, Evangelos. Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950–63. New York: Caratzas Publishing, 1986. Ball, George W. The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982. Barutçu, Ecmel. Hariciye Koridoru [In the Corridors of the Foreign Ministry]. Ankara: Yüzyıl Yayınları, 1999. Çag˘layangil, I˙hsan Sabri. Anılarım [My Recollections]. Istanbul: Günes¸ Yayınları, 1990. Callaghan, James. Time and Chance. London: Collins, 1987. Clerides, Glafkos. Cyprus: My Deposition, 4 vols. Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989. Denktas¸, Rauf. Rauf Denktas¸ ın Hatırları [Rauf Denktash’s Memoirs]. 9 vols. Istanbul: Bog ˘aziçi Yayınları, 1996–1998. Eden, Sir Anthony. Full Circle. London: Cassell, 1960. Erim, Nihat. Bildig ˘im ve Gordüg˘üm Ölçülerinde Kıbrıs [Cyprus as I Knew and Saw It]. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaasi, 1974. Foot, Hugh (Lord Caradon). A Start in Freedom. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964. Grivas, George. The Memoirs of General Grivas. London: Longman, 1964. Hannay, Lord David. Cyprus: The Search for a Solution. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. I˙nanç Gül. (ed.) Büyükelçiler Anlatiyor: Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs, 1970–1991. [As the Ambasasadors Recount: Cyprus in Turkish Diplomacy, 1970–1991]. Istanbul: Türkiye I˙s Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007. Küçük, Fazıl. The Cyprus Question: A Permanent Solution. Nicosia, 1957. Küneralp, Zeki. Sadece Diplomat [Simply a Diplomat]. Istanbul: n.p., 1981. Kissinger, Henry A. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999. Yavuzalp, Ercument. Kibrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik [An Ambassador in the Cyprus Inferno]. Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

Books and Articles* Adams, T.W. and Cottrell, A.J. Cyprus Between East and West. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968. Alasya, Halil Fikret. Küzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Tarihi [A History of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus]. Ankara; Ankara University Press, 1987. Altan, Mustafa Has¸im. Kıbrısta Rumlas¸tırma Hareketleri [The Attempts by the Greek Cypriots to Assimilate the Turkish Cypriots]. Lefkos¸a: National Archive Publications, no. 1, 1997. An, Ahmet. Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor? [Where is Cyprus Going?]. Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2002. *For books published in the capital of the TRNC Lefkos¸a, vice Nicosia, is given as the place of publication.

300 Bibliography Anderson, Perry. ‘The Divisions of Cyprus’, London Review of Books vol. 30, 8 (April 2008). Armaog˘lu, Fahir A. Kıbrıs Meselesi, 1954–1959 [The Cyprus Question, 1954–1959]. Ankara: Ankara University Political Science Faculty, 1963. Asmussen, Jan. Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis. London: I.B. Tauris, 2008. Atakol, Kenan. Turkish and Greek Cypriots: Is Their Separation Permanent? Lefkos¸a: METU Press, 2003. Atalay, Nail. Birles¸mis¸ Millet;erde On Buçuk Yıl [Ten and a Half Years at the United Nations]. Lefkos¸a: Rustem, 2008. Attalides, Michael A. (ed.) Cyprus Reviewed. Nicosia: Jus Kypri Association, 1977. —— Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics. Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979. Axt, Heinz-Jürgen and Brey, Hansjörg (eds) Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict? München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1997. Bahceli, Tozun. Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. —— ‘Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 30, 1–2 (Winter/Spring 2000). Baier-Allen, Susanna (ed.) Looking into the Future of Cyprus-EU Relations. Baden-Baden: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999. —— Exploring the Linkage between EU Accession and Conflict Resolution: The Cyprus Case. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003. Bayülken, Ü. Haluk. ‘[The] Cyprus Question and the United Nations’, Dıs¸ Politika vol. 4, 2–3 (1975). Bilge, A. Suat. Le Conflit de Chypre. et les Cypriotes Turcs. Ankara: Ankara University Political Sciences Faculty, 1961. —— ‘Le Conflit Cypriote’. Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 4 (1963). Birand, Mehmet Ali. 30 Hot Days. Lefkos¸a: Rustem, 1985. —— Diyet; Turkiye ve Kıbrıs Üzerinde Pazarlıklar, 1974–1979 [Blood Money: Disputations on Turkey and Cyprus, 1974–1979]. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1979. Bitsios, D.S. Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic. 2nd edn. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975. Bölükbas¸ı, Suha. Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus. Lanham MD: University Press of America (for the White Burkett Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia), 1988. —— Boutros Ghali’s Cyprus Initiative in 1992. Why Did it Fail?, Middle Eastern Studies, 31 (1995). —— ‘The Johnson Letter Revisited’, Middle Eastern Studies 29 (1993). —— ‘The Cyprus Dispute in the Post-Cold War Era’, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, vol. 18, 1 (1994). —— Barıs¸çı Çözümsüzlük [A Peaceful Non-solution]. Ankara: I˙mge Kitabevi, 2001. Borowiec, Andrew. Cyprus: A Troubled Island. Westport/London: Praeger, 2000. Brewin, Christopher. The European Union and Cyprus. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 2000. —— ‘A Changing Turkey: Europe’s Dilemma’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 3, 2 (August 2003). Bryant, Rebecca. Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Çelenk, Ays¸e A. ‘The Restructuring of Turkey’s Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party’s Struggle for Power’, Turkish Studies, vol. 8, 3 (September 2007).

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Index

Abou, Serge, 179, 185 Acheson, Dean first plan, 68 second plan, 70 Akbulut, Yıldırm, 167 Akel at Bürgenstock, 252 and 1946 constitutional proposals, 12 and Draft Framework Agreement, 154 founded, 7 opposes Greek domination, 152 and Makarios, 42, 48 in 2008 presidential elections, 262 recognition of enosis, 12 relations with church, 7, 12 supports Papadopoulos, 231, 251 and Turkish Cypriot left, 177 and unions, 11 Akritas Plan, 52–3, 55 Akıncı, Mustafa, 148, 192, 197, 210, 258 Aldıkaçtı, Orhan, 98 Allen, Sir Denis, 48 Amery, Julien, 50 Anastasiou Ltd, 182–4 Annan, Kofi formula for 1999 talks, 202 at Bürgenstock, 248 first Annan Plan, 221 New York, 2004, 242–3 Oral Remarks, 208 meets Papadopoulos, 2006, 260 visits island, 2002, 216 statement, Sep. 2000, 206 Annan Plan III constitutional structure, 225 general character, 224–5, 274 pro-Plan demonstrations, 228 property and residence, 226 Annan Plan IV, 208 Annan Plan V, 249–50 changes from Annan III, 250–2 Apostolides, Meletios, 256–7 arms embargoes on Turkey, 133, 140–1, 151

Arınç, Bülent, 228 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 8 Avcı, Turgay, 258 Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos, 37, 39 Ayios Thodoros see Bog ˘aziçi Baker, James, 168, 170 Balkan Pact, 16, 19 Ball, George, 61 Ban Ki-moon, 262 Barutçu, Ecmel, 111 Batterskill, William, 7 Baykal, Deniz, 110, 192, 231 Bayülken, Haluk, 111 Beattie, Richard, 188, 193 Berberog ˘ lu, Ahmet, 106 Berlin Wall, 162, 163 Bilgi, Suat, 89 Birand, Mehmet Ali, 126, 217 Bitsios, Demetri, 59, 61, 64 Bog ˘ azici, 82–4 border incidents, 161, 194 Bottomley, Arthur, 74 Bozbeyli, Ferruh, 110 British-Canadian Plan, 140 British Sovereign Base Areas, 39, 48, 56, 65, 70, 79, 81, 137, 149, 211, 276 Buffum, Wlliam, 116 Bürgenstock meeting, 247–50 Brown, Gordon, 263 Bush, George H., 105 Cag ˘ layangil, I˙hsan Sabri, 70, 78, 80, 92, 93, 95 Callaghan, James in talks with Ecevit, 1974, 112 at Second Geneva Conference, 119, 122, 124–5, 127, 130 Nicosia Airport incident, 116 tries to restrain Turkish army, 116–17 Camp David summit proposals, 163, 168 Caradon, Lord see Foot, Sir Hugh Cassoulides, Ioannis, 214, 262

308

Index 309 Castle, Barbara, 133, 280 Cem, I˙smail, 200, 211, 217 Çevikel, Nuri, 258 Chicago Convention, 255 Christofias, Demetris at Bürgenstock, 252 constitutional solution envisaged, 233 in face-to-face talks, 214 as President of House of Representatives, 210 in presidential elections, 2006, 231 talks with Talat, 2007–9, 263–6 Churchill, Winston, 4 Çiller, Tansu, 188, 190, 192, 194 Clark, Joe, 178 Clark, Sir Arthur, 48–50 Clauson, Sir John, 5 Clerides, Glafkos Acting-President, 1974, 117 Anastasiou case, comment on, 183 on Acheson Plan, 70 calls for coercive measures against TRNC, 184 and confidence-building measures, 179 Denktas¸ talks, 1960–3, 45; 1968–74, 93–100; five talks, 1994, 185–6 elected president, 1993, 175; 1998, 192 at Glion negotiations, 196, 202 on Greek Cypriot morale, 1967, 90 at London Conference 1964, 57 loses 1988 presidential election, 160; and in 2003, 231 sees Makarios as obstacle to solution, 98 partnership concept rejected, 99 on return of Turkish Cypriots to parliament, 1965, 72–3 at Second Geneva Conference, 119, 121–7, 128 attitudes to Set of Ideas, 175 Turkey/TRNC integration criticized, 196 forms Unified Party, 101 response to UNSG’s statement, 2000, 207 at Vienna talks, 132–4

Communal Liberation Party coalition with NUP, 201, 210 in elections, 1998, 201 opposes Turkish Cypriot independence, 147 confederation in negotiations, 1999–2000, 204–5 and I˙smail Cem, 217 Turkey-TRNC proposal, 200 see also two-state solution Confidence-building Measures Nicosia Airport problems, 178 UNSC calls for, 175–6 Varosha proposals, 178–9 consociationalism, 43, 269 Constitution, 1960, 42–4 abrogation, 1965, 72–3 British response, 73–4, 75 Turkish response, 74 and UN Security Council, 76 constitutional revision, 1960–3, 48–50 Copenhagen European Council, 2002, 194–6 Cordovez, Diego, 196 Crete, 7, 237 Cyprus as British base, 3, 13 colonial rule see United Kingdom, British rule early history, 1 Ottoman rule, 1–2 Cyprus Convention see United Kingdom, British rule Davis, Roger, 130 Davos meetings, 1988, 160; 2004, 241 Dean, Sir Patrick, 60 Declaration of Independence, 148–50 legality of, 150 referendum on, 156 rejection by European Commission, 147; by UN Security Council and United Kingdom, 149–50 Turkish reaction, 150 Declaration of Solidarity, 167, 193, 200 Dekleris, Michalis, 98 Demirel, Süleyman, 77, 85, 93–4, 99, 110, 133, 143, 173

310 Index Democratic Party boycott of parliament, 228 coalitions, with NUP, 2001, 192; with RTP, 1993–5, 177–8, 192; with RTP 2003 and 2005, 227–8 collapse of RTP coalition, 2006, 228 parliamentary elections 2003, 211; 2005, 239, 258 Denktas¸, Rauf Raif Anastasiou case, 184 and Bürgenstock, 184 Clerides, negotiations with 1968–74, 93–8 Clerides, relations with, 1960–3, 45 on Davos 2004 meeting, 241 Declaration of Independence, 148–9, 163 Draft Framework Agreement, 152–6 early career, 9 Erdog ˘ an, relations with, 229, 242 Erog ˘ lu, relations with, 177 Face-to-Face talks, 2002, 214–15, 218 five talks with Clerides, 1994, 185–6 14 point peace plan, 1995, 186 at Glion, 196 and High-level Agreement, 1977, 119, 122–3, 134–5 hospitalized in New York, 221 Küçük, relations with, 92 New York talks, 2004, 243 in New York, 1964, 62 Nicosia negotiations, 2004, 244–7 as obstacle to an agreement, 216 presidential elections, 1990, 185; 1995, 191 resigns and reassumes as UN negotiator, 177–8 return to Cyprus, 1967, 82, 89 at Second Geneva Conference, 119, 122–3 speeches at UN, 60, 139, 151 at The Hague, 2003, 229–30 addresses Turkish Grand National Assembly, 176, 229–30 Turkish presidential summit, 2003, 229 Turkish support for, 163 Varosha proposals, 139 Vassiliou, negotiations with, 163–5 and Zürich Agreement, 37 Denktas¸, Serdar, 192, 236, 244, 247, 258

derogations, 217 De Soto, Alvaro at Bürgenstock, 248 in face-to-face talks, 2002, 213 at Nicosia negotiations, 2004, 244, 247 proposals, 1999–2000, 205 Dikerdem, Mahmut, 64 DIKO, 231, 261 Dirvana, Emin, 47 DISY, 154, 231, 262 Doctrine of Necessity, 63 Downer, Alexander, 264 Draft Framework Agreement, 152–6 Durduran, Alpay, 138, 149, 156, 165 Earthquakes, 202 Ecevit, Bülent assumes power, 1973, 98–9 against Declaration of Independence, 143 declining health, 219 fall from power, 1974, 133 on federal solution, 99 and First Geneva Conference, 116–18 and future of TRNC, 211 intervention decision, 1974, 110–11 reply to Kissinger, 115 London meetings, 1974, 112–13 criticizes Özal, 169 reassumes power, 1974, 104; 1978, 140 and Second Geneva Conference, 121, 125 Turkish demands, 1974, 113 EDEK, 146, 160 Eden, Sir Anthony, 25–6, 30 Eisenhower, Dwight, 30 embargoes on Turkish Cypriots, 140, 142–4, 151 enclaves see Turkish Cypriot Community enosis Churchill statement, 4 demand for in 1878, 3 Greek Cypriot proposals, 1929, 6 Greek rejection of offer, 4–5 Makarios statement on, 96 strength of after 1960, 43–4 EOKA, 20, 30, 35, 269

Index 311 Erbakan, Necmettin, 110–11, 133, 192 Ercan Airport, 225 Erdog ˘ an, Tayyip and Annan III, 230 at Bürgenstock, 249 Cyprus statement, 2008, 233 Denktas¸ criticized, 227 Denktas¸ meetings with, 224, 242 election 2003 success, 220 European tour, 2003, 222 meets Annan and Bush, 241–2 New York negotiations, 2004, 243 Erel, Ali, 228 Erenköy, 69 Erim, Nihat, 64, 78, 97, 110 Erkin, Feridun, 53, 70, 78, 105, 110 Erog ˘ lu, Dervis¸, 156, 162, 167, 177, 191, 204, 228–30, 256, 265–6 Ertug ˘ rulog ˘ lu, Tahsin, 222, 227, 259, 264 Ethnarchy Council, 25 European Community Cyprus application, 167 and Declaration of Independence, 166 ‘Opinion’ on Cyprus’ application, 179–81 Turkish membership application, 163 European Council Copenhagen, 2002, 218, 202–3; Corfu, 1994, 181; Dublin, 1990, 167; Essen, 1994, 182; Brussels, 2009, 267; Helsinki, 1999, 202–3; Luxembourg, 1997, 197; Nice, 2000, 209 Greek presidency, 160 Law of Adaptation, 2004, 251 European Court of Human Rights, 210, 215 European Court of Justice, 183–4, 256–7, 259, 265 European Parliament welcomes Cyprus’ EC application, 166 endorses Cyprus’ EU membership, 190–1 and EU/Turkey Customs Union, 189 Resolution critical of TRNC, 211

European Union Agenda 2000, 196 European Security and Defence Policy, 209 EU/Cyprus Accession Treaty, 236 EU/Turkey accession document, 209 EU/Turkey Association Council, 189 EU/Turkey Customs Union, 189, 193 EU/Turkey Customs Union and Cyprus, 267 financial aid pledge to North Cyprus, 238, 255–6 influence in TRNC, 218 Evdokas, Taki, 91 Face-to-Face talks agreement on terms, 216–17 Belgian model, 214 Greek Cypriot attitudes, 214 Turkish Cypriot proposals, 215, 217 Famagusta, 76, 256, 260 Federenko, Nikolai, 61 Feyziog ˘ lu, Turhan, 110 Fischer, Joschka, 241 Fogg, Karen, 210, 231 Foot, Sir Hugh, 31–3 Forsthoff, E., 47 Forum journal, 28–30 Freedom and Reform Party, 258 G8 Group, 201 Gambari, Ibrahim, 260 Gazimag ˘ usa see Famagusta Geçitkale, 82–4 Geneva Conference (1), 115–19 Geneva Conference (2), 119–28 Ghali, Boutros Boutros, 169, 170, 173 Gizitis, Phaidon, 104, 107 Glion negotiations, 196–7 Gobbi, Hugo, 144, 147 Greece Defence Co-operation Agreement with US, 167–8 promotes Cyprus’ EU accession, 167 and EU enlargement, 181, 199 Junta in power, 80–1, 85, 97, 100–5, 107–9 opposes Macmillan Plan, 36

312 Index Greece – continued relations with UK, 13, 15 and Turkish demands, 1974, 113 and UN, 15–16, 23–4, 32 White Paper, 1954, 18 Greek Cypriot community enosis demand, 1878, 5 and Legislative Council, 3, 5, 7 National Organization established, 5 refugees, 131–2, 134, 155, 159, 170–2, 237 rioting, 1931, 6–7 Greek invasion of Anatolia, 4 Greek Orthodox Church, Cyprus under Ottoman rule, 1–2 referendum on enosis, 14 Greek War of Independence, 2, 268 Greek troops in Cyprus, 67, 69, 74, 82, 89, 92 Greeks in Turkey exodus, 1922–3, 5 Istanbul Greeks, 23 Grey, Sir Edward, 5 Grivas, Georgias Bog ˘ aziçi and Geçitkale assault, 83–4 death, 99 on enosis, 102 EOKA established, 20–1 EOKA-B, 102 Erenköy, attack on, 69 and Famagusta, 76 imminent capture, 1960, 39–40 and Makarios, 102–3 Gül, Abdullah, 227, 229, 231, 240, 248, 259–60 Günes¸, Turan, 99, 116, 118–19, 122–3, 126 Gürel, ¸Sükrü, 219 Guvenir, Ali Asaf, 8 Güzelyurt, 264 The Hague criticism of Denktas¸, 233–5 Greek/Turkish Cypriot positions, 234–5 summit meeting, Ankara, 229 and Turkish Government, 233 Halkın Sesi, 10 Hannay, Sir David, 217 Harding, Sir John, 24–6, 31

Hart, Parker T., 86 Hartman, Arthur, 115–16, 120–1 Hattersley, Roy, 111 Heinze, Christian, 47 Hellenic ‘Great Idea’, 5 High-level Agreement 1977, 135–6 Holbrooke, Richard, 188, 193, 197–9, 200–1 Home, Sir Alec Douglas, 75 House of Commons on abrogation of 1960 Constitution, 74–5 Foreign Affairs Committee, Cyprus 1986–7, 157–9 Select Committee on Cyprus, 1975–6, 112 Howe, Sir Geoffrey, 150 Hunt, Sir David, 73–4 Iacovou, George, 192, 261 Independence solution, 30, 35–6, 41 Ioannides, Dimitrios, 103, 107, 109, 114–15 I˙nönü, Erdal, 176 I˙nönü, I˙smail, Erenköy air strike, 69 and intevention, 1964, 67 Küçük, letter to, 54 and Lyndon Johnson, 62 military pressure on, 58 on 1960 settlement, 39–40 on partition, 30, 39–40 resigns, 77 UN Force agreed, 60 and UNSC res. 186, 64 I˙s¸ık, Hasan, 111 internationalizing the dispute, 142–4 Johnson, Lyndon, 60, 62, 67, 69, 86 Joint Defence Doctrine, 181 July 2006 Agreement, 260, 263 Justice and Development Party, 219, 259 Karamanlis,Constantine, 51, 115, 249 Kardak/Imia incident, 193–4 Kazım, ¸Semsi, 91 Kesan-Dedeag ˘ aç negotiations, 80–1 Kissinger, Henry American policy, 107–8 and Bürgenstock, 219

Index 313 Callaghan, criticism of, 115–16 and Second Geneva Conference, 123, 125–6, 129–30 Kition, Bishop of, 6 Kokkina see Erenköy Kokott, Juliane, 257 Konuk, Nejati, 148 Kophinou see Geçitkale Kormakiti, 250 Küçük, Dr Fazıl on abrogation of the Constitution, 73 relations with Denktas¸ and the Turkish Cypriot community, 92–3, 108 early career, 10 exclusion from government, 270 response to Makarios’ 1963 proposals, 50 and UN Peace Force, 59 on withdrawal from Cyprus government, 54–5 on Zürich Agreement, 37 Küneralp, Zeki, 81, 89 Kyprianou, Spyros and Cag ˘ layan meeting, 95 and Sir Arthur Clark, 48 Draft Framework Agreement, 153 at London Conference, 1964, 57 elected president, 139 end of presidency, 160 at UN, 60, 139 labour unions, 7, 11 Lausanne Treaty, 17, 22–3 legality of TRNC (Lauterpacht Opinion), 150 Ledsky, Nelson, 166 Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 25–6, 29–30 Lillikas, George, 231 Lloyd, Selwyn, 32 Lloyd-George, David, 5 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 25 Loizidou, Titina, 210, 256 London Conference, 1960, 38–40 London Conference, 1964, 56–8 Lusignan dynasty, 1 Macmillan Plan, 33–6, 38 Macmillan, Harold constitutional proposals, 1955, 22, 30 Lancaster House Conference, 1960, 39

release of Makarios, 31 at Tripartite Conference, 1955, 21 Makarios III, Archbishop abrogation of 1960 treaties, 55–6 and Acheson Plan, 68 Ankara visit, 1962, 47–8 appointment, 14 assassination attempt, 1970, 101 bishops’ opposition, 103 and Clerides-Denktas¸ negotiations, 1968–73, 96–8 constitutional proposals, 1963, 48–51; 1998, 92 coup failure, 1972, 102 coup, 1974, 105–8 death, 138 and EOKA violence, 20 exile to the Seychelles, 26, 30 and Geneva conferences, 119, 124, 127–8 High-level Agreement, 1977, 134–6 and Lancaster House Conference, 39, 41 letter to Junta, 1974, 104–5 presidential elections, 1968, 91; 1973, 103 return to Cyprus 1974, 132 speech on enosis, 1971, 96 establishes Tactical Police Force, 103 and Treaty of Guarantee, 74 and Tripartite Conference, 1955, 21 supports UN Peace Force (UNFICYP), 60 Maras¸ see Varosha Mason, Roy, 111 Mavros, George, 116, 119, 122–3, 126, 134 Megali Idea, 237 Memorandum of Understanding, 263 Menderes, Adnan, 18, 20, 29–30, 39, 51 Menemciog ˘ lu, Turgut, 53, 111 Menon, Krishna, 30 missiles, S.300, 195, 201 Mitsotakis, Constantine, 165, 166–7 Morphou see Güzelyurt Moses, Alfred, 207 municipality question, 34–5, 46–8 NATO, 31, 65, 66 National Front, 95, 101 National Guard, 80, 83, 86, 104–5

314 Index National Salvation Party, 110 National Unity Party boycott of parliament, 228 coalitions with CLP, 157, 192, 201 coalitions with DP, 1995, 2001 elections, 1976 and 1981, 147; 1993, 177; 1998, 200–1; 2003, 239; 2005, 258; 2009, 266 Erog ˘ lu’s return to leadership, 2008, 234 Ertug ˘ rulog ˘ lu, Tahsin, 228, 234 resignations from, 2006, 228 negotiations, Christofias-Talat, 2008, 263–6 New York UN negotiations, 2004, 243–4 Nicosia Airport, in confidence-building measures, 176–8 incident, 1974, 116 in 1984 talks, 151 Nimetz, Matthew, 140 non-aligned states’ conference, 141, 143–5 non-aligned sates, 77 Olcay, Osman, 96 Olgun, Ergün, 227, 244 Orams, David and Linda, 256–7 Örek, Osman, 57, 92 Organization of Islamic States, 145 osmosis, 261, 263 Ottoman elite in Cyprus, 89, 168–9 Özal, Turgut Antalya conference, 165 Davos, meeting with Papandreou, 160 Denktas¸, relations with, 163, 168–9 elected President, 165 proposed quadripartite meeting, 168–9 TRNC visit, 157 Warning to Greece, 1990, 168 Özgür, Özker, 138, 148, 154, 177, 191 Özgurgün, Hüseyin, 258 Özkan, Necat, 8 Özkok, Hilmi, 218, 227, 229, 232, 235, 241 Palmer, Sir Herbert, 9 Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Committee, 11 Pangalos, Theodoros, 192

Papadopoulos, Col. George assassination attempt, 101 and Clerides-Denktas¸ negotiations, 97 falls from power, 1973, 103 and Makarios, 106 policy overall, 106 Papadopoulos, Tassos Annan meeting, 2006, 260 Annan Plan criticism, 252–3 at Bürgenstock, 247 elected president, 2003, 231 in ‘face-to-face’ negotiations, 214 and High-level Agreement, 1977, 135 New York negotiations, 2004, 243 Nicosia negotiations, 2004, 216 on solution for Cyprus, 259 at The Hague, 2003, 232–3 Papagos, Alexandros, 15 Papandreou, Andreas assumes power, 145 at Davos, 160 influences Kyprianou, 152–3 electoral defeat, 166 Papandreou, George, 68, 70 Papapetrou, Michalis, 214 Paphos air base, 195 partition British interest in, 28–9 Lennox-Boyd statement on, 29 at London Conference, 1964, 57–8 pro-partition demonstrations, 33, 269 Turkish movement towards, 28–9 Peace and Democracy Movement, 239, 258 Peace Force see UNFICYP Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 134, 147, 152–3, 161, 163, 168–9 Phillips, Sir Horace, 137 Plaza, Galo, 71–2, 77 see UN Security Council Popper, David, 102 population census, 1996, 200 Prendergast, Sir Kieran, 200 Prodi, Romano, 241 Property Commission, N. Cyprus, 257 Radcliffe, Lord, 26–7 Reddaway, John, 34 referenda, 14, 252–3 Rehn, Oili, 235 Reppas, Dimitris, 205

Index 315 Republic of Cyprus abrogation of constitution, 1965, 72–8 application for EU membership, 167 attempted revision, 1963, 48–50 basic articles, 41–2 Constitution, 1960, 38, 42–4 constitutional problems, 1960–3, 42, 44–7 EU accession negotiations, 189, 199 EU accession treaty signed, 236 internationalizing the Cyprus dispute, 142–4 Memorandum of Understanding, 263 and municipalities, 42, 46–7 parliamentary election, 2006, 262 presidential election, 2008, 262–3 rights and benefits for Turkish Cypriots, 237 S-300 missiles, 195–6 Turkish Cypriot judges, 55 Turkish Cypriots leave government, 53–5 Republican People’s Party, 16, 30, 219, 227, 258 Republican Turkish Party changing policies, 177–8 in coalition with Democratic Party, 177–8, 191, 258 elections 1993, 177; 1998, 200–1; 2003, 239; 2005, 258; 2009, 266 and Turkish Cypriot independence, 147 Rifkind, Sir Michael, 194, 261 Riza, Memet Ali, 57 Rolandis, Nicol, 140, 154 Russia, 3, 195 Sampson, Nicos, 101, 109, 114 Sandys, Duncan, 53, 66, 166 Sarper, Selim, 28, 78 Set of Ideas and the EC, 174–5 blame for failure, 174–5 and Clerides, 175 constitutional issues, 172–3 Security Council’s approval, 169 sovereignty in, 172 support for Denktas¸, 173 territory and property, 170–1 and Vassiliou, 175

Sezer, Ahmet, 227, 240 Simitis, Kostas, 192, 201 Sisco, Joseph, 113–14 Soyer, Ferdi Sabıt, 258 Spaak, Paul Henri, 31, 36 Stevenson, Adlai, 60 Straw, Jack, 217, 261–2 Sunay, Cevdet, 85 Tafall, Osorio, 97, 99 Talat, Mehmet Ali at Bürgenstock, 247 Christofias talks, 2007–9, 263–5 elected party leader, 192 elected president, 258 on Glion negotiations, 197 and New York negotiations, 2004, 243 Nicosia talks, 2004–5 on Memorandum of Understanding, 232 Tasca, Henry, 104, 109 Ten-point Agreement, 141–2 Treaty of Alliance, 39 Treaty of Establishment, 39 Treaty of Guarantee, 38, 41, 62–3, 74, 110–11, 116, 166, 173 Tripartite Conference, 1955, 21–4, 34 Troutbeck negotiations, 196 Türk Mukavemet Tes¸kilatı [Turkish Resistance Organization], 32, 34, 67 Turkey and abrogation of 1960 Cyprus Constitution, 1965, 78 Action Plan for Cyprus, 261, 267 growing concern over Cyprus, 1950s, 15–16 Cyprus military contingent, 55, 67, 89 Cyprus policy in 1930s, 9 Cyprus policy, 1968–71 and Declaration of Independence, 150 EC membership application rejected, 174 and ECHR, 210 Turkish elections, 2002, 219–20; 2007, 259 on EOKA campaign, 20–1 EU-Turkey Customs Union, 189–90 flights over Cyprus, 1960, 55 Grand National Assembly and Cyprus, 126, 195–6, 230 Greek Cypriot uprising, 1931, 8

316 Index Turkey – continued Greek-Turkish relations, 18–19, 160, 202; démarche to Greece, 1967, 85 integration with TRNC, 185, 187 and Macmillan Plan, 35 military intervention, 1974, 114; ceasefire, 112; second operation, 127 military coup, 1980, 144 National Security Council, 59, 193, 231, 235, 241 presidency summit, 2003, 229 Turkey-UK Strategic Partnership, 262 and UNSC Resolution 186, 64 warning to UK on Cyprus, 1949, 15 Turkey-TRNC Association Council, 197 Turkey-TRNC Declaration of Solidarity, 195–6 Turkish Cypriot community anti-enosis demonstrations, 7, 14 casualties, 1963–4, 55 Crete, as a warning, 7 Cyprus Turkish Provisional Administration, 88–9 flight of refugees to North Cyprus, 1974, 133 KATAK (Turkish Minority Association), 10 nationalism, development of, 10, 13 Ottoman elite, 8–9 press campaigns, 1948–9, 14 Turkish Cypriot parliament adopts new constitution, 156 on Anastasiou judgment, 186 avoids vote on Annan III, 232 elections, 1976 and 1981, 147; 1990, 176; 1993, 177; 1998, 200–1; 2003, 239; 2005, 258; 2009, 266 Freedom and Reform Party formed, 258–9 and self-determination, 146 Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, 131, 134, 143 Turkish National Student Federation, 18 Turkish parliament see Turkey; Turkish Grand National Assembly Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Anastasiou judgment, 182–4 border opening, 236–7 confidence-building measures, proposed revival, 238

census, 1996, 200 constitution adopted, 1985, 156 economic crisis 2000–1, 205–6 established 1983, 149, 156 Peace Plan, 2003, 236 presidential elections, 1995 presidential elections, 1995, 191; 2000, 180; 2005, 258 growing unrest in, 209–10 Turkish-Greek negotiations see Greek-Turkish negotiations Türkmen, I˙lter, 138, 150 TÜSI˙AD [Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association], 212, 228 two-state solution, 137, 159, 272, 275–6 see also confederation Tzionis, Tassos, 259 Tzouniz, John, 123 United Kingdom abrogation of Constitution, 1965, 73–5 Acheson plans, 70 annexation of Cyprus, 4 Anastasiou case, 1994, 183 British rule: annual tribute, 5; colonial attitudes, 6–7; constitutional proposals, 12–13, 22–4, 25–7; divide and rule policy, 11, 237; Legislative Council, 4, 11; riots, 1931, 6 on Declaration of Independence, 149–50 Defence White Paper, 1937, 31 and Ecevit, Bülent, 1974, 110–13 evacuation of Turkish Cypriot refugees, 133 financial aid to Republic of Cyprus, 71 and Geneva conferences, 1974, 115–30 and Glion negotiations, 196–7 Greece, relations with, 15–16 and overthrow of Makarios, 109 Memorandum of Understanding, 263 policy on Cyprus 1960–3, 48–50, 239 recognition of Republic of Cyprus, 58 and Resolution 186, 1964, 65 Tripartite Conference, 1955, 21 Turkey/UK Strategic Partnership Agreement, 263

Index 317 and two-state solution, 1977, 137, 276–7 and UN, 1964–5, 18–19 and university proposal, 237 UNFICYP, 59–61, 63 UN General Assembly pro-Greek Cypriot resolutions, 77, 139, 143, 145–6 UN Secretary-General 1999–2000 negotiations, 201, 203–4, 205–8 see also Annan, Kofi, Ban Ki-moon, de Cuellar, Javier, U Thant, and Waldheim, Kurt draft [Annan] plan, 2000, 221 Oral Remarks, 2000, 208 proposals 1983–4, 146–7, 152 on self-determination, 164 Set of Ideas initiative, 169 UN Security Council Resolutions 1999 negotiations, Res. 1250, 213 on Gen. Assembly Res. 37/253, (1983), 146 blames Turkish Cypriots (1992), Res. 789, 175 confidence-building measures called for (1992), Res. 789, 179 on confidence-building measures (1994), Res. 939, 179 calls for cease-fire (1974), Res. 354, 115 on changes to 1960 Constitution (1965), Res. 207, 75–6 and Declaration of Independence, (1983), Res. 541, 149, 151 (1983), establishes Peace-keeping Force (1964) Res.186, 60–3 and Set of Ideas (1992), Res. 789, 175 on Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Res. 367, 116 after The Hague (2003), Res. 1475, 235 United States Cyprus policy 1963–4, 56, 65 Cyprus policy 1973–4, 107–8 on Declaration of Independence, 151 and Greek Junta, 102 Greek-Turkish crisis, 1967, 86 on Turkish military intervention, 1974, 113–15, 120–1, 125–6 Universal Postal Union Congress, 143 Ürgüplü, Suat Hayri, 77

USSR Cyprus policy, 1965, 76 supports enosis, 12, 13 Khruschev’s warnings to Turkey, 59, 68, 69 policy after Khruschev, 70–1, 76 support for Makarios, 48 and the Middle East, 33, 36 in Security Council, 1964, 61, 65 SAM missiles, 71 and Turkish military intervention, 1974, 118 U Thant, 60–2, 73, 83, 92 Vance, Cyrus, 88 Varosha, 142, 151–2, 179, 256 Vassiliou, George talks with Denktas¸, 161, 165–5, 174, 175 elected president, 160 election defeat, 1993, 175 and Set of Ideas, 175 Venizelos, Eleftherios, 5 Verheugen, Gunther, 236, 241, 248 Vezirog ˘ lu, Fuat, 148 Vienna talks, 132–4, 138 violence, 1963–4, 56 Waldheim, Kurt, 97–8, 120, 132, 138–9 Weston, Thomas, 241, 248 Wilson, Harold, 111 Winster, Lord, 12 Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 3, 11 World Bank, 262 Yakıs¸, Yasar, 221, 227, 229 Yavuzalp, Ercüment, 92–3 Yılmaz, Mesut, 163, 190, 192, 199, 216 Yiorkadjis, Polykarpos, 52, 101 Zeka, Mehmet, 91, 92 Zerihoun, Taye-Brook, 264 Ziyal, Ug ˘ ur, 227, 243 Zorlu, Tatin Rüs¸tü, 22, 32, 37, 39, 51, 221 Zürich Conference, 37, 38 Zerihoun, Taye-Brook, 264 Ziyal, Ug ˘ ur, 227, 243 Zorlu, Fatin Rüs¸tü, 22, 32, 37, 51, 221 Zürich Conference, 37, 38